The National Security Act of 1947 (P.L. 80-253) established the statutory framework for themanagerial structure of the United States Intelligence Community, including the Central IntelligenceAgency (CIA) and the position of Director of Central Intelligence (DCI). A fundamental intent ofthis legislation was to coordinate, and to a certain extent centralize, the nascent intelligence effortsof the United States as an emergent superpower in the face of a hostile Soviet Union. In addition,the act provided the CIA with the ability to assume an operational role by charging it with: Perform[ing] such other functions and duties related to intelligence affecting the national security as the National Security Council may from time to timedirect. (1) In 1947, the foundation of the present-day Intelligence Community consisted only of therelatively small intelligence components in the Armed Services, the Departments of State and theTreasury, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and the fledgling CIA. Since 1947, however,the Intelligence Community "has greatly expanded in size and acquired a much broader range ofresponsibilities in the collection, analysis, and dissemination of foreign intelligence." (2) The U.S. Intelligence Community is defined in the National Security Act as amended. It currently includes the following: Central Intelligence Agency; National Security Agency; Defense Intelligence Agency; National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency; National Reconnaissance Office; Intelligence elements of the Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, the FederalBureau of Investigation, the Department of the Treasury, the Department of Energy, and the CoastGuard; Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department ofState; Elements of the Department of Homeland Security concerned with analysesof foreign intelligence information; and Coast Guard. (3) Beginning in January 1948, numerous independent commissions, individual experts, and legislative initiatives have examined the growth and evolving mission of the IntelligenceCommunity. Proposals by these groups have sought to address perceived shortcomings in theIntelligence Community's structure, management, role, and mission. These proposals have rangedin scope from basic organizational restructuring to the dissolution of the CIA. In 1948 and 1949, two executive branch commissions examined the intelligence and operational missions of the CIA, and identified fundamental administrative and organizational loopholes in P.L.80-253. By the 1950s, however, the physical growth and evolving mission of the IntelligenceCommunity led subsequent commissions to broaden the scope of their proposals to include theenhancement of the DCI's community-wide authority, and the establishment of executive andlegislative branch intelligence oversight committees. Unlike the intelligence investigations of the1970s and 1980s, these early studies were primarily concerned with questions of efficiency andeffectiveness rather than with issues of legality and propriety. Following the Vietnam War and "Watergate," investigatory bodies became increasingly critical of the national intelligence effort. Beginning in the mid-1970s, the impetus shifted to the legislativebranch where investigatory committees led by Senator Frank Church and Representative Otis G. Pikeissued a broad range of proposals, including the separation of the DCI and CIA Director positions,dividing the CIA's analytical and operational responsibilities into two separate agencies, and theestablishment of congressional oversight committees. In 1976 and 1977, respectively,recommendations by the these committees led to the establishment of the Senate Select Committeeon Intelligence (SSCI) and the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI). Thesecommittees were heavily involved in the investigations into the Iran-Contra affair of the mid-1980s. With the end of the Cold War, and in the wake of the Aldrich Ames espionage case, both the executive and legislative branches undertook studies to determine the future roles, capabilities,management, and structure of the Intelligence Community. These studies include such issues as theneed to maintain the CIA as a separate entity, the extent and competence of U.S. counterintelligence(CI) efforts, and the managerial structure of intelligence components in the armed services and theDepartment of Defense (DOD). A comprehensive examination of the DCI's roles, responsibilities,authorities, and status was also undertaken. In an era of budgetary constraints and shifting policyconcerns, these studies also examined personnel issues, allocation of resources, duplication ofservices, expanded use of open source Intelligence (OSCINT), and the need for maintaining a covertaction (CA) capability. The results of this effort were reflected in organizational adjustments madeby the Intelligence Authorization Act for FY1997 ( P.L. 104-293 ), but some observers havesubsequently concluded that this legislation did not go far enough and that, in the light of the eventsof September 11, 2001 and the Iraq War, intelligence organization questions need to be reevaluated. The history of these investigations has witnessed the gradual transformation of intelligence from a White House asset to one that is shared between the executive and legislative branches. Congressnot only has access to intelligence judgments but to most information that intelligence agenciesacquire as well as to the details of intelligence activities. Congress has accepted some responsibilityas a participant in the planning and conduct of covert actions. In significant measure, this processhas been encouraged by these external intelligence investigations. This report provides a chronological overview and examination of the major executive and legislative branch intelligence investigations made from January 1949 to date. Major proposals arelisted in chronological order with a brief discussion of their respective results. Proposals specificallyrelating to congressional oversight of the Intelligence Community are not included in this report. Following the Second World War, the United States emerged as a global political, military, and economic leader. In the face of Soviet aggressiveness, the U.S. sought to enhance its nationaldefense capabilities to curb the international spread of communism and to provide security for thenation itself. The National Security Act (P.L. 80-253), signed July 26, 1947, established the statutory framework for the managerial structure of the United States Intelligence Community, including theCentral Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the position of Director of Central Intelligence (DCI). Theact also created a semi-unified military command structure under a Secretary of Defense, and aNational Security Council (NSC) to advise the President "with respect to the integration of domestic,foreign, and military policies relating to the national security." (4) The fundamental intent of thislegislation was to coordinate U.S. national defense efforts, including intelligence activities, in theface of a Soviet Union intent upon expanding and leading a system of communist states. In response to the rapid growth and changing role of the Federal government following theSecond World War, several studies were conducted to examine the structure and efficiency of theexecutive branch, including the intelligence agencies. (5) Between 1948 and 1949, two importantinvestigations of the national intelligence effort were conducted. The first, the Task Force onNational Security Organization of the First Hoover Commission, was established by a unanimousvote in Congress. The second, known as the Dulles-Jackson-Correa Report, was initiated by theNSC at the request of President Harry S. Truman. The Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the government was established pursuant to P.L. 80-162 of July 27, 1947. (6) Underthe chairmanship of former President HerbertHoover, the twelve member bipartisan commission conducted a comprehensive review of the federalbureaucracy, including the intelligence agencies. The commission's Task Force on National SecurityOrganization was headed by Ferdinand Eberstadt, a strong advocate of a centralized intelligencecapability who had been instrumental in drafting the National Security Act of 1947. (7) Hearings conducted by the task force began in June 1948. On January 13, 1949, the Hoover Commission submitted the task force's 121 page unclassified report to Congress. (8) Known as theEberstadt Report, it found the "National Security Organization, established by the National SecurityAct of 1947, [to be] soundly constructed, but not yet working well." (9) The report identifiedfundamental organizational and qualitative shortcomings in the national intelligence effort and thenewly created CIA. A principal concern of the task force was the adversarial relationship and lack of coordination between the CIA, the military, and the State Department. It suggested that this resulted inunnecessary duplication and the issuance of departmental intelligence estimates that "have oftenbeen subjective and biased." (10) In large measure,the military and State Department were blamed fortheir failure to consult and share pertinent information with the CIA. The task force recommended"that positive efforts be made to foster relations of mutual confidence between the [CIA] and theseveral departments and agencies that it serves." (11) In short, the report stressed that the CIA "must be the central organization of the nationalintelligence system." (12) To facilitate communitycoordination in the production of national estimates,a founding intent of CIA, the task force recommended the creation within CIA "at the top echelonan evaluation board or section composed of competent and experienced personnel who would haveno administrative responsibilities and whose duties would be confined solely to intelligenceevaluation." (13) To foster professionalism andcontinuity of service, the report also favored a civilianDCI with a long term in office. (14) In the arena of covert operations and clandestine intelligence, the Eberstadt Report supported the integration of all clandestine operations into one office within CIA, under NSC supervision. Toalleviate concerns expressed by the military who viewed this proposal as encroaching upon theirprerogatives, the report stated that clandestine operations should be the responsibility of the JointChiefs of Staff (JCS) in time of war. (15) In examining the daily workings of the CIA, the task force found the agency's internal structure and personnel system "not now properly organized." (16) This led to recommendations for the adoptionof clearer lines of departmental responsibilities, and the establishment of proper personnel selectionand training systems. (17) In response to legislativeconcerns regarding intelligence budgets, the reportsupported establishing a legal framework for budgetary procedures and authorities, and inmaintaining the secrecy of the CIA budget in order to provide the "administrative flexibility andanonymity that are essential to satisfactory intelligence." (18) The report also addressed, and rejected,the possibility of placing the FBI's counterintelligence responsibilities in the CIA. (19) Of particular concern was the level of professionalism in military intelligence, and the glaring inadequacies of medical and scientific intelligence, including biological and chemical warfare,electronics, aerodynamics, guided missiles, atomic weapons, and nuclear energy. (20) The reportdeclared that the failure to appraise scientific advances in hostile countries (i.e., the Soviet Union)might have more immediate and catastrophic consequences than failure in any other field ofintelligence. Accordingly, the report stressed that the U.S. should establish a central authority "tocollect, collate, and evaluate scientific and medical intelligence." (21) On January 8, 1948, the National Security Council established the Intelligence Survey Group (ISG) to "evaluate the CIA's effort and its relationship with other agencies." (22) Commissioned at therequest of President Truman, the group was composed of Allen W. Dulles, who had served in theOffice of Strategic Services (OSS) during the Second World War and would become DCI in 1953,William Jackson, a future Deputy DCI, and Matthias Correa, a former assistant to Secretary ofDefense James V. Forrestal when the latter had served as Secretary of the Navy during the war. Under the chairmanship of Dulles, the ISG presented its findings, known as theDulles-Jackson-Correa Report, to the National Security Council on January 1, 1949. The 193-page report, partially declassified in 1976, contained fifty-six recommendations, manyhighly critical of the CIA and DCI. (23) In particular,the report revealed problems in the agency'sexecution of both its intelligence and operational missions. It also criticized the quality of nationalintelligence estimates by highlighting the CIA's -- and, by implication, the DCI's -- "failure to takecharge of the production of coordinated national estimates." (24) The report went on to argue that theCIA's current trend in secret intelligence activities should be reversed in favor of its mandated roleas coordinator of intelligence. (25) The Dulles Report was particularly concerned about the personnel situation at CIA, including internal security, the high turnover of employees, and the excessive number of military personnelassigned to the agency. (26) To add "continuity ofservice" and the "greatest assurance of independenceof action," the report argued that the DCI should be a civilian and that military appointees berequired to resign their commissions. (27) As with the Eberstadt Report, the Dulles Report also expressed concern about the inadequacies in scientific intelligence and the professionalism of the service intelligence organizations, and urgedthat the CIA provide greater coordination. (28) Thisled to a recommendation for increased coordinationbetween the DCI and the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) in the arena ofcounterespionage. In turn, the report recommended that the Director of FBI be elevated tomembership in the Intelligence Advisory Committee (IAC), whose function was to help the DCIcoordinate intelligence and set intelligence requirements. (29) The principal thrust of the report was a proposed large-scale reorganization of the CIA to endoverlapping and duplication of functions. Similar to the Eberstadt Report, the Dulles studysuggested incorporating covert operations and clandestine intelligence into one office within CIA. In particular, the report recommended that the Office of Special Operations (OSO), responsible forthe clandestine collection of intelligence, and the Office of Policy Coordination (OPC), responsiblefor covert actions, be integrated into a single division within CIA. (30) Accordingly, the report recommended replacing existing offices with four new divisions for coordination, estimates, research and reports, and operations. The heads of the new offices wouldbe included in the immediate staff of the DCI so that he would have "intimate contact with theday-to-day operations of his agency and be able to give policy guidance to them." (31) Theserecommendations would become the blueprint for the future organization and operation of thepresent-day CIA. The Task Force on National Security Organization was almost immediately eclipsed by the Dulles-Jackson-Correa Report, that found a sympathetic ear in the White House. On July 7, 1949,the NSC adopted a modified version of the Dulles Report, and directed DCI Roscoe H. Hillenkoetterto begin implementing its recommendations, including the establishment of a single operationsdivision at CIA. In 1953, the OSO and OPC were merged within the CIA to form the Directorateof Plans (DP). (DP was designated the Directorate of Operations (DO) in 1973.) Although the Eberstadt Report was not as widely read among policymakers as the Dulles study, it did play a principal role in reorganization efforts initiated by DCI Walter Bedell Smith in 1950. The two reports, and the lessons learned from fall of China to the Communists and the unexpectedNorth Korean invasion of South Korea in June 1950, prompted Smith to create an intelligenceevaluation board called the Board of National Estimates (BNE). Designed to review and produceNational Intelligence Estimates (NIEs), the BNE was assisted by an Office of National Estimates(ONE) that drew upon the resources of the entire community. (32) The Eisenhower Administration witnessed the Soviet Union solidify its hold over Eastern Europe, crushing the Hungarian revolution, and the rise of Communist insurgencies in SoutheastAsia and Africa. This was a period in which extensive covert psychological, political, andparamilitary operations were initiated in the context of the threat posed by Soviet-led Communistexpansion. However, between 1948, when a covert action program was first authorized throughNSC Directive 10/2, and 1955 there was no formally established procedure for approval. Between 1954 and 1956, this prompted three investigations into U.S. intelligence activities, including the CIA. The first, the Task Force on Intelligence Activities of the Second HooverCommission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government, was sponsored byCongress. The second, the Doolittle Report, was commissioned at the request of President DwightD. Eisenhower in response to the Second Hoover Commission. The third, the Bruce-Lovett Reportwas initiated by the President's Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities (PBCFIA),and reported to President Eisenhower. The Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government, also chaired by former President Hoover, was created pursuant to P.L. 83-108 of July 10, 1953. Known as theSecond Hoover Commission, it contained a Task Force on Intelligence Activities under thechairmanship of General Mark W. Clark. In May 1955, the task force submitted both classified andunclassified reports. The classified version was sent directly to President Eisenhower, and has notbeen declassified according to available information. The unclassified version was sent to Congress. The unclassified report's seventy-six pages contained nine recommendations and briefly described the evolution of the Intelligence Community and its then-current functioning. The reportinitiated the official use of the term "Intelligence Community." (33) Until that time, the U.S. had soughtto apply increasing coordination to departmental intelligence efforts, without the concept of a"community" of departments and agencies. The task force began by expressing the need to reform the CIA's internal organization, including the recommendation that the DCI concentrate on intelligence issues facing the entirecommunity by leaving the day-to-day administration of the CIA to an executive officer or chief ofstaff. (34) It foresaw the need for better oversightof intelligence activities and proposed a small,permanent, bipartisan commission, including Members of Congress and other "public-spiritedcitizens," to provide independent oversight of intelligence activities that were normally kept secretfrom other parts of the government. (35) The fullcommission's report elaborated on this byrecommending the establishment of both a congressional oversight committee and a presidentialadvisory panel. The task force also expressed concern about counterintelligence and recommended systematic rechecking of all personnel every five years "to make sure that the passage of time has not alteredthe trustworthiness of any employee, and to make certain that none has succumbed to some weaknessof intoxicants or sexual perversion." (36) In addition, the task force recommended that the CIA replace the State Department in the "procurement of foreign publications and for collection of scientific intelligence." (37) Finally, therewere a number of "housekeeping" recommendations such as the need to construct an adequate CIAheadquarters, to improve linguistic training, and to raise the salary of the DCI to $20,000 annually. (38) In response to the establishment of the Second Hoover Commission's Task Force on Intelligence Activities, President Eisenhower sought and secured an agreement for a separate reportto be presented to him personally on the CIA's Directorate of Plans, that now had responsibility forboth clandestine intelligence collection and covert operations. Accordingly, in July 1954,Eisenhower commissioned Lieutenant General James Doolittle (USAF) to report on the CIA's covertactivities and to "make any recommendations calculated to improve the conduct of theseoperations." (39) On September 30, 1954, Doolittle submitted his 69-page classified report directly to Eisenhower. Declassified in 1976, the Doolittle Report contained forty-two recommendations. Thereport began by summarizing contemporary American Cold War attitudes following the Korean War: It is now clear that we are facing an implacable enemy whose avowed objective is world domination by whatever means and at whatever cost. There are norules in such a game...If the United States is to survive, long-standing American concepts of "fairplay" must be reconsidered. We must develop effective espionage and counterespionage services andmust learn to subvert, sabotage and destroy our enemies by more clever, more sophisticated andmore effective methods than those used against us. It may become necessary that the Americanpeople be made acquainted with, understand and support this fundamentally repugnantphilosophy. (40) The report went on to recommend that "every possible scientific and technical approach to the intelligence problem" be explored since the closed society of the Eastern Bloc made humanespionage "prohibitive" in terms of "dollars and human lives." (41) In examining the CIA, Doolittle found it to be properly placed in the organization of the government. Furthermore, the report found the laws relating to the CIA's functions were sufficientfor the agency to meet its operational needs, i.e. penetration of the Soviet Bloc. (42) The report wenton to issue several recommendations calling for more efficient internal administration, includingrecruitment and training procedures, background checks of personnel, and the need to "correct thenatural tendency to over classify documents originating in the agency." (43) It also called for increasedcooperation between the clandestine and analytical sides of the agency, and recommended that the"Inspector General ... operate on an Agency-wide basis with authority and responsibility toinvestigate and report on all activities of the Agency." (44) Finally, the report mentioned the need toprovide CIA with accommodations tailored to its specific needs, and to exercise better control(accountability) of expenditures in covert projects. Shortly after submitting the written report, General Doolittle voiced his concern to President Eisenhower over the potential difficulties that could arise from the fact that the DCI, Allen Dulles,and the Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, were brothers and might implement policies withoutadequate consultation with other administration officials. (45) In 1956, PBCFIA's chairman, James Killian, president of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, directed David Bruce, a widely experienced diplomat, and Robert Lovett, a prominentattorney, to prepare a report for President Eisenhower on the CIA's covert action programs asimplemented by NSC Directive 10/2. The report itself has not been located by either the CIA'sCenter for the Study of Intelligence or by private researchers. Presumably, it remains classified. However, Peter Grose, biographer of Allen Dulles, was able to use notes of the report prepared yearsearlier by historian Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. (46) According to Grose's account of the Schlesinger notes, the report criticized the CIA for beingtoo heavily involved in Third-World intrigues while neglecting the collection of hard intelligenceon the Soviet Union. Reportedly, Bruce and Lovett went on to express concern about the lack ofcoordination and accountability of the government's psychological and political warfare program. Stating that "no charge is made for failure," the report claimed that "No one, other than those in CIAimmediately concerned with their day-to-day operation, has any detailed knowledge of what is goingon." (47) These operations, asserted Bruce andLovett, were in the hands of a "horde of CIArepresentatives (largely under State or Defense cover),...bright, highly graded young men who mustbe doing something all the time to justify their reason for being." (48) As had Doolittle, Bruce and Lovett criticized the close relationship between Secretary of State John Foster Dulles and his brother DCI Allen W. Dulles. Due to the unique position of each brother,the report apparently expressed concern that they could unduly influence U.S. foreign policyaccording to their own perceptions. (49) The report concluded by suggesting that the U.S. reassess its approach to covert action programs, and that a permanent authoritative position be created to assess the viability and impactof covert action programs. (50) As a result of the Second Hoover Commission's Report and General Doolittle's findings, two new NSC Directives, 5412/1 and 5412/2, were issued pertaining to covert activities in March andNovember 1955, respectively. Together, these directives instituted control procedures for covertaction and clandestine activities. They remained in effect until 1970, providing basic policyguidelines for the CIA's covert action operations. In 1956, in response to the Clark Task Force, and to preempt closer congressional scrutiny of intelligence gathering, President Eisenhower created the President's Board of Consultants on ForeignIntelligence Activities (PBCFIA) to conduct independent evaluations of the U.S. intelligenceprogram. PBCFIA became the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB) in 1961. Permanent intelligence oversight committees were not established in Congress until the mid-1970s. When the Bruce-Lovett Report was first issued in the autumn of 1956, its immediate impact was muted due to the contemporaneous Suez Canal crisis and the Soviet invasion of Hungary. However, it did establish a precedent for future PBCFIA investigations into intelligence activities. In the 1950s, the Eisenhower Administration had supported covert CIA initiatives in Iran (1953) and Guatemala (1954) to overthrow governments unfriendly to the United States. These operationswere planned to provide the United States with a reasonable degree of plausible deniability. Duringthe last Eisenhower years, revolution in Cuba resulted in a Communist government under FidelCastro. In the context of the Cold War, a communist Cuba appeared to justify covert U.S. action tosecure a change in that nation's government. In April 1961 an ill-fated U.S. backed invasion of Cubaled to a new chapter in the history of the Intelligence Community. On April 17, 1961, some 1,400 Cuban exiles of the Cuban Expeditionary Force (CEF), trained and supported by the CIA, landed at the Bay of Pigs in Cuba with the hope of overthrowing thecommunist regime of Fidel Castro. Known as Operation Zapata, the invasion was a completedisaster. Over the first two days, Castro succeeded in defeating the invasion force and exposingdirect U.S. involvement. The fiasco led to two official examinations of U.S. involvement and conduct in Operation Zapata. The first, the Taylor Commission, was initiated by President John F. Kennedy in an attemptto ascertain the overall cause of the operation's failure. The second, the Kirkpatrick Report, was aninternal CIA investigation to determine what had been done wrong. On April 22, President Kennedy asked General Maxwell Taylor, former Army Chief of Staff, to chair a high-level body composed of Attorney General Robert Kennedy, former Chief of NavalOperations Admiral Arleigh Burke, and DCI Allen Dulles to ascertain the reasons for the invasion'sfailure. Known as the Taylor Commission, the study group's 53-page classified report wassubmitted to President Kennedy on June 13, 1961. Declassified in 1977, the report examined the conception, development, and implementation of Operation Zapata. The commission's final report focused on administrative rather thanoperational matters, and evenly leveled criticism at the White House, the CIA, the State Department,and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. (51) The report found that the CIA, at White House direction, had organized and trained Cuban exiles to enter Cuba, foment anti-Castro sentiment, and ultimately overthrow the Cuban government. Originally intended by the Eisenhower Administration as a guerrilla operation, Zapata was supposedto operate within the parameters of NSC Directive 5412/2, that called in part for plausible U.S.deniability. However, in the Kennedy Administration, the operation grew in size and scope toinclude a full-scale military invasion involving "sheep-dipped" B-26 bombers, supply ships andlanding craft. (52) The report found that "themagnitude of Zapata could not be prepared and conductedin such a way that all U.S. support of it and connection with it could be plausibly disclaimed." (53) In large measure, the report blamed the operation's planners at the CIA's Directorate of Plans for not keeping the President fully informed as to the exact nature of the operation. However, thereport also criticized the State Department, JCS, and the White House for acquiescing in the ZapataPlan, that "gave the impression to others of approving it" and for reviewing "successive changes ofthe plan piecemeal and only within a limited context, a procedure that was inadequate for a properexamination of all the military ramifications." (54) The Taylor Commission found the operation to be ill-conceived with little chance for ultimate success. Once underway, however, the report cited President Kennedy's decision to limit overt U.S.air support as a factor in the CEF's defeat. (55) Thisdecision was apparently reached in order to protectthe covert character of the operation. The report criticized this decision by stating that when anoperation had been approved, "restrictions designed to protect its covert character should have beenaccepted only if they did not impair the chance of success." (56) The failure in communication, breakdown in coordination, and lack of overall planning led the Taylor Commission to conclude that: The Executive Branch of government was not organizationally prepared to cope with this kind of paramilitary operation. There was no singleauthority short of the President capable of coordinating the actions of CIA, State, Defense and USIA[U.S. Information Agency]. Top level direction was given through ad hoc meetings of seniorofficials without consideration of operational plans in writing and with no arrangement for recordingconclusions reached. (57) The lessons of Operation Zapata led the report to recommend six courses of action in the fields of planning, coordination, effectiveness, and responsibility in overall Cold War strategy. The reportrecommended the creation of a Strategic Resources Group (SRG) composed of representatives ofunder-secretarial rank from the CIA and the Departments of State and Defense. With direct accessto the President, the SRG would act as a mechanism for the planning and coordination of overallCold War strategy, including paramilitary operations. The report recommended including theopinions of the JCS in the planning and implementation of such paramilitary operations. In thecontext of the Cold War, the report also recommended a review of restraints placed upon the UnitedStates in order to make the most effective use of the nation's assets, without concern for internationalpopularity. The report concluded by reaffirming America's commitment to forcing Castro frompower. (58) Concurrent with the Taylor Commission, DCI Dulles instructed the CIA's Inspector General, Lyman B. Kirkpatrick, Jr., to conduct an internal investigation to determine what the CIA had donewrong in the Cuban operation. Completed in five months, the report was viewed by the few withinCIA who read it as professionally shabby. (59) Whereas the Taylor Report had more of the detachedperspective of a management-consultant, the Kirkpatrick Report was viewed as a personal attackagainst the CIA and DCI Dulles. The 170-page report remains classified. However, in 1972, Kirkpatrick published an article in the Naval War College Review that apparently reflected the findings of his report. (60) In particular,Kirkpatrick criticized the Zapata planners at the Directorate of Plans for not having fully consultedthe CIA's Cuban analysts before the invasion. The article also criticized the operation's internalsecurity, that Kirkpatrick claimed was virtually nonexistent. Calling the operation frenzied,Kirkpatrick accused the CIA of "playing it by ear" and misleading the President by failing to informhim that "success had become dubious." (61) InKirkpatrick's view, the CIA bore most of the blame,and the Kennedy Administration could be forgiven for having trusted the advice of the operation'splanners at the Agency. On May 4, 1961, following the Bay of Pigs, President Kennedy reconstituted the PBCFIA as the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB). Although little is known of theKirkpatrick Report's impact, the Taylor Report influenced Kennedy's desire to improve the overallmanagement of the intelligence process. In 1962, this prompted the President to instruct the newDCI, John McCone, to concentrate on his community-wide coordination role: As [DCI], while you will continue to have overall responsibility for the Agency, I shall expect you to delegate to your principal deputy, as you maydeem necessary, so much of the detailed operation of the Agency as may be required to permit youto carry out your primary task as [DCI]. (62) No major investigations of the Intelligence Community were conducted under President Lyndon B. Johnson. In large measure, this was due to America's growing preoccupation with the Vietnamconflict and the strain that this placed on the community's resources. The only major investigationduring the Johnson Administration was the Warren Commission on the assassination of PresidentKennedy. Former DCI Allen Dulles served on the commission. During the Vietnam War, the Intelligence Community devoted enormous attention in both manpower and resources towards achieving U.S. policy objectives in Southeast Asia. As the U.S.effort in Vietnam and Laos wound down, and attention turned towards strategic weapons concernswith the Soviet Union, some members of the Nixon Administration believed that the community wasperforming less than adequately. In 1970, President Richard M. Nixon and National SecurityAdvisor Henry A. Kissinger undertook a review of the Intelligence Community's organization. In December 1970, President Nixon commissioned the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) to examine the Intelligence Community's organization and recommend improvements, shortof legislation. In March 1971, the report, "A Review of the Intelligence Community," was submittedby Deputy OMB Director James R. Schlesinger, a future DCI. Known as the Schlesinger Report, the study's forty-seven pages noted the community's "impressive rise in...size and cost" with the "apparent inability to achieve a commensurateimprovement in the scope and overall quality of intelligence products." (63) The report sought touncover the causes of this problem and identify areas in which constructive change could take place. In examining the Intelligence Community, Schlesinger criticized "unproductively duplicative" collection systems and the failure in forward planning to coordinate the allocation of resources. (64) In part, the report cited the failure of policymakers to specify their product needs to the intelligenceproducers. (65) However, the report identified theprimary cause of these problems as the lack of astrong, central Intelligence Community leadership that could "consider the relationship between costand substantive output from a national perspective." (66) Schlesinger found that this had engendereda fragmented, departmental intelligence effort. To correct these problems, Schlesinger considered the creation of a Director of National Intelligence (DNI), enhancing the DCI's authority, and establishing a Coordinator of NationalIntelligence (CNI) who would act as the White House-level overseer of the Intelligence Communityto provide more direct representation of presidential interest in intelligence issues. (67) In the end, thereport recommended "a strong DCI who could bring intelligence costs under control and intelligenceproduction to an adequate level of quality and responsiveness." (68) The Schlesinger Report led to a limited reorganization of the Intelligence Community under a Presidential directive dated November 5, 1971. In part, the directive called for: An enhanced leadership role for the [DCI] in planning, reviewing, and evaluating all intelligence programs and activities, and in the production of nationalintelligence. (69) Consequently, two boards were established to assist the DCI in preparing a consolidated intelligence budget and to supervise community-wide intelligence production. The first, was theill-fated Intelligence Resources Advisory Committee (IRAC), that replaced the National IntelligenceResources Board (NIRB) established in 1968 under DCI Richard Helms. The IRAC was designedto advise the DCI on the preparation of a consolidated budget for the community's intelligenceprograms. However, IRAC was not afforded the statutory authority necessary to bring theintelligence budget firmly under DCI control. The second, and the only long lasting result of theNixon directive, was the establishment of the Intelligence Community Staff (ICS) in 1972. Createdby DCI Helms, the ICS was meant to assist the DCI in guiding the community's collection andproduction of intelligence. However, the ICS did not provide the DCI with the statutory basisnecessary for an expanded community-wide role. (70) In 1992, DCI Robert Gates replaced the ICS withthe Community Management Staff (CMS). In the late 1940s and throughout the 1950s, there had been widespread public agreement on the need for an effective national security structure to confront Soviet-led Communist expansion. However, by the late 1960s, the war in Vietnam had begun to erode public consensus and supportfor U.S. foreign policy. The controversy surrounding the Watergate Investigations after 1972, andsubsequent revelations of questionable CIA activities involving domestic surveillance, provided abackdrop for increasing scrutiny of government policies, particularly in such fields as nationalsecurity and intelligence. Between 1975 and 1976, this led the Ford Administration and Congress to conduct three separate investigations that examined the propriety of intelligence operations, assessed the adequacyof intelligence organizations and functions, and recommended corrective measures. A fourth panel,convened earlier to look more broadly at foreign policy, also submitted recommendations forintelligence reform. The Commission on the Organization of the Government for the Conduct of Foreign Policy, created pursuant to the Foreign Relations Authorization Act for FY1973 (P.L. 92-352) of July 13,1972, was headed by former Deputy Secretary of State Robert D. Murphy. It looked at nationalsecurity formulation and implementation processes rather than the government as a whole. As such,the Murphy Commission was more focused than either of the two Hoover Commissions and devotedgreater attention to intelligence issues. Although it made reference to the need to correct "occasionalfailures to observe those standards of conduct that should distinguish the behavior of agencies of theU.S. Government," (71) the commission's approachwas marked by an emphasis of the value ofintelligence to national security policymaking and was, on the whole, supportive of the IntelligenceCommunity. Many of the Murphy Commission's recommendations addressed problems that have continued to concern successive intelligence managers. The commission noted the fundamental difficulty thatDCIs have line authority over the CIA but "only limited influence" over other intelligence agencies. (72) Unlike other observers, the Murphy Commission did not believe that this situation should bechanged fundamentally: "[It] is neither possible nor desirable to give the DCI line authority over thatvery large fraction of the intelligence community that lies outside the CIA." At the same time, itrecommended that the DCI have an office in close proximity to the White House and be accordedregular and direct contact with the President. The commission envisioned a DCI delegatingconsiderable authority for managing the CIA to a deputy while he devoted more time tocommunity-wide responsibilities. The commission also recommended that the DCI's title bechanged to Director of Foreign Intelligence. (73) The commission provided for other oversight mechanisms, viz., a strengthened PFIAB and more extensive review (prior to their initiation and on a continuing basis thereafter) of covert actions bya high-level interagency committee. It argued that although Congress should be notified of covertactions, the President should not sign such notifications since it is harmful to associate "the head ofState so formally with such activities. (74) " It wasfurther recommended that intelligence requirementsand capabilities be established at the NSC-level to remedy a situation in which "the work of theintelligence community becomes largely responsive to its own perceptions of what is important, andirrelevant information is collected, sometimes drowning out the important. (75) " It also recommendedthat this process be formalized in an officially approved five-year plan. A consolidated foreignintelligence budget should also be prepared, approved by an inter-agency committee and OMB andsubmitted to Congress. Although the importance of economic intelligence was recognized, the commission did not see a need for intelligence agencies to seek to expand in this area; rather, it suggested that the analyticalcapabilities of the Departments of State, Treasury, Commerce, Agriculture, and the Council ofEconomic Advisers should be significantly strengthened. The commission noted the replacement of the Board of National Estimates by some eleven National Intelligence Officers (NIOs) who were to draw upon analysts in various agencies to draftNational Intelligence Estimates (NIEs). This practice was criticized because it laid excessiveburdens on chosen analysts and because NIEs had in recent years been largely ignored by seniorofficials (presumably Secretary of State Kissinger) who made their own assessments of futuredevelopments based on competing sources of information and analysis. Thus, the commissionrecommended a small staff of analysts from various agencies assigned to work with NIOs in draftingNIEs and ensure that differences of view were clearly presented for the policymakers. Prior to the mid-1960s, the organization and activities of the Intelligence Community were primarily the concern of specialists in national security and governmental organization. The MurphyCommission, although working during a subsequent and more politically turbulent period, hadapproached intelligence reorganization from this perspective as well. The political terrain had,however, been shifting dramatically and the Intelligence Community would not escape searchingcriticism. During the era of the Vietnam War and Watergate, disputes over national security policyfocused attention on intelligence activities. In 1975, media accounts of alleged intelligence abuses,some stretching back over decades led to a series of highly publicized congressional hearings. Revelations of assassination plots and other alleged abuses spurred three separate investigations and sets of recommendations. The first was undertaken within the Executive Branch and was headedby Vice President Nelson A. Rockefeller. Other investigations were conducted by select committeesin both houses of Congress. The Senate effort was led by Senator Frank Church and the Housecommittee was chaired by Representative Otis Pike. These investigations led to the creation of thetwo permanent intelligence committees and much closer oversight by the Congress. In addition, theyalso produced a number of recommendations for reorganization and realignment within theIntelligence Community. Established by Executive Order 11828 on January 4, 1975, the Commission on CIA Activities within the United States was chaired by Vice President Rockefeller and included seven othersappointed by President Ford (including then-former Governor Ronald Reagan). The commission'smandate was to investigate whether the CIA had violated provisions of the National Security Act of1947, precluding the CIA from exercising internal security functions. The Rockefeller Commission's 30 recommendations (76) included a number of proposals designedto delimit CIA's authority to collect foreign intelligence within the United States (from "willingsources") and proscribe collection of information about the domestic activities of U.S. citizens, tostrengthen PFIAB, to establish a congressional joint intelligence committee, and to establishguidelines for cooperation with the Justice Department regarding the prosecution of criminalviolations by CIA employees. There was another recommendation to consider the question ofwhether the CIA budget should be made public, if not in full at least in part. The commission recommended that consideration should be given to appointing DCIs from outside the career service of the CIA and that no DCI serve longer than 10 years. Two deputiesshould be appointed; one to serve as an administrative officer to free the DCI from day-to-daymanagement duties; the other a military officer to foster relations with the military and providetechnical expertise on military intelligence requirements. The CIA position of Inspector General should be upgraded and his responsibilities expanded along with those of the General Counsel. Guidelines should be developed to advise agencypersonnel as to what activities are permitted and what are forbidden by law and executive orders. The President should instruct the DCI that domestic mail openings should not be undertaken except in time of war and that mail cover operations (examining and copying of envelopes only) areto be undertaken only on a limited basis "clearly involving matters of national security." The commission was specifically concerned with CIA infiltration of domestic organizations and submitted a number of recommendations in this area. Presidents should refrain from directing theCIA to perform what are essentially internal security tasks and the CIA should resist any effort toinvolve itself in improper activities. The CIA "should guard against allowing any component ... tobecome so self-contained and isolated from top leadership that regular supervision and review arelost." Files of previous improper investigations should be destroyed. The agency should notinfiltrate American organizations without a written determination by the DCI that there is a threatto agency operations, facilities, or personnel that cannot be met by law enforcement agencies. Otherrecommendations were directed at CIA investigations of its personnel or former personnel, includingprovisions relating to physical surveillance, wire or oral communications, and access to income taxinformation. As a result of efforts by some White House staff during the Nixon Administration to use CIA resources improperly, a number of recommendations dealt with the need to establish appropriatechannels between the agency and the Executive Office of the President. Reacting to evidence that drugs had been tested on unsuspecting persons, the commission recommended that the practice should not be renewed. Also, equipment for monitoringcommunications should not be tested on unsuspecting persons within the United States. Anindependent agency should be established to oversee civilian uses of aerial photography to avoid anyconcerns over the improper domestic use of a CIA-developed system. Concerned with distinguishing the separate responsibilities of the CIA and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the commission urged that the DCI and the Director of the FBI prepare andsubmit to the National Security Council a detailed agreement setting forth the jurisdictions of eachagency and providing for effective liaison between them. The commission also recommended that all intelligence agencies review their holdings of classified information and declassify as much as possible. Established in the wake of sensational revelations about assassination plots organized by the CIA, the Church Committee had a much wider mandate than the Rockefeller Commission, extendingbeyond the CIA to all intelligence agencies. (77) Ittoo, however, concentrated on illegalities andimproprieties rather than organizational or managerial questions per se . After extensive and highlypublicized hearings, the committee made some 183 recommendations in its final report, issued April26, 1976. (78) The principal recommendation was that omnibus legislation be enacted to set forth the basic purposes of national intelligence activities and defining the relationship between intelligenceactivities and the Congress. Criticizing vagueness in the National Security Act of 1947, thecommittee urged charters for the several intelligence agencies to set forth general organizationalstructures and procedures, and delineate roles and responsibilities. There should also be specific andclearly defined prohibitions or limitations on intelligence activities. The effort to pass suchlegislation would consume considerable attention over a number of years, following the completionof the work of the Church Committee. A number of recommendations reflected the committee's views on the appropriate role of the National Security Council in directing and monitoring the work of the intelligence agencies. Theapparent goal was to encourage a more formal process, with accountability assigned to cabinet-levelofficials. The committee concluded that covert actions should be conducted only upon presidentialauthorization with notification to appropriate congressional committees. Attention was given to the role of the DCI within the entire Intelligence Community. The committee recommended that the DCI be recognized by statute as the President's principal foreignintelligence advisor and that he should be responsible for establishing national intelligencerequirements, preparing the national intelligence budget, and for providing guidance for intelligenceoperations. The DCI should have specific responsibility for choosing among the programs of the different collection and production agencies and departments and to insure against waste and unnecessaryduplication. The DCI should also have responsibility for issuing fiscal guidance for the allocationof all national intelligence resources. The authority of the DCI to reprogram funds within theintelligence budget should be defined by statute. (79) Monies for the national intelligence budget would be appropriated to the DCI rather than to the directors of the various agencies. The committee also recommended that the DCI be authorized toestablish an intelligence community staff to assist him in carrying out his managerial responsibilities.The staff should be drawn "from the best available talent within and outside the intelligencecommunity." (80) Further, the position of DeputyDCI for the Intelligence Community should beestablished by statute (in addition to the existing DDCI who would have responsibility primarily forthe CIA itself). It also urged consideration of separating the DCI from direct responsibility over theCIA. The DCI, it was urged, should serve at the pleasure of the President, but for no more than ten years. The committee also looked at intelligence analysis. It recommended a more flexible and less hierarchical personnel system with more established analysts being brought in at middle and uppergrades. Senior positions should be established on the basis of analytical ability rather thanadministrative responsibilities. Analysts should be encouraged to accept temporary assignments atother agencies or on the NSC staff to give them an appreciation for policymakers' use of intelligenceinformation. A system should be in place to ensure that analysts are more promptly informed aboutU.S. policies and programs affecting their areas of responsibility. In addressing covert actions, the committee recommended barring political assassinations, efforts to subvert democratic governments, and support for police and other internal security forcesengaged in systematic violations of human rights. The committee addressed the questions of separating CIA's analysis and production functions from clandestine collection and covert action functions. It listed the pros and cons of this approach,but ultimately recommended only that the intelligence committees should give it consideration. Reflecting concerns about abuses of the rights of U.S. citizens, the committee made a series of recommendations regarding CIA involvement with the academic community, members of religiousorganizations, journalists, recipients of government grants, and the covert use of books andpublishing houses. A particular concern was limiting any influence on domestic politics of materialspublished by the CIA overseas. Attention was also given to proprietary organizations CIA createsto conduct operations abroad; the committee believed them necessary, but advocated stricterregulation and congressional oversight. The committee recommended enhanced positions for CIA's Inspector General (IG) and General Counsel (GC), urging that the latter be made a presidential appointee requiring Senate confirmation. In looking at intelligence agencies other than the CIA, the committee recommended that the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) be made part of the civilian Office of the Secretary of Defenseand that a small J-2 staff provide intelligence support to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It was urged thatthe directors of both DIA and the National Security Agency (NSA) should be appointed by thePresident and confirmed by the Senate. The committee believe that either the director or deputydirector of DIA and of NSA should be civilians. Turning to the State Department, the committeeurged the Administration to issue instructions to implement legislation that authorized ambassadorsto be provided information about activities conducted by intelligence agencies in their assignedcountries. It also stated that State Department efforts to collect foreign political and economicinformation overtly should be improved. Funding for intelligence activities has been included in Defense Department authorization and appropriations legislation since the end of World War II. The Church Commission advocatedmaking public, at least, total amounts and suggested consideration be given as to whether moredetailed information should also be released. The General Accounting Office (GAO) should beempowered to conduct audits at the request of congressional oversight committees. Tests by intelligence agencies on human subjects of drugs or devices that could cause physical or mental harm should not occur except under stringent conditions. The committee made a number of recommendations regarding procedures for granting security clearances and for handling classified information. It also recommended consideration of newlegislative initiatives to deal with other existing problems. Finally, the Committee recommendedthe creation of a registry of all classified executive orders, including NSC directives, with accessprovided to congressional oversight committees. The House Select Committee on Intelligence, chaired by Representative Otis G. Pike, also conducted a wide-ranging survey of intelligence activities. In the conduct of its hearings, the PikeCommittee was far more adversarial to the intelligence agencies than the Senate Committee. Publication of its final report was not authorized by the House, although a version was published ina New York tabloid. The Pike Committee's recommendations, however, were published onFebruary 11, 1976. (81) There were some twentyrecommendations, some dealing with congressionaloversight, with one dealing, anomalously, with the status of the Assistant to the President forNational Security Affairs. The Pike Committee recommended that covert actions not include, except in time of war, any activities involving direct or indirect attempts to assassinate any individual. The prohibition wasextended to all paramilitary operations. A National Security Council subcommittee would reviewall proposals for covert actions and copies of each subcommittee member's comments would beprovided to congressional committees. The committee further recommended that congressionaloversight committees be notified of presidential approval of covert actions within 48 hours. According to the proposal, all covert actions would have to be terminated no later than 12 monthsfrom the date of approval or reconsidered. The committee recommended that specific legislation be enacted to establish NSA and define its role in monitoring communications of Americans and placed under civilian control. The Pike Committee further recommended that all "intelligence related items" be included as intelligence expenditures in the President's budget and that the total sum budgeted for intelligencebe disclosed. The committee recommended that transfers of funds be prohibited between agencies or departments involved in intelligence activities. Reprogramming of funds within agencies would bedependent upon the specific approval of congressional oversight and appropriations committees. The same procedures would be required for expenditures from reserve or contingency funds. The Pike Committee also looked at the role of the DCI. Like many others who have studied the question, it recommended that the DCI should be separate from managing any agency and shouldfocus on coordinating and overseeing the entire intelligence effort with a view towards eliminatingduplication of effort and promoting competition in analysis. It advocated that he should be amember of the National Security Council. Under this proposal the DCI would have a separate staffand would prepare national intelligence estimates and daily briefings for the President. He wouldreceive budget proposals from agencies involved in intelligence activities. (The recommendationsdid not indicate the extent of his authority to approve or disapprove these recommendations.) TheDCI would be charged with coordinating intelligence agencies under his jurisdiction, eliminatingduplication, and evaluating performance and efficiency. The committee recommended that the GAO conduct a full and complete management and financial audit of all intelligence agencies and that the CIA internal audit staff be given completeaccess to CIA financial records. The committee recommended that a permanent foreign operations subcommittee of the NSC, composed of cabinet-rank officials, be established. This subcommittee would have jurisdiction overall authorized activities of intelligence agencies (except those solely related to intelligence gathering)and review all covert actions, clandestine activities, and hazardous collecting activities. It was recommended that DIA be abolished and its functions divided between the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the CIA. The intelligence components of the military services would beprohibited from undertaking covert actions within the U.S. or clandestine activities against U.S.citizens abroad. Relations between intelligence and law enforcement organizations were to be limited. Intelligence agencies would be barred from providing funds to religious or educational institutionsor to those media with general circulation in the United States. The committee recommended that specific legislation be considered to deal with the classification and regular declassification of information. It was also recommended that an Inspector General for Intelligence be nominated by the President and confirmed by the Senate with authority to investigate potential misconduct of anyintelligence agency or personnel. He would make annual reports to the Congress. The committee also made recommendations regarding the organization and operations of the FBI and its role in investigating domestic groups. In an additional recommendation, Representative Les Aspin, a member of the committee, urged that the CIA be divided into two separate agencies, one for analysis and the other for clandestinecollection and covert operations. A similar recommendation was made by Representative RonDellums, who also served on the committee. In 1976 hearings by the Senate Committee on Government Operations, Clark Clifford (who had served as President Johnson's final Secretary of Defense and, in an earlier position in the TrumanAdministration, had been involved in legislation creating the CIA) proposed the creation of a postof Director General of Intelligence to serve as the President's chief adviser on intelligence mattersand as principal point of contact with the congressional intelligence committees. There would bea separate director of the CIA whose duties would be restricted to day-to-day operations. (82) In the same year, Ray Cline, a former Deputy Director of the CIA, made a number of recommendations. (83) He recommended that theDCI exert broad supervisory powers over the entireintelligence community and the CIA be divided into two agencies, one to undertake analytical workand the other for clandestine services. He also proposed that the DCI be given cabinet rank, apractice that would find support in both the Reagan and Clinton administrations. Subsequent to the establishment of permanent intelligence oversight committees in the Senate in 1976 and the House of Representatives in 1977, attention in Congress shifted to consideration ofcharter legislation for intelligence agencies. (84) Itwas envisioned that the charter legislation wouldinclude many of the recommendations made earlier by the Church and Pike Committees. Introducedby Senator Walter Huddleston and Representative Edward Boland, the draft National IntelligenceReorganization and Reform Act of 1978 (S. 2525/H.R. 11245, 95th Congress)would have provided statutory charters to all intelligence agencies and created a Director of NationalIntelligence (DNI) to serve as head of the entire Intelligence Community. Day-to-day leadership ofCIA could be delegated to a deputy at presidential discretion. The draft legislation containednumerous reporting requirements (regarding covert actions in particular) to Congress and anextensive list of banned or restricted activities. The draft legislation of more that 170 pages wasstrongly criticized from all sides in hearings; some arguing that it would legitimize covert actionsinconsistent with American ideals and others suggesting that its complex restrictions would undulyhamper the protection of vital American interests. The bills were never reported out of eitherintelligence committee, although the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 ( P.L. 95-511 )provided a statutory base for electronic surveillance within the United States. Charter legislation was also introduced in the 96th Congress. It contained many of the provisions introduced in the earlier version, but also loosened freedom of information regulationsfor intelligence agencies and the requirements of the Hughes-Ryan amendments of 1974 requiringthat some eight committees be notified of covert actions. This legislation (S. 2284, 96thCongress) came under even heavier criticism from all sides than its predecessor. It was not reportedby the Senate Intelligence Committee, but other stand-alone legislation did pass and a shorter billreducing the number of committees receiving notification of covert actions -- and "significantanticipated intelligence activities" -- was introduced and eventually became law in October 1980as part of the FY1981 Intelligence Authorization Act ( P.L. 96-450 ). Concurrent with, and subsequent to, these legislative initiatives, the Executive Branch, in part to head off further congressional action, implemented some of the more limited recommendationscontained in their respective proposals. Presidents Gerald Ford, Jimmy Carter, and Ronald Reaganeach issued detailed Executive Orders (E.O.) setting guidelines for the organization and managementof the U.S. Intelligence Community. Issued by President Ford on February 18, 1976, prior to the release of the Church and Pike Committee findings, Executive Order 11905 undertook to implement some of the more limitedrecommendations of the Rockefeller and Murphy Commissions. In particular, E.O. 11905 identifiedthe DCI as the President's primary intelligence advisor and the principal spokesman for theIntelligence Community and gave him responsibilities for developing the National ForeignIntelligence Program (NFIP). It also delineated responsibilities of each intelligence agency, providedtwo NSC-level committees for internal review of intelligence operations, and established a separatethree-member Intelligence Oversight Board to review the legality and propriety of intelligenceactivities. It placed restrictions on the physical and electronic surveillance of American citizens byintelligence agencies. (85) On January 24, 1978, President Carter issued Executive Order 12036, that superseded E.O. 11905. (86) Carter's Executive Order sought todefine more clearly the DCI's community-wideauthority in areas relating to the "budget, tasking, intelligence review, coordination anddissemination, and foreign liaison." (87) Inparticular, it formally recognized the establishment of theNational Foreign Intelligence Program budget and the short-lived National Intelligence TaskingCenter (NTIC), that was supposed to assist the DCI in "translating intelligence requirements andpriorities into collection objectives." (88) E.O. 11905also restricted medical experimentation andprohibited political assassinations. President Reagan continued the trend towards enhancing the DCI's community-wide budgetary, tasking, and managerial authority. On December 4, 1981, he issued Executive Order 12333,detailing the roles, responsibilities, missions, and activities of the Intelligence Community. Itsupplanted the previous orders issued by Presidents Ford and Carter. E.O. 12333 remains thegoverning executive branch mandate concerning the managerial structure of the IntelligenceCommunity. E.O. 12333 designates the DCI "as the primary intelligence advisor to the President and NSC on national foreign intelligence." (89) In thiscapacity, the DCI's duties include the implementation ofspecial activities (covert actions), liaison to the nation's foreign intelligence and counterintelligencecomponents, and the overall protection of the community's sources, methods, and analyticalprocedures. (90) It grants the DCI "full responsibilityfor [the] production and dissemination of nationalforeign intelligence," including the authority to task non-CIA intelligence agencies, and the abilityto decide on community tasking conflicts. (91) Theorder also sought to grant the DCI more explicitauthority over the development, implementation, and evaluation of NFIP. (92) To a certain extent, E.O. 12333 represented a relaxation of the restrictions placed upon the community by Carter. Although it maintained the prohibition on assassination, the focus was on"authorizations" rather than "restrictions." "Propriety" was removed as a criterion for approvingoperations. Arguably, the Reagan Administration established a presumption in favor of governmentneeds over individual rights. (93) However, in theabsence of legislation, the DCI continued to lackstatutory authority over all aspects of the Intelligence Community, including budgetary issues. In 1985, Admiral Stansfield Turner, DCI in the Carter Administration, expressed his views on the need for intelligence reform (94) . In part, Turnerrecommended reducing the emphasis on covertaction and implementing a charter for the Intelligence Community. The most importantrecommendation involved the future of the DCI of which Turner maintained: The two jobs, head of the CIA and head of the Intelligence Community, conflict. One person cannot do justice to both and fulfill the DCI's responsibilities to the President, the Congress, and thepublic as well. (95) Turner went on to propose the separation of the two jobs of DCI and head of the CIA with the creation of a Director of National Intelligence, separate and superior to the CIA. Turner alsorecommended placing less emphasis on the use of covert action than the Reagan Administration. During highly publicized investigations of the Reagan Administration's covert support to Iran and the Nicaraguan Resistance, the role of the Intelligence Community, the CIA, and DCI Caseywere foci of attention. Much of the involvement of National Security Council staff was undertakenprecisely because legislation had been enacted severely limiting the role of intelligence agencies inCentral America and because efforts to free the hostages through cooperation with Iranian officialshad been strongly opposed by CIA officials. The executive branch's review, chaired by formerSenator John Tower, expressed concern that precise procedures be established for restrictedconsideration of covert actions and that NSC policy officials had been too closely involved in thepreparation of intelligence estimates. (96) Theinvestigation of the affair by two congressional selectcommittees resulted in a number of recommendations for changes in laws and regulations governingintelligence activities. Specifically the majority report of the two congressional select committees that investigated the affair made a number of recommendations regarding presidential findings concerning the need toinitiative covert actions. Findings should be made prior to the initiation of a covert action, theyshould be in writing, and they should be made known to appropriate Members of Congress in noevent later than forty-eight hours after approval. Further, the majority of the committees urged thatfindings be far more specific than some had been in the Reagan Administration. Statutory inspectorgeneral and general counsels, confirmed by the Senate, for the CIA were also recommended. (97) Minority members of the two committees made several recommendations regarding congressionaloversight, urging that on extremely sensitive matters that notifications of covert actions be made toonly four Members of Congress instead of the existing requirement for eight to be notified. (98) These recommendations were subsequently considered by the two intelligence committees. A number of provisions was enacted dealing with covert action findings in the IntelligenceAuthorization Act for FY1991 ( P.L. 102-88 ). A major legislative initiative, reflecting the changed situation of the post-Cold War world, began in February 1992, when Senator David Boren, the Chairman of the Senate Select Committeeon Intelligence, and Representative Dave McCurdy, the Chairman of the House Permanent SelectCommittee on Intelligence, announced separate plans for an omnibus restructuring of the U.S.Intelligence Community, to serve as an intelligence counterpart to the Goldwater-NicholsDepartment of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986. The two versions of the initiative( S. 2198 and H.R. 4165 , 102nd Congress) differed in several respects, butthe overall thrust of the two bills was similar. Both proposals called for the following: Creating a Director of National Intelligence (DNI) with authority to program and reprogram intelligence funds throughout the Intelligence Community, including the DefenseDepartment, and to direct their expenditure; and to task intelligence agencies and transfer personneltemporarily from one agency to another to support new requirements; Creating two Deputy Directors of National Intelligence (DDNIs); one of whom would be responsible for analysis and estimates, the other for Intelligence Community affairs; Creating a separate Director of the CIA, subordinate to the new DNI, to manage the agency's collection and covert action capabilities on a day-to-day basis; Consolidating analytical and estimative efforts of the Intelligence Community (including analysts from CIA, and some from DIA, the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR)at the State Department, and other agencies) into a separate office under one of the Deputy DNIs(this aspect of the proposal would effectively separate CIA's analytical elements from its collectionand covert action offices); Creating a National Imagery Agency within the Department of Defense (DOD) to collect, exploit, and analyze imagery (these tasks had been spread among several entities; theHouse version would divide these efforts into two new separate agencies);and Authorizing the Director of DIA to task defense intelligence agencies (DIA, NSA, the new Imagery Agency) with collection requirements; and to shift functions, funding, andpersonnel from one DOD intelligence agency to another. This major restructuring effort would have provided statutory mandates for agencies where operational authority was created by executive branch directives. Both statutes and executive branchdirectives provided the DCI authority to task intelligence agencies outside the CIA and to approvebudgets and reprogramming efforts; in practice, however, this authority had never been fullyexercised. This legislation would have provided a statutory basis for the DCI (or DNI) to directcollection and analytical efforts throughout the Intelligence Community. The Boren-McCurdy legislation was not adopted, although provisions were added to the FY1994 Intelligence Authorization Act ( P.L. 102-496 ) that provided basic charters for intelligenceagencies within the National Security Act and set forth in law the DCI's coordinative responsibilities vis-Ã -vis intelligence agencies other than the CIA. Observers credited strong opposition fromtheDefense Department and concerns of the Armed Services Committees with inhibiting passage of theoriginal legislation. Established pursuant to the Intelligence Authorization Act for FY1995 ( P.L. 103-359 ) of September 27, 1994, the Commission on the Roles and Capabilities of the U.S. IntelligenceCommunity was formed to assess the future direction, priorities, and structure of the IntelligenceCommunity in the post-Cold War environment. Originally under the chairmanship of Les Aspin,after his sudden death the commission was headed by former Secretary of Defense Harold Brown. Nine members were appointed by the president and eight nominated by the congressional leadership. The Report of the Aspin/Brown Commission (99) made a number of recommendations regardingthe organization of the Intelligence Community. Structural changes in the NSC staff were proposedto enhance the guidance provided to intelligence agencies. Global crime -- terrorism, internationaldrug trafficking, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and international organized crime -- was given special attention with recommendations for an NSC Committee on Global Crime. TheCommission also recommended designating the Attorney General to coordinate the "nation's lawenforcement response to global crime,"and clarifying the authority of intelligence agencies to collectinformation concerning foreign persons abroad for law enforcement purposes. It urged that thesharing of relevant information between the law enforcement and intelligence communities beexpanded, and their activities overseas be better coordinated. (100) The Commission noted that it considered many options for dealing with limitations in the DCI's ability to coordinate the activities of all intelligence agencies. The Aspin/Brown Commissionrecommended the establishment of two new deputies to the DCI -- one for the IntelligenceCommunity and one for day-to-day management of the CIA. Both would be Senate-confirmedpositions and the latter for a fixed six-year term. The DCI would concur in the appointment of theheads of "national" intelligence elements within DOD and would evaluate their performance in theirpositions as part of their ratings by the Secretary of Defense. "In addition, the DCI would be givennew tools to carry out his responsibilities with respect to the intelligence budget and new authorityover the intelligence personnel systems." The Aspin/Brown Commission recommended the realignment of intelligence budgeting procedures with "discipline" (i.e. sigint, imagery, humint, etc .) managers having responsibilities formanaging similar efforts in all intelligence agencies. "The DCI should be provided a sufficient staffcapability to enable him to assess tradeoffs between programs or program elements and shouldestablish a uniform, community-wide resource data base to serve as the principal information toolfor resource management across the Intelligence Community." (101) Responding to a longstanding criticism of intelligence budget processes, the Commission recommended that the total amounts appropriated for intelligence activities be disclosed -- arecommendation that was implemented by the Clinton Administration for Fiscal Years 1997 and1998. Subsequently, however, figures were not made public. In regard to congressional oversight, the Aspin/Brown Commission recommended that appointments to intelligence committees not be made for limited numbers of years but treated likeappointments to other congressional committees. In addition to the Aspin/Brown Commission, in 1995-1996 the House Intelligence Committee undertook its own extensive review of intelligence issues. Many of the conclusions of the resultantIC21 Staff Study were consistent with those of the Commission. (102) The "overarching concept" wasa need for a more "corporate" intelligence community, i.e. a collection of agencies that recognizethat they are parts of "a larger coherent process aiming at a single goal: the delivery of timelyintelligence to policy makers at various levels." Accordingly, "central management should bestrengthened, core competencies (collection, analysis, operations) should be reinforced andinfrastructure should be consolidated wherever possible." (103) Specific IC21 recommendations provided for a radically restructured community and included the DCI should have a stronger voice in the appointment of the directors of NFIP defense agencies; the DCI should have greater programmatic control of intelligence budgets and intelligence personnel; a Committee on Foreign Intelligence should be established within the National Security Council; two DDCIs should be established; one to direct the CIA and managing analysis and production throughout the Community and the other responsible for IC-wide budgeting,requirements and collection management and tasking, infrastructure management and systemacquisition; establishment of a Community Management Staff with IC-wide authority over,and coordination of, requirements, resources and collection; there should be a uniformed officer serving as Director of Military Intelligence with authority to manage/coordinate defense intelligence programs (JMIP andTIARA); the Clandestine Service, responsible for all humint, should be separated from the CIA, reporting directly to the DCI; a Technical Collection Agency should be established to create an IC-wide management organization responsible for directing all collection tasking by all agencies and ensuringa coherent, multi-discipline approach to all collection issues; there should be common standards and protocols for technical collection systems, from collection through processing, exploitation and dissemination; a Technology Development Office should be established to perform community research and development functions; and congressional oversight should be strengthened by the establishment of a joint intelligence committee; alternatively the House intelligence committee should be made a standingcommittee without tenure limits. Congressional Response. The recommendations of the Aspin/Brown Commission and the IC21 Study led to extensive congressional considerationof intelligence organization issues. The House Intelligence Committee considered separatelegislation on intelligence organization ( H.R. 3237 , 104th Congress); the Senateincluded extensive organizational provisions as part of the intelligence authorization bill for FY1997( S. 1718 , 104th Congress). In addition, the Defense Authorization Act for FY1997 ( P.L.104-201 ) included provisions establishing the National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA) (104) that combined elements from intelligence agencies as well as the Defense Mapping Agency whichhad not been part of the Intelligence Community. (105) The conference version of the FY1997 intelligence authorization legislation, eventually enactedas P.L. 104-293 , included as its Title VIII, the "Intelligence Renewal and Reform Act of 1996." Theact established within the NSC two committees, one on foreign intelligence and another ontransnational threats. The former was to identify intelligence priorities and establish policies. Thelatter was to identify transnational threats and develop strategies to enable the U.S. to respond andto "develop policies and procedures to ensure the effective sharing of information about transnationalthreats among Federal departments and agencies, including law enforcement agencies and theelements of the intelligence community. ..." (106) Two deputy DCI positions were established, one for Deputy DCI and the other for a Deputy DCI for Community Management, both Senate-confirmed positions. While the Deputy DCI wouldhave responsibilities coterminous with those of the DCI, the Deputy DCI for CommunityManagement would focus on the coordination of all intelligence agencies. Congress did not attemptto establish a position for a head of the CIA separate from that of the DCI. In addition to the two deputy DCIs, the legislation provided for three assistant DCIs -- for Collection, for Analysis and Production of Intelligence, and for Administration. The statute callsfor all three assistant DCI positions to be filled by, and with, the advice and consent of the Senate. The statute is clear that the positions were envisioned as being designed to enhance intelligencecapabilities and coordination of the efforts of all intelligence agencies. In addition, the legislationrequired that the DCI concur in the appointment of three major defense intelligence agencies --NSA, the NRO, and NIMA (later renamed the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency). If the DCIfailed to concur, the nominations could still be forwarded to the President, but the DCI'snon-concurrence had to be noted. The act required that the DCI be consulted in the appointment ofthe DIA director, the Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research, and the director ofthe Office of Nonproliferation and National Security of the Energy Department (107) . The FBI directoris required to give the DCI timely notice of an intention to fill the position of assistant director of theFBI's National Security Division. The act gave the DCI authority to develop and present to the President an annual budget for the National Foreign Intelligence Program and to participate in the development by the Secretary ofDefense of the Joint Military Intelligence Program (JMIP) and the Tactical Intelligence and RelatedActivities Program (TIARA). Moreover, the DCI gained authority to "approve collectionrequirements, determine collection priorities, and resolve conflicts in collection priorities levied onnational collection assets, except as otherwise agreed with the Secretary of Defense pursuant to thedirection of the President." (108) Presidential Statement. President Clinton signed the legislation on October 11, 1996, but in so doing he stated concerns about provisions that "purportto direct" the creation of two new NSC committees. "Such efforts to dictate the President's policyprocess unduly intrude upon Executive prerogatives and responsibilities. I would note that undermy Executive authority, I have already asked the NSC to examine these issues." Furthermore, hecriticized provisions requiring the DCI to concur or be consulted before the appointment of certainintelligence officials. This requirement, he argued, "is constitutionally questionable in two areas:regarding limitations on the President's ability to receive the advice of cabinet officers; and regardingcircumscription of the President's appointment authority." The statement also noted the "strong opposition" by DCI John Deutch to provisions establishing three new assistant DCIs, each requiring Senate confirmation. President Clinton added: "I share hisconcerns that these provisions will add another layer of positions requiring Senate confirmationwithout a corresponding gain in the DCI's authority or ability to manage the IntelligenceCommunity. I understand that the DCI intends to seek repeal or significant modification of theseprovisions in the 105th Congress. I will support such efforts." (109) Implementation. George Tenet, nominated to succeed John Deutch, responded to a question from Senator Robert Kerrey during his Senateconfirmation hearing in May 1997, that "I may have some changes in the law in my own mind, if I'mconfirmed, that allows us to meet your objectives. And I want to come work with you on it." Tenetalso indicated that he believed that the DCI's statutory responsibilities for coordinating the work ofall intelligence agencies was adequate. (110) In May 1998, the Senate Intelligence Committee held a hearing on the nomination of Joan A. Dempsey as the first Deputy DCI for Community Management. In opening remarks, ChairmanShelby noted discussions with the executive branch regarding the positions established by P.L.104-293 : we have reached an accommodation with the Director of Central Intelligence on these positions, and we expect that the President to put forward a nomineefor the position of Assistant Director of Central Intelligence for Administration, or ADCI, soon. Wehave agreed to allow the DCI to fill the positions of ADCI for Collection and ADCI for Analysis andProduction without exercising the Senate's right for advice and consent for up to one year while weassess the new management structure. (111) Dempsey in her testimony succinctly set forth the fundamental problem of intelligence organization: It's somewhat amusing to me -- and I've spent most of my career in the Department of Defense ... and when I was in DOD there was always this fear thata very powerful DCI with a full-time emphasis on intelligence and managing the community wouldfail to support the DOD the way it needed to be supported with intelligence. Since I've come overto the Central Intelligence Agency side of the intelligence community, I've found the same fear, butthis time directed at what DOD is going to do to subvert the role of theDCI She noted, however, the establishment of coordinative mechanisms such as the Defense Resources Board and the Intelligence Program Review Group and "constant accommodations made bySecretaries of Defense and DCIs to work together to find solutions to problems." In general, sheargued, "the relations have been good." (112) The following February, the Senate Intelligence Committee met to consider the nomination of James Simon as Assistant DCI for Administration. At the hearing, the Vice Chairman, SenatorRobert Kerrey, noted that the DCI had taken the interim steps of appointing Acting AssistantDirectors for collection and for analysis. He added: "I expect Presidential nominations for thesepositions will be forthcoming soon." (113) Henoted, however, that "Once the 1997 Authorization Actwas passed, the Community resisted mightily the appointment of Assistant Directors of CentralIntelligence for collection and analysis." (114) Simon testified that he would be responsible for "the creation of a process to ensure that the needs of all customers -- strategic and tactical, intelligence and battlefield surveillance, traditionaland novel -- are articulated, validated, and made manifest in our programs." (115) Simon noted inpassing the importance of a highly capable staff to perform coordination missions; he referred to theformer Intelligence Community Staff as having had "a certain percentage of people there who,frankly, had retired in place or were considered to be brain dead and wanted a quiet place where theycould make it to retirement without being bothered. A greater proportion were those that theiragencies either didn't want or that they felt were not progressing acceptably within their own agency.. . . " (116) Both Dempsey and Simon were confirmed by the Senate and served for several years in their respective positions. In July 2003 Dempsey, having left the DDCI position, was appointed ExecutiveDirector of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board; Simon retired in 2003. Only in July2004 was Larry Kindsvater confirmed by the Senate as DDCI for Community Management;nominations for assistant DCI positions have not been submitted. The statutory provisions remainin place, however. Despite the effort that went into the FY1997 legislation, the efforts intended to enhance the DCI's community-wide role have not been fully implemented. (117) The FY1997 Act established fournew Senate-confirmed positions having responsibilities that extend across all intelligence agencies. Since enactment, the Senate has received nominations for only two individuals to these positions(both were duly confirmed and sworn in) but both left office in 2003 and replacements have not yetbeen nominated. Some observers also believe that the DCI's authorities in the preparation of budgetsfor all intelligence agencies have not been fully exercised. (118) Observers suggest that there is littlelikelihood that serious efforts will be made, however, to seek repeal of the provisions at a time whenintelligence agencies are under scrutiny for their abilities to "connect the dots" on internationalthreats. In the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, the two congressional intelligence committees agreed to conduct a Joint Inquiry into theactivities of the Intelligence Community in connection with the attacks. The Joint Inquiry undertookan extensive investigation and conducted a number of public and closed hearings. The twoCommittees' recommendations were published in December 2002 some of which addressed issuesof Intelligence Community organization. The unclassified version of the Inquiry's report waspublished in mid-2003. Principally, the two committees urged that the National Security Act be amended to create a statutory Director of National Intelligence, separate from the head of the CIA. This DNI would havethe "full range of management, budgetary and personnel responsibilities needed to make the entireU.S. Intelligence Community operate as a coherent whole." These would include "establishment andenforcement" of collection, analysis, and dissemination priorities; authority to move personnelbetween Intelligence Community elements; and "primary management and oversight of theexecution of Intelligence Community budgets." The committees also recommended that Congress consider legislation, similar to the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 which reorganized the Defense Department, to instill a sense ofjointness throughout the Intelligence Community, including joint education, joint career specialties,and more "joint tours" in other agencies that would be designated as "career-enhancing." The then-Vice Chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee, Senator Richard Shelby, submitted additional views that also advocated organizational changes in the IntelligenceCommunity. (119) Shelby argued that "Thefragmented nature of the DCI's authority has exacerbatedthe centrifugal tendencies of bureaucratic politics and has helped ensure that the IC responds tooslowly and too disjointedly to shifting threats."Accordingly, the "office of the DCI should be givenmore management and budgetary authority over IC organs and be separated from the job of the CIADirector." (120) Further, Shelby argued that the basic structure of the National Security Act needs to be re-examined to separate "central" analytical functions from "resource-hungry collectionresponsibilities that make agencies into self-interested bureaucratic 'players.'" Shelby acknowledgedthat, "Creating a true DCI would entail removing dozens of billions of dollars of annual budgetsfrom the Defense Department, and depriving it of 'ownership' over 'its' 'combat supportorganizations.' In contemporary Washington bureaucratic politics, this would be a dauntingchallenge; DOD and its congressional allies would make such centralization an uphill battle, to saythe least." (121) Shelby also recalls theGoldwater-Nichols precedent in urging that the IntelligenceCommunity be restructured, but cautions that the Intelligence Community should not be reformedsolely to meet the terrorist threat: " we need an Intelligence Community agile enough to evolve asthreats evolve, on a continuing basis. Hard-wiring the IC in order to fight terrorists, I shouldemphasize, is precisely the wrong answer, because such an approach would surely leave usunprepared for the next major threat, whatever it turns out to be." (122) Established by the Intelligence Authorization Act for FY2003 ( P.L. 107-306 ), the 9/11 Commission, chaired by former New Jersey Governor Thomas H. Kean, undertook a lengthyinvestigation of the "facts and circumstances relating to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001." Although the Commission's mandate extended beyond intelligence and law enforcement issues, anumber of principal recommendations, made public on July 22, 2004 address the organization of theIntelligence Community. The Commission argues that with current authorities the DCI is: responsible for community performance but lacks the three authorities critical for any agency head or chief executive officer: (1) control over purse strings,(2) the ability to hire or fire senior managers, and (3) the ability to set standards for the informationinfrastructure and personnel. (123) The 9/11 Commission recommends the establishment of a National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), responsible for both joint operational planning and joint intelligence, and the position ofa Director of National Intelligence. In addition to overseeing various intelligence centers, the DNIwould manage the National Foreign Intelligence Program and oversee the agencies that contributeto it. The Community Management Staff would report to the DNI. The DNI would manage theagencies with the help of three deputies, each of whom would also hold a key position in one of thecomponent agencies. A deputy for foreign intelligence would be the now-separate head of the CIA,a deputy for defense intelligence would be the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, and thedeputy for homeland intelligence would be either an FBI or Department of Homeland Security(DHS) official. The DNI would not have responsibilities for intelligence programs affecting onlyDefense Department consumers. The report does not describe how the person serving simultaneouslyas the DNI's assistant for defense intelligence and as an Under Secretary of Defense would resolveany differing guidance from the DNI and the Secretary of Defense. The 9/11 Commission alsorecommends a separate intelligence appropriation act the total of which would be made public. (124) The efforts of committees, commissions and individuals to encourage restructuring of the U.S.Intelligence Community have led to numerous changes through internal agency direction,presidential directives and executive orders, and new statutes. The general trend has been towardsmore thorough oversight both by the executive branch and by congressional committees. Theposition of the DCI has been considerably strengthened and DCIs have been given greater staff andauthority to exert influence on all parts of the Community. They have not, however, been given"line" authority over agencies other than the CIA, and the influence of the Defense Departmentremains pervasive. Some have argued that, in the light of the Intelligence Community's inability toprovide warning of the September 2001 attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon andinaccurate intelligence estimates about Iraqi weapons of mass destruction, the need for reorganizingthe Intelligence Community has become self-evident. Others argue that many of the reforms thathave been proposed could make matters worse. The issue appears to be moving higher on thecongressional agenda. Specific legislation to reorganize the nation's intelligence effort, including S. 2845 , is currently under consideration and the 9/11 Commission's recommendationsare receiving widespread interest.

Summary: Proposals for the reorganization of the United States Intelligence Community have repeatedly emerged from commissions and committees created by either the executive or legislative branches. The heretofore limited authority of Directors of Central Intelligence and the great influence of theDepartments of State and Defense have inhibited the emergence of major reorganization plans fromwithin the Intelligence Community itself. Proposals to reorganize the Intelligence Community emerged in the period immediately following passage of the National Security Act of 1947 (P.L. 80-253) that established the positionof Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Recommendations have ranged from adjustments in the DCI's budgetary responsibilities to theactual dissolution of the CIA and returning its functions to other departments. The goals underlyingsuch proposals have reflected trends in American foreign policy and the international environmentas well as domestic concerns about governmental accountability. In the face of a hostile Soviet Union, early intelligence reorganization proposals were more concerned with questions of efficiency. In the Cold War context of the 1950s, a number ofrecommendations sought aggressively to enhance U.S. covert action and counterintelligencecapabilities. The chairman of one committee charged with investigating the nation's intelligencecapabilities, Army General James H. Doolittle, argued that sacrificing America's sense of "fair play"was wholly justified in the struggle to prevent Soviet world domination. Following the failed invasion of Cuba at the Bay of Pigs, the unsuccessful results of intervention in Vietnam, and the Watergate scandal, investigations by congressional committeesfocused on the propriety of a wide range of heretofore accepted intelligence activities that includedassassinations and some domestic surveillance of U.S. citizens. Some forcefully questioned theviability of secret intelligence agencies within a democratic society. These investigations resultedin much closer congressional oversight and a more exacting legal framework for intelligenceactivities. At the same time, the growth in technical intelligence capabilities led to an enhanced --but by no means predominant -- leadership role for the DCI in determining community-widebudgets and priorities. With the end of the Cold War, emerging security concerns, including transnational terrorism, narcotics trafficking, and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, faced the United States. Some statutory changes were made in the mid-1990s, but their results were not far-reaching. In theaftermath of the September 11, 2001 attacks and the Iraq War, some observers urge reconsideringthe intelligence organization. The 9/11 Commission has specifically recommended theestablishment of a National Intelligence Director to manage the national intelligence program. Current intelligence organization issues can be usefully addressed with an awareness of argumentspro and con that were raised by earlier investigators; this recommendation has been incorporated ina number of bills, including S. 2845 . This report will be updated as circumstanceswarrant.