U.S. policy since the mid-1950s has been to maintain a stockpile of at least several thousandnuclear weapons (active and inactive) for the indefinite future. The Bush Administration reaffirmedthis policy in its Nuclear Posture Review, briefed to Congress in early 2002. (1) This report deals withan element the Administration views as necessary for continued maintenance of the stockpile,resuming production of "pits," a key component of nuclear warheads. (2) U.S. nuclear warheads include a primary and a secondary stage. The primary stage has a layer of chemical explosive surrounding a shell of fissile metal -- all warheads in the stockpile useplutonium -- and other components. Detonating the explosive compresses the fissile metal so muchthat it can sustain a fission chain reaction. The resulting nuclear explosion triggers a secondarystage, which through fission and fusion produces most of the warhead's explosive yield. In theprimary, the components inside the explosive make up what is called the pit. Of these components,the plutonium shell is by far the hardest to make. When completed, the pit is sealed to protect itfrom air and moisture. From 1952 to 1989, Rocky Flats Plant, under the supervision of the Department of Energy (DOE) and its predecessor agencies, used industrial-scale processes to manufacture many thousandsof pits for deployed weapons. All weapons now in the U.S. stockpile use pits made there. (LosAlamos and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratories fabricated hundreds of one-of-a-kind pitsfor nuclear tests.) Following a 1989 raid by agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and othersto investigate suspected environmental, safety, and health violations, (3) DOE suspended Rocky Flats'pit manufacturing operations in 1989, and permanently closed these operations in 1992. Thus, since1989, the United States has had no capability to build pits of the quality and quantity that DOEdeems necessary for use in the stockpile. DOE stated in February 2004, "Today, the United Statesis the only nuclear weapons power without sufficient capability to manufacture stockpile-certifiedplutonium pits required to sustain its nuclear arsenal." (4) The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), a semiautonomous agency within DOE that Congress established in 1999, manages the nuclear weapons complex -- the labs, plants, andtest site for nuclear warhead R&D, production, maintenance, etc. It is thus responsible for restoringpit production. NNSA holds that the inability to build pits could impair the nuclear stockpile, for reasons such as the following. Each year, NNSA monitors some warheads for defects. Most of these warheads can be put back into the stockpile, but a few undergo more extensive tests that precludetheir reuse. These latter tests include destruction of pits. Therefore, when DOE built pits forstockpile weapons, it built some spares to replace pits expected to be destroyed over a warhead'sdesign life. Now, warheads are expected to remain in the stockpile far beyond their design lives. Unless new pits are made by the time spares are used up, tests that consume pits would force theremoval of deployed warheads from the stockpile. Based on current data, NNSA anticipates that pits will last for decades, but will eventually deteriorate. If that proves to be the case, NNSA would ultimately have to replace all pitsthat remain in the stockpile beyond that time. Without replacement pits, if a type of pit develops certain kinds of defects, NNSA might have to withdraw from service all warheads using that pit. If NNSA designs new nuclear warheads in the future, it would probably need new pits for them. NNSA now stores thousands of pits from retired warheads. In theory, newwarhead designs might incorporate stored pits. However, any aging problems would affect storedpits as well as deployed pits, so that NNSA cannot count on using existing pits in futurewarheads. The Nuclear Posture Review presents the Administration's general policy guidance for nuclear weapons and related defense elements, including infrastructure. While it isclassified, NNSA said that the review "stated that the ability to produce pits is important to ensurethe future viability of the nation's nuclear deterrent." (5) The Pit Manufacturing and Certification Campaign is NNSA's effort to restore pit production. Campaigns are "focused scientific and engineering efforts" whose goal is "to develop and maintainspecial capabilities and tools needed for continued certification of the stockpile, now and into thefuture, in the absence of underground nuclear testing." (6) This campaign seeks to manufacture andcertify one type of pit in the short term, restore the capability to build other pit types in theintermediate term, and build a higher-capacity manufacturing facility for the long term. This sectiondiscusses the elements of this campaign; "Congressional Actions," below, discusses congressionalhandling of this campaign. Table 1 presents estimated funding. The FY2005 request document isthe first to include detailed out-year budget projections (in this case through FY2009) generatedthrough the Future-Years Nuclear Security Program, providing a window into future plans. The basis for the Pit Manufacturing and Certification Campaign was a record of decision on stockpile stewardship, published December 26, 1996, in which DOE "decided to ... reestablish pitfabrication capability, with a small capacity, at the Los Alamos National Laboratory." (7) DOEestimated requirements at 20 pits per year to replace pits destroyed in surveillance testing, but alsoclaimed that with the capability to produce all types of pits in the stockpile, it could produce "about50 pits per year in single shift operations." It judged the latter rate would be sufficient for the next10 years or more, rejected larger capacity because of small current demand and the long periodbefore added capacity might be needed, and raised the prospect of greater capacity in the future. (8) Rocky Flats Plant ceased production abruptly when it was only part-way through the planned production run of pits for the W88, a nuclear warhead used on the Trident II submarine-launchedballistic missile. Only one W88 pit remains for destructive evaluation. (9) Accordingly, the mosturgent short-term need of the current pit program is to produce and certify W88 pits. To accomplishthese tasks, the W88 pit effort has two main elements within the Pit Manufacturing and CertificationCampaign -- W88 Pit Manufacturing and W88 Pit Certification. A third element, Pit CampaignSupport Activities at NTS, mainly involves subcritical experiments at the Nevada Test Site toprovide data that NNSA requires for W88 pit certification. Table 1. Pit Manufacturing and Certification Campaign Budget, FY2001-FY2009 (Budget Authority, $ millions) Abbreviation: NTS, Nevada Test Site. Source: FY2001 Support Activities at NTS figure was provided by NNSA March 3, 2004. OtherFY2001 data: U.S. Department of Energy. Office of Management, Budget and Evaluation/CFO, FY2003 Congressional Budget Request. vol. 1, National Nuclear Security Administration. DOE/ME-0001, February 2002, p. 170. FY2002 data: U.S. Department of Energy. Office ofManagement, Budget and Evaluation/CFO, FY 2004 Congressional Budget Request. vol. 1, NationalNuclear Security Administration. DOE/ME-0016, February 2003, p. 225. FY2003-FY2009 data:U.S. Department of Energy. Office of Management, Budget and Evaluation/CFO. FY 2005Congressional Budget Request, vol. 1, National Nuclear Security Administration. DOE/ME-0032,February 2004, p. 147. Note: The Pit Manufacturing and Certification Campaign began in FY2001. Before then, pit fundswere scattered in other programs, so earlier cost data are not available. The current Future-YearsNuclear Security Program projects funds out to FY2009; data beyond then are not available. a. For FY2004, the pit campaign was reduced from $298.5 million to $296.8 million as a result ofthe omnibus rescission of 0.59 percent. The reduction was all applied to W88 pit manufacturing;the amount appropriated for that component was $126.7 million. Source for the latter figure: U.S. Congress. Committee of Conference. Making Appropriations for Energy and Water Developmentfor the Fiscal Year Ending September 30, 2004, and for Other Purposes. 108th Congress,1st Session, H.Rept. 108-357 , USGPO, p. 158. b. FY2008 and FY2009 funding for W88 Pit Manufacturing is currently included in Directed Stockpile Work. NNSA estimates that the cost for this activity will be $110 million a year for eachof these two years. These amounts do not appear in Table 1, which presents funding for Campaigns. As Table 1 shows, NNSA projects that W88 Pit Manufacturing will remain in the Pit Manufacturing and Certification Campaign through FY2007. In the FY2005 budget submission,W88 Pit Manufacturing continues in FY2008 and beyond in a different part of NNSA's WeaponsActivities budget, Directed Stockpile Work (DSW), which is direct work on warheads currently inthe stockpile. This was originally planned to mark the transition from manufacturing that supportedcertification to interim production of W88 pits. Pit Campaign Support Activities at NTS is notbudgeted in FY2007 because subcritical experiments to support the W88 are planned to becompleted in FY2006. Similarly, W88 Pit Certification budgets are planned to end after FY2008as a result of expected certification in FY2007. By way of background, the term "certifiable," and the four-year gap between delivery of a certifiable pit and a "certified" or "war reserve" pit, have caused much confusion. Certifiable pitsmeet quality control and process standards; certified pits meet product performance standards. Acertifiable pit is manufactured using processes meeting standards set by the laboratory that designedthe weapon and approved by NNSA. A war reserve pit is one that NNSA has determined to meetengineering and physics standards to be accepted for use in deployed nuclear weapons. NNSA haslaunched a major effort to establish that certifiable pits meet these product standards. It holds thatit needs this effort because Los Alamos manufactures pits using different methods and equipmentthan did Rocky Flats. Rocky Flats pits were proven to work in underground nuclear tests at theNevada Test Site. The U.S. nuclear test moratorium, which started in 1992 and continues to thepresent, bars similar tests on pits manufactured at Los Alamos. NNSA plans to provide the basis forcertifying pits without nuclear tests by demonstrating through computer models, subcriticalexperiments, (10) small-scale laboratory experiments,experiments using multimillion-dollar nuclearphysics facilities, and archived data from past nuclear tests that Los Alamos pits are equivalent toRocky Flats pits in many key characteristics, and by resolving uncertainties conservatively, such asby insisting on tighter specifications and greater manufacturing precision. In these ways, NNSAseeks to provide confidence that Los Alamos pits will work as designed. To meet the need for W88 pits, NNSA decided to create at Los Alamos a facility that could produce pits at a low rate. The facility is housed in PF-4 (plutonium facility 4), which opened in1978 for plutonium R&D. It occupies about 30% of the space in PF-4 available for plutoniumoperations; another 25% is reserved for plutonium metal preparation. Los Alamos manufactured thefirst certifiable W88 pit in April 2003. NNSA expects Los Alamos to produce six or more certifiableW88 pits in FY2005, "to achieve, by FY2007, a sustained manufacturing rate of 10-20 pits/year,"and to complete certification work in FY2007. (11) NNSA also expects Los Alamos to certify inFY2007 the first W88 pit made there. (12) In March 2004, NNSA indicated that certification was on track, and that production of certifiable pits was proceeding extremely well, with five such pits produced as of early March2004. (13) The near-term goal is to produce thosepits needed to support certification experiments. Each early pit has a specific physics and engineering certification test purpose and will exercise theprocesses required to confirm that production is reliable and efficient. Accordingly, there is noreason now to produce pits faster than the schedule calls for. Once certification activities arecomplete, NNSA may choose to increase the production rate. In theory, nuclear testing could accelerate pit certification. A successful test would demonstrate promptly that a pit worked and that the processes used to make it were acceptable. In practice,however, NNSA would probably conduct a series of tests because a single test would not likelyprovide sufficient confidence and the first test might indicate the need for changes that would requiresubsequent tests to validate. Further, it would take 2 or 3 years from a presidential decision to testuntil the conduct of a first test. While the Administration plans to reduce that time, perhaps to 18months, it would take some time to make that change. Compared to the current program if itproceeds as anticipated, then, testing might accelerate certification by a year or so. PF-4's capacity and schedule, and the schedule for pit certification, have changed over time, and statements have been contradictory. In the December 1996 record of decision cited above, DOE appeared to need a capacity of 20 pits per year, would wind up with a capacity of 50 a year, and found the lattersufficient for some time. "DOE foresees only the replacement of pits destroyed in routinesurveillance testing unless a near-term, life-limiting phenomenon is discovered in stockpile pits. ...The technological capability to manufacture all of the pit designs in the enduring stockpile providesan inherent capacity to manufacture about 50 pits per year in single shift operations. ... About 20 pitsper year are expected to be required to replace pits destroyed in routine surveillance testing. Acapacity of about 50 pits per year is, therefore, judged to be sufficient for the next 10 or moreyears." (14) The FY1999 DOE budget request, released February 1998, stated, "In accordance with the Record of Decision on the Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement, thecurrent objective is to establish a long term capacity for manufacturing up to 50 pits/year with asingle shift of personnel." (15) Further, DOE plannedto "[p]roduce a single WR [war reserve] pit peryear at LANL beginning in FY 1998 and provide up to 10 pits annually into the stockpile [i.e.,certified as war reserve] beginning in FY 2001 to meet near-term requirements" and to "[m]eetschedules to rebuild, qualify and certify Trident II [W88] pits by FY2001 and develop intermediatepit production capability of 20 pits per year at the Los Alamos National Laboratory by2007." (16) In the September 1999 record of decision on the site-wide environmental impact statement for Los Alamos National Laboratory, DOE decided to establish at Los Alamos acapacity to produce nominally 20 pits per year to be achieved in 2007. "While this [decision] doesnot change the 50-pit-per-year mission assignment made in the Stockpile Stewardship andManagement Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement Record of Decision, it does suspendfull implementation of that decision until an undetermined time in thefuture." (17) In 2000, NNSA stated, "FY 2001 efforts will support W88 pit certification by FY 2005." (18) In 2001, the Administration proposed having a certified pit available in FY2009. (19) An October 2002 NNSA document stated that "establishment of an interim pit production capacity of up to 20 pits per year at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) is expectedto be completed in 2007." (20) In March 2003, NNSA stated, "NNSA will ... [e]stablish a small (10 pits/year) W88 pit production capability at LANL with a goal of FY 07." (21) And in February 2004, NNSA stated its intent "to enable the plutonium facility at LANL TA-55 to achieve, by FY2007, a sustained manufacturing rate of 10-20pits/year." (22) These changes have occurred for several reasons. NNSA has, over time, developed a better sense of how many pits would be needed. Los Alamos has found that certifying pits is morecomplicated and time-consuming than it had anticipated at first. The schedule has slipped. Further,the documents, or people's reading of them, have led some to confuse available and requiredcapacity. The Pit Manufacturing and Certification Campaign has an intermediate-term element, Pit Manufacturing Capability (PMC), for "[p]it manufacturing and certification activities not specificallysupporting the W88." This includes work on pits for the W87 warhead, currently carried byMinuteman III intercontinental ballistic missiles, and the B61 mod 7, a gravity bomb. NNSA notesthat these two pits, together with the W88 pit, "span technical variations of pits within thestockpile." (23) That is, the ability to manufactureand certify these three pits would help NNSAmanufacture and certify all types of existing pits that may need such work in the future. While PF-4could build some W87 and B61 developmental pits by 2012 under current plans, PMC would notmanufacture war reserve pits for these warheads because many spare pits of these types are availableto be cut apart for examination in ways that preclude their reassembly and reuse. Rather, PMC willdevelop manufacturing technologies that NNSA plans to use in fabricating pits for these and otherwarheads in PF-4 or the Modern Pit Facility. Table 1 shows Pit Manufacturing Capability increasingsubstantially; as pilot work on W88 pit manufacturing and certification is transferred out of the PitManufacturing and Certification Campaign, this campaign shifts to develop manufacturing capabilityfor other types of pits. Plutonium, a radioactive metal, decays radioactively and generates heat. As a result, plutonium pits undergo metallurgical and other changes that may affect weapon performance. (24) As of May2003, "the NNSA weapons laboratories have determined that pits will perform adequately for 45-60years." (25) This remains NNSA's estimate as ofMarch 2004. This estimate could increase or decreasebased on experimental data, further analysis, or data obtained by examining pits from deployedweapons. Accordingly, NNSA is working to refine its estimate. Two of its labs are performing "pitaging experiments and modeling to determine whether pit lifetimes equal or exceed 60 years ..." (26) Los Alamos is conducting experiments that accelerate sixteenfold a key process that agesplutonium. (27) Livermore will also conduct studiesrelated to assessing pit life. (28) The results will helpdefine whether a potential new pit manufacturing facility should be accelerated or delayed, and whatcapacity would be appropriate. In addition to funds for the Pit Manufacturing and CertificationCampaign, NNSA requested $25.9 million for FY2004 for a component of another campaign,Enhanced Surveillance, to support pit aging research. (29) The FY2005 NNSA budget document didnot break out funds for pit aging research. Several factors -- a larger stockpile, shorter pit life, a desire to build pits for new-design warheads, or a desire to hedge against the prospect that a type of pit develops a problem thatnecessitates replacing all units quickly -- would increase the production capacity needed or requirehaving that capacity sooner, or both. A smaller stockpile, etc., would have the opposite effect. International events could work in either direction. The implications of plutonium aging for the needand schedule for new pits are therefore debated. Some outside government argue that there is noclear end to pit life, or that pits could last many more decades. Further, some claim that withthousands of spare pits available from retired warheads, many would be available as "a 'hedge'against aging in the remaining arsenal." (30) Responding to concerns that plutonium will deterioratein ways that impair weapon performance, one report finds that plutonium undergoes "benign aging"and "exhibits good crystalline order even after decades of aging." (31) It may also be argued that anydecision on future pit production can be put off until there is reasonable evidence on the "shelf life"of pits. NNSA, on the other hand, believes that pits will ultimately fail to function. If one type of pit used in deployed warheads goes bad, then, depending on the specifics of the problem, there mightbe no confidence in any of the hundreds to thousands of warheads using that pit, or in spare pits ofthat type, which would age at the same rate as pits in deployed warheads. NNSA's view is thatmaintaining the stockpile indefinitely therefore requires, in the longer term, a higher pit fabricationcapacity than PF-4 can offer in order to replace pits removed due to aging or destructive testing. Similarly, the Panel to Assess the Reliability, Safety, and Security of the United States NuclearStockpile (the Foster Panel) observed, "While it is desirable to attempt to forecast the life spans ofplutonium and other weapon components, we must be able to replace such parts if our predictionsare incorrect or our needs for deterrence change," and recommended that NNSA "[e]stablish, withurgency, a pit production capability adequate for national needs." (32) Responding to the argument thatplutonium aging will not impair weapon performance for a long time, NNSA asserts that, based onresearch at the weapons labs, "increased delta-phase stability [of plutonium] with aging cannot beassumed." (33) Because of -- or, depending on one's point of view, despite -- uncertainty about pit life, NNSA has decided to proceed with planning for a new facility, the Modern Pit Facility (MPF), which isanother element of the Pit Manufacturing and Certification Campaign. NNSA is currently assessinga capacity from 125 to 450 pits per year in single-shift operation. (34) (Choice of capacity woulddepend on requirements for production, reserve capacity, and expansion potential, all to bedetermined.) NNSA estimates that MPF operations will start in FY2019 and that the plant willachieve full production capability in FY2021. (35) (Table 4 includes MPF milestones.) The SenateArmed Services Committee in 2002 estimated the cost of MPF at $2 billion to $4 billion. (36) NNSApersonnel stated in March 2004 that this estimate remains the same. The supplemental programmatic environmental impact statement (EIS) on stockpile stewardship and management for MPF evaluates five candidate sites: Los Alamos NationalLaboratory, NTS, Pantex Plant (TX), Savannah River Site (SC), and the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant(NM). (37) Public meetings were held at these sitesand in Washington, DC, in June and July 2003 toobtain public comments on the draft EIS. (38) Thefinal EIS was scheduled for publication by April2004, but NNSA stated in January 2004 that it delayed this document because of the congressionalconcerns just noted. (39) NNSA did not indicate anew release date or whether this decision woulddelay MPF. MPF has not proceeded on an accelerated basis because of competing priorities, uncertainties in the size of the stockpile and pit lifetimes, and the value for MPF of gaining experience from LosAlamos's pit efforts. The Nuclear Posture Review and approval of mission need provided impetusfor NNSA to give higher priority to MPF. This higher priority was to begin in FY2004, as reflectedin the increased request from $2.1 million in FY2003 to $22.8 million in FY2004. As discussedunder "The FY2004 Request," below, however, the FY2004 Energy and Water DevelopmentAppropriations Act, P.L. 108-137 , reduced funds for MPF from the requested $22.8 million to $10.8million on grounds that it would be premature to pursue further decisions on MPF pendingcongressional review of the nuclear stockpile plan. NNSA stated that, in general, reductions couldcut either the scope of activity, or the schedule. In this case, scope involves activities conceptualdesign and steps to comply with the National Environmental Protection Act. Since these activitiesare required for MPF, NNSA anticipates that the reduction will result in a slippage of the schedule. It estimates the slippage at one year. Future technical developments, funding decisions, or otheractions might offset this delay if decisionmakers later determine that a one-year slip is inadvisablefor the long term. (40) As Table 1 shows, NNSAprojects a substantial increase in MPF's budgetthrough FY2009. MPF's schedule has slipped between June 2003 and February 2004, as Table 2 shows. NNSA states that this delay was caused by congressional reductions to the FY2004 budget request. Table 2. MPF Schedule Slippage, June 2003 to February 2004 Source: June 2003 data are from U.S. Department of Energy. National Nuclear Security Administration. "Modern Pit Facility Fact Sheet," p. 2, June 2003, available at http://www.mpfeis.com , click on "Fact Sheets" and then on "Modern Pit Facility Fact Sheet." February 2004 data are from Department of Energy, FY 2005 Congressional Budget Request, vol.1, February 2004, p. 147-154, except that the entry for "publish MPF EIS ..." is from U.S. Department of Energy. National Nuclear Security Administration. "NNSA Delays Modern PitFacility Environmental Impact Statement and Selection of a Preferred Location." Press release,January 28, 2004, p. 1. DOE's report on MPF acceleration. In its report on the FY2004 defense authorization bill, the Senate Armed Services Committee directed DOE tosubmit a report on options for accelerating MPF's schedule, and how DOE planned to maintainexpertise and provide a flexible facility. The committee further directed that "DOE must have arequirement established to ensure that the MPF is appropriately sized. (41) DOE submitted the report,dated February 1, 2004. (42) In brief, it states thatMPF's schedule can be accelerated and that the LosAlamos facility will have inadequate capacity for all but the smallest stockpiles. Key points aresummarized below; page numbers in parentheses refer to the DOE report. MPF's schedule can be accelerated by 3 to 4 years by such measures as minimizing transitions between design steps, accelerating the design schedule, starting someconstruction actions before completing the final design, and using a longer work week.(16) Some costs to accelerate the schedule are a modest fraction of the total project cost. Planning activities before construction starts are expected to account for more than half thetotal project time at about a fifth of the estimated cost. (5) Accelerating MPF can reduce its required capacity. Rocky Flats produced most currently-stockpiled pits between 1978 and 1989. If pits have a 60-year life, they would "expire"between 2038 and 2049. The time available to remanufacture them largely sets the number that mustbe produced each year. Accelerating MPF would spread that production run over more years,lowering required capacity. After the initial run, production could be done at a steady, lower rate. NNSA did not provide numbers linking schedule to capacity, as they are classified. (11-12) Using PF-4/TA-55 (43) as the sole pit facility has many drawbacks. NNSA statesthat it "requires the agility to simultaneously manufacture different types of pits," and that TA-55cannot provide such agility for a stockpile sized in the 1000's of warheads because of inadequatefloor space. NNSA says it "could make do with TA-55 if the long-term stockpile is at a level inthe 100's of weapons with a reduced number of pit types and if modifications to TA-55 tomanufacture 50 pits per year could be made without constructing an additional building." Itrecommended against this upgrade for such reasons as "high risk" that it could not do the upgradewithin TA-55; the upgrade might be completed around 2015, at which point the facility would beabout 40 years old, and it would be "problematic" to operate it another 50 years; and the layout,designed for R&D, is "not optimal for production operations." (13-14) NNSA plans to take various steps to preserve expertise in pit production. These include maintaining an interim production capability at Los Alamos, drawing on U.S. experts inplutonium, manufacturing, and nuclear facility operations for planning MPF, and starting to hire andtrain staff for MPF at least 5 years before operations start. (18) NNSA staff stated that there are too many uncertainties to establish an annual requirement for numbers and types of pits to be produced when MPF is operational. (44) Instead,NNSA arrived at a range of capacities by examining the range of variance of such factors as size andcomposition of the stockpile in the future, pit lifetime, and when full-scale production might start. NNSA will continue to revalidate MPF capacity. (21) In particular, 125 pits per year is a reasonableestimate for the minimum capacity: "A minimum set of pit manufacturing equipment would resultin a manufacturing facility with a capacity of approximately 125 pits/year." (19) Challenges to DOE's report on MPF acceleration. The case for accelerating, or even building, MPF might be challenged in the following ways: If PF-4 began production at a rate of 50 pits per year in 2015, and the stockpile many years from now had 2,000 pits (both deployed and non-deployed), PF-4 could produce 1,750of these pits by 2050. (A future stockpile in this range is possible. The Strategic OffensiveReductions Treaty calls for 1,700-2,200 deployed strategic warheads by 2012 and there are additionalstockpiled pits that are not deployed; on the other hand, the number of deployed nuclear forces hasbeen declining for 20 years or more.) If MPF's capacity is 125 pits per year, and the stockpile many years from now included 2,000 pits, then NNSA could rebuild these pits in 16 years. If the rebuild had to be finishedby 2050, then in theory MPF could begin operations in 2034. It might be well to advance this dateby a few years to provide a margin in case unanticipated problems required an earlier rebuild of somewarheads. Even in that case, it could be argued that there is no need to complete MPF by 2021, letalone to accelerate it. Accordingly, while MPF might be accelerated by a few years at a fraction of the projected cost, it might arguably be a better use of funds to wait on MPF until pit life and futurestockpile size became clearer. If it appears some years from now that the future stockpile will dropsharply, then PF-4 might suffice, yielding a net savings. Large-scale production at MPF is scheduled to begin three decades after Rocky Flats shut. MPF would involve different people than Rocky Flats, at a different location, in a newfacility, with different equipment and processes. Despite ongoing efforts for certification, it couldbe argued that uncertainties would be likely to arise about the performance of MPF pits. Theseuncertainties could generate pressure to conduct nuclear tests. Keeping the production line open atTA-55 might reduce these uncertainties. Despite explicit direction by the Senate Armed Services Committee that the report base MPF capacity on specific requirements, NNSA based capacity on parametric analysis. It may be that there was no other reasonable approach, and a capacity of 125 pits per year may turnout to be needed. If it is found that a substantially smaller capacity is needed once MPF is wellalong, however, the United States would be committed to MPF even though it would in this casehave been less costly to use PF-4. Congress has expressed interest in the pit program for many years. Both Houses haverepeatedly raised concerns over such management issues as budgeting and planning, and over theslow pace of pit certification. Both Houses have supported low-rate pit production at Los Alamos. FY1997 National Defense Authorization Act conferees required the Secretary of Energy to submit "a report on plans for achieving a capability to produce and remanufacture plutonium pits." (45) FY1999 conferees directed the Secretaries of Energy and Defense "to prepare a long range planidentifying pit production requirements." (46) FY2001 authorization conferees directed DOE to startconceptual design "for a pit production facility with a capacity adequate to meet future nationalsecurity needs immediately." (47) Appropriationsconferees called the pit production program "behindschedule and over cost," and faulted DOE's "lack of attention to this critical program." (48) For FY2002, the House Appropriations Committee recommended the requested amount, $128.5 million, for the Pit Manufacturing and Certification Campaign, but asserted that DOE cannot show"that it has a viable plan to manufacture and certify pits on the schedule dictated by national securityneeds," criticized the project as "years behind schedule and hundreds of millions of dollars over theoriginal cost estimate," and stated that it would judge NNSA's success on how well the pit projectsucceeds. (49) The Senate AppropriationsCommittee recommended increasing funding by $109.2million to "fully fund" all relevant activities, viewing the then-current schedule, which would notcertify a pit for use in the stockpile until FY2009, as "unacceptable." (50) On September 28, 2001,after the two Appropriations Committee reports had been completed, NNSA notified the committeesthat projected cost for this campaign had increased to $219.0 million, and the conference billprovided this latter amount. (51) The Senate Armed Services Committee recommended providing $237.7 million to "fully fund all increases associated with efforts to manufacture and certify a new pit." Further, "the committeebelieves it is premature to rush to design a new pit manufacturing facility when there are significantuncertainties about the size of the nuclear weapons stockpile in the future and until such time as theability to manufacture a certifiable pit is restored." Recognizing concerns raised by the Foster Panel,however, the committee "urge[d] the administration to begin a time-phased program to design andbuild a pit production facility," i.e., MPF. (52) TheHouse Armed Services Committee bill included therequested amount, noted that W88 pit certification had slipped from FY2007 to FY2009 "with nocommitment to meeting the latter date," expressed its concern that "the budget request woefullyunder funds this important activity and urges the NNSA to place higher priority on pit certificationin future budget submissions." (53) The conferencebill provided $219.0 million. The FY2003 request was $194.5 million. NNSA stated its plans to "certify a W88 pit built at [Los Alamos National Laboratory] without underground nuclear testing by FY 2009, with a goal ofachieving an earlier date of FY 2007." (54) Further,NNSA planned to defer detailed design of aModern Pit Facility until FY2004, "with FY 2003 funding used to continue manufacturingconcepts." (55) The House Armed Services Committee recommended providing the requested amount. It expressed its belief that Los Alamos's planned capacity was inadequate for the long run, and that"prudence dictates a need to proceed immediately, with preliminary steps to re-establish a large scalepit production facility." (56) The Senate ArmedServices Committee recommended adding $5 millionto the pit campaign to allow the EIS for MPF to proceed, urged NNSA and DOD "to establish a validannual pit requirement," and cautioned NNSA not to begin construction on MPF until DOD andDOE have approved a valid requirement for it. (57) The conference bill provided $199.5 million forthe campaign, an increase of $5.0 million over the request. In its report on FY2003 energy and water appropriations, the Senate Appropriations Committee recommended $246.0 million for pit manufacturing and certification, an increase of $51.5 millionover the request. The committee, however, "remain[ed] greatly concerned about the NNSA's refusalto request funds consistent with its own project plan submitted less than 1 year ago." Because thiswas not done, which would have resulted in a lower request for this important project, "theCommittee has been forced to reduce other items in the budget." The Senate AppropriationsCommittee directed NNSA to revise the plan and report to Congress before the end of the currentfiscal year and then annually. (58) The HouseAppropriations Committee provided $194.5 million, therequested amount, for pit manufacturing and certification. The final appropriation for pitmanufacturing and certification was $222.0 million. (With a 0.65% rescission, a general reduction,and reprogramming, the adjusted appropriation was $220.6 million.) According to the jointexplanatory statement of the Committee of Conference, "The increase will ensure that the NNSAmaintains its commitment to produce a certifiable W88 pit by 2003 and a certified W88 pit by 2007." The conference statement directed NNSA "to provide a revised pit production and certification planto the relevant Congressional committees by March 31, 2003, and annually thereafter." (59) For FY2004, the Administration requested a substantial increase to items in this campaign: $126.8 million for manufacturing the pit for the W88 warhead, $108.6 million for W88 pitcertification, $19.7 million for pit activities not specifically supporting the W88, and $22.8 millionfor planning for the Modern Pit Facility. In addition, it requested $42.4 million for "subcriticalexperiments [at Nevada Test Site] which support the certification of the W88 pit." (60) For FY2004,this latter funding element was transferred into the Pit Manufacturing and Certification Campaignfrom Directed Stockpile Work, another component of the stockpile stewardship program; itsFY2003 request was $41.5 million. Thus the total request for FY2004 was $320.2 million, anincrease of 35.7% over the FY2003 request of $236.0 million (with both figures including subcriticalexperiments supporting W88 pit certification). In H.R. 1588 and S. 1050 , National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004, each Armed Services Committee recommended authorizing the full amountrequested for the Pit Manufacturing and Certification Campaign. The Senate Armed ServicesCommittee urged DOE to evaluate options for accelerating MPF and for maintaining pit productionexpertise until MPF opens, and to indicate how the production program can be made able to respondrapidly to needs for multiple types of pits or for pits that can meet "changing military requirements." Accordingly, the committee directed the Secretary of Energy to report on steps DOE is taking toaccelerate MPF and protect production expertise, and to provide "a schedule to establish arequirement by pit type by year ... to ensure that the MPF is appropriately sized." It directed that thereport be submitted to the congressional defense committees with the FY2005 budget request. (61) (Thereport is summarized above under "Long-Term Goal: Modern Pit Facility.") The conference billincluded the full request for the Pit Manufacturing and Certification Campaign; the report ( H.Rept.108-354 ) did not comment on the matter, which was not at issue between House and Senate. OnNovember 7, the House agreed to the conference report on H.R. 1588 , 362-40; theSenate agreed to the report, 95-3, on November 12. The President signed the measure into law ( P.L.108-136 ) on November 24. The House Appropriations Committee saw the pit campaign as proceeding too quickly. In H.R. 2754 , Energy and Water Development Appropriations for 2004, it recommendedreducing the request for this campaign by $47.0 million, still an increase of $12.2 million over theFY2003 budget. The committee praised NNSA and Los Alamos National Laboratory for "turningaround" this campaign, but urged NNSA to reduce costs. It stated that the current plan would"aggressively pursue a multi-billion dollar Modern Pit Facility before the first production pit haseven been successfully certified for use in the stockpile." In reducing MPF to $10.8 million fromthe requested $22.8 million, it recommended that NNSA should look hard at better ways to use theLos Alamos pit production facility for near-term requirements and "take a less aggressive planningapproach" to MPF. It felt that it was premature to spend $19.7 million to develop technologies formanufacturing pits other than for the W88 when MPF was at least 15 years from operating, and sorecommended reducing this part of the request to $4.7 million. (62) On July 18, 2003, the House passed H.R. 2754 without amending the Weapons Activities section, which includes funds forthe Pit Manufacturing and Certification Campaign. The Senate Appropriations Committeerecommended the amount requested for this campaign. (63) In floor action on September 16, the Senatetabled, 53-41, Amendment 1655 by Senator Feinstein that would, among other things, have barreduse of funds for MPF site selection. No other amendments on pits were offered. Later that day, theSenate passed H.R. 2754 (amended to incorporate the Senate bill, S. 1424 ),92-0. The energy and water development appropriations conference report, H.Rept. 108-357 , provided $298.5 million for the Pit Manufacturing and Certification Campaign. The two reductionsto this campaign, totaling $21.7 million, were $9.7 million to pit activities not specifically supportingthe W88, and $12.0 million to MPF. Regarding MPF, the conference report directed the Secretariesof Energy and Defense to report to Congress with their plan to achieve the nuclear force reductionsin the President's revised Nuclear Weapons Stockpile Memorandum, which made sharp cuts, forexample, in deployed strategic nuclear weapons. The conference report stated: "The conferees agreewith the House Report that until the Congress reviews the revised future Stockpile plan it ispremature to pursue further decisions regarding the Modern Pit Facility." On November 18, the twoHouses agreed to the conference report, the Senate by unanimous consent and the House by a voteof 387-36. The President signed the measure into law ( P.L. 108-137 ) on December 1. As noted earlier, the FY2005 request continues W88 Pit Manufacturing and W88 Pit Certification at about the same level as FY2004, boosts funding somewhat for Support Activities atNTS, and substantially increases funding for Pit Manufacturing Capability and MPF. Table 3 showsthe request and tracks congressional action on it. Table 3. Congressional Action on FY2005 Pit Program Request (Budget Authority, $ millions) Abbreviations: Mfg., manufacturing; Cert., certification; Capby, capability; MPF, Modern Pit Facility; NTS, Nevada Test Site; HASC, House Armed Services Committee; SASC, Senate ArmedServices Committee; Conf., conference; HAC, House Appropriations Committee; SAC, SenateAppropriations Committee. The FY2005 budget document is the first to include a detailed breakout for out years, making it possible to see NNSA's plans for pit program elements. These elements are funded underCampaigns, as shown in Table 1. NNSA plans to wind down W88 Pit Manufacturing funding withinCampaigns. (Pit manufacturing then is funded under Directed Stockpile Work beginning in FY2008,as per note b to Table 1.) W88 Pit Certification and Support Activities at NTS are reduced as W88certification work is completed. The pit program will increasingly focus on developing technologyto manufacture other pit types, which accounts for the ramp in Pit Manufacturing Capability funding,and on MPF, which increases substantially as work begins on an EIS on the selected site for MPFin FY2005 and conceptual design activities are expanded to prepare for the start of preliminarydesign in FY2007. (The schedule for MPF may change.) This section highlights issues connected with the pit program, raises arguments andcounterarguments for each issue, and presents under "prospects" the state of play for each issue orwhat currently appears to be the most likely outcome. Issues dealt with include pit certification; theneed for new pits (beyond limited quantities for W88 warheads); if new pits are needed, what is therequired capacity; how might that capacity be obtained, and how quickly could or should that bedone. Is NNSA's Plan for Certification Reasonable? Yes: To certify pits without nuclear testing, NNSA believes it must use much more sophisticatedtechniques than were used to certify Rocky Flats pits in order to rule out each plausible source offailure. No: In one view, only nuclear testing can assure that pits will work as intended on groundsthat pits are sensitive to minor variations in process and materials, many potential unknowns exist,and computer models may not capture what we do not know. Others see the certification plan asexcessive, claiming pits will work despite minor production variations. For decades, Los Alamosand Livermore technicians made many one-of-a-kind pits for testing. These pits did not meet warreserve standards but, as evidenced by the nuclear test record, a great many of them worked. (64) Prospects: Absent nuclear testing, the United States seems sure to use NNSA's plan to certify pits. Does the United States Need New Pits (Beyond Limited Quantitiesfor W88)? Yes: In one view, greater pit manufacturing capability is needed tohedge against uncertainty in pit life in order to ensure that the U.S. nuclear deterrent remainseffective. Further, the international situation may require the United States to manufacturenew-design warheads, including pits; pits in storage may prove unsuitable for these warheadsbecause of design or aging. No: Some believe pits will deteriorate so slowly that a decision on MPFcan be deferred for decades. Some see new types of warheads as undesirable because these warheadswould imply that the United States was preparing to test, build, deploy, and threaten the use ofnuclear weapons, so these critics reject the new-weapons argument as a rationale for new pits. Thosewho favor abolishing nuclear weapons would not produce these weapons or their components. Prospects: No one can be certain that NNSA will not need to manufacture pits at some future date,and at any rate NNSA will have a limited capacity to produce pits at PF-4. Accordingly, the needfor some new pits is less at issue than are capacity, schedule, and the need for MPF. If So, What Capacity Is Needed? Low: It is notclear that pits will fail for many decades, if ever, in the critics' view. PF-4 could replace the few pitswithout spares that are destroyed during surveillance. If new-design warheads are needed, smallnumbers might suffice, or NNSA might use spare pits for those warheads, or it might convertexisting warheads for new missions without changing the nuclear explosive package. Multiple-shiftoperations at PF-4 would increase output somewhat if needed. Further, critics argue, proceedingwith MPF would reduce funds for other stockpile stewardship programs. Higher: One study stated,"A paramount concern is the need to begin work now on an adequate plutonium pit productionmanufacturing capability, in order to hedge against the uncertainties in useful pit life and in the timerequired to establish a new production facility." (65) MPF, in this view, would guard against the failureof one or more types of pits and would enable ongoing replacement of pits to forestall problems fromaging. It would permit fabrication of large numbers of new-design warheads. While a smallerstockpile might permit lower pit production capacity, there can be no assurance on future stockpilesize. Prospects: The FY2004 energy and water development appropriations conference reportrequired DOE and DOD to submit a report to Congress with the FY2005 budget request providingdetails on a stockpile plan supporting the Nuclear Weapons Stockpile Memorandum and stated itwould be "premature" to pursue further decisions on MPF pending congressional review of thereport. In a hearing before the House Armed Services Committee on March 18, 2004, NNSAAdministrator Linton Brooks could not provide an estimate of the delivery date of the report. Thereport should help clarify stockpile size, giving some indication of required capacity. On the otherhand, while the report will focus on the stockpile through 2012, the stockpile and required capacitycould change substantially by 2021, when MPF is scheduled to begin full production operations. Thus capacity will be at issue for some time to come, and with it the fate of MPF. Can NNSA Expand PF-4 to Build Enough Pits Without MPF? Yes: Critics of the current plan note that some areas of PF-4 are not used forpit manufacturing. Instead, they are used for fabricating plutonium-238 components for spaceprobes, monitoring weapons components, and storing obsolete equipment from past plutonium R&D. Floor constraints make the layout of pit production equipment less than ideal. Using all of PF-4 forpit production, arranging equipment more efficiently, and using multiple shifts might raise PF-4'scapacity beyond 50 pits a year. By one estimate, if national security depended on boosting the rateand if Los Alamos had prepositioned the necessary production equipment, PF-4's capacity mightreach 100 or more a year. (66) Further, someplutonium work could be consolidated, moved out of PF-4,or moved to Livermore's Superblock facility. (67) No: MPF's proponents note that PF-4 is the nation'smain plutonium R&D facility. They hold that using it for production would interfere with R&D. NNSA holds that the maximum feasible capacity of PF-4 is 80 pits per year, that achieving thiscapacity would require major changes to plutonium work and considerable expense, and that adding50 years to the life of PF-4, which would be 40 years old by the time that it could begin productionat the new rate, may not be feasible. (68) Since MPFmust proceed now if it is to provide a hedgeagainst possible future needs, the question of expanding PF-4 is moot. Prospects: MPF's prospectsappear unsettled. Without knowing pit life, future stockpile size, and required capacity, it cannot bedetermined conclusively if PF-4 would suffice, and such determination might not be possible forsome years. On the other hand, PF-4 would not suffice if the dominant consideration is a desire tobegin to hedge against a possible future need for a larger capacity than PF-4 could reasonably offer. Congressional approval of MPF is also uncertain. While the FY2004 National Defense AuthorizationAct provided the funding requested for the entire pit program, including MPF, the Energy and WaterDevelopment Appropriations Act cut MPF funding from $22.8 million to $10.8 million and theconferees, as noted, stated it was premature to pursue further decisions on MPF pending a report onthe stockpile plan. Could NNSA Accelerate MPF's Schedule? Yes: The NNSA report on MPF acceleration cited above presents various steps that it states couldaccelerate MPF by 3 to 4 years. Yes, but: Projects often take longer than anticipated, so netacceleration might be less than anticipated. If MPF acceleration were to delay other NNSA projectsby drawing funds or managerial attention from them, it is not clear that the tradeoff would beworthwhile. Prospects: The NNSA report arguably moves the debate away from the feasibility ofaccelerating MPF toward the desirability of so doing. Ironically, if congressional actions delay MPF,and Congress were to subsequently decide to return to the original scheduled operating date, anaccelerated schedule might be the only way to meet the original schedule. Should Congress and the Administration Delay MPF's Schedule? Yes: Those who would delay MPF find little if any evidence that pitswill deteriorate in ways that will require rebuilding of all pits of a given type, hundreds to thousandsof units. Furthermore, international developments might lead to a smaller arsenal that PF-4 couldsupport. It would be unwise, in their view, to spend billions on a facility that might well proveunneeded and that would support any future decision to proceed with development of new types ofnuclear weapons. No: MPF's supporters believe uncertainties about plutonium aging and theinternational situation mean that the United States would be taking a big risk to delay proceedingwith MPF. If events turn out unfavorably, an inability to make pits on a large scale could provedisastrous to U.S. security. Hedge: Instead of proceeding with or delaying MPF based onincomplete information, NNSA could proceed on the current track until 2012. By that time, thatagency expects to complete the large volume of preconstruction work -- EIS, site selection,planning, permitting, design, process development, etc. If at that time plutonium aging did notappear to be a problem, or if the stockpile were projected to shrink, or if fewer types of nuclearweapons were deployed, or the likelihood of using nuclear weapons had become more remote thanat present, then the United States would, for a fraction of the cost of MPF, have purchased a hedgein case MPF needed to be built on the current schedule. Should such events turn out unfavorably,MPF could proceed to construction and operation with little or no loss of time. Prospects: In theshort term, further delay of several months in submitting the DOD-DOE report on stockpile planscould lead Congress to delay MPF in the FY2005 budget cycle. In the longer term, for reasons notedearlier, prospects for acceleration or delay are both quite uncertain. Table 4. Key Dates in NNSA's Proposal for the Pit Manufacturing and Certification Campaign Note: Many entries for FY2004 and beyond are from Department of Energy, FY 2005Congressional Budget Request, vol. 1, esp. p. 147-154. Some MPF entries before FY2004 are fromU.S. Department of Energy. National Nuclear Security Administration. "Modern Pit Facility (MPF)Fact Sheet," October 2002, 2 p. See also "Project Schedule: Modern Pit Facility Project," MPF EIS, p. S-14. Both documents are available via http://www.mpfeis.com . NNSA pit project staffupdated some information, March 3, 2004.

Summary: A "pit" is the fissile core of a nuclear warhead. In modern warheads, it creates a nuclear explosion that triggers a substantially larger thermonuclear explosion. All pits currently in the U.S.nuclear stockpile were made at the Rocky Flats Plant near Denver, CO, which opened in 1952. TheDepartment of Energy (DOE) halted pit manufacturing operations there in 1989; the United Stateshas been unable to make stockpile-quality pits -- and therefore complete nuclear warheads -- sincethen. Inability to make pits may have adverse consequences. For example: (1) The United States cannot replace pits for the W88 warhead (for the Trident II missile) that are destroyed duringevaluation; currently, only one W88 evaluation pit remains, so use of more W88 pits would reducedeployable warheads. (2) Pits deteriorate over time, though the rate at which that happens is understudy. If pits of a given type deteriorate so much as to be no longer reliable, or if an unanticipateddefect arises, then hundreds to thousands of deployed warheads might have to be withdrawn. The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), which manages the U.S. nuclear weapons program, has a five-part plan to restore pit production capability: (1) Establish a smallfacility (PF-4) at Los Alamos National Laboratory (NM) to fabricate pits, initially for the W88. LosAlamos manufactured the first pit to stockpile standards in April 2003. (2) Develop procedures tocertify W88 pits -- to provide high confidence without nuclear testing that the pits will work asintended. NNSA expects that, in 2007, Los Alamos will be able to certify W88 pits that it makes.Only certified pits can enter the stockpile. (3) Conduct experiments (not nuclear tests) in supportof W88 pit certification at the Nevada Test Site. (4) Conduct pit manufacturing and certification forother pits. (5) Plan a Modern Pit Facility (MPF) with a higher capacity than PF-4, to reach fulloperational capability in FY2021. NNSA estimates total cost at $1.46 billion for items (1) and (2),smaller amounts for items (3) and (4), and $2 billion to $4 billion for item (5). Congress has long shown interest in the program. It generally supports low-rate production at Los Alamos. It raised concern over budgeting and the pace of pit certification, but now praisesNNSA for "turning around" the W88 pit program. On MPF, the FY2004 defense authorization actsupported the Administration's schedule. The appropriations act reduced funding; conferees statedthat until Congress reviews nuclear stockpile plans, "it is premature to pursue further decisions" onMPF. MPF's schedule to reach full operational capability slipped a year between 2003 and 2004. Congress faces several issues as it considers the pit program. Is NNSA's plan for certification reasonable? Does the United States need new pits (beyond limited quantities for the W88)? If so,what capacity is needed? Can PF-4 be expanded to build enough pits to avoid the need for MPF? Could MPF's schedule be accelerated? Should its schedule be delayed? This report is intended for those interested in the U.S. nuclear weapons program. It will track the pit budget request and program, and will be updated as needed.