The Department of Defense defines intelligence as "information and knowledge obtained through observation, investigation, analysis, or understanding." (4) Surveillance and reconnaissancerefer to the means by which the information is observed. Surveillance is "systematic" observationto collect whatever data is available, while reconnaissance is a specific mission performed to obtainspecific data. For the purposes of this paper, the distinctions between intelligence, surveillance, andreconnaissance are not important unless specified-ISR is used as a shorthand to refer to the systemof collection assets and analysts which brings information about the enemy or potential enemy to thedecision-maker, whether that decision-maker is a top general in Washington, DC or a soldier on theground facing an armed attacker. Another shorthand commonly used by the military services and the intelligence community refers to the source of any given piece of intelligence. Intelligence which comes from a personobserving it is called Human Intelligence, or HUMINT. Intelligence derived from photographs andother imagery is called Imagery Intelligence, or IMINT. Intelligence obtained from electronic signalssuch as communications is called Signals Intelligence, or SIGINT. Finally, intelligence derived fromother technically measurable aspects of the target, such as vibrations or hyper-spectral emissions, isnamed Measurement and Signatures Intelligence, or MASINT. (5) These terms are important, as theyhelp characterize the basic structure of the intelligence community. The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), State Department, Department of Energy, Department of Justice, and Department of Treasury all contribute to the intelligence picture available to themilitary. (6) However, most intelligence used by themilitary comes from the Defense IntelligenceAgency (DIA), which produces some HUMINT, MASINT and a large portion of the DefenseDepartment's strategic, or long-term, analysis; the National Security Agency (NSA), which producesmost SIGINT; and the National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA), which produces mostIMINT. The services themselves also produce all types of intelligence for the community. Today's security environment appears to be quite different from the environment of only tenyears ago. Major shifts in both the threat to our national security, and the technologies available tous and our potential adversaries, seem to have occurred. In response, the military services have plansto change their ISR capabilities to meet the new environment effectively. Most of today's military equipment and organization was originally designed to fight the Soviet Union. A common scenario was that the Soviets and their Warsaw Pact allies would attempt tooccupy all of Western Europe, using large numbers of tanks and aircraft to sweep through Germanyon their way to the rest of the continent. Defense against such an assault was perceived to requireheavy weapons such as tanks, fighter and bomber aircraft, and aircraft carriers. However, theWarsaw Pact has collapsed and a similar threat has not emerged. Instead, the security environmentlooks significantly different compared to 1989. DOD's 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR)points out that we "cannot predict with a high degree of confidence the identity of the countries orthe actors that may threaten (our) interests and security." The QDR explains DOD's perception ofthe changed threat by stating that the U.S. is no longer physically protected by distance from itsadversaries. It sees a "broad arc of instability" from the Middle East to Northeast Asia, wherenon-state entities whose activities are damaging to U.S. interests (drug traffickers, terrorists, etc.)are growing in strength and finding safe-haven in weak and failing states. In addition, newtechnologies (especially information technologies and those related to chemical, biological,radiological, nuclear, or enhanced high-explosive weapons) are increasingly within the reach ofpotential adversaries, and warfare may extend to space and cyber space. (7) Outside observers, including other members of the national intelligence community, generally agree with DOD's characterization of the threat. Concern over surprise, deception, increasinglydiverse threats, weapons of mass destruction, the Middle East, and Asia, appears consistent. Someadd that non-state actors with new technology may undermine nation-state control in manycountries. This could exacerbate the effects of environmental deterioration and disaster, increasingthe probability that the U.S. would feel compelled to deploy its military forces to stem a resultinghumanitarian crisis. (8) In sum, many analysts believe the U.S. is now faced with "asymmetric warfare," in which means such as drug-trafficking, terrorism, and biological warfare would be used to attack ourinterests. The events of September 11 appear to confirm the judgement that the threats of the futureare unlikely to look like the threats of the past. Because these are means that the United States wouldnot choose to employ itself and which bear no resemblance to the old Warsaw Pact tank assaultscenario, some believe the U.S. military is currently ill-prepared to deal with them. In addition to the changed threat, the U.S. military along with the rest of society also has experienced major changes in the technologies available. The huge increases in both informationprocessing technology, including data collection and storage, and communications technologies suchas increased bandwidth and networking, appear to be able to completely change the way militaryforces are equipped, organized and employed. (9) Based on these changes in both the threat and in available technology, DOD states it must "transform." Transformation in the context of large organizations such as the Defense Departmentis generally recognized as a process of radical change involving technology, organization, andconcepts of employment. Another term used in military theory which also expresses the idea oftransformation is "revolution in military affairs." However, even within DOD there are at least twocompeting perspectives on what constitutes "transformation." Some personnel define transformationas a discontinuous or leap-ahead change. (10) Thisview supports those who believe it is necessary tomove money, manpower, and particularly patterns of thinking ("doctrine") away from currentweapon systems and methods to entirely new technologies and procedures. They perceive thatresources are being wasted on the older systems, and the only way to accomplish change is to do soin a radical way. The Navy's shift in the 1920s and 30s from the battleship to the aircraft carrier asits centerpiece weapon system could be considered an example of a leap-ahead change, even as thebattleship remained in service until the 1980s. The Army's plan to replace its tank force in favor ofmuch lighter vehicles and other technologies may be seen as an attempt to achieve similar change. (11) Others tend to define transformation as incremental change using current or modernizing technologies in new ways, with an end result of radical improvement over time. They expressconcern that the future is unknown; if DOD cuts out proven capabilities for new ones, those newcapabilities may not match the currently unforeseen threat any better than today's technology. Aproven technology, however, may be able to be adjusted to meet that unknown situation. Theseofficials point to examples such as the change in the military's ability to attack targets from the air,comparing Operation Desert Storm against Iraq in 1991 to Operation Enduring Freedom againstAfghanistan in 2001. Nearly every weapon system which was used in Afghanistan had also beenused in Iraq in 1991. However, improved communications, procedures and the Joint Direct AttackMunition (a standard 2000 lb bomb which can be guided using Global Positioning Systemtechnology) allowed B-52 bombers to attack targets which were very close to friendly militarypersonnel with little risk of hitting the friendly soldiers. This would not have even been consideredin 1991. (12) Regardless of how transformation may be defined, retired Vice Admiral (USN) Arthur Cebrowski, the chief of the Defense Department's Office of Force Transformation, has identifiedsome criteria by which military programs may be judged for their transformational qualities. His topcriterion is that the weapon system or operating procedure be interoperable . Interoperabilitymeansthat the system can function easily with a variety of other systems, including those from otherservices. (13) Other criteria Cebrowski has namedare judgements as to whether the system helps theuser to change warfighting methods , as opposed to merely improving existing methods; andwhether the system can deal with a wide range of threats . (14) Observers generally agree with Cebrowski's criteria. For example, Andrew Krepinevich, Executive Director of the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, also notes therequirement for interoperability and support to new warfighting methods, and discounts any hard andfast rule that a program must employ new technology to be considered transformational. At the sametime, Krepinevich, along with some other observers, advocates the leap-ahead definition oftransformation, and therefore would likely want to see larger changes in interoperability andwarfighting methods than might Cebrowski. (15) In addition to assessing the military services' ISR programs based on Cebrowski's informal criteria for transformation, it may be helpful to look at what ISR they will really need. Somecommonly recognized characteristics include a world-wide perspective, fusion, detail, andpersistent surveillance . (16) The transformed force, much more than the Cold War force, needs a truly world-wide perspective derived from world-wide collection capabilities and in-depth analysis. During the ColdWar, the threat from the Warsaw Pact was considered so great that military activity in other placesoften was considered inconsequential, or a "lesser included threat." (17) The intelligence communitytherefore put greater effort toward monitoring the Warsaw Pact than the rest of the world. Today,however, the threat may in fact come from within a country which appears quite non-threatening. For example, one former Central Intelligence Agency analyst notes that, in 1998, half of the foreigncrises which demanded U.S. attention occurred in "lower-priority areas,"against which feweranalysts and collection resources had been allocated. (18) Fusion refers to bringing together all types of intelligence to create one consolidated picture of the threat. As mentioned in the beginning of this paper, the various sources of intelligence form thebasic structure of the intelligence community. That is, every piece of intelligence data is identifiedby whether it came from HUMINT, SIGINT, IMINT, or MASINT. In addition, these data are oftenkept in separate communications channels and databases designed to support the unique aspects ofthe data collected. A piece of imagery, for example, requires different bandwidth, software, andhardware for transmission than does a communications intercept, and they each fill completelydifferent types of fields in a database. However, military forces cannot easily use separate HUMINT,SIGINT, IMINT, and MASINT data. They need one "fused" assessment of the threat. While thishas always been true, the speed and precision with which the transformed force is expected to actmakes this fusion even more desirable, as it presents information about the enemy in a timely, clearmanner. The transformed force may also seek more detailed information than before. First, given today's emphasis on precise application of force while mitigating risk to U.S. and civilian personnel,the intelligence required to employ destructive force such as a bomb or artillery round has increased. As adversaries hide within civilian populations or inside mountains, the once straightforward processof identifying potential targets has become much more complex. Once a target has been identifiedfor destruction, the information required to successfully employ the weapon is increasing as targetcoordinates must be accurate to within a few feet in three dimensions. Even after a weapon isemployed, the assessment of whether the target is destroyed, known as bomb damage assessment(BDA), has also increased in difficulty. In the Cold War, this was performed primarily by comparing"before" and "after" images of the target. If a target such as an enemy tank looked destroyed, withits turret blown off or smoke coming out of a gaping hole, then it probably was. Weapons used bythe transformed force, however, may not cause that type of visible damage. Even in OperationDesert Storm against Iraq, precision-guided munitions made only small holes in Iraqi tanks as theypenetrated and completely obliterated the insides. This damage, however, could not be seen fromimagery. Other types of information, such as hyperspectral data which might detect whether the tankgot very hot from internal explosions, are needed to make an accurate damage assessment. Second,as opposed to most Cold War scenarios, physical destruction is not the only effect the transformedforce may be able to bring against the adversary. The military force may, for example, be able toaccomplish its objectives by isolating an opposing commander electronically. However, creatingor defending against this type of effect requires extremely specific intelligence. The ability to continuously monitor a given target and provide immediate assessment of changes to it, known as persistent surveillance, is seen as essential to the transformed force's ability to defeatunconventional enemies like terrorists. (19) As hasbeen seen in Kosovo and Afghanistan, detailed,long-term surveillance of a house or convoy, such as that provided by a Predator Unmanned AerialVehicle (UAV) or a special operator on the ground, is key to properly identifying all personnel inthe target area and maintaining full awareness of all activities, hostile, friendly, or neutral. Theassessment that the desired target is present and can be effectively struck must then be made andcommunicated to the striking force within seconds, so that the opportunity is not lost. Some experts express caution about these characteristics. They assert that doctrinal writings about the transformed force assume perfect access to perfect intelligence, that training its personnelto rely on such intelligence will prevent them from learning initiative, and that reliance on perfectintelligence may keep the U.S. from acting in circumstances where it needs to act but, for whateverreason, its precision-guided munition or other high-technology asset cannot be used. (20) The U.S.intelligence community does not have eyes and ears everywhere in the world, and it does not haveperfect vision into potential adversary minds. Transformation advocates, when asked, recognize thefact of imperfect intelligence and respond to this criticism by emphasizing the planned force'sagility, in equipment and training, to overcome situations where intelligence is imperfect andrespond quickly to the evolving circumstances. To assess the intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance aspects of military transformation, it is useful to have a basic understanding of the military forces which the future ISR structure willbe expected to support. This section explains, in general terms, DOD's plans for future forces, andprovides greater detail on ISR programs. All of the services are planning their forces in light of thechanged threat and new information technologies. In general, the changes are intended to increasethe force's access to information, agility and versatility while maintaining or increasing its lethality. OSD and JCS. The Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) have multiple initiatives touted as supporting ISR. While neither organization procures weapon systems, they do have a voice in funding, research anddevelopment, operating methods supported, and joint organization. In November 2001, Secretary Rumsfeld established an Office of Force Transformation, headed by retired Vice Admiral Cebrowski, to monitor and push transformational ideas in the services. Theoffice is staffed by approximately 18 uniformed and civilian personnel from all the services and 15contractors, and focuses on five broad areas-strategy, concept formulation, technology andtechnological surprise, joint and service experimentation, and operational prototyping. The officeintends to assess service plans with respect to these areas, and make recommendations to the servicesand OSD which identify gaps in DOD's capability to meet potential threats, increase efficiency,improve existing capabilities, and recognize outmoded paradigms which should be changed. (21) TheOFT is studying Operation Enduring Freedom to determine whether there are completely differentways it could have been approached, and also seeking to provide seed money to service experimentswhich appear transformational. (22) Two key offices for developing technology, the Advanced Systems & Concepts Office and the Defense Advanced Research Project Agency (DARPA), have strong track records in ISRdevelopment. For example, DARPA developed both the Predator and Global Hawk UnmannedAerial Vehicles, then handed them off to the Advanced Systems & Concepts Office for furtherdevelopment as Advanced Concept Technology Demonstrations (ACTD). Although still indevelopmental status, both aircraft have contributed substantially to the war in Afghanistan. (23) Bothoffices appear to continue to consider ISR as a significant area for research. For example, of the 15ACTDs which the Advanced Systems & Concepts Office established for FY2002, five aretechnologies which promise to improve the military's ability to collect data on enemy forces. Another may substantially improve the ability of commanders to control surveillance andreconnaissance assets over the battlefield. A final ACTD aims at new ways of analyzingintelligence. (24) DARPA is developing continuingadvances in unmanned vehicles, afoliage-penetrating radar, an advanced ISR management program, and artificial intelligence fordatabase analysis. (25) Its recently formedInformation Exploitation office is specifically intended towork on improving the military's ability to identify a target on the battlefield and communicate thatinformation quickly to a weapon system for destruction. (26) The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence (ASD/C3I) has oversight of ISR concept development. It has divided ISR initiatives into fivecategories. First, as discussed above, are collection technologies. Second are efforts forinteroperability and networking, ensuring that all intelligence available to one entity is also availableto other entities working in the same theater. (27) A major contribution to this effort is ASD/C3I'scoordination of the Distributed Common Ground System (DCGS). DCGS is an umbrella term forseveral systems tailored to individual service requirements. These systems are designed to receiveand process HUMINT, SIGINT, IMINT, and MASINT data (all of which come in different formsand often on different networks), support analysis of the data, and distribute intelligence to theircustomers, both on the battlefield and at higher headquarters. DCGS is recognized as beingextremely important to all of the services, and they are moving toward this single, integratedarchitecture. (28) ASD/C3I's third category forinitiatives is persistent and responsive surveillance, withprograms such as the Global Hawk long-endurance UAV, the Army's Aerial Common Sensor, andSpace-Based Radar. Fourth, the office seeks new ways to use existing capabilities, such as gettingimagery to be automatically tagged with all required geographic coordinate information. Finally,ASD/C3I is working on the communications technology needed to move the collected intelligenceto its customers. (29) Other than its work on DCGS, some ISR planners discount ASD/C3I work, noting that they coordinate directly with the other services without prompting from the OSD office, while ASD/C3Imay push "one size fits all" solutions. (30) Someobservers also believe that ASD/C3I has little actualauthority, with the result that services continue to do what they think best for themselves. Most ofASD/C3I's power appears to come from its direct access to the Joint Requirements OversightCouncil (JROC), which is chaired by the vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. (31) The JROCvalidates major service programs as being either "joint" or not. Those programs which are notdeemed joint enough are unlikely to receive funding. However, the current chair, Marine GeneralPeter Pace, believes that the JROC is not playing a significant role in the transformation of the armedforces, and advocates a greater role in identifying and pushing development of new capabilities. (32) If Pace or his successors succeed in shifting the JROC from a simple validation role to a morepro-active one, this may also increase ASD/C3I's control over the future of ISR. Joint Forces Command (JFCOM), established in 1999, is another organization which some defense experts believe has the potential to aid military efforts toward transformation and ISRintegration. (33) This unified command has thecharter to run major force experimentation and improveinteroperability among the services, and has been working several ISR-related initiatives. (34) Its JointInterface Control teams, consisting of communications specialists as well as special software andhardware, are reportedly improving communications among intelligence sources in Afghanistan. (35) JFCOM is testing a new analytical capability known as Operational Net Assessment this year. Thissystem of databases, analytical tools, and networks claims to fuse intelligence and other data in aninteragency environment. DOD's new Unified Command Plan, which divides warfightingresponsibilities among various commanders, may improve JFCOM's ability to supporttransformation. The plan emphasizes JFCOM's experimentation and interoperability duties whileit moves responsibilities for homeland defense on land and sea from JFCOM to the newly createdNorthern Command. (36) Do the Office of the Secretary of Defense and Joint efforts in ISR support transformation, according to Admiral Cebrowski's criteria? Taken together, they do appear to be helping improveinteroperability while supporting changes in the way warfare is conducted against a wide range ofthreats. The DARPA and Advanced Systems & Concepts Office projects promise to provide someof the detailed intelligence sought, as well as improve persistent surveillance. ASD/C3I's leadershipof DCGS could result in significant improvements in providing fused assessment to warfighters. Observers generally point to strengthening the JROC and JFCOM, particularly their influence onmilitary spending, as ways to increase OSD's and JCS's abilities to guide military transformation. Army. The Army may be making the biggest force structure change of all the services, as it seeks to replace the M-1 tank as its centerpieceweapon system. It is designing the network-centric Future Combat System, an as-yet undefinedcombination of manned and unmanned vehicles, tied together with a comprehensive network,intended to be much lighter and therefore more transportable than today's weapon systems. Thisforce will depend on the ability to detect enemy activity, share that information quickly, and defeatit before coming into close contact with an enemy. (37) The Army's plans for ISR focus on interoperability. The Army recognizes that the majority of its intelligence needs are collected by other services and the national agencies. It therefore stressesbeing able to communicate with the other intelligence sources. However, exactly how it intends toaccomplish that is still under development. Thus, at least some of the programs which will beneeded to achieve Army objectives have not yet been defined. Technologically, research anddevelopment effort is focused on analysis tools, especially data fusion and validation. An apparentlysingular success in this area is the Pathfinder text analysis system, which is used extensively by theArmy's National Ground Intelligence Center and is being incorporated into analysis systemsthroughout the military. This software is reported to be able to sort through 500,000 documents injust a few minutes, finding patterns, trends and statistics, and to have already contributed extensivelyto key decisions. (38) Key procurement effortsinclude the Distributed Common Ground Station, theTactical Exploitation System for IMINT analysis, a Tactical Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (Shadow),a HUMINT analysis support system, the Aerial Common Sensor to replace the Guardrail andAirborne Reconnaissance-Low airborne reconnaissance systems, and the PROPHET ground-basedsensor and jammer. (39) The Joint Tactical Terminal,a prototype radio system designed forinteroperability to access several different intelligence broadcasts, has been deployed in Afghanistanwith apparent success. (40) Operationally, the Army says it is making major changes at the tactical level. It is forming Reconnaissance, Surveillance, Targeting and Acquisition (RSTA) squadrons to provide focusedanalysis to the brigade commander. Traditionally, this level of effort for collecting and analyzingintelligence occurs higher up the chain of command, at division and corps level. The shift todelivering high-quality, timely intelligence directly to the smaller unit is a key aspect of why theArmy believes it can operate some units successfully in combat without the armored protection anM-1 tank provides. These RSTA squadrons are expected to employ many of the technologies listedin the previous paragraph, particularly the tactical UAV, HUMINT analysis, ground sensors, and theDCGS for analysis and dissemination. The RSTA squadrons will place intelligence personneltrained to collect HUMINT forward to operate directly with tactical patrol elements, creating thepotential to significantly increase the quantity and value of HUMINT to army operations. (41) A finalplanned change to army tactical intelligence operations is to allow every soldier, regardless ofoccupational specialty, to contribute his or her observations of battlefield activity to the intelligencenetwork. How this will be manifested is not yet determined. If achieved, it will likely mean a vastincrease in the amount of information available to the units, and a concurrent increase in therequirement for analysis while seeking to prevent information overload. (42) Organizationally, the Army appears to have made fewer recent changes than other services. While both the Air Force and the Navy have in the past few years designated their senior intelligenceofficers as the functional managers for ISR, the Army does not have a focal point for ISR. Thesenior intelligence officer has some programmatic oversight, particularly for intelligence, butsurveillance and reconnaissance fall under the purview of the operations officer. (43) Some observersbelieve this split in responsibility may slow the Army's ability to integrate all aspects of ISR not onlywith Army operations but with other service ISR capabilities. Do the Army's activities in ISR support transformation? The Army's emphasis on interoperability, as well as its apparent major commitment to change the way it fights, seems to saythey do, although there are still many questions to be answered concerning how the new army unitswill operate, including how they will use ISR. The RSTA squadron, incorporating most aspects ofArmy intelligence plans and promising fusion, increased detail, and persistent surveillance, may beviewed as a radical departure from current operations, but its ability to function in the face of a widerange of threats is yet to be determined. Air Force. The Air Force says its transformation effort builds on the successes it has already achieved in being able to reach targets with stealthaircraft and strike them very accurately with guided weapons. It emphasizes integration of currentcapabilities with modernization of its fighter force (the F-22 Raptor and the Joint Strike Fighter),improved airborne reconnaissance and command and control aircraft including UAVs, andnetworking. (44) The Air Force is the largest military provider of surveillance and reconnaissance as it operates most surveillance and reconnaissance aircraft and is DOD's executive agent for space. It is focusingits ISR transformation effort on creating multiple platforms which together can watch a battlefieldregardless of the terrain, time of day or weather conditions, and communicate the observations in away that an identified target can be destroyed within ten minutes of the initial observations. (45) Technologically, the challenges the Air Force perceives are in integrating today's platforms toprovide one coherent picture of the battlespace, reducing the need for human transfer betweensystems of basic technical data such as location information, and determining if or when to moveISR capabilities currently performed by airborne platforms to space. Key procurement programs arethe Space-Based Radar and "Smart Tanker" (a program to equip all aerial tankers with surveillancesensors and communications equipment) to increase the military's persistent surveillance, theMulti-Platform Radar Technology Insertion Program to improve tracking moving ground targets,Predator B and Global Hawk UAVs for airborne persistent surveillance and reconnaissance, TheaterBattle Management Core System, Network Centric Collaborative Targeting and the Air OperationsCenter Common Operating Picture for coordination with operations, and the previously mentionedDistributed Common Ground Station for analysis and dissemination. (46) To some observers, the operational changes the Air Force is now attempting to develop in ISR are more incremental than revolutionary. As noted earlier, the Air Force claims that revolutionarychanges have already occurred, such as the integration of UAVs into the Air Force's operations andthe ability to get the process of identifying targets and subsequently destroying them down from daysto minutes in length. The Air Force believes it is doing a good job providing ISR at the theater level,but is not yet able to provide a global perspective. Moving most of the Air Force's surveillance andreconnaissance assets to space could significantly increase world-wide coverage, and may be the nextmajor change in ISR operations, if appropriate technology develops. Such a move, however, willsurely be quite costly, and also risks a loss in flexibility, as satellites have historically been difficultto move quickly from one target area to another, and have also been more difficult than aircraft torepair or replace when necessary. Observers also question whether more emphasis should be placedon analysis, rather than on more equipment. For example, bomb damage assessment, the processby which the commander determines how much damage an attack caused on a given target, andtherefore whether it needs to be struck again, has been called a weak area for Operation EnduringFreedom. (47) Organizationally, the Air Force has made several moves to improve its ISR. Its re-organization in the early 1990s combining Strategic Air Command with Tactical Air Command to form AirCombat Command could be seen as a step toward ISR transformation, as it brought most ISR assetsunder one commander. Previously, the Air Force's "strategic" reconnaissance aircraft like theRC-135, U-2, and SR-71, belonged to Strategic Air Command, and were reserved primarily for tasksassociated with defeating the Soviet Union. With the formation of Air Combat Command, theseaircraft have been made much more available to units fighting theater wars, such as Iraq, Bosnia, andKosovo. Another organizational change the Air Force has made which may support ISRtransformation is the designation of its senior intelligence officer as the functional manager for allISR, giving that person responsibility for all ISR resourcing and management. Also, in 1997 the AirForce formed a center now known as the Aerospace Command and Control and Intelligence,Surveillance and Reconnaissance Center (AC2ISRC) which focuses on standardizing Command andControl as well as ISR systems for both the joint and coalition audience. (48) The Air Force's recentdesignation as DOD's executive agent for space, including director of the National ReconnaissanceOffice (NRO), has increased its responsibility and authority to coordinate and guide the use of spacefor ISR. The Air Force has also formed a new office, the deputy chief of staff for warfareintegration. This office is expected to ensure that all Air Force systems fit into a commonarchitecture, with particular emphasis on command and control and ISR systems. (49) Finally, the AirForce has formed seven functional "task forces" in its headquarters staff, each headed by a Colonel.One of these is the Air and Space/C2ISR Task Force. The task forces are meant to be able to cutacross traditional program areas and staff lines focused on weapon systems such as "bombers,"design new concepts of operation, and advocate for required capabilities with a stronger, morecoherent voice than has previously occurred. (50) Do the Air Force's activities in ISR support transformation? Judged by the standards of interoperability, support to changed methods of warfighting, and ability to confront a wide range ofthreats, the answer is unclear. Interoperability stands at the top of the Air Force's stated priorities. The various changes in Air Force organization which have occurred since the end of the Cold Warappear to be the most aggressive of all the services. The availability and applicability of space assetsto warfighting has increased significantly, adding greatly to the services' access to a world-wideperspective as well as in-depth intelligence. As noted earlier, Air Force efforts appear to have playeda large role in establishing the lauded ISR capabilities, particularly their persistent surveillance, forOperation Enduring Freedom. However, some observers believe the Air Force is primarily achievingtechnical improvements to established programs and operating methods, rather than a radical changeappropriate to a potentially radically different enemy. Another point made is that while the Air Forceowns the vast majority of ISR aircraft, these aircraft have been operating at a very high rate for anumber of years, such that the aircraft and crews are significantly more stressed than most of the AirForce. This leads to situations where ISR aircraft are unavailable to fly missions for commanderswho need them. Observers wonder why the Air Force has not yet fixed this problem. (51) Navy and Marine Corps. The Navy and Marine Corps' primary effort for transformation is their concept of network centric warfare, linking today'sweapon systems in local and wide-area networks such as the Cooperative Engagement Capability(CEC) for air and missile defense and the Navy and Marine Corps Intranet (NMCI) to exchangeinformation and control actions. In addition, the Navy is studying new ship designs and operationalconcepts to improve naval capability in littoral waters and for sea-basing to defeat the "anti-access"threat where no near-by land bases are available. (52) The Marine Corps seeks to improve its abilityto fight in the urban environment. This includes less-than-lethal weapons, tactical and man-portableUAVs, and networking. (53) The Navy and Marine Corps' plans for ISR are toward better networking and integration, as well as organic sensors for persistent surveillance. (54) The Navy's CEC has been successfullydeployed with the USS John F. Kennedy carrier battle group, earning accolades from some observersas the military's first true "network-centric" program. (55) While CEC is not specifically an ISRprogram, it ties many Navy sensors together to achieve a much better picture of the battlespace. Fornetworking and analysis, DCGS forms the foundation for bringing all sources of intelligencetogether, while the Naval Fires Network is the primary program supporting the Navy's entire processof identifying targets and striking them. The P-3 Aircraft Improvement Program and S-3Surveillance System Upgrade, both still in development but used with success in Afghanistan, aimat significantly improving that process. (56) Concerning sensors, most effort is on unmanned platformswith new sensors for better SIGINT and MASINT. The Navy expects to procure the Global HawkUAV, at least for testing, and is actively developing an unmanned underwater vehicle (UUV), whilethe Marine Corps is speeding the fielding of its man-portable Dragon Eye UAV and continues worktoward a vertical-takeoff and landing UAV to replace its Pioneer UAV. (57) Operationally, some degree of transformation appears to have occurred as shown by the successful integration of Navy ISR assets, particularly the P-3 and space assets, with Air Force assetsto produce persistent surveillance and a common operating picture of the battlefield for all services'combat assets operating in Afghanistan. In the Marine Corps, a shift in ISR operations began afterOperation Desert Storm, when it was thought that the marines received poor intelligence support. In 1993 the Corps initiated a plan to produce professional intelligence officers, with their own careerplans and command opportunities. (58) The Corpsnow has experienced intelligence officers at alllevels, apparently contributing directly to the success of the Marine units in Afghanistan. TheMarine Corps is also expanding its Intelligence Analysis System, which brings the various sourcesof intelligence together for analysis by intelligence personnel. Organizationally, the Navy has implemented some of the same concepts as the Air Force in its bid to transform its ISR. Its senior intelligence officer is also designated the functional manager forISR. In addition, the Navy has implemented a concept very similar to the Air Force's sevenfunctional task forces. It has identified six "mission capability packages," each overseen by a NavyCaptain, to cut through the traditional weapon systems focus, design new concepts of operation, andbuild the architectures needed. One of these mission capability packages is dedicated to ISR. (59) Themission capabilities packages are overseen by the Navy's Office of Warfare Integration andAssessment, which began operation in October, 2000. (60) Finally, the Navy has designated a newcommand, the Naval Network Warfare Command, to begin operation in May 2002. (61) While notlimited to ISR, its charter to oversee the development of all networks in the Navy should have amajor impact on Navy and Marine Corps ISR. Do the Navy and Marine Corps activities in ISR support transformation? Like the Army and Air Force, interoperability appears to be stressed in the naval ISR programs. The Marine Corps'Intelligence Analysis System appears to be making progress on improving fused assessments for itsunits. Some observers believe the Navy deserves just as much credit as the Air Force for theestablishment of a successful persistent ISR network in Operation Enduring Freedom. (62) In addition,the naval programs appear, more than the Army and Air Force, designed to deal with a wide rangeof threats as they consider littoral and urban warfare as well as the "anti-access" scenario of havingto fight completely from the sea with no nearby land-based support. Their programs promise toprovide the detail and persistence warfighters believe they need to defeat these threats. Special Operations Forces (SOF). SOF are elite, specialized military units that can be inserted into enemy territory. These forces both require andcollect intelligence at all levels-one of their capabilities is strategic reconnaissance. (63) While muchof the equipment SOF uses is procured by the services, Special Operations Command (SOCOM) hasauthority unique among the unified commands to procure systems specific to SOF requirements. Its main effort for transformation appears to be successful fielding of the CV-22 tilt-rotor aircraft andthe Advanced SEAL Delivery System (ASDS) mini-submarine to be launched from former ballisticmissile submarines which the Navy is converting to guided missile submarines. (64) The unique capabilities SOF are seeking in ISR concentrate on receiving the highest-quality intelligence at the lowest tactical level. They are developing the Joint Threat Warning System toprovide a downlink for intelligence broadcasts and a SIGINT receiver for immediate warning. Thissystem will be designed in several physical configurations, from body-worn to maritime-based. Theyare also designing an upgrade to the SOF Intelligence Vehicle, a modified "humvee" withcommunications links and analysis terminals which may increase the availability of intelligence andtailored analysis to personnel in the field. (65) Man-portable UAVs are also being procured. (66) Operationally, SOF actions in Afghanistan suggest that some transformation has already occurred, as SOF personnel determined how to identify and communicate potential targets foraircraft to strike. While this type of operation has long been a SOF skill, the melding of GPS andother immediately available data such as Predator video with the human observations of the SOFpersonnel had not been possible in previous conflicts. (67) Organizationally, the naval component of SOCOM, Naval Special Warfare Command, which previously did not have a dedicated intelligence analysis capability, is establishing a Mission SupportCenter which will include intelligence analysis. The other components, Air Force SpecialOperations Command and Army Special Operations Command, are increasing the size of theirintelligence organizations, mostly in response to the increased requirements of the global war onterrorism. The Special Operations Command Joint Intelligence Center's production capability mayexpand considerably, as well. (68) To many observers, the special operations forces have always been transformational. At least within their own community, interoperability is stressed, and they have historically used differentways of fighting against unconventional enemies. The plans outlined above for ISR may appear tobe only incremental, but this may be appropriate for a force which is believed to already have aculture of transformation. The effort in unmanned vehicles may improve SOF's ability to providesurveillance, while the increasing size of their intelligence centers promises an improved world-wideperspective, potentially at a greater level of detail than before. A caution may be that SOF, whileinteroperable and innovative among themselves, have in the past had difficulty communicating andcoordinating with non-SOF assets. This appears to have been overcome in Operation EnduringFreedom, at least with respect to calling in air strikes, receiving other types of air support, andsharing intelligence. If after-action reports of the war in Afghanistan bear out these earlyobservations, SOF will probably be considered by most to still be on the leading edge oftransformation. Coast Guard. The Coast Guard, probably more than any of the other services, is undergoing a mission change due to the attacks of September 11,2001. It is moving from a force which emphasized maritime safety, protection of natural resources,and law enforcement to focus more on its maritime security and national defense missions, includingport security both in the United States and at overseas ports where U.S. forces are located. (69) At thesame time, the Coast Guard is undergoing a wholesale replacement of many of its ships, boats, andaircraft in an effort to replace obsolete systems while achieving full integration and interoperability. This acquisition program, named "Deepwater", has been in planning for several years and shouldbe contracted out in 2002. It will not replace systems type for type, but instead will use an integratedmix of surface and air platforms with appropriate connectivity to achieve the required capabilities. (70) Coast Guard acquisitions, including Deepwater, claim to strongly emphasize interoperability. Much more than the other services, however, for the Coast Guard interoperability implies the abilityto communicate and operate with civilian vessels and other non-defense agencies, as well as withdefense organizations. Thus, one key ISR program is its National Distress Response ModernizationProgram, providing VHF radio towers to improve communications with all maritime activities,particularly its ability to receive distress calls. Another program aims at expanding SIPRNET, thestandard DOD-wide secure internet system for classified data, to all port operations centers andmajor cutters. (71) The Deepwater contractspecifically requires its system integrator to periodicallyupgrade sensors and ISR throughout the 30 years of the Deepwater program. (72) ISR capabilities beingconsidered for the Deepwater program include the Global Hawk UAV, a vertical take-off andlanding UAV, and other sensors such as air and surface-search radars and passive electronicsurveillance systems. (73) Operationally, the Coast Guard has a goal to inspect all suspect and other high-interest vessels such as cruise ships before they enter U.S. territorial waters. ISR must point the Coast Guard to theright vessels for inspection. Some regulatory tools, such as the requirement that all ships provideinventory and crew data 96 hours before reaching U.S. waters and the anticipated 2004implementation of an identification transponder for all ships worldwide larger than 300 gross tonsare expected to help. However, these sources of information need automated analysis not yetavailable. Another shift in operations involves the field intelligence teams working at major ports. The Coast Guard's goal is to post a team permanently at every major port. These teams includeCoast Guard intelligence personnel and Coast Guard investigative service special agents. The teamsare expected to liaise with other federal, state and local law enforcement and intelligence agenciesto conduct data collection, reporting and dissemination. Finally, putting SIPRNET terminals onevery ship could encourage a major change in ISR operations. These terminals provide easy accessto and transmission of large amounts of classified data and communications and enhance the user'sability to coordinate with other DOD activities, including the military intelligence community. Taken together, these changes in ISR operations are expected to substantially increase the CoastGuard's production of and access to intelligence. (74) Organizationally, the Coast Guard sees a need for shore-based fusion and analysis centers to handle the increased quantity of intelligence, and is coordinating with the Navy to establish one such24-hour operations center on each coast. The Coast Guard is also significantly increasing itsairborne and shipborne intelligence collection capability, and bringing it under the guidance of theNavy's Naval Security Group. (75) Do the Coast Guard's activities in ISR support transformation? As with the other services, interoperability is perceived as key and appears to be receiving strong emphasis from Coast Guardplanners. The Deepwater program's ISR, although conceived well before transformation becamethe coin of the realm in the Defense Department, seems to be aimed at allowing the Coast Guard tochange its methods of operation by giving it an ability to function in tandem with the Navy and otheragencies, significantly farther from shore than is possible today. Finally, the Coast Guard doesappear to be standing up to the new perception of the threat with its desire to intercept suspect shipsat sea and increase the robustness of in-port intelligence and security. These, in turn, should addsignificant detail to the intelligence picture. However, the Coast Guard seems to be in unchartedwaters. Deepwater is a very ambitious program, and the means to fully fuse and analyze the vastlyincreased amount of intelligence while coordinating with law enforcement agencies has not yet beendetermined. As noted earlier, military intelligence uses ISR from the entire intelligence community, not just the military services. The services depend primarily on three intelligence agencies in the DefenseDepartment itself-the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), National Security Agency (NSA), and theNational Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA). The National Reconnaissance Office (NRO), whilea DOD agency, designs, launches, and flies satellites for the other agencies, and is not a primaryproducer of intelligence products. Service expectations concerning the future activities of DIA, NSA,and NIMA are important factors in service decision-making. DIA. Since September 11, 2001, DIA, the military's primary source of HUMINT and strategic analysis, has received a large increase inresources to increase its production of both HUMINT and strategic analysis. This has the potentialto significantly improve the military's awareness of possible threats worldwide. Service officialsindicate general satisfaction with DIA's direction. The Navy, for example, appears to be reducingits expenditure on HUMINT activities in the belief that DIA will be able to successfully fill anygaps. (76) In addition, DIA runs severalmilitary-wide programs that support strategic analysis. Forexample, DOD officials believe the Joint Intelligence Virtual Architecture, a collaborativeintelligence network, has made major headway in establishing standardized access to data andanalysts throughout the military intelligence community. The architecture has incorporated manyanalytical tools including the Army's Pathfinder mentioned earlier as well as a single integrated database which together may improve analysts' ability to fuse all sources of intelligence. NSA. Analysts generally believe the nation's primary producer of Signals Intelligence, or SIGINT, is struggling to maintain and improvecapability while faced with the huge world-wide changes in how information flows and is processed. For example, experts say fiber-optic cables make eavesdropping difficult. The vast increase in thequantity and variety of communications, such as by cell phones, pagers, and the internet, alsoincrease the difficulty of finding communications of interest. (77) Due to the need to re-tool, especiallyin the light of its essential role in protecting the United States from terrorist attack, NSA hassignificantly reduced its support to tactical-level military operations. The services are acutely awareof this and are devoting more resources toward tactical SIGINT, an often key element for successfultime-critical targeting. (78) NIMA. The nation's primary producer of geospatial intelligence (maps and imagery) is attempting to digitize all geospatial intelligence, aidingin the processing and dissemination of the gathered intelligence, as well as fusion with otherintelligence resources. It also plans to deploy a Future Imagery Architecture which consists of alarge number of small imagery satellites able to provide more persistent coverage of areas of interestthan today's satellite architecture. Service representatives are generally convinced that there will besufficient imagery data for the transformed force. They are less certain that the geo-locationinformation required for precision strike will be available for every location the services may needto know about, and they also believe that continued emphasis on processing, exploitation, anddissemination of geospatial intelligence is needed. (79) As noted earlier, many observers believe significant transformation of ISR has already occurredand has been practiced in Afghanistan. The military's ability to move data from the reconnaissanceplatform to the weapon system able to take action, the so-called "sensor to shooter" sequence,generally required at least a full day in Operation Desert Storm, as imagery from a satellite orreconnaissance aircraft had to be analyzed, identified as a target, turned into hard-copy, andintensively studied by the aircrew before a weapon could be dropped accurately. In OperationEnduring Freedom, Special Operations Forces personnel on the ground identified a Taliban troopconcentration, called the target back to the Combined Air Operations Center in Saudi Arabia,received permission to call in an airstrike, determined the exact coordinates of the enemy usingGlobal Positioning System (GPS), and passed those coordinates to a loitering B-52 bomber whichagain used GPS to guide bombs onto the target within less than 20 minutes of the originalidentification of the target. (80) Similarly, PredatorUAVs have been able to transmit live video picturesto waiting AC-130 gunships, which were able to attack moving targets while the Predator monitoredfor effectiveness, again within minutes of original target identification. (81) These examples highlightrecent gains in the precision and timely communication of intelligence, as well as interoperabilityamong weapon systems and even between services. With regard to analysis, over the past ten yearsthe growth of an intelligence-community-wide secure intranet known as INTELINK has significantlyincreased intelligence personnel access to intelligence data, reports of all types, and other analysts,worldwide. (82) Most members of the military intelligence community say they are continuing to work hard at interoperability-they appear to have agreed that the ability to share intelligence throughout thecommunity is essential. In addition, there appear to be some significant departures from old waysof doing things which could support the other goals of transformation. The most revolutionaryconcepts being developed today appear to be the Army's Reconnaissance, Surveillance, Targetingand Acquisition squadron, DIA's Joint Intelligence Virtual Architecture, and the large increase inthe use of unmanned vehicles already underway in all of the services. Although by no means radicalto the rest of the intelligence community, the Coast Guard's plan to bring classified communicationsvia SIPRNET onto every ship creates the possibility of a sweeping change in its use of intelligence. Some outside observers, however, believe that in addition to these changes, the military intelligence community needs to establish a whole new method for analysis. Bruce D. Berkowitz andAllan E. Goodman, for example, note that the subject matter for most military analysts is far morefluid than during the cold war, rendering standard databases and analytical models for explainingbehavior obsolete. (83) Indications and Warning,the analysis which warns of impending attack on theUnited States or its vital interests, depends on the ability to predict enemy activity, based on enemyplans, doctrine, and observed exercises and training. Many of today's potential adversaries offerlittle in the way of traditionally observable activity. (84) Berkowitz and Goodman see maintainingdatabases as a vastly more difficult problem today than it was twelve years ago; precision-guidedmunitions, world-wide interests, adversary use of western and non-traditional weaponry, and theneed for increased information about civilian populations have significantly expanded andcomplicated military intelligence database needs. (85) In response to this problem, the primary solution offered, both inside and outside the Defense Department, is the development of better technology. This may be artificial intelligence such asneural networks which "learn" as they are used to perform data-mining and other analytical tasks,or powerful "cookies" like those that internet marketers use to track customer responses. (86) However,senior analysts who have observed these tools believe they still require significant developmentbefore they can be applied to day-to-day intelligence analysis. (87) As noted earlier, this is an area inwhich DARPA is conducting research and development. While much effort is being placed on improving the technological tools available to analysts, several observers argue that, whereas in the Cold War the vast majority of key information wasobtainable only through classified intelligence methods, today most information of value is availablethrough open sources. They propose a more market-based or decentralized approach to intelligenceanalysis, allowing multiple groups, possibly contractors or even the general public, to makecompeting inputs to databases and analyses for the decision-maker. (88) Another possible approach is to move more intelligence analysis from the arguably insulated world of the intelligence community directly into operations analysis. Two examples of this meldingare the Air Force's Checkmate analysis cell which gained public attention helping plan the airoperation for Desert Storm, (89) and the JointWarfare Analysis Center, which conductsengineering-level analyses of potential target systems such as power grids to find the linkages andvulnerabilities in them. (90) Both organizations havestrong reputations within the Defense Departmentfor finding new ways to defeat the enemy when "traditional" intelligence and operations centers donot. They are not intelligence centers, although both have intelligence analysts working in them. The intelligence analysts work side by side with operations analysts to focus all data, whether froman intelligence source or another source such as a logistics report, on the operational problem athand. This type of analysis requires getting the intelligence community to find and produce exactlywhat a specific customer requests, working beside the customer from start to finish. The conference report for the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002 stated fourprimary concerns for the intelligence community; re-vitalization of NSA, correction of HUMINTdeficiencies, correcting a perceived imbalance between collection and analysis, and ensuringadequate research and development. (91) In addition,several other issues involving the cost and qualityof intelligence, as well as leadership, military intelligence's role in homeland defense and the impactof potential intelligence community reform may be considered. A long-standing congressional concern has been to ensure that NSA adjust successfully to the emerging electronic environment. (92) The servicesnote that NSA has shifted resources to help it dealwith the new environment, with a resulting reduced support for tactical operations. The serviceshave therefore identified actions needed to mitigate the loss of some NSA support. As mentionedearlier, these include upgraded airborne platforms in all services, including UAVs and aerialrefueling aircraft, the PROPHET ground-based sensor, and SOF's Joint Threat Warning System. The services stress, however, that NSA must still provide them with access to technologies as theyare fielded. (93) Congress may choose to monitorthis aspect of NSA's performance, while fundingappropriate service initiatives which fill in some of the gaps left by NSA's current focus on thestrategic electronic environment. Congress also sees a national security imperative to improve HUMINT. HUMINT is the one type of intelligence that nearly all outside experts believe needs to be increased, as it can provideaccess to potential enemies' plans and intentions in greater detail than other sources. This isprimarily the responsibility of CIA and DIA; the services' roles at the strategic level have declinedsignificantly since 1995 when most service HUMINT capabilities, in particular their attaches postedto embassies world-wide, were consolidated into the Defense HUMINT Service, run by DIA. Somebelieve this move hurt the production of HUMINT for military purposes. (94) The services do retain some capabilities, usually for employment on or near the battlefield itself. For example, some military personnel are trained to monitor potential hostile activity in the localareas of bases and ports, for force protection. In addition, as previously discussed, the Army plansto integrate soldiers trained in collecting information into front-line squadrons. Operation EnduringFreedom has apparently used Special Operations Forces and other troops to gather tacticalinformation to a greater extent than has occurred in other recent conflicts. Collection is only part of the issue, however. The information gained must be analyzed and processed into usable formats. This is a difficult problem currently without a clear solution. Whilethe other sources of intelligence data are generally objective and fit fairly easily into databaseformats, information derived from humans is subjective and often defies objective categorization. Entry into a database so that the information is easily available to other analysts is, at this time, verymanpower intensive. Within the military community, DIA is responsible for this type of analysisand has apparently made progress on database development. (95) DIA's continued efforts in increasingthe quantity and analysis of HUMINT in support of DOD, especially the global war on terrorism,may deserve examination. A third area in which Congress has expressed significant concern is the apparent imbalance between collection and analysis, such that much data is collected by the intelligence community butnot analyzed in a timely manner. All of the services report that analysis requires more attention. They say they are shifting manpower toward analytical positions, increasing their use of contractedregional experts, and trying to reduce redundancy in analysis. Technological solutions to theinformation overload problem are also being researched, as noted earlier. Institutional changes toaddress the analysis shortfall, such as encouraging competing analyses from outside DOD, however,are not apparent. At the same time that there is reported to be more information than can be analyzed, continued acquisition of some specific collection capabilities may still be appropriate. Many of DOD's ISRplatforms are in very high demand and are operating at a significantly higher operating tempo thanmost of the rest of the force. (96) These platformscollect focused intelligence of immediate value tothe warfighter and cannot be replaced by the large amounts of other intelligence already beingcollected. In addition, acquisition of emerging capabilities designed to detect very difficult targets,such as foliage-penetrating radars and other highly-technical capabilities potentially able to detectdeeply buried targets or biological and chemical laboratories may provide previously inaccessibleinformation of direct relevance to prosecution of the global war on terrorism and other potentialthreats of the 21st century. (97) Another major area of congressional concern is in research and development-will the intelligence community be able to stay ahead of potential adversaries as they develop new ways toconduct and hide their activities? As noted above, both DARPA and OSD's Advanced ConceptTechnology Demonstrations have projects which cover many aspects of Defense ISR, particularlyin unmanned reconnaissance, sensing technologies, and integrated analysis. Congress may chooseto watch these projects, as well as OSD's selection of future projects, to ensure the appropriatetechnologies are being developed. Congress may also scrutinize the performance of the NationalReconnaissance Office in this area. Widely recognized as highly innovative in its early years, theNRO has over the past several years been criticized for a reduced level of innovation as it becamemore a standard member of the defense bureaucracy. (98) Some of DOD's ISR research and development programs have encountered Congressional opposition. For example, the 106th Congress killed "Discoverer-2", a space-based radar conceptconsisting of two experimental satellites, due to the high cost and possible overlap with NIMA'sFuture Imagery Architecture satellite program. In addition, some in DOD believe that the structureof the program with just two experimental satellites and no follow-on funding requirementsinaccurately communicated a low DOD priority for the program. (99) In the FY2002 budget, the AirForce's Space Based Radar and Space Based Infrared System both had funding requests reduced. The cuts were due primarily to seriously escalating costs and program management issues. (100) TheDOD intelligence community still believes development of these capabilities is vital, and the AirForce is re-focusing the programs in response. (101) Congress will then have the opportunity todetermine whether the programs still make sense. A consistent theme throughout DOD is an emphasis on getting networks in place so that information can flow. (102) While even the bestintelligence is only useful if it is communicated, poordata on the network can also have devastating consequences. One potential danger is that the flowof information, regardless of the quality of that information, may become a measure of success. (103) Particularly if the number of contributors to the intelligence networks grows, possibly exponentially,the data must still be analyzed and validated. While DIA appears to be making progress on thisproblem at the strategic analysis level, some observers believe the Marine Corps has the clearestvision on meeting this requirement at the tactical level with its design of its Intelligence AnalysisSystem bringing all data collected by the front-line troops into one location for comparison, analysis,and dissemination. The Army's Pathfinder text analysis tool appears to be an example of the typeof automated analytical tool which will be needed both in the field and in supporting intelligencecenters, although it is currently primarily used by strategic analysts, not those directly supportingcombat troops. Analysis tools and the doctrine and people to use them will need to develop whilethe networks evolve. Congress may choose to examine service networking programs to ensure thatquality of data, as well as data flow, is being improved. Will ISR for the transformed force cost significantly more than today's ISR? Due to the mix of "black" (classified) with "white" (unclassified) funding, it is impossible to quantify in anunclassified report the expected changes in the military ISR budget over the next several years. However, some feel for the impact on the budget can be measured in general terms. In theadministration's budget request for FY2003, for example, the Defense Emergency Response Fundrequest of $20.1 billion included $2.6 billion for increased situational awareness supporting theglobal war on terrorism. (104) With a significantportion of this request going toward ISR and relatedactivities, service ISR planners note general satisfaction with the budgetary support they arereceiving. One area which traditionally is quite expensive is satellite reconnaissance. Whileupgrades to our imagery satellite constellation are already presumably budgeted (the funding forreconnaissance satellites has always been classified), other changes to the satellite constellation,particularly in support of DOD's quest for world-wide "persistent" surveillance and reconnaissance,may significantly increase the cost of future ISR. These programs are apparently exactly the typesof programs Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld is proposing should receive funds re-directed fromreduced or cancelled major weapons programs such as the F-22 fighter and Comanche helicopter. (105) On the other hand, increased ISR expenditure may hold out the promise of decreased expendituresin other areas, as potentially the services will require fewer and/or cheaper weapon systems as theyexperience lower attrition and more efficient employment in combat situations. These savings,however, are unlikely to compensate for the potential large increases in ISR funding requirements. The military services seem to place their greatest trust in people who are trained to directly attack the enemy with deadly force. Officers who spent much of their career in the intelligence fieldare rarely selected to be senior leaders of their services. Most three-star officers who spentsignificant time as intelligence officers, as well as Admiral Bobby Inman, U.S. Navy (ret), perhapsthe only career intelligence officer to achieve four-star rank, have served at that rank only as theirservice's senior intelligence officer or as the head of an intelligence agency such as the NationalSecurity Agency. An exception was Lieutenant General (three star) Ervin Rokke, U.S. Air Force(ret), who served as the president of National Defense University. Invariably, the officers retire aftercompletion of their tours as the head of an intelligence agency, rather than move back into theleadership of their parent service or the Joint Chiefs of Staff. (Admiral Inman led the NationalSecurity Agency as a three-star, then became the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence as afour-star officer.) Consequently, the most senior uniformed members of the military continue to be people who are most familiar with the procurement, planning and employment of lethal force, rather than withthe procurement, planning and employment of information and intelligence. (106) While the effect isnot measurable, this fact could reduce the strength with which ISR issues are fought in the DODbureaucracy, as well as reducing the options senior officers are willing to consider as they confrontnew enemies and situations. While it is probably appropriate that any officer in position to orderothers into combat also be a combat officer, there are positions at the three and four star level whichdo not command combat forces. If intelligence is becoming more important to national security andthe application of force than the weapons themselves, the Senate may find it desirable to express adesire to the Secretary of Defense that more officers with an intelligence background be nominatedfor senior officer positions. All of the services believe that they must play a greater role in homeland defense than they had before the September 11 attacks. The role of the services' intelligence capabilities, however, doesnot appear to be as clear. By law, the military is restricted in its authority to collect or analyzeintelligence on U.S. persons or the United States. In addition, the military is in a war, the global waron terrorism, which is stretching intelligence assets. Intelligence collected and analyzed for themilitary should be made available to other agencies involved in homeland defense. This is alreadyoccurring between the Navy, Coast Guard, and other domestic agencies with responsibilities for portsecurity, as well as between DIA, CIA, FBI and NSA. (107) However, a significant shift of effort by theservice intelligence agencies from overseas to homeland defense may be inappropriate. The establishment of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) in January 2003 will affect the responsibilities of all intelligence agencies, including those in DOD. DHS will not itself collectforeign intelligence, but will depend upon intelligence forwarded from other agencies. The natureand extent of support that DOD agencies will be expected to provide DHS remains as yetuncertain. (108) Congress may wish to maintainoversight of the overall effort to coordinate andconsolidate intelligence for homeland security. Reform of the Intelligence Community is a perennial subject for high-level commissions. The most recent presidential commission, headed by Lt Gen Brent Scowcroft (U.S. Air Force, ret), madea recommendation to place the defense intelligence agencies directly under the Director of CentralIntelligence (DCI), (109) but no action was takenon the proposal in the 107th Congress. If such a movedoes occur in the future, the concern for the military services would probably be to prevent anysignificant reduction in current and near-term production of IMINT by NIMA and SIGINT by NSA. The services use these capabilities heavily, and subordinating the defense agencies under the DCIcould lower the priority placed on military requirements. If, on the other hand, the centralizationcreates conditions for a transformation in analysis without significantly reducing current production,the military services may be better off in the long run. AC2ISRC Aerospace Command and Control and Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance Center ACTD Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration ASD/C3I Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence ASDS Advanced SEAL Delivery System BDA Bomb Damage Assessment C2ISR Command, Control, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance CEC Cooperative Engagement Capability CIA Central Intelligence Agency DARPA Defense Advanced Research Project Agency DCGS Distributed Common Ground System DCI Director of Central Intelligence DIA Defense Intelligence Agency DOD Department of Defense GPS Global Positioning System HUMINT Human Intelligence IMINT Imagery Intelligence ISR Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance JCS Joint Chiefs of Staff JFCOM Joint Forces Command JROC Joint Requirements Oversight Council MASINT Measurement and Signatures Intelligence NIMA National Imagery and Mapping Agency NMCI Navy and Marine Corps Intranet NRO National Reconnaissance Office NSA National Security Agency OFT Office of Force Transformation OSD Office of the Secretary of Defense QDR Quadrennial Defense Review RSTA Reconnaissance, Surveillance, Targeting and Acquisition SEAL Sea-Air-Land forces SIGINT Signals Intelligence SIPRNET Secure Internet Protocol Network SOCOM Special Operations Command UAV Unmanned Aerial Vehicle UUV Unmanned Underwater Vehicle 

Summary: The Department of Defense (DOD) indicates it is undertaking a major alteration in its capabilities, from a force designed to fight the Soviet Union to one tailored to 21st centuryadversaries including terrorism. This shift has been prompted by the perception of a changing threatand improved technology, especially information technology. As the military services attempt toincrease the agility and versatility of their weapon systems, they also see a need to increase thecapabilities of military intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) to support the newweapon systems and operating methods against these new threats. To judge whether service activities are likely to help the military "transform," the head of DOD's Office of Force Transformation, retired Vice Admiral Arthur Cebrowski (U.S. Navy) hasproposed three criteria-whether the proposed capability can communicate and operate easily inconjunction with the other services, whether it helps the military develop new methods ofwarfighting, and whether it will be useful against a wide range of threats. In addition, ISR activitiesshould, in the aggregate, provide a world-wide perspective of the threat, "fuse" all types ofintelligence into one picture, access extensive details about the enemy, and monitor specific targetsfor long periods of time. All of the services are planning ISR programs which exhibit at least some attributes of transformation. Many observers believe military ISR has already achieved some transformation, asshown in the war in Afghanistan by the military's ability to detect a target and destroy it withinminutes. The military's ability to move intelligence quickly has improved dramatically. However,many observers are concerned that analysis may be lagging behind. Proposals to make revolutionarychanges in analysis include using contractors to produce competing unclassified analyses, developingartificial intelligence capabilities for database work, and establishing more operations analysiscenters. The military intelligence community is supported by the national intelligence community, which even before the September 11 attacks was under intense scrutiny. Therefore, the aspects ofthe national intelligence community's operations in which Congress has expressed interest directlyaffect the quality of military intelligence. In addition, DOD's plans for improving its ISRcapabilities raise potential issues for Congress with regard to cost, the balancing of potentiallycompeting efforts to improve the flow of intelligence and the quality of the data, and the support ofmilitary leadership. Finally, the consequences of the military's role in homeland defense, andintelligence community reform may generate concern. Discussion of these issues is provided asbackground as Congress considers ISR programs as part of defense and intelligence authorizationand appropriations legislation. This report will not be updated.