One of the most important and contentious issues of any post-conflict operation is who willundertake what security tasks. The importance of immediately ensuring adequate security is aconstant theme of post-conflict literature. There is considerable acknowledgment that a failure toprovide enough properly equipped troops and police, with an appropriate use of force mandate, cancomplicate post-conflict operations enormously and usually prolong them. Most importantly, afailure to guarantee stability is often viewed as a serious impediment the establishment of alegitimate and effective government. (4) Accordingto one analyst, "the security dilemma remains amajor problem, both in the short term during the transition from war to building shared politicalinstitutions, and later, as the new government tries to cope with its very substantial problems." (5) In Iraq, some citizens have already expressed disillusionment with the United States, faulting the U.S. military for failing to assign personnel immediately to prevent the looting and killings ofIraqis by Iraqis that accompanied the coalition takeovers of Baghdad and some other major cities. (6) In the weeks before the coalition action in Iraq, many analysts pointed to a need to place a highpriority on providing security in a post-conflict Iraq. One "think tank" report on Iraq stated thatsecurity needs in the post-war period "cannot be underestimated." (7) Another stated that U.S. andcoalition forces would need "to pivot quickly from combat to peacekeeping operations in order toprevent post-conflict Iraq from descending into anarchy." (8) Lack of adequate security has been cited as a key problem in many peacekeeping operations. Most recently, many analysts have faulted the ad hoc coalition peacekeeping force in Afghanistan,where a vice president was assassinated in July 2002. There, many analysts argue, the legitimacyof the interim government of Hamid Karzai has been substantially eroded as the relatively smallpeacekeeping force of 7,000 troops (from a fluctuating group of about 20 nations) deployed only inand around Kabul, has been unable to protect the Afghani population against bandits and warlords. Earlier, the lack of adequate military force, complicated by the lack of a mandate to use force exceptin self-defense, also has been cited as an important factor in the failure of the 1992-1995 U.N.peacekeeping operation in Bosnia, (9) where Serbianforces slaughtered Muslims who had soughtrefuge in UN-established "safe havens." The lack of security, in particular a lack of constabularyforces (i.e., military police or policemen with military training) is also cited as a problem with thecurrent NATO peacekeeping operations in Bosnia and Kosovo. (10) In post-conflict situations, military forces -- including U.S. forces -- have performed many different kinds of security tasks, (11) most of whichwould apply to Iraq. At least 12 broad tasks (eachof which has many different components) have been cited as necessary to ensure security in postconflict settings. About five of these are considered largely military tasks, including to 1) protecthumanitarian relief workers; (2) disarm and demobilize unwanted or unneeded military personnel;(3) de-mine national territory; (4) protect borders against intruders; and (5) contain the ambitionsfor power of armed local, regional, religious, or ethnic leaders (known in some cases as "warlords")who would seek to disrupt the establishment of the new regime. The remaining seven tasks are viewed as mainly requiring police skills, although military might, influence, organizational structure, materiÃ©l, and skills are often required to carry them out in theimmediate aftermath of conflict, when violence is still high. (12) Of these, the three that most oftenrequire a combination of military and police attributes are to: (1) block reprisal killings andrecrimination actions, the latter of which may require crowd control; (2) control arms and confiscateillegal weapons; and (3) arrest and try war criminals. Four other tasks which usually fall to thepolice, although military intelligence and trainers may assist in their performance, are: (1) dismantlecriminal networks (sometimes involving local police and government officials); (2) undertake policeand security force reform; (3) promote concepts of human rights, and (4) protect civilians andproperty from common crime. (13) Especially inearly post-conflict situations, protecting civilians andproperty from common crime may require a mix of military and policing skills. Analysts cite most of these tasks as necessary for maintaining security in post-conflict Iraq. The exception, thus far, is that no one has reported the existence within the Iraq security forces and inHussein's Baath political party of the type of organized criminal network that exists in Bosnia. There, some political leaders and alleged war criminals are believed to belong to the network, whichengages in counterband smuggling. Also, at times, local police have refused requests to act againstcriminals because, some analysts believe, the police are accomplices. This linkage between politicaland criminal groups did not develop, or at least surface, however, until after Bosnia's nationalistleaders had attained power. Only now, over seven years after NATO forces initiated peacekeepingoperations in Bosnia, are the intelligence and legal systems in place to begin to crack this network. (14) One crucial issue for U.S. policymakers will be who is to perform these tasks, particularly if U.S. armed forces do not? The Bush Administration's repeated assertions that the U.S. military willremain only as long as necessary, preferably for a limited period, and the possibility that U.S. forcesmight be needed in other theaters, raises the question of whether the United States military mightleave while a military force is still required. Related questions are when and to what degree Iraqimilitary and police, and possibly U.S. contracted or international police, partner with U.S. forces ortake over the various security tasks. (Within days after the fall of Baghdad, the United States calledfor Iraqi police to register themselves for a possible return to duty after vetting.) Military Forces. In past occupations and peace operations, these security tasks have been handled in different ways. In Germany and Japan, forinstance U.S. and allied military forces provided total security at the outset, gradually handingpolicing tasks over to vetted indigenous police forces, who took over both normal policing andconstabulary roles. Over the past decade, however, there has been some controversy over the useof U.S. forces in peacekeeping operations for any tasks except the protection of humanitarian reliefworkers and the containment of warlords. (15) In the early 1990s, the United Nations organized peacekeeping forces with troop (and later police) contributions from member states to undertake several of these tasks. The UN's inability toestablish a stable environment in several operations, most particularly in the Balkans in the early1990s, led most analysts to conclude that the United Nations, as currently structured, lacks thecapacity to carry out the type of military activities that are necessary to keep the peace in hostile andpotentially hostile environments. Since 1995, operations in such environments have been carried out by the military forces of NATO, as in Bosnia and Kosovo, or "coalitions of the willing," i.e., U.N. sanctioned multilateralforces, as in Afghanistan. Some analysts have suggested that NATO might take on a security rolein Iraq. Given international tensions surrounding U.S. military action in Iraq, particularlydisagreements with NATO members France and Germany, however, other nations may proveunwilling, even in the long-term, to provide troops to supplement or replace U.S. forces in thepost-war period. Police Forces. The potential disadvantages of a continuing use of military forces have led military planners to give special consideration todetermining the point when conditions existed for constabulary and police forces to begin to assumesecurity tasks. While military forces are viewed as necessary in the early post-conflict periods, theycan sometimes prove counterproductive. "If a single soldier errs by using excessive force, the entiremission can be placed in jeopardy because local consent may be squandered," wrote one militaryofficer. (16) According to another analyst, an"excessive security presence or the wrong type ofpresence can be provocative and dangerous. After violence has been contained the visibility ofarmed security forces indicates problems and dysfunction." (17) Over the past decade, experiences in peacekeeping operations have been combed for lessons that might be learned regarding the appropriate timing and mix of forces to use to perform securitytasks. Increasingly, those analyzing and planning peacekeeping operations have argued for a rangeof different kinds of forces carrying out different roles. In the words of one analyst: "Military forcesare effective at guaranteeing security against military opposition. They are much less effectiveagainst riots and civilian disturbances like the ones experienced in Bosnia as the refugees tried to gohome....They are impotent in the face of bricks through windows or threatening calls in the night. So we need a spectrum of forces to bring violence under control." (18) In addition to the military forces and military police contributed by many countries to peacekeeping operations, several other types of forces have been used to provide security. Two typesof international forces have been important: (1) the constabulary forces of other countries, inparticular the carabineri of Italy and the gendarmes of France, and (2) the U.N. CIVPOLs,i.e.,police contributed through the U.N. civilian police mechanism that recruits active duty or retiredpolicemen from member states to serve in an international police force. (International CIVPOLs monitor, assist, mentor and train local police. On occasion, they may mediate local disputes, andensure public order. They may call on military forces when necessary.) Often, vetted local policeforces have also been used to provide security under international oversight, (19) and sometimesreconstructed military forces have also been used. Studies and experiences suggest the importance of a coordinated, overlapping sharing of powers among military, paramilitary, and international and domestic police forces, with the first threephasing out as levels of violence diminish. (20) Inparticular, the need to provide constabulary forcesto handle crowds of civilians became more and more recognized in peacekeeping operations."Organized in platoons and companies along military lines, [such] paramilitary forces deal withlarge-scale civil disturbances and with armed and organized criminal elements. To avoid embroilingheavily armed troops in crowd control, the U.N. Transitional Authority in Eastern Slavonia(UNTAES) included a Polish riot-control company [i.e., military unit]. In Bosnia, the NATOpeacekeeping Stabilization Force (SFOR) developed the Multinational Specialized Unit (MSU) [aparamilitary unit] including police and paramilitary Italian Carabinieri. " (21) Subsequently, in Kosovo,a similar unit was incorporated into NATO's Kosovo peacekeeping force (KFOR), and the UnitedNations deployed civilian constabulary Special Police Units (SPU). (22) These experiences also have led many analysts to argue for the strengthening of the UNCIVPOL, or CIVPOL-like units to carry out tasks that are widely viewed as difficult or eveninappropriate for military forces, and which local police forces may not be able to carry out. TheNational Defense University's Institute for International and Strategic Studies (IISS) in 1998identified a security "deployment gap" resulting from an inadequate law enforcement presence onthe ground in several peacekeeping operations. This gap left military forces as the only source ofenforcing order early in an intervention, and made CIVPOL dependent for credibility as a capableforce on a military backup. The IISS report attributed this gap to the lack of "significant surgecapability, international mobility, or experience in operating beyond national borders." It suggestedremedies to "narrow" the gap. These included (1) strengthening the capacity of the internationalcommunity to mobilize CIVPOL personnel, either by creating a standby force of trained CIVPOLpersonnel and making adjustments in training and organization to make them more effective, and(2) preparing the military to discharge police functions during a transition period "until the securityenvironment has been sufficiently stabilized and the CIVPOL contingent has become operational." (23) Recent recommendations for post-conflict policy in Iraq include military constabulary forces, specialpolice constabulary units, and U.N. CIVPOLS as components of security forces. (24) Recent publications note continuing problems with CIVPOL deployments, including "a shortage of properly trained and experienced police officers and the lack of adequate logisticalsupport." (25) Presidential Decision Directive 71,issued by the Clinton Administration in February2000 but never put into effect, attempted to provide a framework for strengthening U.S. andinternational CIVPOL capabilities and related police and justice institutions. H.R. 1414, introducedby Representatives McGovern and Houghton on March 25, 2003, proposes that the United Statesencourage negotiations with the United Nations and U.N. member states to establish a U.N. civilianpolice corps. The size of a military occupation force, and the length of time that it should remain in place in support of an occupation government depends on many factors. The situation in Iraq is not yet clear,but two decisive factors may be the range and scope of tasks that military forces will be assigned,and the degree to which the Iraqi citizenry, police forces, and remaining military forces are willingto cooperate with the occupiers. Numerous estimates of the size of the necessary occupation force have been put forward over the last several months. A February 2003 U.S. Army War College publication cites an initialprojection of 100,000 troops, although it cautions that projections "of actual troop numbers remainhighly speculative until the actual postwar situation becomes clear." (26) This figure conforms to amid-2002 estimate of the U.S. Army Center of Military History that100,000 troops would be neededfor a peacekeeping force in Iraq if the peacekeepers were to carry out the full range of tasks of anoccupation force such as was provided in Germany and Japan after World War II, throughout thecountry. (27) These tasks would include providingemergency humanitarian relief, assisting withreconstruction, and administering Iraq on an interim basis. Conditions were somewhat different inGermany and Japan than they may be in Iraq, however, as there was virtually no resistance to theU.S. occupation, and cooperation from local police forces was high. Other estimates span a wide range above and below that figure. In testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (August 1, 2002), retired U.S. Army Colonel Scott Feil suggested75,000 as the number of forces that should remain. The Heritage Foundation, which argues that U.S.troops should be deployed only to secure three circumscribed war aims, estimates that the UnitedStates should contribute 40,000 troops to a 60,000-member coalition occupation force. (28) Intestimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee (February 25, 2003), General Eric Shinseki,Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army, estimated that "something on the order of several hundred thousandsoldiers" would probably be required for an occupation force to control Iraq. Department of Defensecivilian officials rebutted that estimate, some citing 100,000 as the appropriate number. (29) TheCongressional Budget Office (CBO) has estimated the annual cost of maintaining a militaryoccupation force of 75,000-200,000 at $17 billion to $46 billion per year, based on the average costof maintaining a U.S. Army peacekeeper. (30) Several factors will be important in determining the size of the U.S. and coalition occupation forces in Iraq and the amount of time the forces will remain. With regard to internal security,important factors will be the degree to which the Iraqi population accepts them, whether and howmany troops from other nations and U.S. or international civilian policemen are deployed, and theextent to which the United States has confidence in Iraqi police to handle the task. (As of late April, the State Department was reportedly seeking bids for a contract to send 1,000 former police officers and lawyers to work with the Iraqi police, as well as the justice and prisonsystems. (31) Several other countries, mostlyEuropean, have pledged to send small numbers of troopsto perform security, patrolling, and humanitarian tasks. (32) ) Among other factors are the perceived threat from one or more of Iraq's neighbors, which may be manifested as threats to territorial integrity through incursions across Iraq's borders, requiringconsiderable forces patrolling those borders, or more likely, as attempts to influence political eventsin Iraq by funding armed Iraqi groups. Such external "spoilers" have been identified as at leastpartially responsible for the breakdown of the U.N. peacekeeping operation in Bosnia and of severaloperations in Africa. The difficulty of disarming and demobilizing Iraqi military, paramilitary, and Baath party forces may be another significant determinant of the size of the occupying force and the length of time itremains. Demobilization, disarmament, and reintegration (often referred to as DDR) processes inpeacekeeping operations have been cited as complex and costly, but essential to the success of anypeace mission. (33) According to one analyst, largenumbers of forces can be required to accomplishthe task, but still may not be sufficient to guarantee a successful operation. (34) Some believe that theDDR problems presented in Iraq will surpass the problems elsewhere. For example, in his SenateForeign Relations Committee testimony, Col. Feil testified that DDR "requirements will dwarfprevious efforts" because of the huge size of Iraqi security forces. (35) One recent report estimated,"based on historical precedents," that U.S. military planners should allow at least four months fora "demilitarization" phase (apparently corresponding to demobilization and disarmament), duringwhich "aggressive re-training" and reintegration would begin. (36) The size of a coalition force and length of time it must remain will also depend on the degree to which the United States believes local security forces can be used. (Two recent reports recommended retaining Iraqi security forces in some form and using them, after retraining, inconjunction with U.S. and international forces in the post-war period. (37) ) The use of such forces hasvaried in previous peacekeeping operations. As the United States proceeds to establish an interim Iraqi regime, three issues have emergedregarding the transition to a permanent Iraqi government. (38) These are: (1) the appropriate role forthe United Nations in the transition; (2) the feasibility of establishing democracy in Iraq; and (3) theappropriate time frame and stages in which a transition to full Iraqi rule would occur, particularlythe length of time in which the U.S. military would head an occupation government. Even as the United States begins to organize the new structures that will govern Iraq, policymakers are debating the appropriate caretakers for an interim period, and the appropriatemeans to create Iraq's permanent governing structures. For now, governmental authority in Iraq isexercised by U.S. Army General Tommy Franks, the commander-in-Chief of the U.S. CentralCommand which directed the war. Retired U.S. Army general, Jay Garner, who heads theDepartment of Defense's national reconstruction office for Iraq, has assumed the position of civilianadministrator, responsible for civilian government functions. The Bush Administration's early plans,as of February 2003, called for a transition phase, during which control of Iraqi governmentministries would be gradually transferred from occupation military and civilian administrators toIraqis. In a final phase Iraqis would draft and ratify a new constitution, which would provide thebasis for free elections. In February, Bush Administration officials stated that, under propitiouscircumstances, the occupation government would last two years. (39) Currently, however, the BushAdministration is promoting the organization of an interim Iraqi "authority," to be put in place withina short period of time. Its powers and status vis-a-vis the occupation authorities are unclear. Some policymakers have argued that the United Nations should play a central if not the lead role in designing Iraq's future government. The process of peacebuilding that the United Statesenvisions for Iraq, with the goal of forming a democratic government, is arguably similar, in a broadbrush way, to the democratization processes of the U.S. military occupations of Japan and Germany. Some argue, however, that in key ways it may more closely resemble the multidimensionalpeacebuilding operations that the United Nations has conducted in several countries since the early1990s -- among them, most recently, Kosovo, Afghanistan, and East Timor, as well as the earliercases of Namibia, Cambodia, Mozambique, and El Salvador. Unlike the current situation in Iraq,U.N. peacebuilding missions have involved guiding countries from civil war towards a stable peace. Iraq does, however, share some characteristics of the nations involved in many of the peacebuildingmissions, i.e., sectarian divisions, which some analysts fear may give way to violence in the absenceof a strong, central, Iraqi authority, and a lack of experience with democracy. The Bush Administration envisions a role for the United Nations in post-war Iraq, but argues that the United States should continue to play a lead role, if not the lead role, in shaping Iraq's futuregovernment. As of April 2003, the only role that President Bush had identified for the U.N.regarding a future Iraqi government was a "participation" in the selection -- which some analystsinterpreted as meaning endorsement -- of members of an interim Iraqi government. The debate on the appropriate role for the United Nations is influenced by (1) considerations as to whether the United Nations Security Council's resistance to endorsing coalition military actionagainst Iraq is a significant indicator of its behavior in post-Hussein Iraq, (2) the comparativeadvantages of the United Nations and of the United States in harnessing international support fora future government, and (3) the United Nations' performance in past and current peacebuildingoperations. Proponents of a continuing U.S. lead in Iraq's political development believe that the United Nations has previously demonstrated a lack of the political will necessary to deal with securitythreats posed by the Hussein regime, and would prove an obstacle to securing U.S. security goals ifit were to play a deciding role in Iraq's political future. (40) Some also voice doubts about the UnitedNations' institutional ability to handle a complex transitional administration for a population of 24million, many times larger than the other two areas in which it currently runs transitionaladministrations, i.e., Kosovo (five million) and East Timor (approx. 950,000). They would alsodiscount this option based on the United Nations' reputation, especially throughout the 1990s, ashaving at best mixed results in its various peacekeeping and peacebuilding enterprises, and argue thatthe U.N. lacks the capacity to coordinate its operations effectively. Proponents of a lead U.N. role argue that U.S. interests in creating a stable and democratic Iraq would be better served if the United Nations were to assume control of the governmental aspects ofa peace operation through a transitional authority. (41) For one, they argue that only the United Nationsnow possess the high degree of international legitimacy that the United States enjoyed whenoccupying Japan and a sector of Germany in 1945. (42) Such legitimacy is necessary, they argue, toreap the high levels of international support, including financial assistance for reconstruction thatIraq will need for many years to come. (43) (Inaddition, some doubt that US policymakers would beable to muster enough political support domestically to provide the large amounts of assistance theybelieve will be needed for a lengthy reconstruction process.) A U.N. authority also would provide,proponents argue, assurances to both Iraqis and the international community of greater impartialityin such intrusive enterprises as purging and reshaping government institutions than would a U.S.occupational authority. (44) The perception ofimpartiality might affect the degree to which a broadmajority of Iraqis might be willing to support new governmental institutions, and a democratic ethos,proponents believe. Proponents also argue that while problems remain and reforms must be made, (45) the UnitedNations' has learned from past experiences in running complex peacebuilding operations, and thatseveral operations that seemed highly problematic several years ago have, with time, begun to seemmarkedly positive. (46) Some analysts also arguethat while some problems of U.N. peacebuildingoperations have been due to actions, or lack thereof, of U.N. personnel, the greatest problems havebeen the result of an insufficient mandate and a lack of resources, which can be attributed to a lackof political will on the part of member countries. (47) Strong differences exist over whether a Western-style democracy in Iraq is feasible. (48) Theestablishment of a democratic government in Iraq, which could provide a model for the Middle East,has long been advanced as a goal of Bush Administration officials, and was stated early on as onegoal of U.S. military action. Whether Iraq contains inherent institutional and cultural obstacles todemocratization, and if so, whether it can overcome them, is subject to debate. Some policymakersand analysts assert the majority of Iraqis aspire to democracy, and many have the education, skillsand modern outlook to create, with international assistance, durable democratic institutions. Others,however, point to Iraq's lack of significant prior experience with democratic institutions as aliability. Many analysts perceive significant differences among the Iraqi ethnic and tribal groupsthat may lead to continuing violence in a post-war Iraq, and are skeptical of the possibility ofbuilding democratic institutions and practices on such a shaky foundation in the short, or even thelong run. Some also warn of possible anti-democratic attitudes about the character of leadership,and other possible social, cultural, and psychological impediments to democracy. (49) Since the early 1980s, there has been a growing international interest in assisting the development of democratic institutions and practices, of which assistance through peacebuildingoperations has been a recent manifestation. (50) Literature on democratization and peacebuildingoperations highlights the difficulty of establishing democracies in societies with deep and bitterethnic and religious divisions. Three places currently in the midst of extensive internationalpeacekeeping/peacebuilding operations following civil conflict, with aspirations to create functioningdemocracies, are Afghanistan (since December 2001), Kosovo (since July 1999), and Bosnia (mostintensively since 1996). The continuing ethnic, criminal and terrorist violence in these regions provides examples of the durability of such problems. Even without sectarian differences, establishing the institutions and mores of democratic practices in states with conflictive and authoritarian histories, which often involve overcomingcultures of dependency and mistrust, is a formidable undertaking. One of the stated rationales forU.S. interventions around the turn of the 20th century in the Philippines and throughout the Caribbeanregion was the establishment of democracy. The United States encouraged democratic constitutionalmodels and laws, and the holding of elections, but real and enduring democracies, in most cases, didnot take root. After World War II, the United States was successful in creating democracies duringthe occupations of Germany and Japan, but conditions there were substantially different than in Iraqtoday. Despite concerns of policymakers during wartime planning for the occupations that theGerman and Japanese cultures were inherently anti-democratic, U.S. occupation forces found thepopulations receptive to the creation of a democratic model and able to build on previousexperiences with democratic politics and government, particularly in Germany, to replace thedefeated, authoritarian governments. Once on the ground, occupation planners soon becameconvinced that a primary threat to democracy came from the devastated economies of the defeatedcountries, where material want and misery might make strongman leaders again attractive. Recent experiences with conflict resolution and peacebuilding, which emphasize the necessity of a comprehensive approach encompassing all levels of society and politics, may point to some ofthe inadequacies of early U.S. democracy-building efforts. Since the early 1990s, analysts ofinternational efforts to encourage democracies have increasingly asserted a need to put into place awide array of institutions, practices, and attitudes, as well as a functioning economy capable ofabsorbing demobilized soldiers, (51) to makedemocracy work. One author emphasizes the profoundchanges necessary to create a culture in which peacebuilding operations can succeed: "If apeacekeeping operation is to leave behind a legitimate and independently viable political sovereign,it must help transform the political landscape by building a new basis for domesticpeace....successful contemporary peacebuilding not only changes behavior but, more important, alsotransforms identities and institutional context. More than reforming play in an old game, it changesthe game." (52) Other analysts of peacebuilding efforts warn that some early attempts at democratization in post-conflict states were counterproductive, generating conditions for renewed warfare. Oneobservation on the vulnerability of such states to the "societal tensions that naturally arise from theprocess of democratization and marketization" (53) may be relevant to Iraq, where some suggest thata sense of national community is at best tenuous and new sources of discord, such as possiblegrowing income disparities, may exacerbate existing frictions. Depending on how Iraq's post-conflict situation evolves, "lessons learned" from the implementation of peacebuilding programs in five areas may be of particular interest topolicymakers in considering how best to create conditions for success in Iraq. These areas are: (1)guarantees of the rule of law; (2) the role of civic society and local participation; (3) the appropriatetiming and conditions for elections; (4) the utility of powersharing arrangements, and (5) theestablishment of international norms. Guaranteeing the Rule of Law. In addition to the security tasks listed in the previous section, some analysts of peacekeeping and peacebuildingoperations cite the immediate creation of institutions to guarantee the rule of law as essential to theestablishment of a secure climate in which democracy can prosper. While the rule of law starts witha democratic constitution, and requires a representative parliament, analysts have found that theinstitutions which most directly touch the lives of the citizens, ensuring their rights day-to-day anddeeply affecting their perception of their government, are often those which most urgently need tobe built or rebuilt in post-conflict situations. An analysis of seven peacekeeping experiences -- Cambodia, El Salvador, Mozambique, Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, and Panama, -- identified two crucial rule of law "gaps" that could createextreme difficulties. The first was an "enforcement gap," i.e., a lack of police forces capable ofdealing with serious lawlessness and violent domestic disorder, as discussed earlier. The second,was an "institutional gap," i.e., the lack of an adequate number of impartial and competent judges,humane prisons and jailers, and a fair and coherent legal code, in post-conflict societies. (54) Former U.S. Ambassador William G. Walker, who has played a prominent role in three peace operations, suggests the complexities, and long-term nature, of efforts to strengthen the rule of lawby developing the above-mentioned institutions. "All parts of a legal system -- the judiciary, theprosecutors, the bar, the police, the prison system, the codes -- must work properly and insynchronization. If a single component is left unreformed, the system will continue to generateinjustice. Decades are required to produce a new police, not to mention a transformed judiciary,composed of officials not schooled in the behavior of the past. Few international donors have thepatience, long-term commitment, or resources necessary to assume such a burden." (55) For Iraq, analysts have recommended a variety of means to help assure the rule of law. In addition to recommendations regarding the police, discussed earlier, analysts have recommended avariety of forms of legal assistance, such as teams of international legal specialists -- includinglawyers, judges, court administrators and corrections officers -- to monitor, train, and supplementIraqi personnel. (56) As of late April, 2003, theUnited States Army had begun to assess the judicialsystem in Iraq, (57) and as mentioned earlier, theState Department has begun the bidding process onassistance for the police, and justice and prison systems. A recent review of rule of law assistance programs since the 1980s indicates that their contribution to strengthening democracy is uncertain. "Rule of law aid practitioners can probablyprescribe rule-of-law programs with a safe belief that these initiatives may well be helpful to botheconomic development and democratization," according to one analyst, "but they really do not knowto what extent there are direct causal connections at work and whether similar resources directedelsewhere might produce greater effect on economic or political conditions." (58) The extent to which such assistance would help Iraq establish institutions imbued with a democratic ethos may well depend on how deeply Iraqis desire democratization. In an assessmentof many democratization programs since 1989, the same analyst found that the degree of successcorrelated with a country's overall progress towards democracy. Concluding that "no dramaticresults should be expected from democracy promotion effort" as they "can do little to change thefundamental social, economic, and political structures and conditions that shape political life in othercountries," this author argued that nonetheless the United States should not abandon its commitmentto advancing democracy, but instead approach democracy promotion "as a long-term, uncertainventure." (59) Role of Civic Society and Local Participation. Increasingly, analysts have come to view the establishment of appropriate governmental institutionsas a necessary, but insufficient condition for the creation of a well functioning democracy. Alsoimportant, many believe, is the development of a culture which fosters tolerance, the exchange ofideas, respect for human rights, and active citizen participation. International democratization effortsinclude support for an increasing variety of "civic society" groups, non-governmental institutions,the press, particular interest organizations (such as unions, business, professional, and legalassociations, and human rights groups). Such efforts were an important component of the U.S.democracy building efforts after World War II in Japan, where such organizations were created orstrengthened, and in Germany, where they were revitalized. Recent peacekeeping literatureemphasizes the need for a high level of "civil society" participation, particularly at the local level,in the creation of representative institutions from the "bottom up." (60) International donors arecurrently providing assistance to such groups in Afghanistan, where few such organizations existed.Support for such group has also played a role in post-conflict democratization efforts in SouthAfrica, and in the transitions from communism or authoritarianism to democracy in Eastern Europeand Latin America. One policy institution recently cited a need for the international community to "focus on" the many local groups in Iraq, which may, or may not, provide a basis for local level democratization. (61) Its analysis found that it is still too early to determine whether existing local organizations based ontraditional and hierarchical sources of power, such as tribal and religious structures, will contributeto or hinder the development of a Western-style democracy there. It also noted, however, that Iraq"already has a wide range of professional and trade associations that can serve as building blocs formore open and transparent consultations and provide a counterweight to more traditional,ethnic-religious groups." (62) Some analysts,however, believe that these groups have been dominatedby the Baath party, and thus may not be appropriate vehicles for democratization efforts. As described by analysts of peace operations, civil society is important in several ways to furthering democratic processes. (63) One waysupport for such groups promotes democracy is that itenables populations to take "ownership" of the process, building cooperation at a grass-roots level,and providing checks on government. Another is that local civil society institutions can address "keyissues such as reconciliation, justice, and human rights...that go to the heart of what many considerto be the root causes of civil wars." (64) A third isthat such institutions can foster a culture thatpromotes democratic governance. Whether international assistance to support civil society in Iraq would similarly contribute to democratization is unknown. While it is difficult to judge the effects of democratization aid ingeneral, judging the degree to which assistance to such groups can promote democracy is even moreproblematic. One extensive study of such groups stated that it could not reach a definitive answerregarding the effect of civil society assistance on overall political change, but found that "evidencefairly consistently indicated that such assistance alone is unlikely to be a major factor" in promotingdemocratization. (65) Still, despite noting numerousproblems with civil society aid and suggestingreforms, the authors recounted several benefits of such aid, including the establishment of "theimportant idea that civil society has a rightful role in governance." (66) Appropriate Conditions for and Timing of Elections. Carefully structured and internationally supervised elections, at alllevels, have been the centerpiece of most peacebuilding and democratization efforts since the early1990s. They have also been established as the end points of international and U.S. "exit strategies"for peacekeeping and peacebuilding operations. While the Bush Administration and otherpolicymakers are now indicating that elections are the appropriate path to democracy in Iraq, pastexperience suggests caution concerning the timing and objectives of elections. According to some,elections that are held too soon after a conflict has ended become disruptive rather than contributingto stability. In the words of one analyst: "Paradoxically, to proceed precipitously with elections mayturn out to be the least productive way to build peace and ensure the emergence of democracy." (67) Unlike the cases on which this assessment is based, Iraq is not emerging from a civil war. Given, however, the probable weakness of any political alternatives to the Baath party, the observedtendency of elections to consolidate the power of existing organizations and leaders, and to preventthe emergence of new ones, may prove just as problematic in post-Hussein Iraq as it has in countriesemerging from civil wars. According to some analysts, early post-conflict elections have entrenchedleaders of extremist factions: "not infrequently, early elections influence the balance of societalforces in ways that are inimical to the consolidation of peace. In Bosnia, the elections held underthe Dayton accords consolidated and formalized nationalist divisions within society and served tocomplicate an already complex and highly contentious peace process." (68) In addition, some analystssuggest that the political competition inherent to democracy can exacerbate frictions or conflict indeeply divided societies. (69) Nevertheless, oneanalyst believes that even "with all their real andperceived flaws," elections are, in the long run, "imperative," as they provide the necessarylegitimacy "to implement rehabilitation and reconciliation policies." (70) To ensure that elections are held under the most propitious circumstances, one study suggests that elections be delayed until certain preconditions can be met, most of which may still be lackingin Iraq. These preconditions are: (1) the "existence of a state capable of performing the essentialfunctions expected of it," (2) a "working consensus...about national boundaries, the structure andfunctioning of the government, and relations between national and subnational units," (3) a"demonstrable political commitment on the part of the major conflicting parties to carry out theagreed-upon peace accord or pact," and (4) "significant progress toward demobilization andreintegration of ex-combatants." (71) In the interim,the authors of this study suggest the adoption ofcoalition arrangements and reconciliation measures that confer legitimacy on a temporarygovernment. (72) Utility of Powersharing Arrangements. Potential problems with elections as the vehicle to representative government in post-conflict situations hasled to new thinking about the utility of powersharing arrangements. Although some analysts willargue that the 1995 Dayton accord's permanent geographical powersharing arrangements in Bosnia,which divided the country into two regions along ethnic lines, were a mistake, temporary solutionshave been looked to as providing a bridge to an eventual elected government. In Afghanistan, afterthe coalition forces ousted the ruling Taliban forces in November 2001, interim powersharingarrangements were put in place to govern Afghanistan through the mediation of the United Nations. In December 2001, delegates of the major Afghan factions signed an agreement in Bonn, Germany,to form an interim administration that would govern for six months, while a traditional nationalassembly ( loya jirga ) was being organized to choose a national government. In June 2002, the loyajirga selected Hamid Karzai, head of the interim administration, to head a national government untilelections are held in two years, and it endorsed Karzai's cabinet, which contained leaders andrepresentatives from the various factions. Some analysts now argue that the Afghan arrangementscan provide a model for the formation of a government in Iraq. (73) Although the concept of such arrangements may seem anti-democratic to many observers, some analysts have seen powersharing arrangements as an essential element in settling or avoiding somecivil wars in countries where there sharp division among ethnic or religious groups. And, onefundamental requirement for such effective peacekeeping, according to some analysts, is that suchoperations include all "local stakeholders -- including those who have been the victims of war aswell as those who have been the perpetrators of war -- [and put them] at the center of externalsupport for rebuilding..." (74) In Iraq, too,powersharing arrangements may be useful in gaininglegitimacy for a new government and in curbing potential strife or violence among contendingfactions. (Such arrangements may also help to retain capable people in government. Many analystsstate that the continuation of Iraqi governmental functions will depend on the retention ofbureaucrats, some of whom, particularly at the upper levels, are Baath party members, if notloyalists.) Still, as in the case of Afghanistan, where political violence continues to occur and someanalysts believe threatens to undermine the new government, a powersharing arrangement alone maynot guarantee a successful transition. According to one study that looked at the settlement of civilwars, third-party security guarantees and enforcement are often necessary as well. (75) Some analysts have also suggested that some form of power-sharing formula be integrated into an electoral formula as one means of insuring stability in peacebuilding operations. As argued byone analyst, power-sharing provisions for winners and losers in elections can be helpful in somecircumstances: "There need to be positions for both winners and losers in a new government. Winner-take-all elections are seen as zero-sum contests. Unless there is some form of compensation,the loser will have strong incentives to take up arms and turn to a renewed campaign of violence inpursuit of political objectives." (76) Nevertheless,this analyst also notes tensions betweenpowersharing arrangements and the achievement of other goals, such as ensuring human rights andpromoting justice. (77) In addition, one analystpoints out that, in some situations, such arrangementsmay provide only weak incentives to moderate extremist positions, thus making democracyvulnerable to such positions. (78) Establishing International Norms. Even among analysts of peace operations who acknowledge the difficulties of establishing democracies, someargue that the only solutions to differences are reached through the establishment of democraticpractices. Arguing for international organizations to adopt norms and practices that promotedemocracy, one analyst argued that "Sustained peace in deeply divided societies requires a formulafor the recognition and tolerance of ethnic differences, strong legal protections for individual andgroup rights, and political institutions that encourage bargaining, compromise, and inclusivecoalitions." He urged the continued development of international mediation and monitoringpractices, and the establishment of new international norms on democracy, "such as an internationalright to local freedom of choice." (79) Some urgeinternational donors to fund and improve such effortsdespite some failures. (80) The Bush Administration has not announced any comprehensive plans for peacebuilding activities in Iraq, although it has recently contracted for one peacebuilding activity (see the sectionson police and on the rule of law, above). Recent evaluations of peacebuilding missions suggest thata time frame longer than two years may be necessary to put in place and consolidate the basicstructures of democracy in an enduring framework. Much will depend, however, on Iraqis' abilityto control sectarian differences, hasten economic recovery and growth, and retain experienced peoplein government, as well as the length of time it takes Iraqis to agree on a political structure. In examining several U.N. peacekeeping/peacebuilding missions, one analyst judged the one to two year transition periods (in Angola, Bosnia, Cambodia, El Salvador and Mozambique) to be "too short to record significant progress on even the reforms prescribed by the peace accords, letalone those that are necessary to consolidate the peace but are not mandated by the accords...." (81) She pointed out that time constraints, such as restrictions on the length of mandates, were often dueto resource constraints and created difficulties in retaining high quality staff, among otherproblems. (82) Another analyst who also notes thatthe one to three year length of U.N. missions typicalof more recent operations has been too short, recommends linking the termination of peaceoperations to the accomplishment of specific objectives. He estimates a decade as "probably aminimum in most circumstances." (83) In any case,although the variety of views and precedents, andthe unique conditions in Iraq as it other societies, makes it difficult to forecast precise outcomes andtimeframes with certainty, the study of past experiences can nonetheless provide valuable guidelinesfor initiating peacebuilding activities an evaluating their progress.

Summary: In the immediate aftermath of the coalition victory in Iraq, U.S. policymakers face a number of decisions regarding security and government in post-war Iraq. While there are significantdifferences between the Iraq situation and other post-war experiences, observations and "lessonslearned" from such experiences might be relevant. This report will discuss six security andgovernance issues raised by previous experiences, with particular reference to U.S. post-World WarII occupation experiences and also peacekeeping experiences in the Balkans and Afghanistan. It maybe updated as new issues arise for which assessments of previous experiences might be useful. Previous experience suggests three key decisions on security in post-war Iraq which policymakers must take. These are: (1) what security tasks must be performed, (2) who shouldperform them, and (3) how large should an occupation military force be, and how long should itremain? Many tasks must be performed in order to guarantee the security of citizens and propertyin the post-conflict environment, several of which require "constabulary" forces, i.e., thosepossessing both military and policing skills. In previous major U.S. occupations, U.S. soldiersinitially performed most policing tasks, turning them over to indigenous police as the situationallowed. In the 1990s, peacekeepers increasingly assumed policing functions as the need toguarantee security for property and citizens in the aftermath of conflict became apparent. Manyanalysts have argued that policing functions are not appropriate for U.S. forces, as they can erodewarfighting and many also believe that appropriately trained civilian police are often preferable. The lack of such personnel, however, has been a problem in current peacekeeping operations. Thesize of an occupation force, and the length of time that it should remain in place during anoccupation government depends on many factors, including in particular the tasks it undertakes andthe cooperation it receives from Iraqis. Policymakers must also decide what type of assistance to provide Iraq in creating a new government and supporting institutions to fill the power vacuum left by the fall of the Husseingovernment. Three issues are: (1) who should form a post-war government for Iraq, (2) what arethe possibilities of and means to achieving democracy in Iraq, and (3) how long is a peacebuildingpresence necessary? While the U.S. government has taken charge of the formation of a new Iraqigovernment, with the intent of encouraging the creation of democratic institutions and practices,some analysts believe that the possibilities for creating a viable and democratic Iraqi governmentwould be enhanced if the United Nations were to assume that role. Some senior U.S. officials hadcontemplated an occupation of some two years, which some experience suggests may be inadequateto create stable institutions. Studies of past peacekeeping experiences point to the special need forconsiderable attention to building capacities to assure the rule of law, conducting elections at anappropriate time, and possibly providing for interim powersharing arrangements. Some have alsoadvocated creating or supporting channels for political participation by civic society and localgroups.