Crusader XM2001 Self-Propelled Howitzer: Background and Issues for Congress RS21218 -- Crusader XM2001 Self-Propelled Howitzer: Background and Issues for Congress Updated June 25, 2002 Summary The Army has been seeking to enhance its self-propelled 155mm artillery capabilitiessince the late 1970's. In additionto several programs to modify the M109 artillery system, culminating in the current M109A6 Paladin, since 1987these efforts have focused on what is now calledthe XM2001 Crusader. Initially begun in order to match the mobility and firepower of Soviet artillery, the Crusaderprogram is now the center of a controversyover whether it is an appropriate investment given the Army's on-going transformation to a lighter, more mobileforce. Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld hasannounced his intent to terminate the program, however the Crusader's supporters in the House and Senate ArmedServices Committees are seeking legislativeprovisions to maintain the program until at least May 2003 while an assessment of alternatives is conducted. Thisreport will be updated as further events occur. The Army has been seeking to enhance its self-propelled 155mm artillery capabilities since the late 1970's. Among other tasks, artillery systems providedirect-fire maneuver forces, such as tanks and infantry, with immediate, heavy, indirect fires from a distance. Inaddition to several programs to modify theexisting M109 artillery system, culminating in the current M109A6 Paladin, these efforts have focused since 1987on what is now called the XM2001 Crusader. Initially begun in order to match the mobility and firepower of Soviet artillery, the Crusader program is now thecenter of a controversy over whether it is anappropriate investment given the Army's on-going transformation to a lighter, more mobile force. (1) The Crusader program is still in research and development, and was scheduled to undergo a "Milestone B" evaluation in April 2003, which would have decidedwhether the program would move into the "system development and demonstration" R&D phase. A prototypehowitzer was delivered in early 2000 and hasdemonstrated the Crusader's firing capabilities. The plan has been to begin equipping units in FY2008. Approximately $2 billion has been spent on the Crusaderthrough FY2002, with the total program estimated to cost at least $11 billion. This reflects a 1999 reduction in theprocurement objective from 1,138 to 480vehicles. The FY2003 Crusader budget request, as originally submitted, was $475 million. The Crusader has beenfrequently mentioned over the last few years asa program that could be cut or terminated because it did not fit - by some analysts' definitions - the Army'stransformation goals; and, its termination could freeup funds for more technologically advanced systems. Its supporters, however, have maintained that a re-designed,lighter Crusader could play a vital role in bothexpeditionary and traditional heavy units. The controversy intensified on May 3rd when Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition Pete Aldridge directed the Army to prepare an "assessment ofalternatives" to the Crusader by June 10, 2002. On May 8th, however, it was announced that SecretaryRumsfeld, with the concurrence of President Bush, wasrecommending an amendment to the FY2003 DOD budget request terminating the Crusader program. DeputySecretary Paul Wolfowitz explained that the decision to terminate the Crusader without the review of alternatives was determined by the congressional schedulefor consideration of the DOD FY2003authorization legislation. (2) Press reports indicate that within the Departmentof the Army there was considerable opposition to the Crusader's cancellation, whichled to a controversy over whether inappropriate steps were taken to provide congressional supporters with "talkingpoints" in favor of the program after SecretaryRumsfeld had made his decision. (3) The Crusader would be built by UnitedDefense, LP in a new plant in Oklahoma. The United Defense headquarters is inMinnesota and major subcontractors are in California, Michigan, New Mexico, Pennsylvania, Vermont, andVirginia. Almost simultaneously, proponents of the Crusader program gained the support of the House Committee on Armed Services, which included language in its May3rd report on the DOD FY2003 authorization legislation ( H.R. 4546 / H.Rept. 107-436 ) directing that there be no change to the Crusader development schedule, funding or procurement requirements, to includetermination, until the completion of the Army's Milestone B Analysis of Alternatives. The Secretary of the Armyshall present a report of the completed analysis tothe congressional defense committees by March 1, 2003. The committees will respond to that analysis within 30days so that the scheduled Milestone B reviewcan be completed in April 2003. On May 14, an amendment to the FY2002 Supplemental Appropriation was introduced in the House that was characterized as stopping "the Pentagon fromkilling the Crusader artillery program before it justifies its decision to Congress and recommends an alternative." (4) On June 24, the House AppropriationsCommittee reluctantly agreed to the termination of Crusader but added $173 million to the Administration's proposalfor the purpose of incorporating Crusadertechnologies into a Future Combat System artillery successor by 2008. (5) As the Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC) considered its FY2003 DOD authorization legislation ( S. 2514 ), Crusader supporters there soughtto obtain a similar provisions, although in statutory rather than report language. The SASC invited the Secretaryof Defense and the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army totestify about this matter on May 16, 2002. (6) One unresolved issue at that timewas what it would cost to terminate the Crusader program; proposed estimatesvaried from $136.3 to $500 million. (7) On June 13, the SASC approved anamendment to S. 2514 that would prevent the Administration fromdisbursing any Crusader funds for alternative systems until the Army presents Congress a study on alternatives 30days after enactment of the bill. (8) Congress has become actively involved in deciding the fate of the Crusader, whether that be to endorse the DOD cancellation decision, continue the currentdevelopment schedule, or to choose another option. There are many factors to weigh in considering this issue,including: DOD arguments, Army arguments,industrial base implications, affordability issues, and comparing shorter-term versus longer-term security interests. In the past, Congress has forced reversal ofprevious Administration decisions to cancel major weapons programs; witness the continued existence of the V-22Osprey Tilt-Rotor Aircraft. (9) Compiled beloware the major arguments made by advocates for canceling and for continuing the Crusader program. In seeking to cancel the Crusader program, DOD officials maintain that it is "a system originally designed for a different strategic context, i.e. high intensitywarfare against Soviet forces in Europe, than currently exists." They also assert that it is important, whereverpossible, to invest in truly transformational ratherthan legacy-type systems. While acknowledging that the requirement for long-range all-weather fire supportremains, Crusader opponents suggest that there arealternatives more in keeping with the Army's transformation to a more mobile and deployable force, and that thesecould be available in approximately the sametime-frame as the Crusader. On May 13, Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics Pete Aldridge banned the Army from spending more money on Crusader andordered a separate review of which Crusader technologies the Army wishes to carry forward into the Future CombatSystem (FCS) program, due by June 30,2002. (10) Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz has suggested thatfunds allocated to the Crusader in the FY2004-2009 Defense Planning Guidance couldbe applied to a variety of new long-range fire support technology programs, including: Excaliber Guided Artillery Munition (Raytheon) Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System (Lockheed-Martin) High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (Lockheed-Martin) Non-Line-of-Sight Future Combat System (Boeing/SAIC) The weight and timing of the Crusader are seen as key disadvantages. Its weight, about 40 tons, is twice the target weight of all other transformational weaponssystems planned for the Army. It is designed to fight with the 70-ton Abrams tank, which will be phased out within30 years. The General Accounting Office hasnoted that the Crusader will first be deployed in 2008, and this is the same year that the Army plans to begindeployment of the FCS, which would eventuallyreplace the Crusader. (11) In his SASC testimony, Secretary Rumsfeldemphasized that Crusader was not designed to deliver precision fires and he favoredtransformational investments in precision fires. Finally, cancellation of the Crusader is the kind of bold step forward that President Bush proposed during his election campaign with the concept of "skipping ageneration" in weapons deployments. To illustrate the importance attached to this principle, the Office ofManagement and Budget stated that "The President'ssenior advisors would recommend that he veto any bill which included statutory restrictions limiting his ability tocancel this program." (12) Many artillerymen believe that the howitzer will continue to occupy an important niche on the future battlefield. (13) U.S. infantrymen fighting recently in theAfghan mountains during Operation Anaconda had only man-packed mortars for fire support when combat aircraftwere not available. The Excaliber roundtouted by the Administration would still require a 155 mm howitzer to fire it; and according to Crusader supporters,the advanced computers and battlefieldnetworking capabilities of the Crusader would use Excaliber to better advantage than any other howitzers proposed. Supporters of the Crusader emphasize that it has performed well in its live-firing tests, is on schedule, and believe that, with the weight reduction efforts thecontractor has undertaken, has improved its deployability. The Program Manager Col. Russell Hrdy has also notedthat with the Crusader's increased rate of fire,deploying 3 units would be the equivalent of deploying 6 M-109A5/6 Paladins, the Army's current self-propelled155mm artillery system. In other words, the 40tons and 3-man crew of one Crusader would require less lift than the equivalent 60 tons and 8 crewmen of twoPaladins. In regards to substituting the twoadvanced multiple launch rocket systems (GMLRS and HIMARS), it should be noted that one MLRS rocket weighsabout 650 pounds, compared to about 100pounds for one 155 mm artillery round. The Army believes that Crusaders would remain in service until at least 2032, when the transformation to the Army's new Objective Force and full deployment ofthe Future Combat Systems would be complete. (14) During that time,supporters have said the Crusader could provide excellent fire support to the Army's InterimForce in a variety of scenarios and invaluable support to the Legacy Force of Abrams tanks - particularly should itface major combat against enemies equippedwith Soviet-style artillery, e.g. North Korea, Iraq, China, and Russia. (15) Inhis SASC testimony, General Shenseki pointed out that precision weapons do not fulfillone important Crusader requirement, the ability to deliver, cost effectively, massed suppressive fires against close-inand imprecisely located enemy forces. Also, most proposed alternative fire support systems do not provide armored protection for their crews, as doesCrusader. Crusader supporters believe that the program should definitely not be terminated until a thorough review of alternatives for long-range fire support is completed. They point out that most of the alternatives suggested by DOD leadership are all in R&D (in the case of theFCS indirect fire variant, the technology has not evenbeen decided), and have not clearly demonstrated that they could fulfill the long-range fire support requirement ina timely fashion. The Army appears to be fullycommitted to transformation and has cancelled many programs on its own to free up funds for the FCS. (16) The full support the Crusader program received fromthe Army leadership (including Army Chief of Staff General Shinseki), up to the cancellation decision, may betaken as an indication of the program's importanceto current Army war-fighting doctrine. 1. For a discussion of the U.S. Army's efforts to transform, see CRS Report RS20787 , Army Transformation and Modernization: Overview and Issues forCongress, , by [author name scrubbed]. For discussions of transformation efforts in the other Services, see CRS Report RS20859 , Air Force Transformation:Background and Issues for Congress, by [author name scrubbed]; and CRS Report RS20851 , NavalTransformation: Background and Issues for Congress, by[author name scrubbed]. 2. Department of Defense News Briefing, May 8, 2002. 3. Ibid. The DOD IG conducted an investigation into the allegation, which resulted inthe resignation of a mid-level appointee in the Army legislative liaisonoffice. 4. Lisa Caruso. Congress Daily, "Controversial Votes on Supplemental WillBe Delayed," May 14, 2002. 5. Frank Wolfe. Defense Daily , "HAC-D Adds $173 Million ForTechnology Integration of Crusader Successor," June 25, 2002, p.1. 6. SASC held hearings on Thursday, May 16 with Panel 1 consisting of SECDEF DonaldRusfeld, DEPSECDEF Paul D. Wolfowitz, and USD for Aquisition,Technology and Logisitics Edward C. Aldridge. Panel 2 consisted of General Eric K. Shinseki, Chief of Staff, U.S.Army. Transcripts provided by Federal NewsService. 7. Erin Q. Winograd. Inside the Army, "Amended Budget Request ShiftsCrusader Money To Other Army Efforts," May 20, 2002, p. 10. 8. Winograd. Op. cit. , "Senate Committee Rejects Bush Administration'sCrusader Amendment, June 17, 2002, p.1. 9. See CRS Report RL31384 , V-22 Osprey Tilt-Rotor Aircraft, by[author name scrubbed]. 10. Erin Q. Winograd. Inside Defense.com, "OSD Bans Army FromSpending Money On Crusader Development," May 13, 2002. 11. Defense Acquisition: Army Transformation Faces Weapon SystemsChallenges (21-May-01, GAO-01-311) 12. Jon M. Donnelly. Defense Week Daily Update, "White House Threatensto Veto Defense Bill Over Crusader," May 9, 2002. 13. For a more extensive list of these arguments, see Ann Roosevelt. DefenseDaily, "Army Weighs Options Beyond Howitzers," May 13, 2002. 14. [author name scrubbed]. CQ Weekly, "Army's Three-Part Plan Causes Budget, HillDisharmony," April 27, 2002, p.1105. 15. Ann Roosevelt, op. cit. 16. Frank Tiboni. Defense News, "U.S. Army Targets 18 Programs forCancellation," February 18-24, 2002. Included examples are: Armored CombatEarthmover, Follow-on TOW ATGM, M113 A3, Wolverine Assault Bridge, and the Armored Security Vehicle.

Summary: The Army has been seeking to enhance its self-propelled 155mm artillery capabilitiessince the late 1970's. In additionto several programs to modify the M109 artillery system, culminating in the current M109A6 Paladin, since 1987these efforts have focused on what is now calledthe XM2001 Crusader. Initially begun in order to match the mobility and firepower of Soviet artillery, the Crusaderprogram is now the center of a controversyover whether it is an appropriate investment given the Army's on-going transformation to a lighter, more mobileforce. Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld hasannounced his intent to terminate the program, however the Crusader's supporters in the House and Senate ArmedServices Committees are seeking legislativeprovisions to maintain the program until at least May 2003 while an assessment of alternatives is conducted. Thisreport will be updated as further events occur.