I would like to address the theme of "the U.S. is no better than China!" when it comes to trade.

It is true that both have countries have manipulated and are currently manipulating levers in greedy self-interests. It is also true that the U.S. is not perfect. Far from it: I'm sure many Russian commenters have some words about the western-bred neoliberal experts who preached "Shock Therapy" to Yeltsin (Spoiler alert: oligarchs).

The difference between China and the US, in my opinion, lies in their motivations and how it translates into economic action. The West, like other "enlightened" spheres before it, has had some element of "for the greater good" guiding its vision. One historical example is that instead of colonizing Europe after WW2 (like the Soviets did), the US instituted the Marshall Plan. You can argue that this aid was given in exchange for a degree of suzerainty ( don't bomb NATO! ). Fundamentally, however, those states regained their status as independent actors and were not seen as extensions of the US.

Security is very much the heart of the matter here, it's the age-old question of "how much control does the government need over its spheres to feel secure and therefore strong?". Although not always spoken, a country normally ought to be as protectionist over its trade as it is weak in that area of trade. In the U.S., it happened with Japan and Cars as the article points out, and Great Britain and textiles if one goes back even further.

With this rationale in mind, Xi Jingping insists that China is still "developing"[1], that China can be excused for so-and-so action to maintain its economy, even though it wields more power than almost all other "developing nations" in the same space put together.

What's often overlooked is that it's not just economic (in)securities at play here. China demands the submission of foreign companies because China is politically insecure. Consider a related section from the "X Article":

> Easily persuaded of their own doctrinaire "rightness," they insisted on the submission or destruction of all competing power. Outside of the Communist Party, Russian society was to have no rigidity. There were to be no forms of collective human activity or association which would not be dominated by the Party. No other force in Russian society was to be permitted to achieve vitality or integrity. Only the Party was to have structure. All else was to be an amorphous mass. [2]

Although China hasn't been at this totalitarian stage for a long while, the concept of "amorphousness", that the only "true" political form is the central power and all else exists in service to it, is one of China's current most debilitating problems. If you don't have multiple organizations each with their own sphere of power, how can you express the multifaceted will of your citizenry (the definition of a functional civil society)? While the Chinese people have to date built many forms [3], the central government is certain to come down hard on any actual power of the forms as fast as they develop. [4].

To summarize: China acts with greater force internally because China's leaders are afraid. Very afraid. First, they don't have the same political mechanisms for dealing with foreign political influences that the U.S. has. In more concrete terms: the last time they allowed for other forms, in the same way the U.S. did and does, came just before their tanks crushed students underfoot in their nice, government square. History in mind, China's leaders have continually resorted to harsh action in all spheres to maintain their form, which they cannot bear to be without.

[1]
http://foreignpolicy.com/2014/09/25/is-china-still-a-develop...

[2] https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/russian-federation/1...

[3] http://www.economist.com/news/china/21600747-spite-political...

[4] https://www.hrw.org/news/2015/05/08/dispatches-china-tighten...