The Bohm interpretation is quite simple. It does start with the idea that the world is made of particles and that we are satisfied if we can make correct predictions of where stuff is. In other words, I have a computer in front of me and a particle theory would say that is because there are particles making up the computer and they are located in front of me. So that is the correspondence with reality. For some, this is a reasonable starting point. For most others, it is blasphemy for some reason.

Once we settle on stuff with position, then we have to ask how that stuff changes. One option is that we specify accelerations; that's Newton's way.

Another option is to specify velocities. That is the Bohm way. Specifically, the velocity is derived from the wave function of quantum mechanics. It is basically the derivative of the wave function, normalized and made real. Done. You can see a simple derivation of the equations here: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/De_Broglie–Bohm_theory#Derivat... The first one derives Bohm's equation very quickly and simply from the starting wave relation equations of Einstein and de Broglie.

The complication is that the wave function is a function of the configurations of all the particles. Thus, to get the velocity, one technically needs the positions of all of the particles of the universe. Practically, one only needs the positions of entangled particles, but still. It is a non-trivial setup though the most basic, natural setup one could possibly have given particles and a wave function. Also, the particle positions do not influence the wave function evolution. This is rather unusual.

For the Dirac wave function, it is even simpler. That object directly gives the velocity of the particles; no derivative needed.

Contrast this with MW which says, I guess, that the fundamental thing that we are concerned with is the wave function. It does not seem that particles exist in any meaningful sense in that theory. It is as if we are machines able to track a singular aspect of the change of an abstract vector in Hilbert space. It is not clear why this vector is often represented as a function on configuration space when there is no configuration of stuff. The theory essentially says that actual reality is nothing at all like what we perceive. I would think an honest account of a theory which only has a wave function would be to formulate the theory on an abstract Hilbert space and derive configuration space and, thus, configurations from that. Not very likely, by the way.

Reality may be deceptive, but I certainly prefer to start with theories in which our experience is explained in a pretty simple and straightforward way: it looks like stuff is over there because there is stuff over there. We have singular experiences because a single experience is what actually happens.

Also note that in Bohmian mechanics, we specify the initial wave function and the initial particles and then evolve the system using differential equations. All of the operator stuff, collapse, etc., comes out of that evolution; we don't need to have any special considerations about them. The quantum formalism becomes analogous to thermodynamics, not a fundamental theory, but a useful practical one replacing the individual evolutions with some useful shorthand. In MW, there is this question of how to model an experimental situation. Where are the measurement operators coming from? What is a subsystem? In BM, these things arise essentially by conditioning on the configuration of the environment. In certain situations, this will give rise to roughly an isolated system evolving according to its own Bohmian dynamics. The measurement interaction is then represented by an operator, or its generalization, depending. But all of that emerges from the basic differential equations evolving the universe.

It is not clear to me how easy it is to do that kind of analysis in MW. After all, there is no singular experience to break it down to, there is no subsystem, there is no definitive experiment being done. It is not really clear how one would falsify a theory which, more or less, assumes everything happens.