Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) have been referred to in many ways: RPVs (remotelypiloted vehicle), drones, robot planes, and pilotless aircraft are a few of the terms that have beenused. Most often called UAVs, they are defined by the Department of Defense (DOD) as powered,aerial vehicles that do not carry a human operator, use aerodynamic forces to provide vehicle lift,can fly autonomously or be piloted remotely, can be expendable or recoverable, and can carry a lethalor nonlethal payload. Ballistic or semiballistic vehicles, cruise missiles, and artillery projectiles arenot considered UAVs by the DOD definition. (1) Drones differ from RPVs in that they are designed to flyautonomously. UAVs are either described as a single air vehicle (with associated surveillancesensors), or a UAV system (UAS), which usually consists of three to six air vehicles, a groundcontrol station, and support equipment. The military use of UAVs in recent conflicts such as Iraq (2003), Afghanistan (2001), andKosovo (1999) has opened the eyes of many to the advantages and disadvantages provided byunmanned aircraft. UAVs regularly make national headlines as they are used to perform taskshistorically performed by manned aircraft. UAVs are thought to offer two main advantages overmanned aircraft: they eliminate the risk to a pilot's life, and their aeronautical capabilities, such asendurance, are not bound by human limitations. UAVs may also be cheaper to procure and operatethan manned aircraft. UAVs protect the lives of pilots by performing the "3-D" missions - those dull,dirty, or dangerous missions that do not require a pilot in the cockpit. However, the lowerprocurement cost of UAVs must be weighed against their greater proclivity to crash, while theminimized risk should be weighed against the dangers inherent in having an unmanned vehicle flyingin airspace shared with manned assets. There are a number of reasons why the employment of UAVs has recently grown. Navigation and communication technology is now available that wasn't available just a few shortyears ago. Some say that the services' so-called "silk scarf syndrome" of preferring manned aviationover unmanned, has diminished as UAVs entered the mainstream. Although only recently procured in significant numbers by the United States, UAVs have hada century-old history in aviation. First included in Jane's All the World's Aircraft in 1920, UAVswere tested during World War I, but not used in combat by the United States during that war. However, it was not until the Vietnam War that UAVs such as the AQM-34 Firebee were used ina surveillance role. The Firebee exemplifies the versatility of UAVs -- initially flown in the 1970s,it was modified to deliver payloads and flew its first flight test as an armed UAV on December 20,2002. (2) The Israeli Air Force pioneered several UAVs in the late 1970s and 1980s that wereeventually integrated into the United States's UAV inventory. U.S. observers noticed Israel'ssuccessful use of UAVs during operations in Lebanon in 1982, encouraging then-Navy SecretaryJohn Lehman to acquire a UAV capability for the Navy. Interest also grew in other parts of thePentagon, and the Reagan Administration's FY1987 budget requested notably higher levels of UAVfunding. (3) This markedthe transition of UAVs in the United States from experimental projects to acquisition programs. One of the UAVs acquired from Israel, Pioneer, emerged as a useful source of intelligenceat the tactical level during Operation Desert Storm. Pioneer was used by Navy battleships to locateIraqi targets for its 16-inch guns. Following the Gulf War, military officials recognized the potentialvalue of UAVs, and the Air Force's Predator became a UAV on a fast track, quickly adding newcapabilities. (4) Debutingin the Balkans conflict, the Predator performed surveillance missions such as monitoring area roadsfor weapons movements and conducting battle damage assessment. Operations in Afghanistan havefeatured the Air Force's Global Hawk, as well as adding a new mission for Predator that allows theUAV to live up to its name -- armed reconnaissance. There are currently five major UAVs in theU.S. inventory: the Navy and Marine Corps's Pioneer, the Air Force's Global Hawk and Predator,and the Army's Hunter and Shadow UAVs. Reflecting a growing awareness and support in Congress for UAVs, investment in unmannedaerial vehicles has increased annually. The FY2001 investment in UAVs was approximately $667million, while the FY2003 funding totaled over $1.1 billion dollars. The Pentagon has asked for$1.6 billion in procurement and development funding for FY2006, with much more planned for theout years. Congress's role in UAV development has been one of strong encouragement tempered withconcern. Taking a proactive stance in UAV program management, Congress has in the past directedthe formation of joint program offices to ensure commonality between the services' UAV programs. Congress has also expressed concern that DOD's "growing enthusiasm may well lead to a situationin which there is no clear path toward the future of UAVs", and so has required DOD to submit aUAV roadmap. (5) In someinstances, Congress has advocated a more aggressive approach to fielding UAVs. For example, in1996, the House Armed Services Committee (HASC) supported legislation directing DOD toweaponize both the Predator and Hunter, but DOD opposed the initiative. (6) The scope of Congress'ssupport and confidence in UAV technology can be gleaned from a prediction in the reportaccompanying the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001, which stated that,"Within ten years, one-third of U.S. military operational deep strike aircraft will be unmanned." (7) In recent years, the pace of UAV development has accelerated, and the scope of UAVmissions and applications has expanded. How should these efforts be managed so that they arecost-efficient, effective, and interoperable? In its eagerness to deploy UAVs, does DoD riskduplication of effort between various programs? Are DOD UAV acquisition plans responsive tocongressional direction? Investment priorities could change as the introduction of UAVs into the U.S. inventory shiftsthe balance between manned and unmanned capabilities. Congress, as part of its defense oversightresponsibilities, may assess DOD's current UAV efforts to verify that they match up with newinvestment goals and strategies. Conventional wisdom states that UAVs are cheap, or cost-effective. Is this true today? How do UAV costs compare to manned aircraft costs? UAVs have traditionally been used for reconnaissance and surveillance, but today they arebeing employed in roles and applications that their designers never envisioned. The unanticipatedflexibility and capability of UAVs has led some analysts to suggest that more, if not most, of themissions currently undertaken by manned aircraft could be turned over to unmanned aerial platforms,and that manned and unmanned aircraft could operate together. Congress may have to contemplatethe replacement of a significant portion of the manned aircraft fleet with unmanned aircraft that haveyet to be designed. The defining characteristic of UAVs is that they are "unmanned." If UAVs are introducedinto the force in large numbers, might personnel issues arise? Recruitment and retention is aperennial congressional issue, that may be receiving increased attention due to the operationalstresses associated with the Global War on Terrorism. What impact might wide spread deploymentof UAVs have on military personnel? Industrial base issues also need to be considered. If defense companies devote more of theirtime and expenses to develop unmanned aircraft, will the skills and technologies needed for mannedaircraft design erode? Those who argue that UAVs will replace manned aircraft in the future are notas concerned with the industrial base issue as those who feel manned aircraft will still be needed tocombat future threats. As U.S. companies compete for business in a growing international UAV marketplace,concerns about the proliferation of these systems may grow. Are steps required -- and if so, whatmight they be -- to control the spread of UAVs? As part of its defense and foreign policy oversight,Congress may examine whether a balance must be struck between supporting legitimate U.S. exportsand curbing the spread of UAV technologies to dangerous groups or countries. Undeniably, UAVs are being developed, procured and fielded in growing numbers. Thediversity of designs and applications is also accelerating. Considering this growth, many in Congressmay wish to evaluate the management of UAVs: Are UAVs being developed fast enough? Are theybeing developed too fast? Has DoD developed an appropriate plan and structure for incorporatingUAVs into future military capabilities? UAV programs range from the combat tested -- Pioneer, Hunter, Predator and Global Hawk-- to the not yet tested -- the Air Force and Navy's Unmanned Combat Air Vehicles. Sizes andranges of UAVs also vary greatly: the Wasp Micro UAV at 8 inches long has a combat radius of 5nautical miles, while the Global Hawk at 44 feet long (the size of a medium sized corporate jet) hasa combat radius of 5,400 nm. Figure 1 shows the evolution of UAVs and demonstrates the recentinitiation of several UAV programs. (8) Similarly, Table 1 outlines the total UAV inventory. (9) When compared to theinventory of February 2003,which only included five major platforms yeilding an inventory of 163unmanned aircraft, the acceleration and expansion becomes clear. The 604 UAVs includes many2nd generation derivatives, such as Predator B and I-Gnat-ER, and several non-traditional vehicles,such as Snow Goose, Onyx and Neptune. Figure 1. Current and Planned UAV Programs Source: OSD, UAS Roadmap 2005-2030, August 2005, Section 2, p. 3. Table 1. UAV Platforms Source: OSD, UAS Roadmap 2005-2030, August 2005; Safety and accident reports from eachservice's website. Note: For comparison purposes, table does not include Mini/Small, Micro, or Lighter-than-AirUAVs. a. Estimate Inventories calculated by subtracting number of UAVs lost to attrition from the totalnumber of UAVs delivered. Attrition numbers were taken from Class A accidents reportedby each service; Total UAVs delivered for each platform were drawn from the OSD's UASRoadmap 2005-2030 , August 2005. The increase in DoD's UAV inventory appears largely due to the rising demand for UAVsto conduct a wide variety of missions and to branch out from the typical intelligence, surveillanceand reconnaissance (ISR) applications. Predator B is equipped with a strike capability, and manyPredator As have been modified to carry weapons. The Joint-Unmanned Combat Air Systems(J-UCAS) final product will target air defenses (missiles, artillery, air bases, andcommand-and-control facilities). Additionally, mine detection, border patrol, medical resupply, andforce perimeter protection are increasingly considered as roles for UAVs. (10) DOD's UAV research and development (R&D) funding has also grown, for a variety ofreasons: UAVs are considered a growth industry, many UAVs are relatively inexpensive to produceand new technology in miniaturization has helped accelerate the development of many UAV types.R&D funding in FY2006 for UAVs is more than double the total procurement funding for UAVs. This suggests that accelerated acquisition of UAVs is likely to continue in the future. In order to understand fully the pace and scope of UAV acquisition, a comparison betweenmanned aircraft inventories and unmanned inventories may prove to be a useful tool. Figure 2 shows the ratio of manned to unmanned aircraft. Despite the recent acceleration in UAVproduction, manned aircraft still represent 95% of all DoD aircraft, which suggests that UAVsreplacing manned aircraft in the foreseeable future is not likely. Rather UAV programs have quitefrequently been described as complements to, or augmentation of manned aircraft. As it appears from statements and internal recommendations, the pace of UAV productionwill either continue or accelerate in the coming years. When asked to study DoD's UAV programs,the Defense Science Board (DSB) found that "the single most important recommendation is toaccelerate the introduction of UAVs into the force structure." (11) Figure 2. Manned Aircraft Inventory vs. UAVInventory Source : The Military Balance 2004-2005; 2005-2030 UAS Roadmap Further, some describe Air Force plans to grow UAV operations in the Air National Guardand Air Force Reserve as a "massive introduction" of the technology. (12) Former Air Force Chiefof Staff, General John Jumper indicated a significantly faster pace of production of UAVs,specifically of the Predator, when he told the Senate Armed Services Committee, "we're going to tellGeneral Atomics to build every Predator they can possibly build." (13) These statements raise the question of whether the current and anticipated pace of UAVdevelopment is appropriate. Historically, Congress has chastened DoD for what it saw as a leisurelyrate of UAV acquisition and encouraged it to speed up this pace, or speed up the incorporation ofcertain capabilities. For example, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001expressed the Senate's desire that "Within ten years, one-third of U.S. military operational deep strikeaircraft will be unmanned." (14) This goal was seen at the time as very challenging, because DoDhad no unmanned deep strike aircraft. In 1996, the House Armed Services Committee (HASC)supported legislation directing DoD to weaponize both the Predator and Hunter, but DoD opposedthe initiative. (15) Somein the 109th Congress have advocated increased procurement and application of UAVs fornon-military roles. For example, House Homeland Security Committee Chairman, RepresentativePeter King was reported to have said that UAVs are "'underutilized' by the Department of HomelandSecurity, and should play a larger role in border security." (16) On the other hand, Congress has also expressed concern that DoD's "growing enthusiasmmay well lead to a situation in which there is no clear path toward the future of UAVs." (17) Some critics haveexpressed concern that an overly ambitious pace could affect the quality of the end product and theefficiency of the acquisition process. A fast pace could make congressional oversight much moredifficult, which could allow UAV programs to exceed cost or to stray from the design objective. AsRepresentative Curt Weldon cautioned, Aggressively fielding new types of vehicles andeven building more of the same type of vehicle may be premature. We must feel confidentthat we have adequately addressed some of the fundamentals to ensure that unmanned airsystems are designed and fielded consistent with the common communications architectureand that common standards are established for operations. ... Some services are buyingmillion dollar UAVs using operations and maintenance funding that has never beenspecifically authorized for UAVs and for which appropriations have never been made. ...Other services are leasing UAV services for combat operations using operations andmaintenance accounts. And some services have effectively reduced congressional oversightby establishing UAV projects within multi-billion dollar, multi-project aggregated programrequests. (18) The Global Hawk's ambitious pace may be an example of the dilemma RepresentativeWeldon described. A 2004 Government Accountability Office (GAO) report cites a crowdedproduction schedule and aggressive funding strategy as one reason for the "immaturity" of severalcritical technologies for the Global Hawk program. (19) The report indicates that a deceleration of pace -- possibly evena temporary halt in production -- must be coupled with management changes in order to preservethe quality and efficiency of the Global Hawk development process. Many, in DoD and in Congress,may argue that the pace is appropriate and the Global Hawk's problems are exceptional. They couldargue that the rapid rate of production of the Hunter in the past and the Predator currently areevidence that a fast pace can be extremely efficient and produce high quality aircraft. While supporting UAV programs in general, and even challenging DoD to pursue UAVsmore aggressively, many in Congress appear to want assurances that tax-payer dollars are being wellspent. For example, Section 142 of the FY2006 Defense Authorization Act ( H.R. 1815 , H. Rept. 109-89 , p.123) "would preclude procurement of new unmanned aerial vehiclesystems by the military services without the written approval of the Under Secretary of Defense forAcquisition, Technology, and Logistics." In addition to establishing acquisition pace, and scope of application, one crucialCongressional task may be to determine whether DoD's administrative processes and lines ofauthority within the acquisition process are effective for UAV development and acquisition. Themanagement of DoD's development and acquisition programs has received heightened attention inthe 108th and 109th Congresses. The Air Force's attempt to lease 100 KC-767 tanker aircraft, andmany aspects of the Army's Future Combat System (FCS) have focused congressional scrutiny onthe mechanics of DoD's acquisition process. (20) Because UAVs are acquired by all four of the military services,and the U.S. Special Operations Command, and because UAVs appear to be acquired at anaccelerated rate, and for a growing list of applications, it appears that great potential exists forduplication of effort. This leads many to call for centralization of UAV acquisition authority, toensure unity of effort, and reduce chances for wasteful duplication of effort. On the other hand, ifUAV efforts are too centralized, some fear that competition and innovation may be repressed. Another management issue pertains to cost. UAVs are developed and procured through thesame acquisition system as manned aircraft, and they appear to suffer from similar cost growth. Once viewed as a cheap alternative to manned aircraft, or even a "poor man's airforce," some UAVsare beginning to rival manned aircraft in cost. According to DoD's most recent estimate, the GlobalHawk program will cost $6.5 billion to purchase 51 aircraft; a program unit acquisition cost of $128million per UAV. The program has seen $194 million in development cost overruns, triggering aNunn-McCurdy breach due to an average unit cost growth of 18 percent per airframe and hasprompted appropriators to voice their concern ( H.R. 2863 , 109-119, p.174). (21) Much of UAV cost growth appears to be attributable to factors that have plagued mannedaircraft programs, such as "mission creep," and inconsistent management practices. Global Hawkcosts, for example, have been driven up by adding multiple sensors, which themselves increase cost,but also require larger wings and more powerful engines to carry the increased weight, which alsoincreases cost. Originally, Global Hawk was intended to carry one primary kind of sensor at a time,a fleet of these UAVs would provide a mix of sensors. To make Global Hawk more analogous tothe U-2 aircraft, DoD changed the requirement so that Global Hawk is to carry two or more primarysensors, which has increased the UAV's price. (22) Originally considered a relatively modest UAV, the Joint Unmanned Combat Air System(JUCAS) has evolved into a large, long range aircraft with a heavy payload, which has increasedcost. Further, DoD has cut over $1 billion from the JUCAS budget, and has moved management ofthe program from the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) to the Air Force. Cutting the JUCAS budget topline may reduce the total number or aircraft to be procured, but canalso increase the cost per aircraft. Changing management responsibility can also contribute to costgrowth via a lack of coherent direction, and changes in requirements and priority. The frequent change and realignment of DoD's organizations with a role in UAVdevelopment illustrates the difficulties of establishing a comprehensive UAV management system. Over the years, management of UAV programs has gone full circle from the military services, to aNavy-run Joint Program Office (JPO), to the Defense Airborne Reconnaissance Office (DARO) andthen back to the services, under the auspices of OSD. The JPO was established in 1988, but metcriticism in Congress. In 1992, Congress expressed its... serious reservations over the management of these[UAV] programs by the joint program office. Remarkably little progress has been registered duringthe past five years in this area. The conferees believe the Secretary of Defense should undertake acomprehensive review of the joint [project] office. (23) The JPO was replaced by the Defense Airborne Reconnaissance Office (DARO), created in1993 to more effectively manage DoD's disparate airborne reconnaissance programs, includingUAVs. DARO was disbanded in 1998, amid further criticism of problems, redesigns, and accidentswith the family of systems that it was formed to develop. (24) It is unclear whether this criticism was completely legitimate,or whether it was generated by advocates of manned aviation, who sought to protect theseestablished programs. Since DARO's demise, there has been no single procurement focal point to manage DODUAV efforts. General oversight authority resides within the Office of the Assistant Secretary ofDefense for Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence (OASD(C3I)), while the militaryservices manage program development and acquisition. In an effort to increase joint coordination of UAV programs operated by the services, theOSD established the Joint UAV Planning Task Force in 2001. The task force, which falls under theauthority of the Pentagon's acquisition chief (Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition,Technology and Logistics), works to help standardize payload development, establish uniforminterfaces, and promote a common vision for future UAV-related efforts. Subsequently, the JointUAV Planning Task Force has been viewed by many in the defense community as the top rung onthe UAV management ladder. Dr. Glenn Lamartin, Director of Defense Systems in the OSD, arguedthat the Joint UAV Task Force was empowered through the Joint Staff to institute requirements,satisfy joint needs and to provide discipline and structure to individual programs. (25) In order to help acommon UAV vision become a reality, the task force has, through the OSD, published three UAV Roadmaps: April 2001, December 2002, and August 2005. In spite of the creation of the UAV Task Force, Congressional concerns with UAVacquisition management, program duplication, interoperability, and other issues continued. Forexample, in 2002, the House Committee on Armed Services noted: "The committee expresses itsconcern about proper program management elsewhere in this report, and is specifically concernedthat UAV programs adhere to the same standards as other acquisition programs." (26) Several other management mechanisms have recently been initiated in addition to the UAVTask Force. In 2003 the U.S. Joint Forces Command announced that it would take the lead inconducting experimentation in UAV interoperability and flexibility for the Joint UAV TaskForce. (27) Also in 2003,DoD created the UAV Interoperability Working Group to pursue joint-service and internationalcooperation in UAV programs to support systems development. The Joint Requirement OversightCouncil (JROC), which "reviews operational requirements representing the interests of theoperational or warfighting community" and its combatant commanders, (28) established a UAV SpecialStudies Group, which serves as the staff-level advisory and action organization concerning all UAVissues under JROC's purview. (29) In what appeared to be a move toward further management restructuring, reports in the springof 2005 indicated that OSD was considering appointing one of the services as the executive agentand coordinator for UAV programs, a position for which Air Force actively petitioned. (30) However, in late June2005, the JROC announced that DoD had abandoned the notion of an executive agent in favor of twosmaller organizations focusing on interoperability. (31) The first, entitled the Joint UAV Overarching Integrated ProductTeam (OIPT), provides a forum for identification and problem solving of major interoperability andstandardization issues between the services. (32) In compliment, the Joint UAV Center of Excellence coordinateswith the OIPT to improve interoperability and enhance UAV applications through the examinationof sensor technologies, UAV intelligence collection assets, system technologies, training andtactics. (33) Over the past three years, management initiatives to increase system uniformity andinteroperability have been equally as numerous as the overall management structure initiatives. Most recently, JROC established two organizations to promote joint coordination of production. The constant organizational changes has led to mounting concern over UAV management.These fluctuations suggest that DoD has not yet landed on a final UAV development and oversightstructure to meet the needs of the military. Instead, the recent establishment of the Joint UAV OIPTand Joint UAV COE have lead many to believe that these bodies are not a final solution, but a stepin the right direction. The March 2005 testimony by the GAO to the House Armed ServicesSubcommittee on Tactical Air and Land Forces most likely played a role in facilitating the OSD'screation of these management groups. The testimony criticized DoD for the lack of an "...oversightbody to guide UAV development efforts and related investment decisions," which ultimately doesnot allow DoD "...to make sound program decisions or establish funding priorities." (34) From the testimony, itwould appear that the GAO envisioned a central authority or body to satisfy this role. However,DoD's intended purpose for this oversight body may differ from the GAO's concept. Air ForceMajor General Stephen M. Goldfein, commander of the Air Warfare Center at Nellis Air ForceBase, NV, described the UAV Center of Excellence as a "...one-stop shop that takes a look at all thepossibilities for common operating systems and the best ways to use UAVs". (35) If the intent of thesebodies are simply to serve as 'one-stop' checkpoints in the UAV development process instead of thecentralized monitoring and oversight authority envisioned by the GAO, then questions may ariseover where the final management authority resides -- within these bodies or with each of theservices? The task of finding adequate answers to these problems may fall on the shoulders ofCongress in the coming years. Outside of the current management structure, does our defense establishment have anadequate plan or framework for how UAVs will fit into the future of U.S. warfighting? The JointUAV Task Force released in 2001 and 2002 the UAV Roadmap and a follow up in 2005, entitled the 2005-2030 UAS Roadmap for the purpose of providing guidance on the future roles for UAVs, thetechnological progress and opportunities for UAVs, and the potential UAV investment needs. InMarch of 2005, prior to the release of the updated UAS Roadmap , the GAO called upon theDepartment of Defense to establish a binding and authoritative strategic plan, citing the 2002Roadmap failure to outline the inter-service strategic goals for UAVs and its lack of clearly definedinvestment priorities. (36) The 2005 UAS Roadmap reiterates its predecessor's mandate and scope. It states that itspurpose is part of an oversight service in which the intent is to give strong guidance "...in suchcross-program areas as standards development and other interoperability solutions." (37) Furthermore, the Roadmapneither, "....authorizes specific UAS nor prioritizes the requirements.... It does, however, identifyfuture windows when technology should become available to enable new capabilities, linked towarfighters' needs, to be incorporated into current or planned UAS." (38) Like its predecessor, theRoadmap only provides guidance and refrains from establishing a authoritative blueprint for thefuture of UAV development paths and approaches. Most likely, the discrepancy between the DoD'sapproach to the Roadmap's authority and the GAO's vision of strategic UAV plan will generatesignificant debate in the discussion of future UAV management. Consequently, in the wake of theestablishment of the Joint UAV OIPT and COE, Congress may decide to revisit therecommendations of the GAO and to evaluate the adequacy of the Roadmap mandate in order todetermine the best way to integrate UAVs into our future warfighting capabilities. All four military services, the U.S. Special Operations command (SOCOM), and the U.S.Coast Guard are developing and fielding UAVs. Developing a coordinated, DOD-wide UAVinvestment strategy appears key to ensuring duplication is avoided, and scarce resources aremaximized. As part of its defense oversight role, Congress is positioned to arbitrate betweencompeting UAV investments, or impact DOD's overarching investment plan. Several relevantquestions seem apparent: How is UAV cost quantified? What is the most effective balance inspending between UAVs and manned aircraft? How should DoD, Congress and the UAVmanufacturers balance cost with capability? Finally, what areas of investment are the most importantto maximize UAV capabilities? Quantifying and characterizing cost has proven to be a complicated task for the members ofthe UAV community, yet would need to be assessed in an exploration of UAV cost efficiency. (39) As with most aircraft,UAV costs can be depicted by different measurements. Two of the most frequently cited costdescriptions are flyaway cost, and program acquisition unit cost (PAUC). According to the AirForce's System Command (AFSC) Cost Estimating Handbook, an air vehicle's flyaway cost includes"prime mission equipment (sensor payload, propulsion mechanics, and body design), systemsengineering, program management, and allowances for engineering changes and warranties." (40) In contrast, the PAUC,as described by the Government Accountability Office, is the "total of all acquisition-relatedappropriations divided by the total quantity of fully configured end items", which takes into accountacquisition cost from previous years that tend to be more than the current year acquisition cost. (41) The difference betweenGlobal Hawk's PAUC and flyaway cost demonstrates the wide discrepancy between these costdescriptions: Global Hawk's flyaway cost for FY2005 was $64.1 million, while its PAUC is $128.7million. (42) When compared to other aircraft, the cost of an individual remotely piloted vehicle can bemisleading. UAVs operate as part of a system, which generally consist of a ground control station,a ground crew including remote pilots and sensor operators, communication links and often otherair vehicles. Unlike a manned aircraft such as an F-16, these supporting elements are a requisite forthe vehicle's flight. (43) Consequently, analysts comparing UAV costs to manned aircraft may need to consider the cost ofthe supporting elements and operational infrastructure that make up the complete unmanned aviationsystem. Monitoring or evaluating UAV costs can also be complicated by budgeting conventions. While UAVs can be found in the "Aircraft Procurement, Air Force" account in that service's budgetrequest documentation, the Army includes its UAV funding requests in "Other Procurement, Army." This account contains a broad range of dissimilar items to be procured. Also, because most UAVsconduct Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance missions, some portion of their costs arecovered in the Intelligence budget rather than the DOD budget, which complicates building acomplete picture of cost. Once an adequate and uniform cost comparison mechanism or definition has beenestablished, the next step for Congress may be to identify an appropriate balance in spendingbetween UAVs and manned aircraft. As a result of the apparent ascension of UAVs to a permanentposition in the US's military aircraft inventory, one logical question should be, "How much shouldbe spent on UAVs in relation to manned aircraft?." If the upward trend in UAV funding continuesthrough 2010, as shown in Figure 3 , DoD is projected to have spent upwards of $18 billion onprocurement, RDT&E, operations and maintenance for UAVs from 2001-2010. This number farexceeds the $3.5 billion spent on UAVs in the preceding decade. Source: OSD, UAS Roadmap 2005-2030, August 2005, p.37. Figure 4 illustrates the funding by platform requested and expected to be requested by theexecutive branch from FY2005 to FY2011. While funding for many of these programs will remainsteady through the decade, the Presidential Budget Requests for the Joint Unmanned Combat AirSystem is expected to break $1 billion by FY2011, which could be an indicator of where theDepartment of Defense plans to go with UAV funding. Source : OSD, UAS Roadmap 2005-2030, August 2005, p.38. Figure 5 compares manned to unmanned funding from FY2006 through FY2011. The chartreveals that UAV will remain somewhere under 10% of the total spending on all militaryaviation. (44) Figure 6 demonstrates the total funding for UAVs as a percentage of the total military aviation funding. Asthe pie chart shows, UAV funding only represents three percent of all military aviation funding. Source for Figs 5 & 6 : DoD UAS Roadmap 2005-2030; FY2006 DoD Justification Books forprocurement and RDT&E of manned aircraft. Does not include small UAVs, micro-UAVs orlighter-than-air platforms. Cost savings have long been touted by UAV advocates as one of the advantages offered byunmanned aircraft over manned aircraft. However, critics point out that the acquisition cost savingsare often negligible if one considers that money saved by not having a pilot in the cockpit must beapplied to the "ground cockpit" of the UAV aircrew operating the UAV from the ground controlstation. Another cost question concerns personnel. Do UAV "pilots" cost less to train and keepproficient than pilots of manned aircraft? (45) So although the air vehicle might be cheaper than a mannedaircraft, the UAV system as a whole is not always less expensive. (46) Additionally, UAVs havea higher attrition rate and lower reliability rate than manned aircraft, which means that the operationand maintenance costs can be higher. On the other hand, UAV ground control stations are capableof simultaneously flying multiple UAVs, somewhat restoring the advantage in cost to the unmannedsystem. (47) Congresshas noted that, "while the acquisition per unit cost may be relatively small, in the aggregate, theacquisition cost rivals the investment in other larger weapon systems." (48) Two studies have addressed the head-to head manned vs. unmanned cost issue. The first,a CBO study, showed that replacing Army manned attack helicopters with UCAVs would produceno significant savings in steady-state procurement costs relative to current plans. (49) DoD also studied thecomparative costs of manned vs. unmanned aircraft in their UAV Roadmap 2000. It found that development costs were essentially the same while there was a cost savings in procurement costswhen an F-16 was compared to an unmanned combat aerial vehicle (UCAV). (50) Assuming that a funding balance is struck between manned and unmanned vehicles, howthen will DoD juggle cost with capability? The OSD has cited this question as one of its mostpressing challenges. A significant concern with some UAVs is their rising price tag. In a March 9,2005 hearing, for example, members of the House Armed Services Committee Tactical Air and LandForces Subcommittee expressed their concern over cost growth of not just "high-tech" UAVs likeGlobal Hawk and JUCAS, but also relatively less technologically ambitious UAVs. (51) At what threshold does an "expendable" UAV cost too much to lose? Sensors haveconsistently increased the cost of the air vehicle, according to Former Air Force Secretary JamesRoche. (52) Theinexpensive design of small UAV air vehicles like the Desert Hawk and Dragon Eye are dwarfed bythe cost of the lightweight electro-optical/infrared cameras that make up their payloads. On the otherend of the size spectrum, the RQ-4 B second generation Global Hawk's sensor payload representsapproximately 54 percent of the vehicles flyaway cost, which does not include the cost of theincreased wingspan that shoulders the extra 1000 pounds of sensor suites. (53) These costs are increasingdue to the basic law of supply and demand. Growing demand, matched with a lack of commercialsensor equivalents, means that UAV sensor producers face little competition, which would help keepcosts down. Growing sensor costs have prompted some to recommend equipping UAVs withself-protection devices, suggesting those UAVs are no longer considered expendable. Consequently, there are two schools of thought for UAV employment that could help balance costwith capability. One is to field many smaller, less expensive and less capable UAVs controlledthrough a highly interconnected communications network. (54) One example of thisinvestment approach is the developmental Army's Future Combat System, which networks severalrelatively inexpensive UAVs like the Raven, the Shadow and the Fire Scout with 18 other weaponsplatforms. None of these UAVs can individually shoulder all of the air duties required by thesystem, yet the robust communications network is expected to distribute the mission duties to alloweach platform to provide its specialized task. (55) A second approach advocates fielding fewer, more expensive and more capable UAVs thatare less networked with other systems, such as the autonomous Global Hawk. The Global Hawkserves as a high altitude, "all-in-one" surveillance platform capable of staying aloft for days at a time,yet does not operate in concert with any of its fellow UAV peers. Since 2003, programs at bothends of this spectrum have experienced delays and a reduction in funding. The Army's FutureCombat System has experienced delays due to significant management and technology issues. Similarly, the highly capable Global Hawk and the J-UCAS program have risen in cost and beenconsumed by apparent management struggles, which have prompted funding cuts for both. (56) Finally, what areas of investment will yield the maximum effectiveness out of these UAVs?Four specific issues stand out as the most pressing: interoperability, reliability, forcemultiplication/autonomy, and engine systems. Over the past three years of the UAV evolution, one the most worrisome issues for UAVshas been the slow pace of the advancement of interoperability. Recently, acting chief of acquisitionsfor the Department of Defense Michael Wynne declared that the lack of interoperability could be oneof the pitfalls that causes DoD to "fall out of love with UAVs" unless the matter was resolvedsoon. (57) The futureplans for UAV usage within the framework of larger battlefield operations and more interconnectedand potentially joint-service combat systems require UAVs to seamlessly communicate between eachother and numerous different ground components, and to also be compatible with as equallynumerous ground control systems. The lack of interconnectivity at these levels have oftencomplicated missions to the point of reducing their effectiveness, as Dyke Weatherington, head ofDoD's UAV planning taskforce, noted in 2004; "There have been cases where a service's UAV, ifit could have gotten data to another service, another component, it may have provided bettersituational awareness on a specific threat in a specific area that might have resulted in differentmeasures being taken." (58) Advancing the interoperability of UAVs has been a critical part of the OSD's investmentplans. The Department of Defense has pushed forward with the establishment ofinter-communication between similar UAVs as a vehicle to help facilitate interoperability amongfour categories. (59) First,DoD hopes to integrate an adequate interface for situational awareness, which will relay theobjective, position, payload composition, service operator and mission tasking procedure to otherunmanned aircraft and potentially to ground elements. Second, a payload interface will allow thecoherent transfer of surveillance data while the third category, the weapons interface, will constitutea separate transfer medium by which operators can coordinate these platform's offensive capabilities. Finally, the air vehicle control interface will enable navigation and positioning from the ground withrespect to other aircraft. Although the framework for these categories of interoperability has been established, thetechnology has been slow to catch up. The House of Representatives version of the FY2006Defense Authorization Act ( H.R. 1815 , House Report 109-89) took a major step toencourage inter-platform communication. The members of the House Armed Services Committeeincluded a clause that called for the requirement of all tactical unmanned aerial vehicles throughoutthe services to be equipped with the Tactical Common Data Link, which has become the services'standardized communication tool for providing "critical wideband data link required for real-timesituational awareness, as well as real time sensor and targeting data to tactical commanders." (60) The 2005 UnmannedAircraft Systems (UAS) Roadmap (61) endeavors to take a step further; it intends to field the CommonData Link communications systems for not only tactical UAVs, but for all large UAVs as well. (62) If UAVs are to achievethe level of interoperability envisioned by the OSD, the services and industry must will likely needto keep focused on achieving the Common Data Link communications system goal and investappropriately to facilitate an expedited and efficient development process. The finite bandwidth that currently exists for all military aircraft, and the resultingcompetition for existing bandwidth, may render the expansion of UAV applications infeasible andleave many platforms grounded. Ultimately, the requirement for bandwidth grows with every warthe U.S. fights. (63) Theincreased use of UAVs in the Iraq war indicates that remotely pilotted platform and their massconsumption of bandwitdth will require a more robust information transfer system in the comingyears. Some sources say that the military currently does not have enough bandwidth to downloadvideo and radar images via satellite communications from more than one UAV at a time. In a hearingof the House Armed Services Committee's subcommittee on Tactical Air and Land Forces,Representative Curt Weldon noted that while the United States possesses an extensive fleet ofUAVs, "many sit on many sit on the ground because there is inadequate bandwidth for them to beused effectively." (64) As confirmed by an OSD official in the same hearing, an unspecified number of UAVs in Iraq andAfghanistan are incapable of operations because the information transfer capacity connecting UAVsto the ground operators are simply not large enough to manage multiple UAVs. One program designed to alleviate the bandwidth concern is the Transformation SatelliteCommunications (TSAT) project. DoD intends to use the laser and satellite communications systemto the provide U.S. armed forces with an unlimited and uninhibited ability to send and receivemessages and critical information around the world without data traffic jams. (65) However, the multibilliondollar project, nicknamed "the internet in the sky", is expected to be the subject of funding cutbacksand, at earliest, will be deployed between 2015 and 2016. (66) As another interim option,DOD has testified that a more autonomous UAV would require less bandwidth, since more data areprocessed on board and less data are being moved. (67) However, it is unclear that autonomy will actually decreasebandwidth requirements since Global Hawk, an autonomous UAV, is currently the most aggressivebandwidth user. One solution to alleviating the bandwidth problem is allowing UAVs to be operated from amanned stand-off aircraft such as a command and control aircraft. Stationing the mission controlelement of the UAV system in another aircraft instead of on the ground would reduce the relianceon satellites for beyond line of sight communication, simplifying command and control. Not onlywould this help overcome the bandwidth issue, but it would also address another potential problemarea, which is pilot manpower and retention. Pilots in this case would still get to "fly" whileoperating the UAV. Experimentation is currently ongoing in this area, with the first step beingcontrolling the UAV's sensor payload from the air. Investment in reliability upgrades appear to be another high priority for UAVs in recent years. In 2004 the Defense Science Board indicated that relatively high UAV mishap rates might impedethe widespread fielding of UAVs. (68) The 2005 UAS Roadmap indicates that UAV mishap ratesappear to be much higher than the mishap rates of many manned aircraft. Table 2 shows the numberof Class A Mishap per 100,000 hours of major UAVs and comparable manned aircraft. (69) Table 2. Select Mishap Rates Source : DoD's UAS Roadmap 2005-2030, p. 75. In its recent UAV study, the Defense Science Board (DSB) notes that manned aircraft overthe past five decades have moved from the relatively high mishap rate to relatively low rates throughthe advancement of system design, weather durability improvements and reliability upgrades. (70) It should be pointed out,however, that the UAVs, with the exception of Predator, have total flight times that are significantlyless the than the 100,000 hours used to calculate the mishap rate. Most aircraft tend to have a muchhigher mishap rate in their first 50,000 hours of flight than their second 50,000 hours of flight. Further, some of the UAVs in Table 2, have flown numerous missions while still under development . Predator and Global Hawk, for instance, were rushed into combat well prior to the aircrafts' initialoperational capability: 2005 for Predator, and a projected FY2006 for Global Hawk. It is unfair,some might argue, to compare the mishap rates of developmental UAVs with manned aircraft thathave completed development and been modernized and refined over decades of use. The DSB's report also suggests that nominal upgrades and investment -- arguing even thatmany UAVs will need little change -- could produce substantial reductions in the UAV mishap rates. The 2005 UAS Roadmap proposes investments into emerging technologies, such as self-repairing"smart" flight control systems, auto take-off and recovery instruments, and heavy fuel engines, toenhance reliability. (71) Also the incorporation of advanced materials -- such as high temperature components, light-weightstructures, shape memory alloys and cold weather tolerance designs that include significant de-icingagent -- will also be expected to improve the survivability of UAVs in adverse environments. (72) One of the most attractive and innovative technological priorities in the industry is to enableone ground operator to pilot several UAVs at once. At the 2003 Paris Airshow, Vice President ofBoeing's Integrated Defense Advanced Systems, Mike Heinz said, "We have to reduce operatorworkload. That's been a real thorn in our side. Typically, we have had multiple operators per vehicle,...but where we want to go is multiple vehicles per operator." (73) Currently most UAVsrequire at least two ground operators; one to pilot the vehicle and another control the sensors. Theend goal for UAV manufactures and users is to reduce the to 2:1 operator-vehicle ratio andeventually to elevate the autonomy and interoperability of UAV to the point where two or morevehicles can be controlled by one operator. If this technological feat is established, the advantageof UAVs as a force-multiplier on the battle field could provide a dramatic change in combatcapability. Many believe that the process of achieving this goal would most likely require significanttime and investments. As the 2005 UAS Roadmap notes, "Getting groups of UA to team (or swarm)in order to accomplish an objective will require significant investment in control technologies" withspecific reference to distributed control technologies. (74) Considering the two operator system currently in place for mostUAVs, the logical approach to reaching this technological advancement is to first invest in theautonomous flight capabilities of the UAVs, so as to reduce the workload for UAVs. The GlobalHawk and the Scan Eagle possess significant automate flight capabilities, but their degree of actualflight autonomy can be debated due to the UAV's need for continuous operator intervention in poorweather conditions. The OSD quantifies the degree of UAV autonomy in on a scale of one to ten. Table 3 shows the OSD's Autonomous Capability Levels for UAVs. Table 3. Autonomous Capability Levels(ACL) Source : Data taken from DoD's UAS Roadmap 2005-2030, p. D-10. Note: OSD. UAS Roadmap 2005-2030, August 2005, p. D-7. In order for UAVs to achieve maximum use when being controlled by a single pilot, the UAVACL must achieve a level of at least eight. Currently, the Global Hawk, which is considered bymany as the most autonomous UAV presently in service, maintains an ACL of approximately 2.5. J-UCAS plans hope to make the combat UAV capable of autonomous flight levels of six, yet thetimetable for this level is fairly far off. FAA and the UAV industry are working with the Departmentof Defense in order to facilitate the universal development of "see and avoid" technology that wouldallow a UAV to operate autonomously and avoid approaching aircraft, potentially increasing thestandard ACL for UAVs to four. Additionally, inter-UAV communication and the coordinationassociated with interoperability (see interoperability above) must match the autonomous flightabilities. Full automation of sensor capabilities would enable the lone operator to control a networkof intelligence collecting drones. The first steps towards the "one-operator-per-several-UAVs" advancement are alreadyunderway. Recently, the Air Force evaluated a Predator upgrade that allowed one operator to pilotup two four UAVs. (75) The Multi-Aircraft Control (MAC) system allowed one ground pilot to control the flight plan of fourPredator UAVs during an exercise in which one UAV engages a target and the other three hovernearby on standby status. The next step is to consolidate the tasks of the four mission payloadoperator, each manning the sensors or weapons system on the four Predators, into one or feweroperators. One key area of investment interest may be heavy fuel burning engines. The OSD's2005-2030 Unmanned Aviation System Roadmap outlined the development of heavy fuel engine(HEF) in order to replace gasoline-powered internal combustion engines as a top priority for UAVinvestment. (76) (Heavyfuel refers to diesel or JP-8 fuel, used by the Army and Air Force. (77) ) The Defense ScienceBoard urged DoD to take the lead in investing in the rapid development and acquisition of heavyfuel engines for Predator, Shadow, Hunter and Fire Scout primarily because of the lack ofcommercial demand for these engines. Enrique J. Enriguez, President of the Locust USA, Inc.testified that the ...military has clearly established their need for heavyfuel burning engines for UAVs, but industry has been slow to respond to this need. In the small sizerange that we are working in, the military requirements are in place requiring heavy fuel burningengines; however, these requirements are being placed on the aircraft developer. (78) The incorporation of heavy fuel engines onto UAVs could help the vehicle to climb faster,operate at more lofty altitudes and to reduce the amount of time spent servicing the engine on theground. Proponent of heavy fuel engines argue that the integration of heavy fuel engines would notonly increase performance capabilities and reduce servicing time, but would make the UAVs flightsystem more reliable and significantly reduce operations and maintenance costs. Furthermore, heavyfuel is cheaper and more abundant than the gasoline used in standard internal combustion engines. However, some drawbacks may exist when applying HFE to UAVs. The targeted unmannedplatforms for this engine are the medium-sized and less complex UAVs such as Shadow, Pioneerand Predator. Although the operations and maintenance costs may lessened by the heavy fuel engine,the initial acquisition cost is much greater than traditional engines and could burden these relativelycheap UAVs with increased production costs. Furthermore, developers are experiencing difficultiesin designing an engine light enough and small enough to accommodate the flight requirements ofthis lighter UAV. Another alternative being considered is a modified fuel cell under development by PacificNorthwest National Laboratory. Supporters of fuel cells note that these devices could double theefficiency of mid-sized UAVs and could reduce the acoustic and thermal signatures of the UAVs,effectively making them more difficult to detect and target. (79) Air Combat Command issponsoring the project with the idea in mind to use the fuel cells in many of its smaller UAVs andexpects a flight test in 2010. Considering the growing abundance of remotely-piloted platforms and the rapid growth ofthe UAV industry, some may question whether DoD has a coherent plan for determining UAV rolesand applications. Specifically, are UAVs being applied to new roles aggressively enough? Conversely, is DoD too eager to use UAVs? Are there alternatives that should be considered for theirmissions? Under what circumstances does it make more sense to add missions to a single-missionUAV, rather than develop a new UAV for the new mission? Traditionally, and contemporaneously, most UAVs are designed and used primarily forintelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) missions. (80) Some project that ISRUAVs will be the dominant UAV role until at least 2014. (81) ISR applications range from multi-intelligence, high altitude andlong endurance missions conducted by the Global Hawk over Iraq and Afghanistan, or"over-the-hill" reconnaissance and sniper spotting performed by the Army's Raven UAV. In 2003 100 percent of DoD's major UAV programs (five of five programs) conducted ISR missions. (82) In 2005, 87 percent (12of 16 major programs) are designed for ISR missions. This two year comparison indicates somediversification of UAV missions, and a rapid growth in overall programs. With this rapid growth in ISR UAVs may come the concern that production of numerousaircraft with the same basic mission could yield unnecessary duplication. Some contend that DoDhas had a difficult time building joint manned aircraft in the past. (83) The Services' desire tooptimally satisfy their unique operational requirements have often made them unwilling tocompromise and accept an aircraft developed by another service. Might UAV development beequally vulnerable to this dynamic? Why, some in Congress have asked, for example, does the Navy require a new maritime surveillanceUAV? Why can't they purchase the Global Hawk? (84) The majority of ISR UAVs possess apparently similarelectro-optical and infrared sensors. They are differentiated, however, by the altitude reached, theircommunications range, their flight endurance and their landing/takeoff procedure. In the future,Congress may act to decide when a new UAV program is justified, and when it is duplicative. Table 4. ISR UAVs with E-O/IR Sensors Source : OSD. 2005-2030 UAS Roadmap. August 2005, p.4-25. Figure 7 shows a comparison of the performance specifications of ISR-capable UAVs. Thechart indicates that a majority of UAVs feature an endurance of 4 to 8 hours, an altitude of 10,000- 20,000 ft, max speeds between 105 and 125 knots and radiuses of 100 to 150 nm. Figure 7. ISR UAV Characteristics Congress may ask if the production of different UAVs with relatively similar performancecapabilities constitutes unnecessary duplication. Critics of these expanded UAV roles often arguethat the production of these similar platforms is unnecessary, considering that a consolidatedinventory -- hypothetically consisting of only the RQ-4B Global Hawk, the RQ/MQ-1 Predator andthe RQ-2 Pioneer -- could perform and fulfill the same duties as the expanded inventory. However,proponents of the more varied platform inventory often argue that these basic performancecapabilities cannot alone qualify the necessity of these UAVs, and that the variety of UAVs reflectsthe specific need of the mission or user-services and not unnecessary duplication. Furthermore, theyargue that landing/takeoff capabilities, durability, storage requirements and overall cost all playadditional roles in determining the necessity of the vehicle. In recent years, the UAV's role in combat missions has significantly increased. The firstpublic acknowledgment that UAVs were being used for combat operations was in 2002 when aPredator UAV outfitted with a Hellfire missile attacked and killed several Al-Qaeda operatives inYemen. (85) Now theUAV combat landscape has changed: the majority of the Predator A UAVs have been equipped withHellfire missiles; Predator B comes off the assembly line with a large array of munitions; theMaverick, I-Gnat-ER, Fire Scout and Hunter UAVs are undergoing armament evaluations; and theJ-UCAS program endeavors to create the first UAV primarily designed for offensive applications. Using UAVs to deliver air-to-ground munitions appears inherently useful. UAVs can loiterover the battlefield to attack emerging targets, at no risk to flight crew. Yet, UAVs are not withoutlimitations. While cost and effectiveness comparisons between manned and unmanned aircraft mustbe made cautiously, doing so can help determine when using UAVs for combat operations is moreattractive than using manned aircraft. The 2006 actual current year cost for the MQ-9 Predator B is $11.7 million, about one-thirdthe $35.5 million estimate for the F-16 Falcon. A simple payload comparison shows that the F-16can carry approximately four times the payload of the Predator B (10,750 lbs vs 2,500 lbs). (86) This means that the costper one pound of munitions delivered is $4,680 for the Predator and $3,302 for the F-16. (87) Further, the F-16 is aversatile combat aircraft that can be used to perform many missions that the Predator B cannot. Thismay suggest that using manned aircraft for air-to-ground combat may generally prove more costeffective than using UAVs, and that he UAV's unique combat capabilities may be most valued inniche circumstances, such as when manned aircraft would be in extreme danger. Other missions for which UAVs appear useful, or are being considered in the near-term,include electronic attack (also called stand-off jamming, or escort jamming), and psychologicaloperations, such dropping leaflets. On the medical side, UAVs such as the Army's Shadow have beenstudied and evaluated for its capability to deliver critical medical supplies needed on the battlefield. While UAV use in foreign theaters is well established, one of the most commonly discussednew mission areas for UAVs is homeland defense and homeland security. The Coast Guard and U.S.Border Patrol already have plans to deploy UAVs such as the Eagle Eye to watch coastal waters,patrol the nation's borders, and protect major oil and gas pipelines. Congressional support exists forusing UAVs like the Predator for border security. During a Senate Armed Services Committeehearing on homeland defense, several members agreed that although it would not be appropriate orconstitutional for the military to patrol the border, domestic agencies using UAVs could carry outthis mission. (88) It appears that interest is growing in using UAVs for a variety of domestic, and oftennon-defense roles. Long-duration law enforcement surveillance, a task performed by manned aircraftduring the October 2002 sniper incident near Washington, D.C. is one example. The U.S.Department of Transportation has studied possible security roles for UAVs, such as following truckswith hazardous cargo, while the Energy Department has been developing high-altitude instrumentsto measure radiation in the atmosphere. (89) The inexpensive vertical take-off and landing GoldenEye 100UAV is expected to serve as a medium-range, small-package transport and may be affordable enoughfor local law enforcement use during events of large-scale civil unrest. (90) UAVs might also be usedin sparsely populated areas of the western United States to search for forest fires. Following thewide-spread destruction of Hurricane Katrina, some suggest that a UAV like Global Hawk couldplay roles in "consequence management" and relief efforts. (91) Also, UAV advocates notethat countries like South Korea and Japan have used UAVs for decades for crop dusting and otheragricultural purposes. (92) Not all of these new applications have are uncontroversial -- UAV advocates state that inorder for UAVs to take an active role in homeland security, Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)regulations and UAV flight requirements must approach a common ground. According to FAAspokeman William Shumann, the primary challenge in meeting this common ground is "to developvehicles that meet FAA safety requirements if they want to fly in crowded airspace". (93) The August 2003announcement that the FAA had granted the Air Force a certificate of authorization for nationalairspace operation signifies the first steps in the reconciliation of these discrepancies. (94) Upgrading UAVs collisionavoidance capabilities appears to be a critical part in the next step of reaching the UAV-airspacecommon ground. The FAA's Unmanned Aircraft Systems Working Group indicates it will workwith the Department of Defense, specifically through the new UAV OIPT and Center of Excellenceto facilitate safe UAV operations and the adequacy of flight requirements. (95) The schedule for integrating UAVs into the national airspace may become contentious. AFebruary 2004 study by the Defense Science Board found that "DoD has an urgent need to allowUAVs unencumbered access to the National Airspace System...here in the United States and aroundthe world." (96) InSeptember 2005 it was reported, however, that NASA planned to cancel funding for Access 5 , agovernment/industry partnership created to facilitate the incorporation of UAVs into the nationalairspace system. UAV advocates bemoaned this development, arguing that disbanding Access 5 would severely hamper the forecasted development of UAVs and their numerous globalapplications. (97) Further in the future, large UAVs could take on the aerial refueling task now performed byKC-10 and KC-135 tanker aircraft. Although DOD has not expressed plans for exploring the aerialrefueling role, it appears to some to be a mission well suited for unmanned aircraft. The flightprofiles flown by KC-10 and KC-135 aircraft are relatively benign compared to many other aircraft,and they tend to operate far from enemy air defenses. Except for operating the refueling boom (torefuel Air Force aircraft), the refueling crew's primary job is to keep the aircraft flying straight, level,and at a steady speed. The Global Hawk's 2001 trans-oceanic flights (from the United States toAustralia and from the United States to Portugal) demonstrate the ability of current UAVs to flymissions analogous to aerial refueling missions. Another, far more difficult future task, could be air-to-air combat. DOD is experimentingwith outfitting today's UAVs with the sensors and weapons required to conduct such a mission. In fact, a Predator has reportedly already engaged in air to-air combat withan Iraqi fighter aircraft. In March, 2003 it was reported that a Predator launched a Stinger air-to-airmissile at an Iraqi MiG before the Iraqi aircraft shot it down. (98) While this operationalencounter may be a "baby step" on the way toward an aerial combat capability, it appears significant.Aerial combat is often described as the most challenging mission for manned aircraft to perform,and, some say, one that UAVs will never be able to accomplish. Though embryonic, the recentPredator launch of an air-to-air missile will likely hearten UAV advocates who wish to see moreaggressive missions for unmanned aircraft. Are UAVs always the preferred platforms for these new roles and applications? Otheroptions could include manned aircraft, blimps, and space satellites. (99) Each platform offers bothadvantages and disadvantages. Manned aircraft provide a flexible platform, but risk a pilot's life. Some of the country's largest defense contractors are competing to develop unmanned blimps thatmay be capable of floating months at a time at an altitude of 70,000 feet and carrying 4,000 poundsof payload. OSD's 2005 UAS Roadmap includes a section on lighter-than-air blimps and tethered"aerostat" platforms, which OSD indicates to be important for a variety of roles, includingpsychological operations, spot incoming enemy missiles and border monitoring. Furthermore, theseplatforms could provide services equivalent to many border surveillance UAVs, but their decreaseddependency on fuel could minimize operations costs. One drawback to these lighter-than-airplatforms is their lack of maneuverability and speed relative to UAVs like the Global Hawk. None-the-less, the goal of many major UAV manufacturers is to develop an operational system by2010 that could carry out a variety of missions for homeland security. (100) Space satellites offer many benefits -- they are thought to be relatively invulnerable to attack,and field many advanced capabilities. However, tasking the satellites can be cumbersome, especiallywith competing national priorities. The limited number of systems can only serve so manycustomers at one time. Additionally, some satellites lack the loitering capability of UAVs, onlypassing over the same spot on Earth about once every three days. Due to the high costs of spacelaunches, UAVs like Global Hawk are being considered for communication relays as substitutes forlow-orbiting satellite constellations. (101) One commonly voiced concern with the pace of UAV production is that these remotelypiloted planes will replace manned aircraft in large numbers. (102) Critics of mass UAVproduction warn that a reliance on unmanned vehicles degrades pilot skills and takes away thetactical flexibility and adaptability that manned aircraft bring to combat operations. It has not always been easy for the aviation culture to adapt to flying aircraft from the ground. Deputy Secretary of Defense Wolfowitz, during a hearing on transformation, stated that: Not long ago, an Air Force F-15 pilot had to bepersuaded to forego a rated pilot's job to fly Predator. Now Air Force leadership is working hard toencourage this pilot and others to think of piloting UAVs as a major mission and to become trailblazers in defining new concepts of operations. (103) The Air Force has realized the retention implications of requiring rated pilots to fly their UAVs (104) , and has offeredenticements such as plum assignments after flying the UAV, and allowing pilots to keep up theirmanned flying hours during their UAV tour of duty. Historically, many believed that as more UAVs were fielded, recruitment and retentionwould suffer because those inclined to join the military would prefer to fly manned aircraft insteadof unmanned aircraft. This may be the case in some instances. The future impact of DoD's UAVprograms on recruitment, however is more complicated than this argument suggests. The recruitment and retention situation varies among the services and for different types ofpersonnel. While the Army appears to be having some difficulty with recent recruitment, the AirForce and Navy are actively trying to reduce their number of uniformed personnel. Thus, reducedenlistments due to increased UAV use, if that turns out to be the case, might not have the anticipatedimpact. (105) A central question related to the potential impact of increased UAV employment onpersonnel, is "what qualifications are required to operate UAVs?" Currently, the Air Force requirePredator and Global Hawk operators to be pilot-rated officers. Other services do not require UAVoperators to be pilot-rated officers. This means that, in the other services, there is no competitionbetween manned and un-manned aircraft for potentially scarce pilots. Many enlist in military service with no desire, or intention to fly manned aircraft. Some wishto fly, but lack physical qualifications, such as good eyesight. The increased fielding of UAVs mayencourage some to enlist because it offers them an opportunity to "fly" that they may not have hadotherwise. Further, those inclined to fly manned aircraft may not be as disinclined to fly UAVs aswas believed in the past. Flying armed UAVs may be more appealing to these personnel than isflying non-armed UAVs. Also, flying UAVs may be an attractive compromise for certain personnel. While it may not confer all the excitement of flying a manned aircraft, it also avoids many of thehardships (e.g. arduous deployments and potential harm). The Air Force believes that flying UAVsfrom control stations in the United States will be attractive to some Reservists and Guardsmen whomay already be disinclined to experience an active duty lifestyle consistent with flying mannedaircraft. Also, not all UAVs compete with manned aircraft for pilots. Those UAVs that arepre-programmed and operate autonomously (like Global Hawk) do not require a pilot, like thePredator and other remotely piloted vehicles. The Air Force maintains that their UAVs are more technologically and operationallysophisticated than other UAVs, and a trained pilot is required to employ these UAVs mosteffectively. As UAV autonomy, or command and control matures, or if personnel issues for the AirForce become more troublesome, it, or Congress, may decide to review the policy of requiringpilot-rated officers to operate UAVs. Increased employment of UAVs could potentially boost enlistment in other specialties, if theyare perceived as being effective in their missions. If, for example, those inclined to enlist in infantrypositions perceive UAVs to offer improved force protection and CAS capabilities over today'smanned aircraft, these potential recruits may have fewer qualms about the potential hazards ofcombat. Congress is perennially confronted with a spate of defense industrial base issues. Is U.S.industry becoming too dependent on foreign suppliers? Do foreign competitors get governmentsubsidies that put U.S. firms at a competitive disadvantage? Should Congress take steps toencourage or discourage defense industry consolidation? Should Congress take steps to promotecompetition in the defense industrial base? Should Congress takes steps to protect U.S. defenseindustries in order to safeguard technologies or processes critical to national defense? (106) It appears that DoD'spursuit of UAVs presents several inter-related issues relevant to the defense industrial base. Some are concerned, that if UAVs are increasingly designed and built, funding for mannedaircraft programs is likely to wane, and the technical expertise required to design, and perhaps build manned combat aircraft could erode. Many point out that the ability to produce world class combataircraft is a distinct U.S. comparative advantage, and should be guarded closely. Others disagree thatthe pursuit of UAVs could harm the industrial base. They argue that the Joint Strike Fighter is likelyto be the last manned tactical fighter, and that the industrial base is naturally evolving toward theskills and processes required to make increasingly advanced UAVs. Those who fear manned industrial base atrophy argue that the future of UAVs is overrated,and that there will be a demand for tactical manned aircraft in the post-JSF timeframe. In their eyes,crucial skills and technologies could thus be lost by concentrating only on unmanned aircraft design,possibly causing U.S. dominance in tactical aircraft design to wane. These proponents point out thatUAVs have been around for almost a century, yet only recently became operationally effective, andare not likely to replace manned aircraft in the near future. (107) Some disagree, and believe that critical manned aircraft design skills are not jeopardized byincreased pursuit of UAVs because there is considerable commonality between manned andunmanned combat aircraft. Except for the obvious lack of a cockpit, unmanned combat aircraft mayrequire stealthy airframes, advanced avionics, and high performance engines just like mannedcombat aircraft. Also, major defense contractors have already begun to shift to unmanned aircraftdesign in order to stay competitive. This is because UAVs are beginning to play a prominent rolein warfare, as seen in Operation Enduring Freedom in 2001 and Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003. The same skills and technologies required for building manned aircraft will likely lend themselvesto unmanned aviation design as well. Companies that have lost out in recent aviation contracts, suchas Boeing and the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) in 2001, are looking towards unmanned bombers andfighters as prospects for growth. (108) Northrop Grumman Corp., as another example, has createda new business unit to aggressively pursue UAV business. (109) If Boeing were todesign manned aircraft in the future, the critical skills needed would still be present, according to thisargument. Others would argue that maintaining a healthy U.S. defense industrial base depends, in part,on how well U.S. firms compete for the global UAV market. One survey finds that in 2005, thereare 195 different UAV programs world wide. (110) Some estimate that global UAV expenditures double from $2.1billion in 2005 to $5 billion in 2014. (111) The global market for combat aircraft alone, at approximately$12.5 billion in 2005, dwarfs the UAV market. But the rate of growth is projected to be muchslower, peaking at approximately $16 billion in 2013, and dropping to approximately $14 billion in2014. (112) Thus, somewould argue that much new business is likely to be generated in the UAV market, and if U.S.companies don't capture this market share, European, Russian, Israeli, Chinese, or South Africancompanies will. From this perspective, capturing this new business, and nurturing industrialexpertise in UAV challenge areas (e.g. autonomous flight, control of multiple vehicles, commandand control, communications bandwidth) would be an effective way to keep U.S. industrycompetitive and healthy. This apparent and projected global growth of UAVs presents the related policy issue of UAVproliferation and export controls. Both the 108th and 109th Congresses have held hearings to expressconcern and explore the policy dimensions of UAV and cruise missile proliferation. (113) UAVs and cruise missiles (essentially a UAV with a weapon payload) are concerns forpolicy makers for two reasons. First, because their proliferation appears difficult to control. Themajority of UAV components are indistinguishable from components found in civil mannedaviation. (114) Therefore, many believe that it is relatively easy to divert legitimate civilian or military exports ofaviation technology into a covert UAV or cruise missile program. (115) UAVs could beaccessible to many countries or even non-state actors (Hizbollah militants, for example, have flownUAVs over Israel, and Al Qaeda has used UAVs to monitor Pakistani soldiers (116) ), that might nototherwise have access to long range aircraft or ballistic missiles. Second, UAV proliferation is aconcern because, if armed, they appear to be cost effective weapons. It cost much more toeffectively defend against these threats than it costs to create the threat. (117) Cruise missiles andUAVs, it is feared, could become the "poor man's air force." The George W. Bush Administrationhas expressed concern over the potential military effectiveness of UAVs in the wrong hands. Priorto the beginning of Operation Iraqi Freedom, for example, both White House and DoD officialsfocused on Iraq's UAVs and how they could be used to attack neighboring countries with weaponsof mass destruction. (118) Foreign companies are increasingly gaining access to keytechnologies that could make future UAVs even more effective. (119) Policy makers maybecome particularly mindful of potential exports of stealth technology, efficient turbofan engines,and terrain avoidance/terrain following guidance systems that could be incorporated in foreignUAVs. As DoD employs UAVs more aggressively, and as U.S. companies pursue a growing bodyof international business opportunities, some in Congress may wish to address policy issues relatedto the potential for UAV proliferation, and its consequences: What steps might be taken to ensurethe pursuit by U.S. companies of domestic and international UAV export success doesn't lead to thedissemination of critical UAV technologies? What balance should be struck between supportinglegitimate military aid to U.S. allies, which may include UAVs, and concerns about the proliferationof these weapon systems? Another complicating issue is that UAVs, when used for ISR, can be very effective inenabling the discriminating use of military force. UAVs can help positively identify enemycombatants, and reduce the accidental targeting of friendly forces or innocent civilians. (120) How might overseersweigh the potential benefits of reducing collateral damage versus the potential acquisition of UAVsby enemy groups and their use against the United States? What revisions might be considered toexisting non-proliferation accords such as the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), to moreeffectively control the spread of UAVs and their technology? Would tighter controls on UAVs bea detriment to industry? (121) This section addresses the program status and funding of some of the most prominent UAVprograms being pursued by DoD, and most likely to compete for congressional attention. Thissection does not attempt to provide a comprehensive survey of all UAV programs, nor to developa classification system for different types of UAVs (e.g. operational vs developmental, singlemission vs multi mission, long range vs short range). One exception is a short subsection belowtitled "Small UAVs." The UAVs described in this section are distinguished from the proceedingUAVs by being man-portable and of short range and loiter time. These smaller UAVs are notcurrently, and are unlikely to be, weaponized. The Services do not provide as detailed cost andbudget documentation for these UAVs as they do for major UAV programs. Individually, theseUAVs appear very popular with ground forces, yet do not necessarily demand as much congressionalattention as larger UAV programs like Predator or Global Hawk. As a whole, however, these small,man-portable UAVs appear likely to increasingly compete with major UAV programs forcongressional attention and funding. Through its high profile use in Iraq and Afghanistan and its multi-mission capabilities, theMQ-1 Predator has become the Department of Defense's most recognizable UAV. Developed byGeneral Atomics Aeronautical Systems in San Diego, CA, the Predator has helped to define themodern role of UAVs with its integrated surveillance payload and armament capabilities. Consequently, Predator has enjoyed accelerated development schedules as well as increasedprocurement funding. The wide employment of the MQ-1 has also facilitated the development ofseveral closely related UAVs (described below) designed for a variety of missions. System Characteristics. Predator is amedium-altitude, long-endurance UAV, roughly half the size of an Air Force F-16 Falcon. At 27 feetlong, 7 feet high and with a 48 foot wingspan, it has long, thin wings and a tail like an inverted "V".The Predator typically operates at 10,000 to 15,000 feet to get the best imagery from its videocameras, although it has the ability to reach a maximum altitude of 25,000 feet. Each vehicle canremain on station, over 500 nautical miles away from its base, for 24 hours before returning home.The Air Force's Predator fleet is operated by the 11th Reconnaissance Squadron out of the IndianSpring Auxiliary Field, Nevada and the 15th and 17th Reconnaissance Squadrons out of Nellis AirForce Base, Nevada. Current reorganization efforts will make Indian Springs the home for all threesquadrons. (122) TheCIA reportedly possesses and operates several Predators as well. Mission and Payload. The Predator's primaryfunction is reconnaissance and target acquisition of potential ground targets. To accomplish thismission, the Predator is outfitted with a 450-lb surveillance payload, which includes twoelectro-optical (E-O) cameras and one infrared (IR) camera for use at night. These cameras arehoused in a ball-shaped turret that can be easily seen underneath the vehicle's nose. The Predator isalso equipped with a Multi-Spectral Targeting System (MTS) sensor ball which adds a laserdesignator to the E-O/IR payload that allows the Predator to track moving targets. Additionally, thePredator's payload includes a synthetic aperture radar (SAR), which enables the UAV to "see"through inclement weather. The Predator's satellite communications provide for beyond line-of-sightoperations. In 2001, as a secondary function, the Predator was outfitted with the ability to carry twoHellfire missiles. Previously, the Predator identified a target and relayed the coordinates to a mannedaircraft, which then engaged the target. The addition of this anti-tank ordinance enables the UAVto launch a precision attack on a time sensitive target with a minimized "sensor-to-shoot" time cycle. Consequently, the Air Force changed the Predator's military designation from RQ-1B(reconnaissance unmanned) to the MQ-1 (multi-mission unmanned). (123) The air vehiclelaunches and lands like a regular aircraft, but is controlled by a pilot on the ground using a joystick. Variants. MQ-9 Predator B . The MQ-9 Predator,or "Predator B", is General Atomic's follow on to MQ-1, or "Predator A". The goal of the PredatorB project is to build upon the strengths of the parent UAV and to advance its mission capabilities. The result is a medium-to-high altitude, long endurance Predator optimized for surveillance, targetacquisition and armed engagement. While the B-model borrows from the overall design of theA-model, the newest incarnation is longer by 13 feet in length and 16 feet in wingspan. It alsofeatures a 900hp Honeywell TPE 331-10 turbo propjet engine, which is significantly more powerfulthan the Predator A's 115hp propjet engine. These upgrades allow the Predator B to reach amaximum altitude of 50,000 feet, a maximum speed of 225 knots, a maximum endurance of 32hours and a maximum range on 2000 nautical miles. (124) General Atomics also upgraded the 17-inch diameter MTScamera gimbal to a 22-inch MTS-B gimbal for extended range surveillance. However, the featurethat most differentiates Predator B from its predecessor is its ordinance capacity. While the PredatorA is outfitted to carry two 100-pound Hellfire missiles, Predator B now can carry as many as 16Hellfires, equivalent to the Army's Apache helicopter, or a mix of 500-pound weapons and SmallDiameter Bombs approximately equal to the munitions payload of an F-16. Additionally, Raytheonhas experimented with a mini-UAV known as "Silent Eyes" to be launched from the fuselage of thePredator B and to serve as a target identifier in supplement to the laser designator. (125) Predator B-ER, "Mariner". The Predator B-Extended Range or "Mariner" is less of a nextgeneration Predator and more of hybrid of the Predator B and NASA's Altair UAV, also producedby General Atomics. The Mariner was created as a result of General Atomic's pursuit of the Navy'sBroad Area Maritime Surveillance (BAMS) program contract. As an extended range UAV, theMariner retains the original airframe of the Predator, but adds the 86 ft. wing from the Altair and anincreased fuel capacity. The subsequent combination has yielded a surveillance UAV capable ofaltitudes of 50,000 feet and a flight endurance of 49 hours. General Atomic has partnered withLockheed Martin System and Sensors to integrate an exterior-mounted maritime radar that willadvance the surveillance capabilities of the Mariner beyond the standard Predator B payload. TheMariner is expected to compete with Northrop Grumman's Global Hawk for the BAMS contract, andthe vehicle's proponents hope that Mariner could have a flyaway cost as little $19 million pervehicle. (126) Predator C. In addition to the Mariner, General Atomics is currently developing a thirdgeneration Predator that uses a turbo-jet engine to fly long endurance, high altitude surveillancemissions. The Predator C will reportedly use the fuselage of the Predator B, but will be similar toNorthrop Grumman's Global Hawk in payload capacity and flight performance. A spokesman forGeneral Atomics stressed that the Predator C will not be a direct competitor with the GlobalHawk. (127) I-Gnat-ER. Currently, the Army uses the I-Gnat as a temporary gap-filler for the RQ-5 Hunterwhen that UAV is removed from deployment to be overhauled or modified. Servicemen in the fieldhave characterized the I-Gnat as a downsized version of the Predator UAV. (128) This medium altitude,long-endurance surveillance and reconnaissance platform is also manufactured by General AtomicAeronautical Systems and evolved as an upgraded derivation of the Gnat-750. The I-Gnat-ERfeatures nearly the same system, payload and performance characteristics as the MQ-1 Predator Awith a few exceptions. The I-Gnat-ER can remain aloft for 30 hour, six hours longer than its AirForce sibling, yet it lacks the SAR and Beyond-Line-Of-Sight (BLOS) capabilities and is engineeredfor a significantly shorter flight radius. The Army currently owns three I-Gnat vehicles as the resultof an FY2004 Congressional budget increase for ER/MP CONOPS development. (129) Two additionalvehicles outfitted with Satellite Communications (SATCOM) data links, MTS sensor/targetdesignators and Hellfire missiles are expected to be delivered to the Army by the end of 2005. (130) According to DoDcongressional testimony, the I-Gnat will continue to augment Hunter operations in Iraq. (131) Program Status. Predator UAVs are operated aspart of a system, which consists of four air vehicles, a ground control station, and a Predator PrimarySatellite Link. The actual current year cost in FY2005 for one Predator A system was approximately$18.0 million, while the current year cost (CY05) for a Predator B system was $46.8 million. (132) The Air Forcecurrently possesses 57 deployable MQ-1 Predators and fields 12 systems. The current inventory ofMQ-9 Predator Bs stands at six vehicles and initial Pentagon plans anticipate the number to growto 46 by the end of FY2011. Recent developments have led many to believe that both Predators willcontinue to be some of the Air Force's most valued assets. During a Senate Armed Service hearing,Air Force Chief of Staff General John Jumper said, "We're going to tell General Atomics to buildevery Predator they can possibly build." (133) However, in order to avoid the logistical complicationsexperienced with the accelerated development of the Predator A in the mid 1990s, the Air Forceannounced that the initial operation capability (IOC) of the Predator B has been pushed back fromFY2006 to FY2009. The extra time will be used to ensure that trained operators, adequate supportinfrastructures and appropriate operation strategies are in place. (134) In FY2005 andFY2006, Congressional appropriators increased both Predator R&D and Procurement funding fromthe President's Budget Request. In FY2006, Senate Authorizers supported research into integrating"Viper Strike" munitions on the Predator. For complete budget activity, see Table 7 below: Table 5. Predator A & B CombinedFunding ($ in Millions) Source for all funding tables in this section : FY2005 Auth: H.R. 4200 , P.L. 108-375 , H.Rept. 108-767 FY2005 Appro: H.R. 4613 , P.L. 108-287 , H.Rept. 108-622 FY2005 Emergency Supplemental: H.R. 1268 FY2006 Auth: H.R. 1815 , H.Rept. 109-89 , S. 1042 , S.Rept. 109-69 FY2006 Appro: H.R. 2863 , H.Rept. 109-119 , H.R. 2863 , S.Rept. 109-141 The Pioneer UAV has gained distinction for its nearly twenty years of service to the Navy,Army and Marine Corps. Originally developed by Israeli Aircraft Industries (IAI), RQ-2 Pioneer wasacquired by the U.S. Navy in 1986. Subsequently, Aircraft Armaments Incorporated out of HuntValley, MD and IAI jointly manufactured the Pioneer for the Navy, U.S. Marine Corp and the U.S.Army. The UAV was often employed in 1991 during Operation Desert Storm for reconnaissanceand Naval gun spotting missions. At the end of FY2002 the Navy ended its use of the air vehicleand passed its assets to the Marine Corps, which intends to field the RQ-2 until either 2010 or untila Vertical Take off and Landing UAV (VTUAV) is ready for operation. (135) Many believe thatPioneer has remained useful during its service life by being durable-the Marine Corp unofficiallyrefers to the vehicle as "Old Reliable"-and by undergoing several progressive performanceupgrades. (136) System Characteristics. At 14 feet long, thePioneer is roughly half the size of the Air Force's MQ-1 Predator A UAV. It can reach a maximumaltitude of 15,000 feet, but flies an optimal altitude of 5,000 feet above its target. The vehicle canachieve flight by rocket-assisted takeoff (RATO), a catapult launcher, or traditional runway takeofffrom land or from ships. Pioneer is maintains a flight range of 100 nautical miles. The propellerdriven SF-350 piston engine keeps the UAV aloft for up to five hours. The Pioneer can land on arunway or can be recovered using a retrieval net when a runway is unavailable. Since 1986, Pioneerhas flown over 36,500 hours in direct support of Navy and Marine Corps operational commanders,including more than 7,500 flight hours during Operation Iraq Freedom. Mission and Payload. The mission of the Pioneeris to provide real-time intelligence and a reconnaissance capability to field commanders. Pioneer canbe used for over-the-horizon targeting, surveillance, Naval gunfire spotting, and battle damageassessment. Its 75 lb payload consists of a combined E-O/IR camera. Other payloads that have beendemonstrated include a meteorological sensor, a mine detection sensor and a chemical detectionsensor. Program Status. The Navy had planned to retirethe Pioneer in 2004 and replace it with the VTUAV. However, when it quit that program, the Navygave all of its Pioneer systems to the Marine Corps. The Marine Corps hopes keep them flyinganother 10 years through a product improvement program. (137) Current procurementfunds are geared towards post-production support. In FY2005 and FY2006, DoD's Pioneerprocurement requests contained funding for upgrade kits only and no actual system or vehicleprocurement appropriations. According to the Office of the Secretary of Defense, in the final yearof production, the Pioneer system, which includes five vehicles, a ground control station withsupporting equipment and launch/recovery devices, cost $17.2 million in FY2004 dollars. TheMarine Corps currently possesses 35 Pioneer UAVs operated out of MCAS Twenty Nine Palms, CA,MCAS Cherry Point, NC and with the Marine Aviation Detachment in Paxtuxent River, MD. Table 6. Pioneer Funding ($ in Millions) Recently, Northrop Grumman's RQ-4 Global Hawk has gained distinction as the largest andmost expensive UAV currently in operation for the Department of Defense. This large UAVincorporates a diverse surveillance payload with performance capabilities that rival or exceed mostmanned spy planes. The Global Hawk's surveillance achievements in demonstrations and over thebattlefield have led many to believe that the RQ-4A and its successor, the RQ-4B, play an importantrole in the future of ISR. However, the complex task of adding specific intelligence systems to thepayload configuration has helped to keep this high altitude, long endurance UAV from advancingbeyond developmental stage despite extensive operational deployment. Many Pentagon officials andCongressional members have become increasingly concerned with the program's burgeoning costand have subsequently slowed development progress until adequate program controls areimplemented. (138) System Characteristics. At 44 feet long andweighing 26, 750 lbs, Global Hawk is about as large as a medium sized corporate jet. Global Hawkflies at nearly twice the altitude of commercial airliners and can stay aloft at 65,000 feet for as longas 35 hours. It can fly to a target area 5,400 nautical miles away, loiter at 60,000 feet whilemonitoring an area the size of that state of Illinois for 24 hours, and then return. Global Hawk wasoriginally designed to be an autonomous drone capable of taking off, flying, and landing onpre-programmed inputs to the UAV's flight computer. Air Force operators have found, however, thatthe UAV requires frequent intervention by remote operators. (139) The RQ-4B resemblesthe RQ-4A, yet features a significantly larger airframe. In designing the B-model, NorthropGrumman increased the Global Hawk's length from 44 feet to 48 feet and its wingspan from 116 feetto 132 feet. The expanded size enables the RQ-4B to carry an extra 1000 lbs. of surveillancepayload. Mission and Payload. The Global Hawk UAVhas been called "the theater commander's around-the-clock, low-hanging (surveillance)satellite." (140) TheUAV provides a long-dwell presence over the battlespace, giving military commanders a persistentsource of high quality imagery that has proven valuable in surveillance and interdiction operations. The RQ-4A's current imagery payload consists of a 2,000-lb integrated suite of sensors much largerthan those found on the Predator. These sensors include an all-weather SAR with Moving TargetIndicator (MTI) capability, an E-O digital camera and an IR sensor. As the result of a January 2002Air Force requirements summit, Northrop Grumman expanded its payload to make it amulti-intelligence air vehicle. The subsequent incarnation, the RQ-4B, is outfitted with anopen-system architecture that enables the vehicle to carry multiple payloads, such as signalsintelligence (SIGINT) and electronic intelligence (ELINT) sensors. Furthermore, the classifiedMulti-Platform Radar Technology Insertion Program (MP-RTIP) payload will be added in order toincrease radar capabilities. These new sensor packages will enable operators to eavesdrop on radiotransmissions or to identify enemy radar from extremely high altitudes. Future plans include addinghyper-spectral sensors for increased imagery precision and incorporating laser communications toexpand information transfer capabilities. (141) The end goal is to field a UAV that will work withspace-based sensors to create a "staring net" that will prevent enemies from establishing a tacticalsurprise. (142) InAugust of 2003, the Federal Aviation Administration granted the Global Hawk authorization to flyin U.S. civilian airspace, which further expanded the vehicles' mission potential. (143) This distinction, incombination with the diverse surveillance capabilities, has led many officials outside the Pentagonto consider the Global Hawk an attractive candidate for anti-drug smuggling and Coast Guardoperations. (144) Documentation from the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) indicates that the RQ-4A isexpected to reach initial operational capability (IOC) in 2006. (145) Program Status. Developed by NorthropGrumman Corporation of Palmdale, CA, Global Hawk entered low-rate-initial-production inFebruary 2002. The Air Force has stated that it intends to acquire 51 Global Hawks, at an expectedcost of $6.6 billion for development and procurement costs. Currently, the Air Force possesses 12RQ-4A vehicles. According to the most recent Select Acquisition Report, the current program-unitcost for the Global Hawk has reached $128.7 million. (146) In April 2005, the Air Force reported to Congress that theprogram had overrun by 18% as a result of an "increasing aircraft capacity to accommodaterequirements for a more sophisticated, integrated imagery and signals intelligence senor suite". (147) A GovernmentAccountability Office Report in December 2004 noted that the program had increased by nearly $900million since 2001 and recommended delaying the purchase of future Global Hawks until anappropriate development strategy could be implemented. (148) The rising costs of theUAV and accusations of Air Force mismanagement have caused concern among many in Congressand in the Pentagon as well as facilitating an overall debate on the Air Force's developmentstrategy. (149) TheConferees of the FY2005 Defense Authorization Bill [House Report 108-767] admonished the AirForce's management strategy for not using previously authorized funds for a counter-drugsurveillance evaluation program. They noted that "the committee suspects the Air Force used the$18.0 million set aside in 2001 for the counter-drug demonstration to meet other requirements of theGlobal Hawk development program". (150) As a result, the Conferees recommended a cut of $18 millionto the President's R&D request for the Global Hawk. The final appropriation bill [Public Law108-335] cut the R&D request by six million dollars. In June of 2004, the House AppropriationsCommittee expressed serious concern over Air Force's accelerated development strategy andconsequently cut the president's budget request for advanced procurement by $21.3 million andcurrent year procurement by $89.86 million. (151) The current year procurement cut transferred one RQ-4A tothe Navy for FY2005. Neither of the cuts survived conference and the Air Force's procurementbudget request was fully funded for FY2005. In December 2004, Michael Wynne, acting UnderSecretary of Defense for Acquisitions, emphasized that DoD would not purchase UAVs that cost asmuch as manned aircraft of equivalent capabilities. Of the Global Hawk, Wynne noted that thevehicle had gone from being "relatively inexpensive to [where it] now approaches what we have paidfor some bombers in the past". (152) As a result of increasing cost criticism, the Air Force deviseda plan in early 2005 intended to restructure the Global Hawk program in an effort to facilitate IOCby the end of 2005. The House Appropriations Committee cut the President's FY2006 current yearprocurement request by $110 million, advance procurement request by $10 million and increasedGlobal Hawk R&D by $21 million. Final appropriations and authorizations await the SenateDefense Appropriations and Senate Defense Authorization ( S. 1042 , Senate ArmedServices Committee Report 109-69) bills. See Table 9 for a complete overview of FY2005 andFY2006 funding. Table 7. Global Hawk Funding ($ in Millions) Originally co-developed by Israel Aircraft Industries and TRW (now owned by NorthropGrumman) for a joint U.S. Army/Navy/Marine Corps short range UAV, the Hunter system has founda home as one of the Army's principle unmanned platforms. The service has deployed the RQ-5Afor tactical ISR in support of numerous ground operations around the world. At one time, the Armyplanned to acquire 52 Hunter integrated systems of eight air vehicles a piece, but the Hunter programhas experienced some turbulence. The Army canceled full-rate-production of the RQ-5A in 1996,but continued to use the seven systems already produced. It acquired 18 MQ-5B Hunter IIs throughlow-rate-initial-production in FY2004 and FY2005. The MQ-5B's design includes longer enduranceand the capability to be outfitted with anti-tank munitions. Both variants are currently operated bythe 224th Military Intelligence Battalion out of Fort Steward, GA; by the 15th Military IntelligenceBattalion out of Ft. Hood, TX; and by 1st Military Intelligence Battalion out of Hoenfel, Germany. System Characteristics. The RQ-5A can fly ataltitudes up to 15,000 feet, reach speeds of 106 knots, and spend up to 12 hours in the air. Weighing1,600 lbs, it has an operating radius of 144 nautical miles. The MQ-5B includes an elongatedwingspan of 34.3 feet up from 29.2 feet of the RQ-5A and a more powerful Mercedes High-FuelEngine, which allows the Hunter II to stay airborne for three extra hours and to reach altitudes of18,000 feet. (153) Mission and Payload. . During its years of service,the Army has used the Hunter system mostly for short and medium range surveillance andreconnaissance. More recently, however, the Army has explored the expansion of the Hunter'smissions, including weaponization for tactical reconnaissance/strike operations and bordersurveillance for the Department of Homeland Security. The Hunter primarily uses a gimbaledE-O/IR sensor payload for its ISR functions, yet a 2003 Northrop Grumman demonstrationshowcased a new ground operated SAR/MTI (moving target indicator) sensor on the Hunter as partof a potential Tactical Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Radar (TUAVR) package. (154) The Hunter II is alsoset to receive an advanced software architecture in order to ease the integration of future payloadsand to extend the vehicle's service-life. During the later half of 2004, Northrop Grumman tested avariety of munitions as part of the Hunter payload. The Viper Strike precision guided munitions,which can designate targets either from the munition's laser, from another aerial platform or froma ground system, appears to be weapon of choice for the Hunter system. This weapon allows theHunter to provide accurate strikes at targets that elude the Hellfire missile, and makes the Hunter theArmy's first armed UAV. Program Status. The Army has halted productionon the RQ-5 Hunter and now fills service gaps in the Hunter force with the I-Gnat-ER. As ofFebruary 2005, all 32 Hunter UAVs are still in operation and periodically receive upgrades andmodifications. The Hunter system consists of eight aircraft, ground control systems and supportdevices, and launch/recovery equipment. In FY2004, the final year of Hunter procurement, a Huntersystem cost $26.5 million. The FY2005 and FY2006 Defense budgets contained no funds for theprocurement or R&D of any RQ-5 system. An August 2005 announcement revealed that the Armyawarded General Atomic's Warrior UAV the contract for the Extended Range-Multi Purpose(ER-MP) UAV program over the Hunter II. (155) Despite the loss, Northrop Grumman expects to continue tomarket the Hunter II to the rest of the services over the next few years. (156) The RQ-7 Shadow found a home when the Army, after a two decade search for a suitablesystem, selected AAI's close range surveillance platform for its tactical unmanned aerial vehicle(TUAV) program. Originally, the Army, in conjunction with the Navy explored several differentUAVs for the TUAV program, including the now-cancelled RQ-6 Outrider system. However, in1997 after the Navy pursued other alternatives, the Army opted for the low cost, simple design ofthe RQ-7 Shadow 200. Having reached full production capacity and an IOC in 2002, the Shadowhas become the primary airborne ISR tool of numerous Army units around the world and is expectedto remain in service through the decade. System Characteristics. Built by AAI Corporationof Hunt Valley, MD, the Shadow is 11 feet long with a wingspan of 13 feet. It has a range of 68nautical miles, a distance picked to match typical Army brigade operations, and an average flightduration of five hours. Although the Shadow can reach a maximum altitude of 14,000 feet, itsoptimum level is 8,000 feet. The Shadow is catapulted from a rail-launcher, and recovered with theaid of arresting gear. The UAV also possesses automatic takeoff and landing capabilities. Theupgraded version, the RQ-7B Shadow, features a greater wingspan by 16 inches and larger fuelcapacity that allows for an extra two hours of flight endurance. Mission and Payload. The Shadow providesreal-time reconnaissance, surveillance and target acquisition information to the Army at the brigadelevel. A potential mission for the Shadow is the perilous job of medical resupply. The Army isconsidering expanding the UAV's traditional missions to include a medical role, where severalcrucial items such as blood, vaccines and fluid infusion systems could be delivered to troops viaparachute. (157) Unlikethe RQ-5 Hunter, the Shadow will not be outfitted with weapons capabilities. (158) For surveillancepurposes, the Shadow's 60-pound payload consists of an E-O/IR sensor turret which produces dayor night video, and can relay data to a ground station in real-time via a line-of-sight data link. Aspart of the Army's Future Combat System plans, the Shadow will be outfitted with the TacticalCommon Data Link currently in development to network the UAV with battalion commanders,ground units and other air vehicles. (159) Program Status. The Army currently maintainsan inventory of 100 Shadow UAVs at Ft. Bragg, Ft. Hood, Ft. Lewis, Ft. Stewart, Ft. Wainwright,at military bases in Germany and Korea, and with National Guard units in Baltimore, MD and IndianTown Gap, PA. (160) The program cost for a Shadow UAV system -- which includes four vehicles, ground controlequipment, launch and recovery devices, remote video terminals, and High Mobility MultipurposeWheeled Vehicles for transportation-reached $16.4 million in current year dollars for FY2005. (161) The Army intends touse the Shadow as the interim Class III TUAV for the future combat systems project, which theArmy expects to reach IOC in 2014. (162) In FY2005 the Army procured eight TUAV systems, but onlyrequested $26 million in FY2006 for retrofitting the existing Shadow fleet with previously developedupgrades and modifications. Total RDT&E requests equalled $53.6 million in FY2005 and $139.6million in FY2006. In FY2005, the Appropriations Conferees increased the request amount bynearly a third, while in FY2006 the House Appropriators matched the request levels. Table 8. RQ-7 Shadow Funding ($ Millions) **Markup includes funding for RDT&E of an I-Gnat ER system In the mid 1990s, the Pentagon began developing a UAV designed primarily for combatmissions. The result was two separate Unmanned Aerial Combat Vehicles (UCAV) programs, theAir Force's UCAV and the Navy's UCAV-N demonstrator program. The Air Force favored Boeing'sX-45 for its program, while Northrop Grumman's X-47 Pegasus and Boeing's X-46 competed for theNavy's project. However, in June 2003, the Pentagon merged the two separated programs in orderto establish the Joint Unmanned Combat Air Systems (J-UCAS) project under the management ofthe Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA). The objective of the J-UCAS mergerwas to create a flexible offensive network in which the air and ground elements are adapted to meetspecific combat mission. (163) As part of Program Budget Decision (PBD) 753 in December2004, DARPA was ordered to transfer administration of the J-UCAS resources to Air Force, whichwill form a joint program planning committee with the Navy. (164) While questionssurround the direction in which the Air Force will move the program forward, statements from thePentagon have indicated that the program will maintain a competitive environment between Boeingand Northrop Grumman's vehicles. (165) System Characteristics. Currently, J-UCASconsists of two variants from the Navy and Air Force's previous programs. Featuring a length of 39feet and a wingspan of 49 feet, the X-45C evolved as an enhanced cross-breed of the two evaluationX-45A vehicles DARPA inherited from the Air Force and the Boeing's experimental X-46Asubmission for the Navy program. Powered by General Electric's GE F404-102D turbojet engine,the X-45C is expected to achieve speeds of 450 knots and altitudes of 40,000 feet. Furthermore, theX-45 can stay aloft for up to seven hours and operate at a range of 1,200 nautical miles. Whenengineering the X-45C, Boeing experimented with airframe designs that maximized the stealthcapabilities of the UAV system. They landed on the larger arrowhead design, which resembles fellowstealth aircraft like the B-2 Spirit Bomber and F117A-Nighthawk. As the X-45C's competitor,Northrop Grumman's X-47B, an advanced version of the UCAV-N's X-47A, is nearly as long as theX-45C, yet possess a significantly greater wingspan of 62 feet. The increased wingspan incombination with the more powerful Pratt & Whitney F100-220U turbojet engine will allow X-47Ban endurance of nine hours and range of 1,600 nautical miles. The speed and altitude of the Pegasusis expected to match that of the X45-C. The X-47B retains a smooth and sleek design optimized forstealth but features folding wing-tips that cut down on size, making it more suitable for storageaboard an aircraft carrier. (166) Designs are in place for the X-47B's common operatingsystem, which is expected to accommodate both Air Force and Naval technology. (167) Both aircraft possessesautomated flight capabilities. Potential Mission and Payload. Initially, theseparate Navy and Air Force programs envisioned UCAV combat missions specific to the needs ofthe individual services. The Air Force intended the X-45's primary mission to be the suppressionof enemy air defenses (SEAD) and secondary mission of electronic attack warfare. (168) The Navy planned touse its UCAV for armed intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance. (169) The payloads of eachvehicle are expected to be tailored to the respective mission. Both Boeing and Northrop Grumman'ssystems will possess internal weapons bays and will be capable of carrying guided weapons similarto those of conventional strike aircraft. The current weapon choice for the X-45C and the X-47Bis the GBU-31 Joint Direct Attack Munitions (JDAM). Both vehicles will feature SARs, ElectronicSupport Measure sensor suites (ESM), and Ground Moving Target Indicators (GMTI). Additionally, the X-47B's payload will include an E-O/IR camera combination in order to augmentits surveillance and reconnaissance missions. Program Status. Since its inception, the UCAVprograms have experienced a constant change in administration and organization, which manybelieve will affect the pace of development. In 2003, the Air Force and Navy's respective UCAVprojects were combined under the DARPA controlled J-UCAS program in order to facilitateinteroperability and development synergy. In September of 2004, DARPA hired the Johns HopkinsUniversity Applied Physics Laboratory as a not-for-profit integrator/broker in charge of promotingcooperation for common vehicle architectures. (170) In a move viewed by several observers as an abrupt reversal,the Office of the Secretary of Defense instructed the Air Force to take control over the project. Thesubsequent fluctuation of J-UCAS management appears to complicate forecasting of the program'sfuture. Development of the combat UAV has been advanced via the spiral developmentprocess. (171) Currently, the J-UCAS aircraft inventory includes two X-45A air vehicles and one X-47A airvehicle. OSD plans indicate that three X-45Cs three and the X-47Bs will be delivered by the endof 2006. Operational flight assessments of both vehicles are expected to begin in 2007. (172) The total money spenton the J-UCAS/UCAV program, which prior to FY2006 reached more than $1.45 billion in RDT&Efunding, made it one of the most expensive UAV ventures undertaken by DoD. For recent fundingdevelopments, see Table 11. Table 9. J-UCAS Funding ($ in Millions) Currently in the engineering and manufacturing development phase of production, the FireScout was initially designed as the Navy's choice for an unmanned helicopter capable ofreconnaissance, situational awareness and precise targeting. (173) While the Navycanceled production of the Fire Scout in 2001, Northrop Grumman's vertical take-off UAV wasrejuvenated by the Army in 2003, when the Army designated the Fire Scout as the interim Class IVUAV for the future combat system. The Army's interest spurred renewed Navy funding for theRQ-8, making the Fire Scout DoD's first joint UAV helicopter. Recent experimentation andevaluation efforts have explored the possibility of arming the Fire Scout and adding multiple andnon-traditional mission capabilities to the platform. System Characteristics and Mission. NorthropGrumman based the design of the Fire Scout on a commercial Schweitzer Co. helicopter. As anupgrade from the original RQ-8A, the RQ-8B Fire Scout features an advanced four-blade rotordesign to reduce the aircraft's acoustic signature. (174) With a basic 127 lbs payload, the Fire Scout can stay aloftfor up to 9.5 hours. With the full capacity sensor payload the helicopter UAV endurance diminishesto roughly six hours. The vehicle also possesses autonomous flight capabilities. The surveillancepayload consists of a laser designator and range finder, an IR camera and a multi-color EO camera,which when adjusted with specific filters could provide mine-detection capabilities. (175) The Fire Scoutcurrently possesses line-of-sight communication data links. Northrop Grumman officials hope toexpand the communications capabilities to include a wideband data relay from another airborneplatform and possible satellite communications. (176) Accompanying the renewed interest in the Fire Scout is anexpanded vision of mission capabilities, which most notably includes the armament of the helicopterUAV for strike missions. Recent weaponization plans have included the integration of Hydrafolding-fin rockets, 2.75 inch Mark 66 unguided rockets, or the Hellfire II anti-tank missiles. Discussions of future missions have also covered border patrol, search and rescue operations,medical resupply and submarine spotting operations. (177) Program Status. Currently, five RQ-8A airvehicles accompanied by four ground stations have reached the developmental testing phase of theacquisition process. These evaluation Fire Scouts were produced as low-rate-initial-productionvehicles. The Pentagon's 2005 UAS Roadmap estimates a future inventory of 192 vehicles betweenboth the Army and Navy. (178) The Army anticipates full-rate-production in 2008 and IOCby 2010. (179) Furthermore, the Army intends to use the Fire Scout as the interim brigade-level UAV for its FutureCombat System program (180) , while the Navy selected the RQ-8B to support the LittoralCombat Ship class of surface vessels. (181) Fire Scout funding is spread out through a variety of Navy andArmy programs. In February 2003, the Coast Guard selected the Bell Helicopter Textron's TR911D Eagle Eyetilitrotor UAV for its Deepwater Modernization program. A partnership of manufacturers, led byBell and including Lockheed Martin and AAI, manages the development of the Eagle Eye. (183) The $3 million EagleEye takes off vertically like a helicopter, but then tilts down its rotors to fly like a plane. The CoastGuard, anticipates the eventual acquisition of 69 vehicles, which will extend the surveillancecapability of their cutters. (184) Able to patrol the U.S. coastline for drug smugglers, refugeesand ships in distress, the Eagle Eye will also be able to transmit video and infrared images to thecutter and command centers ashore. Furthermore, the vehicle can fly up to 220 knots and has anoperational radius of roughly 300 miles, which surpasses the performance capabilities of comparableVUAVs. (185) Subsequently, Marine Corps officials have expressed interest in the Eagle Eye as a short to mediumrange replacement for the RQ-2 Pioneer. (186) Force Protection Aerial Surveillance System (FPASS) . Serving as part of the Air Force'sairbase defense system, Lockheed Martin's FPASS currently monitors the perimeter of severalairbases in Iraq and Afghanistan in an effort to prevent enemy incursions or terrorists attacks. Known to airmen as the Desert Hawk, this battery operated, propeller driven UAV was developedin 1999 at the request of U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) to improve situational awarenessthrough area surveillance, patrols of base-perimeters and runway/departure paths, and aerial spottingfor ground convoys. The Desert Hawk's small size, light weight and Styrofoam body have led manyservicemen to draw comparison to remote-controlled model planes. The simple design, however,appears conducive to on-the-job repairs, which operators perform routinely with tape or glue. (187) Launched by ashoulder mounted slingshot device, the aircraft flies preprogrammed paths for up to one hour andlands through a controlled crash. The Desert Hawk carries either a small digital or infrared cameraand can operate as far away as six nautical miles. The total inventory of Desert Hawks for the AirForce stands at 126 vehicles. (188) Each system, including ground control stations, six vehiclesand spare parts, costs approximately $300,000. (189) Dragon Eye . AeroVironment's Dragon Eye provides Marines at the company level and belowwith reconnaissance, surveillance and target acquisition capabilities. This backpack carried, batteryoperated UAV features a 3.8 ft. rectangular wing, twin propellers and two cameras ports eachcapable of supporting day-light electro-optical cameras, low-light TV cameras, and infrared cameras.Using autonomous GPS navigation, Dragon Eye surveys preprogrammed area and relays nearreal-time images to a control station on the ground. The compact and lightweight design of the UAVallows an operational endurance of 45 minutes and can travel as far as two and a half nautical milesfrom the operator. Low-rate-initial-production of 40 aircraft began in 2001. However, after a 2003operational assessment, the Marine Corps awarded AeroVironment a contract to deliverapproximately 300 systems of full-rate-production Dragon Eyes. (190) One Dragon Eyesystem consists of three air vehicles and one ground station. The FY2006 Marine Corpsprocurement budget request anticipated the current unit cost per Dragon Eye system as$154,000. (191) FQM-151 Pointer . Currently in service in Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and OperationIraqi Freedom (OIF), the Pointer is a short range reconnaissance and battlefield surveillance UAVdeveloped by AeroVironment. The Pointer is capable of greater flight endurance (two hours) thanmost similar small UAVs, in part due to its relative large wingspan. The Pointer weighs in at nearly8.5 lbs and features a 9 foot wingspan, which decreases portability when part of a system of two airvehicles and a ground control unit. As a result, transportation of a Pointer system requires twopersonnel. (192) Thebattery-operated UAV carries either an IR or a daytime E-O sensor and has remained a valued shortrange ISR asset for the Air Force and Special Operations Command. Currently, these twoorganizations own 50 Pointer systems and, according to OSD documentation, plan to purchase anadditional 50 systems in the near future for OIF and OEF. (193) AeroVironment is inthe process of developing the Pointer's successor, the Puma, which is expected to have an enduranceof four hours and be capable of simultaneously carrying E-O and IR cameras. (194) Raven . AeroVironment's development of the Raven emerged from the company's attemptto maximize the simplicity, portability and short range utility of mini-UAVs for the warfighter. Engineered from the basic design of the Pointer, the Raven is two-thirds the size and weight of itspredecessor, making it backpackable. (195) The Raven provides Army and SOCOM personnel with"over-the-hill" reconnaissance, sniper spotting and surveillance scouting of intended convoy routes. The advanced electric motor initiates flight once hand-launched by a running start from the groundoperator. The vehicle is powered by an electric battery that needs to be recharged after 90 minutes,but deployed soldiers are equipped with four auxiliary batteries that can be easily charged using the28 volt DC outlet in a Humvee. The vehicle lands via a controlled crash in which the cameraseparates from the body, which is composed of Kevlar plating for extra protection. Like the Pointer,the Raven can carry either an IR or an E-O camera and transmits real-time images to its groundoperators. The relatively simple system allows soldiers to be trained in-theater in a matter of days. Raven systems can either be deployed in three aircraft or two-aircraft configurations. The Army andSOCOM have purchased 185 and 70 three-aircraft systems respectively, while the Air Force iscurrently in the process of buying 41 two-aircraft systems. (196) A three-aircraft systemcosts approximately $250,000. (197) Silver Fox . Developed by Advanced Ceramic Research in conjunction with the Office ofNaval Research (ONR), the Silver Fox is a Diesel-powered, front propeller UAV designed fortactical ISR support of brigade and battalion forces. With a five foot fuselage and an eight footwingspan, the twenty pound vehicle achieves flight through a compressed air catapult or by hand,depending on wind speed. The fuselage houses both a daylight E-O and a micro-IR camera forsurveillance purposes. While ONR and Advanced Ceramic Research Inc. began development of theSilver Fox in early 2003, the vehicle now supports U.S. forces in Iraq through a variety ofundisclosed applications. Currently 20-30 systems of three vehicles each are planned for theNavy. (198) Scan Eagle . While still in development, the Scan Eagle, has gained notice for its longendurance capabilities and relative low cost. The single propeller gasoline powered UAV featuresa wingspan two and a half times the length of its fuselage. The narrow 10 foot wings allow the 40lb. vehicle to reach altitudes as high as 19,000 feet, distances of more than 60 nautical miles and aflight endurance of almost 20 hours. Developed by Boeing and the Insitu Group as a"launch-and-forget" UAV, the Scan Eagle autonomously flies to points of interest selected by aground operator. (199) Using an inertially stabilized camera turret carrying both E-O and IR sensors, the Scan Eaglecurrently provides Marine Corps units in Iraq with force-protection ISR. The vehicle achieves flightthrough the use of a pneumatic launcher and lands through the Skyhook recovery system. Scan Eaglecan be launched from the deck of a ship. Furthermore, the UAV's sensor data links possess the"Cursor-on-Target" feature, making a Scan Eagle system of eight vehicles interoperable with otherlegacy UAV systems. The Marine Corps, which is evaluating two systems under lease, expects theprice of a single Scan Eagle to be approximately $100,000.

Summary: The war on terrorism has put a high premium on a primary mission of UAVs, intelligencegathering. Furthermore, the military effectiveness of UAVs in recent conflicts such as Iraq (1990)and Kosovo (1999) opened the eyes of many to both the advantages and disadvantages provided byunmanned aircraft. Long relegated to the sidelines in military operations, UAVs are now makingnational headlines as they are used in ways normally reserved for manned aircraft. Conventionalwisdom states that UAVs offer two main advantages over manned aircraft: they are considered morecost-effective, and they minimize the risk to a pilot's life. However, the current UAV accident rate(the rate at which the aircraft are lost or damaged) is 100 times that of manned aircraft. UAVs range from the size of an insect to that of a commercial airliner. DOD currentlypossesses five major UAVs: the Air Force's Predator and Global Hawk, the Navy and MarineCorps's Pioneer, and the Army's Hunter and Shadow. Other key UAV developmental efforts includethe Air Force and Navy's unmanned combat air vehicle (UCAV), Navy's vertical takeoff and landingUAV (VTUAV), and the Broad Area Maritime Surveillance UAV(BAMS), and the Marine Corps'sDragon Eye and Dragon Warrior. The services continue to be innovative in their use of UAVs. Recent examples include arming UAVs (Predator, Hunter), using UAVs to extend the eyes ofsubmarines, and teaming UAVs with strike aircraft and armed helicopters to improve targeting. In the past, tension has existed between the services' efforts to acquire UAVs andcongressional initiatives to encourage a consolidated DOD approach. Some observers argue that theresult has been a less than stellar track record for the UAV. However, reflecting the growingawareness and support in Congress and the Department of Defense for UAVs, investments inunmanned aerial vehicles have been increasing every year. DoD spending on UAVs has increasedfrom $284 million in Fiscal Year 2000 to $2.1 billion in FY2005. Congressional considerations include the proper pace, scope, and management of DoD UAVprocurement; appropriate investment priorities for UAVs versus manned aircraft; UAV future rolesand applications; personnel issues; industrial base issues; and technology proliferation. This reportwill be updated as necessary.