U.S. military operations as part of the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) began on October7, 2001, and continue today. The military component is just one aspect in this endeavor, which alsoinvolves diplomatic, intelligence, law enforcement, and financial efforts to defeat terrorists aroundthe world. This report focuses on U.S. military operations in four areas -- Afghanistan, Africa, thePhilippines, and Colombia -- although the U.S. military is likely engaged in a variety of activitiesin other countries or regions that are considered part of the GWOT by the Administration. Whilesome consider military operations in Iraq as part of this war, many do not, and because of thecomplexity of this issue, Iraq is treated separately and in greater detail in other CRS reports. (2) Congress has a wide ranging interest in U.S. military operations in these regions. NATOassumption of responsibility for Afghanistan and its impact on U.S. military operations,counternarcotics operations in Afghanistan, and the apparently emerging long-term military strategyfor Africa -- raise a variety of issues for potential congressional consideration. (3) There are approximately 19,000 U.S. military personnel in and around Afghanistan. Troopscurrently in Afghanistan represent the sixth major troop rotation in Operation Enduring Freedom(OEF) since the United States became involved in the fall of 2001. At present, the majority of U.S.ground forces come from the Army's Italy-based 173rd Airborne Brigade and the 1st Brigade of theFort Bragg, North Carolina-based 82nd Airborne Division and Marine elements from the Second (II)MEF from Camp Lejeune, North Carolina. U.S. Special Forces are also operating in Afghanistanand are primarily concerned with capturing or killing Taliban and Al Qaeda leaders. In addition,Army units from the Florida National Guard's 53rd Infantry Brigade have been deployed to train theAfghan National Army (ANA). (5) Drawdown of U.S. Forces in Afghanistan. InDecember 2004, the Department of Defense (DOD) designated the 3rd and 4th Brigades of the 10thMountain Division from Ft. Drum New York and Ft. Polk, Louisiana and elements of the division'sheadquarters as the primary ground forces and command headquarters for OEF 7. (6) On December 20, 2005, DODannounced that one battalion-sized infantry task force from the 4th Brigade stationed at Ft. Polkwould deploy to Afghanistan to assist in the transition of coalition operations in southernAfghanistan in mid-2006 to NATO. (7) DOD attributes this reduction to NATO's growing presence inAfghanistan as well as continued growth and progress of the Afghan National Army (ANA) andAfghan National Police. (8) DOD's decision to deploy only a portion of the 4th Brigade is expected to bring U.S. troop levels --currently at approximately 19,000 -- to approximately 16,500; a reduction of 2,500 troops. (9) Security for Parliamentary Elections. U.S. andCoalition forces, in conjunction with the Afghan National Army (ANA) and National Police,provided security for Afghanistan's September 18, 2005 nationwide National Assembly andProvincial Council elections. Reports suggest that security efforts were relatively effective, despitea number of insurgent harassing attacks prior to the election, and about 16 of 6,270 elections stationswere not opened because of security-related problems. (10) Shortly after the elections, Afghan President Hamid Karzaireportedly questioned the need for further international military operations within Afghanistan,suggesting that instead a "stronger political approach focusing on shutting down guerilla trainingcamps and outside financial support" would be more effective. (11) President Karzai alsosuggested that airstrikes were no longer needed -- a view shared by many as airstrikes have beenresponsible for the deaths and injury of numerous Afghan civilians and has been a past point ofcontention between the United States and the Afghan government. Although insurgents failed to follow through on their vows to disrupt September's elections,U.S. military officials contend that the insurgents have recently reasserted themselves -- killinghundreds of civilians, government workers, soldiers and police in bombings and ambushes insouthern and eastern Afghanistan. (12) The commander of U.S. troops in Afghanistan, Army Lieutenant General Karl Eikenberry, reportedlysuggested that this pattern would continue and that U.S. and coalition forces would continue to stayon the offensive against insurgents. Operational Issues. Changing Insurgent Tactics? A number of reportsnote that in the past months, insurgent tactics have shown an increase in the use of suicide androadside bombings, not unlike the tactics being used by insurgents in Iraq. (13) There have been over 20suicide attacks in Afghanistan since September 2005 including car bomb attacks against U.S. andNATO convoys -- resulting in four NATO deaths -- as well as individuals with explosives strappedto their bodies throwing themselves at vehicles or detonating their explosives in crowds. Most ofthese bombings failed to hit their intended targets but instead killed or wounded Afghan civilians.In one of the more successful attacks, on September 28, 2005, an insurgent dressed in an ANAuniform, blew up a motorcycle near Afghan troops boarding transportation outside their base inKabul, killing 9 soldiers and injuring 28. A top Taliban commander reportedly stated that he hadmore than 200 insurgents willing to become suicide attackers against U.S. and allied forces but theAfghan government dismissed this claim as "propaganda"suggesting instead that this was anindication of the insurgent's weakening military power. While U.S. military officials postulate that insurgents no longer have a pool of resources tomount a serious offensive they also acknowledge that insurgent forces are "far from being on theropes." (14) The U.S.military asserts that the insurgents are recruiting younger fighters and staging smaller-scale attacks, often times using a hit-and-run approach as opposed to the major combat operations of the past.According to an unnamed Afghan source with supposed ties to Taliban insurgents, the Taliban havedivided up into groups of 18 to 20 fighters and in each unit there is an Al Qaeda member fromPakistan or an "Arab" who teaches the group tactics developed in Iraq. According to this source,"rogue" elements from Pakistan's Intelligence Service help to further refine these tactics as wellprovide these groups sanctuary and training in Pakistan, provided these groups return to Afghanistanto fight U.S. and allied forces. In instances where U.S. forces have engaged insurgents, they noted that insurgents were"extremely resolute and fought to the last man." Insurgents were also characterized as well-organizedand reacted well to battlefield situations. Despite this perceived proficiency, the U.S. Army claimsto have killed more than 1,200 insurgents in 2005 -- including a number of senior commanders. U.S.forces have reportedly used small U.S. formations such as platoons (16 to 50 soldiers)to draw outinsurgent forces, who will often "swarm" into larger formations to overwhelm the smaller U.S. unit.The smaller U.S. unit then engages the insurgent forces to "fix" it, while other infantry units andU.S. airpower engage and destroy it. Combat Operations Against Insurgents. U.S. andcoalition forces continue combat operations, primarily in the border provinces where the Talibancontinue to exert a degree of control. On August 31, 2005, U.S. and ANA forces, backed by attackhelicopters, raided a Taliban camp in the mountains of southern Afghanistan, killing nine suspectedinsurgents. (15) Thiscamp was believed to have sheltered 80 insurgents using it as a base camp to launch attacks inUruzgan province. (16) On September 4 and 5, U.S. and Afghan forces conducted raids in Zabol and Kandahar provinces,killing 25 suspected Taliban and capturing dozens more. (17) Pakistani Involvement. Prior to Afghanistan's September 18 parliamentaryelections, Pakistan reportedly deployed thousands of reinforcements to its borders to help preventinsurgent attacks. (18) According to Pakistani defense officials, about 5,000 additional troops were sent to the NorthwestFrontier Province and approximately 4,500 additional troops were sent to Baluchistan. (19) On September 13,Pakistan conducted an operation with thousands of troops and helicopter gunship support in NorthWaziristan, reportedly destroying a "major Al Qaeda hideout" and arresting 21 suspectedmilitants. (20) OnSeptember 29, Pakistan began a series of attacks in North Waziristan region and reportedlyencountered considerable resistance from insurgents, resulting in the deaths of at least five Pakistanisoldiers and an unknown number of insurgents. (21) Despite the significant presence of the Pakistani Army inPakistan's Tribal Zone bordering Afghanistan, the Taliban and Al Qaeda are said to be rallying inthe Waziristan region. (22) According to reports, there appears to be evidence that Arab, Uzbek, and Chechen fighters linkedto Al Qaeda are operating in that area and openly recruiting local tribesman to fight in their "jihad"against the Pakistani Army and U.S. forces in Afghanistan. (23) This has supposedlyresulted in fighting between local tribesman that have aligned themselves with the Pakistani Armyand those siding with the insurgent. (24) Renewed Fighting. U.S. and Afghan forces continuedoffensive operations against insurgents after Afghan parliamentary elections and on September 23coalition ground forces, backed by helicopter gunships, killed 14 suspected Taliban fighters inUruzgan province. (25) On September 24, a U.S. Army CH-47 Chinook helicopter was shot down by insurgents in southernZabul province, killing all five crew members. (26) On October 8, a U.S. soldier patrolling in Helmand provincestepped on a land mine and became the 200th U.S. service member killed in Afghanistan since theU.S. invaded in 2001. (27) On October 11 in Helmand province, insurgents ambushed a convoy of 150 Afghan police officers,killing 19 officers. (28) U.S. Desecration of Taliban Dead. In mid-October, allegations thatU.S. soldiers had burned the bodies of two dead Taliban fighters and then used their corpses forpropaganda purposes against the insurgents emerged after the event was broadcasted on Australiantelevision. (29) According to reports, U.S. soldiers from the 173rd Airborne Brigade burned the two bodies --supposedly for hygiene reasons as none of the local inhabitants would claim the bodies and affordthem a Muslim burial -- and then U.S. Psychological Operations soldiers used the bodies to tauntinsurgent fighters believed to be in the area. Cremation is prohibited by the Muslim faith and respectfor the body of the dead is also a central tenet of the religion. This act was strongly condemned byAfghan President Karzai and raised fears that such an act would further damage the United State'simage to Muslims, given the Abu Ghraib prisoner abuse scandal as well as other allegations ofprisoner abuse in both Afghanistan and Iraq. U.S. CENTCOM, which commands operations in Iraqand Afghanistan, quickly condemned the actions of the U.S. troops involved, reportedly stating that"desecration, abuse or inappropriate treatment of enemy combatants were never condoned and thatthese actions violated U.S. policy and the Geneva Convention." U.S. Army Major General JasonKamiya, the commander of Joint Task Force 76, the U.S.-led force that operates in eastern andsouthern Afghanistan, reportedly halted all tactical psychological operations the day after he wasinformed of the incident and ordered an immediate investigation. It is not known if those soldiersinvolved were punished for the incident, but extensive training was ordered to deal with what U.S.military officials described as an "emerging gap" between Afghanistan's Islamic culture and whatis permissible under the Geneva Convention. Continued Offensive Operations Against Insurgents. On October 16, U.S. forces - mainly U.S. Marines from the 3rd Marine Regiment, 3rd MarineDivision, from Kaneohe Bay, Hawaii - conducted a seven day battalion-level (800 Marines)offensive operation with about 300 ANA soldiers and U.S. Army forces and U.S. air support. (30) Dubbed Operation Pil (theDari word for "elephant") this operation was aimed at disrupting enemy activities and sanctuariesin Afghanistan's Kunar province. No U.S. troops were killed during the operation and there were noestimates of the number of enemy killed. On October 29, a U.S. and British soldier were killed - theAmerican during a patrol in Khost province and the British soldier while on patrol in the city ofMazar-e Sharif. (31) OnOctober 30, two U.S. soldiers with the Alabama National Guard's 926th Engineers were reportedlycharged with assaulting two Afghan prisoners and both soldiers -- still serving in Afghanistan --could face court-martial. (32) On December 5, two U.S. CH-47 Chinook helicopters were hitby enemy fire - one in Kandahar province and one in Uruzgan province - and made emergencylandings, resulting in minor injuries to their occupants. (33) On December 6, U.S. and Afghan forces reportedly killed nineTaliban insurgents in Uruzgan province and 13 insurgents were killed in joint operations inKandahar province on December 7. (34) On December 15, one U.S. soldier was killed during a firefightin Kandahar province and another was killed on December 28 by a roadside bomb while anotherwas killed in a vehicle accident. (35) According to reports, 2005 was the deadliest year for the U.S.military in Afghanistan with 91 service members killed as of December 29, 2005 by fighting andaccidents. (36) Predator Strike in Pakistan. On January 13, 2006, anarmed CIA Predator unmanned aircraft reportedly launched an airstrike on the Pakistani village ofDamadola near the Afghan border, possibly killing four top Al Qaeda leaders but also killing 13 Pakistani villagers -- sparking angry, nation-wide protests in Pakistan. (37) The target of the raid, AlQaeda's alleged second-in-command, Ayman al-Zawahri, apparently escaped or was not present atthe insurgent's meeting. Those four Al Qaeda leaders believed to have been killed in the raidincluded a supposed chemical weapons expert, a public relations and recruitment chief, and AlQaeda's operations chief responsible for planning attacks on U.S. and coalition forces on the Afghanborder. If these reports are true, some experts believe that this could be a significant blow to AlQaeda as these men were considered very experienced leaders who will be difficult to replace. Permanent Presence and Bases inAfghanistan? (38) There are indications that the United States may seek permanentmilitary bases in Afghanistan. The United States is upgrading military facilities in Afghanistan --primarily at the airbases of Bagram and Kandahar, which are currently being equipped with newrunways. At Bagram airbase, the United States hopes to have a new 11,800-foot runway built byMarch 2006, along with a hospital, and facilities to accommodate 1,000 service members. (39) At Kandahar airbase, U.S.forces are expanding and widening the damaged 7,900-foot runway for both military and civilian airtraffic. (40) Afghan leadersare said to be seeking a "long-term strategic partnership" with the United States and other friendlycountries to avoid a strategic disengagement by the international community like the West's 1990sdisengagement that helped to bring the Taliban to power. Senior U.S. military and governmentofficials have acknowledged that bases, and perhaps pre-positioned U.S. military equipment, are apossibility, but note that there are numerous regional sensitivities to such a plan. Some believe thatthe importance of these bases in Afghanistan was emphasized when Uzbekistan evicted the U.S.military from a key airbase in July 2005 -- a base that had been used to ship troops, equipment, andsupplies to forces to Afghanistan. (41) ISAF is a NATO-led organization, consisting of approximately 9,000 troops from 26 NATOnations, as well as troops from nine partner and two non-aligned countries. (42) The United States hasapproximately 200 troops assigned to ISAF, but these troops serve primarily in staff and supportroles. ISAF operates under a series of U.N. mandates and conducts security patrols in Kabul andsurrounding districts and runs several Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT) located throughoutAfghanistan. In addition, ISAF coordinates Civil Military Cooperation projects throughout the areaof operations. (43) ISAFcurrently does not participate in offensive operations against the Taliban and Al Qaeda -- theseoperations are carried out by the U.S.-led Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF)-180 and forces from19 other countries (44) (including some countries that have other forces assigned to ISAF) and the ANA. Current Situation. The Italian Rapid DeploymentCorps will command ISAF until May 2006 and then relinquish command to the British-ledmulti-national Allied Command Europe Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC), which will command ISAFfor nine months. (45) InFebruary 2005, NATO agreed to expand ISAF coverage into southern Afghanistan, providingsecurity assistance to an estimated 50 percent of Afghanistan. (46) On September 28, theGerman Parliament voted in favor of extending Germany's mandate in Afghanistan until October2006 and will expand its forces assigned to ISAF from 2,250 to 3,000 troops. (47) France reportedlyannounced on December 18 that it would send an additional 450 troops by mid-2006 to support the600 French troops that are currently part of ISAF. (48) France also has about 200 special forces troops deployed insouthern Afghanistan. (49) Despite these commitments of additional troops, there continues to be a great deal of concernamongst certain U.S. allies about ISAF working more closely with the U.S. counterterrorism effortin Afghanistan. France, Germany, and Spain do not want ISAF leadership to also take overleadership of counterterror operations - a position supported by the United States and GreatBritain. (50) Reportedly,discussions were underway to find a way whereby France and Germany would permit NATO tocommand both ISAF and counterterror operations but not participate directly in theseoperations. (51) On November 14, Taliban insurgents killed a German ISAF member and wounded two othersin a suicide car attack in Kabul. (52) This attack, along with other recent incidents, have raisedsecurity concerns amongst NATO nations. The Netherlands, one of a reported thirteen nations thatwill lead NATO's expansion in 2006, has raised questions publically about the sufficiency of plannedNATO forces to handle serious trouble. (53) The Dutch plan to deploy about 1,000 to 1,400 troops tosouthern Afghanistan, and Britain and Canada are also expected to send additional forces to theregion; non-NATO members New Zealand and Australia might also provide forces for theexpansion. (54) OnJanuary 10, 2006, the Australian Defense Minister reportedly announced that Australia would sendan additional 110 special forces soldiers and two helicopters in support of 190 Australian troopsalready in Afghanistan. (55) By adding an additional 6,000 troops to the 9,000 already a partof ISAF, the United States may be able to decrease the number of forces it has in Afghanistan. In February 2005, NATO and the United States agreed to merge ISAF and the U.S.-ledOperation Enduring Freedom (OEF) under NATO command. (56) This merger is expectedto occur in mid to late 2006 and essentially involves NATO expansion into southern Afghanistanand other volatile regions of the country such as the Pakistani border region. Command arrangementsfor this merger and peacekeeping versus counterterror roles quickly became points of contention formany NATO countries who felt that placing both missions under a single NATO commander wouldbe counterproductive and that having NATO troops keeping the peace and at the same timeconducting combat operations against insurgents would result in widespread Afghan resentment andoverall mission failure. On November 14, NATO agreed to a plan where there would be a singlechain of command for all operations under an ISAF commander, but a deputy commander would bemade responsible for counterinsurgency operations. (57) Under this plan, NATO agreed that British, Dutch, andCanadian troops would spearhead NATO's move into southern Afghanistan while Germany wouldtake over the north, and Italy and Spain would retain responsibility for western Afghanistan. (58) Dutch Concerns Over Deploying to SouthernAfghanistan. The Netherlands currently has approximately 625 troops currentlyserving in Afghanistan and under NATO's expansion plan, are due to provide an additional 1,000to 1,400 troops to serve in Urzuzgan province in the south. (59) The Dutch government,based on a Dutch intelligence service report, are concerned that their forces may be operating in aparticularly dangerous area and have sought assurances that additional military support would beavailable in the event of significant levels of violence in the region. (60) The Dutch government hasgiven Parliament - who are reportedly deeply divided over the issue -- the authority to approve orreject the deployment and a vote on the issue is scheduled for February 2. (61) This situation is causingdifficulty amongst other NATO members, the majority of whom suggest that they would be"hard-pressed" to make up for the Dutch shortfall should the Dutch Parliament vote "No" to sendingforces to the southern region. (62) In this event, the United States, already operating in the region,might be required to make up for the shortfall of forces, possibly affecting recently announced plansto decrease force levels by 2,500 troops. NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, a formerDutch defense minister, is reportedly putting pressure on the Dutch government to honor its troopcommitment and former U.S. Ambassador to the Netherlands, Paul Bremer, reportedly suggestedthat the U.S. Congress might act against Dutch economic interests if Dutch troops are not deployedas planned. (63) While NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, stated that "NATO is committed forthe long term" in Afghanistan (64) some believe that a substantial U.S. military presence will berequired throughout the duration of the NATO-led mission to insure long-term NATO commitment.There are no treaty requirements for NATO members to contribute troops to Afghanistan and NATOhas had difficulties in the past trying to muster sufficient troops and military resources for operationsusing this "pass the hat" approach. Some question how effective NATO will be in its new role, particularly when many of its members are unwilling to place their troops in potentially hostilesituations and only a few member nations are willing to commit their forces to counterterror andcounterinsurgency operations. If only a few NATO's 26 members are willing to engage incounterterror and counterinsurgency operations, then NATO's ability to sustain these operations overan extended period -- against an insurgency that has shown a great deal of resiliency and has shownno signs relenting their attacks against coalition forces -- could be called into question. PRTs are small, civil-military teams originally designed to extend the authority of the Afghancentral government beyond Kabul and to facilitate aid and reconstruction projects. PRTs haveenabled coalition forces to extend a degree of security to outlying regions and have also permittedU.S. forces to establish personal relationships with local Afghan leaders which some believe hashelped to diminish insurgent influence in a number of regions. (65) As of July 2005, therewere 22 PRTs -- 13 supervised by the Coalition and nine by NATO. (66) The 13 PRTs run by theCoalition are located in the south and east -- generally considered to be moderate to high threat areas. Twelve of the PRTs are U.S. and one is run by New Zealand. The nine PRTs administered by NATOare located in the north and west in low to moderate threat areas and cover approximately 50 percentof Afghanistan. Efficacy of PRTs. While overall, the PRTs havebeen described as successful in accomplishing their main missions and have played an importantsupporting role in other endeavors such as training, counter narcotics, and election support, someNATO PRTs have been described as "risk averse" and overly controlled by their nation'spolitical-military leadership. If all PRTs eventually transition to NATO control, some question ifthey can perform as well as PRTs run by the United States and the United Kingdom. One senior U.S. defense official, acknowledging the record of success of PRTs, suggests thatPRTs operate in a "muddled" fashion which has prevented them from having a much greater effecton Afghanistan's future. (67) He attributes this lack of efficacy to four basic factors:inconsistent mission statements; unclear roles and responsibilities; ad hoc preparation; and -- mostimportantly -- limited resources both human, equipment and financial. (68) In order for PRTs toachieve their full potential the Defense official suggests the following improvements: Either create more PRTs or extend the operational reach of the current 22 PRTswith mini-PRTs into key districts throughout Afghanistan; Each PRT should be equipped the best communications possible, additionaltransportation assets, and receive substantially more funding for a diverse array ofprojects; PRTs need a broad range of development and civilian governance expertiseand civilians with the PRTs must have both the authority and resources to play a leadershiprole; The civil-military coordination on PRTs must improvesignificantly; PRTs need to improve their ability to measure the effectiveness of theiractivities. PRTs must determine what activities have the greatest impact on the locals by employinga more rigorous cause and effect analysis; and PRTs should place greater emphasis on capacity-building programs thatimprove local governance and help to link local officials and institutions to the Afghan centralgovernment. (69) Training of the ANA commenced shortly after U.S. and coalition forces defeated Talibanforces in early 2002. The Bonn II Conference on rebuilding Afghanistan in December 2002mandated a 70,000 strong Afghan National Army. (70) Although the Afghan National Army initially experienceddifficulties in terms of morale and desertion at its inception, most analysts agree that the multi-ethnicANA has developed into a credible fighting force and eight of the ANA's most experiencedbattalions have been deployed to bases in the provinces where they routinely work with U.S. andNATO forces. (71) WhileANA soldiers are described as "fearless fighters who learn very quickly," there have been somedifficulties to overcome. (72) U.S. military officials assert that Afghanistan's lack of aprofessional army for the past 13, years, a 20 percent literacy rate amongst recruits, no barracks ormodern equipment, plus an inadequate logistics system have hampered the growth of the ANA. (73) In February 2005, the U.S. military doubled the number of tactical trainers that are embeddedwith ANA units from 300 to 600 soldiers. (74) The majority of these U.S. trainers come from the U.S. ArmyNational Guard and about 16 of these trainers are assigned to each new ANA battalion and assist thebattalion as it undergoes its 14-week basic training course and then remain with the battalion, serving as leadership mentors when the battalion deploys for operations. (75) As of December 20, 2005,the Afghan Army reportedly consisted of almost 27,000 officers and soldiers supported by about55,000 members of the Afghan National Police. (76) While the U.S. military trains the soldiers for the ANA, Francealso assists in training senior officers; Britain trains the non-commissioned officers; and othercountries such as Romania and Mongolia train the ANA on its Soviet-era equipment such as artilleryand tanks. (77) OnOctober 9, Russia reportedly announced that it will supply the ANA with $30 million worth ofequipment - including four helicopters, dozens of vehicles, and communications equipment. (78) In March 2005, U.S.officials began training six ANA battalions simultaneously -- up from 4 battalions per trainingrotation, and they hope that the ANA will reach its mandated strength of 70,000 by the end of 2006-- a full year earlier than previously planned. (79) In addition to infantry units, the ANA has fielded two combatsupport battalions with a 122 mm towed D-30 artillery battery and 82 mm mortars. (80) The ANA has also fieldeda tank battalion, equipped primarily with T-62, T-55, and T-54 Soviet-era tanks, and is to eventuallyalso field a mechanized infantry battalion equipped with U.S.-made M-113 armored personnelcarriers. (81) The Afghan government reportedly seeks to equip its military with high-tech weaponry and develop specialized units. Afghan officials would like to acquire U.S. Apache helicopters, A-10ground attack aircraft, as well as transport aircraft and armored vehicles. (82) According to U.S. militaryofficials, the United States and Afghanistan are discussing the possibility of providing the Afghanmilitary with transport aircraft and helicopters. (83) The Afghans would also like for the United States to assist increating and training commando, engineer, and intelligence units for the ANA. (84) Afghanistan's opium industry is estimated to employ directly or indirectly anywhere between20 to 30 percent of the Afghan population and provides for almost 60 percent of Afghanistan's grossdomestic product (GDP). (86) The cultivation of poppies -- used in making opium for heroin-- which was regulated and taxed under Taliban rule, flourished after the elimination of the Talibanregime. (87) Accordingto a United Nations (U.N.) report, Afghanistan's poppy harvest rose by 64 percent in 2004 -- makingAfghanistan the world's leading source for opium and heroin. (88) In August 2005, the U.N.reported that opium production had decreased by 21 percent from its 2004 level but, even with thisdecrease, Afghanistan still ranks as the world's largest opium supplier, accounting for 87 percent ofthe world's supply, according to the U.N. (89) There is reportedly evidence that the Taliban are orderingincreased poppy production from Afghan farmers in remote regions beyond the government's controlas a means to make money to finance their operations and also to weaken the Afghan centralgovernment. (90) NATO'sSupreme Commander, U.S. Marine General James L. Jones, has reportedly stated that drugs are agreater threat to Afghan security than a resurgent Taliban. (91) In 2005, DOD increased its counternarcotics role in Afghanistan. The U.S. military inAfghanistan supported efforts by Afghan and U.S. agencies such as the Drug Enforcement Agency(DEA) by providing helicopter and cargo aircraft transport and planning and intelligenceassistance. (92) The U.S.Army has reportedly provided training to DEA agents deploying to Afghanistan on weapons, nightvision devices, and how to spot landmines. Britain is in command of the Coalition's military counternarcotics efforts in Afghanistan. Reports suggest that Britain will step up military efforts next year when the ARRC takes overcommand of ISAF and Britain deploys additional forces to Afghanistan. (93) British troops willsupposedly deploy to southern provinces as well as Helmand province in the southwest -- aninsurgent stronghold as well as the center of the country's opium trade. As part of thiscounternarcotics emphasis, Britain is reportedly establishing a joint intelligence fusion center withthe United States to focus on drug-related intelligence and British military officials are trying to gaina better understanding of the "Afghan narco-economy and its links to terrorism." (94) Largely facilitated byCongress, Colombia -- which has resumed diplomatic relations with Afghanistan -- is preparing toassist Afghanistan by providing its counternarcotics expertise to Afghan police and militaryforces. (95) Raids byAfghan police and Coalition forces have enjoyed mixed success, with large amounts of narcoticsbeing seized but often times drug producers and traffickers have eluded capture -- sometimes fleeingacross the border to Pakistan. (96) The U.S. military has only played a supporting role in counternarcotics operations inAfghanistan, despite recognition by some U.S. military officials that drugs are currentlyAfghanistan's primary security problem. With Britain supposedly taking a more active role incounterdrug operations and a decrease of U.S. military presence in southern Afghanistan, some assertthat the United States has all but ceded its counternarcotics responsibilities to NATO and the Afghancentral government. (97) NATO's Supreme Commander has reportedly stated that NATO does not have sufficient funds toaddress Afghanistan's drug trafficking and the Afghan government has been reportedly less thansatisfied with the international community's efforts, particularly in providing alternatives for farmerswho grow poppies. (98) Some suggest that a more aggressive policy towards the Afghan opium problem might be moreeffective in limiting insurgent activities by taking away a significant means of their financial support. The United States is deeply concerned about the potential for Africa to become a breedingground for terrorists -- citing its vast ungoverned spaces and unprotected borders. Somalia has beenreferred to as a "lawless haven for terrorists," (100) and reports suggest that Al Qaeda has opened recruiting basesin Nigeria, Somalia, Tanzania, and Uganda. (101) One report suggests that there is evidence of 17 trainingcenters in Kenya, possibly set up by groups related to Al Qaeda. (102) Others, however,disagree and contend that the region is not the terrorist zone that some U.S. officials assert. (103) These critics suggestthat there are some groups with ties to Al Qaeda in the region but no actual Al Qaeda groups or evenfranchise groups and that U.S. military and financial support to some of the region's military forcescould actually "fuel radicalism where it scarcely exists." (104) The U.S. European Command (U.S. EUCOM), which oversees military operations in mostof Africa, has reported that nearly 400 foreign fighters captured in Iraq have come from Africa andthat some of these veterans of Iraq are returning to places like Morocco and Algeria where theiracquired skills, such as operational planning and bomb making, could be used against theirrespective governments. (105) While terrorism is cited as the primary reason for U.S. militaryoperations in Africa, access to Africa's oil -- which presently accounts for 15 percent of the U.S. oilsupply and could reach 25 percent by 2015 -- is also considered a primary factor for growing U.S.military involvement in the region. (106) In October 2002, the United States established Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) Horn ofAfrica (HOA) to combat terrorism in the region. For the purpose of this operation, the Horn ofAfrica is defined as "the total airspace and land areas out to the high-water mark of Kenya, Somalia,Ethiopia, Sudan, Eritrea, Djibouti, and Yemen." (107) CJTF-HOA is headquartered at Camp Lemonier in Djiboutiand consists of approximately 1,400 personnel including U.S. military and Special Operations Forces(SOF), U.S. civilian, and coalition force members. (108) In addition to CJTF-HOA, Combined Task Force (CTF)150is a naval task force consisting of ships from Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Pakistan,New Zealand, Spain, the United Kingdom and the United States, and has the task of monitoring,inspecting, boarding, and stopping suspect shipping not only in the Horn of Africa region, but alsoin support of Operation Iraqi Freedom. (109) Originally, the reported mission of CJTF-HOA was to conductraids on Al Qaeda targets in the region - particularly Somalia - but due to a lack of targets, themission has instead evolved into gathering intelligence, military training for some of the region'smilitary forces, and building infrastructure and goodwill to create an environment hostile to terroristorganizations. (110) A New Regional Command? DOD isreportedly considering putting Africa -- currently the responsibility of both U.S. European Commandand U.S. Central Command -- under a single, unified command. (111) U.S. EUCOM, basedin Stuttgart, Germany, is responsible for more than 90 countries, with 42 of these countries in Africa,while U.S. CENTCOM - primarily responsible for Afghanistan, Iraq, Iran, and other Persian Gulfcountries -- is responsible for Egypt, Sudan, Ethiopia, Somalia, Kenya, and Djibouti. U.S.CENTCOM, which is focused on wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, supposedly has little in terms ofmanpower and resources to devote to Africa and officials suggest that while such a proposal has beendiscussed for many years, that "the time has arrived to do something." One suggestion would involveexpanding the area that CJTF- HOA is responsible for, taking advantage of the command structurepresently in Djibouti. Some say this suggestion has merit as one official noted that "competingresources leave little room for new staffs and command elements." While CJTF-HOA might formthe basis for a new regional "U.S. Africa Command," analysts suggest that, at present, the commandis under-resourced and low on DOD's priority list -- noting that the command has only three CH-53transport helicopters and one C-130 transport at its disposal and the troops that are assigned toCJTF-HOA arrive on very short 4 to 6 month rotations. (112) While CJTF- HOA and Camp Lemonier may provide a basisfor such a command, most agree that additional personnel augmentation and resources would berequired. CJTF-HOA Change of Command. In 2006 theU.S. Navy will take over command of CJTF-HOA and assume responsibility for its mission fromthe U.S. Marines Corps, in part to free up Marine forces currently stretched by operations inAfghanistan and Iraq, (113) and the creation of a 2,500 Marine Special OperationsCommand. In addition, the United States has reportedly expressed an interest in expanding activitiesinto Uganda, Tanzania, and possibly Eritrea as well as bringing in troops from foreign nations intoCJTF-HOA, which has 15 officers from various nations serving on its staff but no foreign troopsunder its command. DOD is also reportedly looking for alternative sites for CJTF-HOAheadquarters, as Djibouti has reportedly doubled its yearly rent for the facilities at Camp Lemonierto $ 30 million U.S. dollars. Candidates for new headquarters locations include Ethiopia, Kenya, andUganda but each location has its own political sensitivities. U.S. officials note that CJTF-HOA couldbe headquartered on a U.S. Navy command ship at sea, such as the USS Mount Whitney, as it waswhen CJTF-HOA was first formed in 2002. The government of the Philippines, a long-time major non-NATO ally of the United States,faces an insurgency threat from four primary groups -- three Islamic groups who seek anindependent state in Mindanao and one Communist group which seeks a Marxist state. (115) One group inparticular, the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG), has reported financial and training links to Al Qaeda andhas become the focus of the Administration's counterterror efforts in the region. (116) Estimates vary on thesize of Abu Sayyaf -- ranging from one thousand to a couple of hundred fighters -- and theiractivities were largely aimed at the Philippine government until 2001 when allegations emerged thatAbu Sayyaf had been involved in planning the assassination of the Pope during a planned visit to thePhilippines and also had plans to hijack and destroy 12 U.S. airliners. (117) Philippine authoritiesreportedly suspect that Abu Sayyaf had a role in the October 2002 bombing near a Philippinemilitary base, which killed three Filipinos and one U.S. Army Special Forces soldier. (118) Another group, the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), with an estimated 10,000 fighters,is presently involved in negotiations with the Philippine government, but there is reported evidencethat the MILF provides training facilities to the Al Qaeda affiliate Jemaah Islamiyah -- an Islamicgroup based largely in Indonesia. (119) U.S. military operations in the Philippines are limited by the Philippine constitution (foreignmilitary forces are not permitted to participate in combat operations on Filipino territory) toconducting training in counterinsurgency and counterterrorism tactics, advising Filipino units, andparticipating in civil-military operations. The focus of civil-military operations is to limit theinfluence of insurgents with the local population, particularly in the southern region where most AbuSayyaf and other Islamic insurgent group activity is focused. The United States has been conducting large joint training exercises with the Philippinessince 1981 called the Balikatan exercises (120) as well as a variety of other training exercises. On October 22,2005 the U.S. Navy's Forward Deployed Amphibious Readiness Group and the 31st MarineExpeditionary Unit (MEU) arrived in the Philippines to begin Amphibious Landing Exercise(PHIBLEX) 06. (121) In addition to amphibious operations, U.S. and Filipino military personnel also planned to conductcommunity service projects at a number of Filipino elementary schools and medical civil actionprograms during the exercise. On January 16, about 30 U.S. Army special forces soldiers from theFt. Lewis, Washington-based 1st Special Forces Group and about 250 Filipino soldiers began smallunit tactics, marksmanship, and combat lifesaver training about 560 miles southeast of Manila in anarea known to be frequented by Abu Sayyaf and Jemaah Islamiyah. (122) The U.S. specialforces units also planned to conduct medical missions in the local communities in an effort to winover the local Muslim populations. (123) The United States has frequently conducted lower-leveltraining exercises with specialized Filipino counterterrorism and counterinsurgency forces. (124) This training, typicallyinvolving no more than 100 U.S. Special Forces troops at one time, focuses on the training ofindividuals and small units on planning, tactics, and techniques and also on specializedcounterterrorism equipment provided to the Philippine Armed Forces. Reportedly, the United Stateshas also begun counter-drug training with the Philippines, which is considered a major drugtranshipment center and a major regional producer of marijuana. (125) The Balikatan exercise for 2006 is scheduled to start on Febraury 20 and run for two weeks,involving more than 5,000 U.S. military personnel. (126) In addition to ground, air, and naval exercises, U.S. andFilipino forces plan to conduct humanitarian, medical, and engineering operations on Jolo island-- an area where Islamic insurgents are particularly active. (127) Some suggest that U.S. involvement in the Philippines is part of a greater U.S. strategy tocombat Islamic terrorism throughout Southeast Asia. (128) Some U.S. officials reportedly believe that Abu Sayyaf andthe Moro Islamic Liberation Front have established connections with Jemaah Islamiyah, an Al Qaedaaffiliate operating across Indonesia and the Philippines, who are believed to be responsible for astring of bombings including Bali in 2002 and the Davao bombings in 2003. (129) A May 2005 reportsuggests that Abu Sayyaf has developed a "training relationship and operational alliance" withJemaah Islamiyah that could lead to new capabilities for Abu Sayyaf. (130) While some note therelative success of joint U.S.-Filipino training exercises in combating Abu Sayyaf, others warn thatincreasing U.S. involvement could "complicate" the Philippine's insurgency dilemma and alsopossibly fuel anti-American sentiment in the region, which could form the basis "of a newpan-Islamic solidarity in the region." (131) Some experts contend that not all militant Muslim groupsoperating in Southeast Asia are aligned with Al Qaeda, and it is important that U.S. counterterrorefforts in the region "do not motivate these potential affiliates to join the Al Qaeda cause." (132) Colombia occupies a unique position in the Administration's global war on terror in that itstargeted terrorist groups are Marxist as opposed to Islamic-based and have no reported links to AlQaeda or other Islamic groups. U.S. military involvement began in 2000 under "Plan Colombia" andwas limited to training Colombian counternarcotics units, although U.S. forces now train theColombian military in counterinsurgency operations. Colombia has been involved for almost fortyyears in what some describe as a civil war and others describe as a counterinsurgency campaignagainst three major groups. The first two groups, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the National Liberation Army (ELN) started in the 1950s as Marxist revolutionarygroups but reportedly have lost most of their ideological support and have transformed into violentcriminal organizations. (134) The other group, the rightist United Self-Defense Forces ofColombia (AUC) is a conglomerate of illegal self-defense groups formed in rural areas where theColombian government did not exert a strong presence. (135) All three groups allegedly fund their activities through drugrevenues (136) and areon the Administration's official list of terrorist organizations. (137) These groups alsocurrently hold a number of Colombian and foreign hostages whom they use as negotiating leverage-- including three U.S. defense contractors who were taken by the FARC in February 2003 whentheir plane was shot down. (138) On December 12, 2005, the Colombian government said thatit would withdraw its forces from a contested area if the FARC would agree to talks intended toexchanged jailed rebels for 59 hostages being held by the FARC -- including the three U.S. defensecontractors. (139) The majority of U.S. military personnel in Colombia are from the U.S. Army's 7th SpecialForces Group stationed at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. About 200 special forces soldiers are currentlyserving as trainers, where they are limited to training in garrison and planning support atheadquarters, and another 200 troops provide "information support" providing intelligence,leadership, and planning support. (140) U.S. forces reportedly do not accompany or serve as advisorsto Colombian units conducting combat operations. (141) While some have criticized the military contribution made byU.S. trainers as "small," U.S. forces in Colombia claim that the training that they have provided tothe Colombian military has resulted in killing or capturing more than 600 insurgents, the confiscationof huge amounts of arms and ammunition, and the destruction of numerous drug labs. (142) On December13, 2005,a U.S. Navy SH-60B Seahawk helicopter crashed shortly after taking off from the frigate USSDeWert, killing its three-person crew. (143) The USS DeWert was reportedly involved in counterdrugoperations at the time of the helicopter's crash. (144) On December 12, after extensive negotiations, 1,923 members of the United Self DefenseForces of Colombia (AUC) demobilized, also surrendering a large arsenal of weapons andequipment, including two helicopters. (145) Reportedly, the demobilized fighters will receive a $168 permonth stipend from the Colombian government, as well as housing, healthcare, schooling, and newidentities to reintegrate them back into Colombian society. (146) Approximately 8,000AUC paramilitaries remain to be demobilized. (147) On December 16, the National Liberation Army (ELN) andthe Colombian government announced that talks had been convened in Havana, Cuba to begin aformal peace process. (148) The ELN is believed to have about 4,000 members and peacetalks held in 2003 failed, reportedly due to an inability to agree to a framework for negotiations. (149) The FARC, after having spent the last two years on the defensive as a result of the Colombiangovernment's "Plan Patriota" to recapture FARC-held territory, have launched an aggressivecountry-wide campaign against the Colombian government, likely aimed to influence Colombia's2006 presidential elections. (150) According to reports, the FARC has restructured from a larger"front" (about 100 or so guerillas) to companies of 54 and squads of 12 to avoid casualties inflictedby Colombian air force bombings directed by U.S. intelligence sources. The FARC has alsoincreased the use of improvised explosive devices, landmines, and snipers, particularly in areaswhere force ratios do not favor FARC offensive actions against government forces. Since February2005, more than 100 members of the Colombian military have been reported killed by the FARC and732 soldiers have been reported killed since January 2004 -- with more than a third of them killedby land mines and explosive devices. On December 27, 2005 the FARC reportedly killed 24Colombian soldiers who were protecting coca-eradication workers near the Town of Vista Hermosain southern Colombia. (151) This attack was preceded 10 days earlier by an attack thatkilled eight Colombian police officers and some suggest that these attacks will continue during therun up to Colombia's presidential primary in March 2006 and continue through the national electionin May. (152) Congress may opt to examine a number of issues concerning NATO's assumption ofcommand of ISAF and Operation Enduring Freedom in 2006. Some possible issues include: Is there a formal transition plan for the transfer of command toNATO?; What will be the U.S. military role in the NATO commandstructure?; How much say will NATO have in security and stability operations andoffensive operations designed to destroy the Taliban/Al Qaeda insurgency? Will NATO be able to"overrule" the United States or change existing policies? Will NATO assumption of command leadto a less vigorous pursuit of insurgents?; What are NATO's long-term plans to provide adequate forces for security andstability and offensive operations? Has NATO secured commitments from NATO members fortroops and military resources for at least the next ten years or will NATO continue to "pass the hat"to obtain forces needed for Afghanistan?; Does NATO have a comprehensive and effective counternarcotics plan forAfghanistan?; and Does NATO have a long-term strategy to transition all security and offensivemilitary operations to the Afghan government and its armed forces andpolice? Congress might act to review current Administration and DOD policy concerning the U.S.military role in Afghan counternarcotics operations. While the insurgency remains a threat, theperformance of the ANA and the progress made toward governance, suggest that the Afghan nationalgovernment and Coalition are successfully meeting these challenges. Some suggest that, despite theprogress made to date, Afghanistan's burgeoning drug trade has the potential to undermine theAfghan government and provide the Taliban with the financial resources needed to perpetuate theinsurgency indefinitely. The current U.S. military role in counternarcotics operations is limited to training, planningsupport, and the transport of police and troops. The rationale provided in the past for limited U.S.military involvement in Afghan counterdrug operations was that active involvement "was notachievable given U.S. force levels in Afghanistan" and that it could "significantly undermine itscounterinsurgency campaign." (153) While the United States has gone from a "no participation"policy to a supporting role, critics suggest that a more active role is now essential. Some suggest thatU.S. strategy in this regard is contradictory -- senior U.S. military leadership describes the Afghandrug trade as the most significant security problem facing Afghanistan yet it appears that somebelieve that the U.S. is ceding its responsibilities in counternarcotics operations at a time that suchefforts should be intensified. It is possible that Congress may explore in greater detail how Africa not only fits into theAdministration's long term strategy for the war on terror but also what the Administration's specificstrategy is for Africa, if such a strategy exists. While Combined Joint Task Force Horn of Africa(CJTF-HOA) has been in existence for almost three years, little is publicly known about theselong-term commitments to the region in terms of overall strategy and what resources -- both militaryand financial -- would be required to implement such a strategy, particularly if the Administrationintends to expand operations to other African nations. Congress may also choose to review with DOD, the prospects for establishing a separateregional command for Africa. While there appears to be a number of arguments favoring such acourse of action, there are also political and resource issues that might be examined in great detail.Security for such a headquarters, if it is placed in Africa, could also be a significant issue fordiscussion, given the volatile nature of the region. Removing Africa from U.S. CENTCOM's andU.S. EUCOM's responsibility could also have political and resource implications. Reports that Abu Sayaaf and Jemaah Islamiyah are developing a training relationship andoperational alliance suggest to some the potential for an increase in terrorist activities throughoutSoutheast Asia. While the majority of these activities would likely be against regional governments,the potential exists for attacks against U.S. concerns and citizens in the region. U.S. military presenceand ongoing operations in the region are considered by some as modest at best and might do littleto deter attacks or assist U.S. regional allies in pursuing those responsible. Given this possibility,Congress might act to review the adequacy of U.S. military forces in the region as well as theircurrent mandate in terms of training and advising regional military forces. Congress may decide to examine the progress being made against the FARC by theU.S.-trained Colombian military. While reports of demobilization and peace talks by the otherinsurgent groups are considered promising by some, others note that the FARC continues itscampaign against the Colombian government, adopting some of the tactics employed successfullyby insurgents in Afghanistan and Iraq. Some reports also suggest that while Colombian militaryoperations against the FARC have enjoyed a degree of success, that joint U.S.-Colombiancounternarcotics operations have done little to stem the supply of cocaine. (154) Critics note that profitsfrom drug operations finance the FARC and suggest that drastically reducing narcotics-related profitswould have a significant impact on the FARC's ability to sustain operations against the Colombianmilitary. 

Summary: U.S. military operations in Afghanistan, Africa, the Philippines, and Colombia are part of theU.S.-initiated Global War on Terrorism (GWOT). These operations cover a wide variety of combatand non-combat missions ranging from combating insurgents, to civil affairs and reconstructionoperations, to training military forces of other nations in counternarcotics, counterterrorism, andcounterinsurgency tactics. Numbers of U.S. forces involved in these operations range from 19,000to just a few hundred. Some have argued that U.S. military operations in these countries areachieving a degree of success and suggest that they may offer some lessons that might be applied inIraq as well as for future GWOT operations. Potential issues for the second session of the 109thCongress include NATO assumption of responsibility for operations in Afghanistan, counterdrugoperations in Afghanistan, a long-term strategy for Africa, and developments in Colombia and thePhilippines. This report will not discuss the provision of equipment and weapons to countries wherethe U.S. military is conducting counterterrorism operations (1) nor will it address Foreign Military Sales (FMS), which are alsoaspects of the Administration's GWOT military strategy. This report will be updated on a periodicbasis.