RS21685 -- Coup in Georgia [Republic]: Recent Developments and Implications Updated December 4, 2003 (1) Former President Eduard Shevardnadze had led Georgia since 1972, except for 1985-1992, during which he primarily served as the pro-Western foreignminister of the Soviet Union. Shevardnadze's constitutional limit of two terms in office expired in 2005, whichmade the November 2, 2003, legislativeelection a critical bell-weather of who might succeed him. Nine party blocs and twelve parties contested 150legislative seats in a party list vote, and another 75seats were contested in single constituencies. Shevardnadze's party, the Citizens' Union of Georgia (CUG), had become deeply unpopular as economic conditions failed to noticeably improve. Tostrengthen its chances in the election, in April 2003 the CUG formed an alliance termed "For a New Georgia" (FNG)with other pro-Shevardnadze parties. Three opposition parties that had split from the CUG contested for seats: the National Movement (led by formerJustice Minister Mikhail Saakashvili); theUnited Democrats (led by former Speaker Zurab Zhvania and Speaker Nino Burjanadze); and the businessmen-ledNew Right Party. Other major partiesincluded the Revival Party (led by Ajaria's regional leader Aslan Abashidze), and the populist Labor Party. Campaigning tended to focus on personal attacksrather than ideology or platforms. Saakashvili called for forcing Shevardnadze to resign, raising pensions andwages, taxing the rich, and fighting corruption. Abashidze also criticized Shevardnadze's policies, but some observers speculated that Revival and FNG had covertlyformed an alliance (Center for Strategicand International Studies, Caucasus Election Watch , Oct. 27). The pro-Shevardnadze and oppositioncamps both appealed to nationalism by accusing eachother of selling out Georgia's sovereignty to Russia. The observer mission of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) reported on November 3 that the electoral processes appearedsomewhat more democratic than in the past, but still did not meet the standards of a free and fair election. It mainlyfocused on problems with voters' lists, butalso mentioned ballot box-stuffing in Ajaria and some districts. It also raised concerns that pro-government partymembers dominated district and precinctelectoral commissions and that Ajaria carried out its own electoral processes virtually independently and blockedmost opposition party campaigning in theregion. Ajaria's announcement on November 6 of its large vote for Revival seemed to overwhelm and marginalize the partial vote counts being announced for theopposition parties, galvanizing their resistance to Shevardnadze. Voter turnout in Ajaria was reportedly 98%, ofwhom 95% endorsed the Revival Party. These results meant that Revival would be a major force in the legislature, which was unacceptable to those whofelt that Ajaria's vote tally was a sham. TheDutch ambassador to the OSCE reportedly stated later that the "gross manipulation" of the vote in Ajaria was theworst of the irregularities in the election ( AP ,Nov. 26). Opposition leaders broke off negotiations with Shevardnadze on November 9, after he refused theirdemand to hold a new election. To displaysupposed mass support for the election results, the next day he traveled to Ajaria to address an assembled crowdof ostensible supporters, and Abashidze senthundreds of police and other supporters to Tbilisi to march in support of the election. Final electoral results were announced on November 20. The FNG bloc won the highest percentage of the party list vote, 21.3%, and Revival the secondhighest, 18.8%, prospectively giving the pro-Shevardnadze forces the largest share of seats. The NationalMovement received 18.8% of the party list vote, theLabor Party 12%, the United Democrats 8.8% and the New Right 7.8% of the vote. In single constituencies,FNG-affiliated or independent (but probablypro-presidential) candidates won the largest number of seats. Unlike the other opposition parties, New Right didnot challenge the electoral returns and did notjoin opposition street protests. The crisis deepened in Georgia following the announcement of final vote counts, with major demonstrations in the capital by pro-presidential Ajarian policeand opposition supporters prominently led by Saakishvili, who demanded Shevardnadze's resignation and newelections. Protestors were galvanized by pollsbefore and during the election (conducted with the guidance of U.S. and British NGOs) that indicated that theNational Movement and the United Democratscould each expect over 20% of the vote. Georgians also were motivated by extensive coverage of the election bythe independent Rustavi-2 television station. Saakashvili eschewed violence, urging his followers to emulate the peaceful protesters who helped oust formerYugoslav dictator Slobodan Milosevic in 2000. Georgian activists over the past few months had closely conferred with democracy advocates in Serbia on campaignand demonstration tactics ( WashingtonPost , Nov. 25). Although many in Georgia at first viewed Shevardnadze's role in the suspect vote count as uncertain, they saw his bid for support from Abashidze and defenseof the results as indicating that he at least condoned, if not orchestrated, the suspect tally ( FBIS , Nov.22, Doc. No. CEP-16). Shevardnadze hurriedly convenedthe rump legislature on November 22 (National Movement and the United Democrats boycotted the session), buthe was chased from the podium whendemonstrators broke into the chamber. Burjanadze announced that she was assuming the presidency pendingelections. Shevardnadze declared emergency rule,but cautioned his security forces not to use force. In an ultimatum delivered to the protestors the next day,Shevardnadze insisted that the new legislature hadconvened, replacing the old, and was now the supreme representative body. However, he seemingly offered todiscuss moving up the date for new legislativeand presidential elections. Shevardnadze's Ouster. Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov mediated between opposition leaders andShevardnadze on the evening of November 23 in the face of Saakashvili's threat to storm the president's residence. Reportedly with U.S. concurrence, Ivanovstressed to Shevardnadze that he should not risk civil war by resorting to force against the opposition, but shouldnegotiate a settlement, presumably to includenew legislative elections ( Washington Post , Nov. 25; see below for an alternative explanation). Alsocritical to Shevardnadze's decision to resign were reportsthat top defense, security, and internal (police) officials -- whom Shevardnadze stated he would rely on to suppressthe protests -- told him that they would notaccept such orders. Faced with this lack of support, Shevardnadze and the opposition leaders reached agreementon his resignation. Saakashvili hailed thiscoup a "rose revolution" to signify that it had not been violent. In a speech to the country on November 24, acting president Burjanadze called for order to be re-established and for presidential elections within aconstitutionally-mandated 45 days. She directed that the prorogued 1999 legislature would resume its work untilnew legislative elections could be held. Shequickly met with security officials, and Tedo Japaridze (who broke with Shevardnadze during the crisis) wasconfirmed as secretary of the presidential SecurityCouncil (composed of the heads of the security ministries). He later was named foreign minister. She also declaredthat Georgia would continue its existingforeign policy aimed at integration with Europe and NATO. The Georgian Constitutional Court the next day lentsome legitimacy to the coup and plans fornew elections by ruling that the November 2 election was a fraud. On November 26, the three opposition leaders announced their plans for sharing power, with Burjanadze stating that her party would back Saakashvili forpresident. She appointed Zhvania the minister of state (the top executive branch office under the president), butrecommended that the constitution be changedto give the office more power. Saakashvili, in turn, stated that the opposition hoped to sweep both the presidentialand legislative elections, and that Burjanadzewould top the party list, perhaps assuring that she would become the speaker of a new legislature. Perhaps toalleviate some concerns raised among many ofShevardnadze's supporters by a statement by Burjanadze that investigations were being opened into electoralirregularities and that the guilty would bepunished, Saakashvili called for a unity government that would include all progressive Georgians of all parties, andpledged that no one in the old governmentwould be prosecuted. He called for the police to maintain order and for the military to suppress possible dissidentelements in its ranks. The Central Electoral Commission announced on December 2 that fifteen people had applied to gather signatures for the January presidential election. OSCEforeign ministers met in early December and pledged up to $6 million to help administer presidential and legislativeelections (OSCE, Press Release , Dec. 2). According to most observers, the legislative race marked an extraordinarily determined struggle for power as a prelude to the presidential election in 2005. Ensconced and corrupt officials were determined to gain dominant legislative influence in order to maintain theirpower and to control the prospectivepresidential race, and the opposition parties were determined to block these efforts, in this view ( FBIS ,Nov. 25, Doc. No. CEP-274; Transitions Online , Nov.3). It was anticipated that the new pro-presidential legislature would elect a kindred politician as speaker, a crucialpost in the run-up to the 2005 presidentialrace. The speaker becomes the interim head of state in case the president resigns or dies. According to thisspeculation, Abashidze, with tacit Russian militarybacking, aimed to assume the speakership and perhaps later the presidency. All the political players in the crisis seemed intent on avoiding a repeat of the bloody 1992 coup that toppled independent Georgia's first president. The threeprincipal opposition leaders agreed on power-sharing and quickly moved to reaffirm or appoint able individuals tothe critical finance, foreign, and defenseministries. Nonetheless, some observers warn that there is no pre-eminent political figure behind which the countrycan rally, so factional disputes couldeventually lead to violence. Some observers argue that Saakashvili's personal volatility may not make him apresident able to unify and bring stability toGeorgia (Institute for Advanced Strategic and Political Studies, Policy Briefings , Nov. 19; TheDaily Telegraph , Nov. 24). Some observers warn thatindependent Georgia has witnessed frequent violence and uprisings by military and paramilitary groups. Saakashvili, concerned about rumors that reactionarygroups might be mobilizing, on November 28 urged the avoidance of bloodshed but also threatened that "we willdeal with [armed attacks] mercilessly" ( FBIS ,Nov. 28, Doc. No. CEP-282). If the prospective government receives a solid mandate as expected at the polls, it may receive the legitimacy and time it needs to implement changes that mightotherwise tax an impatient populace. The prospective government faces widespread poverty, official corruption,and separatism in its Abkhazia and SouthOssetia regions. Among the immediate domestic problems it must address are a budget deficit and rising crime. The new government also will need to carryout confidence-building with Ajaria, Abkhazia, and South Ossetia. Abashidze has asserted that Ajaria will notaccept orders from the interim government. Atthe same time, however, he has firmly stated that Ajaria will not formally secede. South Ossetia has re-emphasizedthat it wants to join Russia. The prospective government must also reassure its neighbors. Azerbaijan's President Ilkham Aliyev, who had just won a controversial election himself,supported Shevardnadze during the crisis and has appeared cool toward the interim leadership. Japaridze met withAliyev in late November to pledge thatexisting cooperation would continue. Armenia, which depends on energy from Russia that transits Georgia, calledfor peaceful elections and economic reformsthat would bolster regional trade. Russia's Ivanov made clear that Russia was not happy that the coup had occurred,but accepted it and would pursue closestrategic ties with Georgia. He also stated that Russia was concerned that "outside pressure" had contributed to thecoup ( ITAR-TASS, Nov 25; Nov. 26). According to some observers, Putin was critical of the coup because it appeared to negate the added influence thatRussia would have gained throughAbashidze's increased power. But he also accused Shevardnadze of bringing on his own downfall by failing tomaintain "traditional" close ties to Russia or toprotect, he seemed to imply, the legacy of Soviet-style economic and political rule ( FBIS , Nov. 24, Doc.No. CEP-252; Nov. 25, Doc. No. CEP-141). Ivanovmet with several CIS foreign ministers on November 25, and they seemed to accept the change of government inGeorgia, but pointedly called fornoninterference by "outside powers" (seemingly referring to U.S. interests) in Georgia's domestic affairs( ITAR-TASS , Nov. 25). According to the State Department, "Georgia plays a key role in furthering U.S. interests" in the Caspian region. Georgia cooperates in the war on terrorismand is a "key conduit" for Caspian oil and gas pipelines to Western markets, thereby increasing the diversity of worldenergy suppliers. The United States seeksto strengthen civil society and the rule of law in Georgia, and provides military assistance to combat terrorism,secure borders, and enhance participation inNATO's Partnership for Peace and interoperability with U.S. and coalition forces ( Congressional BudgetJustification for FY2004 ). Congress has earmarked orallocated $1.1 billion in aid to Georgia (among the highest for Eurasia in per capita terms) over the period1992-2002 to buttress these goals. The StateDepartment on November 21 indicated that the Administration had spent $2.4 million to support a democraticelection on November 2. Most of the Georgianparties running in the November election endorsed cooperation with the United States on these goals, and the leadersof the acting government have reaffirmedthese goals. The Administration's assessment of the November election became more negative after the final results were announced. The U.S. State Department issuedstatements on November 20-21, 2003, expressing deep disappointment that "massive vote fraud" had taken place,and in the face of rising protests in Georgia,called for all sides to abjure violence. Secretary of State Colin Powell on November 22 encouraged Shevardnadzeto peacefully resolve the crisis, but did noturge him to resign or hold new elections, according to the State Department. After Shevardnadze resigned, Powellcalled to thank him for peacefully resolvingthe crisis and the State Department issued a statement praising Shevardnadze as a "towering figure in Georgia'shistory and a close friend of the United States,"and as contributing to freeing millions from Soviet communism. The United States quickly recognized Burjanadze as interim president, with Secretary Powell reportedly telephoning her on November 23 to offer U.S. supportand to urge that new elections be free and fair. Burjanadze reported that she talked with President Bush onNovember 26 and that he offered electoral aid andthat the United States "will guarantee Georgia's safety if the country is threatened." He also asked for and receivedassurances about Shevardnandze's personalsafety ( FBIS , Nov. 26, Doc. No. CEP-309). The European Union on November 24 also expressedsupport for the interim government and called for democraticelections. U.S. strategic interests in stability in Georgia seemed underlined by State Department spokesman Richard Boucher on November 25, when he announced thatseveral U.S. agencies would send advisors to the interim government to discuss aid for the upcoming elections andhelp in democratization. The next day, theWhite House announced that President Bush in his phone call to Burjanadze pledged continued U.S. support forGeorgia's sovereignty, independence, territorialintegrity, and democratic and economic reforms. On November 28, Burjanadze met with the head of the AzerbaijanInternational Oil Consortium (a group ofU.S. and other international energy firms that are developing Caspian offshore oilfields) and reassured him that theinterim government backed the completionof the pipeline. Georgia's interim government also has indicated that its peacekeepers will remain on duty withNATO in Kosovo and with the U.S.-ledcoalition in Iraq. The backgrounds of several of the new officials, including Saakashvili, who was educated in theUnited States, and Japaridze, the formerambassador to the United States, also appeared reassuring to many U.S. observers. Many oppositionists in Georgia hailed the U.S. censure of the November election as a major contribution to Shevardnadze's decision to resign. Otherscriticized the United States for not sending a top emissary to Georgia and instead depending on Russia to defusethe crisis. Some also were critical of what theyviewed as long-term U.S. efforts to prop up Shevardnadze's rule. Some pro-Shevardnadze supporters were highlycritical of what they viewed as U.S.indifference to -- if not active support for -- Shevardnadze's ouster. Shevardnadze lent credence to this view onNovember 26 when he ruefully questionedthe U.S. role, stating that "I was one of the biggest supporters of U.S. policy" ( The Daily Telegraph, Nov. 27; FBIS , Nov. 25, Doc. No. CEP-227; and Nov. 24,Doc. No. CEP-358). Some observers supposed that different U.S. groups may have operated at cross-purposes, withsome supporting the Shevardnadzegovernment and others the opposition parties ( FBIS , Nov. 24, Doc. No. CEP-142). Russian FederationCouncil head Mikhail Margelev on November 22seemed to suggest that the United States had criticized the election results without fathoming that this couldencourage Shevardnadze's overthrow ( Interfax ,Nov. 22; FBIS , Nov 22, Doc. No. CEP-148). Commentators varied widely on whether Shevardnadze's resignation would bolster U.S. or Russian influence in Georgia. Some viewed Shevardnadze'sputative "tilt" toward Russia as a feint to spur the United States to rush to his aid. One advocate of this view statedthat the coup amounted to the replacementof one pro-U.S. government by another that would be even more pro-American ( FBIS , Nov. 25, Doc.No. CEP-259). Such a government could press harder formore U.S. aid and for integration into Western institutions, including admission into NATO (Alexander Rahr, FBIS , Nov. 24, Doc. No. CEP-287). Othersargued that Shevardnadze's alliance with Abashidze threatened a strategic tilt toward Russia (Center for Strategicand International Studies, Caucasus ElectionWatch , Nov. 18). Supporting this view, a German analyst concluded that Russia was playing an increasingrole in Georgia that the West would have toaccommodate ( Hamburg Financial Times , Nov. 25). A third view is expressed by those who suggestthat both U.S. and Russian interests in Georgia couldsuffer if it becomes a harbor for terrorism or otherwise becomes more unstable, so that U.S.-Russian cooperationthere is essential (Dmitriy Trenin, FBIS , Nov.24, Doc. No. CEP-287). On November 27, Saakashvili appeared to endorse this perspective, arguing that Georgiashould seek security and economicassistance from both Russia and the United States. Zhvania too has argued for economic ties with both the UnitedStates and Russia.

Summary: This report examines the ouster of Georgia's President Eduard Shevardnadze in thewake of a legislative electionthat many Georgians viewed as not free and fair. Implications for Georgia and U.S. interests are discussed. Thisreport may be updated as events warrant. Seealso CRS Report 97-727, Georgia; and CRS Issue Brief IB95024, Armenia, Azerbaijan, andGeorgia, updated regularly.