> [part 1, of course!]

It is what it is I guess.

> I suspect the problem is more the nailing down of definitions than the logical structure of the argument

Possibly, but where we are missing each other on definitions would likely be more noticeable in a syllogism.

> The point of testability is to weed out those claims that are indistinguishable from stuff that someone just made up.

Is it possible that a testable claim could imply another claim that is not testable? In other words, could you have an implicit reason for believing that something is true rather than an explicit one?

> I don't know, possibly not.

So, if it is possible that some aspects of reality are not testable, then it is possible that a claim about such an aspect of reality is not compatible with science?

===

> You are believing something, it seems, because it hasn't been disproven to you.

That is not the case. I think there is great evidence. If it is false, then it is likely that my willingness to accept things is too generous, but I'll make any effort I can to get past that if that is indeed the position I find myself in.

> So, no matter whether they are true or false, you won't ever find a way to disprove them.

So, might you be attempting to say that non-testable claims are incompatible with doing science, rather than non-testable claims being incompatible with science itself?

> If you are interested...

I am.

===

> No, by testing with an established scientific methodology. You simply use methods that you do already know are reliable to test other methods whether they are reliable.

So, is there a chain of scientific methods that establish further scientific methods with no beginning, or is there some first self-evident method, that can't be tested for reliability without being circular?

===

> That's like asking "can claims about John be about Jack?"

So are you saying "you can't make a claim about John be about Jack, because John is not Jack", and to parallel "you can't make a claim about math be about reality because math is not reality"? What if John was Jack's middle finger, how could a claim about John not be about Jack?

>>>> So, it is not obvious to you that '1 < 2' does or does not have a referent, because the Peano axioms that '1 < 2' is derived from may or may not be a purely artificial construct of humans (or possibly more generalized evaluators)?

>>> I guess so? ...

>> My point is... If you don't know that '1 < 2' has no referent, then you don't know that mathematical claims are not about reality. I don't need to establish "'1 < 2' has a referent" to establish that you don't know whether mathematical claims are about reality.

> Let me clarify: ... '1 < 2' has no referent absent the axioms defined by mathematicians

Given the Peano axioms, and their evaluations and derivations by humans, does '1 < 2' have a referent?

===

> But I have never made that claim, so what is the point of bringing it up?

You objected to my claim that "everything has an explanation" thinking I had not substantiated it. I get that you're not making the opposing claim, but in order to substantiate my claim I showed that the opposing claim can't be true. Even if your not making the opposing claim, your objection has no case because the opposing claim can't be true. If "not everything has an explanation" can't be true then "everything has an explanation" must be true. So you can choose to reject my claim, but that is a choice to reject a substantiated claim. If you don't think I have substantiated it, let me know why.

> I don't have a criterion? I don't think there is any distinction to be made, and if you think that there is, it's up to you to demonstrate some way to make the distinction.

You don't have a definition for physical? You don't think there is a distinction, or do you lack reason to think there is a distinction? For the criterion that I did give what was deficient? (you said that I didn't but I did: to be physical is to be able to have measurable effects or to be measurably affected)

===

> For any action X, "being moral" is semantically equivalent to "being moral to do", and "immoral" is the negation of "moral". Therefore, your statement says that there exists an action that is moral and not moral at the same time.

My statements never fluctuate the moral value of X.

Another rephrase: It is immoral to do (A: X while thinking X is immoral) even if (B: X is moral). You'll be better off doing (C: any X while thinking X is moral) even if (D: X is immoral).

Regarding A and B: A is immoral, even though B says X of A might be moral. It is not doing X that is immoral, it is doing A.

Regarding C & D: The entirety of C is moral, even though D says X of C might be immoral. It is not X that is moral, it is C.

> The primary problem is not what you are saying, the primary problem is the method you use to justify it.

What is my method, and what is problematic with it?

> That you have in no way demonstrated that your version of morality does produce any of the results promised, it's just an empty assertion.

If, for my demonstration, I were to refer to the lives of the saints, they being better at achieving their goals of happiness than anyone else whom does not employ their methods by far, how might you object then?