> Nothing does, because that is exactly what it is?

So, we can only agree or disagree, and there is no reason to believe your definition of 'definition'?

> Just because definitions are arbitrary, doesn't mean that you can't get together with other people and agree on a common definition, to make it useful for communication, nor that you can't empirically determine whether such an agreement exists.

How might we empirically determine whether such agreements exist without having agreement on what the term 'agree' means?

> Well, yeah?

How do you determine that there are actual unresolved references, and that it is not just a deficiency in your definitions?

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> Either consistent with reality or derived from axioms.

Why is that your definition of "true"?

Also what are your definitions of "consistent" and "derived"?

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> ... (In other words: No, you can't?)

Agreed.

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> So, in that sense, every 'formal truth' is a 'real truth' about evaluators in the world...

You may need to go into more depth for me because this seems to walk back on previous statements you've made. Above you defined "true" as "Either consistent with reality or derived from axioms". It seems that you agree with calling 'consistent with reality' a 'real truth' and 'derived from axioms' a 'formal truth'. Now you've stated that "... every 'formal truth' is a 'real truth' ...". Wouldn't that in some way negate the most of the emphasis provided by the term 'formal truth'?

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> How about 'a more abstract word'?

A number is 'a more abstract word'??

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> And in the same way, mathematicians can be observed doing math. But that doesn't mean that the math that they are doing is in any way a model of reality.

Does that mean that the math isn't a model of reality though?

> The existence of a thought and the content of that thought are two distinct things.

Does that establish that the content of a thought doesn't really exist though?

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> But it is not a(n existing) movie anymore when you destroy all representations of it.

Are you making a distinction between a representation and the thing being represented? It seems that your definition of 'representation' also includes the thing being represented, but that is a definition you deny later on when you state "For one, there is reason to think that things that are not (just) representations do exist, like, say, a rock (unless you count everything as a representation of itself, then I guess that's true by definition, but there is still a distinction between self-representation and "other-representation")".

>>>> Are definitions and rules of evaluation physical?

>>> For definitions: No, the same way that movies aren't physical.

>> This seems to fly in the face of you stating "[...]"

> In which way?

"... the same way that movies aren't physical." and "... all movies we have ever encountered so far had a physical representation.", and now also "But it is not a(n existing) movie anymore when you destroy all representations of it."

To paraphrase my understanding of your position:

"All movies encountered have had physical representation." K

"Definitions are not physical in the same way that movies aren't physical." Contradicts the previous line a bit...

"When all representations of a movie are destroyed, that movie no longer exists." Wait, if there are only physical representations of movies, then, even if I'm confusing abstraction and representation, how can movies be non-physical in any way?

Again this could be another case of confusing abstraction and the underlying representation, and if that is the case, what is 'abstraction', what does it mean for something to be an abstraction, and do particular abstractions have physical representation?

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> And also, I am not saying that all representations are physical, just that no non-physical representation has ever been demonstrated, and thus there is no reason to believe that that's a thing (yet).

This back-and-forth between us started off of me having stated "Math is not testable with the scientific method, but it is obviously compatible with science" and you had replied "If you mean that axioms are not testable, that's simply a category error because axioms are not claims about reality."

Now, if you're not saying "that all representations are physical", and are saying "that no non-physical representation has ever been demonstrated", wouldn't that, at the very least, leave the question open to axioms being claims about reality?

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>> I analogized "1 < 2" being true or false regardless of its symbolic or conceptual representation

> That simply seems to be a category error, which is the reason why I can't see a referent. '1 < 2' is an expression that can be evaluated using some formal system. Like, there are rules for transforming '1 < 2' into 'true'. You seem to be assuming that there is something left that '1 < 2' could refer to after you have removed the evaluation rules, but I don't see what that could be.

Why are you equating the "symbolic or conceptual representation" of '1 < 2' to the "evaluation rules" of '1 < 2'?

> '1 < 2' having a physical presence was not a requirement on my part. Not that I have any clue what a non-physical presence would look like, but that isn't my problem, because you are the one making the claim that there is such a thing, so it is up to you to demonstrate that.

I have no qualms with ending our discussion if your taking the middle ground of "I don't know". I could go on, but I really don't care to. You initially challenged my assertion regarding math and science, my claims namely being on the grounds of math not being physical, by claiming that I was making a category error (at the time from my vantage point, you seemed to be saying only the physical exists). My goal has been to bring things to a middle ground, but if you haven't been or are no longer making claims against the non-physical, then we are at where I wanted to be. You can challenge claims of the non-physical, to be sure, but at this juncture I prefer to shoot down claims that assert the non-physical doesn't exist, of which you no longer appear to me to be claiming.

>> If you are "simply pointing out that there is no truth value if there is no referent" and not saying that "'1 < 2' has no referent", then you haven't challenged my analogy because you've only asserted "if".

> That is actually a perfectly valid challenge, namely pointing out an unjustified assumption? Your argument builds on there being a truth value, and I have pointed out that you have not established that there is a truth value (because that is dependent on '1 < 2' having a referent, which you have not demonstrated), hence your argument fails, and it is now up to you to show that there is in fact a referent (and thus a truth value) if you want to continue using that argument, or to use a different argument, or to take back your claim.

Your paragraph here is a valid challenge. Your pointing out of an unjustified assumption was not explicit previously.

What makes "'1 < 2' has a referent" an unjustified assumption in the context of my argument? Yes I have not established it, but what would make me unjustified in assuming it?

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>>>>> An expression of the form "movies are not material" only says something about which aspects are relevant to the abstraction, not about the underlying reality of instances of movies.

>>>> Would the equivalent statement for axioms therefore say "An expression of the form "axioms are not material" only says something about which aspects are relevant to the abstraction, not about the underlying reality of instances of axioms"?

>>> Sure.

>> What, then, constitutes an instance of an axiom that is analogous to an instance of a movie?

> I think I don't understand what you are asking.

What did you mean by "instances of movies"?

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>> The potential for the universe being in a different state does not effect anything.

> Doesn't it effect, you know, the universe changing its state?

No. The potential for the universe being in a different state is not a mechanism by which the universe changes state.

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> ... why I should care about morality under the definition you gave (i.e., why I should use that version of morality for anything).

First "care" and "use" are two very different questions. Again, define should ;).

Why should you use the version of morality of which I am speaking? Because it is the true one (I recognize that I have not established this).

> So, are you saying that if you believe that shooting yourself in the head will make you attain maximum wealth, and you then shoot yourself in the head, you will indeed attain maximum wealth?

Absolutely not.