RS20787 -- Army Transformation and Modernization: Overview and Issues for Congress Updated March 11, 2004 Modernization is not a new issue or objective for U.S. military forces, but it has taken on new urgency because of: the post-Cold War downsizing andprocurement reductions, the new global environment and unexpected requirements, and the promise of a "revolutionin military affairs" (RMA) suggested byrapid developments in computers, communications, and guidance systems. The last notable surge in modernizationculminated during the "Reagan build-up" ofthe 1980's. Weapons and doctrines developed and fielded in that era made fundamental contributions to UnitedStates successes in the Cold War, the Gulf War,and Kosovo. For the Army, such weapons included the M1 Abrams tank, M2 Bradley armored fighting vehicle,Apache attack helicopter, Blackhawk utilityhelicopter, and Patriot air defense system. During post-Cold War downsizing, the Army greatly decreased purchase of new equipment and largely deferred development of a next generation of weapons,with notable exceptions being R&D for a howitzer, the Crusader, and a reconnaissance helicopter, theComanche. (1) Much older equipment was retired. Modernization was approached through upgrading and inserting new technologies into previously acquired"legacy," systems. Information technology wasseen as the most immediate, promising aspect of RMA. It exploited Desert Storm successes such as pinpointtargeting and navigation, while addressingproblems such as friendly fire casualties. A major initiative was launched in the 1990's to create Army Force XXI,based on the "digitization" of thebattlefield, now dubbed "network-centric warfare." Modern computers and communications systems would connectall weapons systems and give U.S. soldiersand commanders advantages in situational awareness and speed of decisions. (2) One heavy, mechanized division at Fort Hood, TX was so equipped in 2001and was battle tested in Iraq in 2003. Other units were at least partially equipped and trained with this capabilitybefore commitment in Iraq. Even before Desert Storm, the "battlefield" was changing as the Army was called upon to respond to numerous, lengthy operations short of war rather thanoccasionally to defeat a large army. Near-term readiness became a problem as fewer troops were asked to covermore missions, and operation and maintenance(O&M) funds were diverted from fixing aging equipment and facilities to pay for unbudgeted deployments suchas Bosnia (funds eventually replaced in part byemergency supplemental appropriations). The problem of rapidly projecting heavy forces had been highlightedbeginning with the long buildup required for Desert Shield/Desert Storm in 1990-91. In 1999, it was suggested that an Army task force inserted intoAlbania for potential action in Kosovo was too heavyfor rapid air insertion and the unimproved roads and bridges found there. The Army determined that a newcapability was needed in addition to mobile, lightforces and heavy, lethal forces - a medium, lethal force. In October 1999, the Army announced its priority program to transform into a force that could better meet future requirements to be both rapidly deployable andlethal. The first step was near-term fielding of a new unit, first called the Interim Brigade Combat Team but nowcalled the Stryker Brigade Combat Team(SBCT), based on a wheeled armored vehicle much lighter than the standard M2 Bradley. For the long-term, theArmy is developing a Future Combat System(FCS) based on new technologies that would equip very mobile formations with lethality and survivability equalor greater than that of present heavy units. Until the FCS is fielded, the Army believes it must also continue to maintain and upgrade legacy weapons systems(e.g., M1, M2, etc.) and equipment in unitsthat can meet any potential foe across the spectrum of conflict. These Legacy, Interim, and Objective Forces wouldeventually meld into the transformedObjective Force of the future. In Summer of 2003, the new Army Chief of Staff emphasized that the Army was atwar and transforming. The Current Forcewould incorporate usable technology and other ideas being developed for the Future Force without waiting, movingtowards the Future Force while fighting theGlobal War on Terrorism. He also began a short term reorganization of the active Army from 33 to 48 combatbrigade modules using existing resources and atemporary increase of 30,000 in soldier end strength. (4) Stryker Force. The Army is fielding a new capability based on the SBCT. This unit is designed formaximum strategic and operational mobility in that its equipment can be airlifted inter-theater in all U.S. cargoaircraft, including the comparatively smallC-130 Hercules. All vehicles weigh less than 20 tons. The goal is that a SBCT could be completely moved to acombat zone within 96 hours. It is an infantrybrigade of about 3,500 soldiers with the armored mobility needed to fight on a mid-intensity battlefield. Particularstrengths are an included reconnaissance andintelligence battalion and "network-centric" command, control, and communications (C3) systems. The effort beganearly in 2000 at Fort Lewis, WA, wheretwo existing brigades were converted, using temporary, borrowed equipment. In November, 2000 the Army selected the Light Armored Vehicle III (LAV III), built by General Motors Defense and General Dynamics Land Systems, as its"interim armored vehicle" under a six year contract worth $4 billion. (5) Some 2,131 LAV III's, now called Strykers, will be procured. They willinclude twovehicle variants, an infantry carrier with eight additional configurations and a mobile gun system with a 105 mmcannon. The vehicle can negotiate flatsurfaces at 62 mph, convert to 8-wheel drive off-road, and self-recover with its winch if needed. As of early 2004,the first Stryker Brigade was conductingstability operations in a sector of Iraq. Plans also include procurement of the Joint Lightweight 155 mm Howitzerfor the Brigade's included field artillery --an Army-Marine program, with an estimated cost of about $1.1 billion, aiming for Army initial operating capability(IOC) at the end of 2004. Future Force. For the long-term, the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency and the Army beganwork on some 25 critical technologies for incorporation into R&D of new systems to be selected as early as2006, with fielding to begin by 2008 and IOC by2010. (6) A key component is expected to be a FutureCombat System (FCS) that could, as one capability, assume the role currently held by the Abrams tank. Itis intended to be as transportable and mobile as the Stryker, with lethality and crew survivability equivalent to orgreater than that of today's tanks. The FCSmay, however, bear little or no resemblance to today's tanks and could feature advanced technologies such asrobotics and electric guns and facilitate newoperational doctrines. The FCS currently encompasses some 18 subsystems and the network to tie them together. Boeing Company and Science ApplicationsInternational Corp. were selected as the lead system integrator. As of September 2002, the Army had budgeted $20billion to develop FCS. FutureForce units will also incorporate ongoing developments in information technology. They should respond to allrequirements from stability operations tohigh-intensity conflict. Current Force. Until the Future Force exists, the Army must be prepared to fight with legacy equipment,whether on low or high-intensity battlegrounds. According to Army planners, programs to replace and/or upgradeolder equipment must continue if forces otherthan or additional to 6 new Stryker Brigades are to be ready for combat. The ongoing program to replace old truckswill continue. Older models of the Abramstank and the Bradley fighting vehicles will continue to be rebuilt and upgraded. The current force will have manyM1A2 SEP (for Systems EnhancementPackage) and M1A1D tanks and M2A3 and M2A2ODS with applique Bradley's. Inserting these vehicles into theforce will aid the whole Army in convertingto a digitized force. Although modernization of the current force is important, the Army sacrificed manypreviously desired programs to free funds fortransformation priorities. Examples are a dedicated Command and Control vehicle, the Grizzly Breacher engineervehicle, and the Wolverine assault bridgevehicle. The 107th and 108th Congresses gave strong support to Army modernization and transformation initiatives. At the same time, Congress showed caution bypressing a requirement to compare the wheeled LAV III with similar tracked vehicles already in inventory. TheArmy believes its evaluation demonstrated thatbuying Stryker was more desirable than converting the M113A3 APC. (7) Whether the 108th Congress will continue to support Armytransformation as a highpriority will depend on its evaluation of issues such as those discussed below. Desirability. All Services have felt pressures to "transform," or at least adapt to current circumstances andexperiences with the post-Cold War world. These include opportunities and challenges from a rush of technologicaladvances, unexpected numbers and typesof missions (particularly peacekeeping and urban warfare requirements), new threats from potential enemies withnuclear, chemical, or biological weapons, and,for the Army, criticism that it was not "nimble" enough during 1999 allied operations in Kosovo. The broadest long-term question is whether current transformation plans will yield the military forcecapabilities the United States requires 20 years from now. Should they include a power projection Army capable of fighting equally well across the full spectrum of groundcombat; or, should other services or entitiesassume some parts of that mission? Will Army plans over-stress DoD airlift assets, or would more reliance on fastsealift yield greater flexibility andeconomies? Internally, has the Army sought the right approach to transformation with its emphasis onmedium-weight formations? Does the Army's planstrike the right balance in allocating resources between modernizing the current legacy force and developing andfielding the Future Force? For the short term, it is projected that some amount of modernization for current forces is needed to prevent further aging and degradation. The average age ofthe M1 tank fleet is now 11.9 years and an estimated 11.7 years for support vehicles. (8) Many of these vehicles may not be able to remain in service beyond2030 without some form of service life extension. Deciding the proper allocation of resources is made morecomplex by the large numbers and diverse typesof vehicles and weapons systems in the Army, which makes it difficult to gather and present desirable data, that isboth comprehensive and aggregated, onequipment age, condition, and potential combat effectiveness. The Navy, in managing a fleet of about 315 ships,may have an easier job describing the level ofinvestment needed to maintain a fleet of a given size over time. (9) Congress may consider recommending that the Army attempt to develop some aggregateportrayal of its fleet capitalization status and implications of various funding strategies. Feasibility. The Army plan for transformation is considered aggressive. But, by using largely off-the-shelfmateriel, the "interim Stryker force is fairly low risk for meeting technology objectives. After an initial slip of 16months, a contractor's protest, and initialhesitation by the incoming Bush Administration, deliveries of Strykers are now supporting the fielding of 6 SBCTs,to be completed by May 2010. (10) Plans for the Future Force involve higher risk in both technology and time. It is possible that integration of all the specific FCS technologies into a leap-aheadsystem will experience some problems. The goal of fielding the first unit of this system of 18 systems by 2010 isvery ambitious. (11) Previoussystem-development efforts of this kind have often encountered technical problems, schedule problems, or both. The need for the Comanche helicopter, forexample, was identified in 1979 and it had not yet entered production when cancelled in 2004. The original targetdate proposed for FCS, 2023, may be morerealistic but it also raised concerns regarding duration of development. Congress will likely influence the priorityand speed with which the FCS becomesreality. Affordability. Some question the Army's ability to finance its transformation plan, particularly given aninability in recent years to finance many procurement programs at desired rates. Can the Army adequately financeall three elements of its plan at once, whilealso providing adequate funds for necessary non-transformation priorities such as readiness and pay and benefits? The life-cycle cost for equipping 6 brigadeswith LAV III's has been estimated by program officials at $9 billion through FY2032. (12) This will only be part of the total cost to transform and modernize theArmy; some have estimated that the Army requires a sustained increment of $10 billion annually beyond its averagepost-Cold War expenditures for R&D andprocurement. The Army is not alone in claiming a need for more investment funds. Other Services cite even highernumbers. (13) An issue that will confront Congress is whether to fund Army transformation and modernization efforts at levels proposed by the Bush Administration, orhigher or lower. If Congress ascribes a higher priority to Army transformation, will necessary funds be providedby adding to overall DoD appropriations,subtracting from DoD programs in other services, or reducing deployments? During the FY2003 budget cycle, DoD expressed its intent to cut acquisition programs that do not meet its definition of "transformational" in favor of those thatdo. Its prime example was the Army's Crusader Howitzer program. DoD cut Crusader and allocated the savingsto several other advanced fire support systemsin development. Congress reluctantly endorsed the action with the proviso that Crusader expertise be rolled intothe FCS program. As part of its appropriationsresponsibilities, the 108th Congress may choose to enforce DoD's implied promise to supportadequately fire support throughout the FCS developmentprogram. (14) Wheels or Tracks and How Many Stryker Brigades? An early issue to confront the Army was whether theInterim Force should use tracked or wheeled armored vehicles, or some combination. (15) Traditionally, the U.S. Army has favored tracks for its combatvehicles; with their low ground pressure and greater traction, they generally perform better off roads on difficultterrain. Wheels generally perform better onroads in terms of speed, agility, and quietness. After reviewing proposals, the Army selected the wheeled LAV IIIfrom General Motors, and named it Stryker. Critics of the decision, including some current and former members of Congress, continue to argue for a reversalor curtailment of the Stryker decision. (16) TheArmy defends its case strongly and DoD has not intervened. The question of whether the FCS will be based onwheels, tracks, or a combination remains open. DoD has, however, raised questions about the ultimate number and stationing of SBCT's. In the past, it requested the Army consider stationing one of the sixunits in Europe and thhe first one is now on station in Europe. More recently it suggested that units five and sixnot be funded unless they could be "spiraldeveloped" into much more transformational formations. It appears, however, that funding for all 6 SBCT's willnow be requested. The combination of theseevents and considerations could, however, open prior decisions to station SBCT's in Hawaii and Alaska to debateand thus create political complications. (17) The 108th Congress may play an important role in resolving the ultimate disposition of the proposedSBCT Force.

Summary: The U.S. Army continues an ambitious program intended to transform itself into astrategically responsive forcedominant in all types of ground operations. As planned, its Future Force will eventually meld all ongoing initiativesinto a force based on a high-tech FutureCombat System (FCS). Its Current Force is beginning to provide a new combat capability, based oncurrent-technology armored vehicles, for the mid-intensitycombat operations that seem prevalent in today's world. Its current "legacy force" of existing systems is beingmodernized and maintained to ensure effectivelight and heavy force capabilities until the Future Force is realized. This short report briefly describes the programand discusses issues of feasibility, viability,and affordability of potential interest to Congress. It will be updated as events warrant.