The United States established TSCTP in 2005 as a result of growing concerns about terrorist groups in the region affiliated with al Qaeda and the increased efforts of those groups to attract young recruits, among other reasons. Since 2005, terrorist activity in the region has increased significantly. Figure 1 illustrates the number of terrorist events conducted by select terrorist groups in the 11 TSCTP countries from 2009 to 2012. Key terrorist groups in northwest Africa and their regions of operation since 2009 are illustrated in figure 2. Figure 3 further illustrates some of the political and security events in TSCTP countries since 2009, including coups in Niger, Mauritania, and Mali, as well as significant terrorist events, such as Boko Haram’s August 2011 attack in Nigeria outside the United Nations office in Abuja. It does not include the numerous kidnappings for ransom that have taken place since 2009 or other significant regional events that have affected TSCTP countries, such as the collapse of the Libyan government in 2011, which resulted in the spread of unsecured military-grade weapons and experienced fighters throughout the region. To assist partner country efforts to tackle the terrorist threat in the region, State, USAID, and DOD have conducted a variety of activities using TSCTP-dedicated funding. State’s TSCTP activities include public diplomacy efforts as well as law enforcement training and equipping and criminal justice sector reform. USAID’s TSCTP activities include efforts to support youth employment, strengthen local governance capacity, and improve access to education. DOD’s TSCTP activities, which are funded by State, include counterterrorism training and equipping. See appendix II for additional details as well as illustrations of TSCTP activities. Funding for TSCTP comes from various appropriation accounts and is administered by State or USAID, with DOD assisting in State’s implementation of one of these accounts.following: Peacekeeping Operations (PKO)—authorizes the President to furnish assistance to friendly countries and international organizations for peacekeeping operations and other programs carried out in furtherance of the national security interest of the United States. PKO funds are State- and DOD-implemented and are used, in part, to train and equip military units tasked with monitoring and controlling border areas and territory exploited by terrorist elements. Development Assistance (DA)—authorizes the President to provide assistance for various purposes, including agricultural development, education and human resources development, grant assistance for microenterprises, and a development fund for Africa, among other purposes. DA funds are USAID-implemented and are used to support host nation efforts to counter radicalization, recruitment, and violent extremist organizations. Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining, and Related Programs (NADR)—authorizes the President to provide antiterrorism assistance, nonproliferation and export control assistance, and other assistance to foreign countries for various purposes. NADR funds are typically State-implemented and are used to support activities designed to enhance the law enforcement capacity and antiterrorism skills of partner countries by providing training, equipment, and mentoring to deter, detect, and respond to terrorism. Economic Support Fund (ESF)—authorizes the President to assist countries and organizations in order to promote economic or political stability. ESF funds are State- and USAID-implemented and are used, in part, to counter violent extremism. International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE)— authorizes the President to assist foreign countries and international organizations to control narcotics and other controlled substances, or for other anticrime purposes. INCLE funds are typically State- implemented and are used to develop and implement policies and programs that maintain the rule of law and strengthen institutional law enforcement and judicial capabilities, including combating transnational crime. The five accounts funding TSCTP also fund other, non-TSCTP counterterrorism assistance to TSCTP countries, such as NADR funds that have been used to post Department of Justice legal advisers in some TSCTP countries. In addition, State, DOD, and other U.S. agencies such as Justice, Treasury, and DHS use other accounts to fund non-TSCTP counterterrorism-related assistance in the TSCTP region. One such effort is DOD’s Section 1206 program, which provides counterterrorism training and equipment globally, including to TSCTP countries. See appendix III for more information about select accounts and programs that support U.S. counterterrorism efforts outside of TSCTP. The Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs is responsible for coordinating TSCTP activities funded through INCLE. The Bureau of Counterterrorism coordinates TSCTP activities funded through NADR. The Bureau of Political-Military Affairs coordinates TSCTP activities funded through PKO. implementation of programs such as TSCTP, as shown in figure 4. Each country team is led by and falls under the authority of the U.S. ambassador to that country and is generally made up of key officials from State, USAID, DOD, and other relevant agencies. USAID’s regional office in Accra, Ghana, and its bilateral office in Bamako, Mali, manage the agency’s TSCTP activities with support from USAID bureaus in Washington, D.C. DOD’s Office of the Secretary of Defense is responsible for coordinating the agency’s TSCTP activities that are undertaken using State’s PKO funding.representatives under the authority of AFRICOM work with country teams in coordinating and implementing TSCTP’s security assistance activities, as well as other counterterrorism-related activities in the region. U.S. agencies allocated about $288 million for TSCTP between fiscal years 2009 and 2013, of which they have disbursed slightly less than half. Although State’s Foreign Affairs Manual and federal standards for internal control note that effective internal management requires financial information, TSCTP’s managers at State and USAID do not routinely collect and assess data on the status of funds for TSCTP activities, such as the amounts of funds unobligated or disbursed—key data that could help inform their management of the program. As a result, the process of providing us with a complete, sufficiently reliable set of information on the status of funds allocated for TSCTP took several months and, according to State and USAID officials, was very time-consuming and labor-intensive. Consequently, TSCTP’s program managers may lack the day-to-day access to financial information that federal standards for internal control state is required to make operating decisions, monitor performance, and allocate resources. While State and USAID could not readily provide data on the status of funding for TSCTP (as discussed in more detail later in this report), the data they eventually provided to us indicate that about $288 million was allocated for TSCTP between fiscal years 2009 and 2013. As table 1 illustrates, the amount of funds allocated for TSCTP declined each year between fiscal years 2010 and 2013, dropping from a high of about $80 million in fiscal year 2010 to about $53 million in fiscal year 2013. As of late 2013, State and USAID had disbursed about $139 million, or 48 percent, of the funds allocated for TSCTP between fiscal years 2009 and 2013. Of the approximately $288 million allocated in total for TSCTP between fiscal years 2009 and 2013, about 62 percent (about $178 million) came from the PKO and DA accounts. Table 2 shows the status of funding for TSCTP broken down by funding account. See appendix IV for further details on funding for TSCTP by funding account. Of the approximately $288 million in total allocations for TSCTP between fiscal years 2009 and 2013, about $260 million has been allocated to country-specific and regional programs.distribution of allocations for TSCTP between fiscal years 2009 and 2013. As the figure demonstrates, Mali, Mauritania, and Niger were the top three recipients of bilateral funding, collectively accounting for approximately $106 million of the funds allocated. In addition, State and USAID allocated about $82 million for regionally focused programs. State’s Foreign Affairs Manual notes that effective internal management requires financial information for planning, programming, budgeting, performance evaluation, and reporting. Further, federal internal control standards state that financial information is required on a day-to-day basis to make operating decisions, monitor performance, and allocate resources. Various entities involved in TSCTP implementation, such as embassies and State’s functional bureaus, track data on the status of funding for TSCTP—such as the amounts unobligated and disbursed— from the respective accounts that they manage. However, TSCTP’s program managers in State’s Bureaus of African Affairs and Near Eastern Affairs and at USAID do not routinely collect and assess such data to develop a complete picture of the status of TSCTP-dedicated funding. Program managers in both State bureaus said that their efforts to compile the status of funding for TSCTP to fulfill our request was the first time they had done so. One program manager explained that State currently lacks a system for routinely requesting and collecting such data from the various embassies and State bureaus involved in TSCTP implementation. Program managers in both regional bureaus added that, given other priorities, State currently lacks the manpower to develop such a system. Furthermore, officials from State’s Bureaus of Counterterrorism and International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs stated that although they track data on the status of TSCTP-dedicated funding from the accounts that they manage, they typically do not provide and have generally not been asked to provide such data to TSCTP program managers. Regarding USAID, officials there stated that the agency does not routinely track the status of its funding for TSCTP and therefore is not in a position to readily generate such data. Overall, the process of providing us with a complete, sufficiently reliable set of information on the status of funds allocated for TSCTP took several months and, according to State and USAID officials, was very time-consuming and labor- intensive. Consequently, TSCTP’s program managers may lack the day- to-day access to financial information that federal standards for internal control state is needed to make operating decisions, monitor performance, and allocate resources. Notwithstanding these difficulties, TSCTP program managers outlined several ways in which having such data readily available would be useful for their management of TSCTP. For example, one program manager stated that the status of funding would be a valuable tool to have on hand at TSCTP’s quarterly senior-level meetings for the purpose of providing agency leadership with progress reports on the execution of TSCTP- dedicated funds, including details on the extent to which funds from different accounts are being executed. Program managers in both regional bureaus also stated that through their efforts to compile the status of funding at our request, they identified millions of dollars in unobligated balances of which they were previously unaware. Specifically, as noted earlier, nearly $7 million in NADR, INCLE, and ESF funding from fiscal years 2009 through 2012 was not obligated or was deobligatedto incur new obligations. One program manager explained that having routine access to such data would help him to identify funds for which the and, according to State officials, may no longer be available period of availability for obligation would soon expire, which would then prompt him to work with the respective bureaus to develop other, more expedited options for using the funds in support of TSCTP. This official added that the Bureau of African Affairs is exploring the possibility of hiring additional staff to assist with TSCTP program data collection and analysis. Similarly, another program manager stated that he believes the data could be useful for program management purposes in ways that State has not yet anticipated, and that he plans to recruit staff to further analyze the data collected at our request to identify how else the data can inform TSCTP program management. In implementing TSCTP, State, USAID, and DOD actions are generally consistent with most but not all the key practices of interagency collaboration that we previously reported as important to enhancing and sustaining collaborative agency efforts. Specifically, in regard to these key practices, agencies have (1) agreed on their roles and responsibilities, (2) established a joint strategy, (3) defined a common outcome, (4) developed consistent goals to reinforce agency accountability, and (5) taken steps to evaluate their results. However, although agencies have taken steps to (6) leverage their resources and (7) establish compatible procedures to operate across agency boundaries, State could do more to integrate Justice into TSCTP coordination efforts. Officials at State, USAID, and DOD said that they understand and agree on their respective roles and responsibilities related to TSCTP implementation—a key practice that facilitates decision making and assists agencies in organizing their efforts. Officials noted that State is the lead U.S. agency for TSCTP and that the National Security Council articulated TSCTP agency roles and responsibilities in 2005. In part to assist in implementation of TSCTP and to facilitate decision making, officials said that in 2013 they established a quarterly meeting at the deputy assistant secretary level. Through these meetings, senior leaders have approved an interagency guiding strategy for TSCTP, agreed on expanding TSCTP membership, and discussed coordination opportunities We confirmed these practices during our with other international donors.review of agency documents and in our discussions with agency officials. Agencies have also taken action to address the key practice of establishing a joint strategy, as demonstrated by the January 2014 State-, USAID-, and DOD-approved TSCTP Guiding Strategy. Because this is a joint strategic document that also defines a common outcome and is consistent with agency goals, it addresses three key practices that we have previously reported assist in agency efforts to overcome differences in missions, cultures, and established ways of doing business; help agencies align activities and resources; and can reinforce agency Figure 6 depicts the five lines of effort articulated in the accountability. joint 2014 TSCTP strategy, which also provides a common outcome for U.S. agencies participating in TSCTP. Additionally, the TSCTP strategy is consistent with agency goals articulated in other strategic documents, such as State and USAID’s Mission Resource Requests and DOD’s Northwest Africa Campaign Plan, which outline complementary counterterrorism goals. GAO-06-15. State, USAID, and DOD have taken steps to evaluate the progress of their TSCTP efforts and plan to conduct a holistic evaluation of TSCTP within a year. We have previously reported that evaluating and reporting on results is a key practice that can assist interagency efforts to identify To date, agencies have areas for policy and operational improvement.taken various steps to evaluate the progress of some TSCTP efforts. Examples of these steps include the following: 1. Agency efforts to measure progress of specific programs that are a State conducts assessments of its NADR-funded Antiterrorism Assistance program in TSCTP countries. Such assessments are conducted prior to providing assistance to a country and every 2-3 years thereafter to measure progress. According to State officials, Antiterrorism Assistance assessments have been conducted in every TSCTP country and assist State in tailoring assistance. For example, State officials noted that the 2013 assessment in one TSCTP country found that the partner country forces were not effectively using the U.S. equipment provided. As a result, the officials stated that future assistance to that country will focus more on training and less on equipping. USAID periodically conducts evaluations and assessments of its Peace through Development program, which is primarily DA- funded and accounts for the majority of USAID’s TSCTP activities. Such reviews have been either regional or country-specific in nature and have identified areas of progress as well as areas for improvement. One impact evaluation completed in 2011 concluded that USAID activities in Niger, Chad, and Mali had some positive effects on program participants. For example, the evaluation identified that media and messaging programs have made moderate progress in reaching vulnerable populations and are more effective in combination with other USAID activities. Recommendations from the evaluation included expanding assistance to insecure areas and considering whether program suspension could undermine U.S. objectives when designing activities. 2. Agency and interagency efforts to measure progress toward counterterrorism goals that are not specific to TSCTP efforts: State conducts public opinion polls annually in most TSCTP countries. While these polls may be influenced by factors beyond U.S. counterterrorism assistance, they have shown that since 2008 favorable opinions toward the United States have generally increased in TSCTP countries and that the United States has made progress in reducing perceptions that it is fighting Islam rather than terrorism. State and USAID track counterterrorism measures in their annual Foreign Operations Performance Reports and, prior to fiscal year For 2015, some country-specific Mission Resource Requests.example, the fiscal year 2014 Foreign Operations Performance Report showed that State and USAID had met or exceeded their 2012 performance targets related to countering threats to the United States. Such performance targets include goals for the number of new groups or initiatives created to resolve conflict or drivers of conflict and the number of students trained through the Antiterrorism Assistance program, neither of which is specific to TSCTP countries, but both of which State and USAID exceeded in fiscal year 2012. DOD conducts periodic classified assessments of DOD assistance efforts in northwest Africa to determine progress made toward the objectives outlined in DOD’s Northwest Africa Campaign Plan. The National Counterterrorism Center conducts an interagency assessment, generally annually, of progress made through U.S. counterterrorism efforts toward achieving the strategic goals of the National Strategy for Counterterrorism. This assessment also identifies areas where adjustments or changes are needed to ensure that U.S. goals are achieved. Although agencies have taken some steps to evaluate their TSCTP efforts, they have not completed a comprehensive evaluation of the program. Additionally, agencies have not conducted and documented evaluations of all TSCTP activities that are funded from two of the five accounts that support TSCTP: PKO and ESF. For these accounts, agency officials said they primarily rely on informal feedback from posts to determine progress. Agency officials recognize that a more holistic evaluation of TSCTP-specific assistance is needed, noting that they plan to develop progress benchmarks for TSCTP within the next year to facilitate such an evaluation, consistent with a requirement in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014. State, USAID, and DOD have taken several actions consistent with the key practices of leveraging resources and facilitating operations across agency boundaries, but can do more to integrate the Department of Justice. We have previously reported that leveraging resources and operating across agency boundaries can assist agencies with identifying opportunities to obtain additional benefits that would not be available if they were working separately and to prevent misunderstandings between the agencies.these key practices. For example, State, USAID, and DOD rotate the hosting of an annual TSCTP conference, where U.S. embassy officials implementing TSCTP in partner countries and in Washington, D.C., meet and coordinate with their interagency and headquarters counterparts and with representatives from other international donors, such as France. U.S. embassy officials who have participated noted that this conference was particularly useful for identifying important points of contact and gaining a better understanding of TSCTP. We observed the interagency interaction during the most recent TSCTP conference, held in Washington, D.C., in October 2013. Agencies have taken numerous actions consistent with Agencies have also developed interagency working groups that meet regularly in Washington, D.C., as well as at U.S. embassies in partner countries. These working groups provide an opportunity for agency officials to discuss potential activities as well as activities that will be initiated, thereby facilitating activity coordination and helping agencies to avoid conflicting or duplicative efforts. Other interagency efforts include the joint State and DOD process for selecting TSCTP security assistance activities to implement using PKO funds. To coordinate, State and DOD conduct regular meetings to jointly identify and prioritize which counterterrorism-focused security assistance activities to implement in Africa. While the agency actions described can enhance interagency collaboration, Justice—a key agency for building law enforcement capacity, with expertise in combating transnational crime and building the capacity of foreign prosecutors, investigators, and judges—is not currently included in the quarterly deputy assistant secretary meetings on TSCTP. As a result, TSCTP may not be fully leveraging the resources and expertise of one of the U.S. government’s lead agencies for building partner nation law enforcement capacity in support of the TSCTP strategy. According to a State official, the quarterly senior-level meeting has traditionally involved higher-level strategic discussions among the three primary TSCTP agencies—State, USAID, and DOD—that would not have necessarily benefited from the participation of other agencies that play a supporting role in TSCTP. However, after we spoke with this official about the potential future participation of other agencies in the quarterly meetings, State invited DHS and Treasury officials to participate, and TSCTP program managers at State have expressed their willingness to invite Justice representatives in the future. Justice officials have also expressed an interest in participating in these meetings, given their involvement in counterterrorism activities in TSCTP countries and their potential growing role in assisting State with implementing some TSCTP assistance. In selecting TSCTP activities, and consistent with the presidential policy directive on security sector assistance, U.S. agencies conduct a variety of assessments and meetings to consider partner country needs and absorptive capacities. They also rely on bilateral and multilateral outreach to consider efforts undertaken by other donors, although some donor nations are reluctant to share information on their activities. State, USAID, and DOD have all conducted assessments to identify the needs and absorptive capacities of TSCTP partner countries. As noted earlier, State has conducted assessments in support of its NADR-funded Antiterrorism Assistance program, which include discussions of country needs and absorptive capacities. For example, regarding partner country needs, one assessment noted that the country assessed needed to become more capable in securing and managing land and sea ports of entry, while the assessment of another country called for strengthened communication and coordination among units that jointly patrol the country’s borders. With respect to absorptive capacity, an assessment of one country found it to be capable of absorbing additional training, whereas an assessment of another country identified infrastructural, personnel, and technological limitations to absorbing training. USAID has conducted country assessments that include consideration of partner country needs and absorptive capacities in support of its TSCTP activities. For example, its 2009 Niger Counter Extremism Assessment notes that it had previously identified Niger’s youth as the group most at risk for recruitment by violent extremists, and had accordingly recommended that TSCTP programming address the need for youth to find employment and participate in governance. A 2010 assessment entitled Strengthening Stability through Development in Burkina Faso comments on absorptive capacity, noting that vocational training programs must be appropriately tailored so that the local economy can absorb the graduates of these programs and provide them with sustainable economic opportunities. DOD has developed assessments of country needs and absorptive capacities as part of AFRICOM’s annual process for selecting counterterrorism activities in Africa, including those funded by State from the PKO account. Specifically, AFRICOM has created multiyear plans for developing the counterterrorism capabilities of several TSCTP countries. These plans identify various partner country needs. For example, the plan for one country states the need for airborne intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance to cover the country’s long borders and provide operational support. The plan for another country notes that enabling it to transport forces to threatened areas will necessitate enhancements to aviation assets and the development of usable airfields. AFRICOM’s plans also comment on absorptive capacity, as the plan for each country includes a military estimate of the maximum monetary amount of counterterrorism assistance the country can absorb per year. We discussed several of these plans during our November 2013 meetings with DOD and interagency officials at AFRICOM. Some agency and implementing partner officials also reported using meetings with host nation officials to identify partner country needs and absorptive capacities. For instance, a DOD official in Mauritania noted that after DOD responds to the Mauritanian military’s requests for assistance with detailed proposals of what the United States can provide, she meets with Mauritanian military officials again to ensure that the detailed proposals are in line with their needs and capacity. Using this method, she said, has enabled her to identify opportunities for more targeted assistance. For example, meetings with the Mauritanian military led her and other DOD colleagues to modify a preexisting proposal to provide the Mauritanians with two technically sophisticated video cameras costing about $10,000 each and to instead purchase $1,100 cameras that were more rugged, easier to use, and better suited to the Mauritanians’ needs. In another case, she learned from her meetings that the Mauritanian military has limited access to the Internet, after which she developed a project proposal to instead use satellite communications to transmit real-time intelligence to the Mauritanian military’s national command center. In Niger, USAID and implementing partner officials stated that as part of the Peace through Development program, they meet regularly with community action committees—entities composed of representative members of the communities where the program is conducted. As USAID and implementing partner officials explained, the community action committees play a vital role in gauging the needs of the communities they represent, proposing activities to address the needs, and using firsthand knowledge of their communities to nominate participants for the activities who they believe to be at risk of becoming involved in violent extremism. A USAID official stated that the committees also assist in identifying absorptive capacity, as they help to ensure that the skills individuals learn through their participation in Peace through Development activities, such as vocational training, are ones for which a market exists in their home communities. U.S. agencies rely on various forms of bilateral and multilateral outreach to identify and consider the counterterrorism efforts other donors are conducting in TSCTP countries. With respect to bilateral outreach, agency officials in all three TSCTP countries we visited reported using meetings to coordinate efforts. For example, the regional security officer in Algeria stated that through discussions with her French counterparts, she had gained an awareness of the types of law enforcement training the French were providing to Algeria. Similarly, a DOD official in Mauritania cited a briefing she received from her Spanish counterparts that provided her insight into the security assistance activities Spain is conducting in Mauritania. Additionally, the regional security officer in Niger stated that he has contacted security officers at several other donor nations’ embassies in Niger about their capacity-building efforts. With respect to multilateral outreach, U.S. and other donor officials identified a variety of multilateral efforts that have facilitated donor coordination and informed U.S. assistance decisions. For instance, several officials named the Global Counterterrorism Forum and its Sahel Working Group as key multilateral venues for sharing information and insights on the counterterrorism activities of other donor nations. In July 2013, for example, State officials noted that a recent meeting of the Sahel Working Group had been used to take inventory of the participant nations’ civilian assistance efforts in the Sahel to ensure that U.S. efforts are not duplicative. In addition, a European Union civilian mission in Niger has assisted with international coordination. For example, through the assistance of this mission, the U.S. embassy in Niger was able to coordinate with the French on efforts to provide Niger with radios. These efforts notwithstanding, officials identified several donor nations that typically do not share information on their efforts with the United States. For example, the official who chairs the counterterrorism working group at the U.S. embassy in Niger stated that China does not participate in international donor coordination meetings. As a result, he said, neither the United States nor other donor countries have visibility into China’s activities in Niger. In addition, officials at the European Union’s civilian mission in Niger stated that Turkey and some of the wealthier TSCTP partner countries, including Algeria and Morocco, have provided counterterrorism aid to Niger but do not customarily share information on such activities with other donors. Terrorist groups in northwest Africa continue to pose a national security threat to the United States. To address this threat, U.S. agencies have allocated nearly $290 million since 2009 to provide a wide range of diplomacy, development, and security assistance to partner countries through TSCTP. However, because TSCTP program managers at State and USAID do not routinely collect and assess data on the status of funds for TSCTP—including unobligated balances, unliquidated obligations, and disbursements—they may lack key information that could help inform current and future TSCTP program management decisions. Further, while State, USAID, and DOD are generally consistent with most key practices of interagency collaboration in their efforts to implement a whole-of- government approach to TSCTP, the Department of Justice has not been fully integrated into TSCTP coordination efforts although it has expertise in building law enforcement capacity—one of TSCTP’s five lines of effort. We believe opportunities exist to enhance program management and interagency collaboration that would help program managers as well as decision makers better plan future TSCTP activities and leverage the expertise of all relevant U.S. agencies. To enhance TSCTP program management and interagency collaboration, we make the following two recommendations. First, we recommend that the Secretary of State and the Administrator of USAID ensure that TSCTP program managers take steps to routinely collect and assess information that will better enable them to efficiently determine and report on the status of funds allocated for TSCTP. Second, we recommend that the Secretary of State, in coordination with the Administrator of USAID and the Secretary of Defense, take steps to ensure that the Department of Justice is better integrated into TSCTP coordination efforts. This could include inviting Justice to quarterly meetings on TSCTP held at the deputy assistant secretary level. We provided a draft of this report to State, USAID, DOD, DHS, Justice, Treasury, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, and the Central Intelligence Agency for their review and comment. State and USAID provided written comments, which we have reprinted in appendixes V and VI, respectively. State, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, and the Central Intelligence Agency also provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. DOD, DHS, Justice, and Treasury did not provide comments. State concurred with our recommendations to take steps to routinely collect and assess information on the status of funds allocated for TSCTP and to better integrate the Department of Justice into TSCTP coordination efforts. Specifically, State said it is seeking to identify better mechanisms and processes for collecting and maintaining financial data on TSCTP activities and will engage Justice to explore formalized participation in the TSCTP working group as well as higher-level policy coordination mechanisms. USAID also concurred with GAO’s recommendation to routinely collect and assess information on the status of funds allocated for TSCTP and stated that it is seeking to identify better processes for collecting and maintaining financial data on TSCTP. We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional committees, State, USAID, DOD, DHS, Justice, Treasury, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, and the Central Intelligence Agency. In addition, the report is available at no charge on the GAO website at http://www.gao.gov. If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 512-7331 or johnsoncm@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made key contributions to this report are listed in appendix VII. To examine the status of Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP)–related funding and U.S. agencies’ ability to track such funding, we reviewed relevant laws and other funding documents and asked officials from the Department of State (State) and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) to provide data on allocations, unobligated balances, unliquidated obligations, and disbursements for TSCTP by country and account for fiscal years 2009 through 2013. As neither State nor USAID routinely collects or maintains these funding elements in a central source, the agencies had to gather the data from various databases. The process of gathering the data took several months and, according to State and USAID officials, was very time- consuming and labor-intensive. To determine the reliability of the funding data we received from State and USAID, we compared and corroborated information from the sources the agencies relied upon, requested information from State and USAID officials regarding the processes they use to collect and verify each data source, and checked the complete agency data sets for reasonableness and completeness. As we note throughout this report, the funding data we received from State are current as of November 2013, while the funding data we received from USAID are current as of December 2013. We did not conduct a financial audit of the funding data and are not expressing a financial opinion on them. Based on the checks we performed, we determined that the funding data we collected from State and USAID were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this engagement. To examine the extent to which U.S. agency implementation of TSCTP is consistent with key practices of interagency collaboration, we collected and reviewed U.S. government strategy documents, agency reports, and evaluations to identify and compare agency actions with key practices GAO has identified for enhancing interagency collaboration. We reviewed the National Security Strategy, the National Strategy for Counterterrorism, State and USAID’s strategic plans for fiscal years 2007- 2012 and 2014-2017, the Department of Defense’s (DOD) 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review, and the Guiding Strategy for TSCTP, approved in 2014. In addition, we reviewed State’s Foreign Operations Performance Reports, Mission Resource Requests, Bureau Resource Requests, Integrated Country Strategies, and Antiterrorism Assistance assessments. For DOD, we reviewed the Northwest Africa Campaign Plan and assessments of the Northwest Africa Campaign Plan, among other documents. For USAID, we reviewed the mid-term and final evaluations of the first phase of the Peace through Development program; country assessments for Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, and Niger; and a report on factors contributing to violent extremism. To identify whether U.S. agencies considered partner country needs, absorptive capacities, and other donor efforts when selecting TSCTP activities, we reviewed State and DOD guidance for agency officials proposing TSCTP activities. In addition, we reviewed agency assessments, to include several State Antiterrorism Assessments; USAID assessments for Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, and Niger; and the U.S. Africa Command’s (AFRICOM) multiyear plans for developing the counterterrorism capabilities of TSCTP countries. We also reviewed documentation from the Global Counterterrorism Forum and the European Union’s Common Security and Defence Policy civilian mission in Niger. Additionally, we discussed our objectives with State, USAID, and DOD; the Departments of Justice, Homeland Security, and the Treasury; and intelligence community officials in the Washington, D.C., area. At State, we interviewed officials from the Bureaus of African Affairs, Near Eastern Affairs, Political-Military Affairs, Counterterrorism, and International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs. At USAID, we met with officials from the Bureau for Africa and the Bureau for Policy, Planning, and Learning. At DOD, we interviewed officials from the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Staff. Additionally, we met with participants of the 2013 annual TSCTP conference that USAID hosted in Washington, D.C., in October 2013, including U.S. embassy officials from Burkina Faso, Mali, and Senegal. To obtain a more in-depth understanding of TSCTP, we conducted fieldwork in November 2013 at AFRICOM in Stuttgart, Germany, during which we met with DOD representatives as well as a State political adviser and a USAID adviser. Subsequently, in December 2013, we conducted fieldwork in Algiers, Algeria; Nouakchott, Mauritania; and Niamey, Niger, to observe TSCTP assistance and meet with U.S. embassy and partner country officials implementing TSCTP as well as international donors conducting similar counterterrorism activities, including officials from the Canadian Embassy and African Union in Algeria and officials from the European Union in Algeria and Niger. We also interviewed U.S. implementing partners, including officials implementing USAID’s Peace through Development program in Niger and State-funded training and equipping efforts in Mauritania, as well as local participants in TSCTP activities, including a community action committee in Niamey, Niger. In addition, we visited a U.S.-funded military facility in Mauritania and met with Algerian, Mauritanian, and Nigerien government officials and Algerian and Mauritanian security forces officials. In selecting the countries to visit, we considered several criteria, including but not limited to the level of funding received by each country for TSCTP activities, geographic distribution, the number and duration of TSCTP activities in each country, and agency recommendations. To identify terrorist events in TSCTP countries between 2009 and 2012, we used the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism’s Global Terrorism Database. To determine the reliability of these data on terrorist events, we reviewed documentation outlining the database’s scope and methodology, checked the data for reasonableness, and interviewed a knowledgeable official at the consortium regarding the database. On the basis of these checks, we determined that the data were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this engagement. Regarding key terrorist groups in northwest Africa and their regions of operation, we received and incorporated input from officials in State’s Bureaus of African Affairs, Counterterrorism, and Intelligence and Research on how best to depict the geographic presence of groups that State identified as primary concerns to U.S. interests. We conducted this performance audit from June 2013 to June 2014 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. Between fiscal years 2009 and 2013, State, USAID, and DOD conducted a variety of activities using TSCTP-dedicated funding. As previously noted, State has conducted diplomacy and law enforcement activities, while USAID and DOD have focused on development and security assistance activities, respectively. State’s TSCTP activities include public diplomacy efforts as well as law enforcement training and equipping and criminal justice sector reform. Through its public diplomacy efforts, State provides messaging that is intended to represent an alternative to violent extremist propaganda, including support for mainstream media and other forums that promote interfaith dialogue and peaceful political participation. For example, figure 7 shows an imam training and interfaith dialogue workshop in Chad. State’s law enforcement training and equipping efforts focus on building partner nations’ capacity to prevent, respond to, investigate, and prosecute acts of terrorism. According to State, providing border security training and equipment to secure porous land, air, and maritime borders makes up a significant component of these activities. USAID’s TSCTP activities include efforts to support youth employment, strengthen local governance capacity, and improve access to education. USAID’s TSCTP activities are primarily conducted through the Peace through Development program in Niger, Chad, and Burkina Faso, which succeeds a prior Peace through Development program that mainly targeted Niger and Chad.envisions the current Peace through Development program as a 5- year effort that, according to USAID officials, includes various “layers” of activities, such as support for messages of tolerance and moderation, livelihood support, and education, among others. Figure 8 shows one example of USAID assistance efforts—a radio studio built in Niger to support messaging efforts as part of the Peace through Development program. DOD’s TSCTP activities, funded from State’s Peacekeeping Operations account, include counterterrorism training and equipping. Examples of DOD’s activities include multicountry training in logistics, military intelligence, combat medical skills, and civil-military operations; bilateral training and equipping of counterterrorism and military intelligence units; and providing spare parts and maintenance for vehicles. Other Peacekeeping Operations–funded activities have been implemented directly by State contractors. For instance, figure 9 shows radio equipment provided for the Mauritanian military’s national command center and body armor and night vision goggles for Mauritanian special forces. Examples of accounts used by State and USAID to support counterterrorism activities outside of TSCTP include the following: Foreign Military Financing—authorizes the President to finance the procurement of defense articles and services for foreign countries and international organizations. This assistance supports, among other things, building and sustaining military counterterrorism capabilities globally. In Africa, State created a Regional Africa Counterterrorism program specifically to help sustain activities built through counterterrorism capacity-building programs in Africa. These funds are approved by State and implemented by DOD. International Military Education and Training—authorizes the President to furnish military education and training to military and related civilian personnel of foreign countries. This assistance supports the professionalization of militaries globally through training and education activities, primarily in the United States. Courses in Africa are not focused on counterterrorism but may include counterterrorism topics as part of efforts to professionalize and establish relationships with foreign militaries. These funds are State- approved and DOD-implemented. Peacekeeping Operations—authorizes the President to furnish assistance to friendly countries and international organizations for peacekeeping operations and other programs carried out in furtherance of the national security interests of the United States. Outside of funds dedicated for TSCTP programs, Peacekeeping Operations funds have been used to support security sector reform in the region, such as in Mali for fiscal year 2014. In fiscal year 2013, Peacekeeping Operations funds not dedicated for TSCTP were used to train and equip African troops deploying to the African Union mission in Mali, which has since transitioned into a United Nations mission. Development Assistance—authorizes the President to provide assistance for various purposes, including agricultural development, education and human resources development, grant assistance for microenterprises, and a development fund for Africa, among other purposes. Outside of funds dedicated for TSCTP programs, USAID has used Development Assistance funds to transfer financial resources to developing countries as well as to help countries solve development problems. Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining, and Related Programs— authorizes the President to provide antiterrorism assistance, nonproliferation and export control assistance, and other assistance to foreign countries for various purposes. Outside of funds dedicated for TSCTP programs, State has provided Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining, and Related Programs–funded assistance to support additional activities designed to enhance the antiterrorism skills of friendly countries by providing training and equipment and other programs run by State’s Bureau of Counterterrorism, including its Counterterrorism Engagement, Counterterrorism Finance, Countering Violent Extremism, and Regional Strategic Initiative programs. State has provided some funding from this account to the Department of Justice to implement activities, such as providing resident legal advisers and training in criminal investigative techniques to select TSCTP countries. Economic Support Fund—authorizes the President to assist countries and organizations in order to promote economic or political stability. Outside of funds dedicated for TSCTP programs, State has used the Economic Support Fund to support its Countering Violent Extremism Program and the interagency Center for Strategic Counterterrorism Communications, while USAID has used it for programs and activities to counter violent extremism in the Sahel region. International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement—authorizes the President to assist foreign countries and international organizations to control narcotics and other controlled substances, or for other anticrime purposes. Outside of funds dedicated for TSCTP programs, State has provided International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement funds to assist foreign countries and international organizations in developing and implementing policies and programs that maintain the rule of law and strengthen institutional law enforcement and judicial capabilities, including combating transnational crime. State has provided some funding from this account to the Department of Justice to provide resident and intermittent legal advisers in TSCTP countries. Examples of DOD accounts or programs supporting counterterrorism activities outside of TSCTP include the following: Section 1206 funds—These funds may be used by DOD to build the capacity of a foreign country’s military forces and security forces to (1) conduct counterterrorist operations and (2) enable foreign military forces to participate in or support military and stability operations with the U.S. armed forces. Programs funded with this assistance must be jointly formulated and implemented by the Secretaries of Defense and State, and the law authorizes DOD to provide the assistance with the Secretary of State’s concurrence. Various Title X programs—DOD’s primary source of funding to support activities conducted by the armed forces, including its counternarcotics program, Combating Terrorism Fellowship Program, and humanitarian assistance and disaster relief efforts. Operation Enduring Freedom–Trans-Sahara—DOD’s mission- oriented regional program that supports personnel activities related to implementation of TSCTP and other related DOD counterterrorism efforts. Between fiscal years 2009 and 2013, State and USAID allocated about $288 million for TSCTP activities. Tables 4 through 10 show the status of funding for TSCTP activities between fiscal years 2009 and 2013 and the total by account. Specifically, the table for each account shows allocations, unobligated balances, unliquidated obligations, and disbursements. In addition to the contact named above, Godwin Agbara (Assistant Director), Aniruddha Dasgupta, Kendal Robinson, Ashley Alley, Martin de Alteriis, Karen Deans, and Etana Finkler made key contributions to this report. Cynthia Taylor and Sarah Veale provided technical assistance. Combating Terrorism: State Department Can Improve Management of East Africa Program. GAO-14-502. Washington, D.C.: June 17, 2014. Afghanistan: Oversight and Accountability of U.S. Assistance. GAO-14- 680T. Washington, D.C.: June 10, 2014. Countering Overseas Threats: DOD and State Need to Address Gaps in Monitoring of Security Equipment Transferred to Lebanon. GAO-14-161. Washington, D.C.: February 26, 2014. Central America: U.S. Agencies Considered Various Factors in Funding Security Activities, but Need to Assess Progress in Achieving Interagency Objectives. GAO-13-771. Washington, D.C.: September 25, 2013. Combating Terrorism: DHS Should Take Action to Better Ensure Resources Abroad Align with Priorities. GAO-13-681. Washington, D.C.: September 25, 2013. Building Partner Capacity: DOD is Meeting Most Targets for Colombia’s Regional Helicopter Training Center but Should Track Graduates. GAO- 13-674. Washington, D.C.: July 24, 2013. Status of Funding, Equipment, and Training for the Caribbean Basin Security Initiative. GAO-13-367R. Washington, D.C.: March 20, 2013. U.S. Assistance to Yemen: Actions Needed to Improve Oversight of Emergency Food Aid and Assess Security Assistance. GAO-13-310. Washington, D.C.: March 20, 2013. Building Partner Capacity: Key Practices to Effectively Manage Department of Defense Efforts to Promote Security Cooperation. GAO- 13-335T. Washington, D.C.: February 14, 2013. Afghanistan: Key Oversight Issues. GAO-13-218SP. Washington, D.C.: February 11, 2013. Security Force Assistance: DOD's Consideration of Unintended Consequences, Perverse Incentives, and Moral Hazards. GAO-13-241R. Washington, D.C.: January 8, 2013. Counternarcotics Assistance: U.S. Agencies Have Allotted Billions in Andean Countries, but DOD Should Improve Its Reporting of Results. GAO-12-824. Washington, D.C.: July 10, 2012. Combating Terrorism: State Should Enhance Its Performance Measures for Assessing Efforts in Pakistan to Counter Improvised Explosive Devices. GAO-12-614. Washington, D.C.: May 15, 2012. Foreign Police Assistance: Defined Roles and Improved Information Sharing Could Enhance Interagency Collaboration. GAO-12-534. Washington, D.C.: May 9, 2012. Uncertain Political and Security Situation Challenges U.S. Efforts to Implement a Comprehensive Strategy in Yemen. GAO-12-432R. Washington, D.C.: February 29, 2012. Combating Terrorism: Additional Steps Needed to Enhance Foreign Partners’ Capacity to Prevent Terrorist Travel. GAO-11-637. Washington, D.C.: June 30, 2011. Combating Terrorism: U.S. Government Should Improve Its Reporting on Terrorist Safe Havens. GAO-11-561. Washington, D.C.: June 3, 2011. Combating Terrorism: Planning and Documentation of U.S. Development Assistance in Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas Need to Be Improved. GAO-10-289. Washington, D.C.: April 15, 2010. Combating Terrorism: U.S. Agencies Report Progress Countering Terrorism and Its Financing in Saudi Arabia, but Continued Focus on Counter Terrorism Financing Efforts Needed. GAO-09-883. Washington, D.C.: September 24, 2009. Securing, Stabilizing, and Developing Pakistan’s Border Area with Afghanistan: Key Issues for Congressional Oversight. GAO-09-263SP. Washington, D.C.: February 23, 2009. Combating Terrorism: Actions Needed to Enhance Implementation of Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership. GAO-08-860. Washington, D.C.: July 31, 2008. Somalia: Several Challenges Limit U.S. and International Stabilization, Humanitarian, and Development Efforts. GAO-08-351. Washington, D.C.: February 19, 2008.

Summary: Events in northwest Africa—such as al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb's seizure of territory in Mali in 2012 and Boko Haram's near-daily attacks in Nigeria—have underscored concerns that the region is vulnerable to the spread of violent extremism. TSCTP, a U.S. multiagency counterterrorism effort begun in 2005, led by State, and primarily coordinated with USAID and DOD, focuses on strengthening partner countries' counterterrorism capabilities and inhibiting the spread of terrorist ideology through diplomacy, development, and security assistance. This report examines (1) the status of TSCTP-related funding and U.S. agencies' ability to track such funding; (2) the extent to which U.S. agency implementation of TSCTP is consistent with key practices of interagency collaboration; and (3) whether U.S. agencies considered partner country needs, absorptive capacities, and other donor efforts when selecting TSCTP activities. GAO reviewed agency documents, met with key officials in Washington, D.C., and conducted fieldwork at the U.S. Africa Command in Germany and in Algeria, Mauritania, and Niger. Nearly half of the funds allocated for the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP) since fiscal year 2009 have been disbursed, but TSCTP program managers are unable to readily provide data on the status of these funds. As of late 2013, U.S. agencies reported disbursing nearly $140 million of the approximately $288 million allocated for TSCTP between fiscal years 2009 and 2013. Mali, Mauritania, and Niger were the top three recipients of bilateral funding. Although the Department of State's (State) Foreign Affairs Manual and federal standards for internal control note that effective internal management requires financial information for planning, programming, and performance evaluation, TSCTP's program managers do not routinely collect and assess data on the status of funding for TSCTP, such as the amount of funds unobligated. Consequently, TSCTP's program managers may lack the day-to-day access to financial information that federal standards for internal control state is required to make operating decisions, monitor performance, and allocate resources. State, U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), and Department of Defense (DOD) actions to implement TSCTP are generally consistent with most but not all of the key practices of interagency collaboration that GAO has identified as important to enhancing collaborative agency efforts. For example, agencies have agreed on their roles and responsibilities, established a joint strategy, and defined a common outcome for TSCTP. However, although agencies have taken steps to leverage their resources and establish compatible procedures to operate across agency boundaries, the Department of Justice has not been fully integrated into TSCTP coordination efforts despite its expertise in building law enforcement capacity—one of TSCTP's five lines of effort. U.S. agencies have used various means to consider partner country needs, absorptive capacities, and other donor efforts when selecting TSCTP activities. These include assessment reports, meetings with host governments, and bilateral and multilateral outreach to other donors. For example, the United States participates in the Global Counterterrorism Forum, a multilateral venue for sharing information on the counterterrorism activities of other donor nations. GAO recommends that the Secretary of State and the Administrator of USAID ensure that TSCTP program managers take steps to routinely collect and assess information on the status of funds for TSCTP. GAO also recommends that the Secretary of State take steps to better integrate the Department of Justice into TSCTP coordination efforts. State and USAID both concurred with GAO's recommendations.