The most important military component of the struggle against violent extremists is not the fighting we do ourselves, but how well we help prepare our partners to defend and govern themselves . National Defense Strategy 2008 The United States is unlikely to repeat another Iraq or Afghanistan —that is, forced regime change followed by nation building under fire—anytime soon. But that does not mean it may not face similar challenges in a variety of locales. Where possible, U.S. strategy is to employ indirect approaches—primarily through building the capacity of partner governments and their security forces—to prevent festering problems from turning into crises that require costly and controversial direct military intervention. In this kind of effort, the capabilities of the United States' allies and partners may be as important as its own, and building their capacity is arguably as important as, if not more so than, the fighting the United States does itself. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, January 2009 Security force assistance (SFA) is defined by the Department of Defense (DOD) as department activities that contribute to unified action by the U.S. government to support the development of the capacity and capability of foreign security forces and their supporting institutions. It encompasses all activities formerly consolidated under the term "military training and advisory assistance." SFA is intended to be a U.S. means to develop, within a host nation, an enduring capability to establish and maintain security, provide legitimate governance, and foster development programs that address root grievances. Security force assistance is an overarching concept that ties into several interests of Congress, including security assistance, security cooperation, foreign military financing, foreign military sales, foreign affairs, foreign aid, overseas contingency operations, and legislative authorities associated with training foreign forces (Foreign Assistance Act, P.L. 87-195; 22 U.S.C. 2151). (see Figure 6 ). Security force assistance relates to several significant issues in which Congress may have interest and oversight. SFA is considered key to engaging underdeveloped, undergoverned nations in a preventive context linked to counterterrorism strategy. Its basic premise, widely endorsed by analysts and within DOD, is that developing nascent military and governance capabilities in nations that could either stabilize or tip into anarchy prevents the conditions that would devolve into nesting grounds for terrorists. SFA is central to U.S. strategy for ensuring that Afghanistan and Iraq will be responsible for their own future stability and security. The services' ability to provide trainers/advisors to Central Command (CENTCOM) is at the nexus of reconstruction and stability operations in those countries. Congress may want to further consider policies to ensure that allies and coalition forces are contributing to this requirement. Congress may also consider the extent to which the capability that these nations attain through coalition SFA is sustainable and how it will impact future years' budgets. SFA is linked to security cooperation and security assistance efforts through a diverse portfolio of legislative authorities, reporting requirements, and congressional oversight functions. While these authorities provide for significant oversight from several committees, Congress might decide to consolidate these authorities into pooled or multiyear funding intended to expedite a comprehensive and transparent approach. Security force assistance (SFA), in general terms, supports the development of foreign security forces (usually military and law enforcement) so as to meet U.S. national security objectives. SFA spans many types of operations. It can be a component of conventional operations or it can support or be conducted in conjunction with irregular warfare operations, stability operations, security cooperation, and security assistance. Through SFA, foreign forces are trained to operate across the spectrum of conflict—combating internal threats such as insurgency, subversion, and lawlessness, defending against external threats, or serving as coalition partners/peacekeepers in other areas (see Figure 1 ). The resulting forces must possess the capability to accomplish the variety of required missions, with sufficient capacity to succeed and sustain themselves as long as required. SFA may be understood as the security forces equivalent of "teaching a man to fish." Its ultimate goal is to develop security forces that contribute to the legitimate governance of the host nation population. This is done by developing foreign security forces that are competent, capable, committed, and confident, not only in the eyes of U.S. (and potentially coalition) forces and the host nation government, but more critically, in the eyes of that nation's population, as well as in the eyes of prospective opponents. The conduct of SFA is not limited to the Department of Defense. It includes coordinated efforts across the multi-service, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational spectrum. This is significant in that, while SFA is an overarching approach to meeting the nation's security needs, legislation and oversight for its implementation span several different government agencies and congressional committees (see " How SFA Fits into U.S. Strategy and Administration Policy "). The National Security Council (NSC) will generally provide the initial guidance and clarification of national-level decisions pertaining to SFA. The Department of State (DOS) is generally the lead government agency and assists the NSC in building and carrying out national policies and priorities. The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) carries out nonmilitary assistance programs designed to assist certain less developed nations to increase their productive capacities and improve their quality of life. The Director of National Intelligence (DNI) and the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) support the mission in both a national-level advisory capacity and at the regional and country levels through direct support of SFA activities. Although SFA is considered a "whole-of-government" activity, this report focuses primarily on the military aspect of training, advising, and assisting. The Department of Defense is the largest agency with the most resources available to conduct SFA missions. Still, while there have been specific instances (such as Iraq and Afghanistan) in which Congress has given DOD authority to train and equip forces of a specified country, it is important to emphasize that DOD generally trains and equips foreign military forces under State Department Title 22 authority and through State Department programs. Additionally, DOD has frequently encouraged Congress to increase DOS's capacity to conduct the nonmilitary aspects of engagement and capacity building (SFA). (See Figure 2 .) As described earlier, while the U.S. military services (Army, Navy, Air Force, Marines) organize, train, and equip to meet SFA mission requirements, it is the combatant commanders who carry out the operations in their respective theaters. The National Security Strategy outlines the overarching approach for the nation. This is articulated to the regional combatant commanders, who, in turn, develop theater-specific security cooperation plans. Included in these plans are "critical partners," a select group of countries or organizations that directly receive U.S. security cooperation resources because their collaboration or assistance is essential to achieving regional or functional objectives. Additionally, "key supporting partners" are countries or organizations that assist a command in working with critical partners to achieve one or more of the command's strategic end states. They are key supporting partners because they are militarily competent and can complement or supplement U.S. capabilities. National security strategy objectives are overarching in nature and are designed to support broader U.S. government foreign policy. They usually reflect longer-term goals that cannot be achieved in the near or mid-term, and many may exceed the combatant commander's capability to achieve alone. Thus combatant commanders are tasked with establishing achievable, intermediate military objectives that directly and materially contribute to the achievement of the longer-term campaign end states provided in national security objectives. The guidance provided to combatant commanders allows great latitude in how they may construct their campaign plans to achieve these objectives. The initial campaign plans reflect varied approaches, particularly in terms of intermediate military objectives, which range from broad theater objectives to country-specific ones. The U.S. diplomatic mission to a host nation is the coordinator of SFA activities in that country. The diplomatic mission includes representatives of all U.S. departments and agencies physically present in the country. The President gives the chief of the diplomatic mission, normally an ambassador, full responsibility for the direction, coordination, and supervision of all executive branch employees within the mission and host country, except for employees under the command of a U.S. military commander (22 U.S.C. Section 3927). Close coordination by the chief of mission and military counterparts at the respective regional combatant command are a prerequisite for SFA operations that support the host nation's internal defense and development (IDAD) program and U.S. regional goals and objectives. Country teams develop the agenda and objectives for developing the capacity of a host nation's security forces. Before any military training teams set foot in country, their activities are vetted and scrutinized by the embassy. SFA missions are crafted by DOS and DOD counterparts so that the capabilities developed in the host nation are commensurate with the diplomatic goals of the U.S. government. Embassy country teams also ensure that such efforts are coordinated with the security objectives of the host nation receiving the training. (See Figure 3 .) However, some analysts recognize a disconnect in interagency coordination for SFA in the State Department's lack of regional coordination equivalent to that of a military regional combatant commander. Regional bureaus at DOS in Washington, DC, provide policy guidance to embassies but usually do not operate major programs. Nor are regional bureaus in DOS geographically aligned with military combatant commanders. Although guidance to a particular embassy is coordinated within the State Department, it goes directly from Washington to the affected country rather than through a Regional Combatant Command-equivalent organization. The military services provide technical and operational expertise through scaled-to-need groups known as mobile training teams (MTTs). The size of an MTT may range from a half-dozen subject matter experts teaching, for example, Nigerian counterparts how to do C-130 engine maintenance to an Armored Cavalry Regiment of nearly 5000 soldiers deploying under the auspices of an Advise and Assist Brigade (AAB) to work with Iraqi Army counterparts. Historically, responsibility for training, advising, and assisting foreign forces has rested with the U.S. military's Special Operations Forces (SOF). Yet, more recently, the Secretary of Defense, Robert Gates, has said that the organization, training, and mentoring of indigenous armies and police—once the province of Special Forces—is now a key mission for the military as a whole. The practice of assisting militaries of friendly nations has a long history (see Figure 4 ). The Lend Lease Program increased the capacity of the Soviet Union and other Allied countries in the struggle against the Axis in World War II. Simultaneously, allied troops were training Chinese and French North African forces. After the war, the Marshall Plan included establishing a West German professional military. Economic, equipment, training, and advisory support was provided to Greece and Turkey to help stabilize their governments. Although the term "security force assistance" did not yet exist, training, advising, assisting, and equipping post-war South Korea, Japan, and Taiwan were also concrete examples of SFA used with weak post-war states. Supporting weak and failed states through military assistance has been endorsed by Republican and Democratic administrations alike. Efforts to train, advise, and equip foreign forces shifted toward Vietnam and Latin America in the 1950s and 1960s. It was during this time that the special operations community was given primary responsibility for conducting the training portion of the mission. Eventually, arms transfers, economic aid, and collective security began to merge under a program known as "security assistance." Following Vietnam, the United States shifted to a policy of assisting friendly nations, but requiring them to provide the manpower and be ultimately responsible for their own national defense. Such was the case with Lebanon and Panama in the 1980s. Security force assistance played a part in the first Iraq war. U.S. Special Forces teams worked with the Saudi military to train them on the effective and efficient use of modern weaponry and in other technical areas. SOF also trained Saudi naval forces in special warfare. SOF eventually trained about 30,000 coalition troops in 44 subject areas. In the 1990s, the United States provided SFA assistance to former Warsaw Pact nations under the NATO "Partnership for Peace" initiative. Assistance was also given to Colombia under "Plan Colombia" to help stabilize the country during its campaign against the revolutionary Marxist group Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC). The premise that weak and failing states pose a national security threat is supported by many audiences. The rationale is that lawlessness, instability, and lack of security or governance in these areas creates conditions ripe for terrorist organizations to function. The conditions in the Mindanao region of the southern Philippines could be considered an example of this. Here terrorist organizations such as the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), Jemaah Islamiyah, and Abu Sayyaf have sought refuge and sanctuary for their operations in an area of the country where the military and the government have little or limited capability. (See CRS Report RL34194, Terrorism in Southeast Asia , coordinated by [author name scrubbed], and CRS Report RL33233, The Republic of the Philippines and U.S. Interests , by [author name scrubbed]. Also, supporters of SFA argue that the security condition of a destitute populace, disconnected from their subpar security apparatus or government in weak and failing states, could easily evolve into regional security threats. The application of SFA through "the indirect approach" is meant to "to prevent festering problems from turning into crises that require costly and controversial direct military intervention." Some analysts have gone so far as to say that the conditions in weak and failing states pose "the single most critical threat to US national security." The inability of weak and failed states to carry out basic functions—securing their own borders and populations, providing essential civil services and public goods, and maintaining rule of law and governing legitimacy—can spark a range of crises that might undermine U.S. strategic interests involving terrorism, international crime, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, limiting U.S. access to vital natural resources, and regional stability. Several regions in Africa, particularly the Sahel and the Horn of Africa, could become such risks in pre-conflict conditions. Here Al Qaeda in the Islamic Magreb (AQIM) seeks sanctuary in outlying regions such as northern Mali and is making inroads with the Nigerian Taliban. (See CRS Report R41473, Countering Terrorism in East Africa: The U.S. Response , by Lauren Ploch.) Risks of regional instability, terrorism, and other forces can also exist in post-conflict conditions, as characterized by the deteriorated conditions in Iraq that followed major combat in Operation Iraqi Freedom. Following the 2003 invasion by the United States, security forces of the Iraqi government dissolved. The inability of Iraq's government to provide security, equitably administer justice, or deliver services led in part to a violent Sunni Arab-led insurgency, Sunni-Shiite sectarian violence, and violent competition among Shiite groups (see CRS Report RL31339, Iraq: Post-Saddam Governance and Security , by [author name scrubbed]). Supporters of a broad SFA strategy emphasize that neutralizing threats posed by state failure is becoming a top national security priority. The National Security Strategies (NSS) put forth by the last three presidential administrations have emphasized this premise. Most recently, the Obama Administration reiterated that "diplomacy and development capabilities must strengthen weak and failing states," that "failing states breed conflict and endanger regional and global security," and that "our military will continue strengthening its capacity to partner with foreign counterparts, train and assist security forces, and pursue military-to-military ties with a broad range of governments." There is an opposing view to the assumption that weak and failed states pose a threat to U.S. national security interests. This view points to the ambiguity of defining a "weak state" or a "failed state." It further suggests that these states almost never produce threats to national security and that efforts to strengthen them squander resources on threats that exist primarily in the minds of policymakers. Other critics are concerned that the oversight and use of a failed state's security forces are much more critical than their capabilities. How a weak or failed state's security force is used—as an instrument to provide security or as a repressive instrument linked to human rights violations—is a more driving concern. That is to say, aside from the fiscal and material resources, building partner capacity "is a human and institutional development activity, with the training of forces and the development of competent command, control, and governance institutions at its core." In this understanding, the investment in building foreign security forces for at-risk states is of limited return without equivalent commitment to reinforcing other necessary government functions. The DOD Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) of 2006 called for a transformation of military approaches to meet the new strategic environment. Part of this transformation was a shift "from major conventional combat operations—to multiple irregular, asymmetric operations" and further "from the U.S. military performing tasks—to a focus on building partner capabilities." The QDR stated that "[b]uilding partnership capacity and strengthening alliances to defeat terrorist networks is an example of how the United States can strengthen freedom of action at the strategic level." It further stated: Maintaining a long-term, low-visibility presence in many areas of the world where U.S. forces do not traditionally operate will be required. Building and leveraging partner capacity will also be an absolutely essential part of this approach, and the employment of surrogates will be a necessary method for achieving many goals. Working indirectly with and through others, and thereby denying popular support to the enemy, will help to transform the character of the conflict. In many cases, U.S. partners will have greater local knowledge and legitimacy with their own people and can thereby more effectively fight terrorist networks. Setting security conditions for the expansion of civil society and the rule of law is a related element of this approach. In the years that followed the 2006 QDR, the services' efforts to develop resident capabilities to train foreign faced confusing terminology and were exacerbated by a lack of clarity and conceptual agreement regarding policy. The lexicon of terms surrounding security force assistance has been called confusing, duplicative, contradictory, or completely lacking. It includes, among other terms, "train advise assist" (TAA), "security assistance" (SA), "security cooperation" (SC), "irregular warfare" (IW), "building partnerships" (BP), "building partnership capacity" (BPC), and "foreign internal defense" (FID), none of which are synonymous or mutually exclusive. The lexicon has been characterized as an "[u]nnecessarily created confusion within the DOD by ignoring more than fifty years of experience and doctrine related to the challenges faced by the post-Cold War world and after the events of September 11, 2001." For the most part, training, advising, and assisting partner nations' military forces (SFA) have been a subset of policy related to irregular warfare. However, following the release of the 2006 QDR, DOD policy on the subject has been disjointed in its presentation as to what specifically constitutes irregular warfare. For example, in describing policy priorities, Secretary Gates has described the DOD commitment as "10 percent for irregular warfare, about 50 percent for traditional, strategic and conventional conflict, and about 40 percent dual-purpose capabilities." This statement did not clarify what was considered an irregular warfare resource (budgetary program, organization, or military unit). More recently, OSD has described irregular warfare primarily by two lines of effort: (1) to prevent, deter, disrupt, and defeat non-state actors, as well as state actors who pose irregular threats, and (2) to enhance a local partner's legitimacy and influence over a population by addressing the causes of conflict and building the partner's capacity to provide security, good governance, and economic development (see Figure 5 ). The term "irregular warfare" has tended to limit congressional discussion and understanding to those kinetic activities associated with counterinsurgency. The policy of emphasizing training, advice, and assistance to foreign forces was reiterated and endorsed by the incoming Obama administration and Secretary of Defense Gates in the 2010 QDR. However, the 2010 QDR tried to remove some of the confusion over terminology in that it did not use the term "irregular warfare." Rather, it underscored the indirect approach by making " Build the security capacity of partner states " a priority qualifier for rebalancing U.S. defense forces and security force assistance the vehicle by which capacity building would be accomplished. It identified SFA as "the most dynamic" of security cooperation activities in upcoming years and described SFA missions as "'hands on' efforts, conducted primarily in host countries, to train, equip, advise, and assist those countries' forces in becoming more proficient at providing security to their populations and protecting their resources and territories." (See Appendix D .) The QDR also directly linked SFA training activities to partner nations' ability to participate in peacekeeping operations, stability operations, and counterterrorism operations. It stated, "SFA activities can help enable host-country participation in coalition stability operations and multilateral peacekeeping operations that improve regional security. Working in conjunction with other U.S. government agencies and allied military forces to strengthen the security institutions of partner nations will be a crucial part of U.S. and allied efforts to defeat terrorist groups around the world." Although the review is intended to address DOD issues beyond current operations, the QDR spoke to SFA as the mechanism for success in current contingency operations. When referring to training Afghan and Iraqi security forces, it said, "U.S. forces have been training, advising, and assisting Afghan and Iraqi security forces so that they can more effectively uphold the rule of law and control and defend their territories against violent non-state actors. In these contested environments, partnered counter insurgency (COIN), in which Afghan and Iraqi units operate in tandem with U.S. forces, is an effective way to train and advise forces while conducting combat operations against insurgents." The QDR also instructed the services to strengthen and institutionalize general purpose force capabilities for security force assistance. Specifically, it cited the need to add personnel to train-the-trainer units. It called for several distinctive areas of training: "enhancing language, regional, and cultural abilities; strengthening and expanding capabilities for training partner aviation forces, as well as capacities for ministerial-level training; and creating mechanisms to facilitate more rapid transfer of critical materiel." Regarding the interagency process, the QDR indicated how DOD and DOS would further integrate coordinated efforts to cross-functional authorities (e.g 1206 funding, see " Section 1206 (Global Train and Equip) Authorities ", page 38) and mutually supporting roles. "Working with interagency partners and with Congress, DOD is also exploring how to improve the ways in which security assistance funds are authorized and overseen within the executive branch to enhance their effectiveness in supporting national security goals." The priority to continue training, advising, and assisting partner nations (i.e., SFA) is also reflected in the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review Independent Panel (QDRIP). The panel made a number of recommendations for structural and cultural changes in both the executive and legislative branches, which it considered necessary for each branch to play its role in protecting enduring U.S. interests. Included in the QDRIP's report was the following finding regarding security force assistance. The realities of today's security challenges have revealed the institutional weaknesses of the existing security assistance programs and framework . If unchanged, the United States will fail in its efforts to shape and sustain an international environment supportive of its interests. [emphasis added] As a result, the panel made the following recommendation to increase the efficiency of security force assistance / building partner capacity: Seek authority to establish pooled funding mechanisms for selected national security missions that would benefit from the Comprehensive Approach, including security capacity building, stabilization, and conflict prevention . [emphasis added] Under the section entitled "International Security and Assistance Reform," the QDRIP endorsed the policy of SFA. Yet it did not focus only on fragile and weak states. It went further to identify the second-order effects of training near-peer nations and allies, so as to have synergistic coalition capability for training, advising, and assisting on the lower end of SFA engagement: vii. Continue efforts at Building Partnership Capacity , recognizing that these efforts have several complementary aspects. [emphasis added] 1. Low-end institution building in post-conflict/failing states 2. Developing high-end capacity of our traditional allies [which entails not only security assistance reform but also, as part of acquisition reform, to build in sharing our defense products with our allies from the outset (requiring export control reform and national disclosure policy reform)]. Put another way, we need a "build to share" policy from the outset. 3. Viewing rising powers as potential partners that offer us opportunities for collaboration as well as potential challenges. On October 27, 2010, the Department of Defense released Department of Defense Instruction (DODI) 5000.68, "Security Force Assistance." It established policy and assigned responsibilities for SFA across the Department of Defense, including preparation of DOD personnel, operational planning for SFA, and conduct of SFA. The DODI attempted to provide some clarity to the aforementioned conflicting terminology. A significant portfolio of authorities is associated with SFA. Most notably, the DODI differentiates SFA from Security Cooperation (SC) and Security Assistance (SA) which are codified in legislation, primarily in the Foreign Assistance Act and the Arms Export Control Act. Security force assistance, the instruction states, is an overarching policy approach to building the capacity of partner states. Unlike other restrictive terms such as SA (Title 22 programs only) or SC (DOD only), SFA is intended to enable all the agencies and organizations involved in security capability and capacity development to coordinate, synchronize, and integrate all their foreign security force developmental activities to avoid gaps and to increase efficiency and effectiveness of those efforts. The DODI also attempts to described the relationships between existing legislation and the overarching SFA policy. Specifically, it says: SFA contributes to the DOD role in USG [U.S. government] security sector reform (SSR) initiatives. SFA is a subset of DOD overall security cooperation (SC) initiatives . Other SC activities, such as bilateral meetings or civil affairs activities dedicated to the non-security sector, provide valuable engagement opportunities between the United States and its partners, but fall outside the scope of SFA. Security assistance programs are critical tools to fund and enable SFA activities, which contribute to a host country's defense. The portion of SFA oriented towards supporting a host country's efforts to counter threats from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency, is a subset of foreign internal defense. [emphasis added] In February 2011, the Obama Administration provided to Congress the 2012 budget request. Included in the Defense section of the request was the following segment, which reiterated the premise of building partner capacity. Providing assistance to develop foreign countries' security capabilities is an essential element of U.S. strategy in Iraq and Afghanistan and of the overall national security strategy. The Administration is committed to funding these security sector assistance programs in an effort to maintain and develop allies' capability to prevent terrorist threats, to the United States and other countries, which originate from abroad. Further, by assisting the development of other countries' abilities to combat terrorism, these investments reduce the need for greater U.S. involvement in the future. In both Iraq and Afghanistan, the strategy of the United States is to create conditions for withdrawal from these countries and leave an environment wherein these nations can provide for their own security. Critical to this strategy is the degree to which U.S. and allied forces can train and equip Iraqi and Afghan security forces to a point where they are self-sufficient. While there are many notable examples of SFA by troops serving across the globe, the immediate focus for developing the force is to meet the pressing needs in Afghanistan and Iraq. In February 2009, President Obama announced that a National Security Council review had been completed. As result of this review, the Administration decided to pursue a new strategy to end the war in Iraq through a transition to full Iraqi responsibility. The first part of this strategy included a removal of combat forces from Iraq. The resulting contingent left in Iraq would carry out three distinct functions: training, equipping, and advising Iraqi security forces, conducting targeted counterterrorism missions; and protecting ongoing civilian and military efforts within Iraq. Similarly, on March 27, 2009, the President outlined a new strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan. In it, he emphasized the policy of training Afghan forces so as to have them eventually maintain their own security. [W]e will shift the emphasis of our mission to training and increasing the size of Afghan security forces, so that they can eventually take the lead in securing their country. That's how we will prepare Afghans to take responsibility for their security, and how we will ultimately be able to bring our own troops home. For three years, our commanders have been clear about the resources they need for training. And those resources have been denied because of the war in Iraq. Now, that will change. The additional troops that we deployed have already increased our training capacity. And later this spring we will deploy approximately 4,000 U.S. troops to train Afghan security forces. For the first time, this will truly resource our effort to train and support the Afghan army and police. Every American unit in Afghanistan will be partnered with an Afghan unit, and we will seek additional trainers from our NATO allies to ensure that every Afghan unit has a coalition partner. We will accelerate our efforts to build an Afghan army of 134,000 and a police force of 82,000 so that we can meet these goals by 2011—and increases in Afghan forces may very well be needed as our plans to turn over security responsibility to the Afghans go forward. The core goal of the U.S. strategy is to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al Qaeda. SFA is a means to the President's objective of transitioning to Afghan responsibility. International forces are predominantly focused on ensuring the security of the indigenous population as they build the capacity within the Afghan forces and government to transition. NATO Training Mission Afghanistan (NTM-A) was established to plan and implement authorized and resourced capacity building of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), in recognition of the full scope of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) mission and importance of ANSF growth. Lieutenant General William B. Caldwell IV, commander of NTM-A, told a collective audience of ISAF allies that if the training mission in Afghanistan is not resourced with adequate trainers, transition will be delayed. Stating that "[t]actical gains on the battlefield will not be enduring without a self-sustaining Afghan Security Force," Caldwell urged his NATO counterparts to provide additional trainers to conduct the capacity-building mission. He made the analogy that "developing the Afghan National Security Force is transition." Subsequently, the Armed Services Committees have urged the highest levels of DOD to push NATO to continue to provide trainers. In correspondence with the Armed Services Committees, Caldwell highlighted the recent accomplishments of and need for an "Afghan surge." This refers to a dramatic increase in the size and capability of the ANSF, in contrast to a surge of coalition ISAF forces. Both, the majority and minority parties in Congress endorsed this point. In terms of measuring the success of security force assistance in Afghanistan, NATO aims to increase the number of Afghan security forces from 256,000 to 306,000 by October of this year. In the past year, the Afghan army and police have more than doubled in size compared to any previous year's average, reaching almost 64,000 personnel. The administration is considering a proposal to grow the Afghan army by 35,000, which would bring total Afghan security force levels to 378,000 by the end of 2012. These additional forces are meant to add important enablers--logistics, engineering, and intelligence and others--to reinforce and sustain the transition of responsibility to the Afghan security forces. Yet General James Mattis, the commander of U.S. Central Command, raised the question of whether an ANSF of this proposed size would sustain enduring capabilities over time. However, he did indicate that the quality of the Afghan forces has increased, thus helping to reduce attrition, enhance recruitment, and contribute to sustainability. (See Figure 8 .) The increase in the size of the ANSF is not without its critics. According to one report by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), a "chronic failure" of U.S. training efforts is: the inability to properly structure efforts to create true partners once new units complete the formal training process and provide the proper quality and number of mentors, partner units, enablers, and efforts to integrate higher level command structures. Far too often the US has also sought to rush new battalion sized combat elements into service to meet its own short term needs without considering the resulting problems in quality, force retention, and host country perceptions of the result. Expediency has led to fundamentally misleading ratings of unit war-fighting capability like the CM rating system, using up half prepared forces in combat, and major leadership and retention problems. This analysis emphasizes quality over quantity and cautions against ignoring the impact of Afghan cultural needs, regional and ethnic differences, family and tribal structures, and the real-world "friction" that affects force development. Another analysis by the International Crisis Group underscores the strategic importance of developing the ANSF. Yet it describes the SFA attempt to develop a unified national military in service of a civilian government as a quixotic effort hampered by the tendency to create militias in a bid to insulate the state from internal and external threats. The ANSF is depicted as seeped in Soviet-style, over-centralized and top-heavy command and control structures, with army combat readiness undermined by weak recruitment and retention policies, inadequate logistics, insufficient training and equipment, and inconsistent leadership. One of the primary tools Congress has approved and funded to conduct SFA in Afghanistan is the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund (ASFF). The ASFF allows the Secretary of Defense, with the concurrence of the Secretary of State, to transfer DOD operations and maintenance funds to the Commander, Combined Security Transition Command—Afghanistan (CSTC-A), to provide equipment, supplies, services, training, facility and infrastructure repair, renovation, construction, and funding to the security forces of Afghanistan. Congress requires the Secretary of Defense to submit to the congressional defense committees a report summarizing the details of any obligation or transfer of funds from the ASFF during a fiscal year quarter. DOD considers the ASFF critical to the building of the ANSF's capabilities and to the ANSF's eventual assumption of security responsibilities. General Mattis, the CENTCOM commander, has said, "Above all, we rely on the ASFF to enable the eventual full transition of security tasks to a robust, trained ANSF capable of preventing the resurgence of insurgent safe havens in Afghanistan." The Afghan Security Forces Fund (ASFF) budget directly supports funding to grow, train, equip, and sustain the ANSF. In December 2009, Congress appropriated $6.6 billion for the ASFF. An additional $2.6 billion was appropriated in the Supplemental Appropriations Act of Fiscal Year (FY) 2010. The 2011 NDAA approved $11.6 billion for train-and-equip programs in Afghanistan, which is equivalent to the Administration's request (see Figure 9 ). Congress stated that funding is "critical for to (sic) help bring stability to Afghanistan and will allow the U.S. and our allies to transition the responsibility for security to the ANSF so we can bring our troops home." President Obama's budget request for FY2012 includes substantial resources to continue supporting the training of Afghan forces to ideally bring closer the point where Afghan troops will bear the major responsibility for their nation's security (see Figure 10 ). The FY2012 Administration budget request for ASFF, presented in February 2011, totaled $12.8 billion. The security force assistance effort in Afghanistan addresses a significant disparity between the cost to sustain the Afghan security forces and the cost of the continued deployment of U.S. forces to the area. Estimates to sustain an autonomous ANSF range from $2 billion to $6 billion annually , compared to an estimated $8 billion a month ($96 billion annually) to maintain 98,000 American troops in Afghanistan along with the rest of the 30,000-40,000 coalition forces that cost several billion dollars per month. Yet analysis also estimates total Afghan GDP at $29.8 billion and total Afghan government revenue at $1 billion. NATO has estimated that that the Afghan state may not be able to sustain the overall cost of maintaining the ANSF until 2040 or later. Despite SFA efforts to create an autonomous Afghan security force, some analysts see a requirement to have to fund half the Afghan budget with long-term military aid, similar to the relationships the United States has with Israel, Egypt, and Jordan. In Iraq, on August 31, 2010, the U.S. transitioned from combat and counterinsurgency activities to a more limited focus on training and advising the Iraqi Security Forces, conducting targeted counterterrorism operations, and providing force protection for U.S. military and civilian personnel and facilities. Central to this strategy is that coalition forces are building the capacity of indigenous forces, forging relationships with local leaders, and preventing attempts by the Taliban to reintroduce themselves into the area. According to the DOD justification for the FY2011 Overseas Contingency Operations Iraq Security Forces Fund (ISFF): The Iraq Security Forces Fund (ISFF) is required to enable Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) to reach minimum essential capabilities (MEC). MEC will allow the ISF to maintain internal security with police forces in the lead and defense forces in support while building foundational capabilities for the Iraqi military forces to provide external defense prior to US forces departure 31 December 2011. Revenue shortfalls due to low oil prices caused severe challenges in equipping forces across the Government of Iraq (GoI). The tightening fiscal environment has forced Iraq to pass a 2009 budget that set spending 25% below its original proposal and sacrificed numerous initiatives. The GoI budget has negatively affected equipping, sustaining and training the ISF throughout 2009. The Ministry of Interior (MoI) has improved training capacity, but still suffers from poor facilities and recruiting shortage. The Ministry of Defense (MoD) faces significant logistical and sustainment challenges in addition to the recruiting shortfall. Although oil prices have risen slightly since the final 2009 budget was passed, Iraq has exhausted a significant portion of its available fiscal reserves in 2009 and is projected to have greater financial shortages into the foreseeable future. The total FY2011 budget request for ISFF was $2.0 billion (see Figure 11 ). The FY2011 NDAA approved $1.5 billion for programs in Iraq, $500 million less than the request. Yet, the difference is still an increase over the initial Senate mark of $1.0 billion as Congress displayed skepticism toward Iraq's contribution to its own security efforts. The final bill requires that the Iraqi government pay 20 percent of the cost of many types of equipment. The NDAA also fences $500 million of ISFF authorized funds until the Secretary of Defense certifies "that the Iraqi Security Forces are committed to sustaining and maintaining their forces." The FY2012 Administration budget request, presented in February 2011, did not include any request to fund the ISFF. Rather, the priority for the administration is shifting to the establishment of the Office of Security Cooperation-Iraq (OSC-I). OSC-I is anticipated to begin operating in June of this year and to be fully operational by this October. OSC-I would become the cornerstone of the long-term mission to build partner capacity with the ISF. Additionally, the OSC-I would ensure the continuation of the military-to-military relationships that advise, train, and assist Iraqi Security Forces. The Iraqi Security Forces Fund and equipment transfer provisions are envisioned to operate through FY2011, with follow-on increasing emphasis on International Military Education and Training (IMET; see Glossary) and other traditional security force assistance programs, as well as authority to transfer equipment from Department of Defense stocks. Although it is not typically considered to be directly affiliated with SFA, Security Cooperation, or Security Assistance, the Commanders' Emergency Response Program (CERP) is another resource approved by Congress to provide military assistance in Iraq and Afghanistan. It enables local U.S. commanders in the two countries to respond to urgent humanitarian relief and reconstruction requirements within their areas of responsibility by carrying out programs that will immediately assist the indigenous population. CERP has been described as an invaluable tool for commanders to influence local populations and to counter Taliban propaganda and influence. CERP was originally funded with seized Iraqi assets, but Congress later appropriated U.S. funds for the purpose. Authorized and appropriated annually, CERP is not applicable to missions outside Iraq and Afghanistan. The FY2011 NDAA authorized a total of $500 million for CERP: $100 million for CERP in Iraq, half of the Administration's request, and $400 million for CERP in Afghanistan, $700 million less than the Administration's request. The reduction in Afghan CERP is offset by a new $400 million Afghan Infrastructure Fund. Additionally, the FY2011 NDAA prohibits using Afghan "CERP funds in excess of $20 million to fund any project, including any ancillary or related elements of the project." A 2008 GAO report called attention to CERP's ambiguity in defining "small-scale" and "urgent" projects, the difficulty in monitoring projects to see that they are completed to specification, and the need for greater visibility with command and DOD leadership as to the scale and extent of work being undertaken. Subsequently, the FY2009 National Defense Authorization Act included enhanced approval and reporting requirements for the program. Recently, however, legislators have highlighted the "continuing practice of using CERP to fund large-scale projects, particularly in Afghanistan, which is inconsistent with CERP's purpose of enabling commanders to carry out small-scale projects designed to meet urgent humanitarian relief and reconstruction requirements that directly benefit the local people." Congress has also reiterated that it wants Iraq to shoulder more of the rebuilding costs. CERP is not used for the training, equipping, or operating costs of Afghan and Iraqi security forces. Yet, used in parallel with SFA, CERP provides military commanders a bridge between the development of indigenous civilian and military capabilities. Another means to conduct security force assistance with specific relevance outside of Iraq and Afghanistan are the Global Train and Equip / Section 1206 authorities. This mechanism is widely endorsed by regional combatant commanders for conducting security force assistance effectively within the legislative restrictions for training foreign forces (see page 61 " Do Legislative Authorities Restrict Conducting SFA? "). One combatant commander has said, "Congressional 1206 authority is the only partner capability/capacity building tool that we have to address urgent or emergent needs in the region." Section 1206 of the 2011 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) provides the Secretary of Defense with authority to train and equip foreign military and foreign maritime security forces. The Department of Defense (DOD) values this authority as an important tool to train and equip military partners. Funds may be obligated only with the concurrence of the Secretary of State. Thus far, DOD has used Section 1206 authority primarily to provide counterterrorism (CT) support. These funds may also be used to train and equip foreign military forces for military and stability operations in which U.S. forces participate. The 2011 NDAA authorizes Section 1206 for one year through FY2012. The authorization bill provided $350 million, compared to an Administration request of $500 million. It also included a provision that raises the ceiling to $100 million (up from $75 million) of Section 1206 funds available for "building the capacity of foreign military forces to participate in or support stabilization operations in which the United States Armed Forces are a participant" (e.g., training coalition partners—Polish, Romanian, Ukrainian, etc—that participate in Iraq and Afghanistan). In February 2011, the Obama Administration's 2012 budget request included continuation of the 1206 authority and reiterated the $500 million level of funding: In addition to these programs, which are directly related to completing the mission in Iraq and combat operations in Afghanistan, the Budget provides $500 million for DOD's global military "train and equip" assistance programs. DOD uses these programs to fund counterterrorism training in a variety of countries. DOD also uses these programs to develop the internal counterterrorism capability of Yemen, which is critical to the Administration's goal of defeating al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. Congress has not yet codified Section 1206 into permanent authority. One issue is whether this capability should be placed with other train and equip authorities under the State Department. In recent testimony before the House Armed Services Committee, DOD suggested that the 1206 authority "money should probably be in the State Department to start with." Congress requires an annual report to provide oversight and visibility of 1206 activities to preclude the potential misuse of security assistance by nations targeted for assistance. In July 2010, the Government Accountability Office reported that the 1206 program was being employed in a manner commensurate with the intent of Congress and was generally consistent with U.S. strategic priorities related to combating terrorism and addressing instability. However, GAO noted that "the long-term viability of Section 1206 projects is threatened by (1) the limited ability or willingness of partner nations to support new capabilities, as 76 percent of Section 1206 projects are in low- or lower-middle-income countries, and, (2) U.S. legal and policy restrictions on using FMF (foreign military financing) and additional Section 1206 resources for sustainment." GAO recommended that DOD estimate sustainment costs and seek funding commitments from partner nations, and that it seek guidance from Congress on how to sustain projects. DOD concurred. The most recognizable counterterrorism efforts are direct action missions against Al Qaeda leadership, as seen in the reporting of drone strikes in Afghanistan and Pakistan. It is not the intent of this report to discuss these kinetic operations. Nevertheless, the Secretary of Defense has stated, "Arguably the most important military component in the War on Terror is not the fighting we do ourselves, but how well we enable and empower our partners to defend and govern their own countries." The inability of weak or failed states to provide for their own internal security potentially creates within them a sanctuary for terrorist organizations such as Al Qaeda to operate, if not with impunity, then at least with greater freedom and less scrutiny. The U.S. military focus is increasingly on the search for small cells of terrorists and on building the capacity of U.S. partners. DOD's emphasis in SFA is, in part, to give partner countries capabilities to deter and prevent terrorist activities and training. Counterterrorism includes actions taken directly against terrorist networks and indirectly to influence global and regional environments and render them inhospitable to terrorist networks. The framework for the U.S. Special Operations Command Concept Plan 7500, Department of Defense Global War on Terrorism Campaign Plan , identifies two approaches consisting of efforts applied directly against the enemy and actions applied indirectly to influence the global environment. These are referred to as direct and indirect approaches. SFA is a primary piece of the indirect approach. Through training partner nations to be capable of their own security, the United States "enables partners to combat violent extremist organizations (VEOs)" (see Figure 12 ). SFA enables partners to conduct operations against terrorists and their organizations as well as to shape and stabilize their environments in order to erode the capabilities of terrorist organizations and degrade their ability to acquire support and sanctuary. The premise of weak/failed state linkage to terrorism has its skeptics. Some analysts believe the common denominator for terrorist activity is not state failure. Rather, they argue, terrorist attacks are carried out by extremists claiming social or religious affiliations that have no linkage to geography. Thus, safe havens are not necessarily geographical but social. This argument points out that several regions identified in the upper tier of state weakness (such as Haiti, Congo, Burundi, Zimbabwe, and Myanmar) are not havens for terrorists. This position further holds that the biggest terrorist threat to the homeland is posed by European radicals, who are able to travel to America more freely than those that reside in weak or failed state. In testimony before the House and Senate Armed Services Committees, Secretary of Defense Gates, service chiefs, and regional combatant commanders have been asked what steps are being taken to build a larger pool of SFA-oriented trainers within the services. The challenge for the services has been to facilitate the organizing, training, and equipping of their own forces to meet this demand. The special operations community has historically organized, trained, and equipped forces for this mission, and the conventional services are still standardizing their training methods and supporting organizations. There have been increases in training, in the number of individuals trained, and in organizational commitment. Still, a significant challenge for the services will be providing continuity of effort, because their task-organized training is for a limited time, as compared to the long-term commitment of SOF. For example, a service member individual assigned to a conventional unit may be tasked to deploy as a trainer in his or her area of expertise (e.g. a logistician, an air traffic controller, a civil engineer or a helicopter pilot). Then he or she will attend the training provided by the service before deployment. Afterward, the individual will return to his or her own unit and resume functioning in a traditional capacity. The "training" skill is not a permanent characteristic the soldier maintains proficiency in. A reason for this is the degree of resources that would be required to maintain a standing capability. SOF personnel train for years in this field, and it is the mission for which they are inherently responsible (see " U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF) and Security Force Assistance "). To develop the same degree of fidelity in the conventional forces could require a significant increase in time and money. The responsibility for conducting security force assistance has long resided with the special operations community. The U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM) was established in 1987, and the U.S. Code ( Title 10 , Subtitle A , Part I , Chapter 6 , Section 167) identified foreign internal defense (FID) as a special operations activity. SOF receive extensive training to conduct this mission and are the most highly qualified to do so. Under DOD, SOCOM has been given the responsibility of being the overall "joint proponent" for SFA. In this capacity, they serve as lead for the development of joint doctrine, training, and education relevant to SFA activities conducted within a host country from the individual to the service level. SOCOM recommends the most appropriate forces for meeting SFA requirements validated by geographic combatant commanders. U.S. SOF are uniquely appropriate to conduct SFA for several reasons. They are extensively trained, well led, flexible, and adaptable. They can adjust quickly to meet the needs of the country they are assisting. In addition to expert proficiency in their military combat skills, SOF are trained to have a regional area of expertise. SOF not only participate in the host nation's military training activities. They excel at SFA because they have also learned to respect the customs, may speak the language, and often participate in a host nation's special cultural activities and functions. SOF units may find themselves spending the majority of their careers in the same geographic theater. In conducting SFA, SOF provide continuity with their counterparts in host nation militaries because of long-standing relationships between individuals and units. In testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, the SOCOM commander, Admiral Eric Olson, emphasized the importance of SFA and the indirect approach. Direct and indirect approaches must be carefully balanced. While the direct approach is often necessary and has immediate impact, it essentially creates time for the indirect approach to achieve lasting outcomes through other means. Security Force Assistance (SFA) remains a highlight of USSOF indirect action. SFA is a collaboration engine for the Command to include: security cooperation, security assistance, foreign internal defense, internal defense and development, and security sector reform. SFA enhances the military capabilities and capacities of our allies and partners via training, advising, assistance, and—as authorized—equipping and supporting foreign military and security forces. Further in the testimony, Admiral Olson presents SFA as an element of the command's mechanism for counterterrorism. Through direct action, we deter, disrupt and defeat terrorist threats across the globe. In tandem, indirect action creates and sustains environments to empower longer term success.... As we remain prepared for urgent, bold and decisive action, we recognize that it is high-quality, low-profile, long-term engagement that fosters trust and enables essential partnerships. In this regard, we should measure success by how well we have prepared others to face their security challenges, not by what we do for them. SOCOM has expressed concern over its ability to adequately resource the SFA mission. SOF have a unique capability to conduct SFA. Yet, despite their enhanced skills, SOF are "low-density/high-demand" assets. Their skills are in high demand and there are not enough of them to accomplish all the SFA missions. About 85% of deployed SOF are directly engaged in operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. Admiral Olson emphasized the limitations of the mission due to limited numbers and a high operations tempo within SOF, despite recent growth in the overall personnel for the command. Even with a charge to grow the SOF force quickly, demands have exceeded resources. "As we have essentially doubled our force over the last nine years [and] tripled our budget over the last nine years, we have quadrupled our overseas deployments over the last nine years," Admiral Olson said. He cautioned about the "frayed edges" of the force given current commitments. The Armed Services Committees have concurred that the demand for such forces and their unique skills will continue to outpace supply for the foreseeable future. Olson gave the following details about increased SOF operations tempo: We saw 100,000 American troops come out of Iraq; we only saw about 500 special operations [members] as part of that.... We grew a battalion in the 5th Special Forces Group in 2008, and it's deployed. We grew a battalion in 3rd Special Forces Group in 2009, and it's deployed.... We grew a battalion in the 10th Special Forces Group, and it is preparing to deploy. Over the next two years, we'll grow battalions in 1st Group and 7th Group.... We've been able to deploy 36 additional [operational detachments A, or "A-teams"], and frankly, if you're on a 1-to-1 deployment ratio, which is the very most that you can sustain ... as you grow 36 ODAs, you should deploy no more than 18. But the demand has gone up close to 50 in that time. Though SOF are considered the "gold standard" for conducting SFA, the time, talent, and funding required to develop this level of capability cannot easily be afforded to conventional forces that carry out similar missions. Nevertheless, the growing appetite for SFA missions cannot be met using only SOF forces. This is why conventional forces (also referred to as general purpose forces or GPF) are assuming responsibility for more SFA activities. GPF have been in the SFA business for a long time, especially in technical training (i.e., security assistance missions and Technical Assistance Field Teams (TAFT)). What is new in recent years is using GPF to do basic training and advisory duties in the current large numbers. There is historical precedence, however, for large GPF advisory missions (e.g., there were nearly 10,000 conventional advisors in South Vietnam in 1964). Additionally, the SOCOM commander has expressed the importance that U.S. SOF be used primarily to train partner nations' SOF and that they refrain from training in basic military skills in which conventional forces can instruct. I'd like to see special operations get in the business of training foreign special operations forces a little bit more, and in the business of training new recruits in a foreign country how to march in straight lines and shoot on seven-meter ranges a little bit less. But I think the reality is that, given the skills to which special operations trains, the global demand will still be mostly for us. I can't predict a balance, but I do think that the demand for special operations, globally, will continue to go up. Some notable recent SFA missions by U.S. SOF that have elicited congressional interest include the training of counterterrorism forces in Yemen, development of indigenous SOF forces in Iraq and Afghanistan, training of the Frontier Corps in Pakistan, training of forces in Mali against the illicit trafficking of weapons, drugs, and people, and training of armed forces of the Philippines to counter Muslim insurgent groups in Mindanao. With the establishment of a Marine Corps component within SOCOM in 2006, the Marines' foreign military training units (FMTUs), which had been formed to conduct foreign internal defense, were transferred and then designated as the Marine Special Operations Advisor Group (MSOAG). In April 2009, MSOAG was redesignated as the Marine Special Operations Regiment with the 1 st , 2 nd , and 3 rd Marine Special Operations Battalions (MSOB) as subordinate units. The newly designated 3 rd MSOB incorporated the structure and personnel from MSOAG's former companies. Marines and sailors of the MSOR train, advise, and assist friendly host nation forces—including naval and maritime military and paramilitary forces—to enable them to support their governments' internal security and stability, counter subversion and reduce the risk of violence from internal and external threats. The 1 st Marine Special Operations Battalion was activated on October 26, 2006, and is headquartered at Camp Pendleton, California. When fully manned, it consists of four Marine Special Operations Companies (MSOCs). The 2 nd and 3 rd Marine Special Operations Battalions are headquartered at Camp Lejeune, NC. Each MSOC is to be task-organized with personnel uniquely skilled in special equipment support, intelligence, and fire support. The Marine Corps special operations community is the newest of SOCOM's components, and SFA is still considered an evolving capability for them. Naval Special Warfare Command conducts training of foreign forces through its foreign internal defense program. According to SOCOM, however, Naval Special Warfare Forces are primarily organized, trained, and equipped for direct action and special reconnaissance missions. As such, Naval Special Warfare Forces do not have units specifically dedicated to training foreign forces. However, in addition to providing basic and advanced instruction and training in maritime special operations to U.S. military and government personnel, the Naval Special Warfare Center provides the same training to members of select foreign armed forces. In 2006, the commander of SOCOM assigned Naval Small Craft Instruction and Technical Training School (NAVSCIATTS) the following new mission: NAVSCIATTS conducts Foreign Internal Defense (FID) in support of Combatant Commanders in accordance with Commander, United States Special Operations Command, priorities using Mobile Training Teams (MTTs) and in-residence training to prepare partner nation forces to conduct small craft operations in riverine or littoral environments. [emphasis added] On December 19, 2008, Naval Special Warfare Command shifted NAVSCIATTS from the Naval Special Warfare Center to Naval Special Warfare Group-4 (NSWG-4) for its SFA component. NAVSCIATTS is located in the riverine and littoral training areas of the John C. Stennis Space Center near Bay St. Louis, Mississippi. NAVSCIATTS has trained more than 6,000 students from over 55 partner nations. According to NSWG-4, NAVSCIATTS has been conducting security force assistance since 1963 to prepare partner nation forces to conduct small craft operations in riverine and littoral environments, as well as to develop and sustain professional and personal relationships. U.S. Army Special Forces Command identifies foreign internal defense operations (a component of security force assistance—see Figure 7 ) as Special Forces' main peacetime mission. These activities are designed to help friendly developing nations by working with indigenous military and police forces to improve their technical skills, increase understanding of human rights issues, and help with humanitarian and civic action projects. Each of the seven Special Forces Groups is regionally oriented to support one of the war-fighting regional combatant commanders. Special Forces Groups are currently located at Fort Bragg, NC; Fort Campbell, KY; Fort Carson, CO; and Fort Lewis, WA. Additional Special Forces battalions are in Okinawa, Japan, and Panzer Kaserne, Stuttgart, Germany. In 2011, the 7th Special Forces Group (currently at Fort Bragg) will relocate to Eglin Air Force Base, FL. There are also two National Guard Special Forces Groups located in Alabama and Utah, with subordinate units based in 19 states. Approximately 1,400 soldiers are assigned to each group. The 12-man ODA (Operational Detachment Alpha), or "A" Team, is the basic operating element of a Special Forces group. It is largely made up of noncommissioned officers (NCOs). Each team member has a specific function, ranging from operations and intelligence to weapons, engineering, medical duties, and communications. The advanced training for each specialty can take six months or longer and includes small-unit tactics; languages; and survival, evasion, resistance and escape. The ODA itself may specialize in an infiltration skill or a particular mission-set, such as military freefall, combat diving, mountain warfare, maritime operations, or urban operations. Within Air Force Special Operations Command, the 6th Special Operations Squadron (6th SOS) is a combat aviation advisory (CAA) unit. Its mission is to assess, train, advise, and assist foreign aviation forces in airpower employment, sustainment, and force integration. Squadron advisors help friendly and allied forces employ and sustain their own airpower resources and, when necessary, integrate those resources into joint and combined (multinational) operations. Squadron training and advisory capabilities in the employment arena include airpower applications, tactical employment, and mission planning. Tactical flying activities include fixed and rotary-wing operations for combat search and rescue, close air support and airlift/aerial delivery (infiltration, exfiltration, resupply, and air drop). Assistance in the sustainment arena includes aviation maintenance, supply, munitions, ground safety, life support, personal survival, air base defense, command and control, and other sustainment functions supporting combat air operations. Assistance to the theater combatant commands includes assessments of foreign aviation capabilities, liaison with foreign aviation forces, and assistance in theater air campaign planning for combined operations. The 6 th SOS currently has 218 personnel assigned, which includes 12 Operational Aviation Detachment (OAD) Teams. Currently, it takes 12-18 months to train and mission-qualify a 6 th SOS member. The training starts at the U.S. Air Force Special Operations School and transitions to training within the unit. The squadron has seen significant growth and is projected to double in size to approximately 500 people. The squadron conducts SFA operations by working "with, through, and by" host nation aviation forces from the ministerial to the tactical unit level. "With, through, and by" describes the process of interaction with foreign security forces that initially involves training and interacting "with" the host nation forces. The next step is advising, which may include advising in combat situations (acting "through" the forces). The final phase is achieved when foreign security forces operate independently (act "by" themselves). A popular and efficient method for SOF to conduct SFA has been through the Joint Combined Exchange Training (JCET) program. JCETs are unique to SOF and allow U.S. forces to train side by side with counterparts from a partner nation. Title 10 of the U.S. Code describes special operations forces training with friendly foreign forces. It says that the purpose of the training "shall be to train the special operations forces of the combatant command." Hence, training for foreign forces is a lower priority than training for U.S. forces. The SFA skill sets taught to partner nations' forces through the JCET program are tailored to tactical-level combat readiness. Combat commanders convey that the JCET program is a means to support regional stability throughout the theater. Other than combat skills, training that could occur in JCETs might include humanitarian assistance operations, disaster assistance/relief operations, and civic assistance projects. These projects are touted as constructive interactions among foreign military and civilians and U.S. SOF. Congress has scrutinized SOF's conduct of SFA via the JCET program. This resulted primarily from some high-profile instances during the 1990s, particularly in Indonesia. In these cases, the partner nation forces that had been trained by U.S. SOF counterparts were shown to have employed the skills they learned in repressive or brutal fashion in suppressing internal and civil disturbances. The program was also criticized for conflicting senses of purpose within the executive branch. In some instances, the State Department made evaluations of nations' human rights record. However, these inspections, and subsequent vetting or condemnation, were not commensurate with the list of nations that were being trained. As a result, Congress enacted legislation to bring JCET more into alignment with policies and to establish more stringent oversight. The Leahy Amendment to the Department of Defense FY1999 Appropriations Act ( P.L. 105-262 ) prohibited the U.S. military from training with human rights abusers (unless the prohibition is waived by the Secretary of Defense). Since then, federal law has barred U.S. forces from offering assistance to foreign military units if there is evidence that they have gone unpunished after committing human rights violations. (See section below on " Leahy Amendment .") Additionally, in an effort to increase congressional oversight of the program, the relevant section of the U.S. Code was amended to add a reporting requirement to Congress: Reports.— Not later than April 1 of each year, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to Congress a report regarding training during the preceding fiscal year for which expenses were paid under this section. Each report shall specify the following: (1) All countries in which that training was conducted. (2) The type of training conducted, including whether such training was related to counter-narcotics or counter-terrorism activities, the duration of that training, the number of members of the armed forces involved, and expenses paid. (3) The extent of participation by foreign military forces, including the number and service affiliation of foreign military personnel involved and physical and financial contribution of each host nation to the training effort. (4) The relationship of that training to other overseas training programs conducted by the armed forces, such as military exercise programs sponsored by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, military exercise programs sponsored by a combatant command, and military training activities sponsored by a military department (including deployments for training, short duration exercises, and other similar unit training events). (5) A summary of the expenditures under this section resulting from the training for which expenses were paid under this section. (6) A discussion of the unique military training benefit to United States special operations forces derived from the training activities for which expenses were paid under this section. The Obama Administration is trying to achieve a diplomatic balance with regard to using JCETs for SFA. Training with Western-leaning Muslim nations such as Indonesia is linked to U.S. efforts to counter terrorism (see " SFA and Counterterrorism "). Radical groups linked to al Qaeda, such as Jemaah Islamiyah and Abu Sayyaf, have targeted Indonesia and used its territory as a staging ground for attacks elsewhere. Jemaah Islamiyah's October 2002 attack in Bali killed 202, including American tourists. Furthermore, engaging with Indonesia is seen by some analysts as an effort to counter China's rise. Yet members of the Senate continue to express concern regarding Indonesian human rights abuses. The "Leahy Amendment" was first enacted as part of the 1997 Foreign Operations Appropriations Act (FOAA). The amendment, sponsored by Senator Patrick Leahy of Vermont, prohibited provision of Foreign Operations appropriations assistance to foreign security force units implicated in gross human rights violations, unless the Secretary of State determines that the host government is taking effective measures to bring those responsible to justice. Initially the law was narrowly focused on the Department of State's International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement program, but it was expanded in 1998 to include all security assistance programs using FOAA funds. Additionally, recurring language in the annual National Defense Appropriations Act (NDAA) applies Leahy requirements to NDAA-funded training. (For more information, see CRS Report RL30034, Joint Combined Exchange Training (JCET) and Human Rights: Background and Issues for Congress , by [author name scrubbed].) The Army has identified SFA as one of four primary activities for which the service is responsible. The Chief of Staff of the Army, General Casey, has highlighted this responsibility in testimony before the House and Senate Armed Services Committees. He has stated: [T]he Army must engage to help other nations build capacity and to assure our friends and allies. Through security force assistance, we can increase the capacity of other nations' military and police to uphold the rule of law, ensure domestic order, and deny sanctuary to terrorists—thereby helping avoid future conflicts that might otherwise develop. American Soldiers are currently deployed to Central America and the Balkans, building the capacity of indigenous security forces. Additionally, the Army has established an Army Service Component Command for U.S. Africa Command to assist partner nations and humanitarian organizations in Africa. Over the past two years, the Army has reconfigured itself to conduct SFA. The 2010 posture statement (previous paragraph) of outgoing Chief of Staff of the Army (CSA) General George W. Casey contrasts with his 2008 position, when he said; "I'm just not convinced that anytime in the near future we're going to decide to build someone else's army from the ground up," and further, "to me, the 'advisory corps' is our Army Special Forces—that's what they do." Additionally, during his confirmation testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, the presumptive new CSA, General Martin Dempsey, said he anticipated that there will be a future ongoing requirement for SFA-tasked brigades to carry the role of building partner capacity beyond Iraq and Afghanistan. Yet, he indicated, it is too early to tell if general purpose force brigades will be regionally aligned to carry out future advise-and-assist missions. The Army has organized to conduct SFA via the modular design of the brigade combat team (BCT). Army forces are task-organized, trained, and equipped for the SFA mission through the cyclical process of force generation. Elements are organized from within the brigade with the required size and skill sets for each mission. Each BCT has over 250 commissioned officers and over 1,000 NCOs of sergeant rank and above, providing a large base of trainers and advisors. Afghanistan and Iraq are examples where the army uses modular brigades augmented and adapted for SFA as the base organization for providing SFA. Instead of trying to design exactly the right unit for every situation, the versatility of Army modular organizations is leveraged by tailoring them for the mission. According to the Army, lessons from these deployments so far indicate that the brigade is a viable basis for large-scale SFA to build capacity at the individual and unit levels. Nevertheless, some analysts do not agree with the strategy of leveraging BCTs to fulfill the training and advising role. These critics believe that the Army should have dedicated training units to conduct the mission. Army service component command staffs have also expanded to include a 20-person section responsible for coordination between the command, country teams, security cooperation organizations, geographic combatant command staffs, Special Operations Command elements, and Army headquarters. This staff is the nexus for assigning SFA missions and assessing their effectiveness. Army training for SFA-type missions includes an emphasis on regional language expertise and core cultural skills. Professional training and specific mission-tailored training are delivered by various specialist organizations, notably 162 Brigade in Fort Polk, LA. Additionally, the Army has established the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command Culture Center at Fort Huachuca, AZ, and a force modernization proponent for SFA at the Combined Arms Center at Fort Leavenworth, KS, to further institutionalize its ability to deliver SFA. According to the Navy, SFA plays a key role in support of the Navy's strategic imperatives by fostering and sustaining cooperative relationships through increased capacity-building, thus preventing or containing local disruptions before they have a larger impact. According to some analysts, this preemptive SFA engagement strategy implies a focus on smaller, frailer nations, consistent with "emphasis on building partnership capacity and security cooperation to minimize emerging transnational challenges . " The Cooperative Seapower Strategy presses U.S. naval forces past merely being deployed forward to engaging forward, in a proactive sense, to enhance and minimize the conditions that generate conflict and instability in the first place. One analysis of the Navy's indirect approach highlights that a proactive engagement will increase dependence on maritime assets, but foresees a continued reliance on the special operations community for SFA as the Navy begins to train for this mission. According to the Navy, the Maritime Civil Affairs and Security Training (MCAST) Command SFA Detachment mans, trains, equips, and deploys sailors to establish and enhance relations between military forces, governmental and nongovernmental organizations, and the civilian populace. MCAST defines its mission as follows: In support of the Combatant Commander (COCOM) Theater Security Cooperation Plan (TSCP), MCAST Command, Security Force Assistance Detachment (SFA Det) will deliver maritime expeditionary core capability training and instruction in the areas of small boat operations, maritime interception, weapons, maritime expeditionary security, maintenance, professional development, and skill sets external to NECC. This mission will be carried out by teams of SFA Det personnel with the subject matter expertise to train foreign audiences at a basic to intermediate level. Navy general purpose forces (GPF) are allocated to SFA activities through the Global Force Management (GFM) process. These forces receive pre-deployment training designed to support their assigned task. GPF conduct the full range of military operations, including maritime security, counter-proliferation, security cooperation, security force assistance, stability, maritime interdiction, counterinsurgency, and humanitarian assistance/disaster relief (HA/DR) missions. The Navy conducts SFA using three methods: (1) fleet and regional training and exercises, (2) enduring rotational deployments, and (3) fleet and expeditionary operations. The cooperative engagements include topics such as small boat operations and tactics, maritime combat operations, weapons handling, antiterrorism and force protection, maintenance and construction, and officer and non-commissioned officer professional development and leadership. While no single command is dedicated specifically to SFA, the following Navy commands are heavily engaged in SC and SFA activities: Naval Expeditionary Combat Command Maritime Civil Affairs and Security Training Command Naval Education and Training Security Assistance Field Activity Navy International Programs Office Naval Small Craft Instruction and Technical Training School Navy Reserve Maritime Partnership Program The Marines measure the appetite for how many building partnership capacity activities (i.e., SFA) are needed as it is communicated to them from regional combatant commanders (e.g., CENTCOM and European Command (EUCOM) commanders). They want a forward presence engaging partner nations and allies in order to shape relationships and deter violence. General Michael W. Hagee (Commandant of the United States Marine Corps, 2003–2006) has said, "If we can do much better in 'phase zero,' better prepare foreign militaries to handle their own situations, maybe we won't have to do phases one, two and three." Operating on General Hagee's premise, the Marines created a Security Cooperation Marine Air-Ground Task Force (SC-MAGTF). This is built around a Marine infantry battalion. It includes personnel and materiel specifically tailored for SFA operations and allows them to build a force to meet the requirements of the combatant commanders. If the requirement is to go into a specific country to train its military, provide humanitarian support, dig wells, provide medical and dental support, or just engage to develop a relationship, the Marines will organize for the task. Some aspects of the SC-MAGTF training missions are similar to those of special operations forces, such as the Army's Special Forces detachments (Green Berets) and the Marine Special Operations Advisor Group. They will help advise foreign militaries, but the advisory missions conducted by special operations forces tend to be more complex, reflecting capabilities that exceed the capacity of general-purpose forces. Yet the current deployment commitments in Iraq and Afghanistan will limit the Marines from meeting their goal of training a wider contingent of the Corps to conduct SFA. The approach is dependent upon the drawdowns in the Middle East because they draw resources away from the SC-MAGTF effort. Recently, underscoring that the SC-MAGTF concept has evolved to reflect the organizational, mission, and doctrinal characteristics of a special purpose MAGTF, the Marines decided that the "Security Cooperation MAGTF" would be renamed "Special Purpose Marine Air Ground Task Force-Security Cooperation (SPMAGTF-(Security Cooperation))." Hence, the moniker "SPMAGTF-(Security Cooperation)" now describes MAGTFs stood up specifically to engage in theater security cooperation activities. Additionally, units other than MAGTFs that conduct theater security cooperation will be called security cooperation task forces/detachments/teams as appropriate. The Marine Corps Training and Advisory Group (MCTAG) coordinates Marine Corps security force assistance (SFA) and security cooperation (SC) efforts; provides conventional training and advisor support to host nation security forces (HNSF), or to U.S. general purpose forces (GPF) partnering with HNSF; and provides planning assistance to Marine forces in developing and executing partner nation training programs in order to build partner capacity in support of combatant commander SFA/SC objectives. The MCTAG was developed to fill the gap in standardizing advisor training that occurred when the Corps' foreign military training units (FMTUs), later designated Marine Special Operations Advisor Group (MSOAG), moved to the Marine component of Special Operations Command. A subset of SFA in developing indigenous forces is the building of a partner nation's aviation capacity. The recent establishment in 2010 of the U.S Air Force's Air Advisor Academy is designed to train airmen to carry out these missions effectively in a manner similar to that of the 6 th Special Operations Squadron, a unit dedicated to conducting foreign internal defense (see previous section on special operations forces " Air Force Combat Aviation Advisors "). Training at this academy includes language and cultural awareness courses, along with combat survival training. Additionally, the Air Force is investing in a small inventory of light mobility and light attack aircraft to use in training partner nations. A study chartered by Air Force headquarters stated that "[t]he security, stability, and economic development of a nation in the early 21 st century are inextricably linked to its aviation resource capacity and capability." A common characteristic of underdeveloped and undergoverned regions is a lack of transportation infrastructure (roads, bridges, etc). For example, although it is nearly the size of Texas, Afghanistan has only 1/12 the miles of roads (approximately 13, 000 miles), and of these, only 13% are paved surfaces. This, combined with rugged, mountainous terrain, makes aviation capacity essential to projecting influence and establishing legitimacy for government services. A partner nation's aviation capacity, developed through SFA, can project the influence of that nation's government through such high-payoff learned skills as medical evacuation and search and rescue. Additionally, aviation allows nascent military forces, such as the Afghan National Army and its ISAF allies, to avoid maneuvering with trepidation in and around improvised explosive devices (IEDs). A partner nation's military aviation capacity also includes supporting activities that contribute to economic development and trade that may not include a partner nation owning any aircraft. Again using Afghanistan as an example, aviation capacity provides transportation and economic flexibility to a landlocked country. Yet there are constraints to developing aviation capacity. Because fragile states are also typically characterized by lower literacy and education rates, training in aviation skills can be challenging, as this technically centered enterprise may require a greater education level than exists in the forces receiving the training. Additionally, aviation resources can be expensive to acquire, operate, and maintain. The cost to own, operate, and maintain a single C-130 could be more than the gross national product of some lower-tier partner nations. DOD uses the term "right tech" to underscore the importance of training, advising, and assisting partner nations in aircraft that are transferable, affordable, modular, and interoperable within the absorptive capacity of that nation. The Air Force goal is to help partner nations develop an aviation enterprise that contributes to the partner nation's security and to its government's legitimacy and stability, to thwart terrorist networks, drug cartels, and criminal organizations and prevent lethal threats emanating from fractured or failing states. General Norton Schwartz, the Chief of Staff of the Air Force, gave examples in his 2010 posture statement of the Air Force's SFA strategy: The Air Force continues to seek opportunities to develop partnerships around the world, and to enhance long-term capabilities through security cooperation. In the USCENTCOM AOR, deployed Airmen are working with our Afghan and Iraqi partners to build a new Afghan National Army Air Corps and Iraqi Air Force to strengthen the ability of these nations to uphold the rule of law and defend their territories against violent, non-state actors.... In FY11, we will expand our capabilities to conduct building partner capacity (BPC) operations with partner air forces. Past experience has shown us that we are more effective trainers when we operate the same platforms as our partners. Additionally, in a message delivered to all of the members of the U.S. Air Force, General Schwartz listed "Partner with the Joint and Coalition Team to Win Today's Fight" as one of five priorities to guide the direction of the Air Force. The Air Force will always be an integral part of Joint and Coalition operations. As we look ahead, we are likely to encounter more sophisticated hybrid adversaries and situations requiring enhanced integration across multiple domains. In irregular warfare and anti-access / area denial environments, the Air Force must continue to build partnerships with other air forces to bolster international cooperation, sustain powerful, global forces for stability, and ensure access to the global commons. Included in the areas for executing this agenda were these activities directly linked to training partner nations: Enhance our ability to train, advise, assist and integrate partner air forces, institutionalize Air Advisor training, and stand up an Air Advisor Academy. Develop and field the Light Attack/Armed Reconnaissance Aircraft (LAAR) and Light Mobility Aircraft (LiMA) to allow training with a broader array of aviation partners. Build stronger international air force cooperation, interoperability, and mutual support. In February 2010, Secretary Gates highlighted that an institutional challenge within the Pentagon is that DOD's various partner capacity and security assistance functions are scattered among different staff and headquarters elements of the military. Yet he singled out the Air Force, where "most of these functions—from foreign military sales to training exchanges—are grouped under one civilian executive—the equivalent of a three-star general—to better coordinate and integrate them with larger goals and national strategy. This more integrated and consolidated approach makes better sense for the department, and for the government as a whole." The Deputy Undersecretary of the Air Force for International Affairs (SAF/IA) is the Air Force proponent for SFA. SAF/IA has outlined its role in support of the Air Force's strategic engagement imperatives, as described in its Global Partnership Strategy: This strategy utilizes a capabilities-based approach to identify the specific ways and means to utilize in relations with a specific country in support of the CCDR objectives. This strategy establishes ends necessary to organize, train, and equip the USAF to address the importance of building partnerships. These ends are for the USAF to: Establish, sustain, and expand Global Partnerships that are mutually beneficial. Provide global partners the capability and capacity necessary to provide for their own national security. Establish the capacity to train, advise, and assist foreign air forces, while conducting partnership activities using USAF Airmen with the appropriate language and cultural skills. Develop and enhance partnership capabilities to ensure interoperability, integration, and interdependence, as appropriate. The Air Force has emphasized that success in SFA occurs through people, not equipment. In 2007, with an increase in the requirement for U.S. trainers in Iraq and Afghanistan, the CSAF directed Air Education and Training Command (AETC) to conduct pre-deployment training for airmen (referred to as "air advisors") en route to Iraq and Afghanistan. The number of students went from 136 in the first year of operation to 675 students per year in 2010. The air advisor course supporting current CENTCOM SFA requirements through the 321 st and 438 th Air Expeditionary Wings has transitioned into a permanent capability providing advisor training for global SFA requirements. Training is conducted at Joint Base McGuire/Dix/Lakehurst, NJ, and includes (1) core knowledge, (2) language, region, and culture skills, and (3) field craft (survival training, convoy training, etc). Many of those deploying with this training are not aviators but rather "Agile Combat Support" (ACS). To increase assistance to less-developed nations, specific Air Force ACS and aviation experts are trained in basic and advanced training techniques. Those training partner nation counterparts in a flying capacity receive air advisor training and may go on to specified flight training (depending on the aircraft in which they will instruct) at one of seven flight training locations (five stateside, two overseas). Currently the New Jersey training facility is used on a temporary basis for the Air Advisor Academy. A permanent basing facility has yet to be determined through the Air Force basing process. Initial operating capacity is expected in 2011, with full operating capacity in 2014. Moreover, the number of students is expected to increase to between 1,500 and 2,000 students per year. Given force structure constraints, the Air Force intends to take advantage of existing organizations (for somewhat different purposes) by slightly altering their procedures. Contingency response groups, originally organized to open airfields as an expeditionary capability, represent an example of this opportunity. With a focus on increased language skills and regional orientation, these groups could relate very easily to nascent Air Force partners. Air Force contingency response forces (two stateside wings and two overseas groups) include a wide variety of skill sets, from civil engineers, to medics, to air traffic controllers. The Air Force has regionally aligned its GPF contingency response forces and assigned a secondary mission supporting SFA. The leadership within contingency response forces has unanimously lauded the decision to assign them a formal role within the broad Air Force SFA portfolio. They described their core airfield opening functions (aerial port, mobile command and control, and maintenance) as perfect building blocks for the nascent air infrastructures of many nations with whom the United States desires closer relationships. Yet they have expressed concerns over their ability to support traditional (air base opening) missions and engagement missions concurrently, given historically low manning rates (near 70%). According to the Air Force, the Light Mobility Aircraft (LiMA) and the Light Attack Armed Reconnaissance Aircraft (LAAR) are two new programs intended to provide specific SFA capabilities. They would allow the United States to engage with a wider range of allies and partners, providing both kinetic and non-kinetic training capability for current and future operations. Under standard operations, LiMA forces would deploy in conjunction with a contingency response group's forces. These units will have the lead in training and advising partner nations in the development of an air mobility capability. The LiMA program is intended to enable the United States to perform lower-cost airlift operations to and from austere areas, working in concert with other nations that have limited capacity and capability to perform aviation functions. Within its own inventory, the Air Force currently lacks a light airlift capability that is affordable, easily deployable, and maintainable. The LiMA is also intended to be capable of operating from austere, short, or unimproved landing surfaces. This program is intended to enable conventional (GPF) units to increase their ability to work effectively with a wider range of partner nation air forces. The LiMA program plans to acquire 15 aircraft beginning in FY2011, with planned initial operations beginning in FY2012. The LAAR platform should be used to train U.S. aviators and support personnel (ACS) advisors on light attack tactics, techniques, and procedures so that they, in turn, are able to assist other nations in developing or improving their capability to operate similar platforms. The LAAR program plans to acquire 12 aircraft beginning in FY2012, with planned initial operational capability in FY2013. Full operational capability is scheduled for mid-FY2014. The Administration's FY 2011 budget request included $65.7 million in procurement for the LiMA program. There is no projected procurement beyond this initial lot. The Administration's FY2012 request also included $158.5 million in procurement for the LAAR program. It indicated a projected requirement of $106.6 million in procurement for FY2013. The concept of operations for these aircraft has received considerable interest. At the center of the discussion is whether these aircraft and their associated personnel will be used strictly for the training of other nations' aviation capacity, or whether they will also be used as part of the joint force to support U.S. forces. This is especially contentious for the LAAR aircraft, where proponents believe such assets should provide a close air support capability for ground forces. The Air Force believes that close air support is currently being adequately provided by existing force structure (other aircraft currently in the inventory). Additionally, some analysts believe that investing in these aircraft and personnel to conduct SFA or building partner capacity is a misguided effort. The argument goes that, with further constraints on the defense budget in terms of dollars and manpower, resources would be better allocated to recapitalizing and modernizing existing Air Force aircraft. Further, it says, failure to prioritize a U.S. technological advantage in assets, with newer fighters, bombers, and tankers, will position the nation to "fight the last war" instead of the next. The Inter-American Air Forces Academy (IAAFA) is located at Lackland AFB, San Antonio, TX. It provides professional training and education to partner nations' aerospace forces, through global military-to-military engagement focused on Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) SFA. IAAFA graduates an average of 800 students a year. It also provides training classes in Spanish for partner nations' air forces. English-language training for foreign aviation units is especially important, as English is the international language of aviation. The Defense Language Institute English Language Center (DLI/ELC) provides English-language training to members of foreign armed forces. Although DLI is under the operational control of the U.S. Air Force, it is a Department of Defense agency providing services to numerous and varied customers under U.S. security assistance programs. For some of these customers, services include teaching international students general- or special-purpose English; others are trained to be English instructors and school administrators. Increasingly, DLI provides in-country consultations through training detachments and teams. It also develops curriculum that can be used in partner nations to meet their specific needs. Aviation assets provide flexibility and help legitimize fragile states in that they allow government services to function in remote areas. Some of the biggest obstacles to developing aviation capacity are in the area of supporting infrastructure. Airfields, runways, and significant ground-based support are required for most fixed-winged aircraft. Hence, less-developed countries that cannot invest in such infrastructure often use rotary wing aircraft (helicopters) to operate from, and get into and out of, rural areas. An example of this is the wide employment of the MI-17 helicopter throughout the world, including in Iraq and Afghanistan. In 2005, DOD began procuring Russian-made MI-17s to build rotary-wing capabilities in Iraq, Pakistan, and Afghanistan. The decision to operate MI-17s was controversial programmatically and politically. During budget hearings, the Secretary of Defense and Secretary of the Army were questioned about decisions to procure MI-17s. Congressional concerns have included a lack of defined requirements, no consideration for other U.S. airframes, delays and rising costs in procurement efforts, multiple services conducting procurements, and a relative sense of mismanagement of efforts with regards to MI-17s within DOD. Most notably, Congress has expressed significant "Buy American" concerns about supporting the Russian helicopter industry with nearly $1 billion of U.S. taxpayer dollars. As a result, the Secretary of Defense directed an internal study to assess DOD's enduring operational and SFA requirements for non-standard rotary wing platforms and to develop long-term acquisition, training, and management recommendations. After a comprehensive review of how much capacity the consolidated combatant commanders needed to enhance partners' rotary wing capabilities through SFA, the study concluded that there is a steady demand to support at least 39 countries of strategic importance through 2016. Eighty percent of these countries are categorized by the department as urgent priorities for building partner capacity. The review also identified that at least 50% of the inventory of rotary wing platforms in these priority countries are made up of MI-variant platforms. To adequately support rotary wing SFA within these countries, the study recommended that DOD should be prepared to provide materiel assistance, individual training, and unit training on rotary wing platforms (primarily MI-17s), while also considering the opportunities for DOD to transition partner nations to a U.S.-sourced helicopter solution when and where appropriate. The study also found several other issues with respect to training with MI-17s. These include the concern that the demand for DOD to provide unit training to enhance partners' rotary wing capabilities is greater than DOD's capacity. The study identified that air crews needed for DOD to provide individual training on these platforms include approximately 43 U.S. pilots and 100 partner nation pilots per year. Last, the study assessed management practices regarding acquisition, sustainment, airworthiness, and training. DOD took several steps as a result of the findings of this study, including (1) an evaluation of U.S.-made platforms as alternatives (or additives) to the MI-17 for the Afghan Air Force, (2) institutionalized MI-17 training, with $45 million in the budget for establishing this training (the Army would be the lead, at Fort Rucker), and (3) updated Army authorities, responsibilities, and funding to manage the program. The study highlights that where building partner nation rotary wing capabilities benefits U.S. strategy, DOD should be prepared to provide resources to develop those capabilities. The study was well received by DOD leadership, which has briefed congressional defense committees. SFA (security assistance and security cooperation) programs are governed by U.S. statute. The primary laws with application to SFA are the Arms Export Control Act (AECA) (as amended), the Foreign Assistance Act (FAA) (as amended), and various sections of Titles 10 and 22 of the U.S. Code. (See Figure 13 .) Some analysts have described these authorities as disjointed, fragmented, cumbersome, and not finely tuned to address overseas needs or U.S. national security interests. Further, the obstacles to successful implementation of SFA are largely the same today as when the FAA was enacted as a "remedy" to the nation's lacking unity of effort in 1961. This dilemma was summed up by DOD in its 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review as "a limited ability to sustain long-term efforts." It has consistently been an issue raised by combatant commanders in congressional hearings (see Appendix A ). In a 2009 memorandum to the National Security Council, DOD described what it considered to be several deficiencies in the existing authorities: shortfalls and earmarks in funding that impede flexibility; foreign military financing (FMF) funding essentially unchanged from 1991 to 2008; budget-to-execution timelines (~ 3 years) that are not responsive to a changing security environment; security assistance framework designed for building long-term relationships against a Cold War adversary; uncertainty about what capacity-building Title 10 and Title 22 programs are appropriate in the ambiguous area between war and peace (Lebanon, Yemen, Southern Philippines); the lack of multiyear funding and authorities available to combatant commanders to support building partner capacity (i.e. SFA) missions. Secretary Gates underscored that current authorities create missed opportunities for the United States to conduct capacity building in at-risk locations, opportunities that are often filled by other nations, such as China. "All the while, other countries that do not suffer from such (legislative) encumbrances have been more quickly funding projects, selling weapons, and building relationships." As an example of the disparate U.S. government efforts to support SFA, an analysis by the Government Accountability Office (GAO) cited difficulties in Africa Command (AFRICOM), which stated that it had access to 15 different funding sources to fund its activities in FY2009. This complex matrix of legal constraints affected the timely execution of capacity-building missions. AFRICOM essentially "disinvited two-thirds of the intended participants for activities at the last minute because it was discovered that certain funding sources could not be used to support the participants." Another analysis done by the GAO used the example of Thailand, the Philippines, and Indonesia, where U.S. assistance was provided through at least 12 programs and activities managed by State, DOD, and Justice. The study pointed out that execution of these programs is hampered because of a lack of continuity at the strategic level across government agencies. The "U.S. government lacks an integrated national security assistance strategy covering all U.S. training and assistance provided to foreign security forces." Critics of expanded authorities to conduct the training of foreign forces bring up several points. The most frequently heard criticism is the seemingly expansive role of DOD serving as the lead in implementing foreign relations through SFA. Critics caution against reliance on a military-centric approach to international capacity building. This position also highlights the disparity in resources between DOD and DOS and encourages significant investment in the latter as opposed to expanding the authorities of the former. A 2007 report to Senate members of the Committee on Foreign Relations highlighted the expanded growth in Department of Defense authorities in the foreign assistance field since 2001. The report had the following recommendations: Foreign assistance functions and authorities should not be migrating to the Department of Defense due to inadequate executive branch requests for funding in the proper budget account. The Secretary of State should streamline security assistance decision-making to make certain that there is ready flexibility and means to address emerging threats and unexpected opportunities. Insufficient funding for foreign assistance in the civilian agency budgets reinforces a migration of foreign aid authorities and functions to the Department of Defense. Congress, in cooperation with the executive branch, should undertake an overhaul of the Foreign Assistance Act. Too often, Members of Congress narrow their foreign aid focus to favorite or least-favorite countries, specific NGOs or programs, and other unique enthusiasms that end in earmarks or reporting requirements in appropriations bills. The executive branch must provide detailed justifications for its requests and a sound strategic rationale for its priorities in order to stave off congressional directives. Congressional leadership should find floor time for a foreign aid authorization bill as a routine matter at least every two years. Members of Congress should agree on reprogramming levels below which decisions can be made at the embassy level without requiring legislative branch notifications. Nevertheless, Congress provided DOD with an opportunity to explicitly spell out what is needed to facilitate building partner capacity. As part of the 2010 National Defense Authorization Act, Congress directed under Section 1204 that DOD provide a "Report on Authorities to Build the Capacity of Foreign Military Forces and Related Matters." As of the writing of this CRS report, a final report from DOD to meet this requirement had not been completed. (See Appendix B .) One potential means for revised authorities was recently introduced. Both the Department of State and the Department of Defense have endorsed a new Global Security Contingency Fund (GSCF) that is intended to pool resources and expertise between the two departments and allow them to respond quickly as new challenges emerge. This three-year pilot pooled fund is intended to be used to build partner capacity, prevent conflicts, and prepare for emerging threats. Described as an initiative that would "incentivize interagency collaboration through a new business model," it is intended to "provide a more agile and cost effective way to reduce the risk of future conflicts by allowing our government to respond to unforeseen needs and take advantage of emerging opportunities to help partners secure their own territories and regions." The GSCF proposal was introduced in a memorandum to the Secretary of State entitled "Options for Remodeling Security Assistance Authorities." This proposal is modeled after a similar effort recently employed in the United Kingdom. This approach is intended to structure funding mechanisms and approval processes to reflect the importance of security sector activities to both DOD and DOS and to offer incentives for collaboration across the national security structure. It is also intended to provide impetus for future steps toward national security budgeting. In supporting the proposal for pooled funding, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Mike Mullen urged, "We should not allow bureaucratic resistance to trump operational effectiveness when security sector assistance is essential to our national strategy of helping others secure and defend themselves." This fund coincides with a State Department reorganization, as outlined in the 2010 Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR). The GSCF would be affiliated with the Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations (formerly the Coordinator for Stabilization and Reconstruction). The QDDR (see Appendix C ) emphasizes the priority of interagency coordination, while still leveraging DOD's resources: "We must more effectively work with the Defense Department, which has unparalleled logistical, operational, and personnel capacities to operate in complex crisis situations and the capacity and knowledge to help countries build effective, responsible military forces under civilian leadership." The QDDR also states: "The Department of Defense is uniquely positioned to stop violence, create conditions of security, and build the military capacity of foreign nations." One section of the QDDR appears to give tacit endorsement for the GSCF proposal, and another directly endorses it. Each department would seek funding within its own budget to contribute to the pooled funds. Both the State Department and the Defense Department would contribute to these funds, and no project could move forward without the approval of both agencies. The initial request for the program is for $50 million to be appropriated in whole or in part to either the State Department or DOD. The proposal also includes a request for authority to transfer an additional $450 million into the fund from either department if needed. The GSCF is not intended to replace the 1206 and 1207 programs, which have leveraged interagency coordination for implementation. These authorities provide training and equipment to partners for counterterrorism operations or for stability operations in which U.S. forces are a participant, including Afghanistan (see " Security Sector Legislation Beyond ASFF and ISFF "). However, if the three year pilot program proves successful, 1206 could be supplanted by the GCSF. The GSCF would expand the scope of foreign security force organizations that could receive training to include the justice sector (e.g., law enforcement, prisons, rule of law programs), when the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense, determines that conflict or instability in a region challenges the existing capability of civilian providers to deliver such assistance. This approach would require a request for authorities and funding from Congress. Legislation would be required to establish funding pools in the U.S. Treasury. Additionally, DOD and State would both need to seek authority to provide funding to the pool as well as seeking their own appropriations for this purpose. This funding could be drawn from existing accounts or identified as a separate funding requirement with a dedicated appropriation each year. The request for authority would also likely include a mechanism for each department to add to the pool if a departmental priority needs to be addressed in the near term. Under current committee structure, this approach would require broad oversight from several committees. This scrutiny would mirror current oversight of the 1206 and 1207 programs. This process has provided more transparency to Congress than is typical in most DOD programs. However, one analysis conducted by Stimson Center considers the necessary degree of congressional coordination to be an insurmountable task. An option for Congress could be a more transformational approach. This would include creating in both the House and the Senate a select committee to oversee these funds (notionally referred to as Select Committees on Security Capacity Building, Stabilization, and Conflict Prevention). Moreover, the proposal could establish a new title of the U.S. Code , separate from DOD's Title 10 or State's Title 22, under the oversight of these two select committees (notionally referred to as "Title 51"). The intent would be to codify this process into a law with cross-cutting responsibility beyond a single committee's jurisdiction or section of U.S. Code . Those that endorse the GSCF proposal point out several issues. Among them are the availability of personnel and resources, the efficacy of streamlined authorities, and the move toward an overarching SFA effort as part of national security sector reform. The most commonly heard endorsement is that while the State Department holds overarching responsibility for determining engagement strategies and capability development for foreign nations, it is more often than not military resources that are available and accessible to conduct interaction, capability development, and relationships with our allies and partner nations. One analysis of the proposal also points out that, in an area of tightening fiscal budgets, it is unlikely that there will be a huge shift in resources from DOD to State and USAID, but it is likely that there will be ways to spend these resources together, with State and USAID in the lead. One analysis sees the GCSF as part of a greater unified effort to coordinate an overarching security agenda. The fund is seen as one effort that is combined with the State Department's reorganization and a consolidated DOD/DOS Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) budget. Some hold that pooling the resources of DOD and State undermines the authorities and responsibilities inherent in each of these organizations. While the security assistance authorities within the Department of Defense have expanded since 9/11, some attest that this has eroded the tradition of State Department leadership in aligning security assistance with America's foreign policy priorities. They argue that a program such as the GSCF would in essence grant the Secretary of Defense a veto over foreign policy decisions made by the Secretary of State. Further, it could misalign the role of the Defense Department in policymaking and the contribution of security assistance to America's delicate diplomatic balance. Proponents of this position believe a more appropriate option for Congress would be to amend Section 506 of the Foreign Assistance Act. Such an amendment would authorize the president to direct the drawdown of resources from any agency of the government to provide assistance elsewhere. Currently, this authority does not explicitly include security assistance. Opponents of the GSCF proposal also argue that providing some of the funding through defense (armed services) committees is a conflict of interest and that doing so contradicts the importance of conflict prevention through diplomatic and development efforts rather than military ones. Those who endorse this stance contend that funding lines should remain distinct and that further efforts should be directed toward the State Department's Complex Crises Fund. The overarching concept of security force assistance raises several questions for congressional consideration. Are the services' efforts to organize, train, and equip (and corresponding resource budgets) sufficient to conducting SFA? Are dedicated GPF units, similar to SOF, for conducting SFA more suitable. Is the premise of training indigenous forces in Afghanistan the correct methodology for establishing stability or is a smaller presence dedicated to eradicating the Taliban more appropriate? Are current legislative authorities sufficient to conduct SFA? And if the GSCF is endorsed, how will effective oversight be ensured across committees? What future steps will be taken to ensure a coordinated approach to capacity building between DOS and DOD? Combatant Commanders' Testimonies: Authorities to Conduct SFA Combatant Commanders' Requests for Revisions to Authorizations In testimony before the Armed Services Committees, the position of the Global Combatant Commanders has consistently been that the current authorizations for conducting SFA are counter to effective security cooperation efforts. In Africa Command (AFRICOM) , where SFA is considered essential to stability and counter-terrorism strategies, the commander testified: Our ability to sustain forward progress toward our long-term goals in Africa is dependent on several factors that enable our efforts. Some, such as limits on authorities, present us with challenges where we seek assistance. Others, such as interagency integration, present opportunities for growth and development of new or improved programs and activities that we wish to sustain. Sustaining our long-term security cooperation programs and activities in Africa requires flexible, multi-year authorities. Existing authorities are designed to support the conduct of individual short-term activities or long-term programs, but do not support the transition from the former to the latter. They are also insufficiently responsive to changing conditions, such as when train and equip efforts initiated in response to emergent threats highlight the need for long-term capacity building. We encourage dialogue on ways to streamline or modify legislative authorities to enable sustained security engagement with our African partners, ranging from train and equip programs that respond quickly to changing conditions to long-term partner capacity-building, especially in countering violent extremism. Similarly, the European Command (EUCOM) commander testified: Through these training efforts, EUCOM enabled partner nations in making contributions to the effort in Afghanistan. However, we require expanded long-term authorities and funding to enhance and continue these efforts. Operationally, we must continuously strive to find flexible authorities and funding mechanisms to build the capacity of those partner nations willing to fight side-by-side with us. This has become increasingly important because of the recent surge in activities in Afghanistan and the need to get our Allies and partners more involved. Your continued support and expansion of authorities like NDAA Section 1206, particularly allowing their use for partner nation forces deploying to Iraq and Afghanistan, has been absolutely pivotal in enabling our strategic efforts in the European theater. The Pacific Command (PACOM) commander testified: We face challenges in building partner capacity under the current patchwork of authorities and programs designed to support our Security Assistant efforts. Unfortunately these (security assistance) programs have not evolved much since the end of the Cold War. As reported by the QDR, these security assistance programs are constrained by a "patchwork of authorities, persistent shortfalls in the resources, unwieldy processes and a limited ability to sustain such undertakings beyond a short period of time." I agree with this description and fully support the Administration's efforts to reform and enhance these important programs as essential to maintaining, and, in some cases, regaining our competitive edge. I hope you will support the Administration efforts in this regard. Congressional 1206 authority is the only partner capability/capacity building tool that we have to address urgent or emergent needs in the region. In Central Command ( CENTCOM), authorities are unique in that there is specific legislation addressing training activities with Afghanistan, Iraq, and Pakistan. Nevertheless, General David Petraeus also identified the legislative obstacles to effective security force assistance. While these programs are reasonably successful in meeting needs in a peacetime environment, we support the reformation of the security assistance programs and processes described in this year's Quadrennial Defense Review to create new, more responsive, long term mechanisms for developing our partner nations' security capacity. Additionally, in the face of enduring conflict in the region, we look to expanded special authorities and multi-year appropriations to quickly meet the emerging needs of counterterrorism, counterinsurgency, and Foreign Internal Defense/Security Force Assistance activities. Multi-year programs-of-record that provide training, equipment, and infrastructure for our partner nations' security forces enabled our successes in Iraq and are of prime importance if we are to achieve comparable progress in Afghanistan and Pakistan. These critical programs include the Iraq Security Forces Fund, the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund, the Pakistan Counterinsurgency Fund, and the Cooperative Defense Program. Additionally, in his 2011 guidance, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Mike Mullen, conveyed a similar theme to the Joint Staff: Our engagement across the globe would be greatly enhanced by wholesale reform of security sector assistance. Our security assistance is designed for another era: authorities are inflexible, resources are insufficient, and processes are too cumbersome for addressing today's security challenges. The laws and regulations surrounding security assistance are one of the major barriers to better and more substantial partnerships and a pooled-resources approach to foreign assistance. We must better coordinate resources that are dedicated to the cause of national security, and ask Congress to reform these authorities. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010, Section 1204 Report on Authorities to Build Partner Capacity SEC. 1204. REPORT ON AUTHORITIES TO BUILD THE CAPACITY OF FOREIGN MILITARY FORCES AND RELATED MATTERS. (a) REPORT REQUIRED.—Not later than March 1, 2010, the President shall transmit to the congressional committees specified in subsection (b) a report on the following: (1) The relationship between authorities of the Department of Defense to conduct security cooperation programs to train and equip, or otherwise build the capacity of, foreign military forces and security assistance authorities of the Department of State and other foreign assistance agencies to provide assistance to train and equip, or otherwise build the capacity of, foreign military forces, including the distinction, if any, between the purposes of such authorities, the processes to generate requirements to satisfy the purposes of such authorities, and the contribution such authorities make to the core missions of each such department and agency. (2) The strengths and weaknesses of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2151 et seq.), the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2171 et seq.), title 10, United States Code, and any other provision of law relating to training and equipping, or otherwise building the capacity of, foreign military forces, including to conduct counterterrorist operations or participate in or support military and stability operations in which the United State Armed Forces are a participant. (3) The changes, if any, that should be made to the provisions of law described in paragraph (2) that would improve the ability of the United States Government to train and equip, or otherwise build the capacity of, foreign military forces, including to conduct counterterrorist operations or participate in or support military and stability operations in which the United State Armed Forces are a participant. (4) The organizational and procedural changes, if any, that should be made in the Department of Defense and the Department of State and other foreign assistance agencies to improve the ability of such departments and agencies to conduct programs to train and equip, or otherwise build the capacity of, foreign military forces, including to conduct counterterrorist operations or participate in or support military and stability operations in which the United State Armed Forces are a participant. (5) The resources and funding mechanisms required to ensure adequate funding for such programs. (b) SPECIFIED CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES.—The congressional committees specified in this subsection are the following: (1) The Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Foreign Affairs, and the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives. The Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Foreign Relations, and the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate. State Department's Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review, Referral to Pooled Funding Civil-Military collaboration, particularly in countries characterized by conflict or instability, initiatives and programs jointly developed by teams of State, USAID, and Department of Defense personnel are generally more effective. Where appropriate, we will work in joint civilian and military teams and develop innovative mechanisms for civil-military collaboration, such as shared funding or pooled funds.... Pooled funding. As we work toward comprehensive solutions to the challenges described above, State and USAID will pursue innovative mechanisms to facilitate unified planning and implementation of missions that cut across agencies, programs and budgets, and that require the integration and cohesion of military and civilian power. We are currently exploring the creation of a 3-year joint pilot pooled fund between State, USAID, and Department of Defense for security and justice sector and stabilization assistance. The creation of a pooled funding mechanism would provide needed flexibility and resources in situations in which the confluence of several security challenges, such as armed conflict, terrorist activities or organized crime, converge with state fragility. In such circumstances, a coordinated and holistic assistance response across the security and justice sector is necessary, requiring State and USAID to work in complete synchronization with the Department of Justice, Department of Defense, and other agencies. Pooled funding would help overcome the limitations of current authorities and resource shortfalls, by allowing for the integration of military and civilian assets in planning and implementing comprehensive assistance programs. In this way, it would facilitate the design of assistance programs based on the comparative advantages of each agency in a particular situation, instead of the current allocation of funding between agencies. Pooled funding would embody the principle of shared responsibility, with a dual key decision model and an interagency staff, through which our agencies would work together to identify requirements and develop programs, taking advantage of the diverse expertise of State, USAID, the Department of Defense, and other agencies. Defense Department's 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review, SFA References Build the Security Capacity of Partner States : Since the United States assumed the role of a leading security provider after the end of World War II, DOD has worked actively to build the defense capacity of allied and partner states. Doing so has also given the U.S. Armed Forces opportunities to train with and learn from their counterparts. These efforts further the U.S. objective of securing a peaceful and cooperative international order. Security cooperation activities include bilateral and multilateral training and exercises, foreign military sales (FMS) and financing (FMF), officer exchange programs, educational opportunities at professional military schools, technical exchanges, and efforts to assist foreign security forces in building competency and capacity. In today's complex and interdependent security environment, these dimensions of the U.S. defense strategy have never been more important. U.S. forces, therefore, will continue to treat the building of partners' security capacity as an increasingly important mission. Within the range of security cooperation activities, the most dynamic in the coming years will be security force assistance (SFA) missions: "hands on" efforts, conducted primarily in host countries, to train, equip, advise, and assist those countries' forces in becoming more proficient at providing security to their populations and protecting their resources and territories . In order to ensure that improvements in partner security forces are sustained, the Department must seek to enhance the capabilities and capacity of security institutions, such as defense ministries, that support fielded forces.... [emphasis added] As we place greater emphasis on building the capacity of our partners, our efforts will continue to be informed by our long-term determination to foster human dignity. This commitment is manifested in human rights vetting and other controls that shape our efforts to train, equip, advise, and assist foreign forces and partner security institutions. America's efforts to build the capacity of our partners will always be defined by support for healthy civil-military relations, respect for human dignity and the rule of law, promotion of international humanitarian law, and the professionalization of partner military forces. These SFA activities can help enable host-country participation in coalition stability operations and multilateral peacekeeping operations that improve regional security. Working in conjunction with other U.S. government agencies and allied military forces to strengthen the security institutions of partner nations will be a crucial part of U.S. and allied efforts to defeat terrorist groups around the world. Terrorist groups seek to evade security forces by exploiting ungoverned and undergoverned areas as safe havens from which to recruit, indoctrinate, and train fighters, as well as to plan attacks on U.S. and allied interests. Where appropriate, U.S. forces will work with the military forces of partner nations to strengthen their capacity for internal security, and will coordinate those activities with those of other U.S. government agencies as they work to strengthen civilian capacities, thus denying terrorists and insurgents safe havens. For reasons of political legitimacy as well as sheer economic necessity, there is no substitute for professional, motivated local security forces protecting populations threatened by insurgents and terrorists in their midst. U.S. forces have been training, advising, and assisting Afghan and Iraqi security forces so that they can more effectively uphold the rule of law and control and defend their territories against violent non-state actors. In these contested environments, partnered counter insurgency (COIN), in which Afghan and Iraqi units operate in tandem with U.S. forces, is an effective way to train and advise forces while conducting combat operations against insurgents. These partnered host-nation units have the advantage of knowing the terrain, language, and local culture. Partnering with U.S. forces in return allows them to train and learn by doing.... U.S. forces have been training, advising, and assisting Afghan and Iraqi security forces so that they can more effectively uphold the rule of law and control and defend their territories against violent non-state actors. In these contested environments, partnered counter insurgency (COIN), in which Afghan and Iraqi units operate in tandem with U.S. forces, is an effective way to train and advise forces while conducting combat operations against insurgents. These partnered host-nation units have the advantage of knowing the terrain, language, and local culture. Partnering with U.S. forces in return allows them to train and learn by doing.... Key QDR initiatives to support this mission area include the following: Strengthen and institutionalize general purpose force capabilities for security force assistance. All four Services provide specialized training to individuals and groups deploying abroad to train and advise the security forces of partner nations. In anticipation of the growing role of security force assistance in U.S. defense strategy and operations, the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps will add more than 500 personnel to their train-the-trainer units for general purpose forces. The Air Force will also expand its regionally oriented contingency response groups (CRGs). The intention is for these units to steadily grow to the point at which their staffs can sustain specialized expertise in regions and countries of greatest importance and regularly detach experts to accompany units deploying to training missions abroad. In addition, the Air Force will field light mobility and light attack aircraft in general purpose force units in order to increase their ability to work effectively with a wider range of partner air forces.... [emphasis added] Building the defense capacity of allies and partners and ensuring that the U.S. Armed Forces are able to effectively train and operate with foreign militaries is a high-priority mission. As the emphasis on developing the capability of indigenous security forces in Afghanistan and Iraq reflects, conducting security force assistance (SFA) operations is an increasingly critical element of building partnership capacity. In anticipation of the growing role of security force assistance in U.S. strategy and operations, the Department is institutionalizing general purpose force capabilities for security force assistance; enhancing language, regional, and cultural abilities; strengthening and expanding capabilities for training partner aviation forces, as well as capacities for ministerial-level training; and creating mechanisms to facilitate more rapid transfer of critical materiel....

Summary: Historically, the U.S. military's Special Operations Forces (SOF) have had primary responsibility for training, advising, and assisting foreign military forces. Today, although this mission has not been completely relegated to conventional forces, the National Security Strategies of the current and previous administrations direct the U.S. military services (Army, Navy, Air Force, Marines) to organize, train, and equip themselves to carry out these activities on a larger scale with conventional (non-SOF) forces. This responsibility in its broad sense of building the capacity of partner states has been termed "security force assistance" (SFA). SFA ties into several interests of Congress, including security assistance, security cooperation, foreign military financing, foreign military sales, foreign affairs, foreign aid, overseas contingency operations, and legislative authorities associated with training foreign forces (Foreign Assistance Act, P.L. 87-195; 22 U.S.C. 2151). Of significant interest to Congress in the near term is the ability of U.S. military forces to train their counterparts in Afghanistan and Iraq. The Obama Administration position, endorsed for the most part by Congress, is that developing competent forces in these countries is pivotal to coalition mission success and to protecting U.S. national interests. SFA is part of the U.S. strategic goal of having Iraq and Afghanistan responsible for their own security. Congress has supported the Department of Defense's agenda for training Afghani forces; however, some Members are skeptical of the new Iraqi government's commitment to developing its own security forces. Each of the military services has undertaken to organize, train, and equip themselves for SFA. However, while SOF have units specifically dedicated to a long-term role in SFA, the conventional forces services do not. Each of the services does have Security Cooperation and Security Assistance organizations that are dedicated to SFA activities, although they do not have SFA in their titles. The services also standardize training for deploying forces to support combatant commanders in their SFA mission. This effort to "train the trainers," although an object of consistent inquiry in congressional hearings, has been endorsed in testimony by combatant commanders. Along with its role in the current Afghanistan and Iraq wars, SFA is directly linked to counterterrorism strategy and is key to engaging underdeveloped and undergoverned nations (often referred to as "weak or fragile states") in a preventive national security strategy. Regional combatant commanders apply this preventive strategy through authorities provided in the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA). The SFA authorizations in the NDAA are often criticized as being disjointed and cumbersome, creating significant challenges to effective SFA employment. The Departments of Defense and State have presented a proposal for pooled funding to alleviate some of these challenges. The proposed Global Security Contingency Fund would be a shared resource requiring authorization by both departments. This would be similar to the temporary authorization known as "1206 global train and equip" authorization. The training, organizing, and equipping of U.S. forces to conduct SFA competes for scarce fiscal and personnel resources among the services. Some critics of SFA attest that committing to this capability within the services detracts from their ability to conduct traditional combat roles. Others suggest that building the security capacity of weak and failed states is a misguided effort. This report provides the following elements: An overview of the SFA rationale, focused primarily on Department of Defense support for and relations with foreign security forces. Description of the possible employment of U.S. conventional forces and platforms in support of the SFA mission (see "SFA in Current and Previous National Security Strategies"). Exploration of current operations in Afghanistan and Iraq (see "SFA Linkage to Iraq and Afghanistan Strategies"). Resident training capability in U.S. forces as a tool for geographic combatant commanders. Issues Congress may consider ("Do Legislative Authorities Restrict Conducting SFA?") The report summarizes congressional reaction to SFA proposals and provides a detailed account of the issues raised by SFA concepts and programs. A glossary is also provided (see Glossary, page 57).