During the latter years of the Clinton presidency, the United States began to focus on the possible deploymentof defenses against long-range ballistic missiles. The Administration, and many missile defense supporters, claimed that the United States needed to pursue NationalMissile Defenses (NMD) because "rogue"nations such as North Korea, Iran, and Iraq might soon acquire longer range missiles that could strike U.S. territory,and the United States could not be certain thatthe threat of offensive retaliation would deter these unpredictable actors. The Clinton Administration realized thatits plans for NMD would exceed the limitsimposed by the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty between the United States and Soviet Union. Consequently, theAdministration opened discussions with Russiain an effort to negotiate amendments to the Treaty that would permit the deployment of a limited NMD system. Russian officials consistently and repeatedly insisted that the 1972 ABM Treaty is the cornerstone of strategic stability (this is defined on page 4). They arguedthat any changes to the Treaty that permitted the deployment of defenses against long-range ballistic missiles wouldundermine international strategic stability,upset the nuclear balance established by the Treaty, and interfere with Russia's nuclear deterrent capabilities. Duringtalks with the Clinton Administration,Russia refused to accept any modifications to the ABM Treaty that would permit national missile defenses andcampaigned against the U.S. policy at meetingswith other nations and international organizations. Russia also offered alternatives, suggesting that the UnitedStates, Russia, and the international communityaddress emerging missile threats with diplomacy and arms control measures that would seek to stop the proliferationof new threats and with cooperation ontheater-range ballistic missile defenses to address those threats that did emerge. This report provides a detailed review of Russia's reaction to U.S. policy on missile defense and U.S. proposals for modifications to the ABM Treaty. It beginswith a brief background section that describes the central limits in the ABM Treaty and U.S. policy on thedeployment of missile defenses. It then describes, inmore detail, Russia's objections to the U.S. proposals. The report also provides a summary of possible militaryresponses that Russia might take after the UnitedStates withdraws from the ABM Treaty and begins deployment of missile defenses and contains a discussion ofRussia's proposals for diplomatic and militaryalternatives to the U.S. plans to deploy missile defenses. The report concludes with a brief discussion of the U.S.response to Russia's objections, a few issues forCongress, and a summary of the Russian reaction to the U.S. withdrawal from the ABM Treaty. The United States and Soviet Union signed the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems (ABM Treaty) in May 1972. This Treaty prohibits thedeployment of ABM systems for the defense of the nations' territory, or an individual region, or defenses that canprovide the base for such a defense. It permitseach side to deploy limited ABM systems at two locations, one centered on the nation's capital and one at a locationcontaining ICBM silo launchers. A 1974Protocol further limited each nation to one ABM site, located either at the nation's capital or aroundan ICBM deployment area. Each ABM site can contain nomore than 100 ABM launchers and 100 ABM interceptor missiles. The Treaty also specifies that, in the future, anyradars that provide early warning of strategicballistic missile attack must be located on the periphery of the national territory and oriented outward. The Treaty bans the development, testing, and deployment of sea-based, air-based, space-based, or mobile land-based ABM systems and ABM systemcomponents (these include interceptor missiles, launchers, and radars or other sensors that can substitute for radars). Each party can propose amendments, and, inthe Standing Consultative Commission established by the Treaty, they can consider possible proposals for furtherincreasing the viability of the Treaty. Each partycan also withdraw from the Treaty, after giving 6 months notice, if "extraordinary events related to the subject matterof this Treaty have jeopardized its supremeinterests." (1) In September 1997, the Clinton Administration signed a Memorandum of Understanding on Succession that named Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan asthe successors to the Soviet Union for the Treaty. This agreement never entered into force because Congressinsisted that the Clinton Administration submit it tothe Senate for advice and consent, as an amendment to the Treaty. The Clinton Administration never did so, in partbecause it feared that the Senate might rejectthe agreement in an effort to abolish the Treaty. Some Members of Congress argued that the ABM Treaty was nolonger in force because the Soviet Union hasceased to exist. The Clinton Administration, however, determined that, in the absence of alternative arrangements,Russia would serve as the successor to theSoviet Union for the Treaty. The Bush Administration did not explicitly accept the argument that the ABM Treaty was no longer in force and Deputy Secretary of Defense Wolfowitz said theUnited States would withdraw before violating the Treaty. During their nomination hearings, Secretary of DefenseRumsfeld referred to the Treaty as "ancienthistory" and Secretary of State Powell stated that the Treaty is no longer relevant to our strategic framework. The President Bush has also said that the ABMTreaty is outdated, and that the United States must move beyond the limits in the Treaty to deploy effective missiledefenses. He announced the U.S. withdrawalfrom the Treaty on December 13, 2001; this withdrawal took effect on June 13, 2002. Clinton Administration. The Clinton Administration's plan for NMD, which it outlined in 1999, called for thedeployment of 100 interceptor missiles at a single site in Alaska. (2) This system would have been designed to defend against a relatively limited threat of perhaps20 missiles. Eventually the system might have expanded to 200-250 interceptors at one or more sites to defendagainst a larger and more sophisticated threat. Itmight also have included space-based sensors and components currently banned by the ABM Treaty. TheAdministration recognized that this site, and some ofthe technologies under consideration, would not have been consistent with the limits in the ABM Treaty. As aresult, it participated in discussions with Russia inan effort to modify the ABM Treaty to permit a limited deployment. It would, however, have retained many of thecentral features of the Treaty that limit thecapabilities of ABM systems. President Clinton announced on September 1, 2000 that he had decided not to authorize deployment of an NMD system because he did not have "enoughconfidence in the technology, and the operational effectiveness of the entire NMD system." In two of three tests,the defensive missile had failed to intercept itstarget. The Administration announced that it planned to continue with research and development on its NMDtechnologies, and that it would continue discussionswith the Russians about the ABM Treaty. But the final decision on whether to begin NMD deployment would beleft to Clinton's successor. Bush Administration. President Bush has emphasized that he places a high priority on defenses that couldprotect the United States, its forces, and its allies from ballistic missile attack. He outlined his Administration'sapproach in a speech on May 1, 2001, (3) when heindicated that "we can draw on already established technologies that might involve land-based and sea-basedcapabilities to intercept missiles in mid-course orafter they re-enter the atmosphere." (4) During hearingsbefore Congress in July 2001, Deputy Secretary of Defense Wolfowitz provided more details on theAdministration's missile defense program. He stated that the Pentagon would pursue a robust research anddevelopment program into a wide range oftechnologies that could be based on land, at sea, or in space. He stated that the Administration had not yet identifieda specific architecture for its system becauseit would make use of the most promising technologies as soon as they were ready. Ultimately, though, theAdministration is seeking to develop and deploy anintegrated, layered system that can defend the United States, its forces, and allies from missiles of all ranges at allphased of their flight trajectories. Administration officials acknowledged that many parts of its missile defense program would not be consistent with the terms of the ABM Treaty. They arguedthat the Treaty, and the nuclear strategy it embodied, should be replaced by a new framework for deterrence thatcombines both offensive and defensivecapabilities. The Administration participated in consultations with Russia on a new strategic framework, but, whenit was unable to convince Russia to withdrawfrom the Treaty with the United States, it announced that the United States would withdraw itself. The dominant theme in Russia's response to the U.S. approach to missile defenses and the ABM Treaty is the idea that the ABM Treaty is the "cornerstone ofstrategic stability" and that the U.S. deployment of missile defenses would undermine stability and upset armscontrol. (5) According to this view, the Treaty, withits ban on widespread ballistic missile defenses, underscores the Cold War model of deterrence, where neither theUnited States nor Soviet Union could threatenan attack on the other without facing an overwhelming retaliatory strike. The assured destruction promised by thisretaliatory strike meant that the strategicbalance was stable, that neither side would risk an attack no matter how grave a crisis. Accordingly, the deploymentof ballistic missile defenses that could protectall U.S. territory (as opposed to the limited defenses permitted by the Treaty) would undermine this concept ofstability. If a nation could intercept missileslaunched in retaliation, particularly if it had diminished their numbers in its initial strike, it might believe it couldlaunch a first strike without fearing retaliation. Knowing this, the nation without the defensive system might conclude that it had to launch preemptively, beforelosing any of its forces in an initial attack. Underthese circumstances, stability would be lost and a nation might have an incentive to launch first in a crisis. Furthermore, Russian officials have argued that the ABM Treaty is the cornerstone of the entire network of agreements that reduce offensive nuclear weapons. (6) The Treaty's limits on ballistic missile defenses allowed the United States and Soviet Union to accept limits andreductions in their offensive forces because theyknew they could maintain an effective deterrent at lower levels when the offensive forces could not be blunted bydefensive systems. Accordingly, if the UnitedStates were to abrogate the ABM Treaty to deploy ballistic missile defenses, Russia might feel compelled toabrogate agreements on offensive forces so that itcould retain an arsenal of sufficient size to ensure that it could penetrate the U.S. ballistic missile defenses. Finally, Russian critics note that the U.S. approach to missile defenses and the ABM Treaty would upset not only strategic stability between the United States andRussia, but also international strategic stability. They argue that other nations, such as China, might believe thattheir offensive forces would be undermined byU.S. defenses, and might feel compelled to expand their arsenals to ensure an effective retaliatiory attack. But, ifone nation, such as China, were to react thisway, other nations might feel threatened and might react, themselves, by increasing their offensive militarycapabilities. Hence, the deployment of missiledefenses and U.S. abrogation of the ABM Treaty could set off a new, threatening international arms race. Russiancritics, and many critics of missile defense inthe United States argue that, in the long run, the United States could become less secure with nationwide missiledefenses than it is in its current more"vulnerable" condition. The Clinton Administration sought to reassure Russia about its concerns for strategic stability. On several occasions, when President Clinton met with PresidentYeltsin or President Putin, he signed statements and declarations acknowledging that the ABM Treaty remained thecornerstone of strategic stability. At theirsummit meeting in June 2000, Presidents Clinton and Putin signed a Joint Statement On Principles of StrategicStability. In this document, the Presidentsdeclared that "They agree on the essential contribution of the ABM Treaty to reductions in offensive forces, andreaffirm their commitment to that Treaty as thecornerstone of strategic stability." (7) At the same time,the United States sought to convince Russia that the Treaty could serve this purpose even if it weremodified or amended to allow the deployment of a limited NMD. (8) In addition, the Clinton Administration argued that the changes it sought in the ABM Treatywould permit only a limited NMD system that would address the emerging threat from "rogue" nations and that thesystem would not be capable enough tointercept the larger numbers of missiles that Russia would possess, even as its forces declined in the coming decade. Differing Threat Assessments. Russian officials have agreed with the U.S. view that ballistic missileproliferation could pose a problem and introduce new missile threats to both nations. The Joint Statement onPrinciples of Strategic Stability, signed after theJune 2000 summit, stated that the Presidents agreed "that the international community faces a dangerous andgrowing threat of proliferation of weapons of massdestruction and their means of delivery, including missiles and missile technologies..." Furthermore, the Presidentsagreed that "this new threat represents apotentially significant change in the strategic situation and international security environment." (9) In an interview held shortly before the summit,President Putinproposed that the United States and Russia cooperate on the development of a "boost-phase" theater missile defensesystem that could be based near "rogue"nations to address this emerging threat. (10) However, Russian officials disagree with the U.S. view that missile proliferation and the potential missile capabilities of "rogue"nations pose a significant orimmediate threat to the United States. In an interview with the Russian press, President Putin acknowledged that"such threats, theoretically, in principle, [could]emerge one day." But he went on to state that "we do not believe that there are such threats now nor that they arecoming from any specific states." (11) Consequently, President Putin did not agree with the U.S. view that these emerging threats justified the U.S.proposals for changes to the ABM Treaty and thedeployment of an NMD system. (12) Moreover,Russian officials claim that, even if "rogue" nations could threaten the United States with long-range missiles, theoverwhelming power of U.S. offensive forces would deter such an attack. Russia's former Defense Minister, IgorSergeyev, outlined this view when he stated: "the development of ICBMs entailed a colossal strain on the economy even for giants like the USSR and the United States. So assertions that ICBMs will appearin the near future in the possession of Third World states that do not possess a sound economy or the relevanttechnologies appear very lightweight andunfounded. Indeed, even if we imagine the purely theoretical situation where such missiles will become part of thearmory, the nuclear deterrence factor thatdemonstrated its effectiveness back in the Cold War years will still apply to those countries." (13) Thus, Minister Sergeyev, and others in Russia have concluded that, if the emerging missile threats in "rogue" nations do not really threaten U.S. territory, then aU.S. NMD system cannot really be directed against those threats. Instead, the United States must be seeking todevelop a missile defense system that cancontribute to its global drive for domination and undermine Russia's nuclear deterrent. "The results of our military-technical analysis indicate that the threat of the carrying out of a strike against the USA by intercontinental ballistic missiles launchedby so-called "problem" states, which the USA sets forth as the primary reason for the development of its nationalABM system, is, in realty, not being considered[i.e., it is not the real reason for the development of the national ABM system]. We do not see any [real] motivesfor the deployment of this national ABM systemother than the striving of the USA to acquire strategic domination in the world. We are deeply convinced that sucha deployment would be primarily directedagainst Russia." (14) Skepticism about "Limited NMD". Many Russian officials and analysts did not believe that the United Statesplanned to limit its missile defense system, even under the Clinton Administration. Some argued that the UnitedStates would not spend more than $100 billiondollars to develop and deploy a missile defense system, then limit it to a capability to intercept only 10-20missiles. (15) The Clinton Administrationcontributed tothis disbelief when it stated that it would seek modifications to the ABM Treaty in two phases; the first wouldsimply allow the deployment of a single NMD sitein Alaska and the upgrades to some early warning radars. In the second phase, the Clinton Administration plannedto request an increase in the permitted numberof interceptor missiles and the addition of space-based sensors. Some Russians suspected that additional phases,with additional "minor modifications" wouldhave followed, and that, eventually, the U.S. approach would have loosened the Treaty enough to permit thedeployment of more extensive defenses. The BushAdministration also insists that its missile program would be limited to address only the threat from rogue nations. But the Administration has outlined plans todevelop and deploy a robust, layered system, as opposed to the limited land-based system considered by the ClintonAdministration, which could provide a morecapable defense against Russian missiles. Russian analysts calculated that, even with the Clinton Administration's limited defensive system, the United States could expand its missile defense capabilitiesby upgrading its early warning and command and control structures, then quickly adding to the number of deployedinterceptors. Former Defense MinisterSergeyev outlined this concern in an interview with the Russian press. He noted that "It is not the quantity ofinterceptor missiles that determines the combatpotential of any antimissile defense system. First and foremost, it depends on the system's information componentswhich ensure the acquisition and tracking oftargets, the ability to distinguish real warheads from dummy targets." (16) A Russian analyst, Alexander Pikayev, also noted that the United Statescould easilyexpand its NMD capabilities once it had developed the space-based sensors that would improve targeting andtracking capabilities. He stated that, once it haddeveloped and deployed these capabilities, "it would be easy for the U.S. to produce and deploy large numbers ofinterceptors." (17) In April 2000, Pentagon officials presented Russia's Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov with a detailed briefing about the capabilities of the radars planned for the U.S.NMD system in an effort to convince him that the system would not pose a threat to Russia's strategic deterrentforces. (18) But Russian officials were notconvinced. (19) The Bush Administration alsoprovided Russian officials with detailed briefings on the new U.S. missile defense program in early August 2001. Consequently, with their doubts about the U.S. assessments of emerging ballistic missile threats and their doubts about the limited nature of a prospective U.S.NMD system, many Russian officials and analysts concluded that "the so-called limited nature of the U.S. NMDsytem is based on the desire to obscure the veryessence of the system. The NMD is only a stage in the development and deployment of a full-scale ABMsystem." (20) Former Defense Minister Sergeyevstatedthat the Clinton Administration's limited NMD would be the "first step toward the future emergence of amultifunctional global system for combating all types ofballistic, aerodynamic, and space targets and subsequently also surface and land targets. This comprehensive defensesystem will be directed first and foremostagainst the deterrent potential of the Russian Federation and the People's Republic of China." (21) The Threat to Russia's Deterrent. Russian analysts have argued that the United States could undermineRussia's strategic nuclear deterrent, and possibly acquire a disarming first strike capability, with even a relativelylimited missile defense capability. First, theynote that Russia's arsenal of strategic offensive nuclear weapons is likely to decline sharply over the next decade,to perhaps fewer than 1,500 warheads, as olderweapons are retired and financial constraints preclude the acquisition of newer weapons. But the United Statescould maintain a much larger offensive nuclearforce of several thousand nuclear weapons, even under prospective arms control scenarios. In addition, NATOenlargement, the U.S. advantage in anti-submarinewarfare, and the U.S. advantage in precision-guided conventional weapons, such as the sea-launched Tomahawkcruise missile, provide the United States and itsallies with the ability to conduct conventional attacks on strategic targets in Russia in a comprehensive first strike. If the United States launched an attack againstRussia with its conventional and nuclear forces, and destroyed a large percentage of Russia's diminished nuclearforces, a few hundred missile defenseinterceptors could be sufficient to intercept Russia's retaliatory strike. Hence, according to this argument, even alimited missile defense system could "underminestrategic stability" and contribute to U.S. efforts to "achieve radical changes in the military balance." (22) Russian analysts also note that China is likely to react to the deployment of a U.S. NMD system by expanding its military capabilities and its offensive missileforces. One Russian analyst, Alexander Pikayev, has stated that China has already adopted a $10 billion packagefor a new nuclear buildup in reaction to U.S.plans to deploy an NMD system together with a TMD system in the Western Pacific, and that China would haveto significantly increase the size of its missileforce to maintain the credibility of its deterrent in the face of a U.S. NMD. But, according to Pikayev and otherRussian analyts, these weapons could pose asmuch of a threat to Russia as they could to the United States: "Currently, the predominance of Chinese conventionalweapons vis-a-vis the vast but sparselypopulated Russian Far East is balanced by Moscow's superiority in nuclear weapons. China's nuclear build-up mightconsiderably erode this superiority, furtherweakening Russia's position in the Far East." (23) According to Pikayev, this imbalance with Chinese forces might compel Russia to withdraw from the 1987Intermediate Forces Treaty. Hence, in spite of U.S. claims to the contrary, many Russian officials and analysts appear to believe that U.S. withdrawal from the ABM Treaty and deployment ofa nationwide missile defense system would undermine the existing framework of arms control agreements, upsetinternational strategic stability, incite new armsraces, and threaten the credibility of Russia's strategic nuclear deterrent. Several Russian officials have declaredthat, if the United States were to follow this path,Russia would feel compelled to withdraw from a range of arms control agreements so that it could deploy themilitary forces that it would need to offset the U.S.threat to its nuclear deterrent. These military responses could include changes in the deployment of several differenttypes of nuclear weapons. Deploy Multiple Warheads on New ICBMs. The 1993 START II Treaty, which has not yet entered into force,would have banned the deployment of land-based strategic ballistic missiles with multiple warheads (MIRVedICBMs). Under this agreement, Russia would havehad to eliminate its 10-warhead SS-18 ICBMs and 10-warhead SS-24 ICBMs. It also would have to reduce, from6 to one, the number of warheads deployed onits SS-19 ICBMs. This would leave Russia with an ICBM force that consisted of single warhead SS-25 and SS-27missiles and around 100 aging SS-19 missiles.. Even without Treaty implementation, Russia is likely to eliminate many of the older multiple warhead missiles. The SS-18s, which have long been considered thebackbone of Russia's strategic nuclear force, are likely to reach the end of their service-lives by the end of thedecade. Russia would find it hard to maintainthese forces because the missiles were produced at a plant in Ukraine, which is no longer making ICBMs for Russia,and Russia lacks the economic resourcesneeded to build a new plant to support these missiles in Russia. However, if it were not bound by the START IIban on MIRVed ICBMs, Russia could deploy itsolder single-warhead SS-25 ICBM and new single-warhead SS-27 ICBM with 3 warheads. (24) Alternatively, Russia could develop new typesof decoys andpenetration aids for these missiles, to complicate U.S. efforts to intercept them with its missile defense system. Russia currently has 360 SS-25 missiles and 30 operational SS-27 missiles. The SS-27 missiles were expected to replace the SS-25 missiles in Russia's force. Russia is currently producing fewer than 10 of these missiles per year, but had hoped to produce up to 30 missilesper year later this decade. Many expertsbelieved Russia would eventually produce 300 SS-27 missiles, but with the low production rates currently in place,this number is likely to be lower. Even if eachof these missiles were to carry 3 warheads, Russia's ICBM force would likely include fewer than 1000 warheadsby the end of the decade. This contrasts withmore than 3,500 warheads on Russia's ICBM force now. So, even if Russia were to abrogate START I and set asideSTART II, it would probably institute sharpreductions in the size of its ICBM force. Deploy new intermediate range missiles. Several Russian officials have also suggested that Russia mightabrogate the 1987 INF Treaty and deploy new shorter-range and intermediate-range missiles. (25) As was noted above, Russia could pursue thisoption in an effortto offset any advantages that China might acquire if it expanded its nuclear forces in response to a U.S. NMD. Butthe threat to deploy new missiles in this rangecan also be seen as a part of Russia's attempt to convince U.S. allies in Europe to join it in opposing U.S. NMDplans. (26) In discussing this option, VladimirYakovlev, the former Commander of Russia's Strategic Rocket Forces noted that "in the event of the repudiationof the INF Treaty, Europe once again fallshostage to a clash between the nuclear superpowers. The United States is planning to [maintain] a 100,000-stronggrouping on the continent of Europe withcommand and control posts and the relevant infrastructure and all this is an extremely worthy target for Russianmissiles. (27) Russia could reportedly produce new intermediate range missiles in a relatively short amount of time. According to one official, the Moscow Institute of Heat andEngineering, Russia's leading design bureau for ballistic missiles, has already prepared blueprints and technicaldocuments for the system and could transfer themto the Votkinsk missile assembly facility as a soon as a decision was made to begin producing missiles. (28) Nevertheless, it is unlikely that it could producelargenumbers of these missiles in a short period of time. The Votkinsk Missile Assembly facility is the same locationwhere Russia produced the SS-25 missiles and iscurrently producing the SS-27 missile, at a rate of fewer than 10 per year. Economic constraints would make it verydifficult for Russia to expand production atthis facility. Hence, any increase in the production of intermediate-range missiles could come at the expense of thealready-low production rate for SS-27 missiles. Redeploy shorter-range nuclear delivery systems. During the early 1990s, the United States and Soviet Unionboth withdrew from deployment many of their shorter-range nuclear delivery systems. They did this unilaterally,without any negotiated agreements and withoutany formal monitoring or verification provisions. For Russia, these weapons came out of deployment areas in theother former Soviet republics and near Russia'sborders. Many were consolidated at storage areas within Russia. Some analysts in the United States have expressedconcerns that Russia might return some ofthese weapons to deployment or to storage areas closer to Russia's western borders. The Commander of Russia'sStrategic Rocket forces indicated that this was apossibility when he stated that Russia could also institute "changes to the principles of employment and deploymentof operational-tactical nuclear weapons" as apart of its response to U.S. deployment of NMD. (29) This type of response would not give Russia any new capabilities to threaten the United States or to penetrate U.S. missile defenses. However, it would beconsistent with Russia's new national security strategy, which allows for the possible use of non-strategic nuclearweapons in response to conventional militaryattacks on Russia. Most experts believe that this change in Russia's strategy is a response to the degradation inRussia's conventional military capabilities, and itsgrowing concern about the military implications of NATO enlargement. In addition, the threat of new nucleardeployments near Europe could be a part ofRussia's efforts to draw support from the United States' allies in Europe for Russia's opposition to missile defense. According to this school of thought, the morethreatened the Europeans feel by Russia's potential responses, the more likely they are to pressure the United Statesto alter its policy on missile defense. Most experts agree that Russia will not win the support of U.S. allies in Europe, even if it threatens to redeploy shorter-range or intermediate-range nuclear forcesnear its western borders. However, if Russia intends to make these changes anyway, in response to its diminishedconventional capabilities, then the collapse ofarms control in response to U.S. missile defense policy could provide a convenient excuse. Russian officials have stated that, instead of relying on missile defenses that could upset stability and underminearms control, the two sides should rely on "anumbrella based on diplomacy" (30) and has offeredproposals for measures that the international community might adopt to address the threat posed by missileproliferation. The Clinton Administration did not dismiss the Russian approach, but also did not accept it as analternative to the U.S. approach. Then-Secretaryof Defense Cohen noted, after the June 2000 summit between Presidents Clinton and Putin, that the response tomissile proliferation should include bothdiplomatic efforts to stop proliferation and defensive systems to protect the nations from possible attack. (31) In June 1999, Russia proposed that the international community establish a Global Missile and Missile Technology Non-proliferation Control System (GCS). Russia advocated this regime as "component part of the global regime of the non-proliferation of missiles andmissile technologies." (32) It would, in part,complement the Missile Technology Control Regime - which regulates the supply side of missile technologies - byregulating the behavior of nations that mightseek to acquire ballistic missile technologies; and, would operate under U.N. auspices. It would also provideincentives to nations so that they would forgo theirown missile arsenals. Russian officials said the goal was to present an alternative to NMD that maximizes"peaceful" diplomatic and political efforts to addressconcerns about missile proliferation. (33) Specifically, Russia proposed that the international community create a pre-launch and post-launch notification launch-monitoring regime to build transparencyinto ballistic missile developments. Nations that participated in this regime would gain an understanding of missiledevelopments in neighboring countries andmight feel less threatened, and therefore, less compelled to develop their own missiles. The regime would alsoinclude a global monitoring system to provide a"mechanism for detection of missile launches for any purpose." This monitoring system, which could build on thesystem under development by the United Statesand Russia, might also ease tensions and uncertainties about ballistic missile developments. For nations who agreedto forgo the development of their ownballistic missiles, the Russian proposal offered security guarantees, with the international community coming to anation's assistance if it were attacked by ballisticmissiles. Finally, the proposal contained incentives for countries to forgo the development of ballistic missiles. (34) The Clinton Administration responded cautiously to the Russian proposal. It reportedly saw some positive elements, but also had concerns that the discussionsmight be used as a forum to criticize U.S. NMD plans and undermine U.S. efforts to win support for missiledefenses. (35) Furthermore, although the UnitedStatessupported the principle of a multilateral launch notification regime, it preferred to focus its attention on the bilateralU.S.-Russian effort. It believed it would beeasier to make the Joint Data Exchange Center available to other countries once it was operational than to conductmultilateral negotiations to establish the center. Russia has held two organizational meetings on its proposal for a GCS. At the first conference, in March 2000, Russia outlined its plan for the regime. At thesecond, in February 2001, the participants talked about an international code of conduct on missile technologytransfers that had been proposed at the MTCRmeetings in 2000. This code would affect the demand side, placing limits on nations seeking to advance theirmissile capabilities. The United States has notparticipated actively in the GCS forum. The U.S. embassy sent an observer to the first meeting but no U.S. officialattended the second. The ClintonAdministration agreed to try to integrate the GCS proposal into the existing MTCR framework, but it did not supportthe creation of a separate regime outside ofthe MTCR framework. (36) The Russian Proposal. Russia's President Vladimir Putin first proposed that Russia cooperate with nations inEurope in developing defenses against theater ballistic missiles in June 2000, shortly after his summit meeting withPresident Clinton. He referred to this conceptas "a regionally-based missile defense system" that would not require any changes in the ABM Treaty." (37) Putin's initial, general proposal was followed bymeetings between NATO officials and Russia's Minister of Defense, Igor Sergeyev, later in June. At that time,General Sergeyev reportedly outlined theframework for cooperation that Russia had in mind. He said that possible areas of cooperation could include: -- joint assessment of the nature and scale of missile proliferation and possible missile threats; -- joint development of a concept for a pan-European nonstrategic missile defense system and of a procedure for its creation and deployment; -- joint creation of a pan-European multilateral missile launch warning center; -- the holding of joint command and staff exercises; -- the conducting of joint research and experiments; -- joint development of nonstrategic missile defense systems; -- creation of nonstrategic missile defense formations for joint or coordinated actions to protect peacekeeping forces or the civilian population. (38) Russia's second proposal was included in a nine-page paper entitled "Phases of European Missile Defense" that was presented to NATO's Secretary General LordGeorge Robertson in Moscow in February 2001. This paper reportedly added details to the general outline thatRussia had first presented in June 2000. One keydifference was that, instead of hinting at the use of boost-phase defenses, as Russia had done in June 2000, the newpaper indicated that the defensive systemwould rely on more conventional terminal defenses in transportable units that could be moved to counter specificthreats during a crisis. (39) But the rest of theproposal remained essentially the same. Russia and the European nations would first cooperate in a forum thatwould review and assess emerging ballistic missilethreats. They could then establish a joint early warning center to process data and share information on missilelaunches. These nations could also jointlydevelop, build and deploy a non-strategic anti-ballistic missile system that could be ready for rapid deployment toany area in Europe where the threat of missileattack might arise. (40) According to some reports,the plan was "long on generalities and short on specifics." It provided "little technical evaluation and no costestimates, development timetables, or organizational structures." It simply represented a "theoretical basis for howa mobile European-based system might bedeveloped using Russian technology." (41) Russian officials emphasized that Russia had the technology, industrial base, and testing facilities needed to develop and produce a mobile non-strategic ballisticmissile defense system. They also noted that Russia had the early warning network needed to monitor and respondto ballistic missile threats that might emergefrom nations to the south of Europe. (42) The paperpresented to Lord Robertson did not identify the technologies that could be used in the system, but it did containa diagram, and analysts who reviewed the material concluded that Russia intended to use its S-300 and S-400air-defense systems. (43) The S-300 reportedlyincludes a sophisticated set of tracking devices and rockets that can reportedly intercept up to six missiles or aircraftat one time. (44) These systems are reportedlybased on the SA-10 air-defense system that the Soviet Union first deployed in the late 1960s. The systemaccomplished some successful intercepts of theater-range ballistic missiles in the mid-1990s. Jane's StrategicWeapons Systems attributes this system with capabilities similar to the U.S. Patriot system, which canintercept shorter-range ballistic missiles. (45) ButRussian sources claim the S-400 version will be able to intercept missiles with ranges up to 3,500 kilometers. This version reportedly entered production in mid-2000 and may become operational in 2001. (46) The U.S. and European Reactions. When Russia first offered its proposal for a European missile defensesystem, the Clinton Administration said the idea could not serve as a substitute for a U.S. NMD. Specifically,Secretary of Defense Cohen stated that it wouldleave the United States and Europe vulnerable to attacks from long-range rockets being developed by countries suchas Iran and North Korea. Therefore, it couldnot protect the United States or its allies from the full range of emerging threats. (47) To be acceptable to the United States, a missile defense sytem would haveto"protect all of the United States territory." Therefore, the Russian suggestion for a cooperative system with Europe"could supplement, but not substitute for thesystem that the U.S. is developing." (48) The European reaction to Russia's initial proposal was also "guarded" According to a European diplomat, "There is a lot of skepticism because this would seemto be another attempt by Moscow to drive a wedge between Europe and the United States." (49) Many analysts also considered the proposal to abe a "clumsy"attempt by Moscow to draw the European nations away from the United States and to increase pressure on theClinton Administration to defer missile defensedeployment and remain within the ABM Treaty. The reaction to Russia's February 2001 paper that added details to the June 2000 proposal was not as critical. Officials from the both Bush Administration andNATO noted that Russia's focus on theater missile defenses for Europe indicated that Russia appeared to agree withthe United States that missile proliferationposed a threat and agreed that missile defense systems, as well as diplomacy and arms control, could play a role inaddressing the threat. (50) Some analystssuggested that a change in tone that accompanied Russia's second proposal, and the fact that it came less than amonth into the Bush Administration, signaled thatRussia realized that the new President was more committed to the deployment of missile defenses and that Russia'sopposition could be futile. Instead, byoffering more details on the Russian alternative, Russia could be seeking to maintain a dialogue with the UnitedStates on missile defenses. (51) The Clinton Administration sought to address Russian concerns about the U.S. plans for missile defense by convincing Russia that the ABM Treaty would remainlargely in place, that missile defenses would remain relatively limited, and that they would be directed againstpossible small-scale attacks from "rogue" nations. As was noted above, the Clinton Administration agreed with the Russian view that the ABM Treaty was thecornerstone of strategic stability. It proposed onlymodest changes to the Treaty, so that it could deploy a limited ground based site in Alaska, rather than NorthDakota, and so that it could upgrade radarcapabilities. It acknowledged that the United States might seek further modifications in the future, but it neversuggested that it would deploy a robust, layereddefense that included sea-based or space-based interceptors. Administration officials also met frequently with Russian officials to discuss U.S. NMD plans and to seek Russian agreement on changes to the ABM Treaty. Although these discussions proved futile, and Russia offered little more than a simple "no" in response to U.S.initiatives, this effort appeared to indicate that theUnited States placed a high priority on reaching agreement with Russia before it proceeded with its missile defenseplans. Administration officials indicated thatthe United States would consider withdrawing from the ABM Treaty if Russia failed to accept modifications butRussia apparently never believed that the ClintonAdministration would take this step. This view may have contributed to Russia's reluctance to accept or evendiscuss the U.S. proposals. The Bush Administration has altered sharply the U.S. approach towards addressing Russia's concerns. First, the Administration does not support the view that theABM Treaty remains the cornerstone of strategic stability. To the contrary, Secretaries Rumsfeld and Powell statedthat the Treaty is "ancient history" and "notrelevant in the current strategic framework." In his speech on May 1, 2001, President Bush said the United Statesmust "leave behind the constraints of the ABMTreaty" and, instead, "replace this treaty with a new framework that reflects a clear and clean break from the past..." Second, the Bush Administration has not accepted the limited approach to missile defenses that had been pursued by the Clinton Administration. Although theAdministration insists that its defensive systems will also be directed against "rogue" nation threats and accidentallaunches, it has not pledged to keep that systemlimited to a few hundred interceptors based at one or a few sites on land. Instead, the Administration has pledgedto develop a "layered" defense that will includecomponents based on land, at sea, and in space. Unlike the Clinton Administration, and possibly because it has notyet settled on an architecture, the BushAdministration has not yet sought to convince Russia that the technologies included in U.S. missile defense planscould not intercept a deliberate Russian attackand would not undermine Russia's deterrent. Instead, the Administration has offered verbal assurances that it doesnot view Russia as an adversary, and,therefore, would not direct U.S. missile defense efforts against Russian forces. In late July 2001, Presidents Bush and Putin agreed that the two nations would hold discussions on their offensive nuclear weapons and missile defenses, and seekto reach agreement on a new strategic framework. These discussions began in early August, when Russian officialsreceived a detailed briefing on U.S.technologies and the Bush Administration plans for missile defenses. But the Bush Administration did not viewthese discussions as the opening round in aformal negotiating process that might produce a new treaty limiting offensive nuclear weapons or missile defenses. Instead, the United States wanted Russia toagree to set aside the ABM Treaty, or to have both parties withdraw from it together, so that the United States couldproceed with missile defense. Russia, on the other hand, preferred to keep some form of Treaty regime in place. It acknowledged that the world has changed and that the relationship with theUnited States has changed, but it continued to place a value on the predictability and formality offered by armscontrol agreements. Reports indicate that it mayhave been willing to permit more extensive testing of missile defense systems, and to relax the definitions in theAgreed Statements on Demarcation so that theUnited States can test TMD systems against a wider range of targets. It also sought details about how the U.S.missile defense program would be constrained bythe ABM Treaty, so that the two sides could devise amendments to relax the relevant constraints. In essence, Russiaapproached the Bush Administration with aresponse that would have been acceptable, and possibly even effective, during the Clinton Administration, whenthe United States was willing to modify the ABMTreaty. But the Bush Administration did not offer any proposals for amendments because it did not want anyconstraints to remain on U.S. missile defense plans. Members of Congress have expressed a range of opinions about the Bush Administration's approach to missile defense and arms control. (52) Congress did not votedirectly on binding legislation that would address the question of whether the United States should withdraw fromthe ABM Treaty. It does, however, have annualopportunities to review the Administration's plans for missile defenses when it reviews the Administration's budgetrequests during the annual authorization andappropriations process. These debates may be dominated by questions about the costs and technical feasibility ofU.S. missile defense plans. But the Membersmay also address some questions about the implications of these plans for the U.S. relationship with Russia and thefuture of the arms control process. Will Russia continue to cooperate on offensive arms reductions? Many critics of U.S. missile defense policyconsider Russia's threat to withdraw from a range of offensive arms control agreements as a key threat to U.S.security. They note that these agreements not onlyreduce the size of the only arsenal that can threaten U.S. survival, but they also include monitoring and verificationprovisions that bring predictability,transparency, and cooperation to the U.S.-Russian nuclear relationship. Others, however, argue that the benefitsof arms control are not worth the cost ofremaining vulnerable to missile attack. They note that Russian nuclear forces are likely to decline sharply duringthe next decade under economic constraints,with or without arms control. They also note that the United States and Russia have signed a new Treaty that wouldreduce their offensive nuclear forces, so thatRussia's withdrawal from older Treaties would not undermine U.S. security. (53) Finally, they contend that the United States and Russia have established amature,cooperative relationship on nuclear weapons issues and that the transparency and predictability from this relationshipcould continue even if the countries were notmonitoring compliance with arms control treaties. Will Russia continue to cooperate in non-proliferation and threat reduction activities? Some critics of U.S.missile defense policy argue that Russia might cease its cooperation in a range of other policy areas if the UnitedStates were to withdraw from the ABM Treaty. They point to Russia' expanding nuclear cooperation with Iran as evidence that Russia could do serious harm to U.S.national security if it chose to pursue a lessrestrained nonproliferation policy. Some also contend that Russia might withdraw from participation in theNunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program,where the United States provides financial and technical assistance in securing and eliminating Russian nuclearweapons and materials. Without U.S.participation, these weapons and materials might be lost, stolen, or sold to nations seeking their own nuclearweapons. Some believe these possibilities could posea greater threat to U.S. security than the emerging missile threats that would be the target of U.S. missile defenses. Others, however, doubt that Russian policies in these areas would be linked to U.S. withdrawal from the ABM Treaty. They note that Russia has been cooperatingwith Iran in nuclear developments and military sales for many years, and that these activities are driven more byRussia's interest in earning hard currency than byRussia's interest in undermining U.S. non-proliferation objectives. Some also argue that Russia would not be likelyto cut off cooperation under the Nunn-Lugarprograms because it recognizes the threats posed by the potential loss of nuclear weapons and materials and it wouldbe unable to safeguard and eliminate agingnuclear weapons without U.S. assistance. Will Russia convince other nations to support its objections to U.S. missile defense policies? Russia conducteda world-wide public relations campaign in an effort to win the support of other countries in its opposition to U.S.missile defense policies. It joined with China onnumerous occasions to criticize U.S. missile defenses as a threat to international stability and it has sought to winsupport from U.S. allies in Europe by promisingto cooperate on the development of theater missile defenses for Europe. It has also issued declarations with manyother nations in support of the ABM Treaty andopposition to U.S. missile defense plans. Some critics of U.S. missile defense plans argue that the United States might find itself isolated in the international community if it continues to pursue missiledefenses and withdraws from the ABM Treaty. They note that most countries are at least uncomfortable, if notoutright opposed, to this policy. Some fear thatthese nations might interfere with or complicate other areas of U.S. policy if they feel that the United States hasupset the international order with its pursuit ofmissile defenses. The Bush Administration pledged to consult with U.S. allies before it proceeded with missile defense, in part to ease their concerns and reduce their resistence. Supporters of missile defense deployments generally support consultation with U.S. allies, although some haveexpressed concern that the Administration'semphasis on these consultations could leave U.S. policy vulnerable to the objections of other nations. And manydo not think these objections will affect the U.S.international position. They argue that U.S. missile defenses will enhance, not degrade, international security, andthat other nations will realize that they willbenefit in the long run if the United States pursues this course. Some also note that international criticism will not,in the long run, affect U.S. policy objectives. Finally, as is noted below, the international reaction to the U.S. withdrawal from the ABM Treaty was relativelyquiet, in large part because Russia's reaction wasso mild. During the first months of the Bush Administration, analysts and observers debated how Russia would react ifand when the United States withdrew from theABM Treaty. They questioned whether Russia would continue to press its objections to U.S. policies on missiledefense and the ABM Treaty, or whether it wouldtry to reach an accommodation with the Bush Administration on a new framework for strategic stability. Manymembers of the Bush Administration believed thatthe United States would gain Russia's cooperation when Russia realized that the U.S. was committed to withdrawingfrom the ABM Treaty. They noted thatRussia remained extremely interested in reductions in offensive nuclear forces and that the Bush Administration'splans to reduce U.S. forces would ease Russia'sconcerns about U.S. intentions. Others, however, argued that Russia had outlined well-reasoned and complex objections to U.S. policies on missile defense and the ABM Treaty, and that it wasnot likely to change its views in the near term. Instead, they believed that Russia could follow through on its threatsto withdraw from a range of arms controlagreements and its plans to augment its nuclear forces. They argued that the United States might eventually becomeless secure, even if it deployed missiledefenses, because it would be faced with a more adversarial, less cooperative Russia. And Russia would retainenough nuclear weapons to saturate the U.S.defenses and threaten the survival of the United States. This debate grew silent in September 2001, after the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon. Russia's President Putin was the first internationalleader to call President Bush after the attacks and he quickly offered his support to the U.S. war on terrorism. Heallowed U.S. forces to use bases in formerSoviet republics and he cooperated by sharing intelligence and Russian knowledge about Afghanistan. TheU.S.-Russian relationship that emerged in the lattermonths of 2001 seemed to prove the Bush Administration's view that the two nations were no longer enemies andthat they could build a new, more cooperativerelationship. Thus, when President Bush announced, on December 13, 2001, that the United States had given Russia the six-month notice of its intent to withdraw from theABM Treaty, Russia's reaction differed sharply from the conventional wisdom. Reports indicated that the WhiteHouse called President Putin in the days beforethe announcement, and that the two sides worked together to craft statements that would indicate that the withdrawalwould not upset their relationship. In hisstatement, President Putin said that he considered the U.S. decision to be "mistaken" and he emphasized that Russiahad done everything it could to preserve theTreaty. But he indicated that the U.S. withdrawal would not undermine U.S.-Russian relations, and that the twosides should work out a "new framework ofmutual strategic relations." (54) The White Housewelcomed Putin's statement and said that it agreed that the U.S. withdrawal presented "no threat to the security ofthe Russian Federation." The White House also pledged to work with Russia to formalize reductions in offensiveforces, a process that Russia viewed as a highpriority. (55) Other officials and analysts in Russia responded with a similar, mild tone. Andrey Kokoshin, who had served as Russia's Deputy Defense Minister and was amember of the Duma, also referred to the U.S. decision as a mistake, but said that it would not undermine Russia'ssecurity because Russia had weapons systemsthat were capable of overcoming U.S. defenses. Kokoshin said that Russia would not have to "step up thecapabilities" of its strategic nuclear forces. (56) MarshallIgor Sergeyev, the former Defense Minister and an adviser to Putin, echoed these views. He said that the U.S.withdrawal would not create any problems forRussia's military security for 10-15 years. He also supported the negotiation of a new strategic framework, arguingthat it "would be extremely undesirable toremain in a legal vacuum on strategic stability matters for a long time." (57) Some in Russia, however, offered a more negative response. The Dumaapproved aresolution that called the U.S. withdrawal "mistaken and destabilizing." (58) By the time the U.S. withdrawal took effect, on June 13, 2002, the United States and Russia had negotiated a new Treaty limiting strategic offensive weapons andthe Presidents had signed a Joint Declaration outlining a new framework for cooperation between the two nations. Although some tensions remained in thisrelationship, particularly with respect to Russia's nuclear cooperation with Iran, cooperation between the two nationscontinued to grow. The U.S. withdrawalfrom the ABM Treaty no longer seemed like a potentially divisive issue. Foreign Minister Ivanov noted the event,but stated the "the primary aim now is tominimize the negative consequences of the U.S. withdrawal." (59) He, and others, noted that Russia had convinced the United States to continue negotiations onreductions in strategic offensive forces, which represented a significant achievement for Russian diplomacy. Furthermore, Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov notedthat the U.S. missile defense system did not yet exist and, therefore, there was no reason for Russia to retaliate. (60) The Russian Duma, on the other hand, criticized the U.S. withdrawal, calling it a "gross political mistake" and proposed that, in response, Russia "declare itselffree from its commitments under the START II Treaty." (61) The Russian government took this step on June 13, 2002, when the Foreign Ministry issued astatement saying that Russia no longer felt bound by the Treaty. (62) This step, however, was largely symbolic. Officials in both the U.S. and Russian governmentshave indicated that the Treaty has been set aside; they acknowledged its absence when they referred to the STARTI Treaty as "START" in the text of the newStrategic Offensive Reductions Treaty. Hence, although Russian officials criticized U.S. missile defense plans and promised to take military and diplomatic steps in response to the U.S. withdrawal fromthe ABM Treaty, the Russian reaction when the event occurred was far less aggressive. The changes in theinternational security environment, and the continuingimprovements in the U.S-Russian relationship, had essentially buried the debate over the ABM Treaty.

Summary: In the late 1990s, the United States began to focus on the possible deployment of defenses against long-range ballistic missiles. The planned National MissileDefense (NMD) system would have exceeded the terms of the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. Recognizing this,the Clinton Administration sought toconvince Russia to modify the terms of the Treaty. But Russia was unwilling to accept any changes to the Treaty. It also decried the U.S plan to deploy NMD,insisting that it would upset strategic stability and start a new arms race. Russia claimed that the ABM Treaty is the "cornerstone of strategic stability" and that, without its limits on missile defense, the entire framework of offensivearms control agreements could collapse. Furthermore, Russia argued that a U.S. NMD system would undermineRussia's nuclear deterrent and upset stability byallowing the United States to initiate an attack and protect itself from retaliatory strike. The Clinton Administrationclaimed that the U.S. NMD system would bedirected against rogue nations and would be too limited to intercept a Russian attack. But Russian officialsquestioned this argument. They doubted that roguenations would have the capability to attack U.S. territory for some time, and they believed that the United Statescould expand its NMD system easily. Furthermore, they argued that, when combined with the entirety of U.S. conventional and nuclear weapons, an NMDsystem would place the United States in aposition of strategic superiority. During the Clinton Administration and first year of the Bush Administration, Russian officials stated that, if the United States withdrew from the ABM Treaty anddeployed an NMD, Russia would withdraw from a range of offensive arms control agreements. Furthermore, Russiacould deploy multiple warheads on itsICBMs to overcome a U.S. NMD, or deploy new intermediate-range missiles or shorter-range nuclear systems toenhance its military capabilities. Russia has also outlined diplomatic and cooperative military initiatives as alternatives to the deployment of a U.S. NMD. Russia has proposed that theinternational community negotiate a Global Missile and Missile Technology Non-Proliferation regime as a meansto discourage nations from acquiring ballisticmissiles. It has also suggested that it would cooperate with nations in Europe to develop and deploy defensesagainst theater-range ballistic missiles. Manyanalysts believe this proposal was designed to win support among U.S. allies for Russia's opposition to the U.S.NMD program. U.S. officials expressed aninterest in the idea but said it could not substitute for defenses against longer-range missiles. The Clinton Administration sought to address Russia's concerns by offering continued support to the fundamental principles of the ABM Treaty and by seeking toconvince Russia that the U.S. NMD system would remain too limited to threaten Russia's nuclear deterrent. TheBush Administration, in contrast, has supportedmore robust missile defenses, but it also has stated that they will not be directed against Russia's offensive forces. The President has indicated that the UnitedStates will need to move beyond the limits in the ABM Treaty, but he suggested that Russia join the United Statesin developing a new strategic framework.