The United States now has approximately 130,000 troops in Iraq and another 30,000 supporttroops in Kuwait, a force that some senior U.S. military officials believe stretches the country'scombat capabilities , especially in the event of a major crisis in Korea or elsewhere. The BushAdministration wishes NATO countries to send forces to Iraq to reduce the demands on U.S. forces,and to spread the costs of stabilization and reconstruction. Key allies acknowledge the possibilityof a NATO role, but first wish to see a new U.N. mandate and greater sharing of decision-makingwith both the U.N. and the allies. Some other allies appear to reject involvement in a U.S.-led force,as a NATO force would be, and prefer a force with a substantial U.N. role. In a broader context, unresolved issues from earlier disputes among the allies also intrude in the debate over possible NATO involvement. These issues include the causes of the war in Iraq, therole of the U.N. in NATO out-of-area operations, the military capabilities of the allies, and theeffects of Iraq's evolution on the Middle East as a whole. In addition, vestiges of a dispute overallied assistance to Turkey in February 2003 before the war with Iraq remain a cause for frictionbetween the United States and several allies. This section will first briefly review the debate in NATO over the last two years about alliedmissions outside Europe. It will then discuss several related issues, primarily those generated byallied disagreement over the reasons for war with Iraq, that affect any possible decision by Europeangovernments to contribute forces to stabilize Iraq. There follows a discussion of the evolution of theAdministration's position on its objectives for post-war Iraq and the necessary force levels to achievethose objectives. The section closes with an examination of how many European forces might beavailable for Iraq, and the relation of force levels to costs. NATO members agreed in principle in 2002 that allied forces might be sent beyond Europe to combat threats to member states' security. In May 2002, the allies agreed that "to carry out the fullrange of its missions, NATO must be able to field forces that can move quickly to wherever they areneeded, sustain operations over distance and time, and achieve their objectives." Several monthsearlier, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, when asked what NATO's area of operations shouldbe, responded, "The only way to deal with the terrorist network that's global is to go after it whereit is." On July 9, 2003, he told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that the Administrationwould "certainly want assistance from NATO and from NATO countries" in stabilizing Iraq. (1) Thosewho favor a NATO role in Iraq cite the recent precedent of the allied force in Afghanistan. TheInternational Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan has 4,800 troops, including a smallU.S. contingent, that came under NATO command on August 11, 2003. Its commander on theground is a German general. Its objective is to bring stability to Kabul. (An additional 9,000 U.S.forces, not under NATO command, continue combat operations outside Kabul.) In early October2003, NATO agreed in principle to extend the NATO force to the town of Kunduz. Before the conflict in Iraq, some Administration officials made a case for NATO involvement in post-war Iraq. They contended that only NATO had the capability for force generation,intelligence, and planning for a peace operation. NATO has had experience in Bosnia, Kosovo, andAfghanistan in leading stabilization forces. The bombing of U.N. headquarters in Baghdad onAugust 19 may signal a continuation of violent resistance to any outside entity, whether military orcivilian, be it NATO or the U.N. (2) NATO's agreement in principle to send forces outside Europe and the precedent of ISAF mask a range of issues that must be resolved before the European allies might send troops to Iraq. Someallied governments believe that the Bush Administration should have involved NATO more closelyin the conflict in Afghanistan in late 2001 to build an international political base for using militaryforce against terrorism. A more narrow range of allied governments believes that the Administrationoverrode their preference for allowing U.N. WMD inspections to run their course in Iraq in late 2002and 2003, that the Administration pushed aside the U.N. as a centerpiece for building aninternational coalition against the government of Saddam Hussein, and that the Administration wentto war precipitately, without establishing firm evidence of WMD in or Al Qaeda links to Iraq. In February 2003, several allies resisted a U.S. effort to send NATO forces to defend Turkey in the event of an attack by Iraq. They opposed such a move because they viewed it as anAdministration maneuver to imply NATO endorsement of the impending conflict with Iraq. Theseexperiences have led the allies to demand a greater share of decision-making and more authority forthe U.N. in Iraq before committing military forces to that country, issues that will be discussed ina later section of this report. (3) Both President Bush and Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld have previously said that U.S. forces in Iraq are adequate to stabilize the country and to accomplish Administration objectives there. InJune 2003, President Bush said that the United States has in Iraq "the force necessary to deal withthe security situation." On August 20, Secretary Rumsfeld said, "At the moment, the conclusion ofthe responsible military officials is that the force levels are where they should be." (4) Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz testified to Congress that the purpose of the U.S. occupation is to build "a free, democratic, peaceful Iraq" that will not threaten friends of the UnitedStates with "illegal weapons. A free Iraq that will not be a training ground for terrorists...[and] willnot destabilize the Middle East. A free Iraq can set a hopeful example to the entire region and leadother nations to choose freedom." He added that by bringing in military forces from other countries,U.S. forces could be drawn down. (5) On September23, 2003, in a speech at the U.N., President Bushsaid that "Iraq as a democracy will have great power to inspire the Middle East. The advance ofdemocratic institutions in Iraq is setting an example that others, including the Palestinian people,would be wise to follow." (6) There are views, some within the United States government, that contend that the force levels in Iraq cannot be maintained without severe stress on U.S. forces. The United States Army has 33active-duty combat brigades, of which only three are available today for new missions. Twenty-oneare overseas, including 16 in Iraq. A CBO study released September 3 found that the U.S. Armycould not maintain170,000-180,000 forces in Iraq and Kuwait past March 2004 without activatingmore National Guard and Reserve units, or calling upon foreign forces. General John Abizaid,CENTCOM commander, placed the figure at a lower level. He said that the United States could notsustain the current level of 130,000 troops without rotating active duty, reserve, and National Guardforces into Iraq by spring 2004, absent international forces to replace them. (7) Other estimates put the level of forces needed in Iraq at a higher figure than that given by the Administration. A Rand Corporation official has given an estimate of 300,000-500,000 troops.Former Army Chief of Staff General Eric Shinseki said that several hundred thousand troops wouldbe needed. Some of these estimates do not cite democracy and influence on regional governmentsto develop representative institutions as goals of the occupation; rather, they generally cite "stability"as the key objective. (8) One defense analyst providesa more sobering perspective, noting that the U.S.political as well as military strategy is deficient to bring stability to Iraq. In his view, the UnitedStates lacks properly trained forces, such as peacekeepers and military police, for the job; the essenceof Iraq's need is for civilian training for administrators and establishment of civil institutions, butIraq is now being administered by the Department of Defense, which is not prepared for such amission, according to this view. (9) NATO is providing a measure of assistance in Iraq to Poland, which has formed a multinational force that became operational in part of its originally assigned sector September 3. NATO's NorthAtlantic Council decided on May 21, 2003, to provide Poland allied assets for force planning,communications, logistics, and establishment of a headquarters. The operation is not technically aNATO operation. Poland leads a contingent of 9,000 troops from a variety of countries, some ofwhich are not NATO members, from north of Basra into the central part of the country. Thebombing of a major mosque in Najaf, which took the life of an important Shi'ite cleric, led the U.S.government to delay Poland's takeover of that city, which is in the Polish sector, for at least severalweeks. Some observers, while crediting Warsaw with a willingness to undertake a dangerousmission, believe that some of the forces are not trained to NATO standards. (10) The United States willpay Poland $250 million to cover primarily logistics and communication costs for its force. On August 26, 2003, NATO SACEUR (Supreme Allied Commander Europe) General James Jones floated the idea that the Polish-led force might eventually be expanded and transformed intoa NATO-led force, a step that would require the approval of all allies. (11) Several factors could limit the availability of forces from NATO countries. Several allies -- such as France, Italy, Britain, and Germany -- are already contributing to stability operations inBosnia, Kosovo, the Ivory Coast, and Afghanistan. NATO Secretary General George Robertson,who favors a NATO force for Iraq, has said that a maximum of 80,000 troops from European NATOcountries might be available. A more realistic figure might be in the range of 40,000-50,000, he said,given NATO governments' obligations in current operations. Another key factor that could affect contributions from NATO governments is the limited deployability and sustainability of most of their forces. Only Britain and France have a developedcapability for deploying and sustaining forces. Some allies, such as Germany, have large numbersof conscripts that serve short periods in the armed forces. Such troops are not suitable for servingin a stabilization force. (12) Cost is also a major factor in the effort both to stabilize Iraq and to involve allied governments there. If forces sent to Iraq could stabilize the country and allow the Iraqis to rebuild their economy,then an Iraqi government could eventually assume more of the expense of reconstruction over thelong term. Current operational costs for U.S. forces in Iraq are approximately $4 billion per month. Reconstruction costs would be in addition to this figure. For FY2004, the Administration has askedCongress for $20.3 billion for Iraq's reconstruction, and another for $51 billion for militaryoperations there. (13) Before the war, some Administration officials had predicted Iraq would stabilize quickly after the conflict, and have sufficient revenues to pay for its own rebuilding. On March 27, 2003, DeputyDefense Secretary Wolfowitz told Congress that "we are dealing with a country that can reallyfinance its own reconstruction, and relatively soon." (14) Such a situation might have produced anenvironment where a functioning Iraqi government could have borne more costs, sold industrialassets to private investors in and outside Iraq, and contracted to pay private companies to rebuild thecountry over time. The World Bank estimated in early October 2003 that Iraq would need $36billion through 2007, in addition to the $20.3 billion requested by the Administration, to rebuild. Iraqi oil revenues may reach an annual estimated figure of $14 billion in that period. (15) A donors'conference will be held in Madrid on October 23-24, where an estimated $2 billion will be pledged. European companies appear reluctant to enter Iraq until stability returns, and until a government viewed as "legitimate" is put into place. International oil executives, for example, are openlydoubtful of investing the $30-40 billion estimated to be necessary to rebuild Iraq's petroleumindustry unless there is a legitimate, popularly backed, government in Baghdad with which they cannegotiate contracts in a transparent process. (16) There is a gulf between Administration views and those of most allied governments on sendingEuropean forces to Iraq. There is also a range of views among allied governments. Key Europeangovernments, such as France and Germany, want a strong U.N. role in Iraq, and a new U.N.resolution to outline that role. Several important allies, including France, Germany, and Turkey,opposed the U.S. decision to use force against Iraq, and instead favored continuing the U.N. WMDinspections there. Some NATO governments do not want their forces to serve under U.S. command,especially under U.N. Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 1483, which gives the United States andBritain power as an "occupying" authority. Moreover, most European governments have objectivesthat differ from those of the Administration. In general, they do not believe that, in the currentcontext, building democratic institutions in Iraq and making Iraq a model for peaceful, representativegovernment that will inspire peace in the region, including settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict,are attainable objectives. They also place strong emphasis on multilateralism, and wish to see thegeneral stature of the United Nations enhanced. On the other hand, some allies, particularlycountries that joined NATO recently, support Administration policy, and wish to forge a long-termstrategic partnership with the United States. Administration officials had previously said that UNSC 1483 was sufficient for introducing a NATO or broader multinational force into Iraq. They continue to oppose any resolution that woulddilute the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), established by UNSC 1483 as the "occupying"power, or weaken U.S. military authority. Deputy Secretary of Defense Wolfowitz has said that anew U.N. resolution would be acceptable "provided it doesn't put limitations on what AmbassadorBremer [the U.S. official who heads the CPA] and our people can do in Iraq that are crucial forspeeding up transition to normalcy and allow us to hand over power to Iraqis...." (17) TheAdministration has drafted a new resolution that is now before the UNSC. The draft resolutionreportedly calls for a U.S.-led U.N. stabilization force, and for Iraq's U.S.- appointed GoverningCouncil, working with Ambassador Bremer, to submit a timetable for writing a constitution andholding elections. Secretary Powell said that under the draft resolution, Bremer would continue toplay "a dominant political role." (18) SecretaryPowell has also said that the Governing Council couldoversee drafting of a constitution by spring 2004, with elections by the end of 2004. The U.N. Security Council, which includes France, Russia, and Britain as permanent members with veto powers, has endorsed the current Iraqi Governing Council as a step towards providing theIraqi people real power. Germany is now on the Security Council as a rotating member, having avote but not a veto. The CPA chose the members of the Governing Council. Three governments-- France, Germany, and Russia -- issued a joint statement on May 21, 2003, in which they praisedUNSC 1483 because it gave the U.N. a measure of involvement; placed the action of the CPA underinternational law and limited the CPA's actions; and allowed the U.N. to monitor Iraqi oil revenues. At the same time, they described the resolution as only a first step, asked that the U.N. be given anincreased role, and that a "calendar" be established for putting in place "a legitimate andinternationally recognized administration in Iraq." In addition, they asked that contracts for thereconstruction of Iraq be opened to competitive bidding. (19) The British government's perspective on governing Iraq is in evolution. British forces were actively engaged in Iraq during the conflict. Britain commands a force of approximately 11,000troops in the southern part of the country, and is an "occupying power" under UNSC 1483. At thesame time, Britain has reportedly been more open to a greater U.N. role in Iraq than theAdministration, and a more rapid turnover of power to the Iraqis. London has a keen interest inending European divisions over policy towards Iraq. Britain has reportedly proposed that somemembers of the Governing Council should quickly form a provisional government, then form acommittee to draft a constitution, and prepare for national elections. British Prime Minister TonyBlair is under political pressure for his possible role in creating a dossier that appears to haveprovided misleading information to the House of Commons about weapons of mass destruction inIraq, although Blair insists that this was not intentional. Public support for Blair and for Britain'sinvolvement in Iraq has plunged since the end of the conflict. (20) Among the allies, France has the most explicit requirements for supporting a new U.N. resolution, although French officials say that they will not veto a new U.S. resolution. AmongFrance's conditions for supporting a new resolution are: The U.N. should play the "primary role" in "supplying humanitarian aid, supporting the reconstruction of Iraq, and assisting in the creation of an interim Iraqi authority."Secretary General Annan should replace Ambassador Bremer as the principal outside politicalauthority for Iraq. Iraq must have "a precise calendar" for a process of securing a legitimate government, with no involvement of an outside government or entity in an "arbitrary choice ofleaders." Such a government must be "legitimate" and "pluralist,"with a new constitution writtenunder U.N. auspices. The Governing Council and the cabinet that it has chosen could represent"sovereignty"; within a month, the Governing Council and the cabinet could name a provisionalgovernment. A personal representative of Secretary General Annan would report regularly to the Security Council on conditions in Iraq, and would advise the provisional government on aphased transfer of authority to it. A constitution could be drafted by the end of 2003, under U.N.auspices, and elections could be held in spring 2004. The United States could continue to head an international military force, under U.N. auspices, to bring stability to Iraq. There should be international supervision within international law of Iraqi oil production, "with a transparent mechanism that assures the Iraqi people that they will not bedispossessed of their riches." (21) While the French government has not explicitly opposed a NATO operation, it is clear that France prefers a force mandated by the U.N. with a clear mission. French President Chirac and GermanChancellor Schroeder contend that the U.S. draft resolution gives insufficient authority to the U.N.and to the Iraqi people. France has offered to train the Iraqi military and police, but has indicatedthat it will not send forces to Iraq, nor make a contribution to the donors' conference until atransparent international mechanism for accepting donors' funds is established. A range of views is evident in other countries. The German government has said that it might send troops to Iraq, but that they would not serve under UNSC 1483 because the resolution embodiesthe idea of an "occupying power." Some German officials say, however, that Berlin is more likelyto seek involvement in civilian reconstruction rather than to supply forces; such projects as assistingin institution-building, including a court system, or developing infrastructure such as water and oilpipelines, might be attractive to Germany. Norway has a strong tradition of sending peacekeepingforces, but its government does not want to be associated with the occupying force outlined in UNSC1483. (22) On October 7, 2003, Turkey agreed in principle to send forces to Iraq. The Bush Administration has reportedly asked Ankara for 10,000 troops. However, the Governing Councilopposes a Turkish contingent on the grounds that no neighboring country should send forces, andbecause the Ottoman Empire's control of Iraq until 1919 left a bitter legacy. U.S.-Turkish relationshave been strained since March 2003, when the Turkish parliament refused to allow U.S. forces todeploy to Iraq from Turkish territory. Some Bush Administration officials, including DeputyDefense Secretary Wolfowitz, sharply criticized Turkey as a result. (23) Ankara already has 5,000 troops deployed in northern Iraq to act against Turkish Kurdish elements that have committed acts of terrorism against Turkish interests. These forces are underTurkish, and not U.S., command. There has been tension between Turkish and U.S. forces innorthern Iraq. Foreign Minister GÃ¼l has said that there must be "a separate sector under Turkishcommand and a separate chain of command" if more Turkish forces are sent to Iraq. (24) The Spanish government strongly supported the Bush Administration's decision to go to war against Iraq and is now contributing peacekeeping forces. At the same time, Spain has beenimplicitly critical of current Administration policy in Iraq, particularly the Governing Council chosenby U.S. officials. Foreign Minister Palacio has urged immediate efforts to begin a constitutionalprocess in Iraq. "The process cannot be sequestered by the local interests of a small number ofIraqis, nor can it be imposed from without. Iraqis must be the main protagonists throughout.... Animpartial third party, preferably with the intervention of the United Nations, should identify thesestakeholders." (25) A number of NATO members have already sent or will send forces to Iraq. The Italian government will send 3,000 troops to create security zones, serve as military police, and search forweapons of mass destruction. (26) Several European allies, and virtually all the NATO candidate states, place strategic relations with the United States above considerations for a stronger U.N. role. While these governments maydesire a new U.N. resolution that encourages a broader role for multilateral institutions in Iraq, theybelieve that their own future security lies with close relations with the United States. As alreadynoted, Poland may eventually lead a force of approximately 22 countries, some of which are sendingsmall contingents. Polish officials would welcome a general NATO force in Iraq. Hungary and theCzech Republic, among current NATO members, also place great importance on an enhancedstrategic partnership with the United States, and have committed to sending small numbers of troops. On July 10, 2003, the Senate passed an amendment, offered by Sen. Biden, to the ForeignRelations Authorization Act, S. 925 , urging the President to request that NATO "raisea force for deployment in post-war Iraq similar to what it has done in Afghanistan, Bosnia andKosovo...." It also calls upon the U.N. to provide military and police forces "to promote security andstability in Iraq and resources to help rebuild and administer Iraq." The bill is pending in the Senate. In the House, Mr. Bereuter, Mr. Wexler, and Mr. Lantos proposed an amendment identical to theBiden amendment to H.R. 1950 . It was adopted, and the bill was passed on July 16. Members in both houses and both parties have called upon the Administration to send more U.S.troops to Iraq as well. Senator Lugar said on July 29 that "overall the United States mission in Iraqcontinues to hang in the balance," and added that "coalition efforts in Iraq must undergo furtherinternationalization to be successful and affordable." (27) The debate between the United States and some of its European allies over an enhancedEuropean role in Iraq poses a range of problems with important implications. The Administrationdesires international troop contributions, but on terms that do not dilute U.S. political and militarycontrol over Iraq. Administration officials wish to preserve pre-war political objectives: thedemocratization of Iraq; elimination of weapons of mass destruction and terrorist operations; anda residual moderating effect upon the rest of the Middle East, including possible settlement of theArab-Israeli conflict. Key Europeans allies, to some extent including Britain, seek an international force with a strong U.N. voice. Some of these allies doubt, and even disparage as unrealistic, the Administration's goalsof a democratic Iraq and a consequent moderation of Middle Eastern politics by these means. Theyhave openly doubted the existence of an active Iraqi WMD program and any significant connectionbetween the Hussein regime and terrorists. In a broader perspective, virtually all European allieswish to see international problems solved in a multilateral framework, and believe that theAdministration damaged this goal when it cut short U.N. inspections in Iraq and went to war. Thesegovernments wish to restore a measure of credibility to the use of multilateral institutions ininternational affairs. (28) For these reasons, someNATO governments are hesitant to send their troopsto operate under U.S. leadership in Iraq. The conflicting positions of the Bush Administration andthese allies on these points raises the question whether the Administration would alter its positionas a compromise to obtain the 45,000-80,000 European troops that might be available. Some allies, such as Poland and Norway, and most of the seven candidate states for NATO membership, support key elements of Administration policy in Iraq in part because they wish toforge an enduring strategic partnership with the United States. They do not believe that either theEuropean Union or the U.N. can provide for their own security, although EU membership is a vitalinterest for them. Poland, for example, had bad experiences with French (and British) securityguarantees before World War II, and the Warsaw Treaty Organization was an alliance imposed uponcentral Europe that was solely for the benefit of its leader, the Soviet Union. With such recenthistory fresh in their minds, many central European leaders wish to tie themselves closely to theUnited States, although they still wish to see a measure of U.N. involvement in Iraq that will supplyinternational legitimacy to their tasks there. France, most vocally, and Germany are in the forefront of countries calling for a strong U.N. presence and guidance in Iraq. The current French government has aspirations to lead an EU thateventually develops a military capability suitable at least to provide a measure of defense forEuropean countries. President Chirac advocates a "multipolar" world, with the European Unionacting as a pole to balance U.S. power. Few, if any, European governments have expressedenthusiasm about such French leadership and ideas, and many have sharply opposed them. Beyondaspirations for such leadership, France, joined by Germany, has a strong belief that tying themselvesto U.S. leadership in Iraq augurs ill for their relations with a future sovereign Iraqi government, (29) andrisks alienating a broad range of Arab states hostile to the U.S. occupation. France's call for a"pluralistic" government in Iraq is at least a step removed from the U.S. objective of a "democratic"government. France's position on this point is shared in most European capitals, and is likely moreacceptable to Arab governments as well. At the same time, in France, Germany, and other allied states, there are influential voices that do not wish to see the United States fail to bring stability and at least a measure of representativegovernment to Iraq. Several possible gains for European governments are apparent should amoderate Iraq, close to the United States, emerge: a chastened Iran, more hesitant in the pursuit ofweapons of mass destruction and promotion of Islamic radicalism; an intimidated Syria, morecautious in its interference in regional affairs and support for terrorism; and a peace process free ofan Iraqi government adamantly opposed to a settlement of Arab-Israeli differences. Failure of theU.S. effort in Iraq has potentially great negative consequences: further disaffection with U.S.leadership of NATO; a renewal of radical Islam in the Middle East, with regimes hostile to westerngovernments; and exacerbation of tensions in the Arab-Israeli peace process. For these reasons,these observers believe that European governments criticizing the United States should seek anaccommodation over Iraq with the Bush Administration. (30) A wide range of European officials appears to be seeking a compromise. Several options have been suggested. Such a compromise might provide the United States with overall leadership of aU.N.-approved administration and military force in Iraq, but with individual allies in command ofdifferent geographic sectors, as is the case, for example, in Bosnia and Kosovo. It might containelements of the French position, particularly a timetable for elections and establishment of an Iraqigovernment chosen by the Iraqi people or representatives of various groups in Iraq. In addition, thecompromise might include a transparent economic development regime that provides companiesfrom a range of countries access to contracts for reconstruction. Such a compromise could free U.S.forces for availability elsewhere; provide European (and other) governments with a voice in Iraq'sfuture, and legitimacy through a U.N. imprimatur; and shift part of the financial burden forreconstruction from the U.S. government to other governments and to the international privatesector. A key disadvantage for the Bush Administration might be the surrender of some of itspolitical objectives in Iraq, such as the quest for a democratic government, that would be a modelfor the region.

Summary: Bush Administration officials have said that they wish to see NATO countries contribute forces to bring stability to Iraq, possibly as part of a U.S.-led NATO or U.N. force. Key European alliessuch as France and Germany would first like to see a new U.N. mandate that would includeobjectives, such as a timetable for turnover of authority to Iraqis and a transparent process forimproving Iraq's petroleum industry, that the Administration now opposes. Some European alliesdo not wish to serve under a U.S. command in Iraq; other European allies already have troops in Iraq. Administration officials are concerned that greater international involvement in governing Iraq could deflect the United States from achieving some of its stated goals for that country's future. Such goals include establishing a democracy there that would influence other Middle Easterngovernments to follow a similar course, and easing of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Some Europeansargue that these goals are unattainable in the framework established by the U.S.-led occupation. Atthe same time, involvement of European forces, if a common outlook could be worked out, couldfree some U.S. forces for other missions, dampen international criticism of U.S. management of Iraq,and spread costs for reconstructing Iraq to other countries and the private sector. See also CRS Report RL31339 , Iraq: U.S. Regime Change Efforts and Post-War Governance , CRS Report RL31701, Iraq: U.S. Military Operations, and CRS Report RL31843(pdf) , Iraq: ForeignContributions to Operation Iraqi Freedom, Peacekeeping Operations, and Reconstruction . This report will be periodically updated.