> I wanted to learn in which context you've read about that detail (I guess in some articles) as I don't believe you've discovered yourself

> That way, I wanted to get you to say something more, in order to learn more myself. I'm still waiting and hoping to learn how is the discovery of the "backchannel" in e-mails relevant and for what, in your view.

Definitely. I heard about the backchannel through international media reporting. You can find plenty of details by searching "Erdogan Assad AKP backchannel."

I heard several narratives about the backchannel discovery and subsequent coup attempt. Essentially at that time Turkey was considering (again) a reevaluation of its foreign policy, with an emphasis on Kurdish terrorism in the homeland, sputtering relations with the US, lost energy on regime change as the forces formerly led by Turkish intelligence (the FSA) had dissolved, loss of Turkish admittance into the EU, and a warming relationship between Turkey and Russia - which had earlier been further exasperated by the Turkish downing of Russian planes and the Russian bombing of Syrian Turkmen in the North of the country, and bickering with Saudi Arabia about logistics and outcomes.

While this potential pivot in policy was going on, the core of Turkish Military burgeoned to recommit to the alliance to change the Assad regime. The discovery of a backchannel launched what had been building inside the Turkish state in any case, and there was a manifest attempt to remove Erdogan from power and recommit to the alliance.

The coup failed with other members of the alliance including the United States failing to condemn it while it was happening. The confluence of interests and actions and partially soured relationships between the administrations led Turkey to blame members of the alliance for any support they may have provided, and at least the United States to spread rumors that the coup was self-initiated.

Some hard conversations were had between Turkey and the United States which resulted in a compromise, where the US would abandon much of its support for Kurds in Northern Syria in exchange for continued Turkish activity. With the settlement the Turks invaded Northern Syria splitting what would have been a contiguous autonomous Kurdish zone in two. As part of the settlement the United States would urge that the Kurdish forces would remove themselves from key cities that they had captured from the Islamic State Group.

Of course, there's still an 'edge' to the relationship between the rest of the coalition and Turkey, who has not wanted Iraqi Kurdish forces to be supported in the coalition invasion and occupation of Mosul and other Northwestern areas of Iraq (ongoing). It also maintains that, when forces converge on Raqqa, its invading military play a larger role than the Kojave Kurds.

Overall, while Turkish commitment to the campaign has wavered over the course of the proxy war, its deal with the United States to look the other way while it ousts its society of critical voices and the US hears in a serious way the long standing US demand that it stop safehousing a political aggravant ("Gulen") has led Turkey to stay its course.

At least, that's one narrative.

> Also as you consider my "characterization" "not good" I'm interested in your take.

It isn't a full whose-who of actors in the region. It doesn't mention other Gulf Countries (Qatar, UAE, Kuwait), it doesn't mention Yemen, it excludes Lebanon, Jordan and Israel. It doesn't include Nusra, any of the splintered opposition groups, the terrorists supported by Israel in Iran, the pipelines being concerned, Russian naval forces - or curiously Russia at all, the United States, Hezbollah and/or Hamas, Iraq and Malaki and AQI and JTJ, etc.

Namely looking at Syria as a sectarian war is definitely part of the picture, but you've also got to look at Syria from a Ba'athist historical perspective and US target for regime change, as a Iranian client state, as a key decider in European energy security, as a Russian protectorate, as a victim of European "Ottomanization" (Balkinization).

Why does Israel have a stake in the outcome? Why have they supplied ISIL with arms and funding? How about Saudi Arabia? Qatar? The US? Why has Iran supported the regime, send intelligence and military elite and weapons there? Why is Russia supporting the regime, helping it to shape the ground with airpower the Syrian's can't muster? Why did the US ground the Syrian air force? What are the countries at diplomatic meetings trying to barter for themselves, and why isn't Syria invited?

Syria is more than a sectarian war, though sectarian tensions are exploited to mobilize people - be those tensions the Druze, Kurds, Shia or Sunni, etc.

Here we have a confluence of states with different interests all bidding for different outcomes, and not enough room for compromise for the aggravators, organizers and funders to find terms for a cessation.