The Corps is the world’s largest public engineering, design, and construction management agency. Located within the Department of Defense (DOD), the Corps has both military and civilian responsibilities. The Military Program provides engineering, construction, and environmental management services to DOD, other U.S. government agencies, and foreign governments. Under its Civil Works Program, at the direction of Congress, the Corps plans, constructs, operates, and maintains a wide range of water resources projects. The Corps’ Civil Works Program is organized into three tiers: a national headquarters in Washington, D.C., eight regional divisions, and 38 local district offices (see fig. 1). In fiscal year 2010, the Civil Works Program employed approximately 25,000 civilian personnel in numerous occupational classifications, including civil engineers, biologists, economists, architects, lock operators, mechanics, and foresters. Corps headquarters primarily develops policies and plans the future direction of the organization. The Assistant Secretary of the Army for Civil Works, appointed by the President, establishes the policy direction for the Civil Works Program. The Chief of Engineers, a military officer, is responsible for execution of the civil works and military missions. The Chief of Engineers delegates day-to-day leadership and management of the Civil Works Program to the Deputy Commanding General for Civil and Emergency Operations, who is a general officer, and the Director of Civil Works, who is a civilian employee. The primary role of the Corps’ eight civil works divisions, which were established generally according to watershed boundaries, is to coordinate their districts’ civil works projects. Each division office is headed by a division commander, who is a military officer. The role of the 38 civil works districts is to plan and execute projects. Each district office is headed by a district commander, who is also a military officer. Each district office performs the following seven functions that are relevant to executing its projects: (1) planning, (2) engineering, (3) construction, (4) operations, (5) program and project management, (6) resource management, and (7) regulatory functions. Furthermore, district offices are responsible for coordinating with project stakeholders such as state and local partners. The Civil Works Program operates 50 Centers of Expertise and seven research laboratories, which assist Corps division and district offices in the planning, design, and technical review of civil works projects. The Centers of Expertise are designated individuals or organizations—located either in district offices, division offices, or research laboratories—with capability or expertise in a specialized area. The Corps designates employees at various levels within the organization to oversee, manage, and coordinate the centers. The Corps established the centers to consolidate expertise, improve consistency, reduce redundancy, and enhance institutional knowledge, among other things. The Corps’ seven research laboratories support DOD and other agencies in military and civilian projects. For example, the Coastal and Hydraulics Laboratory performs ocean, estuarine, riverine, and watershed regional scale systems analyses research support work for the Corps and the DOD Task Force in support of the Ocean Commission. The Centers of Expertise program is comprised of 10 mandatory centers and 40 nonmandatory centers. The Corps requires that district and division offices consult the mandatory Centers of Expertise that are relevant to their projects during project planning, formulation, or execution. For example, if a district is implementing a hydropower project, it must consult the Hydropower Analysis Center, a mandatory Center of Expertise, on project analysis or economic benefit evaluations. The set of 40 nonmandatory centers are known collectively as a Directory of Expertise, and their use is discretionary. Divisions and districts may seek out the expertise of the centers in the directory as needed. The Centers of Expertise, both mandatory and nonmandatory, are typically funded out of project budgets, and according to the Corps, collectively these centers have unique and unparalleled expertise that is critical to the functions of district and division offices. The conference reports accompanying the annual Energy and Water Development Appropriations Acts generally lists individual projects and specific allocations of funding for each project. Through this report, the appropriations committees essentially outline their priorities for the Corps’ water resource projects. Congress directs funds for many individual projects in increments over the course of several years. For example, a construction project to reduce flood damage in the Greenbrier River Basin of West Virginia has an estimated total cost of $158 million. The conference reports directed $1.5 million to this project in fiscal year 2009 and $1.4 million in fiscal year 2010. Additional funding for this project will be contingent upon future congressional appropriations. In fiscal year 2010, funding for civil works projects included annual appropriations of over $5.4 billion through the Energy and Water Development Appropriations Act. The Energy and Water Development Appropriations Act provides funds for nine appropriation accounts, which support eight of the Civil Works Program’s nine major business lines. In addition to the funding received through annual appropriations acts, the Corps received supplemental appropriations in 6 of the past 8 fiscal years. Also, as outlined in the Water Resources Development Act (WRDA) of 1986, the Corps typically receives funds, particularly for construction projects, from each project’s local sponsor, which may be a state, tribal, county, or local agency or government. The degree of cost sharing required varies by, among other things, project purpose. The Corps has faced significant changes in its mission, budget, staffing, and workload over the last several decades. As a result, the Corps has had mixed results in modifying certain aspects of its organizational alignment, such as the roles, responsibilities, and resources of its components in response to these changes. While the agency’s fundamental structure has remained the same since 1893, it has made efforts to realign its organization within its three-tiered structure—some of which have been implemented, but others were not. The Corps’ civil works mission started with navigation responsibilities in 1824 when Congress passed the General Survey Act, which authorized the President to use the Corps to survey road and canal routes of commercial or military importance. Since that time, the Corps’ civil works mission has expanded to include the following additional responsibilities: flood risk management, regulatory program, water supply, hydropower, recreation, environment, emergency management, and support for others (see fig. 2). Appendix III contains a more detailed timeline of key events and legislation related to the Corps’ civil works mission. Over time, the Corps has also seen fluctuations in its appropriations and obligations, staffing levels, and workload. For example, although the Corps had relatively stable appropriations and obligations for fiscal years 2000 through 2004, subsequent years have shown more variability in funding (see fig. 3 and fig. 4). In recent years, some of this variability is a result of supplemental funding that has been provided to the Corps for expenses related to the consequences of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita in 2005. According to a senior Corps budget official, funding has also been directed to expenses related to the consequences of hurricanes Gustav and Ike (both 2008 hurricanes), as well as the 2008 Midwest floods. In fiscal year 2009, the agency received supplemental funding of about $5.8 billion for hurricane protection in Louisiana; and the Corps received $4.6 billion in fiscal year 2009 through the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act. At the same time, Corps-wide allocations for staff, measured in FTEs, has declined from over 28,000 in 1980 to fewer than 22,000 in 2009 (see fig. 5). However, the extent of the decline in FTEs has also varied by divisions and districts, and some offices have seen a slight increase in FTEs. For example, from fiscal year 2000 to fiscal year 2009, FTEs in the North Atlantic Division reduced by over 24 percent from 2,417 FTEs to 1,822 FTEs, while FTEs in the Northwestern Division reduced by about 7 percent from 3,840 FTEs to 3,557 during the same time period (see table 1). Similarly, while FTEs in the Seattle District increased by about 5 percent, from 539 FTEs in fiscal year 2000 to 567 FTEs in fiscal year 2009, FTEs in the Honolulu District reduced by about 57 percent, from 130 in fiscal year 2000 to 56 in fiscal year 2009. This variability has also been seen in the divisions’ and districts’ workload. For instance, between fiscal years 2000 and 2009, the Pacific Ocean Division’s construction and O&M project expenditures have ranged from a low of $18,756,845 to a high of $73,960,902, while the Mississippi Valley Division ranged from a low of $882,822,221 to a high of $957,991,516 (see table 2). Similarly, in some districts like Seattle, construction and O&M project expenditures have ranged from a low of $62,716,478 to a high of $78,650,927, while Honolulu’s has ranged from a low of $2,583,263 to a high of $13,884,393. Appendix IV contains detailed information on the Corps’ budget, staffing, and workload for each of the 38 districts. The Corps’ three-tiered structure—headquarters, divisions, and districts— has remained the same since 1893. However, in some instances, the number of divisions and districts and the roles and responsibilities have changed in response to changes in the agency’s mission, workload, funding mechanisms, staffing levels, and budget. Some past efforts to realign the agency include the following: Expanding mission. The Corps has realigned as a result of its expanding mission. For example, in 1824 the Corps’ primary mission was navigation, but as the Corps’ mission expanded and as a result of the increased responsibility given to the Corps, it realigned into eight divisions largely based on watershed boundaries. Also, because of its expanding mission, the Corps realigned its district offices in the 1970s by, for example, hiring environmental specialists. This came, in part, in response to the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, which requires federal agencies to consider the environmental impacts of proposed major federal actions that significantly affect the environment. Specific workload needs. In the past, the Corps has established temporary district offices to handle the work of a single large project. For example, in 1942, the Corps formed its Manhattan Engineer District to oversee and provide technical expertise for the planning and construction of facilities related to atomic research. The district remained open until the end of World War II. Similarly, in 1972, the Corps established the Susquehanna Engineer District to complete work related to the extensive damage caused by Hurricane Agnes in New York and Pennsylvania. The Susquehanna Engineer District was only open for 4 months. Changes in funding mechanisms. In the 1980s, the Corps implemented a realignment in response to its changing funding mechanisms. Specifically, the 1986 WRDA generally required the Corps to obtain cost-share agreements with local sponsors to share the federal burden of Corps projects. In response, the Corps expanded its district roles and responsibilities and implemented a project management process in 1989 to improve relationships with nonfederal partners and improve project costs and timelines. This new process assigned a project manager at the district level to each Corps project to work with project sponsors on a day-to-day basis and manage the progress of the project. Changes in staffing levels. The Corps has also implemented some realignments in response to changes in staffing—which have been reduced by over 22 percent over the past two decades. For example, the Federal Workforce Restructuring Act of 1994 required the President to reduce the number of FTEs in federal agencies, with the Corps’ Civil Works Program assigned to reduce by 3,401. In response, in 1995 the Corps realigned division roles and responsibilities and the structure of the agency. Specifically, it regionalized human resource functions, transferred finance and accounting functions to a single location, and eliminated technical and policy review functions at the division level. In addition, in response to the reduced FTEs, in 1997 the Corps reduced the number of division offices from 11 to 8. Static budget. In 2003, the Corps implemented a realignment, in part, in response to its relatively static budget. Specifically, from 1994 to 2003, the Corps experienced a period of static administrative funding levels. In response to this situation, the Corps launched an organizational initiative in 2003—called USACE 2012—to realign the roles, functions, and processes of the three tiers with the goal of improving the efficiency of the Civil Works Program. For example, USACE 2012 created regional business centers at the division level to coordinate the activities of the districts within a region to ensure they shared resources and technical expertise, and improved project management and delivery. As part of their responsibilities, the regional business centers assign work to each of the districts according to each district’s capabilities and available staff. USACE 2012 also created regional integration teams at the headquarters level to resolve regional issues. Regional integration teams provide a single point of contact for regional business centers to resolve concerns and issues that must be dealt with at the headquarters level. In the past, other attempts for organizational realignment of the Corps have been considered but not implemented for a variety of reasons. For example, in 1949, 1971, 1978, and the early 2000s, various members of the executive branch proposed to transfer the Corps’ civil works functions to other federal agencies, but these proposals did not result in any changes. In 1949, the Hoover Commission recommended the transfer of all water resource functions of the federal government, including those of the Corps, to the Department of the Interior. Similarly, in 1971, President Nixon proposed a new Department of Natural Resources to bring together natural resources responsibilities scattered throughout the federal government, and President Carter made a similar proposal in 1978. More recently, former Corps officials we spoke with said that during his tenure, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld had considered whether the Civil Works Program should be taken out of DOD and given to another agency. The Corps has also undertaken some past attempts to make its organizational structure more efficient by reducing the number of district offices. However, these attempts faced stiff resistance and were not implemented. For example, in 1989, the Senate Committee on Appropriations recognized the need for the Corps to examine every available opportunity to increase its efficiency and effectiveness and directed the Chief of Engineers to initiate a conceptual study of potential field organization structures. As a result of this study, the Corps proposed a reduction in the number of district offices in the contiguous United States from 35 to 22 and a reduction in the number of division offices from 10 to 6, in response to the diminished workload and budget of the agency. In order to accomplish this realignment, the Corps chose to submit the plan as part of the Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) process. However, in an amendment to the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990, Congress specifically excluded the Corps’ Civil Works Program from downsizing. Shortly after, in the fiscal year 1993 annual appropriation, Congress included funds to further a more efficient headquarters and division office structure but prohibited the Corps from closing any district offices as part of that reorganization plan. As a result of this study, the Corps proposed consolidating and downsizing division offices, reducing the number from 11 to 6, and removing technical and policy review functions from the division level. The proposal also added another district, for a total of 36, but consolidated planning and engineering functions in 15 districts. Congress did not approve this proposal, and it was not implemented. Inability to obtain congressional support has been and will continue to be the primary challenge to any organizational realignment, according to the officials and stakeholders we interviewed, as well as our analysis of records of past realignment attempts. Current and former Corps officials and other stakeholders also identified two additional challenges that could impede any realignment attempts. These include the Corps’ funding structure and the autonomous culture of its districts. Lack of support for the Corps realignment efforts by Members of Congress, as well as local officials and their constituents in the potentially affected divisions or districts, has been one of the challenges most often noted by current and former Corps officials and other stakeholders that we interviewed. According to former officials, the Corps districts have historically enjoyed a close relationship with their elected representatives in Congress. As a result, any closure of a district office as part of a realignment proposal is likely to meet strong opposition from elected officials because of congressional concerns, including (1) the perception that the district’s needs will not be adequately served if the office is closed and (2) the potential loss of jobs in the district. For example, according to a former Chief of Engineers, in response to a past realignment effort, he received calls from congressional delegations upset because he was proposing to take jobs away from their district. According to another senior Corps official, in 1997, the Corps was able to reduce the number of division offices from 11 to the 8 that it currently has, rather than reduce the number of district offices, because the divisions have a smaller number of employees than district offices. Therefore, reducing the number of division offices would result in fewer job losses in a congressional district, thus reducing the congressional concern. Similarly, historical records indicate that past realignment efforts to reduce the number of Corps districts and divisions were unsuccessful or were delayed because of significant opposition from Members of Congress. For example, as mentioned earlier, in 1991 the Corps attempted to close 13 districts and four divisions using the BRAC process, which was intended to provide a fair process for the timely closure and realignment of military installations inside the United States. However, in response to concerns among Members of Congress, the Secretary of Defense decided against including the Corps’ reorganization plan in the 1991 list of BRAC base closures. Four of the five former Chiefs of Engineers we interviewed provided examples of opposition from Members of Congress to past realignment efforts that included the closure or reorganization of districts. For example, one former Chief of Engineers said that a realignment proposal was delayed because Members of Congress were concerned about which division their Corps district would be incorporated into. A former senior Corps official faced a similar situation as a district engineer when he wanted to move a facility from his district to another district where the facility was better able to perform its work. However, the congressional Member representing the district opposed the move and, according to this former senior official, prevented it from happening. Several officials we interviewed told us that the inability to obtain congressional support for any Corps realignment efforts that include closing districts and divisions will continue to be a factor in the foreseeable future. Unlike many other federal agencies that have budgets established for broad program activities, most Corps civil works funds are appropriated for specific projects and require nonfederal sponsors to share project costs. Current and former Corps officials and other stakeholders we interviewed said that these requirements have led to inefficiencies and project delays that are difficult to overcome and hinder attempts at organizational realignment. Specifically, they identified the following challenges created by the Corps’ funding structure: Incremental funding reduces efficiency and increases costs. According to an academic stakeholder we interviewed, organizations need stable funding and a predictable workload to be efficient, but the Corps has neither. This sentiment was echoed by many former and current Corps officials who said that funding projects in increments hinders the Corps’ ability to be efficient. For example, they said that incremental funding sometimes forces the Corps to stop projects because they do not have sufficient funding to complete the next stage of the project. This can cause project delays and the costs of projects to escalate. For example, according to a division commander, “What used to be $1 million will be $3 million by the time you get around to spending the money.” Another current senior official said, “his is one of the reasons that a civil works project takes 20 years to execute, instead of 3 if we were fully funded from the start.” Our previous work has demonstrated that incremental funding can result in project delays and cost increases. For example, our work looking at hurricane protection projects in southeastern Louisiana found that taking an incremental approach that was based on funding and direction provided through specific appropriations had increased the overall cost to the federal government. Cost-sharing requirements can delay projects and cause costs to escalate. According to the current Chief of Engineers, the Corps sometimes has to delay work on a project while local sponsors raise their portion of a civil works project’s cost. For example, according to a division commander, recently some local sponsors have been unable to raise their portion of the funding due to the economic downturn, resulting in some projects having to be idled. Conversely, at times the local sponsor has been able to fund its portion of the project, but the Corps has not, according to some Corps officials that we spoke with. In such cases, the sponsor may have to raise more money as the price of the project increases due to delays, which they said can also be frustrating to the local sponsors. The Corps’ funding structure makes watershed planning difficult. The Corps’ organizational structure is built around the nation’s watersheds. Many current and former Corps officials and stakeholders that we spoke with said the Corps should plan projects based on feasibility studies conducted at the watershed level, but that the existing funding process, according to these officials and stakeholders, prevents them from doing so. Specifically, funding is directed for studies that are intended to lead to individual district-based projects, not for watershed-level studies. For example, according to a senior Corps official, Corps division and district boundaries are generally based on watersheds, but districts must complete individual project budgets that do not take into consideration the needs of the nation. In addition, feasibility studies—a necessary step leading up to every project—generally require cost sharing from local sponsors, and thus a watershed-level feasibility study would typically require multiple sponsors. However, some officials said that sponsors may be reluctant to fund such a study because it will not necessarily result in a project in their district. Many former and current Corps officials supported a watershed approach to civil works project planning and development, but recognized the difficulties in the current funding structure to conduct them. The culture of the Corps district offices was cited by the majority of current and former officials as a challenge to realignment efforts. Because Corps districts receive project-based funding, they have an incentive to acquire and retain control over projects, according to some officials, and this has led to an autonomous culture in which some districts are reluctant to share resources. In particular, these officials said this is because a district’s workload determines the amount of personnel it can employ, so some district officials believe that sharing work could lead to layoffs or reductions in force. Several former Corps officials cited examples of how this culture is an impediment to organizational realignment and may lead districts to resist sharing work with other districts. For example, one former Assistant Secretary of the Army for Civil Works said that there was tension among districts about sharing work, and there is nostalgia for the “full-service” district—a district that could carry out all aspects of a project. According to this Assistant Secretary, “It sets up a functional barrier to sharing work across districts.” Another former senior Corps official said that districts’ resistance to sharing work was compounded by the belief that other districts do not understand local needs, problems, and conditions, and therefore the local district must execute its own projects. Yet another former senior Corps official said that collaboration is difficult because the congressional boundaries and funding process force districts to only think locally. Some current Corps officials cited similar examples. For example, a district commander told us that his district once had excess capacity to perform work, yet a neighboring district contracted out their excess work instead of sharing it with his. Similarly, a division commander confirmed that some districts use contractors instead of using other Corps capabilities. Additionally, some division commanders told us that district commanders may hesitate to share work because the commander loses control of the tasks that are shared but is still responsible for completing the project. As a result of this culture, the Corps has also been slow to implement aspects of USACE 2012, its most recent realignment effort, according to some Corps officials we spoke with. USACE 2012 is intended, in part, to promote the sharing of work by the districts within each division, thereby providing a steadier workload for each district and more stability for the workforce. However, two former Chiefs of Engineers said that districts were used to being in control of the resources within their boundaries, and it was a big cultural shift for the districts to give up some of their control. Furthermore, USACE 2012 was undertaken, in part, because the funding the Corps was receiving at that time was not enough to support an organizational structure with 38 full-service districts. According to the current Chief of Engineers, while he recognizes that some of the districts would rather be independent and “full-service,” the reality is that this level of effort cannot be sustained in each district. While many current and former Corps officials and stakeholders generally agreed that the Corps’ three-tiered structure was appropriate to meet its mission, some believe that the number of districts could be reduced as part of a comprehensive organizational realignment. In addition, these officials and stakeholders identified opportunities to clarify roles and responsibilities, enhance expertise and policy guidance, as well as modify the Corps’ funding structure that could lead to improved effectiveness without resorting to a complete realignment. Many current and former Corps officials and stakeholders agreed that the Corps’ three-tiered structure was appropriate to accomplish the agency’s civil works mission. Specifically, according to the officials and stakeholders we spoke with, the Corps’ three-tiered structure allows each tier to focus on the client and stakeholder needs at that level. For example, according to some current Corps officials, including the Chief of Engineers, the division level provides supervision for districts that headquarters alone would not be able to provide. Some former and current Corps officials also told us the district level is important because it provides a presence in the local community. For example, one former senior Corps official said that “having people at the local level is a strength of the Corps because it brings local understanding, relationships, contacts, and an appreciation for local problems.” However, some interview participants told us that the Corps was not well structured. For example, one current senior Corps official said it takes too much of an investment to sustain 38 districts and eight divisions. Although many favored the three-tiered structure, some former and current officials and stakeholders said that the Corps could consolidate some of its districts—including some of the smaller districts that do not have sufficient work. However, these officials and stakeholders also recognized that any kind of realignment plan that reduces the number of districts would require congressional support and could not be accomplished by the Corps alone. Some officials and stakeholders suggested that Congress would have to consider establishing a process similar to the BRAC process to facilitate congressional approval of a reduction in the number of districts. According to one former official, a BRAC-like process to close a district would involve choosing districts to close based on objective criteria. However, as mentioned earlier, past attempts to include district closures as part of the BRAC process were not successful. Several current Corps officials identified the need to redefine and clarify the roles and responsibilities within the Corps’ three-tiered structure to help improve its effectiveness. In particular, the roles and responsibilities of division and district commanders need to be clarified, according to some division commanders. For example, one division commander new to the Corps said that he was unsure where he could locate specific guidance to accomplish tasks necessary for his role. Another division commander said that although new district commanders receive an orientation course, a capstone document for commanders would be helpful, as would a published doctrine that explains the roles and responsibilities for each level within the Corps. Some division and district commanders said that while USACE 2012 was the Corps’ overall foundational doctrine, it needed more details to be helpful to commanders in understanding their roles and responsibilities. Our past work shows that clearly defined roles and responsibilities are necessary for an organization to be most effective. Many current division and district commanders also said that the Corps should clarify the roles and responsibilities of its Communities of Practice (CoP). The Corps created CoPs to build, maintain, and provide expertise and capability and develop best practices, and considers them a central part of the USACE 2012 realignment. For example, the environmental CoP develops and delivers solutions and provides advice on technical management, design, and execution of a full range of sustainability, cleanup, and environmental protection activities. However, some current division and district commanders said that the CoPs’ roles and responsibilities need to be clarified because some CoP members were taking actions that were not consistent with their level of responsibility. For example, one commander said that CoPs members were generating policies that had resource implications, which is a responsibility of commanders—not the CoPs. Another commander said that a CoP ordered a job description in his division to be revised without his consent. However, according to this official, CoPs are not in the chain of command and are therefore not allowed to give orders on personnel-related matters. One division commander said that this confusion was a result of a failure within the agency to understand the difference between a CoP, which is a forum to exchange best practices, and a functional board, which focuses on specific disciplines. Many current and former Corps officials and stakeholders also identified opportunities to alter roles and responsibilities within the project review process. For example, according to some officials we spoke with, Corps projects receive multiple reviews at the headquarters, division, and district levels, as well as an external review, without regard to project size. In 1995, the Corps began implementation of a realignment plan that removed review functions from the divisions. According to a former Assistant Secretary of the Army for Civil Works, a previous effort to streamline the review process by removing division-level reviews further slowed the process because headquarters did not have the capacity to handle more review responsibilities. In 2003, USACE 2012 established a concurrent project review process. The goal of this was for all levels of the organization to provide input early in the project planning process rather than waiting until later on to identify problems, which can result in time- consuming repetition of the planning process. However, according to some current Corps officials that we spoke with, the Corps has not fully embraced this concept. For example, one division commander said the agency still performs two levels of review because headquarters is concerned that policy will not be applied consistently across the agency. Similarly, all four of the interest groups we interviewed told us that the Corps’ review process was slow. For example, one group said that the multiple reviews between the various Corps levels is time-consuming. Many current Corps officials identified two specific areas that need to be addressed to enhance the review process: (1) re-examine the roles and responsibilities within the three tiers and (2) reassess the criteria that dictate the level of review a project receives. With regard to the first area, the role of the division in the review process was questioned by some officials we spoke with. For example, according to a deputy district commander, divisions should only be doing an administrative review to make sure planning documents are complete for headquarters review. Similarly, a district commander suggested transferring all review functions from the division to headquarters because the division review did not add value to project plans. Another area identified by current officials where roles and responsibilities need to be clarified, was that review bodies at the headquarters level need to be integrated earlier into the project review process. These officials said that it is time-consuming to fix a project plan if flaws are discovered during the final review because they must then be sent back through the review process. With regard to the second area of concern, current Corps officials cited the opportunity to revise criteria that determine the level of review a project receives. Some district commanders told us that currently small projects are required to receive the same level and number of reviews as large projects, and this is inefficient and costly. For example, a district commander told us that a $5 billion hurricane project receives the same level of review as a $1 million ecosystem restoration project. He and others said that, instead, the level of risk should determine the level of review. Many current and former Corps officials, including the current Chief of Engineers, said that the Corps’ Centers of Expertise were useful because they help to optimize the use of specialized expertise, but they noted opportunities to make better use of the centers. First, some former and current officials agreed that the centers need a stable source of funding to remain viable. Centers are typically funded by performing work for districts and being reimbursed from a district’s project funds. According to these officials, districts may be reluctant to use the centers because they take resources away from their civil works projects. For example, this leads to centers being under-funded and asking for work from others, according to a former senior Corps official. In order to ensure better utilization of the centers, some former and current officials suggested centrally funding the centers. For example, two officials suggested fully funding the centers from the Corps’ general expense account, which currently funds headquarters and divisions. Second, several current Corps officials told us that districts and divisions need more information about the centers, including information on their capabilities and their roles and responsibilities. For example, some of the officials we interviewed said that they needed more information on the differences between mandatory centers and directories of expertise. During our interviews, one district commander was unable to distinguish between the two, and another was unaware of the centers altogether. In addition, other officials said there was not enough information on the mandatory Centers of Expertise. For example, one division commander said that while it may be mandatory to send work to a center, it is generally unclear that districts must do so, and he believed that the centers are not being used consistently across the agency. Another division commander said centers could better publicize themselves with brochures and outreach to other divisions and districts. Some officials also said the centers should provide more information on how long it will take for projects to receive services, so that districts can better manage their projects’ timelines. Third, several current and former Corps officials suggested that more information should be available on the certification and training that the experts at the centers receive, so that the centers can assure district offices that they have the qualified staff necessary to do the job. For example, one division commander said that, in the case of one of his own centers, he was not sure it had the level of expertise that he would want or that he would recommend its services to other commanders. In addition, a current deputy district commander said certain centers have bad reputations, so he would not send work to them without assurance that they had quality staff. In this regard, he suggested the centers should have some kind of requirements or certification for experts to demonstrate that they are qualified in their area of expertise. Other current and former officials also said that the centers vary in the quality of work they provide to districts and that the level of expertise needed to be standardized. Although many current and former Corps officials and other stakeholders said that the best way to maintain expertise was to keep it concentrated in the centers, others disagreed. For example, one former Chief of Engineers said that it is difficult for a subject matter expert within a district to maintain expertise if they only work on a subject occasionally, whereas in a center they can work on it regularly. Furthermore, an academic expert that we spoke with said that grouping experts together allows them to interact, creating a collective expertise that as a whole exceeds the sum of the parts. In contrast, some current and former officials questioned the usefulness of the centers and said that the Corps could better use expertise if it were kept in the districts. For example, one former Chief of Engineers said national centers may not know the local area as well as the district and that districts may be able to purchase expertise in their own area, such as at a local university. This was echoed by a current division commander who said that experts from the centers may not understand the local projects, politics, or environment as well as district experts. In addition to identifying ways of improving the use of expertise, the majority of current division and district commanders we interviewed, as well as a former senior Corps official, said that the Corps’ technical guidance is outdated and needs to be revised. According to some Corps division and district commanders, on average Corps technical guidance is between 10 and 15 years out of date, and some guidance dates back to the 1970s. According to a former senior Corps official, this means that each division and district may be executing projects differently because they lack current guidance. This has also resulted in confusion for Corps project managers and has led local sponsors to question the feasibility of constructing projects without current guidance, according to a Corps district official. Some Corps officials told us that historically, the Corps had been noted by industry officials and around the world as the place to go to get technical guidance. Now, according to one Corps official, the Corps has to go to the industry for such information, and another official told us that the New Orleans District is using manuals from other nations for some of its work because their technical guidance is more advanced than the Corps’. Furthermore, the current Assistant Secretary of the Army for Civil Works agreed that technical guidance is outdated and added that the Corps is behind in issuing implementation guidance on many requirements of WRDA 2007. The Assistant Secretary also said that the Corps has limited resources dedicated to address such updates. Current and former Corps officials, including the current and former Assistant Secretaries of the Army for Civil Works, and stakeholders that we interviewed identified opportunities to change how the Corps is funded to better enable it to execute its mission. First, several officials suggested providing a steadier stream of funding, such as full funding for projects or funding them in multiyear increments. As mentioned previously, the Corps receives “no-year” funding and Congress currently funds projects in 1-year increments, which, according to these officials may delay or increase the costs of projects. One current Corps official told us that the fully funded projects authorized in response to Hurricane Katrina gave the Corps an opportunity to involve contractors earlier in the building process, which has allowed the Corps to be more timely and efficient in carrying out these projects. A former Assistant Secretary suggested funding civil works projects in multiyear increments, as the Corps’ military construction projects are now funded. According to a division commander, this would provide a predictable funding stream that would allow the Corps to execute civil works projects in more a timely manner. Second, several former and current officials and stakeholders suggested that Congress fund civil works projects that take into account an entire watershed, which they said would better address the nation’s water resources. As previously mentioned, funding is currently provided for specific projects at the district level, and the needs of the whole region or watershed are not taken into account. One stakeholder said, “he Corps does not often receive funds for watershed studies because Congress wants to appropriate funds that benefit their own local districts rather than the whole watershed.” Some current and former officials and stakeholders advocated that Congress dedicate a stream of funding for watershed programs, then let the Corps decide how best to use the funds. However, some of these officials and stakeholders acknowledged that changes to how the Corps is funded would be difficult in a fiscally constrained budget environment and would require changes in congressional authorizations and a significant increase in appropriations, which they recognize is highly unlikely. Since 1824, the Corps has been responsible for civil works projects of national importance, and its mission has expanded over time to include such responsibilities as navigation, emergency response, and environmental restoration. Organizational alignment of the Corps is crucial because it establishes the framework within which the Corps’ large workforce can most effectively and efficiently carry out these diverse and important missions. In this regard, clearly defined roles and responsibilities are necessary for management to exercise control over an organization. However, the Corps does not have clear guidance on the roles of division and district commanders, and as a result, some Corps staff indicated that commanders and CoPs are confused about the scope of their responsibilities. Without clearly defined roles and responsibilities, Corps officials are left to determine, on their own, what their job requires, which increases the risk that they might complete tasks inconsistently. In addition, the alignment of the Centers of Expertise within the Corps’ organization is important if the Corps is to optimize the use of specialized expertise, eliminate redundancy, and increase standardization across the agency. However, without a stable source of funding, lack of information on how the centers are to be used, and without adequate assurance that the centers have the appropriate quality of experts, it is unlikely that the districts will use them in a systematic fashion. Moreover, up-to-date technical guidance is crucial to the Corps’ civil works mission, since it helps determine how the Corps executes projects. However, much of the Corps’ technical guidance is outdated and needs to be revised and the Corps has limited resources available to complete this task. As a result, districts may not be following the best available practices because they lack current guidance. Finally, even though the Corps receives “no-year” funding, a more stable funding approach could improve the overall efficiency and effectiveness of the Civil Works Program. To improve the effectiveness of the Corps’ Civil Works Program, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Chief of Engineers and Commanding General of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers to take the following four actions: Review and revise as necessary the roles and responsibilities of each component level of the organization and ensure that they are clearly articulated in agency guidance; re-evaluate the Centers of Expertise and develop a process to help ensure that they are consistently used across the agency; determine the extent to which the agency’s technical guidance needs to be updated, create a schedule for completing these updates, and if additional funding is needed to accomplish these updates, provide this information to Congress; and work with Congress to develop a more stable project funding approach that facilitates project implementation and that provides more efficient and effective use of funds. We provided a draft of this report to the Department of Defense for review and comment. The department generally agreed with the recommendations in our report. Specifically, the department concurred with our recommendation that the Corps re-evaluate the Centers of Expertise and develop a process to help ensure that they are consistently used across the agency. The department agreed that the Centers of Expertise need to be periodically reviewed and that the agency should improve its guidance and information on the types of services available and qualifications of the experts in the Centers. The department partially concurred with our other three recommendations. Specifically, with regard to our recommendation that the Corps review and revise as necessary the roles and responsibilities of each component level of the organization and ensure that they are clearly articulated in agency guidance, the department believes that the roles and responsibilities of each component are appropriate, but agreed to work to increase the understanding of the roles of the components, both within and outside of the organization. The department also agreed that confusion exists about the roles and responsibilities of the Communities of Practice, particularly with regard to reviewing decision documents, and will review and clarify as necessary all existing guidance, corporate governance documents, and other publications. In addition, the department also partially concurred with our recommendation that the Corps determine the extent to which the agency’s technical guidance needs to be updated, create a schedule for completing these updates, and if additional funding is needed to accomplish these updates, provide this information to Congress. The department stated that development and maintenance of technical guidance is identified by technical experts within the Corps; however, budget decisions regarding this development and maintenance must be made within the framework of all of the needs and priorities of the Civil Works Program. The department also noted that it is not appropriate for the agency to inform Congress of requirements for funding beyond those included in the President’s budget, unless that information is specifically requested by Congress. While we believe that it is important to recognize individual agency needs within the framework of all of its priorities when making budget decisions for the Civil Works Program, we continue to believe that, if additional funding is needed to accomplish these updates, that information should be provided to Congress. Finally, the department partially concurred with our recommendation that the Corps work with Congress to develop a more stable project funding approach that facilitates project implementation and a more efficient and effective use of funds. The department agreed and believes the administration and Congress are generally aware that many studies and some projects are not funded for the most efficient execution. The department stated that the Corps will continue to promote efficient funding during the budget process, but will support budget decisions made by the administration. While we acknowledge that there are constraints to the budgeting and appropriation of funds for the efficient execution of projects, we continue to believe that the Corps should work with Congress to develop a more stable project funding approach that would allow for a more efficient and effective use of funds and execution of projects in a more timely manner. A copy of the department’s letter commenting on the draft report is reprinted in appendix V. As agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce the contents of this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days from the report date. At that time, we will send copies of this report to the appropriate congressional committees, the Secretary of Defense, the Chief of Engineers and Commanding General of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, and other interested parties. In addition, this report will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov. If you or your staff have any questions regarding this report, please contact me at (202) 512-3841 or mittala@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. Key contributors to this report are listed in appendix VI. We were asked to examine (1) how, over time, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (Corps) has modified its organizational alignment to take into account its changing mission, budget, staffing, and workload; (2) the challenges the Corps has faced in realigning its organization and the extent to which these or other challenges are still relevant; and (3) what changes to the Corps’ organizational alignment, if any, do officials and stakeholders believe could enhance the effectiveness of the civil works mission. To examine the Corps’ changing civil works mission over time, we conducted a review of the legislative history of the Corps’ civil works mission. We also conducted a review of historical Corps literature, studies, and congressional hearings and committee reports. To examine the Corps’ civil works budget, we obtained appropriations and obligations data from the Budget of the United States Government, by the nine appropriations funding accounts, for the following fiscal years: 1980, 1990, and annually between 2000 and 2009. We chose these years because data were electronically available and the appropriations funding accounts remained relatively constant over those years. To examine the changes over time for the staffing of the Civil Works Program, we obtained full-time equivalent (FTE) data, by district for fiscal years 2000 through 2009, from the Corps based on data from the Corps of Engineers Financial Management System. We also obtained FTE allocations by division for fiscal years 2000 through 2009 and Corps-wide FTE allocations for fiscal years 1980, 1990, and annually between 2000 and 2009. According to the Corps, Corps-wide staffing data were found for prior fiscal years; however, it was unknown how these data were collected and counted and therefore they were deemed not reliable. Additionally, FTE data pertain only to Corps civilian employees, because, according to the Corps, military personnel are considered to be on duty all day, every day and, therefore, the Corps does not track the time they spend on civil works projects. To examine the Corps’ changing workload, we obtained the number of construction and operations and maintenance (O&M) projects each district listed in its cost and financial statements included in the Corps’ Annual Report on Civil Works Activities for fiscal years 1980, 1990, and annually between 2000 and 2008. According to the Corps, the districts only report construction and O&M projects in this table. We also obtained project expenditure data for construction and O&M projects for fiscal years 1980, 1990, and annually between 2000 and 2008. These were the only years the Corps was able to supply us with project expenditure data, so we also restricted our analysis of the number of projects to those years. To determine how the Corps has modified its organizational alignment throughout its history, we reviewed Corps documentation, congressional hearings, and committee reports related to past realignment efforts. We also spoke with former and current Corps officials and stakeholders about efforts that they were involved with or had knowledge of. Based on the documentation and testimonial evidence, and to the extent possible, we linked these efforts with changes in the Corps’ mission, budget, staffing, and workload. To determine the challenges the Corps has faced and would face in modifying its organizational alignment, and the changes to organizational alignment needed to enhance its effectiveness, we conducted semistructured interviews with the current and five former Chiefs of Engineers; the current and four former Assistant Secretaries of the Army for Civil Works; one former Acting Assistant Secretary of the Army for Civil Works; seven current and six former senior Corps officials; officials from the eight domestic civil works divisions; officials from a nonprobability sample of 10 of the 38 domestic civil works districts; and seven stakeholders, including three academics and four interest groups. During these interviews, we discussed whether the Corps was aligned to accomplish its mission, opportunities to realign roles and responsibilities of the three-tiers, advantages and disadvantages to the number and location of districts and divisions, opportunities to realign expertise and the sharing of best practices, realignment of and challenges associated with the way in which the Corps is funded, and challenges associated with past and any future realignment of the Corps’ Civil Works Program. The semistructured interviews were transcribed and coded to identify the challenges to modifying the Corps’ alignment and changes in alignment that would enhance effectiveness. The coding was based upon themes in the interviews and was verified by a second reviewer. For the purposes of reporting our results, we used the following categories to quantify responses of officials and stakeholders: “some” refers to responses from two to five individuals, “several” refers to responses from six to eight individuals, “many” refers to responses from nine or more individuals, and “majority” refers to responses from over half of an interview group. We attempted to contact all Chiefs of Engineers and Assistant Secretaries of the Army for Civil Works that were in office in 1988 or later. One former Chief of Engineers declined our interview, one former Assistant Secretary is deceased, and another was unavailable to speak with us. We identified other former senior Corps officials, interest groups, and two of the three academic stakeholders using a snowball sampling technique, in which we selected interviewees after two of our previous interviewees had mentioned them as important contacts. Finally, we spoke with one of the academic stakeholders based upon previous GAO work on organizational alignment. Additionally, academic stakeholders had to meet the following criteria: (1) the academics’ recognition in the professional or academic community and (2) relevance of his or her published work or research to organizational alignment. To choose the nonprobability sample of districts, we gathered 2009 civil works FTE data from the Corps and divided it into three categories: (1) large districts with more than 800 FTEs; (2) medium districts with 400 to 799 FTEs, and; (3) small districts with 399 or fewer FTEs. We sorted all districts by their FTE size category and chose three districts in each of the FTE size categories, ensuring that at least one district from each of the eight domestic civil works divisions was chosen. We then plotted these nine districts on a map of the Corps districts and divisions, and based on the geographical spread of those nine districts, chose an additional district from an area that was not geographically represented. We conducted this performance audit from August 2009 through August 2010 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. This appendix includes former senior-level Corps officials that we spoke to, including former Assistant Secretaries of the Army for Civil Works, former Chiefs of Engineers, and former senior-level officials. This appendix includes legislation and events that have led to the current responsibilities of the Corps under its civil works mission. Legislation and events are listed by the Corps’ nine business lines. While many of these laws and events affected more than one of the Corps’ nine responsibilities, we have grouped the laws and events discussed in this appendix under nine headings describing the responsibilities for illustrative purposes. April 30, 1824, General Survey Act of 1824: This act outlined the initial definition of the Corps’ civil works mission. The act authorized the President to employ “two or more skilful civil engineers, such as officers of the corps of engineers” to survey road and canal routes that facilitated national commercial, military, or postal service activities. May 24, 1824, Navigation Act: This act appropriated funds ($75,000) for improvement of inland waterways navigation (removal of sand bars in the Ohio River and removal of snags in the Ohio and Mississippi Rivers). May 20, 1826, Rivers and Harbors Act of 1826: This act authorized both surveys and construction projects within the same act (a practice continued to today). January 21, 1927, Rivers and Harbors Act of 1927: This act gave congressional authorization for the Corps to conduct surveys to devise the most comprehensive and effective strategy for improving navigation on navigable streams and their tributaries, and the most efficient development of flood control, potential water power, and irrigation needs. September 30, 1850: Congress commissioned the first planning study from the Corps to determine the best way to control flooding on the lower Mississippi River. June 28, 1879, Establishment of Mississippi River Commission: Federal flood control activity took form with the establishment of the Mississippi River Commission, a seven-member organization including three members from the Corps. The commission was responsible for directing and completing surveys of the lower Mississippi River and taking into consideration plans to prevent destructive flooding. March 1, 1917, Flood Control Act of 1917: This is act established the Corps’ flood damage reduction role and gave authority for federal construction of flood control improvements beyond the Mississippi Valley. It also notably prescribed that all plans for flood control should include a comprehensive study of the relevant watershed and report on potential other uses for the project, such as water power, navigation improvements, and “such other uses as may be properly related to or coordinated with the project.” January 21, 1927, Rivers and Harbors Act of 1927: This act gave congressional authorization for the Corps to conduct surveys to devise the most comprehensive and effective strategy for improving navigation on navigable streams and their tributaries and the most efficient development of flood control, potential water power, and irrigation needs. May 15, 1928, Flood Control Act of 1928: This act authorized the Corps’ Mississippi River and Tributaries Project. June 22, 1936, Flood Control Act of 1936: This act declared flood control as a “proper activity” of the federal government and established the Corps as the agency responsible for flood control throughout the nation, in cooperation with the Bureau of Reclamation. The act also effectively required submission of all Corps flood control projects to a cost-benefit test (the federal government should only sponsor projects where the benefit of a project exceeds its cost). August 18, 1941, Flood Control Act of 1941: This act rescinded certain local contribution requirements for reservoir construction, spurring their construction. July 14, 1960, Flood Control Act of 1960: Section 206 of this act authorizes floodplain management studies. The Corps begins its Flood Plain Management Services Program in response to this act. March 7, 1974, Water Resources Development Act of 1974: This was the first Water Resources Development Act. Prior to 1974, Corps projects were authorized and funded through Rivers and Harbors and Flood Control Acts. September 19, 1890 and March 3, 1899, Rivers and Harbors Act of 1890 and 1899: The acts prohibit unauthorized obstructions in navigable waterways and authorizes the Secretary of the Army to remove wrecks or other obstructions from navigable waterways and to issue permits for construction, excavation, or disposition of materials in, over, or under navigable waters. Provisions of the 1899 act superseded the provisions of the 1890 act. October 18, 1972, Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972: This act amended the Federal Water Pollution Control Act (commonly referred to as the Clean Water Act), adding section 404. Section 404 authorizes the Corps to issue permits for discharging dredged or fill materials into “the waters of the U.S.” October 23, 1972, Marine Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries Act of 1972: Authorizes the Corps to issue permits for the transportation of dredged materials for the purpose of dumping in the ocean. March 3, 1909, Rivers and Harbors Act of 1909: This act authorized the Corps to report data concerning the development and utilization of hydroelectric power in project plans. March 3, 1925, Rivers and Harbors Act of 1925: This was one of earliest acts (together with 1909 Rivers and Harbors Act, above) that called for a multipurpose approach to water resources development. It authorized the Corps and the Federal Power Commission to conduct survey cost estimates of navigable streams and tributaries “whereon power development appears feasible and practicable.” December 22, 1944, Flood Control Act of 1944: This act gave the Corps a recreation role that was added as part of flood control projects at Corps reservoirs. October 23, 1962, River and Harbor Act of 1962: This act expanded the Corps’ recreation role by authorizing the agency to build recreational facilities as part of all water resource development projects. July 9, 1965, The Federal Water Project Recreation Act of 1965: This act provided for development of recreational opportunities at federal water resources projects. May 11, 1882: In the winter of 1882, floods on the Mississippi forced thousands of people from their homes. The Army Quartermaster Department had relief supplies for the refugees, but they were unable to deliver them. Congress authorized the Corps of Engineers to use their engineer vessels to dispense supplies and rescue victims along the river. December 10, 1896: In Circular #18, the Chief of Engineers, by authority of the Secretary of the Army, gave Army Engineers standing authority to use or loan government equipment to save life and property in cases of sudden emergency without prior headquarters approval. August 18, 1941, Flood Control Act of 1941: Section 5 of this act authorized the Secretary of War to allot up to $1 million per year to be used for rescue work or repair or maintenance of damaged or threatened flood control works. May 17, 1950, The Flood Control Act of 1950 (Title II of the River and Harbor Act of 1950): Section 210 of this act further amended the 1941 Flood Control Act to increase the annual authorized funding level (for rescue work and repair, restoration, or maintenance of damaged or threatened flood control projects) from $2 to $15 million, and authorized the Secretary of the Army to allot funds from other flood control appropriations for immediate works until appropriations are made. Sept. 30, 1950, Disaster Relief Act of 1950: The act authorizes the President to direct any federal agency to assist states and local governments to alleviate suffering and damage caused by major disasters. June 28, 1955, Flood Control and Coastal Emergencies Act of 1955: This act amended section 5 of the 1941 Flood Control Act giving the Corps its emergency management mission. The act directed the Corps to spend funds in emergency preparation and in rescue operations. This led to the establishment of the Corps’ Flood Control and Coastal Emergencies Program. May 22, 1974, Disaster Relief Act of 1974: This act authorizes the President to establish a program of disaster preparedness that utilizes services of all appropriate agencies. November 23, 1988, Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act: The Stafford Act authorizes federal agencies to provide assistance during certain emergencies, expanding the Corps’ disaster preparedness role. The act, as subsequently amended, authorizes agencies, including the Corps, to support the Federal Emergency Management Agency in carrying out the Federal Response Plan (now the National Response Plan) to provide coordinated disaster relief and recovery operations. 1850s to 1860s: The Corps developed and continues to maintain permanent water supply systems to the District of Columbia and Georgetown (today known as the Washington Aqueduct division of the Corps’ Baltimore District). July 3, 1958, Water Supply Act of 1958: This act gave the Corps the authority to include water storage in new and existing reservoir projects for municipal and industrial uses. September 19, 1890 and March 3, 1899, Rivers and Harbors Act of 1890 and 1899: The 1890 act, later superseded by provisions of the 1899 act, prohibits unauthorized obstructionsin navigable waterways and authorizes the Corps to permit certain activities. It lays the foundation of the Corps’ environmental mission to protect, restore, and manage the environment through the regulation of dredging and the dumping of dredged materials given in the 1972 Clean Water Act. August 12, 1958, Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act: This act authorized the Secretary of the Interior to coordinate with federal agencies concerning wildlife, stating that “wildlife conservation shall receive equal consideration and be coordinated with other features of water-resource development programs through the effectual and harmonious planning, development, maintenance, and coordination of wildlife conservation and rehabilitation.” 1966: U.S. Army Chief of Staff assigns the Corps supervision over all engineering responsibilities related to the Army’s growing environmental protection and pollution reduction in the construction and operation of the Army’s military activities. January 1, 1970, National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA): This act requires federal agencies to include in every recommendation or report on a major federal action that significantly affects the quality of the human environment, a detailed statement on the environmental impact on, any unavoidable adverse environmental effects of, and alternatives to the proposed action, among other things. October 18, 1972, Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972: This act amended the Federal Water Pollution Control Act (commonly referred to as the Clean Water Act), adding section 404. Section 404 authorizes the Corps to issue permits for discharging of dredged or fill materials into “the waters of the U.S.” November 17, 1986, Water Resources Development Act of 1986: This act further expanded the Corps’ environmental role to include enhancing and restoring natural resources at certain new and existing projects. November 28, 1990, Water Resources Development Act of 1990: This act mandates that environmental protection be included as one of the Corps’ primary missions. October 13, 1997, Energy and Water Resources Appropriations Act of 1998: Congress for the first time directs funding for the Formerly Utilized Sites Remedial Action Program (FUSRAP) to the Corps. The Corps is to conduct cleanup activities of early atomic energy program sites under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act and National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan. The FUSRAP Program was started in the 1970s under the predecessor to the Department of Energy. March 4, 1915, Rivers and Harbors Act of 1915: Section 4 of this act authorizes the Secretary of the Army to receive contributions from private parties on expenditures of public funds in connection with authorized river and harbor improvements. September 4, 1961, Foreign Assistance Act of 1961: This act established the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). Also, Section 607 provided for the furnishing of services and commodities to foreign countries on a reimbursable basis. October 27, 1965, River and Harbor Act of 1965: This act authorized the Chief of Engineers, under supervision of the Secretary of the Army, to accept orders from federal departments and agencies for work or services and to perform all or any part of such work by contract. This provision was later repealed and re-enacted as an amendment to the codification of Title 10 of the United States Code at 10 U.S.C. § 3036(d). This work includes flood control, the improvement of rivers and harbors, research, and support to private engineering and construction firms competing for, or performing, work outside the United States. The Support for Others program (now named the Interagency and International Services program) engages the Corps in reimbursable work that is determined to be in America’s best interests. October 16, 1968, Intergovernmental Cooperation Act of 1968: Provides authority for federal agencies to provide specialized or technical services to state and local governments. This section was later repealed and re-enacted as an amendment to the codification of Title 31 of the United States Code at 31 U.S.C. 6506. In addition to the individual named above, key contributors to this report included Vondalee R. Hunt (Assistant Director), Kevin Bray, Jennifer Bryant, Kirsten Lauber, Justin L. Monroe, Anne Rhodes-Kline, Holly Sasso, and Ben Shouse.

Summary: The U.S. Army Corp of Engineers' (Corps) civil works mission has grown over the years, while its three-tiered headquarters, division, and district structure has remained the same since it was created in 1893. GAO was asked to examine for the Civil Works Program (1) over time, how the Corps has realigned its organization to take into account its changing mission, budget, staffing, and workload; (2) the challenges that the Corps has faced in realigning its organization; and (3) areas where officials and stakeholders believe changes to organizational alignment, if any, could enhance the Corps' civil works mission. Organizational alignment refers to, among other things, changes in structure, roles and responsibilities, and technical and policy guidance. GAO completed a historical and legislative review of the Corps' mission and past realignment efforts, reviewed budget, staffing, and workload data, and interviewed current and former officials and stakeholders. Since 1893, the Corps has had mixed results in modifying its organizational alignment in response to its changing mission, budget, staffing, and workload, but the fundamental structure has remained the same. For example, the Corps has added capacity and staff in response to its expanding mission, which now includes nine functional areas. Additionally, from 1994 to 2003, the Corps experienced static funding levels and responded by launching an effort that realigned the agency roles, functions, and processes to improve the efficiency of the Civil Works Program. In contrast to these efforts, other past proposals for realignment have not been implemented. For example, in 1992, the Corps proposed reducing the number of district offices in response to a diminished workload and budget. However, Congress did not support the closing of any districts, and therefore, this, as well as other similar proposals, have not been implemented. The Corps has faced and will likely continue to face three challenges to any realignment effort: (1) inability to gain congressional support, (2) limitations of its funding structure, and (3) the autonomous culture of its districts. Most current and former officials told GAO that past attempts to realign district offices have failed because of a lack of congressional support. They said that the perceived risk of service reductions and job losses has and will continue to generate congressional resistance to such realignment efforts. In addition, they said the Corps' annual incremental project-based appropriations and cost-sharing requirements create an impediment to realignment. For example, funding projects in increments hinders project efficiency by increasing costs and timelines. Finally, they said the autonomous culture of the districts has created a culture where they are reluctant to share resources and workload. This has impeded the Corps' efforts to realign its work and resources more efficiently. Although many officials and stakeholders that GAO spoke with generally agreed that the Corps' structure is appropriate because it allows each level to focus on client and stakeholder needs at that level, some said that the current workload did not justify 38 districts. Officials and stakeholders also identified three areas where changes could result in enhanced effectiveness. First, they identified the need to redefine and clarify roles and responsibilities within the three levels so that Corps staff and managers are clear about the extent of their responsibilities. Second, there are opportunities to make better use of the Corps' Centers of Expertise, which were created to consolidate key skills and knowledge and improve the effectiveness of the overall Civil Works Program. Areas in which the centers could be improved include better information on the types of services available and qualifications of the experts in the centers. Finally, the majority of division and district commanders we interviewed said that the Corps' technical guidance is outdated and needs to be revised. Some of this technical guidance is between 10 and 15 years out of date and may result in divisions and districts executing projects differently. To improve the effectiveness of the Corps, GAO recommends, among other things, that the Department of Defense direct the Corps to review and revise as necessary the roles and responsibilities of component levels of the organization, and determine the extent to which the agency's technical guidance needs to be updated. The Department of Defense generally agreed with the recommendations.