You're arguing that `curl | sh` is insecure as compared to something that literally nobody does, which is to read every single line of every script they ever execute. Once you discard the ridiculous notion that everybody should be reading every line of the script before running it, then there's nothing wrong with `curl | sh`. Yeah, you can't go back and read the script later, but if you wanted to do that, then just don't use `curl | sh`! If you're not planning on going back to read the script later, you wouldn't be saving it anyway after you ran it, so I genuinely don't understand how this argument is supposed to be convincing.

> Oh, and you apparently haven't even considered what happens when a connection is interrupted and the shell receives a corrupted or incomplete script.

I addressed this in my very first comment. You might want to try actually reading it before accusing me of not understanding an issue that is honestly really trivial to fix (wrap the whole script in a shell function and then execute the function; early termination means syntax error without anything being executed).

> The correct thing to do is to discourage Worst Practices and encourage Best Practices. The correct thing to is to never tell people to pipe to shell. The correct thing to do is to provide instructions on how to verify the integrity of downloaded software. To do anything else is grossly negligent and irresponsible.

Refusing to provide a convenient way to install your software doesn't make anyone safer, it just means you have fewer users. Anybody who is even remotely able to read shell scripts or to verify software integrity already knows how to read an install instruction like `curl | sh` and modify that to download the script first. And nobody who doesn't already know how to evaluate something like `curl | sh` and decide if they want to do that or download/verify the script first is going to bother using your product if you make the install instructions overly complicated.

> It has been demonstrated that the delivery mechanism in question is completely insecure. Even TLS does not ensure that a state-level actor who can forge certs is not MitM'ing a connection. You think NSA can't do this? They probably can. Can they break a 4k GPG key? Unlikely.

As stated in the original comment, even considering a state-level actor who can forge legitimate certificates is way out of scope for this discussion. Anybody who is at risk of being targeted by a state-level actor already has to take many many precautions that normal users don't take, and your website telling them to use `curl | sh` to install something is not going to be an attack vector, because either they understand how to download and verify the script first, or they've already been compromised by any number of easier ways than hoping the target decides to install the particular piece of software that the state-level actor has compromised.

> So the real question here is why you're trying so hard to encourage people to continue with this grossly irresponsible practice.

No, the real question is why are you behaving as though users are simultaneously capable of reading every line of every shell script, doing GPG verification of downloaded software, and figuring out how to even make sure the GPG keys are trustworthy, while at the same time so ignorant that they can't figure out how to go from `curl | sh` to "download, verify, and then run" without step-by-step instructions.

Avoiding `curl | sh` does not make anybody safer. All it does is make it harder for users to install your software, while not changing a single thing for users who are paranoid enough to want to verify the software before running it (since they can do that anyway). The only 2 things that you need to do to make `curl | sh` reasonable are always use https, and make your script resilient against unexpected EOF.

Edit: Another thing that hasn't even been considered this whole time, is if the threat model here is the website or delivery mechanism has been compromised, then the attacker can change the install instructions too. So even if you don't offer `curl | sh`, the attacker could modify your install instructions to use `curl | sh` and the victim wouldn't know that's not the "real" instructions. The alternative threat model is the vendor itself is untrustworthy (e.g. they're serving up a malicious script without having been compromised), but there's nothing you can do to guard against that because if you don't trust a vendor to not intentionally give you a malicious installer, then you shouldn't be running their software to begin with.