More than most countries, Poland's relations today with the rest of the world are influencedby its past. At the end of the 18th century, it was partitioned among Russia, Prussia and Austria, andfor more than a century, Poland as a state did not exist. It was re-established after the First WorldWar with U.S. backing, only to be divided again between the Nazis and the Soviets in 1939, and thendominated by Moscow after 1945. (1) Poland has long been viewed as a crucible for change in Central and Eastern Europe and,ultimately, the Soviet Union. Historians are likely to attribute that in large part to the rise of tworemarkable men. In 1978, the Archbishop of Krakow, Cardinal Karol Wojtyla, was elected PopeJohn Paul II. The following year, he returned from Rome to visit his homeland and said mass beforemore than one million celebrants, urging Poles, "Do not be afraid." (2) John Paul served as aninspiration for Poles to confront their own government, and, by extension, the USSR. In 1980, afterthe government raised food prices, electrician Lech Walesa led his fellow shipyard workers inGdansk in a strike. The confrontation led to the formation of Solidarity, an independent trade union;over the ensuing decade, it evolved into a political party that was instrumental in ending communistrule. In 1983, Solidarity leader Walesa was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize. In 1989 and 1990,Solidarity candidates won Poland's first democratically-contested parliamentary and presidentialelections. In the 1990s, successive post-communist governments moved swiftly to consolidatedemocracy and establish a market economy. Their efforts were capped in 1999 by NATOmembership, and in 2004 by entry into the European Union (EU). Poland has conducted a proactiveforeign policy over the past 15 years. It has aggressively pursued its national interests, and has notbeen reluctant to assert itself with major powers -- for example, with Germany, its leading tradingpartner; with the European Union; and with the United States. Warsaw has cooperated with its neighboring states to the north and south in such regionalformations as the Baltic Cooperation Council and the VisegrÃ¡d group. But Poland's main foreignpolicy initiatives in Europe have been directed to the east and west. It has actively promoted thedevelopment of democracy in the two countries to its immediate east: Belarus and Ukraine. To itswest, Poland has had a somewhat contentious experience integrating into the EU. In terms of transatlantic relations, Poland is perhaps the most emblematic of the countriestied to both the United States and the EU; it does not wish to have to choose between the two, butoccasionally has had to take sides. This was particularly true of the Iraq conflict, in which Polandchose to support U.S. policy both diplomatically and militarily. However, several factors, includingthe March 11, 2004 Madrid terrorist bombings and revelations of prisoner abuse at Abu Ghraib,caused Polish public opinion to turn resolutely against continued involvement in Iraq. Thegovernment has responded with a phased withdrawal of its troops. In addition, many Poles believethat the United States has failed to show sufficient gratitude for Poland's support. Poland will be holding parliamentary elections in September 2005. Many observers believethat the current ruling party, the Democratic Left Alliance (SLD), is likely to suffer defeat at thehands of the center-right Civic Platform (PO) party. If that does transpire, most observers believethat Poland's foreign policy would not likely undergo abrupt and dramatic changes. Under the nextgovernment -- whichever party leads it -- Warsaw may become somewhat less reflexivelypro-American. Although the Poles may have lined up beside the United States on Iraq, they alsoknow that their future economic prosperity depends on continued cooperation and integration withthe EU. As noted above, part or all of Poland was under Russian domination throughout thenineteenth century and most of the 20th. For Poles, history is never far from the surface. In lookingeastward, Poland has therefore sought to encourage democratization of Belarus and Ukraine not onlyon principle, but also for the practical reason that doing so would improve Poland's security byestablishing a buffer zone between itself and Russia. Poland's policies toward its two immediateneighbors have been largely consistent with those of the United States -- somewhat confrontationaltoward the more repressive Belarus, but seeking engagement with Ukraine. Many have argued thathelping the two countries eventually acquire EU and NATO membership should be a foreign policypriority for Poland. Poland's involvement in Ukraine's fall 2004 political crisis was particularly noteworthy. President Kwasniewski joined with EU foreign policy chief Javier Solana and Lithuanian PresidentVladas Adamkus in helping negotiate a settlement over the disputed presidential vote. Poland's newstatus as a member of the EU is believed to have lent weight to its role in mediating the Ukrainepolitical crisis. Poland pushed within the Union to get Brussels more actively involved in helpingsolve the crisis in Kiev. Finally, Poland subsequently joined with several of its neighboringcountries in endorsing Ukraine's eventual EU membership. A U.S. commentator noted that "[t]heUkraine experience ... showed that the European Union has grown more hospitable to democraticevangelists: Polish President Alexander Kwasniewski ... provided Europe's backbone in Ukrainealong with ... Javier Solana." Some observers believe that, flush with its success in Ukraine, Polandmight now set its sights on encouraging reforms in Moldova. (3) Perhaps the most important factor in Poland's eastward perspective is its relationship toRussia. One Polish academic has asserted that his countrymen "fear Russia and exaggerate the threatit poses," and cautioned against allowing a "phobia" about Russia to hamper the effectiveness ofPoland's foreign policy. Noting that the United States is a main source of Poland's security, hepointed out that "for the US, Russia is not a threat but an important, though difficult, partner in thewar against Islamic terrorism." (4) He argued that, to more effectively promote democracy in Belarusand Ukraine, Poland must improve its relations with Moscow. In May 2004, Poland fulfilled a long-term foreign policy goal when it joined nine othercountries in becoming a member of the European Union (Poland achieved NATO membershipearlier, in 1999.) EU membership had been a contentious issue, particularly for Poles living in ruralareas who feared that they would be overwhelmed economically by more efficient, western Europeanagricultural producers. However, those fears have thus far been groundless, as Poland began toexperience economic gains -- agricultural subsidies and a surge in farm exports -- almostimmediately after it joined. Poland was not reluctant to assert itself before joining the EU and will likely be even lesshesitant to do so now that it is a member. On several issues, Poland staked out positions intendedto advance its interests and values; these stances have sometimes been opposed by major playerswithin the EU, such as France and Germany. For example, during the development of the EUconstitution, Poland, joined by several other mostly Roman Catholic countries, called for thepreamble to include language referring to Europe's Christian heritage; the measure was not adopted,but Pope John Paul II lauded Poland for its efforts. Warsaw also has argued strongly that Turkey isa democratic Islamic state, and deserves to be admitted into the EU. Poland has argued for its rightto maintain relatively low corporate taxes, a practice criticized by some other countries as an unfairsubsidy meant to attract foreign investment. Finally, Poland has supported the development of anEU military capability, but has stressed that this not be done at the cost of weakening NATO. Poland supported the United States in Iraq both politically and militarily. It was one of asmall number of countries to provide troops in the combat phase of the conflict, and then deployeda large (2,500-strong) contingent of peacekeeping troops. Poland took command of a multinationaldivision providing stability in the center of Iraq. But several factors -- chiefly the March 11, 2004terrorist attacks in Madrid and the revelations of prisoner abuses at Abu Ghraib -- contributed toincreased public pressure against continued military engagement in Iraq. In December 2004, thePolish government declared that it would be withdrawing about one-third of its forces after the Iraqielections; further announcements on a phased withdrawal followed. Given the many daunting challenges and political risks, some question why Poland joinedwith the United States in the Iraq conflict in the first place. Observers attribute Poland's participationto a variety of factors. Some stress that the Poles were at least in part motivated by a sense ofgratitude for past U.S. support, including U.S. assistance during the Cold War and the lead roleplayed by the United States in expanding NATO to include Poland, among other states. Poland mayalso have joined the Iraq effort because it subscribes to the Bush Administration's belief in the needto thwart tyranny and spread democracy. Poles cite their role as a mediator in Ukraine's politicalcrisis as another example of this conviction in action. According to former Polish Foreign MinisterCimoszewicz, Poland did not join the coalition because it believed that Saddam Hussein hadweapons of mass destruction, but rather because Poland believed it was in its own security intereststo support the United States and thereby maintain a strong transatlantic security linkage. (5) There were practical benefits of joining the Iraq operation. Polish defense officials speak ofthe invaluable experience and information that the Iraq operation has provided the military, chieflythrough having command of a large, international expeditionary force. Another benefit waspsychological: at the outset of the conflict, the Bush administration treated the Poles as importantpartners in the international scene. According to one analyst "Bush gave Poles and the Polishpolitical class the feeling that they belong to the countries that really matter in the world." (6) However, Poland has experienced difficulties both at home and abroad as a result of itsparticipation. Along with other factors, the Iraq deployment is listed as a reason for the SLDgovernment's sharp decline in popularity. In addition, some analysts believe that Poland'spartnership with the United States may have contributed to strained relations with other EU states-- particularly France and Germany, which opposed the Iraq invasion; in May 2003, a Germannewspaper referred to Poland as America's "Trojan donkey." Some Poles have faulted thepartnership for being unconditional; a former Polish Defense Minister has argued, for example, thatthe SLD government erred in not bargaining with the Americans for military assistance beforecommitting troops to Iraq. (7) Some Poles also maintain that their country has begun to see itself as paying for U.S.mistakes in Iraq, and that this might have an impact on bilateral relations. In the past year, in fact,the Poles have become less reluctant to criticize the United States openly. For example, in aSeptember 2004 interview, President Kwasniewski urged the United States to be "flexible, open, andgracious." In a later press appearance, he recalled that "from the beginning I warned President Bushagainst a policy of American dominance in Iraq and in the whole world." And more pointedly,former President and Solidarity leader Lech Walesa remarked that "America failed its exam as asuperpower. ... [it is] a military and economic superpower but not morally or politically anymore. This is a tragedy for us." (8) Poles also have begun to ask themselves what they have received in return for their loyaltyto the United States; in particular, Poles had hoped for help in three areas: military assistance, Iraqreconstruction contracts, and U.S. visa policy. In recent months, some Iraq reconstruction businesshas begun to flow toward Polish firms, and President Bush pledged to seek $100 million in militaryassistance for Poland. It is the visa waiver issue, however, that seems to resonate the most amongPoles, perhaps because it could be "fixed" without financial cost to the United States. Warsaw hashoped to join 27 other countries which have been granted a waiver of the U.S. governmentrequirement to obtain a visa for short-term travel to the United States. According to one report,"[t]he political class were outraged at the US decision to treat Poland differently from the EU-15 byimposing visa regulations on Polish nationals, as part of a general tightening of immigration controlsin the wake of [9/11.]" In a radio interview that touched upon this issue, Lech Walesa maintainedthat Americans "are making fun of us." (9) U.S. analysts, however, argue that there are some factors militatingagainst waiving visas for Poles. First of all, Poland's continued high unemployment rate (close to20% in April) might act as an incentive for Poles to seek work outside of the country and overstaytheir visas. Secondly, if the United States were to make an exception for Poland, even though it doesnot meet the objective requirements, many other countries would also seek to make their case forbeing exempted. One observer has pointed out that, given continuing concerns over the threat ofterrorism, there is not much sentiment in Congress to make it easier for people to enter the UnitedStates. Finally, Poland is said to be lobbying to be a future location for a U.S. military base amidU.S. consideration of a global re-basing scheme. Poles claim that such a move would represent goodpayback for their participation in Iraq; U.S. military bases would benefit local economies, as wellas Poland's desire for American investment. Lastly, having the U.S. military present on its soil, theyargue, would increase Poland's sense of security. More than many countries, Poland has a habit of asserting its independence; one unwaveringconstant in Poland's foreign policy has been its efforts to protect its perceived national interests ina region that more than once has devoured it as a state. Poland has been a close ally of the UnitedStates; as a new member of the EU, it is now attempting to balance its transatlantic interests. Because it views the United States as the main guarantor of its security, Poland will likelycontinue to support the United States within NATO. Poland wants to modernize its armed forces,ensure alliance interoperability, and improve its own defense capabilities. However, the Poles pointout that their resources have been severely strained by the Iraq mission, forcing them to sideline theirplans to update their military. Poles were more supportive than most Europeans of the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq and thesubsequent military occupation. Nevertheless, some observers maintain that participation in the Iraqoperation was the most controversial foreign policy decision made by a Polish government since thefall of Communism. Many Poles agreed with the government's decision to deploy troops with thecoalition, and were proud that Poland was given a command role; some asserted that Iraqdemonstrated that Poland's security interests are now global, no longer just regional. Several factors eventually increased Polish public opposition to the war, and Poland hasbecome less reluctant to criticize the United States openly, in part, some argue, because it has begunto see itself as paying for U.S. mistakes. (10) Some Poles assert that, in siding with the Americans, they erredby putting all their security eggs in one basket, damaging their relations with other allies. Theysuggest that Poland repair its intra-EU relations; and believe that, given its size and growinginfluence, Poland might eventually become a leading force within a larger, stronger EU. Many of Poland's actions within the EU have been consistent with policies preferred by theUnited States: Poland and the Bush administration both support the notion of taxing consumption,rather than investment. On EU security policy, Poland stresses the importance of maintaining thetransatlantic link. Like Washington, Warsaw supports the accession of Turkey. Poland'ssponsorship of a reference to Europe's Christian heritage in the EU constitution shows that Poles arenot reluctant to mix religion with governance, compared to many other European societies. Poland has demonstrated that it can be an independent actor within Europe, often takingpositions in line with U.S. policy or interests. For example, the decision to buy Lockheed MartinF-16s rather than European-built fighter aircraft, regardless of technical rationale, might have hadpolitical repercussions -- Poland was still queued up to join the EU at the time. Polish officials stressthat their government did not expect a quid pro quo for its decisions to join the Iraq coalition andto purchase U.S. fighters. Nevertheless, there is a sense that the U.S. inaction on several issues ofintense interest to Poles indicates an absence of gratitude; it resulted in a "disappointment thatsupport for [the] USA didn't bring Poland measurable benefits." (11) Poland's foreign policy outside the EU has also generally been in harmony with U.S.international goals. For example, Poland was instrumental in advancing the practice of democracyin Ukraine; Warsaw played a lead role in resolving the fall 2004 election crisis. President Bushstated that President Kwasniewski had "showed remarkable leadership and the people of the Ukraineare better for it and the world appreciates it and I appreciate it." (12) During the current decade,Polish leaders have at times spoken of acting as a bridge between Russia and the West. Throughmaintaining active ties with Russia, Poland also hopes to discourage non-democratic tendencies. In answer to the question of where Poland sees its future and interests, some observers seea division: the United States may be important to its security, but Poland has a natural affinitytoward fellow EU countries in cultural and economic matters. Many believe it is inevitable thatPoland will draw closer to Europe. (13) But what kind of EU member it will eventually become -- fromthe U.S. standpoint -- remains to be seen. Some believe that Poland as an EU member will likelywind up being more like the United Kingdom, a staunch U.S. ally, than like Belgium, which has attimes taken positions contrary to U.S. policy. Some have speculated that Poland, given its size, will be looked to as leader of the Centraland Eastern European region. However, officials from neighboring countries say that, although theymay respect and admire Poland, they hope that it does not come to regard itself as the chiefspokesperson for Central Europe. Some observers believe that Polish politics is undergoing a transition period, featuring thefading of the old Solidarity generation. They assert that, although Poland has traditionally had closerties to the United States than many other European countries have, members of the new generationentering politics are perhaps not so firmly rooted in the transatlantic relationship. Analysts thereforecaution that U.S. policymakers should not take Polish friendship for granted. In addition, for the pastten years the United States has had a close friend in Poland in Aleksander Kwasniewski, but his timeas president is coming to an end. In one view, [i]t is unlikely that any Polish leader in the next fewyears ... will be as strongly pro-US as Mr. Kwasniewski. ... It is important not to exaggerate theextent to which Poland will move away from the US in the next few years, but Warsaw will be lesswilling to set itself at odds with Berlin and Paris in order to accommodate Washington -- especiallyas it believes its loyalty has been poorly rewarded. (14) Poland's fall 2005 parliamentary elections, according to many observers, may well result ina center-right coalition. The parties that would likely form the new government might not qualifyas "Euroskeptics," but some of their members have admitted to feelings of ambivalence about theEU. (15) Some analystsalso argue that communist successor parties, such as the SLD, and politicians, such as Kwasniewski,may have been overly cooperative toward the United States and Western Europe in an effort tocompensate for their past allegiances. Polish foreign policy since 1989 does not appear to have beensignificantly affected by whichever party is in power, but analysts suggest that a non-socialist-ledgovernment at this point could be expected to push Poland's national interests more aggressively inits bilateral relations with the United States.

Summary: More than most countries, Poland's relations today with the rest of the world are influencedby its past. The victim of historical forces and powerful neighbors, Poland was partitioned in the 18thcentury, and once again in the 20th. This loss of sovereignty may partly explain its assertive foreignpolicy. Poland has carved out a unique, sometimes maverick role for itself in Europe. A NATOmember since 1999, and an EU member since 2004, Poland has forcefully pursued its nationalinterests and has not been reluctant to assert itself with major powers -- for example, with Germany,its leading trading partner; with the European Union; and with the United States. Poland has been a staunch U.S. ally, not only in the global war on terrorism, but also in theU.S.-led campaign in Iraq. However, several factors -- including the revelations of prisoner abuseat Abu Ghraib prison and the March 2004 Madrid bombings -- have caused Poland to weigh thecosts and benefits of its participation in Iraq and reassess its partnership with the United States. Many Poles are also disappointed that their cooperation in the Iraq mission has yet to yield tangiblebenefits. In particular, the Poles had hoped for help in three areas: military assistance, Iraqreconstruction contracts, and U.S. visa policy. Poland has been an active member of the European Union (EU), and has not always sidedwith the majority; many of its positions within the EU -- and toward its eastern neighbors -- havebeen in accord with U.S. policy preferences that have at times been at odds with EU members. However, some analysts believe that, for economic and social reasons, Poland likely will draw closerto its fellow EU countries over the long term, and may eventually play a leadership role on thecontinent. This report analyzes Polish foreign policy motivations and trends, and implications forU.S.-Polish relations and U.S. interests in Europe. It will be updated after the 2005 Polish elections. For additional information, see CRS Report RL32966 , Poland: Background and Current Issues, by[author name scrubbed].