According to a September 2011 DHS/FBI joint bulletin, more than 68 percent of general aviation aircraft registered with the Federal Aviation Administration are personally owned aircraft—mostly small, single- or twin-engine propeller aircraft—used for recreation or personal transportation. Corporate- or business-owned aircraft compose approximately 15 percent of general aviation aircraft. Regarding the types of general aviation in the general aviation aircraft fleet, FAA data indicate that about 63 percent of general aviation aircraft are single-engine piston aircraft, while about 4 percent are turboprop. Figure 1 shows the composition of the general aviation fleet. Pursuant to ATSA, TSA assumed from FAA responsibility for securing the nation’s civil aviation system. Consistent with its statutory obligations, TSA has undertaken a direct role in ensuring the security of commercial aviation through its performance and management of the passenger and baggage screening operations at TSA-regulated airports, among other things. In contrast, TSA has taken a less direct role in securing general aviation, in that it generally establishes standards that operators may voluntarily implement and provides recommendations and advice to general aviation owners and operators, except to the extent such operations fall under existing TSA security requirements or where otherwise specifically directed by statute.general aviation airports and aircraft is generally shared with state and local governments and the private sector, such as airports and aircraft owners and operators. TSA has worked to enhance general aviation security by developing various security programs and working with aviation industry stakeholders to enhance their security efforts through the development of new security guidelines. The agency works to obtain information on the security practices of industry stakeholders through compliance inspections and outreach and is working with its industry partners to develop new security regulations. As shown in table 1, TSA and other industry stakeholders have taken a number of actions to enhance general aviation security. Among other measures, TSA worked with members of the General Aviation Working Group of the Aviation Security Advisory Committee in 2003 and 2004 to develop recommended guidelines for general aviation airport security. A more detailed list of federal, state, and industry general aviation security initiatives can be found in appendix II. Independent of regulatory requirements, operators of private general aviation aircraft not covered under existing security programs we spoke to indicated that they implement a variety of security measures to enhance security for their aircraft. For example, 7 of the 12 operators that perform as private operators that we interviewed stated that they park their aircraft in hangars to protect them from possible misuse or vandalism. Further, 2 of the 12 operators stated they had hired security personnel to guard their aircraft if they are required to stay at an airport without hangar facilities. Seven of the 12 operators stated that they implement these security measures because of security concerns associated with operating their aircraft. For example, the 7 operators stated that their aircraft represent a major investment for their company and help generate a stream of income that must be protected, and that protecting the well-being of senior executives was a priority. TSA obtains information directly from aircraft operators that fall under the Twelve-Five and Private Charter security programs (see fig. 2) through its review and approval of the security programs developed by these operators and through periodic inspections to determine the extent to which operators comply with their security programs. TSA Transportation Security Inspectors are responsible for conducting these periodic inspections and determining whether operators are in compliance with program requirements or whether a violation has occurred. As part of the inspection process, TSA inspectors examine certain key security areas with respect to Twelve-Five and Private Charter operations, including the roles and responsibilities of aircraft operator personnel and whether the operator has procedures for addressing emergencies. For example, TSA’s 2009 Inspector Handbook provides guidance to TSA inspectors to examine, among other things, whether aircraft operators under its security programs ensure that individuals are denied boarding if they do not have valid ensure that passenger identification documents are checked against have adequate procedures for addressing incidents where indications of tampering or unauthorized access of aircraft are discovered. Inspectors are required to record inspection results, including any violations of program requirements, in TSA’s PARIS database and to close the violations when the problem is resolved. Violations may be resolved with on-the-spot counseling; however, some violations may result in TSA sending a warning notice to the operator or in civil penalties for the operator. If warranted, follow-up inspections may be conducted, based on any findings made during an inspection. TSA officials stated that inspection results in PARIS are used to inform TSA of security challenges that may be faced by aircraft operators and to allow the agency to better address security concerns expressed by these operators. TSA inspection data indicate that from 2007 through 2011, aircraft operator compliance with security requirements has been well over 90 percent and has generally increased. TSA officials attribute the increase in compliance to a better understanding of security program requirements by operators, and to increased TSA outreach. Agency data illustrate that the reasons for noncompliance among aircraft operators varied. For example, in fiscal year 2011, inspectors found that Private Charter aircraft operators did not always provide advance notice to the Federal Security Director of upcoming private charter operations or of subsequent changes or additions, which occurred in 7 percent of 424 inspections for this item. Program compliance violations detected by inspectors were sometimes resolved either by counseling with the aircraft operator or by initiating an investigation of the incident, which could result in TSA issuing a warning notice or civil penalties being assessed. In addition to taking steps to obtain information on security measures enacted by general aviation aircraft operators that fall under TSA security programs, the agency has also taken steps to obtain information on security measures implemented by general aviation airport operators. Specifically, the 9/11 Commission Act required TSA to, among other things, develop a standardized threat and vulnerability assessment program for general aviation airport operators and implement a program to perform such assessments on a risk management basis. To help comply with the act’s requirement, TSA distributed a survey in 2010 to approximately 3,000 general aviation airports to identify any vulnerabilities at the airports, and received responses from 1,164 (39 percent) of the airports. In this survey, airport officials were asked to respond to questions on security measures implemented by the general aviation airport operators, such as whether hangar doors were secured when unattended, and whether the airport had closed-circuit camera coverage for hangar areas. This survey also included questions about the types of perimeter fencing and physical barriers installed, as well as the type of security measures in use at these airports. The survey found that, while most general aviation airports had initiated some security measures, the extent to which different security measures had been implemented varied by airport. For example, survey results indicated that more than 97 percent of larger general aviation airports responding to the survey had developed an emergency contact list, but less than 19 percent had developed measures to positively identify passengers, cargo, and baggage. The survey also found that nearly 44 percent of airports responding to the survey required security awareness training for all tenants and employees and more than 48 percent of airports had established community watch programs. According to TSA officials, the results of the survey were analyzed to identify the general strengths and weaknesses in the general aviation community, and to show an overall picture of general aviation security measures at a national and regional level. In addition, TSA officials said that the information collected in the survey can be used to help determine a plan of action to mitigate security concerns at general aviation airports. For example, TSA used the survey to identify approximately 300 airports that it considers to be higher risk and could therefore be prioritized to receive security grants, should they become available. TSA officials added that information from the survey allowed the agency to establish a baseline for security measures in place at general aviation airports. In addition to the survey, TSA also gathers information on security measures implemented by operators through outreach activities its inspectors conduct at general aviation airports, designed to establish a cooperative relationship with general aviation airport stakeholders and encourage voluntary adoption of security enhancements. However, TSA officials stated that this type of outreach by its inspectors is not mandatory and therefore is not conducted regularly. In addition, while inspectors are encouraged to record results of these outreach visits in PARIS, inspectors do not always do so in practice. According to aviation industry officials, there are approximately 9,900 general aviation aircraft over 12,500 pounds not covered under either the Twelve-Five or Private Charter security programs. Analysis by the Homeland Security Institute indicates that some of these larger aircraft may be able to cause significant damage in terms of fatalities and economic costs, particularly general aviation aircraft with a maximum takeoff weight of 71,000 pounds. According to industry data, there are over 800 general aviation aircraft weighing over 71,000 pounds. TSA officials we spoke to stated that, unlike for aircraft that fall under the Twelve-Five or Private Charter security programs, the agency does not have a systematic mechanism to collect information on the security measures implemented by other general aviation aircraft operators that do not fall under TSA security programs. Rather, the agency has developed informal mechanisms for obtaining information on security measures enacted by these operators, such as outreach conducted by TSA inspectors, and has contacted general aviation industry associations to obtain this information as well as obtain information on the concerns of these operators regarding costs and other challenges associated with potential security requirements. As previously mentioned, TSA issued a notice of proposed rulemaking for a Large Aircraft Security Program in October 2008, which would have resulted in all general aviation aircraft larger than 12,500 pounds, including those not currently covered under existing security programs, being subject to TSA security requirements and inspections. However, industry associations and others expressed concerns about the extent to which TSA obtained industry views and information in the proposed rule’s development. They also questioned the security benefit of the proposed rule and stated that it could negatively affect the aviation industry given its broad scope. For example, officials from three of the six industry associations we interviewed stated that many of the proposed rule’s measures, such as having third-party contractors conduct inspections of private aircraft operators for a fee, would impose substantial logistical and cost burdens on the general aviation industry. These association officials added that any revised rule that TSA develops must take into account the security measures already put in place by general aviation aircraft operators as well as the costs associated with implementing any additional security measures. TSA managers responsible for general aviation security operations stated that, in response to these concerns, the agency was revising the proposed rule to make it more focused and risk-based, and that the agency plans to issue a supplemental notice of proposed rulemaking in late 2012 or early 2013. Further, officials from all six of the industry associations we interviewed stated that TSA has reached out to industry in developing its new rule and three of the six associations stated that TSA has performed a better job of reaching out to industry in its ongoing development of the new rule than it did with the rule it proposed in 2008. For example, the vice president from one association stated that as part of its development of its supplemental notice of proposed rulemaking, TSA has more actively sought information on these security measures, which better allows the agency to ensure the requirements would impose as limited a burden as possible while maximizing security. He also stated that TSA periodically solicits information on its proposed rule and on industry security measures from industry associations through its Aviation Security Advisory Committee. TSA has not ensured that all foreign nationals seeking flight training in the United States have been vetted through AFSP prior to beginning this training or established controls to help verify the identity of individuals seeking flight training who claim U.S. citizenship. TSA also faces challenges in obtaining criminal history information to conduct its security threat assessments as part of the vetting process, but is working to establish processes to identify foreign nationals with immigration violations. Some foreign nationals receiving flight training may not have undergone a TSA security threat assessment. Under AFSP, foreign nationals seeking flight training in the United States must receive a TSA security threat assessment before receiving flight training to determine whether each applicant is a security threat to the United States. This threat assessment is in addition to screening that the Department of State conducts on foreign nationals who apply for nonimmigrant visas and that U.S. Customs and Border Protection conducts on travelers seeking admission into the United States at ports of entry. According to TSA regulations, an individual poses a security threat when the individual is suspected of posing, or is known to pose, a threat to transportation or national security, a threat of air piracy or terrorism, a threat to airline or passenger security, or a threat to civil aviation security. AFSP to obtain flight training, TSA uses information submitted by the foreign national—such as name, date of birth, and passport information— to conduct a criminal history records check, a review of the Terrorist Screening Database, and a review of the Department of Homeland Security’s TECS system, as shown in table 2. See 49 C.F.R. § 1540.115(c). Description Criminal history record checks, which are fingerprint-based, require an adjudicator to review the applicant’s criminal history. According to TSA officials responsible for conducting these reviews, AFSP has no specific disqualifying offenses; however, if a foreign national applying to AFSP has criminal violations, TSA will forward this information to FAA to determine whether the violation disqualifies that individual from holding an FAA certificate. Information in the Terrorist Screening Center’s consolidated database of known or suspected terrorists—the Terrorist Screening Database—is used for security-related screening of foreign nationals applying to AFSP. For example, the Selectee List, a subset of the Terrorist Screening Database, contains information on individuals who must undergo additional security screening before being permitted to board an aircraft. The No Fly List, another subset of the Terrorist Screening Database, contains information on individuals who are prohibited from boarding an aircraft. If a foreign national is on one of these lists, TSA analysts will perform additional research to determine whether he or she is eligible to receive flight training. TECS, an updated and modified version of the former Treasury Enforcement Communications System, is an information-sharing platform that allows users to access different databases relevant to the antiterrorism and law enforcement mission of numerous other federal agencies. TSA reviews information contained in TECS to determine if an AFSP applicant has prior immigration-related violations. If the AFSP applicant has prior immigration-related violations, such as a previous overstay, TSA will conduct additional TECS queries to determine if the applicant is eligible to obtain flight training. An overstay is an individual who is admitted to the country legally on a temporary basis—either with a visa, or in some cases, as a visitor who was allowed to enter without a visa—but then overstayed his or her authorized period of admission. According to TSA data, about 116,000 foreign nationals applied to AFSP from fiscal year 2006 through fiscal year 2011, and TSA’s AFSP security threat assessments resulted in 107 training requests submitted by foreign nationals being denied from 2006 through 2011 because of national security reasons, immigration violations, or disqualifying criminal offenses. According to TSA officials, most foreign nationals taking training from a U.S. flight training provider will apply for an FAA airman certificate once their flight training is completed. Information obtained by FAA as part of this application for certification is placed in the airmen registry. Consistent with ATSA, TSA strives to coordinate with other federal agencies to secure the nation’s transportation systems. According to TSA, this may include coordinating with FAA and U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) to identify individuals who pose a threat to transportation security. For example, FAA provides TSA with data on individuals new to the airmen registry database on a daily basis, including biographic information on foreign nationals applying for airman certificates based on their foreign license. According to a report by the DHS Office of Inspector General, in early 2009, TSA used these data to perform a one- time, biographic, name-based security threat assessment for each of the 4 million individual FAA airman certificate holders. These security threat assessments consisted of matching the biographic data provided by FAA against the Terrorist Screening Database to determine whether credible information indicated that the individual holding a certificate was involved, or suspected of being involved, in any activity that could pose a threat to transportation or national security. FAA certificate holders suspected of being in the Terrorist Screening Database were referred to TSA’s Transportation Threat Assessment and Credentialing office for investigation. The airman vetting activities had been transferred to TSA in October 2009 after a TSA and FAA work group developed business processes and an interagency agreement was signed, according to Since then, TSA has vetted both new FAA airman certificate FAA.applicants and holders on an ongoing basis against the Terrorist Screening Database. In addition to vetting names of FAA airman certificate holders against the Terrorist Screening Database, TSA also vets foreign nationals applying for flight training through the AFSP, including training that occurs before a student applies for an FAA airman certificate. To determine whether foreign nationals applying for FAA airman certificates had previously applied to AFSP and been vetted by TSA, we obtained data from FAA’s airmen registry on foreign nationals who had applied for airman certificates and provided these data to TSA so that the agency could conduct a matching process to determine whether the foreign nationals in the FAA airmen registry were in TSA’s AFSP database and the extent to which they had been successfully vetted through the AFSP database. The results of our review of TSA’s analyses are as follows: TSA’s analysis indicated that some of the 25,599 foreign nationals in the FAA airmen registry were not in the TSA AFSP database, indicating that these individuals had not applied to the AFSP or been vetted by TSA before taking flight training and receiving an FAA airman certificate. TSA’s analysis indicated that an additional number of the 25,599 foreign nationals in the FAA airmen registry were also in the TSA AFSP database but had not been successfully vetted, meaning that they had received an FAA airman certificate but had not been successfully vetted or received permission from TSA to begin flight training. As stated previously, TSA continuously vets all new and existing FAA airmen certificate holders against the Terrorist Screening Database, which would include the foreign nationals identified through TSA’s analysis. However, this vetting does not occur until after the foreign national has obtained flight training. Thus, foreign nationals obtaining flight training with the intent to do harm, such as three of the pilots and leaders of the September 11 terrorist attacks, could have already obtained the training needed to operate an aircraft before they received any type of vetting. In commenting on the results of the analysis, TSA’s Program Manager for AFSP could not explain with certainty why some of the foreign nationals applying for FAA airman certificates may not have been vetted though TSA’s security threat assessment process. The Program Manager stated, however, that certain individuals can receive exemptions from the vetting requirement as a result of a Department of Defense (DOD) attaché endorsement at a U.S. embassy or consulate overseas. TSA takes steps to help ensure that foreign nationals are obtaining security threat assessments prior to beginning flight training. Specifically, TSA regulations require flight training providers to maintain documentation on foreign nationals who receive AFSP approval to begin flight training as well as documentation on those who are taking flight training under DOD endorsements. Similarly, TSA standard operating procedures for inspectors indicate they should review documentation over the course of their inspections of the flight training provider, including documentation indicating the foreign national was approved for flight training under AFSP and, if available, the DOD endorsement letter that informs them of the status of the foreign national in question as a DOD endorsee, which would exempt them from receiving a security threat assessment under AFSP. Our review of compliance data from TSA’s PARIS database for fiscal year 2011 found that TSA inspectors have encountered and documented instances where foreign nationals attending flight school presented to the flight training provider DOD endorsement letters, which would indicate they are exempt from security threat assessment requirements. Additional details are considered sensitive security information. TSA’s fiscal year 2011 Compliance Work Plan for Transportation Security Inspectors requires that a minimum of one comprehensive inspection per year must be performed on each of the approximately 7,000 known flight training providers. The work plan was revised in 2011 to require a minimum of two comprehensive inspections per year for each of the 4,500 certified flight instructors who train foreign students, and TSA’s program manager stated that the agency was able to inspect all of these entities at least twice in 2011. In general, the inspection process requires inspectors to, among other things, review documents maintained by the flight training provider, including the flight training records of both U.S. citizens and alien flight students, and also ensure that foreign students have registered with TSA’s AFSP database and were granted permission The results of the inspections are to be to begin flight training from TSA.reported in TSA’s PARIS database consistent with the reporting requirements of the work plan and other TSA guidance. As warranted, any follow-up inspections are to be performed based on findings made during the inspection process. As of January 2012, inspection results show that the rate of compliance with AFSP requirements increased from 89 percent in fiscal year 2005 to 96 percent in fiscal year 2011. TSA officials attribute the increase in compliance to a better understanding of AFSP requirements by flight training providers, among other things. Agency data also illustrate that the reasons for noncompliance among providers varied. For example, in fiscal year 2011, the reasons for noncompliance included violations such as missing photographs of foreign students, which occurred in 9 percent of 1,800 inspections for this item. In 7 percent of about 2,800 inspections, providers did not document and retain employee records related to completion of the required Security Awareness Training. When inspectors checked for retention of records of U.S. citizenship by the flight training provider, the provider was not in compliance in about 5 percent of the nearly 2,800 inspections performed in this area. Compliance violations detected by inspectors were sometimes resolved either by counseling with the flight training provider or by initiating an investigation of the incident, which could result in civil penalties being assessed. As part of its compliance inspection process, TSA inspectors also review records of documentation provided by U.S. citizens applying for flight training, which are maintained by flight training providers. TSA regulations governing AFSP require individuals claiming U.S. citizenship to provide one of the following documents, among other information, to flight training providers before accessing flight training: a valid, unexpired U.S. passport an original or government-issued birth certificate original certificate of birth abroad and a government-issued picture original certificate of U.S. citizenship with raised seal and government- original U.S. Naturalization Certificate with raised seal and government-issued picture identification. Flight school personnel are required to review the credentials presented by individuals claiming U.S. citizenship and to maintain records, and TSA inspectors, as part of the inspection process, review these records to ensure flight training provider compliance with regulatory requirements. Additional details are considered sensitive security information. We have previously reported on the challenges TSA faces in ensuring it has the necessary information and appropriate staffing to effectively conduct security threat assessments for screening and credentialing programs, which include AFSP. As we reported in December 2011, criminal history record checks are a key element of the security threat assessment process for TSA’s screening and credentialing programs, helping to ensure that the agency detects those applicants with potentially disqualifying criminal offenses. However, as we reported, the level of access that TSA credentialing programs have to the Department of Justice’s FBI criminal history records is the level of access accorded for noncriminal-justice purposes (i.e., equal to that of a private company doing an employment check on a new applicant, according to TSA), which limits TSA in accessing certain criminal history data related to charges and convictions. TSA said that it had been difficult to effectively and efficiently conduct security threat assessment adjudication of criminal history records because of the limited access it has as a noncriminal justice-purpose requestor of criminal history records—and that this limitation had increased the risk that the agency was not detecting potentially disqualifying criminal offenses. We reported that while TSA was seeking criminal justice-type access to FBI systems, the FBI reported that it is legally unable to provide this access. The FBI and TSA were collaborating on options, but had not identified the extent to which a potential security risk may exist under the current process, and the costs and benefits of pursuing alternatives to provide additional access. In December 2011, we recommended that TSA and the FBI conduct a joint risk assessment of TSA’s access to criminal history records. DHS concurred with this recommendation and indicated it would work with the Department of Justice to assess the extent of security risk, among other things, and evaluate the costs and benefits of each alternative. In response to our recommendations, the FBI reported that it was pursuing several strategies to provide TSA with access to the most complete criminal history information available for noncriminal justice-related purposes, including reaching out to states that do not provide criminal history records for noncriminal justice purposes as well as working to develop technical solutions. As of February 2012, TSA officials indicated that they are continuing to work with the FBI to address our recommendation. TSA officials responsible for overseeing security threat assessments stated that the process for conducting criminal history record checks for AFSP is substantively the same as that used for other TSA screening and credentialing programs. While there is no information indicating that any foreign nationals seeking flight training should not have been allowed to do so because of unidentified criminal offenses, we believe that TSA should continue to work with the FBI on joint risk assessments of TSA’s access to criminal history records for credentialing programs, including AFSP. There have been instances of overstays or other immigration-related violations for foreign nationals taking flight training in the United States, most notably for three of the September 11 hijackers. Specifically, three of the six pilots and apparent leaders were out of status on or before September 11, including two in overstay status. AFSP was implemented to help address such security concerns. As previously discussed, as part of AFSP, TSA conducts security threat assessments for foreign nationals requesting flight training in the United States. According to TSA officials, the purpose of the security threat assessment, which includes a check of the Terrorist Screening Database and a criminal history records check, is to determine whether the foreign national requesting flight training presents a security threat; the checks are not designed to determine whether an applicant is in the country legally. As part of the security threat assessment, TSA also conducts reviews of DHS’s TECS database to determine if any negative immigration-related information is associated with the foreign national seeking flight training. However, TSA officials acknowledged that it is possible for a foreign national to be approved by TSA through AFSP and to complete flight training after entering the country illegally or overstaying his or her allotted time to be in the country legally. In 2010, ICE investigated a Boston-area flight school after local police stopped the flight school owner for a traffic violation and discovered that he was in the country illegally. Twenty-five of the foreign nationals at this flight school had applied to AFSP and had been approved by TSA to begin flight training after their security threat assessment was completed; however, the ICE investigation and our subsequent inquiries revealed the following issues: Eight of the 25 foreign nationals who received approval by TSA to begin flight training were in “entry without inspection” status, meaning they had entered the country illegally. Six of these foreign nationals were later arrested by ICE as a result of the investigation. TSA indicated 1 individual had been approved to begin flight training at two other schools, although the flight schools indicated that he did not complete training. Three of the 8 foreign nationals in “entry without inspection” status obtained FAA airman certificates: 2 held FAA private pilot certificates and one held an FAA commercial pilot certificate. Seventeen of the 25 foreign nationals who received approval by TSA to begin flight training were in “overstay” status, meaning they had overstayed their authorized period of admission into the United States. Sixteen of these were arrested by ICE as a result of the investigation. Four of the 17 foreign nationals in “overstay” status obtained FAA airman certificates: 3 held FAA private pilot certificates and 1 held a commercial pilot certificate. In addition, the flight school owner held two FAA airman certificates. Specifically, he was a certified Airline Transport Pilot (cargo pilot) and a Certified Flight Instructor. However, he had never received a TSA security threat assessment or been approved by TSA to obtain flight training. He had registered with TSA as a flight training provider under AFSP. Further, TSA data indicated that an additional foreign national arrested as a result of this flight school investigation for “entry without inspection” had previously completed flight training through an airline. According to the AFSP program manager, TSA reviews TECS to determine if the student has prior immigration violations, including overstays. However, the program manager stated that this TECS review is not designed to determine how long the student is authorized to stay in the country or whether the student had entered the country legally. Rather, if the TECS review indicates that the foreign national has previous immigration-related violations, such as overstaying the authorized period of admission, TSA is to conduct additional TECS queries to determine if the individual is eligible to receive flight training. Further, according to TSA, prospective flight students may apply for AFSP before entering the United States, rendering moot the question of whether the foreign national had entered the country legally or overstayed. The AFSP program manager stated that even though the foreign nationals were later found to be overstays, at the time of the review and adjudication of their security threat assessments, they were determined to be in legal status. According to TSA, none of the individuals that TSA processed and approved under AFSP had derogatory information within TECS, and visa overstay information is contained within TECS. However, ICE data we reviewed indicated that 16 of the 17 foreign nationals associated with the flight school who were found by ICE to be in overstay status at the time of the investigation had already been in overstay status at the time they received AFSP approval to begin flight training. This includes the 4 foreign nationals who were able to obtain FAA airman certificates. Further, the AFSP program manager stated that foreign nationals who may have entered the country illegally but who did not have prior immigration violations, did not have a criminal history, or were not on the terrorist watch list, could be successfully vetted through an AFSP security threat assessment and approved to receive flight training. The program manager added that under the current AFSP process, TSA cannot always determine at the time of application if an individual entered the United States “without inspection” (illegally) because applicants can apply to AFSP more than 180 days prior to the start date of training and applicants are not necessarily in the United States at the time of application. Senior officials from TSA and ICE stated that the agencies have initiated a process in which TSA and ICE check the names of AFSP applicants against the U.S. Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology (US- VISIT) program’s Arrival and Departure Information System (ADIS) to help address this gap, as well as to identify foreign nationals taking flight training who become overstays. Specifically, in March 2011, TSA vetted a list of current alien flight students in TSA’s AFSP database against names in USVISIT’s ADIS to determine if any were potential overstays. This review resulted in the identification of 142 possible overstays. In May 2011, TSA provided ICE with the results of its analysis, and ICE vetting further reduced the list of possible overstays to 22. In September and October of 2011, ICE initiated 22 investigations based on the results of this analysis, which resulted in three arrests. According to TSA and ICE officials, this initial matching of names in the AFSP database against ADIS was conducted once to give the agencies an indication of how many foreign nationals seeking flight training in the United States may be in violation of their immigration status and what the workload associated with conducting such matches would be. Information from this review could then be used to initiate investigations of individuals suspected of being in the country illegally either by overstaying their allotted time in the country or who may have entered the country illegally. The TSA and ICE officials added, however, that such a process would have to be conducted more regularly to systematically identify foreign nationals taking flight training who may be in violation of their immigration status or who may have entered the country illegally. They stated that establishing a more regular process of matching names of foreign nationals in the AFSP database against ADIS would allow the agencies to better identify foreign nationals seeking flight training who have violated the terms of their admission as well as those who have entered the country illegally. However, several issues related to how a name matching program would work are being considered, such as which agency would vet names in the AFSP database against ADIS, and how frequently names associated with potential violations would be provided to ICE. ICE and TSA officials stated that they have not specified desired outcomes or time frames, or established performance measures to evaluate the success of the program. Standards for program management state that specific desired outcomes or results should be conceptualized, defined, and documented in the planning process as part of a road map, along with the appropriate The standards steps and time frames needed to achieve those results.also call for assigning responsibility and accountability for ensuring the results of program activities are carried out. Having a road map, with appropriate steps and time frames, and individuals assigned with responsibility and accountability for fully instituting a pilot program, as well as instituting that pilot program if it was found to help identify foreign nationals taking flight training who may be in violation of their immigration status or who may have entered the country illegally, could help TSA and ICE account for flight students with potential immigration violations, and thus better position TSA to identify and prevent a potential risk. Since our 2004 report on general aviation security, TSA has taken steps to enhance communications and interactions with general aviation industry stakeholders as well as improve the vetting of foreign nationals enrolling in U.S. flight schools. AFSP was implemented to help prevent future occurrences of foreign nationals obtaining flight training to commit terrorist attacks, as they did for the September 11, 2001, attacks. Key to the effectiveness of this effort is the ability of TSA to conduct meaningful security threat assessments on foreign nationals seeking flight training to help determine whether these individuals pose a security threat. However, as shown in TSA’s analysis, there are discrepancies between the data found in FAA’s airmen registry and TSA’s AFSP database, raising questions about whether some foreign nationals with airman certificates (pilot’s licenses) have completed required security threat assessments. In addition, working with ICE to develop a plan that assigns responsibilities and accountability and time frames for assessing the joint TSA and ICE pilot program to identify foreign nationals who may have immigration violations—including those who entered the country illegally to obtain flight training—and instituting that program if it is found to be effective, could better position TSA and ICE to determine the benefits of checking TSA data on foreign nationals pursuing flight training in the United States. To better ensure that TSA is able to develop effective and efficient security programs for general aviation operators, we recommend that the Administrator of TSA take the following action: Take steps to identify any instances where foreign nationals receive FAA airman certificates (pilot’s licenses) without first undergoing a TSA security threat assessment and examine those instances so that TSA can identify the reasons for these occurrences and strengthen controls to prevent future occurrences. To better ensure that TSA is able to identify foreign nationals with immigration violations who may be applying to the Alien Flight Student Program, we recommend the Secretary of Homeland Security direct the Administrator of TSA and the Director of ICE to collaborate to take the following action: Develop a plan, with time frames, and assign individuals with responsibility and accountability for assessing the results of a pilot program to check TSA AFSP data against information DHS has on applicants’ admissibility status to help detect and identify violations, such as overstays and entries without inspection, by foreign flight students, and institute that pilot program if it is found to be effective. We provided a draft of this report to the Departments of Homeland Security and Transportation for comment. DHS, in written comments received July 13, 2012, concurred with the recommendations and identified actions taken, planned, or under way to implement the recommendations. The Department of Transportation’s Deputy Director of Audit Relations stated in an e-mail received on June 4, 2012, that the department had no comments on the report. Written comments are summarized below and official DHS comments are reproduced in appendix III. In addition, DHS and DOT provided written technical comments, which we incorporated into the report, as appropriate. In response to our recommendation that TSA take steps to identify instances where foreign nationals receive FAA airman certificates (pilot’s licenses) without first undergoing a TSA security threat assessment, DHS stated that TSA receives a daily feed from FAA of all new FAA certificates issued, and that TSA vets these against certificates in the Terrorist Screening Database on a daily basis. While this is a beneficial practice, we believe that it would be preferable for TSA to vet prospective flight students before they begin flight training, rather than after they have completed training and received a pilot’s certificate and are thus capable of flying an aircraft. In addition, while TSA vets the names of new certificate holders against the Terrorist Screening Database on a daily basis, the AFSP vetting process includes additional criminal history records checks and a check for derogatory immigration-related information. To help improve the AFSP vetting process, DHS also stated that TSA signed a memorandum of understanding with FAA in February 2012 to exchange data. The memorandum, which FAA signed in March 2012, outlines a process for FAA to provide certain data from its airmen registry on a monthly basis, via encrypted e-mail and password protected, to a designated point of contact within TSA, and authorizes TSA to use the data to ensure flight training providers are providing TSA with applicant/candidate information in order to conduct the appropriate background check prior to flight instruction. This is an important first step toward addressing our recommendation, provided that TSA uses the data to identify instances where foreign nationals receive FAA airman certificates without first undergoing a TSA security threat assessment, identifies reasons for these occurrences, and strengthens controls to prevent future occurrences, as we recommended. In response to our recommendation that TSA and ICE collaborate and develop a plan with time frames for assessing the results of a pilot program to check TSA AFSP data against information DHS has on applicants’ admissibility status, and to institute that pilot program if it is found to be effective, DHS stated that TSA will prepare a plan by December 31, 2012, to assess the results of the pilot with ICE to determine the lawful status of the active AFSP population. The plan is to include specific details on time frames and accountability and recommendations for next steps. We believe that these are positive actions that could help TSA address the weaknesses identified in this report and we will continue to work with TSA to monitor progress on the proposed solutions as the agency proceeds. In its comments, DHS also referred to additional recommendations related to TSA’s vetting of foreign nationals. Because DHS deemed the details of these recommendations and its response as sensitive security information, they are not included in the public version of this report. We are sending copies of this report to the Secretaries of Homeland Security and Transportation, the TSA Administrator, and appropriate congressional committees. In addition, this report is available at no charge on the GAO website at http://www.gao.gov. If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 512-4379 or lords@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. Key contributors to this report are acknowledged in appendix IV. This report addresses the following questions: (1) What actions have the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) and general aviation aircraft operators taken to enhance security and how has TSA obtained information on the implementation of the operators’ actions? (2) To what extent has TSA ensured that foreign flight students seeking flight training in the United States do not pose a security threat? To address these questions, we examined laws and regulations— including provisions of the Aviation and Transportation Security Act (ATSA), Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 (9/11 Commission Act), and TSA regulations governing aircraft operators and the Alien Flight Student Program (AFSP)—related to the security of general aviation operations. We also interviewed representatives from six industry associations based on their participation in TSA’s Aviation Security Advisory Committee and on their focus on general aviation security issues: the American Association of Airport Executives, Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association, Experimental Aircraft Association, General Aviation Manufacturers Association, National Air Transportation Association, and National Business Aviation Association. We also interviewed officials from TSA’s Office of Security Operations, Office of Intelligence and Analysis, and Office of Security Policy and Industry Outreach, as well as U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) and the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). In addition, we conducted site visits and interviewed representatives from a nonprobability sample of 22 general aviation operators located at selected airports—including 5 private operators that operate at least one aircraft weighing more than 12,500 pounds, 7 private charter operators that also perform as private operators, and 10 flight schools—to observe and discuss security initiatives implemented. We selected these airports based on geographic dispersion (Southern California, North Texas, and Central Florida) as well as variation in the types of general aviation operations present (such as charter and private operations) and size of aircraft based at each airport. Because we selected a nonprobability sample of operators to interview, the information obtained cannot be generalized to all general aviation operators. However, the interviews provided important perspective to our analysis and corroborated information we gathered through other means. To identify actions TSA and general aviation aircraft operators have taken to enhance security and how TSA has obtained information on the implementation of the operators’ actions, we examined documentation on TSA’s inspection processes for monitoring aircraft operators’ implementation of security programs, including the Transportation Security Inspector Inspections Handbook, the National Investigations and Enforcement Manual, and the Compliance Work Plan for Transportation Security Inspectors. We also reviewed documentation related to aircraft operators’ implementation of voluntary security initiatives not covered by TSA security programs, such as guidance for TSA personnel who conduct outreach to general aviation operators. We reviewed a report conducted on behalf of DHS examining the potential damage that could be caused by different types of general aviation aircraft. We also reviewed the methodology and assumptions associated with this report and found them to be reasonable and well documented. Also, we reviewed National Safe Skies Alliance’s General Aviation Airport Vulnerability Assessment, which contains survey data on security measures implemented from a sample of general aviation airports, and TSA’s General Aviation Airport Vulnerability Briefing. We also interviewed TSA officials on efforts to interact with general aviation associations as a means to obtain information on security initiatives implemented by private general aviation operators, including the agency’s interaction with members of the Aviation Security Advisory Committee. We also interviewed TSA Federal Security Directors and Transportation Security Inspectors whose areas of operation encompass the airports we selected, as well as airport officials responsible for security at each airport. Finally, we reviewed TSA data from fiscal years 2005 through 2011 on the compliance of general aviation operators and flight training providers that fall under TSA security programs with program requirements. We chose these dates because they reflect the time frame after the publication of our previous report on general aviation security. For example, we obtained compliance data for general aviation operators covered under the Twelve-Five and Private Charter standard security programs stored in TSA’s Performance and Results Information System (PARIS) for fiscal years 2005 through 2011. We identified the frequency that aircraft operators and flight training providers were reported to be in compliance with program requirements. As part of this work, we assessed the reliability of TSA data in PARIS by interviewing TSA officials and reviewing documentation on controls implemented to ensure the integrity of the data in the database and found the data to be sufficiently reliable for use in this report. To assess the extent to which TSA has ensured that foreign flight students seeking flight training in the United States do not pose a security threat, we reviewed our recent reports related to DHS security threat assessment processes, and TSA guidance related to procedures for conducting security threat assessments of several agency programs, including AFSP. We interviewed TSA officials who perform security threat assessments and inspections of flight training providers for AFSP to better understand program operations. To determine whether foreign nationals applying for FAA airman certificates had previously applied to AFSP and been vetted by TSA, we obtained from FAA data on foreign nationals from FAA’s Comprehensive Airmen Information System, also known as the airmen registry. Specifically, we obtained FAA airmen registry data, including names and dates of birth, on 25,599 foreign nationals applying for their first FAA airman private pilot certificate, sport pilot certificate, or recreational pilot certificates from January 2006 through September 2011. We selected these dates because 2006 was the first full year after TSA assumed responsibility for AFSP from the Department of Justice and September 2011 was the end of the fiscal year for our reporting period. The data did not include information on foreign nationals applying for FAA airman certificates based on an existing foreign airmen certificate issued by another government, thus ensuring that the data we obtained were for foreign nationals who had obtained flight training in the United States and therefore would have been required to have applied for vetting under AFSP. We provided the FAA airmen registry data to TSA so that the agency could conduct a matching process to determine whether the foreign nationals in the FAA airmen registry were in the AFSP database and the extent to which they had been successfully vetted through AFSP. As stated previously, TSA receives FAA airmen registry data on a daily basis; however, given the specific parameters we specified for matching FAA airmen registry data against the AFSP database, we provided TSA with airmen registry data we had obtained from FAA to allow for easier review and analysis of TSA results. We found the FAA and TSA data and the approach, methodology, and results of the data matching process to be sufficiently reliable for our purposes. We used the results of TSA’s analysis to identify whether foreign nationals in the FAA airmen registry were not in the AFSP database, and therefore not approved for flight training through AFSP, as well as foreign nationals who were in the FAA airmen registry and were in the AFSP database, but had not been successfully vetted though AFSP. As part of this work, we also assessed the reliability of data in the FAA airmen registry as well as data in the AFSP database by interviewing FAA and TSA officials, and reviewing documentation on controls implemented to ensure the integrity of the data in the database and found both to be sufficiently reliable for use in this report. We also spoke to TSA inspection officials to discuss common issues associated with compliance inspections and efforts to address compliance deficiencies. We reviewed documentation on TSA compliance procedures for flight training providers participating in the AFSP program and reviewed summary statistics for the period fiscal year 2005 through fiscal year 2011, on flight school compliance compiled by TSA. We also performed an analysis on compliance data for flight training providers. We ascertained the reliability of AFSP inspection results derived from PARIS, by interviewing TSA officials and reviewing documentation on controls implemented to ensure the integrity of the data in the database, and found the inspection data sufficiently reliable for use in this report. We also spoke with cognizant TSA and ICE officials to discuss the pre-pilot initiative under way with ICE to detect foreign nationals registered with AFSP who overstayed their period of admission in the country or entered the country illegally. We also reviewed documentation from an ICE investigation related to a Boston-area flight training provider. We compared the names of foreign nationals ICE identified in this investigation with the names of AFSP candidates assigned to the flight school, to ascertain which of the AFSP candidates had undergone a security threat assessment and passed, but were subsequently found via the ICE investigation to have either overstayed their admission period or entered the country without inspection. We also evaluated TSA’s efforts to assess risk for the AFSP against Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government. We conducted this performance audit from March 2011 through July 2012 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. TSA has conducted or commissioned five assessments examining threats, vulnerabilities, and consequences associated with potential terrorist use of general aviation aircraft. For example, in May 2007, TSA and the Homeland Security Institute published an assessment of, among other things, the potential destructive capability of various sizes of general aviation aircraft. In November 2010, TSA released its assessment of vulnerabilities associated with general aviation airports. In 2003 and 2004, TSA and the Aviation Security Advisory Committee developed guidelines or best practices designed to establish nonregulatory security standards for general aviation airport security. These guidelines are based on industry best practices and an airport characteristic measurement tool that allows airport operators to assess the level of risk associated with their airport to determine which security enhancements are most appropriate for their facility. According to the Acting General Manager for General Aviation, the committee is in the process of updating these guidelines, with an expected release in mid-2012. TSA implemented a hotline (1-866-GA-SECURE, or 1-866-427-3287) in December 2002, which allows individuals to report suspicious activities to a central command structure. Pursuant to FAA regulations, general aviation operations are generally prohibited within a 15-mile area of the Washington, D.C., metropolitan area unless otherwise authorized by TSA. This limits access at Potomac Airpark, Washington Executive/Hyde Field, and College Park Airport (referred to as the “Maryland-3”) to only cleared and vetted pilots operating in compliance with specific flight planning and air traffic control procedures. TSA advises FAA to impose airspace restrictions at various locations throughout the United States to limit or prohibit aircraft operations in certain areas when intelligence officials report heightened security sensitivity. This includes the Air Defense Identification Zone around Washington, D.C., and restrictions that are put into effect when the President travels outside of Washington, D.C. FAA has used Flight Data Center NOTAMs to advertise temporary flight restrictions and warn of airport closures. Aircraft weighing more than 12,500 pounds in scheduled or charter service that carry passengers or cargo or both, and that do not fall under another security program must implement a “Twelve-Five” standard security program, which must include, among other elements, procedures for bomb or air piracy threats. FAA, in July 2003, discontinued issuing paper airman certificates and began issuing certificates that incorporate a number of security features reducing the ability to create counterfeit certificates. The new certificates are made of high-quality plastic card stock and include micro printing, a hologram, and an ultraviolet-sensitive layer.An FAA requirement, adopted in October 2002, requires a pilot to carry government- issued or other form of photo identification acceptable to the FAA Administrator along with the pilot certificate when operating an aircraft. Requirement to notify FAA of aircraft transfers FAA, in February 2008, issued a final rule requiring those who transfer ownership of U.S.-registered aircraft to notify the FAA Aircraft Registry within 21 days from the transaction. Description The National Business Aviation Association proposed a security protocol for Part 91 operators, enabling operators with a TSA Access Certificate to operate internationally without the need for a waiver. TSA launched a pilot project in cooperation with the National Business Aviation Association with Part 91 operators at Teterboro Airport in New Jersey and later expanded the pilot to two additional airports. The Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association implemented the Airport Watch program to help increase security awareness. The program includes warning signs for airports, informational literature, and a training videotape to educate pilots and airport employees on potential security enhancements for their airports and aircraft. It helped to increase awareness of TSA’s centralized toll-free 1-866-GA-SECURE (1-866-427- 3287) hotline. General aviation security educational materials The Experimental Aircraft Association distributed Airport Watch videotapes and other educational materials concerning security practices and airspace restrictions. The National Agricultural Aircraft Association produced the Professional Aerial Applicators Support System, an annual education program that addresses security of aerial application operations. It is presented at state and regional agricultural aviation association meetings throughout the country. The National Air Transportation Association, on September 24, 2001, issued a series of recommended security procedures for all aviation businesses through its Business Aviation Security Task Force. The recommendations focused on immediate steps to be taken, plus longer-term actions. Examples included signage, appointing a single manager responsible for security at all locations, developing a “security mission statement,” methods to verify identification, seeking local law enforcement assistance to develop a security plan, and a host of others, including an advisory poster that was created and distributed free to all association members. FAA, in January 2002, issued a number of recommended actions addressing security for flight schools and those renting aircraft. These recommendations are designed to provide security against the unauthorized use of a flight school or rental aircraft. The National Association of State Aviation Officials, in December 2002, submitted to federal and state authorities a document outlining general aviation security recommendations. This included securing unattended aircraft, developing a security plan, and establishing a means to report suspicious activity. In addition, airports should establish a public awareness campaign, perform regular inspections of airport property, and control movement of persons and vehicles in the aircraft operating area. The U.S. Parachute Association disseminated security recommendations to its 219 skydiving clubs and centers across the United States, most of them based on general aviation airports. Some recommendations were aimed at ensuring security of jump aircraft during operations, as well as periods when aircraft are idle. The General Aviation Manufacturers Association, in conjunction with the U.S. Department of the Treasury, worked to help aircraft sellers identify unusual financial transactions. The publication entitled Guidelines for Establishing Anti-Money Laundering Procedures and Practices Related to the Purchase of General Aviation Aircraft was developed in consultation with manufacturers, aviation-finance companies, used-aircraft brokers, and fractional ownership companies. All publicly owned general aviation airports in Alabama must prepare and implement a written security plan that is consistent with TSA’s May 2004 Security Guidelines for General Aviation Airports. The plan was to be submitted and on file by January 1, 2006, with the Aeronautics Bureau of the Alabama Department of Transportation in order for the airport to be eligible to receive a state-issued airport improvement grant. Florida requires that certain public-use general aviation airports implement a security plan consistent with guidelines published by the Florida Airports Council. Airport security enhancements (New Jersey) New Jersey requires that all aircraft parked or stored more than 24 hours be secured by a two-lock system, that hangar doors have working locking devices and be closed and locked when unattended, that permanent signs providing emergency contact phone numbers be posted where specified, and that communications equipment provided by the Division of Aeronautics for emergency notification by the division or law enforcement agencies be available. Background checks for flight students (New York) New York law requires flight students to complete a criminal background check and wait for written permission to be sent to his or her flight school before beginning flight training. Airports must also register with the state and supply contact information and a security plan consistent with TSA’s May 2004 Guidelines for General Aviation Airports. State troopers provide airports with security audits (Virginia) Virginia trained selected state troopers to provide airports with security audits at no charge to the airport operator. Security assessment of public-use general aviation airports (Washington) Washington contracted with a consultant to perform a security assessment of public- use general aviation airports. In addition to the contact named above, Jessica Lucas-Judy, Assistant Director, and Robert Rivas, Analyst-in-Charge, managed this assignment. Erika D. Axelson, Orlando Copeland, Katherine Davis, Gloria Hernandez- Saunders, Adam Hoffman, Richard Hung, Mitchell Karpman, Stanley Kostyla, Thomas Lombardi, Marvin McGill, Jessica Orr, Anthony Pordes, Minette Richardson, and Robert Robinson made significant contributions to this report.

Summary: U.S. government threat assessments have discussed plans by terrorists to use general aviation aircraftgenerally, aircraft not available to the public for transportto conduct attacks. Also, the September 11, 2001, terrorists learned to fly at flight schools, which are within the general aviation community. TSA, within DHS, has responsibilities for general aviation security, and developed AFSP to ensure that foreign students enrolling at flight schools do not pose a security threat. GAO was asked to assess (1) TSA and general aviation industry actions to enhance security and TSA efforts to obtain information on these actions and (2) TSA efforts to ensure foreign flight students do not pose a security threat. GAO reviewed TSA analysis comparing FAA data from January 2006 to September 2011 on foreign nationals applying for airman certificates with AFSP data, and interviewed 22 general aviation operators at eight airports selected to reflect geographic diversity and variations in types of operators. This is a public version of a sensitive security report GAO issued in June 2012. Information TSA deemed sensitive has been omitted, including two recommendations on TSAs vetting of foreign nationals. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) and aircraft operators have taken several important actions to enhance general aviation security, and TSA is gathering input from operators to develop additional requirements. For example, TSA requires that certain general aviation aircraft operators implement security programs. Aircraft operators under these programs must, among other things, develop and maintain TSA-approved security programs. TSA has also conducted outreach to the general aviation community to establish a cooperative relationship with general aviation stakeholders. In 2008, TSA developed a proposed rule that would have imposed security requirements on all aircraft over 12,500 pounds, including large aircraft that Department of Homeland Security (DHS) analysis has shown could cause significant damage in an attack. In response to industry concerns about the proposed rules costs and security benefits, TSA is developing a new proposed rule. Officials from all six industry associations GAO spoke with stated that TSA has reached out to gather industrys input, and three of the six associations stated that TSA has improved its efforts to gather input since the 2008 notice of proposed rulemaking. TSA vets foreign flight student applicants through its Alien Flight Student Program (AFSP), but weaknesses exist in the vetting process and in DHSs process for identifying flight students who may be in the country illegally. From January 2006 through September 2011, more than 25,000 foreign nationals had applied for Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) airman certificates (pilots licenses), indicating they had completed flight training. However, TSA computerized matching of FAA data determined that some known number of foreign nationals did not match with those in TSAs database, raising questions as to whether they had been vetted. In addition, AFSP is not designed to determine whether a foreign flight student entered the country legally; thus, a foreign national can be approved for training through AFSP after entering the country illegally. A March 2010 U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) flight school investigation led to the arrest of six such foreign nationals, including one who had a commercial pilots license. As a result, TSA and ICE jointly worked on vetting names of foreign students against immigration databases, but have not specified desired outcomes and time frames, or assigned individuals with responsibility for fully instituting the program. Having a road map, with steps and time frames, and assigning individuals the responsibility for fully instituting a pilot program could help TSA and ICE better identify and prevent potential risk. The sensitive security version of this report discussed additional information related to TSAs vetting process for foreign nationals seeking flight training. GAO recommends that TSA identify how often and why foreign nationals are not vetted under AFSP and develop a plan for assessing the results of efforts to identify AFSP-approved foreign flight students who entered the country illegally. DHS concurred with GAOs recommendations and indicated actions it is taking in response.