Russia's then-Premier (and current President) Vladimir Putin ordered military, police, andother security forces to enter the breakaway Chechnya region (with a population variously estimatedat less than one-half to one million) in September 1999, and these forces occupied most of the regionby early 2000. (1) Theconflict has ebbed and flowed since then and has resulted in thousands of military and civiliancasualties and the massive destruction of housing and infrastructure. Chechen rebel forces, estimatedby Russian officials to have declined to several hundred dedicated fighters, currently appearweakened but still tenacious. (2) They now mainly engage in small-scale armed attacks andbombings, including suicide bombings, against both Russian troops and civilians in Chechnya andother parts of Russia. Suicide bombings had been relatively rare occurrences in both Chechnya conflicts butappeared to increase after 2001. The deadliest incidents were the hostage-taking at a Moscow theaterin October 2002 (although most of the 130 deaths of hostages resulted from the rescue effort) anda suicide truck bombing in December 2002 that destroyed a government building in Chechnya andkilled more than seventy. Ten suicide bombings throughout Russia in 2003 -- that resulted in over200 casualties -- seemed aimed in part to publicize the Chechnya conflict and to sway voters inupcoming elections in Russia and Chechnya. Chechen rebel leader Shamil Basayev reportedly tookresponsibility for the Moscow theater hostage-taking and at least two of the suicide bombings. (3) The pace and lethality of suicide bombings and other terrorist attacks increased in 2004, andthese attacks spread far beyond Chechnya. A suicide bombing in the Moscow subway in Februaryresulted in about forty casualties. Chechen female suicide bombers downed two Russian commercialairliners in August, killing 89. Other incidents included an attempt to assassinate the leader ofRussia's Ingushetia region in April and a large-scale Chechen terrorist attack against security forcesand government offices in Ingushetia in June, causing the deaths of about 100 Ingush police. Basayev reportedly took responsibility for this attack, and he received praise from Maskhadov. Attacks in Chechnya's capital of Grozny on August 21, 2004, reportedly resulted in the deaths ofabout 120 pro-Moscow Chechens. Basayev also claimed responsibility for a September 2004 attackin the town of Beslan in Russia's North Ossetia region, where terrorists seized over 1,100 gradeschool teachers, students, parents, and others as hostages. The hostage standoff ended with thedestruction of the school and the deaths of 320 children and others. Basayev likewise allegedly claimed to be the primary planner of an October 2005 attack onpolice and security offices in Nalchik, the capital of Kabardino-Balkaria, that reportedly resulted inthe deaths of over 100 police and rebels and nearly two dozen civilians. Russian officials accusedtwo communities of local Islamic extremists of involvement in the attacks (the Yarmuk Jama'at andthe Institute of Islamic Studies) with Basayev's assistance, indicating the spread of such extremismthroughout the North Caucasus, according to some observers. (4) Maskhadov was killed during a skirmish with the Russian military on March 8, 2005, andwas replaced as "president" and "prime minister" of Chechnya by Abdul-Khalim Sadulayev. In2002, Maskhadov reportedly had designated Sadulayev as his heir, and Basayev announced afterMaskhadov's death that the State Defense Committee (Majlis ul-Shura) of Chechnya had concurredwith Maskhadov's wishes. (5) In August 2005, Sadulayev announced a reorganization of therebel "government" that included naming new "ministers" and dismissing Maskhadov's "diplomatic"representatives abroad, including "foreign minister" Ilyas Akhmadov. Indicative of close ties,Sadulayev made Basayev his second in command by appointing him the "first deputy primeminister." While criticizing Basayev's tactic of hostage-taking as ineffective (but not unethical), hereportedly praised his military leadership and gave him control over all security functions of the rebel"government." (6) Sadulayev announced another government re-organization in February 2006 that appeared to furtherreduce the influence of "moderate" Chechen rebels. He decreed that Zakayev would no longer bethe deputy prime minister, with responsibility for foreign policy guidance, although he would remainminister of culture. At the same time, Sadulayev elevated the status of the hardline Islamicideologist Movladi Udugov by naming him head of a new Information Service. (7) Since the 2002 Moscow theater siege, the Putin administration has appeared unequivocallyopposed to talks with the rebels and more dedicated to establishing a pro-Moscow government inChechnya. This regional government increasingly is using its own forces to battle the remainingrebels. According to some estimates, there are now about 20,000 Chechen police and securitypersonnel. This has permitted the disengagement and withdrawal of thousands of Russian troopsfrom the region. This "Chechenization" of the conflict, along with related pacification efforts,constitutes the main elements of the Russian government's campaign to wind down the Chechnyaconflict. Pacification efforts aim to gain the support or acquiescence of the population to federalcontrol and include rebuilding assistance and elections. The assassination of the Chechen presidentin May 2004, and the attack on the school in Beslan in September 2004 have raised questions aboutwhether Chechenization and pacification are succeeding. The Putin government long claimed that the fight against terrorism in Chechnya required thesuspension of some civil rights. However, it claimed in 2002 that ebbing fighting permitted thebolstering of civil rights and arranged a constitutional referendum and a presidential election in theregion in 2003. Many human rights organizations nonetheless have documented or alleged ongoinghuman rights abuses by Russian and pro-Moscow Chechen forces, including sweeps of villages bytroops in search of hiding rebels. Such sweeps result in civilian disappearances, summary killings,and hostage-taking for ransom. Although the scale and number of such sweeps may have declinedto some degree since 1999, more than 400 civilian abductions may have occurred in 2004 and morethan 200 in 2005, according to Russia's Memorial human rights organization. (8) Many observers have objectedto an apparent Chechen government policy of abducting the relatives of rebel leaders, includingMaskhadov's, to compel the leaders to surrender. (9) Chechen rebels also continue to commit abuses. The Putin government in 2003-2004 pressed displaced Chechens outside the region to returnto Chechnya, arguing that civil order had been largely restored and that rebuilding had commenced. By June 2004, authorities had closed tent cities in Chechnya's neighboring Ingush region to forcethese displaced people to return to Chechnya (or to move elsewhere). During his January 2004 visitto Chechnya, U.N. Undersecretary-General Jan Egeland raised concerns about these efforts to forcethe Chechens to return, such as by bulldozing camps or turning off electricity, especially since hefound that living conditions in Chechnya were still harsh and unsafe. A mid-2005 U.N. assessmentindicated that there were still large numbers of internally displaced and ill-housed Chechens. (10) To encourage displaced Chechens to return to the region and to bolster popular support, theRussian government launched a limited program of compensation for the destruction of housingduring the conflict that reportedly assisted about 39,000 Chechen families. Reconstruction inChechnya is lagging far behind schedule, however, because of a lack of coordination between federaland regional governments and widespread corruption. (11) Noting this slow progress, the U.N. appeal for aid for 2005stated that the region's population still faced abductions, tortures, terrorist attacks, extrajudicialmurders, and rape. The appeal reported that most Chechens remained unemployed and in poverty,many without homes or basic services such as healthcare, education, electricity, water, and seweragesystems. (12) The scheduling of popular elections in Chechnya has been a primary component of Russia'seffort to foster peace. The Russian government has hailed elections as restoring civil order,affirming the region's status as a constituent part of Russia, establishing new pro-Moscow politicalinstitutions, and formally repudiating the former Chechen government of President AslanMaskhadov. The Russian government hopes that the new political system will come to be viewedas legitimate by the international community, and that Chechens will at least acquiesce to the newsystem. The strategy has included holding a constitutional referendum and presidential, legislative,federal, and local elections in Chechnya. This strategy was put to a severe test in May 2004 with theassassination of Akhmad Kadyrov, who had been elected to the Chechen presidency just monthspreviously. The Putin government continued on this course, however, and held new presidentialelections in the region in August 2004. The assassination delayed a legislative election until late2005. (13) The Russian government has portrayed the promulgation of a new Chechen constitution andthe holding of a referendum as marking the will of the people to re-establish the rule of law. Apro-Moscow Chechen constitutional commission decided on a final draft constitution in August2002. Despite promises by Putin that a constitutional referendum would by held in late 2002, pro-Moscow Chechen leader Akhmad Kadyrov argued successfully that unrest in the regionprecluded a referendum until March 26, 2003. Besides a question on approving the constitution,voters were asked to approve draft laws on electing a president and a legislature. Some Chechensprotested against holding a referendum absent a peace settlement of the conflict, but AkhmadKadyrov reportedly dismissed such protesters as enemies. (14) Visiting representatives from the Organization for Security andCooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the Council of Europe in early March appeared to view thereferendum preparations with a few misgivings, including the absence of organized and openopposition to the constitutional draft. They determined that the unstable and inhospitableenvironment precluded deploying a full contingent of observers, but recommended that a handfulof observers be sent to assess the referendum. (15) The Central Electoral Commission (CEC) reported a very high 89.5% turnout among 569,000eligible voters and that 96% approved the new constitution. The voting rolls reportedly includedabout 23,000-30,000 Russian troops who were considered "permanently based" in Chechnya. Also,the authorities deemed that up to 17,000 Chechens displaced in Ingushetia were eligible to vote. TheOSCE observers described voting irregularities in the polling places they visited, and somejournalists reported few observable voters and many voting irregularities. There were allegationsthat displaced and resident Chechens were threatened with food aid cutoffs or other sanctions if theydid not vote. In some districts, the vote counts reportedly were higher than the number of registeredvoters. (16) Despite theseproblems, the OSCE voiced hope that the vote might lead to political talks and the end of humanrights abuses. President Putin hailed the win as removing the last serious threat to Russia's territorialintegrity. Putin's presidential spokesman dismissed criticism of the referendum by somerepresentatives of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE), asserting that theywere needlessly badgering Russia. (17) Before the referendum, the Venice Commission of the Council of Europe and others hadraised concerns about the secretive constitutional drafting process and unsuccessfully had urgedrewriting some sections they viewed as problematic. As approved, the Chechen Constitution appearsto spell out fewer powers than those provided in other regional constitutions. The constitution doesnot provide the region with a special status in the Russian Federation, totally repudiating its uncertainautonomy in 1996-1999. Russian language is designated the exclusive language of officialdiscourse. The Constitution prohibits advocacy of separatism and establishes strong federal controlover the region, specifying the primacy of federal law, ensured in part by the center's appointmentand direct control over the regional Prosecutor. The federal government can remove the regionalpresident and the federal legislature can dissolve the regional legislature. The Constitution createsa presidential system of administration in the region, with the president able to appoint manyofficials with no advice or consent by the regional legislature and to issue decrees with the force oflaw. (18) Soon after the constitutional referendum, Putin decreed that a popular election of Chechnya'sexecutive head would take place on October 5, 2003. This election would replace a system put inplace in June 2000 whereby Putin directly appointed a head of administration. Many Russianofficials publicized this race as demonstrating that local civil order was being restored. Prospectivecandidates were required either to gather signatures from 2% of the electorate or to pay a $160,000deposit. Eleven candidates were registered for the ballot, but three of the major opponents toAkhmad Kadyrov -- State Duma deputy Aslambek Aslakhanov and businessmen Malik Saydullayevand Khusein Dzhabrailov -- dropped out before the election under circumstances deemedquestionable, according to some observers. All three of them had been running ahead of AkhmadKadyrov, according to several polls. Just before political campaigning was to begin in early September 2003, Akhmad Kadyrov'ssecurity forces seized control of Chechnya's television and radio stations and newspapers. Thesemedia highlighted Akhmad Kadyrov's activities and gave scant coverage to other candidates, andAkhmad Kadyrov was virtually the only candidate shown on posters and billboards. On election day,journalists and observers from Agence France Presse and the Moscow Helsinki Commissionreported a low turnout at several polling places they visited in the region, perhaps partly becausemany Chechens feared venturing out because of rebel threats of violence. Nonetheless, electoralofficials reported that 88% of 562,000 registered voters turned out, of which 81% voted for AkhmadKadyrov. He allegedly had electoral support throughout Chechnya, including in all mountainousconflict areas. He also presumably enjoyed automatic support from the 23,000-30,000 permanentlydeployed Russian troops in the region. Reportedly, Chechens being detained at Russian prisoncamps also voted. (19) The OSCE and the Council of Europe decided that because of security concerns they wouldnot send observers to monitor the election. Afterward, then-chairman of the OSCE Jaap de HoopScheffer suggested that media manipulation and a lack of viable opposition candidates had renderedthe race non-pluralistic. However, other observers from the Organization of the Islamic Conference(OIC) and the Arab League did monitor the election and declared it unobjectionable, after which theywere praised by Putin. Akhmad Kadyrov in January 2004 proposed that a prospective Chechen legislative electiontake place in late 2004, after the construction of legislative buildings. The 122 deputies would beelected for four years and the legislature would consist of two chambers, the Council of the Republicand the National Assembly. These elections were postponed, however, in the wake of AkhmadKadyrov's assassination, and were not held until late 2005 (see below). Akhmad Kadyrov was assassinated on May 9, 2004, just days after Putin's presidentialinauguration, at which Putin had proclaimed that his policies were succeeding in Chechnya. Kadyrov and over twenty others were killed by a bomb that went off under a stadium grandstand. The White House condemned the attack, stating that "no national, ethnic, religious or other causecan ever justify the use of terrorism." The Putin government continued its electoral strategy -- ratherthan returning to direct presidential rule over the region -- by seeking another pro-Moscow Chechento take Kadyrov's place. Kadyrov's son, Ramzan, was viewed by many in Moscow as a suitablecandidate, but he did not meet the minimum age requirement to run for the presidency, so theChechen Interior Minister, Alu Alkhanov, was selected. Chechnya's electoral commission refused to register Alkhanov's main challenger, MalikSaidullayev, with the result that Alkhanov ran against six less known (and unfavored by Moscow)candidates in the August 29, 2004 race. Allegedly, the pro-Moscow Chechen government orderedlocal election precincts to report that a majority of votes had been cast for Alkhanov. Manyobservers viewed the election as problematic and as unlikely to persuade moderate Chechens toembrace the government or rebels to lay down their arms. Sworn into office on October 6, 2004,President Alkhanov pledged to follow Kadyrov's policies, curb abductions of citizens by maskedassailants, and convince rebels through an amnesty program to cease fighting. Indicating the power of supporters of Akhmad Kadyrov, his son Ramzan was named firstdeputy prime minister while retaining control over the presidential guard, which is widely accusedof carrying out abductions and committing serious human rights abuses. Nonetheless, Putin awardedhim the title Hero of Russia in December 2004, for his role in "bringing peace" to Chechnya. Healso has been appointed the Presidential Security Adviser to the Southern Federal District of Russiaand controls federal finances in the republic. (20) The legislative election was held on November 27, 2005, with 357 candidates contesting 58seats, 251 in single member constituencies and 106 on the lists of eight registered parties. TheElectoral Commission announced on December 3 that turnout was 69.6% of about 600,000 voters,and that the pro-Putin United Russia Party won 24 seats in the National Assembly and nine seats inthe Council of the Republic. The Communist Party gained three seats in the National Assembly andthree in the Council of the Republic. The Union of Right Forces won four seats, and the EurasianUnion won one seat. Fourteen deputies who won ran as independents. The OSCE and COEdeclined to send observers, but the COE sent a fact-finding mission. Its representatives and otherobservers raised concerns that the reported turnout appeared inflated and that administrativeresources were used heavily to support favored candidates. Some observers suggested that relativesand supporters of Ramzan Kadyrov won most or even all of the seats. President Putin the day afterthe election proclaimed that "a legitimate, representative authority has been elected in Chechnya.... This completes the formal legal procedure of restoring constitutional order." (21) Traveling to Chechnyato address the new legislature on December 12, 2005, Putin argued that "Russia has always been thetruest and most reliable and consistent defender of the interests of the Islamic world.... In trying todestroy Russia, [the Islamic extremists and those they dupe] are trying to destroy one of the mainsupporters of the Islamic world in the struggle for their rights in the international arena." (22) Marking Chechnya's full participation as a subject of the Russian Federation in the electionsto the State Duma (the lower legislative chamber of the Federal Assembly), polling purportedly tookplace throughout the region on December 7, 2003. The head of Russia's Central ElectoralCommission later reported, however, that the vote count in Chechnya had exceeded the number ofregistered voters by about 11%, but attributed the discrepancy to returnees who were added to theelectoral rolls when they turned up to vote. (23) Perhaps marking contempt for the Duma as a symbol of Russianpower, suicide bombers allegedly targeted the building in early December 2003, but the bombs wentoff prematurely just short of the legislative building. Both of Chechnya's seats in the Russian Federation Council (the upper legislative chamber,where members are selected by the regional governments) became vacant in late 2003. One seatbecame vacant when Zavgayev won election to the State Duma. On January 5, 2004, AkhmadKadyrov appointed Umar Dzhabrailov -- a wealthy Chechen who ran against Putin in 1999 -- to fillthis seat (in 1996, the State Department had revoked Dzhabrailov's visa for entry into the UnitedStates in connection with the unsolved Moscow murder of U.S. investor Paul Tatum). Accordingto some speculation, Dzhabrailov's appointment may have been a partial reward for the suddenwithdrawal of his brother, Khusein, from the presidential election in Chechnya. (24) Chechnya's other seat inthe upper chamber became vacant when Akhmad Kadyrov removed Adnan Muzykayev andappointed Musa Umarov, another wealthy Chechen who had withdrawn as a candidate for the StateDuma election. (25) The Federal Presidential Race. In the face ofPutin's strong candidacy, many democratic, communist, and other parties and groups called for aboycott of the election to register displeasure with the Russian government, since the electoral lawrequires a turnout of over 50% for the election to be valid. In January 2004, a Chechen websitecalled for Chechens also to boycott the race as a symbol of protest against the Chechnya War. (26) While the Russiangovernment made claims during the 2000 presidential race that some areas of Chechnya werepeaceful enough for polling to take place, during this election cycle it claimed that peace and"normalization" are region-wide. (27) After the March 14, 2004 presidential election, Chechenelectoral officials reported the fourth-highest voter turnout of all Russia's regions (94.2%) and thefourth-highest percentage of votes for Putin (94.4%), a result one Russian newspaper, Nezavisimayagazeta , deemed improbable, since Putin appeared more popular in Chechnya than in his own hometown (St. Petersburg). (28) The Russian and pro-Moscow Chechen governments have hailed elections in Chechnya asmarking an emergent peace and rule of law in the republic. Some independent Russian media,however, were highly critical and pointed to the rise in suicide bombings and other violence as proofthat questionable elections exacerbate tensions and cannot precede or substitute for a peacesettlement. (29) Suchvoting raises questions about its representativeness or inclusiveness and hence its legitimacy, sincesome portion of the rebel population could not or would not participate, they argue. Severalobservers have reflected the view that "life in Chechnya did not improve [after elections] ... it wasnot safer, and therefore the threat to Russia did not decrease." (30) Impact of Terrorism in Beslan. Thehostage-taking in Beslan in September 2004, carried out by Chechens and others (allegedly includingtwo foreigners and with the assistance of some North Ossetians), appeared to galvanize the Putingovernment to continue its "Chechenization" and pacification strategy in Chechnya, while at thesame time stepping up (with the aid of Ramzan Kadyrov's forces) sweeps, abductions, anddisappearances aimed at eliminating rebels. Putin strongly linked the Beslan incident to foreignterrorism and stated that "this is an attack on our country." Putin used the Beslan attack to increasethe centralization of power in the presidency, including by eliminating future direct popular electionsof regional/republic leaders. Observers who argue that Russia's actions in Chechnya have had negative repercussions onits democratization point to the repercussions of Beslan. They also suggest that central and localgovernments throughout Russia have come routinely to commit civil rights abuses against ethnicChechens and similar "swarthy" ethnic groups because of fears that they are separatists or terrorists. Tens of thousands of Russians have served in Chechnya. Russian police who commit abuses inChechnya allegedly have continued such abuses -- even against non-Chechens -- when rotated backto their home districts. Military units allegedly have been emboldened by freedom of action inChechnya, weakening civilian control over the military. Zbigniew Brzezinski has argued that theconflict is "helping to reverse" democratization in Russia as it strengthens the power of the securityapparatus. (31) International Response. During 2003-2006, theinternational community variously assessed Russia's peace-making efforts in Chechnya, withEuropean bodies appearing to be more critical. Having earlier called for Russia to cancel theconstitutional referendum, PACE in April 2003 approved a resolution warning that the internationalcommunity might create a war crimes tribunal if Russia did not remedy human rights abuses inChechnya. However, PACE has not followed up on this warning. The European Parliament in July2003 appeared less dismissive of the referendum, but echoed PACE in criticizing thenon-inclusiveness of the vote, condemning Russian "war crimes" in Chechnya, and urging Russia soon to agree to peace talks under international auspices. Disagreements within the EU regarding Chechnya policy were highlighted during Putin's visitto Italy in early November 2003. Premier and EU president Silvio Berlusconi suggested thatWestern media had exaggerated Russia's human rights abuses in Chechnya, prompting the EuropeanCommission on November 7, 2003, to announce that Berlusconi's remarks did not represent itsofficial position. Even before Berlusconi's comments, the European Parliament's Committee onForeign Affairs had undertaken an assessment of EU-Russia ties. Its report in January 2004 statedthat the EU should place more emphasis on Russia's human rights abuses in Chechnya and issuessuch as Chechnya's "illusory" presidential election. (32) Faced with Russia's refusal to extend an expiring 2000 agreement for the cooperation of COEhuman rights advisors with Putin's Special Representative for human rights in Chechnya, the twosides in December 2003 agreed to some future ad hoc COE programs in Chechnya, such as technicalassistance for holding elections. These programs were to be coordinated with the specialrepresentative. Seeming to place the agreement in limbo, however, Russia abolished this post in lateJanuary 2004 and stated that the duly elected Akhmad Kadyrov would guarantee human rights. Following COE criticism, Russia demurred that a new representative would be appointed. In October 2004, PACE approved resolutions critical of the electoral process in Chechnyaand stating that Russia had failed to distinguish between moderate Chechen rebels seeking politicaldialogue and extremists, and that peace would not be possible until talks began with these moderateforces. PACE also warned that "the conflict in the North Caucasus appears to be spreading like anepidemic, threatening the rule of law throughout the Russian Federation." PACE expressed "indignation" over unsolved abuses against persons who had filed complaints at the European Courtof Human Rights, and their families, and called for Russian authorities to facilitate access by nationaland international mass media to Chechnya. PACE resolved to set up a working group which wouldorganize round table talks between PACE representatives, the pro-Moscow Chechen government,and former Chechen independence fighters. The first round table talks opened in Chechnya in March2005. PACE requested that the latter emissaries renounce terror and recognize Russia's territorialintegrity. Maskhadov's supporters (Maskhadov had just been killed) reportedly refused to take partin the round table because it did not recognize the independence of Chechnya as a goal. A secondsession of the roundtable had not yet taken place in early 2006. (33) In early 2006, PACE approved a harsh resolution condemning "ongoing serious human rightsviolations [that] still occur on a massive scale" in Chechnya and raising "deep concerns" that "a fairnumber of governments, member states and the Committee of Ministers (COM) of the COE havefailed to address [violations] in a regular, serious and intensive manner." It highlighted torture anddisappearances committed by Russian government personnel and the government's slowness inimplementing judgments on cases brought by Chechens before the European Court of Human Rights. It called for the Russian government and the COM to address its previous recommendations onaddressing abuses, urged the COM to step-up monitoring (which it claimed had not been adequatesince early 2004) of the human rights situation in Chechnya, and warned that the COM's lack ofaggressiveness in engaging Russia on abuses was undermining the credibility of the COE. (34) Outside these European institutions, the U.N. Human Rights Commission in 2003 and 2004failed to pass resolutions that accused Russia of grave human rights violations in Chechnya. (35) In 2005, the Commissiondid not consider a resolution. Russia's actions in Chechnya also appeared to receive legitimacy inthe Muslim world when Saudi Arabia shifted its critical stance toward Russia's policy in Chechnyain January 2004 by hosting Akhmad Kadyrov on a state visit as a bonafide regional leader. According to Akhmad Kadyrov, the Saudis agreed to further crack down on financiers of theChechen rebels and offered increased humanitarian and rebuilding aid to the region. The ArabLeague and Organization of the Islamic Conference also observed the late 2005 Chechen legislativeelections and reputedly found them acceptable. International observers and some Russians and Chechens who reject current Russiangovernment policy have made various proposals for peace negotiations. (36) In February 2004, nearly150 European Parliament deputies endorsed a peace proposal first submitted to the body by Chechen"foreign minister" Ilyas Akhmadov in April 2003 that calls for deploying U.N. peacekeepers,withdrawing Russian troops, and disarming rebels. In mid-December 2003, some Chechens whohad been elected to the regional legislature before the 1999 Russian incursion met with AkhmadKadyrov and urged political talks to end the conflict. Reportedly, Akhmad Kadyrov rejected holdingsuch talks, and in turn urged the legislators to convince rebels to surrender. Maskhadov reportedly ordered his rebel forces to observe a ceasefire February 2-22, 2005,as a inducement to Russia to open peace talks, but the Putin government rejected holding talks. Seventeen Russian human rights activists sent a letter to Putin urging him to open talks with whatthey termed "moderate rebels," including Maskhadov. The activists warned that Chechnya wasbecoming a center for Islamic terrorism and that the conflict threatened to widen and become"eternal." The Russian government alleged that some rebel attacks continued in Chechnya, indicating that Maskhadov did not control all rebel forces. Basayev, however, stated that his forceswould observe the ceasefire. Maskhadov was killed by federal forces in March 2005. In May 2005, Sadulayev reportedly rejected a U.S. NGO's call to open talks with Russia andissued a decree establishing the "Caucasus front," to ostensibly assist the North Caucasian Muslimsin resisting Russian abuses and to widen the conflict to force Russia to the peace table. (37) In late August 2005,Sadulayev reportedly empowered Akhmed Zakayev as his emissary to "conduct consultations withall interested parties on peacefully regulating the Russian-Chechen conflict," and stressed that therebel "government" was "always open to realistic dialogue with Russia" when Russia was ready tosue for peace. (38) Although Zakayev was replaced in early 2006, Sadulayev has appeared to continue to emphasize"forcing" Russia to reach a settlement. (39) Chechen factionalism is widely expected to make it difficult to arrange peace talks (Russiainsists they would be impossible to arrange). Besides including pro-Moscow Chechens, manyadvocates of talks urge including "moderate" separatists, although there are varying views on whois moderate. Most observers exclude Islamic extremists such as Basayev, because of their terroristacts, although some argue that all parties to the conflict should be invited to take part in talks. BothSadulayev and Basayev demand full independence for Chechnya and its adoption of Shariarule. (40) Chechnya's Future. Alternative futures facingChechnya include not only Russia's hope to wind down the conflict but also the possibilities ofcontinued low-level fighting or greatly escalating violence. The Russian government argues thatits pacification and Chechenization efforts, along with attrition of the rebel forces, will result in alargely peaceful and secure Chechnya. According to some observers, the Putin administration is divided on how far to accommodatethe pro-Russian Chechen leadership's jockeying for greater self-rule and autonomy. Some observerssuggest that the apparent strengthening of Russian nationalism as a result of the State Duma electionand the strengthening of the security apparatus within the Putin administration may make thegovernment less supportive of the Chechenization process. The Russian government could do a volte face and re-impose a greater degree of direct rule and exclude ethnic Chechens from politicaland economic control over their region. Reflecting this more nationalist viewpoint, some Russiansargue that Chechnya's oil and other resources should serve as reparations to Russia for the economiccosts of the conflict. (41) Analyst Rajan Menon and some others argue that low-level conflict may well continueindefinitely, contributing to a downward spiral of "further barbarization of the Russian military, theerosion of Russian democracy, and a Chechnya that breeds ... radicalism and terrorism." (42) These analysts point toevidence that major human rights abuses -- including kidnaping and killing -- continue despite thesupposed establishment of the rule of law in the region. Some observers warn that the Chechnya conflict appears to be intensifying again, includingnot only clashes between Russian forces and Chechen rebels, but also intra-Chechen clan conflictand vendettas that Moscow seems to be overlooking as part of its Chechenization effort. They alsowarn that Islam is becoming a motivating factor in what formerly was mainly a secular struggle forChechen independence. Some even caution that Islamic fundamentalism also is increasing amongthe wider Chechen society. These trends may be creating wider schisms within Chechen society thatcontribute to religious conflict. Growing Islamic extremism also could make it increasingly difficultin the future for Russia to engage in peace talks that consider less than full independence. Some observers warn that widening Islamic unrest in the Dagestan, Ingushetia, andKabardina-Balkariya regions in 2005-2006 is indicative of a widening pool of terrorist recruitmentin the North Caucasus. Reportedly, the attackers in Nalchik in October 2005 included few ethnicChechens, although the attackers were advised and assisted by Basayev. (43) A consistent theme of U.S. and other international criticism of Russia has been that Russiantroops are using excessive and indiscriminate force in quelling separatism in Chechnya andotherwise are committing serious human rights abuses. As stated by U.S. Ambassador to RussiaAlexander Vershbow in January 2004, Russia's operations in Chechnya "lead ... to needless sufferingof the civilian population ... they are not holding enough of their own troops accountable when theycommit excesses." (44) On other issues, several analysts have discerned shifts in Administration policy in recentyears, perhaps spurred to some degree by the Moscow theater siege in late 2002 and stepped-upterrorist bombings throughout Russia in 2003 and 2004. U.S. concerns before the Iraq conflict withgaining Russia's support, concerns afterward with terrorist attacks within Iraq on coalition forces,and concerns about the replacement of the "moderate" Maskhadov with Sadulayev (who is an Islamicfundamentalist with close and clear links to Basayev) also may have contributed to the shifts. Thereappeared to be fewer Administration suggestions to Russia that it should open peace talks withseparatists, more tolerance for Russia's argument that it was battling terrorism in Chechnya, andsome hope that elections and rebuilding efforts in Chechnya could contribute to a "politicalsettlement." (45) The Administration's view that elections could contribute to a political settlement washighlighted by the U.S. Mission to the OSCE on March 27, 2003. The U.S. emissary stressed thatproblematic voting could harm the legitimacy of Russia's peace process, which the United Stateshoped could create "institutions of self-government acceptable to the people of Chechnya." (46) In the case of the regionalpresidential race, President Bush reportedly urged Putin at a September 2003 U.S.-Russia summitto ensure a free and fair election. (47) After the race, however, State Department spokesman RichardBoucher on October 6 criticized the elimination of viable challengers to Akhmad Kadyrov andconstraints on the media and concluded that "given these problems, it's unclear whether the electionwill have sufficient credibility and legitimacy [among Chechens] to advance the settlement process." He also called on the "people of Chechnya on both sides ... to work with the Russians to resolve thisconflict peacefully." (48) Putin downplayed this criticism by stressing "understanding ... from the President of the UnitedStates," regarding Russia's efforts to combat "Islamic radicalism" in Chechnya, and that "it servesU.S. interests to shore up" such efforts. (49) Secretary Powell reiterated during his January 2004 Moscowvisit that the United States was "not satisfied with" the October 2003 presidential election inChechnya." (50) Afterthe August 2004 presidential race in Chechnya, the U.S. State Department described it as having"serious flaws" and not democratic (51) More recently, the State Department has placed more emphasis on the anti-terrorism aspectsof the Chechnya conflict. It seemingly has reserved criticism of the character of the November 2005legislative and previous races in Chechnya and downplayed the idea of talks with moderateseparatists. (52) Some Administration officials have raised concerns that problematic elections in Chechnyaare emblematic of a Russia less interested in adopting Western democratic and human rights"values," and that such slippage could ultimately harm bilateral relations. (53) However, SecretaryPowell during his Moscow visit in January 2004 stressed that the conflict was "an internal matter for[Russia] to deal with," and that U.S. concern would not jeopardize friendship and cooperation withRussia on higher priority strategic issues such as anti-terrorism and combating weapons of massdestruction. A similar response was given by Under Secretary of State R. Nicholas Burns at a pressconference after a late 2005 meeting of the U.S.-Russia Counter-terrorism Working Group. (54) Other observers such asZbigniew Brzezinski have decried such a prioritization on the grounds that it results in U.S.government "indifference" to the plight of the Chechens. (55) Some observers are increasingly concerned that the Chechnya conflict appears to bespreading into other areas of the North Caucasus as it continues to erode the democratic and moralfabric of Russian society. They worry that a more authoritarian Russian government is not onlycommitting human rights abuses in this wider area, but is threatening "preventive actions" againstputative terrorists in neighboring countries such as Georgia, as well as becoming in general lessoriented toward integration with the West. (56) Recent strains in U.S.-Russia relations contributed by the Chechnya conflict include Putin'sDecember 2004 reaction to a statement by Polish President Aleksander Kwasniewski that Russiawithout Ukraine is better for the United States than Russia with Ukraine. Putin stated that he did notthink that U.S. policy endorsed "isolating" Russia from its neighbors, but that he would ask PresidentBush about this at the February 2005 U.S.-Russia summit. "If it is [U.S. policy]," Putin suggested,"then the position on Chechnya becomes more understandable. Then it means that the policy aimedat creating elements that rock the Russian Federation is being pursued there too." (57) The U.S. government and the U.N. Security Council have labeled some Chechen factions andindividuals as terrorists. While there also appears to be ample evidence of foreign Islamicfundamentalist support for some Chechen rebel groups, (58) the questions of support by al Qaeda and recent rebel support forterrorist actions outside Russia remain controversial. Analyst Brian Williams argues that there is noevidence of Chechen rebel involvement in Afghanistan or other ties with al Qaeda. (59) Other analysts argue thatthere are some al Qaeda members in Chechnya and other links. (60) Congress consistently has criticized Russia's human rights abuses in Chechnya since theconflict resumed in 1999 and has called for various sanctions. Even after September 11, 2001 --when the Administration's focus was on forging an international anti-terrorist coalition that includedRussia -- Congress retained a provision first included in FY2001 appropriations that cut some aidto Russia unless the President determined that non-governmental organizations (NGOs) were givenfull access to Chechnya. Foreign Operations Appropriations for FY2006 ( H.R. 3057 ; P.L. 109-102 ) retains this provision. The President has made determinations consistently cutting orreprogramming Russian aid on this and other scores. Congress has been at the forefront in allocating assistance for Chechnya. Conferencemanagers for Emergency Supplemental Appropriations for FY2005 ( P.L. 109-13 ; H.Rept. 109-072 )called for $5 million for humanitarian, conflict mitigation, relief, and recovery assistance forChechnya and the North Caucasus. For FY2006, conference managers for Foreign OperationsAppropriations (H.R. 3057; P.L. 109-102 ; H.Rept. 109-265 ) called for another $5 million forimprovements in basic services, community reconstruction and recovery, economic development(especially job creation), the promotion of good governance, human rights, free media, and civilsociety NGO support for Chechnya and the North Caucasus. (61) Among othercongressional concern, in November 2006, Senator Robert Leahy urged President Bush to intercedewith President Putin to end the ongoing human rights abuses by Russian troops in Chechnya andsuggested that the U.N. should play a larger role in the demilitarization and political settlement ofthe conflict. (62) Congress also has been concerned about lagging democratization in Russia. Commentingon Putin's apparent backtracking on democratization in the face of the Beslan attack, Senator JohnMcCain stated on September 21, 2004, that "I think that Mr. Putin is using this latest terrible tragedy,this horrible thing in Beslan as an excuse to further consolidate his power, to repress the media, tohave a Duma that will basically be a rubber stamp ... But, also, it won't stop the war with theChechens until they receive some kind of autonomy or independence. He is fighting an insurgencythat's been overtaken by extremists because of the incredible brutality that's been inflicted on theChechens. ... he's got to find some moderates in Chechnya and set them up in a government and givethem some kind of autonomy." (63) Issues for the second Session of the 109th Congress include weighing the benefits of Russiansupport for U.S.-backed anti-terrorism efforts against continuing a ban on some aid to Russia. TheChechen government has permitted a few NGOs and international aid agencies to set up offices inthe region. However, many of the groups have faced Russian government impediments to theiroperations, remain troubled by ongoing violence in the region, and are suspicious that Russian forcesmay be among those targeting aid workers. (64) The U.N., EU, and others still prefer to have aid offices outsideof Chechnya, and press Russia to facilitate freer access by these offices to Chechnya. Russia's new law that tightens reporting requirements and the activities of NGOs may hindertheir access (the law comes into effect in April 2006). Even before this date, it appears that thepro-Russian Chechnya government may be growing less supportive of the activities of NGOs. Onetroubling incident was Ramzan Kadyrov's early February 2006 ban on the activities of the DanishRefugee Council NGO. He accused it of aiding Chechen rebels, spying for the West, and reflectinganti-Islamic views (a Danish newspaper had published a caricature of the Prophet Mohammed). Theban was heavily criticized by the international community and by many in Chechnya and Russia. The ban was soon repudiated by the Russian government and the NGO resumed activities inChechnya in early March 2006. (65) 

Summary: Russia's then-Premier (and current President) Vladimir Putin ordered military, police, andsecurity forces to enter the breakaway Chechnya region in September 1999, and these forcesoccupied most of the region by early 2000. The conflict has resulted in thousands of military andcivilian casualties and the massive destruction of housing and infrastructure. Putin's rise to powerand continuing popularity have been tied at least partly to his perceived ability to prosecute thisconflict successfully. In the run-up to Russian legislative elections in December 2003 and apresidential election in March 2004, Putin endeavored to demonstrate that peace had returned to theregion. After Chechen terrorists held hundreds of Moscow theater-goers hostage in late 2002, thePutin administration appeared unequivocally opposed to talks with the rebels and more dedicatedto establishing a pro-Moscow government in Chechnya. This pro-Moscow government has used itsown forces to battle the remaining rebels, ostensibly permitting the disengagement and withdrawalof most Russian troops from the region. This "Chechenization" of the conflict, along with relatedpacification efforts, has constituted the main elements of the Russian government's campaign to winddown the fighting. Pacification efforts have aimed to gain the support or acquiescence of thepopulation to federal control and have included rebuilding assistance and elections. Theassassination of a pro-Moscow Chechen leader in May 2004, the attack on a school in the town ofBeslan, Russia, in September 2004, by Chechen terrorists, and widening of conflict to other areasof Russia's North Caucasus have raised questions about whether Chechenization and pacification aresucceeding. A consistent theme of U.S. and other international criticism of Russia is that Russian troopsuse excessive and indiscriminate force to quell separatism in Chechnya and commit serious humanrights abuses. Several analysts have discerned a decrease in Bush Administration criticism ofRussian policy in Chechnya, perhaps spurred to some degree by the Moscow theater hostage crisisand stepped-up terrorist bombings and armed attacks throughout Russia in recent years. U.S.concerns before the Iraq conflict with gaining Russia's support also may have contributed to theshifts. There appeared to be fewer Administration suggestions to Russia that it should open peacetalks with "moderate" separatists, more tolerance for Russia's argument that it primarily was battlingterrorism in Chechnya, and some hope that elections and rebuilding in Chechnya could contributeto a "political settlement." But some in the Administration also argue that Russia is showingdeclining interest in the adoption of Western democratic and human rights "values," and that suchslippage could ultimately harm bilateral relations. Foreign Operations Appropriations for FY2006 ( H.R. 3057 ; P.L. 109-102 )retains a provision first included in FY2001 appropriations that cuts some aid to Russia unless thePresident determines that Russia is not hampering access to Chechnya by non-governmentalorganizations (NGOs). One issue for the second Session of the 109th Congress is whether tocontinue this ban in FY2007 legislation.