What?

"His merit in this respect, therefore, is very great; yet justice requires that we also remember here, firstly that his exposition and argument are often not in keeping with the tendency and spirit ofhis ethics, as we shall see in a moment, and secondly that, even so,he is not the first to have purged virtue of all principles of happiness.For Plato, especially in the Republic, of which the main tendencyis precisely this, expressly teaches that virtue is to be chosen for itsown sake alone, even if unhappiness and ignominy should be in-evitably associated with it. But still more does Christianity preach awholly unselfish virtue, that is also practised not for the sake of thereward in a life after death, but quite gratuitously out of love forGod, inasmuch as works do not justify, but only faith which virtueaccompanies, as its mere symptom so to speak, and which thereforeappears quite gratuitously and of its own accord. See Luther's DeLibertate Christiana. I will not take at all into account the Indians,in whose sacred books the hope of a reward for our works iseverywhere described as the path of darkness which can never leadto the blissful state. However, we do not find Kant's doctrine ofvirtue so pure; or rather the presentation falls far short of the spirit,and has in fact lapsed into inconsistency. In his highest good, whichhe subsequently discussed, we find virtue wedded to happiness. Yetthe ought, originally so unconditioned, does postulate afterwards acondition for itself, really in order to be rid of the inner contradic-tion, burdened with which it cannot live. Now supreme happinessin the highest good should not really be the motive for virtue; yetit is there like a secret article, the presence of which makes all therest a mere sham contract. It is not really the reward of virtue,but yet is a voluntary gift for which virtue, after work has beendone, stealthily holds its hand open. We can convince ourselves ofthis from the Critique of Practical Reason (pp. 223-266 of thefourth, or pp. 264-295 of the Rosenkranz edition). The whole ofKant's moral theology also has the same tendency, and on this veryaccount morality really destroys itself through moral theology. ForI repeat that all virtue in any way practised for the sake of a re-ward is based on a prudent, methodical, far-seeing egoism.Now the purport of the absolute ought, the fundamental law of practical reason, is the famous: "So act that the maxim of your willmight always be valid at the same time as the principle of a uni-versal legislation." This principle gives to the person who demandsa regulation for his own will, the task of seeking a regulation forthe will of all. The question then arises how such a regulation is tobe found. Obviously, to discover the rule of my conduct, I oughtnot to have regard to myself alone, but to the sum-total of all indi-viduals. Then instead of my own well-being, the well-being of allwithout distinction becomes my object and aim. This aim, however,still always remains well-being. I then find that all can be equallywell off only if each makes the egoism of others the limit of his own.It naturally follows from this that I ought not to injure anyone, sothat, since this principle is assumed to be universal, / also may notbe injured. This, however, is the only ground on account of whichI, not yet possessing a moral principle but only looking for one,can desire this to be a universal law. But obviously in this way thedesire for well-being, in other words egoism, remains the source ofthis ethical principle. As the basis of political science it would beexcellent; as the basis of ethics it is worthless. For the man who at-tempts to establish a regulation for the will of all, which is proposedin that moral principle, is himself in turn necessarily in need of aregulation, otherwise everything would be a matter of indifferenceto him. This regulation, however, can only be his own egoism, asthe conduct of others influences this alone. Therefore only by meansof this, and with respect to it, can that man have a will concerningthe conduct of others, and is such conduct not a matter of indiffer-ence to him. Kant himself very naïvely intimates this"

Pg 524-525, The World as Will and Representation, http://www.gutenberg.org/files/38427/38427-pdf.pdf

Kant was eternally destroyed by Schopenhauer and Philip Mainlander.