Everything you said has no bearing on my point, which maybe I should've stated more strictly: 'Japan had no military capacity to win the war or subject other countries to its will'.

The fact they still had the capacity to fight to the last man and that this would be bloody is a truism that doesn't need to be stated. But my point is that they (1) had no capacity beyond their borders and (2) their defeat was inevitable. In that respect, the USSR's decision to go to war, too, changed nothing for them. That's my point. An anecdote about how a lot of purple hearts were printed because the end was expected to be bloody doesn't change that point. Of course it made Japan's case even more hopeless (in particular because the Soviet's would likely invade Manchuria, one of the remaining places for Japan to gain natural resources, although even those were effectively cut off as Japan's merchant fleet had been decimated).

For example the US Strategic Bombing Survey established by the secretary of war (1940-1945) established:
> Based on a detailed investigation of all the facts, and supported by the testimony of the surviving Japanese leaders involved, it is the Survey's opinion that certainly prior to 31 December 1945, and in all probability prior to 1 November 1945, Japan would have surrendered even if the atomic bombs had not been dropped, even if Russia had not entered the war, and even if no invasion had been planned or contemplated.

Eisenhower says:
> During his recitation of the relevant facts, I had been conscious of a feeling of depression and so I voiced to him my grave misgivings, first on the basis of my belief that Japan was already defeated and that dropping the bomb was completely unnecessary, and secondly because I thought that our country should avoid shocking world opinion by the use of a weapon whose employment was, I thought, no longer mandatory as a measure to save American lives.

And he was joined by other generals, e.g. McArthur. The guy in charge of the , LeMay, who of course famously firebombed Japan in a way much more destructive than the nuclear bombs (death tolls between 200k and 500k, and destroying nearly half of all built up areas of 66 cities) who opined he had committed war crimes and that he'd be tried as a war criminal had the US lost the war somehow, said

> The atomic bomb had nothing to do with the end of the war at all.

Fleet admiral Nimitz said:

> The Japanese had, in fact, already sued for peace. The atomic bomb played no decisive part, from a purely military point of view, in the defeat of Japan.

Fleet Admiral Leafy said:
> The use of [the atomic bombs] at Hiroshima and Nagasaki was of no material assistance in our war against Japan. The Japanese were already defeated and ready to surrender because of the effective sea blockade and the successful bombing with conventional weapons... The lethal possibilities of atomic warfare in the future are frightening. My own feeling was that in being the first to use it, we had adopted an ethical standard common to the barbarians of the Dark Ages. I was not taught to make war in that fashion, and wars cannot be won by destroying women and children.

The fact that the end of the war might've have involved more fighting and that some campaigns had been planned that would have been bloody (again, an invasion wasn't the only scenario accounted for, the nuclear bombs proved at the very least that), doesn't change the fact that Japan had in essence already been defeated, whether they'd surrendered or not, whether the last mile would be painful or not.

> In fact, if anything, I would expect the causality ran the other way.

Your statement just supports the idea I raised, which is that the US threw the bombs knowing the USSR would at some point shift its focus towards Japan. I'm not saying that the US decided within 24 hours 'oh, the USSR attacks Japan, never woulda imagined that, took us by complete surprise, let's quickly drop the bomb'. Of course not, and of course that wouldn't make sense as you stated given the first bomb was dropped before that. My point is that with the war in Europe roundly settled, the USSR would very likely at one point have looked to exert its influence south of its borders, the region of Japanese influence, the US knew this and in fact the US was aware that the USSR delayed surrender proposals to make itself ready to shift its forces to the east. Given the above statements by top-ranked military personnel it's sensible to say that Japan had already been defeated, was dependent on imports, had no merchant fleet and barely a naval fleet that couldn't be refueled anyway. Thus an atomic bomb wasn't required to defeat Japan, unless you were on a timeline because at some point the USSR would shift its attention. The fact the USSR did shift immediately after the first bomb was dropped proves exactly their interest in being there for the end and playing a role in the peace process and aftermath. And indeed the very fact the USSR had the ability to invade quite quickly (much quicker than the Japanese had expected the Americans to invade), perhaps even caused the US to choose targets that'd show maximum damage (outside of Tokyo which was ruled out for obvious reasons), as opposed to using multiple nuclear weapons 'for show'. After all, the US would have the third bomb ready later that month, and the 4th in August, and others following, and was not at threat by Japan. Given a few months they could've continued to bomb with impunity, drop nuclear weapons for show with impunity, block off Japan's trade with impunity, and be strengthened by their Soviet allies.

> As for the threat of a divided Japan, exactly whose navy would have deposited enough Red Army troops on the Home Islands for that to be a concern?

The same fleet that allowed the 16th Army (100k strong) invade Sakhalin, or the fleet that facilitated the invasion of the Kuril islands, or the planned Russian invasion of Hokkaido which never happened due to the surrender. Don't take it by the way as a divided Japan in terms of two different countries on a militarised border like say Korea, but rather one like a divided Europe, in which the USSR has half of the influence. Unlike in Europe however, the USSR didn't acquire as much influence in Japan and Japan turned into a very strong US/Western ally, and one can argue sensibly that the atomic bombs may have helped the US in that regard, and that in turn this may have inspired the US to use the bombs in spite of a resolution to the war that would've taken longer.