CBP’s security strategy for maritime cargo uses a risk-based approach to focus limited resources on targeting and examining cargo shipments that pose a potential risk while allowing other cargo shipments to proceed without unduly disrupting commerce into or out of the United States. The strategy is based, in part, on obtaining advance cargo information. In particular, through what is referred to as the 24-hour rule, CBP generally requires vessel carriers to electronically transmit cargo manifests to CBP 24 hours before cargo is loaded onto U.S.-bound vessels at foreign ports. Through the Importer Security Filing and Additional Carrier Requirements (known as the 10+2 rule), CBP requires importers and vessel carriers to provide data elements for improved identification of containerized cargo shipments that may pose a risk for terrorism. Importers are responsible for supplying CBP with 10 shipping data elements—such as country of origin—24 hours prior to loading, while vessel carriers are required to provide 2 data elements—container status messages and stow plansOther aspects of CBP’s maritime cargo container security strategy include using technology, such as radiation detection equipment, to detect potential threats and partnering with foreign governments and the trade industry to examine containers prior to their arrival in the United States and implement security measures throughout the supply chain process, respectively. A brief description of the core programs that constitute CBP’s security strategy for cargo containers is provided in appendix I. Throughout the supply chain process, and underlying many of the programs within CBP’s security strategy for cargo containers, CBP assesses the national security risks posed by shipments throughout the supply chain process, as shown in figure 1. —that are not required by the 24-hour rule. ATS is the primary system that CBP targeters use to review maritime cargo shipments for national security purposes, and targeters we spoke with were generally satisfied with how ATS and its weight set of national security rules have assisted in their targeting efforts. For example, targeters at one ATU we visited said that because ATS filters information and presents key information to the targeters, the targeters are able to better focus their targeting efforts than before they had ATS. Those targeters as well as the ATU supervisor at another ATU noted that, in particular, the risk scores that the current version of the weight set produces are helpful in balancing their targeting workload. The risk score, however, is not the sole factor that determines whether a targeter reviews the data for a shipment or whether the shipment is selected for a security examination. In particular, targeters at each of the six ATUs we visited explained that they use the ATS risk score as a starting point for the targeting process, but that their decisions are ultimately based on additional research. To conduct this research, they may use information within ATS or other tools and information outside of ATS. On the basis of the ATS risk score and the research conducted, targeters make a qualitative assessment of the risk and determine whether to hold a shipment for examination. Targeters at one of the ATUs we visited emphasized the important role that targeters’ expertise and experience play in the risk assessment process, stating that although they believe ATS’s capabilities are helpful, they believe that there could be negative effects from further automating the targeting process, such as decreased use of targeters’ expertise regarding the different types of shipments that arrive at their respective ports. According to CBP policy, the risk scores assigned by the weight set in ATS determine, in part, what actions CBP officers at the ports are to take to address potential threats. Targeters at ATUs are required to review data in ATS for all medium-risk and high-risk shipments that arrive at their respective ports. For example, a targeter may review individual data elements, such as the name of the importer or other supply chain parties. A targeter may also review the rules that detected potential threats and, ATU targeters therefore, contributed to the calculation of the risk score. are also required to hold high-risk shipments for examination unless they can mitigate the risk through additional research or analysis of available information.demonstrated how they implement this policy at their respective ports. In addition to actions targeters take in accordance with CBP policy, targeters have discretion over which low-risk and medium-risk shipments to select CBP targeters at each of the six ATUs we visited for security examinations, and CBP expects targeters to select shipments based on discretionary factors. Targeters use various features within ATS to assist them in their research into shipments of interest. Officials at each of the six ATUs we visited discussed or demonstrated the following features and how targeters use these features when targeting: Queries: Through ATS’s querying capabilities, targeters are able to search for shipments that meet specific criteria, such as shipments from a particular country. For example, targeters at each ATU we visited use queries to identify shipments for review, although the set of queries used varied at each ATU. Five of the six ATUs we visited use queries to ensure that all shipments, regardless of risk score, are reviewed prior to arrival. For example, targeters at one ATU run a query for each arriving vessel to ensure that all shipments on the vessel have been reviewed. Targeters at another ATU have a query for each risk level (high, medium, or low) and targeters reviewing the results of each query are to ensure that all shipments of a particular risk level have been reviewed. In addition, targeters at five of the six ATUs we visited said that they run additional queries of interest for discretionary targeting after completing their assigned duties. Such discretionary targeting could be for national security purposes or for other efforts, such as counternarcotics. For example, targeters at one ATU may independently create queries to identify items of interest, such as all shipments of a particular commodity or those coming from a particular country of origin. In addition to queries that targeters at the ATUs run, NTC-C targeters run nationwide queries daily to identify shipments with the potential for containing chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, or conventional weapons, among other things. Targeters’ notes: ATS has a feature that allows a targeter to annotate a shipment with the targeter’s conclusion based on research regarding whether the shipment is considered a potential threat. The notes feature within ATS facilitates the sharing of research findings with CBP targeters at other locations. Targeters’ reviews: ATS also indicates whether the shipment data have been reviewed by a targeter at the targeter’s own location or at another CBP targeting location, such as a Container Security Initiative port or NTC-C. CBP targeters also use tools outside of ATS to conduct research. During our interviews at the six domestic port ATUs we visited, targeters explained that they use web-based and other research tools to aid in their assessments of shipments. Such tools include web searches, which targeters use to find general information on a company or address; a third-party database of public and proprietary records, which targeters use to research business names and associated information such as a business’s locations, officers, and assets (e.g., registered vehicles); and the State Department’s Consular Consolidated Database, which targeters may use to obtain visa and passport information for foreign individuals involved in a shipment. Targeters review and analyze all of the information collected to make a decision as to whether a shipment should be examined. On the basis of such research and analysis, a targeter could select a low-risk shipment for examination. A targeter could also determine that an examination is not necessary for a medium-risk shipment—for example, the weight set may assign a medium-risk score to a shipment based on the data available, but the targeter could determine through research that the score is based on a clerical error in the data provided. Targeters’ experience may also inform targeting decisions. For example, targeters at ATUs may have information about recent seizures and can look for recurring patterns to identify future shipments that may be part of a trend of illegal shipments. Targeters may also share such information with other targeting units to help inform targeting decisions. Also, targeters at all six of the ATUs we visited said they communicate regularly with targeters at NTC-C regarding shipments of interest. We have previously reported that ensuring controls to assess ATS’s effectiveness in identifying high-risk shipments was important for providing CBP with the best information to inform its targeting efforts. In 2005, in response to our work and an external peer review of ATS conducted in 2005, CBP contracted with a consulting firm to develop performance measures and a methodology to determine the effectiveness of the weight set in identifying high-risk shipments. The resulting performance measures and methodology, which the consulting firm provided to CBP in April 2006, balanced targeting accuracy with examination workload and enabled CBP to compare the weight set’s performance with the effectiveness of examinations conducted through a random selection program. We then reported in August 2006 that the performance measures and methodology developed by the consulting firm were sufficient to assess the performance of the weight set and provide a baseline against which future assessments may be conducted; however, we also reported that data limitations and uncertainties existed, and we noted that CBP must interpret the evaluations cautiously. We also reported in August 2006 that CBP planned to continue using the consulting firm’s methodology in making future adjustments to the weight set. For more information about GAO’s past audit findings and recommendations to improve the targeting process, see appendix II. Currently, CBP assesses the performance of the weight set using the following performance measures: True positive rate (TPR) which reflects the percentage of maritime shipments that ATS assessed as high risk within the population of shipments in which CBP identified a threat during an examination. False positive rate (FPR) which reflects the percentage of maritime shipments that ATS assessed as high risk within the population of shipments in which CBP did not identify a threat during an examination. Taken in combination, the TPR and FPR measures enable CBP to determine the effectiveness of the weight set by providing information about the accuracy of the weight set and its impact on examination workload. The TPR enables CBP to determine the accuracy of the weight set in identifying high-risk shipments. The TPR and FPR measures also enable CBP to determine the workload or examination rate for ports based on the results of the weight set scores. For example, a high FPR would unnecessarily increase the workload or number of examinations at ports because officials would be required to examine a higher number of shipments that do not contain an actual threat. Using data from the version of the weight set CBP was using in 2005, the consulting firm used its methodology to conduct a performance assessment, which involved calculating the TPR and FPR to ultimately indicate the effectiveness of the weight set at that time. Since the contract with the firm ended in 2011, CBP has taken on the role of assessing the effectiveness of the weight set. In its project plan for the most recent update to the weight set implemented in early 2011, as it had previously done, CBP planned to assess the performance using these measures to compare the targeting effectiveness of the weight set with other measurements. CBP officials stated that they face ongoing challenges with the performance measures and the methodology by which they are calculated. In particular, the FPR and TPR may not accurately reflect the weight set’s performance in identifying national security threats because they rely on indirect measures given that no true security threat has been found in a cargo container. We reported in 2006 that CBP planned to take steps to improve the process for assessing ATS performance. Since the most recent update to the weight set in early 2011, CBP formed working groups and has begun taking steps to ensure that the methodology it uses to approximate threats accurately reflects what CBP considers to be a national security threat (to the extent possible). For example, these working groups plan to (1) create a new definition of “national security” for the purposes of clarifying what the weight set should target and (2) revisit the current definitions of threats in containers to provide consistency with the new definition of national security. CBP officials stated that they expect the working groups’ activities to be completed by April 2013. Prior to implementing the current version of the weight set in early 2011, CBP did not conduct an assessment to determine whether the updated version of the weight set would be more effective than the previous version of the weight set or other alternatives that were considered during the update process. For the 2011 update, CBP developed and evaluated five alternative versions of the weight set. CBP’s consideration for which alternative to select focused on two of the five versions because, according to CBP officials, these two versions incorporated the newly required 10+2 data and reflected current threat information about countries of interest. CBP ultimately implemented one of these two versions of the weight set, but CBP could not provide any documentation to demonstrate that the version selected was more effective than either the other alternative or the version it was to replace. CBP’s process for updating the weight set involves assessing the impact of alternative versions of the weight set. For example, for the most recent update to the weight set, CBP’s impact assessment provides information on how many shipments would be assessed as high risk under each alternative version of the weight set and would, therefore, affect CBP targeters’ workload at ports of arrival because such high-risk shipments, under CBP policy, are to be held for examination, for example, through the use of NII equipment. CBP officials stated that they believed the impact assessment that CBP conducted during the update process indicates the reasons for selecting the chosen version of the weight set. While, according to CBP officials, the impact assessment provides CBP’s reason for replacing the prior version of the weight set, we found that the impact assessment primarily evaluates how the chosen alternative version of the weight set could affect targeter workload and does not address measures of accuracy in identifying high-risk shipments. Therefore, the impact assessment does not fully account for the effectiveness of each alternative of the weight set. Although managing resources is an element of risk management, effectiveness in reducing risks is also an important consideration when evaluating alternatives to manage risk. CBP’s impact assessment does not address the balance between targeting accuracy and workload. Assessing the potential effectiveness of alternative versions of the weight set prior to selecting one for implementation would provide CBP with more information to make an informed decision. In January 2010, the DHS Office of Inspector General recommended that CBP enhance its documentation efforts to ensure that each stage of the process for analyzing and developing ATS rules is documented, and CBP concurred with this recommendation. As part of this recommendation, the DHS Office of Inspector General recommended documenting the rationale for making changes to ATS rules but did not specify what types of analyses could demonstrate or support the rationale for making changes to the rules. On the basis of our analysis, the rationale for updates to the weight set could be further strengthened through assessments of effectiveness beyond workload. For example, determining the expected TPR and FPR for an alternative version of the weight set and comparing these measures against the TPR and FPR for the existing version of the weight set could enable CBP to determine if the alternative version of the weight set could be expected to result in improved effectiveness, based on these performance measures. This would enable CBP to quantitatively compare the effectiveness of the alternative versions of the weight set being considered prior to selecting one for implementation. Doing so, in addition to the impact assessment, would provide CBP with reasonable assurance that the version of the weight set it selects for implementation is the most effective of the alternatives considered after taking into account any resource constraints. Furthermore, assessing the alternative versions of the weight set in the future would provide CBP with better assurance that the version it selects for implementation is more effective than the previous version of the weight set. CBP officials stated that they plan to calculate and document measures of effectiveness during the planned update to the weight set that will begin in the fall of 2012. Since implementing the current version of the weight set in early 2011, CBP has not regularly assessed the weight set against established performance targets to monitor its performance and obtain information to determine when updates to the weight set are necessary. We reported in August 2006 that CBP intended to establish targets for the performance measures to assess future performance of ATS, but CBP did not establish such targets for those measures. Targets could help CBP determine when updates are needed to improve targeting effectiveness. For example, according to CBP’s analysis, the TPR for summer 2011 through spring 2012 shows that, among shipments CBP found to contain a potential threat during an examination, the weight set accurately identified 6.3 percent as high risk, meaning that the weight set classified 93.7 percent of shipments that carried a potential threat as either medium risk or low risk. Furthermore, the FPR for that time period shows that, among all the arriving shipments that CBP examined during that time that did not pose a threat, the weight set identified 3.6 percent as high risk. However, because CBP did not establish targets for either TPR or FPR, it is not clear whether 6.3 percent for the TPR is sufficiently low or 3.6 percent for the FPR is sufficiently high to suggest that changes are needed to improve the performance of the weight set. CBP’s project plan calls for conducting periodic performance assessments by determining recurring measures of TPR and FPR. Furthermore, according to CBP officials, the performance assessments are to be conducted as part of quarterly reporting responsibilities. However, CBP did not calculate these measures at the end of each quarter, but instead calculated them as part of a single assessment in the summer of 2012 and divided the results into quarters. Accordingly, CBP was not aware of the ongoing performance of the weight set from its implementation in early 2011 through spring 2012, and CBP was therefore unable to determine for 18 months whether the weight set was performing at a level that could require changes or updates to improve its effectiveness. According to CBP officials, the summer 2012 assessment was conducted at that time in preparation for a conference to discuss updates to the weight set planned for the fall of 2012. CBP had decided to hold this conference before CBP conducted the assessment, meaning its decision for when to update the weight set was not based on information about the weight set’s effectiveness from ongoing monitoring of CBP’s performance measures for the weight set. Ongoing monitoring is a key element of a risk management approach, and CBP’s project plan calls for such periodic performance monitoring to determine targeting effectiveness. In addition, standard practices for internal control indicate that (1) ongoing monitoring should occur in the course of normal operations and can be accomplished by periodic review of performance measures and (2) in the process of ongoing performance monitoring, actions should include continuous comparison of performance data against planned targets and analysis of any differences to take corrective actions as necessary. CBP officials stated that personnel have not been consistently available to conduct performance assessments since the initial contract with the consulting firm ended in July 2011 and that resource concerns, such as funding, the availability of subject matter experts, and the availability of programmers may affect the timing of weight set updates. Nevertheless, given the importance of the weight set to CBP’s process for targeting cargo containers, regular performance assessments of the weight set that include evaluating results against established performance targets could help CBP determine when updates are needed in a timelier manner and help it better prioritize the resources it needs to complete the updates.Furthermore, CBP officials stated that they intend to continue adjusting the methodology for calculating the performance measures to mitigate data limitations and more accurately reflect the performance of the weight set. Such steps could help CBP ensure that its targeters have the best information available regarding the risk of maritime cargo container shipments arriving in the United States. CBP recognizes the importance of and challenges to ensuring the security of the global supply chain while facilitating the flow of legitimate commerce. Although no events have occurred to date, terror-related attacks on the supply chain could have devastating effects on the nation’s security and economic well-being, and it is imperative that CBP use the best information and tools available to continually mitigate potential threats and address vulnerabilities. DHS and CBP face difficulties in achieving 100 percent scanning of cargo containers prior to loading at foreign ports and have, instead, advocated a risk-based approach to target and scan those cargo containers that pose the highest risk. Given the critical role that ATS plays as part of this risk-based approach, it is important to ensure that ATS is performing effectively. CBP plans to continue enhancing risk management processes, including the use of ATS and its associated targeting rules. CBP’s determination of which containerized shipments to review or to hold for examination is based, in part, on the risk score. Thus, updating the weight set in ATS that calculates this risk score is important for ensuring that targeters are using the most effective tools in making targeting decisions. CBP has assessed workload impacts when making updates to the weight set, but it did not fully assess the weight set’s effectiveness as part of the most recent update. As a result, CBP does not have reasonable assurance that the implemented version is the most effective. Further, CBP did not conduct periodic assessments as part of ongoing monitoring efforts. Specifically, CBP did not conduct an assessment of the weight set until 18 months after CBP implemented the new weight set. We believe it is important that CBP more regularly assess the performance of the weight set in ATS that produces the risk scores and compare the results of this assessment against established performance targets. Such steps could help CBP determine when changes may be needed and ensure that its targeters have the best information available regarding the risk of maritime cargo container shipments arriving in the United States. To enhance its targeting of maritime cargo containers and better position CBP to provide reasonable assurance of the effectiveness of ATS, we recommend that the Commissioner of CBP take the following two actions: ensure that future updates to the weight set are based on results of assessments that demonstrate that the chosen version of the weight set is more effective than other alternatives, including the existing version, and establish targets for CBP’s performance measures and use those measures to assess the effectiveness of the weight set on a regular basis to better determine when updates to the weight set are needed. On October 17, 2012, DHS provided written comments on a draft of this report, which are reprinted in appendix III. DHS concurred with the two recommendations. Specifically, DHS concurred with the recommendation to ensure that future updates to the weight set are based on the results of assessments and stated that CBP plans to conduct analyses to ensure that future versions of the weight set result in increased effectiveness. DHS also noted that CBP is to conduct these analyses during the development and deployment of future versions of the weight set. According to DHS, these analyses would include performance measures, subject matter expert input, current threat information, and other intelligence. DHS stated that it expects these actions to be completed by April 2013. Such actions should address the intent of the recommendation to ensure improvements in the effectiveness of future versions of the weight set. DHS also concurred with the recommendation to establish targets for CBP’s performance measures and stated that CBP is working to improve the current performance measures methodology. DHS stated that, following approval of this methodology, CBP plans to conduct quarterly reviews of the weight set to inform decision making. DHS stated that it expects these actions to be completed by September 2013. If CBP takes these steps as planned and includes targets for any performance measures that are part of the updated methodology, this should address the intent of our recommendation. DHS also provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. As agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce its contents earlier, we plan no further distribution of this report until 30 days after its issue date. At that time, we will send copies of this report to the Secretary of Homeland Security, appropriate congressional committees, and other interested parties. In addition, the report will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov. If you or your staffs have any questions on this report, please contact me at (202) 512-9610 or caldwells@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. Staff acknowledgments are provided in appendix IV. This appendix describes the core programs related to U.S. Customs and Border Protection’s (CBP) strategy for ensuring the security of maritime cargo container shipments. CBP has developed this strategy to mitigate the risk of weapons of mass destruction, terrorist-related material, or other contraband being smuggled into the United States in cargo containers. CBP’s strategy is based on related programs that attempt to focus resources on potentially risky cargo shipped in containers while allowing other cargo containers to proceed without unduly disrupting commerce into the United States. The strategy includes obtaining advanced cargo information to identify high-risk containers, using technology to inspect cargo containers, and partnering with foreign governments and the trade industry. Table 1 provides a brief description of the core programs that compose this security strategy. Since 2004, we have conducted audits of CBP’s targeting process and ATS. In particular, we published reports related to these topics in February 2004, August 2006, and September 2010. In addition, the Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation Act of 2004 requires the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) Office of Inspector General (OIG) to report annually on its evaluation of the current targeting system for international intermodal cargo containers. Our and DHS OIG’s audits have addressed, among other things, incorporating key elements of a risk management framework and recognized modeling practices, documenting the targeting rule development process, improving data collection and ATS’s use of data, and providing additional information outside of ATS to targeters. Collectively, these audits have made recommendations to DHS and CBP for improving the targeting process, and CBP has taken actions to implement them, although in some cases CBP’s implementation efforts have been slow, leaving CBP without the benefits of these improvements for several years. This appendix provides an overview of key findings and recommendations from these audits, as well as the status of actions taken to implement the recommendations. In February 2004, we reported that while CBP had taken steps to address the terrorism risks posed by maritime cargo containers, its targeting strategy did not incorporate all key elements of a risk management framework, and ATS was not consistent with certain recognized modeling practices. We recommended, among other things, that CBP improve the targeting strategy by incorporating key elements of a risk management framework and recognized modeling practices. These recommendations included specific steps CBP should take to help ensure it could achieve the objectives of its overall targeting strategy and better ensure that the tools it uses to protect against terrorism are working effectively at the nation’s ports. We later reported, in August 2006, that CBP had made progress addressing the recommendations but had not yet fully implemented the recommendations in our February 2004 report. Since that time, CBP has fully implemented the February 2004 recommendations aimed at improving the targeting strategy by incorporating key elements of a risk management framework and recognized modeling practices. Table 2 provides more detail on our February 2004 recommendations and CBP’s efforts to implement them. In August 2006, among other things, we reported on the status of recommendations issued in our February 2004 report and reiterated the importance of the recommendations. Additionally, with respect to the recommendation regarding risk assessments, at the time, CBP had begun taking action to implement the recommendation by conducting and using risk assessments that incorporated discussions of potential threats and estimates of the relative importance of assets and vulnerabilities associated with the supply chain. We noted, though, that CBP did not have a methodology in place to guide its staff in identifying sources of threat information, such as agencies to contact, what approach to take in conducting the assessment, and key elements to include that would help ensure consistency in the preparation of threat assessments associated with the movement of cargo shipped in containers. As a result, we further recommended that CBP establish and document a methodology for conducting threat assessments associated with cargo shipped in containers to help ensure that CBP staff responsible for conducting threat assessments consult relevant information sources, prepare threat assessments consistently, and include key elements to effectively communicate risk to program managers. In response to that recommendation, in October 2006, CBP issued a protocol to assist its intelligence research specialists in preparing port threat assessments in support of the Container Security Initiative. Under this initiative, CBP places staff at foreign seaports to work with foreign counterparts to inspect high-risk containers before they are shipped to the United States. The October 2006 protocol included a discussion of information sources for CBP staff to consult and the overall methodology to follow in making the port threat assessment. CBP also distributed a template that discussed the key elements its specialists should include when preparing port threat assessments. In addition, CBP developed a checklist for its specialists to use to help ensure that appropriate information sources are consulted in making port threat assessments. To assist in addressing threats related to global supply chain logistics and the movement of maritime containers carrying cargo arriving in the United States, CBP established an Office of Intelligence and Operations Coordination in October 2007, which has since been renamed the Office of Intelligence and Investigative Liaison. This office includes the Analysis and Targeting Division (A&T), which is composed of program managers with operational experience and intelligence analysts and is responsible for conducting risk assessments of countries (known as country risk profiles) that consider threats, vulnerabilities, and the associated criticality of related assets from which or through which cargo is shipped to the United States. In 2008, the A&T Division assessed risks in two primary mission areas: (1) terrorism and weapons of mass destruction and (2) narcotics. On the basis of these assessments, the A&T Division developed a risk assessment methodology to rank countries according to the level of risk associated with each mission area. The A&T Division teams translated these rankings into scores, and program managers integrated them into ATS. Specifically, CBP integrated the rankings for the terrorism mission into ATS in 2008 and for the narcotics mission in 2009. Thus, CBP has fully addressed this recommendation and is better positioned to ensure consistency in the preparation of risk assessments associated with the movement of maritime cargo container shipments. In January 2010, the DHS OIG reported on several aspects of CBP’s process for developing and updating targeting rules in ATS. In this report, the DHS OIG stated that CBP could improve its process for changing or deleting targeting rules by, among other things, documenting (1) rule change decisions and (2) the testing and evaluation of rule changes. Specifically, one component of the rule update process involves the review of the proposed rule changes by subject matter experts, and the DHS OIG reported that CBP could improve the process by ensuring the rationale for changes implemented or not implemented are documented and recorded for future use. Furthermore, the DHS OIG reported that CBP tested new rules using actual data to determine how well the new rules are working, but the DHS OIG noted that this process for testing and evaluating the rules, and subsequent modifications of the new rules, was not documented. The DHS OIG recommended that CBP ensure it documents each stage of the process for analyzing and developing ATS rules, including the rationale for making changes and the details on tools used to improve application consistency and rule change standardization. According to the DHS OIG report, in response to this recommendation, CBP (1) developed a documentation process to capture and record information that includes the rationale for rule changes and the utilization of tools and (2) introduced more formality into the rules process by implementing a structure to guide national conferences, rule evaluation, targeting development, and process management, among other things. The DHS OIG stated in its report that it considered the actions taken by CBP to be responsive to the recommendation. In February 2004, in addition to making the recommendations discussed earlier, we also reported that CBP was relying on the manifest as its principal data input, and CBP did not mandate the transmission of additional information before a cargo’s risk level was assigned. We reported that terrorism experts, members of the international trade community, and CBP inspectors at the ports we visited as part of that review characterized the ship’s manifest as one of the least reliable or useful types of information for targeting purposes. We reported that terrorism experts, trade community representatives, and some CBP inspectors at ports we visited told us that CBP should explore requiring more timely electronic transmittal of additional data elements for cargo container targeting purposes, such as stowage plans (a map of where each container aboard a ship is stored), container movement tracking data, and entry data. Although we did not analyze the feasibility or the costs and benefits of these suggestions, we reported that it could be useful for CBP to explore requiring appropriate parties in the supply chain, such as the importer, to provide additional data elements for use in ATS to perform more complex linkage analyses and identify potential anomalies in the shipping documents filed. Although we did not make a recommendation directly related to data collection because we did not analyze the feasibility or the costs and benefits of collecting additional data, the recommendations in our report focused generally on incorporating key elements of recognized modeling practices, and one of the recognized modeling practices applicable to ATS is enhancing the sources and types of information input into ATS. Furthermore, in July 2005, the DHS OIG issued an unclassified summary of an audit regarding CBP’s targeting for maritime cargo containers, which concluded that improvements were needed in the data to which ATS targeting rules are applied. In January 2009, CBP initiated an effort to collect additional data through the Importer Security Filing and Additional Carrier Requirements, collectively known as the 10+2 rule. The rule requires importers and carriers to provide 10 data elements and 2 data elements, respectively, to CBP for improving CBP’s ability to identify high-risk cargo container shipments. Specifically, the 10+2 rule requires importers to submit information about the commodities being transported in a shipment and about entities involved in the supply chain. These additional data elements include information that we reported could be helpful in improving targeting efforts. In particular, the rule requires stowage plans and some elements of entry data. We reported in September 2010 that the 10+2 rule data elements were available for identifying high-risk cargo at that time, but that CBP had not yet updated ATS to fully incorporate the data into its targeting criteria. We recommended that CBP establish milestones and time frames for updating the targeting criteria. In December 2010, CBP provided us with a project plan for integrating the data into its targeting criteria, and in early 2011, CBP implemented the updated targeting criteria to address risk factors present in the Importer Security Filing data. In November 2006, the DHS OIG reported on issues related to information that is available to targeters to conduct targeting activities. The DHS OIG found that CBP targeters did not always have access to a particular system that directly accesses a database containing billions of records on individuals and businesses. The DHS OIG recommended that CBP provide targeters with access to that system or a similar system that would allow targeters to access business records. In its report, the DHS OIG stated that it considered the recommendation to be implemented because CBP had acquired funding to grant personnel access to that system and had issued a memo stating that all personnel that were to be scheduled for targeting training should also have access to the system. The DHS OIG also found that it was unclear which personnel involved in targeting should have security clearances, and as a result, important information affecting container targeting and inspection decisions may not be available to the staff for making these decisions in a timely manner. The DHS OIG recommended that CBP increase the number of targeters with security clearances. In response to this recommendation, according to the DHS OIG, CBP presented a corrective action plan with an established completion date of June 30, 2007, for this recommendation. The DHS OIG further noted that in July 2006, CBP issued a memo for Security Clearance for Counter Terrorism Response Officers, directing CBP field offices to forward applications of port personnel that need to have security clearances. On the basis of these efforts, the DHS OIG reported that CBP had satisfied the intent of this recommendation. In addition to the contact named above, Christopher Conrad (Assistant Director), Alana Finley, Richard Hung, Katie Mauldin, and Janay Sam made key contributions to this report. Also contributing to this report were Richard Brown, Frances Cook, Stanley Kostyla, and Lara Miklozek. Supply Chain Security: Container Security Programs Have Matured, but Uncertainty Persists over the Future of 100 Percent Scanning. GAO-12-422T. Washington, D.C.: February 7, 2012. Maritime Security: Responses to Questions for the Record. GAO-11-140R. Washington, D.C.: October 22, 2010. Supply Chain Security: CBP Has Made Progress in Assisting the Trade Industry in Implementing the New Importer Security Filing Requirements, but Some Challenges Remain. GAO-10-841. Washington, D.C.: September 10, 2010. Supply Chain Security: Feasibility and Cost-Benefit Analysis Would Assist DHS and Congress in Assessing and Implementing the Requirement to Scan 100 Percent of U.S.-Bound Containers. GAO-10-12. Washington, D.C.: October 30, 2009. Intellectual Property: Better Data Analysis and Integration Could Help U.S. Customs and Border Protection Improve Border Enforcement Efforts. GAO-07-735. Washington, D.C.: April 26, 2007. Cargo Container Inspections: Preliminary Observations on the Status of Efforts to Improve the Automated Targeting System. GAO-06-591T. Washington, D.C.: March 30, 2006. Homeland Security: Summary of Challenges Faced in Targeting Oceangoing Cargo Containers for Inspection. GAO-04-557T. Washington, D.C.: March 31, 2004.

Summary: The U.S. economy is dependent on the expeditious flow of millions of tons of cargo each day. Cargo containers are an important instrument of global trade but also can present security concerns. CBP is responsible for administering container security programs, and its strategy for securing maritime cargo containers includes analyzing information to identify shipments that may contain terrorist weapons or other contraband. Because CBP has insufficient resources to examine every container, targeters use ATS to target which container shipments should be examined. GAO was asked to assess CBP's targeting efforts. This report addresses (1) how ATS supports CBP's targeting of maritime cargo container shipments for national security purposes and (2) the extent to which CBP assesses the effectiveness of ATS's national security targeting rules. GAO analyzed fiscal year 2011 CBP data on shipments and containers arriving at U.S. ports and containers scanned at these ports. GAO also visited six CBP units selected on the basis of the percentage of maritime shipments that were scored as high risk or medium risk for national security purposes at these locations in fiscal year 2011, among other factors. GAO also analyzed documents, such as CBP's ATS performance measures. U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), employs a risk-based approach that uses the Automated Targeting System (ATS) and other tools to identify (target) maritime cargo shipments for further examination. ATS is a web-based enforcement and decision support system that includes a set of rules to assess the risk level for each arriving cargo shipment. This set of rules is referred to as the maritime national security weight set (weight set) because each rule in the set has a specific weighted value assigned to it. CBP classifies the risk scores from the weight set as low, medium, or high risk. CBP policy states that a shipment's risk score is to determine, in part, actions taken by CBP officers (targeters) at the ports. Specifically, targeters are generally required to review shipment data for all medium-risk and high-risk shipments and hold high-risk shipments for examination. The risk score, however, is not the sole factor that determines whether a targeter reviews the data for a shipment or whether CBP examines a shipment. In particular, targeters at each of the six ports GAO visited explained that they use the ATS risk score as a starting point for the targeting process but that their decisions regarding which shipments to examine are ultimately based on additional research. Targeters at the six ports GAO visited said they also use tools outside of ATS, such as web searches, to research shipments. CBP efforts to assess the weight set's effectiveness in identifying the risk of shipments have been limited. CBP has performance measures--represented by the percentage of shipments targeted as high risk that contain a threat and the percentage of shipments targeted as high risk that do not contain a threat--that enable CBP to determine the accuracy of the weight set, given a particular workload or examination rate. However, CBP did not assess the weight set to verify its effectiveness when implementing an updated version in early 2011. Prior to implementing the updated version of the weight set, CBP assessed the potential impact of the update on CBP's workload but did not conduct an assessment to determine whether the updated version of the weight set would be more effective in identifying high-risk shipments than the previous version or other alternatives. Assessing the potential effectiveness of alternative versions of the weight set prior to selecting one for implementation could help CBP make more informed decisions about future updates. Doing so could also provide CBP reasonable assurance that the version it selects is the most effective of the alternatives and is more effective than the previous version it replaces. Furthermore, since implementing the updated version of the weight set in early 2011, CBP has not regularly assessed the weight set to monitor its performance and to help determine when changes are needed. For example, CBP conducted the first assessment of the current version of the weight set, using the performance measures, in the summer of 2012--18 months after the weight set's implementation in early 2011. Regular assessments of the weight set's effectiveness could help CBP determine when updates are needed in a timelier manner and ensure that targeters have the best information available to make targeting decisions. Moreover, CBP has not established targets for the performance measures so that it is not clear whether a particular change in the weight set's performance is significant enough to suggest that changes are needed to improve the effectiveness of the weight set. GAO recommends that CBP (1) ensure that future updates to the weight set are based on assessments of its performance and (2) establish targets for performance measures and use those measures to regularly assess effectiveness of the weight set. DHS concurred with these recommendations.