The U.S. Constitution does not clearly specify how military bases should be managed. Article II, Section 2, appoints the President as the commander-in-chief, with the implied power to deploy, and redeploy, the armed forces as necessary for national defense. In common practice, this has included the authority to create and close military installations needed to accommodate and train personnel under the President's command. However, Article I, Section 8, charges Congress with the responsibility to raise armies, maintain a Navy, and regulate the militia. Through annual authorization and appropriation legislation, Congress legislates policy for managing DOD real property assets and funds the construction, maintenance, operation, and disposal of military infrastructure. Throughout most of American history, the President has exercised broad, relatively unchallenged authority for opening, closing, or realigning military installations. Congress largely deferred to the Executive branch primarily because the President, as commander-in-chief, is empowered with the responsibility of deploying military forces. Prompted by large-scale closures of World War II era infrastructure during the 1960s and 1970s, Congress enacted legislation in 1977 that effectively limited the Executive branch's ability to close or realign major military installations. The new statute, later codified as 10 U.S.C. 2687 (Section 612 of the Military Construction Authorization Act of 1978, P.L. 95-82 ), generally required DOD to conduct comprehensive and lengthy assessments of major basing decisions as part of a congressional report-and-wait process. These assessments could be challenged in court on environmental grounds or on questions related to their sufficiency, further lengthening delays. The new legislation effectively halted DOD's ability to close or realign domestic bases of significant size. In the decade that followed the passage of 10 U.S.C. 2687, congressional pressure grew to accommodate DOD basing priorities. By 1988, ongoing negotiations between the Secretary of Defense and the House and Senate Armed Service Committees led to new legislation ( P.L. 100-526 ) that authorized a limited number of base closures based on the oversight of an independent panel. Though later modified, the effort marked the beginning of the first Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) process, which was intended to insulate base closings from considerations such as favoritism or other political interference. Widely considered a success, the 1988 BRAC legislation was taken up again and modified in succeeding BRAC rounds; first in 1991, 1993, and 1995; and again in 2005. The modern BRAC process refers to a temporary authority that amends the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990 ( P.L. 101-510 ), hereinafter referred to as the Base Closure Act , and features a framework of elements that entrusts an independent commission with certifying closure and realignment recommendations made by the Secretary of Defense. In general, the process has required the Secretary to submit a list of military installations recommended for closure or realignment to an independent, bipartisan BRAC commission. After analyzing the Secretary's recommendations, the commission may accept, reject, or modify the list. Upon completing its review, the commission forwards its final findings and recommendations to the President. Upon acceptance of commission's recommendations, the President then submits them to Congress. If the President does not submit the recommendations to Congress within the timeframe required under the Base Closure Act, the BRAC process is terminated. Upon receipt of the report from the President, Congress has the opportunity to disapprove of the recommendations in toto through the enactment of a joint resolution. The hallmarks of this framework include establishment of an independent commission whose members are appointed by the President, in consultation with congressional leadership (and the advice and consent of the Senate); reliance on objective and uniform criteria for evaluating basing recommendations; GAO review and certification of DOD data; deliberations that include open hearings, solicitation of feedback, installation visits, and data available for public review; requirement that the commission's final list of closure and realignment actions be accepted or rejected in its entirety; and presidential and congressional off-ramps that would terminate the BRAC process when certain conditions are not met. The timeline to complete an entire BRAC round has varied; however, the most recent one conducted in 2005 took approximately 10 years, from authorization to completion (end of the six-year BRAC implementation period). Key milestones of a typical BRAC timeline include DOD force structure plan, infrastructure inventory, and analysis of options (up to four years); nomination and confirmation of BRAC commissioners; DOD submission of BRAC recommendations (and associated reports) to the commission; commission deliberations (typically four months); final report sent to the President for approval; 45-day deadline for Congress to reject recommendations in their entirety (Joint Resolution of Disapproval) or allow implementation to begin; DOD implementation (two years to begin; six years to complete); and DOD disposal of real property (indeterminate). BRAC is often characterized as a cost efficiency measure that enables DOD to more effectively manage its real property assets by allowing it to shed excess infrastructure, but historically, potential costs and savings have been a consideration that have ranked below military value. No BRAC round has established cost savings targets, floors, or ceilings. During BRAC rounds in 1991, 1993, and 1995, Congress required the Secretary of Defense to develop and report a set of objective selection criteria that would be used for identifying bases for closure and realignment. For the 2005 round, Congress amended the BRAC statute to require the Secretary to regard military value (defined below) as the primary consideration. Other factors, such as potential costs and savings, were explicitly categorized as lower priority. Because the amended legislative language reflected longstanding DOD policy, the 2005 BRAC criteria appear almost identical when compared with previous versions, with additional language added for emphasis or included for explanatory examples. The excerpt below indicates the 2005 BRAC selection criteria. Emphasized text (in italics) represents new language not included as part of the 1995 criteria. SEC. 2913. SELECTION CRITERIA FOR 2005 ROUND. (a) FINAL SELECTION CRITERIA.—The final criteria to be used by the Secretary in making recommendations for the closure or realignment of military installations inside the United States under this part in 2005 shall be the military value and other criteria specified in subsections (b) and (c). (b) MILITARY VALUE CRITERIA.—The military value criteria are as follows: (1) The current and future mission capabilities and the impact on operational readiness of the total force of the Department of Defense, including the impact on joint warfighting, training, and readiness. (2) The availability and condition of land, facilities, and associated airspace (including training areas suitable for maneuver by ground, naval, or air forces throughout a diversity of climate and terrain areas and staging areas for the use of the Armed Forces in homeland defense missions) at both existing and potential receiving locations. (3) The ability to accommodate contingency, mobilization, surge, and future total force requirements at both existing and potential receiving locations to support operations and training. (4) The cost of operations and the manpower implications. (c). OTHER CRITERIA.—The other criteria that the Secretary shall use in making recommendations for the closure or realignment of military installations inside the United States under this part in 2005 are as follows: (1) The extent and timing of potential costs and savings, including the number of years, beginning with the date of completion of the closure or realignment, for the savings to exceed the costs. (2) The economic impact on existing communities in the vicinity of military installations. (3) The ability of the infrastructure of both the existing and potential receiving communities to support forces, missions, and personnel. (4) The environmental impact , including the impact of costs related to potential environ mental restoration, waste management, and environmental compliance activities. The transfer and disposal of DOD real property made available following the implementation of a BRAC round is a complex process that may extend for years beyond the initial six-year implementation window. Disposal may be delayed or otherwise affected by the participation of local and state communities and the degree to which environmental remediation by federal authorities is necessary. The graph below shows the total acreage from previous BRAC rounds yet to be disposed. The Base Closure Act authorizes a variety of conveyance mechanisms not otherwise available for the transfer and disposal of federal property, a process typically performed by the General Services Administration (GSA). Under a BRAC, conveyance authority is delegated from GSA, through the Secretary of Defense to the various military departments, which receive special approval to supersede GSA regulations with BRAC specific regulations. The primary difference between the routine disposal of federal property and real property conveyed under a BRAC is the role of local communities. Under normal (non-BRAC) circumstances, the General Services Administration (GSA) is directly responsible for disposing of any surplus federal real property, which includes defense property. A military department in possession would, for example, declare property as excess to its needs and turn over the administration of a site to the GSA. The GSA would then follow a number of consecutive steps for disposal of federal property laid out in statute. It would first offer the excess property to other federal agencies. If none expressed an interest, the excess property would be declared surplus . The GSA would then offer the surplus property to state or local governments and non-profits that might use it for a public benefit ( public benefit conveyance) , such as a homeless shelter or medical center. Finally, if the property has neither been transferred nor conveyed in the previous steps, the surplus property would be offered for sale to the public. Under a BRAC, local communities can significantly affect the BRAC property transfer and disposal decisions, which are managed by the Secretary of the responsible military department. Once approved for closure, communities around an installation typically organize a Local Redevelopment Authority (LRA) for the purpose of creating and executing a redevelopment plan for the property. While the plan is not binding on DOD, the Department has been statutorily directed to give the plan considerable weight. DOD makes economic development grants and technical support available through its Office of Economic Adjustment (OEA) to assist LRAs with the process. In recent BRAC rounds, Congress has authorized a special transfer authority that has permitted DOD to transfer title to property at less than fair market value, or even at no cost, if the LRA agrees to certain conditions designed to create employment at the former defense facility. This has been referred to as an Economic Development Conveyance (EDC). DOD has asserted that savings generated from BRAC are generally the result of avoiding the cost of retaining and operating unneeded infrastructure, with upfront costs eventually offset by annual savings. Between FY2012 and FY2018, the Department consistently argued for a new BRAC, asserting that "absent another BRAC round, the Department will continue to operate some of its installations sub-optimally as other efficiency measures, changing force structure, and technology reduce the number of missions and personnel." Emphasizing the potential cost savings, DOD has suggested a new "efficiency-focused BRAC" could save the Department billions of dollars annually: "Savings from BRAC rounds are real and substantial. The last five BRAC rounds are collectively saving the Department $12B annually. A new efficiency-focused BRAC could save the Department an additional ~$2B annually (based on the '93/'95 rounds)." In its ongoing series of BRAC-related reports, the GAO has noted the unreliability of DOD cost savings estimates. In 2013, GAO concluded that, though the Department had achieved annual recurring savings as the result of the 2005 round, visibility into the outcome has been limited due to missing and inconsistent recordkeeping. Similar studies have raised questions about the data DOD has used to predict and monitor BRAC effectiveness, long-term savings, and outcomes. For example "... the services did not develop baseline operating costs before implementing the BRAC recommendations, which would have enabled it to determine whether savings were achieved." "... We found that DOD's process for providing the BRAC commission with cost and savings estimates was hindered by underestimating recommendation-specific requirements and that DOD did not fully anticipate information technology requirements for many of the recommendations." "The department cannot provide documentation to show to what extent it reduced plant replacement value or vacated leased space as it reported in May 2005 that it was intended to do.... In addition, DOD bundled multiple closures ... thus limiting visibility into the estimated costs and savings for individual closures and realignments." "... DOD has not reported to Congress how the cleanup of emerging contaminants, especially certain perfluorinated compounds, at installations closed under BRAC will significantly increase the estimated (BRAC) cleanup costs." "... We found that OSD (Office of the Secretary of Defense) did not have a fully developed method for accurately collecting information on costs, savings, and efficiencies achieved specifically from joint basing, and that OSD had not developed a plan to guide joint bases in achieving cost savings and efficiencies...." "... DOD has not committed to take action on some of our recommendations related to implementing any future BRAC rounds, such as improving DOD's ability to estimate potential liabilities, and savings to achieve desired outcomes." In its final report to the President, the 2005 BRAC commission noted DOD's initial estimate of savings had been "vastly overestimated," and suggested that the Department had claimed savings that were "not truly savings in the commonly understood sense of the term." Reflecting on the quality of cost estimates and savings associated with 2005 BRAC round, Anthony Principi, Chairman of the 2005 Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission, has suggested opportunities exist for the DOD to improve its analysis by adopting more consistent accounting practices and inclusive metrics: To start, DoD has to do a better job estimating the true cost of any closure or realignment.... Second, the cost of base realignment actions (COBRA) accounting procedure, used by DoD as a basis of comparison among scenarios, should include cost estimates for environmental restoration not just "clean to current use" standards. In addition, COBRA or some other cost evaluation process should also include transportation and infrastructure costs and burden sharing with the federal government.... In addition to refining DOD accounting metrics, some observers have suggested congressional visibility into BRAC cost and long-term effectiveness could be improved by amending the process to require the Department to disclose how closure and realignment recommendations meet expected cost saving and reduced infrastructure targets. A BRAC process is the chief means by which DOD disposes of excess infrastructure. Each year between 2013 and 2017, the Department requested a new BRAC round as a means of realizing greater efficiency and reducing excess infrastructure. It has also attempted to allay concerns related to the 2005 BRAC experience - marked by unexpectedly high costs and complexity - by emphasizing cost savings and efficiencies rather than force transformation. In April 2016, DOD submitted to the House Armed Services Committee an I nfrastructure C apacity R eport (interim version) that assessed 22% of the Department's base infrastructure excess to its needs. The methodology used in the report—required by Section 2815 of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for FY2016 (P.L. 114-92)—remained consistent with excess capacity reports submitted prior to the 1998 and 2005 BRAC rounds round. The Department stated its purpose for obtaining "a sense of excess and whether excess remains after various changes, such as (prior) BRAC or force structure reductions." A final infrastructure capacity report, submitted to Congress in October 2017, modified the original excess capacity estimate to 19%. The Department concluded its infrastructure capacity analysis by arguing it had established sufficient justification for a new BRAC round, a process that would allow it to more effectively dispose of excess infrastructure and manage remaining real property assets. The Department believes we have addressed all congressional concerns.... The time to authorize another BRAC round is now. The BRAC process requires considerable time to analyze and develop recommendations, have those recommendations reviewed by the independent BRAC Commission, and then implemented over a six-year period of time. The longer authorization is delayed, the longer the Department will be forced to expend valuable resources on unnecessary facilities instead of weapons systems, readiness, and other national security priorities. Critics of the Department's methodology for estimating excess infrastructure have asserted it includes unreasonable research assumptions and metrics, undermining the basis for DOD's conclusion. For example, observers have cited the report's reliance on Cold War baseline values to establish excess capacity, inconsistent application of existing metrics for measuring capacity shortfalls, and overly broad categorization schemes. Some observers have also cited longstanding data management challenges that continue to affect the Department's ability to measure current excess facility inventory and utilization rates. Others have noted the dearth of data that support DOD claims related to BRAC effectiveness and the disposal of excess property. During a news briefing on the FY2019 defense budget, Undersecretary of Defense (Comptroller) David L. Norquist noted that the Department had declined to propose a BRAC round that year, stating that it would work instead to focus on internal reforms while preparing for a financial audit. And so, I think we're looking at doing two things, going forward. One is, working with Congress to find common areas where we can make reforms and changes that don't create the same types of obstacles. The other is that we are undergoing a financial-statement audit that includes a look at property, and assets and investments and improving the accuracy of the data behind it. And as a view of being able to take advantage of the data coming out of that process, to help us make better decision-making on real property. But, yes, you are correct, there is not (a) request for another BRAC round in this budget. In testimony before the Senate Appropriations Committee Subcommittee on Military Construction, Veterans Affairs, and Related Agencies, Lucian Niemeyer, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Energy, Installations and Environment, indicated DOD would be working in FY2019 to improve its excess infrastructure accounting processes and demolish unneeded infrastructure: In lieu of another request for legislation in FY 2019 to authorize an additional Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) round, we will review our facilities, to include facility usage optimization review to ensure we have a better accounting of excess infrastructure. We also have proposed for FY 2019 increased efforts to demolish unneeded or obsolete facilities over the course of this year. The 2005 BRAC round was unique among all previous rounds due to its relative size, scope and complexity. (See Figure 2 for comparison of major and minor BRAC actions between rounds.) Colloquially called "the mother of all BRACs," the objectives of the 2005 round were primarily about transforming military infrastructure; however, unanticipated expenses have played a role in shaping subsequent congressional views of the BRAC process and, according to many observers, dampened support for consideration of a new round. Savings estimates submitted during the 2005 round were overvalued by as much as 67%, according to GAO analysis, with one-time implementation costs rising from $21 to $35.1 billion. GAO found that the $14.1 billion increase was due primarily to the rising cost of new construction associated with subsidiary projects not included in the original BRAC implementation plan. Referring to the implementation of the 2005 round, Assistant Secretary Niemeyer, noted, "BRAC legislation effectively limited the ability of Congress to oversee BRAC implementation costs and the Department made deliberate decisions to use BRAC implementation as a recapitalization tool, expanding facility requirements and associated costs." To address congressional concerns about spiraling costs in new BRAC rounds, DOD has periodically proposed legislative language that would constrain the Secretary's ability to recommend BRAC actions that would not yield savings within 20 years and to emphasize recommendations that would yield net savings within five years. Each year, Congress appropriates funding for the Department of Defense Base Closure Account, part of the Military Construction Defense-Wide appropriation. With no BRAC round authorized or underway, the primary purpose of continuing BRAC appropriations is to fund the environmental cleanup and caretaker functions at bases that were closed under prior rounds (see Figure 3 ). In FY2020, the Trump Administration has requested $278.5 million for BRAC continuing environmental and caretaker costs, with $158.3 million provided for the Navy (57%), $66.1 million for the Army (24%), and $54 million for the Air Force (19%). The total request represents a $63 million decrease (19%) from FY2019 enacted levels ($342 million). In FY2018, Congress urged DOD to accelerate environmental remediation at BRAC sites. In report language, appropriators stated that additional funds were provided to speed environmental remediation at installations closed under previous rounds. Accelerated cleanup.—The agreement includes additional funding to accelerate environmental remediation at installations closed during previous Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) rounds. Priority should be given to those sites with newly identified radiological cleanup cost. There are many factors hindering the cleanup of BRAC sites. However, strategic investments can lead to quicker clean-ups and faster turnover of DOD property to the local community. Therefore, the Department is directed to submit to the congressional defense committees a spend plan for the additional BRAC funds not later than 30 days after enactment of this Act. Congressional authorizers and appropriators have regularly inserted language into annual defense legislation that would disallow the use of funds for the purpose of a new BRAC round. In FY2019, for example, though DOD did not propose a BRAC, authorizers inserted language into the annual NDAA that prohibited a new round: SEC. 2703. Prohibition on Conducting Additional Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) Round. Nothing in this Act shall be construed to authorize an additional Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) round. A similar provision was included in the final FY2019 defense appropriations bill: SEC. 8122. None of the funds made available by this Act may be used to propose, plan for, or execute a new or additional Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) round. In 2017, Members in both chambers proposed legislation that would have authorized a new round of base closures. Though no legislation for a full BRAC was enacted, a provision included the following year in the final FY2019 NDAA. Under the new scenario described by Section 2702 of the John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019 ( H.R. 5515 , P.L. 115-232 ), BRAC-like actions are authorized within the confines of a state based on the recommendation of the governor and support of local communities affected by the proposed actions. Unlike a traditional BRAC process, the new authorities would forgo the creation of an independent review panel. The Secretary of Defense is, instead, required to deliver a report of planned BRAC actions to congressional defense committees and, following a 90-day waiting period, begin implementation. For details, please refer to "In-State BRAC" in Appendix A of this report. The BRAC related legislative proposals above illustrate the flexibility Congress has for amending or adopting the template of past BRAC processes that DOD has called "the only fair, objective, and comprehensive process to achieve these goals (eliminating excess infrastructure)." Congress may consider whether future legislative proposals for base closures and realignments will adopt the lessons learned from previous rounds while retaining the basic framework, or fundamentally alter the process. No BRAC legislation has so far been proposed in the 116 th Congress. Additionally, the Department has asserted that it does not intend to use the new BRAC-like authorities authorized by Section 2702 of the FY2019 NDAA. To date, DOD has received no state requests under this authority. Appendix A. Legislative References BRAC Authorizing Legislation 1988 Round The Defense Authorization Amendments and Base Closure and Realignment Act, enacted October 24, 1988 (P.L.100-526) 1991, 1993, 1995 Rounds National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1991, enacted November 5, 1990 (P.L. 107-107, Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990, Title XXIX) 2005 Round National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002, ( P.L. 101-510 ; amended the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990 ( P.L. 101-510 ) 10 U.S.C. 2687, 10 U.S.C. 993 Summary In 1977, Congress enacted 10 U.S.C. 2687, the first statutory restriction on the President's ability to close or realign military installations. Amended over the years, the statute has retained its essential elements, establishing procedures the Secretary of Defense must follow before closing a military installation where a threshold number (currently 300) of civilian personnel are authorized to be employed, or realigning an installation that involves a reduction by more than 50% (or 1,000) of civilian workers. A more recent statute, 10 U.S.C. 993, introduced additional reporting requirements that would restrict the Secretary's ability to realign installations if the plan would affect more than 1,000 assigned members of the Armed Forces. In-State BRAC Section 2702 of the John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019 ( H.R. 5515 , P.L. 115-232 ) authorizes new in-state BRAC authorities. Text of the provision is included below in its entirety. SEC. 2702. ADDITIONAL AUTHORITY TO REALIGN OR CLOSE CERTAIN MILITARY INSTALLATIONS. (a) Authorization.—Notwithstanding sections 993 or 2687 of title 10, United States Code, and subject to subsection (d), the Secretary of Defense may take such actions as may be necessary to carry out the realignment or closure of a military installation in a State during a fiscal year if— (1) the military installation is the subject of a notice which is described in subsection (b); and (2) the Secretary includes the military installation in the report submitted under paragraph (2) of subsection (c) with respect to the fiscal year. (b) Notice From Governor of State.—A notice described in this subsection is a notice received by the Secretary of Defense from the Governor of a State (or, in the case of the District of Columbia, the Mayor of the District of Columbia) in which the Governor recommends that the Secretary carry out the realignment or closure of a military installation located in the State, and which includes each of the following elements: (1) A specific description of the military installation, or a specific description of the relevant real and personal property. (2) Statements of support for the realignment or closure from units of local government in which the installation is located. (3) A detailed plan for the reuse or redevelopment of the real and personal property of the installation, together with a description of the local redevelopment authority which will be responsible for the implementation of the plan. (c) Response to Notice.— (1) Mandatory response to governor and congress.—Not later than 1 year after receiving a notice from the Governor of a State (or, in the case of the District of Columbia, from the Mayor of the District of Columbia), the Secretary of Defense shall submit a response to the notice to the Governor and the congressional defense committees indicating whether or not the Secretary accepts the recommendation for the realignment or closure of a military installation which is the subject of the notice. (2) Acceptance of recommendation.—If the Secretary of Defense determines that it is in the interests of the United States to accept the recommendation for the realignment or closure of a military installation which is the subject of a notice received under subsection (b) and intends to carry out the realignment or closure of the installation pursuant to the authority of this section during a fiscal year, at the time the budget is submitted under section 1105(a) of title 31, United States Code, for the fiscal year, the Secretary shall submit a report to the congressional defense committees which includes the following: (A) The identification of each military installation for which the Secretary intends to carry out a realignment or closure pursuant to the authority of this section during the fiscal year, together with the reasons the Secretary of Defense believes that it is in the interest of the United States to accept the recommendation of the Governor of the State involved for the realignment or closure of the installation. (B) For each military installation identified under subparagraph (A), a master plan describing the required scope of work, cost, and timing for all facility actions needed to carry out the realignment or closure, including the construction of new facilities and the repair or renovation of existing facilities. (C) For each military installation identified under subparagraph (A), a certification that, not later than the end of the fifth fiscal year after the completion of the realignment or closure, the savings resulting from the realignment or closure will exceed the costs of carrying out the realignment or closure, together with an estimate of the annual recurring savings that would be achieved by the realignment or closure of the installation and the timeframe required for the financial savings to exceed the costs of carrying out the realignment or closure. (d) Limitations.— (1) Timing.—The Secretary may not initiate the realignment or closure of a military installation pursuant to the authority of this section until the expiration of the 90-day period beginning on the date the Secretary submits the report under paragraph (2) of subsection (c). (2) Total costs.—Subject to appropriations, the aggregate cost to the government in carrying out the realignment or closure of military installations pursuant to the authority of this section for all fiscal years may not exceed $2,000,000,000. In determining the cost to the government for purposes of this section, there shall be included the costs of planning and design, military construction, operations and maintenance, environmental restoration, information technology, termination of public-private contracts, guarantees, and other factors contributing to the cost of carrying out the realignment or closure, as determined by the Secretary. (e) Process for Implementation.—The implementation of the realignment or closure of a military installation pursuant to the authority of this section shall be carried out in accordance with section 2905 of the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990 (title XXIX of P.L. 101-510 ; 10 U.S.C. 2687 note) in the same manner as the implementation of a realignment or closure of a military installation pursuant to the authority of such Act. (f) State Defined.—In this section, the term ``State'' means each of the several States, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, American Samoa, Guam, the United States Virgin Islands, and the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands. (g) Termination of Authority.—The authority of the Secretary to carry out a realignment or closure pursuant to this section shall terminate at the end of fiscal year 2029. Appendix B. BRAC Acreage Disposal Status, By State

Summary: Since 1977, statutory thresholds have effectively constrained the President's ability to close or realign major military installations in the United States. Congress has instead periodically granted temporary authorities—known as a Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC)—that have established independent commissions for the review and approval of basing changes submitted by the Secretary of Defense. These unique and transient authorities last expired on April 16, 2006. There have been five rounds of base closures: 1988, 1991, 1993, 1995, and 2005. Though Congress has periodically adjusted the BRAC process to account for lessons learned, the modern framework has remained generally consistent with earlier rounds, and includes establishment of an independent commission; reliance on objective and uniform criteria; Government Accountability Office (GAO) review and certification of Department of Defense (DOD) data; deliberations designed to be transparent that include open hearings, solicitation of feedback, installation visits, and data available for public review; and requirement that the final list of closure and realignment recommendations be accepted or rejected in their entirety. Congress has defined BRAC selection criteria in statute, thus requiring the Secretary to prioritize military value over cost savings. Additionally, Congress has required the Secretary to align the Department's recommendations with a comprehensive 20-year force structure plan. The commission may modify, reject, or add recommendations during its review before forwarding a final list to the President. After receiving the Commission's list of recommendations, the President may either accept the report in its entirety or seek to modify it by indicating disapproval and returning it to the commission for further evaluation. If the President accepts the commission's recommendations, they are forwarded to Congress. BRAC implementation begins by default unless Congress rejects the recommendations in their entirety within 45 days by enacting a joint resolution. During the implementation phase, DOD is required to initiate closures and realignments within two years and complete all actions within six years. The BRAC process represents a legislative compromise between the executive and legislative branches wherein each shares power in managing the closure and realignment of military bases. The imposition of an independent, third-party mediator was intended to insulate base closings from political considerations by both branches that had complicated similar actions in the past. This report provides background on the development of BRAC, describes its major elements and milestones, and outlines issues frequently cited in the context of new rounds, such as potential savings.