Couldn’t agree more. This is a rambling mess of an article which strings together past commentary on Boeing’s history and the 737 Max without making a coherent point.

Furthermore, the author also gets a number of things wrong about his research, and also presents statements as pure fact which are purely false.

Here are three examples I pulled out—in order from minor to argument-disqualifying.

1. The author cites innovation on the 787 as having electrically operated systems in place of hydraulics. He meant to say pneumatics. The 787 does not have an engine air-bleed system, using solid state electric systems to power the aforementioned components instead of the system of valves and ducts which manage the flow of high pressure air coming off the engine, as is the norm on other aircraft.

2. The author sites engines being outsourced historically because of a natural difference in engineering expertise between engine and airframe. While engine and airframe engineering are different domains, the real reason airframe manufacturers don’t make engines and vise-versa is entirely due to the Air Mail Act of 1934. I suggest the OP research the United Aircraft and Transport Corporation.

3. The OP’s central argument of cost control, and particularly outsourcing, as being a central driver to engineering problems with the MAX is hindered when he cites example and supporting arguments primarily about the 787 program.

Yes, cost control is an overarching issue and one that is being investigated vigorously, and 787’s level of airframe outsourcing has been a key problem to that particular program’s profitability.

However, the author fails to understand that the outsourcing he talks about is made at the program level. Citing the 787 as being representative of Boeing as a whole is spurious. The author also fails to understand how outsourcing effects engineering both at Boeing and down the supply chain.

In truth, the level of outsourcing on the MAX is largely no different than on the NG. (The previous model 737 that has been flying safely for decades, which went into service 2 years before the MD-Boeing merger.) It has been common since the advent of the jet age for there to be separate suppliers for engines and components—i.e landing gear or avionics. This does not mean innovation and engineering expertise is past over the fence—-airplanes are in fact built on strong partnerships between firms, and that includes partnerships between engineers. This has always been how the industry works.

Now, tying this back to my 3rd example: The 787 supply chain problems the OP sites are in regards to final assembly of fuselage and wing structures — this is a specific area in which one could argue the 787 went overboard in outsourcing. This, of course, has nothing to do with MCAS—a piece of flight control software—nor the AOA vanes that feed it. Flight control systems, sensors, and vanes are typically outsourced, as they are on the 777, 767, 777, and 747 (all of which engineered and built before the merger.)

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If we really want to add value to the conversation about Boeing’s culture, the 737 MAX, and engineering aircraft—then let’s please build some knowledge first about how aircraft systems are actually engineered.

Disclaiming that nothing can be definitively said about the MCAS crashes until all the investigations are complete and known, I strongly believe the issue is not a software failure but a systems failure, and particularly, a failure in the management of the safety classification and assessment process.

There is also the matter that the 737 is a very old program. Beyond the argument that it was a mistake to try to modernize a 1967 design and architecture a 3rd time, there is also the problem that the 737MAX doesn’t necessarily adhere to current engineering standards for safety assessment—especially at the systems level. This is because the 737MAX was engineered under the authority of the original 737 certification.

For aerospace engineers working in industry, it would be useful to map what we know about MCAS and the 737MAX against the requirements outlined in DO-178C and, especially, ARP-4754. Unfortunately, the 737MAX doesn’t subscribe fully to ARP-4754 methodology, since it’s a continuation of the program certified in 1967 and not a new type.