The various systems that collect, process, and disseminate intelligence are encompassed inthe budget category known as Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR (1) ). ISR covers a multitude ofprograms ranging from billion-dollar satellites to hand-held cameras. The bulk of funding is forresearch and development (R&D) and procurement; personnel costs are comparatively low. Somesystems are used only by military units; others are national systems operated by Washington-leveldefense agencies. Most are surrounded in secrecy, but total spending on ISR, while difficult toestimate with unclassified information, undoubtedly runs into the tens of billions of dollars. The ISRprograms considered in this report are managed by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and by thelarge intelligence agencies and components of the Department of Defense (DOD). (2) ISR acquisition has in recent years come under strong criticism. Reportedly, there aretechnical problems with the new generation of reconnaissance satellites, along with billion dollarcost-overruns; only a small number of the planned high-altitude UAVs are actually deployed; andthere have been difficulties in ensuring that the troops who need intelligence acquire it in a timelymanner. There is a widespread awareness that ISR spending, much greater than in past years, couldeasily absorb even larger portions of defense and intelligence budgets, making the need for tradeoffseven more important. Some observers point to the possibility that satellites and UAVs potentiallyundertake the same or similar missions, but that the current system gives little opportunity for costcomparisons or trade-offs to be made in the acquisition process. Appendix A provides a case studyof the trade-offs between satellites and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). Understanding the procedures for acquiring ISR systems is, however, complicated by the factthat different ISR systems are acquired in entirely different ways, by different intelligence agenciesor military services, and are designed for different users. In addition, the acquisition processes areoverseen by different congressional committees. It is difficult to ensure efficient acquisition in theseparate programs which are often based on innovative technologies. It is even more challengingto envision a seamless and comprehensive system of systems and to ensure the acquisition of anoptimal mix of specific systems. Although procedures for coordinating the budgeting of ISR programs have long been inplace, some Members of Congress have concluded that the procedures have not been whollyeffective. There has been, it is argued, inadequate data to compare systems capabilities and costsacross the spectrum of intelligence programs, an imbalance between collection and analysisprograms, and an intelligence effort that does not reflect an optimal allocation of extensive resources. Expressions of congressional concern go back a number of years. In 1995, the Senate SelectCommittee on Intelligence (SSCI) expressed its misgivings about existing cooperation amongagencies and recommended a joint review by the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) and theDeputy Secretary of Defense to ensure that "both Intelligence Community and Defense Departmentequities are served in the planning, programming, and management of all intelligence activities andprograms." (3) Some believed that giving the DCI greater management responsibilities would improve themanagement of ISR programs, including those in the Department of Defense (DOD). Reflecting thatview, the FY1997 Intelligence Authorization Act ( P.L. 104-293 ) included provisions thatstrengthened the ability of the DCI "to manage the Intelligence Community by codifying hisauthority to participate in the development of the budgets for defense-wide and tacticalintelligence...." (4) TheConference Committee stated: "Giving the DCI a database of all intelligence activities and requiringall National Foreign Intelligence Program (NFIP) elements (5) to submit periodic budget execution reports should enable the DCIto make better use of his existing authorities -- given to him by Congress in 1992 -- to approve thebudgets of NFIP elements and to transfer funds and personnel with the concurrence of affectedagency heads. The conferees in considering the FY1997 legislation urged the DCI to be moreassertive in using these authorities." (6) In May 2000, the Senate Intelligence Committee reported that, "the budget practices of the[Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)] and the Intelligence Community as a whole are simplyinadequate to address current requirements. Upper level program managers lack sufficient insightinto the process to make informed and timely decisions regarding the allocation of funds, and toassure Congress, and themselves, that funds are being spent as appropriated and authorized." (7) The next year the committee again argued that the Intelligence Community "is handicappedby the lack of comprehensive strategic and performance plans that can be used to articulate programgoals, measure program performance, improve program efficiency and aid in resource planning." Accordingly, the Committee directed the DCI to produce a "comprehensive Intelligence Communitystrategic plan and performance plan, as well as complementary strategic and performance plans forthe intelligence agencies within the National Foreign Intelligence Program aggregation." TheCommittee asked that such plans be undertaken annually and made available to congressionalcommittees by March 1 of each year. (8) In 2002, the Senate Intelligence Committee acknowledged receipt of the "first-ever planscoordinated across the Intelligence Community aimed at establishing performance measures alignedwith the stated goals and priorities of the Director of Central Intelligence." The Committee went on,however, to indicate that further work is needed and suggested that developing new systems merelyto acquire a new capability was insufficient; the capability had to meet validated intelligence needs. "A key issue is the development of performance plans and measures that are not focused solely onthe attainment of intelligence capabilities but also on the value received from such capabilities inpursuit of Intelligence Community missions." (9) Despite this admonition, the next year the Committee called attention to the absence of a2003 performance plan submission, even though the deadline had passed with no request for anextension. (10) Moresignificantly, the Committee noted that it is aware of no capability within DoD or the IntelligenceCommunity for objectively, independently, and comprehensively evaluating alternative sensor andplatform architecture and capabilities. There are some capabilities within different agencies anddepartments, but none that are available, independent of the program offices, to model and assesscross-program trades without regard to the location of the sensor or platform (air, space, land, or sea)or the level of compartmentation. Consequently, although DoD and Intelligence Communityofficials expend substantial effort and time evaluating program trades, they do so without the benefitof the rigorous quantitative modeling necessary to optimize collection capabilities and architectures. Given the vast sums involved in these programs, even modest increases in the efficiency of resourcesallocation could lead to substantial benefits. Further, the Committee notes that the national militarystrategy, as well as the Defense Planning Guidance, have been developed in recent years without theparticipation of the Director of Central Intelligence or his staff, notwithstanding the growingimportance of intelligence to military operations and the need to build forces commensurate tovalidated threats. (11) Section 355 of the FY2004 Intelligence Authorization Act ( P.L. 108-177 ) required a report from theDCI and the Secretary of Defense assessing progress in the development of "a comprehensive anduniform analytical capability to assess the utility and advisability of various sensor and platformarchitectures and capabilities for the collection of intelligence ... [and] the improvement ofcoordination between the Department [of Defense] and the intelligence community on strategic andbudgetary planning. In separate legislation, Congress also urged that DOD take a greater role in managing ISR;in section 923 of the FY2004 Defense Authorization Act ( P.L. 108-136 ) Congress found that: ... there is not currently a well-defined forum throughwhich the integrators of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities for each of theArmed Forces can routinely interact with each other and with senior representatives of Departmentof Defense intelligence agencies, as well as with other members of the intelligence community, toensure unity of effort and to preclude unnecessary duplication of effort. (12) P.L. 108-136 further stated that the existing structure of intelligence programming may not be the best approach for supporting thedevelopment of an intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance structure that is integrated to meetthe national security requirements of the United States in the 21stcentury. Accordingly, the FY2004 Defense Authorization Act directed the Under Secretary of Defense forIntelligence to establish an "ISR Integration Council" to provide a permanent forum for assessingISR capabilities. The council is to consist of senior intelligence officers of the services, the SpecialOperations Command, the Joint Staff, and the directors of DOD intelligence agencies. The DCIwould be "invited" to participate. The council would be charged with developing a comprehensiveroadmap "to guide the development and integration" of DOD ISR capabilities for 15 years. (13) In addition to its general concerns about ISR programs, some Members of Congress havespecifically focused on two issues related to budget processes that they argued undermine theirabilities to conduct oversight of ISR efforts. They argue that congressional budget justificationbooks have been inadequate, and that there has been an over-reliance on supplemental appropriationsto fund continuing ISR programs. Effective congressional oversight depends on accurate, consistent information over amulti-year period; the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI), in particular,has criticized the inadequacy of intelligence budget justification materials and asked for morecomplete budgetary submissions in the form of congressional budget justification books. Proposalsfor ISR programs are to be forwarded to intelligence committees along with armed services andappropriations committees. Justification materials on national programs are submitted to the twointelligence committees along with classified CBJBs, which include one volume for each NIPprogram plus an additional summary volume. The classified books, available to Members andcommittee staff, include explanatory narrative and resource displays for all resources requested bythe program. Also included are descriptions of base levels of efforts, ongoing initiatives and newinitiatives with associated resource displays. CBJBs are submitted to Congress within a few weeksof the delivery of the budget in early February and form the basis for the committees' review of theentire NIP prior to the drafting of annual intelligence authorization bills. Once the intelligencecommittees complete their review -- generally in the spring and early summer -- the legislation isreferred to the armed services committee which have the option of submitting a separate report priorto floor consideration. Classified budget justification books, provided by the Administration to Congress, are theprimary ways, in addition to oral testimony, by which Congress obtains information aboutintelligence programs. In 1997 HPSCI criticized justification books for lacking "several criticalcomponents necessary for the Committee to ensure proper alignment of funding within the fundingappropriations categories. Clear identification of each project; its specific budget request numbers;the appropriation category (e.g., Other Procurement, Defense-wide; RDT&E, Navy, etc.); the budgetrequest line number, and if a research and development project, the Program Element number [are]essential to this task.... Therefore, the Committee directs the CMS [Community Management Staff]and the Defense Department to provide this specific data in all future budget justificationdocuments." (14) In 2000, HPSCI expressed its continued frustration with a perceived lack of detail providedin justification books (which are classified) and strongly criticized financial management practicesat some NFIP agencies. HPSCI stated that: ... the NFIP agencies need greater insight into theirfinancial obligations and the capabilities that they are developing. NSA's baseline activity, forexample, identified many areas of duplicative development, as well as lack of investment in keystrategic areas. Yet, due to the lack of detail, the CBJB did not provide this information. TheCommittee notes that, at least at some agencies, internal financial management practices seriouslycomplicate this process.... (15) In 2003, HPSCI again called attention to limitations in the data included in CBJBs which isoften less extensive than that routinely provided in DOD budget materials: The Committee believes, for example, that acquisitionprogram details in the CBJBs should include major milestones and deliverables for contractedprojects for the entire length of a contract and contain more specificity for the budget year of therequest. Many of the project milestones in the CBJBs are, however, at such a high-level that theCommittee is unable to determine the stage of the development activity or what will be accomplishedin the coming year. The project descriptions are often so vague that the Committee is unable todetermine the value of, or even what is being developed. (16) While procedures for annual budget submissions have long been established, there has beenan increasing practice in recent years, and especially since the September 11, 2001 attacks, ofproviding intelligence funding in supplemental appropriations acts. (17) Of the $165.6 billion insupplemental appropriations that the Defense Department has received since September 2001, asignificant, but not publicly identified, portion of these sums -- at least $16 billion (not countingfunds received in the FY2004 Iraq supplemental) -- was directed at intelligence andintelligence-related activities. (18) Arguably, there is less opportunity for consideration of proposed supplemental intelligencespending within the context of established programs. The HPSCI noted in July 2002: The "advantage" of the supplemental process to theIntelligence Community is that pressing budgetary demands can be met in a shorter time (and withfewer bureaucratic hurdles) than the regular yearly process. However, by continuing to rely onsupplemental appropriations year after year, the Intelligence Community risks fostering a budgetprocess that is ripe for abuse and long-term funding gaps. The House Committee also argued that the Defense Emergency Response Fund (DERF) (a fundinginitiative that permits DOD to shift funds from a central fund to specific appropriations accountsafter enactment as required for counterterrorist operations) "has turned into just another vehicle tofund items that the Intelligence Community did not get through the regular budget and planningprocess." (19) Inparticular, it is argued, supplemental legislation can undercut established budgeting andcongressional oversight procedures making it more difficult to weigh trade-offs and adjust overallpriorities. It can, in some situations, lead to the launching of programs that are unlikely to besustained in the regular authorization and appropriation process. Some question the propriety of funding "core" programs in emergency supplementallegislation which are intended to provide for additional unforeseen needs resulting from combat andoccupation duties. In June 2003, HPSCI reiterated its concerns, regretting that "core mission andcore mission support programs have also been funded in supplemental appropriations." It arguedthat, "The repeated reliance on supplemental appropriations has an erosive negative effect onplanning, and impedes long-term, strategic planning. The Committee hopes that the IC has finallyreached a plateau of resources and capabilities on which long-term strategic planning can nowbegin." Further, HPSCI concluded: The Committee cannot help but note that budgeting bysupplemental consequentially limits congressional oversight. The Committee strongly believes thatthe health of the IC is directly related to the oversight from Congress it receives. Certainly, theconfidence of the American people activities, and programs of the IC is increased significantly asa result of the transparency that exists between the IC and its congressional overseers. (20) Concern in not limited to the House Committee. In its report on a FY2005 IntelligenceAuthorization bill ( S. 2386 ) the Senate Intelligence Committee argued, "While thepractice of funding baseline expenditures using supplemental vehicles has become more prevalentin the past 10 years, ... it is time to rein in this practice." (21) A concern for some observers of the Intelligence Community are the current procedures forreprogramming of previously appropriated funds. Reprogrammings are intended to permit shiftingfunds to meet unanticipated new requirements that arise during the course the year. The NationalSecurity Act permitted the DCI to transfer funds appropriated for one program within NIP to anotherprogram within the NIP, but there were congressional concerns that reprogramming procedures didnot invariably met statutory requirements. (22) In May 2000, the House Intelligence Committee complainedabout "significant and deleterious movements of money" from field stations to CIA Headquartersthat were inconsistent with National Security Act provisions and asked the CIA Inspector Generalto investigate whether statutory provisions were being followed. (23) Similar concerns wereexpressed by the Senate Intelligence Committee: "Recent actions, including taxing directorates forfunds to be used in other areas, and moving funds within expenditure centers without congressionalnotification, have eroded this Committee's confidence that appropriations are used as intended." (24) During floor considerationof the FY2004 intelligence authorization conference report, Senator Roberts, Chairman of the SenateIntelligence Committee, commented on "difficulties in the out years as the National ForeignIntelligence Program becomes burdened with content that is more costly than the budgeted funding. This underestimation of future costs has resulted in significant re-shuffling of NFIP funds to meetemerging shortfalls." (25) Congress also criticized the process for reprogramming funds between NFIP programs andnon-NFIP programs. In May 2002, the Senate Intelligence Committee expressed concern that "thecorrespondence it receives notifying it of the reprogramming of funds from one activity to anotheroften does not set forth clearly how the ... requirements of 'higher priority' and 'unforeseen'circumstances have been satisfied." Section 305 of the FY2003 Intelligence Authorization Act"clarifies the 'unforeseen' requirement by stating that such a requirement does not include the failureof the Director of Central Intelligence to anticipate an action by Congress, such as an authorizationor appropriation level lower than that requested in the President's budget." (26) The provision was not,however, included in the version of the bill that was enacted as P.L. 107-306 . Section 311 of theSenate version of the FTY2004 intelligence authorization bill would have deleted the "unforeseenrequirements" criterion altogether, but the provision was not adopted in conference. Given the congressional concerns indicated above, a number of Members and outsideobservers have argued that a major restructuring of the Intelligence Community would be requiredif certain challenges in ISR efforts are to be addressed effectively. The 2002 Joint Inquiry conductedby the two intelligence committees to review the background of the 9/11 attacks recommended theestablishment of a position of Director of National Intelligence who would have "the full range ofmanagement, budgetary and personnel requirements needed to make the entire U.S. IntelligenceCommunity operate as a coherent whole." (27) The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the UnitedStates (the 9/11 Commission) also recommended establishing a position of National IntelligenceDirector (NID) to oversee national programs, but not joint military or tactical intelligence programswhich would managed solely by DOD. Furthermore, a senior Intelligence Community official, LarryKindsvater, the DCI's Executive Director for Intelligence Community Affairs and subsequentlyDeputy DCI for Community Management, argued the need to reorganize the IntelligenceCommunity, and proposed, among other things, to give the DCI authority to transfer funding acrossagencies with congressional approval. (28) The publication of the 9/11 Commission's report in July 2004 provided the impetus forcongressional action in an election year. The 9/11 Commission's recommendations regarding therole of the new DNI appear to have been based primarily on the perceived inability of the DCI toensure interagency communications and effectively control the allocation of intelligence assets. TheCommission noted that DCI Tenet was reported to have placed the Intelligence Community "at war"with Al Qaeda in December 1998, but without being able to ensure that all agencies concentratedsignificant resources on the terrorist group. (29) The Commission also noted efforts in the 1990s to address theDCI's perceived lack of personnel and budget authority over intelligence agencies. It further pointedout the results of intelligence reorganization legislation introduced in the 1996: The Department of Defense and its congressionalauthorizing committees rose in opposition to the proposed changes. The President and the DCI didnot actively support these changes. Relatively small changes made in 1996 gave the DCIconsultative authority and created a new deputy for management and assistant DCIs for collectionand analysis. The reforms occurred only after the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence took theunprecedented step of threatening to bring down the defense authorization bill. Indeed, rather thanincreasing the DCI's authorities over national intelligence, the 1990s witnessed movement in theopposite direction through, for example, the transfer of the CIA's imaging analysis capability to thenew imagery and mapping agency created within the Department of Defense. (30) Nevertheless, as former Representative Hamilton, the Vice Chairman of the 9/11 Commissiontestified: I do not recall us finding a failure of a DOD agency, sofar as we know. But we certainly think that part of the problem has been an unwillingness to sharethe information that a number of agencies had. (31) Although some observers argued that the "wall" separating intelligence and law enforcementagencies may have been a primary reason for the unwillingness to share information and that the wallhad been effectively removed by the USA Patriot Act of October 2001 ( P.L. 107-56 ), therecommendation of the 9/11 Commission to establish a DNI with stronger oversight andmanagement responsibilities for all intelligence agencies (including components of law enforcementagencies) was ultimately accepted by both the Bush Administration and the Congress. As described below, the Intelligence Reform Act provides the DNI with important statutoryauthorities in the intelligence budget process. It also enhances the reprogramming authorities of theDNI; the DNI may transfer or reprogram funds within the National Intelligence Program with theapproval of the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, after consultation with heads ofdepartment affected, and subject to provisions in annual appropriations acts. In addition, the fundsmust be transferred to an activity that is a higher priority intelligence activity, that supports anemergent need or improves program effectiveness. The transfer or reprogramming out of anydepartment or agency in a single fiscal year must be less than $150 million or 5% of the amountsavailable to the department or agency from the National Intelligence Program. These limitations donot apply if the transfer has the concurrence of the department or agency head involved. One argument that has been used by those who have proposed a major reorganization ofintelligence programming and budgeting is that the different categories of intelligence programs areobsolete in today's complex technological and threat environment. ISR programs are currentlygrouped into three major categories -- the National Intelligence Program (NIP), the Joint MilitaryIntelligence Program (JMIP), and Tactical Intelligence and Related Activities (TIARA). (32) The three categories ofintelligence activities used in programming and budgeting are based on the different consumer beingserved, different management arrangements, and different oversight in Congress. (33) The NIP (formerly, NFIP) is defined in statute as: All programs, projects, and activities of the intelligencecommunity, as well as any other programs of the intelligence community designated jointly by theDirector of Central Intelligence and the head of a United States department or agency or by thePresident. Such term does not include programs, projects, or activities of the military departmentsto acquire intelligence solely for the planning and conduct of tactical military operations by UnitedStates Armed Forces. (34) The NIP is usually described as consisting of programs to support national decisionmakers,especially the President, the National Security Council (NSC) staff, and heads of cabinetdepartments, especially the Secretaries of State and Defense. Major NIP programs include: Central Intelligence Agency Program (CIAP) General Defense Intelligence Program (GDIP) Consolidated Cryptologic Program (CCP) National Geospatial-Intelligence Program [formerly the National Imagery andMapping Agency Program (NIMAP)] National Reconnaissance Program (NRP) DOD Foreign Counterintelligence Program (35) (FCIP) NIP encompasses more than half of overall intelligence spending and includes most effortsof the Intelligence Community (IC) -- the CIA, the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), the NationalReconnaissance Office (NRO), the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA) [formerly theNational Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA)], and the National Security Agency (NSA). Inaccordance with the Intelligence Reform Act, the DNI has overall responsibility for preparing NIPbudget submissions based on priorities established by the President and taking into account inputfrom DOD agencies that have NIP responsibilities. NIP budget totals are authorized in annualintelligence authorization acts; total amounts are specified in the classified schedule that accompanyappropriations legislation, but are not made public. (36) The JMIP was established in 1995 to include defense-wide efforts that provide support tomultiple defense consumers. There are four principal components to the JMIP: the Defense Cryptologic Program designed to provide cryptologic support tomilitary commands; the Defense Imagery Program designed to provide imagery support to militarycommands; the Defense Mapping, Charting, and Geodesy Program; the Defense General Intelligence and Applications Program that includessub-programs managed by DIA and other agencies in support of DOD commands. (37) In its report on the FY2001 Intelligence Authorization act, the House Intelligence Committeedescribed a number of JMIP programs in the year 2000, including modifications to reconnaissanceaircraft, Global Hawk UAVs, and antenna systems for reconnaissance aircraft. (38) TIARA programs are "a diverse array of reconnaissance and target acquisition programs thatare a functional part of the basic military force structure and provide direct information support tomilitary operations." (39) In the year 2000 the House Intelligence Committee described a number of TIARA programs --cryptologic and language skills training for the Army, an Army ground station to use with theJSTARS aircraft, funds for extending naval space surveillance, hyper spectral sensing systems onAir Force UAVs, and a tactical video system for Special Operations Forces. (40) An annual list of TIARAprograms is not published, although some are indicated in appropriations reports. (41) Unlike JMIP programswhich tend to be completely intelligence systems, TIARA includes "related activities," systems thatare essentially parts of various weapons systems (and that can be reclassified out of TIARA). Over a number of years it has become apparent that, to consumers of intelligence, distinctionsamong NIP, JMIP, and TIARA programs are becoming indistinct. As the Intelligence ResourceManager's Guide noted, "As systems grow in complexity and capability and methods become moresophisticated, increasing numbers of intelligence assets are capable of simultaneously serving bothnational and tactical purposes." (42) For example, there has been for a number of years a program,known as Tactical Exploitation of National Capabilities (TENCAP), which is designed to facilitatethe use of satellite imagery and other NIP products by military commanders. In some militaryengagements with important diplomatic and political implications, low-level tactical intelligenceacquired through TIARA systems is also desired by senior officials to support their efforts at crisismanagement. In August 2004 testimony, Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence StephenCambone stated, in response to a question about the existence of a clear line between national andtactical intelligence: ... an irony of this, sir, is that we spent a good deal oftime, at least during my tenure, trying to merge and blur the line and distinction between what isstrategic and tactical and what is national and military, since it's increasingly difficult to distinguisheither in the product that is produced or in the capability that is applied. So Global Hawks, whichare built by the Air Force, are as significant and important as SIGINT satellites that are built by theNational Reconnaissance Office and whose take is managed by the National Security Agency. (43) As a result, some observers argued that the three categories of ISR programs cannot bemeaningfully considered by themselves; they must be considered as parts of a greater whole and,accordingly, the NIP, JMIP, and TIARA categories are outmoded. Changing the statutes,regulations, and rules which established the three categories obviously would be difficult and wouldaffect organizational relationships in both executive and legislative branches. One result ofabolishing the system could mean a devolution of acquisition to a multitude of program managersthroughout the military services -- an approach that most observers would argue could have majordrawbacks. Some have suggested that the growing interrelationships among NIP, JMIP, and TIARAsystems may complicate provisions in the Intelligence Reform Act that establish separateresponsibilities for NIP on one hand and JMIP and TIARA on the other. Arguably, the act couldcomplicate, rather than facilitate, effort to coordinate the acquisition and operation of ISR systems. A major challenge for the Office of the DNI, when activated, will be to coordinate ISR programswithin the NIP for which it is primarily responsible with those that are in JMIP and TIARA forwhich the Defense Department has primary responsibility. The same types of coordinativemechanisms that have long existed will undoubtedly continue to be required. In any event, Congresswill have a major influence on ISR acquisition; it may also choose to determine whether theenhanced authorities of the DNI (in comparison to those of the DCI) permit more effectivecoordination of ISR programs. Programming and budgeting of ISR systems have been managed by the Department ofDefense (DOD) and its many components, and by the Intelligence Community (through the officeresponsible to the DCI for inter-agency coordination, the Community Management Staff (CMS)).The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) also plays a critical role in allocating budgetary goalsthat can constrain intelligence spending proposals. Congressional responsibilities are spread amongarmed services, intelligence, appropriations, and other committees. Although it would be easy toquestion the number of entities involved, the reality is that the overlap results from the evolution ofa multiplicity of systems and the variety of consumers. Whereas NASA can singlehandedly managea moon probe, no intelligence agency will ordinarily by itself collect, analyze, and disseminatefinished intelligence. Different procedures used for different ISR systems by different agencies canalso complicate efforts to achieve compatibility and maximize effectiveness. Prior to passage of the Intelligence Reform Act, the DCI was responsible for facilitating thedevelopment of an annual budget for intelligence and intelligence-related activities and forpresenting to the President an annual budget for the NFIP. He participated in the development bythe Secretary of Defense of the annual budgets for JMIP and TIARA. Observers have argued thatthese responsibilities did not provide for the comprehensive management of ISR programs that isneeded. Although the 9/11 Commission did not focus at length on the role of the DCI in systemsacquisition, it concluded that there was an urgent need to restructure the Intelligence Community andestablish stronger authorities for the DCI or a DNI. (44) Consideration of intelligence reform legislation in the 108th Congress included extensivedebate on the role of the new DNI in developing budgets and overseeing their execution. On oneside was a determination to ensure that the DNI would be effectively in charge of the entireIntelligence Community and able to direct its resources at the most critical threats. On the other wasa determination to ensure that the combat support agencies of the Department of Defense would notbe diverted by non-DOD officials. The language incorporated in the final version that became law requires that the DNI provide,based on priorities set by the President, guidance to departments and agencies regarding their portionof the National Intelligence Program. Then, based on budget proposals provided by agency anddepartment heads, the DNI is to develop and determine the annual NIP budget. Funds appropriatedby Congress are to be apportioned by the OMB "at the exclusive direction of the Director of NationalIntelligence." Furthermore, "[d]epartment comptrollers or appropriate budget execution officersshall allot, allocate, reprogram, or transfer funds appropriated for the National Intelligence Programin an expeditious manner." (45) The legislation did not, however, repeal statutory authorities of the Secretary of Defense formanaging the components of DOD. In addition, Section 1018 requires that the President issueguidelines to ensure the effective implementation and execution of the DNI's authorities "in a mannerthat respects and does not abrogate the statutory responsibilities of the heads" of other departments. Some believe that this provision reflects separate, even conflicting priorities and suggest that it maybe as difficult to write the guidelines as it was to draft the legislation. Much of the media analysis of this question tends to focus on a "turf battle" and differencesamong key officials. Although elements of individual and bureaucratic competition are inevitable,the underlying reality is that intelligence systems must support different sets of consumers; noserious observers suggest that duplicate systems could be available in the foreseeable future. Priorities in acquisition of new systems and in tasking collection must be set and the mechanismsof coordination will inevitably be subject to different, but legitimate, requirements of differentagencies and policymakers. In recent years, the CIA budget -- the only part of the NIP that has been managed solely bythe DCI -- is comprised mainly of personnel expenses -- the salaries of case officers, assets, analysts,managers, etc. along with associated costs for equipment, buildings and grounds. In the past, the CIAwas also involved in significant procurement efforts such as reconnaissance satellites, mannedaircraft such as the U-2, and UAVs (46) . The CIA Program is managed by the Executive Director of theCIA, a senior staff official at CIA; other agencies play a relatively minor role in CIA acquisitionefforts. The Secretary of Defense has had a major role in developing programs to address DOD'sintelligence needs and in managing most NIP programs. The National Security Act assigns to theSecretary of Defense the responsibility to ensure, in consultation with the DCI, that: (1) the budgets of the elements of the intelligencecommunity within the Department of Defense are adequate to satisfy the overall intelligence needsof the Department of Defense, including the needs of the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff andthe commanders of the unified and specified commands and, wherever such elements are performinggovernment-wide functions, the needs of other departments andagencies; (2) ensure appropriate implementation of the policiesand resource decisions of the Director of Central Intelligence by elements of the Department ofDefense within the National Foreign Intelligence Program; (3) ensure that the tactical intelligence activities of theDepartment of Defense complement and are compatible with intelligence activities under theNational Foreign Intelligence Program.... (47) Executive Order (EO) 12333, United States Intelligence Activities , required that the DCI,together with the Secretary of Defense, "ensure that there is no unnecessary overlap between nationalforeign intelligence programs and Department of Defense intelligence programs...." (48) There have been, inaddition, a number of inter-agency agreements within the executive branch that govern thecoordination of intelligence programs and budget processes. (49) Most NIP programs have been managed by the Defense Department. National programsmanaged by DOD are gathered into several intelligence program categories -- the General DefenseIntelligence Program (GDIP), the Consolidated Cryptologic Program (CCP), the DOD ForeignCounterintelligence Program (FCIP), the National Geospatial-Intelligence Program [formerly, theNational Imagery and Mapping Agency Program (NIMAP), and the National ReconnaissanceProgram (NRP). (50) In some cases, a single agency within DOD has managed one program; in other casesresponsibility has been shared. The CCP is managed by NSA. The GDIP largely covers the workof DIA; the CCP is implemented by NSA; geospatial intelligence is the responsibility of the NGA,the NRP is the responsibility of the NRO, and specialized programs are found in various agenciesand offices. Counterintelligence (FCIP) is a responsibility of all agencies. Satellites and sigint -- responsibilities of the NRO, NGA, and NSA -- are the largest ISR programs and constitute a verysizable portion of the estimated $40 billion in annual intelligence spending. Changes in DOD's Management of ISR. Overallcoordination of these programs within DOD was for years the responsibility of the AssistantSecretary of Defense for Communications, Command, Control and Intelligence (C3I); but in May2003 these functions were transferred to the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, a newlycreated post headed by Stephen Cambone, a longtime associate of Defense Secretary Rumsfeld. TheUSD(I) is granted authority to "lead departmental activities in programmatic processes related tointelligence and intelligence-related programs, including, but not limited to, program changeproposals, program evaluations, assessments, and recommendations." (51) Cambone has noted that making decisions on ISR programs early in the process could havemajor implications for years ahead: "There are a lot of efforts, I think perhaps more than some peopleappreciate, that are either early in their development or just beginning or are envisioned over the next18 months or so where a choice between spending the dollar in one direction or another could havea big payoff downstream." (52) The ultimate role of Cambone and his successors may not befully determined as yet, but the establishment of his office appears to reflect a more centralized andcoordinated approach to ISR acquisition. The Intelligence Reform Act provides importantacquisition and management authorities over DOD's national intelligence programs to the DNI. These authorities will have to be implemented in a way that is consistent with the existing authoritiesof the Defense Department; the timing and contours of the implementation process are as yetuncertain. How ISR Funding is Included in DOD's Budget. Managing programs involves planning for future acquisition, preparation of budget documents, andmonitoring expenditures. Intelligence funds are programmed, budgeted, and expended in accordancewith Defense Department procedures. (53) They are contained with the Budget's 050 National DefenseFunction (within Function 051, DOD Budget, or Function 054 Defense-related Activities categories). Funds for CIA are included ("hidden") in the DOD budget but, once appropriated, are transferred byOMB directly to the DCI for execution. Of the eleven major programs in DOD's Future YearsDefense Program (FYDP), most ISR funding is in Program 3, Command, Control, Communications,Intelligence, and Space. Funding for other programs, such as aircraft, may includeintelligence-related research and development; training, and intelligence-related functions may bein other categories. These major categories are, in turn, divided into program elements (PEs) thatcan be aggregated for different purposes, including the identification of intelligence efforts. Slightly more than half of annual authorized intelligence spending is devoted to the agenciesthat are part of the NIP; the remainder goes to programs that are part of JMIP and TIARA. JMIPprograms extend beyond one service and are included in defense authorization and appropriationsbills. Some JMIP programs are the responsibility of a single defense agency while others aremanaged by one service as an "executive agent" for the rest of DOD. Funding for specific intelligence programs is included in the budgets of the services anddefense agencies. This funding is largely hidden in appropriations legislation although someRDT&E programs with special code names are known to fund intelligence efforts. Other funds areincluded in larger "pots" of money, such as the appropriation account, "O&M Defensewide." TIARA programs are usually managed by a single service for its own forces. One analystdescribes TIARA as: nothing more than a reporting concept . It is adesignation applied to aggregations of programs, projects and activities in military Servicebudgets that provide tactical-level intelligence and related support to military operations. Theseaggregations comprise two types of assets, i.e., organic military intelligence assets and funding forService-specific tactical intelligence programs. (54) As a reporting concept, the TIARA category consists of a variety of programs that may vary fromyear to year. In some cases, it may be difficult to distinguish among TIARA programs and othersurveillance and targeting efforts that may not be categorized as TIARA. To complicate mattersfurther, surveillance programs may be characterized as TIARA one year but not necessarily thenext. (55) TIARA programs are perhaps the most challenging to review because they are forwarded aspart of budget requests from the three military departments. They have to be disaggregated andconsidered along with TIARA programs of the other services, a process that is not necessarily easyand may involve a program that the parent service believes to be an integral part of a favoredweapons system. Under such circumstances, assessing trade-offs among intelligence programs canbecome difficult. Similarly, when a weapon system with a TIARA component is delayed orcancelled, there can be significant implications for intelligence efforts that were designed to beintegrated with the delayed or cancelled effort. Internal DOD Coordinating Boards. A numberof steps have been taken in the past to ensure an integrated approach to intelligence programs,whether NIP, JMIP, or TIARA. An unusual DOD entity, the Expanded Defense Resources Board,consisting not only of senior DOD military and civilian officials but also the DCI, was establishedin the mid-1990s to provide a broader executive branch review. Another interagency review entityis the Intelligence Program Review Group which reviews issues, analyzes priorities, and studiesfunding alternatives at the staff level prior to consideration by the Expanded Defense ResourcesBoard. Different procedures used by the Defense Department and the Intelligence Community indealing with the diffuse efforts that are collectively part of the collection, analysis, and disseminationof intelligence have long been a source of concern to resource managers. As noted in the Intelligence Resource Manager's Guide , by 1993 there was a perceived need to (a) depictintelligence capabilities and associated resources, (b) ensure adequate levels of detail for programreview and analysis, (c) ensure that compatible processes were in place to support decisionmaking. "The time had come to tear down barriers that had made it difficult to identify shortfalls andunwanted NFIP/TIARA duplication." (56) Accordingly, at congressional urging, the then-DCI, R. James Woolsey, undertook a numberof measures during his tenure (1993-1995) to ensure a comprehensive review process by adjustingschedules to ensure that DOD and IC milestones coincided and that there were joint TIARA/NFIPreviews and that a "common budget framework" was established to make characterization of NFIPand TIARA resources consistent. The goal was "to allow resource managers to peer across seamsinto all programs, projects, and activities containing dollars and/or manpower assets designed tomeet the same or similar types of missions." (57) One goal was to identify changes in one program that might havean unintended consequence, e.g. eliminating a TIARA program to collect imagery by an airbornesensor might lead to a requirement for additional, and more expensive, satellite coverage of the areapreviously covered by reconnaissance aircraft. Implementation of this effort began with the FY1995budget and continues to be used. Related changes involved DOD, including the Expanded DefenseResources Board and the Intelligence Program Review Group. An interagency MissionRequirements Board was established by the Community Management Staff to ensure that thenational and tactical needs of all consumers were addressed. The process has been coordinated by DOD and Intelligence Community officials rangingfrom the Secretary of Defense and DCI down to lower-level budget specialists. The DCI and theSecretary of Defense (represented by the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence) are responsiblefor jointly deciding major issues (and negotiating any percentage reductions that might be requiredto meet cuts ordered by the President or OMB), while their respective staffs interact in definingissues and preparing submissions to congressional committees. In practice, some observers believethat DOD has greater influence in the process given its size and the need to ensure that the militaryservices have the intelligence they need to meet their operational responsibilities. (58) Procedures for congressional oversight of intelligence activities also affect the acquisitionof ISR resources. On Capitol Hill, the NIP is overseen by the two congressional intelligencecommittees. HPSCI's jurisdiction is specified in programmatic terms. It has oversight over NIPalong with "intelligence and intelligence-related activities of all other departments and agencies ofthe Government, including the tactical intelligence and intelligence-related activities of theDepartment of Defense." (59) Senate rules, on the other hand, focus on agencies; SSCI hasjurisdiction over the CIA, DIA, NSA, other DOD agencies and subdivisions, and the intelligenceactivities of the State Department and the FBI. A crucial difference between the two chambers isthe exclusion from SSCI's jurisdiction of "tactical military intelligence serving no nationalpolicymaking function." (60) HPSCI oversees JMIP and TIARA programs, coordinating withthe House Armed Services Committee. In practice, SSCI also has an opportunity to providecomments on JMIP and TIARA programs to the Armed Services committee, which has primaryjurisdiction. Both intelligence committees have sole jurisdiction over budgets for the CIA, the CIAretirement system, and the Community Management Staff. After committee review, all NIPprograms are included in annual intelligence authorization legislation; NIP programs are includedas well as national defense authorization bills. JMIP and TIARA programs are authorized by HPSCI and the House Armed ServicesCommittee. As a result of differing jurisdictions of the two intelligence committees, the SenateArmed Services Committees authorizes JMIP and TIARA expenditures. SSCI does not haveauthorizing authority over JMIP and TIARA, but it reviews and analyzes the JMIP and TIARAbudget request, and recommends actions to the Armed Services Committee. Although the relationship between intelligence committees and armed services committeesis generally cooperative, in some instances their approaches have differed. The National DefenseAuthorization Act of FY1997 ( P.L. 104-201 ) established the National Imagery and Mapping Agency(NIMA) despite the misgivings of Members of HPSCI. (61) The position of Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence wasestablished by the FY2003 National Defense Authorization Act ( P.L. 107-314 , section 901), not byan intelligence authorization act. Similarly, it was the FY2004 National Defense Authorization Act( P.L. 108-136 , section 921) that changed the name of NIMA to the National Geospatial-IntelligenceAgency, not intelligence authorization legislation. Despite the existence of the coordinative mechanisms described above, Congress formallyexpressed its concerns that ISR has been ill-coordinated. In part, coordination difficulties havederived from the challenges faced by large governmental organizations in managing fast-movingtechnological developments. In addition, U.S. post-cold war defense planning continues to evolveinto new, and uncertain, approaches to a wide variety of possible conflict situations. This evolutionmay make it even more difficult to reach consensus on ISR requirements in future years. How theprovisions of the Intelligence Reform Act will be implemented remains unknown. Many complexissues will have to be addressed, including the roles of congressional authorizing and appropriationscommittees. In regard to ISR systems, the act provides the DNI with an opportunity and a staff (theCommunity Management Staff is to be transferred to the Office of the DNI) to assess whethergovernment-wide ISR requirements are being effectively addressed. Some observers believe that past failures to satisfy congressional concerns about coordinationresulted in significant measure from the lower relative influence of the DCI and the CommunityManagement Staff compared with that of the Secretary of Defense and DOD. The DCI was arguablyat a disadvantage in any dispute with DOD because of the latter's size, influence, and prestige. Similarly, questions have existed regarding the relative influence of intelligence and Armed Servicescommittees (and some Members have suggested that certain intelligence matters should receiveoversight from other committees). The Intelligence Reform Act did not specify procedures forcongressional oversight, but Congress may choose to develop new approaches to reviewing ISRprograms. Some observers go so far as to argue that longstanding distinctions among national, jointmilitary, and tactical systems have outlived their usefulness and that a more comprehensive approachshould be attempted. Since these distinctions are provided for in statutes and have been recently beenincluded in the Intelligence Reform Act, any major changes would require further congressionalaction. There is a widespread sense that the optimal mix of ISR systems has not yet been determined. Admittedly, it would be almost impossible to design analytical processes that would identifydefinitive options for ISR systems readily acceptable to all interested parties. The diverse nature ofthe systems, the multiple customers for data, the number of intelligence agencies, and the dynamicsof ever-changing ISR technologies make a multi-year "roadmap" extremely difficult. Yet, a moredisciplined assessment of the potential advantages and disadvantages of different ISR options couldbe required for review in the executive branch and in congressional committees. Given the potential for the need for future budgetary restraints on ISR programs, with orwithout a new procedural framework, the acquisition of expensive new systems will undoubtedlyremain an especially complex challenge to government decisionmakers. Efforts to procure a new generation of reconnaissance satellites and high altitude unmannedaerial vehicles (UAVs) serve as a case study that illustrates the dilemmas involved in the acquisitionsof intelligence platforms and systems. Both of the these expensive and technologically sophisticatedplatforms can support national policymakers as well as military commanders. Each has strengths andlimitations. (62) Whileno serious observer would argue that U.S. ISR requirements could be met by only one approach,many believe that there have been insufficient efforts to achieve an appropriate mix that providesoptimal collection capabilities while avoiding unnecessary duplication or wasted resources. Satellite imagery has long been one of the most valuable tools of the intelligence profession. The need for to obtain accurate estimates of Soviet military forces in the mid-1950s led the UnitedStates, in order to avoid highly dangerous overflights by conventional aircraft, to develop specialplanes that could fly at very high altitudes and ultimately to build reconnaissance satellites that couldidentify small objects from space. Satellite imagery became the cornerstone of arms control effortsin the Cold War and, coupled with the availability of precision guided munitions, became the keyto those post-Cold War defense tactics that rely on highly selective targeting to destroy selectedtargets with minimal collateral damage. Satellite programs are among the most expensive intelligence efforts, with individualsatellites costing a billion dollars each. The need to replace aging satellite programs led theIntelligence Community in the mid-1990s to initiate the Future Imagery Architecture (FIA) programthat is intended to provide a greater number of smaller satellites that can provide coverage of moreregions for longer periods. FIA has, however, received considerable criticism. In 1998, the HouseIntelligence Committee has concluded: For several years, the committee has been concernedwith the increasing costs of several major National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) programs and theNRP's [National Reconnaissance Program through which the NRO is funded] growing share of theNFIP budget. Not seeing any relief from the tight fiscal environment, the committee has sought tofind technological innovations and managerial reforms in the NRP that could reduce costs. This goallay behind the committee's push to shift to larger numbers of smaller satellites, which the committeethought also would provide better performance against hard targets, reduce satellite vulnerability,and help to counter foreign denial and deception practices. The committee, in summary, is not satisfied that allappropriate measures have been taken to reduce or control costs in the NRP or to adequately measurethe cost-effectiveness of all overhead collection activities. The committee believes that the DCIneeds to exercise much more knowledgeable and diligent oversight of NRO programs, with an eyeto freeing up funds for investment elsewhere, wherever possible. This oversight must extend fromrequirements tradeoffs, to cost estimating, to acquisition oversight. The DCI also needs to acquirethe expertise necessary to make tradeoffs across the major NFIP programs. The DCI can no longerafford to rely on the major program managers to police their organizations and budgets. Thecommittee has recommended additional funds for the DCI to accelerate the development of thesecapabilities. (63) One media account in December 2002 reported that "The National Reconnaissance Office'snext-generation spy satellites, known as Future Imagery Architecture, are more than a year delayedand almost $3 billion over cost, spurring an internal Pentagon debate about whether to proceed withthe program at all, say people familiar with the discussions." (64) Further criticism wasvoiced in May 2003 by a task force established by the Defense Science Board which submitted areport finding that "the FIA program under contract at the time of our review to be significantlyunderfunded and technically flawed. The task force believes that the FIA program -- thus structured-- is not executable." (65) The process of satellite procurement and the role of the DCI vis-a-vis DOD has come undersome criticism. One former CIA official who worked with the NRO has described "an incrediblyinefficient requirements process," and suggested that the DCI's role has been reduced to thedetriment of the overall satellite reconnaissance effort: The process for deriving the requirements for the newimagery architecture (FIA) took two years and makes the point about the DCI's diminished powerclear. DoD and the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) played key roles in the FIArequirements process; now DoD essentially controls all major NRO requirements. The DCI and theCIA have let DoD significantly erode what should be the DCI's major responsibility: the arbitration,consolidation, and establishment of national intelligence requirements. (66) FIA, whose satellites are expected to be launched beginning around 2008, absorbs a majorportion of the intelligence budget and reportedly continues to be plagued with serious delays andmanagement problems. (67) According to one media account, the program is more than ayear behind schedule and is forcing a shift of some $4 billion from other ISR programs. (68) Some observers have,accordingly, suggested that many of the capabilities of reconnaissance satellites could be realizedby relying on less expensive, high-altitude unmanned aerial vehicles such as Global Hawk, whichhas recently become available for operational missions and has been used during Operation IraqFreedom. Proponents of Global Hawks, which have been estimated to cost some $57 million perunit, maintain that these vehicles could provide a considerable portion of the imagery that couldotherwise be obtainable by satellites that cost many times that figure. (69) There are advantages and disadvantages to both satellites and UAVs (as well as mannedaircraft which can also be used advantageously in some circumstances). Satellites have beenconsidered invulnerable to attacks from all but the most sophisticated adversary and can be launchedfrom U.S. territory. (70) They are in orbit for years and can be shifted from target to target as needs change. On the otherhand, they are expensive and there are inevitably limited numbers in the U.S. inventory. GlobalHawks, on the other hand, can be launched when needed, and can be targeted by local commanders. They do not, however, have the capability to remain overhead for lengthy periods (sometimes termeda "long-dwell capability"), and they may be vulnerable to attack. While inexpensive in comparisonwith satellites, they are far too costly to be considered expendable, as is the case with some tacticalUAVs. UAV acquisition has been as heavily criticized as FIA. HPSCI, in particular, has pointedout problems with Global Hawk procurement: The Committee is very concerned about themanagement and cost growth of the Global Hawk endurance UAV program.... [Because of AirForce-initiated upgrades] a $10 million per copy Global Hawk platform has become at least a $30-40million aircraft, and the cost will increase substantially further as additional and improved sensors,and corresponding power/payload upgrades, are added. In fact, the Air Force projects that theaverage total unit cost (including all program costs) will exceed $75 million percopy. ... there is now an effort to flood the Global Hawkprogram with money, there are ad hoc plans for rapid, major upgrades before requirements have beenestablished, and no sign of serious examination of where and how Global Hawk fits into an overallcollection architecture.... DoD has taken no serious steps to be able to relay and process the hugeamounts of data from Global Hawk, or to process, exploit, and disseminate all the data that a fleetof 51 Global Hawks with highly capable sensors will generate. (71) Satellites are budgeted under NIP and operated by the NRO; Global Hawk UAVs, on theother hand, have been budgeted under JMIP and operated by Air Force components of regionalcommands. These separate paths have made the possibility of potential trade-offs between space andUAV collection vastly more difficult. Observers sense that current procedures to integrateintelligence acquisition efforts have not led to a comprehensive assessment of major issues relatingto satellite and UAV programs. If UAVs can do at least part of the work of satellites then, arguably,considerable budgetary savings might be realized. On the other hand, a failure to take advantage ofU.S. satellite technological superiority could limit intelligence-gathering capabilities for decades tocome and prompt the decline of an important U.S. industry.

Summary: Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) functions are principal elements of U.S.defense capabilities, and include a wide variety of systems for acquiring and processing informationneeded by national security decisionmakers and military commanders. ISR systems range in sizefrom hand-held devices to orbiting satellites. Some collect basic information for a wide range ofanalytical products; others are designed to acquire data for specific weapons systems. Some are"national" systems intended primarily to collect information of interest to Washington-area agencies;others are "tactical" systems intended to support military commanders on the battlefield. Collectively, they account for a major portion of U.S. intelligence spending that, according to mediaestimates, amounts to some $40 billion annually. For some time Congress has expressed concern about the costs and management of ISRprograms. With minor exceptions, ISR acquisition has been coordinated by the Defense Departmentand the Intelligence Community. Although there are long-existing staff mechanisms for reviewingand coordinating ISR programs in the context of the annual budget submissions, many in Congressbelieve that existing procedures have not avoided duplication of effort, excessive costs, and gaps incoverage. Examples that some observers cite are separate efforts to acquire a new generation ofreconnaissance satellites and a high altitude unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) known as Global Hawk. Both systems acquire some of the same sorts of information and serve similar customers, but theyare acquired in distinctly different ways; moreover, in both cases procurement efforts have beenbeset by increasing costs and schedule delays. Recently enacted statutes mandate better integration of ISR capabilities and require that theDefense Department prepare a roadmap to guide the development and integration of ISR capabilitiesover the next fifteen years. An effective roadmap, if developed, could potentially ensure morecomprehensive coverage of targets and save considerable sums of money. To establish responsibilityfor an Intelligence Community-wide effort, the 9/11 Commission recommended that a new positionof Director of National Intelligence be established to manage the national intelligence program (butnot joint military and tactical intelligence programs, which would continue to be managed by theDefense Department). This position was included, after extended debate, in the Intelligence Reformand Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 ( P.L. 108-458 ) that was approved by the President onDecember 17, 2004. The implications of this legislation for ISR programs are as yet uncertain, butCongress may seek to assess the effectiveness of the statute in addressing long-existing concernswith ISR programs. This report will be updated as circumstances warrant.