For context, I have an extension designed for a single html5 game, with roughly ~80k weekly active users. I've been using the chrome web store to deploy and update it for about 2 years, and recently wrote my own installer after Google stopped me from issuing security updates for over a month. I also had to build my own configuration update system to enable me to disable features on an hour's notice due to the security update incident & Chrome taking over a day to install updates - I'm serving about 3GB of configuration and update data per day right now, at around 1kb/user/hr.

Lots of functionality (and thus current extensions) requires requesting blanket access to all websites so they have a big task ahead of them trying to get all those extensions to comply.

In general the way things work for Chrome Extensions right now is bad for users and downright hostile to developers. Because I actually followed best practices on extension permissions I got a lot of confused, paranoid users, and had to explain Google's awful permissions model and UI in detail: https://www.reddit.com/r/Granblue_en/comments/86bdmo/psa_vir...
If I had simply requested a large set of blanket permissions when I first created the extension, I would've saved myself a huge amount of effort.

Users having the choice to scope wildcards down to specific pages is a start but until it's a default it isn't really a meaningful improvement for anyone because few people are qualified to actually set those restrictions properly. The design of the extension API itself tends to require wildcards to provide functionality due to limitations in the other APIs. For example, if you want to do anything fancy with web requests and do it performantly, you may need to inject JS directly into webpages - the background-page-based webRequest API is slow and missing key features.

There's also a risk here that by trying to kludge better access controls into the existing full-of-holes extension model, Google is going to break tons of extensions that ordinary users rely on and they're going to be too frustrated by this to be happy about any security upside.

Some genuinely good changes though:

* Requiring 2FA to deploy extension updates. This is a big vulnerability in the existing system, especially if an extension has many users. It's been exploited in the past.

* Service worker support (probably) - the current model with page/content/background scripts and popup pages is a nightmare both to author and debug, hopefully service workers will provide a better way to architect all of this.

* Narrowly scoped declarative APIs - hopefully this means extension developers can finally get access to smaller features without having to request access to the entire universe. Some of the feature scoping is really absurd and occasionally unrelated APIs are tucked under a larger permission in a way that really confuses users. As I explained to users in my old reddit comment above, Google currently uses "Access your browsing history" to describe an ENORMOUS set of unrelated features.

* Blocking obfuscated JS - this literally will do nothing to protect users, but it's worth denying it anyway. There's no good reason to obfuscate extension JS since it's so hard to debug extensions you didn't write anyway. It's possible this will make it easier for them to apply machine learning to identify malicious extension code, at least, but I bet the machine learning will just randomly reject updates to legitimate extensions without any explanation and you'll be screwed.

The big wildcard here is Google's history of failing to maintain or properly document extension APIs. They're going to be rearranging lots of existing stuff and adding new stuff, so the underlying mess will probably become 10x worse. Core APIs like notifications have been entirely or partially broken for years with no effort made to fix them or update docs. Inertia is one of the main things carrying the chrome extension ecosystem forward and it's possible many extension developers will churn out after they find the migration effort involved here too much, similar to how Firefox lost many extensions during their two transitions (old->multiprocess compatible->webextensions)