> How do you know it manifests as trim at all? How do you know it's not an elevator problem? But you're certain, gotcha.

I was under the impression that MCAS only controlled trim, and that the Ethiopian crash was found with full nose down trim. If it's an elevator problem, we're all chasing shadows.

> The pilot who wasn't flying, because he couldn't fly, was in a position to watch the scene unfold and happened to be the only person with both the trim wheel and yoke toggle in his field of view? Are you aware most airlines with four crew for international flights require all of them in the cockpit for takeoff and landing expressly to aid in CRM? If two high hour pilots are all that's needed, why require four? Sometimes in an emergency a different perspective might be useful? But again you're certain.

Yeah, that pilot. The guy who I would not be surprised to find out that he's not Lion Air. (not confident either way) He had some advantages, but either way he did what several other crews have apparently failed to. As for airlines with four crew requiring all crew in the cockpit for takeoff and landing, well why wouldn't you require all the crew to be there, even if it's an extremely marginal safety improvement? Hell, it's probably worth it just to ensure that you have all four on board at departure.

> Not in evidence. (x2)

I think if Boeing had considered MCAS driving trim to maximum they would have implemented it differently. I'd be happy to hear your opinion on that. And Lion Air maintenance seems to have failed to replace/fix the AOA sensor - not sure why you're saying they didn't fuck up. (It may have been a policy fuckup, but still in the general case of "if the sensor had been repaired this crash would not have happened)

> We don't know how far along they got. The first step in commanded pitch, roll, yaw, or power changes is reaction based on training, not diagnoses. The plane must be stabilized to buy time to conduct a diagnosis. There's circumstantial evidence of startle factor which can be a considerable inhibitor to diagnosing anything.

They had 7 minutes from reporting flight control problems to the crash.

> I have no certainty based on the available evidence. That's the point. What we know is, they were expressly not trained on any differences between the prior model and the one they were flying, let alone the existence of MCAS or MCAS upset. And many U.S. based pilots who fly MAX and found out years after the fact for the first time of its existence and function were pissed that it took an accident to learn about it.

> Why would U.S. pilots be pissed if this "certainly" manifests in such a familiar manner that there'd be no difficulty, no delay, and no worry whatsoever, and that U.S. pilots would have easily recovered from the identical scenario?

There's never any certainty in whether a pilot will successfully recover from an incident. I still think recovery is possible, and from the reactions of American and Southwest pilots I would say probable in an aircraft flown today. I do not know if it would have been probable before the Lion Air crash. I also expect US maintenance to be better. Between those two factors I'd expect a factor of 100+ safety improvement, putting accident frequency back around the normal level.