Appendix I describes, in chronological order, selected federal interagency policy and planning documents related to combating terrorism that form the foundation for the federal government’s efforts to combat terrorism and protect the nation’s critical infrastructure against attack. These documents delineate federal agencies’ roles and responsibilities for responding to potential or actual terrorist threats or incidents as well as the processes and mechanisms by which the federal government mobilizes and deploys resources and coordinates assistance to state and local authorities. This August 1973 plan provides the organizational structure and procedures for preparing for and responding to discharges of oil and releases of hazardous substances, pollutants, and contaminants. The plan lists the general responsibilities of federal agencies regarding such incidents, identifies the fundamental kinds of activities that are performed pursuant to the plan, and describes the specific responsibilities of the National Response Team, the Regional Response Teams, the National Response Center, and the U.S. Coast Guard’s National Strike Force Teams for planning and responding to such incidents. Federal agencies may conduct consequence management activities in a terrorist incident under the National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan because it provides authority and funding sources to respond to hazardous materials incidents regardless of the suspected cause. For example, a terrorist act may at first appear to be a routine hazardous materials incident, leading to the activation of a federal response under this plan. If the Federal Response Plan is activated, the response actions of the National Contingency Plan are conducted as one of the Federal Response Plan’s emergency support functions. The National Contingency Plan is authorized under section 105 of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act of 1980, 42 U.S.C. 9605, and 40 Code of Federal Regulations Part 300. This November 1988 Executive Order assigns specific responsibilities during national security emergencies to federal departments and agencies based on extensions of their regular missions. The order also designates the National Security Council (NSC) as the principal forum for consideration of national security emergency preparedness policy, and instructs the Director of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) to advise the NSC on issues of national security emergency preparedness, including mobilizing preparedness, civil defense, continuity of government, technological disasters, and other issues. It also directs the FEMA Director to assist in the implementation of national security emergency preparedness policy by coordinating with other federal departments and agencies and with state and local governments. The April 1992 Federal Response Plan, as amended, lays out the manner in which the federal government, with FEMA coordinating the support/assistance efforts of other agencies, responds to domestic incidents or situations in which the President has declared an emergency requiring federal emergency disaster assistance. More specifically, the plan outlines the planning assumptions, policies, concept of operation, organizational structures, and specific assignment of responsibilities to lead departments and agencies in providing federal assistance. The plan also categorizes the types of federal assistance into specific emergency support functions, such as transportation, communications, fire fighting, and health and medical services. The Terrorism Incident Annex establishes a general concept of operations for the federal response to a terrorist incident, including the concurrent operation under other plans such as the National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan and the Federal Radiological Emergency Response Plan. The Federal Response Plan is authorized under the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, 42 U.S.C. 5121 et seq., and 44 Code of Federal Regulations Subchapters D (Disaster Assistance) and F (Preparedness). This June 1995 directive sets forth U.S. general policy to use all appropriate means to deter, defeat, and respond to all terrorist attacks against U.S. interests. More specifically, Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 39 directs federal departments and agencies to take various measures to (1) reduce vulnerabilities to terrorism (e.g., to assess the vulnerabilities of government facilities and critical national infrastructure); (2) deter and respond to terrorism (e.g., to pursue, arrest, and prosecute terrorists and to minimize damage and loss of life and provide emergency assistance); and (3) develop effective capabilities to prevent and manage the consequences of terrorist use of weapons of mass destruction. This May 1996 plan establishes an organizational and operational structure for coordinated responses by federal agencies to peacetime radiological emergencies, taking into consideration the specific statutory authorities and responsibilities of each agency. The plan provides guidance as to which agency will lead and coordinate the federal response to a radiological emergency (i.e., the lead federal agency). According to the guidance, the specific agency depends on the type of emergency involved. For example, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission is the lead agency for an emergency that occurs at a nuclear facility or any activity licensed by the Commission. The plan also identifies the specific roles and responsibilities of each federal lead agency, such as responding to requests from state and local governments for technical information and assistance. This plan may be used whenever any of the signatory agencies respond to a radiological emergency, which would include terrorist acts to spread radioactivity in the environment. The Federal Response Plan may be implemented concurrently with the Federal Radiological Emergency Response Plan. The functions and responsibilities of the Federal Radiological Emergency Response Plan do not change, except for the coordination that occurs between the lead federal agency and the Federal Coordinating Officer (usually a FEMA official). This May 1998 directive attempts to increase the federal government’s effectiveness in countering terrorism threats against U.S. targets. PDD 62 organizes and clarifies the roles and activities of many agencies responsible for combating a wide range of terrorism, including preventing terrorist acts, apprehending and prosecuting terrorists, increasing transportation security and protecting critical computer-based systems. This directive also provides for consequence management of terrorist incidents. To carry out the integrated program, PDD 62 establishes the Office of the National Coordinator for Security, Infrastructure Protection and Counterterrorism. Working with the NSC, the National Coordinator is responsible for overseeing the wide range of policies and programs covered by PDD 62 and is to take the lead in developing guidelines that might be needed for crisis management. This May 1998 directive acknowledges computer security as a national security risk and established several entities within the NSC, the Department of Commerce, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) to address critical infrastructure protection, including federal agencies’ information infrastructures. PDD 63 tasks federal agencies with developing critical infrastructure protection (CIP) plans and establishing related links with private industry sectors. It called for the development of a national plan for critical infrastructure protection. The December 1998 classified Attorney General’s Five-Year Plan and its annual updates are intended to provide a baseline strategy for coordination of national policy and operational capabilities to combat terrorism in the United States and against American interests overseas. The plan identifies several high-level goals aimed at preventing and deterring terrorism, facilitating international cooperation to combat terrorism, improving domestic crisis and consequence planning and management, improving state and local capabilities, safeguarding information infrastructure, and leading research and development efforts to enhance counterterrorism capabilities. It also identifies the specific tasks federal agencies perform when responding to terrorist incidents and sets forth current and projected efforts by the Attorney General in partnership with other federal agencies; the National Coordinator for Security, Infrastructure Protection and Counterterrorism; and state and local entities to improve readiness to address the threat of terrorism. The January 2000 National Plan for Information Systems Protection provides a vision and framework for the federal government to prevent, detect, respond to, and protect the nation’s critical cyber-based infrastructure from attack and reduce existing vulnerabilities by complementing and focusing existing Federal Computer Security and Information Technology requirements. Subsequent versions of the plan will (1) define the roles of industry and state and local governments working in partnership with the federal government to protect privately owned physical and cyber-based infrastructures from deliberate attack and (2) examine the international aspects of critical infrastructure protection. The National Plan for Information Systems Protection is authorized by PDD 63, which calls for the development of a national plan for information system protection to prioritize CIP goals, principles, and long-term planning efforts. The November 2000 Domestic Guidelines (Guidelines for the Mobilization, Deployment, and Employment of U.S. Government Agencies in Response to Domestic Terrorist Threat or Incidence in Accordance With Presidential Decision Directive 39) provide a road map for government agencies’ mobilization, deployment, and use under PDD 39 in response to a terrorist threat or incident. The Domestic Guidelines describe specific procedures and responsibilities for deploying the Domestic Emergency Support Team, particularly in weapons of mass destruction (WMD) incidents, and facilitate interagency coordination in support of the lead federal agency’s mission to combat terrorism in the United States. The January 2001 CONPLAN (U.S. Government Interagency Domestic Terrorism Concept of Operations Plan) provides overall guidance to federal, state, and local agencies concerning how the federal government would respond to a potential or actual terrorist threat or incident that occurs in the United States, particularly one involving weapons of mass destruction. The CONPLAN outlines an organized and unified capability for a timely, coordinated response by federal agencies—specifically, the Department of Justice, the FBI, Department of Defense, Department of Energy, FEMA, Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), and Department of Health and Human Services—to a terrorist threat or act. It establishes conceptual guidelines for assessing and monitoring a developing threat, notifying appropriate agencies concerning the nature of the threat, and deploying necessary advisory and technical resources to assist the lead federal agency in facilitating interdepartmental coordination of crisis and consequence management activities. The January 2001 International Guidelines (Coordinating Subgroup Guidelines for the Mobilization, Deployment, and Employment of U.S. Government Elements in Response to an Overseas Terrorist Incident) outline procedures for deploying the Foreign Emergency Support Team and otherwise coordinating federal operations overseas. This February 2001 directive communicates presidential decisions concerning the national security policies of the United States. It also reiterates the role of the NSC system as the process to coordinate executive departments and agencies in the effective development and implementation of those national security policies. The directive designates the NSC Principals Committee as the senior interagency forum for consideration of policy issues affecting national security and tasks the NSC Policy Coordination Committees with the management of the development and implementation of national security policies by multiple U.S. agencies. It also establishes the Policy Coordination Committees and defines their roles and responsibilities. Appendix II describes, in chronological order, selected individual agency plans and guidance for combating terrorism that either have been completed recently or are being drafted. These documents clarify agencies’ roles and procedures for responding to terrorist attacks; provide guidance for the allocation of resources for planning, exercising, and implementing agency plans and programs; and delineate agency strategies for addressing terrorism. This unclassified directive issued on February 18, 1997, establishes DOD policy and assigns responsibility for providing military assistance to civil authorities. The employment of U.S. military forces in response to acts or threats of domestic terrorism is contingent upon authorization by the President as well as approval by the Secretary of Defense. The directive does not address non-federalized National Guard assets in support of local and/or state civil agencies approved by the governor. The guide includes a Biological Warfare Response Template that addresses both crisis and consequence management within five scenarios. States may use the template to formulate an integrated approach to biological weapons emergency responses. The Biological Weapons Improved Program was initiated in 1998 and the final draft of the planning guide was issued on August 1, 2000. The guide was developed as the result of the Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction Act of 1996 (P.L. 104- 201, Sept. 23, 1996), which required the Secretary of Defense to develop and implement a program to improve the responses of federal, state, and local agencies to emergencies involving biological and chemical weapons. DOD developed the Biological Warfare Improved Response Program and coordinated the associated planning guide with the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the Department of Energy (DOE), and the Department of Agriculture. The August 10, 2000, memorandum states that some chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield explosive incidents may have qualitative and quantitative differences from routine incidents. Thus, all official requests for DOD support for chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield explosive incidents are routed through the Executive Secretary of the Department of Defense, who determines if the incident warrants special operational management. For incidents not requiring special operations, the Secretary of the Army will serve as the Executive Agent through the Director of Military Support channels. DOD has several contingency plans to address its potential crisis and consequence management support roles in both domestic and international situations. Some of these are classified. The April 1999 document, Design Basis Threat for the Department of Energy Programs and Facilities, identifies and characterizes potential adversary threats to DOE’s programs and facilities that could adversely affect national security, the health and safety of employees, the public, or the environment. The document specifically addresses the protection of DOE facilities in the United States against terrorist attacks and is coordinated with DOD and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission as well as with the intelligence community and the FBI. It serves as the foundation for DOE’s defensive policies and requirements, including facility protection strategies and countermeasures. The June 1996 plan provides a coordinated federal response for urgent public health and medical care needs resulting from chemical and/or biological terrorist threats or acts within the United States. The plan supports the FBI and FEMA by leading the Emergency Support Function No. 8 response to the health and medical aspects of a chemical or biological terrorist incident. It also supplements and assists affected state and local governments by providing resources from (1) HHS and its supporting federal agencies and departments and (2) non-federal sources, such as major pharmaceutical suppliers and international disaster response organizations like the Canadian Ministry of Health. The plan is an appendix to Emergency Support Function No. 8 of the Federal Response Plan. Portions of the plan may be implemented under HHS authorities prior to formal implementation of the Federal Response Plan. The April 1999 plan serves as a tool for infection control professionals and healthcare epidemiologists to guide the development of response plans for their institutions in preparation for a real or suspected bioterrorism attack and encourages institution-specific response plans to be prepared in partnership with local and state health departments. The plan is updated as needed to reflect public health guidelines and new information. The unpublished April 2000 report outlines steps for strengthening public health and health care capacity to protect the United States against chemical and biological terrorism in cooperation with law enforcement, intelligence, and defense agencies in addition to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). The June 2000 draft manual outlines criteria for implementation of the smallpox response plan and CDC vaccine and personnel mobilization activities. The draft manual assists state and local health officials with specific activities essential for the management of a smallpox emergency. The January 2001 departmental 5-year plan builds on HHS’ strategic plan to include budget projections for the agencies and offices involved in achieving the department’s goals for (1) prevention of bioterrorism; (2) infectious disease surveillance; (3) medical and public health readiness for mass casualty events; (4) the national pharmaceutical stockpile; (5) research and development; and (6) secure and continuously operating information technology infrastructure. This February 2001 draft-planning guidance is designed to help state public health officials determine their role in terrorism response and understand the emergency response roles of local health departments and emergency management communities. It also may be used to help coordinate efforts among state health departments and agencies and organizations at all levels of government that would respond to a WMD terrorist event. The draft plan describes how HHS will provide coordinated federal assistance for public health and medical care needs resulting from terrorist threats or acts using weapons of mass destruction within the United States or its territories and possessions. The plan encompasses both crisis and consequence management responsibilities; describes the essential features for a systematic, coordinated and effective national health and medical response; and defines procedures for the use of Department resources to augment and support state and local governments. The December 1999 manual serves as a planning resource for special events held within the United States. It provides an overview of the issues FBI personnel consider when planning and coordinating support for special events and identifies the roles and functions of other federal agencies that often support special events. The December 1999 blueprint discusses the role of the National Domestic Preparedness Office as a single coordinating office and information clearinghouse for federal assistance programs to prepare state and local officials to respond to WMD acts of terrorism within the United States. The plan provides guidance to the FBI On-Scene Commander to effectively respond to a WMD threat or incident. The plan highlights the FBI’s policy for crisis management of WMD terrorist events and delineates specific responsibilities of FBI components during a WMD incident. The plan sets out procedures and resources available to support the FBI’s investigative and crisis management responsibilities. This June 2000 interim document provides guidance to the U.S. Coast Guard concerning participation in WMD incidents and planning while recognizing resource and training shortfalls. It also provides guidance concerning command and control and operating procedures. The August 2000 plan provides a national framework for current and future U.S. Coast Guard program operations and strategies for attaining the Marine Safety and Environmental Protection Program’s mission to protect the public, the environment, and U.S. economic interests through the prevention and mitigation of maritime accidents. The plan aims to reduce the vulnerability of the marine transportation system to intentional harm from terrorist acts. It also directs the U.S. Coast Guard to achieve a specific readiness level in interdiction and consequence management responsibilities concerning the use or threat of use of weapons of mass destruction. The Marine Transportation System Report submitted to the Congress in September 1999 and the President’s Commission on Seaport Crime and Security, along with the Oceans Report to the President, “Turning to the Sea: America’s Ocean Future,” provide the blueprint for the U.S. Coast Guard to obtain these objectives as part of their responsibility for port security. The December 2000 document provides guidance for the allocation of resources for planning, exercising, and executing the U.S. Coast Guard’s contingency preparedness program that includes, but is not limited to, terrorist incidents. The guidance seeks to encourage standardization and consistency in the U.S. Coast Guard’s contingency preparedness efforts and to help focus limited resources toward high-risk contingencies. It directs the U.S. Coast Guard to update outdated plans; strengthen ties with federal, state, and local governments, and industry to improve coordination during responses; develop a 5-year national exercise schedule to anticipate planning and resource requirements; and record all exercise after-action reports and lessons learned in a centralized U.S. Coast Guard database. The January 2000 plan supercedes the 1986 version and represents EPA’s current programmatic and operational concepts for responding to radiological incidents and emergencies. It is used as a guide for planning and maintaining readiness to respond to those releases in accordance with EPA’s mission to protect the environment and support the Federal Radiological Emergency Response Plan and National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan. The plan covers both EPA’s role as a lead federal agency for response coordination under the Federal Radiological Emergency Response Plan and its role as a lead agency for directing and managing an emergency response pursuant to the National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan. The March 2000 manual serves as a resource for EPA regional and headquarters personnel to use during domestic terrorism-related planning or response activities. Although the manual is not agency policy, EPA updates it periodically. It provides background information on the response framework and other agencies’ responsibilities and presents details pertaining to the specific roles and responsibilities of EPA response personnel during a terrorist threat or incident. Several annexes provide an overview of EPA’s strategy for addressing counterterrorism, including the EPA organizations involved in developing and implementing its counterterrorism strategy to protect public health and the environment from the threat or adverse effects of nuclear, biological, and/or chemical substances released during terrorist incidents. The annexes also discuss funding for regional counterterrorism activities, supporting legal authorities, and interagency counterterrorism workgroups. FEMA’s September 1997 Strategic Plan presents three strategic goals that support the agency’s mission to reduce the loss of life and property and protect U.S. institutions from all hazards by leading and supporting the nation in a comprehensive, risk-based emergency management program of mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery. Several of the goals address FEMA’s role as the lead agency for consequence management in a terrorist incident and describe related activities. The June 2000 Terrorism Preparedness Strategic Plan outlines the mission, vision, and goals of FEMA’s Terrorism Preparedness Program and supports FEMA’s Strategic Plan by clarifying agency goals and objectives related to terrorism. The Terrorism Preparedness Strategic Plan presents several goals related to mitigation and preparedness. It emphasizes providing guidance on FEMA’s roles and responsibilities in terrorism related activities; supporting federal, state, and local consequence management planning, training, and exercise programs; improving coordination and sharing of information at all levels of government; establishing an organizational structure for coordinating terrorism preparedness within FEMA; and developing systems to monitor and track resources needed to support FEMA’s terrorism consequence management programs and activities. The August 2000 plan clarifies roles and responsibilities in the implementation of FEMA-wide programs and activities in terrorism preparedness and supports FEMA’s June 2000 Terrorism Preparedness Strategic Plan and overall FEMA Strategic Plan. Under this plan, the Senior Advisor for Terrorism Preparedness provides overall direction, coordination, and oversight for the implementation of FEMA’s terrorism- related programs and activities. It also sets forth the roles and responsibilities of each of FEMA’s directorates that support terrorism- related consequence management activities. In April 2001, FEMA issued Attachment G to the State and Local Guide 101 for All-Hazard Emergency Operations Planning under the authority of the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief Act and the Emergency Assistance Act, as amended. Issued in September 1996, the State and Local Guide 101 provides emergency managers with information on FEMA’s concept for developing risk-based, all-hazard emergency operations plans. The voluntary guide provides a “toolbox” of ideas and advice for state and local authorities and clarifies the preparedness, response, and short-term recovery planning elements that warrant inclusion in state and local emergency operations plans. Attachment G to the State and Local Guide 101 aids state and local emergency planners in developing and maintaining a Terrorist Incident Appendix to their Emergency Operations Plan for incidents involving terrorist-initiated weapons of mass destruction. Appendix III lists selected federal crisis management response teams by agency. It describes their mission and number of personnel that could be deployed. If state and local first responders are unable to manage a weapons of mass destruction terrorist incident or become overwhelmed, the incident commander can request these and other federal assets. Agency/Team Department of Defense U.S. Army 52nd Ordnance Group (Explosive Ordnance Disposal) Trained on chemical and nuclear weapons of mass destruction and on specialized equipment for diagnostics and render-safe/mitigation of a nuclear device. Provides field sampling, monitoring, recovery, decontamination, transportation, and verification of weaponized and non-weaponized chemical and biological materials. Determined based upon circumstances. Three Explosive Ordnance Disposal companies located in San Diego, CA; San Antonio, TX; and Andrews AFB, Washington, D.C. Approximately 150 military and civilian personnel at Aberdeen Proving Grounds, MD; Pine Bluff Arsenal, AR; and Dugway Proving Grounds, UT. Determined based upon circumstances. Federal Bureau of Investigation Critical Incident Response Group (includes Hostage Rescue Team, Crisis Negotiation, Crisis Management, and Behavioral Assessment) Approximately 230, including the Hostage Rescue Team. Facilitates rapid response to and management of crisis incidents. Provides on-scene commander with rapid response/support in crisis incidents, including crisis negotiations, command post, behavioral assessment, and crisis information management. Deploys to any location within 4 hours and conducts a successful rescue operation of persons held by a criminal or terrorist force. Plan and execute high-risk tactical operations that exceed the capabilities of field office investigative resources. Provide management support of SWAT operations. Responds safely and effectively to incidents involving hazardous materials and develops the FBI’s technical proficiency and readiness for crime scene and evidence-related operations in cases involving chemical, biological, and radiological materials. Authorized about 90 personnel at the FBI Academy at Quantico, VA. Over 1,000 trained personnel in 56 field offices, with nine enhanced SWAT teams. Headquarters unit plus 17 smaller and less capable units through the United States. Provides specialized technical expertise in resolving nuclear or radiological terrorist incidents. Searches for lost or stolen nuclear material, weapons, or devices. Varies in size from a five- person technical advisory team to a tailored deployment of dozens. Basic team consists of seven persons. Mission Provides technical advice, emergency response, and follow-on expertise to the On-Scene Commander. Number of personnel Eight-person team. Provides expert technical advice to deployable U.S. military Explosive Ordnance Disposal operators concerning diagnostics, render-safe procedures, weapons analysis, and device modeling and effects prediction. Provides advanced technical capabilities to move or neutralize nuclear weapons. Five-person team. Thirty one-person team composed of 21 DOE and 10 DOD personnel, all of whom have other primary duties. Provides technical assistance as needed. Each team provides an operational response capability, including a pharmaceutical cache for treating up to 5,000 people for chemical weapons exposure. The size and composition of each team is determined by the type and location of the event or threat. The size and composition of each team is determined by the type and location of the event or threat. Assists federal, state, and local investigators in meeting the challenges faced at the scenes of significant arson and explosives incidents. Four teams organized geographically to cover the United States. Conducts environmental monitoring, performs laboratory analyses, and provides advice and guidance on measures to protect the public. As many as 60 personnel with these collateral duties are located in Las Vegas, NV, and Montgomery, AL. Appendix IV lists selected federal consequence management response teams by agency. It describes their mission and number of personnel that could be deployed. If state and local first responders are unable to manage a weapons of mass destruction terrorist incident or become overwhelmed, the incident commander can request these and other federal assets. Number of team (dedicated/collateral) members and team’s primary location Sixty dedicated personnel located at Fort Monroe, VA. Fourteen dedicated personnel located at Aberdeen Proving Grounds, MD. Approximately 190 personnel located at Aberdeen Proving Grounds, MD; Fort Belvoir, VA; Pine Bluff, AR; and Dugway, UT. Six teams located at various sites with six members per team who have these collateral duties. Supports lead federal agency, establishes command and control of designated Department of Defense (DOD) forces, and provides military assistance to civil authorities to save lives, prevent human suffering, and provide temporary critical life support. Coordinates and integrates DOD’s technical assistance for the neutralization, containment, dismantlement, and disposal of chemical or biological materials. Assists first responders in dealing with consequence management. Provides chemical/biological advice, assessment, sampling, detection, field verification, packaging, escort, and render-safe for chemical/biological devices or hazards. Provides technical advice in the detection, neutralization, and containment of chemical, biological, or radiological hazardous materials in a terrorist event. Provides a rapid response evacuation unit to any area of the world to transport and provide patient care under conditions of biological containment to service members or U. S. civilians exposed to certain contagious and highly dangerous diseases. Provides force protection or mitigation in the event of a terrorist incident, domestically or overseas. Approximately 20 personnel who have this collateral duty are stationed at Fort Detrick, MD. Assists and furnishes radiological health hazard guidance to the on-scene commander or other responsible officials at an incident site and the installation medical authority. Three hundred seventy-three dedicated personnel at Indian Head, MD. Eight to 10 personnel who have these collateral duties are located at Walter Reed Army Hospital, Washington, D.C. Manage federal medical teams and assets that are deployed in response to an incident. Six to eight dedicated personnel located at Rockville, MD, supplemented by 18 to 20 Department of Veterans Affairs personnel who have these collateral duties. Mission Decontaminate casualties resulting from a hazardous materials incident, provide medical care, and deploy with pharmaceutical cache of antidotes and medical equipment. Provide emergency medical care during a disaster or other event. Provide identification and mortuary services to state and local health officials upon request in the event of major disasters and emergencies. Resupplies state and local public health agencies with pharmaceuticals and other medical supplies in the event of a terrorist incident. Number of team (dedicated/collateral) members and team’s primary location Four teams located at Washington, D.C. (non-deployable); Winston- Salem, NC; Denver, CO; and Los Angeles, CA, with 36 members per team who have these collateral duties. Forty-four teams at various locations nationwide with 34 members per team who have these collateral duties. Ten teams at various locations nationwide with 25 to 31 members per team who have these collateral duties. Six rapid response inventories are located at five of six permanent sites. Assist federal agencies, state and local governments, private business, or individuals in incidents involving radiological materials. Collects, evaluates, interprets, and distributes off- site radiological data in support of the lead federal agency, state, and local governments. Coordinates federal resources in responding to the off-site monitoring and assessment needs at the scene of a radiological emergency. Detects, measures, and tracks ground and airborne radioactivity over large areas using fixed-wing and rotary-wing aircraft. Provides medical advice and on-site assistance in triage, diagnosis, and treatment of all types of radiation exposure events. Twenty-six teams at various locations nationwide with seven members per team who have these collateral duties. Team members deploy in phases. Phases I (15 members) and II (45 members) consist of Department of Energy personnel with these collateral duties from Nellis Air Force Base, NV, and other locations. Phase III (known as Full Federal Radiological Monitoring and Assessment Center) involves multiple federal agencies and may have 150 or more personnel from various federal agencies. Five to 10 dedicated and collateral duty personnel located at Nellis Air Force Base, NV, and Andrews Air Force Base, MD. Four to eight dedicated personnel located in Oak Ridge, TN. Respond to oil and hazardous substance pollution incidents in and around waterways to protect public health and the environment. Area of responsibility includes all Coast Guard Districts and Federal Response Regions. Support Environmental Protection Agency’s On-Scene Coordinators for inland area incidents. Three teams located in Fort Dix, NJ; Mobile, AL; and Novato, CA, with 35 to 39 dedicated members per team. Mission Coordinate all containment, removal and disposal efforts, and resources during a hazardous release incident in coastal or major navigational waterways. Number of team (dedicated/collateral) members and team’s primary location Approximately 50 dedicated personnel in pre-designated Coast Guard regional zones at various locations nationwide. Provides technical advice, radiological monitoring, decontamination expertise, and medical care as a supplement to an institutional health care provider. Twenty-one to 23 personnel with these collateral duties are located at various sites nationwide. Direct response efforts and coordinates all other efforts at the scene of a hazardous materials discharge or release. Provides technical support for assessing, managing, and disposing of hazardous waste. Provides mobile laboratories for field analysis of samples and technical expertise in radiation monitoring, radiation health physics, and risk assessment. Approximately 200 dedicated personnel, plus contractor support, at various locations nationwide. Twenty-two dedicated personnel, plus contractor support, located in Edison, NJ, and Cincinnati, OH. As many as 60 personnel with these collateral duties are located in Las Vegas, NV, and Montgomery, AL. Coordinates federal response and recovery activities within a state. Size is dependent on the severity and magnitude of the incident. Team members with these collateral duties are geographically dispersed at Federal Emergency Management Agency headquarters and 10 regional offices. Carry out the responsibilities and functions of the lead federal agency during incidents at licensed facilities, such as nuclear power plants. Four teams located in Atlanta, GA; Lisle, IL; Arlington, TX; and King of Prussia, PA, with 25-30 members per team who have these collateral duties. The Department of Energy has the lead responsibility for coordinating the Federal Radiological Monitoring Assessment Center during the early phase of an emergency. The Environmental Protection Agency assumes control during later phases. Appendix V provides a compendium of selected GAO recommendations for combating domestic terrorism made over the last 5 years. This appendix also provides the current status of GAO’s prior recommendations. Combating Terrorism: Spending on Governmentwide Programs Requires Better Management and Coordination (GAO/NSIAD-98-39, Dec. 1, 1997). Recommendations, p. 13. GAO recommendations We recommend that consistent with the responsibility for coordinating efforts to combat terrorism, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, the National Security Council (NSC), in consultation with the Director, Office of Management and Budget (OMB), and the heads of other executive branch agencies, take steps to ensure that (1) governmentwide priorities to implement the national counterterrorism policy and strategy are established; (2) agencies’ programs, projects, activities, and requirements for combating terrorism are analyzed in relation to established governmentwide priorities; and (3) resources are allocated based on the established priorities and assessments of the threat and risk of terrorist attack. To ensure that federal expenditures for terrorism-related activities are well-coordinated and focused on efficiently meeting the goals of U.S. policy under PDD 39, we recommend that the Director, OMB, use data on funds budgeted and spent by executive departments and agencies to evaluate and coordinate projects and recommend resource allocation annually on a crosscutting basis to ensure that governmentwide priorities for combating terrorism are met and programs are based on analytically sound threat and risk assessments and avoid unnecessary duplication. Status of recommendations Recommendation partially implemented. (1) The Attorney General’s Five-Year Counter-Terrorism and Technology Crime Plan, issued in December 1998, included priority actions for combating terrorism. According to the NSC and OMB, the Five- Year Plan, in combination with Presidential Decision Directives (PDD) 39 and 62, represent governmentwide priorities that they use in developing budgets to combat terrorism. (2) According to the NSC and OMB, they analyze agencies’ programs, projects, activities, and requirements using the Five-Year Plan and related presidential decision directives. (3) According to the NSC and OMB, they allocate agency resources based upon the priorities established above. However, there is no clear link between resources and threats. No national threat and risk assessment has been completed to use for resource decisions. Recommendation partially implemented. OMB now is tracking agency budgets and spending to combat terrorism. According to the NSC and OMB, they have a process in place to analyze these budgets and allocate resources based upon established priorities. However, there is no clear link between resources and threats. No national threat and risk assessment has been completed to use for resource decisions. Combating Terrorism: Opportunities to Improve Domestic Preparedness Program Focus and Efficiency (GAO/NSIAD-99-3, Nov. 12, 1998). Recommendations, p. 22. GAO recommendations The Secretary of Defense—or the head of any subsequent lead agency—in consultation with the other five cooperating agencies in the Domestic Preparedness Program, refocus the program to more efficiently and economically deliver training to local communities. The Secretary of Defense, or the head of any subsequent lead agency, use existing state and local emergency management response systems or arrangements to select locations and training structures to deliver courses and consider the geographical proximity of program cities. The National Coordinator for Security, Infrastructure Protection and Counterterrorism actively review and guide the growing number of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) consequence management training and equipment programs and response elements to ensure that agencies’ separate efforts leverage existing state and local emergency management systems and are coordinated, unduplicated, and focused toward achieving a clearly defined end state. Status of recommendations Recommendation implemented. The Department of Defense (DOD) transferred the Domestic Preparedness Program to the Department of Justice on October 1, 2000. The Department of Justice has implemented this recommendation by emphasizing the program’s train-the-trainer approach and concentrating resources on training metropolitan trainers in recipient jurisdictions. Recommendation implemented. DOD transferred the Domestic Preparedness Program to the Department of Justice on October 1, 2000. The Department of Justice has implemented this recommendation by modifying the programs in metropolitan areas and requiring cities to include their mutual aid partners in all training and exercise activities. Recommendation partially implemented. The NSC established an interagency working group called the Interagency Working Group on Assistance to State and Local Authorities. One function of this working group is to review and guide the growing number of WMD consequence management training and equipment programs. However, as described in our current report, we believe that more needs to be done to ensure that federal efforts are coordinated, unduplicated, and focused toward achieving a clearly defined end state—a results-oriented outcome as intended for government programs by the Results Act. We make a related recommendation in this current report to consolidate assistance programs. Combating Terrorism: Issues to Be Resolved to Improve Counterterrorist Operations (GAO/C-NSIAD-99-3, February 26, 1999). Recommendations, pp. 38, 39, and 65. GAO recommendations The Attorney General direct the Director, FBI, to coordinate the Domestic Guidelines and CONPLAN with all federal agencies with counterterrorism roles and finalize them. Further, the Domestic Guidelines and/or CONPLAN should seek to clarify federal, state, and local roles, missions, and responsibilities at the incident site. The Secretary of Defense review command and control structures and make changes, as appropriate, to ensure there is unity of command to DOD units participating in domestic counterterrorist operations to include both crisis response and consequence response management and cases in which they might be concurrent. The Secretary of Defense require the services produce after-action reports (AAR) or similar evaluations for all counterterrorism field exercises that they participate in. When appropriate, these AARs or evaluations should include a discussion of interagency issues and be disseminated to relevant internal and external organizations. Status of recommendations Recommendation implemented. The Domestic Guidelines were issued in November 2000. The CONPLAN was coordinated with key federal agencies and was issued in January 2001. Recommendation implemented. In May 2001, the Secretary of Defense assigned responsibility for providing civilian oversight of all DOD activities to combat terrorism and domestic WMD (including both crisis and consequence management) to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict. Recommendation partially implemented. The Joint After Action Reports database contains lessons learned. These reports address interagency issues, where appropriate. Many DOD units produce AARs and many of them address interagency issues. However, DOD officials acknowledged that service units or commands do not always produce AARs and/or disseminate them internally and externally as appropriate. We make a similar recommendation to DOD and other agencies in this current report. Combating Terrorism: Use of National Guard Response Teams Is Unclear (GAO/NSIAD-99-110, May 21, 1999). Recommendations, p. 20. GAO recommendations The National Coordinator for Security, Infrastructure Protection and Counterterrorism, in consultation with the Attorney General, the Director, FEMA, and the Secretary of Defense, reassess the need for the Rapid Assessment and Initial Detection teams in light of the numerous local, state, and federal organizations that can provide similar functions and submit the results of the reassessment to the Congress. If the teams are needed, we recommend that the National Coordinator direct a test of the Rapid Assessment and Initial Deployment team concept in the initial 10 states to determine how the teams can best fit into coordinated state and federal response plans and whether the teams can effectively perform their functions. If the teams are not needed, we further recommend that they be inactivated. Status of recommendations Recommendation partially implemented. With authorization from the Congress, DOD established additional National Guard teams and changed their names from Rapid Assessment and Initial Detection teams to WMD Civil Support Teams. However, subsequent to our report and a report by the DOD Inspector General, which found some similar problems, DOD has agreed to review the National Guard teams and work with other agencies to clarify their roles in responding to terrorist incidents. We make a similar recommendation in this current report. Combating Terrorism: Need for Comprehensive Threat and Risk Assessments of Chemical and Biological Attack (GAO/NSIAD-99-163, Sept. 7, 1999). Recommendations, p. 22. GAO recommendations The Attorney General direct the FBI Director to prepare a formal, authoritative intelligence threat assessment that specifically assesses the chemical and biological agents that would more likely be used by a domestic-origin terrorist—non-state actors working outside a state run laboratory infrastructure. The Attorney General direct the FBI Director to sponsor a national-level risk assessment that uses national intelligence estimates and inputs from the intelligence community and others to help form the basis for, and prioritize, programs developed to combat terrorism. Because threats are dynamic, the Director should determine when the completed national-level risk assessment should be updated. Status of recommendations Recommendation partially implemented. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) agreed with our recommendation. The FBI, working with the National Institute of Justice and the Technical Support Working Group, has produced a draft threat assessment of the chemical and biological agents that would more likely be used by terrorists. Along these lines, we make a similar recommendation in this current report. The Department of Justice anticipated that a draft of the assessment would be available for interagency review and comment in September 2001 and the final assessment would be published in December 2001. Recommendation partially implemented. According to the Department of Justice, the FBI is in the process of conducting such an assessment. The report will assess the current threat, the projected threat, emerging threats, and related FBI initiatives. Along these lines, we make a similar recommendation in this current report. The Department stated that this assessment is being finalized and anticipated that the classified report would be published in October 2001. Combating Terrorism: Chemical and Biological Medical Supplies are Poorly Managed (GAO/HEHS/AIMD-00-36, Oct. 29, 1999). Recommendations, p. 10. GAO recommendations The Department of Health and Human Services’ (HHS) Office of Emergency Preparedness (OEP) and Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA), and U.S. Marine Corps Chemical-Biological Incident Response Force (CBIRF) establish sufficient systems of internal control over chemical and biological pharmaceutical and medical supplies by (1) conducting risk assessments, (2) arranging for periodic, independent inventories of stockpiles, (3) implementing a tracking system that retains complete documentation for all supplies ordered, received, and destroyed, and (4) rotating stock properly. Status of recommendations Recommendation partially implemented. All of the agencies have made significant progress toward implementing our recommendations. They have conducted risk assessments, completed periodic physical inventories of the stockpiles, and developed and implemented procedures for stock rotation. Each of the agencies is taking steps to replace their current tracking systems with ones that are capable of tracking pharmaceutical and medical supplies from the time an order is placed until the item is consumed or otherwise disposed of. Combating Terrorism: Need to Eliminate Duplicate Federal Weapons of Mass Destruction Training (GAO/NSIAD-00-64, Mar. 21, 2000). Recommendations, p. 25. GAO recommendations The Secretary of Defense and the Attorney General eliminate duplicative training to the same metropolitan areas. If the Department of Justice extends the Domestic Preparedness Program to more than the currently planned 120 cities, it should integrate the program with the Metropolitan Firefighters Program to capitalize on the strengths of each program and eliminate duplication and overlap. Status of recommendations Recommendation partially implemented. DOD transferred the Domestic Preparedness Program to the Department of Justice on October 1, 2000. The Department of Justice, is attempting to better integrate the assistance programs under its management. We make a similar recommendation in this current report to further consolidate these programs. Combating Terrorism: Federal Response Teams Provide Varied Capabilities; Opportunities Remain to Improve Coordination (GAO-01-14, Nov. 30, 2000). Recommendations, p. 27. GAO recommendations To guide resource investments for combating terrorism, we recommend that the Attorney General modify the Attorney General’s Five-Year Interagency Counterterrorism and Technology Crime Plan to cite desired outcomes that could be used to develop budget requirements for agencies and their respective response teams. This process should be coordinated as an interagency effort. Status of recommendations Recommendation not implemented. The Department of Justice asserts that the current plan includes desired outcomes. As discussed in this report, we disagree with the Department and believe what it cites as outcomes are outputs—agency activities rather than results the federal government is trying to achieve. In this current report, we repeat this recommendation to the Attorney General. We also recommend that the President establish a single focal point for overall leadership and coordination to combat terrorism. If such a focal point is established, then we believe that the focal point, and not the Attorney General, should be responsible for developing a national strategy. FEMA said it will take steps to ensure that the Weapons of Mass Destruction Interagency Steering Group works with relevant scientific and intelligence communities in developing WMD scenarios. The Director, Federal Emergency Management Agency, take steps to require that the Weapons of Mass Destruction Interagency Steering Group develop realistic scenarios involving chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear agents and weapons with experts in the scientific and intelligence communities. The Director, Federal Emergency Management Agency, sponsor periodic national-level consequence management field exercises involving federal, state, and local governments. Such exercises should be conducted together with national-level crisis management field exercises. FEMA stated it would support and sponsor periodic national consequence management field exercises to ensure better coordination among federal and state and local response teams. Along these lines, we make a similar recommendation in this current report. Combating Terrorism: Accountability Over Medical Supplies Needs Further Improvement (GAO-01-463, Mar. 30, 2001). Recommendations, pp. 25 and 26. Status of recommendations Recommendation partially implemented. CDC’s National Pharmaceutical Stockpile Program has final written agreements in place with most partners and anticipates finalizing those under negotiation within the next few months. CDC also issued written standard operating procedures that address security to its private warehouse partners and installed fencing at all locations where inventories are currently stored. Recommendation partially implemented. OEP finalized its inventory requirements list in February 2001. In June 2001, the supplies stored at the central location were moved to a facility that meets security and controlled temperature requirements. Pharmaceuticals at the central cache are in the process of being potency tested by FDA, and VA has ordered drugs to replace those no longer deemed usable. Further, OEP issued written policies on the frequency of inventory counts and acceptable discrepancy rates. In March 2001, OEP issued national and local operating plans to VA and provided training and conducted periodic quality reviews to ensure that these plans are followed. train VA personnel and conduct periodic quality reviews to ensure that national and local operating plans are followed; and immediately contact FDA or the pharmaceutical and medical supply manufacturers of items stored at its central location to determine the impact of items exposed to extreme temperatures, replace those items deemed no longer usable, and either add environmental controls to the current location or move the supplies as soon as possible to a climate controlled space. The Commandant of the Marine Corps direct the Marine Corps Systems Command to program funding and complete the fielding plan for the CBIRF-specific authorized medical allowance list, require the Commanding Officer of the CBIRF to adjust its stock levels to conform with this list, and remove expired items from stock and replace them with current pharmaceutical and medical supplies. Recommendation partially implemented. The Marine Corps Systems Command programmed funding in June 2001 to cover deficiencies identified in its authorized medical allowance list. CBIRF expects to fill these deficiencies by October 1, 2001. Further, it removed and destroyed expired items from its stock. Critical Infrastructure Protection: Significant Challenges in Developing National Capabilities (GAO-01-323, Apr. 25, 2001). Recommendations, pp. 57, 68, and 85. Status of recommendations Recommendation not implemented. The Administration currently is reviewing the federal critical infrastructure protection (CIP) strategy. As of July 2001, no final documents on this strategy had been issued. develop a comprehensive governmentwide data-collection and analysis framework and ensure that national watch and warning operations for computer-based attacks are supported by sufficient staff and resources; and clearly define the role of the National Infrastructure Protection Center (NIPC) in relation to other government and private- sector entities, including lines of authority among the NIPC and the National Security Council, Justice, the FBI, and other entities; the NIPC’s integration into the national warning system; and protocols that articulate how and under what circumstances the NIPC would be placed in a support function to either the DOD or the intelligence community. Recommendation not implemented. According to the Director of the NIPC, the NIPC has begun developing a plan that incorporates these elements. a description of the relationship between the long-term goals and objectives and the annual performance goals; and a description of how program evaluations could be used to establish or revise strategic goals, along with a schedule for future program evaluations. Recommendation partially implemented. An emergency law enforcement services sector plan has been issued. monitor implementation of new performance measures to ensure that they result in field offices’ fully reporting information on potential computer crimes to the NIPC; and complete development of the emergency law enforcement plan, after comments are received from law enforcement sector members. As the national strategy for critical infrastructure protection is reviewed and possible changes considered, we recommend that the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs define the NIPC’s responsibilities for monitoring reconstitution. GAO recommendations The Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (1) direct federal agencies and encourage the private sector to better define the types of information that are necessary and appropriate to exchange in order to combat computer-based attacks and procedures for performing such exchanges; (2) initiate development of a strategy for identifying assets of national significance that includes coordinating efforts already underway, such as those at DOD and Commerce; and (3) resolve discrepancies between PDD 63 requirements and guidance provided by the federal Chief Information Officers Council regarding computer incident reporting by federal agencies. The Attorney General direct the FBI Director to direct the NIPC Director to (1) formalize relationships between the NIPC and other federal entities, including DOD and the Secret Service, and private-sector ISACs so that a clear understanding of what is expected from the respective organizations exists; (2) develop a plan to foster the two-way exchange of information between the NIPC and the ISACs; and (3) ensure that the Key Asset Initiative is integrated with other similar federal activities. Status of recommendations Recommendation partially implemented. The Administration currently is reviewing the federal CIP strategy. As of July 2001, no final documents on this strategy had been issued. The NIPC has created the Interagency Coordination Cell to foster cooperation across government agencies in investigative matters and on matters of common interest and has continued to foster better relationships with the information sharing and analysis centers. Office of Crisis Planning and Management, Washington, D.C. Office of Procurement, Property and Emergency Preparedness, Washington, D.C. Office of the Chief Information Officer, Washington, D.C. Office of the Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Communications and Information, National Telecommunications and Information Administration, Washington, D.C. Critical Infrastructure Assurance Office, Washington, D.C. National Institute of Standards and Technology, Information Technology Laboratory, Computer Security Division, Gaithersburg, Md. Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence, Principal Director (Acting), Security and Information Operations, Washington, D.C. Office of Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence, Director, Critical Infrastructure Protection, Arlington, Va. Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, Washington, D.C. Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict, Washington, D.C. Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Counterterrorism, Plans, and Support, Washington, D.C. Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Directorate of Operations (J-3), Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Material, or High-Yield Explosive Division, Washington, D.C. Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, Arlington, Va. Office of Defense Programs, Germantown, Md. Office of Non-Proliferation Research and Engineering, Washington, D.C. Office of Security and Emergency Operations, Washington, D.C. Office of the Chief Information Officer, Office of the Associate CIO for Cyber Security, Washington, D.C. Office of Critical Infrastructure Protection, Washington, D.C. Office of Security Affairs, Germantown, Md. Office of Safeguards and Security, Germantown, Md. Office of Emergency Operations, Washington, D.C. Office of Emergency Management, Washington, D.C. Office of Emergency Response, Germantown, Md. Office of the Assistant Secretary for Management and Budget, Office of Information Resources Management, Washington, D.C. Office of Emergency Preparedness, Rockville, Md. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, Ga. U.S. Public Health Service, Rockville, Md. U.S. Public Health Service, Region VIII, Denver, Colo. Office of the Deputy Attorney General, Washington, D.C. Criminal Division, Computer Crime and Intellectual Property Section, Washington, D.C. Justice Management Division, Washington, D.C. Office of Justice Programs, Washington, D.C. Office for State and Local Domestic Preparedness Support, Washington, D.C. National Institute for Justice, Washington, D.C. Federal Bureau of Investigation, Washington, D.C. Counter Terrorism Division, Washington, D.C. Domestic Terrorism/Counterterrorism Planning Section, Washington, D.C. Special Events Management Unit, Washington, D.C. National Domestic Preparedness Office, Washington, D.C. WMD Countermeasures Unit, Washington, D.C. National Infrastructure Protection Center, Washington, D.C. Critical Incident Response Group, Quantico, Va. Crisis Management Unit, Quantico, Va. Office of the Undersecretary of Management, Bureau of Information Resource Management/Chief Information Officer, Washington, D.C. Office of the Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security Affairs, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, Washington, D.C. Office of the Undersecretary for Global Affairs, Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, Washington, D.C. Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, Washington, D.C. Technical Support Working Group, Arlington, Va. Office of the Secretary of Transportation, Washington, D.C. Office of Security and Administrative Management, Washington, D.C. Office of Intelligence and Security, Washington, D.C. Federal Aviation Administration, Office of the Assistant Administrator for Information Services and Chief Information Officer, Office of Information Systems Security, Washington, D.C. Research and Special Programs Administration, Washington, D.C. Office of Emergency Transportation, Washington, D.C. Office of Innovation, Research and Education, Washington, D.C. U.S. Coast Guard, Headquarters, Washington, D.C. National Response Center, Washington, D.C. Office of the Under Secretary for Enforcement, Washington, D.C. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, Headquarters, Washington, D.C. United States Secret Service, Washington, D.C. Major Events Division, Washington, D.C. Technical Security Division, Washington, D.C. Office of Protective Operations, Olympic Coordinator, Salt Lake Office of the Assistant Secretary for Financial Institutions, Washington, D.C. Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary (Information Systems) and Chief Information Officer, Washington, D.C. Headquarters, Washington, D.C. Office of Emergency Preparedness/Emergency Management Strategic Healthcare Group, Martinsburg, W.Va. Office of the Assistant Administrator for Environmental Information, Washington, D.C. Office of the Assistant Administrator for Water, Office of Ground and Drinking Water, Washington, D.C. Chemical Emergency Preparedness and Prevention Office, Washington, D.C. Region VIII, Denver, Colo. National Security Council Staff; National Coordinator for Security, Infrastructure Protection and Counterterrorism, Washington, D.C. Office of Management and Budget, Headquarters, Washington, D.C. Office of Science and Technology Policy, Headquarters, Washington, D.C. Office of the Director, Washington, D.C. Information Technology Services, Washington, D.C. Office of the Inspector General , Washington, D.C. Office of National Security Affairs, Washington, D.C. Preparedness, Training, and Exercises Directorate, Washington, D.C. Readiness Division, Washington, D.C. Program Development Branch, Washington, D.C. Response and Recovery Directorate, Washington, D.C. Region VIII, Denver, Colo. Federal Technology Service, Office of Information Assurance and Critical Infrastructure Protection, Washington, D.C. Federal Computer Incident Response Center, Washington, D.C. Office of the Inspector General, Washington, D.C. Tri-County Health Department, Commerce City, Colo. Office of Emergency Management, Arapahoe County, Colo. Sheriff/Emergency Law Enforcement Services Sector Coordinator, Arapahoe County, Colo. Aurora Fire Department, Aurora, Colo. Office of Emergency Management, Aurora, Colo. Aurora Police Department, Aurora, Colo. Buckley Air National Guard Base, Aurora, Colo. 8th Weapons of Mass Destruction Civil Support Team, Aurora, Colo. Denver Police Department, Denver, Colo. Department of Environmental Health, Denver, Colo. Department of Fire, Denver, Colo. Department of Safety, Denver, Colo. Office of Health and Emergency Management, Denver, Colo. Denver Health, Colo. Denver Public Health Department, Denver, Colo. Department of Emergency Medicine, Denver, Colo. Colorado Department of Public Health and Environment, Denver, Colo. Office of Emergency Management, Department of Local Affairs, Division of Local Government, Golden, Colo. Rocky Mountain Poison and Drug Center, Denver, Colo. Banking and Finance Infrastructure Sector Coordinator (a position outlined in Presidential Decision Directive 63), in Washington, D.C. Financial Services—Information Sharing and Analysis Center, Reston, Va. The following are GAO’s comments on the Office of Management and Budget’s (OMB) letter dated September 4, 2001, which provided a consolidated response from selected offices within the Executive Office of the President, including OMB, the Office of Science and Technology Policy, and the National Security Council. We incorporated the consolidated comments where appropriate throughout the report. In addition to the letter reprinted in this appendix, OMB referred us to the President’s May 8, 2001, statement about the Vice President’s effort related to national preparedness. As a result, we have reprinted that statement in this appendix. The following are GAO’s comments on the Department of Agriculture’s letter dated September 5, 2001. The Department of Agriculture (USDA) requested that we revise our discussion of after-action reports (AARs) in chapter 4. After USDA provided us with AARs, we updated table 5 in chapter 4 to indicate that the Department does produce evaluations for terrorism-related exercises that it sponsors. USDA agrees with the practice of writing AARs, but asked that we delete our recommendation to the Secretary of Agriculture because the Department already produces AARs for exercises that it sponsors. We continue to believe that this is a valid recommendation because the Department also could learn valuable lessons when it participates in field exercises sponsored by other agencies. We have incorporated this discussion at the end of chapter 4. In addition, USDA requested that we revise the report to address the issue of terrorism targeted at U.S. agriculture and the role of the Department in such incidents. Its letter stated that an attack aimed at the safety of our food supply and agricultural infrastructure would cause widespread and long-range damage. As our report clearly states, the objectives and scope of our report focused on federal efforts to respond to terrorist using WMD directly against civilian targets. Therefore, we did not focus on terrorism directed against agricultural targets. Consequently, our discussion of USDA was limited. The Department also requested that we address the issue of terrorism targeted at federal government employees, facilities, and programs. Its letter stated that there is an increase in the intensity and frequency of domestic terrorist incidents aimed at its employees, facilities, and programs—particularly those of the Forest Service, Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service, and Agricultural Research Service. Again, the objectives and scope of this report focused on federal efforts to respond to terrorist incidents involving WMD against civilian targets. Therefore, we did not focus on terrorism directed against federal government employees and programs. The Department further requested that we revise the report to include agriculture in our discussion of critical infrastructures in chapter 6. The objectives and scope of this report focused on the critical infrastructures identified by the President’s Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection and the Critical Infrastructure Assurance Office. While we recognize the importance of the food supply, agriculture has not been designated as a critical infrastructure by either group; therefore, it was not included in our review. The Department provided us with a separate discussion and summary of USDA’s capabilities to prepare for and respond to a terrorist incident. Given the objectives and scope of our review, we have not reprinted that document in this report. The following is GAO’s comment on the Department of Commerce’s letter dated September 7, 2001. We incorporated the Department’s comments where appropriate in chapter 6. The following are GAO’s comments on the Department of Defense’s letter dated August 27, 2001. We incorporated the Department’s comments where appropriate in chapters 4 and 5. In addition to the letter reprinted in this appendix, officials from the Department provided us with technical comments, which we also incorporated where appropriate. The following is GAO’s comment on the Department of Energy’s letter dated August 27, 2001. We incorporated the Department’s comments where appropriate throughout the report. The following is GAO’s comment on the Department of Health and Human Service’s letter dated August 29, 2001. We incorporated the Department’s comments where appropriate throughout the report. The following are GAO’s comments on the Department of Justice’s letter dated September 6, 2001. Regarding the Department of Justice’s comments on chapter 2 about creating a single focal point, on chapter 3 about the Attorney General’s Five-Year Plan, on chapter 4 about lessons learned, on chapter 5 about consolidating some of its functions under FEMA, and on chapter 6 about computer-based threats, we have incorporated its comments as appropriate in those respective chapters. In addition to the letter in this appendix, the Department of Justice provided us with technical comments on our report. The Department’s Office for State and Local Domestic Preparedness Support also provided us with extensive technical comments and supporting documentation. Because these points were not fully addressed in the Department’s letter, we are summarizing them below, including our response. The Department commented that chapter 1 of our draft report needed to clarify its discussion of the concurrency of crisis and consequence management and the respective roles of lead and support agencies. We incorporated its comments as appropriate. The Department commented that chapter 3 of our draft report downplayed the significance of its efforts to help states and local governments conduct threat and risk assessments. It said that the Department plans to use the results of these assessments in deciding how to allocate its equipment, training, and exercise program resources consistent with previous GAO recommendations. We revised the report to discuss these assessments in more detail and to reflect their potential importance. We also separated our discussion of state and local-level assessments from our discussion of a national-level assessment that the FBI had previously agreed to produce. The Department commented that chapter 5 of our draft report did not adequately reflect its efforts to reduce duplication and improve the delivery and coordination of assistance to state and local governments. The Department said it had taken a number of actions to reduce duplication and better integrate these programs across the federal government. We updated the report to reflect these ongoing efforts. The Department also asserted that because of its efforts, state and local first responders are no longer confused by the multitude of federal assistance programs. We disagree with this point and revised the report by providing additional evidence of continued confusion. governments to manage the consequences of WMD terrorism. The Office for State and Local Domestic Preparedness Support took the position that the Department of Justice, in both legal and programmatic terms, was the lead agency for preparing state and local governments for WMD terrorism. We disagree with the Office’s position and discuss this issue at the end of chapter 5. In addition, the Department provided us with an update related to chapter 3 on our previous recommendations that it develop threat and risk assessments. We updated chapter 3 of the report to reflect these efforts and provide the Department’s latest milestones for their completion. The following is GAO’s comment on the Department of the Treasury’s letter dated September 10, 2001. In addition to the letter reprinted in this appendix, the Department provided technical comments from the U.S. Secret Service; the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms; and the Office of Enforcement. We incorporated these technical comments where appropriate throughout the report. The following are GAO’s comments on the Department of Veterans Affairs’ letter dated September 5, 2001. The Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) concurred with the intent of our recommendation on after-action reports (AARs) in chapter 4 and agreed that it will implement the recommendation. Our past and ongoing work has already demonstrated that VA has a good record of producing AARs. However, VA asked that we change the wording of the recommendation to limit it to exercises that are “designated as federal interagency counterterrorist exercises by the lead federal agency.” We disagree with this revision because it might limit the production of AARs in a manner to exclude important exercises. In our previous work, we found that some of the better consequence management exercises were sponsored by VA or the Department of Defense (DOD), not by FEMA—the lead federal agency for consequence management. For example, in September 1997, VA and DOD sponsored a field exercise to practice providing medical care to victims of a terrorist WMD attack. That exercise, which had over 2,000 participants, also included state and local responders and local community hospitals. Changing the wording of our recommendation, as suggested by VA, might exempt agencies from producing AARs for such exercises. Given the Department’s good record in producing AARs, even in cases when they were not “designated” by a lead federal agency, we believe that the wording in our recommendation will not place any additional burden upon the Department. The following is GAO’s comment on the Federal Emergency Management Agency’s letter dated August 31, 2001. After we received FEMA’s written comments, FEMA provided us with revised figures for the number of persons trained at the National Fire Academy and Emergency Management Institute from fiscal year 1998 through July 31, 2001, of fiscal year 2001. We incorporated the Agency’s comments where appropriate throughout the report. In addition to those named above, Mark A. Pross, Michael W. Gilmore, Richard A. McGeary, Danielle P. Hollomon, James C. Lawson, Krislin M. Nalwalk, Harry L. Purdy, Karl W. Siefert, Yvonne J. Vigil, Keith A. Rhodes, Rahul Gupta, Grace A. Alexander, Jane D. Trahan, and Heather J. Taylor made key contributions to this report. Combating Terrorism: Actions Needed to Improve DOD’s Antiterrorism Program Implementation and Management (GAO-01-909, Sept. 19, 2001). Critical Infrastructure Protection: Significant Challenges in Protecting Federal Systems and Developing Analysis and Warning Capabilities (GAO-01-1132T, Sept. 12, 2001). International Crime Control: Sustained Executive-Level Coordination of Federal Response Needed (GAO-01-629, Aug. 13, 2001). FBI Intelligence Investigations: Coordination Within Justice on Counterintelligence Criminal Matters Is Limited (GAO-01-780, July 16, 2001). Critical Infrastructure Protection: Significant Challenges in Developing Analysis, Warning, and Response Capabilities (GAO-01-769T, May 22, 2001). Combating Terrorism: Comments on H.R. 525 to Create a President’s Council on Domestic Preparedness (GAO-01-555T, May 9, 2001). Critical Infrastructure Protection: Significant Challenges in Developing National Capabilities (GAO-01-323, Apr. 25, 2001). Combating Terrorism: Observations on Options to Improve the Federal Response (GAO-01-660T, Apr. 24, 2001). Combating Terrorism: Accountability Over Medical Supplies Needs Further Improvement (GAO-01-463, Mar. 30, 2001). Combating Terrorism: Comments on Counterterrorism Leadership and National Strategy (GAO-01-556T, Mar. 27, 2001). Combating Terrorism: FEMA Continues to Make Progress in Coordinating Preparedness and Response (GAO-01-15, Mar. 20, 2001). Combating Terrorism: Federal Response Teams Provide Varied Capabilities; Opportunities Remain to Improve Coordination (GAO-01-14, Nov. 30, 2000). West Nile Virus Outbreak: Lessons for Public Health Preparedness (GAO/HEHS-00-180, Sept. 11, 2000). Information Security: Serious and Widespread Weaknesses Persist at Federal Agencies (GAO/AIMD-00-295, Sept. 6, 2000). Combating Terrorism: Linking Threats to Strategies and Resources (GAO/T-NSIAD-00-218, July 26, 2000). Critical Infrastructure Protection: Challenges to Building a Comprehensive Strategy for Information Sharing and Coordination (GAO/T-AIMD-00-268, July 26, 2000). Combating Terrorism: Action Taken but Considerable Risks Remain for Forces Overseas (GAO/NSIAD-00-181, July 19, 2000). Security Protection: Standardization Issues Regarding Protection of Executive Branch Officials (GAO/GGD/OSI-00-139, July 11, 2000). Aviation Security: Long-Standing Problems Impair Airport Screeners’ Performance (GAO/RCED-00-75, June 28, 2000). Critical Infrastructure Protection: Comments on the Proposed Cyber Security Information Act of 2000 (GAO/T-AIMD-00-229, June 22, 2000). Weapons of Mass Destruction: DOD’s Actions to Combat Weapons Use Should Be More Integrated and Focused (GAO/NSIAD-00-97, May 26, 2000). Security: Breaches at Federal Agencies and Airports (GAO/T-OSI-00-10, May 25, 2000). Critical Infrastructure Protection: “I LOVE YOU” Computer Virus Highlights Need for Improved Alert and Coordination Capabilities (GAO/T-AIMD-00-181, May 18, 2000). Combating Terrorism: Comments on Bill H.R. 4210 to Manage Selected Counterterrorist Programs (GAO/T-NSIAD-00-172, May 4, 2000). Combating Terrorism: How Five Foreign Countries Are Organized to Combat Terrorism (GAO/NSIAD-00-85, Apr. 7, 2000). Combating Terrorism: Issues in Managing Counterterrorist Programs (GAO/T-NSIAD-00-145, Apr. 6, 2000). Combating Terrorism: Need to Eliminate Duplicate Federal Weapons of Mass Destruction Training (GAO/NSIAD-00-64, Mar. 21, 2000). Critical Infrastructure Protection: National Plan for Information Systems Protection (GAO/AIMD-00-90R, Feb. 11, 2000). Critical Infrastructure Protection: Comments on the National Plan for Information Systems Protection (GAO/T-AIMD-00-72, Feb. 1, 2000). Combating Terrorism: Chemical and Biological Medical Supplies Are Poorly Managed (GAO/HEHS/AIMD-00-36, Oct. 29, 1999). Food Safety: Agencies Should Further Test Plans for Responding to Deliberate Contamination (GAO/RCED-00-3, Oct. 27, 1999). Combating Terrorism: Observations on the Threat of Chemical and Biological Terrorism (GAO/T-NSIAD-00-50, Oct. 20, 1999). Critical Infrastructure Protection: Fundamental Improvements Needed to Assure Security of Federal Operations (GAO/T-AIMD-00-7, Oct. 6, 1999). Critical Infrastructure Protection: The Status of Computer Security at the Department of Veterans Affairs (GAO/AIMD-00-5, Oct. 4, 1999). Critical Infrastructure Protection: Comprehensive Strategy Can Draw on Year 2000 Experiences (GAO/AIMD-00-1, Oct. 1, 1999). Information Security: The Proposed Computer Security Enhancement Act of 1999 (GAO/T-AIMD-99-302, Sept. 30, 1999). Combating Terrorism: Need for Comprehensive Threat and Risk Assessments of Chemical and Biological Attack (GAO/NSIAD-99-163, Sept. 7, 1999). Information Security: NRC’s Computer Intrusion Detection Capabilities (GAO/AIMD-99-273R, Aug. 27, 1999). Combating Terrorism: Analysis of Federal Counterterrorist Exercises (GAO/NSIAD-99-157BR, June 25, 1999). Combating Terrorism: Observations on Growth in Federal Programs (GAO/T-NSIAD-99-181, June 9, 1999). Combating Terrorism: Analysis of Potential Emergency Response Equipment and Sustainment Costs (GAO/NSIAD-99-151, June 9, 1999). Combating Terrorism: Use of National Guard Response Teams Is Unclear (GAO/NSIAD-99-110, May 21, 1999). Combating Terrorism: Issues to Be Resolved to Improve Counterterrorist Operations (GAO/NSIAD-99-135, May 13, 1999). Combating Terrorism: Observations on Biological Terrorism and Public Health Initiatives (GAO/T-NSIAD-99-112, Mar. 16, 1999). Combating Terrorism: Observations on Federal Spending to Combat Terrorism (GAO/T-NSIAD/GGD-99-107, Mar. 11, 1999). Combating Terrorism: FBI’s Use of Federal Funds for Counterterrorism- Related Activities (FYs 1995-98) (GAO/GGD-99-7, Nov. 20, 1998). Combating Terrorism: Opportunities to Improve Domestic Preparedness Program Focus and Efficiency (GAO/NSIAD-99-3, Nov. 12, 1998). Combating Terrorism: Observations on the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici Domestic Preparedness Program (GAO/T-NSIAD-99-16, Oct. 2, 1998). Combating Terrorism: Observations on Crosscutting Issues (GAO/T-NSIAD-98-164, Apr. 23, 1998). Combating Terrorism: Threat and Risk Assessments Can Help Prioritize and Target Program Investments (GAO/NSIAD-98-74, Apr. 9, 1998). Combating Terrorism: Spending on Governmentwide Programs Requires Better Management and Coordination (GAO/NSIAD-98-39, Dec. 1, 1997). Combating Terrorism: Federal Agencies’ Efforts to Implement National Policy and Strategy (GAO/NSIAD-97-254, Sept. 26, 1997). Combating Terrorism: Status of DOD Efforts to Protect Its Forces Overseas (GAO/NSIAD-97-207, July 21, 1997). Chemical Weapons Stockpile: Changes Needed in the Management Structure of Emergency Preparedness Program (GAO/NSIAD-97-91, June 11, 1997). Aviation Security: FAA’s Procurement of Explosives Detection Devices (GAO/RCED-97-111R, May 1, 1997). Aviation Security: Commercially Available Advanced Explosives Detection Devices (GAO/RCED-97-119R, Apr. 24, 1997). Terrorism and Drug Trafficking: Responsibilities for Developing Explosives and Narcotics Detection Technologies (GAO/NSIAD-97-95, Apr. 15, 1997). Federal Law Enforcement: Investigative Authority and Personnel at 13 Agencies (GAO/GGD-96-154, Sept. 30, 1996). Aviation Security: Urgent Issues Need to Be Addressed (GAO/T-RCED/NSIAD-96-151, Sept. 11, 1996). Terrorism and Drug Trafficking: Technologies for Detecting Explosives and Narcotics (GAO/NSIAD/RCED-96-252, Sept. 4, 1996). Aviation Security: Immediate Action Needed to Improve Security (GAO/T-RCED/NSIAD-96-237, Aug. 1, 1996). Terrorism and Drug Trafficking: Threats and Roles of Explosives and Narcotics Detection Technology (GAO/NSIAD/RCED-96-76BR, Mar. 27, 1996). Nuclear Nonproliferation: Status of U.S. Efforts to Improve Nuclear Material Controls in Newly Independent States (GAO/NSIAD/ RCED-96-89, Mar. 8, 1996). Aviation Security: Additional Actions Needed to Meet Domestic and International Challenges (GAO/RCED-94-38, Jan. 27, 1994). Nuclear Security: Improving Correction of Security Deficiencies at DOE’s Weapons Facilities (GAO/RCED-93-10, Nov. 16, 1992). Nuclear Security: Weak Internal Controls Hamper Oversight of DOE’s Security Program (GAO/RCED-92-146, June 29, 1992). Electricity Supply: Efforts Underway to Improve Federal Electrical Disruption Preparedness (GAO/RCED-92-125, Apr. 20, 1992).

Summary: As concerns about terrorism have grown, Executive Branch responsibilities and authorities have received greater attention, which led to the 1998 appointment of a national coordinator in the National Security Council. Both Congress and the President have recognized the need to review and clarify the structure for overall leadership and coordination. The President recently requested that the Vice President oversee a coordinated national effort to improve national preparedness, including efforts to combat terrorism. Federal efforts to develop a national strategy to combat terrorism and related guidance have progressed, but key efforts remain incomplete. The first step toward developing a national strategy is to conduct a national threat and risk assessment. The Department of Justice and the Federal Bureau of Investigation have collaborated on such an assessment, but they have not formally coordinated with other departments and agencies on this task. Under current policy, the federal government also has improved its capabilities to respond to a domestic terrorist incident. The Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Federal Emergency Management Agency are tasked with leading federal efforts in their respective roles for managing a terrorist crisis and the consequences of an incident. Several other federal agencies with response capabilities would support these two agencies. Federal assistance to state and local governments to prepare for terrorist incidents has resulted in training for thousands of first responders--those state and local officials who would first respond at the scene of an incident. To improve this training effort, state and local officials have called for a single federal liaison for state and local preparedness programs. To protect computer systems and the critical operations and infrastructures they support, various efforts have been undertaken to implement a national strategy outlined in Presidential Decision Directive 63. However, progress in some areas has been slow. Specifically, federal agencies have taken initial steps to develop critical infrastructure protection plans, but independent audits continue to identify persistent, significant information security weaknesses that place federal operations at high risk of tampering and disruption.