Intelligence Community (IC) spending reveals much about the IC's structure, capabilities, missions, and customers. Program budgets provide resources (money and manpower) considered necessary to accomplish IC goals, directives, duties and responsibilities defined by the U.S. Code and Executive Order (E.O.) 12333. They fund intelligence and intelligence-related activities such as the collection, analysis and dissemination of information about any entity whose activities may pose a threat to the internal security of the United States, and "covert or clandestine activities affecting the relations of the United States with a foreign government, political group, party, military force, movement, or other association."1F IC program budgets fund the organizations charged with providing information of value to decisionmakers in the national security policy process. Such decisionmakers are thought of as customers —the President, National Security Council (NSC), heads of departments and agencies of the executive branch, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, senior military commanders, Members of Congress, and others as the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) determines appropriate. The IC tends to group its customers into two categories: (1) national/ strategic-level and (2) military/tactical-level. Based on the distinction between national and operational/tactical, IC spending is usually understood as the combination of (1) the National Intelligence Program (NIP), which covers the programs, projects, and activities of the intelligence community oriented towards the strategic needs of decisionmakers, and (2) the Military Intelligence Program (MIP), which funds defense intelligence activity intended to support tactical military operations and priorities. In Fiscal Year (FY) 2016, the aggregate amount (base and supplemental) appropriated to these two programs totaled $70.7 billion (NIP $53B, MIP $17.7). National/strategic- and military/tactical-intelligence differ primarily in where they fall along a continuum stretching from support to the highest levels of the policymaking process at one end to conduct of troop-level military operations at the other end. They may also vary in terms of scope and detail. National-level s trategic i ntelligence is associated with grand-scale (big picture) policy objectives. Operational intelligence narrows its focus to foreign military or military-related situations or activities within theaters or operational areas. Tactical i ntelligence is very detailed intelligence required for planning and conducting military operations at the troop level. To help clarify these three levels of intelligence, Table 1 provides an overview of the intelligence associated with what the Department of Defense (DOD) refers to as levels of war . Organizations such as the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) integrate intelligence from all sources into national intelligence in support of the policy process while organizations such as the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) are more focused on integrating service-specific intelligence into d efense intelligence for the warfighter. Furthermore, joint intelligence elements exist within the DOD to provide a common, coordinated picture for military commanders by fusing national and theater intelligence information into all-source assessments and estimates. Origins of an intelligence budget, separate and distinct from the defense budget, date back to the Nixon Administration. Early efforts to consolidate intelligence-related funds were energized by calls to improve oversight and accountability of the IC. Three programs formed the basis for what we now call the National Intelligence Program (NIP) and Military Intelligence Program (MIP): the National Foreign Intelligence Program, Tactical Intelligence and Related Activities Program, and the Joint Military Intelligence Program. The NFIP was a consolidation of the CIA budget with portions of the defense budget associated with national-level intelligence activities such as cryptologic and reconnaissance programs. The NFIP was originally managed by the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI), in consultation with the Secretary of Defense, and overseen by the NSC. The term NIP was created by the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (IRTPA) of 2004 ( P.L. 108-458 §1074). The IRTPA deleted Foreign from NFIP and also created the position of DNI. The DNI position will be discussed in greater detail later in the report. Funding for military specific tactical-level or operational intelligence activities was not included in the NFIP. It was referred to as TIARA and was managed separately by the Secretary of Defense. TIARA referred to the intelligence activities of a single service that were considered "organic" (meaning "to belong to") military units. In 1994, a new budget category, known as the JMIP, was created by the Secretary of Defense for joint, defense-wide intelligence programs. DOD Directive 5205.9 describes the intended purpose of the JMIP this way: The JMIP shall improve the effectiveness of DoD intelligence activities when those activities involve resources from more than one DoD Component; when users of the intelligence data are from more than one DoD Component; and/or when centralized planning, management, coordination, or oversight will contribute to the effectiveness of the effort. The term MIP originated in 2005 when Acting Deputy Secretary of Defense Gordon England signed a DOD memorandum merging TIARA and JMIP. DOD Directive 5205.12 established policies and assigned responsibilities, to include the Under Secretary of Defense (Intelligence)'s (USD(I)'s) role as program executive of the MIP, acting on behalf of the Secretary of Defense. The line between NIP and MIP can be difficult to draw. Many intelligence-related activities serve both national-level and tactical-level purposes. For example, the same intelligence about the location of a building and its occupants might be used to inform strategic-level discussions about a terrorist group's intentions or plans as well as to develop the tactics to blow it up or capture the inhabitants at the operational/tactical-level. NIP and MIP labels are also not definitive. A program under the NIP one year may be categorized MIP the next. Much depends on who is managing the process and how the program is justified. NIP and MIP labels depend on answers to the following kinds of questions: What is the program designed to do? What need does it satisfy? Who will derive the greatest benefit? Is the customer national- or tactical-level? What label makes the most sense from a logic standpoint? Who needs to do what to get the mission accomplished? How urgent is the need? In the end, NIP and MIP designations are simply ways to manage resources. Anything that is not NIP funded is typically MIP funded. The IC currently uses what it colloquially calls the NIP MIP Rules of the Road to loosely define what falls into either the NIP or MIP. According to these Rules of the Road , an IC program, project, or activity is primarily NIP if it: supports more than one department or agency; provides a service of common concern for the IC; supports Secure Compartmented Information Communications (SCI) across the IC; supports a capability at intelligence agencies and subordinate centers; and supports Information Technology (IT) equipment at Combatant Commands. An IC program, project, or activity is primarily MIP if it: supports military operations; addresses a unique DOD requirement; and supports a capability at Combatant Command headquarters and below. Caveats to these rules include the following: NIP and MIP may add funds to sustain, enhance or increase the capacity and/or capability of the other's systems; NIP capabilities may be temporarily provided to Operating Forces; and NIP and MIP can share program cost based on a DNI and Secretary of Defense determination that the activity is mutually beneficial. While many details associated with funding for IC programs are classified, much can be learned from publicly available documents. The information in this report is based entirely on unclassified, publicly available sources. Disclosure of details associated with the intelligence budget has been debated for many years, with proponents of more disclosure arguing for more accountability. Meanwhile, IC leadership argues that disclosure could cause damage to national security. At present, only the NIP and MIP aggregate budget numbers are publicly available. The appropriations for FY2016 were $53 billion and $17.7 billion respectively. Together, the $70.7B IC budget is approximately 11% of the national defense budget. CRS Report R44381, Intelligence Spending: In Brief , by [author name scrubbed], contains tables comparing NIP and MIP spending to national defense spending from FY2007 to FY2017. There is some confusion over whether the NIP or MIP (or both) comprise what is popularly known as the black budget . The term black budget has no official status in policy or regulation. In using the term, most observers are making a generic reference to all programs (including intelligence programs) for which funding figures are classified at some level. Likewise, there is no authoritative, unclassified, aggregate budget total for the black budget —whether one counts all or a portion of the NIP, MIP or non-intelligence DOD classified program budgets. While intelligence-related organizations span the federal, state and local governments, this report focuses only on programs associated with the agencies considered part of the IC. The IC is a confederation of 17 disparate organizations that all carry out some intelligence function related to national security. The National Security Act of 1947 (P.L. 80-253) created the framework for the IC. U.S. Code, primarily Titles 10 and 50 in combination, regulate its activities and funding and provide the legal foundation for E.O. 12333. The current roles and responsibilities of the DNI are based on provisions in the IRTPA of 2004 ( P.L. 108-458 ). The IRTPA charges the DNI with three main roles: (1) head of the IC, (2) principal intelligence advisor to the President, and (3) director of the NIP. Figure 1 illustrates that with the exception of the CIA and Office of the DNI (ODNI), IC components are housed in one of six separate departments headed by Cabinet secretaries. Most IC elements have a dual mission: (1) support to national-level intelligence activities, and (2) support to operational-level intelligence activities associated with its host department. Each intelligence agency is associated with one or more intelligence collection disciplines. Several NIP programs focus as much on funding a specific intelligence disciplines (such as signals intelligence) as they do on funding specific agencies. Collection disciplines are often referred to by IC professionals and commentators as INTs because the acronyms for each source end with INT . The five main INTs include: 1. Human Intelligence (HUMINT), 2. Open Source Intelligence (OSINT), 3. Signals Intelligence (SIGINT), 4. Geospatial Intelligence (GEOINT), and 5. Measurement and Signature Intelligence (MASINT). Table A-1 (Appendix A) describes the major INTs and their subset INTs, and provides examples of each. Each IC agency brings its own special expertise to what is commonly referred to as the Intelligence Enterprise . For example, CIA is the largest producer of all-source, national security intelligence primarily for the President, Congress, and senior policy-makers in the NSC. It manages clandestine HUMINT collection, covert operations, and OSINT across the IC. DIA collects, produces and disseminates a full range of basic, current, warning, and estimative intelligence that supports geographic commanders and operational forces, the Military Departments, and national policymakers. It also manages MASINT for the IC. NGA acquires imagery, geospatial information, and other products to produce and disseminate GEOINT in all forms to policymakers, military commanders and to first responders, and to mariners and pilots for safety of navigation. NRO builds and operates a fleet of satellites and ground stations whose main purpose is collecting SIGINT and GEOINT. NSA specializes in cryptology, collecting SIGINT, and information assurance (secure data) activities, to include cyber-related operations. Military service elements collect much of the intelligence associated with the INTs discussed above, and provide the service-specific expertise necessary for support to military operations. Non-DOD department elements such as DHS/OIA, DEA/ONSI, State/INR and DOE/I&CI contribute energy, homeland security, law enforcement, drug, diplomatic, and financial intelligence (primarily HUMINT and OSINT) necessary for all-source intelligence analysis and warning. Both 50 U.S.C. §3003(6) and E.O. 12333 define the NIP as including "all programs, projects, and activities of the Intelligence Community, as well as any other programs of the Intelligence Community designated jointly by the Director [DNI] and the head of a United States department or agency or by the President," but excluding , "programs, projects, and activities of the military departments to acquire intelligence solely for the planning and conduct of tactical military operations by U.S. Armed Forces." In reality, the NIP budget is an aggregation of a number of subordinate programs that are often subdivided into defense NIP and nondefense NIP because they are managed separately. These subordinate programs fund the activities of the IC elements. They often assist the DNI in his or her efforts to integrate the IC because a number of the subordinate programs are explicitly designed to coordinate intelligence agencies, budget requirements and mission execution across agencies. Electronic communications and connectivity between intelligence agencies (and their customers) is a good example of the integrating function associated with many NIP-related funds because the secure email network connects all IC employees to one another. NIP programs compete for resources within the IC, not within the larger department budgets. According to one account, this can be a "tremendous advantage to all the departmental intelligence organizations" because NIP resources are protected from use by other organizations within their respective agencies. This special protection is informally known as the NIP fence . The existence of this special protection is a long-standing practice. According to a House Permanent Select Committee Staff Study, the NIP fence was already a "well established tradition" in 1981: DoD internal guidance (Carlucci memorandum of April 17, 1981) stated the policy that NFIP 'resources are "fenced" and they are not to be increased, decreased, or transferred at any point in the fiscal cycle unless such action has been officially coordinated with the DCI.' This policy is deemed to continue and has never been seriously challenged. Thus, the concept of the NFIP as a fenced program is well-established and accepted in the Executive Branch. In contrast, MIP funds are said to be protected but not fenced. The MIP's protected status is discussed more fully below in the " Military Intelligence Program (MIP) " section. The resources (manpower and dollars) associated with the NIP's subordinate programs are managed by Program Managers . Program Managers are discussed later in the " Program and Component Managers " section. Defense NIP is focused on strategic-level intelligence for military-related activities. Defense NIP programs are primarily associated with four IC agencies—NSA, DIA, NGA and NRO—and their respective capabilities—cryptologic, defense, geospatial, and reconnaissance intelligence. These four capabilities form the basis for five defense NIP subordinate programs known as the Consolidated Cryptologic Program (CCP), General Defense Intelligence Program (GDIP), National Geospatial-Intelligence Program (NGP), National Reconnaissance Program (NRP), and the Specialized Reconnaissance Program (SRP). Together, these programs comprise roughly 60% of the total NIP budget. The CCP is managed by the Director of the NSA, who simultaneously acts as Commander, U.S. Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM) and Chief, Central Security Service (CHCSS). Funding for the SIGINT mission and information assurance (IA) activities across the IC are provided through the CCP. NSA's SIGINT mission is specifically limited by law to gathering information about international terrorists and foreign powers, organizations, or persons in response to formal requirements levied by IC customers with a need to know . SIGINT collection activities are widespread among IC elements. For example, the U.S. Coast Guard has a SIGINT collection entity as do each of the military services. In its IA role, NSA protects U.S. intelligence and national security communica tions and data storage systems for a number of government agencies, including the State Department, DOD, the CIA, and the FBI. This role includes development of secure data and voice transmission links on satellite systems such as the Defense Satellite Communications System. Members of the defense cryptologic community receive additional funds from the Information Systems Security Program (ISSP) for information assurance activities. The GDIP is a catch-all program managed by the Director of DIA that supports the wide range of national-level defense intelligence activities that do not fall within the other more specific CCP, NGP, NRP and SRP budgets. It includes the collection, analysis, production and dissemination of the intelligence associated with DIA organizations and Service intelligence centers. GDIP-funded collection activities include: defense HUMINT, particularly through the Defense Attaché System; MASINT against geographic targets, foreign forces, and foreign weapon systems; medical intelligence—intelligence that focuses on "worldwide health threats and issues, foreign medical capabilities, infectious disease, environmental health risks, developments in biotechnology and biomedical subjects of national and military importance, and support to force protection;" IC-wide infrastructure--it operates the Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System (JWICS) for the DOD, for example; and support to OSD, the JCS, and the Combatant Commands (COCOMs). For example, it supports the intelligence division (J-2) within the Chairman's Joint Staff. The DIA Director has a Defense Intelligence Resource Program Office (DIRMO) to manage all the separate GDIP inputs from DIA, the military services, and U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM, or SOCOM). The FCIP no longer exists as a separate program. The IAA for FY2014 ( P.L. 113-126 §314) directed the DNI to merge the FCIP into the GDIP. The DIA Director served as Program Manager for both programs. The FCIP designation was an accounting tool to track money used solely for counterintelligence purposes. CI can be tracked within the GDIP, but lacking the visibility it had as a separate program, it may have less protection now, when weighed against other priorities. The NGP is managed by the Director of NGA. It funds national-level GEOINT-related activities throughout the IC. GEOINT products range from three-dimensional maps and charts, to computerized databases. NGA predominately relies on overhead reconnaissance platforms to provide the raw imagery it needs to produce finished intelligence products. T he Globe is an example of an NGP investment that consolidates legacy search tools into "a single enterprise search and discovery system" designed to deliver "authoritative GEOINT into the hands of our customers." Such products enable analysts to monitor foreign nuclear weapons programs and track ongoing military activities on a worldwide basis. NGA Director Robert Cardillo's testimony before the House Armed Services Committee provides a good example of the NGP's funding for products like commercial imagery. Cardillo stated: This budget request supports U.S. government acquisition of commercial imagery. This imagery enhances U.S. geospatial readiness and responsiveness, and complements national technical means collection for current high-interest areas and rarely imaged areas. This investment in commercial imagery funds a large percentage of our foundation GEOINT data and supports air and sea navigation and humanitarian assistance. In addition, because commercial imagery is unclassified, it meets the growing demands for shareable GEOINT data and products across the government, with allies and nongovernmental partners. The NRP is managed by the NRO Director. The NRP was established in 1961 by the Secretary of Defense to coordinate the development and operation of all U.S. reconnaissance programs, covert and overt, as well as aerial and space-based overflight operations of the Air Force and the CIA. In the spring of 1962, the Navy reconnaissance satellite program, which gathered the signals emitted by foreign radars, was also added to the NRP. The NRP is hardware-focused as opposed to analysis-focused. Government personnel working for the NRO are primarily on detail from the Air Force, CIA, NSA and Navy. The NRP funds the NRO and the NRO's efforts to develop, build, launch, and operate satellites associated with multi-INT collection—meaning that they collect a variety of signals from foreign instrumentation (FISINT), communications (COMINT), electronics (ELINT), and various forms of measurements and signatures (MASINT). With the benefit of these forms of intelligence, the NRP provides the IC with capability to provide intelligence on topics like imminent military aggression, early warning of foreign missile launches, battle damage assessments, tracking high-value individuals, and monitoring treaty agreements and peacekeeping operations. The NRP also provides the IC with the capability to make NRO satellite information available to first responders and disaster relief operations. The SRP is referenced in intelligence policy documents but little is publicly known about the program. According to Elkins, it funds both the procurement of special intelligence gathering devices (to include research and development) and specialized reconnaissance collection activities, in response to tasking procedures established by the DNI. Nondefense NIP programs are associated with the IC elements located outside the DOD (CIA and the intelligence elements of DOE, DHS, DOJ, State, and Treasury). Nondefense NIP spending funds their associated capabilities: human, all-source, energy, homeland security, law enforcement, drug, diplomatic, and financial intelligence for strategic-level intelligence purposes. Like the defense NIP programs, nondefense NIP programs are traditionally fenced from their respective department's budget. They compete for resources within the IC, not within their parent organization. Together, they comprise about 40% of the total NIP budget. The CIAP is managed by the Deputy Director CIA and is the largest NIP nondefense program. The CIAP funds the activities of the entire agency, as the CIA is an independent entity and falls under no federal department. The CIA was originally established for the purpose of providing all-source intelligence analysis to senior policymakers. However, covert and clandestine operations became and continue to be the agency's most notable activity. CIAP funded CIA activities include: HUMINT; technical intelligence collection; covert and clandestine activities; OSINT; counterintelligence (CI) outside the United States; and research and development, and acquisition of technical collection systems. Intelligence Authorization Acts—and related appropriations measures—include funding for the CIA's Reserve for Contingencies , a budgetary account originally established in 1952 to provide funding for unanticipated intelligence activities, including covert actions. The DCIA must notify congressional intelligence committees when he or she intends to transfer funds from the Reserve for Contingencies to undertake a covert action. Although the DCIA has latitude to spend these funds in a number of ways, and effective oversight is difficult at best, they may not be legally spent on any activity for which funding was denied by Congress. CIARDS is a pension (entitlement) program for certain CIA employees, and as such, is a form of mandatory spending. CIA employees are covered under different retirement systems, depending on date of hire and type of duties performed. Most CIA employees are covered by either the Civil Service Retirement System (CSRS) or the Federal Employees Retirement System (FERS). All retirement benefits for CIA employees (CSRS, FERS or CIARDS) are administered by CIA, to protect employee personnel information. For more on CIARDS, see Appendix C . The ICMA (or CMA) is so titled because it was established in 1992 to support a Community Management Staff (CMS) created by then-DCI Robert Gates to coordinate cross-program activities, improve budget oversight, and strengthen community management. When the IRTPA abolished the position of DCI, it created the new position of DNI assisted by an ODNI. The ODNI absorbed the functions of the old CMS and gained new ones. Although the CMS was abolished, the CMA continued and is referred to as either the ICMA or CMA. For more on the ICMA, see Appendix C . DOE's Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence (DOE/IN) represents the DOE in the IC. Its director manages the DOE NIP program. DOE/IN is reportedly valued within the IC for its analysis of "all things nuclear, energy, science and technology and cyber." It provides "timely, technically based intelligence analyses of foreign nuclear/terrorist activities, and the disposition and security of nuclear materials worldwide." Furthermore, DOE/IN provides analyses of major advancements in technology related to global energy security issues. Its counterintelligence efforts are focused on protecting its personnel, technologies, facilities, and intellectual property from foreign collection efforts (particularly cyber threats). DOE/IN has a "reimbursable Intelligence Work (IW) Program" designed to tap into the DOE's nationwide complex of laboratories—each lab focused on highly advanced, high-risk research in areas such as computers, meteorology, space science, molecular biology, environmental science, and alternative energy sources. In this way, DOE's national laboratories perform work for non-DOE sponsors, such as the DOD and IC. According to a DOE report, "The total volume of IW and the customer base is classified, but it is quite a bit larger than IN's appropriated budget, and it represents a very sizable portion of the total reimbursable work performed in the Department's laboratory complex." There are only two NIP funded intelligence elements in the DHS, despite the fact that a number of DHS operational components have robust intelligence organizations to support their respective missions (e.g., U.S. Customs and Border Protection, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, the Transportation Security Administration, U.S. Coast Guard, and the U.S. Secret Service.) The NIP funds the DHS Office of Intelligence and Analysis (DHS/OIA) and some of the U.S. Coast Guard's (USCG's) national-level intelligence-related activities. DHS NIP primarily funds people and activities associated with intelligence analysis as opposed to other types of intelligence-related activities like collection. The NIP Homeland Security program funds the DHS/OIA and is managed by the Under Secretary of DHS for Intelligence and Analysis (DHS/I&A). OIA combines the unique information collected by DHS components as part of their operational activities (e.g., at airports, seaports, and the border) with foreign intelligence from the IC; law enforcement information from federal, state, local, and tribal sources; private sector data about critical infrastructure and key resources; and information from domestic open sources to develop homeland security intelligence. OIA analytical products focus on a wide range of homeland security threats to include: foreign and domestic terrorism, border security, human trafficking, and public health. OIA's customers range from the U.S. President to border patrol agents, Coast Guard seamen, airport screeners, and local first responders. When the DHS/OIA was incorporated into the IC, it was funded through the NIP. In time, the DNI and DHS leadership argued that because OIA supported both an IC-wide mission and a department-specific mission, it needed both NIP funds to support DNI requirements, and separately controlled Homeland Security Intelligence Program (HSIP) funds to support DHS requirements. In response, the congressional intelligence committees established the HSIP within DHS/OIA to separately manage those intelligence activities that serve predominantly DHS missions. The HSIP is discussed more fully in Appendix D . The USCG's NIP program is managed by the Assistant Commandant for Intelligence and Criminal Investigations (CG-2). The CG-2 is responsible for both the National Intelligence Element and the Law Enforcement Intelligence Program. Coast Guard Intelligence efforts are focused primarily on countering illegal smuggling of weapons, drugs, and migrants; port status and/or safety; counterterrorism; coastal and harbor defense operations; and marine safety and/or environmental protection. USCG/IN was made a formal member of the IC pursuant to the Intelligence Authorization Act (IAA) for FY2002 ( P.L. 107-108 , §105). USCG/IN was included as a formal member for a number of reasons but most particularly because it brought new capabilities into the IC. The USCG has diverse missions and unique authorities associated with its dual role as both an armed service and the nation's primary maritime law enforcement agency. A HPSCI report to accompany the IAA for FY2002 quoted the Commandant of the Coast Guard as indicating that the definition of national security has widened to include many of the things for which the Coast Guard has been responsible for years. The so-called asymmetric array of threats are now added to the classical inventory of nation-state engagement, potentially leading to armed conflict. It certainly now includes counter-terrorism, counter-narcotics, illegal alien smuggling and worrying about our Exclusive Economic Zone. USCG intelligence activities are distributed among a number of components to include: the USCG investigative service, CI service, cryptologic group, cyber program, Intelligence Coordination Center (ICC), and several intelligence staffs aligned with regional and field activities. The ICC is the Coast Guard's national-level intelligence analysis and production center. It serves as the liaison between the USCG and other national-level IC and law enforcement entities. The ICC produces intelligence that supports the Coast Guard's maritime intelligence requirements, disseminates intelligence to relevant national and military decisionmakers, and manages USCG intelligence requirements and the collection management process. The FBI is an intelligence and law enforcement agency. Joint Publication 2-01 describes the FBI's role in the IC this way: It is responsible for understanding threats to our national security and penetrating national and transnational networks that have a desire and capacity to harm the US. The FBI coordinates these efforts with its IC and law enforcement partners. It focuses on terrorist organizations, foreign intelligence services, WMD [Weapons of Mass Destruction] proliferators, and criminal enterprises. As the principal investigative arm of DOJ, the FBI is primarily responsible for CI and counterterrorism operations conducted in the United States. CI operations contemplated by any other organizations in the United States must be coordinated with the FBI. Any overseas CI operation conducted by the FBI must be coordinated with the CIA. The FBI was one of the organizations targeted for reform after the attacks of September 11, 2001. Investigations highlighted a number of obstacles to information sharing among the nation's intelligence and law enforcement communities. In the decade following 9/11, a number of laws and executive orders included provisions designed to improve the FBI's counterterrorism efforts. For example, the IRTPA of 2004 ( P.L. 108-458 ) directed the FBI Director "to develop and maintain a specialized and integrated national intelligence workforce consisting of agents, analysts, linguists, and surveillance specialists who are recruited, trained, and rewarded in a manner which ensures the existence within the Federal Bureau of Investigation of an institutional culture with substantial expertise in, and commitment to, the intelligence mission of the Bureau." The FBI's NIP program is headed by the Intelligence Branch Executive Assistant Director. It funds the FBI's National Security Branch (NSB). Within the NSB, the CI Division's efforts focus on preventing theft of sensitive information and advanced technologies. The Directorate of Intelligence maintains field offices throughout the United States, each with its own intelligence staff. The Counterterrorism Division oversees over 100 interagency groups comprised of federal, state, and local government intelligence and law enforcement entities known as Joint Terrorism Task Forces. The WMD Division helps coordinate intelligence-related efforts designed to prevent the use of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons. Among its many functions, the Terrorist Screening Center maintains the U.S. government's consolidated watch list of known or suspected terrorists. The DEA's NIP program is headed by DEA's Assistant Administrator and Chief of Intelligence. It funds the intelligence activities of DEA/ONSI—the IC's most recent formally added entity. While the office is a part of the Office of Strategic Intelligence within the DEA's Intelligence Division, only DEA/ONSI is designated as a member of IC. ONSI employs intelligence analysts in 21 U.S. field divisions and over 80 offices overseas located in more than 60 countries. It seeks to reduce the supply and international flow of narcotics, combat terrorism, and protect U.S. national security interests. E.O. 12333 directs the DEA and the intelligence elements within the Departments of Energy, Homeland Security, State, and Treasury, to: "collect (overtly or through publicly available sources), analyze, produce, and disseminate information, intelligence, and CI to support national and departmental missions; and … conduct and participate in analytic or information exchanges with foreign partners and international organizations." The Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research directs the department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR), serves as the Secretary of State's principal adviser on intelligence matters, and coordinates and supervises all intelligence-related activities in the Department. State Department NIP primarily funds people and activities associated with intelligence analysis. According to the State Department's Foreign Affairs Manual (FAM), the Assistant Secretary's responsibilities include the following: directing the Department's all-source and independent research and analysis; ensuring INR participation in community intelligence analyses; ensuring that U.S. intelligence activities support U.S. foreign policy priorities are consistent with Chief of Mission authority, laws, and Executive Orders and do not undermine the foreign policy interests of the United States; coordinating and representing the State Department's requirements for intelligence collection and analysis to the IC; ensuring efficient receipt, processing, and dissemination of intelligence; facilitating State Department requests for declassification, release, or exceptional use of information derived from State Department intelligence sources; determining whether a State Department employee may have access to certain classified materials; and serving as the primary reporting channel to the President's Intelligence Advisory Board (PIAB) and the Intelligence Oversight Board (IOB). INR has a number of offices that produce all-source analysis on issues as diverse as economic security, terrorist group financing, strategic arms control, political-military issues, and cyber for the Secretary of State and other key policymakers. INR Watch is the State Department's 24-hour, seven-day-a-week center for monitoring, evaluating, alerting, and reporting time-sensitive intelligence to department and INR principals and serves as liaison to other IC operations centers. INR does not engage in clandestine collection operations. The Assistant Secretary of Treasury for Intelligence and Analysis (AS/OIA) manages the NIP program for financial intelligence. The IC element within the Department of Treasury is the Office of Intelligence and Analysis (OIA). The Treasury NIP primarily funds people and activities associated with intelligence analysis. OIA provides intelligence support to both the IC as a whole and the Department of the Treasury's regulatory and enforcement authorities. As the DNI's focal person for threat finance, the AS/OIA has responsibility for ensuring all IC finance intelligence elements collaborate and integrate their respective operations across focus areas such as terrorist financing, weapons proliferation, drug trafficking, and other areas. OIA also provides all-source intelligence relevant to warfighters at the tactical-level. The office established joint intelligence, military, and law enforcement cells in Iraq and Afghanistan to help identify and interdict funding streams to terrorist and insurgent networks. These cells allow OIA to interact with other IC entities and military forces to produce time-sensitive and actionable intelligence valuable to the day-to-day war effort. Both the AS/OIA and the Assistant Secretary for Terrorism Financing (AS/TF) report to the Under Secretary of Treasury for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence (OTFI). OTFI's stated mission is to assemble "the department's intelligence and enforcement functions with the twin aims of safeguarding the financial system against illicit use and combating rogue nations, terrorist facilitators, weapons of mass destruction (WMD) proliferators, money launderers, drug kingpins, and other national security threats." The Senate Intelligence Committee report accompanying the IAA for FY2015 ( P.L. 113-293 ) directs the DNI to provide performance assessments for an initiative called FIX-ITT (Financial Exchange and Intelligence Integration). FIX-ITT is an ODNI integrating effort to bring all financial intelligence-related activities spread across various IC agencies together to better understand, map, and disrupt terrorist organizations, narco-trafficking networks, proliferation networks, organized crime, and other threats. In contrast to the NIP, the MIP belongs to the Secretary of Defense. A program is primarily MIP if it funds an activity that addresses a unique DOD requirement. Each MIP program consists of a "wide range of diverse, disparate joint and tactical intelligence" assets and activities that all reside in the budget of a single DOD component. According to the MIP charter directive: The MIP consists of programs, projects, or activities that support the Secretary of Defense's intelligence, counterintelligence, and related intelligence responsibilities. This includes those intelligence and counterintelligence programs, projects, or activities that provide capabilities to meet warfighters' operational and tactical requirements more effectively. The term excludes capabilities associated with a weapons system whose primary mission is not intelligence. Intelligence budget expert Robert Mirabello explains the MIP as providing "the 'take it with you' intelligence organic to the deployable units in all services at all echelons of command." MIP programs are not capability based. They support anything from language training to biometrics to any number of surveillance tools. Examples include the Army's intelligence support to detainee operations; the Navy's ballistic missile data collection radar system known as Cobra Judy Replacement; the Air Force's Global Hawk unmanned aircraft system; and DIA's intelligence support to the Combatant Commands. Unlike the defense NIP programs, MIP programs compete for resources within the larger DOD budget. The MIP label does not confer any special status on a program or activity. MIP funds are not fenced , but they are monitored closely, and cannot be reprogrammed without the approval of the USD(I). While MIP-labelled resources are prote cted by the USD(I) from use by other organizations within the DOD, they are still subject to DOD budget constraints. In other words, MIP-funded people and programs can be subject to DOD-wide requirements in ways that NIP-funded people and programs are not. For example, when the DOD furloughed thousands of civilian employees for 11 days in 2013 (for reasons related to congressionally mandated automatic budget cuts) NIP-funded civilian personnel were exempted but MIP-funded civilian personnel were not. Table B-1 identifies and briefly describes a number of MIP programs. Funding associated with each MIP program supports tactical-level intelligence activities associated with that entity's overall mission. Each MIP program is managed separately by a Component Manager . See " Program and Component Managers " section below. They are also listed in Table E-1 , Appendix E . The Directors of DIA, NGA, NRO, and NSA manage NIP and MIP funds. Those agency activities that support tactical-level operations not funded by the GDIP, NGP, NRP, or CCP, respectively, are supported in many cases with MIP funds. According to Joint Publication 2-01: DIA MIP consists of DIA's intelligence activities focused on support to the COCOMs. The COCOM Joint Intelligence Operations Centers (JIOCs) and the DOD counterintelligence and HUMINT center resources are included here. The Component Manager is the Director DIA. NGA MIP funds defense-wide GEOINT activities, including communication, and production system improvements, as well as the defense imagery activities of NGA. Also funded are selected defense airborne and space reconnaissance activities managed by NGA. The Component Manager is the Director, NGA. NSA MIP consists of cryptologic and SIGINT support to the DOD. The Component Manager is the Director, NSA. NRO MIP augments the NRO NIP resources addressing specific DOD requirements. The Component Manager is the Director, NRO. In 2015, Betty Sapp, current Director of the NRO, testified publicly about NRO's support to the warfighter, particularly its "ability to fuse multi-intelligence data to support warfighter intelligence needs:" I would like to start by highlighting the real bottom line for the NRO – our support to the warfighter. The NRO has become a key global military operations enabler and many capabilities are integral to the conflict in Afghanistan and other theaters. In addition to traditional NRO ISR systems and support, we provide a wide array of focused capabilities to help solve specific, critical ISR needs for deployed personnel around the world. These services, products, and tools directly contribute to the highest priority missions, to include: countering Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs); identifying and tracking High-Value Targets; and improving battlespace awareness. To ensure users are able to take advantage of NRO capabilities, we developed the Field Representative program that puts NRO subject matter experts, both military and civilian, at the combatant commands and in the theater battlespace. These men and women serve as technical liaison officers to units, and support specific NRO programs and capabilities focused on the warfighter. A real strength of the NRO is our ability to fuse multi-intelligence data to support warfighter intelligence needs. We have helped the warfighter visualize large volumes of data temporally and spatially, establishing patterns of life, identifying the unusual within a multitude of fused data sets, and integrating full motion video data with automated multi-intelligence tipping, cueing, and alerting capabilities. Our cutting-edge solutions combine GEOINT and SIGINT, and span the space, air, and ground operational domains to provide the warfighter a comprehensive common operational picture, enhancing the ability to find, fix, and finish targets. OSD MIP funds are managed by the USD(I) and used "to exercise planning, policy, and strategic oversight of all DOD intelligence, CI, and security policy, plans and program. OSD MIP provides funds for counternarcotics intelligence support managed by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Counternarcotics and Global Threats." It also supports special technology programs with DOD-wide applications that are not funded elsewhere. For example, it funds the following: Advanced Sensors Application Program—a program researching and developing sensors for a variety of service-specific intelligence needs; Foreign Materiel Acquisition and Exploitation Program—a program to acquire, analyze and counter foreign materials that could potentially be used in harmful ways (e.g., chemicals, weapons systems, computer software, microbes); and Horizontal Fusion Program—a program to connect soldiers in the field with commanders and with battlefield information—helping them to "fuse" information available from a number of physically dispersed data sources. As a rule, Combatant Commands (COCOMs), such as the U.S. Pacific Command or the U.S. Central Command, have no military forces or equipment assigned directly to them. Instead, they rely on the military departments and defense agencies to provide the forces and equipment necessary to carry out COCOM-run military operations. These COCOMs do not have their own budgets; instead they each provide budgetary input to the military department that serves as their executive agent. SOCOM is unique—unlike any other COCOM. It was established by Congress in 1987 ( P.L. 99-661 ) with military department-like responsibilities and its own budget to organize, train, and equip its military forces. Thus, SOCOM's MIP budget is submitted separately from the MIP budgets associated with the military services. There is no separate SOCOM NIP program; instead, SOCOM requests for NIP funds go to the CCP, GDIP, and NGP Program Managers for review and incorporation into the annual CCP, GDIP and NGP budget requests. Like most COCOMs, SOCOM has a joint staff at the headquarters level, and the J-2 is its manager for SOCOM's intelligence funds. The J-2 acronym is associated with not only the division of the joint staff associated with intelligence, but also the individual who leads that section. SOCOM tactical-level intelligence resources are directed toward building up its own organic capabilities and reimbursing support from military departments. The SOCOM JIOC is funded through the DIA MIP. One recent report in National Defense magazine provides a number of insights into SOCOM's intelligence needs. For example, according to the report, SOF [special operations forces] has several programs underway to help facilitate that global flow of information, gathered by everything from high-end airborne platforms to troop-worn cameras and tracking devices. [Admiral] McRaven [then-SOCOM Commander] has directed that acquisition efforts be focused first on outfitting an array of aircraft — both manned and unmanned, fixed and rotary wing—with advanced ISR [intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance] and data storage capabilities that will work in multiple environments. General Joseph Votel, the current SOCOM Commander recently testified about the command's reliance on the military services for airborne intelligence specialists: [O]ur operational tempo has created an increased need for Tactical Systems Operators (TSOs), which are airborne intelligence specialists provided by the Services. TSOs operate on aircraft that are not programs of record, but are vital to our ability to target enemies on the ground. This creates a situation where the Air Force, as well as the other Services, have an increased manpower bill they have not programmed for, while they provide us with essential intelligence support. For critical and unique enduring capabilities like TSOs, it is essential that we provide sustainable funding that allows the Services to provide sustainable sourcing. The military services each maintain their own intelligence collection and analysis capabilities. These organic military intelligence assets focus on the intelligence most urgently required by their parent service. The Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) (AF/A2) manages resources associated with the 25 th Air Force (AF) and the National Air and Space Intelligence Center (NASIC). Air Force MIP funds programs and people associated with: globally integrated ISR; electronic warfare; airborne national command and control; nuclear detection and treaty monitoring; information operations; cryptology; science and technology intelligence; and targeting and analysis operations for Air Force and joint commanders, national policymakers and coalition partners. Five 25 th AF wings are responsible for collecting GEOINT, SIGINT and MASINT. ISR systems range in size from hand-held devices to orbiting satellites. Some collect basic information for a wide range of analytical products; others are designed to acquire data for specific weapons systems. ISR platforms most commonly used by ISR-affiliated wings to collect intelligence are the RC-135 variants, U-2, MQ-1 Predator, MQ-9 Reaper, and the RQ-4 Global Hawk. Air Force MIP also funds activities associated with the National Air and Space Intelligence Center (NASIC), a Field Operating Agency subordinate to the AF/A2. NASIC analyzes data on foreign aerospace forces and weapons systems to determine performance characteristics, capabilities, vulnerabilities, and intentions. The center also supports weapons treaty negotiations and verification. U.S. Army intelligence policy, operations (to include training) and budget are the responsibility of the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence (ODCS/G-2). The Army G-2 coordinates multidisciplinary intelligence collection and analysis throughout the Army, to include GEOINT, SIGINT, HUMINT, MASINT, and CI. Funding for Army MIP supports people and activities associated with the U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM). The National Ground Intelligence Center (NGIC) is a subordinate element of INSCOM and is responsible for collecting and disseminating GEOINT and all-source intelligence on foreign ground force capabilities and technologies. Additionally, NGIC employs specialists such as physicists, chemists, and engineers who, along with other technical specialists, evaluate foreign weapon systems in order to evaluate current and future foreign military armament performance and capabilities. Army Cryptologic Operations (ACO) is a subordinate to INSCOM and is the Army's lead cryptologic effort in meeting SIGINT collection requirements. Army Brigade Combat Teams (BCT) have their own organic military intelligence (MI) companies. These companies are devoted to producing, analyzing, and disseminating intelligence information products specific to BCT areas of operations. U.S. Navy intelligence policy, operations (to include training) and budget are the responsibility of its Director of Naval Intelligence, who also serves as the deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Information Dominance (N-2/N-6). The U.S. Marine Corps (USMC) is a component of the Navy. The USMC headquarters staff has a Director for Intelligence (DIRINT) responsible for USMC intelligence policy, operations and budget. The Deputy Under Secretary of the Navy (DUSN) for Plans, Policy, Oversight and Integration (PPOI) is responsible for oversight of both Navy and USMC MIP. According to a Navy policy document: DUSN PPOI exerts authority over the MIP to ensure that projects adhere to applicable strategy and are resourced properly. This authority is executed on behalf of the UNSECNAV [Under Secretary of the Navy] and in coordination with Service MIP component managers. The Navy Budget Office ensures the MIP projects are properly priced, budgeted, and executed through Departmental PPBE processes, and proposes, coordinates, and processes execution realignments when necessary. The Navy Budget Office coordinates with budget submitting offices (BSOs) and Service intelligence and programming staffs to ensure the MIP is properly displayed in Departmental data, budgets, and submissions to higher authority. Funds for Navy MIP support people and activities associated with various aspects of maritime intelligence to include: strategic, operational, and tactical plans and capabilities of foreign naval forces; foreign technologies, sensors, weapons, platforms, combat systems, cyber, and command, control, communication, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities; special collection and analysis for irregular and expeditionary forces; information technology and services; and cyberspace and cryptologic operations. Funds for USMC MIP support people and activities related to battlefield intelligence. MIP funds support Marine Air-Ground Task Force intelligence—which consists primarily of organic intelligence units supporting the tactical and operational intelligence requirements of Marine commanders. USMC MIP funded people include analysts who can conduct intelligence-related activities such as intelligence preparation of the battlefield, and target analysis. It also funds activities associated with GEOINT, SIGINT, CI and ISR. Members of the defense cryptologic community receive additional funds from the Information Systems Security Program (ISSP) for information assurance activities. Table 3 illustrates that a number of IC elements—CIA, ODNI, and IC elements at the Departments of Energy, Homeland Security, Justice, State and Treasury—receive NIP resources but no MIP resources. Other IC elements, such as DIA, NSA, and NRO have both NIP and MIP funding sources. While this report focuses on the NIP and MIP, it should be noted that there are other funding streams outside the NIP and MIP. For example, DHS/OIA also manages an intelligence-related program (neither NIP nor MIP) known as the Homeland Security Intelligence Program (HSIP). The HSIP is briefly examined in Appendix D . Members of the defense cryptologic community receive additional funds from the Information Systems Security Program (ISSP) for information assurance activities. The DNI has overall responsibility for intelligence support to the President and the day-to-day management of the IC. Both defense and nondefense NIP budgets are determined and controlled by the DNI, from budget development through execution (although the USD(I) acting on behalf of the Secretary of Defense is also key player in defense NIP budget development). E.O. 12333 directs heads of IC elements to provide the "programmatic and budgetary information necessary to support the Director in developing the National Intelligence Program." The Office of the DNI (ODNI), a staff of some 1,500 individuals, works to carry out the DNI's NIP-related responsibilities along with other responsibilities such as those associated with the National Intelligence Council and national intelligence centers (e.g., National Counterterrorism Center and National Counterproliferation Center). The position of DNI replaced the position of Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) such that the DCI position no longer exists. The DCI position was a triple-hatted arrangement in which the DCI simultaneously served as community manager, Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and chief intelligence advisor to the President. The IRTPA divided the DCI's three major responsibilities between two new positions—the Director of the CIA (DCIA) and DNI—making the new DNI community manager and principal advisor to the President, and leaving leadership of the CIA to the DCIA. The DNI was given greater budgetary authorities in conjunction with the NIP than the DCI had in conjunction with the NFIP in hopes that the DNI could use those authorities to better integrate the IC horizontally across IC agency lines, and vertically from the federal-level to the intelligence-related entities at the state, local and tribal-levels of government. The IRTPA strengthened the DNI's budget authorities (in relation to department secretaries) by providing certain powers to control spending and participate in the budget process. For example, the IRTPA: authorizes the DNI to "develop and determine" the NIP budget, based on budget proposals provided by IC elements heads and after obtaining the advice of the Joint Intelligence Community Council (JICC); directs the DNI to "monitor implementation," and "ensure the effective execution of the annual budget for intelligence and intelligence related activities;" stipulates that the Director of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), at the exclusive direction of the DNI, may direct ( apportion ) how congressionally appropriated funds will flow from the Department of the Treasury to each of the Cabinet-level agencies containing IC elements—to better ensure that the funds are spent as directed; stipulates that the DNI may allot appropriations directly, providing the DNI an additional opportunity to control spending at the sub-Cabinet agency and department level; requires the DNI to notify Congress if a departmental comptroller refuses to act in accordance with a DNI spending directive; provides the DNI with enhanced "transfer and reprogramming authority." permits the DNI, with OMB approval, to transfer or reprogram funds and personnel, but within certain limits; directs the Secretary of Defense to consult with the DNI before transferring or reprogramming MIP funds; directs the DNI to consult with the Secretary of Defense to ensure that defense NIP program budgets are adequate to satisfy the national intelligence needs of the DOD." stipulates that the DNI serve as the exclusive milestone decision authority on major IC acquisitions; and directs the DNI to determine, coordinate, and consolidate "services of common concern." Intelligence Community Directive (ICD) 104 provides additional information on the DNI's roles and responsibilities as program executive of the NIP. According to this policy document, the DNI duties include the following: designate NIP Program Managers; develop and determine the parameters of NIP programs; develop and determine the NIP budget, and in doing so: provide guidance to the heads of IC elements, receive guidance from the Cabinet secretaries who have IC elements in their departments, and from the DCIA; and manage NIP appropriations. The MIP is managed by the USD(I) in coordination with the DNI. Figure 2 illustrates their shared authorities. The IRTPA directed the DNI to (1) participate in the development of the MIP, and (2) provide guidance to MIP managers in the development of their annual MIP budgets. The IRTPA authorizes the Secretary of Defense to develop the MIP budget and directs him or her to "consult" with the DNI before transferring or reprogramming MIP funds. The MIP is managed by the USD(I) on behalf of the Secretary of Defense. The position of USD(I) was created in 2002 by then-Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld. The USD(I) was made "Principal Staff Assistant (PSA) and advisor to the Secretary of Defense and Deputy Secretary of Defense regarding intelligence, counterintelligence, security, sensitive activities, and other intelligence-related matters." The USD(I) position is dual-hatted —the incumbent acting as both the USD(I) within the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and Director of Defense Intelligence (DDI) within the Office of the DNI. When acting as the USD(I), the incumbent reports directly to the Secretary of Defense and serves as the Secretary's principal advisor regarding defense intelligence matters. When acting as DDI, the incumbent reports directly to the DNI and serves as his principal advisor regarding defense intelligence matters. Working together, the USD(I)/DDI and DNI oversee a number of interagency activities designed to facilitate the seamless integration of NIP and MIP intelligence efforts. Figure 2 illustrates their overlapping and complementary authorities. Figure G-1 ( Appendix G ) illustrates a number of the ways in which NIP and MIP integration takes place. The section in DOD Directive 5143.01 pertaining to the USD(I)'s role as "MIP Executive" lists the following responsibilities: provide perspectives and forecasts on threats and the impact of resource decisions, identifies priorities, proposes programmatic and fiscal guidance, and develop budget justification material; provide policy guidance and oversight to the DOD components within the MIP and NIP; coordinate with the ODNI to develop, synchronize, and implement annual NIP and MIP priorities; and consult and coordinate with the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer on MIP budgetary matters, and the DNI on MIP and NIP budgetary matters. Each military service dedicates resources to "Battlespace Awareness" (BA)—the ability to understand the disposition and intentions of potential adversaries as well as the characteristics and conditions of the operational environment. The USD(I) is responsible for policies and funds associated with the Battlespace Awareness Capability Portfolio. Capability portfolios represent one way in which the DOD manages its DOD-wide assets and activities in order to reduce overlap and duplication. The BA portfolio consists of systems or programs whose primary mission is not intelligence, but has a secondary mission to provide intelligence while conducting its primary mission. For example, the MQ-1 and MQ-9 aircraft have been procured by the Air Force for their strike capability, but their sensor suites collect intelligence before, during, and after the strike making it an "Other DOD" program of interest to the BA Portfolio. The BA Portfolio manager must consider these programs within the portfolio trade space, as their capabilities may be duplicative of MIP programs. Non-intelligence funds associated with the BA portfolio are classified and are not included in the NIP. (They are included in the DOD budget.) In 2014, then-USD(I) Vickers testified: "The BA portfolio includes significant additional resources. Defense Intelligence collectively encompasses the defense portion of the National Intelligence Program (NIP), the MIP and the BA portfolio." There is often confusion among IC professionals and observers over how the positions of Program and Component Manager are related to the positions of IC functional manager, IC element head, and other management titles. In fact, the same individual may wear all of these hats and more. The position titles confer different requirements and authorities. Table E-1 ( Appendix E ) provides a table listing IC leaders in terms of a number of their management titles. NIP Program Managers exercise daily control over the intelligence resources (manpower and dollars) associated with national-level IC capabilities in accordance with DNI guidance and policy. A Program Manager is responsible for the program's annual budget and oversees the expenditure of the funds allocated to the program. The Program Managers whose funds span several agencies consolidate and prioritize budget and manpower inputs. Intelligence Community Directive (ICD) 104 provides overall policy on the NIP budget process to include a description of the Program Manager's roles and responsibilities. MIP Component Managers are responsible for managing intelligence resources associated with tactical-level service-specific IC activities in accordance with USD(I) guidance and policy. Their specific management duties include: responding to guidance from the USD(I); aligning resources within in the MIP—i.e., adding, moving, removing programs, functions, and activities to and from the MIP; monitoring performance of doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel and readiness, and facilities for assigned tasks as they pertain to the MIP; and serving as a members of the ISR Intelligence Council (ISRIC). IC functional managers are associated with managing IC-wide intelligence disciplines like signals and geospatial intelligence—developing future capability requirements, plans, strategy, doctrine, policy, and directives for the entire intelligence enterprise. The IC-wide duties of functional managers may include advising other IC element heads on uniform policies and procedures, determining collection capabilities and gaps, and developing technical architectures. As an example, Robert Cardillo, Director of NGA has explained his functional manager responsibilities this way: As the functional manager for GEOINT, I oversee the formulation of current and future GEOINT requirements and evaluate the performance of sensor systems to meet those needs. As I look to the future, our task is less about finding the proverbial needle in a haystack, but finding — and then holding at risk — one particular needle in a stack of needles…. We must sustain the spatial and temporal access to ensure our customers understand and can respond to adversaries that continue to evolve and adapt. IC element heads, such as the Directors of NGA or DIA, are responsible for leading and executing the mission of their respective element. For example, the Director of DIA is responsible for ensuring that DIA is structured and manned sufficiently in order to satisfy the military and military-related intelligence requirements of the DOD and DNI. They support the Functional Managers by providing function-related information, coordinating new activities or significant changes to existing function-related activities. There are a number of other management titles within the IC that fall outside the scope of this report. For example, National Intelligence Managers (NIMs) serve as the principal substantive advisors on intelligence related to designated countries, regions, topics, or functional areas. The Director of DIA currently wears all five hats depicted in Figure 3 . As Program Manager for the GDIP, the Director of DIA consolidates input from DIA, the COCOMs, and the Military Services, to produce and justify one GDIP budget request, in accordance with guidance from the DNI, and then manages the execution of those funds once they are appropriated. As a Component Manager for DIA's MIP resources, he or she consolidates input from DIA and the COCOMs into one DIA MIP budget request, in accordance with guidance from the USD(I), and then manages the execution of those funds once they are appropriated. As Functional Manager for MASINT his or her focus is on ensuring that MASINT associated activities are standardized and integrated across the IC. As Director of an IC element, his or her primary focus is agency-centric, e.g., issues like DIA mission, organization and structure. As Joint Functional Component Commander for Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (JFCC-ISR), he or she is responsible for ISR allocation strategic planning globally. Management and oversight of intelligence programs is complicated by the fact that they are resourced through two separate budget processes—one entirely within the IC and one entirely within the DOD. The DNI manages the NIP budget through the Intelligence Planning, Programming, Budgeting & Evaluation Process (IPPBE) process; the MIP and its accompanying budget is managed separately by the USD(I) through the DOD's Planning, Programming, Budgeting, & Execution (PPBE) process. The key players in both systems must work in concert with to facilitate the integration of NIP and MIP intelligence efforts. The DNI's Chief Financial Officer and USD(I)'s MIP Resource Manager are particularly important to the process of creating the NIP Congressional Budget Justification Books (CBJBs) and MIP Congressional Justification Books (CJBs), respectively. Both sets of books consist of a number of volumes and are classified. They are submitted to the congressional authorizing and appropriating committees each year as part of the President's Budget. Table F-1 ( Appendix F ) summarizes a number of key elements of the IPPBE and PPBE to demonstrate important similarities and differences in the two processes. Figure G-1 ( Appendix G ) illustrates the process developed to integrate the two budget systems. The budget documents reflect IC and DOD intelligence-related priorities, as depicted in a number of strategy documents such as the Quadrennial Defense Review, National Security Strategy, National Military Strategy, National Intelligence Priorities Framework (NIPF) and National Intelligence Strategy. The NIPF is the IC's current classified system for rank ordering intelligence requirements. Overseers within the executive and legislative branches try to ensure analytically based, fiscally constrained resource decisions within the context of these types of overarching policy documents. Within the Executive Office of the President, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) issues fiscal guidance for agency budget development—as part of the normal federal budget process. Guidance on the NIP goes to the ODNI, and guidance on the MIP goes through the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) to the USD(I). Negotiations are at the NIP top-line level, not at the individual component level. OMB may also issue/negotiate guidance in key areas (e.g., counterterrorism, information sharing, cybersecurity, and so on.) OMB budget examiners review component budget submissions along with ODNI and USD(I) and ultimately provide guidance to the DOD and IC through passback . Once the budget goes to the Congress, OMB works with the agencies to defend their budgets while legislation is drafted, debated, passed and signed by the President. OMB may send Statements of Administration Policy (SAP) to Capitol Hill designed to shape the final contents of legislation. SAPs typically outline what the Administration likes least and most about pending legislation. OMB apportions funds that have been appropriated by Congress and reapportions when necessary. It reviews and approves agency transfers and reprogramming notifications, and holds mid-year execution reviews with ODNI and OSD. Recall from the earlier section on the DNI, that the IRTPA stipulates that at the DNI's exclusive direction, the Director OMB shall apportion the flow of congressionally appropriated funds from the Department of the Treasury to each of the Cabinet-level agencies containing IC elements. If an agency fails to comply with certain of the DNI's priorities, the DNI can withhold that agency's funding. The DNI is also authorized to "allot" or "allocate" appropriations directly at the sub-Cabinet agency and department level. If a departmental comptroller refuses to act in accordance with a DNI spending directive, the law requires that the DNI notify Congress of such refusal. OMB apportions funds to OSD where they go directly to the ODNI's Chief Financial Officer (CFO) (they pass through OSD to the ODNI). Prior to the creation of the intelligence committees in the 1970s, oversight of the IC relied on formal and informal communication and collaboration among disparate standing committees. Oversight responsibilities for intelligence in general, and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in particular, belonged primarily to the HASC and SASC. The HASC and SASC had legislative jurisdiction over all intelligence-related activities (national- or tactical-level). The SSCI and HPSCI were established in 1976 and 1977, respectively, to better integrate (not replace) the interests, responsibilities, and depth of intelligence-related expertise of all the intelligence-related standing committees and to respond to perceptions of widespread abuse by certain intelligence agencies. One goal was consolidated authority over the entire IC and enhanced collaboration among oversight committees. Another goal was continuous and "vigilant legislative oversight" over the IC to assure (1) "that the appropriate departments and agencies of the United States provide informed and timely intelligence necessary for the executive and legislative branches to make sound decisions affecting the security and vital interests of the Nation," and (2) "that such activities are in conformity with the Constitution and laws of the United States." Many committees have jurisdictional claims to oversight on IC-related topics, not only because IC elements are spread across so many separate Cabinet departments within the executive branch, but also because some IC-related topics challenge fundamental principles such as privacy and human rights. Currently, based on House and Senate rules, only the House Permanent and Senate Select Committees on Intelligence (HPSCI and SSCI), House and Senate Armed Services Committees (HASC and SASC) and House and Senate Appropriations Committees (HAC and SAC) either authorize or appropriate funding for IC programs. Committees like the Judiciary, Foreign Affairs/Relations, and Homeland Security Committees tend to draft freestanding, intelligence-related legislation. The Judiciary Committees take the lead on legislation concerning domestic surveillance that affects the policies and procedures of the entire IC—the USA PATRIOT Act, for example. The SSCI and HPSCI serve a similar function but are not mirror images of one another. They are different in numerous ways, to include organizational structure, membership, term limits, and their jurisdictions over intelligence budgets. In the years since their creation, the HPSCI and SSCI have had exclusive jurisdiction over authorizing the portion of the NIP budget that pertains to the CIA and the Office of the DNI (ODNI), but beyond those two areas, budget authorizing jurisdiction has been shared with the armed services committees. NIP funding is authorized in the annual Intelligence Authorization Act (IAA). Currently, the HPSCI asserts exclusive jurisdiction over the NIP but that is not true of the SSCI. The SSCI shares jurisdiction over defense NIP with the SASC. MIP funding is authorized as part of the HASC and SASC's annual National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) process. The HPSCI participates in the NDAA conference process on MIP-related matters, but the SSCI does not. MIP authorizations are included in the classified Schedule of Authorizations accompanying both the NDAA and IAA. The authorizing legislation passed by the intelligence committees has particular power with the IC agencies because the respective rules that established the intelligence committees provided that "no [appropriated] funds would be expended by national intelligence agencies unless such funds shall have been previously authorized by a bill or joint resolution passed by the Senate [and House] during the same or preceding fiscal year to carry out such activity for such fiscal year." In 1985, Section 504 of the National Security Act was tightened to require that appropriated funds available to an intelligence agency could be obligated or expended for an intelligence or intelligence-related activity only if "those funds were specifically authorized by the Congress for use for such activities." If and when intelligence authorization bills fail to pass, the IC relies on language in appropriation bills that both authorizes and appropriates funds, until such time as an authorization bill is passed; In terms of process, each year the House and Senate intelligence committees receive the NIP and MIP budget justification books (CBJBs and CJBs) from which they produce their respective versions of an Intelligence Authorization Act (IAA). Each committee produces an unclassified bill, an unclassified report, and a classified "Schedule of Authorizations" (included within the "Classified Annex," or simply "the Annex") that provide detailed guidance to the nation's intelligence agencies. The Annex contains the schedule of authorization budget numbers as well as committee guidance and requirements that directly pertain to the classified material and may not be disclosed publicly. Committee reports state that the Schedule of Authorizations "is incorporated by reference in the Act and has the legal status of public law." Both intelligence committees make the Annex available for review by Members of their respective chambers. Following passage of these bills, a conference process resolves the various differences between the House and Senate versions. In recent years the conference process has been informal—consisting primarily of staff-level discussions comparing the two versions of the bill and seeking common ground for settling whatever differences exist. After initial staff discussions, the House and Senate committee leaders may become involved. If these informal and unofficial conversations appear productive, they may continue until a tentative agreement is reached, even though no conference committee has yet been created. If the tentative agreement proves acceptable to other interested Representatives and Senators, a formal conference committee may be unnecessary. The IAA for FY2016 was remarkable in terms of final bill passage. It was signed into law as part of the "Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2016," P.L. 114-113 (Division M)—marking the first time in the history of congressional intelligence committees that the intelligence authorization act was part of an appropriations bill, not a freestanding intelligence authorization bill, debated as such, in both chambers of Congress. When the authorization and appropriation match, the IC budget community colloquially refers to it as an A & A ; when they do not match, it is an A not A . Discrepancies between what is authorized and what is appropriated ( A not A ) may reflect committee policy disagreements or may simply occur because the authorization and appropriation processes are separate. There is no conference process to resolve differences between the separate authorization and appropriation bills. The IC has a number of procedures in place to deal with authorization and appropriation discrepancies. For example: if the appropriation is greater than the amount authorized, the IC needs permission from the authorizers to spend the additional amount; if the appropriation is smaller than the amount authorized, the program may be able to operate at the level dictated by the smaller appropriation; and if the appropriation lacks any matching authorization , it will either be terminated or not allowed to begin, unless the agency is able to convince the authorizing committees to authorize the program retroactively. Based on the FY2017 President's Budget request, the IC programs discussed in this report currently equate to approximately $70 billion dollars (or roughly 11%) of national defense spending. Observers point to a number of issues that may affect the ability of IC and DOD leadership to make the best use of those resources. To conclude this report, this section addresses issues associated with IC-wide integration, transparency and balance. The IPPBE and PPBE processes are overseen, managed, organized and structured differently. For example, the PPBE relies on program elements as its basic building blocks while the IPPBE relies on expenditure centers. The PPBE is organized around the military services while the IPPBE is organized around capabilities. (See Appendix F for a side-by-side comparison of the IPPBE and PPBE.) It is unclear to what degree the integrated IPPBE/PPBE processes may help or hinder efficient management of IC programs but an illustrative example such as the joint IC/DOD acquisition of a common overhead satellite architecture suggests that the joint process makes efficient use of IC-related resources difficult at best. In the case of overhead satellite architecture, congressional overseers have repeatedly raised concerns for many years. A 2008 House Intelligence Committee report revealed its frustration with both the IC and DOD. It stated: [T]he Intelligence Community and DOD seem at odds with each other over satellite program requirements. Without adequately defining the requirements of the combatant commanders, the Air Force and Intelligence Community are forced to hit an ever-moving or invisible target in managing overhead program requirements. …. The competition between DOD and the Intelligence Community for mission-specific requirements must be better coordinated by the ODNI, USD(I) and USD(AT&L) [Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics]. The report found that programs jointly funded in NIP and MIP, "requiring joint decisions by the DNI and DOD, result in delayed program starts." Despite the findings and recommendations offered in the 2008 report, problems acquiring the overhead satellite architecture persist. The IAA for FY2016 ( P.L. 114-113 , Division M, §312) requires the DNI, in collaboration with the Secretary of Defense, and the CJCS, to develop a strategy, with milestones and benchmarks, to ensure that there is a comprehensive interagency review of policies and practices for planning and acquiring national security satellite systems and architectures, including the capabilities of commercial systems and partner countries, consistent with the National Space Policy issued on June 28, 2010. Where applicable, this strategy is to account for the unique missions and authorities vested in the DOD and IC. The provision has a lengthy explanation in the accompanying Senate Report. The views of Senators Warner, King, Rubio, Hirono, and Mikulski echo the HPSCI findings published in 2008: Satellite systems and architectures should also be designed in such a way that a number of elements common to multiple spacecraft could be standardized, to reduce costs, simplify execution and preserve a competitive industrial base; and the entire overhead satellite architecture of the United States, including programs funded by the Department of Defense or by an element of the intelligence community, commercial providers, and foreign partners, should be viewed and treated as an integrated whole, not simply as a series of independent and unrelated satellite systems. It is unclear how well the NIP and MIP programs are structured to handle IC-wide programs like the IC's information technology (IT) modernization effort—the IC Information Technology Enterprise (IC ITE). IC ITE is focused on providing a common IC desktop, secure online collaboration tools, and secure common cloud architectures. If all goes as planned, IC ITE will help the IC pool IT resources, cut costs, increase data storage capabilities, increase mission agility and efficiency, and increase the ability to protect all levels of data. However, IC ITE does not belong to any one agency, and is not a collection capability like the INTs. Thus adequate funding may depend more on voluntary contributions— a coalition of the willing —than on DNI budgetary authorities. As all resources are finite, money used for IC ITE means less money available for agency-specific priorities. Coalition of the willing is also heard in reference to agencies like DHS that contain a number of autonomous intelligence-related activities. While many DHS components are engaged in strategic intelligence activities, there is no mandated coordination of such activities within DHS because they are not NIP funded. Coordination and collaboration appears to be based more often on the relationships between key players than on department regulations. Total intelligence-related spending is almost impossible to calculate and its management and oversight is completely decentralized. IC funding alone is divided into two budget categories. The NIP and MIP are managed within the executive branch separately, justified to Congress separately, and overseen by congressional committees separately. IC programs fund only a portion of intelligence activities in the United States. Intelligence-related programs that are not part of the IC include, for example, the large Office of Intelligence within DHS's Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) division. The ICE Office of Intelligence is not included in the IC because theoretically, ICE activities primarily support the DHS mission to protect the homeland. The IC does not include state or local intelligence-related entities such as the New York Police Department's (NYPD's) Intelligence Division & Counter-Terrorism Bureau because of the NYPD's focus on domestic law enforcement. Furthermore, there is no one source that provides a list of all intelligence-related programs in the U.S. government. A 2008 RAND study written by IC expert Gregory Treverton includes a graphic that attempts to illustrate and link the hundreds of organizations spread across the federal government that comprise the Domestic Intelligence Enterprise . A 2010 investigation by Washington Post journalists Dana Priest and William Arkin reported that there are "3,984 federal, state and local organizations working on domestic counterterrorism." Priest and Arkin describe some of the difficulties associated with calculating the cost of such programs: The Department of Homeland Security [DHS], for example, does not know how much money it spends each year on what are known as state fusion centers, which bring together and analyze information from various agencies within a state.... [T]the bulk of the spending every year comes from state and local budgets that are too disparately recorded to aggregate into an overall total. Furthermore, congressional oversight is distributed across a number of committees. Committee interactions with IC officials occur generally in closed sessions for any discussion of program or operation specifics. Classified transcripts are maintained by the committees and are made available on a limited basis to Members of Congress. Since there is no automatic declassification system for congressional documents, it is unclear if, or when, such materials will become available to the public. There is a history of presidential and congressional oversight efforts to force the IC into compliance with federal financial accounting standards. IAAs and committee reports have contained a multitude of provisions along these lines since at least FY2002. The Senate report accompanying the IAA for FY2002 first stipulated that the financial statements of the NRO, NSA, CIA, DIA, and what is now the NGA to be audited by a statutory Inspector General (IG) or independent public accounting firm by March 1, 2005. In the Senate report accompanying its IAA for FY2010, the SSCI noted the following IC response: The bottom line is that more than ten years after the President called for action, and more than four years after the Committee anticipated receiving auditable statements, the five agencies are still unable either to produce auditable financial statements or receive favorable audit opinions on those that are auditable. The current projection for doing so is at least four years away. The Senate report goes on to urge the IC to ensure its accounts are auditable and to establish an IC-wide business enterprise architecture (BEA) and a consolidated financial statement for the NIP: Accordingly, the April 2007 plan has now been superseded by the imperative to construct a BEA, which makes the 2012 auditability timeline difficult or impossible to achieve for most agencies. Nonetheless, the Committee strongly supports this BEA work, which, if successful, will provide a stronger foundation for sustainable, financial auditability. Indeed, the Committee has repeatedly called for a BEA over the last four years. Section 322 of this bill is designed to empower the DNI's fledgling BTO [Business Transformation Office] to produce this business systems architecture.... Finally, the Committee believes that both the Congress and the DNI would benefit from the creation of a consolidated National Intelligence Program financial statement. Such a statement would provide valuable macro-level data and, once established, offer insight into financial trends within the Intelligence Community. The IAA for FY2014 ( P.L. 113-126 §309) directs the DNI and the Directors of the, CIA, DIA, NSA, NRO, and NGA to undergo full financial audits beginning with FY2014 financial statements. How well the agencies are meeting this requirement is unclear. In the end, Congress is often faced with having to balance resources (money and manpower) and priories across many competing demands. Are the resources (both money and manpower) and priorities of the IC appropriately balanced? In a worldwide threats briefing to Congress, current DNI James Clapper listed a number of national security issues facing the United States. These included: violent extremists, migration and displaced people, government instability, cyber espionage and other cyber-related threats, state-sponsored terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, and China's and Russia's nuclear missile force and anti-satellite missile programs. Theoretically, the funds dedicated to intelligence-related activities across the federal government should reflect a balance between these strategic priorities on the one hand, and resources on the other, but no one outside the IC knows how many resources are actually devoted to the many tasks at hand, or how well those resources are distributed and balanced between and within government agencies. The NIP budget funds intelligence capabilities that support national priorities. DNI Clapper has frequently remarked that his job is to prioritize and balance resources among competing demands. In a July 2016 interview he reiterated that view: One of the reasons we have DNI is to prioritize and keep some balance among all the competing demands that are placed on us [the IC] because in the end, there's a finite resource here. Every year the Congress gives us so many dollars and so many people that are appropriated to us. And those are numbers, and we have to allocate those across a whole variety of threats and concerns that people have. So it is not a trivial proposition to surge from this issue this week to surge to that one next week … and so one of the things I try to do is to try to … maintain some balance because there is just so much resource… and you have to attend to all of these threats … and everything is zero sum. So if you move resources in the Intelligence Community from one problem to another, there's no bullpen of relief pitchers waiting to go into the game here because everybody is occupied. The Congress doesn't give us extra bodies to just sit around and wait until the next surge. Appendix A. IC Collection Disciplines Appendix B. Intelligence Programs: In Brief Appendix C. CIARDS and ICMA The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Retirement and Disability System (CIARDS) and Community Management Account (ICMA or CMA) are seldom discussed in IC-related literature. They are unique IC programs because they were both created in statute, funding for each is disclosed in every Intelligence Authorization Act (IAA), and they are openly discussed in a number of congressional reports. For example, the IAA for FY2016 authorized an appropriation of $514 million for CIARDS and an appropriation of $516 million and 785 positions for the ICMA. CIARDS is also unique within the NIP because its costs are driven by the number of recipients eligible as opposed to mission requirements. CIA Retirement and Disability System (CIARDS) Overview The CIA operates various retirement systems that cover its employees: the regular civil service retirement system for the majority of its employees and CIARDS. The CIA's regular civilian service retirement system includes both the Civil Service Retirement System (CSRS) and the Federal Employees Retirement System (FERS)—employee coverage depending on date of entry into federal service and by type of job performed. All retirement benefits for CIA employees (CSRS, FERS or CIARDS) are administered by CIA, to protect employee personnel information. Most CIA employees first hired into federal service prior to 1984 are covered by CSRS and may be eligible for benefits identical to other CSRS covered employees in the federal government. However, certain pre-1984 CIA employees were covered by CIARDS. When Congress created FERS in 1986, CIARDS, like CSRS, was closed to new entrants hired in 1984 or later. Thus, the CIARDS account applies only to those CIA employees who were covered under CIARDS (i.e., first hired before 1984). As with other federal employees, all CIA employees who joined the agency after December 31, 1983, are covered by FERS. The FERS Act ( P.L. 99-335 ) provided for those CIA employees, who qualified for CIARDS-like retirement, by creating two special categories known as Section 302 and Section 303 employees (for the applicable provisions in FERS and the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement Act of 1964 for Certain Employees, respectively). Under FERS, Section 302 and 303 employees are eligible for retirement benefits similar to those available to federal law enforcement officers. Background The Central Intelligence Agency Retirement Act of 1964 for Certain Employees (CIARA) ( P.L. 88-643 , Title II) created CIARDS to meet the needs of certain CIA employees who were less likely than other federal employees to be in federal service long enough to qualify for CSRS retirement benefits. A Senate Armed Services Committee report accompanying CIARA explains that creating CIARDS not only addressed a CIA need, but also created equity with systems already in place for law enforcement professionals and Foreign Service officers: With respect to Central Intelligence Agency employees engaged in conducting and supporting intelligence activities abroad, it has been the experience of the Agency that because of the conditions of service, not all of these employees can anticipate serving the period of time required in order to retire under the civil service retirement provisions. A special retirement system is therefore needed in order for some of these employees to retire at an earlier age and with a less severe financial penalty than the present civil service system imposes. The precedents for this type of legislation may be found in the provisions now applicable to certain personnel of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and other Federal investigative and criminal detection activities, and the separate provisions now applicable to Foreign Service officers. Discussions concerning the original intent for CIARDS occurred in 1973, during hearings associated with amending CIARDS. According to testimony by then-DCIA James Schlesinger, the purpose of CIARA was to provide a retirement system for those CIA employees who are actually involved in supporting or conducting our U.S. intelligence operations abroad. As they become older and move into their early 50's, it is often not possible, because of the rigorous conditions of service, for them to usefully serve the further period of time that would otherwise be required to qualify them for immediate retirement under the normal civil services rules. During a House Armed Services Committee hearing on CIARDS, Representative Stratton recalled that CIARDS was set up "due to the special character of CIA work, it was possible that an individual might burn himself out, or might have his cover removed at an early age and therefore would be required to retire at an early age." According to one former CIA employee who is a current CIARDS beneficiary, the program was also used for other reasons to include (1) as an incentive for those CIA employees who elected to serve overseas, and (2) as compensation for those CIA employees whose work as field agents made them unsuitable for most types of post CIA employment. CIARDS Eligibility In order to participate in CIARDS, CIA employees had to meet the definition of CIARDS participant . As the law was originally written, selected CIA employees must have completed at least 15 years of qualifying service . Qualifying service, determined by the CIA Director (DCIA), included duties "in support of Agency activities abroad hazardous to life or health or… so specialized because of security requirements as to be clearly distinguishable from normal government employment." In 1992, Congress passed the "CIARDS Technical Corrections Act of 1992" as part of the IAA for FY1993 ( P.L. 102-496 , Title VIII) to update and restate CIARA. The 1992 version incorporated the many changes made between 1964 and 1992 mandated by statute, executive order, and necessity (e.g., the change from CSRS to FERS). Under the new legislation, CIA employees who have completed 5 years of qualifying service are eligible, and the definition of qualifying servic e has remained unchanged. CIA employees under CIARDS are eligible for retirement at age 50 with at least 20 years of service; or at any age with at least 25 years of service. These employees are also subject to mandatory retirement at the discretion of the DCIA. CIARDS Funding Most CIARDS participants make the required employee contribution of 7% of pay. For individuals who are covered by Social Security, employee contributions are offset by Social Security contributions. The required agency contribution on behalf of CIARDS-covered employees is set out in current law at 7.0% of pay for most participants. The DCIA manages the CIARDS Fund in the U.S. Treasury. CIA is responsible for the government's portion of the pension plan. Current law requires the DCIA to have actuarial calculations made of the funding status of the CIARDS Fund at least once every five years. These actuarial calculations are used to produce estimates of the annual appropriations needed to meet the normal cost of the CIARDS for each year minus the required employee contributions. The combination of CIARDS employee and agency contributions do not cover the normal cost of benefit payments. Therefore, the CIARDS Fund has accrued an unfunded liability and additional appropriations are required to (1) finance CIARDS benefit payments, which are mandatory entitlements, and (2) pay down the unfunded liability of CIARDS in order to maintain its solvency. Appropriations The appropriated payment of funds to the CIARDS is set out as an entitlement under 50 U.S.C. §2091(d) & (e). This funding has been part of annual appropriations acts since Fiscal Year 1977. The dollar amount in the IAA represents the amount of money the Congress has authorized the DNI to receive in order to meet the actual CIARDS pension payments anticipated in a given fiscal year. The appropriated entitlement payment of funds to finance the non-employee contribution portion of CIARDS was established in 1976, in statute titled, "An Act to amend the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement Act of 1964 for Certain Employees" ( P.L. 94-522 , Section 102). P.L. 94-522 also specified that annual appropriations to the CIARDS Fund were authorized to include amounts to pay down unfunded liabilities; more specifically, each fiscal year in such sums as may be necessary to provide the amount equivalent to (1) interest on the unfunded liability computed for that year at the interest rate used in the then most recent valuation of the System, and (2) that portion of disbursement for annuities for that year which the Director estimates is attributable to credit allowed for military service, not to exceed the following percentages of such amounts: 70 per centum for 1977; 80 per centum for 1978; 90 per centum for 1979; and 100 per centum for 1980 and for each fiscal year thereafter. Community Management Account The ICMA replaced an account used to support the DCI's Intelligence Community Staff (ICS) from 1972 through 1992.The ICMA was established in 1992 to support a Community Management Staff (CMS) created by then-DCI Robert Gates to coordinate cross-program activities, improve budget oversight, and strengthen community management. When the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (IRTPA) of 2004 ( P.L. 108-458 ) abolished the position of DCI and the DCI's CMS, it created the new position of DNI assisted by an ODNI. The ODNI absorbed the functions of the old CMS and gained new ones. Although the CMS was abolished, the CMA continued and is sometimes referred to as the ICMA. The ICMA funds expenditures associated with personnel and day-to-day activities of the organizational elements that make up the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI). Intelligence Community Staff The Intelligence Community Staff (ICS) was created in response to a 1971 directive from President Nixon, issued in response to recommendations made by then-Director of the Office of Management and Budget, James Schlesinger. President Nixon directed DCI Richard Helms to plan and review all intelligence activities, produce national intelligence, chair and staff all community committees, and reconcile intelligence requirements and priorities with budgetary constraints. DCI Helms responded, in part, by renaming and expanding the authority of the National Intelligence Programs Evaluation (NIPE) Staff—formalizing the name change to the "Intelligence Community Staff" on March 1, 1972. Language authorizing the IC Staff is included in the SSCI's first IC budget authorization bill from 1977. According to S. 1539 , Section 201(a): "There is authorized to be appropriated for the Intelligence Community Staff for fiscal year 1978 the sum of $8,950,000 to provide the support necessary to permit the Director of Central Intelligence to fulfill his responsibility for directing the substantive functions and managing the resources of the Intelligence Community." Language in the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) Report 95-214 is instructive in regards to committee intent as to the responsibilities of the IC Staff: The Intelligence Community Staff requested $10.5 million and 196 personnel in fiscal year 1978 to support the Director of Central Intelligence in fulfilling his responsibilities for overall management and direction of the intelligence community. This includes: (1) developing national intelligence requirements and priorities, (2) assessing the performance and quality of national intelligence collection and production activities, (3) improving the community's long-range planning process, and (4) monitoring the allocation and management of community resources. The IC Staff was authorized in subsequent IAAs, until 1992, when it was statutorily replaced with the previously discussed Community Management Staff (CMS) in the IAA for FY1993 ( P.L. 102-496 ). Community Management Staff The end of the Cold War prompted many efforts to reform and reorganize the IC. According to a 1992 House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI) report, the committee perceived a "lack of consistently exercised central management authority," and desired a DCI "ultimately accountable for the performance of its [the IC's] components." Then-DCI Robert Gates commissioned a number of task forces to review the operation of elements of the IC and make recommendations for change. Acting upon those recommendations, Gates abolished the ICS and created the CMS in order to: "Strengthen centralized coordination and management;" "Identify cross program trade-offs;" "Establish divisions of labor;" "Reduce unneeded or unwanted duplication of effort;" "Evaluate competitive proposals for investment from the Community;" "Look for efficiencies and cost savings;" "Manage the overall intelligence requirements process, to ensure coordination among the major collection disciplines;" and "Evaluate performance in satisfying policymaker needs for information." The new CMS was headed by an executive director for IC affairs, located within CIA headquarters, and unlike the ICS (which was staffed almost exclusively by CIA personnel), was staffed by employees from across the IC. The staff included the new position of open source coordinator who will catalog the entire intelligence community's open source (that is, unclassified) holdings, establish a comprehensive requirements system for acquiring new open sources, improve the sharing of such sources throughout the community, and work with the managers of the other types of intelligence collection to ensure that they do not spend time and resources collecting intelligence that can be collected openly. The IAA for FY1993 ( P.L. 102-496 , Section 104) endorsed DCI Gates's management decision by recognizing a new "Community Management Staff." According to SSCI Report 102-324, Section 104 authorizes appropriations and personnel levels for fiscal year 1993 for the Community Management Staff of the Director of Central Intelligence. This provision supersedes what had, in previous authorization bills, been the separate, public authorization for the Intelligence Community Staff. Pursuant to recent action by the Director of Central Intelligence, the existing Intelligence Community Staff was formally abolished, and many of its functions were dispersed to other elements within the Intelligence Community. To carry out the DCI's residual responsibilities for the Intelligence Community, the DCI created an Executive Director for Intelligence Community Affairs to head a smaller Community Management Staff located at CIA headquarters. Office of the DNI The IRTPA of 2004 ( P.L. 108-458 ) created the new position of DNI assisted by an ODNI. The ODNI absorbed the functions of the old CMS and gained new ones. The ICMA now funds the staffs of the DNI, the Principal Deputy DNI (PDDNI), Deputy and Associate DNIs, and all activities associated with the ODNI's mission and support activities (MSAs)—those offices and organizations directly responsible for providing IC-wide substantive intelligence, CI, strategic analysis, research and development, and training and education. Some of the larger MSAs include: Cyber Threat Intelligence Integration Center (CTIIC); National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC); National Counterproliferation Center (NCPC); National Counterintelligence and Security Center (NCSC); National Intelligence University (NIU); Intelligence Advanced Research Projects Activity (IARPA); and National Intelligence Council (NIC). A number of ODNI offices focus on IC-wide concerns such as acquisition, budget, human capital, policy and strategy, and systems and resource analysis. Oversight offices such as the General Counsel, Inspector General, and the Civil Liberties and Privacy Protection Office focus on IC-wide activities including compliance with U.S. law, investigating allegations of fraud, waste, and abuse, and other issues. Appendix D. Homeland Security Intelligence Program (HSIP) When the DHS Office of Intelligence and Analysis (OIA) was incorporated into the IC, there was no separate HSIP, although OIA's customers were extremely diverse. It was entirely funded through the NIP. In the words of Francis Taylor, the current Under Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis (DHS/I&A), "I&A has one of the broadest customer bases in the IC, ranging from the Secretary, to DHS policymakers and operators, to thousands of state and local officials and private sector partners—each of whom have different information classification requirements and limitations." In time, the DNI and DHS leadership argued that because OIA supported both an IC-wide mission and a department-specific mission, it needed both NIP funds to support DNI requirements, and separately controlled HSIP funds to support DHS requirements. In response, the congressional intelligence committees established the HSIP within DHS/OIA to include those "intelligence activities ... that serve predominantly departmental [DHS] missions." For example, some of DHS's cyber support, and some of the governance activities associated with the Homeland Security Intelligence Council staff have been funded with HSIP dollars. In S.Rept. 112-192 , accompanying the IAA for FY2013, the Senate Intelligence Committee stated its support of the concept, but maintained its jurisdiction over the HSIP: The OIA is currently funded through the NIP. The Committee supports the request of the Secretary and DNI to fund OIA through the NIP and a new HSIP but is continuing to study the question of whether other intelligence activities of the Department should be included in the HSIP. The Committee intends to continue oversight of and authorize the HSIP. The IAA for FY2015 ( P.L. 113-293 §324) requires the DHS/I&A to provide the congressional intelligence committees with a report on each intelligence activity of each intelligence component of the Department that includes, among other things, the amount of funding requested, the number of full-time employees, and the number of full-time contractor employees. In addition, Section 324 requires the Secretary of Homeland Security to submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report that examines the feasibility and advisability of consolidating the planning, programming, and resourcing of such activities within the HSIP. According to the Joint Explanatory Statement accompanying the IAA for FY2015: The HSIP budget was established to fund those intelligence activities that principally support missions of the DHS separately from those of the NIP. To date, however, this mechanism has only been used to supplement the budget for the office of Intelligence and Analysis. It has not been used to fund the activities of the non-IC components in the DHS that conduct intelligence-related activities. As a result, there is no comprehensive reporting to Congress regarding the overall resources and personnel required in support of the Department's intelligence activities. In summary, within DHS, the NIP budget funds activities within the OIA that support national-level, IC-wide roles and responsibilities. The NIP does not fund OIA department-specific activities. The NIP budget provides no funds to operate DHS intelligence activities such as its Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) Office of Intelligence because ICE is not an IC element. Because it is not part of the NIP, management of the HSIP does not belong to the DNI; it belongs to the Secretary of Homeland Security. Thus, the Secretary of DHS manages intelligence-related budgets (that fall outside the NIP) that include: department specific, intelligence-related activities of an IC component ; and intelligence-related activities of non-IC components within their departments. The same can be said of the Secretary of Defense, who manages the MIP and intelligence-related activities of non-IC components within the DOD. Other department secretaries, such as the Attorney General, and the Secretary of Treasury manage the intelligence-related activities of non-IC components within their departments, not the DNI. It is unclear how well the myriad of intelligence-related activities that fall outside the NIP or MIP are managed, coordinated or overseen on a day-to-day basis. Appendix E. IC Leaders and Selected Management Hats Appendix F. Budget Processes (IPPBE and PPBE) Appendix G. NIP MIP Program Integration Appendix H. Selected Acronyms 

Summary: Congress's and the American public's ability to oversee and understand how intelligence dollars are spent is limited by the secrecy that surrounds the intelligence budget process. Yet, total spending on the Intelligence Community (IC) programs discussed in this report equates to approximately $70 billion dollars—roughly 10% of national defense spending. This report is designed to shed light on the IC budget—in terms of its programs, management, and enduring issues—using unclassified materials available in the public domain. This report focuses those IC programs, grouped, for the most part, under two labels: (1) the National Intelligence Program (NIP), and (2) the Military Intelligence Program (MIP). Nevertheless, the combined NIP and MIP budgets do not encompass the total of U.S. intelligence-related spending. Intelligence-related programs that are not part of the IC include, for example, the large Office of Intelligence within the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS's) Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) division. The ICE Office of Intelligence is not included in the IC because, theoretically, ICE activities primarily support the DHS mission to protect the homeland. This report explains the management structure for the NIP and MIP to include their two separate budget processes and the roles of the Director of National Intelligence and the Under Secretary of Defense (Intelligence). The concluding section of this report considers the ability of the U.S. government to make the best use of its intelligence-related resources when: (1) total intelligence spending is impossible to calculate; (2) its management and oversight is completely decentralized; and (3) IC funding alone is largely divided into two categories (NIP and MIP)–managed within the executive branch separately, justified to Congress separately, and overseen by separate congressional committees. The Appendices are designed, in a number of cases, to provide quick reference tables summarizing the more detailed information available in the body of the report. Appendix A provides a summary of intelligence disciplines. Appendix B provides very brief explanations of NIP and MIP subordinate programs. Appendix C examines two unique and relatively obscure NIP programs, the Central Intelligence Agency's Retirement and Disability System and the IC's Community Management Account. Appendix D briefly describes a program called the Homeland Security Intelligence Program (HSIP). Appendix E provides a summary table of management hats. (Senior executives are often referred to as dual-hatted, triple-hatted, and so on, when they are charged with a number of different roles and responsibilities and associated titles.) Appendix F provides a summary table comparing the IPPBE and PPBE budget systems. Appendix G provides a figure illustrating the ways in which the IPPBE and PPBE are integrated. Appendix H provides a list of IC-related acronyms, many of which are commonly used in this report. For more on IC spending trends, see CRS Report R44381, Intelligence Community Spending: Trends and Issues, by [author name scrubbed].