The Congressional Budget Act of 1974 established the congressional budget process. (1) Under the act, the House andSenate are required to adopt at least one budget resolution each year. (2) The budget resolution, whichtakes the form of a concurrent resolution and is not sent to the President for his approval or veto,serves as a congressional statement in broad terms regarding the appropriate revenue, spending, anddebt-limit policies, as well as a guide to the subsequent consideration of legislation implementingsuch policies at agency and programmatic levels. Budget resolution policies are enforced througha variety of mechanisms, including points of order. (3) The House and Senate Budget Committees, which were createdby the 1974 act, exercise exclusive jurisdiction over budget resolutions and are responsible formonitoring their enforcement. In developing a budget resolution, the House and Senate Budget Committees use varioussources of budgetary information and analysis, including baseline budget projections of revenue,spending, and the deficit or surplus prepared by the Congressional Budget Office (CBO). A budgetresolution typically reflects many different assumptions regarding legislative action expected tooccur during a session that would cause revenue and spending levels to be changed from baselineamounts. Most revenue and direct spending, (4) however, occurs automatically each year under permanent law;therefore, if the committees with jurisdiction over the revenue and direct spending programs do notreport legislation to carry out the budget resolution policies by amending existing law, revenue anddirect spending for these programs likely will continue without change. The budget reconciliation process is an optional procedure that operates as an adjunct to thebudget resolution process. The chief purpose of the reconciliation process is to enhance Congress'sability to change current law in order to bring revenue, spending, and debt-limit levels intoconformity with the policies of the budget resolution. Accordingly, reconciliation can be a potentbudget enforcement tool for a large portion of the budget. Reconciliation is a two-stage process. First, reconciliation instructions are included in thebudget resolution, directing the appropriate committees to develop legislation achieving the desiredbudgetary outcomes. If the budget resolution instructs more than one committee in a chamber, thenthe instructed committees submit their legislative recommendations to their respective BudgetCommittees by the deadline prescribed in the budget resolution; the Budget Committees incorporatethem into an omnibus budget reconciliation bill without making any substantive revisions. (5) The second step involves consideration of the resultant reconciliation legislation by theHouse and Senate under expedited procedures. Among other things, debate in the Senate on anyreconciliation measure is limited to 20 hours (and 10 hours on a conference report) and amendmentsmust be germane and not include extraneous matter. The House Rules Committee typicallyrecommends a special rule for the consideration of a reconciliation measure in the House that placesrestrictions on debate time and the offering of amendments. In cases where only one committee has been instructed, the process allows that committeeto report its reconciliation legislation directly to its parent chamber, thus bypassing the BudgetCommittee. In some years, budget resolutions included reconciliation instructions that afforded theHouse and Senate the option of considering two or more different reconciliation bills. Once thereconciliation legislation called for in the budget resolution has been approved or vetoed by thePresident, the process is concluded; Congress cannot develop another reconciliation bill in the wakeof a veto without first adopting another budget resolution containing reconciliation instructions. As an optional procedure, reconciliation has not been used in every year that thecongressional budget process has been in effect. Beginning with the first use of reconciliation byboth the House and Senate in 1980, however, reconciliation has been used in most years. (In threeyears, 1998 (for FY1999), 2002 (for FY2003), and 2004 (for FY2005), the House and Senate did notagree on a budget resolution.) Congress has sent the President 19 reconciliation acts over the years;16 were signed into law and three were vetoed (and the vetoes not overriden). Table 1 provides alist of these 19 reconciliation acts. Not every reconciliation measure considered by one chamber has been considered by theother chamber, or been regarded as a reconciliation measure when considered by the other chamber. In 2000, for example, the House considered and passed several reconciliation measures, but theywere not considered by the Senate. (6) In 1976, the Senate considered a House-passed revenue bill under reconciliation procedures,although the measure had not been considered as a reconciliation bill in the House; the bill later wasvetoed. (7) Conversely, in1984, the House and Senate agreed to deficit-reduction legislation that had been considered as areconciliation bill by the House but not the Senate; the bill, the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, wassigned into law by President Ronald Reagan ( P.L. 98-369 ) but was not designated as a reconciliationmeasure. The budget reconciliation process reflects a complex set of rules, procedures, and practicesemployed by the House and Senate. Like other complex processes of the House and Senate, suchas the annual appropriations process, the reconciliation process has been marked by significantchange over time. The House and Senate have adapted reconciliation procedures to fit changingpolitical and budgetary circumstances. Table 1. Reconciliation Resolutions and Resultant ReconciliationActs: FY1981-FY2005 Source : Prepared by the Congressional Research Service. The framers of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974 anticipated that changes might be madefrom time to time in the budget resolution and reconciliation processes that it established. In aneffort to provide limited procedural flexibility, the act contains a provision referred to as the "elasticclause." Originally framed as Section 301(b)(2), the elastic clause authorized the House and Senateto include in a budget resolution, at their discretion, "any other procedure which is consideredappropriate to carry out the purposes of this Act." The clause later was redesignated as Section301(b)(4) and revised to read: The concurrent resolution on the budget may-- ... (4) set forth such other matters, and require such other procedures, relating to the budget, as maybe appropriate to carry out the purposes of this Act. The House and Senate have used authority under the elastic clause to modify reconciliationprocedures over time in many significant ways, including advancing the use of reconciliation to thespring budget resolution and extending the reconciliation time frame from one year to multiple years. While some innovations in reconciliation procedure were dropped, others persisted and eventuallywere incorporated into the 1974 act as required elements of reconciliation procedure. Two of the most significant changes in reconciliation procedure involved advancing its useto the spring budget resolution and extending its time frame from one year to multiple years(paralleling the changes in budget resolution scheduling and time frame). As originally framed, the1974 act required the adoption of two budget resolutions each year. The first budget resolution, tobe adopted in the spring, set advisory budget levels for the upcoming fiscal year. The second budgetresolution, to be adopted on September 15, just before the start of the new fiscal year on October 1,set binding budget levels for the year. Reconciliation was established as an adjunct to the adoptionof the second budget resolution. Congress and the President could use reconciliation procedures toquickly make any adjustments in existing law or pending legislation that were required to achievebudget policies as they changed between the adoption of the spring and fall budget resolutions. Action on any required reconciliation legislation was expected to be completed by September 25. In the early 1980s, the House and Senate abandoned the practice of adopting a second budgetresolution, choosing instead to adopt a single budget resolution in the spring of each year (althoughthe schedule often slipped, sometimes markedly). This change in practice formally was incorporatedinto the 1974 act by the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985 (Title II of P.L. 99-177 ; December 12, 1985; 99 Stat. 1037-1101). The growing prominence of the spring budget resolution was indicated by the decision in1980 to use it to initiate reconciliation procedures for FY1981. Reconciliation procedures were usedagain the following year as an adjunct to the adoption of the FY1982 budget resolution in the spring,but the budget resolution and reconciliation time frame was extended to three years,FY1982-FY1984 (although figures for the latter two years were considered to be "planning" levels). These changes occurred for several reasons, including the belief that an advancement in thereconciliation schedule was needed to allow committees more time to develop their reconciliationrecommendations, and to allow the House and Senate more time to consider them on the floor andreconcile their differences in conference, and that an extended time frame would promote moreeffective and lasting changes in budgetary policy while discouraging evasions of enforcement. In addition to the changes made with respect to the timing and scheduling of reconciliation,the 1974 act has been amended to bar in the Senate the inclusion of extraneous matter inreconciliation legislation (see later discussion of Section 313 of the act, known as the "Byrd rule"). Although Section 313 operates as a rule of the Senate, it has also dramatically affected thedevelopment of reconciliation legislation in the House and, at times, been a source of frictionbetween the two chambers. Other significant changes in reconciliation practice have derived from the changing politicaland budgetary environment, or changes in precedent, and have not relied upon the elastic clause. Initial actions under reconciliation, for example, focused on deficit-reduction efforts. Consequently,the procedures were employed to achieve spending reductions and revenue increases on a net basis. In the latter part of the 1990s, particularly when large surpluses emerged in the federal budget forthe first time in decades, the focus of reconciliation action was shifted to reducing revenues, whichcontinued into the 2000s. Most recently, for FY2006, reconciliation directives entail reductions inboth revenues and spending. The principal authorities underlying the reconciliation process are set forth in two keysections of Title III ("Congressional Budget Process") of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974. Section 310 (2 U.S.C. 641) establishes the basic reconciliation procedures, and Section 313 (2U.S.C. 644) establishes a Senate rule aimed at preventing the inclusion of extraneous matter inreconciliation legislation. The text of Section 310 and Section 313 is provided in Appendix A and Appendix B , respectively. In addition, other provisions in Title III have a bearing on the reconciliation process. Section300 (2. U.S.C. 631), for example, lays down the timetable of the congressional budget process,indicating that Congress should complete action on any required reconciliation legislation by June15 during a session. Section 301 (2 U.S.C. 632) contains a provision authorizing the inclusion in a budgetresolution of reconciliation directives (in subsection (b)(2)), a deferred enrollment procedure to usedin connection with reconciliation (in subsection (b)(3)), and other appropriate "matters" and"procedures" under the elastic clause (in subsection (b)(4)). Section 305 (2 U.S.C. 636) sets forth, in subsection (b), Senate procedures for theconsideration of budget resolutions, which, by virtue of a reference in Section 310(e), also apply tothe consideration of reconciliation measures (except for the time limit on debate). Points of order pertaining to the enforcement of timing requirements, substantive budgetresolution policies, and the jurisdiction of the House and Senate Budget Committees, that couldapply to the consideration of reconciliation measures, are found in Sections 302, 303, and 311. Additional points of order that could apply to reconciliation measures, dealing with budgetarylegislation not subject to appropriations and unfunded mandates, are set forth in Title IV of the act. Finally, Section 904 (2 U.S.C. 621 note) imposes a three-fifths vote requirement on waivers (andappeals of the ruling of the chair) with respect to certain points of order under the act. Section 310(a) of the 1974 act provides for the inclusion of reconciliation directives in abudget resolution. The directives shall, "to the extent necessary to effectuate the provisions andrequirements of such resolution," specify the total amounts by which spending, revenues, the publicdebt limit, or a combination of these elements are to be changed. The directives take the form ofinstructions to each appropriate committee to make changes in the laws under its jurisdiction toachieve the specified budgetary results. Under Section 310(b), when only one committee in the House or Senate is subject toreconciliation directives, it reports its recommendations directly to its chamber. When two or morecommittees in the House or Senate receive reconciliation instructions, each committee submits itsrecommendations to its respective Budget Committee. The Budget Committee incorporates therecommendations of all of the instructed committees, "without any substantive revision," into anomnibus measure, which it then reports to its chamber. The subsection refers to a reconciliation resolution, which is a concurrent resolution directingthe Clerk of the House or the Secretary of the Senate to make changes in legislation that has not yetbeen enrolled. A reconciliation resolution is intended to be used with a "deferred enrollment"procedure (see discussion below), but the House and Senate instead have always used reconciliationbills. Section 310(c), known informally as the "fungibility rule," grants some flexibility tocommittees subject to reconciliation directives pertaining to both spending and revenues. Thisprovision applies principally to the House Ways and Means Committee and the Senate FinanceCommittee because they exercise jurisdiction in their chambers over tax legislation generally; someother committees exercise jurisdiction over matters, such as certain fees, involving budgetarytransactions that are treated as revenues. In essence, the fungibility rule deems either committee tobe in compliance with its reconciliation directives if its recommended legislation does not causeeither the spending changes or the revenue changes to exceed or fall below its instruction by morethan 20% of the sum of the two types of changes, and the total amount of changes recommended isnot less than the total amount of changes that were directed. Section 310(d) imposes a requirement in the House and Senate that amendments be deficitneutral, but suspends the requirement if a declaration of war is in effect. The subsection providesthat, in the Senate, a motion to strike always is in order, notwithstanding the deficit-neutralityrequirement. Further, the subsection authorizes the House Rules Committee to make in orderamendments to achieve compliance with the reconciliation instructions in the event one or more ofthe instructed committees fail to submit recommendations. Senate procedures for the consideration of budget resolutions are made applicable to theconsideration of reconciliation measures by Section 310(e), except that the 50-hour debate limitapplicable to budget resolutions is reduced to a 20-hour limit for reconciliation bills. Section 310(f) is intended to enforce in the House the June 15 deadline for completing actionon reconciliation legislation (as indicated in the timetable in Section 300). It does so by barring theconsideration in July of an adjournment resolution providing for the traditional August recess if theHouse has not completed action. There is no comparable provision in the act for the Senate. Finally, Section 310(g) prohibits the consideration of any reconciliation measure, includinga special reconciliation measure under Section 258C of the Balanced Budget and Emergency DeficitControl Act of 1985 (see discussion below), that contains recommendations with respect to theSocial Security program. Section 313 of the 1974 act is informally known as the "Byrd rule," after its chief sponsor,Senator Robert C. Byrd. The Byrd rule originated on October 24, 1985, as Amendment No. 878 (asmodified) to S. 1730, the Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act (COBRA) of1985. The Senate adopted the amendment by a vote of 96-0. In this form, the Byrd rule applied toinitial Senate consideration of reconciliation measures, but a short while later its coverage wasextended to conference reports. Senator Byrd explained that the basic purposes of the amendment were to protect theeffectiveness of the reconciliation process (by excluding extraneous matter that often provokedcontroversy without aiding deficit reduction efforts) and to preserve the deliberative character of theSenate (by excluding from consideration under expedited procedures legislative matters not centralto deficit reduction that should be debated under regular procedures). The rule achieves its purposes by defining six categories of extraneous matter inreconciliation legislation, and several exceptions thereto, and providing points of order against anysuch matter. The Byrd rule, and its operation, is discussed in more detail in the section of this reportdealing with "Initial Consideration in the Senate." During the first five years that the Byrd rule was in effect, from late 1985 until late 1990, itconsisted of two separate components: (1) a provision in statute applying to initial Senateconsideration of reconciliation measures; and (2) a Senate resolution extending application ofportions of the statutory provision to conference reports and amendments between the two chambers. Several modifications were made to the Byrd rule in 1986 and 1987, including extending itsexpiration date from January 2, 1987, to January 2, 1988, and then to September 30, 1992, but thetwo separate components of the rule were preserved. In 1990, these components were mergedtogether and made permanent when they were incorporated into the 1974 act as Section 313. Therehave been no further changes in the Byrd rule since 1990. Pursuant to authority granted in Section 301(b) of the 1974 act, including the elastic clause,the House and Senate have, on occasion, included procedural provisions in budget resolutions thataffect the reconciliation process. Several examples are discussed below. In 1980, the second budget resolution for FY1981 contained a bar against House or Senateconsideration of a resolution providing for sine die adjournment of either chamber "unless action hasbeen completed on H.R. 7765, the Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1980," which had beendeveloped in response to reconciliation directives in the first budget resolution for FY1981. (8) In 1987, a provision in the FY1988 budget resolution declared that any reconciliationrecommendations developed by the House Ways and Means Committee and the Senate FinanceCommittee pertaining to the establishment of a special Deficit Reduction Account would not beconsidered extraneous matter under the Byrd rule. (9) Most recently, the FY2006 budget resolution included a procedural provision applying athree-fifths vote requirement to waivers and appeals of points of order dealing with unfundedmandates and the consideration of certain measures prior to passage of a budget resolution, butprovided that the change not apply in the case of reconciliation legislation. (10) In 1993, the Senate established a "pay-as-you-go" (PAYGO) rule as part of the FY1994budget resolution. The rule, which has been modified several times and extended through September30, 1998, was not part of the statutory PAYGO requirement in effect from FY1992-FY2002 (seediscussion below). The Senate's PAYGO rule generally prohibits the consideration of direct spending andrevenue legislation that is projected to increase (or cause) an on-budget deficit in any one of threetime periods: the first year, the first five years, and the second five years covered by the mostrecently adopted budget resolution. Any increase in direct spending or reduction in revenuesresulting from such legislation must be offset by an equivalent amount of direct spending cuts, taxincreases, or a combination of the two. Without an offset, such legislation would require the approvalof at least 60 Senators to waive the rule and be considered on the Senate floor. An exception is madefor revenue or spending legislation assumed in the budget resolution levels. (11) Prior budget resolutions containing reconciliation directives explicitly exemptedreconciliation legislation from the Senate's PAYGO rule; reconciliation legislation also wasexempted by virtue of being assumed in budget resolution levels. Section 301(b)(3) of the 1974 act authorizes an optional "deferred enrollment" procedure.Under the procedure, if reconciliation is triggered by the budget resolution, all or certain spendingbills (i.e., bills providing new budget authority or new entitlement authority) for the upcoming fiscalyear that have passed the House and Senate may be held at the desk rather than being enrolled. Thisaffords the House and Senate an opportunity, through a reconciliation resolution, to direct the Clerkof the House or the Secretary of the Senate to make changes in the enrollment of pending legislation,rather than having to use a reconciliation bill to make the changes in existing law. Once action hasbeen completed on the reconciliation resolution, and any necessary changes are made in theenrollment of the spending measures held at the desk, they are cleared for the President. Several budget resolutions in the early 1980s contained deferred enrollment provisions, butthe release of the deferred measures was made contingent upon the adoption of the then-requiredsecond budget resolution, not upon the passage of reconciliation legislation. Key elements of the methodology used to prepare budget baselines and score budgetarylegislation are laid out in Section 257 of the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Actof 1985. Other scoring practices that underpin the congressional budget process, includingreconciliation procedures, are rooted partly in scorekeeping guidelines that were included in the jointexplanatory statements accompanying two reconciliation acts -- the Omnibus Budget ReconciliationAct of 1990 and the Balanced Budget Act of 1997. (12) One of the guidelines, number 3, specifically refers to the treatment of reconciliationlegislation under certain circumstances. Guideline number 3 requires that changes in direct spending(i.e., entitlement and other mandatory spending, including offsetting receipts), made in annualappropriations acts, be scored against the Appropriations Committees' Section 302(b) allocations ofspending made under the budget resolution. The guideline states, in part, that "direct spendingsavings that are included in both an appropriations bill and a reconciliation bill will be scored to thereconciliation bill and not to the appropriations bill." Section 258C (2 U.S.C. 907d) of the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Actof 1985 (Title II of P.L. 99-177 , as amended) established a special reconciliation process in theSenate, but not the House, tied initially to statutory deficit targets, and subsequently, to a statutorypay-as-you-go (PAYGO) requirement. Violations of the deficit targets and PAYGO requirementwere to be enforced by "sequestration," a process entailing the automatic imposition of largelyacross-the-board spending cuts. Section 258C, which was never invoked, provided for the consideration of reconciliationlegislation in the fall in order to achieve deficit reductions that would obviate the need for anexpected sequester under the PAYGO requirement (or, previously, the deficit targets). The PAYGOrequirement effectively expired at the end of the 107th Congress. (13) All of the reconciliationmeasures considered by the Senate thus far have originated pursuant to Section 310 of the 1974 act. (Sections 310 and 313 of the 1974 act currently reference the reconciliation process under Section258C of the 1985 act.) The fundamental purpose of reconciliation directives is to compel committees to developlegislation to achieve certain goals reflected in the budget resolution that require changes in existinglaw (or pending legislation) to be realized. A directive to a committee represents an expression ofthe intent of the parent chamber that the specified legislative action be carried out. Reconciliation directives, and the budget resolution policies that underpin them, areexpressed in terms of highly aggregated dollar amounts and do not determine the budgetaryoutcomes for individual accounts, programs, or activities. Decisions at these levels remain theprerogative of the committees with jurisdiction over spending and revenue legislation. In a few rareinstances, however, reconciliation directives have been couched in programmatic terms. In theFY1981 budget resolution, for example, the Senate Appropriations Committee was instructed to"limit appropriations for fiscal year 1981 subsidies to the U.S. Postal Service" to a particular levelas part of the reconciliation directives. (14) In response to a parliamentary inquiry on May 19, 1982,however, the Senate Presiding Officer advised that reconciliation directives may not specify that theinstructed committee must achieve its changes from certain types of programs or in specificways. (15) Nonetheless, the Budget Committees may indicate particular options or assumptions thatwould allow an instructed committee to meet its spending or revenue reconciliation directives, partlyto garner credibility and support for the budget resolution and partly to influence the subsequentpolicy debates. A reconciliation directive to a committee usually consists of several components: (1) anidentification of the House or Senate committee being instructed; (2) the type of budgetary changesthat are intended to be achieved by changes in laws, bills, and resolutions within the instructedcommittee's jurisdiction, together with specified amounts; (3) the fiscal year periods to which thechanges apply; and (4) a deadline by which the instructed committees must submit theirrecommendations to their respective Budget Committee, or, if singly instructed, report them to theirchamber. Each dollar amount of change for a fiscal year time period is regarded as a separatedirective. A committee instructed to achieve savings in direct spending outlays of $100 million forthe first fiscal year and $800 million for a five-fiscal year period, for example, is considered to besubject to two different directives. Given that the language authorizing reconciliation directives refers to "changes," suchdirectives may properly recommend both increases and decreases in revenues, spending, and the debtlimit (see further discussion below). Types of Directives. Section 310(a) of the 1974act enumerates three different types of budgetary changes that reconciliation directives may require: (1) spending , in the form of new budget authority for the budget year and thereafter, budget authorityinitially provided for prior fiscal years, new entitlement authority, and credit authority; (2) revenues ;(3) and the statutory limit on the public debt . In addition, Section 310(a) provides that reconciliationdirectives may combine any of the three types of changes, including "a direction to achieve deficitreduction" (representing a combination of spending reductions and revenue increases). The type of budgetary changes included in the reconciliation directives determines the typeof legislation that will result. After the first several years of experience with reconciliation, spendingdirectives have applied almost exclusively to direct spending (also known as mandatory spending),rather than discretionary spending. Direct spending, which is under the jurisdiction of the legislativecommittees of the House and Senate, funds entitlements and other mandatory programs (e.g.,Medicare, unemployment compensation, federal employee retirement), largely on a permanent basis. Discretionary spending, which mainly funds the ongoing operations of federal agencies, falls underthe jurisdiction of the House and Senate Appropriations Committees and is provided in annualappropriations acts. Under current practice, reconciliation directives for direct spending generally refer to changesin outlay levels. (16) While such directives usually specify the dollar amounts by which outlay levels are to be changed,for a time the House Budget Committee specified the total outlay level that should occur after therequired changes had been made. (Therefore, the amount of changes involved had to be calculatedby comparing baseline levels to the levels expected to occur following reconciliation.) In the courseof complying with a directive to change spending, a committee may recommend changes inoffsetting collections or offsetting receipts within its jurisdiction; offsetting collections, whichinclude many user fees, are treated as negative spending. Reconciliation directives have sometimes been used to affect discretionary spending levels,although this is not the usual practice. Initially, reconciliation was used to directly change the levelsof discretionary spending. The House Appropriations Committee (in the FY1981 budget resolution)and the Senate Appropriations Committee (in the FY1981 and FY1982 budget resolutions) wereinstructed to reduce spending for the fiscal year already in progress. In order to comply with theseinstructions, the committees recommended rescissions of annual appropriations that already had beenenacted. (The rescissions were considered separately from the reconciliation legislation for thoseyears.) A more expansive, and indirect, attempt to reduce discretionary spending through thereconciliation process occurred in 1981. The FY1982 budget resolution included reconciliationdirectives that, in part, required legislative committees to reduce authorizations of appropriations. The intent behind this approach was to set in place reduced authorization levels over a three-yearperiod that would reduce spending levels in the annual appropriations acts considered in each ofthose years. This approach was widely regarded as having unnecessarily complicated thereconciliation legislation and strained relationships between the authorizing committees and theAppropriations Committees. The House and Senate Budget Committees have not returned to thisapproach, except occasionally on a much more selective basis. In the Senate, such languageprobably would be judged extraneous under the Byrd rule, on the ground that it does not affectoutlays. Due to the dispersal of spending jurisdiction to almost every standing committee of theHouse and Senate, nearly every one of them has been involved in reconciliation at least once. Directives to change revenue levels have been less complicated generally in that they havenot differentiated between different sources of revenue, such as individual incomes taxes, corporateincome taxes, or excise taxes. On occasion, revenue reconciliation directives have beenaccompanied by directives to change outlays because some tax-related changes, such as increasesin refundable tax credits, are scored as outlays. (Conversely, in some instances changes in spendingprograms may affect revenue levels.) As mentioned previously, reconciliation directives may also instruct a committee to achievea level of "deficit reduction," reflecting a combination of spending reductions and revenues increasesat the committee's discretion. In the reconciliation process, compliance with reconciliation directives is judged on a netbasis, or on the basis of the "bottom line." Consequently, directives to reduce spending or increaserevenues in order to achieve deficit reduction generally may include "sweeteners" that increasespending and reduce revenues, so long as the required amount of deficit reduction is accomplished. As practiced by the House and Senate, a reconciliation instruction to reduce spending, orincrease revenues, includes a target that is a minimum amount of spending reduction, or revenueincrease (a floor). Similarly, a reconciliation instruction to increase spending, or reduce revenues,includes a target that is a maximum amount of spending increase, or revenue reduction (a ceiling). For years, the public debt limit has been codified in Section 3101(b) of Title 31, UnitedStates Code . Periodic adjustments in the debt limit take the form of amendments to 31 U.S.C.3101(b), usually by striking the current dollar limitation and inserting a new one. While mostadjustments to the debt limit have been increases, in some instances the debt limit has been reducedor extended at its current level for a specified interval. For example, P.L. 455 of the 79th Congress(60 Stat. 316; June 26, 1946) reduced the debt limit from $300 billion to $275 billion as budgetsurpluses reemerged following World War II. While the debt limit has been adjusted inreconciliation legislation, in most instances Congress employs another type of measure for thispurpose. The House Ways and Means Committee and the Senate Finance Committee exercisejurisdiction over the debt limit. (17) From time to time, budget resolutions have included contingent reconciliation directives. Under a contingent directive, the amount of changes in spending or revenue that a committee isdirected to achieve may be adjusted at a later time upon the happening of a contingency. TheFY1998 budget resolution, for example, provided for an adjustment in the Senate FinanceCommittee's reconciliation directives (as well as the committee's spending allocations and otherbudget levels) to accommodate a five-year children's health initiative of up to $16 billion. Theadjustments were made contingent upon the committee reporting reconciliation legislation with anexcess of outlay savings so that the additional spending on the children's health initiative would bedeficit neutral. (18) In at least one instance, reconciliation directives to a committee became effective (withoutany adjustment) upon the happening of a contingency. The FY1996 budget resolution containeddirectives to the Senate Finance Committee to reduce revenues by $245 billion over seven yearsupon the certification by the Congressional Budget Office that spending reconciliation legislationwould lead to a balanced budget by FY2002. Under the budget resolution, if CBO did not certifya balanced budget, the revenue reconciliation directives to the committee would not becomeeffective, and the revenue reductions could not be included in the final reconciliation bill. (19) The House and Senate typically use multiple directives, in terms of the number of committeesinstructed and the types of budgetary changes designated, when initiating the reconciliation process. Whenever the House and Senate included spending reconciliation directives in a budget resolution,more than one House and Senate committee received them, except for the FY2002 and FY2004budget resolutions; in these two cases, the House Ways and Means Committee and the SenateFinance Committee received instructions regarding outlays in order to accommodate the outlayeffects of certain changes in revenue laws. The number of House and Senate committees given spending reconciliation directives in abudget resolution ranged from one, for both chambers (both in the FY2002 and FY2004 budgetresolutions), to 14 for the Senate and 15 for the House (both in the FY1982 budget resolution). Reconciliation directives to change the statutory limit on the public debt are made only to asingle committee in each chamber, because the House Ways and Means Committee and the SenateFinance Committee exercise sole jurisdiction in their chambers over this matter. Whilereconciliation directives to change revenue levels principally involve the Ways and MeansCommittee and the Finance Committee, other committees sometimes receive such instructions aswell. As stated previously, the Ways and Means Committee and Finance Committee exercisejurisdiction in their chambers over the tax code and revenues generally, but some other committeesexercise jurisdiction over matters, such as certain fees, involving budgetary transactions that aretreated as revenues. When reconciliation directives require different types of budgetary changes, the committeerecommendations affecting revenues, spending, or the debt limit, as appropriate, may be incorporatedinto a single omnibus measure or considered as separate measures, depending on how the directivesare fashioned. In the FY1998 budget resolution, for example, the Senate Finance Committeereceived a two-part reconciliation directive in Section 104(a). Section 104(a)(5)(A) instructed thecommittee to reduce outlays (by $40.911 billion for FY2002 and $100.646 billion forFY1998-FY2002) and Section 104(a)(5)(B) instructed the committee to increase the statutory limiton the public debt (to not more than $5.950 trillion). Seven other Senate committees received aninstruction to reduce spending (or the deficit) in Section 104(a). In a separate provision, Section104(b), the Finance Committee was instructed to reduce revenues (by not more than $20.5 billionin FY2002 and $85 billion for FY1998-FY2002). Accordingly, in response to its directives, theFinance Committee could develop reconciliation legislation reducing spending and raising the debtlimit, for inclusion in an omnibus bill, and reducing revenues in a separate bill. Under current procedures in the Senate, only one reconciliation measure of each type ofbudgetary change is allowed. Thus, a budget resolution may create as many as three reconciliationbills -- one for spending, one for revenues, and one for the debt limit. The reconciliation directives,however, may not lead to two reconciliation bills for spending, or two for revenues, or two for thedebt limit. In the case of the FY2006 budget resolution, for example, the directives to eight Senatecommittees to reduce direct spending, and to the Senate Finance Committee to reduce revenues andincrease the debt limit, are expected to result, at most, in three reconciliation measures -- a spendingbill, a revenue bill, and a debt-limit bill. House practices in this regard allow for greater latitude in the development of multiplereconciliation measures. Reconciliation measures may mix together different types of reconciliationchanges, and more than one reconciliation measure involving a particular type of budgetary changemay be provided for under the reconciliation directives. The FY1997 budget resolution, forexample, provided for the potential consideration of three separate reconciliation measures in theHouse, including a "Welfare and Medicaid Reform and Tax Relief" act, a "Medicare Preservation"act, and a "Tax and Miscellaneous Direct Spending Reforms" act. As explained by the HouseBudget Committee: The House conferees note that themulti-reconciliation process provides maximum flexibility to achieve the changes in spending andthe tax relief assumed in this conference report. For example, any of the spending or revenuechanges assumed in the first bill could -- if not enacted -- be achieved in the third bill. (20) Given that the Senate's flexibility in packaging reconciliation legislation is relatively moreconstrained under its current practices compared with past ones, the House is more constrained inits choice of reconciliation packaging as well. Consequently, a reconciliation procedure in the Houseas flexible as the one proposed for FY1997 may no longer be practicable. During the period covering FY1981 through FY2006, the House and Senate adopted 18budget resolutions containing reconciliation directives. (The budget resolutions for FY1985,FY1989, FY1992, FY1993, and FY1995 did not include reconciliation directives; also, the Houseand Senate did not reach final agreement on budget resolutions for FY1999, FY2003, and FY2005.) The reconciliation directives included in budget resolutions through FY1998 were intended to reducethe deficit in the net; the directives in budget resolutions since then (through FY2006), while partof an overall budget resolution policy to improve the budgetary posture over time, on their own termsproposed reducing the surplus or increasing the deficit in the net (by virtue of revenue reductions). The reconciliation directives to House and Senate committees during this period generallywere of comparable scope, although there were some significant differences in particular years. Table 2 and Table 3 present information on the reconciliation directives to House committeesduring this period to illustrate the relationship taken generally by the House and Senate betweenreconciliation and deficit reduction. As Table 2 shows, all 18 of the budget resolutions recommended policies that assumed animprovement in budgetary posture from the budget year to the final fiscal year covered, either bychanging a deficit into a surplus (seven instances), reducing a deficit to a lower level (eightinstances), or increasing a surplus to a higher level (three instances). (21) For example, over afive-year time frame, the budget resolution for FY1991 called for a deficit of $64 billion in the firstyear and surplus of $156 billion in the final year; the budget resolution for FY1994 called for adeficit of $254 billion in the first year and a deficit of $202 billion in the final year; and the budgetresolution for FY2001 called for a surplus of $170 billion in the first year and a surplus of $232billion in the final year. The reconciliation directives in the first 10 budget resolutions listed in Table 2 , coveringthrough FY1981-FY1994, all recommended net deficit reduction in the aggregate, ranging from $12billion (in the FY1981 budget resolution) to $343 billion (in the FY1994 budget resolution). Thereconciliation directives included revenue increases, spending decreases (and other changes), or acombination thereof intended to eliminate or reduce the deficit by the final year. With regard to the next three budget resolutions (for FY1996, FY1997, and FY1998), precisedata are not available because the reconciliation directives to House committees were not expressedas amounts of change from baseline levels, but rather were expressed as the levels of revenue anddirect spending outlays that were to result from the changes. The reconciliation directives in thesethree budget resolutions, however, generally were regarded as containing revenue reductions thatwere expected to be more than offset by reductions in direct spending. (22) The remaining five sets of reconciliation directives (in the FY2000-FY2002, FY2004, andFY2006 budget resolutions), all recommended net reductions in the surplus/increases in the deficit,ranging from $35 billion (over six years) to $1.350 trillion (over 11 years). The budget resolutions for FY2000-FY2002 included directives that recommended largerevenue reductions (and a $100 billion increase in outlays in the FY2002 budget resolution) withoutoffsetting changes. These resolutions recommended allocating a portion of the projected surplusesfor tax cuts; in each case, the estimated final year surplus was larger than estimated for the first year. The FY2004 budget resolution included reconciliation directives that recommended largerevenue reductions (and a $27 billion increase in outlays) without any offsetting changes. Despiteaggregate reductions in the surplus/increases in the deficit through reconciliation of $550 billion over11 years, covering FY2003-FY2013, the budget resolution envisioned a deficit of $385.0 billion forthe budget year becoming a surplus of $36.8 billion by the final year. The FY2006 budget resolution included reconciliation directives that recommended revenuereductions of $70 billion over five years (FY2006-FY2010) and outlay reductions of $35 billion oversix years (including FY2005) in the context of a decline in the total deficit over the period. Table 3 provides more detailed information on the overall deficit and surplus levels and thereconciliation directives to House committees in the budget resolutions for this period. Table 2. Summary of Reconciliation Directives to House Committees and Overall Deficit or Surplus Levelsin BudgetResolutions for FY1981-FY2006 (amounts in $ billions) Sources : conference reports on budget resolutions (see Table 3 for complete listing). a. The budget resolutions for FY1985, FY1989, FY1992, FY1993, and FY1995 did not contain reconciliation directives; also, the House and Senate didnot reach final agreement on budget resolutions for FY1999, FY2003, and FY2005. Details may not add to totals due to rounding. b. The "revenue changes" column reflects reconciliation directives to the House Ways and Means Committee to change revenue levels, and the "outlay(or deficit reduction) changes" column reflects reconciliation directives to all House committees to change outlay levels or to achieve deficitreduction, which in some cases could have allowed additional revenue increases beyond those reflected in the preceding column. "Net decreases(-)" in the deficit also refers to net increases in the surplus; "net increases (+)" in the deficit also refers to net decreases in the surplus. c. Although the text of the budget resolution reflects only the on-budget deficit or surplus (as required by law), tables in the joint explanatory statementaccompanying the conference report usually reflect the total deficit or surplus (which includes the off-budget Social Security trust funds and PostalService Fund). This column presents total deficit or surplus levels, unless otherwise noted. d. The $343.1 billion in "outlay (or deficit reduction) changes" and "net decreases" excludes $42.953 billion in reconciled reductions in authorizations. e. Reconciliation directives to House committees in the budget resolutions for FY1996-FY1998 were not expressed as amounts of change from baselinelevels, but rather were expressed as the levels of revenue and direct spending outlays that were to result from the changes. The amounts of revenuereduction expected to occur over the multiyear period, apparently by means of reconciliation, were indicated in the joint explanatory statementaccompanying the conference report for each of the fiscal years involved; see H.Rept. 104-159 , page 89 (for FY1996), H.Rept. 104-612 , page 51(for FY1997), and H.Rept. 105-116 , page 100 (for FY1998). While the amounts of direct spending reductions in reconciliation directives to Housecommittees were not indicated in the joint explanatory statements, such amounts in reconciliation directives to Senate committees yielded estimatednet savings of $387.1 billion (over seven years) in the FY1996 budget resolution, $228.9 billion (over six years) in the FY1997 budget resolution,and $52.2 billion (over five years) in the FY1998 budget resolution. Table 3. Detailed Information on Reconciliation Directives to House Committees and Overall Deficit orSurplus Levelsin Budget Resolutions for FY1981-FY2006 (amounts in $ billions) Sources : FY1981 -- conference report on H.Con.Res. 307, H.Rept. 96-1051 (May 23, 1980), pages 27 and 28. FY1982 -- conference report on H.Con.Res. 115, H.Rept. 97-46 (May 15, 1981), pages 41-43 and 46. FY1983 -- conference report on S.Con.Res. 92, H.Rept. 97-614 (June 21, 1982), pages 19 and 29; FY1984 -- conference report on H.Con.Res. 91, H.Rept. 98-248 (June 21, 1983), pages 29, 45, and 46; FY1986 -- conference report on S.Con.Res. 32, H.Rept. 99-249 (August 1, 1985), pages 24, 32, and 33; FY1987 -- conference report on S.Con.Res. 120, H.Rept. 99-664 (June 26, 1986), pages 20, 30, and 31; FY1988 -- conference report on H.Con.Res. 93, H.Rept. 100-175 (June 22, 1987), pages 23 and 30-32; FY1990 -- conference report on H.Con.Res. 106, H.Rept. 101-50 (May 15, 1989), pages 19, 29, and 30; FY1991 -- conference report on H.Con.Res. 310, H.Rept. 101-820 (October 7, 1990), pages 21, 26, and 27; FY1994 -- conference report on H.Con.Res. 62, H.Rept. 103-48 (March 31, 1993), pages 38 and 41-43; FY1996 -- conference report on H.Con.Res. 67, H.Rept. 104-159 (June 26, 1995), pages 44 and 50-51; FY1997 -- conference report on H.Con.Res. 178, H.Rept. 104-612 (June 7, 1996), pages 56 and 83-84; FY1998 -- conference report on H.Con.Res. 84 , H.Rept. 105-116 (June 4, 1997), pages 58, 100, and 104-105; FY2000 -- conference report on H.Con.Res. 68 , H.Rept. 106-91 (April 14, 1999), pages 36, and 61; FY2001 -- conference report on H.Con.Res. 290 , H.Rept. 106-577 (April 12, 2000), pages 49 and 66; FY2002 -- conference report on H.Con.Res. 83 , H.Rept. 107-60 (May 8, 2001), pages 48, and 76-77; FY2004 -- conference report on H.Con.Res. 95 , H.Rept. 108-71 (April 10, 2003), pages 38 and 102-104; and FY2006 -- conference report on H.Con.Res. 95 , H.Rept. 109-62 (April 18, 2005), pages 50 and 68-71. Note : Details may not add to totals due to rounding. a. The reconciliation directives applied to the budget year (i.e., the fiscal year beginning on October 1 of the calendar year in which the budget resolutionwas considered) and ensuing fiscal years covered by the budget resolution, except that reconciliation directives in budget resolutions for FY1981,FY2002, and FY2004 also applied to the current year (i.e., the fiscal year in progress at the time). b. This column reflects reconciliation directives to the House Ways and Means Committee to change revenue levels. c. This column reflects reconciliation directives to all House committees to change outlay levels or to achieve deficit reduction (which in some cases couldhave allowed additional revenue increases beyond those reflected in the preceding column). d. "Net decreases (-)" in the deficit also refers to net increases in the surplus; "net increases (+)" in the deficit also refers to net decreases in the surplus. e. Although the text of the budget resolution reflects only the on-budget deficit or surplus (as required by law), tables in the joint explanatory statementaccompanying the conference report usually reflect the total deficit or surplus (which includes the off-budget Social Security trust funds and PostalService Fund). This column presents total deficit or surplus levels, unless otherwise noted, and does not include any revised deficit or surplusfigures for the current fiscal year. f. In addition to reconciliation directives to House and Senate Committees for FY1981, the budget resolution included reconciliation directives to theHouse and Senate Appropriations Committees to reduce spending for FY1980. Accordingly, savings of $1.0 billion in outlays from the directivesto the Appropriations Committees are reflected in this figure. g. The $343.1 billion in "other changes" and "net savings" excludes $42.953 billion in reconciled reductions in authorizations. h. Reconciliation directives to House committees in the budget resolutions for FY1996-FY1998 were not expressed as amounts of change from baselinelevels, but rather were expressed as the levels of revenue and direct spending outlays that were to result from the changes. The amounts of revenuereduction expected to occur over the multiyear period, apparently by means of reconciliation, were indicated in the joint explanatory statementaccompanying the conference report for each of the fiscal years involved; see H.Rept. 104-159 , page 89 (for FY1996), H.Rept. 104-612 , page 51(for FY1997), and H.Rept. 105-116 , page 100 (for FY1998). While the amounts of direct spending reductions in reconciliation directives to Housecommittees were not indicated in the joint explanatory statements, such amounts in reconciliation directives to Senate committees yielded estimatednet savings of $387.1 billion (over seven years) in the FY1996 budget resolution, $228.9 billion (over six years) in the FY1997 budget resolution,and $52.2 billion (over five years) in the FY1998 budget resolution. Four aspects of House action at this stage of the reconciliation process areaddressed in this section: (1) the development of legislative recommendations by theinstructed committees; (2) the preparation of an omnibus measure by the HouseBudget Committee; (3) the special rule providing for the consideration ofreconciliation legislation; and (4) floor consideration of reconciliation legislation. Each committee included in the reconciliation directives is instructed torecommend legislative changes to existing law to meet specific budgetary targets bya certain date. The Congressional Budget Act of 1974 does not provide any specialrequirements (other than meeting those specified in the reconciliation directives ina budget resolution) or any guidance as to the procedures committees must follow todevelop their legislative recommendations pursuant to reconciliation directives. Theinstructed committees generally follow the rules and practices of developinglegislation under the normal legislative process. It is expected that each instructed committee will comply with the pertinentrequirements in the Standing Rules of the House, as well as its committee rules,when developing its legislative recommendations pursuant to the reconciliationdirectives. In particular, clause 2(h)(1) of House Rule XI requires that a committeemust meet, with a majority quorum present, to report its reconciliationrecommendations. Prior to marking up and reporting reconciliation recommendations, as in thecase of other legislation, instructed committees often hold hearings. In 1997, forexample, in developing reconciliation recommendations pursuant to the directivesin the FY1998 budget resolution, at least four of the eight instructed committeesconducted oversight and legislative hearings related to its reconciliationrecommendations subsequently transmitted to the House Budget Committee. (23) Committee Markup Procedures. While there are variations among committees' formal rules and informal practices,House committees typically follow a standard markup process. (24) Under thisprocess, the legislative text to be considered first is read in full, unless waived by amajority vote or unanimous consent, and then it is read for amendment, section bysection. (25) Amendments are considered under a five-minuterule. At the end of consideration of the legislative text and amendments, a committeevotes to order the legislation reported to the House directly or, if instructed by thereconciliation directives, transmitted to the House Budget Committee. A key decision in the markup process is selecting the text the committee willconsider. A committee may consider a bill introduced and referred to the committeeor consider draft legislation that has not been introduced. In most cases, in responseto reconciliation directives, committees have considered draft legislation developedby the committee's staff, instead of a bill introduced and referred to the committee. In 1997, for example, pursuant to the reconciliation directives contained inthe FY1998 budget resolution, all eight committees instructed to submit to the HouseBudget Committee legislative recommendations changing existing law consideredoriginal legislative language as the markup text. (26) Three ofthese committees considered its reconciliation recommendations in the form ofcommittee prints as the markup text. Only one committee considered a billintroduced and referred to the committee. In that case, the Education and theWorkforce Committee considered H.R. 1515 and incorporated the textof the bill, as amended during markup, into its reconciliation recommendations; thecommittee, as well, ordered the bill reported, as amended, to the House directly. (27) In some cases, however, especially in those cases when a committee receivedinstructions to report legislative recommendations to the House directly, as in recentyears, committees have considered a bill introduced and referred to the committee asthe markup vehicle. In 2003, for example, the House Ways and Means Committeeconsidered and marked up H.R. 2 , which had been previously introducedand referred to the committee, as the legislative vehicle to respond to itsreconciliation directives contained in the FY2004 budget resolution. (28) Committee Submissions. Asmentioned above, the reconciliation directives contained in a budget resolutionspecify a certain date in which an instructed committee is required to report itslegislative recommendations. In addition, the directives indicate, as provided in the1974 act, whether a committee is required to report its legislative recommendationsto the House directly or to submit such recommendations to the House BudgetCommittee. Section 310(b) of the 1974 act specifies two options for the submissionof legislative recommendations to comply with reconciliation directives: (1) if onecommittee is instructed, the committee reports its legislative recommendations to itsparent chamber directly; or (2) if two or more committees are instructed, thecommittees submit their legislative recommendations to their respective BudgetCommittee. Of the 17 budget resolutions that have contained reconciliation directives,excluding the FY2006 budget resolution, five budget resolutions contained directivesinstructing a committee to report legislation to the House directly. (29) Thirteenbudget resolutions directed two or more committees to submit legislativerecommendations to the House Budget Committee. In either case, the submission material is similar. A committee reporting itsreconciliation recommendations to the House directly must include the requiredcontents of a written report to accompany the reported legislation. Such informationincludes, for example, supplemental, minority, or additional views, a cost estimate,and committee rollcall votes. (30) In the case of submissions to the House Budget Committee, the BudgetCommittee typically provides guidance to the instructed committees, requesting thatthey include with their reconciliation submissions similar material required in acommittee report. This year, for example, the Budget Committee requested thefollowing material to be submitted by each instructed committee: 1. legislative text; 2. transmittal letter signed by the committee chairman; 3. summary of the major policy decisions in the legislation; 4. section-by-section description; 5. committee oversight findings; 6. constitutional authority statement; 7. committee votes; 8. Ramseyer statement regarding the text of changes made in existing law; 9. performance goals; and 10. supplemental, additional, and minority views. (31) When a committee is directed to submit reconciliation recommendations tothe Budget Committee, it also may report legislation to the House directly. On atleast two occasions, for example, the Ways and Means Committee submittedreconciliation recommendations to the Budget Committee as well as reportinglegislation, containing those recommendations, to the House directly. (32) In addition,on at least one occasion, several instructed committees reported reconciliationlegislation to the House directly instead of submitting their recommendations to theBudget Committee. In 1982, four of the nine instructed committees reportedindividual reconciliation measures to the House directly. The House considered andpassed each of these measures individually and subsequently incorporated them intoone omnibus reconciliation bill (H.R. 6955, 97th Congress). (33) Compliance with ReconciliationDirectives. Each instructed committee is expected to comply withits reconciliation directives, specifically with regard to submitting its reconciliationrecommendations by the date specified and recommending legislative changes toexisting law projected to produce the budgetary changes specified. Neither the 1974act nor the Standing Rules of the House provides a point of order, or any othersanction, against a committee's reconciliation recommendations, or the subsequentomnibus reconciliation legislation, for not complying with the reconciliationdirectives. The House Rules Committee, however, as will be discussed furtherbelow, under Section 310(d)(5) of the 1974 act, may make in order amendments toachieve compliance if one or more committees fail to submit their legislativerecommendations pursuant to their reconciliation instructions. In the past, several committees have submitted their reconciliationrecommendations after the submission deadline or not at all. In 1995, for example,nine of the 12 instructed committees submitted their reconciliation recommendationsto the Budget Committee after the September 22 deadline. (34) All of thetardy submissions were included in the reconciliation measure reported by the BudgetCommittee. In this case, as in the past, it does not appear that the late submissionscaused any procedural consequences. (35) In several instances, one or more of the instructed committees did not submitany legislative recommendations. In at least two years, 1981 and 1995, the HouseRules Committee made in order amendments that provided language within thejurisdiction of the non-compliant committees to satisfy their reconciliation directives. In 1995, for example, the Rules Committee made in order an amendment in thenature of a substitute, offered by then-Budget Committee Chairman John Kasich,that, among other things, achieved compliance for the House AgricultureCommittee. (36) In 1996, several of the instructed committees didnot submit reconciliation recommendations to the Budget Committee, butreconciliation legislation applicable to those committees was not developed. The House Budget Committee plays a significant, if not substantive, role inthe development of reconciliation legislation when two or more committees aredirected to recommend legislative changes pursuant to reconciliation directives. Asmentioned above, when two or more committees are involved, each committee isrequired to submit its legislative recommendations to the Budget Committee, by acertain date, as specified in the reconciliation directives contained in the budgetresolution. Section 310(b)(2) of the 1974 act provides that when the BudgetCommittee receives all the legislative recommendations from the directedcommittees, it is required to report to the House "reconciliation legislation carryingout all such recommendations, without any substantive revision." In practice, this administrative function has entailed incorporating thecommittee's recommendations as separate titles into an omnibus reconciliationmeasure. The Budget Committee has performed this function formally by conductinga markup of the reconciliation legislation. At the end of the markup, the BudgetCommittee orders reported the omnibus reconciliation legislation, containing theinstructed committees' submissions, as an original bill. During the markup, amendments are not considered, as in the case of astandard committee markup, because of the prohibition against any substantiverevision to the instructed committees' recommendations. The Budget Committee,however, traditionally has entertained motions to direct the Budget Committeechairman to request that the Rules Committee make in order certain amendments. In 1997, for example, during the markup of H.R. 2015, the BalancedBudget Act of 1997, committee Members made 11 motions to direct the BudgetCommittee chairman to request that the rule for floor consideration include anamendment; one motion passed, seven motions were rejected, and three motionswere withdrawn. (37) The Budget Committee formally orders reported the omnibus reconciliationmeasure to the House with a written report (see Table 4 ). An original billsubsequently is introduced in the House by the chairman of the Budget Committee. Past committee reports have included an overview of the reconciliation measure,occasionally including comments by the Budget Committee on the instructedcommittees' compliance with the reconciliation directives. The committee report also typically contains report language submitted by thecommittees, including a general explanation of the development of the legislativerecommendations and a section-by-section analysis of the recommendations. Asmentioned above, the committee submissions usually, but not always, include all theinformation that is required to be printed in committee reports, such as committeevotes. In most cases, the Budget Committee report has included a cost estimateprepared by the Congressional Budget Office (or, for revenue measures, the JointCommittee on Taxation) for the recommended legislative changes submitted by eachcommittee. The House considers most major legislation under the provisions of a specialrule, supplementing and at times superseding the Standing Rules of the House. Aspecial rule, when adopted by the House, governs the consideration of the applicablemeasure, including regulating the amending process. (38) The HouseRules Committee has the exclusive responsibility for developing and reporting aspecial rule providing for the consideration of a measure on the House floor. The 1974 act contemplates a role for the Rules Committee in thereconciliation process by providing, under Section 310(d)(5), as mentioned above,that the committee may make in order amendments to achieve changes specified byreconciliation directives if one or more committees fails to comply with them. Aswith most major legislation considered by the House, reconciliation measurestypically have been considered under a special rule reported by the Rules Committee. In most cases, the special rule reported by the House Rules Committee wasagreed to by the House (see Table 5 ). Only one special rule was amended (in 1981for FY1982), after the previous question was defeated, and only two were rejected(in 1984 for FY1985 and 1988 for FY1989). Provisions of the Special Rule. The special rule providing for the consideration of the reconciliation measure usuallyhas provided for general debate; made only certain amendments in order; placeddebate limitations on some of these amendments; waived points of order against theconsideration of the reconciliation bill, the provisions of the bill, and certainamendments; and provided for a motion to recommit with or without instructions. General debate under special rules providing for the consideration of areconciliation measure has ranged from one hour to 10 hours. In 1980, the first timethe House considered an omnibus reconciliation measure, the special rule divided thegeneral debate time among all the instructed committees plus the Budget Committee. After 1980, general debate on an omnibus reconciliation measure has beenequally divided between the chair and the ranking minority member of the BudgetCommittee. In cases when the reconciliation measure was reported by onecommittee, such as in recent years with the Ways and Means Committee, the specialrule has divided the time for general debate equally between the chair and rankingminority member of that committee. The special rule providing for the consideration of a reconciliation measurealways has limited the consideration of amendments to the bill; a reconciliationmeasure has never been considered under an open rule, as defined by the RulesCommittee. In three instances, the Rules Committee reported and the House adopteda rule prohibiting any floor amendments (defined as a closed rule by the RulesCommittee). (39) On several occasions, especially since the mid-1980s, the special ruleprovided that an amendment, or modifications to the underlying reconciliation bill,be considered as adopted upon the adoption of the special rule (sometimes referredto as a self-executing provision). The special rule (H.Res. 186) on theOmnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, for example, included twoself-executing provisions involving: (1) about two dozen brief amendments affectingvarious titles in the bill; and (2) a new title (Title XV) dealing with the budgetprocess. Both of the self-executing provisions were printed in the Rules Committeereport on the special rule. Most special rules for the consideration of a reconciliation measure havemade in order very few floor amendments. In fact, many special rules allowed onefloor amendment only, usually an amendment in the nature of a substitute. Moreover, only five special rules, excluding those that prohibited any flooramendments, allowed more than two floor amendments; the greatest number of flooramendments made in order by a special rule was 10 in 1989 (H.Res. 249for H.R. 3299). In every instance that a floor amendment was made in order by the specialrule, debate on the amendment was limited by the rule as well. Debate on individualamendments under the special rules has ranged from 20 minutes to four hours,equally divided between the proponent and an opponent of the amendment. Typically, the special rule provided an hour of debate for each floor amendment. All special rules waived one or more points of order against the considerationof the reconciliation bill, the bill itself, or a floor amendment. In most cases, thespecial rule waived all points of order against the reconciliation bill. Two specialrules waived certain points of order against the reconciliation bill except for certainprovisions in the bill. (40) In addition, most special rules waived all pointsof order against the floor amendments, including amendments in the nature of asubstitute, made in order by the special rule. Finally, all the special rules providing for the consideration of a reconciliationmeasure provided for the offering of a motion to recommit. A motion to recommitmay be offered with or without instructions. Most special rules allowed the motionwith instructions. Four special rules, however, explicitly prohibited any motion torecommit that contained instructions. (41) The House floor consideration of a reconciliation measure, as mentionedabove, usually is governed by a special rule. Of the 29 reconciliation measuresconsidered on the House floor during the period covering 1980 to 2003, 23 measureswere considered under a special rule. Of the remaining six reconciliation measures,five measures were considered under "suspension of the rules" procedures and onewas considered by unanimous consent. (42) This section discusses the consideration ofreconciliation measures under a special rule. During the House floor consideration of a reconciliation measure under aspecial rule, at least three key elements can have a substantive impact on themeasure: amendments, points of order, and motions to recommit the measure. Thehistorical experience of the House regarding each of these actions is discussed below. Consideration and Disposition ofAmendments. The special rule providing for the consideration ofa reconciliation measure limited the consideration of floor amendments to thosemade in order by the special rule. In only one instance, a Member offered anamendment not made in order by the rule. (43) In most cases, a Member offered the amendmentsmade in order by the rule. The number of amendments offered to a reconciliation billranged from one (eight times) to 10 (once). In six cases, an amendment made in order by the rule was not offered or waswithdrawn by a Member. In one of these cases, a Member attempted to modify hisamendment prior to offering it but was unsuccessful; consequently, he did not offerhis original amendment made in order by the rule. (44) With regard to 13 reconciliation measures, one or more amendments wereadopted upon the adoption of the special rule; four of these amendments wereamendments in the nature of a substitute to the reconciliation bill. Overall, of the 30 floor amendments offered to reconciliation measures, 19amendments were agreed to and 11 amendments were rejected (see Table 6 ). Thisoverall success of amendments, however, masks the variation over the years. In theearly 1980s, for example, almost all of the amendments offered to the reconciliationmeasures were agreed to (between 1980 and 1985, 16 of the 19 floor amendmentswere agreed to). Since 1985, only eight of the 21 floor amendments to reconciliationmeasures were agreed to. Moreover, over half (five) of these eight floor amendmentswere offered to one reconciliation measure (H.R. 3299 in 1989). Raising and Sustaining Points ofOrder. Any Member may make a point of order against a pendingmatter (e.g., a provision in a bill or an amendment) on the grounds that it violates arule of the House. (45) Unless a special rule waives the relevant pointsof order, a reconciliation measure and amendments thereto are subject to the StandingRules of the House, such as the germaneness requirement under clause 7 of RuleXVI. In addition, as a budgetary measure, a reconciliation bill is subject to thebudget enforcement procedures associated with the Congressional Budget Act of1974 and the annual budget resolution. (46) In particular, a reconciliation measure and anyamendments thereto must not cause the aggregate spending and revenue levels(Section 311), and any committees' spending allocations (Section 302) associatedwith the annual budget resolution, to be exceeded. Under Section 310(d)(1) of the1974 act, amendments to a reconciliation measure also must be deficit neutral to thebill. Most of the special rules providing for the consideration of a reconciliationmeasure, however, waived one or more points of order against the bill and flooramendments made in order. Therefore, while various provisions in the reconciliationbills or amendments offered thereto might have violated certain points of order underthe Standing Rules of the House or the 1974 act, the special rule prohibited aMember from raising such points of order. Two special rules, as mentioned above, made exceptions to the waiver ofcertain points of order. In each of these cases, Members raised points of orderagainst the unprotected provisions during the consideration of the reconciliationmeasure. In 1985, for example, the special rule providing for the consideration of H.R.3500, the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985, waived any pointsof order under clauses 5(a) and (b) of Rule XXI (now clauses 4 and 5(a) of Rule XXI)against the bill except for certain provisions. Clause 5(a) of Rule XXI prohibited anappropriation in legislation reported by a committee not having jurisdiction to reportappropriations. Clause 5(b) of Rule XXI prohibited a tax measure reported by acommittee not having jurisdiction to report a tax measure. During the consideration of H.R. 3500, Representative SidneyYates raised a point of order against one of the unprotected provisions that containedan appropriation in a title of the reconciliation bill reported by a committee nothaving jurisdiction to report an appropriation. In addition, Representative DanRostenkowski raised points of order against two unprotected provisions thatcontained a tax measure in a title of the bill reported by a committee not havingjurisdiction to report tax measures. In all three cases, the points of order weresustained and thus the violating provisions were stricken from the bill. (47) Motions to Recommit. Under theStanding Rules of the House, one motion to recommit a reconciliation measure maybe offered by a Member opposed to the measure, with preference given to a Memberof the minority party, after the previous question has been ordered on the measure butbefore the vote on final passage (House Rule XIX, clause 2). (48) Themotion may be made with or without instructions. A motion to recommit with instructions is debatable for 10 minutes, equallydivided between the proponent and an opponent of the motion; this debate time maybe extended to an hour if requested by the majority floor manager. A motion torecommit without instructions is not debatable. All special rules providing for the consideration of a reconciliation measureallowed for the offering of a motion to recommit. Members offered 16 motions torecommit 15 reconciliation bills. Almost all of these motions to recommit (13 of the16) included instructions. All of the motions to recommit with or withoutinstructions were rejected. In one case, in 2003, a motion to recommit withinstructions fell on a point of order that it was not germane to the bill. (49) Subsequently, another motion to recommit with instructions was offered; it wasrejected. Table 4. Initial House Action on Reconciliation Measures: FY1981-FY2005 Source : Prepared by the Congressional Research Service. a. The first four measures listed, H.R. 6782, H.R. 6812, H.R. 6862, and H.R. 6892, were considered and passed separatelyby the House, but later were incorporated into H.R. 6955, which became the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1982 (except forH.R. 6782, which became public law separately, P.L. 97-306 ). b. The House Budget Committee issued a report, Efforts to Reduce the Federal Deficit (H.Rept. 98-673, Apr. 10, 1984) pertaining to the reconciliationrecommendations contained in H.R. 5394, but the report did not officially accompany that measure. c. Following its passage by the House, H.R. 3500 was incorporated into H.R. 3128 by H.Res. 330. Table 5. Special Rules Providing for the Consideration of Reconciliation Measures in the House:FY1981-FY2005 Source : Prepared by the Congressional Research Service. Table 6. House Floor Amendments and Motions to Recommit to Reconciliation Measures:FY1981-FY2005 Source : Prepared by the Congressional Research Service. Note : "ANS" refers to an amendment in the nature of a substitute. a. The previous question on the amendment was agreed to by a vote of 215-212. b. The amendment was agreed to in the Committee of the Whole on a division vote of 31-24. The amendment, subsequently, was agreed to in the Houseon a vote of 245-176, as indicated. c. The ruling of the chair was appealed and a motion to table the appeal was agreed to by a vote of 222-202. The initial consideration of reconciliation measures in the Senate ispotentially a complex process that parallels House action in some respects, but differssignificantly in others. Four aspects of Senate action at this stage of thereconciliation process are addressed in this section: (1) the development oflegislative recommendations by the instructed committees; (2) the preparation of anomnibus measure by the Senate Budget Committee; (3) floor consideration of reconciliation legislation; and (4) the operation of the Senate's "Byrd rule." The reconciliation directives contained in the budget resolution, as finallyagreed to by the House and Senate, inform each instructed Senate committee as to thetype and scope of the legislative recommendations it must develop in order to complywith the directives. In addition, the reconciliation directives include a deadline forthe submission of legislative recommendations to the Budget Committee or thereporting of legislation directly to the Senate. Whether a committee has been instructed to submit legislativerecommendations to the Senate Budget Committee for inclusion in an omnibusreconciliation measure, or has been instructed to report a reconciliation measuredirectly to the Senate, it develops its recommendations in generally the same manneras it develops other legislation. (50) In doing so, the committee must adhere to thepertinent requirements in the Standing Rules of the Senate, as well as it owncommittee rules, including rules regarding the reporting of a measure or matter. (51) Relationship With the BudgetCommittee. Prior to the commencement of work by the instructedcommittees on their reconciliation recommendations, the Senate Budget Committeeusually sends a set of "guidelines" to the chairman and ranking member of eachcommittee. The guidelines summarize the applicable procedural requirementsstemming from the budget resolution containing the reconciliation directives andpertinent provisions of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974, and provide additionalinformation on related matters, such as scoring conventions that will be used toevaluate the reconciliation recommendations. The Budget Committee also mayadvise each instructed committee on drafting considerations (e.g., the number of thetitle or titles in the measure for the committee's recommendations) to avoid confusionwhen compiling the committee recommendations into a single measure. In most instances, the instructed committees maintain an ongoing relationshipwith the Budget Committee during the process of developing their legislativerecommendations, at least informally at the staff level. Consultations occur betweenthe committees to foster a clear understanding of procedural requirements, to assesspotential compliance issues with the aim of avoiding them, and for other reasons. Inaddition, the instructed committees regularly consult with CBO and, if appropriate,the Joint Committee on Taxation (JCT) on the budgetary implications of policyoptions and other budget-related assessments, and seek appropriate guidance andsupport from the Parliamentarian, Legislative Counsel, and other offices. Hearings, Markup, and Reporting or Submissionof Recommendations. While committees typically are afforded acertain amount of flexibility in conducting their legislative activities, Senate RuleXXVI, entitled "Committee Procedure," lays out basic requirements with regard tosuch matters as the scheduling of meetings and hearings, quorums, openness, andvoting and reporting requirements. As in the case of other legislation, instructed committees often hold hearingsprior to marking up their legislative recommendations. The Senate FinanceCommittee, for example, held multiple hearings at the full committee andsubcommittee level before marking up a revenue reconciliation measure on June 19,1997. Over a period spanning from February 4 through June 5 of that year, thecommittee held 10 full committee and two subcommittee hearings on topics relatedto the reconciliation recommendations, covering such matters as the status of theAirport and Airway Trust Fund, Individual Retirement Account proposals, capitalgains and losses, the Administration's FY1998 budget, and tax proposals related toeducation, health care, and small business. (52) Committees may proceed by marking up a bill that already has beenintroduced. The most common approach, however, is for the committee to originatelegislation in the markup, such as by considering a "chairman's mark," which may bealtered by the adoption of amendments in committee. Before an instructed committee can submit reconciliation legislation to theBudget Committee or report it directly to the Senate, it must meet to consider andapprove the legislation, including relevant amendments and motions that may beoffered, and then order the legislation reported by a majority vote. A majority of thecommittee must be physically present in order to vote to report the legislation;otherwise, a point of order may be raised on the Senate floor to prevent itsconsideration. (53) Committee Report or SubmissionRequirements. In addition to complying with reportingrequirements under Senate Rule XXVI, the committee must comply with reportingrequirements in Section 308 (2 U.S.C. 637), Section 402 (2 U.S.C. 653), and Section423 (2 U.S.C. 658b) of the 1974 act. These sections pertain to various analyses ofbudgetary legislation, including cost estimates and assessments of unfundedmandates prepared by CBO and, in the case of revenue legislation, the JCT. TheCBO and JCT estimates must be included in committee reports only if they areavailable in a timely manner. Further, with respect to revenue legislation, Section 4022(b) of the InternalRevenue Service Reform and Restructuring Act of 1998 ( P.L. 105-206 ) requires theinclusion of a tax complexity analysis in the report accompanying any revenuemeasure reported by the House Ways and Means Committee, the Senate FinanceCommittee, or a conference committee, if the measure directly or indirectly amendsthe Internal Revenue Code and has widespread applicability to individuals or smallbusinesses. Committee submissions to the Budget Committee usually consist of fourrequired elements. In addition to the legislative text, the submission includes thecommittee report language, the CBO or JCT estimates, and a transmittal letter signedby the chairman of the instructed committee. In many instances, the ranking memberof the instructed committee signs the transmittal letter as well. Like committee reports on other measures, the committee report languageaccompanying reconciliation legislation may include additional, supplemental, ordissenting views, which allow committee members individually, or as part of a group,to amplify their views, register their concerns, or express their dissent regarding partor all of the legislation. In the case of 1995 reconciliation legislation, for example,eight minority members of the Budget Committee signed a statement collectivelyexpressing their views. (54) On occasion, the CBO or JCT estimates may not be prepared in time forinclusion in the committee's submission and are omitted, but usually becomeavailable in time for inclusion in the Budget Committee's report on the omnibusreconciliation measure. On other occasions, the instructed committee may includeCBO or JCT estimates that are preliminary and are revised later. While a committee that is participating in the development of an omnibusreconciliation measure must submit its legislative recommendations to the BudgetCommittee, it may also publish them separately or report them as separate legislationaltogether. Senate committee actions that led to the enactment of two reconciliation actsin one year during the 105th Congress, the Balanced Budget Act of 1997 and theTaxpayer Relief Act of 1997, illustrate the potential complexity involved. TheFY1998 budget resolution provided for a revenue reconciliation act and an omnibusspending reconciliation act. The initial Senate version of the spending reconciliation measure, theBalanced Budget Act (S. 947), originated in the Budget Committee andwas reported on June 20, 1997. In lieu of a written report on the bill, the BudgetCommittee issued a 241-page committee print containing the transmittal letters,report language, and cost estimates provided by the eight instructed Senatecommittees. (55) The print included (on pages 71-197) a 126-pagesubmission from the Senate Finance Committee. As a supplement to the BudgetCommittee's print, the Finance Committee issued its own 474-page committee print,explaining its spending reconciliation recommendations in more detail. (56) The initial Senate version of the revenue reconciliation measure, the TaxpayerRelief Act of 1997 ( S. 949 ), was reported directly to the Senate by theFinance Committee (because it was the sole committee subject to revenuereconciliation directives) on June 20. The committee issued a written report toaccompany the measure. (57) In the course of preparing an omnibus reconciliation measure, the BudgetCommittee's task usually is described as a "ministerial function." Under Section310(b)(2) of the 1974 act, after receiving the legislative recommendations of theinstructed committees, the Budget Committee must report omnibus reconciliationlegislation carrying out the recommendations "without any substantive revision." Ensuring Accuracy andCompleteness. Although this task may be described correctly asbeing ministerial, the Budget Committee still is faced with several issues at thispoint. First, the Budget Committee must endeavor to ensure that all responses frominstructed committees are complete and accurate. As indicated previously, theBudget Committee secures any CBO or JCT estimates that were not prepared in timefor inclusion with the committee submissions, or secures final estimates in place ofpreliminary ones. In order to ensure accuracy, the Budget Committee from time to time hasmade technical corrections in the submissions at the request of the instructedcommittees. In the case of reconciliation legislation in 1996 dealing with welfarereform, for example, both of the instructed committees asked the Budget Committeeto make corrections in their previous submissions. On July 9, 1996, ChairmanRichard Lugar and Ranking Member Patrick Leahy of the Senate Agriculture,Nutrition, and Forestry Committee sent a letter to Budget Committee Chairman PeteDomenici, with technical corrections to four provisions in the June 28 submissionattached. (58) Similarly, on July 15, Chairman William Rothof the Finance Committee sent a letter to Chairman Domenici notifying him that theJuly 11 submission "inadvertently included a change to the child care section of thebill which was not actually made by the Committee." (59) TheBudget Committee indicated that it had made the changes requested by bothcommittees. It was the instructed committees, and not the Budget Committee, thathad the authority to make these changes. Dealing With Tardy Responses. A second issue faced by the Budget Committee is what to do if one or morecommittees does not submit its recommendations by the deadline. The initialpractice of the Senate was to extend the deadline when the Budget Committee feltthat such action was warranted. This practice was motivated by the view thatincluding tardy committee submissions could "taint" the reconciliation measure,thereby causing it to lose its privilege and the protection of expedited procedures. In1985, for example, the Senate extended the September 27 deadline set in the FY1986budget resolution to October 1 by unanimous consent in order to accommodate theBanking, Housing, and Urban Affairs Committee. (60) In someinstances, the deadline was extended in a series of tightly constrained steps. In 1986,for example, the deadline of July 25 set in the FY1987 budget resolution wasextended to 6:00 p.m. on July 29, to 12:00 noon on July 30, and then to 3:30 p.m. onthat same day, July 30. (61) Finally, the deadline has been extended by largermargins; the July 28 deadline in the FY1988 budget resolution was extended toSeptember 29 and then to October 19. (62) Under more recent practice, the Budget Committee may be afforded somediscretion in awaiting the responses of tardy committees in order to include them inthe omnibus reconciliation measure. While the budget resolution provides a deadlinefor the submissions by the instructed committees, it does not impose a reportingdeadline on the Budget Committee. Under Section 310(b)(2) of the 1974 act, theBudget Committee is obliged to report the omnibus reconciliation measure only"upon receiving all such recommendations." Consequently, the Budget Committee'sobligation to report does not ripen until all recommendations have been received,even tardy ones. (63) Nonetheless, the Budget Committee is expected to report the omnibusreconciliation measure in a reasonably prompt manner. Accordingly, when facedwith lingering delay in the responses by one or more instructed committees, it maychoose to report the omnibus reconciliation measure without the responses and seeka remedy for the omissions during floor consideration. Evaluating Compliance. A thirdtask facing the Budget Committee at this stage of the reconciliation process, andperhaps the most important one, is evaluating compliance by the respondingcommittees. Compliance may be judged by several criteria. First and foremost, theBudget Committee assesses whether each instructed committee has met the goals laidout in the reconciliation directives. In the case of each committee, the estimatedlevels of spending changes (and, if appropriate, revenue changes and debt-limitchanges) that would be achieved for each time period are measured against theinstructed levels. Although the Budget Committee and each instructed committee receives costestimates from CBO and the JCT, it is the Budget Committee's responsibility andprerogative to assess committee compliance on the basis of spending or revenuelevels. In measuring compliance, the Budget Committee sometimes will makeadjustments to the estimates provided by CBO or the JCT. One such adjustment,which occurred in 1995, involved a change in the enactment date assumed by CBO,which shortened the time available in FY1996 for the sale of the Naval PetroleumReserves. As a consequence of this change, CBO judged that the sale could not becompleted in FY1996 and reduced the savings attributed to the Armed ServicesCommittee accordingly. As explained by the Senate Budget Committee: The FY1996 budget resolutionassumed an October 1, 1995 enactment date and the reconciliation instructions tocommittees were based on this enactment date. Due to the delay of some of thecommittee's submissions and other factors, CBO is currently using a November 15,1995 enactment date. As a result, some committees followed the assumptions in thebudget resolution and still failed to meet their fiscal year 1996 reconciliationinstruction because of this change in the assumption on the enactment date.... However, if a committee follows the assumptions in the budget resolution and failsto meet its instructions for fiscal year 1996 solely because of an assumption on theenactment date, the Senate Budget Committee will hold the committee harmless andwill score the committee as achieving its instruction. Therefore, with thisadjustment, the Armed Services Committee has complied with the budget resolution'sreconciliation instructions for FY1996. (64) A second criterion for determining compliance involves the "fungibility rule," which is set forth in Section 310(c) of the 1974 act. (65) Thepurpose of the rule is to allow some flexibility in the response of a committeeinstructed to change both spending and revenues. The fungibility rule may not applyif revenue and spending changes are reported in separate reconciliation measurespursuant to separate directives. In sum, the fungibility rule: (1) applies to any Senate (or House) committeethat is subject to reconciliation directives in a budget resolution requiring it torecommend reconciliation legislation changing both spending and revenues; (2)deems any such committee to be in compliance with its reconciliation directives ifits recommended legislation does not cause either the spending changes or therevenue changes to exceed or fall below the directives by more than 20% of the sumof the two types of changes, and the total amount of changes recommended is not lessthan the total amount of changes that were directed; and (3) authorizes the chairmanof the Senate Budget Committee to file appropriate adjustments in the levels in thebudget resolution, and committee spending allocations thereunder, upon the exerciseof the rule, and requires any committee receiving revised spending allocations topromptly report Section 302(b) suballocations. The operation of this rule in the Senate was described in 1993 in a print of theSenate Budget Committee, as follows: For an example of the rule inoperation, take the case of a budget resolution that instructs a committee to achieve$3 million in outlay reductions and $7 million in revenue increases, for a total of $10million in deficit reduction. By virtue of this section, that committee maypermissibly achieve outlay reductions as low as $1 million ($3 million minus 20percent of $10 million, or $2 million), as long as it achieves a total of at least $10million in deficit reduction by also achieving at least $9 million in revenue increases. Alternatively, the committee may achieve revenue increases as low as $5 million ($7million minus 20 percent of $10 million, or $2 million), as long as it achieves a totalof at least $10 million in deficit reduction by also achieving outlay reductions of atleast $5 million. (66) In its current form, the fungibility rule authorizes the chairman of the SenateBudget Committee to file changes in budget resolution levels, and committeespending allocations thereunder, whenever the rule is exercised, and to require thatany committee receiving revised spending allocations promptly report Section 302(b)suballocations. (67) As Senate and House rules grant jurisdiction over revenue matters primarilyto the Senate Finance Committee and House Ways and Means Committee,respectively, these are the two main committees to which the fungibility rule applies. Finally, a third criterion for assessing committee compliance with thereconciliation directives is the Senate's "Byrd rule," which is discussed in detailbelow. Briefly, the rule bars the inclusion of matter in reconciliation legislation thatis extraneous to the purposes of the reconciliation directives. The Parliamentarian also plays a role in assessing compliance withreconciliation directives, determining whether provisions from the instructedcommittees are within their respective jurisdictions. Further, the Parliamentariandetermines, as a threshold matter, whether the assembled submissions from theinstructed committees constitute a reconciliation bill and, thus, whether the bill maybe considered under the expedited procedures of the reconciliation process. While the Budget Committee must report the legislative recommendationssubmitted to it, the committee need not necessarily issue a written report. Beginningin the late 1980s, the practice of the Senate Budget Committee has been to reportomnibus reconciliation bills without a written report. The purpose of this practiceis to avoid both a Budget Committee rule providing for time to submit additional andminority views, and the Senate rule requiring legislation accompanied by a writtenreport to lay over for a period of time before floor consideration. The BudgetCommittee usually issues a committee print explaining the legislation in lieu of areport. The Budget Committee, because it must report an omnibus reconciliation bill"without any substantive revision," may not resolve any substantive issues onnon-compliance at this point. The Budget Committee may, however, in concert withthe leadership, evaluate strategies for remedying the non-compliance on the Senatefloor through one or more manager's amendments or by other means. The basic contours of Senate procedure for the consideration of reconciliationmeasures are shaped by Section 310 of the 1974 act. In particular, Section 310(e)provides that the provisions of Section 305 of the act, which establish procedures forthe consideration of budget resolutions and conference reports thereon in the Senate,shall also apply to the consideration of reconciliation measures and conferencereports thereon. In one important exception, a 20-hour limit on debate is set forreconciliation measures, instead of the 50-hour limit applicable to budget resolutions. The timetable for the congressional budget process set out in Section 300 ofthe 1974 act indicates that Congress should complete action on any requiredreconciliation by June 15. While Section 310(f) of the act is intended to enforce thisdeadline in the House (by barring the consideration in July of an adjournmentresolution providing for the traditional August recess if the House has not completedaction), the act does not contain any comparable provision for the Senate. Like other budgetary legislation, reconciliation measures generally must bein compliance with budget enforcement procedures in the 1974 act and included inannual budget resolutions. In particular, spending levels in the measure must notcause any committee's spending allocations under the budget resolution to beexceeded (Section 302), revenues levels in the measure must not drop below therevenue floor established in the budget resolution (Section 311), and no policy orprocedural matters within the Budget Committee's jurisdiction can be included(Section 306), or the bill will be subject to points of order under these sections thatrequire a three-fifths vote to waive. Patterns in the Consideration of Senate and HouseLegislation. During the period from 1980-2004, covering budgetresolutions for FY1981-FY2005, the Senate completed action on a total of 19reconciliation acts stemming from reconciliation directives in budget resolutions for17 different years (see Table 7 ). In all but three of these years, the Senate considereda single reconciliation measure in response to the reconciliation directives in thebudget resolution. In the three remaining years, the Senate considered two differentreconciliation measures each year, resulting in the enactment of five reconciliationacts -- one act in 1980 (for FY1981) and two acts each in 1982 and 1997 (for FY1983and FY1998). As a general matter, the Senate initially considers a single, Senate-numberedreconciliation measure, either an omnibus reconciliation act reported by the BudgetCommittee or a reconciliation act reported by the Finance Committee. Following thecompletion of debate and amendment, the Senate positions itself for conference withthe House by taking up the House-passed reconciliation measure, striking all after theenacting clause, and inserting the text of the Senate-passed measure. This procedure is especially important with respect to reconciliation measuresthat affect revenues due to the requirement in the Constitution that revenue measuresoriginate in the House. By passing a House-numbered bill in the final instance, theSenate abides by the constitutional requirement. (After the Senate considers theSenate-numbered bill, the 1974 act would allow an additional 20 hours to considerthe House-numbered bill, but the Senate usually considered the House-numbered billby unanimous consent.) Different patterns of legislative action have occurred as well. In 1980, forexample, the Senate Budget Committee reported two different original Senate billscarrying out revenue and spending reconciliation instructions, and the Senateconsidered each of them separately. Following their consideration, the Senateincorporated both of the measures into the House-passed reconciliation bill. (68) Table 7. Initial Senate Action on Reconciliation Measures: FY1981-FY2005 Source : Prepared by the Congressional Research Service. On two occasions, in 1982 and 1997, the Senate considered separate revenueand spending reconciliation acts that each became law. (69) Three ofthe four measures were original Senate bills reported by the Budget Committee (twobills) or the Finance Committee (one bill), but in the remaining instance the FinanceCommittee reported a House-passed bill instead of an original Senate bill. (70) In 2001 and 2003, the Finance Committee reported original Senate billscarrying out revenue reconciliation instructions, but the Senate did not consider them. Instead, the Senate considered House-passed reconciliation bills under an acceleratedschedule. (71) The Senate usually completes initial action on reconciliation measures overa period of two to four days. In 1980, the Senate devoted only one day each to theinitial consideration of two reconciliation bills, but in 1985 it considered areconciliation measure for eight days. Initiating Consideration and ControllingTime. Although not explicitly stated in the 1974 act, reconciliationmeasures are privileged measures. Accordingly, the motion to proceed to theconsideration of a reconciliation measure is not debatable. In practice, mostreconciliation measures are laid before the Senate by unanimous consent. A reconciliation measure does not need to lie over on the calendar for onelegislative day, but if such legislation is accompanied by a written report, the reportmust be available for 48 hours before the measure can be considered. As statedpreviously, the usual practice of the Budget Committee since the late 1980s has beento report omnibus reconciliation bills without a written report, issuing a committeeprint in lieu of a report. The Finance Committee has been instructed to reportlegislation directly to the Senate on several occasions in recent years, sometimesissuing a written report and sometimes not doing so. Reconciliation legislation is subject to a 20-hour debate limitation. Debateon first degree amendments is limited to two hours, and debate on second degreeamendments and debatable motions or appeals is limited to one hour. In practice,debate time may vary from these limits, pursuant to unanimous consent agreements. Control of time under the 20-hour limit is equally divided between, andcontrolled by, the majority leader and the minority leader or their designees. Thechairman and ranking member of the Budget Committee usually are designated toserve as floor managers and to control the time. With respect to amendments (anddebatable motions and appeals), time is divided equally and controlled by the Senatorwho proposed the amendment and the majority manager (or, if the majority managerfavors the amendment, the minority manager). Not all actions pertaining to a reconciliation measure are counted under the20-hour time limit. Debate on the measure, all amendments thereto, debatablemotions and appeals, and time used in quorum calls (except for those that precede arollcall vote) is counted under the limit, but time used to read amendments, to vote,or to establish a quorum prior to a rollcall vote is not counted, absent a unanimousconsent agreement to the contrary. Therefore, it is possible, especially with theconsideration of a large number of amendments under a "vote-arama" situation(discussed below), for consideration to extend well beyond 20 hours. Conversely,because the time for debate may be reduced by yielding back time, by unanimousconsent, or by a nondebatable motion, the consideration of a reconciliation measuremay not consume the full 20 hours. Restrictions on Amendments and Motions toRecommit. There are several restrictions on the consideration ofamendments. First, as provided in Section 305(b)(2) of the 1974 act, amendmentsmust be germane (the germaneness requirement also applies to amendments tobudget resolutions). (72) While certain amendments are per se germane(e.g., an amendment to strike, or to change numbers or dates), the germaneness of anamendment typically is determined on a case-by-case basis if a point of order israised. Once matter has been stricken from the measure by amendment, the mattercan no longer be used to justify germaneness. Conversely, matter added to themeasure by amendment can be used as the basis for additional amendments to bedeemed germane. An important exception to the germaneness requirement is made inconnection with a motion to recommit with instructions intended to bring acommittee's recommendations into full compliance. Although the motion itself mustbe germane, the amendment reported back by the instructed committee is not subjectto a germaneness requirement. This practice recognizes the fact that in order to makethe changes in spending or revenues necessary to achieve full compliance, it may benecessary to address matter not included in the instructed committee's originalrecommendations. Section 310(d) prohibits the consideration of any amendment that wouldcause the reconciliation measure to reduce outlays by less than the amount instructed,or would cause it to increase revenues by less than the amount instructed, unless theresulting deficit increase is offset. The prohibition does not interfere, however, witha motion to strike, regardless of that motion's effect on the deficit. Section 310(g) bars the consideration of any reconciliation legislation,including any amendment thereto or conference report thereon, "that containsrecommendations with respect to" Social Security. For purposes of these provision,Social Security is considered to include the Old-Age, Survivors, and DisabilityInsurance (OASDI) program established under Title II of the Social Security Act; itdoes not include Medicare or other programs established as part of that act. Finally, Section 313, the Senate's "Byrd rule," prohibits the consideration ofany reconciliation legislation, including amendments, that include extraneous matter(see discussion below). One provision of the Byrd rule buttresses the prohibitionagainst considering recommendations affecting Social Security set forth in Section310(g). Each of the restrictions discussed above requires an affirmative vote ofthree-fifths of the membership (60 Senators, if no seats are vacant) to waive or toappeal the ruling of the chair. An amendment fashioned to avoid one restriction still may run afoul ofanother. An amendment may be germane, for example, yet violate the Byrd rulebecause it has no budgetary effect and therefore is extraneous. Motions to recommit, as previously indicated, afford a means of bringingcommittee recommendations into full compliance. Section 305(b)(5) of the 1974 actprohibits any motion to recommit, except for a motion to recommit with instructionsto report back within no more than three days. In practice, such motions usuallyrequire the instructed committee to report back "forthwith." While the committeenamed in the instructions may not be amended, the legislative language included inthe instructions is amendable in two degrees. If not necessary to bring a committeeinto compliance, the amendments proposed by a motion to recommit must begermane. "Vote-arama". The number ofamendments offered to reconciliation measures generally has increased over thehistory of the reconciliation process. Only a few amendments were offered to theearliest reconciliation bills, but dozens of amendments have been offered toreconciliation bills in recent years. When the 20-hour debate limit has been reached, Senators may continue toconsider amendments and motions to recommit with instructions (and to take otheractions as well), but they may not debate them unless unanimous consent is granted. The circumstance under which debate time on a reconciliation measure (or budgetresolution) has expired but amendments and motions continue to be considered hascome to be known as "vote-arama." As a general matter, accelerated votingprocedures sometimes are put into effect under a vote-arama scenario, allowing twominutes of debate per amendment for explanation and a 10-minute limit per vote. During the consideration of the three most recent reconciliation measures, in2000, 2001, and 2003, the Senate considered 162 amendments and motions torecommit (38 in 2000, 59 in 2001, and 65 in 2003). Many of the amendments andmotions were considered and disposed of under a vote-arama, as discussed in moredetail below. Marriage Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2000 (vetoed). TheSenate considered H.R. 4810 ( S. 2839 ) on July 14, 17, and18, 2000. Under a series of unanimous consent agreements, 37 amendments and onemotion to recommit were offered and debated on the first day of consideration, July14, without any final action being taken on them. On the second day ofconsideration, July 17, the Senate took up these amendments for disposition at 6:15p.m., with two minutes of debate time available for explanation of each amendment. This procedure was employed on the following day, July 18, as well, ending withfinal passage of the bill. Over the two days, 37 amendments and one motion torecommit were considered under this procedure; 10 amendments were adopted, threeamendments (and one motion to recommit) were rejected, seven amendments fell ona point of order, and 17 amendments were withdrawn. Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001(P.L. 107-16). The Senate considered H.R. 1836 on May 17, 21, 22, and23, 2001. On the second day of consideration, May 21, after the 20-hour limit ondebate apparently had expired, (73) the Senate took up and disposed of a series ofamendments under a unanimous consent agreement, propounded by Senator Lott,under which the votes would be limited to 10 minutes each, with two minutes beforeeach vote for an explanation. (74) This procedure was employed on the followingtwo days of consideration, May 22 and May 23, as well, ending with final passageof the bill. Under this procedure, over the three-day period, the Senate considered59 amendments and motions to recommit; eight were adopted, 20 were rejected, 26fell on a point of order, and five were withdrawn. Thirty-five of these 59amendments and motions to recommit had been offered, considered, and temporarilylaid aside prior to the expiration of the 20-hour limit. Subsequently, these 35amendments and motions to recommit were considered under the accelerated votingprocedures; three were adopted, 14 amendments were rejected, 13 fell on a point oforder, and five were withdrawn. Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003 (P.L.108-27). The Senate considered S. 1054 on May 14 and 15, 2003. Onthe first day of consideration, the Senate agreed by unanimous consent that the20-hour limit on debate be expired and that the Senate proceed to vote onamendments at the beginning of the following day. (75) At the endof May 14, Senator Grassley announced that during consideration of the amendmentson May 15, all votes after the first vote would be limited to 10 minutes each. (76) On May15, the Senate considered 65 amendments; 30 amendments were adopted, nineamendments were rejected, 19 amendments fell on a point of order, and sevenamendments were withdrawn. Of these 65 amendments, 26 amendments wereoffered, considered, and set aside prior to the expiration of the 20-hour limit. Subsequently, these 26 amendments were considered under the accelerated votingprocedures; eight amendments were adopted, 14 amendments fell on a point of order,and four amendments were withdrawn. During the first several years' experience with reconciliation, the legislationcontained many provisions that were extraneous to the purpose of implementingbudget resolution policies. The reconciliation submissions of committees includedsuch things as provisions that had no budgetary effect, that increased spending orreduced revenues when the reconciliation instructions called for reduced spendingor increased revenues, or that violated another committee's jurisdiction. Reconciliation procedures, and other expedited procedures that limit debateand restrict the offering of amendments, run counter to the long-standing practicesof the Senate applicable to most legislation, in which Senators may engage inextended debate and freely offer amendments. Many Senators were willing tosurrender customary freedoms with respect to debate and amendment in order toexpedite reconciliation legislation, but they sought a means of confining the scopeof such legislation to its budgetary purposes. In 1985 and 1986, the Senate adopted the Byrd rule (named after its principalsponsor, Senator Robert C. Byrd) on a temporary basis as a means of curbing thesepractices. The Byrd rule has been extended and modified several times over theyears. In 1990, the Byrd rule was incorporated into the 1974 Congressional BudgetAct as Section 313 and made permanent. (77) In general, a point of order authorized under the Byrd rule may be raised inorder to strike extraneous matter already in the bill as reported or discharged (or inthe conference report), or to prevent the incorporation of extraneous matter throughthe adoption of amendments or motions. A point of order may be raised against asingle provision or two or more provisions in the bill (usually as designated by titleor section number, or by page and line number), in amendments offered thereto, orin motions made thereon, or against an entire amendment or amendments. The chairmay sustain a point of order as to all of the provisions (or amendments) or only someof them. The maker of the point of order defines the scope of the provision orprovisions being challenged. The Byrd rule is nearly unique in that points of order made thereunder bringdown the offending matter, but not the entire measure. Once material has beenstricken from reconciliation legislation under the Byrd rule, it may not be offeredagain as an amendment. A motion to waive the Byrd rule, or to sustain an appeal of the ruling of thechair on a point of order raised under the Byrd rule, requires the affirmative vote ofthree-fifths of the membership (60 Senators if no seats are vacant). (78) A singlewaiver motion can: (1) apply to the Byrd rule as well as other provisions of theCongressional Budget Act; (2) involve multiple as well as single provisions oramendments; (3) extend (for specified language) through consideration of theconference report as well as initial consideration of the measure or amendment; and(4) be made prior to the raising of a point of order, thus making the point of ordermoot. While the point of order itself is not debatable, the motion to waive isdebatable, subject to the time limits for debatable motions. When a reconciliation measure, or a conference report thereon, is considered,the Senate Budget Committee must submit for the record a list of potentiallyextraneous matter included therein. (79) This list is advisory, however, and does not bindthe chair in ruling on points of order. Determinations of budgetary levels for purposes of enforcing the Byrd ruleare made by the Senate Budget Committee. Definitions of Extraneous Matter. Subsection (b)(1) of the Byrd rule provides definitions of what constitutes extraneousmatter for purposes of the rule. Some aspects of the Byrd rule require considerablejudgment regarding its application to complex legislation. As the Senate BudgetCommittee noted in its report on the budget resolution for fiscal year 1994,"'Extraneous' is a term of art." (80) In the most general terms, the rule bars theinclusion of matter that is not related to the purposes of the reconciliation process. A provision is considered to be extraneous if it falls under one or more of thefollowing six definitions: 1. It does not produce a change in outlays or revenues; 2. It produces an outlay increase or revenue decrease when theinstructed committee is not in compliance with its instructions; 3. It is outside of the jurisdiction of the committee that submitted thetitle or provision for inclusion in the reconciliation measure; 4. It produces a change in outlays or revenues which is merelyincidental to the non-budgetary components of the provision; 5. It would increase the deficit for a fiscal year beyond those coveredby the reconciliation measure; and 6. It recommends changes in Social Security. The last definition complements the ban in Section 310(g) of the 1974 actagainst considering any reconciliation legislation that contains recommendationspertaining to Social Security. While a successful point of order under the lastdefinition in the Byrd rule would excise the offending provision, a successful pointof order under Section 310(g) would defeat the entire bill. Exceptions to the Definition of ExtraneousMatter. Subsection (b)(2) of the Byrd rule provides that aSenate-originated provision that does not produce a change in outlays or revenuesshall not be considered extraneous if the chairman and ranking minority members ofthe Budget Committee and the committee reporting the provision certify that: the provision mitigates direct effects clearly attributable to aprovision changing outlays or revenues and both provisions together produce a netreduction in the deficit; or the provision will (or is likely to) reduce outlays or increaserevenues: (1) in one or more fiscal years beyond those covered by the reconciliationmeasure; (2) on the basis of new regulations, court rulings on pending legislation, orrelationships between economic indices and stipulated statutory triggers pertainingto the provision; or (3) but reliable estimates cannot be made due to insufficientdata. Subsection (b)(3) of the Byrd rule provides an exception to the definition ofextraneousness on the basis of committee jurisdiction for certain provisions reportedby a committee, if they would be referred to that committee upon introduction as aseparate measure. Additionally, under subsection (b)(1)(A), a provision that does not changeoutlays or revenues in the net, but which includes outlay decreases or revenueincreases that exactly offset outlay increases or revenue decreases, is not consideredto be extraneous. The Byrd rule has been applied to 19 reconciliation measures considered bythe Senate from 1985 through 2004. In 42 of the 55 actions involving the Byrd rule,opponents were able to strike extraneous matter from legislation (18 cases) or bar theconsideration of extraneous amendments (24 cases) by raising points of order. Nineof 41 motions to waive the Byrd rule, in order to retain or add extraneous matter,were successful. The Byrd rule has been used only four times during considerationof a conference report on a reconciliation measure (twice in 1993, once in 1995, andonce in 1997). Under the usual practice, the House and Senate initially consider and passtheir own reconciliation measures. In addition, reconciliation measures are complex,and in many instances, quite lengthy legislation. Accordingly, these factorseffectively guarantee that the House and Senate bills will be different. The twochambers must, however, as with all legislation, agree to the same reconciliationmeasure in the exact same form before it can be sent to the President. For the mostpart, the House and Senate employ the usual legislative procedures and practicesunder their rules to resolve differences on reconciliation measures, although theCongressional Budget Act of 1974 specifies some aspects of procedure at this stage. As with other complex legislation, the House and Senate typically use aconference as the means of developing an agreement on reconciliation legislation. In the case of all but one of the 19 reconciliation measures ultimately submitted byCongress to the President, the House and Senate convened a conference on themeasure and a conference report was issued. In the one instance in which aconference was not used, the two chambers passed identical legislation and therewere no differences to resolve. (In response to reconciliation directives in theFY1984 budget resolution, the Senate passed a House-passed reconciliation billwithout amendment, clearing it for the President.) The pattern with regard to conference procedure on reconciliation measureshas been for the Senate to consider one or two Senate bills initially, then to take upand amend the House-passed bill in order to proceed to conference. Table 8 provides information on House and Senate actions on conference reports onreconciliation measures. The one exception to the pattern occurred in 1982. Inresponse to reconciliation directives in the FY1983 budget resolution, the Senateinitially considered, and went to conference with the House on, a House-numberedbill, H.R. 4961 (which became the Tax Equity and Fiscal ResponsibilityAct of 1982). The House and Senate also may use an amendment exchange instead of aconference in order to resolve differences regarding legislation, or as a fallbackprocedure when conference agreements are not completed successfully. In the caseof reconciliation legislation, amendment exchanges are seldom used. The conferencereport on the Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985, forexample, was rejected by the House on December 19, 1985, by a vote of205-151. (81) Between December 19, 1985, and March 20, 1986, the House and Senate exchangedamendments nine times before their disagreements were resolved. (82) In addition,a successful point of order raised under the Byrd rule against the conference reporton the Balanced Budget Act of 1995 resulted in the Senate receding and concurringwith a further amendment that effectively deleted the offending matter. Although theHouse had previously adopted the conference report, it resolved the disagreement byconcurring in the further Senate amendment. In order to proceed to conference, the second chamber to act insists on itsamendment, thereby expressing its disagreement with the recommendations of thefirst chamber. Then, the second chamber requests a conference with the firstchamber in order to resolve the disagreement. In the case of reconciliationlegislation, the Senate has always been the "second" chamber to act, with respect tosetting up a conference. After a conference has been requested and agreed to, each chamber appointsconferees. Upon the appointment of conferees by both chambers, the conferencecommittee may then convene to carry out its work. In the Senate, these steps usuallyare merged together into a single unanimous consent request; in the House, confereesare not necessarily appointed at the time that the other actions occur. (83) In instances where there is unusual controversy or complications in enteringinto a conference, each of the three required steps may entail a separate motion (andvote). The House, in a few cases, used special rules reported by the House RulesCommittee to go to conference. In the House, it is the prerogative of the Speaker to appoint conferees, whilein the Senate, the usual practice is for the full Senate by unanimous consent toauthorize the Presiding Office to appoint them. Conferees can be appointed to consider the entire matter in conference or onlyfor limited-purposes. "General conferees" negotiate over the entire bill and anyamendments, and "limited-purpose" conferees negotiate only on a portion of thematter in conference designated at the time of appointment. Both types of conferees are appointed on omnibus reconciliation measures. Members of the House and Senate Budget Committee are appointed as generalconferees (and the chairman and ranking member serve as floor managers of theconference report). Members of the committees that submitted reconciliationrecommendations make up the rest of the conference committee. The conferees fromthe legislative committees have the responsibility of resolving differences in thelegislative language within their committee's jurisdiction, while the conferees fromthe Budget Committees work to facilitate the conference actions generally andpromote a timely resolution of policy disagreements. From time to time, when aMember must drop out of conference proceedings, a replacement may be appointed. When a conference committee deals with a reconciliation measure that wasreported to each chamber by a single committee, the conferees usually are chosenfrom the legislative committee's membership. Sometimes matter within the jurisdiction of a committee in one chamber thatdid not receive a reconciliation instruction may be before the conferees because ofthe action of the other body. Therefore, a chamber may include conferees from morecommittees than were instructed in the budget resolution. Conferences on reconciliation measures sometimes involve only a fewMembers from each chamber. The House and Senate appointed three conferees each,for example, on the Marriage Tax Relief and Reconciliation Act of 2000. In manyinstances, however, the wide range of issues encompassed by reconciliation, and thelarge number of conferees appointed to address them, leads to the creation ofsubconferences. The largest conference on a reconciliation measure, the OmnibusBudget Reconciliation Act of 1982, involved 184 Representatives and 69 Senatorsand relied upon 58 subconferences. The subconferences are established informally by agreement of theconference leaders. Members of the legislative committees involved in theconference typically are assigned only to the subconferences that deal with matterswithin their committee's jurisdiction. The general conferees from the BudgetCommittees also are assigned to subconferences, but they do not directly negotiatethe resolution of the pending legislative issues. These procedures are informal in theSenate, for under the Senate rules, a Senate conferee is a conferee for all purposes,and a majority of all Senate conferees must sign the conference report to conclude theconference, regardless of the purposes for which the Senate appointed the conferees. When the House and Senate prepare to go to conference on a measure, it isnot uncommon in either chamber for one or more motions to be considered thatinstruct conferees. Instructions to conferees may encourage them to take a particularposition on an issue, or set of issues, but neither chamber regards the instructions asbinding the conferees in any way. In the House, the motion to instruct can be offered at three separate times inthe legislative process: (1) prior to the appointment of conferees; (2) after theconferees have been appointed for 20 calendar days and 10 legislative days, butbefore they report to the House; (3) and after the conferees have reported, inconjunction with a motion to recommit the conference report. Only one motion toinstruct conferees is allowed prior to the appointment of conferees, and only one ina motion to recommit a conference report; in contrast, the practice of the House is toadmit multiple 20-day motions to instruct. Members of the minority party areaccorded preference in recognition to offer motions to instruct in the first twoinstances, but are not accorded preference in recognition to offer the 20-day motion. Motions to instruct conferees are not as common in the Senate as in theHouse, in part because Senators generally have more opportunity thanRepresentatives to be heard on measures and to let their views on conferencenegotiations be known. In the Senate, motions to instruct can only be offered priorto the appointment of conferees, but Senators also instruct their conferees throughsimple resolutions and amendments to legislation. Motions to instruct conferees have been made to reconciliation measures, justas they have been made to budget resolutions. In the case of budget resolutions,motions to instruct conferees have been made regularly in the House but infrequentlyin the Senate. (84) With respect to reconciliation measures,however, such motions have been made regularly in the House and on occasion in theSenate. Some examples of the circumstances under which motions to instructconferees were made in each chamber are discussed below: Motions to Instruct in the House . In the House, the firstmotion to instruct conferees on a reconciliation measure occurred the first year thatreconciliation was used. On September 18, 1980, the House agreed to such a motionwith respect to the conference on H.R. 7765 by a vote of 300-73. In 1997,motions to instruct conferees were made in the case of both reconciliation bills thatyear. A motion offered by Representative John Spratt, ranking member of the BudgetCommittee, on July 10, 1997, to the Balanced Budget Act of 1997 (H.R.2015) was approved by a vote of 414-14, but a motion offered the same dayby Representative Charles Rangel, ranking member of the Ways and MeansCommittee, to the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, was rejected by a vote of199-233. Motions to Instruct in the Senate . The Senate considered asingle motion to instruct conferees in 1981 and 1989. The first such motion insistedthat funding for the Head Start Program be set at specified levels forFY1982-FY1984, while the second instructed the Senate conferees not to accept anyHouse language that would not result in savings or in revenue increases. Duringconsideration of the Balanced Budget Act of 1995, the Senate on November 13,1995, considered four different motions to instruct conferees, adopting three of themand tabling the other. Motions to instruct conferees may be amended. On July 14, 1993, forexample, a motion to instruct House conferees on the Omnibus BudgetReconciliation Act of 1993 was amended by an amendment in the natureof a substitute, by a vote of 235-183; the motion to instruct, as amended, was agreedto by a vote of 415-0. Procedures relating to the conduct of conferences between the House andSenate on legislation are relatively informal, and conferees are granted considerablelatitude in resolving the chambers' differences. The chairmanship of the conferencecommittee is determined by the conferees, who usually select the chairman of theBudget Committee, in the case of omnibus reconciliation bills, or the chairman of theHouse Ways and Means Committee or the Senate Finance Committee, when thosecommittees were instructed to report separate reconciliation legislation. By tradition,the chairmanship of the conference alternates between the House and Senate. When the conferees reach agreement with respect to their disagreements ona reconciliation measure, they submit a conference report explaining the agreement. The report consists of two separate items: (1) the conference report, which explainsthe actions proposed by the conferees to resolve the disagreements between the twobodies, including the recommended legislative text; and (2) the accompanying "jointexplanatory statement," also referred to as the "managers' statement," which explainsthe actions of the conferees with regard to the particular policy issues that theyaddressed, often in great detail. The conference report reflects the agreement of a majority of the confereesof the House and a majority of the conferees from the Senate. Each of the confereesthat supports the conference report signs a signature sheet for both the conferencereport and the joint explanatory statement. Any conferee who does not support theagreement is not required to sign the signature sheets, and usually does not do so. For a conference report to be valid in the House, a majority of the Membersfrom each chamber who were appointed to negotiate each provision must sign thereport; limited-purpose House conferees sign only for the portion of the agreementthey were given authority to negotiate. For a conference report to be valid in theSenate, a majority of all House conferees and a majority of all Senate conferees mustsign the report, regardless of whether or not any of the conferees were appointed forlimited purposes. The conference report and joint explanatory statement are published as aHouse report and printed in the Congressional Record . (Although a conferencereport may be published as a Senate report too, the Senate usually defers such action.) Conference reports are privileged matters in both the House and Senate andmay be called up for consideration as a priority matter. Motions to proceed to theconsideration of a conference report are not debatable. In the House, conferencereports typically are considered for one hour, but in the Senate conference reportsmay be debated for up to10 hours. The House usually considers conference reports on major legislation underthe terms of a special rule. In recent years, the special rule has provided a "blanket"waiver of all points of order against the conference report and, in some instances,more than the typical hour of debate time. In 1997, for example, special rulesextended the debate time on the conference report on the Balanced Budget Act of1997 to 90 minutes, under H.Res. 202 , and extended the debate time onthe Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 to two and one-half hours, under H.Res. 206. In the Senate, the consideration of a conference report on a reconciliationmeasure may differ markedly from the consideration of conference reports on othertypes of measures in one key respect. The Byrd rule, which applies only toreconciliation measures, allows for extraneous matter to be stricken from aconference report pursuant to the successful raising of a point of order. Typically,when a point of order is successfully raised against a conference report in the Senate,the conference report is defeated. Pursuant to the Byrd rule, however, the Senate mayremove language from the conference report without causing the remainder of theconference report to be rejected. In that case, under the Byrd rule, the Senate recedesand concurs with a further amendment that effectively deletes the offending matter. The House and Senate may reach final agreement on the measure by resolving theirdisagreement on the further Senate amendment, as occurred in connection with theBalanced Budget Act of 1995. The Senate sometimes will use unanimous consent agreements to customizeprocedures during the consideration of a conference report, and agreements reachedduring initial consideration of a reconciliation measure often are made applicable tothe consideration of the conference report as well. In July of 1997, for example, theSenate considered two reconciliation measures under a unanimous consent agreementthat had been entered into on May 21 of that year, at the time the FY1998 budgetresolution was under consideration. (85) The agreement suspended the application of onecomponent of the Byrd rule under certain circumstances, during both initial actionon the reconciliation measures and during consideration of the conference reports,effectively allowing long-term tax cuts in one act to be offset by long-term spendingreductions in the other. One chamber may recommit the conference report to the existing conferencecommittee if the other chamber has not yet acted on the report. This situationoccurred in 1982, during House consideration of the conference report (H.Rept.97-750) on the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1982. On August 17, 1982,the House recommitted the report to the conference by a vote of 266-145. Subsequently, the conference committee reported a second agreement (H.Rept.97-759), which both chambers accepted. Once a chamber acts on the conference report, the conference committeeformally is dissolved and cannot resume consideration of the measure. If eitherchamber disagrees to a conference report, "the matter is left in the position it was inbefore the conference was asked but in the stage of disagreement." (86) At thispoint, the chambers may dispose of the matter in disagreement by motion, or send itto a further conference. In the case of reconciliation legislation, a further conferencenever has been convened. The House and Senate often consider measures pertaining to the enrollmentof complex and lengthy legislation, either to expedite the enrollment or to maketechnical corrections. Title 1, Section 107 of the United States Code , requires that measures beenrolled on parchment paper. In order to expedite the enrollment of the measure,thereby speeding up its presentation to the President, the requirement in 1 U.S.C. 107sometimes is waived (upon certification by the House Administration Committee thata "true" or accurate enrollment is prepared) by the enactment of a joint resolution. On July 31, 1997, for example, the House and Senate agreed to H.J.Res. 90 , which waived the enrollment requirements with respect to the two reconciliationmeasures, H.R. 2014 and H.R. 2015. The measure became P.L.105-32 (111 Stat. 250) on August 1, 1997. Second, the House and Senate may make technical corrections in a measureprior to enrollment by adopting a concurrent resolution directing the Clerk of theHouse or the Secretary of the Senate, as appropriate, to make the necessary changes. Enrollment correction measures may originate in either the House or Senate and oftenhave been used in connection with the reconciliation process. Technical correctionswere made, for example, in the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981 pursuantto H.Con.Res. 167, and such corrections were made in the Omnibus BudgetReconciliation Act of 1983 pursuant to S.Con.Res. 102. Table 8. House and Senate Action on Conference Reports on Reconciliation Acts:FY1981-FY2005 Source : Prepared by the Congressional Research Service. Reconciliation measures follow the same legislative path to enactment asother legislation. After a bill is submitted to him, the President has 10 days(excluding Sundays) in which to approve or disapprove it. If the President signs ordoes not sign the bill during the 10-day period, it becomes law; however, if Congressadjourns sine die during the 10-day period, thereby preventing the bill's return, it isdisapproved by "pocket veto." If the President vetoes the bill during the 10-dayperiod, it is returned to the chamber in which it originated (as a "return veto"), alongwith a message explaining the President's objections. The House and Senate thenhave an opportunity to override the President's veto, thus enacting the measure intolaw. In 1996, the Line Item Veto Act conferred line-item veto authority on thePresident, which President Clinton used in 1997 in connection with tworeconciliation measures and several annual appropriations acts; the act was nullifiedby the Supreme Court in 1998. Congress has sent the President 19 reconciliation acts, of which 16 have beensigned by the President into law. None of these measures became law without thePresident signing them. Eleven reconciliation acts were signed into law byRepublican Presidents -- Ronald Reagan (7), George H.W. Bush (2), and George W.Bush (2); five reconciliation acts were signed into law by Democratic Presidents -- Jimmy Carter (1) and Bill Clinton (4). While congressional deliberations on reconciliation legislation are underway,the President may signal his approval of congressional action through various means. In the case of major budgetary legislation, these signals are conveyed principallythrough the issuance of Statements of Administration Policy (SAPs), which theOffice of Management and Budget maintains for the current administration on itsWeb site ( http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/ ). SAPs take on more significance ifcongressional action is at significant variance with the President's recommendations. In such instances, his advisers may use SAPs to raise the possibility or likelihood ofa presidential veto if policy adjustments acceptable to the Administration are notmade in the legislation (see discussion below). In view of the significance usually attached to reconciliation legislation, thePresident often signs such legislation into law in an official signing ceremonyattended by Members of Congress, cabinet members, and other executive officialsinvolved in the process that culminated in the enactment of the legislation. Anyofficial statement issued by the President upon the signing of the measure, as well asany remarks made during the event, are included in the Weekly Compilation ofPresidential Documents , which is maintained by the National Archives and RecordsAdministration and is available at the GPO Access Web site http://www.gpoaccess.gov . Three of the reconciliation acts sent to the President by Congress were vetoed,all by President Bill Clinton. (87) In each instance, Republican majorities inCongress fashioned reconciliation measures proposing significant policy changes thatwere fundamentally at odds with President Clinton's policy agenda. When an Administration is engaged with Congress in the formulation ofbudgetary legislation, the SAPs may be used to motivate Congress to adopt policiesfavored by the Administration and to drop policies that it does not favor. Thelanguage of the SAPs may be modulated to present the mix of encouragement andveto threat considered appropriate. With respect to a particular issue encompassedby the legislation, for example, the SAP might express the "concern" of seniorAdministration officials and indicate the possibility that they might recommend tothe President that he veto the bill if the offending provisions are retained or notappropriately modified. In the case of the three reconciliation acts that President Clinton vetoed, theSAPs clearly communicated his opposition. The SAP issued on July 27, 1999,pertaining to Senate action on the Taxpayer Refund and Relief Act of 1999, forexample, stated: "The Administration strongly opposes the package of tax cutproposals contained in S. 1429 . If a bill encompassing these proposalswere to pass the Congress, the President would veto it." The bluntness of thewording left Congress no doubt regarding how the President would react to such abill, if it were presented to him. When the President vetoes a bill, he returns it to the House of its origin witha message notifying the chamber of his action and explaining the basis of hisobjections. The veto message, together with the vetoed bill, is printed as a Housedocument. President Clinton's message to the House regarding his veto of theBalanced Budget Act of 1995 began: I am returning herewith withoutmy approval H.R. 2491, the budget reconciliation bill adopted by theRepublican majority, which seeks to make extreme cuts and other unacceptablechanges in Medicare and Medicaid, and to raise taxes on millions of workingAmericans. (88) The veto message continued with a title-by-title summary of the majorprogrammatic objections to the legislation. In addition, a nine-page enumeration of82 specific objections, arranged by program area (e.g., Medicare, Medicaid, studentloans, food stamps, and special interest tax provisions), was attached. (89) Upon the return of a vetoed bill to the House or Senate, the veto message isread and the measure either is reconsidered, referred to committee, or tabled. If thechamber to which the vetoed bill was returned passes it by a two-thirds vote, it isthen sent to the other chamber. If the second chamber also passes it by a two-thirdsvote, then it becomes law over the President's objections. All of the reconciliation bills sent to the President carried a House number. Consequently, the three vetoed bills were returned to the House. The vetoed billswere referred to the committee that reported them, either the House BudgetCommittee or the House Ways and Means Committee. Subsequent motions todischarge the bill from committee were made with respect to the two bills referredto the Ways and Means Committee. One discharge motion was tabled by a vote of215-203, but the other discharge motion was successful. In that instance, the Housereconsidered the vetoed bill (the Marriage Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2000),but the bill failed on a vote of 270-158, by not securing the necessary two-thirdsmargin. These actions are discussed in more detail below: the Balanced Budget Act of 1995 (H.R. 2491) wasvetoed on December 6, 1995, and returned to the House. Later that day, the chair laidthe veto message (H.Doc. 104-141) before the House, which referred the messageand the bill to the Budget Committee by unanimous consent. The House took nofurther action on the matter. the Taxpayer Refund and Relief Act of 1999 ( H.R. 2488 ) was vetoed on September 23, 1999, and returned to the House. Later that day,the chair laid the veto message (H.Doc. 106-130) before the House, which referredthe message and the bill to the Ways and Means Committee by voice vote. OnOctober 19, a motion to discharge the bill from committee was tabled by a vote of215-203. the Marriage Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2000( H.R. 4810 ) was vetoed on August 5, 2000, and returned to the House. The chair laid the veto message (H.Doc. 106-291) before the House on September6 and, later that day, the House referred the message and the bill to the Ways andMeans Committee by unanimous consent. On September 13, the House dischargedthe bill from committee and reconsidered it. Upon reconsideration, the bill failed bya vote of 270-158, lacking the necessary two-thirds. Because the House did not successfully reconsider any of the three vetoedreconciliation bills, they were not sent to the Senate. The Line Item Veto Act was enacted into law on April 9, 1996 ( P.L. 104-130 ;110 Stat. 1200-1212) and became effective on January 1, 1997. The main proceduresunder the act were incorporated into the Congressional Budget and ImpoundmentControl Act of 1974, as amended, as a new Part C of Title X (Sections 1021-1027). Reconciliation measures were included in the several types of budgetary legislationsubject to line item veto authority. In 1998, the Line Item Veto Act was nullified by the Supreme Court in Clinton v. City of New York , 524 U.S. 417 (1998). (90) The caseinvolved actions taken by President Bill Clinton pertaining to reconciliationlegislation enacted in 1997. The reasoning behind the Supreme Court's decision ischaracterized as follows: The Court rejected the argument that thePresident's power to cancel items was a mere exercise of discretionary authoritygranted by Congress. Instead, the cancellation authority represented the repeal of lawthat could be accomplished only through the regular legislative process, includingbicameralism and presentment. In the two cancellations that reached the Court,Congress did not pass a resolution of disapproval. As a result, the Court concludedthat "the President has amended two Acts of Congress by repealing a portion ofeach." (91) The act authorized the President to cancel any dollar amount of discretionarybudget authority, any item of new direct spending, or any limited tax benefit in an actif such cancellation will reduce the deficit, not impair any essential governmentfunctions, and not harm the national interest. The President could exercise thisauthority only within five days of signing an act into law. If he chose to line-itemveto any provisions in an act, he was required to notify Congress in a specialmessage. Each cancellation had to be separately identified by its own referencenumber. Congress could consider, under expedited procedures set forth in the act,special legislation to disapprove any cancellations. At the end of July 1997, the House and Senate completed action on tworeconciliation measures implementing the tax cuts and most of the deficit reductioncalled for in the FY1998 budget resolution ( H.Con.Res. 84 ). The firstreconciliation act, the Balanced Budget Act of 1997 ( H.R. 2015 ), madenet reductions in direct spending of $122 billion over the five fiscal years andincreased the statutory limit on the public debt to $5.950 trillion. The secondreconciliation act, the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 ( H.R. 2014 ),contained tax cuts which partially are offset by revenue increases. The net effect ofrevenue changes in the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, coupled with several revenueprovisions in the Balanced Budget Act of 1997 (most notably, an increase in thetobacco tax), was a revenue reduction of $95 billion. President Clinton signed the two measures into law on Tuesday, August 5 --the Balanced Budget Act of 1997 as P.L. 105-33 (111 Stat. 251), and the TaxpayerRelief Act of 1997 as P.L. 105-34 (111 Stat. 788). On Monday, August 11, President Clinton exercised his authority under theLine Item Veto Act to cancel one item of direct spending in the Balanced Budget Actof 1997 and two limited tax benefits in the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997. Theseactions represented the first use of the line-item veto authority. Cancellation of Limited TaxBenefits. Section 1027 of the Line Item Veto Act required the JointCommittee on Taxation (JCT) to prepare a statement for any revenue orreconciliation measure (amending the Internal Revenue Code of 1986) for which aconference report was being prepared, identifying whether such legislation containedany limited tax benefits. The conferees, at their discretion, could include the JCTinformation in a separate section of the measure, using a form prescribed by the LineItem Veto Act. If such a section was included, then the President could use theitem-veto authority only against the limited tax benefits identified in the section;otherwise, the President could use the authority against any provision in the measurethat he felt met the definition of limited tax benefit provided in the act. A total of 80 limited tax benefits were identified in the two reconciliationbills sent to the President. The conference report on the Balanced Budget Act of1997 ( H.Rept. 105-217 ) was filed on July 29. Section 9304 of the act identified onesection as providing a limited tax benefit subject to the line-item veto (see the Congressional Record of July 29, 1997, vol. 143, no. 109, part II, at page H6140). That section, Section 5406, pertained to the tax treatment of certain servicesperformed by prison inmates. The conference report on the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 ( H.Rept. 105-220 )was filed on July 30. Section 1701 set forth a list prepared by the JCT of 79 limitedtax benefits subject to the line-item veto (see the Congressional Record of July 30,1997, vol. 143, no. 110, part II, at pages H6490-91 and H6607-08). President Clinton applied the line-item veto to two limited tax benefits in theTaxpayer Relief Act of 1997. The first, identified in his special message asCancellation No. 97-1, canceled Section 1175 (Exemption for Active FinancingIncome) of the act. Cancellation No. 97-2 applied to Section 968 (Nonrecognitionof Gain on Sale of Stock to Certain Farmers' Cooperatives) of the act. Theseprovisions were identified in Section 1701 of the act as items 54 and 30, respectively,and dealt with the sheltering of income in foreign tax havens by financial servicescompanies and the treatment of capital gains on the sale of certain agricultural assets. Cancellation of Direct SpendingItem. Unlike limited tax benefits, there was no special procedurefor congressional identification of items of new direct spending. The cost estimateprepared by the Congressional Budget Office on the Balanced Budget Act of 1997identified about a dozen accounts that had increases in direct spending for one ormore fiscal years. Presumably, at least a dozen (if not dozens) of "items" of newdirect spending were associated with these accounts. President Clinton applied the line-item veto to one item of new directspending in the Balanced Budget Act of 1997. Cancellation No. 97-3 applied tosubsection 4722(c) (Waiver of Certain Provider Tax Provisions) of Section 4722(Treatment of State Taxes Imposed on Certain Hospitals), a Medicaid provisioninvolving New York State. (Section 310 of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974; 2 U.S.C. 641) Reconciliation (Section 313 of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974; 2. U.S.C. 644) Extraneous Matter in Reconciliation Legislation CRS Report 98-814 , Budget Reconciliation Legislation: Development and Consideration , by [author name scrubbed] CRS Report RL30458 , The Budget Reconciliation Process: Timing of LegislativeAction , by [author name scrubbed]. CRS Report RL30862 , The Budget Reconciliation Process: The Senate's "ByrdRule," by [author name scrubbed]. CRS Report RL30714, Congressional Action on Revenue and Debt ReconciliationMeasures in 2000 , by [author name scrubbed]. CRS Report RL31902(pdf) , Revenue Reconciliation Directives in the FY2004 BudgetResolution , by [author name scrubbed]. CRS Report RS20870 , Revenue Reconciliation Directives to the Senate FinanceCommittee in Congressional Budget Resolutions , by [author name scrubbed]. CRS Report RS21993 , Spending Reconciliation Directives to the Senate FinanceCommittee in Congressional Budget Resolutions , by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed] CRS Report RS22098 , Deficit Impact of Reconciliation Legislation Enacted in 1990,1993, and 1997 , by [author name scrubbed]. CRS Report RS22160(pdf) , Reconciliation and the Deficit in FY2006 and ThroughFY2010: Fact Sheet , by Philip D. Winters. CRS Congressional Distribution Memorandum, January 14, 2005, ReconciliationDirectives to House Committees in Budget Resolutions for FY1976-FY2005 , by BillHeniff Jr. CRS Congressional Distribution Memorandum, Reconciliation Directives to SenateCommittees in Budget Resolutions for FY1976-FY2005 , January 14, 2005, by BillHeniff Jr.

Summary: The budget reconciliation process is an optional procedure that operates as an adjunct to thebudget resolution process established by the Congressional Budget Act of 1974. The chief purposeof the reconciliation process is to enhance Congress's ability to change current law in order to bringrevenue, spending, and debt-limit levels into conformity with the policies of the annual budgetresolution. Reconciliation is a two-stage process. First, reconciliation directives are included in thebudget resolution, instructing the appropriate committees to develop legislation achieving the desiredbudgetary outcomes. If the budget resolution instructs more than one committee in a chamber, thenthe instructed committees submit their legislative recommendations to their respective BudgetCommittees by the deadline prescribed in the budget resolution; the Budget Committees incorporatethem into an omnibus budget reconciliation bill without making any substantive revisions. In caseswhere only one committee has been instructed, the process allows that committee to report itsreconciliation legislation directly to its parent chamber, thus bypassing the Budget Committee. The second step involves consideration of the resultant reconciliation legislation by theHouse and Senate under expedited procedures. Among other things, debate in the Senate on anyreconciliation measure is limited to 20 hours (and 10 hours on a conference report) and amendmentsmust be germane and not include extraneous matter. The House Rules Committee typicallyrecommends a special rule for the consideration of a reconciliation measure in the House that placesrestrictions on debate time and the offering of amendments. As an optional procedure, reconciliation has not been used in every year that thecongressional budget process has been in effect. Beginning with the first use of reconciliation byboth the House and Senate in 1980, however, reconciliation has been used in most years. In threeyears, 1998 (for FY1999), 2002 (for FY2003), and 2004 (for FY2005), the House and Senate did notagree on a budget resolution. Congress has sent the President 19 reconciliation acts over the years;16 were signed into law and three were vetoed (and the vetoes not overriden). Following an introduction that provides an overview of the reconciliation process anddiscusses its historical development, the report explains the process in sections dealing with theunderlying authorities, reconciliation directives in budget resolutions, initial consideration ofreconciliation measures in the House and Senate, resolving House-Senate differences onreconciliation measures, and presidential approval or disapproval of such measures. The text of tworelevant sections of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974 (Sections 310 and 313) is set forth in theappendices, along with a list of other Congressional Research Service products pertaining toreconciliation procedures. This report will be updated as developments warrant.