Pakistan is a key front-line ally in the U.S.-led anti-terrorism coalition, and the BushAdministration has expressed satisfaction with ongoing Pakistan-U.S. cooperation in this area. (1) Top U.S. government officialsregularly praise Pakistan and its leadership for their "fine efforts" in joint counterterrorismoperations, most recently with the capture of suspected Al Qaeda leader Khalid Mohammed in thePakistani city of Rawalpindi on March 1, 2003. Yet the bilateral relationship has come undersignificant strain in recent months due to signs of growing U.S. frustration with the continuedexistence of Islamic militants both along the Afghan-Pakistani border and infiltrating intoIndian-held Kashmir; doubts about the commitment of Pakistan's intelligence service to Islamabad'sstated anti-terrorism policies; widespread anti-American sentiment in Pakistan; reports of allegedPakistani nuclear proliferation activities; continued perceived anti-democratic practices in Islamabad;new U.S. immigration regulations; and continued antagonistic relations between Islamabad and NewDelhi. One senior observer reports that U.S. frustration with Islamabad grew alarmingly high in thelatter months of 2002. (2) At the same time, suspicion of and resentment toward the United States is reported to be spreadingrapidly throughout Pakistani society. (3) A sense of the difficulties faced in pursuing U.S. policies inPakistan's conservative Muslim western regions can be found in the March 2003 assertion by thespokesman for Pakistan's largest Islamist party that captured alleged Al Qaeda leader KhalidMohammed is a "hero of Islam" and that there is "no reason to believe that Al Qaeda really exists." Many Pakistanis reportedly believe that September 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States werea ploy by Israel designed to cause anti-Muslim backlash. (4) For several years, analysts have discussed the potential dangers toPakistan and its people's civil liberties represented by increased Islamization there. (5) There are newer concerns thatU.S. military action in Iraq may fuel Islamic radicalism in Pakistan; March 2003 witnessedanti-U.S./anti-war marches in Karachi, Lahore, and other cities organized by Islamist political partiesand involving as many as 250,000 demonstrators at a time. (6) After the September 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States, a previously poor bilateralrelationship with Pakistan was quickly improved. On September 22, 2001, President Bush lifted allremaining nuclear proliferation-related sanctions on Pakistan (and India). The Congress then passed,and the President signed into law, S. 1465 ( P.L. 107-57 ) in October 2001. With thislaw, Congress exempted Pakistan from all sanctions related to democracy and debt-arrearage forFY2002, and granted the President authority to waive such sanctions through FY2003. PresidentialDetermination 2003-16 exercised this authority for FY2003 on March 14, 2003. Members of the 107th Congress introduced several Pakistan-related bills that were not votedupon, including one that would authorize the President to reduce or suspend duties on Pakistanitextiles ( S. 1675 ); one that would repeal the President's authority to waive economicsanctions and end assistance to Pakistan as a country whose elected head of government was deposedby military coup ( H.R. 5150 ); and one that would require Presidential certification ofPakistan's successful efforts to halt cross-border terrorism into India, that the country's nationalelections are conducted freely and fairly, and that waivers on aid restrictions would facilitate bothU.S. anti-terror efforts and the transition to democratic rule in Pakistan ( H.R. 5267 ). During the final months of 2002, in response to reports alleging Pakistani assistance to NorthKorea's covert nuclear weapons program, a Member of Congress urged reinstatement ofproliferation-related aid restrictions pursuant to P.L. 106-79 , Title IX. A similar call was taken upin another Member's February 2003 request that the Bush Administration take "immediate steps" toban all military sales to Pakistan and reimpose proliferation-related sanctions under Â§669 of theForeign Assistance Act of 1961 (the Symington Amendment). However, in March 2003, the BushAdministration announced that it had "carefully reviewed the facts relating to the possible transferof nuclear technology from Pakistan to North Korea and decided that they do not warrant theimposition of sanctions under applicable U.S. laws." (7) Members of the 108th Congress may confront more proliferation- and democracy-related aidissues with regard to Pakistan, as questions about Islamabad's possible nuclear technology transfersand about levels of democratic governance in Pakistan continue to surface. (8) Pakistan's enthusiastic desireto purchase U.S.-made weapons is likely to be an area of continuing congressional interest. Trade-related legislation may again arise, especially in the area of textile duties. (9) U.S. assistance to Pakistanrose steeply after September 2001, from about $10 million in FY2001 to more than $1 billion inFY2002. P.L. 108-7 includes authorization for Pakistan to use $188 million in FY2003 EconomicSupport Funds to cancel approximately $1 billion in concessional debt to the U.S. government. TheBush Administration is requesting bilateral assistance to Pakistan in the amounts of $305 million forFY2003 and $395 million for FY2004. (10) Prior to the September 2001 terror attacks on the United States, and especially afterIslamabad's 1998 nuclear tests and 1999 military coup, U.S. relations with Pakistan had becomemarked by discord and distance. After the attacks, and under intense diplomatic pressure, PakistaniPresident Gen. Pervez Musharraf made a swift decision to end his government's support for theTaliban regime in Afghanistan and join the U.S.-led anti-terrorism coalition. The United States andPakistan now share pressing interests in the region. These chiefly are related to ending Islamicmilitancy that continues to wreak terror and destruction in South Asia and elsewhere, and that posesa threat to the continued existence of moderate government in a nuclear-armed Pakistan. The policy reversal by Musharraf took place without the full support of the country's Islamiccitizens or its military and intelligence organizations. Islamabad subsequently has asked the UnitedStates for military equipment, aid, and other forms of security cooperation to both assist in theanti-terror campaign and in an effort to maintain balance with India's conventional forces. WithinPakistan, however, a negative political reaction is fueling anti-government and anti-Americansentiment that may jeopardize longer-term U.S. interests in the region. A further complication is that the massive U.S. bombardment of Afghanistan's Tora Boraregion in late-2001 and Operation Anaconda in Afghanistan's eastern Shah-i-Kot mountains inMarch 2002 apparently prompted two waves of up to 5,000 Al Qaeda fighters fleeing intoPakistan. (11) Pressreports indicate that Pakistan has been allowing the United States to conduct low-level military ormilitary support operations in Pakistan's western border regions since April 2002. (12) U.S. efforts to pursuecounterterror operations in Pakistan are complicated by alleged assistance given to the Taliban, AlQaeda, and indigenous Pakistani terrorist groups by elements of Pakistan's powerful Inter-ServicesIntelligence agency (ISI). (13) Anti-terrorism operations may meet further obstacles if recentlybolstered Pakistani Islamist political parties succeed in exerting their anti-American influences onthe country's foreign policy orientation. The United States continues to make large aid donations to Pakistan and to support thatcountry's interests in negotiations with international financial institutions. President Bush andSecretary of State Powell commonly refer to the Islamabad regime as a "crucial ally." Yet there areconcerns that 2002 national elections in Pakistan were not sufficiently free and open by Westernstandards and that the military-dominated government in Islamabad intends to remain in powerthrough manipulation of constitutional and democratic processes. This possibility has led someMembers of Congress to seek the renewal of aid restrictions until such time that a more robustdemocratic process is sustained and a civilian-led government is effectively in place. (14) At the same time, the very democratic process encouraged by the United States may bringto power Islamist political groups that do not share some key U.S. interests and concerns. There isalso possibly growing anti-American sentiment in Pakistan, and the potential "re-Talibanization" ofthat country's western provinces bordering Afghanistan could lead to a reduction of Pakistan-U.S.cooperation in counterterrorism efforts, thereby harming U.S. interests in the region. (15) Some Islamist membersof Pakistan's national assembly have warned U.S. forces to stay out of areas near the border withAfghanistan, and the provincial government of one such region recently dropped the criminal chargesthat had been brought against hundreds of Pakistani citizens for taking part in anti-U.S.demonstrations last year. (16) It was reported that, following Pakistan's October 2002 elections and the ascension of anIslamist coalition there, U.S. officials presented to the Islamabad government three policy priorities:1) a preference that the Islamists not be included in the ruling national coalition; 2) that provincialgovernments being run by Islamist politicians not be allowed to interfere with ongoing anti-terroroperations involving U.S. personnel; and 3) that the basic understanding between the United Statesand Pakistan -- agreed to between Secretary of State Powell and President Musharraf on September14, 2001, and guaranteeing full Pakistani cooperation with the U.S.-led anti-terror campaign -- "mustcontinue unhindered." (17) This report reviews the current status of Pakistan-U.S. anti-terrorism cooperation in the areasof law enforcement, intelligence, and military operations. U.S. arms transfers to and securitycooperation with Pakistan are also discussed. A following section addresses the major domesticrepercussions of Pakistan-U.S. counterterrorism efforts, the ways in which such efforts are perceivedby newly-empowered Pakistan Islamists and their followers, and the possible effects these dynamicsmay have on future Pakistan-U.S. cooperation in this realm. The final section assesses the overallstatus of Pakistan-U.S. anti-terrorism cooperation and key points of U.S. concern. Pakistan historically has demonstrated inconsistency in its efforts to reign in Islamic militantsoperating inside its borders. The United States has long been aware of the existence of outlawedgroups both in Pakistan-held Kashmir and within Pakistani cities. The government of neighboringIndia continues to call Pakistan the "epicenter of global terrorism." In July 2000 testimony beforethe House International Relations Committee, a senior U.S. counterterrorism official calledPakistan's record on combating terrorism "mixed," noting that "Pakistan has tolerated terrorists livingand moving freely within its territory" and is believed to have provided "material support for someof these militants, including the Harakat ul-Mujahidin, a group that [the United States] hasdesignated as an FTO [Foreign Terrorist Organization]." The official pointed to the role played byIslamic religious schools, or madrassas, some of which "inculcate extremism and a violentanti-Americanism in their students." (18) Pakistan's tolerance of and support for hardline Islamists in both the country and the regionhas been rooted in ethnic Pashtun ties that cross the Afghani-Pakistani border and in formerPresident Gen. Zia ul-Haq's moves to strengthen Islamists during the 1980s. President Musharraf'ssweeping policy shift away from Islamic extremism began with the severing of all official ties tothe Taliban in September 2001 and culminated in a landmark January 2002 speech in which hevowed to end Pakistan's use as a base for terrorism of any kind, criticized religious extremism andintolerance in the country, and banned numerous militant groups, including Lashkar-e-Taiba andJaish-e-Muhammad (both blamed for terrorist violence in Kashmir and India). (19) The Islamabadgovernment also instituted sweeping police reforms, upgraded its immigration control system, andbegan work on new anti-terrorist finance laws. In the wake of the speech, about 3,300 extremistswere arrested and detained, though at least one-third of these have since been released, including thefounders of both Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Muhammad. (20) American military successes in Afghanistan in the final months of 2001 apparently ended theexistence of Al Qaeda as a coherent entity in that country. Yet the first half of 2002 saw increasingindications that the group -- along with its Taliban cohorts -- was making progress in regrouping,first in the tribal western regions of Pakistan and later in major urban centers. By late-2002,intelligence analysts believed that Al Qaeda had established a new base of operations in thesprawling city of Karachi, Pakistan's most populous. In early-2003, President Musharraf shifted hisprevious stance and opined that Osama bin Laden himself may be in Pakistan. (21) In response, U.S. law enforcement agencies, led by the F.B.I., began in early 2002 to provideactive assistance to Pakistan in its effort to hunt terrorists and their allies. The number of U.S.counterterrorism agents in Pakistan has been reported at between "several dozen" and "the lowhundreds." (22) WhileU.S. officials claim that the involvement of American agents in field operations and raids has beenquite limited, senior Pakistani officials have indicated that F.B.I. agents participated in numerousraids, where they "carry guns" and "help us break down doors." (23) Yet a spokesman for thePakistan Foreign Office stated in April 2002 that there exist "no independent F.B.I. offices inPakistan," and Pakistan's interior minister repeatedly has claimed that F.B.I. operatives are notinvolved in hunting Al Qaeda supporters in Pakistan. (24) Director of Central Intelligence Tenet is reported to have made at least one trip to Pakistanafter September 2001, and the Islamabad government is said to be cooperating with the C.I.A. in theongoing hunt for Osama bin Laden, Mullah Omar, and other top-level Islamic militantfugitives. (25) There havebeen some concerns raised that U.S. counterterrorism agents, by working in tandem with Pakistanisecurity organizations that have been accused of human rights abuses including extralegaldeportation and torture, may share responsibility for any such abuses that may be occurring. (26) December 2002 pressreports suggest that "stress and duress" techniques used by the C.I.A. to interrogate suspected AlQaeda and Taliban members may be abusing human rights. New York-based Human Rights Watchhas written a letter to President Bush calling for an investigation into what the rights group allegesmay be the use of torture by U.S. officials. (27) The February 2002 kidnaping and subsequent murder of Wall Street Journal reporter DanielPearl is believed to have spurred an intensified U.S. focus on law enforcement in Pakistan and effortsto assist local security forces in tracking and capturing Islamic militants in that country's urbancenters. Al Qaeda is believed by U.S. officials to have assisted Pakistani militants in carrying outtwo deadly car bombings in the spring of 2002: a May attack that killed 14, including 11 Frenchmilitary technicians, and a June explosion that killed 12 Pakistani nationals outside the Americanconsulate in Karachi. Al Qaeda links also are suspected in numerous other violent anti-Western andanti-Christian attacks in Pakistan. (28) On May 8, 2002, senior U.S. government officials from several executive-branch agencieshosted the first meeting of the U.S.-Pakistan Joint Working Group on Counterterrorism and LawEnforcement. Pakistan's Minister of Interior, Moin Haider, led the Pakistani delegation. The twogovernments discussed a broad range of bilateral law enforcement issues, including counternarcotics,counterterrorism, extradition, money laundering, trafficking in persons, demand reduction and drugabuse control, alternative development and poppy eradication, police and legal system reform, andissues related to the repatriation of Pakistani nationals detained in the United States in connectionwith immigration proceedings. (29) The two governments agreed to strengthen their cooperation ineach of these areas, and ensuing trips to Pakistan by Deputy Secretary of State Armitage andCoordinator for Counterterrorism Taylor marked a continuation of this process. Officials from theU.S. Departments of State and Justice met with Pakistani counterparts in Islamabad in September2002, and another full meeting of the U.S.-Pakistan Joint Working Group on Counterterrorism andLaw Enforcement is slated to take place in Washington in April 2003. (30) In November 2002, then-U.S. Treasury Secretary O'Neill met with top officials in Islamabadto discuss Pakistan's ongoing efforts to halt terrorist financing. He stated that Pakistan was "leadingthe world" in the fight to eradicate money-laundering, but some officials are more pessimistic. (31) Islamabad has taken actionagainst at least 185 of the 247 U.S.-designated entities operating on Pakistani territory, and has takenits own initiative to detain operatives and designate active groups suspected of financing terroristactivities. Yet Pakistan's legal and regulatory structures remain insufficient for a fully effectiveanti-terrorism financing regime, especially with an inability to monitor the activities of foreigncharities, and the newly seated Assembly has yet to enact a proposed money laundering bill. U.S.officials continue to encourage stricter oversight and regulation, and the United States has agreedto provide technical assistance and training to Pakistani customs and finance officials as part of thiseffort. (32) Supplemental FY2002 U.S. aid to Pakistan included $73 million in International Narcoticsand Law Enforcement (INCLE) Emergency Response Funds that continue to be used in FY2003 forborder security and related law enforcement efforts. (33) The United States reportedly has supplied numerous instrumentsto bolster Pakistani security forces, including five used transport helicopters, 750 short- andlong-range radios, and 434 vehicles (trucks, tractors, SUVs, and motorcycles) to increase mobility. During her December 2002 visit to Islamabad, Assistant Secretary of State for South Asia Roccaannounced the provision to Pakistan of some 8,000 pieces of sophisticated communication andsurveillance equipment worth more than $4 million. The equipment is to be used in efforts to trackdown suspected terrorists and those involved in drug trafficking. Also, the United States isundertaking to train Pakistani police investigators and is helping to establish a national fingerprintdatabase modeled on that of the F.B.I. In March 2003, the United States disbursed to Pakistan $10million for the Criminal Information Database, along with nearly $20 million more for road-buildingprojects in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas. The roads are expected to improve access forlaw enforcement and security personnel, as well as bolster the region's economy. (34) In what may become the most ambitious integrated national identification system everinstalled, the United States reportedly is supplying to Pakistan the Personnel Identification SecureComparison Evaluation System (PISCES). This computer software is said to make real-timecomparisons of photographs and other personal details with the F.B.I. database in order to track themovements of Islamic militants. The ultimate aim is to monitor travelers entering or leavingPakistan at all 18 major transit points. The system is reported to be in place at Karachi, Islamabad,and Lahore airports, and is expected to soon be operational at airports in Quetta and Peshawar, aswell. (35) It is through the provision of intelligence that American agents are reported to be makingtheir greatest contributions to such operations as those noted below. (36) The interception andtracing of satellite telephone transmissions has been a key tool in joint U.S.-Pakistani efforts tocapture fugitive Taliban and Al Qaeda forces in Pakistan. American agents also closely monitoremail and other Internet traffic for signs of terrorist communications. The F.B.I. is reported to havetrained and equipped a number of former Pakistani army officers and others in what is known as the"Spider Group," an informal intelligence-gathering unit that is especially focused on monitoring theactivities of Pakistani Islamist groups. (37) U.S. government efforts to assist Pakistan with counterterrorism and law enforcement haveproduced many positive results. U.S. law enforcement personnel are reported to have played vitaland direct, if low-profile roles in each of the following operations: (38) In March 2002, Abu Zubaydah, believed to be Al Qaeda's field commander,was shot and captured while trying to flee a raid in the Pakistani city of Faisalabad. He is said tohave provided abundant intelligence to American authorities. Also that month, an F.B.I. agent wasasked by the Pakistan government to provide sworn testimony to help in the prosecution of DanielPearl's kidnappers. Finally, in the eastern cities of Faisalabad and Lahore, a major raid netted 26suspected Al Qaeda and Taliban fugitives. In June, 8 suspected members of banned extremist organizations were capturedin Lahore. In July, 10 "Arab mujahideen" -- alleged escapees from Kohat -- were arrestedin Hyderabad. In August, an office used by Harakat-ul-Mujahideen, a group linked to AlQaeda, was raided, resulting in the arrest of 12 suspected militants and the seizure of explosives andother incriminating evidence. In September, Ramzi bin al-Shibh, said to be a key figure in the planning ofthe September 2001 terror attacks on the United States, and Sharib Ahmad, the most-wanted militantin Pakistan and alleged organizer of the June 2002 car bomb attack on the U.S. consulate in Karachi,were both apprehended. Later in the month, two Algerian nationals believed to be Al Qaedamembers were arrested in Karachi, bringing to 10 the number of Algerians apprehended over atwo-day period. In October, a raid on a refugee camp near Peshawar netted four suspected AlQaeda operatives. Days later, a pre-dawn raid on another refugee camp led to the capture of fivesuspected militants wanted in connection with a spate of terror attacks on Pakistani Christians, aswell as Khan Mohammad, said to be security chief for renegade Afghani warlord GulbuddinHekmatyar. Later in the month, FBI agents interrogated a physician who admitted to treating Osamabin Laden and collaborating with Al Qaeda in Afghanistan. In December, two tribesmen from Pakistan's South Waziristan Agency werehanded over to U.S. agents for interrogation for their alleged involvement in an attack on a U.S.military camp in Afghanistan. Later in the month, a joint raid by Pakistani police and F.B.I. agentsnetted 9 suspected Al Qaeda operatives, including two naturalized Americancitizens. In January 2003, Pakistani police and F.B.I. agents arrested three suspected AlQaeda operatives after a gunfight on the outskirts of Karachi. Computers, grenades, and $30,000in U.S. currency were recovered. Among the nine suspects arrested in December was a Pakistanidoctor, Ahmed Khawaja, who is named in January, and then charged along with his brother inFebruary, as having provided material assistance to numerous Al Qaedafigures. On March 1, Khalid Mohammed, alleged mastermind of the September 2001terrorist attacks and close associate of bin Laden, was arrested along with two cohorts in a pre-dawnraid in Rawalpindi. The efforts of U.S. communications specialists reportedly were key to locatingthe suspects. Seized at the scene were computer and communications equipment that are said toprovide a "trove" of valuable data on Al Qaeda's methods of operations, support networks, andfinances. One week after, 10 Al Qaeda suspects were arrested in Peshawar, including one believedto have had recent contact with Osama bin Laden. Later in March, police arrested alleged Al Qaedafinancier and communications operative Yassir al-Jaziri in Lahore. This arrest appears to haveprovided leads resulting in the arrest of 6 more suspected Al Qaeda militants near Lahore and twoin Peshawar on March 17. The arrest of Khalid Mohammed in early March spurred heightened speculation that Osamabin Laden's capture was imminent. The White House called Mohammed's capture a "joint operation"between Pakistani and U.S. authorities and President Bush expressed his "deep appreciation andgratitude to President Musharraf and to the government of Pakistan" for their "fine efforts" incombating terrorism. (39) In the wake of the announced capture, rumors abounded that the ISI had known of Mohammed'swhereabouts for weeks or even months before and that they may have staged the videotaped seizurethat was shown to reporters. (40) In mid-March, Pakistan's intelligence agency claimed to havecaptured 442 foreign nationals suspected of terrorist activities and to have remanded 346 of theseto U.S. custody (at least 36 have been transferred to other countries and more than 50 releasedwithout charge) since September 2001. (41) Pakistan has served as a vital basing and transit point for Operation Enduring Freedom, theU.S.-led anti-terror mission in Afghanistan. According to the U.S. Department of Defense, Pakistanis providing basing and overflight permission for all United States and coalition forces engaged inAfghanistan. The airbase near Jacobabad has been vital to U.S. military operations in the region, andthe airport of Dalbandin, near the Afghan border, is a key forward operational base. More than57,000 U.S. military sorties have originated on Pakistani territory. U.S. military personnel reportedlyhave installed extensive radar facilities at three Pakistani airfields, allowing for coverage of the entirePakistani airspace. Pakistan also deployed more than 115,000 regular and paramilitary troops alongthe tribal belt bordering Afghanistan and Iran in support of U.S.-led efforts to capture Taliban andAl Qaeda fugitives (many of the regular army troops were redeployed to the Pakistan-India borderduring a 10-month period of heightened tensions between Islamabad and New Delhi from December2001-October 2002). Some 45,000 Pakistani troops were reported to be actively supportingOperation Enduring Freedom as of October 2002. (42) Reports indicate that U.S. special operations soldiers and C.I.A. paramilitary agentsparticipate in operations on Pakistani territory at the company-level (small teams of Americanspecialists accompany much larger Pakistani units). (43) These reports are not confirmed by either Washington orIslamabad, as both governments make no official statements about such joint operations. Thepresence and activities of U.S. military personnel in Pakistan is a subject of great sensitivity in bothcapitals. Officially, there is only a handful of U.S. troops operating on Pakistani territory. In orderto blend in with Pakistani military units, American special forces personnel are said to all be ofmedium-height, Pashto-speaking, and wearing Pakistani Army uniforms. (44) A July 2002 press report stated that more than 3,500 Al Qaeda operatives crossed intoPakistan while fleeing U.S. military operations in neighboring Afghanistan. There is continuingconcern that these militants intend to establish a permanent presence in Pakistani cities. (45) In August, a U.S. militaryassessment estimated the presence of up to 1,000 Al Qaeda fighters in Pakistan, spurring the topofficer of the U.S. Central Command, Gen. Tommy Franks, and Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld tosuggest that the successful continuation of his Afghanistan mission would require expanding U.S.military operations into "neighboring countries." (46) His statement was met with adamant Pakistani assertions thatany U.S. troop presence on their territory is "out of the question" given the professed sufficiency ofongoing Pakistani security operations. (47) U.S. military operations in Afghanistan extremely close to thePakistan border and employing thousands of troops have been ongoing. (48) In this mountainousregion, the location of the international border is not always clear, but there remain no confirmedopen-source reports of large-scale American troop movements or aerial sorties in Pakistaniterritory. (49) Pakistani government officials have issued contradictory statements on the issue of AlQaeda's presence in their country, but many have flatly denied that Al Qaeda forces have enteredPakistan in any but the smallest numbers. In September 2002, a senior Pakistani security officialclaimed that his forces had "broken the back" of Al Qaeda in the country, (50) but more recentpronouncements have been less assured: after acknowledging that Al Qaeda members are in hidingthroughout the country, the chief of Karachi's police investigation department stated in December2002 that Al Qaeda is "down, but not out" in Pakistan. It is estimated that up to 5,000 Al Qaeda andTaliban fighters are still on the loose in the North West Frontier Province (NWFP) alone. (51) Press reports in early 2003 suggested that Al Qaeda and Taliban forces have regrouped onPakistani territory near the Afghani border in preparation for spring offensive operations againstU.S.-led coalition units in Afghanistan. (52) More recently, however, the chairman of the Senate IntelligenceCommittee claimed that the March arrest of Khalid Mohammed likely would preclude any plannedAl Qaeda offensive, and a U.S. military spokesman was quoted as saying he does not expect a springoffensive by Al Qaeda because he does not think there is "that much spring in them." (53) Almost immediately upon joining the U.S.-led anti-terrorism coalition in September 2001,the Pakistani government sought compensation for its support, primarily through economic aid, debtforgiveness, and renewed access to sophisticated U.S. weaponry. The transfer to Pakistan of U.S.military equipment was ended in 1990 when then-President Bush could no longer certify thatPakistan was not pursuing a nuclear weapons program. U.S. economic sanctions triggered byPakistan's May 1998 nuclear tests and October 1999 military coup were waived by President GeorgeW. Bush and new legislation in October 2001, (54) spurring Islamabad to present Washington with a "wish list" thatwas reported to have included a variety of missiles, artillery and rocket launching systems, unmannedaerial vehicles, and the release of previously purchased F-16 jets. An unnamed Pakistani defenseministry source was quoted as saying, "We want the kind of relationship the United States has withEgypt in terms of weapons sales." (55) In the lead-up to his January 2003 visit to the United States,Pakistani Foreign Minister Kasuri urged the United States to "take steps to reduce the conventionalweapons disparity" between Pakistan and India as a means of halting a nuclear arms race in SouthAsia. (56) There have been numerous foreign press reports, along with Pakistani and Indian governmentofficials' claims, that Islamabad has secured deals for the purchase of major U.S. weapons platforms,including F-16s fighter jets, P-3 maritime surveillance aircraft, and Harpoon anti-ship missiles. Yet,as of late March 2003, the Bush Administration has notified Congress of only two pending transfers: the first, dated July 16, 2002, involves seven used C-130E transport aircraft (one being for spareparts); the second, dated July 26, 2002, is for six Aerostats -- sophisticated, balloon-mountedsurveillance radars. These mark the first noteworthy arms sales to Pakistan in more than a decadeand reportedly are intended to support Islamabad's ability both to move troops quickly and to detectinfiltration (thus aiding in counterterror operations). Pakistan lately has emphasized a perceived need to bolster its air forces, if not throughacquisition of new F-16s then at least through the receipt of spare parts and weaponry for its existingfleet of 1970s-era F-16A fighters (many of which are grounded for want of maintenance andmunitions). (57) Whilemost of Pakistan's arsenal is of Chinese origin, major U.S.-made weapons systems include P-3 Orionand C-130 Hercules aircraft, Harpoon and Stinger missiles, and 155mm howitzers. PastU.S.-imposed sanctions have caused many of these systems to become inoperable. (58) The long-moribund Pakistan-U.S. Defense Cooperation Group (DCG) -- created to overseea bilateral defense relationship that has existed since the 1950s -- met in Pakistan in late September2002. This was the first such meeting since 1997. The two-day session included discussions amongworking groups on military cooperation, security assistance, and anti-terrorism. A joint statementissued by the DCG reports that the meetings "served the purpose of providing a forum to exchangeviews on security matters and, in Pakistan's case, share with the United States its views of its securityenvironment." (59) October 2002 saw the first joint U.S.-Pakistan military exercises in nearly five years, withapproximately 120 soldiers from each country coming together in Pakistan for "Inspired Gambit III." U.S. Central Commander Gen. Tommy Franks witnessed the event. As with recent joint U.S.-Indianmilitary exercises, an emphasis was placed upon increasing interoperability in weapon systems andtactics. (60) NumerousPakistani press reports in early 2003 claimed that further joint exercises were being planned, butthese reports are not confirmed by the U.S. government. U.S. assistance to Pakistan undersecurity-related programs includes $396.5 million distributed in FY2002, $56.5 million allocated forFY2003, and $120 million requested for FY2004. (61) As a current rotating member of the UN Security Council (UNSC), the Pakistani governmentfaced a dilemma in addressing early-2003 discussions related to Iraq. Islamabad's external role asa key U.S. ally and member of the U.S.-led counterterrorism effort came up against powerfuldomestic opposition to Pakistan's participation in or condoning of a war against another Muslimcountry. So great were the countervailing pressures that most analysts foresaw a Pakistani abstentionon a potential UNSC Res. 1442, but the vote never came. Upon the initiation of U.S.-led militaryoperations against Iraq in March 2003, Islamabad called the war "unjustified" and vowed to opposeit in all fora, while nearly all Pakistani opposition parties -- religious and secular, alike -- wereharshly critical of U.S. policy. (62) November 2002 saw the formation of a fragile, pro-Musharraf ruling coalition in Islamabad,and President Musharraf ostensibly has turned day-to-day governance of the country over to civilianpoliticians. (63) Thecomposition and actual level of influence exerted by the National Assembly and Prime MinisterZafarullah Jamali may have significant impact on future Pakistan-U.S. security relations in generaland on U.S. counterterrorism efforts in South and Southwest Asia in particular. Thus far, the newcivilian government in Islamabad has stated that it will "fulfill all its commitments to theinternational community in the fight against terrorism" and that "the policies initiated by PresidentPervez Musharraf will be continued." (64) A rough estimate indicates that regional anti-terrorism effortshave caused the Pakistani economy losses in excess of $10 billion since October 2001. (65) President Musharraf's cooperation with U.S.-led anti-terrorism efforts is widely recognizedas placing him in a precarious circumstance between external pressures to uphold pledges toeliminate Al Qaeda, Taliban, and Kashmiri separatist militants operating from Pakistani soil on theone hand, and internal pressures to maintain foreign policy independence, support for Kashmirifreedom, and even Islamic cohesion on the other. A February 2003 report indicates that Musharrafsurvived at least 6 assassination attempts during 2002, and notes that the risk of a coup staged by"senior-ranking" Pakistani military officials who disapprove of his relationship with the West cannotbe ruled out. (66) Thelatter development could place Pakistan's nuclear arsenal of up to 75 warheads in the hands ofIslamic extremists. In March 2003, large-scale street demonstrations organized by Islamist parties,combined with persistent calls by opposition political figures that Musharraf drop his "illegal"package of constitutional amendments and resign his post as Army Chief, are said by many to bemaking the Pakistani government "extremely uncomfortable." (67) The escalation of U.S. military involvement in anti-terrorism operations in western Pakistanapparently has brought some positive results and probably keeps Al Qaeda and Taliban remnantsoff-balance, but a negative political reaction within Pakistan is fueling anti-government andanti-American sentiments that may jeopardize longer-term U.S. interests in the region. An apparentbreakdown of the long-standing autonomy of Pakistan's tribal zone along the border withAfghanistan, combined with an unprecedented U.S. military presence in the country, is reported tobe causing increased anger and resentment among the ethnic Pashtun majority there. Likewise, thepresence of American law enforcement agents in Pakistani cities is seen to be having similar effectsamong middle- and upper-class urban Pakistanis. The Islamabad government has attempted to assuage this negative political response. Pakistani ballistic missile tests in early October 2002 were viewed as both a pre-election messageof continued hawkishness vis-a-vis Kashmir and India, and a demonstration of foreign policyindependence from the United States, given Washington's expressed displeasure at any signs of armsrace dynamics in the region. The presence in Pakistan of U.S. law enforcement and militarypersonnel, and the arrest and extradition of several Pakistani nationals, have spurred frequentexpressions of sovereignty concerns, especially by leaders of the Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA),a coalition of six leading Islamist parties. In late-2002 and early-2003: the president of the Peshawar Bar Association described Pakistan as havingbecome "a U.S. colony;" senior legal figures in Baluchistan have complained that F.B.I. operations inthat region are "clear violations of the Pakistani constitution;" MMA Secretary-General Maulana Rehman made a declaration of "jihad againstAmerica that has stationed its forces in Pakistan to do away with oursovereignty;" top MMA chief Liaquat Baloch demanded that all Americans living in Pakistanshould be fingerprinted and tested for AIDS; the MMA vice president stated that police forces in the NWFP and Baluchistanhad been instructed to comply only with the orders of their provincial governments and not withthose given by any U.S. agencies; and reports that F.B.I. agents had raided several mosques and madrassas in thePakistani capital elicited complaints and warnings from Islamic clerics that such raids would leadto a "direct clash." (68) The Pakistani government also has been critical of the newly-instituted U.S. policy offingerprinting and photographing all Pakistani men who enter the United States, considering thepolicy unwarranted and "discriminatory" against the citizens of a U.S. ally. Islamabad formallyrequested that the United States remove Pakistan from the list of 20 nations subject to suchimmigration restrictions, with Pakistani Foreign Minister Kasuri warning that his country's presenceon the new U.S. registration list could destabilize the Islamabad government and bolster the causeof radicals in Pakistan. Secretary of State Powell responded by assuring Kasuri that the UnitedStates is "very sensitive" to Pakistani concerns on this issue and emphasizing that the registrationprogram "is not something directed at Pakistan or directed at Muslims or directed at Pakistanis inAmerica" (69) The issuereflects a growing perception in Pakistan that the United States maintains a double-standard offriendly relations with the Islamabad government and "adversarial" relations with the Pakistanipeople. Negative repercussions also were manifest in Pakistan's October 2002 national elections. Thepolls resulted in unexpectedly strong showings for candidates of the United Action Forum (knownas MMA in its Urdu-language acronym), a coalition of six Islamic parties that ran on what largelywas an anti-American platform and that won 68 seats -- about 20% of the total -- in the nationalassembly. The MMA also controls the provincial assembly in the North West Frontier Province andleads the coalition running that in Baluchistan (the two Pashtun-majority regions which borderAfghanistan). This circumstance has led to concerns that a major shift in Pakistan's foreign policymay be in the offing, most especially with renewed indications of the "Talibanization" of westernborder regions. Yet anti-Americanism as expressed through support for Islamic parties is not limitedto the rural western regions; religious candidates won parliamentary seats in Islamabad, Lahore, andKarachi, and resentment of perceived U.S. support for what are called President Musharraf'santi-democratic practices and military dictatorship has arisen even among Pakistan's moniedelite. (70) Leading Islamist politicians in Pakistan reportedly have made numerous provocativecomments since coming to power. One senior MMA leader stated that "Taliban and Al Qaedamembers are our brothers." MMA parliamentary leader Qazi Hussain Ahmed has threatened that,if Musharraf supported any U.S. military action against Iraq, "the MMA will make the governmentunmanageable." During prayers on the floor of the Pakistani Parliament for a Pakistani nationalrecently executed in Virginia for two murders outside the CIA headquarters in 1993, a senior MMAmember stated that, "America is the biggest terrorist state." In the first days of January 2003, thechief of Jamat al-Daawa -- one of 6 MMA coalition parties -- asserted his belief that "all anti-Muslimforces including the United States are trying to paralyze the Muslims economically, socially, andpolitically all over the world." MMA leader Maulana Mahmood stated later in the month thatPakistan's opposition groups will "break America into pieces like Russia" and "erase America fromthe world." (71) Anti-American sentiment is notably more virulent in Pakistan's Urdu-language press, wherereferences to an alleged Christian-Jewish assault on Islam and the "traitorous" status of Pakistan'sWestern-allied leadership are more explicit. (72) Along with Islamist expressions of anger at the United States and the Musharraf-Jamaligovernment's current alliance with it, there are plentiful signs of efforts underway to "re-Talibanize"Pashtun-majority areas near the Afghani-Pakistani border. In 2003, MMA lawmakers in the NWFPhave pledged to accelerate the process of Islamization in the region, and have made requests that thefederal government grant them the authority to impose harsh penalties under Sharia , such asamputating the hands of thieves and stoning adulterers, as well as severely limiting women'sfreedoms. The seizure and burning of books and videotapes deemed "pornographic" has becomecommon; numerous carnivals and theaters have been shut down. Even a leading Muslim separatistgroup in India's Jammu and Kashmir state has criticized Pakistan for the "Talibanization" of IndianKashmir by sending jihadis across the Line of Control. (73) Although the MMA did enjoy a strong showing in October 2002 elections, Pakistanigovernment officials repeatedly have stated that Islamabad's foreign policy will remain unchanged. Moreover, Pakistan does have a small, but politically active middle-class, as well as a notable campof moderate political figures who seek to establish a firm middle ground between the perceived polesof secular military dictatorship and the institution of Islamic rule. These figures often root their ideasin the writings of Mohammed Ali Jinnah, Pakistan's founding father and proponent of a moderateand democratic Islamic republic. To date, such moderate views usually have been outweighed bymilitarist influences and/or the perception of widespread corruption among Pakistan's civilianpoliticians, which have fostered political polarization. In March 2003, a top U.S. diplomat stated that U.S.-Pakistan relations are both "significantlybroadened" and "solid." She called Pakistan-U.S. anti-terrorism cooperation "excellent" and "100percent solid," and noted that "Pakistan has apprehended close to 500 suspected Al Qaeda operativesand affiliates." (74) However, while the U.S. State Department and White House continue to be almost wholly positivein their pronouncements relevant to Pakistani cooperation, the first months of 2003 have seenincreasing expressions of U.S. doubts and concerns, emanating especially from top military andcongressional leaders. Specific issues most commonly raised regard the continuation of Islamistmilitant infiltration into Indian Kashmir, the continued presence in Pakistan of wanted terrorists andillegal terrorist groups, and the extent to which Pakistan's government and its intelligence apparatusare committed to Islamabad's stated anti-terrorism policies. In an unusually strong rebuke, U.S. Ambassador to Islamabad Nancy Powell stated in Januarythat Pakistan is being used as a "platform for terrorism" and that this must stop. Later in the month,an unnamed U.S. State Department official was quoted as saying that the amount of infiltration ofIslamic militants across the Line of Control into Indian Kashmir was increasing and that Pakistanwas not doing enough to halt it. (75) Leading U.S. military commanders overseeing OperationEnduring Freedom have complained that renegade Al Qaeda and Taliban fighters are able to attackcoalition troops in Afghanistan then escape across the Pakistani frontier. They have expresseddismay at the "slow pace of progress" in capturing wanted fugitives, especially Taliban leaders, inPakistan and have urged Pakistan to "do more" to secure its rugged western border area. (76) The U.S. Special Envoyto Afghanistan Khalilzad stated in February that, "There are some key Taliban figures in Pakistan... some Al Qaeda people in the border areas" and that the U.S. government "will not accept" theseindividuals being allowed to "find refuge" in Pakistan. (77) In the same month, the two senior members of the SenateForeign Relations Committee -- Sen. Lugar and Sen. Biden -- expressed "deep concern" that"elements of Pakistan's powerful Inter-Services Intelligence agency might be helping members ofthe Taliban and Al Qaeda operate along the border and infiltrate into Afghanistan." (78) In a security-related matter that may affect future Pakistan-U.S. anti-terrorism cooperation,late-2002 and early-2003 press reports citing U.S. intelligence officials indicated that Pakistanappears to have provided nuclear weapons-related technologies to North Korea beginning in thelate-1990s and possibly continuing through July 2002. (79) Subsequent reports suggest that Iran's nuclear program may alsohave benefitted from Pakistani assistance in the past. (80) Islamabad adamantly denies that any such transfers haveoccurred. In October 2002, Musharraf gave Secretary of State Powell a "400% assurance" that suchtransfers to North Korea are "not taking place now." When asked about past transfers, SecretaryPowell said, "The past is the past and there isn't a whole lot I can do about it." In March 2003, theBush Administration declared that it had "carefully reviewed the facts relating to the possible transferof nuclear technology from Pakistan to North Korea, and decided that they do not warrant theimposition of sanctions under applicable U.S. laws." (81) Congressional oversight of U.S.-Pakistan relations in a March 2003 hearing of theSubcommittee on Asia and the Pacific of the House International Relations Committee includedMember expressions of concern about possible links between Al Qaeda and Pakistan's largestIslamic party; about Musharraf's possibly continuing support for "Kashmiri terrorists;" about thepossibility that "lower-level operatives within the ISI" may be assisting Al Qaeda and Talibanfugitives; about possible ISI involvement in regional heroin trafficking; about Pakistan's possiblenuclear weapons proliferation activities and "contradictions" in U.S. nonproliferation policy towardthe region; about the role madrassas play in raising levels of Islamic radicalism in Pakistan; andabout problems with Pakistani democratization and the danger of the United States "giving fullrecognition to a military coup" through continuous waivers of democracy-related aidrestrictions. (82) Pakistan-U.S. anti-terrorism cooperation has been broad in both scale and scope, and hasrealized tangible successes since October 2001. Yet the wide range of U.S. concerns about relationswith Pakistan indicate that such partnership between the two countries may be undermined. Areduction of U.S. cooperative efforts could result from increased indications of suboptimal levelsof Pakistani commitment or from exacerbated Pakistan-India tensions that are linked to infiltrationin Kashmir. Differences over weapons proliferation and human rights violations could triggerfar-reaching restrictions on future U.S. aid to Pakistan. The Islamabad government, for its part, maycome under increasing pressure to adjust its foreign policy to more accurately reflect the sentimentsof Pakistan's opposition parties, especially the virulently anti-Western Islamists. This could erodePakistani cooperative efforts and is made even more likely as domestic violence and publicdisturbances in Pakistan continue. Given such numerous and substantial potential disruptions topresent levels of Pakistan-U.S. anti-terrorism cooperation, it may be unwise to assume that suchcooperation is sustainable in the middle- and long-term. Figure 1. Map of Pakistan Note: Boundary representations not necessarily authoritative.

Summary: Pakistan is a key front-line ally in the U.S.-led anti-terrorism coalition. After September2001, Pakistani President Musharraf ended his government's ties with the Taliban regime ofAfghanistan and has since cooperated with and contributed to U.S. efforts to track and captureremnants of Al Qaeda and Taliban forces that have sought refuge inside Pakistani territory. Pakistan's cooperation has been called "crucial" to past and ongoing U.S. successes in the region, butthere is growing concern that the bilateral relationship is fragile and may be undermined bypotentially disruptive developments in the areas of weapons proliferation, democracy-building, andPakistan-India relations. Remaining proliferation- and democracy-related aid restrictions on Pakistan were removedin the final months of 2001, and the United States continues to make large aid donations to Pakistanand to support that country's interests in negotiations with international financial institutions. Thereare concerns that October 2002 national elections in Pakistan were not sufficiently free and open byWestern standards and that the military-dominated government in Islamabad intends to remain inpower through manipulation of constitutional and democratic processes. This possibility led someMembers of the 107th Congress to seek the renewal of aid restrictions or a modification of thePresident's waiver authority until such time that a more robust democratic process is sustained anda civilian-led government effectively is in place. There also is concern that possibly growinganti-American sentiment in Pakistan and the potential "re-Talibanization" of that country's western provinces bordering Afghanistan could adversely affect U.S. interests in the region. During 2002, the United States took an increasingly direct, if low-profile, role in both lawenforcement and military operations being conducted on Pakistani territory. These operations haveled to favorable results in tracking and apprehending dangerous Islamic militants, but the activitiesof U.S. personnel in the country have led to increasing signs of anti-American backlash and Pakistanisovereignty concerns. Recent electoral gains by a coalition of Pakistani Islamist political parties areviewed as an expression of such sentiments that may lead to reduced Pakistan-U.S. cooperation incounterterrorism operations in the future. The civilian Parliament and Prime Minister that wereseated in Islamabad in November 2002 may powerfully influence the course and scope of future U.S.presence in the region. This report reviews the status of Pakistan-U.S. anti-terrorism cooperation in the areas of lawenforcement, intelligence, and military operations. U.S. arms transfers to and security cooperationwith Pakistan are also discussed. A following section addresses the major domestic repercussionsof Pakistan-U.S. counterterrorism efforts, the ways in which such efforts are perceived bynewly-empowered Pakistan Islamists and their followers, and the possible effects these dynamicsmay have on future Pakistan-U.S. cooperation in this realm. The final section assesses the overallstatus of Pakistan-U.S. anti-terrorism cooperation and key points of U.S. concern. Broaderdiscussion of bilateral relations and relevant legislation is found in CRS Issue Brief IB94041, Pakistan-U.S. Relations . This report will be updated periodically.