Since the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, federal agencies have implemented numerous measures designed to improve maritime security. Moreover, legislation has been enacted to provide a framework for protecting the nation’s seaports and waterways from terrorist attack through a wide range of security requirements and programs. Federal agency measures include, for example, the U.S. Coast Guard working with foreign countries to ensure that their seaports have adequate security measures in place. Also, under the Container Security Initiative, U.S. Customs and Border Protection stations officers overseas to work with foreign officials to identify and inspect high-risk cargo en route to the United States. The Maritime Security Working Group was created in May 2004 to increase coordination among U.S. government maritime security policy stakeholders and to develop an overarching policy that would serve to enhance maritime security and defense, and strengthen antiterrorism efforts in the global maritime environment. As a result of the working group’s efforts, on December 21, 2004, the President issued HSPD-13 directing the coordination of U.S. government maritime security programs and initiatives to achieve a comprehensive and cohesive national effort involving appropriate federal, state, local, and private sector entities. HSPD-13 established the Maritime Security Policy Coordination Committee as the primary forum to coordinate U.S. policy, guidelines, and implementation actions to protect U.S. maritime interests and enhance U.S. national security and homeland security. The Maritime Security Working Group, working on behalf of the Maritime Security Policy Coordination Committee, is currently responsible for monitoring and assessing implementation of actions related to the supporting plans. HSPD-13 required the Secretaries of Defense and Homeland Security to lead a joint effort to draft a National Strategy for Maritime Security. The strategy was issued in September 2005. Additionally, HSPD-13 directed relevant federal departments and agencies to develop eight supporting implementation plans to address the specific threats and challenges in the maritime environment. These supporting plans, the lead departments for their implementation, and their completion dates are shown below. National Plan to Achieve Maritime Domain Awareness, DOD and DHS (October 2005); Global Maritime Intelligence Integration Plan, DOD and DHS (July 2005); Maritime Operational Threat Response Plan, DOD and DHS (October 2006); International Outreach and Coordination Strategy, State (November 2005); Maritime Infrastructure Recovery Plan, DHS (April 2006); Maritime Transportation System Security Recommendations, DHS (October 2005); Maritime Commerce Security Plan, DHS (October 2005); and Domestic Outreach Plan, DHS (October 2005). Figure 1 depicts a DHS assessment of how maritime security legislation and the National Strategy for Maritime Security’s eight supporting implementation plans relate to the stages of the international supply chain. Also included is one other strategy—the Strategy to Enhance International Supply Chain Security—that overlaps with some of the supporting plans. Although numerous entities are responsible for security in the maritime domain within the United States, the federal government has primary responsibility and shares this role with numerous other stakeholders in the state, local, and private sectors. For example, DHS—with its component agency, the U.S. Coast Guard, acting as executive agent—has the lead role in maritime homeland security; DOD leads efforts to further integrate maritime intelligence and increase maritime domain awareness; and State is responsible for taking steps to inform U.S. missions abroad on maritime security initiatives and concerns, as necessary. Also, the Departments of Commerce, Energy, and Transportation, among others, have responsibilities for various aspects of maritime security. We have reported on performance in the maritime security mission, particularly by DHS, for several years. In our 2007 review of DHS’s progress in management and mission areas, we reported that DHS had made substantial progress in maritime security in that it had generally achieved 17 out of 23 performance expectations. Specifically, we reported that DHS had developed national and regional plans for DHS’s maritime security and response and a national plan for recovery, and it had ensured the completion of vulnerability assessments and security plans for port facilities and vessels. DHS had also developed programs for collecting information on incoming ships and was working with the private sector to improve and validate supply chain security. Additionally, we reported that DHS (1) had improved security efforts by establishing committees to share information with local port stakeholders, (2) was taking actions to establish interagency operations centers to monitor port activities, (3) was developing port-level plans to prevent and respond to terrorist attacks, (4) was testing such plans through exercises, and (5) was assessing security at foreign seaports. We further reported that DHS had strengthened the security of cargo containers through enhancements to its system for identifying high-risk cargo and expanding partnerships with other countries to screen containers before they are shipped to the United States. However, we also reported that DHS faced challenges in implementing certain maritime security responsibilities including, for example, a program to control access to seaports’ secure areas and to screen incoming cargo for radiation. In October 2007, we updated our findings when we testified on DHS’s overall maritime security efforts as they related to the Security and Accountability For Every Port Act of 2006. We also reported on other challenges faced by DHS in its cargo security efforts, such as CBP’s requirement to test and implement a new program to screen 100 percent of all incoming containers overseas. As part of our body of work on the performance of maritime security missions, we have made recommendations to DHS including that it develop strategic plans, better plan the use of its human capital, establish performance measures, and otherwise improve program operations. DHS has generally concurred with our recommendations and is making progress towards implementing them. A list of related GAO products is included at the end of this report. Of the six desirable characteristics of an effective national strategy that GAO identified in 2004, the National Strategy for Maritime Security and its eight supporting implementation plans together address four and partially address two. The four characteristics that are addressed include: (1) purpose, scope, and methodology; (2) problem definition and risk assessment; (3) organizational roles, responsibilities, and coordination; and (4) integration and implementation. The two characteristics that are partially addressed are: (1) goals, objectives, activities, and performance measures; and (2) resources, investments, and risk management. Specifically, the elements of these characteristics that are not addressed are those concerning performance measures, and resources and investments. What follows is our assessment of the National Strategy for Maritime Security and its supporting plans as compared to the six desirable characteristics of an effective national strategy. These characteristics and the results of our assessment are shown in table 1. Our analysis shows that the National Strategy for Maritime Security and its supporting implementation plans together address four of the desirable characteristics of an effective national strategy. In general, these characteristics communicate why a strategy was produced, specify the threats that a strategy addresses, identify the organizations responsible for implementing a strategy and how they will coordinate their efforts, and tie a strategy to other strategies and plans, and subordinate levels of government. The extent to which each of these four desirable characteristics is addressed in the National Strategy for Maritime Security and its supporting plans is discussed in the following sections. The purpose, scope, and methodology characteristic is addressed in the National Strategy for Maritime Security and its eight supporting implementation plans. Specifically, while the purpose and scope are addressed in both the national strategy and the supporting plans, the strategy alone does not describe the methodology used in its development. However, five of the eight supporting plans do contain information on the methodology for how the plans were developed, and the Domestic Outreach Plan documents that eight working groups of maritime security stakeholders developed the eight plans supporting the national strategy— providing additional insight into the methodological development of the plans. For example, the Maritime Security Policy Coordination Committee is cited in the Maritime Domain Awareness and Maritime Commerce Security plans as having the responsibility for developing the supporting plans. This characteristic is important because if a national strategy does not contain a complete description of the purpose, scope, and methodology, this could reduce the document’s usefulness to the organizations responsible for implementing the strategy, as well as organizations seeking to exercise oversight, such as the Congress. Although the purpose and scope are described generally in the national strategy, they are more specifically described in the supporting plans. For example, the strategy states that its purpose is “to better integrate and synchronize the existing Department-level strategies and ensure their effective and efficient implementation,” while the Commerce Security Plan’s purpose is to “promote international supply chain security.” The strategy’s introduction defines the scope of the maritime domain as well as the scope of maritime security that the supporting plans are to address. Supporting plans define the scope further. For example, the scope for the Maritime Transportation Security System Recommendations plan describes its scope as the systems that comprise transportation security: component security, interface security, information security, and network security. The problem definition and risk assessment characteristic is addressed in the strategy and is discussed with varying levels of detail in six of the supporting plans. This characteristic identifies the particular national problem and threats to which a strategy is directed. Without necessarily prescribing a detailed solution, better problem definition and risk assessment provide greater latitude to responsible parties to develop innovative approaches that are tailored to the needs of specific regions or sectors and can be implemented as a practical matter given fiscal, human capital, and other limitations. The introduction to the national strategy identifies the problem stating that the oceans support commerce and are a source of food, resources, and recreation for the United States, and that they also act as a barrier and a conduit for threats to our nation. All of the supporting plans with the exception of the Domestic Outreach Plan further define the problem relative to their own purpose. For example, the problem cited in the National Plan to Achieve Maritime Domain Awareness is that “today’s complex and ambiguous threats place an even greater premium on knowledge and a shared understanding of the maritime domain.” In regard to risk assessment, one section of the national strategy identifies five threats to maritime security and discusses them with references to intelligence assessments and other national strategies. For example, citing the National Security Strategy of the United States, the National Strategy for Maritime Security states that terrorists have indicated a strong desire to use weapons of mass destruction which, when coupled with technology dispersion and the fact that some nations are unable to account for their stockpiles of these weapons or materials, increases the possibility that a terrorist attack involving such weapons could occur. It also states that terrorists can develop effective attack capabilities against maritime targets relatively quickly. The International Outreach and Coordination Strategy and the Plan to Achieve Maritime Domain Awareness also discuss the threats to maritime security in a manner similar to the National Strategy for Maritime Security. Other plans, such as those for Maritime Commerce Security and the Maritime Transportation System Security , mention threats more generally, citing, for example, the type of threat—nuclear, chemical, biological—as in the commerce plan, or the source of the threat—terrorism—as in the transportation system plan. Collectively, the national strategy and its eight supporting implementation plans address the organizational roles, responsibilities, and coordination characteristic. Though the level of specificity regarding roles, responsibilities, and coordination varies in the national strategy, all of the supporting plans address this characteristic with some detail. The inclusion of this characteristic in a national strategy helps agencies and other stakeholders to coordinate their efforts. It also helps clarify specific roles, particularly where there is overlap, and thus can enhance both implementation and accountability. Regarding organizational roles and responsibilities, the national strategy indicates that the public and private sectors share responsibility for the protection of critical infrastructure and key resources, with DHS in the lead role. However, the strategy does not identify the more specific roles of DHS components such as Customs and Border Protection or the Coast Guard in the protection of critical infrastructure or key assets. The supporting plans, however, are more explicit about roles and responsibilities. For example, specific agencies and components such as the Coast Guard and CBP within DHS are identified in the National Plan to Achieve Maritime Domain Awareness. In another case, while the national strategy references the National Incident Management System and the National Response Plan under the strategic objective to Minimize Damage and Expedite Recovery, it does not identify which agency is to coordinate and lead such a recovery. However, these roles and responsibilities are discussed in greater detail in the Maritime Infrastructure Recovery Plan. For example, it identifies the capabilities or types of assets the Army Corps of Engineers and the Department of Transportation will provide to aid in recovery. Additionally, the National Plan to Achieve Maritime Domain Awareness identifies the Maritime Security Policy Coordination Committee as having overall coordination responsibility for that plan. Other plans such as the Maritime Commerce Security Plan and Maritime Transportation System Security Recommendations, respectively, cite coordination responsibilities for specific recommendations or actions. For example, the Maritime Commerce Security Plan directs DHS to coordinate with DOD in the development of technology to secure containerized cargo, and the Maritime Transportation Security System Recommendations plan directs DHS to coordinate improvements to international maritime regulation. The integration and implementation characteristic is addressed in the national strategy and all but one of the supporting plans by noting, for example, that the terrorist threats cited in the national strategy are also considered in the National Security Strategy and the National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace. This characteristic builds on the aforementioned organizational roles and responsibilities—and thus can further clarify the relationships between various implementing parties. With regard to integration, the National Strategy for Maritime Security states that it is guided by the goals of the National Security Strategy and National Strategy for Homeland Security and draws upon other national strategies to counter terrorism, protect critical infrastructure, and combat weapons of mass destruction, among other strategies. The supporting plans provide more details on the integration characteristic by, for example, discussing how a particular plan supports or is supported by another supporting plan. For example, the Maritime Commerce Security Plan states that its development was closely coordinated with that of the Maritime Infrastructure Recovery Plan and the Maritime Transportation Security System Recommendations plan. Furthermore, the Maritime Infrastructure Recovery Plan discusses the integration of the plan with other national and local area maritime security plans. With regard to implementation, the National Strategy for Maritime Security cites the eight supporting plans as the means to implement the strategy and seven of the eight supporting plans provide amplifying detail and specificity on implementation issues, often citing their own implementation in terms of the implementation of other supporting plans. Three plans also state how their implementation is related to other plans. For example, the National Plan to Achieve Maritime Domain Awareness states that its implementation directly supports, and is supported by, the Global Maritime Intelligence Integration Plan and that the Maritime Domain Awareness plan is an enabler of the Maritime Operational Threat Response plan. The strategy and supporting plans only partially address the remaining two desirable characteristics: (1) goals, objectives, activities, and performance measures; and (2) resources, investments, and risk management. These characteristics are partially addressed because they do not identify the performance measures needed to gauge the implementation of the strategy and its supporting plans, and the resources and investments needed to successfully implement and carry out the strategy. These two characteristics are discussed below. The goals, objectives, activities, and performance measures characteristic is only partially addressed in the national strategy, and the supporting plans also do not include information to address all elements of this characteristic, such as performance measures to gauge the progress made implementing the strategy and plans. This characteristic provides for a clear identification of priorities, milestones, and performance measures, without which implementing parties may find it difficult to achieve results in specific time frames. This also enables more effective oversight and accountability. While the national strategy does not specifically use the term “goals” in its description, it does provide a list of principles that serve as the equivalent of goals and a hierarchy of objectives and subordinate objectives. For example, the stated principles of the maritime security strategy are to (1) preserve freedom of the seas, (2) facilitate and defend commerce to ensure the uninterrupted flow of shipping, and (3) facilitate the movement of desirable goods and people across our borders while screening out dangerous people and material. The strategy also outlines the steps for achieving these with subordinate objectives such as to protect maritime-related population centers and critical infrastructures. Furthermore, the strategy includes five strategic actions—such as to embed security into commercial practices—intended to achieve further coordination of maritime security efforts. Each of the supporting plans provides more focused goals and objectives. For example, the goal of the Maritime Commerce Security Plan is to improve the security of the maritime supply chain, and one of the goals of the National Plan to Achieve Maritime Domain Awareness is to enhance transparency in the maritime domain. However, performance measures are lacking in both the national strategy and all but one of the supporting plans. The only supporting plan that mentions performance measures is the Maritime Commerce Security Plan which lists potential or possible performance measures. For example, the Maritime Commerce Security Plan states, “Customs and Border Protection performs validations of the foreign security procedures of Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism participants. This could act as a measure of effectiveness in implementing procedures to secure cargo.” Additionally, in our previous work, we have reported that performance measures are in place for some individual maritime security programs. For example, we reported that CBP has established performance metrics for its Automated Targeting System and uses performance measures to gauge the effectiveness of its Container Security Initiative program. We have also made recommendations for the development of performance measures for other maritime security programs, such as emergency response capabilities. DHS generally concurred with these recommendations and is working to implement them. The resources, investments, and risk management characteristic is also only partially addressed in the national strategy and supporting implementation plans because not all of the elements of this characteristic are addressed. Specifically, while the strategic actions of the maritime security strategy discussed earlier in this report constitute an approach to minimize risk and invest resources to achieve maritime security, the strategy lacks information on resource requirements. Six of the eight supporting plans also discuss risk management; for example, there is a distinct recommendation to incorporate risk management in maritime security in the Maritime Transportation Security System Recommendations plan. However, the supporting plans, like the national strategy, mostly lack information on the sources and types of resources needed. The national strategy addresses investments and risk management in a general way. For example, the strategic action to “Embed Security into Commercial Practices” discusses the need to conduct vulnerability assessments to identify defenses that require improvement and procedures that are used to identify terrorist threats in cargo containers, but the strategy does not contain an investment strategy for implementing this strategic action nor does it determine how costs will be borne among the involved parties. With the exception of the National Plan to Achieve Maritime Domain Awareness, none of the other seven supporting plans address the resources issue and three do not address investments. In a November 2007 briefing regarding the status of the implementation of the national plan, the working group identified resources and investments as challenges in implementing the strategy. This briefing also included recommendations to address the resource issue. For example, it suggested that the Maritime Security Policy Coordination Committee evaluate the feasibility of developing an interagency priorities and investment strategy. Without guidance on resources, investments, and risk management, implementing parties may find it difficult to allocate resources and investments according to priorities and constraints, track costs and performance, and shift investments and resources as appropriate. Although this information was not included in the strategy or its supporting plans, DHS’s latest Future Years Homeland Security Program (FYHSP), a 5-year resource plan to support the mission, priorities, and goals of the department within projected funding, provides some details on how much DHS expects to spend to implement its maritime security responsibilities. Within the goal to protect our nation from dangerous people and goods, the FYHSP discusses several maritime security programs that are part of the National Strategy for Maritime Security or it supporting plans. Among these are the Container Security Initiative to screen cargo containers for weapons before the cargo is shipped to the United States, the C-TPAT program which works with the private sector to improve the security standards for supply chain and container security, and research into the development of technology to improve container security. Documents provided to us by the Maritime Security Working Group indicate that the implementation of the supporting plans varies and the working group reported one plan had been completed, another has reached the assessment phase, a third has reached the execution phase, and the other five plans remain primarily in the planning phase. The working group identified 76 actions across the various supporting plans and has monitored the implementation status of these actions. The working group reported that, as of November 2007, six of these actions were completed and 70 were ongoing. The types of actions it monitored included issuing guidance, developing plans and coordination procedures, assigning personnel and forming working groups, as well as technology development and partnering with the private sector. The process by which the working group monitors the implementation of the actions associated with the supporting plans is demonstrated in figure 2. According to the working group co-chair, the working group identified a list of actions to be carried out to implement the supporting plans. The working group then provided this list to the departments which in turn delegated further actions to their components (right side of the figure). The status of these actions was communicated back to the working group and up to the committee through the departments (left side of the figure). A DHS official who is a working group member said that sometimes components communicate directly to the working group. Table 2 contains a brief description of each implementation plan and examples of actions the working group is monitoring as reported by the working group in November 2007. The working group has also reported on whether each plan was in the guidance, planning, execution, or assessment and evaluation phase. Overall, the working group reported that the National Plan to Achieve Maritime Domain Awareness has reached the execution phase, which includes training exercises and operations; the Maritime Operational Threat Response Plan has reached the assessment phase, where lessons learned are assessed and best practices are developed; and implementation of the Domestic Outreach Plan has been completed. The other five plans remain primarily in the planning phase where strategic planning, requirements and capabilities, operational, and tactical planning occur. For example, actions that the working group is monitoring for the Maritime Infrastructure Recovery Plan—which the working group reports is in the planning phase—include the assignment of risk management personnel, the incorporation of recovery management procedures, and the identification of private sector subject matter experts essential to recovery execution. Though we did not verify the accuracy of what the working group reported regarding the status of the 76 actions it had been monitoring, in August 2007 we reported that DHS had made substantial progress with regard to maritime security. We reported that DHS had generally achieved 17 out of 23 performance expectations. Specifically, we reported that DHS had generally achieved many planning goals, but had not achieved performance expectations related to the development of technology. For example, we reported that DHS had not developed a long-range vessel tracking system to provide more information on vessels approaching or already in U.S. waters. We have ongoing work reviewing the progress the Coast Guard has made in implementing its vessel tracking system. In its November 2007 briefing to Maritime Security Policy Coordination Committee, the working group cited three challenges to implementing the National Strategy for Maritime Security and its supporting plans: (1) the need to align the implementing actions in overlapping national strategies, (2) the lack of dedicated interagency resources to effectively coordinate actions in supporting plans, and (3) the differences in the prioritization of actions by responsible components and agencies. The working group briefing also included recommendations to the Maritime Security Policy Coordination Committee to address these challenges. For example, to address the first challenge, it recommended an analysis of uncoordinated strategies with maritime components to identify gap-closing strategies. In response to the second challenge, the working group recommended that additional analysis of the maritime security strategy’s implementation and coordination be conducted. The working group also identified the need to prioritize task recommendations and develop an implementation plan which integrates tasks into the individual plans. The working group suggested addressing the third obstacle by evaluating the feasibility of developing interagency priorities or an investment strategy for efforts that are mutually supportive of implementing the National Strategy for Maritime Security. According to the working group briefing, this would require the incorporation of a standardized mechanism for future updates and the need to ensure that the strategy’s oversight roles and responsibilities are clarified, understood, and embraced by all parties. We provided a draft of this report to the Departments of Defense, Homeland Security, and State for comment. The departments had no official comments on the draft, but provided technical comments which we incorporated as appropriate. We are sending copies of this report to interested congressional committees and subcommittees. We will make copies available upon request. In addition, this report will be available at no cost on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov. If you or your staffs have any questions about this report or wish to discuss the matter further, please contact me at (202) 512-9610 or caldwells@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. Key contributors to this report are listed in appendix II. Our first objective was to assess the extent to which the National Strategy for Maritime Security and its supporting implementation plans contain the elements identified as desirable characteristics of an effective national strategy. To answer this question, we first analyzed the National Strategy for Maritime Security and determined whether it contains the desirable characteristics for an effective national strategy that we identified in February 2004. We also analyzed the unclassified versions of the strategy’s eight supporting implementation plans to determine if they provided evidence of the characteristics contained within or missing from the national strategy. If a characteristic or an element of a characteristic was missing from the national strategy, our methodology required that the characteristic or element be present in at least five of the supporting plans for the characteristic to be considered “addressed.” An assessment of “partially addressed” meant that the characteristic or element was present in at least one of the supporting plans. In our past work, we did not assess supporting plans as part of our evaluation of the national strategies. However, we believe it is proper to include the eight supporting plans in our analysis of the National Strategy for Maritime Security because Homeland Security Presidential Directive-13 (HSPD-13) directed that this strategy and its supporting plans be produced together. Two analysts independently reviewed the strategy and each of the supporting plans to determine whether the National Strategy for Maritime Security addressed each of the characteristics of an effective national strategy. Any differences between each analyst’s determinations were resolved through discussion and a comparison of evidence. Our second objective was to determine the reported status of the implementation of these plans. To describe the reported status of the implementation actions, we reviewed spreadsheets and briefing charts detailing the actions taken to implement the supporting plans that were obtained from representatives of DHS, DOD, and State who, in turn, had received them from the Maritime Security Working Group. We also conducted interviews with officials representing lead implementation agencies including DHS, DOD, and State, and the co-chair of the Maritime Security Working Group. These officials provided us with the same information on the actions taken to implement the supporting plans that we had received from the Maritime Security Working Group. We did not independently evaluate any of the actions reported for the implementation of these plans; however, we have published numerous reports regarding selected maritime security programs and initiatives that are included in the National Strategy for Maritime Security and its supporting plans. A list of related GAO products is included at the end of this report. We conducted this performance audit from July 2007 to June 2008 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. The report was prepared under the direction of Dawn Hoff, Assistant Director. Other individuals making key contributions to this report include Pille Anvelt, Nancy Briggs, Steve Calvo, Tony DeFrank, Wayne Ekblad, Geoff Hamilton, Stan Kostyla, April Thompson, and Adam Vogt. Supply Chain Security: Challenges to Scanning 100 Percent of U.S. Bound Cargo Containers. GAO-08-533T. Washington, D.C.: June 12, 2008. Supply Chain Security: U.S. Customs and Border Protection Has Enhanced Its Partnership with Import Trade Sectors, but Challenges Remain in Verifying Security Practices. GAO-08-240. Washington, D.C.: Apr. 25, 2008. Coast Guard: Observations on the Fiscal Year 2009 Budget, Recent Performance, and Related Challenges. GAO-08-494T. Washington, D.C.: Mar. 6, 2008. Maritime Security: Coast Guard Inspections Identify and Correct Facility Deficiencies, but More Analysis Needed of Program’s Staffing, Practices and Data. GAO-08-12. Washington, D.C.: Feb. 14, 2008. Supply Chain Security: Examination of High-Risk Cargo at Foreign Seaports Have Increased, but Improved Data Collection and Performance Measures Are Needed. GAO-08-187. Washington, D.C.: Jan. 25, 2008. Maritime Security: Federal Efforts Needed to Address Challenges in Preventing and Responding to Terrorist Attacks on Energy Commodity Tankers. GAO-08-141. Washington, D.C.: Dec. 10, 2007. Transportation Security: TSA Has Made Progress in Implementing the Transportation Worker Identification Credential Program, but Challenges Remain. GAO-08-133T. Washington, D.C.: Oct. 31, 2007. Maritime Security: The SAFE Port Act: Status and Implementation One Year Later. GAO-08-126T. Washington, D.C.: Oct. 30, 2007. Department of Homeland Security: Progress Report on Implementation of Mission and Management Functions. GAO-07-454. Washington, D.C.: Aug. 17, 2007. Information on Port Security in the Caribbean Basin. GAO-07-804R. Washington, D.C.: June 29, 2007. Homeland Security: Observations on DHS and FEMA Efforts to Prepare for and Respond to Major and Catastrophic Disasters and Address Related Recommendations and Legislation. GAO-07-835T. Washington, D.C.: May 15, 2007. Homeland Security: Management and Programmatic Challenges Facing the Department of Homeland Security. GAO-07-833T. Washington, D.C.: May 10, 2007. Maritime Security: Observations on Selected Aspects of the SAFE Port Act. GAO-07-754T. Washington, D.C.: Apr. 26, 2007. International Trade: Persistent Weaknesses in the In-Bond Cargo System Impede Customs and Border Protection’s Ability to Address Revenue, Trade, and Security Concerns. GAO-07-561. Washington, D.C.: Apr. 17, 2007. Port Risk Management: Additional Federal Guidance Would Aid Ports in Disaster Planning and Recovery. GAO-07-412. Washington, D.C.: Mar. 28, 2007. Maritime Security: Public Safety Consequences of a Terrorist Attack on a Tanker Carrying Liquefied Natural Gas Need Clarification. GAO-07- 316. Washington, D.C.: Feb. 23, 2007. Maritime Security: Information Sharing Efforts Are Improving. GAO-06- 933T. Washington, D.C.: July 10, 2006. Cargo Container Inspections: Preliminary Observations on the Status of Efforts to Improve the Automated Targeting System. GAO-06-591T. Washington, D.C.: Mar. 30, 2006. Combating Nuclear Smuggling: DHS Has Made Progress Deploying Radiation Detection Equipment at U.S. Ports-of-Entry, but Concerns Remain. GAO-06-389. Washington, D.C.: Mar. 22, 2006. Risk Management: Further Refinements Needed to Assess Risks and Prioritize Protective Measures at Ports and Other Critical Infrastructure. GAO-06-91. Washington, D.C.: Dec. 15, 2005. Homeland Security: Key Cargo Security Programs Can Be Improved. GAO-05-466T. Washington, D.C.: May 26, 2005. Maritime Security: Enhancements Made, but Implementation and Sustainability Remain Key Challenges. GAO-05-448T. Washington, D.C.: May 17, 2005. Container Security: A Flexible Staffing Model and Minimum Equipment Requirements Would Improve Overseas Targeting and Inspection Efforts. GAO-05-557. Washington, D.C.: Apr. 26, 2005. Maritime Security: New Structures Have Improved Information Sharing, but Security Clearance Processing Requires Further Attention. GAO-05-394. Washington, D.C.: Apr. 15, 2005. Preventing Nuclear Smuggling: DOE Has Made Limited Progress in Installing Radiation Detection Equipment at Highest Priority Foreign Seaports. GAO-05-375. Washington, D.C.: Mar. 31, 2005. Cargo Security: Partnership Program Grants Importers Reduced Scrutiny with Limited Assurance of Improved Security. GAO-05-404. Washington, D.C.: Mar. 11, 2005. Homeland Security: Agency Plans, Implementation, and Challenges Regarding the National Strategy for Homeland Security. GAO-05-33. Washington, D.C.: Jan. 14, 2005. Homeland Security: Process for Reporting Lessons Learned from Seaport Exercises Needs Further Attention. GAO-05-170. Washington, D.C.: Jan.14, 2005. Port Security: Better Planning Needed to Develop and Operate Maritime Worker Identification Card Program. GAO-05-106. Washington, D.C.: Dec. 10, 2004. Maritime Security: Better Planning Needed to Help Ensure an Effective Port Security Assessment Program. GAO-04-1062. Washington, D.C.: Sep. 30, 2004. Maritime Security: Partnering Could Reduce Federal Costs and Facilitate Implementation of Automatic Vessel Identification System. GAO-04-868. Washington, D.C.: July 23, 2004. Maritime Security: Substantial Work Remains to Translate New Planning Requirements into Effective Port Security. GAO-04-838. Washington, D.C.: June 30, 2004. Homeland Security: Summary of Challenges Faced in Targeting Oceangoing Cargo Containers for Inspection. GAO-04-557T. Washington, D.C.: Mar. 31, 2004. Homeland Security: Preliminary Observations on Efforts to Target Security Inspections of Cargo Containers. GAO-04-325T. Washington, D.C.: Dec. 16, 2003. Maritime Security: Progress Made in Implementing Maritime Transportation Security Act, but Concerns Remain. GAO-03-1155T. Washington, D.C.: Sep. 9, 2003. Homeland Security: Efforts to Improve Information Sharing Need to Be Strengthened. GAO-03-760. Washington, D.C.: Aug. 27, 2003. Homeland Security: Challenges Facing the Department of Homeland Security in Balancing Its Border Security and Trade Facilitation Missions. GAO-03-902T. Washington, D.C.: June 16, 2003.

Summary: The safety and economic security of the United States depends on the secure use of the world's seaports and waterways. Homeland Security Presidential Directive-13 (HSPD-13, also referred to as National Security Presidential Directive-41) directs the coordination of U.S. maritime security policy through the creation of a National Strategy for Maritime Security and supporting implementation plans. GAO was asked to evaluate this strategy and its eight supporting plans. This report discusses: (1) the extent to which the strategy and its supporting plans contain desirable characteristics of an effective national strategy, and (2) the reported status of the implementation of these plans. To conduct this work, GAO evaluated the National Strategy for Maritime Security and its supporting plans against the desirable characteristics of an effective national strategy that GAO identified in February 2004, reviewed HSPD-13 and supporting plans, and reviewed documents on the status of the plans' implementation. Of the six desirable characteristics of an effective national strategy that GAO identified in 2004, the National Strategy for Maritime Security and its eight supporting implementation plans address four and partially address the remaining two. Documents provided by the Maritime Security Working Group--an interagency body responsible for monitoring and assessing the implementation of the maritime strategy--indicate that the implementation status of the eight supporting plans varies. For example, as of November 2007, implementation of one plan had been completed, while another has reached the assessment phase (e.g., lessons learned and best practices), and a third has reached the execution phase (e.g., exercises and operations). The other five plans remain primarily in the planning phase. The working group is monitoring the implementation of 76 actions across the plans, and reported 6 of these are completed and 70 are ongoing.