Egypt is the most populous country in the Arab world and is strategically located at the geographic nexus between Africa and the Middle East (see fig. 1). It is bordered to the north by the Mediterranean Sea; to the west by Libya; to the south by Sudan; and to the east by the Gaza Strip, Israel, and the Red Sea. Egypt controls the Suez Canal, a strategic maritime linkage between the Mediterranean Sea and Indian Ocean by way of the Red Sea. The United States helped broker the Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty in 1979 and since then has regarded Egypt as a key strategic partner on a range of security issues, including maintaining peace in the Middle East and countering terrorism and violent extremism. For example, Egypt played a key role in mediating negotiations between Israel and Hamas during their 2014 conflict. Egypt has also undertaken a number of security operations in recent years to restore law and order in the Sinai Peninsula and to combat terrorist organizations that have used the peninsula as a base of operations to conduct attacks in Egypt and Israel. In addition, Egypt joined the U.S. coalition against the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant in September 2014. Egypt has faced a number of economic challenges in recent years, including persistently high unemployment, growing public debt, unsustainable subsidies on food and fuel, and declining revenues in key sectors, such as tourism. According to a 2014 International Monetary Fund report, political and social tensions continue to depress economic For example, real gross domestic product and private activity in Egypt.investment growth remained weak; inflation remained high (consumer price inflation was estimated to be 10.7 percent from 2013 to 2014); and the poverty rate increased to 26.3 percent. Furthermore, while improvements in Egypt’s political environment have boosted the World Bank’s assessments of the country’s economic outlook, in 2014 the World Bank noted that some measures of Egypt’s economic performance, such as foreign direct investment and international reserves, remain well below their pre-revolutionary levels. The World Bank also noted that Egypt suffered from weak performance in indicators of government transparency and accountability, earned a low ranking (114 out of 177 countries) in an index of global corruption, and ranked close to the bottom in the World Bank’s 2013 Ease of Doing Business index. In the years leading up to the January 2011 revolution, the Egyptian government initiated work on a number of economic reform initiatives, including tariff reductions, privatization of state-owned enterprises, and the easing of regulations on the private sector, according to U.S. government documents; however, reform initiatives have stalled since that time. More recently, since taking office in June 2014, President al-Sisi has started work on several economic initiatives, including cutting fuel subsidies and launching major infrastructure projects such as an expansion of the Suez Canal. Since the January 2011 revolution, other countries in the region, including Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the United Arab Emirates, have provided billions of dollars in economic assistance to Egypt. After a long period of relative political stability, Egypt has experienced a series of tumultuous political transitions in recent years. Following the assassination of President Anwar el-Sadat in October 1981, Hosni Mubarak assumed power in Egypt and ruled for almost 30 years until 2011. Starting on January 25, 2011, Egyptian citizens took to the streets to protest against President Mubarak and to demand a variety of political, economic, and social reforms. These protests followed shortly after and were inspired in part by the successful revolution in Tunisia that began in December 2010. The protests in Egypt culminated in President Mubarak’s resignation on February 11, 2011. Since that time, Egypt has continued to undergo a series of turbulent political transitions. After a transitional period of military rule following President Mubarak’s resignation, Mohamed Morsi of the Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated Freedom and Justice Party became Egypt’s first democratically elected president in June 2012. However, in July 2013, the Egyptian military removed Morsi from power after widespread citizen protests against his rule. After Morsi’s removal, the military appointed the chief justice of Egypt’s Supreme Constitutional Court, Adli Mansour, to serve as interim president. Former field marshal Abdelfattah al-Sisi resigned from the Egyptian army and was subsequently elected as president in May 2014. In January 2015, the Egyptian government announced that parliamentary elections would take place in two phases, with the first slated for March 22 and 23 and the second for April 26 and 27, 2015. At various points since the January 2011 revolution, Egyptian government officials have reiterated their commitment to Egypt’s democratic transition, but the Egyptian government has also taken a number of actions that have caused some observers to question its commitment to democratic ideals. For example, the Egyptian government has conducted an aggressive campaign against supporters of former President Morsi, including one incident on August 14, 2013, when Egyptian security forces killed at least 817 Morsi supporters in Raba’a Square, according to a report by Human Rights Watch. Additionally, in June 2013, an Egyptian court convicted employees of four U.S. nongovernmental organizations on charges related to their implementation of U.S. government-funded democracy and governance assistance programs. The Egyptian government has also taken other steps to curb press freedom and limit political dissent, according to U.S. government, international organization, and nongovernmental organization reporting. For example, in June 2014, an Egyptian court sentenced three Al Jazeera journalists to multiyear sentences on charges of producing misleading news coverage and supporting the Muslim Brotherhood. Figure 2 provides a timeline of key events in Egypt’s political transitions. Since 1979, when the Egypt-Israel peace treaty was signed, Egypt has been among the top recipients of U.S. foreign assistance. Historically, the U.S. government has provided Egypt with both security and economic assistance. The United States has provided Egypt with almost $64 billion in assistance since 1979, including about $40 billion in security assistance and $24 billion in economic assistance. While U.S. funding for security assistance to Egypt has stayed generally constant since the 1980s, economic assistance has declined significantly since that time. The U.S. government provides bilateral assistance to Egypt through a number of accounts, which are described in table 1. In addition to its bilateral assistance, the U.S. government has also provided assistance to Egypt through a number of accounts that fund global or regional programs, including the Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund, the Democracy Fund, and the Global Health Program. The U.S. government provides the majority of its security assistance to Egypt through the Foreign Military Financing (FMF) account. Egypt has used FMF funding to purchase and sustain a wide array of military systems, including major systems such as F-16 aircraft, Apache helicopters, and M1A1 tanks, as shown in figure 3. The U.S. government provides the majority of its economic assistance for Egypt through the Economic Support Fund (ESF) account. The U.S. government has used ESF assistance to fund economic development, health, education, and democracy and governance programs in Egypt. Appendix II provides examples of activities that the U.S. government has funded with ESF in each of these areas. The U.S. government funds most ESF programming in coordination with the Egyptian government under assistance implementation agreements, according to USAID and State officials. The U.S. government also uses the ESF account to directly fund nongovernmental organizations and other organizations to implement activities in Egypt outside of the framework of an assistance implementation agreement, including democracy and governance activities. The U.S. government has used assistance from other accounts to fund a range of other activities. For example, the U.S. government has used International Military Education and Training (IMET) funding to provide training to Egyptian military personnel on U.S. military doctrine and values, International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE) funding to train the Egyptian police on forensic investigative techniques and community policing models, and Nonproliferation, Anti-terrorism, Demining, and Related Programs (NADR) funding to expand cooperation with the Egyptian government related to efforts to target and disrupt international terrorism and weapons smuggling groups. U.S. strategic objectives for Egypt have generally remained constant since fiscal year 2009. The U.S. government’s overall levels of security and economic assistance to Egypt have also generally remained constant from fiscal years 2009 through 2014. While U.S. strategic objectives and overall levels of assistance generally did not change during this period, the U.S. government did increase its focus on particular objectives and adjusted some aspects of its assistance in response to Egypt’s political transitions. After the revolution in January 2011, the U.S. government adjusted its assistance to place more emphasis on democracy and governance and economic growth initiatives. After the removal of President Morsi, the U.S. government adjusted its assistance again by suspending some assistance, including holding the delivery of several large military systems, and focusing its economic assistance more on programs that directly benefit the Egyptian people and its security assistance more on shared interests. According to U.S. government officials, this policy remains in place, but some previously suspended assistance to Egypt has resumed, enabled in part by the passage of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2014, which provided additional authority for and restrictions on U.S. assistance to Egypt. U.S. strategic objectives for Egypt have generally remained constant since fiscal year 2009, according to senior U.S. officials and State documents. objectives for Egypt: State officials identified the following as U.S. strategic Egypt is stable, democratic, and prosperous. Egypt upholds the peace treaty with Israel and is a partner for regional stability. State confirmed that the U.S. objectives for assistance to Egypt are consistent with U.S. policy developed by the National Security Council. Egypt helps counter terrorism and violent extremism. Egypt continues to provide strategic benefits to the United States, including expedited access through the Suez Canal and approval of military overflights. We found these objectives to generally be consistent with those contained in various U.S. government documents and senior administration officials’ statements. According to State officials, strategic objectives for Egypt can be found in several different documents: mission strategic plans and resource requests, congressional budget justifications, presidential speeches, and congressional testimony by senior administration officials. We analyzed the mission strategic plans and resource requests for Egypt, as well as the congressional budget justifications for fiscal years 2009 through 2015, and presidential speeches and congressional testimony. We found that the objectives in these documents were generally consistent with statements made by State officials and remained largely constant in fiscal years 2009 through 2015. In September 2014, State began a planning process to review its strategic objectives for Egypt as part of the development of its integrated According to State guidance, this strategy is intended country strategy.to encapsulate policy priorities and objectives, as well as the means by which diplomatic engagement, foreign assistance, and other tools will be used to achieve them. The integrated country strategy, once it has been finalized, will serve as the basis for future resource requests and performance reporting, according to State guidance. To guide its efforts in Egypt prior to beginning work on the integrated country strategy, State used annual mission strategic plans in fiscal years 2009 through 2013 and mission resource requests for fiscal years 2014 and 2015. State officials told us that U.S. Embassy Cairo plans to have an integrated country strategy in place by February 2015 in order to inform the mission’s budget planning process for fiscal year 2017. U.S. assistance to Egypt generally remained constant in fiscal years 2009 through 2014. State and USAID allocated more than $9.3 billion in security and economic assistance to Egypt over this period, averaging about $1.55 billion in annual allocations for assistance to Egypt. Allocations ranged from a high of about $1.61 billion in fiscal year 2010 to a low of about $1.49 billion in fiscal year 2013. The majority of this funding—approximately 84 percent—supported security assistance, while 16 percent supported economic assistance. As shown in figure 4, the shares of U.S. assistance allocated to security and economic assistance to Egypt largely remained constant in fiscal years 2009 through 2014. Though overall U.S. strategic objectives and amounts of economic assistance to Egypt have largely remained unchanged since fiscal year 2009, the prioritization of particular economic assistance efforts, and the amount of funding allocated for them, changed after Egypt’s January 2011 revolution. More specifically, the U.S. government adjusted its economic assistance after the January 2011 revolution to place greater emphasis on economic growth and democracy and governance programs. For example, U.S. agencies increased their allocations for economic growth programs by about 74 percent in fiscal year 2011, compared with the average of the previous 2 fiscal years. In addition, in fiscal year 2011, allocations for categories of assistance related to democracy and governance constituted four of the five highest categories of economic assistance to Egypt, whereas democracy and governance did not rank among the five highest categories of economic assistance in fiscal year 2009. In February 2011, after the revolution, State and USAID reprogrammed $150 million in prior year ESF funds in support of Egypt’s political transition, with $100 million for job creation, poverty alleviation, and economic development initiatives and $50 million for democracy and governance initiatives. State and USAID allocated an additional $15 million from prior year ESF democracy funding to bring U.S. support for democracy and governance programs in Egypt to $65 million after the 2011 revolution. State and USAID funded a variety of activities with the $165 million in ESF funding for economic growth and democracy and governance assistance. Economic growth activities included micro, small, and medium-sized enterprise development and entrepreneurship; youth employment; and community development. Democracy and governance activities included political party strengthening, election monitoring, independent media development, and civil society assistance, among others. According to USAID, the U.S. government focused its assistance in these areas in order to support Egypt’s democratic transition after the resignation of former President Mubarak and to promote growth in the economy. According to a USAID official, the U.S. government addressed these objectives in tandem because officials recognized that democracy promotion would not be successful unless accompanied by efforts to address the economic hardships that Egyptians were experiencing and that led, in part, to the revolution. After the 2011 revolution, the U.S. government also announced several new economic growth initiatives that had not been implemented, or were only partially implemented, as of the end of fiscal year 2014. In a May 2011 speech, President Obama announced the creation of an Egyptian- American Enterprise Fund to promote the development of the Egyptian private sector, including small and medium-sized businesses. As of the end of fiscal year 2014, USAID had obligated $120 million to support this fund, although the fund had not yet made any investments. In his May 2011 speech, President Obama also announced an initiative to provide up to $1 billion to relieve some of Egypt’s debt, and an additional $1 billion in U.S.-backed loan guarantees for infrastructure projects and job creation, but the U.S government later canceled these plans. According to State officials, in order to be more responsive to the Egyptian government’s immediate fiscal needs, the department decided to use a portion of the $1 billion intended for debt relief to instead fund a $450 million cash transfer to the Egyptian government using ESF funds. The cash transfer was intended to help close the government’s financing gap and thus bolster Egypt’s economic stability as well as to encourage the Egyptian government to adopt economic and budgetary reforms. In September 2012, USAID and State notified Congress of their intent to obligate $450 million for the cash transfer, which was to be provided in two tranches. A congressional hold was immediately placed on these funds, and according to USAID officials, the administration subsequently negotiated with Congress for several months before the hold was lifted on a portion of this funding.million in March 2013, but State announced in October 2013 that the USAID made a first cash transfer of $190 administration would hold the delivery of a second planned transfer of $260 million. After President Morsi’s removal, the U.S. government adjusted its economic and security assistance. According to State officials and State guidance, the U.S. government adjusted its economic assistance toward programs that would more directly benefit the Egyptian people, rather than programs that would primarily benefit the Egyptian government. State officials also said that the U.S. government adjusted its security assistance to better target shared U.S.-Egyptian security interests. Following the removal of President Morsi on July 3, 2013, the administration announced that it was conducting a review of U.S. assistance to Egypt. This review culminated in a decision announced by State on October 9, 2013, to adjust some economic and security assistance to Egypt. The administration did not make a determination as to whether President Morsi’s removal was a coup d’état. However, according to State guidance, it adjusted its assistance to Egypt consistent with Section 7008 of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2012, which prohibits foreign assistance to the government of a country whose duly elected head of government is deposed by military coup d’état or decree, or a coup d’état or decree in which the military plays a decisive role. State guidance stipulated that the government of Egypt would be defined as the government at any level (national, regional, and local) and all branches of the government (executive, legislative, and judicial). It stated further that departmental policy would be to continue to provide as much assistance as possible, including assistance to the Egyptian government, within the parameters of the policy decision and legal authorities. For example, the guidance authorized implementing agencies to use available legal authorities, including notwithstanding and wind-up authorities, to continue assistance to the Egyptian government. that directly benefits Egyptian students.and USAID reported that they had obligated $119 million in fiscal year 2012 and 2013 ESF funding for this initiative to support scholarships for women in fields such as business, science, and technology and for disadvantaged youth, as well as partnerships between U.S. and Egyptian universities, among other activities. In addition, senior administration officials stated that the U.S. government would continue funding for the Egyptian-American Enterprise Fund, which is focused on supporting private sector development. After the October 2013 decision, USAID began to shut down 10 projects, funded at approximately $48 million, which provided assistance benefitting the Egyptian government, primarily in the economic growth and education sectors. For example, USAID began to close out $29 million in ongoing basic education projects because they benefitted public employees and institutions. USAID also placed funding on hold for some other planned education projects with the Egyptian government. Furthermore, the administration held the delivery of the second, $260 million tranche of the planned $450 million cash transfer to the Egyptian government, and senior administration officials noted that these funds would be used for other purposes. After Morsi’s removal, but prior to October 2013, the administration also canceled some security-related activities with the Egyptian military, though these were not security assistance. In August 2013, the administration announced that a biennial U.S.-Egyptian joint military exercise, Bright Star, had been canceled. In addition, DOD officials stated that the U.S. government postponed an annual meeting between the U.S. and Egyptian militaries that had been scheduled to take place in October 2013. for addressing shared security interests at that time. The administration also asserted in its October 2013 decision that Egypt’s FMF program would be reoriented to focus on shared security interests, including border and maritime security, Sinai security, and counterterrorism. According to DOD officials, prior to this decision, the U.S. government had placed few restrictions on Egypt’s use of FMF, although the U.S. government had been trying for several years to reorient FMF assistance away from weapon systems designed to wage a ground war and toward capabilities necessary for border security and counterterrorism. A State official noted, however, that the U.S. government may continue to provide sustainment support for some existing U.S.-origin weapon systems even if those systems do not address one of the shared security interests. The administration also asserted that it would continue to fund military education and training to the Egyptian armed forces. Subsequent to the October 2013 decision, DOD’s Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA), which implements FMF on behalf of State, led a review of Egypt’s FMF program to align current purchases with shared security interests and to make recommendations on whether to continue to support specific systems through FMF. As part of this review, DSCA identified some systems that did not directly align with shared security interests. These included some older, outdated, or third-party- produced systems, such as Chinese-built submarines and Russian-made surface-to-air missiles, as well as U.S.-manufactured Gulfstream VIP aircraft and M1A1 tank kits. DSCA recommended continuing support for 18 of these systems totaling $6.5 billion, but identified 15 of these systems totaling $777 million that should be transitioned from FMF funds to Egyptian government funds or ended. With the passage of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2014,January 2014, Congress provided additional authority to the administration to resume some economic and security assistance to Egypt, while also placing restrictions, including certification requirements, on assistance. As previously noted, while the administration did not make a determination as to whether President Morsi’s removal was a coup d’état, State guidance on implementing assistance in accordance with the October 2013 decision notes that the administration decided to act consistently with a recurring provision in State’s annual appropriations act in that prohibits foreign assistance to the government of a country whose duly elected head of government is deposed by military coup d’état or decree, or a coup d’état or decree in which the military plays a decisive role. The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2014, again included this provision but enabled some assistance to resume by authorizing some assistance for Egypt notwithstanding any provision of law restricting assistance for Egypt. The law did, however, include certification requirements that had to be met before some of the appropriated funding for Egypt could be made available for certain purposes. For example, the law specified that funds appropriated by the act that are available for assistance for the government of Egypt could only be made available if the Secretary of State certified to Congress that Egypt was sustaining its strategic relationship with the United States and was meeting its obligations under the Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty. Secretary of State Kerry made this certification on April 22, 2014, enabling fiscal year 2014 funding to be made available for assistance to Egypt. As of February 3, 2015, Secretary Kerry had not yet made other certifications under the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2014, which would allow certain fiscal year 2014 funds to be made available without restriction for economic and security assistance. For example, he had not yet certified that the government of Egypt has (1) held a constitutional referendum and is taking steps to support a democratic transition in Egypt or (2) held parliamentary and presidential elections, and that a newly elected government of Egypt is taking steps to govern democratically. Even without making these certifications, the U.S. government has been able to continue to provide, or resume providing, some economic and security assistance to Egypt because the law also makes exceptions for funding in certain areas. Such funding is said to have “notwithstanding authority” because it can be provided notwithstanding other provisions of law that may otherwise restrict assistance to Egypt. Appendix III provides an overview of the adjustments made to economic and security assistance for Egypt following the October 2013 policy decision and the enactment of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2014. The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2014, made ESF funds from this and prior fiscal year appropriations available for education and economic growth programs, notwithstanding any other provision of law restricting assistance for Egypt. With the authority provided by that provision, the U.S. government was able to resume providing some economic assistance to Egypt that had previously been marked for termination or put on hold. Of the 10 projects mentioned previously that USAID had been in the process of shutting down after the October 2013 decision, 7 have now resumed. Additionally, in September 2014, USAID signed $268 million in new and amended bilateral agreements with the Egyptian government for projects in six areas, including education, economic growth, agriculture, and governance. The U.S. government also has resumed some of its security assistance. The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2014, provides notwithstanding authority for FMF and IMET funding appropriated in fiscal year 2014 and prior fiscal years, but imposes certain restrictions. With regard to fiscal year 2014 funding for FMF, State notified Congress of its intent to obligate $650 million in FMF for Egypt a few days after Secretary Kerry certified to Congress on April 22, 2014, that Egypt was sustaining its strategic relationship with the United States and was meeting its obligations under the Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty. A congressional hold was placed on this funding because of concerns about the Egyptian government’s abuse of the justice system. According to State officials, until December 9, 2014, $78 million of this funding was on hold, but it has been released and all of the $650 million in fiscal year 2014 FMF is available at the minimum rate necessary to pay existing FMF contracts or to support activities that had security exemptions—including counterterrorism, nonproliferation, and border security programs in Egypt, and development activities in the Sinai. According to State officials, fiscal year 2014 FMF funds have been used to make payments on existing contracts, and in July 2014, State authorized DSCA to use approximately $80 million for FMF purchases under the security exemptions. These included spares for radars, vehicles, fixed and rotary wing aircraft, and border security equipment, according to State officials. The U.S. government has also removed the delivery hold for one weapon system. In April 2014, Secretary Kerry announced that the administration would deliver the Apache helicopters to Egypt. An administration official noted that the Apache helicopters are being provided to the Egyptian government to counter terrorist groups in the Sinai Peninsula. However, the helicopters were not released to the Egyptians until August 2014. According to State officials, new deliveries of the other three weapons systems that were suspended as part of the October 2013 decision—F-16 aircraft, M1A1 tank kits, and Harpoon missiles—remained on hold as of February 3, 2015. State and USAID had disbursed or committed almost $7.5 billion, or 80 percent, of the approximately $9.3 billion allocated for assistance for Egypt in fiscal years 2009 through 2014, as of the end of fiscal year 2014. While the U.S. government allocated assistance for Egypt from a number of accounts in fiscal years 2009 through 2014, over 98 percent of allocated funding was from the FMF and ESF accounts. The extent to which State and USAID had obligated and disbursed or committed funds allocated for Egypt in fiscal years 2009 through 2014 varied by account, with significant unobligated balances in the ESF account because of various challenges related to Egypt’s political transitions that the agencies faced in obligating these funds. Of the $9.3 billion in funds allocated for Egypt in fiscal years 2009 through 2014, State and USAID had disbursed or committed almost $7.5 billion, or 80 percent, as of the end of fiscal year 2014 (see table 2). While U.S. agencies allocated assistance for Egypt from a number of accounts in fiscal years 2009 through 2014, over 98 percent of allocated funding was from two of these accounts—FMF and ESF. During this period, U.S. agencies allocated over $7.7 billion in FMF assistance for Egypt and over $1.4 billion in ESF assistance, or approximately 83 percent and 15 percent, respectively, of total assistance allocated for Egypt. The remaining 2 percent of assistance allocated for Egypt included bilateral assistance from the NADR, INCLE, and IMET accounts, as well as several global or regional programs. The extent to which State and USAID had obligated and disbursed or committed funds allocated for Egypt in fiscal years 2009 through 2014 varied by account. Table 3 provides summary information on the status of funding allocated for Egypt, by account, for fiscal years 2009 through 2014, as of the end of fiscal year 2014. Appendix IV provides more detailed information on the status of funding for each of these accounts for this period. Of the over $7.7 billion in funding allocated for security assistance to Egypt through FMF in fiscal years 2009 through 2014, State had committed over $7 billion, or 91 percent, as of the end of fiscal year 2014 (see table 4). As of this same date, State had $728 million in unobligated FMF balances for Egypt, all from its fiscal year 2014 appropriation, which remains available for obligation through September 30, 2015. Several characteristics of the FMF program have contributed to State’s ability to obligate and commit funds for Egypt. First, annual appropriations acts for fiscal years 2009 through 2014 have contained language stating that FMF funds shall be obligated upon apportionment. In addition, Egypt has certain benefits associated with its FMF assistance, including cash flow financing, that the U.S. government has granted to only a limited number of countries. The U.S. government has historically provided Egypt with FMF assistance through a statutory cash flow financing arrangement that gives Egypt the ability to agree to the purchase of defense goods and services in a given year and then pay for them over time, using FMF funds allocated from future appropriations. Cash flow financing provides Egypt with the flexibility to commit to major acquisitions in one year that will be paid for over time, similar to installment payments. Because of Egypt’s payment schedules on existing contracts, all of its FMF funding for fiscal years 2009 through 2014 had been committed as of the end of fiscal year 2014, with the exception of the $728 million in fiscal year 2014 funding that had not been obligated. Of this $728 million in unobligated funds, $78 million was subject to a congressional hold as of the end of fiscal year 2014 and, thus, had not been obligated. For the remaining $650 million, State had not yet submitted a notification to Congress as of the end of fiscal year 2014, so those funds had not been obligated. State is currently in the process of determining when to notify Congress of the $650 million in FMF unobligated funds, according to State officials. Once this $728 million has been obligated, these funds will be committed to existing programs and potentially to a small number of new programs in the four security exemption categories identified in the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2014—counterterrorism, nonproliferation, border security, and development activities in the Sinai— according to DOD officials. USAID had disbursed almost $370 million, or 26 percent, of the over $1.4 billion in funding allocated for economic assistance through the ESF account in fiscal years 2009 through 2014, as of the end of fiscal year 2014 (see table 5). As of the end of fiscal year 2014, USAID had approximately $460 million in unobligated ESF balances—equal to about 230 percent of its fiscal year 2015 ESF budget request of $200 million. Of these unobligated funds, approximately $260 million was from appropriations prior to fiscal year 2014. The $260 million in unobligated funds was originally allocated for a cash transfer to the Egyptian government, but the administration decided not to use the funds for that purpose after President Morsi’s According to State officials, the fiscal removal from power in July 2013.year 2011 funding allocated for a cash transfer has been transferred into a no-year ESF account and is available for obligation until expended, and the fiscal year 2012 funding allocated for a cash transfer has been transferred into an extended-life ESF account and is available for obligation until September 30, 2017.that although the administration had decided not to move forward with the cash transfer, these funds had not been reprogrammed for other purposes. Additionally, State and USAID officials stated that there are currently no established time frames for making a determination regarding how these funds will be used. State and USAID officials stated In addition to the unobligated balances that had been previously allocated for a cash transfer, State and USAID have faced challenges obligating other ESF funding allocated for Egypt. For example, USAID did not obligate over $280 million in fiscal years 2012 and 2013 ESF funding for Egypt until the last 2 months of fiscal year 2014. This funding would have expired as of the end of fiscal year 2014 if it had not been obligated by then. State and USAID officials noted a variety of issues that have challenged the U.S. government’s ability to obligate and disburse ESF funds. Given the ongoing changes in Egypt’s political leadership, USAID has experienced challenges reaching agreement with the Egyptian government on new projects to fund, according to State and USAID officials. For example, in one sector, USAID officials noted, they are working with their seventh Egyptian minister since the January 2011 revolution. State and USAID officials noted that the ordered departure of those agencies’ personnel from Cairo, which was in effect from July to November 2013, affected their ability during that period to conduct their normal planning and programming processes. State and USAID officials informed us that the security situation at certain project locations, as well as broader security concerns across the country, has affected their ability to obligate and disburse funds. For example, USAID reported that technical advisors it needed for the implementation of some of its economic growth programs refused to travel to Egypt because of security concerns. Policy decisions by the administration have affected the pace at which USAID has been able to obligate and disburse ESF funds, according to State and USAID officials. For example, the administration’s decision to not move forward with the $260 million planned cash transfer has required State and USAID to consider alternative plans for this funding. State and USAID officials stated that various congressional holds and legal restrictions that have been placed on planned assistance to Egypt have resulted in delays in the obligation and disbursement of funds. For example, on May 25, 2012, USAID notified Congress of its intent to obligate almost $27 million in fiscal year 2011 ESF funds for a variety of programs in Egypt; however, a congressional hold was placed on all but $500,000 of this funding, so, according to State, USAID reprogrammed these funds. Because of challenges in obligating and disbursing ESF funds in Egypt, State and USAID officials have adjusted their assistance plans. For example, USAID had to seek an extension of the period of availability for obligation for its fiscal year 2012 ESF funds for Egypt since it determined that it was unlikely that it would be able to obligate the funds by the end of the original period of availability, which was September 30, 2013. In fiscal year 2014, Congress appropriated up to $250 million in ESF funds for Egypt consistent with the administration’s budget request for the year;use only $200 million of this funding. In addition, the administration requested $200 million in fiscal year 2015 ESF funding for Egypt, which was $50 million less than its requests in fiscal years 2009 through 2014. According to State officials, the administration requested $50 million less however, the administration subsequently determined that it would in funding for Egypt in part because of the large amount of unobligated and undisbursed funding already available from previous fiscal years. As of the end of fiscal year 2014, State had disbursed the majority of IMET and NADR funding allocated for Egypt in fiscal years 2009 through 2014 (70 percent and 57 percent, respectively); however, it had disbursed less than half of the funding allocated for INCLE during this same period (47 percent). All three accounts had unobligated balances of over 20 percent of their total allocated amounts in fiscal years 2009 through 2014, as of the end of fiscal year 2014. IMET, NADR, and INCLE had unobligated balances that represented 21 percent, 33 percent, and 27 percent, respectively, of the total funds allocated to the accounts in fiscal years 2009 through 2014. All of the IMET unobligated balances, as well as the majority of the NADR and INCLE unobligated balances (63 percent and 95 percent of the two accounts’ total unobligated balances, respectively), were from funds allocated in fiscal year 2014 and are available for obligation until September 30, 2015. However the NADR and INCLE accounts also had unobligated balances that included allocated funding going back to fiscal year 2009. State has been prohibited from obligating and disbursing fiscal year 2014 IMET funds because the certifications contained in section 7041 of the fiscal year 2014 Consolidated Appropriations Act had not yet been made, as of February 3, 2015. State officials noted challenges in obligating and disbursing INCLE and NADR funds that were similar to many of the challenges experienced in obligating and disbursing ESF funds. For its fiscal year 2015 budget request, State reduced its IMET request by $100,000 compared with its fiscal year 2014 allocation, increased its request for NADR funds by $680,000 compared with its fiscal year 2014 allocation, and reduced its INCLE request by $2 million compared with its fiscal year 2014 allocation. USAID and State have completed evaluations of U.S. economic assistance for Egypt, but State has not evaluated the results of its security assistance efforts. Since fiscal year 2009, USAID has completed 15 evaluations covering more than $600 million in economic assistance and has completed all of the evaluations required under its policy. These evaluations highlighted various achievements and challenges with USAID-funded projects, and USAID officials noted that they have used the results of these evaluations to inform decisions about their assistance. State has also completed evaluations of three multicountry initiatives funded by its Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI) that addressed activities in Egypt and used the results to inform future efforts. However, while State has undertaken efforts to commission a required evaluation of security assistance to Egypt, it has not yet carried out the evaluation because none of the five eligible evaluation firms submitted bids to conduct it. Although State officials said that they remain committed to evaluating security assistance to Egypt and are considering alternate approaches, State has not established a time frame for completing the required security assistance evaluation. USAID’s and State’s policies do not require an overall evaluation of all assistance to Egypt. USAID’s and State’s policies do, however, require periodic evaluations of large projects under agency stewardship. Evaluations are individual or systematic studies conducted to assess how well a program is working and are often conducted by experts external to the program. USAID’s evaluation policy requires that each operating unit, including USAID’s mission in Egypt, conduct at least one evaluation of each large project it implements. According to USAID officials, the Egypt mission calculated its threshold for large projects as $12.2 million when it first implemented the evaluation policy in May 2011. USAID’s policy stipulates that evaluations may be undertaken for different levels within an assistance portfolio. For example, evaluations may cover individual projects or collections of projects that support a higher-level objective. State’s February 2012 evaluation policy requires that all large projects be evaluated at least once during each project’s lifetime or every 5 years, whichever is less, and states that for most bureaus a large project is one whose dollar value equals or exceeds the median project size for that bureau. State’s policy also requires each bureau to evaluate two to four projects under its direction over the 24- month period that began in fiscal year 2012, depending on the size, scope, and complexity of the projects being evaluated and funding availability. State’s evaluation policy notes that the requirement for its headquarters bureaus to evaluate two to four projects over a 24-month period was to be extended to diplomatic posts, including U.S. Embassy Cairo, in fiscal year 2013. According to State officials, this requirement has yet to be extended to diplomatic posts. According to State officials, State is continuing to focus its efforts on building its capacity to conduct evaluations in headquarters bureaus, some of which also manage assistance to Egypt. USAID has completed evaluations for all of the projects that it determined required evaluation under agency policy. USAID completed some of these evaluations during the fiscal years included in the scope of our review (2009-2014), whereas others were completed before fiscal year 2009 or after fiscal year 2014. From fiscal years 2009 through 2014—the time period included in the scope of our review—USAID completed 15 evaluations of U.S.-funded economic assistance projects in Egypt totaling more than $600 million. As shown in table 6, USAID evaluated projects across all four sectors of assistance—democracy and governance, economic growth, education, and health. Among the 15 evaluations completed by USAID, 7 were midterm evaluations, 7 were final evaluations, and 1 was an evaluation of USAID’s education portfolio, which included several projects at various stages of completion. With the exception of the evaluation of USAID’s education portfolio, most evaluations focused on a single project. According to USAID guidance, individual projects must contribute to USAID’s broader development objectives for a particular country. Appendix V provides additional information on the projects evaluated by USAID in fiscal years 2009 through 2014. The evaluations of USAID assistance identified a range of successes achieved and challenges experienced by USAID economic assistance projects in Egypt, as shown by the following examples. A December 2009 midterm evaluation of USAID’s $22 million democracy and governance project to provide technical assistance, training, and policy support to improve the effectiveness, transparency, and accountability of local governments (the Egyptian Decentralization Initiative) determined that the aggregate impact of USAID’s efforts to decentralize governance in Egypt had been negligible in large part because of powerful political forces in Egypt. However, the evaluation also noted that recent efforts may have influenced the formulation of decentralization policies by decision makers and increased awareness of the need for decentralization, among other things. An April 2010 evaluation of USAID’s $250 million education portfolio determined that USAID had made positive changes to Egyptian education through projects that contributed to girls’ education, the use of technology in schools, and reforms in the Egyptian Ministry of Education. The evaluation team noted that it believed the prospects for significant additional progress on implementation of Egypt’s National Strategic Plan over the next 5 years were excellent and recommended that USAID develop a new education strategy to support continued implementation of this plan. A September 2010 final evaluation of a $126 million project to provide technical assistance to Egyptian ministries to define and implement policy reforms found that the project was generally successful. The evaluation noted that the project contributed to the implementation of several important reform measures, which helped to improve the trade environment, support the financial sector and economic growth, streamline tax administration, and improve the business environment. However, the evaluation also noted that some efforts undertaken as part of the project—for example, studies on privatization and housing reform—did not result in any reforms. A February 2012 final evaluation of two USAID economic growth projects totaling $40 million to provide technical assistance to the institutions responsible for overseeing and managing the provision of water and wastewater services in Egypt found that one of the projects had helped contribute to cost-effective service delivery improvements; however, the evaluation noted that some of the project’s achievements seemed surprisingly modest given the long history of similar support in this sector. The evaluation determined that the second project had not met its dual objectives of (1) strengthening the policy, legal, and regulatory framework for the water and wastewater sector in Egypt and (2) improving the quality of and access to sustainable water and wastewater services. The evaluation concluded that the work conducted under this project may prove valuable if the environment for reform changes in the future. The USAID mission in Egypt considers evaluation findings and other performance information during semiannual portfolio reviews and uses these to inform decisions about future assistance, according to USAID officials. For example, the evaluation of technical assistance in the water and wastewater sectors concluded that USAID should reduce its emphasis on capital investment planning and project management support. As a result, USAID phased out this assistance by transferring responsibility for such support to an Egyptian entity, according to USAID officials. Another evaluation of a USAID project to strengthen Egypt’s health systems recommended that future technical assistance focus on leadership development, noting that this would be particularly important in response to the high turnover at Egypt’s Ministry of Health and Population in the aftermath of the January 2011 Egyptian revolution. USAID officials reported that the mission developed two leadership development programs to address this recommendation, one for hospital administrators and one for nurses. USAID officials noted that although the mission in Egypt has not yet updated its calculation of large projects to reflect new initiatives, the mission has already developed a planned timetable for conducting a midterm evaluation, final evaluation, or both for all seven of the new education, economic growth, and democracy and governance projects totaling about $545 million that it approved in the summer of 2014 (see app. VI). USAID plans to revise its calculation of the threshold for large projects when the mission has an approved strategy in place to reflect new projects and respond to recent changes in how USAID-funded projects are designed and approved. USAID officials also noted that the mission will calculate its threshold for large projects by development objective to reflect revised agency guidance, which aims to ensure that projects in each development objective are evaluated. In addition to the evaluations described in this section, USAID officials noted that they also use a variety of mechanisms to monitor and report on the performance of U.S. assistance to Egypt. For example, according to USAID officials, the mission conducts periodic reviews of its assistance portfolio for each development objective—as well as reviews of individual projects and activities—to monitor whether USAID-funded initiatives are achieving their objectives. Officials from State’s MEPI, which funds democracy and governance projects in Egypt and other countries in the Middle East and North Africa, noted that since fiscal year 2009 they have completed three evaluations of multicountry initiatives that included activities in Egypt. For example, these officials reported that in 2011 MEPI commissioned an evaluation of its legal reform projects, one of which was a regional civil society law reform project that included activities in Egypt, among other countries. MEPI officials noted that recommendations from this evaluation were used to inform the design of a follow-on project dedicated specifically to reforming the law governing nongovernmental organizations in Egypt. They noted that although the proposed new law was not passed, the project helped communicate how such a law should be formulated in Egypt and aided Egyptian organizations in advocating for reform. According to U.S. agency officials, the annual Performance Plan and Report prepared by U.S. Embassy Cairo represents the most comprehensive reporting on the entirety of U.S. security and economic assistance to Egypt. Although not an evaluation, this report broadly describes the successes and challenges of foreign assistance to Egypt and measures annual progress toward selected performance indicators that correspond to global objectives for U.S. foreign assistance (i.e., peace and security, governing justly and democratically, investing in people, and economic growth). State has proposed, but has not carried out, a required evaluation of security assistance to Egypt. State’s February 2012 evaluation policy requires that all large projects be evaluated at least once during each project’s lifetime or every 5 years, whichever is less, and states that for most bureaus a large project is one whose dollar value equals or exceeds the median project size for that bureau. According to officials in State’s Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, which manages security assistance through FMF, the bureau identified security assistance to Egypt as a large program in February 2013, making it subject to evaluation requirements.Accordingly, State commissioned an external evaluation of security assistance to Egypt, including assistance provided through both FMF and The Statement of Work for the proposed evaluation noted that IMET.examining the impact of security assistance to Egypt was critical given the recent transitions in the Egyptian government and the role the Egyptian Armed Forces played in those transitions. It noted further that that the intended purpose of the evaluation would be to (1) determine the effectiveness of State-funded security assistance to Egypt; (2) provide accountability for the program; and (3) identify lessons learned that would benefit security assistance programs in Egypt, in the region, and globally. Additionally, it specified that the evaluation should focus on the following questions: What impact, if any, has U.S. security assistance had on Egypt’s capacity for satisfying U.S. strategic objectives? Has U.S. security assistance been effective in addressing U.S. program objectives? Is security assistance provided by the U.S. government being used effectively by the host government? Were there any unintended consequences of U.S. security assistance? Were the consequences positive or negative? What factors explain the intended or unintended consequences of the assistance? What project activities should be sustained, if any? What project activities should be expanded or contracted, if at all? What lessons can be learned from the project experience? State solicited proposals for this evaluation in May 2014 but did not receive any responses from the eligible evaluation firms. According to the State official overseeing the solicitation process, some of the eligible firms reported having concerns about being able to carry out an evaluation given the uncertain security environment in Egypt. State officials also noted that the department has never before attempted to holistically evaluate security assistance to Egypt or any other country, and the size and complexity of security assistance to Egypt make it especially challenging to conduct a formal evaluation. The State official overseeing the solicitation process for the proposed evaluation noted the difficulty of determining how security assistance contributes to broader strategic goals and said that there is limited information to serve as the basis for an evaluation because neither State nor DOD has established performance metrics, nor has either agency consistently collected performance data on the FMF program. In addition, this official noted that a foreign military such as the Egyptian Armed Forces might be reluctant to cooperate on an evaluation of military capabilities, as it might be perceived as intelligence gathering. Because of such challenges and the nonresponsiveness of eligible evaluation firms, a State Bureau of Political-Military Affairs official reported in October 2014 that the department had decided to take a different approach to the evaluation. State’s Bureau of Political-Military Affairs is in the process of developing a global security assistance evaluation and monitoring strategy and plans to hire additional staff members with expertise in program evaluation to develop a methodological framework that could be applied to evaluations of security assistance globally. One of the goals of this methodological framework would be to clearly define the objectives of security assistance and create a logic model linking the components of security assistance programs to these objectives. According to the State official overseeing these efforts, the bureau is seeking to have the new staff members in place early in 2015 to begin developing the framework. The bureau also hired a contractor to conduct an evaluation of security assistance to Lebanon, which it expects will help inform future evaluations of security assistance to Egypt and other countries. According to State officials, State remains committed to evaluating security assistance to Egypt and conducting an evaluation as soon as practicable. However, the State official in charge of this process noted that there are no set time frames for when this will occur. Standard practices in program management include, among other things, developing a plan to execute projects within a specific time frame. The U.S.-Egypt partnership yields significant benefits, including Egypt’s support of peace with Israel, shared interest in counterterrorism and regional stability goals, as well as other strategic U.S. benefits such as expedited access through the Suez Canal and approval of military overflights. Security and economic assistance amounting to more than $9.3 billion since fiscal year 2009 has served as the linchpin of this long- standing strategic partnership. However, factors related to the political upheaval in Egypt since 2011 have hindered the ability of the U.S. government to implement some assistance. As a result, the U.S. government has significant amounts of funding that it allocated for assistance to Egypt but has not yet obligated for a particular purpose, including $260 million in ESF funds allocated for a cash transfer the administration no longer intends to carry out. Given the resource constraints the U.S. government faces, it is important that U.S. agencies have plans for using existing resources in an effective and timely manner. Plans for an alternative use of the $260 million in funding allocated for the cash transfer would allow the U.S. government to support programs designed to respond to the evolving situation in Egypt or other identified priorities that contribute to U.S. strategic objectives, while also potentially allowing for reductions in future budget requests. While the U.S. government is in the process of developing a multiyear strategic plan to guide future U.S. assistance to Egypt, little is known about the effectiveness of past assistance toward achieving U.S. strategic goals. U.S. officials have acknowledged challenges in linking assistance provided to Egypt with specific results. In particular, U.S. officials noted that it is difficult to determine the extent to which security assistance has contributed to strategic objectives, such as promoting regional stability, upholding the Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty, countering terrorism and extremism, and maintaining key strategic benefits. Nevertheless, evaluations can provide useful information to the executive branch and Congress about whether a program is meeting its goals or may be producing unintended consequences. The absence of an evaluation of security assistance to Egypt raises questions about how this program— supported by $1.3 billion in U.S. funding annually—is contributing to meeting strategic objectives and what levels of funding are necessary for success. State has stated its commitment to completing such an evaluation but has not established specific time frames for doing so. Establishing time frames for completion of an evaluation of security assistance to Egypt would help ensure that State successfully fulfills this commitment. Given the significant unobligated balances of about $260 million in the ESF account for Egypt previously allocated for a cash transfer that the administration has stated it no longer intends to carry out, we recommend that the Secretary of State and the USAID Administrator work to develop plans for an alternate use of these funds, in consultation with the appropriate committees of Congress. As part of planning for these funds, State should also consider ways that this funding could potentially be used to offset future budget requests. To help ensure the timely completion of an evaluation of security assistance to Egypt that is required by State policy, we recommend that the Secretary of State establish specific time frames for completing such an evaluation. We provided a draft of this report to DOD, State, and USAID for review and comment. DOD did not provide comments. State and USAID provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. State and USAID also provided written comments, which are reproduced in appendixes VII and VIII, respectively. In their written comments, State and USAID generally agreed with our recommendation to develop alternate uses for $260 million previously allocated for a cash transfer and noted that they were currently examining other uses for these funds. Additionally, State agreed with our recommendation to establish specific time frames for completing a required evaluation of security assistance to Egypt. State noted that while evaluation of security assistance to Egypt poses challenges, State views evaluation as a critical tool for accountability and program improvement and will continue to pursue a formal evaluation of security assistance to Egypt, or some element of Egypt’s security assistance program. As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce the contents of this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days from the report date. At that time, we will send copies of this report to the appropriate congressional committees, the Secretaries of Defense and State, and the Administrator of USAID. In addition, the report will be available at no charge on the GAO website at http://www.gao.gov. If you or your staff members have any questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 512-7331 or johnsoncm@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made contributions to this report are listed in appendix IX. The objectives of this review were to examine, for fiscal years 2009 through 2014, the extent to which (1) U.S. strategic objectives and assistance for Egypt evolved, (2) the U.S. government disbursed funds allocated for assistance to Egypt, and (3) the U.S. government evaluated the results of its assistance. To determine the extent to which U.S. strategic objectives and assistance for Egypt have evolved since fiscal year 2009, we analyzed the Department of State’s (State) mission strategic plans from fiscal years 2009 through 2013, mission resource requests for fiscal years 2014 and 2015, congressional testimony by senior administration officials, presidential speeches, and congressional budget justifications for assistance to Egypt from fiscal years 2009 through 2015. We reviewed the U.S. Agency for International Development’s (USAID) strategies for Egypt, including its strategic plan for fiscal years 2000-2009, bridge strategy for fiscal years 2009 and 2010, and 2012 papers outlining priorities for each development sector: democracy and governance, economic growth, education, and health. We also reviewed the Department of Defense (DOD) U.S. Central Command’s fiscal years 2014 and 2015 Country Security Cooperation Plans for Egypt. Finally, we reviewed relevant laws pertaining to U.S. assistance to Egypt and State’s and USAID’s guidance for strategic planning. To determine the extent to which levels of U.S. assistance to Egypt evolved in fiscal years 2009 through 2014, we obtained and analyzed State data on allocations for security and economic assistance to Egypt, and we reviewed cables and memos that described changes in assistance priorities. To address strategic objectives and changes in assistance—particularly after Egypt’s political transitions in 2011 and 2013—we interviewed officials from State’s Bureaus of Near Eastern Affairs; Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor; and Political-Military Affairs; the Middle East Partnership Initiative; and the Office of U.S. Foreign Assistance Resources; USAID’s Bureau for the Middle East; DOD’s Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Defense Security Cooperation Agency, and U.S. Central Command. State confirmed that the U.S. objectives for assistance to Egypt are consistent with U.S. policy developed by the National Security Council. We conducted audit work in Cairo, Egypt, and interviewed U.S. officials from State, USAID, DOD, the Department of Homeland Security, and the Department of Justice who manage assistance programs for Egypt. We also interviewed Egyptian government officials from the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, International Cooperation, and Social Solidarity—the three ministries that coordinate bilateral assistance with the United States or approve the registration of a portion of the organizations that implement U.S.-funded assistance—and the Egyptian Armament Authority, a unit within the Egyptian Armed Forces that oversees the procurement of U.S. military equipment using U.S. assistance. In both the United States and in Cairo we also interviewed officials from nongovernmental organizations that implement U.S. assistance to Egypt. To determine the extent to which the U.S. government disbursed funds allocated for assistance to Egypt from fiscal years 2009 through 2014, we collected and analyzed data from State’s Office of Foreign Assistance Resources, by appropriation account, on allocations, unobligated balances, unliquidated obligations, and disbursements. Recognizing that different agencies and bureaus may use slightly different accounting terms, we provided State with definitions from GAO’s A Glossary of Terms Used in the Federal Budget Process and requested that it provide The data State provided the relevant data according to those definitions.were as of the end of fiscal year 2014. State provided data on bilateral assistance managed by both State and USAID from the Economic Support Fund (ESF); Foreign Military Financing (FMF); International Military Education and Training (IMET); International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE); and Nonproliferation, Anti-terrorism, Demining, and Related Assistance (NADR) accounts. In addition, State provided data on funding from global or regional programs that supported assistance to Egypt from the Democracy Fund, Development Assistance, ESF, Global Health Program, and NADR accounts. In the case of FMF, funds are budgeted and tracked in a different way than for other foreign assistance accounts, so State provided us data on funding that was uncommitted or committed rather than data on unliquidated obligations and disbursements. To assess the reliability of the data provided, we requested and reviewed information from State regarding the agency’s underlying financial data systems and the checks, controls, and reviews used to ensure the accuracy and reliability of the data provided. We determined that the data State provided were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report. To gather additional information on the status of assistance to Egypt, we interviewed State, USAID, and DOD officials and reviewed agency documents to identify factors that contributed to any unobligated balances and unliquidated obligations. Finally, we identified any relevant legal authorities related to these accounts, including the periods of availability for funds to be obligated from each of these accounts. To guide our assessment of unobligated balances and unliquidated obligations in Egypt, we used GAO’s report Budget Issues: Key Questions to Consider When Evaluating Balances in Federal Accounts, which provides guidance on evaluating such balances in federal accounts. While that prior GAO report does not make recommendations about what level of unobligated balances and unliquidated obligations are appropriate, it does identify key questions that should be considered in evaluating such balances. GAO, Performance Measurement and Evaluation: Definitions and Relationships, GAO-11-646SP (Washington, D.C.: May 2011). documentation of the analysis USAID conducted in May 2011 to determine which of its projects in Egypt would require evaluation. To identify evaluations of USAID assistance, we queried USAID’s Development Experience Clearinghouse database, downloaded relevant evaluations, compiled a list of these evaluations, and verified the accuracy of our list with USAID officials. We cross-referenced these evaluations with data on USAID-funded projects in Egypt that were active in fiscal years 2009 through July 31, 2014, to determine the value of the projects evaluated by USAID. We determined that these data were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of determining the value of these projects. To identify evaluations of State assistance, we interviewed or obtained written responses from State officials and reviewed evaluation reports provided by State. We also reviewed a Request for Task Order Proposal and Statement of Work issued by State in May 2014 to commission an evaluation of security assistance to Egypt, and we discussed the status of the proposed evaluation with officials from State’s Bureau of Political-Military Affairs. Although the scope of our report is limited to program evaluation, we also reviewed documents that describe, and interviewed U.S. officials to discuss, other performance monitoring activities undertaken by the agencies to assess the results of assistance to Egypt. We conducted this performance audit from November 2013 to February 2015 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. The U.S. government has used Economic Support Fund assistance to fund economic growth, education, health, and democracy and governance programs in Egypt. Table 7 provides examples of projects the U.S. government has funded in Egypt in each of these areas. Following the removal of President Morsi on July 3, 2013, the administration announced that it was conducting a review of U.S. assistance to Egypt. This review culminated in a decision announced by the Department of State on October 9, 2013, to adjust some economic and security assistance to Egypt. With the passage of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2014, in January 2014, Congress provided additional flexibility to the administration to resume some economic and security assistance to Egypt, while also placing restrictions, including certification requirements, on some assistance. Table 8 shows the adjustments to U.S. assistance for Egypt following the October 2013 policy decision and enactment of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2014. This appendix provides additional information on the status of U.S. assistance to Egypt, by account, for fiscal years 2009 through 2014. All data in the appendix are as of the end of fiscal year 2014. The U.S. government provides bilateral assistance to Egypt through a number of accounts, including the Foreign Military Financing; Economic Support Fund; Nonproliferation, Anti-terrorism, Demining, and Related Programs; International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement; and International Military Education and Training accounts. Tables 9 through 13 provide information on the status of funds allocated for assistance for Egypt from these bilateral accounts for fiscal years 2009 through 2014, as of the end of fiscal year 2014. In addition to its bilateral assistance, the U.S. government has provided assistance to Egypt through a number of accounts that fund global or regional programs, including the following: Development Assistance; Democracy Fund; Economic Support Fund; Global Health Program; and Nonproliferation, Anti-terrorism, Demining, and Related Programs. Tables 14 through 18 provide information on the status of funds allocated for assistance to Egypt from these accounts that fund global or regional programs for fiscal years 2009 through 2014, as of the end of fiscal year 2014. U.S. funding awarded for project (dollars in millions) 1 Media Development Program. Increase the professional standards of Egyptian print and broadcast journalism and improve the economic viability of the media through the strengthening of marketing and advertising capacities. Family Justice Project. Strengthen access to justice, enhance family stability, and protect the rights of children. Takamol Project. Help Egypt achieve sustainable reduced fertility and improved health outcomes for mothers and newborns. Egypt Financial Services Project. Promote reforms that would allow financial institutions to offer mortgages by removing structural, legal, and institutional constraints. International Human Rights Law Outreach Program. Create an enabling environment for the protection of human rights within selected faculties of Egyptian universities. Egyptian Decentralization Initiative. Provide technical assistance, training, and policy support to improve the effectiveness, transparency, and accountability of local government in pilot governorates so they can respond to citizen priorities. Education Portfolio. Administration of Criminal Justice Program. Enhance the capability of Egypt’s Prosecutor General’s Office through a series of activities, including the automation of nine public prosecution offices and the development of a Prosecution Information Center. Technical Assistance for Policy Reform II Project. Provide a comprehensive and flexible source of technical assistance to Egyptian reformers to help them define and implement their policy reform vision. Integrated Water Resource Management II. Increase water efficiency and productivity, improve water quality, and provide a more equitable allocation of water resources. 11 Agriculture Exports and Rural Incomes II, Agricultural Technical Schools Value Chain Training. Improve the quality of education in agricultural technical schools by improving the learning environment, providing supervised internship programs, and holding career skill development competitions. U.S. funding awarded for project (dollars in millions) Project dates —b Sept. 2008- vulnerable communities by cultivating opportunities for girls to practice their leadership skills, creating partnerships to promote girls’ leadership, and enhancing knowledge to implement and promote girls’ leadership programs. 13 Egypt Capacity Building and Policy Support in the Water and Wastewater Sector. Provide technical assistance to the institutions responsible for overseeing and managing water and wastewater service provision in Egypt and sector investment planning and implementation. 14 Avian and Pandemic Influenza Program. Produce improved and sustainable avian and pandemic influenza prevention and control in Egypt. 15 Egypt Health Systems 20/20 Project. Support the efforts of Egypt’s Ministry of Health and Population to build capacity in health sector strategic planning and financing, social health insurance, and quality of care. Appendix VI: Planned Evaluations for New U.S. Agency for International Development Projects in Egypt Approved amount for project (dollars in millions) In addition to the contact named above, Jeff Phillips (Assistant Director), Drew Lindsey (Analyst-in-Charge), Ryan Vaughan, Rachel Dunsmoor, and Ashley Alley made key contributions to this report. Debbie Chung, David Dayton, Kaitlan Doying, Justin Fisher, Jeff Isaacs, and Oziel Trevino provided additional assistance.

Summary: Since the signing of the Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty in 1979, Egypt has been a key strategic partner of the United States and the recipient of almost $64 billion in U.S. security and economic assistance, including an annual average of about $1.3 billion in security assistance and $245 million in economic assistance since fiscal year 2009. State outlines strategic objectives for Egypt, State and USAID are primarily responsible for funding and managing assistance provided to Egypt, and the Department of Defense implements most security assistance. Since the January 2011 revolution that ended the almost 30-year presidency of Hosni Mubarak, Egypt has experienced a series of tumultuous political transitions that have raised concerns about how U.S. assistance is supporting strategic objectives. This report examines, for fiscal years 2009 through 2014, the extent to which (1) U.S. strategic objectives and assistance evolved, (2) the U.S. government disbursed funds allocated for assistance to Egypt, and (3) the U.S. government evaluated the results of its assistance. To address these objectives, GAO analyzed U.S. government documents; interviewed U.S. officials in Washington, D.C.; and conducted fieldwork in Cairo, Egypt. U.S. strategic objectives and levels of assistance to Egypt have generally remained constant since fiscal year 2009, though the U.S. government adjusted some aspects of its assistance in response to events in Egypt. According to documents and senior U.S. officials, U.S. strategic objectives are to assist Egypt to be stable, democratic, and prosperous; uphold the peace treaty with Israel and advance regional stability; counter terrorism and extremism; and continue to provide strategic benefits to the U.S. government. After Egypt's 2011 revolution, the U.S. government increased its emphasis on democracy and economic growth initiatives. After President Morsi's removal in July 2013, the U.S. government suspended some assistance and adjusted its economic assistance to focus more on directly benefitting the Egyptian people and its security assistance to focus more on shared interests. The administration has now resumed some assistance, enabled in part by new legal authorities provided by Congress. As of September 30, 2014, the U.S. government had disbursed or committed almost $7.5 billion (about 80 percent) of over $9.3 billion in assistance allocated for Egypt in fiscal years 2009 through 2014. The U.S. government allocated 98 percent of this funding from the Foreign Military Financing and Economic Support Fund (ESF) accounts. The Department of State (State) and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) reported $460 million in unobligated ESF balances for Egypt—equal to about 230 percent of their fiscal year 2015 budget request of $200 million. This included $260 million in prior year funding allocated for a cash transfer to Egypt that the administration announced in October 2013 that it would not carry out. According to U.S. officials, these funds have not been reprogrammed for other purposes. Given U.S. government resource constraints, it is important that U.S. agencies have plans for using existing resources. While USAID has evaluated some economic assistance, State has not evaluated the results of billions of dollars in security assistance to Egypt. Since fiscal year 2009, USAID has evaluated 15 projects in Egypt totaling over $600 million and has completed all of the evaluations required under its policy. USAID officials noted that they have used evaluations to inform decisions about assistance. In May 2014, State attempted to commission a first-ever evaluation of results of security assistance to Egypt but received no proposals in response to its solicitation. State officials said that the agency remains committed to completing such an evaluation and is considering alternate approaches, although State has not established specific time frames for doing so. Standard practices in program management include a plan to execute projects within a specific time frame. GAO recommends that (1) State and USAID develop a plan for other uses for $260 million previously allocated for a cash transfer and (2) State establish specific time frames for completing a required evaluation of security assistance. State and USAID generally agreed with these recommendations.