Historically, Germany's experience with terrorism has been predominantly with domesticgroups. Since the 1970s, Germany has demonstrated both the willingness and capability to combatdomestic sources of terrorism. After the attacks of September 11, 2001, however, it became apparentto many within and outside Germany that its traditional approaches were ill-suited to dealing withthe new threat of transnational, radical Islamic terrorism. Terrorists' use of German territory to hatchthe 9/11 plot served as a wake up call for many. Three of the hijackers lived and plotted in Hamburgand other parts of Germany for several years, (1) taking advantage of liberal asylum policies and the low levels ofsurveillance by authorities. The German response to the 9/11 terrorist attacks against the United States was immediateand unprecedented in scope for that country. Setting aside its post-World War II prohibition againstdeploying forces outside of Europe and overcoming pacifist leanings of some in the governingcoalition, Germany quickly offered military and other assistance to the United States. In his initialreaction to the attacks of 9/11, Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder declared Germany's "unlimitedsolidarity" with the United States. On September 12, 2001, the German government, along with otherU.S. allies, invoked NATO's Article V, paving the way for military assistance to the United States.The Chancellor gained approval from the German Parliament to deploy troops to Afghanistan witha call for a vote of confidence in his own government. Since then, German efforts in the fight against terrorism have expanded across a widespectrum. Germany has instituted significant policy, legislative, and organizational reforms. Bilateralcooperation with the United States has been extensive, despite differences stemming from thedistinct approaches and constraints in each country and frictions resulting from sharp disagreementover Iraq policy. The following sections examine the German domestic and international response to terrorismafter 9/11 and potential issues and problems regarding the German approach. They assess theaccomplishments of U.S.-German cooperation, as well as problems and future prospects. Germany's counterterrorism strategy shares a number of elements with that of the UnitedStates, although there are clear differences in emphasis: Key elements include: (2) Identifying terrorists and their supporters, bringing them to justice, andbreaking up their infrastructure at home and abroad. Assisting countries facing the danger of becoming failedstates. Addressing the social, economic, and cultural roots ofterrorism. Halting the proliferation of weapons of massdestruction. Seeking multilateral legitimization for any military action through the UnitedNations. Significantly, Germany now sees radical Islamic terrorism as its primary security threat anditself as a potential target of attack. (3) Although German citizens have not been directly targeted byradical Islamic terrorism to date, they frequently have been its victims. Since September 11, 2001,more German citizens have died as victims of Islamic terrorist attacks than in the entire history of domestic violence by the Red Army Faction (RAF), a German terrorist group that operated for overthirty years. (4) Germany has responded to the fact that it was a center for the planning of the attacks of 9/11. Key figures in the attacks were part of a Hamburg cell and the evidence suggests that terrorist cells,even before 9/11, saw Germany as one of the easier places in Europe from which to operate. Terrorists were able to take advantage of Germany's liberal asylum laws, as well as strong privacyprotections, and rights of religious expression which shielded activities in Islamic Mosques fromsurveillance by authorities. In its efforts to combat terrorism, Germany has emphasized the need to ensure that all of itsdomestic and international actions are consistent with the country's own laws, values and historicallessons of the Nazi era. Germany has given high priority to the protection of the civil rights andliberties of all those residing in Germany, including non-citizens. Germans stress that thislong-standing emphasis on civil rights should not be seen as a lack of political will to target terroriststoday. (5) However, someobservers are concerned that the German interpretation of its civil rights requirements could hinderthe capture and prosecution of important terror suspects. Although Germany has contributed troops to international operations, German officials donot believe that military force can serve as the principal instrument to fight terrorism and do not evenlike to use the term "war" to describe the international response to global terrorism. Germany tendsto stress "soft power" instruments such as diplomacy, development assistance, and addressing issuesthat can give rise to terrorism: "Providing support for modernization, resolving bitter regionalconflicts, rebuilding shattered structures is just as important as the work being done by the military,the police and the secret services", according to Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer. (6) Chancellor Schroeder has saidthat "the foremost task of international politics is to prevent wars" (7) and that Germany seekspeaceful resolution of international disputes as a guiding principle. Some critics, however seeGermany's stance against the use of force as unrealistic, particularly when facing hard core Islamicterrorist groups and "rogue" states. Germany also sees itself as limited in its ability to respond militarily to the threat of terrorismabroad both by its historical experience and by the fact that upon the reunification of the twoGermanies in 1990, Germany formally pledged to use its military forces only within the frameworkof the UN Charter. Although Germany supported the UN-sanctioned intervention in Afghanistan to root out theTaliban and al Qaeda, the German government strongly opposed the U.S. policy of broadening thewar against terrorism to a war against Iraq. Chancellor Schroeder argued that "those who want toresolve the crisis with military means must have an answer to the question of whether this will helpthe global alliance against terrorism, which includes about fifty Moslem states, or whether it willjeopardize this alliance, or perhaps even destroy it." (8) From Germany's perspective, the war in Iraq is intensifying theterrorist threat. (9) Despite differences over Iraq, Germany is viewed as a key partner in the global war onterrorism. In the wake of the 9/11 attacks, Germany has redefined its security strategy and foreignpolicy. (10) Today,Germany perceives threats to its domestic security that lie far beyond its own borders. The so-called"Struck-Doctrine" (11) states that Germany's security is now defended in places far removed from its borders, such as inAfghanistan. Germany's global economic position makes counterterrorism an important German foreignpolicy concern. Alongside security concerns, Germany has extensive economic interests worldwidethat it believes are now potentially threatened by terrorism. As one of the world's largest exportingnations, Germany exports nearly 50% of its goods to non-EU (European Union) countries. (12) Furthermore, Germanyimports 98% of its natural gas and oil from abroad. Germany views secure trade routes and marketsas vital to its economic security. Thus, global stability and combating terrorism are connected inGerman foreign policy. Reform Measures Implemented. The Germangovernment has taken extensive domestic measures against terrorism since 9/11, in the legal, lawenforcement, financial, and security realms. The first step taken was to identify weaknesses in thelaws that allowed some of the terrorists to live and plot in Germany largely unnoticed. After 9/11, Germany adopted two major anti-terrorism packages. The first, approved inNovember 2001, targeted loopholes in German law that permitted terrorists to live and raise moneyin Germany. Significant changes included (1) The immunity of religious groups and charities frominvestigation or surveillance by authorities was revoked, as were their special privileges under rightof assembly, allowing the government greater freedom to act against extremist groups; (2) terroristscould now be prosecuted in Germany, even if they belonged to foreign terrorist organizations actingonly abroad; (3) the ability of terrorists to enter and reside in Germany was curtailed; and 4) borderand air traffic security were strengthened. The second package was aimed at improving the effectiveness and communication ofintelligence and law enforcement agencies at the federal and state levels. Some $1.8 billion wasmade immediately available for new counterterrorism measures. In fiscal years 2002 and 2003, thebudget for relevant security and intelligence authorities was increased by about $580 million. (13) The new laws providedthe German intelligence and law enforcement agencies greater latitude to gather and evaluateinformation, as well as to communicate and share information with each other and with lawenforcement authorities at the state level. The most important intelligence authorities in Germany are the Federal Intelligence Service(BND), (14) the FederalBureau for the Protection of the Constitution (BfV), (15) and the Military Counterintelligence Service (MAD). (16) The most importantsecurity authorities are the Federal Bureau of Criminal Investigation (BKA) (17) and the Federal BorderGuard (BGS). (For a more detailed picture of the organizational structure, see Appendix A.) Since the approval of these laws, further measures have been instituted. For instance, aviationsecurity has been increased by placing armed security personnel and installing bullet- and entry-proofcockpit doors on German planes. Full inspection of all luggage is now mandatory at German airports. As elsewhere in Europe, the presence of Germany's large Muslim population also influencesanti-terror policies. Germany has a strong record of tolerance and protecting Muslim religiousfreedoms. However, the government is determined to go after Muslim extremists. Profiling isconsidered an acceptable means for identifying likely terrorists under German law. The government launched a major effort to identify and eliminate terrorist cells. Germany'srecent annual "Report on the Protection of the Constitution 2003" (18) indicated that about 31,000German residents are thought to be members of Islamic organizations with extremist ties. Shortly after the 9/11 attacks the government moved against twenty religious groups andconducted more that 200 raids. (19) Three radical Islamic organizations are now banned in Germany(i.e., Kalifatstaat, Al-Aksa e.V., and Hizb-ut-Tahrir). Currently, the German Justice Ministry isinvolved in 80 preliminary proceedings related to Islamic terrorism against 170 suspects. (20) Since February 2004, theGerman government has prosecuted members of a splinter group of the Iraqi Tawhid and Jihad(referred to as the Al Tawhid case in Germany). This terrorist group is accused of having preparedattacks against Israeli facilities in Germany; some members were caught in April 2002. Reportedly,they had connections to Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi, head of the Iraqi Tawhid and Jihad, and alsoaffiliated with Al Qaeda. With the legislative reforms giving it the authority to lead its own investigations and withincreased law enforcement capacity, the BKA has placed some 250 to 300 suspects who are thoughtto have links to international terror networks under surveillance. (21) Shortly after 9/11, Germanauthorities conducted a computer-aided search of the type that had proven successful in profiling andeventually dismantling the Red Army Faction in the 1990s. Reportedly, this effort uncovered anumber of radical Islamic "sleepers" in Germany, and a "considerable number of investigations" havebeen started. (22) In the financial area, new measures against money laundering were announced in October2001. A new office within the Ministry of Interior was charged with collecting and analyzing information contained in financial disclosures. Procedures were set up to better enforce asset seizureand forfeiture laws. (23) German authorities were given wider latitude in accessing financial data of terrorist groups. Stepswere taken to curb international money laundering and improve bank customer screening procedures.The Federal Criminal Police Office set up an independent unit responsible for the surveillance ofsuspicious financial flows. Measures to prevent money laundering now include the checking ofelectronic data processing systems to ensure that banks are properly screening their clients' businessrelationships and following the requirement to set up internal security systems. In seeking to dry up the sources of terrorist financing, new laws (24) are aimed at strengtheningGermany's own capabilities, as well as German cooperation with the broader international effort.Under the oversight of the German Federal Banking Supervisory Office, banks, financial serviceproviders and others must monitor all financial flows for illegal activity. Within the BKA, aFinancial Intelligence Unit (FIU) was established to serve as Germany's central registration officefor money laundering as well as a main contact point for foreign authorities. Germany was the firstcountry to implement an EU guideline against money laundering as well as the recommendationsof the Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering (FATF). (25) The FATF hascharacterized Germany's anti-money laundering regulations as comprehensive and effective. (26) Additional measures are being implemented by Germany. A new aviation security law isunder consideration which would allow the military to shoot down threatening hijacked aircraft. (27) A new immigration lawmakes it easier to deport suspected foreigners and makes naturalization more difficult. (28) In early July 2004, federaland state Ministers of the Interior implemented some key organizational changes: 1) a centraldatabase will now collect and store all available information regarding Muslim radicals suspectedof terrorism; 2) a joint Coordination Center consisting of the BKA, BND, BfV and MAD will seekto cooperate more closely to prevent terrorist attacks; and 3) German federal states will be integratedinto the coordination center. Germany's approach to terrorism is influenced by its geographic position in the heart ofEurope and its membership in the European Union. Germany has two borders, its own and the EUborder within which it sees its economic and security future. EU procedures and the EU jurisdictionin certain areas affect the domestic affairs of its member states. A lot of basic anti-terrorismmeasures -- for instance EU definitions of terrorism, terrorist organizations and common penalties,border control within the Schengen System, the EU-wide arrest warrant and the EU-wide assetfreezing order -- are governed by EU legislation. Possible Issues and Problems. DespiteGermany's sweeping reforms, critics point to continuing problems hampering Germany's domesticefforts. As a result of the emphasis on guarding civil liberties, the German law enforcement andintelligence communities face more bureaucratic hurdles, stricter constraints, and closer oversightthan those in many other countries. They are required to operate with greater transparency. Privacyrights of individuals and the protection of personal data are given prominent attention. Theseprotections are extended to non-citizens residing in Germany as well. Police are prohibited fromcollecting intelligence and can only begin an investigation when there is probable cause that a crimehas been committed. Thus, no legal recourse exists against suspected "dangerous persons," until acase can be made of a felony or its planning. (29) In turn, intelligence agencies cannot make arrests andinformation collected covertly cannot be used in court. Although the ease of entry of terrorists into Germany and their movement has beensignificantly curtailed, suspects already living in Germany are able to take advantage of apparentweaknesses in German law. Academic and job training programs, as well as the granting of asylum,have allowed potential terrorists to obtain extended residency permits. (30) Some terrorists may havemarried into German citizenship. Second generation immigrants possess citizenship and serve as apotential recruitment pool. The new immigration law, which becomes effective in January 2005, isexpected to close some loopholes. (31) Authorities have arrested, interviewed, and searched the homes of a number of suspects butreleased them for lack of evidence. (32) Similarly, the number of asset seizures and forfeitures inGermany has remained relatively low because of the high burden of proof under German law. (33) Another problem relates to Germany's organizational framework for fighting terrorism. Nocentral agency or person is in charge of overseeing and coordinating all anti-terrorism andcounterterrorism efforts. (34) Opinions differ on whether greater centralization would bebeneficial or harmful. Moreover, the most important domestic security and intelligence authorities,the BKA and BfV, are divided into one federal and 16 state bureaus each. The state bureaus workindependently of each other and independently of the federal bureaus. (35) Furthermore, German lawrequires a complete organizational separation of executive agencies such as the BKA and federalstate police agencies, as well as intelligence authorities such as the BfV. (36) The fact that automaticcooperation is not possible, increases the potential for information loss. (37) Cooperation is possibleonly in selected cases after formal requests have been approved. An Information Board was recentlyestablished to facilitate such exchanges and interaction between authorities in certaininvestigations. (38) Recently, the decision was made to establish a Coordination Center to improve cooperation amongfederal and state-level authorities. Eliminating remaining weaknesses in Germany's domestic response may be difficult. Manydoubt that the German government will be able to institute significant further changes to itsinstitutional and legal structures, so long as Germany does not suffer a large-scale attack. Already,the 16 federal states are blocking proposals for tighter centralization at the federal level, not wantingto cede authority. (39) Yet, there have been indications of terrorist activities in individual states with importantinternational traffic hubs (e.g., airports, harbors) and large Muslim populations. (40) Some have suggested thatthe upcoming 2006 Soccer World Cup in Germany, a potential target for terrorist attacks, mightprovide a catalyst for officials and security experts to rethink legal and security measures and to gainsupport for further steps to counter the terrorist threat. The German international response to the 9/11 terrorist attacks also has many elements. OnSeptember 12, 2001, the German government, along with other U.S. allies, invoked NATO's ArticleV, paving the way for military assistance to the United States. Chancellor Schroeder gainedparliamentary approval to deploy troops to Afghanistan. Since then, Germany has contributed in anumber of ways to the international fight against terrorism. However, the German support hasstopped short of supporting U.S. actions in Iraq or playing a direct role there. The Germangovernment has continued to oppose the war and occupation and to reject the linkage between Iraqand the war on terrorism. Some highlights of German efforts follow. Military. Currently Germany has about 7,800troops based abroad. (41) Some forty percent of those troops are directly engaged in counterterror missions. Germany isdirectly involved in five major counterterror missions as part of the global coalition (see below).German costs for these military deployments are estimated at $3.5 billion for 2002 and 2003. (42) In order to adjust Germansecurity strategy to the new threat environment, the Ministry of Defense issued new "Defense PolicyGuidelines" (43) in May2003. In the aftermath of the September 11th attacks, German crews participated in Operation NobleEagle patrolling North American airspace in NATO's airborne early warning aircraft (AWACS).Germany contributed one third of the squadrons' personnel. This mission lasted until May 15, 2002. Since January 2002, when the first German troops were deployed there, Afghanistan has beencentral to Germany's international military involvement. Chancellor Schroeder has said he is willingto maintain this engagement indefinitely. (44) In Afghanistan, some 2,300 German soldiers participate in theInternational Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and the Provincial Reconstruction Team(PRT)missions in the region of Kunduz and Feizabad. From February until August 2003, Germany and theNetherlands had joint command of ISAF . German special forces units which participated in specialoperations in Afghanistan are now on standby in Germany. (45) German forces are part of two naval missions as well: One associated with Operation Enduring Freedom (in the region around the Horn of Africa) and the other with Active Endeavor (inthe southeastern Mediterranean Sea and Straits of Gibraltar). These multilateral missions aredesigned to gather intelligence about possible terrorist activity in these regions, cut off terroristsupply channels, and safeguard international shipping routes. Currently, some 720 German navalpersonnel participate in these two missions. From May 2002 until October 2002, Germany tookcommand of allied naval forces in the Horn of Africa. Additionally, from February 2002 until July2003, a Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical (NBC) detection unit with up to 250 soldiers wasdeployed in Kuwait as part of Enduring Freedom . However critics point out that German military efforts have been hampered by the fact that,among major U.S. allies, German forces are presently among the least quickly deployable due todelays in implementing military reforms and, specifically, addressing a lack of airlift capacity. Delays and problems were encountered in fulfilling the German force commitments in Afghanistanin part because the military did not have the necessary transport planes and had to charter Ukrainianaircraft. While Germany is implementing military reforms to make its armed forces moreexpeditionary and committed to overcoming post-Cold War deficiencies, budget shortfalls may delaythese efforts. Diplomacy. By hosting two internationalconferences on Afghanistan, Germany has been engaged in establishing global support for thatcountry's post-war reconstruction. (46) Within the United Nations, Germany supported a number of counterterror resolutions, mostnotably the UN sanctions regime targeting members or associates of Al Qaeda and the Taliban.Germany also ratified the UN International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings. Germany has ratified all eleven UN anti-terror Conventions and is preparing legislation for theratification of the 12th Convention against terrorist financing. (47) At the European level, Germany is pressing to shorten the transition period before new EUanti-terror legislation takes effect. Germany is working with other countries to improve theSchengen-system (a system that allows passport-free travel between participating EU member states-- travel into or out of the EU-wide system still requires traditional passports and visas) withphotographs on visas and resident permits. Moreover, Germany is pushing for the use of biometricidentifiers on passports, visas and resident permits, and for international standardization of thesesystems. (48) Germanyviews itself as a driving force in European counterterrorism efforts. Germany's Interior Minister hassaid: "Maybe a few of the EU countries will have to take the lead. After all, the pace cannot be setby the slowest, but by the fastest and most determined." (49) Within the G8, a German initiative has led to the establishment of a working group onbiometrics. The U.S. has supported Germany's proposal that G8 countries develop joint standardsfor the deployment of air marshals. (50) Germany has coordinated its efforts to adopt measures againstterrorism with the United States and other G-8 member states. (51) Reconstruction and Foreign Aid. Foreignassistance and economic development are integral parts of Germany's security and foreign policy.As a member of the German Federal Security Council, the Ministry of Economic Cooperation andDevelopment takes an active part in foreign policy decision-making. The Schroeder Government unveiled a new plan for "Civil Crisis Prevention, ConflictResolution, and Peace Consolidation," (52) in May 2004. Financial resources for reconstruction and otherforeign aid are constrained, however, by spending cuts to deal with current German economicproblems. Critics have argued that the plan is underfunded. (53) Nonetheless, Germany'scontribution remains important, especially in Afghanistan. By the end of 2004, Germany will havecontributed $384 million for the reconstruction of Afghanistan. Through 2008, Germany haspromised $1.2 billion (non-monetary contributions not included). (54) Germany is coordinatingand leading efforts to build the Afghan police forces. (55) Despite its opposition to the war in Iraq, Germany hascontributed about $196 million toward the postwar effort there. Moreover, at the Paris ClubGermany has agreed to waive some fifty percent ($ 2.4 billion) of debt owed it by Iraq in threestages through 2008. (56) Total German foreign aid and reconstruction funding worldwide for 2002 and 2003 was about $13.9billion. (57) Security cooperation between the United States and Germany, which had been close evenbefore 9/11, was greatly expanded after the attacks. The BKA now has two permanent liaisonofficers at the German Embassy in Washington, DC and a liaison officer from the office of theGerman Federal Prosecutor is working in the U.S. Department of Justice. In Germany, up to 15 U.S.liaison officers are participating in the investigations of the 9/11 terrorist cells that were based inGermany. Several other measures have been taken. An agreement on bilateral cooperation for theprotection of computer systems and networks was reached in June 2003. This effort is aimed atdefending critical infrastructure such as power supplies, and transportation and telecommunicationsgrids in both the United States and Germany. Steps are being taken to extend this cooperation to theprotection of nuclear facilities. (58) Moreover, the United States and Germany reached an agreementon increased legal cooperation in criminal matters in October 2003. Bilateral cabinet-level meetingsare frequent. Germany plays an active role in the U.S. Container Security Initiative (CSI). Officials inWashington, DC and Berlin signed an agreement to improve bilateral cooperation on containersecurity with the aim of stopping terrorists from smuggling weapons of mass destruction in sea-cargocontainers. U.S. Customs agents are stationed in Germany to monitor suspicious containers beforethey leave German harbors. (59) Furthermore, Germany is an active member of the 14-countrycore group of the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI). This initiative is aimed at preventing thespread of materials that could be used to build weapons of mass destruction. U.S. and Germanintelligence cooperation led to seizure of a ship bound for Libya in the Mediterranean Sea in October2003. Illicit nuclear material aboard was confiscated. (60) Some believe that bilateral cooperation is weaker in the field of information sharing for avariety of reasons. The United States has security concerns about sharing sensitive information.German authorities in turn fear that the United States will use sensitive shared information in waysthat might conflict with Germany's practices with regard to data protection and civil liberties. (61) Also, German critics claimthat the U.S. expectation of information sharing by others is not matched by a U.S. willingness toshare with them. A recent example of the problems created by inadequate information sharing concerned twotrials of suspects in the 9/11 attacks. Mounir el Motassadeq and Abdelghani Mzoudi were eventuallyacquitted by a German Federal Court with the explanation that the United States had not madecrucial evidence available. (62) After the Department of Justice forwarded the evidence requestedby the German government, the Motassadeq trial was reopened on August 10, 2004. What effect theinformation might have on the outcome of the new trial is unclear. U.S.-German cooperation in the area of information sharing mostly occurs on a case-by-casebasis and is not based on formal governmental agreements. Some question whether this is adequate. Given the way that transnational terrorist networks operate, some argue that it is necessary to targetthe entire terrorist infrastructure (e.g., recruitment, fund raising, logistics, and training). (63) A shared databasecontaining all available information regarding the most threatening persons might allow bothcountries to better track terrorist suspects, to harmonize surveillance activities, and to target travelby terrorists (as was recommended by the U.S. 9/11 Commission). Apparently the only databasesof such dangerous persons accessible to both governments are the lists of Islamic terroristorganizations and persons maintained by the UN and the EU. (64) Sharply different perspectives on the death penalty have also hampered bilateral cooperationin some cases. Germany, like all EU member countries, has abolished the death penalty. Germanlaw does not allow extradition of a person wanted by another country if there is a possibility that theperson might be executed if found guilty. In previous cases, Germany extradited suspects only afterit had received assurances that the death penalty would not be imposed. In 1998, Germany arrestedand extradited a key suspect in the 1998 U.S. Embassy bombings in Africa, after U.S. prosecutorsagreed to waive the death penalty. Germany has interpreted its laws to forbid even provision ofevidence relating to such a case, if that information might lead to the imposition of a death sentence. This became an issue when the United States sought to obtain documents from Germany related tothe case of Zacarias Moussaoui, the so-called 20th hijacker. The information was eventually suppliedbased on the understanding that the United States would agree not to seek the death penalty solelybased on the evidence gained from Germany. (65) Still, the death penalty issue remains a potential impediment tocooperation in specific cases. Germany and the United States also differ on the question of the status of prisoners,particularly the Al Qaeda and Taliban detainees in GuantÃ¡namo Bay. Germany's Foreign MinisterJoschka Fischer and other politicians have argued that all detainees should be granted formal statusas prisoners of war. Germans, like other Europeans, have also criticized U.S. plans to use militarytribunals to try at least some of the terrorist suspects. Such tribunals are seen as unnecessary andcounterproductive by German officials. Some question has been raised whether terrorist suspectswould be extradited by Germany and other EU countries, if they were likely to face a militarytribunal. (66) In the German view, conduct of the fight against global terrorism requires multilateralcooperation, formally sanctioned by the relevant international organizations. Germans argue thatmost unilateral measures are illegitimate and ineffective. In this context, German officials are hopingthat the second Bush Administration will place greater emphasis on multilateralism to strengtheninternational support for U.S. counterterrorism initiatives. From Germany's perspective, joint actionon counterterrorism is also tied closely to joint decision making. (67) The U.S. Administration rejects any absolute commitment to multilateralism in terms ofwaiting for UN approval for any military action. Such a policy would be seen in the United Statesas a dangerous and unacceptable recipe for paralysis. Some criticize the German approach as toowedded to process over results, especially when dealing with "rogue" states and weapons of massdestruction. While Germany has declared WMD non-proliferation a core element of its nationalsecurity strategy, the German approach has been criticized by some for relying almost exclusivelyon positive engagement and avoiding conflict, an approach that might not be very successful ininfluencing certain regimes or potential terrorists. Some observers believe that the German stancereflects the reality that the country presently lacks the military means or the political will to confrontWMD states with anything other than "soft power" instruments (such as diplomacy and economiclevers). Some see a complementarity in the differing U.S. and German approaches. The U.S. hasextensive military capabilities to deal with threats of terrorism, while Germany views its strengthsin conflict prevention and reconstruction. This could mean, for instance, that Germany might bebetter positioned to take on a greater role in long-term reconstruction efforts in countries likeAfghanistan. Some argue that with a better understanding of the potential complementary roles thetwo countries can play based on the strengths and advantages of each, new opportunities forenhanced cooperation in the global war on terrorism might be found. The final report of the U.S.9/11 Commission suggests that long-term success in the war against terrorism demands the use ofall elements of national power, including "soft power" instruments such as diplomacy, intelligence,and foreign aid. A key question is to what degree differences are likely to hamper U.S.-German cooperationagainst terrorism. It could be argued that U.S. and German security in the near and mid-term arelikely to be affected far more by what Germany does to cooperate with the United States in terms ofdomestic security and bilaterally than by Germany's stance on other international issues. Lapses inGerman domestic surveillance or other shortcomings in German domestic policy could directlythreaten U.S. security. For example, according to statements from the BND, some dozen or soIslamic militants capable of carrying out assaults may have left Germany for Iraq not too longago. (68) Therefore, manyquestion whether the United States and Germany can afford the risk of allowing international policydifferences to lead to declining cooperation within the crucial arena of domestic security. The United States and Germany may see security threats through different lenses, andresponses to those threats are shaped by different national interests, practices, and historicalexperiences. (69) Ultimately, understanding and accepting these differences (agreeing to disagree), in the minds ofsome observers, may be the best approach to enhancing future U.S.-German cooperation in theglobal war on terrorism. Close bilateral cooperation with the United States is important forGermany's own global interests. For the United States, as well, German cooperation againstterrorism is likely to remain significant in light of Germany's importance as a European and worldactor, as a key hub for the transnational flow of persons and goods especially to the United States,and as a country whose soil has been used by terrorist to target the United States. At the Information Board data is shared regarding Networks of Arab Mujaheden ("Jihadists"). The Federal Security Council is a committee of the Federal Cabinet. Its top-confidential sessions are convened and led by the Chancellor. Association/Organization Law. Before 9/11, religious associations were protectedfrom surveillance and investigation under German law. The anti-terror laws passedin late 2001 have removed this legal protection, permitting state authorities to probeand investigate groups with suspected terrorist ties. In the future, associations offoreigners that promote violent or terrorist activities will be prohibited. Penal Code Changes. In the future terrorist activities are subject to prosecution ofGerman authorities even if they occur outside Germany's borders and without directinvolvement of German citizens or organizations. Alien Act. People who present a danger to the democratic order in Germany, andwho are engaged or encourage others to engage in terrorist organizations will bedenied entry or residence permits in Germany regardless of whether the individualsare tourists, immigrants, or asylum seekers. Asylum Procedure Law. All asylum applications will be required to include a voicerecording stating the exact country of origin of applicants. Fingerprints will also becollected with applications. All records will be on file with the security authoritiesfor 10 years. Law on Central Foreigner Registry. Information filed in the Central AlienRegister (for instance) is now automated and more accessible for security authorities.Moreover the collected data includes information about visa applications anddecisions and about people already living in Germany. Security Oversight Law. Personnel working in areas of counterterrorism and othersensitive defense occupations will receive security screening. Air Traffic Law. Clarification of this law restricts the carrying and use of firearmsto air marshals. Additionally, security clearances are required for all airport and flightpersonnel, as well as others working in activities connected to airports or air traffic. Passport and Personal I.D. Law. Changes in this law will provide for an improvedcomputer-supported identification system. This will help prevent the use of bogusidentification documents. Encrypted biometric identification codes will be added tophotographs and signatures. Act on the Protection of the Constitution. The Federal Bureau for the Protectionof the Constitution (BfV) is given authority to track any activities of extremist groupsthat seek to intensify ideological or religious differences. The law calls for combiningseveral databases with civil information to make computerized searches moreeffective. Federal Bureau for Criminal Investigation. The BKA now has the right to lead itsown investigations, replacing the former system which required formal requests bythe BfV. Federal Border Guard Act. Armed officers of the Federal Border Guard (BGS) arenow deployed aboard German airplanes. Moreover, the BGS has been tasked toconduct in-depth screening of border traffic.

Summary: This report examines Germany's response to global Islamic terrorism after the September 11,2001 attacks in the United States. It looks at current German strategy, domestic efforts, andinternational responses, including possible gaps and weaknesses. It examines the state ofU.S.-German cooperation, including problems and prospects for future cooperation. This report maybe updated as needed. Although somewhat overshadowed in the public view by the strong and vocal disagreementsover Iraq policy, U.S.-German cooperation in the global fight against international terrorism hasbeen extensive. German support is particularly important because several Al Qaeda members and9/11 plotters lived there and the country is a key hub for the transnational flow of persons and goods.Domestically, Germany faces the challenge of having a sizable population of Muslims, some withextremist views, whom terrorists might seek to recruit. German counterterrorism strategy shares a number of elements with that of the United States,although there are clear differences in emphasis. Like the United States, Germany now sees radicalIslamic terrorism as its primary national security threat and itself as a potential target of attack. Today, Germany also recognizes that threats to its domestic security lie far beyond its own borders,in places such as Afghanistan. Germany has introduced a number of policy, legislative, and organizational reforms since9/11 to make the country less hospitable to potential terrorists. Despite these reforms, critics pointto continuing problems hampering Germany's domestic efforts. German law enforcement andintelligence communities face more bureaucratic hurdles, stricter constraints, and closer oversightthan those in many other countries. The German government has sent troops into combat beyond Europe for the first time sinceWorld War II. Currently Germany has about 7,800 troops based abroad of which some forty percentare directly engaged in counterterror missions. In Afghanistan, some 2,300 German soldiersparticipate in the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). Germany's role in Afghanistan'sstabilization and reconstruction is substantial. German military efforts have been hampered to someextent by delays in implementing military reforms to make German forces more expeditionary. A key question for U.S. German relations is whether differences on issues such as Iraq policy-- shaped by different national interests, practices, and historical experiences -- will harmU.S.-German cooperation against terrorism. Some believe that understanding and accepting thesedifferences (agreeing to disagree) may be the best approach to enhancing future U.S.-Germancooperation in the global war on terrorism. Both countries have strong incentives to make thecooperation work.