More Quillette nonsense.

Look, the First Amendment isn't only about "free speech". It also includes the right to assembly. Quoting https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Freedom_of_assembly , "Freedom of assembly is often used in the context of the right to protest, while freedom of association is used in the context of labor rights and in the Constitution of the United States is interpreted to mean both the freedom to assemble and the freedom to join an association."

Thus, when Richwine at Quillette writes:

> "I should not have to worry that White will lobby my employer to fire me"

That's an objection to the First Amendment right to free speech. It is direct example of White's complaint that "the “spirit of free speech” people want a world where people can be consequence-free assholes: where there’s a set of rules of civility and high-minded discourse that apply only to the responses to racist billboards, not to the racist billboards themselves. This is a legally and philosophically incoherent view and encourages, I think, people to view free speech arguments with suspicion and contempt."

And if we replace Richwine's use of "mob" in the following ("mob" carries with it the sense of being a "bent on riotous or destructive action", quoting Wiktionary) with the more generic "group of people":

> "or encourage a mob to protest outside my house"

then it's an objection to the First Amendment right to assembly peacefully. (There are already manner restrictions on free speech which prohibit 'riotous or destructive action'.)

When Richwine argues:

> Of course, the First Amendment restrains only the government, but if we take the wisdom of it seriously we should value its principles more broadly.

we must therefore also value its full set of principles, and not elevate free speech protections above all others.

> As chilling effects go, “I would speak out, but I don’t want to risk going to jail” is not all that different from “I would speak out, but I don’t want to risk losing my friends and my livelihood.”

John Stuart Mills addressed this quite directly, in "On Liberty", saying:

"""We have a right, also, in various ways, to act upon our unfavourable opinion of any one, not to the oppression of his individuality, but in the exercise of ours. We are not bound, for example, to seek his society; we have a right to avoid it (though not to parade the avoidance), for we have a right to choose the society most acceptable to us. We have a right, and it may be our duty, to caution others against him, if we think his example or conversation likely to have a pernicious effect on those with whom he associates. We may give others a preference over him in optional good offices, except those which tend to his improvement. In these various modes a person may suffer very severe penalties at the hands of others, for faults which directly concern only himself; but he suffers these penalties only in so far as they are the natural, and, as it were, the spontaneous consequences of the faults themselves, not because they are purposely inflicted on him for the sake of punishment."""

The "not bound .. to seek his society" means "he may lose friends." The loss of "livelihood" can indeed be one of the "very severe penalties at the hands of others" which Mills argues is an exercise of our own individuality.