Border and Transportation Security (BTS) is a pivotal function in protecting the Americanpeople from terrorists and their instruments of destruction. While BTS may be difficult to attain, thefederal government has put into place multiple programs and policies to achieve this goal. The threereports in this series attempt to provide an understanding of the complex problems faced in seekingenhanced border and transportation security, suggest a framework to better understand existingprograms and policies, and explore some possible new directions and policy options. As noted in the first report (1) in this series, homeland security efforts can be seen as a series ofconcentric circles or screens, with the outer screen being that of preventive efforts launched outside the country -- before terrorists or their weapons can reach the country. The continuum of activitiesto provide homeland security then moves through progressively smaller circles starting from moredistant efforts to closer and more localized measures, ending with emergency preparedness andresponse. Thus, the process starts with prevention abroad and progresses through the other stagesas needed. As the first report in this series observes, border management is a complex task and currentprograms and policies in place to strengthen the border and facilitate the flow of legitimate peopleand things can seem overwhelmingly complex and difficult to approach in a systematic way. Thisreport addresses the myriad programs and policies that make up the nation's current approach toattaining higher levels of BTS. Before doing so, however, it is useful to review the development ofcongressional concern and policy approaches. Congressional concern with terrorism and border security was manifested early, followinga series of terrorist attacks beginning in the 1990s. The shock of the first World Trade Center attackin 1993 was followed by two attacks in Saudi Arabia (Riyadh in 1995 and Khobar Towers nearDhahran in 1996), the simultaneous Embassy bombings in 1998 (Kenya and Tanzania), the attackon the USS Cole in 2000, and culminating in the catastrophic attack on the World Trade Center andthe Pentagon on September 11, 2001. The congressional response began with inquiries related tothe nature of the terrorist threat, and was followed by specific, targeted measures to protect the nationfollowing the events of 9/11. There are indications that congressional interest continues in broader,more comprehensive approaches including recent efforts to respond to the report of the 9/11Commission contained in the National Intelligence Reform Act of 2004 ( P.L. 108-458 ). Congressional policy evolution is charted briefly below: Broad efforts to understand the terrorist threat -- Starting in 1998, Congresscreated three commissions to better understand the nature of the terrorist threat facing the nation. These included the Gilmore Commission (to investigate domestic preparedness to cope withweapons of mass destruction), the Bremer Commission (to explore the terrorist threat and what couldbe done to prepare for it), and the Hart-Rudman Commission (to investigate national securitychallenges in the 21st Century). (2) Structural changes to provide a proper framework for action -- Following the9/11 attacks, Congress enacted legislation to create the Department of Homeland Security to providea structural framework for subsequent action, and the USA PATRIOT ACT to provide the toolsneeded for the new challenge to national security. (3) Starting even earlier, but continuing through this period, Congressattempted to remedy perceived flaws in the immigration system with a series of legislativemeasures. (4) Highly specific actions to protect against immediate threats -- Understandably, following the 9/11 attacks that were committed by foreign national extremists, early legislativeaction called for the immediate implementation of the entry and exit control system, the use ofbiometric identifiers in travel documents, and intelligence sharing among federal law enforcementand immigration agencies through the passage of the PATRIOT Act. Airline security measures weretaken with the creation of the Transportation Security Administration, among other things in theAviation and Transportation Security Act. That was soon followed by the Enhanced Border Securityand Visa Entry Reform Act to tighten immigration practices and tools, and legislation to protectagainst the serious threats posed in the maritime domain with enactment of the MaritimeTransportation Security Act. (5) Interest in broader, more comprehensive approaches -- As evidenced in recentoversight hearings, Congress has been frustrated by the failure to more aggressively address otherborder and transportation security threats (including the need to create integrated terroristwatch-lists, and measures to address other modes of transportation -- rail and mass transit, air cargo,trucking, and buses). These concerns were given a strong impetus by the Final Report of the 9/11Commission, which highlighted the need for more strategic approaches to the terrorist threat, andare expressed in legislative form in the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004( P.L. 108-458 ). (6) The next section of the report traces the development of selected programs and policiesdesigned to achieve higher levels of border and transportation security, and presents them in aframework that facilitates a better understanding of current approaches and some possible newdirections. Since the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, the nation has made securing the homelandits primary objective. Border security has emerged as a critical stage in achieving this goal. Priorto the terrorist attacks, federal agencies involved in securing the homeland were fragmented andoften plagued by internal performance problems. As discussed below, many federal agencies taskedwith securing the nation's borders did not communicate with one another. Moreover, technology wasinadequate for communications within many of these agencies as well as between agencies. Forexample, immigration systems and databases, which are critical when trying to determine theadmissibility of a foreign national and keep bad people out of the country were not (and to someextent still are not) integrated. In an effort to address some of these issues, Congress passed theHomeland Security Act of 2002 ( P.L. 107-296 ). (7) The Homeland Security Act of 2002 consolidated many of the federal agencies responsiblefor border and transportation security into a single department. Within the Department of HomelandSecurity (DHS) is a Directorate of BTS, which is charged with securing: the borders; territorialwaters; terminals; waterways; and air, land and sea transportation systems of the United States. BTShouses the Bureau of Customs and Border Protection (CBP), the Transportation Security Agency(TSA) and Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). Within CBP are the inspections serviceof the former Immigration and Naturalization Services (INS), the U.S. Border Patrol, the inspectionsservice of the U.S. Customs Service, and the border-related inspection programs of the Animal andPlant Health Inspection Service (APHIS). In addition to the border security-related functions of theformer INS and U.S. Customs Service being transferred to CBP, the following agencies were alsotransferred to DHS: (1) U.S. Coast Guard; (2) TSA; and (3) immigration investigations, intelligence,interior enforcement and detention and removal functions of the former INS and U.S. Customsinvestigations and interior enforcement. The Coast Guard was transferred to DHS as a stand-aloneagency and TSA was maintained in DHS' BTS as a distinct entity. (8) This section focuses on current border security activities of CBP, (9) the Coast Guard and the airlinesecurity component of the TSA. The activities discussed in this section are divided into categoriesof how they provide BTS and further divided into people and goods security-related programs. The DHS is the primary federal agency responsible for securing the border. CBP's functionis to secure U.S. borders while facilitating the legitimate flow of people and goods across the border. CBP personnel carry out these duties by inspecting people and goods prior to entry into the UnitedStates and by dispatching border patrol agents to patrol the border between ports of entry to preventpeople from illegally entering the country. In addition to the various components in DHS, the CoastGuard aids in securing U.S. ports and waterways. In securing the ports and waterways, the CoastGuard performs the following functions: (1) defense readiness; (2) drug interdiction; (3) migrantinterdiction; and (4) law enforcement-related functions. (10) Another component of border security is securing the nation'sair system, which is primarily done by TSA. Current policies at the border can be separated into twomajor categories: people-related border security and goods-related border security. Since the terrorist attacks, considerable focus has been placed on the fact that the 19 terroristswere aliens who apparently entered the United States legally despite provisions in immigration lawthat could have barred their admission. (11) Fears that lax enforcement of immigration laws regulating theadmission of foreign nationals into the United States may continue to make the United Statesvulnerable to terrorist attacks have led many to call for tighter measures at the border (as well asduring the screening process for visas). These concerns, which are constantly weighed with effortsto facilitate the legitimate travel of people across the border, have been expressed frequently in alegislative form. (12) The U.S. maritime system consists of more than 300 sea and river ports with more than 3,700cargo and passenger terminals, with most ships calling at U.S. ports being foreign-owned. Containerships have been the focus of much of the attention on seaport security due to the potential ofterrorists infiltrating them. More than 6 million marine containers enter U.S. ports each year andwhile all cargo information is analyzed by CBP officers for possible targeting for closer inspection,only a fraction is actually physically inspected. (13) CBP works in tandem with the U.S. Coast Guard at sea portsof entry. Efforts such as the Coast Guard's requirement that ships provide a 96-hour Notice ofArrival and CBP's Container Security Initiative (CSI) program aid in preventing more harmful thingsfrom getting to the United States. In addition to maritime security, much attention has been focused on the nation's air, truckand rail system. Similar to the massive volume of containers entering the nation's seaports, airportsalso experience large volumes of cargo. The U.S. government has employed a number of strategies and programs to make the nation'sborders more secure. The following actions are set in a framework that suggests types of possiblepolicy actions: Pushing the border outwards to intercept unwanted people or goods before theyreach the United States; Hardening the border through the use of technology and the presence of moreagents at the border; Making the border more accessible for legitimate trade andtravel; Strengthening the border through more effective use of intelligence;and Multiplying effectiveness through the engagement of other actors in theenforcement effort (including engaging Canada, Mexico, state and local law enforcement resources,and the private sector). Many contend that the best way to secure the border is by addressing issues before they reachthe border. While this concept is not new, greater emphasis has been placed on "pushing the borderout" since the terrorist attacks. (The following discussion is organized to highlight activities thattarget people and goods for inspection). In 2004, there were more than 427 million travelers who were inspected at a U.S. port ofentry. (15) Of the 427million travelers who sought entry into the United States in 2003, approximately 62% were foreignnationals. While the majority of travelers seeking entry into the United States are admitted duringprimary inspections, (16) a small percentage of travelers (less than one percent) are referred to secondary inspections. (17) In theory, by pushing outthe border, the number of travelers needing closer scrutiny at the border (i.e., referrals to secondaryinspection) would diminish, which would create a higher level of security. Following are a fewexamples of either congressional mandates and/or administrative initiatives that are aimed at pushingout the border. Pre-Inspections. Pre-inspections are immigrationinspections conducted at foreign ports of embarkation by United States authorities for passengersseeking entry into the U.S. Congress first authorized immigration pre-inspections in 1996. (18) However, efforts topreinspect travelers had previously been underway for several years. As of spring 2005, 15 foreignairports participated in the pre-inspection program, (19) and Congress has mandated that preinspections be extended to"at least 25 foreign airports." (20) Under the pre-inspection program, the Secretary of Homeland Security details immigrationofficers to foreign airports. While immigration officers that are located at pre-inspection sites canperform general inspection functions, other law enforcement functions performed by immigrationofficers within the United States may be limited in the countries where pre-inspection sites arelocated. (21) Although the original intention of pre-inspections was to decrease the number of inadmissiblealiens entering the United States, some officials now view it as a useful means to better secure ourborders while facilitating the flow of travel. Setting up pre-inspection sites at foreign airports,however, is not without controversy. In order to have a pre-inspection site at a foreign airport, theUnited States must enter into diplomatic negotiations with the host country. These negotiationsinclude addressing issues such as sovereignty and the extent to which immigration officers canenforce United States' immigration laws in the foreign country. Another issue in setting uppre-inspection sites at foreign airports is the amount of resources it takes to staff them. Immigrationofficials are assigned to pre-inspection sites based on the volume of travelers seeking entry to theUnited States. Thus, countries that may not have the volume of travelers to justify a pre-inspectionsite may still justify having such a site based on the number of "high risk" travelers. Advanced Passenger Manifest. Air carriers enroute to the United States from a foreign country are required to submit passenger manifests inadvance of their arrival at a U.S. port of entry. While inspections are done on U.S. soil, suchadvance notification alerts the CBP inspectors to which travelers will need closer scrutiny. Themanifest is transmitted electronically via the Advanced Passenger Information System (APIS), whichis integrated with the Interagency Border Inspection System (IBIS), a component of the US-VISITprogram. TSA and ICE Border Security-Related Activities. TSA and ICE have several programs that have implications for securing the nation's borders but areusually not considered to be directly applicable to border security. These programs are either gearedtowards pre-screening individuals before they embark on a flight originating in the United States orproviding intervention during a flight should an act of terrorism occur. Computer Aided Passenger Pre-Screening System. Since 1996, the Computer Aided Passenger Pre-screening (CAPPS) System has analyzed ticketpurchasing behavior to identify air travelers who may pose a threat. While the TSA maintains thatthe methods of identifying suspicious passengers under the existing CAPPS program has largelybeen compromised by information publicly discussed following the terrorist attacks, efforts to createa next-generation passenger risk assessment and pre-screening system (CAPPS II) have beenscrapped due to mounting privacy concerns and operational problems. On August 26, 2004,however, TSA announced its plans to test a new passenger pre-screening program, SecureFlight. (22) Under SecureFlight, TSA will be responsible for checking domestic airline passengers' names against terroristwatch lists (see discussion below, "Strengthening the Border Through More Effective Use ofIntelligence"). (23) The "No-Fly" and "Selectees" Lists. (24) TSA is mandated by lawto maintain a watchlist of names of individuals suspected of posing "a risk of air piracy or terrorismor a threat to airline or passenger safety." The watchlist was created in 1990 and was initiallyadministered by the Federal Bureau of Investigations, then the Federal Aviation Administrationbefore TSA finally took over the administrative responsibility. Individuals whose names are on theselists are subjected to additional security measures, with a "no-fly" match requiring the individual tobe detained and questioned by federal law enforcement and a "selectees" match requiring additionalscreening. P.L. 108-458 sets forth procedures for appealing erroneous information or determinationsmade by TSA with respect to the aforementioned records. (25) Federal Air Marshal Service. The Federal AirMarshall Service (FAMS) was created as a direct result of the events of the terrorist attacks. It wasoriginally a part of TSA but was moved to ICE by DHS in December 2003. FAMS places plainclothes federal law enforcement agents on board "high-risk" flights either destined to the UnitedStates or originating in the United States. In the two-year period following the terrorist attacks, airmarshals responded to over 2,000 aviation security incidents, used non-lethal force 16 times,discharged their weapons on three occasions and were involved in 28 arrests or detainments ofindividuals. (26) In addition to FAMS, other measures to secure passenger airlines include the hardening ofcockpit doors, training and arming pilots who volunteer to be Federal Flight Deck Officers, and thetraining of flight attendants to handle security threats in the aircraft cabin. As discussed above, the massive volume of containers that arrive at U.S. ports each yearmakes it impractical for CBP to inspect every container. In order to focus its limited inspectionresources, CBP has launched several initiatives designed to enhance the targeting of high-riskshipments and securing the entire supply chain from point of origin to final destination. While theseinitiatives assist CBP inspectors with targeting high-risk containers, thus requiring a physicalinspection at the border, they also permit the identification of such containers in advance of theirarrival at the border. Advance Electronic Cargo Manifest Requirement. Cargo inspections are dependent on receiving accurate information in a timely manner in order toexecute risk assessment and targeting procedures before shipments reach the border. To giveinspectors adequate information and time to perform a risk assessment on arriving cargo shipments,the legacy Customs agency published a rule (known as the 24-hour rule) (27) requiring the submissionof certain manifest information to Customs 24-hours in advance of the vessel cargo being laden atthe foreign port. Current law required CBP to develop rules concerning the mandatory electronicsubmission of cargo manifest data. (28) CBP published regulations establishing these rules accordingto the following time-frames: Vessel -- 24 hours prior to lading in the foreign port; Air -- 'wheels up' or four hours prior to departure for the United States(depending upon where the flight originated); Rail -- two hours prior to arrival in the United States; Truck -- one hour prior to arrival for shipments entered through the Pre-ArrivalProcessing System (PAPS) or the Automated Broker Interface (ABI) and 30 minutes prior to arrivalfor shipments entered through FAST. (29) Container Security Initiative. The ContainerSecurity Initiative (CSI) program, one of a series of initiatives aimed at securing the supply chain,was initiated by the U.S. Customs Service (now CBP) in January of 2002 to prevent terrorists fromexploiting containers entering into the United States. CSI is based on four core elements: (1)developing criteria to identify high-risk containers; (2) pre-screening high-risk containers at theearliest possible point in the supply chain; (3) using technology to pre-screen high risk containersquickly; and (4) developing and using smart and secure containers. Under the CSI program, CBPofficers are sent to participating ports where they collaborate with host country customs officers toidentify and pre-screen high-risk containers using non-intrusive inspection technology before thecontainers are laden on U.S.-bound ships. Similar to CBP inspectors who conduct pre-inspectionsat foreign airports, (as discussed above), CBP officers stationed at CSI ports are neither armed, norhave arrest powers. CBP continues to expand CSI to additional foreign ports. As of spring 2005,CSI was at 32 foreign ports. Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism. The Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT) was initiated in April 2002 and offersimporters expedited processing of cargo if they comply with CBP requirements for securing theirentire supply chain. C-TPAT participants benefit from fewer cargo inspections, as membership inC-TPAT reduces a company's overall risk score in the Automated Targeting System (ATS). (30) In order to participate inthe C-TPAT businesses must sign an agreement that commits them to the following actions: conduct a comprehensive self-assessment of supply chain security using theC-TPAT security guidelines jointly developed by CBP and the tradecommunity; submit a completed supply-chain security profile questionnaire toCBP; develop and implement a program to enhance security throughout the supplychain in accordance with C-TPAT guidelines; and communicate C-TPAT guidelines to other companies in the supply chain andwork toward building the guidelines into relationships with these companies. Once the applicant company has conducted the security self-assessment and submitted thesecurity profile, C-TPAT officials review the security profile to develop an understanding of thecompany's security practices. C-TPAT officials also gather information regarding the company'strade compliance history and any past criminal investigations. Based upon the results of the review,CBP will work with the company to address any security concerns discovered during the review, orwill further reduce the company's risk score. Additional efforts to push the border out include the following (see Appendix A for adescription of each program): Carrier Consultant Program (people); Immigration Security Initiative (people); Known Shipper Programs (goods); and North American Perimeter Security (people). The U.S. northern and southwest borders extend over 6,000 miles, with vast areas of bothborders lacking direct surveillance by border patrol personnel. While the northern border,historically, has posed less of a problem than its southwestern counterpart, the terrorist attacks havebrought attention to the vulnerabilities that both borders pose. The southwest border, on the otherhand, has a longstanding history of illegal migrants attempting to gain entry into the United Statesas well as individuals attempting to smuggle human beings and drugs into the country. The borderpatrol has increased its manpower along portions of the border and various types of technology arealso being used such as video cameras, ground sensors, radiation detectors, geographic informationsystems, and physical barriers to provide surveillance at the border. (31) While critics of the current technological infrastructure contend that its weaknesses pose asecurity risk, efforts are underway to enhance border technology. Issues such as integrating datasystems, sharing intelligence among agencies and departments, having technology that can track thecomings and goings of foreign nationals and having technology that can read biometric identifiersare all important to border management. Additionally, agencies continue to invest in technology that will aid in detecting things thatmay cause harm, including technology that would detect explosives. (32) For example, inspectorsare increasingly using portal scanning devices on commercial vehicles to detect radiation. Theborder patrol has begun using Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV) in its Tucson Border Patrol Sectoras part of its Arizona Border Control (ABC) initiative in an attempt to control the flow of illegalmigration between ports of entry. (33) The border patrol also uses other technology such as groundsensors and video cameras. In addition, CBP has deployed an array of non-intrusive inspection (NII) technologies at portsof entry to assist inspectors with the examination of cargos and the identification of contraband. Large scale NII technologies include a number of x-ray and gamma ray systems. The Vehicle andCargo Inspection System (VACIS) uses gamma rays to produce an image of the contents of acontainer for review by the CBP inspector. The VACIS can be deployed in a stationary or mobileconfiguration depending on the needs of the port. CBP has also deployed several rail VACISsystems to screen railcars entering the country. Other large scale NII systems include truck x-raysystems, which like the VACIS can be deployed in a either a stationary or mobile configuration; theMobile Sea Container Examination System, and the Pallet Gamma Ray system. CBP also continuesto deploy nuclear and radiological detection equipment in the form of personal radiation detectors,radiation portal monitors, and radiation isotope detectors at ports of entry. Following are selectedexamples of either congressional mandates and/or administrative initiatives that are aimed athardening the border. In 1996, Congress first mandated that the former INS implement an automated entry and exitdata system (now referred to as the U.S.-VISIT program) that would track the arrival and departureof every alien. (35) Theobjective for an automated entry and exit data system was, in part, to develop a mechanism thatwould be able to track nonimmigrants (36) who overstayed their visas as part of a broader emphasis onimmigration control. Following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, however, there was amarked shift in priority for implementing an automated entry and exit data system. While thetracking of nonimmigrants who overstayed their visas remained an important goal of the system,border security has become the paramount concern. Tracking the entry and exit of most foreign nationals at U.S. ports of entry is not a smallundertaking. The massive volume of travelers seeking entry into the United States at one of the 300land, air and sea ports of entry coupled with the demands such a system would place on portinfrastructure makes implementing the system challenging. Nonetheless, implementation of theU.S.-VISIT program began at selected air and sea ports on January 5, 2004, and selected land portsof entry on December 31, 2004. Although initially required by Congress in 1996 to curtail the use of fraudulent MexicanBorder Crossing Cards (now referred to as Laser Visas), (37) biometric identifiers have received a great deal of attention post9/11 as the need to positively identify people seeking entry into the United States became paramount. The U.S.-VISIT program, as discussed above, brought national attention to such technology asdiscussion centered around which type of biometrics (i.e., iris scan, fingerprint, facial photograph,etc.) would be best for the program. Under current law, travel documents must have a biometric identifier that is unique to thecardholder. In May 2003, the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) finalized standardsfor biometric identifiers, which asserted that facial recognition is the globally interoperable biometricfor machine readable documents with respect to identifying a person. (38) In an earlier reportpublished by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), it was determined that twofingerprints, as opposed to ten-fingerprints, and a facial photograph "... are the only biometricsavailable with large enough operational databases for testing at this time." (39) Although NIST set thetwo-fingerprint standard for identifying one's identity, concern has been raised about the possiblelimitation two-fingerprints pose for obtaining additional information on a person, such as arrestwarrants and criminal history. In an effort to secure the supply chain across international boundaries, CBP and selectvolunteer importers participating in C-TPAT have begun testing a new "smart container." Althoughincreasingly sophisticated tools exist, such as bomb sniffers and high-tech locks, many view smartcontainers that are capable of sensing changes in the surrounding environment as a critical meansto prevent crime and terrorism. In theory, "a smart container would include the means of detectingwhether someone has broken into a sealed container and would have the ability to communicate thatinformation to a shipper or receiver, via satellite or radio." (40) Under this initiative, CBP provides selected importers with sensors to be secured inside acontainer. The sensors can detect whether or not a container has been entered during transit and willsubmit the information to CBP. The first phase of 'smart box' testing involves volunteer importerswith containers originating in Europe and Asia, moving through U.S. ports in New York-New Jersey,Los Angeles-Long Beach, Seattle and Charleston. (41) Additional efforts to harden the border through the use of technology include the following(see Appendix A for a description of each program): Integration of Data Systems; Integrated Surveillance Intelligence System (ISIS); Operation Safe Commerce; and Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV). The facilitation of legitimate cross-border travel and commerce, while still providing foradequate border security, has long been a challenge for policy makers. CBP inherited severalinitiatives aimed at using technology to help speed up the inspection processes for low-risk travelersand goods, which allows CBP inspectors to focus their attention on high-risk situations, as discussedbelow. NEXUS and the Secure Electronic Network for Travelers' Rapid Inspection (SENTRI) areprograms used at land ports of entry to facilitate the speedy passage of low-risk, frequent travelers. NEXUS is located at selected northern ports of entry while SENTRI is located at selected southwestports of entry. Ports of entry are selected based on the following criteria: (1) they have anidentifiable group of low-risk frequent border crossers; (2) the program will not significantly inhibitnormal traffic flow; and (3) there are sufficient CBP staff to perform primary and secondaryinspections. Travelers can participate in the program if: (1) they are citizens or legally permanentresidents of the United States, citizens of Mexico or Canada, or legally permanent residents ofCanada; (2) they have submitted certain documentation and passed a background check; (3) they paya user fee; and (4) they agree to abide by the program rules. (42) Both programs use an electronic identifier (e.g., a proximity card for NEXUS participantsor a radio transponder for SENTRI participants) that triggers an automated system to review theInteragency Border Inspection System (a background check system) and other records related to thevehicle and its designated passengers once the vehicle enters the NEXUS or SENTRI lane. WhileNEXUS and SENTRI lanes are not at all land border crossings, efforts are underway to implementthem at additional land border crossings. The Free and Secure Trade (FAST) program is a joint U.S.- Canada and U.S. - Mexicoinitiative that is aimed at expediting commerce across both the Southwest and the Northern border. FAST offers pre-approved importers, carriers, and registered drivers an expedited processing throughland ports of entry. FAST is available to "low-risk" participants who have a demonstrated historyof compliance with relevant legislation and regulations. Importers and carriers must be C-TPAT-certified in order to participate; carriers must also be approved as FAST Highway carriers; anddrivers must possess a FAST Commercial Driver Card. In order for a shipment to be processedacross the border as a FAST shipment, each of the parties involved must be FAST-certified, andless-than-truckload FAST shipments cannot be consolidated with non-FAST shipments and beprocessed through the FAST lanes at the border. While FAST lanes are not at all land bordercrossings, efforts are underway to implement them at additional land border crossings. FAST is alsoan harmonized clearance process, in that it operates in both directions across the Northern border(shipments exported from the United States into Canada can also be processed through the Canadianversion of FAST: Partners in Protection). Additional efforts to make the border more accessible for legitimate travel and trade includethe following (see Appendix A for a description of each program): INS Passenger Accelerated Service System (INSPASS)and I-68 Canadian Border Boat Landing Program / Outlying Area Reporting Station(OARS) In addition to technology used to facilitate legitimate travel and goods across the border byway of a vehicle, DHS also inherited programs designed to facilitate legitimate travel of certaingroups of people. An example of such a program is the Visa Waiver Program, as discussed below,and the Laser Visa (Mexican Border Crossing Card). (See Appendix A for a discussion of the LaserVisa). The VWP allows nationals from certain countries to enter the United States as temporaryvisitors for business or pleasure without first obtaining a visa from a U.S. consulate abroad. (44) By eliminating the visarequirement, this program facilitates international travel and commerce and eases consular officeworkloads abroad, but it also bypasses the first step by which foreign visitors are screened foradmissibility to enter the United States. Travelers under the VWP do not need a visa, and thus nobackground checks are done prior to their arrival at U.S. ports of entry, which allows only oneopportunity -- immigration inspection at the port of entry -- to identify inadmissable aliens. Whilethis program facilitates travel, questions have been raised about the VWP being a potential loopholefor terrorists. Of concern to some is the delay in issuing nationals from the participating countriespassports that contain biometric identifiers, although this concern may have abated since theAdministration is now requiring foreign nationals entering the United States through the VWP to beenrolled in the U.S.-VISIT program. (45) Intelligence plays an essential role in the protection of U.S. national security, one elementof which is to contribute to the protection of U.S. borders. As with traditional foreignintelligence, (47) theprimary role intelligence plays in the context of border security is to provide indications andwarnings to government personnel responsible for border protection -- primarily DHS personnel. Regardless of where the intelligence is collected -- domestically or internationally -- intelligencecontributes to the protection of U.S. borders by seeking to prevent certain goods and individualsfrom crossing U.S. borders. However, as the tragic events of September 11, 2001, demonstrated,even when intelligence systems and mechanisms are in place to prevent individuals with inimicalintent from crossing U.S. borders, it only takes one failure of the intelligence process and/orindividuals involved in it, to contribute to a potential catastrophe. (48) Traditional foreignintelligence as well as criminal intelligence contribute to enhancing border security. At the most basic level, intelligence is designed to find where the danger lies. With respectto protection of the U.S. borders, the primary goal is to collect, analyze and rapidly disseminateintelligence that can deny entry into the United States of terrorists or dangerous material that couldbe used as a weapon by terrorists. With respect to terrorists, one of the most useful tools in thegovernment's counterterrorism arsenal for border protection is the Terrorist Screening Database(TSDB) first compiled by the Terrorist Threat Integration Center. (49) As a testament to therobust role that traditional foreign intelligence entities are playing in the protection of bordersecurity, of the more than 20,000 records in the Terrorist Screening Database in 2004, the CentralIntelligence Agency provided just over 42% of the entries, the State Department provided almost42%, the National Security Agency provided 10%, the Federal Bureau of Investigation almost 4%,and the Defense Intelligence Agency just under 3%. (50) At the sensitive but unclassified (SBU) security level, the TSDBis then shared broadly across the U.S. government, to include agencies such as the DHS, the FederalBureau of Investigation (and the FBI-led Terrorist Screening Center), the Department of Justice-ledForeign Terrorist Tracking Task Force (51) ), the Department of Defense, as well as the Department of State,among others. A "hit" on the TSDB will trigger certain protective actions by the law enforcement,intelligence or security personnel having interaction with the individual. With respect to protection against illicit cargo coming into the United States and the potentialfor shipping to be used as a conveyance of weapons of mass destruction, one of the unique toolsbeing used by DHS's CBP is its Automated Targeting System. With shipments into the UnitedStates in the thousands of containers per day, it is not practically or financially feasible to inspecteach container. Building on years of experience in interdicting drugs being shipped into the UnitedStates through cargo containers, DHS's CBP established the interagency-supported NationalTargeting Center (NTC) as a tool to triage and effectively target cargo containers for inspection. Working with the intelligence community and law enforcement community personnel, the NTC'sAutomated Targeting System develops dynamic rules and algorithms which allow it to examine abroad scope of passenger and cargo factors to assign appropriate risk scores. Certain risk scores flaga shipment or container for human inspection. In short, intelligence serves as a force multiplier in contributing to the protection of U.S.borders. It serves the direct purpose of providing advance warnings to alert officials on the frontlines of U.S. borders. However, its indirect use may be equally valuable. That is why domesticintelligence officials, including those at the state and local levels, collect intelligence within theircommunities to put international terrorist activities into a local context. It is also why experts believethere needs to be a wide access to information that may not seem to be relevant in a national context,yet may prove what's happening in Sanaa, Yemen, may be directly or indirectly relevant and valuableto state and local law enforcement and intelligence personnel on the ground. While border security policies may not have received heightened attention until after theterrorists attacks, efforts to improve border management date back to 1995. For example, the UnitedStates and Canadian governments entered into a joint accord on February 24, 1995 called OurShared Border . The 1995 accord brought together five agencies (the former United States INS, theformer U.S. Customs Service, Revenue Canada, Citizenship and Immigration Canada, and the RoyalCanadian Mounted Police) to focus on joint border issues such as enhancing security through moreeffective inspection efforts that target specific problem areas (e.g., drugs, and smugglers), and thecontinued commitment to pool inspection and enforcement resources. And in 1999, the twocountries entered into a partnership, Canada-U.S. Partnership Forum (CUSP). CUSP provided amechanism for the two governments, border communities and stakeholders to discuss issues ofborder management. The guiding principles for U.S.-Canada cooperation resulting from thesedialogues are as follows: Streamline, harmonize and collaborate on border policies andmanagement; Expand cooperation to increase efficiencies in customs, immigration, lawenforcement, and environmental protection at and beyond the border; and Collaborate on common threats from outside the United States andCanada. Current bilateral efforts include a declaration signed on December 12, 2001, by the UnitedStates and Canadian governments establishing a "smart-border." The declaration included a 32-pointplan to secure the border and facilitate the flow of low-risk travelers and goods through thefollowing: Coordinated law enforcement operations (i.e., IBETS, see AppendixA ); Intelligence sharing; Infrastructure improvements; The improvement of compatible immigration databases; Visa policy coordination; Common biometric identifiers in certain documentation; Prescreening of air passengers; Joint passenger analysis units; and Improved processing of refugee and asylum claims, among otherthings. On December 3, 2001, the two countries signed a joint statement of cooperation on bordersecurity and migration that focused on detection and prosecution of security threats, the disruptionof illegal migration, and the efficient management of legitimate travel. In March 2002, the United States and Mexico announced a partnership to create a new,technologically advanced "smart border" to assure tighter security while facilitating legitimate travel. The U.S.-Mexico Border Partnership Action Plan has 22 points that include greater cooperationbetween the two governments in order to better secure border infrastructure and facilitate the flowof people and goods between the countries. The plan also calls for the development of integratedcomputer databases between the two countries and express lanes at high volume ports of entry forfrequent, pre-cleared low-risk travelers. (53) In addition to the bilateral agreements between the U.S./Canada and the U.S./Mexico, theUnited States has begun working with the European Union (EU) to facilitate cooperation on the CSI,as discussed above. On November 18, 2003, the United States and EU signed an agreement thatwould facilitate such cooperation by establishing an EU-wide container security policy. (54) Figure 1 maps some of the current policy approaches discussed in this report. For example,illustrations of "pushing the border outward" in order to intercept unwanted people and goods beforethey reach the United States include CBP's and FDA's advance manifest rules; the Coast Guard's96-hour rule; the CSI; and passenger pre-inspection at foreign airports. Examples of "making theborder more accessible for legitimate travel and trade" include the C-TPAT; FAST; and theNEXUS/SENTRI trusted traveler/frequent crosser programs. Examples of "multiplyingeffectiveness through the engagement of other actors" include C-TPAT; CSI; FAST; NEXUS; andpassenger pre-inspection. Figure 1. Movement of Goods and People Source: CRS and CRS analysis of OECD figures in Security in Maritime Transport . Note : FPOE = foreign port of exit, and DPOE = domestic port of entry. Balancing security with trade and travel may require a "layered approach" to attain bothgoals. The next report in this series, Border and Transportation Security: Possible New Directionsand Policy Options , examines the concept of layering and how it may fit into BTS. The currentprograms and policies in place, however, do reflect some layering. For example, the framework setforth in this report highlights the purposeful overlapping of programs and policies in order to attainBTS. Efforts to push the border outwards are aimed at preempting potential attacks and preventingindividuals who are trying to surreptitiously enter the United States. The various preinspections andadvance passenger/cargo notice programs were developed with this in mind. If someone, however,is able to penetrate the first layer of security then efforts to harden the border are put to the test. Theuse of biometric identifiers in travel documents and smart containers for the shipment of goods areboth examples of how technology is being used to harden the border. In addition to efforts to hardenthe border , the use of intelligence and engaging other actors such as state and local law enforcementand our foreign neighbors are other cumulative measures that have been taken to attain better BTS. While the programs and policies highlighted in this report may reflect an attempt at layering,some contend that there are still gaps in the system. (55) The current programs and policies were either put into place asa result of the 9/11 terrorist attacks or predated the attacks. Those programs and policies that wereput into place as a result of the attacks were done so with a sense of urgency -- to prevent anotherattack . Programs and policies already in existence prior to the attacks, however, were created witha different focus and not necessarily with the goal of keeping terrorists out of the country. As willbe examined in the next report, current efforts to provide a layered approach to BTS would meanapplying some measures of security effort to almost every point of vulnerability or opportunity. As noted earlier, this report is one of a series of three CRS reports that address the issue ofBTS. The first report in the series, CRS Report RL32839 , Border and Transportation Security: TheComplexity of the Challenge , analyzes the reasons why BTS is so difficult to attain. This report isthe second in the series. The final report is CRS Report RL32841 , Border and TransportationSecurity: Possible New Directions and Policy Options . Carrier Consultant Program (CCP). Sometimesreferred to as prescreening, the CCP was originally developed in the former INS. Working withofficials from the Department of State, CBP deploys officers to work with air carriers to preemptattempts to use those carriers to gain illegal entry into the United States using fraudulent documents. In doing so, CCP officials work towards eliminating the arrival of improperly documented aliens ata U.S. port of entry prior to their departure from the foreign port. At domestic airports, CCP officialswork with airlines in identifying any illegal or suspect activity involving the carrier, primarily relatedto the use of fraudulent documents. While the goal of CCP is to reduce illegal migration, theprogram has received heightened attention in this post 9/11 era. I-68 Canadian Border Boat Landing Program/Outlying AreaReporting Station (OARS). The I-68 Canadian Border Boat Landing Programpermits enrolled participants admission to the United States by small pleasure boats without aninspection. The program requires applicants (56) to appear in person for an inspection and interview. During theinspection/interview process, applicants names are checked against the IBIS and biometrics arecollected. Upon approval, participants are issued a boating permit for the season that allows themto enter the United States from Canada without submitting to an inspection. OARS allows travelers of small boats who are not in possession of a valid I-68 form to enterthe United States via Canada without presenting themselves for inspections. Travelers can use oneof the 33 OARS videophone stations upon entry into the United States. (57) The stations are locatedat public marinas along the Canadian border and provide automated inspections through a two-wayvisual and audio communication between the person and the remote inspector. Immigration Security Initiative (ISI). Like CCP,ISI was originally developed in the former INS. CBP is now piloting ISI at several foreign airports. ISI relies on CBP inspectors positioned at foreign airports to intercept people who have beenidentified as national security threats from traveling to the United States ISI has been compared toCBP's CSI, discussed above, which targets high risk containers for inspections. Integrated Border Enforcement Teams (IBETS). IBETs are bi-national, multi-agency law enforcement teams that target cross-border criminal activity. Although IBETS were originally created in 1996 along the British Columbia and Washington stateborder to target cross-border crimes that usually involved illicit drug violations, the terrorist attackshave prompted officials in both countries to expand IBETs role to include counterterrorismmeasures. INS Passenger Accelerated Service System(INSPASS). INSPASS is used at selected international airports. (58) It is a form ofpre-inspections for low-risk, frequent travelers. (59) INSPASS records a biometric geometry (of the hand) for eachenrollee that is verified when the traveler inserts his card. Upon arrival at an airport that hasINSPASS, enrollees proceed to an INSPASS kiosk where they access an automated hand geometryreader. Upon approval by the kiosk, the traveler receives a receipt of his inspection. INSPASSapplicants must enter the United States on certain nonimmigrant visas (60) or under the Visa WaiverProgram. (61) Integration of Data Systems. CBP officials useseveral data systems and databases that assist them with identifying aliens who are potentiallyinadmissible under the Immigration and Nationality Act or otherwise may pose a threat to thecountry. CBP officials also utilize several data systems and databases with respect to identifyinghigh-risk commercial goods that warrant further inspection or review. Of concern are the numerousdata systems and databases that are not integrated or not readily accessible. Critical to the successof border security is the ability to process information in real time. The legacy Customs Service and now CBP have been engaged in a long-term effort todevelop a new automated system to process and track the entry of all goods into the country. TheAutomated Commercial Environment (ACE) will utilize web-based electronic accounts to provideinformation regarding cargo inspections, status of clearance and other information to CBP andaccount users. Integrated Surveillance Intelligence System(ISIS). Along the northern and southwest borders, the border patrol uses ISIS asa surveillance tool. ISIS is comprised of remote video surveillance cameras that are mounted on topof towers, which are remotely monitored. According to CBP, "one camera uses natural light andtakes traditional video images; the other uses 'infrared' imaging for night vision." (62) ISIS also consists ofsensors and an Integrated Computer Assisted Detection (ICAD) database. Known Shipper Programs. The TransportationSecurity Administration uses a program that differentiates trusted shippers that are known to a freightforwarder or air carrier through prior business dealings, from unknown shippers. Under such aprogram, shipments from unknown sources are identified and placed under closer scrutiny. (63) Laser Visa (Mexican Border Crossing Card). Mexican nationals applying for admission to the United States as visitors are required to obtain avisa or hold a Mexican Border Crossing Card, now referred to as the "laser visa." The laser visa isused by citizens of Mexico to gain short-term entry (up to six months) for business or tourism intothe United States. It may be used for multiple entries and is good for ten years. Under currentpractices, Mexican nationals in possession of a laser visa will be exempt from the requirements ofthe U.S.-VISIT program, thus allowing for a speedy passage into the United States. North American Security Perimeter. As theUnited States moves forward with implementing much of the security requirements in the PATRIOTAct and the Border Security Act, many fear that the tighter security requirements will impede theflow of people across the border. Some critics are advocating for a more open border. The ideal ofa North American Perimeter Security concept has been around for several years and the basicpremise of a North American Perimeter Security would move inspections and enforcement activitiesaway from the border. Such a concept would essentially eliminate barriers to the movement ofpeople (and goods) across the shared border. P.L. 107-173 called for a study to examine thefeasibility of establishing a North American Perimeter Security program that would provide forincreased cooperation with foreign governments on questions related to border security. The NorthAmerican Perimeter Security, however, would require the harmonization of United States andCanadian immigration and refugee policies, among other things. While such a harmonization ofpolicies may be problematic following the events of 9/11, both countries have begun to harmonizeother policies at incremental levels that could be viewed as "pushing the border out" (i.e.,preinspections and reverse inspections). Operation Safe Commerce (OSC). OSC is a pilotprogram that brings together private businesses, the maritime industry and the government to analyzesecurity procedures and practices for cargo entering the country and develop improved methods forsecuring the supply chain. OSC's goal is to protect the global supply chain while facilitating the flowof commerce by identifying potential supply chain security weaknesses. Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV). In 2004 DHSlaunched an initiative, dubbed the Arizona Border Control (ABC) Initiative that uses technologysuch as the UAV to increase border surveillance along the Arizona/Mexico border. Currently, theborder patrol is piloting two UAVs along the Arizona and Mexico border.

Summary: Border and Transportation Security (BTS) is a pivotal function in protecting the Americanpeople from terrorists and their instruments of destruction. This report addresses selected programsand policies now in place that seek to attain higher levels of BTS. It is the second in a three-partseries of CRS reports that make use of analytical frameworks to better understand complexphenomena and cast them in terms that facilitate consideration of alternative policies and practices. (The first report in the series, CRS Report RL32839 , Border and Transportation Security: TheComplexity of the Challenge , analyzes the reasons why BTS is so difficult to attain. This report isthe second in the series. The final report is CRS Report RL32841 , Border and TransportationSecurity: Possible New Directions and Policy Options .) Congressional concern with terrorism and border security was manifested as early as 1993,with the first World Trade Center attack and subsequent terrorist attacks against U.S. targets abroad. The congressional response to these events began with attempts to understand the nature of theterrorist threat through the creation of several commissions. The response to the 9/11 attacks wasfollowed by specific, targeted measures to protect the nation such as the creation of theTransportation Security Administration and the passage of laws that were aimed at strengtheningsecurity at the border, including immigration policies with respect to the admission of foreignnationals; and strengthening security in the maritime domain. Congressional interest continues inmore comprehensive approaches including recent efforts to respond to the report of the 9/11Commission. There are several broad strategies that could be pursued to enhance border security. Currentprograms and policies can be grouped under the following generic categories, which include pushingthe border outwards to intercept unwanted people or goods before they reach the United States (asin the passenger pre-screening program); hardening the border through the use of technology (asshown by biometric identifiers); making the border more accessible for legitimate trade and travel(as in "trusted traveler" programs); strengthening the border inspection process through moreeffective use of intelligence (with the integration of terrorist watch lists); and multiplying theeffectiveness of interdiction programs through the engagement of other actors in the enforcementeffort (as displayed by bi-national accords with Canada and Mexico). It is also possible to use thestrategies as a checklist for what new efforts might be explored. Many current programs and policies to enhance border and transportation security were putinto place as a result of the 9/11 terrorist attacks with a sense of urgency -- to prevent another attack . Programs and policies in existence prior to the attacks, however, were often created with a differentfocus and not necessarily with the terrorist threat in mind. The challenge for Congress is to reviewthese programs and policies comprehensively to help them form a more coherent and effectiveoverall strategy. This report will be updated periodically as events warrant.