In October 2004, Congress included a provision in the Ronald W. Reagan National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005 that required the Secretary of Defense to develop a comprehensive policy for DOD on the prevention of and response to sexual assaults involving members of the Armed Forces. The legislation required that the policy be based on the recommendations of the Defense Task Force on Care for Victims of Sexual Assaults and on other matters as the Secretary deemed appropriate. Among other things, the legislation requires the Secretary to establish a standardized departmentwide definition of sexual assault, and to develop a policy, using the standardized definition, to address a number of issues, including the confidential reporting of sexual assault incidents and the uniform collection of data on the incidence of sexual assault. The law also requires DOD to submit an annual report to Congress on reported sexual assault incidents involving members of the Armed Forces. In October 2005, DOD issued DOD Directive 6495.01, which contains its policy for the prevention of and response to sexual assault. In June 2006, DOD issued DOD Instruction 6495.02, which provides guidance for implementing this policy. DOD’s directive defines sexual assault as follows: “intentional sexual contact, characterized by use of force, threats, intimidation, abuse of authority, or when the victim does not or cannot consent. Sexual assault includes rape, forcible sodomy (oral or anal sex), and other unwanted sexual contact that is aggravated, abusive or wrongful (to include unwanted and inappropriate sexual contact), or attempts to commit these acts. “Consent” means words or overt acts indicating a freely given agreement to the sexual conduct at issue by a competent person. An expression of lack of consent through words or conduct means there is no consent. Lack of verbal or physical resistance or submission resulting from the accused’s use of force, threat of force, or placing another person in fear does not constitute consent. A current or previous dating relationship by itself or the manner of dress of the person involved with the accused in the sexual conduct at issue shall not constitute consent.” In October 2008, Congress passed the Duncan Hunter National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009, which includes a provision requiring the Secretary of Defense to implement a centralized, case-level database for the collection and maintenance of information regarding sexual assaults involving members of the Armed Forces. The law specifies that the database include information, if available, about the nature of the assault, the victim, the offender, and the outcome of any legal proceedings associated with the assault, and requires DOD to implement the database by January 2010—which is 15 months from the day of its enactment. In OSD, the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness has the responsibility for developing the overall policy and guidance for the department’s sexual assault prevention and response program. Under the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, OSD’s Sexual Assault Prevention and Response Office (within the Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Plans) serves as the department’s single point of responsibility for sexual assault policy matters. These responsibilities include providing the military services with guidance and technical support and facilitating the identification and resolution of issues; developing programs, policies, and training standards for the prevention of, reporting of, and response to sexual assault; developing strategic program guidance and joint planning objectives; overseeing the department’s collection and maintenance of data on reported alleged sexual assaults involving servicemembers; establishing mechanisms to measure the effectiveness of the department’s sexual assault prevention and response program; and preparing the department’s annual report to Congress. The Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Plans has the responsibility for programming, budgeting, and allocating funds and other resources for the Sexual Assault Prevention and Response Office. Each military service has established a sexual assault prevention and response office with responsibility for overseeing and managing its sexual assault matters. Further, DOD’s instruction requires the military services to establish Sexual Assault Response Coordinator positions and states that at the services discretion, these positions may be staffed by members of the military, civilian employees, or DOD contractors. Sexual Assault Response Coordinators are generally responsible for implementing their respective services’ sexual assault prevention and response programs, including coordinating the response to and reporting of sexual assault incidents. Other responders include victim advocates, judge advocates, medical and mental health providers, criminal investigative personnel, law enforcement personnel, and chaplains. The Coast Guard has had a sexual assault prevention and response program in place since 1997, and in December 2007, the Coast Guard updated its instruction to generally mirror DOD’s policy. According to Coast Guard officials, in January 2009, they revised their instruction to incorporate what officials have stated is a more comprehensive definition of the term “sexual assault,” modify titles of certain program personnel to better reflect their responsibility, and clarify processes for reporting a sexual assault. The Coast Guard’s Office of Work-Life (within the Health, Safety, and Work-Life Directorate, which is under the Office of the Assistant Commandant for Human Resources) is responsible for overseeing and managing sexual assault matters. At the installation level, the Coast Guard has established Employee Assistance Program Coordinators to manage the response to and reporting of sexual assault incidents. Like DOD’s, the Coast Guard’s sexual assault prevention and response program utilizes other responders to manage sexual assault incidents, including victim advocates, judge advocates, medical and mental health providers, criminal investigative personnel, law enforcement personnel, and chaplains. In August 2008, we issued a report containing nine recommendations to DOD and two recommendations to the Coast Guard to improve program implementation. With respect to DOD, we recommended that the Secretary of Defense take the following actions: Review and evaluate the department’s policies for the prevention of and response to sexual assault to ensure that adequate guidance is provided to effectively implement the program in deployed environments and joint environments. Direct the military service secretaries to emphasize to all levels of command their responsibility for supporting the program, and review the extent to which commanders support the program and resources are available to raise servicemembers’ awareness of sexual assault matters. Systematically evaluate and develop an action plan to address any factors that may prevent or discourage servicemembers from accessing health services following a sexual assault. Direct the Defense Task Force on Sexual Assault in the Military Services to begin its examination immediately, now that all members of the task force have been appointed, and to develop a detailed plan with milestones to guide its work. Require the Sexual Assault Prevention and Response Office to develop an oversight framework to guide continued program implementation and to evaluate program effectiveness. At a minimum, such a framework should contain long-term goals, objectives, and milestones; performance goals; strategies to be used to accomplish goals; and criteria for measuring progress. Review and evaluate sexual assault prevention and response training to ensure that the military services are meeting training requirements and to enhance the effectiveness of the training. Evaluate the military services’ processes for staffing and designating key installation-level program positions—such as coordinators—at installations in the United States and overseas, to ensure that these individuals have the ability and resources to fully carry out their responsibilities. Direct the military service secretaries to provide installation-level incident data to the Sexual Assault Prevention and Response Office annually or as requested to facilitate the analysis of sexual assault- related data and to better target resources over time. Improve the usefulness of the department’s annual report as an oversight tool both internally and for congressional decision makers by establishing baseline data to permit the analysis of data over time and to distinguish cases in which (1) evidence was insufficient to substantiate an alleged assault, (2) a victim recanted, or (3) the allegations of sexual assault were unfounded. With respect to the Coast Guard, we recommended that the Commandant of the Coast Guard take the following actions: Evaluate the Coast Guard’s processes for staffing key installation-level program positions—such as coordinators—to ensure that these individuals have the ability and resources to fully carry out their responsibilities. Develop an oversight framework to guide continued program implementation and to evaluate program effectiveness. At a minimum, such a framework should contain long-term goals, objectives, and milestones; performance goals; strategies to be used to accomplish goals; and criteria for measuring progress. We also suggested as a matter for congressional consideration that the Coast Guard be required to annually submit to Congress sexual assault incident and program data that are methodologically comparable to those required of DOD. In commenting on a draft of that report, both DOD and the Coast Guard concurred with all of our recommendations. DOD has made varying levels of progress in implementing our recommendations from 2008 to improve its sexual assault prevention and response programs. To its credit, DOD has implemented four of the nine recommendations in our August 2008 report. However, DOD’s efforts toward implementing the other five recommendations reflect less progress, which is likely to hinder the effectiveness of DOD’s efforts to oversee its programs. During fiscal years 2008 and 2009, DOD implemented four of the recommendations in our August 2008 report on DOD and Coast Guard sexual assault prevention and response programs. First, OSD established a working group to address our recommendation to review and evaluate the adequacy of DOD policies for implementing its sexual assault prevention and response program in joint and deployed environments. Based on the working group’s findings, OSD submitted a memorandum to the Joint Staff in April 2009 detailing its suggested revisions to joint policy, which a Joint Staff official told us they are using to modify related publications. Additionally, according to a Joint Staff official, the Joint Staff has issued interim guidance to support the implementation of sexual assault prevention and response programs in joint and deployed environments until the new joint publications are approved. Second, the military service secretaries have taken a variety of steps to address our recommendation to emphasize responsibility for program support to all levels of command. For example, the military services’ top leadership spoke at their respective services’ sexual assault prevention summits, during which they emphasized the need for “ownership” of the programs and commitment to the prevention of and response to sexual assault. Specifically, in the spring of 2009, the Secretary of the Army spoke to noncommissioned officers—the personnel responsible for program implementation—on the importance of modifying the Army’s culture to actively reject sexual assault and other inappropriate behavior. In the fall of 2009, the Secretaries of the Air Force and Navy and the Commandant of the Marine Corps gave similar presentations to their personnel, during which they stressed their commitment to eradicating sexual assault in the military services. The military services have taken even more far-reaching steps to relay their support for and to commit resources to sexual assault prevention and response programs. For example, the Secretary of the Navy recently established the Navy’s Sexual Assault Prevention and Response Office that reports directly to the Secretary, which Navy officials assert will foster additional support and accountability for its sexual assault program initiatives. The Marine Corps, following a review of its program staffing, established full-time Sexual Assault Response Coordinator positions at four installations with the highest troop concentrations and is in the process of establishing full-time coordinator positions at installations with at least 1,000 troops as a way to better manage its sexual assault prevention and response programs. Additionally, the Army has incorporated an assessment of sexual assault program awareness into promotional boards for noncommissioned officers to promote accountability for the implementation of prevention and response initiatives. DOD has also taken a variety of steps to emphasize support for and to further develop its sexual assault prevention and response programs. For example, in fiscal year 2008, representatives from OSD and the military services visited selected military installations to assess, among other things, the extent to which commanders—company and field grade officers—support sexual assault prevention and response programs. OSD found that while most program personnel had demonstrable support from their command, command support of sexual assault prevention and response programs varied from installation to installation, and stronger command support of the program was required. OSD further reported that it is working with its stakeholders to address its findings. Additionally, each of the military services has incorporated interactive, scenario-based training programs to promote increased involvement by participants and to enhance the retention of the material being presented. For example, the Army contracts with a company that offers a nationally recognized presentation called “Sex Signals”—a 90-minute program that uses interactive skits to address the topics of dating, rape, consent, and intervention. The Air Force has implemented bystander intervention training that incorporates techniques such as role-playing to motivate servicemembers to take actions if they see, hear, or otherwise recognize signs of an inappropriate or unsafe situation. The Marine Corps has implemented and the Navy is in the process of adopting a program called Mentors in Violence Prevention training. Like the Air Force’s program, this consists of role-playing exercises that allow students to construct and practice ways to respond or intervene in incidents of harassment, abuse, or violence. Third, OSD chartered the Health Affairs Sexual Assault Task Force to address our recommendation to evaluate and develop an action plan to address factors that may prevent or discourage servicemembers from seeking health services. In March 2009, the task force made a number of recommendations intended to improve the availability of health care, such as (1) chartering a military health system Sexual Assault Health Care Integrated Policy Team to review department-level policies regarding clinical practice guidelines, standards of care, research gaps and opportunities, personnel and staffing, training requirements and responsibilities, continuity of care, and in-theater equipment and supplies; (2) drafting model memorandums of understanding for use by all service military treatment facilities as they establish continuity of care relationships with local community providers; and (3) reviewing DOD policy, including performing peer reviews of sexual assault cases to ensure that they are aligned with civilian practices. Fourth, in August 2008, the Defense Task Force on Sexual Assault in the Military Services began its examination of matters relating to sexual assault, as we recommended. According to task force staff, the task force has conducted interviews and focus groups with sexual assault prevention and response program personnel at approximately 60 locations throughout the world. However, the task force did not meet its August 11, 2009, reporting deadline. It was granted an extension, which it met by releasing its report on December 1, 2009. DOD’s efforts to implement the five other recommendations we made in our report issued in August 2008 reflect less progress. Further, remaining issues with OSD’s strategic planning efforts and DOD’s annual report to Congress on alleged sexual assault incidents are likely to hinder the effectiveness of DOD’s efforts to oversee its programs. OSD recently drafted an oversight framework, but the framework only partially satisfies our recommendation in that the framework does not contain all the elements that we previously recommended as necessary for effective strategic planning and program implementation. Further, the draft oversight framework cannot be implemented until it is approved—a step that OSD officials stated will occur once they have incorporated revisions from and obtained the endorsements of the military service secretaries. Based on our prior work on the importance of strategic program planning guidance and our finding that OSD had not established an oversight framework to guide the implementation of its programs, we recommended in August 2008 that OSD develop an oversight framework that includes, at a minimum, (1) long-term goals, objectives, and milestones; (2) performance goals and strategies to be used to accomplish goals; and (3) criteria for measuring progress. To its credit, OSD, in October 2009, completed drafting and is preparing to begin a 3-year implementation of its oversight framework to improve the oversight and integration of the department’s sexual assault prevention and response programs. This draft oversight framework contains long- term goals, objectives, and milestones for implementation. For example, it identifies nine objective-like elements—called “improvement opportunities”—to facilitate program oversight. Examples of the improvement opportunities include defining core oversight roles and responsibilities, standardizing performance measures and reports, and improving communication with stakeholders. The draft framework also identifies action-oriented steps that correspond with and are designed to facilitate the achievement of these opportunities. For example, the draft framework specifies that OSD will “define and document the policy development, coordination, and approval process” and “define and document the process to review alignment between policy and program development” as specific steps toward the achievement of its objective of defining core oversight roles and responsibilities. Table 1 details the nine opportunities and selected steps for achieving them that are contained in the draft framework. OSD’s draft oversight framework is a positive step toward stronger management of the department’s sexual assault prevention and response programs. Further, OSD recently restructured its Sexual Assault Advisory Council and established the Oversight Steering Committee to more actively involve DOD’s top leadership in the development and implementation of the department’s sexual assault prevention and response initiatives. For example, DOD’s instruction specifies that the Sexual Assault Advisory Council shall be chaired by the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness and shall comprise top DOD leadership, including the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Plans, the military departments’ assistant secretaries for manpower and reserve affairs, and the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. While the establishment of such committees is an important step toward successful implementation of the oversight framework, implementation will require the personal involvement of top DOD leadership to maintain the long-term focus on and accountability for program objectives. Further, OSD’s draft oversight framework is missing key elements that are needed to provide comprehensive oversight of DOD’s sexual assault prevention and response programs. Specifically, OSD’s framework lacks performance measures, does not identify how it will use or report the results of its performance assessments, does not identify how OSD’s budgeting of resources relates to its achievement of strategic program objectives, and does not correlate with the program’s two strategic plans. OSD’s draft oversight framework does not satisfy our recommendation from 2008 in that it does not yet contain performance measures, which are needed to facilitate the evaluation of program performance and the identification of areas needing improvement. Our prior work has shown that managers can use performance information to identify problems and develop solutions that will improve program results. Currently, OSD has plans to develop a standardized set of performance measures and targets by the second year of its 3-year plan for implementing its oversight framework. We note that our prior work has highlighted the importance of performance measures and that they should include quantifiable, numerical targets or other measurable values for determining (1) whether the desired performance results are being achieved and (2) overall program progress. Until performance measures are established, OSD cannot accurately assess the progress of the department’s initiatives or correctly identify and implement actions to improve program performance. In addition to its lack of performance measures, OSD’s framework does not identify how OSD’s budgeting of resources relates to its achievement of strategic program objectives, which limits the department’s ability to inform budget formulation and execution decisions according to performance considerations. Our prior work has demonstrated that by linking program plans with budgets, organizations can more explicitly guide budget discussions and can assist management by correlating total resources consumed with actual results achieved. While these correlations have not been made in the draft framework, OSD officials told us that the process of developing the framework helped to identify the need and gain approval for 21 full-time employees, which is three times the number of staff originally approved for that office. However, until OSD explicitly correlates its budgeting of resources to the achievement of strategic program objectives, it will be challenged in its justification of future budget requests. OSD’s strategic planning documents do not correlate with the program’s two strategic plans. Our prior work has shown that clear linkages among long-term strategic goals, objectives, strategies, and day-to-day activities are critical for enabling a strategic plan to drive an organization’s operations. In addition to its draft oversight framework, OSD drafted an internal strategic plan to guide the initiatives of DOD’s Sexual Assault Prevention and Response Office, and a DOD-wide strategic plan to guide initiatives across the larger DOD community. According to OSD officials, the oversight framework, when approved, will support OSD’s ability to meet the goals of its strategic plans, which were designed to serve as the overarching program planning guidance. However, the intended correlation among these three documents is not clear because they do not use similar terminology to clearly link their purposes. For example, OSD’s internal strategic plan is based on five “strategic objectives” that are identical to the five “strategic sexual assault prevention and response priorities” contained in the DOD-wide strategic plan. In contrast, the draft oversight framework contains terminology that is different from both strategic plans, and it refers to its nine objective-like elements as “future state improvement opportunities.” As a result, the correlation between these three documents is not clear. Further, the two strategic plans and the draft oversight framework do not clearly illustrate how each supports the achievement of the objectives and strategies contained in the other two documents. In commenting on a draft of this report, DOD further defined the relationship between the draft oversight framework and its two strategic plans for sexual assault prevention and response programs. DOD also noted that the objective-like elements in its draft oversight framework were purposely not tied to the program objectives in the two strategic plans. However, without consistent terminology and clearly correlated objectives and strategies among these three documents, the prioritization of and responsibility for these initiatives will remain unclear. (See app. II for DOD’s comments) While OSD has taken steps to evaluate the effectiveness of the sexual assault prevention and response training provided to DOD servicemembers, training programs cannot be assessed because OSD’s strategic plans and draft oversight framework do not contain measures against which to benchmark performance. As we reported in August 2008, DOD’s sexual assault prevention and response training was not consistently administered or evaluated for effectiveness. Accordingly, we recommended that DOD undertake an evaluation of the department’s training programs. To its credit, OSD’s training subcommittee reviewed the military services’ training policies and found that they continue to provide initial and refresher training for all personnel. However, it also found that a greater level of detail was needed in policy to guide the execution of training requirements. OSD’s training subcommittee developed an action plan for fiscal year 2009 that included visits to selected military installations to review sexual assault prevention and response training programs. Nevertheless, OSD’s draft oversight framework does not include performance measures, thus limiting OSD’s ability to assess the effectiveness of training programs and other initiatives. OSD officials, as part of their recent strategic planning efforts, have acknowledged the need for and are planning to develop a standard set of DOD-wide performance measures over the next few years for DOD sexual assault prevention and response programs. However, they have stated that these performance measures will not be established until at least the second year of DOD’s 3- year implementation plan for the oversight framework. Until these measures are established, we continue to assert that OSD cannot ensure that the department’s sexual assault prevention and response training effectively imparts an awareness of the subject matter to servicemembers. DOD has not implemented our recommendation to evaluate the military services’ processes for staffing key installation-level program positions to ensure that they have the ability and resources to fully carry out their responsibilities. In fiscal year 2008, OSD and the military services examined program staffing processes during OSD’s assessments of selected military installations, and similarly concluded that DOD’s policy on selection criteria and scope of duty for key program personnel should be further evaluated. However, OSD officials stated that they had not taken action to address their findings because personnel from the congressionally mandated Defense Task Force on Sexual Assault in the Military Services advised OSD that they would be making related recommendations in their December 2009 report to Congress. Until DOD implements our 2008 recommendation, it cannot ensure that it is able to adequately staff and resource its sexual assault prevention and response programs. While the military services have agreed to provide installation-level data on sexual assault incidents, OSD officials told us that they will not collect them until they have implemented the statutorily mandated centralized database to maintain these data. (For a discussion of this database, see a later section of this report.) As we reported in our August 2008 report, OSD could not conduct a comprehensive cross-service trend analysis because it did not have access to installation-level data on sexual assault incidents from the military services. As such, we recommended that the military services provide these data to OSD to facilitate the analysis of sexual assault-related data and to better target resources over time. However, OSD is not currently collecting these data, despite their availability, because it has not yet completely standardized its data definitions and data elements. OSD and its stakeholders have started to create a standardized set of sexual assault data elements, thus delineating the types of data to be provided by each of the services. However, OSD officials told us that the process of developing and training the numerous program personnel worldwide to collect and report standardized data elements will be a very complex and time-consuming undertaking. Further, OSD officials stated that they plan to finalize the data definitions in the coming months, but added that similar to the data elements, they will not require that the definitions be used by the military services until the implementation of DOD’s sexual assault incident database, the date of which is not yet known. Therefore, it is unknown when OSD will establish baseline data, which are needed to conduct trend analyses of the military services’ sexual assault data. While OSD introduced some changes in DOD’s annual report to Congress, these changes have not sufficiently improved the report to ensure that congressional stakeholders are better informed on DOD’s prevention of and response to incidents of sexual assault. As we previously reported, DOD’s annual report may not have been effectively characterizing incidents of sexual assault in the military services, and thus we recommended that the department improve the usefulness of its annual report as an oversight tool. To its credit, OSD incorporated new charts and graphics into DOD’s fiscal year 2008 annual report that more specifically illustrated the demographics of individuals involved and the locations in which sexual assaults in the military have been occurring. Further, OSD and its stakeholders have started to create a standardized set of sexual assault data elements and definitions. However, the standardization is not yet complete, and as noted previously, OSD officials told us that developing definitions and data elements for and training the numerous program personnel worldwide on how to consistently report on the data elements collected, is very complex and time-consuming. OSD officials added that the standardization of data definitions is something that they expect to accomplish in the near term, while standardizing data elements will take longer since it is a task that will be completed in conjunction with their development of a centralized sexual assault database. Further, OSD has not provided its own analysis of the military services’ reports and programs, and we do not believe that it will be able to do so until it establishes performance measures with which it can assess program effectiveness. We believe that the format of the information provided in DOD’s annual report to Congress continues to complicate the reader’s ability to establish a comprehensive understanding of the department’s sexual assault prevention and response programs. Our prior work shows that the usefulness of data ultimately depends on the degree of confidence that users have in the data being presented. Higher confidence can be achieved by providing key information about the data being reported, including efforts to validate data and the implications of the data limitations that have been identified. However, we believe the sexual assault incident data are not qualified at the outset of DOD’s annual report to disclose that incident data may include an alleged sexual assault that occurred prior to the victim’s or perpetrator’s military service or outside of the year in which it was reported. Our prior work shows that standardized data with common definitions are critical to ensuring that comparable information from multiple sources is accurately represented. However, the military services’ sections in the annual report contain similar but not comparable types of information. For example, the Army and Air Force structure their respective reports according to the category of program information, and the Navy and Marine Corps structure their report according to the responses received from program personnel involved in their sexual assault prevention and response initiatives. While we do not advocate for one military service’s approach over another’s, the dissimilar report formats make it difficult, if not impossible, to compare program efforts. OSD officials told us that they have taken initial steps to address some data inconsistencies by providing the military services with a data collection template to begin the process of standardizing the collection and reporting of sexual assault program information in DOD’s fiscal year 2009 annual report to Congress. This is an important first step; however, it does not fully address our concerns in that the military services may still be reporting data that are based on different criteria. Further, while we recognize that the complete standardization of the type, amount, and format of the military services’ data will be a significant undertaking, OSD will not be able to report consistent data on the status and condition of DOD’s sexual assault prevention and response programs until these issues are resolved. Until OSD and the military services reach consensus on the data elements and begin disseminating the new data collection and reporting requirements to program personnel, DOD will continue to lack key information needed for oversight. DOD has taken preliminary steps to implement a centralized, case-level sexual assault incident database. However, the database was not implemented by the statutorily mandated deadline of January 2010. Moreover, when the database will be implemented is uncertain because a reliable schedule to guide acquisition and implementation tasks and activities has yet to be developed. In addition, other key information technology management practices that are essential to successfully acquiring and implementing the database also remain to be accomplished. DOD officials agreed that these key practices need to be implemented; however, they have yet to develop plans or time frames for doing so. The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009 required DOD to implement a centralized, case-level database for collecting and maintaining information on sexual assaults involving members of the Armed Forces, including information, if available, about the nature of the assault, the victim, the offender, and the outcome of any legal proceedings in connection with the assault. The law also required the Secretary of Defense to submit a concept plan for this database to Congress by January 2009 and to implement the database by January 2010. In response to these statutory requirements, the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness instructed the Sexual Assault Prevention and Response Office to develop the Defense Sexual Assault Incident Database. According to OSD officials, this database is to generate congressionally mandated annual reports, run ad hoc queries, track sexual assault victim support services, support program administration, meet program reporting requirements, and perform data analysis. Among other things, the database is also to ensure the privacy and restricted reporting options of victims. DOD has established conceptual plans for acquiring and deploying a centralized sexual assault incident database. According to these plans, the database will be delivered in two increments, with the first increment consisting of four phases. (See table 2 for a description of the increments and phases.) However, these phases have not yet been decomposed into meaningful work tasks, activities, and events, including timeframes and resources needed to execute them. Moreover, other important practices associated with creating a reliable schedule of when and how these phases will be accomplished have yet to be satisfied. Specifically, our research has identified nine practices associated with developing and maintaining a reliable schedule. These practices are (1) capturing all key activities, (2) sequencing all key activities, (3) assigning resources to all key activities, (4) integrating all key activities horizontally and vertically, (5) establishing the duration of all key activities, (6) establishing the critical path for all key activities, (7) identifying float between key activities, (8) conducting a schedule risk analysis, and (9) updating the schedule using logic and durations to determine the dates for all key activities. According to program officials, the steps and associated time frames for the increments and phases identified in table 2 cannot be reliably determined until the development and implementation contractor is hired, which will not occur until sometime after March 31, 2010. This means that the program office currently lacks the necessary means by which to execute a system acquisition, gauge progress, identify and address potential problems, and promote accountability. In addition, DOD’s current plans include a few general milestones. For example, OSD officials told us that the first phase of the initial increment was to have been achieved when they provided a “proof-of-concept” document to Congress in January 2010. However, this document has yet to be approved. Further, they stated that they intend to release a Request for Proposals for a database developer in the second quarter of fiscal year 2010. Based on these milestones and the absence of a reliable program schedule, DOD did not meet its legislative mandate to implement the database by January 2010, and when it will implement the database is uncertain. OSD program officials stated that they received milestone approval in July 2009 from the milestone decision authority, the Acting Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Program Integration, to conclude the Materiel Solution Analysis (previously Concept Refinement) phase and begin the Technology Development phase of DOD’s acquisition system. Associated with this progression, DOD has taken steps to begin employing a number of key information technology acquisition management disciplines that are provided for in DOD and related guidance. Our research and evaluations of information technology programs across the federal government have shown that adhering to such disciplines is essential to delivering promised system capabilities and benefits on time and within budget. Among other things, these disciplines include assessing a program’s overlap with and duplication of related programs through architecture compliance, justifying investment in the proposed system solution on the basis of reliable estimates of life cycle costs and benefits, effectively developing and managing system requirements, adequately testing system capabilities, and effectively managing program risks. However, DOD has yet to progress to the point that it can demonstrate that these disciplines have been fully implemented, as discussed below. Until it does, the chances of it successfully delivering the database are reduced. Architectural alignment: DOD’s guidance and other guidance recognize the importance of investing in business systems within the context of an enterprise architecture. Additionally, our experience in reviewing federal agencies has shown that making investments without the context of a well-defined enterprise architecture often results in systems that are, among other things, duplicative of other systems. Within DOD, the means for avoiding business system duplication and overlap is the department’s process for assessing compliance with DOD’s business enterprise architecture and its associated investment review and decision-making processes. DOD officials told us that the database was assessed for compliance with the business enterprise architecture and received investment review board approval as compliant in July 2009. However, a complete set of system-level architecture products needed to perform a thorough and meaningful compliance assessment are not yet available. As we have previously reported, architecture compliance is not a onetime event but rather a determination that needs to be made at key junctures in a system’s acquisition life cycle. If it is not, unnecessary overlap and duplication with other systems, as well as system interoperability shortfalls, can occur. Economic justification: Our prior work has shown that a reliable cost estimate is critical to informed investment decision making, realistic budget formulation and justification, program resourcing, meaningful progress measurement, proactive course correction, and accountability for results. Further, according to Office of Management and Budget (OMB) guidance, justifications for an investment should include an analysis of the investment’s total life cycle cost. DOD developed a business case for the database in June 2009 that provides the department’s proposal and justification for its database (i.e., system solution), and this business case includes a program cost estimate of $12.6 million. While the cost estimate was derived in accordance with some best practices identified in relevant cost estimating guidance, such as estimating software costs with a parametric tool that incorporates GAO cost estimating best practices and relying on the costs of analogous existing systems, it was not done in accordance with others. For example, it does not include all costs over the system’s life cycle, and it has not been adjusted to account for program risks. More specifically, program officials stated that the $12.6 million does not include program office and management costs, relevant development costs (e.g., testing), or sustainment costs (i.e., operations and maintenance). OSD officials told us that they intend to develop a reliable cost estimate once the development contract is awarded. Without reliable estimates, a proposed system solution cannot be adequately justified on the basis of costs and benefits, and DOD may be at increased risk of experiencing cost overruns, schedule slippages, and performance shortfalls. Beyond not having a reliable cost estimate, DOD’s business case does not comply with other OMB guidance. According to OMB, the economic analysis used to justify an investment should meet certain criteria to be considered reasonable, including comparing alternatives on the basis of net present value and conducting an uncertainty analysis of benefits. While the business case includes an explanation of why the database is needed, it does not address the costs and benefits associated with each of the four database alternatives that were considered (i.e., commercial-off-the-shelf case management system software product, custom-built system, enhancement of an existing military service system, or maintenance of the status quo). Moreover, the four alternatives were not assessed on the basis of net present value, including using the proper discount rate to account for inflation. Instead, only the selected alternative was evaluated quantitatively. Without a meaningful analysis of alternatives, DOD lacks sufficient assurance that it has selected the most cost-effective system solution. Requirements development and management: Well-defined and well-managed requirements are the cornerstone of effective system development and acquisition. Effective requirements development and management includes, among other things, (1) effectively eliciting user needs early and continuously in the system life cycle process, (2) establishing a stable baseline set of requirements and placing the baseline under configuration management, (3) ensuring that system- level requirements can be traced back to higher-level business or operational requirements (e.g., concept of operations) and forward to system design documents (e.g., software requirements specification) and test plans, and (4) controlling changes to baseline requirements. DOD has begun to take steps to engage users in the development of requirements. For example, it formed a working group composed of representatives from each of the military services and the National Guard to develop high-level system requirements. Further, program officials stated that additional actions are planned or under way to reach agreement on system interfaces, which is important given that the database is to draw data from multiple systems to satisfy statutory requirements. They also said that users will be further involved in developing requirements. For example, DOD is working with the Air Force and National Guard to define more specific functional, performance, and data requirements, and has initiated discussions with the Army, Navy, and Marine Corps to do the same. In addition, program officials stated that once the high-level system requirements are baselined, the Change Control Board, comprising representatives from DOD and the user community, will be established to control changes to the baseline requirements. While these ongoing and planned actions are positive, they represent only the beginning of a series of actions that are associated with effectively defining and managing requirements over a system’s acquisition life cycle. To the extent that this series of actions is not well detailed and implemented, the risk of the database not performing as intended, and costing more and taking longer to implement than necessary, is increased. Test management: According to DOD and other relevant guidance, system testing should be progressive, meaning that it should consist of a series of test events that first focus on the performance of individual system components, then on the performance of integrated system components, followed by system-level tests that focus on whether the system (or major system increments) are acceptable, interoperable with related systems, and operationally suitable to users. Among other things, effective testing should ensure that (1) all test events are governed by a well-defined test management structure, (2) each test event is executed in accordance with well-defined plans, and (3) the results of each test event are captured and used to ensure that problems discovered are disclosed and corrected. Program officials stated that they plan to work with the development contractor to establish an effective test management structure, develop test plans, and capture and resolve problems found during testing. In addition, they plan to engage an independent test organization. However, DOD has not yet developed milestones for its testing plans or activities. Unless adequate testing is performed and key test management structures and controls are established, it is unlikely that the database will meet user expectations and mission needs, and the risk of it costing more and taking longer than planned is increased. Risk management: Proactively managing program risks is a key acquisition management control that if done properly, can increase the chances of programs delivering promised capabilities and benefits on time and within budget. Relevant guidance, including DOD’s Risk Management Guide for DOD Acquisition, recognizes the importance of conducting effective risk management. Among other things, effective risk management includes (1) establishing and implementing a written plan and defined process for risk identification, analysis, and mitigation; (2) assigning responsibility for managing risks to key stakeholders; (3) encouraging programwide participation in risk management; and (4) examining the status of identified risks during program milestone reviews. Program officials stated that they intend to document and implement a risk management strategy that is consistent with DOD’s Risk Management Guide. To its credit, the program office has begun to identify key risks. For example, it cited identified risks related to (1) what officials believed to be an unattainable congressionally mandated database implementation date of January 2010; (2) staffing shortages that complicate the office’s ability to develop and gain approval of a large number of key documents (e.g., privacy impact assessments, documentation required for investment reviews, and updates of relevant DOD instructions, etc.); (3) potential shortfalls in system development and maintenance funding issues; (4) limitations of the military services’ systems, which are expected to provide data to DOD’s database; and (5) the military services’ competing priorities, which may jeopardize their support and involvement. However, they have yet to begin proactively managing these risks. Unless this is done, the risks could evolve into actual cost, schedule, and performance shortfalls. The Coast Guard has partially implemented one of our recommendations from 2008 to further develop its sexual assault prevention and response program, but it has not addressed the other. To its credit, the Coast Guard conducted an assessment of its processes for staffing key program positions and has continued to develop, through a variety of initiatives, other components of its sexual assault prevention and response program. However, the Coast Guard has not addressed our recommendation to develop an oversight framework, and its program is challenged by the lack of a systematic process for collecting, documenting, and maintaining sexual assault data and by the lack of training for program coordinators. The Coast Guard has taken steps to implement our previous recommendation to evaluate its processes for staffing key program positions. As we previously reported, Coast Guard officials told us that its Sexual Assault Response Coordinators do not have the time to effectively implement a sexual assault prevention and response program. Thus we recommended that the Coast Guard evaluate its processes for staffing key program positions to ensure that they have the ability and resources to fully carry out their responsibilities. Coast Guard officials told us that current levels of full-time staffing continue to hinder their ability to appropriately implement various components of their sexual assault prevention and response program, adding that the continuity of care for victims is negatively affected since its coordinators do not possess the time or the training to provide consistent case management services. To address this, the Coast Guard, in June 2009 initiated an assessment of the current workload requirements and resource allocations for its Sexual Assault Response Coordinators. Officials told us that they plan to use the results of this assessment to determine whether the responsibilities of the position or associated resource levels need to be revised. Coast Guard officials also noted that the assessment is to be completed by December 2009, and that they hope to address any program recommendations within 2 years of the assessment’s completion. While these are positive first steps, they do not fully address our findings and recommendation from 2008 because the Coast Guard has yet to complete its assessment and decide what, if any, program modifications it will make. The Coast Guard also established two new program positions in response to findings in our previous report. Specifically, in September 2008, the Coast Guard established a headquarters-level program manager position to oversee the management of, training for, and evaluation of its sexual assault prevention and response program. The Coast Guard also established a Sexual Assault Response Coordinator position at its academy to manage its sexual assault prevention and response program. While the Coast Guard is not generally subject to the departmental direction or statutory requirements that apply to DOD, it has developed an instruction that charges responsible personnel with establishing policies and procedures for its program. To the Coast Guard’s credit, Coast Guard officials stated that they frequently leverage program information and materials obtained through their regular participation in OSD’s Sexual Assault Advisory Council subcommittees and working groups and the military services’ conferences and summits. For example, the Coast Guard recently modeled its victim advocate training after the Navy’s curriculum, and it is revising its data collection requirements to mirror those of DOD. The Coast Guard is also modifying its sexual assault prevention and response program instruction to clarify its definition of sexual assault and revise its description of selected program positions to better reflect program responsibilities. Coast Guard officials stated that they plan to issue the revised instruction in spring 2010. With respect to our second recommendation, the Coast Guard’s efforts to establish a program oversight framework have been limited. Although the Coast Guard has identified broad program objectives, it has not addressed our recommendation to develop an oversight framework that provides comprehensive and specific guidance for operating its programs. Further, the Coast Guard’s program lacks a systematic process for assembling, documenting, and maintaining sexual assault incident data, lacks quality control procedures to ensure that the program data being collected are reliable, and the Coast Guard has yet to complete the development and implementation of training for key program personnel. As a result, the Coast Guard’s program development efforts continue to be hindered by its inability to evaluate program effectiveness, to accurately account for sexual assault incidents, to prioritize program initiatives, and to help ensure that program personnel are trained to properly execute their responsibilities. The Coast Guard has not developed an oversight framework to guide its program development and implementation, despite its concurrence with our August 2008 recommendation that it do so. Our prior work has demonstrated the importance of results-oriented performance measures to successful program oversight, and has shown that having an effective plan for implementing initiatives and measuring progress can help decision makers determine whether initiatives are achieving their desired result. As we previously reported, the Coast Guard was not able to fully evaluate the results achieved by its efforts, and thus we recommended that it develop an oversight framework that at a minimum includes long-term goals, objectives, and milestones; performance goals; strategies to be used to accomplish goals; and criteria for measuring progress. The Coast Guard revised its program instruction to clarify departmental oversight roles, and it has developed an action plan that broadly defines program goals, objectives, strategies, milestones, and criteria. However, based on our prior work on developing and enhancing program oversight, the Coast Guard’s efforts do not sufficiently encompass the key components of an oversight framework. For example, the Coast Guard’s action plan does not contain performance measures, nor does it identify how it plans to use the results of its program evaluations to revise its future program objectives. Furthermore, the strategies identified in its action plan are too vague to enable an assessment of whether they would help achieve program goals and objectives. For example, the Coast Guard’s action plan includes as one of the long-term program objectives, “provide updated, consistent information on program reporting options and resources,” and the corresponding strategy is simply, “purchase and distribute marketing materials to the field,” without specifying how or when it plans to achieve this objective. Further, the Coast Guard has not correlated program objectives and strategies with its internal budget requests, which limits its ability to effectively allocate and account for program resources. As we noted previously, our prior work shows that having program plans clearly linked with budgets allows an organization to more explicitly guide budget discussions and can assist program management by connecting total resources consumed with actual results achieved. Thus, we continue to believe that our recommendation has merit, and that the Coast Guard will remain limited in its ability to manage and evaluate its sexual assault prevention and response program until it develops and implements an oversight framework. The Coast Guard does not have a systematic process to collect, document, and maintain its sexual assault data and related program information. The Coast Guard’s instruction charges responsible program personnel with establishing a reporting system to evaluate statistical data related to sexual assault incidents, maintaining records to identify victims and track services provided, and providing oversight of quality assurance review processes to ensure the provision of quality services. Additionally, our prior work has shown that organizations striving to meet program goals must have information systems in place to meet the modern need for fast, reliable, and accurate information. However, the Coast Guard’s sexual assault program does not currently have a systematic process to collect, document, and maintain its sexual assault incident data. One individual maintains a hard copy log, informed by reports from coordinators in the field, and if necessary, may call these coordinators to get additional information. At the conclusion of our review, Coast Guard officials told us that they are in the process of developing a prototype to enable personnel to electronically manage sexual assault cases, and that they expect to conduct an assessment of prototype capabilities in early 2010. However, until the Coast Guard establishes a systematic process for the collection, documentation, and maintenance of these data, it will be challenged in its ability to efficiently retrieve data and its visibility over sexual assault incidents will remain limited. Additionally, the Coast Guard has not instituted quality control processes to ensure the reliability of the sexual assault incident and program data being collected. Our prior work has highlighted the importance of organizations assessing the quality of their program data and ensuring that these data are complete and reliable. However, the Coast Guard has not established a process to periodically assess the sufficiency of the program information it collects. For example, Coast Guard officials noted that in fiscal year 2008, the Coast Guard Investigative Service, in the course of its investigations, documented 78 reports of sexual assault, while Coast Guard Headquarters, using the hard copy log of reports from its coordinators, had documented only 30. Further, the Coast Guard’s sexual assault prevention and response instruction requires that commanding officers “ensure completion of mandatory annual training on sexual assault prevention by all unit personnel.” However, officials told us that the current system used to track training is designed to report training compliance at the unit level, and while individual training compliance can be discerned, the process to do so is overly cumbersome. As a result, this practice complicates the Coast Guard’s ability to oversee whether personnel are completing their required training. Officials added that unit compliance with training is assessed during inspections that occur every 2 to 3 years, and the responsible command is notified if any problems are identified. Further, Coast Guard officials told us that while there is no systematic process for following up on the findings from these inspections, they are confident that the issues are taken seriously and appropriately addressed. However, we believe that until the Coast Guard establishes a systematic process to assess the quality and reliability of its data, it cannot be sure that the information it collects is relevant to and sufficient for the achievement of its program goals. The Coast Guard recently developed and is starting to conduct training for its victim advocates however, it has not provided training for its Sexual Assault Response Coordinators—the personnel who manage the victim advocates. The Coast Guard’s instruction requires that all Coast Guard Sexual Assault Response Coordinators be trained to perform relevant duties, and prohibits them from accepting a restricted sexual assault report until the training has been completed. However, Coast Guard officials stated that they have not developed a curriculum or implemented training for the Coast Guard’s 16 Sexual Assault Response Coordinators, because, alternatively, they were developing and implementing a training curriculum for victim advocates. Coast Guard officials initially told us that it would likely take up to 2 years to develop a formalized curriculum for Coast Guard Sexual Assault Response Coordinators, but that in the meantime, they have scheduled a training session for coordinators in January 2010 to review policy revisions and reporting processes. At the conclusion of our review, Coast Guard officials stated that they have since updated their plans to train Sexual Assault Response Coordinators, noting that they plan to complete a formalized curriculum by May 2010 and have scheduled training for the Coordinators during the week of May 4, 2010. However, until such training is administered, Sexual Assault Response Coordinators will lack formalized Coast Guard sexual assault prevention and response training, and according to Coast Guard officials, they will rely instead only on the general mandated training provided to all personnel, their own professional experience, and their interpretation of the Coast Guard’s sexual assault prevention and response policy. Additionally, the Coast Guard’s Sexual Assault Program Manager plans to travel to Coast Guard installations throughout the country to administer annual victim advocate training, which will eventually be administered by coordinators. However, this may not be the most effective use of resources, as the training could be administered by trained Sexual Assault Response Coordinators. Until a formal curriculum is developed and implemented, the Coast Guard cannot be sure that it has effectively imparted program responsibilities and requirements to its Sexual Assault Response Coordinators. Since the release of our August 2008 report, DOD has taken a number of positive steps toward addressing our recommendations to further strengthen its sexual assault prevention and response programs and to develop the statutorily mandated sexual assault incident database. Additionally, each service has proactively developed and implemented a variety of initiatives—beyond what we recommended—to increase program awareness and to improve prevention of and response to occurrences of sexual assault. While such progress is noteworthy, DOD’s efforts have not fully established a sound management framework, which must build upon the foundation of a comprehensive strategic framework that guides program development and implementation. Without such a foundation, DOD’s programs lack the institutional support, long-term perspective, and clear lines of accountability that are needed to withstand the administrative, fiscal, and political pressures that confront federal programs on a daily basis. Until OSD finalizes and fully implements its oversight framework and strategic plans, it will continue to lack the ability to synergize its prevention and response initiatives, and it may not be able to effect the change in military culture that is needed to ensure that programs are institutionalized. Additionally, successful implementation of the oversight framework will require the personal involvement of top DOD leadership to maintain the long-term focus on and accountability for program objectives. While the Coast Guard is not generally subject to the departmental program direction or statutory requirements that apply to DOD, it continues to proactively develop its sexual assault prevention and response program. The Coast Guard has, however, experienced challenges similar to those of DOD because it lacks the long-term strategic perspective needed to structure its program development and implementation. Until the Coast Guard develops an oversight framework that includes specific management improvement steps, key milestones, and performance measures, it will be unable to accurately demonstrate that its programs are achieving its goals of establishing a culture of prevention, sensitive response, and accountability. Further, the Coast Guard may not be able to demonstrate that program elements, such as its sexual assault prevention and response training, are being implemented in a manner that most effectively ensures its achievement of program goals. We recommend that the Secretary of Defense take the following 10 actions: To improve the management, strategic planning, and comprehensiveness of OSD’s oversight of the department’s sexual assault prevention and response programs, direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness to strengthen OSD’s oversight framework by identifying how the results of performance assessments will be used to guide the development of future program initiatives, identifying how OSD’s program resources correlate to its achievement of strategic program objectives, and correlating its oversight framework to the program’s two strategic plans so that program objectives, timelines, and strategies for achieving objectives are synchronized. To enhance visibility over the incidence of sexual assaults involving DOD servicemembers, the department’s sexual assault prevention and response programs, and the pending implementation of the Defense Sexual Assault Incident Database, direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness to standardize the type, amount, and format of the data in the military services’ annual report submissions. To enhance the oversight of the sexual assault prevention and response program in DOD, direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness to ensure that the development and implementation of the Defense Sexual Assault Incident Database includes adherence to the following key system development and acquisition management processes and controls developing a reliable integrated master schedule that addresses the nine key practices discussed in this report, adequately assessing the program’s overlap with and duplication of related programs through architecture compliance, adequately justifying investment in the proposed approach on the basis of reliable estimates of life cycle costs and benefits, effectively developing and managing system requirements, adequately testing system capabilities, and effectively managing program risks. We are recommending that the Commandant of the Coast Guard take the following three actions: To improve the oversight and accountability of the Coast Guard’s sexual assault prevention and response program establish a systematic process for collecting, documenting, and maintaining sexual assault incidence data, and establish quality control processes to ensure that program information collected is valid and reliable. To improve execution of sexual assault prevention and response programs, we recommend that the Commandant of the Coast Guard establish and administer a curriculum for all key program personnel to ensure that they can provide proper advice to Coast Guard personnel. In written comments on a draft of this report, both DOD and the Coast Guard concurred with all of our recommendations. DOD noted in its comments that our report contained technical inaccuracies, which we addressed where appropriate, based on the technical comments received from both DOD and the Coast Guard. Further, DOD asserted that the report also contained misstatements that improperly diminished the department’s efforts to address our recommendations. We believe that our report accurately represents DOD’s progress to address our recommendations from 2008. DOD’s comments are reprinted in appendix II, and the Coast Guard’s comments are reprinted in appendix III. In concurring with our recommendations aimed at improving the management, strategic planning, and comprehensiveness of OSD’s oversight of the department’s sexual assault prevention and response programs—including that OSD should strengthen its oversight framework by (1) identifying how the results of performance assessments will be used to guide the development of future program initiatives, (2) identifying how OSD’s program resources correlate with its achievement of strategic program objectives, and (3) correlating its oversight framework with the program’s two strategic plans—DOD commented that several efforts are underway or are planned to address these issues. For example, DOD stated that in the early part of 2010, it will have a plan in place that details how it will track its progress toward the performance objectives laid out in the DOD-wide strategic plan, and it will develop a procedure to report back on progress toward objectives and any needed corrective steps. DOD also stated that starting with the 2012 budget cycle, OSD plans to align its budget categories with specific performance objectives laid out in its strategic plan. Further, DOD noted that the process it plans to use to track its progress toward performance objectives will also allow the department to synchronize the objectives, timelines, and strategies of its two strategic plans. We commend DOD for taking immediate steps in response to our recommendations, and encourage the department to continue taking positive actions toward fully implementing them. In its concurrence with our recommendation that the department standardize the type, amount, and format of the data in the military services’ annual report submissions, DOD acknowledged that achieving uniformity among the military services for all required data elements will greatly enhance its oversight capabilities. DOD added that it recently established definitions for case disposition data and developed a standardized program report template, and that both are being used by the military services to compile their respective data for the department’s fiscal year 2009 report on sexual assault in the military services. DOD stated that the comprehensive process of linking all of its data elements will ultimately be accomplished through its development of the Defense Sexual Assault Incident Database. Our report credits DOD with taking initial steps toward developing standardized data elements and definitions, and acknowledges the data template it developed and is using to collect a more standardized set of data from the military services for the department’s fiscal year 2009 annual report to Congress. However, as we noted in our report, OSD officials stated that full standardization of data elements and definitions will not be achieved until it implements the Defense Sexual Assault Incident Database—for which DOD does not currently have a reliable implementation schedule. While we recognize that this will be a complex and time-consuming task, we continue to assert that the full establishment and implementation of standardized data elements and definitions will facilitate a more comprehensive understanding of DOD’s sexual assault prevention and response programs. In concurring with our recommendation to develop a reliable integrated master schedule for the Defense Sexual Assault Incident Database, DOD stated that it will give priority to doing so, and will follow GAO schedule estimating guidance. However, it added that while the department has thus far developed schedules that it characterized as capturing broader scope key activities, it would not be able to capture key schedule activities or estimate a timeframe for identifying key activities that are fundamental to developing a reliable schedule until it acquired the assistance of the system development contractor. DOD noted that this is because only the contractor will know the steps and time required to adopt proprietary materials to DOD’s requirements for the database. We understand the role that the development contractor plays in developing a reliable integrated master schedule, which is why our recommendation does not specify a timeframe for developing the schedule, and thus allows DOD to first acquire a contractor’s services. Further, while we agree with the department’s comment that our report does not include an assessment of the viability of a 15-month deadline contained in statute for the database’s design, acquisition, and implementation, we note that we told program officials during the course of our review that such an assessment was not part of the scope of our work because the 15-month deadline was a statutory requirement rather than a DOD schedule-driven milestone. In concurring with our recommendation to adequately assess the program’s overlap with related programs through architecture compliance, the department stated that it acknowledges the benefits derived from doing so. It added, however, that our report inaccurately asserts that DOD has not complied with DOD guidance governing architecture compliance by stating that a complete set of system-level architecture products are not yet available to perform a thorough architecture compliance assessment. In this regard, it stated that DOD guidance does not call for the development of system-level architecture products until the Technology Development Phase in the Defense Acquisition System. We agree with the department’s comment as to the timing of system-level architecture products, which is why we do not conclude that DOD has not assessed architecture compliance. As stated in this report, architecture compliance is not a onetime event but rather a determination that needs to be made at key junctures in a system’s acquisition life cycle. Thus, the intent of our statement and our recommendation is to emphasize the importance of conducting compliance activities once a complete set of system-level architecture products is available. In concurring with our recommendation to adequately justify investment in the proposed database approach on the basis of reliable estimates of life cycle costs and benefits, the department stated that it agreed that the cost estimate in the existing business case does not account for all life cycle costs and risks. However, it added that DOD guidance does not require comprehensive cost estimates in the business case and that the cost estimate in the business case was derived using cost estimating best practices. While we agree that DOD guidance does not explicitly state that business case cost estimates must be comprehensive, both DOD guidance and OMB guidance state that these cost estimates should include all costs over the system’s life cycle, which is a recognized best practice. Further, while the cost estimate was derived in accordance with some cost estimating best practices, such as estimating software costs with a parametric tool and relying on the costs of analogous existing systems, it was not done in accordance with others. For example, it was not risk adjusted. Further the business case did not include a comparison of alternatives on the basis of net present value. In concurring with our recommendation to effectively develop and manage system requirements, DOD noted that it has continued to work with the military services in developing system requirements and that its progress in doing so is much greater than our report states. It also noted that since the database was legislated, Congress expanded its annual sexual assault reporting requirements, which in turn necessitated additional requirements development work with stakeholders. Further, it stated that it will institute a Change Control Board, which is a key requirements management control mechanism, and is using a range of system life cycle management tools that support requirements development and management. We support DOD’s continued efforts to work with stakeholders to further develop requirements and capture them in a range of requirements documents, as such efforts are consistent with our recommendation. Also consistent with our recommendation are its plans to institute a Change Control Board and use relevant requirements-related tools. In concurring with our recommendation to adequately test system capabilities, DOD stated that our report does not sufficiently describe its efforts to develop a detailed test plan defining the program’s testing approach and strategy, including the entrance and exit criteria for each testing phase. We agree that our report does not cite the development of this plan because no such plan was provided to us as part of the documentation set submitted for the database’s milestone acquisition approval, nor were we made aware of the existence of such a plan. Moreover, program officials told us that a test plan would be developed after the contractor was hired, and DOD’s comments on our draft report acknowledge that a final test plan has yet to be created. In concurring with our recommendation to effectively manage program risks, DOD noted that our statement that risk management has yet to begin is incorrect because key risks have been identified. We agree that risk identification, which is the first step in risk management, has begun, as our report recognizes. We also agree that the statement in our draft report that risk management has yet to begin is not consistent with its recognition of these risk identification efforts. As a result, we have modified the report to note that many aspects of risk management have yet to begin, which DOD also states in its comments on our draft report. The Coast Guard also concurred with our recommendations aimed at improving the oversight, accountability, and execution of its sexual assault prevention and response programs, including (1) establishing a systematic process for collecting, documenting, and maintaining sexual assault incidence data; (2) establishing quality control processes to ensure that program information collected is valid and reliable; and (3) establishing and administering a curriculum for all key program personnel to ensure that they can provide proper advice to Coast Guard personnel. In commenting on our draft report, the Coast Guard noted that it has several initiatives underway to continue developing its sexual assault prevention and response program. For example, the Coast Guard stated that an electronic database to track sexual assault reports is in the prototype development phase, and based on current progress, it expects to complete the database in 2010. Further, the Coast Guard noted that it has completed an assessment of workload requirements and resource allocations for its Sexual Assault Response Coordinators, and upon release of the final report, the Coast Guard plans to review and analyze the recommendations and, as appropriate, incorporate additional resource requirements into its annual budget process. We commend the Coast Guard for the steps it has taken and its plans for further developing its sexual assault prevention and response program, and we encourage the service to continue taking positive actions toward fully implementing our recommendations. As agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce the contents of this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until thirty days from the report date. At that time, we will send copies to interested members of Congress; the Secretaries of Defense, Homeland Security, the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force; the Commandant of the Marine Corps; and the Commandant of the Coast Guard. The report also will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov. If you or your staff have any questions concerning this report, please contact Brenda Farrell at (202) 512-3604 or farrellb@gao.gov or Randolph Hite at (202) 512-3439 or hiter@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. Key contributors to this report are listed in appendix IV. To determine the extent to which the Department of Defense (DOD) has taken steps to address our previous recommendations in GAO-08-924 regarding programs to prevent and respond to sexual assault, we reviewed relevant statutory requirements and obtained and analyzed DOD’s policies, guidance, and procedures for the prevention of and response to sexual assault incidents. We also interviewed officials in DOD, the Army, the Air Force, the Navy, the Marine Corps, and the Defense Task Force on Sexual Assault in the Military Services to gain a comprehensive understanding of their efforts to address our previous recommendations. We also obtained and analyzed the Office of the Secretary of Defense’s (OSD) strategic plans and draft oversight framework for the department’s sexual assault prevention and response efforts to determine whether they contained the elements necessary for effective program implementation. In addition, we obtained and analyzed DOD’s annual reports to Congress on sexual assault in the military services for fiscal years 2007 and 2008 to assess the extent to which OSD addressed our recommendation to improve the usefulness of DOD’s annual report. To determine the extent to which DOD has taken steps to address a statutory requirement to establish a centralized, case-level sexual assault incident database, we reviewed statutory provisions related to DOD’s process for collecting and maintaining sexual assault data. We also interviewed DOD officials to obtain information on the department’s efforts to establish the database; reviewed documentation related to database development; and compared this documentation to relevant DOD, federal, GAO, and industry guidance. To determine the extent to which the U.S. Coast Guard has taken steps to address our previous recommendations regarding policies and programs to prevent and respond to sexual assault, we identified relevant legislative requirements and obtained and analyzed the Coast Guard’s policies, guidance, and procedures for the prevention of and response to sexual assault incidents. We also interviewed Coast Guard officials to gain a comprehensive understanding of their efforts to address our previous recommendations. We also obtained and analyzed the Coast Guard’s action plan for sexual assault prevention and response to determine the extent to which it consisted of the elements that we recommended be included in an oversight framework. We visited or contacted the following organizations during our review: Defense Task Force on Sexual Assault in the Military Services, Sexual Assault Prevention and Response Office, Arlington, Virginia Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs, Falls Defense Center of Excellence for Psychological Health and Traumatic Brain Injury, Rosslyn, Virginia Office of the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff J-1, Manpower and Personnel, Washington, D.C. Sexual Harassment/Assault Response and Prevention Program Office, Washington, D.C. Department of the Air Force Office of the Assistant Secretary (Manpower and Reserve Affairs), Washington, D.C. Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary (Force Management Integration), Washington, D.C. Deputy Chief of Staff for Manpower, Personnel and Services, Washington, D.C. Sexual Assault Prevention and Response Program Office, Washington, D.C. Sexual Assault Prevention and Response Office, Washington, D.C. Sexual Assault Prevention and Response Office, Quantico, Virginia Health, Safety and Work-Life Directorate, Office of Work-Life, Washington, D.C. We conducted this performance audit from February 2009 through February 2010 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. In addition to the contacts named above, key contributors to this report include Marilyn K. Wasleski, Assistant Director; Neelaxi Lakhmani, Assistant Director; Divya Bali; Stacy Bennett; Steve Caldwell; Elizabeth Curda; Matt Dove; K. Nicole Harms; Jim Houtz; Ron La Due Lake; Kim Mayo; Geoffrey Peck; Adam Vodraska; and Cheryl A. Weissman.

Summary: Sexual assault is a crime with negative implications to military readiness and esprit de corps. In response to a congressional request, GAO, in 2008, reviewed Department of Defense (DOD) and U.S. Coast Guard sexual assault prevention and response programs and recommended a number of improvements. GAO was subsequently asked to evaluate the extent to which (1) DOD has addressed GAO's 2008 recommendations and further developed its programs, (2) DOD has established a sexual assault database, and (3) the Coast Guard has addressed GAO's 2008 recommendations and further developed its programs. To do so, GAO analyzed legislative requirements and program guidance, interviewed officials, and compared database implementation efforts to key information technology best practices. DOD has addressed four of GAO's nine recommendations from 2008 regarding the oversight and implementation of its sexual assault prevention and response programs. For example, the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) evaluated department program guidance for joint and deployed environments, and it evaluated factors that may hinder access to health care following a sexual assault. But DOD's efforts to address the other recommendations reflect less progress. For example, GAO recommended that DOD develop an oversight framework, to include long-term goals and milestones, performance goals and strategies, and criteria for measuring progress. However, GAO found that the draft framework lacks key elements needed for comprehensive oversight of DOD's programs, such as criteria for measuring progress and an indication of how it will use the information derived from such measurement to improve its programs. Until OSD incorporates all key elements into its draft oversight framework, it will remain limited in its ability to effectively manage program development to help prevent and respond to sexual assault incidents. DOD acknowledges that more work remains in order to fully develop its oversight framework. DOD has taken steps to begin acquiring a centralized sexual assault database. However, it did not meet a legislative requirement to establish the database by January 2010, and it is unclear when the database will be established because DOD does not yet have a reliable schedule to guide its efforts. Also, key system acquisition best practices associated with successfully acquiring and deploying information technology systems, such as economically justifying the proposed system solution and effectively developing and managing requirements, have largely not been performed. OSD officials said they intend to employ these acquisition best practices. Until this is accomplished the program will be at increased risk of not delivering promised mission capabilities and benefits on time and within budget. While the Coast Guard has partially implemented one of GAO's two recommendations for further developing its sexual assault prevention and response program, it has not implemented the other. In June 2009, the Coast Guard began assessing its program staff's workload, which represents progress in addressing GAO's recommendation to evaluate its processes for staffing key installation-level positions in its program. However, it has not addressed GAO's recommendation to develop an oversight framework. Further, the Coast Guard lacks a systematic process for assembling, documenting, and maintaining sexual assault incident data, and lacks quality control procedures to ensure that the program data being collected are reliable. In fiscal year 2008, for example, different Coast Guard offices documented conflicting numbers of sexual assault reports: the Coast Guard Program Office documented 30, while the Investigative Office documented 78. The Coast Guard had to resolve this significant discrepancy before it could provide its data to DOD. Without a systematic process for tracking its data, the Coast Guard lacks reliable knowledge on the occurrence of sexual assaults.