Congress and the Department of Defense (DOD) are engaged in an extended discourse overthe future direction of U.S. defense strategy and military force structure. (1) In the past, these discussionshave focused almost exclusively on questions related to U.S. conventional military forces, withdiscussions about nuclear weapons held in separate fora. However, the 2005 Quadrennial DefenseReview (QDR) examined both nuclear and conventional forces, a first in the QDR's history. (2) As a result, this indicates thatanalysts both inside and outside government are beginning to review and assess the relationshipbetween conventional and nuclear weapons. The purpose of this report is to support this assessment,using possible conflict with China as a framework or case study. DOD's attention to possible military conflict with China appears to have increased since theend of the Cold War. Such a potential conflict presents the challenge of a very complicatedpolitical/economic/social relationship among the participants. It also presents the noteworthymilitary challenges of defending a distant ally or friendly country from a proximate adversary,possessing large conventional forces and nuclear weapons capable of reaching the continental UnitedStates. Many in DOD appear to consider military conflict with China to be a "pacing threat": themilitary capabilities required to successfully cope with this scenario are likely to be adequate to copewith other, and presumably less challenging state-on-state conflicts. Practical decisions regardinghow the United States might most effectively equip its forces and develop strategies for their use tocontend with possible military conflicts with China raise obvious issues concerning the structure ofU.S. conventional forces and the role of nuclear deterrence. During the Cold War, assessments of the interplay between nuclear and conventional forceswere most relevant, and most often debated, in scenarios that pitted the United States and its NATOallies against the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies. Defense planners recognized andcalculated the effect a perceived balance or imbalance of conventional and nuclear forces might haveon deterrence, crisis stability, and the outcome of potential conflicts in Europe. Specifically, theUnited States sought to "extend" deterrence and protect its NATO allies with both conventional andnuclear forces. For much of the Cold War, NATO's conventional forces were perceived to be weakerthan those of the Warsaw Pact and were allowed to stay that way in part, because nuclear weaponswere seen as a less costly alternative to large conventional force structure. Many analysts argued thatunder these circumstances, the United States and NATO could deter a Soviet and Warsaw Pactattack by threatening to escalate the conflict to nuclear use. Others, however, questioned whethersuch threats were credible, in light of the fact that the Soviet Union could have responded withnuclear attacks of its own. As a result, analysts often argued the pros and cons of increasing NATO'sconventional force capabilities, and the potential this might have for enhancing deterrence and"raising the nuclear threshold." (3) DOD's 2002 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) constructed a "new triad" consisting of offensivestrike weapons, missile defense, and the nuclear weapons infrastructure to describe the capabilitiesthat are a part of the U.S. nuclear posture. The "old" nuclear triad consisted of land-based ICBMs,sea-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and nuclear-armed long-range bombers. Thus, the newtriad appears to be a much broader construct. One noteworthy aspect of the new triad's offensive strike component is the planned interplaybetween nuclear and conventional weapons. DOD seeks to integrate nuclear and conventionalcapabilities in some military plans and applications where hitherto only nuclear weapons werethought to play a role. Administration officials suggest that this integration may reduce potentialU.S. reliance on nuclear weapons. Studies and analyses subsequent to the NPR have sought to consider whether the additionof conventional weapons to U.S. nuclear plans might alter the role of nuclear weapons. Few appearto have asked, however, whether the integration implied in the new triad might alter the role orrequirements for U.S. conventional weapons. Further, very few, if any of these considerationsappear to have informed the debate over budget and procurement of conventional weapons. Some DOD leaders say that today's conventional and nuclear forces are well suited to deterstate-on-state conflict, and that the primary challenges are deterring non-state actors. (4) This may be true. However,DOD currently faces a much more complicated "state-on-state" security environment than it didduring the Cold War, when a possible war with the Soviet Union dominated planning andprocurement activities. Many potential military challenges exist (e.g. North Korea) or could emerge(e.g. Iran, or a revanchist Russia), but a possible conflict with China is often mentioned as themilitary scenario of great concern to military planners. Conducting a review of military strategy and force structure today is likely to be dominatedby two overarching themes. The first theme is uncertainty. Relative to the past, contemporary defenseplanners must now consider a broad and diverse menu of national security challenges whenexamining the relationship between conventional forces and nuclear deterrence, and assessing themost effective mix of forces. During the Cold War, the threats confronting the United States were reasonably wellunderstood and comparatively predictable. If the United States had the military capabilities to deteror defeat its most stressing threat (e.g. the Soviet Union), then these military capabilities weredeemed adequate to address "lesser included cases" such as nation states with more modest militarycapabilities or even non-state actors, such as insurgents and terrorists. The terrorist attacks ofSeptember 11, 2001 graphically illustrated that today's non-state actors can exploit relativelyinexpensive and commercially available technology to conduct very destructive attacks over greatdistances. Few observers today consider non-traditional threats to be "lesser included cases."Increasingly it is recognized that in many cases, combating non-state threats presents a different --and in many cases greater -- set of challenges than combating a conventional military foe. A key question for contemporary defense planners is what proportion of U.S. militarycapabilities should be focused on traditional military challenges and what proportion should befocused on non-traditional challenges, such as "irregular, disruptive and catastrophic" threats? (5) Preparing for non-traditionalthreats will likely call for a much different "investment pattern" than a strategy that "seeks to furtherleverage our superiority over any potential peer competitor." (6) How should risk beapportioned across this investment spectrum? The second theme affecting any current strategy and forces review is that of resourceconstraints. Owing to growing concerns about controlling the overall size of the federal budget, itappears that pressure is building on DOD leaders to make strategy and force structure decisions withcost-effectiveness in mind. For example, the cost of the ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistancould have a much higher price tag than the $357 billion allocated to date. (7) Some economists estimate thatthe final cost to U.S. taxpayers could be $2 trillion. (8) In the past, most of the funds for Iraq and Afghanistan have beenprovided through supplemental appropriations. The Office of Management and Budget (OMB)however, reportedly will resist any future large supplemental appropriations, which may increaseturbulence within DOD's annual spending plans. (9) Further, in June 2006, the Senate passed an amendment of theFY2007 Defense Authorization bill that could restrict the use of emergency supplemental warfunding. (10) Long-term DOD spending plans are already experiencing intense pressure. TheCongressional Budget Office (CBO) estimates that DOD's spending plans are underfunded by$50-150 billion annually during the years covered by the QDR. (11) Such projected shortfallslead some observers to believe that DOD will increasingly be forced to make hard decisions aboutforce structure, such as having to choose between purchasing new equipment and maintaining oldequipment. Another choice may have to be made between purchasing new equipment andmaintaining personnel end strength. (12) Failure to adequately consider the possible interaction between nuclear weapons and nuclearstrategy, on the one hand, and the size and capabilities of conventional weapons, on the other, (anda failure to plan for and budget against the potential interaction between them) could result in theacquisition of functionally redundant, unnecessary, or sub-optimized military forces and thedevelopment of military strategies ill-suited to the forces they are intended to guide. The need toaddress a complex and broad range of possible threats, combined with a more expeditionaryorientation for U.S. forces, and intense projected budgetary shortfalls make cost effective decisionson force structure and strategy unusually important. Understanding how nuclear weapons and deterrence might combine with U.S. conventionalforces in a possible conflict with China, requires some understanding of both U.S. and Chinesenuclear strategy and doctrine. Forces and strategy are not static, but evolve over time. Thus, ageneral discussion of the subject may be useful. The U.S. nuclear strategy and doctrine has evolved over 50 years. It can be roughly dividedinto three distinct eras: Cold War, post-Cold War, and present, or, 21st century strategy. Cold War. Deterrence. During the Cold War, the Soviet Unionwas the primary country to be deterred by U.S. military forces. The United States sought to developa policy and nuclear forces that it believed were needed to convince the Soviet Union that anynuclear attack on the United States would be met with a retaliatory attack against the full range ofvalued targets in the Soviet Union. Other countries, such as China and the countries of EasternEurope, were covered by U.S. nuclear war plans, but their presence reflected their relationship withthe Soviet Union more than any independent threat they might pose to the United States or its allies. The United States also expected its nuclear weapons to deter a Soviet nuclear attack,conventional attack, or coercion aimed at U.S. allies in Europe and Asia. (13) Many believed the UnitedStates needed to threaten nuclear retaliation to deter these threats because the Soviet Union and itsWarsaw Pact allies had far greater numbers of conventional forces than did the United States andits NATO allies. According to this view, if a war was fought with only conventional weapons, U.S.and NATO forces could be overrun. Therefore, the United States fielded a variety of strategic,theater and tactical nuclear weapons that might be used to repel and defeat such an attack. This doctrine came to be known as extended deterrence. The theory underlying this doctrinewas that if any level of aggression against U.S. allies could escalate into a nuclear conflict that mightinvolve attacks on the Soviet Union, then the Soviet Union might be deterred from all levels ofaggression. This theory was not without critics, however, as some analysts questioned whether theSoviet Union would believe that the United States would use nuclear weapons to defend its allies,particularly if such use might invite a Soviet nuclear attack on the United States. Strategic Doctrine and Targeting. During the 1950s,the strategic doctrine known as "massive retaliation" envisioned a "simultaneous, massive,integrated" U.S. nuclear strike against targets in the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, and China if theSoviet Union or its allies initiated any nuclear or conventional attack against the United States or itsallies. (14) In the early 1960s, the United States developed a doctrine of "damage limitation," whichcalled for attacks against Soviet conventional and nuclear military forces. This "counterforce"strategy explicitly excluded attacks designed to destroy cities and focused instead on attacks thatwould impede the Soviet Union's warfighting capability. (15) In particular, it sought to destroy those weapons that the SovietUnion might use to attack U.S. cities. In the mid-1960s, DOD developed the doctrine of "assureddestruction," a strategy that was designed to convince the Soviet leadership that Soviet society wouldbe destroyed if the Soviet Union launched an attack on the United States or its allies. But, by theearly 1970s, many again questioned the credibility of a doctrine that called for massive strikesagainst Soviet society, particularly if the Soviet Union could threaten to strike back against U.S.cities. Therefore, the United States shifted its doctrine once again, to "Flexible Response" in themid-1970s and "Countervailing Strategy," in the late 1970s. These policies emphasized retaliatorystrikes on Soviet military forces and war-making capabilities, as opposed to attacks on civilian andindustrial targets, and they called for limited, focused attacks on specified military targets, insteadof large-scale attacks on a greater number of sites. (16) Post-Cold War. Deterrence. In its 1995 National Security Strategyreport, the Clinton Administration stated that "the dissolution of the Soviet empire has radicallytransformed the security environment facing the United States and our allies. The primary securityimperative of the past half century -- containing communist expansion while preventing nuclear war-- is gone." (17) TheAdministration did, however, determine that Russia remained a concern for U.S. national securitybecause it continued to control the only nuclear arsenal that could threaten the survival of the UnitedStates. The Clinton Administration also argued that "nuclear weapons served as a hedge against anuncertain future, a guarantee of our security commitments to allies and a disincentive to those whowould contemplate developing or otherwise acquiring their own nuclear weapons." (18) The Clinton Administration did not consider China to pose a direct threat to the United Statesas a regional or global adversary. Nevertheless, DOD officials testified that China's small nuclearforce "is still formidable" and "China continues to make steady efforts to modernize those forces." Assistant Secretary of Defense Ted Warner stated that the United States could not be sure that itwould not need nuclear weapons to deter China in the future. (19) The ClintonAdministration also identified other threats to U.S. national security, specifically noting in itsNational Security Strategy Report for 1998, that "weapons of mass destruction pose the greatestpotential threat to global stability and security." (20) Strategic Doctrine and Targeting. Although theClinton Administration maintained the U.S. focus on deterring a potential Russian threat, it did issuenew guidelines for U.S. nuclear strategy in late 1997. In a document known as PDD-60 theAdministration stated that "our military planning for the possible employment of nuclear weaponsis focused on deterring a nuclear war rather than attempting to fight and win a protracted nuclearexchange." (21) Inpractice, this probably meant that the United States would not seek to cause as much damage againstas wide a range of targets as it had planned on attacking in previous war plans. But ClintonAdministration officials also noted that this did not alter the structure of U.S. nuclear war plans orthe variety of options available to the President for a U.S. retaliatory strike. Many press reports about PDD-60 highlighted the provisions covering the use of U.S. nuclearweapons to deter nations other than Russia, and viewed this as an "expansion" of the role of U.S.nuclear weapons. However, the United States has never maintained a "no first use" policy, and hasalways retained the option to use nuclear weapons in response to attacks by conventional, chemical,or biological weapons. These policies did not change in the 1990s. Present Environment. Deterrence. The George W. Bush Administration hasemphasized that nuclear weapons "continue to be essential to our security, and that of our friends andallies." (22) As the onlyweapons in the U.S. arsenal that can hold at risk the full range of targets valued by an adversary, theycontinue to play a key role in U.S. deterrent strategy. However, in contrast with the ClintonAdministration's focus on a potential Russian threat, the Bush Administration has stated that Russiaand the United States are no longer enemies. Even though Russia retains thousands of nuclearweapons, the increased cooperation between the two nations has allowed a "new strategicframework" to replace the Cold War's adversarial relationship. The Bush Administration hasemphasized, however, that the United States faces threats from "multiple potential opponents,sources of conflict, and unprecedented challenges" (23) and that these challenges must be taken into consideration whenthe United States plans its nuclear weapons policy and force posture. According to theAdministration, these adversaries could include non-state actors and terrorists as well as nations suchas China, (24) Iran, NorthKorea, and others. In the past, U.S. policy essentially viewed nuclear weapons apart from the rest of the U.S.military establishment, with nuclear weapons serving to deter a global nuclear conflict with theSoviet Union or Russia. In contrast, the Bush Administration has described a more comprehensiverole for nuclear weapons, arguing that nuclear weapons, along with missile defenses and otherelements of the U.S. military establishment, not only deter adversaries by promising an unacceptableamount of damage in response to an adversary's attack, they can also assure allies and friends of theU.S. commitment to their security by providing an extended deterrent, dissuade potential adversariesfrom challenging the United States with nuclear weapons or other "asymmetrical threats" byconvincing them that they can never negate the U.S. nuclear deterrent; and defeat enemies by holdingat risk those targets that could not be destroyed with other types of weapons. (25) Doctrine and Targeting. In describing the future roleof nuclear weapons, the Bush Administration has stated that the United States will not only rely onthe threat of nuclear retaliation, but will also seek to deter and defeat adversaries with precisionconventional weapons, which are hoped to be capable of destroying some targets that were assignedto nuclear weapons in the past, and ballistic missile defenses, which might deter attack by denyingan adversary the ability to threaten U.S. targets with ballistic missiles. (26) The Administration refersto this change as "tailored deterrence," with the United States developing more specific responsesthat would rely on a broader range of military capabilities to respond to the threats posed byemerging adversaries. Moreover, the Bush Administration has stated that the United States will no longer size andstructure its nuclear forces to address the "Soviet threat." (27) Instead, it will employ a "capabilities-based" strategy, where itwould "look more at a broad range of capabilities and contingencies that the United States mayconfront" and tailor U.S. military capabilities to address this wide spectrum of possiblecontingencies. (28) Specifically, the United States would identify potential future conflicts, review the capabilities ofits possible adversaries, identify those capabilities that the United States might need to attack orthreaten with nuclear weapons, and develop a force posture and nuclear weapons employmentstrategy that would allow it to attack those capabilities. The Bush Administration has not discussed,publicly, how it will identify specific targets or allocate weapons in its "capabilities-based" strategy. The most specific and visible change to emerge from this new targeting strategy has been thereplacement of the Cold War SIOP (single integrated operational plan) with a new war plan knownas OPLAN (operations plan) 8044. This document contains the major strike options and majorcontingency plans that had been included in the SIOP, but could also include plans for a wider rangeof options against a greater number of adversaries. Some press reports indicate that theAdministration has also developed a companion contingency plan, CONPLAN 8022-22, which plansfor the prompt U.S. response to a number of contingencies with nations other than Russia. Reportsindicate that most of the options in this new plan call for the use of conventional weapons, but somealso allow for the use of nuclear weapons early or at the start of a conflict. (29) As a result, it is evidentthat the Bush Administration has not altered the U.S. policy that permits the possible first use ofnuclear weapons. Further, the Administration has stated that the United States would develop anddeploy those nuclear capabilities that it would need to defeat the capabilities of any potentialadversary whether or not it possessed nuclear weapons. The focus will be "on how we will fight,not who we will fight." (30) Table 1: U.S. Strategic Force Source: Department of State, "START Aggregate Numbers of Strategic Offensive Arms," April 1,2006. a. The United States has deactivated all 50 Peacekeeper ICBMs, and their 500 warheads are nolonger operational. But it has not eliminated the silos, so they still count against the STARTTreaty limits. China's nuclear force structure and public statements about nuclear policy are consistent witha nuclear strategy known as "minimum deterrence." Under this strategy, a nation seeks to deternuclear attacks against its territory by threatening to respond with its own nuclear weapons if suchan attack were to occur. To be certain that it can retaliate after a nuclear attack, a nation with aminimum deterrent would need forces that could survive a direct assault by another nation's nuclearweapons. This strategy of threatening retaliation against major population centers with even a smallnumber of nuclear weapons is assumed to be sufficient to deter a nuclear attack. However, U.S.estimates of the PRC's evolving nuclear forces have been uncertain, including both over-estimatesof the speed of deployment of new missiles as well as concern over China's ability to surprise withundetected military modernization. (31) In their frequent reevaluations of the Chinese People's LiberationArmy's (PLA) capabilities, U.S. experts have questioned whether the PLA has shifted or consideredshifting its nuclear doctrine to one of "limited deterrence." (32) The two countries lackdialogue over their respective strategic nuclear forces and doctrine as well as confidence-buildingmeasures. (33) Nuclear Forces. China has deployed a relativelysmall number of nuclear warheads on operational delivery systems. The Department of Defensereports that China has deployed approximately 20 silo-based, liquid-fuel CSS-4 intercontinentalballistic missiles (ICBMs) for its "primary nuclear deterrent" and about 20-24 liquid-fuel,shorter-range CSS-3 ICBMs for its "regional nuclear deterrent." China also deployed 14-18 CSS-2intermediate-range ballistic missiles and 19-50 CSS-5 medium-range ballistic missiles. (34) The PLA also has 10-14JL-1 submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), but the operational status of the singleXia-class ballistic missile submarine has been questionable. China is developing new rail- orroad-mobile DF-31 and DF-31A ICBMs and JL-2 SLBMs (12 on each new Type 094 ballisticmissile submarine) for greater survivability. (35) As for the evolution of the nuclear force, the Director of Central Intelligence estimated in2002 that the PRC's strategic nuclear force could grow by 2015 to about 75 to 100 warheadsdeployed primarily against the United States. (36) Still, U.S. government estimates have changed, and China coulddeploy significant new capabilities, such as multiple warheads. Also, some experts have chargedU.S. intelligence with over-estimating dramatic improvements, as the modernization of China'smissile force has been slower than predicted for about 15 years. (37) China employs a variety of basing modes, such as hardened silos and mobile launchers, alongwith concealment and deception techniques, to ensure that its missiles can survive a first strike. These basing modes can add hours or days to the amount of time that China would need to prepareits missiles for launch. This long launch time could seriously hamper any effort by China to usethese missiles in a first strike against the United States, because the United States would be able todetect launch preparations and, possibly, preempt the attack. However, these basing modes couldensure the survivability of China's missiles in the event of a U.S. attack and help to guarantee thatChina would be able to launch a retaliatory strike. The PRC has expressed strong opposition to U.S. plans to deploy ballistic missile defenses. U.S. national and theater missile defenses, even with limited numbers of interceptor missiles andlimited capabilities, could possibly undermine the credibility of China's deterrent by denying itsmissiles the ability to reach U.S. targets in theater or in the United States a retaliatory strike. (38) Chinese concerns aboutmissile defense have grown as many analysts in the United States and some officials in the BushAdministration have linked plans for U.S. missile defenses to their concerns about China's militarymodernization and possible expansion of China's ballistic missile forces. Table 2: China's Strategic Missile Force Source: Secretary of Defense, report to Congress, "PRC Military Power," May 2006. China isbelieved to have deployed single nuclear warheads on its missiles. Note: China also fields ballistic missiles of regional range. Nuclear Strategy. China has declared a "no firstuse" policy, stating that it would not use nuclear weapons first against any nation and that it wouldnever threaten to or actually use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear nations. (39) China has not, however,ruled out the use of nuclear weapons in retaliation for a nuclear attack. This is the essence of aminimum deterrent strategy. Some observers note that declaratory policy is a poor measure of nuclear strategy, becausepolicy statements need not be consistent with actual military plans or warfighting. Others however,believe that China is sincere in this policy of no-first-use because its nuclear forces lack commonlyrecognized first strike capabilities. Because of their propellant type, and current deploymentpatterns, China cannot launch its missiles promptly, upon warning of an attack or early in a crisis,and add that the missiles lack the accuracy to destroy an enemy's retaliatory forces, which could bea key objective of a nuclear force strike. The PLA's strategic nuclear modernization, however,combined with the occasional statements by some PRC officials about China's ability to strike theUnited States, have led some to question whether China will change its minimum nuclear deterrent. Some have questioned whether China might pursue a more proactive "limited deterrence"strategy with its nuclear weapons. (40) This strategy presumes that nuclear weapons can deter bothnuclear and conventional conflicts and that, if deterrence fails, a nation could use nuclear weaponsto control escalation and compel the enemy to back down. With this strategy, China might not waitfor an adversary to use nuclear weapons before it employed its own nuclear forces. It could respondto conventional attacks with nuclear weapons or it could threaten nuclear attack to compel anadversary to cease hostilities or other actions short of war that it perceived as threatening to itsinterests. Many analysts believe that such a strategy would be more useful to China if it sought todeter U.S. intervention in a crisis with Taiwan, particularly if it feared that the United States couldachieve its objectives with advanced conventional weapons and without resorting to nuclear attacks. Such a strategy also would address some of China's concerns about U.S. missile defenses, becausea Chinese first strike might contain more warheads than a retaliatory strike and, therefore, might bemore capable of penetrating U.S. missile defenses. However, a "limited deterrence" strategy would place added demands on China's nuclearforces. They would need to do more than simply survive and retaliate against cities or wide-areatargets after an attack. China would need a variety of delivery vehicles and warheads types, alongwith relatively high accuracies on its weapons, so that it could credibly threaten to attack the fullrange of targets, from forces in the field to military facilities and urban areas. It would also need todevelop relatively complex warfighting strategies and would need advanced command and controlcapabilities so that it could direct its attacks and monitor their effects. China might seek to developthese capabilities in the longer term, but DOD reports no evidence that China's "no first use" doctrinehas actually changed. (41) China's nuclear force capabilities and nuclear doctrine have been monitored closely. Manyobservers were concerned, for example, when in July 2005, PLA Major General Zhu Chenghu, toldWestern journalists in Beijing that "if the Americans draw their missiles and position-guidedammunition into the target zone on China's territory, I think we will have to respond with nuclearweapons." Zhu also dismissed China's declared "no first use" policy, saying that the policy appliedonly to non-nuclear states and could be changed. (42) Some argued that Gen. Zhu's comments were a reaction to China's concerns about thegrowing challenges presented by U.S. defense policy and nuclear strategy. (43) Others downplayed Zhu'sremarks, saying they reflected his personal opinion. For example, the Commander of the PLA'snuclear forces assured Defense Secretary Rumsfeld that China would not be the first to use nuclearweapons. (44) The status and tenor of political and military relations among the United States and theprimary actors in East Asia will strongly affect the options considered and pursued to deter or defeatany aggression in the region. U.S. policymakers face the challenge of balancing U.S. relations withthe PRC, Taiwan, and Japan, in particular. Measuring the deterrent value of U.S. military forces vis-a-vis China is difficult. Unlike theU.S.-Soviet relationship during the Cold War, the U.S.-China relationship is marked not only bycompetition and tension, but also by cooperation and interdependence. The potential economic andpolitical fall-out from a military conflict between China and the United States would be significant. China is the third-largest U.S. trading partner. (45) China is a permanent member with veto power at the UnitedNations Security Council, and has played an important role on policy priorities of the United States,including nuclear nonproliferation in North Korea and Iran. (46) Would China jeopardizethis economic partnership and potentially economic relations with other countries by initiatingmilitary operations against Taiwan or Japan? Similarly, would the United States jeopardize itseconomic and political interests in a cooperative China by going to war against China? Some long-term ambivalence is apparent in the Bush Administration's policy. In September2005, Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick called on China to be a "responsible stakeholder"in his search for a deeper framework for the bilateral relationship. (47) President Bush issued hislatest National Security Strategy on March 16, 2006, declaring that if China keeps its commitmentto "peaceful development," the United States will welcome the emergence of a China that is"peaceful and prosperous and that cooperates with us to address common challenges and mutualinterests." The new strategy also criticized China's continuing "military expansion in anon-transparent way." It explicitly declared a "hedging" strategy against China, which was firstindirectly noted in the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), issued on February 6, 2006. In thatQDR, the Administration argued that it had a "balanced approach" in seeking cooperation, but also"hedged" against the possibility that cooperative approaches might fail to preclude future conflict. At the same time, the QDR states that the U.S. goal is for "China to continue as an economic partnerand emerge as a responsible stakeholder and force for good in the world." Some have concerns thatmutual hedging between Washington and Beijing is counterproductive for promoting a cooperativerelationship with China that fosters Asian stability, while others call for carrying out a coherent andactive "hedging strategy" against China. (48) The QDR, issued on February 6, 2006, stated that "of the major and emerging powers, Chinahas the greatest potential to compete militarily with the United States and field disruptive militarytechnologies that could over time offset traditional U.S. military advantages absent U.S. counterstrategies." The Department of Defense estimates that the PLA has accelerated its modernizationsince the mid-1990s, with a determined focus on possible conflict with Taiwan and intervening U.S.forces. The Defense Secretary's 2006 report to Congress on PRC military power notes that "Chinais pursuing long-term, comprehensive military modernization to improve its capabilities for powerprojection and access denial." (49) Specific PLA investments include an expanding force of ballisticmissiles, cruise missiles, submarines, advanced aircraft, and other modern systems. Because ofChina's status as a nuclear weapon state, the United States has concerns that any intervention in theTaiwan Strait has the potential of Beijing and/or Washington escalating conflict into a nuclear war. Both sides have made implicit and explicit warnings over the years. Even military matters between the United States and China are not always clearly adversarial. During a Senate Armed Services Committee hearing, for example, Senator Carl Levin askedAdmiral William Fallon, Commander of the Pacific Command "Is it a foregone conclusion thatChina and the United States are going to be at odds over security in the Pacific or even globally?"Admiral Fallon responded "no" and emphasized the countries' "common interests" as well as hispush to increase military-to-military contacts between the United States and China. (50) The Taiwan Relations Act (TRA), P.L. 96-8 , has governed U.S. security assistance to Taiwansince 1979, when the United States recognized the People's Republic of China (PRC) instead of theRepublic of China (ROC). (51) (The ROC is commonly called Taiwan.) The TRA is not aformal commitment to Taiwan's defense, and therefore the United States is not legally compelledto extend deterrence to, or otherwise defend Taiwan. The TRA specifies that it is U.S. policy , toconsider any non-peaceful means of determining Taiwan's future to be "a threat" to the peace andsecurity of the Western Pacific and of "grave concern" to the United States; "to provide Taiwan witharms of a defensive character;" and "to maintain the capacity of the United States to resist any resortto force or other forms of coercion" jeopardizing the security, or social or economic system ofTaiwan's people. The TRA also specifies a congressional role in decision-making on security assistance forTaiwan. Section 3(b) stipulates that both the President and the Congress shall determine the natureand quantity of such defense articles and services based solely upon their judgment of the needs ofTaiwan. Section 3(b) also says that "such determination of Taiwan's defense needs shall includereview by United States military authorities in connection with recommendations to the Presidentand the Congress." In passing the TRA, Congress did not specify what U.S. response might be toa future situation in the Taiwan Strait. U.S. policy statements have added more nuanced qualifications regarding Taiwan's defense. Some argue that U.S. policy regarding Taiwan is vague, although successive U.S. presidents contendtheir policies are "clear." In March 1996, President Clinton deployed two aircraft battle groups towaters off Taiwan in response to Chinese ballistic missile tests. In April 2001, President Bush saidthat he would do "whatever it took to help Taiwan defend herself" if China attacked. Supportershave viewed such clarity as needed to prevent miscalculations in Beijing and deter attacks againstTaiwan. However, critics have argued that Bush encouraged provocations from Taiwan andweakened willingness in Taiwan to strengthen its own defense. At a hearing in April 2004, AssistantSecretary of State James Kelly sought to clarify U.S. policy, saying that the United States intends tofulfill the defense responsibilities under the TRA "to the extent necessary;" "we oppose actions thatwould unilaterally alter Taiwan's status;" leaders in Taiwan "misunderstood" if they believe thatPresident Bush supports whatever they do; and "decisions of war and peace are made by thepresident with consultation with Congress." There has also been rising concern about Sino-Japanese tensions. (52) Despite its contributionsto regional stability for decades, the U.S.-Japan alliance is viewed by China with increasingskepticism about whether its continuation benefits China's interests. The historic hostility betweenChinese and Japanese peoples, rising military capabilities, territorial disputes, and emotionalnationalism make Sino-Japanese tensions have a dangerous potential for conflict that could involveU.S. armed forces. In contrast to the U.S.-Taiwan relationship, Japan and the United States are military alliesunder a security treaty concluded in 1951 and revised in 1960. Under the treaty, Japan grants theUnited States military base rights on its territory in return for a U.S. legal commitment to protectJapan's security. Japan has also cooperated with the United States in development of weaponsystems, including missile defense systems. (53) In general, Japan's U.S.-drafted constitution remains a major obstacle to closer U.S.-Japandefense cooperation because of a prevailing constitutional interpretation of Article 9 that forbidsengaging in "collective defense."Article 9 outlaws war as a "sovereign right" of Japan and prohibits"the right of belligerency." It provides that "land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potentialwill never be maintained." In February 2005, Secretaries Rice and Rumsfeld, along with their Japanese counterparts,outlined a more global and integrated vision of their mutual interests, specifically mentioning the"peaceful resolution" of issues related to the Korean Peninsula and the Taiwan Strait as "commonstrategic objectives." Japanese defense officials continue to stress, however, that the Japanesemilitary will not be involved in combat missions but instead limit its contributions to logisticalsupport for counterterrorism operations or to humanitarian and reconstruction efforts. Requirements for military force structure and capabilities are often expressed in terms of thenumber and type of conflicts that can be addressed by that force. For example, DOD's 1993 BottomUp Review found that "The United States must field forces sufficient to fight and win two nearlysimultaneous major regional conflicts." (54) Subsequent reviews recommended different formulas, such asthe "1-4-2-1" formula: U.S. forces should be able to defend the U.S. homeland, operate in four keyforward regions, engage in two nearly simultaneous regional contingencies, and swiftly prevail inone of those conflicts. (55) Debate rages over such formulas because they "are euphemisms for bread-and-butter issues, suchas larger or smaller fighter aircraft forces, a bigger or smaller Army, and whether to spend moremoney on space systems or on ground equipment." (56) In the 2005 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America , DOD describes howit has adopted a "new approach for planning to implement our strategy." DOD's "capabilities-based"planning is intended to focus more on how adversaries may challenge us, than on whom thoseadversaries might be. Some find "capabilities-based" planning to be artificial or misleading. In theend, analysis always returns to the question of which countries or non-state actors we may need tofight. To effectively analyze the desired size and characteristics of tomorrow's military, some arguethat we must take "a hard look at feasible, real-world contingencies." (57) Examining feasible contingencies, or scenarios, can be useful in determining the preferredsize and characteristics of U.S. military forces in various contexts. Do some scenarios place a greateremphasis on air and naval forces? Do others require greater commitment of ground forces? Perhapsmore important, how relevant are nuclear weapons in particular scenarios, and how exactly mightthey influence the conflict or crisis? For example, some observers contend that the availability ofnuclear weapons can help de-escalate a conflict by reminding all the parties of the risks of escalation;others argue that a nation's ability to strike critical targets at the start of a conflict can place pressureon the other nation to preempt such a potential attack, escalating the crisis and possibly complicatingefforts to end it short of all-out war. DOD's 2006 Report to Congress on China's military capabilities notes that China's currentoptions to prevent Taiwan from claiming formal independence include persuasion and coercion. IfChina were to resort to overt military force, the DOD report outlines four possible "courses ofaction"the PLA would be likely to take: missile strikes and information operations, an air and missilecampaign, a naval blockade, and an amphibious invasion. DOD's scenarios are not exhaustive, however, as additional sources of conflict could emergebetween the United States and China. For example, Taiwan, in expectation of a Chinese attack,could take the initial overt military action in the conflict. Further, possible conflicts between Chinaand Japan might unfold and draw in the United States. Illustrative scenarios that capture theseadditional dynamics are addressed below. Examining these scenarios can contribute to an understanding of U.S. force requirements andthe potential dynamics of the conflict. This assessment focuses on the possible interaction betweenconventional and nuclear forces, rather than on the specific order of battle and force levels the UnitedStates might need in each particular scenario. China attempts to insert military special operations forces (SOF) into Taiwan. The totalnumber of troops involved could be somewhere between 100 and 1,000. The method of attemptedinfiltration is small boats, submarines, and helicopters. SOF forces cooperate with covert PRCintelligence operatives already in Taiwan to conduct disruptive attacks on Taiwan's political,economic, communications, and military centers of gravity. Specific targets could include politicaland military leaders, power generation and transportation infrastructure, early warning radars, andcommand and control facilities. The purpose of these actions could be to foment fear and unrest inthe Taiwanese population in an attempt to undermine Taiwan's government. Another potentialpurpose of this infiltration may be to facilitate a follow-on combined arms attack by the PLA. Thisattack could be preceded or accompanied by cyberwarfare, or an information operations campaignagainst Taiwan's political and military organizations. China's People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) deploys a destroyer, two submarines, andother ships to support Chinese oil-drilling operations near islands in the East China Sea that areclaimed by China, but controlled by Japan (called Senkaku by Japan, Diaoyu by China). Japandeploys P-3 maritime patrol aircraft, two Aegis destroyers, and F-15 fighters to monitor PLANactivities. A night-time collision between a Chinese submarine and a Japanese destroyer results indamage to both vessels and numerous casualties. Japanese forces attempt to assist the severelydamaged submarine, and a Chinese destroyer interprets the action as hostile. It fires two anti-shipmissiles, which are intercepted by the Aegis destroyer's defenses. Naval forces in the area separate,and no further shots are fired. The Chinese submarine sinks with no additional casualties. Both Japanand China prepare to dispatch additional forces to the region. Japan's Ambassador to the UnitedStates requests a personal meeting with the President to discuss the U.S. Japanese Mutual SecurityTreaty. This scenario is the military conflict that is most often discussed in defense circles, and mayrepresent the worst case for both Taiwan and the United States. In this scenario China would employair, land, and naval forces in an attempt to invade Taiwan, defeat the Taiwanese military, and imposemilitary control over the island. One of China's military objectives would likely be to prosecute asuccessful attack as quickly as possible to reduce the ability of the United States or potentially otherallies from intervening in the conflict. Fearing that a PLA / PLAAF / PLAN exercise is actually a de-facto mobilization and theprelude to an imminent attack on Taiwan, Taipei launches an attack on Chinese forces andinfrastructure across the Taiwan Strait. Specific military actions by Taiwan include air and missileattacks on Chinese ports, airfields, ballistic missile sites, and ground forces in southern China. Taiwan's Navy conducts attacks on PLAN ships operating in Chinese territorial waters. TaiwaneseSOF forces are reported to severely damage a PLAN submarine believed to carry long range ballisticmissiles. The analysis that follows seeks to study the role that U.S. nuclear and conventional forcesmight play in four stages of each potential conflict: deterrence prior to the start of the conflict; crisisstability in the early stages of the conflict; warfighting during the height of the conflict; and wartermination. Objectives and potential challenges or shortcomings are identified. Deterrence is based on a threat or promise. To be effective, this threat or promise mustappear credible to the actor to whom it is directed. Studies of deterrent theory suggest that credibilityis something of a national-level "mind game." Perception of intent and capability is more importantto deterrence than actual intent and capability. In some instances a clear indication of militarycapabilities and intentions has more deterrent value than an ambiguous indication of capabilities andintentions. In other instances reverse is true. Finally, cultural, societal, linguistic, historical and otherqualitative differences between countries play a role in what might deter conflict, and what does not. Given these uncertainties, it appears that U.S. deterrence objectives in these illustrativescenarios may be to field nuclear and conventional forces 1) that are more capable than the Chineseforces, 2) that are postured in a way that makes their use appear credible, and 3) cast doubt onwhether China would be able to satisfy its military or political objectives, at an acceptable cost. In some circumstances, the mere existence of military capabilities may be sufficient to determilitary aggression. Some analysts argue that U.S. and Chinese nuclear weapons can overshadowall interaction between the two nations, and "deter" behaviors that might lead to a conflict that couldescalate to nuclear use. This school of thought appears to apply to Scenario C (Combined ArmsAttack), and Scenario D (Taiwan preempts) the most overt uses of military force. Whether U.S. nuclear forces actually would serve as the key deterrent in Scenario C isunclear. While superior U.S. nuclear forces are clearly capable of severely punishing China forattacking Taiwan, China's ability to respond with a nuclear attack on the United States, albeit alimited one, could be sufficient to deter the United States from credibly threatening a nuclearresponse to China's conventional attack. Similarly, many fear that Scenario D is plausible becauseof the questionable credibility of U.S. extended deterrence to Taiwan. Scenario A (SOF infiltration) and Scenario B (Maritime Conflict), however represent criseswhere nuclear threats may not be credible and nuclear capabilities may not play an active role indeterrence because the level of violence is too low. Direct threat of nuclear use appears even lesscredible because the circumstances do not pose a dire threat to national survival. Conventional U.S.military capabilities also appear to have limited deterrent value in these scenarios. In Scenario A,there is unlikely to be unambiguous warning upon which to act, and it is not clear that U.S.conventional forces would be more effective than Taiwanese forces. Because Scenario B is theresult of an accident, it, by definition cannot be deterred. Once a conflict begins, participants can feel pressure to act quickly, to control events and tomanage the crisis in a way that meets its interests. This, in turn, can make the crisis escalate quicklyand unpredictably. For example, if its command and control systems were protected from attack andoffered redundant capabilities, and its forces were not vulnerable to an early strike by the adversary,then a nation could delay its response, await further information, and possibly seek alternate meansto resolve the conflict. On the other hand, if a country's command and control infrastructure and its key forces werevulnerable to attack early in a conflict, then it might feel compelled to act quickly, using those forcesbefore it lost them to attack, and before it had complete information about the intent and capabilitiesof its adversary in pursuing the conflict. Preferably, the capabilities or posture of a nation'sconventional and nuclear forces would not inherently add to this instability. Specific U.S. crisis stability objectives in these scenarios may include fielding forces that 1)are not vulnerable, and do not make Chinese forces vulnerable to "use it or lose it" pressures, and2) do not appear to be either vulnerable to or capable of political or military decapitation. Both the United States and China have currently deployed their long-range nuclear forces inways that would not leave them vulnerable to a first strike, and therefore, appear unlikely toundermine stability in a crisis. Chinese forces lack the accuracy to attack U.S. land-based forces andcannot effectively track and engage U.S. submarines that carry ballistic missiles (called SSBNs). Chinese long-range missiles are deployed in deeply buried silos, protected by rough terrain andmountains, or deployed on mobile launchers. Therefore, neither the United States nor China wouldexperience pressure to use these weapons before losing them. Early warning and command andcontrol systems, could, however, still be vulnerable to disruption on both sides. Therefore, effortsto disrupt these assets, or other factors, such as a desire to achieve tactical surprise, could stimulateprompt or accelerated responses as soon as a crisis unfolds. Today's conventional forces do not appear to have capabilities or to be postured in ways thatinherently erode crisis stability. Currently, the great distance that most U.S. forces must travel toaddress these scenarios imply that they will not effect the conflict immediately. In Scenario A, theforces that might most usefully contribute to Taiwan's defense might be surveillance, intelligence,or information operations resources. Because these assets could be deployed and employedunobtrusively they appear unlikely to exacerbate a crisis. Scenario B represents a classic unstable crisis. It was caused by an accident, but the stakesrise quickly as each side tries to defend its interests and becomes more entrenched. The nature ofthis crisis probably would not be affected, at least in the early stages, by U.S. forces or the doctrineguiding their use, as each nation focused only on the actions of the other. As the crisis unfolds, U.S.decision makers may not experience pressure to use its forces quickly to help resolve this crisis. Current U.S. forces could be employed on a purposefully long time line to allow the situation to cooland to give both countries time to find a diplomatic, face-saving way to resolve the crisis. Both scenarios C and D evolve into conflicts so quickly that it is unlikely that nuclear forceswould either exacerbate or calm the crisis. However, if the United States maintained the ability, withits conventional forces, to attack critical targets in China and to disrupt China's ability to prosecutethe conflict, China might feel compelled to move quickly to achieve its objectives. This, however,may be more of an issue for consideration in the "warfighting" phase of the conflict than the "crisisstability" phase. If the United States found itself drawn into a military conflict with China via any of theillustrative scenarios above, it would wish to prosecute this conflict on its own terms. Specific warfighting objectives would likely include 1) limiting collateral damage to allied or friendlypopulations, 2) minimizing U.S. / Taiwanese / Japanese casualties, 3) emphasizing warfare in whichthe United States excels (e.g. aviation and naval engagements) and avoiding warfare that presentsobvious challenges (e.g. urban warfare), and 4) avoiding protracted conflict. Are current U.S. nuclearand conventional forces and doctrine well suited to achieve these warfighting objectives? U.S. conventional military involvement in Scenario A could present many of the challengesexperienced in recent conflicts in Somalia, or Iraq: urban warfare in the midst of a civilianpopulation. Presumably no civilians would form large or well armed militias in opposition to theTaiwanese government such as the experience in Iraq. Nevertheless, the uncertainty regarding thenumber of Chinese SOF forces, and the difficulty of separating friend from foe, and the need toseverely limit civilian casualties could make it difficult to achieve the objectives above. Scenario B presents no obvious challenges to today's conventional military forces in termsof achieving the warfighting objectives above. There appears little chance for collateral damage, forexample. Managing crisis stability may be the biggest challenge in this scenario. Although most discussions of nuclear weapons focus on their ability to deter conflict,deterrence rests on the adversaries perception that nuclear weapons can achieve U.S. warfightingobjectives that cannot be otherwise achieved by conventional weapons. U.S. nuclear weapons couldbe used under a wide range of circumstances, but they would probably have the most to contribute,in Scenario C, the combined arms attack. If the United States determined that this level of warfarebetween China and Taiwan threatened vital U.S. interests, it could be prepared to take whatever stepswere necessary to defend its interests. For example, the United States might believe that it had touse nuclear weapons to destroy targets in China that were critical to China's ability to achieve itsobjectives, that could only be reliably damaged or destroyed by nuclear weapons. These mightinclude, for example, hardened or deeply buried bunkers housing weapons or command facilities. The United States would likely explore all possible conventional options for disabling ordestroying these targets, but that it would not rule out the use of nuclear weapons. Casualties arelikely to be high regardless of the specific targets. Nuclear employment could bring the conflict toan abrupt end, but the long-term political consequences from using nuclear weapons under anycircumstances is unpredictable, but feared to be considerable. This could also defeat overarchingU.S. politico-military goals, such as regional stability and international support and consensus. The challenges of achieving U.S. warfighting objectives with conventional forces in thisscenario are well documented. (58) It appears likely that airpower would be used to defeat China'sair force engaged in military action vs. Taiwan, to destroy or degrade the invasion force, and todestroy or disrupt the PLA's command, control and communications. The forces most likely to beemployed include land- and sea-based fighter and attack aircraft, long range bombers, command andcontrol aircraft, aerial refueling aircraft, strategic and theater airlift aircraft, and intelligencegathering aircraft. The United States would use naval forces principally to destroy or degrade the invasion force. Naval forces would clear mines, engage PLAN ships in transit and in port, attacking targets in China,and defend against missile attacks. The Navy would probably employ forces that included carrierbattle groups (aircraft carriers, attack submarines, destroyers, cruisers, frigates), and Marine CorpsAmphibious Ready Groups. The air wings on these aircraft are composed of tactical combat aircraftand helicopters. Long range maritime patrol aircraft, and mine countermeasures ships could alsoplausibly be employed. Of primary concern in Scenario C are China's anti-access weapon systems(e.g. advanced air defenses, fighter aircraft, naval mines, anti-ship cruise missiles, theater ballisticmissiles) designed to impede U.S. operations in the theater; the United States would seek to disable,defeat, or destroy these capabilities early in the conflict. Like the nuclear force balance between the U.S. and China, it is generally accepted that U.S.conventional forces are superior to China's conventional forces. (59) Unlike nuclear forces,however, geographical distance and the resulting operational challenges of timeliness andsustainment put U.S. conventional forces at a distinct disadvantage. Further, the potential for highnumbers of U.S. casualties may diminish the U.S. appetite for large scale conventional warfare,which may be required to prevail in Scenario C. If the United States found itself drawn into a military conflict with China, it would benefitfrom nuclear and conventional forces that would facilitate war termination on favorable terms. Wartermination objectives that appear to be appealing include 1) decisive victory, 2) long-termimprovement in the key regional politico-military relationships, and 3) no long-term need forincreased U.S. basing / presence / commitment in the region. Achieving these objectives in Scenario A appears to be difficult. The threat of escalation,possibly to the use of nuclear weapons, could play a role in bringing the conflict in Scenario A to anend. Such action may appear decisive. However, threatening nuclear attacks is unlikely to improvethe regional relationships, and may not appear credible. Employment of U.S. conventional forcesmay succeed in rolling back the Chinese SOF incursion and deterring or preventing escalation bythe PLA. However, once deployed, it may be difficult to avoid a long-term presence in or nearTaiwan to enforce or guarantee the peace conditions. Achieving war termination objectives in Scenario B appears more promising. By brandishingits conventional and nuclear capabilities and reminding China of the U.S. commitment to Japan, theUnited States could possibly play a significant role in ending the crisis on terms favorable to Japan(or at least not unfavorable to Japan). Nonetheless, the threat to leap to nuclear attack, even indefense of a treaty partner, could seem extreme, particularly if both China and Japan were amenableto a "face-saving" way out of this accidental conflict. Deploying or using conventional forces couldalso demonstrate U.S. commitment to Japan, possibly with greater credibility. In either case, noincreased presence or commitment by U.S. forces is likely to be required. The threat of escalation to nuclear weapons could play a significant role in the terminationof a conflict in Scenario C, and may achieve U.S. objectives of decisive victory, and no long-termincreased U.S. presence in the region. Whether terminating this major conventional conflict bythreatening the use of nuclear weapons will contribute to long term stability is unclear. Terminatingthe conflict with actual use of nuclear weapons appears likely to achieve the first objective ofdecisive victory, but only if China does not retaliate with an attack on the United States. As withScenario A, terminating this conflict with conventional weapons capabilities appears advantageous,but may risk the need for increased long-term U.S. presence in the region. Scenario D appears to present noteworthy challenges to achieving war termination objectives.This conflict would be very difficult to terminate without allowing either Taiwan or China to "win." Once this conflict had begun, the stakes for both China and Taiwan would be so high as to make itdifficult to return to the status quo ante. A rapid and sustained deployment of a large contingent ofU.S. or coalition forces might re-assure Taiwan sufficiently to terminate its attacks on the PLA.However, the long-term costs of adopting such an obligation are probably unacceptable to the UnitedStates, and the resulting "peace" could be so unstable -- China is unlikely to support a large andlong-term U.S. military presence on or near Taiwan -- as to raise concerns about the likelihood ofcontinuing conflict with even greater numbers of U.S. forces at risk and an even greater chance ofescalation to nuclear use. (60) A possible conflict with China attracts considerable attention from defense planners becauseit is a regional competitor today and could over time grow to be a "near-peer" competitor. Analystscan also easily identify flashpoints where the two nations might meet and feel compelled to defendnational interests. The United States has a long-standing nuclear deterrent relationship with China. However, during the Cold War, managing this relationship was far less important than managing therelationship with the Soviet Union. With the demise of the Soviet Union and the improvedrelationship between the United States and Russia, the nuclear equation between the United Statesand China raises its own series of questions: Are existing U.S. capabilities sufficient to deter or defeat China or otherpotential challengers? Would added or different capabilities enhance the U.S. position in a conflict,by enhancing deterrence, easing crisis instabilities, or hastening the end of hostilities on termsfavorable to the United States and its allies? The answers to these questions can inform decisions about the balance of nuclear and conventionalcapabilities in the U.S. military force structure. In a time of growing budget scrutiny, investment in several conventional weapon systemsor concepts is frequently justified by their perceived utility in a possible conflict with "near-peer"competitors such as China. (61) Often, these weapon systems are among the more expensiveprograms in DOD's budget. Examples of these weapons or concepts include ballistic missile defense,prompt long-range conventional strike, the F-22A Raptor advanced combat aircraft, and the AirborneLaser. The desired number of U.S. Navy aircraft carriers, attack submarines, anti-submarine warfareships and aircraft is also frequently linked to a need to effectively counter potential Chinese militaryaction. Although not explicitly linked to China, other U.S. weapon systems programs appear to begeared toward large-scale conventional war during a time of increasing threats from non-state actors. Examples of these weapon system programs include the Navy's conversion of Trident nuclear missilesubmarines into conventional guided-missile delivery systems (SSGN). After reviewing thescenarios, and using the weapon system programs above as examples of potential future investments,the following questions arise: What potential do these weapons offer for enhanced deterrence, crisis stability,warfighting or conflict termination? Are the potential enhancements to deterrence, crisis stability, warfighting orconflict termination worth the estimated costs of developing and fielding theseweapons? Are the potential enhancements in one situation offset by potential liabilities in other situations? Might other investments offer more promise at lowercosts? What linkages exist between nuclear and conventionalforces? The answers to these questions can also inform decisions about the balance of nuclear andconventional capabilities in the U.S. military force structure. As described earlier in this report, it is too narrow to conclude that the United States andChina have not engaged in an open, armed conflict simply because each is deterred by the nuclearcapabilities of the other. Potential "flashpoints" (e.g. Taiwan, other territorial disputes) have notignited because both nations apparently recognize that, on many fronts, the costs of a conflict wouldfar exceed the benefits. The U.S. Defense Department, for example, contends that China is deterredfrom using overt military force against its neighbors by concerns over potential economicrepercussions and fear of domestic instability. (62) Some argue that as China's economic and political interests in Asia expand and as China'smilitary continues to develop, the possibility of conflict could increase. Others, however, believethat the possibility of conflict is likely to decrease, or at least not increase, because the United Statesand China may find as many potential areas for cooperation as they do for competition. There is nodoubt that this calculation could change if the political and military factors associated with theflashpoints were to change. As one part of this broad calculation, however, China's assessment ofthe costs of conflict would hinge heavily on its assessment of whether the United States wouldintervene, and its assessment of whether the conflict might escalate to the use of nuclear weapons. The Bush Administration has indicated, and many agree, that the United States can andshould alter its nuclear force structure and nuclear doctrine so that they can play a more prominentrole in U.S. national security policy. Others, however, question whether the threat of nuclearweapons employment would be credible if the United States did not face dire threats to its nationalsurvival. Concerns about the credibility of a more prominent role of nuclear weapons in U.S. nationalsecurity policy are magnified when questions of extended deterrence for Taiwan or Japan come upbecause, as noted above, China could retaliate against U.S. cities with its own nuclear weapons. However, China's threats of nuclear retaliation could also inspire questions about credibility. Chinacould launch a small number of nuclear weapons at U.S. territory if attacked by the United States,but the United States could retaliate against China with a far greater number of weapons and farbroader nuclear attack. Hence, it is possible that each could be deterred from escalating the conflict,and any conflict would remain conventional. Moreover, the possibility that China could invite fargreater destruction if it used its nuclear forces after the United States used a relatively small numberof nuclear weapons against discrete targets has led some to some argue that the current andforeseeable nuclear relationship between China and the United States suffices to deter conflict. Forexample, one observer states "We are not going to fight Russia, China, or India. The main reasonwe're not going to fight these guys is that they all have nuclear weapons." (63) Some have suggested thatChina might employ nuclear weapons to conduct an electromagnetic pulse (EMP) attack on theUnited States or U.S. forces. Others, however doubt the likelihood of such an attack because itwould affect China's forces as well as U.S. forces. It is also unclear whether an adversary wouldinterpret an EMP attack as crossing the nuclear weapons threshold, and how the adversary wouldrespond. Much of the debate above is reflected in proposals to develop ballistic missile defensecapabilities. Some argue that missile defenses -- including boost phase weapons like the AirborneLaser -- could increase the deterrent value of U.S. nuclear weapons. Even limited missile defensescould make the U.S. threat to escalate more credible because it would undermine China's confidencein its ability to retaliate against the United States or its allies. Knowing this, it is argued, Chinawould be deterred from initiating a conflict that might draw in a U.S. response. Missile defenseproponents also note that military conflict can evolve from accidents or miscalculations rather thancogent cost-benefit analysis. Therefore, missile defenses could enhance crisis stability and the U.S.ability to conduct the conflict on its own terms if China and the United States unexpectedly foundthemselves caught up in a quickly escalating conflict. (64) Others believe that the U.S. development of ballistic missile defenses could upset the currentstable balance in the U.S.-China nuclear deterrence equation. In particular, the United States doesnot yet have a capable long-range missile defense system. China could perceive U.S. missiledefenses as effectively swinging the military balance too much toward the United States, and maythus decide to pursue military options against Taiwan sooner, rather than later, while it could stilldeter U.S. nuclear attacks on its territory with the threat of retaliation. (65) Thus, the potential forfuture missile defenses, it is argued, could be destabilizing in a crisis. Further, the U.S. pursuit ofballistic missile defenses could motivate China to develop more capable missiles, or missile defensecountermeasures (such as decoys or early release sub-munitions), or to field more missiles toincrease its retaliatory capabilities. Consequently, any warfighting advantages that missile defenseadvocates desire, it is argued, are unlikely to be realized, particularly if China could build additionalballistic missiles or field missile defense countermeasures more quickly than the United States couldfield effective missile defenses. As mentioned above, the principal justification for many new, and in some cases costly,conventional military capabilities is that they are required to address a possible conflict withChina. (66) For example,DOD is exploring options for fielding prompt global strike (PGS) capabilities. These optionsinclude, for example, conventionally armed Inter Continental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) orSubmarine Launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBMs) (67) , and new hypersonic air vehicles that would be capable ofaccurately striking trans-continental targets within 60 minutes. (68) DOD argues that PGS systems would be able to hold at risk targets that, at present, can onlybe destroyed with high confidence by nuclear weapons. Examples could include mobile, buried orhardened targets or command and control (C 2 ) facilities. They could also attack promptly at the startof a conflict, destroying an enemy's air-defenses or other "anti-access" forces. Therefore, promptglobal strike capabilities might enhance deterrence because these conventionally armed weaponswould be more useable, and therefore more credible, than nuclear weapons. China could stillretaliate against the United States or its allies, but, with its no-first use policy in place and forcesconsistent with a minimum nuclear deterrent, it may not be able to respond with nuclear weapons. Thus, supporters argue that the United States might have greater credibility when extendingdeterrence to its friends and allies. If, through accident or miscalculation, a war were to break out, conventional weapons couldoffer improved warfighting capabilities that would allow the United States to prevail conventionally,and raise the threshold for the employment of nuclear weapons. For example, China's ballisticmissiles, long-range air defenses, long- range surveillance radar, and anti-ship cruise missiles arewidely considered problematic for DOD. These weapons are expected to strongly impinge on DOD'sfreedom to maneuver in this theater, and overcoming these capabilities are likely to engendersignificant U.S. casualties. Advocates argue that in a warfighting context, PGS and the F-22 Raptor(by virtue of its stealth, speed, advanced sensors, and avionics) will be able to destroy or defeat thesetargets more effectively and with much less attrition than current weapon systems. While these new conventional weapons might enhance deterrence, they might also detractfrom crisis stability if a conflict were to occur. For example, in Scenario C (combined arms attack),neither U.S. nor Chinese nuclear forces appear postured in a way that would exacerbate a crisis overTaiwan. Neither is vulnerable to a first strike from the other. However, the same may not be trueof conventional forces. China may believe that its forces are vulnerable to an attack by either Taiwanor the United States., and that such an attack is about to occur. It may then believe that, in spite ofthe risk of escalation and possible attacks (conventional or nuclear) on its own territory, that it wouldbe better off initiating the conflict during the crisis. In essence, then, the U.S. ability to defendTaiwan by attacking targets, especially "centers of gravity," in China could actually make a crisisworse, and could spur China to begin or expand its attack on Taiwan. It can also be argued that potent conventional forces, those that truly overmatch China'sdefenses, may weaken deterrence. As described in the background section of this report, during theCold War, relatively weak U.S. conventional forces were viewed by many as consistent with strongdeterrence because the United States would have to quickly fall back on nuclear weapons if attackedby more potent Warsaw Pact forces in Europe. This report highlights a number of policy issues that may bear consideration in the ongoingdebate regarding investments in conventional and nuclear forces: It appears that China and the United States currently have a stable deterrentrelationship. This deterrence appears to be based on a complicated nexus of economic,political, and military factors. Despite this deterrent relationship, military conflict might ensue either as partof a consciously planned strategy or due to mistakes, misperception, oraccident. Together, U.S. nuclear and conventional capabilities contribute to militarydeterrence, and therefore it appears that it would be worthwhile to consider the interplay of nuclearand conventional capabilities in force structure and strategy decisions. Nuclear and conventional military capabilities can simultaneously havepositive effects on deterrence or warfighting, and negative effects on crisis stability or wartermination objectives. Therefore, it may be overly simplistic to make changes in military forcestructure or capabilities to improve deterrence, for example, without considering potential effectson crisis stability, for example. Investments in military capabilities that may positively contribute to allpotential stages of military conflict (e.g. deterrence, crisis stability, warfighting, and wartermination), might be preferred to investments that have a mixed effect on the potential range ofconflict.

Summary: Congress and the Department of Defense (DOD) are engaged in an extended discourse overthe future direction of U.S. defense strategy and military force structure. In the past, thesediscussions have focused almost exclusively on questions related to U.S. conventional militaryforces, with discussions about nuclear weapons held in separate fora. However, the 2005Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) examined both nuclear and conventional forces, a first in theQDR's history. This indicates that analysts both inside and outside government are beginning toreview and assess the potential deterrent and operational relationship between conventional andnuclear weapons. It appears that considerable pressure is building on DOD leaders to make strategy and forcestructure decisions with cost-effectiveness in mind. A key question for contemporary defenseplanners is what proportion of U.S. military capabilities should be focused on traditional militarychallenges and what proportion should be focused on non-traditional challenges, such as "irregular,disruptive and catastrophic" threats? To effectively analyze the desired size and characteristics of tomorrow's military, some arguethat we must take a hard look at feasible, real-world contingencies. A possible conflict with Chinaattracts considerable attention from defense planners because it is a regional competitor today andcould over time grow to be a "near-peer" competitor. Analysts can also easily identify flashpointswhere the two nations might meet and feel compelled to defend national interests. The analysis that follows seeks to explore the possible role that U.S. nuclear andconventional forces might play in four stages of potential conflicts: deterrence, prior to the start ofthe conflict; crisis stability in the early stages of the conflict; warfighting during the height of theconflict; and war termination, through either a negotiated settlement or a battlefield victory. This report highlights a number of policy issues that may bear consideration in the ongoingdebate regarding military investments. For example, this report suggests that nuclear andconventional military capabilities can simultaneously have positive effects on deterrence orwarfighting and negative effects on crisis stability or war termination objectives. Therefore, changesin military force structure or capabilities to improve deterrence, for example, should considerpotential effects on crisis stability, for example. Further, investments in military capabilities thatmay positively contribute to all potential stages of military conflict (e.g. deterrence, crisis stability,warfighting, and war termination), might be preferred to investments that have a mixed effect on thepotential range of conflict. This report will not be updated.