From November 30-December 2, 2004, the Cuban government released six politicalprisoners, including Raul Rivero and Oscar Espinosa Chepe, and reports indicate that up to 18additional dissidents have been transferred to the main prison hospital in Havana, often a sign thata prisoner will be freed. Many observers maintain that the releases are aimed at improving Cuba'srelations with Europe. (See Human Rights below.) On November 20, 2004, both the House and the Senate agreed to the conference report( H.Rept. 108-792 ) to the FY2005 omnibus appropriations bill ( H.R. 4818 ), whichincluded nine regular appropriations bills. The measure dropped provisions easing Cuba sanctionsthat had been included in the Agriculture, Commerce, Justice, and State, and Transportation/Treasuryappropriations bills. The measure also fully funded the Administration's requests for $27.6 millionfor Cuba broadcasting (Radio and TV Marti) and $9 million in Economic Support Funds for Cubaprojects to promote democratization, respect for human rights, and the development of a free marketeconomy. On November 12, 2004, the Treasury Department's Office of Foreign Assets Controlinstructed U.S. banks to stop transfers of funds to U.S. companies for sales of agricultural andmedical products to Cuba. The temporary move was taken so that OFAC could examine whetherthere were any violations of the provisions of the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export EnhancementAct of 2000 ( P.L. 106-387 , Title IX) requiring that the sales be conducted in "payment of cash inadvance." Some observers fear that the action could jeopardize U.S. agricultural sales to Cuba, whichin the first nine months of 2004, amounted to some $320 million. (See Food and Medical Exports below.) On October 25, 2004, Fidel Castro announced that U.S. dollars no longer would be used inentities that currently accept dollars (such as stores, restaurants, and hotels). As of November 14,Cubans need to exchange their dollars for "convertible pesos," with a 10% surcharge for theexchange. (See Economic Conditions below.) On September 23, 2004, the Senate approved the FY2005 Foreign Operations bill, H.R. 4818 , amended, by voice vote with a provision (Section 5091) providing $5million to establish cooperation with appropriate agencies of the Cuban government oncounter-narcotics matters. The Senate Appropriations Committee had reported its version of the bill, S. 2812 ( S.Rept. 108-346 ), on September 15, 2004, with the same provision. (See DrugInterdiction Cooperation below.) On September 22, 2004, the House approved H.R. 5025 , the FY2005Transportation/Treasury appropriations bill, with three Cuba provisions that would ease sanctionson family travel (Section 647), travel for educational activities (Section 648), and on privatecommercial sales of agricultural and medical products (Section 649). The Administration hasthreatened a presidential veto if the final measure weakens Cuba sanctions. (See sections below on Food and Medical Exports and Travel and Private Humanitarian Assistance Restrictions .) On September 18, 2004, the New York Times reported that the Bush Administration, usingmore stringent intelligence standards, has "concluded that it is no longer clear that Cuba has anactive, offensive bio-weapons program." (See Cuba and Biological Weapons? below.) On September 15, 2004, the Senate Appropriations Committee reported its version of theFY2005 Transportation and Treasury appropriations measure, S. 2806 ( S.Rept.108-342 ), with a provision (Sec. 222) that would prohibit funds from administering or enforcingrestrictions on travel or travel-related transactions. The Administration has threatened a presidentialveto if the final measure weakens Cuba sanctions. (See Travel and Private Humanitarian AssistanceRestrictions below.) On September 14, 2004, the Senate Appropriations Committee reported its version of theFY2005 Agriculture Appropriation bill, S. 2803 ( S.Rept. 108-340 ), with a provision(Section 776) directing the Secretary of the Treasury to promulgate regulations allowing for travelto Cuba under a "general license" when it is related to the commercial sale of agricultural andmedical products. The Administration has threatened to veto the measure if it contained provisionsweakening Cuba sanctions. (See Food and Medical Exports below.) On August 13, 2004, the U.S. Interests Section in Havana announced that it would provide$50,000 in U.S. funds to help Cuba in the aftermath of Hurricane Charley. The Cuban governmentrejected the assistance, calling it "hypercritical" and the amount "humiliating." On July 22, 2004, the Cuban government released political prisoner Marta Beatriz Roque forhealth reasons. Roque had received a 20-year sentence in April 2003 and also had been imprisonedfrom July 1997 until May 2000. Since April 2004, the Cuban government has released 11 politicalprisoners for health reasons, including 7 of the 75 dissidents imprisoned in March 2003. (See HumanRights below.) On July 16, 2004, President Bush suspended for another six months the right of individualsto file lawsuits against those persons benefitting from confiscated U.S. property in Cuba under TitleIII of the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act ( P.L. 104-114 ). (See Helms/BurtonLegislation below.) On July 15, 2004, the House approved the FY2005 Foreign Operations Appropriations bill, H.R. 4818 , that would prohibit counternarcotics assistance for Cuba. The report to thebill ( H.Rept. 108-599 ) also expressed the House Appropriations Committee's full support for theAdministration's $9 million request for projects to promote democratization, respect for humanrights, and the development of a free market economy in Cuba. (See Drug Interdiction Cooperation and U.S. Funding to Support Democracy and Human Rights below.) On July 8, 2004, the U.S. Coast Guard published regulations requiring U.S. vessels less than100 meters to have a Coast Guard permit to enter Cuban territorial waters. ( Federal Register , pp.41367-41374) On July 7, 2004, the House approved, by vote of 221-194, a Flake amendment( H.Amdt. 647 ) to the FY2005 Commerce, Justice, and State appropriations bill, H.R. 4754 , that would prohibit funds to implement the Department of Commerce's newrestrictions on gift parcels to Cuba and the amount of personal baggage allowed for travelers toCuba. The House subsequently approved the bill on July 8, 2004. On June 25, 2004, the Treasury Department's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC)delayed the implementation of tightened travel restrictions for family visits and fully-hosted traveluntil August 1, 2004, for those travelers already in Cuba on June 29, 2004. The action was taken togive those already in Cuba time to return to the United States. On June 22, 2004, the Department of Commerce's Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS)published regulations related to the recommendations of the Commission for Assistance to a FreeCuba ( Federal Register , pp. 34565-34567). The new regulations placed new limits on gift parcelsand personal baggage going to Cuba. Items such as seeds, clothing, personal hygiene items,veterinary medicines and supplies, fishing equipment and supplies, and soap-making equipment mayno longer be included in gift parcels. On June 16, 2004, OFAC published interim regulations implementing the President'sdirectives related to the recommendations of the Commission for Assistance to a Free Cuba ( FederalRegister , pp. 33768-33774). This included tightening travel restrictions in several ways, such asfurther restricting educational travel and family visits (and the amount that family visitors may spendwhile in Cuba) and eliminating the category of fully-hosted travel. The new regulations also furtherrestricted the sending of remittances to Cuba by limiting the remittances to the remitter's immediatefamily. Although most of the tightened restrictions were to go into effect on June 30, 2004,implementation of the regulations for family visits and fully hosted travel have been delayed untilAugust 1 for those travelers already in Cuba on June 29 (see June 25 entry above). Educationalactivities already planned may proceed as long as they are completed by August 15, 2004. OFACnoted that it welcomes interested parties to comment on the regulations no later than August 16,2004, and that it will consider such comments in the development of final regulations. On May 6, 2004, President Bush endorsed the recommendations of the inter-agencyCommission for Assistance to a Free Cuba that had been established by the President in October2003. The recommendations included a number of measures to tighten economic sanctions, suchas further restricting family visits, cash remittances, and gift parcels. (The full Commission reportis available at http://www.state.gov/p/wha/rt/cuba/commission/2004/ . Also see "Commission forAssistance to a Free Cuba," below.) On April 15, 2004, by a vote of 22-21, with 10 abstentions, the U.N. Commission on HumanRights (UNCHR) approved a resolution that deplored Cuba's 2003 human rights crackdown andagain urged Cuba to cooperate with the personal representative of the U.N. High Commission forHuman Rights. (See UNCHR Resolutions below.) On April 8, 2004, the Senate approved S.Res. 328 , amended, by unanimousconsent. It calls on Cuba to immediately release individuals imprisoned for political purposes. Italso calls upon the 60th session of the UNCHR to condemn Cuba for its human rights abuses and todemand that inspectors from the International Committee of the Red Cross be allowed to visit andinspect Cuban prisons. On March 30, 2004, Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International SecurityJohn Bolton testified before the House International Relations Committee that "Cuba remains aterrorist and BW [biological weapons] threat to the United States." Bolton cautioned, however, that"existing intelligence reporting is problematic, and the Intelligence Community's ability to determinethe scope, nature, and effectiveness of any Cuban BW program has been hampered by reporting fromsources of questionable access, reliability, and motivation." (See Cuba and Biological Weapons? below.) On February 26, 2004, President Bush ordered the Department of Homeland Security toexpand its policing of the waters between Florida and Cuba with the objective of stopping pleasureboating traffic. On January 21, 2004, the State Department again condemned Cuba's imprisonment ofjournalists, librarians, and human rights defenders. It criticized the poor conditions and lack ofadequate medical treatment for Oscar Espinosa Chepe and Marta Beatriz Roque and the poor healthof Leonardo Bruzon Avila due to repeated hunger strikes. (See Health and Conditions of PoliticalPrisoners below.) On January 16, 2004, President Bush suspended for another six months the right ofindividuals to file lawsuits against those persons benefitting from confiscated U.S. property in Cubaunder Title III of the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act ( P.L. 104-114 ). (See Helms/Burton Legislation below.) The State Department cancelled the semiannual round of U.S.-Cuba migration talksscheduled for January 8, 2004, because Cuba reportedly has refused to discuss several issues. Cubanofficials maintained that the U.S. decision was irresponsible and that it was prepared to discuss allof the issues raised by the United States. (See Migration Issues below). Although Cuba has undertaken some limited economic reforms in recent years, politicallythe country remains a hard-line communist state. Fidel Castro, who turned 78 on August 13, 2004,has ruled since the 1959 Cuban Revolution, which ousted the corrupt government of FulgencioBatista from power. Castro soon laid the foundations for an authoritarian regime by consolidatingpower and forcing moderates out of the government. In April 1961, Castro admitted that the CubanRevolution was socialist, and in December 1961, he proclaimed himself to be a Marxist-Leninist. From 1959 until 1976, Castro ruled by decree. A Constitution was enacted in 1976 setting forth the Communist Party as the leading forcein the state and in society (with power centered in a Politburo headed by Fidel Castro). TheConstitution also outlined national, provincial, and local governmental structures. Executive poweris vested in a Council of Ministers, headed by Fidel Castro as President. Legislative authority isvested in a National Assembly of People's Power, currently with 609 members, that meets twiceannually for brief periods. While Assembly members were directly elected for the first time inFebruary 1993, only a single slate of candidates was offered. In October 1997, the CubanCommunist Party held its 5th Congress (the prior one was held in 1991) in which the party reaffirmedits commitment to a single party state and reelected Fidel and Raul Castro as the party's first andsecond secretaries. Direct elections for the National Assembly were again held in January 1998 andJanuary 2003, but voters again were not offered a choice of candidates. In response to the challenge posed by the Varela Project, a human rights initiative that calledfor changes to the Constitution (see below), the Cuban government orchestrated a nationalreferendum in late June 2002, signed by 8.1 million people, that declared that Cuba's socialist systemcould not be changed. Subsequently the National Assembly on June 26, 2002, approved amendmentsto the Constitution stating that "socialism and the revolutionary political and social system in theConstitution.....are irrevocable; and Cuba will never again return to capitalism." (1) Observers are divided over the future of the Castro government. Although most believe thatthe demise of the Communist government is inevitable, there is considerable disagreement overwhen or how this may occur. Some point to Castro's age and predict that the regime will collapsewhen Castro is not at the helm. Other observers maintain that Fidel Castro may remain in power foryears, and that Cuba has a plan for the succession of his brother Raul. They point to Cuba's strongsecurity apparatus and the extraordinary system of controls that prevents dissidents from gainingpopular support. Moreover, observers maintain that Cuba's elite has no interest in Castro'soverthrow, and that Castro still enjoys some support, in part because of the social benefits of theCuban revolution, but also because Cubans see no alternative to Castro. Even if Castro is overthrown or resigns, the important question remaining is the possibilityor viability of a stable democratic Cuba after Castro. Analysts point out that the Castro governmenthas successfully impeded the development of independent civil society, with no private sector, noindependent labor movement, and no unified political opposition. For this reason, they contend thatbuilding a democratic Cuba will be a formidable task, one that could meet stiff resistance. Cuba has a poor record on human rights, with the government sharply restricting basic rights,including freedom of expression, association, assembly, movement, and other basic rights. It hascracked down on dissent, arrested human rights activists and independent journalists, and stageddemonstrations against critics. Although some anticipated a relaxation of the government'soppressive tactics in the aftermath of the Pope's January 1998 visit, government attacks againsthuman rights activists and other dissidents have continued since that time. In March 2003, the government began a massive crackdown that resulted in the imprisonmentof 75 independent journalists and democracy activists, many receiving long prison terms. On April11, 2003, the government executed three men who had hijacked a ferry in an attempt to reach theUnited States. The executions, conducted after a swift and secret trial, were condemned around theworld. (See Crackdown in 2003 below). The Cuban government has released a number of prisoners in 2004; as of December 2, thisincludes 13 of the 75 arrested in March 2003. At the same time, however, it has continued itsharassment of democracy and human rights activists, including the imprisonment of severaldissidents during the year. Human rights groups in Cuba estimate that there are between 300-400political prisoners. In late November 2004, the Cuban government began releasing a number ofpolitical prisoners. Many observers maintain that the releases are aimed at improving Cuba'srelations with Europe. The government released three prisoners on November 29 -- Oscar EspinosaChepe, Margarito Broche, and Marcelo Lopez; two prisoners on November 30 -- noted poet andjournalist, Raul Rivero, and Oswaldo Alfonso Valdes; and another prisoner on December 2 -- EdelJosÃ© Garcia. Press reports have indicated that up to 18 additional dissidents have been transferredto the main prison hospital in Havana. Such transfers have often been a prelude to prisoners beingreleased. The State Department's human rights report on Cuba states that the Cuban "authoritiesroutinely continued to harass, threaten, arbitrarily arrest, detain, imprison, and defame human rightsadvocates and members of independent professional associations, including journalists, economists,doctors, and lawyers, often with the goal of coercing them into leaving the country." The reportasserts that "the Interior Ministry Department of State Security investigated and actively suppressedpolitical opposition and dissent" and "maintained a pervasive system of surveillance throughundercover agents, informers, rapid response brigades (RRBs), and neighborhood-based Committeesfor the Defense of the Revolution (CDRs)." Security forces and prison officials reportedly beat andabused prisoners and other detainees, and prison conditions remained harsh and life threatening. TheState Department and international human rights groups have expressed special concern about thehealth of the political prisoners. The Cuban government has reportedly restricted medical care tosome prisoners as a method of control. The following reports provide information on the human rights situation in Cuba: The State Department's 2003 human rights report on Cuba, issued February 25,2004, is available on the State Department's website at http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2003/27893.htm . Amnesty International issued a March 2004 report on the status of the 75dissidents imprisoned in March 2003. "Cuba, One Year Too Many: Prisoners of Conscience fromthe March 2003 Crackdown," available at http://web.amnesty.org/library/Index/ENGAMR250052004?open&of=ENG-CUB . Amnesty International issued a detailed report in June 2003, which termed thecrackdown the most severe since the years following the Cuban revolution. "Cuba: "EssentialMeasures"? Human Rights Crackdown in the Name of Security," June 3, 2003; available at http://web.amnesty.org/library/Index/ENGAMR250172003 ). Florida State University's Center for the Advancement of Human Rights beganpublishing information on the dissidents on the Internet, including the Cuban government'ssentencing documents. (See the website at http://www.ruleoflawandcuba.fsu.edu/ .) Human Rights Watch regularly publishes information on the human rightssituation in Cuba. (See the website at http://www.hrw.org/doc?t=americas&c=cuba .) Crackdown in 2003. As noted above, the humanrights situation in Cuba deteriorated significantly in 2003. Human rights activist Elizardo Sanchez,head of the Cuban Commission for Human Rights and National Reconciliation, has called thecrackdown "the most intense wave of repression in the history of Cuba." (2) In the first two months of 2003, dozens of supporters of Oswaldo Paya's Varela Project were"harassed, jailed, threatened, and expelled from jobs and universities" (3) (see discussion of the "VarelaProject" below). On February 18, 2003, two members of the Oswaldo Paya's Christian LiberationMovement, Jesus Mustafa Felipe and Robert Montero, were sentenced to 18 months in prison oncharges of contempt and resisting arrest. On March 18, 2003, a day after the opening of the 2003 session of the U.N. Commission onHuman Rights in Geneva, the Cuban government began a massive crackdown on independentjournalists and librarians, leaders of independent labor unions and opposition parties, and otherdemocracy activists, including those supporting the Varela Project. Some 75 activists were arrested,subjected to summary trials and prosecutions that began on April 3, 2003, and sentenced to prisonterms ranging from 6 to 28 years. Foreign journalists and diplomats were excluded from the trials. Among the activists were 27 independent journalists, including Raul Rivero and Oscar EspinosaChepe, sentenced to 20 years, and Omar RodrÃ­guez Saludes, sentenced to 27 years. Other sentenceddemocracy activists included economist Marta Beatriz Roque (who had been imprisoned from July1997 until May 2000), who received 20 years, Hector Palacios, a leader of the Varela Project, whoreceived 25 years, and Luis Enrique Ferrer GarcÃ­a of the Christian Liberation Movement, whoreceived 28 years. Another prominent political prisoner, Oscar ElÃ­as Biscet, (who had been arrestedin December 2002 after three years in prison) was also tried in April 2003 and sentenced to 25 yearsin prison. In a further deterioration of Cuba's human rights situation, on April 11, 2003, the Cubangovernment executed three men who had hijacked a ferry in Havana on April 2 in an attempt to reachthe United States. The men were executed by firing squads after summary trials that were heldbehind close doors; four other ferry hijackers received life sentence while another received 30 yearsin prison. The ferry hijacking was preceded by the hijacking of two small planes to the UnitedStates. International human rights groups, such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch,and a number of foreign countries, including Mexico, the European Union, the Vatican, and the15-nation Caribbean Community, condemned the crackdown and the executions. Because of thehuman rights crackdown, the EU postponed consideration of Cuba's application for inclusion in theCotonou Agreement, which provides preferential trade terms and development assistance to formerEuropean colonies; as a result, Cuba withdrew its application for the agreement because it did notwant to be forced to comply with "unacceptable conditions." (4) Both U.N. and OAS Special Rapporteurs on Freedom of Expression expressed grave concernon the sentencing of the dissidents. (5) On May 19, 2003, almost half of OAS members approved astatement expressing "their deep concern about the sharp deterioration of the human rights situationin Cuba in March and April 2003." Other OAS members, however, felt that the OAS was not thebody to discuss the issue since Cuba has been excluded from participating since 1962. (Also see UNHCR Resolutions below.) The United States -- both the Administration and Congress (see "Legislative Initiatives"below) -- strongly condemned the Cuban government's actions. In response to the summary trialsof the dissidents, the State Department issued a statement characterizing the actions as "the mostdespicable act of political repression in the Americas in a decade" and called "on the internationalcommunity ... in condemning this repression and in demanding the release of these Cuban prisonersof conscience." (6) Rationale for the 2003 Crackdown. Analysts see avariety of potential reasons for Cuba's severe crackdown on democracy activists. The Cubangovernment asserts that the crackdown was justified because the defendants were supported by theU.S. government and that U.S. diplomats in Cuba, most notably the head of the U.S. InterestsSection in Havana, James Cason, often met with the dissidents. Some analysts believe that thecrackdown was a clear message by the Cuban government that it will not tolerate the U.S.government's active and open support for the opposition movement. Other analysts emphasize thatthe crackdown was an effort by Castro to strengthen the regime's political control in light of afaltering economy and dim economic prospects ahead. According to this view, an increasinglyassertive opposition movement could become a national security threat to the Castro regime in thetough economic times ahead. Along these lines, some analysts see the crackdown as a way for theregime to clear away any potential opposition in order to ensure that the eventual succession of RaulCastro to power will be smooth. Some observers maintain that the Cuban government's willingness to jeopardize thepossibility of easing U.S. trade and travel restrictions as an indication that it currently views thedissident movement as a serious security threat. Others, however, believe that the Cubangovernment judged that there would not be any movement to ease the embargo under the BushAdministration and felt that it had little to lose in cracking down on the opposition movement. Finally, a view often heard when Castro takes harsh action that jeopardizes an improvementin relations with the United States is that Castro actually is opposed to any further opening to theUnited States because it could threaten his regime's control. According to this view, the crackdownagainst the opposition puts the skids on any potential easing of U.S. policy. Varela Project. A human rights initiative withinCuba that has received attention since 2002 is the Varela Project (named for the 19th century priest,Felix Varela, who advocated independence from Spain and the abolition of slavery) in whichthousands of signatures have been collected supporting a national plebiscite. The referendum wouldcall for respect for human rights, an amnesty for political prisoners, private enterprise, and changesto the country's electoral law that would result in free and fair elections. The initiative is organizedby Oswaldo Paya, who heads the Christian Liberation Movement, and it is supported by othernotable Cuban human rights activists. On May 10, 2002, organizers of the Varela Project submitted 11,020 signatures to theNational Assembly calling for a national referendum This was more than the 10,000 required underArticle 88 of the Cuban Constitution. Former President Jimmy Carter noted the significance of theVarela Project in his May 14, 2002 address in Havana that was broadcast in Cuba. Carter noted that"when Cubans exercise this freedom to change laws peacefully by a direct vote, the world will seethat Cubans, and not foreigners, will decide the future of this country." (7) In response to the Varela Project, the Cuban government orchestrated its own referendum inlate June 2002 that ultimately led to the National Assembly amending the Constitution to declareCuba's socialist system irrevocable. The Varela Project has persevered despite the March 2003 human rights crackdown, whichincluded the arrests of 42 active supporters of the human rights initiative. On October 3, 2003,Oswaldo Paya delivered more than 14,000 signatures to Cuba's National Assembly, again requestinga referendum on democratic reforms. Trafficking in Persons. In September 2003,President Bush, pursuant to the Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000 ( P.L. 106-386 , DivisionA), determined that Cuba did not comply with minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking in persons or make significant efforts to bring itself into compliance. While the determinationtriggers sanctions on U.S. aid and other support, Cuba already is subject to comprehensive U.S.economic sanctions and an embargo on trade and financial transactions. According to the StateDepartment's June 2004 Trafficking in Persons Report (available at http://www.state.gov/g/tip/rls/tiprpt/2004/ ), "Cuba is a country of internal trafficking for sexualexploitation and forced labor. Child sexual victims are generally teenage girls aged 14 to 17 whoare abused in prostitution. The Cuban government does not condone underage prostitution but doesnot publicly address the problem, which largely takes place in the context of tourism that earns hardcurrency for the state." Cuban officials categorized the allegations as absurd and an insult to thecountry's national dignity. In mid-July 2004, President Bush alleged that Castro "welcomes sex tourism" because it is"a vital source of hard currency to keep his corrupt government afloat." (8) Castro vigorously denied thecharges. While prostitution increased in the early 1990s amid Cuba's rapid economic decline, thegovernment began cracking down on prostitution around 1996, and it reportedly is less visible. (9) UNCHR Resolutions. From 1991 until 1997, theU.N. Commission on Human Rights (UNCHR) called on the Cuban government to cooperate witha Special Representative (later upgraded to Special Rapporteur) designated by the Secretary Generalto investigate the human rights situation in Cuba. But Cuba refused to cooperate with the SpecialRapporteur, and the UNCHR annually approved resolutions condemning Cuba's human rightsrecord. In 1998, however, the UNCHR rejected -- by a vote of 16 to 19, with 18 abstentions -- theannual resolution sponsored by the United States that would have condemned Cuba's rights recordand would have extended the work of the Special Rapporteur for another year. U.S. officials andhuman rights activists expressed deep disappointment with the vote. Observers maintained that thevote did not signify any improvement in human rights in Cuba, but rather was an expression ofdisagreement with the United States over its policy toward Cuba. From 1999-2004, the UNCHR again approved annual resolutions criticizing Cuba for itshuman rights record: In 1999, the UNCHR resolution was approved by a vote of 21-20, with 12abstentions. In 2000, the resolution, sponsored by the Czech Republic and Poland, wasapproved by a vote of 21-18, with 14 abstentions. On April 18, 2001, the resolution, sponsored by the Czech Republic andco-sponsored by 16 other nations, including the United States, was approved by a vote of 22-20, with10 abstentions. A U.S. Congressional delegation traveled to Geneva to encourage adoption of theresolution. Mexico abstained but, in a shift under the new Fox administration, publicly stated itsconcern about human rights in Cuba. On April 19, 2002, the UNCHR approved a resolution, by a vote of 23 to 21,with 9 abstentions, calling on Cuba to improve its human rights record "in accordance with theUniversal Declaration of Human Rights and the principles and standards of the rule of law" andcalling for the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights to send a personal representative to Cuba. Uruguay sponsored the resolution, which was supported by six other Latin American nations:Argentina, Chile, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Mexico, and Peru. Brazil and Ecuador abstained, whileVenezuela was the only Latin American country besides Cuba to vote against the resolution. Compared to previous years, the 2002 resolution was milder in that it recognized Cuba's efforts tofulfill the "social rights" of its people "despite an adverse international environment," while at thesame time calling on Cuba "to achieve similar progress in respect of human, civil, and politicalrights." During its 2003 meeting, the UNCHR approved a resolution on April 17, 2003,by a vote of 24-20, with 9 abstentions, sponsored by Costa Rica, Nicaragua, Peru, and Uruguayurging Cuba to receive the personal representative of the U.N. High Commissioner for HumanRights. Cuba has said that it would not accept the visit of the UNCHR representative. Efforts tosecure a more strongly worded resolution expressing "deep concern" about the March 2003crackdown failed, with 31 nations voting against the amendment. On April 15, 2004, by a vote of 22-21, with 10 abstentions, the UNCHRapproved a resolution sponsored by Honduras that deplored the crackdown in 2003 and again urgedCuba to cooperate with the personal representative of the U.N. High Commission for Human Rights. The resolution was co-sponsored by El Salvador, Nicaragua, Peru, Australia, and the CzechRepublic. Legislative Initiatives. Over the years, Congresshas gone on record on numerous occasions condemning the human rights situation in Cuba. In the first session of the108th Congress, both houses approved resolutions condemning theCuban government in the aftermath of the March 2003 crackdown on independent journalists andother democratic activists. The Senate approved S.Res. 97 (Nelson) on April 7, 2003,which condemned the recent arrests and other intimidation tactics against democracy activists andcalled on the Cuban government to immediately release those imprisoned during the crackdown. The House approved H.Res. 179 (Diaz-Balart, Lincoln) on April 8, which condemnedthe crackdown, called for the release of all political prisoners, and called for the United States towork to ensure a strong resolution in the UNCHR this year against the Cuban crackdown. On June 27, 2003, the Senate approved S.Res. 62 (Ensign), calling on OAS and U.N. humanrights bodies, the European Union, and human rights organizations around the world to call attentionto the human rights situation in Cuba. In the second session, the Senate approved S.Res. 328 (Nelson) on April 8,2004, expressing the sense of the Senate regarding the continued human rights violations committedby Fidel Castro and the Cuban government. The resolution called on Cuba to immediately releaseindividuals imprisoned for political purposes and called upon the 60th session of the U.N.Commission on Human Rights to condemn Cuba for its human rights abuses and demand thatinspectors from the International Committee of the Red Cross be allowed to visit and inspect Cubanprisons. Three hearings were held in the 108th Congress on the human rights situation in Cuba. Soonafter Cuba's human rights crackdown, the House International Relations Committee held a hearingon "Castro's Brutal Crackdown on Dissidents" on April 16, 2003. On October 16, 2003, the HouseGovernment Reform Committee's Subcommittee on Human Rights and Wellness held a hearing on"Castro's Cuba: What is the Proper United States Response to Ongoing Human Rights Violationsin Our Hemisphere?" On June 16, 2004, the House Subcommittee on Human Rights and Wellnessheld a hearing on continued human rights abuses in Cuba. Numerous other resolutions have been introduced in the 108th Congress on Cuba's poorhuman rights situation: H.Con.Res. 16 (Andrews), H.Res. 164 (Flake), and H.Con.Res. 125 (Deutsch). H.R. 1201 (Ros-Lehtinen) wouldposthumously revoke the naturalization of an individual reported to be responsible for human rightsviolations in Cuba. H.Res. 208 (Foley) would, among other provisions, condemn themember states of the United Nations Economic and Social Council for renewing Cuba's membershipon the United Nations Commission on Human Rights. S.Res. 146 (Reid) would expressthe sense of the Senate regarding the establishment of an international tribunal to prosecute crimeagainst humanity committed by Fidel Castro and other Cuban political and military leaders. H.Res. 563 (Ros-Lehtinen) would express the sense of the House regarding the one-yearanniversary of Cuba's human rights crackdown and call for the 60th session of the UNCHR toapprove a resolution holding Cuba accountable for its gross violation of human rights and civilliberties. In addition to resolutions on the human rights situation, Congress funds democracy andhuman rights projects for Cuba in annual Foreign Operations and Commerce, Justice, and Stateappropriations measures. For more details, see U.S. Funding to Support Democracy and HumanRights, below. With the cutoff of assistance from the former Soviet Union, Cuba experienced severeeconomic deterioration from 1989-1993, although there has been improvement since 1994. Estimates of economic decline in the 1989-93 period range from 35-50%. From 1994-2000,however, economic growth averaged 3.7% annually, with a low of 0.4% in 1994 and a high of 7.8%in 1996. Growth rates since 2001 have slowed, averaging almost 2.4% (3% in 2001, 1.5% in 2002,and an estimated 2.6% in 2003), although the forecast for 2004 is for 3.5%. (11) Growth in 2001 and 2002slowed in the aftermath of the effects of Hurricane Michelle and the September 11, 2001 terroristattacks in the United States. The terrorist attacks severely affected Cuba's tourist industry, withreports of some hotels closing and restaurants being empty. Hurricane Michelle damaged some45,000 homes and severely hurt the agricultural sector. Low world prices for sugar and nickel andVenezuela's April-September 2002 suspension of oil shipments to Cuba because of Cuba's slowpayment also contributed to the economic slowdown. (12) Economic growth in 2004 could be affected by a drought ineastern Cuba, the worst in 40 years, that has severely damaged agricultural crops, as well as byHurricanes Charley and Ivan that caused significant damage and flooding in western Cuba. Socialist Cuba has expressed pride for the nation's accomplishments in health and education. The World Bank estimates that in 2000, the adult literacy rate was 97%, life expectancy was 76years, and the under-5 years of age mortality rate was 9 per 1,000, the lowest rate in Latin Americaand comparable to the rate of the United States. Nevertheless, the country's economic decline hasreduced living standards considerably and resulted in shortages in medicines and medical supplies. When Cuba's economic slide began in 1989, the government showed little willingness toadopt any significant market-oriented economic reforms, but in 1993, faced with unprecedentedeconomic decline, Cuba began to change policy direction. Since 1993, Cubans have been allowedto own and use U.S. dollars and to shop at dollar-only shops previously limited to tourists anddiplomats. Self-employment was authorized in more than 100 occupations in 1993, most in theservice sector, and by 1996 that figure had grown to more than 150 occupations. Other Cubaneconomic reforms included breaking up large state farms into smaller, more autonomous, agriculturalcooperatives (Basic Units of Cooperative Production, UBPCs) in 1993; opening agricultural marketsin September 1994 where farmers could sell part of their produce on the open market; openingartisan markets in October 1994 for the sale of handicrafts; allowing private food catering, includinghome restaurants ( paladares ) in June 1995 (in effect legalizing activities that were already takingplace); approving a new foreign investment law in September 1995 that allows fully ownedinvestments by foreigners in all sectors of the economy with the exception of defense, health, andeducation; and authorizing the establishment of free trade zones with tariff reductions typical of suchzones in June 1996. In May 1997, the government enacted legislation to reform the banking systemand established a new Central Bank (BCC) to operate as an autonomous and independent entity. Despite these measures, the quality of life for many Cubans remains difficult -- characterizedby low wages, high prices for many basic goods, shortages of medicines, and power outages -- andsome analysts fear that the government has begun to backtrack on its reform efforts. Regulationsand new taxes have made it extremely difficult for many of the nation's self-employed. Some homerestaurants have been forced to close because of the regulations. Some foreign investors in Cubahave also begun to complain that the government has backed out of deals or forced them out ofbusiness. In April 2004, the Cuban government limited the use of dollars by state companies forany services or products not considered part of their core business; some analysts viewed themeasure as an effort to turn back the clock on economic reform measures. (13) On October 25, 2004, Fidel Castro announced that U.S. dollars no longer would be used inentities that currently accept dollars (such as stores, restaurants, and hotels). Instead, Cubans wouldneed to exchange their dollars for "convertible pesos," with a 10% surcharge for the exchange. Cubans could exchange their dollars or deposit them in banks with the surcharge until November14. Dollar bank accounts will still be allowed, but Cubans will not be able to deposit new dollarsinto the accounts. In the early 1960s, U.S.-Cuban relations deteriorated sharply when Fidel Castro began tobuild a repressive communist dictatorship and moved his country toward close relations with theSoviet Union. The often tense and hostile nature of the U.S.-Cuban relationship is illustrated by suchevents and actions as: U.S. covert operations to overthrow the Castro government culminating in theill-fated April 1961 Bay of Pigs invasion; the October 1962 missile crisis in which the United Statesconfronted the Soviet Union over its attempt to place offensive nuclear missiles in Cuba; Cubansupport for guerrilla insurgencies and military support for revolutionary governments in Africa andthe Western Hemisphere; the 1980 exodus of around 125,000 Cubans to the United States in theso-called Mariel boatlift; the 1994 exodus of more than 30,000 Cubans who were interdicted andhoused at U.S. facilities in Guantanamo and Panama; and the February 1996 shootdown by Cubanfighter jets of two U.S. civilian planes, resulting in the death of four U.S. crew members. Since the early 1960s, U.S. policy toward Cuba has consisted largely of isolating the islandnation through comprehensive economic sanctions. These sanctions were made stronger with theCuban Democracy Act (CDA) of 1992 ( P.L.102-484 , Title XVII) and with the Cuban Liberty andDemocratic Solidarity Act of 1996 ( P.L. 104-114 ), often referred to as the Helms/Burton legislation. The CDA prohibits U.S. subsidiaries from engaging in trade with Cuba and prohibits entry into theUnited States for any vessel to load or unload freight if it has engaged in trade with Cuba within thelast 180 days. The Helms/Burton legislation -- enacted in the aftermath of Cuba's shooting down oftwo U.S. civilian planes in February 1996 -- combines a variety of measures to increase pressure onCuba and provides for a plan to assist Cuba once it begins the transition to democracy. Among thelaw's sanctions is a provision in Title III that holds any person or government that traffics in U.S.property confiscated by the Cuban government liable for monetary damages in U.S. federal court. Acting under provisions of the law, however, both President Clinton and President Bush havesuspended the implementation of Title III at six-month intervals. Another component of U.S. policy consists of support measures for the Cuban people, aso-called second track of U.S. policy. This includes U.S. private humanitarian donations, medicalexports to Cuba under the terms of the Cuban Democracy Act of 1992, U.S. government support fordemocracy-building efforts, and U.S.- sponsored radio and television broadcasting to Cuba. Inaddition, the 106th Congress approved the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act of2000 ( P.L. 106-387 , Title IX) that allows for agricultural exports to Cuba, albeit with restrictions onfinancing such exports. The Clinton Administration made several changes to U.S. policy in the aftermath of thePope's January 1998 visit to Cuba, which were intended to bolster U.S. support for the Cuban people.These included the resumption of direct flights to Cuba (which had been curtailed after the February1996 shootdown of two U.S. civilian planes), the resumption of cash remittances for the support ofclose relatives in Cuba (which had been curtailed in August 1994 in response to the migration crisiswith Cuba), and the streamlining of procedures for the commercial sale of medicines and medicalsupplies and equipment to Cuba. In January 1999, President Clinton announced several additionalmeasures to support the Cuban people. These included a broadening of cash remittances to Cuba,so that all U.S. residents (not just those with close relatives in Cuba) could send remittances to Cuba;an expansion of direct passenger charter flights to Cuba from additional U.S. cities other than Miami(direct flights later in the year began from Los Angeles and New York); and an expansion ofpeople-to-people contact by loosening restrictions on travel to Cuba for certain categories oftravelers, such as professional researchers and those involved in a wide range of educational,religious, and sports competition. The Bush Administration essentially has continued the two-track U.S. policy of isolatingCuba through economic sanctions while supporting the Cuban people through a variety of measures. However, within this policy framework, the Administration has emphasized stronger enforcementof economic sanctions and has moved to further tighten restrictions on travel, remittances, andhumanitarian gift parcels to Cuba. There has been considerable reaction to the Administration's June2004 tightening of restrictions for family visits and other categories of travel. President Bush made his first major statement on his Administration's policy toward Cubaon May 18, 2001. He affirmed that his Administration would "oppose any attempt to weakensanctions against Cuba's government ... until this regime frees its political prisoners, holdsdemocratic, free elections, and allows for free speech." He added that he would "actively supportthose working to bring about democratic change in Cuba." (14) In July 2001, PresidentBush asked the Treasury Department to enhance and expand the enforcement capabilities of theOffice of Foreign Assets Control. The President noted the importance of upholding and enforcingthe law in order to prevent "unlicensed and excessive travel," enforce limits on remittances, andensure that humanitarian and cultural exchanges actually reach pro-democracy activists in Cuba. On May 20, 2002, President Bush announced a new initiative on Cuba that included fourmeasures designed to reach out to the Cuban people: 1) facilitating humanitarian assistance to theCuban people by U.S. religious and other non-governmental organizations (NGOs); 2) providingdirect assistance to the Cuban people through NGOs; 3) calling for the resumption of direct mailservice to and from Cuba (15) ; and 4) establishing scholarships in the United States for Cubanstudents and professionals involved in building civil institutions and for family members of politicalprisoners. While the President said that he would work with Congress to ease sanctions if Cubamade efforts to conduct free and fair legislative elections (in January 2003) and adopt meaningfulmarket-based reforms, he also maintained that full normalization of relations would only occur whenCuba has a fully democratic government, the rule of law is respected, and human rights are fullyprotected. The President's initiative did not include an explicit tightening of restrictions on travelto Cuba that some observers had expected. The President, did state, however, that the United Stateswould "continue to enforce economic sanctions on Cuba, and the ban on travel to Cuba, until Cuba'sgovernment proves that it is committed to real reform." (16) On October 10, 2003, the President announced three initiatives "to hasten the arrival of anew, free, democratic Cuba." First, the President instructed the Department of Homeland Securityto increase inspections of travelers and shipments to and from Cuba in order to more strictly enforcethe trade and travel embargo. Second, the President announced that the United States would increasethe number of new Cuban immigrants each year, improve the method of identifying refugees,redouble efforts to process Cubans seeking to leave Cuba, initiative a public information campaignto better inform Cubans of the routes to safe and legal migration to the United States. Third, thePresident announced the establishment of a "Commission for Assistance to a Free Cuba," that wouldhelp plan for Cuba's transition from communism to democracy and help identify ways to help bringit about (see discussion below). Tightened Sanctions in 2004. In 2004, the BushAdministration has taken several measures to tighten U.S. sanctions against Cuba. In February, aspart of the Administration's efforts to strengthen travel restrictions, the Treasury Department's Officeof Foreign Assets Control identified ten foreign companies (nine travel companies and one giftforwarder provider), blocked their assets under U.S. jurisdiction, and prohibited any transactionswith these companies. (17) President Bush also ordered the Department of Homeland Security to expand its policing of thewaters between Florida and Cuba with the objective of stopping pleasure boating traffic. (18) In March 2004, the StateDepartment announced that it would deny visas to those Cubans who participated in the "show trials"of dissidents in March 2003; the actions will reportedly cover some 300 Cubans. (19) On May 6, 2004, President Bush endorsed the recommendations of a report issued by theinter-agency Commission for Assistance to a Free Cuba, chaired by Secretary of State Colin Powell.The Commission made recommendations for immediate measures to "hasten the end of Cuba'sdictatorship" as well longer-term recommendations to help plan for Cuba's transition fromcommunism to democracy in various areas. In total, the President directed that up to $59 million becommitted to implement key recommendations of the Commission, apparently includingreprogrammed FY2004 funding and new FY2005 funding. This total includes up to $36 million fordemocracy-building activities "to empower Cuban civil society;" up to $18 million for regularairborne broadcasts to Cuba and the purchase of a dedicated airborne platform for the transmissionof Radio and TV Marti broadcasts into Cuba in order "to break the information blockade;" and $5million in public diplomacy efforts by U.S. Embassies worldwide to disseminate information aboutCuba abroad in order to "illuminate the reality of Castro's Cuba." (The full Commission report is onthe State Department website at http://www.state.gov/p/wha/rt/cuba/commission/2004/ .) The report's most significant recommendations included a number of measures to tighteneconomic sanctions on family visits and other categories of travel and on private humanitarianassistance in the form of remittances and gift parcels. The Treasury Department issued regulationson June 16, 2004, implementing the tightened restrictions on travel and remittances, most of whichwent into effect on June 30, 2004 (the regulations were delayed until August 1 for those on familyvisits and fully hosted travelers already in Cuba). The Commerce Department issued regulations onJune 22, 2004, regarding gift parcels and weight limits on luggage allowed for family visits; theserestrictions went into effect June 30, 2004. (For more information, see Travel and RemittanceRestrictions below and CRS Report RL31139 , Cuba: U.S. Restrictions on Travel and Remittances .) Over the years, although U.S. policymakers have agreed on the overall objective of U.S.policy toward Cuba -- to help bring democracy and respect for human rights to the island -- therehave been several schools of thought about how to achieve that objective. Some advocate a policyof keeping maximum pressure on the Cuban government until reforms are enacted, while continuingcurrent U.S. efforts to support the Cuban people. Others argue for an approach, sometimes referredto as constructive engagement, that would lift some U.S. sanctions that they believe are hurting theCuban people, and move toward engaging Cuba in dialogue. Still others call for a swiftnormalization of U.S.-Cuban relations by lifting the U.S. embargo. In general, those advocating a loosening of the sanctions-based policy toward Cuba makeseveral policy arguments. They assert that if the United States moderated its policy toward Cuba --through increased travel, trade and diplomatic dialogue, that the seeds of reform would be plantedin Cuba, which would stimulate and strengthen forces for peaceful change on the island. They stressthe importance to the United States of avoiding violent change in Cuba, with the prospect of a massexodus to the United States and the potential of involving the United States in a civil war scenario.They argue that since Castro's demise does not appear imminent, the United States should espousea more realistic approach in trying to induce change in Cuba. Supporters of changing policy alsopoint to broad international support for lifting the U.S. embargo, to the missed opportunities to U.S.businesses because of the embargo, and to the increased suffering of the Cuban people because ofthe embargo. Proponents of change also argue that the United States should be consistent in itspolicies with the world's few remaining Communist governments, and also maintain that moderatingpolicy will help advance human rights. On the other side, opponents of changing U.S. policy maintain that the current two-trackpolicy of isolating Cuba, but reaching out to the Cuban people through measures of support, is thebest means for realizing political change in Cuba. They point out that the Cuban Liberty andDemocratic Solidarity Act of 1996 sets forth a road map for the steps Cuba needs to take in orderfor the United States to normalize relations, including lifting the embargo. They argue that softeningU.S. policy at this time without concrete Cuban reforms would boost the Castro regime politicallyand economically, enabling the survival of the Communist regime. Opponents of softening U.S.policy argue that the United States should stay the course in its commitment to democracy andhuman rights in Cuba; that sustained sanctions can work; and that the sanctions against Cuba haveonly come to full impact with the loss of large subsidies from the former Soviet bloc. Opponentsof loosening U.S. sanctions further argue that Cuba's failed economic policies, not the U.S. embargo,are the causes of the economy's rapid decline. Major Provisions and Implementation. TheCuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act ( P.L. 104-114 ) was enacted into law on March 12,1996. Title I, Section 102(h) , codifies all existing Cuban embargo executive orders and regulations. No presidential waiver is provided for any of these codified embargo provisions. This provision issignificant because of the long-lasting effect on U.S. policy options toward Cuba. In effect, theexecutive branch is circumscribed in any changes in U.S. policy toward Cuba until certaindemocratic conditions are met. Title III , controversial because of the ramifications for U.S. relations with countriesinvesting in Cuba, allows U.S. nationals to sue for money damages in U.S. federal court thosepersons that traffic in property confiscated in Cuba. It extends the right to sue to Cuban Americanswho became U.S. citizens after their properties were confiscated. The President has authority todelay implementation for six months at a time if he determines that such a delay would be in thenational interest and would expedite a transition to democracy in Cuba. Beginning in July 1996, President Clinton used this provision to delay for six months theright of individuals to file suit against those persons benefitting from confiscated U.S. property inCuba. At the time of the first suspension on July 16, 1996, the President announced that he wouldallow Title III to go into effect, and as a result liability for trafficking under the title became effectiveon November 1, 1996. According to the Clinton Administration, this put foreign companies in Cubaon notice that they face prospects of future lawsuits and significant liability in the United States. Atthe second suspension on January 3, 1997, President Clinton stated that he would continue tosuspend the right to file law suits "as long as America's friends and allies continued their stepped-upefforts to promote a transition to democracy in Cuba." He continued, at six-month intervals, tosuspend the rights to file Title III lawsuits. President Bush has continued to suspend implementation of Title III at six-month intervals,most recently on July 16, 2004. When President Bush first used his authority to suspend Title IIIimplementation in July 2001, he cited efforts by European countries and other U.S. allies to push fordemocratic change in Cuba. In testimony before the House Government Reform Committee'sSubcommittee on Human Rights and Wellness on October 16, 2003, Assistant Secretary of StateRoger Noriega justified the continued suspension of Title III implementation by noting numerousexamples of countries condemning Cuba for its human rights crackdown in 2003. Title IV of the law denies admission to the United States to aliens involved in theconfiscation of U.S. property in Cuba or in the trafficking of confiscated U.S. property in Cuba. Thisincludes corporate officers, principals, or shareholders with a controlling interest in an entityinvolved in the confiscation of U.S. property or trafficking of U.S. property. It also includes thespouse, minor child, or agent of aliens who would be excludable under the provision. This provisionis mandatory, and only waiveable on a case-by-case basis for travel to the United States forhumanitarian medical reasons or for individuals to defend themselves in legal actions regardingconfiscated property. To date the State Department has banned from the United States a number of executives andtheir families from three companies because of their investment in confiscated U.S. property inCuba: Grupos Domos, a Mexican telecommunications company; Sherritt International, a Canadianmining company; and BM Group, an Israeli-owned citrus company. In 1997, Grupos Domosdisinvested from U.S.-claimed property in Cuba, and as a result its executives are again eligible toenter the United States. Action against executives of STET, an Italian telecommunications companywas averted by a July 1997 agreement in which the company agreed to pay the U.S.-based ITTCorporation $25 million for the use of ITT-claimed property in Cuba for ten years. For several years,the State Department has been investigating a Spanish hotel company, Sol Melia, for allegedlyinvesting in property that was confiscated from U.S. citizens in Cuba's Holguin province in 1961. Press reports in March 2002 indicated that a settlement was likely between Sol Melia and the originalowners of the property, but by the end of the year settlement efforts had failed. (20) In mid-June 2004,Jamaica's SuperClubs resort chain decided to disinvest from two Cuban hotels. The State Departmenthad written to the hotel chain in May advising that its top officials could be denied U.S. entrybecause the company's Cuban investments involved confiscated U.S. property. Foreign Reaction and the EU's WTO Challenge. Many U.S. allies -- including Canada, Japan, Mexico, and European Union (EU) nations -- stronglycriticized the enactment of the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act. They maintain thatthe law's provisions allowing foreign persons to be sued in U.S. court constitute an extraterritorialapplication of U.S. law that is contrary to international principles. U.S. officials maintain that theUnited States, which reserves the right to protect its security interests, is well within its rights underNAFTA and the World Trade Organization (WTO). Until mid-April 1997, the EU had been pursuing a case at the WTO, in which it waschallenging the Helms/Burton legislation as an extraterritorial application of U.S. law. Thebeginning of a settlement on the issue occurred on April 11, 1997, when an EU-U.S. understandingwas reached. In the understanding, both sides agreed to continue efforts to promote democracy inCuba and to work together to develop an agreement on agreed disciplines and principles for thestrengthening of investment protection relating to the confiscation of property by Cuba and othergovernments. As part of the understanding, the EU agreed that it would suspend its WTO disputesettlement case. Subsequently in mid-April 1998, the EU agreed to let its WTO challenge expire. Talks between the United States and the EU on investment disciplines proved difficult, withthe EU wanting to cover only future investments and the United States wanting to cover pastexpropriations, especially in Cuba. Nevertheless, after months of negotiations, the EU and the UnitedStates reached a second understanding on May 18, 1998. The understanding set forth EU disciplinesregarding investment in expropriated properties worldwide, in exchange for the ClintonAdministration's obtaining a waiver from Congress for the legislation's Title IV visa restrictions. Future investment in expropriated property would be barred. For past illegal expropriations,government support or assistance for transactions related to those expropriated properties would bedenied. A Registry of Claims would also be established to warn investors and government agenciesproviding investment support that a property has a record of claims. These investment disciplineswere to be applied at the same time that the President's Title IV waiver authority was exercised. Reaction was mixed among Members of Congress to the EU-U.S. accord, but opposition tothe agreement by several senior Members has forestalled any amendment of Title IV in Congress. The Bush Administration initially indicated that the Administration was looking into the possibilitiesof legislation to enact a presidential waiver for the provision, but during the June 2001 U.S.-EUsummit, President Bush noted the difficulty of persuading Congress to amend the law. (21) In July 2003, some pressreports indicated that the Administration was considering an arrangement with the EU in which theEU would take a stronger policy stance toward Cuba in exchange for the Administration securingwaiver authority for Title IV and permanent waiver authority for Title III of the Helms/Burtonlegislation. (22) A European Union challenge of U.S. law regarding Cuba in the World Trade Organizationinvolves a dispute between the French spirits company, Pernod Ricard, and the Bermuda-basedBacardi Ltd. Pernod Ricard entered into a joint venture with the Cuban government to produce andexport Havana Club rum, but Bacardi maintains that it holds the right to the Havana Club name. Aprovision in the FY1999 omnibus appropriations measure (Section 211 of Division A, title II, P.L.105-277 , signed into law October 21, 1998) prevents the United States from accepting payment fortrademark registrations and renewals from Cuban or foreign nationals that were used in connectionwith a business or assets in Cuba that were confiscated unless the original owner of the trademarkhas consented. The provision prohibits U.S. courts from recognizing such trademarks without theconsent of the original owner. Although Pernod Ricard cannot market Havana Club in the UnitedStates because of the trade embargo, it wants to protect its future distribution rights should theembargo be lifted. After Bacardi began selling rum in the United States under the Havana Club label, PernodRicard's joint venture unsuccessfully challenged Bacardi in U.S. federal court. In February 2000,the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in New York upheld a lower court's ruling that thejoint venture had no legal right to use the Havana Club name in the United States, and also that itwas barred from recognizing any assertion of treaty rights with regard to the trade name. After formal U.S.-EU consultations on the issue were held in 1999 without resolution, theEU initiated a WTO dispute settlement panel in June 2000, maintaining that the U.S. law violatesthe Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property (TRIPS). An August 6, 2001ruling by the WTO panel was described as mixed, with both sides claiming a partial victory. Thepanel ruled that WTO rules on intellectual property rights did not cover trade names, but also ruledthat a portion of the law (Section 211(a)(2)) prohibiting U.S. courts from recognizing such Cubantrademarks based on common law rights or registration is in violation of the TRIPS because it deniesaccess to U.S. courts by trademark holders. In early October 2001, the EU formally notified the WTO that it was appealing the ruling.The WTO appeals panel issued its ruling on January 2, 2002, and again the ruling was described asmixed. According to the United States Trade Representative (USTR), the appellate panel upheld the"U.S. position that WTO intellectual property rights rules leave WTO members free to protecttrademarks by establishing their own trademark ownership criteria" and overturned the earlier rulingthat Section 211 was in violation of TRIPs because it denied access to U.S. courts by trademarkholders. (24) However,the appellate panel also found that Section 211 violated WTO provisions on national treatment andmost-favored-nation treatment, which could require the United States to amend Section 211 so thatit does not violate WTO rules. Although there is access to courts to enforce trademark rights, Section211 restricted access in a discriminatory manner (against Cuban nationals and foreignsuccessors-in-interest.) On March 28, 2002, the United States agreed that it would come into compliance with theWTO ruling through legislative action by Congress by January 3, 2003. (25) That deadline has beenextended several times, however, since no legislative action has been taken to bring Section 211 intocompliance with the WTO ruling. The current deadline is December 31, 2004. Two different approaches have been advocated to bring Section 211 into compliance withthe WTO ruling. Some want a narrow fix in which Section 211 would be amended so that it appliesto U.S. companies instead of being limited to foreign companies. Advocates of this approach arguethat it would affirm that the United States "will not give effect to a claim or right to U.S. propertyif that claimed is based on a foreign compensation." (26) Some want Section 211 repealed altogether. Those supportinga repeal argue that the law endangers over 5,000 trademarks of over 500 U.S. companies registeredin Cuba. (27) Theymaintain that Cuba could retaliate against U.S. companies under the Inter-American Convention forTrademark and Commercial Protection. In the 108th Congress, identical bills, H.R. 2494 (Rangel), introduced June 17,2003, and S. 2002 (Baucus), introduced December 9, 2003, would, among otherprovisions, repeal the Section 211 trademark provision from law. In addition, four other legislativeinitiatives that would lift the overall trade embargo on Cuba also include provisions that wouldrepeal the Section 211 trademark provision: H.R. 188 (Serrano), introduced January 7,2003; S. 403 (Baucus), introduced February 13, 2003; H.R. 1698 (Paul),introduced April 9, 2003; and H.R. 3422 (Serrano). In the second session, identical bills have been introduced -- H.R. 4225 (Smithof Texas), introduced April 28, 2004, and S. 2373 (Domenici), introduced April 29,2004 -- that would advance a technical fix to Section 211 so that it applies to all parties regardlessof nationality. Press reports in October 2003 had asserted that there were efforts in Congress toadvance the narrow fix that would ensure that Section 211 applies to U.S. companies as well asforeign firms. (28) Plansto add such a remedy advocated by Bacardi to the conference report to the Department of Defenseauthorization measure, H.R. 1588 , were reportedly scuttled when it became apparentthat there would be some opposition. (29) The Senate Judiciary Committee held a July 13, 2004, hearing on the Section 211 trademarkissue featuring those advocating the narrow fix as advanced by S. 2373 and H.R. 4225 , as well as those calling for the repeal of Section 211 as advanced by S. 2002 and H.R. 2494 . Under U.S. sanctions, commercial medical and food exports to Cuba are allowed but withnumerous restrictions and licensing requirements. The 106th Congress passed the Trade SanctionsReform and Export Enhancement Act of 2000 ( P.L. 106-387 , Title IX) that allows for one-yearexport licenses for shipping food and medicine to Cuba, although no U.S. government assistance,foreign assistance, export assistance, credits, or credit guarantees are available to finance suchexports. The law, furthermore, denies exporters access to U.S. private commercial financing orcredit; all transactions must be conducted in cash in advance or with financing from third countries. The law reiterates the existing ban on importing goods from Cuba but authorizes travel to Cuba,under a specific license, to conduct business related to the newly allowed food and medicine sales.Regulations implementing the new provisions were published in the Federal Register on July 12,2001. In the aftermath of Hurricane Michelle that struck in early November 2001, Cuba changedits policy of not buying agricultural products from the United States because of its disapproval ofU.S. financing restrictions. While the U.S. government offered humanitarian assistance to Cuba inthe aftermath of the hurricane, Cuba declined, saying that instead it wanted to purchase food suppliesfrom the United States. As a result, Cuba negotiated with several U.S. agricultural companies toimport products such as wheat, corn, soybeans, rice, and chicken. The first shipments of goodsarrived in mid-December 2001. This marked the first time that Cuba purchased food supplies directlyfrom the United States since the approval of such sales in the 106th Congress. In March 2002, theCuban government agreed to purchase additional agricultural products from the United States. Inlate September 2002, a U.S. Food & Agribusiness Exhibition was held in Havana featuring 288exhibitors marketing 1,000 products from more than 30 states, the District of Columbia, and PuertoRico. (30) In early June2003, the Treasury Department's Office of Foreign Assets Control rejected an application to travelto Cuba for organizers of a potential second U.S. trade exhibition in Cuba. (31) Several Members ofCongress criticized the denial of the license and called for the Administration to reverse OFAC'sdecision. (32) Since late 2001, Cuba has purchased more than $700 million in agricultural products fromthe United States. Overall U.S. exports to Cuba amounted to $7.1 million in 2001, $145.6 millionin 2002, and $259 million in 2003, the majority in agricultural products. For the first nine monthsof 2004, U.S. exports amounted to about $321 million, the majority in agricultural products. (33) On November 12, 2004, the Treasury Department's Office of Foreign Assets Controlinstructed U.S. banks to stop transfers of funds to U.S. companies for sales of agricultural andmedical products to Cuba. The temporary move was taken so that OFAC could examine whetherthere were any violations of the provisions of the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export EnhancementAct of 2000, which requires that the sales be conducted in "payment of cash in advance." Someobservers fear that the action could jeopardize millions of dollars in U.S. agricultural sales to Cuba. Opponents of further easing restrictions on food and medical exports to Cuba maintain thatU.S. policy does not deny such sales to Cuba, as evidenced by the recent sales in the aftermath ofHurricane Michelle. Moreover, according to the State Department, since the Cuban Democracy Actwas enacted in 1992, the United States has licensed more than $4.3 billion in private humanitariandonations. Opponents of easing U.S. sanctions further argue that easing pressure on the Cubangovernment would in effect be lending support and extending the duration of the Castro regime.They maintain that the United States should remain steadfast in its opposition to any easing ofpressure on Cuba that could prolong the Castro regime and its repressive policies. Supporters of easing restrictions on food and medical exports to Cuba argue that therestrictions harm the health and nutrition of the Cuban population. They argue that although the U.S.government may have licensed more than $4.3 billion in humanitarian donations to Cuba since 1992,much smaller amounts have actually been sent to Cuba. Some supporters of easing sanctions believethe embargo plays into Castro's hands by allowing him to use U.S. policy as a scapegoat for his failedeconomic policies and as a rationale for political repression. U.S. agribusiness companies thatsupport the removal of trade restrictions on agricultural exports to Cuba believe that U.S. farmersare missing out on a market of some $700 million so close to the United States. Some agricultural producers exporting to Cuba support continuation of the prohibition onfinancing for agricultural exports to Cuba because it ensures that they will be paid. Instead, someexporters want to change U.S. restrictions in order to sell agriculture and farm equipment toCuba. (34) Otheragricultural exporters, however, support the lifting of the prohibition on financing. They contendthat allowing such financing would help smaller U.S. companies expand purchases to Cuba morerapidly. (35) Legislative Initiatives. In the 107th Congress,numerous initiatives focused in whole or in part on easing restrictions on food and medical exportsto Cuba. The House-passed version of the FY2003 Treasury Department appropriations bill, H.R. 5120 , included a provision stating that no funds in the bill could be used toimplement any sanction on private commercial sales of agricultural commodities or medicines toCuba. Some observers suggested that the practical effect of this amendment would be to prevent theTreasury Department's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) from ensuring that sales to Cubado not include private financing. (36) The Senate version of the bill, S. 2740 , as reportedout of committee, did not include a similar provision. Final action on the FY2003 TreasuryDepartment appropriations measure was not completed before the end of the 107th Congress, so the108th Congress faced early action on the measure. In the end, the final version of the FY2003omnibus appropriations measure, P.L. 108-7 ( H.J.Res. 2 ), which included TreasuryDepartment funding, did not include the House-passed provision from the 107th Congress that wouldhave provided no funds for enforcing restrictions against private financing of agricultural sales toCuba. The White House had threatened to veto the omnibus bill if it had provisions weakening theembargo on Cuba. The Senate version of the FY2004 agriculture appropriations bill, H.R. 2673 ,included a provision that would have allowed travel to Cuba under a general license (withoutapplying to the Treasury Department) for travel related to commercial sales of agricultural andmedical goods, but the provision was dropped in the conference on H.R. 2673 ( H.Rept.108-401 ), which became the FY2004 Consolidated Appropriations Act that included agricultureappropriations in Division A. The House version of the bill had not included a similar provision. Such travel to Cuba currently is allowed under the Cuba embargo regulations but under a specificlicense, which requires approval by the Treasury Department. As noted above, in June 2003, theTreasury Department rejected application for the U.S. organizers of a trade exhibition to travel toCuba, prompting criticism from some Members of Congress who called for a reversal of thedecision. The Senate version of the FY2005 agriculture appropriations bill, S. 2803 , asreported out of the Appropriations Committee ( S.Rept. 108-340 ), again included a provision thatwould have allowed travel to Cuba under a general license for travel related to commercial sales ofagricultural and medical goods, but the provision was dropped in the FY2005 omnibusappropriations measure ( H.R. 4818 , H.Rept. 108-792 ). The House-passed version of the FY2005 Transportation/Treasury appropriations bill, H.R. 5025 , had a provision (Section 649) that would have prohibited funds from beingused to implement any sanction on private commercial sales of agricultural or medical commodities. The Senate version, S. 2806 , as reported out of the Appropriations Committee ( S.Rept.108-342 ), had a provision (Section 222) that would have prohibited funds from administering orenforcing restrictions on travel or travel-related restrictions, which would include travel related tocommercial sales of agricultural and medical goods. The Cuba provisions from both the House andSenate versions were dropped in the FY2005 omnibus appropriations measure ( H.R. 4818 , H.Rept. 108-792 ). Several additional initiatives were introduced in the 108th Congress that would have liftedrestrictions in whole or in part on food and medical exports to Cuba, but no action was taken onthese measures. H.R. 187 (Serrano), introduced January 7, 2003, would have allowedfor the financing of agricultural sales to Cuba. H.R. 3422 (Serrano), introduced October30, 2003, would, among other measures, have permitted exports of food, medicines, and otherhumanitarian goods to Cuba. Three broad bills, H.R. 188 (Serrano), introduced January7, 2003, S. 403 (Baucus), introduced February 13, 2003, and H.R. 1698 (Paul), introduced April 9, 2003, would have lifted all Cuba embargo restrictions, including thoseon food and medical exports. S. 2449 (Baucus)/ H.R. 4457 (Otter) wouldhave required congressional renewal of trade and travel restrictions with respect to Cuba, includingrestrictions on food and medical exports. Restrictions on travel to Cuba have been a key and often contentious component in U.S.efforts to isolate the communist government of Fidel Castro for much of the past 40 years. Over timethere have been numerous changes to the restrictions and for five years, from 1977 until 1982, therewere no restrictions on travel. Restrictions on travel and remittances to Cuba are part of the CubanAssets Control Regulations (CACR), the overall embargo regulations administered by the TreasuryDepartment's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC). Under the Bush Administration, enforcement of U.S. restrictions on Cuba travel hasincreased, and restrictions on travel and on private remittances to Cuba have been tightened. InMarch 2003, the Administration eliminated travel for people-to-people educational exchangesunrelated to academic coursework. In June 2004, the Administration significantly restricted travel,especially family travel, and the provision of private humanitarian assistance to Cuba in the form ofremittances and gift parcels. Among the new restrictions: Family visits are restricted to one trip every three years under a specific licenseand are be restricted to immediate family members. Under previous regulations, family visits couldoccur once a year under a general license, with travel more than once a year allowed but under aspecific license. Previously travel had been allowed to visit relatives to within three degrees ofrelationship to the traveler. Cash remittances, estimates of which range from $400 million to $800 million,are further restricted. Quarterly remittances of $300 may still be sent, but it is now restricted formembers of the remitter's immediate family and may not be remitted to certain government officialsand certain members of the Cuban Communist Party. The regulations were also changed to reducethe amount of remittances that authorized travelers may carry to Cuba, from $3000 to$300. Gift parcels are limited to immediate family members and are denied to certainCuban officials and certain members of the Cuban Communist Party. The contents of gift parcelsmay no longer include seeds, clothing, personal hygiene items, veterinary medicines and supplies,fishing equipment and supplies, and soap-making equipment. The authorized per diem allowed for a family visit is reduced from the StateDepartment per diem rate, currently $167 per day, to $50 per day. With the exception of informational materials, licensed travelers may notpurchase or otherwise acquire merchandise and bring it back into the United States. Previousregulations allowed visitors to Cuba to import $100 worth of goods as accompaniedbaggage. Fully-hosted travel is no longer allowed as a permissible category oftravel. Travel for educational activities is further restricted, including the eliminationof educational exchanges sponsored by secondary schools. There has been mixed reaction to the tightening of Cuba travel and remittance restrictions. Supporters maintain that the increased restrictions will deny the Cuban government dollars that helpmaintain its repressive control. Opponents argue that the tightened sanctions are anti-family and willonly result in more suffering for the Cuban people. There have also been concerns that the newrestrictions were drafted without considering the full consequences of their implementation. Forexample, the elimination of fully-hosted travel raised concerns about the status of 70 U.S. studentsreceiving full scholarships at the Latin American School of Medicine in Havana. Members of theCongressional Black Caucus, who were instrumental in the establishment of the scholarship programfor U.S. students, expressed concern that the students may be forced to abandon their medicaleducation because of the new OFAC regulations. As a result of these concerns, OFAC ultimatelylicensed the medical students in August 2004 to continue their studies for a period of two years andengage in travel-related transactions. Major arguments made for lifting the Cuba travel ban are it contributes to the suffering ofCuban families; it hinders efforts to influence conditions in Cuba and may be aiding Castro byhelping restrict the flow of information; it abridges the rights of ordinary Americans; and Americanscan travel to other countries with communist or authoritarian governments. Major arguments inopposition to lifting the Cuba travel ban are that more American travel would support Castro's ruleby providing his government with millions of dollars in hard currency; that there are legal provisionsallowing travel to Cuba for humanitarian purposes that are used by thousands of Americans eachyear; and that the President should be free to restrict travel for foreign policy reasons. (For further information, see CRS Report RL31139 , Cuba: U.S. Restrictions on Travel andRemittances , by [author name scrubbed].) Legislative Initiatives. In the first session of the108th Congress, both the House- and Senate-approved versions of the FY2004Transportation-Treasury appropriations bill, H.R. 2989 , had a nearly identical provision(Section 745 in the House version and Section 643 in the Senate version) that would have preventedfunds from being used to administer or enforce restrictions on travel or travel-related transactions.But the provision was dropped in the conference report to the FY2004 Consolidated AppropriationsAct, H.R. 2673 ( H.Rept. 108-401 ), which incorporates seven regular appropriationsacts, including Transportation-Treasury appropriations. The White House had again threatened toveto any legislation that weakened economic sanctions against Cuba. The conference also droppedtwo Cuba provisions from the House version of H.R. 2989 on remittances (Section 746)and on people-to-people educational exchanges (Section 749). The conference version of H.R. 2673 ( H.Rept. 108-401 ) also dropped a Cuba provision from the Senate-approvedversion of the bill (Section 760) that would have eased restrictions for travel to Cuba related tocommercial sales of agricultural and medical goods. The House version of the bill had no suchprovision. In the second session of the 108th Congress, the House-passed version of the FY2005Commerce, Justice, and State appropriations bill, H.R. 4754 , included a provision(Section 801) that would have prohibited funds from being used to implement, administer, or enforcerecent amendments to the Cuba embargo regulations that tightened restrictions on gift parcels andbaggage taken by individuals for travel to Cuba. The provision was added by a Flake amendment, H.Amdt. 647 , approved by a vote of 221-194. Ultimately, the provision was notincluded in the FY2005 omnibus appropriations bill ( H.R. 4818 , H.Rept. 108-792 ). Both the House-approved version of the FY2005 Transportation/Treasury appropriations bill, H.R. 5025 , and the Senate Appropriations Committee version of the bill, S. 2806 , had provisions that would have eased Cuba travel sanctions in various ways, but theseprovision were not included in the FY2005 omnibus appropriations measure ( H.R. 4818 , H.Rept. 108-792 ). In its statement of policy on H.R. 5025, the Administrationindicated that the President would veto the measure if it contained provisions weakening Cubasanctions. S. 2806, as reported out of committee, had a provision (Section 222) that wouldhave prohibited funds from administering or enforcing restrictions on travel or travel-relatedtransactions. As approved by the House, H.R. 5025 had three provisions that would haveeased Cuba sanctions. During floor consideration on September 21, 2004, the House approved aDavis (of Florida) amendment ( H.Amdt. 769 ) by a vote of 225-174, which provided thatno funds could be used to administer, implement, or enforce the Bush Administration's June 2004tightening of restrictions on visiting relatives in Cuba; the amendment became Section 647 of thebill. On September 22, 2004, the House approved two additional Cuba amendments by voice vote.A Lee amendment ( H.Amdt. 771 ) was approved that would prohibit funds from beingused to implement, administer, or enforce the Bush Administration's June 2004 tightening ofrestrictions on travel for educational activities; the amendment became Section 648 of the bill. AWaters amendment was approved ( H.Amdt. 770 ) that would prohibit funds from beingused to implement any sanction imposed on private commercial sales of agricultural and medicalproducts to Cuba , which would include travel related to the sale of such products; the amendmentbecame Section 649 of the bill. The House also rejected a Rangel amendment ( H.Amdt. 772 ) on September 22, 2004, by a vote of 225-188, that would have more broadly prohibited fundsfrom being used to implement, administer, or enforce the economic embargo of Cuba. DuringSeptember 15, 2004 House floor consideration of H.R. 5025 , Representative Jeff Flakeannounced his intention not to offer an amendment, as he had for the past three years, that wouldhave prohibited funds from being used to administer or enforce restrictions on travel or travel-relatedtransactions. The Senate version of the FY2005 Agriculture appropriations bill, S. 2803 , asreported out of committee ( S.Rept. 108-340 ), had a provision (Section 776) that would have directedthe Secretary of the Treasury to promulgate regulations allowing for travel to Cuba under a "generallicense" when it was related to the commercial sale of agricultural and medical products. TheAdministration threatened to veto the measure if it contained provisions weakening Cuba sanctions.Ultimately, the provision was not included in the FY2005 omnibus appropriations measure( H.R. 4818 , H.Rept. 108-792 ). Also in the 108th Congress, H.R. 4678 (Davis of Florida), introduced June 24,2004, would have barred certain additional restrictions on travel and remittances that theAdministration imposed in June 2004. Two bills would have specifically lifted all restrictions ontravel to Cuba: S. 950 (Enzi), introduced April 30, 2003, and reported by the SenateCommittee on Foreign Relations November 11, 2003, and H.R. 2071 (Flake),introduced May 13, 2003. H.R. 3422 (Serrano), introduced October 30, 2003, would,among other measures, have lifted restrictions on travel to Cuba. Three broad bills, H.R. 188 (Serrano), introduced January 7, 2003, S. 403 (Baucus),introduced February 13, 2003, and H.R. 1698 (Paul), introduced April 9, 2003, wouldhave lifted all Cuba embargo restrictions, including those on travel. Finally, S. 2449 (Baucus)/ H.R. 4457 (Otter), introduced respectively on May 19 and 20, 2004, wouldhave required congressional renewal of trade and travel restrictions with respect to Cuba. Because of Cuba's geographic location, the country's waters and airspace have been used bytraffickers to transport illicit drugs for ultimate destinations in the United States. Over the pastseveral years, Cuban officials have expressed concerns over the use of their waters and airspace fordrug transit as well as increased domestic drug use. The Cuban government has taken a number ofmeasures to deal with the drug problem, including legislation to stiffen penalties for traffickers,increased training for counternarcotics personnel, and cooperation with a number of countries onanti-drug efforts. Cuba has bilateral counternarcotics agreements with 29 countries and less formalarrangements with 12 others, according to the Department of State. Britain and France haveprovided counternarcotics training. In November 2001, Cuba hosted a regional counternarcoticsconference focusing on strategies to prevent drug abuse, drug trafficking, and money laundering. The United States has cooperated with Cuba on anti-drug efforts on a case-by-case basisdating back to the 1970s. In 1996, Cuban authorities cooperated with the United States in the seizureof 6.6 tons of cocaine aboard the Miami-bound Limerick , a Honduran-flag ship. Cuba turned overthe cocaine to the United States and cooperated fully in the investigation and subsequent prosecutionof two defendants in the case in the United States. Cooperation has increased since 1999 when U.S.and Cuban officials met in Havana to discuss ways of improving anti-drug cooperation. Cubaaccepted an upgrading of the communications link between the Cuban Border Guard and the U.S.Coast Guard as well as the stationing of a U.S. Coast Guard Drug Interdiction Specialist (DIS) at theU.S. Interests Section in Havana. The Coast Guard official was posted to the U.S. Interests Section in September 2000, andsince that time, coordination has increased somewhat. The State Department, in its March 2004International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, maintains that there has been some Cubancooperation with the Coast Guard specialist, but only after U.S. insistence that he either be usedeffectively or he would be withdrawn. The report also noted that the Coast Guard official had beensubjected to diplomatically unacceptable harassment. In addition, the State Department appeared to be more critical of Cuba in the March 2004drug strategy report than in previous years. According to the report: "Cuban authorities have chosennot to provide an effective use of force policy and adequate resources to counternarcotics authoritiesto give them more than a limited ability to interdict go-fast vessels or aircraft." Nevertheless, thereport maintained that Cuba did provide the U.S. Coast Guard and Drug Enforcement Administrationwith information on suspect aircraft and go-fast vessels that resulted in U.S. drug seizures andarrests. In the past, Cuba has called for a bilateral anti-drug cooperation agreement with the UnitedStates. (37) In January2002, Cuba deported to the United States Jesse James Bell, a U.S. fugitive wanted on drug charges,and in early March 2002, Cuba arrested a convicted Colombian drug trafficker, Rafael Bustamante,who escaped from jail in Alabama in 1992. At the time, while Drug Enforcement Administrationhead Asa Hutchison expressed appreciation for Cuba's actions, he indicated that cooperation wouldcontinue on a case-by-case basis, not through a bilateral agreement. (38) State Departmentspokesman Richard Boucher said that if Cuba "were to demonstrate a willingness to work across theboard with us on law enforcement issues, then we might consider some more formal structure," buthe indicated that Cuba has not demonstrated that kind of commitment. As an example, Bouchermaintained that "there are still dozens of fugitives from U.S. justice who have been provided safehaven by the Cuban government." (39) Legislative Initiatives. In the second session ofthe 107th Congress, both House and Senate versions of the FY2003 Foreign Operationsappropriations bill ( H.R. 5410 and S. 2779 ) had divergent provisionsrelated to Cuba and counternarcotics cooperation with the United States. Section 585 of the Senatebill provided that $3 million in International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement assistanceshould be made available for preliminary work by the Department of State and other entities toestablish cooperation with appropriate agencies of the Cuban government on counter-narcoticsmatters. The money would not be available if the President certified 1) that Cuba does not have inplace appropriate procedures to protect against the loss of innocent life in the air and on the groundin connection with the interdiction of illegal drugs and 2) that there is evidence of involvement ofthe Cuban government in drug trafficking. In contrast, Section 581 of the House bill provided thatnone of the funds appropriated for "International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement" may bemade available for assistance to the Cuban government. Final action on the Foreign Operationsmeasure was not completed before the end of the 107th Congress. In the end, the final version of the FY2003 omnibus appropriations measure in the 108thCongress, H.J.Res. 2 ( P.L. 108-7 ), which included Foreign Operations funding, did notinclude either the House or Senate provisions on anti-drug cooperation with Cuba. The Senateversion of H.J.Res. 2 , included a provision (Division E, Foreign Operationsappropriations, Sec. 580) similar to the Senate bill in the 107th Congress described above. It wouldhave provided $3 million for international narcotics control and law enforcement assistance forpreliminary work to establish cooperation with Cuba on counter-narcotics matters. Similar legislative action took place on FY2004 appropriations. The House-passed versionof the foreign operations appropriations measure, H.R. 2800 , would have provided, inSection 571, that no International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement Funds be made availablefor assistance to Cuba. The House Appropriations Committee report to the bill ( H.Rept. 108-222 )asserted that "full reporting and transparency by the Cuban Government and United Statesmonitoring of the use of counter-narcotics assistance in Cuba would be difficult if not impossible,according to the State Department, given Cuban hostility toward the United States Government." Incontrast, the Senate-passed version of the bill, H.R. 2800 (Section 680), would haveprovided $5 million in International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement assistance forpreliminary work to establish cooperation with Cuba on counter-narcotics matters. The moneywould not have been available if Cuba did not have in place appropriate procedures to protect againstthe loss of life in connection with the interdiction of illegal drugs or if there were evidence that theCuban government was involved in drug trafficking. In the end, neither the Senate nor the Houseprovision was included in the conference on H.R. 2673 ( H.Rept. 108-401 ), theConsolidated Appropriations Act for FY2004, which incorporates seven regular appropriations acts,including foreign operations in Division D. Again for FY2005, the House-passed version of the foreign operations measure, H.R. 4818 , included a provision, in Section 572, that no International Narcotics Controland Law Enforcement Funds be made available for assistance to Cuba. In contrast, as in the pastseveral years, the Senate-passed version of the bill would have provided (Sec. 5091) $5 million toestablish cooperation with appropriate agencies of the Cuban government on counter-narcoticsmatters. The money would not be available if the President certified that Cuba did not have in placeappropriate procedures to protect against the loss of innocent life in the air and on the ground inconnection with the interdiction of illegal drugs and there was evidence of involvement of the Cubangovernment in drug trafficking. Ultimately, neither provision was included in the FY2005 omnibusappropriations measure ( H.R. 4818 , H.Rept. 108-792 ). Another freestanding legislative initiative introduced in the 108th Congress, H.R. 1432 (Rangel), introduced March 25, 2003, would have authorized the Secretary of State to enterinto negotiations with representatives of the Cuban government to establish cooperation between theUnited States and Cuba on illicit narcotics control efforts. Cuba was added to the State Department's list of states sponsoring international terrorism in1982 because of its alleged ties to international terrorism and its support for terrorist groups in LatinAmerica. Cuba had a history of supporting revolutionary movements and governments in LatinAmerica and Africa, but in 1992 Fidel Castro said that his country's support for insurgents abroadwas a thing of the past. Cuba's change in policy was in large part because of the breakup of theSoviet Union, which resulted in the loss of billions of dollars in annual subsidies to Cuba, and ledto substantial Cuban economic decline. Cuba remains on the State Department's terrorism list. According to the State Department'sApril 2004, Patterns of Global Terrorism report, while Cuba ratified all 12 internationalcounterterrorism conventions in 2001, it has remained opposed to the U.S.-led global coalitionagainst terrorism and "actively condemned many associated U.S. polices and actions throughout2003." The State Department report also noted that Cuba continued to host several members ofForeign Terrorist Organizations as well as some U.S. fugitives from justice. The report maintainedthat Cuba provides safehaven to up to 20 Basque ETA terrorists from Spain and has provided "somedegree of safehaven and support" to members of two Colombian insurgent groups, the RevolutionaryArmed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the National Liberation Army (ELN). The reportacknowledged, however, that Colombia acquiesced to having the two groups in Cuba; it also notedthat Colombia has publicly said that it wants Cuba's continued mediation with the ELN in Cuba. With regard to the ETA members, the report cited a Cuban declaration in May 2003 that maintainedthat the ETA presence in Cuba stemmed from a request from Spain and Panama, and that the issueis a bilateral matter between Cuba and Spain. In general, those who support keeping Cuba on the terrorism list argue that there is ampleevidence that Cuba supports terrorism. They point to the government's history of supporting terroristacts and armed insurgencies in Latin America and Africa. They point to the government's continuedhosting of members of foreign terrorist organizations and U.S. fugitives from justice. Critics ofretaining Cuba on the terrorism list maintain that it is a holdover of the Cold War. They argue thatdomestic political considerations keep Cuba on the terrorism list and maintain that Cuba's presenceon the list diverts U.S. attention from struggles against serious terrorist threats. Although Cuba offered support to the United States in the aftermath of the World TradeCenter and Pentagon attacks in 2001, Fidel Castro also stated that the attacks were in part aconsequence of the United States having applied "terrorist methods" for years. (41) Cuba's subsequentstatements became increasingly hostile, according to press reports, which quoted Cuba's mission tothe United Nations as describing the U.S. response to the U.S. attacks as "fascist and terrorist" andthat the United States was using the attack as an excuse to establish "unrestricted tyranny over allpeople on Earth." (42) Castro himself said that the U.S. government was run by "extremists" and "hawks" whose responseto the attack could result in an "infinite killing of innocent people." (43) The Cuban government, however, had a much more muted reaction to the U.S. decision tosend captured Taliban and Al Qaeda fighters from Afghanistan to the U.S. naval base at GuantanamoBay, Cuba. Although the Cuban government objects to the U.S. presence at Guantanamo as anational security threat and opposes the presence as illegal, it has not opposed the new mission ofhousing detainees from Afghanistan. (44) The Cuban government has, however, expressed concerns aboutthe treatment of terrorist suspects at Guantanamo. (Also see "Guantanamo Naval Base" below.) Cuba as the Victim of Terrorism. Cuba has beenthe target of various terrorist incidents over the years. In 1976, a Cuban plane was bombed, killing73 people. In 1997, there were almost a dozen bombings in the tourist sector in Havana and in theVaradero beach area in which an Italian businessman was killed and several others were injured. Two Salvadorans were convicted and sentenced to death for the bombings in March 1999, and threeGuatemalans were sentenced to prison terms ranging from 10-15 years in January 2002. Cubanofficials maintain that Cuban exiles funded the bombings. In November 2000, four anti-Castro activists were arrested in Panama for a plot to kill FidelCastro. One of the accused, Luis Posada Carriles, was allegedly involved in the 1976 airplanebombing of a Cuban airliner. (45) The four stood trial in March 2004 and were sentenced in Aprilto prison terms ranging from seven to eight years. In late August 2004, Panamanian PresidentMireya Moscoso pardoned the four men before the end of her presidential term. Three of the menare U.S. citizens and traveled to Florida, where they received strong support from some in the CubanAmerican community, while Posada Carriles reportedly traveled to another country. The pardonsresulted in Cuba breaking diplomatic relations with Panama, although Panama's newly inauguratedPresident Martin Torrijos, who disagreed with the pardon, has vowed to work toward the restorationof relations. U.S. State Department officials did not criticize President Moscoso's pardon of the four,but maintained that they did not lobby Panama for the pardons. (46) Cuba and Biological Weapons? In 2002, the StateDepartment made controversial allegations that Cuba, which has an advanced biotechnology sector,has been involved in developing biological weapons. On May 6, 2002, Under Secretary of State forArms Control and International Security John Bolton stated that "the United States believes thatCuba has at least a limited offensive biological warfare research-and-development effort" and "hasprovided dual-use technology to other rogue states." Bolton called on Cuba "to cease allBW-applicable cooperation with rogue states and to fully comply with all of its obligations underthe Biological Weapons Convention." Although Bolton's statement received considerable mediaattention, it was similar to a March 19, 2002 statement by Assistant Secretary of State forIntelligence and Research Carl Ford before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. When questioned on the issue, Secretary of State Powell maintained that Under SecretaryBolton's statement was not based on new information. Powell asserted that the United States believesCuba has the capacity and the capability to conduct research on biological weapons but emphasizedthat the Administration had not claimed that Cuba had such weapons. Some observers viewedPowell's statement as contradicting that of Under Secretary Bolton. (47) In response to Under Secretary Bolton's statement, the Cuban government called theallegations a lie and maintained that the Bush Administration was trying to justify its hard-linepolicies just when the momentum is increasing in the United States to ease the embargo. During histrip to Cuba, former President Jimmy Carter criticized the Bush Administration over the allegationsand said that Administration officials who had briefed him before the trip assured him that Cuba hadnot shared anything with other countries that could be used for terrorist purposes. (48) The Senate Foreign Relations Committee's Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere, PeaceCorps, and Narcotics Affairs held a hearing on the issue on June 5, 2002. (49) At the hearing, AssistantSecretary of State for Intelligence and Research Carl Ford distinguished between the term "effort"and "program," and maintained that Cuba has a biological weapons effort and not a biologicalweapons program. Ford characterized a program as something substantial and multifaceted thatincludes test facilities, production facilities, and a unit within the military specifically designated forsuch weapons capability. In contrast, he characterized an effort as the research and development thatwould be necessary to create biological weapons. In late June 2003, news reports stated that an employee of the State Department's Bureau ofIntelligence and Research maintained that Undersecretary Bolton's assertions about Cuba andbiological weapons were not supported by sufficient intelligence. (50) U.S. government concerns about Cuba's capability to produce biological weapons dates backseveral years. In 1998, then U.S. Secretary of Defense William Cohen stated in a transmittal letter(accompanying a report to Congress on Cuba's threat to U.S. national security) that he was"concerned about Cuba's potential to develop and produce biological agents, given its biotechnologyinfrastructure..." (51) Cuba began building up its biotechnology industry in the 1980s and has spent millionsinvesting in the sector. The industry was initially geared "to apply biotechnology and geneticengineering to agriculture in order to increase yields" but has also produced numerous vaccines,interferon, and other drugs and has exported many of its biotechnology products. (52) In 1999, the Britishpharmaceutical company GlaxoSmithKline announced an agreement to test and market a new Cubanmeningitis vaccine that might eventually be used in the United States. (53) In May 2003, the Centerfor Defense Information published a report on a delegation sent to Cuba that visited nine Cubanbiotechnology facilities. (54) In March 30, 2004, congressional testimony before the House International RelationsCommittee, Under Secretary of State John Bolton asserted that "Cuba remains a terrorist and BWthreat to the United States." According to Bolton: "The Bush Administration has said repeatedly thatwe are concerned that Cuba is developing a limited biological weapons effort, and called on FidelCastro to cease his BW aspirations and support of terrorism." Bolton went on to add a caveat,however, that "existing intelligence reporting is problematic, and the Intelligence Community'sability to determine the scope, nature, and effectiveness of any Cuban BW program has beenhampered by reporting from sources of questionable access, reliability, and motivation." (55) The New York Times reported on September 18, 2004 that the Bush Administration, using more stringent intelligencestandards, had "concluded that it is no longer clear that Cuba has an active, offensive bio-weaponsprogram." (56) Over the past several years, the FBI has arrested and convicted several Cuban intelligenceagents in the United States. In June 2001, five members of the so-called "Wasp Network" wereconvicted on espionage charges by a U.S. Federal Court in Miami. Sentences handed down inDecember 2001 ranged from 15 years to life in prison. The group tried to penetrate U.S. militarybases and exile groups. The Cuban government has vowed to work for the return of the five spieswho have been dubbed "Heroes of the Republic" by Cuba's National Assembly. In addition to thefive, a married couple was sentenced in January 2002 to prison terms of seven years and 3Â½ yearsfor their participation in the spy network. In addition, two U.S. government officials have been implicated in spying for Cuba. InFebruary 2000, an Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) official from Miami, MarianoFaget, was arrested and ultimately convicted in May 2000 for passing classified information to afriend with ties to Cuba. He was sentenced to five years in prison in June 2001. The case led to theState Department's expulsion of a Cuban diplomat working in Washington D.C. On September 21, 2001, Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) analyst Ana Montes wasarrested on charges of spying for the Cuban government. Montes reportedly supplied Cuba withclassified information about U.S. military exercises and other sensitive operations. (57) On March 19, 2002,Montes pled guilty to spying for the Cuban government for 16 years, during which she divulged thenames of four U.S. government intelligence agents working in Cuba and information about a "specialaccess program" related to U.S. national defense. On October 16, 2002, Montes was sentenced to25 years in prison in exchange for her cooperation with prosecutors as part of a plea bargain. In response to the espionage case, in early November 2002 the U.S. Department of Stateordered the expulsion of four Cuban diplomats in the United States, two from the Cuban InterestsSection in Washington D.C. and two from Cuba's U.N. Mission in New York. Cuba stronglyasserted that the diplomats were not involved in intelligence activities. On May 13, 2003, the BushAdministration ordered the expulsion of 14 more Cuban diplomats from the United States, sevenfrom Cuba's U.N. Mission and seven from the Cuban Interests Section in Washington for espionage. Cuba call the action an "irrational act of vengeance and claimed that the United States was trying toprovoke a confrontation that could result in the closure of the diplomatic offices in eachcountry. (58) In December2003, the State Department expelled a third secretary of the Cuban Interests Section in Washington. The 45-square mile U.S. naval facility at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, has been a U.S. base since1903, and under a 1934 treaty that remains in force, the U.S. presence can only be terminated bymutual agreement or by abandonment by the United States. When Fidel Castro assumed power inthe 1959 Cuban revolution, the new government gave assurances that it would respect all its treatycommitments, including the 1934 treaty covering the Guantanamo base. Subsequently, however,as U.S.-Cuban relations deteriorated, the Cuban government opposed the presence as illegal. The mission of the base has changed over time. During the Cold War, the base was viewedas a good location for controlling Caribbean sea lanes, as a deterrent to the Soviet presence in theCaribbean, and as a location for supporting potential military operations in the region. In 1994-1995,the base was used to house thousands of Cubans and Haitians fleeing their homeland, but by 1996the last of refugees had departed, with most Cubans paroled into the United States, pursuant to a May1995 U.S.-Cuban migration accord. Since the 1995 accord, the U.S. Coast Guard has interdictedthousands of Cubans at sea and returned them to Cuba, while a much smaller number, those deemedat risk for persecution, have been take to Guantanamo and then granted asylum in a third country. In the aftermath of increased violence in Haiti in February 2004, the base reportedly was beingconsidered as a contingency option to house Haitian migrants in the event of a mass exodus fromHaiti. (60) Another mission for the Guantanamo base emerged with the U.S.-led global campaignagainst terrorism in the aftermath of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks in the United States. With the U.S. war in Afghanistan in 2001, the United States decided to send captured Taliban andAl Qaeda fighters to be imprisoned in Guantanamo. Although the Cuban government objects to theU.S. presence at Guantanamo, it has not opposed the new mission of housing detainees. DefenseMinister Raul Castro noted that, in the unlikely event that a prisoner would escape into Cubanterritory, Cuba would capture the prisoner and return him to the base. (61) The Cuban government,however, has expressed concerns about the treatment of prisoners at the U.S. base and has said it willkeep pressing the international community to investigate the treatment of terrorist suspects. Atpresent, some 600 detainees are being held at Guantanamo. U.S.-government sponsored radio and television broadcasting to Cuba -- Radio and TV Marti-- began in 1985 and 1990 respectively. As spelled out in the Broadcasting Board of GovernorsFY2005 Budget Request , the objectives of Radio and TV Marti are 1) to support the right of theCuban people to seek, receive, and impart information and ideas through any media and regardlessof frontiers; 2) to be effective in furthering the open communication of information and ideasthrough use of radio and television broadcasting to Cuba; 3) to serve as a consistently reliable andauthoritative source of accurate, objective, and comprehensive news; and 4) to provide news,commentary, and other information about events in Cuba and elsewhere to promote the cause offreedom in Cuba. TV Marti broadcasts for four and one-half hours daily from facilities in Cudjoe Key, Florida;on May 20, 2002, the broadcast schedule was changed from the early hours of 3:30 a.m. - 8:00 a.m.to the evening hours of 6:00 p.m. - 10:30 p.m. In addition, TV Marti began broadcasting on theHispasat satellite 24 hours a day in September 2003. According to the Broadcasting Board ofGovernors Fiscal Year 2005 Budget Request, the Office of Cuba broadcasting (OCB) proposes toclose down the existing aerostat transmission system in Cudjoe Key, Florida, in September 2004. Radio Marti broadcasts 24 hours a day on short and medium wave (AM) channels. Surveysof Cubans have shown a Radio Marti listenership of 9% in 2000 and 5% in 2001. (62) There has been testing ofvarious methods to overcome Cuban jamming efforts. Until October 1999, U.S.-government funded international broadcasting programs had beena primary function of the United States Information Agency (USIA). When USIA was abolished andits functions were merged into the Department of State at the beginning of FY2000, the BroadcastingBoard of Governors became an independent agency that included such entities as the Voice ofAmerica (VOA), Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL), Radio Free Asia, and the Office ofCuba Broadcasting (OCB), which manages Radio and TV Marti. OCB is headquartered in Miami,Florida. Legislation in the 104th Congress ( P.L. 104-134 ) required the relocation of OCB fromWashington D.C. to south Florida. The move began in 1996 and was completed in 1998. Both Radio and TV Marti have at times been the focus of controversies, including adherenceto broadcast standards. There have been various attempts over the years to cut funding for theprograms, especially for TV Marti, which has not had an audience because of Cuban jammingefforts. Various studies and audits of these programs have been conducted, including investigationsby the U.S. General Accounting Office, by a 1994 congressionally established Advisory Panel onRadio and TV Marti, and by the State Department's Office of the Inspector General. (63) (For background on Cubabroadcasting through 1994, see CRS Report 94-636(pdf) , Radio and Television Broadcasting to Cuba:Background and Issues through 1994 .) From FY1984 through FY2004, Congress has appropriated about $460 million forbroadcasting to Cuba, with about $281 million for Radio Marti (since FY1984) and $179 million forTV Marti (since FY1989). Debate on TV Marti. In the various congressionaldebates on TV Marti over the years, opponents of continued funding of the program maintain thatvirtually the only people who see TV Marti in Cuba are those Cubans who visit the consular sectionof the U.S. Interests Section in Havana, which has a waiting room in which TV Marti may beviewed. These critics argue that almost $180 million has been spent by the United States for TVMarti, while the Cuban government only needs to spend a few thousand dollars to jam the broadcastseffectively. They argue that TV Marti is a waste of taxpayers' money because it does not contributeto the promotion of freedom and democracy in Cuba, unlike Radio Marti, which some Cubans listento as a source of information. Opponents also argue that the conversion of TV Marti from VHF toUHF transmission has not succeeded in overcoming Cuba's jamming efforts. In contrast, supporters of continued TV Marti funding point to a congressionally mandatedAdvisory Panel in 1994, which stated that "the Cuban people have an ardent desire and a genuineneed to receive the programming produced by TV Marti." (64) Supporters argue that eliminating TV Marti would send amessage to the Cuban people that the United States is not committed to the cause of freedom inCuba. They believe that eliminating TV Marti would be giving in to the dictatorial Castrogovernment, which suppresses the free flow of information in Cuba. These proponents contend thatit is impossible for the Cuban government to completely jam TV Marti, and maintain that significantnumbers of Cubans have attempted to tune in to the programming. Still others point to the potentialuse of TV Marti in the event of a crisis or upheaval in Cuba's future, and argue that in such ascenario, it would be important to have TV Marti available as a news source. Airborne Broadcasts. In early May 2004, theCommission for Assistance for a Free Cuba called for the immediate deployment of the EC-130E/JCommando Solo airborne platform for weekly airborne radio and television broadcasts to Cuba inorder to overcome Cuban jamming. It also called for funds "to acquire and refit a dedicated airborneplatform for full-time transmission of Radio and TV Marti into Cuba." In support of theserecommendations, President Bush directed that up to $18 million be committed "for regular airbornebroadcasts to Cuba and the purchase of a dedicated airborne platform for the transmission of Radioand Television Marti into Cuba." The longer term proposal for a dedicated airborne platform wouldnot be a military aircraft but an aircraft acquired and operated by the Broadcasting Board ofGovernors' Office of Cuba Broadcasting (OCB). Assistant Secretary of State for WesternHemisphere Affairs Noriega indicated that some of the funding may come from existing resourcesalready provided for Cuba broadcasting, while there may be additional resources provided. (65) At present, there are six EC-130E/J Commando Solo aircraft flown by the Air Force SpecialOperations Wing at Harrisburg, Pennsylvania. The aircraft are specialized assets that have been usedto conduct information operations, psychological operations, and civil affairs broadcasts worldwideincluding Grenada in 1983, Operation Desert Storm in 1990-1991, Kosovo in 1999, OperationEnduring Freedom in Afghanistan, and Operation Iraqi Freedom. (66) In May 2003, the aircraftwas used in a test to broadcast Radio and TV Marti to Cuba in an effort to overcome Cuban jammingof the U.S.-government broadcasts. The State Department announced that Radio and TV Marti werebroadcast via the airborne platform for several hours on August 21, 2004. While the production cost of the military aircraft range from $70 million for the EC-130Eto $90 million for the EC-130J, (67) the cost of acquiring and refitting an aircraft to be operated bythe Office of Cuba Broadcasting would be much less and would probably be covered by the amountof funding called for by the President. FY2003 Funding. In September 2002, bothhouses approved the conference report ( H.Rept. 107-671 ) to the Foreign Relations Authorization Actfor FY2003 ( H.R. 1646 ) that authorized $25.923 million for Cuba broadcasting forFY2003. The President signed the measure into law on September 30, 2002 as P.L. 107-228 . The Bush Administration requested $25.362 million for broadcasting to Cuba for FY2003,with about $15 million for Radio Marti and $10 million for TV Marti. In the 107th Congress, theSenate Appropriations Committee reported out its version of the FY2003 Commerce, Justice, Stateand Related Agencies (CJS) appropriations bill, S. 2778 ( S.Rept. 107-218 ) on July 24,2002, which would have provided $24.996 million for Cuba broadcasting. Final action on themeasure was not completed before the end of the 107th Congress. In the 108th Congress, the finalversion of the FY2003 omnibus appropriations bill, H.J.Res. 2 ( P.L. 108-7 ), whichincludes Commerce, Justice and State appropriations in Division B, provides $24.996 million forRadio and TV Marti broadcasting to Cuba. FY2004 Funding. For FY2004, theAdministration requested $26.901 million for Cuba broadcasting, with $16.355 million for RadioMarti and $10.546 million for TV Marti. The House-approved version of the FY2004 Commerce,Justice, and State Department appropriations bill, H.R. 2799 , would fund theAdministration's request for Cuba broadcasting under the International Broadcasting OperationsAccount, but without a specific earmark. The House Appropriations Committee report to the bill( H.Rept. 108-221 ) recommended full funding of the Administration's Cuba broadcasting request. The Senate Appropriations Committee version of the bill, S. 1585 , would provide$28.201 million for Cuba broadcasting, $1.2 million more than the Administration's request. According to the committee report to the bill, S.Rept. 108-144 , the additional funding is to be usedto enhance efforts to defeat Cuban government jamming. The Committee directed the BroadcastingBoard of Governors and the Office of Cuba Broadcasting "to use all available means to overcomethe jamming of Radio and TV Marti, including broadcasting via the Internet and satellite." In theend, funding for Commerce, Justice, and State Department appropriations was included in theFY2004 Consolidated Appropriations Act, H.R. 2673 , ( H.Rept. 108-401 ), whichconsisted of seven regular appropriations bills. The conferees funded Cuba broadcasting underInternational Broadcasting Operations Account, but without a specific earmark, and stated in thereport that they expected the Broadcasting Board of Governors to provide $1.2 million to pursuealternative means of transmission, including Internet transmission, of Cuba broadcasting. FY2005. The Administration requested $27.6million for Cuba broadcasting, with $17.4 million for Radio Marti and $10.3 million for TV Marti,and this was fully funded in the FY2005 omnibus appropriations measure ( H.R. 4818 , H.Rept. 108-792 ). The Office of Cuba Broadcasting (OCB) is proposing to close down the existingaerostat transmission system for TV Marti in Cudjoe Key, Florida in September 2004, while thebroadcast will continue to be carried on the Hispasat satellite. The OCB is reportedly continuing toexplore ways of mitigating the jamming of TV Marti. The House-passed version of the Commerce, Justice, and State appropriations measure, H.R. 4754 , would have funded Cuba broadcasting under the International BroadcastingOperations account, but without a specific earmark. The report to the bill ( H.Rept. 108-576 )recommended full funding of the Administration's $27.6 million request. The Senate version of thebill, S. 2809 , as reported out of committee ( S.Rept. 108-344 ) would have fully fundedthe Administration's request with a specific earmark of $27.6 million under the InternationalBroadcasting Operations account. In the end, funding was included in the FY2005 omnibusappropriations measure ( H.R. 4818 , H.Rept. 108-792 ), which earmarked $27.6 millionfor Cuba broadcasting. In terms of authorization legislation, the House-passed version of the State Departmentauthorization bill for FY2004 and FY2005, H.R. 1950 (Hyde), would have authorized(Section 121) $26.901 million for Cuba broadcasting for FY2004 and $27.439 million for FY2005. Section 502 of the bill would have amended the Radio Broadcasting to Cuba Act to use additionalAM frequencies and the FM and Shortwave bands to improve Radio Marti signal delivery to Cuba. Section 503 of the bill would require a report on efforts to counter jamming of Radio and TV Martibroadcasts. The Senate version of the bill for FY2005, S. 2144 (Section 111), wouldhave authorized appropriations for radio and television broadcasting to Cuba within the InternationalBroadcasting Operations account but without a specific earmark. Over the past several years, the U.S. Agency for International Development has providedassistance to increase the flow of information on democracy, human rights, and free enterprise toCuba. USAID's Cuba program supports a variety of U.S.-based non-governmental organizations topromote rapid, peaceful transition to democracy, help develop civil society, and build solidarity withCuba's human rights activists. (68) These efforts are funded through the annual foreign operationsappropriations bill. In FY2001, $4.989 million was provided for various Cuba projects; $5 millionwas provided in FY2002; $6 million was provided in FY2003; almost $7 million will be providedin FY2004; and the Administration has requested $9 million for FY2005. For FY2004, the Administration requested $7 million in Economic Support Funds forinformation dissemination to foster democratic progress and the development of a civil society inCuba. The House-passed version of the FY2004 foreign operations appropriations bill, H.R. 2800 , had no specific earmark for democracy funding for Cuba, but the HouseAppropriations Committee report to the bill, H.Rept. 108-122 , noted that the committee fullysupported the Administration's $7 million request. The Senate-passed version of H.R. 2800 (Section 699G), would have provided not more than $5 million in Transition Initiatives fundsfor "individuals and independent nongovernmental organizations to support democracy-buildingeffort for Cuba," essentially opening up another spigot of funding for Cuba democracy projects. Inthe end, the conference on H.R. 2800 was included in Division D of P.L. 108-199 ( H.R. 2673 , H.Rept. 108-401 ), the FY2004 omnibus appropriations measure. Theconferees did not earmark assistance for Cuba democracy programs, but the conference reportrecommended full funding of the Administration's $7 million in Economic Support Funds fordemocracy programs supported by USAID. For FY2005, the Administration requested $9 million to back public diplomacy to promotedemocratization, respect for human rights, and the development of a free market economy in Cuba. The House-passed version of the FY2005 foreign operations appropriations bill, H.R. 4818 , did not specifically earmark such assistance for Cuba, but the House AppropriationsCommittee's report to the bill ( H.Rept. 108-599 ) noted that the committee fully supports theAdministration's budget request. In final action, Congress fully funded the $9 million request forCuba projects in the FY2005 omnibus appropriations (H.R. 4818, H.Rept. 108-792 ). In terms of authorization legislation, the House-passed version of the Foreign Relationsauthorization bill for FY2004 and FY2005, H.R. 1950 , would, in Section 1807, haveauthorized $15 million for each of FY2004 and FY2005 to support democracy-building efforts forCuba. The Senate version of the authorization measure, S. 2144 , the Foreign AffairsAuthorization Act, Fiscal Year 2005, had no such provision. (69) In addition, anotherlegislative initiative introduced in the 108th Congress, S. 1089 (Ensign), would haveauthorized $15 million to support democracy building in Cuba and $30 million to the President toestablish a fund to provide assistance to a transition government in Cuba. In early May 2004, the President endorsed the recommendation of the Commission forAssistance to a Free Cuba and directed that up to $29 million be made available fordemocracy-building activities for Cuba to augment the $7 million in FY2004 funding already beingprovided by USAID. It is unclear how the additional assistance relates to the FY2005 budget requestof $9 million for USAID projects to promote democratization. In addition, the President directedthat $5 million for public diplomacy initiatives be provided to "illuminate the reality of Castro'sCuba." In addition to funding through foreign operations appropriations, the United States providesdemocratization assistance for Cuba through the National Endowment for Democracy (NED), whichis funded through the annual Commerce, Justice, and State (CJS) appropriations measure. Cubafunding through NED has steadily increased over the past several years. NED-funded democracyprojects for Cuba amounted to $765,000 in FY2001; $841,000 in FY2002; and $1.143 million inFY2003. 1994 and 1995 Agreements. In 1994 and 1995,Cuba and the United States reached two migration accords designed to stem the mass exodus ofCubans attempting to reach the United States by boat. On the minds of U.S. policymakers was the1980 Mariel boatlift in which 125,000 Cubans fled to the United States with the approval of Cubanofficials. In response to Castro's threat to unleash another Mariel, U.S. officials reiterated U.S.resolve not to allow another exodus. Amidst escalating numbers of fleeing Cubans, on August 19,1994, President Clinton abruptly changed U.S. migration policy, under which Cubans attempting toflee their homeland were allowed into the United States, and announced that the U.S. Coast Guardand Navy would take Cubans rescued at sea to the U.S. naval base at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. Despite the change in policy, Cubans continued fleeing in large numbers. As a result, in early September 1994, Cuba and the United States began talks that culminatedin a September 9, 1994 bilateral agreement to stem the flow of Cubans fleeing to the United Statesby boat. In the agreement, the United States and Cuba agreed to facilitate safe, legal, and orderlyCuban migration to the United States, consistent with a 1984 migration agreement. The UnitedStates agreed to ensure that total legal Cuban migration to the United States would be a minimumof 20,000 each year, not including immediate relatives of U.S. citizens. In a change of policy, theUnited States agreed to discontinue the practice of granting parole to all Cuban migrants who reachthe United States, while Cuba agreed to take measures to prevent unsafe departures from Cuba. In May 1995, the United States reached another accord with Cuba under which the UnitedStates would parole the more than 30,000 Cubans housed at Guantanamo into the United States, butwould intercept future Cuban migrants attempting to enter the United States by sea and would returnthem to Cuba. The two countries would cooperate jointly in the effort. Both countries also pledgedto ensure that no action would be taken against those migrants returned to Cuba as a consequenceof their attempt to immigrate illegally. On January 31, 1996, the Department of Defense announcedthat the last of some 32,000 Cubans intercepted at sea and housed at Guantanamo had left the U.S.Naval Base, most having been paroled into the United States. Elian Gonzalez Case. (71) From late November 1999through June 2000, national attention became focused on Cuban migration policy as a result of theElian Gonzalez case, the five-year old boy found clinging to an inner tube off the coast of FortLauderdale. The boy's mother drowned in the incident, while his father, who resided in Cuba, calledfor his return. Although the boy's relatives in Miami wanted him to stay in the United States, theImmigration and Naturalization Service ruled that the boy's father had the sole legal authority tospeak on his son's behalf. After numerous legal appeals by the Miami relatives were exhausted, theboy returned to Cuba with his father in June 2000. In Cuba, Fidel Castro orchestrated numerousmass demonstrations and a media blitz on the issue until the boy's return. The case generated anoutpouring of emotion among the Cuban population as well as in south Florida. Wet Foot/Dry Foot Policy. Since the 1995migration accord, the U.S. Coast Guard has interdicted thousands of Cubans at sea and returned themto their country, while those deemed at risk for persecution have been transferred to Guantanamo andthen found asylum in a third country. Those Cubans who reach shore are allowed to apply forpermanent resident status in one year, pursuant to the Cuban Adjustment Act of 1966 (P.L. 89-732). This so-called "wet foot/dry foot" policy has been criticized by some as encouraging Cubans to risktheir lives in order to make it to the United States and as encouraging alien smuggling. Othersmaintain that U.S. policy should welcome those migrants fleeing Communist Cuba whether or notthey are able to make it to land. U.S. prosecution against migrant smugglers in Florida has increased in recent years withnumerous convictions. There have been several violent incidents in which Cuban migrants havebrandished weapons or in which Coast Guard officials have used force to prevent Cubans fromreaching shore. In July 2003, a U.S. federal court in Florida convicted a Cuban national for hijackinga plane to Key West on April 1, 2003. Another six Cubans were convicted in Key West inDecember 2003 for hijacking a Cubana Airlines plane to Florida in March 2003. The Cuban government has taken forceful action against individuals engaging in aliensmuggling. Prison sentences of up to three years may be imposed against those engaging in aliensmuggling, and for incidents involving death or violence, a life sentence may be imposed. On April11, 2003, the Cuban government executed three men who had hijacked a ferry in Havana on April2 in an attempt to reach the United States. The ferry hijacking had been preceded by the hijackingof two small planes to the United States. The summary execution prompted worldwidecondemnation of the Cuban government. The Cuban government maintained that it took the actionto prevent additional hijackings. The U.S. Interest Section in Havana has officers that visit the homes of returned migrants toassess the Cuban government's treatment of those repatriated. The Department of State (pursuantto P.L. 105-277 , Section 2245) makes a semi-annual report to Congress on the methods employedby the Cuban government to enforce the the 1994 migration agreement and on the Cubangovernment's treatment of those returned. In the most recent report to Congress, submitted in May2004, the State Department noted that it has been unable to monitor returnees outside Havana sinceMarch 2003. The State Department noted, however, that prior to that time, "a majority of thereturnees it monitored did not suffer retribution from the Cuban authorities as a result of theirattempt to depart illegally" but noted that "there continued to be clear and credible instances ofharassment and punishment of returnees." (72) On July 21, 2003, the U.S. Coast Guard repatriated 15 Cubans who had been interdicted ona Cuban government vessel that had been stolen on July 15 (12 of the Cubans were involved instealing the boat and overpowered the three others who were guarding the government vessel.) TheUnited States returned the Cubans after assurances from the Cuban government that no one wouldface execution and no one would serve more than 10 years in prison. The Cuban government laudedthe return of the migrants for being in line with the 1995 migration agreement. The repatriation ofthe migrants prompted widespread criticism of the Administration in Florida and among someMembers of Congress. Some critics called for an investigation into the U.S.-Cuban negotiations thatled to the return of the migrants and some have called for the Administration to change the policyof repatriating those Cubans interdicted at sea. Supporters of the policy maintained thatimplementation of the migration accords is important for preventing another mass exodus of Cubansfleeing to the United States. On October 10, 2003, the President announced that the United States would increase thenumber of new Cuban immigrants each year, improve the method of identifying refugees, redoubleefforts to process Cubans seeking to leave Cuba, and initiative a public information campaign inFlorida and Cuba to better inform Cubans of the routes to safe and legal migration to the UnitedStates. The President's announcement was in part a response to the criticism of the Administration'smigration policy in the aftermath of the July 2003 repatriation of several Cubans involved in stealinga Cuban government vessel. Migration Talks. Semi-annual U.S.-Cuban talks(held alternatively between Cuba and the United States) had been held regularly on theimplementation of the 1994 and 1995 migration accords, but the State Department cancelled the 20thround of talks scheduled for January 8, 2004. According to the State Department, Cuba has refusedto discuss five issues identified by the United States: (1) Cuba's issuance of exit permits to allqualified migrants; (2) Cuba's cooperation in holding a new registration for an immigrant lottery; (3)the need for a deeper Cuban port utilized by the U.S. Coast Guard for the repatriation of Cubansinterdicted at sea; (4) Cuba's responsibility to permit U.S. diplomats to travel to monitor returnedmigrants; and (5) Cuba's obligation to accept the return of Cuban nationals determined to beexcludable from the United States. (73) In response to the cancellation of the talks, Cuban officials maintained that the U.S. decisionwas irresponsible and that it was prepared to discuss all of the issues raised by the UnitedStates. (74) The last timetalks were suspended was in 2000 by the Cuban government when Elian Gonzalez was in the UnitedStates. The cancellation of the talks has increased concern among those in Cuba seeking visas tomigrate legally. Excludables. Under a 1984 U.S.-Cubanmigration accord, Cuba agreed to take back 2,746 so-called excludables, criminal alines and mentallyill people, who had arrived in the 1980 Mariel boatlift. To date, Cuba has taken back over 1,600 ofthose on the 1984 list. Another issue in U.S.-Cuban relations is the return of Cubans in the UnitedStates not on the 1984 list who are no longer eligible to remain in the United States because ofcriminal offenses. Over 900 Cubans reportedly fall into this category, and Cuba will not accept theirreturn. (The Supreme Court announced in January 2004 that it wold rule on whether the federalgovernment can indefinitely imprison Cubans and other immigrants who have finished their prisonsentences but whose home countries will not accept their return.) (75) The United States hasproposed a technical working group from both governments to explore options that would allow forthe return of some of these excludables. (76) P.L. 107-77 ( H.R. 2500 / S. 1215 ). State Department and RelatedAgencies Appropriations, FY2002. The measure fully funded the Administration's request of$24.872 million for broadcasting to Cuba for FY2002. H.R. 2500 reported by the HouseCommittee on Appropriations ( H.Rept. 107-139 ) July 13, 2001. House passed (408-19), amended,July 18, 2001. S. 1215 reported by the Senate Committee on Appropriations July 20, 2001( S.Rept. 107-42 ). On September 10, 2001, the Senate substituted the language of S. 1215as its version of H.R. 2500, and on September 13, 2001 the Senate passed (97-3) the bill,amended. Conference report ( H.Rept. 107-278 ) filed November 9, 2001. House approved conference(411-15) on November 14, 2001, and the Senate approved it (98-1) on November 15, 2001. Signedinto law November 28, 2001. P.L. 107-115 ( H.R. 2506 ). Foreign Operations Appropriations, FY2002.Introduced and reported by the House Committee on Appropriations July 17, 2001 ( H.Rept.107-142 ). House passed (381-46) July 24, 2001. The House committee report to the bill notes thatthe Appropriations Committee fully supports the Administration's budget request of at least $5million aimed at promoting democracy in Cuba. Senate Committee on Appropriations reported itsversion September 2, 2001 ( S.Rept. 107-58 ). Senate passed (96-2) October 24, 2001. The Senateversion would have provided $1.5 million for the Department of State and other agencies to establishcooperation with Cuba on counter-narcotics matters. Conference report ( H.Rept. 107-345 ) filedDecember 19, 2001, without the Senate provision on counter-narcotics cooperation with Cuba. However, the conference report called for a report by the Secretary of State within six months on 1)the extent, if any of the direct involvement of the government of Cuba in illegal drug trafficking; 2)the likelihood that U.S. international narcotics assistance to the government of Cuba would decreasethe flow of drugs transiting through Cuba, and 3) the degree to which the government of Cuba isexchanging with U.S. agencies drug-related law enforcement information. The conference reportalso encouraged the Administration to transmit to Congress, not later than nine months, anylegislation necessary to decrease the flow of drugs to or from Cuba. House agreed (357-66) to theconference December 19; Senate agreed (unanimous consent) December 20. Signed into lawJanuary 10, 2002. P.L. 107-228 ( H.R. 1646 ). Foreign Relations Authorization Act, FY2002 andFY2003. Conference report ( H.Rept. 107-671 ) filed September 23, 2002; Section 121 of theconference report version of the bill authorized $25.923 million for FY2003 for Cuba broadcasting.House agreed to conference report by voice vote September 25, 2002; Senate agreed by unanimousconsent September 26, 2002. Signed into law September 30, 2002. H.Res. 91 (Smith, Christopher). Expressing the sense of the House ofRepresentatives regarding the human rights situation in Cuba. House passed (347-44, 22 present)April 3, 2001. S.Res. 272 (Nelson). Expresses support for the Varela Project. IntroducedMay 20, 2002. Senate Foreign Relations Committee reported May 29, 2002. Senate approved (87-0)June 10, 2002. H.R. 4818 ( H.Rept. 108-792 ). Consolidated Appropriations Act for FY2005. Originally introduced as FY2005 Foreign Operations Appropriations, which the House approved onJuly 13, 2004, and the Senate approved, amended, on September 23, 2004. Conference report, H.Rept. 108-792 , filed November 20, 2004, which incorporated nine regular appropriations bills.The House agreed (344-51) to the conference report on November 20, 2004, as did the Senate(65-30). The House is scheduled to complete action on a measure correcting the enrollment of H.R.4818 before it is sent to the President. Division A, covering agriculture appropriations, dropped the Cuba provision that had beenincluded in the Senate committee version of S. 2803 (Section 776) that would haveeased restrictions on travel to Cuba if it was related to the commercial sale of agricultural andmedical products. Division B, covering Commerce, Justice and State appropriations, dropped the Cubaprovision in the House-passed version of H.R. 4754 (Section 801) that would haveprohibited funds from being used to implement recent restrictions on gift parcels and on baggage fortravelers. The omnibus measure also earmarks $27.629 million for broadcasting to Cuba, the fullamount requested by the Administration. Division D, covering Foreign Operations appropriations, drops contrasting House- andSenate-approved provisions from the original versions of H.R. 4818 related toassistance for cooperation with Cuba on counter-narcotics matters. The Senate version would haveprovided $5 million in International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement assistance for suchefforts, while the House version would have prohibited such assistance. The measure omnibus alsoearmarks $9 million in Economic Support Funds, as requested by the Administration, for Cubaprojects to promote democratization, respect for human rights, and the development of a free marketeconomy. Division H, covering Transportation/Treasury appropriations, drops all House and Senateprovisions that would have eased Cuba sanctions. These consisted of three House provisions in H.R. 5025 that would have eased Cuba sanctions on family and educational travel andon private commercial sales of agricultural and medical products; and one Senate provision in thecommittee version S. 2806 that would have prohibited funds from administering orenforcing restrictions on Cuba travel. P.L. 108-199 ( H.R. 2673 ). Consolidated Appropriations Act for FY2004. Originally introduced as the FY2004 agriculture appropriations measure, which the House passedJuly 14, 2003, and the Senate passed November 6, 2003. On November 25, 2003, a conferencereport was filed, H.Rept. 108-401 , which incorporated seven regular appropriations acts for the year. Conference report agreed to (242-176) in House November 25, 2003; agreed to (65-28) in SenateJanuary 22, 2004. Signed into law January 23, 2004. Division A, covering agriculture appropriations, dropped the Cuba provision that had beenincluded in the Senate-approved version of H.R. 2673 (Section 760) that would haveallowed travel to Cuba under a general license (without applying to the Treasury Department) fortravel related to commercial sales of agricultural and medical goods. Division B, covering Commerce, Justice, and State appropriations, funds Radio and TVbroadcasting to Cuba under the International Broadcasting Operations Account, but without aspecific earmark. The conferees state that they expect the Broadcasting Board of Governors toprovide $1.2 million to pursue alternative means of transmission, including Internet transmission,of Cuba broadcasting. The Administration requested $26.901 million for Cuba broadcasting, with$16.355 million for Radio Marti and $10.546 million for TV Marti. Also see H.R. 2799 / S. 1585 below. Division D, covering foreign operations appropriations, did not include assistance forcounter-narcotics cooperation with Cuba that had been in the Senate-approved version of H.R. 2800 (Section 680), nor did it include the provision in the House version of bill(Section 571) that would have prohibited such assistance. Division D also would fund democracyprograms for Cuba. While the conferees did not earmark assistance for Cuba democracy programsin the bill, the conference report recommended full funding of the Administration's $7 million inEconomic Support Funds for democracy programs supported by USAID. The House-passed versionof H.R. 2800 had no earmark (although the House report, H.Rept. 108-122 , recommendedfull funding of the Administration's $7 million request), while the Senate-passed version of H.R.2800 (Section 699G) would have provided not more than $5 billion in TransitionInitiatives funds for democracy-building efforts for Cuba. Also see H.R. 2800/S.1426 below. Division F, covering Transportation-Treasury appropriations, dropped all provisions easingCuba sanctions that had been included in the House- and Senate-approved versions of H.R. 2989 . Both the House and Senate versions of H.R. 2989 had a nearlyidentical provision (Section 745 in the House version and Section 643 in the Senate verison) thatwould have prevented funds from being used to administer or enforce restrictions on travel ortravel-related transactions. In addition, the House version of H.R. 2989 had provisions thatwould have prevented funds from being used to administer or enforce restrictions on remittances(Section 746) and from being used to eliminate the travel category of people-to-people educationalexchanges (Section 749). Also see H.R. 2989/S. 1589 below. P.L. 108-7 ( H.J.Res. 2 ). Consolidated Appropriations Resolution, 2003.President signed into law February 20, 2003. While the measure does not earmark funding for humanrights and democracy projects for Cuba, it does fund FY2003 Foreign Operations appropriations; theAdministration's FY2003 foreign aid request had included $6 million for such projects ($5.750 wasultimately allocated by the Administration). Also see "Cuba Broadcasting" below for the law'sprovisions regarding Radio and TV Marti. H.Con.Res. 16 (Andrews). To call for the immediate release of all politicalprisoners in Cuba, including Dr. Oscar Elias Biscet. Introduced January 28, 2003; referred toCommittee on International Relations. H.Con.Res. 125 (Deutsch). Expressing the sense of Congress regarding thearrests of Cuban democracy activists by the Cuban government. Introduced March 27, 2003;referred to Committee on International Relations. H.R. 1201 (Ros-Lehtinen). Cuban Victims of Torture Act. To posthumouslyrevoke the naturalization of Eriberto Mederos. Introduced March 11, 2003; referred to Committeeon the Judiciary. H.R. 1950 (Hyde). Foreign Relations Authorization Act, FY2004 andFY2005. Introduced May 5, 2003. Reported by Committee on International Relations May 16, 2003( H.Rept. 108-105 ). House (382-42) passed July 16, 2003. As approved, Section 1807 wouldauthorize $15 million for each of FY2004 and FY2005 to support democracy-building efforts forCuba. (For additional provisions, see "Cuba Broadcasting" below.) H.R. 2800 (Kolbe)/ S. 1426 (McConnell). FY2004 ForeignOperations Appropriations. H.R. 2800 introduced and reported by House Committee onAppropriations July 21, 2003 ( H.Rept. 108-222 ). House passed (370-50) July 24, 2003. S.1426 introduced and reported by Senate Committee on Appropriations July 17, 2003( S.Rept. 108-106 ). Senate passed H.R. 2800 October 30, 2003, by voice vote. The billfunds the Administration's request for human rights and democracy projects for Cuba. The Houseversion does not earmark funding for such projects, although the House Appropriations Committeereport to the bill notes that the committee fully supports the Administration's $7 million request inEconomic Support Funds. The Senate-passed version, in Section 699G, provides not more than $5million in Transition Initiatives funding to support democracy-building efforts for Cuba. (Also see"Anti-Drug Cooperation" below for additional provisions.) For further action, see P.L. 108-199 (H.R. 2673), Consolidated Appropriations Sct for FY2004, above. H.R. 4818 (Kolbe)/ S. 2812 (McConnell). FY2005 ForeignOperations Appropriations. H.R. 4818 introduced and reported ( H.Rept. 108-599 ) bythe House Appropriations Committee July 13, 2004. House approved (365-41), amended, July 15,2004. S. 2812 reported ( S.Rept. 108-346 ) by the Senate Appropriations CommitteeSeptember 15, 2004. Senate approved H.R. 4818, amended, by voice vote on September23, 2004. Neither version specifically earmarks the Administration's $9 million request for projectsto promote democratization, respect for human rights, and the development of a free marketeconomy, but the House Appropriations Committee report to the bill notes that the committee fullysupports the Administration's budget request. does not specifically earmark the Administration'srequest. (Also see "Anti-Drug Cooperation" below for additional provisions of the bill.) For finalaction, see "FY2005 Consolidated Appropriations Act" above. H.Res. 164 (Flake). Expressing the sense of the House regarding the humanrights situation in Cuba, and for other purposes. Introduced March 26, 2003; referred to theCommittee on International Relations Committee. H.Res. 179 (Diaz-Balart, Lincoln). Expresses the sense of the Houseregarding the systematic human rights violations in Cuba committed by the Castro regime, calls forthe immediate release of all political prisoners, and supports respect for basic human rights and freeelections in Cuba. Introduced April 7, 2003. House passed (414-0, 11 present) April 8, 2003. H.Res. 208 (Foley). Condemns the Cuban government's brutal crackdown;calls on the UNCHR to recognize the resolution passed by the House condemning Cuba for itshuman rights atrocities and condemns the member states of the United Nations Economic and SocialCouncil for renewing Cuba's membership on the UNCHR. Introduced April 30, 2003; referred toHouse Committee on International Relations. H.Res. 563 (Ros-Lehtinen). Expressing the sense of the House regarding theone-year anniversary of the human rights crackdown in Cuba. Introduced March 16, 2004; referredto the Committee on International Relations. S. 1089 (Ensign). Cuba Transition Act of 2003. To encourage multilateralcooperation and authorize a program of assistance to facilitate a peaceful transition in Cuba. Requires the Secretary of State to designate a coordinator, with the rank of ambassador, for Cuba'stransition. Authorizes the Secretary of State to designate up to $5 million of monies provided to theOrganization of American States for human rights activities, election support, and scholarships forCuban students. Authorizes $15 million in foreign operations funding to support democracy-buildingefforts for Cuba. Authorizes $30 million for the President to establish a fund to provide assistanceto a transition government in Cuba. Introduced May 20, 2003; referred to Committee on ForeignRelations. S.Res. 62 (Ensign). Calling upon the OAS Inter-American Commission onHuman Rights, the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights, the European Union, and humanrights activists throughout the world to take certain actions in regard to the human rights situationin Cuba. Introduced February 24, 2003; referred to Committee on Foreign Relations. Senate agreedto by unanimous consent on June 27, 2003. S.Res. 97 (Nelson). Expresses the sense of the Senate regarding the arrestsof Cuban democracy activists by the Cuban government. Introduced March 25, 2003; SenateCommittee on Foreign Relations discharged by unanimous consent. Senate amended and agreed tothe resolution April 7, 2003, by unanimous consent. S.Res. 146 (Reid). Expressing the sense of the Senate regarding theestablishment of an international tribunal to prosecute crimes against humanity committed by FidelCastro and other Cuban political leaders. Introduced May 20, 2003; referred to Committee onForeign Relations. S.Res. 328 (Nelson). Expresses the sense of the Senate regarding thecontinued human rights violations committed by Fidel Castro and the Cuban government, calls onCuba to immediately release individuals imprisoned for political purposes, and calls upon the 60thsession of the U.N. Commission on Human Rights to condemn Cuba for its human rights abuses anddemand that inspectors from the International Committee of the Red Cross be allowed to visit andinspect Cuban prisons. Introduced April 1, 2004; Senate passed, amended, April 8, 2004, byunanimous consent. H.R. 187 (Serrano). To amend the Trade Sanctions Reform and ExportEnhancement Act of 2000 to allow for the financing of agricultural sales to Cuba. Introduced January7, 2003; referred to Committee on Financial Services and in addition to the Committees onInternational Relations and Agriculture. H.R. 188 (Serrano). Cuba Reconciliation Act. To lift the trade embargo onCuba, and for other purposes. Introduced January 7, 2003; referred to Committee on InternationalRelations and to Committees on Ways and Means, Energy and Commerce, the Judiciary, FinancialServices, Government Reform, and Agriculture. H.R. 1698 (Paul). To lift the trade embargo on Cuba, and for other purposes.Introduced April 9, 2003; referred to Committee on International Relations, and in addition to theCommittees on Ways and Means, Energy and Commerce, the Judiciary, Financial Services,Government Reform, and Agriculture. H.R. 2071 (Flake). Export Freedom to Cuba Act of 2003. To allow travelbetween the United States and Cuba. Introduced May 13, 2003; referred to the Committee onInternational Relations. H.R. 2494 (Rangel)/ S. 2002 (Baucus). United States-CubaTrademark Protection Act of 2003. To improve and promote international intellectual propertyobligations relating to the Republic of Cuba, and for other purposes. Section 3 (d) would repeal aprovision in the FY1999 omnibus appropriations measure (Section 211 of Division A, title II, P.L.105-277 ) that prohibits transactions or payments with respect to trademark registrations and renewalsfrom foreign nationals that were used in connection with a business or assets in Cuba that wereconfiscated. H.R. 2494 introduced June 17, 2003; referred to the Committee onInternational Relations and to the Committee on the Judiciary. S. 2002 introducedDecember 9, 2003; referred to Committee on the Judiciary. H.R. 2989 (Istook)/ S. 1589 (Shelby). Transportation, Treasury,and Independent Agencies Appropriations Act, FY2004. H.R. 2989 reported by HouseCommittee on Appropriations July 30, 2003 ( H.Rept. 108-243 ). House approved September 9, 2003(381-39) after approving three Cuba sanctions amendments: H.Amdt. 375 (Flake)(227-188) would prevent funds from enforcing travel restrictions(Section 745); H.Amdt. 377 (Delahunt) (222-196) would prevent funds from enforcing restrictions on remittances (Section746); and H.Amdt. 382 (Davis) (246-173) would prohibit funds from being used toeliminate the travel category of people-to-people educational exchanges (Section 749). S.1589, reported September 8, 2003 ( S.Rept. 108-146 ), had no such Cuba provisions, but duringSenate floor consideration of H.R. 2989 on October 23, 2003, the Senate approved byvoice vote S.Amdt. 1900 (Dorgan), nearly identical to the Flake amendment notedabove, that would prevent funds from being used to administer or enforce restrictions on travel ortravel-related transactions (Section 643). The only difference between the Flake and Dorganamendments is that the Dorgan amendment, as amended by S.Amdt. 1901 (Craig),provides that the section will take effect one day after enactment of the bill. A motion to table theDorgan amendment was defeated by a vote of 59-36. Senate approved H.R. 2989 October23, 2003 (91-3). For further action, see P.L. 108-199 (H.R. 2673), ConsolidatedAppropriations Act for FY2004, above. H.R. 3422 (Serrano). To provide the people of Cuba with access to food,medicines and other humanitarian goods and from the United States, to ease restrictions on travelto Cuba, to provide scholarships for certain Cuban nationals, to repeal the prohibition on transactionsor payments with respect to certain U.S. intellectual property, to provide for expedited securitychecks for certain visiting Cubans, and to remove restrictions in order to allow Cuban nationals tocome to the United States to play organized professional sports. Introduced October 30, 2003;referred to Committee on International Relations, and in addition to the Committees on Agriculture,Financial Services, Government Reform, the Judiciary, and Ways and Means. H.R. 3470 (Rothman). To amend the Cuban Liberty and DemocraticSolidarity (LIBERTAD) Act of 1996 to require that, in order to determine that a democraticallyelected government in Cuba exists, the government extradite to the United States convicted felonJoanne Chesimard and all other individuals who are living in Cuba in order to escape prosecutionor confinement from criminal offenses committed in the United States. Introduced November 6,2003; referred to Committee on International Relations. H.R. 3670 (Deutsch). Anti-Communist Cooperation Act of 2003. To amendthe Internal Revenue Code to impose a 100% tax on amounts received from trading with Cuba if thetrading is conditioned on lobbying Congress to lift trade or travel restrictions. Introduced December8, 2003; referred to Committee on Ways and Means. H.R. 4225 (Smith of Texas)/ S. 2373 (Domenici). To modifythe prohibition on recognition by United States courts of certain rights relating to certain marks, tradenames, or commercial names. H.R. 4225 introduced April 28, 2004; referred to HouseCommittee on the Judiciary. S. 2373 introduced April 29, 2004; referred to SenateCommittee on the Judiciary. H.R. 4678 (Davis). To bar certain additional restrictions on travel andremittances related to per-diem allowances, family visits, remittances, and accompanied baggage. Introduced June 24, 2004; referred to House Committee on International Relations. H.R. 4754 (Wolf)/ S. 2809 (Gregg). Commerce, Justice, andState, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, FY2005. House Committee onAppropriations reported H.R. 4754 ( H.Rept. 108-576 ) July 1, 2004. House approved(398-18) July 8, 2004. As approved, the bill included a provision (Section 801) prohibiting fundsfrom being used to implement, administer, or enforce recent amendments to Cuba embargoregulations that tightened restrictions on gift parcels and baggage taken by individuals for travel toCuba. The provision was added to the bill on July 7, 2004, when the House approved, by vote of221-194, a Flake amendment ( H.Amdt. 647 ). S. 2809 reported ( S.Rept.108-340 ) September 14, 2004. The Senate version of the bill has no such provision on gift parcelsand baggage. (Also see the bill's additional provisions on "Cuba Broadcasting" below.) For finalaction, see "FY2005 Consolidated Appropriations Act" above. H.R. 4766 (Bonilla)/ S. 2803 (Bennett). AgricultureAppropriations, FY2005. H.R. 4766 reported ( H.Rept. 108-584 ) by the HouseAppropriations Committee July 7, 2004. House passed July 13, 2004. S. 2803 reported( S.Rept. 108-340 ) September 14, 2004. As reported, S. 2803 has a provision (Section 776)directing the Secretary of the Treasury to promulgate regulations allowing for travel to Cuba undera "general license" when it is related to the commercial sale of agricultural and medical products. H.R. 4766 has no such provision. In its statement of policy on the bill, the Administrationstated that the President would veto the measure if it contained a provision weakening Cubasanctions. For final action, see "FY2005 Consolidated Appropriations Act" above. H.R. 5025 (Istook)/ S. 2806 (Shelby). Transportation, Treasury,and Independent Agencies Appropriations Act, FY2005. H.R. 5025 reported ( H.Rept.108-671 ) by House Appropriations Committee September 8, 2004. House approved (397-12)September 22, 2004. S. 2806 reported ( S.Rept. 108-342 ) by Senate AppropriationsCommittee September 15, 2004. Both House and Senate versions have different provisions thatwould ease Cuba sanctions. The Administration indicated that the President would veto the measureif it weakened Cuba sanctions. As approved by the House, H.R. 5025 has three provisions easing Cubasanctions. During floor consideration on September 21, 2004, the House approved a Davis (ofFlorida) amendment ( H.Amdt. 769 ) by a vote of 225-174, which provides that no fundsmay be used to administer, implement, or enforce the Bush Administration's June 2004 tighteningof restrictions on visiting relatives in Cuba; this became Section 647. On September 22, 2004, theHouse approved by voice vote: a Lee amendment ( H.Amdt. 771 ) that prohibits fundsfrom being used to implement, administer, or enforce the Bush Administration's June 2004tightening of restrictions on travel for educational activities -- this became Section 648; and a Watersamendment ( H.Amdt. 770 ) that prohibits funds from being used to implement anysanction imposed on private commercial sales of agricultural commodities or medicine or medicalsupplies to Cuba -- this became Section 649. The House also rejected a Rangel amendment( H.Amdt. 772 ) on September 22, 2004, by a vote of 225-188 that would have morebroadly prohibited funds from being used to implement, administer, or enforce the economicembargo of Cuba. S. 2806 , as reported out of committee has a provision (Section 222) that wouldprohibit funds from administering or enforcing restrictions on travel or travel-related transactions. For final action, see "FY2005 Consolidated Appropriations Act" above. S. 403 (Baucus). United States-Cuba Trade Act of 2003. To lift the tradeembargo on Cuba, and for other purposes. Introduced February 13, 2003; referred to the Committeeon Finance. S. 950 (Enzi). Freedom to Travel to Cuba Act of 2003. To allow travelbetween the United States and Cuba. Introduced April 30, 2003; referred to the Committee onForeign Relations. Senate Foreign Relations ordered reported November 11, 2003. S. 2449 (Baucus)/ H.R. 4457 (Otter). Cuba Sanctions ReformAct of 2004. To require congressional renewal of trade and travel restrictions with respect to Cuba. S. 2449 introduced May 19, 2004; referred to Senate Committee on Finance. H.R.4457 introduced May 20, 2004; referred to House Committee on International Relationsand to Committees on Rules, Ways and Means, Energy and Commerce, Financial Services, andAgriculture. P.L. 108-7 ( H.J.Res. 2 ). Consolidated Appropriations Resolution, 2003.President signed into law February 20, 2003. The final version provides $24.996 million for Radioand TV Marti broadcasting to Cuba (Division B, Commerce, Justice, and State appropriations). Alsosee "Human Rights" above regarding the law's funding of human rights and democracy projects. H.R. 1950 (Hyde). Foreign Relations Authorization Act, FY2004 andFY2005. Introduced May 5, 2003. Reported by Committee on International Relations May 16, 2003( H.Rept. 108-105 ). House passed (382-42) July 16, 2003. As approved, Section 121 would authorize$26.901 million for Cuba broadcasting for FY2004 and $27.439 million for FY2005. Section 502bill would amend the Radio Broadcasting to Cuba Act to use additional AM frequencies and the FMand Shortwave bands to improve Radio Marti signal delivery to Cuba. Section 503 of the bill wouldrequire a report on efforts to counter jamming of Radio and TV Marti broadcasts. (For additionalprovisions, see "Human Rights and Democracy" above.) H.R. 2799 (Wolf)/ S. 1585 (Judd). Commerce, Justice, andState, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, FY2004. Introduced and reported bythe House Appropriations Committee ( H.Rept. 108-221 ). House passed (400-21) July 23, 2003. TheHouse-passed bill would fund the Administration's request for Cuba broadcasting under theInternational Broadcasting Operations Account, but without a specific earmark. The HouseAppropriations Committee report to the bill recommends full funding of the Administration's Cubabroadcasting request, $26.901 million. S. 1585 reported by the Senate Committee onAppropriations September 5, 2003 ( S.Rept. 108-144 ). The Senate version would provide $28.201million for Cuba broadcasting, $1.2 million more than the Administration's request. According tothe committee report, the additional funding is to be used to enhance efforts to defeat Cubangovernment jamming. For further action, see P.L. 108-199 (H.R. 2673), ConsolidatedAppropriations Act for FY2004, above. H.R. 4754 (Wolf)/ S. 2809 (Gregg). Commerce, Justice, and State,the Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, FY2005. House Committee onAppropriations reported ( H.Rept. 108-576 ) July 1, 2004. House approved (398-18) July 8, 2004. As approved, the bill would fund the Administration's request for Cuba broadcasting under theInternational Broadcasting Operations account, but without a specific earmark. The report to the billrecommends full funding of the Administration's $27.6 million request. S. 2809 reported by the Senate Appropriations Committee ( S.Rept. 108-344 ) September 14, 2004. Asreported, the bill would fully fund the Administration's request with a specific earmark of $27.6million under the International Broadcasting Operations account. (See the bill's additional provisionsmodifying U.S. sanctions above.) For final action, see "FY2005 Consolidated Appropriations Act"above. S. 925 (Lugar). Foreign Relations Authorization Act, FY2004 and FY2005. Section 111 would authorize appropriations for radio and television broadcasting to Cuba within theInternational Broadcasting Operations account but without a specific earmark. Introduced andreported by Committee on Foreign Relations April 24, 2003 ( S.Rept. 108-39 ). For further action, see S. 2144 . S. 2144 (Lugar). Foreign Affairs Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 2005.Section 111 would authorize funding for Cuba broadcasting, but without a specific earmark, underthe International Broadcasting Operations account. Introduced February 27, 2004; Senate ForeignRelations Committee reported March 18, 2004 ( S.Rept. 108-248 ). H.R. 1432 (Rangel). To authorize the Secretary of State to enter intonegotiations with representatives of the Cuban government to establish cooperation between theUnited States and Cuba on illicit narcotics control efforts. Introduced March 25, 2003; referred tothe Committee on International Relations. H.R. 2800 (Kolbe)/ S. 1426 (McConnell). FY2004 ForeignOperations Appropriations. H.R. 2800 introduced and reported by House Committee onAppropriations July 21, 2003 ( H.Rept. 108-222 ). House passed (370-50) July 24, 2003. The Houseversion would, in Section 571, provide that no International Narcotics Control and Law EnforcementFunds be made available for assistance to Cuba. S. 1426 introduced and reported bySenate Committee on Appropriations July 17, 2003 ( S.Rept. 108-106 ). Senate approved H.R.2800, amended, October 30, 2003 by voice vote. The Senate version would provide $5million in International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement assistance for preliminary work toestablish cooperation with Cuba on counter-narcotics matters. The money would not be availableif Cuba does not have in place appropriate procedures to protect against the loss of life in connectionwith the interdiction of illegal drugs or if there is evidence that the Cuban government is involvedin drug trafficking. For further action, see P.L. 108-199 (H.R. 2673), ConsolidatedAppropriations Act for FY2004, above. H.R. 4818 (Kolbe)/S. 2812 (McConnell). FY2005 ForeignOperations Appropriations. Introduced and reported ( H.Rept. 108-599 ) by the House AppropriationsCommittee July 13, 2004. House approved (365-41), amended, July 15, 2004. S. 2812 reported ( S.Rept. 108-346 ) by the Senate Appropriations Committee September 15, 2004. Senateapproved H.R. 4818 , amended, by voice vote on September 23, 2004. The Houseversion (Section 572) prohibits International Narcotics Control Law Enforcement assistance for thegovernment of Cuba. The Senate version has a provision (Sec. 5091) providing $5 million toestablish cooperation with appropriate agencies of the Cuban government on counter-narcoticsmatters. (Also see "Human Rights and Democracy" above for additional provisions of the bill.) For final action, see "FY2005 Consolidated Appropriations Act" above. H.R. 189 (Serrano). Baseball Diplomacy Act. Waives certain prohibitionswith respect to nationals of Cuba coming to the United States to play organized professionalbaseball. Introduced January 7, 2003; referred to the Committee on International Relations and tothe Committee on the Judiciary. H.R. 3422 (Serrano). Among the bill's provisions, the measure would providefor expedited security checks for certain visiting Cubans and remove restrictions in order to allowCuban nationals to come to the United States to play organized professional sports. IntroducedOctober 30, 2003; referred to Committee on International Relations, and in addition to theCommittees on Agriculture, Financial Services, Government Reform, the Judiciary, and Ways andMeans. (Also see "Modification of Sanctions" above for the bill's additional provisions.) CRS Report RL32308 , Appropriations for FY2005: Transportation, Treasury, Postal Service,Executive Office of the President, General Government, and Related Agencies, coordinatedby [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed]. CRS Report RL31808 , Appropriations for FY2004: Transportation, Treasury, Post Office,Executive Office of the President, General Government, and Related Agencies, coordinatedby [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed]. CRS Report RS20450(pdf) , The Case of Elian Gonzalez: Legal Basics, by [author name scrubbed]. CRS Report RL32251 , Cuba and the State Sponsors of Terrorism List , by Mark P. Sullivan. CRS Report RL30837, Cuba: An Economic Primer, by [author name scrubbed]. CRS Report RL30806 , Cuba: Issues for the 107th Congress, by [author name scrubbed] and MaureenTaft-Morales. CRS Report RL30628 , Cuba: Issues and Legislation in the 106th Congress , by [author name scrubbed] and[author name scrubbed]. CRS Report RL31139 , Cuba: U.S. Restrictions on Travel and Remittances, by [author name scrubbed]. CRS Report RL30386(pdf) , Cuba-U.S. Relations: Chronology of Key Events 1959 -1999, by Mark P.Sullivan. CRS Report RS20468 , Cuban Migration Policy and Issues, by [author name scrubbed]. CRS Issue Brief IB10061, Exempting Food and Agriculture Products from U.S. EconomicSanctions: Status and Implementation, by [author name scrubbed]. CRS Report 94-636(pdf) , Radio and Television Broadcasting to Cuba: Background and Issues Through1994, by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed]. CRS Report RS21764 , Restricting Trademark Rights of Cubans: WTO Decision and CongressionalResponse , by [author name scrubbed]. CRS Report RL31258 , Suits Against Terrorist States by Victims of Terrorism , by David M.Ackerman. CRS Report RS21003, Travel Restrictions: U.S. Government Limits on American Citizens' TravelAbroad , by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed]. Figure 1. Map of Cuba

Summary: Cuba under Fidel Castro remains a hard-line communist state with a poor record on humanrights that has deteriorated significantly since 2003. With the cutoff of assistance from the formerSoviet Union, Cuba experienced severe economic deterioration from 1989 to 1993. While there hasbeen some improvement since 1994, as Cuba has implemented limited reforms, the economyremains in poor shape. Since the early 1960s, U.S. policy toward Cuba has consisted largely of isolating the islandnation through comprehensive economic sanctions. Another component of U.S. policy consists ofsupport measures for the Cuban people, including private humanitarian donations andU.S.-sponsored radio and television broadcasting to Cuba. The Bush Administration has furthertightened restrictions on travel for family visits, other categories of travel, and on sending privatehumanitarian assistance to Cuba. While there appears to be broad agreement on the overall objectiveof U.S. policy toward Cuba -- to help bring democracy and respect for human rights to the island,there are several schools of thought on how to achieve that objective. Some advocate maximumpressure on the Cuban government until reforms are enacted; others argue for lifting some U.S.sanctions that they believe are hurting the Cuban people. Still others call for a swift normalizationof U.S.-Cuban relations. Several FY2005 appropriations bills had provisions that would have eased Cuba sanctions,but ultimately these provisions were not included in the FY2005 omnibus appropriations measure( H.R. 4818 , H.Rept. 108-792 ). The House-passed version of the FY2005 Commerce,Justice, and State appropriations bill, H.R. 4754 , would have prohibited funds toimplement recent restrictions on gift parcels and on baggage for travelers. The House-passed versionof the FY2005 Transportation/Treasury appropriations bill, H.R. 5025 , had three Cubaprovisions that would have eased sanctions on family and educational travel, and on privatecommercial sales of agricultural and medical products; the Senate committee version of the bill, S. 2806 , would have prohibited funds from administering or enforcing restrictions onCuba travel. The Senate committee version of the FY2005 Agriculture appropriation bill, S. 2803 , would have eased restrictions on travel to Cuba if it was related to thecommercial sale of agricultural and medical products. The Administration had threatened to vetoboth the Transportation/Treasury and Agriculture appropriations measures if they had provisionsweakening Cuba sanctions. In other action, the 108th Congress demonstrated concern about the poor human rightssituation by approving four resolutions: S.Res. 97 , H.Res. 179 , S.Res. 62 , and S.Res. 328 . Numerous additional legislative initiatives wereintroduced that would have eased sanctions on Cuba, but no action was completed on these bills: H.R. 187 , H.R. 188 , H.R. 1698 , H.R. 2071 , H.R. 3422 , H.R. 4678 , S. 403 , S. 950 , and S. 2449 / H.R. 4457 . Two initiatives, H.R. 3470 and H.R. 3670 , would have tightened sanctions. H.R. 2494 / S. 2002 would have repealed a provision in law that prohibits trademark registration or courts fromconsidering trademark claims if the trademark was used in connection with confiscated assets inCuba; in contrast, H.R. 4225 / S. 2373 would have applied a narrow fix tothe law so that it conformed with a World Trade Organization ruling.