In 1982, Congress enacted the Federal Managers’ Financial Integrity Act requiring executive agencies to establish and maintain controls that, among other things, provide reasonable assurance that assets are safeguarded against waste, loss, unauthorized use, and misappropriation. The act also mandated that GAO’s internal control standards serve as the framework for agencies to use in establishing and maintaining their internal control systems. Among other things, GAO’s internal control standards require agencies to establish physical controls to secure and safeguard vulnerable assets such as cash, securities, inventories, and equipment, which might be vulnerable to loss or unauthorized use. In March 2002, GAO published a supplemental guide for inventory controls, which summarized fundamental principles that have been successfully implemented by seven private sector firms noted for outstanding inventory management. GAO internal control standards provide that in establishing internal controls, agencies should assess the risks associated with asset losses and establish control activities to help ensure those risks are addressed. The standards further require that agencies document and monitor control activities to ensure they are appropriately implemented and are effective in addressing risk inherent in agency operations. In addition to the Federal Managers’ Financial Integrity Act and GAO standards, two other organizations issued advisory criteria addressing inventory controls. In June 1995, the Joint Financial Management Improvement Program issued advisory criteria for implementing and maintaining inventory systems. The criteria addressed management’s responsibility to provide guidelines for developing, documenting, and implementing physical controls to safeguard and provide accountability for inventory items. Furthermore, in August 1983, the Commission on Accreditation for Law Enforcement Agencies, Inc., an independent accrediting authority for law enforcement agencies, published accreditation standards to include procedures for inventory and property control. All 18 of the federal law enforcement agencies we surveyed had policies and procedures designed to control and safeguard firearms, one of the first steps in developing and implementing an effective system of internal control. These controls were generally consistent with federal internal control standards and related criteria issued by law enforcement and management organizations. However, agencies could strengthen controls in key areas consistently identified as important for effective inventory management. Strengthening controls could assist agencies in ensuring their firearms are secured from loss, theft, or unauthorized use. In order to assess the consistency of selected agencies’ policies and procedures for controlling and safeguarding firearms with established criteria, we reviewed federal and other internal control standards designed to help ensure that assets, including firearms, are protected against damage, loss, theft, and unauthorized use. The criteria included GAO’s internal control standards and supplemental inventory guidelines, advisory criteria issued by the Joint Financial Management Improvement Program for maintaining inventory systems, and accreditation standards for inventory and property control issued by the Commission on Accreditation for Law Enforcement Agencies, Inc. Our analysis of federal internal control standards and other related criteria found four key areas that were consistently identified as important for effective inventory management. These four areas include (1) recording firearms inventory data in property management records and systems (inventory data); (2) controlling and safeguarding firearms inventories (inventory control); (3) assigning responsibility for safeguarding firearms and overseeing the conducting of firearms inventories (personal and supervisory accountability); and (4) investigating missing firearms and considering employee discipline when requirements for maintaining and controlling firearms are not met (investigations and discipline). Within each of these four areas, federal internal control standards and related criteria identify specific controls designed to assist agencies in controlling and safeguarding their firearms inventories. For example, in the area of inventory control, the standards and criteria recommend that agencies (1) have written policies and procedures for issuing agency firearms to individuals, organizational units, and functional areas; (2) conduct periodic inventory counts of firearms; (3) use occasions other than periodic inventories to confirm employees’ possession of assigned firearms; and (4) limit access to secured firearms storage areas and facilities to authorized personnel. We compared agency policies and procedures for maintaining firearms with controls identified in federal internal control standards and related criteria for each of the four key control areas. Appendix III identifies, for each agency reviewed, whether the agency established policies and procedures addressing specific controls recommended by GAO and other management organizations within each of the four areas. We surveyed agencies to determine whether they established controls to record and update firearms inventory data in agency property records and property management systems, consistent with standards issued by GAO and other management organizations. Specifically, we determined whether agencies had written policies and procedures requiring the update of property records and systems (1) upon their receipt of new firearms, (2) as a result of discrepancies identified during periodic firearms inventories, and (3) upon the removal of firearms from agency inventories. The recording and update of firearms inventory data is an important component of maintaining and controlling agency firearms. Data on activities that monitor the receipt and removal of firearms from inventory, as well as discrepancies found during periodic inventories, are needed to ensure management has adequate oversight over agency firearms. The absence of these controls could result in management being unaware of the number and location of firearms they have on-hand, and could result in a lack of appropriate oversight over these assets. The majority of agencies we reviewed usually required in their policies and procedures the recording and update of firearms inventory data. Specifically, 16 of the 18 agencies required that the date of receipt and the specific identification of the firearm, as well as the person and unit to which the firearm was assigned, be reported in property management records as new firearms are received. In addition, 17 of the 18 agencies required that adjustments be made to firearms inventory records as a result of discrepancies identified during physical inventory counts. Sixteen agencies also required the update of property management records upon the removal of firearms from agency inventories. In the area of inventory control, we surveyed agencies to determine whether they established written policies and procedures, consistent with federal internal control standards and related criteria, addressing the (1) issuance of agency firearms to individuals, organizational units, and functional areas; (2) conducting of periodic inventory counts of firearms and the manner in which inventories should be conducted; and (3) use of occasions other than periodic inventories to confirm employees’ possession of assigned firearms. We also surveyed agencies to determine whether they (4) limited access to secured firearms storage areas and facilities to authorized personnel. The issuance of firearms, periodic checks of firearms on-hand, and limited access to firearms storage areas are important in ensuring that agencies appropriately safeguard their firearms. Agencies often learn of missing or stolen firearms when conducting periodic inventories, or when they use occasions other than inventories to confirm employee’s possession of firearms. Without these controls, management may not be alerted when firearms are not appropriately maintained, or when stored firearms are not adequately protected from loss, theft, or unauthorized use. The agencies we reviewed generally established written policies and procedures for issuing firearms and conducting firearms inventories, but could strengthen other inventory controls. Specifically, agencies generally had written policies and procedures addressing the issuance of agency firearms to individuals (18 out of 18) and organizational units (16 out of 16 that reported the control applicable). In addition, all 18 agencies required the conducting of periodic inventory counts of firearms, and 15 of these agencies required that the objectives, timing, and instructions for the counts be established. However, only 11 of the 18 agencies required that persons assigned responsibility for conducting inventories be trained in inventory counting procedures. In addition, 15 of the 18 agencies required counters to verify firearm ID numbers and descriptive information about the firearm during inventory counts. However, 9 agencies did not preclude individuals from counting firearms if they had firearms custodial responsibilities. Furthermore, only 2 of these 9 agencies established compensating procedures such as using count teams of 2 or more members, or ensuring that counters have no prior knowledge of the firearms inventory being counted. Agencies also varied in using occasions other than inventories to verify employees’ possession of an assigned firearm and limiting access to secured firearms storage areas. Fifteen of the 18 agencies surveyed confirmed an employee’s possession of an assigned firearm during firearms retraining or retesting. However, only 8 of the 18 agencies required unannounced inspections to verify employees’ possession of assigned firearms. In addition, of the 15 agencies that reported this control applicable, only 7 required limited access to firearms storage areas and facilities. We surveyed agencies to determine whether they established policies and procedures, consistent with federal internal control standards and related criteria, requiring individuals to (1) safeguard assigned firearms from damage, loss, theft, and unauthorized use, and (2) store firearms in lock boxes or secure gun cases, or use trigger locks. We also surveyed agencies to determine whether (3) job descriptions included requirements for conducting inventories, (4) individual performance in conducting inventories is assessed during performance evaluations, and (5) whether supervisory oversight is provided over periodic firearms inventories. Internal controls addressing an individual’s responsibility in maintaining assigned firearms, and a supervisor’s responsibility in overseeing the control of those firearms, are needed to help ensure firearms policies are adhered to and firearms are appropriately secured. In order to be accountable for safeguarding firearms, employees and supervisors must be made aware of their responsibilities related to firearms control. The lack of these controls could make responsibilities related to firearms control unclear and result in difficulties in holding appropriate individuals accountable for failing to follow established procedures. The agencies we reviewed generally established written policies and procedures requiring individuals to safeguard assigned firearms, but could strengthen controls for conducting and overseeing firearms inventories. Specifically, 17 of the 18 agencies had policies and procedures requiring individuals to safeguard assigned firearms from damage, theft, loss, and unauthorized use. In addition, all 18 agencies required that firearms be secured in lock boxes or secured gun cases or that trigger locks be used. However, only 12 agencies assigned responsibility for conducting firearms inventories in job descriptions, and only 7 agencies assessed individuals’ performance in conducting firearms inventories during performance evaluations. In addition, only 11 of the 18 agencies required that supervisors oversee periodic firearms inventories. We surveyed agencies to determine whether they established written policies and procedures, in accordance with federal internal controls standards and related criteria, to ensure that instances of missing firearms are investigated, and employees are appropriately disciplined for not safeguarding firearms or reporting missing firearms. Specifically, we determined whether agencies had policies and procedures requiring that (1) missing firearms be investigated, (2) investigations of missing firearms be conducted by an independent body, (3) missing firearms be reported to the National Crime Information Center (NCIC), (4) disciplinary action be taken for failing to report missing firearms, and (5) disciplinary action be taken for failing to properly safeguard assigned firearms. Federal internal control standards and related criteria provide that agencies should have the ability to investigate instances of missing firearms and consider appropriate disciplinary action to enforce compliance with firearms controls. Instances of missing firearms should be investigated to identify the reasons the firearms were missing and to provide management with information to implement any corrective actions needed. In addition, procedures requiring the discipline of individuals who did not appropriately secure their firearm or report a missing firearm could act as a deterrent to others in failing to adhere to these controls. The agencies we reviewed generally had written policies and procedures requiring that incidents of missing or stolen firearms be appropriately investigated and reported. Specifically, all 18 agencies required that physical count discrepancies of firearms be investigated, and 17 agencies required that written instructions for investigating such discrepancies be developed. In addition, 15 agencies had written policies and procedures requiring that an independent body conduct the investigations, and 15 agencies required that missing firearms be reported to the NCIC. Agencies also generally required disciplinary action for employees failing to report missing firearms and for not adhering to firearms accountability procedures. Fifteen of the 18 agencies required that disciplinary action be taken for employees failing to report missing firearms. In addition, 14 agencies required disciplinary action for employees failing to appropriately safeguard their firearms. Agencies did not always document their controls for maintaining and controlling firearms inventories in policies and procedures. Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government issued by GAO require that internal control activities be clearly documented in management directives, administrative policies, or operating manuals. Although we found that agencies documented most of the firearms controls reviewed, 16 of the 18 agencies reported implementing some firearms controls as a matter of practice, without documenting the controls in their policies and procedures. Only the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (ATF) and INS reported documenting in their policies and procedures all of the controls we reviewed. Appendix III identifies, for the four areas reviewed, whether agencies relied on control activities that were not documented in their policies and procedures. In the area of inventory data, for example, 1 agency reported updating property management records and systems to identify out-of- service and disposed of firearms, but did not include this requirement in its policies and procedures. Another agency reported adjusting inventory records as a result of physical inventories, but did not require this in its policies and procedures. In the inventory control area, 13 of the 18 agencies surveyed reported conducting some aspect of inventory control that was not required by their policies and procedures. For example, 9 agencies reported taking measures to ensure the integrity of firearms counts, and 9 agencies reported limiting access to secured firearms storage areas, but did not include these controls in their policies and procedures. Agencies also reported following unwritten practices to hold individuals accountable for firearms inventories and to help ensure that inventories are properly performed. For example, 5 agencies reported assessing individuals’ participation in inventories during performance evaluations, and 2 agencies reported providing supervisory oversight of firearms inventories, without including these requirements in their policies and procedures. Regarding the investigation of missing firearms and associated employee discipline, 2 agencies reported requiring that an independent body investigate missing firearms, but did not include this requirement in their policies and procedures. In another example, 3 agencies reported that while employees who fail to safeguard their firearms are subject to disciplinary action, disciplinary action was not required by the agencies’ policies and procedures. Controls that are not included in policies and procedures may not be consistently applied throughout the agency and may not be effective in helping ensure that firearms are appropriately controlled and safeguarded. Without documented controls, individuals may not know the controls are required, and management may not be able to enforce their use. Agencies that rely on unwritten practices to protect their firearms run the risk that those controls may not be followed, and their firearms may not be appropriately secured. The key control areas identified in federal internal control standards and other criteria—inventory data, inventory control, personal and supervisory accountability, and investigations and discipline—provide a framework to assist agencies in building their systems of firearms controls. However, internal control guidance recommends that agencies tailor these controls to reflect their unique needs and circumstances, as well as their relative risks for firearms losses. Agency management is ultimately responsible for implementing the combination of controls deemed reasonable to effectively control and safeguard their firearms, based on agency needs. Firearms control needs may vary depending on an agency’s operations and structure. For example, law enforcement employees at the Bureau of Engraving and Printing (BEP) and the National Institutes of Health (NIH) generally secure fixed buildings and store their firearms in one or few central locations when they are off-duty. Conversely, employees at the FBI, Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), and INS conduct investigations nationwide and generally keep their firearms with them at all times. As a result, BEP and NIH may require different methods for conducting firearms inventories than may be needed at the FBI, DEA, and INS. In addition, the FBI, DEA, and INS may wish to use other occasions to check an employee’s possession of an assigned firearm, along with annual inventories, such as unannounced inspections and checks during retraining or testing in firearms use. Audits conducted by the Departments of Justice and Treasury OIGs and TIGTA found that agencies did not always comply with agency policies and procedures for maintaining and controlling firearms inventories or establish needed controls. Specifically, the audits found that some agencies did not conduct periodic inventories of firearms or report and investigate instances of missing firearms, as required. However, the audits found that agencies generally disciplined employees who did not appropriately control their firearms or report missing firearms. Although these weaknesses were found, agencies have taken, or are in the process of taking, actions to improve their controls over firearms inventories. See appendix VI for a detailed listing of audits conducted by the OIGs and TIGTA of their agencies’ controls over firearms. The Department of Justice’s OIG reviewed the firearms control activities of the Bureau of Prisons (BOP), DEA, U.S. Marshals Service (USMS), FBI, and INS from March 1999 through March 2002, to assess the effectiveness of agencies’ controls over firearms and to determine what actions were taken by the agencies in response to the identification of lost or stolen firearms. The OIG reported that some agencies did not always conduct periodic physical inventories of firearms or investigate instances of missing firearms, but generally disciplined employees who did not report or control missing firearms as required by their policies and procedures. In addition, the OIG found that employees did not always report missing firearms or follow established procedures for storing firearms in vehicles or retrieving firearms from separating employees. Justice’s OIG found that FBI, DEA, and INS did not conduct periodic physical inventories of firearms as required by their policies and procedures. The FBI required that periodic inventories be conducted every 2 years, while the DEA and INS required annual physical inventories of firearms. Despite these requirements, the OIG found that until it began its review in 2001, FBI had not completed a firearms inventory since prior to 1993. In addition, the OIG found that DEA and INS did not properly conduct or document past inventories, including not inventorying all firearms. For example, INS had not completed inventories in accordance with its policies and procedures, including tracking inventory adjustments and confirming that that appropriate property was inventoried. The OIG found that BOP and USMS were generally current in conducting firearms inventories. According to the OIG, FBI and DEA officials stated that they had not conducted or completed required inventories for a variety of reasons, including not having the required funds to conduct the inventories and relying on other methods to verify inventories. For example, FBI officials said that they did not conduct all required inventories due to budgetary and equipment limitations and due to the reassignment of personnel who had conducted inventories in the past. At DEA, officials stated that they relied on the physical check of assigned firearms during agents’ annual firearms qualifications as a substitute for the required annual inventories. Despite this reliance, however, DEA still reported firearms as lost or stolen from its inventories. While BOP and DEA initiated investigations of all missing firearms, FBI and INS did not always initiate investigations, as required by agency policies and procedures, or could not provide documentation that investigations were conducted. Justice requires that component agencies investigate instances of missing property, including firearms, and grants agencies the authority to discipline employees determined not to have followed property control procedures. However, the OIG determined that 29 of 74 missing firearms incidents at the INS between January 1996 and September 1999 were not investigated. In addition, the OIG could not find evidence that the FBI investigated 141 of 212 missing firearms incidents reported for the period October 1999 through January 2002. Although the OIG found that investigations of missing firearms were not always initiated, they found that investigations of missing firearms usually resulted in employees found responsible for the loss being disciplined. For example, at the DEA, 10 of 15 missing firearms cases reviewed for the period October 1999 through August 2001 resulted in disciplinary action, including letters of reprimand and recommendations for suspensions without pay. In another example, the OIG concluded that 37 of 70 investigations of missing property (firearms and laptops) at the FBI from October 1999 through January 2002, resulted in recommendations for disciplinary action, including letters of censure and suspensions without pay. Justice’s OIG found that agencies did not always report, or report in a timely manner, missing firearms internally or to the NCIC. The OIG further found that some agencies did not always follow established procedures for storing firearms in vehicles or retrieving firearms from separating employees. Table 2 identifies the average time taken for employees to report missing firearms within their agency and the number of missing firearms reported to the NCIC. The OIG found that the average timeframe for employees reporting missing firearms within their agency ranged from the same day at the BOP to 4.3 years at the FBI. While the USMS required the immediate reporting of missing firearms, and DEA required reporting within 48 hours, the FBI and BOP did not include a timetable for reporting missing firearms in their policies and procedures. The OIG attributed delays for reporting missing firearms at the FBI to the absence of a required timetable for reporting missing firearms, but concluded that the BOP generally reported missing firearms in a timely manner due to firearms being stored in a central location. The OIG could not determine whether USMS experienced delays in reporting missing firearms because agency loss reports did not identify the date the loss was discovered. The OIG found reporting delays of 1 to 89 days in 11 of the 16 DEA lost firearms cases examined, but did not identify the reasons for these delays. The OIG also found that the agencies had inconsistent practices for reporting missing firearms to the NCIC. The OIG discovered that all agencies reviewed, with the exception of BOP, had policies and procedures requiring that missing firearms be reported to NCIC. However, the OIG found that FBI, DEA, and INS had not reported from 2 to more than 300 of their missing firearms to the NCIC, and that only USMS had reported all missing firearms. Reporting missing firearms to NCIC would assist agencies in retrieving lost or stolen firearms recovered by the law enforcement community, since the NCIC system is generally regarded by law enforcement agencies as the primary nationwide method for tracking stolen firearms. In addition, Justice’s OIG found that some agencies did not always follow established procedures for storing firearms in vehicles or retrieving firearms from separating employees. Specifically, the OIG found that 4 of 16 firearms losses at DEA, for the period October 1999 through September 15, 2001, occurred as a result of vehicle thefts. In some cases, the employees stored their firearms in unattended vehicles, despite internal policies prohibiting this practice. At FBI, the OIG found that some of the 52 firearms stolen from FBI or privately owned vehicles, during the period October 1999 through January 2002, were due to firearms not being properly secured in vehicles. In addition, 3 of the 6 firearms losses at USMS were due to thefts from vehicles. Both FBI and USMS allowed the storage of firearms in vehicles either temporarily (FBI) or indefinitely (USMS), as long as the vehicle was secured and the firearm was placed in a locked container. The OIG also found weaknesses in the agencies’ use of accountable property checklists designed to retrieve property from separating employees, sometimes resulting in instances of firearms not being retrieved. Department of Justice policies require that each agency develop, maintain, and distribute an accountable property checklist for employees to complete prior to separating from the department to help facilitate the return of agency property, including firearms. Despite this requirement, the OIG found weakness in the use of these checklists at all of the agencies reviewed, including (1) failure to enforce the use of the checklist; (2) lack of relevant accountable signatures; and (3) failure to include key identifying information, such as the firearm’s serial number. As a result, firearms were not always retrieved from separating employees. For example, the OIG reported that in 2001, FBI found that at least 31 firearms of separated employees could not be accounted for. Treasury’s OIG and TIGTA reviewed the firearms control activities of the ATF, U.S. Customs Service, U.S. Secret Service, BEP, the U.S. Mint, and Internal Revenue Service/Criminal Investigation (IRS/CI) for fiscal years 1999 through 2001. The purpose of these reviews was to determine whether the agencies’ inventory practices were sufficient for controlling items that, if lost or stolen, might compromise the public’s safety, national security, or ongoing criminal investigations. The OIG and TIGTA concluded that the agencies generally conducted periodic firearms inventories; investigated instances of missing firearms; and disciplined employees for not maintaining firearms as required by agency policies and procedures. However, the OIG determined that the U.S. Mint did not follow all policies and procedures related to conducting periodic inventories or identify its firearms from its property management records. In addition, TIGTA determined that IRS/CI did not appropriately record and report missing firearms data. Treasury’s OIG and TIGTA found that the agencies reviewed, with the exception of the U.S. Mint, conducted periodic inventories at least annually, as required by their internal policies and procedures. For example, at ATF, the OIG concluded that frequent, independent physical inventories reduced the risk that weapons would be lost or stolen without being promptly detected. At IRS/CI, TIGTA found that property inventories were conducted locally on an annual basis and in accordance with established policies and procedures. However, the OIG determined that the U.S. Mint had not conducted a complete annual physical inventory of firearms during fiscal years 1999, 2000, or 2001, and the firearms inventory completed in October 2001 was not conducted in accordance with agency policies and procedures. In addition, Treasury found that ATF, U.S. Customs Service, Secret Service, and IRS/CI investigated instances of firearms losses and appropriately considered employee discipline, as required by agency policies and procedures. For example, the OIG determined that ATF’s Professional Review Board investigated 15 of 16 instances of missing firearms identified during the period October 1, 1998 through September 30, 2001, and appropriately considered employee discipline in each of those cases. The board recommended employee suspensions in 9 of the cases and no disciplinary action in 3 of the cases. The remaining 3 cases were still under investigation at the completion of the OIG’s review. The OIG also determined that the U.S. Customs Service’s Board of Survey, the unit responsible for investigating missing firearms, investigated all 72 missing firearms identified during the period October 1, 1998 through September 30, 2001. The OIG determined that employees were held financially responsible for losses in 26 of the cases and not financially responsible in 37 of the cases. The remaining 7 cases were still under investigation at the completion of the OIG’s review. The OIG determined that the U.S. Mint could not provide a listing of firearms from its property management records to support reported firearms inventories, as required by their policies and procedures. The OIG concluded that without this list it would not be possible to reconcile the firearms that were on-hand against recorded inventory counts, resulting in the possibility that missing firearms might not be identified. The OIG concluded that these and other factors, including the number and storage of its firearms at several locations, increased the Mint’s risk of lost or stolen firearms. TIGTA reported that it could not determine the number of IRS/CI missing firearms from its management information system and that the hard copy reports of IRS/CI missing firearms were not always prepared or completed. Specifically, TIGTA found that IRS/CI’s inventory management system did not differentiate between lost or stolen firearms and, as a result, TIGTA could not rely on that system to identify IRS/CI missing firearms inventories accurately. Although TIGTA was able to review and comment on hard copy reports from IRS/CI field offices in order to identify missing firearms, TIGTA found that some of these reports were not completely prepared. Justice and Treasury agencies have taken many actions designed to strengthen and enforce firearms controls, based on recommendations made by the OIGs and TIGTA. Specifically, in reports issued in March 2001 and August 2002, Justice’s OIG made a total of 63 recommendations to INS, BOP, DEA, FBI, and USMS designed to improve firearms control activities. Treasury’s OIG and TIGTA also made five firearms-related recommendations in reports to the U.S. Mint in May 2002 and to IRS/CI in November 2001 and March 2002. According to the OIGs and TIGTA, agencies agreed to all recommendations and have taken, or are in the process of taking, corrective action addressing all identified weaknesses. Specifically, the INS, BOP, DEA, FBI, and USMS have implemented 29 of the 63 recommendations made by the Justice OIG, and are in the process of implementing the remaining 34 recommendations. Of the 34 recommendations that have not been implemented, management has begun taking corrective actions and is working with the OIG to ensure their efforts address the weaknesses identified. Completed and ongoing actions include establishing procedures requiring periodic firearms inventories on an annual basis and the appropriate segregation of duties during physical inventories. The agencies are also requiring that missing firearms be immediately reported and minimum timeframes for completing investigations of missing firearms be established. In addition, agencies are requiring that all missing firearms cases be adjudicated and that controls for securing firearms in vehicles and recovering firearms from separating employees be strengthened. In addition, the U.S. Mint and IRS/CI have implemented all five recommendations made by the Treasury OIG and TIGTA. The U.S. Mint now requires the performance and documentation of an independent physical inventory of firearms annually and the reconciliation of those inventories against property management records. Furthermore, IRS/CI agreed to change its inventory management system to be able to differentiate between lost, stolen, and damaged items in their property management system, and now requires that missing firearms reports be completely prepared. IRS/CI also established guidelines addressing the types of lost or stolen equipment that should be referred to TIGTA for investigation. Fifteen of the 18 federal law enforcement agencies we surveyed reported firearms as lost, stolen, or otherwise not in their possession during some point in time between September 30, 1998 and July 2002. Agency officials reported that although some firearms were lost due to negligence, some losses occurred despite appropriate precautions being taken by employees. Audits conducted by Justice’s and Treasury’s OIGs found that some missing firearms were recovered during the commission of a crime, or in connection with a criminal investigation. Fifteen of the 18 federal law enforcement agencies we surveyed reported 1,012 firearms as lost, stolen, or otherwise not in their possession during some point in time between September 1998 and July 2002. As of July 2002, 188 of these firearms had been subsequently recovered, leaving 824 still missing. While we could not determine the exact percentage of agency firearms that were reported lost, stolen, or missing, it appears that these firearms generally accounted for less than one percent of agencies’ total firearms inventories. Only BEP, the U.S. Mint, and Veterans Affairs reported having no lost, stolen, or missing firearms. Agencies identified missing firearms using internal reporting systems, through which personnel reported weapons as missing, and from periodic physical inventories of firearms. Table 3 identifies firearms as lost, stolen, or otherwise not in an agency’s possession for the 18 agencies surveyed, those firearms subsequently recovered, and those firearms still missing as of July 2002. Of the 1,012 firearms that agencies reported lost, stolen, or otherwise not in their possession, most missing firearms were pistols (541). Agencies also reported 187 revolvers or other handguns, 157 training weapons, 92 shotguns, 38 rifles, 19 submachine guns, and 1 stun gun as missing. Agency officials recognized that firearms were sometimes lost due to negligent behavior, such as employees not properly securing firearms in locked vehicles, as required by agency policies and procedures. However, officials also identified that some firearms were lost despite appropriate precautions being taken by the employee. For example, one agency reported that four firearms were stolen while in the custody of the airlines, and that the theft did not occur due to the negligent behavior of the employee. Specifically, the firearms were checked in a locked, hard-sided gun case, in accordance with agency policies and procedures. Due to the manner in which the agencies recorded missing firearms data, they usually could not readily identify, for the missing firearms we reviewed, the number of firearms determined to have been lost due to negligence. Agencies also identified cases where lost firearms, although not in the agency’s possession, were not recoverable and could not be used to harm the public. For example, several agencies reported firearms being lost in the ocean or in a river. These weapons were considered unrecoverable and therefore did not pose a threat to the public. Audits conducted by Justice’s and Treasury’s OIGs identified several incidents where missing firearms had been recovered in connection with criminal activity or during a criminal investigation. The OIGs made this determination during separate audits of agency controls over weapons, laptops, and other sensitive items at FBI, DEA, INS, U.S. Secret Service, and U.S. Customs. For example, Justice’s OIG reviewed 16 missing firearms cases reported to the DEA Board of Professional Conduct, for the time period October 1, 1999 through November 15, 2001, and found that 3 had been recovered by local law enforcement during an arrest of an individual for a handgun violation, and 2 in connection with searches during unrelated criminal investigations. In another example, Treasury’s OIG reviewed 10 of 13 firearms reported missing and recovered by U.S. Customs Service, for the time period October 1, 1998 through September 30, 2001, and found that 5 of the 10 firearms had been recovered in connection with a robbery, a drive-by shooting, or during the execution of a search warrant. The Federal Managers’ Financial Integrity Act requires that executive agencies establish and maintain controls that provide reasonable assurance that all assets are safeguarded against waste, loss, unauthorized use, and misappropriation. Standards and guidance for effectively maintaining and controlling firearms inventories are available to assist federal law enforcement agencies in designing controls to safeguard their firearms. Although these controls provide a framework to assist agencies in controlling and safeguarding their firearms, agencies should tailor these controls to meet their unique needs and circumstances, as well as their risks for firearms losses. Accordingly, the appropriate mix of controls may vary for each federal law enforcement agency. When agencies discover lost, stolen, or missing firearms, they should reassess their firearms controls to determine why they were not effective and if they should be modified. This is particularly important when agencies find that existing controls have not been implemented or have been implemented but have not prevented the loss of agency firearms, as was the case with some agencies reviewed by the Departments of Justice and Treasury OIGs. Internal controls that have been established to safeguard firearms, but were not appropriate controls based on the agencies’ needs, or were not implemented or properly applied, provide little assurance that firearms are safe from loss, theft, or misuse. In addition, agencies should document their firearms controls in policies and procedures. Without documenting these controls, employees may not know of their requirement, and the controls may not be uniformly applied agencywide. In addition, it may be difficult for management to enforce a control that is not required by policy and procedures, such as disciplining employees who do not adhere to firearms controls. The need for an assessment of firearms controls, and documentation of controls in policies and procedures, is demonstrated by the majority of agencies reviewed reporting missing firearms. These firearms may pose a serious risk to the public, including the risk that they may be used to inflict bodily harm or to further criminal activity. The Attorney General; the Secretaries of the Treasury, Interior, Veterans Affairs, and Homeland Security; the Director of the National Institutes of Health, and the Postmaster General should periodically assess existing policies and procedures designed to control and safeguard firearms and determine whether they have been effective, or should be modified to help prevent future firearms losses. In assessing firearms controls, agencies should use as guides (1) internal control standards issued by GAO, Joint Financial Management Improvement Program, and Commission on Accreditation for Law Enforcement Agencies, Inc; and (2) audits conducted by the Department of Justice OIG, Department of the Treasury OIG, and TIGTA of agencies firearms controls, and document internal controls in agency policies and procedures to the maximum extent practical to help ensure that they are consistently understood and applied. We requested and received comments on a draft of this report from the Attorney General, Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of the Interior, Secretary of Veterans Affairs, Secretary of Homeland Security, the Director of the National Institutes of Health (Department of Health and Human Services), and the Postmaster General. Officials generally agreed with the information presented. Six agencies provided technical changes that have been incorporated, as appropriate. Four agencies—the NIH, Fish and Wildlife Service (Department of the Interior), U.S. Postal Inspection Service, and Department of Veterans Affairs—provided comments on the report recommendation. NIH and Fish and Wildlife Service agreed with the recommendation and identified actions taken to strengthen their controls over firearms. The U.S. Postal Inspection Service also identified actions taken to strengthen firearms controls consistent with the recommendation. The Department of Veterans Affairs expressed concerned about our recommendation, saying that its controls were effective in preventing firearms losses. Appendixes VII, VIII, X, and XI include the written comments from these four agencies. In addition, although the Department of Justice did not comment on the recommendation, its letter presents general observations regarding standards for control over agency firearms and is included in appendix IX. NIH agreed with the recommendation, saying that in response to a review conducted by the department’s OIG, NIH has taken numerous steps to strengthen its controls over firearms. These efforts include updating and including accurate descriptions of firearms in its firearms inventory database, and appointing and training property custodial officers for the NIH Police Branch. The Fish and Wildlife Service also agreed with the recommendation, and said that as a result of an internal assessment, the Service will (1) develop a Web-based firearm training guide addressing various internal controls over firearms, (2) conduct unscheduled random checks of firearms against property records, and (3) annually review reports of any lost and/or stolen firearms to determine if policies and procedures should be modified to prevent future losses. Although not saying whether it agreed with our recommendation, the U.S. Postal Inspection Service said that it had reviewed the Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government and will assess these standards along with the results of a firearms review conducted by the Inspection Service Firearms Task Force. In addition, the Service provided us with a copy of its proposed policy update that it plans to incorporate into its firearms inventory and accountability procedures. We appreciate that the Service provided the proposed update and look forward to receiving the final updated policy. VA expressed concerned about our recommendation, saying that its lack of firearms losses during the time period of our review was due to its having appropriate internal controls over firearms. VA further said that its police officers document the handling of firearms on a daily basis; generally do not remove their firearms from department property; check their assigned firearms out of and into the armory each day; conduct monthly inventories of all firearms, ammunition, and magazines; have unannounced inventories and spot checks; and conduct independent annual inventories of firearms. Although VA did not report missing firearms during the time period of our review, the potential exists that firearms could be lost or stolen at some point in the future. Accordingly, we believe that VA and other agencies we reviewed should periodically assess their firearms controls, particularly when their organizations or operations have changed, or when firearms are identified as missing. These assessments should be conducted to determine whether established controls have been effective, are still relevant, or should be modified. For example, VA recently reported that as of March 2003, police officers at more than 100 of its field sites were assigned firearms. Prior to 2000, officers at only 27 sites were armed. We believe that this is a good example of when an organizational change necessitates a reevaluation of an agency’s firearms controls to reduce the risk of potential firearms losses. We further believe that federal internal control standards and other criteria included in our report provide a useful framework from which to conduct these assessments, and identify appropriate firearms controls when an agency’s environment has changed, or when existing controls have not been effective. In addition, six agencies requested that we change some of their original responses to our survey regarding firearms controls, usually to identify that they had a written policy and procedure addressing a specific control. We made these technical changes in all cases in which the agency provided documentation of its policy. However, if the agency said that the policy change was planned but had not yet been made, we did not change the original response and look forward to receiving documentation identifying changes that have been incorporated into its policy. As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly release its content earlier, we plan no further distribution of this report until 30 days from its issue date. At that time, we will provide copies of this report to the appropriate congressional committees, the Attorney General, Secretary of the Treasury, Secretary of the Interior, Secretary of Veterans Affairs, Secretary of Homeland Security, the Director of the National Institutes of Health, and the Postmaster General. We will also make copies available to others on request. In addition, the report will be available at no charge on GAO’s Web site at http://www.gao.gov. If you or your staffs have any questions on this report, please call me on (202) 512-8777. Key contributors are listed in appendix XII. We reviewed federal law enforcement agencies’ control over firearms to determine (1) the extent to which these agencies’ policies, procedures, and practices for controlling and safeguarding firearms were consistent with federal internal control standards and related criteria issued by law enforcement and management organizations; (2) whether reviews conducted by the Department of Justice and Department of Treasury identified instances of noncompliance with firearms policies and procedures, and whether agencies have taken actions to correct identified weaknesses, particularly regarding (a) conducting inventories, (b) investigating missing firearms, and (c) disciplining employees; and (3) the number of firearms that selected federal law enforcement agencies identified as lost, stolen, or otherwise not in their possession between September 30, 1998 and July 2002. We also determined how selected agencies maintained control and accountability over weapons other than firearms and weapons components. (See app. II.) To answer objectives 1 and 3, and to determine how agencies maintained and controlled weapons other than firearms and weapons components, we selected for review 18 out of 33 federal civilian law enforcement agencies in the executive branch identified by the Department of Justice’s Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS), as of June 2000, as having personnel with the authority to carry firearms and make arrests. We systematically selected the agencies for our review. First, we stratified the 33 agencies according to size, based on whether the agency had (1) 1,000 or more, (2) 500—999, (3) 100—499, or (4) less than 100 law enforcement personnel. We then selected all agencies with 1,000 or more law enforcement personnel (11 agencies) and the 2 agencies with the largest number of law enforcement personnel in each of the remaining 3 strata (6 agencies in total). To account for all Department of Justice and Treasury law enforcement agencies, we also included BEP, which fell into the 100—499 strata (1 agency). These 18 agencies employed about 96 percent (76,510) of the total personnel employed by the federal civilian law enforcement agencies (79,910) that are authorized to carry firearms and make arrests, as reported in the BJS. Table 4 identifies the 18 agencies selected for review, along with the strata from which they were selected. We surveyed the 18 agencies using a detailed questionnaire. We pretested the questionnaire with 2 of the 18 agencies and a third federal law enforcement agency, not included in the final survey, and made relevant changes to the questions based on these pretests. We also surveyed the 18 agencies using a follow-up questionnaire to obtain additional related information. See appendixes IV and V for the initial and follow-up questionnaire, respectively. In the questionnaire, we asked agencies about their firearms inventories and the policies, procedures, and practices currently in place to control their firearms. We also asked agencies to provide the results of their most recently completed 100-percent inventory since September 30, 1998, and the date of the inventory. We asked the 18 agencies to identify their policies and procedures related to recording firearms inventory data, controlling firearms inventories, ensuring personal and supervisory accountability for agency firearms, and investigating missing firearms and administering associated employee discipline. We also asked agencies to identify the number of firearms reported missing since September 30, 1998, the number of those missing firearms recovered up to the time of our survey, and the sources of the missing firearms information. To determine how federal law enforcement agencies maintained control and accountability over weapons other than firearms and weapons components, specifically ammunition, explosives, and gas and chemical agents, we surveyed the 18 agencies regarding their policies, procedures, and practices for tracking and controlling these items. Because this was not a sample survey, there are no sampling errors. However, the practical difficulties of conducting any survey may introduce errors, commonly referred to as nonsampling errors. For example, difficulties in how a particular question is interpreted, in the sources of information that are available to respondents, or in how the data are entered into a database or were analyzed can introduce unwanted variability into the survey results. We took steps in the development of the questionnaires, the data collection, and the data editing and analysis to minimize these nonsampling errors. In addition, to the extent possible, we obtained and reviewed agencies’ firearms control policies and procedures to verify their responses to our questionnaire. To answer objective 2, we reviewed the results of audits conducted by the Departments of Justice and Treasury Offices of Inspector General (OIG) and the Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration (TIGTA). These audits evaluated the extent to which Justice and Treasury law enforcement agencies adhered to internal controls over firearms inventories and other sensitive properties and were completed between March 2001 and August 2002. (See app. VI for audit reports and dates issued.) In addition, we reviewed documents from selected Justice and Treasury law enforcement agencies detailing their firearms control policies, procedures, and practices. We also reviewed selected agencies’ internal reports on compliance with firearms control policies and procedures and interviewed officials on corrective actions taken in response to OIG and TIGTA recommendations. We conducted our review between August 2001 and May 2003 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Federal law enforcement agencies generally reported establishing inventory controls to account for weapons other than firearms and weapons components. The 18 agencies we surveyed reported maintaining accountability for their stocks of explosives, gas and/or chemical agents, and ammunition through conducting periodic physical inventory counts of the items, or maintaining running balances through perpetual inventories. Agencies also reported using other methods, such as tracking the distribution of items to individuals or organizational units and limiting access to areas in which inventories are stored, or a combination of methods, to account for the inventories. The 18 federal law enforcement agencies we reviewed reported having explosives, gas and/or chemical agents, and ammunition. Table 5 identifies weapons other than firearms and weapons components reported by the agencies surveyed. While all 18 agencies reported having ammunition, only 7 reported having explosives, and 12 reported having gas and/or chemical agents. Seven agencies reported inventory in all three categories, including BOP, FBI, USMS, ATF, U.S. Customs Service, the U.S. Mint, and U.S. Secret Service. Agencies reporting inventories of explosives and gas and chemical agents responded that the weapons were primarily diversionary devices, defensive chemical sprays, and chemical projectiles. Included were items such as flash-bangs that distract with a flash and bang effect and smoke grenades that dispense chemically based inflammatory agents or membrane irritants. The 18 federal law enforcement agencies we reviewed reported having accountability procedures for weapons other than firearms and weapons components, and these agencies generally reported that they relied on inventories to account for these items. As shown in table 6, the agencies reported that they controlled weapons and weapons components through monthly and annual inventory counts, or by maintaining a running summary of the quantities on hand through perpetual inventories. In addition to relying on monthly, annual, and periodic inventories to control weapons other than firearms and weapons components, some agencies reported using additional procedures, or a combination of procedures, to account for their inventories. For example, IRS/CI reported controlling ammunition and pepper spray by tracking their distribution to field installations from a headquarters procurement office, while the National Park Service reported that it controlled ammunition by monitoring its distribution to law enforcement personnel. In addition, the Fish and Wildlife Service reported that it controlled ammunition by monitoring its distribution and limiting access to supply. In another example, the FBI reported maintaining its supply of gas and/or chemical agents at a military storage facility, thereby reducing access and the potential for unauthorized use or loss. In addition, the FBI, INS, USMS, ATF, Secret Service, and the VA reported using a combination of methods to account for these weapons and weapons components. For example, the FBI reported controlling access to ammunition supplies in addition to maintaining a record of each time ammunition was received or disbursed. INS reported that, in addition to conducting annual inventories of ammunition and gas and chemical agents, it maintains logs at all locations that record receipts from manufacturers and issuances for operational purposes. In another example, the ATF reported controlling explosives by maintaining a separate record of acquisitions and removals; keeping a daily, perpetual record of transactions; and conducting annual inventories and inspections. Fredrick D. Berry, Miguel A. Salas, Barbara A. Stolz, Christine F. Davis, Katherine M. Davis, Stuart M. Kaufman, David P. Alexander, Delois N. Richardson, Daniel C. Harris, and Miko D. Johnson made key contributions to this report.

Summary: In March 2001, the Department of Justice Office of Inspector General reported that the Immigration and Naturalization Service could not account for over 500 of its firearms. Furthermore, in July 2001, the Federal Bureau of Investigation disclosed that 449 of its firearms were lost or stolen. Given the possible threat that lost, stolen, or missing firearms poses to the public, GAO assessed (1) the consistency of federal agencies' firearms controls with federal internal control standards and related criteria; and (2) compliance by Justice and Treasury agencies with established firearms controls and improvements made to strengthen and enforce controls. GAO found that all 18 federal agencies reviewed, which accounted for over 95 percent of federal officers and agents authorized to carry firearms, had policies and procedures for controlling and safeguarding firearms that were consistent with federal internal control standards and related criteria. However, agencies could strengthen their controls in key areas that have been consistently recognized as important for effective inventory management. These areas include recording and tracking firearms inventory data; maintaining, controlling, and accounting for firearms inventories; ensuring personal and supervisory accountability for firearms; and requiring investigations, and discipline when deemed appropriate, for individuals determined not to have followed firearms accountability procedures. Although agencies established policies and procedures to control firearms, audits conducted by the Departments of Justice and the Treasury found that agencies did not always follow established procedures, or implement procedures, for conducting periodic inventories, reporting and investigating missing firearms, and securing firearms inventories. Since these weaknesses were identified, we found that agencies have implemented, or are in the process of implementing, actions to strengthen their firearms controls. In addition, 15 of the 18 federal agencies GAO reviewed reported a total of 1,012 firearms as lost, stolen, or otherwise not in their possession between September 30, 1998 and July 2002, further indicating the need for stronger controls. Of these firearms, 188 were recovered, leaving 824 firearms still missing. While we could not determine the exact percentage of agency firearms that were reported lost, stolen, or missing, it appears that these firearms generally accounted for less than 1 percent of agencies' total firearms inventories. In independent reviews of selected missing firearms cases, the Departments of Justice and the Treasury identified instances of firearms recovered in connection with criminal activity or during the course of criminal investigations.