Shortly after President Bush took office in January 2001, the Administration declared itsintent to undertake a full review of U.S. policy towards North Korea, distancing itself from theClinton engagement policy that culminated in Madeleine Albright's October 2000 visit to Pyongyangfor talks to curtail North Korea's missile program. (2) The reformulated policy, announced in June 2001, outlined afurther lifting of U.S. sanctions (3) , increased assistance to North Korea, and "other political steps" ifthe North agreed to 1) start to take serious, verifiable steps to reduce the conventional weapons threatto the South, 2) undertake "improved implementation" of the 1994 Agreed Framework, and 3) allowverifiable "constraints" on North Korea's missile exports. Formal negotiations between Washingtonand Pyongyang did not occur, however, during 2001. Following the 9/11 attacks, Bush linked NorthKorea to the war on terrorism by including it in the "axis of evil" along with Iraq and Iran in hisJanuary 2002 State of the Union address. The Administration insisted, however, that its stated policyof resuming a dialogue with the North Koreans "any time, any place," remained in effect. Scheduled bilateral talks were postponed in summer 2002 due to a naval skirmish betweenthe North and South Koreans; during this delay, U.S. intelligence, building on evidence dating backto 1998, reportedly indicated that the North Koreans were secretly developing a highly enricheduranium program. Prospects for successful talks were derailed when Assistant Secretary of StateJames Kelly reportedly presented the North Koreans with evidence of the program during a visit toPyongyang in October 2002. North Korea reportedly confirmed the allegations. The BushAdministration maintained that the suspected uranium program constituted a breach of Pyongyang'sinternational obligations under the 1994 Agreed Framework and the Nuclear Non-proliferationTreaty (NPT). With this confrontation, already uneasy relations abruptly shifted to a more hostilestance. After the confrontation became public, the Agreed Framework quickly unraveled. At U.S.urging, KEDO's executive board decided to halt the heavy fuel oil shipments in November 2002. This prompted a series of angry and consequential responses from the North Koreans: shrilldenouncements of the U.S. failure to live up to its obligations under the agreement, the removal ofIAEA monitors from the Yongbyon plant, the expelling of IAEA inspectors from the country, theremoval of fuel rods from the storage pond, and withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-ProliferationTreaty (NPT). The Bush Administration maintained that a serious flaw of the Clinton approach during theAgreed Framework talks in the 1990's was the willingness to engage Pyongyang in direct bilateralrelations, instead of relying on a more multilateral process to pressure the North into compliance. As the 1994 agreement faltered, the Administration stood by its conviction that the previousarrangement rewarded North Korea for bad behavior and failed to engage regional powers,particularly China, in enforcement. Pyongyang, meanwhile, insisted that direct talks withWashington were the only way to reach a resolution. Together with the Chinese, the Administrationset the stage for a multilateral forum to address the North Korean nuclear issue. In April 2003, around of three-party talks was held in Beijing among the United States, North Korea (also knownas the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, or the D.P.R.K.), and China (also known as thePeople's Republic of China, or the P.R.C.). In the month that followed, President Bush met withSouth Korean President Roh Moo-hyun and Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi, pledgingto include both countries in future talks. North Korea rejected the arrangement. At the ASEANRegional Forum (ARF) in mid-June, China also called for Japan and South Korea (also known asthe Republic of Korea, or the R.O.K.) to "join the efforts," and Pyongyang relented. Four monthsafter the three-party talks, the first round of six party talks convened in Beijing, also including formerNorth Korean patron Russia. Central to the Administration's initiative of multilateral talks was the involvement of China,the North's last major ally. China earlier had been reluctant to engage in multilateral efforts to dealwith North Korea and did not play a direct role in the 1994 Agreed Framework. Because China isthought to be North Korea's top trading partner and source of aid, Beijing's cooperation wasconsidered crucial to any attempts by the international community to put economic pressure on thePyongyang regime. President Bush cultivated Chinese cooperation by addressing the nuclear issuewhen Chinese President Jiang Zemin visited Crawford, Texas in October 2002, and later callingJiang directly to request his help in resolving the escalating crisis. On both occasions, Jiang statedChina's commitment to a non-nuclear Korean peninsula. China's new activism in diplomacycontinued under Jiang's successor Hu Jintao, who officially assumed the presidency in March 2003. Chinese leadership pushed firmly for the formation of the six-party talks and, according to reports,shut down an oil pipeline to North Korea for three days early in 2003, demonstrating its resolve toPyongyang. Beijing also reportedly gave the North Koreans substantial amounts of money, oil, andfood in exchange for attendance at the six-party meetings. Beijing reportedly fears the profoundly destabilizing effects of either a robust nuclear-armedNorth Korea, which could set off an arms race in the region, or the collapse of the regime, whichcould send thousands of refugees over the border into China. China has struggled to deal with tensof thousands of North Koreans who are believed to be living in and traveling to and from China.Some observers have noted the limitation of depending on China, which prioritizes stability on theKorean peninsula above all, while some members of the Bush Administration reportedly favorregime change in Pyongyang. Three rounds of talks -- in August 2003, February 2004, and June 2004 -- failed to achievesignificant breakthroughs. Analysts blamed a number of factors for the stalemate: most significantly,intransigence by Pyongyang and inflexibility by Washington. Semantics also stalled meaningfuldebate, as negotiators disagreed over the meaning of phrases such as the U.S.-demanded "complete,verifiable, and irreversible dismantlement"(which became known by its acronym CVID) of NorthKorea's weapons program and "simultaneous" or "reciprocal" actions. The formation of workinggroups during the second round of talks was also criticized as slowing the process by detractingattention from the higher-level plenary sessions. Many observers faulted the perceived struggle within the Administration for severely limitinglead U.S. negotiator Kelly's freedom to work out compromises. The United States did not putforward a detailed negotiating proposal until June 2004, despite requests from Chinese, Japanese,and South Korean leaders. According to reports, an influential coalition in the Administrationconsisted of the offices of the Secretary of Defense and the Vice President, and non-proliferationspecialists in the State Department and the National Security Council. This group reportedly opposeddirect negotiations with and concessions to North Korea, favored the issuance of demands forunilateral North Korean concessions on military issues, and advocated an overall U.S. strategy ofisolating North Korea diplomatically and economically. Officials within this group expressed hopeand/or expectations of a collapse of the North Korean regime. A second faction, mainly in the StateDepartment and NSC, was composed of officials with experience on East Asian and Korean issues. This faction believed that the Administration should attempt negotiations before adopting morecoercive measures in order to build coalitions among the other parties, and they reportedly doubtedthe effectiveness of a strategy to bring about a North Korean collapse. (4) Despite regular denunciations of the talks, North Korea set forward a series ofvaguely-worded proposals. Prior to the second round of talks, North Korea indicated that it may bewilling to end its nuclear program if the United States issued a non-aggression pact or securityguarantee. President Bush indicated in a statement in October 2003 that he would support a multilateral security guarantee. (5) A separate plan advanced by the North Koreans in December 2003included a "freeze"of its weapons program in exchange for a list of U.S. concessions, includinglifting economic sanctions and energy assistance. The United States rejected this proposal, insistingon a complete dismantlement of North Korea's nuclear programs before entering into othernegotiations. The U.S. eventually countered with a proposal at the June 2004 talks, which wasloosely modeled on Libya's decision to abandon its nuclear weapons program in December 2003:a freeze of North Korea's weapons' program, followed by a series of measures to ensure completedismantlement, and, eventually, a permanent security guarantee and discussions on a return tonormal relations. In the interim, Japan and South Korea would provide heavy oil. The proposalclosely resembled one presented by South Korea earlier in the talks. After some mixed reactions,the North Koreans ultimately rejected the offer. A major obstacle to the negotiations was NorthKorea's suspected uranium enrichment program: North Korean envoys refused to acknowledge itsexistence, while the United States insisted that its verified dismantlement be a prerequisite for furtherprogress. Many analysts used a "1-3-2" formulation to describe the dynamics of the six- party talks:North Korea on its own; South Korea, Russia, and China favoring a more conciliatory approach ofoffering incentives to North Korea and more emphasis on a nuclear freeze instead of dismantlement;and Japan and the United States preferring a mix of dialogue and pressure on Pyongyang. After thefirst two rounds of talks failed to produce breakthroughs, indications of frustration with the U.S.approach appeared among the other parties. In June 2004, China's deputy prime minister assertedthat the U.S. had not convinced Beijing that North Korea was pursuing a uranium program, asuggestion echoed by officials in South Korea. (6) At the G-8 summit in Sea Island the same month, Prime MinisterKoizumi urged President Bush to open up a productive dialogue with North Korea, stressing KimJong-il's readiness to find a resolution. Some speculated that this pressure led to the U.S. proposalat the June 2004 talks. China and Russia also reportedly voiced some support for allowing NorthKorea to use nuclear technology for "peaceful" civilian purposes, while the United States insistedthat all nuclear programs should be dismantled. Following the June meeting, the talks came to astandstill in the run-up to the U.S. presidential election. In October 2004, during a trip to Asia bySecretary of State Colin Powell, both Chinese and South Korean officials criticized the U.S. position,calling for a more "realistic" and "flexible" approach to resolving the problem, without noting NorthKorea's rejection of the June U.S. proposal. (7) As the talks failed to achieve any breakthroughs, North Korea is believed to have movedahead with its nuclear weapons program, according to its own statements and estimates from variousintelligence agencies. In the months following the October 2002 confrontation, North Koreaexpelled International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors, removed IAEA seals andmonitoring devices, moved spent fuel rods to its Yongbyon power plant, and announced itswithdrawal from the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT). In 2002, U.S. and South Koreanintelligence officials indicated that the Yongbyon nuclear reactor was re-started. Pyongyang officialslater claimed that the plutonium from the fuel rods had been turned into weapons. Rumors ofpossible nuclear tests or missile launches proliferated, but North Korea refrained from "physicallydisplaying" its "nuclear deterrent force" as it had threatened. (8) At the talks, spokesmen forNorth Korea also reportedly made threats that they would export their nuclear weapons. (9) Despite frequent setbacks, North-South relations advanced, particularly on a variety ofhumanitarian issues and economic cooperation. President Roh Moo-hyun pledged in his inauguraladdress in February 2003 to pursue a policy of "peace and prosperity" on the Korean peninsula, apolicy widely understood to be a continuation of Kim Dae Jung's "Sunshine Policy" of politicalengagement and economic integration. Bilateral ministerial talks, held on a nearly quarterly basis,led to a wide range of government-to-government contacts. Unprecedented military talks were heldin June 2004 at the general level; meetings since the 1950's had not gone beyond the colonel rank. The talks led to the exchange of radio messages between North and South Korean vessels and acessation of the daily broadcasts of propaganda across the DMZ. Other joint projects, such as arailway linking the two countries and an industrial park in Kaesong, North Korea for South Koreancompanies, also moved forward, causing some to question Seoul's iterations that future large-scaleassistance to the North first required resolution of the nuclear issue. South Korea has become NorthKorea's second biggest trade partner and aid provider, spending over $3 billion in assistance since2000. South Korea's steadily increasingly economic engagement with the North reportedlyconcerned many U.S. policymakers who advocated a hard-line stance to pressure Pyongyang. Although Seoul continued to promote a policy of eventual reunification of the peninsula, it alsomade clear that its top priority for the short-term was stability, which precludes precipitating acollapse of the regime in Pyongyang. The progress in inter-Korean relations took place against a backdrop of uncertainty about thefuture of the U.S.-South Korea alliance. Anti-American sentiment reportedly rose among the publicin South Korea, particularly after two schoolgirls were killed accidentally by a U.S. military vehiclein 2002. President Roh Moo-hyun took office pledging to develop a defense policy moreindependent of the United States, but he stood by his decision to send 3,600 troops, medics andengineers to Iraq despite public opposition to the U.S.-led war. Recent military configurationdecisions -- the redeployment of 3,600 U.S. troops to Iraq and the withdrawal of one third of the37,000 American troops stationed in the country by the end of 2005 -- alarmed some South Koreansthat the United States was not committed to the defense of South Korea. (10) Many observers noted asharp discrepancy between Seoul and Washington's public stances on North Korea; in a speech inLos Angeles in November 2004, Roh suggested that Pyongyang's claims to be developing nuclearweapons as a deterrent were "understandable considering the environment they live in," insisted thatdialogue was the only option, and described as positive North Korea's "reward for freeze"proposal. (11) The BushAdministration did not offer a public reaction to Roh's speech. In September 2002, Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi traveled to Pyongyang fora historic summit with Kim Jong-il. During the visit, Kim Jong-il admitted to Koizumi that NorthKorea had abducted 13 Japanese nationals in the 1970's and 1980's. Repercussions from hisadmission continued to affect Japan's role in dealing with North Korea. Facing an outraged Japanesepublic, Koizumi prioritized the return to Japan of the abductees in October 2002 and spent furtherdiplomatic capital to win the release of the abductee family members during a second summit inPyongyang in May 2004. While Koizumi reportedly pressed Kim Jong-il to abandon his nuclearweapons program during the 2004 meeting, he also pledged in the same visit to provide 250,000 tonsof rice and $10 million in other aid to the North. The Japanese legislature, however, reinforced itsthreats to cut off economic assistance to North Korea by passing laws that allow the Japanesegovernment to impose sanctions on Pyongyang and to ban foreign vessels, suspected of carrying hardcurrency, that go to and from North Korea. (12) Japan's position hardened in December 2004, after JapaneseDNA tests invalidated North Korea's claims that boxes of remains delivered to Japan were those ofdeceased kidnap victims. Following this development, the Japanese government suspended its aidshipments to North Korea, and calls for an imposition of sanctions increased. The six nation talks unfolded during a period of unprecedentedly strong U.S.-Japan securitycooperation. Following the attacks of September 11, 2001, Japanese Self Defense Forces providedlogistical support to U.S. military operations in Afghanistan, the first time that Japan had dispatchedits forces overseas for a non-peacekeeping operation since the end of World War II. Again breakingwith its postwar tradition, Tokyo deployed over 500 troops to southern Iraq to support humanitarianactivities as part of the U.S.-led coalition. In addition, Japan provided billions of dollars in financialassistance to the reconstruction of Iraq and Afghanistan. In the six-party talks, Japan was generallyseen as hewing more closely to the U.S. position than the other participants, but domestic focus onthe abductee issue and security concerns -- specifically about North Korea's missile program -- created somewhat different priorities for Japan. The Bush Administration reportedly urged Japannot to institute sanctions against North Korea, fearing that sanctions would damage the six-partytalks. (13) As state-to-state contact continued in the six-nation talks, non-Administration emissaries alsomade trips to North Korea to explore possible resolutions or to clarify claims of capability. In May2003, Representative Curt Weldon led a bipartisan delegation to Pyongyang and held discussionswith government officials on potential deals to eliminate the North's nuclear weapons program. Asecond trip planned in October 2004 by Representative Weldon was cancelled because of WhiteHouse objections. In January 2004, two aides from the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (FrankJanuzzi and Keith Luse) accompanied a nuclear scientist (Siegfried Hecker), and the former seniorenvoy for negotiations with North Korea (Jack Pritchard) to Pyongyang and nearby nuclear facilities,including the Yongbyon reactor. The findings of the trip were viewed as significant because thevisitors reported that the nuclear plutonium facilities other than Yongbyon were defunct; NorthKorea was apparently capable of producing plutonium metal; and the 8,000 fuel rods previouslystored and watched by IAEA inspectors had been removed from the cooling pond. In addition to the Member and staff delegations, Congress was engaged in issues concerningNorth Korea through a series of hearings on the six-party talks as well as on refugees and humanrights. In June 2002, the House of Representatives passed H.Con.Res. 213 (107thCongress), which called on China to halt forced returns of refugees to North Korea and give the U.N.High Commission on Refugees access to North Korean refugees. Congress also passed H.R. 4011 , the North Korean Human Rights Act of 2004, in September 2004. The act( P.L. 108-333 ) eases the asylum and legal immigration process for North Korean refugees and callsfor the U.S. executive branch to adopt a number of measures aimed at furthering human rights inNorth Korea, including financial support of non-government human rights groups, increased radiobroadcasts into North Korea, the distribution of radios in North Korea, and more effectivemonitoring of food aid. The Administration, although it brought up human rights concerns brieflyin the six-party talks, and generally raised the issue more often than did previous Administrations,assigned higher priority to the North's nuclear program, as well as conventional forces, missiles, andNorth Korea's trade in illicit goods. Although the six nation talks have reached no significant breakthroughs, the multilateralapproach has provided a forum for Northeast Asian powers to meet regularly and establish commonobjectives. The players have achieved a strong degree of consensus on stopping the spread ofweapons of mass destruction and a shared commitment to maintaining regional stability. Asiawatchers speculate that the six-party format could provide an institutionalized forum for securitydiscussions in the future. The inclusion of North Korea in the talks may also prove to be valuable if the state continues to threaten regional stability in the years to come. CRS Issue Brief IB98045, Korea: U.S.-Korean Relations -- Issues for Congress CRS Issue Brief IB91141, North Korea's Nuclear Weapons Program CRS Report RL31696 , North Korea: Economic Sanctions CRS Report RS21834 , U.S. Assistance to North Korea: Fact Sheet CRS Report RL31785 , U.S. Assistance to North Korea: Issues and Options for U.S. Policy CRS Report RL32493(pdf) , The North Korean Economy: Background and Policy Analysis CRS Report RS21391 , North Korea's Nuclear Weapons: How Soon an Arsenal? CRS Report RL31900 , Weapons of Mass Destruction: Trade Between North Korea and Pakistan CRS Report RS21473 , North Korean Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States CRS Report RS21582 , North Korean Crisis: Possible Military Options CRS Report RL32167 , Drug Trafficking and North Korea: Issues for U.S. Policy CRS Report RL32428, Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi's May 2004 Trip to North Korea:Implications for U.S. Objectives CRS Report RL32161 , Japan-North Korea Relations: Selected Issues CRS Report RL32137 , North Korean Supporters in Japan: Issues for U.S. Policy CRS Report RL31906 , South Korean Politics and Rising "Anti-Americanism": Implications for U.S.Policy Toward North Korea 7/5/04In a statement issued by the state news agency, North Korea said it had "no objection" to a request by the Red Army hijackers to return to Japan. 7/5/04At working-level military talks in Kaesong, the two sides agree to maintain openwireless communications to prevent accidental clashes in the West Sea, and to startthe second phase of removing propaganda at the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ). 7/7-7/9/04National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice visits Tokyo, Seoul, and Beijing. 7/8/04The 10th anniversary of the death of Kim Il-sung. Seoul prohibits a group of NGOsfrom traveling to the North to mark the occasion, prompting Pyongyang to cancelofficial North-South dialogues. 7/11-7/16/04The 10th round of family reunions at Mt. Kumgang. 7/13-15/04Scheduled fifth round of inter-Korean maritime cooperation working-level talks arecancelled by North Korea. 7/19/04Planned North-South working level military talks are not held after NorthKorea fails to respond to phone calls to arrange logistics. 7/21/04U.S. House of Representatives approves H.R. 4011 , the NorthKorea Human Rights Act. 7/23/04The U.S. and ROK finalize agreements to relocate all of the roughly 8,000U.S. Forces from the Seoul Metropolitan Area to the Pyongtaek area,approximately 50 miles south of Seoul, by the end of 2008. 7/24/04North Korea denounces the U.S. nuclear proposal as "nothing but a shamoffer." 7/27-28/04The ROK airlifts over 450 North Korean defectors from Vietnam to Seoul. Decryingthe action as an "abduction,"Pyongyang halts most forms of inter-Korean dialogue. 8/3-6/04Scheduled 15th inter-Korean ministerial cabinet level talks are postponed byNorth Korea, which cites South Korea's mass acceptance of over NorthKorean refugees. 8/10/04At a closed-door session of an international seminar on the North Koreannuclear issue hosted by the National Committee on American Foreign Policyin New York, Ri Gun, deputy director-general of American affairs at theDPRK's Foreign Ministry; meets with Joseph DeTrani, U.S. special envoy tothe DPRK, State Department Policy Planning Director Mitchell Reiss, andHan Seung-joo, ROK ambassador to Washington. 8/11-12/04Japan-DPRK abduction talks in Beijing reportedly yield little progress. 8/13/04At the opening ceremony for the Athens Olympics, the ROK and DPRKOlympic march together under the same flag, just as they did in Sydney in2000. 8/23/04KCNA quotes a DPRK Foreign Ministry spokesman as saying "The meetingof the working group for the six-party talks cannot be opened because theU.S. has become more undisguised in pursuing its hostile policy." Thespokesman calls President Bush an "imbecile" and "a tyrant that puts Hitlerinto the shade." 8/31-9/3/04Scheduled 10th inter-Korean economic talks are postponed by North Korea. 9/2/04South Korea admits scientists enriched a tiny amount of uranium in 2000 to a levelclose to what would be usable in a nuclear weapon. Seoul claims this was donewithout the government's knowledge or authorization, so was not reported at the timeto the IAEA. 9/2/04Conducting a case-by-case review of possible U.S.-made dual-use technology thatSouth Korean companies may bring into the Kaesong Industrial Zone, ROK and U.S.officials clear 11 of 15 approved ROK companies to begin operating in Kaesong. 9/12/04Sources in Seoul and Beijing report seeing a huge mushroom cloud innorthern North Korea on September 9, the anniversary of the founding of theDPRK. President Bush reportedly is briefed that the cloud may have resultedfrom a nuclear test. North Korea claims the cloud resulted from a detonationassociated with a hydroelectric dam, but when it transports foreignambassadors to the area for a visual inspection, it brings them to a site 60miles away from where the cloud was reported. South Korean authoritieslater say the episode may have been an unusual cloud formation. 9/9/04South Korean scientists admit they separated a tiny amount of bomb-grade plutoniumin 1982 without notifying the IAEA. 9/12/04In an interviews with the New York Times , Democratic Presidential nomineeSenator John Kerry accuses the Bush administration of letting "a nuclearnightmare" develop by refusing to deal with North Korea when it first cameto office. 9/12/04Kim Jong-il meets in Pyongyang with a senior communist party delegationfrom the PRC that reportedly informs the DPRK leadership that China wouldcontinue to provide development assistance to North Korea. 9/15/04ROK officials reportedly say that removal of propaganda installations alongthe DMZ has stalled. 9/21/04A ceremony to mark the completion of an ROK office in the KaesongIndustrial Zone is called off after the North bars 11 lawmakers of theopposition GNP from attending. After Pyongyang later agrees to allow the11 to attend, the event is rescheduled for October 21. 9/23/04Amid reports that U.S. and Japanese intelligence indicates North Korea maybe preparing to test-launch an intermediate ballistic missile, ROK ForeignMinister Ban, meeting Secretary of State Powell in New York, warns theDPRK that any such launch would negatively affect inter-Korean ties,including Kaesong. 9/23/04North Korea's state-run Rodong Sinmun newspaper declares "if the UnitedStates ignites a nuclear war, the U.S. military base in Japan would serve asa detonating fuse to turn Japan into a nuclear sea of fire." 9/24/04South Korea announces that the Export-Import Bank of Korea will insureSouthern investors in the North for between 70%-90% of any losses in caseof events such as broken agreements, blocked remittances, confiscation ofassets, or war. 9/24/04The ROK government confirms that 107 metric tons of sodium cyanide, a keyingredient in the manufacture of nerve gas, were sent illegally to North Koreavia China in 2003. 9/25-9/26/04Japan and North Korea hold a second round of working-level consultations in Beijingon the abduction issue, with no progress reported. 9/27/04In a speech before the opening session of the U.N. General Assembly, NorthKorean Vice Foreign Minister Choe Su Hon says "the ever intensifying U.S.hostile policy" and the lack of clarity about "the secret nuclear relatedexperiments in South Korea...makes us unable to participate in the talksaimed at discussing the nuclear weapon program." Later, at a newsconference, Choe says "We have already made clear that we have alreadyreprocessed 8,000 wasted fuel rods and transformed them into arms," he said. 9/28/04The Senate approves H.R. 4011 , the North Korea Human RightsAct. 9/30/04In their first debate of the presidential campaign, President Bush andDemocratic presidential nominee Kerry clash over the U.S.' North Koreapolicy. 10/5/04KCNA quotes a DPRK Foreign Ministry spokesman as saying the Senate'spassage of the Human Rights Act has deprived the DPRK of "anyjustification" for participating in the six-party talks, and reveals the U.S.' "realintention" is to "topple" the North Korean government. Later, KCNA callsthe act "a declaration of war." 10/6/04Washington and Seoul announce that Washington's plans to reduce sharplyits troops in South Korea would be delayed to 2008, instead of the end of2005. 10/7/04Inter-Korean working-level military talks on rail and load links break down. 10/18/04President Bush signs the North Korean Human Rights Act into law. ( P.L.108-333 ) 10/21/04Dedication ceremony held in Kaesong for the new office of Koland, the ROKstate-run main contractor for the Kaesong Industrial Zone. In attendance are63 members of the ROK National Assembly. 10/22/04A North Korean Foreign Ministry spokesman tells KCNA that in order forPyongyang to return to the six-party talks, the U.S. must drop its hostilepolicy, join an economic aid program for the North, and agree to discuss"South Korea's nuclear problem." 10/23/04Secretary of State Powell begins a trip to Japan, China, and the ROK. Powellurges North Korea to rejoin the six-party talks and rejects demands fromNorth Korea that the U.S. offer economic inducements before North Koreahas agreed to dismantle its nuclear program. Chinese Foreign Minister LiZhaoxing reportedly asks the U.S. to "adopt a flexible and practical attitude." In Seoul, ROK Foreign Minister Ban Ki-moon says he told Powell that allcountries involved develop a "more creative and realistic" offer to encouragethe North to return to the negotiating table. 10/26/04Proliferation Security Initiative exercise is held off the coast of Japaninvolving navy and coast guard vessels from 10 countries, including Japan,France, and Australia. Pyongyang condemns the exercise as an "ultimate waraction." 11/1/04In an interview with the Wall Street Journal , Han Song Ryol, North Korea'sambassador in charge of U.S. affairs, says that "Pyongyang won't participatein six-party talks unless it sees real changes" in U.S. policy, includingannulling the U.S. North Korea Human Rights Act and completely liftingeconomic sanctions. Han also says Senator John Kerry's proposal to negotiatebilaterally with North Korea is "as hostile as Bush's DPRK policy." 11/1/04South Korean patrol boats fire warning shots to repel three North Koreanpatrol boats that reportedly crossed the NLL in two separate incidents. 11/2/04George W. Bush re-elected to the U.S. Presidency. 11/12/04In a speech before the Los Angeles World Affairs Council, President RohMoo-hyun reportedly says that taking a hard line over North Korea's nuclearweapons program could have "grave" consequences and that "there is noother way than dialogue." 11/20-21/04At the APEC summit in Santiago, Chile, President Bush urges members to drawNorth Korea back into six-nation negotiations and says he is convinced "that the willis strong, that the effort is united and the message is clear to Mr. Kim Jong-il: Get ridof your nuclear weapons programs." 11/26/04KEDO's Executive Board members decide to extend for another year (untilDecember 1, 2005) a freeze on constructing two light-water nuclear reactorsin North Korea. 11/29/04At ASEAN Plus Three summit in Laos, PRC Premier Wen Jiabiao, ROKPresident Roh Moo-hyun, and Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumiagree to "promote close consultations and cooperation for the peacefuldenuclearization of the Korean Peninsula through the Six-Party Talks." 12/1/04Speaking to a group of South Koreans living in England, President Roh saysthat the ROK has grown powerful enough that no country can impose asolution that would be unacceptable to South Korea. 12/1/04The final section of an inter-Korean road along the east coast border isopened to traffic. 12/2-4/04Working-level inter-Korean talks at Mt. Kumgang to discuss technical issues forbuilding a permanent meeting place for separated families. 12/3/04The two Koreas announce an agreement for South Korean electric powercompany KEPCO to supply electricity to the Kaesong Industrial Complex. 12/3/04In an interview with the New York Times , IAEA Director General MohamedElBaradei says that he is "sure" that North Korea has reprocessed all the8,000 rods of spent plutonium that the IAEA had watched over untilDecember 2002. 12/6/04Speaking to a group of ethnic Koreans in Paris, President Roh is quoted assaying, "As long as the regime itself is questioned due to the North Koreannuclear issue, those countries that do not want it to collapse, like China andSouth Korea, and those countries and individuals that think regime change isnecessary will not be able to coordinate." 12/8/04Japanese officials announce that the results of DNA tests on a box of bonesand ashes that North Korea had said contained the remains of MegumiYokota, a Japanese woman kidnapped by North Korea, proved that theremains belong to a number of other people. "'It would be difficult undersuch circumstances to provide further assistance to North Korea," says chiefcabinet secretary, Hiroyuki Hosoda. 12/8/04Convicted American army deserter Charles Jenkins leaves the United StatesArmy base at Camp Zama outside Tokyo, where he served a one-monthprison term and was given a dishonorable discharge. 12/10/04An eight-member team from the ROK and DPRK begin a joint survey of Mt.Kumgang for the construction of a permanent meeting place for separatedfamily members. 12/12/04Fueled by public anger, Acting Secretary General of the LDP Shinzo Abe,along with other politicians, urge the Japanese government to imposesanctions on North Korea. 12/13/04In an interview Assistant Secretary of State Kelly says that the currentarmistice agreement on the Korean peninsula can be replaced with amulti-party peace treaty if the North agrees to dismantle all of its nuclearprograms. 12/15/04KCNA quotes a Foreign Ministry spokesman as warning that any move byJapan to impose economic sanctions on Pyongyang would be regarded as a"declaration of war" and would cause North Korea to reconsider taking partin the six-party talks. 12/15/04On December 15, a ceremony is held at the Kaesong Industrial Complex inNorth Korea to mark the start of production of an initial line of goods. On thesame day, 1,000 sets of pots delivered from the Livingart's Kaesong factoryto the Lotte Department Store in Sodong-dong, Seoul, sold out in only sevenhours. 12/17/04In a summit in Kagoshima, Japan, President Roh urges Prime MinisterKoizumi not to impose sanctions on North Korea. Koizumi states that thedecision will be based on North Korea's response to Tokyo's complaint aboutYokota's false remains. 12/23/04South Korea's Unification Ministry announced it will decrease the flatfinancial subsidies for North Korean defectors by a third but plans tointroduce an incentive system to encourage them to undertake job trainingand obtain jobs. CVID - complete, verifiable, and irreversible dismantlement (of North Korea's nuclear programs) DMZ - demilitarized zone dividing North and South Korea DPRK - Democratic People's Republic of Korea EU - European Union GNP - Grand National Party, South Korea's largest opposition party HEU - highly enriched uranium IAEA - International Atomic Energy Agency KCNA - Korea Central News Agency (North Korea's official news agency) KEDO - Korea Peninsula Energy Development Organization NGO - non-governmental organization NLL - Northern Limit Line NPT - Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty PRC - People's Republic of China PSI - Proliferation Security Initiative ROK - Republic of Korea TCOG - Trilateral Coordination and Oversight Group (United States, Japan, and South Korea) Figure 1. Map of the Korean Peninsula

Summary: This report provides a chronology of events relevant to U.S. relations with North Korea fromOctober 2002 through December 31, 2004. The chronology includes significant meetings, events,and statements that shed light on the issues surrounding North Korea's nuclear weapons program. An introductory analysis provides background on U.S. policy preceding October 2002 as well as anoverview of developments and dynamics among the major players in the North Korea nucleardispute: South Korea, Japan, China, Russia, and the United States. Particular attention is paid to thedemise of the Agreed Framework, the ongoing six-party talks, China's prominent role in thenegotiations, inter-Korean relations, and the Japanese abductee issue. Also discussed is Congress'srole in dealing with North Korea, including the passage of the North Korea Human Rights Act ( P.L.108-333 ). This report will not be updated.