> 1) Stability. Other than for development, unstable kernels are a no go. Can possible negative effects be mitigated?

If by "stability" you mean "crash-proof-ness," I think there's no particular inherent reason Rust code is going to be more crash-prone than C, especially since basically the whole purpose of the language is increased stability. One notable shortcoming is that Rust doesn't currently have a fallible allocations API nor widespread support in common libraries for using it, so under memory pressure, if kmalloc fails, your only choice is to panic (Rust panic, i.e., unwind, maybe BUG() and kill the current thread). See https://github.com/fishinabarrel/linux-kernel-module-rust/is... for some discussion.

If by "stability" you mean interface stability, the Rust project has made great progress in the last year or two at stabilizing everything needed to write code that doesn't use the full standard library / link to a libc that can open files etc. See e.g. https://github.com/fishinabarrel/linux-kernel-module-rust/is... .

> 2) Security is often what Rust is expected to bring on the table. So is Rust actually more secure in the environment kernel requires? This could be tested by "clean-room" reimplementing something that is historically known to have many security issues.

Agree that in practice we're going to need to test this. But all of Rust's safety features (type system that handles null pointers, borrow checker, bounds-checked arrays, safe iterators so you don't need to bounds-check in the first place, etc.) work fine in kernelspace.

> 3) Are there showstoppers for kernel builds? Interoperability, build performance, architectures unsupported by Rust, etc. If so, could these be mitigated?

Build performance is a bit slow, but it's not as bad as userspace Rust because you inherently can't use that many crates and you generally don't want to be linking third-party code anyway - everything should be in the kernel tree.

For architecture support see https://github.com/fishinabarrel/linux-kernel-module-rust/is... . Notably, all the architectures that have kernels by the major distros (I checked RHEL, Fedora, Debian, Ubuntu, SUSE, Android, Oracle, and Arch) should work.

One challenge for interoperability is that most kernels in the real world are built with GCC, and rustc itself emits code using LLVM. The most common way of binding C code is using rust-bindgen, which uses libclang to parse C headers; even if you're not using bindgen, I believe you're still using LLVM's idea of C layout with #[repr(C)] structs and extern "C" functions. It's possible that kernels are built with particular GCC -m options that change the ABI (e.g., regparm) or GCC plugins (e.g., randstruct); if those aren't supported in compatible ways by LLVM / clang, then it's hard to write modules that load into an existing kernel. But, of course, if the question is to build new kernels with components in Rust, one workable restriction is to say that the C parts need to be built with Clang. There is good support for building the Linux kernel with Clang, and there are production Android models with Clang-built kernels.

> 4) How does it affect runtime performance? Average case. Bloat issues? Any pathologic cases? Any benefits?

There's a team that did some investigation on a prototype, and found that runtime performance was comparable, but binary size wasn't too great: https://mssun.me/assets/ares19securing.pdf (The prototype driver uses lots of unsafe code, but it's a good proof of concept for what ought to be achievable.)

I think we can claw back binary size with some focused work.

> 5) What other unexpected it brings on the plate? Both benefits and disadvantages. For example, could Rust types also be used to catch errors other than memory related, like invalid states?

One thing I'm very curious about is whether you can use a battle-tested third-party ASN.1 implementation (for example) instead of writing your own ASN.1 implementation in the kernel. (In fact the kernel has multiple ASN.1 implementations!)

Another useful thing is to use Rust's linear(ish) type system to prevent TOCTTOU bugs when checking userspace pointers, by making it very explicit when you're dereferencing the same address more than once.

A little closer to memory safety: Rust's Send and Sync traits make it easy to ensure you're not unsafely using data across threads (i.e., you're forced to pay attention to shared data and are unlikely to get into a big-kernel-lock situation), and you can use the typesystem to get a better and safer interface to things like RCU pointers. RCU requires that you be in a read-side critical section to read pointers; there's no concept of locking a specific pointer, being in one lets you read any RCU-protected pointer (as long as it's of the same RCU flavor, and confusing RCU flavors did lead to a use-after-free vulnerability recently!). In Rust it's pretty easy to have a Guard object on the stack that uses RAII to enter/exit the critical section, and ensure that you pass a reference to your Guard to any dereference of an RCU pointer type.