RS21529 -- Al Qaeda after the Iraq Conflict May 23, 2003 There is a great deal that remains unknown or debatable about the specific nature, size, structure and reach of the organization, despite many years of studyingit. For example, Western experts are not exactly sure how many members it has now or has had in the past. Estimates are often based upon an approximationof how many people trained in Al Qaeda camps in Afghanistan and Sudan. The estimates range as high as60,000 (7) and as low as 20,000. (8) These assessmentsare inexact in part because the total number of camps that operated is not firmly agreed. (9) But even if experts knew the correct total number of camps andtrainees, not all the people who took the training necessarily became (or remained) actual members of theorganization. (10) The State Department estimatesthatAl Qaeda "probably has several thousand members and associates." (11) But since these are all estimates, it is not known what proportion of AlQaeda membersU.S. and allied forces have captured or killed. (12) But do operatives even necessarily need to be members? It is apparent from some of those apprehended in failed plots that it is not essential to be formally "in"Al Qaeda in order to carry out attacks. Operatives seem to vary, from the best-trained, controlled and financedprofessional cadres, such as Mohammed Atta(who led the September 11th attacks), to less-trained and relatively uncontrolled volunteers, such asAhmed Ressam (who intended to blow up Los AngelesInternational Airport) and Richard Reid (who tried to detonate plastic explosives in his shoes aboard an AmericanAirlines transatlantic flight). (13) Al Qaedaeven acts like a foundation at times, reportedly giving grants to existing local terrorist groups who present"promising" plans for attacks that serve theorganization's general goals. (14) Unlike manytraditional terrorist groups, Al Qaeda has no single standard operating procedure, although it does have awell-developed manual for its operations. Benefitting from Osama bin Laden's considerable experience in business,the organization is said to be structuredlike a modern corporation, reflective of management concepts of the early 1990s, including bottom-up and top-downnetworks, a common "mission statement,"and entrepreneurial thinking even at the lowest levels. This makes it extraordinarily flexible and, many believe, ableto survive serious blows. (15) Al Qaeda has also developed strong ties to other terrorist organizations, some new and some long-standing. (16) Osama bin Laden formed an umbrella group inlate 1998, "The International Islamic Front for Jihad Against Jews and Crusaders," which included not only AlQaeda, but also groups from Egypt, Algeria,Pakistan, and Bangladesh. Some argue that Al Qaeda has been something of a hybrid terrorist organization for sometime. (17) A sampling of groups currentlythought to be connected includes the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (Philippines), Jemaah Islamiah (SoutheastAsia), Egyptian Islamic Jihad (merged with AlQaeda in 2001), Al-ansar Mujahidin (Chechnya), al-Gamaa al-Islamiya (Egypt, and has a worldwide presence), AbuSayyaf (Philippines), the IslamicMovement of Uzbekistan, and Harakat ul-Mujahidin (Pakistan/Kashmir). The list is illustrative, not comprehensive. Some experts see increased reliance onconnections to other groups as a sign of Al Qaeda's weakness; others point to enhanced cooperation with othergroups as a worrisome indicator of strength,especially with groups that formerly focused on local issues and now display evidence of convergence on Al Qaeda'sinternational anti-U.S., anti-West agenda. An important question is whether Al Qaeda might be evolving further into a new form, more like a movement thana formal organization, increasingly diffuseinternationally and less reliant upon its own membership. Clearly Al Qaeda is in transition. Whether that transition will lead to something more or less dangerous is a point of contention. On one hand, clear progress inapprehending or killing senior leaders of Al Qaeda has been evident. In recent weeks, President Bush announcedthat the United States has captured about halfthe senior leadership; (18) other sources claim thatabout a third have been captured. (19) Many of theseterrorist leaders have been crucial participants in past AlQaeda attacks; the arrests of September 11 plotter and third-in-command Khalid Shaikh Mohammed and operationschief Abu Zubaydah, for example, arebelieved to have hurt the organization and disrupted its operations. According to U.S. officials, the organization'sprevious communications network hasapparently been crippled, its leaders are on the run, and its Afghanistan base has been largely eliminated. (20) Still, Al Qaeda is not like a state, whose regime you can remove in order to disable it. Counterterrorism officials describe it more as an organic structure thatadapts to changing circumstances, including the loss of some senior leaders. The two most senior leaders, Osamabin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri, are widelybelieved to be alive and at large, and terrorism experts argue over the extent to which a succession plan is in effectto replace those who have been captured. (21) During the week before the Riyadh attacks, email interviews conducted by the London-based magazine AlMajalla apparently with Al Qaeda spokesman Thabetbin Qais claimed that Al Qaeda had undertaken a thorough restructuring of its leadership. (22) One of the worrisome aspects of the attack itselfwas the apparentinvolvement of people thought to have been lower-level fighters who may have now stepped into the breach. Forexample, Khaled Jehani, who was previouslyconsidered a low-level operative, seems to have been involved in the Riyadh operation. (23) Also mentioned is Seif al-Adel, one of a number of younger AlQaeda members who seem to have gained influence in the absence of former leaders and who may have played arole. (24) Many worry that this could illustratean evolution within Al Qaeda to a new generation. (25) This, as well as other evidence in the attack itself, seems to demonstrate a level of central direction. Finally, some believe that there has been a spike in recruitment to the network as a result of the U.S. militaryoperations in Iraq, leading to a worry that, despiteits serious recent losses, Al Qaeda could grow stronger in future months. (26) Ultimately, the debate about Al Qaeda's current status centers on the important question of whether it is growing or declining in strength. In the wake of theAfghanistan and Iraq military campaigns, when the predicted terrorist attacks on the United States and its interestsdid not materialize, what is the current levelof threat to the United States? Most believe that the denial of safe havens and arrests of senior leaders have seriously crippled the organization when judged by its earlier form. However, itmay be evolving into something new. For terrorist groups, periods of evolution can be particularly dangerous. Organizations in transition can be especiallyvulnerable to disruption and destruction, but they can also be less predictable and prone to lash out in order to causeadditional damage, rally flaggingsupporters, and/or prove their continuing viability. (27) With respect to Al Qaeda, evidence of new sophisticated operations, a possible succession planin action,central coordination of attacks, and growing international ties, all increasingly converging on a commoninternational agenda hostile to the United States and itsallies, may give U.S. officials new reason for concern. In the short term at least, even successes in counterterroristoperations against a more decentralizedorganization can lead to greater difficulty in collecting reliable intelligence, as the paths of communication areincreasingly unfamiliar, the personalities arechanging, and the locations of operatives are more diffuse. While the long term trajectory is very difficult to assess,for the time being it seems that Al Qaeda(or its successors) has emerged from a period of inactivity and remains a very serious threat, requiring concentratedattention and vigorous countermeasures onthe part of its prospective targets. Congress may face a number of questions in the coming months. These include How does U.S. counterterrorism policy need to adapt to match the changingthreat of Al Qaeda and its associated groups? Is there a need for strategic reassessment of the successes and failuresof U.S. counterterrorism policy in thepost-Iraq strategic environment, not only in the military and intelligence fields but also in foreign policy, lawenforcement, international cooperation, publicdiplomacy, foreign aid, homeland security, and elsewhere? Are there places where U.S. policies in a given area arenow no longer meeting the challenge, arepotentially counterproductive, or where funding is inadequate or misplaced? How will the U.S. occupation of Iraqaffect the changing regional terrorist threat? To what degree will regime change in Iraq alter the overall international terrorist threat to the United States at homeand abroad? Will progress, or the lackthereof, in achieving an Israeli-Palestinian peace agreement and resolving sensitive issues such as the conflicts inKashmir, southern Philippines, Chechnya, andelsewhere affect Al Qaeda's prospects?

Summary: The May 12, 2003, suicide bombings of three Western housing compounds in Riyadh,Saudi Arabia reopenedquestions about the strength and viability of Al Qaeda in the post-Iraq conflict environment. The apprehension ofa number of senior Al Qaeda leaders in recentmonths, combined with the absence of major terrorist attacks during the military campaign in Iraq, had led someto believe that Al Qaeda was severely crippledand unable to launch major attacks. Others argued that the organization was in transition to a more decentralizedstructure, had gained new recruits, and mighteven be a growing threat. This report analyzes current viewpoints about the state of Al Qaeda and the threat it posesto the United States. It will be updated asevents warrant.