After the breakup of the Soviet Union in 1991, Russia inherited the world’s largest arsenal of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons. As Russia adopted economic reforms and moved toward an open society, its economy and central controls deteriorated, thereby making it difficult to maintain security at its weapons sites. Recognizing these difficulties, the Congress began authorizing funds in 1992 for programs to help destroy Russian weapons and improve WMD security. More recently, the events of September 11, 2001, have increased U.S. concerns that terrorists might obtain WMD materials or weapons at poorly secured sites. While DOD and DOE implement most of the U.S. threat reduction and nonproliferation programs, the Departments of State, Commerce, and Homeland Security implement related programs. The Congress established DOD’s CTR program in 1992 to reduce the WMD threat posed to the United States from weapons remaining in the FSU. The program was designed to assist the FSU in securing and destroying WMD and its means of delivery. Initial CTR assistance was provided to Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Belarus, and Russia, which had inherited the majority of the Soviet Union’s WMD. The program helped Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus remove nuclear weapons from their soil, eliminating the potential emergence of three additional nuclear states. CTR also facilitated Russia’s efforts to reduce its massive nuclear weapons arsenal and address its arms control commitments. In fiscal year 2004, CTR had 22 projects (see app. I). One of the newest CTR projects—the WMD Proliferation Prevention Initiative—is designed to strengthen the ability of non-Russian FSU states to deter, detect, and interdict illicit trafficking of WMD and related materials. For example, DOD is providing equipment and training to Uzbekistan to enhance its ability to monitor its borders for illegal transport of radioactive material. Additionally, the CTR program has expanded outside of the FSU, as DOD will use CTR funds to help Albania eliminate its chemical weapons stockpile. Furthermore, a bill introduced in the Senate in November 2004 would grant DOD additional flexibility to expand the CTR program outside the FSU. DOD implements the CTR program through the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA), which receives policy guidance from the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. In 1993, DOE began implementing programs funded by DOD, to help secure weapons-usable nuclear materials in the FSU. DOE also received funding in 1994 from State to employ former Soviet weapons scientists and engineers in cooperative research projects with U.S. laboratories and industry to deter their employment by rogue states. In 1996, with the growth of these programs, funding shifted directly to DOE. These programs remained focused on the FSU and were spread throughout DOE. In October 1999, DOE’s nonproliferation programs were consolidated within the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA). Since that time, NNSA’s nonproliferation mission has been implemented by the Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation (DNN), which seeks to detect, prevent, and reverse WMD proliferation. This mission has now expanded to address proliferation threats in more than 70 countries to prevent the spread of WMD. For example, DNN is initiating a new program to provide employment opportunities to Iraqi scientists, technicians, and engineers. In fiscal year 2004, DOE had 19 projects addressing nonproliferation threats worldwide (see app. I). The threat reduction and nonproliferation programs have evolved from a $400 million DOD program in 1992 to approximately $1.8 billion in programs at DOD and DOE in 2004. The State Department also manages its own nonproliferation programs and coordinates U.S. assistance to the FSU. In 1992, the Freedom Support Act established the Office of the Coordinator within the State Department to coordinate U.S. assistance to the FSU. The coordinator’s responsibilities include resolving program and policy disputes among U.S. government agencies regarding their programs in the FSU. In 1994, State and DOD established the International Science and Technology Center in Moscow to fund peaceful research carried out by otherwise underpaid weapons scientists. The center supplements the income of scientists, purchases equipment for scientific research, and supports programs to help scientists identify and develop commercially viable research projects. In 1996, the Congress established State’s Nonproliferation, Anti-terrorism, Demining, and Related Programs Account to fund programs addressing the spread of WMD. For example, the Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund supports projects to prevent the proliferation of WMD, their delivery systems, and related materials. NSC staff coordinates U.S. policy for threat reduction and nonproliferation programs and conducted reviews of these programs that validated the need to maintain them in 2001 and 2002. The Proliferation Strategy Policy Coordinating Committee, chaired by the Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for Proliferation Strategy, Counterproliferation and Homeland Defense, sets general policy for U.S. nonproliferation programs. NSC staff establishes guidelines but does not implement programs or control their budgets. DOD and DOE prepare their own individual strategies to implement their respective threat reduction and nonproliferation programs, but there is no governmentwide strategy that integrates them with one another or with those of other agencies that implement threat reduction and nonproliferation programs. We found that DOD and DOE strategies to address security issues for their authorized agency missions generally meet selected criteria for strategic planning established by GPRA. Recognizing the importance of coordinating U.S. efforts, using resources effectively, and enhancing agencies’ abilities to anticipate growing nonproliferation concerns, the Congress, GAO, and others have required or recommended integrated planning among DOD, DOE, and other agencies’ threat reduction and nonproliferation programs. NSC staff and State created plans in response to the above requirements and recommendations, but these plans either focus solely on one agency or on one geographic location. Furthermore, these programs are expanding beyond the FSU and may potentially involve the response of multiple U.S. agencies. DOD and DOE each have strategic plans governing their respective threat reduction and nonproliferation programs. We found that each agency’s strategic plan generally meets the selected GPRA criteria for strategic planning. See table 1 for a listing of the selected GPRA criteria. Additionally, we found that DOD and DOE have their own methods to prioritize their respective activities and programs. Furthermore, DOD and DOE threat reduction and nonproliferation programs undergo periodic internal and external reviews to improve program management. The CTR Policy Office, in conjunction with DTRA, produces and updates a strategy for the CTR program. We found that this strategy generally contains the elements of a strategic plan developed using GPRA criteria. Additionally, all CTR projects develop detailed plans that also contain these elements. Figure 1 depicts DOD offices that are involved in strategic planning for the CTR programs. In accordance with GPRA, the CTR program’s mission statement is comprehensive and concise: that is, to prevent the proliferation of WMD and related materials, technologies, and expertise from FSU states— including providing for the safe destruction of Soviet-era WMD, associated delivery systems, and related infrastructure. The CTR program’s strategy also includes the following specific goals: (1) dismantle FSU WMD and associated infrastructure, (2) consolidate and secure FSU WMD and related technology and materials, (3) increase transparency and encourage higher standards of conduct, and (4) support defense and military cooperation with the objective of preventing proliferation. These goals provide clear direction to the activities and desired outcomes of the CTR program. The CTR strategy also cites external factors that could affect the program, describes how performance will be measured, and states budget requirements. For example, the level of Russian cooperation is cited as an external factor that will affect the successful implementation of the program. The strategy provides metrics by which performance of the program can be measured, such as the number of missiles destroyed. DOD and DOE performance metrics are shown in appendix II. In accordance with GPRA criteria, the CTR plans include cost estimates and cover a period of 5 years. For example, the overall CTR funding request for fiscal year 2005 is $409 million, and the 5-year plan calls for an additional $1.5 billion between fiscal years 2006 and 2009. The CTR program has five program areas, with several projects under each program area. Each project has a plan that details its broad mission, specific objectives, external factors that could affect the achievement of these objectives, metrics that are used to evaluate the performance of the project, and cost estimates. For example, the mission of the Automated Inventory Control and Management System project, under the nuclear weapons safety and security program area, is to enhance Russia’s capability to account for and track the strategic and tactical nuclear weapons scheduled for dismantlement. Specific objectives include installing hardware and software at 18 sites within Russia and providing initial training and data entry. External factors cited for this program include whether Russia will grant sufficient access to the sites and improve the equipment storage conditions. The project uses milestone dates, which range from the procurement of the software to the final certification of the system at all sites, as one method to measure its performance. The project is estimated to cost $50.2 million. Additionally, according to agency officials, DOD has not had to prioritize CTR projects on the basis of available funds. The CTR program generally receives the funding requested for its projects. DOD develops its budget request for the CTR program on the basis of funding needed to continue existing programs and implement new programs. As a result, projects have not competed for funding. Furthermore, the CTR program has undergone internal performance reviews in order to improve management practices. In 2003, the CTR Policy Office conducted a 6-month, project-by-project review of the program that changed the scope of several CTR projects to ensure that program activities met threat reduction goals. The review also resulted in a decision to stop funding activities that did not contribute directly to threat reduction goals. For example, the CTR program no longer funds the restoration of the environment surrounding missile sites but continues to fund the elimination of the nuclear missiles and silos. The CTR program also has undergone several external reviews to identify areas needing improvement. For example, in 1996, we recommended that no funds should be obligated for constructing a chemical weapons destruction facility in Russia until reliable cost estimates were completed. (See prior GAO reports listed at the end of this report.) The DOD Inspector General also recommended that the CTR program adopt numerous controls to improve program management. For example, the DOD Inspector General recommended amendments to CTR program implementing agreements with Russia to ensure that Russia provides its weapons systems and their components scheduled for destruction, that it grants access rights to DOD, and that it is penalized for failure to use DOD assistance. As a result of this recommendation, DOD required Russia to sign an agreement specifying that all of Russia’s declared nerve agents could be destroyed at a facility under construction by the CTR program. However, DOD did not include a penalty for noncompliance. DNN produces a broad strategy for DOE’s nonproliferation programs, and DNN’s six program offices prepare strategic plans for their projects. Collectively, these plans generally contain the elements of a strategic plan developed using GPRA criteria. Figure 2 depicts DOE offices that are involved in strategic planning for DOE’s nonproliferation programs. In accordance with GPRA, DNN’s strategic plan clearly states its mission— which is to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons, nuclear weapons- usable and radiological materials, technologies, and expertise. This plan also describes broad goals for its nonproliferation mission. For example, one of its goals is to secure nuclear and radiological materials at potentially vulnerable sites overseas. DNN’s plan identifies external factors that could affect its program goals, such as delays in its program to employ weapons scientists due to lengthy Russian government clearance procedures. Although DNN’s strategic plan does not list performance measures for each of its nonproliferation projects, DNN maintains a database of goals and performance metrics for each of its six program areas. For example, to measure performance in preventing the migration of WMD expertise, DNN tracks the annual number of former Soviet weapons scientists, engineers, and technicians engaged by its programs. Appendix II contains performance metrics for DOE’s nonproliferation. In accordance with GPRA criteria, DNN plans include cost estimates and cover a period of 5 years. For example, DNN is requesting $1.3 billion for fiscal year 2005 and is projected to request an additional $5.7 billion between fiscal years 2006 and 2009. In the past, DNN generally received requested funding for its nonproliferation programs, but as the scope of these programs expanded, DNN began to prioritize projects within program areas, according to agency officials. In fiscal year 2004, DOE first applied several criteria, such as risk, availability of funding, and legal obligations, to prioritize projects. The criteria were used to identify activities with the greatest proliferation risk, on which DOE focused its resources. For example, in fiscal year 2004, Russia provided access to more nuclear warhead storage sites than originally planned. DOE diverted funds from lower priority activities, such as converting weapons-grade uranium to uranium that cannot be used in weapons, in order to fund security enhancements at the new nuclear warhead storage sites. DNN’s nonproliferation programs have undergone internal and external reviews to identify areas needing improvement. The NNSA Under Secretary biannually reviews each program’s budget, accomplishments, and any other concerns. DOE also uses the results of external audits to identify areas needing improvement. For example, audits conducted by the DOE Inspector General have recommended improvements to NNSA’s process for matching program requirements with budgetary resources and managing the program to eliminate weapons-grade uranium in research reactors. In addition, we have conducted numerous reviews of various aspects of DOE’s nonproliferation programs. For example, in 2001, we found duplication between DOE’s two programs to employ former weapons scientists in Russia and recommended consolidating the programs. In response, DOE merged the programs into a new program, the Russian Transition Initiatives. Since the mid-1990s, the Congress and others have called for the executive branch to develop governmentwide plans to govern threat reduction and nonproliferation programs. The Congress found that although U.S. nonproliferation efforts in the FSU have achieved important results in securing WMD materials, technology, and knowledge, the effectiveness of these efforts has suffered from a lack of coordination within and among agencies. Recognizing the importance of integrated planning of threat reduction and nonproliferation programs, the Congress required the executive branch to develop three plans. To comply with the requirements of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002, as amended, the President submitted a plan and an annual report on the implementation of the plan covering all agency efforts to secure nuclear weapons, material, and expertise in the FSU. This plan addressed the specific requirements of the legislation, including identifying the goals and objectives of the programs and strategies for terminating U.S. contributions to the programs. The Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 2003 requires (1) the State Department to provide the appropriate congressional committees with a 3-year international arms control and nonproliferation strategy and (2) the President to provide the Congress with a plan detailing coordination of nonproliferation programs. State submitted the 3-year international arms control and nonproliferation strategy to the Congress in August 2003. The strategy focuses on the State Department’s programs and activities, discusses broad U.S. arms control and nonproliferation goals, and describes State’s efforts under way to achieve these goals. For the coordination plan, the Congress required the establishment of an interagency committee consisting of representatives of the Departments of Defense, Energy, State, Commerce, Homeland Security, and the Attorney General and other officials that the President deems necessary. This committee will exercise responsibility for coordinating all U.S. threat reduction efforts and enhance the U.S. government’s ability to anticipate growing nonproliferation areas of concern. This committee is required to submit a coordination plan in May 2005. In past work, we found that the development of a governmentwide strategy could strengthen the coordination of threat reduction and nonproliferation programs. The strategy should identify overall goals, time frames for meeting those goals, and ways to set priorities for allocating resources governmentwide to address all U.S. nonproliferation concerns. The executive branch also called for the development of a governmentwide plan for U.S. threat reduction and nonproliferation programs. Specifically, the President’s National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction of 2002 calls on the Proliferation Strategy Policy Coordinating Committee, chaired by NSC staff, to prepare a 5-year governmentwide plan by March 2003. To achieve greater efficiency through program coordination, the strategy stated that this governmentwide plan should include all threat reduction and nonproliferation programs in the FSU that are funded wholly or in part by the U.S. government. As of November 2004, the plan had yet to be developed. In addition, independent panels have also called for the development of governmentwide plans. In 1998, the Congress established the Commission to Assess the Organization of the Federal Government to Combat the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (the Deutch Commission), which recommended coordinated and consistent governmentwide strategies to address nonproliferation threats to the United States. In 2001, the Baker-Cutler Commission, established by the Secretary of Energy, recommended the development of a national strategic plan to secure all Russian nuclear weapons-useable material and prevent WMD expertise from leaving Russia. No reports have been developed that address either commission’s recommendations. Table 2 is a listing of the various calls for governmentwide plans and their status. None of the existing plans in table 2 integrates agencies’ plans with one another or addresses U.S. threat reduction and nonproliferation programs worldwide. For example, the plan developed as a result of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002 did not address programs to secure and eliminate chemical weapons in Russia or the infrastructure used to develop chemical and biological weapons throughout the FSU. Similarly, the 2003 arms control plan that State prepared addressed U.S. arms controls efforts, but the plan is limited to a description of DOE’s programs for addressing these goals. On the basis of our review of NSC staff guidance and discussions with DOD and DOE officials, we found that coordination among programs that share similar missions, goals, and activities is improved when each agency’s roles and responsibilities are delineated, information sharing is formalized, and procedures for resolving interagency disputes are clear. While the majority of programs in DOD and DOE are distinct, three program areas perform similar functions in the FSU: (1) improving the security of sites where Russian nuclear warheads are stored, (2) employing former biological weapons scientists, and (3) enhancing the ability of countries to secure their borders against the smuggling of WMD materials. The warhead security programs implemented by DOD and DOE were not well coordinated in the past, but NSC staff guidance that describes each agency’s role, formalizes meetings, and establishes a dispute resolution process has improved coordination, according to agency officials. DOD, DOE, and State officials in the biological weapons scientists programs understand each agency’s roles and responsibilities, meet monthly, and follow dispute resolution procedures as described in governmentwide guidance for this program area. By contrast, there is no governmentwide guidance delineating the roles and responsibilities of agencies managing border security programs. As a result, DOD and DOE officials managing border security programs stated that agencies’ roles are not defined, information sharing is infrequent, and there are no procedures to resolve differences among agencies. We found that most threat reduction and nonproliferation projects in DOD and DOE have distinct missions, goals, and activities. DOD’s CTR program has few projects that are similar to those in DOE and State. Figure 3 folds DOD’s projects into broader program areas and distinguishes those distinct program areas from those that are similar. First, DOD has several projects in the FSU to destroy strategic weapons systems such as bombers, missiles, and submarines. Second, DOD funds the safe and secure transport of the Russian nuclear warheads scheduled for elimination. Third, DOD is constructing a chemical weapons destruction facility at Shchuch’ye to help eliminate Russia’s declared stockpile of nerve agents. Fourth, DOD is assisting in the elimination of WMD infrastructure by, for example, dismantling biological weapons facilities in Kazakhstan. Finally, the CTR program engages in projects that facilitate contact between U.S. and FSU defense and military personnel. Program events include conferences, seminars, and combined military exercises designed to strengthen defense partnerships between the United States and FSU states. We also found that most DOE projects have distinct missions, goals, and activities addressing the proliferation threat posed by nuclear and radiological materials (see fig. 3). First, fissile materials disposition projects eliminate weapons-grade nuclear materials. For example, DOE has a project to eliminate surplus Russian plutonium by turning it into fuel for use in civilian nuclear power plants. Second, DOE is assisting Russia by shutting down three nuclear power plants that produce plutonium and replacing them with power plants fueled by coal. Third, DOE conducts nonproliferation research and development, such as developing technologies used to detect, locate, and identify nuclear explosions. Fourth, DOE consolidates and secures radioactive materials that could be used in dirty bombs. Finally, DOE’s highly enriched uranium transparency project monitors the conversion of material from Russian nuclear warheads into fuel for civilian nuclear power plants. We found three program areas where both DOD and DOE have projects that perform similar activities in the FSU. First, both agencies have projects to improve the security of sites where Russian nuclear warheads are stored, such as installing fences and security systems. Second, both agencies have projects to employ former biological weapons scientists to prevent the proliferation of their expertise to states and terrorist organizations. Third, both agencies have projects to enhance the ability of countries to secure their borders against the smuggling of WMD materials. The State Department has its own programs to employ biological former biological weapons scientists and secure borders against the trafficking of WMD materials and plays a role in coordinating U.S. efforts in these areas. See appendix III for more information regarding DOD, DOE, and State’s projects in these areas. We have previously reported that DOD and DOE were pursuing different approaches to securing nuclear warhead sites in Russia. DOD and DOE had plans to upgrade some of the same storage sites, and DOD had already purchased equipment to upgrade security at some of those sites. Additionally, DOD and DOE used different vendors to purchase different equipment to perform the same function, which could have resulted in extra training and maintenance costs. As a result of our work, DOD and DOE coordinated their efforts to avoid duplication by identifying the agency with the best access to and cooperation of the Russians to install the security upgrades. Furthermore, we recommended that an integrated plan be developed for these programs on issues such as resolving equipment standardization concerns. During the course of our audit work, NSC staff issued common policy guidance for DOD and DOE programs that help Russia secure its nuclear warheads. The policy guidance prohibited assistance to operational sites due to concerns that U.S. assistance may enhance Russia’s military capability. Additionally, NSC staff established interagency procedures for coordinating warhead security assistance activities through a working group that reviews all requests for assistance, with neither DOD nor DOE being allowed to implement a project without the group’s approval. In the case of a dispute, an agency can escalate the request for assistance to a higher level interagency group. According to both DOD and DOE officials, the guidelines and procedures implemented since our report have improved coordination, such as holding interagency meetings. In commenting on a draft of this report, DOE stated that DOD and DOE include representatives from the other agency on each other’s bilateral forums with the Russians. Other working group participants acknowledged that coordination concerns have been reduced but stated that information sharing should be improved, especially about issues escalated above the working group level. We found that the coordination of biological weapons scientist employment programs is characterized by clearly delineated roles and responsibilities, regular interaction, and dispute resolution procedures. In September 2002, NSC staff issued guidelines governing the coordination of the biological weapons scientist employment programs, which addressed these three elements. These guidelines state the roles of each agency, formalize information sharing, and include procedures for resolving disputes. Additionally, the guidelines describe oversight requirements and other factors to be considered when implementing these programs. Agency officials managing the biological weapons scientist employment programs did not report any difficulties pertaining to coordination or to the activities of other agencies. These officials stated that the NSC staff guidelines are valuable in ensuring that activities are undertaken by the appropriate agency and agencies’ programs work toward common U.S. objectives. These guidelines established the Nonproliferation Interagency Roundtable, which ensures that all agencies are aware of each other’s activities in employing biological weapons scientists in the FSU and that the agencies avoid duplication of efforts. Proposals for new projects are reviewed and voted on monthly by the Nonproliferation Interagency Roundtable. If disagreements arise after the voting process has occurred, agencies may escalate the decision to a group chaired by NSC staff. Officials we spoke with stated that coordination has worked successfully. DOD, DOE, and State officials all cited the NSC staff guidelines when discussing their programs with us and confirmed that these guidelines were applied governmentwide. There is no governmentwide guidance for border security programs that delineates agencies’ roles and responsibilities, establishes regular information sharing, and defines procedures for resolving interagency disputes, according to DOD and DOE officials. Although the State Department prepared a strategic plan that identifies and describes border security programs and interagency coordination mechanisms in Eurasia, the plan does not clearly establish the departments’ roles or how information is shared. The plan also acknowledges that NSC staff will provide policy oversight and guidance to implement the border security programs, but DOD and DOE officials with whom we met were unaware of such guidance. The primary coordination mechanism for all border security programs is an interagency working group chaired by the State Department’s Nonproliferation Bureau. According to DOD and DOE officials, the group does not have regularly scheduled meetings. DOE officials stated they would prefer to meet more often to facilitate coordination of their programs and reduce the amount of informal coordination, such as telephone conversations and e-mails, which they believe is less efficient. State Department officials acknowledged that coordination of these programs could be better, but stated that they lack the authority to resolve conflicts over coordination. In the absence of guidance for coordination, agency officials question the other agencies’ roles and responsibilities. For example, both State and DOD officials acknowledged that their border security programs conduct similar activities, such as training border security guards and providing equipment for detecting illicit trafficking of WMD. Furthermore, State Department officials questioned whether some aspects of DOD’s International Counterproliferation Program were targeting countries that may no longer require the type of assistance being provided. For example, DOD’s program provided basic level WMD courses to officials from Bulgaria, which is beyond the need for basic level training, according to a State Department official. In May 2002, we reported problems with the coordination of border security programs. We found that portal monitors provided through the State Department’s border security program did not meet the standards established by DOE. Since our report, the State Department has transferred responsibility of operation and maintenance of the monitors to DOE, and State is no longer funding the installation of portal monitors. According to State and DOE officials, the specific problems we highlighted have since been resolved, such as the coordination of agencies’ border security activities. We have follow-up work under way regarding this issue. DOD and DOE develop their own strategic plans, prioritize their own program activities, and measure their own program performance. While this approach helps keep the departments on track to meet their own objectives, it does not provide governmentwide guidance for U.S. threat reduction and nonproliferation programs, which would include goals, time frames for meeting those goals, and mechanisms for establishing priorities across the various departments involved in program implementation. In light of the U.S. government’s elimination of nuclear infrastructure in Libya, recent agreement to eliminate chemical weapons in Albania, and the growing likelihood of other efforts expanding outside the FSU, overall strategic guidance becomes increasingly important given the involvement of multiple agencies. While NSC staff has provided guidance to agencies implementing programs to secure Russian warheads and employ former Soviet biological weapons scientists, there is no governmentwide strategy for agencies implementing threat reduction and nonproliferation programs worldwide. The requirement in the Fiscal Year 2003 Foreign Relations Authorization Act for a Presidential report detailing the coordination of nonproliferation programs provides an opportunity for the administration to review its broad array of threat reduction and nonproliferation programs to ensure that the programs and capabilities of the various departments address all proliferation threats worldwide. As part of this effort, DOD and DOE can draw upon lessons learned from programs in the FSU. In addition, while the majority of threat reduction and nonproliferation programs do not address similar missions, it is still important for policy makers and program managers at DOD and DOE to (1) understand how their efforts contribute to broader U.S. goals and (2) have formal mechanisms for sharing information and lessons learned that cut across programmatic boundaries. In those areas where more than one department is addressing a similar mission, interagency coordination is important to avoid duplication and collectively meet common goals. We found that interagency coordination of threat reduction and nonproliferation programs appears to work best when there is clear guidance from NSC staff regarding the roles of the various departments, regularized agency interactions, and resolution of interagency disputes, as is the case with the projects to employ biological weapons scientists and secure warhead sites. However, we found that coordination is limited among the border security projects where there is no NSC staff guidance. We recommend that the Secretaries of Defense and Energy, in consultation with other agencies involved in threat reduction and nonproliferation programs, develop an integrated plan for all U.S. threat reduction and nonproliferation programs to ensure that the programs are effectively coordinated and address all threats. The results of this review should be reported to the Congress as part of the President’s response to section 1339 of the Fiscal Year 2003 Foreign Relations Authorization Act, which requires the President to submit a report after each presidential inauguration on threat reduction and nonproliferation objectives and how executive branch efforts will be coordinated. We also recommend that the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, through the NSC staff, lead the development of a plan guiding the implementation and coordination of threat reduction and nonproliferation programs addressing border security as they have done with the programs addressing the employment of biological weapons scientists. This plan should identify U.S. government goals and objectives, designate departments’ roles and responsibilities, and establish procedures to resolve policy and program disputes. DOE and DOD provided comments on a draft of this report, which are reproduced in appendixes IV and V. DOE agreed with the report and the corresponding recommendations. DOD concurred with the need for better integrated nonproliferation and threat reduction programs, but did not specify whether it agreed with the need for an integrated plan. DOD concurred with the need for NSC staff guidance governing border security programs. State Department and the NSC staff did not comment on this report. DOE, DOD, and State provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. To assess DOD and DOE’s strategies to implement their respective threat reduction and nonproliferation programs, we obtained agencies’ strategic plans, project/program planning documents, budget documents, and annual reports. To assess attempts to integrate these strategies, we consulted relevant public laws and met with experts at the Nuclear Threat Initiative, a global initiative that seeks to raise public awareness of WMD threats and carries out threat reduction work; the Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies, a nongovernmental organization in the United States that provides research and training on nonproliferation issues; and the U.S. – Russia Corporate Partnerships Advancing Nonproliferation and National Security, a congressional bipartisan study group. To assess DOD and DOE strategies to implement their threat reduction and nonproliferation programs, we compared them against select criteria contained in GPRA and reviewed our prior work relating to performance metrics and program assessment. We also interviewed DOD and DOE officials, including the Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for Technology Security Policy and Counterproliferation, the Director and Deputy Director of DTRA’s CTR program, and senior leadership from the CTR program office. The DOE officials we interviewed include the Deputy Administrator for Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation and senior officials from the Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention Program. In addition, we spoke with officials from the DOD and DOE Inspector’s General office, the Office of Management and Budget, the Congressional Research Service, and the intelligence community. To assess efforts to coordinate DOD, DOE, and State programs with similar missions, we obtained documents from these agencies regarding their threat reduction and nonproliferation programs. We also reviewed NSC staff guidance on biological weapons scientists’ employment and warhead security programs. We also reviewed DOD, DOE, and State documents regarding their border security programs. Finally, we relied on our previous reviews of the CTR program and several nonproliferation programs within DOE and the State Department. We also interviewed numerous officials, including the Director and Deputy Director of DTRA’s CTR program, the Office of the Secretary of Defense Policy for CTR programs, and the Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for Technology Security Policy and Counterproliferation. DOE officials include the Deputy Administrator for Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation, the Assistant Deputy Administrator of the Office of International Material Protection and Cooperation, and other senior officials from the other DNN program areas. At the State Department, we interviewed the Coordinator of U.S. Assistance to Europe and Eurasia and met with officials from the Bureau of Nonproliferation. We also met with the managers of programs addressing border security, weapons security, and employment of biological weapons scientists. NSC officials did not respond to our requests to meet. However, we discussed the role of the NSC staff and the extent of its participation in coordinating programs with DOD, DOE, and State officials. We also relied on related prior GAO reports. We performed our review in Washington, D.C., from February 2004 to November 2004 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. We are sending copies of this report to interested congressional committees; the National Security Council; and the Secretaries of Defense, Energy, and State. We will also make copies available to others upon request. In addition, the report will be available on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov. If you have questions regarding this report, please contact Mr. Christoff at (202) 512-8979 or christoffj@gao.gov or Mr. Aloise at (202) 512-3841 or aloisee@gao.gov. GAO contacts and staff acknowledgments are listed in appendix VI. DOD and DOE assess the performance of their threat reduction and nonproliferation programs. They establish goals and assess progress toward meeting these goals using performance metrics. Table 5 lists these DOD and DOE goals and metrics. DOD and DOE and State have projects in three areas that address similar missions in the FSU. These areas are the employment of former biological weapons scientists to prevent the proliferation of their expertise, improvement of security at sites where Russian nuclear warheads are stored, and the enhancement of countries’ ability to secure their borders against the smuggling of WMD materials. Tables 6, 7, and 8 show the different projects, funding and countries served for all three agencies and areas. In addition, Hynek Kalkus, Wyatt R. Hundrup, Nanette J. Ryen, William Lanouette, Dorian L. Herring, Stacy Edwards, Lynn Cothern, Etana Finkler, Judy Pagano, and Ernie Jackson made significant contributions to this report. Russian Nuclear Submarines: U.S. Participation in the Arctic Military Environmental Cooperation Program Needs Better Justification. GAO-04-924. Washington, D.C.: September 9, 2004. Nuclear Nonproliferation: DOE Needs to Take Action to Further Reduce the Use of Weapons-Usable Uranium in Civilian Research Reactors. GAO-04-807. Washington, D.C.: July 30, 2004. Nuclear Nonproliferation: DOE’s Effort to Close Russia’s Plutonium Production Reactors Faces Challenges, and Final Shutdown Is Uncertain. GAO-04-662. Washington D.C.: June 4, 2004. Nuclear Nonproliferation: U.S. and International Assistance Efforts to Control Sealed Radioactive Sources Need Strengthening. GAO-03-638. Washington, D.C.: May 16, 2003. Weapons of Mass Destruction: Additional Russian Cooperation Needed to Facilitate U.S. Efforts to Improve Security at Russian Sites. GAO-03-482. Washington, D.C.: March 24, 2003. Weapons of Mass Destruction: Observations on U.S. Threat Reduction and Nonproliferation Programs in Russia. GAO-03-526T. Washington, D.C.: March 5, 2003. Nuclear Nonproliferation: U.S. Efforts to Help Other Countries Combat Nuclear Smuggling Need Strengthened Coordination and Planning. GAO-02-426. Washington, D.C.: May 16, 2002. Weapons of Mass Destruction: State Department Oversight of Science Centers Program. GAO-01-582. Washington, D.C.: May 10, 2001. Nuclear Nonproliferation: DOE’s Efforts to Assist Weapons Scientists in Russia’s Nuclear Cities Face Challenges. GAO-01-429. Washington, D.C.: May 3, 2001. Nuclear Nonproliferation: Security of Russia’s Nuclear Material Improving; Further Enhancements Needed. GAO-01-312. Washington, D.C.: February 28, 2001. Biological Weapons: Effort to Reduce Former Soviet Threat Offers Benefits, Poses New Risks. GAO/NSIAD-00-138. Washington, D.C.: April 28, 2000. Nuclear Nonproliferation: Limited Progress in Improving Nuclear Material Security in Russia and the Newly Independent States. GAO/RCED/NSIAD-00-82. Washington, D.C.: March 6, 2000. Weapons of Mass Destruction: Effort to Reduce Russian Arsenals May Cost More, Achieve Less Than Planned. GAO/NSIAD-99-76. Washington, D.C.: April 13, 1999. Weapons of Mass Destruction: Reducing the Threat From the Former Soviet Union: An Update. GAO/NSIAD-95-165. Washington, D.C.: June 17, 1995. Weapons of Mass Destruction: Reducing the Threat From the Former Soviet Union. GAO/NSIAD-95-7. Washington, D.C.: October 6, 1994.

Summary: Since 1992, the Congress has provided more than $7 billion for threat reduction and nonproliferation programs in the former Soviet Union (FSU). These programs have played a key role in addressing the threats of weapons of mass destruction and are currently expanding beyond the FSU. The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004 mandated that GAO assess (1) Department of Defense (DOD) and Department of Energy (DOE) strategies guiding their threat reduction and nonproliferation programs and (2) efforts to coordinate DOD, DOE, and Department of State threat reduction and nonproliferation programs that share similar missions. GAO found that there is no overall strategy that integrates the threat reduction and nonproliferation programs of the DOD, DOE, and others. DOD and DOE have strategies governing their respective programs, which generally contain the elements of a strategy as established by the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993. These strategies include a mission statement and goals, identify external factors that could affect meeting these goals, establish metrics to evaluate the performance of the programs, provide cost estimates, and cover a period of at least 5 years. Given the involvement of multiple agencies, and the expansion of the threat reduction and nonproliferation programs beyond the FSU, integration of agencies' strategies is important. The agencies' implementation of very similar programs has not always been well coordinated. While the majority of programs in DOD and DOE are distinct, GAO found three program areas that perform similar functions in the FSU. GAO found that the coordination of programs enhancing security at Russian nuclear warhead sites improved after the National Security Council (NSC) staff issued guidance. Specifically, the guidance delineates agencies' roles, interactions, and ways to resolve disputes. The biological weapons scientist employment programs in DOD, DOE, and State are well coordinated and also have NSC staff guidance addressing roles, interactions, and disputes. By contrast, there is no governmentwide guidance delineating the roles and responsibilities of agencies managing border security programs. According to DOD and DOE officials managing these programs, agencies' roles are not well delineated and coordination could be improved.