According to FPS officials, since 2010 the agency has required its guards to receive training on how to respond to an active-shooter scenario. However, as our 2013 report shows, FPS faces challenges providing active-shooter response training to all of its guards. Without ensuring that all guards receive training on how to respond to active-shooter incidents, FPS has limited assurance that its guards are prepared for this threat. According to FPS officials, the agency provides guards with information on how they should respond during an active-shooter incident as part of the 8-hour FPS-provided orientation training. FPS officials were not able to specify how much time is devoted to this training, but said that it is a According to FPS’s small portion of the 2-hour special situations training.training documents, this training includes instructions on how to notify law enforcement personnel, secure the guard’s area of responsibility, appropriate use of force, and direct building occupants according to emergency plans. We were unable to determine the extent to which FPS’s guards have received active-shooter response training, in part, because FPS lacks a comprehensive and reliable system for guard oversight (as discussed below). When we asked officials from 16 of the 31 contract guard companies we contacted if their guards had received training on how to respond during active-shooter incidents, responses varied.of the 16 contract guard companies we interviewed about this topic: officials from eight contract guard companies stated that their guards had received active-shooter scenario training during FPS orientation; officials from five guard companies stated that FPS has not provided active-shooter scenario training to their guards during the FPS- provided orientation training; and officials from three guard companies stated that FPS had not provided active-shooter scenario training to their guards during the FPS- provided orientation training, but that the topic was covered at some other time. DHS and FPS agreed with our 2013 recommendation to take immediate steps to determine which guards have not had screener or active-shooter scenario training and provide it to them and, as part of developing a national curriculum, decide how and how often these trainings will be provided in the future. As part of their 120 hours of training required by FPS, guards must receive 8 hours of screener training from FPS on how to use x-ray and magnetometer equipment. However, in our September 2013 report, we found that FPS has not provided required screener training to all guards. Screener training is important because many guards control access points at federal facilities and thus must be able to properly operate x-ray and magnetometer machines and understand their results. In 2009 and 2010, we reported that FPS had not provided screener training to 1,500 In response to those reports, FPS contract guards in one FPS region.stated that it planned to implement a program to train its inspectors to provide screener training to all its contract guards. We were unable to determine the extent to which FPS’s guards have received screener training, but information from guard companies we contacted indicate that guards continue to be deployed to federal facilities who have never received this training. For example, an official at one contract guard company stated that 133 of its approximately 350 guards (about 38 percent) on three separate FPS contracts (awarded in 2009) have never received their initial x-ray and magnetometer training from FPS. The official stated that some of these guards are working at screening posts. Further, officials at another contract guard company in a different FPS region stated that, according to their records, 78 of 295 (about 26 percent) guards deployed under their contract have never received FPS’s x-ray and magnetometer training. These officials stated that FPS’s regional officials were informed of the problem, but allowed guards to continue to work under this contract, despite not having completed required training. Because FPS is responsible for this training, according to guard company officials no action was taken against the company. Consequently, some guards deployed to federal facilities may be using x-ray and magnetometer equipment that they are not qualified to use─thus raising questions about the ability of some guards to execute a primary responsibility to properly screen access control points at federal facilities. As noted above, FPS agreed with our 2013 recommendation to determine which guards have not had screener training and agreed to provide it to them. In our September 2013 report, we found that FPS continues to lack effective management controls to ensure that guards have met training and certification requirements. For example, although FPS agreed with our 2012 recommendation to develop a comprehensive and reliable system for contract guard oversight, it has not yet established such a system. Without a comprehensive guard management system, FPS has no independent means of ensuring that its contract guard companies have met contract requirements, such as providing qualified guards to federal facilities. Instead, FPS requires its guard companies to maintain files containing guard-training and certification information and to provide it with a monthly report containing this information. In our September 2013 report, we reported that 23 percent of the 276 guard files we reviewed (maintained by 11 of the 31 guard companies we interviewed) lacked required training and certification documentation.table 1, some guard files lacked documentation of basic training, semi- annual firearms qualifications, screener training, the 40-hour refresher training (required every 3 years), and CPR certification. FPS has also identified guard files that did not contain required documentation. FPS’s primary tool for ensuring that guard companies comply with contractual requirements for guards’ training, certifications, and qualifications is to review guard companies’ guard files monthly. From March 2012 through March 2013, FPS reviewed more than 23,000 guard files. It found that a majority of the guard files had the required documentation but more than 800 (about 3 percent) did not. FPS’s file reviews for that period showed files missing, for example, that documented screener training, initial weapons training, CPR certification, and firearms qualifications. However, as our September 2013 report explains, FPS’s process for conducting monthly file reviews does not include requirements for reviewing and verifying the results, and we identified instances in which FPS’s monthly review results did not accurately reflect the contents of guard files. For instance, FPS’s review indicated that required documentation was present for some guard files, but we were not able to find documentation of training and certification, such as initial weapons training, DHS orientation, and pre-employment drug screenings.not able to provide reasonable assurance that guards have met training and certification requirements. As a result of the lack of management controls, FPS is DHS and FPS agreed with our 2013 recommendation to develop and implement procedures for monthly guard-file reviews to ensure consistency in selecting files and verifying the results. We reported in 2012 that FPS is not assessing risks at federal facilities in a manner consistent with federal standards. The preliminary results of our ongoing review of risk assessments of federal facilities indicate that this is still a challenge for FPS and several other federal agencies. Federal standards such as the National Infrastructure Protection Plan’s (NIPP) risk management framework and ISC risk assessment provisions call for a risk assessment to include threat, vulnerability, and consequence assessments. Risk assessments help decision-makers identify and evaluate security risk and implement protective measures to mitigate risk. Moreover, risk assessments play a critical role in helping agencies tailor protective measures to reflect their facilities’ unique circumstances and enable them to allocate security resources effectively. Instead of conducting risk assessments, FPS uses an interim vulnerability assessment tool, referred to as the Modified Infrastructure Survey Tool (MIST), with which it assesses federal facilities until it develops a longer- term solution. According to FPS, MIST is allowing it to resume assessing federal facilities’ vulnerabilities and recommend countermeasures— something FPS has not done consistently for several years. However, MIST has some limitations. Most notably, it does not assess consequence (the level, duration, and nature of potential loss resulting from an undesirable event). Three of the four risk assessment experts we spoke with generally agreed that a tool that does not estimate consequences does not allow an agency to fully assess risks. FPS officials stated that they did not include consequence information in MIST because it was not part of the original design and thus requires more time to validate. MIST also was not designed to compare risks across federal facilities. Consequently, FPS does not have the ability to take a comprehensive approach to risk management across its portfolio of 9,600 facilities and recommending countermeasures to federal tenant agencies. As of December 2013, according to an FPS official, FPS had used MIST to complete vulnerability assessments of approximately 1,800 federal facilities and have presented approximately 1,000 of them to the facility security committees. We will continue to monitor this issue and plan to report the results early next year. DHS agreed with our 2012 recommendations to incorporate NIPP’s risk management framework in any future risk assessment tool; coordinate with federal agencies to reduce any unnecessary duplication in FPS’s assessments; and address limitations with its interim tool to better assess risk at federal facilities. However, it has not yet implemented them. For further information on this testimony, please contact Mark Goldstein at (202) 512-2834 or by email at GoldsteinM@gao.gov. Individuals making key contributions to this testimony include Tammy Conquest, Assistant Director; Geoff Hamilton; Bob Homan; and Sara Ann Moessbauer. Homeland Security: Challenges Associated with Federal Protective Service’s Contract Guards and Risk Assessments at Federal Facilities. GAO-14-128T. Washington, D.C.: October 30, 2013. Federal Protective Service: Challenges with Oversight of Contract Guard Program Still Exist, and Additional Management Controls Are Needed. GAO-13-694. Washington, D.C.: September 17, 2013. Facility Security: Greater Outreach by DHS on Standards and Management Practices Could Benefit Federal Agencies. GAO-13-222. Washington, D.C.: January 24, 2013. Federal Protective Service: Actions Needed to Assess Risk and Better Manage Contract Guards at Federal Facilities. GAO-12-739. Washington, D.C.: August 10, 2012. Homeland Security: Protecting Federal Facilities Remains a Challenge for the Department of Homeland Security’s Federal Protective Service. GAO-11-813T. Washington, D.C.: July 13, 2011. Federal Facility Security: Staffing Approaches Used by Selected Agencies. GAO-11-601. Washington, D.C.: June 30, 2011. Homeland Security: Preliminary Observations on the Federal Protective Service’s Workforce Analysis and Planning Efforts. GAO-10-802R. Washington, D.C.: June 14, 2010. Homeland Security: Federal Protective Service’s Use of Contract Guards Requires Reassessment and More Oversight. GAO-10-614T. Washington, D.C.: April 14, 2010. Homeland Security: Federal Protective Service’s Contract Guard Program Requires More Oversight and Reassessment of Use of Contract Guards. GAO-10-341. Washington, D.C.: April 13, 2010. Homeland Security: Ongoing Challenges Impact the Federal Protective Service’s Ability to Protect Federal Facilities. GAO-10-506T. Washington, D.C.: March 16, 2010. Homeland Security: Greater Attention to Key Practices Would Improve the Federal Protective Service’s Approach to Facility Protection. GAO-10-142. Washington, D.C.: October 23, 2009. Homeland Security: Federal Protective Service Has Taken Some Initial Steps to Address Its Challenges, but Vulnerabilities Still Exist. GAO-09-1047T. Washington, D.C.: September 23, 2009. Homeland Security: Federal Protective Service Should Improve Human Capital Planning and Better Communicate with Tenants. GAO-09-749. Washington, D.C.: July 30, 2009. Homeland Security: Preliminary Results Show Federal Protective Service’s Ability to Protect Federal Facilities Is Hampered by Weaknesses in Its Contract Security Guard Program. GAO-09-859T. Washington, D.C.: July 8, 2009. Homeland Security: The Federal Protective Service Faces Several Challenges That Raise Concerns About Protection of Federal Facilities. GAO-08-897T. Washington, D.C.: June 19, 2008. Homeland Security: The Federal Protective Service Faces Several Challenges That Raise Concerns About Protection of Federal Facilities. GAO-08-914T. Washington, D.C.: June 18, 2008. Homeland Security: The Federal Protective Service Faces Several Challenges That Hamper Its Ability to Protect Federal Facilities. GAO-08-683. Washington, D.C.: June 11, 2008. Homeland Security: Preliminary Observations on the Federal Protective Service’s Efforts to Protect Federal Property. GAO-08-476T. Washington, D.C.: February 8, 2008. 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Summary: As part of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the Federal Protective Service (FPS) is responsible for protecting federal employees and visitors in approximately 9,600 federal facilities under the control and custody of the General Services Administration (GSA). Recent incidents at federal facilities demonstrate their continued vulnerability to attacks or other acts of violence. To help accomplish its mission, FPS conducts facility security assessments and has approximately 13,500 contract security guards deployed to federal facilities. This testimony discusses challenges FPS faces in (1) ensuring contract security guards deployed to federal facilities are properly trained and certified and (2) conducting risk assessments at federal facilities. It is based on GAO work issued from 2008 through 2013 on FPS's contract guard and risk assessment programs, and preliminary results of GAO's ongoing work to determine the extent to which FPS and select federal agencies' facility risk assessment methodologies align with federal risk assessment standards. To perform this work, GAO reviewed FPS's and eight federal agencies' risk assessment documentation and compared it to the Interagency Security Committee (ISC) standards. These agencies were selected based on their missions and types of facilities. FPS faces challenges ensuring that contract guards have been properly trained and certified before being deployed to federal facilities around the country. In its September 2013 report, GAO found that providing active shooter response and screener training is a challenge for FPS. For example, according to officials at five guard companies, their contract guards have not received training on how to respond during incidents involving an active shooter. Without ensuring that all guards receive training on how to respond to incidents at federal facilities involving an active-shooter, FPS has limited assurance that its guards are prepared for this threat. Similarly, an official from one of FPS's contract guard companies stated that 133 (about 38 percent) of its approximately 350 guards have never received screener training. As a result, guards deployed to federal facilities may be using x-ray and magnetometer equipment that they are not qualified to use which raises questions about their ability to screen access control points at federal facilities--one of their primary responsibilities. GAO was unable to determine the extent to which FPS's guards have received active-shooter response and screener training, in part, because FPS lacks a comprehensive and reliable system for guard oversight. FPS agreed with GAO's 2013 recommendation that they take steps to identify guards that have not had required training and provide it to them. GAO also found that FPS continues to lack effective management controls to ensure its guards have met its training and certification requirements. For instance, although FPS agreed with GAO's 2012 recommendation that it develop a comprehensive and reliable system for managing information on guards' training, certifications, and qualifications, it does not yet have such a system. FPS also continues to face challenges assessing risk at federal facilities. GAO reported in 2012 that FPS is not assessing risks at federal facilities in a manner consistent with federal standards. GAO's preliminary results from its ongoing work on risk assessments at federal facilities indicate that this is still a challenge for FPS and several other federal agencies. Federal standards, such as the National Infrastructure Protection Plan 's risk management framework and ISC's risk assessment provisions, state that a risk assessment should include threat, vulnerability, and consequence assessments. Risk assessments help decision-makers identify and evaluate security risks and implement protective measures to mitigate the risk. Instead of conducting risk assessments, FPS is using an interim vulnerability assessment tool, referred to as the Modified Infrastructure Survey Tool (MIST) to assess federal facilities until it develops a longer-term solution. However, MIST does not assess consequence (the level, duration, and nature of potential loss resulting from an undesirable event). Three of the four risk assessment experts GAO spoke with generally agreed that a tool that does not estimate consequences does not allow an agency to fully assess risks. Thus, FPS has limited knowledge of the risks facing about 9,600 federal facilities around the country. FPS officials stated that they did not include consequence information in MIST because it was not part of the original design. GAO will continue to monitor this issue and plans to report its final results early next year. DHS and FPS agreed with the recommendations in GAO's 2012 and 2013 reports to improve FPS's contract guard and risk assessment processes.