Yikes there's a lot of (in my opinion) misconceived cynicism here...

> The original purpose of an EV cert is to provide a browser UI that tells a first-time visitor that they can trust the website they've landed on. This is a separate goal from TLS in general, which is just supposed to secure the traffic in transit.

This isn't really accurate. Basic TLS (domain validation) provides encryption and authentication - if TLS did not provide authentication in its most basic form, the encryption would not be very secure on its own. Extended validation merely adds further parameters (properties, characteristics, etc) to the server side of the authentication process that already exists in TLS, in combination with administrative work on the part of the certificate authorities.

Then the client provides the UI visual indicators corresponding to the authenticated identity, as you say. But while all of this technically works, most users don't bother with checking it. Security with friction to use doesn't typically provide any security, it just makes you feel like you're doing something.

> Google in particular has no interest in providing such a browser UI. They want users to use Google Search to establish trust instead. "If you're not sure, Google the business name" is common advice to avoid copycat sites. Boy is that a good position for Google to be in! Why would they invest in an alternate solution with a distributed architecture and client-side UI?

I can trade your flavor of cynicism with my own: certificate authorities don't want TLS certificates to be cheap, so they come up with shiny options such as OV and EV to have something they can upsell.

See what I just did? We can just keep arguing cynically if we'd like, but we don't arrive at any new insight about the actual point. The fact of the matter is that it's largely irrelevant what Google's motivation is, because the efficacy of extended validation (or lack thereof) does not rely on Google (or any other browser's) motivation. And for what it's worth, Google is not the only browser maintainer moving away from EV visual indicators.

> Almost all the "best practice" security advice today is centered around protecting existing relationships with sites. "Use a strong password, a password manager, and two-factor-authentication" does nothing to protect a first-time site visitor from a scams.

This is a fair point. It's definitely true that phishing is not as sexy a problem as "technical" security vulnerabilities, and so gets relatively less attention. But a security mechanism only augments security if it's actually used or adhered to. I'm not debating the technical merits of extended validation. I'm stating that it's ineffective beause it's a technical solution to a social problem. The way to resolve that social problem is through more sophisticated education and training. Or more likely, to re-architect the interface and browsing methodology in a way that obviates phishing entirely. Just because one of those approaches seems out of reach doesn't mean we should settle for EV, which in practice doesn't do anything. The only nontrivial users of EV are banks and financial institutions; these are the same institutions who have completely bought into security questions, inability to paste passwords and draconian password complexity requirements.