That's a good list, though I'd add a few caveats / contras to it.

Your "Creating the Product" and "Generating Demand" elements synergise off one another. Facebook has considerable network effects, and those network effects stimulate content, but break the chain, or boil-off customers (see "The Evaporative Cooling Effect"), and the feedback's strongly negative all the way down. MySpace imploded quite rapidly. Google's G+ had some traction initially, but worked exceptionally hard to drive off its strongest fans. Those who are slower to learn (/me raises hand) are only now being convinced of our error.

But "Obsolescence" is the big one. Ford's plant degrades from the inside, and the rate of amortisation of manufacturing equipment is fairly well known. Innovation in automobiles peaked in the 1920s, though it's arguable that there were additional spurts in the 1970s (largely around economy), 1990s (quality and electronic controls), and now a possible shift to hybrid or electric vehicles, though those remain tiny portions of the entire market (highly visible, but still tiny by either unit count or, slightly less so due to much higher per-unit costs, currency marketshare).

Ford, along with other US automakers was blindsided when a very modest amount of market innovation, toward more efficient vehicles, hit in the 1970s. That was an exogenous obsolesence function.

Facebook and other technologies face this all the damned time. As I've slowly realised, the cost of provisioning technology hardware falls by an order of magnitude per decade. The rate is much slower for software, but there's far more capable, far more modular software rising up all the time. You can actually see this progression going back to the dawn of electronic computing, with IBM owning the market in the 1950s and 1960s, then a cascade of first minicomputers (DEC, Wang, Sun), then micros (PCs), then laptops, now handhelds, coming along at roughly 10-year intervals.

Software's taken a while to catch up.

Facebook had roughly 1/10 the hardware cost profile of Google (though growth of the Web may have increased that). Scaling out a startup now is largely a solved problem. Revenue model is harder -- but you need far less revenue.

The other problem Facebook (and any other tech player) faces is that their own codebase becomes liability. For every table-based desktop site (say, Hacker News), that existing site layout (and perhaps much the technology underpinning it) actively impedes movement to mobile or tablet devices. I've had long arguments with designers of sites who insist on pixel- and point-based font sizing, rather than em and rem, and then screw up with low-contrast sites to boot.

(HN's own fonts are barely readable for me on a 10" tablet, and no, mobile extensions don't help.)

Further, "Making Money" for Facebook has been exceptionally reliant on both easy-money Federal Reserve policies, and lending and banking regulations favouring Silicon Valley style investments. A tremendous amount of advertising is itself financial services, electronics, and other startups (I'm basing this off of Google's advertisers which I'm familiar with from other sources, but suspect FB's profile is similar). That ads money could well dry up damned quickly.

Tech companies have the problem that as the money dries up so does their tech workforce. Look at the salaries reported to have been offered to Yahoo's top tech talent (if you can't offer appreciating stock, you've got to bleed money). Lose programmer interest, and again there's a downward cascade of talent and capabilities, and some of the negative feedbacks start dominating.