The United States has provided support to drug crop eradication programs in the Andes sincethe 1980s and for alternative development (AD) since at least the 1970s. Since 2000, the centerpieceof the U.S. counternarcotics policy has been the Andean Counterdrug Initiative (ACI), withColombia the major recipient. The ACI program is the centerpiece of U.S. support for PlanColombia, a six-year plan developed by Colombian President Pastrana in 1999. ACI supports anumber of missions, including interdiction of drug trafficking, illicit crop eradication, alternativedevelopment, and rule of law and democracy promotion in the Andes. The three main producers of cocaine -- Colombia, Bolivia and Peru -- collectively producenearly the entire global supply. In addition, Colombia has become a producer of high quality heroin,most of it destined for the United States. Colombia became the main producer of coca and cocainein the Andean region in 1997, according to the U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime's (UNODC) WorldDrug Report 2005 . Peru was the leading producer of coca and coca paste until that time, which itsgrowers shipped to Colombia for processing into cocaine. Bolivia is the third largest producer ofcoca. The United States has made a significant commitment of funds and material support to helpthe Andean region fight drug trafficking since 2000. (See Table 1 .) Congress passed legislationproviding $1.3 billion in assistance for FY2000 ( P.L. 106-246 ) for Colombia and its neighbors. From FY2000 through FY2005, the United States has provided a total of about $4.3 billion from theAndean Counterdrug Initiative account. For FY2006, the Administration requested, and Congressapproved, $734.5 million in ACI funding ( P.L. 109-102 ). The Department of Defense has spentapproximately $1.2 billion from FY2000 through FY2005 from its counternarcotics account,managed by the U.S. Army Southern Command. The State Department's International NarcoticsControl and Law Enforcement (INL) bureau is responsible for managing the ACI account. Thecountries considered part of the ACI include Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, Panama, Peru, andVenezuela, (1) with mostfunding allocated for Colombia, Peru and Bolivia. Additional funding for the Andean region is provided through the Foreign Military Financing(FMF) program and the International Military Education and Training (IMET) program, bothmanaged by the State Department. FMF provides grants to foreign nations to purchase U.S. defenseequipment, services, and training. FMF assistance to Colombia, Peru, and Bolivia has the objectiveof establishing and strengthening national authority in remote areas that are prone to drug trafficking,and related activities of illegally armed groups. Some FMF funding has been used for infrastructureprotection of oil pipelines in Colombia. The IMET program provides training for foreign militaries. Its objectives are to improve defense capabilities, develop professional and personal relationshipsbetween U.S. and foreign militaries, and influence these forces in support of democratic governance. Training focuses on the manner in which military organizations function under civilian control,civil-military relations, military justice systems, military doctrine, strategic planning, and operationalprocedures. Table 1. U.S. Drug - Related Foreign Assistance to the AndeanRegion, FY2000-FY2006 (in millions U.S. $) Source: Congressional Budget Justifications, Foreign Operations FY2002-FY2006; U.S.Department of State's Washington File, "U.S. Support for Plan Colombia, FY2000 EmergencySupplemental Appropriations," July 5, 2000. Note: ACI figures reflect funding for all nations considered a part of the Andean CounterdrugInitiative. FMF and IMET figures are for Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru. FY2006 figuresfor FMF and IMET are amounts proposed by the Administration in its budget request. ACI funds are divided between programs that support eradication and interdiction efforts,as well as those focused on alternative development and democratic institution building. On theinterdiction side, programs train and support national police and military forces, providecommunications and intelligence systems, support the maintenance and operations of host countryaerial eradication aircraft, and improve infrastructure related to counternarcotics activities. On thealternative development side, funds support development programs in drug crop growing areas,including infrastructure, and marketing and technical support for alternative crops. It also includesassistance for internally displaced persons, promotion of the rule of law, and expansion of judicialcapabilities. Table 2. ACI Funding Eradication versus AlternativeDevelopment, FY2000-FY2006 (in millions U.S. $) Note: Eradication figures include interdiction programs; AD figures include institution buildingprograms. The FY2006 figures are the amounts provided in the FY2006 Foreign OperationsAppropriations Act, P.L. 109-102 . Other figures are drawn from Foreign Operations annualcongressional budget justifications, FY2002 through FY2006. The State Department reports that the area under coca cultivation in the Andes in 2003 was428,595 acres, down from a high point of 552,763 acres in 2001, representing a 22% decline. Thelargest decrease has occurred in Colombia, with a 32% decline in coca cultivation since 2001, theyear that Colombian production reached its peak. (2) For 2004, the Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP)reported no decrease in Colombian coca cultivation. (3) The eradication of opium poppies, grown mainly in Colombia, has resulted in crop decreasesfrom about 16,000 acres in 2001 to nearly 5,200 acres in 2004, representing a 67% decrease. Thelargest portion of the decrease occurred from 2003 to 2004 when cultivation was cut in half. (4) Both Peru and Bolivia allow a small level of legal cultivation for indigenous use. Coca leafuse is a deeply rooted cultural tradition in which the leaf is chewed or made into tea, and is used asa stimulant, appetite suppressant, and treatment for stomach ailments. It is also used to ease altitudesickness. When chewed or used as tea, coca does not have a hallucinogenic effect, and has beencompared to the effects of coffee. Bolivia's Law 1008 allows nearly 30,000 acres of legal coca,while Peru's 1978 General Law on Drugs permits about 28,000 acres. In Bolivia, coca cultivationis legal in the Yungas region and some parts of Chapare. Growers may sell their product tointermediaries who are licensed by the government drug agency that also controls two legal cocamarkets. Peruvian law requires that growers are registered, and obligates its 14,463 registeredgrowers to sell their coca leaf to the state-owned firm, National Coca Enterprise (ENACO). Inneither country are there clear demarcations for which exact cultivation areas are legal versus illegal. For example, while Bolivian law permits coca cultivation in the Yungas region, authorities have notidentified which fields should be counted toward the 30,000 acre limit. (5) Figure 1. Coca Cultivation 2004 asPercent of Global Total Figure 2. Cocaine Production 2004 asPercent of Global Total Source: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Coca Cultivation in the Andean Region: ASurvey of Bolivia, Colombia and Peru , June 2005. There are two types of eradication programs. Aerial eradication, often referred to asfumigation, involves dispersing the chemical glyphosate, an herbicide mixed with water and thesurfactant Cosmo Flux 411F, from low-flying aircraft over illicit crops to kill or inhibit their growth. Drug crops can also be manually eradicated, often with the agreement of the grower, but also withouthis consent. Both aerial and manual eradication takes place in Colombia, while Bolivia and Peruallow only manual eradication. U.S. support for eradication programs is managed by the StateDepartment's Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL), and theNarcotics Affairs Section (NAS) of U.S. embassies. Spray missions are conducted by U.S.-hiredcontractors, through the State Department's Office of Interregional Aviation Support. Colombia. Unlike Peru and Bolivia, Colombiahas no legal market for coca leaf, with all of it destined for processing into cocaine. There are fewindigenous communities that use coca leaf for traditional, cultural, or medicinal purposes. Putumayohas been the principal coca growing area, but cultivation has now spread to more than 20 ofColombia's 32 regions. (6) Opium poppy is grown mainly in the mountainous regions of Tolima, Huila, Cauca, and NariÃ±o. Poppy is grown on very small plots of land and interspersed with other crops, making its detectionand eradication difficult. When Plan Colombia began in 2000, the aerial eradication of coca and poppy crops with aglyphosate herbicide mixture became a key component of the Colombian and U.S. efforts to reducethe supply of illegal drugs entering the U.S. market. Glyphosate had previously been used aeriallyin the successful eradication of marijuana in the 1980s in Colombia. Spray operations are conductedby the Colombian National Police with U.S. support through the State Department's Office ofInterregional Aviation. The United States provides technical and scientific advice, herbicide, fuel,spray aircraft, and a limited number of escort helicopters. Spray aircraft are piloted by U.S. citizens,Colombian, or third-country national contractors, and are accompanied by escort helicopters thatcarry combined U.S. civilian contractors or third-country nationals, and Colombian National Policecrews. Spray aircraft use global positioning computer systems to identify locations of crops, withareas for spraying chosen by the Colombian government. There are currently 17 fixed-wing and 26helicopters devoted to spraying operations. Aircraft are flying missions from three forward operatinglocations (FOL) in Colombia. (7) Reductions in coca and opium poppy cultivation began to be seen by 2003. Some areaswhere aerial eradication took place experienced marked decreases -- Meta, CaquetÃ¡, and Putumayo. But, these successes have been accompanied by increases in other areas -- Antioquia, NariÃ±o, andGuaviare. (8) Areas thathave been manually eradicated, Vichada, BolÃ­var, and Cauca, have had lower rates of reduction. While manual eradication does not carry as many risks as the aerial program, the rate of eradicationis much slower and requires more manhours with operations in rugged, inaccessible, and oftenhostile territory. A 1988 Government Accountability Office (GAO) report concluded that manualeradication had been unable to keep pace with new plantings, and so had a minimal effect oncultivation. (9) The UnitedStates Agency for International Development (USAID) supports voluntary agreements withcommunities in coca growing regions, whereby the communities themselves eradicate their drugcrops in exchange for development assistance. More recently, the government of Colombia has useddemobilized right-wing paramilitary fighters, flying them to coca regions to manually eradicatecrops. Peru. Peru's support for eradication programs hasvaried historically, based on the political conditions in the country and the resolve of nationalgovernments. While once the largest producer of cocaine in the Andes, it is now second toColombia. The traditional areas of coca cultivation are the Upper Huallaga/Monzon and theApurimac/Ene Valleys, although the State Department has reported that dense cultivation isincreasing in other areas. It also reports that there is an upward trend in opium poppy cultivation innorthern Peru. Coca cultivation has decreased in Peru from its peak in 1995 and is considered anAndean success story. Some observers believe the reduction was due to several factors other thanthe eradication operations, including the following: the appearance of a soil fungus, Fusariumoxysporum in the Huallaga Valley; the decline of Colombia's dependence on Bolivian and Peruviancoca; and the successful dismantling of Colombia's drug cartels that were the principal buyers ofPeruvian coca. This led to a collapse in coca prices in the early 1990s. (10) The government of Peruallows only the manual eradication of drug crops. By the end of the 1980s, Peru was the world's leading producer of coca leaf, supplying 60%of world supply. Early in President Fujimori's government (1990-2000), he adopted an approach thatemphasized alternative development and land titling, incorporating coca farmers into the formaleconomy, while de-emphasizing forced eradication. As his administration proceeded, Fujimoriadopted policies that gave more authority to the military in drug matters, and combinedcounterinsurgency and drug control missions. Forced eradication was restarted in 1996 and increasedin tempo toward the end of the 1990s. Eradication operations provoked the mobilization of cocagrowers, especially in light of unsubstantiated claims that spraying of crops was occurring. This ledFujimori to sign a decree prohibiting the use of chemical or biological defoliants in 2000. Under theToledo government (2001 to present), alternative development programs using voluntary agreementshave become again widely utilized, although forced eradication continues. Assistance for growersis provided, as long as they sign agreements to fully eradicate their crops. If an agreement is notsigned, forced eradication occurs, and the grower reaps no assistance. The State Department reportsthat in 2004, about 18,500 acres were forcefully eradicated, while another 6,000 acres were part ofthe alternative development/voluntary eradication program. Bolivia. (11) Political instability inBolivia has resulted in the uneven application of counternarcotics policy over the years. Despite this,Bolivia has seen some successes in reducing cultivation, but some observers would argue, at theexpense of social unrest.The two main coca growing regions are Chapare and Yungas. Sincethe beginning of Plan Dignidad in 1998, the counternarcotics policy of former President Banzer(1997-2001) that focused on increasing forced eradication, cultivation in the Chapare has decreased. It has, however, dramatically increased in the Yungas. The State Department reports that theincrease is far above the legal limit. As in Peru, indigenous Bolivians believe coca is a cultural rightand use it for cultural, spiritual, and medical purposes. Total coca cultivation in Bolivia decreased from its peak in the mid-1990s of 118,000 acresto around 36,000 acres in 2000, but in 2001, coca cultivation began to increase again and to expandto new areas. In 2004, the State Department estimates that there were nearly 61,000 acres of cocacrops. (12) Bolivian lawstates that only manual and mechanical methods can be used to eradicate, and prohibits the use of"chemical means, herbicides, biological agents, and defoliants." (13) While interim presidentshave reaffirmed their support for counternarcotics policy, continuing political instability and themobilization of coca growers' organizations, especially in the context of an upcoming presidentialelection, have led some observers to question the resolve of the national government. Both the StateDepartment and the UNODC reported increases in coca cultivation during 2004. Providing alternatives to drug crop cultivation is believed to be a crucial component toachieve effective eradication. U.S. alternative development programs are managed by the U.S.Agency for International Development, and often include technical support for farmers agreeing togive up their drug crops, marketing assistance, and the strengthening of transportation infrastructurein order to get crops to market. Alternative development began in the mid-1970s in Bolivia, (Chapare region) and in theearly 1980s in Peru (Upper Huallaga Valley), as coca crop substitution. The United States was theprincipal donor, with UNODC involvement beginning in 1984. U.S. alternative developmentstrategies played a modest role in Colombia until 2000, when the United States started investing inAD as part of its support for Plan Colombia. The legal framework for AD in Peru is Law 22095,which outlaws all coca cultivation except that grown by farmers registered with the governmentagency, National Coca Enterprise (ENACO). Bolivia's Law 1008 permits legal coca cultivation onlyin traditional coca-growing areas. Under these laws, alternative development programs benefitfarmers growing illicit coca, while those cultivating legal coca for traditional purposes fail to receiveassistance. The main feature of U.S.-supported alternative development programs is that they are tiedto agreements by farmers and communities to eradicate coca crops. USAID's objectives are toencourage farmers to grow alternative crops and become part of the legal economy. After farmersagree to eradicate illicit crops, they receive support for food crops, while plans for future cash cropsare made. In a recognition that crop substitution is insufficient to realize sustainable development,projects are also undertaken to improve an affected area's infrastructure, such as road, water systems,schools and municipal buildings, which also provides employment opportunities for former cocafarmers. Education, infrastructure, and health services are provided to make sure that coca andpoppy growing regions would attract and support other economic activities. Colombia. USAID works to strengthenColombia's National Alternative Development Plan and the capabilities of local non-governmentalorganizations. By increasing licit economic opportunities, it is believed coca and poppy growers willbe able to permanently give up illegal crops. Over the past five years, USAID reports that itestablished 62,964 hectares of legal crops, 31,461 hectares of forest land, and completed 918 socialand productive infrastructure projects, benefitting over 54,780 families, in collaboration with localNGOs. In 2003, USAID started to support small- and medium-sized agribusiness and commercialforestry development activities. Projects cover areas such as wood projects, cocoa, coffee, rubber,oil palm, exotic fruits, medicinal herbs, and handcrafts in 30 of the 32 departments. Since 2000, theUnited States has allocated about $976 million for AD programs. Peru. USAID describes its programs in Peru asa multi-sector approach that seeks to improve local governance, strengthen the rule of law, andincrease the economic competitiveness of coca-growing areas. Its programs focus on generatingtemporary income to growers who voluntarily eradicate their crops, supporting basic services, andpromoting community organization. USAID then seeks to promote sustainable economic and socialdevelopment in and around primary coca-growing areas. This includes infrastructure projects,technical assistance and training to small farmers, private sector entrepreneurs, and governmententities. The agency reports in its annual congressional budget justification for FY2006 that morethan 27,000 families have voluntarily eradicated nearly 18,000 acres of coca since October 2002. Since 2000, the United States has supported more than $330 million in AD programs. In2004, USAID supported "legal productive activities" on about 49,000 acres, built or rehabilitated 134schools, health facilities, and water systems, 205 kilometers of road, 12 bridges and irrigationprojects, and brought electrification to six communities. Support for the rehabilitation andmaintenance of a major highway out of the Huallaga Valley, a coca region, has eased thetransportation of agricultural products to national markets. In 2004, USAID reports that 20,000families made voluntary eradication agreements. Bolivia. Bolivia has had the largest and longestrunning alternative development program in the Andes with USAID making major investmentsthere. Since the start of the ACI, the United States has spent about $323 million on such programs. In the Chapare region, a coca growing area, USAID has focused on strengthening licit livelihoods,community development, legal land tenure, and access to justice. More recently, and in response tothe decrease in cultivation there, USAID is adopting a more integrated approach that puts emphasison sustainability and increased participation by municipalities to develop, implement, and monitorprograms. In 2004, USAID assisted 28,290 rural families, and increased the number of licit jobs by9,300 and licit cultivation by 21,000 acres in the region. Similar programs are conducted in theYungas, along with assistance for coffee cultivation and rural electrification projects. (14) Congress has expressed a number of concerns with regard to eradication, including thefollowing: the health and environmental effects of aerial spraying; the reliability of drug cropestimates; and the effectiveness and sustainability of eradication. With regard to alternativedevelopment, Congress has expressed interest in its effectiveness; its relationship with eradication;and the long-term sustainability of programs. Both eradication and alternative development face anumber of challenges, some of which are general to the region, and others that are specific to thecountry in which they are conducted. Since the inception of aerial coca crop eradication, Members of Congress have expressedconcerns about the possible health and environmental effects of the herbicides used. There is alsoconcern with the proposed use of aerial eradication in Colombia's national parks, which is currentlyunder consideration in Colombia. Congress has directed in annual Foreign Operations Appropriationlegislation that the aerial spray program be certified by the U.S. State Department as causing nounreasonable risk to the environment or health of people living in sprayed areas. Congress has alsodirected that spraying in national parks can only occur if it is consistent with Colombian law, andno other viable alternatives exist. (16) The program in Colombia uses a mixture of Roundup Ultra Herbicide Â® , (17) water, and Cosmo Flux411F, which is a blend of two additives, whose identities are considered trade secrets. (18) The Roundup Â® productcontains the active ingredient glyphosate, a surfactant -- polyoxethylene alkylamine (POEA) -- toaid penetration of foliage, and another unnamed additive. (19) The same herbicide mixture is used in Colombia for eradicatingboth coca plants and opium poppy, although because poppy is easier to eradicate, less glyphosate(relative to the amount of water) is needed in the formulation. Roundup Ultra Herbicide Â® (but notCosmo Flux 411F) is registered, sold, and widely used in the United States, where it has generallybeen considered a relatively safe and environmentally friendly herbicide. (20) Studies on Glyphosate. The State Departmentconsulted with the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and reported in 2002 and 2003 thatthe EPA had found that "there is no evidence of significant human health or environmental risksfrom the spraying" in Colombia. (21) The State Department has certified four times since 2002 thatthe herbicide mixture poses no unreasonable risk to health or the environment, and that usage inColombia is consistent with applications in the United States and with label recommendations. (22) Both the EPA and the State Department have acknowledged that unintentional spraying oflegal crops and natural vegetation, due to spray drift, is likely to kill plants downwind of cocafields. (23) But the StateDepartment argues that such damage is reversible (that is, the forest re-grows and new crops maybe planted) and not an unreasonable price to pay for drug eradication, given the severity ofenvironmental and health impacts of coca production, processing, and distribution. Chemicals usedby coca growers and processors include pesticides, herbicides (2,4-D and paraquat), kerosene,sulfuric acid, ammonia, and acetone. (24) The State Department's 2005 certification is supported by a recent study by the Organizationof American States (OAS). (25) The Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission (CICAD),an OAS agency, undertook a "science-based risk assessment of the human health and environmentaleffects" of glyphosate in response to a request from the United States, United Kingdom, andColombia. The report concluded that neither glyphosate nor Cosmo Flux 411F presents "asignificant risk to human health." With regard to the environment, CICAD determined that riskswere minimal in most circumstances, but that spray drift poses moderate risks to aquatic organismsin shallow or static water. (Risks to aquatic life are discussed below.) The probability and extentof such impacts is unknown. The report concluded that based on available data, glyphosate has lessenvironmental impact than cocaine and poppy production and processing, which also causedeforestation, displacement of flora and fauna, and damage to non-target plants and animals. (Therisks of certain additives are discussed below). However, the report also recommended testing ofother additives that might pose less risk to aquatic life as well as further study to better understandthe potential for adverse effects on human health or the environment. The annual certifications by the State Department and the CICAD study have been criticizedby environmental groups and some researchers. (26) Criticism often centers around the composition of the herbicidemixture used in Colombia, which is different from that applied in the United States. (27) However, EPA knows theidentities of the ingredients in Cosmo Flux 411F and has stated that they are "approved for use in/onfood by EPA." (28) TheState Department's certification mentions that the application rate for Cosmo Flux 411F is withinthe manufacturer's recommended application rate. In addition, the State Department provided EPAwith data from six acute toxicity studies conducted using the mixture used in Colombia, as well asinformation about health complaints. Of the 5,000 health complaints received through 2004, halfwere "rejected as invalid, because it was determined that spraying did not take place in the areas inquestion on the dates claimed." (29) Compensation for lost crops was paid in 12 cases. In no instancedid the U.S. embassy or the Colombian government determine that spraying caused harm to humanhealth or wildlife. (30) Based on this information, EPA concluded in its 2003 report that "there are no risks of concern from[sic] dietary, mixer/loader/ applicator or field workers, or bystanders (including children)." (31) Others who disagree with the conclusions reached by the State Department and CICADquestion the applicability of toxicity data gathered in the United States to a tropical environment andits ecosystems. Rather, it is argued, studies should be conducted to assess effects on the forests andwildlife of Colombia, and information should be gathered from Colombians. One such study,requested by the Colombian Ombudsman's Office, and conducted along the Ecuador-Colombianborder, reported that blood samples taken from 22 women showed genetic damage. The incidenceof damage was far greater (500% and 800%) than found in two control groups. (32) The State Department iscooperating with the Colombian government to collect data on health complaints in the areas wherespraying occurs, but such information is difficult to collect and to interpret. Toxicity of Additives. Several recent scientificstudies have led to conclusions that apparently conflict with those of previous studies and raise thepossibility that spraying might lead to adverse effects on human health or the environment. Theweight of recent evidence seems to be pointing not to glyphosate, but rather to POEA, the surfactantin RoundupÂ®, as a potential hazard. (33) One study, at the University of Caen, France, found that humanplacental cells are sensitive to RoundupÂ® at concentrations lower than those found in agriculturaluse. This study found that the effects of RoundupÂ® were greater than those of glyphosate alone,indicating that adjuvants had their own effect, either independently or in combination withglyphosate. (34) AChinese study found that POEA was more toxic to aquatic creatures and algae than Roundup, whichin turn was more toxic than glyphosate. (35) Another study, by a University of Pittsburgh biologist, reportedthat RoundupÂ® may be "extremely lethal" to amphibians. The researcher's experiments with NorthAmerican tadpoles produced high rates of mortality. (36) Similarly, experiments with young adult frogs and toads indicateda potential for significant toxicity. (37) Spraying in National Parks. Because of theeradication program, some drug crop cultivation has moved to national parks. It is estimated that28,000 acres of coca are being grown in Colombia's 49 national parks, a more than doubling of the11,000 acres under cultivation three years ago. The Colombian government is now consideringlifting its ban on spraying in the national parks. Critics fear that spraying will also kill many plantspecies in the jungles and mountains, and could also harm amphibians, mammals, and birds. Colombia's national parks contain a large number of diverse plant and animal species. (38) Proponents of spraying in the national parks argue that coca cultivation does more harm tothe environment than eradication. The processing of coca leaf into cocaine base is also harmful tothe environment. Growers often clear forested land in order to plant crops, while traffickers do thesame to build transportation routes and landing strips. The State Department reports that over thepast 20 years, coca cultivation in the Andean region has resulted in the destruction of at least 5.9million acres of rainforest. The processing of coca leaf into cocaine base involves the use of harshprecursor chemicals such as kerosene, ethyl ether, sulfuric acid, potassium permanganate, acetone,and thousands of tons of lime and carbide, which are allowed to seep into the water supply and soil,and contaminate the food chain. According to the Colombian government, traffickers have dumpedmore than one million tons of chemicals since the mid-1980s. Alternative Methods. While the effects of cocaand poppy production and processing may be more damaging to the environment and human healththan crop eradication with glyphosate and Cosmo Flux 411F, eradication may motivate coca growerswho lose their crops to start over in other, more remote parts of the forest, causing still moreecosystem destruction. If eradication is, nevertheless, the best option, then alternative methods ofcrop eradication might arguably be more benign. Some alternatives, such as eradication by hand,might be impractical, due to the terrain and hostility of drug growers. Other methods might hold more promise. Biological controls for drug crops were discussedin a 1993 report to Congress by the Office of Technology Assessment. (39) Biological controls useliving things or their byproducts to reduce the target plant pest to a tolerable level. The living thingsmay be native to an area and natural enemies of the target plant, or they might be imported. In eithercase, to be effective in controlling pests, they first must be identified and then established insufficient numbers in proximity to the targeted plants. At the same time, it is important to ensurethat such biological agents are controlled to keep them from attacking or competing withnon-targeted, native plants and animals. It also would be necessary to consider the potentialsusceptibility of any live biological controls to pesticides that might be available to coca or poppyproducers. In sum, development of potential biological controls could require significant investmentsin research and field testing. A form of biological control that has received attention is the use of mycoherbicides, whichare naturally occurring fungi that infect and kill plants. In the 109th Congress, the GovernmentReform Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drugs and Human Resources approved an amendmentto H.R. 2829 , the Office of National Drug Control Policy Reauthorization Act of 2005,that authorizes a study on the health and environmental effects of mycoherbicides. Themycoherbicide Fusarium oxysporum (species erythroxyli , known as FoxyE) has received the mostattention as a possible means of controlling drug crops. It was discovered on diseased coca plantsin a research facility of the U.S. Department of Agriculture during the 1980s. (40) Some have advocatedsubstitution of this fungus for glyphosate in aerial applications in Colombia, because, they argue, itis endemic to Andean countries, non-toxic to people and animals, does not attack non-target plants,and persists in the environment. However, other species of fusarium attack a wide range of plantsand some fear that the coca-specific species might mutate. (41) The Colombiangovernment has not approved its use. Producing reliable estimates of illegal crop cultivation is difficult for several reasons relatingto the methodologies used and the changing nature of cultivation. Several organizations monitor thecultivation levels of drug crops, often using different methodologies and producing different results. A 2003 Government Accountability Office (GAO) report examined the differences in methodologybetween the ONDCP and the State Department's Office of Aviation. In one area, the twoorganizations differed in the identification of drug crop fields by 79%. The discrepancy was largelybased on differences in definition of what should be counted as a coca field. As a result, the reportconcluded that there are reliability problems with the both surveys. Neither had in place a statisticallyrigorous accuracy assessment, commonly known as an error rate, for their respective methodologies;and the technologies were insufficient for the purposes they were being used. (42) The U.S. government data also often differs from that of the U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime(UNODC), which has consistently reported higher eradication rates. For example, the United Statesestimates that coca cultivation in Colombia decreased from 336,000 acres in 2000 to 282,000 in2004, a 16% reduction. The United Nations reports that cultivation went from 403,000 acres to198,000 in the same period, a 51% reduction. U.S. figures show that in 2004, Colombia cultivationremained stable, while UNODC reported a 7% decrease. Likewise, the United Nations reportedincreases in Bolivia (17%) and Peru (14%), while the United States reported decreases. ONDCPreports that estimates are made using survey-sampling techniques and satellite imagery, that it arguesis similar to techniques used to estimate agricultural crops in the United States. The United Nationsreport interprets satellite images taken over a five month period, and verifies the results with aerialsurveillance and on-the-ground observations. Margins of error can differ based on the resolution ofsatellite images, neglecting to include areas of new plantations, and missing areas where coca hasbeen interspersed with licit crops. Opium poppy, grown in small plots and at high altitudes withnearly permanent cloud cover, are particularly difficult to survey. The nature of cultivation is also changing as a result of eradication efforts. Growers arereducing the size of their crops and interspersing them among food crops in order to avoid detection. It is estimated that around half of Colombia's coca is grown on fields of less than 7.5 acres. Further,there is some evidence that farmers are increasing the density of plants per acre. (43) Whether aerial eradication is an effective means to curb drug production has been a matterof intense debate. Even when eradication programs have been unable to reduce cultivation, asoccurred in 2004 in Colombia, officials argue that drug production has still decreased because newercrops, planted to replace eradicated ones, are less productive. According to the Office of NationalDrug Control Policy, the eradication program in Colombia has resulted in potential cocaineproduction decreasing by 7% in 2004 to 430 metric tons of pure cocaine. This is down from its peakof 700 metric tons in 2001. The same report indicated that potential cocaine production throughoutthe Andes has fallen 5% in 2004. Total regional cocaine production is estimated at 640 metric tons,dropping nearly 30% from its peak of 900 metric tons in 2001. Potential heroin production in 2004decreased by 51%. (44) Some observers caution that the propensity of farmers to replant coca and poppy is atroubling indication with regard to the sustainability of eradication programs, demonstrating that nolasting change in preferences is being achieved. John Walters, the head of ONDCP, stated in 2004during a trip to Colombia that 85% of crops sprayed are replanted very quickly. The EnvironmentalProtection Agency (EPA) reports that the herbicide glyphosate has no residual effect; plants thatwould be susceptible to glyphosate can be planted shortly after its application. (45) Other observers believethat decreases in cultivation in one area will result in increases in other areas. For example,successful eradication programs in the Putumayo region, the traditional coca growing area ofColombia, have been accompanied by increases in other regions. While both the ONDCP and theState Department report that a balloon effect -- coca cultivation moving from one area to another aseradication proceeds -- has not been observed across borders, there is evidence that some cultivationhas moved across borders, although not yet in size that would indicate a large shift in cultivationpatterns. (46) In Bolivia and Peru, cultivation has been sensitive to changes in price. When prices havebeen depressed, growers have abandoned their crops. When prices increase, abandoned crops havebeen reactivated. (47) InPeru, the head of its antidrug agency reported that the price of coca leaf had increased from 80 centsper dry ton in 1980 to around $4 in 2005. Part of the price increase was attributed to the aerialeradication campaign in Colombia which had forced traffickers to turn to Peruvian suppliers. (48) The price, purity, andavailability of cocaine and heroin have generally remained stable since 2000. However, the ONDCPreported in November 2005 that cocaine prices were beginning to show increases across the country. This complements earlier data indicating a recent increase in heroin prices in some parts of theUnited States. (49) Somestudies question the effect of eradication on drug prices. Even if increased eradication forced cocaprices to double, the retail price of cocaine would likely be negligible. Since the mid-1990s, cocaleaf prices in the Andes have increased, while the retail price of cocaine has not. (50) This may be due to thefact that coca leaf represents a very small fraction of the retail price. A 1994 study showed that cocaleaf represents just 2% of the street price. (51) Some Members of Congress have urged that the Colombian government take over theoperation of the eradication program that is now provided by the United States. A 2003 GAO reportfound that neither the Colombian military nor the police are able to sustain the current program"without continued U.S. funding and contractor support for the foreseeable future." (52) Each country presents its own challenges to successful eradication. In Colombia, the armedconflict among illegally armed groups who profit from the drug trade and who control vast territorycomplicate eradication missions. (53) Other challenges there include difficulties with regard to theconduct of aerial eradication and criticism of the compensation system for accidental spraying offood crops. Peru and Bolivia face growing indigenous movements that are becoming formidablepolitically and are pushing for an end to eradication, and in some cases, for legalization ofcultivation. Spray Drift. Because Colombia allows aerialeradication of drug crops, there have been complaints about food crops, and even alternativedevelopment sites being sprayed.Supporters of the program contend that the targeted fields areidentified with high precision, and the areas sprayed are electronically documented. Further, thespray drift is supposedly minimized by the use of large droplets, making the likelihood of accidentalspraying from drift less than 1% of the total area sprayed. (54) While the State Department reports that "occasional errors areunavoidable," it argues that every effort is made to minimize human and mechanical mistakes. (55) Spray missions are not tobe conducted when wind speed at the airport is above 10 m.p.h., relative humidity is below 75%, andthe temperature is more than 90 degrees. Spray planes fly at low altitudes, generally less than 100feet, when releasing the herbicide. According to the Colombian government, the ColombianNational Police does not spray regions that are identified as present or future alternative developmentrecipients. However, there are numerous reports of spray drift affecting licit crops and forestland. TheColombian Ombudsman's Office reported that the Indigenous Organizations of Putumayo (OZIP)complained spraying had taken place in the Nasa Chamb community in Puerto Asis, and that the areahas no coca cultivation. The office also reported complaints from other parts of Putumayo in 2001and 2002 that areas with corn, fruit trees, and grasslands had been sprayed. The Comptroller's Officereported in 2004 that forests near targeted areas had been damaged by spray drift, and Ecuador hascomplained that spray drift has affected crops across its border with Colombia. (56) Compensation for Accidental Spraying. The U.S.Congress has included provisions in the annual foreign operations appropriations legislation (57) requiring the evaluationof complaints of harm to licit crops, or human health caused by aerial eradication, and for faircompensation to be paid for "meritorious" claims. Colombian law also provides for compensationin such cases. Complaints of potential harm to licit crops are investigated by the Colombiangovernment, with nearly 50% of cases eliminated after verifying that the specific places during thedates reported were not fumigated. The remaining complaints are verified by field visits, where itis often found that licit crops were planted near drug crops. Under Colombian law, illicit crops thatare interspersed with licit crops are legitimate objects of aerial fumigation. According to the State Department's March 2005 International Narcotics Control StrategyReport , the Colombian National Police Antinarcotics Directorate (DIRAN), the agency responsiblefor aerial eradication operations, has received approximately 5,500 complaints of accidental foodcrop and/or pastureland spraying since 2001. Of these, 12 received compensation, resulting in about$30,000 in compensation. DIRAN reported that as of June 2004, those filing reports were residentsof remote rural areas. Almost two-thirds were rejected because they were filed late, or because cocaplantings were found next to food crops, while one-third were still under consideration. DIRAN alsoreported that peasants had filed complaints in no spray zones, that some complaints of damaged foodcrops had coca interspersed (and therefore subject to spraying under Colombian law), and that healthcomplaints were due to other unrelated factors. Critics argue that the few claims for restitution that have been accepted do not indicate theextent of the problem. They cite the "substantial security risks, time, and expense involved infarmers traveling to town and filing claims." (58) Colombia's Ombudsman's Office has indicated that the longdistances, lack of roads and the security situation constrain the registration of complaints as well astheir verification within specified deadlines. That office, and the Comptroller General's Office(CGO), has questioned the advisability of having DIRAN review compensation claims when theyare also responsible for eradication. (59) Social Effects. Public opposition to eradicationhas contributed to the growth in indigenous political movements in Peru and Bolivia. Thesemovements have in some cases undermined the political will of national governments to aggressivelyeradicate, and have spurred movements to legalize cultivation. In Colombia, the larger conflict, inwhich drug trafficking is a component, has produced a large internally displaced population aspeople flee drug zones. Public opposition has been most evident in Bolivia where eradication has met with protestsfrom coca growers ( cocaleros ) who have organized themselves in legally recognized labor unions. Coca growers have also formed their own political party, the Movement toward Socialism (MAS). The MAS presidential candidate, Evo Morales, came in a close second in the last presidentialelection in 2002, and is a candidate in the upcoming election scheduled for December 18, 2005. Thecontinuing protests in Bolivia, orchestrated largely by coca growing unions and their supporters,have contributed to the resignations of two presidents, and continuing instability. Interim president,Eduardo Rodriguez, has made a commitment to not increase the pace of eradication until a study iscompleted to determine the current level of traditional coca leaf use. Cocaleros have also protestedthe use of combined military and police units for eradication; conflicts with growers resulted in 33deaths of growers, and 27 police and military fatalities between 1998 and 2003. (60) In Peru, there has been a growing movement to de-criminalize cultivation, above thegovernment-sanctioned legal limits. The region of Cuzco passed an ordinance in June of 2005 toallow legal coca cultivation. This ordinance was accepted by the national government on thegrounds that it applied to areas where cultivation is already legal. The Cuzco ordinance promptedtwo other regions to follow suit -- Puno and HuÃ¡naco -- although the national government has statedthat these ordinances are incompatible with national law. With President Toledo's low popularityand growing discontent in coca growing regions, some observers believe the government is unwillingto take on the increasingly assertive coca growers. (61) In 2004, the Peruvian drug agency, National Commission for Development and Life WithoutDrugs (DEVIDA), released a study on traditional uses of coca leaf. It found that approximately 2million Peruvians use coca leaf either habitually or occasionally, with another two million using itfor tea, or for traditional or ceremonial purposes, demand that can be satisfied with about 9,000metric tons. About 24,700 acres are needed to produce this amount, a slightly smaller land area thanwhat is allowed under current law. The study may form the basis for new legislation limitingcultivation to that needed to supply the licit domestic demand. In Colombia, the conflict among leftist guerrilla groups, rightist paramilitaries, and thegovernment has resulted in large numbers of displaced persons. Drug crop areas are some of themost contested regions as groups fight for their control for income generation. Some of thedisplaced relocate to other parts of the country, while others cross the border into neighboringcountries. The Colombian Human Rights and Displacement Consulting Office (CODHES) and theOmbudsman's Office believe there is a direct link between eradication and the increase in internallydisplaced persons (IDPs). The U.S. and Colombian position is that the drug trade itself and thearmed conflict that it continues to fuel are the causes of displacement for those living in conflictiveareas. According to the two governments, eradicating drug crops and removing the availability ofits profits for illegally armed groups will result in the end produce peace and stability. Congress has expressed interest in the effectiveness of alternative development programs topromote general economic development, their level of funding in relation to eradication programs,and their general ability to accomplish the objective of sustainability in reducing or eliminating drugcrop cultivation. It is difficult to assess the success of AD with regard to promoting economicdevelopment because we do not know what poverty levels would be in the absence of alternativedevelopment assistance. Even in the presence of such programs, it is difficult to ascertain if they arehelping to reduce poverty when there are so many variables that can inhibit economic development. Many observers believe that without a sustained alternative development program, eradication effortswill ultimately fail as farmers will replant drug crops as their only viable means to supportthemselves. With regard to achieving counternarcotics goals, USAID maintains that alternativedevelopment is essential because it can foster political support for eradication programs and provideincentives that, coupled with the eradication disincentive, ensure the permanent eradication of illicitcrops. Some observers, however, contend that the value of alternative development lies in itsconjunction with "intelligent law enforcement, interdiction and community-based voluntaryeradication," and that these three components are rarely adequately combined. (62) Other observers believethat AD alone does not reduce cultivation, particularly when it is not funded sufficiently or carriedon for a long enough period of time. (63) On the issue of sustainability, many foreign aid policy analysts believe that alternativedevelopment programs need to be comprehensive with a long-term commitment by sponsors. U.S.programs target a number of related problems, from infrastructure development to basic health andeducation. Proponents of AD believe that for results to be sustainable, programs must be orientedtoward poverty reduction with a focus on generating both agricultural and non-agricultural income. Toward that end, they recommend including education, basic health care, land titling, and conflictmanagement. (64) Challenges to AD programs in the Andes include the isolation of sites of production, poortransportation infrastructure, and the lack of access to marketing opportunities. Critics maintain thatthe United States too closely links the receipt of AD assistance on voluntary eradication, and putsmore resources into eradication rather than alternative development. With regard to AD programsin Colombia, the Government Accountability Office reported that obstacles included difficulty inmarketing products, poor soil conditions, security constraints, lack of territorial control that impedesthe development of infrastructure, and lack of established markets and private sector investment. In addition, GAO mentions that individual projects reach a small group of families, are ratherlocalized and small, and may not be sustainable. While the report's focus was Colombia, many ofits conclusions may be applicable to Peru and Bolivia. (65) Linking Eradication and AD. In Colombia, theUnited States considers aerial spraying a prerequisite for alternative development. For example,USAID contends that growers in Putumayo showed little interest in participating in alternativedevelopment until after parts of the region were sprayed involuntarily at the end of 2000. Thisresulted in 37,000 families agreeing to sign up for voluntary eradication and alternative developmentsupport. (66) While thethreat of forced eradication can act as an incentive to participate in alternative developmentprograms, some observers argue that the two are contradictory, not complementary. (67) These observers believethat educating farmers on the negative impacts of illegal crop production is a more effectiveprevention tool. Some believe that coca farmers would prefer not to grow illicit crops because theyunderstand the negative consequences for their communities -- the social impact of coca production,a spiral of violence, and drug abuse -- but feel compelled to do so in the absence of an alternativesustainable livelihood. U.S. alternative development programs, however, require that growers eradicate all cocabefore being eligible for assistance. There have been complaints that AD has not kept pace witheradication, that it has been unable to provide adequate income for subsistence, and that poor soilsand poor transportation infrastructure prevent getting agricultural or other income generatingproducts to national markets. GAO has reported that USAID in Colombia is not sufficientlycoordinating its efforts, with implementing partners cited as being unaware of each other's projects. The report concluded that successful continuation of projects requires better coordination betweenUSAID and its contractors and grantees. (68) In Bolivia's two main coca growing regions -- Chapare and Yungas -- growers havecomplained that they have not been able to benefit from alternatives to growing coca, citing a lackof coordination between existing community organizations and local governments, among otherproblems. (69) TheBolivian Law to Regulate Coca and Controlled Substances (Law 1008) authorizes forced eradication,but also requires simultaneous alternative development programs. Bolivia's 1998 Plan Dignidad stated that alternative development should accompany forced eradication. Resources. Critics say that the resources devotedto alternative development programs are insufficient to provide a long-term alternative to illicitcrops, and that the ratio between drug-related programs and development assistance is skewedtoward the former. Since 2000, alternative development funding has been a little more than half thatfor eradication and interdiction programs. For Colombia, Peru, and Bolivia combined, spending oneradication has totaled about $3 billion, while total spending on alternative development is $1.6billion. In Peru and Bolivia, the ratio between eradication and AD programs is approximately equal.In Colombia, eradication far outpaces AD programs. The cost of the aerial eradication program inColombia may account for differences with Peru and Bolivia, where aerial spraying is not permitted.(See Table 2 ). GAO reported in 2004 that funding constraints adversely affect nonmilitary assistance andcomplicate sustainability efforts. While USAID estimated in 2001 that a program for 136,600families could cost up to $4 billion, the United States has allocated about $1.6 billion since2000. (70) Bothproponents and critics of AD programs believe that the continuation of financial and technicalsupport is necessary for them to reach a sustainable momentum. Appropriate Crop Substitution. Some observershave questioned the viability of crops recommended for alternative development programs. Thehead of Peru's antidrug agency, DEVIDA, has stated that crop substitution programs fail because theland is acidic and not conducive to other crops. The Peruvian agriculture minister also stated thatprograms to replace coca crops with alternative crops have been a failure, because the crops used,such as papayas and pineapples, are not profitable. While he proceeded to argue that AD wouldcontinue to be pursued, he recommended finding more profitable crops. (71) Similar complaints havebeen heard in Bolivia where some AD sites have been affected by falling global prices and a lackof assistance in exporting some commodities, such as hearts of palm and pineapples.

Summary: The United States has supported drug crop eradication and alternative development programsin the Andes for decades. Colombia, Bolivia, and Peru collectively produce nearly the entire globalsupply of cocaine. In addition, Colombia has become a producer of high quality heroin, most of itdestined for the United States and Europe. The United States provides counternarcotics assistancethrough the Andean Counterdrug Initiative (ACI). The program supports a number of missions,including interdiction of drug trafficking, illicit crop eradication, alternative development, and ruleof law and democracy promotion. From FY2000 through FY2005, the United States has provideda total of about $4.3 billion in ACI funds. Since 2001, coca cultivation in the Andes has been reduced by 22%, with the largest decreaseoccurring in Colombia, according to the State Department. Opium poppy crops, grown mainly inColombia and from which heroin is made, have been reduced by 67%. However, the region wasstill capable of producing 640 metric tons of cocaine, and 3.8 metric tons of heroin in 2004,according to the White House Office of National Drug Control Policy. Congress has expressed a number of concerns with regard to eradication, especially the healthand environmental effects of aerial spraying, its sustainability and social consequences, and thereliability of drug crop estimates. With regard to alternative development, Congress has expressedinterest in its effectiveness, its relationship to eradication, and the long-term sustainability ofprograms once they are started. Drug crops are eradicated either manually or by aerial spraying of a herbicide mixture, themain ingredient being glyphosate, used commercially in the United States under the brand name ofRoundupÂ®. Eradication can be conducted with the voluntary agreement of growers, or involuntarily. Peru and Bolivia do not allow aerial eradication, which has proven to be controversial. Criticsbelieve it poses risks to the environment and the health of inhabitants living in sprayed regions. Proponents believe it is the most effective and safe means to defoliate large areas being used for drugcrop cultivation, thereby removing a lucrative source of income from the illegally armed Colombiangroups. Providing alternatives to drug crops is believed to be crucial to achieve effective eradication. This often includes technical support for farmers, marketing assistance, and strengthening thetransportation infrastructure in order to get crops to market. The U.S. approach to alternativedevelopment (AD) is to link it to eradication. Growers who agree to eradicate are eligible forassistance. This report will not be updated. For more information on the Andean Counterdrug Initiative,see CRS Report RL32337 , Andean Counterdrug Initiative (ACI) and Related Funding Programs:FY2005 Assistance ; and CRS Report RL32774 , Plan Colombia: A Progress Report , both by ConnieVeillette.