Maintaining an overseas military presence that is prepared to deter threats and engage enemies remains an enduring tenet of U.S. national military strategy and priorities. For example, the National Military Strategy notes that an overseas presence supports the ability of the United States to project power against threats and support the establishment of an environment that reduces the conditions that foster extremist ideologies. The strategy also notes that keeping an overseas presence serves to assure U.S. allies; improves the ability to prosecute the global war on terrorism; deters, dissuades, and defeats other threats; and supports transformation. The Chief of Naval Operations earlier this year underscored the continuing importance of forward-deployed forces, noting “Our forward rotations remain critically important to our security, to strengthening alliances and coalitions, and to the global war on terrorism. But it is clear we must make these rotations with purpose, not just to fill the calendar.” In early 2001, the Chief of Naval Operations recognized the challenge of accomplishing the Navy’s missions within its budget. In February 2001, the Vice Chief of Naval Operations established a task force to explore force structure options facing the naval service, noting that in order for organizations to remain vital and competitive “they maintain their options and seek innovative developments that may provide simpler, more convenient, or less costly alternative solutions to their needs.” One of the task force’s primary assumptions was that the Navy leadership understands that there may be insufficient procurement funds available to maintain current fleet size. Another assumption was that the demand for naval forward presence would remain greater than the supply, regardless of fleet size. Within a year, an operational studies group within the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations noted that the need for alternative crewing approaches might be necessary to sustain the pace of global operations, especially in the global war on terrorism. More recently, senior Navy officials have warned that budgets will remain tight. In June 2004, the Secretary of the Navy stated that DOD will have less money for recapitalization because the defense budget will not continue growing at the rates it has in recent years. The Navy’s acquisition executive has also noted that the Navy is employing multiple strategies that eventually may reduce the number of ships, submarines, and aircraft it purchases, saving taxpayer dollars as it seeks more effective ways of employing its forces so that fewer of them can provide the capabilities needed to accomplish assigned missions. One such effort that may enable the Navy to sustain a high pace of operations within expected budgets involves the rotation of crews on and off forward-deployed Navy surface ships. While the Chief of Naval Operations stated earlier this year that the ideal fleet size would be about 375 ships, he also said that he is no longer willing to commit to any specific number of ships until the Navy completes a new assessment of ship requirements. The assessment, which started this year, will evaluate the potential impact on force structure requirements from keeping ships at sea for longer than standard 6-month deployments by rotating the crews on and off. He noted the Navy’s recent experience with keeping two destroyers on extended deployments, whereby these two ships provided the presence overseas that is the equivalent of 8 to 10 ships on normal deployment schedules. The amount of time a ship ultimately spends forward deployed in a theater of operations is affected by several factors in its employment cycle. These factors include length of a deployment, transit speeds and port calls, crew training and certification, ship maintenance requirements, and maintaining sufficient readiness for surging forces during nondeployed periods. The result is that a ship homeported in the United States and deploying to the Persian Gulf area for 6 months will normally spend less than 20 percent of its time in theater and that the Navy would need about 6 ships to maintain a continuous presence in the region over a 2-year period. As part of the transformation efforts to increase the fleet’s operational readiness and responsiveness, the Navy recently implemented a new operational strategy—called the Fleet Response Plan—that changes the manner in which it maintains, trains, mans, and deploys its ships. The overall objective of the plan is to create a more responsive force by sustaining a more level balance of training between deployments, instead of dropping to minimum rates of readiness upon return from deployment and then gradually rebuilding its state of readiness throughout a 12-month training cycle that follows major maintenance of the vessel. The plan also modifies long-standing forward presence policy of predictable, 6-month deployments to predetermined regions. This flexible deployment concept allows units that have attained high readiness to embark on deployments of varied duration—but still generally no longer than 6 months—in support of specific national priorities, such as homeland defense, multinational exercises, security cooperation events, deterrent operations, or prosecution of the global war on terrorism. These deployments provide what the Chief of Naval Operations calls “presence with a purpose,” and are intended to occur in less predictable patterns to keep potential adversaries off guard. In addition to the standard ship and crew employment cycle, the range of Navy crewing options falls into four major categories: (1) Sea Swap, (2) Horizon, (3) Blue-Gold, and (4) partial or graduated crew swapping. Each of these options can be implemented in varying ways and may have different advantages and disadvantages, but the Navy’s actual experience with nonstandard crewing concepts on surface ships is limited. Standard crew deployments use one crew per ship. Most of the crewmembers are assigned to the ship for 4 years, and it is common for crewmembers to deploy overseas on the same ship more than once. Standard ship deployments occur once every 27 months for a period of 6 months of which the ship and the crew are on-station for 3 to 4 months, depending upon whether the ship deploys from the east or west coast of the United States. Most Navy ships and their crews employ the standard crew deployment option. The Sea Swap option uses the same number of crews as ships. Notionally under this option, one of the ships deploys two, three, or four times longer than the standard time by rotating crews every 6 months at an overseas location. Ideally, all of the Sea Swap ships share an identical configuration, so crew performance and capability are not degraded because of ship differences. Because crews do not return to the ships on which they trained, under a four-ship Sea Swap option, some crews could serve on three different ships in just over 6 months and be expected to demonstrate combat proficiency on each one. A limited number of destroyers and patrol coastal ships have employed the Sea Swap option in recent years. The Horizon option involves one or two more crews than hulls, such as four crews for three ships or five crews for three ships. Crews serve for no more than 6 months on ships that are deployed for 18 months or more. Under a three-ship Horizon option, crews could serve on at least two ships in just over 6 months and be expected to demonstrate combat proficiency on each one. In addition, each crew would be without a ship for a period of time and stay ashore at a readiness, or training, center. This crewing option was employed on mine countermeasure ships during the 1990s. The Blue-Gold option assigns two complete crews, designated “Blue” and “Gold,” to a single ship. Most of the crewmembers are assigned to a ship for several years, and it is common for them to deploy overseas on the same ship more than once. Crew deployments would not exceed 6 months and are often of much shorter duration. An advantage with this option includes the crews’ familiarity with the ship. However, a disadvantage is that the proficiency can degrade since crews sometimes do not have a ship on which to train and must rely on mock-ups and simulators. The Blue- Gold option has been employed by the strategic submarine force and the HSV-2 Swift. Partial or Graduated Crew Swapping Partial crew swapping has been employed on a limited basis. The most notable use of this option involved the exchange of crewmembers between a ship based in Japan with a ship based in the United States in 1999. A variation on this theme is when portions of a ship’s crew are swapped out at regular intervals, for example, one-quarter of the crew every 2 or 3 months. The most significant advantage attributed to rotational crewing options is the more efficient use of a ship in an overseas operating area. This is accomplished by keeping the ship on extended deployments, ranging from 12 to 36 months or longer, while at the same time not increasing the crew’s time away from home. Top Navy officials, including the Chief of Naval Operations, believe that increased efficiencies from rotating crews enable the Navy to perform the same number of missions with fewer ships or to increase the number of missions with the same force size. For example, the Navy’s acquisition executive stated that if the Sea Swap option is employed on its next generation guided missile destroyer, the DD(X), the Navy might be able to reduce requirements from 24 to 16 ships and apply the savings toward the next generation cruiser. Disadvantages often associated with rotational crewing include increased infrastructure costs; deteriorating ship material condition and lack of ready access to maintenance support while on extended deployment; decreased readiness due to differences between ships; and decreased quality of life and other sociological issues for crew members, including the sense of less “ship ownership,” fewer port calls, and cultural changes. The Navy recently conducted a 2-year demonstration to determine if two destroyers could (1) provide more deployment time on-station and (2) maintain sailor quality of life while rotating crews. The Navy declared the demonstration a success, stating that the ships operated well while increasing their operational capability. In its report on the Sea Swap demonstration project, the Center concluded that the feasibility of the concept clearly was a success. However, the Center noted that there were problems and limitations. While none of the problems was considered a showstopper, the Center stated that the Sea Swap demonstration afforded the opportunity to learn lessons in order to enhance the use of the practice in the future. Many of these, such as the need for improved accountability, oversight, and understanding of maintenance strategies, are discussed in this report. The Chief of Naval Operations has charged the Commander, Naval Surface Force, U.S. Pacific Fleet, with being the primary proponent for demonstrating the feasibility of rotating crews on surface ships as well as assessing the cost of the various options and providing oversight and accountability. To date the Command’s emphasis has been on using the Sea Swap demonstration as a “proof-of-concept” for rotational crewing. It provided the guidance implementing the concept, approved the assessment plan, and used Center support to collect and analyze some data. However, other commands are involved in implementing other rotational crewing options on surface ships; they include the Mine Warfare Command and the Amphibious Group Two Command. See appendix II for a more complete list of organizations involved. Although the Navy’s senior leadership has initiated a change in how the Navy can operate in the future by demonstrating that rotational crewing is a feasible alternative to traditional 6-month ship deployments, the Navy has not systematically evaluated the feasibility and cost-effectiveness of all rotational crewing options for its current and future classes of surface ships. The Navy has documented that rotational crewing helps to increase the forward presence of its ships beyond the traditional 6-month deployment periods, and officials have indicated that they want to make greater use of rotational crew options. While the Navy has conducted some limited assessments of the Sea Swap destroyer demonstration project, it has not developed a comprehensive common analytical framework to assess the potential impact of all rotational crewing options on the material condition of all of the ships, operational requirements, and the quality of life for crews. In addition, the Navy has not collected complete and consistent information that is critical for comparing different crewing alternatives for such factors as evaluating which alternative most cost-effectively meets specific requirements and warfighting effectiveness. In the absence of a common analytical framework, Navy officials assigned to ships that have used or experimented with crew rotations have been left to develop their own goals, objectives, and metrics and the results have to date been uneven. As a result, the Navy does not have complete and accurate data, including cost data that reflect total ownership and operating and support costs, readiness, and crew quality of life, making success or failure of the individual options involving different types of ships difficult to determine. In the absence of a systematic evaluation, the Navy also does not know the extent to which rotational crewing options can provide maximum return on investment and economically offset future ship total ownership costs. The Navy has developed some data to demonstrate that rotational crewing helps to increase the forward presence of its ships beyond the traditional 6-month deployment periods. Table 1 shows the percentage of time a ship would be notionally forward deployed during the employment cycle for each type of crew deployment option and the number of ships that would be required to keep one vessel continuously operating in the Persian Gulf. Given such promise for improving deployment efficiencies, Surface Force Pacific Command officials have considered using rotational crewing options on other ships. For example, in July 2004, the Commander, Naval Surface Force, indicated plans to use the Sea Swap option on an Arleigh Burke-class destroyer based in the Atlantic Fleet and an expeditionary strike group based in the Pacific Fleet, during the spring and summer of 2005, respectively. In addition, Mine Warfare Command officials informed us in July 2004 that it intends to rotate crews on mine warfare ships based in the Persian Gulf later in the year, but it had not yet determined which option it will use. The Navy is also considering rotational crewing for operating future ships and, as a result, it could change the number of new ships that might be purchased. For example, the Navy is designing and procuring the littoral combat ship and the DD(X), which will cost billions of dollars. The Navy has suggested that if crew rotations with an expeditionary strike group are as successful as with the Sea Swap destroyers’ demonstration, procurement plans for the number of the DD(X) destroyers can be reduced and the savings applied to other high priority ships. While the Center and the Surface Force Pacific Command have conducted some assessments of the Sea Swap demonstration project, the Navy did not have an analytical framework or collect the information that would be needed to assess and compare all crewing options. Lacking such a framework, the Navy has not systematically assessed the effect that rotational crewing has on such factors as the ships’ material condition and readiness or crew quality of life and training. Additionally, the Navy has not systematically evaluated the cost-effectiveness of the various crewing options. Best practices show that an analytic framework that includes measurable goals and objectives, performance metrics, and evaluation plans would allow decision makers and others to receive consistent information needed to compare and assess different policy options, measure implementation progress, and determine whether the desired results were being achieved. Without such information for the various crewing options, Navy managers do not have a clear picture of the status of the crew rotation efforts, whether potential benefits from different crew rotations are being achieved, which option might be best in certain situations, and whether major issues need to be resolved. The Navy has not established formal criteria for evaluating the implementation of the various rotational crewing options because its focus has been on demonstrating the feasibility of the concept rather than on assessing and formalizing the options. For example, the Navy did not establish evaluation criteria prior to implementing Sea Swap, and none was identified in the Center’s Sea Swap assessment plan. As a result, the Center lacked criteria for judging ship condition and crew quality of life. According to the Center’s September 2004 report, the Navy had no intent to control the operational activities in the sense of a scientific experiment, where one notionally scores a probability of success or other such measure of effectiveness. It said the intent was that general conclusions about the feasibility and difficulties of pursuing the Sea Swap concept for future force employment planning would be drawn from the experiment. Moreover, the Navy did not have comparable assessments for the options employed on other ships such as the patrol coastal ships and the HSV-2 Swift. More common data and analyses are not available for comparison because, in the absence of a common analytical framework, individual commands using crew rotations have been able to decide on their own what (1) goals, objectives, and metrics to establish; (2) data to collect; and (3) evaluations to do, if any. Such goals, objectives, and metrics on ship condition and quality of life, which could affect crew retention, were not established prior to deployment, and complete information on these factors was not systematically collected during and after deployments. As a result, while the Navy has reported that the Sea Swap demonstration project was a success for the destroyers involved, the Navy lacks clear criteria to objectively evaluate how well the project did and the project’s potential against other rotational crewing options in two key areas we assessed—the condition of the ship and the crew’s quality of life. The Sea Swap demonstration project collected data on ship condition that could be valuable. However, complete data were not systematically collected on the ships before deployment and there were no clear criteria for comparing the ships’ condition upon return. For example, the Navy conducted a total ship readiness assessment of the U.S.S. Higgins, one of the two demonstration destroyers, in April 2004, shortly after the ship returned from its 18-month deployment. This post-deployment assessment of the combat, hull, mechanical, and electrical systems was used to compare the U.S.S. Higgins’s material condition to the U.S.S. Decatur’s. The U.S.S. Decatur, a guided missile destroyer, had recently completed a standard 6-month deployment. According to Surface Force officials, there was no significant difference between the two ships’ material condition upon return. However, there is some disagreement about the criteria and interpretation of the data used in reaching this conclusion. This is discussed in more detail on pages 37-39. In its report, the Center cautioned that further analyses of ship material condition are needed. Comparable assessments of ship condition are not being performed on the U.S.S. Fletcher, the other Sea Swap destroyer on extended deployment. The Navy is missing an opportunity to collect data and more objectively assess the impact of extended deployments on ship condition. A more stringent independent inspection for the U.S.S. Higgins is scheduled in January 2005, about 8 months after its return from deployment and likely after having received significant shipyard maintenance and modernization. Furthermore, Surface Force officials also told us that a comparable pre- inactivation inspection, which is normally performed, would not be done on the U.S.S. Fletcher because it is being decommissioned and they do not want to spend the money. An objective of Sea Swap was to maintain the crews’ quality of life. The Center’s study plan stated the Center would examine how the project improved or degraded the quality of life and quality of work for Navy personnel through surveys and interviews with crewmembers. However, the Navy did not establish goals for determining the quality-of-life success of the Sea Swap program. As a result, even though the Center had collected data on morale, it could not conclude whether Sea Swap had succeeded or failed in this regard. Also, the Navy has no plans to monitor crews’ quality of life for the patrol coastal ships and the HSV-2 Swift. The need for such an analysis is borne out by the impact of crew morale on reenlistment rates. Quality of Life Is an Important Factor in Sailors’ Career Choice Sailors’ views of their quality of life is an important factor in determining whether they will choose to continue their military career. The Chief of Naval Operations has recognized the importance of people in making the Navy successful in performing its mission and has consistently made manpower and quality of service top priorities. According to the Chief, “Quality of work includes everything that makes your workplace a great place to be—from getting the spare parts you need in a timely manner to working spaces that are up to current standards.” Sea Swap’s Implementation May Have Been Key to Quality-of-Life Concerns Information collected by the Center, and by us during our review, indicated that implementation of the Sea Swap demonstration project had a negative effect on crewmember quality of life. While noting that Sea Swap had been successful technically, the Center’s pre- and post- surveys of the crew showed that Sea Swap adversely affected morale because of the increased workload, fewer opportunities for liberty port calls, and crewmembers’ general impression that the Sea Swap deployment was worse than their previous deployment. For example, the Center asked crews about their expectations for Sea Swap compared to previous deployments. The survey results showed that 65 percent of the arriving crews expected that Sea Swap would be a worse experience than their last deployment and of departing crews; 84 percent said participating in Sea Swap was worse. Our focus groups with crews on the U.S.S. Higgins and the patrol coastal ships also revealed a negative quality of life. The Center and we both identified several factors that contributed to sailors’ feelings, including workload, training and professional development opportunities, quantity and quality of port visits, and several sociological issues (e.g., culture, ship “ownership,” sense of pride and recognition, predictability, or Navy tradition). The Center also noted that Navy leadership would need to understand which features of Sea Swap cause negative perceptions. We addressed quality-of-life issues in each of our 43 focus group meetings. All 26 of our focus group meetings with Sea Swap destroyer crews that served on the U.S.S. Higgins and with crews on patrol coastal ships attested to a highly negative quality of life, a decreased morale, and a strong desire to not participate on any more crew rotations implemented like their most recent experience. Many crewmembers indicated that rotational crewing might have had a more positive effect if the following conditions were met: crew swapping had been better managed to ensure work accountability to reduce the workload, there had been time for individual training and professional development, promises had been kept on designated port calls, port calls had been phased throughout the deployment instead of at the end when sailors just wanted to return home, return flight schedules had been better coordinated, and proper recognition had been given to each crew. A small number of crewmembers indicated that their Sea Swap experience was positive in that they liked knowing they would be on a finite deployment period of 6 months. In contrast, the 17 focus groups we conducted with Blue-Gold crewmembers from the HSV-2 Swift and the strategic submarine force found that these crewmembers had a generally positive crew rotation experience. They attributed their positive experiences to a level workload, management accountability, predictable schedules, individual training and professional development opportunities, and sufficient amounts of personal time during the interdeployment cycle, despite the ships’ high operational tempo. Negative Morale Impacted Reenlistment Rates Lower reenlistment rates for sailors with less than 6 years of service that served on Sea Swap guided missile destroyers and patrol coastal ships reinforced the Center’s survey results and our focus group findings. Both Pacific Fleet and Surface Force Command officials identified reenlistment data as a key indicator of whether crews are satisfied with rotations. The Center’s survey and our analysis showed that negative morale associated with participating in Sea Swap had an adverse impact on reenlistment rates. The Center’s conclusion was based on a series of crew surveys. According to the Center, 55 percent of the crew said after the deployment that they thought that Sea Swap would make them less likely to stay in the Navy, versus 39 percent before the deployment, and 73 percent stated that if all deployments were like Sea Swap, they would be less likely to stay in the Navy. Our analysis of overall reenlistment data for sailors with less than 6 years of active service indicated that the crews on all three Arleigh Burke-class destroyers involved in the Sea Swap demonstration experienced 50 percent reenlistment rates. These rates were below the Navy-wide reenlistment goal of 56 percent for this group and the actual 64 percent reenlistment rate for non-Sea Swap Arleigh Burke-class destroyers based in the Pacific Fleet. Because the first-term reenlistment rates for the three Sea Swap destroyer crews were as low as 23 to 37 percent during their Sea Swap cycle, these ships were among the few that did not meet the Navy-wide reenlistment goal. If the Navy expands rotational crewing with out understanding its full impact on crews, the results could affect retention and crew support. The Offices of the Chief of Naval Operations and Navy commands using crew rotations have not systematically collected cost data for assessing the return on investment or cost-effectiveness of all surface ship rotational crewing options for current and future ships. The Navy testified to the Senate Committee on Armed Services in March 2002 that it would determine the true cost and potential savings of one rotational crewing option, Sea Swap, to provide a firm analytical basis in order to decide whether to expand use of that option or look for other alternatives. Recently, the Commander, Naval Surface Force, initiated a limited effort to collect and model costs. However, to date, data collection and analyses comparing the cost of all the crew rotation options have not been completed. Cost-effectiveness is a method used by organizations seeking to gain the best value for their money and to achieve operational requirements while balancing costs, schedules, performance, and risks. The best value is often not readily apparent and requires an analysis to maximize value. A cost-effectiveness analysis is used where benefits cannot be expressed in monetary terms but, rather, in “units of benefit,” for example, days of forward presence. Such an analysis would be of particular importance when making return on investment decisions about how many ships to buy and how to operate them. Moreover, officials in DOD’s Office of Program Analysis and Evaluation told us that they have not conducted a basic cost-effectiveness analysis of rotational crewing alternatives. Nonetheless, they believe that rotational crewing is a good concept, that the Navy needs to perform these analyses, and that they were not aware of any such analyses having been conducted in the Navy. The Naval Cost Analysis Division cited DOD cost analysis guidance and procedures that would be applicable to a cost-effectiveness study of rotational crewing alternatives. According to Division officials, this guidance is to be used as the basis for preparing program life-cycle cost estimates, and provides information on the scope of the cost analysis, the procedures, and the presentation of the estimates. Division officials also told us they have not participated in any rotational crewing cost-effectiveness studies nor are they aware of any. Officials in both DOD and Navy offices indicated that the cost analyses for crew rotation alternatives should include the development of a cost structure for identifying all the relevant cost elements in the program, including depot level maintenance, fuel, training, infrastructure costs, and other costs unique to the program. While Surface Force Pacific officials had developed limited information on costs and savings unique to the Sea Swap destroyers, it was not complete, and they have not developed comparable data for the patrol coastal ships and the HSV-2 Swift. Examples of information collected included the estimated fuel savings from ship transits that were not needed; transportation, room and board for flying the crews to turnover cities; and special training. These officials told us that they plan to collect additional data to help evaluate Sea Swap costs, but that they are still determining what cost data should be collected and how to establish a baseline for control group comparison purposes. Furthermore, they told us that collection of the data will be challenging because there is no central database or automated system for coding rotational crewing-related expenses that could be used for documenting the unique costs associated with rotational crewing. The officials were also concerned that Navy management and accounting data systems are not integrated, making it difficult to collect complete and actual cost information that could be helpful in identifying the costs of the Sea Swap initiative. Surface Force Pacific officials have also determined that they have responsibility for assessing the costs of crew rotation in the patrol coastal ships as well, but they had not been doing so. Amphibious Group Two officials told us in October 2003 that they have not systematically evaluated costs and are not aware of any cost-effectiveness analyses of rotational crewing being conducted. Surface Force officials said that more complete costs for patrol coastal ships have to be collected and analyzed to allow for cost-effective comparisons. Notwithstanding the limitations in the available cost data, Naval Surface Force Pacific officials told us they recently developed and are refining a model that presents information that is more comprehensive. For example, in a July 14, 2004, briefing, the Force’s commanding officer presented costs of the Sea Swap demonstration, including a cost comparison for both the U.S.S. Fletcher and the U.S.S. Higgins to other ships in their respective classes, including the average costs per deployed day. Surface Force Pacific officials said that this model is also used to present similar data for the future littoral combat ship. However, we were informed that much of the data used in the model is based on estimates rather than actual costs and that some costs integral to evaluating rotational crewing options, such as maintenance and training infrastructure, were not included. Furthermore, the model has not been tested or validated by the Navy. The Navy has done some planning in support of rotational crewing on surface ships, such as for the Sea Swap demonstration project, but because the concept is evolving as an alternative, the service has not provided effective guidance during implementation on all ships to ensure proper oversight and accountability. Furthermore, the Navy has not systematically leveraged lessons learned to effectively support rotational crewing. Effective guidance and sharing of lessons learned are key management tools to overcome challenges associated with institutionalizing change and facilitating efficient operations. The Navy has well-established crew rotation policies and procedures for ballistic missile submarines for use as best practices that include appropriately documenting the ship’s condition and using advanced teams to help prepare for crew turnover and help ensure accountability. However, the Navy has not provided comparable guidance with policies and procedures to ensure proper crew turnover and accountability to all surface ships using rotational crewing. Consequently, the management of surface ship crew rotations has been informally delegated to each ship’s incoming and outgoing commanding officers. This has resulted in inconsistent management of and accountability for operational factors, such as the ship’s condition and ship inventories, when one crew replaces another. In addition, the surface ship community has not systematically collected, recorded, or disseminated lessons learned from all rotational crewing experiences. Although the Navy has a formal system to record lessons learned from fleet operations, experiences from crew rotations are not being recorded in the system so that they could be routinely shared among the surface ships and commands using rotational crewing. As a result, the Navy unnecessarily risks repeating past mistakes that could decrease warfighting effectiveness and crew morale. Because rotating crews aboard surface ships on extended deployments differs from the traditional 6-month ship deployment, it is important that planning be effective to increase institutional knowledge and gain acceptance for implementing the change. The Navy has performed extensive planning in support of rotational crewing on ballistic missile submarines. However, crew rotation planning for the surface ship community has been limited and less formal. The submarine community has a well-established concept for conducting Blue-Gold crew rotations, based on 40 years of experience on fleet ballistic missile submarines. As a result, we analyzed the community’s concepts, procedures, and processes to identify “best practices.” We found that three key elements of this concept are formalized turnover policies and procedures; a training plan that maintains proficiency of crews that are in port; and a maintenance plan that includes crew and incremental maintenance. Formalized Crew Rotation Turnover Policies and Procedures Help Ensure Accountability The Navy’s Submarine Forces Command developed formal policies and procedures for crew turnover in order to develop a comprehensive status of a ship’s material condition and accountability of controlled material and documents, scheduled maintenance, and supply. The turnover process takes place over 2 to 3 days, during which the on-coming crewmembers from each department and division meet with their off-going counterparts to review detailed turnover checklists that cover issues such as personnel, training, administration, maintenance logs, classified material, ship operational funds, parts, and food supplies. For example, both crews review the status of preventative and corrective maintenance repairs that are recorded in equipment status logs, which help document the material condition of the ship. This information is passed from one crew to another during turnover to maintain continuity of maintenance. Both crews also review an inventory of provisions, medicines, hazardous material, and information technology equipment. Crewmembers from both crews are required to sign the checklists, and the two ship commanders are ultimately responsible for ensuring accountability of the material condition of the ship. By taking these steps, the on-coming ship command has the opportunity to note unsatisfactory conditions—including significant personnel, training, operational readiness, habitability, and material deficiency issues—on an exchange-of-command report. Turnovers can be delayed if both crews do not agree on the ship’s material status. Members from one crew we met mentioned that they take pride in conducting the turnover because they want to set the standard for their partner crew. Training Programs Maintain Proficiency of the Crew While Ashore Maintaining the operational proficiency of the crew that is in port without a submarine is the main challenge to the strategic submarine’s Blue-Gold system. In response, the strategic submarine force has developed a training program to maintain crew proficiency in core competencies while ashore. This program is designed to update crews on recent procedural changes, allow crews to perform maintenance operations, and refresh personnel who have been away from their duties for several months. Crews receive classroom instruction and maintain their skills in simulators at the Trident Training Facility. Crews are monitored and evaluated through graded individual and group exercises. Officers and crewmembers stated that they generally received adequate and sufficient training at the training facility to perform their mission. Nevertheless, they stated that simulated training is not the same as training on a ship and that crew readiness is lower during the first week of deployment as they try to refamiliarize themselves with the ship and their mission. Crew and Incremental Maintenance Plan Designed for Rotational Crewing The ballistic missile submarine maintenance concept was specifically designed to accomplish incremental maintenance over a 42-year life cycle. The concept consists of crews working together to conduct maintenance repairs and incremental maintenance that is planned or unplanned corrective maintenance during an in-port maintenance period. The submarine community has formal guidance for the in-port maintenance period during which both crews jointly conduct maintenance repairs. One main purpose is to enhance the efficiency and productivity of the maintenance period. During this time, both crews operate under one chain of command; the off-going crew reports directly to the on-coming ship commander. Once the submarine is at sea, the off-crew works with the maintenance facility and the on-crew to develop a work package of needed preventive and corrective maintenance repairs. As a result, during the next in-port maintenance period the crew that has just taken command knows what to expect. Officers and crewmembers in our focus groups stated that this approach was key to completing required maintenance repairs in a short period. It also helps ensure that items that may not have been captured during turnover are identified according to officers on one submarine. In addition, crews stated that this concept decreases the incentives for pushing off work to the other crew because both crews conduct the needed maintenance repairs. The incremental maintenance plan involves routine maintenance based on a set schedule common to all submarines and corrective repairs, which include those items that break or are in a degraded condition as a result of operations. The Trident Planned Equipment Replacement Program, another aspect of incremental maintenance, provides for repairs on hull, mechanical, electrical, or combat control system equipment that require maintenance beyond the ability of the ship’s crew. The incremental overhaul relies on an extensive shore-based maintenance infrastructure, including dedicated full-time maintenance personnel, maintenance facilities that provide a full range of repair and maintenance services, and dry docks that provide the support necessary to conduct required equipment repairs and replacements. Despite the challenges of implementing this change in crewing practice, the surface ship community’s planning in support of crew rotations has been less formal and limited to several areas, including crew training on different systems used on participating ships, use of advanced crew turnover teams, and location and timing of port calls. Crews in our focus groups also identified some limitations to these planning efforts. Planned Training for Different Equipment and Systems between Ships Had Limitations A Naval Warfare College study of several crew rotation options identified the crew’s unfamiliarity with equipment and systems between different ships as a potential challenge for conducting the program. As part of the Sea Swap demonstration project, the Commander, Naval Surface Force, sought to address differences in ship design, construction, and modernization between forward-deployed and nondeployed ships by providing crews with predeployment training specific to the forward- deployed ship they would join. The Command planned for the training to account for many of the differences between the destroyers, with emphasis on training systems and equipment on the forward-deployed ship, and set-up training classes in the United States and Sea Swap cities. For example, one on-coming crew received training to ensure its proficiency in areas such as critical weapons systems and engineering prior to the ship’s turnover. Amphibious Group Two also provided training to patrol coastal ship crews to help them bridge the engineering differences they would face on the deployed ship. However, in our focus group discussions, ship crews participating in Sea Swap and on the patrol coastal ships cited concerns about the adequacy of this training. The crewmembers indicated that proficiency improved with practice drills, but sufficient proficiency was not achieved prior to deploying, even though they had received their certifications. The delay in achieving proficiency was accentuated for the crew that swapped in the Persian Gulf because the crewmembers did not have the opportunity during a transit to become familiar with their new ship. For example, crewmembers for one ship stated that they only received partial training for operating a new radio that is necessary for conducting strike operations. This partial training degraded the crew’s ability to shoot Tomahawk land attack missiles. Crewmembers also stated that they did not receive training to operate damage control radios, which meant the crew would have been unable to use the radios in an emergency. Patrol coastal ship crewmembers also indicated that they faced challenges in training to operate the deployed ship’s different equipment. For example, crewmembers stated they did not receive weapons training for Stinger missiles prior to overseas deployment because these weapons systems are not typically used while on deployment in the United States. Patrol coastal ship focus group comments revealed that the crews compensated for training deficiencies with self-initiated training during deployment. These crews also received some training from the Coast Guard while in theater. They felt the deficiencies in training on different systems compromised their ability to perform their respective mission. Value of Some Advanced Turnover Teams Was Limited The Surface Force Pacific Command established advance turnover teams to assist ships participating in the Sea Swap destroyer demonstration project, but their assistance was sometimes constrained. These teams were comprised of approximately 15 to 20 members of the on-coming crew who were sent to the forward-deployed ship 2 weeks in advance of the turnover to conduct inventories and observe ship operations. The use of an advanced turnover team was an effort to expedite the turnover process from one crew to another. A Command official cited the work performed by these teams as instrumental in reducing the amount of time required for the turnover as well as for increasing their familiarity with the new ship. However, crewmembers in our focus groups stated that advance teams were not as effective as they could have been in some turnovers because they were denied access to areas and equipment in the ship at the time of turnovers. For example, a regional support office assumed control of a Sea Swap destroyer in the United States, locked up the workspaces, and did not grant the advance team access. In another instance, the advance team arriving on the ship overseas was not given access until the new crew assumed responsibility for the ship, which limited the team’s time and ability to expedite an effective turnover. The Navy’s implementation of surface ship crew rotation efforts lacked effective guidance to ensure oversight and accountability. Because the practice differs from the traditional crewing approach, such guidance is a key to ensuring successful implementation. In the absence of such guidance, including standard policies and procedures similar to those used in the ballistic missile submarine community, officers and crews on Sea Swap destroyers, patrol coastal ships, and the HSV-2 Swift developed their own turnover procedures. This caused inconsistency between crews conducting the turnovers, which in turn, led to problems in documenting ship condition and accounting for ship inventories. As a result, surface ship crews cited the need to develop and implement standard turnover procedures, including checklists. Crewmembers said there was no document to sign during the turnover to hold crews accountable for recording necessary maintenance repairs. For example, crews reported that Navy systems for tracking maintenance requirements and accomplishments were not systematically used to record maintenance repairs. Officers and enlisted crews on Sea Swap destroyers and patrol coastal ships indicated that, as a result, the ship maintenance logs did not accurately reflect the material status of the ships. One Sea Swap crew reported that the prior crew did not document that the forward-fueling station had a hole, which took the entire deployment to fix. In another instance, one crew stated that although three portable fire pumps were required to be on board the vessel, the crew only found two pumps, of which only one worked. Additionally, a patrol coastal ship crew indicated that the previous crew reported only a few needed maintenance repairs in the maintenance log. However, after turnover, the on-coming crew said that it noted about 50 repair items, including all 6 main engines that could not operate simultaneously. In another case, the electronic preventive maintenance log was not working during turnover, which the on-coming crew reportedly spent 3 weeks in repairs to make it function. A ship commander mentioned that there is a challenge associated with properly tracking maintenance logs, which are not valued by all crews. Those logs can be valuable tools when used, but he stated that the maintenance logs did not reflect the material status of the ship. Some patrol coastal ship officers stated that every crew emphasizes different maintenance priorities, which can contribute to perceptions of inadequate material condition of the ship during and after turnover. Notwithstanding different perceptions of the material condition of the ship, Sea Swap and patrol coastal ship crewmembers raised concerns about the lack of accountability, in particular oversight of documenting the material condition of the ship. Crewmembers from the Sea Swap destroyers and patrol coastal ships cited the need to establish turnover standards and checklists and to conduct an independent inspection to monitor the turnover and review the material condition of the ship. Sea Swap and patrol coastal ship crews also mentioned that accountability for ship inventories was inadequate. Naval supply guidance cites the need to conduct physical inventories of equipment and materials to the extent necessary to ensure effective control of those materials normally required for performing the mission or which require special management attention. Crewmembers told us that guidance on conducting inventories was not always followed in preparation for and during turnovers. Some crews mentioned that the time to review supply inventories, a time-consuming activity during turnover, was a problem. There were several instances on Sea Swap destroyers of missing equipment— maintenance assistance modules estimated at $90,000—and tools. One Sea Swap destroyer crew also reported that the crew discovered during an inventory a pair of missing night vision goggles. In another case, the on- coming crew lacked basic supplies, such as cleaning materials, light bulbs, and toilet paper. Crewmembers also reported items missing on their assigned ships upon return that were not identified during turnover. In another example, crewmembers of a patrol coastal ship crew stated that, upon return to the United States, they found that 10,000 rounds of ammunition were missing on their assigned ship. Sea Swap destroyer and patrol coastal ship crews cited the need for an independent authority to hold crews accountable for ship inventories. The surface ship community also has not capitalized on existing and evolving lessons learned to more effectively plan and conduct crew rotations. Capturing and sharing such lessons serve to further institutionalize change by improving its implementation. While the Navy has a formal system to record lessons learned, experiences from current rotational crewing efforts are not being systematically collected and recorded in that system. As a result, the Navy is missing an opportunity to record lessons learned that could be leveraged by crews involved in current and future crew rotation experiences. Further, surface ships and commands have not capitalized on the lessons learned in the system to plan and conduct crew rotations. Consequently, crews experienced similar difficulties to those that the previously recorded lessons learned sought to correct. The Navy created a lessons learned database in 1991 to provide a system for units to benefit from collective Navy experiences, identify deficiencies, and take corrective measures in all aspects of fleet operations. A lesson learned is defined as information that increases the efficiency of Navy processes and improves the execution of future operations. According to the Navy, it should provide value to existing Navy policy, doctrine, tactics, techniques, procedures, organization, training, systems, or equipment. The Navy Warfare Development Command is responsible for administering the system, and its officials indicated that information for current rotational crewing efforts should be submitted to the system, as it is the best way for lessons to be shared across the Navy community. Anyone in the Navy can submit a lessons learned report through the immediate chain of command. Fleet commands process and validate the proposed report, which is then forwarded to be officially entered into the system. Navy personnel ashore and at sea can access lessons learned contained in the system through a classified Internet site. Use of this central repository would preclude the loss of lessons, such as those lost by the Mine Warfare Command in the late 1990s due to a computer failure. The Naval Surface Force Command recognized the need for a comprehensive list of lessons learned in order to examine the Sea Swap initiative, but the Command has not made a systematic effort to collect or record lessons learned, nor did it task Sea Swap crews to identify and submit them. Aside from 78 lessons learned pertaining to crew rotations that took place in 1999 on Forward Deployed Naval Forces in the Seventh Fleet area of operations, no lessons learned directly related to crew rotations had been posted regarding the Sea Swap destroyers, patrol coastal ships, and HSV Swift experiences as of July 30, 2004. Absent guidance, Sea Swap crews’ efforts to record lessons learned have been inconsistent. Some crews developed lists of lessons learned that were distributed to other rotational crews and the Command, including some that related to manning, personnel, supply, predeployment maintenance, training, turnover preparations and execution, turnover time, and advance parties. In one case, a Sea Swap ship undertook a concerted effort to document lessons learned prior to deployment, but a majority of those documents were later discarded because the crew wanted to create additional workspace. By not systematically recording and providing valuable experiences from crew rotations to the Navy Lessons Learned System, the Navy is missing an opportunity to more effectively plan and conduct current and future crew rotations. In response to a Senate Armed Services Committee request on the status of one of the Sea Swap ships, the Command identified a preliminary set of lessons learned as shown in table 2. A final report will be provided to the Committee once the initiative is completed. None of these lessons learned from the Sea Swap initiative have been reported to the Navy Lessons Learned System. Efforts to gather lessons learned in the patrol coastal community have been inconsistent. Amphibious Group Two similarly did not provide direction to collect and record lessons learned and stated that crews involved in rotations passed on lessons learned to one another. A patrol coastal ship commander stated that crew efforts to gather lessons learned were informal. We identified one lessons learned report sent by a ship commander to the ship’s command, Amphibious Group Two, that contained lessons related to maintenance funding, ownership, and maintaining good ship inventories. However, none of these lessons learned had been recorded in the Navy Lessons Learned System as of July 30, 2004. The Mine Warfare Command directed the HSV-2 Swift commanding officers to develop lessons learned reports on five issues. Only two of those lessons learned reports had been posted to the Navy Lessons Learned System as of July 30, 2004, and neither addressed ship crewing issues. The surface ship community has not capitalized on the Navy lessons learned database to plan and conduct crew rotations. A Naval Surface Force Pacific Command official told us that the Command did not systematically solicit available lessons learned from the Navy Lessons Learned System to help plan for crew rotations. We found that participants in our focus groups reported experiencing similar problems that several of the formal lessons learned reported by the Forward Deployed Naval Forces in 1999 had addressed. For example, two important lessons not leveraged were reviewing the automated process for the transfer of crew identification codes when assigned to a new ship and establishing and abiding by a written agreement between both ship commanders that clearly defines transfer and accountability procedures for equipment turnover. When crews for Forward Deployed Naval Forces were rotated in 1999, the Navy recognized that the ships were not timely in properly updating crewmembers’ records to show the ship to which crewmembers were assigned. This resulted in incorrect enlisted master files and the inability to process pay transactions. The lesson learned report stated that the Navy should instantly transfer personnel from one code to another automatically in a timely manner, which is crucial to avoid incorrect master files and the potential loss of certain pay and entitlements. Numerous Sea Swap destroyer, patrol coastal ship, and HSV-2 Swift officers and crews we met experienced similar difficulties. They reported that because their respective code was not changed to reflect they had changed ships, some crewmembers experienced problems receiving pay and others were ordered to the wrong ship. Officers and crew from a Sea Swap ship stated that creating codes for each crew would help alleviate similar problems. Assigning crews codes is a standard practice in the ballistic missile submarine community. This practice was also used by the mine warfare community during their crew rotations in the mid-1990s. The systematic use of an effective lessons learned system could have alerted the Navy to the need for a mechanism to ensure the effective transfer of crews and ships from one code to another in a timely and an accurate manner. Establishing and abiding by written agreements between both ship commanders involved in a crew rotation enable both crews early in the planning phase to determine what equipment stays with the ship or the crew and improves accountability for tool equipment transfer. The Navy’s lessons learned database identified the need for such agreements. However, despite both ship commanders agreeing during the planning phases of one of the turnovers that each ship’s tools, parts, and material would remain with the respective ship and that both crews would review an inventory checklist during turnover, both crews did not follow the agreement. One crew removed many of the tools and other equipment before leaving the ship. As a result, the on-coming crew did not have the needed tools and other equipment to perform maintenance and repairs and had to spend $150,000 to buy the needed tools. Officers and crews from two patrol coastal ships also indicated that absent an agreed-upon written inventory identifying which items stay with the ship and what items stay with the crew, one of the crews took needed ship items back to the United States, in part, to ensure the crew had necessary items on the new ship. Officers from one patrol coastal ship stated that there is a need for a standard set of inventory items that should stay on a ship. Sea Swap and patrol coastal ship officers and crewmembers stated that an independent authority is needed to monitor the turnover process, including an inventory of tools, to hold both crews accountable. The impact of ship maintenance on the implementation of rotational crewing has not been fully assessed. This is because the Navy has been focused on demonstrating the feasibility of the practice and allowed ships to use different approaches to conducting maintenance without capturing all needed information and examining all related issues that could impact success. A full assessment of maintenance issues on all ships employing this practice would be important in identifying and addressing possible impediments to effectively implementing rotational crewing. Navy destroyers and patrol coastal ships using rotational crews on extended deployments have faced maintenance challenges to ensure the mission capability of ships while overseas. To help minimize the adverse effects on the material condition of forward-deployed Sea Swap destroyers, the Navy expanded the scope of predeployment maintenance and sent maintenance support representatives in theater to provide additional technical support to crews. Despite concluding that the condition of the returning ship, U.S.S. Higgins, was comparable to that of another ship that had recently returned from a deployment, the results of such efforts on maintaining ship material condition are uncertain. The Center recommended that a review of maintenance support might be necessary prior to expanding Sea Swap to other ships. We found the need for such an analysis was further supported by the experience of patrol coastal ships, which did not receive such focused maintenance and identified several maintenance problems that were not corrected while deployed that could have affected their mission capability. Moreover, both the Center and our focus groups with rotational crews found that increased maintenance tasks contributed to diminished crew morale. Therefore, while the Navy used rotational crews to keep ships on station for up to 24 months, in the absence of a careful analysis of alternative maintenance strategies, the Navy runs the risk that some maintenance approaches will degrade the long-term condition of ships, diminish crew morale, and discourage crew support for using the practice. Navy vessels using rotational crews on extended deployments have faced maintenance challenges to ensure the vessels’ mission capability while overseas. Normally, most ship maintenance and repair is completed between 6-month deployments. For instance, Arleigh Burke-class destroyers normally receive continuous maintenance annually and 2-month Selected Restricted Availabilities every 22 months. However, ships employing rotational crews on extended deployments do not return to the United States for periods of 12 or more months, so crews must maintain ship capability while deployed in compliance with law and Navy guidance on overseas maintenance (see appendix III for details on Navy guidance). According to the Center, each Sea Swap destroyer received more maintenance support and more intensive support than typically received by ships on routine deployments. This support included numerous predeployment inspections and maintenance on their power, electrical, steering, combat, and other systems to eliminate many potential required maintenance activities during deployment. For example, the predeployment maintenance on one of the Sea Swap ships, the U.S.S. Fletcher, began with the identification of all time-driven maintenance requirements that were scheduled during the extended deployment. Examples included calibration, assessments, and inspections of equipment to renew time-driven certifications. (Such actions are comparable to checking a car’s timing belt or inspecting brakes and tires before taking a long trip.) Numerous other inspections were also conducted prior to deployment on selected ship systems and equipment to identify and repair problems and ensure the good working order of the ship. The U.S.S. Fletcher and the U.S.S. Higgins each received inspections for hull, mechanical, and electrical systems, as well as combat systems. The U.S.S. Higgins also received inspections of its Aegis radar system. Sea Swap destroyers also received overseas maintenance support beyond that available to ships on a typical deployment. The Surface Force Pacific Command sent U.S.-based ship engineering material assessment teams, ranging from 3 to 11 members, to perform maintenance on the Sea Swap destroyers while the ships transited from their operational area of responsibility to overseas locations where crew turnovers occurred. The teams also assisted the crews while the destroyers were in port at the crew turnover city and were comprised of senior-level maintainers capable of performing a variety of maintenance jobs at the ship’s organizational and intermediate levels. According to Navy maintenance officials, the team’s presence during transit from the theater of operations to the Sea Swap city and in port facilitated the completion of preventative maintenance, particularly repairs associated with ship habitability. Surface Force Pacific Command also assigned a Sea Swap destroyer port engineer to help ship officials develop maintenance plans during port visits, which is not typical for ships on normal deployments. U.S. Naval Forces Central Command officials also noted that Sea Swap destroyers experienced material degradation over time. As a result, both destroyers required maintenance that was not readily supportable during operations. Navy officials said that Sea Swap destroyers were given preference for port visits in support of crew turnovers and maintenance as compared to other ships. They also said that maintaining ships deployed to the U.S. Central Command area of responsibility for long periods would continue to be a challenge. During our review, we found that patrol coastal ship rotational crews also faced challenges in maintaining ship material condition. Like the Sea Swap destroyers, the patrol coastal ships received system inspections prior to deployment. Patrol coastal port engineers and maintenance support teams checked key systems—such as engines, weapons packages, and the bridge—to hedge against wear and tear the ship would experience on an extended deployment. However, unlike the Sea Swap destroyers, U.S. Naval Forces Central Command officials indicated that patrol coastal ships were not given preferential treatment to support maintenance. The patrol coastal ship community deployed a maintenance support team with the crews in an effort to address overseas maintenance needs, however, these teams are not unique to rotational crewing and typically support any patrol coastal ship deployment. The team consisted of five members located in theater who performed limited maintenance, ordered and stored parts, and provided administrative support. The scope of the maintenance performed by the teams was limited to organizational, intermediate, and select depot-level maintenance. According to focus groups with patrol coastal ship crews, the maintenance support teams were usually the only personnel in theater capable of rectifying frequently occurring maintenance problems. If a maintenance support team was not available, the crew had to contact a technical support representative in the United States for assistance or try to conduct the maintenance itself. Some patrol coastal ship crewmembers indicated that the size of the maintenance support teams was insufficient to support both patrol coastal ships on extended deployments and suggested expanding the maintenance support teams to be comparable to the system used by the Coast Guard. According to patrol coastal ship crews, the Coast Guard had four ships similar to the patrol coastal ships in theater and provided approximately 50 maintenance personnel to perform the same function as the patrol coastal maintenance support team. The increased size of the Coast Guard’s maintenance support allowed its crews to stand down and live in barracks during maintenance periods. By contrast, a patrol coastal officer noted that, during maintenance availabilities, maintenance support teams only assisted the crew and did not take over the work effort and the crews remained on board throughout the repair process and performed maintenance. The results of the different maintenance strategies used to sustain the two destroyers that were apart of the Sea Swap demonstration project and other ships using rotational crewing are uncertain. While the Center judged that the condition of the U.S.S. Higgins was comparable to another ship that had recently returned from a routine 6-month deployment, others in the Navy disagreed based on inspection results. We did not identify any similar effort to determine the impact on the patrol coastal or other ships that would provide the Navy with additional insights into the impact of the extended deployment on their condition. The Center’s judgment was based in part on a total ship readiness assessment conducted by Pacific Fleet maintenance personnel, in which Surface Force Pacific officials judged the U.S.S. Higgins’ ship material condition after a 17-month deployment to be comparable to the U.S.S. Decatur’s. However, officials from the Fleet Technical Support Center Pacific that performed the assessment thought there were some significant differences in the condition between the two ships. These officials found that the U.S.S. Higgins had 697 noted deficiencies out of 3,370 items tested (21 percent), whereas the U.S.S. Decatur had 465 out of 3,231 items tested (14 percent). While the number of deficiencies alone does not necessarily indicate the significant material differences between the ships, some of the items deficient on the U.S.S. Higgins included data links for controlling operations between a ship and an aircraft and another was the nonoperational extra high frequency communication system on the U.S.S. Higgins that was operational on the U.S.S. Decatur. Fleet Technical Support Center Pacific officials also assessed the operational functionality of each ship’s equipment and found that the U.S.S. Higgins was not as capable. This assessment measured the equipment operational capability of each ship in order to quantitatively determine whether the ship’s systems were performing in accordance with Navy requirements. The assessment results showed that the U.S.S. Higgins received an overall score of .70, while the U.S.S. Decatur received a score of .85. According to the Navy handbook, an equipment operational capability score of 1.0 indicates the equipment is fully capable of performing its function as designed, while a score of 0 indicates the equipment is totally unable to perform its function as designed. The handbook provides that any score between .70 and .80 indicates ship equipment is unable to obtain optimum operational standards, while scores above .80 indicate ship equipment passes all operational tests. A further breakdown of the scores indicates the U.S.S. Higgins may have had problems that were more serious. The .70 score for the U.S.S. Higgins was arrived at by assessing two categories of equipment: the combat system-related equipment and the hull, mechanical, and electrical systems-related equipment. The combat system-related equipment score for the U.S.S. Higgins was .77, while the U.S.S. Decatur received a score of .83. Since the combat system portion of the score was higher than the total for the U.S.S. Higgins, the hull, mechanical, and electrical equipment score was at a minimum below .70. According to the handbook, scores above .50 and below .70 indicate that equipment has significantly reduced output or restricted operability. By contrast, we found that the hull mechanical and electrical equipment score for the U.S.S. Decatur was at least .85, given an overall score of .85 and a combat system score of .83, which indicated that equipment was fully operable. Even though it concluded that the U.S.S. Higgins’ condition was comparable, the Center recognized the importance of maintenance to the success of rotational crewing and proposed the Navy further assess maintenance responsibilities, relationships, and costs. Specifically, the Center suggested that if Sea Swap becomes a more standard practice, “it will be necessary to conduct a holistic review of the overall maintenance process, including technical services and training.” This review would assess the responsibilities and interrelationships among the many players, such as the ship’s force, ship repair units, port engineers, and ship engineering maintenance teams. In addition, the Center added that the Navy should conduct a careful assessment to determine which maintenance support aspects are essential costs and which are dispensable. As of July 2004, the Navy had not started such an assessment. We found that the experience of other ships on extended deployments, such as patrol coastal ships, bore out the need for such an analysis. Patrol coastal ships did not receive focused maintenance comparable to Sea Swap destroyers, and ship officials identified several maintenance problems aboard one or more ships (see table 3) that were not corrected while deployed that could have affected their mission capability. Patrol coastal ships on extended deployments did not have extra in-theater maintenance support comparable to Sea Swap destroyers. For instance, patrol coastal ships did not have ship engineering maintenance teams to aid the crew in achieving maintenance. As a result, according to the maintenance support team coordinator for patrol coastal ships, routine continuous maintenance often could not be accomplished and, subsequently, the overall material condition of patrol coastal ships deployed overseas slowly degraded. The official explained that repairs authorized overseas are very narrow in scope and only cover maintenance absolutely necessary for the ship to conduct its mission. As a result, the official commented that organizational- and intermediate-level planned maintenance and preservation work are left to the crew and deployed maintenance support teams to take on over short periods in port, typically 5 days or less. In addition, according to a patrol coastal ship port engineer, each forward-deployed patrol coastal ship had received about 4 weeks of maintenance in port over the last 18 months and added that this level of maintenance does not equal what a traditionally deployed patrol coastal would receive. Port engineers and other maintenance staff noted challenges in keeping the patrol coastal ships operationally ready. For instance, in our focus group discussions with patrol coastal ship crews, they explained that the ship’s rotating crane that launches and retrieves the ship’s rigid inflatable boats broke down during a patrol and the ship had to rely upon the Coast Guard to help with its repair. A Navy official also explained that the extendedly deployed patrol coastal ships have a very high operational tempo, which also impacts the ability of the ship’s force to conduct organizational maintenance and increases the overall degradation of the ship over time. The official stated that onboard maintenance efforts have been able to keep the patrol coastal ships running, but that the Navy will pay a heavy price once the ships return to homeport for extensive overhauls, since repairs that are more serious will be necessary. The Center and we found that crews expressed concern about the extra workload they endured to maintain high ship readiness. Specifically, the Center concluded that while the Sea Swap demonstration showed a benefit for the Navy—saving dollars and increasing forward presence— many sailors spoke of the burdens and loss of traditions. According to the Center, Sea Swap crews performed more work and experienced fewer benefits and traditions than what may have originally drawn them to the Navy. For instance, the Center’s report noted that some Sea Swap crewmembers found that the maintenance workload was high throughout the entire deployment. Other complaints were that whenever the Sea Swap ships pulled into an Arabian Gulf port, other ships’ sailors left on liberty while the Sea Swap crews remained on board doing maintenance. This intense maintenance schedule was a morale problem and a frequent topic that arose during the Center’s crew interviews. Our focus groups with Sea Swap destroyer crews identified similar concerns. For instance, extra maintenance work related to painting and preserving the ship was left to the ship’s crew to accomplish. In addition, Sea Swap officers in our focus groups indicated that unreported work and high workloads disrupted sailor quality of life and that there was no increase in time or resources to get maintenance done. They also told us that more equipment inspections by in-theater support teams were needed while in port. The officers explained that the ship’s crew had to inspect and fix different equipment throughout the ship because in-theater support teams were not available. According to the Sea Swap officers and crew, this affected their quality of life since liberty time was reduced to accommodate ship maintenance needs. Our focus groups with patrol coastal ship rotational crews also indicated that increased maintenance tasks and workloads adversely affected crew morale and quality of life. Patrol coastal ship senior chiefs told us that rotational crews had difficulty meeting ship preservation requirements, loading supplies, and documenting ship maintenance logs for non-working items during port visits of 5 days or less. In addition, crewmembers on each rotational patrol coastal ship complained that they received no liberty ports; that all port visits became working ports due to the ship’s maintenance needs; and that, given the small size of the ships, they needed time away from other crewmembers to decompress. Furthermore, a patrol coastal ship commanding officer said that his deployed patrol coastal ship required too many maintenance demands and noted that the ship was maintenance-intensive from the day his crew took over. Rotating crews aboard surface ships on extended deployments appears to be a feasible alternative to the traditional way the Navy operates that could enhance its effectiveness. Successfully overcoming issues that could impede using this alternative and to gain support for implementing this change require knowledge of the various rotational options and their impact on operational requirements, ship condition, and crew morale. However, the Navy has not taken several key steps that could help it better plan, manage, and monitor the implementation of this crewing approach and therefore may not realize its full potential. For example, the Navy has not established the analytical framework to evaluate all rotational crewing options and related costs. In the absence of formal measurable goals, objectives, and metrics for assessing feasibility, cost, and other factors, including crew quality of life, the Navy does not have clear criteria for deciding when to use rotational crewing and which option best fits the situation. Furthermore, until the Navy more systematically collects data on current and potential surface ship rotational crewing options, including complete and accurate cost data for cost-effectiveness analyses, it will lack valuable information for making informed decisions about the potential for applying rotational crewing to current and future ships as well as whether it can get maximum return on investment and offset billions of dollars in future total ownership costs. The Navy’s implementation of crew rotations also lacks effective guidance to ensure oversight and accountability. For example, the Navy does not provide guidance that specifies standard policies and procedures for rotating crews to ensure consistent management of and accountability for ship operations during crew rotations. Until it does, crews may continue to have problems consistently documenting ship condition and accounting for ship inventories during ship turnover, which could lead to additional work burdens on the on-coming crew and potentially affect readiness. Furthermore, without more formal guidance built on systematically collected, recorded, and disseminated lessons learned from all rotational experiences that specify standard policies and procedures, the Navy may repeat mistakes. Finally, the Navy does not know enough about the implications of maintenance on ships using rotational crews as a means to extend their deployments. The Center for Naval Analyses noted in its report on the Sea Swap demonstration that if that option is to become a more standard practice, the Navy needs to further review the overall maintenance process. However, until the Navy fully assesses the additional maintenance demands and related crew quality-of-life issues experienced by all ships implementing this crewing approach, and evaluates alternative maintenance strategies, it runs the risk that it will degrade the long-term condition of ships and discourage crew support for rotational crewing. To ensure that the nation’s multibillion-dollar investment in Navy ships yields the greatest possible benefits at the lowest possible total cost, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of the Navy to take the following four actions: Systematically evaluate the feasibility and cost-effectiveness for current and potential application of several rotational crewing alternatives for its surface forces by establishing formal measurable goals, objectives, and metrics for assessing feasibility, costs, and other factors, including crew quality of life, and systematically collecting and developing complete and accurate cost data, including ship total ownership costs, in order to perform accurate cost-effectiveness analyses. Provide guidance that specifies standard policies and procedures for rotating crews to ensure consistent management of and accountability for ship operations during the rotation. Systematically collect, record, and disseminate lessons learned pertaining to rotational crewing in the Navy Lessons Learned System to enhance knowledge sharing. Conduct a study of the maintenance processes used for all ships involved in rotating crews and examine, as part of the study, opportunities to mitigate the crews’ concerns about maintenance workload to improve their quality of life. In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD agreed with the recommendations and cited actions it will take to implement the recommendations. DOD’s comments are presented in their entirety in appendix IV. We are sending copies of this report to interested congressional committees, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of the Navy, and the Director, Office of Management and Budget. We will make copies available to others upon request. In addition, the report will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov. If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please call me at (202) 512-4402 or e-mail me at stlaurentj@gao.gov. Key staff members that contributed to this report are listed in appendix V. Nuclear-powered Ohio-class ballistic missile submarines, also known as Trident submarines, provide the sea-based leg of the triad of U.S. strategic deterrent forces and the most survivable nuclear strike capability. There are 14 Ohio-class ballistic missile submarines in the fleet, homeported in Kings Bay, Georgia, and Bangor, Washington. Each submarine has about 15 officers and 140 enlisted personnel. The average procurement unit cost for each Ohio-class ballistic missile submarine is $2 billion (in fiscal year 2004 dollars). To maintain a constant at-sea presence, a Blue-Gold rotational crewing concept is employed on these submarines. Each ship has a “Blue” Crew and a “Gold” Crew, each with its own respective ship command. The ship deploys with one of these crews for 77 days, followed by a 2- to 3-day crew turnover and a 35-day maintenance period. For example, after a Blue Crew deployment, the Gold Crew takes command of the boat after a 3-day turnover process. The Blue Crew assists the Gold Crew in conducting maintenance repairs. During the Gold Crew’s patrol, the Blue Crew stands down and enters a training cycle in its homeport. The DD-963 Spruance-class destroyer has multimission offensive and defensive capabilities, and it can operate independently or as part of other naval formations. These ships were developed for the primary mission of antisubmarine warfare. Many of these ships were subsequently modernized with a vertical launch system and a Tomahawk cruise missile capability that greatly expanded the role of the destroyer in strike warfare. The crew consists of 30 officers and 352 enlisted personnel. The average procurement unit cost is $489.6 million (in fiscal year 2004 dollars). The Pacific Fleet conducted Sea Swap rotational crewing with four ships of this class, with the U.S.S. Fletcher being the forward-deployed unit. The three other destroyers were decommissioned coincident with the crew exchange. That is, each on-coming crew decommissioned its ship prior to swapping with the off-going crew of the U.S.S. Fletcher. As a result, after their 6-month deployment, the off-going crewmembers dispersed to a variety of new assignments, just as if their own ship were being decommissioned. Further, the Spruance-class destroyer swap rotation was initially planned on three ships but was extended by adding a fourth destroyer. As a result, the U.S.S. Fletcher remained deployed for over 22 months. All of the Spruance-class destroyers will be decommissioned by the end of fiscal year 2006. The DDG-51 Arleigh Burke-class guided missile destroyers—first commissioned in July 1991, with primary homeports in San Diego and Norfolk—provide multimission offensive and defensive capabilities, operating independently or as part of other naval formations. The DDG-51 is equipped with the Aegis combat system, a vertical launching system for launching antiaircraft and Tomahawk missiles, and an advanced antisubmarine warfare system. Each destroyer crews 23 officers and 300 enlisted personnel, and has a procurement average unit cost of $976 million (in fiscal year 2004 dollars). Navy plans call for a force of 62 Arleigh Burke-class guided missile destroyers. At the end of fiscal year 2004, this force will total 43 ships. The Navy is conducting a Sea Swap rotational crewing system to rotate entire crews from one hull to another on selected ships in the Naval Surface Force Pacific Command’s fleet of Arleigh Burke-class destroyers. The Cyclone-class patrol coastal ships are small Navy vessels used to conduct surveillance and shallow-water interdiction operations in support of maritime homeland security operations and coastal patrol of foreign shores. The Cyclone-class patrol coastal ship first entered into service in 1993. The patrol coastal force consists of 13 ships—4 stationed in San Diego, California, and 9 in Little Creek, Virginia. The crew consists of 4 officers and 24 enlisted personnel. The procurement average unit cost is $19.4 million (in fiscal year 2004 dollars). The Navy is using a crew swap model in which the entire crew of 28 crewmembers rotates from one hull to another. The rotations are occurring between patrol coastal ships in the United States and those deployed in the Arabian Gulf to increase operation days and reduce transit times. Operational requirements have delayed the decommissioning of 8 ships and the transfer of 5 ships equipped with loading ramps to the Coast Guard. The HSV-2 Swift is a high speed (almost 50 knots), wave-piercing aluminum-hulled catamaran that was acquired as an interim mine warfare command and support ship and a platform for conducting joint experimentation, including Marine Corps sea basing. The Navy leased and accepted delivery of the catamaran from the builder, Incat Australia, in Australia, in August 2003. The Swift was leased for 1 year at a cost of $27 million, with a 4-year option ($58 million). The Swift employs two crews of 41 members each and uses the Blue-Gold crewing option. The Gold Crew is based out of the Naval Amphibious Base Little Creek, Norfolk, Virginia. It operates the ship as a joint experimental platform with Marine Corps troops embarked, testing experimental and near-shore combat ship concepts. It also conducts special operations warfare. The Blue Crew is based out of Naval Station, Ingleside, Texas. This crew operates the ship as a mine warfare command and control ship. The Mine Warfare Command is in charge of coordinating overall mission scheduling for the ship and crews. The crews are responsible for the ship, but not its mission equipment. Each command that brings modules aboard ship must supply personnel to operate the modules. The Swift operates on a nominal 117-day cycle (plus or minus 10 days), including a 3-to-4 day turnover between crews, with a 4-month on/4-month off cycle. Crew exchanges take place in the crews’ respective homeports or at overseas locations. The DD(X) is a next generation, multimission surface combatant ship tailored for land attack that has not been built. The Navy intends to operate the DD(X) independently or as part of other naval formations. The DD(X) is expected to provide precision firepower at long ranges in support of forces ashore using two 155-mm advanced gun systems and 80 vertical-launch system tubes for the Tomahawk cruise missiles and other weapons. For fiscal year 2005, the Navy is requesting $221 million to begin building the first DD(X) and $1.2 billion for research and development for the program. The first ship is planned for delivery to the Navy in 2012. The Navy estimates that the first DD(X) will cost about $2.8 billion, including about $1.0 billion in detailed design and nonrecurring engineering costs for the class. The Navy earlier indicated it was planning to procure 24 DD(X) vessels through fiscal year 2017, before shifting to procurement of the next generation cruiser in fiscal year 2018. Recently, however, the Navy indicated it might accelerate the start of the cruiser procurement to sometime between fiscal year 2011 and 2014 and reduce the number of DD(X) destroyers it intends to buy to between 10 to 16. Current DD(X) design planning anticipates a crew size of 125 to 175 persons. The procurement contract establishes the requirement to consider deploying ships up to 3 years and requires the design agent to conduct and complete an analysis of crewing options that would support extended forward deployments, including standard, Sea Swap, Horizon, and Blue-Gold crewing options. The contract also requires the design agent to ensure that the DD(X) system can be effectively operated with an optimized crew and provide the crew with the highest quality of life, while minimizing total ownership cost. The littoral combat ship—a new class of Navy surface combatants and the smallest member in the DD(X) family of next generation surface combatant ships—is intended to be fast, agile, stealthy, affordable, and tailored for specific missions, such as antisubmarine, antisurface, or mine warfare in heavily contested littoral, or near-shore, waters, and it will use interchangeable mission modules tailored for specific missions. The Navy’s goal is to develop a platform that can be fielded in relatively large numbers to support a wide range of joint missions, with reconfigurable mission modules to assure access to the littorals for the Navy forces in the face of threats from surface craft, submarines, and mines. It is also expected to have the capability to deploy independently to overseas littoral regions and remain on station for extended periods either with a battle group or through at-sea replenishment. Baseline ship planning is for a single crew; rotational crewing concepts are being explored as a secondary option. Crew size is expected to range between 15 to 50 core crewmembers, which do not include the crew for the mission package. The Navy has plans to build 56 ships, with the first to be delivered in fiscal year 2007 for an estimated cost of $20 billion. Each sea frame hull has an average unit cost of $147.5 million to $216.4 million (in fiscal year 2004 dollars). The mission modules’ average procurement cost is $177 million (in fiscal year 2004 dollars) per ship set. The resulting average cost for a littoral combat ship platform is $324.6 million to $393.4 million (in fiscal year 2004 dollars). To assess whether the Navy has systematically evaluated the feasibility and cost-effectiveness of rotational crewing concepts for existing and future classes of surface ships, we interviewed Department of Defense (DOD) and Navy Headquarters and fleet officials, met with cost analysis experts in the government and the private sector, reviewed key acquisition documents and crew employment plans, and reviewed rotational crewing studies performed for and by the Navy. Studies we reviewed included “Future Force Operational Plan,” Executive Summary of the Horizon Concept Generation Team, Chief of Naval Operations Strategic Studies Group XVI (June 1997); “Crew Rotation: The MCM-1 Experience,” Center for Naval Analyses (May 1998); “Alternative Naval Crew Rotation Operations,” Center for Naval Analyses (October 2001) “Task Force Sierra Force Structure For The Future Phase One,” Naval War College (undated); “Alternative Approaches to Meet New Operational Commitments,” Briefing by the Deep Blue Team, Chief of Naval Operations (undated); “Sea Swap,” Warfare Analysis & Research Department, Naval War College (June 2003); and “Sea Swap Assessment,” Center for Naval Analyses (September 2004). We also conducted meetings with several of the commanding and executive officers of the Sea Swap destroyers, the HSV-2 Swift, and selected patrol coastal ships and strategic ballistic missile submarines. To assess whether the Navy has effectively managed rotational crewing on surface ships and leveraged lessons learned, we visited Naval Surface Force Command, U.S. Pacific Fleet, San Diego, California; Submarine Group Nine Command, Bangor, Washington; Mine Warfare Command, Corpus Christi, Texas; and Amphibious Group Two Command, Norfolk, Virginia. We also met with officials from the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Naval Warfare (Plans, Policies, and Operations; Surface Warfare; and Submarine Warfare) to review Navy guidance and plans for conducting crew rotations. We also conducted over 40 focus group meetings with Navy officers and crews involved in crew rotations on the guided missile destroyer U.S.S. Higgins, selected ballistic missile submarines, the HSV-2 Swift, and selected patrol coastal ships (see page 58 for more information on the objective, scope, and methodology of the focus groups). Further, we reviewed Navy Lessons Learned System instructions and visited the Navy Warfare Development Command, Newport, Rhode Island, to query the Navy Lessons Learned System to determine recorded lessons learned pertaining to crew rotations. To assess how ship maintenance may impact implementation of rotational crewing, we reviewed relevant laws and Navy regulations pertaining to maintenance of U.S. Navy ships. We discussed ship material condition and associated sailor workload in over 25 focus groups with crews from the Sea Swap guided missile destroyers and from selected patrol coastal ships that had participated in crew rotations. We also obtained ship material condition assessments, called Total Ship Readiness Assessments, for the U.S.S. Higgins and the U.S.S. Decatur. We discussed the methodology and results of the assessments with officials from the Fleet Technical Support Center, San Diego, California; the Southwest Regional Maintenance Center, Commander Pacific Fleet, San Diego, California; the Naval Surface Warfare Center, Corona Division, Corona, California; and the Naval Surface Force Pacific, San Diego, California. We met with and obtained maintenance guidance and reports from Navy officials at Combined Fleet Forces Command, Norfolk, Virginia; Surface Force Atlantic, Norfolk, Virginia; Surface Force Pacific, San Diego, California; Commander U.S. Pacific Fleet, Honolulu, Hawaii; Amphibious Group Two Command, Little Creek, Virginia; and maintenance experts in the Offices of the Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Research, Development and Acquisition) and the Chief of Naval Operations, Washington, D.C. We also obtained written responses to our questions from U.S. Naval Forces Central Command. In addition, we reviewed the Center for Naval Analyses’s Sea Swap Assessment report and discussed the report’s findings with officials from the Center. To compare reenlistment rates for crews on Sea Swap guided missile destroyers and non-Sea Swap guided missile destroyers in the U.S. Pacific Fleet, we obtained Unit Honor Roll reports, derived from the Enlisted Master File, from the Commander, U.S. Pacific Fleet, Honolulu, Hawaii. We did not analyze Spruance-class destroyer data for two reasons: (1) we did not conduct focus groups with these crews and (2) the rotational crewing experience was not as complete or complicated as that experienced by crews on Arleigh Burke-class guided missile destroyers. Based upon discussions with Pacific Fleet officials we also excluded selected ship crews from our non-Sea Swap guided missile ship analysis because we wanted the ships we analyzed to reflect the standard ship and crew option as closely as possible. The ships and crews we excluded were: (1) precommissioning crews because of their small sample sizes and nondeployed status, (2) the U.S. Milius and its crew because it was an optimal manning experiment ship, and (3) the U.S. Paul Hamilton because this crew was on an extended, 10-month deployment. We compiled reenlistment averages for the ships we analyzed in 6-month blocks that roughly corresponded with Sea Swap guided missile destroyer program and crew deployments, beginning November 1, 2001, and ending on April 30, 2004, and that included pre-deployment, deployment and post- deployment data for these crews. While we did not validate the casualty report and sailor reenlistment data used in this report, we discussed the data with DOD officials to determine that the data were sufficiently reliable for our analysis. We did validate the Navy Lessons Learned System data and determined the data were sufficiently reliable for our analysis. We conducted our review from July 2003 through July 2004 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. We conducted focus group meetings with Navy submarine and ship officers and enlisted personnel who were involved in crew rotations. Focus groups involve structured small group discussions designed to gain more in-depth information about specific issues that cannot easily be obtained from single or serial interviews. As with typical focus group methodologies, our design included multiple groups with varying group characteristics but some homogeneity—such as rank and responsibility— within groups. Each group involved 7 to 10 participants. Discussions were held in a structured manner, guided by a moderator who used a standardized list of questions to encourage participants to share their thoughts and experiences. Our overall objective in using a focus group approach was to obtain views, insights, and feelings of Navy submarine and ship officers and enlisted personnel involved in crew rotations. To gain broad perspectives, we conducted over 40 separate focus group sessions with multiple groups of Navy ship officers and enlisted personnel involved in crew rotations on the guided missile destroyer U.S.S. Higgins, selected ballistic missile submarines, the HSV-2 Swift, and selected patrol coastal ships. Table 4 identifies the composition of the focus groups on each of the vessels. Across focus groups, participants were selected to ensure a wide distribution of officers, enlisted personnel, seniority, and ship departments. GAO analysts traveled to each naval station to conduct the majority of the focus groups. Six of the focus groups were conducted on board the U.S.S. Higgins while it transited to its homeport after its extended deployment. A guide was developed to assist the moderator in leading the discussions. The guide helped the moderator address several topics related to crew rotations: training, maintenance, infrastructure and operations, management and oversight, readiness, crew characteristics, quality of life, lessons learned, and overall satisfaction with the rotational crewing experience. Each focus group discussion began with the moderator describing the purpose of our study and explaining how focus groups work. Participants were assured anonymity of their responses, in that names would not be directly linked to their responses in write-ups of the sessions and that all of the responses for the session would be summarized. The participants were then asked open-ended questions about the impact of crew rotations on each of the topics. All focus group questions were moderated by a GAO analyst who was assisted by a GAO subject matter expert, while two assistants took notes. We performed a systematic content analysis of the open-ended responses in order to categorize and summarize participants’ experiences with crew rotations. Based on the primary topics developed in the focus group guide, individual GAO analysts reviewed the responses from one of the crews and created their own respective lists of subcategories within each of the primary focus group topics. The analysts then met collectively to generate a proposed list of topic primary categories and subcategories. To ensure inter-rater reliability, one of our analysts reviewed the responses from each vessel type and assigned each comment to a corresponding category. Another analyst also reviewed each response and independently assigned the same comment to a corresponding category. Any comments that were not assigned to the same category were then reconciled and adjudicated by the two analysts, which led to the comments being placed into one or more of the resulting categories. Agreement regarding each placement was reached between at least two analysts. All initial disagreements regarding placement into categories were discussed and reconciled. The responses in each category were then used in our evaluation of how the Navy’s experiences with rotational crewing have been effectively managed and the effect of maintenance overseas on ships homeported in the United States during extended deployments. Methodologically, focus groups are not designed to (1) demonstrate the extent of a problem or to generalize results to a larger population, (2) develop a consensus to arrive at an agreed-upon plan or make decisions about what actions to take, or (3) provide statistically representative samples or reliable quantitative estimates. Instead, they are intended to generate in-depth information about the focus group participants’ reasons for the attitudes held toward specific topics and to offer insights into the range of concerns and support for an issue. The projectability of the information produced by our focus groups is limited for several reasons. First, they represent the responses of Navy ship officers and enlisted personnel from more than 40 selected groups. Second, while the composition of the groups was designed to assure a distribution of Navy officers, enlisted personnel, seniority, and ship departments, the groups were not randomly sampled. Third, participants were asked questions about their specific experiences with crew rotations. The experiences of other Navy ship officers and personnel involved in crew rotations, who did not participate in our focus group, may have varied. Because of these limitations, we did not rely entirely on focus groups, but rather used several different methodologies to corroborate and support our conclusions to objectives two and three. Department of the Navy guidance related to the implementation of Title 10, United States Code, section 7310(a) restrictions on overseas maintenance, or that define terms used in the law, is noted below. Chief of Naval Operations Instruction 4700.7K (July 2003), “Maintenance Policy for U.S. Navy Ships,” defines voyage repairs as “corrective maintenance of mission- or safety-essential items necessary for a ship to deploy or to continue on its deployment.” Naval Sea Systems Command Fleet Modernization Program Management and Operations Manual (June 2002, Rev. 2), SL720-AA-MAN-010, Glossary, defines voyage repairs as “emergency work necessary to repair damage sustained by a ship to enable the ship to continue on its mission and which can be accomplished without requiring a change in the ship’s operating schedule or the general streaming notice in effect.” Commander Military Sealift Command Instruction 4700.15A (February 2, 2000), “Accomplishing Ship Repair in Foreign Shipyards,” states that voyage repairs include corrective maintenance on mission or safety essential items necessary for a ship to deploy, to continue on its deployment, or comply with regulatory requirements; scheduled maintenance, only to the extent that said maintenance is absolutely necessary to ensure machinery and equipment operational reliability or comply with regulatory requirements; and voyage repairs do not include corrective maintenance actions that may be deferred until the next scheduled regular overhaul and drydocking availability in the United States or Guam without degrading operational readiness, habitability standards, or personnel safety, or adversely impacting regulatory compliance. The following are GAO’s comments on the Department of Defense’s letter dated October 25, 2004. 1. We have added a discussion of the methodology we used in our Sea Swap destroyer reenlistment analysis. See appendix II. 2. No change needed in report. 3. No change needed in report. 4. We agree that expanded scope predeployment inspections and maintenance for ships scheduled for extended deployments are prudent. We also agree that ships scheduled for extended deployments would benefit from a clearly defined process to delineate those increased requirements. 5. Our report noted that increased maintenance tasks contributed to diminished crew morale. We agree with DOD’s comment that many other factors also contributed to the diminished morale for sailors crewing on rotational crewing ships. 6. Our report did not recommend revising Title 10 requirements. 7. No change needed in report. 8. No change needed in report. 9. No change needed in report. 10. No change needed in report. 11. No change needed in report. Jim Bancroft, Kelly Baumgartner, Larry Bridges, Lee Cooper, Corrie Dodd-Burtch, Joseph Kirschbaum, Kate Lenane, Elizabeth Morris, Richard Payne, Charles Perdue, Terry Richardson, Roderick Rodgers, Bill Russell, Rebecca Shea, Jennifer Thomas, Julie Tremper, John Van Schaik, and R.K. Wild made key contributions to this report. The Government Accountability Office, the audit, evaluation and investigative arm of Congress, exists to support Congress in meeting its constitutional responsibilities and to help improve the performance and accountability of the federal government for the American people. GAO examines the use of public funds; evaluates federal programs and policies; and provides analyses, recommendations, and other assistance to help Congress make informed oversight, policy, and funding decisions. GAO’s commitment to good government is reflected in its core values of accountability, integrity, and reliability. 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Summary: The Navy has traditionally maintained overseas presence by deploying ships for 6 months. Rotating crews aboard ships that remain deployed for longer periods is an alternative the Navy could pursue to increase the utilization of ships. Senior Navy officials have also cited crew rotations as a way to reduce part of the Navy's plans for a larger force structure and reportedly free billions of dollars for other priorities. On its own initiative, GAO examined the Navy's efforts to evaluate and implement several rotational crewing options and the impacts of ship maintenance on extended rotational crewing deployments. The Navy has initiated change by demonstrating that rotating crews aboard surface ships on extended deployments may be a feasible alternative to traditional 6-month ship deployments. To effectively institutionalize and implement change, best practices show that a comprehensive analytical framework provides useful information to decision makers. However, the Navy has not established such an analytical framework--consisting of formal measurable goals, objectives, and metrics--that could be used to assess the feasibility of various rotational crewing options and determine their impact on operational requirements, ship condition, and crew morale. Further, the Navy has not systematically collected or developed accurate cost data to perform complete cost-effective analyses. Absent such information, the Navy may not know the full impact of rotating crews on surface ships, the extent to which the various options should be implemented, or whether it is getting maximum return on investment. Because rotating crews on surface ships is evolving as an alternative, the Navy has not provided effective guidance when implementing the practice and has not systematically leveraged lessons learned. Effective guidance and sharing of lessons learned are key tools used to institutionalize change and facilitate efficient operations. While the Navy has well-established crew rotation policies and procedures for ballistic missile submarines that include appropriately documenting a ship's condition and turnover procedures for accountability, it has not provided comparable guidance to surface ships. As a result, the Navy unnecessarily risks repeating mistakes that could decrease warfighting effectiveness and crew morale. Furthermore, the impact of ship maintenance on the implementation of rotational crewing has not been fully assessed. Effective maintenance strategies help ensure ships can perform their missions without adverse impacts on crew morale. It is a challenge to ensure the mission capability of ships that are deployed for longer periods because most maintenance and repair is usually completed between 6-month deployments. While rotating crews has enabled the Navy to keep ships deployed for up to 24 months, the service has not fully examined all issues related to the best maintenance strategies that could affect a ship's condition and crew's morale. Absent effective strategies, the Navy risks degrading long-term ship condition and discouraging crew support for rotational crewing.