On August 1, 2004, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) issued a terrorism alert forcritical financial institutions in New York, Washington, DC and Newark, NJ. Press reports indicatedthat these institutions employed security guards, and that surveillance by terrorists included thelocation, armament, and activity of those guards. (1) Widely deployed among transportation hubs, power plants, andother nationally important facilities, such security guards are viewed by many as both a vital elementof terror deterrence and the first line of response to terrorist attacks. The Bush Administration sharesthis view. In the National Strategy for the Physical Protection of Critical Infrastructures and KeyAssets the administration identifies security guards as "an important source of protection for criticalfacilities." (2) The nation'sdependence on security guards for critical infrastructure protection gives rise to questions as to thestatus and capability of these guards, and federal efforts to help them combat terrorism. In 2003, there were approximately one million security guards (including airport screeners)employed in the United States -- compared to 650,000 U.S. police officers. (3) Nearly half of these guardswere employed directly by the institutions they served; the rest, approximately 53% of all guards,worked for contract guard companies providing outsourced guard services. This report provides background information concerning security guards in the United Statesand their role in critical infrastructure protection. It analyzes trends in the number and deploymentof security guards, including effects of the terror attacks of September 11, 2001 (9/11). It discussesthe wages paid to security guards compared to similar workers, and the relationship between pay andworkforce effectiveness. The report reviews the qualifications and training of security guards, including background checks, highlighting recent changes related to counter terrorism andstate-to-state differences in qualification requirements. Finally the report discusses policyconsiderations of potential interest to Congress. The role of the federal government in protecting the nation's critical infrastructure has beena fundamental concern of Congress since 9/11. Part of this concern involves the potential impositionof federal security requirements, including guard requirements, on infrastructure which lies largelyin the private sector. Among nuclear power plants, for example, the federal government has requiredmore training and staffing of private guards since 9/11. Airport screeners have been federalizedoutright. As U.S. homeland security policy evolves, direct federal intervention in the protection ofother critical infrastructure, including chemical plants, banks, and communications networks, isbecoming an increasingly important issue. Critical infrastructure is found in many congressional districts. By definition, a terroristattack on such infrastructure would affect not only local communities, but the nation as a whole. Faced with the widely perceived need for greater critical infrastructure protection, some in Congressare examining the adequacy of current U.S. counter-terrorism activities, including the role andcapabilities of security guards. If Congress concludes that the effectiveness of security guards couldbe enhanced, Congress may consider additional guard-related legislation (such as H.R. 4830 of the 108th Congress), or may exercise its oversight authority in other ways to influencesecurity guard capabilities and deployment. What U.S. policy makers consider to be "critical infrastructure" has been evolving and isoften ambiguous. Twenty years ago, "infrastructure" was defined primarily with respect to theadequacy of the nation's public works. In the mid-1990's, however, the growing threat ofinternational terrorism led policy makers to reconsider the definition of "infrastructure" in the contextof homeland security. Successive federal government reports, laws, and executive orders haverefined, and generally expanded, the number of infrastructure sectors and the types of assetsconsidered to be "critical" for purposes of homeland security. Currently, the USA PATRIOT Actof 2001( P.L. 107-56 ) defines "critical infrastructure" as: systems and assets, whether physical or virtual, so vitalto the United States that the incapacity or destruction of such systems and assets would have adebilitating impact on security, national economic security, national public health or safety, or anycombination of those matters (Sec. 1016e). This definition was adopted, by reference, in the Homeland Security Act of 2002 ( P.L. 107-296 , Sec.2.4) establishing the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). The National Strategy also adoptsthe definition of "critical infrastructure" in P.L. 107-56 , and provides the following list of specificinfrastructure sectors (and assets) falling under that definition: The critical infrastructure sectors in the National Strategy contain many physical assets, butonly a fraction of these could be viewed as critical according to the DHS definition. For example,out of 33,000 individual assets cataloged in DHS's "national asset database," the agency considersonly 1,700, or 5%, to be nationally critical. (4) The 33,000 assets in the DHS database themselves constitute onlya subset of all assets in the critical infrastructure sectors. (5) Because federal agencies, state agencies and the private sector oftenhave different views of what constitutes criticality, compiling a consensus list of nationally criticalassets has been an ongoing challenge for DHS. The implications of this challenge as it relates tosecurity guards is discussed later in this report. Protecting people and property from accidents and crime is the principal role of securityguards. They monitor, patrol, and inspect property to protect against fire, theft, vandalism, and otherillegal activity. They may enforce laws on their employer's grounds, conduct incident interviews,prepare incident reports, and provide legal testimony. Guards may work at one location, or maypatrol among multiple locations to conduct security checks. Security guards typically use radios andtelephones to call for assistance from police, fire, or other emergency services as required. They maybe armed, as required by specific duty assignments, consistent with state and federal laws governingprivate ownership and use of firearms. Although security guards, in general, share many common responsibilities, they may alsoface unique duties at particular institutions. In banks, for example, guards protect customers, money,safety deposit boxes, and records. They may work with bank detectives to prevent theft andapprehend criminal suspects before police arrive. By comparison, transportation terminal guards(e.g., airport screeners) protect travelers, freight, luggage, and equipment. They may screenpassengers for weapons and explosives, ensure no property is stolen while being loaded or unloaded,and watch for fires and criminal activity. (6) Security Guard Police Powers. Although securityguards have long supplemented public law enforcement, they typically have more limited authoritiesthan police and other law officers. Specific powers vary by jurisdiction, but they generallycorrespond to the police authorities of private citizens. In most states, citizens may make arrests only when acrime is committed in their presence; suspicion that a crime has taken place is not enough. And insome states, citizens may only make arrests for felonies, and then must immediately turn the suspectover to a police officer. Even those guards who do see felonies in progress are advised to arrest withcaution. Unlike police officers, civilians who accidentally take innocent suspects into custody areliable for false arrest. (7) Security guards may have other authorities or may face further limitations to their policepower according to state licensing or other regulation, where it exists. For example, the followingauthorities are listed in California's security guard training manual: As an agent of the employer, a security guard can question an individual on theemployer's property and may prevent entry to the property by standing in the individual'sway. Although a security guard has the power of citizen's arrest, a guard is notobligated by law to make arrests. A security guard should never touch a criminal suspect except for self defense,or when necessary to use reasonable force in an arrest. If a security guard believes an arrested person is armed, the guard may searchfor weapons only. A suspect may not be legally searched for weapons unless he is actuallyarrested. A security guard cannot legally carry a firearm or baton without a state permitand a valid security guard license. (8) Critical Infrastructure Protection Responsibilities. Since the terror attacks of 9/11, protecting against terrorism has been an additional responsibility formany security guards -- especially for guards associated with critical infrastructure. Security guardsare viewed by many as a necessary supplement to the counter terrorism activities of public lawenforcement agencies, which have limited resources and broad responsibilities. According tocongressional testimony by one guard company executive, Law enforcement agencies [have] been called upon tofulfill two fundamentally different and competing missions -- to deter domestic crime while alsobeing engaged in the fight against potentially new and devastating terrorist attacks orchestrated fromabroad. Unfortunately, there are simply neither the public resources nor the personnel to do the job....Consequently ... security officers are being asked to fill the gap. (9) The increased counter terrorism role for security guards has become apparent in many privateand public sector security plans. In the refinery industry, for example, security guidelines during aDHS "orange" alert call for engaging a "trained and knowledgeable" security workforce, increasingpatrols, inspecting vehicles, and other security activities that may rely on security guards. (10) Counter terrorismactivities of security guards in other key sectors are discussed later in this report. Guards Deployed at Critical Infrastructure. According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) there were approximately 1,022,000 securityguards working in the United States in 2003 ( Table 1 ). For the purposes of policy analysis, theseguards may be separated into two categories of employment and three categories of service."Contract" guards work directly for private guard companies and are deployed under contract to otherinstitutions. "Staff" guards are employed directly by institutions as regular line employees. Bothcontract and staff guards may work either at private facilities, government facilities, or airports. (Guard forces at airports are mostly "airport screeners," whose duties and employment characteristicswarrant their distinction from other guards.) The approximate number of contract and staff guardsworking at all three types of institutions in 2003 is summarized in Table 1 . The BLS reports that over 14% of all security guards work part-time. The number ofpart-time employees is higher among contract guards than among staff guards. According to a 2002survey of major contractors, 20% to 30% of contract guards worked part-time. (11) A significant number ofthese part-time guards are off-duty police officers supplementing their incomes. (12) Table 1. 2003 Total U.S. Security GuardEmployment Source: CRS analysis of Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) and trade press data. (13) Critical Infrastructure Guards. How many securityguards actually protect critical infrastructure? Only a rough estimate can be made. Although thereis no source of data detailing the number of contract security guards serving specific industry andgovernment sectors, the BLS does report such data for staff guards. By totaling 2002 BLSemployment figures for the appropriate industries, CRS estimates that approximately 122,000 (28%)of staff guards (excluding airport screeners) worked in industries corresponding to the NSPP criticalinfrastructure sectors. (14) As noted above, however, critical assets typically comprise only a fraction of a sector's total assets. Assuming, for simplicity, that guards are found only among assets in DHS's national asset database,and that guards are uniformly distributed across those assets, it may be reasonable to estimate that,consistent with DHS's critical asset ratio, up to 5% of staff guards actually protect criticalinfrastructure. Further assuming that contract guard deployment reflects staff guard deployment, thetotal number of security guards protecting critical assets could be on the order of 50,000. Such a"critical" guard force would be comparable in size to the 55,000 Transportation SecurityAdministration (TSA) and contract screeners working at the nation's commercial airports in 2003. Note that airport screeners are also considered to be critical infrastructure guards for purposes of thisreport. The Contract Guard Industry. Table 1 shows thatcontract security guards accounted for approximately 53% of all guards working in the United Statesin 2003. As a business, contract guard services is one of the largest segments of the broader securityindustry in the United States; its revenues of approximately $11 billion accounted for 30% of totalsecurity industry revenues in 2003. (15) Contract guarding is a somewhat fragmented industry, however,with several large national companies and thousands of smaller regional and local companies. (16) Table 2 summarizes 2003operating statistics for the largest U.S. guard contractors. As Table 2 shows, the four largestcontractors account for 50% of industry revenues and 35% of contract employees. These fourcontract guard companies are profiled in Appendix 1 . The top two contractors, Securitas U.S.A. andWackenhut, are foreign-owned. Table 2. U.S. Private Guard Contractor Key Operating Statistics2003 Source: CRS Report RL32523(pdf) , The U.S. Contract Security Guard Industry: an Introduction toServices and Firms , by [author name scrubbed]. Financial reporting period may vary by company due todiffering accounting practices. * Statistics include North American guard operations outside the United States. Contract guards are widely deployed to protect critical infrastructure and key assets. Wackenhut, for example, provides guard services to 30 of the country's nuclear plants. (17) Akal Security providesguard services at U.S. Army bases and weapons depots. (18) The U.S. Federal Protective Service, which safeguards allfederally owned and leased facilities nationwide, including certain critical facilities, employs 10,000contract security guards. (19) Although there are several very large U.S. guard contractors,critical infrastructure guards are found in both large and small companies. For further informationabout the U.S. contract guard industry, see CRS Report RL32523(pdf) , The U.S. Contract Security GuardIndustry: an Introduction to Services and Firms , by [author name scrubbed]. One basic measure of security guard activity is year-to-year change in employment. Analysisof the available data shows that overall employment of U.S. security guards (excluding airportscreeners) has declined over the last five years, although guard employment has increased in certaininfrastructure sectors. Total U.S. Guard Employment Trends. TotalU.S. police and security guard employment (excluding screeners) from 1999 to 2003 is shown in Figure 1 . As the figure shows, the number of guards fell by approximately 124,000 (11%) between1999 and 2003, while the number of police increased by approximately 34,000 (6%) during the sameperiod. Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS). National Occupational Employment and Wage Estimates(1999-2003). "Protective Service Occupations." Published annually, 2000-2004. Figure 1. Total U.S. Police and Guards (except Screeners) A decline in overall guarding jobs since 2001, notwithstanding the nation's heightenedconcerns about terrorism, would appear to contradict popular perceptions about U.S. guarddeployment. Many analysts have assumed that private guard contractors, in particular, would seean increase in business as infrastructure owners stepped up guarding of their facilities under moreprotective security plans. One reason this increase may not have occurred is because private sectorreactions to 9/11 may have been short-lived. As one major guard contractor noted in a recentinvestor publication: "Following September 11, 2001, there was a sharpincrease in demand for security, particularly in the USA .... Most of this additional demand hasproved to be short-term.... Total market growth in 2003 was around zero percent." (20) Others have suggested that, due to the U.S. economic recession which followed 9/11, manycompanies were forced to cut discretionary expenses, including security guard expenses, to maintainprofitability. Although the total number of U.S. guards appears to have declined over the last several years,it is not clear to what degree the number of guards at critical sites reflects this trend. It is possiblethat the deployment of critical infrastructure guards increased, but that these increases were offsetby larger reductions in non-critical infrastructure guards. The following examples suggest that thereare more critical infrastructure guards, at least in several infrastructure sectors. Airport Screener Trends. The employment trendfor airport screeners has differed from that of other guards. Figure 2 shows total U.S. employmentof airport screeners from 1999 to 2004. When airport screening was federalized after September 11,2001, the number of screeners more than doubled to approximately 60,000 in November, 2003. (21) The TSA has subsequentlyreduced the screening work force to 44,000 workers, although this number of screeners is still 57%higher than in 2001. Sources: General Accounting Office (GAO). Aviation Security. GAO/RCED-00-75. June 2000.p18; O'Rourke, L.M. "Air Safety Bill OK'd by House." Sacramento Bee . Nov. 2, 2001;Transportation Security Administration (TSA). Internal database. June, 2003 and April, 2004. Note:Because screener employment estimates are only available for specific months during the 1999-2004period, annual averages may differ from these values. Nuclear Plant Guard Trends. Nuclear powerplants have long been recognized as potential terrorist targets. Consequently, their security isregulated by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). In response to the terror attacks of 9/11,and specific intelligence about potential attacks on U.S. nuclear facilities, the NRC has increasednuclear plant guard staffing requirements, along with other security requirements. As a result, thetotal number of guards deployed among the nation's 67 nuclear sites reportedly increased from 5,000in 2001 to 8,000 in 2004. (22) Guard Trends in Other Critical Sectors. Thereis little public information available on security guard employment trends at the sector level forinfrastructures other than airports and nuclear plants. Anecdotal reports within sectors suggest someincrease in guards at other potentially critical facilities. It may not be appropriate to generalize theseanecdotes to all other critical facilities, nor is it clear whether these guard increases have beensustained. Nonetheless, the following examples do illustrate a range of guard deployment policiesamong critical infrastructure sectors since 9/11. Figure 2. Total U.S. Airport Screeners Security costs at four downtown Los Angeles skyscrapers, including the U.SBank Tower, reportedly increased 25% between 2001 and 2002, primarily due to additional guardexpenses. Security at these buildings was budgeted "slightly" lower for 2003. (23) In a 2002 security review of 15 financial market organizations (including 7"critical" ones), the GAO found increased deployment of security guards over pre-9/11 deployment. Some organizations used more guards for patrols, others for greater armed response, and one toinitiate vehicle screening. (24) In 2003, the GAO found that seven chemical facilities visited by GAO staffhad increased the number of security guards in response to chemical industry security guidancedeveloped after 9/11. Nineteen other chemical facilities were unwilling to host GAO visits. (25) The GAO did not indicateif any of the facilities might be considered critical. The Los Angeles Department of Water & Power (LADWP), spent $7 millionto "double" its city and ground-based security patrols in FY2001. This patrol budget decreased to$5 million in both FY2002 and FY2003, although the utility proposed increasing it again to $7million for FY2004. (26) The American Petroleum Institute (API) has reported that, since 9/11, someoil pipeline operators, including operators of critical systems, have "used guard patrols at certainfacilities under certain threat conditions." (27) The API does not report a baseline increase in guards amongpipeline operators. The Jamestown-Surry (Virginia) ferry system hired 12-15 guards under asix-month contract for passenger and vehicle screening beginning July, 2004. (28) The examples above indicate that the timing, level and duration of changes in guard employmentmay vary considerably within and across critical infrastructure sectors. In considering the role of security guards in U.S. critical infrastructure protection, policyanalysts have focused on several key issues: staffing, pay, background checks, and training. A fewadditional policy issues, such as counter-terrorism support and contract guard cost-effectiveness,have also received some public attention. The relationship between the size of a guard force stationed at a critical facility, and its effecton facility security is the subject of debate. Many policy analysts assume that the security of acritical asset is proportional to the number of guards protecting it (i.e., more guards means bettersecurity). For example, in a 2002 campaign speech, one U.S. presidential candidate called forCongress to "require much better physical security for [chemical] plants, including more securityguards." (29) PresidentBush's National Strategy likewise calls for "recruiting and training more skilled ... security personnelto protect our critical infrastructures." (30) Significant increases in the number of airport screeners andnuclear plant guards since 9/11 appear to be based, at least in part, on similar thinking. (31) While in many cases it may be true that increasing guard numbers can make a facility moresecure, in other cases the relationship between guard deployment and facility security may be lessclear. In guarding, quantity does not necessarily ensure quality. Analysts have suggested severalreasons why increasing the number of guards at a given facility might not make it more secure, ormight even make it less secure. Guards can only meet "guardable" threats, such as physical intrusion orsurveillance by potential terrorists. Any number of guards could not be expected to prevent attackby a commandeered airliner, or a remote cyber-attack on facility safetysystems. If the nature of a terrorist attack is potentially "guardable," but guards are nottrained to recognize it, additional guards may be no more likely to respond to it effectively thanfewer guards. (32) If an increase in the number of guards at a facility is accomplished by makingthe existing force work more hours, the guards may become fatigued, disgruntled, and, consequently,less effective. (33) Increasing the size of a guard force may lead to confusion about individual responsibility and reporting relationships, which may reduce guard effectiveness. (34) Expanding a guard force may increase opportunities for hostile "insiders" toinfiltrate that force. (35) Having a larger guard force, however, might make it more difficult for such an insider to successfullyconduct hostile activities. Debate about the relationship between guard numbers and security suggests that enhancingcritical facility security may not be as simple as posting more guards. As a practical matter, theeffectiveness of guards in countering a terrorist attack also depends on the specific types of threatsthe guards may face, the training they receive, their organization, the conditions of their employment,and background checks. When these factors are taken into account at a given facility, analysts mayconclude that increasing the size of its guard force may not significantly increase its security againstterrorism, or that the facility operators might realize greater security benefits from additionaltraining, better organization, or security technology investments. Policy analysts often assert that security guard employment pays too little and offers too fewbenefits to sustain a well-qualified pool of workers. (36) Pay advocates claim that the U.S. guard force could attract"better" workers, and consequently, could be more effective, if guards were better compensated. These claims have been directed especially at critical infrastructure guards. In its 2000 report onairport security, for example, the GAO linked "long-standing" problems with airport screenerperformance to "personnel factors" including low pay and associated high turnover. (37) The subsequentfederalization of the nation's airport screeners included a pay increase of more than 100% from nearminimum wages of $12,000 per year in 2000. These pay increases appear to have improved bothemployee quality and retention. Some policy analysts suggest that a similar reconsideration of guardpay might be warranted for other critical infrastructure guards. Guard Salaries and Qualifications. Analysis ofthe available data demonstrates that security guards are relatively low paid workers. According to Figure 2 , contract guard salaries averaged $19,400 per year in 2003, less than half of the averagesalary for police and well below the average U.S. salary for all occupations. Staff guards earnednearly 25% more than contract guards in 2003. Pay for both government and contract airportscreeners in 2003 is estimated to have averaged over $28,700, nearly 50% higher than contractguards but still $16,000 less than police officers. There is no publicly available report on averagepay for all nuclear plant guards, although one study in 2002 found that salaries among five specificnuclear plants started at $19,364 to $32,117, and ranged up to $40,393 after three years ofemployment. (38) Contract security guards who work full time often also receive benefits such as health insurance, paidleave, and retirement plans. Low pay for guard employment reflects the minimal qualifications required by guardemployers. According to the BLS, many contract guard companies have no specific educationalrequirements, although they prefer high school graduation or equivalent certification for armedemployees. Armed guards must be licensed by appropriate government authorities and may receivespecial police certification allowing them to make some types of arrests. Figure 3. Average Annual Salaries for U.S. Occupations, 2003 Sources: Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS). May 2003 National Occupational Employment andWage Estimates . "All Occupations" and "Protective Service Occupations." 2004; Screener data from Magaw, John., Under Sec. of Transportation for Security. Statement before the HouseAppropriations Committee, Transportation Subcommittee. June 20, 2002. Note: 2002 screener payis adjusted by 4.1% federal pay increase for 2003. Higher Pay for Critical Infrastructure Guards? Airports and nuclear plants are nationally critical facilities, and are perceived to be at greater risk forterrorist attack than many other facilities. Consequently, airport and nuclear plants are deemed torequire guards with better qualifications, experience, and counter-terror training than other guards. Given their presumed experience and skills, airline screeners and nuclear plant guards are paid more,on average, than other contract or staff guards. It is possible that an informed assessment of security needs across all critical assets woulddemonstrate a need for more capable guards and associated higher salaries. In such a case, higherguard salaries would impose added security costs on the critical asset owners. For purposes ofillustration, if 50,000 critical infrastructure guards had their salaries increased from the averagecontract guard salary ($19,400) to the average airport screener salary ($28,732), total annual guardcosts would increase by $466 million. Imposition of such costs on guard employers, especiallyprivate guards contractors, might be met with resistance, however, since the provision of guardservices is a highly cost-competitive business. The potential for terrorists to infiltrate critical facilities by hiring on as security guards haslong been a concern in specific critical infrastructure sectors. The NRC, for example, requiresexhaustive background checks of nuclear plant guards under the Atomic Energy Act (P.L. 83-703). The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) began requiring "background investigations andcriminal history checks" for airport screeners in 1998. (39) Since 9/11 heightened concern about terrorism has promptedsome legislators to call for increased federal background screening of other security guards to help"determine whether or not employees ... pose a threat to the facilities and persons they are supposedto protect." (40) Similarly,the Bush Administration's National Strategy states that "time-efficient, thorough and periodicbackground screening ... is an important tool for protecting against the 'insider threat.'" (41) Congressional interest in federal background checks for security guards stems, in part, frominconsistent or incomplete screening requirements at the state level. According to a 2004 survey,23 states (including the District of Columbia) have licensing requirements which authorize federalcriminal background checks for contract security guards. An additional 12 states authorize only statecriminal checks. The remaining 16 states had no background check regulations. (42) Even in states withauthorizing regulations, however, federal background checks are not necessarily performed on allprospective guards. Consequently, as one legislator has stated, background checks of both State andFederal criminal history for private security guards "are the exception rather than the rule." (43) The Private Security Officer Employment Authorization Act of 2004 ( P.L. 108-458 , Sec.6402) facilitates federal background checks of private security guard company employees (or jobapplicants) by authorizing employer access to Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) criminalrecords. Under P.L. 108-458 , FBI backgrounds checks could presumably be made for both contractand staff security. The act includes provisions for states that either do or do not have stategovernment standards for security guard qualification (Sec. 6402d1Dii). Other legislation proposedIn the 108th Congress would have required private security guard companies to perform federalcriminal background checks, and would have prohibited the hiring of guards who failed such checks( H.R. 4022 , Section 5a). Criminal Backgrounds and Terrorism. From thestandpoint of crime prevention and employee reliability, many analysts have argued that screeningguards specifically for criminal history is only prudent. It might be unwise, for example, to hireconvicted bank robbers to guard banks. Furthermore, Al Qaeda and other terror groups have beenknown to recruit disgruntled U.S. citizens, such as alleged "dirty" bomber Jose Padilla, from withinthe U.S. criminal justice system. (44) However, there is also evidence that sophisticated terror groupsdeliberately recruit operatives without criminal histories. The Irish Republican Army (IRA), forexample, viewed new recruits with no criminal records as ideal to undertake missions which wouldbe difficult for members known to security authorities. (45) United States officials cite similar recruiting preferences forterror groups like Al Qaeda. (46) It appears, therefore, that the direct relationship between criminalhistory and terrorism is debatable. Background Check Limitations. Both U.S. andinternational experience suggest that federal criminal background checks may be valuable forweeding out some security guard job applicants with terrorist connections. However, the FBI cannotreadily estimate how many prospective guards might fall into this category due to limitations in thefederal criminal records database. (47) Moreover, federal background checks may not identify "cleanoperatives" specifically recruited for their lack of a criminal or terror record, so such checks may beonly partially effective. Note that background checks for nuclear security guards extend beyondcriminal offenses to "any ... circumstances which tend to show that the individual is not reliable ortrustworthy, or ... may be subject to coercion, influence, or pressures ... to act contrary to the nationalinterest" (10 CFR 10.2-10.11). Airport screeners likewise are reportedly subject to "an analysis todetermine whether candidates present ... or may be associated with potential terrorist threats." (48) Even these higherstandards, however, which are comparable to federal security clearance requirements, might not beeffective against carefully selected terrorist operatives. Finally, if background screening laws applyonly to state-licensed contract guards, hostile insiders may still find infiltration opportunities asunlicenced staff guards. Federal criminal background checks may also be limited by incomplete state records. TheGAO recently reported that, as of 2001, 11% of state criminal records had not been automated andmade available nationally. The agency further found Figure 4. Hours of U.S. and E.U. Required Guard Training 2002 that automated information on the dispositionof felony and other arrests , as opposed to convictions , is not always widely available. (49) FBI officials have statedthat resource limitations among law enforcement agencies and state identification bureaus limitstheir ability to conduct "thorough and timely" background checks for prospective employees. (50) Given the potential relationship between criminal history and terrorist activity, federalcriminal background checks are viewed by some as potentially important, but not insurmountable,hurdles to terrorist infiltration of critical facilities. Furthermore, as stricter criminal screening isimposed on critical infrastructure guards, terrorist groups may divert recruitment and collaborationaway from convicted criminals in a greater effort to circumvent these screening requirements. Because federal criminal checks may only be partially effective, policy makers may need to draw oncomplementary measures, including guard supervision and access controls, to help reduce the terrorthreat should a terrorist insider penetrate a critical guard force. Counter-terrorism training is an important part of the professional development of effectivecritical infrastructure guards. As the National Strategy states, "there is an urgent need for ongoingtraining of security personnel to sustain skill levels and to remain up-to-date on evolving terroristweapons and tactics. (51) Since 9/11, counter-terrorist training has increased for law enforcement, broadly, and for airportscreeners and nuclear guards. At this time, however, there are no U.S. federal requirements fortraining of other security guards. Twenty-two states do require basic training for licensed contractguards, but not for staff guards. Of the states with training requirements for security guards, fewspecifically require counter-terrorism training, and such training appears cursory. U.S. and European Guard Training Hours. Hoursof training required is viewed by some as a key measure of guard capability. In states that requireit, basic guard training consists of 1 to 48 hours of classroom or field instruction, in some casesfollowed by a qualification exam. Such training is typically limited to coverage of property rights,emergency procedures, and criminal detention. Training required in specific states is summarizedin Figure 4 . Additional weapons training is required for armed guards. Figure 5. Hours of Security Guard Training Required by State 2004 Source: Service Employees International Union (SEIU). "Report Card on Security Standards." Webpage. Oct. 12, 2004. http://www.seiu.org/building/security/statesecuritygrades.cfm . For purposes of comparison, Figure 5 provides data showing U.S. guard basic trainingrequirements with those in the European Union (E.U.). As the figure shows, training requirementsfor security guards are also highly variable in the E.U., although several E.U. countries require moretraining than the greatest U.S. state requirements ( Figure 5 ). Note that Spain, which has a longhistory of Basque separatist terrorism, has the highest training requirements in the E.U.. Informationon guard training in other countries is less readily available, although there is at least one non-E.U. country (Hungary) that requires even more training for private security guards -- 350hours. (52) Sources: Weber, T. "A Comparative Overview of Legislation Governing the Private SecurityIndustry in the European Union." ECOTEC Research and Consulting. Birmingham, U.K. Nov. 4,2002. * In the U.K., mandatory training is planned by 2005 under the 2001 Private Security Industry Act. Counter-Terrorism Curricula. In the UnitedStates, required guard training traditionally has included basic coverage of: security responsibilities;police powers; relations with police; inspection and observation; report writing; legalresponsibilities; liability; ethics; and professionalism. (53) Nuclear power plant guards are required to receive severalmonths of special training in areas such as firearms, first aid, alarms, and electronic securitysystems. (54) Counter-terrorism makes up a significant part of nuclear guard training. Although some states include counter-terrorism in their guard training curricula, timeconstraints typically allow them to cover the topic only at the most general level. For purposes ofillustration, Appendix 1 includes the entire "Terrorism" instruction section from California'smandatory initial 8-hour guard training manual. The section includes two pages of mostly definition. Although California requires an additional 32 hours of guard training for new guard employees, statelaw does not specifically require coverage of terrorism in this training. (55) Connecticut's 2004 guardtraining law requires only a brief terrorism discussion -- 90 minutes on "public safety" issues suchas bomb threats and terrorist attacks. (56) Perceived limitations in state-mandated security guard training have prompted some policymakers to specifically call for greater counter terrorism training requirements. For example, themayor of Los Angeles recently ordered security guards at the Los Angeles Department of Water andPower (LADWP) to attend three antiterrorism seminars taught by the Los Angeles PoliceDepartment (LAPD). The seminars include topics such as terrorism awareness, surveillancedetection, and vehicle-borne explosives detection. (57) According to the LAPD, this new utility guard training "isunique because it uses intelligence data on Al Qaeda tactics gleaned from detained terrorismsuspects" and includes the showing of seized videotapes. (58) DHS Guard Training. The DHS InformationAnalysis and Infrastructure Protection Directorate's Protective Security Division (PSD) does notcurrently have programs that specifically target private security guard companies. However, PSDhas invited private security companies to participate in its Soft Target Awareness and Buffer ZoneProtection training programs. PSD reports that 174 staff from 37 contract guard companies and otherinstitutions took this training as of October, 2004. These training attendees appear to have beenprimarily guard managers or guard training supervisors. In the future, PSD plans to make threeadditional counter-terrorism training programs available to private security companies: Web-Based Workforce Antiterrorism Awareness/Prevention -- a 2.5 hourself-paced program Surveillance Detection -- a three day program including classroom andhands-on training delivered by mobile training teams Physical Security -- a program involving both distance learning and five daysof classroom and hands-on training at a DHS Regional Field Office, Protective Center or TrainingFacility (59) The PSD did not provide projected schedules, budgets, or attendance for these programs. Training Legislation. Some policy makers havecalled for security guard terrorism training legislation. In the District of Columbia, the proposedD.C. Enhanced Professional Security Amendment Act of 2004 would have increased private guardtraining requirements, including terrorism training. (60) At the federal level, the Private Sector Preparedness Act of 2004in the 108th Congress ( H.R. 4830 ) would have directed the Secretary of HomelandSecurity to develop and conduct "training programs for security guards to implement emergencypreparedness and response plans and operations procedures" (Sec. 510b8). According to its leadsponsor, "emergencies" under H.R. 4830 was intended to include "acts of terrorism." (61) H.R. 4830would have applied to contract guards, but not staff guards. Opponents of expanded, government-mandated guard training standards question thepotential effectiveness of such training requirements, especially if they do not distinguish amongdifferent guard assignments. Job responsibilities, levels of oversight, exposure to thepublic, and state-granted powers vary to such a degree that ... no specific minimal trainingrequirements could meet the needs of some security officer assignments without substantiallyexceeding the level required for others. (62) These concerns reflect real differences in facility security needs as determined by vulnerabilityassessments, threat information, and criticality evaluation. Given the variability of these factorsacross many kinds of infrastructure, different facilities may need security guards in substantiallydifferent capacities. Telecommunications centers, for example, may require guards primarily foraccess control, whereas sports stadiums may require guards for screening and crowd monitoring. Certain electric power facilities may require no guards at all, relying instead on remote surveillanceand other means of physical protection. Because of these differences in facility guarding needs,some analysts argue that training policies for security guards may best be evaluated on asector-by-sector, or even facility-by-facility, basis. Opponents of federal training regulation may, instead, wish to rely on private companiesvoluntarily providing such training to their workers. There is little public information, however, onhow many guard employers have been doing so. A 2002 survey of security guards in Californiafound that, since 9/11, 60% of guard employers had issued new "procedures," 52% had conductedsome kind of emergency drill, and 33% had conducted a bomb-threat drill. (63) A 2004 survey of 125facilities storing hazardous chemicals found that, in the prior 12 months, 68% had providedemergency response training, 59% had conducted emergency response drills, and 38% had improvedtraining and procedures "to prevent possible terrorist attacks." (64) Securitas, the largest U.S.guard contractor provides "specialized training for ... guards for high-rise buildings, nuclear powerplants and other so called high-risk objects." (65) Other major contractors do not publicly report changes to theiremployee training, although such training is increasingly available from a number of security firmsand other institutions. (66) Counter-Terror Training for Critical Guards. Given the importance of critical infrastructure protection in the nation's homeland security strategy,some analysts have suggested that critical infrastructure guards, specifically, should be encouragedby federal agencies to receive additional counter-terrorism training. The National Strategy , forexample, directed DHS to "initiate a dialogue with state and local counterparts, private-sectorinfrastructure owners and operators, and private security firms concerning the creation of a trainingand certification regime for private security officers." (67) Likewise, a panel of drinking water experts convened by theGAO identified "specialized training of utility security staff" as one of the water system securityenhancements "most deserving of federal support." (68) Nuclear power plant guards, for example, are required to receiveseveral months of special training in areas such as firearms, first aid, alarms, and electronic securitysystems. (69) One barrier to special critical guard training is cost. A 40-hour training course developed foroffice building security guards in Manhattan, for example, was projected to cost approximately $20per hour, or $800 per guard. (70) If such training were required for 50,000 critical infrastructureguards, total costs would be $40 million. Assuming the same average hourly cost, training 50,000guards to the 260-hour Spanish standard would cost $260 million. Increased training might alsorequire higher salaries for critical infrastructure guards, as noted earlier in this report. DHS Grants for Guard Training. The DHSFY2004 appropriations ( P.L. 108-90 ) allocated $2.9 billion for first responders and urban securitygrants, administered through the Office for Domestic Preparedness (ODP). These grants areintended to assist state and local law enforcement, fire service, emergency medical service,emergency managers, and other first responders with terrorism preparedness. According to theODP's program guidance for FY2004, grant funds may be used to establish counter-terrorismtraining programs and to cover "overtime and backfill costs" associated with employee attendanceof such programs. ODP's guidance specifically includes "private security providers" in the targetaudience for these programs. (71) Although CRS is not aware of any specific DHS grants awardedfor security guard training, it appears that such training programs may be eligible. ODP's guidancefor training grants is not expected to change for FY2005. Government Oversight of Staff Guards. Statesecurity guard training and other licensing requirements generally apply to prospective employeesof "private security companies," i.e., contract guards, but not to staff guards. Some proposed guardlegislation at the federal level, likewise, has been directed primarily at contract guards. Accordingto Table 1 , however, approximately 489,000, or 48% of all U.S. guards in 2003 were staff guardsand so would not be subject to such oversight. Many of these staff guards may be subject toscreening and training by their institutional employers, but these requirements would not necessarilybe related to any government-defined standards. As state and federal legislators consider greater training and other licencing requirements forcontract guards, they may need to address potential disparities between standards for contract andstaff guards. Contract and staff guards may protect the same types of critical facilities, so it couldbe argued that they should be subject to the same screening and capability requirements. This is thecase, for example, in nuclear power plants, where both contract and staff guards are subject to thesame NRC regulations. Contract and TSA airport screeners are likewise subject to the samebackground checks and training requirements. In addition to security guard deployment and overall qualification, several other guard issueshave emerged in infrastructure security discussions. Full analysis of these issues is beyond the scopeof this report, but they are mentioned briefly below for purposes of completeness. Contract vs. Staff Guard Performance. TSAofficials and other policy makers have begun to consider potential performance differences betweencontract guards and staff guards, or between private guards and government guards. (72) Such comparisons are notstraightforward, however, and there appears to be little research available on this specific topic. Arecent GAO study of airport screeners found, for example, that the post-9/11 TSA airport screeningprogram "was not established in a way to enable an effective evaluation of the differences in theperformance of federal and private screening and the reasons for those differences." (73) Additional informationmay be needed to shed light on this issue. Civilian Guards at Military Bases. In the 2003Defense Authorization Act ( P.L. 107-314 ), Congress authorized military bases to hire contractguards in place of military guards to meet new base security requirements (Sec. 332). Since thattime, contract guards have been hired at numerous U.S. military installations including Andrews AirForce Base (MD), Fort Hood (TX), and the U.S. Military Academy (NY). While the hiring ofcivilian guards to replace soldiers at U.S. military bases raises some interesting issues related toguard training and cost-effectiveness, the deployment of such guards may have more to do withoverseas U.S. troop demands than with critical infrastructure security per se . Nuclear Plant Guard Capabilities. The trainingand effectiveness of nuclear guards regulated by the NRC has been questioned in the national media. Specifically, the press has reported alleged lapses in nuclear guard performance, questions aboutNRC security tests, and perceived conflicts of interest in future guard testing by a securitycontractor. (74) Whilepotentially important, these issues appear unique to nuclear security and have been addressed inother policy forums. (75) Foreign-Owned Guard Contractors. A provisionin the Aviation and Transportation Security Act ( P.L. 107-71 ) allows only U.S. owned and operatedcompanies to provide contract screeners at U.S. airports, unless TSA cannot identify U.S. firms withsufficient capability to meet screening needs. This measure was presumably included in response toperceived inadequacies of airport screening contractors, several of which were foreign controlled,after the 9/11 attacks. (76) Some analysts have criticized the restrictions on foreign ownership since many foreign security firmsare located in countries that are close allies in the war on terrorism and have extensive internationalexperience in infrastructure security which could be valuable in U.S. critical infrastructureprotection. (77) (Note thatsome U.S. critical infrastructure in the private sector is actually owned and operated by foreign firms;a ban on "foreign" contract guards at such facilities might be difficult to implement (78) ) To date, there has beenlittle call for similar restrictions on guard contractors already serving other U.S. criticalinfrastructure. (79) Counter-Terrorism Support. Some analystsquestion whether or not critical infrastructure guards would benefit from more equipment,technology, or other resources in performing counter-terrorism functions. For example, advancedcommunications links directly to DHS information centers and local police could improve guards'ability to learn of imminent terrorist threats and could facilitate incident response. Identification andevaluation of such guard needs is an open issue. This report addresses critical infrastructure guards as a distinctive group, but CRS is awareof no federal or state policy that explicitly makes a similar distinction. On the contrary, federalcriminal background legislation and state licensing regulations appear to apply uniformly to allguards under their jurisdiction, without consideration of differing guard assignments. As noted inthis report, uniform requirements for all one million U.S. guards may be excessive for some andinsufficient for others. Questions remain, however, about what is the appropriate role of the federalgovernment with respect to security guards, especially private guards, protecting criticalinfrastructure. While there appears to have been relatively little congressional debate on this subject,it may become increasingly important as homeland security strategy evolves and the distinctivesecurity requirements of U.S. critical infrastructure become better understood. If homeland security policy does evolve towards special treatment of critical infrastructureguards, responsible agencies may face a challenge in identifying those guards because ofuncertainties in identifying critical assets. In April, 2004, the DHS Information Analysis andInfrastructure Protection Directorate (IAIP) reported that it had compiled the list of 1,700 criticalU.S. assets referred to earlier in ths report, but confusion among private sector and state governmentpartners about what constituted a critical asset cast doubt on the validity of that list. (80) Among electric utilities,for example, there was some question as to why certain assets were considered critical by IAIP, sincesome of those assets were not in use and others did not support significant electric loads. (81) According to pressaccounts, subsequent classified briefings with Members of Congress to review lists of critical assetsin their states have continued to raise concerns about IAIP's critical asset identification. (82) Without clarity aboutwhich assets are critical, policies directed at critical infrastructure guards may be difficult toimplement. Counter-terrorism funding for critical infrastructure guards may also present a policychallenge because the overwhelming majority of these guards appear to be in the private sector. TheDHS Assistant Secretary for Infrastructure Protection recently stated that the department "will notprovide money to the private sector to remediate vulnerabilities." (83) But as Table 1 shows,approximately 87% of all U.S. security guards in 2003 were employed either by a private guardcompany or directly by a private institution. As one Member of Congress recently remarked,"private security workers play a vital role ... protecting critical infrastructure, both public and private,from threat of terrorism." (84) Even critical government facilities such as national laboratories,military bases, and courthouses, often rely upon private security guards for counter-terror protection. If the private sector could be relied upon to make socially warranted counter-terrorisminvestments in guards and training, federal funding for guards might not be an issue. However, assome analysts have suggested, there are economic reasons why private companies may not makesuch investments. In homeland security, private markets do notautomatically produce the best result. To be sure, private firms have some incentive to avoid thedirect financial losses associated with a terrorist attack on their facilities or operations. In general,however, that incentive is not compelling enough to encourage the appropriate level of security. (85) It is an open question whether private operators of critical infrastructure have hired, trained, andotherwise supported security guards to the degree warranted by the social value of the facilities theyprotect. At this time, there does not appear to be sufficient information to make such judgments. Furthermore, the overall balance between public and private funding of homeland security is anexpansive topic beyond the scope of this report. Nonetheless, as Congress continues its oversightof homeland security, funding for private guards may emerge as a security consideration wherepublic benefits and private resources may not align. Source: State of California, Bureau of Security and Investigative Services (BSIS). "Power to ArrestTraining Manual." West Sacramento, CA. Feb. 2002. pp. 2-3. 

Summary: The Bush Administration's 2003 National Strategy for the Physical Protection of CriticalInfrastructures and Key Assets indicates that security guards are "an important source of protectionfor critical facilities." In 2003, approximately one million security guards (including airportscreeners) were employed in the United States. Of these guards, analysis indicates that up to 5%protected what have been defined as "critical" infrastructure and assets. The effectiveness of critical infrastructure guards in countering a terrorist attack depends onthe number of guards on duty, their qualifications, pay and training. Security guard employment mayhave increased in certain critical infrastructure sectors since September 11, 2001, although overallemployment of U.S. security guards has declined in the last five years. Contract guard salariesaveraged $19,400 per year in 2003, less than half of the average salary for police and well below theaverage U.S. salary for all occupations. There are no U.S. federal requirements for training ofcritical infrastructure guards other than airport screeners and nuclear guards. Twenty-two states dorequire basic training for licensed security guards, but few specifically require counter-terrorismtraining. State regulations regarding criminal background checks for security guards vary. Sixteenstates have no background check regulations. The federal government's role in protecting U.S. critical infrastructure has been a concern ofCongress since 9/11. Part of this concern involves the possible imposition of federal securityrequirements, including guard requirements, on infrastructure which is largely private. The PrivateSecurity Officer Employment Authorization Act of 2004 ( P.L. 108-458 , Sec. 6402) facilitatesemployer access to FBI criminal records to conduct background checks of security guard employees. Other legislation proposed in the 108th Congress would have required private security guardcompanies to perform criminal background checks, would have prohibited the hiring of guards whofailed background checks, or would have directed the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) toconduct security guard emergency training, including training for "acts of terrorism." The DHScurrently does not have counter-terrorism training programs specifically for private security guards. There appears to be no federal or state policy that explicitly addresses critical infrastructureguards as a distinctive group. If homeland security policy evolves towards special treatment ofcritical infrastructure guards, responsible agencies may face a challenge identifying those guardsbecause of uncertainties in identifying critical assets. Federal counter-terrorism funding for criticalinfrastructure guards may also present a policy challenge, since 87% of these guards are in theprivate sector. It is an open question whether private operators of critical infrastructure have hired,trained, and otherwise supported security guards to the degree warranted by the social value of thefacilities they protect. As Congress continues its oversight of homeland security, funding for privateguards may emerge as a security consideration where public benefits and private resources may notalign. This report will not be updated.