U.S.-Turkey ties, always complicated, appear to have reached crisis levels in the summer of 2018. Although the United States and Turkey, NATO allies since 1952, share some vital interests, harmonizing priorities can be difficult. These priorities sometimes diverge irrespective of who leads the two countries, based on contrasting geography, threat perceptions, and regional roles. Current points of tension in the relationship include the following: Sanctions and worsening U.S.-Turkey relations . Policy differences and public acrimony between the two countries have fueled concern about their relationship and about Turkey's status as a U.S. ally. In August 2018, the Trump Administration levied sanctions against Turkey in connection with the continued detention of Andrew Brunson, an American pastor charged with terrorism. The sanctions appear to have quickened the decline in value of Turkey's already depreciating currency, which has lost considerable value against the dollar (see " Currency Decline: U.S.-Turkey Crisis and Sanctions " below). The crisis in bilateral relations has appeared to deepen as Turkey has retaliated with its own sanctions, and as each country has raised tariffs on imports from the other. Congressional initiatives. 1 Within the tense bilateral context, Congress has required the Trump Administration—in the FY2019 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA, P.L. 115-232 )—to report on the status of U.S.-Turkey relations. Also, some Members of Congress have proposed legislation to limit arms sales and strategic cooperation—particularly regarding the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter—or to place additional sanctions on Turkish officials. While Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and other Turkish leaders have sharply criticized U.S. policies on many issues, questions in U.S. public debate about Turkey's status as an ally and its relationship with Russia have intensified. Possible S-400 acquisition from Russia. Turkey's planned purchase of an S-400 air defense system from Russia could trigger U.S. sanctions under existing law. The possible transaction has sparked broader concern over Turkey's relationship with Russia and implications for NATO. U.S. officials seek to prevent the deal, and reports suggest that they may be offering alternatives to Turkey such as Patriot air defense systems. Syria and the Kurds . Turkey's political stances and military operations in Syria have fed U.S.-Turkey tensions, particularly regarding Kurdish-led militias supported by the United States against the Islamic State (IS, also known as ISIS/ISIL) over Turkey's strong objections. Turkey's domestic trajectory and financial distress . President Erdogan rules in an increasingly authoritarian manner. Presidential and parliamentary elections held in June 2018 consolidated Erdogan's power pursuant to constitutional changes approved in a controversial 2017 referendum. Meanwhile, even before the U.S. sanctions in August, Turkey's currency had fallen considerably in value amid concerns about rule of law, regional and domestic political uncertainty, significant corporate debt, and a stronger dollar. Turkey's large, diversified economy, Muslim majority population, and geographic position straddling Europe and the Middle East make it a significant regional power. Important political developments in Turkey since 2002 have occurred within the context of significant socioeconomic changes that began in the 1980s. The military-guided governments that came to power after Turkey's 1980 coup helped establish Turkey's export-driven economy. This led to the gradual empowerment of a largely Sunni Muslim middle class from Turkey's Anatolian heartland. These socioeconomic changes helped fuel political transformation led by the Islamist-leaning Justice and Development Party ( Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi , or AKP) and President (formerly Prime Minister) Recep Tayyip Erdogan. The AKP won governing majorities four times—2002, 2007, 2011, and 2015—during a period in which Turkey's economy generally enjoyed growth and stability. For decades since its founding in the 1920s, the Turkish republic had relied upon its military, judiciary, and other bastions of its Kemalist (a term inspired by Turkey's republican founder, Mustafa Kemal Ataturk) "secular elite" to protect it from political and ideological extremes—sacrificing at least some of its democratic vitality in the process. Erdogan has worked to reduce the political power of the "secular elite" and has clashed with other possible rival power centers, including previous allies in the Fethullah Gulen movement. Domestic polarization has intensified since 2013: nationwide antigovernment protests that began in Istanbul's Gezi Park took place that year, and corruption allegations later surfaced against a number of Erdogan's colleagues in and out of government. After Erdogan became president in August 2014 via Turkey's first-ever popular presidential election, he claimed a mandate for increasing his power and pursuing a "presidential system" of governance. Analyses of Erdogan sometimes characterize him as one or more of the following: a pragmatic populist, a protector of the vulnerable, a budding authoritarian, an indispensable figure, an Islamic ideologue. Erdogan's consolidation of power has continued. He outlasted the July 2016 coup attempt, and then scored victories in the April 2017 constitutional referendum and the June 2018 presidential and parliamentary elections. U.S. and European Union officials have expressed a number of concerns about rule of law and civil liberties in Turkey, including the government's influence on media and Turkey's reported status as the country with the most journalists in prison. While there may be some similarities between Turkey under Erdogan and countries like Russia, Iran, or China, some factors distinguish Turkey from them. For example, unlike Russia or Iran, Turkey's economy cannot rely on significant rents from natural resources if foreign sources of revenue or investment dry up. Unlike Russia and China, Turkey does not have nuclear weapons under its command and control. Additionally, unlike all three others, Turkey's economic, political, and national security institutions and traditions have been closely connected with those of the West for decades. Erdogan and various other key Turkish figures (including political party leaders) are profiled in Appendix A . In an election that President Erdogan moved up to June 2018 from November 2019, he was reelected to a five-year presidential term with about 53% of the vote. The election reinforced his dominant role in Turkish politics because a controversial April 2017 popular referendum had determined that the presidential victor would govern with expanded powers. To obtain a parliamentary majority in the June elections, Erdogan's AKP relied on the Nationalist Action Party ( Milliyet Halk Partisi , or MHP) (see Figure 2 below). The MHP is the country's traditional Turkish nationalist party, and is known for opposing political accommodation with the Kurds. The MHP also had provided key support for the constitutional amendments approved in 2017. If the MHP's role in parliament influences policy, the government may be less inclined to make conciliatory overtures to the Kurdish militant group PKK ( Partiya Karkeren Kurdistan , or Kurdistan Workers Party). However, given his expanded powers, Erdogan might be less sensitive to parliamentary developments. Most of the constitutional changes, which significantly affect Turkey's democracy and will probably have ripple effects for Turkey's foreign relations, went into effect after the June 2018 elections. Among other things, the changes eliminate the position of prime minister, with the president serving as both chief executive and head of state; allow the president to appoint ministers and other senior officials without parliamentary approval; prohibit ministers from serving as members of parliament; transfer responsibility for preparing the national budget from parliament to the president; and increase the proportion of senior judges chosen by the president from about half to over two-thirds. As with the 2017 constitutional referendum , some allegations of voter fraud and manipulation surfaced in connection with the 2018 elections. Muharrem Ince of the Republican People's Party ( Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi , or CHP), Erdogan's main challenger in the presidential race, noted these allegations in his concession message. He claimed that the campaign, which was conducted under a state of emergency and featured media coverage disproportionately favoring Erdogan and the AKP, was "unfair." However, Ince also said that the alleged manipulation did not affect the outcome. The AKP's political successes have been aided considerably by robust Turkish economic growth since the early 2000s. Growth rates have been comparable at times to other major emerging markets, such as the BRIC economies of Brazil, Russia, India, and China. Key Turkish businesses include diversified conglomerates (such as Koc and Sabanci) from traditional urban centers as well as "Anatolian tigers" (small- to medium-sized export-oriented companies) scattered throughout the country. According to the World Bank, Turkey's economy ranked 17 th worldwide in annual GDP in 2017; when Erdogan came to power in 2003, Turkey was ranked 21 st . However, despite a real GDP growth rate of over 7% in 2017, a number of indicators suggest that the Turkish economy may be entering a period of volatility and perhaps crisis, with potentially significant implications for the global economy. Some observers assert that the "low-hanging fruit"—numerous large infrastructure projects and the scaling up of low-technology manufacturing—that largely drove the previous decade's economic success is unlikely to produce similar results going forward. Turkey's relatively large current account deficit increases its vulnerability to higher borrowing costs. Prospects are uncertain for how the economy and foreign investors will respond under Erdogan's new government. In July 2018, Erdogan gave himself the power to appoint central bank rate-setters and appointed his son-in-law Berat Albayrak (the former energy minister) to serve as treasury and finance minister, exacerbating concerns about greater politicization of Turkey's monetary policy. Some observers have speculated that if investment dries up, Turkey may need to turn to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for a financial assistance package. This would be a sensitive challenge for Erdogan because his political success story is closely connected with helping Turkey become independent from its most recent IMF intervention in the early 2000s. The Turkish lira has depreciated significantly as of August 2018. Even before U.S. sanctions were enacted in August, Turkey's lira had faced a downward trend in value, with that trend becoming more pronounced around 2015. The lira's decline and accompanying inflation appear to have been driven in part by a strengthening of the U.S. dollar and in part by concerns about Turkey's central bank independence and rule of law. These factors compounded the problem of the country's corporate debt, which stands at nearly 80% of GDP. The U.S. sanctions related to Pastor Andrew Brunson's case (see " Sanctions, Pastor Brunson, and Other Criminal Cases " below) and the historic crisis they may augur for U.S.-Turkey relations could be speeding the lira's decline. The lira has depreciated against the dollar by around 40% from January through August of 2018. In August, President Erdogan called on Turks to help with a "national struggle" by converting their savings from dollars and gold to lira. Turkey's importance as a regional energy transport hub makes it relevant for world energy markets while also providing Turkey with opportunities to satisfy its own domestic energy needs. Turkey's location has made it a key country in the U.S. and European effort to establish a southern corridor for natural gas transit from diverse sources. However, Turkey's dependence on other countries for energy—particularly Russia and Iran—may somewhat constrain Turkey from pursuing foreign policies in opposition to those countries. Construction on the Turkish Stream pipeline, which would carry Russian natural gas through Turkey into Europe, has proceeded apace since 2017; the first gas deliveries are projected for the end of 2019. As part of a broad Turkish strategy to reduce the country's dependence on foreign actors, Turkey appears to be trying to diversify its energy imports. In late 2011, Turkey and Azerbaijan reached deals for the transit of natural gas to and through Turkey via the Trans-Anatolian Pipeline (TANAP); the project was inaugurated in June 2018. The deals have attracted attention as a potentially significant precedent for transporting non-Russian, non-Iranian energy to Europe. In June 2013, the consortium that controls the Azerbaijani gas fields elected to have TANAP connect with a proposed Trans Adriatic Pipeline (TAP) to Italy, though political developments in Italy and elsewhere could complicate these arrangements. Turkey also has shown interest in importing natural gas from new fields in the Eastern Mediterranean, and possibly even developing its own gas fields, but difficult relations with Cyprus, Israel, and Egypt could hamper these efforts. Another part of Turkey's strategy to become more energy independent is to increase domestic energy production. Turkey has entered into an agreement with a subsidiary of Rosatom (Russia's state-run nuclear company) to have it build and operate what would be Turkey's first nuclear power plant in Akkuyu near the Mediterranean port of Mersin. Construction, which had been delayed for several years, began in April 2018, with operations expected to begin in 2023. Some observers have expressed both skepticism about the construction timeline and concerns that the plant could provide Russia with additional leverage over Turkey. Japan has agreed to assist with the construction of a second nuclear power plant for Turkey in Sinop on the Black Sea coast, and Turkey is reportedly discussing cooperation with China to build a third plant in Thrace (northwest Turkey). Ethnic Kurds reportedly constitute approximately 19% of Turkey's population. Kurds are largely concentrated in the relatively impoverished southeast, though populations are found in urban centers across the country. Some Kurds have been reluctant to recognize Turkish state authority in various parts of the southeast—a dynamic that also exists between Kurds and national governments in Iraq, Iran, and Syria. This reluctance and harsh Turkish government measures to quell Kurdish demands for rights have fed tensions that have occasionally escalated since the foundation of the republic in 1923. Since 1984, the Turkish military has periodically countered an on-and-off separatist insurgency and urban terrorism campaign by the PKK. The initially secessionist demands of the PKK have since ostensibly evolved toward the less ambitious goal of greater cultural and political autonomy. According to the U.S. government and European Union, the PKK partially finances its activities through criminal activities, including its operation of a Europe-wide drug trafficking network. The struggle between Turkish authorities and the PKK was most intense during the 1990s, but has flared periodically since then. The PKK uses safe havens in areas of northern Iraq under the nominal authority of Iraq's Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG). The Turkish military's approach to neutralizing the PKK has been routinely criticized by Western governments and human rights organizations for being overly hard on ethnic Kurds. Thousands have been imprisoned and hundreds of thousands have been displaced or had their livelihoods disrupted for suspected PKK involvement or sympathies. Until the spring of 2015, Erdogan appeared to prefer negotiating a political compromise with PKK leaders over the prospect of armed conflict. However, against the backdrop of PKK-affiliated Kurdish groups' success in Syria and domestic political considerations, Erdogan then adopted a more confrontational political stance with the PKK. Within that context, a complicated set of circumstances involving terrorist attacks and mutual suspicion led to a resumption of violence between government forces and the PKK in the summer of 2015. As a result of the violence, which has been concentrated in southeastern Turkey and has tapered off somewhat since late 2016, hundreds of fighters and civilians have died. In addition to mass population displacement, infrastructure in the southeast has suffered significant damage. U.S. officials, while supportive of Turkey's prerogative to defend itself from attacks, have advised Turkey to show restraint and proportionality in its actions. Under the state of emergency enacted after the failed July 2016 coup attempt, Turkey's government cracked down on Turkey's Kurdish minority. Dozens of elected Kurdish mayors were removed from office and replaced with government-appointed "custodians." In November 2016, the two co-leaders of the pro-Kurdish HDP were arrested along with nine other parliamentarians under various charges of crimes against the state. Turkish officials routinely accuse Kurdish politicians of support for the PKK, but these politicians generally deny close ties. The future trajectory of Turkey-PKK dealings may depend on a number of factors, including which Kurdish figures and groups (imprisoned PKK founder Abdullah Ocalan [profiled in Appendix A ], various PKK militant leaders, the professedly nonviolent HDP) are most influential in driving events; Erdogan's approach to the issue, which has alternated between conciliation and confrontation; and possible incentives to Turkey's government and the Kurds from the United States or other actors for mitigating violence and promoting political resolution. Many Members of Congress follow the status of religious minorities in Turkey. Adherents of non-Muslim religions and minority Muslim sects (most prominently, the Alevis) rely to some extent on legal appeals, political advocacy, and support from Western countries to protect their rights in Turkey. The Turkish government controls or closely oversees religious activities in the country. The Turkish arrangement (often referred to as "laicism") was originally used to enforce secularism, partly to prevent religion from influencing state actors and institutions as it did under Ottoman rule. However, since at least 2015, observers have detected some movement by state religious authorities in the direction of the AKP's Islamic-friendly worldview. U.S. concerns focus largely on the rights of Turkey's Christian and Jewish communities, which have sought greater freedom to choose leaders, train clergy, own property, and otherwise function independently of the Turkish government. According to the State Department's International Religious Freedom Report for 2017, "Members of the Jewish community continued to express concern about anti-Semitism and increased threats of violence throughout the country." Some Members of Congress routinely express grievances through proposed congressional resolutions and letters on behalf of the Ecumenical (Greek Orthodox) Patriarchate of Constantinople, the spiritual center of Orthodox Christianity based in Istanbul. The Patriarchate, along with various U.S. and European officials, continues to press for the reopening of its Halki Theological School, which was closed after a 1971 Constitutional Court ruling prohibiting the operation of private institutions of higher education. After an April 2018 meeting with President Erdogan, Patriarch Bartholomew said that he was "optimistic" that the seminary would be opened in the fall. Turkey has converted some historic Christian churches into mosques, and may be considering additional conversions. A popular movement to convert Istanbul's landmark Hagia Sophia (which became a museum in the early years of the Turkish republic) into a mosque has gained strength in recent years. Bills to effect that conversion have been introduced in the Turkish parliament, but none have been enacted. In June 2016, the government permitted daily televised Quran readings from Hagia Sophia during Ramadan, prompting criticism from the Greek government, and calls from the State Department for Turkey to respect the site's "traditions and complex history." As part of a cultural event in March 2018, President Erdogan recited a prayer from the Quran at the Hagia Sophia. About 10 to 20 million Turkish Muslims are Alevis (of whom about 20% are ethnic Kurds). The Alevi community has some relation to Shiism and may contain strands from pre-Islamic Anatolian and Christian traditions. Alevism has been traditionally influenced by Sufi mysticism that emphasizes believers' individual spiritual paths, but it defies precise description owing to its lack of centralized leadership and reliance on secret oral traditions. Despite a decision by Turkey's top appeals court in August 2015 that the state financially support cemevis (Alevi houses of worship), the government still does not do so. Alevis have long been among the strongest supporters of secularism in Turkey, which they reportedly see as a form of protection from the Sunni majority. Arab Alawites in Syria and southern Turkey are a distinct Shia-related religious community. Numerous points of bilateral tension have raised questions within the United States and Turkey about the two countries' alliance. In the context of concerns about Turkey's strategic orientation (see " Turkey's Strategic Orientation and Foreign Policy "), many Members of Congress are increasingly active in proposing legislation and exercising oversight on U.S.-Turkey matters that include arms sales and strategic cooperation, various criminal cases, and economic sanctions. For its part, Turkey may bristle because it feels like it is treated as a junior partner, and may seek greater foreign policy diversification through stronger relationships with more countries. Turkey's location near several global hotspots makes the continuing availability of its territory for the stationing and transport of arms, cargo, and personnel valuable for the United States and NATO. From Turkey's perspective, NATO's traditional value has been to mitigate its concerns about encroachment by neighbors. Turkey initially turned to the West largely as a reaction to aggressive post-World War II posturing by the Soviet Union. In addition to Incirlik air base (see textbox below), other key U.S./NATO sites include an early warning missile defense radar in eastern Turkey and a NATO ground forces command in Izmir (see Figure 4 below). Turkey also controls access to and from the Black Sea through its straits pursuant to the Montreux Convention of 1936. Current tensions have fueled discussion from the U.S. perspective about the advisability of continued U.S./NATO use of Turkish bases. Reports in 2018 suggest that some Trump Administration officials have contemplated permanent reductions in the U.S. presence in Turkey. There are historical precedents for such changes. On a number of occasions, the United States has withdrawn military assets from Turkey or Turkey has restricted U.S. use of its territory or airspace. These include the following: 1962 - Cuban Missile Crisis . The United States withdrew its nuclear-tipped Jupiter missiles following this crisis. 1975 - Cyprus. Turkey closed most U.S. defense and intelligence installations in Turkey during the U.S. arms embargo that Congress imposed in response to Turkey's military intervention in Cyprus. 2003 - Iraq. A Turkish parliamentary vote did not allow the United States to open a second front from Turkey in the Iraq war. The July 2016 coup plotters apparently used Incirlik air base, causing temporary disruptions of some U.S. military operations. This raised questions about Turkey's stability and the safety and utility of Turkish territory for U.S. and NATO assets. As a result of these questions and U.S.-Turkey tensions, some observers have advocated exploring alternative basing arrangements in the region. The cost to the United States of finding a temporary or permanent replacement for Incirlik and other sites in Turkey would likely depend on a number of variables including the functionality and location of alternatives, the location of future U.S. military engagements, and the political and economic difficulty involved in moving or expanding U.S. military operations elsewhere. An August 2018 media report claimed that U.S. officials have been "quietly looking for alternatives to Incirlik, including in Romania and Jordan." Another August report cited a Department of Defense spokesperson as saying that the United States is not leaving Incirlik. Calculating the costs and benefits to the United States of a U.S./NATO presence in Turkey, and of potential changes in U.S./NATO posture, revolves to a significant extent around three questions: To what extent does strengthening Turkey relative to other regional actors serve U.S. interests? To what extent does the United States rely on the use of Turkish territory or airspace to secure and protect U.S. interests? To what extent does Turkey rely on U.S./NATO support, both in principle and in functional terms, for its security and regional influence? Turkey has historically been one of the largest recipients of U.S. arms (see more information in Appendix B ), owing to its status as a NATO ally, its large military, and its strategic position. Presently, however, Turkey seeks to build up its domestic defense industry (including through technology-sharing and co-production arrangements with other countries) as much as possible, while minimizing "off-the-shelf" arms purchases from the United States and other countries. Since 1948, the United States has provided Turkey with approximately $13.8 billion in overall military assistance (nearly $8.2 billion in grants and $5.6 billion in loans). Current annual military and security grant assistance, however, is limited to approximately $3-5 million annually in International Military Education and Training (IMET); and Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining and Related Programs (NADR) funds. In December 2017, Turkey and Russia reportedly signed a finance agreement for Turkey's purchase of the Russian-made S-400 surface-to-air defense system. Media reports indicate that the deal, if finalized, would be worth approximately $2.5 billion. Turkey's procurement agency anticipates initial delivery in July 2019, which is sooner than the first reports of the deal had indicated. (An expedited delivery could increase the purchase price. ) Alongside Turkey's pursuit of the S-400 deal to address short-term needs, Turkey also is exploring an arrangement to co-develop a long-range air defense system with the Franco-Italian Eurosam consortium by the mid-2020s. Turkey's planned acquisition of the S-400 has raised a number of U.S. and NATO concerns, ranging from technical aspects of military cooperation within NATO to broader political considerations. For some observers, the S-400 issue raises the possibility that Russia could take advantage of U.S.-Turkey friction to undermine the NATO alliance. In a May 3, 2018, press briefing, a State Department spokesperson said, "Under NATO and under the NATO agreement ... you're only supposed to buy ... weapons and other materiel that are interoperable with other NATO partners. We don't see [an S-400 system from Russia] as being interoperable." In March 2018, Czech General Petr Pavel, who chairs the NATO Military Committee, voiced concerns about the possibility that Russian personnel helping operate an S-400 system in Turkey could gain significant intelligence on NATO assets stationed in the country. Additionally, in November 2017, an Air Force official raised specific concerns related to Turkey's operation of the S-400 system alongside F-35 aircraft, citing the potential for Russia to obtain sensitive data related to F-35 capabilities. A Turkish columnist noted in July 2018 that a number of other countries planning to acquire the F-35 share U.S. worries about S-400 information-gathering on F-35s in Turkish airspace. Turkey has justified its preliminary decision to acquire S-400s instead of U.S. or European alternatives by claiming that it turned to Russia because its attempts to purchase an air defense system from NATO allies were rebuffed. Turkey has also cited various practical reasons, including cost, technology sharing, and territorial defense coverage. However, one analysis from December 2017 asserted that the S-400 deal would not involve technology transfer, would not defend Turkey from ballistic missiles (because the system would not have access to NATO early-warning systems), and could weaken rather than strengthen Turkey's geopolitical position by increasing Turkish dependence on Russia. According to one Turkish press report, Turkey may be taking various steps intended to assuage U.S. concerns, such as insisting on systems and training that allow Turkish technicians to operate the S-400 without Russian involvement, and allowing U.S. officials to examine the S-400. Nevertheless, a Turkish columnist has predicted that "either these S-400s are going to be stored somewhere without being installed, or Turkey will purchase something else from Russia…to appease Moscow." In March 2018, Turkish Foreign Minister Cavusoglu said that Turkey would also be willing to purchase U.S.-origin Patriot systems if the Administration "guarantees that the US Congress [would] approve the sale." In April, following a meeting in Brussels in which Secretary of State Pompeo reportedly asked Cavusoglu to "closely consider NATO interoperable systems," Cavusoglu said that the S-400 process was a "done deal," and that further purchases would be in addition to, not in place of, S-400s. At a public event in May, Air Force Secretary Heather Wilson referred to U.S.-Turkey discussions aimed at preventing the F-35 from being close to the S-400. In expressing an opinion about room for improvement with U.S. export controls, she added that the United States sometimes should design defense systems "to be exportable from the very beginning so that we can all operate off the same equipment [with allies]." In July, a State Department official confirmed ongoing talks with Turkey about the Patriot system. As mentioned above, the planned S-400 acquisition could trigger sanctions under existing U.S. law. In a September 2017 letter to President Trump, Senators John McCain and Ben Cardin cited the deal as a possible violation of section 231 of the Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA, P.L. 115-44 )—relating to transactions with Russian defense and intelligence sectors—that was enacted on August 2, 2017. In April 18, 2018, testimony before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs Wess Mitchell said that a Turkish S-400 purchase from Russia could "potentially lead to sanctions under section 231 of CAATSA and adversely impact Turkey's participation in an F-35 program." Previously, in 2013, Turkey reached a preliminary agreement to purchase a Chinese air and missile defense system, but later (in 2015) withdrew from the deal, perhaps partly due to concerns voiced within NATO, as well as China's reported reluctance to share technology. The U.S.-Turkey relationship has always been complicated. Since the 2016 coup attempt, several differences and increased public acrimony have developed between the two countries. Turkey's possible S-400 acquisition from Russia has been discussed above, and U.S.-Turkey disputes over Syria are discussed in a later section of this report. This section discusses other points of bilateral tension. Turkish actions and statements on a number of foreign policy issues have contributed to problems with the United States and other NATO allies. For example, Turkey's dealings with Russia on Syria, arms sales, and energy; its openness to better relations with China; and its periodic public spats with U.S. and European officials have fueled questions about its commitment to NATO and its Western orientation. Additionally, President Erdogan has taken a leading role in rallying regional and international opposition to President Trump's decision to recognize Jerusalem as Israel's capital and move the U.S. embassy to Israel there, and in condemning U.S. support of Israel during rounds of Israeli-Palestinian violence. Erdogan also has vocally opposed the May 2018 U.S. withdrawal from the international agreement on Iran's nuclear program, amid questions about Turkey's willingness to comply with sanctions that the United States is re-imposing on Iran's oil exports. Also during 2018, Turkey's interactions have become increasingly contentious with Greece and Cyprus over airspace and maritime access issues that have implications for NATO and the European Union. For more information, see " Turkish Foreign Policy " below. On August 1, 2018, the Treasury Department levied sanctions against Turkey's justice and interior ministers, blocking any property interests they might have within U.S. jurisdiction due to their "leading roles in the organizations responsible for the arrest and detention of Pastor Andrew Brunson." Turkey reacted with reciprocal sanctions against the U.S. Secretary of the Interior and Attorney General. Reciprocal sanctions of this type between the United States and an ally are unusual and suggest a crisis in bilateral relations. With the impasse on Brunson's situation ongoing, on August 10 President Trump announced a doubling of tariffs on Turkish steel and aluminum imports. This prompted retaliatory action from Turkey. Pastor Brunson's case and a number of other cases that have stoked U.S.-Turkey tensions have some connection with the 2016 coup attempt. Shortly after the attempt, Turkey's government called for the extradition of Fethullah Gulen, and the matter remains pending before U.S. officials. Sharp criticism of U.S. actions related to Gulen's case has significantly increased in Turkish media since the coup attempt. Parallel with nationwide efforts to imprison and marginalize those with connections to Gulen, Turkish authorities have detained Brunson (see textbox below) and a number of other U.S. citizens (most of them dual U.S.-Turkish citizens), along with Turkish employees of the U.S. government. On August 15, 2018, White House press secretary Sarah Sanders drew a distinction between the Treasury Department sanctions and the new tariff levels on steel. She said that the sanctions were "specific to Pastor Brunson and others that we feel are being held unfairly," but that the tariffs that are in place on steel are specific to national security and "would not be removed with the release of Pastor Brunson." Separately, two prominent Turkish citizens with government ties were arrested by U.S. authorities in 2016 and 2017 for conspiring to evade sanctions on Iran. One, Reza Zarrab, received immunity for cooperating with prosecutors, while the other, Mehmet Hakan Atilla, was convicted and sentenced in May 2018 to 32 months in prison. The case was repeatedly denounced by Turkish leaders, who were reportedly concerned about the potential implications for Turkey's economy if the case led U.S. officials to impose penalties on Turkish banks. This has not happened to date. On some occasions during Erdogan's trips outside Turkey, members of his security detail have gotten into physical confrontations with those they perceive as Erdogan's critics or political opponents. Several Members of Congress became particularly concerned about an incident in May 2017 in Washington, DC, outside the Turkish ambassador's residence. The incident featured confrontation between the security guards and largely Kurdish protestors, and 19 people who acted to quell the protest were indicted by a DC grand jury on charges of conspiracy to commit violent crime. The House unanimously passed a resolution (H.Res. 354) in June 2017 that condemned the violence against "peaceful protesters," and Congress included a provision in FY2018 appropriations legislation (section 7046(d) of P.L. 115-141 ) that prohibited the use of U.S. funds to facilitate arms sales to Erdogan's security detail. Section 7046(d)(2) of the Senate FY2019 State Department, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations bill ( S. 3108 ) would maintain that prohibition. Bilateral tensions have contributed to various legislative proposals by Members of Congress, alongside a public debate about the potential costs and benefits of sanctions against Turkey. The most significant congressional action against Turkey to date has been an arms embargo that Congress enacted in response to Turkish military intervention in Cyprus. That embargo lasted from 1975 to 1978. The FY2019 NDAA ( P.L. 115-232 ) enacted in August 2018 includes a provision (section 1282) that requires a report to congressional armed services and foreign affairs committees within 90 days from the Secretary of Defense (in consultation with the Secretary of State) on the status of U.S.-Turkey relations. The provision prohibits the delivery of F-35 aircraft to Turkey until the report is submitted. The report will include an assessment of the U.S. military and diplomatic presence in Turkey, including military activities conducted from Incirlik air base; an assessment of Turkey's potential S-400 purchase from Russia and the effects it might have on the U.S.-Turkey relationship, including on other U.S. weapon systems and platforms operated with Turkey (aircraft, helicopters, surface-to-air missiles); an assessment of Turkey's participation in the F-35 program, including how changing Turkey's participation could impact the program and what steps might mitigate negative impacts for the United States and other program partners; and an identification of potential alternative air and missile defense systems for Turkey, including military air defense artillery systems from the United States or other NATO member states. Turkey is a cooperative partner in developing the F-35, and as part of its involvement, several Turkish companies are assisting with development and manufacture of various F-35 components. Media reports indicate that Turkey plans to purchase 100 F-35s; the first was handed over in Texas at a June 21, 2018 ceremony, and training on the aircraft for Turkish pilots is now underway on U.S. soil. This first aircraft is reportedly scheduled to leave the United States for Turkey sometime in 2020. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, in May 23, 2018, testimony before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, said that the State Department had not yet decided whether to permit Turkey's purchase of F-35s, and in the same sentence mentioned continuing efforts to persuade Turkey not to acquire the S-400 from Russia. Some Members of Congress have sought to prevent or place conditions on Turkey's acquisition of F-35s because of the S-400 deal, Pastor Brunson's imprisonment, or other U.S.-Turkey tensions described above. In a June 2018 Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC) report ( S.Rept. 115-262 ) accompanying an early version of the FY2019 NDAA ( S. 2987 ), SASC described Turkey as a NATO ally and critical strategic partner of the United States, but also said that a Turkish purchase of the S-400 from Russia would be incompatible with Turkey's NATO commitments. Additionally, the report expressed concerns about U.S. citizens detained in Turkey (including Pastor Brunson) and called upon Turkey to uphold its obligations under the North Atlantic Treaty to "safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilization of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law." In May, Senator Jeanne Shaheen had said, "There is tremendous hesitancy in transferring sensitive F35 planes and technology to a nation who has purchased a Russian air defense system designed to shoot these very planes down." Because the F-35 program is multinational, unwinding Turkey's involvement could be costly and complicated. One source has said that "the Pentagon last year awarded [Lockheed Martin, a key contractor on the F-35 program] $3.7 billion in an interim payment for the production of 50 of the aircraft earmarked for non-U.S. customers, including Ankara." In May, two Members of Congress circulated a letter to other Members expressing concern about Turkey but opposing its exclusion from the F-35 program. According to these two Members As of January 2018, Turkey had contributed over $1 billion to the program. This investment would be required to be returned to the Turkish Government if the United States fails to deliver on the contract. Even more significantly, Turkey manufactures critical components of the F-35. Removing them from the program will lead to delays and [cost] overruns to the rest of the partners and allies. In a July letter to the Senate and House Armed Services Committees, Secretary of Defense Jim Mattis said that he opposed removal of Turkey from the F-35 program "at this time." Secretary Mattis agreed with congressional concerns about "the authoritarian drift in Turkey and its impact on human rights and rule of law," but said that if "the Turkish supply chain was disrupted today, it would result in an aircraft production break, delaying delivery of 50-75 jets and would take approximately 18-24 months to re-source parts." Turkey could take a number of measures in response to U.S. actions to end Turkey's involvement with the F-35. Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu has said that a U.S. withdrawal from the deal would not be in keeping with the U.S.-Turkey alliance, would trigger Turkish retaliation, and that Turkey could go elsewhere to meet its needs. The Senate version of the FY2019 State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act ( S. 3108 ) includes a provision (section 7046(d)(3)) that would withhold funding for the transfer of F-35 aircraft to Turkey until the Secretary of State certifies that Turkey is not purchasing the S-400 from Russia and will not accept delivery of the S-400. For FY2018, the Senate Appropriations Committee proposed a provision for annual appropriations legislation (section 7046(e) of S. 1780 ) that would have required the Secretary of State to deny entry into the United States "to any senior official of the Government of Turkey about whom the Secretary has credible information is knowingly responsible for the wrongful or unlawful prolonged detention of citizens or nationals of the United States," subject to a few exceptions or possible waivers on grounds of national interest, international obligation, or changed circumstances. In March, Senator Jeanne Shaheen said that she and Senator James Lankford had agreed to drop the above provision (which they had originally sponsored) from FY2018 appropriations legislation ( P.L. 115-141 ) to give time for U.S.-Turkey diplomacy to bear fruit on a number of issues, including the status of U.S. citizens and consulate staff imprisoned in Turkey. However, on April 20, the two Senators released a joint statement criticizing President Erdogan for continuing to hold "Pastor Brunson and other innocent Americans behind bars on fabricated charges," and stating that they would pursue targeted sanctions against Turkish officials in FY2019 appropriations legislation. On June 21, 2018, the Senate Appropriations Committee reported the FY2019 Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act ( S. 3108 ) which contains a nearly identical provision (section 7046(d)(1)). In July 2018, six Senators introduced the Turkey International Financial Institutions Act ( S. 3248 ), which would direct "the U.S. executive of the World Bank and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) to oppose future loans, except for humanitarian purposes, to Turkey by the International Finance Corporation (IFC) and EBRD until the administration can certify to Congress that Turkey is 'no longer arbitrarily detaining or denying freedom of movement to United States citizens (including dual citizens) or locally employed staff members of the United States mission to Turkey.'" Turkey's involvement in Syria's conflict since 2011 has been complicated and costly. Turkey's chief objective has been to thwart the Syrian Kurdish People's Protection Units (YPG, which has links with the PKK) from establishing an autonomous area along the northern Syrian border with Turkey. Turkey appears to view the YPG and its political counterpart, the Democratic Union Party (PYD), as the top threat to its security, given the boost the YPG's military and political success could provide to the PKK's insurgency within Turkey. The YPG plays a leading role in the umbrella group known as the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), which also includes Arabs and other non-Kurdish elements. Since 2014, the SDF has been the main U.S. ground force partner against the Islamic State. U.S. support for the SDF has fueled U.S.-Turkey tension because of Turkey's view of the YPG as a threat. As part of SDF operations to expel the Islamic State from Raqqah in 2017, the U.S. government pursued a policy of arming the YPG directly while preventing the use of such arms against Turkey, and Secretary of Defense Jim Mattis announced an end to the direct arming of the YPG near the end of the year. U.S. officials have contrasted their longstanding alliance with Turkey with their current but temporary cooperation with the YPG. After Turkey moved against IS-held territory in northern Syria as a way to prevent the YPG from consolidating its rule across much of the border area between the two countries (Operation Euphrates Shield, August 2016-March 2017), Turkey launched an offensive directly against the YPG in the Afrin district in January 2018. Some U.S. officials expressed concern during the operation because several YPG units went to help their fellow Kurds in Afrin, causing a manpower drain from the anti-IS mission east of the Euphrates. By March, the YPG had abandoned control of the district to Turkish forces and their Syrian rebel allies. In Afrin and the other areas Turkey has occupied since 2016, Turkey has set up local councils, though questions persist about future governance and Turkey's overarching role. T he local councils and security forces reportedly provide public services in these areas with oversight and training from Turkish officials. Some observers, citing signs of a YPG insurgency, predict that the Turkish military may feel compelled to stay for an extended period of time. The U.N. Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) published a report in June 2018 alleging possible violations by the de facto authorities of international humanitarian and human rights laws—including actions or omissions that prevent Kurds from returning to their homes. The town of Manbij, which the SDF seized from the Islamic State in 2016 with U.S. support, is a focal point of U.S.-Turkey tensions in Syria because of a continuing YPG presence there. After concerns grew in early 2018 that Turkish forces could conceivably clash with U.S. Special Operations personnel patrolling Manbij or its vicinity if Turkey advanced on the area, the two countries have sought to deconflict their forces. According to a senior State Department official, on June 4 the two countries endorsed a roadmap which is a broad political framework designed to fulfill the commitment that the United States had made to move the YPG east of the Euphrates and to do so in a way that contributes to security and stability of Manbij and in a fashion that is mutually agreed between the United States and Turkey in every aspect. According to this official, implementation of the roadmap will be based on developments on the ground, with one major factor being the YPG's willingness to cooperate. Syrian Kurdish leaders have expressed openness to negotiating with any party with whom their interests coincide, including the Syrian government. Turkey's priorities in Syria appear to have evolved during the course of Syria's civil war. While Turkey still officially calls for Syrian President Bashar al Asad to leave power, it has engaged in a mix of coordination and competition with Russia and Iran (Asad's supporters) on some matters since intervening militarily in Syria starting in August 2016. Similar interaction takes place between Turkey and the United States given the U.S. military presence in key areas of northern Syria east of the Euphrates River. Turkey may be seeking to protect its borders, project influence, promote commerce, and counter other actors' regional ambitions. Turkey is part of the Astana process that it launched with Russia and Iran in January 2017 to seek Syria's post-civil war stability and territorial integrity. In a September 2017 agreement, the three countries identified some specific "de-escalation zones," and Turkey has inserted troops directly into areas of the northern Syrian province of Idlib as part of efforts to establish these zones. Going forward, it is unclear to what extent Turkish-supported forces will hold their positions or advance farther into Syrian territory, either with or without U.S. support; and how Turkey might administer areas occupied inside Syria and coordinate with local populations and outside actors. A number of considerations drive the complicated dynamics behind Turkey's international relationships. Turkey's history as both a regional power and an object of great power aggression translates into wide popularity for nationalistic political actions and discourse. This nationalistic sentiment might make some Turks wary of Turkey's partial reliance on other key countries (for example, the United States for security, European Union countries for trade, and Russia and Iran for energy). Moreover, Turkey's maintenance of cooperative relationships with countries whose respective interests may conflict involves a balancing act. Turkey's vulnerability to threats from Syria and Iraq increases the pressure on it to manage this balance. Involvement in Syria and Iraq by the United States, Russia, and Iran further complicates Turkey's situation. Additionally, grievances that Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and his supporters espouse against seemingly marginalized domestic foes (the military and secular elite who previously dominated Turkey, the Fethullah Gulen movement, Kurdish nationalists, and liberal activists) extend to the United States and Europe due to apparent suspicions of Western sympathies for these foes. Turkey's Middle Eastern profile expanded in the 2000s as Erdogan (while serving as prime minister) sought to build economic and political linkages—often emphasizing shared Muslim identity—with Turkey's neighbors. However, efforts to increase Turkey's influence and offer it as a "model" for other regional states appear to have been set back by a number of developments since 2011: (1) conflict and instability that engulfed the region and Turkey's own southern border, (2) Turkey's failed effort to help Muslim Brotherhood-aligned groups gain lasting power in Syria and North Africa, and (3) domestic polarization accompanied by government repression. Although Turkey shares some interests with traditional Sunni Arab powers Saudi Arabia and Egypt in countering Iran, these countries' leaders regard Turkey suspiciously because of its government's Islamist sympathies and close relationship with Qatar (see " Other International Relationships " below). Turkey maintains relations with Israel, but these have become distant and—at times—contentious during Erdogan's rule. Turkey-Russia relations appear to have improved significantly since a rapprochement in 2016. Russia had imposed economic sanctions on Turkey and closed Syrian airspace to it after the Turkish military shot down a Russian fighter aircraft near the Turkey-Syria border in November 2015. Since the rapprochement, the two countries have cooperated in a number of areas, most notably the possible S-400 air defense deal (see " Possible S-400 Acquisition from Russia " above); some military and political coordination in northern Syria (see " Syria " above); and energy dealings (see " Energy " above). Viewpoints vary on the significance of closer Turkey-Russia relations. Some analysts have posited that Erdogan may be seeking closer relations with Russia, possibly at the expense of Turkey's relations with the United States and Europe. Some others view the Turkey-Russia relationship as less of a potential strategic partnership than a "marriage of convenience" as the two nations compartmentalize their relations—alternating between cooperation and competition depending on the specific issue in question. Such a situation, according to one observer, could reflect an effort by Turkey to push for its national interest by "balancing between East and West" without cutting security ties to NATO or economic ties to the EU. Other observers have explained Turkish policy changes largely by reference to the leverage Russia used with sanctions and airspace closures after the November 2015 incident. For example, one analyst has argued that Turkish policies favoring Russia are probably due more to Turkey feeling abandoned by the West and intimidated by Russia than to a Turkish preference for Russia over the West. Turkey has a centuries-long history of geopolitical conflict with Russia, and disagreements on various issues persist. Some U.S. officials have suggested that Russia may be seeking closer ties with Turkey as part of a deliberate strategy to undermine NATO and U.S. strategic relationships more broadly. In written testimony in February 2018, General Joseph Votel, Commander of U.S. Central Command, said that Russia (along with Iran) is trying to "fracture the longstanding U.S.-Turkey strategic partnership." Additionally, in July 2018 U.S. Ambassador to NATO Kay Bailey Hutchison said, "I do think Russia is trying to flip Turkey. They are trying to flip many of our allies." While Turkey and Iran are sometimes rivals for regional influence, they also work together on certain regional issues and to ensure Turkish access to Iranian oil and gas. Iranian ties with the Syrian and Iraqi governments and with various Iraqi Kurdish groups provide it with some possible leverage over Turkey. Turkey and Iran (along with Russia) coordinate their efforts in Syria as part of the Astana process, as mentioned above. However, Turkey "is traditionally wary of Tehran's ambitions in its immediate neighborhood." Erdogan and other Turkish officials, who earlier sought the ouster of Iran's key Arab ally, the Asad regime of Syria, have periodically criticized Iran in stark terms, accusing it of destabilizing the region in pursuit of sectarian interests. In a July 2018 column that raised concerns about Turkey's relationships with the United States and a number of regional actors, a senior advisor to Erdogan wrote that Iran is "displaying Persian expansionist policies throughout the Middle East." President Trump's decision to withdraw from the Iranian nuclear agreement in May 2018 may further complicate both Turkey-Iran and U.S.-Turkey relations. Turkish officials have said that Turkey will not comply with U.S. secondary sanctions that are scheduled to take effect in November, given its dependence on oil and gas imported from Iran. These sanctions will require third-party countries to stop or significantly reduce those imports. The Administration maintains that the United States is unlikely to offer waivers or exceptions from the sanctions for any country, though a State Department official said in July 2018 that "we are prepared to work with countries that are reducing their imports on a case-by-case basis." Turkey's first priority in Iraq appears to be countering threats to Turkey from Kurds based in northern Iraq—primarily the PKK. Another concern—despite generally positive relations between Turkey and Iraq's Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG)—is the possibility that Iraqi Kurdish moves toward independence could spread separatist sentiment among Kurds in Turkey. Turkey also maintains an uneasy relationship with Iraq's central government over concerns that its Shia leaders are unduly influenced by Iran and that Iraq's security forces and Shia militias often mistreat Sunni Arabs and Turkmen. Relations with Baghdad are also strained by Iraqi concerns about the potential impact that Turkish dam construction and water management decisions could have on downstream Iraqi communities. Turkey's military maintains various posts inside northern Iraq and a presence at a base in Bashiqa near Mosul. Around 2008, Turkey started developing a political and economic partnership with the KRG. As part of this cooperation, in 2013 the KRG began transporting oil through pipelines to Turkish ports for international export. However, Turkey and most other countries strongly opposed the KRG's symbolic 2017 popular referendum on independence. Turkey halted oil exports connected with the KRG pipelines after the referendum. Talks are ongoing between Turkish, Iraqi, and KRG officials over restarting the exports. Turkey has conducted airstrikes against PKK safe havens in Iraq, with reported intelligence assistance from the United States, since 2007. The KRG—given its own rivalry with the PKK—generally does not object to these strikes, though it remains sensitive to pan-Kurdish sympathies among its population. In June 2018, Turkish forces began moving into KRG territory in preparation for a possible ground operation against the main PKK redoubt in the Qandil Mountains. Partly because of the constraints a Turkish operation would face from the area's harsh terrain and weather conditions, the operation may be more focused on projecting Turkish determination and competence to other stakeholders in northern Iraq than on decisively defeating the PKK. Ties between Turkey and Israel, which were close during the 1990s and early 2000s, have deteriorated considerably during Erdogan's rule. This slide has reflected the military's declining role in Turkish society relative to Erdogan and other leaders whose criticisms of Israel resound with domestic public opinion. Despite the countries' differences, trade between the two countries has grown. During Syria's civil war, Turkey has used Israel's port at Haifa as a point of transit for exports to various Arab countries after the conflict cut off overland routes. After years of downgraded diplomatic ties following the 2010 Mavi Marmara (or Gaza flotilla) incident, Turkey and Israel announced the full restoration of diplomatic relations in 2016, in a deal reportedly facilitated by the United States. Nevertheless, the bilateral relationship remains tense. Israelis routinely decry Turkey's ties with Hamas and its refusal to characterize Hamas as a terrorist organization. For their part, Turks bemoan Israel's treatment of Palestinians in the West Bank and especially the Gaza Strip. Additionally, Erdogan has sought to lead regional opposition to the 2017 U.S. recognition of Jerusalem as Israel's capital. Israeli authorities have reportedly been monitoring increased Turkish financial investment and political activism in East Jerusalem, with officials from the Palestinian Authority and Arab states warning Israel of Erdogan's interest in gaining greater influence over the Jerusalem issue. At various points in 2018, President Erdogan and Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu have traded public accusations, and in May the two countries temporarily expelled each other's top diplomats in Ankara, Istanbul, and Jerusalem. Some observers have characterized negative statements by Erdogan and other prominent Turkish voices about Israel, Zionism, and other historical references as anti-Semitic. Erdogan insists that his criticisms of the Israeli government and its policies are not directed to the Jewish people or to Jews in Turkey. In connection with bilateral tensions, Israel has raised concerns with U.S. officials over Turkey's acquisition of the F-35 and has contemplated measures to limit Turkish influence over holy sites in Jerusalem. Israel also has strengthened security and economic ties with traditional Turkish rivals Greece and Cyprus. Turkey has a long history of partnership with the European Union (and its predecessor organizations) and began negotiations to join the EU in 2005. Talks stalled shortly thereafter and Turkey's membership is now seen as unlikely, at least in the near future. Many analysts argue that resistance to Turkish EU accession has been rooted in a fear that Turkey's large Muslim population would fundamentally change the cultural character of the EU and dilute the power of the EU's founding Western European states in particular. Turkey's unwillingness to normalize diplomatic and trade relations with EU member Cyprus presents a major obstacle to its accession prospects. Other EU concerns over Turkey's qualifications for membership center on the treatment of Kurds and religious minorities, media freedoms, women's rights, and the proper and transparent functioning of Turkey's democratic and legal systems. Debate regarding the extent to which Turkey meets EU standards has intensified in recent years in light of domestic controversies since 2013 and President Erdogan's consolidation of power. Erdogan has used anti-European rhetoric to gain support both at home and among the substantial Turkish diaspora communities in Europe. Turkish domestic expectations of full accession to the EU have apparently been in decline for several years, though support for joining the EU remains according to some polls. In its Turkey 2018 report, the European Commission noted a number of membership criteria in which there has been "serious backsliding," including the judiciary and freedom of expression. Despite the lack of significant progress in accession negotiations, the EU provides Turkey hundreds of millions of euros in annual pre-accession financial and technical assistance (separate from the support for refugees addressed below). Since 2011, nearly four million refugees or migrants from Syria and other countries have come to Turkey, posing significant humanitarian, socioeconomic, and security challenges. Turkey and the European Union (EU) reached an arrangement in March 2016 providing for the return from Greece to Turkey of "irregular migrants or asylum seekers whose applications have been declared inadmissible." In exchange, the EU agreed to resettle one Syrian refugee for every Syrian readmitted to Turkey and provide Turkey with six billion euros to be used to support refugees, among other incentives. The deterrent effect of the arrangement appears to have contributed to a dramatic reduction in the number of people crossing from Turkey to the Greek islands, leading one U.N. official to characterize the deal's impact as "huge." Ongoing Turkey-EU disputes and questions about the deal's compatibility with international legal and human rights standards, however, call its long-term viability into question. From 1915 to 1923, hundreds of thousands of Armenians died as a result of actions of the Ottoman Empire (Turkey's predecessor state). U.S. and international characterizations of these events influence Turkey's domestic and foreign policy, and are in turn influenced by developments in Turkey-Armenia relations. Turkey and Armenia initially agreed in 2009 on a set of joint protocols to normalize relations, but the process stalled shortly thereafter and there has been little or no momentum toward restarting it. Congress has considered how to characterize the events of 1915-1923 on a number of occasions. In 1975 (H.J.Res. 148) and 1984 (H.J.Res. 247), the House passed proposed joint resolutions that referred to "victims of genocide" of Armenian ancestry from 1915 and 1915-1923, respectively. Neither proposed joint resolution came to a vote in the Senate. A number of other proposed resolutions characterizing these World War I-era events as genocide have been reported by various congressional committees (see Appendix C for a list). In the 115 th Congress, resolutions have been introduced in both the House ( H.Res. 220 ) and Senate ( S.Res. 136 ) that would characterize the events as genocide. All U.S. Presidents since Jimmy Carter have made public statements memorializing the events, with President Ronald Reagan referring to a "genocide of the Armenians" during a Holocaust Remembrance Day speech in 1981. In an April 2018 statement, the second of his presidency, President Trump (echoing statements made by President Obama) said that the events were "one of the worst atrocities of the 20 th century" and that "one and a half million Armenians were deported, massacred or marched to their deaths." In addition to past statements or actions by U.S. policymakers, the website of the Armenian National Institute, a U.S.-based organization, asserts that at least 25 other countries (not counting the United States or Armenia) have characterized the events as genocide in some way, including 15 of the 28 EU member states. Since Cyprus became independent of the United Kingdom in 1960, Turkey has viewed itself as the protector of the island's ethnic Turkish-Cypriot minority from potential mistreatment by the ethnic Greek-Cypriot majority. Responding to Greek and Greek-Cypriot political developments that raised concerns about a possible Greek annexation of Cyprus, Turkey's military intervened in 1974 and established control over the northern third of the island. This prompted an almost total ethnic and de facto political division along geographical lines that persists today. The ethnic Greek-Cypriot-ruled Republic of Cyprus is internationally recognized as having jurisdiction over the entire island, while the de facto Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (in the northern third) has only Turkish recognition. The Republic of Cyprus's accession to the EU in 2004 and Turkey's refusal to normalize political and commercial relations with it are seen as major obstacles to Turkey's EU membership aspirations. Moreover, EU accession may have reduced incentives for Cyprus's Greek population to make concessions toward a reunification deal. Turkey and Turkish Cypriots have opposed efforts by the Republic of Cyprus to explore and develop offshore energy deposits without a solution to the question of the island's unification. Turkey's relations with Greece are also fraught. The two countries joined NATO in 1952, but intercommunal tensions, the Cyprus question, and border disputes "ensured that war between the two allies remained a real risk well into the 1990s." Despite more regular diplomatic relations in the following two decades, Turkish relations with Greece have again deteriorated in recent years, with the number of Turkish violations of Greek territory and airspace spiking in early 2018. While the two nations agreed in July 2018 to focus on reducing tensions in the Aegean, the area could remain a flashpoint going forward. Turkey seeks to use political and economic influence to strengthen relationships with non-Western countries. Through political involvement, increased trade and investment, and humanitarian and development projects, Turkey has curried favor with foreign countries not only in the greater Middle East, but also in the Balkans, the Caucasus and Central Asia, and sub-Saharan Africa. Gulen movement-affiliated organizations had spearheaded some of these ties with other countries before Turkey's government classified the movement as a terrorist organization. Questions persist about how these ties will develop in response to changes in Turkey. Over the past year, Turkey established a military base in Somalia and announced a number of economic initiatives with countries near the Horn of Africa. Prospects of greater Turkish influence in this area, especially considering Turkey's close relationship with Qatar, have sparked concern from a number of Arab countries for whom the Horn has important strategic value. Since 2015, Turkey has deployed troops to Qatar, and has supported it politically and economically during its tensions with other Gulf Arab states. Appendix A. Profiles of Key Figures in Turkey Appendix B. Significant U.S.-Origin Arms Transfers or Possible Arms Transfers to Turkey Appendix C. Congressional Committee Reports of Resolutions Using the Word "Genocide" in Relation to Events Regarding Armenians in the Ottoman Empire from 1915 to 1923

Summary: Turkey, a NATO ally since 1952, significantly affects a number of key U.S. national security issues in the Middle East and Europe. U.S.-Turkey relations have worsened throughout this decade over several matters, including Syria's civil war, Turkey-Israel tensions, Turkey-Russia cooperation, and various Turkish domestic developments. The United States and NATO have military personnel and key equipment deployed to various sites in Turkey, including at Incirlik air base in the southern part of the country. Bilateral ties have reached historic lows in the summer of 2018. The major flashpoint has been a Turkish criminal case against American pastor Andrew Brunson. U.S. sanctions on Turkey related to the Brunson case and responses by Turkey and international markets appear to have seriously aggravated an already precipitous drop in the value of Turkey's currency. Amid this backdrop, Congress has actively engaged on several issues involving Turkey, including the following: Turkey's possible S-400 air defense system acquisition from Russia. Turkey's efforts to acquire U.S.-origin F-35 Joint Strike Fighter aircraft and its companies' role in the international F-35 consortium's supply chain. Complex U.S.-Turkey interactions in Syria involving several state and non-state actors, including Russia and Iran. Over strong Turkish objections, the United States continues to partner with Syrian Kurds linked with Kurdish militants in Turkey, and Turkey's military has occupied large portions of northern Syria to minimize Kurdish control and leverage. Turkey's domestic situation and its effect on bilateral relations. In addition to Pastor Brunson, Turkey has detained a number of other U.S. citizens (most of them dual U.S.-Turkish citizens) and Turkish employees of the U.S. government. Turkish officials and media have connected these cases to the July 2016 coup attempt in Turkey, and to Fethullah Gulen, the U.S.-based former cleric whom Turkey's government has accused of involvement in the plot. In the FY2019 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA, P.L. 115-232) enacted in August 2018, Congress has required a comprehensive report from the Trump Administration on (1) U.S.-Turkey relations, (2) the potential S-400 deal and its implications for U.S./NATO activity in Turkey, (3) possible alternatives to the S-400, and (4) various scenarios for the F-35 program with or without Turkey's participation. Other proposed legislation would condition Turkey's acquisition of the F-35 on a cancellation of the S-400 deal (FY2019 State and Foreign Operations Appropriations Act, S. 3180), place sanctions on Turkish officials for their role in detaining U.S. citizens or employees (also S. 3180), and direct U.S. action at selected international financial institutions to oppose providing assistance to Turkey (Turkey International Financial Institutions Act, S. 3248). The S-400 deal might also trigger sanctions under existing law (CAATSA). The next steps in the fraught relations between the United States and Turkey will take place in the context of a Turkey in political transition and growing economic turmoil. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, who has dominated politics in the country since 2002, won reelection to an empowered presidency in June 2018. Given Erdogan's consolidation of power, observers now question how he will govern a polarized electorate and deal with the foreign actors who can affect Turkey's financial solvency, regional security, and political influence. U.S. officials and lawmakers can refer to Turkey's complex history, geography, domestic dynamics, and international relationships in evaluating how to encourage Turkey to align its policies with U.S. interests.