> I wish the downvoters would explain what's wrong with the parent comment,

One obvious guess is contradicting Latacora. 'tptacek is well known here, his name alone give significant weight to anything he writes.

In any case, they have valid points. PGP was written at a time we didn't understand cryptography as well as we do now. We can do better. Have done better, if half of what I've heard about Age is true.

Absurd complexity: We can definitely do simpler than PGP, at no loss of functionality.

Swiss Army Knife design: I think I disagree with Latacora there. Doing many things doesn't mean you have to do them poorly. There's no material difference between having 3 programs, and having one programs with 3 options, at least on the command line. If PGP does anything poorly, it's for other reasons.

Mired In Backwards Compatibility: well that depends. It makes sense that PGP can decrypt old obsolete ciphers & formats. Ability to encrypt to those same old stuff wouldn't. For instance, PGP longer be able to generate RSA keys at all. Then, one year later, once all RSA keys have expired, new PGP versions should no longer be able to encrypt to RSA keys at all. (In an ideal world. More realistically, we should wait a couple more years.) Only the ability to decrypt old messages should be kept until the end of times.

Obnoxious UX: I don't know enough to have an opinion.

Long term secrets: Sure they're bad, but I don't think we can avoid them. People need your public key to send you anything, so it can't be too short lived. My guess here is that Latacora is attacking the whole file encryption + web of trust thing, not PGP in particular.

Broken Authentication: If attackers can trick PGP decoders into decrypting forged messages, that's fairly critical, and should be fixed even if it breaks backwards compatibility (we could have an optional `-legacy` flag or something to compensate). Now if you go sign and encrypt… well there are two possibilities: if you sign then encrypt, you run into the cryptographic doom principle: the decoder will decrypt then verify, which creates the temptation to process unauthenticated data. Many vulnerabilities have been caused by such errors. If you encrypt then sign, you reveal to the entire world that you signed this particular ciphertext. Not the kind of data most people would like to leak. In my opinion what we really want is authenticated key exchange followed by AEAD. With the Noise X pattern, you'd even hide your identity from snoopers.

Incoherent Identity: Okay, they're clearly attacking the very notion of web of trust, not PGP specifically. They say it doesn't work, but I'd like to know why. First, I'm not sure I want to take their word for it, and second, the causes might be fixable.

Leaks Metadata: that one is clearly avoidable. Noise X for instance uses an ephemeral key to encrypt the transmitted public keys, and the recipient's key is implicit. Can't know who the message is for (nor from) without the recipient's private key.

No Forward Secrecy: Different use case indeed. Again, Latacora is attacking the very notion of file encryption, not PGP specifically.

Clumsy Keys: I'm with Latacora on this one. The 50 lines SSH keys are clearly RSA based, and as such obsolete. Modern keys use elliptic curves, and those take one line, which is more easily copy & pasted in various contexts. Arguably a detail, though.

Negotiation: It's more than just backwards compatibility. Backwards compatibility can be achieved with a simple version number. If instead we have a range of algorithms to chose from, things get more complicated. Now, you can't avoid the need for different kinds of encryption: you can send against a public key, or you can encrypt with a password. Possibly both. Beyond that however it's simpler to have a version number that hints at a single public key encryption and a single password based encryption.

Janky Code: Can't judge for myself. I can guess however that much of it is caused by the (ever evolving) PGP specifications themselves. Probably more a consequence of all the other issues than a separate problem. Still, I think we can do much better. I mean, I've written an entire crypto library, and people give me hell for a single vulnerability in over 3 years. 27 CVE in comparison would be worth burning in Crypto Hell for a long time.