I'm not the original author of the article, but I try my best: the article argues that public policy has affected wages, in many case negatively for lower paid workers.

For example, free trade has undoubtedly lowered the cost of commodities for Americans, but at the same time has also cost manufacturing jobs. From a monetary perspective, there is no contention that America as a whole is richer because of free trade. But where has that wealth gone? Not much to the now-jobless manufacturing workers.

The economics profession deserves some blame. When evaluating a policy, economists often ask whether there society would reap a net benefit in "utility." But chiefly, economists often ignore questions about distribution -- which groups should benefit from policy? One reason might be because answers to distribution questions could be seen as "political" -- if you think labor should receive compensation for lost wages due to free trade, then people will question whether "leftist" politics biased your thinking.

Indeed, economics has a special name for changes that benefit society on net at the expense of another group of people -- a "Kaldor-Hicks improvement." A change is a Kaldor-Hicks improvement if the people made better off could, in theory, fully compensate those made worse off and still come out ahead. In practice, that compensation usually never happens. Uwe Reinhardt, who was an economics professor at Princeton, writes an absurd satirization of policies justified by the Kaldor-Hicks criterion:

> To highlight the tenuous ethical foundation of Kaldor's criterion, one might call it the unrequited-punch-in-the-nose criterion of social welfare. Suppose, for example, that I feel very aggressive today and therefore would like to punch you in the nose. An honest referee (an economist) asks me what 1 would be willing to pay for that privilege. Suppose the maximum I'd be willing to pay were $1,000. Next, the honest referee asks you how much you would have to be paid to receive that punch in the nose without hitting me back. Because you are strapped for cash, you might accept the punch for $600. The referee (our economist) is ecstatic, for (s)he perceives here the opportunity to enhance social welfare. Consequently, the deal is struck, you kindly present your precious nose, I punch, you bleed and hold out your hand in anticipation of my payment of $1,000. Alas, I walk away happily, along with my $1,000, which I refuse to surrender. Not to worry. The honest referee (our economist) will soothe you with the expert assurance that, according to Nicholas Kaldor, and in principle, we just have witnessed a major enhancement in social welfare, to the tune of $400, even though the expected $1,000 bribe is not actually paid. It is to be hoped that you have enough respect for the referee to accept this verdict gracefully, and you probably will, if you accept the benefit-cost analyses typically sold by economists to policy makers.

> Although this illustration may seem beastly and absurd, it can easily be adapted, with only minor modifications, to the context of environmental pollution, to health care or to many other situations in which public policy bestows benefits upon one group of people at the expense of others. One is struck by how readily and how uncritically many economists apply the Kaldorian criterion to their analyses of such policies -- particularly younger economists, many of whom no longer seem to explore very carefully the philosophical and ethical underpinnings of their profession and instead concentrate on mere analytic technique. [1]

(The whole paper is worth reading.)

So this is what the author might be criticising -- that policies have been evaluated mostly with consideration to whether society as a "whole" would benefit, with not much thought about who exactly benefits. Add to that the marginal utility of money -- that poorer people see a greater increase in happiness per dollar than the richer people -- and you could argue that those policies have caused a group of people, namely menial laborers, to experience significantly increased hardship than those nearer to the top of the economic ladder. The author's goal, then is to justify the "compensation" portion of a Kaldor-Hicks improvement -- according to them, wealth, wages, and healthcare should be redistributed to these workers who were made worse off -- at the benefit of everyone else.

[1] https://www.jstor.org/stable/40239382?seq=1