On October 7, 2004, the Senate rejected, by a vote of 23-74, a proposal by Senator JohnMcCain to transfer jurisdiction over appropriations related to funding intelligence matters from theSenate Appropriations Committee to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. (1) On October 9, 2004, theSenate adopted S.Res. 445, which included a provision establishing a new Subcommittee onIntelligence within the Senate Committee on Appropriations (for more information on this approach,see "Current Legislation" below). On July 22, 2004, the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States(also known as the 9/11 Commission) issued its final report on the September 11, 2001, attacks onthe World Trade Center and the Pentagon. The report contained the commission's findings as wellas its recommendations for corrective measures that can be taken to improve the protection of theUnited States against future terrorist attacks. In its report, the commission stated that existingcongressional oversight of intelligence was "dysfunctional," due to the limitations of the existingcongressional intelligence authorizing committees. (2) The commission recommended two alternative proposals to changethe current intelligence committee structure: (1) replace the existing Senate and House SelectIntelligence Committees with a joint committee on intelligence; or (2) consolidate intelligenceappropriation and authorization functions in the existing intelligence authorizing committees, therebyenhancing the power of the authorizing committees. The commission explained: Whichever of these two forms are chosen, thegoal should be a structure -- codified by resolution with powers expressly granted and carefullylimited -- allowing a relatively small group of [M]embers of Congress, given time and reason tomaster the subject and the agencies, to conduct oversight of the intelligence establishment and beclearly accountable for their work. The staff of this committee should be nonpartisan and work forthe entire committee and not for individual members. (3) This report focuses on the commission's second proposal, to consolidate appropriation andauthorization functions in the existing Senate and House Select Intelligence Committees. The report(1) describes the proposal; (2) compares it to the existing committee system; (3) describes a 19thcentury precedent for consolidation; (4) provides selected arguments in favor of consolidation as wellas against; (5) discusses two alternatives to consolidating authorization and appropriation functions:a Joint Committee on Intelligence and separate intelligence appropriations subcommittees in theSenate and House Committees on Appropriations; and (6) describes current legislation. For information on the proposed joint committee on intelligence, see CRS Report RL32525 , A Joint Committee on Intelligence: Proposals and Options From the 9/11 Commission and Others ,by [author name scrubbed]; and CRS Report RL32538(pdf) , 9/11 Commission Recommendations: JointCommittee on Atomic Energy -- A Model for Congressional Oversight? , by [author name scrubbed],both available at http://www.crs.gov/ . The 9/11 Commission proposes combining intelligence authorization and appropriationauthorities under a single committee in each chamber, specifically, the existing Senate and Houseselect intelligence authorization committees. The commission would transfer jurisdiction overintelligence appropriations from the Senate and House Appropriations Committees to the intelligenceauthorization committees. The commission also recommends (1) reducing the membership of the intelligencecommittees from the existing 17 Senate panel members and 20 House panel members (plus two exofficio members on each) to seven or nine members in each chamber; and (2) making the terms ofthe committees' members indefinite, as opposed to the existing term limits. (4) In addition, the commissioncalls for both intelligence committees to be granted subpoena power. The commission is in favorof continuing the policy of reserving seats on each intelligence committee for one member of eachof the following panels: the Committees on Armed Services; Foreign Affairs (or InternationalRelations); and the Judiciary; and the Defense Appropriations Subcommittees. (5) Currently, authorization and appropriation authorities for discretionary spending are underthe jurisdiction of two separate types of committees. Authorizing committees are responsible forreporting legislation that establishes, continues, or modifies agencies, program, projects, or activities(referred to as authorizing measures). The Senate and House Appropriations Committees reportmeasures that providing funding (budget authority (6) ) for certain agencies, programs, projects, and activities(appropriations measures). The Senate and House Committees on Appropriations have jurisdiction over appropriationsfor the intelligence community. The Senate and House Select Intelligence Committees and ArmedServices Committees generally have jurisdiction over intelligence authorizations. Appropriations Jurisdiction. Under the Senateand House Appropriations Committees, jurisdiction over appropriations for the 15 agencies (or units)of the intelligence community is split among five subcommittees. (7) All of the intelligenceagencies and units are administratively part of various U.S. departments, except two: the CentralIntelligence Agency (CIA) and the Office of the Director of Central Intelligence. Appropriations forall other intelligence agencies and units are reported by the subcommittees with jurisdiction over theparent department. The bulk of intelligence appropriations are under the jurisdiction of the Senate and HouseDefense Appropriations Subcommittees, which have jurisdiction over all Department of Defenseintelligence spending. The 9/11 Commission reports: "[i]ntelligence agencies under the Departmentof Defense (DOD) account for approximately 80 percent of all U.S. spending forintelligence...." (8) The CIAand Office of the Director of Central Intelligence are also under the jurisdiction of the DefenseAppropriations Subcommittees. (For Senate and House aApropriations Subcommittees withjurisdiction over the intelligence entities, see Table 1 .) Authorizing Jurisdiction. The budget of theintelligence community is divided into three components: National Foreign Intelligence Program;Joint Military Intelligence Program; and Tactical Intelligence and Related Activities. The distinctionbetween these programs is generally functional, as opposed to organizational. The National ForeignIntelligence Program funds all foreign intelligence and counterintelligence activities that supportnational needs, as opposed to single departmental needs. The Joint Military Intelligence Programsupports DOD-wide activities, as opposed to individual military service needs. The TacticalIntelligence and Related Activities component funds DOD tactical military intelligence activities tomeet needs of the individual military services. DOD agencies funded by the National Foreign Intelligence Program and the DODcomponents include Defense Intelligence Agency; National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency;National Reconnaissance Office; and National Security Agency. The National Foreign IntelligenceProgram also provides funding for (1) Central Intelligence Agency (CIA); (2) Director of CentralIntelligence; (3) Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Department of State); (4) Directorate ofInformation Analysis and Infrastructure Protection and Directorate of Coast Guard Intelligence(Department of Homeland Security); (5) Office of Intelligence (Department of Energy); (6) Officeof Intelligence and the Counterterrorism and Counterintelligence Divisions (Federal Bureau ofInvestigation (FBI), Department of Justice); and (7) Office of Terrorism and Finance Intelligence(Department of the Treasury). Authorization of the intelligence community is predominantly exercised by the Senate andHouse Select Intelligence Committees and Armed Services Committees; however, other committeesmay also have jurisdiction over some intelligence activities. Table 1. Senate and House Appropriations Subcommittee Jurisdiction over Intelligence CommunityEntities a. The source of the list of intelligence community entities is U.S. National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, The 9/11Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (Washington: GPO, 2004), pp.407-408. Senate. In the Senate, the SelectCommittee on Intelligence exercises jurisdiction over authorizations ofappropriations, both direct and indirect, for the following: (9) Central Intelligence Agency; Director of Central Intelligence; Defense Intelligence Agency; National Security Agency; National Geospatial-IntelligenceAgency; Intelligence activities of other agencies and units ofDOD; Intelligence activities of the Department ofState; Intelligence activities of the Federal Bureau of Investigation,including all activities of the Office of Intelligence; and Any department, agency, or subdivision which is a successorto any agency named above. (10) The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence exercises jurisdiction overauthorizations of one of the components, National Foreign Intelligence Program. TheSenate Committee on Armed Services exercises jurisdiction over the other twocomponents, DOD's Joint Military Intelligence Program and Tactical Intelligence andRelated Agencies, in consultation with the Select Intelligence Committee. "As such,intelligence activities and programs are authorized both in an annual intelligenceauthorization and an annual defense authorization." (11) Smallerportions of intelligence activities are under the jurisdiction of several otherauthorizing committees (Senate Committees on Energy and Natural Resources,Finance, Foreign Relations, and the Judiciary). Other authorizing committees may obtain a sequential referral of billsreported from the Select Intelligence Committees that include matters under theirjurisdiction, and the intelligence committee has corresponding authority with respectto bills reported from other committees. The Senate Committee on Armed Servicesroutinely exercises this authority, while others have not. House. In the House, the PermanentSelect Committee on Intelligence exercises jurisdiction over legislation for andauthorization of the entire intelligence community. It has exclusive jurisdiction overonly the National Foreign Intelligence Program, including the CIA and theIntelligence Community staff. The committee shares jurisdiction over the other twocomponents of the intelligence community, DOD's Joint Military IntelligenceProgram and Tactical Intelligence and Related Activities, with the House Committeeon Armed Services, typically through sequential referrals. Other committees mightclaim jurisdiction to study and review an intelligence or intelligence-related activityto the extent the activity directly affects a matter under their jurisdiction. (12) Sequentialreferral authority, similar to the Senate's authority, also applies to House committeeswith jurisdiction over intelligence. As Congress analyzes the commission's proposals, it may consider changingthe jurisdictions over intelligence of the various authorization committees. It couldconsider, for example, consolidating the authorization authority over the intelligencecommunity in the House and Senate Select Intelligence Committees. Examples ofsuch consolidation would include providing (1) the Senate Select IntelligenceCommittee with jurisdiction over the entire intelligence community; (2) both selectIntelligence Committees with exclusive jurisdiction over intelligence; or (3) SelectIntelligence Committees in both houses with exclusive jurisdiction over a portion ofthe intelligence community. Congress may also be called upon to consider proposalsto provide exclusive jurisdiction over a new National Intelligence Program, asproposed by the 9/11 Commission. The suggested reorganization would replace theNational Foreign Intelligence Program with a National Intelligence Program thatwould be headed by a new National Intelligence Director. One of the commission'sarguments in support of transferring intelligence appropriations is that it would helpensure implementation of the commission's proposals to consolidate intelligence inthe executive branch (see "Arguments in Favor of Consolidation" below). Separate standing committees for spending and authorization have been acongressional fixture for two centuries. In the late 19th century, jurisdiction overseveral general appropriations bills was transferred from spending committees toauthorization committees and then, after World War I, returned. Since the House recognized the House Committee on Ways and Means as astanding committee in 1802, (13) and the Senate established the Senate Committeeon Finance in 1816, Congress has had separate standing committees for spending andauthorization. The House Ways and Means and Senate Finance Committees hadjurisdiction over both revenue measures and general appropriation bills (14) until theend of the Civil War. In 1865 and 1867, the House and Senate AppropriationsCommittees, respectively, were established and jurisdiction over generalappropriation bills was transferred to the new committees. Both appropriationscommittees have been in existence for almost 140 years. Beginning in the last quarter of the 19th century, the House and Senateconsolidated the appropriation and authorization functions of certain activities bytransferring jurisdiction over several general appropriations bills from the Senate andHouse Appropriations Committees to various authorization committees. In theHouse, the process began in 1878 (15) and was completed in 1885, when six of the billswere transferred. In total, eight of the 14 general appropriations bills were transferredto various authorization committees. (16) This consolidation also fragmented jurisdictionover appropriations bills among several committees, reducing central committeecontrol over spending. The House fragmentation lasted approximately 35 years, untilall general appropriations bills were re-centralized in the House AppropriationsCommittee in 1920. In 1899, the Senate transferred jurisdiction over seven of the 14 generalappropriations bills to various authorization committees. (17) Accordingto the committee history of the Senate Appropriations Committee, one additional bill,the Rivers and Harbors bill, had not been considered a general appropriations bill andhad been under the jurisdiction of the Committee on Commerce since 1826. (18) In 1922,the Senate re-centralized jurisdiction over all the general appropriations bills in theSenate Appropriations Committee. Scholars have suggested various theories to explain support for thefragmentation of appropriating authority. (19) Prominent among these opinions are that: House rank-and-file Members revolted because it was felt theHouse Appropriations Committee was emphasizing economy at the expense of theirdistricts' needs; Some Representatives felt the Appropriations Committee'sdistribution of spending was geographically biased; Some House Members felt the House AppropriationsCommittee had too much power and was using it inappropriately; Some Representatives wanted a more equitable distribution ofcongressional power; Some House Members wanted to reduce the influence of the1885 chair of the House Appropriations Committee, Samuel J. Randall, for policyand/or personal reasons; Executive agencies and others opposed various practicesCongress had implemented to maintain control over the national pursestrings; Junior Senators wanted greater access to power; and Some Senators opposed the dominance of 20 Senators on theAppropriations and Finance Committees. Some scholars have found that the devolution of several appropriations billsto authorizing committees, in part, contributed to the increase in spending thatoccurred after the decentralization. One of the scholars, political scientist Charles H.Stewart III, argues that other factors, such as the economy and wars, also contributedto the spending increase. (20) The House in 1920 and the Senate in 1922 resumed the separation ofauthorization and appropriation functions. In response to the dramatic increase inexpenditures and the national debt as a result of World War I, (21) Congressdecided to centralize budgetary decisionmaking in both the executive and legislativebranches. In 1920, the House re-centralized all the general appropriations bills in theHouse Appropriations Committees. A year later, Congress passed the Budget andAccounting Act of 1921, which established the Bureau of the Budget (laterreorganized as the Office of Management and Budget) and gave the President theresponsibility for preparing and submitting the annual budget to Congress. (22) Shortlythereafter, the Bureau of the Budget recommended reorganizing generalappropriations bills on administrative rather than topical lines. The HouseAppropriations Committee soon adopted this recommendation. Proceduraldifficulties arose almost immediately, however. While the House had reorganizedits bills along administrative lines and had re-centralized all the appropriations billsunder the House Appropriations Committee, the Senate continued to organize its billsalong topical lines and to fragment committee jurisdiction of appropriations billsamong several committees. As a result, in 1922, the Senate re-centralized all generalappropriations bills in the Senate Appropriations Committee and accepted theorganization of appropriations bills along administrative lines. (23) As during the earlier period, fragmentation of committee jurisdiction overspending exists today. Currently, most spending is controlled by the Senate Financeand House Ways and Means Committees (by virtue of their jurisdiction over majorentitlement programs) and the Senate and House Appropriations Committees. Comparatively small amounts of spending are under the jurisdiction of several otherauthorizing committees, generally in the form of entitlements. Examples ofentitlement programs include Social Security, Medicare, unemploymentcompensation, and various veterans benefit programs. Approximately 57% of allFY2003 spending was for entitlements; about 38% was controlled by theappropriations committees. (24) There are significant differences between the earlier period and today thatlimit the applicability of this precedent to the 9/11 Commission proposal. First, themeans by which authorization committees perform their basic function has changed. Authorization committees are basically responsible for evaluating the effectivenessof various existing and potential programs and policies, or assessing program quality(the program-quality analysis ). Appropriations committees are responsible forselecting items to be funded, determining the funding levels of each, and examiningwhether funds are spent according to congressional intent (the budget analysis ). During the earlier period, authorization bills were permanent law that established anagency and provided broad missions for the agency. Those enactments did notexplicitly provide authorization of subsequent appropriations. Occasionally, theoriginal act was amended by a subsequent authorization act. Annual appropriationsacts typically provided more detailed guidance to the agency than the authorizationact by setting funding levels for individual activities within the agency. Today,authorizations for discretionary spending (25) agencies and programs frequently providespending guidance to the appropriations committees, through authorization ofappropriations. They are typically temporary, on an annual or multi-year cycle. (26) In manycases, they establish and change programs or projects and also provide detaileddirectives to the agencies as well. Second, the 9/11 Commission proposal would transfer jurisdiction over allintelligence appropriations, for both the program activities and administrativeactivities, to the select intelligence committees. During the earlier period onlyprogram expenses were generally transferred. Earlier, appropriations bills wereorganized by topic, generally separating program activities of a department from itssalaries and contingent expenses. (27) As a result, the military activities of the WarDepartment, for example, were under the jurisdiction of the Committees on MilitaryAffairs (authorizing committees), while the salaries and contingent expenses of thecivilian administration of the War Department were under the jurisdiction of theAppropriations Committees. Today, appropriations measures are organized alongadministrative lines; funding for both programs and salaries of a department (oragency) are included in the same regular appropriations bill. Third, there are different institutional controls for spending today. During theearlier period, there was no institutionalized mechanism to coordinate revenue andspending decisions or establish enforceable spending ceilings. Today, under thecongressional budget process, Congress (1) sets annual total spending ceilings andrevenue floors; (2) distributes the spending among the various committees withjurisdiction, setting committee spending ceilings; and (3) may enforce these decisionsthrough points of order and a reconciliation process. (28) In order to inform Members of Congress and the public of the effect ofcongressional budgetary decisions and to provide information for budget enforcementpurposes, much of the budgetary information is publicly available. The variousspending ceilings are available, including the total spending ceilings, committeespending ceilings, and appropriations subcommittee ceilings. Funding levelsprovided in measures considered by Congress are also available. Spending prioritiesare publicly debated during consideration of the annual budget resolution. Membersenforce spending ceilings publicly through points of order on the Senate and Housefloors. The classified character of intelligence spending might present difficulties fortransferring intelligence appropriations to the authorization committees. Under theexisting budget process, the spending ceilings associated with the intelligenceauthorization committees could not be publicly enforced. Neither the total ceilingsfor the intelligence committees nor the total amount of spending provided in theintelligence appropriations bills would be public. Therefore, intelligenceappropriations would not be part of the congressional budget process. While the 9/11Commission recommended declassification of total intelligence spending, manyMembers are opposed. (29) Members may consider a modification of theexisting budget process that would allow the inclusion of classified spending. Under present practices, classified intelligence spending has been made a partof the annual budget process by including the bulk of it in the regular Defenseappropriations bills. The intelligence spending has been hidden in lump-sumamounts in the annual Defense regular appropriations bills. These bills are a part ofthe congressional budget process. Spending ceilings for the appropriationssubcommittees with jurisdiction, Defense Appropriations Subcommittees, areenforceable and publicly available. The total amount provided in these bills ispublicly available. These bills are also subject to other spending ceilings associatedwith the annual budget resolution. Improve Congressional Oversight (30) ofIntelligence . The 9/11 Commission states that adopting its package of congressionalintelligence oversight reforms and, in particular, either of its committee restructuringproposals, would substantially improve the current inadequate congressionalintelligence oversight capability. "Under the terms of existing rules and resolutions,"the commission reasoned, "the House and Senate intelligence committees lack thepower, influence, and sustained capability" (31) to meet thenation's daunting intelligence challenges. Supporting the transfer of appropriationsauthority, the vice chair of the 9/11 Commission, former Representative Lee H.Hamilton, told the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence that "unlessyou have the power of the purse, unless you can control the money, you're not goingto get effective oversight." (32) Supporters furthermore contend that stronger intelligence oversightcommittees are needed due to the secretive nature of intelligence. FormerRepresentative Hamilton also argued: The only place you get independentoversight of the intelligence community is in Congress. You don't get it in the media;they don't have the information. You don't get it in special interest groups; they don'thave the information, either. Only you [Congress] can give robust oversight.... Wethink a robust oversight by the Congress is hugely important to monitor what goeson and to keep an eye on the activities of this vast intelligence community, whichoperates as it must in secrecy. (33) Contribute Toward Implementing the 9/11 Commission's ProposedNational Intelligence Director and National Counterterrorism Center. Proponents argue that transferring appropriations authority to the intelligenceauthorizing committees would help ensure successful implementation of thecommission's proposals to establish a National Intelligence Director (NID) andNational Counterterrorism Center (NCTC). The 9/11 Commission states: "[u]nityof effort in executive management can be lost if it is fractured by dividedcongressional oversight." (34) Existing committee jurisdiction over intelligenceagencies and activities that would constitute the NID is spread over severalauthorization committees and appropriations subcommittees. Proponents explain asingle committee in each chamber would improve efforts to promote a systematicreview of executive branch intelligence activities. Counter-Balance Proposed Centralization of Executive BranchIntelligence. The 9/11 Commission proposes centralizing executive branch nationalintelligence authority under a National Intelligence Director. Some argue that aconsolidation of appropriation and authorization functions (or establishing a jointcommittee) is needed to provide additional control over the executive branchcentralization of intelligence power. The consolidation would provide theintelligence committees with budgetary leverage over the executive branch to ensurestrong congressional checks. (35) Provide Clear Congressional Accountability. Some proponents reason thatconsolidating intelligence authorization and appropriation into a single committee ineach chamber ensures clear congressional accountability. There would be a singlecommittee in each chamber that would be responsible for intelligence, instead of atleast two committees in each chamber: the respective Select Committees onIntelligence and Committees on Appropriations. Reduce Conflicting Congressional Directives to Intelligence Entities. Under the existing committee structure, the Select Intelligence Committees proposevarious intelligence policies and programs for the intelligence community. TheAppropriations Committees may provide conflicting direction to the intelligencecommunity through, for example, the funding decisions they make regarding eachintelligence policy and program. Consolidation would reduce these conflictingdirectives. Provide More Integrated Perspective on National Intelligence. Othersmaintain consolidation is needed to ensure that intelligence spending decisions aremade within the context of a more integrated perspective on national intelligence needs than exists today. That is, the needs of various programs and entities in theintelligence community are evaluated and coordinated, and the intelligence spendingpriorities are established. This approach contrasts with current practices in theappropriations subcommittees, which, it is argued, focus on the intelligence needs ofindividual departments (the departmental perspective on intelligence ). The DefenseAppropriations Subcommittees, for example, may focus on the military intelligenceneeds of the Department of Defense at the expense of national intelligence needs. Some also argue that under present arrangements, intelligence needssometimes may not be adequately funded due to competing non-intelligence needs,since the appropriations subcommittees must balance spending needs of bothintelligence and non-intelligence programs and activities. Attract Members to Intelligence Committees. Transferring jurisdictionover appropriations to the intelligence committees might make membership on thosecommittees more attractive. Intelligence committees may also become moreattractive if the 9/11 Commission's proposal to change membership on theintelligence committees from limited terms to indefinite terms is adopted. Increasingthe attractiveness of intelligence committee membership would help to ensurecontinuity of membership and, therefore, more informed and consistent oversight. Reduce Oversight of Program Quality. Opponents maintain thatconsolidation would significantly reduce oversight of program quality. Under theexisting separation of the two functions, authorization committees are responsible forprogram quality (the program-quality analysis ) and the appropriations committeesare responsible for items of appropriations and for examining whether funds are spentaccording to congressional intent (the budget analysis ). Under contemporaryconditions, budgetary control is frequently considered the more important form ofpower, but budget analysis requires substantial expenditures of time and effort. Asa result, it is possible that committees with consolidated jurisdiction would focuschiefly on this aspect of their work, and that program quality might consequentlyreceive inadequate attention. May Weaken Intelligence Oversight. Some opponents argue that due to thesecretive nature of intelligence, providing only one committee in each chamber withjurisdiction over intelligence oversight would weaken oversight. As mentionedpreviously, Congress is the only institution able to conduct intelligence oversight. In order to reduce the chances of enactment of faulty policies, checks and balanceswithin Congress are needed, such as an authorization committee and anappropriations committee with different responsibilities. Competitive analysis ofintelligence in Congress would also be lost if a single committee had jurisdictionover intelligence. There is also congressional concern that if the two intelligencecommittees eventually develop close, supportive relationships with the intelligenceagencies, rigorous congressional intelligence oversight would be weakened, notstrengthened. Some argue that it would be less likely that four separate committeeswould be co-opted. Shortchange Intelligence Needs of the Military. Some might contend thatthe proposal would result in a detrimental shift in intelligence spending prioritiesfrom the intelligence needs of the military to those of national policymakers. Underthe existing committee structure, the Defense Appropriations Subcommittees focusprimarily on intelligence needs of the military. Senator Daniel K. Inouye, RankingMember of the Senate Defense Appropriations Subcommittee, stated: Linking Defense and Intelligenceis critical. DOD cannot operate without good intelligence. The DefenseSubcommittee has ensured that intelligence resources support the needs of thewarfighter. Today, the Defense Subcommittee reviews the recommendations of boththe Armed Services and Intelligence Committees. The Appropriations Committeecan minimize redundancies and make sure that the needs of both Defense andIntelligence are met. (36) Increase Spending. Some maintain that if intelligence spending remainsclassified and appropriations are transferred to the Select Intelligence Committees,institutional checks on funding for intelligence will be reduced, and spending willtherefore tend to increase. Under present arrangements, as explained above in Comparison of Earlier Period to Today , much information on intelligence spendingis not publicly available. As a result, ceilings set on total intelligence spending couldnot be enforced through the existing congressional budget process. Some may arguethat, without visible spending controls, there would be little ability to restrainintelligence spending. Set a Precedent for Dispersion of Appropriations. In the opinion of someMembers, transferring intelligence appropriations to the select intelligencecommittees might set a precedent for transferring appropriations for otherdiscretionary spending programs and activities to applicable authorizing committees. Other Members of Congress may support establishing such a precedent. Opponentsof the proposal to merge authorization and appropriation functions could maintainthat any piecemeal or major overhaul of the current committee structure should bepreceded by a thorough analysis of the effect such a change would have. Congressshould examine, for example, the possible delay in completing appropriations billsthat such a merger might create. One suggested solution is to restructure thejurisdiction of the Senate and House authorization committees. Concentrate Too Much Power in Intelligence Committees. Intelligencecommittees with jurisdiction over both authorization and appropriations, in theopinion of some, might be too powerful, particularly if the intelligence committeesalso have exclusive authorization jurisdiction. Currently, the funding decisions ofthe appropriations committees about intelligence policies and programs may providea check, review, and constraint on the policy decisions of the intelligencecommittees. Under a structure that consolidates authorization and appropriationjurisdiction, this check would be lost. In addition, reducing the size of the intelligence committee and changingmembership to indefinite terms could have the long-term effect of reducing thenumber of Members with knowledge of the secret intelligence policies and practices. As a result, it is possible that fewer Members will be willing to question theintelligence committees recommendations. May Require a Bicameral Approach. If only one chamber transfersappropriations jurisdiction to its select intelligence committee, opponents mightargue that fewer of the claimed benefits of a unified policy focus would be realized. In addition, difficulties in the conference process would result. The Senate andHouse Appropriations Subcommittees have traditionally had parallel jurisdictionsover individual regular appropriations bills, and each subcommittee pair hasconferenced on a single regular appropriations bill. The result would be one chamberapproving a unified intelligence appropriation bill, and the other passing a defenseappropriations bill containing most intelligence, while with the rest would be in otherappropriations bills. The defense appropriations bill in the latter chamber, unlike thatin the former, would include both intelligence and non-intelligence spending, aswould the other appropriations bills containing intelligence spending. (37) Opponentsof consolidation might maintain that it is unclear how measures passed by the twochambers would be reconciled in a final version of the legislation. Congress is considering various alternatives to the 9/11 Commission proposalto consolidate authorization and appropriation. Two are discussed below. The firstis the 9/11 Commission's other recommendation: a Joint Committee on Intelligence. The second is a proposal to establish an Intelligence Appropriations Subcommitteein each of the Senate and House Appropriations Committees. As an alternative to combining intelligence authorization and appropriationauthorities, the 9/11 Commission recommended replacing the existing Senate andHouse select intelligence authorization committees with a joint committee onintelligence. This joint committee would be modeled after the former JointCommittee on Atomic Energy (joint committee, 1947-1977). (For more information,see CRS Report RL32538(pdf) , 9/11 Commission Recommendations: Joint Committee onAtomic Energy -- A Model for Congressional Oversight? , by [author name scrubbed].) The Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, which had jurisdiction over theformer Atomic Energy Commission and nuclear energy, was established as an18-member committee with an equal number of Members from each chamber. Virtually unique among joint committees, the Joint Committee on Atomic Energyhad authority to report legislation to both the Senate and House. (38) Those who have studied the joint committee have concluded that it becameone of the most powerful committees of Congress. There are several reasons for thejoint committee's power. The joint committee had exclusive legislative and oversightjurisdiction and, therefore, committee policy competition was limited to the Senateand House Appropriations Committees. Also, the joint committee had exclusiveaccess to restricted data not available to other congressional committees, and strongleverage over the nuclear activities of the executive branch. (39) (Fordetailed information on the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, see CRS Report RL32525 , A Joint Committee on Intelligence: Proposals and Options From the 9/11Commission and Others .) Another alternative proposal calls for the establishment of separateintelligence appropriations subcommittees in the Senate and House AppropriationsCommittees. This option would transfer intelligence appropriations from the existingappropriations subcommittees, predominantly the Defense AppropriationsSubcommittees, to the new intelligence subcommittees. This recommendation, proponents reason, would have several advantagesover the 9/11 Commission recommendation. It would retain program-quality andbudget analyses in separate appropriations and authorization committees, whichwould be lost under the 9/11 Commission's proposal. Also, it would not concentratepower predominantly in a single committee in each chamber or set a precedent fortransferring appropriations to authorization committees, and it would likely be more easily implemented than the 9/11 Commission recommendation. Another argument offered in favor of this approach is that it retains certainadvantages of the 9/11 Commission's consolidation proposal. Proponents state, forexample, that intelligence spending decisions would be based on a morecomprehensive national perspective on intelligence. Some argue that concentratingintelligence spending could be used to counter consolidation of intelligence powerin the Executive, whether the congressional committees were intelligenceappropriations subcommittees or intelligence authorization committees withappropriations power. The disadvantages to establishing intelligence appropriations subcommittees, opponents argue, are that this approach too would be likely to (1) increase spending,unless the total intelligence amount is declassified or existing budget procedures aremodified; and (2) shortchange the intelligence needs of the military. Also, concernhas been expressed that congressional accountability would be more diffuse thanunder the 9/11 Commission proposal. Instead of two committees focusing entirelyon intelligence, there would be four committees only focusing on intelligence. Consolidating Responsibility for IntelligenceAppropriation and Authorization in Senate Select Committee onIntelligence. On October 7, 2004, the Senate rejected, by a vote of23-74, a proposal by Senator John McCain, to transfer appropriations,rescissions, (40) and spending authority (41) related tofunding intelligence matters from the Senate Appropriations Committee to the SenateSelect Committee on Intelligence. The proposal was in the form of an amendment(S.Amdt. 3999) to the amendment in the nature of a substitute (S.Amdt. 3981) toS.Res. 445, the intelligence committee reorganization resolution. Separate Senate Intelligence AppropriationsSubcommittee. On October 9, 2004, the Senate adopted, by a voteof 79-6, S.Res. 445, an intelligence committee reorganization resolution, whichestablishes a separate Subcommittee on Intelligence in the Senate AppropriationsCommittee (see Â§402). S.Res. 445 clarifies that the Appropriations Committee willidentify the intelligence activities to be transferred to the new subcommittee. It also provides that as soon as possible after the 109th Congress convenes, theSenate Appropriations Committee is responsible for reorganizing the appropriationssubcommittees to ensure that the existing number of subcommittees (13) remains(see Â§402). The original amendment in the nature of a substitute (S.Amdt. 3981) tothe resolution would have preserved the 13 subcommittees by merging the MilitaryConstruction and Defense Subcommittees. This language was replaced with the finallanguage by an amendment (S.Amdt. 4015) proposed by the Chair of the MilitaryConstruction Subcommittee, Senator Kay Bailey Hutchison. The amendment wasadopted by a vote of 44-41 on October 9. Since the Senate and House appropriationssubcommittees have customarily retained parallel jurisdictions, the House is expectedto respond to the Senate's action. Requiring Congressional Action on 9/11Commission's Congressional Oversight Proposals in 108th Congress. On October 7, 2004, the House rejected, by a vote of 203-213, a proposal that, amongother provisions, would have required the Senate and House to establish in the 108thCongress either of the 9/11 Commission's recommendations to establish (1) a JointCommittee on Intelligence; or (2) a single committee in each chamber withjurisdiction over both intelligence authorizing and appropriating authorities. Theproposal was in the form of an amendment in the nature of a substitute to H.R. 10,the 9/11 Recommendations Implementation Act, and was proposed by RepresentativeRobert Menendez.

Summary: On July 22, 2004, the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States(also known as the 9/11 Commission) issued its final report on the September 11, 2001, terroristattacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. Among other findings and recommendations,the commission stated that existing congressional oversight was "dysfunctional" and recommendedtwo alternative proposals to change the existing intelligence committee structure: (1) replace theexisting Senate and House Select Intelligence Committees with a joint committee on intelligence;or (2) consolidate intelligence appropriation and authorization functions in existing intelligenceauthorization committees. This report discusses the second of these two proposals. (For informationon the first proposal, see CRS Report RL32525 , A Joint Committee on Intelligence: Proposals andOptions From the 9/11 Commission and Others , by [author name scrubbed]; and CRS Report RL32538(pdf) , 9/11 Commission Recommendations: Joint Committee on Atomic Energy -- A Model forCongressional Oversight? , by [author name scrubbed].) Under existing Senate and House rules, intelligence appropriations are under the jurisdictionof the Senate and House Appropriations Committees. Each committee distributes theseappropriations among five appropriations subcommittees, predominantly the Defense AppropriationsSubcommittees. The 9/11 Commission recommended transferring jurisdiction over intelligenceappropriations from the Senate and House Appropriations Committees to the intelligenceauthorization committees in each chamber. Proponents of the commission's proposal have contended that its adoption would (1) improvecongressional oversight of intelligence, (2) counter-balance the commission's proposed consolidationof executive branch intelligence activities, (3) provide a more integrated perspective on nationalintelligence spending, (4) attract Members to the consolidated intelligence committees, and (5)provide clear congressional accountability on intelligence within Congress. Opponents argue thatconsolidation would (1) reduce oversight of program quality, (2) weaken intelligence oversight, (3)shortchange intelligence needs of the military, (4) concentrate too much power in intelligencecommittees, and (5) increase spending. Opponents may accordingly argue that it would be preferable to adopt the alternativerecommendation of the 9/11 Commission to consolidate authorizing responsibility for intelligencein a joint committee. A third approach would be to consolidate responsibility for intelligenceappropriations in a new subcommittee of each the Senate and House Committees on Appropriations. On October 9, 2004, the Senate adopted S.Res. 445 , instituting this approach in theSenate. This action was based on a proposal by the Senate Majority and Minority Whips, the leadersof a bipartisan working group appointed by the Majority and Minority Leaders. This report will be updated.