The American military has often relied upon contractors to support military operations. During the Revolutionary War, the Continental Army relied on contractors to provide such goods and services as transportation and engineering services, clothing, and weapons. Congress has generally accepted the concept of using unarmed contractors to carry out support functions in military operations. But for the Department of Defense (DOD), Afghanistan and Iraq present new challenges. The United States is relying heavily, apparently for the first time during combat or stability operations, on private firms to supply a wide variety of security services. Given current troop levels, PSCs are widely viewed as vital to U.S. efforts in the region. The U.S. government is just one of many entities—including foreign governments, international organizations, and private industry—that employ private security contractors in Afghanistan and Iraq. In recent years, many other nations and organizations, including the United Nations, have increasingly turned to private contractors to provide security, as well as a variety of other functions, in support of stabilization and reconstruction efforts. This increased reliance on contractors has fueled the growth of the private security industry worldwide. There is some debate as to what constitutes a private security contractor. Some commentators define private security as any activity that a company undertakes that is directly related to protecting a person, place, or thing. Others use a broader definition that includes such activities as providing intelligence analysis, operational coordination, and the training of military or law enforcement personnel. The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 ( P.L. 110-181 Sec. 864) defined private security functions as the guarding of personnel, facilities, or property, and any other activity for which contractors are required to be armed. Such a definition does not include unarmed personnel providing services directly related to security, such as coordinating the movements of PSCs throughout Afghanistan and Iraq. Many of the services provided by companies that consider themselves PSCs go beyond providing armed security. For the purposes of this report, the services provided by private security contractors can be divided into two major categories: armed services and unarmed services. Armed services include static (site) security—protecting fixed or static sites, such as housing areas, reconstruction work sites, or government buildings; convoy security—protecting convoys traveling through unsecured areas; security escorts—protecting individuals traveling in unsecured areas; and personal security details—providing full-time protective security to high-ranking individuals. For some PSCs, unarmed services represent more than 50% of their total revenue. Unarmed security services include operational coordination—establishing and managing command, control, and communications operations centers; intelligence analysis—gathering information and developing threat analysis; hostage negotiations; and security training—providing training to domestic or international security forces. How the term private security contractor is defined affects how one counts the number of contractors. For example, according to the Department of Defense (DOD), as of December 2009, there were 11,095 PSC employees in Iraq, of which 1,664 (15%) provided unarmed services. This figure does not include contractors, armed or unarmed, who trained security forces, analyzed intelligence, or conducted interrogations. In June 2010, DOD stopped providing data on armed versus unarmed personnel. As a result, PSC data in this report include both armed and unarmed PSC personnel (previous CRS reports distinguished between armed and unarmed personnel). Historically, the percentage of armed PSC personnel working for DOD was 90% or greater. Security contractors come from all over the world to work in Afghanistan and Iraq. Peter Singer of the Brookings Institution estimated that citizens of some 30 countries have worked as security contractors in Iraq. PSC employees are generally divided by nationality into three groups: 1. U.S. nationals, 2. Third-country nationals, and 3. Local nationals. U.S. and coalition nationals often have military or law enforcement experience and are generally the easiest to vet through a background check. Third-country nationals are generally cheaper than U.S. coalition contractors, even though some third-country nationals have extensive military training and experience. Local nationals are generally the least expensive to hire, in part because there are no large overhead costs related to transportation, housing, and sustenance. Using local nationals as security contractors can also provide a number of potential benefits, such as providing jobs, building relationships and developing contacts with the local population, and having a security force that has a better understanding of the region. However, local nationals are often more difficult to screen and can be more easily infiltrated by hostile forces. In Iraq, as of December 2010, there were 100 PSCs registered and licensed (or in the process of renewing their license) with the Ministry of Interior (72 Iraqi companies and 28 foreign companies). These PSCs employed more than 30,000 armed employees working for a variety of government and private sector clients. The number of Iraqi PSCs has increased over the past two years. According to some analysts, the primary clients for non-Iraqi PSCs have shifted dramatically over the past two years from working for the U.S. government to working for private industry (such as international oil companies) and non-governmental organizations. In Afghanistan, there were recently 52 PSCs licensed to operate with some 30,000 registered security contractors. PSCs operating in Afghanistan are limited to 500 employees and can only exceed 500 with permission from the Cabinet. Because of the legal restrictions placed on security companies in Afghanistan, a number of PSCs have operated without a license or have exceeded the legal limit, including security contractors working for NATO and the U.S. government. Many analysts believe that regulations governing PSCs are only enforced in Kabul; outside Kabul there is limited government reach at present, and local governors, chiefs of police, and politicians run their own illegal PSCs. Estimates of the total number of security contractor personnel in Afghanistan, including those that are not licensed, are as high as 70,000. The majority of these PSCs do not work for the U.S. government. In recent months, the Karzai government has sought to decrease the number of PSCs. In the fall of 2010, the Afghan government disbanded some PSCs and allowed some licenses to expire. In March 2011, the Afghan government approved a negotiated agreement with the international community that calls for a twelve-month bridging strategy for reducing, but not eliminating, the use of PSCs by coalition forces, diplomatic entities, and international organizations. Pursuant to the agreement, PSCs will continue to operate for one year, while the capability and capacity of the Afghan Public Protection Force (APPF), a guard force run by the Afghan Ministry of the Interior, is developed. Congress has generally focused more on PSCs than other specific contracting issues, even though such contractors represent a minority of all DOD and Department of State contractors in Afghanistan and Iraq. Much of the attention given to PSCs is a result of numerous high-profile incidents in which security contractors were accused of shooting civilians in Afghanistan and Iraq, using excessive force, being insensitive to local customs or beliefs, or otherwise behaving in a manner that has raised concerns (see below " Can the Use of PSCs Undermine U.S. Efforts? "). Congress has also focused on whether DOD is effectively managing PSCs and whether improved oversight could have prevented or minimized the impact of these incidents. Hearings have been held in the Senate Committee on Armed Services, the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, the House Oversight and Government Reform Committee, the House Committee on Armed Services, and the House Judiciary Committee . The National Security and Foreign Affairs Subcommittee of the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform conducted a hearing, Investigation of Protection Payments for Safe Passage along the Afghan Supply Chain , which focused on armed private security contractors providing convoy security along the Afghan supply chain. More recently, a Senate Armed Services Committee report found evidence of U.S.-funded prime contractors supporting the Taliban and subcontracting to warlords. Congress has enacted legislation to address some of its concerns. In the FY2008 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), Congress required the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Secretary of State, to prescribe regulations and guidance relating to screening, equipping, and managing private security personnel in areas of combat operations. These regulations were to include tracking private security contractor (PSC) employees, authorizing and accounting for weapons used by PSCs, and reporting requirements whenever a security contractor discharges a weapon, kills or injures another person, or is killed or injured. Included in the FY2009 NDAA is a "Sense of the Congress" provision that private security contractors should not perform inherently governmental functions, such as security protection of resources in high-threat operational environments. The FY2011 NDAA contained three sections that deal specifically with PSCs. Section 831 revised the regulations prescribed in the FY2008 NDAA; Section 832 required these regulations to also be applied to "other significant military operations." Section 833 required the Secretary of Defense to determine whether the private sector developed a useful certification processes for determining if PSCs are adhering to industry standards, and if such a process exists, to incorporate the standards into DOD contracting procedures. Private security contractors can provide significant operational benefits to the U.S. government. Contractors can often be hired and deployed faster than a similarly skilled and sized military force. Because security contractors can be hired and fired quickly as needed, using contractors can allow federal agencies to adapt more easily to changing environments around the world. In contrast, adapting the military force structure or training significant numbers of Department of State civilian personnel can take months or years. Security contractors also serve as a force multiplier for the military, freeing up uniformed personnel to perform combat missions or providing the State Department with the necessary security capabilities when State's civilian security force is stretched thin. In some cases, security contractors may possess unique skills that the government workforce lacks. For example, local nationals hired by U.S. government agencies working overseas may provide critical knowledge of the terrain, culture, and language of the region. Using PSCs can also save the government money. Contractors can be hired when a particular security need arises and be let go when their services are no longer needed. Hiring contractors only as needed can be cheaper in the long run than maintaining a permanent in-house capability. According to government officials, both DOD and the Department of State would be unable to execute their missions in Afghanistan and Iraq without the support of PSCs. DOD did not begin to gather data on private security contractors until the second half of 2007. As a result, the following CRS analysis includes the past two and a half years, ending March 31, 2011. In addition, a number of analysts have raised questions about the reliability of the data gathered. In October 2010, GAO reported that DOD's quarterly contractor reports represent only a rough approximation of the number of contractors and therefore should not be relied upon for precise analysis. DOD officials have acknowledged these shortcomings; the census for the third quarter of FY2009 notes that the recorded 19% increase in armed security contractors over the previous quarter is partly a result of "continued improved ability to account for subcontractors who are providing security services." As of March 2011, there were more than 28,000 private security contractor personnel in Afghanistan and Iraq, representing 18% of DOD's total contractor workforce in Afghanistan and Iraq. Since December 2009, the number of PSC personnel in Afghanistan has exceeded the number in Iraq (see Figure 1 ). Since December 2009, the number of PSC personnel in Afghanistan has exceeded the number of PSC personnel in Iraq. According to DOD, as of March 2011, there were 18,971 private security contractor personnel in Afghanistan. This represents the highest recorded number of private security contractor personnel used by DOD in any conflict in the history of the United States. Local nationals made up 95% of all security personnel (see Table 1 ). According to DOD, for the 15-month period of September 2007 to December 2008, the number of security contractors in Afghanistan increased by 16%, from 3,152 to 3,689. However, from December 2008 to March 2011, the number of security contractors increased from 3,689 to 18,971, an increase of over 400% (see Figure 2 ). DOD has attributed the increase in contractors to increased operational tempo and efforts to stabilize and develop new and existing forward operating bases. From December 2008 to March 2011, the number of U.S. troops and DOD contractor personnel in Afghanistan increased. However, the number of security contractors increased at a much faster rate (414%) than total contractors (26%) or troop levels (207%). As of March 2011, security contractor personnel made up 21% of all DOD contractors and was equal to 19% of the size of total U.S. troop presence in Afghanistan (see Figure 3 ). According to DOD, from June 2009 to November 2010, 319 private security contractor personnel working for DOD have been killed in action in Afghanistan, compared to 626 U.S. troops killed in action over the same period. Adjusting for the difference in the number of PSC personnel compared to troops, a PSC employee working for DOD in Afghanistan is 2.75 times more likely to be killed in action than uniformed personnel (see Figure 4 ). More contractor security personnel were killed in action providing mobile security (233 people or 73% of fatalities) than static security, even though those providing mobile security are only 25%-30% of the total PSC workforce. According to DOD, since September 2007, local nationals have made up 90% or more of all security contractors in Afghanistan (see Figure 5 ). According to DOD, as of March 2011, there were 9,207 private security contractor personnel working for DOD in Iraq. Local nationals made up just 6% of all security personnel, compared to 95% in Afghanistan (see Table 2 ). According to DOD, from September 2007 to June 2009, the number of security contractors increased from 6,068 to a high of 15,279, an increase of 152%. However, from June 2009 to March 2011, the number of security contractors decreased by 6,072, or 40% (see Figure 6 ). DOD officials anticipate that the number of security contractors in Iraq will continue to decrease, much as the overall number of contractors and troops in Iraq is decreasing. As the military continues to withdraw from Iraq, the Department of State will assume greater responsibility for providing security and will have to hire more PSC personnel. It is estimated that the number of security contractors working for State will increase to approximately 5,500, with some 1,500 providing personal security for diplomatic movements and an additional 4,000 providing perimeter security. Despite the Department of State's increasing reliance on PSCs, the overall number of PSC personnel working in Iraq for the United States is not increasing. As stated above, the number of PSC personnel working for DOD has declined by more than 6,000—more than offsetting the estimated additional 3,000 PSC personnel that the Department of State anticipates having to hire as a result of the transition from DOD to State. From December 2007 to March 2011, the number of troops in Iraq dropped from 165,700 to 45,600, a decrease of 72%. The total number of contractors dropped from a high of approximately 163,000 in September 2008 to approximately 64,300 in March 2011, a decrease of 61%. The number of PSCs peaked at 15,279 in June 2009. As reflected in Figure 7 , even as overall contractor and troop levels were generally falling, the number of PSCs was increasing. This trend was reversed in June 2009 and as discussed above, the number of PSC personnel working for DOD in Iraq has since dropped by 40%. PSC personnel represent approximately 14% of all DOD contractors in Iraq. According to DOD, from September 2009 to November 2010, four private security contractor personnel working for DOD were killed in action in Iraq, compared to 26 U.S. troops killed over the same period. Adjusting for the difference in the number of PSC personnel compared to troops, a PSC employee working for DOD in Iraq was 1.2 times more likely to be killed in action than uniformed personnel. However, the relatively fewer number of deaths in Iraq make this analysis less mathematically significant than in Afghanistan. Contracting local nationals is an important element in DOD's counterinsurgency strategy. In January 2009, General Raymond Odierno issued a memorandum stating "employment of Iraqis not only saves money but it also strengthens the Iraqi economy and helps eliminate the root causes of the insurgency—poverty and lack of economic opportunity." The memorandum set forth a goal of increasing the percentage of local national contractors. From January 2009 to March 2011, the percentage of local nationals serving as security contractors has decreased from 13% to 6% (see Figure 8 ). As of March 2011, there were 563 local national PSC personnel compared to more than 7,700 third-country nationals personnel. In contrast to Iraq, where 6% of security contractor personnel were local nationals, in Afghanistan, 95% are local nationals (see Table 1 and Figure 2 ). According to the Army Field Manual on counterinsurgency, one of the fundamental tenets of counterinsurgency operations—such as those undertaken in Afghanistan and Iraq—is to establish and maintain security while simultaneously winning the hearts and minds of the local population. Abuses by security forces, according to the manual, can be a major escalating factor in insurgencies. Abuses committed by contractors, including contractors working for both DOD and U.S. civilian agencies, can also strengthen anti-American insurgents. There have been published reports of local nationals being abused and mistreated by DOD contractors in such incidents as the summary shooting by a private security contractor of an Afghan who was handcuffed, the shooting of Iraqi civilians, and the abuse of prisoners at Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq. (It should be noted that there have also been reports of military personnel abusing and otherwise mistreating local nationals, including the abuses that took place at Abu Ghraib prison. CRS has not conducted an analysis to determine whether the incidence of abuses is higher among contractors than it is among military personnel.) Many of the high-profile reports of PSCs shooting local nationals or otherwise acting irresponsibly were committed by contractors working for the Department of State. Some of these incidents include the reported shooting of Iraqi civilians by Triple Canopy employees, the shooting of 17 Iraqi civilians at a Baghdad traffic circle in Nisoor Square by Blackwater employees, and the recent controversy over the behavior of security contractors from Armour Group who were hired to protect the U.S. embassy in Afghanistan. Of the six incidents listed above, five were committed by U.S. companies and U.S. nationals. Incidents of abuse still occur in Afghanistan. From 2006 to 2009, private security contractors escorting supply convoys to coalition bases have been blamed for killing and wounding more than 30 innocent civilians in Afghanistan's Maywand district alone, leading to at least one confrontation with U.S. forces. And in May 2010, U.S. and Afghan officials reportedly stated that local Afghan security contractors protecting NATO supply convoys in Kandahar "regularly fire wildly into villages they pass, hindering coalition efforts to build local support." One officer from a Stryker brigade deployed in Afghanistan was quoted as saying that these contractors "tend to squeeze the trigger first and ask questions later." And unlike in Iraq, where a series of high-profile incidents involved U.S. security personnel, in Afghanistan, many of the guards causing the problems are Afghans. Recent U.S. government investigations have also found that U.S. money for contracts in Afghanistan has been used to pay the Taliban in exchange for security. The Office of the Inspector General for the U.S. Agency for International Development found that "millions of dollars in American taxpayer funds may have been paid to Taliban fighters in southern Afghanistan to provide security for a U.S. development project." The majority report issued by the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform's Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs found similar evidence that U.S. contractors made protection payments to local warlords to secure safe passage of supply convoys. The investigation further found that protection payments may even have gone to the Taliban. And the Senate Armed Services Committee issued a report that found evidence of U.S.-funded prime contractors supporting the Taliban and subcontracting to warlords. According to many analysts, these events have in fact undermined the U.S. mission in Afghanistan and Iraq. An Iraqi Interior Ministry official, discussing the behavior of private security contractors, said "Iraqis do not know them as Blackwater or other PSCs but only as Americans." One senior military officer reportedly stated that the actions of armed PSCs "can turn an entire district against us." Some analysts also contend that PSCs can be a direct threat to the legitimacy of the local government. These analysts argue that if counterinsurgency operations are a competition for legitimacy but the government is allowing armed contractors to operate in the country without the contractors being held accountable for their actions, then the government itself can be viewed as not legitimate in the eyes of the local population. These analysts point to the recent court decision dismissing the case against former Blackwater employees as a case in point where the legitimacy of the U.S. and local government is being undermined by the actions of PSCs. The extent to which the behavior of private security contractors in Afghanistan has hurt coalition efforts in Afghanistan was discussed by Major General Nick Carter (United Kingdom), International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) Afghanistan Regional Command South, who stated that the "culture of impunity" that exists around PSCs is a serious problem that needs to be dealt with and that this culture is to some degree "our own doing." The perception that DOD and other government agencies are deploying PSCs who abuse and mistreat people can fan anti-American sentiment and strengthen insurgents, even when no abuses are taking place. There have been reports of an anti-American campaign in Pakistan, where stories are circulating of U.S. private security contractors running amok and armed Americans harassing and terrifying residents. U.S. efforts can also be undermined when DOD has ties with groups that kill civilians or government officials, even if the perpetrators were not working for DOD when the killings took place. In June 2009, the provincial police chief of Kandahar, Afghanistan, was killed by a group that worked as a private security contractor for DOD. Pointing to the example of the killing of the police chief in Kandahar, some analysts have also argued that the large-scale use of armed contractors in certain countries can undermine the stability of fragile governments. In a paper for the U.S. Army War College, Colonel Bobby A. Towery wrote After our departure, the potential exists for us to leave Iraq with paramilitary organizations that are well organized, financed, trained and equipped. These organizations are primarily motivated by profit and only answer to an Iraqi government official with limited to no control over their actions. These factors potentially make private security contractors a destabilizing influence in the future of Iraq. These and other considerations have led a number of analysts, government officials, and military officers to call for limiting the use of PSCs in combat and stability operations. Some analysts have called for completely barring the use of PSCs during such operations. The executive summary for the U.S. Naval Academy's 9 th Annual McCain Conference on Ethics and Military Leadership takes this position: We therefore conclude that contractors should not be deployed as security guards, sentries, or even prison guards within combat areas. PSCs should be restricted to appropriate support functions and those geographic areas where the rule of law prevails. In irregular warfare (IW) environments, where civilian cooperation is crucial, this restriction is both ethically and strategically necessary. Others have suggested a more targeted approach, such as limiting DOD's use of PSCs to providing only static security in combat areas, leaving all convoy and personal security details to the military. Analysts calling for restrictions on the use of PSCs generally believe that contractors are more likely to commit abuses or other atrocities than military personnel. Some analysts believe that the culture of the military, which is focused on mission success and not on profit or contractual considerations, makes it less likely that uniformed personnel will behave inappropriately. Some analysts and DOD officials believe that lax contractor oversight has significantly contributed to contractor abuses. This sentiment was echoed by then Senator Barack Obama, who stated "we cannot win a fight for hearts and minds when we outsource critical missions to unaccountable contractors." According to these analysts, improved oversight and accountability could mitigate the negative effects that the use of PSCs and other contractors has had on U.S. efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq, and could potentially bring the standard of behavior of PSCs on par with that of uniformed personnel. DOD officials have stated that the military's experience in Afghanistan and Iraq, coupled with congressional attention and legislation, has focused DOD's attention on the importance of contractors to operational success. DOD has taken steps to improve how it manages and oversees all contractors in Afghanistan and Iraq. These steps include tracking contracting data, implementing contracting training for uniformed personnel, increasing the size of the acquisition workforce to manage contractors in Afghanistan and Iraq, implementing rules and regulations for managing and coordinating PSCs, and updating DOD doctrine as it relates to contractors generally. To the extent that DOD improves the management and oversight of contractors broadly, management and oversight of security contractors should also be improved. DOD has also taken a number of steps to specifically improve management and oversight of PSCs. In July 2009, DOD issued an Instruction, Private Security Contractors (PSCs) Operating in Contingency Operations , establishing policy and procedures for managing private security contractors during contingency operations. DOD also released an interim rule modifying the Code of Federal Regulations that lays out policy regarding the use of private security contractors in war zones. The interim rule includes policies and procedures for selecting, training, equipping, and overseeing private security contractors. DOD established Contractor Operations Cells in Iraq and in Afghanistan to coordinate the movement of PSCs, and it established the Armed Contractor Oversight Division to receive serious incident reports involving PSCs and to ensure that all of the incidents are reported, tracked, and investigated. DOD's efforts have improved the management, oversight, and coordination of PSCs in Iraq. These and other improvements have been discussed at length and noted by the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, the Government Accountability Office, and the Commission on Wartime Contracting, which called DOD's improved management of PSCs a success story. Many analysts believe that such improvements can help rein in contractor behavior that undermines U.S. efforts. However, according to a number of analysts, substantial gaps still remain in DOD's management of PSCs, particularly in Afghanistan. DOD officials stated that improving the management of PSCs is a work in progress that could take some time to fully implement. DOD has actively participated in international efforts to develop a code of conduct for PSCs. On November 9, 2010, 58 companies signed the International Code of Conduct for Private Security Service Providers to limit the use of force, respect human rights of local nationals, vet and train personnel, and report any violations. As of April 1, 2011, 94 companies signed the code of conduct. The U.S. government continues to actively participate in developing a governance and oversight mechanism for the code of conduct. Of the 29 PSCs working for DOD in Iraq and Afghanistan, 19 (66%) had signed on to the international code of conduct. Of the 10 companies that did not sign the code, six were Afghan and one was an Iraqi company. In assessing whether legislative action could help minimize the harm that armed private security contractors could have on U.S. efforts in Iraq, Afghanistan, and future operations, Congress may consider the options discussed below. Many analysts believe that the use of armed private security contractors in combat or stability operations poses significant risks to U.S. government interests, including undermining efforts to win hearts and minds during counterinsurgency and other contingency operations. Defining the role that PSCs can—and should not—play in supporting military operations could help minimize the risk that contractors will be placed in situations where their actions will undermine U.S. efforts. Below are several different options for defining the role of PSCs. Proponents of this approach argue that in combat zones, the mechanisms for oversight and accountability of contractors are likely to deteriorate and that, therefore, the use of deadly force should be restricted only to the military. The military possesses a more robust chain of command and is focused on achieving the mission, without consideration for profit motives or contractual requirements. Opponents of this approach argue that DOD simply does not have the forces to accomplish its mission in Afghanistan and Iraq, and that restricting the use of armed security contractors deprives the military of the flexibility to hire and dismiss defensive security contractors that can be tailored for specific situations in a highly fluid environment. Such an approach would permit DOD to use armed security contractors in and around the perimeter of a static location and would bar contractors from performing convoy and some personal security. Contractors would also be barred from serving as quick reaction forces that move to the site of an engagement to extract or protect an individual or convoy. Proponents of this approach argue that most of the high-profile incidents involving armed contractors shooting at local nationals have occurred during convoy or personal security movements outside of the perimeter of a secure location. Accordingly, this approach specifically restricts the use of armed contractors only in those situations where there is likely to be a shooting incident that involves civilians. Opponents of this approach argue that such a restriction leaves DOD with insufficient forces to accomplish its mission in Afghanistan and Iraq. They also argue that this approach limits the flexibility that allows DOD to mobilize and demobilize defensive security forces that can be tailored for specific situations in a highly fluid environment. Allowing local national contractors to participate in convoy and personal security would minimize the impact of such a restriction on military forces. Proponents argue that reserving an exception for local nationals gives the military more flexibility in using PSCs without adding significant risk. As discussed above, using local national contractors is an important element in DOD's counterinsurgency strategy. Local nationals understand the language and are subject to local jurisdiction. Few of the high-profile incidents between PSCs and local citizens involved local national security contractors who were working for the U.S. government. Opponents of this approach will still argue that such a restriction leaves DOD with insufficient forces to accomplish its mission in Afghanistan and Iraq, and that it limits the flexibility that allows DOD to mobilize and demobilize defensive security forces that can be tailored for specific situations in a highly fluid environment. Such a restriction could also hamper DOD in future military operations, particularly in the early days of a conflict when events are particularly fluid and the need to rapidly deploy security personnel could be acute. To address this last issue, Congress could empower a Combatant Commander to waive this restriction in initial phases of an operation, for a period not to exceed one year. Using primarily uniformed personnel (51% or more of total personnel) on each convoy security movement promotes a workforce mix that could give DOD actual command and control of security operations and contractor behavior. Alternatively, a minimal troop presence could be required, sufficient to maintain substantial command and control of contractor personnel. Such an approach appears to be in line with the Office of Management and Budget policy letter on inherently governmental which states that agencies should "ensure that federal employees perform critical functions to the extent necessary to operate effectively and maintain control of its mission and operations." Proponents of this approach maintain that using contractors in this way could still give DOD the benefits of using armed security contractors, including serving as a force multiplier, employing local nationals, and leveraging particular expertise and knowledge of contractors. Opponents of this approach could argue that such a restriction leaves DOD with insufficient forces to accomplish its mission in Afghanistan and Iraq, and that it limits the flexibility of DOD to mobilize and demobilize defensive security forces that can be tailored for specific situations in a highly fluid environment. 

Summary: The United States relies on contractors to provide a wide variety of services in Afghanistan and Iraq, including armed security. While DOD has previously contracted for security in Bosnia and elsewhere, it appears that in Afghanistan and Iraq DOD is for the first time relying so heavily on armed contractors to provide security during combat or stability operations. Much of the attention given to private security contractors (PSCs) by Congress and the media is a result of numerous high-profile incidents in which security contractors have been accused of shooting civilians, using excessive force, being insensitive to local customs or beliefs, or otherwise behaving inappropriately. Some analysts believe that the use of contractors, particularly private security contractors, may have undermined U.S. counterinsurgency efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq. As of March 31, 2011, there were more than 28,000 private security contractor personnel in Afghanistan and Iraq, representing 18% of DOD's total contractor workforce in those two countries. Since December 2009, the number of PSC personnel in Afghanistan has exceeded the number in Iraq. In Afghanistan, as of March 2011, there were 18,971 private security contractor personnel working for DOD, the highest number since DOD started tracking the data in September 2007. The number of PSC personnel in Afghanistan has more than tripled since June 2009. In Iraq, as of March 2011, there were 9,207 private security contractor personnel working for DOD, down from a high of 15,279 in June 2009. As a result of the transition of activities from DOD to the Department of State, State anticipates increasing its reliance on PSCs. However, the overall number of PSC personnel working in Iraq for the United States is not increasing. From June 2009 to March 2011, the number of PSC personnel working for DOD has declined by more than 6,000—more than offsetting the estimated additional 3,000 PSC personnel that the Department of State anticipates having to hire as a result of the transition. This report examines current PSC trends in Afghanistan and Iraq, steps DOD has taken to improve oversight and management, and the impact using private security personnel can have on military operations. It also reviews steps Congress has taken to exercise oversight over the use of PSCs and includes options for Congress.