RS20572 -- Indonesian Separatist Movement in Aceh Updated February 26, 2004 Aceh Merdeka (Free Aceh or GAM) came into existence in the 1970s and issued a declaration of independence in 1976. GAM is waging an insurgency with amilitary force estimated at 5,000. GAM's political goals appear to have substantial public support, especially forthe proposal to hold a referendum onindependence vs. union with Indonesia. However, some of GAM's tactics -- forced "taxation," kidnapping,assassinations of pro-Indonesian Acehnese, andcriminal activities -- have drawn criticism from Acehnese. GAM has a political organization throughout Aceh. Indonesian commanders in Aceh haveacknowledged that community leaders, religious leaders, and local government officials do not support Indonesiansecurity forces against the GAM. (2) GAM professes the aim of establishing Aceh as an Islamic kingdom but not as a fundamentalist Islamic state. Most of its arms reportedly come fromSoutheast Asian sources through supply routes in southern Thailand. Its official leader, Hasan de Tiro, is exiled inSweden. He is U.S.-educated, at ColumbiaUniversity in New York and Plano University in Texas. He describes himself as pro-U.S. GAM condemned theSeptember 11 terrorist attack on the UnitedStates and voiced support for the U.S. campaign against terrorism. (3) However, GAM attacked the Arun natural gas facilities of the U.S. company,Exxon-Mobil, and drew a warning from the U.S. State Department. GAM claims that Exxon-Mobil collaborateswith the Indonesian military (TNI) and iscomplicit in the human rights abuses committed by the TNI. (4) The causes of separatism and alienation in Aceh are a combination of four factors: (1) Aceh has a distinct history as an independent kingdom from the 15th century until thebeginning of the 20th century. It maintained diplomatic and consularrelations with several states, including Great Britain. It exchanged diplomatic notes with the United States. (5) In 1873, the Dutch invaded Aceh and conqueredit after a war that lasted until 1904. Hasan de Tiro is a descendant of the last Sultan, who was killed fighting theDutch. (2) There has been a progressive alienation of the population in reaction to the policies of successive Indonesian governments since Indonesia wonindependence from the Netherlands in 1949. The Indonesian government abolished the province of Aceh in 1950,prompting the first revolt of the Acehnese inthe early 1950s. In 1959, the Indonesian government declared Aceh a special territory with autonomy in religiousand education affairs, but the governmentnever implemented this special status. From the 1960s, Aceh was subject to increased centralization of power inJakarta under President Suharto. Revolts,aiming at independence, occurred in the 1970s and late 1980s. (3) Extensive human rights abuses by the TNI have been documented. Military abuses of civilians reportedly became common from the 1970s to the present. Abusive tactics have included the murder, torture, and arbitrary arrests of politically active Acehnese (especiallythose who advocate a referendum), members ofnon-government organizations (NGOs), and human rights workers. Retaliation is a major source of abuses. Inresponse to GAM attacks and ambushes,military units often enter nearby villages and summarily execute residents, usually the male residents. Some of theseexecutions reportedly are unprovoked byGAM. (6) The TNI reportedly extorts money from localbusinesses as payment for "protection." (4) Aceh's wealth has gone to the central government. By the 1970s, discontent arose over the flow of wealth from Aceh's natural resources. Upwards of80-90% of this wealth has gone to Java, Indonesia's most populous island and the center of Indonesian politicalpower. (7) This prompted dissident Acehnese toclaim that Aceh was the object of Javanese colonialism, which had replaced Dutch colonialism. Indonesian policies toward Aceh have been influenced by three factors since the fall of the Suharto government in May 1998. One is the weaknesses in thegovernments that followed Suharto. They have been coalitions of individuals and groups with little or no priorgovernment experience or little experience intop decision-making levels. The same is true of the parliament elected in June 1999. Second, the Indonesian bodypolitic remains resentful over the loss ofEast Timor, blames the United Nations and foreign governments rather than Indonesian policies, and is determinedthat Aceh will not separate. The third is therelationship between the new governments and the military since Suharto's fall. Civilian leaders have tried to exertcontrol over the TNI with minimal success. The TNI retains authority over policy in Indonesia's outer islands and resists the central government's attempts toassert its authority in these places, includingAceh. The TNI leadership favors a policy of crushing the rebellion by military means, and it is suspicious ofnegotiations with GAM. It has pressed severaltimes since 1999 for the imposition of martial law in Aceh, which would give the TNI unquestioned authority overthe province. The government's political response includes an offer of autonomy to Aceh. In early 2001, the parliament passed a special autonomy law for Aceh. It providesthat Aceh will receive 70 percent of the revenue from the province's natural resources. It gives the provincialgovernment the right to impose Islamic sharia law(but sharia reportedly is not popular among many Acehnese). It provides for local elections. However, the specialautonomy law has not been implemented. The provincial government has not passed needed implementation legislation. According to a report by theInternational Crisis Group in July 2003, the centralgovernment controls all policies and programs in Aceh, and revenue from Aceh's resources goes to the TNI. Theprovincial government is considered to becorrupt; it is accused of siphoning off economic aid and humanitarian aid funds that pass through it. (8) The government also negotiated with GAM. The talks have been held under the auspices of the Henry Dunant Center, a Swiss organization. Negotiations since2000 produced several cease-fires, which quickly broke down. The talks made little progress on key political issues. The government holds that GAM mustaccept the special autonomy law. GAM contends that negotiations can take up special autonomy but must also takeup GAM's proposal of a referendum on thequestion of independence. GAM holds that there should be an international role in the settlement of the Acehquestion; the Indonesian government opposes arole by other governments or the United Nations. These issues were key to the breakdown of the cease-fire signed in December 2002. The truce provided for TNI and police units to withdraw from specifiedpositions. GAM would turn over its arms in specified locales under supervision of the Henry Dunant Center andThai and Filipino military monitors. GAMagreed to refrain from advocating independence. Political negotiations were to ensue. The cease-fire initiallyreduced violence. However, it began to breakdown after February 2004. Independent observers agreed with the TNI accusation that GAM used the cease-fireto rearm and reorganize. GAM cadrereportedly propagandized among villagers that independence would soon be achieved. GAM delayed turning overarms to the international monitors. The TNIrefused to withdraw from the specified forward positions. Offices and automobiles of the international observerswere arsoned; most observers accused the TNIof these acts. The Indonesian government, under apparent pressure from the TNI, took uncompromising positionsin negotiations. It demanded that GAMrenounce independence and accept special autonomy "within the framework of the unitary state of the Republic ofIndonesia." It refused to offer GAM a role asa political party. In May 2003, the TNI arrested five GAM negotiators who were preparing to fly to Tokyo, the siteof talks. (9) They were subsequentlysentenced to 12-15 years imprisonment. In the spring of 2003, the TNI held a meeting of over 48 commanders in Aceh. The apparent aim was to pressure the government to end the cease-fire and givethe TNI full authority, including authority over the police. On May 18, 2003, President Magawati declared martiallaw in Aceh for six months. The TNI andthe police deployed 45,000 troops into the province. Security forces gained control over major towns and the mainroads; security improved in these locales. GAM guerrillas reportedly dispersed into smaller units "all over Aceh," according to TNI Commander GeneralEndriartono Sutarto. (10) On December 31, 2003,the police commander in Aceh stated that since the imposition of martial law, 580 GAM members and 470 civilianshad been killed; 50 soldiers and 26policemen had been killed. The TNI earlier had claimed over 1,000 GAM members killed, apparently includingcivilians killed in the GAM figure. InNovember 2003, President Megawati extended martial law for another six months. The government also set forthpreconditions for negotiations, that GAMmust disband and accept "special autonomy." GAM called for a European government to mediate the conflict. With martial law, the TNI closed off Aceh from contact with outsiders with a few exceptions under TNI control. Foreign journalists were denied access to theprovince and were prohibited from contact with GAM. Cellular telephones were blocked. The TNI expelled foreignaid workers until December 2003 whenfive United Nations organizations were allowed access. Foreign human rights groups were denied access. The TNI also subjected Indonesian and Acehnese human rights groups to pressure and intimidation. This was part of a broad pattern of TNI and police humanrights abuses that were reported. The State Department's human rights report for 2003 stated regarding Indonesiathat "Human rights abuses were mostapparent in Aceh province." The report attributed to the TNI killings, beatings and torture, rapes, and arbitraryarrests of people for voicing pro-independenceviews. (11) Indonesian human rights groups,including the government's Human Rights Commission, made similar allegations, describing the forcible evacuationof 40,000 people, mass graves, and TNI orders for people to fly the Indonesian flag. The international organizations,Human Rights Watch and theInternational Crisis Group, issued similar reports. Former Indonesian President Abdurrahman Wahid declared thatthe "basic rights of the Acehnese have beenput aside" by the TNI. (12) GAM also was criticizedfor abuses, including the burning of schools, kidnappings, extortion, and killings of civilians. U.S. policy developed within the context of three broader policy objectives toward Indonesia that came out of East Timor's separation in 1999 and the fall ofthe Suharto government. The first was to support political evolution in Indonesia towards democracy. The secondwas to support Indonesia's territorialintegrity -- to reassure post-Suharto leaders that the United States would not repeat its East Timor policy of 1999towards other parts of Indonesia where therewere separatist movements. The third, advocated by the Pentagon and the U.S. Pacific Command, was to restorelinks between the U.S. and Indonesianmilitaries, which had been cut because of the East Timor situation. The U.S. war against terrorism added a policy priority of securing Indonesian cooperation against terrorism. This did not conflict with the three existing policygoals but reinforced them. The Bush Administration worked hard to restore links between the U.S. and Indonesianmilitaries and institute counter-terrorismtraining programs for the Indonesian police and the TNI. In August 2002, Secretary of State Colin Powell announceda $50 million package of such programs. The Clinton and Bush administrations have tried to influence the Aceh situation but in ways that would prevent Aceh from worsening U.S.-Indonesian relationsand reducing the possibilities of anti-terrorism cooperation. The United States urged GAM to accept specialautonomy within Indonesia. It supportedcease-fires; retired Major General Anthony Zinni reportedly played an important mediating role in the negotiationof the cease-fire of December 2002. TheUnited States tried to persuade the Indonesian government on several occasions against the imposition of martiallaw in Aceh and work instead for a politicalsolution; this diplomacy included the dispatch of National Security Council official, Karen Brooks, to Jakarta in July2003, a statement by Deputy Secretary ofDefense Paul Wolfowitz (former U.S. Ambassador to Indonesia) to Indonesia's Defense Minister in Singapore inMay 2003; and a tripartite statement withJapan and the European Union in November 2003. The Bush Administration has resisted Indonesian pressure todeclare GAM a terrorist organization underU.S. law. The State Department criticized TNI human rights abuses, including extensive criticisms in its 2003human rights report. However, high level BushAdministration officials refrained from public criticism. President Bush apparently did not raise Aceh during hisvisit to Indonesia in October 2003,concentrated exclusively on cooperation with Indonesia against terrorism and the case of Americans killed in Papuain August 2002. (13) The Administrationalso opposed a human rights lawsuit in U.S. courts filed by the International Labour Rights Foundation against theU.S. Exxon-Mobil Corporation forcomplicity in human rights abuses by TNI units guarding the company's natural gas installations in Aceh. (14) Congressional-imposed prohibitions on U.S. arms sales to Indonesia also affect the U.S. role in the Aceh situation. These restrictions, in the form of the "Leahyamendment" to foreign operations appropriations legislation, have existed since 2000 in reaction to TNI abuses inEast Timor. Foreign operations legislationfor FY2004 demands that the Indonesian government act against members of the TNI who abuses human rights. Aceh is not mentioned; but these provisionswould appear to apply to TNI abuses in Aceh. In addition to the U.S. priority to terrorism, another limitation on U.S. policy on Aceh is the low U.S. influence in Indonesia. Polls show a substantial majorityof Indonesians critical of the United States because of the U.S. invasion of Iraq and strongly supportive of themartial law policies in Aceh. The Indonesiangovernment and the TNI reportedly calculated that the U.S. war on terrorism and attack on Iraq would make theUnited States less critical of martial law inAceh. The government imposed martial law during the U.S. invasion. Anti-U.S. sentiment appears to be strongin the TNI. General Ryamizard Ryacudu, TNIChief of Staff, declared to TNI senior officers that future U.S. training of TNI personnel would be unnecessary andcounter-productive. (15)

Summary: Indonesia faces a major separatist insurgency in the province of Aceh in northernSumatra. The Indonesiangovernment has proposed autonomy for Aceh, but insurgents demand independence. Negotiations and cease-fireshave been unsuccessful. Indonesian civilianleaders have been unable to control the Indonesian military, whose aggressive actions in Aceh produce frequentreports of human rights abuses and alienation ofthe populace. The Bush Administration has urged Indonesia to seek a political settlement; but it has been hesitantto deal with the military's actions and seeksrenewed ties with the military in order to cooperate against terrorism.