U.S. security interests in South Asia concentrate on weapons proliferation, strategies to reducetensions, antiterrorism, and regional stability. This report emphasizes the role of missiles in SouthAsian security because of their potential use as delivery vehicles for nuclear weapons. As such, theproliferation of missiles in the region is considered to be a central variable in calculations gaugingregional stability. During the 1990s, the U.S. security focus in South Asia sought to minimize damage to the nonproliferation regime, prevent escalation of a nuclear arms and missile race, and promoteIndo-Pakistani bilateral dialogue, especially on the sovereignty dispute over Kashmir. In light ofthese goals, the Clinton Administration established five "benchmarks" for India and Pakistan basedon the contents of UN Security Council Res. 1172, which condemned the two countries' nuclear testsof May 1998. These were: signing and ratifying the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT); (2) halting all further production of fissile material and participating in FissileMaterial Cutoff Treaty (FMCT) negotiations; limiting development and deployment of WMD deliveryvehicles; implementing strict export controls on WMD materials and technologies;and establishing bilateral dialogue between New Delhi and Islamabad. Progress in each of these areas has been limited, and the Bush Administration makes no reference to the benchmark framework. (3) NeitherIndia nor Pakistan has signed the CTBT, and bothappear to be continuing their production of weapons-grade fissile materials. (4) The status ofweaponization and deployment is unclear, though there are indications that this is occurring at aslow, but more or less steady pace. (5) Earlier optimismin the area of export controls waned as fearshave gained credence that these countries, especially Pakistan, might seek to export WMD materialsand/or technologies. (6) Finally, while there has beenno repeat of the intense 1999 military clashesin Kashmir -- and a ten-month-long military standoff in 2002 ended without large-scale fighting --bilateral tensions remain significant, and no substantive dialogue between New Delhi and Islamabadis underway. Upon taking office, the Bush Administration set out substantively to build upon an initial improvement in U.S. relations with New Delhi begun by President Clinton, while also shifting U.S.nonproliferation policy from seeking to prevent South Asian nuclearization to encouraging India andPakistan to be "more responsible nuclear powers." (7) Some analysts have argued that, by moving theU.S. focus away from international nonproliferation treaties such as the CTBT and withdrawing fromthe Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, the Bush Administration's de-emphasis of "vertical proliferation" (8) issues has contributed to legitimizing South Asia's strategic arsenals. (9) In the face of congressionalquestioning about seeming "contradictions" in U.S. policy, Assistant Secretary of State for SouthAsia Christina Rocca stated in March 2003 that the United States is taking a "pragmatic approach"that seeks to have India and Pakistan "exercise restraint" with regard to the proliferation of strategicarsenals. (10) The September 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States and ensuing U.S.-led antiterrorism efforts transformed U.S. relations with India and, especially Pakistan, which again became a"front-line" ally and beneficiary of significant U.S. foreign assistance (up from $3.5 million inFY2001 to more than $1 billion in FY2002). India's swift offer of full support for U.S. antiterrorismefforts was widely viewed as reflective of much improved U.S.-India relations. In 2003, and forperhaps the first period in history, the United States simultaneously enjoys positive relations withboth countries. (11) This circumstance may meanthat the ability of the United States to influence SouthAsian security dynamics is at an all-time high. At the same time, differences with Pakistan (overissues of terrorism, proliferation, and democratization) and with India (over definitions of terrorism,U.S. policy in the Middle East, and human rights) continue to cloud forecasts of future U.S.engagement with South Asia's two largest and nuclear-armed countries. The key issues for Congress addressed here are whether missile proliferation in South Asia enhances or detracts from regional stability and the role of U.S. policy in promoting such stability,as well as in tension reduction and nonproliferation. Levels of U.S. foreign assistance to India andPakistan, the establishment of aid restrictions, the transfer of conventional weapons platforms(possibly including missile defense systems), the setting of export control parameters andnonproliferation goals, and the maintenance of policy and intelligence oversight of U.S. relationswith India and Pakistan all have a vital congressional facet. Pending and future legislation couldinfluence levels of stability in South Asia. Understanding present-day missile proliferation in South Asia and relevant U.S. policy optionsis aided by a review of the historical setting. Three wars -- in1947-48, 1965, and 1971 -- and aconstant state of military preparedness on both sides of their shared border have marked thehalf-century of bitter rivalry between India and Pakistan. A bloody battle in the Kashmiri mountainsnear Kargil in 1999 cost thousands of lives and marked history's first significant direct clash betweenthe forces of two nuclear-armed countries. Most recently, a 10-month-long military standoff in 2002involving up to one million Indian and Pakistani soldiers was viewed as the closest the two countrieshad been to full-scale war since 1971, and caused the U.S. government to become "deeply concerned... that a conventional war ... could escalate into a nuclear confrontation." (12) A persistent and oftentimes perplexing aspect of U.S. engagement in the region has been the difficulty of maintaining a more-or-less balanced approach toward two antagonistic countries whilesimultaneously promoting perceived U.S. interests in South Asia. India has seven times thepopulation and four times the land area of Pakistan. In 2002, the Indian GDP was more than eighttimes that of Pakistan, and the Indian military enjoys a 2:1 or 3:1 advantage in numbers of soldiersand conventional arms. (13) Yet, despite India'sclearly greater status in these concrete terms, theUnited States has for the past half-century found itself much more closely engaged with Pakistan,in particular during the 1950s, when Pakistan was part of the U.S.-led alliance system to contain theSoviet Union; the 1980s, when Pakistan was a front-line ally in U.S.-supported efforts to defeat theSoviet Army in Afghanistan; and today, when Pakistan is again a front-line ally, this time in U.S.-ledefforts to defeat Islamic militancy. India and Pakistan were established in August 1947 from what had been British India. Some 500,000 people died during the Partition, and by October the two countries were fighting a war overthe disputed Kashmir region. Even before the onset of the U.S.-Soviet Cold War, there existed a"strategic divergence" between the United States and Indian nationalists that "set habits and patternson both sides" which persisted for many decades. (15) Over the course of the Cold War, U.S. interestin South Asia was inconsistent and almost wholly subordinated to efforts at containing Soviet andChinese communist expansion. A perceived absence of compelling geostrategic or economic stakeslimited the extent of U.S. involvement in South Asian affairs. During the 1950s, Pakistan became embedded in U.S.-led treaty organizations that sought to encircle and contain communist expansion. Two key results were the institutionalization of closeU.S.-Pakistan ties and the provision to Islamabad of large assistance packages. (16) While thisU.S.-Pakistan security relationship developed, Indian leaders concentrated on nation-building andfollowed a policy of what became known as nonalignment. By the mid-1950s, Washington'sdifferences with New Delhi gave rise to what a top U.S. diplomat characterized as "correct but ratherchilly"exchanges that would last for several decades. (17) After a brief 1962 border war with China exposed serious weaknesses in the Indian Army, the United States initiated military assistance programs for New Delhi that totaled about $150 millionby 1966. However, the second India-Pakistan war over Kashmir in 1965 spurred the United Statesto end military assistance to both countries. Given Pakistan's 10 years of close cooperation with theUnited States, some in Islamabad felt betrayed by this move. However, when East Pakistan (nowBangladesh) fell into turmoil in 1971, leading to the forced partition of Pakistan after its defeat ina third war with India, President Nixon elected to "tilt" U.S. support toward Pakistan and, in sodoing, brought U.S.-India relations to a nadir. (18) India's "peaceful nuclear explosion" of 1974 madeSouth Asian weapons proliferation a top-tier U.S. concern for the remainder of the Cold War. TheSoviet invasion of Afghanistan of 1979 transformed U.S.-Pakistan relations virtually overnight, andduring the 1980s Pakistan became regarded as a front-line U.S. ally in the struggle against Sovietexpansion. (19) Following the Soviet Union's withdrawal from Afghanistan and its subsequent collapse in 1991, U.S. policy toward South Asia sought to "break the zero-sum mind-set that [had] plaguedIndo-Pakistani relations since partition and was reinforced by the global rivalries of the pastdecades." (20) Proliferation-related restrictions onaid to Pakistan constrained this effort, however, andcontributed to a perceived imbalance in U.S. policy after their (re-)imposition in 1990. (21) For India,the end of the Cold War meant an end to two decades of close Indian-Soviet relations and a majorreduction of aid infusions from Moscow. At about the same time, disaffected separatists in theJammu and Kashmir state launched a full-blown rebellion there. During the 1990s, Islamabad cameunder intense criticism from both India and the United States for its active role in supporting theinsurgency, and later for its support of the Afghani Taliban regime. The May 1998 nuclear teststriggered sweeping U.S. aid restrictions on both countries, and an October 1999 military coup inPakistan brought added U.S. sanctions on that country. (22) Yet the decade-long shift in U.S.orientation toward South Asia became especially clear when President Clinton visited the region inMarch 2000, spending six days in India, but only six hours in Pakistan. The September 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States suddenly transformed U.S. relations with Pakistan, which again became a front-line U.S. ally, this time against radical Islamic terroristsand their supporters. India also joined the U.S.-led antiterrorism coalition, and remaining aidrestrictions on both India and Pakistan were quickly lifted by Congress and President Bush. However, while the Bush Administration has moved to bolster U.S.-India relations on a broad front-- including regular and unprecedented joint military exercises and potentially major arms sales toNew Delhi -- the U.S.-Pakistan relationship has continued to be constrained by U.S. concernsregarding Islamabad's possible role in WMD proliferation, terrorist infiltration into both IndianKashmir and across the Durand Line separating Pakistan and Afghanistan, and perceivedanti-democratic practices by President Gen. Pervez Musharraf. Despite these concerns, Islamabadagain became a leading recipient of U.S. foreign assistance funds. Central to an analysis of the meaning of missile proliferation in South Asia are two key questions: First, is a strategic arms race between India and Pakistan underway? And, second, doesprogress in the development of missile and nuclear capabilities promote or degrade regionalstability? Indian and Pakistani government officials express a desire to avoid engaging in a costlyand potentially disastrous arms race, while also asserting that no such race is afoot. (23) Yet a 2001Defense Department review of proliferation threats indicated that, "Indian and Pakistani strategicprograms continue to be driven by the perception of the other's effort," and that the two countries"are in a period of accelerated nuclear weapons and missile development" that may be termed a"slow-speed" arms race. (24) In 2002, Director ofCentral Intelligence Tenet told the Senate SelectCommittee on Intelligence that, Both India and Pakistan are working on the doctrine and tactics for more advanced nuclear weapons, producing fissile material, and increasing their nuclearstockpiles. ... Both countries also continue development of long-range nuclear-capable ballisticmissiles, and plan to field cruise missiles with a land-attackcapability. (25) Apparent tit-for-tat ballistic missile tests in April 1999 and again in March 2003 have been viewed as evidence that an action-reaction dynamic is indeed at work. (26) Many analysts argue thatovert nuclear weaponization by either side -- most especially of their ballistic missiles -- could behighly destabilizing, especially if significant nuclear missile forces are deployed in the absence ofsecure command and control structures. If these forces are perceived as being vulnerable to attack,one or both sides might adopt a launch-on-warning status, making conflict escalation even moredifficult to govern. (27) Ever since the 1998 nuclear tests in South Asia, it has appeared that India's strategic decision-making is a key factor in shaping regional stability. According to the Pentagon, "India'sdevelopment of [medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs)] ... is motivated by its desire to berecognized as a great power and strategic competitor with China." (28) China seems content with itsexisting deterrent against India, and Pakistan's limited resources appear to constrain its ability toinitiate an Indo-Pakistani arms race. (29) Thus, akey variable in the future evolution of South Asiannuclear proliferation is India's strategic intention in relation to China. One of the more dangerousscenarios is one in which India actively seeks to gain nuclear parity with China by building a largernuclear arsenal and long-range delivery force. In the middle-term, the deployment of Agni missilescapable of striking China's eastern population centers could spur Beijing to re-target more nuclearforces to the south and likewise move Islamabad to seek some form of parity in this arena, thuspotentially setting in motion a full-blown arms race on the Asian Subcontinent. (30) Moreover, someobservers suggest that U.S. sales of theater missile defense systems in Asia -- or the deployment ofa national system covering U.S. territory -- could spur further ballistic missile proliferation in SouthAsia (see below). (31) Debate over the proliferation of strategic arsenals generally is divided into two camps: "optimists" and "pessimists." (32) Proliferationoptimists operate under the logic of deterrence,wherein the possession of nuclear weapons by both sides of an adversarial interstate relationship canbe expected to produce stability. Put simply, mutual deterrence obtains when both sides believe thatthe costs of aggression or escalation are likely to outweigh the potential benefits of such action. (33) Proliferation pessimists , however, take the view that the spread of nuclear weapons capability isinherently destabilizing and dangerous, and that nuclear dynamics in the developing world areunlikely to re-create the Cold War pattern. Political and technological factors in conflict-prone areasare seen to create conditions where nuclear weapons will not produce stability and the introductionof more nuclear weapons will significantly increase the likelihood that these weapons will be used. (34) Many analysts have pointed to the brief, bloody Kargil conflict of 1999 as evidence that SouthAsia's strategic arsenals do not contribute to stability and may lead to the use of nuclear weapons. (35) Only seven months after the May 1998 tests, the main architect of the "benchmark" framework, then-Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott, noted that the New Delhi and Islamabad governmentswere justifying their moves to overt capabilities with reference to the U.S.-Soviet experience,"almost as if they see Cold War brinkmanship between the superpowers as something to beemulated." He warned that such a perspective misreads the reality of U.S.-Soviet interactions, andthat historic, geographic, and economic differences appear significant in the South Asian case. (36) Thisuse of the Cold War experience illustrates the general proliferation optimism of the Indian andPakistani governments in contrast with the proliferation pessimism expressed by some U.S.government officials, especially those in the State Department. As noted above, BushAdministration officials have been more muted in their criticism of South Asian strategic arsenals. Both India and Pakistan have claimed to be seeking only the nuclear weapons needed for minimum credible deterrence (MCD). (37) Most Indian and Pakistani planners have conceived of MCDas a significantly scaled-down form of the massive urban/industrial retaliation envisaged under theU.S. nuclear doctrine of the 1950s, based on the ability to launch a retaliatory strike that would inflict"unacceptable damage" upon an adversary. (38) Given the expressed positions of the Indian andPakistani governments and their observable behaviors as noted in the sections above, it would appearthat some form of strategic arms race is taking place on the Asian Subcontinent, albeit one in whichprogress is limited by economic and technological factors. There exists no consensus, however, onthe question of how such developments affect the level of regional stability. One's perspective onthis issue tends to be decisively colored by fundamental beliefs about the utility of nuclear deterrenceand the extent to which it obtains in South Asia. Such beliefs often are derived through analysis ofkey variables that affect stability in the region: Indian and Pakistani strategic capabilities and controlmechanisms, and their potential deployment of missile defense systems. India and Pakistan have the ability to strike and destroy military and civilian targets outside oftheir respective countries by means of nuclear weapons, ballistic missiles, and aircraft. These forces,associated readiness postures, command and control, and missile defense constitute a strategiccapability on a regional scale. This section will discuss these capabilities and their impact onregional security. Detailed descriptions of the specific missiles in India's and Pakistan's arsenals arepresented in the Appendix. In June of 1998, as required by the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), India declared that it possessed chemical weapons; it is now reportedly in the process of destroying its chemicalweapons stockpile. India, a 1973 signatory of the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), isbelieved to have an active biological defense research program as well as the necessary infrastructureto develop a variety of biological agents. (39) Estimates on India's nuclear weapons arsenal vary but a number of analysts believes that, as of 2002, India had between 30 to 35 nuclear weapons with yields varying between 5 to 25 kilotons(Kts) (despite an Indian claim that it had detonated a nuclear device on May 11, 2002 with a 43 KTyield). (40) These devices are likely configured asaerial bombs or missile warheads. While a precisebreakdown of number of bombs versus missile warheads is unknown, a senior Pakistani militaryofficial reportedly claimed that the majority of India's nuclear weapons were configured as aerialbombs. (41) While India reportedly has a number of different types of aircraft, some analysts believe that it would use 1970s- and 1980s-vintage Soviet-built MiG-27 Flogger aircraft, with a range of 800 km,and the Anglo-French Jaguar aircraft with a 1,600 km range to deliver nuclear aerial bombs. (42) TheSukhoi-30MKI aircraft purchased from Russia with a reported capacity to carry an 8,000 kg payload,and with a normal range of 3,200 km and an air-to-air refueling range of about 7,000 km, gives Indiaa nuclear deep strike capability and some experts believe that India acquired the Sukhoi to counterChina's deep-strike capability. (43) India is suspected of having successfully flight tested an Agni II missile (range 3,000 - 3,500 km) carrying a nuclear warhead assembly without its plutonium core in 1999 and again in 2001. (44) While such testsare considered crucial for warhead development bysome experts, some nuclear scientists believe that additional flight testing to adequately test theweapon's fuze and trigger will be required before India could deploy nuclear-armed missilesoperationally. (45) According to press reports, India'sDefense Minister, George Fernandez, reportedto the Indian Parliament on July 29, 2003 that India had conducted 20 tests of seven different typesof missiles, including two Agni variants, during the first half of 2003. (46) While not a weapon or delivery system, India's satellites contribute to its strategic capabilities. Some analysts believe that India's network of communication satellites and its TechnologyExperiment Satellite, which reportedly has an optical resolution capacity of one meter, provides Indiawith a strategic early warning capability that could help ensure the survivability of its nuclear forces. These satellites could also help improve India's military command, control, communication, andintelligence capacities. (47) Pakistan, a member of the CWC since 1997, is not believed to possess chemical weapons but, according to a January 2001 U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) report, has imported a number ofdual-use chemicals with commercial applications that could also be used to make chemical weapons. Pakistan, a BWC member since 1974, was assessed by the DOD in 2001 as having the resources andscientific capability to conduct limited biological warfare research and development, but was notbelieved to possess biological weapons. (48) Information on Pakistan's nuclear weapons arsenal is speculative but some analysts believe that Pakistan possesses between 24 and 48 nuclear weapons configured as both aerial bombs and missilewarheads. Despite Pakistani claims of higher yield weapons, seismic measurements from Pakistaninuclear detonations on May 28 and 30, 2002 suggest weaponized yields more along the order of 9-12KT and 4-6 KT, respectively. (49) It is possible thatPakistan has higher yield weapons that have notbeen tested. While Pakistan has obtained a variety of combat aircraft from different nations, many experts believe that the most likely aircraft to be used to deliver nuclear weapons would be the U.S. F-16fighter. Twenty eight F-16 A (single seat) and 12 F-16 B (two seat) fighters were delivered toPakistan between 1983 and 1987, and 8 of these original aircraft are believed to be no longer inservice. Pakistan's 1988 order of 11 additional F-16 A/Bs and additional orders for F-16s since thenhave not been fulfilled due to the 1985 congressional enactment of the Pressler Amendment (Section620E of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 as amended) which forbids military aid to suspectednuclear weapons states. (50) Despite the September22, 2001 Presidential Determination waiving thePressler Amendment and other sanctions on India and Pakistan, the Administration's current five-year, $ 3 billion aid package will reportedly not include the promised F-16s, despite PresidentMusharraf's request that their sale be approved. (51) Pakistan's current fleet of F-16s is believed to becapable of delivering a 1,000 kg nuclear bomb to a range of 1,600 km. (52) While some analysts believe that Pakistan's Hatf, M-11, and Shaheen short and medium range missiles are nuclear-capable, Pakistan's A.Q. Khan, director of the organization that builds theGhauri missile, reportedly claims that the Ghauri is currently Pakistan's only nuclear-capablemissile. (53) In May of 1998, the Pakistanigovernment claimed that it was ready to equip the Ghauriwith nuclear weapons. (54) A number of factors influences the stability of India's and Pakistan's missile forces. These factors include: Readiness Posture. India's and Pakistan's deployment of missiles and nuclear-capable aircraft as well as nuclear warheads and bombs has beendescribed by some analysts as a "virtual state of de-alert." (55) Regional analysts assert that both Indiaand Pakistan maintain similar readiness postures. Each country claims that its missiles are not trulydeployed but, on a day-to-day basis, are maintained in what is described as a state of "induction."Induction is described as the peacetime, non-threatening activity of acquiring a weapon and testingand training with it. Deployment is described as a belligerent posture with missiles actually onlaunchers, deployed to forward locations, and kept in a high state of readiness for use. (56) Bothcountries have been accused of having deployed their missiles on a number of occasions. During theJuly 1999 Kargil crisis, U.S. intelligence reportedly detected the Pakistani military deployingnuclear- armed missiles, a fact reportedly unknown to Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif whowas in Washington D.C. on July 4th conferring with President Clinton in an attempt to de-escalatethe Kargil situation. (57) Both countries' nuclear weapons are believed to be stored in facilities separate from airfields and missile units for both security and maintenance purposes. One observer suggested that in orderfor India and Pakistan to have more credible nuclear postures, both countries should increase thestate of alert of their nuclear forces to at least provide a rudimentary capability to launch underattack. He posited that such a posture could be particularly of use to India in terms of China, whichis believed to keep a portion of its ballistic missile force on a high state of alert. (58) Many analysts,however, believe that the current state of alert in India and Pakistan is a credible deterrence postureand that any move by either country to increase its posture could have negative consequences. Command and Control. Unlike India, which has declared a "no-first-use policy" for its nuclear weapons, Pakistan has not issued a similar statement.In February 2000, Pakistan announced the creation of a National Command Authority (NCA) comprised of an Employment Control Committee, Development Control Committee, and a StrategicPlans Division. (59) Pakistan's President, GeneralMusharraf, serves as leader of the NCA and likelywould exercise ultimate authority over employment of nuclear weapons. Pakistan's NCAmembership reportedly includes officials from "foreign affairs, defense and interior ministers, chiefsof all military services and heads of strategic organizations." General Musharraf also reportedlyestablished a Strategic Force Command that is responsible for the deployment of strategic missiles. (60) While some experts consider the establishment of a political-military command and control hierarchyreassuring, others point out that in order for it to be effective there must be clear and undisputed linesof authority and established and practiced procedures. On January 4, 2003, the Indian government announced the establishment of its Nuclear Command Authority. Reportedly, the Nuclear Command Authority consists of a two-tiered politicalcouncil headed by the Prime Minister who will be the singular authority for launching a nuclearattack and an executive council chaired by the Prime Minister's national security advisor who willprovide input for decision making purposes and execute directives from the political council. (61) Aspart of the establishment of the Nuclear Command Authority, the Indian government also establisheda strategic forces command which, according to press reports, would command all strategic assetsdefined as "aircraft, land-based missiles, and nuclear weapons and bombs." (62) While the Indiangovernment claimed that the establishment of the Nuclear Command Authority and the strategicforces command were logical command and control arrangements, some officials conceded that thecreation of these two entities was also a response to international concerns about India's"rudimentary, almost non-existent nuclear command and control structure and also to send a 'firm'message to Pakistan." (63) Regional missile defense has been viewed by some analysts as a potential catalyst to promotestability and by others as an inherently volatile proposition which could upset the region's strategicbalance. In July 2002, a Deputy Assistant Secretary for Defense presented DOD's position onregional missile defense to the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee: "We believe that missiledefenses, generally speaking, are part of an inherently stabilizing concept. The right to defendyourself against these missiles is something we feel is a matter to explore with the Indians, with thePakistanis if they're interested." (64) This Pentagon position reportedly is not shared by the State Department. During the same Senate Governmental Affairs Committee hearing, State Department officials expressed concern thatif India obtained the joint U.S. - Israeli Arrow ballistic missile interceptor, that it might heightentensions with Pakistan. (65) Some experts believe that India's motivation for a missile defense capability was a result of Pakistan's acquisition of M-11 short-range ballistic missiles from China in 1992 and its continueddevelopment of longer range and more capable missiles. (66) Other analysts note that India's desire formissile defense is also a function of its concern about the Chinese DF-21medium-range ballisticmissiles believed to be deployed in western China. Pakistan's periodic declarations that it would usenuclear weapons against India if it feels threatened likely reinforced New Delhi's desire to obtaina ballistic missile defense capability. India is reported to be pursuing two approaches to regional missile defense: creating an indigenous system or purchasing a complete system from another country. Since late 1993, India'sDefense Research and Development Organization( DRDO) has reportedly been involved in effortsto modify the Indian-designed Akash low-to-medium altitude surface-to-air missile (SAM) into aninterceptor capable of engaging ballistic missiles. (67) While some analysts report that efforts are stillunderway to develop the Akash into a missile defense system, there have been no open-sourcereports of the Akash being tested against ballistic missile targets. A number of reports suggest that India also is interested in purchasing the jointly-developed U.S. - Israeli Arrow Missile Defense system from Israel. Because the United States has played amajor financial and scientific role in developing the Arrow, any legal export of the system by Israelwould likely require prior U.S. approval. Both the Senate and House Armed Services Committeeshave expressed reservations about a possible sale to India or other countries (Turkey has alsoexpressed an interest in the Arrow) and reportedly have the following concerns: Although the Arrow is a defensive system, it could possibly be re-engineered into and offensive system; Its sale could possibly trigger a regional offensive armsrace; Israel has allegedly transferred or attempted to transfer critical militarytechnologies to countries of concern such as China; Such a sale could violate the provisions of the Missile Technology ControlRegime (MTCR), a missile nonproliferation arrangement to which the United States is a party;and, Concern that Israel would profit from the sale of a product largely paid for bythe United States and might also constitute competition to Raytheon's U.S. Patriot missile system. (68) The Arrow 2 missile system is designed to provide terminal phase (69) intercept against short andmedium range ballistic missiles and reportedly can detect and track up to 14 inbound missiles atdistances as far as 500 km away and then intercept them as close as 16 to 48 kilometers from themissile system. Some experts believe that India would deploy the Arrow system along the line ofcontrol separating Kashmir and the India-Pakistan international border to protect population andmilitary centers. (70) India has also reportedly beenin negotiations with Russia since 1995 to acquireeither the S-300PMU-1 or S-300V anti-tactical ballistic missile system. (71) In May 2003, an Indian newspaper reported that India had discussed sale of the U.S. Patriot Advanced Capabilities-3 or PAC-3 air and missile defense system with U.S. Deputy Secretary ofState Richard Armitage. According to Indian authorities cited, discussions have been underway withthe Bush Administration since May 2002 about such a sale, but the U.S. government has not givenRaytheon the go-ahead to provide India with pricing, availability, and other information needed tobegin the acquisition process. (72) Observers offer a variety of implications for Indian missile defense. Some feel that India's deployment of a missile defense system could erode Pakistan's confidence that its F-16s andmissiles, if vulnerable to intercept, could continue to provide a credible nuclear deterrent againstIndia. (73) Other analysts believe that an Indianballistic missile defense capability would break thecurrent state of mutual "non-weaponized deterrence" (74) and lead Pakistan to mount nuclear warheadson deployed missiles which could destabilize the region. Another possibility is that Pakistan mayadopt a "use it or lose it" policy whereby Pakistan might employ its nuclear forces early in theconflict to penetrate Indian defenses. (75) Anotherpossibility is that Pakistan could embark on aprogram to develop a greater number of missiles and nuclear warheads in order to saturate andoverwhelm India's ballistic missile defenses. Some analysts reject these possibilities and claim thatIndian missile defense would contribute to regional stability but provide little explanation as to howmissile defense would actually achieve this. With the waiver of the Pressler Amendment because of Pakistan's support for the United States in its war on terrorism, the Indian press has reported that Pakistan has initiated negotiations with theUnited States to purchase a ballistic missile defense system. (76) It claims that Pakistan is attemptingto acquire either the Patriot system or the Hawk, or Nike-Hercules system. The Hawk andNike-Hercules systems are no longer in active service with the U.S. Army and were designedprimarily to shoot down Soviet-era long-range bombers. While both systems are in use around theworld with a variety of militaries, it is not known how effective they would be against modernaircraft and ballistic missiles. Some analysts feel that the acquisition of one of these systems couldhelp dissuade Pakistan from further missile development in an attempt to overcome India's ballisticmissile defense capabilities. Pakistan reportedly has stated that it would deploy any missile defensesystems around nuclear facilities and at sites where missiles are built and stored. Such a deploymentmight be intended to insure that at least some of Pakistan's nuclear warheads and missiles wouldsurvive an Indian strike and be available as a deterrent. If Pakistan did acquire a ballistic missile defense system from the United States, India might react by producing more missiles and nuclear weapons to offset an enhanced capability by Pakistanto intercept Indian aircraft or missiles, particularly if Pakistan acquired the more modern and capablePatriot system. Another concern could be that Patriot technology provided to Pakistan might betransferred by Pakistan to China, North Korea, or Iran and be used in the development ofcountermeasures to prevent U.S. intercept of their ballistic missiles. MTCR-Related Issues. Some experts have expressed concern that India or Pakistan might export their missiles or nuclear technology to othernations, increasing the number of nuclear missile-armed nations thereby increasing the security riskto the United States and other countries. Neither India nor Pakistan (nor China, for that matter) aremembers of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), (77) which was established in 1987 torestrict the proliferation of WMD-capable ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and unmanned aerialvehicles (UAVs) and their associated technology. The MTCR is not a legally binding treaty orformal agreement, but MTCR members do voluntarily agree to enforce common export controlstandards. Many analysts agree that the MTCR has had a positive impact on slowing missile proliferation. Congress may consider the possibility of renewed U.S. efforts to gain Indian and Pakistani accessionto the MTCR. Because of the legally non-binding aspect of the MTCR and its requirements foreffective national export control, MTCR membership might be a first step in helping to promoteother bilateral or regional initiatives to address missile proliferation and security concerns. Criticsof this approach might cite both countries' long-standing resistance to enter into what Pakistan's Permanent Minister to the U.N. called in 1997 "a cartel formed by some industrializedcountries for the purpose of placing controls on the transfer of technology" and "an arrangement forpromoting their own security interests only." (78) Technical Assistance. Various technologies might reduce the risk of an India-Pakistan nuclear exchange. Technical assistance for both countriescould take a number of forms. A version of a Nunn-Lugar-type program has been discussed inCongress and some analysts see India and Pakistan as prime candidates for such a program. (79) Otherinitiatives such as establishing a missile launch notification agreement or hotline might beconsidered. Military sales designed to help each country safeguard its missiles from accidentallaunch are also a possible option. Opponents of technical assistance could argue that it would virtually be impossible to extend any form of technical assistance to one nation without arousing suspicion in the other country. Whatwe might consider as safeguarding ballistic missiles from accidental launch could be construed asimproving the ability to launch a missile surprise attack by either country. Another considerationis that of equity. Pakistan, with a smaller and less modern military, could argue that it deservesconsiderably more technical assistance than India----a position that might arouse considerableIndian opposition. Export Controls. Another option that could be explored is a multilateral initiative to assist India and Pakistan in improving their export controlsystems, particularly as they pertain to missile technology. Such an initiative could be a "standalone" effort undertaken to improve the overall quality of each country's system, or it could be inanticipation of eventual MTCR membership. In order for a country to become an MTCR member,it must be approved for membership by all current members and meet stringent export controlrequirements. It is not known how receptive India or Pakistan would be to such an initiative. Export controls are essentially a domestic legal matter and U.S. assistance in this area might not be well received oreven appreciated, for that matter. In Pakistan's case, export controls which could limit itsmissile-related dealings with North Korea and Iran would likely meet considerable resistance fromgovernment and military officials. Confidence-Building Measures. Confidence-building measures, or CBMs, are described as "measures designed to reduce the risk ofdeliberate or accidental conflict and build trust by demonstrating the ability of the parties to keeppromises." (80) Confidence-building measures areby no means new to India and Pakistan. The 1999Lahore Declaration entailed a number of CBMs designed to "reduce the risks of a nuclear exchangeprompted by an accident or misinterpretation of a nuclear or ballistic missile test." (81) Pakistan'sdeployment of troops to Kargil and the ensuing fighting in July 1999 effectively derailed the Lahoreprocess and its associated CBMs. Some analysts suggest that the United States could play a role in helping to establish a series of CBMs in the region. Experts point to the previously abandoned hotline, notifications of militaryexercises, and missile launch notifications. (82) Another possible CBM could be an aerial monitoringeffort along the lines of the Open Skies Agreement. If initial joint monitoring flights along the Lineof Control proved successful, then deeper, more intrusive flights might be a future option. Otherpossible measures might involve assisting India and Pakistan in the establishment of a mechanismto settle disputes, perhaps modeled on the U.S. - Russian Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers inMoscow and Washington, or providing technological support in establishing a series of ground-based sensors in critical, disputed areas. Some experts assert that the United States would notnecessarily have to be directly involved in all aspects of mediating or monitoring but could providetechnological support and advice as needed. Critics of regional CBMs might emphasize the past failure of CBMs due to the volatile nature of the region. Resurrecting previously-attempted CBMs, only to have them suspended due to adisagreement or incident, could further their argument that the region is not conducive to thisparticular approach. Perhaps a more practical and cost-effective approach might be to attempt to firstsettle regional disputes diplomatically and then institute appropriate CBMs on an incremental basisbased on equal commitments from both India and Pakistan. Proliferation Security Initiative (Counterproliferation). (83) TheProliferation Security Initiative (PSI), announced byPresident Bush on May 31, 2003, is an international initiative which focuses on the interdiction ofWMD and associated delivery systems and technology. Ten nations besides the United States haveagreed to take steps to stop the flow of these items including the seizure of shipments as they transitair, land, and sea routes. (84) According to theAdministration's Fact Sheet, the PSI principles are"fully consistent with national legal authorities and with relevant international laws andframeworks." The PSI group met in Paris in October 2003 and adopted these principles detailed inthe fact sheet. A series of U.S.-sponsored naval interdiction exercises called "Pacific Protector"were conducted in September 2003, involving Australia and Great Britain, as part of the PSI. (85) While the Administration claims that the PSI does not target any particular country, many expertsbelieve that the PSI was developed in response to growing North Korean missile exports andtechnological assistance to countries of concern. In theory, both India and Pakistan could be subjectto seizures of WMD and missile-related items under the PSI. Congress may further explore the legality of the PSI both in terms of U.S. and international law. Other issues for Congress may include how the PSI complements or detracts from currentnonproliferation regimes. Congress might also review the scope of the PSI in terms of India andPakistan -- will proscribed shipments to or from these countries be interdicted or will we choosenot to interdict in order to maintain favorable relations with both countries and their continuedcooperation in the global war on terror? The CRS Report Weapons of Mass Destruction Counterproliferation: Legal Issues for Ships and Aircraft questions the legality of the PSI's intent to interdict sea, air, and land shipments. Thereport acknowledges that international law recognizes that states have a limited right to interdictvessels and aircraft in specific circumstances, but suggests that the PSI's wide-ranging provisionsto interdict and seize WMD and missile-related technologies on the high seas appear "doubtful"under current international law. Suggestions to address this issue range from amending currentinternational laws governing the sea and air to include WMD and missile technologies to amendingcurrent nonproliferation treaties. (86) Pakistan-North Korea Relations. Of critical concern to both Congress and the Administration is a suspected Pakistan-North Korean proliferationrelationship. Both countries stand accused of proliferating missile and nuclear technology, and manyanalysts believe that rapid advancements in Pakistan's missile and perhaps nuclear program can bedirectly attributed to North Korean assistance. Some experts suggest that, as Pakistan's missileprograms have matured and advanced, Pakistan may be assisting North Korea in its missile program,primarily by providing North Korea with missile test flight data. Prior to September 22, 2001, whenPresident Bush issued a Presidential Determination waiving a number of sanctions against both Indiaand Pakistan, (87) sanctions were the primary meansby which the United States attempted to compelPakistan to terminate proliferation activities with North Korea. Today, the situation is considerablymore complex and may merit congressional attention. The BrahMos Cruise Missile. Concerns have been raised about current and proposed U.S. missile defense vulnerability to the alleged supersonic,stealth-enhanced BrahMos cruise missile being developed by Russia and India. Could these missilesin the hands of hostile states and non-state actors, provide them with a dangerous asymmetricmilitary advantage? Another issue is how difficult would it be to develop a nuclear warhead for theBrahMos and what countries presently have the scientific and engineering capability to do so. Vertical and Non-Missile Proliferation. While U.S. efforts to strengthen the international nonproliferation regime have slowed under the BushAdministration, some observers advocate increasing pressure on India and Pakistan to encouragetheir accession to such treaties as the NPT and the CTBT. Moreover, the world's nascent nuclearpowers watch closely for any new U.S. development and procurement of nuclear weapons, and soU.S. decisions in this realm may have cascading effects on the scope and pace of global proliferationperspectives and behaviors. Thus, while some policy makers believe that new U.S. nuclear weaponswould enhance deterrence, others claim that such weapons would undermine U.S. nonproliferationgoals. (See CRS Issue Brief IB90091, Nuclear Nonproliferation Issues , by Carl Behrens; CRS Report RS20351(pdf) , Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty: Pro and Con , by Jonathan Medalia; and CRS Report RS21619 , Nuclear Weapons and U.S. National Security , by Amy Woolf.) The ramifications of possibly providing U.S.-developed missile and air defense systems to India and Pakistan are of concern. While some experts contend that providing both countries with thesesystems would help to de-escalate tensions others argue that it could heighten tensions and possiblyinvite military "adventurism" by creating a false sense of security. In addition to the impact thatmissile defense might have on India and Pakistan, its possible effects on Sino-Indian relations couldbe a serious concern. Were the United States to provide such systems to India and Pakistan, issues related to technology transfer would arise. Policymakers, including many in Congress, would be concernedabout the potential for onward transfer of advanced U.S. missile defense technology to countriessuch as North Korea, Iran, China, and Russia. If these or other countries had access to U.S. missiledefense technologies, the potential may exist for them to develop countermeasures and penetrationaids that could render U.S. theater missile defenses less effective. For more than one decade, the United States repeatedly has expressed concerns about ongoing terrorism in Pakistan and neighboring regions, and about the continued existence in Pakistan ofoutlawed terrorist groups. After September 2001, these concerns became acute. Some Members ofCongress, along with numerous independent analysts, have opined that a perceived need for alliesin the global anti-terrorist coalition has caused the United States to significantly mute its criticismof South Asian WMD proliferation, and signs of onward proliferation activities by Pakistan, inparticular. (88) It appears that continued U.S. focuson counterterrorism policy requires a trade-off inrelation to nonproliferation policy. Options for Congress in addressing this issue includeadjustments in U.S. development assistance to improve economic and educational conditions inPakistan, possibly with regard to reform of the extensive madrassa (religious school) system. (89) Areview of military assistance to both India and Pakistan may affect levels of terrorism in the region. In recent years, such assistance has emphasized counterterrorism, including ground transport, airlift,communication, surveillance, and emergency response equipment. Initiatives to help resolve theKashmir dispute might also reduce the incidence of regional terrorism. Another facet of U.S. concern in this area regards fears that terrorists in Pakistan or India might gain access to nuclear materials in those countries. (90) Options for addressing this possibility includeauthorizing expansion of Cooperative Threat Reduction programs aimed at securing Pakistan'sand/or India's nuclear assets, or otherwise seeking to make the region's nuclear arsenals saferthrough new initiatives, although such initiatives may conflict with U.S. treaty obligations and areopposed by some proliferation analysts (see Technical Assistance section of this report above). The United States recognizes that geostrategic and geopolitical stability in South and Southwest Asia are augmented by strong U.S. ties with both India and Pakistan. With New Delhi, the BushAdministration seeks to increase the scope and quality of engagement on a range of fronts, includinghigh-technology trade, arms sales, and military-to-military relations. (91) With Islamabad, a somewhatmore utilitarian approach focuses on antiterrorism cooperation, even as President Bush vows toestablish a multi-year package that would provide billions of dollars in U.S. economic and militaryaid for the remainder of the current decade. (92) Inboth South Asian capitals, the United States isviewed by some as an unreliable ally, so the extent to which Indians and Pakistanis feel assuredabout long-term U.S. engagement in the region will almost certainly affect their willingness tocooperate on those issues most important to U.S. policy makers. For these reasons, and others, many in Congress continue to be interested in initiatives that affect the overall tenor of U.S. relations with India and/or Pakistan, as well as the progress ofeconomic development and human rights promotion in the region. Many observers believe thatincreased U.S. trade with and investment in India and Pakistan would enhance more stable andpacific international relations on the Subcontinent. Some emphasize the need for strong democraticinstitutions. A major issue may be a more effective U.S. role in efforts to resolve what arguably isthe single greatest threat to regional stability: continuing violence in the Kashmir region. From abroader perspective, many experts believe improved U.S.-China and India-China relations could domuch to ensure a more tranquil Asia in coming years and decades. In the new century----and especially after September 2001----South Asia is no longer the "strategic backwater" that it was for many U.S. analysts during the Cold War. The overt nuclearpostures of India and Pakistan, and U.S.-led antiterrorism efforts centered on Southwest Asia havemade the region's security dynamics a matter of great concern for the United States, wheregovernment officials acknowledge that a stable and thriving South Asia would advance U.S.interests. With regard to missile proliferation and South Asian security, many appear sanguine aboutthe future: from the perspective of proliferation optimists, the establishment of nuclear command andcontrol mechanisms and the deployment of reliable ballistic missile capabilities on both sides is seento contribute to crisis stability through mutual deterrence, and thus to decrease the likelihood of afourth full-scale India-Pakistan war. However, proliferation pessimism continues among many. Some years ago, then-Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott warned that, "Unless India and Pakistan exercise genuine restraintand great care, the [nuclear weapons] delivery systems themselves could become a source of tensionand could by their nature and disposition increase the incentive to attack first in a crisis." (93) Unlikeaircraft, ballistic missiles cannot be recalled after launch and, given the contiguity of the twocountries, missiles afford little time for warning and protective measures. So long as terrorism- andKashmir-related animosity exists between India and Pakistan, making the outbreak of war asubstantive risk, the continued proliferation of strategic arsenals in South Asia cannot be viewed withcomplacence. Among the future developments that could exacerbate regional tensions are theincreased influence of Hindu nationalism in New Delhi and/or the increased influence of Islamicfundamentalism in Islamabad. Moreover, many analysts are concerned that continued military rulein Pakistan will hamper efforts at regional entente. In the near term, two issues appear key to South Asian security or its absence: (1) ongoing violence in the Kashmir region and Pakistani support for or tolerance of Islamic terrorist groupsoperating from territory under its control; and (2) Afghani instability and ongoing conflict along thePakistan-Afghanistan border. Trends in these areas are difficult to determine, but significantviolence has continued in both theaters. In the middle and longer term, developments in four areasappear directly relevant: (1) the course of India-China relations and strategic posturing; (2) the extentof positive U.S. engagement with both India and Pakistan; (3) New Delhi's weapons procurementdecisions; and (4) the possible deployment of missile defense systems. Here trends appear to bemixed: New Delhi and Beijing have moved toward more peaceful relations, and the United Statesis remaining fully engaged with both of South Asia's largest countries. Yet India's energeticacquisition of sophisticated new weapons platforms and pursuit of missile defense systems may bodepoorly for regional stability. Moreover, within each of these areas, the progress and scope ofregional missile proliferation represents a crucial and interactive facet. The importance of U.S.policies toward South Asia is difficult to deny. Missile proliferation and its implications for SouthAsian security are worthy of careful monitoring in the future. Some experts believe that India's ballistic missile program is motivated primarily by a desire for political and technological prestige, and to a lesser extent, strategic military considerationstowards Pakistan and China. (94) India's programis considered to be one of the most ambitious missileprograms in the developing world, capable of producing missiles with ranges equal to thosedeployed by the original five nuclear powers (United States, Russia, China, England, and France).Many analysts consider India's ballistic missile program a derivative of its space program which israted by some as one of the most advanced programs among emerging missile nations. Some expertsclaim that India's space launch vehicles constitute an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM)capability but others argue that, although conversion of space launch vehicles into ICBMs ispossible, India does not have a security requirement that would necessitate such an undertaking. India launched its first satellite in 1975 atop a Soviet rocket and by 1980 was able to launch a small spacecraft into orbit using its own domestically-produced SLV-3 space launch vehicle. (95) TheIndian Defense Research and Development Organization (DRDO) established the Integrated GuidedMissile Development Program in 1983 under the direction of Abdul Kalam to develop ballisticmissiles. Most likely in anticipation of the adoption of the Missile Technology Control Regime(MTCR) by a number of key supplier countries, India went on what was described by some analystsas a "shopping spree" for gyroscopes, accelerometers, and motion simulators from suppliers in theUnited States, Germany, France, and Sweden. (96) Many analysts cite this foresight in obtaining highquality foreign missile components and subsequent reverse engineering by Indian engineers as a keyfactor which has enabled India's missile program to become virtually self-sufficient. Thisself-sufficiency permits India to avoid international export control restrictions as well as inherent difficulties that could arise with extensive foreign involvement in its missile program. India has developed two ballistic missiles, the short range Prithvi and the medium range Agni. (97) Table 1. Indian Ballistic Missiles Source: Information in this table is from Jane's Strategic Weapons Systems , Issue 37, July 2002, pp.80-84 and "Agni - India Missile Special Weapons Delivery Systems," Federation of AmericanScientists, June 19, 2003, available at http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/india/missile/agni.htm . Prithvi I. The Prithvi I, like all Prithvi variants, is a single-staged, liquid propellant, (100) singlewarhead short-range ballistic missile. The Prithvi I isused exclusively by the Indian Army and is reported to have high explosive (HE) penetration,submunitions (incendiary and anti-personnel/anti-armor), and fuel air explosive and possiblychemical warheads. (101) Following Indiannuclear tests in 1998, some experts believe that Indiadeveloped a number of small yield nuclear warheads for the Prithvi I with 1, 5, 12 or 20 KT yieldswith the warhead weight estimated at about 250 kg. First test fired in February 1988, India hasconducted 16 known launch tests of the Prithvi series as of March 2003. (102) In service with the armysince 1994, the Prithvi I is believed capable of striking approximately a quarter of Pakistan,including Islamabad and other major cities. (103) Prithvi II. Prithvi II missiles are reportedly used by the Indian Air Force to attack enemy airfields and to support the Indian Army on the battlefield. Some experts believe that efforts are underway to adapt the full range of Prithvi I warheads forPrithvi II use. (104) First test fired in January1996, the Prithvi II is assessed to be capable of hittingalmost half of Pakistan including almost all critical military targets and all major cities. (105) Prithvi III. The Prithvi III is currently under development and is not yet believed to be operational. It is believed to have a range of 350 km anda payload of 750 kg and may also have either a new liquid or solid propulsion system. Some reportssuggest that India may install a Global Positioning System (GPS) guidance system that could reducethe missile's CEP to 25 m. Agni I. The Agni I is a two-staged, intermediate-range, single warhead ballistic missile. The Agni I is believed to have a minimumrange of 500 km and a maximum range of 2,500 km with a CEP of 100 m. Some analysts believethat India has developed a 45 KT nuclear warhead for the Agni I and possibly a 200 KT warhead. The Agni I has a separating reentry vehicle (RV) that reportedly has an altitude control system andaerodynamic maneuver fins designed to make intercept from ballistic missile defenses more difficult. The Agni I, considered a technology demonstrator and not a developed weapons system by the Indiangovernment, has undergone three test flights between 1994 and 2002. Agni II. The Agni II has two solid propellant stages and some experts believe that it has a minimum range of 500 km and a maximum rangeof3,000 to 3,5000 km. The Agni II is believed to have a 100 m CEP and a separating 200 KT nuclearwarhead weighing approximately 500 kg. The Agni II was first test launched in April 1999. Someanalysts suggest that a small number of Agni II missiles (fewer than five) have been operationallyavailable since late 2000 and that the annual production rate since then has been from 15 to 20missiles. The Agni II's range permits it to strike all of Pakistan and deep into western portions ofChina. (106) Agni III. The Agni III is believed to have a range of 5,000 km (a range of approximately 4,000 km would be required for a missile to reach Beijingfrom India) and is presently assessed to be under development. (107) Senior Indian defense officialsreportedly claim that the Agni III is a "China-specific" missile and not intended for use againstPakistan. (108) The Times of India claims that theAgni III will be both rail and road-mobile with a newinertial guidance system and will be able to "deliver a one-tonne warhead beyond the range ofcombat aircraft." The Agni III may have three stages and some analysts speculate that the first andsecond stages may be solid propellant stages and the third stage either liquid or solid propellant. (109) India has claimed that the Agni III would only be used to deliver conventional warheads but with areported cost of 4.5 to 8 million U.S. dollars per missile, some experts find it difficult to imaginethat the cost of such a missile could be justified unless it was used to deliver nuclear weapons. (110) Submarine Launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBMs). According to some U.S. intelligence sources, India is developing a submarine launched ballisticmissile (SLBM) known as the Sagarika which could be operational sometime after 2010. (111) Indiareportedly is seeking a nuclear triad (missiles, aircraft, and sea based) to insure that at least some ofthe country's nuclear weapons survive a first strike attack. (112) It is unclear if the Sagarika is intendedto be deployed on a modified Russian Kilo-class submarine or a Russian Akula-class submarine,which is believed capable of firing only cruise missiles, or India's Advance Technology Vessel, anuclear submarine that has been under development with Russian assistance since 1985. (113) Russian Involvement in India's Missile Program. Reportedly, more than two thirds of India's military equipment is from Russia or the former SovietUnion and some analysts believe that India will purchase an additional 8 billion U.S. dollars worthof military items from Russia in the decade to come. (114) While specifics are not readily available,some analyst suggest that it is a reasonable assumption -- although India's missile program isconsidered largely self-sufficient -- that India will continue to acquire some missile components andother missile-related technology from Russia. BrahMos Cruise Missile. India and Russia reportedly are jointly developing the BrahMos anti-ship cruise missile. The BrahMos, which is notpresently assessed to be nuclear-capable, has a reported range of 185 miles, a payload of 440 pounds,and a speed of more than 1,400 miles per hour. (115) The BrahMos is significant in that it is consideredby many analysts to be a state-of-the-art missile which travels at supersonic speed (it is about 3 timesfaster than the current U.S. Tomahawk cruise missile) and has been built with stealth technologywhich, according to some experts, could make it virtually impossible to intercept. Both countriesreportedly plan to deploy the BrahMos with their armed forces as well as export the BrahMos to thirdworld countries, possibly to offset U.S. military capabilities. According to Global Security.org, thetwo-staged BrahMos, which can be fired from air, land, and sea, could be modified to accommodatea small nuclear warhead, adding another operational capability to India's nuclear missile arsenal.While India and Russia have publically stated their intentions to deploy the BrahMos to theirrespective armed forces by the end of 2003, some military officials believe that they are still severalyears away from deploying the missile. (116) Many analysts consider Pakistan's ballistic missile program to be a response to India's ballistic missiles, its sophisticated air defense system, and India's large and well-equipped armed forces. (117) Some experts feel that relatively rapid advances in Pakistan's missile program are a result ofcompetition between Samar Mubarak Mund of the National Development Complex, responsible forsolid-fuel missiles and Abdul Qadeer Khan of the Khan Research Laboratories where liquid-fueledmissiles are produced. Despite these two competing organizations, Pakistan relies heavily on NorthKorean, Chinese, and, to a lesser degree, Iranian assistance in its missile program. (118) Prior to 1989, Pakistan's missile arsenal was comprised primarily of Hatf I rockets (119) and HatfII missiles with ranges of 80 and 280 km, respectively. India's 1989 launch of its Agni I missile, inconjunction with the U.S. denial of delivery of F-16 aircraft (120) to Pakistan, is credited by manyexperts as central events that compelled Islamabad to pursue ballistic missiles as Pakistan's primarymeans to deliver nuclear weapons. In 1992, Pakistan allegedly received M-11 missiles from Chinawhich are capable of carrying nuclear warheads to a range of approximately 300 km. Since thisacquisition in 1992, much of Pakistan's missile program has been devoted to the development of theShaheen and Ghauri-series of ballistic missiles. Table 2. Pakistani Ballistic Missiles Source: Information in this table is from Jane's Strategic Weapons Systems , Issue 37, July 2002, pp.124 -131. Hatf I. The Hatf I is believed to be a single-stage, solid propellant rocket with a 60 to 80 km range carrying a 500 kg payload or a 350 km rangecarrying a 100 kg payload. (121) Some analystsspeculate that the limited range and payload capacityof these rockets would preclude the use of a nuclear warhead and more likely payloads include highexplosives, submunitions, and possibly chemical weapons. (122) The Hatf I's accuracy is unknown andPakistan may have as many of 80 of these rockets. (123) Hatf II. The Hatf II is a two-stage, solid propellant missile of 280 km range with a 500 kg payload or a 450 km range with a 300 kgpayload. (124) The Hatf IIprogram is believed to have been terminated due to technical problems butsome analysts speculate that in addition to high explosive and chemical payloads, that the Hatf II wasintended to carry a nuclear warhead. (125) M-11. In 1992, China reportedly delivered to Pakistan between 30 and 84 unassembled M-11 missiles with a 300 km range and a 500 kg payloadcapacity. (126) The M-11's separating warheadis considered by many experts as a desirablecharacteristic for nuclear weapons delivery, but limited range precludes its use to strike New Delhior large population centers lying beyond the Indian Desert. (127) The M-11 is a road-mobile, solidpropellant missile with a 600 m CEP that, in addition to high explosive, sub munition, and chemicalwarheads, can possibly deliver a variety of nuclear warheads with 2, 10, or 20 KT yields. (128) It ispossible that M-11s may be fitted with GPS technology to increase their accuracy. Shaheen I. The Shaheen I is a solid propellant, single warhead missile reportedly developed by Dr. Samar Mubarak Mund's National DevelopmentComplex. Many analysts consider the Shaheen I a scaled-up version of the Chinese M-11 missile. The Shaheen I has a reported range of 600 km, an accuracy of 200 m, and can carry a 750 kg, 35 KTnuclear warhead or conventional or chemical munitions. Because launch preparations for thesolid-fueled, road-mobile Shaheen I are relatively short, the missile reportedly can be launchedwithin 5 to 10 minutes of its arrival at a pre-surveyed launch site. Some analysts speculate thatPakistan may have had from 5 to 10 Shaheen Is available for testing and operational use by the endof 1999 and more may have been produced since then. Shaheen II. The Shaheen II is a road-mobile, two-stage, solid propellant ballistic missile also developed by Pakistan's National DevelopmentComplex. Many analysts speculate that the Shaheen II is based on the Chinese M-18 missile. (129) TheShaheen II reportedly has a 2,500 km range, a 350 m CEP, and can carry a 750 kg 15 to 35 KTnuclear warhead, as well as high explosives, submunitions, chemical, and fuel-air explosives. (130) TheShaheen II is also believed to have a separating reentry vehicle and its accuracy may be enhancedthrough the use of GPS technology. The Shaheen II was first publically displayed in March 2000and it is not believed to have been flight tested to date. Some experts speculate that Pakistan mayhave produced from 5 to 10 Shaheen IIs. Ghauri I. The Ghauri-series of road-mobile, liquid propellant missiles are produced in Pakistan's Khan Research Laboratories. (131) Many analystsbelieve that the Ghauri I is based on North Korea's No Dong I and II missile. Reports that Iran'sShahab III missile appears to be very similar in design to the Ghauri I have led to widespreadspeculation by intelligence officials that Pakistan, North Korea, and Iran have collaborated in thedevelopment of these missiles. (132) The GhauriI is believed to have a range of 1,500 km, and accuracyof 2,500 m, and could deliver a 760 kg 15 to 35 KT nuclear warhead which Pakistan has alleged tohave tested in May 1998. The Ghauri I is believed to have been operationally deployed in late 1998by Pakistan's 47th Artillery Brigade with 5-10 missiles available for testing or operational use. Ghauri II. The Ghauri II is believed to be a lengthened and improved version of the Ghauri I, possibly employing new propellants and a motorassembly. The Ghauri II's accuracy is unknown but its range is believed to be between 1,800 to2,300 km and could also accommodate a 15 to 35 KT nuclear warhead as well as the full range ofwarheads available for the Ghauri I. A Ghauri III missile has been reported to be in developmentwith a possible 3,000 km range and motor tests for this missile were believed to have taken placein July and September 1999. Foreign Involvement in Pakistan's Missile Program. A February 2000 report from the Central Intelligence Agency citedChinese and North Korean assistance as "critical for Islamabad's efforts to produce ballisticmissiles." (133) Some analysts suggest that Chinamay have been heavily involved in the developmentof the Shaheen I. A 1999 U.S. intelligence report alleges that China transferred designs for a missilefactory to Pakistan and this factory is currently being used to produce Shaheen I missiles. (134) A July2000 report from the U.S. intelligence community stated that China had stepped up its shipments ofspecialty steels, guidance systems, and technical expertise to Pakistan. (135) Press reports, citing aJanuary 2003 Central Intelligence Agency report to Congress on Weapons Technology, claim thatChina also assisted Pakistan in developing the Shaheen II and possibly nuclear weapons. (136) Pakistan is believed to have started development of the Ghauri I in 1993 with North Korean assistance. (137) Experts believe that the GhauriI is essentially a North Korean No Dong missile.India's interception in June, 1999 of a ship carrying a large amount of missile technology from NorthKorea to Pakistan has raised the issue that North Korean missile technology may be able to helpPakistan achieve ranges out to 8,000 km. (138) There is also evidence that Pakistan is reciprocating andassisting North Korea in its missile program. Pakistan has been accused of providing North Koreawith test data from Ghauri test flights for its use in improving its No Dong missiles despite NorthKorea's self-imposed 1999 moratorium on long range missile test flights. (139) Some experts have alsosuggested that Pakistan is providing valuable solid-fuel propulsion technology from itsChinese-based Shaheen missiles for North Korea's use in the Taepo Dong missile program. In 1993,Pakistani and Iranian specialists were alleged to have traveled to North Korea to observe the launchof a No Dong and three SCUD missiles. (140) Some suggest that Pakistani-Iranian missile cooperationhas deteriorated. Amin Tarzi, writing for the Monterey Institute of International Studies inCalifornia, claims that the relationship has lessened because of reported anti-Shiite activities inPakistan and Islamabad's policies towards Afghanistan related to the U.S. war on terror in theregion. (141)

Summary: This report analyzes the policy implications of missile proliferation in South Asia, providing information on India's and Pakistan's missile programs and their role in regional security. Thereport also provides background on the India-Pakistan conflict and the U.S. role, and reviews theregion's strategic security dynamics. The report concludes with a review of key issues and optionsfor U.S. policy. The United States has long been concerned about the proliferation of nuclear weapons and their delivery systems in South Asia. This concern became acute after May 1998, when both India andPakistan tested nuclear explosive devices. Since that time, both countries have continued testingnuclear-capable ballistic missiles, and both have established command and control authorities tooversee their nuclear arsenals. India and Pakistan have fought three wars since 1947 and havesignificant unsettled territorial disputes. Although the status of weaponization is unclear, aslow-speed arms race appears to be underway on the Asian Subcontinent, and the proliferation ofmissile capabilities in South Asia has been identified as a potentially major threat to regional stabilityand to key U.S. foreign policy goals. A persistent aspect of U.S. engagement in the region has been the difficulty of maintaining a balanced approach toward two antagonistic countries while simultaneously promoting perceived U.S.interests. During the 1990s, U.S. security policy toward South Asia focused on preventing weaponsproliferation, but the Bush Administration shifted to a more "pragmatic" approach emphasizing"restraint" in this area. For perhaps the first period in history the United States currently enjoyssimultaneously positive relations with both countries. While relationships between the United States, India, and Pakistan have taken on a positive hue, potential for regional instability persists. The strategic capabilities of India and Pakistan couldprovide a ready catalyst for transforming disputes or terrorist incidents into potentially cataclysmicconfrontations. Both countries also are pursuing the development or acquisition of missile defensesystems. It is unknown at this early stage if missile defenses will offer a degree of stability to theregion or if they will create an imbalance, thus prompting the other country to build more missilesto compensate for the disparity. Key issues for Congress addressed in this report are the extent to which missile proliferation in South Asia enhances or upsets regional stability and the role of U.S. policy in promoting suchstability, as well as in tension reduction and nonproliferation. Levels of U.S. foreign assistance toIndia and Pakistan, the establishment of aid restrictions, the transfer of conventional weaponsplatforms (possibly including missile defense systems), the setting of export control parameters andnonproliferation goals, and the maintenance of policy and intelligence oversight of U.S. relationswith India and Pakistan constitute additional issues of concern to Congress. This report will beupdated as warranted by events.