Exactly. From the project proposal[1] for the gain-of-function research at WIV:

> DESCRIPTION (provided by applicant): This project will examine the risk of future coronavirus (CoV) emergence from wildlife using in-depth field investigations across the human-wildlife interface in China, molecular characterization of novel CoVs and host receptor binding domain genes, mathematical models of transmission and evolution, and in vitro and in vivo laboratory studies of host range. Zoonotic CoVs are a significant threat to global health, as demonstrated with the emergence of pandemic severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus (SARS-CoV) in China in 2002, and the recent and ongoing emergence of Middle East Respiratory Syndrome (MERS-CoV). Bats appear to be the natural reservoir of these viruses, and hundreds of novel bat-CoVs have been discovered in the last two decades. Bats, and other wildlife species, are hunted, traded, butchered and consumed across Asia, creating a large scale human-wildlife interface, and high risk of future emergence of novel CoVs. This project aims to understand what factors increase the risk of the next CoV emerging in people by studying CoV diversity in a critical zoonotic reservoir (bats), at sites of high risk for emergence (wildlife markets) in an emerging disease hotspot (China).

For a novel coronavirus to emerge in the part of the world containing the institute is not sufficient to implicate them. They are set up to do research in that part of the world, because such viruses are known emerge in such places. And yes, their research involved a lot of testing and categorization that requires some proximity to the wildlife and markets.

> The three specific aims of this project are to: 1. Assess CoV spillover potential at high risk human-wildlife interfaces in China. This will include quantifying he nature and frequency of contact people have with bats and other wildlife; serological and molecular screening of people working in wet markets and highly exposed to wildlife; screening wild-caught and market sampled bats from 30+ species for CoVs using molecular assays; and genomic characterization and isolation of novel CoVs.

And Daszak's role as part of the WHO investigation is similarly plausible. If you (unwisely, but just as a thought experiment) assume for a moment that it is impossible for the source to be a lab leak, he would be a perfect choice -- he is connected to some of the most relevant and nearby research!

I am supportive of further/proper investigation into the lab leak hypothesis, and do think some degree of public and political pressure is required.

But the tenor of the "lab leak" conversation I have with friends and that I see online (including here) is more like that of Russiagate (a mostly unsubstantiated, years long, liberal media conspiracy theory). Alternatively, it's like the idea that Iraq had WMD (some plausible concern, but info published from unnamed intelligence sources, using tiny amounts of raw and unverified intelligence data, taken from the least trustworthy informants imaginable, all to satisfy a pre-existing conservative grudge). I have seen people say the lab leak story reminds them of the doubts about WMD in Iraq, which is ironic, because again, I see it as more like the invention of WMD in Iraq.

[1] https://reporter.nih.gov/search/xQW6UJmWfUuOV01ntGvLwQ/proje...