After reading the article, I think we might be talking about two different things. But first of all, as a non-comm I was familiar with the political machinations of the officer core, but not directly involved. I can't comment too much other than that politics did exist and sometimes hurt qualified officers. However, the adherence to "zero flaws" is a curious dilemma. On one hand, the military is under the microscope of public scrutiny. Every decision is subject to being picked up in the press and dissected or spun one way or another. This isn't necessarily bad, but it does lead to a culture of conservatism. Everyone is trying to make sure they are not the ones who take the flack. On the other hand, threats and theaters change and rapid adaptation is sometimes required.

Of the solutions offered some good but some present serious flaws. For example, an internal "job market", though it resembles a working system in the private sector, doesn't reflect the undesirable nature of most postings that need good officers. The the example of Captain Smart who wants to work in Korea is a poor one because no one wants Korea (this is an exaggeration, obviously, but there is no question there were more soldiers who wanted Europe over Korea, despite the more urgent need for good soldiers in Korea). If you have a certain skill set and you are needed in Iraq, you need to go to Iraq. This isn't the private sector where 1. You just don't build a factory in a warzone and 2. You can offer a bunch of extra money to attract those employees. The nature of the service is such that sometimes you need to do things you don't want. Another option touched on -- keeping people in roles they prefer -- is a good suggestion, I think. I have often wondered why the path is always up to command. If you are a good mechanic, pilot, radio operator, etc. why can't you continue to rise in pay and prestige while still doing what you are best at? There is a the warrant officer corps for branches that have that, but that's a limited option.

However, that's still tangential to my experience. What I mean is that problem solving was actively encouraged. The initial invasion of Iraq revealed the poor state of readiness of the service for the mission at hand and daily soldiers on the ground were finding solutions and sharing them. When I was in, the Army set up a group called The Center for Lessons Learned. They actually had a hotline where you could call up and tell them things you learned. They published a regular newsletter with some of these tidbits. (I believe there was a This American Life episode about it.)

When there were issues on the ground, the company commander had a great deal of leeway to coordinate local resources directly, rather than referring to a specific agency set up for that purpose. Equipment modifications or procedural changes were a fairly regular part of the day to day work. Even the day to day patrols were often coordinated with local authorities to ensure everything went smoothly.

The Army is a bureaucratic organization, one that could be frustrating (I am not in any more, after all), but it was also one that revealed more ingenuity than I often see in large private organizations.