Public diplomacy is the promotion of America's interests, culture, and policies by informingand influencing foreign populations. From 1977 to the 1990s, all functions of State's Bureau ofEducational and Cultural Affairs and the USIA's international information and broadcasting activitiesmerged to become the International Communication Agency (ICA). Subsequently, in 1982, Section303(b) of P.L. 97-241 renamed ICA to be the U.S. Information Agency (USIA). In 1994, theinternational broadcasting activities were consolidated by Title III, P.L. 103-236 and administeredby a new entity referred to as the Broadcasting Board of Governors. As of October 1, 1999, USIAwas abolished and its functions were merged back into the Department of State. Currently, public diplomacy primarily consists of three categories of activities: (1)international information programs, (2) educational and cultural exchange programs, and (3)international nonmilitary broadcasting. The Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy andPublic Affairs administers the Bureau for International Information Programs and the Bureau forEducational and Cultural Affairs, while the Broadcasting Board of Governors manages and overseesinternational broadcasting. Other public diplomacy efforts involve the White House, the U.S.Agency for International Development (USAID), and the Department of Defense (DOD). After the abolishment of the United States Information Agency (USIA) in 1999 and theterrorist attacks two years later, the U.S. government expedited implementation of public diplomacyto help win its war on terrorism. Some observers noted as evidence that the Administration was newat conducting public diplomacy when immediately after 9/11 it referred to the U.S. response as"Operation Enduring Crusade," a name that experts pointed out could be viewed by Muslims asinflammatory." (1) Over the past four years, the Bush Administration has taken numerous actions to improve theeffectiveness of its public diplomacy. For example, in November 2001, two months after theterrorist attacks, the Bush Administration created the Coalition Information Center (CIC)headquartered in the Old Executive Office Building. The CIC, which was touted by theAdministration as public diplomacy, coordinated U.S. government agency press conferences andtalking points, dispersing them rapidly and around-the-clock worldwide. Soon thereafter, thePresident created, by Executive Order, the Office of Global Communications (OGC), which replacedthe CIC with a primary mission to "coordinate strategic communications with globalaudiences." (2) Also,then-National Security Advisor Condoleeza Rice established a Strategic Communication PolicyCoordinating Committee (PCC) in September 2002. The PCC mission was to coordinateinteragency activities, develop the White House message, and disseminate it abroad. More recently, the President created the Muslim World Outreach Policy CoordinatingCommittee in July 2004 which replaced the Strategic Communications Policy CoordinatingCommittee. The State Department also established an Office of Policy, Planning, and Resources inthe Office of the Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs. Informally in 2002 and officially in 2003, the Pentagon created the Office of StrategicInfluence (OSI) to oversee military propaganda and other information related to the war on terrorism. The Secretary of Defense dissolved OSI after press coverage claimed the Office was to placedisinformation deliberately in foreign media. In October 2003, the Department of Defense issued Information Operations Roadmap which involves the direction that DOD wants to take in publicdiplomacy and other information operations. DOD has appointed its Under Secretary of Defense forPolicy as the Defense point person for public diplomacy and will be continuing to define DOD's rolein public diplomacy. USAID became more involved in public diplomacy after the 9/11 Commission reported toCongress that some of the largest recipients of U.S. foreign aid had very strong anti-Americansentiment among its population. Since 2004, USAID has acted to more prominently inform U.S.aid recipients that the aid they have received was a gift from American taxpayers. Also, byestablishing a State-USAID Policy Council and a Public Diplomacy Working Group, it hasestablished closer ties with the Department of State and embassies around the world to publicizeAmerica's humanitarian and development aid initiatives. Since 1999, U.S. public diplomacy has been rigorously examined to determine whetherimproved methods, structure, and goals could help the United States win the war on terrorism. Thisreport reviews 29 articles and studies on public diplomacy that have been identified by theDepartment of State as being credible reports with valuable suggestions and compares therecommendations. These 29 documents, listed in reverse chronological order from 2005 to 1999 in AppendixA , vary in scope, depth, and purpose. Some focus on public diplomacy and include numerous,specific recommendations; others are more general in nature and deal with public diplomacy in thecontext of broader foreign policy issues. Some reports represent the consensus of a group of authors;others state the views of a series of individuals. For the purposes of this review, each document hasbeen given an abbreviation, for example, "PDC" for the Public Diplomacy Council, to make it easierto identify. Appendix B provides each report's specific recommendations. Following in Table 1 is a matrix indicating the major recommendations of all 29 reports.(Note, however, that the U.S. Institute of Peace (USIP1) report from 2003 did not have relevantrecommendations for this review.) The matrix lists 14 categories of recommendations that appearedmost frequently. A second matrix in Table 2 lists only those reports that include specificrecommendations concerning international broadcasting. A brief discussion of recommendationsimilarities and differences follows each matrix. Note that this discussion deals only with thecontent of the documents. An author or organization listed in the Appendix may have written onpublic diplomacy at an earlier or a later date, and the views expressed in a particular document maynot represent those of the organization that published the document. (For more detail on publicdiplomacy, in general, please see CRS Report RL32607 , U.S. Public Diplomacy: Background andthe 9/11 Commission Recommendations , by [author name scrubbed].) Table 1. Key Recommendations for Public Diplomacy Reform Note: See Table 2 for recommendations for international broadcasting reform. a. WP : Washington Post op-ed; PDC1 : Public Diplomacy Council 2005; PDC2 : Public Diplomacy Council 2004; ADV1 : U.S. AdvisoryCommissionon Public Diplomacy; DSB1 : Defense Science Board 2004; GAO1 : Government Accountability Office 2004; 911 : 9/11 Commission Report; NSFR : National Strategy Forum Review ; PDC3 : Public Diplomacy Council 2004; RAND : RAND Corporation; FPA : Foreign PolicyAssociation; KIE : Kiehl, William; DJE1 : Djerejian, Edward, October 7, 2003; DJE2 : Djerejian, Edward, October 2003; USIP1 : U.S. Institute of Peace 2003; GAO2 : Government Accountability Office 2003; CFR1 : Council on Foreign Relations 2003; HER1 : Heritage Foundation, May 2003; HER2 :Heritage Foundation, April 2003; ISD : Institute for the Study of Diplomacy; USIP2 : U.S. Institute of Peace 2002; BRO : Brown, John; CFR2 :Council on Foreign Relations 2002; PBS : Public Broadcasting Service; ADV2 : U.S. Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy 2002; DSB2 :Defense Science Board 2001; NWC : National War College; CFR3 : Council on Foreign Relations 2001; HRC : Hart/Rudman Commission b. Public Diplomacy From 1999 through 2005 numerous reports, articles, studies, and op-ed pieceshave been written touting the importance of public diplomacy as a foreign policy tooland focusing on how the United States government can improve its public diplomacyoperations to help win the war on terrorism. Among the many writings are the 29considered here. (See Appendix A for a reverse chronological list of the reportsincluded in this CRS review.) Several reports suggest that the Administration has not sufficiently definedor verbalized an overall strategy for the use of public diplomacy to both improve theU.S. image around the world, but also counter the threat of terrorism againstAmericans. The 9/11 Commission Report states that the United States shouldidentify what it stands for and communicate that message clearly. Of the ten reportsthat recommend defining an overall strategy, the Government Accountability Office(GAO) reports that the United States needs to do a better job of defining its publicdiplomacy message, and that while the Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG) doeshave a strategy for its broadcasting activities, the Department of State (DOS) does nothave an integrated strategy for its public diplomacy operations. GAO states that the"absence of an interagency strategy complicates the task of conveying consistentmessages." Furthermore, GAO offers that the Administration needs to define publicdiplomacy success and determine how it can be measured. The Advisory Group on Public Diplomacy for the Arab and Muslim Worldreport recommends that the White House establish strategic goals and oversee theimplementation of programs that meet those goals. The U.S. Advisory Commissionon Public Diplomacy study claims that the State Department lacks authority toimplement an overall strategy for the various agencies engaged in public diplomacyand recommends that the DOS Policy, Planning and Resources Office coordinate allpublic diplomacy efforts. The Heritage Foundation recommends that the U.S.government view public diplomacy as a long-term effort, saying that publicdiplomacy should be "enshrined in a doctrine that emphasizes consistent efforts." Themore recent Council on Foreign Relations report recommends rethinking how theUnited States formulates, strategizes, and communicates its foreign policy and should"move public diplomacy from the margins to the center of foreign policy making."The National War College report notes a "lack of strategic planning," and the earlierCouncil on Foreign Relations study says there is an absence of an overall strategyand recommends the Administration develop a coherent strategic and coordinatingframework for public diplomacy activities. Ten of the studies discuss the White House taking a more proactive role inpromoting public diplomacy, coordinating public diplomacy activities throughout theexecutive branch agencies, and reorganizing or initiating public diplomacy taskforces or coordinating committees at the White House. For example, reports by theDefense Science Board Task Force and the Council on Foreign Relations urge thePresident to issue a directive to strengthen the importance of communication andpublic diplomacy and coordinate all activities through the White House. TheHeritage Foundation also recommends that inter-agency coordination of publicdiplomacy activities be carried out through the White House. The Advisory Groupon Public Diplomacy for the Arab and Muslim World report recommends thePresident appoint a cabinet-level Special Counselor to the President for PublicDiplomacy. This person would, in consultation with the President and otheragencies, establish strategic goals and messages, and oversee the implementation ofprograms that meet those stated goals, the report suggests. Similar ideas are offeredby the Public Diplomacy Council which suggests that a cabinet level InteragencyCommittee on Public Diplomacy should be established by Presidential Directive,cochaired by the Deputy National Security Advisor for Communication and theDirector of a new U.S. Agency for Public Diplomacy (USAPD). Several of the studies suggest that the existing public diplomacy structure atthe Department of State is not working. The Washington Post op-ed piece by Marks,Wick, Gelb, and Catto states that "shutting down the USIA was a major mistake,"a sentiment that has been expressed by others in recent years. (3) The op-edpiece goes on to say that public diplomacy is not very effective under DOS and "there-creation of an effective instrument of public diplomacy has been urged by many." Other reports propose establishing an entirely new agency to have primaryresponsibility for U.S. public diplomacy activities and coordination with othergovernment entities. The Council on Foreign Relations recommends establishing aCorporation for Public Diplomacy to be modeled after the Corporation for PublicBroadcasting. The Public Diplomacy Council suggests establishing an agency, theU.S. Agency for Public Diplomacy (USAPD), within the Department of State and theNational Security process. The Defense Science Board reports that the Presidentshould establish a permanent strategic communications structure within the NationalSecurity Council (NSC). That report goes on to state that "the President should workwith Congress to establish and fund a non-profit, non-partisan Center for StrategicCommunication to support the NSC, departments, and organizations represented ona newly-recommended Strategic Communication Committee." Since the 1999 elimination of the USIA, numerous experts and observershave critiqued how the Department of State has conducted public diplomacy. According to the GAO, public diplomacy activities at State are fragmented amongvarious organizational entities within the Department, with insufficient directionfrom the top. Many of the studies here agree that public diplomacy in theDepartment of State could be working better, but there are differing views as to howDOS should improve it. The 2002 U.S. Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy report says thereshould be a review of the 1999 consolidation of USIA into State with the Secretaryof State making recommendations on new training, location, and reporting structureof public diplomacy personnel at the Department. The Defense Science Board's 2004report recommends redefining the role of the Under Secretary of State for PublicDiplomacy to be policy advisor and manager. Furthermore, it suggests raising thepublic diplomacy office Directors to the level of Deputy Assistant Secretary or SeniorAdvisor to the Assistant Secretary. The report urges DOS to strengthen the Bureauof International Information Programs (IIP) with an Assistant Secretary and modernize and diversify its products. The Heritage Foundation suggests restoring the independent reporting andbudget channels that public diplomacy lost during the USIA merger and recreatinga public diplomacy hierarchy within the Department of State as previously existedat USIA. Another suggestion by author William Kiehl proposes creating a new publicdiplomacy organization within the State Department, including a new Bureau ofPublic Diplomacy Operations. Also, he writes, "regional bureaus must include seniorpublic diplomacy officers at least at the Deputy Assistant Secretary level." The Hart/Rudman Commission recommends repealing laws that establish anUnder Secretary for Public Diplomacy and having some of those functions migrateto an Assistant Secretary level official reporting directly to the Secretary of State. Other functions could be folded into the Assistant Secretary for Economic andTransnational Affairs, according to the Commission. Overhauling the ForeignService system, including ending the oral exam's policy so that applicants could bebetter matched to particular cones, like public diplomacy, would be beneficial, theCommission asserts. Beyond reorganizing public diplomacy at State, several of the reports referto the need for a new "culture" at State: seeking to change the perception that publicdiplomacy personnel are second class citizens in the Department; recruiting andhiring practices that would encourage public diplomacy skills to be highly valued;and a "much more open approach in which innovation trumps the caution," accordingto the National War College report. Six of the studies refer to the need for redefining the role of the UnderSecretary of State for Public Diplomacy. Most call for strengthening the role, thechain of authority leading to the Under Secretary, and the authority to make decisionsregarding public diplomacy funding, policy, personnel, and direction. In contrast, theHart/Rudman Commission recommends repealing the laws establishing an UnderSecretary for Public Diplomacy and having some of those functions migrate to anAssistant Secretary-level officer reporting directly to the Secretary of State. Otherpublic diplomacy functions should become the responsibility of the AssistantSecretary for Economic and Transnational Affairs, the Commission said. Several reports speak of a need to increase embassy involvement in publicdiplomacy activities. Suggestions include expanding U.S. diplomats' personalcontacts in the host country, sending the message from the top tiers of theAdministration and the Department of State that public diplomacy is central to U.S.foreign policy, and requiring at least one tour in a public diplomacy assignment forForeign Service Officers to be promoted to Senior Foreign Service Officers or Chiefof Mission. Another suggestion involves embassies maintaining networks ofindividuals (such as former Peace Corps volunteers, exchange students, and retiredForeign Service Officers) who could be tapped to help portray America in the bestlight. Several studies suggest a lack of coordination of U.S. government publicdiplomacy activities by the White House and within the Department of State. TheU.S. Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy notes that there have been attemptsto improve coordination, citing the January 2003 creation of the Office of GlobalCommunications within the White House, as well as the September 2002 formationof the Strategic Communication Policy Coordination Committee and the December2002 interagency Strategic Communications Fusion Team. Nevertheless,coordination is still inadequate, according to several of the reports. Recommendations on improving government coordination of public diplomacy entities and programs include (1) the Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy suggests assigning the StateDepartment's Office of Policy, Planning, and Resources with the responsibility foroverseeing the strategic planning of all public diplomacy programming andresources; (2) the Heritage Foundation seeks better coordination through the White House,specifically through the Office of Global Communications; (3) the Public Diplomacy Council recommends that a new U.S. Agency for PublicDiplomacy be responsible for coordinating all U.S. government public diplomacyefforts and establish an Interagency Committee on PD at the Cabinet level tocoordinate and direct the national PD strategy; (4) the Council on Foreign Relations recommends that a coherent strategic andcoordinating framework for public diplomacy be developed, including a presidentialdirective on public diplomacy and a Public Diplomacy Coordinating Structure led bythe president's personal designee; (5) the Advisory Group on Public Diplomacy for the Arab and Muslim World advisesa strengthening of the role of the Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy to coordinategovernment-wide public diplomacy activities, review country program plans withrespect to public diplomacy, allocate human and financial resources, and play a rolein performance evaluations. The Group asserts that strengthening the UnderSecretary's role is essential. About half of the reports state that public diplomacy resources are inadequateand call for increased monetary and human resources. The Council on ForeignRelations said that funding should be increased to "significantly higher levels" to bemore in line with public diplomacy's role as a vital component of U.S. foreign policyand national security. The Council put forth the idea of establishing a PublicDiplomacy Reserve Corps patterned after FEMA's disaster-relief model. The PublicDiplomacy Council specifically recommends a 300% increase in public diplomacy overseas staffing and a four-fold budget increase over five years. Some, such as theAdvisory Group on Public Diplomacy for the Arab and Muslim World, state thatadditional professional staff dedicated only to Arab and Muslim issues would bevaluable. Coupled with the view since 9/11 that public diplomacy is an essential toolin U.S. foreign policy and national security is the belief that all personnel involvedwith conducting U.S. foreign policy should be trained about the importance of publicdiplomacy and given skills needed to fully utilize public diplomacy effectively. TheCouncil on Foreign Relations states that there is a deficit of trained professionalsregarding public diplomacy. GAO suggests expanding public diplomacy and foreignlanguage training of Foreign Service Officers; the Council on Foreign Relationsoffers the idea of establishing an independent public diplomacy training institute; and the Advisory Group on Public Diplomacy for the Arab and Muslim Worldrecommends that all State Department personnel receive public diplomacy training. Taking that a step further, the Foreign Policy Association argues that "public affairsdiplomacy officers should be encouraged to develop language fluency and countryand regional expertise and should not be rotated among regions like other FSOs[Foreign Service Officers]." Most of the eight reports that speak about increased, more effective, andcreative uses of technology referred to use of the Internet. For example, the NationalWar College report states that there are "deficiencies in information technologies andthe mindsets needed to integrate new technologies into the conduct of diplomacy....State Department needs to learn how to leverage the Internet's capabilities andpotential in the conduct of diplomacy." In addition, some reports promote increasedsatellite broadcasting and more creative use of all available informationtechnologies. Some studies make the observation that the private sector has manyadvantages in getting things done quickly, being highly effective, and efficient ininfluencing people. By incorporating the best practices of the private sector in U.S.government public diplomacy activities, it is believed that public diplomacy can become a more valuable foreign policy tool. RAND suggested that "outsourcing"public diplomacy would put some distance between a "favorable message and anunfavorable messenger," and that identifying private sector talents could bemotivated through a competitive bidding process. Another idea comes from thePublic Diplomacy Council to create a public-private partnership "Foundation for theGlobal Future" to provide permanent off-budget funding for international exchangesconducted by civilian and military federal agencies. The U.S. Advisory Commissionon Public Diplomacy agrees with the Council on Foreign Relations about creating anindependent Corporation for Public Diplomacy. Additionally, the Commissionwould encourage overseas posts to explore local public-private partnerships, findways for visitor exchanges to take advantage of private sector generosity, anddevelop Internet and media programming that would utilize public/privatepartnerships. The Advisory Commission also proposes that private sectorcommunication consultants could become more involved in public diplomacy effortswith advertising, as well as entertainment programs, and that the academiccommunity could offer public diplomacy majors at American colleges anduniversities. GAO adds that the U.S. government could collaborate with the privatesector to develop optimal methods for measuring effectiveness of public diplomacyefforts. Improved and increased communication between the United States andforeign, particularly Arab and Muslim, populations was cited by a few of the studies. The Defense Science Board's 2004 report asserts that "nothing shapes U.S. policiesand global perceptions of U.S. foreign and national security objectives morepowerfully than the President's statements and actions, and those of senior officials." The Board suggests that the President communicate directly with overseas audiences. The 9/11 Commission Report recommends that the United States shouldidentify what it stands for and communicate that message clearly. The 9/11Commission observed that many foreign populations receive large amounts of aidfrom U.S. citizens and never know from where it came. The Council on Foreign Relations proposes a more customized, "two-way"dialogue, as contrasted to conventional one-way, "push-down" mass communication,including an "engagement" approach that involves listening, dialogue, and debate thatincreases the amount and the effectiveness of public opinion research. Furthermore,communication should foster increasingly meaningful relationships between U.S.government, foreign publics, and foreign journalists. The Council says the U.S.government should: support voices of moderation, especially among the young;identify and develop indigenous talent; and craft messages highlighting culturaloverlaps between American values and those of the rest of the world. The RAND study encourages finding different ways of promoting two-waycommunication, such as call-in talk shows, live interaction among different elementsof an audience, and broadcasting debates, rather than offering monologues. TheAdvisory Group on Public Diplomacy for the Arab and Muslim World proposesestablishing an Arab and Muslim Countries Public Communications Unit under thedirection of the Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy to work closely with theOffice of Global Communications and coordinate U.S. government media outreachto Arab and Muslim populations and promote a 'rapid response' team to react andcorrect inaccuracies and distortions in foreign media. More than half of the 29 reports recommend expanding U.S. exchangeprograms and/or U.S. libraries overseas, making it the most common proposal amongthis group of reports. Some ideas for exchanges include expanding the U.S. Speakerand Specialist Program, expanding shorter duration exchange programs, creating American studies programs in local universities in Arab and Muslim populations,creating a public-private partnership, "Foundation for the Global Future," to providepermanent off-budget funding for international exchanges conducted by civilian andmilitary federal agencies, significantly broadening Middle East/U.S. exchangeprograms, and expanding exchanges to government officials and businessprofessionals. Several studies echoed recommendations to expand Americanoverseas libraries as well as the American Corners Program. (4) In addition,the Advisory Group on Public Diplomacy for the Arab and Muslim World proposesimplementing a new American Knowledge Library to translate the best Americanbooks and make them available to local libraries and universities. A few of the studies recommend greater and continuous oversight of publicdiplomacy activities. One suggestion was for Congress to provide legislativeauthority for a quadrennial review of public diplomacy. Another would create a newcongressional committee structure with sustained oversight of all U.S. government public diplomacy programs and activities. Table 2. Key Recommendations for International Broadcasting a. PDC1 : Public Diplomacy Council 2005; ADV1 : U.S. Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy 2004; GAO1 : Government Accountability Office2004; NSFR : National Strategy Forum Review; PDC3 : Public Diplomacy Council 2004; DJE2 : Djerejian, Edward, October 2003; HER1 :Heritage Foundation, May 2003; HER2 : Heritage Foundation, April 2003; USIP2 : U.S. Institute of Peace 2002; CFR2 : Council on ForeignRelations 2002; PBS : Public Broadcasting Service b. Broadcasting Board of Governors Of the 29 reports and articles, 11 offer recommendations specifically for U.S.government international broadcasting. Recommendations range from havingstrategic objectives to reorganizing the broadcasting entities to increasing resourcesand using more technologies to focusing on combating jamming. (See Table 2.) GAO, the Public Diplomacy Council (PDC), and the PBS News Hourbroadcast suggest the need for the Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG) to betterdefine its overall objectives and strategy of obtaining the objectives. The 2002 PBSbroadcast states that there is no grand strategy or coordinated approach of U.S.broadcasting with other public diplomacy activities. GAO's 2004 report states thatwhile the BBG does have a strategic plan and has made progress in some measuringof its progress, the BBG has not defined a plan to adequately measure audience sizeor its programming credibility overseas. The PDC's January 2005 report urges the"Administration and Congress to take a hard look at how international broadcastingis managed to serve broad U.S. public diplomacy goals and the American taxpayerand integrate broadcasting more closely with other public diplomacy tools." ThePDC believes that international broadcasting should be more closely integrated withother elements of strategic communication. Although the U.S. government international broadcasting structure wasreorganized in 1994, some reports recommend reorganizing U.S. internationalbroadcasting again. The U.S. Institute of Peace states that, "the current array of USgovernment broadcasting services is duplicative, expensive, and evencounterproductive." The Heritage Foundation's May 2003 report asserts that internationalbroadcasting has "lapsed into a jumble of duplicative efforts, led by a part time Boardof Governors." Reorganizing broadcasting would make it more streamlined andmore efficient, the report claims. Furthermore, according to Heritage, revitalizing theVoice of America's resources and program content is in order as VOA has beenneglected while Middle East programing has "proliferated in a confusing array." The Council on Foreign Relations (July 30, 2002) "supports an independentand well-qualified broadcasting board with a full-time, top-caliber Chief ExecutiveOfficer who would report to the current BBG and be empowered to direct andsupervise all U.S. nonmilitary international broadcasting activities. Furthermore, theDepartment of State and the BBG should strengthen the Secretary of State's role inproviding information and guidance on foreign policy to the BBG by clarifying andspecifying the Secretary's role in making decisions on broadcast languages and otherforeign policy matters." The Advisory Group for the Arab and Muslim World proposes that U.S.government media should reach out to Arab and Muslim populations and promotea 'rapid response' team to react and correct inaccuracies and distortions in foreignmedia. The Advisory Group for the Arab and Muslim World states that about halfof the fund for public diplomacy goes for international broadcasting. The Groupbelieves that U.S. government international broadcasting should be brought under thestrategic direction of their proposed new Special Counselor to the President, saying"[broadcasting] must be part of the public diplomacy process, not marching to itsown drummer with its own goals and strategy, sources of funding and board." Five reports provide various proposals regarding additional broadcasting toArab and Muslim populations. As previously mentioned, the Heritage Foundationargues that the various Middle East surrogate broadcasting entities such as RadioSawa and Al Hurra TV have distracted the BBG from properly maintaining VOAresources and programming. The Advisory Group for the Arab and Muslim Worldrecommends a thorough independent review of the Middle East Television Network,saying that there is a high level of skepticism in the Middle East region aboutstate-owned television of any sort. The Group suggests that paring up with privatesector programming might be more effective. The U.S. Advisory Commission onPublic Diplomacy recommends expanding communication with Arab press bycreating a network of 24-hour message dissemination and monitoring centers. ThePublic Diplomacy Forum (February 2004) held a panel discussion on Middle Eastbroadcasting. One panelist referred to Radio and Al Hurra TV as being state-run, andtherefore, less successful with Middle East audiences. The panelist said that, "theArab public is interested in American programming, but they are not necessarilyinterested in programming that is under tight U.S. government direction." Anotherpanelist said that "there is no market waiting for Al Hurra's message." The thirdpanelist strongly disagreed and said that "the United States should have started RadioSawa and Al Hurra a long time ago." Other reports generally support ongoing Middle East broadcasting or thinkmore resources and expanded programming to Muslim and Arab populations shouldbe forthcoming. As with public diplomacy, most reports that addressed resources urged agreater long-term monetary commitment for international broadcasting. Reachinglarger audiences and improving the ability to measure impact are two primary needsfor additional broadcast funding. International broadcasting is one area of foreign policy that can make use ofnew technologies to become more effective. The Advisory Commission on PublicDiplomacy encourages the BBG to look for better software to improve broadcasting'sreach to foreign audiences over the Internet. The Commission suggests theeducational programs teaching the English language or American culture might beuseful. Also, the Commission recommends that satellite television programs can befurther developed to increase local language programming available via satellite TV. The Public Diplomacy Council recommends more innovative broadcasting, Internetprograms for youth, and interactive radio programming. The Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy notes that there are someareas of the world such as North Korea, China and Cuba where the United States hasdifficulty reaching audiences because of local government jamming. TheCommission notes that technologies such as the Internet and direct broadcast satellitehave made it more difficult, but not impossible, for governments to block Americanprogramming from their citizens. The Commission urges the BBG to continue todevelop new methods to combat jamming. (WP) Leonard H. Marks, Charles Z. Wick, Bruce Gelb and Henry E. Catto. "America Needs a Voice Abroad," Washington Post, February 26, 2005. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A54764-2005Feb25.html (PDC1) Public Diplomacy Council. Call for Action on Public Diplomacy . January2005. http://pdi.gwu.edu/merlin-cgi/p/downloadFile/d/7536/n/off/other/1/name/ACALLFORACTIONONPUBLICDIPLOMACY01-2005prin/ (PDC2) Public Diplomacy Council. "Transformation Not Restoration." Statementof Dissent to Call for Action on Public Diplomacy . January 2005. http://pdi.gwu.edu/merlin-cgi/p/downloadFile/d/7537/n/off/other/1/name/Dissent_12-21-04pdf/ (ADV1) United States Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy. 2004 Reportof the United States Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy . September 28,2004. http://www.state.gov/r/adcompd/rls/36275.htm (DSB1) Defense Science Board. Report of the Defense Science Board Task Forceon Strategic Communication . September 2004. http://www.acq.osd.mil/dsb/reports/2004-09-Strategic_Communication.pdf (GAO1) U.S. Government Accountability Office. U.S. Public Diplomacy: StateDepartment and Broadcasting Board of Governors Expand Post-9/11 Efforts butChallenges Remain . GAO-04-1061T. August 23, 2004. http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d041061t.pdf (911) National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States. The 9/11Commission Report . July 22, 2004. http://www.gpoaccess.gov/911/index.html (NSFR) Walter R. Roberts and Barry Fulton. "Rebuilding Public Diplomacy." National Strategy Forum Review . Spring 2004. http://ics.leeds.ac.uk/papers/vp01.cfm?outfit=pmt&requesttimeout=500&folder=7&paper=1611 (PDC3) Public Diplomacy Council. "Engaging the Arab/Islamic World - Next Stepsfor U.S. Public Diplomacy." Summary of Public Diplomacy Forum. February 27,2004. http://pdi.gwu.edu/merlin-cgi/p/downloadFile/d/6504/n/off/other/1/name/SummaryoftheFeb27Forumdoc/ (RAND) Charles Wolf, Jr. and Brian Rosen. Public Diplomacy - How To ThinkAbout and Improve It . RAND Corporation. 2004. http://www.rand.org/pubs/occasional_papers/2004/RAND_OP134.pdf (FPA) Jerrold Keilson. "Public Diplomacy and U.S. Foreign Policy." GreatDecisions 2004. Foreign Policy Association. http://www.fpa.org/topics_info2414/topics_info_show.htm?doc_id=200548 (KIE) William Kiehl. "Can Humpty Dumpty be Saved?" American Diplomacy. November 13, 2003. http://www.unc.edu/depts/diplomat/archives_roll/2003_10-12/kiehl_humpty/kiehl_humpty.html (DJE1) Peter G. Peterson and Edward Djerejian. A New Strategic Direction for U.S.Public Diplomacy in the Arab & Muslim World . Transcript. Council on ForeignRelations. October 7, 2003. http://www.cfr.org/publication.php?id=6417 (DJE2) Advisory Group on Public Diplomacy for the Arab and Muslim World. Changing Minds, Winning Peace: A New Strategic Direction for U.S. Publicdiplomacy in the Arab and Muslim World . October 1,2003. http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/24882.pdf (USIP1) Richard Solomon and Sheryl J. Brown. Creating a CommonCommunications Culture: Interoperability in Crisis Management . United StatesInstitute of Peace. September 12, 2003. http://www.usip.org/virtualdiplomacy/publications/reports/17.html (GAO2) U.S. General Accounting Office. U.S. Public Diplomacy: State DepartmentExpands Efforts but Faces Significant Challenges.GAO-03-951. September 2003. http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d03951.pdf (CFR1) Council on Foreign Relations. Finding America's Voice: A Strategy forReinvigorating Public Diplomacy. September 2003. http://www.cfr.org/content/publications/attachments/public_diplomacy.pdf (HER1) Stephen Johnson and Helle Dale. Reclaiming America's Voice Overseas . Web Memo #273. The Heritage Foundation. May 4, 2003. http://www.heritage.org/Research/NationalSecurity/wm273.cfm (HER2) Stephen Johnson and Helle Dale. How to Reinvigorate U.S. PublicDiplomacy . Backgrounder #1654. The Heritage Foundation. April 23, 2003. http://www.heritage.org/Research/NationalSecurity/bg1645.cfm (ISD) Talking with the Islamic World: Is the Message Getting Through? Institute forthe Study of Diplomacy. Working Paper. October 2002. http://www.ciaonet.org/wps/sites/isd.html (USIP2) Barry Fulton, ed. Net Diplomacy I, II, and III. Virtual Diplomacy Report. United States Institute of Peace. October 2002. http://www.usip.org/virtualdiplomacy/publications/pubs.html#vdr (BRO) John Brown. "The Purposes and Cross Purposes of Public Diplomacy." American Diplomacy. August 15, 2002. http://www.unc.edu/depts/diplomat/archives_roll/2002_07-09/brown_pubdipl/brown_pubdipl.html (CFR2) Council on Foreign Relations. Public Diplomacy: A Strategy for Reform .Report of a Council on Foreign Relations Independent Task Force. July 2002. (PBS) "Public Diplomacy, U.S. Outreach to Arab World." OnlineNewsHour, thewebsite of the NewsHour with Jim Lehrer. February 18, 2002. http://www.pbs.org/newshour/media/public_diplomacy/ (ADV2) United States Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy. Building PublicDiplomacy Through a Reformed Structure and Additional Resources . 2002. http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/13622.pdf (DSB2) Defense Science Board. Report of the Defense Science Board Task Forceon Managed Information Dissemination . September 2001. http://www.acq.osd.mil/dsb/reports/mid.pdf (NWC) Information Age Diplomacy . National War College/Northwestern UniversitySymposium. April 5-6, 2001. http://www.ndu.edu/nwc/activities/public/SymposiumWebsite/symposium_main.htm (CFR3) Council on Foreign Relations and Center for Strategic and InternationalStudies Task Force. State Department Reform . 2001. (HRC) U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century (Hart/RudmanCommission). Phase I report: New World Coming: American Security in the 21stCentury (1999); Phase II report: Seeking a National Strategy: A Concert forPreserving Security and Promoting Freedom (2000); Phase III report: Road Map forNational Security: Imperative for Change (2001). http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/nssg/Reports/reports.htm WP -- Leonard H. Marks, Charles Z. Wick, Bruce Gelb and Henry E. Catto. "America Needs a Voice Abroad," Washington Post, February 26, 2005. This editorial by former USIA directors is a general call to rebuild U.S. publicdiplomacy. While it does not make specific recommendations, it does call for theUnited States to explain its policies directly and openly; argues for the importanceof public affairs officers and USIA libraries; states that shutting down USIA wasmajor mistake; and supports the Public Diplomacy Council's recommendation tocreate a U.S. Agency for Public Diplomacy (see below). PDC1 -- Public Diplomacy Council. Call for Action on Public Diplomacy. January2005. Recommendations: Establish U.S. Agency for PublicDiplomacy; Increase public diplomacy staffing overseas by 300% andbudgets for international broadcasting and exchange programs by 400% over fiveyears; Provide long-term resources necessary for global internationalbroadcasting capability; Establish an Interagency Committee on Public Diplomacy atthe Cabinet level; and Create a public-private partnership "Foundation for the GlobalFuture" to provide permanent off-budget funding for internationalexchanges. PDC2 -- Public Diplomacy Council. "Transformation Not Restoration." Statement of Dissent to Call for Action on Public Diplomacy . January 2005. This statement of dissent refutes each of the five recommendations made ina Call for Action on Public Diplomacy (see above), arguing that the report draws tooheavily on the past. The dissent emphasizes that understanding what is credible inthe context of other societies is the foundation upon which effective publicdiplomacy is constructed; that the reference point for U.S. public diplomacy must bethe hopes, aspirations, and fears of foreign citizens; and that the United States' firstpriority must be observing and listening. ADV1 -- Report of the US Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy, 2004 Reportof the United States Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy , September 28,2004. Recommendations: Message dissemination Have more U.S. government staff employed abroad serve asmessengers of public diplomacy; Expand the London Media Outreach Center's ability tocommunicate with Arab press by creating a network of 24-hour messagedissemination and monitoring centers; Model a public diplomacy strategy in a test region throughconcentrated programs, programming, exchanges, andinitiatives; Evaluate the success by measuring publicperception. Coordination Bridge disparate public diplomacy mechanisms within the StateDepartment by tasking the Policy, Planning and Resources Office with overseeingthe strategic planning of all public diplomacy programming andresources. Third party credibility Require embassies to maintain networks of individualsinterested in communicating positive concepts on behalf of the UnitedStates; Provide electronic products, through the Bureau of InternationalInformation Programs (IIP), to support the efforts of individuals interested inadvocating U.S. policies and perspectives. Cross-cultural communications Implement the language continuum strategy aggressively tohelp Foreign Service officers achieve language proficiency, and providecross-cultural and language training for other government personnel and contractorsabroad; Support the Administration's efforts to negate certain terroristmessages and convey ideas through the skillful use ofsemantics. Border security Fund a significant marketing campaign, either through theprivate sector or the government, to explain visa processes and recruit visitors, andhelp the United States maintain its competitive advantage; Encourage Congress to ensure that international citizens notbear the entire costs of new security measures dedicated to visaprocesses; Phase out redundant and duplicative checks based primarily onethnic origin and gender once US-visit is completely functional, and encourageCongress to allow Visa Waiver Program countries sufficient time to incorporatebiometric identifiers in their passports. Exchange programs Allocate the resources necessary to develop a comprehensiveexchange alumni database; Encourage the resourcefulness of posts in offering exchangeprograms by requiring the submission of competitive proposals for suchprograms. Centers, corners, virtual consulates, and libraries Encourage each American Corner with Internet access toprovide a virtual consulate Website as a start-up page on allworkstations; Fund American centers/libraries wherever security constraintspermit their existence, in order to continue benefitting from the great publicdiplomacy value they provide; Encourage Congress to give the Secretary of State the authorityto create American presence posts, and thereby expand this concept, by notifying theHouse International Relations Committee and the Senate Foreign RelationsCommittee. USAID and public diplomacy Create, for multiple areas of the globe, director of publicdiplomacy positions in the Bureau of Legislative and Public Affairs, as has been donefor the Middle East; Continue to enhance efforts to publicize the substantial amountof financial aid that the American people contribute abroad; Continue to coordinate with USAID to better publicize thenumerous contributions America makes to foreign societies. English language programs Seek the support of the private sector to bolster programsdesigned to increase knowledge of the English language around theworld; Continue efforts to reach English teachers through officialtraining programs and exchanges, for better use of government resources and greaterresults from the programs. Private sector Encourage individual posts to explore public-privatepartnerships on a local level; Create a means of allowing visitors to overcome restrictionsand take advantage of private sector generosity while on visitorexchanges; Use the small Cultural Affairs budget as seed money to initiateprojects that ultimately will be self-sustaining; Continue to foster the kinds of Internet and media programmingdeveloped by the private sector that exemplify mutually beneficial public-privatepartnerships in public diplomacy. Broadcasting: War on Terror Grant more resources. Broadcasting: Educational Programs Continue circumventing heavy jamming and reaching Chineseaudiences through websites and teaching products that educate users in both theEnglish language and American culture. Broadcasting: Satellite Programs Develop satellite television technologies further and expand onrecent successes in making native language programming available via satellitetelevision to missions of viewers in other countries. Internet Encourage the Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG) toactively look for ways to use emerging software developments to expand itsbroadcasting reach over the Internet. Hard-to-reach areas Continue the BBG development of new transmission methodsto combat jamming. DBS1 -- Department of Defense, Report of the Defense Science Board Task Forceon Strategic Communication, September 2004. The President should issue a directive to strengthen,understand, and communicate with global audiences; coordinate all components ofstrategic communication including public diplomacy, public affairs, internationalbroadcasting, and military information operations; and provide a foundation for newlegislation for planning, coordination, conduct and funding of strategiccommunications. The President should establish a permanent strategiccommunication structure within the National Security Council (NSC) and work withCongress to create legislation and funding. The President should work with Congress on legislation toestablish and fund a non-profit and non-partisan [501(c) (3) hybrid organization suchas Rand or the National Endowment for Democracy] Center for StrategicCommunication to support the NSC and departments and organizations representedon its Strategic Communication Committee. The Department of State should providea core funding grant for the Center. The President should redefine the role of Under Secretary ofState for public diplomacy and public affairs to be both policy advisor and managerfor public diplomacy. Responsibilities should include approving public diplomacyassignments, setting program direction and evaluation, reviewing performance ratingsof the public diplomacy office director and embassy public affairs officers. Allforeign policy initiatives and directives should have a public diplomacy componentapproved by the Under Secretary. Personnel and funding resources should be tripledand placed under the control of the Under Secretary. State Department public diplomacy office directors should beraised to level of Deputy Assistant Secretary or Senior Advisor to the AssistantSecretary. Officers promoted to Chief of Mission or Senior Foreign Service shouldhave at least one tour in a public diplomacy assignment in the Department or in aninteragency assignment related to public diplomacy. The Bureau of IIP should bedirected by an Assistant Secretary. DOD's Under Secretary for Policy should act as the DOD focalpoint for strategic communication and serve as the DOD's principal on NSC'sStrategic Communication Coordinating Committee. DOD's Under Secretary for Policy and the Joint Chiefs of Staffshould ensure that all military plans and operations have appropriate strategiccommunication components, ensure collaboration with DOS and with theater securitycooperation plans. DOD should triple resources -- personnel and funding -- available to combatant commanders for DOD support to public diplomacy andreallocate information operations funding within U.S. STRATCOM (U.S. StrategicCommand) for expanded support for strategic communicationprograms. GAO1 -- U.S. Government Accountability Office. U.S. Public Diplomacy, StateDepartment and Broadcasting Board of Governors Expand Post-9/11 Efforts butChallenges Remain. August 23, 2004. This report discusses some findings of post-9/11 public diplomacy efforts. The report includes criticisms, including some by public affairs officers, ofinsufficient time spend on public diplomacy, insufficient public affairs resources; theamount of time devoted to public diplomacy training is inadequate; and often theForeign Service Officers lack foreign language skills. This report did not list specificrecommendations, but the following were implied in the text of the report: Implement an overall public diplomacystrategy; Improve interagency communication and coordinationefforts; Define success and how it should bemeasured; Collect polling data and establish reportingrequirements; The Department of State public diplomacy operation isfragmented among various entities within State and needs betterorganization; The U.S. Government must define itsmessage; BBG's strategic plan does not, but should, include a single goalor related program objective to gage progress; BBG's plan needs measurable program objectives to support itsstrategic goals; U.S. public diplomacy resources need to be expanded to areasof the world thought to breed terrorist activities. 911 -- National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States. The 9/11Commission Report , July 22, 2004. Expand funding for public diplomacy activities, such as information programs, broadcasting, exchanges, scholarships, libraries, and U.S.aid; Clearly identify that U.S. assistance comes from the citizens ofthe United States; The U.S. should identify what it stands for and communicatethat message clearly; The U.S. government should join other nations in generouslysupporting a new International Youth Opportunity Fund to improve education andprovide textbooks that do not teach hate, offering a choice of schools other thanmadrassas; Establish a forum for engaging both Western and Arab/Muslimrepresentatives to discuss each culture's needs and perspectives. This would helpcreate long-term relationships and understanding amongcultures. NSFR -- Walter R. Roberts and Barry Fulton. "Rebuilding Public Diplomacy."National Strategy Forum Review. Spring 2004. Recommendations: Substantially increase public diplomacyresources; Conduct a careful assessment of America's public diplomacyreadiness; New broadcast programs (e.g. Radio Sawa and Al Hurra) haveto be initiated and adequately funded; Better coordination with White House, other governmentagencies, and the private sector is needed. PDC3 -- Public Diplomacy Council. "Engaging the Arab/Islamic World - Next Steps for U.S. Public Diplomacy." Summary of Public Diplomacy Forum. February 27,2004. This forum dealt specifically with American public diplomacy in the Arab/Islamicworld. Its recommendations and comments include: Public diplomacy must be more engaged in advising the policycommunity; Increase resources and trained personnel; Elites must lead in creating a civil discourse and in breakingdown stereotypes; Use the potential of Radio Sawa and Al HurraTV; Increase foreign language training and knowledge of cultureand history; Create a White House Counselor for Public Diplomacy at theCabinet level; The Djerejian Report (see DJE ) should beadopted; Arabs and Muslims need to study and understand the UnitedStates much more deeply; Break down stereotypes on both sides; reveal more of U.S.diversity and complexity; Improve personal contact by professionals, especially publicaffairs, political, and economic officers and ambassadors; Strengthen foreign press centers; Send American speakers abroad; Encourage more robust educational exchangeprograms. RAND -- Charles Wolf, Jr. And Brian Rosen. Public Diplomacy -- How to ThinkAbout and Improve it , 2004. Rand Observations: Public diplomacy should not come from government alone; The United States should seek creative talents in the privatesector, business, and academia which could be motivated through a competitivebidding process; It may be useful to find different modes of communicating bigpicture ideas of public diplomacy through debate and discussion, call-in shows, liveinteraction among different elements of the audience, rather than through the typicalmonologic conveyance of the message; Outsourcing public diplomacy may be helpful to put somedistance between a favorable message and an unfavorable messenger (i.e. the UnitedStates). FPA -- Jerrold Keilson. "Public Diplomacy and U.S. Foreign Policy." G reatDecisions 2004 . Foreign Policy Association. This edition of the annual "Great Decisions" series offers mostly historicaland background information. While it refers to recommendations of other reports,it makes relatively few of its own. Among its recommendations and comments are: Educational exchange programs areimportant; The evidence on international broadcast programmingeffectiveness is mixed; The USIA realignment has reduced flexibility and independentaction; Foreign public opinion of the United States has declined evenas financial support for public diplomacy has increased in the last threeyears; Significant investment in number and quality of trained publicdiplomacy officers is needed; Public diplomacy officers need language proficiency andregional expertise and should not be rotated among regions like other foreign serviceofficers; The United States should create special libraries of key bookson America in accessible libraries, rather than in security-conscious embassylibraries; The United States should consolidate exchange, cultural, andinformation programs into one agency. Public diplomacy is now lost within overalloperation of the State Department; America should dramatically increase the number ofinternational visitors from the Muslim world; The possibility of policies being profoundly unpopular overseasshould be taken into account when developing the policy; modifications should beconsidered that might make them less so. KIE -- William Kiehl. "Can Humpty Dumpty be Saved?" American Diplomacy . November 13, 2003. Among Kiehl's comments and recommendations: Public diplomacy must be proactive, more akin topsychological operations than to public relations; Regional bureaus must include senior public diplomacy officersat least at the Deputy Assistant Secretary level; Establish a new organization for public diplomacy that wouldbe a middle ground between the old USIA and the current weak structure [includesorganizational chart]; Amend Smith-Mundt to lift restriction on domesticdissemination of American international informationalmaterial. DJE1 -- Peter G. Peterson and Edward Djerejian. A New Strategic Direction for U.S.Public Diplomacy in the Arab and Muslim World , Council on Foreign Relations,October 7, 2003. This article presented a question and answer session between the moderator,Peter G. Peterson of the Council on Foreign Relations at the Council on ForeignRelations and the speaker, Edward Djerejian of the Advisory Group on PublicDiplomacy in the Arab and Muslim World. In this article, Mr. Djerejian presentsAdvisory Group recommendations that the U.S. government: needs strategic coordination at the top -- Special Counselor tothe President; should create an office to monitor what is being done and saidabout America and immediately craft talking points to support orrefute; would benefit by getting the private sector more involved inpublic diplomacy; should create a Corporation for Public Diplomacy (modeledafter the Council on Foreign Relations concept); should get embassies more involved in publicdiplomacy; identify policies that would benefit the people in a region, suchas outreach to high school students; recognize solving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is the centerof most of U.S. public diplomacy problems; realize that there is a gap between what we stand for and whatwe do. DJE2 -- Advisory Group on Public Diplomacy for the Arab and Muslim World. Changing Minds, Winning Peace: A New Strategic Direction for U.S. PublicDiplomacy in the Arab and Muslim World , October 1, 2003. This report organizes recommendations under three specific headings:Structure, Financial and Economic Resources, and Programs. Structure -- The White House should: create a cabinet-level Special Counselor to the President forPublic Diplomacy which would, in consultation with the President, and othergovernment agencies, establish strategic goals and messages, oversee theimplementation of programs that meet the strategic goals, and ensure effectivemeasurement of those programs; establish a board -- President's Public Diplomacy Experts'Board; reactivate the interagency Strategic Communications PolicyCoordinating Committee to be co-chaired by the Under Secretary of State for publicdiplomacy as well as a high-level representative from the National SecurityCouncil. Structure -- The Department of State should: emphasize to all its personnel that public diplomacy is ofprimary interest in doing their job; encourage every employee abroad to participate in publicdiplomacy activities; provide training on the basics of public diplomacy to everyemployee who serves abroad; strengthen the role of the Under Secretary of State for PublicDiplomacy to coordinate public diplomacy government-wide and set strategic publicdiplomacy guidance, review country program plans, allocate human and financialresources, monitor public opinion and program results, and play a role inperformance evaluation. The Advisory Group is convinced that strengthening theUndersecretary's role is essential. establish an Office of Policy, Plans, and Resources within theUndersecretary's office to coordinate the development of strategy and strategicguidance, oversee country-specific plans, monitor execution of plans, and assist inallocation and management of financial and human resources; establish an Arab and Muslim Countries PublicCommunications Unit under the direction of the Undersecretary; it would workclosely with the Office of Global Communications in the White House and wouldcoordinate the U.S. government's media outreach to Arab and Muslim nations andpromote 'rapid response' in disseminating messages and reacting and correctinginaccuracies and distortions in foreign media; find creative ways to measure effectiveness of public diplomacyprograms. Structure -- The U.S. Agency for International Development should: get the same public diplomacy training as the Department ofState; publicize that aid is from the UnitedStates. Structure -- The Department of Defense should: be better connected to the other agencies involved in publicdiplomacy and better coordinated with strategic plan. Structure -- The Broadcasting Board of Governors should: be brought under the White House's Office of SpecialCounselor to the President. Financial and Human Resources -- U.S. Public Diplomacy: needs a dramatic increase in funding; needs additional professional staff dedicated to Arab andMuslim issues; should increase funding AIDscholarships; needs a greater concentration of budget on tapping into uses ofthe Internet and information technology; should provide a greater effort to aiding Arabs and Muslims togain access to U.S. education. Programs -- The U.S. government should: expand English language trainingprograms; expand the American Corners Program; implement a new American Knowledge Library -- to translatethe best American books and make them available to local libraries anduniversities; create American studies programs in Arab and Muslimcountries in collaboration with local universities; expand the U.S. Speaker and SpecialistProgram; expand shorter duration exchangeprograms; thoroughly review the Middle East TelevisionNetwork. USIP1 -- Richard Solomon and Sheryl J. Brown. Creating a CommonCommunications Culture: Interoperability in Crisis Management . United StatesInstitute of Peace. September 12, 2003. Originally this was presented as a speech at the Conference on CrisisManagement and Information Technology in Helsinki, Finland, which focused onways of developing interoperable communications systems that can facilitateinformation sharing during crises. The speech did not directly address publicdiplomacy. GAO2 -- Government Accountability Office, U.S. Public Diplomacy: StateDepartment Expands Efforts but Faces Significant Challenges , September 2003. Recommendations: That the Secretary of State: develop and widely disseminate throughout the Department astrategy that considers the techniques of private sector public relations firms inintegrating all of State's public diplomacy efforts and directing them towardachieving common and measurable objectives; consider ways to collaborate with the private sector to employbest practices for measuring efforts to inform and influence target audiences,including expanded use of opinion research and better use of existingresearch; designate more administrative positions to overseas publicaffairs sections to reduce the administrative burden; strengthen efforts to train Foreign Service officers in foreignlanguages; program into State's assignment process adequate time forpublic diplomacy training. The Department of State's response to this GAO report was that it generallyconcurred with the report and intended to implement recommendations and said ithas already begun to do so in some areas. CFR1 -- Council on Foreign Relations. Finding America's Voice: A Strategy forReinvigorating U.S. Public Diplomacy . September 2003. In addition to the following recommendations, this report includes appendiceson State Department organizational reforms, a draft mission program plan on publicdiplomacy, and an overview of U.S. international broadcasting. I. Rethink how the U.S. formulates, strategizes, and communicates its foreign policy. Make the formulation of foreign policy more sensitive to publicdiplomacy concerns; Strengthen the public diplomacy coordinating structure so thatit resembles the National Security Council; Issue Presidential Decision Directive on publicdiplomacy; Initiate a "Quadrennial Public DiplomacyReview;" Improve U.S. capacity to listen to foreign publics, e.g. pollingand research; Craft messages highlighting cultural overlaps betweenAmerican values and those of the rest of the world. II. Build new institutions to bolster public diplomacy efforts Create independent, not-for-profit "Corporation for PublicDiplomacy" as focal point for private sector involvement in publicdiplomacy; Establish an "Independent Public Diplomacy TrainingInstitute;" Establish a Public Diplomacy Reserve Corps (patterned onFEMA's disaster-relief model). III. Improve the practice of public diplomacy Through State Department reforms, ensure that publicdiplomacy is central to the work of all U.S. ambassadors anddiplomats; Enhance training for U.S. ambassadors; Expand the range of America's messengers abroad. Identifyand develop credible local messengers and increase the use of independent, diverseU.S. messengers; Foster increasingly meaningful relationships between the U.S.government and foreign journalists; Support voices of moderation in other countries, especiallyamong young people; Adopt an "engagement" approach that involves listening,dialog, debate, and relationship building, as opposed to our traditional "push-down"method; Make better use of satellite broadcasting and theInternet; Create bridges between U.S. society and others using commoncultural pursuits in every genre of art, music, theater, religion, andacademia. IV. Improve funding and allocation Bring public diplomacy funding in line with its role as a vitalcomponent of foreign policy and national security; Build congressional support for publicdiplomacy. HER1 -- Stephen Johnson and Helle Dale. Reclaiming America's Voice Overseas , The Heritage Foundation, May 4, 2003. Recommendations -- The U.S. government should: provide control of the public diplomacy budget and personnelto the Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and create reporting channelsin State Department from embassy personnel up to the Under Secretary for PublicDiplomacy; expand academic exchanges and U.S.-supportedlibraries; reorganize and streamline international broadcasting andeliminate waste; enhance public diplomacy and public affairs career training atthe State Department; improve inter-agency coordination through the White HouseOffice of Global Communications. OGC should do more than keep senior politicalleaders on message; it should ensure that all agencies involved with public diplomacycooperate to do the best job possible to win hearts and minds offoreigners; adopt a doctrine that would enshrine public diplomacy practicesof emphasizing consistent efforts to explain to foreign publics U.S.policies. HER2 -- Stephen Johnson and Helle Dale. How to Reinvigorate U.S. PublicDiplomacy , The Heritage Foundation, April 23, 2003. This article recommends that the Bush Administration and Congress should: recognize that public diplomacy is a long-termeffort; restore public diplomacy's independent reporting and budgetchannels that were lost during the USIA/State merger in 1999; return public diplomacy currently dispersed among other StateDepartment bureaus into a public diplomacy hierarchy; strengthen exchange programs and revive overseaslibraries; reorganize foreign broadcasting to streamline management,eliminate duplicative and ineffective services, and improveprogramming; enhance public diplomacy career training and increase thenumber of experienced foreign service personnel in State Department's public affairsoffice; strengthen inter-agency coordination through the White Houseand define DOD communications efforts for use on thebattlefield; modify outdated legislation, such as the 1948 Smith-Mundt Actthat place irrelevant restrictions on public diplomacyactivities. ISD -- Talking with the Islamic World: Is the Message Getting Through? Institute forthe Study of Diplomacy. Working Paper. October 2002. This document is comprised of the text of speakers' statements and oftranscripts of discussions from three sessions. Key comments from the discussionsinclude: It is not enough for U.S. to change its public diplomacy; it mustchange its foreign policy. The U.S. must address [Arab] peoples' real problems anddo something to change the Arab condition; Mutual understanding between American and Muslim worldsis the most important first step; The U.S. must change (particularly regarding the Palestinianissue) before Muslims embrace Americans; Examples of what the State Department is doing to improvecommunication between the United States and the Middle East include live video ontheir website, links with secondary schools, expanded Fulbright program, Englishlanguage teaching, teacher training, sports and musicexchanges; Much more is needed in the way of resources. Publicdiplomacy resources have been dismantled over the past years; Better coordination between civilian and military publicdiplomacy efforts is needed; The U.S. should seek and embrace coalition efforts as opposedto unilateralism; The dialogue between Americans and Muslims should bebroadened and deepened; Expand exchange programs and fund major exchange programswith the Islamic world; The United States is most successful when Americans interactwith foreign citizens in business, education, culture, music, and technology, outsideofficial American foreign policy. Engage in real dialogue; be more humble; practice what wepreach; Stop the contradictions between rhetoric andaction. USIP2 -- Barry Fulton, ed. Net Diplomacy I, II, and III. Virtual Diplomacy Report. United States Institute of Peace. October 2002. This series of individual articles looks ahead to diplomacy in 2015. Amongits predictions and recommendations are: State broadcasting will continue as element of publicdiplomacy. Current array of U.S. government broadcasting services is duplicative,expensive, and even counterproductive; Training of diplomats must give greater attention to interactionin cyberspace, public diplomacy, international financial markets, and results-orientedmanagement; Public diplomacy needs to be thought of as at the core offoreign affairs. The job done well by USIA must be carried on at an intensifiedlevel; Exchange programs are important; U.S. diplomats must have languageskills; The State Department should change the perception that publicdiplomacy generalists are second class citizens in the Foreign Service Officercorps; The State Department should change its culture and personnelsystem to recruit "change agents"; Public diplomacy will be a key element in dealing with newnational security challenges; Public diplomacy requires active engagement with bothdomestic and foreign publics and their representation in civil society, based ontransparency and information sharing; Internet-based technology has a big impact on publicdiplomacy; Effective public diplomacy requires a willingness to search forcommonality through well-funded cultural diplomacy; Americans need to fund, support, and embark on genuinevoyages of discovery -- bilaterally through embassies, at home, and through globalforums (e.g. UNESCO); Educational exchanges have become the cornerstone of publicdiplomacy; International broadcasting is an important element in theconduct of public diplomacy; Traditional diplomacy will increasingly need to besupplemented by public diplomacy; The Department of State needs to follow the example of theDepartment of Defense and train and educate its employees to meet the Department'srequirements. BRO -- John Brown. "The Purposes and Cross Purposes of Public Diplomacy." American Diplomacy . August 15, 2002. Comments and recommendations include the following: A truthful and accurate information campaign, if bothpersuasive and credible, can set the record straight about U.S. policies andintentions; There is no substitute for long-term educational exchangeprograms. It is especially important to bring responsible Muslim opinion-makers tothe United States; There is a need for serious, but not solemn, cultural activitiesregarding the United States that would appeal to Muslim audiences, especially to theyoung; Adequate funding is necessary. CFR2 -- Council on Foreign Relations. Public Diplomacy: A Strategy for Reform . July 2002. The Council on Foreign Relations offered the following recommendations: I. Develop a coherent strategic and coordinating framework for public diplomacy Issue a presidential directive on publicdiplomacy; Create a Public Diplomacy Coordinating Structure led by thepresident's personal designee; Move public diplomacy from the margins to the center offoreign policy making. II. Increase customized, "two-way" dialogue, as contrasted to conventional one-way,"push-down" mass communication Adopt an "engagement" approach that involves listening,dialogue, debate, and relationship-building and increases the amount and theeffectiveness of public opinion research; Support voices of moderation, with particular attention over thelonger term to the young to empower them to engage in effective debate throughmeans available or created in their societies; Foster increasingly meaningful relationships between the U.S.government and foreign journalists; Craft messages highlighting cultural overlaps betweenAmerican values and those of the rest of the world. III. Significantly increase private sector involvement Broaden use of credible and independent messengers fromdiverse sectors of American life; Create an independent, not-for-profit "Corporation for PublicDiplomacy." IV. Raise the effectiveness of public diplomacy resources Initiate State Department reforms (details are included in anappendix to the report). Initiate a structured evaluation of diplomatic readiness andprioritized spending through a "Quadrennial DiplomacyReview;" Establish a quasi-public/private "Independent Public DiplomacyTraining Institute;" Establish a Public Diplomacy ReserveCorps; Use Internet-age technologieseffectively. V. Increase public diplomacy resources Build congressional support for public diplomacy throughsustained oversight and the formation of a new congressional committeestructure; Bring public diplomacy funding in line with its role as a vitalcomponent of foreign policy and national security; Build a stronger public diplomacy through enhancements in keyareas: foreign public-opinion research, recruiting, training, media studies, programevaluation, significantly expanded field staffing and exchanges, increases in U.S.international broadcasting via the Middle East Radio Network and AmericanEmbassy Television Network, and enhancements of content, marketing, and brandingof multi-language websites. Appendix V deals specifically with the Broadcasting Board of Governors. The Task Force supports an independent and well-qualified broadcasting board witha full-time, top-caliber Chief Executive Officer who would report to the current BBGand be empowered to direct and supervise all U.S. nonmilitary internationalbroadcasting activities. Furthermore, the Department of State and the BBG shouldstrengthen the secretary of state's role in providing information and guidance onforeign policy to the BBG by clarifying and specifying the Secretary's role in makingdecisions on broadcast languages and other foreign policy matters. PBS -- "Public Diplomacy, U.S. Outreach to Arab World." OnlineNewsHour, thewebsite of the NewsHour with Jim Lehrer. February 18, 2002. This series of interviews with four individuals examines the U.S.government's efforts to counter anti-American sentiment in the Arab world throughbroadcasts and ad campaigns. Among the speakers' comments and recommendationsare: The United States is not spending or doing enough oninternational broadcasting. There is no grand strategy or coordinatedapproach; The United States needs more official representation on theground around the world; More cultural exchanges are needed ($1.5 billion budgetsuggested); The United States needs a "salesperson," preferably local or, atleast, people who are close to local sentiment, to sell the U.S.message; Need to know basic facts about Arab media consumption andnature of the audience; Any person carrying the U.S. message [to Arab world] shouldbe Muslim or a native speaker of the language in which they are broadcasting; There must be a meticulous, careful, methodical selection ofbroadcasters; Help from businesses and governments in the region to get U.S.message across would be useful; There's been a significant drop in human and material resourcesfor public diplomacy since the Cold War. ADV2 -- U.S. Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy. Building America'sPublic Diplomacy Through a Reformed Structure and Additional Resources. September 2002. Recommendations: I. Structural Reform Issue a Presidential mandate that public diplomacy has strategicimportance in U.S. foreign policy and significant reform isneeded; Fully implement the White House Office of GlobalCommunications -- coordinate various agencies' efforts and work closely with theUnder Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and PublicAffairs; Review the consolidation of the USIA into the Department ofState -- the Secretary of State should review and make recommendations on training,location, and reporting structure of public diplomacy units at the Department ofState; Integrate Congress into public diplomacy efforts -- legislativeauthority for a quadrenniel review of public diplomacy should beprovided; Involve the private sector -- communications consultants, the academic community (i.e., colleges offering majors in public diplomacy), advertising,and entertainment sectors. II. Expanding resources Money alone will not fix the problems -- assess the state ofAmerica's public diplomacy readiness worldwide; Examine the nation's public diplomacy investment relative toother areas. DSB2 -- Defense Science Board. Report of the Defense Science Board Task Forceon Strategic Communication, Managed Information Dissemination, October 1, 2001. The earlier of two reports done by the Defense Science Board recommends: The President issue a National Security Presidential Directive(NSPD) on international information dissemination to strengthen, coordinate, assessimpact, and develop strategies; The NSPD should establish an NSC Policy CoordinatingCommittee (PCC) on International Information Dissemination to be chaired by aperson of Under Secretary rank to specify who and which agencies will be on thePCC; The NSPD should delegate to the PCC authority to coordinatepublic diplomacy activities including analysis for foreign public opinion,development of strategic themes and messages for long-term and crisis responsecommunications, identification of appropriate media channels, and production ofinformation products; The Secretary of State should support the PCC through adedicated and expanded Secretariat in the DOS consisting of the current interagencyworking group on International Information Programs, augmented by an expandedstaff, budget, and executive staff drawing on expertise from DOS, DOD, JointChiefs of Staff, the 4th PSYOP Group, the CIA, commercial media, andcommunication entities to facilitate audience research and develop channels andinformation products; DOS should strengthen International Information Bureau underan Assistant Secretary, substantially increase funding for the Bureau, with much ofthe increase going for contracted products and services; DOS should make theseassets available to support the strategic objectives of the PCC; DOS should modernize and diversify products of theInformation Bureau to include expanded use of: Internet websites, streamingaudio/video, leased emerging satellite TV and FM radio broadcasts channels,American Embassy TV and radio and Washington File print services, the ForeignPress Center by U.S. policymakers and military leaders to communicate with foreignpublics, interactive information networks containing key foreign audiences, JointState-DOD training and increased interagency assignments, and a reserve cadre ofretired, language-qualified State and DOD officers available for crisis responsedeployment; DOD should establish an International Public InformationCommittee to coordinate all DOD open information programs carried out under theauthority of the PCC; The Secretary of Defense should implement DOD's draftguidelines to increase coordination between PSYOP forces and the Commander inChief (CINC)/Joint Forces (JFC) staff, revitalize CINCs' Theater Engagement Plans,strengthen PSYOP capability to support the U.S. government's strategic informationprograms, and effectively integrate these programs into the activities of the PCCSecretariat; The Secretary of Defense should enhance DOD's informationdissemination capabilities worldwide in support of the regional CINCs TheaterEngagement Plans and in anticipation of crisis response requirements. In addition,the Secretary should make these capabilities available to support U.S. strategic policyobjectives at the direction of the PCC. Enhancements include expanded use of directsatellite FM radio and TV; additional use of regional magazines such as Forum and Dialogue ; expanded use of regional Internet websites; and establishment of a publicdiplomacy office within the Office of the Secretary ofDefense; The President and his senior national security advisors shouldstrengthen U.S. international information dissemination by 1) insisting that civilianand military information capabilities be harnessed to the Internet revolution, 2) takingfull advantage of commercial media production methods, and 3) significantlyincreasing foreign opinion research and studies of foreign media environments andinfluence structures. NWC -- Information Age Diplomacy . National War College/NorthwesternUniversity Symposium. April 5-6, 2001. Symposium overview followed by statements by individual speakers. Symposium Overview: Change is needed in State Department culture, i.e. more openapproach in which innovation trumps caution; State Department change efforts have fallen short due to:inadequate financial and personnel resources, lack of training and strategic planning,and deficiencies in information technology and the mindsets to integrate newtechnologies into the conduct of diplomacy; Public diplomacy should be given higherpriority; The merger of USIA into the State Department hasn't beenaccompanied by a fundamental change in the culture ofdiplomacy. From individual speakers: Public diplomacy and information technology must be at thecenter of statecraft; Diplomats need to give much more attention to publicdiplomacy; The Jeffersonian concept of the State Department didn'tdistinguish between internal and external functions. This concept has relevancetoday; Unlike the Department of Defense, the State Departmentpersonnel system is antiquated and doesn't put proper emphasis ontraining; No government agency is in greater need of reform than theState Department. It must revamp culture, procedures, and infrastructure and givegreater attention to public outreach; The Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy needs to be at thetable on the first day of a crisis. Public diplomacy is substantive engagement overa long period of time with a broad range of people. CFR3 -- Council on Foreign Relations and Center for Strategic and InternationalStudies Task Force. State Department Reform . 2001. This report was prepared for the incoming Bush administration and isbroader in scope than public diplomacy. The main body of the report states that theState Department is impaired by a professional culture that emphasizesconfidentiality over public diplomacy and public affairs. Among the additional viewsincluded at the end of the report are: Merging of USIA and the State Departmenthasn't enhanced public diplomacy; and State Department leadership should do asmuch as it can to ensure that the talents, perspective, and methodology of formerUSIA officers aren't lost. HRC -- U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century (Hart/RudmanCommission). Series of three reports, 1999-2001. Phase I contains a series of broad conclusions, but no recommendations. Phase II report: Public diplomacy is an important part of Americandiplomacy; The United States should help spread information technologyworldwide; The United States should employ new technologies creativelyto improve its public diplomacy. Phase III report: State Department was weakened by having many of its corefunctions parceled out to other agencies, e.g. USIA; Tailor public diplomacy to policy goals and integrate theseactivities with other aspects of U.S. diplomacy; Overhaul the U.S. Foreign Service system, including endingoral exam's blindfolding policy so that applicants could be better matched toparticular cones, e.g. public diplomacy; Repeal the United States Code provisions establishing an UnderSecretary for Public Diplomacy and have some of those functions migrate to anAssistant Secretary-level officer reporting directly to the Secretary of State, andothers be folded into the Assistant Secretary for Economic and TransnationalAffairs.

Summary: Public diplomacy has been officially acknowledged as a tool in the foreign policy arsenalsince World War I. Later, during World War II, it became part of the U.S. government structurewhen in 1942 the President issued an executive order to create the Office of War Information (OWI). OWI aired the first Voice of America program on February 24, 1942, in Europe. These activitieswere carried out without any authority or formal recognition by Congress. More recently, during the post-Cold War era of the 1990s, public diplomacy was viewed asa low priority, and was often seen by lawmakers as a source of funds to tap for other programs. Thisculminated in 1999 when Congress abolished the agency primarily concerned with public diplomacy-- the U.S. Information Agency (USIA) -- and merged its public diplomacy functions into theDepartment of State. Following the elimination of the USIA and after the September 11, 2001 attacks, U.S.government officials, foreign policy experts, and academicians began to assess the direction of, andthe increased need for, public diplomacy. This report looks at 29 articles and studies on public diplomacy that have been identified bythe Department of State as being credible reports with valuable suggestions. Variousrecommendations from these studies are similar. This report organizes the recommendations andprovides a brief discussion of them. CRS takes no position on the recommendations. This report will not be updated.