This report (1) discusses a concerted effort to close unneeded military bases as part of wide-ranging efforts duringthe 1980s and 1990s to balance the budget. This effort had been supported by a broad consensusthat, among the approximately 3,800 military bases (1990 est.) in the United States, many could beclosed without significant detrimental effect to national security. This view became morepronounced in the wake of the Soviet Union's breakup and collapse of the Warsaw Pact militarythreat. While most analysts agreed that the Department of Defense's (DOD's) base structure waslarger than necessary to meet the department's needs, there were differences concerning which, ifany, additional bases should be closed, at what speed, and what criteria should be used for makingthose decisions. Significantly, the impact of a specific base closing would be keenly felt in one Member's stateor district, but benefits in terms of savings could be spread widely among all citizens and taxpayers. In combination, these two factors -- (1) the narrowly felt pain from an individual base closing and(2) the widely diffused benefits from closing many bases to save taxpayer funds -- produced strongincentives for coalitions of Members of Congress to bargain in the legislative process to protectmany bases from closure. (2) A statutory provision enacted by Congress in 1977 (10 U.S.C. Â§ 2687), required procedureswhich made closing a base very difficult, and no major bases were closed between 1977 and 1991. During the late 1980s, several bills were introduced in Congress to relax the statutory restrictions.The first proposal that actually broke the deadlock was the elaborate scheme prescribed by theDefense Authorization Amendments and Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1988 ( P.L. 100-526 ;102 Stat. 2623, at 2627). The procedure established under that statute -- its principal innovationswere to rely on the services of an independent commission and a fast track, no-amendment vote --proved so successful that a later statute, the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990(Title XXIX of P.L. 101-510 ; 104 Stat. 1485, at 1808), created three subsequent commissions. Thisoccurred notwithstanding the arguments of some Members against the legislation on grounds thatbase closings were, in fact, occurring without the legislation, and that the legislation was anabdication of congressional responsibilities, under the Constitution, to the executive branch. (3) A major reason for the complex procedures in the 1988 and 1990 statutes was thecongressional concern that DOD might close, or not close, bases for political reasons. In the past,high-level representatives of the Defense Department, in soliciting congressional support for favoredprograms, reportedly might imply that if a Member of Congress voted against the program, a basemight be closed in the Member's district. For example, Representative Richard K. Armey stated: The fact is, unfortunate as it is, that historically baseclosings have been used as a point of leverage by administrations, Republican and Democraticadministrations, as political leverage over and above Members of Congress to encourage them tovote in a manner that the administration would like. (4) The 1977 measure, P.L. 95-92 , provided a safeguard against arbitrary closure; it required theSecretary of Defense to submit a request for closure or realignment as part of the annualappropriations request; the request was to be accompanied by evaluations of the fiscal, localeconomic, budgetary, environmental, strategic, and operational consequences of closure orrealignment. To whatever extent concerns about politically biased closures were well-founded, it wasclear that a workable legislative remedy must be insulated from political considerations. Thus, the1988 and 1990 statutes provided for the creation of bipartisan commissions and set forth complicatedprocedures to insulate realignment and closure recommendations from politics (includingrecommendations based on specified criteria, with adequate justification), avoid potentialvote-trading that could undermine chances for change, and also accomplish the legislation'ssubstantive goal of saving funds. Among other things, the 1990 version of the law provided for three successive, eight-membercommissions that would operate in 1991, 1993, and 1995, with all eight members of eachcommission appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. (5) The President was also givenauthority to designate each commission's chairman. When selecting the commission members, thestatute stated that the President "should consult" with the Speaker of the House of Representativesconcerning the appointment of two members, the majority leader of the Senate concerning theappointment of two members, and each of the minority leaders of the House of Representatives andthe Senate, respectively, concerning the appointment of one member (for a total of six consultations). This framework did not explicitly require that the commission be composed of equal numbers ofDemocrats and Republicans. The statutes and the Base Closure and Realignment (BRAC) (6) commissions succeeded ineffecting the selective closure of many military bases and the reduction of military infrastructure. The "process" was instrumental in forcing this outcome, since, once set in motion, closurerecommendations were very difficult to stop. This impetus resulted from the fact that overall dollarsavings from the package outweighed the "pain" associated with an individual installation closureor downsizing. Specifically, under the 1990 BRAC legislation, congressional review and action took placeafter an extended and multi-tiered review and recommendation process. DOD was required tosubmit its recommendations to the commission, which in turn was required to submit its own reportand recommendations, which could differ from DOD's recommendations, to the President. After thecommission received DOD's recommendations, the General Accounting Office (GAO; now theGovernment Accountability Office) was required to transmit a report to Congress and to thecommission analyzing DOD's recommendations and selection process. The President could electto either transmit the commission's recommendations to Congress, with no opportunities forchanging them, or disapprove the commission's recommendations and not submit them to Congress. If the commission's recommendations were disapproved by the President, the commission would berequired to revise its recommendations and resubmit them to the President. If the Presidentdisapproved the commission's revised recommendations, that year's round of the BRAC processwould cease. Furthermore, the BRAC statute provided for expedited congressional procedures todisapprove commission recommendations regarding base realignments and closures, with a straightup or down vote and no possibility for amending the list. Upon receiving the commission'srecommendations from the President, Congress would need to pass a joint resolution of disapprovalof the recommendations within 45 days, or else the commission's recommendations would go intoeffect. In sum, the key elements of this process were: The DOD proposes, the commission disposes . The Secretary of Defense madethe initial recommendations for closure or realignment. The commission could, and did, add to anddelete from these recommendations. Both DOD and commission proposals had to conform with theforce structure plan developed by DOD. The President can seek changes in commission recommendations. No Presidentever challenged a commission over its recommendations, although the law provided this opportunity.If a deadlock had occurred over the closure list, the process would have terminated with thePresident's refusal to forward the list to Congress. Congress must pass a joint resolution of disapproval of the recommendationslist within 45 days, or the recommendations for closure and realignment go into effect. This wasthe only action allowed to Congress under the base closure law: a straight up or down vote, with nochanges permitted in the list of actions by the commission. Under the BRAC law, the Secretary of Defense was obligated to implement the closure andrealignment recommendations if Congress did not disapprove them. Another forcing mechanismin the law was the requirement that the selected bases close within six years from the time Congressvoted upon the recommendations. The statute further required that proceedings, information, and deliberations of thecommission be open to various chairmen and minority ranking members of congressionalcommittees or their designees, upon request. (7) Heads of federal departments and agencies were allowed to detailpersonnel to the commission, upon the commission director's request, and the Comptroller Generalwas required to provide assistance to the commission (including the detailing of GAO employees)in accordance with an agreement with the commission. Congress amended the BRAC laws over the years to lessen the economic and socialdisruption in base closure communities. These amendments included the transfer of personalproperty (such as furniture and equipment), below cost sales or transfers of real property tocommunities, and technical assistance in land planning and base reuse. On December 29, 1988, the first base closure commission (with its 12 members appointedby the Secretary of Defense Carlucci) issued its report. It recommended the closure, in part or inwhole, and realignment of 145 bases. The commission projected that this would improve theeffectiveness of the base structure, and would save an estimated $693.6 million a year in baseoperating costs. After various procedural requirements of the statute were met, culminating withCongress's tacit approval by not adopting a joint resolution of disapproval, the Secretary of Defensewas required to close or realign the listed bases by September 30, 1995. The first base -- Pease AirForce Base, NH -- was closed in the spring of 1991. One commission member, former Senator Thomas Eagleton, criticized the cooperation ofthe services in the process, singling out the Navy for "stonewalling" and "getting away with it." Inhis additional views in the 1988 report, he suggested starting with the Navy in any future baseclosing effort. While the commission approach taken in the 1988 statute was generally regarded byCongress as successful, DOD took the position that the closure of military bases is essentially anexecutive branch function. Accordingly, early in 1990, Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney issuedanother list of bases which Congress should consider for possible closure. Representative Les Aspinof Wisconsin, chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, rejected the list as including adisproportionate number of bases in Democratic districts, and stated that the only fair way to developa new list of base closures was to enact legislation creating another commission. Such a commissionwas then created by P.L. 101-510 , dated November 5, 1990. The earlier commission had beendisbanded after the submission of its final report. As provided for by statute, the new commission consisted of eight members appointed by thePresident, with the advice and consent of the Senate. In selecting individuals to be nominated formembership on the commission, the President was directed to consult with the Speaker of the Houseof Representatives concerning the appointment of two members; the majority leader of the Senateconcerning the appointment of an additional two members; and the minority leaders of the Houseand Senate for one member each. As noted, the commission was to meet in 1991 and, asreconstituted, again in 1993 and 1995. Another requirement was that not more than one-third of thepersonnel employed by or detailed to the commission staff could be on detail from DOD. The procedures provided by the 1990 law were substantially more complicated than thoseset forth by its predecessor. The major difference lay in the fact that the initial recommendations onbase closures made under the new statute were to be made by the Secretary of Defense. For example, in the 1991 round of base closure recommendations, DOD's recommendationswere transmitted to the commission, where they were reviewed. The commission's ownrecommendations, which differed in several important respects from DOD's, were then sent to thePresident (July 1, 1991). After his review and approval, the President transmitted the commission'sreport to Congress. If he had not approved of the report, in whole or in part, the President would havebeen obliged to explain his reasons for disapproval to both Congress and the commission. Thecommission would then have transmitted to the President a revised list of recommended closures. The procedure was, in fact, somewhat more complicated than this description -- for example, theComptroller General was directed to assist the commission -- and there was considerably more detailset forth in the current statute than there was in the earlier one. However, it may be said, in general,that the changes were designed (1) to insulate the entire process even further from politicalconsiderations, as indicated by the provisions requiring that the commission meet only during thenon-election years 1991, 1993, and 1995; and (2) make the process more open to the public. P.L. 101-510 included other provisions of significance to the base closure program. For onething, it directed the Secretary of Defense to ensure that the environmental restoration of the closedbases took place as soon as possible. Secondly, it specifically authorized the Secretary to provide"outplacement assistance" to civilian employees of the Defense Department at installations beingclosed. A third important difference lay in the way overseas bases were treated. These bases werenot within the commission's jurisdiction; their closure was an important issue, but, presumably, notaffected by the same political considerations that would require the appointment of a bipartisancommission. The 1990 statute, nevertheless, contained a policy statement that did not appear in theprevious one ( P.L. 100-526 ). First, it was declared to be the "sense of Congress" that militaryoperations at overseas bases be terminated at the discretion of the Secretary of Defense "at theearliest opportunity." Secondly, it was the sense of Congress that, in providing for termination, theSecretary of Defense "should take steps to ensure that the United States receives, through directpayment or otherwise, consideration equal to the fair market value of the improvements made by theUnited States at facilities that will be released to host countries." In practice, if the decision to closean overseas base was made, there were negotiations with the host nation weighing the U.S. costs ofconstructing and improving the facilities against the estimates for environmental or otherremediation required at closing. These last considerations would be under the terms of the hostnation agreement when the U.S. built or took over the facility. Another feature of the statute was the establishment of a "base closure account," into whichrevenues generated from the sale of closing bases would be placed; the funds could then be used topay for the expenses associated with the relocation of forces, such as new construction orrehabilitation of existing facilities at receiving bases. There were also several provisions designed to assist DOD in carrying out Congress' baseclosure policy. The 1990 statute required the Defense Department to publish its proposed criteriafor selecting bases to be closed. These proposed criteria were included in the Federal Register forNovember 30, 1990. There followed a period during which public comments were received, andthen on February 15, 1991, the final criteria, which contained a few changes, were published. Thesefinal criteria were subject to congressional disapproval by joint resolution until March 15, 1991, butno such resolution was adopted. The language included in the Federal Register stated that, inselecting military installations for closure or realignment, DOD was to consider the following: military value, return on investment, and impact. Military Value Current and future mission requirements and the impact on operationalreadiness of the Department of Defense's total force. Availability and condition of land, facilities and associated airspace at both theexisting and potential receiving locations. Ability to accommodate contingency, mobilization, and future total forcerequirements at both the existing and potential receiving locations. Cost and manpower implications. Return on Investment Extent and timing of potential costs and savings, including the number of years,beginning with the date of completion of the closure or realignment, for the savings to exceed thecost. Impact Economic impact on communities. Ability of both the existing and potential receiving communities' infrastructureto support forces, missions, and personnel. Environmental impact. After the publication of these criteria, the Secretary of Defense, on April 12, 1991, announceda new list of proposed base closures. Analysts on the staff of the House Armed Services Committeeestimated that the closings would eliminate approximately 70,000 military and civilian jobs by 1997,or 3.3% of the military's 2.1 million personnel. A number of Senators and Congressmen objectedto proposed closures in their various jurisdictions, but in general Congress appeared to find the listmore acceptable than the one announced by Secretary Cheney in January 1990. RepresentativeAspin stated that the list "at first glance appears to be fair." On the other hand, RepresentativeJoseph Moakley of Massachusetts concluded that: "It almost looks like the Democratic strongholdshave been hit the worst." Secretary Cheney, claiming that he did not know how many bases werein Democratic and how many in Republican districts, asserted that: "There is nothing to be gainedby a secretary of defense trying to play base closings for some political purpose." The second phase in the base closure process was then initiated, with the commission holdinga number of statutorily mandated public hearings in various parts of the country. Many Membersof Congress, as well as other witnesses, testified regarding the process, merits, and impacts of thepossible closings. Press accounts of commission hearings indicated that much of the testimony byMembers of Congress objected to a specific, individual closure. The commission report noted that"Community and elected leaders were tireless advocates for their military installations." Oneobjection was that there was too little time, and too little independent expertise in the commission,to permit a complete evaluation of DOD's recommendations. However, the commission chairman,James Courter (a former Republican representative from New Jersey), indicated that complying withthe July 1 deadline was not a problem. He had also stated, on several occasions, that the commissionwas an independent body, and that it would not rubber-stamp DOD's recommendations. On May 31, 1991, the commission issued a list of "preliminary candidates for base closure." Subsequently, after concluding its deliberations, the commission released its "final" list of 82proposed closures and realignments on July 1, 1991. In its recommendations, the 1991 basecommission largely accepted the list proposed by Secretary of Defense Cheney. However, it madea few significant changes -- the most important involving six bases selected by DOD for closure. The commission recommended that Ft. Chaffee (AR) and Ft. Dix (NJ) be realigned, and that FortMcClellan (AL), Naval Training Center Orlando (FL), Naval Air Station Whidbey Island (WA), andMoody Air Force Base (GA), remain open. An important aspect of the base closure statute was the mandated role for GAO. GAO issueda report, dated May 1991, containing detailed comments about the various methods used by DODas a basis for its recommendations. The report, Military Bases: Observations on the AnalysesSupporting Proposed Closures and Realignments , also contained important information aboutindividual bases. The report is too lengthy to permit an adequate summary here, but it is noteworthythat (1) the Army's recommendations were found by GAO to be "well supported"; (2) in the case ofthe Air Force, GAO found generally that "the rationale was adequately supported by documentation";and (3) as regards the Navy, GAO found that it used "inadequate documentation," so that "GAO wasunable to independently evaluate the relative military value of the bases considered." On July 10, 1991, President George Bush approved the independent commission'srecommendations for closure, in compliance with the procedures prescribed by law, and transmittedthem to Congress. The closings proposed by the commission would, by its estimate, cost $4.1 billionfrom 1992 to 1997, but would save about $1.5 billion a year thereafter. The statute gave Congress45 days to overturn the recommendations by joint resolution. No such action took place. Many Members of Congress expressed concern over the impact of new closures on the livesof people in their districts and states. Concern with the possibility of widespread unemployment incertain affected communities and with the validity of military valuations of competing basesprompted calls for reversal of commission decisions in a number of specific cases. Members statedthese and other arguments during House floor debate (see the Congressional Record of July 30,1991). Recommendations to close the Philadelphia Naval Shipyard and Naval Station and LoringAir Force Base in Maine drew extended comment from Members. A more broadly based reactionon Capitol Hill was to seek increased funding for programs which would provide an economic"safety net" for those adversely affected by closures. (8) Earlier, on July 23, the House Armed Services Subcommittee on Military Installations andFacilities voted to support the recommendations of the Defense Base Closure and RealignmentCommission. Before the vote, the subcommittee heard testimony from several Members of Congressin opposition to the commission's recommendations. In general, they objected to the lack ofcoordination between the three military departments in making their recommendations to thecommission. There were also specific complaints that the closure of certain medical facilities wouldresult in inconvenience and higher medical costs to persons currently using those facilities. Mostof these concerns and examples would be raised again in floor debate the following week. On July 24, 1991, the House Committee on Armed Services favorably adopted the report ofits subcommittee, and endorsed the commission's recommendations. On July 30, by a vote of 60 to364, the House rejected a resolution disapproving (and, thereby, tacitly approving) therecommendations of the commission. The Senate then had no need to consider their resolution ofdisapproval, as rejection of the commission's recommendations required both bodies to agree tooverride. The Senate 1992 Defense Authorization bill, S. 1507 , contained severalprovisions that would have facilitated transfers of real property at closing bases to localcommunities. These provisions were contained in the Johnston-Breaux amendment, which theSenate had adopted after its introduction on the floor. The amendment would have made two majorchanges in existing law: (1) it would have provided that if a community near a closed base wassignificantly harmed, local governments would have first priority in obtaining excess propertylocated there, although for the past forty years other federal agencies have been given this priorityby statute; (2) it would have provided that these recipients would be offered the property at no cost,although in the past such transfers have generally been made on a reimbursable basis. Theseprovisions were deleted in conference, however. The conference report, H.Rept. 102-311,acknowledged the existing obstacles to base reuse, but found that the proposed changes raised otherproblems: loss of revenue from property sales, displacement of existing land allocation priorities,and conflicts with environmental laws, among others. The committees of jurisdiction had notconsidered the changes, the report said, but added that the House of Representatives pledged toreview the matters in 1992. The conferees clarified the congressional intent that civil works, river and harbor projects,and other activities of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, were to be excluded from the base closureprogram. The impending closure of substantial numbers of bases raised several difficult environmentalproblems. Under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act(CERCLA), also known as "Superfund," the U.S. Government could not transfer land outside federalownership until it agreed that all remedial action necessary to protect human health and theenvironment had been taken. Since the communities adjoining bases programmed for closuregenerally wish to obtain the land quickly, while the decontamination process found necessary torestore the environment could be time-consuming, serious conflicts between the interests ofeconomic development and the interests of environmental restoration could occur. There have been many federal environmental statutes enacted in recent years, and there arealso a number of relevant state laws. In general, Congress and the courts have made it fairly clearthat federal facilities must comply with state and local environmental requirements, but until recentlyit was not entirely clear that state authorities could impose penalties on federal facilities that werein violation. This problem was addressed by the Federal Facilities Compliance Act, whichspecifically provides that states and municipalities have this authority. As the base closure program accelerated, it became increasingly important to convert thebases to nonmilitary use as expeditiously as possible. It has been DOD policy to negotiate with alocal organization, often referred to as a "reuse committee," that represents the various communityinterests, but at some bases the competing cities and counties have found themselves unable tocooperate even to the extent of forming such an organization. In one case, where the base wasincluded on the 1988 list, and the closure actually took place in 1992, lawsuits among localjurisdictions delayed implementation of a reuse plan until February 1995. On January 5, 1993, President Bush submitted a list of eight nominees for appointment toa newly reconstituted Base Closure and Realignment Commission. He selected James Courter, the1991 commission chairman, to be head of the new group. These were subsequently confirmed bythe Senate. The 1993 commission, after reviewing DOD's list of recommended closures (submittedon March 12, 1993) and holding extensive public hearings, recommended closing 130 bases andrealigning 45 others. Congress acceded to the commission's recommendations by declining to passa joint resolution of disapproval. These actions were expected to result in savings of approximately$4 billion between FY1994 and FY1999, after one-time closure costs of approximately $7 billion,and additional annual savings in the range of $2.3 billion thereafter. On May 23, 1994, the Supreme Court unanimously decided that decisions to close militarybases were not subject to judicial review. Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing the opinion of the Court,held that although the Administrative Procedure Act provides for judicial review of a "final agencyaction," the President was not an agency within the meaning of that statute, and his decisions weretherefore not reviewable. In the lower court decision which the Supreme Court reversed, it wassuggested that the President's authority to close bases was limited to those situations where there hadbeen "compliance with statutory procedures" by the Secretary of Defense and the base closurecommission. Attorneys arguing for judicial review contended that "the commission used impropercriteria, failed to place certain information in the record until after the close of public hearings, andheld closed meetings with the Navy." The Supreme Court, was not, however convinced by thesearguments, and held that "The President's authority to act is not contingent on the secretary's andcommission's fulfillment of all the procedural requirements imposed on them by the 1990 [baseclosure] act." In a concurring opinion, Justice Souter, joined by three other justices, examined thelegislative history of the base closure statute and made specific reference to the fact that "Congresswas intimately familiar with repeated, unsuccessful, efforts to close military bases in a rational andtimely manner." Accordingly, Congress adopted the complicated procedures of the base closure actto "bind its hands from untying a package of [base closures]." Consequently, "Congress did notmean the courts to have any such power through judicial review." On June 23, 1994, Senator ArlenSpecter of Pennsylvania, who had argued unsuccessfully in the Supreme Court that base closuredecisions were subject to judicial review, introduced an amendment to the defense authorization actwhich would have provided for such review in certain cases where there was evidence of "fraudulentconcealment" of information relevant to a particular decision. The amendment was rejected by atabling motion, after debate. Opponents argued, among other things, that the amendment wouldopen a "Pandora's box," in which virtually all aggrieved communities would initiate lawsuits. As the process of closure and realignment took place, generally in accordance withannounced schedules, several changes in statutory procedure were enacted in FY1994 and FY1995defense authorization bills -- as well as in other bills. Notable among these was the Base ClosureCommunity Redevelopment and Homeless Assistance Act of 1994 (PL 103-421). It reduced thescope of the McKinney Homeless Assistance Act provision that gave organizations that served thehomeless a priority claim to federal property that was declared surplus. Under the new law, localcommunities would exercise a greater degree of influence and control over disposition of surplusproperty through their redevelopment planning process. The process included consideration ofhomeless needs in the community, and that portion of the reuse plan was subject to review by theSecretary of Housing and Urban Development. Additional details on this aspect of base reuse arefound in the Department of Housing and Urban Development March 1966 publication, Guidebookon Military Base Reuse and Homeless Assistance . An October 1994 report, Uncovering the Shell Game: Why Military Facilities Don't StayClosed , issued by Business Executives for National Security, a Washington, DC, independent studygroup, claimed that of the 67 major bases scheduled to be closed, 26 had reopened, or else werenever closed in the first place. As a result, the report went on to state, the substantial savingsoriginally envisaged were not achieved. DOD argued that some of the figures used in the report werewrong. For example, in the case of Carswell AFB, which the Air Force had intended to close, theBENS report stated that maintenance of the base cost an annual $197 million. On the other hand,DOD claimed that the costs were only $15 million. The BENS report, also, noted that after Carswellwas closed by the Air Force, it was reopened by the Navy as the Fort Worth Naval Air Station. DODargued that the Navy achieved savings through this action by consolidating its activities previouslylocated at Detroit, Memphis, and Dallas, and closing those stations. In November 1994, GAO's report Military Bases: Reuse Plans for Selected Bases Closed in1988 and 1991 , analyzed reuse plans of 37 major closed military bases. It pointed out that althoughDOD originally estimated it would realize $4.1 billion in property sales revenue from closed bases,in 1994 the estimate was reduced to $1.2 billion. The most important reason for this change,according to the report, was that: Consistent with federal regulations, the vast majorityof the disposed property is being retained by DOD or transferred to other federal agencies and statesand localities at no cost. The GAO report noted that widespread use of no-cost transfers was greatly facilitated by theenactment of provisions in the FY1994 DOD authorization act, which authorized such transferswhere the property was to be used for economic development. When the base closure program wasinitiated in 1988, considerable emphasis was placed on the substantial revenues to be deposited inthe base closure account from the sale of surplus bases. However, this emphasis shifted to assistingthe economic recovery of communities affected by a closure. This was evidenced by the provisionsadopted in the FY1994 DOD authorization act (Title XXIX of PL 103-160). The major impact wasprobably from section 2903, which provided for a transfer of real property to a redevelopmentauthority "for consideration at or below the estimated fair market value," but other provisions werepart of the same general scheme. Section 2904 provided for "expedited determination oftransferability of excess property;" and section 2906 provided for the outleasing of property at basesto be closed, pending final disposition. The GAO report discussed other aspects of the base closure program, such as the largeamounts of military land that were severely contaminated. Apart from decontamination, other typesof improvement might be found necessary: for instance, sewage and electrical systems might requireupgrading and buildings might have to be brought into compliance with local, state, and federalstandards. Finally, the report indicated that of the property remaining in federal ownership, 50%would go to the Fish and Wildlife Service, 22% to the Bureau of Land Management, and 24% wouldremain with the Department of Defense. Smaller acreages would go to the Bureau of Prisons,NASA, and the National Park Service. While the basic statutory scheme for determining which installations were to be closed wasgenerally the same as it was in 1990, the 104th Congress came under Republican control. Severalissues associated with base closure, including costs and savings, were included on the oversight planfiled by the House National Security Committee at the start of the new Congress, holding out thepossibility of changes. An important development took place on January 26, 1995, when Secretaryof Defense William J. Perry, addressing the nation's mayors, stated that the final round of closings"will not be as large as the last one." He also commented, in connection with the base closureprogram, that "we have closed all of the bases that were relatively easy to close," but that DOD still"need(s) to close more bases from the point of view of saving infrastructure..." Former Senator Alan Dixon of Illinois was nominated and confirmed as chairman of the 1995commission in October 1994, before the 103rd Congress adjourned. On February 7, 1995, President Clinton announced the following appointments to the finalBase Realignment and Closure Commission authorized by P.L. 101-510 : Al Cornella, a Vietnam veteran who runs a refrigerationbusiness in Rapid City, SD; Rebecca G. Cox, a vice-president of ContinentalAirlines who, during the Reagan Administration was director of the White House Office of PublicLiaison and Deputy Assistant Secretary of Transportation for Public Affairs; Retired Air Force Gen. J.B. Davis, a former combatfighter pilot who became Chief of Staff at Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers, Europe; S. Lee Kling, a former finance chairman of theDemocratic National Committee who is chairman of the board of Kling Rechter & Co., a merchantbanking company in Missouri; Retired Rear Admiral Benjamin F. Montoya. presidentof Public Service Co. of New Mexico; Wendi L. Steele, who served in 1991 as Senate liaisonto the Commission; Michael P. W. Stone, former Secretary of the Army,who is a director of BEI Electronics in San Francisco. This nomination was subsequentlywithdrawn. Retired Army Major General Josue Robles, Jr., was laternominated to replace Stone. These nominees were confirmed by the Senate on March 2, 1995. Earlier, on December 1,1994, President Clinton submitted a "dummy" list of commissioners, including Deputy DefenseSecretary John Deutch. This met the requirement for submission of a list of candidates prior to theJanuary 3 deadline set by law, and allowed the White House and new Republican majority inCongress to consider other names, later. The Department of Defense on February 28, 1995 released the Base Closure andRealignment Report setting out proposed actions affecting 146 military installations for theconsideration of the BRAC Commission. Thirty-three major bases were listed for closure, and34,200 civilian jobs would be lost under the recommendations. Although former Secretary ofDefense Les Aspin had suggested that the 1995 BRAC round would be "the mother of all baseclosure rounds," the actual recommendations touched fewer bases than did the 1993 round. Secretary Perry stated in his press conference of February 28 that reduction of infrastructuresignificantly lagged personnel reduction, 21% versus 33% through the first three closure rounds. DOD estimated aggregated savings of about $57 billion over 20 years, from this and the previousthree rounds. On May 10, the commission added 31 installations to the list of bases to be considered forpossible closure or realignment. The chairman emphasized that inclusion of a base on the list didnot mean the base would close or be realigned, but would allow a fairer assessment of closurecandidates. Indeed, in 1993, the commission added 70 bases for further consideration, but, in theend, made few final recommendations that differed from the DOD list. Nevertheless, thecommission's views seemed somewhat different from DOD's. For example, the DOD list includedonly one major shipyard (Long Beach, California) for closure, but the commission added Portsmouthshipyard in Kittery, Maine for consideration. The commission also added Air Force depots atMcClellan AFB, California and Kelly AFB, Texas. The latter additions would prove to be moremomentous. During May and June -- and prior to its final vote on June 22 -- the commission heldnumerous regional hearings. One of the commissioners stated that between 70 and 80 installationshad been visited. In one major difference, although the Air Force had recommended retaining allfive maintenance depots, with a reduced workload, the commission put all the depots on a list to beconsidered for possible closure or realignment. On June 22, the commission began its final vote, and announced its first set ofrecommendations on closures and realignments, after reviewing 40% of the recommendationssubmitted by DOD. It made substantial changes in several of the Air Force recommendations: theAir Force had wanted to close Rome Laboratory, NY, but the commission voted to keep it open. TheAir Force also wished to retain all five of its maintenance depots while reducing their workloads, butunder the commission's plan, both Kelly AFB, TX, and McClellan AFB, CA, would be virtuallyclosed. Kelly itself would remain open, although the depot would close; McClellan would closeentirely. A number of Navy laboratories were also scheduled to be closed. On June 30, the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission sent its 1995 Reportto the President to President Clinton. The report recommended the closure of 79 bases (including28 major ones), the realignment of 26 bases (including 21 major ones), and a number ofdisestablishments or relocations. Chairman Dixon stated that implementing these actions would save$19.3 billion over 20 years, but would cost an estimated 94 thousand jobs. The biggest closureswould be McClellan AFB, CA, Long Beach Naval Shipyard, CA, and Fort McClellan, AL. The twoCalifornia senators urged President Clinton to reject the commission's recommendations. On theother hand, several Republican congressmen stated that rejection of the report would impair theintegrity of the base closure process (see, for example, CQ , July 1, 1995, pp. 1939-1941); no reporthad been rejected since the base closure program was initiated in 1988. The 1995 report, however,was the first in which the commission had recommended more savings than those proposed by theAdministration. On July 13, President Clinton approved the commission's report, as submitted. In histransmittal message to Congress, he expressed serious reservations because of the severe economicimpact that would be suffered by California and Texas. He stated that California had alreadysuffered disproportionately by bearing about half the defense job losses in the three previous rounds,and the latest recommendations would also result in California losing about half the jobs, althoughit was responsible for only about 15% of the military work force. In its initial report to thecommission, the Defense Department had strongly opposed the closing of McClellan Air Force Base,Sacramento, Ca., and Kelly Air Force Base, San Antonio, Tx., for the reason that closure woulddisrupt Air Force operations and undermine the Air Force's ability to carry out some of itsmodernization programs. In his July 13, 1995 transmittal message Clinton defended privatization. He said he wouldview as a violation of the base closure law any effort by Congress to restrict privatization afterapproving the base closure package. Representative James V. Hansen stated a contrary view inremarks contained in H.Rept. 104-220 , which accompanied the resolution of disapproval, H.J.Res. 102 . He said, in part, "the President's direction to 'privatize-in-place,' and thePentagon's plan for implementation, appear to be in violation of several sections of current law." On July 26, the House National Security Committee rejected, by a vote of 43-10, a resolutionintroduced by Representative Frank Tejeda (D., Tx.) that would have overturned the commission'sbase closure and realignment recommendations. On September 8, the House rejected the resolutionof disapproval by a vote of 345-75. The administration plan for privatizing some of the operationsat Kelly AFB, Texas, and McClellan AFB, California was a point of controversy. President Clinton told Kelly AFB workers in an October 17, 1996 speech that, "for five moreyears, Kelly will keep the jobs that would be here if closure had not been recommended, and eveneight years from now, more than two-thirds of Kelly's jobs will still be here." Employment at Kellywhen it was recommended for closure was about 16,000. At McClellan AFB, some 8,700 of the 11,000 jobs were to be protected for the next fiveyears, after which privatization would take place, with the expectation that as many as 4,300 jobswill shift to non-government employers, according to DOD estimates. In 1996, the Air Forceidentified work at the two depots to be bid competitively as part of the privatization effort. Critics contended that the two depots were recommended for closure by the 1995 BRACCommission because the five Air Force depots had excess capacity, and that the closures would shiftwork so as to more fully utilize the capacity of the remaining open depots. Continued operation withprivatization, they contended, would continue the overcapacity and undercut the commission'sprojected savings from closure of McClellan and Kelly. In conformance with the authorizing statute, by December 31, 1995, the commissioncompleted its mission and went out of existence. Creation of a new BRAC commission wouldrequire new authorizing legislation by Congress. The process of closing previously selected military bases continued. Congress amended thebase closing statute a number of times in order to help local communities shift quickly to neweconomic uses of the land and resources left behind. The National Defense Authorization Act forFY1996 ( P.L. 104-106 ), for instance, added several base closure provisions which addressed suchsubjects as environmental remediation, the lease back of property to the federal government, and theperformance of police and similar services at closed installations. Additional changes werecontained in the FY1997 National Defense Authorization Act ( P.L. 104-201 ): principally, bases fromthe 1988 closure round were made eligible for several provisions available for bases closed underlater rounds. (9) . The RAND National Defense Research Institute has also studied the impact of base closures,concentrating on several non-metropolitan communities in California. Their 1996 report, The Effectsof Military Base Closures on Local Communities: A Short-Term Perspective , concluded that "Whilesome of the communities did indeed suffer, the effects were not catastrophic (and) not nearly assevere as forecasted," and, "the burden of defense cuts falls on the individual worker or firm ratherthan the community." (p.xii) There is a wide variety among military bases, ranging from those with a training mission anda high percentage of military personnel to support facilities such as shipyards and depots staffedprimarily with civilians. There are great differences in the settings in which military installationsare found, from lightly populated rural areas to robust, economically diversified metropolitan centers. Base closure impacts clearly differ with individual circumstances. Thus, RAND noted, "(C)losuresof major facilities such as Mare Island or Long Beach may have serious effects on the displacedworkers, but the effects on the local community are muted by the fact that the community isembedded in a much larger economy..." (p.12) It was clear to many observers that individual workers and firms would be adversely affectedas the base closures and realignments laid out by the four commissions were completed. Theircommunities, possibly suffering at least initial disruption, however, might gain in the long run. Emerging experience indicated that more jobs, not less, followed many, but not all, closures.

Summary: The United States has experienced difficulty in closing military bases to match therequirements of downsized forces with changed composition. During the decade of the 1980s, majormilitary base closures were seriously hampered by procedural requirements established by Congress,to the point that none occurred. The mismatch between real estate assets and defense requirementsgrew with the military downsizing that began late in the Reagan Administration and continued underPresidents George H. W. Bush and Clinton. After several legislative efforts to break the deadlock had failed, Congress established a newbase closure procedure in P.L. 100-526 , enacted October 24, 1988. The statute provided for abipartisan commission, appointed by the Secretary of Defense, to make recommendations toCongress on closures and realignments to be voted down or accepted as a whole. The process wassuccessfully implemented, but produced complaints of partisanship in selecting bases for closure. P.L. 101-510 , enacted November 5, 1990, provided new authority for additional base closurerecommendations by a series of presidentially appointed commissions (with the advice and consentof the Senate), commonly called Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) commissions. Thesecommissions were to operate in 1991, 1993, and 1995, after which the authority of the final baseclosure commission would end. The four commissions recommended closure of 98 major bases and hundreds of smallerinstallations, and the realignment of many other bases and facilities. These recommendations wereestimated to be implemented and completed by the year 2001. The Department of Defense at onetime estimated savings of about $57 billion over 20 years. At the community level, in turn, implementation of the base closure process commenced. Congress has amended the base closure legislation several times to protect and assist communitiesas they adjust to the social and economic stress caused by the loss of military installations. Many,but by no means all, communities appeared to be succeeding in local efforts to replace defense jobsand find new uses for former military lands and buildings. After expiration of the authorizing legislation, a number of influential leaders recommendedestablishment of a new commission and the closure of additional bases and facilities. Theseadvocates included the chairman of the 1995 commission, Alan Dixon, former Defense SecretaryWilliam Perry, and Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman John Shalikashvili. In Congress, many felt thatinfrastructure costs diverted money from modernization and sapped the readiness of America's armedforces. Against these pressures to cut military real estate further was caution concerning furthermilitary cuts, as well as the traditional reluctance of Senators and Representatives to lose federal jobsand disrupt communities in their state or district. Subsequently, new authorizing legislation by the Congress was required to reconstitute baseclosure and realignment through the commission approach.