After over a decade of intensive experience with multifaceted peacekeeping and peacebuildingoperations, (1) many analysts have concluded thatestablishing a secure and stable environment is oneessential element for achieving a sustainable peace. As continued instability in Iraq and Afghanistanimpedes the restoration of normal lives for those countries' inhabitants, and as Haiti exhibitsrenewed instability, some Members of Congress are examining with renewed interest available toolsto provide effective security. While military forces are considered indispensable for establishinginitial security and often are also used to maintain law and order in peacekeeping and related"stability" or "stabilization" operations designed to normalize conditions in post-conflict and post-interventionenvironments, their use is often controversial. (2) Overthe past decade, internationalcivilian police (known as "CivPol") have become increasingly recognized as generally more suitedthan military forces for most law and order tasks, and their use has increased dramatically. TheSenate Foreign Relations Committee, in its March 2004 Report 108-248 accompanying the FY2005foreign relations authorization bill ( S. 2144 ), stated that it recognizes "the importanceof the United Nations peacekeeping operations, including its capability to deploy civil police forces,in promoting stability in post-conflict situations." (3) Policymakers have recognized problems withtheir use and made efforts to deal with them. Among the current issues for Congress are whether to provide for continued improvements to the existing system and whether to build new U.S. and international CivPol capabilities. CivPoladvocates have advanced proposals to (1) facilitate the recruitment and rapid deployment of adequatenumbers of qualified police and related law enforcement personnel to complex post-conflictmissions, and (2) ensure that such missions include personnel with the appropriate training and skillsto handle a range of law enforcement situations. These proposals encompass provisions that wouldstress continued implementation of U.S. and U.N. reform efforts, as well as provisions that wouldreform the existing system. Most important among the reform efforts were two key documents that recommended mechanisms to improve existing CivPol systems and approaches for providing and using CivPolforces. One was the Clinton Administration's February 2000 Presidential Decision Directive 71(PDD-71), which specifically dealt with the law enforcement aspects of peacekeeping operations. (4) While its provisions were left largely unimplemented by the Clinton Administration, (5) the directiveremains in effect under the Bush Administration, which has begun implementing some measures.The other was the United Nations' August 2000 "Brahimi Panel" report, (6) which dealt with problemsof U.N. peacekeeping operations in general, but also contained four specific recommendations toaddress problems with the U.N. civilian police system, particularly in the areas of recruitment,training, and deployment of international civilian police personnel. The United Nations has begunimplementing some of the Brahimi Panel recommendations and other proposed reforms, while othersremain under discussion. Among the proposals recommended by advocates are: (1) the creation of a reserve CivPol force, as could be contemplated under H.R. 1414 for the U.N. and as proposed for theUnited States under H.R. 2616 ; (2) the diversification of international police forces ascurrently constituted, including the establishment of units of police with military skills (i.e.,"constabulary forces") to handle hostile situations such as crowd control (as is suggested for NATOunder H.R. 2616 ; and (3) the creation of more robust civilian response mechanisms, ascontemplated by S. 2127 and related proposals, including a proposal for a "stabilitypackage" of lawyers, judges, prosecutors, and penal experts, in addition to CivPols, to create viablelaw enforcement systems. An important consideration to many policymakers is whetherrecommendations for improving the CivPol mechanisms could reduce reliance on U.S. militaryforces in post-conflict operations or shorten the length of their deployments to such operations. This report will provide a brief synopsis of the evolution of the uses of international police in peacekeeping operations, with a description of the problems encountered. (Appendix A providesa synopsis, in chart form, of many of these operations. Appendix B discusses in more detail thegradual expansion of policing in U.N. and U.S.-led operations during the 1990s.) This report willthen discuss the current U.N., U.S., and European mechanisms for providing CivPols to internationaloperations, recommendations for improving those systems, and the status of their implementation. It will then assess the various approaches that are recommended to resolve continuing problems andprovide options for the U.S. Congress for continued improvements to the system. This report maybe updated if warranted. Note : This is a list of acronyms used two or more times in the text. Acronyms used only once arenot included. The international community has increasingly turned to CivPols to perform a variety offunctions in international peace operations. Between 1994 and 2000, the number of internationalcivilian police participating in U.N. operations (UNCIVPOLs) increased fourfold. Despite a dropfrom that peak, the number of currently deployed UNCIVPOLs is twice what it was nearly ten yearsago. (7) As of February 29, 2004, 4,655 internationalcivilian police, including 476 Americans, wereassisting with law enforcement tasks in the eight U.N. peacekeeping missions with UNCIVPOLcomponents. In addition, several nations, including the United States, continue to provide bilateralassistance, especially training, to indigenous police forces in a variety of post-conflict situations. Some analysts urge the eventual deployment of sizable contingents of international civilian policeto Afghanistan (where the United States, Germany, and the United Kingdom are now working torecreate an indigenous police force) to Iraq (where the United States and Jordan are doing the same),and to Haiti. As of February 29, 2004, five UNCIVPOL were deployed to Afghanistan. All U.S. assistance for law enforcement entities abroad is carried out within the context ofSection 660 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended (FAA), adopted in 1975. Except forspecific exempted cases, Section 660 prohibits aid to train, advise, or provide financial support forpolice, prisons, or other law enforcement forces of any foreign government, or for programs ofinternal intelligence or surveillance on behalf of a foreign government. Among the exceptions toSection 660 is one that states that it does not apply to assistance in post-conflict situations. (8) Suchassistance is provided, and the details regarding it are worked out, on a case-by-case basis, as thereis no specific statutory authority to regulate and fund such assistance. (9) International civilian police forces have been used for a variety of purposes and in many situations since at least the late 19th century. [See Appendices A and B.] Since then, police forceswith recruits from one to many nations have been used to monitor and supervise local forces,conduct joint patrols with them, train and advise them, and assist with their restructuring andreformation, including identifying and expelling undesirable members. (The acronym SMART hasbeen used to summarize these functions, i.e.: S upport for human rights, M onitoring, A dvising, R eporting, and T raining.) (10) Sometimes -- particularly recently -- theinternational forces have beenarmed and granted arrest powers (referred to jointly as "executive authority"); usually, they are not. (11) During the past decade, policing in peacekeeping and related operations has evolved through what might be described as five approximate phases of increasing scope and complexity, aimed atestablishing security. These phases have been roughly, but not entirely, sequential and have tendedto build on previous experiences. (As analysts have noted, however, operations need not necessarilybe modeled after the latest operations.) The first two phases of this evolution involved the expansionof U.N. activities and/or mandates from (1) monitoring mandates , which have been a constant ofvirtually all operations, through (2) the addition of training components, beginning in a small, adhoc manner in Cambodia, intensified in El Salvador as part of the police reform effort, and made animportant part of U.S.-led and subsequent U.N. peacekeeping efforts in Somalia and Haiti, and (3)the development of mandates that include substantial reform and restructuring of existing policeinstitutions or the creation of new institutions, as in Somalia and Haiti and later operations. Twosubsequent phases were (4) the addition of specially constituted constabulary units , designedspecifically to operate as such in hostile situations, beginning with Bosnia, and (5) in the operationsin East Timor and Kosovo, the expansion of mandates to provide international police with "executive authority" to bear arms and make arrests. (12) (See Appendix A for a list of UNCIVPOLand other police operations since 1989, and information on their responsibilities and the number ofpolice authorized and/or deployed on these missions, and Appendix B for a narrative account of theevolution of CivPol mandates and activities.) This evolution reflected the international community's growing awareness of the broad range of security needs, and types of assistance required by indigenous police forces in peace operations. Also, as the scope of international interventions has broadened, policymakers and analysts haveincreasingly viewed ensuring public security as the responsibility of the countries and organizationswhich have intervened (to be provided jointly, where possible, with indigenous personnel). At thesame time, policymakers and analysts recognized several important problems. These problemsconcerned the need for the adoption of clear and feasible mandates (which is outside the scope ofthis paper) and the development of standards and procedures for smooth and effectiveimplementation. As policymakers and analysts have grappled with improving the mechanisms for implementing peacekeeping mandates, they have identified two problem areas, or sets of "gaps," which must beaddressed in order to ensure public security. These gaps are of concern to U.S. policymakers andare the subject of recent legislative proposals. (13) The first problem area might be labeled a system gap. This concerns what many analystsperceive as a deficiency in the recruitment and training mechanisms of current systems. Theproblem is considered particularly acute for the United Nations, which recruits volunteers from awide variety of countries with different police standards and policing practices. Because of thisdiverse pool, the United Nations has for years encountered difficulties in recruiting an adequatenumber of well-trained and professional policemen who can work together effectively. Besides alarge number who lack basic skills -- including the ability to drive -- and required languagecapabilities, some of the early recruits (including both American and foreign) allegedly engaged incorruption. (14) Over the past decade, the UnitedNations has adopted procedures to weed out obviousmisfits. But, as missions have become more complex and demanding, problems remain in recruitingpersonnel with all needed skills. In addition, many analysts argue that additional training is required(1) to improve and instill a common set of "generic" policing skills necessary for all policingmissions and a uniform standard of professionalism, and (2) to enhance their ability to work together. The second problem area is the presence of three security gaps in the ability of the international community to establish law and order in peacekeeping and other post-conflict situations. (15) (Deficiencies in recruitment and training systems can contribute to the first two of these gaps.) Thesegaps can be particularly troublesome in situations where not all parties to the conflict are dedicatedto peace or where criminal networks have taken root, and where local authority has been removedor replaced by an international intervention. The first of these security gaps is the deployment gap , or the failure or inability to deploy police forces as quickly as needed, or in adequate numbers to perform the mission assignedto them. This was noted in the U.S. unilateral intervention in Panama in 1989, and subsequently insome of the earliest international missions of the 1990s, for example in Cambodia. There, theUNCIVPOL mission could not perform some of its mandated tasks because it took several monthsto deploy CivPol components and some 10 months for the mission to reach its authorized size. InSomalia, it took nearly a full year to deploy the first dozen UNCIVPOL. In other cases, such asBosnia in the mid-1990s, the United Nations was able to recruit only about half of the numberauthorized for the mission. Although deployment time apparently has been somewhat reduced asmissions have become more complex, it still is not considered optimal. In addition, a gap remainsin the U.N.'s ability to deploy a sufficient number of people with specialized skills. The second is the enforcement gap , or the inability of deployed police forces to assure the level of security needed to provide the necessary climate to conduct normal policingoperations. In these cases, the police deployed often lack the necessary skills to handle the situation,in particular the military skills needed to carry out constabulary functions in hostile situations, andinvestigative and intelligence-gathering skills to deal with organized crime. When military forceshave not been available to assist police in handling hostile situations, either because they were inshort supply (as occurred in Somalia in 1993-1995) or because their mandate did not include lawenforcement functions (as in Bosnia in 1996), peacekeeping operations have been compromised. The third is the institution gap , where the indigenous law enforcement system lacks adequate numbers of honest and efficient judicial and penal personnel, as well as sound judicialand penal institutions, and thus are unable to effectively follow-up to police work with prosecutionand punishment necessary for sustainable security. In many post-conflict situations, understaffed(if not partially intimidated or corrupted) judiciaries and penal systems, lacking even basic resources,have not been able to handle effectively the increased workload that results from more efficientpolicing. Since the end of the Cold War, the international community has provided international policeassistance through multilateral and unilateral mechanisms. The United Nations has been theprincipal actor in international police operations, but the European countries and regionalorganizations and the United States have also played important roles. The United Nations international civilian police system is currently the mechanism through which much international civilian police assistance is provided in multilateral operations. As ofFebruary 29, 2004, some 4,655 UNCIVPOL officers from 65 nations were serving in eight U.N.missions. (16) About a fifth of those countries (13)provide about two-thirds of those officers. Thelargest contributor is Jordan (553) and the second largest is the United States (476). Other countriescontributing over 100 officers are: India (347), Germany (259), Turkey (194), the Ukraine (192),Nepal (182), Malaysia (178), Romania (176), Pakistan (172), Argentina (146), Poland (127), and theUnited Kingdom (126). Over 75% of those UNCIVPOL (3,508) were serving in Kosovo, the largestUNCIVPOL mission by far, as of February 29, 2004. Other missions are in Liberia (518), EastTimor (303), Sierra Leone (142), the Democratic Republic of the Congo (115), Cyprus (47), Georgia(10), and Afghanistan (5). Many nations have also provided training and reform assistance on an individual basis, oftenwithin the context of multilateral efforts. During the early to mid-1990s, the United States providedpolice assistance in two U.S. peacekeeping operations in Somalia and Haiti, carried out under U.N.authority. The United States also took the lead in developing police training programs in Somaliathrough the Justice Department's International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program(ICITAP), which continues to provide direct training and reform assistance. (For more information,see Appendix B.) Many European Union (EU) member states have contributed police assistance onan individual basis, including the United Kingdom, Germany, Sweden, Belgium, Netherlands,France, Spain, and Italy. Increasingly over the past decade, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), and more recently the European Union (EU) have taken the lead in specific missions, oftenas an adjunct or follow-up to U.N. missions. For instance, while the United Nations has hadresponsibility for the overall police mission in Kosovo, the OSCE has provided CivPols to establishthe new police academy and train the members of the new police force there. The OSCE also hasmissions which provide training assistance and support for building local police capacity in sevenother countries. In January 2003, the EU assumed responsibility from the United Nations for thepolice mission in Bosnia. On December 15, 2003, the EU launched its second police mission, the200-strong PROXIMA mission in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. Background. U.N. Member States contribute police personnel on a voluntary basis, following a United Nations Security Council resolutionauthorizing a peacekeeping operation. (17) MostMember States have national police forces and theircontributions consist of individual police officers or "formed" police units (18) recruited from theirnational forces. The U.N. philosophy of CivPol is based on international standards for democraticcommunity policing and human rights. The Charter-driven principles of peacekeeping governingcivilian police include consent and cooperation of the local parties, impartiality, and minimal use offorce (strictly in self-defense), among others. (19) Within the U.N. Headquarters, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO) provides political and executive direction, under the overall mandate or charge of the U.N. SecurityCouncil, to all components of the operation in the field, including the police mission. (20) Within theUNDPKO, the Civilian Police Division (CPD) provides for the policy and planning of civilianpolicing activities and for the management of that aspect of the mission. Its responsibilities includeoversight, assistance to contributing Member States with their recruitment and selection of CivPolpersonnel, and administration of the deployment and rotation cycles for all international civilianpolice officers. Training-related activities are handled by the UNDPKO training unit, however, asthe CPD does not have a budget line for training. In the field, UNCIVPOL personnel are under thecommand of the UNCIVPOL Police Commissioner, who reports to the U.N. Secretary-General'sSpecial Representative. Perceived Problems, Proposed Reforms and Implementation. The Brahimi Panel report is the document widely cited as theauthoritative analysis of the many problems in the U.N. peacekeeping system and as the blueprintfor peacekeeping reform. Among its many topics, the report identified difficulties with therecruitment and training of adequate police personnel, and impediments to their deployment. Itrecommended four actions to strengthen the U.N.'s capacity to rapidly deploy UNCIVPOLs and toconduct effective police missions. Two of these concerned recruitment: (1) the establishment byeach police-contributing Member State of a "ready roster" of rapidly deployable, qualified CivPols;and (2) the development by the United Nations of an on-call list of experts for advance missionplanning. A third involved training: the development of regional partnerships for joint policetraining. The last -- the identification of a national point of contact on CivPol matters in eachcountry -- was procedural. (21) In addition, between March 1998 and mid-August 2000, the UNDPKO held three conferences with police-contributing nations to review U.N. policing operations in order to identify problemswith the U.N. system and to propose solutions. As a result of these meetings, donor countriesreached near consensus on proposals to address problems with recruitment, training, deployment,and related problems. (22) There was some overlap between the Brahimi Panel recommendations and the UNDPKO seminar proposals, as the UNDPKO proposals also called for the incorporation of CivPol personnelunder the U.N. standby arrangement system created for military personnel, as well as measures toimprove training. The UNDPKO seminar recommendations also made a specific proposal for pre-positioning ofequipment in order to facilitate rapid deployment. Three other UNDPKOrecommendations concerned procedural and organizational impediments to efficient operations. Some of the Brahimi panel and UNDPKO seminar recommendations have been implemented, although many analysts judge that significant problems remain with the UNCIVPOL system. Thefollowing sections on recruitment, training, and deployment discuss (1) the perceived problems inthese areas, (2) the three Brahimi and the three UNDPKO seminar reforms that were recommendedto remedy recruitment, training, and deployment problems, and (3) the status of reform implementation. These sections also discuss constraints on UNCIVPOL reform in these areas. Since the Brahimi Panel report was issued, some analysts find that the U.N. has made progress in other areas. One of these is the reform of the operational, technical, and internal management ofUNDPKO, which was the subject of a Brahimi and of UNDPKO seminar recommendations. (23) Thesetopics are outside the scope of this report. The Brahimi Panel's specific recommendations were based on a recognition that the increasingly broad and complex UNCIVPOL operations, targeted at reforming and restructuringlocal police, called for a new approach. This new approach required more qualified and bettertrained law enforcement personnel working in tandem with other rule of law professionals. TheBrahimi Panel report defined this new approach as a "doctrinal shift," emphasizing reform andrestructuring instead of monitoring, advising, and training activities. Further, this doctrinal shiftrequired that the law enforcement personnel integrate their activities with those of rule of lawexperts (judicial, penal and human rights specialists) in order to strengthen all rule of lawinstitutions. (24) The Brahimi Panel itself recognized that such a shift might stress U.N. Member States by requiring them "to provide even more well-trained and specialized police experts, at a time whenthey already face difficulties meeting current requirements." (25) Further, some analysts see variousproblems with implementing this approach. For one, it is controversial within the U.N. CivPolsystem, where the UNDPKO and CPD perspective seems to be that the primary role and functionof UNCIVPOL personnel is building local police services capacity, according to some experts. Thereasoning undergirding this viewpoint is that broad and intrusive undertakings would infringe onMember States' perceptions of the inviolability of national sovereignty and the principal of non-interference and,in any event, would prove unfeasible because of limited personnel, material, andfinancial resources. Nevertheless, the United Nations has taken steps towards greater use of a full range of rule of law experts in peacekeeping operations by creating a new rule of law unit. Still, a recent report ofthe Henry L. Stimson Center views progress towards integrating rule of law-related components as"lagging" as the UNDPKO received only two of the six posts it requested for planning rule of lawoperations, leaving it "nearly as hard-pressed" to deploy a mission "with a substantial criminaljustice component (police, prosecutors, judges, corrections)...as it was three years ago." (26) (Forfurther discussion on the use of such experts, see the option on the development of a U.S. "stabilityforce," below.) Recruitment. The current ad hoc system of recruiting civilian police from a wide range of U.N. Member nations results in three problems, the first two ofwhich are the subject of specific reforms proposed by the Brahimi Panel report and the UNDPKOseminar. First, the United Nations still experiences uneven results in recruiting police who can meetminimum standards and who, in many cases, lack experience with community policing andinternational human rights standards, even though efforts to improve the overall quality reportedlyhave had some success. (27) In addition, asUNCIVPOL roles have expanded, the United Nations hasexperienced significant difficulties in recruiting police officers with specialized skills. A thirdproblem is the absence of a comprehensive U.N. civilian police strategy, including a methodologyfor determining mission needs, which has made it difficult to determine the appropriate authorizedstrength and necessary skills for a mission, according to some analysts. (28) This in turn, they argue,complicates the process of recruiting an adequate number of suitable civilian police personnel withskills appropriate for mission requirements. Despite increasingly complex mandates and responsibilities for UNCIVPOL missions, the United Nations only requires Member States to provide officers who meet basic criteria, excludingother mission-specific requirements. (29) Currently,the criteria for civilian police include (1) a miniumage of at least 25, (2) five years of service in a national police force with community policingexperience, (3) proficiency in one of the official U.N. languages (Arabic, Chinese, English, French,Russian or Spanish), (4) possession of a driver's license, (5) ability to operate a four-wheel drivevehicle, and (6) meeting medical standards. Executive authority missions require police officerswith firearms experience. Pre-selection testing and induction training in contributing countries areencouraged but not mandatory. Many analysts assert that some civilian police personnel still do not meet the basic selection criteria, especially language, driving, and firearms skills, despite U.N. efforts to improve the qualityof recruits. Since 1996, the United Nations has sent Selection Assistance Teams (SATs) to provideguidance to Member States in selecting police candidates. The SATs and induction tests conductedin the field have focused on the basic language, driving, and firearms requirements which arenecessary for all monitoring missions. (30) Someretraining and retesting of basic requirements continuein the mission upon arrival. (In the U.N. Mission in Bosnia-Hercegovina, retesting reportedlyaccounted for "approximately one quarter of the total induction period." (31) ) Until recently, thesedeficiencies resulted in high repatriation costs as well as lags in deployment. (32) Recruitment for specialized skills has been even more difficult, according to many analysts. UNDPKO reportedly has had better success recruiting for general skills than in recruiting in advancefor specialists in areas such as training, investigations, organized crime, forensics, drug trafficking,and police intelligence. Specialists have often been recruited from within the missions afterUNCIVPOL personnel have arrived. Three of the Brahimi Panel and the UNDPKO seminar recommendations concerned the advance recruitment of personnel (i.e., before a mission is authorized) in order to improve the qualityof recruits and also to speed deployment. Although analysts consider activities in the pre-deploymentstage crucial to holding down the costs of dealing with unqualified personnel, success has beenmixed in implementing these recommendations. The Brahimi Panel Report recommended that Member States establish, under the U.N. System of Standby Arrangements (UNSAS), a national "ready roster" of pre-selected andtrained CivPol personnel available for deployment on short notice. [The report specified that such"national pools" be comprised of "serving police officers ... augmented, if necessary, by recentlyretired police officers who meet the professional and physical requirements...." (33) ] Similarly, theUNDPKO seminar recommendations proposed that the UNSAS be enhanced by the creation of aneffective ready roster of international police personnel, to be made possible by an increase in thenumber of participating countries, the creation of job descriptions, and the identification of personnelby specialization. A March 2003 report of the U.N. Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations"welcomed the considerable progress made in strengthening" UNSAS "for military, civilian policeand civilian personnel." (34) Nevertheless, theDecember 2003 Henry L. Stimson Center evaluation ofprogress on the Brahimi recommendations found that "too few states have created...national poolsof candidates for international operations...." (35) The report found the lack of individual candidatesto be a major weakness, and recommended that countries "replace 'bidding for slots' on these on-call lists" with realcandidates with professional experience and familiarity with UN rules,procedures, and operational requirements." (36) The Brahimi Panel Report also called for the United Nations to maintain an "on-call list of 100 police officers and related experts"who would be available on seven days noticefor advance mission planning and early deployment while a UNCIVPOL force is being mobilized. In February 2002, UNDPKO established a 100-person on-call roster of civilian police personnel torecruit for specialized expertise and to provide leadership for new missions. As of March 2004, 10of the 89 police-contributing Member States have nominated specific individuals for the on-call lists(although these individuals have not necessarily been screened or trained for U.N. operations.) TheUnited Nations has also held training exercises to make the on-call system moreefficient. (37) In addition, the United Nations has made another effort to improve recruitment for specialists. Since spring 2003, SAT visits now include substantive skills among the selection criteria. (38) "Substantive" skills include those skills related to management, planning, training, mentoring, andoperations such as criminal investigations, forensic analysis, and traffic control, among others. Analysts have also pointed to perceived shortcomings in U.N. procedures and processes that they believe undermine recruitment efforts. Most importantly, in a U.N. audit issued in 2001,analysts faulted the apparent absence of standardized criteria to determine the number of civilianpolice to authorize at the outset of a mission and to justify their continued presence. (39) (For theUnited Nations Mission in Bosnia and Hercegovina, UNMIBH, the criteria considered the ratio ofUNCIVPOL to local police forces. But for the United Nations Mission in Kosovo, UNMIK, thecriteria expanded to consider local crime statistics, local police strength, and local population.) Inaddition, the audit faulted UNDPKO for not consistently applying assessment systems to ensure thatskills were appropriately matched to specific missions. In one example, civilian police personnelreportedly perform non-policing functions, reducing the number of police available for policingfunctions. (40) Nearly 18 percent of the civilianpolice in UNMIBH and UNMIK, and 10 percent in theUnited Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET), were assigned to missionheadquarters. Administrative functions -- in areas such as personnel, procurement, developingdatabases, and logistics -- accounted for eight percent of the total number of the police officers inthese three missions. Training. Mission-preparedness training routinely varies among police-contributing Member States and, in some cases, is considered inadequate. Evenamong well qualified personnel, the lack of uniformity in experience and standardized training canundermine the effectiveness of a UNCIVPOL mission. Some of the impediments to assembling acoherent force were explained by a 2003 report of the U.N. Secretary-General: "the policecomponent of a mission may comprise officers drawn from up to 40 countries who have never metone another before, have little or no United Nations experience, and have received little relevanttraining or mission-specific briefings, and whose policing practices and doctrines may varywidely." (41) Presently, Member States are responsible for providing pre-deployment generic and mission-specific training (42) to the civilian police personnel that theycontribute to police missions. In themission area, UNCIVPOL personnel undergo in-theater training, which covers standard operatingprocedures, safety and security, and human rights, computer, and local language training. Experts have cited three main reasons for inadequate pre-deployment training. First, Member States do not possess adequate police trainers with peacekeeping experience or training skills.Second, Member States lack the resources to conduct pre-deployment training programs. Third,national training programs differ widely among police-contributing countries. One each of both the Brahimi Panel and the UNDPKO recommendations concerned training. The Brahimi Panel recommended that contributing nations should develop regional partnerships forjoint police training exercises in accordance with U.N. standard operating procedures. TheUNDPKO seminars recommended that U.N. educational materials and training programs be usedto help Member States pre-train personnel to be available for rapid deployment. According to theStimson Center, "Evidence is scant that many member states have ... with the possible exception ofthe European Union ... moved toward regional training partnerships." (43) The UNDPKO Training Unithas made some efforts at improving pre-deployment training by developing and distributing fourtraining publications to assist Member States with their pre-deployment training program. (44) (UNDPKO also is planning to write a training publication to address international standards forpolice. Additionally, as part of the SAT, training specialists visit Member States to provideresources and advise on pre-deployment training programs.) Recently, UNDPKO has developedcommon training standards, including standardized "generic training modules" to provide for moreuniformity in the level of competence of deployed peacekeepers, including police. (45) PDD-71 identified training as one area where the United States could make a contribution to increasing the capabilities of other nations to perform CivPol operations. While asserting that the"training and preparedness of individuals and units being supplied to coalition peace operationsshould remain a national responsibility," PDD-71 recognized that "international organizations orother organizing bodies may need to supplement national training from time to time." It thereforecalled for the State Department's International Narcotics Control and Legal Affairs (INL) office(now the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs) to "maintain the capacityto provide tailored training packages to U.S. and international CIVPOL when requested by theorganizing body or the contributing state and when appropriate U.S. funding or appropriatereimbursement is available." (46) Under a new StateDepartment CivPol program, the State Departmentseeks to acquire capabilities to invite foreign police officers to train with the U.S. contingent,although no precise arrangement or program has been decided upon. (See the discussion on the newCivPol cadre program in the section on the United States, below.) Deployment. The deployment of UNCIVPOL is a highly complex undertaking, involving the definition of missions needs, the rapid recruitment ofadequate and qualified personnel, and the procurement of material and equipment, all within thecontext of coordinating contributions from many nations. Historically, the deployment times forUNCIVPOL missions have ranged from six to eighteen months due to insufficient human, material,and financial resources. The Brahimi Report cited four reasons for the deployment lag, the first ofwhich -- the lack of a standing police force -- would require a major organizational change and wasnot the subject of a recommendation. The Brahimi Panel and UNDPKO seminar recommendationssought to address the other three: (1) the lack of a reserve corps of mission leadership, (2) theunreliability of current standby arrangements, and (3) an insufficient supply of ready equipment. The Brahimi Panel defined an "effective and rapid deployment" period for a peacekeeping mission, including the UNCIVPOL component, as within four to 12 weeks of a Security Councilauthorization. Optimally, the Brahimi Panel report recommended full deployment within 30 days for"traditional" peacekeeping missions and within 90 days for complex emergencies after an authorizedSecurity Council mandate for a peace operation. It recommended that a mission headquarters be installed and functioning within 15 days for complex emergencies. Uncertainty exists as to whether the 30-90 day rapid deployment time frame (for military and police personnel) can be met, according to the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations. (47) The Committee alluded to three constraints on rapid deployment: the inability of the current U.N.system to handle concurrent (or nearly concurrent) deployment of two or more missions, the limitedcapacity of the civilian standby arrangements system with regard to region-specific expertise, andthe need for contributing states to exercise the political will to quickly deploy well-trained andequipped civilian police personnel. As mentioned in the section on recruitment, above, some reform is underway regarding the United Nations System for Standby Arrangements (UNSAS) for personnel and equipment. Thisreform will enable the United Nations to deploy more rapidly in the future, as will the developmentof the 100-person on-call roster of civilian police personnel. Following the UNDPKOrecommendation that equipment be pre-packaged and stored at the U.N. Logistics Base in Brindisi,Italy (UNLB) for rapid deployment at the beginning of new missions, the United Nations hasimproved its procurement and management of strategic deployment stocks at UNLB (for allcomponents of peace missions.) Nevertheless, there has been no program developed to prepareUNCIVPOL for rapid deployment. Although many U.N. Member States have developed genericrapid deployment programs, few currently possess the capability to deploy rapidly. (48) Background. The Department of State's Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) manages the U.S. CivPol program,with responsibility for policy development, training, oversight, and coordination with the UnitedNations and other contributing countries. Unlike most other countries, the United States does nothave a large national police force to draw from and no permanently established system forcontributing personnel to police operations. (49) Instead, on a case-by-case basis for each mission, theState Department recruits civilian police personnel from local and municipal law enforcementagencies through a commercial contractor. Through the end of March 2004, DynCorp International,a CSC Company, has been the sole supplier of civilian police personnel under a State Departmentcontract. As of April 1, 2004, the State Department will initiate a new arrangement. In February2004, the State Department contracted two companies, DynCorp and Civilian Police InternationalLLC (a joint venture of L-3 and MPRI), to maintain rosters of up to 2,000 personnel whom they haverecruited and prescreened. A third contract for the same purpose was issued in March to a jointventure formed by PAE Government Services, Inc., and HomeLand Security Corporation. Thesecompanies will use their rosters as the basis for bidding on contracts to actually deploy CivPolpersonnel, both for replacements for existing operations and for people for new operations. (Seebelow for further discussion.) As there is no specific authority and thus no dedicated budget line for the U.S. CivPol program, it is usually funded through various State Department regional bureaus and the State Department'sPeacekeeping account. Most U.S.CivPol officers receive a base salary ranging from $50,000-100,000 dependingon the mission. Those participating in U.N. missions receive a subsistenceallowance which ranges from $75-95 per day. In some cases, they also receive danger pay. The total cost of U.S. CivPol personnel varies according to mission, with recent annual costs ranging from $100,000 per U.S. CivPol officer in Kosovo to $150,000-$175,000 per officer in Iraq,according to a representative of DynCorp, the private contractor currently providing police servicein those areas. The Kosovo cost figure covers the cost of an officer's salary, equipment,transportation and "MWR" (morale, welfare, and recreation) support, such as exercising equipmentand Internet connections. The higher Iraq figure also includes the cost of providing security, food,and housing. These expenses are covered by the United Nations in Kosovo. (50) As a point ofcomparison, the Congressional Budget Office has estimated that the incremental cost per troop (i.e.,the cost over and above paying their salaries and maintaining them during peacetime) of postingsoldiers to Iraq as of September 2003 ranged from $179,000, when the estimate was based on atwelve-month rotation schedule, to $206,000, when based on a standard six-month rotation schedule.The latter also was based on a slightly higher number of reserve component soldiers, which costconsiderably more to deploy than to maintain in peacetime. (51) As of March 27, 2004, some 1,016 U.S. CivPol and support personnel were participating in international CivPol missions. Four of these were in U.N. missions: Kosovo (479 police officers/26support personnel), Liberia (75/2), East Timor (18/2), and Sierra Leone (1 officer). In addition, fourpolice officers were seconded to Organization of Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)missions and one was seconded to the OSCE headquarters for mission liaison in Vienna, Austria. Some 408 police officers and support personnel are deployed as unilateral U.S. contributions:Afghanistan (30/20) and Iraq (295/63). As of that date, the United States also provided six policeofficers to monitor several high-profile prisoners in a prison in Israel, although that deployment isnot considered an international police program. (52) Perceived Problems, Proposed Reforms, and Implementation. U.S. policymakers have recognized that the United States, likeother nations, has problems in recruiting and deploying qualified CivPol personnel. The majorpoints of PDD-71 were designed to enhance U.S. response capacities, including improvingoperational activities. PDD-71 set forth policy and provided guidance for the provision of U.S.CivPol personnel, including their recruitment, training, management, and deployment, as well as forthe improvement of the capacity of foreign police to participate in peace operations. Some of the perceived problems with the U.S. CivPol contingents are similar to those cited for the U.N. civilian police system. These include inefficiency in matching individual skills with missionrequirements, inconsistencies in levels of training and professionalism, and lag in deployment. Manyanalysts emphasize a continued need to improve the current system, even though perceptions aboutthe U.S. civilian police program have become more positive with ongoing improvements over thelast few years. In what was intended as a major innovation in the U.S. CivPol system -- building upon the PDD-71 mandate -- the Department of State has issued contracts (as mentioned above) for theestablishment and maintenance of a reserve cadre of up to 2,000 U.S. law enforcement personnel,who would be available for international police service on short notice. (53) The intention ofestablishing a reserve cadre was to facilitate the rapid deployment of well-qualified CivPols. Underthe State Department's Request for Proposal (RFP), the contractor was to be responsible forrecruitment, training, and procurement services, as well as pre-deployment and deploymentsupport. (54) As envisioned by the bidding proposal,the new cadre of U.S. civilian police would"eliminate the requirement to conduct from scratch, recruitment, selection, and training activitieseach time the U.S. contributes police to an international CivPol operation." (55) The RFP also calledfor the contractor to identify technical advisors, who are not police officers, who could be calledupon to assist with establishing institutional capabilities in police, judicial, and corrections systems. The State Department's decision to award contracts for the new CivPol cadre program to multiple companies, rather than one as originally envisioned, has raised some questions aboutwhether the process will be as expeditious as originally planned. While there may be someadvantages to be gained by continued competition for CivPol deployments, and the greater numberof applicants from which to choose, which some may judge necessary because of the Iraq andAfghanistan missions, some analysts fear that these advantages will be offset by additional costs anddelays. Moreover, the extent to which the original RFP provisions continue to apply are unclear asthe new contracts have not been made public. Further details are discussed below under theappropriate headings. Recruitment. While the current recruitment program has enabled the United States to provide CivPols to U.N. police missions for several years, and morerecently to dispatch them unilaterally to Iraq, experts have disagreed on the relative utility of thisrecruitment method. DynCorp (to date, and other companies in the future) recruits police officerswho are serving or have recently served with state and local law enforcement agencies. Most policeofficers take a leave of absence; others resign to perform international police service, and some arerecent retirees. Many analysts recognize that the system draws from overextended municipal andstate forces. In recent years, problems with adequate police staffing of municipal and statedepartments have been exacerbated by the repeated call-ups of U.S. military reserve forces forhomeland security, Afghanistan, and Iraq, as a significant number of U.S. police officers aremembers of the reserve, according to some analysts. Some analysts assert that the United States has not obtained uniformly high quality recruits through the current contracting system because municipal and state police departments are generallyunwilling to allow their most valuable officers to take extended leaves. Some suggest that the UnitedStates might be able to recruit a more professional and qualified force if it were able to provide stateand municipal governments with some compensation or reimbursement for detailing police officersto CivPol missions. (This would apparently require new legal arrangements, however. Currently,law enforcement agencies receive no financial incentives for officers participating in internationalpolice service.) Some also argue that the recruitment of individual U.S. police officers, rather thanof formed police units, has made the U.S. police contingent less cohesive. This contributes to thealready varied mix within UNCIVPOL forces. (56) In addition, some analysts assert that the U.S. selection criteria do not accurately reflect mission requirements. Current employment selection criteria for civilian police candidates vary accordingto mission, but all include (1) U.S. citizenship, (2) eight years of work experience, with at least fiveyears as an active sworn civilian law enforcement (LE) officer, and currently serving as a sworn LEoffice or recently separated from LE service within five years, (3) an unblemished record, (4) validdrivers license and ability to drive a standard transmission 4x4 vehicle, (5) excellent health andability to pass physical, agility, and psychological tests, (6) valid U.S. passport, and (7) ability tocommunicate in English. Most also require the ability to qualify with a 9mm semi-automatichandgun. (57) Nevertheless, the Department of Stateapparently satisfies its recruitment goals for basicskills and is making improvements in recruiting for specialized skills. For the Kosovo, East Timor,and Iraq police missions, requirement qualifications were expanded to include two years' experiencein a specialized area. The problem of recruiting high quality and specialized personnel may be addressed to some extent by the new State Department CivPol cadre program. The State Department's bid solicitationdocument for that program indicated that nearly 55% of the total cadre would be comprised ofspecialists. In addition, minimal police officer qualifications were to include interpersonal,leadership, training and negotiation skills, knowledge of international police standards, andexperience working in multicultural environments. The CivPol cadre program bid solicitation also states that individuals selected for the program would "receive training on an annual basis in policing skills recognized across the United States asessential to conducting effective law enforcement." The intention of offering such training,according to a State Department official, was to create an incentive for high quality officers to jointhe program by providing training which might help that officer achieve a promotion or other careergoal. (58) A precise program had not beendeveloped, however. Whether sufficient funding would beprovided to offer such training to all members of the three separate cadre lists (i.e., potentially asmany as 6,000 people) that will be maintained under the new program is unclear. Training. Training for U.S. CivPols is complicated by the inconsistencies in the levels of skills and professionalism among the individual police officersrecruited from the many police departments across the country. As a result, some experts haveviewed the training program's length and content as insufficient. Under the current U.S. CivPolprogram, U.S. police officers undergo several days of pre-deployment training (the length dependingon the mission), referred to as Police Assessment, Selection, and Training (P.A.S.T). Currently, thepre-deployment training curriculum includes (1) United Nations and peace operations, (2)International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program (ICITAP) vis -- a-vis internationalCivPol program, (3) mission overview and history of the region, (4) U.S. military in peaceoperations and civil-military relations, (5) team building, (6) lifestyle in the mission, (7) humanrights, (8) contractor logistical support, (9) personal safety and defensive tactics, and (10) use of theexpandable police baton and aerosol subject restraint. In addition, candidates undergo driving,language, and firearms tests. As described in the bid solicitation documents of the new State Department CivPol cadre program, an improved training curriculum being developed by INL would meet nation-wide PoliceOfficer Standards and Training (POST) certification requirements and be consistent withinternational principles of democratic policing and human rights, with ongoing training courses inpolicing skills, specialized and in-service training. This new training program would seekrecognition and certification from U.S. and select foreign law enforcement organizations and policeacademies. As mentioned above, the new CivPol cadre program also contemplates additionaltraining to be provided on an annual basis. Some have wondered whether training costs may behigher under the new three-contractor cadre system than originally anticipated because of a possibleincreased number of annual trainees and facilities for pre-deployment training, and associatedadministrative requirements. Deployment. The U.S. CivPol contingent can currently deploy to a U.N. operation within 30-45 days following a U.N. Security Councilauthorization. Currently, the United States fulfills the deployment requirement as recommended by the Brahimi Panel report, but falls short of expectations contemplated in proposed legislation( H.R. 1414 , discussed in the Options section below), which calls for deploymentcapability for UNCIVPOL no later than 15 days following authorization by a U.N. Securityresolution. Whether the United States will be able to maintain its current deployment capability under the new CivPol cadre system is being questioned by some analysts, however. As detailed in the bidsolicitation documents of the program, the contractor would maintain a database of commercialsources capable of providing basic and personal equipment on a "standby arrangement," which couldlikely decrease deployment time. Additionally, the contractor would develop a logistics supportteam to provide advanced logistical and administrative support in the mission for the U.S. policecontingent that could also augment lacking operational capabilities of the United Nations andregional organizations. (59) This team would deployin advance of the U.S. CivPol contingent. It is notclear, however, to what extent those provisions continue to apply under the actual contracts issuedfor the new system. Also unclear is the extent to which deployments may be slowed by the need fora new round of bidding with each new mission. Most European countries deploy police recruited from their national police forces to international CivPol operations. (The United Kingdom is the major exception because, as in theUnited States, its police are organized largely at the local level. (60) ) As major contributors to U.N.and, more recently, European-sponsored police missions, European governments have recognizedfor several years that reform of their own deployment systems were important to substantiallyimproving international CivPol capabilities. European Union. (61) Since 1999, the EU hasdeveloped goals and procedures to improve the quality and timeliness of European contributions toU.N., OSCE, and EU police missions. At the June 2000 meeting of the EU heads of state andgovernment in Feira, Portugal (known as the Feira European Council), Member States agreed todevelop a 5,000 civilian reserve police force (individual police officers or integrated police units)for international peace operations (with 1,000 police deployable within 30 days) by 2003. (62) Thedevelopment of police capabilities takes place within the context of the European Security andDefense Policy (ESDP) adopted at the December 1999 Helsinki Summit of European heads of stateand government. Police capabilities would include both civil status and police forces, capable ofperforming constabulary functions. (63) In June2001, the GÃ¶teborg [Sweden] European Counciladopted a Police Action Plan, which establishes a common requirement for selection and trainingof police, as well as guidelines for command and control and for inter-operability. (64) The EU alsoestablished the Rapid Reaction Mechanism (RRM) to provide flexible funding arrangements forcivilian crisis management operations for a six-month period. As of late February 2004, EU Member States have committed up to 5,000 police officers for crisis management operations. Of this number, 1,400 could be available for rapid deployment within30 days. As part of their commitments, Member States have also undertaken to provide up to 13rapidly deployable, integrated police units, ranging from 60 to 110 officers each. Two MemberStates have offered to provide four headquarters units for police missions, two of them for rapiddeployment. In November 2003, personnel from 22 European countries attended a joint exercise inItaly in order to test the inter-operability of integrated police units at the headquarters level. The EU launched its first ESDP mission on January 1, 2003: the EU Police Mission in Bosnia and Hercegovia (BiH), as a successor mission (without executive authority) to the U.N. InternationalPolice Task Force. Under a three year mandate, the mission aims to establish sustainable policingarrangements for BiH in accordance with European and international "best practices." The missionconsists of almost 500 police officers and 70 civilian experts from 33 states. (65) Its annual budget isUS $47.2 million (38 million Euros at an exchange rate of 1.24 Euros/US$). On December 15, 2003, the EU began its second police mission (EUPOL Proxima) in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, with an authorized strength of 200 police and civilianpersonnel. Its first year budget is US$18.6 million (15 million Euros), including start-up costs of$ 9.1 million (7.3 million Euros.) All of the EU Member States, except Portugal, are participating. EU Member States have met their goal for the commitment of police officers, and exceeded the goal for the number available for rapid deployment. Nevertheless, some analysts are skeptical thatthe reformed EU crisis management and rapid reaction capabilities will substantially improve theEU's ability to respond. One factor -- EU Member States' willingness to surrender nationalsovereignty to EU foreign policy coordination -- may prove the most problematic. (66) Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). The OSCE is also enhancing its operational capabilities, including acapability for rapid deployment of CivPols and other civilian experts. (67) As of February 25, 2004, theOSCE has some 160 CivPols conducting policing activities in eight countries: Albania, Azerbijan,Croatia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Macedonia (Skopje), and Serbia and Montenegro(including Kosovo). At the Istanbul Summit in November 1999, the Heads of State and government of OSCE participating States created the Rapid Expert Assistance and Cooperation Teams (REACT) program. The purpose of the program is to enable the OSCE, when circumstances require, to identify, selectand deploy experts in the areas of conflict prevention, crisis management, and post-conflict missions. Current policing activities emphasize training, reform, and development of local police, rather thanbasic monitoring functions. The REACT program has developed the capability for participatingStates to each establish its own database of qualified civilian experts, including CivPols, withknowledge and experience in the broad range of areas needed to promote security, from humanrights, rule of law, civil and political affairs (including elections) to economic and environmentalstabilization. Its objective is to deploy such personnel within two to eight weeks of posting positionsfor a specific mission. Since the establishment of the REACT program in April 2001, the OSCE and its 55 participating States (which include non-European States, most notably the United States and Canada)have taken various steps to implement and improve the program. (68) This includes creating nationalwebsites to recruit personnel for the program or providing mechanisms to receive such applicationsvia the OSCE website. (69) As with the U.N. lists,many OSCE participating States (for a variety ofefficiency, legal, and privacy concerns) prefer not to nominate specific individuals to the OSCEavailability list until specific field requirements are known. Nevertheless, some participating Stateshave provided numerical commitments in specific fields of expertise. The OSCE developed aframework of standards covering both educational and experience requirements which identify theskills needed for its activities. Based on an assessment of past and current OSCE field activities, theOSCE developed a staffing matrix which is used to assist participating States in recruiting qualifiedcandidates. (70) Through REACT, the OSCE recruits CivPols capable of performing advising, mentoring, reform and development functions. OSCE general minimum requirements for civilian police aresimilar, but not identical, to U.N. and U.S. requirements. They are (1) graduation from a recognizedpolice training school, (2) active police experience, (3) ability to communicate in English, (4)negotiation and interpersonal skills, (5) mapping skills, and (5) first aid experience. Desired skillsinclude liaison experience with non-law enforcement organizations (e.g., NGOs) and the ability tooperate police radio equipment. The mission specific requirements for police officers focus onspecific skills. (71) OSCE also recruits lawenforcement administrators, including senior and middlemanagement, with eight to 20 years of experience in law enforcement and police management plusrelevant field and subject expertise. In the 108th Congress, Members introduced three bills with the intent of strengthening U.S. andinternational capabilities to conduct CivPol missions and other rule of law missions. H.R. 1414 is intended to improve UNCIVPOL capabilities. H.R. 2616 addresses perceived problems with U.S. CivPol capabilities and would create capabilities withinNATO to handle international post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction efforts. S. 2127 seeks to improve the United States' ability to provide civilian capabilities to respond to crisesabroad. These proposals build upon prior U.N. and U.S. efforts to improve international capabilities. In addition to these proposals, analysts advance three related options to address perceiveddeficiencies in training, in capabilities for performing constabulary functions, and in creating viablelaw enforcement and rule of law institutions. H.R. 1414: Reform of U.N. Civilian Police System. Representatives McGovern and Houghton introduced H.R. 1414 , the International Rule of Law and Antiterrorism Act of 2003, on March 25, 2003. The billproposes substantial reform, if not innovation, to make UNCIVPOL rapidly deployable and moreeffective, as well as a measure to address UNCIVPOL recruitment and training problems. The bill calls for the Administration to encourage negotiations within the United Nations for the establishment of a professional United Nations civilian police corps (UNCPC) and requests theU.N. Secretariat to prepare a report concerning the establishment of such a corps. The bill does notdefine "professional" nor does it mandate specific arrangements, in particular, whether the forcewould be a standing or an on-call force. It does set forth a sense of Congress statement that the corpsshould be (1) "available for rapid deployment" to peace operations within 15 days of a U.N. SecurityCouncil authorization of a peacekeeping operation, and that it should be (2) composed of an"appropriate number of law enforcement professionals recruited and employed by the United Nationswho are appropriately trained and equipped for civilian policing functions" in U.N. peace operations. (Although these points seem to suggest either the formation of a standing force (72) or a force of paidreservists that train together, some proponents state that the bill only intends for the structure to benegotiated with the United Nations.) (73) The billalso expresses a sense of Congress that the corpsshould be given "appropriate resources to do its job properly, including funding, equipment, training,logistical support, and staffing." The staff would include corrections and judicial law enforcementprofessionals. In addition to the establishment of a UNCPC, the bill would encourage improvements in the current system. It would direct the Secretary of State to work within the United Nations "to establishstandards and training programs for international civilian police." Proponents of H.R. 1414 view the bill as a vehicle to address several problems regarding the use of UNCIVPOL personnel in police missions, most importantly the deploymentgap and, to a lesser extent, the enforcement gap. Some proponents argue that such a measure shouldaddress other issues, such as creating a mechanism to ensure adequate and continued funding andspecifying a size for the proposed UNCPC. The bill's findings state that the creation of a professional U.N. police corps would allow the United Nations to take responsibility more quickly and effectively for maintaining a secureenvironment. The findings argue that this would greatly reduce the number of combat soldiersneeded to perform civilian police tasks in peacekeeping and other post-conflict situations, and allowfor their earlier withdrawal. The findings also point to the corps as a mechanism to raise thestandards and skill levels of UNCIVPOL personnel and make them more accountable. Opponents fear that the bill would result in the establishment of a standing corps, which they regard as too costly and too problematic. Many argue that Member States, including the UnitedStates, would be reluctant to establish a standing corps because it could increase assessedcontributions in order to cover the cost of a standing UNCPC. If, on the other hand, Member Statesfunded the force through voluntary contributions rather than mandatory assessments, many analystsfear that it would not be sustainable. Many analysts have also expressed concern over giving theUnited Nations responsibility for the administration of a permanent UNCPC, given its limitedmanagement capacity. In addition, some fear that a permanent police corps would permit the UnitedNations to infringe on national sovereignty, perhaps contrary to U.S. interests, although proponentsof H.R. 1414 point out that the United States could veto any proposed use of such acorps. H.R. 2616: Improving U.S. and NATO Capabilities. To enhance existing U.S. capabilities and create new internationalcapabilities to provide reconstruction assistance in post-conflict situations, Representatives Farr,Wolf, Hoeffel, Leach, and Wexler introduced H.R. 2616 , the Winning the Peace Actof 2003, (74) on June 26, 2003. (75) Among its provisions, the bill contains sense ofCongress statementsproposing two new mechanisms to provide security in post-conflict situations where reconstructionefforts are underway. One of those proposed mechanisms, the establishment of a U.S. civilian police reserve, may constitute a substantial upgrading of the current ad hoc U.S. CivPol system. According to theproposal, this reserve of law enforcement officers would be capable of (1) serving overseas as aninterim police force in post-conflict situations, and (2) of training and equipping indigenous civilianpolice forces in such situations. The bill also suggests a procedure by which the United States wouldestablish the civilian police reserve. Through Section 8 of the bill, Congress would call upon thePresident to establish a task force comprised of federal, state, and local law enforcement officials todevelop the reserve. A second proposal calls for a new NATO mechanism to provide a broad range of military and policing services in post-conflict situations. It calls upon the Administration to propose to NATOthat (1) selected NATO units be trained and equipped to provide security in reconstruction situations,and (2) NATO establish an "integrated security support component" to provide that training andequipment. If NATO were to accept the proposal, the bill authorizes the President to commitpersonnel to the support component; such personnel should be capable of providing for the securityof civilians, "including serving as a police force." The illustrative tasks that the bill specifies thatthe selected units be able to perform include one requiring constabulary skills, i.e., "the control ofbelligerent groups and crowds," as well as those requiring policing, investigative, and intelligenceskills, i.e., "apprehending targeted persons or groups, performing anti-corruption tasks, andsupporting police investigations." (For more information on constabulary forces and their functions,see the option on constabulary forces, below.) Relative Merits of Possible U.S. Reserve Models. Proponents argue that the proposed legislation would provide U.S. support for increasinginternational capabilities to provide a security environment in which post-conflict reconstructioncan occur. In particular, a civilian police reserve would help bridge the deployment gap, as theavailability of a pool of on-call officers would expedite the deployment of U.S. civilian police. Itis unclear, however, whether the intention of the legislation was to establish a civilian police reservein line with the State Department's current private sector model as described earlier or to establisha new U.S. government reserve force, along the lines proposed under the "stability force" modeldiscussed below. Proponents of the private contractor model argue that it is preferable because commercial contractors can often respond more quickly and because use of the private sector avoids the creationof new government bureaucracies. Opponents of this model might find that limitations often citedregarding the use of commercial contractors in military operations may also apply to policingoperations. For example, commercial contractors may not exhibit the same dedication to their jobin situations where unexpected changes may occur, particularly in the level of risk and the conditionsof the job. Some opponents of a government-sponsored reserve might concede that a federal agencycould conceivably deploy a reserve CivPol force as efficiently and speedily as a private contractor,but only if civilian law enforcement personnel were maintained as paid reservists, such as under theU.S. military reserve system, at a cost some policymakers may consider prohibitive. Proponents of the government-created model argue that a government reserve is a more potent symbol of U.S. commitment, more responsive to U.S. policy, and might well prove a more cohesiveforce than a privately-contracted force. In addition, proponents argue, its members would be moreaccountable. Further, some argue that a government agency could better guarantee the quality ofrecruits, as it would have greater incentives to establish more stringent screening mechanisms. Inaddition, it might more easily to draw qualified CivPol personnel from local and state policedepartments, as discussed in the U.S. CivPol section above, if a compensation system wereestablished for departments that provided personnel to federal service; it might be easier to establishsuch a compensation under a federal reserve model than under a private contractor reserve model. The desirability of pre-deployment training also could influence judgments regarding the relative merits of a government-sponsored vs. a government-contracted reserve force. If the policereservists regularly trained together as U.S. military reservists do, and established mechanisms forcoordination with military forces, they arguably could prove a more effective and reliable contingentthan those assembled under the current ad hoc model. This might be easier under a government-createdmodel than under a contractor model. Questions Regarding a NATO Constabulary Capability. The NATO constabulary capability could help bridge theenforcement gap as it would provide through NATO the full range of skills needed in post-conflictsituations, according to proponents. Some question, however, whether NATO, a militaryorganization, is the wrong venue for any force with policing functions. Many analysts argue that theuse of military forces for policing functions may, in the words of PDD-71, "over an extended period... send inappropriate signals to civil authorities and the local population...." (76) Some critics alsoargue that the creation of such a reserve within NATO may duplicate current European Unionstructures and possibly add one more source of friction in U.S.-European relations. Additional Considerations. Some analysts argue that the bill should contain additional provisions on equipment, training, and coordination with themilitary. For one, they argue that without a previous commitment of equipment by the United States,the deployment of U.S. and other police reservists may well be delayed while needed supplies areassembled. In addition, some argue that the creation of U.S. or international reserves, without theprovision of standardized training, would only perpetuate the lack of conformity in policing stylesthat is viewed as undermining current operations. In addition, many of the problems of pastoperations might be repeated in the future if mechanisms weren't established, and perhaps some jointtraining provided, with the U.S. and other military forces. Other critics are skeptical of the need for such forces, or of the need for the commitment of U.S. police officers to them. Some critics argue that by creating police reserves, the bill may only drawupon existing police resources, which are already in short supply, and would contribute to tensionswith local and state governments. (77) S. 2127: Strengthening Civilian Rule of Law and Other Capabilities. On February 25, 2004, Senators Lugar and Biden, introduced the Stabilization and ReconstructionCivilian Management Act of 2004 ( S. 2127 ), which, according to the reportaccompanying the bill ( S.Rept. 108-147 ), would reorganize government structures "to strengthen thecapacity of civilian foreign affairs agencies to respond quickly and effectively to overseas crises,including post-conflict and other complex emergencies." To that end, S. 2127 wouldprovide $80 million to hire up to 250 personnel and designate employees of the State Departmentand the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) to comprise a Response ReadinessCorps, and to augment that corps by maintaining a "Response Readiness Reserve" roster. The rosterwould consist of federal employees and at least 500 non-government personnel. All Corps andReserve personnel would be trained specifically for such missions. Within three years of enactment,the bill would require that 10% of State Department and USAID personnel be identified and trainedfor this force. Although this measure is interpreted as intended, at least in part, to address theinstitution gap created by delays in deploying rule of law personnel, neither the legislation norSenator Lugar's floor statement in introducing the bill specify the types of personnel who are to berecruited and the extent to which this cadre would include "stability" (i.e., police and other rule oflaw) experts versus reconstruction experts is not clear. See the section below on the developmentof a Stability Force for related opinions on such a capability. Improve the Training and Professionalization of CivPol Personnel. Many experts assert that substantially increased and improved training,especially in basic functions, and professionalization of existing CivPol personnel mightsignificantly assist in bridging the deployment gap. As the scope and mandate of police missionshave increased, pre-deployment training has not kept pace with the needs, according to someanalysts. Instead, in places like Bosnia, Kosovo, and East Timor, training adjustments were madein the field on a case-by-case basis. Recognizing the importance of adequate and appropriatetraining, PDD-71 proposed that the United States "maintain the capacity to provide tailored trainingpackages to U.S. and international CivPol when requested by the organizing body or the contributingstate and when appropriate U.S. funding or appropriate reimbursement is available." (78) Some analysts continue to argue that increased police training would be desirable: one recent think tank report recommends a "robust" increase in funds for such training, as many nations findthe cost of training prohibitive for large numbers of personnel. (79) As discussed earlier, the StateDepartment's new CivPol cadre bid solicitation proposal included a provision for U.S. training offoreign police personnel, although there has been no decision on a program or arrangements for suchtraining. The content and scope of such a program may depend on the amount of funding available. Increase International Capability for Constabulary Forces. Another option to address the deployment and enforcement gap, urged bymany analysts, is the strengthening of existing international constabulary capabilities in the smallnumber of nations that already have them and the creation of new capabilities in the nations that donot. ( H.R. 2616 , discussed above, proposes incorporating a unit capable of performingconstabulary functions within NATO.) Constabulary police perform a variety of tasks that requireless force than combat, but more force than routine law enforcement activities. As defined by PDD-71, constabulary tasks include the regulation of peoples' movements when necessary to ensuresafety; interventions "to stop civil violence, such as vigilante lynchings or other violent publiccrimes" and to "stop and deter widespread or organized looting, vandalism, riots or other mob-typeaction;"and the dispersal of "unruly or violent public demonstrations and civil disturbances." (80) Less heavily armed than combat soldiers, constabulary forces are trained in both military and policing skills and use those combined skills to carry out their duties, making them essential for avariety of hostile situations that occur more frequently in post-conflict areas than in nations at peace.When deployed on peacekeeping missions, constabulary police often are equipped with their owncommunication and logistical support. Also, constabulary forces usually can deploy more rapidlythan other CivPols because they typically are deployed as "formed units" (i.e., in groups that havepreviously worked together and will continue to do so) instead of as individuals. Many analysts argue for the establishment of specialized paramilitary units, such as those available in other countries, citing them as the most appropriate forces to conduct constabulary tasksin peacekeeping operations. (81) Presently, severalcountries already have national police forces orspecialized paramilitary police units, that are trained as constabulary forces, such as the Italian carabinieri , the French gendarmerie , and the Spanish Guardia Civil , amongothers. As noted byseveral analysts (as well as PDD-71), these resources can be [and often are] severely strained byhigh deployment rates when deployed to numerous U.N. peacekeeping operations. (82) (Some also argue that the U.S. army should develop its own active duty constabulary force to augment the military police (MPs), who are usually called upon to perform constabulary functionsin peacekeeping and related operations. As much of the U.S. army MP capability resides in thereserve, shortages occur when peacekeeping deployment rates are high. According to some reports,Army analysts and policymakers are considering this option. However, Army leaders have longresisted structuring the service to facilitate peacekeeping operations, arguing that a military force isweakened if it is structured to fulfill secondary missions, such as peacekeeping, rather than itsprimary warfighting mission. (83) With thesubsequent U.S. interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq,however, many analysts have questioned whether military forces can be said to have won a war ifthey have not established the conditions for a durable peace, as do some military personnel whobelieve Army forces are most valuable if they are adaptable and capable of performing security tasksin high, medium, and low-intensity conflict environments.) Proponents of such forces argue that, as an intermediary security force for peace operations capable of handling some violent situations which are beyond the capabilities of CivPol,constabulary forces can reduce reliance on combat soldiers to engage in policing activities, as wellas shorten their withdrawal time from post-conflict situations, according to many analysts. (84) (Currently, regular military forces often perform constabulary functions in peacekeeping operations,despite their lack of training and resources.) Despite these possible advantages, analysts are uncertain whether other countries would be willing to augment their constabulary capabilities, or whether countries that do not now possess suchcapabilities might want to develop them for deployment abroad. Drawing an analogy with U.S.localities that they perceive as stressed by the temporary deployment of police officers abroad, someanalysts judge that, like the United States, other countries are increasingly concerned about meetingdomestic needs. Develop a "U.S. Force for Stability". A final option to address the institution gap in peace operations is the development of rapidly deployableunits of law enforcement and rule of law personnel to ensure "sustainable security." Severalanalysts have urged the development of U.S. and international capabilities to rapidly deploy a fullrange of rule of law professionals in addition to police (i.e., judicial branch officials such as judgesand prosecutors, and prison personnel, among others). (85) The United States currently deployspersonnel with experience in justice and corrections systems through Department of Justicecontracts, funded by the State Department's INL CivPol program. The State Department's newCivPol cadre program, as discussed above, requests contractors to identify such personnel in aneffort to create a capability within the CivPol to deploy them. To many analysts, however, thecurrent system does not provide the full range of necessary personnel in a timely manner. Robert S. Perito, currently a special advisor to the Rule of Law Program at the United States Institute for Peace (USIP) has been a primary proponent of such units. Most recently, in a bookpublished by the United States Institute for Peace, Perito outlines a comprehensive proposal forintegrating military and civilian personnel to form a "U.S. force for stability" that would constitutepart of U.S. intervention forces (86) In a lessextensive work on the same subject, Perito and a co-author stated that this proposal constitutes "a new approach topost-conflict intervention" that wouldclose security gaps and break the cycle of impunity caused by a law enforcement authority vacuumin the post-conflict period. (87) As proposed, theU.S. stability force would be comprised of fourelements: (1) robust military forces, (2) civilian constabulary units, (3) civilian police, and (4) ruleof law professionals (lawyers, judges, and corrections experts). Under the Perito model, these forceswould deploy concurrently (and not sequentially as is now the practice) in order to provide theneeded security from the outset, and to decisively bridge the deployment, enforcement, andinstitution gaps. Civilian personnel would be present in the field from the outset in order to takeover law enforcement functions as soon as security conditions permit, or immediately following theend of the major combat phase. As Perito outlines the functioning of this model, (88) the military role shifts at the end of majorcombat operations from combat to providing perimeter security. Concurrently, constabulary unitstake responsibility for internal security. The function of these units, comprised of both military andcivilian personnel, is to suppress lawlessness and other forms of civil disorder. Next, civilian police augment the military and constabulary forces to maintain and restore public safety. Justice experts(judges, prosecutors, and court administrators) complete the force package by ensuring therestoration of the rule of law. Over time, the preponderance of personnel shifts from military tocivilian, and the military component cedes operational control over law enforcement functions to thecivilian component. Perito states that his model is similar to the current organization of the NATOmilitary and U.N. civilian security forces in Kosovo. Two recent reports provide related recommendations. A November 2003 report of the National Defense University (NDU) also recommends the concurrent deployment of civilian "stabilizationand reconstruction" personnel with combat forces, in order to expedite the transfer of nation-buildingresponsibilities to civilians. The report recommends the creation of a standing interagencystabilization and reconstruction team within the government, and the development of an "on-call"civilian crisis management corps of medical, legal, language, and law enforcement personnel fromstate and local governments and the private sector. (89) A March 2004 report of the Center for Strategicand International Studies (CSIS) recommends the establishment of an Agency for StabilityOperations reporting directly to the Secretary of State. The agency would be responsible forpreparing for such operations, as well as the management and deployment of a Civilian StabilityOperations Corps of 200-300 U.S. government civilians, who are organized, trained and equippedfor conducting such operations, and of a Civilian Stability Operations Reserve of an unspecifiednumber of non-government civilians with related expertise who would be on-call for rapiddeployment. (90) Proponents of a "stability force" model argue it has many advantages. Many analysts view the early deployment of rule of law personnel as essential to providing security from the outset of anoperation, which they argue will enhance the possibilities for long-term stability and democracy inan intervened or post-conflict country. Many also view such a structure as permitting the earlierwithdrawal of military personnel than would otherwise be possible. Nevertheless, as proposed by Perito, such a force would require certain changes in current U.S. practices. For the military, it would require the development of significant constabulary capabilities,including an increased number of military police. And, for the international civilian policecomponent, as proposed by Perito, constabulary and police personnel would be provided by a newfederal agency, which would recruit active duty and retired officers as temporary federal employees,instead of being hired through contractors as is the current practice. Because of these changes, the creation of such a force could prove controversial. Arguments related to such a restructuring of military forces are discussed above, in the section onconstabulary forces. And, perspectives on the relative merits of a government-employment versusa government-contracted model for CivPol deployments are discussed in the section on H.R. 2616 , above. This model, however, is not necessarily a reserve as proposed in H.R. 2616 . While the model might offer advantages in establishing security more rapidly in countries in crisis than recruiting on an ad hoc case-by-case basis through a civilian contractor, the ease ofdeployment will depend on the method used to recruit and hire personnel. (Perito favors federalizingat least the CivPol component of the stability force, rather than hiring CivPols through privatecontractors.) Personnel hired at the time a mission is conceived under a lengthy federal employmentprocess might be less quickly deployable than those called up under a reserve system, or a stand-byon-call system, as envisioned under S. 2127 , discussed above. The availability ofpersonnel for rapid deployment may well depend on the arrangements under which they arerecruited. If, as with the U.S. military reserve component, law enforcement and rule of lawpersonnel are to commit to deploy immediately when called, they may require the type of benefits(i.e., pension, salaries for regular training) such as members of the U.S. military reserve componentreceive. Sources: Peacekeeping Fact Sheets accessible through the U.N. Department of Peacekeeping Operations website http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/home.shtml ; fact sheet on the EU Police accessible at http://ue.eu.int/eupm ;OMIK information accessible throughthe Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) website http://www.osce.org ; United Nations. The Blue Helmets , 3rd edition, NewYork, 1996; Erwin A. Schimidl, Police in Peace Operations , Informationen Zur Sicherheitspolitik,(Landesverteidigungsakademie/MilitÃ¤rwissenschaftliches BÃ¼ro of Austria) No. 10, September 1998; Robert B. Oakley, Michael J. Dziedzic, and EliotGoldberg, eds. Policing the New World Disorder: Peace Operations and Public Security . Washington,D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1998,and Robert M. Perito, The American Experience with Police in Peace Operations , Clementsport,Canada: The Canadian Peacekeeping Press, 2002. Note: This chart excludes a number of U.N. civilian police missions whose numbers were under 100 authorized or deployed. The dispatch of groups of bilateral and multilateral international policemen to advise and train local police forces predated the First World War. European nationssent police units in the late 1800s to provinces of the disintegrating Ottoman Empire and to Albania in 1913-1914 to create a new police force. Early police monitors weredeployed to guard the Suez Canal in 1882, and under the League of Nations to theSaarland in 1935. (91) The first use of U.N. civilian police in a peacekeeping operation took place in 1960 with the U.N. Operation in the Congo, when first a Ghanaian contingent wasdeployed for a few months, and next a Nigerian contingent which remained for abouta year after the U.N. operation ended in 1964. They were tasked with assisting theCongolese police in maintaining order. Subsequently, in 1962-63, the UnitedNations provided a U.N. Temporary Executive Authority (UNTEA) to administerWest New Guinea during the transition from Dutch to Indonesian rule and recruitedPhilippine police officers to assist the local force. The U.N. Peacekeeping Force inCyprus (UNFICYP), beginning in 1964 and continuing to the present day, was thefirst operation where the term UNCIVPOL was used, and the first multilateral U.N.police force. UNFICYP CivPols assisted Cypriot police in maintaining order andproviding security in sensitive areas in hopes of diffusing tensions. Predominance of Monitoring Mandates, Cambodia, et al.: 1989-Early 1992 and Recognition of Deployment and InstitutionGaps. The earliest post-cold war operations with mandates limitedto or focused primarily on monitoring the performance of local police officerscommenced in 1989 through 1992. Two of the earliest post-cold war operations, inNamibia (1989-1990), and the Western Sahara, (starting in 1991 and continuingintermittently, with the latest UNCIVPOL presence there recorded in November2003) took place in areas where there were well-trained police forces, as did the U.N.operations of the Cold War period. (92) The UnitedNations Transition AssistanceGroup (UNTAG) in Namibia was established to monitor the electoral process leadingup to South West Africa's independence. Unarmed CivPol monitors were to assistwith this mission. In the field, the UNCIVPOL mission increased to patrollingseparate from the local police and investigating complaints about them. (93) Accordingto one analyst, UNTAG became a model for future missions in the early 1990s,setting the three main tasks for the early monitoring missions: "accompanying localpolice in performing their duties; receiving and investigating public complaints aboutthe police; and supervising investigations conducted by local police." (94) UNTAG was followed in 1991 by the U.N. Mission for the Referendum in Southwest Sahara(MINURSO) where the United Nations established a temporary administration tocarry out a referendum to decide on the future status of the former Spanish colony --a referendum that is yet to be held because of continued opposition by Morocco. Two other operations with strictly monitoring mandates -- Angola (UNAVEM II and III, 1991-1995) and Cambodia (1992-1994) -- occurred in more difficultsituations with less established institutions and in the wake of tenuous peace accords. Despite the limited mandates, actors in the field occasionally decided additionalfunctions were necessary. Police monitors were also deployed in another tenuoussituation through the U.N. Protection Force peacekeeping operation (1992-1995) tothe new states created by the break-up of Yugoslavia, with CivPols deployed in 1992,first to Croatia, then to Bosnia-Hercegovia, and last to Macedonia for a variety ofmonitoring functions. Their missions were largely overwhelmed by the escalationof armed conflict which many analysts attribute to an inadequate mandate andinsufficient number of UNPROFOR military forces. The U.N. Transition Administration in Cambodia (UNTAC) was one of the last and certainly the largest and most ambitious U.N. peacekeeping operation in whichpolice served a strictly monitoring mandate. A broad operation in other respects,UNTAC did little to increase the scope of police operations and powers in themandate. As a result, the UNTAC police mission underwent a significant shift ofresponsibilities in the field. As rethought, the focus of the UNTAC police unit wasto investigate complaints of violations of political liberties and human rights. When Cambodian police failed to apprehend those cited as suspects of such violations byUNCIVPOLs, the U.N. Secretary-General's representative began in January 1993bestowing arrest powers on CivPols, by directive and for the first time in a U.N.operation, and mandating the establishment of an UNTAC jail. Both actions,however, came too late to make the operation effective according to some analysts. (95) Cambodia was one of the first places where the slowness of deployment, which took some 10 months to get to the field in full strength due to problems of raising alarge force, was noted as a hindrance to the effective performance of the entireoperation. (96) It was also quickly recognized thatalthough UNTAC had been assignedthe task of ensuring law and order, the numbers of authorized police were inadequatefor such a task. As a result of this deployment gap, the UNTAC police missioninitially underwent another adjustment, cutting the scope of its efforts from ensuringlaw and order to monitoring elections. While not an explicit part of the UNTAC mandate, the operation contemplated a limited amount of training for Cambodian police, and UNTAC police quicklyrecognized the need for training not only the police, but also the judiciary. Accordingto one analyst, "once in the field, they could clearly see the value of [such]training...." As few resources were available, according to the same source, "Somecivil police undertook makeshift training using their own training manuals..." (97) Analyses of the UNTAC operation, among others, led to the concept of thedevelopment of an "institution gap" as UNTAC police were perceived as unable topromote justice due to the lack of an adequate and independent judicial system,which had been "systematically removed by the [previous] Pol Pot regime," to punishthose that UNTAC police apprehended. (98) As aresult, analysts developed the ideaof deploying integrated "justice packages" of justice and penal officials, as well aspolice officers. Police Reform and Training Components Added: 1992-1994, and Recognition of Enforcement Gap. Reform ofpolice forces became a "pivotal" element for the first time in the U.N. ObserverMission in El Salvador (ONUSAL). According to one analyst, ONUSAL "constitutedthe most radical attempt to date to put internal security forces under civilian control"with the international community supplying "unprecedented levels of technicalassistance, training, on-the-job supervision, and material assistance to the new policeforce." (99) The reform role for international policeforces was established throughJanuary 1992 peace accords, negotiated with the mediation of the United Nationsfrom April 1990, which put an end to El Salvador's decade long civil war. Theaccords were detailed on security affairs, calling for the dismantling of the military-controlled security forces andthe creation of a new National Civilian Police force(PolicÃ­a Nacional Civil, or PNC), and had a general reference to the reform of thejudicial system. (100) ONUSAL, which had started operations in July 1991 with the dispatch of human rights monitors even before a cease-fire was declared, provided UNCIVPOLsbeginning in March 1992. Their mandate included the broad and vague direction to cooperate "in ensuring a smooth transition and assisting police authorities," and alsothe function of "accompanying officers and members of the [existing] NationalPolice in the performance of their duties." (101) These functions occurred during a two-year transition period while a new police academy was created and the recruits forthe CNP force were trained. Although the emphasis of the ONUSAL policeoperation was on verification and field work, (102) ONUSAL also was responsible foroverseeing the formation of the new police academy and police force. The U.N.Development Program (UNDP) took over the management role, soliciting andcoordinating international contributions from Spain, Norway, and Sweden, with theUnited States and Chile providing assistance under bilateral agreements. (103) The establishment of the new police force, which was seen as a crucial element in the country's reconciliation and democratization processes, was considered asuccess by many analysts, even though the overall police operation encounteredsignificant problems. One analyst pointed to the success as "sufficient to convincecontributing governments that civilian police deployment in a peacekeepingoperation had come to stay," despite her judgment that the success was"overshadowed by high crime rates and the continued meddling of the El Salvadorian[sic] military." (104) While the Salvadoran experience may have been the first charged with creating a new police force, subsequent missions in the next few years had at least an implicit,if not an explicit, training and/or reform mandates. The first of these was theMozambique civilian police operation authorized in February 1994 (although theU.N. Operation in Mozambique, ONUMOZ actually began in December 1992). ONUMOZ's civilian police mission was heavily monitoring, but a small trainingassistance component came under the mandate's provision to provide technicalsupport to the Mozambican police. According to one analyst, ONUMOZ was "aprecursor to later training and police reform missions, in that CivPol were to'monitor and verify the process of reorganization and retraining of the QuickReaction Police.' It is important to note, however, that ONUMOZ was not itselfconducting the training." (105) An important partof international Mozambique policesupport came towards the end of and after the formal UN operations, with follow-uppolice reform programs conducted for several years, primarily through bilateraltraining, particularly by the Spanish Guardia Civil . (106) Training was an explicit partof the mandate of the U.N. Assistance Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR, 1993-1996). In two other countries -- Somalia and Haiti -- international forces made concerted training and reform efforts. Both of these efforts were initiated as U.S.operations. The U.S.-led United Task Force (UNITAF, December 1992-March1993), multilateral coalition began efforts to provide humanitarian assistance and tohelp restore order in Somalia, where competing factions had fought to assert powerafter the collapse of the lengthy dictatorship of Siad Barre. In the context of a largemilitary operation, UNITAF began the task of establishing an interim AuxiliarySecurity Force (ASF), despite the lack of a specific mandate under the authorizingSecurity Council resolution (UN SCR 794), although it had originally intended toleave the reorganization of Somali police forces to the U.N. force which was tofollow. (107) The ASF was intended to "enforcelocally agreed upon laws and becontrolled by the community: in essence, [to be] a community police force," (108) andeventually was present in 17 cities and towns. (109) As perceived by one of itsorganizers, the ASF "would eliminate the need for UNITAF troops to serve as police,not only freeing them for other duties but avoiding confusion about their role andreducing friction with the local population, thus minimizing casualties on both sides. A police force would also enable Somalis to deal with ordinary criminal activity (asdistinct from organized looting and robbery) and give them some responsibility fortheir own affairs. Finally, it would create jobs and provide income to severalthousand otherwise unemployed Somalis." (110) UNITAF encouraged the Somalipolice who, according to at least one analyst, were respected by the Somalipopulation "to act on their own while the allied military forces were available asback-up near the police stations." (111) Substantial assistance was provided for the ASFby UNITAF, the United Nations, and individual nations through bilateral assistance.According to one analyst: The U.N. Development Program (UNDP) paid salaries and operating expenses, provided equipment and officefurnishings, and refurbished police stations. Italian, Dutch and German policeexperts arrived under UNDP auspices to work with the new force.... The Italiansprovided uniforms, nightsticks and whistles. UNITAF provided surplus vehicles andradios brought from Saudi Arabia after Operation Desert Storm. UNITAF militaryforces, particularly contingents from Morocco, Botswana and the United ArabEmirates, provided training, weapons, and conducted joint patrols in their sectors. The World Food Program provided food rations for ASF members and theirfamilies. (112) A smaller U.N. military force, the U.N. Operation in Somalia II (UNOSOM II), took over from UNITAF in May 1993, (113) bywhich time the 5,000 ASF memberswere operating in the capital of Mogadishu and 17 other cities and towns (114) and theASF was considered a credible and popular police force. In December 1993, theU.N. announced that UNOSOM II would re-establish a 10,000 member Somalipolice force by the end of 1994, (115) even as themilitant Somali faction led by GeneralMohamed Farah Aidid increasingly challenged U.N. forces. Despite ambitious plansfor reconstructing not only the Somali police, but also the courts and prisons, theU.N. efforts foundered due to inadequate staffing and funding. It took nearly a fullyear after UNITAF departed for the first of the 54 members of the UNCIVPOL toarrive and another two months for the unit to reach full strength. Even after theyarrived, there were enough training and cultural differences among them to impedethe development and delivery of a coherent program. (116) In the interim, UNOSOMII military forces worked with the U.S. Justice Department's International CriminalInvestigative Training Assistance Program (ICITAP) to develop basic police coursesand, in March 1994, ICIPTAP sent its own trainers to conduct courses for Somalipolice officers. The programs collapsed, however, amid the escalating violence and insecurity, which was largely attributed to an insufficient U.N. military presence. ICITAPwithdrew in June 1994, and the UNCIVPOLs left in March 1995 with the forcedU.N. withdrawal. While the UNITAF ASF is judged as achieving some success inproviding police forces that offered protection to citizens and enjoyed a legitimacythat it conferred by extension upon UNITAF, its success was attributed by someanalysts to the commitment of UNITAF to back it up when it faced a level ofviolence that it could not control. Nevertheless, by the end of the 1990s, the need for the development and reform of existing police institutions was widely recognized. The August 2000 BrahimiPanel Report recommended a "doctrinal shift" in the use of civilian personnel inpeace operations. (117) According to the panel,the primary role and function of CivPolpersonnel should be to build local police services capacity. Enforcement and Institutional Gaps in Somalia and Haiti. UNOSOM II's lack of a commitment to back upUNCIVPOLs, like that which the UNITAF had made to the ASF, contributed to thedevelopment of the concept of a law "enforcement gap." Analysts perceived inSomalia, as previously in Cambodia and as in several future operations, that thepresence of an adequate police force to maintain law and order in normalcircumstances may not be sufficient to control the sporadic outbreaks of violence ormore organized violent challenges in post-conflict situations, often due to the lackof a widely-accepted peace accord. As a result, the use of military force may beneeded to maintain law and order, often in a primary role when violence is high,other times as a supplement to police forces when the level is lower. The Somalia operation also demonstrated several other problems, in the judgment of many analysts. These were that (1) an international civilian police forcecannot function where there is no effective cease-fire, (2) UNCIVPOL missions,because of the sheer diversity of their experiences, are not, as currently constituted,particularly well-suited for training local police, and (3) an "institutional" gap (i.e.,the lack of adequate courts and prison system) and lack of a political settlement willundermine even successful police reform efforts in the long run. (118) Similar gaps were highlighted in Haiti, where six years of intensive U.S. and U.N. police reform efforts demonstrated dramatically, in the opinion of someanalysts, the problems created by the institutional gap. Reform efforts in Haiti beganunder the U.S.-led Multilateral Force (MFN, Sept 1994- March1995). The MFN'spolice component, the International Police Monitoring Force (IPM), with about 820monitors from 20 countries, was formed to create, develop, and train a new Haitiannational police force (HNP). (As a complementary step, the IPM vetted formermembers of Haiti's armed forces in order to select those fit to serve on an interimpublic security force which the IPM also supervised.) IPM members were allowedto carry arms, to use force when necessary, and to make arrests, as were members ofthe UNCIVPOL which followed. (119) TheUNCIVPOL under the subsequent U.N.Mission in Haiti (UNMIH, which actually deployed in force from March 1995through June 1996) took over the monitoring and training functions. Threesubsequent U.N. follow-on missions were sent to Haiti over the next five years(through March 2000) to continue work professionalizing the Haitian police. Analysts note careful coordination between the military and the MNF and UNMIH civilian police to establish and maintain public security while the HNP wastrained and deployed. (120) For instance, whenthe IPMs were slow to deploy insufficient strength and with a sufficient degree of organization to deter violence, theUnited States adjusted MFN rules of engagement to permit the military forces todetain and, as necessary, shoot those committing serious crimes and commencedaggressive patrolling. The interim public security force was rapidly forced to furtherfill the deployment gap before the planned deployment of the HNP between June1995 and February 1996. MNF military police conducted separate patrols and jointpatrols with the IPMs and the IPSF. The MNF military police also provided trainingwith the IPMs at Haitian police stations on basic matters such as patrolling,performing desk operations, and the appropriate use of force. Unlike Somalia, in Haiti there was a smooth transition between the U.S.-led MNF and the succeeding U.N. operation, and the military forces of UNMIH alsoserved to bridge the law enforcement gap. (121) UNMIH, like the MNF, provided rapidback-up to the UNCIVPOL, as well as MPs to police stations for liaison andtechnical assistance. UNMIH also contributed to the restoration of stability bycontinuing military patrols to deter crime and political violence. As the HNPdeployed, the UNCIVPOLs moved from a law enforcement role to a mentoring,monitoring, and on-the-job training role. UNMIH military forces also monitoredHNP performance. Despite the ability of planners in the Haitian operations tocompensate for the deployment and enforcement gaps, the institutional gap -- theovercrowded prisons and the inept if not corrupt judicial system -- proved a severeimpediment to the establishment of public security. (122) Covering the "Enforcement Gap" in Bosnia: the creation of Special Constabulary Units in Bosnia, 1995-1999. Bymandate, the United Nations had full responsibility for international policeassistance in Bosnia from 1995-2002. Under its mandate, that assistance was largelylimited to monitoring, which was emphasized in the first year of the operation, andtraining, which later took on greater importance. The United Nations was assignedthis role by the December 1995 Dayton Accords, under which the three competingpopulations in Bosnia agreed to a joint government overseen by a complexinternational mechanism, in order to put an end to their conflict. It carried out the rolethrough the International Police Task Force (IPTF), a component of the U.N. Missionto Bosnia and Hercegovina (UNMIBH). The U.N. responsibility encompassed sevendistinct functions: (1) to monitor, observe and inspect law enforcement (LE)activities and facilities, "including associated judicial organizations, structures andproceedings;" (2) to advise LE personnel and forces; (3) to train LE personnel; (4)to facilitate the parties' LE activities within the purview of the IPTF mission; (5) toassess threats to public order and to offer advice concerning LE agencies' abilitiesto deal with those threats; (6) to advise the Bosnian government authorities on howto organize effective civilian LE agencies; and (7) to accompany Bosnian LEpersonnel in the performance of their duties as the IPTF deemed appropriate. (123) In January 2003, the European Union took responsibility for monitoring and trainingpolice in Bosnia, as well as contributing to the development of police institutionalstructure, through the EU Police Mission (i.e., the EUPM). In practice, the 1,721 authorized unarmed IPTF CivPols, who lacked any enforcement powers, quickly proved inadequate to the task of ensuring public orderamong the three still openly hostile groups. (IPTF began deploying in January 1996and reached full strength some eight months later, in August. (124) ) This deficiency hadbeen feared during the Dayton negotiations by those, including principal U.S.negotiator Richard Holbrooke, who had argued not only for a stronger mandate forthe international CivPol, but also for a policing function for the NATO peacekeepingImplementation Force (IFOR). (125) Several analysts point to the early 1996 transfer of control of certain areas of Sarajevo, with the relocation of many residents in early 1996 when only a fewhundred IPTF personnel had been deployed, as an early test for both the IPTF andIFOR. IFOR provided much needed assistance to the still-organizing IPTF, with civilaffairs police specialists helping to plan the operation (as well as providing otherassistance in organizing the force), (126) and thus,to compensate in part for the slowdeployment of IPTF personnel. In some analysts' judgment, the death of only oneperson during the weeks of relocation was a "remarkable accomplishment," (127) butthe gutting, burning, and booby-trapping of many dwellings in the process pointedto an "enforcement gap" given that IPTF had "neither the authority nor the resourcesto act" and IFOR refused to act in a law enforcement capacity in the absence of animminent threat to life. In the opinion of one analyst, the result, a flight of BosnianSerbs from Sarajevo suburbs, led to the perception of yet another U.N. failure inBosnia, and a loss of credibility for understaffed and under-resourced IPTF, whichlacked law enforcement powers. "Arguably," she writes, "it took the IPTF almosta year to recover from its inability to live up to exaggerated expectations and madeit more difficult to gain popular confidence." (128) In late 1996, the smaller NATOStabilization Force (SFOR) replaced IFOR; operating under the same provisions ofthe Dayton Peace Accord as IFOR, it provided backup when the IPTF did not possessadequate force to maintain public order. The "enforcement gap" in Bosnia was also covered in another way: the development of "specialized units" within the IPTF, a term that meant paramilitaryforces (i.e., police forces specially trained in certain military skills necessary tohandle exceptional law enforcement situations, especially hostile groups).Paramilitary and paramilitary-like police units from foreign nation, principally the Gendarmarie from France, the Carabinieri from Italy, and the Guardia Civil fromSpain, had taken part in other policing operations. In the early 1990s, they wereintegrated into international CivPols and not assigned special functions. By the late1990s, however, the utility of such police to fill "a perceived gap between militarycapabilities and the abilities of unarmed police monitors" was recognized. The firstplace that the gap was filled with such a unit was in Bosnia in 1998, when theMultinational Specialized Unit (MSU) was formed. The MSU was assigned the tasksof protecting elected officials and those who returned to their former homes in hostileareas, and could be called upon to back up the IPTF in preserving public order. (129) The Bosnia experience was successful enough to warrant the formation of such unitsin Kosovo and East Timor. (130) Mandates Granting Executive Authority: Kosovo and East Timor, 1999. The final expansion of the mandates andpowers of international civilian police occurred in two peacekeeping operations thatbegan in 1999: the U.N. Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) and the U.N. TransitionalAdministration in East Timor (UNTAET). In both operations, the UNCIVPOLs weregiven mandates that included "executive authority" powers (i.e., the authority to carryarms and make arrests). In both cases, the decision to provide international policeforces with executive authority reflected the absence of any legitimate, effective localauthority. After the end of the coalition air war against Serbia, NATO and the United Nations took responsibility for stabilizing Kosovo and providing continuing securitythere. Beginning in June 1999, and continuing to the present day, NATO hasprovided a military presence through the Kosovo Force (KFOR) and the UnitedNations has taken responsibility for all civil administration functions, includingpolicing, through UNMIK. In addition, the OSCE was given responsibility, underthe UNMIK structure, for overseeing and training the Kosovo Police Service (KPS),comprised of a growing number of local police officers. In East Timor, the U.N. Transitional Administration (UNTAET) provided a complete civil administration from October 1999 through May 2002 for East Timoras it made a transition from its former status as a province of Indonesia to self-government as an independentstate. (131) With Indonesia's decision to leave theprovince after protracted civil conflict, and its withdrawal of all Indonesian securityforces, a complete security vacuum would have existed without a mandate for U.N.forces, in conjunction with the Australian-led military peacekeeping force (theInternational Force in East Timor or INTERFET), to exercise executive authority. Despite these cases, a mandate for the exercise of executive authority is judged by many analysts as highly problematic and unlikely to be a wise choice in manyother future situations. Although some analysts and practitioners argue that"executive authority is inevitable when there is no local police force to monitor ortrain," (132) the number of available internationalcivilian police personnel capable ofresponsibly and effectively exercising such authority is limited, and forces of suchpolice will be even more difficult to recruit and deploy in a timely manner than forceswith more limited mandates. In cases where local police forces exist, but may beconsidered as unsuited to perform their duties without considerable, and time-consuming vetting, practitioners andpolicymakers will make case by case decisionsregarding the desirability of executive policing. For many, sovereigntyconsiderations will be an additional important factor to weigh.

Summary: One of the most crucial and difficult tasks in peacekeeping and related stability operations is creating a secure and stable environment, both for the foreign peacekeepers and for the indigenouspopulation. During the past decade, the United States and the international community have triedvarious approaches to providing that security. Most of these approaches have included the use ofUnited Nations International Civilian Police (UNCIVPOL), whose forces are contributed on a caseby case basis by U.N. Member states. (While other countries usually contribute police personnelfrom their own national forces, the United States contracts those it contributes through a privatecorporation.) In a few cases, such as Afghanistan and Iraq at this time, coalition and U.S. militaryforces, and not the United Nations, train and work with indigenous police forces to provide security. Despite continuing improvements over the past decade, the current system has several drawbacks. UNCIVPOL has been unable to provide an adequate number of well-trained policemenfor individual operations and to deploy them rapidly. Their police forces experience a lack ofconsistency in the type and levels of training and a shortage of needed skills. Military forces, on theother hand, are usually not trained to deal effectively with police situations. These deficiencies leadto three gaps that impede the establishment of law and order, particularly those cases where not allparties to the conflict are dedicated to peace or where criminal networks have taken root. The firstis the deployment gap, when international police are not available as quickly as needed. The secondis the enforcement gap, where those deployed lack necessary skills, in particular combined militaryand policing "constabulary" skills, as well as investigative and intelligence-gathering skills to dealwith organized crime. The third is the institution gap, where competent judicial and penal personnelare needed to provide follow-up services to police work. Policymakers have long recognized these problems. In February 2000, the Clinton Administration sought to remedy them through Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 71's broadpolicy reforms and guidelines. Although it did not allocate or request the necessary resources foreffective implementation, the Bush Administration is implementing some provisions. In August2000, the U.N. Brahimi Panel report proposed several remedies to improve the U.N. civilian policesystem, as did another report by contributing nations. Some are being implemented. Three pending bills would address policing and related capabilities for peacekeeping and stability operations. H.R. 1414 would establish a rapidly deployable U.N. civilianpolice corps. H.R. 2616 calls for NATO to establish a security component to be usedin post-conflict reconstruction environments and a U.S. police reserve for use in internationaloperations. S. 2127 provides for the United States to develop a corps of rapidlydeployable personnel, of which rule of law personnel may be a part. Related options recommendedby experts include improving training, increasing international constabulary capabilities, anddeveloping a "stability force" to supplement police with judicial and prison personnel. This reportmay be updated if warranted.