During the 107th Congress, Representative Don Young and Representative John Micaintroduced the Arming Pilots Against Terrorism Act ( H.R. 4635 , 107th Congress). Atthat time, the Bush administration voiced initial opposition to the concept of arming pilots withlethal weapons. As amended by the Aviation Subcommittee of the House Committee onTransportation and Infrastructure on June 19, 2002 (and as ordered reported by the full committeeon June 26, 2002), the bill contained a provision that capped participation in the program at 2% ofeligible pilots and limited the program to a two-year test period. On July 10, 2002, RepresentativePeter DeFazio offered an amendment on the floor to remove the 2% cap on the number of pilots whocould participate in the program and also deleted the 2-year sunset provision contained in the bill. The amendment was adopted twice by large majorities and H.R. 4635 passed by a voteof 310-113. On May 25, 2002, Senator Robert Smith introduced the Arming Pilots AgainstTerrorism and Cabin Defense Act of 2002 ( S. 2554 , 107th Congress) which containedsimilar language to the final version of H.R. 4635 (107th Congress) passed by the House. On September 4, 2002, Senator Smith offered an amendment to the Senate version of H.R. 5005 (107th Congress), a bill introduced to create a Department of HomelandSecurity, that included provisions for arming pilots similar to those contained in H.R. 4635 (107th Congress). On November 12, 2002, Representative Richard Armey introduced H.R. 5710 (107th Congress) as a new vehicle for establishing the Department ofHomeland Security and for other purposes which contained provisions for arming pilots. However,in response to lobbying efforts by the air cargo industry, the language in this legislation limitedparticipation in the program to pilots of passenger air carrier aircraft. On November 19, 2002, theSenate amended H.R. 5005 (107th Congress), incorporating provisions virtually identicalto H.R. 5710 (107th Congress). The House agreed to the Senate amendment to H.R. 5005 (107th Congress) on November 22, 2002, and it was signed by President Bushon November 25, 2002 becoming P.L. 107-296 . Debate over the issue of arming pilots focused on the benefits, risks, and costs associated with implementing the program. Proponents, principally pilots and pilot unions, argued that the potentialbenefits of deterring or thwarting terrorist and criminal acts against passenger aircraft outweighedthe inherent risks associated with arming pilots. Opponents of policy allowing pilots to be armedwith lethal weapons, including the airlines and several prominent aviation safety experts, argued thatsuch a program's safety risks and monetary costs outweighed these potential benefits. Key riskscited by critics of the program include: Added workload and responsibilities associated with participation in the program that may distract pilots from primary flying duties and safety-relatedfunctions; Risks of a firearm discharge to innocent passengers or aircraft structure andsystems; and A proliferation of firearms on aircraft and in secured areas of the aviationsystem that is counter to other security objectives. (4) Many of these concerns raised by critics of the plan to arm pilots have been recognized by bothCongress and proponents of the plan as key issues to be addressed in program implementation. In the first session of the 108th Congress, debate focused on whether pilots of all-cargo aircraft should be included in the Federal Flight Deck Officer Program. All-cargo pilots were initiallyexcluded from the program in the final wording of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 ( P.L.107-296 ). In the first session of the 108th Congress, several legislative vehicles were introduced toexpand the program to cargo pilots as well as to other flight crew members, such as flight engineers. On February 13, 2003, Rep. John Mica introduced H.R. 765 , and on March 5, 2003 Sen.Bunning introduced S. 516 . Both bills sought to include cargo pilots in the FederalFlight Deck Officer Program, while S. 516 sought to also include other flight crewmembers such as flight engineers. A separate stand-alone bill ( S. 1657 ) introduced bySenator Bunning was passed by the Senate on November 10, 2003. Similar legislation( H.R. 1049 and H.R. 3262 ,) was also introduced in the House. Also, theAir Cargo Security Act ( S. 165 ), passed by the Senate on May 9, 2003, contained aprovision that sought to include all-cargo pilots in the Federal Flight Deck Officers Program. AnAmendment offered by Senator Bunning ( S.Amdt. 903 to S. 824 ) wasincluded in the FAA reauthorization legislation ( P.L. 108-176 ) and was enacted into law onDecember 12, 2003. This provision expands the Federal Flight Deck Officer Program to includeother flight crew members such as flight engineers and to flight crew members flying for all-cargoair carriers. Implementation of the Federal Flight Deck Officer Program requires assessments of thestandards and guidelines for: 1) pilot selection and screening; 2) equipment; 3) training; 4)operational procedures; and 5) costs. To implement the program, the TSA formed a task force toaddress these issues and developed a plan for implementation of the program. While Congress hasnoted that the TSA's decisions regarding the methods for implementing procedural requirements ofthe program shall be subject to review only for abuse of discretion, continued legislative oversightof the program is likely to be an issue for the 108th Congress. Furthermore, the 108thCongressdebated and passed legislation ( P.L. 108-176 ) allowing pilots of all-cargo air carriers and flightengineers to participate in the program. What types of screening and selection criteria are needed for volunteer pilots prior to and while participating in the program. Issues considered during implementation of the program include the process for selecting and screening of volunteer pilots seeking to become Federal flight deck officers. The legislation requiresfurther assessment to determine whether additional background checks should be required beyondthat specified by section 44936(a)(1) of Title 49, Code of Federal Regulations. (5) Additional selectionand screening criteria could help to ensure that pilots selected to participate are physically andpsychologically capable of carrying out the duties and responsibilities associated with participationin the program and maintain the standards set forth by the program while serving as Federal flightdeck officers. Screening measures could be used to assess whether a pilot poses a security or safetythreat by possessing a firearm on the flight deck or by being trained in the use of lethal force. Proponents of this new law point out that pilots already undergo rigorous pre-employment evaluations and screening throughout their careers with an air carrier. Captain Stephen Luckey,chairman of the National Fight Security Committee of the Air Line Pilots Association (ALPA),International noted that: Pilots are undoubtedly the most highly scrutinizedemployees in the work force, submitting to a battery of pre-employment evaluations, a flight physicalevery six months, random drug and alcohol testing, and a criminal history records check, amongother formal examinations. Additionally, pilots are constantly interacting with and undergoing defacto monitoring by their airline's management, their peers, FAA personnel, andothers. (6) On the other hand, despite pre-existing measures for screening and evaluating pilots, recent examplesof confirmed and suspected suicides and sabotage of aircraft by flight crew personnel suggest apotential need for more detailed background checks of pilots wishing to participate in the FederalFlight Deck Officer Program. (7) However, there islittle agreement on whether additional screeningincluding psychiatric evaluation of pilots would be able to detect pilots who would pose a risk byparticipating in the program. Some argue that current screening and peer monitoring of pilots areinsufficient, and detailed psychiatric screening and psychological testing is needed to adequatelyassess the mental health of pilots. (8) Others argue thatmany common mental health conditions canbe masked during these evaluations. They assert that the costs of implementing such elaboratescreening measures would far outweigh the marginal improvement in assessing the mental healthof pilots beyond that obtained through the scrutiny pilots already undergo. Proponents for armingpilots also argue that by having access to the flight deck, a pilot intent on causing harm alreadypossesses the means to do so, and introducing a firearm on the flight deck does little to add to thatalready existing capability. They argue that, historically, incidents of deliberate acts by pilots toharm the airplane and its occupants are extremely unusual and current background checks, screening,and evaluations of pilots are more than adequate for assessing their fitness to participate in theFederal Flight Deck Officer Program. The Arming Pilots Against Terrorism Act specifies that pilots who are former military or law enforcement personnel should be given preference to participate in the Federal Flight Deck OfficerProgram. This could be one way to mitigate the risks identified above, at least among the initialcadre of deputized Federal flight deck officers by giving preference for participation in the programto persons that were already deemed fit to carry a firearm. It is also of note that the law does notlimit participation to U.S. citizens. Therefore, another implementation issue is whether additionalbackground checks will be required for non-U.S. citizen pilots volunteering to participate in thisprogram. While provisions for waiting periods and background checks have been established forforeign pilots seeking certain types of advanced flight training in the United States since September11, 2001, it is uncertain whether additional background checks and waiting periods would be neededfor foreign pilots seeking to participate in the Federal Flight Deck Officer Program, particularly ifthe pilot has an extensive employment record flying for U.S. air carriers. Currently, TSA procedures require that pilots applying for the program undergo additional psychological screening, background checks, and a medical examination beyond those alreadyrequired of airline pilots. The Airline Pilots Security Alliance (APSA), a grass-roots organizationsupporting efforts to arm pilots, has called the TSA screening requirements unacceptable andredundant with many existing FAA and airline screening requirements. (9) However, the TSA assertsthat the proposed screening measures are similar to those used in selection of federal lawenforcement officers, including federal air marshals, to determine an individual's fitness to carry afirearm and act in a law enforcement capacity and are necessary to ensure that participating pilotsmeet these same standards. (10) According to TSA,about 6 percent of the applicants for the programare screened out prior to initial training - 2 percent fail to meet the qualifications specified by law,3 percent are eliminated through psychological screening, and 1 percent have problems identifiedby the background check. (11) What are the tradeoffs between firearms effectiveness and risk tothe aircraft? The legislation identifies the selection of firearms and ammunition as an issue to be addressed in developing procedural requirements for the program. The legislation also specifies that ananalysis shall be conducted to assess the risk of catastrophic failure of an aircraft as a result of thedischarge (including an accidental discharge) of a firearm into the avionics, electrical systems, orother sensitive areas of the aircraft. The legislation further specifies that information developed inthis analysis shall be treated as classified information and not disclosed. If significant risks aredetermined to exist, the Under Secretary shall take actions to minimize these risks. The selection of firearms and ammunition for use in the program is an important consideration because the unique environment of the flight deck and the fact that pilots are not primarily lawenforcement officers make this program quite different than other law enforcement applications offirearms. Opponents of arming pilots have argued that a stray bullet could cause serious damage toaircraft systems and structures and jeopardize flight safety. Speaking before the Senate Committeeon Commerce, Science and Transportation, Captain Edward M. Davidson, Director of Flight Safetyand Quality Assurance for Northwest Airlines, cautioned that bullets could pierce flight deckwindows creating a potentially catastrophic cockpit decompression, could strike one of the flightdeck's many multi-functional instruments putting at risk numerous safety critical systems, or couldstrike critical electronic navigation equipment located beneath the flight deck. (12) A depressurizationof the airplane at altitude would necessitate that the flight crew use supplemental oxygen andcomplete checklist procedures in response to the depressurization. Similarly, loss of critical aircraftsystems may require a flight crew's immediate attention. Accomplishing required safety-related tasksmay prove difficult during a struggle with intruders in the cockpit. However, in testimony before the House Subcommittee on Aviation, Mr. Ron Hinderberger, Director of Aviation Safety for the Boeing Company stated that "[t]he risk of loss of the aircraft dueto a stray round from a handgun is very slight. Boeing commercial service history contains cases ofgunfire onboard in-service airplanes, all of which landed safely." Hinderberger further noted that"[c]ommercial airplane structure is designed with sufficient strength, redundancy, and damagetolerance that single or even multiple handgun bullet holes would not result in loss of the aircraft. A single bullet hole in the fuselage skin would have little effect on cabin pressurization." (13) It has been reported that the weapon initially chosen for the program was a Smith & Wesson .40-caliber semiautomatic pistol that is commonly used by law enforcement agencies. (14) Morerecently, it was announced that German weapons manufacturer Heckler & Koch who makes a similar.40-caliber handgun was awarded the TSA contract to supply up to 9,600 guns for the program. (15) This award was questioned, particularly by other bidders and supporters of "buy American"principles. This prompted TSA to reevaluate the contract bids, but Heckler & Koch again came outon top in the reevaluation process. The company is building a manufacturing facility in Columbus,Georgia that will eventually supply guns for the Federal Flight Deck Officer program and createabout 200 U.S. manufacturing jobs. (16) As the program evolves, further research and development of firearms and ammunition more specifically tailored to the needs of Federal Flight Deck officers and the unique environment of theflight deck may be needed. Factors to be examined include enhancement of firearm effectivenessin the flight deck environment and mitigation of the risks of accidental discharges, inadvertentshootings of innocent passengers, and possible depressurization of the cabin or disabling of aircraftsystems from a firearm discharge. The law provides for temporary suspension of the program if thefirearm of a Federal flight deck officer accidentally discharges due to a shortcoming in standards,training, or procedures until the shortcoming is corrected. Who should conduct the training? The law specifies that training of Federal flight deck officers was to begin within three months after enactment. Following enactment, the TSA convened a task force to define the training programand address other implementation issues. The law provides that the training program may beadministered either by the Under Secretary or by a firearms training facility approved by the UnderSecretary. This leaves to the Under Secretary's discretion whether the training will be provided byTSA facilities and staff, by facilities and staff of other Federal law enforcement agencies ororganizations, or by contractor facilities. One advantage of using TSA facilities is that doing socould maximize standardization of training for pilots and compliance with the standards andguidelines established by the Under Secretary. It could also improve coordination of training andprocedures between Federal flight deck officers and Federal air marshals who will need to coordinateand communicate effectively when dealing with in-flight situations that may arise. However, TSAtraining facilities may become overburdened if large numbers of pilots wish to participate in theprogram. TSA facilities and staff may lack the ability to administer training in a timely manner thatmeets scheduling constraints of the pilots, especially given that the pilots will need to complete thistraining during their time off. One alternative that has been considered is to use Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) training facilities. In December 2001, the FBI released its proposal for training airline pilots termed the"Cockpit Protection Program." The advantage of this plan is that it is already well defined andincludes assessments of the facility and staff requirements needed to administer the training. Thedisadvantage of this program is that it removes the training from the direct control of the TSA, whowould instead assume an oversight role to ensure that training standards established by the UnderSecretary are maintained. Also, this arrangement may not offer the opportunity for specific trainingregarding the coordination of duties and responsibilities between Federal flight deck officers andFederal air marshals. Another federal entity named as possible provider of training for Federal flightdeck officers is the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center (FLETC) which has facilities inGlynco, Georgia; Charleston, South Carolina; and Artesia, New Mexico. These facilities mayprovide capabilities to train larger groups of pilots at locations that may be more convenient to some,but like the FBI facilities, these facilities may have limited oversight by TSA and may not offer theopportunity for training on coordination with Federal air marshals. Using contractor facilities and/or contractor staff to administer training to Federal flight deck officers are also options, but ones that pose several challenges. Extensive oversight of contractorprovided training may be necessary to ensure that established curriculum and qualifications standardsare maintained. If multiple contracts are used to train Federal flight deck officers, standardizationof training across vendors may be difficult to maintain. One advantage of using contract training forthe program might be the reduction of capital investment for facilities and personnel. A prototype training program was held in April, 2003 used FLETC facilities in Glynco, Georgia to train an initial group of 48 pilots. Full implementation of the program began in July 2003 at theGlynco facilities as well as facilities in Artesia, New Mexico. In September 2003, the program wasmoved in its entirety to the Artesia, New Mexico facilities because that site has aircraft mockups fortraining that were not available at Glynco and other law enforcement training at Glynco, Georgia waslimiting facilities available for the program there. Some pilot groups have complained that theTSA's reliance on a single site, and the remote location of the Artesia, New Mexico facility (269miles from the nearest major airport in Albuquerque) creates a considerable inconvenience forattending the training. (17) Admiral Loy noted that while the initial training is being conducted at federal facilities, as the program evolves "...there very well may be a private sector opportunity..." to provide the training. (18) More recently, the TSA has indicated that they view initial training of the pilots as a federal function,so that trainees can be appropriately evaluated before being deputized, but remain open to thepossibility that private firms can provide for recurrent training and re-qualification of federal flightdeck officers. However, TSA has indicated that it will make no decision on whether re-qualificationtraining should take place at federal facilities or TSA-approved private facilities or somecombination thereof until they have more experience with the program. (19) What will the training consist of ? The Act specifies that the training of a Federal flight deck officer shall include: Training to ensure that the Federal flight deck officer attains a level of proficiency with a firearm comparable to the level of proficiency required of Federal airmarshals; Training to ensure that the officer maintains exclusive control over the officer'sfirearm at all times, including training in defensive maneuvers; and Training to assist the officer in determining when it is appropriate to use theofficer's firearm and when it is appropriate to use less than lethal force. The Act specifies that the Under Secretary shall base the requirements for training Federal flight deck officers on the training standards applicable to Federal air marshals, taking into account thediffering roles and responsibilities of Federal flight deck officers and Federal air marshals. Whilemany of the details of the Federal air marshal training program are classified and cannot bedisclosed, it has been reported that the program consists of 10 ï¿½ weeks of progressive trainingstarting with basic marksmanship, followed by reactive firearms training scenarios, followed byadvanced firearms techniques specific to the aircraft cabin environment, followed by scenario-basedexercises using wide-body and narrow-body aircraft mockups. (20) Pilot groups including ALPA and the Allied Pilots Association (APA) have suggested that initial training for Federal flight deck officers could be completed in a 48-hour training program. Such a training program was derived from details released in December 2001 regarding the FBICockpit Protection Program that proposed a five-day, 48-hour training course in firearms handling,legal aspects, tort law, and policies regarding use of lethal force. The current TSA program similarlyconsists of a 48-hour curriculum of classroom instruction, firearms training, and tactical drills. The legislation also specifies that Federal flight deck officers will have to re-qualify at an interval required by the Under Secretary. The FBI Cockpit Protection Program specified an annualre-qualification interval. The selection of a re-qualification interval will need to strike a balancebetween adequately ensuring that qualification standards are maintained while ensuring that theprocess does not overburden TSA resources or place an undue schedule burden on Federal flightdeck officers who will need to re-qualify during time away from their flying jobs. How will the effectiveness of the training be evaluated? The law does not specify any criteria or guidelines for assessing the effectiveness of the program or the training provided under the program. Given that the primary objective of theprogram is deterrence of terrorism and criminal acts against the flight deck, effectiveness of theprogram in this regard will be difficult if not impossible to assess. Successful deterrence may beindicated by statistics regarding security incidents aboard aircraft. However, it will be difficult toattribute any reduction in security incidents directly to this program. This is especially true inconsideration of the fact that the Federal flight deck program is but one component of a larger effortto heighten aviation security in response to terrorist threats that also includes enhanced passengerand baggage screening and the deployment of Federal air marshals. Nonetheless, the effectivenessof certain elements of the program can be assessed. For example, the effectiveness of training canbe assessed through evaluation of performance during re-qualification. Also, effectiveness of theprogram with regards to risk management can be assessed though analysis of data on incidents offirearms mishandling, accidental discharges, lost and stolen weapons, and so on. Storage and Transportation of the Firearm. Should the weapon be stored at secure airport facilities or carried by the Federal flight deck officer traveling to and from duty? The legislation identifies storage and transportation of firearms as an issue to be addressed in establishing the procedural requirements for the program. The legislation specifies that particularattention should be given to storage and transportation of firearms on international flights and whenthe pilot leaves the airport to remain overnight away from the pilot's base airport. Pilot groups haveargued for allowing Federal flight deck officers to retain the firearm, particularly at the pilot's homebase, and further advocate that Federal flight deck officers be given the opportunity to train with thefirearm to maintain proficiency in its use. (21) Opponents of such a plan argue that pilots carryingweapons both in airports and to and from work could be the target of terrorists and criminals seekingto steal their firearms and increases the potential for mishandling of the firearm and accidentaldischarges. In February 2003, a TSA task force studying the implementation issues for the Federal Flight Deck Officer Program recommended the use of lock boxes for transporting the firearms. Pilot groupshave voiced concerns that the use of lock boxes undermines the intent of the legislation which theybelieve specifies that "...the officer maintains exclusive control over his or her firearm at alltimes..." (22) The TSA has indicated that itsdecision is based on the very specific nature of themission outlined in the legislation which permits pilots to use their weapons only in defense of theflight deck. The TSA considers the lock box as a means to minimize the risk that the firearms willbe used in other situations. However, the Airline Pilots' Security Alliance (APSA) is concerned thatthe use of lock boxes to transport firearms may make pilots particularly vulnerable targets for thievesseeking to steal their weapons and provides pilots with no means for personal security to protectagainst this threat. (23) Currently, TSA requires thefirearm to be carried in a secured lock box and onlyopened inside a secure cockpit. Should the firearm be concealed? Concealment of the issued firearm is not specifically addressed in the legislation but was a significant issue considered in establishing the procedural requirements of the program. Carryinga concealed firearm would prevent the flying public from determining which pilots were Federalflight deck officers. Doing so could prevent Federal flight deck officers from becoming targets ofattempts to seize or steal firearms. Concealing the firearms could also benefit pilots who are notparticipants in the program since individuals intending criminal acts against a flight deck will nothave foreknowledge of whether the pilots on the flight deck are armed or not. On the other hand,carrying a concealed weapon in the airport terminal, outside controlled access areas of airports, andduring travel to and from work could complicate security screening and law enforcement efforts toestablish a pilot's status as a Federal flight deck officer authorized to carry a concealed firearm. Pilotgroups have also raised the issue of whether Federal flight deck officers will be permitted to carrybackup firearms. (24) It is common practice amonglaw enforcement officers to carry concealed backupfirearms. Currently, the flight deck officers are only issued one weapon which must be transportedin a secured lock box that is concealed in pilots cases, but not readily accessible to the pilot whenoutside the secured cockpit. Airport Security Screening. What identification will verify that a pilot is a deputized Federal flight deck officer authorized to possess a firearm? The legislation identifies methods for ensuring that security personnel will be able to identify whether a pilot is authorized to carry a firearm under the program as an issue that was addressed inestablishing the procedural requirements for the program. Adequate methods for preventing forgeryof identification and accounting for misplaced or stolen identification are needed to ensure thatterrorists and criminals cannot breach security checkpoints by impersonating Federal flight deckofficers. The Aviation and Transportation Security Act (ATSA, P.L. 107-71 ; 115 Stat. 597)mandated the establishment of a uniform system of identification for all State and local lawenforcement personnel for use in obtaining permission to carry weapons in aircraft cabins and inobtaining access to a secured area of an airport, if otherwise authorized to carry such weapons. TheTSA also currently has several research efforts examining technologies for establishing astandardized Transportation Worker Identification Card (TWIC) and for exploring the use ofbiometric technologies for identification. Future deployments of systems using these technologiesmay provide enhanced capability to assure positive identification of Federal flight deck officers. Federal flight deck officers are identified by credentials issued by TSA, but specific procedures forverifying these credentials is considered security sensitive information. Where should screening and identification checking of Federal flight deck officers take place? If it is determined that concealing the identity of Federal flight deck officers would be a desirable aspect of the program, then security screening of Federal flight deck officers and otherflight crew at security checkpoints in open public spaces may diminish the effectiveness of theprogram. As previously noted, public identification of Federal flight deck officers may havenegative consequences for both Federal flight deck officers who may be targeted in attempts to seizefirearms and for pilots not participating in the program whose flights may be targeted if it isdetermined that a Federal flight deck officer is not on board. Screening of pilots in open view mayalso compromise specific security procedures to validate the identity of Federal flight deck officers. However, alternative arrangements for screening of flight crew may be impractical, particularly atsmaller airports where employee and passenger screening are collocated. Flight Deck Operational Procedures. Where should the firearm be placed during flight operations? The legislation identifies the placement of a Federal flight deck officer's firearm on board the aircraft to ensure security and ease of retrieval as an issue to be addressed in developing theprocedural requirements of the program. A holstered weapon may present a safety hazard as it mayinterfere with the pilots full range of motion and prevent performance of normal flight deck duties. A holstered weapon may also be difficult to access from a seated position. However, alternativeoptions involving aircraft modifications for securing firearms on the flight deck would requireindustry retrofitting of flight decks for all affected transport category airplanes and FAA certificationof these designs. Simple designs may be easily approved and implemented. However, moreelaborate designs for housing firearms on the flight deck may require more detailed test andevaluation as part of the certification process. Due to significant differences in flight deck layoutsamong transport category aircraft, standardization across aircraft types in a manner that optimizespositioning of the firearm may be difficult to achieve. These designs may also have difficultyaccommodating differences in physical dimensions and handedness among Federal flight deckofficers. What coordination of flight crew and law enforcement personnel is needed? The legislation identifies interaction between a Federal flight deck officer and a Federal air marshal on board the aircraft and methods for ensuring that pilots are able to identify lawenforcement officers authorized to carry a firearm aboard the aircraft as issues to be addressed inestablishing the procedural requirements of the program. Such coordination will need to addressconcerns over concealing the identity of Federal air marshals while allowing sufficient coordinationbetween them and Federal flight deck officers. Airlines have procedures in place for identifyingarmed law enforcement officers and making these individuals known to flight crews. Theseprocedures may need to be enhanced and further standardized by TSA to ensure that flight crews caneasily recognize armed law enforcement officers on board and coordinate with them if needed. The legislation also identifies the division of responsibility between pilots in the event of an act of criminal violence or air piracy for instances where either one or both of the flight crew are Federalflight deck officers as an additional issue to be addressed in implementing the program. This raisesa question of what, if any, training and educational materials regarding the Federal flight deck officerprogram will be made available to non-participating flight crew and cabin crew members. Currently,only very limited information about the program is available to them. While, flight crews and cabincrews already receive initial and recurrent training in FAA mandated crew resource management(CRM) training programs that facilitates coordination of duties and responsibilities, airlines areunlikely to address the subject of division of responsibility when a pilot must perform duties as aFederal flight deck officer, citing that this is a Federal function and possibly fearing liability issuesif such matters are addressed in training. (25) Furthermore, there is no requirement in the legislationfor training or education of non-participating flight crew personnel regarding the program and mostdetails of the program have not been released because of their security sensitive nature. Thus, it hasbeen largely left up to individual Federal flight deck officers to brief non-participating flight crewon the coordination of flight duties if the flight deck were attacked. The coordination amongmultiple flight crew members who are deputized Federal flight deck officers is likely much lesstroublesome as they have undergone the same standard training and thus have a better understandingof the division of responsibilities during an attack. How should disturbances in the passenger cabin be handled? The legislation specifies procedures for ensuring that the firearm of a Federal flight deck officer does not leave the cockpit if there is a disturbance in the passenger cabin as an issue to be addressedin establishing the procedural requirements of the program. Current guidelines and proceduresprohibit Federal flight deck officers from intervening in cabin disturbances. Rather, Federal flightdeck officers are instructed to use their weapons and training only in the defense of the flight deckwhich is consistent with the intent of the law establishing this program. Disturbances in the passenger cabin are left to be handled by flight attendants, federal air marshals, or any other law enforcement personnel on the aircraft. Federal flight deck officers areinstructed to use their judgment and any available information they can ascertain from flightattendants and so on to determine the best course of action for diverting the aircraft to a locationwhere ground based law enforcement can intervene if needed. While the Aviation andTransportation Security Act ( P.L. 107-71 ) specifies that the FAA may develop and implementmethods, such as video monitors or other surveillance technologies, to alert pilots in the flight deckto activity in the cabin, such devices are not yet available, but are being developed. What procedures should be established for opening the cockpit door and leaving the cockpit? Additionally, the legislation specifies procedures for ensuring that the firearm of a Federal flight deck officer does not leave the cockpit if the pilot leaves the cockpit for personal reasons as an issueto be addressed in establishing the procedural requirements of the program. Procedures relating toopening the cockpit door for other reasons are not specifically addressed in the legislation but wereexamined in the implementation of the program. Reasons for opening the cockpit door and leavingthe cockpit during flight include flight crew meal and beverage service, flight crew changes onlong-duration flights, use of the lavatory, and abnormal or emergency situations that require actionsoutside of the cockpit. Such events may result in a physical separation between the Federal flightdeck officer and his or her firearm if the firearm is to be secured on the flight deck at all times. Occasions when the cockpit door is opened and when the flight crew is moving about may in factbe the most risky times with regard to a potential attack. Procedures may be needed to address thesevarious scenarios and mitigate the risks associated with opening the cockpit door. What will the costs to the Federal government be? The law specifies that the Under Secretary shall be obligated to provide all training, supervision, and equipment needed for the program at no expense to the pilot or the air carrier employing thepilot. Thus, direct training costs will be the obligation of the Federal Government. This will includeinitial training and qualification as well as recurrent training and re-qualification of pilots in theprogram. The Federal Government is also obligated to provide equipment needed for the program. These equipment expenses will primarily consist of issued firearms and ammunition as well as anyequipment needed to maintain the firearms. This may also include facilities to house firearms atairports. The Federal Government will also incur the costs of additional background checks orscreening that may be necessary to determine the fitness of a pilot to participate in the program. Total costs to the Federal Government for the program will be highly dependent on the number of pilots that volunteer and qualify to participate in the program as well as the rate at which pilotsare trained and deputized. Congressional Budget Office (CBO) cost estimates for the program werebased upon earlier proposed legislation (107th Congress, H.R. 4635 ) that limitedparticipation to 2 percent of pilots employed by air carriers. In this estimate, the CBO assumed thatit would cost about $8,000 per pilot annually to cover the costs of equipment, training, and travel. (26) This figure does not include costs required to manage the program. In preparing to implement theprototype program, TSA has indicated that it will cost about $10,400 per pilot for training andequipment. The TSA budgeted a total $500,000 to conduct the prototype program. (27) In theConsolidated Appropriations Resolution for FY2003 ( P.L. 108-7 ), the TSA was given $8 millionto startup the Federal Flight Deck Officer program and begin full scale implementation of theprogram which began in July, 2003. The Homeland Security Appropriations for FY 2004 ( P.L.108-90 , 117 Stat. 1137) gave the TSA $25 million for continuing the program. At this funding level,more than 2,000 pilots could be deputized as Federal Flight Deck Officers by the end of FY 2004assuming TSA is able to conduct the background screening and training for this number of pilotsover the course of the fiscal year. Currently, TSA is conducting weekly initial training classes of 48pilots each. (28) What will the costs to participants and airlines be? The law specifies that pilots participating in the program shall not be eligible for compensation from the Federal Government for services provided as a flight deck officer. The law further statesthat the Federal Government and the air carriers shall not be obligated to compensate the pilots forany training, qualification, or re-qualification to carry firearms under this program. Consequently,pilots are not compensated by the Federal Government while attending training. While the aircarriers employing pilots participating in this program are not obligated to compensate pilots, suchcompensation may be a topic for negotiations between air carriers and pilot unions. Consequently,policies may vary from one air carrier to another. Similarly, indirect costs of training, such as travelto and from the training site and lodging and per diem while in training, could either be paid by theindividual pilots participating in the program or by the air carriers employing these pilots. Whilepilots may use their access to free airline transportation on a space available basis for travel to andfrom the training site, it is likely that most other indirect costs arising from participation in theprogram will be the responsibility of the pilots themselves. Given the airlines' early opposition tothis program, it is unlikely that compensation for pilots and payment of their indirect costs associatedwith participation in this program would be a concession that airlines are likely to make innegotiations with pilots unions. This is especially true in light of the economic difficulties facingmany airlines that prompted them to request tax relief from the Federal Government and ask forconcessions from pilot unions and other labor groups rather than vice versa. Consequently, in thecurrent economic environment, pilots will most likely have to complete training, qualification, andre-qualification during their own time and are likely to pay the indirect costs for training andparticipating in the program out of pocket. One issue that may arise is whether these out of pocketexpenses incurred by pilots participating in the program will be tax deductible. While the law specifies that equipment cost is a Federal obligation, it is uncertain who would pay for cockpit modifications if it is determined that such modifications are needed to store or securefirearms used in the program onboard the aircraft. Even if the direct costs for making suchmodifications are covered by the Federal Government, air carriers may be burdened by indirect costsassociated with removing aircraft from service to make any needed modifications. The currentprogram does not require any cockpit modifications. The Arming Pilots Against Terrorism Act initially limited participation in the Federal Flight Deck Officer Program to volunteer pilots of air carriers providing passenger air transportation orintrastate passenger air transportation. The legislation defines a pilot as a pilot-in-command (i.e.,a captain), or a second-in-command (i.e., first officer) when a second pilot is required, and does notinclude flight engineers or other members of the flight crew not meeting this definition. From thetime the legislation was introduced, pilot organizations have argued that the program should beexpanded to include other pilots and flight crew members, principally pilots of cargo air carriers andflight engineers. Should the Federal flight deck officer program be expanded toinclude other pilots? Proponents for arming pilots voiced concerns that the legislative language of the Arming Pilots Against Terrorism Act did not include all air carrier pilots. Specifically, the language limitsinclusion to pilots providing passenger air transportation or intrastate passenger air transportation. Consequently, pilots of cargo flights initially could not participate in the program. Nor could flightengineers or other flight crew members who are not formally considered pilots. However, aprovision in the FAA reauthorization legislation ( P.L. 108-176 ) expanded the program to includeall flight crew members of both passenger and all-cargo air carrier aircraft. Proponents for including cargo pilots among the cadre of Federal flight deck officers note that layers of security protection similar to those in place to protect passenger air carrier aircraft are notrequired for air cargo operations. They argue that this leaves cargo flight crews vulnerable topotential terrorist threats against cargo aircraft, including large and heavy aircraft that could be usedin an attack similar to that launched on September 11, 2001. They suggest that this vulnerability canbe mitigated by allowing cargo air carrier pilots to participate in the program. In a statement issuedNovember 15, 2002, Captain David Webb chairman of Air Line Pilot Association's FedEx unit,expressed the following view: A cargo aircraft is devoid of cabin attendants and air marshals. However, at airlines such as FedEx, employees and vendors are routinely boarded.Political maneuvering by the cargo industry has shielded them from the level of security screeningmandated for the passenger terminal. The entire burden for the security of the aircraft rests on thetwo or three pilots in the cockpit. There is little we can do to defend the aircraft against a terroristattack. Stripping us of the ability to carry firearms in the post-9/11 environment is an appallinglyirresponsible act. And the worst part is that it is our own managements that did this to us, with nodiscussion, no warning, no justification whatsoever. (29) Opponents argued that the general public does not have authorized access to cargo aircraft and therefore, enhanced ground-based security measures to better protect cargo aircraft and improvescreening of employees authorized to access these aircraft would make deputizing cargo pilots asFederal flight deck officers unnecessary. Some also argued that costly training for Federal flightdeck officers is not needed for cargo pilots, because the operational environment of cargo aircraftdoes not introduce the same risks associated with arming pilots of passenger aircraft. (30) Consequently, a separate program, with separate standards, training, and guidelines was consideredby some to be more suitable for implementation in the air cargo industry. Besides cargo air carrier pilots, other pilots, such as on-demand air charter pilots and pilots flying for fractional-ownership programs, may also seek participation in the program, although thishas not happened to date. Proponents for including these pilots in the Federal Flight Deck OfficerProgram may argue that currently there are few, if any, security protections to guard against threatsof air piracy and criminal violence in these types of aviation operations. Arming these pilots, theyargue, may serve as the most viable means for providing security in these highly varied operationswhere control of access to the aircraft and flight deck is more difficult. Opponents of such aproposal argue that the inclusion of these pilots in the Federal flight deck officer program wouldsignificantly increase the costs of the program and would lead to further proliferation of firearms inthe aviation environment that may compromise other security initiatives. Thus far, there have beenno legislative initiatives to include these types of pilots in the FFDO program.

Summary: The Homeland Security Act of 2002 ( P.L. 107-296 , 116 Stat. 2135) contains provisions to arm pilots of passenger aircraft and gives deputized pilots the authority to use force,including lethal force, to defend the flight deck against criminal and terrorist threats. Participationin the Federal Flight Deck Officer Program, established under the Arming Pilots Against TerrorismAct contained in P.L. 107-296 , was initially limited to pilots of passenger aircraft. However, aprovision in the FAA reauthorization act (Vision 100; P.L. 108-176 , 117 Stat. 2490) expanded theprogram to include flight engineers as well as flight crews of all-cargo aircraft. During debate over legislation to arm pilots, proponents argued that the potential benefits of deterring or thwarting terrorist and criminal acts against passenger aircraft outweighed the inherentrisks associated with arming pilots. However, opponents of policy allowing pilots to be armed withlethal weapons argued that such a program's safety risks and monetary costs significantlyoutweighed these potential benefits. Risks cited included potential distraction to the flight crew,dangers that a weapon discharge could pose to the aircraft or its occupants, and security concernsassociated with carrying firearms in secured areas of the aviation system. Proponents countered thatthese risks could be effectively mitigated, but recognized that these are important issues to beaddressed for successful implementation of the policy to arm pilots. With enactment of this legislation, focus on the issue of arming pilots has turned to implementation of the Federal Flight Deck Officer Program. These implementation issues fall intofour broad categories: 1) pilot selection and screening; 2) equipment (i.e., firearms and ammunitionand the risks they may pose to aircraft and passengers); 3) training; and 4) operational procedures. This report describes several implementation issues within each of these areas that may requirecontinued legislative oversight and possible clarification regarding the intent of the legislation. TheTSA has fully implemented the program over the last year. However, continued concerns voiced bypilot groups over the implementation of the program include: the extensive background checksrequired of applicants; the requirement to transport issued firearms in lock boxes; and theinconvenient location of training facilities. These issues, along with the possibility of using privatecontractors to provide recurrent training for deputized pilots may be the topics of continuedcongressional oversight. This report will not be updated.