By all accounts, the U.S. military dominates state-on-state conflict. The United States has notfaced a true peer military competitor since the Soviet Union disintegrated. Recent conflicts, such asPanama, Libya, Iraq (Desert Storm) Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq (Iraqi Freedom) illustratethat U.S. armed forces have proven very effective at achieving classic military objectives againstother countries' armed forces in a variety of circumstances. Achieving politically significant militaryobjectives against non-state actors, including terrorists and insurgents, has proven moredifficult. (1) In the past, combating non-state actors was seen by many to be a "lesser included case."Non-state actors appeared to be less threatening to national security than the well funded, wellorganized, and much more militarily potent armed forces of an enemy nation-state. If, for example,the U.S. military was deemed adequate to deter or defeat the Soviet military, then it was also deemedadequate to combat non-state actors. The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 graphically illustrate, however, that small groupsof non-state actors can exploit relatively inexpensive and commercially available technology toconduct very destructive attacks over great distances. Few observers today consider non-state actorsto be a "lesser included case." Increasingly it is recognized that in many cases, combating non-stateactors presents a different -- and in many cases greater -- set of challenges than combating aconventional military foe. Senior decision makers have a number of tools at their disposal to attempt to find, identify,track, capture, neutralize, or kill terrorists and other non-state actors. A survey of recentanti-terrorism efforts indicates, that military aviation plays a prominent role in performing thesetasks. The issues for Congress include whether U.S. military aviation forces are appropriatelyfunded, trained, equipped, employed and organized to effectively combat non-state actors. As the Department of Defense (DOD) endeavors to revamp itself for the different demandsof the war in Iraq and the "global war on terror", (GWOT) friction will likely ensue over funding.Will the military services divert funding from major weapons programs such as combat aircraft andaircraft carriers to fund more terrorism-relevant technologies? Or will major programs continue asplanned, or be given additional funding to increase their abilities against non-state actors? The next section provides background on terrorism and non-state actor challenges, and howmilitary aviation may contribute to operations against these actors. The following section willaddress issues associated with the use of military aviation against non-state actors, and potentialoptions for consideration. The U.S. armed forces that are fielded today were organized, trained and equipped principallywith conventional, state-on-state warfare in mind. Senior leaders in the Department of Defense(DOD) appear to appreciate the distinct challenges that combating non-state actors present, however,and are taking steps to ensure that these challenges are reflected in long-term military plans,programs, and policies. In the spring of 2004, DOD's 2006 Strategic Planning Guidance found that the U.S. is wellpositioned to deal with a conventional military adversary. Increasingly, however, the U.S. may finditself facing non-conventional foes, for which it is not well prepared. (2) Further, it has been reportedthat DOD leadership has instructed regional combatant commanders to "develop and maintain newwar plans designed to reduce the chance of postwar instability like the situation in Iraq." (3) Based on these plans, somepredicted that the 2005 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) "could upend U.S. military procurementplans as Pentagon officials shift their focus from waging conventional warfare to developing newways to counter catastrophic, disruptive and irregular threats -- in a word, terrorism." (4) U.S. military forces may be employed against a country that sponsors terrorism or thatharbors terrorists. It is generally agreed that conventional U.S. military forces are adequately trainedand equipped to meet the challenge of defeating conventional forces of states that sponsor terrorism. The focus of this report is on a number of challenges associated with uses of military aviation incombating terrorists and other non-state actors directly. These challenges can be divided into threecategories: operational challenges, mindset challenges, and cost challenges. Operational challenges. Compared to thearmed forces of a nation state, non-state actors are easy to defeat in direct combat. Non-state actorstypically lack the equipment, training and discipline that define a military service. Actually engagingin direct combat with non-state actors is the core operational challenge. Non-state actors typicallydon't wear uniforms. Indeed, they generally strive to integrate themselves into the local civilianpopulation. Thus, target identification is very challenging. Non-state actors rarely mass into easilyrecognizable formations. They typically lack large infrastructure or obvious logistics processes.Therefore, non-state actors present few "high value" targets for U.S. forces. This challenge has notbeen lost on DOD leadership. For example: For many years, though, there's been a concern thatintelligence collection capability basically rested in the ability to find a tank or an artillery piecehiding in a grove of trees. The problem now becomes how to find individuals hiding in groups ofpeople...This presents a huge problem for us. (6) The leadership and structure of non-state organizations, such as Al Qaeda, are opaque. Suchorganizations might be diffuse and operate over long distances. Al Qaeda, for example, oftenoperates through partner organizations which might be small and have fluid leadership. One DODleader has said "When we kill or capture one of these leaders, another one steps in and quickly takestheir place." (7) Therefore,even characterizing the non-state actor target can be difficult for military planners. Once identified, non-state actors are often difficult to engage due to concerns over collateraldamage. Even conventional state-on-state conflict presents collateral damage concerns. When oneparty is actively trying to shield itself behind non-combatants, however, delivering weapons effectswith extreme precision takes on increased importance. A RAND study summed up the operationalchallenges: ...ferreting out individuals or small groups of terrorists,positively identifying them, and engaging them without harming nearby civilians is an extremelydemanding task. Substantial improvements will be needed in several areas before the Air Force canbe confident of being able to provide this capability to combatant commanders. (8) Mindset Challenges. Successfully combatingnon-state actors will likely require different training, tactics, doctrine, political strategies, andpotentially rules of engagement, than are optimal for conventional military warfare. Collectively,these changes may combine to require a different politico-military mindset for senior decisionmakers. The U.S. military, policy makers and the general population, desire short conflicts, with clearsuccess criteria, exit strategies, and decisive victories. In a conventional setting, "victory" typicallyentailed an adversary's unconditional surrender. But non-state actors may define victory as notlosing; their continued existence is a victory. This mindset characterizes several Palestinian terroristgroups that fought Israel's occupation of Palestinian territories. In most cases, they themselvescannot achieve rapid, decisive victory, so they follow a strategy of protracted war. According to onescholar "...insurgent, terrorist and criminal organizations consciously design themselves so that ourmilitary and police forces cannot rapidly and decisively defeat them." (9) Others note that "even dyingfor their cause intentionally or voluntarily is perceived as a victory (for terrorists). It's a differentparadigm than the traditional military concern for limiting casualties." (10) This is characteristic ofgroups such as Hamas and Al Qaeda that employ suicide tactics. The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 may require, and may have already initiated, achange in mindset regarding what level of threat should trigger U.S. military action. Fear thatterrorists or other non-state actors, may acquire a weapon of mass destruction (a nuclear, biologicalor chemical weapon) has engendered debate on pre-emptive or preventative employment of U.S.armed forces. While many would support a pre-emptive attack to obviate an imminent attack on U.S.interests, the definition of what qualifies as "imminent" is highly debatable. (11) Further, preventinginsurgent victory over a friendly government may not be enough to prevent this threat. Instead, theUnited States will likely desire to prevent non-state actors from taking over large portions ofnation-states because these territories could be used to train terrorists and initiate attacks at globaldistances. The recent reported discovery of an insurgent chemical weapons lab in Fallujah, Iraq,exemplifies this threat. In a conventional warfare setting, armed forces typically attempt to avoid civilians or shieldthem from the war's consequences. When combating non-state actors, however, civilians may needto be engaged at an unprecedented level. Winning the "hearts and minds" of the local population, orat least not alienating them could become a large part of the overall counter insurgent, or counterterrorist strategy. Terrorists and insurgents require at least tacit, if not active, support from the local populationto operate effectively. In the words of one British general responsible for counter-insurgencyoperations "The shooting side of the business is only 25 percent of the trouble. The other 75 percentis getting the people of this country behind us." (12) However, the military activities at which today's armed forcesexcel, such as precisely destroying buildings or vehicles, may work counter to this "hearts andminds" strategy. According to one study "counter terrorist military attacks against elusive terroristsmay serve only to radicalize large sectors of the (Muslim) population and damage the U.S. imageworldwide." (13) Cost Challenges. Almost by definition, non-stateactors employ weapons and methods that are inexpensive, when compared to training, equipping andemploying a military force. However, the cost to defend against non-state actors, or to combat them,can be high. For example, terrorists can acquire man-portable, air defense systems (MANPADS) foras little as $5,000. If a terrorist succeeded in shooting down a commercial airliner with thisshoulder-fired missile, the immediate cost of losing the airplane would be over $100 million, andthe indirect costs much higher. Further, fielding technologies on commercial aircraft to defendagainst this threat could cost the United States $10 billion in acquisition costs alone. (14) Identifying and fieldingsystems and methods that can combat terrorists cost effectively will likely be an important challengeto overcome. Given the right context, virtually every military aviation asset or activity can be used tocombat non-state actors. Yet, some are more directly applicable than others. Close Air Support (CAS). Close air support(CAS) is a military aviation mission that appears highly relevant to the non-state actor challenge.DOD defines CAS as "Air action by fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft against hostile targets that arein close proximity to friendly forces and that require detailed integration of each air mission with thefire and movement of those forces." (15) Many of the functions inherent in CAS, such as tracking enemy forces, differentiatingfriendly forces from foes, quickly delivering weapons against moving targets, and closely controllingand coordinating air and ground forces to reduce the chances of fratricide or collateral damage, areapplicable to air-actions against non-state actors. Therefore, assessing how the CAS mission isevolving, what key challenges are inherent in the mission, and how these challenges are currentlybeing addressed should provide a useful framework for assessing how military aviation may beapplied against non-state actors. CAS is a mission that many believe has been historically neglected in favor of moreglamorous missions, such as air-to-air combat. According to the leader of DOD's Joint Close AirSupport Joint Test Team, "Close air support is 'not a mission of primary emphasis' for the Air Force,and the Army treats it largely as an 'afterthought' not a primary objective." (16) Recent activity withinDOD however, suggests that CAS is receiving increased attention, and that it is a growing missionarea. This may be due to changes in the nature of adversaries, the emergence of new technologies,and evolving airpower strategy. (17) Operation Desert Storm , the 1991 war with Iraq, can be considered a traditional state-on-stateconflict. The airpower strategy during this war has been subsequently described as one of "shock andawe." Military aviation conducted a 38-day air campaign against Iraq's "strategic targets" includingair defenses, power grid, roads, bridges, and political and military command, control andcommunications (C 3 ). The ground campaign followed this initial air attack. CAS accounted for 8%of all combat sorties flown during Operation Desert Storm. (18) Operation Allied Force , the 1999 NATO airstrikes against Serbian military, police andpara-military forces engaged in ethnic violence in Kosovo, was a less traditional conflict. No NATOground forces were employed in the conflict, and CAS missions supporting friendly forcesaccounted for 26% of the 21,111 combat sorties flown; a much higher percentage than in Iraq. (19) Although DOD has not released official figures on sorties flown during Operation EnduringFreedom (the war in Afghanistan), the effectiveness and ubiquity of CAS missions against Talibanand Al Qaeda forces was widely reported in the press. (20) Particularly noteworthy was how CAS was conducted during thisconflict. Contrary to the typical method of flying tactical aircraft such as the A-10, F-16 or AC-130at low altitude, the Air Force attacked numerous Taliban and Al Qaeda forces, which were operatingin close proximity to U.S. and allied ground forces, from high altitude, using long-range bombersand precision guided munitions (PGMs). Operation Iraqi Freedom witnessed another leap in the relative number of CAS sortiesflown. By the declared end of state-on-state hostilities in May 2003, 79% of all combat sorties wereCAS sorties; almost 10 times the ratio of CAS to non-CAS combat sorties flown in 1991. (21) Many believe that thisheavy reliance on CAS was planned. U.S. ground forces advanced through Iraq quickly becausemilitary aviation replaced, to a great degree, the fire support normally supplied by heavyartillery. (22) Many have praised the apparent increase in DOD's attention to CAS, and the successeswitnessed in recent operations against both state, and non-state actors. The contemporaryprosecution of CAS missions has revealed, however, shortcomings that have resulted in fratricideand slow responses to ground forces' requests for fire. Many have attributed these shortcomings toa lack of training, a lack of appropriate personnel, or sub-optimal adherence to operational processes.Equipment shortcomings may also be to blame. (23) Special Operations Forces (SOF) Germane to AirOperations. U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF) are small military units withspecial training and equipment. Specialized training may include, for example, foreign languages,psychological operations, advanced piloting skills, and terminal air control. Specialized equipmentincludes, for example, MH-53J/M Pave Low helicopters and MC-130E/H Combat Talon I/II aircraft.SOF forces are found in all four military services, and number approximately 40,000 soldiers,sailors, airmen, and marines. (24) SOF can take both direct and indirect action against non-state actors. Direct SOFaviation-related action can include collecting intelligence, clandestinely inserting forces in closeproximity to non-state actors, rescuing SOF and other forces pursued by, or held by non-state actors.SOF can also capture "high value" terrorists. One heavily reported SOF activity against non-stateactors is the terminal control of strike aircraft. In Operation Enduring Freedom , SOF forces usedtheir infiltration and language skills to work closely with friendly Afghan forces in opposition to theTaliban prior to the initial airstrikes. Once in position, SOF forces scouted enemy positions andprovided precise coordinates for CAS aircraft to effectively attack the Taliban and Al Qaeda. Whileconventional military tactical air controllers were capable of controlling CAS aircraft, only SOFforces had the ability to do so clandestinely and without the support of large ground forces. Aviation-Foreign Internal Defense (A-FID). Special Operations Forces can also take indirect action against non-state actors. A prominentindirect activity is advising friendly foreign governments in foreign internal defense (FID). FID isone of the primary SOF missions designated by the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act, which created theU.S. Special Operations Command. (25) DOD defines FID as "Participation by civilian and militaryagencies of a government in any of the action programs taken by another government or otherdesignated organization to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, andinsurgency." (26) According to the Air Force Special Operations Command: The aviation aspect of FID (aviation-FID, or A-FID)is essentially one of training and advising foreign aviation forces in the sustained use of airpowersupporting their own internal defense and development strategies. Aviation-FID is employed as acomplement to other SOF component operations within various theaters of operation and includessuch activities as support for counterinsurgency, counter narcotics, antiterrorism, and counterpoaching. (27) The Air Force's 6th Special Operations Squadron (6SOS) is the sole DOD organization taskedwith performing A-FID. The 6SOS was created in 1994, and currently is composed of 110 Air Forcepersonnel. The 6SOS is based at Hurlburt Field, FL. Its budget for both FY2004 and FY2005 was$5.6 million The FY2006 budget request was $5.4 million. Since September 11, 2001, the 6SOS hasadvised 26 different foreign countries in how to better use airpower against terrorists, insurgents andother non-state actors. (28) The 6SOS does not perform basic pilot training. Instead it attempts to convey specific combatand combat support skills that are most relevant to FID. Examples of combat skills include, forexample, night flying, use of gunships, air/ground coordination, calling for fire support, medicalevacuation, air assault, and insertion/extraction. Examples of assistance in the aviation supportincludes aviation maintenance; ground safety; survival, evasion, resistance, and escape (SERE); airbase defense; and command, control and communications (C 3 ). (29) An important byproduct of the A-FID mission is potential support to U.S. combatantcommanders. A-FID advisors facilitate the safe and effective integration of foreign air forces intopotential coalition operations by bringing those air forces closer to U.S. standards, providing to theU.S. commanders a clear understanding of the foreign air force's capabilities and limitations, and byestablishing key personal relationships within the foreign air force's leadership and flight personnel. The use of air assets against suspected terrorist or insurgent leaders has gained publicprominence since the September 11, 2001 attacks on the United States, although their use did notnecessarily originate with September 11 or with the United States. Since the September 11 attacks,U.S. forces appear to be making increased use of air power in anti-terrorist missions. U.S. forceshave conducted several successful strikes on senior figures or allies of the Al Qaeda organization. On the other hand, the effectiveness of air-power in an anti-terrorism, anti-insurgent missionis not unquestioned, and it is difficult to compare the effect of air strikes in comparison to otheranti-terrorist methods. For example, several senior Al Qaeda operatives have not been killed in U.S.air strikes but have instead been captured in police or intelligence operations by allied lawenforcement services. The most prominent of such captures was the arrest of senior Al Qaedaoperative Khalid Shaykh Mohammad by Pakistani officers, reportedly working with U.S.intelligence, in March 2003. Some might argue that the arrest of Khalid Shaykh -- the organization'smost senior terrorist planner and the reputed architect of the September 11 attacks -- damaged AlQaeda's operating ability more than any air strike against any other Al Qaeda leader. Another senioroperative, reputed to be Khalid Shayk's replacement, Abu Faraj al-Libi, was captured in a small town(Mardan) about 70 miles northwest of Pakistan's capital, Islamabad, in March 2005. Other Al Qaedafighters and operatives were reportedly captured in U.S. ground operations in Afghanistan. Anexample is a son of the Egyptian cleric Umar Abd al-Rahman, convicted of terrorist plots related tothe 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center. The son, Ahmed Abd al-Rahman, reportedly waskilled fighting alongside Taliban forces in a battle against U.S. troops in November 2001 during themajor combat phase of Operation Enduring Freedom. (30) Another major question is to what to attribute the success of any given anti-terrorist airoperation. The success of air strikes on terrorist leaders and groups appears to depend, in largemeasure, on the development and timely exploitation of precise intelligence on the location andmovements of these individuals. As noted in the examples below, those strikes that have beensuccessful have generally been characterized by the acquisition of precise, actionable intelligenceon a terrorist individual's whereabouts. A broader question is whether or not a successful attack on an individual terrorist leader --whether by air power or any other means -- contributes to the overarching goal of reducing terroristoperations by the targeted group. That broader question is significant, but difficult to measure. Aterrorist organization's effectiveness might be reduced by many different variables -- a reduction inpopular commitment to its cause; deaths of its leaders due to other causes, including arrests ornatural causes; splits within the organization; economic improvement in the areas where the groupoperates; the availability of senior operatives to replace those killed; and an almost infinite numberof other variables. It could be argued that, if other variables remain constant, the effect of a targetedstrike on an individual terrorist or insurgent group appears to depend, in some measure, on thebreadth of a terrorist/insurgent organization's leadership and the capabilities of its less senioroperatives. Some experts say that ethnic or territorial based groups are somewhat more resilient tothe deaths of key leaders than are ideology-based organizations. (31) Another argument is thatsome U.S. strikes cause collateral damage, causing some civilians to resent U.S. operations andperhaps give aid and comfort to the terrorist or insurgent organizations. The following represent specific U.S. or allied country use of air power in anti-terrorist oranti-insurgent missions, and analysis of the effect of those strikes on the group to which the targetindividual belonged: One of the first uses of U.S. air power in an anti-terrorism mission was theApril 1980 attempt to rescue the U.S. diplomats and other Americans held hostage by therevolutionary government in Iran. (32) The mission involved six fuel and equipment-carrying C-130aircraft meeting up with eight carrier-launched Sea Stallion helicopters at a remote Iranian desertlanding strip called "Desert One." The plan was for the helicopters to fly U.S. commandos toTehran, where they would raid facilities holding the U.S. hostages, free them, and return to DesertOne for evacuation. However, three Sea Stallions developed mechanical problems at Desert One- possibly due to the intake of sand into the engines - and the mission was aborted there, beforeflying to Tehran. The hasty abortion of the mission in the Iranian desert resulted in a collisionamong aircraft that killed eight U.S. military personnel. No hostages were rescued. The failure ofthe mission caused the Joint Chiefs of Staff and other Defense Department and government organsto assign a higher priority to the study and implementation of unconventional warfare and thestrengthening of special operations forces spanning all U.S. military services. Another early use of U.S. use of air-power in an anti-terrorism mission -- nota targeted strike on a terrorist leader but an anti-terrorism operation nonetheless -- came in October1985 in connection with the hijacking of the cruise ship Achille Lauro by gunmen of the PalestineLiberation Front (PLF), headed by Abu Abbas (aka Mohammad Zaydun). The two-day hijacking,in which the PLF terrorists killed 69-year old disabled American passenger Leon Klinghoffer, endedwith the four PLF hijackers ending the seizure in Egypt, in exchange for safe passage. U.S. NavyF-14 aircraft intercepted an Egypt Air 737 airliner, on which the hijackers and Abbas were flying toTunisia. The U.S. aircraft forced the Egypt Air plane to land in Italy, where the terrorists were takeninto custody by Italian authorities. (Abbas was released by Italian authorities due to lack of evidence,but in 1986 he was tried in absentia in Italy, convicted, and sentenced to life imprisonment. He laterthrew his support behind Israeli-Palestinian negotiations and lived out his life mostly in Baghdad,where he was captured by U.S. invasion forces in April 2003. While in U.S. custody, he died,ostensibly of natural causes in March 2004.) In probably the most widely noted air strike connected with the September 11attacks, in November 2001 an armed U.S. "Predator" drone, supplemented by U.S. combat aircraft,killed Mohammad Atef, the number three leader of Al Qaeda behind Osama bin Laden and Aymanal-Zawahiri. His location was pinpointed when a Taliban defector told U.S. special forces inAfghanistan where he would be, (33) and the site was surveyed by the circling Predator immediatelybefore and after the strike. (34) Atef's death almost certainly represented a blow to the Al Qaedaleadership structure - he had been associated with bin Laden for the prior ten years, his daughtermarried bin Laden's son in early 2001, and Atef was allegedly responsible for planning anti-U.S.operations in Somalia in 1993 and possibly the two bombings of U.S. embassies in Kenya andTanzania in August 1998. However, it is difficult to fix precisely the degradation in Al Qaeda'scapabilities that resulted from Atef's death, in comparison with the other U.S. and allied operationsagainst Al Qaeda and with other factors, such as the loss of Afghanistan as a base of operations. In another major use of air power, U.S. warplanes dropping targeted munitionskilled an Al Qaeda ally near the northern Afghan city of Konduz in late November 2001. JumaNamangani, military leader of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), was widely regarded asan organization allied to Al Qaeda and most active in Central Asia. In this case, U.S. forcesapparently were targeting Taliban fighters in that battle generally, and might not necessarily havebeen targeting Namangani specifically. (35) Most experts appear to agree that Namangani's death set backIMU operations significantly,and it is only now, three years later, that the group is beginning toresume operations inside Uzbekistan. (36) The surviving co-founder of the group, Tahir Yuldashev, isconsidered more a political philosopher than a militia commander or operational planner, and bymost accounts he has had difficulty keeping the IMU cohesive and active following Namangani'sdeath. On November 3, 2002, an armed U.S. Predator drone killed Al Qaeda's leaderin Yemen, Ali Qaed Sinan al-Harithi, and five other Al Qaeda suspects driving with him in a car. Harithi was a key suspect in the October 2002 bombing of the U.S.S. Cole in Aden harbor. Thegovernment of Yemen virtually admitted that it had provided information on Harithi's movementsthrough the Yemeni desert to U.S. intelligence, enabling the successful Predator targeting andstrike. (37) The effect ofthe strike on Al Qaeda as a whole is difficult to quantify, but Al Qaeda operations in Yemenapparently have diminished significantly since Harithi's death. (Another suspected Cole plotter, anAl Qaeda operative for the Persian Gulf region, Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri, was subsequently arrestedby the United Arab Emirates and turned over to U.S. custody.) An armed Predator drone, assisted by precise, actionable intelligence acquiredon the ground, appeared to succeed again in a June 2004 strike on a pro-Al Qaeda Pakistani militant,Nek Mohammad. His location was reportedly pinpointed based on information obtained byPakistani military officers operating in the South Waziristan area of Pakistan where Nek Mohammadwas killed. (38) The strikeon Nek Mohammad came about three months after he reportedly helped some top Al Qaedaoperatives escape a Pakistani sweep operation in South Waziristan. Nek Mohammad's death did notlead to the subsequent capture of any high value Al Qaeda suspects that are believed to be operatingin the South Waziristan area, suggesting that his death did not necessarily diminish the infrastructureavailable to hide or support Al Qaeda suspects in that region. In one of the most highly publicized uses of the Predator to conduct a targetedstrike, on January 13, 2006, U.S. authorities launched Predator-based missiles at a compound inDamadola, northwest Pakistan, in an attempt to kill bin Laden's top associate, Ayman al-Zawahiri. U.S. officials have acknowledged he was the target, and that the strike was based on intelligence thathe would be attending a dinner in the compound at that time. After several days, Pakistaniauthorities said that four or five Al Qaeda figures were hit in the strike, based on their intelligencefrom villagers, including Al Qaeda's top chemical weaponry expert (Abu Khabab al-Masri);Zawahiri's son-in-law; and at least two other Egyptian Al Qaeda figures responsible for operationsin Afghanistan. (39) Zawahiri has not appeared in a contemporaneous audio or video tape since (he did appear in anapparently re-released video), but most press accounts quoting Pakistani and U.S. intelligence sayZawahiri did not attend the event and was not hit. However, at least a dozen non-combatants werekilled in the strike and it provoked several days of protests in Pakistan against the United States andits policies. On January 23, 2006, Pakistan's Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz said Pakistan was notinformed in advance of the strike and condemned it, although numerous press accounts said that theintelligence for the strike was provided, at least in part, by Pakistani intelligence. The air strikes discussed above generally depended on the acquisition of precise intelligencefrom sources -- mostly allied intelligence and military forces -- on the ground. In key cases, strikeswere not conducted by air power because timely, actionable intelligence was not available. According to press accounts, about a year before the September 11 attacks, Predator drones -- at thetime unarmed -- sighted Al Qaeda training camps and figures that could have included bin Ladenhimself. Air assets -- warplanes and cruise missiles -- were not in position to strike quickly enough,and no strike was ordered. (40) An airstrike against Al Qaeda camps in Afghanistan in August1998 -- about two weeks after the twin bombings of U.S. embassies in East Africa -- reportedlymissed bin Laden by several hours. Similarly, prior to the March 2003 launch of Operation IraqiFreedom to oust Saddam Hussein, there was discussion within the Bush Administration of the campin northern Iraq run by pro-al Qaeda militant Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. No strike was ordered, in largepart because, according to some who participated in the deliberations, "Because there was never anyreal-time, actionable intelligence that placed Zarqawi at Khurmal [northern Iraq], action takenagainst the facility would have been ineffective." (41) Since the 2003 war began, Zarqawi has gone on to become amajor leader of the anti-U.S. insurgency in Iraq, and several U.S. air strikes and raids on suspectedZarqawi headquarters have not led to his death or capture. Bin Laden, as is widely known, remainsat large and appeared in a video released a few days after the January 13, 2006 strike targetingZawahiri, discussed above. The use of air power against terrorist leaders is a relatively recent (post-September 11)development, but U.S. planners are reportedly building on the experiences of at least one U.S. ally,Israel, that has used this method for many years. As analyzed below, the effects of Israel's use of airpower against militants -- even when its strikes have struck the intended targets -- have producedmixed outcomes: In February 1992, Israel used a Hellfire missile launched from an AH-64("Apache") helicopter to kill then leader of Lebanese Hizballah, Abbas Musawi, as he drove in amotorcade through south Lebanon. Hizballah, a Shiite Islamist militia backed by Iran and Syria, hadbecome the most active opponent of Israel's military presence in south Lebanon, which began withIsrael's invasion of Lebanon in 1982 and ended with Israel's unilateral withdrawal in May 2000. Itwas believed responsible for the October 1983 bombing of the U.S. Marine barracks in Beirut, aswell as the holding of U.S. civilian hostages in Lebanon during 1984-1991, and is classified as aterrorist organization by the United States. However, the killing of Abbas Musawi did not materiallydiminish Hizballah's capabilities and the strike on him apparently provoked significant retaliationin the March 1992 bombing, allegedly by Hizballah, of Israel's embassy in Buenos Aires. A U.S.report on terrorism (State Department, "Patterns of Global Terrorism: 2003") states that Hizballahwas behind the July 1994 bombing of an Argentine-Jewish cultural center in Buenos Aires, whichkilled 86 persons. In early 2004, Israeli helicopters fired missiles and killed two major leaders ofHamas, the most active of the Palestinian groups opposed to Israel's occupation of Palestinianterritory. Hamas is a Palestinian Islamist movement that has claimed responsibility for many of thesuicide bombings against Israeli civilian and military targets that have taken place over the pastdecade. The two Hamas leaders killed in early 2004 were Shaykh Ahmad Yassin - the physicallydisabled founder and spiritual leader of Hamas (killed March 22, 2004); and Abd al-Aziz al-Rantisi,the political leader of Hamas appointed after Yassin's death (killed April 17, 2004). A lower-levelHamas operative, Adnan Ghoul, was killed by an armed Israeli drone on October 21, 2004; hereputedly oversaw the manufacture of rockets and other weapons that Hamas uses againstIsrael. (42) The effect ofthese strikes on Hamas is not precisely known, but Hamas is a relatively large organization ("Patterns2003" says it has "tens of thousands of supporters and sympathizers") and new leaders (KhalidMishal, Musa Abu Marzuq, Mahmoud Zohar) have been readily available to assume the places ofthose killed. Although Hamas suicide bombings against Israelis appear to have diminished during2004, many attribute that observation not to Israel's targeted killings but to a fence structure Israelhas been building, which makes it difficult for Hamas and other militants to cross from the occupiedterritories into Israel proper. Although Hamas' institutional capabilities apparently have not beencrippled by these targeted strikes, neither did the strikes produce large sustained popular Palestinianunrest against Israel. One of Israel's early uses of targeted killing incorporated air power in a supportrole. In April 1988, an Israeli commando team conducted a sea-borne raid on a Tunis beachfrontvilla inhabited by a senior PLO military commander, Khalil Wazir (Abu Jihad). He was killed inthe raid. According to detailed published accounts of the operation, (43) two Boeing 707s outfittedwith advanced electronic gear flew overhead during the raid to conduct "electronic warfare" and tokeep the commando team in communication with the Israeli Defense Ministry in Tel Aviv. OtherIsraeli aircraft protected the Israeli sea craft during the four day voyage to Tunis and then back. Inaddition, Israeli helicopters were aboard a larger ship off the Tunisian coast to assist the raiding partyif need be; they reportedly were not used. The implications of the operation against Khalil Wazirare a matter of speculation. Some might argue that, at the time of this killing, the PLO was alreadyundergoing a reassessment that would lead PLO leader Yasir Arafat, in December 1988, to renounceterrorism and recognize Israel's right to exist - a shift that led, five years later, to mutual recognitionbetween the PLO and Israel and to negotiations to resolve their outstanding conflicts. Some mightargue that Arafat was shaken by Israel's ability to strike the senior PLO leadership in an operationso far from Israel's borders, and that the raid might have prompted Arafat to more quickly abandonthe PLO's use of terrorism and opposition to negotiations with Israel. Others believe that KhalilWazir was a highly energetic and effective PLO commander who, had he not been assassinated,could have forestalled or prevented the rise of more militant challengers to the PLO, such as Hamasand Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ). Israel used air power to significant effect in its July 1976 operation to free over100 civilians (passengers aboard Air France flight 139 from Athens to Paris, originating in Tel Aviv)hijacked and held hostage at Entebbe air field in Uganda. (44) This was not an operation against a specific terrorist leader orgroup, although the hijackers allegedly had the backing of Ugandan leader Idi Amin, a supporter ofthe Palestinian position in the Arab-Israeli dispute. The essential ingredient of the successful Israelirescue force was the C-130 "Hercules," which carried the raiding party and its equipment, includingjeeps and troop carriers, the 2,500 miles from Israel to the Entebbe airfield. The aircraft carriedenough equipment to enable Israeli commandos to prevail in the 90-minute battle with the hijackersand Ugandan security forces. There is a consensus view in defense circles that airpower is one of the United States' greatmilitary advantages. Some are increasingly concerned, however, that military aviation is focused toomuch on the demands of fighting conventional foes to the detriment of irregular warfare, and that"the challenge for the Air Force is to re-shape its forces to increase their relevance in small wars,while maintaining the capability to win major conflicts." (45) Some argue that DOD's overall acquisition priorities are still too oriented toward large, "hightech" acquisition programs most applicable to fighting or deterring a peer competitor in state-on-stateconflict. Within aviation, systems might include advanced fighter aircraft or highly specializedaircraft such as radar jammers. Others argue that these kind of platforms are still required forstate-on-state conflict, despite U.S. preeminence in this area, and that new concepts of operation,new organizational schema, or technology upgrades may increase these systems' applicability tonon-state actor challenges. In a worst case scenario, this under-focus on employing airpower against non-state actors isnot a conscious decision, but caused by a fundamental shortfall in airpower training, doctrine,planning, and strategy. As a point of reference, the Air Force's primary doctrine document guidingactions against non-state actors contains less than two pages on combating terrorism. (46) Certain events in the recent Iraq war lend some traction to the argument that many in DODlack a clear understanding of how airpower can contribute to irregular warfare. For example: soon after the Army's 3rd Infantry Division capturedBaghdad, the division released its Air Force air support operations squadron to redeploy, believingthat the air-liaison element had nothing to offer at that point. Worse yet, the Airmen left because they were not sure how airpower and space power could contribute. (47) This apparently premature dismantling of formal air-ground coordination appears to have beenmirrored at higher levels. As the war in Iraq appeared increasingly likely, the Air Force created a newheadquarters organization called the Air Component Coordination Element (ACCE). By all accounts,the ACCE functioned effectively and was largely responsible for smooth coordination of ground andaviation forces. But, the ACCE was dissolved in late April 2003 as major combat operations drewto a close. (48) It appears that the experiences in Afghanistan and Iraq are stimulating military leaders toreexamine how ground combat is conducted. It was reported in November 2004 that, "For the firsttime in decades, the Army has issued a field guide to counter-insurgency warfare, anacknowledgment that the kind of fighting under way in Iraq may become more common in the yearsahead." (49) In 2004 theMarine Corps appended its Small Wars Manual , which was published in 1940. A reexamination ofDOD's airpower mindset appears timely, and may be critical to successfully combating non-stateactors in the future. Policy makers face the questions of the desirability of helping DOD re-orient its airpoweractivities toward a greater emphasis on combating non-state actors, and the means of accomplishingthis re-orientation. This report explores these questions by evaluating potential changes to DODacquisition priorities and mindset (e.g. training, doctrine, planning and organization). If military aviation acquisition priorities are to be changed to equip U.S. air forces engagedin combating non-state actors, the systems that may be considered include sensors; intelligence;battle management and command, control, and communications (BMC 3 ); manned and unmannedaircraft; and munitions. Sensors, Intelligence, and Decision Making. Improvements to airborne sensors, intelligence and battle management (also called command,control and communications) that might most effectively improve U.S. capabilities against non-stateactors may best be described through generic (and overlapping) functions. These functions includedetection, discrimination, and decision making. Detecting small groups of combatants can be difficult, especially in cluttered environmentslike cities. DOD already operates a number of aerial sensor platforms that can be used to detectnon-state actors. These include aircraft such as the U-2, E-8 JSTARS, RC-135 Rivet Joint, RC-12Guardrail, and a number of UAVs. These assets are already heavily used for conventional militarymissions, and are often described as high demand/low density (HD/LD) platforms, to denote theirfrequent use and few numbers. In addition to their heavy tasking and few numbers, it is not clear thatthese sensor platforms adequately satisfy the long on-station time, low observability, low cost, easeof use, and high survivability that are attractive for non-state actor missions. Much has been made of the recent operational use of Predator, Global Hawk, Pioneer,Shadow, and other UAVs as both sensor platforms and weapon platforms. (50) Perhaps a more relevanteffort to the non-state actor problem is the development fielding of smaller UAVs to be operated bysmall groups (e.g. squad, platoon, company) of ground forces. Some types of UAVs appear ideallysuited for use by SOF, and in some cases peacekeeping actions in urban and rural areas. (51) U.S. Marines are reportedlyvery satisfied with the "backpackable" Dragon Eye surveillance UAV that they use daily inIraq. (52) The Air ForceSpecial Operations Command (AFSOC) is the lead proponent of these small UAVs. The Air Forcefields approximately 150 of its smallest UAVs, called the "Batcam," used by tactical air controllersto detect and target enemy forces. (53) The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) andother research organizations are developing even smaller "micro-UAVs" (MAVs) (e.g. SilentEyes,Wasp, Organic Air Vehicle [OAV], ), that could aid small ground units trying to navigate andsurvive in urban anti-terrorist operations, or contribute to locating and capturing bin Laden and otherAl Qaeda leaders. (54) Unmanned aerostats (large balloons tethered to the ground) also appear to offer attributesattractive to surveillance missions against non-state actors. (55) By elevating sensorsthousands of feet above the ground for months on end, U.S. forces appear to have a surveillance toolthat "levels the playing field" to some extent against small irregular forces which depend onconcealment for protection and to prosecute their attacks. Aerostats may also help alleviate some ofthe well known deficiencies of satellites, such as predictable flight schedules and weather limitations.Aerostats have been deployed for this purpose, albeit in what appears to be limited numbers. One key question for DOD is how much effort and funding is being put on small, tacticallevel UAVs like Batcam or Pointer, compared to more expensive and technologically challengingUAVs like Predator or Global Hawk. The top budgeted DOD UAV programs FY2004-FY2009 areJ-UCAS (Joint Unmanned Combat Aerial System) at $4.2 billion, Global Hawk at $4.1 billion, andPredator at $1.3 billion. (56) It appears that these expensive and technologically sophisticatedUAV programs are taking the lion's share of UAV funding. These systems also tend to be used, orare intentioned for use, by higher level theater commanders, not tactical-level ground forces. Asecond question for DOD is how much effort and funding is being put on fielding cost effective,unmanned aerostats for surveillance and communications compared to more expensive mannedaircraft or satellite systems? New generations of sensors may be needed to fly on these sensor platforms to improve theability of U.S. forces to detect and monitor the activities of small groups of enemy combatants. Forexample, new synthetic aperture radar (SAR) that operates simultaneously in UHF and VHF to detectstationary targets under trees or camouflage, would clearly be useful. (57) If they are to survive, however, non-state actors know that they must not remain stationary.Therefore, U.S. radars with ground moving target indicators (GMTI) are valuable. GMTI radars havebeen used in by U.S. forces in combat since 1991, and against non-state actors in Afghanistan andIraq. While GMTI radars have proven useful in detecting and targeting small groups of irregulars,some shortcomings have been noted. For example, the number of GMTI assets was insufficient toprovide desired coverage. Also, a lack of optimal base access reduced the availability of GMTIassets. Finally, it was observed that "Terrain, foliage and opportunities for enemy ground forces todisperse or avoid maneuver can hinder detection and tracking by GMTI." (58) Improved electro optical (EO) and infrared (IR) sensors will also be useful in detectingnon-state actors in all environments, although most applicably, it may be argued, in remoteenvironments. For all sensors mentioned thus far, improvement to acuity may be useful, butminiaturization likely more important. (59) Miniaturization should enable greater application of aerialsensors, easier deployment to remote areas, and less onerous employment by small forces trying tokeep kit to a minimum. The Army, for example, is developing miniature IR cameras it hopes willweigh only three ounces and cost under $500. (60) Some question how much effort is being spent to develop andfield these small, and comparatively simple sensors with direct application to anti-terrorism activitiescompared to larger, more sophisticated, and expensive sensors. Detecting small groups of people can be difficult, but distinguishing enemy combatantsfrom non-combatants , can in many scenarios, be extremely difficult. Gathering and exploiting"actionable" intelligence is a key part of this challenge. Some have argued that the US military's intelligence training and collectionmust concentrate more on understanding criminal, terrorist, and insurgent networks, even if thismeans putting less emphasis on the traditional strengths of our military intelligence, such asdetermining the conventional ground order of battle and targeting power grids and transportationnetworks. (61) It has been reported that DOD has initiated a "'major program' to develop new intelligencedevices for 'tagging, tracking and locating' potential insurgent leaders and terrorists." (62) The details of this effortare currently unclear. However, it is likely that any effort to improve the ability to differentiateterrorists from civilians, track them and target them will employ multiple airborne sensor andintelligence assets. These techniques could be exploited to more effectively attack small groups orindividuals, or in law enforcement capture and arrest operations. As mentioned earlier, one criticism that has been levied on those in DOD responsible foracquisition decisions has been that they overly emphasize large, Cold War-style programs or try toapply these programs to the anti-terrorism mission when less "high-tech" solutions may suffice. Inthe intelligence milieu, one caution may be made against over-reliance on a traditional U.S. strength;signals intelligence (SIGINT). While SIGINT may likely be one tool to identify and track terrorists,it may be ill advised to make it a primary tool. Many observers of non-state actors note that terrorists and guerrillas don't always use thetechnology we wish them to use. The U.S.' ability to intercept and exploit radio and cellular phonecommunications is well known. Osama bin Ladin, for example, is reported to avoid cell phones atall cost. Yet, the Air Force, for instance, appears to emphasize using SIGINT against non-stateactors; "Experiments in the Nevada desert are using unmanned aircraft to find the exact location ofenemy electronic emissions, such as the mobile phone of a terrorist in a fast-moving auto." (63) Human Intelligence (HUMINT) is also a tool to identify and track terrorists. Unlike SIGINT,however, HUMINT is not a recognized U.S. strength. HUMINT may, however, in many cases provethe only way to identify terrorist leaders. While most HUMINT is the domain of the intelligencecommunity, DODs SOF can contribute by questioning captured terrorists and searching theirequipment and facilities. (64) These activities can reveal both the weapons available toterrorists and insight into imminent terrorist operations. In the words of one SOF leader "The abilityto question some of the terrorists is invaluable.... It's this ability that we have in the specialoperations that helps us determine and eradicate terrorist organizations' leadership." (65) When conductingHUMINT-oriented operations, military SOF and CIA clandestine paramilitary forces frequentlyexploit military airpower for situational awareness and stealthy infiltration and extraction. In sum, there appears to be a need to oversee DOD sensor and sensor platform acquisitionplans to ensure it is adequately pursuing systems most applicable to the non-state actor threat. In thewords of one observer: In the counter guerrilla fight, the threat is not ballisticmissiles but rockets, mortars, RPGs, and MANPADS. We need to bring our space-based conceptdown to the counter guerrilla level by deploying persistent aerial ISR platforms that provide similarwide-area coverage focused on the specific signatures of these weapons. The air platforms could takethe form of tethered blimps, UAVs or manned aircraft. (66) Most non-state actors will present fleeting, or time-sensitive targets. While fleeting targetsare often difficult to detect, they typically present greater challenges to decision making and battlemanagement . Targets are detected, but disappear before a decision to attack can be made or aweapon can be brought to bear. DOD has recognized the challenge associated with attacking fleetingtargets, and it is not clear that acquisition priorities for the non-state actor mission are different thanfor the conventional military mission. Acquisition priorities may include programs that more effectively distribute sensorinformation to make tactical decisions about fleeting targets, and maintaining accurate knowledgeof the position of friendly ground forces. U.S. air forces have succeeded in locating and attacking small groups of non-state actors,particularly when terminal air controllers have identified targets and supplied target coordinates toattack platforms. At least three acquisition issues pertain to better enabling these personnel. First,the GAO and others say that a lack of uniformity in laser range finders and communicationsequipment has limited the effectiveness of terminal controllers to direct aircraft from differentservices. (67) Second, thebattlefield air operations (BAO) kits that these personnel use - typically composed of navigationequipment, computers, communication gear, night vision goggles, laser range finders, and batteries-- weigh on the order of 160 lbs. Reducing the weight of this equipment would do much to increaseterminal controller mobility; with potential benefits for survivability and maintainability. (68) Third, a move away fromvoice only communications to "machine-to-machine" datalinks may allow terminal air controllersto pass target coordinates directly from hand-held target designators to strike aircraft. Some assertthat this improvement alone could reduce the required time to attack fleeting targets from an averageof 30 minutes to less than five minutes. (69) While these improvements to SOF and terminal air controllers' equipment could potentiallyincrease their effectiveness, they will likely remain relatively specialized and scarce resources.Increasing the priority of many battle management programs that fall under the rubric of networkcentric warfare (NCW) may prove beneficial to detecting, identifying, tracking, and targeting fleetinggroups of non-state actors. (70) Many of these programs, such as the Affordable Moving SurfaceTarget Engagement (AMSTE) or the Advanced Tactical Targeting Technology (AT3) programs seekto distribute sensing and targeting functions among a network of multi mission aircraft, rather thancentralizing these functions on highly specialized (and expensive) aircraft. (71) Emphasizing these kindsof battle management technologies may speed up decision making against fleeting targets and mayalso reduce the cost of defeating non-state actors relative to the costs they incur to operate; alsoknown as the "cost exchange ratio." Knowing a terrorist's location is important , but often a decision to engage him can't be madeif the location of U.S. or friendly forces, especially ground forces, is in doubt. Thus, investment inprograms such as the Army's Blue Force Tracker appear directly applicable to better combatingnon-state actors. These investments may be especially prudent if the air forces continue to exploreconducting close air support missions from high altitudes with GPS-guided munitions. Theseweapons are quite precise by historical standards. However, they are only as accurate as thegeographical coordinates that operators input. And, operators make mistakes. (72) Some say that a pilot flyingat low altitude -- although more vulnerable to ground fire -- has better situational awareness of whatis transpiring on the battlefield than a pilot flying at 30,000 feet, and can use this awareness to avoidmaking mistakes that could result in fratricide. The implementation of Blue Force Tracker andsimilar systems might reclaim ground situational awareness lost due to high altitude. (73) Blue Force Tracker mayalso be useful to special operations helicopters attempting to insert or rescue ground forces pursuingor fleeing from non-state actors. (74) Aircraft. The military services have proposedseveral procurement and modification efforts to improve aviation capabilities against non-stateactors. These programs can be found in the strike, insertion/extraction, airlift and command andcontrol domains. (75) Strike. While many combat aircraft can be used toattack non-state actors, the Air Force's A-10 Warthogs and AC-130 gunships are the aircraft thatspecialize most in this mission area. The increased use of unmanned combat aerial vehicles(UCAVs) in this mission area also appears likely. The Air Force currently operates an inventory of approximately 354 A-10s and OA-10s. (76) The current modernizationplan is to spend approximately $600,000 per aircraft to improve the Warthog's targetingcapabilities. (77) ThePrecision Engagement (PE) upgrade will include an advanced targeting pod, improved cockpitdisplays, new data link integration and the ability to deliver GPS-guided munitions. PE variants ofthe A-10 should be fielded between 2007 and 2009. A Service Life Extension Program (SLEP),which would include upgrades to engines, and re-winging some of the inventory is also beingconsidered. These upgrades should keep the A-10 flying until 2025, when it is expected to bereplaced by the short take off and vertical landing (STOVL) variant of the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter(JSF). In 2003, Air Force leaders said that some A-10s would be retired in order to pay formodernizing the remaining operational aircraft. It is not clear if this remains the current plan, or howmany A-10 retirements would be required. This strategy of reducing the force structure to pay forplanned upgrades has been pursued with other aircraft, such as the B-1 bomber. That particular forcereduction proved unpopular with Congress, which forced the Air Force to "un-retire" many of theretired B-1s; at a cost of $17 million. (78) The Marine Corps plans to procure STOVL variants of the F-35 to replace its AV-8B HarrierF/A-18 aircraft and to conduct close air support missions (CAS). The Air Force also plans to procuresome currently undetermined number of STOVL F-35s to replace the A-10. Air Force leaders alsosay that the F-22 will be a valuable strike platform for (CAS) missions and attacking moving groundtargets. (79) It appearslikely that these aircraft will have many attributes that will make them effective in these roles, suchas precision targeting capability, and in the case of the JSF, the ability to operate from short runwaysand austere air facilities. It is not clear, however, that either aircraft will be cost effective. Bothaircraft, but especially the F-22 appear to have many costly attributes that may not be required in aCAS platform, such as a high degree of maneuverability, high speed, and low radar cross sections.Today's CAS platforms suggest that modern avionics and targeting capabilities are essential toeffectively attacking small groups of moving targets, but modern advances in stealth,maneuverability, and speed may not be required, or even attractive. The basic design andaeronautical capabilities of the A-10, for example, date from the 1960s. With upgrades to avionicsand targeting however, the Air Force believes the aircraft will remain effective until almost 2030. The Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC) currently operates eight AC-130H Spectre and 13 of the more capable AC-130U Spooky gunships. AFSOC is also adding fourAC-130Us to the fleet via C-130 conversions that are underway. (80) Current gunshipcapabilities appear unique and satisfactory. The effectiveness of the AC-130's realtime exploitationof Predator UAV video images to attack moving targets was much reported during the war inAfghanistan. No other U.S. military aircraft provides the same level of firepower, precision and loitertime as the AC-130. What appears to be at issue is the aircraft's survivability. Fear of vulnerability to attacks fromshoulder-fired missiles typically relegates the AC-130 mission to night time. Even during intenseneed, such as when ground troops were fighting to gain control of Fallujah, Iraq, the AC-130s werenot flown during daylight hours. (81) The Air Force could address this shortcoming in at least three general ways; improve theAC-130's survivability, develop a new gunship based on a more capable aircraft, or combine mannedor unmanned aircraft working in concert to provide close air support. Options to increase theAC-130's survivability include developing more effective defensive countermeasures and decoys,fielding new weapons that could maintain the AC-130's precision and fire power, but at greaterdistance, and increased collaboration with UAVs to enable increased situational awareness forAC-130 crews. Some techniques to reduce the AC-130's infrared (IR), electro optical (EO), andacoustic signature may also be pursued, but the benefits of these techniques is questionable due tothe AC-130's large size and slow speed, which make the aircraft highly visible. New and more capable aircraft upon which a future gunship could conceivably be basedinclude the C-17. An AC-17 could fly faster and higher than the AC-130, and its larger size couldaccommodate more, and different types of weapons. Whether this option would be cost effective isunclear. Air Force estimates put the cost of the standard C-130J Hercules transport at approximately$50 million. (82) However, the AC-130U, which includes weapons, targeting systems and other upgrades is pricedat $190 million per aircraft. (83) The C-17, without any modifications for weapons or targetingsystems, costs approximately $191 million each. (84) Using the same, rough cost difference between the C-130 andthe AC-130 suggests that an AC-17 could cost $340 million each, $140 million more than the C-17. Replacing the AC-130 with some number of UAVs appears the most radical potentialprogram, but perhaps most compatible with other Air Force and DOD efforts to develop networkcentric approaches to warfare. The number and capabilities of these UAVs are being studied, andwill likely be driven much by the maturation of technologies that will give UAVs more autonomythan they currently possess, or allow a single remote operator to control multiple aircraft. (85) A final issue pertains to who should operate the AC-130 and its replacement, and how manyare required. Currently, the AC-130 is operated by AFSOC. Allowing conventional Air Force unitsto fly the Spooky gunship could expand its use and mission. Also, it has been reported on numerousoccasions that the Marine Corps has internally debated the efficacy of operating the AC-130. (86) Although procuring thisaircraft would add to the Department of the Navy's topline budget, increases in operations andmaintenance costs would likely not be as severe as a new type of aircraft because the Marine Corpsalready operates the KC-130. The perceived effectiveness of the armed Predator UAV in Afghanistan and other countrieshas invigorated plans to field more strike-capable unmanned aircraft. (87) The Army, for example,is reportedly speeding up efforts to field its Extended Range Multi-Purpose (ERMP) UAV. InAugust 2005 the Army selected General Atomic's Warrior UAV for this mission. Potentialmunitions to be integrated onto the future UAV include AGM-114 Hellfire, Viper Strike (a modifiedBrilliant Anti-armor (BAT) submunition) and BLU-108 Skeet munitions. The Army hopes to fieldthe aircraft in FY2009. (88) It was widely reported in 2002 and 2003 that the Army hadalready deployed two weaponized Hunter UAVs, but recent press reports quote Army spokesmendenying this, and saying that classification issues prohibited any further elaboration. (89) At issue is whether thesearmed UAVs will simply replicate the same capabilities provided by existing UAVs, such asPredator, or whether by virtue of being controlled by ground forces directly involved in operationswith non-state actors, might provide improved levels of availability and responsiveness. Another issue for armed UAVs may be the effectiveness of their program management,especially for the larger and more technologically aggressive programs. In their FY2005 conferencereport, congressional appropriators expressed their concern that the Joint Unmanned Combat AerialSystem (J-UCAS) had not been properly coordinated with the military services, and cut $200 millionfrom the administration's budget request. (90) In November 2005, the J-UCAS program suffered additionalprogram management turbulence, when it was taken away from DARPA (the Defense AdvancedResearch Projects Agency) and given to a joint office. (91) In December 2004 it was reported that DARPA had cancelledthe Unmanned Combat Armed Rotorcraft (UCAR) program, apparently owing to the Army'sdecision to withdraw its $500 million in funding from the program in favor of other aviationpriorities. (92) Airlift. Combating terrorists and non-state actors mayput increased emphasis on airlift capabilities, owing to both geography and enemy activity. Thiswould likely affect acquisition and modernization priorities. Roles and missions debates among theservices could also ensue. The importance of effective airlift in operations against non-state actorshas been recognized for some time. In 1940, the U.S. Marine Corps wrote This type of aircraft [transport] has provenindispensable for small wars operations. The lack of railroads, improved motor roads, and navigablewaterways in some of our probable theaters of operation makes the supply and transportation oftroops by air more or less mandatory. (93) In addition to poor roads, U.S. armed forces fighting non-state actors are likely to encounterdangerous roads. As has been demonstrated in Iraq, insurgents will likely attempt to increase the risk(and the expense) of ground transportation by employing ambushes, drive-by shootings, andimprovised exploding devices (IEDs). In mid-December 2004, it was widely reported that seniorDOD leaders responded to an increasingly dangerous situation on the ground by significantlyincreasing the amount of military cargo hauled by intra-theater aircraft. (94) Air transportation, it wasreasoned, is more expensive and less efficient than ground transportation over these distances, butwas deemed necessary to protect the lives of civilians and military personnel. A number ofhelicopter losses in late 2005 and early 2006 due to enemy action may merit a re-examination of thisassertion. The Air Force currently operates over 500 C-130 Hercules airlifters. These aircraft are themilitary's workhorse for intra-theater lift and can typically operate from runways shorter than the AirForce's long-range airlift aircraft. However, it does not appear that the C-130 is best suited to deliversupplies and reinforcements to U.S. ground forces operating in remote areas. The C-130 requiresapproximately 5,000 feet of runway to operate. (95) In South America and Central America, for instance, C-130s canoperate from approximately 5% of all airstrips (540 of the 10,400 airstrips). In Africa, the C-130 canland on approximately15% of all airstrips. (96) The U.S. Transportation Command (TRANSCOM) has arequirement for a short-takeoff-and-landing (STOL) aircraft for intra-theater airlift. (97) Some estimate that a STOLairlifter could operate from more than 80% of the airfields in South and Central America, forexample. (98) The Army wishes to satisfy the TRANSCOM requirement by procuring as many as 145aircraft (called the Future Cargo Aircraft, FCA) to replace its aging C-23 Sherpa and some of itsC-12 Huron Aircraft. The leading contenders for the contract appear to be from Europeanmanufacturers: the Alenia Aeronautica C-27J, and the CASA C-295. At issue is which aircraft toprocure, and whether a U.S.-manufactured aircraft might not better satisfy this requirement. Thispotentially large procurement of the FCA appears to have exacerbated an ongoing roles and missionstension between the Air Force and the Army. The Air Force Air Mobility Command (AMC) hasresponsibility for strategic and tactical airlift missions, but the Army flies many (approximately 47C-23s and 46 C-12s) intra-theater aircraft. (99) In January 2006 it was reported that the two services werenegotiating a memorandum of understanding on procurement of this aircraft. (100) Increased use of small, intra-theater airlifters to support ground troops engaged with non-stateactors suggests two additional cautionary issues. First, while aiming to improve the distribution ofmen and materiel, increased use of small airlifters could create its own logistical challenges. TheMarine Corps notes that "Where small air units are maintained and operated on outlying auxiliaryfields, the problem of supplying fuel, ammunition, bombs, and other supplies becomes aconsiderable task." (101) Second, because intra theater airlifters will increasingly find themselves in harm's way,increased effort will likely be required to protect the aircraft, and to create "airlift warriors." Twoexamples include, making the airlift aircraft more difficult to target, or more survivable againstmanportable air defense systems (MANPADS) (102) and providing increased Survival, Escape, Resistance andEvasion (SERE) training for airlift personnel. These two potential concerns may be mitigated, to some degree, by employing UAVs fortactical airlift missions to those engaged in hostilities against non-state actors. The Army, Air Force,Marine Corps, and Special Operations Command are in different stages of exploring the efficacyof fielding battlefield UAVs to conduct tactical airlift of small, but valuable payloads such as bloodplasma, night vision devices, ammunition, or communications equipment. UAVs may be able toprecisely and quickly deliver these kinds of critical payloads to forces remotely located or isolatedby enemy action. (103) Covert Insertion, Extraction and Combat Search andRescue. (104) U.S. Special Operations Forces operate a variety of highlyspecialized helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft to covertly insert, extract and search for friendlyforces under difficult operational circumstances. These aircraft include the Air Force's HH-60G PaveHawk, MH-53J/M Pave Low, MC-130E/H Combat Talon, and the Army's MH-47E Chinook. Numerous upgrades to existing aircraft are being pursued to improve their capabilities andextend their lives. The HH-60G Pave Hawk is receiving upgrades to communications, navigation,and propulsion systems. Survivability enhancements are also being pursued. The HH-60G isexpected to fly until the 2014 timeframe. The Air Force hopes to then field the highly developmentalPersonnel Recovery Vehicle (PRV). The MH-53J/M Pave Low is receiving self protectionenhancements. The Air Force plans to gradually reduce the Pave Low inventory from 33 to sevenaircraft as CV-22 is fielded in 2013 time frame. The MC-130E/H Combat Talon was substantiallyupgraded in the early 1990s. Current efforts focus on increasing the inventory. The Air Force wantsto convert 10 C-130Hs to the MC-130H configuration under Combat Talon III conversion program.The Army is pursing radar, communications, navigation, survivability and weapons upgrades toextend the life of the MH-47G until the 2033 timeframe. At least three new aircraft are being considered for future application to the stealthymovement of SOF and other forces engaged in anti-terrorism or counterinsurgency operations. Themost mature concept is the V-22 Osprey. Some envision that the Ospreys' tilt-rotor technology willgive the Air Force and Marine Corps new capabilities in terms of speed, range and payload. Someobservers challenge both the V-22's capabilities and technological feasibility. The V-22'sdevelopment has been troubled and its future is uncertain. (105) At one point the Air Force considered using the V-22 for CSAR missions, but in 2004announced that it would develop a new aircraft, the Personnel Recovery Vehicle (PRV) to replaceits HH-60Gs. In July 2005 the PRV was renamed the CSAR-X program. The CSAR-X could cost$6 billion for 194 aircraft. The Air Force Special Operations command is also studying a futureCSAR program, the M-X aircraft. This embryonic platform would be fielded in 2018 as asupplement to the V-22 for CSAR missions. (106) Two oversight issues appear to intersect with the acquisition of aircraft for stealthytransportation of troops engaged in anti-terrorism or counterinsurgency operations: cost, and need.As described earlier, the specialized equipment on these aircraft tend to make them expensive toprocure and operate. Unless coordinated closely, however, modernizing SOF aircraft could incurincreased O&M as well as new procurement costs. The Air Force's CSAR-X, for example, isexpected to cost $6 billion to procure 194 new aircraft. O&M costs, are not known, because theCSAR-X is still notional. The HH-60G that it will replace, however, is 87% common with ArmyH-60 helicopters. DOD achieves, or should achieve, important economies of scale savings inoperating large fleets of highly common systems, such as H-60 helicopters. Replacing the HH-60with a new helicopter might not just incur $6 billion in new spending, but could also increase O&Mcosts if new aircraft are unnecessarily dissimilar to others in the inventory. Another cost issue, is what impact these relatively expensive programs may have on DOD'stop line budget. Might they become targets for budget cutters in the FY2006 budget process? InDecember, electronic media outlets made available an internal DOD Program Budget Decision (PBD753), that recommended termination of the Air Force's C-130J program and trimming 20 aircraftfrom the Navy's planned purchase over the future years defense plan (FYDP). The PBD 753 obtainedby the press also recommended cutting 22 aircraft from the planned purchase of V-22s over the sametime period. (107) Suchrecommendations may be an indication that the upcoming budget cycle will be contentious. Also,if implemented, such recommendations could have a direct impact on SOF-relatedinsertion/extraction aircraft by reducing funds, driving up costs, or potentially cancelling programs. Proponents justify many of the programs described above by the perception that today'saircraft are increasingly vulnerable to growing threats. The Air Force, and outside analysts oftenpoint out that many countries have access to surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) and informationtechnologies that can be combined to form integrated air defense systems (IADS). The potentialproliferation of IADS is one of the primary justifications put forth for developing and fieldingadvanced combat aircraft like the F/A-22 Raptor. (108) It is not clear to others, however, that IADS will be asthreatening to low-flying helicopters, already fielding self-protection equipment, as they will be tohigh flying fixed-wing aircraft. Prior to Operation Desert Storm , for example, Iraq was thought tohave a robust and sophisticated IADS. The first shots in that war, however, were fired by AH-64Apache helicopters, led by special operations' MH-53 helicopters. (109) In this case, helicopterswere deemed more survivable than fixed-wing aircraft, and were used to degrade Iraq's IADS soother aircraft could more freely operate. It also appears that there may be different perspectives among the Services regarding thevulnerability of today's helicopters. The Air Force, for example, seeks the CSAR-X, in part, becauseit is said to be more survivable than the HH-60 helicopters it will replace. (110) However, Armyspecial operations forces initiated a service life extension program (SLEP) in 2004 for all their H-60aircraft. This suggests that Army leaders believe that H-60 helicopters are sufficiently survivable,albeit with upgrades, and don't require near term replacement. Advanced integrated air defense systems (IADS) will be fielded exclusively by nation states,not non-state actors. Non-state actors will likely rely instead, on man-portable or vehicle-mountedand easily transportable air defense systems. Non-state actors will also tend to field those systemsthat they can easily access, not necessarily the most advanced systems. Thus, if IADS aresufficiently threatening to justify new SOF helicopters, it may only be in the context of conflicts withstates that sponsor terrorism rather than in conflicts with terrorists or insurgents themselves. Command, Control and Communications (C3). Attacking non-state actors may take U.S. air forces to regions far from established militaryinfrastructure, or into conditions where ground forces are moving rapidly and out run theirline-of-sight communications. Employing air assets in these scenarios could be facilitated bycommand and control aircraft dedicated to matching ground forces requests for air support, includingthe attack of fleeting targets, with nearby air assets. Currently, the Air Force has nocommand-and-control aircraft dedicated to this mission, owing to the retirement in 2002 of theEC-130E Airborne Battlefield Command and Control Center (ABCCC). During Operation Iraqi Freedom, the E-3C AWACS assumed many of the ABCCC tasks, but,reportedly, they were at times unable to cope with the level ofcommunications traffic. As a result, there were times when the ground-based air-control staff inKuwait at the V Corps Headquarters were out of communication range of attack aircraft operatingin the Baghdad region. (111) Air Force officers experienced a certain "comfort" in knowing that an EC-130E was pushed forward,and its sole mission was supporting CAS and combat search and rescue (CSAR) communications.While these officers say they were unsure whether AWACS could satisfy the ABCCC's role incombat, they did not express grave concern. (112) Regardless, if anti-guerrilla scenarios are to be increasinglyencountered, exploring the efficacy of resurrecting the ABCCC's capabilities may be warranted. TheAir Force's E-10A aircraft could plausibly perform some of the ABCCC's functions. Air Forceadvocates emphasize the E-10A's ability to "execute the Air Tasking Order (ATO)," conduct"dynamic re-tasking," and its "improved combat identification." (113) However, the programhas been reduced by appropriations conferees. (114) This $115 million cut in FY2005 will, according to the AirForce, delay delivery of the planned fourth aircraft until 2015. (115) Also, the aircraft's mostadvanced aerial C3 capabilities are planned for the out-years, and are currently unfunded. (116) Press reports inDecember 2005 and January 2006 predict a dramatic reduction to the E-10 program in DOD'sFY2007 budget.. While the Air Force appears to have taken recent steps that have decreased its airbornecommand and control capabilities, the Marine Corps and Army, the services most directly engagedin combating non-state actors on the ground, appear to be taking steps to increase their airbornecommand and control capabilities. The Marine Corps operates a limited number of Direct Air Support Center-Airborne(DASC(A)) terminals based on KC-130 aircraft dedicated to this mission. The aircraft werereportedly used in Operation Iraqi Freedom much more than in previous conflicts. However, theseassets may require upgrades to increase their effectiveness. Reportedly, for example, DASC(A) crewused paper copies of the daily air tasking order (ATO) to help direct aircraft and track their missions.To date, the system cannot maintain an electronic version of the ATO or receive electronicupdates. (117) Thisdeficiency will likely limit the DASC(A)'s capabilities in rapidly changing operationalcircumstances, and appears in need of remedy. The Army has been using prototypes of its Army Airborne Command and Control System(A2C2S) in Iraq for approximately one year. The A2C2S is based on UH-60L Blackhawk helicoptersand works as a flying command post by allowing commanders at the brigade level and above tomaintain digital command, control and communications of ground forces engaged in warfighting andpeacekeeping. Low rate initial production of the A2C2S began in December 2004, and as many as120 systems could be fielded. (118) Many DOD R&D efforts are focused on creating network-centric approaches to warfightingthat will improve current "platform-centric" capabilities. Depending on the specific capabilitiesdesired, the nodes of these various networks could be composed of numerous types of aircraft, shipsor ground vehicles. UAVs appear to be a likely platform for increasing airborne communications andnetworking for forces operating in remote or austere environments. In December 2004 the BoeingCompany announced that it had demonstrated a high-speed, secure, wireless communications relayon its ScanEagle UAV. (119) C3 in general, and airborne C3 specifically, could take on new prominence in operationsagainst non-state actors as more and more UAVs are fielded and as aircraft take on roles (e.g.scouting, medical resupply), often satisfied by ground forces. DOD's top acquisition official forUAVs asserted that DOD has "well over" 400 UAVs supporting current combat operations aroundthe globe, a marked increase in number and capability from only two years ago. (120) In congressionaltestimony, Air Force Chief of Staff General John Jumper said that approximately 450 UAVs wereoperating in Iraq, and that there may be a need to better organize such a large fleet. (121) Weapons. Non-state actors tend to offer smaller,softer targets than military actors, and they often shield themselves behind civilians or civilianinfrastructure (e.g. hospitals, schools, religious and cultural sites). The applicability of smaller, lessdestructive ordnance against non-state actors has been recognized for 50 years. The U.S. MarineCorps Small Wars Manual , notes "...the bombing squadrons will find more use for their lighterbombs and offensive machine guns than they will for their major weapon -- the heavy demolitionbomb. (122) In the morerecent words of one high ranking Israeli general "In the past, the more lethal something was, themore effective it was. Now, sometimes it is the exact opposite." (123) Expanding DOD capabilities against non-state actors suggests increasing the ability to deliverweapons effects precisely. Many DOD efforts to field aircraft targeting pods, or to increase theprecision of weapon guidance are likely applicable to targeting non-state actors. Developing smallerordnance, increasing the aerial employment of guns, developing re-targetable munitions, and fieldingairborne non-lethal weapons may have even greater application to the fight against non-state actorsthan to conventional foes. The Air Force is developing the Small Diameter Bomb (SDB) , which is half the weight ofthe smallest bomb the Air Force uses today, the 500-pound Mark 82. Improvements in targetingaccuracy is hoped to make the 250-lb weapon as effective as the 500 lb weapon. Yet, even a 250 lbweapon may be unnecessarily large for many non-state actor targets; risking unintended damage tononcombatants or friendly troops. Some argue that the 16 lb warhead on the AGM-114 Hellfire anti-armor munition is better suited for soft terrorist targets in close proximity to civilians and friendlyforces. Inert (no warhead) practice bombs may also be worth exploring. These weapons have beenused in recent conflicts, where collateral damage was a concern. However, because thenon-exploding bomb would often ricochet and skip far from the target, it was often not effectiveeither at destroying the target or in limiting collateral damage. (124) Some suggest thatsome sort of "nonexplosive, disintegrated kinetic device that would hit the target like a 50-lb sandbagat terminal velocity, killing an individual...but leaving only a cloud of dust as collateral damage"would be worth investigation. (125) Better or more pervasive employment of aircraft guns may offer the accuracy and low"yield" that operational planners desire when attacking non-state actors. Current aircraft guns rangefrom relatively modest .50 caliber machine guns to very powerful 105mm cannons. These weaponscan destroy vehicles and cause serious damage to buildings, but do not produce the blast andfragmentation of aerial bombs that contribute to collateral damage. Two improvements may be considered to increase the applicability of using aerial gunsagainst non-state actors. The first effort would be to reduce the chances of bullets ricocheting, whichcould cause unintended damage. To illustrate the potential effects of ricochet, when combat aircrafttrain in air-to-ground strafing, safety officers anticipate potential ricochets in an area as large as 50square kilometers. These effects could cause considerable collateral damage in an urban setting. Inertaircraft rounds are being developed that are said to reduce the chances of ricochet by 90 percent andthe range of rounds that do ricochet to 10 square kilometers. (126) Currently, aerial guns are most effective against ground targets when the aircraft flies atrelatively low altitudes, where the aircraft is vulnerable to ground fire. Another improvement wouldbe to develop fire-control software that would provide accurate fire solutions for strafing at safealtitudes. (127) Ground forces anticipating engagement with non-state actors have been developing non-lethal weapons for many years. Many non-lethal weapons, such as rubber bullets and tear gas,are natural extrapolations from law enforcement experience. The exploration of basing non-lethalweapons on military aircraft is less mature than ground forces' employment, but appears to begaining momentum. One airpower thinker has suggested "some of the toughest decisions confrontingour commanders arise from the fact that airpower can kill but cannot capture. If we could detainindividuals from the air until ground elements take custody of them, many of these difficulties wouldsubside." (128) A number of air-delivered nonlethal weapons could be employed that would disperse crowds,hold crowds in place, provide a means to track the movement of people, or temporarily incapacitatesmall vehicles. For example, the Air Force and Navy are developing non-lethal, directed-energyweapons designed to control crowds in urban areas, such as a mobile version of Raytheon's ActiveDenial System (ADS). Millimeter-wave beams of energy are being designed that induce anintolerable heating sensation on contact with the skin and might be used to disperse crowds. (129) Israel has developeda non-lethal acoustic weapon designed for riot control, called The Shout . This weapon canreportedly incapacitate crowds at 100m without causing permanent physical damage. (130) Acoustic weaponssuch as this, and "flash bang" grenades -- used to stun people -- could potentially also be airdelivered. Several different devices could potentially be employed on aircraft that would electronicallyincapacitate vehicles. Also, air delivered "sticky slimes" and foams have the effect of slowing downany sort of movement. The Coast Guard is developing Boat Trap , a propeller-fouling devicedeployed from helicopters. This net could be applicable to stopping boats such as that used to attackthe USS Cole. Currently, the Coast Guard stops boats with shots from helicopter-borne .50 calmachine gun to boat's engine, which is deemed a sub optimal solution. (131) Air delivered dyes, some invisible except to an ultra violet lens, could be used to identifypeople or vehicles that had participated in a terrorist or insurgency act. Those dyed could be allowedto leave crowded areas and be attacked or captured later, when they were in more isolated areas.Similarly, artificial "snow" could be sprayed on the ground immediately following a terrorist attackin the hope that retreating terrorists would leave behind footprints. At issue is whether these potential munitions improvements most relevant to the non-stateactor threat are being adequately funded and pursued. Also, would more aggressive fielding of inertweapons and non-lethal devices carry risk? What complications might fielding these less lethalweapons pose for military planners and logisticians who have to equip and deploy weapons usefulagainst both conventional foes and non-state actors? Some of these potential weapons may have high power requirements, and may generate considerable heat, which would limit the size and typeof aircraft on which they could be employed. Some dyes and gases may have to be squared withpolicy and treaty constraints on the use of chemical and biological weapons. Setting and implementing new acquisition priorities to more effectively combat non-stateactors may be difficult. It may be far more difficult, however, to identify and implement changesto airpower planning, doctrine, coordination, strategy and tactics required to better combat non-stateactors. As described in the introduction to this paper, these functions are described in aggregate asmindset changes. In conjunction with the potential changes in acquisition priorities described in theprevious section of this paper, there appear to be at least two over arching mindset changes thatmerit consideration. They are 1) Decentralization vs Centralization, and 2) Indirect vs Direct Action. Decentralization vs. Centralization. Theemployment of airpower against modern conventional enemies focuses to a great degree on "gettinginside the enemy's OODA loop." The OODA loop, which stands for Observe, Orient, Decide, andAct, is a generic construct for describing an enemy's military decision making process. By movingfaster than the enemy can complete these decision making functions, or by impairing these functions(e.g. interdicting communications, destroying radars and other sensors, isolating C2 elements),airpower planners hope to achieve a rapid and decisive strategic effect on the adversary. Oneobserver notes, however, that unfortunately, guerrillas follow a strategy of 'protractedwar.' Like criminals, they assume they cannot achieve rapid, decisive effects and do not attempt todo so. Instead, insurgent, terrorist and criminal organizations consciously design themselves so thatour military and police forces cannot rapidly and decisively defeat them. (132) Organizations like Al Qaeda have highly distributed command and control (C2) systems. They makestrategic decisions and execute operational plans in decentralized ways. On the other hand, thetactical "OODA loop"in a suicide bomber or guerrilla ambush, as just two examples, is instantaneous, because the sensor, the decision maker and the "shooter" are centralized in the sameperson. A key set of questions for policy makers focuses on whether current DOD airpower doctrineis adequately suited for dealing with non-state actors which operate in highly decentralized ways.Do currently planned joint experiments and exercises focus on combating such terrorists andguerrillas? If not, how will DOD develop new operational concepts and strategies for defeating suchnon traditional foes? Currently, the Air Force and Army do not conduct exercises dedicated to closeair support (CAS). Instituting such exercises could be considered. (133) Just as non-state actors decentralize their planning and execution, the U.S. military, whenfighting such enemies, could adopt more decentralized planning, and command and control ofairpower. However, this approach may be viewed as anathema by some aviation leaders, and mayrequire determined oversight to explore fully. This is because classic air doctrine calls for operationsthat are planned and controlled centrally, but executed in a decentralized manner. This "golden rule"seeks to maintain unity of command while allowing improvisation by those directly engaged incombat. Air Force doctrine dictates that Air Force assets be centrally commanded and controlled,even when fighting terrorists and irregular forces. (134) Centralized planning and control of airpower engaged in fighting a distributed, decentralizedfoe however, may prove disadvantageous. Over 60 years ago the Marine Corps' Small Wars Manual identified the need to match the enemy's decentralization with a similar fluidity of command andindependence of action. the employment of small striking units will be frequent,and independent missions for the division the rule rather than the exception.....the air observer insmall wars operations must be given greater latitude in estimating a situation on the ground than hewould be given in a comparable position in major operations. Often the rapidly moving situation willnot permit delay in the transmission of information to headquarters, but requires immediate positiveaction on the part of the air patrol commander. (135) More contemporary analysts assert that combating non-state actors is analogous to fightingdecentralized and distributed criminal organizations, and that airpower should more closely emulatelaw enforcement activities, which are locally planned and executed. (136) One approach to decentralizing air operations against non-state actors, particularly in the areaof close air support (CAS) would be to coordinate air and ground forces at lower levels oforganization than is currently practiced. Coordination at lowers levels can take place both within andbetween Services. It appears that steps are being taken by the Army, for instance, to coordinate air and groundoperations at lower command levels. Traditionally, much of the Army's aviation was found at thecorps level. According to Army leaders, however, aircraft and aviation personnel are being movedfrom the corps to the division level, and a brigade aviation element will be attached to all Armyground brigades. (137) While this may be a step in the right direction, questions remain. Army platoons (16-40 soldiers)and companies (100-200 soldiers) tend to be directly engaged with non-state actors. Yet, platoonsand companies are far down the organizational ladder from division headquarters. Will movingaircraft and personnel from the corps to the division level make an appreciable difference in thetimeliness and effectiveness of aviation support to these small Army organizations? Also, someArmy ground units (e.g. elements within the 82nd Airborne, 101st Air Assault, 10th Mountaindivisions), will likely require more air support than others. Have provisions been made to bettercoordinate air and ground operations at lower organizational levels within the Army based onanticipated mission needs ? The increased fielding of Army UAVs may be one method of boosting airpower in supportof ground troops, and decentralizing airpower planning and control. As part of its Future CombatSystem (FCS) program, the Army plans to field three classes of UAVs. The smallest system isintended to be man-portable, and used at the platoon level (16-40 soldiers). (138) Pervasively deployingUAVs among the Army's or the Marine Corps' smallest ground units could facilitate the detectionand targeting of non-state actors, as well as communication with larger ground units. Army orMarine Corps) UAVs could also potentially replace or augment manned aviation, performing suchroles as tactical airlift, or medical resupply. By owing and controlling these resources themselves,small ground units may be able to employ them more fluidly and responsively to the anticipatedtactical situation than would aircraft controlled by higher echelons of forces. Much operational air and ground coordination between the services, such as between theArmy and the Air Force, tends to occur at the battalion level and higher. Tactical Air Control Parties(TAC-Ps) are typically composed of an Air Force officer who coordinates with the Army battalion'soperations officer, and three airmen. Three of the four have received extensive training to coordinateand control air strikes in support of ground forces. Many have suggested that TAC-Ps be embeddedin Army units smaller than the battalion, such as companies, or perhaps even platoons. Regularlyintegrating air controllers into lower levels or Army organizations would require additional personnelthan currently are trained for this mission. While this integration could help decentralizeair-to-ground coordination, and facilitate air-ground forces coordination, which service wouldprovide these additional air controllers is not clear. The Army is reportedly interested in increasing the training its artillery fire support officersreceive, to enable them to also control aircraft. A joint force air controller program, withstandardized training and procedures might be part of this process. According to some Army leaders"...the Army needs to be able to train its own soldiers to call in air strikes to supplement what the AirForce provides. 'Having just one person with a critical skill in any direct-fire ground combat [unit]is a recipe for disaster.'" (139) The Air Force has reportedly resisted this idea, and would prefer to satisfy the Army's needfor additional controllers by increasing the number of Air Force air controllers. (140) According to pressreports: Air Force officials are skeptical about turning over themission to Army troops. Air Force controllers, who get five years of training, have to juggle as manyas a dozen planes, each carrying different kinds of bombs with different capabilities. Air Forceofficials question whether there are enough planes in their arsenal to train more Armycontrollers. (141) Some Air Force air controllers point out that profound "cultural differences" exist between how theArmy and the Air Force perceives airpower, and that Army air controllers may not employ aircraftas effectively as Air Force air controllers, even if trained to the same standards. (142) The Marine Corpsappears to be facing a similar problem: a shortage of air controllers to meet the needs ofcompany-sized, and smaller units. To increase the number of air controllers, the Marine Corpsallowed non-aviators to train for this mission. (143) In October 2004, the Air Force announced the creation of a Joint Air-Ground Operations(JAGO) office that would serve as a focal point for this mission area. While this appears a welcomestep, the JAGO's stated goals for both the near and medium time frame were technologyimprovements, not the more difficult, but potentially equally valuable doctrinal considerationsdescribed above. (144) A speedy resolution of how best to increase the number of air controllers, or otherwise encouragethe decentralization of air-ground operations may require oversight from senior decision makers. Direct action vs. Supporting or AdvisoryActivities. The question confronting policy makers is how much emphasis shouldbe placed on involving airpower directly against non-state actors, compared to advising andsupporting allied airpower activities, or allocating resources mainly to ground units and securitypersonnel searching for terrorist leaders. Exploring and resolving this question could have profoundimpact on procurement, training, and O&M budgets. One challenge for air forces engaged in direct action against non-state actors is that they oftenoperate in politically charged environments, where their presence can exacerbate tensions betweengovernments friendly toward the United States and local populations that may be sympathetic toterrorists. In its field manual on counterinsurgency operations (FMI 3-07.22), the Army notes that"A long-term U.S. combat role may undermine the legitimacy of the H.N. (Host Nation) governmentand risks converting the conflict into a U.S.-only war.... That combat role can also further alienatecultures that are hostile to the U.S." (145) Another consideration is that directly engaging non-state actors in many cases requires highlyspecialized equipment, such as MH-53J Pave Low helicopters as just one example. This equipmenttends to be expensive and currently of limited quantity. Personnel also tend to be highly trained andin limited quantity. The Marine Corps notes, for example, that due to adverse operational conditionsand the need to often act independently, fighting non-state actors "...requires a large percentage ofseasoned and highly trained pilots." (146) These specialized forces are required, in some number, foraction against conventional foes. But a growing need to combat non-state actors might stress thecurrent force structure, or demand that it be increased. The need for indirect involvement of military aviation such as aviation foreign internaldefense (A-FID), in conflicts with non-state actors is widely accepted. One observer asserts that "Oneof the most important roles that U.S. forces can play in the fight against terrorist groups is to train,advise, and assist the forces of other nations in counterinsurgency and counterterroristoperations." (147) Also, strengthening friendly-nation airpower (e.g. Philippine military air forces engaged in conflictswith Muslim insurgents) could reduce the chances that U.S. forces would have to get directlyinvolved. Further, if U.S. forces do have to get directly involved, good A-FID will likely increasethe options available U.S. commanders by providing more competent coalition partners. (148) Some argue that DOD already over-emphasizes direct action against non-state actors. Forexample, one observer writes that The specialization of AFSOF aircraft such as theAC-130, MC-130, MH-53J and now the CV-22 reflects the emphasis on direct-action, making themparticularly expensive, complex, and logistically demanding. If it is the tendency for conventionalaviators to think in terms of high-tech conventional platforms, then it should come as no surprise thatspecial operations aviators similarly think almost exclusively in terms of their own specializedplatforms. (149) Those that advocate increasing supporting airpower functions, such as advising allies in aviationforeign internal defense, argue that A-FID is consistent with underlying national strategy. Forexample, when the 6th Special Operations Squadron was being established, the goal was to create "aunit capable of supporting then Defense Secretary Dick Cheney's contention that 'our role is not toshoulder the burden ourselves, but to assist others in defending themselves.'" (150) These sentiments havebeen echoed by senior Bush Administration officials regarding the ongoing conflict in Iraq. A-FIDadvocates argue that the need to assist others in defending themselves is even greater today than itwas in 1991. For example: The changes brought about by 9-11 in the internationalenvironment and the direction taken by the 2003 National Security Strategy seems to make forcescapable of FID operations, not conventional warfare, the most likely force de jour for the U.S. armedforces. (151) Aviation Foreign Internal Defense (A-FID) advocates also say that A-FID allows the UnitedStates to influence the shape and capabilities of foreign air forces in ways that can not only combatinsurgents, but also promote stability vis-a-vis neighboring countries. By helping the Pakistani AirForce improve its counter guerrilla capabilities, for example, A-FID advisors could also attempt tolead Pakistan away from an air force capable of conducting deep, offensive air strikes that mightthreaten India. In essence, U.S. A-FID advisors could help Pakistan build a coast guard rather thana navy. (152) Finally,while A-FID advisors could still risk alienating local populations hostile to U.S. activity in a givencountry, the A-FID "footprint" would likely be much smaller than a direct involvement of U.S.airpower, and could reduce the chances of alienating the population. The Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC) describes A-FID as a complementto direct action. Policy makers wishing to elevate A-FID from a complement, to an activity equal inscope to AFSOC's direct action, may consider increasing the 6SOS' resources. The 6SOS' annualbudget of approximately $5.6 million is a small fraction of the Special Operations Command'sroughly $2 billion budget for procurement, RDT&E and O&M. (153) Historically, the 6SOShas encountered difficulties acquiring the types of fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft it needs to advisedeveloping-world air forces. Scholars suggest that purchasing these relatively "low tech" aircraft runscounter to Air Force cultural bias toward acquiring technologically advanced aircraft. (154) Further, 6SOSpersonnel require specialized training that allows them to operate independently in austere andforeign environments. Advocates maintain that augmenting the 6SOS budget would sustain orimprove this training, and allow the 6SOS to increase its personnel. On the other hand, advancing the Air Force's A-FID activities may require more thanincreased resources. Several observers have noted that the 6SOS' unique mission and practices havemade it something of a "redheaded stepchild" within the larger Air Force. Reportedly, the 6SOS hasexperienced considerable growing pains due to a lack of visibility and influence with Air Forceleaders. (155) Some saythat finding ways to give the 6SOS more traction within the Air Force bureaucracy may be anotherway to foster increased A-FID capabilities. They cite requesting annual reports on A-FID, orelevating the rank of the squadron's commander, currently a Lieutenant Colonel, or making this ajoint organization as three potential approaches. In November 2005 it was announced that 2,660 Marines would join the Special OperationsCommand. In addition to two battalions of "trigger pullers" approximately 800 of the Marines willbe specialists in intelligence, logistics and Foreign Internal Defense. (156) Supporters ofimproving A-FID capabilities could see this as an opportunity. If the Marine Corps is now willingto place its troops under the control of SOCOM, some might argue that the timing is right to augmentthe 6SOS with a detachment of Marine aviators. Adding Marines to the 6SOS would not justincrease the squadron's manpower, but would also likely improve knowledge and processes amongall parties, as Marine Corps experience with close air support and FID is introduced to the Air Force. Creating a joint capability in A-FID could also raise the bureaucratic prominence of the 6SOS, somemight argue. Others might argue that such joint "marriages" tend to take time to implement, and thatthe cultural melding of Air Force and Marine Corps aviation assets won't likely happen in the nearfuture.

Summary: By all accounts, the U.S. military dominates state-on-state conflict. In the past, non-stateactors (terrorists, guerrillas, drug traffickers) appeared to be less threatening to U.S. national securitythan the well funded, well organized, and potent armed forces of an enemy nation-state. The terroristattacks of September 11, 2001 illustrate, however, that small groups of non-state actors can exploitrelatively inexpensive and commercially available technology to conduct very destructive attacksover great distances. Today's U.S. armed forces were developed principally with state-on-state conflict in mind.Combating non-state actors, however, presents a number of distinct challenges in terms ofoperations, cost, and mindset. Non-state actors generally strive to hide within civilian populations.While U.S. policy makers typically seek quick and decisive victories, non-state actors seek protractedwar. Non-state actors often employ cheap, commercially available weapons, that often result inexpensive responses by the United States. Many of the weapons and methods employed today by U.S. armed forces can be used againstnon-state actors. Some, however, are more directly applicable than others. U.S. experience inconducting close air support (CAS), employing special operations forces (SOF) and advising friendlygovernments in using aviation to defend themselves from insurgents and terrorists may form a basisfor building capabilities against non-state actors. Pursuing objectives against non-state actors while "winning the hearts and minds" of localpopulations, or at least not alienating them, appears to be a key consideration. Recent military actionhas killed or captured prominent terrorists, but it is unclear whether this action actually degraded theterrorist organization's capabilities. In some cases, these actions may have even strengthened them. There is a consensus view that airpower is one of the United States' great military advantages.Some are increasingly concerned, however, that military aviation is focused too much on thedemands of fighting conventional foes to the detriment of irregular warfare (also called MOOTWA-- military operations other than war), and that the Department of Defense (DOD) must re-shape itsaviation forces to increase their relevance in small wars, while maintaining the capability to winmajor conflicts. Determination of DOD needs for combating non-state actors and fielding more relevantforces raises a number of acquisition issues. Some argue that DOD's overall acquisition prioritiesare still too oriented toward large, "high tech" acquisition programs most applicable to fighting ordeterring a peer competitor in state-on-state conflict. Equally important, however, are the mindsetchanges that may be required to transition to a force equally adept at fighting conventional and nonconventional foes. These mindset changes could include changes to training, doctrine, planning andorganization. This report will be updated as events warrant.