1. I find that one fairly easy to explain (easier than qualia, even). When we weigh decisions, we can use an internal model of ourselves to support our thought process. We can imagine ourselves doing X, evaluate the consequences a bit, assess how it feels, then imagine ourselves doing Y, and so on. Considering that our intuitive understanding of "I can do X" corresponds to "I can imagine my self-model doing X, and I don't see any external factors that would stop me," then our ability to evaluate multiple courses of action directly entails an impression of free will.

Now, this "free will" only corresponds to epistemic non-determinism about ourselves: "for all we know", we can do X, and we can also do Y, because if we knew we couldn't, we wouldn't be evaluating these possibilities. So in a sense, it is our self-model that has free will: it is the model that we imagine in various circumstances, but the model isn't the real thing. So our mistake is to assume that this property of the model is also a property of the real thing, i.e. that our epistemic uncertainty translates into some kind of metaphysical non-determinism.

I would expect that any decision system that can construct hypotheticals about itself would have an impression of free will, or a qualia of free will. They may not necessarily be able to express it, or to feel it as vividly as we do, but they would have it.

2. I know the point you are trying to make, but where you see a reductio ad absurdum I just see a lack of imagination. Our usual understanding of consciousness is very, very, very deeply anthropomorphic. Neither the Internet nor the USA are systems that have a human or animal consciousness, that much is clear. "But what about consciousness in general?" Man, I'm sorry to be blunt here, but you wouldn't know it even if it hit you in the face. We're human. We have human consciousness. Our idea of consciousness outside of the exact thing that we have is: fuck. all.

We can start with Leibniz's thought experiment they mention in the article, where a gigantic brain is built out of gears and pipes. Or the similar thought experiment about the "China brain" which emulates a human brain by using one person to emulate each neuron. To me, it is clear that both of these things would, in fact, be conscious. I see no good reason to think otherwise and I am perfectly content biting that bullet. I have zero reservations, even intuitively.

Now, regarding something like an "USA consciousness". Personally, I do not think this is bizarre. It's only bizarre under an anthropomorphic view of consciousness, or to put it in an other way, it's only bizarre if you believe that conscious entities ought to be relatable (an absurd expectation). But if you use the criteria I've given, you can find several things that would correspond to "USA's qualia". For example, 9/11 caused large structural changes that you could interpret as the USA feeling a qualia of fear and/or anger. A new episode of Game of Thrones may also be a qualia of sorts. Makes perfect sense to me.

Perhaps that's not evidence to you, but I don't know what more you'd expect. I think you conflate consciousness with human consciousness, so you only perceive consciousness when it's similar enough to your own. If I may indulge in a silly (but, I think, accurate) comparison, it's a bit like a shoemaker conflating craftsmanship with shoemaking, and then saying there is no evidence that a boatsman is a craftsman, because they've never seen them make shoes.