The World Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank, the United Nations, and theEuropean Union co-sponsored an International Donors Conference on Haiti in Washington, D.C.,on July 19- 20, 2004. Representatives from 30 countries and 32 international organizations attended. The sponsors held the conference to garner financial support for the international assistance strategy,known as the Interim Cooperation Framework (ICF), which the interim Haitian governmentdeveloped in conjunction with the four sponsoring organizations. (1) The ICF, released in July2004, outlines Haiti's priority needs and programs for 2004-2006. The Interim CooperationFramework will provide assistance during the interim government, and through September 2006,which will be the end of the fiscal year and eight months into the newly elected government ifelections proceed as scheduled. Its short term goal is stabilization, with the intention that ICFprograms will lead to a participatory process that will produce a long term strategy for povertyreduction. The Interim Cooperation Framework estimated Haiti's needs to total $1.37 billion, and sought$924 million through the donors conference to meet the two-year funding gap. The sponsorsannounced on July 20 that international organizations and governments had pledged $1.085 billionover the next two years to help Haiti rebuild its infrastructure, strengthen institutions, and improvebasic services. The United States committed to provide $230 million for FY2004-FY2005. Donorshave held several conferences since July 2004 reaffirming the support of the international communityfor Haiti's transition process under the Interim Cooperation Framework. Aristide's government fell apart amidst violent protests and pressure from the United States,France, and others. Aristide went into exile, eventually landing in South Africa, where he remainstoday. An interim government was established, with Supreme Court Chief Justice BonifaceAlexandre assuming the Presidency, as outlined in the Haitian constitution, on February 29, 2004. That same day, the United Nations unanimously authorized an international force to help restoreorder, which was replaced in June 2004 by a U.N. peacekeeping force. Gerard LaTortue wasappointed Prime Minister through a compromise process. The interim government negotiated anagreement with opposition political groups to delay elections until the fall of 2005, with a newpresident to be sworn in on February 7, 2006. The government has already postponed electionsseveral times this fall, and reportedly has now scheduled presidential and legislative elections forDecember 27, and runoff elections for January 31, 2006. A weak political structure combined with ongoing political tensions, violence, and humanrights violations make it difficult to pursue the goals of the Interim Cooperation Framework. Someobservers express concern that, unless security conditions improve quickly and opposition partiesfeel free to participate, organizing elections that will be considered free, fair, and safe will beextremely difficult. (For more information on Aristide's terms and the interim government, see CRS Report RL32294 , Haiti: Developments and U.S. Policy Since 1991 and Current CongressionalConcerns, by [author name scrubbed].) The Interim Cooperation Framework addresses many of the developmental concerns for Haitithat have been expressed by Congress. Congressional concerns about its implementation centeraround the rate at which funds are being disbursed, and the effectiveness of the assistance provided. The interim government of Haiti developed the Interim Cooperation Framework inconjunction with the World Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank, the United Nations, andthe European Union. In addition to many offices of the interim Haitian government, some 32foreign governments and international organizations, and eight Haitian associations contributed insome form to the two-year development plan. Over 170 international and Haitian organizations wereconsulted during the preparation of the Interim Cooperation Framework. There is an unprecedented amount of coordination for aid to Haiti among donors and withthe government for the Interim Cooperation Framework. A Joint Committee for the Implementationand Monitoring of the Interim Cooperation Framework includes members of the Haitian government,Haitian civil society, and the donor community. The Prime Minister, Planning Minister, and FinanceMinister represent Haiti; the Inter-American Bank, the U.N. Development Programme (UNDP), theWorld Bank, and foreign aid agencies for the United States (USAID), Canada, and the EuropeanUnion represent the donors; and the Civil Society Initiative, Growth Group, and the Association ofArtisans represent Haitian civil society. This committee conducts the oversight of the ICF. Reporting to the Committee through a Secretariat are "sectoral tables." There are several sectoraltables for each pillar of the ICF. Haitian government and donor counterparts lead small groups inmonitoring the implementation of ICF projects for individual sectors, or groups of sectors, such asthe Sector Table for Agriculture and Water and Sanitation. The donors have also held meetings todiscuss the rate of progress, shortfalls, and shifts of funds to respond to emerging priorities. The Interim Cooperation Framework establishes priority needs and projects that fall underfour broad categories, or "axes": political governance and national dialogue; economic governanceand institutional development; economic recovery; and access to basic services. For each of thesefour strategic axes, the Framework provides a strategy, priority objectives, and monitoring indicators. Each axis of the Framework, its priorities, and the projects designed to address them are discussedbelow. Axis 1: Strengthen Political Governance and NationalDialogue. Politics in Haiti have generally been violent and authoritarian ever sinceHaiti became an independent republic in 1804. Haiti was headed by some 30 despotic rulers fromindependence to the collapse of the 30-year Duvalier dictatorship in 1986. In the late 1980s, a strongdemocratic movement emerged leading to a new constitution that guaranteed personal liberties,distributed power among a president, a Prime Minister, and two legislative chambers, and createdan independent judiciary and an electoral council to oversee democratic elections. The first electionsthat were generally considered free and fair were held in 1990, bringing Aristide to power. Nascentdemocratic institutions were frail, however, and authoritarian traditions strong. Succumbing to along tradition in Haiti, President Aristide was ousted by violent means -- in this case a military coup-- in 1991. After he was restored to office by a U.S.-led military force in 1994, neither he nor hissuccessor, Rene Preval, was able to maintain fully functioning governments or hold fully credibleelections. Although the 1987 constitution remains in force, many of its provisions are not respected inpractice. No parliament has been regarded by the international community or the opposition as fullylegitimate since 1997. The Department of State Human Rights Report for 2004 calls Haiti's judicialsystem "largely moribund," and "subject to significant influence by the executive and legislativebranches." Political parties are mostly vehicles for individual ambitions. Haitian society has becomeincreasingly polarized. Some observers have criticized successive Haitian governments fortolerating, and in some cases facilitating, violence against members of the opposition. At the sametime, observers criticize the opposition for also employing violent means, and for limitingthemselves to a strategy of rejection rather than negotiation. (2) The priorities under this axis include programs directed at: Security, police and demobilization, disarmament and reintegration. Priorities include enhancing security by professionalizing the Haitian National Police and disarmingthe numerous illegal armed groups in the country. The police force became politicized underAristide. Armed groups include Aristide supporters and rebels who contributed to Aristide's ouster. Violence increased during the months preceding that ouster, and part of MINUSTAH's mission isto help the government demobilize and disarm these groups and try to reintegrate them into Haitainsociety. Justice, penitentiary institutions and human rights. Priorities includetaking measures against impunity, and promoting judicial independence and capacity throughtraining of judicial and penitentiary personnel, and rehabilitation of physical infrastructure;promoting respect for human rights and basic freedoms by strengthening government institutionsresponsible for protecting citizens from abuse by the government; and promoting cooperationbetween the government and non-governmental organizations that promote and protect humanrights. Electoral process. Priorities include holding free, credible elections, with theU.N. mission (MINUSTAH) and the Organization of American States (OAS) supporting Haiti'sProvisional Electoral Council in organizing the elections and ensuring security for them. Presidentialand legislative elections are scheduled for fall of 2005, with the transfer of power to take place onFebruary 7, 2006, but the dates have been changed several times and may be postponed yet again. Promotion of national dialogue. Priorities include encouraging politicaldialogue among all sectors of Haitian society to promote national reconciliation, and solutions tolocal and national problems based on consensus. The Interim Cooperation Framework is consideredpart of this process. By involving many sectors of society in creating national plans of developmentsuch as the ICF, a Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper, and Millennium Development Goals, theinterim government and the international community hope to establish a framework for nationaldialogue revolving around development priorities. Axis 2: Strengthen Economic Governance and InstitutionalDevelopment. Use of public coffers for personal wealth has gone on for much ofHaiti's history. It became so rampant under the Duvalier regime (1957-1986) that it became knownas a "kleptocracy." According to the ICF (p.18), "Weaknesses in economic governance have beenone of the most serious impediments to economic growth and poverty reduction in Haiti," and "[T]hecurrent state of economic governance is dismal." The priorities under this axis include programs directed at: Economic governance. Priorities include making the budget processtransparent and efficient by implementing a state accounting system, strengthening controlmechanisms for use of public funds and procurement, and other reforms. The ICF also calls forbetter management of public finances by expanding the tax base and improving the allocation andmanagement of public funds by attacking corruption. Strengthening of institutional capacities. Priorities include improvinghuman resources in public administration by recruiting qualified young officials, from the Haitiandiaspora as well as from within Haiti, providing "massive" training, and significantly improvingcompensation. Regional, urban and local development and decentralization. Prioritiesinclude implementing structures at the local level which will prepare strategies for developmentbased on needs as identified by the community. The ICF also calls for the interim government toprepare policies for decentralization, and regional, urban, and local development to submit to thenext government. Axis 3: Promote Economic Recovery. Haiti isthe poorest country in the western hemisphere, and one of the poorest countries in the world, ranking150th among 175 countries in the U.N.'s Human Development Index. In 1997 the U.N. describedHaiti as having an "economy in regress," meaning that "the living standards and conditions of themajority, or a large part, of the population have fallen substantially," (3) and its economy has mostlycontinued to decline since then. The tasks that must be undertaken to promote economic recoveryand create jobs are enormous. Haiti must establish macro-economic stability, rehabilitateinfrastructures such as electricity and roads, and develop the private sector. In addition, agriculturalproduction must be improved, while protecting the environment, which has greatly deteriorated. The priorities under this axis include programs directed at: Macroeconomic stability. In conjunction with the International MonetaryFund, the interim government designed a macroeconomic program whose purpose is to containinflation at 14%, rehabilitate key public facilities, and provide essential services. According to theICF, this will be difficult to achieve without budgetary discipline on the part of thegovernment. Electricity. Priorities include improving the production and distribution ofelectricity by attacking corruption and mismanagement of the independent public corporation,Electricity of Haiti, which has the monopoly on electricity. According to the ICF, about 90 percentof Haitians have no access to electricity. Development of private sector and small- and medium-sizeenterprises/industries. Priorities include helping to revive the private sector by making variousfunds available to small businesses, combating corruption, developing a commercial code andencouraging integration of Haiti into regional and international markets. Rapid job creation and micro-finance. Priorities include creating jobsthrough labor intensive work programs, especially in public programs to improve infrastructure. According to the ICF (p. 25), "Almost 1 out of every 2 Haitians between the ages of 20 and 45 doesnot have a lucrative occupation." The framework calls for creating about 687,000 jobs from2004-2006, and increasing access to micro-credit, especially for women. Agriculture. Priorities include improving the capacity of agricultural workersto meet their needs in the short term by supplying vaccinations, conducting disease control, repairingfarm equipment, and distributing tools and seed. Various sorts of technical assistance in agriculturaltechniques are called for in the medium term. The report recommends rehabilitation of part of theMinistry of Agriculture "to restore its minimal intervention capability," and training of Ministry ofAgriculture staff, farmers organizations, and others to maximize the effectiveness of suchinterventions. Although 45% to 50% of Haiti's working population is engaged in agriculture, 80%of farmers cannot meet the basic food needs of their families (ICF, p. 26). Roads and transportation. Transportation infrastructure, which includesroads, airports, airstrips, and harbors, are in great need of investment and maintenance, as they arein "a state of very advanced dilapidation," according to the ICF (p. 27). Priorities include makingroads that are necessary for development usable at all times, by quickly conducting roadrehabilitation work, and then setting up financial and institutional mechanisms for managing andmaintaining them. Currently, only 5% of 3,400 kilometers of roads are in good condition. Thestrategy also calls for identifying and quickly investing in whatever is necessary to maintaincontinuity of port and aviation activity, and improving port management. Environmental protection and rehabilitation. Priorities include promotingsustainable use of natural resources through reduced reliance on wood fuel; planning and carryingout of activities aimed at halting degradation of land and natural resources; and supporting thedevelopment and implementation of disaster management plans. Haiti is caught in a vicious cyclethat makes the land unable to sustain the needs of its inhabitants and vulnerable to natural disasters. Because farmers lack the means to invest in more efficient technology, they employ unsustainablemethods, such as cutting down trees for wood fuel, which contributes to deforestation, which leadsto soil erosion, which leads to inadequate agricultural production, and continued poverty. Theprogram focuses on supporting local initiatives and the development of national plans to managenatural resources effectively. Axis 4: Improve Access to Basic Services. Muchof Haiti's population lacks access to basic services. According to the World Health Organization,only 28% of Haitians have access to sanitation, and 46% have access to improved water sources.There are only 25 doctors per 100,000 people. These conditions leave the majority of the populationvulnerable to disease and malnutrition, without educational resources or social safety nets. The priorities under this axis include programs directed at: Emergency humanitarian aid and post-disaster relief. Priorities includeresponding to the various crises in 2004 with emergency humanitarian aid. Haiti experienced asocio-economic crisis surrounding the collapse of the Aristide government in February 2004,followed by the disastrous floods of May 2004. Armed violence, including looting of stockpiles ofhumanitarian assistance. For much of the population, already limited access to basic social servicesand food, and the absence of many public services or further deterioration of what few servicesexisted, made conditions worse. All of these factors, according to the ICF (p. 30), make "the needsfor humanitarian aid and protection extremely urgent." Furthermore, Haiti has become increasingly vulnerable to natural disasters. Haiti is described by the UNDP as being one of the most vulnerable countries in the world for naturalcatastrophes due to cyclones and floods. (4) Therefore, another element of this component of the ICF takes alonger view of post-disaster relief, calling for strengthening governmental authorities' ability toidentify vulnerable groups and provide them assistance, and identifying humanitarian needs not metby current initiatives, such as long-term reconstruction and restoration of areas most affected by the2004 floods. The ICF also notes that while some humanitarian assistance is provided for inthe plan, it is essential for the government and the international community to develop a means ofperiodically assessing humanitarian needs. It also calls on the government to develop a"rehabilitation and reconstruction program with a preventative approach" for flood-affectedareas. Water and sanitation. Priorities include increasing the production anddelivery of potable water by strengthening institutional capacity and conducting studies for furtherimprovement in the long-term. More than half (54%) of all Haitians lack access to improved watersources. According to the ICF (p. 31), almost 60% of rural households, and almost 40% of urbanhouseholds outside major metropolitan areas do not have a lavatory inside or outside of their homes.About 9% of homes in metropolitan areas have no lavatory. On a positive note, the ICF states that where beneficiary communities have been activelyinvolved in water projects, there has been some improvement in access to potable water. Health and nutrition. Priorities include extending minimal health servicesby restarting the operation of the principal hospitals; and strengthening the ability of the PublicHealth and Population Ministry to manage and coordinate health care and coordinate its activitieswith international and non-governmental health organizations. The ICF also calls for the renewalof priority programs, such as systematic vaccinations, and for improved access to health care for boththe general population and vulnerable groups. The latter includes children, pregnant women,handicapped and HIV/AIDS-infected people, and indigents. The ICF's strategy for improving accessand restarting priority programs entails regulating and lowering prices for generic drugs and foressential supplies and services, and establishing a national system for their purchase anddistribution. Education, youth, and sports. This component of the ICF addresses threelevels of education: basic; professional training; and university. The programs are aimed atimproving access to and conditions of basic primary and secondary education by rehabilitatingschools, improving school environments, and reducing the costs of school for vulnerable groups. Other programs aim to raise the level of instruction by restoring and improving teacher training,"remobilizing" educational personnel, and revising and distributing literacy and other programsdesigned to improve the quality of education. Currently, about half a million children lack accessto basic education, and a mere 35% of children complete the 5th grade. The ICF also calls on thegovernment to improve communication with the private sector, which currently provides about 80%of the primary education available. For professional training, the programs are aimed at increasing access to, andthe relevance and quality of, training. The programs will strive to accomplish these goals bystrengthening the capacity of the government institution for professional training, and identifying thetraining needs of the workforce and then recruiting the personnel to meet those needs. Currently,"only 6 out of every 1,000 workers in the workforce have a diploma or certificate in a technical orprofessional field." (ICF, p. 34) For higher education, the initiatives are aimed at reducing the dropout rate byproviding services such as scholarships and food services; initiating reform to improve access andquality of educational programs; and, in the short term, repairing damage done to universities duringthe political violence of 2004. The number of students in higher education almost doubled from1986 to 1996, but the dropout rate is extremely high. Some observers believe that because thegovernment saw university students as part of an opposition movement, university facilities weretargeted during the political upheaval and damaged. Universities also have inadequate educationaland physical materials (ICF, p.34). Because Haitian youth "constitute a key factor in the process of creating ademocratic system and promoting economic development and social progress," the ICF calls on theHaitian institution responsible for Youth, Sports and Civics to focus on vulnerable sectors of theyouth, such as disadvantaged youth or those with substance abuse problems, and to emphasize sportsas an activity that stimulates social cohesion (ICF, p.34). Culture, media, and communications. Priorities include reinforcing "the roleof culture and media in the promotion of a pluralist and democratic society" by strengthening Haitianbroadcast capacities, especially to be able to support the 2005 election process; and integratingwomen and other excluded or disadvantaged groups. Other projects include preparing a publicpolicy for the protection and diffusion of Haitian cultural heritage, and funding and supportingHaitian arts-and-crafts artisans. Food security. Priorities include reinforcing and creating institutions that arecapable of collecting information on and implementing plans for addressing food insecurity. According to the World Food Program, 40% of Haiti's population is "food insecure," and 16% is"precariously food secure." Slum upgrading. Priorities include improving slums by strengtheningnational institutions and community councils responsible for urban planning and various publicworks, and by carrying out physical improvements. The ICF notes that although Haiti is stillpredominantly rural, the urban population grew at almost 5% annually, compared to generalpopulation growth of about 2% from 1982 to 2003 (ICF, p.37). The head of MINUSTAH has saidthat allowing conditions in the slums to continue as they are is "intolerable," and that improving thequality of life in the slums would do much to reduce violence and bolster confidence in both theinternational community and the Haitian government. (5) Solid waste management. Priorities include ensuring effective collection andremoval of solid waste by actively including the private sector and private citizens in wastemanagement efforts; and providing waste treatment and disposal sites that protect the environment. The ICF also calls for existing institutions to be strengthened and new ones to be created that cancreate and support solid waste management plans at the national and local level. The ICF estimatesthat under 30% of solid waste is removed in metropolitan Port-au-Prince, that in other cities mostwaste is dumped in rivers, and that many neighborhoods have no waste removal services at all (ICF,p. 37). Safety nets and social protection. Priorities include laying the foundationfor the respect of fundamental human rights by conducting large-scale awareness campaigns andissuing identity documents; reducing malnutrition by providing food and services, especially tovulnerable groups; increasing access to health care through micro-insurance; encouragingcommunities to identify their development needs and providing international and private sectorfunding; offering social assistance services to the most vulnerable sectors of society; and improvingthe capacity of the ministry responsible for social services. According to the ICF, any assistanceprovided by the Haitian government is "very fragmented, scattered, and without significant impact." While most of the social protection services available are provided by non-governmentalorganizations, these groups only have resources sufficient to meet a small percentage of thepopulation's needs. Authors of the Interim Cooperation Framework cite as one of the strategy's strengths itsinclusive and participatory nature; they consulted members of Haitian civil society, the privatesector, and political parties in drawing up the plan. In addition, the ICF is designed to be a linkbetween short-, medium-, and long-term Haitian development efforts. Some of its programs aremeant to provide immediate results, such as emergency humanitarian aid, the creation of jobs, andthe provision of some basic services. The entire strategy was designed to continue for six monthsbeyond the interim government, so that the newly elected government, scheduled to be inauguratedin February 2006, would have financial resources at its disposal and programs already underway. Other programs lay the foundation for more long-term results. The interim government is using theICF as a basis for a Poverty Reduction Strategy for 2006 to 2009, which it is supposed to have readyin time for the next government. Generations of corrupt Haitian rulers have used the governmentas a means of personal enrichment, neglecting the development of state institutions. In addition,observers have criticized past interventions for failing to build institutions or train Haitians toperform government functions after international actors have departed. A priority of the ICF is tostrengthen the capacity of national institutions so that the Haitian government can design and providepublic services, and manage its resources more effectively and transparently. Haitian institutions have limited capacity. The Haitian government is small, and has fewphysical resources and skilled personnel to design and implement development programs. The ICFauthors themselves warn that absorptive capacity "can only be improved in a gradual manner, [and]must be taken into consideration; otherwise, the system will collapse" (ICF, p. 6). The plan thereforeemphasizes strengthening Haitian government structures, building up fragile institutions, and insome cases, creating entirely new ones. Some observers argue that, until those institutions are mademore capable, however, international actors should take a stronger role in implementing the InterimCooperation Framework and other development plans. In light of Haiti's chronic political instability,some have suggested making Haiti an international protectorate. Others suggest that a multilateraldonor commission should be formed to oversee and ensure accountability of international financialassistance. Still others propose that the donor community assume greater responsibility for planningand implementing development projects so that donor funds could be better absorbed. (6) Some observers express concern that the elections system being established by MINUSTAH,the OAS, and the interim government under the ICF relies too heavily on sophisticated technologynot suitable for a country where electricity is unreliable or not available in much of the country, andwhere half the population is illiterate. Some observers argue that current conditions are notconducive to free, fair and safe elections, and the vote should be postponed until there is greatersecurity. They also believe the government must show that all parties are free to participate. FormerPresident Aristide's party, the Lavalas Family, registered to be able to participate in the elections. Nonetheless, some members of the party are urging a boycott until the interim government ends whatthey say is political persecution. Hundreds of party members, including Aristide's former PrimeMinister, have been held in prison for months without being charged. Others argue that the first step toward stability and security is establishing a legitimategovernment through fair and credible elections, and that the elections must proceed as planned. U.S.Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, during a visit to Haiti on September 27, 2005, said that thosewith whom she spoke believed that a new President must be inaugurated on theconstitutionally-mandated date of February 7 in order to promote stability in Haiti. She also said thatthe obstacles to meeting that date were mostly technical problems, and that Haitians must accelerateelection preparations and make full use of the international assistance that is available to them. Shealso said that the elections must be "free and fair and inclusive." (7) Some observers believe that the international community must be prepared to make along-term commitment to make the changes begun under the ICF sustainable and long-lasting. SinceJuly 2004, donors have held three conferences reaffirming the international community's support forHaiti's transition process under the Interim Cooperation Framework. The most recent was held inOctober 2005 in Brussels. There, the head of MINUSTAH, Juan Gabriel Valdes, said the donorsand Haiti planned to create a post-election stabilization program. Valdes, who is also the UNSecretary-General's Special Representative for Haiti, said that addressing problems such as insecuritywill require a long-term commitment by the international community to development in Haiti. (8) International organizations and governments pledged $1.085 billion at the InternationalDonors Conference in July 2004 in support of Haiti's Interim Cooperation Framework. The fundsare to support Haiti's transition from the Aristide government through the first eight months of a newgovernment (bringing funding to the end of FY2006). Table 1 lists the total pledges made byforeign donor nations and international organizations for 2004 to 2006. Pledges were made to bedistributed over the almost two and a half year time period of the ICF, not all at once. The chart alsoshows the four major priorities to which the funds will be directed. In table and graph form, respectively, Table 2 and Figure 1 show total pledges anddisbursements by countries and institutions, by size of pledge, as of March 2005. When looking atpledges made as a percentage of national gross domestic product (GDP), keep in mind that countrypledges made for the ICF may not represent all donor funding related to Haiti. For example, manycountries, including the United States, also contribute to funding of the United Nations and theinternational financial institutions, which in turn have made pledges at the Donors Conference. SomeEuropean nations have made bilateral pledges, but contribute to the European Union funds as well. Table 1. Haiti-International Donors Conference Pledges as of October 2004 (Pledges in CurrentU.S. Million Dollars) Source: Data from World Bank; table prepared by CRS Knowledge Services Group. Notes: * EC: European Commission, development agency of the European Union. ** IDB: Inter-American Development Bank. *** IFAD: the United Nations' International Fund for Agricultural Development. Table 2. Haiti-International Pledges andDisbursements (in Million U.S. Dollars) Sources: Data from World Bank, Inter-American Development Bank; GDP fromEIU Country Data. Table prepared by CRS Knowledge Services Group, September2005. Notes: * EU is European Union ** IDB is Inter-American Development Bank *** U.N. includes United Nations agencies such as UNICEFF, FAO, UNESCO,UNDP and others. Figure 1. Haiti-Pledges & Disbursements U.S. Pledge Made at Donors Conference. The United States pledged about $230 million inFY2004-FY2005 aid to Haiti at the 2004 Donors Conference. The aid was to bedistributed as follows, according to USAID: $22 million for job creation; $45 millionfor government infrastructure support; $26 million for improved security throughimproved administration of justice; $122 million for humanitarian aid, includinghealth care, nutrition, and education; and $15 million for elections support. USAIDsays that the original pledge will be greatly exceeded, however. Assistance forFY2005 was originally to be $52 million, but was recently increased to a total ofabout $177 million. The Bush Administration has requested $152 million forFY2006. All USAID programs for Haiti come under the Interim CooperationFramework. A portion of an additional $100 million appropriated by Congress insupplemental disaster assistance for the Caribbean region ( P.L. 108-324 ) will go toHaiti as well. The emergency supplemental appropriations act for FY2005 ( P.L.109-13 ) provides that $20 million in Economic Support Funds "should be madeavailable" to Haiti, $2.5 million of which "should be made available for criminal casemanagement, case tracking, and the reduction of pre-trial detention in Haiti." Current law related to funding of U.S. assistance to Haiti under the InterimCooperation Framework includes the following: the U.S. Leadership AgainstHIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria Act of 2003 ( P.L. 108-25 ); the ForeignOperations Appropriations Act for FY2004 ( P.L. 108-199 ); the FY2005 MilitaryConstruction Appropriations and Emergency Hurricane Supplemental AppropriationsAct ( P.L. 108-324 ); the FY2005 Consolidated Appropriations Act ( P.L. 108-447 );and the FY2005 Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense, theGlobal War on Terror, and Tsunami Relief ( P.L. 109-13 ). Pending legislation related to funding of U.S. assistance to Haiti includes the following: the Haiti Economic andInfrastructure Reconstruction Act ( H.R. 611 ); the New Partnership forHaiti Act of 2005 ( H.R. 945 ); the Jubilee Act of 2005 ( H.R. 1130 ); the Caribbean Basin Trade Enhancement Act of 2005 ( H.R. 1213 / S. 704 ); the FY2006 and 2007 Foreign Relations AuthorizationAct ( H.R. 2601 ); the FY2006 Department of State, Foreign Operations,and Related Programs Appropriations Act ( H.R. 3057 ); and the FY2006and 2007 Foreign Affairs Authorization Act ( S. 600 ). For furtherinformation, see the CRS Legislative Information System at http://www.congress.gov/ , or CRS Report RL32294 , Haiti: Developments and U.S.Policy since 1991 and Current Congressional Concerns , by [author name scrubbed]. Other Pledges Made at DonorsConference. (9) Some donors made pledges at the InternationalDonors Conference, which are not delineated on the World Bank charts. Some ofthese do not precisely match the categories outlined in the ICF. Not all donorspledged a specific monetary amount. Some noted contributions that had already beenmade in 2004, such as humanitarian assistance following Haiti's political crisis andnatural disasters, or troops for MINUSTAH. Others expressed a willingness tocontribute technical assistance but a need to work out specific details. Chile noted,for example, that although it has advanced to a level wherein it has "developedtechnical and human capabilities in diverse areas," it is nonetheless "a country indevelopment that has budgetary limitations" and therefore needs to work inconjunction with other countries or international organizations in three-waycooperative efforts. Argentina. Argentina is sending 600members of the Argentine armed forces to participate in MINUSTAH. Argentina has offered a legal expert to the U.N. for elections support, and thegovernment will analyze the way in which to contribute further to electoral and otherMINUSTAH activities. The Cascos Blancos, or White Helmets, a humanitarian aid organizationsupported by the U.N. and OAS, has provided humanitarian assistance, including thedelivery of eight tons of medicine in March 2004 and a technical mission in June2004 to plan future humanitarian missions. The Cascos Blancos will also providea volunteer force to provide humanitarian help and reconstruction work. Bahamas. The Bahamas said it wouldreview the ICF, and consult the OAS, the Pan-American Health Organization, theCaribbean Community (Caricom) and the government of Haiti to determine whatassistance it would provide. The government is also working with non-governmentalorganizations in the Bahamas and expects greater participation from them in Haiti. Belgium. Belgium is providing593,000 euros annually in programs regarding higher education, professionaldevelopment, production of teaching materials, potable water in rural areas, and cultural development. Brazil. Brazil has contributed over1,200 soldiers to serve as the core of MINUSTAH. Brazil states that it "is not a netdonor of financial resources in the area of international cooperation or developmentaid," but is able to provide technical assistance. Is sending a multi-disciplinarymission to Haiti to identify with the GOH priorities for the transfer of technicalknowledge, in projects such as HIV infection diagnosis, mass vaccination campaigns,and efficient collecting and recycling of urban waste, some of which could be appliedimmediately to Haiti. Chile. Chile contributed 285 soldiersto the Provisional Multinational Force for Haiti in March 2004, a "logistical andfinancial effort without precedent in our country, at a cost of nearly $5 milliondollars." It has contributed 585 military and police personnel and logistical supportto MINUSTAH. Chile contributes to Haiti through regional Caribbean programs. Chile will send two agronomists to conduct the first stage of an agriculturalrehabilitation program in conjunction with Canada. Chile is also coordinating and supporting the work of Chileannon-governmental organizations in Haiti. Greece. Greece pledged 100,000euros. Norway. Norway has organizedpolitical dialogue between various political parties and civil society through itsInstitute for Political and Social Studies; it held discussions in Norway in June andAugust 2004. Norway allocated about $4.3 million to Haiti for the year 2004. United Kingdom. The UnitedKingdom provided $3.5 million to support humanitarian efforts following the civilunrest, and another $0.9 million in immediate humanitarian support to reliefoperations following flooding in 2004. Its main contribution will be throughcontributions to the European Commission, the World Bank, the Inter- AmericanDevelopment Bank, and the Caribbean Development Bank (the amounts of thosecontributions were not detailed in the U.K.'s pledge statement). Switzerland. Switzerland pledged$6.5 million for 2004-2006, with priority on water and sanitation projects,humanitarian aid, and support to Swiss non-governmental organizations working onwater and sanitation, education, and health. It will also provide another $1.0 - $1.5million if able to develop a new project in environmental management. According to the World Bank and other sources, some progress has beenmade toward the objectives outlined in the Interim Cooperation Framework, althoughmuch work remains to be done. A mid-way assessment of the Interim CooperationFramework is expected to be published by the end of 2005. Political Governance and NationalDialogue. Under the "Political Governance and National Dialogue"axis, some progress has been made in registering Haitian citizens to vote, and in otheraspects of preparing for the upcoming elections. The dates have been changedseveral times. Prime Minister LaTortue says presidential and legislative elections arenow scheduled for December 11 or 18, 2005, though no official date has been givenyet. Runoff presidential and legislative elections and local elections will follow afterthat, with the inauguration of a new government scheduled for February 7, 2006. Problems cited in organizing elections on time include the following: more voters,especially in remote parts of the country, need the opportunity to register; hundredsof election supervisors and up to 40,000 poll workers must still be hired or recruitedand trained; and polling stations must be identified. The electoral council rejected22 of 54 candidates who applied to run for president. Some of these who wererejected are contesting the decision, and ballots cannot be printed until the HaitianSupreme Court resolves the disputes. In terms of promoting national dialogue, structures have been established topromote civic action in local communities, and local governance structures have beenstrengthened to increase citizens' participation in decision making processes. Nonetheless, some observers voice concern that the ongoing violence and humanrights violations create an intimidating atmosphere that inhibits dialogue at a nationaland local level. Economic Governance and InstitutionalDevelopment. Under the "Economic Governance and InstitutionalDevelopment" axis, anti-corruption units have been created, and improvements intransparency and procurement have been made. The interim government prepareda budget for FY2005, the first one to be prepared before a fiscal year began since1996-1997. It is also preparing a budget for FY2006. Prior to the interimgovernment, some 60% of Haitian government spending was done outside of abudget, through "discretionary" accounts. The interim government has reduceddiscretionary spending to less than 10%. It has also improved cooperation betweenHaiti and the international financial institutions, clearing arrears where necessarywith aid from donors [see Table 1. ]. Previous Haitian administrations were limited in the aid they could receivein part because they lacked a parliament to authorize spending and the incurring ofdebt. The interim government issued a presidential decree, ratified by the Cabinet,vesting the executive branch with the authority of the legislative branch, includingauthority to incur debt. All of these agreements must be published in the officialgovernment gazette. Much of the donors funds consist of grants, not debt-incurringloans. Economic Recovery. In terms of"Economic Recovery," donors say that well-designed budgets could also contributeto macroeconomic stability. The International Monetary Fund reportedly said thatas of March 2005, "[E]xternal trade has returned to pre-crisis levels, the gourde[Haitian currency] remains stable, monthly inflation is on the decline, and netinternational reserves ... have increased." Between the pledging of funds in July 2004and May 2005, approximately 200,000 person-days of work had been created.According to the IMF, "The Haitian authorities have made progress toward restoringmacroeconomic stability and implementing structural reforms ... [since January2005.] They implemented the 2004/05 budget without net recourse to central bankfinancing, and tightened monetary policy in the face of the difficult macroeconomicand security situation as well as delays in donor disbursements." (11) Some ofthose economic reforms include fiscal discipline, cleaning up the payrolls ofstate-owned utilities, and reducing corruption. Access to Basic Services. Interms of "Access to Basic Services," progress includes 300 kilometers of rehabilitatedand new roads; access to clean water for 250,000 people, and the establishment ofcommittees to manage five new drinking water systems; access to health services for400,000 people; provision of over 13,000 scholarships to ensure the return to schoolof children who attended summer camps addressing the psycho-social rehabilitationneeds of children affected by violence in five Haitian cities; the removal of 300,805cubic meters of solid waste, and the rehabilitation of almost 200 schools. There is also concern as to whether some of these improvements can bemaintained. For example, electricity service was restored initially, but after U.S.subsidies ended in March 2005, service fell again. The interim government increasedtax collection, but donors are uncertain that will be sustained. Many of the reforms,such as implementing fiscal discipline and fighting corruption, require political willto carry them out. Observers note that political will to devise and implement reformhas been difficult to maintain in Haiti. Many congressional concerns regarding development in Haiti are addressedby the priorities and programs outlined in the Interim Cooperative Framework:promotion of democratic governance and political stability; effective and transparentuse of domestic and international funds; and economic development and reductionof poverty. The main congressional concerns expressed regarding the DonorsConference strategy is the rate at which funds are being disbursed and theeffectiveness of the aid being provided. The interim government, non-governmental organizations, and someMembers complained of slow initial disbursement. Five months after the DonorsConference was held, interim Haitian President Boniface Alexandre urged the releaseof funds, complaining of "irritating deadlines and [the] slow procedures," and sayingthat Haiti was "virtually on the brink of the abyss." (12) This initialslowness has been acknowledged by some donors. According to the World Bank,however, the rate of disbursement has improved since then. Near the mid-point ofthe Donors Conference time-frame, a little less than half of the pledged funding hadbeen disbursed, an estimated $400 million as of May, and a tentative estimate of$500 million as of July 2005. (13) The rate of disbursement is affected by several factors. Pledges were madeto be disbursed not all at once, but over a period of just more than two years, fromJuly 2004 through September 2006, the end of Haiti's fiscal year, and eight monthsinto a new administration, if elections proceed according to schedule. On the part ofmany of the donors, it took several months to get programs designed and authorizedthrough their own governmental processes. Furthermore, disbursements have beenuneven among donors. At the halfway mark, the United States has disbursed abouthalf of its pledged funds, and Canada more than half. Japan has disbursed more thanit pledged. Some other donors have been slower to disburse funds, however, soprogram development is very uneven. Also, in the case of international financial institutions such as the World Bankand the Inter-American Development Bank, the intention was to commit to thedesignated amount of funding during the two year period, with the assumption thatdisbursing funds and carrying out programs would take longer than that. Becausesuccessive Haitian governments have not had transparent accounting of theirspending, donors are also wary of transferring funds to the current government. Therefore, much of the funding is still going through non-governmentalorganizations. The interim government of Haiti also shares some responsibility for thedifficulties in disbursing the pledged funds early in the process. As of December2004, the interim government had still not developed a plan for spending $800million in donors' funds, and had just established a commission to oversee biddingfor public contracts. As it was complaining that international funds were not beingdisbursed, the interim government was apparently unaware that it had funds in itsown coffers that were not being spent, until made aware of them by World Bankofficials. (14) The Haitian government's capacity to absorb assistance and executedevelopment plans remains a problem as well. As described above, one of the majorgoals of the Interim Cooperation Framework is promoting good economicgovernance and institutional development by building up fragile institutions, and insome cases, creating entirely new ones. The framework's authors hope that asHaitian institutions are strengthened, donor confidence will increase as well. Currently, observers say one of the greatest obstacles to continueddisbursement of Donor Conference funds and execution of ICF programs is politicalinstability. Ongoing violence makes delivery of assistance and services difficult. Inrecent months, kidnaping has become a frequent and often deadly occurrence, addingto the hostile environment for aid workers. In May 2005, the U.S. State Departmentordered nonessential U.S. personnel to leave, warned U.S. citizens against travelingto Haiti, and urged those in Haiti to leave, "due to the volatile security situation." The Peace Corps withdrew its volunteers from Haiti in June. The travel warningremains in effect. (15) The violence obviously creates a hostile environment for ordinary Haitiancitizens, interrupting their ability to work or attend school, and increasing their needsfor social and health services. In its travel advisory, the State Department furthersays that both visitors and residents "must remain vigilant due to the absence of aneffective police force in much of Haiti." Many observers, including some Members of Congress, also express concernthat there is an uncertain and intimidating atmosphere that threatens the nation'sability to hold elections that will be considered free, fair, and inclusive. They pointto the detention of members of former President Aristide's party, the Lavalas Family,in prison for months without being charged as evidence of political persecution bythe interim Haitian government. Some observers argue that Haiti needs a process ofnational reconciliation, through national dialogue and elections, so that the countrywill be able to arrive at a basic policy consensus on governance anddevelopment. (16) There is also congressional concern about how much has been accomplishedwith donors' funds to date. Some might be cautious about further funding becausenot much progress has been made in the past despite massive amounts of aid, andmore progress needs to be made in terms of government accountability andtransparency. Some Members argue that the United States should provide morefunds to have a greater impact on reducing poverty, to enable a more sustaineddevelopment effort, and in turn, to prevent massive migration from the country and help reduce instability. Some observers believe that the international community must be preparedto make a long-term commitment to make the changes begun under the ICFsustainable and long-lasting. Donors have held several conferences since the firstone in July 2004, reaffirming the international community's support for Haiti'stransition process under the Interim Cooperation Framework. At the most recent one,held in October 2005, Juan Gabriel Valdes, the head of MINUSTAH, said the donorsand Haiti planned to create a post-election stabilization program. Valdes said that inorder to tackle problems such as insecurity, the international community must makea long-term commitment to Haitian development. (17) 

Summary: Haiti and its multilateral and bilateral donors developed an international assistance strategy,known as the Interim Cooperation Framework (ICF), to address Haiti's short-term needs between thecollapse of the government of President Jean-Bertrand Aristide in February 2004 and the initialphase of a new government scheduled to be inaugurated in February 2006. The World Bank, theInter-American Development Bank, the United Nations, and the European Union co-sponsored theInternational Donors Conference on Haiti in Washington, D.C., on July 19-20, 2004. The objectiveof the conference was to garner international financial support for the ICF, which outlines Haiti'spriority needs and programs for 2004-2006. The Interim Cooperation Framework establishes priority needs and projects that fall underfour broad categories, or "axes": political governance and national dialogue; economic governanceand institutional development; economic recovery; and access to basic services. For each of thesefour strategic axes, the Framework provides a strategy, priority objectives, and monitoring indicators. Many congressional concerns regarding Haitian development are addressed by the prioritiesand programs outlined in the Interim Cooperative Framework. The main congressional concernsexpressed regarding the Donors Conference strategy is the rate at which funds are being disbursedand the effectiveness of the aid being provided. International organizations and governmentspledged $1.085 billion, to be disbursed over a two and a half-year period, from July 2004 throughSeptember 2006, eight months into a new administration, if elections proceed according to schedule. Initial disbursement was slow. According to the World Bank, however, the rate ofdisbursement began to improve after about six months. At just under the halfway point of theDonors Conference time-frame, a little less than half of the pledged funding had been disbursed, atentative estimate of $500 million as of July 2005. Disbursement has been uneven among donors. The United States has disbursed about half of its pledged funds. Some progress has been made toward the objectives outlined in the Interim CooperationFramework, including voter registration, improvements in fiscal transparency, jobs creation, andbroader access to clean water and other services. Current law related to funding of U.S. assistance to Haiti includes P.L. 108-25 , P.L. 108-199 , P.L. 108-324 , P.L. 108-447 , and P.L. 109-13 . Pending legislation related to funding of U.S.assistance to Haiti includes H.R. 611 , H.R. 945 , H.R. 1130 , H.R. 1213 / S. 704 , H.R. 2601 , H.R. 3057 , and S. 600 . See also CRS Report RL32294 , Haiti: Developments and U.S. Policy Since 1991 andCurrent Congressional Concerns, by [author name scrubbed], and CRS Report RL32733 , LatinAmerica and the Caribbean: Issues for the 109th Congress, [author name scrubbed], Coordinator. Thisreport will be updated as warranted.