The Army maintains 10 active divisions—6 heavy and 4 light, each of which is assigned 10,000 to 15,000 personnel. Heavy divisions are armored or mechanized and equipped with tanks, fighting vehicles, and attack helicopters. Light forces are airborne, air assault, and infantry divisions tailored for operations on restricted terrain, such as mountains, jungles, or urban areas. We reviewed the following five divisions: 1st Armored Division—Also known as "Old Ironsides," is a heavy armored division with headquarters and three brigades in Germany and a fourth brigade at Fort Riley, Kansas. 1st Infantry Division—Also known as the "Big Red One," is a mechanized division with two brigades and headquarters in Germany and a third brigade at Fort Riley, Kansas. 4th Infantry Division—Also known as "Ivy," is a mechanized division with two brigades and its headquarters at Fort Hood, Texas, and a third brigade at Fort Carson, Colorado. 10th Infantry Division—Also known as the "Mountain" Division, is a light infantry division with headquarters and two brigades at Fort Drum, New York. 25th Infantry Division—Also known as "Tropic Lightning," is a light infantry division with headquarters and two brigades at Schofield Barracks, Hawaii, and a third brigade at Fort Lewis, Washington. In addition to preparing to fight and win the nation’s wars, these divisions have deployed soldiers and units periodically to peacekeeping operations. For example, since 1995 units from the 1st Armored, 1st Infantry, and 10th Infantry divisions have deployed at various times to Bosnia as part of an international peacekeeping force. Since February 1998, these divisions have deployed 12 brigade-size units and supported numerous smaller deployments. (See table 1.) Nearly 83 percent of all the deployments—to include all the brigade-sized deployments—were to the Balkans, while the remaining deployments were to the Middle East and East Timor. (See fig. 1.) Two of these divisions have been involved in transformation activities. The 4th Infantry is the Army's experimental division for advanced war-fighting concepts, and part of a brigade of the 25th Infantry is designated to test transformation concepts. The manning initiative directed all Army units to be staffed at 100 percent of their authorized personnel by numbers, grades, and skills—and thereafter to maintain those staffing levels—so that they have the personnel needed for wartime missions. The initiative redressed staffing imbalances that had developed in part because staffing priority had been given to the contingency divisions. It included certain measures to ensure the maintenance of adequate readiness; for example, units are to have no fewer than 70 percent of authorized personnel. The Chief of Staff also emphasized retention and described recruitment as his number one task. Although the specific details are classified, each of the five divisions reported they can conduct most or all of their wartime missions. Throughout January to June 2001, these units reported their overall combat readiness and their readiness in personnel, training, and equipment to be at high levels. The division, brigade, and battalion commanders we interviewed considered the five divisions able to perform their wartime missions. Although the personnel levels for all five divisions are at or near 100 percent of the enlisted personnel that they are authorized, each has some shortages in grades and skills. In at least some cases, the redistribution of existing soldiers would fill these staffing shortages. Training also improved, which Army officials attributed to (1) the increase in the number of personnel, prompted by the manning initiative, and (2) the implementation of a new funding policy for fiscal year 2001 that restricted the use of training funds to pay for other expenses. However, the Army could not show specifically how the new funding policy improved training or unit readiness. In terms of the amount of equipment on hand and its serviceability, readiness was high during fiscal year 2001, although some items were in short supply and some equipment difficult to maintain. Shortages were attributed to outdated authorizations and the incomplete fielding of new equipment; according to the Army's readiness reports, equipment shortages generally did not degrade readiness. Equipment maintenance problems were primarily attributed to the shortage of personnel with specific repair skills and the difficulties associated with maintaining old equipment. As we reported in July 2001, the manning initiative was largely responsible for staffing the reviewed divisions at authorized enlisted levels and, as a result, improving personnel readiness. For the time period January through May 2001, each of the five divisions maintained overall numbers of enlisted personnel at nearly 100 percent of authorizations, compared with the 93 percent we reported in March 1998. (See fig. 2.) The divisions also increased, on average, the numbers of assigned personnel by grade to more than 95 percent (see fig. 3) and skills to greater than 100 percent (see fig. 4) by May 2001. According to Army officials, the increase in personnel has had a great impact not only on personnel readiness but on overall readiness as well. They believe that the increase in personnel overall, as well as in grade and skill, increased the number of personnel available to train and perform maintenance activities, thereby improving overall readiness. Though manning has improved significantly over the past 2 years, divisions still have shortages in certain combat support skills that Army commanders consider critical to their wartime mission. For example, at some time in those months, all five division commanders considered their staffing of specialty 96R—ground surveillance system operator—to be critically short. One commander listed it as critical in all 6 months, while another listed it for 5; the others did so in at least 2 of the 6 months. According to Army officials at the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, this particular specialty has poor retention for initial term soldiers; retention is better for mid-term and career soldiers. Table 2 shows how many division commanders in a particular month reported a shortage for the specified military occupational specialty. In addition to the shortages reported at the division level in table 2, brigade and battalion commanders told us they have experienced shortages such as aircraft electricians, aviation mechanics; and aircraft power train repairers. Even though brigade and battalion commanders reported some of these critical shortages on monthly reports, the shortages might not have been reported at the division level. Our analysis of fill rates for occupational skill specialties shows that one area that the Army needs to address is the imbalance of occupational specialty staffing levels among the five divisions. In some instances, one or more divisions have too few soldiers for a particular skill, while others have more soldiers than authorized. As shown in table 3, the Army fill rate for these selected specialties ranged from 74 to 101 percent, yet the rates for the five divisions ranged from zero to 133 percent. For example, for specialty 96H—imagery ground station operator—the Army fill rate was 74 percent, yet the 10th Infantry Division's fill rate was zero percent, compared with 119 percent for the 4th Infantry Division. The fill rates shown in table 3 are as of May 2001, but in our opinion are generally representative of the trend from December 1999 through May 2001. Our review indicates that, in at least some of these cases, the redistribution of existing soldiers would fill such staffing shortages. For example, for specialty 27E—land combat electronic missile system repairer—redistribution would fill three of the five divisions to 100 percent and the other two to 96 percent. As we reported earlier, Army officials think it unlikely that the service can ever fill divisions at 100 percent in the grades and skills required; they estimate that about 94 percent may be the best they can do. Changes in requirements can be prompted by a need for greater expertise in a skill, by the unforeseen alteration of a mission, or by upheavals in global politics. For instance, the end of the Cold War led the Army to reduce the number of Russian interpreters it needs, while increasing its requirements for Spanish interpreters. Also, personnel with highly technical skills may not be easy to recruit, so a time lag to fill these slots is often inevitable. Given the dynamics of rapidly evolving military technologies and the skills needed to employ those technologies, in concert with recent changes to the U.S. national security and military strategies, it is a challenging task for the Army to achieve its goal to man all of its active component divisions at 100 percent of its authorized enlisted personnel by the skills and grades needed. Army officials acknowledge there have been problems with recruiting and retaining personnel for these specialties, and several of them will be placed on the Army's top-25 recruiting list in fiscal year 2002.However, some of the specialties will remain difficult to staff because of (1) difficulties in recruiting personnel who can learn the skill; (2) lengthy advanced individual training courses; (3) small authorizations that, with the loss of a single soldier, can create drastic shortages in operating strength; and (4) incomplete equipment fielding and therefore the personnel are not yet needed. For example, the Army Recruiting Command added the specialty 98J—electronic intelligence interceptor/analyst, to its top-25 recruiting list at the priority-1 level for fiscal year 2002. However, the five divisions are authorized only five to nine positions, so the loss of a single soldier can create drastic shortages in operating strength. At the time of our review, two of the divisions still had empty slots for specialty 98J—electronic intelligence interceptor/analyst. According to division, brigade, and battalion commanders, shortages of personnel for combat or combat support occupational specialties can result in ineffective training that is not accomplished as intended by Army doctrine because troops learn "work arounds" rather than the skills that will be needed when they go to war and impaired ability to sustain critical combat equipment in a high-intensity conflict. On the basis of our examination of the Army's official readiness and training reports and discussions with division personnel, as of June 2001, the five divisions reported they met their training requirements. Reported training readiness improved early in fiscal year 2001, remained constant through May 2001 for three of the divisions, and was constant throughout the fiscal year for the other two. The commanders of the divisions attributed this improvement to the manning increase. As their units' complement of personnel more closely reflected the numbers, grades, and skills required for successful combat, their ability to train increased. During our review, none of the divisions reported being untrained in any mission-essential task. Even though commanders stated that training readiness was at high levels, some told us that the lack of experienced senior enlisted personnel in equipment repair (such as the military occupational specialty 63Z— mechanical maintenance supervisor, identified in tables 2 and 3) impeded development and on-the-job training of newer soldiers. Senior personnel are very knowledgeable concerning specific equipment, its peculiarities, and troubleshooting techniques. Without them, it takes longer for newer soldiers to become proficient in repairing equipment. The Army also attributed training improvements to a new funding policy restricting the use of training funds to pay for other expenses, such as base operations and real property maintenance. However, the Army could not demonstrate this effect. Earlier this year we reported that, during fiscal years 1997–2000, the Army obligated almost $1 billion less than the nearly $4.8 billion that the Congress had provided for training. We found no evidence that this reduction in funding caused a cancellation or delay of any planned training. Also as previously reported, since at least the mid-1990s, the Army has obligated millions of dollars less than it budgets for the conduct of training. For example, training in tanks has not been at the 800-mile level. As of June 2001, with only one quarter remaining in the fiscal year, it appeared that two divisions—the 1st Infantry and 1st Armored—were still not training at the 800-mile level. Therefore, the Army cannot pinpoint a finite correlation between the level of training funds received and the level of training readiness reported. According to division commanders, however, a primary drawback of the new funding restriction has been a decreased ability to maintain training ranges. Before the funding policy was changed, commanders could use training funds to pay for the maintenance and operation of these ranges. On the basis of our examination of the Army's official readiness reports and discussions with division personnel, as of June 2001, the five divisions reported the amount of equipment on hand and the serviceability of that equipment was in a high state of readiness, indicating that the five divisions expected to be able to perform their combat missions. Although the Army met its goals for having certain percentages of equipment on hand and ready to perform its mission, some units reported shortages of certain equipment items and difficulty with maintaining old equipment. Division officials attributed equipment shortages to outdated authorization documents and the incomplete fielding of new equipment. Although unit commanders cited their top 5 to 10 equipment shortages in monthly readiness reports, they told us that these shortages did not degrade readiness. For example, one unit told us that several years ago, new secure-communications sets for radios were added to its authorized equipment list. The equipment started a phased entry into the supply system instead of an entry at the fully authorized level. The result of this phased equipment fielding is that the unit still does not have these vital sets for all its radios as authorized. All the divisions reported the serviceability of their equipment to be at very high levels of readiness during the period of our review. Our analysis of the five divisions' reported mission capable rates showed that the average mission capable rates for the divisions' ground and air systems exceeded the Army's mission capable goals for those systems. (See fig. 5.) The aggregate average mission capable rates for the divisions' ground and air systems exceeded the Army's mission capable goals during the time of our review. However, we recently reported that although some Army aviation systems generally met their mission capable goals, spare parts shortages have adversely affected operations and led to inefficient maintenance practices that have lowered the morale of maintenance personnel. Although generally meeting their mission capable goals indicates that parts shortages have not affected mission capability, supply availability rates and the cannibalization of parts from one aircraft to another indicate that spare parts shortages have indeed been a problem. According to division officials, by having more people available to make repairs, the increased numbers of personnel have helped units maintain high equipment readiness. Maintenance problems that do exist are largely due to the shortage of personnel with specific repair skills—aircraft electricians, aviation mechanics, missile system repairers, and aircraft powertrain repairers—especially at the more experienced supervisory level, or difficulties encountered trying to maintain old equipment. For example, at one unit the lack of experienced repair personnel resulted in most of its mortar guns’ failing a recent depot-level inspection. At the unit level, the repair personnel responsible for the inspections were not experienced enough to find the defects. If the unit had been called to deploy prior to the depot-level inspection, 4 of its 18 guns would have been incapable of performing their missions. Army officials at another division said they did not always have the skilled personnel needed to fix new equipment. For instance, a unit had received new equipment to improve fire accuracy, but it lacked the trained personnel to repair the item. According to unit officials, if this item were to break during wartime, the unit's ability to sustain combat would be affected because the item would have to be sent to a depot for repair. The maintenance of old equipment also presents a challenge. In June 1999, we reported that aging Army equipment was becoming increasingly difficult to maintain and that unit mechanics were devoting increasing amounts of time to keep equipment operating. During our review, one battalion commander at Fort Riley told us that, every time the unit uses its nearly 30-year-old M-1A1 tanks for training, they break down; if he had to depend upon these tanks in wartime, he said, he would not have confidence in accomplishing his mission. His brigade commander, however, maintained that the brigade, as a whole, would be able to carry out its mission with the equipment on hand and equipment prepositioned in-theater. In October 2000, a team from the Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics was sent to review this brigade and the other brigade located there to determine what was needed to raise the M1A1 fleet to current mission-capable standards and to maintain the fleet. The team and brigade staff identified problems with supply, maintenance, personnel, and training and identified possible solutions. The report stated that the total estimated cost of implementing all recommendations exceeded $25 million. On the basis of our examination of the Army's official readiness reports and deployment schedules and on discussions with division personnel, the number of peacekeeping missions and their effect on unit readiness have varied. According to division, brigade, and battalion commanders, these effects have been both positive and negative, but peacekeeping has not interfered with the divisions' ability to fight and win the nation's wars. In March 1998 we testified that sustained increases in peacekeeping operations for three of the five divisions exacerbated personnel shortfalls and degraded unit readiness and training within those divisions.However, during this review, Army officials found it difficult to quantify the effects of peacekeeping operations, but they did offer several observations. These operations improve training for intelligence, medical, logistics, transportation, and engineering activities because they are called upon to perform tasks similar to their wartime tasks. Peacekeeping operations have also provided junior officers and senior enlisted personnel with leadership opportunities not normally available in a nondeployed status. However, we were told that peacekeeping operations can erode a unit's warfighting skills—especially those that require the maneuvering of large armored or infantry formations, a task considered crucial to the divisions' ability to perform their wartime missions. Army officials told us that, for these five divisions, peacekeeping operations are no longer the exception, but are a regular part of operations. According to division, brigade, and battalion commanders, sustained peacekeeping operations have changed the five divisions from later deployers to a war to early deployers to ongoing and smaller-scale operations. In November 1999, the Army provided unit commanders additional readiness reporting guidance—used in conjunction with Army Regulation 220-1, Unit Status Reporting—that recognized the significance of ongoing peacekeeping operations and their effect on reported readiness. The guidance was formulated to assist commanders in determining whether forces and equipment deployed to peacekeeping operations could be available to redeploy to a major-theater war within scheduled deployment time frames. Prior to the guidance, division commanders generally reported forces and equipment deployed to peacekeeping operations as unavailable for deployment to a major-theater war. The guidance also acknowledged the need for units deployed to peacekeeping operations to have specific plans in place for their disengagement, recovery, reconstitution, and redeployment of forces and equipment committed to current and future peackeeping operations prior to those deployments. For example, in November 1999, as a result of the unavailability of some forces and equipment for immediate deployment to a major-theater war, two divisions reported low levels of readiness. However, the guidance which provides for consideration that deployed forces and equipment could be recovered, reconstituted, and available for redeployment within deployment time frames, allowed the two divisions to report a level of readiness that reflected the divisions’ actual readiness within major- theater war deployment time frames. Those division commanders reported that without the guidance, their divisions would have continued to report lower readiness levels that did not provide an accurate picture of the units’ ability to meet wartime requirements. The divisions’ reported readiness continued to remain at high levels through our review. According to Army officials, since the reporting guidance was issued, the divisions have developed detailed plans to quickly recover and retrain them to their critical war-fighting skills, and to recover and reconstitute equipment for redeployment within established deployment time frames. For example, the 1st Armored and 1st Infantry Divisions in Germany have developed plans that include 4 months of training for peacekeeping operations, 6 months of deployment on such operations, then 6 months of redeployment and reintegration training. According to Department of the Army officials, all divisions that participate in peacekeeping operations have similar plans and those plans can be adjusted to retrain soldiers more quickly in the event of other contingency operations. Additionally, to ease the burden of the divisions under review, the Army has extended their participation in peacekeeping missions in Bosnia and Kosovo—commonly called rotations—to units of the Army Reserve, Army National Guard, and other corps-level units. Deployments for missions in Bosnia, which started in April 2001 and are expected to run through April 2005, will incorporate Reserve units and six National Guard-enhanced separate brigades. Furthermore, from June 2001 through May 2005, other active units from the Army's III Corps (Fort Hood, Tex.), V Corps (Heidelberg, Germany), and XVIII Airborne Corps (Fort Bragg, N.C.) will support peacekeeping rotations in Kosovo. Since our last report, primarily because of the Army Chief of Staff's manning initiative, which increased enlisted personnel, staffing, and occupational specialties, the combat readiness of five divisions—the 1st Armored, 1st Infantry, 4th Infantry, 10th Infantry, and 25th Infantry— has improved. However, the Army's continuing imbalance of occupational specialty staffing levels among the five divisions, although a balance difficult to achieve, should be addressed. These imbalances continue to result in manning shortfalls in some occupational specialties deemed critical to readiness by commanders. While some equipment maintenance problems exist, none of them appear to be "show stoppers" in preparing for wartime missions. To address staffing imbalances for occupational specialties common to all its divisions, we recommend that the Secretary of the Army develop and implement a plan to address those imbalances in making staffing decisions affecting the divisions and monitor the Army's progress in alleviating the imbalances. The Army's plans should include a means to prioritize the distribution of skilled personnel not only among these divisions but also wherever they are needed in the Army. In written comments on a draft of this report, the Department of Defense concurred with our recommendation that the Secretary of the Army develop and implement a plan to address staffing imbalances for critical occupational specialties. The Department further stated that the Army’s manning initiative and innovative enabling programs and policies have provided an effective blueprint for managing the distribution of soldiers in critical occupational fields. Although imbalances in some critical skills have existed, the causes have been identified and the appropriate management actions taken to correct or smooth the imbalances. We agree with the Department’s view that the Army Chief of Staff’s manning initiative, along with the Army’s personnel management policies, provides a blueprint to guide and manage the distribution of soldiers in critical occupational specialties. However, the Army’s manning initiative and personnel management policies have not yet resulted in the Army’s meeting its fiscal year 2001 goals to staff its combat divisions, armored cavalry regiments, and early deploying nondivisional units at 100 percent of authorized enlisted personnel by skills and grades needed. We reported in July 2001 that the Army had achieved only a 93-percent fill rate by skills and grade level for its combat divisions and armored cavalry regiments, and only an 86-percent fill rate by skills and grade level for its nondivisional combat support units. We agree with the Army’s assessment that broad transformational change, equipment modernization programs and other short-term changes to force structure will continue to challenge the Army’s management of soldiers in low-density and difficult-to-fill occupational fields. However, the staffing imbalances we identified in this report were representative of a trend from December 1999 through May 2001. Therefore, we continue to believe that the Secretary of the Army should take the steps necessary to ensure that the Army addresses staffing imbalances in not only these five divisions but wherever they are needed in the Army and continue to monitor the Army’s progress in alleviating the imbalances. The Department’s comments are reprinted in appendix I. As requested, we updated our 1998 testimony to determine (1) the current combat readiness of personnel, training, and equipment in these divisions and (2) the effect of peacekeeping missions on that readiness. We obtained data from and interviewed officials with the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Offices of the Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel and the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations; the Army Personnel Command; Army Forces Command; and U.S. Army Forces Europe; and division, brigade, and battalion commanders and staff from the 1st Armored Division, 1st Infantry Division, 4th Infantry Division, 10th Infantry Division, and 25th Infantry Division. To determine the current combat readiness of the Army's personnel, training, and equipment in the selected divisions, we reviewed the Army's Unit Status Reporting Regulation 220-1 to determine the criteria for unit readiness reports and interviewed division officials regarding their readiness status and how it is reported. We reviewed reports in the Unit Status Reporting System from the five divisions and two separately reporting brigade combat teams located at Ft. Riley, Kansas for February 1998 to June 2001. We focused our assessment of the current state of combat readiness for each unit overall and in the measured areas of personnel, training, and equipment on readiness data for the time period January through June 2001. We analyzed the overall ratings as well as those for personnel, training, equipment on hand, and equipment condition. We trended reported readiness for each of the five divisions and the two separately reporting brigades located at Ft. Riley, Kansas for the time period February 1998 through May 2001. We also reviewed commanders' assessment letters, which provided a narrative assessment of a unit's readiness to accomplish its wartime mission. Additionally, to further determine readiness for the measured areas of personnel, training and equipment, we did the following: Personnel: We analyzed enlisted manning data for each of the divisions over an 18-month period; these data came in electronic form from the Army, Personnel Command. We compared authorized and assigned numbers from these data across the divisions as well as across the Army overall. We gathered additional data and conducted interviews with applicable Army personnel to determine the reasons for manning imbalances and for low fill rates for specific military occupational specialties considered by division commanders as critical to sustaining combat. Training: We obtained and reviewed quarterly training briefings and mission-essential task list (METL) data from the divisions and the two separately reporting brigades. We analyzed METL assessment data to determine whether divisions were fully or partially trained. To determine whether the implementation of a new policy restricting the movement of operation and maintenance training funds improved readiness, we interviewed officials in the Resource Management Offices of the five divisions. We analyzed the operation and maintenance funds obligated for fiscal years 1998 through 2001. For fiscal year 2001, the year the new policy became effective, we compared tank miles driven with operations and maintenance funds obligated. We also interviewed division, brigade, and battalion commanders to determine the effect that the new funding policy had on training and unit readiness. Equipment: We reviewed division equipment-on-hand and equipment shortage lists. We analyzed divisions' mission capable rates and compared those rates with reported readiness levels. We interviewed division, brigade, and battalion commanders, as well as division logistics officials to determine whether equipment shortages or serviceability issues adversely affected unit readiness or the ability to train. To determine whether peacekeeping missions have affected readiness, we interviewed Department of the Army officials from the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, and division, brigade, and battalion commanders at four of the five divisions. We analyzed data on the number and types of deployments for fiscal years 1998 to 2001 and compared the timing of deployments with readiness indicators. We reviewed the Army's three-phase training plans to reintegrate troops returning from peacekeeping missions and retrain them to fight major-theater wars. We reviewed recently published GAO, Congressional Research Service, and RAND reports. We conducted our review from December 2000 through October 2001 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. We are sending copies of this report to appropriate congressional committees, the Secretaries of Defense and the Army, and the Director of the Office of Management and Budget. We will send copies to other interested parties upon request. Please contact me on (757) 552-8111 if you or your staff have any questions about this report. Additional contacts and staff acknowledgments are listed in appendix II. Other staff who made key contributions to this report were Connie W. Sawyer, Donna M. Rogers, Melissa McDowell, Lauren S. Johnson, Nancy Ragsdale, James E. Lewis, and Nadine Furr.

Summary: In recent years, GAO has testified that personnel shortages, assignment priorities, and frequent peacekeeping deployments were undermining the combat readiness of the Army's five later-deploying divisions. In 2001, GAO reported on the Army Chief of Staff's manning initiative of October 1999, which seeks to ensure that all active Army units are assigned the numbers, grades, and skills needed to carry out wartime missions. Since then, terrorists have attacked the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, and the Bush administration has formulated a new military strategy. These developments may change how, when, and where these divisions will be used--as seen in the deployment of soldiers from the 40th Infantry Division in Operation Enduring Freedom. As of June 2001 the five divisions reported they were ready and able to perform all or most of their combat missions. Enlisted personnel levels were at or near 100 percent of their authorization compared with 93 percent in March 1998. However, staffing imbalances persist for some combat support skills. Each division met its training requirements for combat missions. The amount of equipment on hand and the serviceability of that equipment indicated that the five divisions would be able to perform their combat missions. Army officials found it difficult to quantify the varied effects of peacekeeping operations on the five divisions' readiness.