Major Africa commitments at Gleneagles included the following: increasing official developmentassistance to Africa by $25 billion per year by 2010,doubling assistance as compared to2004; developing and implementing "apackage for HIV prevention, treatment, and care, with theaim as close as possible to universal access to treatment forall those who need it by 2010"; (1) increasing investment in thedevelopment of an HIV/AIDS vaccine, and "taking forwardwork" on market incentives for the development ofvaccines, microbicides, and drugs to combat AIDS,tuberculosis, malaria, as well as other neglecteddiseases; investing in improved health systemsand helping Africa train and retain doctors, nurses, andcommunity health workers; and contributing an additional $1.5 billionper year to preventing and treatingmalaria. In addition, the G8 reaffirmed a number of commitments made prior to the 2005 summit,including a June 2005 recommendation by G8 finance ministers that foreign debt be canceled forfourteen African countries that have reached the "completion point" in the World Bank/InternationalMonetary Fund (IMF) Heavily Indebted Poor Countries initiative (HIPC, see below). Moreover,the G8 welcomed a June 30 agreement by the Paris Club of official bilateral lenders to relieveNigeria of its $30 billion foreign debt. Under the agreement, the lending governments would writeoff $18 billion in Nigerian debt, while Nigeria would pay back its arrears as well as the remaining$12 billion in debt. The G8 confirmed a pledge made at the 2004 G8 summit at Sea Island, Georgia,to train and equip 75,000 peace support troops worldwide by 2010, with a sustained focus on Africa. The summit's final communique summarized several earlier pledges by G8 members toincrease aid to Africa, including a May 2005 promise by the European Union countries to provide.7% of GDP as development aid by 2015, with an interim target of .56% by 2010 (see below). Atleast 50% of this additional aid would go to Africa. The communique noted that the United Stateshas proposed to double aid to Africa by 2010, as compared to 2004, through such initiatives as theMillennium Challenge Account, the President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR), andthe five-year, $660 million Global Peace Operations Initiative. U.S. officials are estimating 2004bilateral and multilateral assistance to Africa at $4.3 billion. (2) On June 30, 2005, PresidentBush had announced that he would seek $1.2 billion to fight malaria in Africa over five years as wellas additional aid for education and combating violence against women. With respect to trade barriers that inhibit Africa's exports, the G8 took no specific action butaffirmed that "we are committed to substantially reducing trade-distorting domestic support andsubstantially improving market access." In addition, the G8 stated that a "credible end date" shouldbe set for ending export subsidies and reiterated their commitment to duty-free and quota-free accessfor products originating in the least developed countries. According to the G8, the current round ofWorld Trade Organization (WTO) talks on reducing trade barriers should be concluded by the endof 2006, and the WTO ministerial meeting in Hong Kong in December 2005 will be a "criticalstepping stone" toward that goal. (3) In addition, the G8 promised Africa and other developing countriesadditional help in building trade capacity and raising agricultural productivity. The summit communique welcomed efforts by African institutions, particularly the AfricanUnion and the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD, see below) to strengthengovernance, democracy, and human rights. The G8 promised to support to these institutions andother efforts to promote transparency in Africa, while pledging to enforce their own laws againstbribing foreign officials. Britain's Prime Minister Tony Blair, who chaired the G8 summit, did not win theendorsement he had sought for an International Finance Facility (IFF, see below), which would havechanneled $25 billion in additional annual aid to Africa beginning in 2006. Nor did the G8 agree,as Blair had sought, to specific reductions in trade barriers and or to a date for ending all agriculturalexport subsidies. Nonetheless, in his closing remarks, Blair cast the summit's results in a positivelight, arguing that in politics, "you do not achieve absolutely everything you want to achieve, butnonetheless, I believe we have made very substantial progress indeed." (4) Blair called the summit a"turning point" in the drive to end poverty in Africa, (5) noting the promised additional aid for Africa as well as the debtrelief agreement. On trade, he acknowledged that "some of us would have liked to have gonefurther" but praised the G8 for renewing their commitments to reducing trade barriers and agreeingeventually to set a date for ending export subsidies. Musician and development advocate Bob Geldof, who had organized heavily attended,worldwide "Live8" concerts on July 2, to pressure the G8 to do more to help Africa, had high praisefor the summit: "On aid, it is 10 out of 10. On debt it is 8 out of 10." (6) Geldof and his colleagueBono gave credit to those who had attended the Live8 concerts, participated in demonstrations, orotherwise sought to persuade the G8 to do more to help Africa. According to Bono, "the worldspoke out and the politicians listened." (7) Jeffery Sachs, who heads Columbia University's Earth Institute as well as the United NationsMillennium Project, wrote that Prime Minister Blair had "nudged the world closer" at Gleneaglesto the possibility of halving poverty by 2015 -- one of the principal Millennium Development Goals(see below). (8) Sachsargued this was achieved "despite footdragging by the United States" and maintained that more thanfour-fifths of the aid increase promised at Gleneagles would come from the European Union. Incontrast, the White House released a Fact Sheet asserting that the United States had played a leadrole at the summit. (9) According to the Fact Sheet, President Bush "with his G8 partners had launched an historiccommitment to assist Africa...." and the G8 had given its support to "initiatives that advance U.S.interests." Moreover, the debt relief promise had been attained "with leadership from PresidentBush and Prime Minister Blair," while U.S. leadership had also been key in G8 initiatives in otherareas, including increased assistance, fighting malaria, and promoting trade and investment. Despite praise for the summit from many quarters, a range of non-governmentalorganizations (NGOs) gave mixed reviews or were critical of the summit's results. The Make PovertyHistory campaign, a British-based alliance of NGOs that played a lead advocacy role before thesummit, stated that "the G8 have chosen not to do all that campaigners insist is necessary to freepeople trapped in the prison of poverty. Important steps were taken -- steps that will bring hope tomillions. But more action is urgently needed...." (10) Christian Aid, an agency of churches in Britain and Ireland, saidthat the promised additional aid to Africa was not "new money" but "recycled oldannouncements." (11) Aspokesman for ActionAid, another development-advocacy group, said that "What Africa neededfrom the G8 was a giant leap forward; all it got was tiny steps." (12) Many in the NGOcommunity argued that the debt relief approved at the summit did not go far enough and that a muchlarger group of countries should have been included. Prime Minister Tony Blair and his Chancellor of the Exchequer (Treasury), [author name scrubbed],prior to the Gleneagles summit, launched a major diplomatic effort aimed at marshaling theresources they see as needed to eradicate extreme poverty in sub-Saharan Africa. Their objectiveis the realization, in Africa, of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). The goals were set atthe 2000 U.N. Millennium Summit and consist of a number of development targets to be attainedby 2015, including universal primary education, halving the proportion of people living on less than$1 per day, and halving the proportion of people who suffer from hunger. Prime Minister Blair assumed the rotating presidency of the G8 group of nations in January2005, and sought to use the July summit, which he chaired, to push his Africa developmentinitiative. (13) Specifically, Blair and Brown sought a substantial aid increase for Africa through the IFF, 100%forgiveness of African debt, and the removal of barriers to African exports. The Blair/Brownproposals may also be discussed in September, when the U.N. General Assembly holds a plenarysession, attended by heads of state and government, to consider progress toward achieving theMDGs. Climate change was the second focus of the G8 meeting. The purpose of the remainder of this report is to provide background on Africa, the G8, andthe Gleneagles summit. It outlines the British proposals and the U.S. reaction to them before thesummit. In addition, it briefly reviews the problems that have inhibited African development andthe response to those problems at previous G8 meetings. For additional information, see CRS Report RL32489(pdf) , Africa: Development Issues and Policy Options , and CRS Issue Brief IB95052, Africa: U.S. Foreign Assistance Issues . Prime Minister Blair has championed a "Marshall Plan" for sub-Saharan Africa for severalyears. In October 2001, addressing the challenges of a post 9-11 world, Blair said that "the state ofAfrica is a scar on the conscience of the world" and called for a new partnership with the region: On our side: provide more aid, untied to trade; write offdebt; help with good governance and infrastructure; training to the soldiers, with UN blessing, inconflict resolution; encouraging investment; and access to our markets so that we practice the freetrade we are so fond of preaching. But it's a deal: on the African side: true democracy, nomore excuses for dictatorship, abuses of human rights; no tolerance of bad governance, from theendemic corruption of some states, to the activities of Mr. Mugabe's henchmen in Zimbabwe. Propercommercial, legal, and financial systems.... (14) In February 2004, Blair appointed a 17-member Commission for Africa and asked it toundertake a comprehensive assessment of Africa's development problems. Members included BobGeldof; Prime Minister Meles Zenawi of Ethiopia; President Benjamin Mkapa of Tanzania; formerU.S. Senator Nancy Kassebaum Baker; and the British Chancellor of the Exchequer (Treasury),[author name scrubbed]. On March 11, 2005, the commission issued a 450-page report (15) that helped set theGleneagles agenda. The report analyzes the reasons for Africa's poverty; endorses the main elementsof the Blair initiative; and makes recommendations on governance, conflict prevention andpeacekeeping, education, health, and other issues. Blair and Brown mounted a public relations campaign aimed at winning support for their initiative. At the January 2005 World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland, Blair called for a"quantum leap" in aid and trade to spur African development. German Chancellor GerhardSchroeder and French President Jacques Chirac endorsed his efforts to help Africa, and Chiracproposed a small international tax on financial transactions or air travel to fund the initiative. Former President Bill Clinton, Bill Gates, and Bono added their voices at Davos in support of newefforts to end poverty in Africa. Italy had earlier endorsed Blair's plans. Some argued that the Bush Administration should endorse Blair's initiative as well, not onlyto help Africa but also to reciprocate the strong support Blair has given the Administration in itspolicy toward Iraq and in the war on terrorism. (16) Others argued that the United States has competing prioritiesand no compelling reason to sign on to the Prime Minister's initiative. The Administration distanceditself from Blair's proposal for the IFF Africa and put forward a different approach to achievingfurther debt relief. Both the Bush Administration and the European Union (EU) were already onrecord in favor of a sharp reduction in trade barriers, as Blair urges, but this proposal faces strongdomestic opposition both in Europe and the United States. Chancellor Brown is sometimes portrayed as a political rival of Blair's, but he played a keyrole in formulating Blair's G8 initiative. In January 2005, Brown made several speeches on Africandevelopment and undertook a high-profile trip through the sub-Saharan region to highlight theprincipal British proposals: Blair and Brown initially proposed the creation of an International Finance Facility (IFF) forAfrica funded at $50 billion annually for ten years. This proposal was modified by the Commissionfor Africa's report, which called for a two-stage approach in view of Africa's limited ability to absorbnew aid. The report recommended $25 billion in additional annual aid over the next three to fiveyears, followed by a review and a move to $50 billion if there has been sufficient progress inimproving the managerial and administrative capabilities of African governments. (17) The IFF would not be anew development bank or aid agency, but a mechanism for raising new resources for development. The IFF would sell bonds and disburse the proceeds to existing bilateral and multilateral aid agenciesfrom 2006 through 2015. Donors would commit themselves to repaying the bonds in the years after2015. The Commission's report describes this "big push" of predictable aid as a moral duty for theG7 developed countries, and as a step that would serve their economic self-interest by promoting aneconomic expansion in Africa. The report repeatedly stresses that Africa must continue economicand governance reforms if the new aid is to be used effectively. One source estimated the near-term cost of U.S. participation in the IFF, based on theCommission's $25 billion initial target, at $6 billion or per year. (18) Over the long term,however, Blair regards funding for the IFF as dependent on progress by the G7 in reaching the goalof giving .7% of GDP in development aid. For the United States to reach an interim level of .5%from the 2004 level of .16% would require about $40 billion in added aid annually. Brown and Blairsee their IFF proposal as a way of helping the G7 members "frontload" aid as they gradually movetoward the .7% goal -- an objective first envisaged in a 1970 U.N. General Assembly resolution andendorsed at a 2002 U.N.-convened summit on financing for development at Monterrey, Mexico. After nearing or attaining the .7% goal, the G7 would be in a position to pay off the IFF bonds after2015. Some see anything approaching the .7% goal for the United States as highly improbable ata time when the country faces a budget deficit as well as major commitments in Iraq and elsewhere. Others emphasize that Blair envisaged the United States and others moving only incrementallytoward .7%, while deferring repayment of the IFF bonds for a decade. On May 24, 2005, EuropeanUnion foreign and development ministers pledged that their governments would reach the .7% aidlevel in 10 years, with an interim target of .56% by 2010, when the Europeans would be providing$25 billion in added annual aid. Some cautioned, however, that these pledges could be affected bybudgetary constraints in some European countries. U.S. officials reacted cooly to the IFF proposal, and Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice hasstated flatly that "We don't support the international financing facility, because we don't think it's acost-effective way to deliver what is trying to be delivered here." (19) Rice went on to suggestthat the IFF would lack a mechanism to assure that the money was well spent. Supporters of the IFFargued that since it would disburse funds through existing aid agencies, such as the World Bank andbilateral G7 aid organizations, with their own mechanisms for oversight and evaluation,accountability should not be a problem. The Bank and the bilateral agencies have focused for manyyears on efforts to enhance the effectiveness of development aid by channeling it to "goodperformers:" countries that are improving governance and implementing free market reforms. Suchagencies would be highly attuned, IFF advocates maintained, to assuring that the new funds werespent effectively. Rice and other officials cite the President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) andthe Millennium Challenge Account (MCA) as evidence that the United States is already increasingaid, although by smaller amounts than Blair and Brown envisage. PEPFAR aims at disbursing $15billion for AIDS treatment, prevention, and care from FY2004 through FY2008. Congressappropriated $2.92 billion for this program in FY2005, and $3.16 billion has been requested forFY2006. The MCA was initially intended by President Bush to add $5 billion annually to U.S.foreign aid by FY2006 for countries that are well-governed, investing in people, and fostering freemarket economies. However, Congress has appropriated less than requested for this program, andthe President has asked for $3 billion in FY2006 rather than the $5 billion initially expected. Manyare dissatisfied with the MCA because its governing body, the Millennium Challenge Corporation(MCC), has been slow to disburse funds. (20) Its first "compact" -- for a $110 million program in Madagascarto promote domestic investment -- was announced on March 14, 2005. The MCC has found thateight sub-Saharan countries, including Madagascar, meet the criteria for receiving MCA grants. Another increase in U.S. foreign aid was agreed to in late February 2005, when the United Statesgave its support to a three-year 25% boost in the resources of the World Bank's InternationalDevelopment Association (IDA), which assists poor countries. (21) John Taylor, the U.S. Treasury Under Secretary for International Affairs, told a February2005 meeting of G7 finance ministers that the United States could not participate in the IFF becauseguaranteeing bonds to be paid after 2015, as Brown proposed, would unconstitutionally bind futureCongresses to making appropriations. (22) Some wonder, however, if a means could be found to overcomethis difficulty. The United States regularly assumes debt to be paid in the future in the form of bonds. Moreover, the United States regularly agrees to multi-year "replenishments" of the multilateraldevelopment banks. Congress makes annual appropriations for these replenishments, and may notappropriate the full amount scheduled for a given year. Nonetheless, U.S. support helps give theBank the creditworthiness it needs to borrow in the financial markets. Moreover, the United Stateshas assumed "callable capital" obligations to the "hard loan" windows of the World Bank and otherinternational financial institutions. This capital can be "called" if the institutions find themselvesin financial difficulties; and some argue that if this should occur, a future Congress would be obligedby past U.S. promises to appropriate the funds. President Bush reiterated on June 1, 2005, following a meeting with South Africa's PresidentThabo Mbeki, that the IFF proposal "does not fit our budgetary process," and he maintained thisstance in meetings with Prime Minister Blair at the White House the following week. At a June 7press conference with Blair, however, the President announced an additional $674.4 million in aidto Africa in FY2005, to be drawn from food and disaster assistance funds, as well as refugee aid,already appropriated by Congress. Blair's Commission for Africa recommended full forgiveness of public debt owed by poorAfrican countries. Noting that considerable progress has already been made in forgiving bilateraldebt, the report called for a focus on multilateral debt, owed principally to the World Bank'sInternational Development Association (IDA) and the African Development Bank's AfricanDevelopment Fund. IDA and the Fund make so-called "soft loans" to poor countries on highlyconcessional terms with extended repayment periods. In addition, Blair's initiative sought forgiveness of Africa's debt to the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Africa's debts to themultilateral development banks (MDBs) were estimated at $52 billion in 2002, while debt to the IMFwas $7 billion. (23) Thedeveloped countries should implement the proposed debt relief, according to the Blair Commission,by taking over the debt payments of the African countries, which it calculates at about $2 billion peryear. This sum could be part of the aid package delivered through the IFF. Britain had alreadyagreed to pay 10%, which it regards as its fair share, of the multilateral debt owed by 22 poorcountries. Blair and Brown, meanwhile, urged that debt to the IMF be repaid either by "revaluing"or selling gold held by the IMF. The IMF reports that it has 103.4 million ounces of gold officiallyvalued at $9 billion but worth $45 billion at current world prices. (24) U.S. officials initially endorsed the concept of 100% debt forgiveness, and pointed out thatthe United States has already forgiven poor country bilateral debts and supported the WorldBank/IMF Enhanced Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative for multilateral debt relief. However, officials maintained that the issue of revaluing IMF gold needed furtherconsideration, (25) andreportedly opposed the idea outright at the Spring 2005 meetings of the IMF and World Bank, heldin Washington in April. (26) Some experts in the gold market had been concerned that anymajor IMF gold sale could sharply lower the price of gold, with potentially destabilizingconsequences for the gold reserves held by many countries. Others argued that any sales could besmall and made over a long period of time to minimize this risk. With respect to debt owed by poor countries to the World Bank and the African DevelopmentBank, U.S. officials favored a simple cancellation, not funded by any repayments made by the G7or any new contributions by the G7 to the MDBs. (27) After the writeoff, in the U.S. view, the banks would makegrants rather than loans to poor countries, so that they do not accumulate new debt. (28) Many were concerned thatthe U.S. approach would deplete the banks' capital and reduce their capacity for alleviating poverty,since they would no longer be owed debts by poor countries, or receiving repayments from them. Supporters of the U.S. approach argued that it need not threaten the banks, since the G7 couldprovide new replenishments as required. U.S.-British differences on debt relief were resolved by an agreement reached at a June10-11, 2005, meeting in London of G8 finance ministers, which was ratified at the July summit. Under this agreement, $40 billion in debt owed by 18 countries that have reached the "completionpoint" in the HIPC process will be written off, and the donors will contribute additional funds to theWorld Bank and the African Development Bank to make up for the loss. The IMF will absorb theloss from its own resources and will not sell gold. Fourteen of the 18 countries are in sub-SaharanAfrica. (29) As a resultof reaching the HIPC completion point, they had already had their debt repayments reduced to a levelregarded by the World Bank and IMF as "sustainable" in return for economic reforms and theadoption of an approved strategy for reducing poverty. Nine more African countries are in the HIPCprocess and may soon reach the completion point. The June 2005 agreement covered an estimated $40 billion in debt, but its overall cost wasestimated at $16.7 billion -- the amount expected to be paid to the MDBs and the IMF through 2015. The United States reportedly agreed to pay between $1.28 billion and $1.75 billion per year as itsshare of donor compensation to the World Bank and the IMF. The agreement drew wide praise asa step forward in easing Africa's debt burden, particularly because the G8 promised that thecompensation paid to the MDBs would be in addition to the assistance they were already planningto provide Africa. However, some were concerned that this commitment would be difficult tomonitor; and some also argued that an agreement on the IFF at the London meeting would have beenof far greater benefit to Africa. The agreement did not cover Nigeria's vast debt of $30 billion ormore, which is primarily owed to bilateral lenders rather than the MDBs. (30) Nigeria is not rankedamong the world's poorest countries due to its oil wealth, but the G8 finance ministers agreed that"Nigeria is key to the prosperity of the whole continent of Africa" and promised to find a "fair andsustainable solution to Nigeria's debt problems in 2005...." (31) As noted above, anagreement on debt relief for Nigeria was reached on June 30, 2005. Chancellor Brown advocates ending "the hypocrisy of developed country protectionism" byremoving trade-distorting subsidies and other barriers to trade. (32) Critics of the G7 areadamant that they have done far too little to open their markets to African exports of cotton, sugar,and other commodities, and they blame the G7 for the failure of the 2003 Cancun World TradeOrganization (WTO) summit to agree on the removal of U.S. and European agricultural subsidies. The Blair Commission recommends an immediate end to trade-distorting support programs forcotton and sugar, an end to all trade-distorting agricultural support by 2010, and the progressivereduction of all tariffs to zero by 2015. In July 2004, both the United States and the Europeancountries agreed with other WTO members on a "framework" for discussions on reducing subsidiesand other barriers. (33) The framework opened the way to negotiations, now ongoing, on cutting domestic farm supportprograms in the developed countries, reducing other trade barriers, and eliminating exportsubsidies. (34) Meanwhile, President Bush has proposed scaling back farm subsidies in his fiscal 2006 budgetproposal. In exchange for reduced subsidies, U.S. negotiators are seeking greater access for U.S.manufactured goods and services in developing countries. Whether these developments will lead to the reduction in trade barriers that Blair and Brownare seeking remains to be seen, but as noted above, the Gleneagles summit did not take action onspecific reductions. Some developing countries may not be willing to make the concessions onmarket access sought by the United States, leading to a breakdown in the WTO negotiations. Moreover, reductions in subsidies and other barriers will encounter political opposition in both theUnited States and Europe, where many see them as an important guarantor of jobs and a protectionagainst price and supply fluctuations. Some credit the United States with moving further than Britain and other countries onremoving trade barriers to date through the U.S. African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA)program, begun in 2000. AGOA gives duty-free access to the United States for a wide range ofproducts from 37 sub-Saharan countries, including 24 permitted to export textiles and apparelitems. (35) Moreover, theBush Administration is negotiating a free trade agreement with the five countries of the SouthernAfrican Customs Union, and has expressed an interest in other African free trade agreements as well. At the same time, 78 developing countries in Africa, the Caribbean, and the Pacific (ACP) enjoypreferential access to European markets through the European Union-ACP Partnership, while SouthAfrica has its own trade agreement with the EU. Some analysts are concerned that across the boardreductions in developed country trade barriers will strengthen Africa's competitors in China andelsewhere, reducing the value of such special arrangements as AGOA and the ACP Partnership. Prime Minister Blair's initiatives on Africa reflect widespread concerns over Africa's failureto develop, despite a rich endowment of resources. (36) These include extensive deposits of petroleum, diamonds, andmetals; wide areas of rich agricultural lands; and the potential for tourism lying in Africa's beaches,game reserves, and ancient cultures. Yet average GDP per capita in the sub-Saharan region stoodat $585 in 2003, according to the World Bank, barely above the 1963 figure of $509, measured inconstant dollars. Over the same period, economies in south and southeast Asia, which started at theAfrican level, achieved extremely rapid growth, with many reaching middle income status. Morethan 25 million of sub-Saharan Africa's 700 million people are infected with HIV, and lifeexpectancy, which reached a peak of about 50 years in 1992, has since fallen to about 46. (37) Child malnutrition,illiteracy, and lack of access to clean water are serious problems throughout the region. A January2005 report by the United Nations Millennium Project argued that Africa stood no chance ofmeeting the Millennium Development Goals without a massive infusion of aid: $48 billion in 2006,rising to $74 billion in new aid by 2015. (38) A vast scholarly literature exists on the reasons for Africa's failure to develop. Many blamefactors over which African and Africans have little control, such as a tropical environment thatimposes a heavy disease burden and leads to rapid depletion of soils. Africa's population has tendedto concentrate inland, where higher altitudes make for a healthier climate, but this means manycountries lack large concentrations of people in port cities where export-based industry could readilylocate. The long era of the slave trade, ending only in 1870, took away millions in their mostproductive years, just as the AIDS epidemic does today; while the colonial era left a legacy ofauthoritarian government and a region divided into 48 countries, many of them small and/orlandlocked. Other scholars tend to blame African governments for the difficulties the continent faces. Corruption, a poor quality of governance, and economic policies that discourage free markets havecome in for particular criticism. A wide range of countries have freed up markets in varying degreesand undertaken governance reforms since the late 1980s under pressure from the World Bank, theIMF, and bilateral donors; but corruption remains a problem. Kenya, for example, had been thesource of much optimism for Africa's future after free and fair elections were held in December2002, but recently both the U.S. and British ambassadors have criticized the government of PresidentMwai Kibaki for failing to tackle corruption. The United States has suspended an anti-corruptionassistance program in Kenya in response to the problem. (39) Some also feel that African leaders have done too little on a regional basis to deal with thecontinent's problems. In 2001, African leaders launched the New Partnership for Africa'sDevelopment (NEPAD), intended to improve governance, strengthen institutional capacity, andreduce corruption. (40) NEPAD includes an African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) designed to assure accountabilityin governance and economic policy. Skeptics of Africa's efforts often point to the seemingreluctance of neighboring countries to deal with the ongoing human rights and governance problemsin Zimbabwe as evidence that NEPAD standards are not being upheld. A March 31, 2005parliamentary election in Zimbabwe was widely rejected as not free and fair by western critics, butaccepted and even praised by official observers from South Africa and the Southern AfricanDevelopment Community. In short, a number of observers feel that too many African governments are failing to live upto their end of the deal proposed by Prime Minister Blair in October 2001. They point out that Africahas received substantial amounts of assistance over the years, with official development assistancereaching nearly $24 billion in 2003 (see below). From their perspective, the principal responsibilityfor Africa's development now lies with Africa's leaders who must assure that their countries enterthe ranks of the "good performers. U.N. Millennium Project head Jeffrey Sachs takes a somewhatdifferent view. Though a strong supporter of sound economic policies in Africa, he believes thecontinent is caught in a "poverty trap" -- so poor that few want to invest even in countries where realattempts at reform are being made. The Millennium Project report, which he directed, argues thatmany countries in Africa are well governed, considering the extent of their poverty, and wouldbenefit from a "big push" in foreign assistance to strengthen education, health care, infrastructure,and other sectors. This "rapid scale-up," in his view, would create viable economies attractive toinvestors, and help Africa escape the poverty trap. Proponents of a third view acknowledge that committing large new amounts of aid to Africais risky, given the continent's many difficulties, but maintain that the risk is worth taking since intheir view the amounts of aid being proposed by Blair, Brown, and Sachs could readily be affordedby the G7 countries working together. In return, some argue, the G7 might gain new markets, assureaccess to Africa's oil and other resources over the long term, and create an environment in whichviolence and terrorism are less likely to emerge. G8 meetings in the 1990s often dealt with many of the same themes expected to be raised atGleneagles. The G8 first emphasized in those years that sub-Saharan Africa faces specialdevelopment challenges, and summit communiques acknowledged that "substantial" developmentassistance was needed to help sub-Saharan Africa grow. (41) Debt relief for the poorest countries was another major theme. The 1994 Naples summit encouraged wider cancellation of bilateral debt, and the 1996 summit atLyons helped launch the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Initiative (HIPC) to reduce poor countrydebt owed to the World Bank and IMF. At Cologne in 1999, the G8 agreed on an expanded HIPCprogram that would offer "deeper, broader, and faster" debt relief. Toward the end of the 1990s, G8meetings also began to reflect the view that the least developed countries needed expanded accessto developed country markets. Beginning with the 1997 Denver summit, the G8 repeatedly calledfor expanded efforts to combat HIV/AIDS and other infectious diseases afflicting Africa as well asother impoverished regions. Also at Denver, the G8 expressed their support for "long-term effortsto promote rapidly deployable African peacekeeping capacities." While pledging support for Africain these areas, the G8 have consistently emphasized the other half of the Blair "deal." For example,at Lyons in 1996, the G8 stated that the developing countries have a fundamentalresponsibility for promoting their own development. This means conducting sound and consistenteconomic and social policies, promoting a political and legal environment conducive to thedevelopment of the private sector, and encouraging domestic and foreign investment. (42) The Genoa and Kananaskis, Canada meetings in 2001 and 2002 saw an intensification of thefocus on Africa. Three sub-Saharan presidents were invited to Genoa to report on new Africanefforts to promote development, and African leaders have attended each subsequent G8 meeting. Presidents Thabo Mbeki of South Africa, Olusegun Obasanjo of Nigeria, and Abdoulaye Wade(WAHD) of Senegal were present at Kananaskis as the G8 issued its Africa Action Plan promisinga new Africa partnership. Under the plan, support was offered in several priority areas: promotingpeace and security; strengthening institutions and governance; fostering trade, investment, growth,and sustainable development; implementing debt relief; improving health and confrontingHIV/AIDS; increasing agricultural productivity; and improving water resource management. Thissupport was to be closely linked to progress in Africa in implementing NEPAD objectives withrespect to improving governance, strengthening institutional capacity, and reducing corruption.Mbeki, Obasanjo, and Wade are regarded as the principal authors of NEPAD. Prior to the Gleneagles meeting, Kananaskis represented the high water mark of G8 attentionto Africa. However, at the 2003 summit in Evian, France, the G8 affirmed their commitment to theHIPC initiative and announced a G8 Action Plan Against Famine, Especially in Africa. In June2004, the U.S.-hosted summit at Sea Island, Georgia, issued a number of statements related toAfrica's needs, including commitments to stopping polio forever and combating corruption inNigeria, as well as action plans on science and technology for sustainable development and onending the cycle of famine in the Horn of Africa. Another action plan, reaffirmed at Gleneagles,called for training and, where appropriate, equipping 75,000 peace support troops worldwide by2010, with a sustained focus on Africa. Prime Minister Blair reportedly advanced a proposal at SeaIsland for 100% debt forgiveness for the world's poorest countries, but no agreement was reached. Whether G8 summits have responded adequately to Africa's needs has been the subject ofa lively debate. Many feel that the G8 have not done nearly enough. After the 2003 Evian meeting,for example, Omar Kabbaj, President of the African Development Bank, wrote that there had beensome good initiatives with respect to aid, but sub-Saharan Africa required $50 billion per year toachieve sustainable, broad-based growth. (43) Jeffrey Sachs has argued repeatedly for a vastly expandeddeveloped country aid program for Africa, most recently in the Millennium Project report notedabove. After the Sea Island summit, the Jubilee USA Network and the 50 Years is Enough Network,leading advocates of debt relief, expressed their "outrage" that the G8 had not acted on 100% debtcancellation for the poorest countries. (44) Many have questioned the G8 commitment to peace andsecurity, criticizing as inadequate, for example, the response of the developed countries to theconflict and human rights crisis in Sudan's Darfur region. In May 2004, on the eve of the Sea Island summit, the New York-based Council on ForeignRelations issued a report that took something of a middle ground on G8 performance. The reportpointed out that the G8 donors had indeed launched or expanded initiatives in key priority areas ofthe Kananaskis Africa Action Plan. (45) With respect to strengthening institutions and governance, thereport noted that United States has undertaken an Africa Anti-Corruption Initiative to combat bothpublic and private corruption, while Canada is using part of its Fund for Africa to promotepublic-service reform and decentralization. The Council singled out the U.S. AGOA program as animportant effort by a G8 member to boost African trade and investment. Moreover, the report notedthat developed country aid to Africa is increasing. According to data released subsequently by theOrganization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) Official DevelopmentAssistance (ODA) to sub-Saharan Africa is indeed growing, reaching $23.7 billion in 2003, up from$18.4 billion in 2002 and $13.8 billion in 2001. U.S. assistance to the region would reach $3.9billion under the FY2006 budget request, not including indirect assistance channeled through theWorld Bank and U.N. agencies, or disaster assistance likely to be provided as emergencies arise. Aid in FY2002 was $2.5 billion. (46) The Council on Foreign Relations praised the HIPC initiative, and noted that peace andsecurity are being promoted through U.S., British, Canadian, and other efforts to supportpeacekeeping and train peacekeepers. In keeping with the Sea Island decisions, the BushAdministration's FY2006 budget request seeks funds to begin a new Global Peace OperationsInitiative to train foreign peacekeeping troops, with an emphasis on Africa. (47) At the same time, theCouncil's report cited several areas in which it said the G8 needed to do more, including increasedsupport for NEPAD, a review of proposals for ending agricultural subsidies and quotas, additionalassistance for health infrastructure, and further debt relief.

Summary: Prior to the July 2005 G8 summit, Britain's Prime Minister Tony Blair launched a majordiplomatic effort to marshal the resources he sees as needed to eradicate extreme poverty insub-Saharan Africa. As summit chair, he focused the meeting, held at Gleneagles Hotel in Scotland,July 6-8, on this initiative. Blair pushed for a substantial aid increase for Africa beginning in 2006,through an "International Finance Facility" (IFF), and for 100% forgiveness of poor country debt tothe international financial institutions. The IFF would have issued bonds to finance an additional $25billion in annual aid to Africa for three to five years, followed by another $25 billion boost if Africangovernments improved their managerial and administrative capabilities. IFF bonds would have beenbacked by a promise from the G7 leading economic powers to repay them after 2015. Poor countrydebts to the World Bank and the African Development Bank would have been repaid by the G7,while debts to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) would have been paid by revaluing or sellingIMF gold. Finally, Blair sought the removal of barriers to Africa's exports. Blair has long championed a "Marshall Plan" for Africa as part of a "deal" to help the regionachieve the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), U.N.-endorsed targets for 2015 that includeuniversal primary education and sharp cuts in poverty. In exchange, he expects further governanceand free-market economic reforms in Africa. On March 11, 2005 a high-level Commission forAfrica appointed by Blair issued a comprehensive report elaborating the initiative, which wonsupport from President Chirac of France and Germany's Chancellor Schroeder. The Bush Administration reacted cooly to the proposed IFF on grounds that it lacks a meansof assuring that new aid funds would be well spent. Officials also argued that the IFF wouldunconstitutionally bind future Congresses to appropriations. IFF supporters noted that the fundswould be passed through existing aid agencies with their own monitoring mechanisms. Some alsoargued that the United States routinely agrees to repay debt in the future. At Gleneagles, the IFFproposal was dropped, but the participants agreed on a $25 billion increase in annual aid to Africaby 2010. Moreover, the G8 ratified an agreement on debt forgiveness for 18 of the world's poorestcountries, including 14 in Africa. The donors are to compensate the World Bank and the AfricanDevelopment Bank for the lost repayments. The IMF will fund the loss from its own resources, butnot sell gold. Participants reiterated that they supported the removal of trade barriers, but no specificactions were taken. Many development experts welcomed the summit's results as an important stepforward; but several non-governmental organizations argued that the summit had done too little ontrade or to mobilize "new money." Previous G8 meetings have also focused on Africa. There has been much debate overwhether G8 countries have fulfilled past promises -- and over whether the African states have mettheir own promises of reforms. This report will not be updated. For further information see CRS Report RL32489(pdf) , Africa: Development Issues and Policy Options , and CRS Issue Brief IB95052, Africa: U.S. Foreign Assistance Issues .