In 1996, Congress established the NADR appropriations account in response to the increased importance of nonproliferation and anti- terrorism efforts and to give the executive branch more flexibility in administering funds for these kinds of activities. While some programs funded through the account have been recently established—such as the Small Arms/Light Weapons Destruction Program, other programs were already in operation when the NADR account was created, including the NDF. Programs funded through this account fall under the jurisdiction of the Department of State and are grouped into three categories: (1) Nonproliferation, (2) Anti-terrorism, and (3) Regional Stability and Humanitarian Assistance. There are three major nonproliferation programs: The NDF funds projects to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, their delivery systems, and related materials. The Export Control and Related Border Security Assistance Program assists other governments in implementing effective export control systems to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their missile delivery systems as well as conventional weapons. The Science Centers and Bio-Chem Redirection Program finances civilian research by former Soviet nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons scientists to provide incentives that would prevent them from marketing their skills to other countries. The fiscal year 2005 budget request refers to this program as the Nonproliferation of WMD (weapons of mass destruction) Expertise Program. There are two major anti-terrorism programs: The Anti-terrorism Assistance Program provides training to foreign nationals in such areas as law enforcement, border control, protection of critical infrastructure, and crisis management to develop and sustain other countries’ abilities to impede terrorist activities. The Terrorist Interdiction Program helps countries improve border security through the provision of a computerized database that enables border control officials to identify, detain, or track individuals of interest. Two major programs support regional stability and humanitarian assistance: The Humanitarian Demining Program funds humanitarian assistance programs that remove and destroy land mines and unexploded ordnance from former combat areas. The Small Arms/Light Weapons Destruction Program supports the destruction worldwide of surplus and illicit stocks of military small arms and light weapons that are easily transportable (e.g., small arms, minor explosives, and hand-held missile systems). Table 1 provides the appropriations history for these major programs for fiscal years 1999 through 2005, as applicable. In addition to these major programs, the NADR account funds other activities, including contributions to international organizations that have a more specific focus. For example, the NADR account includes funds that support other nonproliferation activities, including the International Atomic Energy Agency and the International Monitoring System. While some of these activities may have received significant levels of appropriations, we did not conduct in depth review of these activities because they were generally more focused in scope. State officials, nevertheless, consider the funding and programmatic support to the International Atomic Energy Agency to be one of their more important nonproliferation activities, and noted that the appropriations for the U.S. voluntary contribution has been at least $50 million since fiscal year 2001. Table 2 provides a funding history for these activities. All the NADR programs are authorized by law, and program implementation reflects those legislative authorizations. Because the NDF, however, engages in both preplanned and longer-term activities, it also engages in activities that, while legally authorized, appear to go beyond expectations for the scope of the program’s mission of providing a flexible funding source to respond to urgent nonproliferation activities. Program expectations appear in congressional appropriations committee reports and have been reiterated by the Secretary of State and the program’s own mission statement. For example, appropriations committee report language states that the program should focus on “urgent, unanticipated nonproliferation activities of immediate concern to the United States.” Furthermore, the program funds a longer-term export control activity that is designated in committee reports as being outside the scope of the program’s expected activities. That export control activity has not been integrated with State’s Export Control and Related Border Security Assistance Program, which supports development of export control capabilities in other countries. State is authorized to engage in the activities of the major programs funded through the NADR account. The legislative authorities for the programs generally establish the scope of authorized activities, the countries in which the programs may operate, the retention of appropriated funds, and whether the programs can operate regardless of other existing laws. We reviewed the types of activities funded by the major programs in the context of program authorizations and found that these programs engage in activities that are in accord with their legislative authorizations. For example, among the nonproliferation programs, the Science Centers and Bio-Chem Redirection Program is authorized to engage former Soviet weapons scientists in civilian activities, and to facilitate conversion of former Soviet military technologies and capabilities into civilian activities. To fulfill this mission, the Science Centers and Bio-Chem Redirection Program supports two international science centers—the International Science and Technology Center in Moscow and the Science and Technology Center in Ukraine—as well as other activities including those that engage nuclear, biological, and chemical scientists in research projects. These programs help focus on civilian research such as public health, agriculture, the environment, measures to help combat biological and chemical terrorism, and the development of vaccines for infectious diseases. Among the anti-terrorism programs, for example, the Anti-terrorism Assistance Program is authorized to provide assistance to allied countries to enhance their ability to deter terrorists and terrorist groups from engaging in international terrorist acts. To fulfill its mission, this program provides training and equipment to enhance other countries’ abilities to fight and prevent terrorism. The program supports training and equipment in such areas as bomb detection and disposal, management of hostage situations, physical security for personnel, and law enforcement management. Among the regional stability and humanitarian assistance programs, for example, the Humanitarian Demining Program is authorized to provide assistance to help strengthen war-torn countries to develop their resources and improve their living standards. To fulfill this mission, this program assists with the clearance of land mines and unexploded ordnance, provides workshops and classes regarding mine safety for people living in mine-affected regions, and funds research and training for those who run mine action programs. Detailed information on program authorizations and activities, program implementation, and program funding by type of activity and recipient country, as available, are provided in appendixes II (nonproliferation programs), III (anti-terrorism programs), and IV (regional stability and humanitarian assistance programs). The NDF preplans some activities and engages in longer-term activities, including export control activities that, while authorized by law, appear to be inconsistent with expectations for the scope of the program’s mission. According to past language included in appropriations committee reports, and both reiterated by the Secretary of State and incorporated into the program’s mission statement, the NDF is expected to provide a flexible funding source to respond to urgent, unanticipated nonproliferation activities. Furthermore, the longer-term preplanned export control activity supported by the NDF has been, and continues to be, developed and implemented independently from the responsibilities and activities of State’s Export Control and Related Border Security Assistance Program, which is responsible for assisting the development of export control capabilities in other countries. The 1997 congressional conference report on the appropriations for foreign operations for fiscal year 1998 included language that directed the NDF to focus on funding “urgent, unanticipated nonproliferation activities of immediate concern to the United States.” That conference report also stated that “Longer term programmatic activities, such as export controls ”, should be funded separately “outside of the NDF account” so that they would be subject to normal legislative oversight and review. Between 1996 and 2000, the House Appropriations Committee included similar language in committee reports on foreign operations and related appropriations. This congressional appropriations committee report language, however, is not legally binding because it is not part of the program’s statutory authorization. Moreover, the committee has not included similar language since calendar year 2000. Nevertheless, committee reports are a standard source of congressional guidance for program operations. While appropriations reports apply to appropriations for the applicable fiscal year, the NDF’s appropriations are available indefinitely, instead of having to be returned to the U.S. Treasury at the end of a fiscal year if not obligated by then. In testimony before the Senate Committee on Appropriations’ Subcommittee on Foreign Operations in May 2001, the Secretary of State reiterated the emergency response nature of the NDF by characterizing it as a contingency rapid reaction fund, which can meet unanticipated challenges and disperse funds quickly in support of urgent nonproliferation objectives. Also, the NDF acknowledges the nature of the committee report language in its mission statement. In its September 2003 annual report, the program’s mission statement states that the NDF is a “sharply focused fund to permit rapid response to unanticipated (or unusually difficult), high priority requirements/opportunities” in the field of nonproliferation. The “unusually difficult” part of the program’s mission, however, emanates from the program and not language in past congressional committee reports. According to a program official, there are no clear parameters for defining what would constitute an “unusually difficult” activity that warranted support from the NDF. That official stated that a determination of “unusually difficult” is made on a case-by-case basis without standardized formal assessment criteria. The NDF implements its nonproliferation responsibilities through activities such as the removal and/or destruction of weapons and the conversion of weapons testing facilities. However, some activities that the program engages in appear to go beyond the scope of the program’s expected activities. In particular, the NDF (1) preplans some programmatic expenditures and (2) funds at least one major longer-term activity, which is an export control activity. Applying the criteria of “urgent, unanticipated…activities of immediate concern” suggests that a program address urgent needs that generally arise unexpectedly and are not preplanned. Yet the NDF earmarked at least half of its fiscal year 2004 request of $35 million for preplanned and longer-term, multiyear activities to include (1) $8.75 million for a Biological Weapons Terrorism Initiative to help countries develop laws and regulations, inventory existing materials, track the movement of existing materials, and secure existing stock and (2) $8.75 million for the expansion and deployment of an automated export control system called Tracker, which has been under development and deployment by the NDF since 1994. And for fiscal year 2005, at least 57 percent of the requested $34.5 million is for preplanned activities, including $7.5 million for a Biological and Chemical Weapons Terrorism Initiative, $5 million for a Nuclear and Radiological effort, and $7 million for the Tracker automated export control system. To use funds to engage in preplanned activities may result in these funds being unavailable to respond to urgent, unanticipated events. For example, Libya’s recent decision to divest itself of weapons of mass destruction has generated an immediate response from the United States in facilitating that divestiture. Because of the immediacy of the need, the NDF has now been tasked to respond. But, according to program officials, as of March 2004, the NDF was looking to curtail planned expenditures to release funding to meet the urgent needs of the Libya situation. According to State, the NDF now has sufficient money to handle its unanticipated requirements in Libya. The NDF also engages in at least one longer-term activity—development and deployment of the Tracker automated export control system. Tracker is a software system that helps countries process export control applications by providing a central location for inputting, processing, tracking, approving or denying, and reviewing export license applications. The NDF has been paying for the initiation, development, and deployment of this system since 1994, and has also funded, at its discretion, the technical equipment to implement and operate the system. According to a program official, as of February 2004, the Tracker system was operational in nine countries—Bulgaria, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, and Switzerland. Budget plans indicate significant planned investment in further expansion of both the system’s capabilities and the countries to which it is provided. In particular, the NDF’s fiscal year 2004 budget request preplanned $8.75 million to further enhance the Tracker system by improving its ability to handle biological, chemical, and radiological materials, and by expanding its deployment to South Asia and the Middle East. The fiscal year 2005 budget request includes another $7 million for the same effort. Costs of the Tracker system have consumed a significant portion of the NDF’s annual appropriation. As table 3 shows, those costs have ranged from 21 percent of the appropriation level in fiscal year 1999 to as much as 32 percent in fiscal year 2003. In addition, the Tracker system is an export control activity that the language of congressional appropriations committee reports specifically cited as an example of longer-term activities that the program should not be funding. In 1996, the House Appropriations Committee report expressly stated that the export control activities of the NDF, while worthwhile, did not meet the committee’s criteria for the NDF to support only “urgent, unanticipated nonproliferation activities of immediate concern to the United States.” The 1997 conference report for fiscal year 1998 appropriations recommended that $3 million of NADR account funds be used to support export control-related activities. State applied that $3 million toward the creation of the Export Control and Related Border Security Assistance Program. The Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund has developed and implemented the Tracker automated export control system, and continues to do so, independently from the responsibilities and activities of State’s Export Control and Related Border Security Assistance Program. The latter program conducts a comprehensive evaluation of the export control capabilities in foreign countries, identifies deficiencies in those capabilities including deficiencies in automated system capabilities, and funds activities to resolve deficiencies. It has provided assistance to about 42 countries, including eight of the nine countries in which the Tracker system is reported to be operational. According to State and Commerce officials, a comprehensive export control capability generally includes such elements as supporting laws, trained export control professionals, and implementing policies and procedures. However, an official of the Export Control and Related Border Security Assistance Program stated that the automated Tracker system is not integrated into its program’s assessment of foreign countries’ export control capabilities and deficiencies. Department of Commerce officials who have participated in the implementation of the Export Control and Related Border Security Assistance Program expressed concern that the independent deployment of the automated Tracker system may cause countries to mistakenly believe that the Tracker system provides a comprehensive export control capability rather than a single automated component of a comprehensive export control system. Commerce officials noted that deploying any automated export control system, such as the Tracker system, requires careful consideration of a country’s current export control capabilities overall. The major NADR programs are managed primarily by full-time federal employees. However, project implementation is generally performed by experts from other U.S. government agencies who are also federal employees, or by outside contractors. Both the number of contract personnel for implementing projects, and the timeframe for project implementation vary depending on the needs of the project. Program management offices for the major NADR programs consist mostly of full-time federal employees. However, contract employees are also used on a limited basis to assist with program management. The program management personnel are primarily responsible for overall program management rather than the implementation of projects funded by their respective programs. Management responsibilities are generally comprised of planning, oversight, and evaluation of program activities. Program management staff develop projects to accomplish program objectives. As table 4 illustrates, an average of 78.5 percent of program staff for the major NADR programs were full-time federal employees in fiscal year 2003. Except for the Terrorist Interdiction Program, all of the programs use outside contract employees to assist with program management. The use of contract staff for program management ranges from zero to 46 percent. Officials from these programs indicated that, in general, the contract employees are hired through annual, renewable personal service contracts. Project implementation for the major NADR programs, in contrast with general program management, is generally performed by experts, some of whom may be federal employees contracted through other U.S. government agencies to implement projects, and some of whom are outside contractors. The NADR programs enter into interagency agreements with other U.S. government agencies, provide grants to international and nongovernmental organizations, and/or contract with private companies in order to implement projects funded by the NADR account. According to program officials, the NADR programs implement projects through these mechanisms because those agencies, organizations, and contractors have the expertise necessary to effectively implement the projects. To work through other U.S. government agencies to implement projects, the major NADR programs generally enter into Interagency Acquisition Agreements or Memorandums of Agreement/Understanding. These agreements authorize the transfer of funds from the programming office to the implementing agency and specify the work to be performed under the agreement. Many of the NADR programs have entered into these agreements with agencies and offices from the Departments of Defense, Energy, Homeland Security, Health and Human Services, Justice, and Agriculture, and the Environmental Protection Agency. The number of contract personnel needed to implement a project varies by project but can range, according to program officials, from as few as one person to as many as several hundred. Project length also varies depending on individual project requirements. There are differing expectations or interpretations about what the role of the Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund should be in responding to nonproliferation objectives of the United States. Program management implements a broad mission for the NDF, as permitted by law, that includes not only the responsibility to provide a source of emergency response funding, but also to engage in unusually difficult activities. The latter could include longer-term efforts that may not be considered urgent, unanticipated activities of immediate concern. However, the expectations expressed in language in past congressional committee reports, and the characterization of the NDF’s focus in testimony by the Secretary of State before a Senate committee, describe a program mission that can be expected to focus on the objective of providing emergency response capability rather than engaging in longer-term programmatic activities such as export controls. The discrepancy between these expectations and permissible activities under the law would benefit from clarification of congressional intent through legislation. In the light of such clarification, program activities should be reassessed. Furthermore, the NDF’s export control activities and the export control activities in the Export Control and Related Border Security Assistance Program warrant evaluation, coordination, and integration. Having two programs assisting the development of export control capabilities in other countries from two separate approaches that are not integrated or coordinated can result in duplication of effort and wasteful expenditure. In this report, we are recommending that the Secretaries of State and Commerce evaluate the extent to which the export control activities of the Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund and the Export Control and Related Border Security Assistance Program are integrated and thus ensure that recipient countries are receiving comprehensive assistance to improve their export control systems. The Congress may want to consider conditioning future year funding requests for the Tracker export control system until the Secretaries of State and Commerce have determined whether the two systems should be integrated. The Congress may also want to consider clarifying through legislation its intent with respect to the scope and direction of the NDF’s activities. State provided written comments on the draft report. These comments are reprinted in appendix V. The department also provided technical comments, which we incorporated into the report as appropriate. State concurred with our recommendation that the Tracker export control program being developed and implemented by the NDF be integrated with the export control activities of State’s Export Control and Related Border Security Assistance Program. The Department of State took exception, however, to our use of the term “earmarking” in characterizing the plans delineated in the budget requests of the NDF. The department states that it has not earmarked any funds of the Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund nor does it plan to do so in future years. State notes that funds can only be committed through the NDF’s review process. We understand that appropriated funds cannot be committed for specific expenditures except through that process. However, the Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund has informed the Congress in its budget justifications that it designated requested appropriations for the preplanned longer-term activities we cite in the report, which is the point we are making. The department also stated that it had more than sufficient funds to handle the unanticipated nonproliferation requirements in Libya. Nevertheless, the director of the NDF explicitly told us at a meeting on February 5, 2004, and at the exit conference with the department on March 10, 2004, that the NDF was searching for funds that could be de-obligated from approved activities in order to cover the costs for its Libya activities. We have modified the body of the report to state that according to State, the NDF now has sufficient money to handle its unanticipated requirements in Libya. The Department of State further stated that the NDF is not a contingency fund awaiting opportunities. However, the Secretary of State specifically characterized, in his testimony of May 15, 2001, before the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on Foreign Operations, the NDF, as we note in the report, as a “contingency rapid-reaction fund which can meet unanticipated challenges and disperse funds quickly in support of urgent nonproliferation objectives.” In addition, the Department of State stated it often used the NDF to create opportunities, start new initiatives or programs, and undertake unique and unusually difficult work. As we state in the report, some of the NDF’s activities appear to go beyond expectations for the scope of its mission. As a result, we have made a matter for congressional consideration that, if desired, the legal authority for the Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund should be clarified through legislation. The Department of State commented that 1996 conference report language reflected concerns about the Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund being the sole source of export control assistance funding, and that the department responded to those concerns by creating an export control assistance account in fiscal year 1998. However, the November 1997 appropriations conference committee report for fiscal year 1998 appropriations, specifically stated that “he conferees strongly support the core nonproliferation activities of the NDF. The NDF is designed to provide the Secretary of State with a flexible funding source to respond to urgent, unanticipated nonproliferation activities of immediate concern to the United States. Longer term programmatic activities, such as export controls, should be funded separately outside of the NDF account and therefore subject to the normal conditions for legislative oversight and review. For this reason the conference agreement recommends that $3 million in NADR account funds be used to support export control related activities.” The Department of State also took exception to the report’s relegation of the United States’ voluntary contribution to the International Atomic Energy Agency to nonmajor status, although the department acknowledged that we did not appear to intend to diminish the importance of the program. As agreed with the department, we did not intend to diminish the importance of this program, so we have revised the report language to more appropriately reflect the importance of the U.S. contribution to the International Atomic Energy Agency’s mission. We also provided the Department of Commerce with a copy of the draft report for its review and comment. Commerce stated that it had no comments. We conducted this review from August 2003 to March 2004 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. We are sending copies of this report to other interested congressional committees, the Secretary of State, and the Secretary of Commerce. We will also make copies available to others upon request. In addition, this report will be available at no cost on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov. Please contact me at (202) 512-8979 if you or your staff have any questions about this report. Key contributors to this report were F. James Shafer, Beverly Ann Bendekgey, Joseph Brown, John F. Miller, Joe Zamoyta, Mark Dowling, Martin de Alteriis, and Lynn Cothern. To determine the legal authorizations for the programs funded through the NADR account, and the extent to which the types of activities funded met program authorizations, we obtained the statutory authorizations from program officials and from our independent legal searches; we discussed those authorizations with program officials and reviewed them to determine if they were the statutes that applied to their respective programs. We obtained from program officials information and related documentation, as well as project data, on the types of activities funded by the programs. We compared those types of activities with program authorizations to determine if the activities funded were generally in accord with the authorizations. To determine the extent to which program management utilized outside experts, we met with program officials responsible for implementing the NADR programs to discuss, and obtain information and documentation on, the composition of program management staff and the extent to which programs utilized outside experts in project implementation. Program managers provided us with information on each filled position on the program staff and whether the position was filled with federal employees or outside experts hired under contract. To develop program funding histories for the report appendixes, we obtained a 5-year funding history (fiscal years 1999 through 2003) of individual projects for the major programs. We reviewed the reliability of the project data provided by program officials by performing initial testing of the funding data for completeness, consistency, and reasonableness. We also interviewed program officials responsible for managing the data to assess how the data are developed and maintained, including the security of access to the data. We found the data sufficiently reliable for representing program activities. We conducted this review from August 2003 to March 2004 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. The Department of State’s nonproliferation programs funded through the Nonproliferation, Anti-terrorism, Demining, and Related Programs (NADR) account are designed to help achieve U.S. national security interests by preventing the spread of weapons of mass destruction, their delivery systems, and related materials. There are three major nonproliferation programs funded through the NADR account: the Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund (NDF), the Export Control and Related Border Security Assistance Program, and the Science Centers and Bio-Chem Redirection Program, now referred to as the Nonproliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction Expertise Program. Each program operates within State’s Bureau of Nonproliferation under the authority of the Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International Security Affairs. In addition to these three major programs, the NADR account also includes funding for additional nonproliferation activities that are more narrowly focused. State officials consider the voluntary contribution and programmatic support to the International Atomic Energy Agency to be one of their more important nonproliferation activities. While this contribution may have received considerable levels of appropriations, we did not conduct in-depth review of these activities because they were generally more specific in scope than the three nonproliferation programs we reviewed in depth. The International Atomic Energy Agency is discussed at the end of this appendix. The NDF was established in 1992 to help (1) prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and related materials, (2) destroy or neutralize such weapons and materials, and (3) limit the spread of advanced conventional weapons and their delivery systems by providing a flexible funding source that could respond rapidly to nonproliferation needs and activities. To meet its mission, the NDF can hold appropriated funds until expended, and these funds can be expended notwithstanding any other provision of law. The NDF may engage in certain activities worldwide, while some authorized activities are restricted to countries that were part of the former Soviet Union. Table 5 provides detailed information on program authorization, activities, and implementation. Table 6 provides data on program funding by type of activity for fiscal years 1999 through 2003. The Export Control and Related Border Security Assistance Program was established as a separate program in 1998 to help prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, their missile delivery systems, conventional weapons, and related items and materials by (1) assisting foreign governments to establish and implement effective export control systems that meet international standards and (2) preventing transfers of sensitive goods to other countries and terrorist networks. The program cannot hold appropriated funds and must obligate funds within 1 year. Table 7 provides detailed information on program authorization, activities, and implementation. Table 8 provides data on program funding by country—and table 9 by type of activity—for fiscal years 2000 through 2003. The Science Centers and Bio-Chem Redirection Program pursues its responsibilities through three main activities: (1) the Science Centers, (2) the Bio-Chem Redirection Program, and (3) the BioIndustry Initiative. The Science Centers program was established in 1992 in the Department of Defense and transferred to the Department of State in 1996. Along with the Bio-Chem Redirection Program, which was established in 1997, these programs help prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction by (1) engaging former Soviet Union nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons scientists in civilian research to prevent them from providing expertise and weapons to other states and terrorist networks and (2) countering the threat of bio-terrorism through transformation of former Soviet weapons research and production facilities for civilian research. The Science Centers and the Bio-Chem Redirection programs finance civilian research by former Soviet weapons scientists as an alternative to their providing their expertise to terrorist networks and other states. The BioIndustry Initiative, which was established in 2002, helps reconfigure large scale former Soviet biological weapons production facilities to commercial uses, and engages former biological and chemical weapons scientists in civilian research projects, such as developing drugs and vaccines. Program activities are restricted to countries that were part of the former Soviet Union, and funds must be obligated within 1 fiscal year. Table 10 provides detailed information on program authorization, activities, and implementation. As noted above, the funding for the Science Centers effort goes to two international science centers—the International Science and Technology Center in Moscow, Russia, and the Science and Technology Center in Kiev, Ukraine. Table 11 provides the funding history for these two centers for fiscal years 1999 through 2003. As noted above, the Bio-Chem Redirection effort funds projects through other U.S. federal agencies. Table 12 provides the funding history for bio- chem redirection projects for fiscal years 1999 through 2003 by the agency that implemented the projects. The BioIndustry Initiative is a relatively new program, with initial funding provided in fiscal year 2002. Slightly over 88 percent of the $30 million the initiative provided that year went to the International Science and Technology Center in Moscow, while the remaining nearly 12 percent went to projects funded through the Civilian Research and Defense Fund, a private organization that engages in activities similar to that of the science center. In fiscal year 2003, $2 million was provided to the international science center. In addition to the three major programs, the NADR appropriations account included funding for some additional nonproliferation activities that were more narrowly focused. We did not conduct in-depth review of these activities because they were generally more limited in scope than the nonproliferation activities discussed above. The additional activities include the following: The International Atomic Energy Agency Voluntary Contribution supplements the agency’s operating budget to help implement strengthened nuclear safeguards measures, allow expansion in nuclear safety cooperation with key countries, and combat nuclear and radiological terrorism. Funding to the International Monitoring System, which is part of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty, helps detect nuclear explosions. U.S. assistance to the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization funded some administrative expenses and provided annual shipments of heavy fuel oil to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea in lieu of the energy given up when the country froze its declared nuclear facilities. The last funding provided for this activity occurred in fiscal year 2003. The United States provided a one-time voluntary contribution in fiscal year 2002 to the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, which implements provisions of the Chemical Weapons Convention that banned the development, production, acquisition, and use of chemical weapons by member states. U.S. assistance was limited to activities mutually agreed to by the organization and the U.S. government to meet exceptional needs, including (1) the conduction of additional industry inspections, (2) improvements to a relational database for verification planning and reporting, (3) outreach for implementation of legislation to combat chemical terrorism, and (4) support of management and planning functions of the organization. The Department of State’s anti-terrorism programs funded through the NADR account are designed to help achieve U.S. national security interests by providing foreign countries with training and technical capabilities that enhance their ability to prevent terrorist activities. There are two major anti-terrorism programs funded through the NADR account: the Anti- terrorism Assistance Program and the Terrorist Interdiction Program. In addition to these two major programs, the NADR account also includes funding for additional anti-terrorism activities that are more narrowly focused. The Anti-terrorism Assistance Program was established in 1983 in response to the bombings of U.S. Marine barracks in Beirut. The program is intended to help prevent terrorist activities by providing training, equipment, and advice to foreign countries to (1) enhance the anti-terrorism skills and capabilities of foreign law enforcement and security officials to build the capacity of key countries abroad to fight terrorism; (2) establish security relationships between U.S. and foreign officials to strengthen cooperative anti-terrorism efforts; and (3) share modern, humane, and effective anti- terrorism techniques. There is no geographic restriction on which countries may participate in this program, and no time limit for the expenditure of appropriated funds. Table 13 provides detailed information on program authorization, activities, and implementation. Table 14 provides data on program funding by country for the fiscal years 1999 through 2003, while table 15 provides data on program funding by type of activity for those same fiscal years. The Terrorist Interdiction Program was established in 2000 to help prevent terrorist activities by enhancing the ability of foreign countries’ law enforcement personnel to deter terrorists by (1) installing and maintaining a computer database system in participant countries that allows border control officials to quickly identify and either detain or track suspect persons attempting to cross borders and (2) increasing countries’ capability to collect, compare, and analyze traveler data to increase knowledge of terrorist movements. Country participation is not geographically restricted. Table 16 provides detailed information on program authorization, activities, and implementation. The Terrorist Interdiction Program primarily funded the installation and maintenance of the Personal Identification Secure Comparison and Evaluation System in several countries since fiscal year 2000. Table 17 lists those countries and the expenditures for each country. The cost figures, however, do not represent the funds provided to the countries or the sole cost of equipment or services provided. The figures generally represent the costs of software development, including contractor engineering labor, hardware, travel expenses, and program administration associated with the project for a particular country. In addition to the two major programs, the NADR appropriations account included funding for some additional anti-terrorism activities that were more narrowly focused. We did not conduct in-depth review of these activities because they were generally more limited in scope than the activities discussed above. The additional activities include the following: Counterterrorism Engagement with Allies funds workshops and conferences to help improve the capability of the United States and interested governments to respond to terrorist incidents overseas involving weapons of mass destruction. In fiscal year 2004, according to agency officials, those activities will be funded through the Anti- terrorism Assistance Program. The Israel Counterterrorism Assistance was a one-time emergency funding in fiscal year 2002 to help replace the Israeli government’s law enforcement bomb detection equipment that was destroyed during the multiple terrorist attacks in 2001. The United States provided a one-time payment in fiscal year 2001 through the NADR account to the government of the Netherlands in support of the Lockerbie Trial to cover a portion of the costs of the international trial of the suspects responsible for the 1988 terrorist bombing of Pan Am flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland. For fiscal year 2005, funds have been requested for the Counterterrorism Financing Program that would provide training and technical assistance to combat terrorist financing. The Department of State’s regional stability and humanitarian assistance programs funded through the NADR account are designed to promote peace and regional stability, as well as meet humanitarian needs in post- conflict situations. These programs work to achieve U.S. national security interests by supporting demining activities and the destruction of small arms and light weapons in areas that have suffered from hostilities. There are two major programs supporting regional stability and humanitarian assistance: the Humanitarian Demining Program and the Small Arms/Light Weapons Destruction Program. The NADR account also includes funding for an additional demining activity. The Humanitarian Demining Program was established in 1997 to help achieve U.S. regional stability and humanitarian assistance foreign policy goals by (1) reducing land mine casualties worldwide; (2) developing conditions that allow people in areas ravaged by hostilities to return home in safety; (3) restoring land to productive use; (4) revitalizing commercial infrastructure to restore economic health; and (5) extending U.S. bilateral, regional, and international influence. There is no geographic restriction for program activities and appropriated funds are available until expended. Table 18 provides detailed information on program authorization and activities as well as program implementation. Table 19 provides data on program funding by country and type of activity for the fiscal years 1999 through the budget request for 2005. The Small Arms/Light Weapons Destruction Program was established in 2001 to support the destruction of surplus and illicit stocks of military small arms and light weapons worldwide by funding programs that destroy easily transportable weapons in other countries. Small arms/light weapons generally refers to military-style automatic rifles, machine guns, man- portable anti-tank and anti-aircraft missiles, rocket-propelled grenades, and light mortars. These weapons are a major source of arms for terrorists, criminals, and violent insurgent groups. There is no geographic restriction for program activities and appropriated funds are available until expended. Table 20 provides detailed information on program authorization and activities as well as program implementation. Table 21 provides data on program funding by country for fiscal years 2001 through 2003. In addition, the NADR appropriations account included funding for an additional activity. The United Sates provides matching funds to the Republic of Slovenia International Trust Fund for Mine Action and Victims’ Assistance for demining activities in the Balkan countries. We did not conduct in-depth review of this activity because the U.S. role is more limited in scope than in the activities discussed above. The General Accounting Office, the audit, evaluation and investigative arm of Congress, exists to support Congress in meeting its constitutional responsibilities and to help improve the performance and accountability of the federal government for the American people. GAO examines the use of public funds; evaluates federal programs and policies; and provides analyses, recommendations, and other assistance to help Congress make informed oversight, policy, and funding decisions. GAO’s commitment to good government is reflected in its core values of accountability, integrity, and reliability. 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Summary: The Department of State requested $415 million to fund programs in the Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining, and Related Programs (NADR) appropriations account for fiscal year 2005. Interest has been expressed in learning about whether programs are being implemented in accord with the law, and in the extent to which programs use experts hired on a contractual basis. GAO was asked to determine (1) the legal authorizations for the programs and the extent to which programs are implemented in accord with these authorizations and (2) the extent to which program management and implementation use outside experts. The seven major programs funded through the Department of State's Nonproliferation, Anti-terrorism, Demining, and Related Programs appropriations account are authorized by law and engage in activities that are in accord with their authority. However, the Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund (NDF) engages in activities that, while authorized by law, appear to be inconsistent with expectations about the scope of the program's mission. Past appropriations committee reports and testimony by the Secretary of State indicated that the NDF is designed to respond to urgent, unanticipated nonproliferation events of immediate concern to the United States. However, at least half of the NDF's $35 million budget request for fiscal year 2004 and 57 percent of the $34.5 million request for fiscal year 2005 were designated for longer-term activities preplanned through the annual budget process, including expansion of an export control system called Tracker. Furthermore, the Tracker system has been developed and deployed independently of another Department of State program, the Export Control and Related Border Security Assistance Program, which supports the development of export control capabilities in foreign countries. Currently, the Tracker system is not integrated into the export control assessments and activities of this program or the export control activities of other Departments, such as the Department of Commerce. Program management offices, which range in size from 1 to 26 staff, average about 80 percent federal employees and 20 percent experts hired on a contractual basis. In contrast, projects funded by these programs are implemented by experts on contract from other U.S. government agencies (who may also be federal employees), outside contractors, or international and nongovernmental organizations. The Department of State concurred with the need to integrate export control activities, but took exception to other issues regarding the Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund.