> Let me see if I can show you what I am getting at (looking for yes/no answers but I'm not going to stop you from digging deeper, lol): Are all claims about reality scientifically testable?

I am not quite sure I understand what you are getting at. I mean, it's obviously possible for someone to make the claim "I own a real undetectable pet dragon" ... so, given that such claims can be made, not all claims about reality are scientifically testable?! The only possible objection to that that I can see would be that if you define "reality" to require testability, then "real undetectable" is a category error--but then, that's just a matter of definition, and either definition seems to be in common use, and usefully so, in different contexts, so there is no general answer--you only have to be careful to not construct false equivocations due to this ambiguity.

> Can't something be true regardless of whether or not it's being represented?

That's a question with a lot of potential for false equivocations. The most problematic seems to be "be", as that tends to be quite ambiguous, and while that is seldom a problem in day-to-day language use, it causes lots of confusion on such questions. For example, "be" in statements like "is A and B true?" usually means "does A and B evaluate to true?" If that is what you mean: How would you evaluate a proposition without having it represented anywhere? If that is not what you mean: Well, what do you mean then?

Or are we maybe talking about something like a thought experiment of the sort "suppose you could time travel 3 billion years into the past, what would you evaluate 'true and false' to then?"? While that's a perfectly fine thought experiment that can be insightful, you must not lose sight of the pretty wild assumption of time travel and the fact that it implies a human being present in that hypothetical scenario when you then try to generalize that insight: While a lot of generalizations can be made just fine while ignoring that you made those rather unrealistic assumptions, it is easy to be carried away into territory where suddenly the result is just an artefact of those assumptions.

> Wouldn't that be because you can't think of those things without a representation, not because they are dependent upon a representation?

Yeah, sure! But the same applies for cake, then, doesn't it? After all, I am not making the claim that "immaterial axioms" cannot mean anything, nor that "immaterial cake" cannot mean anything. The point is: How would we know? Maybe we can, I don't know, but wouldn't you agree that in order to build an argument on it, there should be more to show than "I can put the words 'immaterial cake' together", when all the cake we've ever seen was material?

> So what material(s) are the Peano axioms composed of?

That's a category error? What material(s) are movies composed of? Or would you say that movies are immaterial (obviously, "immaterial" here meaning "existing without being represented in matter", just as I used it for the Peano axioms)?

> Do you have any definition for "exist" that you consider useful?

Really, I don't. Or rather, I guess I do, somehow (I mean, I do use the word, so I better have some idea what I mean by it when I use it ;-), but I have no clue how to comprehensively dump that into text. Plus, there are multiple useful definitions, depending on the context. I think it is easier to clarify ambiguous aspects of what I mean in a particular use than to write down a general definition.

>> Then ... in which sense isn't that scientific observation demonstrating the existence of the potential for the universe to be in different states?!

> Yes.

I take it that you mean that it is scientific observation demonstrating the existence of the potential for the universe to be in different states?

So ... do you agree then that that is not an example of non-physical reality (which is what you originally proposed it as)?!

> I'd probably say a reason for someone to care about morality would be if they cared to maximize joy/happiness in themselves and others.

Hu? How did we get there?! I mean, that sure sounds like a good reason to care about something if it gets you there, I just don't see how this reason is connected to your definition!?

Let me try and construct an analogous dialog:

A: X is a pleasure to eat.

B: Please provide evidence for the claim that X is a pleasure to eat, or if you think that asking for evidence is a category error, define what you mean by "being a pleasure to eat".

A: Yeah, it's a category error. "A pleasure to eat" concerns the distinction between what tastes good and what tastes bad.

B: Please define what you mean by "tastes good" and "tastes bad".

A: What tastes good is food that you eat in accordance with what Jane wills. What tastes bad is food that you eat not in accordance with what Jane wills.

B: OK ... so, under that definition(!!!): Which reasons would you give to anyone who was interested to try and convince them to care about eating things that are a pleasure to eat under that definition.

A: A reason for someone to care about eating things that are a pleasure to eat would be if they cared about enjoying what they eat.

How does something being enjoyable to eat connect to Jane's will? It seems to me like the whole part about why anyone should be convinced that eating what Jane wants them to eat is going to be enjoyable is missing?

Also, isn't joy and happiness quite accessible to empirical study? Aren't you implicitly saying that it is a category error to ask for evidence that certain acts increase or diminish joy or happiness? Or what would you suggest people to do when they do as Jane/God wants, but they observe decrease in joy and happiness? Do it anyway, because otherwise they aren't eating what is pleasurable/they aren't moral? Or stop eating what they observe to be causing them to puke because a definition of "a pleasure to eat" that makes them puke is kinda useless?