GPRA is intended to shift the focus of government decisionmaking, management, and accountability from activities and processes to the results and outcomes achieved by federal programs. New and valuable information on the plans, goals, and strategies of federal agencies has been provided since federal agencies began implementing GPRA. Under GPRA, annual performance plans are to clearly inform the Congress and the public of the (1) annual performance goals for agencies’ major programs and activities, (2) measures that will be used to gauge performance, (3) strategies and resources required to achieve the performance goals, and (4) procedures that will be used to verify and validate performance information. These annual plans, issued soon after transmittal of the President’s budget, provide a direct linkage between an agency’s longer- term goals and mission and day-to-day activities. Annual performance reports are to subsequently report on the degree to which performance goals were met. The issuance of the agencies’ performance reports, due by March 31 of each year, represents a new and potentially more substantive phase in the implementation of GPRA—the opportunity to assess federal agencies’ actual performance for the prior fiscal year and to consider what steps are needed to improve performance, and reduce costs in the future.To meet the reporting requirements for this year, Commerce issued a combined performance report and performance plan. According to Commerce, its basic mission is to promote job creation and improve living standards for all Americans through economic growth, technological competitiveness, and sustainable development. The component agencies that are accountable for the selected key outcomes covered in this report are responsible for providing assistance to distressed communities; forecasting and warning the public about severe weather, such as hurricanes, tornadoes, and floods; supporting export policies that affect millions of domestic jobs and monitoring hundreds of international trade agreements; and helping stop the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and providing technical assistance to Russia and newly emerging countries concerning export controls. Activities not covered by the selected outcomes include supporting the domestic and international management of living marine resources, including overseeing 2,000,000 square miles of ocean and 300 marine species; fostering telecommunications policies that promote economic and technical advancement; protecting patents, trademarks, and intellectual property rights; and conducting the decennial census, demographic and economic censuses, and over 200 annual surveys. While Commerce shares responsibilities for these functions with a number of other federal departments and agencies, it has a lead role in one area—promoting economic development in distressed areas. This section discusses our analysis of Commerce’s performance in achieving selected key outcomes and the strategies—particularly those related to strategic human capital management and information technology—that it has in place for achieving these outcomes. On the basis of Commerce’s report, the Economic Development Administration (EDA) made good progress in achieving its two performance goals related to this key selected outcome: (1) to create jobs and private enterprise in economically distressed communities and (2) to build local capacity to achieve and sustain economic growth. In March 1999, we reported that measuring job creation that results from economic development programs is problematic. EDA reports that it adjusted its targets related to creating and retaining permanent jobs based on our report, resulting in conservative targets. In addition, EDA uses multiple measures to assess its performance related to this outcome. Among the achievements that EDA reports were creating or retaining over twice as many jobs in distressed areas as planned, obtaining millions of dollars in private sector investments in distressed communities ahead of schedule, obtaining more state and local funds than anticipated, awarding a larger portion of its grants to areas of highest distress, and decreasing the processing time for grant applications. The one performance measure for which the target was not met was the percentage of Economic Development District and Indian tribe planning grantees whose Comprehensive Economic Development Strategies were submitted on time and were acceptable. Commerce explained that this target is not based on statutory requirements and was originally an estimate. In addition, some delays may have stemmed from new legislation that changed the process for some grantees. EDA said that it is analyzing trends to determine if adjustments need to be made to future targets. EDA presents clear and reasonable strategies for the future, which include the following: providing grants for economic development projects in distressed providing grants to implement economic adjustment strategies in communities that experience sudden losses of jobs and severe economic distress, strengthening and expanding its strategic planning and investment activities through a network of regional planning organizations, and disseminating information on economic development issues affecting distressed communities to entities involved in helping those communities. EDA said that it used program evaluations to develop valid performance measures, verify results, provide a more complete understanding of overall program performance, and improve program performance. EDA also identified specific program evaluations that it had used in the past, as well as evaluations that are currently under way. EDA reports that it plans to collaborate with other federal agencies on ways to evaluate and measure crosscutting activities to improve economic development assistance for distressed communities—a topic that was covered in our September 2000 report. For each of its performance measures, EDA describes the data source, as well as its data validation and verification efforts. In addition, EDA generally discusses data limitations. For example, for two measures related to the ratings that EDA receives from its clients, EDA states that this is the first year that data have been reported and that it will evaluate trends after more years of data are available. The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) made limited progress in achieving its performance goal related to this outcome—to advance short-term warnings and forecasts. NOAA reported its fiscal year 2000 performance for this goal using measures such as the lead time and accuracy of forecasts and warnings. Specifically, NOAA met its targets for flash floods and winter storms that are covered by warnings. On the other hand, it did not issue warnings for flash floods, winter storms, and tornadoes with as much lead time as targeted and its false alarm rate for tornado warnings was higher than targeted. NOAA’s performance on one measure—the accuracy of warnings for hurricanes— was not applicable this past year because no hurricanes made landfall during the 2000 season. In some cases, NOAA’s performance stayed about the same as last year even though the target was not met for fiscal year 2000. For example, the reported accuracy for marine forecasts involving winds and waves remained at 50 percent, slightly below the target of 51 percent. Similarly, the reported lead time for severe weather warnings for flash floods increased from 41 minutes to 43 minutes, but fell short of the target of 55 minutes. In reporting on these measures, Commerce’s report offered explanations for its failure to meet targets, which often involved atypical weather conditions. For example, in explaining why it did not meet its three targets for tornado warnings, NOAA noted that the 2000 tornado season had few well-organized storm systems, resulting in fewer and weaker tornadoes that are harder to detect. Similarly, in explaining why it did not meet its target of 20 percent accuracy in 3-day precipitation forecasts, NOAA indicated that the past year had been relatively dry, a factor that can lower the accuracy score. In addition, NOAA noted that this measure was being used for the first time and, therefore, was considered a baseline for this measure. NOAA noted that improvements are difficult to observe on an annual basis and that historical trends show that the agency continues to improve the accuracy and lead time of warnings related to severe weather hazards. NOAA’s strategies for further improving its performance are clear and reasonable. These strategies include continuing its investments in research and new technologies, maintaining continuous satellite coverage, strengthening weather observing and prediction systems, and improving the dissemination of weather forecasts and warnings to the public and others. NOAA also stated that it uses annual program evaluations at its National Weather Service (NWS) field offices as part of its quality control to ensure the reliability of its data and products; however, it did not elaborate on the results of these evaluations. For each of its performance measures, NOAA describes the data source, as well as its data validation and verification efforts. In addition, NOAA generally discusses data limitations. For example, for its measure related to hurricane warnings, NOAA states that there is a large variability in the hurricane warning program due to sample sizes and types of storms. Our prior work drew attention to problems that NWS faced in developing and implementing weather-forecasting technologies. Because of these and other problems, we identified NWS’ efforts to modernize its critical weather systems as a high-risk area in our 1995, 1997, and 1999 high-risk series reports. We made a series of recommendations aimed at helping NWS improve its management of the modernization effort, and NWS has implemented many of those recommendations. Most recently, in January 2001, we removed NWS’ modernization effort from our high-risk list because of the progress NWS had made in addressing our recommendations and in implementing a critical information processing system. NWS is continuing to improve its modernization systems and has reported that these efforts are critical to its ability to improve warnings and forecasts over time. Commerce’s progress made toward ensuring that U.S. businesses have greater access to international markets is unclear for at least three reasons. First, most of the targets related to this outcome were not met and performance for those targets during fiscal year 2000 was lower than performance during fiscal year 1999. For example, the International Trade Administration (ITA) did not meet its target for the number of counseling sessions held with U.S. businesses and held about 20,000 fewer sessions in fiscal year 2000 than it held in fiscal year 1999. ITA stated that the number of counseling sessions did not reflect its level of success given the emphasis on using electronic means to communicate with U. S. firms, but ITA did not describe its efforts to communicate electronically. Also, ITA did not meet the target for the value of gross exports supported through advocacy efforts and reported that the dollar value was $8.9 billion for fiscal year 2000, as opposed to $9.8 billion for fiscal year 1999. Second, it is not clear whether ITA met its targets for two measures. Specifically, ITA reported that it met the original targets for the number of “new-to-market” and “new-to-export” firms. ITA explained that it had revised these targets upward in the fiscal year 2001 performance plan and did not meet the revised targets; however, ITA did not explain why it used the lower targets for this report. In addition, based on the same data, Commerce’s accountability report for fiscal year 2000 states that the target for the number of “new-to-market” firms was not met. Third, ITA reported that its ability to demonstrate future progress is hindered by the limitations of the measures that it uses. ITA reported that it faces inherent difficulties in quantifying its progress due to the reluctance of its business clients to volunteer proprietary information and the unanticipated shifts in the world economy. In addition, ITA faces the challenge of isolating its contribution to U.S. trade objectives from that of U.S. industry and other U.S. agencies. While ITA met its targets for the number of antidumping and countervailing duty cases processed and for the dollar value of market openings, it is discontinuing use of the dollar value of market openings because it does not directly relate to ITA’s success in enforcing trade laws and agreements. ITA also plans to discontinue using the number of counseling sessions held with U.S. businesses and the value of gross exports supported as performance measures. While ITA explains its reasons for discontinuing measures, some of the explanations were very brief. For example, ITA states that the value of gross exports is being discontinued as a measure to reflect departmental goals and objectives but does not describe those goals and objectives or explain the relationship of this measure to those goals and objectives. ITA has taken steps to improve its ability to demonstrate progress towards its goals by discontinuing three measures and adding two new measures. In addition, ITA presented a multi-step strategy for improving its performance. While this strategy is clear and reasonable, ITA’s prospects for success in improving its ability to demonstrate progress are unclear because, for each of its four performance goals for fiscal year 2002, it plans to rely on one, narrowly focused measure to demonstrate progress. For example, ITA will measure its progress in increasing U.S. exports by implementing the National Export Strategy by using the number of “new- to-market” firms. ITA states that this measure is circumstantial evidence of overall export growth and adds that it cannot measure actual dollar value of exports because of limitations on the data, such as the reluctance of businesses to reveal that information. In another instance, Commerce will use the number of anti-dumping and countervailing duty cases processed to measure its progress in improving American competitiveness and access to foreign markets by enforcing compliance with U.S. trade laws. However, in summarizing the limitations to this information, ITA states that the number of cases processed depends entirely on the number of injurious foreign trade actions taken and on the responses of parties other than ITA. In some cases, data exist that could support additional measures related to ITA’s performance goals. For example, as we reported in March 2000, ITA’s Trade Compliance Center relies on multiple sources of information and reporting mechanisms to ensure that trade agreements are monitored and compliance issues are promptly addressed. These sources of information include U.S. businesses, other parts of Commerce, and U.S. embassies overseas. The Trade Compliance Center also produces regular reports on possible compliance violations for use by other executive branch agencies. Thus, ITA already collects and maintains a rich set of useful data that is directly related to one of its key performance goals— improving competitiveness and access to foreign markets by enforcing compliance with U.S. trade laws and agreements. ITA identified both internal and external program evaluations that were related to its performance goals. Specifically, ITA reported that, in response to one of our reports, it clarified criteria for the types of agreements that are to be included in a trade database. Also, ITA reported that it conducted a number of internal reviews that identified needed changes in programs, administration, and management that were implemented at the end of these reviews. For each of its performance measures, ITA describes the data source, as well as its data validation and verification efforts. In addition, ITA generally discusses data limitations. For example, ITA explains that its success in collecting data on “new-to-export” firms is dependent on its clients’ willingness to provide such information. The Bureau of Export Administration’s (BXA) progress toward ensuring that the United States is secure from the proliferation of dual-use commodities and chemical weapons is unclear. As we observed last year, BXA’s ability to demonstrate progress toward this outcome has been hampered by the tendency of its measures to reflect workload and outputs—rather than outcomes—and a lack of clarity in the presentation of its performance goals. BXA reported that it met its targets for the number of strategic industry analyses completed, the number of investigations accepted for criminal or administrative remedies, the number of enforcement outreach visits, the number of end-use visits conducted, and the number of nonproliferation and export control international cooperative exchanges. However, BXA reported that it plans to discontinue using the last four of these measures for external reporting in the future. BXA said that it was changing its measures to align them more closely with new departmental objectives. However, BXA did not describe those objectives or explain why these measures do not support those objectives. In addition, BXA did not achieve its targets for average export licensing processing time, high-risk transactions deterred, licensing decisions made, number of investigations completed, and export assistance seminars and conferences attended. BXA plans to discontinue using all of these measures except the number of high-risk actions deterred. While BXA attributed its lack of success in meeting these targets to several factors—including the liberalization of export controls, the growing complexity of its investigations, and staff limits—its explanations were not always complete. For example, BXA said that the decline in the number of high-risk transactions deterred was due to unforeseen regulatory, policy, and technological changes, but did not describe those changes or explain their impact on the measure. In addition, BXA stated that it did not meet its target for number of licensing decisions due to unanticipated liberalizations of export controls. However, Commerce has advocated such changes and the report did not provide enough information to explain how these liberalizations differed from those advocated by Commerce. In another case, BXA said that it did not meet its targeted number of seminars and conferences due to budget constraints and its inability to fill critical personnel vacancies; however, it did not provide supporting details. BXA broadly described strategies for meeting the targets for its five performance goals associated with this key outcome. However, like ITA, BXA’s prospects for success in improving its ability to demonstrate progress are unclear because for fiscal year 2002, it plans to rely on one measure to demonstrate progress for each of these performance goals. For example, to ensure that the U.S. defense industrial base is healthy and competitive, BXA describes strategies such as coordinating federal support for U. S. defense firms involved in procurement competitions overseas, facilitating business contacts between U. S. industry and potential customers, maintaining the competitiveness of U.S. defense firms, and minimizing the burden of offsets placed on firms that make defense sales to foreign customers. To measure its performance related to this goal, BXA plans to use the dollar value of contracts won in international competitions by U.S. defense firms. While this measure may be an indicator of BXA’s success in this area, additional measures would provide further evidence of progress. Like the other component agencies, BXA identified program evaluations that were related to its performance goals. Specifically, BXA reported that, in response to reports from Commerce’s Office of Inspector General and us, BXA initiated its own program reviews related to data validation. BXA reported that it used the results of these program evaluations to identify improvements in data entry and review, among other things. For each of its performance measures, BXA describes the data source, as well as its data validation and verification efforts. However, unlike the other component agencies covered by this report, BXA generally did not discuss data limitations. Commerce’s FY 2000 Annual Program Performance Report and FY 2002 Performance Plan is a significant improvement over its fiscal year 1999 performance report and fiscal year 2001 performance plan and addresses the recommendations made in our June 2000 report. Most notably, Commerce clearly showed whether targets for performance goals were met or not met, rather than using the three-tiered scoring system that was used in last year’s report. Furthermore, for most of its component agencies and for departmental management, Commerce’s combined performance report and plan includes summaries of the mission, priorities and management challenges, actual and targeted levels of performance, and resource requirements. These summaries are followed by detailed explanations of the performance goals and measures that include explanations of whether performance targets were met or not met, as well as any changes, additions, or deletions from the prior year. In addition, an appendix in the combined document summarizes performance measures across component agencies, links them to Commerce’s strategic goals, and designates whether the targets were met or not met. In our June 2000 report, we recommended that the Secretary of Commerce ensure that the fiscal year 2000 performance report (1) classify performance measures as met or unmet to more clearly communicate the agency’s performance, (2) consistently explain why targets were not met when differences occur between actual and targeted performance, and (3) provide information about plans and schedules for meeting targets when they are not met. Commerce’s combined report and plan addresses these recommendations. For each performance measure, the document includes a table that lists the targeted and actual performance for fiscal years 1999 and 2000, clearly indicates whether the targets were met or not met, and lists targets for fiscal years 2001 and 2002. The table is followed by a narrative explanation of that measure. For the measures whose targets were exceeded or not met, the description usually explains whether Commerce has adjusted its performance targets for future years based on actual performance. For example, EDA reports that it has created or retained over 12,000 jobs in distressed areas, yet one of its fiscal year 2001 targets is to create or retain 7,201 jobs by fiscal year 2004. The narrative explains that this is the first year for which data have become available for this measure and the high number of jobs created or retained could have been due, in part, to strong economic growth; consequently, additional data are required before adjusting long-term projections. In another case, ITA reported that the number of “new-to-export” firms for fiscal year 2000 was 33,514, which was fewer than in fiscal year 1999; consequently, ITA reduced its fiscal year 2001 target for this measure from 36,949 firms to 30,336 firms to reflect trends experienced in fiscal year 2000. Each performance goal also includes a list of the measures that were discontinued, accompanied by explanations; an action plan, including planned strategies; a description of crosscutting activities both inside and outside of the department; and a discussion of external factors and accompanying mitigation strategies. In addition, the document includes two appendixes, one that lists all of the fiscal year 2000 measures and indicates whether they were met or not met and one that lists the performance measures and targets for fiscal years 2001 and 2002. In January 2001, we identified two governmentwide high-risk areas— strategic human capital management and information security—and reported on four major management challenges facing Commerce.Commerce’s combined report and plan contained goals and measures directly related to all of these challenges. Where measures were identified, Commerce reported its progress related to those measures. Commerce’s combined report and plan includes a performance goal of acquiring, managing, and developing a diverse, skilled, and flexible staff, using information technology as an essential tool. In describing its measures related to this goal, Commerce states that our high-risk report on strategic human capital management encourages agencies to consider strategic human capital management as a strategic asset. Commerce notes that it held a departmentwide meeting in August 2000 that involved senior managers who generated ideas for changing Commerce’s human capital strategy and incorporating human capital management into all major management systems. To assess how well it achieves this goal, Commerce plans to measure implementation of a process to identify current and projected mission- related workforce needs, the value of human resources services, the efficiency and effectiveness of hiring systems, recruiting activities, the alignment of performance management with mission accomplishment and overall recognition, and implementation of a telecommuting program. For fiscal year 2000, Commerce reports achievements that include developing a workforce analysis plan and identified workforce planning tools, pilot testing a Web-based recruitment and referral system, integrating performance management and awards, and pilot testing a telecommuting program. In addition, Commerce cited human capital initiatives as part of its strategy for addressing its challenge of strengthening financial management controls. Specifically, Commerce plans to establish financial leadership positions at all bureaus and develop a professional education program. For each of its component agencies, Commerce’s combined report and plan includes a table of resource requirements—including full-time equivalent positions, as well as a summary of the skills needed in that component agency. For example, BXA’s skill summary includes an extensive knowledge of the legislation and Executive Orders related to controlling dual-use commodities; knowledge of world political and economic systems, current trends in U. S. trade, and national security and foreign policy issues; and analytical abilities for complex licensing and policy decisions, as well as regulatory interpretations. Several component agencies discussed challenges related to human capital. The Bureau of the Census states that its strategies to achieve its mission include valuing its employees, and lists its workplace and workforce as a management challenge. By fostering diversity in its workforce, the Bureau hopes to create surveys that are more sensitive to the cultural base of the people being surveyed, as well as retain a trained and skilled workforce. One of ITA’s management challenges is to position human capital as a strategic asset. It projects that one-third of its employees can retire within 5 years and lists strategies for maintaining its workforce. Similarly, BXA notes that it lacks sufficient technical and analytical personnel and will lose people who retire. BXA also includes maintaining technical and analytical abilities as one of its management challenges, although it does not have goals and measures that are directly related to this challenge. NOAA and the Technology Administration discuss investing in people under their respective sections on priorities. While Commerce’s combined report and plan does not identify a specific performance goal for strengthening departmentwide information security, some of its goals contain measures related to information security. For example, under Department Management, Commerce’s performance goal to acquire and manage the fiscal and related resources necessary to support program goals contains a measure to protect information and staff at field sites from risk or disaster. For fiscal years 2001 and 2002, the measure will be to ensure the protection of critical, classified, and sensitive Commerce computer systems and information from compromise or exploitation by adversaries, and will include inspecting, accrediting, and certifying computer systems. Another performance goal under Department Management is to acquire and manage the technology resources to support program goals. This goal includes a measure to increase the maturity of its information technology security program, which is a new measure for which the first target is established for fiscal year 2001. Information security and related issues such as critical infrastructure protection are also identified in the report as management challenges by the following component agencies: EDA, BXA, NOAA, the Bureau of the Census, the Minority Business Development Agency, and the National Institute of Standards and Technology. The report provides little specific information on the progress of resolving these challenges at these component agencies, and the related performance goals or measures identified were shown as new for fiscal year 2000. The fiscal year 2002 plan does not highlight the priority for establishing safeguards against unconventional national security threats that was included in the fiscal year 2001 plan. However, according to the plan, some of Commerce’s component agencies have performance goals and/or measures for critical infrastructure protection. These are as follows: The National Institute of Standards and Technology has a goal to protect the national information infrastructure. The primary focus of this goal is to establish a grants program for new research into advanced technologies, measurements, and methods that can raise the level of reliability and security of critical information technology-based systems and networks. The current measure for this goal is the timely and successful completion of activity milestones to establish the program. In the longer term, outcome measures will be developed that gauge the security, reliability, quality, and survivability of information technology systems and networks. BXA has a new performance goal to ensure that the nation’s infrastructure components are secured in accordance with an integrated plan. To begin in fiscal year 2002, the measure for this goal is the number of agency plans implemented within the framework of the National Critical Infrastructure Protection Plan. The National Telecommunications and Information Administration included a new performance goal to minimize the effects of crisis by preparing the U.S. telecommunications and information infrastructure protection programs. To begin in fiscal year 2002, the measure for this goal is to increase the number of state, city, and county governments actively engaged in critical infrastructure protection programs. However, in commenting on a draft of this report, Commerce officials said they will discontinue this measure because Commerce did not receive funding for efforts related to it. The four management challenges that we identified are the same as the four outcomes covered by this report. As discussed above, we found that Commerce’s performance report described the agency’s progress in achieving these challenges and contained goals and measures directly related to each of them. Commerce’s combined report and plan is a significant improvement over its fiscal year 1999 performance report and fiscal year 2001 performance plan and addresses the recommendations made in our June 2000 report. Furthermore, the report indicates that Commerce has made progress toward achieving two of the selected key outcomes. However, progress toward achieving the remaining two outcomes is unclear largely because of weaknesses related to measuring performance. Specifically, some of the measures are output-oriented, rather than outcome oriented; some measures have known limitations, which Commerce acknowledges; many of the measures used to assess performance in the past are being discontinued for the future; and Commerce plans to rely on one, narrowly focused measure to demonstrate progress for each performance goal related to these key outcomes. Furthermore, other data exist within ITA that could support additional measures related to its performance goals. We recommend that the Secretary of Commerce direct ITA and BXA to reassess the measures that are used to assess progress in achieving their organizational performance goals related to the outcomes covered by this report. Specifically, ITA and BXA should consider using more than one measure to address goals that are multifaceted or are difficult to measure. In addition, ITA should consider developing trade agreement compliance and enforcement measures based on data currently gathered by its trade compliance unit. Our evaluation was generally based on the requirements of GPRA, the Reports Consolidation Act of 2000, guidance to agencies from the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) for developing performance plans and reports (OMB Circular A-11, Part 2), previous reports and evaluations by us and others, our knowledge of Commerce’s operations and programs, our identification of best practices concerning performance planning and reporting, and our observations on Commerce’s other GPRA-related efforts. We also discussed our review with Commerce’s Office of Inspector General. The agency outcomes that were used as the basis for our review were identified by the Ranking Minority Member of the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee as important mission areas for the agency and do not reflect the outcomes for all of Commerce’s programs or activities. The major management challenges confronting Commerce, including the governmentwide high-risk areas of strategic human capital management and information security, were identified in January 2001 in our performance and accountability series and high-risk update or in December 2000 by Commerce’s Office of Inspector General. We did not independently verify the information contained in the performance report and plan, although we did draw from our other work in assessing the validity, reliability, and timeliness of Commerce’s performance data. We conducted our review from April through June 2001 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. We provided copies of a draft of this report to Commerce for its review and comment. We met with the Deputy Director, Office of Budget, and representatives from many of Commerce’s component agencies to obtain their comments. In general, they agreed with the information presented in the draft report and provided technical clarifications, which we incorporated where appropriate. While Commerce indicated that it would send its comments in writing, we did not receive written comments in time to include them in this report. As arranged with your office, unless you publicly announce its contents earlier, we plan no further distribution of this report until 30 days after the date of this letter. At that time, we will send copies to appropriate congressional committees; the Secretary of Commerce; and the Director, Office of Management and Budget. Copies will also be made available at www.gao.gov. If you or your staff have any questions, please call me at (202) 512-8678. Key contributors to this report were Debra Johnson, Stephen Lord, Tina Morgan, Colleen Phillips, William Ritt, Debra Rucker, Nancy Simmons, and Pierre Toureille. The major management challenges confronting Commerce, which include the governmentwide high-risk areas of strategic human capital management and information security, are shown in table 1. The first column lists the challenges that Commerce’s Office of Inspector General and/or we identified. The second column discusses the progress Commerce made in resolving its challenges as discussed in Commerce’s FY 2000 Annual Program Performance Report and FY 2002 Performance Plan. The third column discusses the extent to which Commerce’s combined document includes performance goals and measures to address the challenges. Commerce’s combined document discussed its progress in resolving all of the identified challenges. For its 15 challenges, Commerce’s performance plan contained goals or measures that were directly related to 11 of the challenges and goals or measures that were indirectly related to 3 of the challenges. The remaining challenge was not applicable because it dealt with improving Commerce’s GPRA efforts.

Summary: This report reviews the Department of Commerce's fiscal year 2000 performance report and fiscal year 2002 performance plan required by the Government Performance and Results Act to assess Commerce's progress on achieving selected key outcomes. Commerce's combined performance report and performance plan is a significant improvement over its fiscal year 1999 performance report and fiscal year 2001 performance plan and addresses the recommendations made in GAO's June 2000 report. Furthermore, the report indicates that Commerce has made progress toward achieving two of the selected key outcomes. However, progress toward achieving the remaining two outcomes is unclear largely because of weaknesses related to measuring performance. Specifically, some of the measures are output-oriented, rather than outcome oriented; some measures have known limitations, which Commerce acknowledges; many of the measures used to assess performance in the past are being discontinued for the future; and Commerce plans to rely on one, narrowly focused measure to demonstrate progress for each performance goal related to these key outcomes. Furthermore, other data exist within the International Trade Administration (ITA) that could support additional measures related to these performance goals.