Private ruling: Employment termination payment - payment for personal injury
Published: December 2013
Ruling period: 1 July 2012 to 30 June 2013
Date scheme commenced: 1 July 2012

Ruling: Q1: 1. Is any part of the payment received in settlement of a dispute lodged under the Fair Work Act 2009 included in your assessable income as the taxable component of an employment termination payment? 2. Is any part of the payment excluded from being an employment termination payment under paragraph 82-135(i) of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 (ITAA 1997)? 3. Is any part of the payment excluded from being a capital gain under section 118-37 of the ITAA 1997? Advice/Answers: 1. Yes. 2. No. 3. No.


Relevant legislative provisions: Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 Section 1-3. | Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 Section 82-130. | Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 Subsection 82-130(1). | Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 Paragraph 82-130(1)(a). | Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 Paragraph 82-130(1)(b). | Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 Paragraph 82-130(1)(c). | Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 Paragraph 82-130(2). | Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 Paragraph 82-130(4)(a). | Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 Subsection 82-130(5). | Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 Subsection 82-130(7). | Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 Section 82-135. | Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 Paragraph 82-135(i). | Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 Section 118-20. | Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 Section 118-22. | Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 Section 118-37 | Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 Section 995-1. | Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 Subsection 27A(1).

Reasons for decision: Summary: The settlement payment is an employment termination payment (ETP) as: o it is made in consequence of the termination of your employment; o it is made within 12 months of termination of your employment; and o it is not payment which is excluded from being an ETP . The payment is not exempt from being an ETP as a payment for personal injury. The payment is not subject to capital gains tax. | Detailed Reasoning - Is the payment an employment termination payment?: 1. A payment made to an employee is an employment termination payment if the payment satisfies all the requirements in section 82-130 of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 (ITAA 1997), and is not specifically excluded under section 82-135 of the ITAA 1997. 2. Subsection 82-130(1) of the ITAA 1997 states: 82-130(1) A payment is an employment termination payment if: (a) it is received by you: (i) in consequence of the termination of your employment; or (ii) after another person's death, in consequence of the termination of the other person's employment; and (b) it is received no later than 12 months after the termination (but see subsection (4)); and (c) it is not a payment mentioned in section 82-135. 3. The phrase 'in consequence of' is not defined in the ITAA 1997. However, the words have been interpreted by the courts in several cases. The Commissioner has also issued Taxation Ruling TR 2003/13 (TR 2003/13) which discusses the meaning of the phrase. 4. The Full High Court considered the expression 'in consequence of' in Reseck v. FC of T (1975) 133 CLR 45; (1975) 6 ALR 642; (1975) 49 ALJR 370; (1975) 5 ATR 538; (1975) 75 ATC 4213 ( Reseck ). Justice Gibbs stated: Within the ordinary meaning of the words a lump sum is paid in consequence of the termination of employment when the payment follows as an effect or result of the termination… It is not in my opinion necessary that the termination of the services should be the dominant cause of the payment. 5. While Justice Jacobs stated: It was submitted that the words 'in consequence of' import a concept that the termination of the employment was the dominant cause of the payment. This cannot be so. A consequence in this context is not the same as a result. It does not import causation but rather a 'following on'. 6. In looking at the phrase 'in consequence of' the Full Federal Court in McIntosh v. FC of T (1979) 25 ALR 557; (1979) 10 ATR 13; (1979) 45 FLR 279; (1979) 79 ATC 4325 ( McIntosh ) considered the decision in Reseck . Justice Brennan stated: Though Jacobs J. speaks in different terms, his meaning may not be significantly different from the meaning of Gibbs J... His Honour denies the necessity to show that retirement is the dominant cause, but he does not allow a temporal sequence alone to suffice as the nexus. Though the language of causation often contains the seeds of confusion, I apprehend his Honour to hold the required nexus to be (at least) that the payment would not have been made but for the retirement. 7. The Commissioner in TR 2003/13 considered the phrase 'in consequence of' as interpreted by the Courts. 8. Paragraph 5 of TR 2003/13 states: …the Commissioner considers that a payment is made in respect of a taxpayer in consequence of the termination of the employment of the taxpayer if the payment 'follows as an effect or result of' the termination. In other words, but for the termination of employment, the payment would not have been made to the taxpayer. 9. The question of whether a payment is made in consequence of the termination of employment will be determined by the relevant facts and circumstances of each case. 10. Payments made under a deed of release have also been held to be made in consequence of the termination of employment. 11. In Le Grand v. Commissioner of Taxation (2002) FCA 1258; (2002) 124 FCR 53; (2002) 195 ALR 194; 2002 ATC 4907; (2002) 51 ATR 139 ( Le Grand ), the payment received was not only in respect of the termination of employment. In holding the payment for damages to also be an ETP, Goldberg J stated at paragraph 35: I am satisfied that the payment was an effect or result of that termination in that there were a sequence of events following the termination of the employment which had a relationship and connection which ultimately led to the payment. True it is that the payment was made not only to settle the applicant's claim for common law damages for breach of the employment agreement but also for statutory damages... 12. Justice Heerey in Dibb v. Commissioner of Taxation 2003 ATC 4613; (2003) 53 ATR 290; [2004] ALMD 5781; [2003] FCA 673 ( Dibb ) stated that: 22. The concept of a 'payment 'in consequence of the termination of any employment' was expounded by the High Court in Reseck v FC of T 75 ATC 4213; (1975) 133 CLR 45 and by the Full Court of the Federal Court in McIntosh v FC of T 79 ATC 4325; (1979) 25 ALR 557. These authorities are analysed by Goldberg J in Le Grand v FC of T 2002 ATC 4907 at 4911-4913 [25-30] and 4914 [33-34]; (2002) 195 ALR 194 at [25] to [30] and [33] to [34]. I adopt his Honour's analysis. 23. In my opinion the Commissioner was correct in ruling that the payment under the Deed was made 'in consequence of the termination' of the applicant's employment with AVCO. True it is there was a substantial lapse in time between the termination and the commencement of Federal Court proceeding and a further period of time until settlement. However the reason for that delay was the time taken up with the litigation first in the Commission and then in the Federal Court itself. The subject matter of the litigation in the Federal Court was clearly the termination, the allegedly wrongful way AVCO effected it and its financial and other consequences for the applicant. The various causes of action, whether breach of contract, conspiracy, breach of fiduciary duty or contravention of the Trade Practices Act were, as Goldberg J would say ( Le Grand at ATC 4915 [36]; ALR [36]), 'interwoven and intertwined' with the termination. The payment was a consequence of the settlement, which was a consequence of the Federal Court proceeding, which in turn was a consequence of the termination.' 13. This reasoning was accepted by the Full Federal Court in Dibb v. Commissioner of Taxation (2004) 207 ALR 151; 2004 ATC 4555; (2004) 55 ATR 786; (2004) 136 FCR 388; [2004] ALMD 5780; [2004] FCAFC 126 by Justices Spender Dowsett and Allsop in determining the appeal against Justice Heerey's decision. 14. Therefore, the Courts have held that settlement amounts arising from actions that are in some way connected with the termination of employment are payments made in relation to the taxpayer in consequence of the termination of their employment. 15. In your case, you state that: · you commenced an internal discrimination, harassment and bullying complaint against the employer; · during the investigation of your complaint you were made redundant by the employer for reasons allegedly unrelated to your complaint; · the union lodged a complaint (the complaint), on your behalf, for breaches of the general provisions of an Act including for pain and suffering arising from discrimination, bullying and harassment; and · the complaint was settled by agreement between you and the employer by entering into a Deed of Release (the Deed). 16. On the basis of the information provided, there was a dispute between you and the employer as they deny your allegation. In accordance with the terms of settlement you received a payment (the settlement sum) for pain and suffering. 17. You believe that the settlement payment was made as compensation for pain and suffering incurred in the work place rather than for lost income; and that it should be taxed as a capital gain and not as an employment termination payment. 18. However, by signing the Deed you have agreed to what was written in the Deed. Therefore, by entering into the Deed with the employer, you agreed to release the employer from all claims, actions or proceedings arising out of your employment with the employer (excluding claims for personal injury), including but not limited to the cessation of employment . This is in accordance with the Deed. 19. Although the dominant cause of the payment is to settle the dispute there is a causal connection between the termination of employment and payment. As per the decision in Reseck quoted above, it is not necessary that the termination of employment is the dominant cause of the payment. 20. The payment was made once the Deed was executed, and the employer made that payment, in part because you released it from any further legal action in respect of your employment and the termination of that employment. 21. Given its nature, the dispute, the Deed, the termination of employment and the payment are all intertwined and connected. Based on the principles stated in Reseck , McIntosh, Dibb and Le Grand ; and the Commissioner's views expressed in TR 2003/13, the facts presented demonstrate a clear connection or a link exists between the termination of your employment and the payment. 22. Accordingly, it can only be concluded that the payment you have received satisfies the first condition of being an employment termination payment in accordance with subparagraph 82-130(1)(a)(i) of the ITAA 1997. 23. The other conditions of subsection 82-130(1) of the ITAA 1997 will now be considered. | Detailed Reasoning - The payment is received no later than 12 months after termination: 24. The second condition is stated under paragraph 82-130(1)(b) of the ITAA 1997. The settlement sum must be received within 12 months of the employee's termination of employment, unless the payment is covered by a determination exempting them from the 12 month rule. 25. The settlement payment was made within 12 months of the termination of your employment. Therefore, this condition is satisfied. | Detailed Reasoning - Exclusions under section 82-135 of the ITAA 1997: 26. Certain payments made on termination of employment are excluded from being an employment termination payment under section 82-135 of the ITAA 1997. These payments, among others, include: o accrued annual leave and long service leave payments which are covered by Subdivision 83-A and Subdivision 83-B respectively o superannuation benefits which are covered by Divisions 301 to 307 o the tax-free parts of a genuine redundancy payment or an early retirement scheme payment worked out under section 83-170; and o certain capital payments for personal injury. 27. The payment does not fall within the various exclusions under section 82-135 of the ITAA 1997 except possibly a payment for personal injury. We will now consider whether the payment is a capital payment for personal injury. 28. Paragraph 82-135(i) of the ITAA 1997 specifically excludes from being an employment termination payment: a capital payment for, or in respect of, personal injury to you so far as the payment is reasonable having regard to the nature of the personal injury and its likely effect on your capacity to derive income from personal exertion (within the meaning of the definition of income derived from personal exertion in subsection 6(1) of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1936). 29. This exclusion is for a payment or benefit that compensates or reimburses you for, or in respect of, the particular injury. 30. You have stated that you lodged a complaint against the CEO of the workplace on account of being subjected to bullying, discrimination and unfair treatment in the workplace. Further, you state that because of the above treatment, you became anxious and depressed, requiring you to seek support from psychologists and your GP. Consequently, the possible personal injury you could have had is 'anxiety and depression'. 31. The principal question for determination therefore is whether the payment can be characterised as 'a capital payment for, or in respect of, a 'personal injury'. The words require a relationship between the injury and payment. 32. The Explanatory Memorandum (EM) to the Tax Laws Amendment (Simplified Superannuation) Bill 2006 stated, in relation to section 82-135 of the ITAA 1997, that: consistent with current legislation, certain payments are prevented from qualifying as employment termination payments. 33. In accordance with section 1-3 of the ITAA 1997, provisions in the Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (ITAA 1936) which have been rewritten in the ITAA 1997 will have the same meaning where they express the same idea, even if the words used are different. It is therefore appropriate to cite cases that refer to the previous legislation. 34. The term 'personal injury' is not defined in the ITAA 1936.or in the ITAA 1997. Justice Smith of the Victorian Supreme Court considered the meaning of the term, in Graham v Robinson [1992] 1 VR 279 , ( Graham v Robinson )and stated at 281: In the absence of express authority, I have come to the conclusion that the expression personal injury does not extend beyond physical injury and mental illness to include emotional hurt. I am encouraged to this view by the fact that the law has rejected grief or sorrow as a form of injury which can be relied on to mount a claim in negligence: Mount Isa Mines Ltd. v. Pusey (1970) 125 CLR 383, at p. 394 and Jaensch v. Coffey (1984) 155 CLR 549, at p. 587. It is true that damages are awarded for pain and suffering in the typical personal injury case. They are awarded, however, where pain and suffering flow from and are connected with physical or mental injury and may therefore be said to be damages in respect of personal injury. 35. In considering the meaning of personal injury for the purpose of paragraph (n) the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT) has cited Graham v Robinson , in AAT Case 20/97; No 11 722 (1997) 35 ATR 1114; (1997) 97 ATC 258 and McMahon (mentioned above), and held that personal injury does not extend beyond physical injury or mental illness. 36. In your case, you do not have a physical injury or a mental illness. 37. In Commissioner of Taxation v. Scully (2000) 201 CLR 148; [2000] HCA 6; 2000 ATC 4111; (2000) 169 ALR 459; (2000) 74 ALJR 504; (2000) 43 ATR 718 ( Scully ) the High Court, in considering former paragraph 27A(1)(n), held that compensation must be calculated by reference to the nature and extent of the injury or likely loss to the taxpayer. 38. The payment in Scully was held not to be in respect of personal injury. Acting Chief Justice Gaudron and Justices McHugh, Gummow and Callinan stated in their joint decision: In our opinion, the payment in this case cannot be characterised as consideration... in respect of, personal injury. The fact that the payment is not calculated by reference to the nature and extent of the injury or likely loss to the respondent and the fact that the other benefits are similar to that for total and permanent disablement point inevitably to the conclusion that the payment was consideration... for, or in respect of the respondent's termination of employment and her rights under the Trust Deed and was not consideration... for, or in respect of her injury. 39. Therefore for an amount to meet the requirements of paragraph 82-135(i) of the ITAA 1997, the payment must be for, or in respect of, personal injury and be calculated by reference to the nature and extent of the injury or likely loss to the taxpayer. 40. In Purvis and Ors v. Federal Commissioner of Taxation (2013) 2013 ATC 10-296; (2013) AATA 58 ( Purvis ) the Administrative Appeals Tribunal held that the payment was not compensation for personal injury as the injury was not a factor in determining the amount of the payment. 41. In your case, the payment will be made in accordance the Deed. The Deed states that the payment is for 'pain and suffering' and does not specify any personal injury. In fact it excludes a claim for personal injury. There is no correspondence between the amount of the payment and the likely effect of any personal injury on your capacity to derive income from personal exertion. 42. Further, based on Graham v Robinson, as you do not have a physical injury or mental illness the payment is not for a personal injury and therefore is not excluded from being an employment termination payment. 43. Accordingly, it is considered that paragraph 82-135(i) of the ITAA 1997 does not exclude the lump sum payment from being an employment termination payment. As the payment is not a payment mentioned in section 82-135 of the ITAA 1997, paragraph 82-130(1)(c) of the ITAA 1997 is satisfied. 44. As discussed above, the payment is considered to be a payment received in consequence of the termination of employment and is not a payment mentioned in section 82-135 of the ITAA 1997; and is paid within 12 months of termination, all the conditions of subsection 82-130(1) of the ITAA 1997 will be met. Therefore, the payment is considered to be an employment termination payment. | Detailed Reasoning - Tax Treatment of the employment termination payment: 45. An employment termination payment is comprised of the following components: Ÿ Tax free component - this includes the pre-July 83 segment (if any) and/or the invalidity segment (if any); and Ÿ Taxable component - the amount remaining after deducting the tax free component from the total payment. 46. The tax free component is not assessable income and is not exempt income. 47. The taxable component is included, in full, as assessable income. 48. You commenced employment with the employer after 1983. Therefore, there will not be any pre-July 83 segment within the meaning of section 82-155 of the ITAA 1997. 49. As the payment is not made because you ceased being gainfully employed as a result of suffering from ill-health, there is no invalidity segment for the purposes of section 82-150 of the ITAA 1997. 50. Consequently, the employment termination payment (the settlement sum) will not contain a tax free component and will be comprised entirely of a taxable component (section 82-145 of the ITAA 1997). 51. From 1 July 2012, employment termination payments are subject to the 'whole-of-income- cap'. This cap is $180,000 less your other taxable income for the year. 52. The taxable component is subject to tax, depending on the person's age when the payment is received and on the lesser of the whole-of-income cap and the employment termination payments cap. 53. If the calculated whole-of-income-cap is less than the employment termination payment cap of $175,000 (2012-13 income year), the calculated whole-of-income-cap will apply to your employment termination payment of $15,000. 54. For recipients below preservation age, the taxable component of an employment termination payment is taxed at 30% for amounts below the employment termination payments cap of $175,000 for the 2012-13 income year or 'whole-of-income- cap' and at the top marginal rate for amounts above the cap. Medicare levy of 1.5% is added to the tax rate that applies. 55. Preservation age is the age at which retirees can access their superannuation benefits. This will be 55 for persons born before 1 July 1960 and between 55 and 60 for persons born after 30 June 1960. 56. In your case, your preservation age is 60 and you were under preservation age on the last day of the income year in which the payment was made. Therefore the payment is taxed at 31.5%. | Detailed Reasoning - Capital gains tax (CGT): 57. The general CGT exemptions provisions are found in subdivision 118-A of the ITAA 1997. Included amongst them is an anti-overlap provision, section 118-20, which ensures that an amount cannot be assessable under both the CGT provisions and non CGT provisions. The effect of the anti-overlap provision is to reduce the amount of any assessable capital gain by any amount which is also assessable under non CGT provisions and by amounts which are exempt income. 58. In your ruling application you stated that section 118-37 of the ITAA 1997 makes it clear that compensation for pain and suffering is characterised, not as income but as a capital gain. Further, you have also referred to a previously issued private ruling where a payment for pain and suffering due to bullying and harassment was considered a capital gain. 59. However, the facts in that case are not the same as in yours and therefore that result will not apply in your case. 60. The settlement payment is assessable under section 82-130 of the ITAA 1997 as explained above. The combined effect of section 118-20 and section 82-130 is that where a capital payment is assessable under a non-CGT provision, then it is treated as being assessable under that non-CGT provision. 61. In this regard, it is relevant to note the following comment made by Senior Member Dwyer of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT) in AAT Case 11,722 (1997) 35 ATR 1114; (1997) 97 ATC 258 at paragraph 31: I accept Mr Gibb's submission that if the payment is caught, as I am satisfied it is, by s 27A(1), there is no advantage to the applicant in the fact that it would have been exempt by virtue of s 160ZB(1), if it were not so caught. … 62. The above was in respect of the eligible termination payment provisions which, prior to 1 July 2007, were contained in the Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (ITAA 1936). The term 'eligible termination payment' was defined in former subsection 27A(1) in the ITAA 1936 and included any payments made in consequence of the termination of employment. Subsection 160ZB(1) of the ITAA 1936 was replaced by section 118-37 of the ITAA 1997 for the 1998-99 and later income years. 63. Section 118-37 of the ITAA 1997 deals with exemptions from capital gains of compensation or damages for wrong or injury suffered by a taxpayer. 64. However, as the settlement sum is to be included as assessable income under section 82-130 of the ITAA 1997 (the non CGT provision) any capital gain made is to be reduced under section 118-20 of the ITAA 1997 by the amount assessable under section 83-130. The fact that the payment may also be assessable as a capital gain does not change the fact that it is assessable under another provision of the ITAA 1997. 65. Accordingly, the settlement payment is excluded from the CGT provisions. Consequently, as explained above, the payment is assessable as an employment termination payment and taxed as explained above. | Detailed Reasoning - Genuine redundancy payment: 66. A payment made to an employee is a genuine redundancy payment (GRP) if it satisfies all criteria set out in section 83-175 of the ITAA 1997. 67. The first criteria to be satisfied (subsection 83-175(1) of the ITAA 1997) is: o that the payment is received by an employee who is dismissed from employment because the employee's position is genuinely redundant; and o that the payment exceeds the amount that could reasonably be expected to be received by the employee in consequence of the voluntary termination of his or her employment at the time of the dismissal. 68. Subsection 83-175(2) of the ITAA 1997 requires that all of the following conditions must be met: o The employee is dismissed before the earlier of: o the day he or she turned 65; or o if the employee's employment would have terminated when he or she reached a particular age or completed a particular period of service - the day he or she would reach that age or complete the period of service (as applicable). o If the dismissal was not at arms length the payment must not exceed the amount that could reasonably be expected to be made if the dismissal was at arms length. o At the time of the dismissal, there was no arrangement between the employee and the employer, or between the employer and another person, to employ the employee after the dismissal. 69. Subsection 83-175(3) of the ITAA 1997 imposes a further condition that the payment does not include any part of a payment that was received by the employee in lieu of superannuation benefits to which the employee may have become entitled at the time of the payment or at a later time. 70. From the information provided, you were dismissed from employment and clearly the redundancy payment and the payment in lieu of notice would not have been paid if you had resigned voluntarily. 71. Consequently, these amounts are in excess of what you could have received on voluntary termination of employment and the first condition is satisfied. 72. The other conditions have also been satisfied as there is no evidence to the contrary. Consequently, you have received a GRP. | Detailed Reasoning - Tax-free treatment of a genuine redundancy payment: 73. Section 83-165 of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 (ITAA 1997) states that any part of a genuine redundancy payment (GRP) that is not tax free under Subdivision 83 will normally be an employment termination payment. 74. Section 83-170 applies to determine the tax free treatment of the GRP. This section places a limit on the amount of a GRP that is eligible for concessional tax treatment and states: (1) This section applies if you receive a genuine redundancy payment or an early retirement scheme payment. (2) So much of the relevant payment as does not exceed the amount worked out under subsection (3) is not assessable income and is not exempt income. (3) Work out the amount using the formula: Base amount + (Service amount x Years of service) where: base amount means: (a) for the income year 2006-2007 - $6,783; and (b) for a later income year - the amount mentioned in paragraph (a) indexed annually. service amount means: (a) for the income year 2006-2007 - $3,392; and (b) for a later income year - the amount mentioned in paragraph (a) indexed annually. years of service means the number of whole years in the period, or sum of periods, of employment to which the payment relates. 75. Subsection 83-170(2) of the ITAA 1997 provides that so much of the GRP that does not exceed the amount worked out using the formula prescribed in subsection 83-170(3) of the ITAA 1997 is not assessable income and is not exempt income. 76. The Commissioner states in paragraph 72 of TR 2009/2: Any amount of a genuine redundancy payment in excess of the tax-free amount worked out under section 83-170 will be taxable as an employment termination payment. | Detailed Reasoning - Tax free amount: 77. The formula for working out the tax-free amount is: Base amount + ( Service amount x Years of service ) 78. For the 2012-13 income year: Base amount means $8,806; Service amount means $4,404; and Years of service means whole years of service with the employer. 79. The tax-free amount is calculated as follows. 80. In accordance with subsection 83-175(3) of the ITAA 1997, the tax-free part of a GRP you can receive in the 2012-13 income year equals: $8,806 + ($4,404 x whole years of service). 81. The GRP you have received is as calculated by the above formula. 82. However, as this amount calculated was below the threshold for the 2012-13 income year, the whole payment would be tax-free. The employer has treated only the redundancy payment as the tax free amount. 83. Consequently, you should request an amendment to your income tax return for the year 2012-13 income year to include the settlement sum as an ETP and to exclude the payment in lieu of notice as an ETP. Further this will require the tax deducted on these payments to be included and to be excluded respectively. 84. Please note that the amount paid under the Deed of Release does not form part of the GRP.

1. You are under 55 years of age. | 2. You commenced employment with an employer (the employer) on a casual basis for a period of months. | 3. Later you were offered a two day a week contracted position. | 4. Your position with the employer was made permanent on a number of days per week. | 5. You state that you were subjected to a period of sustained bullying, discrimination and unfair treatment at work. | 6. You commenced an internal discrimination, harassment and bullying complaint against the CEO of the employer. | 7. Your employment terminated due to redundancy while your complaint was still under investigation. | 8. A letter from the employer advised that you would receive a redundancy payment plus a payment in lieu of notice. | 9. Your union filed a complaint on your behalf for breach of the general protections provisions of a particular Act at the government body dealing with discrimination. | 10. Your claim was settled by agreement between you and the employer under a Deed of Release. | 11. Under the terms of settlement you were to receive an amount (the settlement payment) for pain and suffering. This payment is the subject of the ruling request. | 12. The terms of settlement states that you release the employer from all claims actions or proceedings from the employment and its cessation excluding claims for personal injury under a state and federal legislation. | 13. A PAYG payment summary shows that you received a payment in June 2013. This amount includes the settlement payment. | 14. You have lodged your income tax return for the 2012-13 income year.