DOD, through the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, develops department-wide strategic guidance based on direction from the President and issues this guidance through strategy documents. According to joint doctrine and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff guidance, combatant commanders use strategy documents as guidance for planning operations. Specifically, combatant commanders translate this guidance into their commands’ campaign and contingency plans. The military services organize, train, equip, and provide forces to the combatant commanders to execute command plans. The combatant commander must make certain the combatant command can execute these plans. PACOM is one of six geographic Unified Combatant Commands of the U.S. Armed Forces. With an area of responsibility extending from the waters off the west coast of the United States to the western border of India, and from Antarctica to the North Pole, PACOM is the primary U.S. military authority in the Pacific. In 2016, PACOM reported that approximately 380,000 U.S. military and civilian personnel were assigned to this area. PACOM describes the 36 nations that comprise the Asia- Pacific region as home to more than 50 percent of the world’s population and 3,000 different languages, several of the world’s larger militaries, and five nations allied with the United States through mutual defense treaties or agreements. PACOM’s commander reports to the President and the Secretary of Defense through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and is supported by four service component commands: U.S. Pacific Fleet, U.S. Pacific Air Forces, U.S. Army Pacific, and U.S. Marine Forces, Pacific. In President Obama’s speech to the Australian Parliament in November 2011, he stated that after a decade of fighting two wars, the United States was turning its attention to the vast potential of the Asia-Pacific region. The President described the U.S. as a historic Pacific power whose interests are inextricably linked with Asia’s economic, security, and political order. According to a senior administration official, the United States planned to implement a comprehensive, multidimensional strategy in the Asia-Pacific region. PACOM used military strategy documents to implement presidential strategic direction to rebalance efforts to the Pacific. However, according to officials from the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, the Joint Staff, and the U.S. Pacific Command there was no single rebalance-specific strategy document. Instead, these officials identified a number of strategy documents published since 2012 that guided activities associated with the rebalance to the Pacific effort. Based on our interviews with U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM) and DOD officials, we focused our review on six strategy documents, issued between 2012 and 2015, that these officials considered relevant and representative of DOD’s previous strategy to implement the rebalance to the Pacific through 2016. The six documents that we reviewed are: Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense. DOD issued this document in January 2012. This publication reflected presidential strategic direction to DOD and described the key military missions for which the department would prepare. In describing the security environment, this strategic guidance stated that the United States would, of necessity, rebalance toward the Asia-Pacific region. Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). According to DOD guidance, the QDR articulates a national defense strategy consistent with the broader government-wide National Security Strategy by defining force structure, modernization plans, and a budget plan allowing the military to successfully execute the full range of missions within that strategy. The 2014 QDR referred to the rebalance to the Pacific as a part of sustaining U.S. presence and posture abroad to better protect U.S. national security interests. National Military Strategy (NMS). The 2015 NMS described how DOD would employ military forces to protect and advance U.S. national interests. The NMS provided focus for military activities by defining a set of military objectives and concepts used by the combatant commanders and others. The 2015 NMS referenced the rebalance to the Pacific as part of a national military objective. The NMS was informed by the QDR. Guidance for the Employment of the Force (GEF). According to joint doctrine, the GEF provides direction to combatant commands for operational planning, force management, security cooperation, and posture planning. The GEF is the method through which the Secretary of Defense translates strategic priorities in the QDR and other strategy documents into direction for operational activities. The GEF is described in joint doctrine as an essential document for combatant command planners as it provides the strategic end states for the deliberate planning of campaign and contingency plans. Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP). The JSCP is the primary vehicle through which the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff directs the preparation of joint plans. The JSCP provides military strategic and operational guidance to combatant commanders for the preparation of plans based on current military capabilities. The JSCP tasks combatant commanders to develop campaign, contingency, and posture plans and translates requirements from the GEF and other guidance into prioritized military missions, tasks, and plans. The JSCP is informed by the GEF and the NMS. PACOM 2015 Theater Campaign Plan (DRAFT) (TCP). Campaign plans, such as PACOM’s TCP, focus on the combatant command’s steady-state or daily activities and operationalize combatant command theater strategies. According to joint doctrine, joint planning draws from tasks identified in the GEF and JSCP and campaign plans should focus on the combatant command’s steady-state activities. These include ongoing operations, military engagement, security cooperation, deterrence, and other shaping or preventive activities. Campaign plans provide the vehicle for linking steady-state shaping activities to the attainment of strategic and military end states. In January 2018, DOD announced its new 2018 National Defense Strategy that cited as the department’s principal priorities the long-term strategic competition with China and Russia. The strategy also stated that concurrently the department would sustain its efforts to deter and counter rogue regimes such as North Korea and Iran, defeat terrorist threats to the United States, and consolidate gains in Iraq and Afghanistan while moving to a more resource-sustainable approach. In February 2018, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific Security Affairs notified GAO that although DOD continues to prioritize the Asia-Pacific region, the rebalance to the Pacific is no longer U.S. policy. Six DOD strategy documents that helped guide the rebalance to the Pacific collectively included most of the desired elements of an effective national strategy. We have previously reported that effective national strategies incorporate six characteristics, and their associated desired elements. Table 1 lists desired elements that we adapted from our prior work and tailored toward our review of the six DOD strategy documents. We found these six DOD strategy documents that collectively guided the rebalance to the Pacific included, to varying degrees, 24 of the 31 desired elements we determined as being the most relevant to an effective strategy for the rebalance. For example, as a set, the six strategy documents contained a detailed description of the operating environment in which activities for the rebalance were to take place and included references that described the relationship of the rebalance to the Pacific to other strategies, goals, and objectives. The strategy documents referenced their purposes and, in unclassified and general descriptions, the threats that the strategies were to address including long-range missile threats and weapons of mass destruction. Collectively, the strategy documents referred to selected types of resources needed, such as the deployment of ships and aviation assets, and who would be implementing the strategies. We were, however, unable to find any reference to 7 of the 31 elements in any of the six strategy documents. For example, 2 of the 7 missing elements were: Lack of a documented, consistent definition of the rebalance to the Pacific. Based on our systematic review, we found that none of DOD’s six strategy documents issued from 2012 to 2015 included a definition of the rebalance to the Pacific that described the rebalance’s key terms, major functions, mission areas or activities. Further, DOD officials from the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, the Joint Staff, and the U.S. Pacific Command involved in planning and implementing the rebalance to the Pacific were unable to identify a definition for the rebalance to the Pacific in the strategy documents, and consequently could not provide a definition that was in use consistently across the department. During discussions about the absence of a definition, these PACOM officials told us that all PACOM activities were rebalance activities, even activities that were underway before the President’s announcement to rebalance. Senior DOD policy officials referred us to the speeches of senior administration officials given since the President’s 2011 address to derive the definition of the rebalance. However, as noted earlier, after the President’s speech in 2011, there were a number of pronouncements from senior administration officials that varied over time. The lack of consistent attributes to a strategy can make it difficult for policy makers to assess its effectiveness and accountability. Lack of a documented end state for the rebalance to the Pacific. Based on our systematic review, we found that none of DOD’s six strategy documents from 2012 to 2015 identified an end state for the rebalance to the Pacific. Identifying the end state is a desired element associated with establishing goals and objectives for effective strategies and plans. Joint doctrine also states that military planners must know where to look for the guidance to ensure that plans are consistent with national priorities and are directed toward achieving national security goals and objectives. A national strategy that identified the end state of the rebalance could distinguish new efforts from the longstanding U.S. military presence in the region, and the associated increase in resources to support the post-2011 rebalancing. For example, we found a lack of clarity concerning the end state for the rebalance. DOD officials from the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Joint Staff, and PACOM—whom we interviewed because they were involved in planning and implementing the rebalance to the Pacific—said that they were unaware of an end state for DOD’s efforts to rebalance. The same officials told us that there was no foreseeable end state because, as long as the Asia-Pacific region was important to the U.S., the focus would remain on the region. However, officials from different military service components told us that their individual services had an end state for their service-specific activities to support the rebalance. For example, officials from U.S. Army Pacific told us that they had completed their service’s rebalance. They stated that they achieved the end state with the completion of force posture changes and that some efforts supporting rebalancing had begun before rebalancing was inaugurated. In contrast, a Marine Corps official in the Pacific reported there was no end state for rebalancing. According to the official, Marine Corps activities such as posture realignments supported rebalancing, but these longstanding activities were ongoing prior to the President’s announcement to rebalance. Moreover, we found a lack of an awareness of a command-wide end state for rebalancing and coordination among the various military service activities in support of rebalancing. It was unclear how service-defined end states could have been fully integrated or prioritized for funding without a consistent overall end state for DOD’s overall effort. In such instances, a department-wide defined end state could have helped with the allocation of resources because the most important priorities would be known. A clear and consistent definition for rebalance and the identification of an end state, as well as the inclusion of the other 5 missing elements, could have better positioned decision makers to effectively plan, manage, and assess DOD’s progress toward rebalancing efforts to the Pacific. According to DOD officials from the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy responsible for policy for the rebalance to the Pacific, the speeches by senior administration officials between 2012 and 2015 supplanted the need to identify and document a definition of the rebalance or an end state in a strategy document. However, as noted earlier, these statements included varying descriptions of the strategy and objectives over time. According to a DOD official from an office with department-wide performance management responsibilities, defining the rebalance to the Pacific and identifying the initiative’s strategic objectives, or end state, were both important for establishing accountability and measuring progress. For instance, a definition could have helped those charged with implementation to distinguish activities essential to operationalizing the strategic guidance to rebalance from those activities that were routine or peripheral to that effort. Further, knowing the end state could have helped management make the best use of resources, enable the assessment of progress toward a particular goal, and as described in joint doctrine, facilitate the development of strategic and military objectives. In moving forward in the Asia-Pacific region, considering the identification of strategic end states (one of the desired elements of an effective national strategy that is also discussed in joint doctrine) —as well as the other missing elements— could help position DOD to achieve its objectives in the region. We provided a draft of this report to DOD for review. DOD had no comments. We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional committees; the Secretary of Defense; the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy; the commander of the U.S. Pacific Command; the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; and the Secretaries of the military departments. In addition, the report is available at no charge on the GAO website at http://www.gao.gov. If you have any questions about this report or need additional information, please contact me at (202) 512-5431 or RussellC@gao.gov. Contact points for our Office of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. Key contributors to this report are listed in appendix II. To determine the extent to which the Department of Defense (DOD) has developed strategy documents to guide the rebalance to the Pacific that include desired elements of an effective national strategy, we conducted a search of the literature, from January 2010 to July 2015, to identify official statements on, guidance for, and studies of DOD’s implementation of the rebalance to the Pacific. We reviewed department guidance, such as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff instructions and joint publications, to understand DOD’s processes and procedures for developing and disseminating guidance and strategic plans. We also interviewed DOD officials from numerous organizations listed below who were involved with planning, providing guidance or implementing the rebalance to the Pacific to identify DOD’s rebalance efforts and whether a strategy or strategies existed that focused on or included the rebalance. The organizations contacted included: Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) and Chief Financial Officer Office of the Deputy Chief Management Officer, Deputy’s Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific Security Affairs Assistant Secretary of Defense for Logistics and Materiel Readiness Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy, Plans and Capabilities Director of the Office of the Secretary of Defense Cost Assessment U.S. Marines Corps Forces, Pacific U.S. Pacific Air Forces U.S. Transportation Command Based on these interviews and written responses to questions we submitted to the officials associated with these organizations, officials identified documentation and speeches that they indicated informed DOD organizations about implementing the rebalance. Also, based on this information, we found that there was not a single strategy or plan that provided guidance for or outlined DOD’s implementation of the rebalance to the Pacific. Instead, DOD officials from multiple offices identified a number of strategy documents that guided activities associated with the rebalance to the Pacific, including government-wide documents. Based on our interviews with U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM) and DOD officials, we focused our review on the six selected strategy documents, issued between 2012 and 2015, that these officials considered relevant and representative of DOD’s previous strategy to implement the rebalance to the Pacific. Those six strategy documents are described earlier in the main report. We reviewed and analyzed these six strategy documents to determine whether, as a set, they included the 31 desired elements of the associated key characteristics of an effective national strategy. Our prior work on effective national strategies included examples of desired elements that we adapted and tailored toward our review of DOD strategy documents. We selected 31 desired elements as most relevant to DOD’s rebalance effort and for systematically reviewing DOD’s strategy documents associated with the rebalance. These elements and associated key characteristics are described in table 2 below. To determine whether as a set these strategy documents included the desired elements of an effective national strategy, we reviewed each strategy document using a scorecard method, using the following steps: First, we developed scorecards with a two-level scale of “address” and “did not address.” We used a binary scale of “address” or “did not address” and scored a passage as “address” if it included any part of an element description in order to provide the widest latitude in determining whether the selected passage included the specific element. Also, we used 31 desired elements from the six characteristics to make the comparison because these elements provided more specificity than the broad six characteristics. Second, analysts reviewed all of the selected passages from each strategy document and determined whether they were relevant to understanding the rebalance to the Pacific in order to reach agreement on which passages they would consider in the comparison to the desired elements. The readers agreed upon the inclusion and exclusion of passages before assessing whether these passages included the desired elements. Third, two analysts reviewed the relevant passages in each strategy document related to the rebalance and determined whether or not the passages included the element. The analysts used the scorecards to score each passage. Fourth, upon completion of the independent scoring process for each strategy document, the analysts compared their respective scores and reconciled any differences, thereby reaching a consensus on the final score. As needed, a third analyst facilitated reconciliations where there was a difference in the assessment reached by the individual analysts and documented the consensus results. Lastly, upon completion of scoring, the team compiled and summarized the results. To further corroborate our systematic review of the six strategy documents, we asked officials from DOD organizations responsible for the Asia-Pacific region a standard set of related questions. We asked officials these questions in order to obtain DOD’s perspective regarding the applicability of using the selected desired elements and associated key characteristics in reviewing these specific DOD strategy documents. We conducted this performance audit from July 2015 to May 2018 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. In addition to the contact named above, key contributors to this report were Guy LoFaro, (Assistant Director), Pedro Almoguera, Patricia Donahue, Richard Powelson, Paulina Reaves, Michael Shaughnessy, and Stephen Woods. Combating Terrorism: Strategy to Counter Iran in the Western Hemisphere Has Gaps That State Department Should Address. GAO-14-834. Washington, D.C.: September 29, 2014. U.S. Public Diplomacy: Key Issues for Congressional Oversight. GAO-09-679SP. Washington, D.C.: May 27, 2009. Influenza Pandemic: Further Efforts Are Needed to Ensure Clearer Federal Leadership Roles and an Effective National Strategy. GAO-07-781. Washington, D.C.: August 14, 2007. Financial Literacy and Education Commission: Further Progress Needed to Ensure an Effective National Strategy. GAO-07-100. Washington, D.C.: December 4, 2006. Rebuilding Iraq: More Comprehensive National Strategy Needed to Help Achieve U.S. Goals. GAO-06-788. Washington, D.C.: July 11, 2006. Combating Terrorism: Evaluation of Selected Characteristics in National Strategies Related to Terrorism. GAO-04-408T. Washington, D.C.: February 3, 2004. Combating Terrorism: Observations on National Strategies Related to Terrorism. GAO-03-519T. Washington, D.C.: March 3, 2003.

Summary: In 2011, President Obama announced that the United States would turn its attention to the Asia-Pacific region and make the U.S. presence there a top priority. Rebalancing to the Pacific became strategic guidance that informed military planning. By the end of 2015, DOD published strategy documents that included references to the rebalance to the Pacific or related concepts. In February 2018, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific Security Affairs stated that while DOD continues to prioritize the Asia-Pacific region, the rebalance to the Pacific is no longer U.S. policy. DOD has published the 2018 National Defense Strategy, which establishes an objective of maintaining a favorable regional balance in the Pacific region, among other regions. Prior to the change in policy, House Report 114-102 included a provision for GAO to review matters related to the U.S. rebalance to the Asia-Pacific region. GAO evaluated the extent to which DOD developed strategy documents to guide the rebalance to the Pacific that included desired elements of an effective national strategy. GAO analyzed six DOD strategy documents that officials identified as providing guidance for the rebalance to the Pacific to determine whether, as a set, they included desired elements associated with an effective national strategy. DOD had no comments on this report. Department of Defense (DOD) strategy documents that collectively guided the rebalance to the Pacific included most of the desired elements of an effective national strategy. The U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM), which is responsible for the Asia-Pacific region, used DOD strategy documents to implement the President's direction to rebalance to the Pacific, which generally refocused U.S. efforts to that region. PACOM officials told GAO that there was no single rebalance-specific strategy document. Instead, officials identified a number of strategy documents published since 2012 that guided activities associated with the rebalance to the Pacific, including: Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense ; Quadrennial Defense Review ; National Military Strategy ; Guidance for the Employment of the Force ; Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan ; and the PACOM 2015 Theater Campaign Plan (DRAFT) . Based on GAO's analysis, DOD's six strategy documents that guided the rebalance to the Pacific included 24 of the 31 desired elements of an effective national strategy. However, two key elements were missing from the group of strategy documents: (1) a definition of the rebalance to the Pacific, and (2) the identification of the overall results desired, or end state, for the rebalance. DOD officials also could not identify a definition for the rebalance to the Pacific in the strategy documents or provide a definition that was used consistently across the department. According to a DOD official with performance management responsibilities, defining the rebalance to the Pacific and identifying the initiative's strategic objectives, or end state, were important for establishing accountability and measuring progress. For instance, a clear definition of rebalance could have helped those charged with implementation to distinguish activities essential to operationalizing the strategic guidance from activities that were peripheral to that effort. Similarly, knowing the end state could have helped management make the best use of resources, enable the assessment of progress, and facilitate the development of strategic and military objectives. In moving forward in the Asia-Pacific region, considering the identification of strategic end states as well as other missing elements could help position DOD to achieve its objectives in the region.