On December 6, 2002, recently released political prisoner Oscar ElÃ­as Biscet was arrestedat a human rights demonstration in Havana. The Cuban government had released Biscet on October31 2002, after three years of imprisonment for displaying the Cuban flag upside down. (See "HumanRights" below). In early November 2002, the U.S. Department of State ordered the expulsion of four Cubandiplomats in the United States in response to the espionage case of a Defense Intelligence Agency(DIA) analyst spying for Cuba. Cuba strongly asserted that the diplomats were not involved inintelligence activities. (See "Cuban Spies in the United States" below.) From September 26-30 2002, a U.S. Food & Agribusiness Exhibition was held in Havanafeaturing 288 exhibitors marketing 1,000 products from more than 30 states, the District ofColumbia, and Puerto Rico. (See "Food and Medical Exports" below.) On July 24, 2002, the House approved the FY2003 Treasury Department appropriations bill, H.R. 5120 , by a vote of 308-121, that contained three amendments easing Cubaembargo restrictions on travel, remittances, and agricultural exports. On July 24, White Housespokesman Ari Fleischer stated that the President would veto the measure if it contained suchprovisions. On July 16, 2002, President Bush again suspended for a six-month period the right ofindividuals to file lawsuits against those persons benefitting from confiscated U.S. property in Cubaunder Title III of the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act ( P.L. 104-114 ). On June 26, 2002, Cuba's National Assembly approved amendments to the CubanConstitution stating that "socialism and the revolutionary political and social system in theConstitution ... are irrevocable; and Cuba will never again return to capitalism." (See "PoliticalConditions" below.) A speech by Fidel Castro at the National Assembly session raised concernsamong some observers that Castro was planning another mass migration exodus like the ones in1980 and 1994. Subsequently, however, both Cuban and U.S. officials stated the importance ofmaintaining the migration accords. (See "Migration" below.) On June 10, 2002, the Senate approved (by a vote of 87-0) S.Res. 272 (Nelson),which expresses support for the Varela Project that is working for a national referendum in Cubato bring about political change. (See "Human Rights" section below.) On June 6, 2002, the House International Relations Committee's Subcommittee onInternational Operations and Human Rights held a hearing on Radio and TV Marti featuringAdministration and outside witnesses. (See "Radio and TV Marti" section below.) On June 5, 2002, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Subcommittee on WesternHemisphere, Peace Corps, and Narcotics Affairs, held a hearing on the issue of Cuba and biologicalweapons. On May 6, 2002, Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International SecurityJohn Bolton stated that "the United States believes that Cuba has at least a limited offensivebiological warfare research-and-development effort" and "has provided dual-use technology toother rogue states." When questioned on the issue at that time, Secretary of State Powell assertedthat the United States believes Cuba has the capacity and the capability to conduct research onbiological weapons but emphasized that the Administration had not claimed that Cuba had suchweapons. (See "Cuba and Terrorism" below.) On May 20, 2002, President Bush announced a new initiative on Cuba that includes severalmeasures designed to reach out to the Cuban people. (See "U.S. Policy Toward Cuba" below.) On May 12, 2002, former President Jimmy Carter arrived in Cuba for a six-day visit. During the trip, Carter raised human rights issues, and included the topic in an address televisedin Cuba. (See "U.S. Policy Toward Cuba" below.) On May 5, 2002, the Cuban government released prominent political prisoner VladimiroRoca from jail about two months before his 5-year sentence was complete. (See "Human Rights"below.) On May 1, 2002, the conference report ( H.Rept. 107-424 ) to the 2002 Farm Bill was filedwithout a provision from the Senate version of the bill (Section 335) that would have eliminatedrestrictions in U.S. law against U.S. private financing of agricultural sales to Cuba. On April 23,2002, the House had approved (273-143) a nonbinding motion to instruct the House conferees toaccept the Senate provision. (See"Food and Medical Exports" below.) On April 19, 2002, the U.N. Commission on Human Rights approved a resolution (by a voteof 23-21, with 9 abstentions) calling on Cuba to improve its human rights record "in accordancewith the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the principles and standards of the rule oflaw."(See "Human Rights" below.) On March 19, 2002, former Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) analyst Ana Montes pledguilty to spying for the Cuban government for 16 years. Federal prosecutors reportedly agreed toa 25-year prison term if Montes provides information on what she knows about Cuban intelligenceactivities. (See "Cuban Spies in the United States" below.) On March 12, 2002, the Cuban government delivered three diplomatic notes to the StateDepartment proposing bilateral agreements on drug-interdiction, migration, and cooperationagainst terrorism. (See "Drug Interdiction Cooperation" below.) With the cutoff of assistance from the former Soviet Union, Cuba experienced severeeconomic deterioration from 1989-1993, although there has been some improvement since 1994. Estimates of economic decline in the 1989-93 period range from 35-50%. Recovery began in 1994,with the economy growing 0.7% in 1994, 2.5% in 1995, and 7.8% in 1996. While the Cubangovernment originally was predicting a growth rate of 4-5% for 1997, growth for the year was just2.5%, largely because of disappointing sugar production. For 1998, the government's goal was fora growth rate of 2.5-3.5%, but another poor sugar harvest, a severe drought in eastern Cuba, and theeffects of Hurricane Georges resulted in an estimated growth rate of just 1.2%. In 1999 and 2000,the economy rebounded with growth rates of 6.2% and 5.6%, respectively. Growth slowed to 3% in 2001 in the aftermath of the effects of Hurricane Michelle and theSeptember 11 terrorist attacks in the United States. The terrorist attacks severely affected Cuba'stourist industry, with reports of some hotels closing and restaurants empty. Hurricane Michelledamaged some 45,000 homes and severely hurt the agricultural sector. Low world prices for sugarand nickel, a decline in the number of tourists since September 2001, and Venezuela'sApril-September 2002 suspension of oil shipments to Cuba because of Cuba's slow payment allcontributed to the economic downturn in 2002. (2) For 2002, a flat economic growth rate of 0% is forecast, while arate of 3.2% is forecast for 2003, assuming an improvement in the global economy. (3) An oil strike and politicalturmoil in Venezuela that began in December 2002 has caused further concern in Cuba about its oilsupplies since Venezuela provides Cuba with one-third of its oil needs. (4) Socialist Cuba has prided itself on the nation's accomplishments in health and education. Forexample, according to the World Bank, the literacy rate is 94% and life expectancy is 76 years,compared to 79% and 68 years average for other middle-income developing countries. The UnitedNations Children's Fund (UNICEF) reports that Cuba's infant mortality rate (per 1,000 live births)was just 7.9 in 1996, the lowest rate in Latin America and among the world's top 20 countries forthis indicator. Nevertheless, the country's economic decline has reduced living standardsconsiderably and resulted in shortages in medicines and medical supplies. When Cuba's economic slide began in 1989, the government showed little willingness toadopt any significant market-oriented economic reforms, but in 1993, faced with unprecedentedeconomic decline, Cuba began to change policy direction. Since 1993, Cubans have been allowedto own and use U.S. dollars and to shop at dollar-only shops previously limited to tourists anddiplomats. Self-employment was authorized in more than 100 occupations in 1993, most in theservice sector, and by 1996 that figure had grown to more than 150 occupations. Other Cubaneconomic reforms included breaking up large state farms into smaller, more autonomous, agriculturalcooperatives (Basic Units of Cooperative Production, UBPCs) in 1993; opening agricultural marketsin September 1994 where farmers could sell part of their produce on the open market; openingartisan markets in October 1994 for the sale of handicrafts; allowing private food catering, includinghome restaurants ( paladares ) in June 1995 (in effect legalizing activities that were already takingplace); approving a new foreign investment law in September 1995 that allows fully ownedinvestments by foreigners in all sectors of the economy with the exception of defense, health, andeducation; and authorizing the establishment of free trade zones with tariff reductions typical of suchzones in June 1996. In May 1997, the government enacted legislation to reform the banking systemand established a new Central Bank (BCC) to operate as an autonomous and independent entity. Despite these measures, the quality of life for many Cubans remains difficult, characterizedby low wages, high prices for many basic goods, shortages of medicines, and power outages. Moreover, some analysts fear that the government has begun to backtrack on its reform efforts. Regulations and new taxes have made it extremely difficult for many of the nation's self-employed(at one point estimated at more than 200,000, but now estimated at 160,000 or lower, out of a totallabor force of some 4.5 million). Some home restaurants have been forced to close because of theregulations. Some foreign investors in Cuba have also begun to complain that the government hasbacked out of deals or forced them out of business. Although Cuba has undertaken some limited economic reforms, politically the countryremains a hard-line Communist state. Fidel Castro, who turned 76 on August 13, 2002, has ruledsince the 1959 Cuban Revolution, which ousted the corrupt government of Fulgencio Batista frompower. Castro soon laid the foundations for an authoritarian regime by consolidating power andforcing moderates out of the government. In April 1961, Castro admitted that the Cuban Revolutionwas socialist, and in December 1961, he proclaimed himself to be a Marxist-Leninist. From 1959until 1976, Castro ruled by decree. A Constitution was enacted in 1976 setting forth the Communist Party as the leading forcein the state and in society (with power centered in a Politburo headed by Fidel Castro). TheConstitution also outlined national, provincial, and local governmental structures. Executive poweris vested in a Council of Ministers, headed by Fidel Castro as President. Legislative authority isvested in a National Assembly of People's Power, currently with 601 members, that meets twiceannually for brief periods. While Assembly members were directly elected for the first time inFebruary 1993, only a single slate of candidates was offered. From October 8-10, 1997, the CubanCommunist Party held its 5th Congress (the prior one was held in 1991) in which the party reaffirmedits commitment to a single party state and reelected Fidel and Raul Castro as the party's first andsecond secretaries. Direct elections for the National Assembly were held for a second time in January1998, but voters again were not offered a choice of candidates. Elections for the National Assemblywill be held again in 2003. In response to the challenge posed by the Varela Project, a human rights initiative that calledfor changes to the Constitution (see below), the Cuban government orchestrated a nationalreferendum in late June 2002, signed by 8.1 million people, that declared Cuba's socialist systemcould not be changed. Subsequently the National Assembly on June 26, 2002, approved amendmentsto the Constitution stating that "socialism and the revolutionary political and social system in theConstitution ... are irrevocable; and Cuba will never again return to capitalism." (5) Cuba has a poor record on human rights, with the government sharply restricting basic rights,including freedom of expression, association, assembly, movement, and other basic rights. It hascracked down on dissent, arrested human rights activists and independent journalists, and stageddemonstrations against critics. Although some anticipated a relaxation of the government'soppressive tactics in the aftermath of the Pope's January 1998 visit, government attacks againsthuman rights activists and other dissidents have continued since that time. According to the State Department's human rights report for 2001, human rights groupsinside Cuba estimate the number of political prisoners to be between 249 and 300 people, imprisonedon such charges as dissemination of enemy propaganda, illicit association, contempt for theauthorities (usually for criticizing President Castro), clandestine printing, and the broad charge ofrebellion. This reflected a decrease in the estimate of 300-400 reflected in the State Department'shuman rights report for 2000. The Cuban Commission for Human Rights and NationalReconciliation notes that the number of prisoners has decreased because the government hasincreased its use of short-term detentions instead of prison sentences. The State Department reportfor 2001 notes that the government "routinely engaged in arbitrary arrest and detention of humanrights advocates, subjecting them to interrogations, threats, and degrading treatment and unsanitaryconditions for hours or days at a time." On May 5, 2002, the Cuban government released prominent political prisoner VladimiroRoca from jail about two months before his 5-year sentence was complete. Roca was imprisoned inJuly 1997 along with three other leaders of the "Dissident Working Group," Rene Gomez Manzano,Marta Beatriz Roque, and Felix Bonne. The Cuban government had released Manzano, Roque, andBonne in May 2000. All four leaders had been convicted by a Cuban court on March 15, 1999, oncharges of "sedition" under the Cuban penal code after a one-day trial. Sentences ranged from 3 Â½years for Roque to 4 years for Bonne and Gomez Manzano and 5 years for Roca. Just before thedissidents' trial, scores of human rights advocates, independent journalists, and other activists weredetained so that they could not cover or protest the trial. The four dissidents had released a documentin June 1997 entitled, "The Homeland Belongs to Us All" (6) that strongly criticized a draft report of the 5th Congress of theCuban Communist Party that was going to be held that October. The dissidents also urged Cubansnot to vote in legislative elections and encouraged foreign investors not to invest in Cuba. Uponhis release, Roca maintained that he would continue working for dialogue and reconciliation inCuba. (7) On October 31, 2002, the Cuban government released another prominent political prisoner,Oscar ElÃ­as Biscet, who had been imprisoned since November 1999 after displaying Cuban flagsupside down as a sign of protest and distress. But Biscet was jailed again on December 6, 2002 afterhis arrest at a human rights demonstration in Havana. Among Cuba's remaining political prisoners, Amnesty International has called attention toseveral detained in a wave of arrests in February and March 2002. These include Leonardo BruzÃ³nAvila, Carlos Alberto DomÃ­nguez GonzÃ¡lez, Emilio Leyva PÃ©rez, and LÃ¡zaro Miguel RodrÃ­guezCapote. (8) In late October2002, the U.S. Department of State called for the release of Leonardo BruzÃ³n Avila, who reportedlywas in serious medical condition because of a hunger strike. Varela Project. A human rights initiative withinCuba that has received attention in recent months is the Varela Project (named for the 19th centurypriest, Felix Varela, who advocated independence from Spain and the abolition of slavery) in whichthousands of signatures have been collected supporting a national plebiscite. The referendum wouldcall for respect for human rights, an amnesty for political prisoners, private enterprise, and changesto the country's electoral law that would result in free and fair elections. The initiative is organizedby Oswaldo Paya, who heads the Christian Liberation Movement, but it is supported by other notableCuban human rights activists such as Elizardo Sanchez of the Cuban Commission for Human Rightsand National Reconciliation. On May 10, 2002, organizers of the Varela Project submitted 11,020 signatures to theNational Assembly calling for a national referendum, more than the 10,000 required under the CubanConstitution (Article 88). Former President Jimmy Carter noted the significance of the VarelaProject in his May 14, 2002 address in Havana that was broadcast in Cuba. Carter noted that "whenCubans exercise this freedom to change laws peacefully by a direct vote, the world will see thatCubans, and not foreigners, will decide the future of this country." (9) In response to the Varela Project, the Cuban government orchestrated its own referendum inlate June 2002 that ultimately led to the National Assembly amending the Constitution to declareCuba's socialist system irrevocable. On June 10, 2002, the Senate approved (by a vote of 87-0) S.Res. 272 (Nelson),which expresses support for the Varela Project and "urges the President to support the right of thecitizens of Cuba who have signed the Varela Project to petition the Cuban National Assembly fora referendum and the peaceful transition to democracy." In the House, H.Res. 453 (Pallone), introduced June 20, 2002, would also express support for the Varela Project. UNCHR Resolutions. From 1991 until 1997, theU.N. Commission on Human Rights (UNCHR) called on the Cuban government to cooperate witha Special Representative (later upgraded to Special Rapporteur) designated by the Secretary Generalto investigate the human rights situation in Cuba. But Cuba refused to cooperate with the SpecialRapporteur, and the UNCHR annually approved resolutions condemning Cuba's human rightsrecord. In 1998, however, the UNCHR rejected -- by a vote of 16 to 19, with 18 abstentions -- theannual resolution sponsored by the United States that would have condemned Cuba's rights recordand would have extended the work of the Special Rapporteur for another year. U.S. officials andhuman rights activists expressed deep disappointment with the vote. Observers maintained that thevote did not signify any improvement in human rights in Cuba, but rather was an expression ofdisagreement with the United States over its policy toward Cuba. For four years now, the UNCHR has again approved resolutions criticizing Cuba for itshuman rights record, although without appointing a Special Rapporteur. In 1999, the UNCHRresolution was approved by a vote of 21-20, with 12 abstentions. In 2000, the resolution, sponsoredby the Czech Republic and Poland, was approved by a vote of 21-18, with 14 abstentions. On April18, 2001, the resolution, sponsored by the Czech Republic and co-sponsored by 16 other nations,including the United States, was approved by a vote of 22-20, with 10 abstentions. A U.S.Congressional delegation traveled to Geneva to encourage adoption of the resolution. Mexicoabstained but, in a shift under the new Fox administration, publicly stated its concern about humanrights in Cuba. On April 19, 2002, the UNCHR approved a resolution, by a vote of 23 to 21, with 9abstentions, calling on Cuba to improve its human rights record "in accordance with the UniversalDeclaration of Human Rights and the principles and standards of the rule of law." Uruguaysponsored the resolution, which was supported by six other Latin American nations: Argentina,Chile, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Mexico, and Peru. Brazil and Ecuador abstained, while Venezuelawas the only Latin American country besides Cuba to vote against the resolution. Compared toprevious years, the 2002 resolution was milder in that it recognized Cuba's efforts to fulfill the"social rights" of its people "despite an adverse international environment," while at the same timecalling on Cuba "to achieve similar progress in respect of human, civil, and political rights." Theresolution also called on Cuba to allow a visit by a representative of the U.N. High Commission for Human Rights. Cuba lashed out at Uruguay for sponsoring the resolution and accused the country of "beingservile" to the United States and its president of being a liar. Uruguay responded to Cuba'sinvectives by breaking diplomatic relations. Cuba also lashed out at Mexico for supporting theresolution; the Cuban government also stepped up its complaints of Mexican pressure on Castro toleave the United Nations development conference held in Monterrey, Mexico in March 2002 beforethe arrival of President Bush. Observers are divided over the future of the Castro government. Although some believe thatthe demise of the government is imminent, there is considerable disagreement over when or how thismay occur. Some point to Castro's age and predict that the regime will collapse without Fidel at thehelm. Other observers maintain that reports of the impending collapse of the Cuban governmenthave been exaggerated and that Castro may remain in power for years. They point to Cuba's strongsecurity apparatus and the extraordinary system of controls that prevents dissidents from gainingpopular support. Moreover, observers maintain that Cuba's elite has no interest in Castro'soverthrow, and that Castro still enjoys some support, in part because of the social benefits of theCuban revolution, but also because Cubans see no alternative to Castro. Even if Castro is overthrown or resigns, the important question remaining is the possibilityor viability of a stable democratic Cuba after Castro. Analysts point out that the Castro governmenthas successfully impeded the development of independent civil society, with no private sector, noindependent labor movement, and no unified political opposition. For this reason, they contend thatbuilding a democratic Cuba will be a formidable task, one that could meet stiff resistance from manyCubans. In the early 1960s, U.S.-Cuban relations deteriorated sharply when Fidel Castro began tobuild a repressive communist dictatorship and moved his country toward close relations with theSoviet Union. The often tense and hostile nature of the U.S.-Cuban relationship is illustrated by suchevents and actions as: U.S. covert operations to overthrow the Castro government culminating in theill-fated April 1961 Bay of Pigs invasion; the October 1962 missile crisis in which the United Statesconfronted the Soviet Union over its attempt to place offensive nuclear missiles in Cuba; Cubansupport for guerrilla insurgencies and military support for revolutionary governments in Africa andthe Western Hemisphere; the 1980 exodus of around 125,000 Cubans to the United States in theso-called Mariel boatlift; the 1994 exodus of more than 30,000 Cubans who were interdicted andhoused at U.S. facilities in Guantanamo and Panama; and the February 1996 shootdown by Cubanfighter jets of two U.S. civilian planes, resulting in the death of four U.S. crew members. (10) Since the early 1960s, U.S. policy toward Cuba has consisted largely of isolating the islandnation through comprehensive economic sanctions. The principal tool of U.S. policy remainscomprehensive sanctions, which were made stronger with the Cuban Democracy Act (CDA) of 1992and with the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996 ( P.L. 104-114 ), often referredto as the Helms/Burton legislation. The CDA prohibits U.S. subsidiaries from engaging in trade withCuba and prohibits entry into the United States for any vessel to load or unload freight if it hasengaged in trade with Cuba within the last 180 days. The Helms/Burton legislation -- enacted in theaftermath of Cuba's shooting down of two U.S. civilian planes in February 1996 -- combines avariety of measures to increase pressure on Cuba and provides for a plan to assist Cuba once itbegins the transition to democracy. Among the law's sanctions is a provision in Title III that holdsany person or government that traffics in U.S. property confiscated by the Cuban government liablefor monetary damages in U.S. federal court. Acting under provisions of the law, President Clintonsuspended the implementation of Title III at 6-month intervals. Another component of U.S. policy consists of support measures for the Cuban people, aso-called second track of U.S. policy. This includes U.S. private humanitarian donations, U.S.government support for democracy-building efforts for Cuba, and U.S.- sponsored radio andtelevision broadcasting to Cuba, Radio and TV Marti. The Clinton Administration made several changes to U.S. policy in the aftermath of thePope's January 1998 visit to Cuba, which were intended to bolster U.S. support for the Cuban people.These included the resumption of direct flights to Cuba (which had been curtailed after the February1996 shootdown of two U.S. civilian planes), the resumption of cash remittances for the support ofclose relatives in Cuba (which had been curtailed in August 1994 in response to the migration crisiswith Cuba), and the streamlining of procedures for the commercial sale of medicines and medicalsupplies and equipment to Cuba. In January 1999, President Clinton announced several additionalmeasures to support the Cuban people. These included a broadening of cash remittances to Cuba,so that all U.S. residents (not just those with close relatives in Cuba) could send remittances to Cuba;an expansion of direct passenger charter flights to Cuba from additional U.S. cities other than thecurrent flights from Miami (direct flights later in the year began from Los Angeles and New York);and an expansion of people-to-people contact by loosening restrictions on travel to Cuba for certaincategories of travelers, such as professional researchers and those involved in a wide range ofeducational, religious, sports competition, and other activities. Bush Administration Policy. President Bushmade his first major statement on his Administration's policy toward Cuba on May 18, 2001. Hestated that his Administration would "oppose any attempt to weaken sanctions against Cuba'sgovernment ... until this regime frees its political prisoners, holds democratic, free elections, andallows for free speech." He added that he would "actively support those working to bring aboutdemocratic change in Cuba." (11) Although President Bush has announced stronger measures to enforce the embargo, he alsohas continued in the same vein as the Clinton Administration by suspending implementation of TitleIII of the Helms-Burton legislation. On July 13, 2001, President Bush asked the TreasuryDepartment to enhance and expand the enforcement capabilities of the Office of Foreign AssetsControl. The President noted the importance of upholding and enforcing the law in order to prevent"unlicensed and excessive travel," enforce limits on remittances, and ensure that humanitarian andcultural exchanges actually reach pro-democracy activists in Cuba. Just three days later, on July 16,2001, President Bush decided to continue to suspend for a 6-month period the Title III provisionsof the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act ( P.L. 104-114 ) that allows U.S. nationals to suefor money damages in U.S. federal court those persons who traffic in property confiscated in Cuba. He cited efforts by European countries and other U.S. allies to push for democratic change in Cuba.President Bush again suspended implementation of Title III on January 16, 2002, for a 6-monthperiod. On May 20, 2002, President Bush announced a new initiative on Cuba that includes fourmeasures designed to reach out to the Cuban people: 1) facilitating humanitarian assistance to theCuban people by U.S. religious and other non-governmental organization (NGOs); 2) providingdirect assistance to the Cuban people through NGOs; 3) calling for the resumption of direct mailservice to and from Cuba (12) ; and 4) establishing scholarships in the United States for Cubanstudents and professional involved in building civil institutions and for family members of politicalprisoners. President Bush also called on Cuba to take steps to ensure that the 2003 National Assemblyelections are free and fair and to adopt meaningful market-based reforms. If those conditions weremet, the President maintained that he would work with Congress to ease the ban on trade and travel. However, the President maintained that full normalization of relations (diplomatic recognition, opentrade, and a robust aid program) would only occur when Cuba has a fully democratic government,when the rule of law is respected, and when the human rights of all Cubans are fully protected. ThePresident's initiative did not include an explicit tightening of restrictions on travel to Cuba that someobservers had expected. The President, did state, however, that the United States would "continueto enforce economic sanctions on Cuba, and the ban on travel to Cuba, until Cuba's governmentproves that it is committed to real reform." Carter Visit to Cuba. Former President JimmyCarter arrived in Cuba on May 12, 2002 for a six-day visit. During the trip, Carter repeatedly raisedhuman rights issues. On May 13, 2002, Carter met with two leading human rights activists, ElizardoSanchez of the Cuban Commission of Human Rights and National Reconciliation and OswaldoPaya, who heads the Christian Liberation Movement and is the main organizer of the Varela Projectthat has the goal of a national referendum to change Cuba's laws (see "Human Rights" section abovefor more on the Varela Project). He met with a number of human rights and religious organizationsand activists on May 16. Perhaps most significantly, however, was President Carter's address inHavana that was broadcast live on television and radio on May 14. Carter criticized Cuba's one-partyrule that does not allow opposition movements to organize. He asked Cuba to permit theInternational Committee of the Red Cross to visit Cubans prisons and to receive the U.N. HumanRights Commissioner to visit in order to address such issues as prisoners of conscience and thetreatment of inmates. He also called attention to the Varela Project. In addition to his advocacy of democracy and respect for human rights, Carter also called forthe United States to take the first step of improving the U.S.-Cuban bilateral relationship. He calledon Congress "to permit unrestricted travel between the United States and Cuba, establish opentrading relationships, and repeal the embargo." Carter acknowledged that U.S. policy was not thesource of Cuba's economic problems, but he maintained that "the embargo freezes the existingimpasse, induces anger and resentment, restricts the freedoms of U.S. citizens, and makes it difficultfor us to exchange ideas and respect." (13) In response to Carter's call to lift the embargo, the BushAdministration reiterated its stance of maintaining the embargo as a "vital part of American foreignpolicy." (14) Over the years, although U.S. policymakers have agreed on the overall objective of U.S.policy toward Cuba -- to help bring democracy and respect for human rights to the island -- therehave been several schools of thought about how to achieve that objective. Some advocate a policyof keeping maximum pressure on the Cuban government until reforms are enacted, while continuingcurrent U.S. efforts to support the Cuban people. Others argue for an approach, sometimes referredto as constructive engagement, that would lift some U.S. sanctions that they believe are hurting theCuban people, and move toward engaging Cuba in dialogue. Still others call for a swiftnormalization of U.S.-Cuban relations by lifting the U.S. embargo. In general, those advocating a loosening of the sanctions-based policy toward Cuba makeseveral policy arguments. They assert that if the United States moderated its policy toward Cuba --through increased travel, trade and diplomatic dialogue, that the seeds of reform would be plantedin Cuba, which would stimulate and strengthen forces for peaceful change on the island. They stressthe importance to the United States of avoiding violent change in Cuba, with the prospect of a massexodus to the United States and the potential of involving the United States in a civil war scenario.They argue that since Castro's demise does not appear imminent, the United States should espousea more realistic approach in trying to induce change in Cuba. Supporters of changing policy alsopoint to broad international support for lifting the U.S. embargo, to the missed opportunities to U.S.businesses because of the embargo, and to the increased suffering of the Cuban people because ofthe embargo. Proponents of change also argue that the United States should adhere to someconsistency in its policies with the world's few remaining Communist governments, and alsomaintain that moderating policy will help advance human rights in Cuba. On the other side, opponents of changing U.S. policy maintain that the current two-trackpolicy of isolating Cuba, but reaching out to the Cuban people through measures of support, is thebest means for realizing political change in Cuba. They point out that the Cuban Liberty andDemocratic Solidarity Act of 1996 sets forth a road map for what steps Cuban needs to take in orderfor the United States to normalize relations, including lifting the embargo. They argue that softeningU.S. policy at this time without concrete Cuban reforms would boost the Castro regime politicallyand economically, enabling the survival of the Communist regime. Opponents of softening U.S.policy argue that the United States should stay the course in its commitment to democracy andhuman rights in Cuba; that sustained sanctions can work; and that the sanctions against Cuba haveonly come to full impact with the loss of large subsidies from the former Soviet bloc. Opponentsof loosening U.S. sanctions further argue that Cuba's failed economic policies, not the U.S. embargo,are the causes of the economy's rapid decline. Legislative Initiatives. Legislative initiativesintroduced in the 107th Congress reflected divergent views on the direction of U.S. policy towardCuba (whether sanctions should be eased or intensified) and also covered a range of issues includinghuman rights, drug interdiction cooperation, and broadcasting to Cuba. (For a complete listing, see"Legislative Initiatives in the 107th Congress" toward the end of this report.) Several bills would have strengthened sanctions on Cuba. H.R. 160 (Ros-Lehtinen) would prohibit rescheduling or forgiving any outstanding bilateral debt owed to theUnited States by Russia until the President certifies that Russia has ceased all its operations, removedall personnel from, and permanently closed the intelligence facility at Lourdes, Cuba (see sectionbelow on "Russian Intelligence Facility in Cuba," which discusses Russia's October 2001 decisionto close the facility). H.R. 2292 (Rothman) would amend the Cuban Liberty andDemocratic Solidarity Act of 1996 to require, as a condition for the determination that ademocratically elected government in Cuba exists, that the government extradite to the United Statesconvicted felon Joanne Chesimard and all other U.S. fugitives from justice. In addition, someMembers opposed to easing sanctions have proposed legislation, H.R. 1271 (Diaz-Balart) and S. 894 (Helms), providing increased support to the democraticopposition within Cuba. On the other side of the policy debate, numerous measures were introduced to ease U.S.sanctions policy toward Cuba. In the first session of the 107th Congress, the House debated twoamendments that would ease U.S. sanctions on Cuba during July 25, 2001 floor action on H.R. 2590 , the FY2002 Treasury Department appropriations bill. The House approvedone amendment that would prohibit spending for administering Treasury Department regulationsrestricting travel to Cuba and rejected a second that would prohibit Treasury Department funds fromadministering the overall U.S. embargo on Cuba. Ultimately, the Cuba travel provision was notincluded in the conference report to the bill (see "Travel Restrictions" below.) In the second session of the 107th Congress, the Senate version of the 2002 "Farm Bill," H.R. 2646 , would have eliminated language from the Trade Sanctions Reform andExport Enhancement Act of 2000 ( P.L. 106-387 , Title IX) that prohibits private financing ofagricultural sales to Cuba. Although the House version of the Farm Bill had no such financingprovision, the House on April 23, 2002, approved (273-143) a non-binding motion to instruct theconferees to accept the Senate provision. Ultimately, however, the House-Senate conference reporton the bill ( H.Rept. 107-424 , filed May 1, 2002) did not include the Senate provision. (For furtherinformation, see "Food and Medical Exports" below and CRS Issue Brief IB10061, Exempting Foodand Agriculture Products from U.S. Economic Sanctions: Status and Implementation .) During July 23, 2002 consideration of the FY2003 Treasury Department appropriations bill, H.R. 5120 , the House approved three amendments on Cuba sanctions that wouldprohibit funds in the bill from being used to enforce regulations on travel, remittances, and U.S.agricultural sales to Cuba; the House subsequently approved H.R. 5120 with the threeCuba provisions on July 24, 2002. The Senate version of the bill, S. 2740 , as reportedout of committee, included a provision that would prohibit funds from being used to enforceTreasury Department regulations on travel to Cuba. Final action on the Treasury bill was notcompleted before the end of the 107th Congress. In the second session of the 107th Congress, a bipartisan group of over 40 House Membersformed a Cuba Working Group, with the overarching goal of shifting U.S. policy toward Cuba fromone of isolation to one of engagement. The group is critical of Cuba's refusal to allow free electionsand its failure to respect basic freedoms but maintains that U.S. policy has not brought aboutmeaningful political and economic reform in Cuba. On May 15, 2002, the group set forth ninerecommendations for U.S. policy: 1) repeal the travel ban; 2) allow normal unsubsidized exports ofagricultural and medical products; 3) end restrictions on remittances; 4) sunset the Helms/Burton lawin March 2003; 5) repeal a provision of U.S. law (Section 211 of the FY1999 omnibusappropriations measure, P.L. 105-277 ) that prevents the United States from accepting payment fortrademark licenses used in connection with a business or assets in Cuba that were confiscated; 6)terminate TV Marti and improve Radio Marti; 7) promote scholarships; 8) expand U.S.-Cubansecurity cooperation; and 9) consider creative approaches to resolve U.S. property claims. (15) Major Provisions. The Cuban Liberty andDemocratic Solidarity Act ( P.L. 104-114 ) was enacted into law on March 12, 1996. Title I, Section102(h) , codifies all existing Cuban embargo Executive Orders and regulations. No presidentialwaiver is provided for any of these codified embargo provisions. This provision is significantbecause of the long-lasting effect on U.S. policy options toward Cuba. In effect, the ClintonAdministration and subsequent administrations will be circumscribed in any changes in U.S. policytoward Cuba. Title III allows U.S. nationals to sue for money damages in U.S. federal court those personsthat traffic in property confiscated in Cuba. It extends the right to sue to Cuban Americans whobecame U.S. citizens after their properties were confiscated. The President has authority to delayimplementation for 6 months at a time if he determines that such a delay would be in the nationalinterest and would expedite a transition to democracy in Cuba. Title IV of the law denies admission to the United States to aliens involved in theconfiscation of U.S. property in Cuba or in the trafficking of confiscated U.S. property in Cuba. Thisincludes corporate officers, principals, or shareholders with a controlling interest of an entityinvolved in the confiscation of U.S. property or trafficking of U.S. property. It also includes thespouse, minor child, or agent of aliens who would be excludable under the provision. This provisionis mandatory, and only waiveable on a case-by-case basis for travel to the United States forhumanitarian medical reasons or for individuals to defend themselves in legal actions regardingconfiscated property. Implementation of Title III and IV. With regardto Title III, beginning in July 1996 then-President Clinton suspended -- for 6-month periods, asprovided for under the act -- the right of individuals to file suit against those persons benefitting fromconfiscated U.S. property in Cuba. At the time of the first suspension on July 16, 1996, the Presidentannounced that he would allow Title III to go into effect, and as a result liability for trafficking underthe title became effective on November 1, 1996. According to the Clinton Administration, this putforeign companies in Cuba on notice that they face prospects of future lawsuits and significantliability in the United States. At the second suspension on January 3, 1997, President Clinton statedthat he would continue to suspend the right to file law suits "as long as America's friends and alliescontinued their stepped-up efforts to promote a transition to democracy in Cuba." He continued, at6-month intervals, to suspend the rights to file Title III lawsuits. President Bush has continued to suspend implementation of Title III at six-month intervals,most recently on July 16, 2002. When President Bush first used his authority to suspend Title IIIimplementation in July 2001, he cited efforts by European countries and other U.S. allies to push fordemocratic change in Cuba. With regard to Title IV of the legislation, to date the State Department has banned from theUnited States a number of executives and their families from three companies because of theirinvestment in confiscated U.S. property in Cuba: Grupos Domos, a Mexican telecommunicationscompany; Sherritt International, a Canadian mining company; and BM Group, an Israeli-ownedcitrus company. In 1997, Grupos Domos disinvested from U.S.-claimed property in Cuba, and asa result its executives are again eligible to enter the United States. Action against executives ofSTET, an Italian telecommunications company was averted by a July 1997 agreement in which thecompany agreed to pay the U.S.-based ITT Corporation $25 million for the use of ITT-claimedproperty in Cuba for ten years. For several years, the State Department has been investigating aSpanish hotel company, Sol Melia, for allegedly investing in property that was confiscated from U.S.citizens in Cuba's Holguin province in 1961. Press reports in March 2002 indicated that a settlementwas likely between Sol Melia and the original owners of the property, but by the end of the yearsettlement efforts had failed; some Members of Congress are likely to press the State Departmentto enforce the Title IV provisions. (16) Foreign Reaction and the EU's WTO Challenge. Many U.S. allies -- including Canada, Japan, Mexico, and European Union (EU) nations -- stronglycriticized the enactment of the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act. They maintain thatthe law's provisions allowing foreign persons to be sued in U.S. court constitute an extraterritorialapplication of U.S. law that is contrary to international principles. U.S. officials maintain that theUnited States, which reserves the right to protect its security interests, is well within its obligationsunder NAFTA and the World Trade Organization (WTO). Until mid-April 1997, the EU had been pursuing its case at the WTO, in which it waschallenging the Helms/Burton legislation as an extraterritorial application of U.S. law. Thebeginning of a settlement on the issue occurred on April 11, 1997, when an EU-U.S. understandingwas reached. In the understanding, both sides agreed to continue efforts to promote democracy inCuba and to work together to develop an agreement on agreed disciplines and principles for thestrengthening of investment protection relating to the confiscation of property by Cuba and othergovernments. As part of the understanding, the EU agreed that it would suspend its WTO disputesettlement case. Subsequently in mid-April 1998, the EU agreed to let its WTO challenge expire. Talks between the United States and the EU on investment disciplines proved difficult, withthe EU wanting to cover only future investments and the United States wanting to cover pastexpropriations, especially in Cuba. Nevertheless, after months of negotiations, the EU and the UnitedStates reached a second understanding on May 18, 1998. The understanding set forth EU disciplinesregarding investment in expropriated properties worldwide, in exchange for the ClintonAdministration's success at obtaining a waiver from Congress for the legislation's Title IV visarestrictions. Future investment in expropriated property would be barred. For past illegalexpropriations, government support or assistance for transactions related to those expropriatedproperties would be denied. A Registry of Claims would also be established to warn investors andgovernment agencies providing investment support that a property has a record of claims. Theseinvestment disciplines were to be applied at the same time that President Clinton's new Title IVwaiver authority was exercised. Reaction was mixed among Members of Congress to the EU-U.S. accord, but opposition tothe agreement by several senior Members has forestalled any amendment of Title IV in Congress.In a letter to then-Secretary of State Albright, Representative Gilman and Senator Helms criticizedthe understanding for not covering companies already invested in expropriated property. Amongother criticisms, they argued that the understanding only proposes a weak sanction (denyinggovernment support) that may not deter companies that are willing to invest in Cuba. (17) On the other side,however, some Members support the EU-U.S. understanding. They maintain that the understandingis important because it increases protection for the property of Americans worldwide and discouragesinvestment in illegally confiscated property in Cuba. The Bush Administration initially indicated that the Administration was looking into thepossibilities of legislation to enact a presidential waiver for the provision, but during the June 2001U.S.-EU summit, President Bush noted the difficulty of persuading Congress to amend the law. (18) The ClintonAdministration had lauded the 1998 EU-U.S. understanding on investment disciplines and attemptedat the time, but without success, to win congressional support for a waiver of Title IV so that theinvestment disciplines could be implemented. Legislative Initiatives to Repeal or Sunset the Helms/BurtonLegislation. Several legislative initiatives introduced in the 107th Congress -- H.R. 174 (Serrano), H.R. 798 (Rangel), H.R. 2662 (Paul), and S. 400 (Baucus)-- would have repealed the Cuban Liberty and Democratic SolidarityAct as part of overall efforts to lift the embargo on Cuba. In addition, H.R. 5616 (Dooley), would sunset the Helms/Burton legislation on March 21, 2003. Another EU challenge of U.S. law regarding Cuba in the WTO involves a dispute betweenthe French spirits company, Pernod Ricard , and the Bermuda-based Bacardi Ltd. Pernod Ricard entered into a joint venture with the Cuban government to produce and export Havana Club rum, but Bacardi maintains that it holds the right to the Havana Club name. A provision in the FY1999omnibus appropriations measure (Section 211 of Division A, title II, P.L. 105-277 , signed into lawOctober 21, 1998) prevents the United States from accepting payment for trademark licenses thatwere used in connection with a business or assets in Cuba that were confiscated unless the originalowner of the trademark has consented. The provision prohibits U.S. courts from recognizing suchtrademarks without the consent of the original owner. Although Pernod Ricard cannot marketHavana Club in the United States because of the trade embargo, it wants to protect its futuredistribution rights when the embargo is lifted. After Bacardi began selling rum in the United States under the Havana Club label, PernodRicard's joint venture unsuccessfully challenged Bacardi in U.S. federal court. In February 2000,the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in New York upheld a lower court's ruling that thejoint venture had no legal right to use the Havana Club name in the United States. After formalU.S.-EU consultations on the issue were held in 1999 without resolution, the EU initiated a WTOdispute settlement panel on the issue in June 2000, maintaining that the U.S. law violates theAgreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property (TRIPS). An August 6, 2001 ruling by the WTO panel was described as mixed, with both sidesclaiming a partial victory. The panel ruled that international rules on intellectual property rights didnot cover trademarks but also ruled that a portion of the law (Section 211(a)(2)) prohibiting U.S.courts from recognizing such Cuban trademarks is in violation of the TRIPS because it denies accessto U.S. courts by trademark holders. In early October 2001, the EU formally notified the WTO thatit was appealing the ruling. The WTO appeals panel issued its ruling on January 2, 2002, and again the ruling wasdescribed as mixed. According to the United States Trade Representative, the appellate panel upheldthe "U.S. position that WTO intellectual property rights rules leave WTO members free to protecttrademarks by establishing their own trademark ownership criteria" and overturned the earlier rulingthat Section 211 was in violation of TRIPs because it denied access to U.S. courts by trademarkholders. (19) However,the appellate panel also found that Section 211 violated WTO provisions on national treatment andmost-favored-nation treatment, which could require the United States to amend Section 211 so thatit does not violate WTO rules. On March 28, 2002, the United States agreed that it would come intocompliance with the WTO ruling by January 3, 2003. (20) Under U.S. sanctions, commercial medical and food exports to Cuba are allowed but withnumerous restrictions and licensing requirements. The 106th Congress passed the Trade SanctionsReform and Export Enhancement Act of 2000 ( P.L. 106-387 , Title IX) that allows for one-yearexport licenses for shipping food and medicine to Cuba, although no U.S. government assistance,foreign assistance, export assistance, credits, or credit guarantees are available to finance suchexports. The law, furthermore, denies exporters access to U.S. private commercial financing orcredit; all transactions must be conducted in cash in advance or with financing from third countries. The law reiterates the existing ban on importing goods from Cuba but authorizes travel to Cuba,under a specific license, to conduct business related to the newly allowed food and medicine sales.Regulations implementing the new provisions were published in the Federal Register on July 12,2001. Some in the business community argued that the changes in policy did not amount to muchbecause they still do not allow financing for the sales. Nevertheless, U.S. agribusiness companiescontinued to explore the Cuban market for potential future sales. The Cuban government told agroup of U.S. farmers who traveled there in November 2000, after passage of the new law, thatalthough it was interested in U.S. agricultural exports, it refused to buy any under the financingrestrictions imposed by that new law. In the aftermath of Hurricane Michelle that struck in early November 2001, Cuba changedits policy of not buying agricultural products from the United States because of its disapproval ofU.S. financing restrictions. While the U.S. government offered humanitarian assistance to Cuba inthe aftermath of the hurricane, Cuba declined, saying that instead it wanted to purchase food suppliesfrom the United States. As a result, Cuba negotiated with several U.S. agricultural companies toimport products such as wheat, corn, soybeans, rice, and chicken. The first shipments of goodsarrived in mid-December 2001. This marked the first time that Cuba purchased food supplies directlyfrom the United States since the approval of such sales in legislation in the 106th Congress. In March2002, the Cuban government agreed to purchase additional agricultural products from the UnitedStates. Overall, press reports indicate that Cuba has purchased over $100 million in agriculturalproducts, including grains, eggs, frozen chicken, corn, apples, and other products from U.S.companies since late 2001. The companies include Archer Daniel Midland, which has sold about$42 million in agricultural products to Cuba, American Rice Inc., Cargill Corporation, CherokeeTrading, ConAgra Foods, Gold Kist, Marsh Supermarkets, Perdue Farms, Radlo Foods, RicelandFoods, Soufflet USA, and Tyson Foods. (21) In late September 2002, a U.S. Food & Agribusiness Exhibitionwas held in Havana featuring 288 exhibitors marketing 1,000 products from more than 30 states, theDistrict of Columbia, and Puerto Rico. (22) The trade fair reportedly yielded almost $100 million inadditional contracts for U.S. agricultural exports to Cuba. (23) In March 2002, the State Department revoked the visas of several Cuban officials who wereplanning to visit the United States. This included Pedro Alvarez, the head of Cuba's import buyingagency Alimport. Several Senators expressed concern that future agricultural sales to Cuba couldbe jeopardized by the State Department's action. In a subsequent hearing before the SenateAppropriations Committee on April 30, 2002, Senator Byron Dorgan expressed concern that theState Department policy was discouraging food sales to Cuba. Secretary of State Powell indicatedthat the visa for Alvarez should never have been issued because on a previous visit, "a good part ofhis time was spent lobbying against the policy of the United States government." Secretary Powellmaintained that the Administration was pleased that Cuban agricultural sales were taking place butindicated that the visit of Alvarez was not necessary for such sales. (24) Opponents of further easing restrictions on food and medical exports to Cuba maintain thatU.S. policy does not deny such sales to Cuba, as evidenced by the recent sales in the aftermath ofHurricane Michelle. Moreover, according to the State Department, since the Cuban Democracy Actwas enacted in 1992, the United States has licensed more than $4.3 billion in private humanitariandonations. Opponents of easing U.S. sanctions further argue that easing pressure on the Cubangovernment would in effect be lending support and extending the duration of the Castro regime.They maintain that the United States should remain steadfast in its opposition to any easing ofpressure on Cuba that could prolong the Castro regime and its repressive policies. Supporters of easing restrictions on food and medical exports to Cuba argue that therestrictions harm the health and nutrition of the Cuban population. They argue that although theU.S. government may have licensed more than $4.3 billion in humanitarian donations to Cuba since1992, in fact much smaller amounts have actually been sent to Cuba. Some supporters of easingsanctions believe the embargo plays into Castro's hands by allowing him to use U.S. policy as ascapegoat for his failed economic policies and as a rationale for political repression. U.S.agribusiness companies that support the removal of trade restrictions on agricultural exports to Cubabelieve that U.S. farmers are missing out on a market of some $700 million so close to the UnitedStates. Legislative Initiatives in the 107th Congress. Numerous initiatives focused in whole or in part on easing restrictions on food and medical exportsto Cuba. Several focused on lifting private financing restrictions for agricultural sales set forth inthe Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act of 2000 ( P.L. 106-387 , Title IX, Section908(b)). In July 23, 2002 consideration of the FY2003 Treasury Department appropriations bill, H.R. 5120 , the House approved an amendment offered by Representative Moran(Kansas), H.Amdt. 554 , by voice vote, that provides that no funds in the bill can be usedto implement any sanction on private commercial sales of agricultural commodities or medicines toCuba. Some observers suggest that practical effect of this amendment would be to prevent theTreasury Department's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) from ensuring that sales to Cubado not include private financing. (25) The Senate version of the bill, S. 2740 , as reportedout of committee, did not include a similar provision. Final action on the FY2003 TreasuryDepartment appropriations measure was not completed before the end of the 107th Congress. The Senate version of the 2002 "Farm Bill," H.R. 2646 (which the Senate passedFebruary 13, 2002, after incorporating the language of S. 1731 as an amendment) wouldhave lifted such financing restrictions, but the provision ultimately was not included in theconference report on the bill ( H.Rept. 107-424 , filed May 1, 2002). The Bush Administrationstrongly opposes lifting the financing restrictions because of "Cuba's denial of basic civil rights toits citizens as well as its egregious rejection of the global coalition's efforts against terrorism." (26) The Senate report to S. 1731 ( S.Rept. 107-117 ) noted that lifting the private financing restrictions wouldpermit U.S. exporters to gain access to a potential market of about $400 million annually but wouldnot commit U.S. government funds. Although the House version of H.R. 2646 did notcontain the financing provision, the House approved (273-143) a nonbinding motion offered byRepresentative Calvin Dooley to instruct the conferees on H.R. 2646 to accept theSenate provision. Despite the House vote, the conference report ( H.Rept. 107-424 ) did not includethe Senate provision. Several Senators reportedly are interested in adding the provision to theFY2003 agriculture appropriations bill. (27) During consideration of S. 1731 on December 18, 2001, the Senate tabled(61-33) an amendment offered by Senator Bob Smith, S.Amdt. 2596 , that would haveconditioned the lifting of restrictions on private financing of agricultural sales to Cuba on apresidential certification that Cuba is not a state sponsor of international terrorism. A secondaryamendment offered by Senator Torricelli, S.Amdt. 2597 , fell when S.Amdt. 2596 was tabled. The Torricelli amendment would have conditioned the liftingof private financing restrictions on a presidential certification that all convicted felons who are livingas fugitives in Cuba have been returned to the United States for incarceration. In additional action, during May 17, 2002 Senate consideration of "trade promotionauthority" (TPA) legislation (manager's amendment, S.Amdt. 3401 , to H.R. 3009 ), Senator Dorgan offered an amendment, S.Amdt. 3439 , that would havepermitted private financing of agricultural sales to Cuba. The amendment was identical to theprovision that had been included in the Senate version of the Farm Bill. Senator Dorgansubsequently withdrew the amendment on May 21, 2002, because he maintained that somecosponsors did not want to jeopardize the TPA legislation. Several other legislative initiatives -- S. 171 (Dorgan), introduced January 24,2001, S. 239 (Hagel), introduced February 1, 2001, and H.R. 173 (Serrano), introduced January 3, 2001 -- would also have lifted the restrictions on private financingof agricultural sales to Cuba. S. 1017 (Dodd) and H.R. 2138 (Serrano), the Bridges to the CubanPeople Act of 2001, introduced June 12, 2001, would, among other provisions, ease restrictions onfood and medical exports to Cuba and allow for the importation of certain Cuban medicines. OnJune 19, 2002, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee's Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere,Peace Corps, and Narcotics Affairs held a hearing on S. 1017 . Identical bills S. 402 (Baucus) and H.R. 797 (Rangel), the Cuban Humanitarian TradeAct of 2001, introduced February 27 and 28, 2001, respectively, would make an exception to theembargo for the export of agricultural commodities, medicines, medical supplies, medicalinstruments, and medical equipment. Finally, several broad bills would have lifted all sanctions on trade, financial transactions,and travel to Cuba: H.R. 174 (Serrano), the Cuban Reconciliation Act, introducedJanuary 3, 2001; identical bills S. 400 (Baucus) and H.R. 798 (Rangel),the Free Trade with Cuba Act, introduced February 27 and 28, 2001, respectively; and H.R. 2662 (Paul), a bill that would also prohibit any federal funds to provide assistanceto Cuba. For additional information, see CRS Issue Brief IB10061, Exempting Food and AgricultureProducts from U.S. Economic Sanctions: Status and Implementation. Restrictions on travel to Cuba have been a key and often contentious component in U.S.efforts to isolate the communist government of Fidel Castro for much of the past 40 years. Over timethere have been numerous changes to the restrictions and for 5 years, from 1977 until 1982, therewere no restrictions on travel. Major arguments made for lifting the Cuba travel ban are: it hinders efforts to influenceconditions in Cuba and may be aiding Castro by helping restrict the flow of information; it abridgesthe rights of ordinary Americans; and Americans can travel to other countries with communist orauthoritarian governments. Major arguments in opposition to lifting the Cuba travel ban are thatAmerican tourist travel would support Castro's rule by providing his government with millions ofdollars in tourist receipts; that there are legal provisions allowing travel to Cuba for humanitarianpurposes that are used by thousands of Americans each year; and that the President should be freeto restrict travel for foreign policy reasons. Legislative Actions and Initiatives in the 107thCongress. In the first session, on July 25, 2001, the House approved an amendmentto H.R. 2590 , the FY2002 Treasury Appropriations bill, that would prohibit spendingfor administering Treasury Department regulations restricting travel to Cuba. H.Amdt. 241 , offered by Representative Flake (which amended H.Amdt. 240 offered byRepresentative Smith) would prohibit funding to administer the Cuban Assets Control Regulations(CACR) with respect to any travel or travel-related transaction. The CACR are administered by theTreasury Department's Office of Foreign Assets Control. The Flake amendment was approved bya vote of 240 to 186, compared to a vote of 232-186 for a similar amendment in the FY2001Treasury Department appropriations bill. The Senate version of H.R. 2590 , as approved September 19, 2001, did notinclude any provision regarding U.S. restrictions on travel to Cuba. In floor debate, Senator Dorgannoted that he had intended to offer an amendment on the issue, but that he decided not to becausehe did not want to slow passage of the bill. He also indicated his support for the House provisionwhen it came up in conference, but ultimately Congress did not include the provision in theconference report to the bill ( H.Rept. 107-253 ). The Cuba travel issue received further consideration in the second session of the 107thCongress. A bipartisan House Cuba working group of 40 Representatives vowed as one of its goalsto work for a lifting of travel restrictions. On February 11, 2002, the Senate AppropriationsCommittee's Subcommittee on Treasury and General Government held a hearing on the issue,featuring Administration and outside witnesses. The travel issue was part of the debate during consideration of the FY2003 TreasuryDepartment appropriations bill ( H.R. 5120 and S. 2740 ). Secretary of StateColin Powell and Secretary of the Treasury Paul O'Neill said they would recommend that thePresident veto legislation that includes a loosening of restrictions on travel to Cuba (or a weakeningof restrictions on private financing for U.S. agricultural exports to Cuba). The White House alsostated that President Bush would veto such legislation. In July 23, 2002 floor action on H.R. 5120 , the House approved three Cubasanctions amendments, including one on the easing of travel restrictions offered by RepresentativeJeff Flake. The House approved the Flake travel amendment ( H.Amdt. 552 ), by a voteof 262-167, that would provide that no funds could be used to administer or enforce the TreasuryDepartment regulations with respect to travel to Cuba. The Flake amendment would not prevent theissuance of general or specific licenses for travel to Cuba. Some observers have raised the questionof whether the effect of this amendment would be limited since the underlying embargo regulationsrestricting travel would remain unchanged; enforcement action against violations of the relevantembargo regulations could potentially take place in future years when the Treasury Departmentappropriations measure did not include the funding limitations on enforcing the travelrestrictions. (29) During consideration of H.R. 5120 , the House also rejected two Cubaamendments. A Rangel amendment ( H.Amdt. 555 ), rejected by a vote of 204-226,would have prevented any funds in the bill from being used to implement, administer, or enforce theoverall economic embargo of Cuba, which includes travel. A Goss amendment( H.Amdt. 551 ), rejected by a vote of 182-247, would have provided that any limitationon the use of funds to administer or enforce regulations restricting travel to Cuba or travel-relatedtransactions would only apply after the President certified to Congress that certain conditions weremet regarding biological weapons and terrorism. (For further information, see sections below on"Cuba and Terrorism" and "Cuba and Biological Weapons?".) The Senate version of the Treasury Department appropriations measure, S. 2740 ,as reported by the Senate Committee on Appropriations on July 17, 2002 ( S.Rept. 107-212 ),included a provision, in Section 516, that was similar, although not identical, to the Flakeamendment described above. It provides that no funds may be used to enforce the TreasuryDepartment regulations with respect to any travel or travel-related transactions, but would notprevent the Office of Foreign Assets Control, which administers the sanctions, from issuing generaland specific licenses for travel to Cuba as currently allowed. In addition, Section 124 of the Senatebill stipulated that no Treasury Department funds for "Departmental Offices, Salaries, and Expenses"may be used by OFAC, until OFAC has certain procedures in place regarding license applicationsfor travel to Cuba. Final action on the FY2003 Treasury Department appropriations measure was not completedbefore the end of the 107th Congress. Numerous other initiatives introduced in the 107th Congresswould have eased U.S. restrictions on travel to Cuba, but action was not taken on these bills: H.R. 5022 (Flake), introduced June 26, 2002, would lift allrestrictions on travel to Cuba. Several broad bills would lift all sanctions on trade, financial transactions, andtravel to Cuba: H.R. 174 (Serrano), the Cuban Reconciliation Act, introduced January3, 2001, and identical bills S. 400 (Baucus) and H.R. 798 (Rangel), theFree Trade with Cuba Act, introduced February 27 and 28, 2001, respectively. S. 1017 (Dodd) and H.R. 2138 (Serrano), the Bridgesto the Cuban People Act of 2001, introduced June 12, 2001, would, among other provisions, easerestrictions on travel by U.S. nationals or lawful permanent resident aliens to Cuba. Several bills, among other provisions, would repeal the travel restrictionsimposed in the 106th Congress by the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act of 2000( P.L. 106-387 , Title IX, Section 910). These include identical bills S. 402 (Baucus) and H.R. 797 (Rangel), the Cuban Humanitarian Trade Act of 2001, introduced February27 and 28, 2001, respectively; S. 171 (Dorgan), introduced January 24, 2001; and S. 239 (Hagel), the Cuba Food and Medicine Access Act of 2001, introduced February1, 2001. Because of Cuba's geographic location, the country's waters and airspace have been used bytraffickers to transport illicit drugs for ultimate destinations in the United States. In 1999, someMembers of Congress wanted Cuba to be added to the annual list of major drug transit countries,but the Clinton Administration decided not to add Cuba to the list. According to the Department ofState at the time, "Cuba was not placed on the list of major drug transit countries because there isno clear evidence that cocaine or heroin are transiting Cuba on the way to the United States inquantities that significantly affect the United States." (30) According to President Bush, in his November 1, 2001 determination of majordrug-producing or drug-transit countries, "for the last several years, much of the suspect air trafficthat previously crossed Cuban airspace has shifted to Hispaniola (Haiti and the DominicanRepublic)." He indicated that the traffic that occurs does not carry significant quantities of cocaineor heroin to the United States but noted that Cuba will be kept "under observation for any changesto the current transit patterns." Over the past several years, Cuban officials have expressed concerns over the use of theirwaters and airspace for drug transit as well as increased domestic drug use. The Cuban governmenthas taken a number of measures to deal with the drug problem, including legislation to stiffenpenalties for traffickers, increased training for counternarcotics personnel, and cooperation with anumber of countries on anti-drug efforts. Cuba has bilateral counternarcotics agreements with 29countries and less formal arrangements with 12 others, according to the Department of State. Britainand France have provided counternarcotics training. In November 2001, Cuba hosted a regionalcounternarcotics conference focusing on strategies to prevent drug abuse, drug trafficking, andmoney laundering. The United States has cooperated with Cuba on anti-drug efforts on a case-by-case basisdating back to the 1970s. In 1996, Cuban authorities cooperated with the United States in the seizureof 6.6 tons of cocaine aboard the Miami-bound Limerick , a Honduran-flag ship. Cuba turned overthe cocaine to the United States and cooperated fully in the investigation and subsequent prosecutionof two defendants in the case in the United States. Cooperation has increased since 1999 when U.S.and Cuban officials met in Havana to discuss ways of improving anti-drug cooperation. Cubaaccepted an upgrading of the communications link between the Cuban Border Guard and the U.S.Coast Guard as well as the stationing of a U.S. Coast Guard officer at the U.S. Interests Section inHavana. The Coast Guard official was posted to the U.S. Interests Section in September 2000, andsince that time, according to the State Department's International Narcotics Control Strategy Reportfor 2001, coordination between the U.S. and Cuban governments has increased. Cuba has called for even more cooperation and has asked for a bilateral anti-drug cooperationagreement with the United States. (31) In January 2002, Cuba deported to the United States JesseJames Bell, a U.S. fugitive wanted on drug charges, and in early March 2002, Cuba arrested aconvicted Colombian drug trafficker, Rafael Bustamante, who escaped from jail in Alabama in 1992. While Drug Enforcement Administration head Asa Hutchison expressed appreciation for Cuba'sactions, he indicated that cooperation would continue on a case-by-case basis, not through a bilateralagreement. (32) StateDepartment spokesman Richard Boucher said that if Cuba "were to demonstrate a willingness towork across the board with us on law enforcement issues, then we might consider some more formalstructure," but he indicated that Cuba has not demonstrated that kind of commitment. As anexample, Boucher maintained that "there are still dozens of fugitives from U.S. justice who havebeen provided safe haven by the Cuban government." (33) Although the current level of case-by-case cooperation willprobably continue, it is unlikely that the level of cooperation will increase significantly given theAdministration's position. Some Members have called for greater cooperation with Cuba on drugtrafficking and view Cuba's proposal as a good-will gesture, while others view the effort as a ployto sway public opinion and influence views in the U.S. Congress. (34) Legislative Initiatives. In the second session ofthe 107th Congress, both House and Senate versions of the FY2003 Foreign Operationsappropriations bill, H.R. 5410 and S. 2779 , had divergent provisionsrelated to Cuba and counternarcotics cooperation with the United States. Section 585 of the Senatebill provided that $3 million in International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement assistanceshould be made available for preliminary work by the Department of State and other entities toestablish cooperation with appropriate agencies of the Cuban government on counter-narcoticsmatters. The money would not be available if the President certified 1) that Cuba does not have inplace appropriate procedures to protect against the loss of innocent life in the air and on the groundin connection with the interdiction of illegal drugs and 2) that there is evidence of involvement ofthe Cuban government in drug trafficking. In contrast, Section 581 of the House bill provided thatnone of the funds appropriated for "International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement" may bemade available for assistance to the Cuban government. Final action on the Foreign Operationsmeasure was not completed before the end of the 107th Congress. In the first session of the 107th Congress, the Senate version of the FY2002 ForeignOperations Appropriations bill, H.R. 2506 , had a provision (Section 580) that wouldhave made available $1.5 million for preliminary work for the Department of State and otheragencies "to establish cooperation with appropriate agencies of the Cuba government oncounter-narcotics matters." The money was conditioned on a presidential certification that (1) Cubahas in place appropriate procedures to protect against loss of innocent life in the air and on theground in connection with drug interdiction and that (2) there is no evidence of the involvement ofthe government of Cuba in drug trafficking. The House version of the bill, however, did not includethe Cuba drug cooperation, and the conference report was filed without the Senate provision. Nevertheless, the conference report to H.R. 2506 ( H.Rept. 107-345 ) called fora report by the Secretary of State within 6 months on 1) the extent, if any of the direct involvementof the government of Cuba in illegal drug trafficking; 2) the likelihood that U.S. internationalnarcotics assistance to the government of Cuba would decrease the flow of drugs transiting throughCuba; and 3) the degree to which the government of Cuba is exchanging with U.S. agenciesdrug-related law enforcement information. The conference report also encouraged theAdministration to transmit to Congress, not later than 9 months, any legislation necessary to decreasethe flow of drugs to or from Cuba. H.R. 2506 was signed into, P.L. 107-115 , on January10, 2002. In addition to provisions in foreign operations measures, a bill was introduced( H.R. 1124 ) early in the 107th Congress to authorize the Director of the Office ofNational Drug Control Policy to negotiate with Cuban government officials for increasedcooperation between the two countries on drug interdiction efforts. A number of U.S. fugitives from justice are in Cuba, including Joanne Chesimard, who wasconvicted for the killing of a New Jersey state trooper in 1973; Charles Hill and Michael Finney,wanted for the killing of a state trooper in new Mexico in 1971; Victor Manuel Gerena, member ofa militant Puerto Rican separatist group, wanted for carrying out the robbery of a Wells Fargoarmored car in Connecticut in 1983; and Guillermo Morales, another member of a Puerto Ricanmilitant group, who was convicted of illegal possession of firearms in New York in the 1970s. Cubareportedly would be interested in considering negotiation of a mutual extradition of fugitives; forexample, Cuba would like to see the extradition of Orlando Bosch, a Miami resident accused ofbombing a Cuban airliner in 1976. (35) In the 107th Congress, legislation was introduced, H.R. 2292 , to amend theCuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996 ( P.L. 104-114 ) to require, as a condition forthe determination that a democratically elected government in Cuba exists, that the governmentextradite to the United States convicted felon Joanne Chesimard and all other U.S. fugitives fromjustice. During July 25, 2001 consideration of H.R. 2590 , the FY2002 TreasuryDepartment appropriations bill, Representative Smith offered an amendment, H.Amdt. 240 , that would have prohibited funds in the bill from being used to enforce restrictions on travel toCuba once the President certified to Congress that the Cuban government has released all politicalprisoners and has returned to the United States all persons residing in Cuba who are wanted in theUnited States for crimes of air piracy, narcotics trafficking, or murder. Before it was approved,however, the amendment was amended by H.Amdt. 241 offered by RepresentativeFlake, which eliminated the presidential certification regarding political prisoners and U.S. fugitivesin Cuba. Cuba has recently deported two fugitives from justice to the United States. As noted above,the Cuban government deported U.S. drug fugitive Jesse James Bell to the United States in January2002. According to the U.S. State Department, in December 2001 the Cuban government alsodeported William Joseph Harris, wanted on child abuse charges. In addition, in early March 2002,Cuba also arrested a convicted drug trafficker, Rafael Bustamante, who escaped from jail in Alabamain 1992. Cuba was added to the State Department's list of states sponsoring international terrorism in1982 for its complicity with the M-19 insurgent group in Colombia. Communist Cuba has had ahistory of supporting revolutionary movements and governments in Latin America and Africa, butin 1992 Fidel Castro said that his country's support for insurgents abroad was a thing of the past. Cuba's change in policy was in large part because of the breakup of the Soviet Union, which resultedin the loss of billions in annual subsidies to Cuba, and led to substantial Cuban economic decline. Cuba remains on the State Department's terrorism list today. According to the StateDepartment's May 21, 2002 Patterns of Global Terrorism report, Castro continues "to view terroras a legitimate revolutionary tactic." The report maintained that Cuba provides safehaven to at least20 Basque ETA terrorists from Spain and has provided "some degree of safehaven and support" tomembers of two Colombian insurgent groups, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC)and the National Liberation Army (ELN). (Cuba has been the site of peace talks between theColombian government and the ELN.) The report noted that one of three Irish Republican Army(IRA) members arrested in Colombia on suspicion of providing explosives training to the FARC hadbeen based in Cuba for 5 years. The report also noted that numerous U.S. fugitives from justiceresided in Cuba (see "Cuba and U.S. Fugitives from Justice" above). It also asserted that "sinceSeptember 11, Fidel Castro has vacillated over the war on terrorism." The report noted that whileCuba signed all 12 U.N. counterterrorism conventions and the Ibero-American declaration onterrorism in 2001, it has also issued strong rhetoric against the U.S.-led war on terrorism. Although Cuba offered support to the United States in the aftermath of the World TradeCenter and Pentagon attacks, Fidel Castro also stated that the attacks were in part a consequence ofthe United States having applied "terrorist methods" for years. (36) Cuba's subsequentstatements became increasingly hostile, according to press reports, which quote Cuba's mission tothe United Nations as describing the U.S. response to the U.S. attacks as "fascist and terrorist" andthat the United States was using the attack as an excuse to establish "unrestricted tyranny over allpeople on Earth." (37) Castro himself said that the U.S. government was run by "extremists" and "hawks" whose responseto the attack could result in an "infinite killing of innocent people." (38) The Cuban government, however, had a much more muted reaction to the U.S. decision tosend captured Taliban and Al Qaeda fighters from Afghanistan to the U.S. naval base at GuantanamoBay, Cuba. Guantanamo has been U.S. base since 1903, and under a 1934 treaty that remains inforce, the U.S. presence can only be terminated by mutual agreement or by abandonment by theUnited States. In 1994-1995, the base was used to house thousands of Cubans and Haitians fleeingtheir homeland. As of late November 2002, almost 600 detainees from more than 30 countries werebeing held at Guantanamo. Although the Cuban government objects to the U.S. presence atGuantanamo as a national security threat and opposes the presence as illegal, it has not opposed thenew mission of housing detainees from Afghanistan. Defense Minister Raul Castro noted that, in theunlikely event that a prisoner would escape into Cuban territory, Cuba would capture the prisonerand return him to the base. (39) On September 17, 2002, a State Department official, Deputy Assistant Secretary of StateDaniel Fisk, accused Cuba of impeding U.S. efforts to defeat the threat against terrorism. Fiskaccused the Cuban government of distracting U.S. attention and resources from anti-terrorist effortsby setting up false leads. The Cuban government strongly denied the allegations that it has tried tomislead investigators. Cuba itself has been the target of various terrorist incidents over the years. In 1976, a Cubanplane was bombed, killing 73 people. In 1997 almost a dozen bombings targeted the tourist sectorin Havana and in the Varadero beach area in which an Italian businessman was killed and severalothers injured. Two Salvadorans were convicted and sentenced to death for the bombings in March1999, and three Guatemalans were sentenced to prison terms ranging from 10-15 years in January2002. Cuban officials maintain that Cuban exiles funded the bombings. On December 19, 2002,Juan Pablo Roque, a Cuban spy that had infiltrated the Cuban American group Brothers to theRescue (whose plane was shot down by Cuba in 1996) reportedly was shot and wounded in Havana;an anti-Castro paramilitary group known as Comando F-4 claimed responsibility. (40) During December 18, 2001 consideration of the Farm Bill, S. 1731 , the Senatedefeated an amendment, S.Amdt. 2596 , that would have conditioned a lifting ofrestrictions on private financing of agricultural sales to Cuba on a presidential certification that Cubawas not a state sponsor of international terrorism. A recent controversy that has arisen is the question of whether Cuba, which has an advancedbiotechnology sector, is involved in developing biological weapons. (41) On May 6, 2002, UnderSecretary of State for Arms Control and International Security John Bolton stated that "the UnitedStates believes that Cuba has at least a limited offensive biological warfareresearch-and-development effort" and "has provided dual-use technology to other rogue states." Bolton called on Cuba "to cease all BW-applicable cooperation with rogue states and to fully complywith all of its obligations under the Biological Weapons Convention." Although Bolton's statementreceived considerable media attention, it was similar to a March 19, 2002 statement by AssistantSecretary of State for Intelligence and Research Carl Ford before the Senate Committee on ForeignRelations. When questioned on the issue, Secretary of State Powell maintained that Under SecretaryBolton's statement was not based on new information. Powell asserted that the United States believesCuba has the capacity and the capability to conduct research on biological weapons but emphasizedthat the Administration had not claimed that Cuba had such weapons. (42) Some observers, includingsome Members of Congress, view Powell's statement as contradicting that of Under SecretaryBolton. The State Department's annual Patterns of Global Terrorism report issued May 21, 2002,did not mention the issue of Cuba and biological weapons. In response to Under Secretary Bolton's statement, the Cuban government called theallegations a lie and maintained that the Bush Administration was trying to justify its hard-linepolicies just when the momentum is increasing in the United States to ease the embargo. During histrip to Cuba, former President Jimmy Carter criticized the Bush Administration over the allegationsand said that Administration officials who had briefed him before the trip assured him that Cuba hadnot shared anything with other countries that could be used for terrorist purposes. (43) The Senate Foreign Relations Committee's Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere, PeaceCorps, and Narcotics Affairs held a hearing on the issue on June 5, 2002. (44) At the hearing, AssistantSecretary of State for Intelligence and Research Carl Ford distinguished between the term "effort"and "program," and maintained that Cuba has a biological weapons effort and not a biologicalweapons program. Ford characterized a program as something substantial and multifaceted thatincludes test facilities, production facilities, and a unit within the military specifically designated forsuch weapons capability. In contrast, he characterized an effort as the research and developmentnecessary to create biological weapons. U.S. government concerns about Cuba's capability to produce biological weapons dates backseveral years. In 1998, then U.S. Secretary of State William Cohen stated in a transmittal letter(accompanying a report to Congress on Cuba's threat to U.S. national security) that he was"concerned about Cuba's potential to develop and produce biological agents, given its biotechnologyinfrastructure..." Cuba began building up its biotechnology industry in the 1980s and has spent millionsinvesting in the sector. The industry was initially geared "to apply biotechnology and geneticengineering to agriculture in order to increase yields" but has also produced numerous vaccines,interferon, and other drugs and has exported many of its biotechnology products. (45) In 1999, the Britishpharmaceutical company Glaxo SmithKline announced an agreement to test and market a newCuban meningitis vaccine that might eventually be used in the United States. (46) Over the past several years, the FBI has arrested and convicted several Cuban intelligenceagents in the United States. In June 2001, five members of the so-called "Wasp Network" wereconvicted on espionage charges by a U.S. Federal Court in Miami. Sentences handed down inDecember 2001 ranged from 15 years to life sentences. The group tried to penetrate U.S. militarybases and exile groups. The Cuban government has vowed to work for the return of the five spieswho have been dubbed "Heroes of the Republic" by Cuba's National Assembly. In addition to thefive, a married couple was sentenced in January 2002 to lesser prison terms of 7 years and 3 Â½ yearsfor their participation in the spy network. In addition, two U.S. government officials have been implicated in spying for Cuba. InFebruary 2000, an Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) official from Miami, MarianoFaget, was arrested and ultimately convicted in May 2000 for passing classified information to afriend with ties to Cuba. He was sentenced to 5 years in prison in June 2001. The case led to theState Department's expulsion of a Cuban diplomat working in Washington. On September 21, 2001, Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) analyst Ana Montes wasarrested on charges of spying for the Cuban government. Montes reportedly supplied Cuba withclassified information about U.S. military exercises and other sensitive operations. (47) On March 19, 2002,Montes pled guilty to spying for the Cuban government for 16 years, during which she divulged thenames of four U.S. government intelligence agents working in Cuba and information about a "specialaccess program" related to U.S. national defense. On October 16, 2002, Montes was sentenced to25 years in prison in exchange for her cooperation with prosecutors as part of a plea bargain. Inresponse to the espionage case, in early November 2002 the U.S. Department of State ordered theexpulsion of four Cuban diplomats in the United States, two from the Cuban Interests Section inWashington and two from Cuba's U.N. Mission in New York. Cuba strongly asserted that thediplomats were not involved in intelligence activities. U.S.-government sponsored radio and television broadcasting to Cuba -- Radio and TV Marti-- began in 1985 and 1990 respectively. As spelled out in the Broadcasting Board of GovernorsFY2003 Budget Request , the objectives of Radio and TV Marti are: 1) to support the right of theCuban people to seek, receive, and impart information and ideas through any media and regardlessof frontiers; 2) to be effective in furthering the open communication of information and ideasthrough use of radio and television broadcasting to Cuba; 3) to serve as a consistently reliable andauthoritative source of accurate, objective, and comprehensive news; and 4) to provide news,commentary, and other information about events in Cuba and elsewhere to promote the cause offreedom in Cuba. TV Marti daily broadcasts for four and one-half hours daily; on May 20, 2002, the broadcastschedule was changed from the early hours of 3:30 a.m. - 8:00 a.m. to the evening hours of 6:00 p.m.- 10:30 p.m. Radio Marti broadcasts 24 hours a day on short and medium wave (AM) channels. Surveys have showed a Radio Marti listenership of 9% in 2000 and 5% in 2001. (48) Until October 1999, U.S.-government funded international broadcasting programs had beena primary function of the United States Information Agency (USIA). When USIA was abolished andits functions were merged into the Department of State at the beginning of FY2000, the BroadcastingBoard of Governors became an independent agency that included such entities as the Voice ofAmerica (VOA), Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL), Radio Free Asia, and the Office ofCuba Broadcasting (OCB), which manages Radio and TV Marti. OCB is headquartered in Miami,Florida. Legislation in the 104th Congress ( P.L. 104-134 ) required the relocation of OCB fromWashington D.C. to south Florida. The move began in 1996 and was completed in 1998. Both Radio and TV Marti have at times been the focus of controversies, including adherenceto broadcast standards. There have been various attempts over the years to cut funding for theprograms, especially for TV Marti, which has not had an audience because of Cuban jammingefforts. Various studies and audits of these program have been conducted, including investigationsby the U.S. General Accounting Office, by a 1994 congressionally established Advisory Panel onRadio and TV Marti, and by the State Department's Office of the Inspector General. (49) (For background on Cubabroadcasting through 1994, see CRS Report 94-636(pdf) , Radio and Television Broadcasting to Cuba:Background and Issues through 1994 .) From FY1984 through FY2002, Congress appropriated almost $407 million for broadcastingto Cuba, with about $249 million for Radio Marti (since FY1984) and $158 million for TV Marti(since FY1989). Debate on TV Marti. In the various congressionaldebates on TV Marti over the years, opponents of continued funding of the program maintain thatvirtually the only people who see TV Marti in Cuba are those Cubans who visit the consular sectionof the U.S. Interests Section in Havana, which has a waiting room in which TV Marti may beviewed. These critics argue that some $150 million has been spent by the United States for TVMarti, while the Cuban government only needs to spend a few thousand dollars to jam the broadcastseffectively. They argue that TV Marti is a waste of taxpayers' money because it does not contributeto the promotion of freedom and democracy in Cuba, unlike Radio Marti, which many Cubans listento as a source of information. Opponents also argue that the conversion of TV Marti from VHF toUHF transmission has not succeeded in overcoming Cuba's jamming efforts. In contrast, supporters of continued TV Marti funding point to a congressionally mandatedAdvisory Panel 1994, which stated "the Cuban people have an ardent desire and a genuine need toreceive the programming produced by TV Marti." (50) Supporters argue that eliminating TV Marti would send amessage to the Cuban people that the United States is not committed to the cause of freedom inCuba. They believe that eliminating TV Marti would be giving in to the dictatorial Castrogovernment, which suppresses the free flow of information in Cuba. These proponents contend thatit is impossible for the Cuban government to completely jam TV Marti, and maintain that significantnumbers of Cubans have attempted to tune in to the programming. Still others point to the potentialuse of TV Marti in the event of a crisis or upheaval in Cuba's future, and argue that in such ascenario, it would be important to have TV Marti available as a news source. FY2001 Funding. For FY2001, the ClintonAdministration requested $23.456 million for broadcasting to Cuba for both Radio and TV Marti. Of that amount, $650,000 was for the purchase of a 100-kilowatt solid state transmitter to improvethe operation, reliability, and efficiency of Radio Marti broadcasts to Cuba. H.R. 5548 , a bill making appropriations for the Departments of Commerce,Justice, and State; the Judiciary; and related agencies, was incorporated into the H.R. 4942 conference report ( H.Rept. 106-1005 ). Signed into law December 21, 2000 ( P.L. 106-553 ),it provided $22.095 million for radio and television broadcasting to Cuba. A subsequent rescissionbrought the amount down to $22.046 million. FY2002 Funding. The FY2002 State Departmentand Related Agencies Appropriations measure ( P.L. 107-77 , H.R. 2500 ) fully funds theAdministration's request and provides $24.872 million for broadcasting to Cuba for FY2002, $2.826million more than the amount provided in FY2001. Both the House and Senate versions of H.R. 2500 had fully funded the request. During Senate consideration of the bill onSeptember 10, Senator Dorgan filed an amendment, S.Amdt. 1542 , that would haveeliminated funding for TV Marti, but in light of the September 11 attacks in New York andWashington, Senator Dorgan withdrew the amendment on September 13, 2001. H.R. 1646 , the Foreign Relations Authorization Act for FY2002 and FY2003,approved by the House May 16, 2001, would authorize $25 million for broadcasting to Cuba for eachfiscal year. In addition, the House version authorizes $750,000 for the enhancements of transmissionfacilities in Belize and the cost of transmissions from that country. According to the report to thebill ( H.Rept. 107-57 ), such enhancements to the Belize facility "will help increase the capacity ofthe Office of Cuba Broadcasting to evade the jamming by the Cuban regime." The bill would alsoeliminate staff positions, including the staff director, from the Advisory Board for CubaBroadcasting, which had often been the source of political controversy. FY2003 Funding. The Bush Administrationrequested $25.362 million for broadcasting to Cuba for FY2003, with about $15 million for RadioMarti and $10 million for TV Marti. The Senate Appropriations Committee reported out its version of the FY2003 Commerce, Justice, State and Related Agencies (CJS) appropriations bill, S. 2778 ( S.Rept. 107-218 ) on July 24, 2002, which would provide $24.996 million forCuba broadcasting. Final action on the measure was not completed before the end of the 107thCongress. In September 2002, both houses approved the conference report ( H.Rept. 107-671 ) to theForeign Relations Authorization Act for FY2003 ( H.R. 1646 ) that authorizes $25.923million for Cuba broadcasting for FY2003. The House approved the conference report on September25 by voice vote, and the Senate agreed to the conference report by Unanimous Consent onSeptember 26. The President signed the measure into law on September 30, 2002 as P.L. 107-228 . On June 6, 2002, the House International Relations Committee's Subcommittee onInternational Operations and Human Rights held a hearing on Radio and TV Marti featuringAdministration and outside witnesses. (51) Over the past several years, the U.S. Agency for International Development has providedassistance to increase the flow of information on democracy, human rights, and free enterprise toCuba. USAID's Cuba program supports a variety of U.S.-based non-governmental organizations topromote rapid, peaceful transition to democracy, help develop civil society, and build solidarity withCuba's human rights activists. (52) These efforts are funded through the annual foreign aid appropriations bill. In FY2001,$4.989 was provided for various Cuba projects. In FY2002, $5 million was provided. For FY2003,the Administration has requested $6 million as part of its foreign aid request. While the FY2003assistance is not earmarked in either the House or Senate version of the Foreign Operations bill forFY2003, H.R. 5410 and S. 2779 , the House Appropriations Committeereport to the bill ( H.Rept. 107-663 ) states that the committee fully supports the Administration'srequest of $6 million for the goal of promoting a peaceful transition to democracy in Cuba. Finalaction on the FY2003 Foreign Operations measure was not completed before the end of the 107thCongress. Some Members of the 107th Congress again raised concerns about the Russian signalsintelligence facility at Lourdes, Cuba. The facility at Lourdes was built in the aftermath of the Cubanmissile crisis of 1962. It allows Russia to monitor U.S. communications, including militarycommunications that Russians contend ensure compliance with arms control agreements. The Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act ( P.L. 104-114 ) contains a provision thatwould reduce U.S. assistance for Russia by an amount equal to the sum of assistance and creditsprovided in support of intelligence facilities in Cuba. However, the legislation also provides thatsuch a restriction does not apply to most categories of assistance. Moreover, the legislation alsoprovides a presidential waiver if such assistance is important to U.S. national security and if Russiahas assured the United States that it is not sharing intelligence collected at the Lourdes facility withofficials or agents of the Cuban government. H.R. 160 (Ros-Lehtinen), introduced January 3, 2001, would prohibit therescheduling or forgiveness of any outstanding bilateral debt owed by the Russian government to theUnited States until the President certifies to the Congress that the Russian government has ceasedall its operations and permanently closed the Lourdes intelligence facility. In the 106th Congress, asimilar bill ( H.R. 4118 ) was approved by the House (275-146), but stalled in the Senate,where the Senate version ( S. 2748 ) remained in committee at the end of the 106thCongress. On October 17, 2001, Russian President Vladimir Putin announced that the Russian militarywould close the Lourdes facility. The announcement was met with approval from President Bushwho said that both Russia and the United States "are taking down relics of the Cold War and buildinga new, cooperative and transparent relationship for the 21st century." (53) On the other hand, Cubastrongly criticized Russia's move, saying that it had not agreed to the Russian pullout. Cubareportedly received about $200 million annually for the facility. The Cuban government is turningthe 70-square mile facility into a computer science university that will reportedly have 2,000 residentstudents. (54) In 1994 and 1995, Cuba and the United States reached two migration accords designed tostem the mass exodus of Cubans attempting to reach the United States by boat. On the minds of U.S.policymakers was the 1980 Mariel boatlift in which 125,000 Cubans fled to the United States. Inresponse to Castro's threat to unleash another Mariel, U.S. officials reiterated U.S. resolve not toallow another exodus. Amidst escalating numbers of fleeing Cubans, on August 19, 1994, PresidentClinton abruptly changed U.S. migration policy, under which Cubans attempting to flee theirhomeland were allowed into the United States, and announced that the U.S. Coast Guard and Navywould take Cubans rescued at sea to the U.S. naval base at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. Despite thechange in policy, Cubans continued fleeing in large numbers. As a result, in early September 1994, Cuba and the United States began talks that culminatedin a September 9, 1994 bilateral agreement to stem the flow of Cubans fleeing to the United Statesby boat. In the agreement, the United States and Cuba agreed to facilitate safe, legal, and orderlyCuban migration to the United States, consistent with a 1984 migration agreement. The UnitedStates agreed to ensure that total legal Cuban migration to the United States would be a minimumof 20,000 each year, not including immediate relatives of U.S. citizens. In a change of policy, theUnited States agreed to discontinue the practice of granting parole to all Cuban migrants who reachthe United States, while Cuba agreed to take measures to prevent unsafe departures from Cuba. In May 1995, the United States reached another accord with Cuba under which the UnitedStates would parole the more than 30,000 Cubans housed at Guantanamo into the United States, butwould intercept future Cuban migrants attempting to enter the United States by sea and would returnthem to Cuba. The two countries would cooperate jointly in the effort. Both countries also pledgedto ensure that no action would be taken against those migrants returned to Cuba as a consequenceof their attempt to immigrate illegally. On January 31, 1996, the Department of Defense announcedthat the last of some 32,000 Cubans intercepted at sea and housed at Guantanamo had left the U.S.Naval Base, most having been paroled into the United States. Periodic U.S.-Cuban talks have beenheld on the implementation of the migration accords. Since the 1995 migration accord, the U.S. Coast Guard has interdicted thousands of Cubansat sea and returned them to their country, while those deemed at risk for persecution have beentransferred to Guantanamo and then found asylum in a third country. Those Cubans who reach shoreare allowed to apply for permanent resident status in one year. Tensions in South Florida heightened after a June 29, 1999 incident -- televised live by localnews helicopters -- in which the U.S. Coast Guard used a water cannon and pepper spray to preventsix Cubans from reaching Surfside beach in Florida. The incident prompted outrage from the CubanAmerican community in Florida and several Members of Congress. President Clinton characterizedthe incident as "outrageous," and stated that the treatment was not authorized (Associated Press, July1, 1999). Another incident occurred on July 9, 1999, when a boat being interdicted by the CoastGuard capsized and resulted in the drowning of a Cuban woman. The State Department expressedregret over the incident and noted that the Department of Justice and the Immigration andNaturalization Service would investigate whether this was a case of alien smuggling. The Cuban government has taken forceful action against individuals engaging in aliensmuggling. Prison sentences of up to three years may be imposed against those engaging in aliensmuggling, and for incidents involving death or violence, a life sentence may be imposed. As of earlyJuly 2002, Cuba maintained that it had arrested and imprisoned more than 130 immigrant smugglerssince 1998. (56) U.S.prosecution against migrant smugglers in Florida has also increased in recent years with numerousconvictions. (57) From late November 1999 through June 2000, national attention became focused on Cubanmigration policy as a result of the Elian Gonzalez case, the five-year old boy found clinging to aninner tube off the coast of Fort Lauderdale. The boy's mother drowned in the incident, while hisfather who resided in Cuba, called for his return. Although the boy's relatives in Miami wanted himto stay in the United States, the Immigration and Naturalization Service ruled that the boy's fatherhad the sole legal authority to speak on his son's behalf. After numerous legal appeals by the Miamirelatives were exhausted, the boy returned to Cuba with his father in June 2000. In Cuba, FidelCastro orchestrated numerous mass demonstrations and a media blitz on the issue until the boy'sreturn. The case generated an outpouring of emotion among the Cuban population as well as insouth Florida. A June 26, 2002 speech by Fidel Castro raised concerns among some observers that Castrowas planning another mass exodus like the ones in 1980 and 1994. Castro stated that the Cubanmigration accords could be dissolved and the U.S. Interest Section in Havana could be withdrawnif Cuba's sovereignty was violated and if diplomatic norms were flouted by U.S. officials inCuba. (58) Subsequently,however, both Cuban and U.S. officials stated the importance of maintaining the migration accords. On February 24, 1996, Cuban Mig-29 fighter jets shot down two Cessna 337s in the FloridaStraits, which resulted in the death of four members of the Cuban American group Brothers to theRescue. The group was known primarily for its humanitarian missions of spotting Cubans fleeingtheir island nation on rafts but had also become active in flying over Cuba and dropping leaflets. In 1996, President Clinton authorized $300,000 to each of the families of the four victims,which was drawn from a pot of Cuban assets frozen in the United States. In addition, on December17, 1997, a U.S. federal judge awarded $187.6 million ($49.9 million in compensatory damages and$137.7 million in punitive damages) to the families of three of the shootdown victims who suedunder a provision in the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ( P.L. 104-132 ). (Thefourth shootdown victim was not a U.S. citizen, and therefore not eligible to sue under the Act.)However, Cuba refused to recognize the court's jurisdiction. A provision in the FY1999 omnibus appropriations measure ( P.L. 105-277 , H.R. 4328 ) could have affected the payment of the December 1997 judgment from Cuba's frozen assetsin the United States. That provision stipulates that foreign states are not immune from U.S.judgments for violations of international law. However, the provision also includes a presidentialwaiver for national security interests, which the President exercised October 21, 1998. The ClintonAdministration opposed the provision, maintaining that it would undermine the authority of thePresident to use assets of countries under economic sanctions as leverage when sanctions are usedto modify the behavior of a foreign state. Supporters maintain that it would let those nations whosponsor terrorism know that if they are found guilty in U.S. court, their assets will be liquidated inorder to serve justice. Nevertheless, in light of further congressional action on the issue in October 2000, theClinton Administration agreed to go forward with payments to relatives of three of the shootdownvictims. The Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000 ( P.L. 106-386 , Sections2002 and 2003) directed the Secretary of the Treasury to pay compensatory damages for certainclaims against Cuba (and Iran). Subsequently, on January 19, 2001, the day before he left office,President Clinton signed an order unfreezing Cuban funds in the United States to pay almost $97million to the relatives of the shootdown victims. The money came from a pot of $193.5 million inCuban assets frozen in the United States, consisting of funds from long-distance telephone fees thatAT&T paid for access to Cuba's telephone system from the mid-1960s until 1994. While supportersof the relatives, the Cuban American community, and many in Congress supported the President'saction, other U.S. citizens with claims against Cuba maintain that the large judgment drained the potof money that might have been available for other claims. (60) At the end of 2001, about $112 million in Cuban assets in theUnited States remained frozen or blocked. P.L. 106-113 ( H.R. 3194 ) Enacts by reference H.R. 3421 , the Commerce, Justice and State appropriationsbill for FY2000, and H.R. 3427 , the Foreign Relations Authorization Act for FY2000and FY2001, as introduced November 17, 1999. H.R. 3194 signed into law November29, 1999. H.R. 3421 appropriates $22.095 million for Cuba broadcasting for FY2000. H.R. 3427 includes the following Cuba provisions: Section 108 (b) (3) authorizes$6,000 for each of FY2000 and FY2001 for the investigation and dissemination of information onviolations of freedom of expression by Cuba; Section 121 authorizes $22.743 million forbroadcasting to Cuba for each of FY2000 and FY2001; Section 206 requires a report from theSecretary of State not later than 120 days after enactment of the Act on the extent of internationaldrug trafficking through Cuba since 1990. P.L. 106-429 ( H.R. 4811 ) On October 28, the conference report ( H.Rept. 106-997 ) struck H.R. 4811 andenacted by reference H.R. 5526 . Section 507 prohibits direct funding of assistance orreparations to Cuba (and other countries). Section 523 prohibits indirect assistance or reparationsto Cuba unless the President certifies that withholding such funds is contrary to U.S. nationalinterests. P.L. 106-386 ( H.R. 3244 ) Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000. Sections 2002 and 2003 directthe Secretary of the Treasury to pay compensatory damages for certain claims against Cuba (andIran). As provided for in the bill, President Clinton waived such payments in the interest of nationalsecurity when he signed the bill into law on October 28, 2000. (On January 19, 2001, he signed anexecutive order unfreezing the funds.) P.L. 106-387 ( H.R. 4461 ) Agriculture, Rural Development, Food and Drug Administration, and Related AgenciesAppropriations Act, FY2001. Title IX of the bill, Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement,terminates unilateral sanctions on food and medical exports from economic sanctions imposed forforeign policy purposes. It allows one-year licenses for exports of these goods to countries classifiedas state sponsors of international terrorism, which includes Cuba, but without any U.S. financing (thePresident may waive the prohibition of U.S. assistance for commercial exports to Iran, Libya, NorthKorea, or Sudan for national security or humanitarian reasons but may not do so for Cuba). Prohibitstravel to Cuba for tourism, restricts non-tourist travel to Cuba to that expressly authorized in currentfederal regulations. Signed into law October 28, 2000. H.Res. 99 (Ros-Lehtinen) Introduced March 9, 1999. House approved March 23, 1999, by voice vote. Expresses thesense of the House regarding the human rights situation in Cuba, including a condemnation of Cuba'srepressive crackdown against the internal opposition and independent press; a call for theAdministration to secure support for a UNCHR resolution condemning Cuba for its human rightsabuses and for the reinstatement of a UNCHR Special Rapporteur on Cuba; and a call for theAdministration to nominate a special envoy to advocate internationally for the establishment of therule of law for the Cuban people. S.Res. 57 (Graham) Introduced March 4, 1999. Senate approved (98-0) March 25, 1999. Expresses the sense ofthe Senate that the United States should make all efforts to pass a UNCHR resolution criticizingCuba's human rights abuses and securing the appointment of a Special Rapporteur. P.L. 106-553 ( H.R. 4942 ) Appropriations for the District of Columbia government and for other purposes. H.R. 5548 , making appropriations for the Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State;the Judiciary; and related agencies, was incorporated into the H.R. 4942 conferencereport ( H.Rept. 106-1005 ). Signed into law December 21, 2000. Provides $22.095 million for radioand television broadcasting to Cuba. P.L. 107-115 ( H.R. 2506 ) Foreign Operations Appropriations, FY2002. Similar to past foreign operationsappropriations measures, the bill contains provisions (Section 507 and Section 523) that prohibitdirect and indirect assistance to Cuba. The House committee report to the bill notes that theAppropriations Committee fully supports the Administration's budget request of at least $5 millionaimed at promoting democracy in Cuba. Introduced and reported by the Committee onAppropriations July 17, 2001 ( H.Rept. 107-142 ). House passed (381-46) July 24, 2001. SenateCommittee on Appropriations reported its version September 4, 2001 ( S.Rept. 107-58 ). Conferencereport ( H.Rept. 107-345 ) filed December 19, 2001. House agreed (357-66) to the conferenceDecember 19; Senate agreed (unanimous consent) December 20. Signed into law January 10, 2002.(Also see "Drug Interdiction Cooperation" below for conference report language.) H.Res. 91 (Smith, Christopher) Expressing the sense of the House of Representatives regarding the human rights situationin Cuba. Condemns the repressive and totalitarian actions of the Cuban government against theCuban people. Expresses the sense of the House of Representatives that the President should (1)have an action-oriented policy of directly assisting the Cuban people and independent organizationsto strengthen the forces of change and to improve human rights within Cuba; and (2) made all effortsnecessary at the meeting of the United Nations Human Rights Commission in Geneva in 2001 toobtain passage of a resolution condemning the government of Cuba for its human rights abuses andto secure the appointment of a Special Rapporteur for Cuba. Introduced March 19, 2001. Housepassed (347-44, 22 present) April 3, 2001. P.L. 107-228 ( H.R. 1646 ) Foreign Relations Authorization Act, FY2002 and FY2003. H.R. 1646 Introduced April 27, 2001; Committee on International Relations reported the bill May 5, 2001( H.Rept. 107-57 ). House passed (352-73) May 16, 2001. Section 101 of the House version wouldauthorize $70,000 for each fiscal year for the establishment and operation of a mobile library at theUnited States Interests Section in Cuba primarily for use by dissidents and democracy activists. Section 107 of the House version would authorize $6,000 for each fiscal year for the Office of theSpecial Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression in the Western Hemisphere of the Organization ofAmerican States for the investigation and dissemination of information on violations of freedom ofexpression by the government of Cuba. Senate passed, amended, May 1, 2002, with a substituteamendment, the Security Assistance Act of 2002, that did not have Cuba provisions. Conferencereport ( H.Rept. 107-671 ) filed September 23, 2002, without the Cuba provisions described above.House agreed to conference report by voice voted September 25, 2002; Senate agreed by UnanimousConsent September 26, 2002. Signed into law September 30, 2002 (Also see legislative initiativeson "Broadcasting to Cuba" below for additional provisions in H.R. 1646 .) H.R. 5410 (Kolbe)/ S. 2779 (Leahy) Foreign Operations Appropriations FY2003. S. 2779 introduced and reportedby the Senate Committee on Appropriations July 24, 2002 ( S.Rept. 107-219 ). H.R. 5410 introduced and reported by the House Committee on Appropriations September 19, 2002 ( H.Rept.107-663 ). As part of its FY2003 foreign aid request, the Administration requested $6 million for aCuba democracy program. The House committee report to the bill states that the committee fullysupports the $6 million request for Cuba and its goal of promoting a peaceful transition todemocracy. Final action was not completed before the end of the 107th Congress. H.Con.Res. 123 (Andrews) Calling for the immediate release of all political prisoners in Cuba, including Dr. Oscar EliasBiscet, and for other purposes. Introduced and referred to Committee on International Relations May3, 2001. H.R. 1271 (Diaz-Balart) To assist the internal opposition in Cuba, and to further help the Cuban people to regain theirfreedom. Introduced and referred to International Relations Committee March 28, 2001. H.Res. 453 (Pallone) Expresses support for the Varela Project and "urges the President and his representatives totake all appropriate steps to support the Varela Project and any future efforts by the Cuban peopleto assert their constitutional right to petition the National Assembly in support of a referendum.Introduced June 20, 2002; referred to the Committee on International Relations. H.R. 5737 (Ros-Lehtinen) Posthumously revokes the naturalization of Eriberto Mederos, who reportedly directedtorture against political prisoners in Cuba. Introduced November 14, 2002; referred to HouseCommittee on the Judiciary. S.Res. 272 (Nelson) Expresses support for the Varela Project and "urges the President to support the right of thecitizens of Cuba who have signed the Varela Project to petition the Cuban National Assembly fora referendum and the peaceful transition to democracy." Introduced May 20, 2002. Senate ForeignRelations Committee reported May 29, 2002. Senate approved (87-0) June 10, 2002. S.Res. 62 (Lieberman) A resolution expressing the sense of the Senate regarding the human rights situation in Cuba. Introduced and referred to Foreign Relations Committee March 22, 2001. S. 894 (Helms) A bill to authorize increased support to the democratic opposition and other oppressed peopleof Cuba to help them regain their freedom and prepare themselves for a democratic future, and forother purposes. Referred to as the Cuban Solidarity, or Solidaridad, Act of 2001. Introduced andreferred to Foreign Relations Committee May 16, 2001. P.L. 107-67 ( H.R. 2590 / S. 1398 ) Treasury and General Government Appropriations Act, 2002. Introduced and reported( H.Rept. 107-152 ) by the House Committee on Appropriations July 23, 2001. House approved(334-94), amended, July 25, 2001.The Senate Committee on Appropriations reported its version ofthe bill, S. 1398 , on September 4, 2001 ( S.Rept. 107-57 ). On September 19, 2001, theSenate approved its version of H.R. 2590 , amended, which substituted the language of S. 1398 . Conference report ( H.Rept. 107-253 ) filed October 26, 2001. The House andSenate approved the conference on October 31, 2001, and November 1, 2001, respectively. Signedinto law on November 12, 2001. Section 648 (Title VI) of the House version provided that none ofthe funds in the Act could be used to administer or enforce the Cuban Assets Control Regulations(31 CFR, part 515) with respect to any travel or travel-related transaction. This section was addedby H.Amdt. 241 (Flake) that the House approved by a vote of 240-186. Anotheramendment, H.Amdt. 242 (Rangel), that would have prohibited the use of TreasuryDepartment funds to implement or enforce the economic embargo of Cuba, failed by a vote of201-227. The Senate version did not have a provision regarding Cuba travel regulations, and theconference report ( H.Rept. 107-253 ), did not include the Cuba travel provision. P.L. 107-171 ( H.R. 2646 / S. 1731 ) 2002 Farm Bill. H.R. 2646 introduced July 26, 2001. House passed (291-120)October 5, 2001. S. 1731 introduced November 27, 2001; Senate Committee onAgriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry reported the bill ( S.Rept. 107-117 ) on December 7, 2001. Senate passed (58-40) H.R. 2646 on February 13, 2002, after incorporating thelanguage of S. 1731 , as an amendment. Conference report ( H.Rept. 107-424 ) filed May1, 2002. The House and Senate approved the conference report on May 2 and May 8, respectively.Signed into law May 13, 2002. Section 335 of the Senate version would have eliminated restrictionson private financing of agricultural sales to Cuba that were set forth in the Trade Sanctions Reformand Export Enhancement Act of 2000 ( P.L. 106-387 , Title IX). The House version did not have sucha provision, but on April 23, 2002, the House approved (273-143) a nonbinding motion offered byRepresentative Calvin Dooley to instruct the House conferees to accept the Senate provision. Ultimately, however, the financing provision was not included in the conference report. In earlieraction, during consideration of S. 1731 on December 18, 2001, the Senate tabled(61-33) an amendment offered by Senator Bob Smith, S.Amdt. 2596 , that would haveconditioned the lifting of restrictions on private financing of agricultural sales to Cuba on apresidential certification that Cuba is not a state sponsor of international terrorism. A secondaryamendment offered by Senator Torricelli, S.Amdt. 2597 , fell when S.Amdt. 2596 was tabled. The Torricelli amendment would have conditioned the liftingof private financing restrictions on a presidential certification that all convicted felons who are livingas fugitives in Cuba have been returned to the United States for incarceration. P.L. 107-210 , H.R. 3009 Andean Trade Preference Expansion Act. House passed (voice vote) November 16, 2001. Senate passed (66-30) May 23, 2002, after incorporating (voice vote) a manager's amendment(S.Amdt 3401) that included "trade promotion authority" (TPA) legislation. During May 17, 2002Senate consideration of S.Amdt. 3401 , Senator Dorgan offered an amendment, S.Amdt. 3439 , that would permit private financing of agricultural sales to Cuba. Theamendment was identical to the provision that had been included in the Senate version of the FarmBill. Senator Dorgan subsequently withdrew the amendment on May 21, 2002, because hemaintained that some cosponsors did not want to jeopardize the TPA legislation. House approvedconference report ( H.Rept. 107-624 ) July 27, 2002; Senate approved conference August 1, 2002. H.R. 3009 signed into law August 8, 2002. H.R. 5120 (Istook)/ S. 2740 (Dorgan) Treasury and General Government Appropriations Act, 2003. H.R. 5120 introduced July 15, 2002; reported by House Committee on Appropriations ( H.Rept. 107-575 ). Therule for consideration of the bill, H.Res. 488 , was reported by the Rules Committee July17, 2002 ( H.Rept. 107-585 ); House approved the rule July 18, 2002 (224-188). On July 23, theHouse approved three Cuba sanctions amendments that would prohibit funds in the bill from beingused to enforce regulations on travel (Flake, H.Amdt. 552 , by a vote of 262-167),remittances (Flake, H.Amdt. 553 , by a vote of 151-177), and U.S. agricultural sales toCuba (Moran (KS), H.Amdt. 554 , by voice vote); the House also rejected twoamendments to H.R. 5120 that would have prevented any funds in the bill from beingused to enforce the overall economic embargo (Rangel, H.Amdt. 555 , by a vote of204-226) and that would have tied the limitation of funds in the bill for enforcing the travelregulations to certain conditions regarding biological weapons and terrorism (Goss, H.Amdt. 551 , by a vote of 182-247). House passed H.R. 5120 July 24,2002, by a vote of 308-121. S. 2740 introduced July 17, 2002; reported by SenateCommittee on appropriations ( S.Rept. 107-212 ). S. 2740 includes two provision relatedto Cuba travel sanctions. Section 516 provides that no funds may be used to enforce the TreasuryDepartment regulations with respect to any travel or travel-related transactions, but would notprevent the Office of Foreign Assets Controls (OFAC), which administers the sanctions, fromissuing general and specific licenses for travel to Cuba currently allowed by the regulations. Section124 of the Senate bill stipulates that no Treasury Department funds for "Departmental Offices,Salaries, and Expenses" may be used by OFAC, until OFAC has certain procedures in placeregarding license applications for travel to Cuba. Final action on H.R. 5120 was not completedbefore the end of the 107th Congress. H.R. 160 (Ros-Lehtinen) To prohibit the rescheduling or forgiveness of any outstanding bilateral debt owed to theUnited States by the government of the Russian Federation until the President certifies to theCongress that the Government of the Russian Federation has ceased all its operations at, removedall personnel from, and permanently closed the intelligence facility at Lourdes, Cuba. Introducedand referred to International Relations Committee January 3, 2001. H.R. 173 (Serrano) To amend the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act of 2000 to allow forthe financing of agricultural sales to Cuba. Introduced January 3, 2001; referred to Committees onAgriculture, Financial Services, and International Relations. H.R. 174 (Serrano) To lift the trade embargo on Cuba, and for other purposes. Introduced January 3, 2002;referred to Committees on Agriculture, Financial Services, International Relations' GovernmentReform, Energy and Commerce, Judiciary; and Ways and Means. H.R. 796 (Rangel)/ S. 401 (Baucus) To normalize trade relations with Cuba, and for other purposes. H.R. 796 introduced and referred to House Ways and Means Committee February 28, 2001. S.401 introduced and referred to Finance Committee February 27, 2001. H.R. 797 (Rangel)/ S. 402 (Baucus) To make an exception to the United States embargo on trade with Cuba for the export ofagricultural commodities, medicines, medical supplies, medical instruments, or medical equipment,and for other purposes. H.R. 797 introduced and referred to Committees onInternational Relations and Ways and Means February 28, 2001. S.402 introduced and referred toFinance Committee February 27, 2001. H.R. 798 (Rangel)/ S. 400 (Baucus) To lift the trade embargo on Cuba, and for other purposes. H.R. 798 introducedand referred to Committees on Agriculture, Financial Services, Government Reform, Energy andCommerce, Judiciary, and Ways and Means on February 28, 2001. S. 400 introducedand referred to Finance Committee on February 27, 2001. H.R. 2138 (Serrano)/ S. 1017 (Dodd) To provide the people of Cuba with access to food and medicine from the United States, toease restrictions on travel to Cuba, to provide scholarships for certain Cuban nationals, and for otherpurposes. Referred to as the "Bridges to the Cuban People Act of 2001." H.R. 2138 introduced and referred to Committees on Agriculture, Financial Services, International Relations,Judiciary, and Ways and Means June 12, 2001. S. 1017 introduced and referred to theForeign Relations Committee June 12, 2001. On June 19, 2002, the Foreign Relations Committee'sSubcommittee on Western Hemisphere, Peace Corps, and Narcotics Affairs held a hearing on thebill. H.R. 2292 (Rothman) The No Safe Harbor in Cuba Act. To amend the Cuban Liberty and Democratic SolidarityAct of 1996 to require, as a condition for the determination that a democratically elected governmentin Cuba exists, that the government extradite to the United States convicted felon Joanne Chesimardand all other U.S. fugitives from justice. Introduced June 21, 2001; referred to House Committee onInternational Relations. H.R. 2662 (Paul) To lift the trade embargo on Cuba and to prohibit any federal funds to provide assistance toCuba. Introduced July 26, 2001; referred to the Committee on International Relations and in additionto the Committees on Ways and Means, Energy and Commerce, the Judiciary, Financial Services,Government Reform, and Agriculture. H.R. 5022 (Flake) Freedom to Travel to Cuba Act of 2002. Removes restrictions on travel to Cuba. IntroducedJune 26, 2002; referred to Committee on International Relations. H.R. 5616 (Dooley) Provides for the expiration of the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996,known as the Helms-Burton Act, on March 31, 2003. Introduced October 10, 2002; referred toCommittees on International Relations, Ways and Means, Judiciary, and Financial Services. S. 137 (Gramm) To authorize negotiation of free trade agreements with countries of the Americas, and forother purposes. Section 4 outlines restrictions prior to restoration of freedom in Cuba, standards fordetermining restored freedom in Cuba, and establishes priority for negotiating free trade with Cubaonce the President determines that freedom has been restored in Cuba. Introduced and referred toFinance Committee January 22, 2001. S. 171 (Dorgan) To repeal certain travel provisions with respect to Cuba and certain trade sanctions withrespect to Cuba, Iran, Libya, North Korea, and Sudan, and for other purposes. Introduced andreferred to Foreign Relations Committee January 24, 2001. S. 239 (Hagel) To improve access to the Cuban market for American agricultural producers, and for otherpurposes. Introduced and referred to Foreign Relations Committee February 1, 2001. H.R. 26 (Serrano) To waive certain prohibitions with respect to nationals of Cuba coming to the United Statesto play organized professional baseball. Introduced and referred to International Relations andJudiciary Committees January 3, 2001. H.R. 5751 (Meek) Provides the same immigration adjustment rights for Haitians as is provided for Cubans. Introduced November 14, 2002; referred to the Committee on the Judiciary. P.L. 107-115 ( H.R. 2506 ) Foreign Operations Appropriations, FY2002. Introduced and reported by the HouseCommittee on Appropriations July 17, 2001 ( H.Rept. 107-142 ). House passed (381-46) July 24,2001. Senate Committee on Appropriations reported its version September 2, 2001 ( S.Rept. 107-58 ).Senate passed (96-2) October 24, 2001. The Senate version would provide $1.5 million for theDepartment of State and other agencies to establish cooperation with Cuba on counter-narcoticsmatters. Conference report ( H.Rept. 107-345 ) filed December 19, 2001, without the Senate provisionon counter-narcotics cooperation with Cuba. However, the conference report called for a report bythe Secretary of State within 6 months on 1) the extent, if any of the direct involvement of thegovernment of Cuba in illegal drug trafficking; 2) the likelihood that U.S. international narcoticsassistance to the government of Cuba would decrease the flow of drugs transiting through Cuba, and3) the degree to which the government of Cuba is exchanging with U.S. agencies drug-related lawenforcement information. The conference report also encouraged the Administration to transmit toCongress, not later than 9 months, any legislation necessary to decrease the flow of drugs to or fromCuba. House agreed (357-66) to the conference December 19; Senate agreed (unanimous consent)December 20. Signed into law January 10, 2002. (Also see "Human Rights Issues" above for Housereport language on U.S. support for U.S. funding of democracy and human rights funding regardingCuba.) H.R. 5410 (Kolbe)/ S. 2779 (Leahy) Foreign Operations Appropriations FY2003. S. 2779 introduced and reportedby the Senate Committee on Appropriations July 24, 2002 ( S.Rept. 107-219 ). Section 585 of the billprovides that $3 million in International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement assistance shouldbe made available for preliminary work by the Department of State and other entities to establishcooperation with appropriate agencies of the Cuban government on counter-narcotics matters. Themoney would not be available if the President certified (1) that Cuba does not have in placeappropriate procedures to protect against the loss of innocent life in the air and on the ground inconnection with the interdiction of illegal drugs and (2) that there is evidence of involvement of theCuban government in drug trafficking. H.R. 5410 introduced and reported by the HouseCommittee on Appropriations September 19, 2002 ( H.Rept. 107-663 ). Section 581 of the billprovides that none of the funds appropriated for "International Narcotics Control and LawEnforcement" may be made available for assistance to the Cuban government. Final action on H.R.5410 was not completed before the end of the 107th Congress. H.R. 1124 (Rangel) To authorize the Director of the Office of National Drug Control Policy to enter intonegotiations with representatives of the government of Cuba to provide for increased cooperationbetween Cuba and the United States on drug interdiction efforts. Introduced and referred toInternational Relations Committee March 20, 2001. P.L. 107-77 ( H.R. 2500 ) State Department and Related Agencies Appropriations, FY2002. The measure fully fundsthe Administration's request of $24.872 million for broadcasting to Cuba for FY2002. H.R. 2500 reported by the House Committee on Appropriations ( H.Rept. 107-139 ) July13, 2001. House passed (408-19), amended, July 18, 2001. S. 1215 reported by theSenate Committee on Appropriations July 20, 2001 ( S.Rept. 107-42 ). On September 10, 2001, theSenate substituted the language of S. 1215 as its version of H.R. 2500 , andon September 13, 2001 the Senate passed (97-3) the bill, amended. Conference report ( H.Rept.107-278 ) filed November 9, 2001. House agreed to conference (411-15) on November 14, 2001, andthe Senate approved it (98-1) on November 15, 2001. Signed into law November 28, 2001. P.L. 107-228 ( H.R. 1646 ) Foreign Relations Authorization Act, FY2002 and FY2003. H.R. 1646 introduced April 27, 2001; Committee on International Relations reported the bill May 5, 2001( H.Rept. 107-57 ). House passed (352-73) May 16, 2001. In the House version, section 121 wouldauthorize $25 million for broadcasting to Cuba for each fiscal year. The section would also authorize$750,000 for enhancements to and costs of transmission from the facilities in Belize, whichaccording to the bill's report, would increase the capacity of the Office of Cuba Broadcasting toevade jamming by the Cuban government. Section 501 would eliminate staff positions for theAdvisory Board for Cuba Broadcasting. Senate passed, amended, May 1, 2002, with a substituteamendment, the Security Assistance Act of 2002, that did not have Cuba provisions. Conferencereport ( H.Rept. 107-671 ) filed September 23, 2002; Section 121 of the conference report version ofthe bill authorizes $25.923 million for FY2003 for Cuba broadcasting. House agreed to conferencereport by voice vote September 25, 2002; Senate agreed by Unanimous Consent September 26, 2002. Signed into law September 30, 2002. S. 2778 (Hollings) State Department and Related Agencies Appropriations, FY2003. Introduced July 18, 2002;Senate Appropriations Committee reported the measure July 24, 2002 ( S.Rept. 107-218 ). Asreported, the bill would provide $24.996 million for Cuba broadcasting. Final action on the measurewas not taken before the end of the 107th Congress. H.R. 1270 (DeFazio) To increase accountability for government spending and to reduce wasteful governmentspending. Would repeal (1) the Television Broadcasting to Cuba Acts; and (2) the United StatesInternational Broadcasting Act of 1994. Introduced and referred to Committees on Armed Services;Financial Services; International Relations; Energy and Commerce; Resources; Science; Veterans'Affairs; Ways and Means; and Select Committee on Intelligence March 28, 2001; referred tosubcommittees April 24, 2001. CRS Electronic Briefing Book on Trade, Cuba Sanctions , by [author name scrubbed]. http://www.congress.gov/brbk/html/ebtra108.html CRS Electronic Briefing Book on Trade, Economic Sanctions and Agricultural Exports , by RemyJurenas. http://www.congress.gov/brbk/html/ebtra13.html CRS Report RL31302 , Appropriations for FY2003: Treasury, Postal Service, Executive Office ofthe President, and General Government, by [author name scrubbed]. CRS Report RS20450(pdf) , The Case of Elian Gonzalez: Legal Basics, by [author name scrubbed]. CRS Report RL30837, Cuba: An Economic Primer, by [author name scrubbed]. CRS Report RL30628 , Cuba: Issues and Legislation in the 106th Congress , by [author name scrubbed] and[author name scrubbed]. CRS Report RL31139 , Cuba: U.S. Restrictions on Travel and Legislative Initiatives, by Mark P.Sullivan. CRS Report RL30386(pdf) , Cuba-U.S. Relations: Chronology of Key Events 1959 -1999, by Mark P.Sullivan. CRS Report 94-759(pdf) , Cuba-U.S. Relations: Should the United States Reexamine Its Policy? , by MarkP. Sullivan. CRS Report RS20468 , Cuban Migration Policy and Issues, by [author name scrubbed]. CRS Report RL30384 , Economic Sanctions: Legislation in the 106th Congress, by Dianne E.Rennack. CRS Report 97-949(pdf) , Economic Sanctions to Achieve U.S. Foreign Policy Goals: Discussion andGuide to Current Law, by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed]. CRS Report RL30570, Elian Gonzalez: Chronology and Issues, by [author name scrubbed]. CRS Issue Brief IB10061, Exempting Food and Agriculture Products from U.S. EconomicSanctions: Status and Implementation, by [author name scrubbed]. CRS Issue Brief IB93107, Normal-Trade-Relations (Most-Favored-Nation) Policy of the UnitedStates, by [author name scrubbed]. CRS Report RS20449, Private Bills for Citizenship or Permanent Residency: A Brief Overview, by[author name scrubbed]. CRS Report 94-636(pdf) , Radio and Television Broadcasting to Cuba: Background and Issues Through1994, by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed]. CRS Report RL31258 , Suits Against Terrorist States , by [author name scrubbed]. CRS Report RS21003, Travel Restrictions: U.S. Government Limits on American Citizens' TravelAbroad , by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed].

Summary: Cuba remains a hard-line Communist state, with a poor record on human rights. Fidel Castrohas ruled since he led the Cuban Revolution, ousting the corrupt government of Fulgencio Batistafrom power in 1959. With the cutoff of assistance from the former Soviet Union, Cuba experiencedsevere economic deterioration from 1989 to 1993. There has been some improvement since 1994as Cuba has implemented limited reforms. Since the early 1960s, U.S. policy toward Cuba has consisted largely of isolating the islandnation through comprehensive economic sanctions. The Bush Administration has essentiallycontinued this policy. The principal tool of policy remains comprehensive sanctions, which weremade stronger with the Cuban Democracy Act (CDA) in 1992 and the Cuban Liberty andDemocratic Solidarity Act in 1996, often referred to as the Helms/Burton legislation. Anothercomponent of U.S. policy consists of support measures for the Cuban people, including privatehumanitarian donations and U.S.-sponsored radio and television broadcasting to Cuba. In May 2002,President Bush announced a new initiative that includes several measures designed to reach out tothe Cuban people. There appears to be broad agreement on the overall objective of U.S. policy toward Cuba --to help bring democracy and respect for human rights to the island. But there are several schools ofthought on how to achieve that objective. Some advocate a policy of keeping maximum pressureon the Cuban government until reforms are enacted, while continuing current U.S. efforts to supportthe Cuban people. Others argue for an approach, sometimes referred to as constructive engagement,that would lift some U.S. sanctions that they believe are hurting the Cuban people, and move towardengaging Cuba in dialogue. Still others call for a swift normalization of U.S.-Cuban relations bylifting the U.S. embargo. Policy debate in the past several years has focused on whether to maintainU.S. restrictions on food and medical exports as well as on travel to Cuba. Legislative initiatives introduced in the 107th Congress reflected these divergent views on thedirection of U.S. policy toward Cuba and also covered a range of issues including human rights, foodand medical exports, travel restrictions, drug interdiction cooperation, and broadcasting to Cuba.Many of these will likely be introduced in the 108th Congress. In the second session of the 107thCongress, the House version of the FY2003 Treasury Department appropriations bill, H.R. 5120 , included three Cuba provisions that would have eased restrictions on travel,remittances, and U.S. agricultural sales to Cuba; the Senate version of the bill, S. 2740 ,as reported out of committee, would have eased restrictions on travel to Cuba. Final action on themeasure was not completed before the end of the 107th Congress; the 108th Congress will face earlyaction on these and other appropriations measures with Cuba provisions. This report will not be updated. It reflects legislative action through the end of the 107thCongress.