On January 22, 2002, the Congressional Research Service sponsored a seminar on the possiblelessons for U.S. policy from the experiences of other countries in handling their own terrorismchallenges. Although other countries generally have not experienced international terrorist incidentsresembling the events of September 11, 2001 in concept and in devastating execution, many haveconfronted very severe and prolonged domestic threats. To discuss whether there are policy lessonsthat the United States might draw from those countries, CRS invited several experts on internationalterrorism, and others with particular experiences in one or more cases to discuss the topic. Although this seminar was held over two and a half years ago, several of the topics of discussion and speakers' points of view are relevant to the recommendations made by the report ofthe 9/11 Commission issued in July 2004. The following four paragraphs in this introductionsummarize pertinent points on the utility reform (which was the major topic of discussion during theseminar), as well as on four subjects highly relevant to Commission recommendations. Thesesubjects were (1) the possible tradeoffs between security and civil liberties; (2) the tradeoffs betweensecurity risks and costs; (3) international cooperation; and (4) terrorist financing. The remainder ofthe text is unchanged from the original publication of July 24, 2002. Several of the Commission's recommendations dealt with a perceived need for reforms within Muslim countries: economic reforms, political reforms, and social reforms, most particularlyeducation. One of the most controversial topics of discussion at the CRS seminar was the utility ofsuch reforms. The debate centered upon the accuracy of the findings of a 1984 study by one of thespeakers that demonstrated that levels of terrorism did not decrease when economic reforms wereundertaken or when selected economic indicators improved, but rather that violence worsened wheneconomic indicators were better. Other speakers and discussants raised several considerations as towhy this finding may have been true: (1) terrorists may have intensified their activities as they foundreforms counterproductive to their objectives; (2) if negotiations were going on they might haveintensified activities to produce more concessions; (3) the government was unable to deliver thedegree of reform needed or had undertaken reforms too late; (4) other government actions, such asstopping people on the streets, may have undermined the positive effects of reform; or simply (5)that the time frame covered by the study (four to eleven years, depending on the case) may have notbeen long enough to demonstrate the true results of reforms. One speaker pointed out that thetimeframe over which one evaluates a situation can affect perceptions of a policy's effectiveness andoutcome. (See pp. 11-14.) There was some discussion as to whether Islamist terrorism was better addressed through long-term programs, such as secularized education, and whether changed circumstances could modify thesocial and psychological context which feeds terrorism. Speakers could not recall a precedent wherethe United States sought to change an educational system abroad to prevent the emergence ofterrorism, but thought perhaps a domestic example, the influence of education in diminishing overtime the power of the Ku Klux Klan, might provide insight into the possible utility of such anapproach. One speaker said that he found the educational system to be one of the most significantfactors in predicting the occurrence of terrorism. He attributed a large difference in the degree ofterrorism in Quebec, Canada, and Northern Ireland, both of which have separatist movements withinBritish cultures, to the deliberate nationalist indoctrination in Northern Ireland's schools. He alsopointed to an example regarding Northern Ireland where a long term cultural shift in perception hasbeen undermining the pro-terrorism culture there. (See pp. 13-14.) Speakers debated the degree towhich the United States could affect Islamist terrorism by a change in its policies in the Middle East,particularly its policy towards Israel. (See pp. 15-16.) The speakers also addressed two sets of tradeoffs that were raised by the 9/11 Commission. Noting that many of its recommendations called for the government to "increase its presence in ourlives," the Commission advanced several recommendations designed to protect civil liberties whilecautioning that security must be reconciled with liberty "since the success of one helps protect theother." One speaker opined that whether Europe's "severe" anti-terrorism laws grantingextraordinary police powers in the 1970s and 1980s were effectively implemented depended uponthe collection of good intelligence that could minimize the use of intrusive, repressive tactics. TheCommission's recommendations also pointed to the dilemmas raised by evaluating risks within thecontext of limited resources, but concluded, in the case of transportation assets, that "terroristsshould perceive that potential targets are defended." Discussion at the CRS seminar suggested thatdecisions setting priorities in terms of risk may be a difficult -- if not futile -- task, as even thehighest degree of preparedness is not going to prevent terrorist incidents as terrorists turn to secondlevel targets when more desirable targets are well guarded. The net result, according to one of thespeakers, is that the United States will have to decide what degree of risk it is willing to bear, muchas the United States decides to tolerate the risk of deaths on its highways and from smoking. (Seepp. 15-17.) The Commission Report also indicated through several recommendations the need for international cooperation, with one recommendation calling for the development of a comprehensivecoalition strategy against Islamist terrorism. CRS speakers pointed to international cooperation ashelpful in controlling sources of support for terrorist acts, in particular financing and arms. (See pp.8-9.) There were three speakers. The first was Martha Crenshaw , now the Colin and Nancy Campbell Professor in Global Issues and Democratic Thought at Wesleyan University, who gave anintroduction discussing the complexities involved in developing a viable policy towards terrorism. As one of the first scholars to devote herself to the study of terrorism who continues to devote amajor portion of her time to the subject, she has studied the phenomenon for over 30 years. Thesecond speaker was Christopher Hewitt , a Professor of Sociology at the University of Maryland,Baltimore County, who has written a multi-case comparative study of the effectiveness ofgovernment policies towards terrorism, and a book published in the spring of 2002 on Americanterrorism. His comparative study, completed in 1984, looked at five cases, all modern democracies. Three were cases of ethnic or separatist terrorism: the IRA in Northern Ireland (1968-1973); theBasque ETA in Spain (1975-1981); and the EOKA in Cyprus (1955-1958). The other two werecases of revolutionary terrorism: the Red Brigades in Italy (1977-1981), and the Tupamaros inUruguay (1968-1973). [Of these, the first two conflicts are still active to some extent.] The finalspeaker was Peter Probst , an independent consultant with nearly 30 years of experience with theCentral Intelligence Agency and the Department of Defense. His formal remarks concentrated onperceived deficiencies in current U.S. policy. Three additional people were invited to participate in the subsequent discussion with members of the audience. They were Imad-ad-dean Ahmad of the Minaret of Freedom, MarcGopin , avisiting professor at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy and specialist in conflict resolution,and Ulrich Seidt of the German Embassy in Washington, D.C. (For further biographicalinformation on the speakers and commentators, see Appendix A.) The three major issues that the speakers were asked to address were: Methods of dealing with terrorist organizations: whether targeting leadership (for arrest or assassination), and targeting flows of money, can curb or eliminate terroristactivity; Utility of policy reforms and accommodation: whether an accommodation of U.S. policy and/or reform of Middle East governments would help end radical Islamist terrorism; Debate over civil liberties: whether the strengthening of police enforcement powers and strict immigration controls have significantly enhanced public security in othercountries. The speakers were also asked to weigh whether there are particular policies that might be useful, and to suggest policies which may not have yet been tried. There were three areas, discussedimmediately below, on which there seemed to be broad agreement. There were many points of livelydiscussion and debate, the most salient of which are present in the section on Issues in Dealing withTerrorist Organizations. This report concludes with some considerations for U.S. policy that wereraised throughout the program. (One hour, edited versions of the seminar are available in audio(AB50397) and video (VB60057) tapes. Online audio and video excerpts from the seminar areposted at http://www.crs.gov/products/multimedia/sem-020122.shtml .) Nature of Terrorism. An area on which the three speakers agreed was on the nature of terrorism, and the seriousness of the current threat to the UnitedStates. All of them saw it as a tactic used in many different contexts by people willing to inflictviolence on military and civilian targets in order to obtain a variety of ends. In response to a questionas to what was a terrorist organization, both Crenshaw and Hewitt thought it best to avoid labelingorganizations as such, arguing that applying a "terrorist" label to acts, and not the actors, wouldfacilitate clearer analysis and policymaking. Ahmad offered a definition: "deliberate targeting ofcivilians to create an atmosphere of terror with the intention of advancing one's particular cause." Long-term Prospect of Violence. All also agreed that the United States may be dealing with international terrorism as a domestic problem for a verylong time. "The United States is in a situation that is likely to last for generations," according toProbst. While others did not speculate on the time frame, there was general agreement that terrorismtends to become a long term, self-perpetuating problem, because it engenders a cycle of violence. Crenshaw pointed out that the problem in dealing with terrorism is, in many cases, "not just wipingout the terrorist network. It's [dealing with] a whole generation of usually young men who havebeen socialized into a certain culture of violence, and form a recruiting pool. You're not going tokill and arrest all those people, you can't. So in many cases the change that you anticipate, even withthe best of policies and the best of circumstances, will be many years, twenty years, a generationdown the pike..." She, as the others, cautioned that as long as the threat of terrorism exists, "eventhe highest degree of alertness and preparation is not going to prevent acts of terrorism taking place." Unintended Consequences. Several speakers warned, in various contexts, that policymakers needed to think several steps ahead in formulatinganti-terrorism policies, in order to avoid unintended consequences that could make a bad situationworse. Crenshaw pointed out two instances in Israeli policy where attempts to deal with thePalestine Liberation Organization (PLO) were counterproductive, creating new and perhaps moredangerous adversaries and situations. According to Crenshaw, Israel attempted to deal with the PLOin the [late] 1980s by tolerating the emergence of Hamas as a rival to the PLO. Instead of creatinga hoped-for "balance of power," this strategy "in the end may have created an enemy who washarder to deal with than the first enemy..." she said. Also [in 1978 and again in 1982], Israel soughtto protect its northern borders from incursions by the PLO by invading Lebanon and occupyingsouthern Lebanon. In 1982, "Israel succeeded in getting the PLO to withdraw and getting the PLOto go to Tunisia," she pointed out. "But of course in doing so they managed to create Hezballah." In his review of his five country comparative study, Hewitt stated that the only policy tool that significantly reduced levels of terrorist violence was what he called a "model of attrition," i.e., thearrest, internment or killing of terrorists. "The more terrorists or suspected terrorists that you couldarrest or kill, the lower level of violence was," he said. "It wasn't true for every country, but it wastrue for ... three of the five cases I looked at." He also added that the same held true in his morerecent study of American terrorist groups. "There's a limited number of terrorists. If you couldcatch or kill enough of them, then the terrorism will fall off." According to Hewitt, such a policyrequires good intelligence, obtained through good police work in surveillance, payoffs to informants,infiltration, and eliciting information from captured terrorists. The most success is had, he said, fromintelligence gained from infiltration and information given by informants and turned or surrenderedterrorists. Tactics of repression and mass searches are more likely to be counterproductive. "Youneed to be able to know who the terrorists are, so instead of searching a thousand houses...you goto one house, break down the door and grab the terrorist in there...You don't have to alienate athousand households" Hewitt also pointed to successes in countries which have used laws to facilitate gaining information from terrorists. He cited successes in Northern Ireland, gained from terrorists whosurrendered and received amnesty and new identities in return for information, and in Italy, fromterrorists who received reduced sentences. Both Probst and Crenshaw concurred with Hewitt that good police work can be an effective means of dealing with terrorism. "Arrests and the rule of law do seem to be the most effective long-term way,"according to Probst. Crenshaw also concurred that "you can, with goodintelligence...wipe out a certain network, whether it's political or whether it's criminal." Crenshawasserted that one could not arrest or kill all members of an organization, and raised the need toattempt to deal with the circumstances that spawned such organizations or networks. Unless you cando something about those circumstances, she argued, eliminating one adversary might only createanother "that's stronger, more lethal, more committed, and has learned the lessons of itspredecessors," creating a "very, very long run sort of problem." Additional Drawbacks in Targeting Leaders. Crenshaw concurred that there were cases that demonstrated the utility of arresting leaders, but raisedpossible problems in the practice. She noted that the arrest in the 1990s of two top leaders -Abdullah Ãcalan, head of the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), in Turkey, and AnÃ­bal Guzman, headof the Shining Path, in Peru, "did appear to have a very significant negative impact on thosemovements..." However, she also cited the Israeli experience with arrests and assassinations ofleaders as a mixed one, and thought that it and other countries' experiences with such tacticsdeserved more study. "I'm not sure that we know which types of organizations are so dependent ona single leader that removing that leader really ends the organization and when it doesn't." She pointed to a further problem that could ensue if jailing or killing the top leader did not put an end to the organization. "Sometimes what it does is deprive you of someone to negotiate withif in the long run you think you're going to have to negotiate with them." This, she pointed out, wasa dilemma that the Algerian government faced in the 1990s, after it jailed the two top leaders of theIslamic Salvation Front, which was likely to win elections. When the government found it couldn'tcrush the group, however, it released the leaders in order to negotiate. It found, however, that theywere no longer of any use because they had lost the trust of their former followers. Weighing an Assassination Policy. Responding to a question on the issue of targeting leaders of terrorist organizations for assassination, Crenshawlisted common perceptions of the pros and cons of such a policy. She noted that she was leavingaside the moral issue of taking a life without due process. An advantage, she said, was thatassassinations could be an efficient means to cripple an organization by removing the leadership orthe people with key skills, and relatively more humane than using a massive military response inwhich many innocent people might be killed. She cited four disadvantages, however, which in heropinion outweighed the advantages. First, Crenshaw argued that it would be hard to avoid mistakes. She noted that an assassination requires excellent intelligence, but that even with the best intelligence, mistakes canbe made and innocent civilians killed. She pointed out that even Israel, with its "very goodreputation" for gathering accurate intelligence, has killed innocent people because of mistakes inchoosing its targets. Second, she judged that public opinion would be very volatile. In the abstract, she thought most people would regard an assassination policy as a good idea, but that in the long runif a government assassinated the wrong person, two or three times, "as almost surely is going tohappen, then you'd have a public backlash." Third, she raised the possibility that the targets would not be as critical to the organization as believed, and that their elimination might not end the threat. Fourth, she pointed out that in some cases such a policy could "just encourage other people to step into that person's shoes," depending on whether there were others in theorganization with equivalent skills. She speculated that for "technical skills there's always going tobe substitutability." Probst opined that terrorist planners - those who plotted the actual acts - wouldbe hardest to replace, but he thought that some technical people would have "a special flair" thatmight make them irreplaceable. Others picked up on the issues of the morality of an assassination policy, and its effectiveness. Probst asked why some consider it "morally acceptable to try to kill somebody by dropping a bombfrom 30,000 feet, as opposed to a clean rifle shot....The chances for mistake or misstep, I think, aremuch greater when you engage in something like a bombing raid if you are trying to put a terroristleader or terrorist planner out of commission." [In a later amplification, Probst stated thatassassination can be a more humane tool than bombings or other acts of warfare, which are"indiscriminate and risk the killing of innocents," while an assassination carried out by a sniper "isrelatively precise and sends a message." He added that "the primary aim of lethal operations is not'retaliation' but, rather, to deprive a terrorist group of its leadership and brain trust, thereby, reducingthe risk to innocent men, women and children who are the terrorist's prime targets. If, early in thegame, we had been able to eliminate Osama bin Laden, Mohammed Atef, and Ayman al-Zawahiri,we probably would have been spared the tragedy of 9/11, and some 3,000 Americans would be alivetoday."] Probst also expressed concerns about the possible unintended consequences, and thoughtthat policymakers need to "think through" secondary and tertiary consequences of an act. [Otherscommented on the morality issue in the discussion over assassination in the Middle East. See thesecond paragraph in the section below.] Debate over Assassination in the Middle East. The application of these policies in the Middle East situation provoked some debate. Crenshawstated that while in the United States consideration of an assassination policy has always assumedthat the action would be pre-emptive, she thought Israel's assassination policy was retaliatory,designed to extract revenge. Retaliation, in her view, provokes counter-retaliation, currently in theform of the Palestinian suicide bombings. Although she said that Israel might judge that theadvantages of such a policy outweighed the disadvantages, she had reservations. In her judgment,the Israelis had gotten "trapped in a need to respond," creating a vicious cycle from which it wouldbe very difficult to escape. Ahmad, who supported Crenshaw's view that Hamas' actions areretaliatory, also stated that Hamas had offered to stop its suicide bombings if Israel would stopkillings. [He later provided citations to support his view, as footnoted below. (1) ] He argued that anassassination policy is problematic not because it is more or less moral than dropping a bomb orcausing collateral damage, but because it is counterproductive. The problem, he said, "is that itinvites a retaliation on the target of the person who authorized the assassination." Gopin argued that the Hamas suicide bombings were not retaliation, and disputed the idea that Hamas had offered to stop its suicide bombings if Israel would stop its killings: "It was very clearfrom the beginning that they were training throughout the Oslo years for suicide bombing on a veryconcerted basis against civilians." He further argued that the Israelis regarded a policy ofassassinating leaders as more humane than other possible tactics. "Believe it or not they see it as akind of humanitarian lessening of the violence as opposed to tank shells, etc., in response to an attackagainst them." Gopin also questioned whether assassinations can be an effective policy in circumstances where people are willing to die for their cause. "If so many people are committing suicide, in other words,they want to die, where is the preventive measure in terms of killing somebody?" He, as the others,concluded that an assassination policy, in Israel or elsewhere, can be counterproductive: "Arrest ishumiliating, assassination exalted." Several of the discussants cited a need to control the sources of support for terrorist acts. As a corollary, some noted that such control would require the assistance of other nations. Hewitt agreed that policies to cut off funding were helpful, but did not agree that such policies in themselves could curb terrorism. He attributed his reservations about the effectiveness of suchpolicies to his belief that powerful terrorist groups get funding because they are powerful. He pointedout that his view is different from that of other analysts who believe that terrorists become powerfulas a result of the funding, most notably James Adams, (2) and therefore view such policies as highlyeffective. Crenshaw thought that it would be "very helpful" to cut off "not so much the long-term social support structures, the supply of recruits, but money, finances, arms." She warned, however, that"there's no magic bullet." She also noted the need for international cooperation in implementing cut-off policies: "The British had a lot of success [against the Irish Republican Army] once they securedthe active cooperation of the Republic of Ireland in cutting off money and weapons....who discoveredand destroyed arms caches which were often in the Irish Republic..." and also "through the help ofother governments who intercepted arms shipments...." Similarly, she pointed out that Spain couldnot begin to deal with the Basque separatist group, the ETA, until France helped Spain control their common border. Gopin stated that the current Middle East situation is exacerbated by outside powers andinterests. He contended that [elements in] Iraq [and] Saudi Arabia, and some western charities arecontributing money to the support structure for suicide bombings in Israel, raising difficultconsiderations for U.S. policy. (3) A discussion on the utility of negotiations underscored the extreme difficulties of bringing negotiations to a successful conclusion. Negotiations were undertaken in three of the five cases thatHewitt examined, and they broke down in all three. Hewitt offered several different hypotheses onwhy negotiations in these and other cases did not work. For one, he thought that in some cases thedemands are "so thoroughly polar that there's no negotiation possible" because there is no way theparties can "split the difference." "What democratic government is going to allow a socialistrevolution to take place?" he asked. "What democratic government is going to allow a section ofits territory to leave its authority and form an independent state?" He also cited studies that indicatethat some fighters may want to keep fighting because they don't know what else to do. (4) In addition,Hewitt stated that cease-fires are commonly used as a way to "re-equip and regroup" and to bringin new recruits, so that when the negotiations break down, conflict resumes at a higher level. Gopinagreed with this assessment: "Negotiations do, when they fail, create more terrorism." Hewitt and Gopin both ventured that negotiations and unilateral responses to grievances would only work if undertaken before terrorist violence begins. "...Once you've got terrorism working,negotiations probably don't do much," according to Hewitt. For Gopin, the answer also lay in tryingto address problems that are potential sources of violence before organizations develop terroriststructures: "It boils down to knowing the soup from which terrorism comes versus [knowing] thehighly professionalized structures and terrorist cells that you might be examining. You want to cutit off before it gets to that point." Dealing with Factions. The speakers were asked if the large number and divergence of groups, and factions within groups, in the Middle East willmake it impossible to bring an end to conflict there through negotiations. Crenshaw pointed out thatBritish dealings with the Irish Republican Army were just such a case, and the same was true inGermany where some of the groups gave up the armed struggle, but others emerged who were notunder their control. She also pointed out that it was a common psychological misperception that"we're always prone to see these groups as monolithic when they're not monolithic at all." Ahmad suggested that the differences among factions might be dealt with by understanding the value of each issue at stake to each of the groups involved. Outsiders, he said, have to distinguishbetween peripheral issues, which can vary from group to group, and core issues, upon which allparties to one side of the conflict agreed. In dealing with the core issues, outsiders have to judgewhich are widely considered legitimate. If negotiations are focused on those issues, they might notappease the terrorist groups, he argued, but may have an impact on the political dynamics ofnegotiations by appealing to many groups who support the terrorists. "If the demand is on a coreissue that is unacceptable to us [the United States as an interested party] and illegitimate, then wehave a problem and [U.S. support for] negotiation is not possible. But if the demand is for an issuethat is quite legitimate, for example a demand that some state adhere to international law, then [bysupporting that demand you will not satisfy all groups] ... but you will appeal to a whole bunch ofgroups who are siding against our position and may be engaged in what we consider terrorism." Thus, terrorists may be neutralized by undermining support for them in the broader society. Thiswould apply to the current situation in the Middle East, Ahmad argued, stating that even if a positionthat urged Israel to henceforth abide by the Geneva Conventions [and pertinent U.N. resolutions]would not satisfy Al Qaeda, it still would satisfy many other groups. Improving the Possibilities of Negotiations. Two suggestions were made for improving the possibilities of successfully concluding negotiations. Seidtstated that although negotiations may be difficult, the possibility of a successful negotiated outcomeshould not be written off completely, particularly in cases where the conflict is over territory. Toincrease the possibilities of success, he argued that negotiations should involve not only the twoparties in conflict, but also a third party in the role of mediator or facilitator. Looking at the recentincrease in violence and terrorism in Israel, for example, Seidt judged that the level of violence andterrorism in the Middle East was far lower as long as the United States was involved in the MiddleEast peace process, but that it rose when the United States disengaged. (5) Gopin thought that peace processes "without simultaneous and steady steps to increase the rule of law" were doomed to failure. Simultaneous anti-corruption, education, and cultural measuresshould be undertaken to guarantees that a process "is moving towards co-existence." A peaceprocess needs to "slowly and steadily isolate terrorism," he argued, "and not blindly give endlesssums of money that end up being used to create a corrupt system that further feeds the terrorists." Gopin also thought that terrorism strategies should be measured for their effects on both leadership and on the "soup" that feeds terrorism, i.e., the people who provide either active or tacitsupport for terrorists because of their sympathy with their cause. He thought it might be necessaryto develop different policies to deal with each. He pointed out that the ability of leaders to negotiatewill depend on how their followers judge the potential acceptability of a possible outcome, and thatdepends partly on their assessment of the current situation. Hewitt's most contentious findings were that reforms and accommodation did not lead to the cessation of terrorism. Hewitt contended that while many analysts view addressing the "rootcauses" of a conflict through political and economic reforms as essential in order to "dry up the waterin which the fish swim," his study led him to doubt the utility of that approach. The study examined the relationship between levels of terrorism and political reforms, and between the levels of terrorismand several economic indicators, including unemployment, the standard of living, and inflation, andlevels of terrorism. Regarding reforms, he found that even when most of terrorists grievances wereaddressed, the level of terrorism only decreased, it did not end. Hewitt noted that in two cases --Spain and Northern Ireland -- fairly extensive reforms were made, without affecting the levels ofviolence. He also found that "improving economic conditions doesn't have any effect on the levelof terrorism." In every one of the five cases he examined, Hewitt said that "if anything, there wasactually more terrorism in the good months than there was in the bad months." Obstacles to success. Hewitt's remarks led to an extended discussion on the possibilities of generalizing further from his findings in five cases withlimited time frames, and on the motivations of individual terrorists and the sentiments of those whosupport terrorist organizations. One audience member questioned whether Hewitt's findings wouldhold true if he looked at the same cases over decades (the time frame of his studies ranged from fourto 11 years), and if these findings would necessarily hold true in all cases. Hewitt conceded that theymight not. Other speakers and commentators, as well as Hewitt, offered several hypotheses as to why Hewitt's findings would be true, at least in some cases. Their explanations included judgments onthe motivations of terrorists, their vested interests and tactical considerations, and the difficulties ofgovernments in meeting their demands, and the timing of reforms, as discussed below. Gopin andAhmad, however, both argued that in developing policies to control terrorism, it is necessary todistinguish between the effects of policies on the terrorists themselves, and the effects on theirsupporters. "The real question is the support group for them, and the ways in which those supportgroups destabilize or can destabilize efforts to stabilize countries such as Palestine or such asPakistan. And that's where economic issues and psychological issues and gestures and culturalrelations...would become operative," Gopin said Vested Interests, Tactical Considerations, Difficult Demands. Probst, commenting on Hewitt's finding that terrorist activitiesspiked when reform was at its height, opined that perhaps the reason was that "terrorists felt mostthreatened by economic reform. The idea being that if the economy of the area improves, theirrecruiting pool will likely lessen or dry up. If you remove the core grievances, it's true you'll stillhave a core group of terrorists, but recruiting replacements might be much more difficult." AlthoughHewitt had not interviewed terrorists to assess their motivations, but only looked at empirical data,he also offered reasons related to motivations to explain why his data would accurately reflect thesituation. Noting that he had found that periods of political and economic reforms were periods whenviolence spiked, he posited that terrorists might be making cold calculations that they could forcethe government to more concessions if they escalated the amount of violence. (6) He also speculatedthat sometimes reforms might not work because what was needed was beyond what the governmentcould deliver. Hewitt also suggested that it was difficult to separate out the impact of reforms and economic improvements because, despite improvements in economic conditions, the general situation mightnot be perceived as improving when "so many other things were going on" simultaneously. "Onceyou've got violence started, there's a whole dynamic of violence itself. One reason...for example,why economic reforms may not work is you're pumping money in, but the terrorists are blowing upbuildings and factories...so it's sort of a vicious cycle. And there are also other factors...people beingstopped on the streets and harassed and so on." Timing. The timing of reforms might also be a factor. Ahmad, echoing Crenshaw's idea that there were points at which the cycle of violence excludedhelp, posited that reforms did not work because they were undertaken so late "when the cause waslost already." Hewitt stated that one reason that so many ethnic groups with territorial grievancesdid not turn to violence was that some governments made concessions to them in a timely fashion,before the situation reached one of violence. Economic Motivations. Whether economic factors were among the motivations of people for joining organizations and undertaking terrorist acts, or forcontinuing to commit acts of terrorism, was also discussed. Hewitt said that he did not find muchof a correlation between deprivation and the incidence of terrorism. As counter-evidence to the ideathat poverty and economic deprivation motivates people to participate in terrorism, Hewitt noted thatnationalist terrorists tend not to come from the most disadvantaged groups, but rather are a cross-section of theirsociety, and that revolutionary terrorists tend to come from privileged classes. Hepointed out the Basques came from a rich region, and that ethnic Basques within that region tend tobe better off than the inhabitants who are not ethnic Basques. Ahmad, however, indicated that just because terrorists did not come from the poorest groups in a society did not discredit the idea that economic deprivation contributes to terrorism. In hisview, the economic motivation was not necessarily the amount of an individual's own income, butthe perception of "theft" from a group with which one identifies, i.e., whether one group was beingexploited or "raided" to give prosperity to another. He thought that when examining economicrationales, analysts should not think of them on an individualistic basis. Rather, he said, analystsshould "look at a complex feeling of affiliation and sympathy for people and empathy people mayhave with one another." He drew a parallel between the situation of Germany after World War I,when the victorious allies required Germany to pay hefty reparations, which many see as animportant factor in the rise of Hitler, and the economic deprivation in Iraq , which he believesresulted in the "creation" of Osama Bin Laden. Even though Osama Bin Laden "himself is quitewealthy, he is able to have credibility among the masses"of the Arab states, Ahmad argued, "becauseof the extreme dispossession and deprivation of the Iraqis." Several of the speakers and the commentators suggested that the extent to which economic conditions motivate terrorists may differ from the extent to which they motivate terrorists'supporters. Gopin also distinguished between two types of suicide bombers. He thought themotivations were different for those suicide terrorists who are "highly organized and highly trained."and those who are driven to suicide for economic motives because of "a desperate situation or thedesperation of the circumstances." With funding believed to be provided by outside sources tosupport the families of suicide bombers, for the later group, Gopin said, "it's basically like a lifeinsurance policy....There are many people signing up simply because it's the best way in a badsituation for them to have a future for their family." Potential for Long-term Change. Some speakers and audience members raised the possibility that terrorism may be addressed through long-termprograms or circumstances that would change the social and psychological context which feedsterrorism. For some, taking a long-term perspective was crucial in developing and assessing options. Ahmad argued that the "scope of one's view", i.e., the time frame over which one conceptualizesa situation, can affect perceptions of a policy's effectiveness and outcome. "When you're lookingat a longer term, things may look very, very different than they do when you look at the short term,"he stated. Gopin wondered whether "counterterrorism academic research can become wider toexamine things over the long term, not just in terms of what's going on with this terrorist cell, butwhat's going on in the larger culture that can be correlated positively or negatively with...the strengthof terrorism." Two areas were mentioned where change might be encouraged: educational reformand cultural shifts attributable to changing perceptions (discussed below). Educational Reforms. One member of the audience asked whether it might be productive for the United States to invest substantially in secularizededucational institutions in developing countries. Crenshaw stated that she did not know of anyprecedent where the U.S. tried to change an educational system abroad so as to prevent theemergence of terrorism, but speculated that it would take some 20 years for effectiveness to show. There was some discussion as to whether there were other applicable precedents. The suggestionthat the United States has changed the nature of Germany and Japan after World War II througheducational systems drew some skepticism as a precedent because the United States was alsoengaged in extensive political reform in those countries. Others looked to domestic situations forpossible precedents. Probst mentioned that education over time diminished the power of the KuKlux Klan, "and made Martin Luther King a hero..." an example that Crenshaw and others thoughta more valid precedent. Gopin said that he thought "a counter-terrorism strategy without a legislative package that encourages new systems of education globally is going to fail." Hewitt said that one of the reasonsthat he tends to downplay economic factors is that one of the most significant factors he found inpredicting the occurrence of terrorism was the character of the educational system. "I think whatmakes terrorists and what makes terrorist supporters...is the kind of socialization they have." Hepointed out that there was a large difference in the degree of terrorism in Quebec and in NorthernIreland, which both have separatist movements within British cultures. He attributed the differenceto deliberate nationalist indoctrination in Northern Ireland's schools, which was not present in thecase of Quebec: "Education in the Catholic schools of Northern Ireland, the parochial schools whichvirtually every Catholic went to, was a kind of indoctrination in being an Irish nationalist" Comparing the writings of Northern Irish Catholic groups with those of Greek Cypriot groups,Hewitt found similarities in that both emphasized the role of education in promoting their cause. Crenshaw raised concerns about the wisdom of placing too much emphasis on long-term policies, warning that short-term policies should not be slighted. "Obviously the seeds come bothfrom within societies like Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Afghanistan, as well as U.S. globalpresence as the world's only superpower after the end of the Cold War," she said. "Surely, we canwork toward educational reform in these countries... But it's very difficult still to predict what willhappen, to know in the long term what exactly is going to happen...." Changing Perceptions. Hewitt cited the possibilityof long term cultural shifts in perceptions, or reality, that can undermine the social and psychologicalsupport base for terrorism. He discussed changing perceptions in Northern Ireland as a example thatmight help clarify possibilities for Israel. He pointed out that the Irish Republic's 1937constitution had claimed the territory of Northern Ireland, the only constitution that he knows of witha claim on the territory of another state. (7) Thatprovision, he said, "scared the Protestants andencouraged the Catholics" in Northern Ireland, contributing to a culture which fomented terrorism. (He drew a parallel between that document and the founding documents or "constitution" of the PLOwhich he said called for the total destruction of Israel. (8) ) With time, however, he said "Northern IrishCatholics have suddenly realized that Southern Ireland [i.e., the Irish Republic] is not that crazy tohave them," and this realization is prompting a shift in perception that is contributing to a changein the pro-terrorism culture. Gopin discussed the importance of what leaders in the Islamic world say on influencing perceptions. He pointed to recent statements by the Pakistan President as one indication of the typeof change needed. "For example, [General Pevrez] Musharraf made a major speech in the lastcouple of weeks....[saying] our Islam is not going to be captured by extremism. He said we're goingto have a jihad for economic stability, not a jihad against the United States. That [was] ahermeneutic development to the concept of Jihad within his culture, and in his religion that wasrevolutionary." Hewitt noted that European actions against terrorism in the 1970s and 1980s were all carried out in the context of "severe anti-terrorist laws" granting extraordinary police powers. While hefound it difficult to assess the effects of the laws themselves, he thought that whether they workeddepended on whether they were implemented in such a way that they avoided means such as masssearches that would alienate the population. He pointed to the collection of good intelligence, as"the crucial factor" in effective implementation. "You need to be able to know who the terroristsare, so instead of searching a thousand houses...you go to one house, break down the door and grabthe terrorist in there....you don't have to alienate a thousand households but you get the terrorist." Such intelligence was gathered through various means: surveillance, low-level cash payments,infiltration of terrorist groups (which, Hewitt said, can be relatively easy in some cases, impossiblydifficult in others), and dealing with captured terrorists by promising reduced sentences (as in Italy)or giving amnesty and a new identity (as in Northern Ireland) in return for information on theircomrades. Crenshaw thought that one lesson to be learned from the experiences of European liberal democracies with domestic terrorism in the 1970s and 1980s was that despite policies "that clampeddown pretty severely on terrorism...civil liberties did survive." She suggested that restrictions oncivil liberties to protect citizens of well-established democracies against terrorism were not as "greata dilemma as perhaps some people have seen it in past years." "While some [measures] may havebeen arguable [and] some were criticized," the European democracies were resilient, she furtherindicated, surviving their encounters with terrorism "in a very robust sort of fashion." One theme that reoccurred throughout the seminar was the degree to which the United States can control the factors that promote international terrorism, particularly in the current situation indealing with the multi-pronged threat of Islamist terrorism. Crenshaw emphasized the degree towhich the situation was outside of U.S. control. "We can't force Egypt or Saudi Arabia toreform....and in many cases the results of what you do are so long-term and so contingent, that youwill find it hard to persuade a government to take risks for policies when you say the pay-off maybe twenty years from now," she argued. She also warned that the public should not be led to expectthat there can be a perfect solution to the problem. "It's not to say one shouldn't be prepared," shesaid, "but it's very difficult to have the kind of security that the public could be led to expect." Ahmad held that while there are actors in the Middle East that the United States can't control, there are situations there that the United States can control. He cited as "definitely under ourcontrol" three of Osama Bin Laden's objections to U.S. policy in the Middle East: sanctions againstIraq, the supply of arms to Israel, and the presence of American troops on Saudi soil. Regardingwhether it is in the U.S. interest to continue supporting Israeli occupation of the West Bank, Ahmadsaid that George Washington had pointed out "that an entangling alliance with another foreigncountry is not in America's interest," and therefore it would be an affirmation of U.S. interests "tostop supporting an illegal occupation." Referring specifically to Israel, Ahmad made suggestionsthat, in his view, would help the United State assert control in the Middle East, i.e., "don'tlegitimize terrorism by engaging in it or sponsoring it yourself," and "don't provoke it [terrorism]by engaging in unjust policies against people who have no other resources than resistance." Probst took issue with the idea that the United States should alter U.S. policy on these issues, however, arguing that to do so "would be simply to capitulate" American interests "wherever theymight be challenged." Such a capitulation, he argued, would whet the terrorists' appetite." Probststressed that there is no problem between the United States and Islam, but said that there is a"cultural war" between America and "a small but very well-funded band of extremists who, as someMuslims have said, have hijacked Islam." Although there are things which are out of U.S. controland must be recognized as such, Probst argued, "when we defend our interests candidly and well...wenot only earn the respect of other countries who may be innately hostile to us, but we also create anatmosphere in which there is much less chance of misreading signals." "Misread signals lead toconflict, and conflict can often burgeon into war." The question of whether or not the United States needs a "grand strategy" towards terrorism was raised by Crenshaw, who nevertheless stated that she would "stand by my conclusion that it is verydifficult to come up with a viable, grand strategy for dealing with terrorism." However, she alsonoted a "longing" for such a strategy. There are many difficult questions that she thought wouldneed to be answered in order to formulate such a policy, most involving cost-benefit decisionsnecessary to shape such a strategy: How much tolerance of risk do we have as a society? Do weface one threat or many smaller threats? Would a grand strategy be too costly? What would be thecost to achieve certain levels of protection? Crenshaw pointed out that the United States toleratesa lot of risks that are not associated with terrorism, such as deaths on the roads and highways, andsmoking. "Do we feel more keenly about terrorism that we're willing to pay more to defend againstit," she asked, "because the grand strategy that we propose...might be extremely costly...." Crenshaw noted that Germany, beginning in 1972, had organized its bureaucracy to effectively deal with terrorism. She doubted, however, that the United States government would be similarlycapable of organizing an effective structure. Seidt described the rationale for the German organization, and the three main elements of itsstrategy. He recounted that in the 1970s, when Germany found itself faced with a terrorism threatafter the 1972 killing of Israeli athletes at the Munich Olympics, the government decided it neededto start to deal with the problem at the strategic level, not the operational level. To confront thethreat it faced from the Red Army faction in Germany and the Palestinian organizations with whichit had relations, the German government adopted a strategy of attrition. That strategy included "goodold solid police work" and operational thinking, but it also integrated traditional intelligence work,and sought to discern the "mind set" of the terrorists, i.e., the forces driving the terrorists and theirsympathizers. One of the greatest problems in implementing the strategy, Seidt said, was theconflicting operational thinking of the different state agencies, of police work, and of intelligencework, and the question of who was to direct the comprehensive strategy. At the end "we endedrather at the top of the whole political system, namely in the Chancellor's office." Crenshaw questioned whether the United States was appropriately organized to combat terrorism, and made two recommendations. One was that the State Department office ofcounterterrorism assume a more important role. The other was that implications for terrorismbecome an integral part of all foreign policymaking. "We can no longer compartmentalize terrorismand say it's separate from the rest of our foreign policy. It's not separate, it's never been separate,and it always has to be a part and parcel of overall formulation of foreign and defense policy." Many participants seconded Crenshaw's suggestion that there be a constant flow of money to study and deal with terrorism. She noted that in the 30 years that she has been studying terrorism,money seems to follow a crisis and dry up when the crisis is perceived to have passed, underminingefforts to understand the phenomenon. Probst urged greater funding for security, claiming that there are several security measures "that are recognized as being needed but are not implemented because they're judged to be too expensive,too inconvenient, or simply too hard. And then after the terrorists exploit that particularlyvulnerability, and there are too many dead, we find the money and we embrace the inconvenienceand we discover that in reality it wasn't too hard after all." He noted that he thought that the "nextterrorist incident of major proportions is likely to involve weapons of mass destruction: biological,chemical, radiological, or maybe even nuclear." He looked at targets that he thought were naturaltargets for future terrorist actions, and thought they should be protected. Probst cited severalstatements by Osama Bin Laden that his target was the United States' economy, and then said thatwhen he looked at the lack of protection around Wall Street, it made his "blood run cold." Hewitt and Crenshaw argued that even the highest degree of preparedness is not going to prevent terrorist incidents from taking place. They pointed out that the list of potential targets islong, and cited several examples in other countries where terrorists turned to second level targetswhen the most obvious targets were well guarded. Crenshaw pointed out that U.S. policymakers willhave to consider what risks they, and U.S. society as a whole, are willing to take, and how much theyare willing to spend in order to guard potential targets, and believed they might conclude that suchprotection might be too expensive. Virtually all participants argued that there is a need for further study on the causes and conduct of terrorism. Several of the speakers noted an inconsistency in U.S. attention to and funding forcounter-terrorism measures, with a tendency to peak during crises and fade afterwards. Seidtsuggested from the German experience that it is necessary to be patient, be modest, put a slow andsteady stream of money into it. Among the specific suggestions were the following. Noting a dearth of comparative policy studies, Crenshaw stated that she thought that scholars were just beginning to sort through many issues regarding what lessons couldbe learned for U.S. policy from other cases, and thought that some sort of systematic study wouldbe worth the effort. In particular, she suggested further study on the long-term effects ofassassination policy in places which have had such policies such as Israel, South Africa, and to alesser extent, France, something she thought that academics would not be able to do because of theclassified nature of much of the relevant information. Probst suggested the establishment of a multidisciplinary center to study terrorism. He thought particularly important was a better understanding of the motivations ofterrorists and the psychodynamics of different groups -- as "each group is different, each is unique,each has its own customs" -- and the threat such groups pose to our national security. He noted thatbillions were being spent on such items as improving security for infrastructure, but that programs exploring the psychology of terrorism are not as well-funded and given significantly less priority."Actions that we may label as crazy may appear perfectly rational in the context of the terrorist'sworldview and of his value system," he argued. "To effectively fight such groups, we mustunderstand them." Gopin argued for a joint, multidisciplinary effort between policy analysts and the academic field of anti-terrorism. As mentioned earlier, he thought desirable an examination ofcultural determinants of terrorism to achieve a "real understanding of terrorism in the long run." He also argued for more research on long term effectiveness of various anti-terrorismpolicies. Hewitt suggested future research on whether one big terrorist event has more effect on a country than a series of smaller events, i.e., chronic terrorism like a bombing every otherweek in a shopping mall. He also suggested consideration of the adoption of a national ID card inthe United States as a method of controlling terrorism. Seidt suggested a study of the different branches of Sufi Islam, and their ways of thinking. Raphael Perl, of CRS suggested studies of criminal networks and policy responses tothem, for instance, the kingpin approach in wiping out drug cartels, in order to gain insights into howterrorism works and how to make counterterrorism policy more effective. Rens Lee, a consultantwith CRS, suggested an examination of the factors that make negotiations successful orunsuccessful, and of programs that might be developed to help members of terrorist networksreintegrate into society. Imad-ad-Dean Ahmad is President and Director of the Bethesda-based Minaret of FreedomInstitute, a non-profit educational and policy research organization. The Institute's purposes are tocounter distortions and misconceptions about Islamic beliefs and practices, demonstrate the Islamicorigins of modern values, expose American and Islamic-world Muslims to free market thought, andadvance the status of Muslim peoples. Dr. Ahmad is an Adjunct Professor teaching courses onreligion and science, and on Islamic Science, Politics and Economics at the University of Maryland,and an Adjunct Professor at the Johns Hopkins School for Advanced International Studies, wherehe has taught courses on theories of social change and on Islam and development. He is alsoPresident of the Islamic-American Zakat Foundation, a charitable organization. He is the co-editorof Islam and the West: A Dialog (1998), and the author of Signs in the Heavens: A MuslimAstronomer's Perspective on Religion and Science (1992), and "Political Economy of Liberty in theArab and Islamic Middle East," in the Middle East Policy Journal (Vol. 3, 1994). He graduated cumlaude from Harvard University, and holds a Ph.D. in astronomy and astrophysics from the Universityof Arizona. Martha Crenshaw is now the Colin and Nancy Campbell Professor in Global Issues and Democratic Thought at Wesleyan University, where she has taught international politics and foreignpolicy since 1974. She is one of the first U.S. scholars to publish on terrorism with a case study ofthe National Liberation Front in the Algerian war, Revolutionary Terrorism: The FLN in Algeria,1954-1962 (1978). She has published numerous comparative and policy-relevant books and articles. Her books include Terrorism and International Cooperation (1989), and several edited works,among them Terrorism, Legitimacy, and Power: The Consequences of Political Violence (1983), and Terrorism in Context (1995). Her articles include Theories of Terrorism: Instrumental andOrganizational Approaches in Inside Terrorist Organizations, edited by David C. Rapoport, NewYork: Columbia University Press, 1988. She serves as president of the International Society ofPolitical Psychology, and is on the Executive Board of Women in International Security. She hasa Ph.D. from the University of Virginia. Marc Gopin is a consultant and researcher with a specialization in the relationship among culture,religion, and war and conflict, particularly as it pertains to the Middle East, and a trainer in conflictresolution. He is a Senior Associate with the Preventive Diplomacy Program at The Center forStrategic and International Studies (CSIS). He is also a Visiting Associate Professor of InternationalDiplomacy with the Fletcher School of Tufts University and a Senior Researcher in its Institute forHuman Security. He has taught conflict resolution in several countries, and at several academicinstitutions, including the Conflict Transformation Program of Eastern Mennonite University andthe Institute for Conflict Analysis and Resolution of George Mason University. Dr. Gopin's hasworked extensively on conflict resolution between Arabs and Jews, and in multi-faith cooperationon global problems. He is the author of Between Eden and Armageddon: The Future of WorldReligions, Violence, and Peacemaking (2000), and Holy War, Holy Peace: Religion's Role inSolving the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict (forthcoming 2002). He has a B.A. from ColumbiaUniversity, rabbinic ordination from Yeshiva University, and a Ph.D. from Brandeis University. Christopher Hewitt is a Professor of Sociology at the University of Maryland, Baltimore County,where he teaches courses on political violence. In his earliest published work on terrorism, TheEffectiveness of Anti-Terrorist Policies (1984), first prepared for the State Department, he wrote onthe policy applications of other countries' experiences. Since then, he has done extensive work onterrorism and political violence, including comparative articles such as Terrorism and PublicOpinion: A Five Country Comparison (1990), and two books: Consequences of PoliticalViolence (1993), and The Encyclopedia of Modern Separatist Movement s (2000, with Tom Cheetham). Among his many articles and book chapters are "Separatism, Irridentism, and Terrorism: aComparative Survey 1945-2000" in Countering Terrorism through International Cooperation (1991), "The Cost of Terrorism: A Six Country Study, " in Terrorism: An International Journal (Fall1988), and "The Dog that Didn't Bark: FLQ Violence as an Issue in Canadian Politics,: in ConflictQuarterly (April 1990). His forthcoming book, Understanding American Terrorism: from the Klanto Al Qaeda , will be available this summer. He has a B.Sc. from the London School of Economicsin Economics, and a Ph.D. in Sociology from Brown University. Peter S. Probst served with the Central Intelligence Agency and the Office of the Secretary ofDefense for most of his 30 year career. He recently left government to establish a privateconsultancy, and joined the Washington-based Institute for the Study of Terrorism and PoliticalViolence as its Vice-President and Director of Programs. His work at DOD primarily focused on thefuture terrorist threat and the development of strategies, tactics and policy initiatives to mosteffectively counter it. While at DOD, he co-authored a major study: Terror-2000: The Future Faceof Terrorism . Recently, he participated in meetings with senior government officials held inMoscow in conjunction with a National Academy of Science symposium on how best to combatcatastrophic terrorism. Before joining DOD, Mr. Probst served 20 years with the CIA in both theDirectorate of Operations and the Directorate of Intelligence. During his later years there, he workedextensively in intelligence analysis and production, preparing reports and studies for use by seniorgovernment officials, including the President. He is currently a member of the International ResearchGroup on Terrorism, sponsored jointly by the British Airey-Neave Trust and the U.S. Institute ofPeace. He also served with the U.S. Air Force Intelligence Service, retiring with a reserve rank ofLt. Colonel. He holds a B.A. in history and a M.A. in anthropology/archaeology from ColumbiaUniversity. Hans-Ulrich Seidt joined the German Foreign Service in 1982. He has held assignments in Moscow, NATO Headquarters in Brussels, and the Bosnia Special Task Force. From 1994-1997,he was Lecturer for International Security Policy at the Internationales Studienkolleg der RobertBosch Stiftung ; from 1997-1998 he was a Senior Research Fellow at the Deutsche GesellschaftfÃ¼rAuswÃ¤rtige Politik. At the time of this seminar, he was assigned to the Embassy of Germany inWashington, D.C. 

Summary: Participants in a CRS seminar on the possible lessons to be learned from other countries' experiences in dealing with terrorism, generally agreed on three things. First, terrorism is a used bya wide variety of groups for a wide variety of ends. Second, the current threat that the United Statesfaces from Islamist terrorism is most likely long-term. And third, policymakers must think throughanti-terrorist actions in order to avoid consequences that may be worse than the original problem. Much of the seminar discussion focused on matters that two and a half years later became thesubject of 9/11 Commission recommendations. A revised introduction highlights the discussionsummarized in this report that is relevant to Commission recommendations. The remainder of thereport has not been changed. Discussions during the three hour seminar, held on January 22, 2002, centered on the relative utility of three main policy tools: (1) targeting members and leaders for arrest and assassination, oras speaker Christopher Hewitt labeled it, the "model of attrition," (2) negotiations, and (3) reforms. Hewitt, who has studied the effectiveness of anti-terrorism policies in five countries said that theonly one that showed clear results was a "model of attrition," i.e., that arrest, internment, or killingof terrorists is the most effective means to significantly reduce levels of terrorist violence. SpeakerMartha Crenshaw weighed the pros and cons of targeted assassinations, noting that for her thedisadvantages -- principally the difficulty of avoiding mistakes and the possibility thatassassinations would just encourage others to take the place of those killed -- outweighed theadvantages -- principally that it was relatively more humane than a massive military response. The most controversial subject was the utility of political and economic reforms in countries that harbor terrorists. Many questions were raised about Hewitt's finding that improving economicconditions did not have any effect on levels of terrorism, and that fairly extensive political reformsmight decrease, but did not end terrorism. Some raised the possibility that long-term educationalreforms, and other methods of changing perceptions, might have more success. The difficulties of achieving negotiated settlements to end terrorism were examined. Participants suggested ways to increase the chances for successful outcomes. These includedinternational support for legitimate core issues in order to increase support for negotiations,international participation in the negotiations; and the adoption of measures that would isolateterrorists, including steps to increase the rule of law, and anti-corruption, educational, and culturalprograms. The utility of controlling supporting structures for terrorism and restricting civil liberties were also discussed. Speakers noted that international cooperation is necessary to control arms and fundsthat usually flow from abroad. (This seminar was made possible in part by a grant from the Charles H. Revson Foundation.)