First, I want to start out by saying I am not a lawyer, but I have been trying very hard to bone up on law in general and natural rights and constituional law specifically (as former military, I have been dissatisfied with my lack of understanding of the document I swore an oath to protect and defend). So that is where my interest comes from.

First of all, I wish you would elaborate on what specifically you disagree with the author about. If you are talking about the section regarding standing, I would agree there is much more nuance to the question than there may seem at first glance. Also, I agree that the distinction between civil and criminal law isn't "baked into the Constitution" as you say, but I don't think just because it isn't specifically laid out in the constitution doesn't make the distinction any less clear or important taking into account the whole of the spirit and princple of the law (such as common law). I would also agree with you that due-process is largely open to contextual arguments because it was not so clearly deliniated by the founders either. (I can never not think of John Yoo and his twisting of due process to justify torture when discussing this matter.)

That is where our agreements stop though, because the rest of your argument seems disingenuous. You begin citing "McGear v. Woodruff", when in reality you are citing CALLAN v. WILSON [1], and you take the text you cite out of context completely. First of all, the primary issue of the case is the following:

"It is contended by the appellant that the Constitution of the United States secured to him the right to be tried by a jury, and, that right having been denied, the police court was without jurisdiction to impose a fine upon him, or to order him to be imprisoned until such fine was paid."

Skipping to the end result:

"The judgment is reversed, and the cause remanded with directions to discharge the appellant from custody.", preceded by, "we are unable to hold that a person charged with having committed it [conspiracy] in this District is not entitled to a jury, when put upon his trial.", and that the governments argument that trial without jury was acceptable "given an unobstructed right of appeal to, and trial by jury in, another court to which the case may be taken.", "We cannot assent to that interpretation of the Constitution. Except in that class or grade of offences called petty offences, which, according to the common law, may be proceeded against summarily in any tribunal legally constituted for that purpose, the guarantee of an impartial jury to the accused in a criminal prosecution, conducted either in the name, or by or under the authority of, the United States, secures to him the right to enjoy that mode of trial from the first moment, and in whatever court, he is put on trial for the offence charged."

In short, this series of argumentation you use in which you take out of context clips and miscite them in an attempt to defend a position, that seems to state that the right to a jury is not always present, is flatly wrong. If that is not the argument you were making and I have misunderstood you, please clarify your position for me.

If you had cited the section about "Except in that class or grade of offences called petty offences" and argued the authors ticket constituted a petty offence "proceeded against summarily in any tribunal legally constituted for that purpose", this conversation would have gone differently.

As far as I know, in both civil and criminal cases the right to a jury is preserved, though in the civil case the right must be specifically demanded. Of course one can waive this right, but it is preserved until that point. Either way, attempts to cite random state level cases to apparently argue otherwise is the constitutional analysis here I disagree with.

[1]http://www.leagle.com/decision/1888667127US540_1609/CALLAN%2...