DOD has historically faced organizational and management challenges that can limit effective and efficient coordination across the department to fulfill its mission, and Congress has taken steps to address these challenges through, among other things, legislation. For example, in the early 1980s, Congress expressed concern that DOD’s structure primarily served the needs of the services and encouraged interservice rivalries that led to operational failures. In response, Congress passed the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 to improve the management and administration of the department, among other purposes. One of the changes emanating from this act included specifying the military department secretaries’ responsibility for training and equipping forces, while making clear that the military service chiefs were not in the chain of command for military operations. The act also required that military personnel selected for promotion to brigadier general or rear admiral (lower half) to have joint duty experience unless waived by the Secretary of Defense or an authorized official. However, shortfalls in strategic integration at DOD—how DOD and the military services align their efforts and resources across different regions, functions, and domains—continue. Congress intended that section 911 of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2017 improve strategic integration across the organizational and functional boundaries of DOD by, among other things, requiring the Secretary of Defense to develop an organizational strategy to advance a collaborative culture across DOD and create cross- functional teams to address critical objectives and outputs. As required by section 911 of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2017, DOD awarded a contract to study how best to implement effective cross- functional teams in DOD. The study, conducted by McKinsey & Company and completed in August 2017, presented findings on leading practices for implementing cross-functional teams that were drawn from a literature review, DOD and non-DOD case studies, and interviews. It identified seven critical factors for cross-functional team success: (1) mission; (2) objective; (3) delegated authorities; (4) team membership; (5) ways of working; (6) collaborative environment; and (7) an implementation plan. While not required by the contract, the study also contained a checklist for implementing cross-functional teams, which includes recommendations to assist DOD in assembling, initiating, and operating a team. The checklist distinguished action items by implementation phases: prelaunch, at launch, throughout the project, and at the project’s close. For example, the checklist suggested that, at launch, DOD should onboard the team and tailor training to the team experience and timeframe. DOD transmitted the report to Congress in September 2017. ODCMO officials also began collecting information in March 2017 to conduct their own internal study of cross-functional teams within DOD to help inform their implementation of section 911. This internal study, completed in August 2017, evaluated four case studies of prior DOD cross-functional teams, including their structure, returns, and implementation costs. From the case studies, ODCMO officials identified lessons learned to inform establishing and monitoring cross- functional teams. The ODCMO’s internal study found that cross-functional teams require significant senior leader attention. For example, the Secretary of Defense was directly involved in the sampled cross- functional teams, and he publicly stated his support for the teams, gave the teams precedence over other programs, and endorsed non-standard funding practices to accelerate their work. Further, the Secretary of Defense regularly engaged with teams. The study also found that DOD should provide team members with background information and the context behind the team’s mission and goals. Finally, the internal study found that cross-functional teams had the most robust decision-making authority when it came to integration and implementation of the Secretary of Defense’s priority initiatives. Through a review of literature and case studies as well as interviews with subject-matter experts, we identified eight leading practices for effective cross-functional teams, as shown in figure 1. These leading practices are similar to those identified by the McKinsey & Company contracted study and the ODCMO’s internal study as well as leading practices for interagency collaboration that we previously identified. Further, we found that leading practices for implementing effective cross- functional teams include the key characteristics shown in table 1. The ODCMO developed a draft organizational strategy that addresses the two statutory elements required under section 911 of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2017—identifying critical objectives and outputs that would benefit from the use of cross-functional teams, and providing for the appropriate use of these teams—but DOD has not issued that strategy as required by September 1, 2017. In addition, while the draft strategy contains the two required elements, it does not outline how DOD will achieve several future outcomes required under section 911 of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2017 that are designed to advance a collaborative culture within the department. Further, ODCMO officials did not coordinate with key stakeholders, such as the Secretary of Defense, military departments, and defense agencies, in developing the organizational strategy. Our leading practices for collaboration highlight the value of agencies including stakeholders when defining and articulating a common outcome. The ODCMO developed a draft organizational strategy, but DOD did not issue the organizational strategy as required by September 1, 2017, and as of February 2018 has not issued the strategy. The August 2017 draft organizational strategy we reviewed is intended to be an organizational design that focuses on the responsibilities, functions, and authorities of— and relationships between—the leaders of DOD components and those of cross-functional teams. It describes DOD’s current organizational structure and processes and how they will change as a result of recent legislation and reform initiatives, and it describes best practices and lessons learned for implementing cross-functional teams, as well as areas that may benefit from the use of such teams. Although the act required the Secretary of Defense to issue the strategy by September 1, 2017, the Acting DCMO told us that other reform initiatives and organizational changes have a higher priority and that therefore he did not take steps to finalize the strategy. ODCMO officials told us that they plan to align the strategy with the revised National Defense Strategy, which was released in January 2018, and the Agency Strategic Plan, which was expected to be issued in February 2018. We found that DOD’s draft organizational strategy contains the two elements required under section 911 of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2017. According to the act, among other things, the organizational strategy must (1) identify the critical objectives and other organizational outputs for the department that span multiple functional boundaries and would benefit from the use of cross-functional teams to ensure collaboration and integration across organizations within the department; and (2) provide for the appropriate use of cross-functional teams to manage such objectives and outputs. To address the first statutory element, the draft organizational strategy identifies several mission-focused and business- operations areas that would benefit from the use of cross-functional teams. For example, the strategy identifies three primary candidates for business operations, including Military Health Systems reforms, financial auditability, and security clearance backlog mitigation. To address the second statutory element, the draft organizational strategy identifies considerations for the appropriate use of cross-functional teams. For example, the strategy states that cross-functional teams should be used only for the Secretary of Defense’s highest-priority issues and that cross- functional teams require significant engagement with the Secretary of Defense and other top leadership. Section 911 of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2017 also identifies several outcomes that DOD should achieve to advance a collaborative culture within the department; however, we found that DOD’s draft organizational strategy does not clearly articulate how the department will achieve these outcomes. The act states that DOD’s organizational strategy should, among other things: provide for the furtherance and advancement of a collaborative, team- oriented, results-driven, and innovative culture within the department that fosters an open debate of ideas and alternative courses of action, and supports cross-functional teaming and integration; improve the manner in which the department integrates the expertise and capacities of the functional components of the department for effective and efficient achievement of critical objectives and other organizational outputs that span multiple functional boundaries and would benefit from the use of cross-functional teams; improve the management of relationships and processes involving the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, the combatant commands, the military departments, and the defense agencies with regard to such objectives and outputs; improve the ability of the department to work effectively in interagency processes with regard to such objectives and outputs in order to better serve the President; and achieve an organizational structure that enhances performance with regard to such objectives and outputs. We found that the draft strategy does not outline how the department will achieve these outcomes. For example, the draft organizational strategy notes that DOD leaders recognize the department must fully embrace and operationalize the cultural attributes set forth in section 911, including a more collaborative, team-oriented, results-driven, and innovative culture; however, it does not identify actions the department will take to help ensure that leaders embrace these attributes, such as through guidance or training. When we asked how the draft organizational strategy will help achieve these outcomes, ODCMO officials stated that the strategy contains references to cultural attributes for the department. For example, the draft organizational strategy describes cultural attributes of the department’s management and business operations, such as visibility across components and collaboration. However, ODCMO officials stated that they agree that the strategy could do more to address collaboration. The ODCMO officials said they originally interpreted section 911 to mean that the organizational strategy should focus on DOD’s organizational structure, processes, and leading practices for implementing cross- functional teams, rather than on how to transform the department’s culture more broadly. Nonetheless, the outcomes called for under the act refer to the need to advance a collaborative culture across the department. These officials also stated that they plan to revise the draft organizational strategy to include additional information on collaboration and information-sharing processes and systems, among other things. While not required to do so, OCMO, which will now lead the department’s efforts to implement section 911, could utilize our leading practices for mergers and organizational transformations to revise the organizational strategy to address how the department will advance a culture that is collaborative, team-oriented, results-driven, and innovative. We previously reported on leading practices and implementation steps for mergers and organizational transformations that can help agencies transform their cultures so that they are more results-oriented, customer- focused, and collaborative. The leading practices and implementation steps listed in table 2 were built on the lessons learned from large private and public sector organizational mergers, acquisitions, and transformations. These leading practices state that organizations should ensure that top leadership drives the transformation by defining and articulating a succinct and compelling reason for change. Doing so helps employees and stakeholders understand the expected outcomes of the transformation and engender not only their cooperation, but also their ownership of the outcomes. In addition, our leading practices state that organizations should establish a coherent mission and integrated strategic goals by adopting our leading practices for results-oriented strategic planning. Lastly, our leading practices state the organizations should include implementation goals and a timeline for achieving the transformation. By demonstrating progress toward these goals, the organization builds momentum and keeps employees excited about the opportunities change brings and helps to ensure the transformation’s successful completion. The incorporation of these leading practices in its organizational strategy to better articulate how the department will achieve the outcomes that generally advance a collaborative culture across DOD—as section 911 of the NDAA required—would better position DOD to transform and meet its mission. ODCMO did not collaborate with key stakeholders on the development of the organizational strategy. Specifically, as of November 2017, ODCMO officials had not collaborated with or obtained input from the Secretary of Defense on the development of DOD’s organizational strategy. The Acting DCMO noted that the Secretary of Defense has multiple competing priorities related to reorganizing the department, such as creating a separate CMO position required in the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2017, as well as other reform initiatives. In addition, ODCMO officials told us that they did not collaborate with other stakeholders, such as the military departments and defense agencies, on the development of the organizational strategy. According to a draft memorandum from the Acting DCMO to the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Acting DCMO plans to recommend that the Deputy Secretary of Defense coordinate the review and approval of the organizational strategy with stakeholders such as the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Director of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation, and DOD’s General Counsel. However, the memorandum did not specify other stakeholders, such as the military departments, the combatant commands, and defense agencies. ODCMO officials stated that their office plans to coordinate the review and approval of the strategy with other stakeholders, such as the military departments and defense agencies. However, as of November 2017, the officials had not provided documentation, such as a revised memorandum, showing specific plans to do so. Section 911 of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2017 states that the Secretary of Defense should formulate and issue an organizational strategy that identifies the critical objectives and other organizational outputs for the department that span multiple functional boundaries and would benefit from the use of cross-functional teams. In addition, the act states that the organizational strategy should, among other things, improve the management of relationships and processes involving the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, the combatant commands, the military departments, and the defense agencies with regard to such objectives and outputs. Our leading practices for collaboration state that when defining and articulating a common outcome, where appropriate, agencies should include stakeholders. In doing so, agencies can better address their interests and expectations and gain their support in achieving the objectives of the collaboration. Without obtaining key stakeholder input on the development of the organizational strategy, such as from the Secretary of Defense, military departments, the combatant commands, and defense agencies, DOD may not be well positioned to issue an organizational strategy that reflects the Secretary of Defense’s objectives and improves collaboration across the department. In August 2017, the Secretary of Defense issued a memorandum authorizing a cross-functional team to address challenges with personnel vetting and background investigation programs within DOD. Although the memorandum refers to section 951 of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2017, which requires DOD to develop a plan to transfer responsibility for conducting DOD personnel background investigations to the Defense Security Service, ODCMO officials told us that the cross-functional team reviewing personnel vetting was established pursuant to section 911 requirements, as the team will report directly to the Secretary’s office, among other things. Therefore, this team is considered a Secretary of Defense-empowered cross-functional team. The memorandum notes that a backlog of background investigations affects DOD’s mission readiness, critical programs, and operations. According to the memorandum, this cross-functional team will conduct a full review of current personnel vetting processes to identify a redesigned process for DOD’s security, suitability and fitness, and credential vetting. The cross-functional team’s objectives are to develop options and recommendations to mitigate shortcomings, ensure necessary resourcing, and transform the personnel vetting enterprise. An ODCMO official told us that DOD had selected an interim leader for the team. ODCMO officials developed draft guidance for Secretary of Defense- empowered cross-functional teams. The draft guidance fully addresses six and partially addresses one of the section 911 required statutory elements. We also found that the draft guidance fully addresses five leading practices, partially addresses two leading practices, and does not address one leading practice for effective cross-functional teams. Table 3 shows our assessment of the extent to which DOD’s draft guidance meets required statutory elements. The draft cross-functional team guidance briefly describes the characteristics of a cross-functional team and highlights the team’s direct reporting line to the Secretary of Defense, the team’s delegated authorities, and team leader and member selection. The guidance also states expectations for cross-functional team members’ dedication to the team and for leaders of functional components to support their participating staff. Further, DOD’s draft guidance discusses the role of the teams in addressing complex, enterprise-wide issues, and discusses training for and operations of the cross-functional teams. The guidance additionally describes DOD’s commitment to collaboration and integration across the department. Finally, we found that the draft guidance partially addresses the required statutory element of identifying key practices on leadership, organizational practice, collaboration or functioning of cross- functional teams. The draft guidance discusses key practices for senior leaders on the functioning of cross-functional teams, but we found that it does not identify any practices on leadership, organizational practice, or collaboration. We also found that DOD’s draft guidance for cross-functional teams could more fully incorporate leading practices for cross-functional teams, which are similar to those identified by the McKinsey & Company contracted study and the ODCMO’s internal study as well as leading practices for interagency collaboration that we previously identified. Figure 2 shows our assessment of the extent to which DOD’s draft cross-functional team guidance incorporates our leading practices for effective cross-functional teams. We found that the draft guidance fully incorporates five of the leading practices for effective cross-functional teams: well-defined team structure, autonomy, senior management support, committed cross-functional team members, and well-defined team goals. In addition, the draft guidance partially addresses the leading practice for open and regular communication, as it discusses that teams will update the Secretary of Defense and senior staff at regular staff meetings to reflect on progress and seek feedback. The draft guidance, however, does not address information sharing and communication within the cross-functional team. Also, the draft guidance partially addresses the leading practice for empowered cross-functional team leaders by indicating that team leaders should report directly to the Secretary of Defense, select team members, and seek feedback from other federal agencies. Further, the guidance states that cross-functional team leaders will contribute to the performance evaluations of their team members. The guidance states that the Secretary of Defense will select the team leaders, but does not elaborate on what qualities the team leader should possess. Finally, the draft guidance does not address the leading practice for an inclusive team environment. For example, the draft guidance does not contain any reference to developing a unified team culture and trust among team members. ODCMO officials told us that they anticipate the Secretary of Defense reviewing and approving this guidance, including a detailed terms of reference that addresses information on mechanics of team operations and guidance for each team. However, without initial guidance that fully addresses the required statutory elements in section 911 of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2017 and incorporates leading practices, DOD’s cross- functional teams may not be able to consistently and effectively approach the Secretary of Defense’s strategic objectives or further promote a collaborative culture within the department. As of October 2017, the ODCMO developed a draft training curriculum on cross-functional teams for presidential appointees, but this curriculum does not address all statutory requirements. Furthermore, as of February 2018, 22 individuals have been nominated by the President, confirmed by the Senate, and appointed to positions within the Office of the Secretary of Defense, but none have received training required by section 911. Section 911 of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2017 requires that, within 3 months of the appointment of an individual to a position in the Office of the Secretary of Defense appointable by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, the individual complete a course of instruction in leadership, modern organizational practice, collaboration, and the operation of cross-functional teams. The training requirement may be waived by the President upon a request by the Secretary of Defense if the Secretary of Defense determines in writing that the individual possesses, through training and experience, the skill and knowledge otherwise to be provided through a course of instruction. ODCMO officials stated that they intend to recommend that the Secretary of Defense seek such a waiver; however, this requirement had not been waived for any appointees as of November 2017. In addition, according to an ODCMO official, DOD has not developed criteria for determining who would be eligible for such a waiver and on what basis. We found that the draft curriculum addresses only one of four required elements in section 911 of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2017. Specifically, the draft curriculum addresses the required statutory element for training on the operation of cross-functional teams by including information on elements of successful teams and when to use them. It does not, however, incorporate the required statutory elements for leadership, modern organizational practice, or collaboration. According to the Acting DCMO, these appointees do not need this type of training because they are already experts in their field, have considerable leadership experience, and have likely already received this type of training. However, our leading practices of a well-designed training program note that it is important for agencies to consider the need for continuous and lifelong learning, recognizing that learning is an investment in success rather than a cost to be minimized. In addition, our leading practices state that a core characteristic of a strategic training and development process is leadership commitment, meaning that agency leaders consistently demonstrate that they support and value continuous learning and set the expectation that effective training and development will improve individual and organizational performance. Further, as organizations are typically resistant to change and need top leadership to drive a successful organizational transformation, ensuring that senior officials receive this training will be important for DOD’s overall organizational transformation to succeed in driving a more collaborative culture. Without the provision of training for top leadership within the Office of the Secretary of Defense that includes the required elements in section 911 of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2017 or developing criteria for obtaining a waiver from providing the training, DOD may have difficulty implementing its new organizational strategy as top leadership commitment is a key element of an organizational transformation. We found that DOD has developed a draft training curriculum for cross- functional team members and their supervisors that addresses required statutory elements, including the element focused on collaboration. This training has not been provided since no team members have been named for the one Secretary of Defense-empowered cross-functional team to address challenges with personnel vetting and background investigation programs within DOD. Section 911 of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2017 requires that team members and their supervisors of Secretary- empowered cross-functional teams receive training in elements of successful cross-functional teams, including teamwork, collaboration, conflict resolution, and in appropriately representing the views and expertise of their functional components. Table 4 summarizes the requirements of section 911 of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2017 and shows our assessment of the draft training curriculum against these required statutory elements. According to ODCMO officials, this training should take place soon after team members have been announced. In addition, ODCMO officials stated that they considered having an expert from another federal agency lead the training, but were prepared to conduct the training themselves if that expert was unavailable. Congress has been encouraging DOD to undertake transformative organizational change and improve collaboration and more effectively accomplish its missions across its military departments and functional organizations. While ODCMO officials drafted an organizational strategy that includes the two required statutory elements, the strategy does not address how the department will achieve several outcomes that advance a collaborative culture in the department, as required under section 911 of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2017. A revised strategy that addresses how the department will achieve these outcomes and is consistent with our leading practices for mergers and organizational transformations would better position DOD to further a culture within the department that is collaborative, team oriented, results driven, and innovative. DOD could also address three other areas to improve the department’s collaborative efforts. First, OCMO officials need to collaborate with key stakeholders across the department—such as the Secretary of Defense, military departments, the combatant commands, and defense agencies— to strengthen the organizational strategy and ensure a more successful implementation. Without this stakeholder input, the organizational strategy may meet resistance and not result in the desired organizational change. Second, DOD’s guidance for cross-functional teams is critical to their consistent and effective implementation across the department. This guidance would also help ensure that such teams are provided with the leadership support and resources, among other things, to address the Secretary of Defense’s strategic objectives and further promote collaboration across the department. Third, without training for presidential appointees to positions within the Office of the Secretary of Defense that includes leadership, modern organizational practice, collaboration, and the operation of cross-functional teams or developing criteria for who could receive a waiver for this training and on what basis, DOD may have difficulty aligning the perspective of these leaders to most effectively bring about change when implementing its new organizational strategy. We are making a total of four recommendations to the Secretary of Defense and the Chief Management Officer (CMO). The Secretary of Defense should ensure that: The CMO, in its revisions to the draft organizational strategy, address how the department will promote and achieve a collaborative culture, as required under section 911 of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2017. The CMO could accomplish this by incorporating our leading practices on mergers and organizational transformations. (Recommendation 1) The CMO obtain stakeholder input on the development of the organizational strategy from key stakeholders, including the Secretary of Defense, the military departments, the combatant commands, and defense agencies. (Recommendation 2) The CMO fully address all requirements in section 911 of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2017 and incorporate leading practices for effective cross- functional teams in guidance on Secretary of Defense-empowered cross- functional teams. (Recommendation 3) The CMO either: (a) provide training for presidentially-appointed, Senate- confirmed individuals in the Office of the Secretary of Defense that includes the required elements—leadership, modern organizational practice, and collaboration—in section 911 of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2017, or (b) develop criteria for obtaining a waiver and have the Secretary of Defense request such a waiver from the President for these required elements if the individual possesses—through training and experience— the skill and knowledge otherwise to be provided through a course of instruction. (Recommendation 4) We provided a draft of this report to DOD for review and comment. In written comments, DOD concurred with our recommendations. DOD also provided technical comments, which we incorporated where appropriate. DOD’s comments are reprinted in their entirety in appendix III. We initially made our recommendations to the DCMO; however, because section 910 of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2018 disestablished the position of DCMO on February 1, 2018 and established the position of CMO, we have updated our recommendations to be directed to the CMO. In response to our first recommendation, DOD emphasized the importance of collaboration across the department in pursuing DOD’s goals. In response to our second recommendation, DOD stated that finalizing the organizational strategy has been dependent on finalizing the National Defense Strategy and the Agency Strategic Plan. DOD also mentioned the reform teams established by the Deputy Secretary of Defense being aligned with strategic guidance. While DOD’s efforts to establish these reform teams are notable, as we discussed in our report, these reform teams do not meet the requirements for cross-functional teams established pursuant to section 911 of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2017. Finally, DOD concurred with our third and fourth recommendations and stated that criteria for waiving training for presidentially-appointed, Senate-confirmed individuals will be completed and appropriate waivers submitted to the President for key personnel by March 30, 2018. We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional committees, the Secretary of Defense, and DOD’s Chief Management Officer. In addition, the report is available at no charge on our website at http://www.gao.gov. If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 512-2775 or FieldE1@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made key contributions to this report are listed in appendix IV. Section 911 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 requires the Secretary of Defense to take several actions. Table 5 below summarizes some of these requirements, the due date, and the date completed. We identified leading practices for effective cross-functional teams and compared the Department of Defense’s (DOD) steps to establish cross- functional teams against these leading practices. To identify the leading practices, we reviewed literature as well as five case studies of cross- functional teams. In addition, we selected six academic and practitioner experts to interview based on their publications or research, prior testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee on the implementation of cross-functional teams at DOD, and recommendations from DOD officials. We identified eight broad categories of leading practices associated with effective cross-functional teams: (1) open and regular communication, (2) well-defined team goals, (3) inclusive team environment, (4) senior management support, (5) well-defined team structure, (6) autonomy, (7) committed cross-functional team members, and (8) an empowered cross-functional team leader. To identify what is known from published research about factors contributing to effective cross-functional teams, we conducted a literature search among relevant articles published from January 1990 through September 2017. We conducted a search for relevant peer-reviewed articles in 19 databases, including JSTOR, Academic OneFile, and ProQuest. Key terms included various combinations of “cross-functional team,” “best practice,” “characteristics,” “effective,” and “success.” From all database sources, we identified 46 relevant articles. We first reviewed the abstracts for each of these articles for relevancy in identifying contributing factors related to effective cross-functional teams. For the 17 articles that we found relevant and based on empirical research, we reviewed the full article for methodological rigor. GAO social scientists read and assessed each study, using a standardized data collection instrument. The assessment focused on information such as the population examined, the research design and data sources used, and methods of data analysis. The assessment also focused on the quality of the data used in the studies as reported by the researchers, any limitations of data sources for the purposes for which they were used, and inconsistencies in reporting study results. A second GAO social scientist reviewed each completed data collection instrument to verify the accuracy of the information included. We determined that the studies were sufficiently sound to support their results and conclusions. We excluded articles that lacked enough information about their methodologies for us to evaluate them. We then reviewed the citations and literature reviews of the relevant articles for additional sources. After including these articles and excluding others, 14 articles remained, covering cross-functional teams in both the private and public sectors. We took several additional steps to identify leading practices. First, we reviewed five case studies developed by subject-matter experts on cross- functional teams and interagency task forces employing similar collaboration tactics for national security issues. We reviewed these studies for academic rigor and determined that we could use them to inform our leading practice development. Second, we reviewed three relevant congressional testimonies from a Senate Armed Services Committee hearing in June 2016 about the use of cross-functional teams for improving strategic integration within DOD and incorporated them as well into the identification of leading practices. Third, we interviewed six subject-matter experts on cross-functional teams, utilizing a semi- structured set of questions, and used their responses to inform our cross- functional team leading practices. These experts include current and former government officials involved with cross-functional teams and academic researchers, who are listed below. Honorable Michael B. Donley—Former Secretary of the Air Force from 2008 to 2013, Dr. Amy Edmondson—Novartis Professor of Leadership and Management, Harvard Business School, Chris Fussell—Managing Partner at the McChrystal Group, former Navy SEAL and aide-de-camp to General Stanley McChrystal, Dr. Christopher J. Lamb—Distinguished Research Fellow, Center for Strategic Research in the Institute of National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, Honorable James R. Locher III—Former President and CEO, Project on National Security Reform, and Dr. Jeffrey Polzer—UPS Foundation Professor of Human Resource Administration, Harvard Business School. We documented our interviews with the selected subject-matter experts in a record of interview. To determine appropriate subject-matter experts to interview, we received recommendations from the Senate Armed Services committee and DOD officials, and identified subject-matter experts who testified before Congress on the topic of cross-functional teams. We also solicited names of other cross-functional team experts during our initial subject-matter expert interviews. Additionally, we examined the top business programs and research institutes at universities in the country identified in the top five rankings by U.S. News & World Report and identified researchers with expertise in cross- functional teams. Finally, we identified subject-matter experts through reviewing the Academy of Management’s Annual Meeting program from 2014 to 2016. The experts identified from this search were based in the United States and had papers in the program relating to cross-functional teams. We conducted a content analysis of cross-functional team practices identified in our literature review, the case studies, the congressional testimonies, and the subject-matter expert interviews. To do so, team members first reviewed: the results sections from the scholarly articles, the texts of the case studies, the transcripts of the testimonies, and the records of interview from the subject-matter interviews in order to identify characteristics of effective cross-functional teams. Then the team members independently reviewed the characteristics to identify themes. They subsequently compared the themes and developed a series of conceptual categories to be used as a coding structure for the content analysis. To conduct the content analysis of all identified characteristics, two analysts independently assigned each identified characteristic from the sources to one or more categories and sub-categories. Then, the team members met to compare their categorization decisions and to discuss the differences. Any disagreements regarding the categorizations of the characteristics were discussed and reconciled. The team members then tabulated the number of characteristics in each category and sub- category and reached agreement on the final set of categories and sub- categories. We assessed the outcome of our content analysis by comparing leading practices we identified to the contractor and internal DOD studies, as well as to our key considerations for implementing interagency collaborative mechanisms. In addition to the contact named above, Tina Won Sherman (Assistant Director), Tracy Barnes, Leslie Bharadwaja, Arkelga Braxton, Adelle Dantzler, David Dornisch, Jessica Du, Michael Holland, Amie Lesser, Ned Malone, Judy McCloskey, Sheila Miller, Richard Powelson, Terry Richardson, Ron Schwenn, Jared Sippel, Pam Snedden, Sarah Veale, and Richard Zarrella made key contributions to this report.

Summary: DOD continues to confront organizational challenges that hinder collaboration. To address these challenges, section 911 of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2017 directed the Secretary of Defense to issue an organizational strategy that identifies critical objectives which span multiple functional boundaries and that would benefit from the use of cross-functional teams. Additionally, DOD is to establish cross-functional teams to support this strategy. The NDAA also included a provision for GAO to assess DOD's actions in response to section 911. This report evaluates the extent to which DOD, in accordance with statutory requirements and leading practices, has (1) developed and issued an organizational strategy, (2) established Secretary of Defense-empowered cross-functional teams, and (3) provided associated training for Office of the Secretary of Defense leaders. GAO analyzed DOD's draft organizational strategy, draft guidance on establishing cross-functional teams, and draft training curriculum. GAO also interviewed DOD officials and subject-matter experts and identified leading practices for effective cross-functional teams. The Department of Defense (DOD) has implemented some of the statutory requirements outlined in section 911 of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2017 to address organizational challenges, but could do more to promote department-wide collaboration, as required under the NDAA. Specifically, DOD: Drafted an organizational strategy that includes the two required statutory elements, but does not outline how DOD will advance a more collaborative culture, as required by statute. Incorporating GAO's leading practices on mergers and organizational transformations, such as setting goals, would help DOD better advance a collaborative culture. Plans to coordinate review of the organizational strategy with some DOD offices, but has not followed GAO's leading practices for collaboration—to coordinate with key stakeholders, such as the Secretary of Defense and the military departments—in drafting the strategy. Without obtaining key stakeholder input, DOD may not be well positioned to improve collaboration across the department. Established one cross-functional team to address the backlog on security clearances and developed draft guidance for cross-functional teams that addresses six of seven required statutory elements and incorporates five of eight leading practices that GAO has identified for effective cross-functional teams (see figure). Fully incorporating all statutory elements and leading practices will help the teams consistently and effectively address DOD's strategic objectives. Developed a draft training curriculum for Presidential appointees in the Office of the Secretary of Defense. However, the curriculum addresses only one of four required statutory elements, and has not been provided to appointees. In addition, although the statute allows a waiver for this training, DOD has not developed criteria for such a waiver. Providing training for these officials or ensuring that appropriate criteria are used to waive training will improve DOD's ability to implement its new organizational strategy. GAO is making four recommendations to DOD, including revising its organizational strategy, collaborating with key stakeholders on the development of its organizational strategy, revising cross-functional team guidance, and providing training. DOD concurred with GAO's recommendations.