[part 2]

> I have no qualms with ending our discussion if your taking the middle ground of "I don't know"

Well, it's obviously up to you what you want to discuss, but I would very much object to the idea that "I don't know" is some kind of middle ground.

When someone makes some outlandish claim and you ask "How is that true?", to which they they respond "Why are you saying that I am wrong?", and you say "I am not saying you are wrong, I don't know whether you are wrong, but your claim is unsubstantiated, and since it is your claim, it is up to you to substantiate it." ... would you say that you have taken some sort of middle ground on the outlandish claim?

> My goal has been to bring things to a middle ground, but if you haven't been or are no longer making claims against the non-physical, then we are at where I wanted to be.

I don't think I have ever made claims against the non-physical, at least not intentionally. I have only objected to your unsubstantiated claims that the non-physical exists because they are unsubstantiated.

Though I do wonder: If you say that your goal was to bring things to a middle ground, and you consider "I don't know" to be some sort of middle ground ... do you agree then that we don't know of the existence of anything non-physical?

> You can challenge claims of the non-physical, to be sure, but at this juncture I prefer to shoot down claims that assert the non-physical doesn't exist, of which you no longer appear to me to be claiming.

Well, sure, but be careful to not confuse rejections of unsubstantiated claims with counter-claims.

> What makes "'1 < 2' has a referent" an unjustified assumption in the context of my argument? Yes I have not established it, but what would make me unjustified in assuming it?

Hu? What would make you unjustified in assuming it? The fact that you are assuming it? The definition of "assumption" is "to be accepted as true without justification"? So, if you were giving a justification, it wouldn't be an assumption anymore?! I really don't understand what you are asking me here ...

> What did you mean by "instances of movies"?

Like, a particular DVD, or blue-ray, or MPEG file, or series of pictures on a screen, or whatever ... I guess you could say "copies" instead of "instances". And likewise for axioms, them being remembered in a brain, written on a blackboard, printed in a book ...

> No. The potential for the universe being in a different state is not a mechanism by which the universe changes state.

How did you determine that?

Like, I understand you are making this claim, but I don't see the fundamental difference between "the potential for the universe being in a different state" and "the potential for the electric field being in a different state", or however else you could describe the electron, that would justify any fundamental distinction.

So, what are the criteria by which you decided that the potential for the universe being in a different state is not a mechanism by which the universe changes state, that would, when applied to the electron, get you to the conclusion that the electron is a mechanism by which the electric field changes state, which thus would justify the distinction? And the same for any other reasons you give.

So far, it seems more like you have the pre-conceived notion that one of those is physical and the other is not, and then you give reasons that seem consistent with either of those positions somehow. But what I am interested in is: Suppose we don't know yet which of those is physical or non-physical, how do we go about finding out?

> First "care" and "use" are two very different questions. Again, define should ;).

Yeah, and "care" and "listen to" are two different questions as well. If you care about what someone is saying, "listening to" is how you express that. If you care about someone's version of morality, "using it" is how you express that. That is what caring about something means.

> Why should you use the version of morality of which I am speaking? Because it is the true one (I recognize that I have not established this).

And then you certainly also recognized that you haven't given reasons to be convinced, right? Because that is what I explained I meant when you asked for a definition for "should". I am sorry, but this starts to feel like you are willfully missing the point.

> Absolutely not.

OK, so: Are you saying that if you believe that the global maximum of eating pleasure is achieved through eating according to Jane's will for your entire life, then if you eat according to Jane's will for your entire life, you will indeed achieve the global maximum of eating pleasure?