PETITIONER: INDIAN OIL CORPORATION Vs. RESPONDENT: <ORG>. DATE OF JUDGMENT06/04/1988 BENCH: <NAME>, <NAME> (J) BENCH: <NAME>, <NAME> (J) RANGNATHAN, S. CITATION: 1988 AIR 1340 1988 SCR (3) 426 1988 SCC (3) 36 JT 1988 (2) 212 1988 SCALE (1)965 CITATOR INFO : RF 1989 SC 973 (9) ACT: Arbitration Act , 1940: Sections 30 and 33-Award of Arbitrator-Reasoned Award-What is-Arbitration clause requiring arbitrator to give reasoned award-Whether arbitrator required to give detailed reasons-Sufficiency of reasons depends on facts of the case-<ORG> not to sit in appeal over award and review reasons. HEADNOTE: % In respect of sale of raw petroleum coke by petitioner to respondent there were three agreements, providing for sale, petitioner's right to shift raw petroleum coke at the risk and expense of the respondent in case of failure of Respondent to shift the same as agreed, and the Respondent's liability to pay interest on the value of stock not uplifted. There was default in payment and petitioner stopped supplies to respondent, filed a suit and obtained an order of attachment of stocks of raw petroleum coke, to the extent of Rs.6 crores, of the Respondent. The respondent filed an appeal as also an application for stay of the suit under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act. Meanwhile the petitioner terminated the agreement. Thereafter the respondent filed a suit and the <ORG> passed an order for restoration of supplies. On an appeal by the petitioner, this <ORG> stayed the order of restoration of supplies, and recorded the compromise terms, pursuant to which all proceedings were withdrawn by the parties. The petitioner's claim were referred to an Arbitrator, who passed an interim award, according to which the petitioner was not entitled to any interest nor any shifting charges. The petitioner challenged the said award, when it was filed in <ORG>. The <ORG> dismissed the petition and this special leave petition is against the <ORG>'s order. It was contended before this <ORG> that the Arbitrator has failed to give a reasoned award and so it is bad in law. Dismissing the special leave petition, this <ORG>, ^ HELD: 1. It is obligatory in England now after the Arbitration 427 Act, 1979, that the award should give reasons. The purpose of Section 12 of the Act requiring the tribunal to furnish a statement of reasons if requested to do so before it gave its decision is to enable the person whose property or whose interests were affected, to know, if the decision was against him, what the reasons were. [435B-C] 'Law of Arbitration' by Justice <NAME>. First Edition 1983 pp. 320 and 321, referred to. 2.1 In India, there has been a trend that reasons should be stated in the award. The reasons that are set out must be reasons which will not only be intelligible but also deal with the substantial points that have been raised. When the arbitration clause required the arbitrator to give a reasoned award, the sufficiency of the reasons depend upon the facts of the particular case. He is not bound to give detailed reasons. [435C-D] 2.2 The <ORG> does not sit in appeal over the award and review the reasons. The <ORG> can set aside the award only if it is apparent from the award that there is no evidence to support the conclusions or if the award is based upon any legal proposition which is erroneous.[435D-E] 2.3 The award in question is unassailable. According to the Arbitrator, because of the letter dated 18th October, 1982 of the petitioner addressed to the Respondent stating that if the outstandings and interest are not paid, further supplies would not be made, has been acted upon by the petitioner, which had not delivered any coke to the respondent, or made any offer to do so, the petitioner was not entitled to the interest in respect of the period from 18th October, 1982 onwards, nor to shifting charges in respect of any shifting on or after 18th October, 1982. On this reasoning, he had given the award. How the Arbitrator has drawn inference is apparent from the reasons. No proposition was stated in the aforesaid reasons, which could be objected to as an error of law. The reasons given by the Arbitrator meet the requirements of a reasoned award. It is apparent that the arbitrator has not acted irrelevantly and unreasonably. [432E-G; 434G-H] 2.4 Arbitration procedure should be quick and that quickness of the decision can always be ensured by insisting that short intelligible indications of the grounds should be available to find out the mind of the arbitrator for his action. This was possible in the instant case where the arbitrator has spoken his mind, and he is clear as to how he acted 428 and why he acted in that manner.[434H; 435A] <CITATION> ., AIR, 1923 P.C. 66; <CITATION> , 4 JT 1987 3 S.C. 239; <CITATION> ,  Suppl. S.C.R. 489; <CITATION> ,  3 SCR 12 and <CITATION> ,  2 SCR 903, referred to Bremer Handelsgesellschaft v. <NAME>,  2 Lloyd's Law Reports 130, referred to. JUDGMENT:

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 4557 of 1988.

From the Judgment and Order dated 21.3.88 of <ORG> in Appeal No. 306 of 1988.

<NAME>, <NAME> and <NAME> for the Petitioner.

<NAME>, <NAME>, <NAME>, <NAME>, <NAME> and Mrs. <NAME> for the Respondents.

The Judgment of the <ORG> was delivered by <NAME>, J. This petition under Article 136 of the Constitution challenges the judgment and order of <ORG> of <ORG> dated 21st March, 1988. The petitioner in this case on 23rd June, 1961, had agreed to sell to the predecessor of respondent raw petroleum coke. There was a second agreement on 22nd April, 1971. The said agreement was arrived at between the parties whereunder it was provided that in case the respondent failed to lift raw petroleum coke as agreed, the petitioner would have right to shift raw petroleum coke at the risk and expense of the respondent. There was a third agreement providing that in case of delay in payment, the respondent would pay interest at 4 per cent over the <ORG> borrowing rate, on the value of the stock not uplifted. It appears that on 5th August, 1982, the respondent wrote a letter to the petitioner showing inability to pay the arrears of the price against delivery of raw petroleum coke. On 4th October, 1982 there was a stock of about 13,760 M.T.S. Of saleable raw petroleum coke lying at Gauhati Refinery. The petitioner on 18th October, 1982 wrote to the respondent that unless the outstandings as on 1st September, 1982 and interest were paid, the petitioner would not make further supplies. Thereafter the petitioner filed Suit No. 2187 of 1982 for payment and for attachment before judgment. On 21st December, 1982, it appears that there was an order of attachment of stocks of raw petroleum coke to the extent of Rs.6 crores of the respondent. The order was confirmed after notice. Respondent filed Appeal No. 858 of 1983. Thereafter respondent on 20th ostler, 1983 filed an application for stay of the suit under section 34 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 (hereinafter called 'the Act'). The petitioner on 11th July, 1983 terminated the agreement with effect from 31.8.83. The respondent thereafter filed Suit No. 122 of 1983 and applied for an order compelling the petitioner to make supplies. The learned District Judge passed an order on 28th April, 1984 for restoration of supplies. On 7th May, 1984 in petitioner's appeal viz., Civil Appeal No. 2476 of 1984, this <ORG> stayed the above order. On 24th May, 1984 this <ORG>'s order setting aside the order of the learned District Judge dated 28th April, 1984 and recorded the compromise terms. Pursuant to the compromise, all proceedings were withdrawn by the parties. On 11th December, 1984 matter relating to the petitioner's claims in respect of interest on stocks held from 1st October, 1982 onwards and expenses of shifting raw petroleum coke from 1st October, 1982 upto 31st August, 1983, were referred to arbitration of <NAME>, a former Chief Justice of India. On 21st August, 1986 an interim award was passed by the learned arbitrator. Interim award was filed in <ORG> and the petitioner challenged the said award. The learned single Judge of the High <ORG> dismissed the petition challenging the interim award. <ORG> of <ORG> upheld the order of the learned single Judge. Hence this petition under Article 136 of the Constitution.

The main contention urged before us was that it was necessary in the present trend of law for the learned arbitrator to have given a reasoned award. The Arbitration Act , 1979 in England so enjoins. The arbitrator, according to the petitioner has failed to do so. Hence the award was bad and as such the decision of <ORG> was wrong and leave should be granted from the said decision and the matter be referred to <ORG> as several cases are pending on this point.

The learned single Judge of <ORG> in his decision had observed that the award was undoubtedly not an elaborately reasoned award setting out all the reasons which prompted the learned arbitrator to arrive at the conclusion he did reach, but it was a speaking award. The learned Judge however, held that it was not necessary to examine this aspect since even if it was a speaking order, it was not bad in law. It is true that the law as it stands upto date since the decision of <CITATION> ., A.I.R. 1923 P.C. 66 that it was not necessary that all awards should be speaking awards. See in this connection the observations of this Court in <CITATION> , 4 JT 1987 3 S.C. 239.

Previously the law both in England and India was that an arbitrator's award might be set aside for error of law appearing on the face of it, though the jurisdiction was not lightly to be exercised. Since question of law could always be dealt with by means of a special case this is one matter that could be taken into account when deciding whether the jurisdiction to set aside an award on this ground should be exercised or not. The jurisdiction was one that existed at common law independently of statute. In order to be a ground for setting aside the award, an error in law on the face of the award must be such that there could be found in the award, or in any document actually incorporated with it, some legal proposition which was the basis of the award and which was erroneous. See Halsbury's Laws of England, 4th edition. paragraph 623, page 334. The law has undergone a sea change in England. It is obligatory in England now after the Arbitration Act , 979, that the award should give reasons.

In the instant case. the arbitrator has set out the history in the interim award. The arbitrator has stated that the agreement dated 22nd April. 1970 provided that I.C.L.. will uplift all available coke produced at the Gauhati Refinery by which name also the Noonmati Refinery was called. the said upliftment being so regulated that the quantity uplifted every week was equivalent to the production of coke at the refinery in the previous week and that whereas it was thereby further provided that the upliftment by I.C.L. shall also be as regulated that the accumulated quantity of coke in the refinery coke yard does not fall below 2500 tons and does not exceed 4500 tons. The other history of the matter, it was recited that the order dated 24th May, 1984 was passed by consent of the parties by this Court that the claim of <ORG> for interest on stocks said to have been held in the Gauhati Refinery from 1st October, 1982 onwards and its claim for expenses of shifting the coke from 1st October, 1982 upto 3 1st August, 1983 would be referred to the arbitration of a retired Judge of <ORG> mutually acceptable to the parties. Two preliminary issues, the arbitrator framed were, namely, (1) Is the claimant entitled to charge any interest on unlifted stock of raw petroleum coke in view of its letter dated October 18, 1982? and (2) Is the claimant entitled to any shifting charges in view of its letter dated 18th October, 1982? The gist of the letter dated 18th October, 1982 is set out in the arbitration agreement. The arbitrator in his award pro- to observe as follows:

"And whereas it is not in dispute between the parties that since the said letter of 18th October, 1982, <ORG> had not delivered or offered to deliver any raw petroleum coke for <ORG> Now, therefore, having heard counsel for the parties and perused the documents and statements filed by them, the despatch and receipt of none of which is disputed, and having considered thereafter, I adjudge, hold and award as follows: The letter dated 18th October, 1982 is no bar to <ORG> claim for shifting charges and interest in respect of the period from 1st October, 1982 to 17th October, 1982. Because of the said letter which has been admittedly acted upon by <ORG> which had not delivered any coke to <ORG> Or made any offer to do so <ORG> is not entitled to the interest claimed in respect of the period from 18th October, 1982 onwards nor to shifting charges in respect of any shifting done on or after 18th October, 1982."

The aforesaid grounds are the reasons of the arbitrator for making the award. The award is that <ORG> is not entitled to any interest nor any shifting charges. The reasons for the said conclusion are the aforesaid three factors mentioned by the arbitrator. How the arbitrator has drawn inference is apparent from the reasons. It is to be noted that this Court has been insisting on the arbitrators to give some indications to indicate how the mind of the arbitrator acts. This Court in the case of <CITATION> ,  Suppl. S.C.R. 489 was concerned with the decision of the Collector of <ORG>. This Court observed that where an authority makes an order in exercise of a quasi-judicial function, it must record its reasons in support of the order it makes. This Court observed further that every quasi-judicial order must be supported by reasons.

<CITATION> ,  3 SCR 12 where this Court was concerned with an award under section 10A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. This Court observed that there was a need for a speaking order where considerable numbers are affected in their substantial rights. It was further reiterated that in such a situation a speaking order may well be a facet of natural justice or fair procedure. <CITATION> ,  2 SCR 903, this Court reiterated that it was an implied term of the arbitration agreement that the arbitrators must decide the dispute in accordance with the ordinary law and they cannot decide disputes on the basis of their personal knowledge. The proceedings, it was held, before the arbitrators were quasi- judicial proceedings and they must be conducted in accordance with the principles of natural justice. It was, therefore, obligatory to give reasons. As mentioned hereinbefore there has been since then trend that reasons should be stated in the award and the question whether the reasons are necessary in ordinary arbitration agreement between the parties has been referred to <ORG>.

In this case, however, we are in agreement with <ORG> that reasons were stated in the award. We have set out hereinbefore the three grounds, namely, (1) The letter dated 18th October, 1982 is no bar to <ORG> claim for shifting charges and interest in respect of the period from 1st October, 1982 to 17th October, 1982. (2) The inference drawn from the contents of the letter and (3) Because of the said letter which has admittedly been acted upon by <ORG>, and which had not delivered any coke to <ORG> Or made any offer to do so. For these reasons, the arbitrator held that <ORG>, is not entitled to interest claimed in respect of the period from 18th October, 1982 onwards nor to shifting charges from 18th October, 1982. These are the reasons for giving the award. No error of law was pointed out in those reasons. Indeed no proposition of law was stated in the aforesaid reasons, which could be objected to as an error of law. There was, however, no error of fact. It was a possible view to take. It could not be urged that it was an impossible view to take. The arbitrator has made his mind known on the basis of which he has acted that, in our opinion, is sufficient to meet the requirements even if it be reasons should be stated in the award. It is one thing to say that reasons should be stated and another thing to state that a detailed judgment to be given in support of an award. Even if it be held that it is obligatory to state the reasons, it is not obligatory to give a detailed judgment. This question was considered by <ORG> in England in <ORG> v. <NAME>, [1981] 2 <ORG>. There Lord <NAME> speaking for the court at pages 132 and 133 of the report observed as follows:

"It is of the greatest importance that trade arbitrators working under the 1979 Act should realize that their whole approach should now be different. At the end of the hearing they will be in a position to give a decision and the reasons for that decision. They should do so at the earliest possible moment. The parties will have made their submissions as to what actually happened and what is the result in terms of their respective rights and liabilities. All this will be fresh in the arbitrators' minds and there will be no need for further written submission by the parties. No particular form of award is required. Certainly no one wants a formal "Special Case". All that is necessary is that the arbitrators should set out what, on their view of the evidence, did or did not happen and should explain succinctly why, in the light of what happened, they have reached their decision and what that decision is. This is all that is meant by a "reasoned award".

For example, it may be convenient to begin by explaining briefly how the arbitration came about- "X sold to Y 200 tons of soyabean meal on the terms of GAFTA Contract 100 at US. $Z per ton c.i.f. Bremen. X claimed damages for non-delivery and we were appointed arbitrators". The award could then briefly tell the factual story as the arbitrators saw it. Much would be common ground and would need no elaboration. But when the award comes to matters in controversy, it would be helpful if the arbitrators not only gave their view of what occurred, but also made it clear that they have considered any alternative version and have rejected it, e.g., "The shippers claimed that they shipped 100 tons at the end of June. We are not satisified that this is so", or as the case may be. "We are satisfied that this was not the case". The arbitrators should end with their conclusion as to the resulting rights and liabilities of the parties. There is nothing about this which is remotely technical, difficult or time consuming.

It is sometimes said that this involves arbitrators in delivering judgments and that this is something which requires legal skills. This is something of a half truth. Much of the art of giving a judgment lies in telling a story logically, coherently and accurately. This is something which requires skill, but it is not a legal skill and it is not necessarily advanced by legal training. It is certainly a judicial skill, but arbitrators for this purpose are Judges and will have no difficulty in acquiring it. Where a 1979 Act award differs from a judgment is in the fact that the arbitrators will not be expected to analyse the law and the authorities. It will be quite sufficient that they should explain how they reached their conclusion, e.g., "We regarded the conduct of the buyers, as we have described it, as constituting a repudiation of their obligations under the contract and the subsequent conduct of the sellers, also as described, as amounting to an acceptance of that repudiatory conduct putting an end to the contract". It can be left to others to argue that this is wrong in law and to a professional Judge, if leave to appeal is given, to analyse the authorities. This is not to say that where arbitrators are content to set out their reasoning on questions of law in the same way as Judges, this will be unwelcome to the <ORG>. Far from it. The point which I am seeking to make is that a reasoned award, in accordance with the 1979 Act, is wholly different from an award in the form of a special case. It is not technical, it is not difficult to draw and above all it is something which can and should be produced promptly and quickly at the conclusion of the hearing. That is the time when it is easiest to produce an award with all the issues in mind." See the observations in <ORG>, 20th Edn., page 291 Reasons for the Award and the decision referred to therein. "

In a case of this nature, issues are simple, points are fresh and facts are clear, the reasons given by the arbitrator, in our opinion, meet the requirements of a reasoned award. It is apparent that the arbitrator has not acted irrelevantly or unreasonably. Arbitration procedure should be quick and that quickness of the decision can always be ensured by insisting that short intelligible indications of the grounds should be available to find out the mind of the arbitrator for his action. This was possible in the instant case. In the instant case the arbitrator has spoken his mind, and he is clear as to how he acted and why he acted in that manner.

The purpose of section 12 of the English Tribunal and Inquiries Act which required the statutory tribunal to furnish a statement of the reasons if requested to do so before it gave its decision was to enable a person whose property or whose interests were affected to know if the decision was against him what the reasons were. Justice <NAME> in his Law of Arbitration, First Edition 1983, pages 320 and 321 states that the provision was read as meaning that proper and adequate reasons must be given. The reasons that are set out must be reasons which will not only be intelligible but also deal with the substantial points that have been raised. When the arbitration clause required the arbitrator to give a reasoned award and the arbitrator does give his reasons in the award, the sufficiency of the reasons depend upon the facts of the particular case. He is not bound to give detailed reasons. The <ORG> does not sit in appeal over the award and review the reasons. The <ORG> can set aside the award only if it is apparent from the award that there is no evidence to support the conclusions or if the award is based upon any legal proposition which is erroneous.

Judges in that light, the award in question was unassailable in the instant case.

In the aforesaid view of the matter, we are of the opinion that <ORG> was right in the view it took. The special leave petition fails and is accordingly dismissed.

G.N. Petition dismissed.


JUDGMENT <NAME>, J.

1. This appeal under Section 378 . has been filed by the State of U.P. against the judgment and order dated 3rd October, 1981 passed by the then Sessions Judge in ST. No. 108 of 1980 whereby he acquitted all the three accused of all the charges framed against them.

2. In brief, the facts of the prosecution case giving rise to this appeal were as under:

<NAME> <NAME>, son of <NAME>, lodged a report at <ORG> station Gobardhan Mathura on 13.1.1981 at 8-45 P.M. and the local <ORG> registered a case at case crime No. 13 under Section 302 I.P.C. The informant alleged in his report that on 13.1.1981 at about 6-30 P.M. he accompanied by his father <NAME> (deceased), his uncle <NAME>, servant <NAME>, son of <NAME>, and one <NAME> were proceeding towards Gobardhan along with several cattle through a canal road. Accused <NAME>, his son <NAME> and his brother <NAME> met the informant and others on the canal road and wanted to know their destination. The informant replied that they were going to Gobardhan and did business of cattle. The informant's sister <NAME> was married to <NAME> who left her on account of bringing inadequate dowry. Ultimately, the informant settled her second marriage but <NAME> and others did not put any question as to why he had settled her second marriage.

3. Accused <NAME> instigated his brother and son to kill the informant and others and he himself opened fire with a view to kill <NAME> but he missed his aim. The informant and his companions took a turn and raised alarm. <NAME> also opened fire and shot <NAME> at his neck. <NAME> sustained firearm injuries on his neck, fell down and died on the spot. On hue and cry, all the three accused took about turn and ran away. The informant left the dead body of his father in the supervision of his servant <NAME> and <NAME>.

4. He got a report prepared by one <NAME> and accompanied by his uncle and others reached Police station and lodged the FIR.

5. After registration of the case, <NAME> left the <ORG> station and reached the village in question on the same night at about 10-00 P.M. and searched the assailants. Since there was no light available, he did not prepare inquest report. Next day at about 7-00 A.M., Panchayatnama and other papers were prepared by the I.O. He sealed the dead body and handed over to constable <NAME> who took the dead body to mortuary. The I.O. interrogated <NAME>, <NAME>, <NAME> and others and after inspection prepared site plan. He collected blood stained earth on 14.1.1981. All the accused were arrested by the <ORG> and were interrogated. After completing investigation, the I.O. submitted charge sheet against all the three accused named in the FIR.

6. Accused <NAME> was charged under Section 302 I.P.C. and the remaining two accused were charged under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the Penal Code. Accused <NAME> was charged under Section 307 I.P.C. also. They all pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried.

7. In order to bring home the charges against the accused, the prosecution examined <NAME>, the informant, <NAME>, brother of the deceased, <NAME> who was said to be eyewitness of the murder, <ORG> head constable <NAME> and <ORG> constable <NAME> filed their respective affidavits, P.W.6 Dr. <NAME>, the then C.M.O., Mathura, was examined to prove the post-mortem report which was prepared by Dr. <NAME>. He led secondary evidence as Dr. <NAME> had left the country and had gone to Libia, <NAME> of the case was also examined and P.W.8 Constable <NAME> also filed affidavit.

8. All the three accused admitted their inter se relationship as well as this fact that informant's sister was married to <NAME>. <NAME> further admitted that he did not bring his wife but he did not demand dowry. They pleaded that the witnesses are related to each other and <NAME> was servant of <NAME>.

9. Accused examined <NAME> as D.W.1 and <NAME> as D.W. 2, Assistant Record Keeper, S.P. office, Mathura to prove that one <NAME> was also killed in the plots of village Doserash on 13.1.1981 and an entry was made in the G.D. dated 14.1.1981 of <NAME>. One court witness <NAME>, Inspector Commercial Taxes, <ORG>, Bahaz, district Bharatpur was examined who disclosed that <ORG> used to collect 5% as commercial tax on the sale of cattle except cow.

10. After appraisal of the evidence on record led by the parties learned <NAME> concluded that how the assailants came to know that the deceased and others were going to Gobardhan along with their cattle through canal road and the light was not sufficient to identify the assailants. The prosecution witnesses were partisan and as such, he gave benefit of doubt and acquitted all the three accused.

11. Aggrieved by the judgment and order passed by learned <NAME> Judge, the <ORG> has come up in appeal.

12. We have heard learned A.G.A. and <NAME>, learned Counsel for accused-respondents at length and perused the record carefully.

13. Learned Additional Government Advocate has contended that there was motive to the accused to commit murder as <NAME> had left his wife and the informant had settled her second marriage. It was further urged that about 6-30 P.M. on 13.1.1981, there must have been sufficient light to identify the real assailants. The assailants were relatives of the informant and others and as such, there was no difficulty in recognizing them at about sun set. Moreover, the informant and his companions talked to the assailants. It was further submitted that the prosecution examined <NAME> and <NAME>, who are son and brother of the deceased respectively. It is true that they were related to the deceased but there was no question of doubting their presence at the scene of incident. <NAME> was a resident of district Alwar and was an independent witness and as such, learned Judge erred in rejecting his testimony also. He was not justified in extending benefit of doubt to all the three accused who committed murder of <NAME> in furtherance of their common intention. The incident was reported to the <ORG> promptly within two hours of the incident at the <ORG> station situate at a distance of six kilometers. In this view of the matter, the learned Judge committed error in appraisal of the evidence led by the prosecution and this appeal has to be allowed and accused are liable to be convicted.

14. On the other hand, learned Counsel for the accused-respondents urged vehemently that about at 6-30 P.M. in the month of January there must have been complete darkness and as such, it was not possible for the witnesses to identify the real assailants. It was submitted that on the same night <NAME>, a hardened criminal of the area, was also killed and an entry was made in General Diary at P.S. Gobardhan on 14.1.1981, which was proved by <NAME>. The murder of the informant's father was committed at an unknown place by the dacoits who killed <NAME> also and the accused were rightly acquitted by the trial court.

15. We have given our anxious consideration to the submissions made on behalf of the parties and perused the entire record, including oral and documentary evidence led by the parties. We have gone through the impugned judgment also. The learned Judge was of the view that there was no motive for the accused to commit murder of <NAME> and the murder did not take place at the place and in the manner as alleged by the prosecution. The trial Judge further found that it was the month of January and on account of complete darkness at the scene of alleged murder it was not possible for the informant or other witnesses to identify the real culprits and as such, he found that the prosecution could not bring home the charge against any accused beyond all shadow of doubt.

16. We are fully aware of the law on the point that there is no embargo on <ORG> to appreciate the evidence afresh but interference in the order of acquittal should be made for compelling reasons. Generally, the order of acquittal shall not be interfered with because the presumption of innocence of the accused is further strengthened by the acquittal. The golden thread which runs through the web of administration of justice in criminal cases is that if two views are possible on the evidence adduced in the case, one pointing to the guilt of the accused and the other to his innocence, the view which is favorable to the accused should be adopted. The paramount consideration of the court is to ensure that miscarriage of justice is prevented. ( <CITATION> 2006 (56) ACC 219).

17. When we analyze and scrutinize the evidence in the light of aforesaid proposition of law, we find that the trial Judge committed error in appraisal of the evidence led by the prosecution and the prosecution had succeeded in establishing the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. Admittedly, Smt. <NAME>, sister of <NAME>, was married to accused <NAME>, son of <NAME>. The deceased (<NAME>) was father-in-law of <NAME> and the informant is brother-in-law of <NAME>. The third accused <NAME> is real brother of <NAME> and uncle of accused <NAME>. It is thus clear that the parties were closely related to each other and were well known since marriage of Smt. <NAME> with <NAME>. It is further undisputed that after marriage of Smt. <NAME> with <NAME>, he left her and she was living in her <NAME>. Prior to the murder of <NAME>, <NAME> had settled second marriage of Smt. <NAME> but <NAME> was not performed. Smt. <NAME> had not been divorced by her husband. In this view of the matter, it is crystal clear that the accused had a motive to teach a lesson to his father-in-law and members of his family as they had settled second marriage of his wife, who had not been divorced by her husband. This action on the part of the informant must not have been relished by the accused. It is therefore incorrect to say that the accused had no motive. It will not be out of place to mention that motive has no significance in cases, which are based on direct evidence of eyewitnesses.

18. In the instant case, it is quite clear from the medical evidence coupled with eyewitness account that <NAME> was done to death as a result of gun shot injuries on his neck on 13.1.81 at about 6-00 P.M. The doctor who conducted autopsy found that death had taken place about one day prior to the examination which was done at 5-30 P.M. on 14.1.1981. It is noteworthy that the doctor found one gunshot wound of entry trachea deep on the front of neck. There were fractures of third and fourth cervical vertebrae and laceration at the level of third and fourth cervical vertebrae. Moreover, trachea was punctured through and through just below thyroid cartilage. We therefore hold that <NAME> had his unnatural death as a result of gun shot injury on his neck on 13.1.1981 at the time as alleged by the prosecution.

19. So far as the complicity of the three accused in the crime is concerned, the prosecution examined <NAME>, <NAME> and <NAME>. As mentioned above, the prosecution version is that <NAME> did business of sale and purchase of cattle and he used to bring cattle from Rajasthan. On the impugned date also, <NAME> along with others were bringing the cattle to Gobardhan market for sale. They were coming to Gobardhan along with cattle through canal road. The accused met them in the way and made an enquiry. The deceased replied that they were going to Gobardhan to sell cattle. After having heard this reply and recognizing the deceased and <NAME> exhorted his son and he himself opened fire. He, however, missed his target. The informant and others took turn and raised alarm. In the meantime, <NAME> opened fire and shot at the neck of <NAME> who sustained injuries, fell down and succumbed on the spot. On the alarm, all the three accused took about turn and ran away and the witnesses did not chase them on account of fear. <NAME> and <NAME> are no doubt son and brother of the deceased respectively. They wholeheartedly supported the prosecution story and stated in unambiguous words that first shot was fired by <NAME> who missed his aim. It was <NAME> who. fired the fatal shot at the neck of the deceased and thereafter all the three culprits ran away. They were cross-examined extensively on behalf of the accused but nothing could be elicited to show that they have not spoken the truth. <NAME> denied the suggestion of the defence that one <NAME> Jatav was also killed at the scene of incident by dacoits and the murder of <NAME> was committed by unknown miscreants. The prosecution placed reliance on the testimony of <NAME> also, who is a co-villager of the informant and is Brahman by caste. He too fully corroborated the testimony of other witnesses regarding participation of the three accused in the crime. He claimed to have seen the accused in his village as they had their relatives in his village. We find nothing in his cross-examination also to discard or disbelieve his testimony.

20. So far as sufficiency of light is concerned, we find that incident of murder took place on 13.1.1981 at about 6-30 P.M. Admittedly, the sun had set in but there was light in which the culprits could be identified. It may not be out of place to mention that even after sunset, one gets natural light and the persons known to each other may be identified correctly without any difficulty. In the case in hand, the parties were close relatives and were known to each other for the last several years. Moreover, they had a talk with each other regarding cattle and their destination and as such, it cannot be inferred that on account of complete darkness at the time of alleged murder, the witnesses could not identify the real assailants. It is noteworthy that the informant is an illiterate rustic villager and he affixed thumb impression on his written report. It is therefore not possible to conclude that the informant mentioned the exact time of incident. The scribe of the report used the word at about 6-30 P.M. In this view of the matter, we are unable to subscribe the view of the trial Judge that on account of complete darkness, it was not easy for the witnesses to recognize the culprits.

21. There were three accused who faced trial for committing murder of <NAME>. Accused <NAME> and <NAME>, who are father and son respectively, were assigned the specific role of firing and exhortation also. We, however, find that neither role of exhortation/instigation was assigned in the FIR nor any overact was shown on the part of the third accused <NAME>, son of <NAME>, who is brother of <NAME>. The witnesses examined on behalf of the prosecution did not utter a single word about role played by him except that he was accompanying <NAME> and others. He was allegedly carrying a lathi. He, however, did not cause any injury to the deceased or to the witnesses. We are, therefore, of the opinion that his involvement in the crime had not been proved by reliable and convincing evidence and he was rightly given benefit of doubt.

22. In view of the aforesaid discussion and the reasons given above, we hold that the order of acquittal recorded by the trial Judge against accused-respondents <NAME> and <NAME> is not sustainable in law and is liable to be set aside. So far as the acquittal of accused-respondent <NAME> is concerned, we see no valid reason to disturb his acquittal.

23. The appeal is, accordingly, partly allowed. The acquittal of accused-respondent <NAME> is affirmed but acquittal of <NAME> and <NAME> is set aside. Accused <NAME> is found guilty and convicted of the offence punishable under Section 302 I.P.C. Accused <NAME> is convicted under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the Penal Code. We do not intend to hear learned Counsel for the accused on the quantum of sentence to be awarded as we are inclined to impose the lesser penalty prescribed under the law. Both father and son are, therefore, sentenced to undergo imprisonment for life thereunder.

24. Both <NAME> and <NAME> are on bail. A copy of this judgment shall be sent to <NAME>, Mathura who will get both the accused arrested and lodged in Jail within a period of six weeks. He will intimate to this Court within eight weeks about compliance of the order from the date of receipt of a copy of the judgment.

25. A copy of this judgment shall be certified to the court of Sessions Judge, <NAME> also for information and necessary entries. The lower court record shall also be transmitted.