I thank you for the honest response, @dgut--I apologize too if my last post was a bit snippy--I'm just far too used to many beginning these conversations in entirely bad faith, as I mentioned, with no intention of reevaluating their own perspectives.

You're right that Hegel's work, especially considered in relation to developments in science and the amount of knowledge we have today, does seem almost more like an absurdist tract than a piece of interesting philosophy--you picked out excellent quote to illustrate this--'spirit' is a word that's more or less meaningless in the modern epoch.

However, it's important to consider the prevalent episteme or intellectual/epistemic milieu Hegel was working with--you cite Pascal, who did indeed make incredible strides in mathematics--but he also believed he'd had a direct experience of God, and went so far as to record a reminder of his religious experience and literally sew it into his coat--to us Hegel's terminology is dusty and makes little sense, and, you're correct, from a scientific point seems like a hell of a lot of substanceless hot air--but at the time he was utilizing a language many would have still comprehended--point is, it affected persons and how they perceive the world.

This is why philological study is incredibly important, and it's a shame so many, at least in the US are unfamiliar with the field--language is a living, evolving system, and our notions of what words mean, how to use them, and what concepts they capture is fundamentally, if not radically different than it was for our ancestors in the 1700-1800s. Philological readings help inform us of the historical importance of theories that otherwise fall out of our understanding as history progresses. For instance, the ancient greeks also had several notions of 'spirit' which are handled differently today--some retain the word in translation, others, realizing the word is more or less dead translate it instead as something like 'mind' or an equivalent psychological term--but this brings translation fundamentally into question, for the concept the greeks indicated by the term 'psyche' and the concept indicated by our term 'mind', with all the strides we've made in psychology, are radically different--our term brings a whole wealth of psychological propositions and concepts with it that the greeks did not have--so it keeps ancient works alive for modern readers, but we do have to wonder whether its not somewhat intellectually dishonest or leads some down paths of uncritical acceptance or faulty pictures of ancient thought--it's a fascinating problem.

As Wittgenstein said "The limits of my language mean the limits of my world". (He remains, by the way, the greatest philosopher, at least in my view)

I think you want a sort of scientific defense for Hegel's value--I can't offer that because there isn't one that I can conceive of. If you haven't read the work of Karl Popper I highly recommend it--he sketched out precisely why theories such as Hegelianism and Marxism cannot be considered scientific. Additionally I think you ought to check out the work of Thomas Kuhn, which shows that science isn't as rock-solid or immune to the accidents of historical change as you might think. Perhaps if you're feeling really radical and want to challenge your views about science check out Feyerabend's Against Method and Datson and Gallison's Objectivity (D+G's book was instrumental in changing my own views on science, they show, by examining scientific history and the gradual changes that the concept of 'objectivity' has undergone through the years that science, like culture, and like all human pursuit really, is messy).

As to the problem of Hegel's support of the Prussian state--you could levy this critique against many practicing scientists, thinkers, and human beings in general. We all have values and systems of belief. We all find it difficult to separate those values and beliefs form our work, even when we try our damnedest to do so. The unconscious is an unruly little beast. You really think researchers funded by big Pharma are scientifically pure and aren't lead to pursue particular results because of external factors such as the fact that is big Pharma continues to thrive, so do they? Make no mistake, all intellectual pursuits are tainted by politics and value judgements. There is no such thing as Thomas Nagel's 'view from nowhere'--you cannot escape your subjectivity. If you could you'd have no reason to pursue anything. Even the purest scientist must be stimulated by an interest or passion to investigate the world, which will necessarily factor into his perceptions. That's why the perfect scientist is in fact an unfeeling instrument--but of course the instrument is far less flexible than the human being--and the human being still needs to interpret the data--and even if we can devise machines that interpret, we can only devise them such that they follow the model of human interpretation, and thus, are still flawed.

This is why Nietzsche pinpointed valuation/value judgement as the root of nearly all of man's problems. Of course the ubermensch who can launch a radical "revaluation of all values" and disabuse us of our constant need to create and abide by valuations has yet to come--and more than likely never will. Nietzsche himself, gouger of values that he was, had plenty of them.

Nietzsche is fascinating case of someone who held science on a veritable pedestal but whose work is far from scientific, yet incredibly meaningful and effective.

So again, all I can offer to you is a historical defense of Hegel's work. This probably seems dissatisfying, as in theory then anyone could have pulled off the same--and the work loses any value beyond one of historical interest, e.g. it's no longer applicable--but that is a perennial problem--the old wrinkle as to whether the person behind discoveries or theories really matters, i.e. the idea that, had Einstein not reached his conclusions about physics, would someone else eventually have (or for an actual historical example, how Newton and Leibniz developed concepts and notations for calculus near simultaneously--Leibniz actually is another fine example, like Pascal, of a polymath who contributed enormously to mathematics and logic but had weird metaphysical notions that no longer resonate with modern audiences).