On August 16, 2004, President Bush unveiled one of the most sweeping changes to the numbersand locations of military overseas basing facilities since the beginning of the Cold War. Announcing aplan that had been under study for approximately three years, the Department of Defense would movethousands of personnel from installations in Europe and Asia to bases within the United States. Simultaneously, the military would shift its approach away from huge bases such as Ramstein Air ForceBase, which has all of the comforts of the U.S. -- family housing, supermarkets, convenience stores,theaters, and so forth, to reliance on more austere facilities in Central Asia, Africa, and the Middle Eastthat would be less elaborate and lack most of these benefits. In 2004, the Congress chartered theCommission on the Review of Overseas Military Facility Structure of the United States (also known asthe Overseas Basing Commission) to provide an independent assessment of the DOD overseas basingneeds. (1) The DOD plan could prompt budget and oversight decisions for the second session of the109th Congress. These might include approval, modification, or rejection of the DOD proposal. Congress could also have to consider appropriations requests for construction of infrastructure atnew overseas or expanded continental United States (CONUS) locations, as well as fund increasedimpact aid to local communities. Congress would have to oversee new acquisition programs formobility and logistics capabilities (such as airlift) needed for the strategy. Congress may alsoconsider whether the plan will be executable given the results of the 2005 round of the BaseRealignment and Closure (BRAC) process. Finally, the Senate may consider new or revised treatieswith new basing partners submitted for its advice and consent. The Department of Defense Global Posture Review, also known as the Integrated GlobalPresence and Basing Strategy (IGPBS), is intended to realign United States overseas forces over asix-to-eight-year period from the bases (basing "posture") left over from the Cold War (2) to a new posture optimizedto support current allies and confront new potential threats. (3) Overall, U.S. installationsoverseas would decline from 850 to 550. Roughly 70,000 personnel, mostly from the Army, wouldreturn to the United States. The Congressional Budget Office projects the initial cost of thisrelocation effort to be $7 billion, but with a potential savings payoff of $1 billion per year if thenumber of U.S. troops permanently based overseas were reduced to a minimum number needed toreceive and host deployments. (4) The Defense Department plan envisions three tiers of bases. It would retain some of the large"main operating bases,"such as Ramstein AFB in Germany, which have all of the comforts of theUnited States -- family housing, schools, supermarkets, convenience stores, theaters, and populationsin the tens of thousands. (5) Secondly, the military would establish an overseas network of "forward operating sites," whichwould be more austere installations and hosting smaller numbers of personnel. Military personnelwould deploy to these bases for temporary duty (typically one year or less, unaccompanied byfamilies), in contrast to the permanent change of station moves in which an entire family moves toa new base for two or more years. Finally, minimalist "cooperative security locations," would likelybe run by host nation personnel and would not host U.S. forces on a day-to-day basis. Theselocations would be used in the event of a crisis to give U.S. forces access to the region. They wouldalso allow U.S. forces to train with local allies and participate in cooperative activities, such asdisaster relief or peacekeeping, which could improve military-to-military ties. (6) U.S. forces would also relyincreasingly on off-shore prepositioning and sea basing to provide logistical support. (7) The biggest changes would happen in Europe, where the military would shutter nearly 200facilities and ultimately draw down roughly 40,000 troops (from 105,570 as of June 2005). (8) Some of the forces remainingin Europe would periodically deploy from bases in Germany for temporary duty to locations inRomania, Bulgaria, or Central Asia. Both Romania and Bulgaria have energetically campaigned towin U.S. bases. Camp Bondsteel in Kosovo, Eagle Base in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Manas AirField in Kyrgyzstan typify the new forward operating sites. While representing a full time U.S.presence, these bases would lack the elaborate infrastructure of the major installations that evolvedin western Europe. Overall, the focus of military basing would shift south and east, closer to currentMiddle-Eastern hot-spots and Central Asia. (9) For East Asia, the plan advocates consolidating bases in South Korea, with a drawdown ofnearly 12,500 personnel (from a strength of 32,744 troops in June 2005), (10) and move headquarters forremaining units out of expensive Seoul to locations further south. Adjustments are also envisionedfor troop dispositions in Japan. Reports indicate the United States is proposing to move the 1st Armyheadquarters from Washington state to Camp Zama, near Tokyo; to reposition the 5th Air Forceheadquarters from Tokyo to Guam; and to relocate 7,000 of the 15,000 Marines currently onOkinawa to Guam or to other locations in Japan. (11) Other U.S. forces in Asia could potentially deploy to thePhilippines, Malaysia, or Singapore for exercises, training, and as-needed forward basing. Relianceon air and naval capability would increase in the Pacific given the vast distances in the region. The U.S. military presence in Africa is expanding. (12) Officials view Africa asan increasingly important region in the war on terror. The U.S. already has established Memorandaof Understanding (MOUs) with Gabon, Ghana, Namibia, Senegal, South Africa, and Uganda, wherethe focus would be on training and cooperation. (13) The United States established a Combined Joint TaskForce-Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) in 2002, which is currently located at Camp Lemonier inDjibouti. This task force currently focuses on delivering military-to-military training and performingpublic works projects in an area including Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan, andYemen. The United States hopes to expand these activities into Uganda and Tanzania. There iseven discussion within DOD of transforming the CJTF-HOA into a unified command withresponsibility for all of Africa. U.S. Central Command and U.S. European Command currently splitresponsibility for Africa. (14) There are strong arguments motivating the need for a revision to the alignment of U.S. basesoverseas. This structure is a legacy of the Cold War confrontation, and in some cases the U.S.presence may now be less welcome. In testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee,Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld listed multiple reasons for reworking the overseas militarybasing dispositions. He argued that the current arrangements were "seriously obsolete," oriented todeter and fight the large standing militaries of the Warsaw Pact in Europe rather than the currentthreats. However, he gave no geographic specifics on where he viewed the new threats as residing. He stated that updating the military's global posture was part of the Department's largertransformation effort, but his comments did not clarify how the transformational goals such as speedor precision (in his words, to "do more with less") drove the overseas basing strategy decisions. Heargued that relocating personnel and facilities in some cases could reduce frictions with hostgovernments and enhance cooperation with allies. He also indicated that nations that imposedrestrictions or conditions on the use of U.S. forces from their territory would be viewed as lesssatisfactory locations. (15) He did not specifically cite the countries he saw as sources of friction with respect to the presenceof U.S. forces or the conduct of U.S. operations. However, it was widely assumed he was referringto friction with Germany over the invasion of Iraq and German restrictions on U.S. trainingexercises. During his June 2005 testimony to the Senate Armed Services Military ConstructionSubcommittee, Principal Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Ryan Henry echoed many ofSecretary Rumsfeld's themes. He noted an increased reliance on pre-positioned equipment andforces that move to forward operating sites on a temporary basis, but did not explain the anticipatedmix between these forces and permanently stationed forces, or what the department would need forairlift and sealift to sustain this approach. He also suggested that the new strategy would improvemilitary families' quality of life because they would experience fewer disruptive overseas moves, andthe military member would have a more predictable deployment schedule. However, the strategy'sreliance on more frequent short deployments which would increase the frequency of familyseparations would seem to some to contradict this assertion. (16) Deputy Undersecretary Henry also claimed a linkage with the 2005 BRAC round and theanticipated Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) study, a study that Congress mandates DOD toaccomplish every four years to allocate missions and guide military procurement. (17) He did not, however,address the criticism that the first QDR performed after 9/11 should precede a realignment of globalbasing structure, rather than trail it by over a year. Likewise, the interaction of impacts from there-basing and from the relocations driven by the 2005 BRAC process have not been clearlyarticulated. While it is possible that basing arrangements optimized for Cold War adversaries maynot be suitable to counter current threats, the selection criteria for new base locations have not beendelineated. On August 15, 2005, the congressionally chartered Overseas Basing Commission releasedits final report. The Commission visited with senior military leaders, defense analysts, and seniorofficials from other government agencies, and traveled extensively for site visits. While theCommission concurred with the need to reshape the structure of U.S. overseas basing, in general,the report was critical of the DOD's overseas restructuring process and proposal. (18) There were several areas in which the Commission's report concurred with DOD. It laudedthe concept of transforming of the military from a Cold War structure to meet new requirements. Itagreed that the shifting of forces in South Korea and the return of most Army heavy forces fromCentral Europe was appropriate. It also supported the concepts of forward operating sites andcooperative security locations, with their reduced personnel and smaller infrastructure. TheCommission agreed that these arrangements would give more options in a crisis and moreopportunities to work with new allies, thus expanding positive U.S. influence. However, the report'smajor finding held that "the timing and synchronization of the global re-basing initiatives must berethought." (19) Chairman Cornella argued that DOD's plan overemphasized a purely military perspective,and neglected to fully reflect the concerns of all members of the national security interagencycommunity. For example, State Department concerns about opportunities to enhance alliancerelationships through exercises and exchanges and to exert political and diplomatic influence in theregions under review were allegedly given inadequate attention. The Commission believed thedesire to implement base withdrawals quickly, rather than specific strategic decisions andcoordination, seemed to be driving the selections. Further, the report held that the locations werepicked based on today's threats rather than a long term threat assessment. It expressed concern thatthe plan disregards the politics and values of some of the new potential allies, which might notdovetail with U.S. interests. (20) The report questioned the timing of the moves in a environment of fast-paced current militaryoperations. The Commission expressed concern that the strain of conducting this sweeping seriesof moves, while also conducting major conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan has the potential to threatenthe capability of the force. Forces would either be preparing to deploy, deployed, or returning fromdeployment, while also trying to reestablish their unit's support structure, military personnel, andfamilies at new bases. Further, it viewed the pace of the aggressive time line proposed by DOD,projected as 2006 through 2011, as overly ambitious. (21) The Commission noted that mobility and equipment prepositioning were key to the successof the re-basing strategy. However, it expressed concern that current and projected strategic airliftand strategic sealift were inadequate for the Defense Department's concept, which relies heavily ontransporting troops to crisis areas rather than permanent forward basing. It also held that sufficientprepositioned supply stocks do not now exist. Most importantly, it argued that future budget plansfor projected sea and airlift procurement did not account for the re-basing plan's needs. (22) The report highlighted claims that the re-basing plan would harm the quality of life ofvolunteer military personnel. It noted that the military has insufficient plans to ensure both thatrequired support facilities at U.S. bases gaining personnel are in place for new personnel on arrival,and that facilities are preserved at the losing base overseas until the last person is gone. Thesesupport facilities include commissaries, exchanges, hospitals, and child care capacity on base, andoff base support capability provided by the local and state communities such as schools and housing. Without this support, young military families with limited incomes may suffer in areas of spouseemployment, family health, and cost of living. The Commission also argued that the heightenedtempo of temporary overseas rotations that is central to the plan will result in frequent familyseparations over the course of a career that could threaten retention and recruiting. The decision tostay in the military is very much a family decision, and when many child growth milestones aremissed, or a spouse experiences enough home emergencies and worry while the military member isdeployed overseas, the decision can tip to separation from the military. (23) Significantly, the report contended that the DOD might have underestimated the total costto implement their base realignment process. The Commission's independent analysis calculated a$20 billion bill for the moves, while the DOD has only budgeted $4 billion through 2011. Thedanger is that the services will need to spend from their operations and maintenance budget accounts(which should normally be used to buy day-to-day material such as expendable equipment, fuel, orammunition) to cover the difference. This could result in potential damage to force readiness, giventhe concurrent budget demands caused by combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. (24) The Commission, given all its reservations, recommended a slowing and reordering of thepace of overseas re-basing until that the acquisition of key capabilities, such as mobility andprepositioned supplies, required to support the new strategy had occurred. It also maintained thatbetter budget support for establishing forces at new locations (mainly back in the U.S.), such asfunding for the movement of people and equipment and building at these locations is required. Further preparatory activities were needed for local communities to absorb thousands of new militaryfamilies, such as support for additional schools and roads. (25) In general, the Commission held that a coherent national strategy did not sufficiently guidethe overseas posture review and that a formal national debate on the larger scope of Americansecurity post-Cold War should precede further re-basing moves. It argued that completion of the2005 Quadrennial Defense Review, the Base Realignment and Closure Commission report, and theMobility Capabilities Study (26) were key to providing an overall architecture for updating ouroverseas posture. The Commission strongly recommended diligent Congressional oversight of thisprocess to ensure a cohesive basing strategy. (27) The Defense Department responded to the Commission's report upon its release in May 2005. Principal Deputy Undersecretary for Policy Ryan Henry and Acting Under Secretary of the ArmyRay Dubois met with the press and delivered specific counterpoints to many of the report's findings. Mr. Henry rebutted the Commission's critique of the DOD choices for strategic dispositions. Wherethe Commission viewed the DOD selections as based on today's threats, he asserted that the conceptstrove to base the forces in locations that supported flexibility and speed of response to anywherein an unpredictable environment. (28) Critics may contend, however, to simply assert that future threatsare unpredictable sidesteps the challenge of articulating a strategic vision, which includes aprojection of anticipated threats. Mr. Henry also took issue with the Commission's argument that DOD had not sufficientlycoordinated the Global Posture Review across government agencies. He cited meetings with theregional combatant commanders that began shortly after the 2001 QDR, as well as consultations withthe Department of State, the National Security Council, and 45 briefings to Members of Congressand to committee staffs. He maintained that Congress had indicated satisfaction with the amountof oversight consultation to this point. He also highlighted visits to the leadership in over 20 foreigncountries that could be affected by the relocations. While he noted the number of meetings, he didnot indicate whether the briefings were in-depth or ongoing, nor the state of progress, particularlyregarding the delicate status of forces agreements that guide basing rules with the foreign countries. He stated that the Global Posture Review was intended to serve as a starting point to feed the 2005QDR, as well as the 2005 BRAC and the Mobility Capability Study, all of which were to becoordinated in parallel. Therefore, it would fall to the QDR to address the timing of lift procurementand other needed equipment acquisition to ensure it supports the Integrated Global Presence andBasing Strategy (IGPBS). However, since the QDR is intended to be the keystone documentoutlining DODs future strategic vision, selecting how the military will align its bases beforedetermining the strategy they are trying to achieve raises questions of appropriate sequence. Mr. Dubois disputed the Commission report's concerns that DOD was shortchanging militaryfamilies' quality of life. He responded that the re-basing plan's decisions were incorporated into theBRAC analysis. He noted that the DOD held discussions with the Department of Education, as wellas state governors and leaders of communities that would be vital partners in supporting returningpersonnel and dependents. He did not, however, indicate if additional impact aid for thesecommunities was planned. He also did not address plans to expand infrastructure on or near affectedinstallations. He held that the re-basing would give other payoffs to improve quality of life; notingthat the number of family permanent changes of station (PCSs) would be fewer, thus reducing theturmoil of overseas moves. Although reducing the number of PCS moves may offer greater stability,it assumes that all military bases are of equal desirability in their geographical location and facilities,which is often not the case. DOD also appears to assume the overseas stationing in permanentEuropean bases (such as Germany, Italy) are undesirable to military families, which is also often notthe case. In fact, the opportunity to periodically live overseas is, for some, an advantage of a militarycareer. Mr. Dubois also did not address, however, the stress that increased unaccompanied overseasdeployments would place on families, or the troops deployed at isolated, "bare-bones" locations. Neither official addressed the potential impact on recruiting or retention. Finally, Mr. Henry downplayed the disparity between the Defense Department's and theCommission's cost figures. He suggested that the Commission's study included costs that otherprograms in the defense budget covered, while DOD figures only focused on the additional costsdriven specifically by the moves. Mr. Dubois also noted that the military would eventually accruesavings in operations and maintenance accounts as they drew down from maintaining expensiveoverseas locations. Yet even if these costs will be covered by other programs in the budget, thereis no indication that the department has proposed an increase for those budget items, such asconstruction, airlift procurement, or sealift procurement. Further, it is unclear that the compensationthe U.S. would get from the new host nations would offset that currently received from establishedallies. Commonly, countries in which U.S. bases are located provide various forms of "host nationsupport." This could include basic utility services, construction, and even cash payments inrecognition of the benefit to local economies. However, many of the new locations, such asKyrgyzstan, are demanding payments from the U.S. to allow basing in their countries. Reaction to the Pentagon's plan continued to emerge from beyond the Commission. Alliance relationships formed one topic for debate. Historically, European allies have beenespecially desirous of keeping a significant U.S. presence, which they view as supporting Europeanstability and integration. Security guarantees to other allies have encouraged their support ofnon-proliferation regimes. Some critics, such as Philip H. Gordon at the Brookings Institution, fearthat moving forces away from long term allies to basing in nations less likely to restrain U.S. militaryoperations would give the Administration more latitude to take unilateral military action in futurecrises without consultation, thus further harming relationships and the U.S. image. (29) Others have reinforcedthe concern that the moves could erode ties with traditional, long term American allies, withparticular focus centered on the relationship with Germany. Some, such as [author name scrubbed] at the Centerfor Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, even suggested that the moves were intended aspunishment of Germany by the Bush administration for its opposition to U.S. operations inIraq. (30) At the sametime, it bears recognition that land restrictions and real estate costs for some U.S. allies has led tolimitations on training and exercises. Further, prudent U.S. relocations could reduce frictions withlocal populations, especially in Okinawa and South Korea. Advocacy groups for military personnel and families echoed the report's warnings regardingthe impact of the re-basing strategy on quality of life. Some, like Joyce Raezer of the NationalMilitary Family Association, suggested that DOD's record of preparation for past unit moves showedthat services were not ready for families at new locations, and that services closed before oldlocations were empty. Likewise, they fear the strain on civilian infrastructure, such as roads, schools,and housing, could cause problems with the relocations. For example, as a new brigade recentlyassumed posting at Fort Drum (Watertown, New York), soldiers had to move up to 75 miles awayfor housing. (31) Suchlong commutes will strain soldiers on shift work or delay their response in a crisis. Scarce housingalso could harm troops' standard of living, particularly for families where both adults are active dutymembers, or single parent households. It could also drive up rent costs for junior enlisted membersand could limit civilian spouse employment opportunities. For example, schools in Watertownbecame overcrowded, and the single hospital in town lacked capacity for the new patients. However,other larger communities, such as El Paso Texas, have expressed enthusiasm for the job growth andhomebuilding surge these moves would prompt. (32) Other Department of Defense transformational programs that interact with the IGPBScontinue to progress. The 2005 round of Base Realignment and Closure findings entered into forceon November 9, 2005. The BRAC Commission reviewed Pentagon proposals to close or realignover 800 installations. Most of the DOD BRAC list remained unchanged, with the Commissionadopting 86% of the DOD's proposal. Congress did not approve a resolution that would haveprevented the BRAC results from automatically entering into force (H. J. Res 65). However, DODwill not have implementation plans ready until early 2006. Closings must start by 2007, and mustbe complete by 2011. (33) The 2005 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) is under final review and scheduled to be sentto Congress on February 6, 2006. To spur movement on the contentious QDR study, acting DeputySecretary of Defense Gordon England recently directed Pentagon leadership to focus their analysison three core missions: homeland defense, global war on terrorism, and conventional major warfarein order to streamline deliberations from more than 160 issues originally nominated forconsideration. Ensuring sufficient "enabler" forces, which include logistics and mobility functions,remains a point of contention and is a critical aspect of QDR linkage with the Global PostureReview. With regard to force structure, reports indicate that in order to free funds for a potentialQDR call to increase Army and Marine forces for the war on terror, the Navy might drop from 11to 10 carrier battle groups. Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld had proposed this idea as early asSeptember 2004, but it would also seem to cut into the power projection and mobility conceptspivotal to the global re-basing strategy. (34) The Mobility Capabilities Study was completed at the end of July 2005 and DOD has beenbriefing the results to Congressional defense committees and staffers. Despite assumptions of achanged threat environment, the study finds that the currently planned program, which was shapedbefore the September 11, 2001 attacks, is sufficient to support national strategy. It argues that noadditional airlifters, sealift ships, or aerial refueling tankers are needed and calls for ending purchasesof C-17 and C-130J transports. It also requires retaining and modernizing all Air Force C-5transports, which historically have a poor availability rate. (35) The recommendation toend C-17 construction contradicts recommendations from former U.S. Transportation Commandcommander General John Hardy, who called for at least 42 more aircraft. (36) A September 2005Defense Science Board report also questioned the sufficiency of airlift and tanker capabilities andproposed that DOD should "keep open the option to acquire additional C-17s" given theunpredictable threat and budget environment. (37) In examining the DOD methodology behind the MobilityCapabilities Study, the Government Accountability Office also expressed concerns regarding thevalidity of the modeling and simulation tools used in developing the results. (38) Congress incorporated its concerns regarding the Global Posture Review into the FY2006National Defense Authorization Act (PL 109-163). Congress directed the DOD to submit a reportby March 30, 2006. This report would address selection criteria, a process for analyzing alternativelocations, and descriptions of minimum infrastructure for each the types of facilities envisioned. Thelegislation requires DOD to detail funding for these overseas locations in the annual budgetsubmission. Congress also ordered DOD to notify congressional defense committees when basingagreements are completed with foreign governments. One unidentified congressional stafferexpressed concern that the information DOD had forwarded to Congress has been too"subjective." (39) The FY2006 Authorization specifically addressed the mobility requirements for the overseasbasing plan and seemed to express skepticism regarding the findings of the Mobility CapabilitiesStudy. Congress included authorization for the Air Force to purchase up to 42 additional C-17airlifters. However, exercise of that authority is contingent on the DOD first conducting are-assessment of airlift requirements for national defense. This assessment must specifically takeinto account the structure proposed by the IGPBS. The legislation tasks DOD to submit thisassessment with the QDR, or up to 45 days after the QDR is delivered to Congress, if more time isrequired. (40) Congress also gave direction regarding the stateside infrastructure needs that would arisefrom returning forces. The FY2006 Authorization legislation also requires the Secretary of Defenseto consult with state and local governments, as it develops its global posture implementation plans,regarding infrastructure and support needs driven by personnel returning from overseas basing. (41) The legislation alsoincluded a Sense of the Congress that the quality-of-life support facilities should be ready at basesgaining personnel before they arrive, and maintained at closing bases until the personnel havedeparted. (42) Lastly, theFY2006 Authorization incorporated a Sense of the Congress that roads leading to militaryinstallations that gain significant numbers of personnel from the IGPBS or BRAC should bedesignated as defense access roads. (43) This section also directs the Secretary of Defense to conduct astudy of the surface transportation infrastructure around bases affected by BRAC and the IGPBS andits adequacy to support the gains from redeployments. That report is due to Congress by April 15,2007. (44) There have been several recent positive events that help the implementation of the GlobalPosture Review to move forward. On December 6, 2005, Secretary of State Rice signed anagreement with Romanian Foreign Minister Razvan Ungureanu to station U.S. forces at the MihailKogalniceanu air base near Constanta, on the Romanian Black Sea coast. U.S. forces would alsobe able to use the Babadag, Smardan, and Cincu training ranges. The new location would house theEastern European Task Force, with roughly 1,500 personnel. Reports indicate that negotiations forbasing in Bulgaria are also nearing conclusion. (45) The United States also concluded an agreement with Japanregarding operations on Okinawa. The agreement would relocate the 3, 000 Marines at Futenma toland to be reclaimed off-shore at Camp Schwab. (46) Other recent international developments potentially cast shadows on key assumptionsunderlying the Global Posture Review. There might be indicators of an international shift in thedegree of welcome extended by other countries to basing U.S. forces. For example, a statement bySouth Korean President Roh Moo-hyun would seem to place limits on the United States ability toemploy forces stationed in Korea to missions beyond the peninsula. (47) In another case,Kyrgyzstan has demanded a 100-fold increase (from $2 million to $200 million) in the rent theUnited States pays for use of Manas air base. Kyrgyz President Bakiyev had also been trying tocharge the United States an additional $80 million for jet fuel. The United States had already paidfor this fuel, but the payment was allegedly misappropriated by former President Akayev. The DODhas refused this additional charge, claiming the corruption is a Kyrgyz internal problem. The Kyrgyzgovernment has also begun agitating for compensation for claimed environmental damage due toaircraft emergency fuel dumping. (48) In yet another instance, Russian officials quickly expresseddismay at the recently concluded U.S. basing agreement with Romania. Russian Defense MinisterIvanov suggested that the move put the future of the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE)treaty in doubt and appeared to threaten withdrawal from the treaty. The State Department counteredthat the U.S. agreement was in compliance with CFE and other understandings with Russia. (49) Of particular concern to the re-basing plan are recent developments in Uzbekistan. On July29, 2005, the United States was formally notified that it had 180 days to leave its air base atKarshi-Khanabad, in Uzbekistan. This base has served as a vital hub for missions flown to supportoperations in Afghanistan, and was prototypical of the cooperative security locations envisioned inthe Pentagon re-basing plan. The last contingent of U.S. troops departed on November 21, 2005,ending four years of operations there. One reason for this eviction might have been StateDepartment pressure on the Tashkent government regarding recent human rights abuses. (50) Another reason for theeviction might have been encouragement from China and Russia, who have indicated increasingunease regarding U.S. military activity in the Central Asia region -- a region seen by the UnitedStates as strategically vital to the war on terror. Commentators contend that Russia, and particularlyChina, are exploiting the perception of U.S. support for democratic revolutions in Georgia and theUkraine as examples of a U.S. threat to the power of the area's authoritarian leaders, such asPresident Karimov in Uzbekistan. During the demonstrations that prompted the harsh Uzbekgovernment response and attendant U.S. criticism, China publicly expressed support for Karimov'sactions. Furthermore, shortly before the United States' eviction, Karimov visited Beijing, where hegarnered $1.5 billion in contracts and agreements between China and Uzbekistan. (51) Finally, the political and security climate in some locations proposed for U.S. forward basescould require a disproportionate amount of manpower be dedicated to local security requirements. For example, while President Hamid Karzai has signaled a desire for a permanent U.S. militarypresence in Afghanistan, an upsurge of violence killed seven U.S. troops in a four day period inAugust 2005. This increase of attacks also wounded two embassy staffers, four years after the defeatof the Taliban. (52) Othercountries reported to be under consideration for, or already hosting U.S. troops confront significantterrorist threats of their own. For example, the "Lord's Resistance Army" continues to stage brutalattacks in Uganda, with a limited cease-fire having failed at the beginning of the year. InTurkmenistan, a country under consideration to host the U.S. forces removed from Uzbekistan,government crackdowns on terrorists have led to accusations of major violations of human rights andcivil liberties curtailments. (53) The Overseas Basing Commission pointedly emphasized the importance of Congressionaloversight of the overseas basing realignment process. Some of the issues Congress may wish toconsider include the following: Does the IGPBS have adequate linkage to an overarching strategic framework agreed uponby all key government parties in the national security strategy process? While most may agree thata revision of the overseas basing structure left from the Cold War is overdue, some would argue thatdeveloping a re-basing strategy without completing the Defense Department's Quadrennial DefenseReview and achieving buy-in across government agencies and with Congress is premature. Thesemoves may have major impacts across many aspects of U.S. foreign and security policy. The lackof overarching strategy and analysis may also be construed by some to miss vital linkages inexecution timing and schedule, which could lead to implementation pitfalls in the future. Are the Defense Department's cost projections for the overseas realignment accurate? Willprojected savings outweigh the cost of realignment and associate systems procurement? The DODand the Overseas Basing Commission disagree on these points. Others might also contend thatproposing a re-basing strategy before completing the 2005 Base Realignment and Closure round andthe Mobility Capabilities Study could result in mismatches of supporting infrastructure or mobilityassets. The consequence could be a shift of these unfunded requirements onto the services, whichare already under pressure from the cost of ongoing combat operations. Is it feasible to conduct the basing realignment moves given the deployment tempo drivenby ongoing military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan? Units returning from combat deployments,only to immediately pack up families and relocate, can put immense burdens on an already stressedforce. This burden is exacerbated if the bases receiving new troops lack sufficient supportinginfrastructure. Can the services permanently sustain the long term pace of frequent deploymentsrequired by the strategy? At some undetermined point, members may experience enough degradedquality of life for their families, and endure such frequent separations, that retention or recruitingbegin to suffer. What will be the effect of the re-basing on the relationship with long term U.S. allies, suchas Germany, where a drawdown is proposed? Lack of presence could find the United Statesreducing its voice in European or Asian affairs, and finding it harder to motivate internationalcoalitions or support when needed. Have sufficient legal arrangements, such as status of forcesagreements and overflight rights, been negotiated in advance of the arrival of U.S. forces in new hostnations? The Overseas Basing Commission argued that the preliminary diplomatic legwork had notbeen fully accomplished. Do the political climates in the new host nations support U.S. values ofdemocracy and human rights? While some nations, such as Romania, have actively sought a U.S.presence, others, such as Uzbekistan, have ended those arrangements as soon as they begin to annoyor lose their profitability. Is the re-basing proposal affected by standing treaties to which the U.S.is a state party, such as the Conventional Forces in Europe treaty? Early evidence may indicate thatDOD and the State Department need to further examine potential treaty impacts. 

Summary: On August 16, 2004, President Bush announced a program of sweeping changes to thenumbers and locations of military basing facilities at overseas locations, now known as theIntegrated Global Presence and Basing Strategy (IGPBS) or Global Posture Review. Roughly 70,000personnel would return from overseas locations from Europe and Asia to bases in the continentalUnited States (CONUS). Other overseas forces would be redistributed within current host nationssuch as Germany and South Korea, while new bases would be established in nations of EasternEurope, Central Asia, and Africa. In the Department of Defense's (DOD) view, these locationswould be better able to respond to potential trouble spots. The second session of the 109th Congresscould have to consider approval of the DOD proposal, or review appropriations requests forconstruction of infrastructure, increased impact aid to local communities, and new acquisitionprograms for mobility and logistics capabilities (such as airlift). Finally, the Senate may have toconsider ratification of new or revised treaties. In August 2005, the congressionally mandated Commission on the Review of OverseasMilitary Facility Structure of the United States (also known as the "Overseas Basing Commission")formally reported its findings. It disagreed with the "timing and synchronization" of the DODoverseas re-basing initiative. It also saw the initiative as potentially at odds with stresses on the forcefrom operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, and possibly hampering recruiting and retention. TheCommission questioned whether sufficient interagency coordination had occurred. It expresseddoubts that the military had enough airlift and sealift to make the strategy work, and noted that DODhad likely underestimated the cost of all aspects associated with the moves (DOD budgeted $4billion, the Commission estimated $20 billion). DOD disagreed with much of the Commission'sanalysis. Meanwhile, some have voiced concern that the DOD plan would harm long-standingalliance relationships, while others questioned DOD's plans to accommodate the thousands of troopsreturning to the U.S. Critics also argued that the 2005 Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC)round, which entered into force on November 9, 2005, and the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR),which is to be completed in early 2006, should have been finalized before completing the overseasbasing plan. Congress acted on some of its concerns with the re-basing plan in the FY2006 DefenseAuthorization Act, tasking DOD with follow-on studies of overseas basing criteria and mobilityrequirements. It also directs DOD to further examine the state and local impacts on installationsgaining personnel from the re-basing implementation. Recent international diplomatic and security developments could further influence debate onoverseas basing. Uzbekistan, one of the test cases for the new strategy, recently evicted U.S. forcesfrom the base in that Central Asian nation. Some analysts argue this eviction was prompted byRussia and China, who have begun to express concern with U.S. expansion of influence in theregion. This report will be updated as necessary.