In May 2003, the Coalition Provisional Authority dissolved the military organizations of the former regime, and the United States and Iraq began the process of reestablishing or creating new Iraqi military and police forces. Over time, multinational force commanders assumed responsibility in their areas for recruiting and training some Iraqi military and police forces. In October 2003, the multinational force outlined a multistep plan for transferring security missions to the Iraqi forces. The plan had the objective of gradually decreasing the number of U.S. forces in conjunction with neutralizing Iraq’s insurgency and developing Iraqi forces capable of securing the country. From the fall of 2003 through April 2006, MNF-I revised its security transition plan a number of times because the Iraqi government and its military and police forces proved incapable of assuming security responsibilities within the timeframes envisioned by the plans. MNF-I first revised the security transition plan in its August 2004 campaign plan and later in the April 2006 joint MNF-I/U.S. Embassy Baghdad Campaign Plan. In our classified briefings to members and staff, we have discussed the campaign plan and conditions for drawing down U.S. forces. Details of the plans are classified and can be discussed separately from this unclassified statement. The current version of MNF-I’s security transition plan includes the following four phases. According to State and DOD officials, MNF-I and the U.S. Embassy Baghdad are in the process of revising their April 2006 Joint Campaign Plan, which includes the current security transition plan. Partnership: During the first phase, which occurred from 2005 through 2006, MNF-I expanded the use of military, police, and other transition teams to assist in the development of Iraqi security forces and ministries. Its major subordinate commands established partnerships with Iraqi military units. Iraqi army lead: In the second phase, currently ongoing, MNF-I is attempting to organize and develop Iraqi army units so that they can assume the lead for counterinsurgency operations. Units in the lead, however, still require MNF-I support because they need to develop additional capabilities, particularly in the logistics and combat support areas. Provincial Iraqi control: For the third phase, MNF-I and the Iraqi government determine when the Iraqi provinces can assume responsibility for security based on the threat level in the province, the capabilities of the Iraqi security forces and the provincial government, and MNF-I’s ability to respond to major threats, if needed. According to an MNF-I official, as these conditions are met, MNF-I forces will then move out of all urban areas and assume a supporting role. Iraqi security self-reliance: The government of Iraq is capable of planning, conducting, and sustaining security operations and forces through its security ministries. DOD has asked for an additional $5.8 billion to develop the Iraqi security forces in its fiscal year 2007 supplemental request and the fiscal year 2008 Global War on Terror budget request (see table 1). Of this amount, about $3.25 billion (about 56 percent) would purchase equipment and transportation for the Iraqi security forces. For example, DOD requests resources to establish vehicle maintenance facilities at the National Maintenance Depot located in Taji and to procure equipment for the Iraqi military. DOD is also requesting about $1.29 billion for sustainment projects, such as those to support the Ministry of Interior’s seven central warehouses that manage the storage and distribution of mission essential equipment procured for the Iraqi police. DOD is also requesting smaller amounts for infrastructure and training projects, as well as related activities. For example, infrastructure projects include the construction of logistical sustainment facilities at the Taji National Depot, while training projects include the training of Iraqi police officers who will serve as trainers at the 18 Iraqi provincial police headquarters. Finally, under the related activities category, DOD has requested about $155 million to support Iraqi security forces in the implementation of a disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration program for militias. The Iraqi security forces are comprised of Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Interior forces that vary in size and training. Overall, the number of operational Iraqi military and police personnel has increased from about 142,000 in March 2005 to about 327,000 in February 2007. Ministry of Interior forces are made up of the Iraqi police and other components such as the national police (formerly known as special police) that have differing levels of training. The Iraqi police account for over 70 percent of all Ministry of Interior personnel. Even though the number of Iraqi forces has grown and more have taken the lead for security operations, violence in Iraq increased significantly through the end of 2006. The number of military and police forces in Iraq has increased from about 142,000 in March 2005 to about 327,000 in February 2007, making the total number of personnel over twice that of the 153,000 U.S. and other coalition forces under MNF-I, as of January 2007. The Iraqi total includes about 135,000 personnel under the Iraqi Ministry of Defense and about 192,000 personnel under the Ministry of Interior. Table 2 provides the force levels for the major components of the Iraq security forces in March 2005 and in February 2007. Ministry of Defense forces are comprised of the Iraqi army’s 10 divisions, as well as a small air force and navy. The Iraqi army generally receives 13 weeks of basic training, up from 8 weeks of basic training in 2005. Iraqi Ministry of Interior forces consist of Iraqi police—which represents about 72 percent of police personnel within the interior ministry—and other units, specifically, the national police (formerly the special police), Department of Border Enforcement, and Center for Dignitary Protection. Iraqi police precincts are under the operational control of their local municipality and the corresponding provincial government. New Iraqi police recruits generally undergo a 10-week basic training course. Police with prior experience attend a 3-week course instead of the basic course. The national police receive 6 weeks of initial training. The overall growth in trained and equipped Iraqi security forces and the increasing number of Iraqi army battalions leading counterinsurgency operations has not resulted in lower levels of violence in Iraq. As shown in figure 1, since June 2003, overall security conditions in Iraq have deteriorated and grown more complex, as evidenced by the increased numbers of attacks against the coalition and its Iraqi partners and the Sunni-Shi’a sectarian strife after the February 2006 bombing of the Golden Mosque in Samarra. The average total attacks per day has increased from about 70 per day in January 2006 to about 160 per day in December 2006, near the previous record high of 180 per day reached in October 2006. These attacks have increased around major religious and political events, including Ramadan and elections. Coalition forces are still the primary target of attacks, but the number of attacks on Iraqi security forces and civilians also has increased since 2003. In October 2006, the State Department reported that the recent increase in violence had hindered efforts to engage with Iraqi partners and showed the difficulty in making political and economic progress in the absence of adequate security conditions. In the President’s revised strategy for Iraq, he stated that while political progress, economic gains, and security are intertwined, political and economic progress are unlikely absent a basic level of security. In an effort to expand the combat power of the Iraqi army, Prime Minister Maliki announced in the fall of 2006 that the Iraqi government would expand the Iraqi army from 133,000 to about 164,000 personnel. This would allow the Iraqi army to grow from 10 to 13 divisions, 36 to 41 brigades, and 112 to 132 battalions. The initiative would also help compensate for personnel shortages in some existing Iraqi army units. In the fiscal year 2007 supplemental request, DOD stated that the government of Iraq will fund the equipment for new Iraqi army units as the government assumes increasing financial responsibility for Iraqi security forces. However, the request also stated that the United States has approved assistance to the Iraqi government to train and equip the additional Iraqi army units that the Prime Minister requested. Iraq’s financial contribution to the continued development of its security forces was not specified in the supplemental request. We are completing a review of the Iraqi ministries’ abilities to provide for their own security and reconstruction needs. Several factors have complicated the development of effective Iraqi security forces and help explain why the reported growth in Iraqi security forces has not resulted in lower levels of violence. These factors include (1) the portion of Iraqi security forces dedicated to a counterinsurgency mission, (2) high-rates of absenteeism and poor Iraqi ministry reporting of active duty personnel, (3) sectarian and militia influences within Iraqi forces, and (4) shortfalls in Iraqi logistical, command and control, and sustainment capabilities. A complete assessment of the capabilities and limitations of the Iraqi security forces can only be determined through an analysis of data on their readiness. We have requested unit-level TRAs from DOD but have not received them as of March 9, 2007. The following factors help explain why the reported growth in Iraqi security forces has not resulted in lower levels of violence. First, Iraqi security forces are not a single, unified force; instead, they are comprised of a wide range of units with different missions that have changed over time. Of the security forces’ major components, only the Iraqi army currently has the primary mission of conducting counterinsurgency operations. The Iraqi army has evolved over the past 3 years from two distinct forces: (1) army units that had the mission of defending Iraq against external threats, and (2) former national guard battalions that were established to perform constabulary duties such as setting up traffic control points and cordoning off streets in their home areas. In early 2005, the Iraqi government decided to move Iraqi national guard battalions into the Iraqi army and give the entire army the mission of conducting counterinsurgency operations countrywide. The Iraqi army is currently the second largest component of the Iraqi security forces and represents about 41 percent of all Iraqi security personnel. The Iraqi national police—a paramilitary force of about 24,000 personnel under the Ministry of Interior—had conducted counterinsurgency operations in the past, but the Iraqi government decided in late 2006 to transform it into a civil security force due to frequent allegations of abuse and other illegal activities. This transformation includes a 4–week retraining program for Iraq’s national police. While the 135,000 Iraqi police are often forced to engage insurgents and other anti-Iraqi forces, their primary mission and training has focused on civilian law enforcement. The Iraqi police currently comprise about 41 percent of Iraqi security forces. Second, the number of Iraqi security forces who are present for duty is significantly lower than the number of trained and equipped Iraqi personnel reported by DOD and State. For example, data on the number of trained and equipped Ministry of Interior personnel include police who are absent without leave, while Ministry of Defense data exclude military personnel who are absent without leave. In addition, according to DOD’s November 2006 report to Congress, due to a lack of standardized personnel strength reporting in the Ministry of Interior, it is unclear how many of the coalition-trained police the ministry still employs, or what percentage of the 180,000 police thought to be on the ministry payroll are coalition trained and equipped. Moreover, according to a DOD report, the Iraqi army generally has about one-third of its soldiers (about 44,000 of 133,000 personnel) on leave so that they can take their pay home to their families. In addition, some Iraqi army units directed to deploy for combat operations outside of their normal operating areas have absent without leave rates of more than 50 percent. This high-rate of absenteeism significantly affects the manning levels of Iraqi army units at any given time. Third, sectarian and militia influences on the Iraqi security forces have frustrated U.S. efforts to develop effective Iraqi military and police forces and have contributed to the high levels of violence in Iraq. According to the unclassified January 2007 National Intelligence Estimate on Iraq, sectarian divisions have eroded the dependability of many Iraqi units and a number of Iraqi units have refused to serve outside the areas where they were recruited. According to an August 2006 DOD report, sectarian lines among the Iraqi security forces are drawn geographically, with Sunni, Shi’a, or Kurdish soldiers serving primarily in units located in areas familiar to their group. According to the report, commanders at the battalion level tend to command only soldiers of their own sectarian or regional background. DOD also reported in November 2006 that political forces in Iraq may have influenced senior military appointments on the basis of sectarian affiliation. Moreover, DOD and State also have reported numerous instances of sectarian and militia influences on Iraqi police and national police. For example, according to a DOD report, during operations to secure Baghdad in summer 2006, Shi’a death squads received support from some elements of the Iraqi police and the national police. DOD reported that the police facilitated militia movement and warned death squads of operations, serving as the major reason for the increased levels of murders and executions. Further, in November 2006, the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) stated that the Ministry of Interior and the Iraqi police were heavily infiltrated by militia members of the Badr Organization and Mahdi Army. According to the DIA Director, the Mahdi Army often operates under the protection or approval of Iraqi police to detain and kill suspected Sunni insurgents and civilians. In November 2006, the State Department reported that corruption and infiltration by militias and others loyal to parties other than the Iraqi government have resulted in the Iraqi security forces, particularly the police, being part of the problem in many areas instead of the solution. Fourth, as we previously reported, Iraqi units remain dependent upon the coalition for their logistical, command and control, and intelligence capabilities. As of December 2006, the coalition was providing significant levels of support to the Iraqi military, including life support, fuel, uniforms, building supplies, ammunition, vehicle maintenance and spare parts, and medical supplies. The extent of the challenges affecting the development of effective Iraqi security forces cannot be fully assessed without detailed information on the readiness of each Iraqi unit. MNF-I captures such information in its TRAs, but DOD does not provide this critical information to Congress. The TRA reports provide ratings of Iraqi capabilities and identify gaps in areas such as each Iraqi unit’s manpower, equipment, training levels and, as of late 2006, operational effectiveness and reliability. GAO has requested but DOD has not provided these unit-level TRAs. MNF-I uses the TRA system to determine when units of the Iraqi security forces can assume the lead for conducting security operations. The TRA is a classified joint assessment, prepared monthly by the unit’s coalition commander and Iraqi commander. For the Iraqi army, commanders use the TRA process to determine when a unit—specifically, a battalion, a brigade headquarters, or a division headquarters—is prepared to assume the lead in counterinsurgency operations. The TRA report contains capabilities ratings and detailed narrative information for each unit in personnel, command and control, equipment, sustainment/logistics, training, and leadership. Appendix 2 shows a sample TRA form, as of December 1, 2006. As of late 2006, the TRA also includes measures for determining how militia and sectarian influences affect the loyalty and reliability of Iraqi police and military forces. According to MNF-I guidance, the purpose of the TRA system is to provide commanders with a method to consistently evaluate units. It also helps to identify factors hindering unit progress, determine resource shortfalls, and make resource allocations. DOD provided GAO with classified, aggregate information on overall readiness levels for the Iraqi security forces and information on units in the lead. In mid-February, DOD allowed us to review TRAs from 2 battalions—1 Iraqi army battalion and 1 national police battalion. However, DOD has not provided us with all unit-level TRA reports. We are continuing to work with the department to obtain these reports because they would help fully inform Congress on the capabilities and needs of Iraqi security forces. As of March 9, 2007, DOD has not provided GAO with this important data. Capable and effective Iraqi security forces are a critical element in the U.S. strategy to stabilize Iraq, drawdown U.S. forces, and lay the foundation for political reconciliation and economic development. For the past 3 years, MNF-I has tried to reduce violence in Iraq so that Iraqi forces can assume greater responsibility for their country’s security. The additional $5.8 billion that DOD now seeks for the Iraqi security forces attests to the importance of this mission. But, after 3 years, more than $15 billion in prior U.S. assistance and a substantial increase in the number of Iraqi security forces, violence in Iraq’s society has not lessened. This outcome is partly explained by the differing capabilities among Iraqi forces, high absenteeism, divided loyalties, and the continued reliance on U.S. logistical support. Other reasons may be discerned from the readiness assessments coalition advisors complete on Iraqi units. These classified assessments show whether Iraqi units have their required manpower, equipment, and training and how well they perform in battle. We have asked DOD to provide us the TRAs, but they have not done so. We appreciate the Committee’s continuing support for our request. Mr. Chairman, this concludes my statement. I would be pleased to answer any questions that you or other members may have at this time. For questions regarding this testimony, please call Joseph A. Christoff at (202) 512-8979. Other key contributors to this statement were Judith McCloskey, David Bruno, Lynn Cothern, Whitney Havens, Dorian Herring, and Mary Moutsos. A. S. O. N. Dec. Ja. F. M. A. A. S. O. N. Dec. Ja. F. M. A. A. S. O. N. Dec. Ja. F. Leder nd ff primrie re “cable” Annotte totl ner of pge ttched to thi report. See supplementl intrction for required ctegorie. A Level 1 nit iable of plnning, execting, nd susining conterinsurgency opertion. A Level 2 nit iable of plnning, execting, nd susining conterinsurgency opertion with ISF or colition support. A Level nit irtilly cable of condcting conterinsurgency opertion in conjnction with colition nit. A Level 4 nit i forming nd/or incable of condcting conterinsurgency opertion. This Unit is Currently Assessed at Level and will be ready to assume IAL in _____ months. HSC is assessed at level _____________ overall. 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Summary: The National Strategy for Victory in Iraq articulates the desired end-state for U.S. operations in Iraq: a peaceful, united, stable, and secure Iraq, well integrated into the international community, and a full partner in the global war on terrorism. Developing capable Iraqi security forces is a critical component in U.S. efforts to achieve this important goal. Since 2003, the United States has provided $15.4 billion to develop Iraqi military and police forces. DOD has also asked for an additional $5.8 billion in its fiscal year 2007 supplemental request and fiscal year 2008 Global War on Terror budget request to continue U.S. efforts to develop Iraq forces and transition security responsibilities to them. This testimony discusses the (1) results of U.S. efforts to develop Iraqi security forces, and (2) factors that affect the development of effective Iraqi security forces. This testimony is based on GAO's issued reports and ongoing work on U.S. efforts to stabilize Iraq. Although we reviewed both classified and unclassified documents, the information in this statement is based only on unclassified documents. As of February 2007, DOD reported that it had trained and equipped 327,000 Iraqi security forces--a substantial increase from the 142,000 reported in March 2005. The Iraqi security force level is double that of the 153,000-strong U.S.-led coalition currently in Iraq. While the Iraqi security forces are increasingly leading counterinsurgency operations in Iraq, they and the coalition have been unable to reduce the levels of violence throughout Iraq. Enemy-initiated attacks per day have increased from about 70 in January 2006 to about 160 in December 2006. Several factors affect the development of effective Iraqi security forces and help explain why the reported growth in Iraqi security forces has not decreased violence. First, the Iraqi security forces are not a single unified force with a primary mission of countering the insurgency in Iraq. About 40 percent of the Iraqi security forces have a primary mission of counterinsurgency--specifically, the Iraqi army. The other major component--the Iraqi police--has civilian law enforcement as its primary mission. Second, high rates of absenteeism and poor ministry reporting result in an overstatement of the number of Iraqi security forces present for duty. The Ministry of the Interior does not maintain standardized reports on personnel strength. As a result, DOD does not know how many coalition-trained police the ministry still employs or what percentage of the 180,000 police thought to be on the payroll are coalition trained and equipped. Third, sectarian and militia influences have divided the loyalties of Iraqi security forces. In November 2006, for example, the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency stated that the Ministry of Interior and the police were heavily infiltrated by militia members of the Badr Organization and Mahdi Army. According to the 2007 National Intelligence Estimate on Iraq, sectarian divisions have eroded the dependability of many Iraqi army units. Fourth, as we previously reported, Iraqi units remain dependent upon the coalition for their logistical, command and control, and intelligence capabilities. As of December 2006, the coalition was providing significant levels of support to the Iraqi military, including fuel and ammunition. The extent of these problems cannot be fully assessed without detailed information on the readiness of each Iraqi unit. While DOD captures this information in its Transition Readiness Assessments (TRAs), it does not provide this critical information to Congress. These data provide information on capabilities and gaps in Iraqi units' manpower, equipment, and training levels, and as of late 2006, assess each unit's operational effectiveness. Congress needs this information to make informed appropriations decisions and engage in meaningful oversight. Despite repeated attempts over many months, we have yet to be provided the TRA information we are seeking.