It's not principled, it's purely based on a vein of economic and patent scholarship that seeks to strengthen patents by equivocating them with property rights in land and thus subject to the most stringent demands of due process. This scholarship presupposes that patents are a necessary and efficient mechanism for capital allocation, almost completely discounts the economic and social costs of granting a monopoly franchise that restrains liberty, and ignores the practicality of accurately assessing novelty, non-obviousness, etc--ironic given that in almost every other aspect of regulation it's almost a given that government bureaucrats suck at divining these things. And as a general matter this scholarship is a form of ideological reductionism, and fundamentally radical.

All the handwaving about the change of perspective regarding utility patents in the latter part of the 18th century is an attempt to support his policy-based argument. You know it doesn't clearly reflect the law because he uses weasel words like "virtually", and spends much of the time explaining away the actual precedent.

He says that the very existence and wording of the Patent Clause is evidence of this change in perspective regarding the legal framework of patents. But the Patent Clause exists first and foremost because without it--long before modern Commerce Clause powers existed--the Federal government would have lacked the power to establish and regulate patents altogether. In other words, it exists primarily for the purposes of national consistency. The wording about the promoting progress merely evidences that the Founders believed the powers for granting particular public franchises to the Federal government were given because national policies might best promote social welfare, as opposed to a patchwork of state-granted patents. It's a huge stretch to argue it reflects a change in the law regarding whether patents were a species of public franchise.

For a man who claims to hew closely to the original intent and original meaning of the Constitution, and who believes in judicial restraint, his argument is remarkably unprincipled. Absent clear and unequivocal language either in the Constitution or contemporary laws regarding the nature of the patent right, in light of the clear and concise grant of power to Congress, lacking any solid legal precedent for this argument, and without even a clear injustice suffered at the hands of a capricious government in the instant case, he should give way to legislative and executive prerogative. But he doesn't. And he doesn't because he very clearly subscribes to the scholarship I mentioned above.

It is well written, I'll grant you that. But like Scalia before him, principled it is not. Principles should lead to consistency and predictability in the substance of decisions, not the form. Looking at his opinions as a whole, Scalia's were neither consistent nor predictable in substance (relative to other justices), and Gorsuch's appear to be going down the same road, notwithstanding that both are excellent lawyers who play the persuasion game well. Their opinions are consistent and predictable only in form, in that they attempt to reduce every problem to a small handful of preferred talking points and policies. Thus, for Gorsuch this case isn't about the exceedingly complex realities of patent monopolies and administrative processes that attempt to balance costs and benefits, but about politically appointed hacks having power to arbitrarily take away your private property. To get from point A to point B he has to take you along for a ride, hoping you don't realize that he changes the premises along the way.

By contrast, the majority opinion is squarely rooted in the law and in judicial restraint. I'm not one who believes SCOTUS should be shy about crafting new law--in substance if not in name. I actually appreciate Gorsuch's concern with safe-guarding property rights. I just think 1) they're misguided and wrong from a policy perspective (among other restraints, the law making powers of courts should be based on clear, consistent, public policy, and one of the most clear is the common law rule that disfavors monopolies), and 2) a great example of how a judge can go about making new law all the while claiming to hew closely to precedent and history. Moreover, I can't fault a court for not seizing the opportunity to craft law.