I'm afraid not. Though it may be possible to find them through some more thorough Googling than I've attempted. Note, though, that the bills are probably not literal documents. "Bill," in the somewhat antique terminology used in the opinion. referred to what we would probably now call a "claim."

But in any event, this case makes clear that the Supreme Court (or any other federal court) will not hear cases that arise under state law.

>In each of the three cases now before this Court, the only right claimed by the plaintiffs is under the law of Tennessee, and they assert no right whatever under the Constitution and laws of the United States. In the first and second bills, the only reference to the Constitution or laws of the United States is the suggestion that the defendants will contend that the law of the state under which the plaintiffs claim is void, because in contravention of the Constitution of the United States, and by the settled law of this Court, as appears from the decisions above cited, a suggestion of one party that the other will or may set up a claim under the Constitution or laws of the United States does not make the suit one arising under that Constitution or those laws. In the third bill, no mention is made of the Constitution or laws of the United States or of any right claimed under either, and no statement in the petition for removal or in the demurrer of the defendant corporation can supply that want under the existing act of Congress.

> The result is that in the first and second cases, the decrees must be reversed at the cost of the plaintiffs, and the cases remanded to the circuit court of the United States with directions to dismiss the bills for want of jurisdiction, and that in the third case, the decree must be reversed at the cost of the defendants, and the case remanded to the circuit court of the United States with directions to remand it to the state court from which it was removed.

What this is saying is that on all three claims, the asserted cause of action arises under Tennessee law, so they cannot hear it. The fact that the defendants may make constitutional arguments in response to the first two claims is not enough to trigger federal jurisdiction.

The entire case revolves around whether the Supreme Court is able to hear the case in spite of the fact that the claims asserted y the plaintiff are state-law claims only. A notable case that came out the other way is Osborn v. Bank of the United States, https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/22/738/case.html, where the court concluded that it could hear a case involving only state-law claims, but only because the defendant was a bank of the United States (note, by the way, that this means a federal bank, as opposed to, e.g., a Tennessee state bank) and thus, pursuant to one of the exceptions I mentioned several messages ago, the Supreme Court could hear it because it involved distinctly federal interests. But here too, the whole question was whether a federal court was empowered to hear this case since it involved only state-law claims. The premise being, of course, that ordinarily a federal court cannot hear such claims.

Consider this sentence from Osborn:

> We think, then that when a question to which the judicial power of the Union is extended by the Constitution forms an ingredient of the original cause, it is in the power of Congress to give the circuit courts jurisdiction of that cause, although other questions of fact or of law may be involved in it.

This would be a very silly thing to write if the Constitution extended "the judicial power of the Union" to all cases.

I have directed you to many other sources that say the same thing. I can also tell you (though perhaps you won't believe me, or will not care) that this--the fact that federal courts have limited powers and typically can only hear cases involving federal law, or cases where the parties are from different states--is very basic knowledge for any lawyer who practices regularly in federal court.