Following a number of high-profile domestic violence cases involving soldiers stationed at Fort Campbell, Kentucky, who killed their wives, Congress, in the National Defense Authorization Act of 2000, required the Secretary of Defense to establish the Defense Task Force on Domestic Violence. The task force was chartered as a 3-year effort to assist the Secretary of Defense in identifying ways to prevent domestic violence in the military, when possible, and in responding more effectively when domestic violence occurs. In March 2000, 24 members were appointed to the task force. These members included 12 senior officials from the four services and 12 senior officials from the civilian sector who were experts in the area of domestic violence. The act also required the task force to develop a strategic plan for DOD that included recommendations for improving DOD’s domestic violence efforts in areas such as victim safety programs, domestic violence training for military commanders, and domestic violence responses at overseas military installations. The task force also assessed and made recommendations regarding the roles and responsibilities that command, chaplain, law enforcement, legal, and medical personnel have with regard to addressing domestic violence incidents. From February 2001 through February 2003, the task force issued three reports containing 194 recommendations for improving DOD’s response to domestic violence. The task force identified four primary themes with regard to the recommendations made in the three reports: Community collaboration—addresses coordination and collaboration issues among all military organizations, such as family advocacy and legal offices, in relation to domestic violence, as well as coordination between military and civilian communities. Education and training—addresses training issues for commanding officers, senior enlisted personnel, Family Advocacy Program staff, and first responders, such as military police. Offender accountability—identifies measures to improve individual offender accountability and program accountability, as well as improve dispositions and case management. Victim safety—addresses issues related to victim safety programs, confidentiality for victims, and other policies to enhance victim safety. In January 2003, within the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, the Military Community and Family Policy Office established the Family Violence Policy Office to coordinate implementation of the task force’s recommendations, many of which were aimed at improving DOD’s Family Advocacy Program. The Family Advocacy Program, also under the Military Community and Family Policy Office, provides services that contribute to the health of military families, treats victims of domestic violence, and offers rehabilitation and treatment for abusers. The Family Advocacy Program Director works in conjunction with service headquarters managers to oversee the execution of the program within each service. DOD’s ability to report domestic violence incidents involving servicemembers and the disciplinary actions taken by commanders is hampered because the data systems that the department uses to collect domestic violence information contain incomplete data. The National Defense Authorization Act of 2000 required DOD to develop a centralized domestic violence database of information on incidents of domestic violence involving members of the Armed Forces. This includes domestic violence incidents reported to a commander, a law enforcement authority of the Armed Forces, or a family advocacy program official. Under the act, the Secretaries of the military departments are required to report this information annually to the administrator of the database. DOD is also required, under Section 591, to report information from the database, along with its responses to each of the three task force reports. In an effort to satisfy the legislation, DOD established the central domestic violence database within its Defense Incident-Based Reporting System. This database contains domestic violence incidents that are criminal in nature including: infractions of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, state law, or violation of a protection order. Although DOD established the central domestic violence database in June 2000, it is not yet fully operational and it does not contain complete information about reported incidents of domestic violence. DOD officials stated that the information contained in the database on the number of incidents is not complete because some of the law enforcement systems used by the services that feed into the central database are not yet operational. These are the Air Force’s Office of Special Investigation system, which is expected to be operational by August 2006; the Army’s Judge Advocate General Office system, which is still in development; and the Air Force’s Judge Advocate General Office system, which is expected to be operational by June 2006. As a result, the central domestic violence database does not contain any information about domestic violence incidents that would be captured in these systems. The central domestic violence database captures incidents of a criminal nature that were responded to by military law enforcement personnel; but it does not contain information on incidents reported to Family Advocacy personnel such as emotional abuse or domestic violence incidents that occur off the installation. To obtain this information, as required in the act, DOD must supplement data from the Defense Incident-Based Reporting System with data from the Family Advocacy Program Central Registry, which contains clinical data on domestic violence incidents. However, the Central Registry data system previously provided incomplete domestic violence data because until January 2006, the Central Registry only contained reported incidents of abuse involving current spouses. It did not contain domestic violence data as defined by DOD’s 2004 definition that involved former spouses and intimate partners with whom the alleged offender shared a child or a common domicile. Therefore, prior to 2006, DOD did not provide complete information on all reported instances of domestic violence. DOD used information from the two systems in preparing its reports to Congress on the number of incidents of domestic violence in the military and commanders’ actions taken in responding to them during fiscal years 2000 through 2002. However, DOD officials who have responsibility for gathering these data acknowledged that the statistics contained in these reports were questionable. Moreover, they informed us that since the last report to Congress on fiscal year 2002 incidents, no attempts had been made to match up the information from the two systems, despite a June 8, 2000, memorandum from the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness that directed them to do so. Our analysis confirmed that neither system had complete data to enable DOD to accurately determine the extent of reported domestic violence incidents in the military. Beyond these concerns, our review of information in the Defense Incident- Based Reporting System and supporting service law enforcement systems revealed that a number of installations were not reporting disciplinary actions taken by the commanders as required. For example, in the fiscal year 2002 report that DOD released to Congress, DOD reported that of the 2,173 Army and Air Force incidents for which sufficient evidence existed to take disciplinary action, 1,027, or 47 percent had no actions listed. DOD and service instructions require that command disciplinary actions be entered into the law enforcement systems. Moreover, these systems contain a data field to record commanders’ actions in responding to domestic violence incidents. However, during our site visits, we found that some commander disciplinary actions were not being entered into the data field and some of the law enforcement officials we interviewed stated that they were unaware that they were required to do so. These officials acknowledged the importance of including this information to provide visibility over what disciplinary actions had been taken and that there was a field available in the system for them to do so. At one installation, we found that hard copies of the commander disciplinary actions were maintained in a file in the Provost Marshall’s office, but this information had not been entered into the law enforcement database. Officials who oversee the DOD central domestic violence database and the Central Registry data system, as well as Family Violence Policy Office personnel, are aware of the problems with obtaining complete information about domestic violence incidents and commander disciplinary actions. However, officials in the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness have not developed a plan for correcting the deficiencies and ensuring that (1) the central database on domestic violence in the Defense Incident-Based Reporting System and service law enforcement systems have complete and accurate data and (2) all commander disciplinary actions related to domestic violence incidents are reported into these systems. Without complete data on reported incidents of domestic violence and the steps taken by commanding officers to address these incidents, Congress and DOD will lack the visibility and information needed to understand the magnitude of the domestic violence problem, identify domestic violence trends, and proactively address these issues as they emerge. Over the past 3 years, DOD provided the Family Violence Policy Office about $23 million, which it has used to make progress toward implementing many of the task force’s recommendations. Nonetheless, two challenges—shortages in critical staff and ineffective strategies for communicating new domestic violence policies— threaten progress and limit assurance of consistent application of its new policies. From fiscal year 2003 through fiscal year 2005, the Military Community and Family Policy Office provided the Family Violence Policy Office with approximately $23 million to implement the task force’s recommendations. The largest portion, about $17 million, was for funding a contract to provide victim advocate services and shelter services to victims of domestic violence. Program analysts from the Military Community and Family Policy Office told us that this contract provides on-call services from within the local community, supporting approximately 45 full-time and 40 part-time on-call advocates each month. The Family Violence Policy Office was also provided approximately $3 million to train various DOD professionals in 2005. The cost of this training included funds for a contractor to perform conference planning, facilitation, and administrative management support services for these events . Additionally, the Family Violence Policy Office was provided $400,000 to develop a DOD-wide domestic violence public awareness campaign. Appendix II provides a detailed breakdown of the expenditures of the Family Violence Policy Office in implementing the task force recommendations. Our analysis of DOD’s actions in implementing the task force recommendations shows that DOD, as of March 2006, had implemented almost two-thirds of the recommendations they planned to carry out. While this shows progress, the recommendations vary in their relative importance to improving DOD’s efforts to address domestic violence; and thus, the implementation of some recommendations may not have as significant an impact on DOD’s efforts as will the implementation of others. Notwithstanding this point, of the 194 recommendations made by the task force, we found DOD had completed actions on 94 recommendations, had actions pending on 60 recommendations, and had not taken actions on 40 recommendations because the department either disagreed with the recommendations, the recommendation was not applicable to the department, or DOD felt that the recommended action was already undertaken. We counted recommendations as completed if we found evidence of action taken on the recommendation by DOD. Actions taken included guidance, policy memoranda, training materials, or other supporting documentation DOD issued to implement the task force recommendation. Additionally, we found, for the most part, documentation, focus group discussions, or interviews that showed the service and installation levels were implementing or had efforts to begin implementing DOD’s guidance on the completed actions. Figure 1 shows our analysis of DOD’s implementation status of the 194 recommendations. The recommendations are grouped by the four primary task force themes previously discussed in this report; recommendations that did not fit directly into one of these themes were classified as “other.” The “other” category contains items such as issues related to overseas installations and program management. As figure I shows, DOD has made the most progress in implementing recommendations pertaining to community collaboration and victim safety. DOD officials stated that their original focus was placed on addressing victim safety issues, in particular, because it was critical to ensure victims are protected from further abuse. A listing of all 194 recommendations and our analysis of DOD’s status in completing them are included in appendix III. The Family Violence Policy Office believed that they had completed more recommendations than we identified in our analysis. Specifically, DOD officials provided a department-level status matrix that indicated that they had completed 121 of the 194 task force recommendations. Our numbers differ because DOD identified 27 of the recommendations as complete when we found DOD actually had stated that it did not agree with 26 of the recommendations or took no action because the recommendation was already being done or did not apply to them, and one recommendation was still pending. For example, the task force recommended that DOD centrally track military protective orders. DOD essentially disagreed with the recommendation, stating that it had determined that it would not be feasible to centrally record and track military protective orders because there were too few such orders to justify creating another database. Nevertheless, DOD categorized this recommendation as complete, while we categorized this recommendation as one with which they disagreed. We have grouped the 26 recommendations and the one pending action with those that were identified as requiring no action and pending, respectively in appendix III, which shows our analysis of DOD’s status for the recommendations. Despite its investment to date and reported progress, potential personnel shortages in the DOD office implementing the recommendations could hinder the department’s timely implementation of the remaining recommendations. The personnel in this office have an essential role in implementing the domestic violence recommendations, with responsibility for, among other things, (1) drafting, revising, and coordinating DOD policy in response to domestic violence recommendations; (2) drafting training curricula and monitoring implementation of those curricula for family advocacy program staff, health care officials, and law enforcement, among others; and (3) drafting and coordinating public affairs strategies to inform the military community about the revised DOD response to domestic violence in the military. Officials in the Military Community and Family Policy Office and those in the Family Violence Policy Office told us that, originally in 2003, five positions had been provided for the team implementing the task force recommendations. This included one permanent position for the office supervisor; one term position for a program analyst; and three positions for senior-level officers on detail assignments from the services—one each from the Army, Navy, and Air Force. Position descriptions for military personnel stress that these individuals were to serve as military experts in implementing domestic violence programs. However, officials in the Family Violence Policy Office told us the Navy officer retired in 2004, and the Air Force officer was detailed to another OSD position in 2005. The Navy did not “backfill” or replace its position, stating that the position was needed within their service, and officials in the Family Violence Policy Office stated that OSD had placed the Air Force position within another area of DOD because OSD had a greater need for that position there. Thus, since 2005, the Family Violence Policy Office has been reduced to three positions. During our review, officials in the Family Violence Policy Office stated that the officer detailed from the Army is expected to retire in May 2006 and the term position is expected to expire in July 2006. The office had requested and obtained approval from the OSD Military Community and Family Policy Office to fill the Army position and renew the term position, stating that these positions were needed to complete implementation of the remaining recommendations in a timely manner. The officials further noted that the remaining recommendations they will be implementing are more challenging than those already implemented and will require personnel experienced in domestic violence issues. For example, they explained that implementation of the recommendations aimed at revamping the Case Review Committee and the Offender Intervention require more research and analysis with experts within and outside of DOD. Without adequate personnel, the officials estimate that it may take more than 3 years to implement the remaining 60 task force recommendations. However, as of March 2006, officials in the Family Violence Policy Office told us that approval to fill the soon-to-be-vacant positions had not been obtained from the final approval authority at Washington Headquarters Services. Retaining key personnel who can affect the ability of a program to function effectively is a good internal control principle. DOD also faces a challenge in effectively communicating the policies that it has developed in response to the task force’s recommendations. DOD’s method of communicating its policy changes has not been effective in ensuring consistent practices or promoting widespread understanding of the new policies among DOD and the services. As of March 2006, DOD had issued 16 directive-type memoranda as interim guidance to quickly communicate information about changes resulting from implementation of the task force recommendations. (See app. IV for a list of these memoranda). Almost all of the directive-type memoranda set target dates for DOD to issue later guidance implementing the interim policies. In most cases, final guidance such as a directive was expected to be issued within 180 days after each memorandum was signed; however, as of March 2006, the final guidance had not been issued and most of the interim guidance is now more than 2 years old. Since the memoranda are interim guidance, they have been communicated to the services and throughout DOD through mail to the Service Secretaries and informally via e-mails and special Web pages rather than being formally posted on the official DOD directives Web site. Under internal control guidance, organizations should consistently apply policies, and sound management practices of leading organizations offer federal agencies a methodology for establishing effective communications to promote consistency. However, some DOD and service officials we met with stated that existing DOD guidance was not always consistent with the directive-type memoranda implementing the task force recommendations and that this inconsistency has sometimes caused confusion at the installation level. In addition, we found that information in the directive-type memoranda was not always communicated to the installations in a timely manner and had resulted in some of the officials not knowing about and, thus not following current policies consistently. We identified several inconsistencies in implementing the recommendations as a result of DOD’s policy changes not being communicated effectively, including the following: DOD’s Family Advocacy Program Directive 6400.1 has not been updated to reflect DOD’s interim guidance that implements the task force recommendations, even though a number of the task force recommendations had called for these changes to be made in this directive. Family Advocacy officials told us they will not update their directive until the Family Violence Policy Office issues a new instruction, incorporating all of the interim guidance issued in the directive-type memoranda. As a result, some DOD and service officials stated that inconsistent guidance from these two offices has been a source of confusion. A prime example is that while DOD’s new definition of domestic violence was issued in 2004, staff at some of the installations we visited said that they did not become aware of the definition until late 2005 or January 2006. Consequently, some victims of domestic violence who were covered under the new definition, since 2004, may not have been considered for services. The task force also recommended that DOD establish a policy that written copies of military protective orders be forwarded immediately to both law enforcement and family advocacy officials. While DOD initially issued a policy in March 2004 allowing distribution to law enforcement, it reversed this policy in July 2004 due to concerns with the military protective order’s use and dissemination. DOD’s August 8, 2005, status report on recommendations further stated that the Privacy Act does not allow distribution of the military protective orders to family advocacy and law enforcement. This policy change, however, was not effectively communicated, causing many inconsistent practices throughout the installations we visited. For example, contrary to the July 2004 guidance, DOD’s September 2005 domestic violence training materials provided to commanders, judge advocates, and law enforcement personnel contained information on leadership responsibilities, which stated that a copy of each order is to be forwarded to law enforcement and family advocacy. Further, policy information on DOD’s Web sites that allowed the orders to be distributed to law enforcement was not changed until we notified DOD officials of the inconsistency. Additionally, we found inconsistent practices between the services. For example, the Army’s regulations allowed distribution of the protective orders to family advocacy and law enforcement officials. On the other hand, the Navy did not provide copies to family advocacy. However, a Navy instruction, which predated the DOD July 2004 guidance, allowed distribution to law enforcement. Navy officials stated that their guidance will be revised to reflect DOD requirements not to provide copies to law enforcement, upon release of DOD’s Domestic Violence instruction. Finally, our discussions with OSD and service lawyers revealed that they believe providing copies of protective orders to family advocacy and law enforcement officials would not be a violation of the Privacy Act. The task force recommended that “DOD mandate the military services to provide awareness education to military spouses regarding the transitional compensation program.” DOD said that no action was required on this recommendation “ince Congress established the transitional compensation program; the services have routinely educated dependent family members about it.” However, during our installation visits we found inconsistent communication of this information. Discussion groups with victim advocates and interviews with family advocacy officials revealed that a few installations elected not to inform military members or spouses about transitional compensation until a specific victim had a documented, validated domestic violence case in which they would be eligible to receive benefits. The victim advocates stated that this was done to prevent potential abuse of the program. Some of the other installations were quite liberal about providing information on the program. They said they felt providing the information may encourage more people to come forward if they knew help was available. The task force also recommended that DOD develop guidance for commanding officers on how to properly document domestic violence issues in separation papers to help facilitate transitional compensation. The directive-type memorandum issued by DOD to implement this recommendation states that commanding officers should be trained on transitional compensation, but it does not specifically require training them on how to “properly document separation papers.” Some victim advocates at installations we visited said that commanding officers do not always use proper documentation to ensure that victims will receive transitional compensation and that some victims have been denied these funds because of lack of documentation. DOD officials in the Family Violence Policy Office told us that guidance on waiver requirements, as recommended by the task force, is included in a draft instruction from the Military Personnel Policy Directorate on transitional compensation. We found inconsistencies in victim advocates’ knowledge of the waiver associated with transitional compensation requirements because this information had not been effectively communicated to the advocates. DOD officials in the Family Violence Policy Office, Family Advocacy Program Office, as well as officials in the four services acknowledged that communication could be a problem and may result in inconsistencies. They also noted that formal instructions take years to draft and coordinate and that mailing the interim guidance to service secretaries, e-mailing it to key points of contacts, and placing the guidance on the Web pages were the best avenues to follow. However, in our view, without an overall communication strategy that provides a clear and consistent understanding of policy among DOD and the services, there may continue to be confusion and inconsistencies among DOD and the services on implementing the task force’s recommendations. DOD is taking steps to address specific task force recommendations to ensure confidentiality for victims of domestic violence and to train commanding officers, senior enlisted personnel, and chaplains on how to respond to such incidents. In its efforts to ensure confidentiality, DOD has developed a restricted reporting policy that allows victims to report incidents of domestic abuse, which includes domestic violence, to health care and victim advocacy specialists without mandatory disclosure to command or law enforcement officials. However, the policy was not implemented until April 2006. Further, in its efforts to provide additional domestic violence training, DOD issued guidance requiring training for commanding officers, senior enlisted personnel, and chaplains, but tracking and documenting these training efforts have not always occurred. The task force had a number of recommendations asking DOD to explore options for creating a system of confidential services, privileged communications, and exemptions to mandatory reporting. The goal of these recommendations was to provide victims of domestic violence with access to a credible avenue for receiving support, information, options, and resources to address the violence in their lives. In response to the task force’s recommendations, on January 22, 2006, DOD issued its Restricted Reporting Policy for Incidents of Domestic Abuse to ensure that domestic violence victims are protected, treated with dignity and respect, and provided with support, advocacy, and care. Under the new policy, victims can choose either unrestricted reporting or restricted reporting. Unrestricted reporting uses current reporting channels—e.g., chain of command, Family Advocacy Program, or law enforcement—and is for victims of domestic abuse who want to pursue an official investigation of an incident. Restricted reporting allows adult victims of domestic abuse to disclose the abuse to health care providers, victim advocates, or supervisors of victim advocates, and receive medical treatment and victim advocacy services without notifying the alleged offender’s commanding officer or law enforcement. The new policy allows victims to receive relevant information, medical attention, and support while having additional time to make a more informed decision about reporting the incident. The task force found that victims were often reluctant to seek services because they had fears about the potential adverse impact the reported incident may have on the servicemember’s career and the family’s financial well-being, as well as concerns about their personal safety. However, the restricted reporting policy did not take effect until April 22, 2006, in order for the services to have time to develop consistent policies and an implementation strategy. Consequently, at the time of our review, it was too soon to assess what effects this policy will have on reported cases of domestic violence. The new policy, nonetheless, was a topic of great concern during our discussions at the 15 installations included in our study. Installation commanders, commanding officers, legal officers, provost marshals or heads of security forces, chaplains, family advocacy program managers, victim advocates, and health care providers all shared their views about the advantages and disadvantages of the restricted reporting policy. Their views varied considerably and ranged from unequivocal support for the policy, to uncertainty because of licensing and ethical concerns, to outright objection. Those who expressed support for the policy said they did so because they felt the policy promoted victim confidentiality, safety, and support. Some unit commanders, for example, stated that the policy would allow the victims to receive medical care and time to decide if they wanted to press charges. In addition, chaplains at some installations voiced approval for the policy because it opened another avenue for victims to receive assistance without getting others involved. Conversely, officials who objected to the restricted reporting policy said they did so because they believed the policy would not encourage victims to “officially” report the incident, and thus would send the wrong message to aggressors, as well as diminish the commanding officers’ ability to hold offenders accountable. Specifically, legal officers serving as prosecutors and commanding officers at several installations told us that they objected to the policy because, while permitting victims to receive some types of assistance was positive, it allowed aggressors to remain free from disciplinary actions and to be able to continue the pattern of domestic violence. The legal officers also expressed concern about the evidence that would not be captured at the crime scene when domestic violence occurs because the incident was not reported immediately. One area of concern raised during our installation visits dealt with specific licensing issues and ethical dilemmas. For example, health care providers expressed concerns that the new restricted reporting policy may conflict with state licensing requirements mandating them to report incidents of domestic violence to civilian authorities. They also expressed reservations about the policy in cases where they had to provide medical aid to a severely injured individual who appeared to be untruthful about the source of the injury. While this policy is similar to DOD’s Sexual Assault Prevention and Response Program policy, many officials in our discussion groups said that similar reporting may not be appropriate. According to these individuals, the perpetrator of sexual assault does not usually reside with the victim; therefore unreported incidents are less likely to place a victim in a situation for further abuse, unlike domestic violence where a victim would return home to the alleged abuser. Some of the health care providers expressed concerns that they might be placed in a position in which they had to send a battered victim back into a dangerous situation. During the time of our installation visits—i.e., from October 2005 through February 2006—the restricted reporting policy was issued and addresses some of the concerns and issues from our discussion groups. For example, the policy states that confidentiality will be suspended for specific reasons, such as to prevent or lessen a serious and imminent threat to the health or safety of the victim or another person or when required by state statute. While some of the issues are addressed in the policy, the level of support this policy will provide victims of domestic violence, the potential impact restricted reporting will have on law enforcement investigations, as well as the impact the policy will have on a commander’s ability to hold perpetrators accountable, will be determined during implementation. Beyond confidentiality, the task force made over 10 recommendations that focused on training for commanding officers, senior enlisted personnel, and chaplains to respond to domestic violence issues. To respond to the task force recommendations to train commanding officers and senior enlisted personnel, DOD issued guidance directing the services to require these officials to receive such training. Specifically, the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness issued a directive-type memorandum titled “Domestic Abuse Response and Intervention Training for Commanding Officers and Senior Enlisted Personnel” in February 2004. This memorandum required training on specified topics, such as dynamics of domestic violence, common misconceptions of victim safety, and responses to alleged domestic abuse. The military services are addressing this requirement by providing several educational options, including Web-based training, training at the professional military education schools, and training at installations led by instructors. In addressing the task force recommendation to train chaplains, the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness issued a directive-type memorandum titled “Domestic Abuse Training for Chaplains” on January 29, 2004, which required training for chaplains on specified topics. One of the primary topics that chaplains received training on was privileged communication, because of the special role chaplains play in providing assistance to victims of domestic violence. Chaplains we spoke with said they received this training at their basic officer’s course, periodically through continuing professional military education, and at installations. While training on domestic violence issues is being provided to commanding officers, senior enlisted personnel, and chaplains, DOD does not have complete data on which chaplains have received training because the Military Community and Family Policy Office did not require tracking or documenting training provided to chaplains. Although internal control guidance states that management should document and track agency initiatives to ascertain if they are achieved and provide follow-up actions, the Family Violence Policy Office and Family Advocacy Office did not develop training metrics. Without accurate training data and documentation, DOD lacks visibility over whether chaplains have been adequately trained and are being provided with resources that will assist them in handling domestic violence issues. Furthermore, during our discussion groups with chaplains, which included a mix of experienced and junior officers, we found that some chaplains did not fully understand their responsibilities concerning privileged communication. For example, the Army regulation states that such privileged communication is not to be disclosed to third persons other than those to whom disclosure furthers the purpose of the communication, or to those reasonably necessary for the transmission of the communication. The regulation also states that the chaplain and chaplain assistant will not divulge privileged communication without the written consent of the person(s) authorized to claim the privilege. Some Army and Navy chaplains we interviewed stated that they may notify the chain of command about a privileged communication. For example, one chaplain mentioned that there was no Army requirement that chaplains report information discussed during a privileged communication and others stated that the current Army regulation for chaplains speaks to this. The chaplain further stated that some Army chaplains had decided for themselves what they would and would not report and would explain this to people that they counseled. A Navy chaplain also stated that under certain conditions he would notify the commanding officer if an individual admitted being involved in domestic violence, even if the person made the statement as a matter of religious conscience. Other chaplains in our discussion groups told us that a breach of privileged communication could ruin the reputation of chaplains and lead to no one seeking their help. The task force, in its 2002 report, also had similar findings and recommended that DOD issue guidance clarifying clergy confidentiality. An official at the Chaplain Board told us that, since it takes so long to issue DOD-wide guidance, DOD is not likely to issue additional guidance addressing confidentiality and privileged communication because the services have issued guidance, which is consistent with the Military Rules of Evidence. However, when we discussed privileged communication with chaplains, many referred to service guidance, as well as the Military Rules of Evidence; but some were unclear as to what their responsibilities were. Additional guidance and emphasis during chaplain training could facilitate a consistent understanding by chaplains of their responsibilities regarding confidentiality. Without taking action, DOD may be unable to ensure that all chaplains are prepared to handle private information provided by victims or offenders, which could deter both from seeking assistance. DOD has not established an oversight framework to monitor compliance with and evaluate implementation of the task force recommendations on domestic violence. The task force’s initial 2001 report recommended that DOD strategically use regional oversight and monitoring visits at both the DOD and service levels to improve the department’s oversight of its efforts to address domestic violence. DOD’s draft domestic abuse instruction requires the Military Community and Family Policy Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness to monitor compliance with the instruction and periodically evaluate domestic violence efforts. The draft instruction, however, does not communicate how this should be done and the Military Community and Family Policy Office has not established a formal process for doing this. Officials in the Family Violence Policy Office stated that action on the task force recommendation for oversight is pending and told us they were exploring options for addressing it, such as having the DOD Inspector General perform reviews every 2 or 3 years. These officials and those from the Family Advocacy Program told us that the services’ headquarters monitor and evaluate their own installation family advocacy program offices through their accreditation processes. However, they acknowledged that the service accreditation reports are not sent to DOD and that the department has limited visibility into service domestic violence efforts. The Military Community and Family Policy Office is considering asking officials from the Family Advocacy Program Office and the Family Violence Policy Office to go on some of the services’ accreditation visits to provide oversight of the implementation efforts. The task force mentioned, however, that to be effective, program evaluation must be ongoing and fully integrated. Although the DOD Family Advocacy Office has established output metrics that somewhat relate to certain recommendations, DOD has not established results-oriented performance measures that could enable it to evaluate compliance with the recommendations. One example of an established DOD metric is the number of briefings to new unit commanders and senior enlisted personnel on domestic abuse and child abuse. A DOD Family Advocacy Program official stated that this metric is intended to be an output measure related to the Government Performance and Results Act and is only indirectly related to a recommendation in the task force reports. This metric is not a results-oriented performance measure that would capture the results or evaluate the effectiveness of the briefings in increasing these officers’ awareness of domestic violence issues. Without an overall management framework for monitoring and reporting on implementation, DOD and Congress will continue to have limited visibility and oversight to evaluate the changes associated with the recommendations and to make improvements. As a result, DOD may be unable to ensure that all of the accepted task force recommendations are implemented to produce the desired improvements in assisting domestic violence victims and holding offenders accountable. Understanding the size and nature of domestic violence is essential to DOD’s ability to improve its response to this important issue. Yet the department currently lacks the information needed to determine reported domestic violence incidents. To date, DOD does not have a database containing complete information on reported incidents and what actions are being taken to discipline those who commit these violent acts. In addition, the lack of sufficient personnel threatens the timely implementation of the pending task force recommendations. Further, the absence of clear and effective communication of the policy changes made in response to the task force recommendations has hindered servicemembers’ awareness of their responsibilities in providing assistance to victims and holding offenders accountable. The failure to track the training of the chaplains who respond to domestic violence incidents impairs DOD’s visibility over whether chaplains are being provided with the tools to effectively deal with domestic violence and understand their obligations concerning privileged communications. Finally, the absence of an oversight framework limits DOD’s ability to assess its efforts to achieve the desired results in improving the prevention of and response to domestic violence. Without further management action to address all of these deficiencies, DOD may be unable to effectively identify and respond to concerns about domestic violence among servicemembers. To enhance implementation of the task force recommendations and improve the effectiveness of domestic violence efforts, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness to take the following seven actions: Develop, in conjunction with the service secretaries, a comprehensive management plan to address deficiencies in the data captured in DOD’s domestic violence database that focuses on ensuring that accurate and complete data exist and that all instances in the Defense Incident-Based Reporting System and Family Advocacy Program Central Registry are matched and reported annually, as required in DOD’s Manual 7730.47-M; take appropriate steps, in conjunction with the service secretaries, to ensure all commander actions related to domestic violence incidents are entered in law enforcement systems; develop a plan to ensure adequate personnel are available to implement pending task force recommendations; establish a communication strategy for effectively informing DOD and service officials about new guidance implementing the task force recommendations, to include issuing a revised DOD family advocacy program directive that is consistent with interim guidance for implementing the task force recommendations; and clearly articulating its policy regarding the distribution of military protective orders using a method that will ensure consistent application by all services and DOD; develop, in conjunction with the service secretaries, procedures and metrics to ensure that accurate, consistent, and timely domestic violence training data are collected for chaplains; develop, in conjunction with the service secretaries, chaplain guidance and training materials that highlight and clarify chaplain responsibilities concerning privileged communication; and develop and implement, in conjunction with the services, a DOD-wide oversight framework that includes a results-oriented evaluation plan for the implemented recommendations, and a process for ongoing monitoring of and reporting on implementation. In written comments on a draft of our report (reprinted in app. V), DOD expressed concern that GAO had attempted to define, differentiate, and prioritize what it considered important task force recommendations and had focused on perceived deficiencies rather than progress. The department further noted that GAO’s review had assumed that DOD should implement all recommendations of the task force exactly as written and stated that after each report the department clearly indicated the recommendations it agreed with, did not agree with, and would study. DOD also stated that it never suggested that it could not or would not modify any of the task force recommendations. DOD noted that GAO had sought to penalize the department for deviating from the narrowest reading of individual recommendations. We disagree. To the contrary, our report is very clear on the progress the department has made in implementing the recommendations. Moreover, the scope and methodology for our study (explained in app. I) clearly details the approach that we used to assess this progress. Further, in mentioning that the recommendations vary in their relative importance to improving DOD’s efforts to address domestic violence issues, we simply noted that the implementation of some recommendations may not have as significant an impact on DOD’s efforts as will the implementation of others. Additionally, we did not assume that DOD could not modify task force recommendations. As the report states, when counting recommendations as being completed by DOD, we included instances where actions taken to implement the recommendations were different from language that the task force suggested. Specifically, we stated that completed actions were grouped into two categories: (1) actions that DOD took that directly implemented the task force recommendations and (2) completed actions taken that DOD believed met the intent of the recommendation. We also made it clear in our report that there were 40 recommendations that DOD did not take action on because they did not agree with the recommendation, the recommendation was not applicable to DOD, or the recommended action was already being done. In addition, we noted in the report that there were 60 recommendations where DOD had actions pending. Regarding our recommendations, DOD concurred that the department would take steps to ensure commander actions related to domestic violence are entered into law enforcement databases, develop a plan to ensure adequate personnel are available to implement pending task force recommendations, and establish an oversight framework to monitor progress and implementation of the task force recommendations. DOD stated that it had issued policy requiring documentation of commander actions, conducted training to communicate this policy, and would continue to aggressively communicate this policy to the services. DOD also indicated that it was committed to providing resources to implement the task force recommendations and had requested extensions for current personnel to do so. We believe this approach could satisfy the intent of our recommendation if DOD has a defined plan to provide personnel in the event the requested personnel extensions are not granted. DOD said it is developing an initial oversight process to monitor progress and implementation and it anticipates completion will be in fiscal year 2007 or 2008. As DOD develops this oversight process, we reiterate the need for it to include results-oriented performance measures that can enable it to evaluate compliance with the recommendations. DOD partially concurred with our recommendation calling for the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness to develop a comprehensive management plan to address data deficiencies in DOD’s domestic violence database. DOD stated that this recommendation is more appropriately directed to the Military Departments, noting that it requires the services to submit data, but that the systems used by the services are insufficient and unfunded. We agree. While we believe the recommendation is appropriately directed to the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, who has oversight and stewardship for the department’s centralized domestic violence database, we have expanded our recommendation to include the services. DOD partially nonconcurred with our recommendation to establish a communication strategy for informing DOD and service officials about new guidance, to include issuing a revised family advocacy program directive and reconsidering the task force recommendation on providing military protective orders to law enforcement and family advocacy officials and communicating associated policies to the services. Specifically, DOD agreed with the need to issue a revised Family Advocacy Program Directive. However, the department disagreed with the need to reconsider the task force’s recommendation to provide military protective orders. DOD stated that it has considered the issue of providing the protective orders to law enforcement and family advocacy officials and continued to believe there are privacy concerns. Given its position, we are no longer recommending that the department reconsider the task force’s recommendation in that regard. However, because of inconsistent practices found among the services regarding whether distribution of these orders was allowed to law enforcement and family advocacy personnel, we continue to believe that the department needs to clarify and more effectively communicate its policy on this issue and, therefore, we are revising our recommendation to emphasize this point. DOD partially nonconcurred with our recommendation to develop, in concert with the Family Advocacy Director and four service family advocacy program managers, guidance and training materials clarifying chaplain responsibilities regarding privileged communications. DOD stated that the family advocacy program managers were not the proponents of chaplains’ privileged communications. We agree and have modified our recommendation to include the services, as well as the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness. DOD also stated that each military department has policy addressing clergy confidentiality and DOD does not contemplate developing such a policy. DOD further stated that it has issued policy requiring this training and noted that DOD and the services will continue to address this issue at relevant training events. Because we, like the task force, found some chaplains did not fully understand their responsibilities concerning privileged communications, we continue to believe that DOD needs to issue a departmentwide policy on privileged communications, and that DOD and the services need to develop training materials that highlight and clarify chaplain responsibilities for these communications. DOD nonconcurred with our recommendation to develop, in concert with the Family Advocacy Director, four service family advocacy program managers, and the chaplaincy board, procedures and metrics to ensure that accurate, consistent, and timely domestic violence training data are collected for chaplains. DOD stated that the family advocacy program managers were not the proponents of chaplain training and that this recommendation is more appropriately directed to the Military Departments. We agree. While we believe the recommendation is appropriately directed to the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, who has oversight over domestic abuse matters, we have modified our recommendation to include the services. In addition, DOD further stated that it is inappropriate for the department to engage in routine operator-level activity such as tracking training statistics. However, it is important to note that the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness has established metrics for tracking domestic abuse training for commanding officers and senior enlisted personnel and, in light of this fact, we continue to believe that the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness should also maintain procedures and metrics on domestic abuse training for chaplains, who play a critical role in assisting domestic violence victims. We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Defense and the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness. We will also make copies available to others upon request. In addition, the report will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov. Should you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me at 202-512-6304. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. Key contributors to this report are listed in appendix VI. In conducting our review of the Department of Defense’s (DOD) progress in implementing recommendations from the Defense Task Force on Domestic Violence, we contacted officials at the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness’ Family Violence Policy Office and Family Advocacy Program, Defense Manpower Data Center; Army’s Military Community and Family Support Center; Commander of Naval Installations; Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Force Management and Personnel; and Marine Corps Family Advocacy Program Office. We made 15 site visits to installations in the United States, Germany, Japan, and South Korea to collect documentation to assess the status of DOD’s efforts to implement the Defense Task Force on Domestic Violence’s recommendations. We selected locations based on the number of incidents of spouse abuse reported to the Family Advocacy Program office from 2000 through 2004, suggestions from DOD and service officials, and location—i.e., at least two installations per service domestically and at least one per service overseas. At each of these locations, we interviewed key personnel in positions such as installation commanders, provost marshals, commanders, legal officers, victim advocates, family advocacy managers, health care officials, chaplains, military police, and senior enlisted personnel because they were identified by the task force as having specific responsibilities pertaining to victim safety or offender accountability. Table 1 lists all of the installations we visited. To determine DOD’s ability to report on domestic violence in the military and the disciplinary actions taken by commanders to address these incidents, we reviewed and analyzed laws, directives, and other DOD and service policies and guidance for reporting domestic violence incidents including DOD’s Manual for Defense Incident-Based Reporting System 7730.47-M and DOD’s Manual for Child Maltreatment and Domestic Abuse Incident Reporting System 6400.1-M-1. We also reviewed and analyzed DOD domestic violence data obtained from the Defense Incident- Based Reporting System, Family Advocacy Program Central Registry, and reports to Congress on DOD domestic violence. To assess the reliability of the criminal and clinical data systems, we (1) reviewed existing information about the data and systems that produced them and (2) interviewed agency officials knowledgeable about the data. We also reviewed information on the collection methods used to gather, record, and report the data mentioned above and verified the reliability of the data in the Defense Incident-Based Reporting System and Family Advocacy Program Central Registry. We concluded that the data from both data systems were not complete enough to provide an accurate number of domestic violence incidents or commander actions. To determine the extent to which DOD has implemented the recommendations of the task force as well as the amount of resources provided to the office responsible for implementing the recommendations, we reviewed Defense Task Force on Domestic Violence reports and spoke with members of the defense task force that made the recommendations to DOD. In addition, we prepared a matrix summarizing the recommendations; obtained DOD’s status in implementing the recommendations, along with supporting documentation and evidence to corroborate implementation; and we interviewed or conducted focus groups with officials at the selected installations mentioned above to understand the guidance and training received by the officials and assess how they are implementing the recommendations. We also obtained from the installations supporting documentation for many of the implemented recommendations, including copies of memoranda of agreements with civilian law enforcement agencies, training materials, and guidance on military and civilian protection orders. Furthermore, we interviewed officials at the DOD Family Violence Policy Office, the office responsible for implementing the recommendations, and examined budget information to ascertain the funding and resources provided to this office. To facilitate the data-gathering process for all four questions, we developed and pretested our questions and data collection instruments at Fort Mead and Andrews Air Force Base, both located in Maryland. We identified the content of the instruments through a review of the task force report recommendations, service guidance, and other policy manuals. We ultimately used three types of data collection instruments at the 15 installations visited. Specifically: Focus group protocols were used to solicit information from two homogeneous groups: military police and senior enlisted personnel. The focus group protocol was used to increase the likelihood that the questions were asked and procedures were conducted in a standardized manner, regardless of which GAO analyst conducted the focus groups during the 15 site visits. For each focus group we required a minimum of 6- 10 participants. Participants were assured of anonymity and therefore encouraged to openly share their opinions. Advanced questions were sent to six types of officials at the installations we visited: unit commanders, legal officials, Family Advocacy Program managers, victim advocates, chaplains, and health care officials. The questionnaires were sent ahead of our visit and these groups were asked to fill out the questionnaires and return them to us before the interview. The purpose of the questionnaires was to obtain specific information such as training and budget information. Separate discussion group interview protocols were created for eight types of officials: installation commanders, provost marshals, unit commanders, legal officials, Family Advocacy Program managers, victim advocates, chaplains, and health care officials. When possible, we also interviewed civilian law enforcement officials around the military installation. While some of the questions were the same or very similar for some issues, the content of the discussion group interview protocols was tailored to the type of official interviewed. To determine the efforts DOD has taken to ensure the confidentiality of victims and the education and accountability of commanding officers and chaplains, we used the methodology for the second question as well as reviewed and analyzed DOD’s recently issued confidentiality policy, which provides limited confidentiality for victims. We also conducted discussion groups with commanding officers and chaplains at the installations visited to ascertain the training these officials have received and to address the accountability of these individuals. We reviewed and analyzed domestic violence training materials obtained from installation officials and officials at the service training schools to determine (1) the efforts DOD takes to educate commanding officers and chaplains, (2) whether such training is standardized, and (3) whether the training covers topics recommended by the task force on domestic violence. Additionally, we reviewed accreditation reports for installation Family Advocacy Program programs, where available, and other materials documenting the effectiveness of training programs, such as reports to DOD on training metrics. To determine the extent to which DOD has developed an overall framework to guide and evaluate implementation, we interviewed officials in the DOD Family Violence Policy Office, which is the office responsible for implementing the defense task force recommendations. We also reviewed and analyzed DOD regulations and guidance and reports submitted to the OSD Family Advocacy Program office to ascertain if DOD has an overall framework to guide and evaluate implementation of the recommendations. The Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 and Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government provided model criteria for determining the adequacy of the oversight framework. We conducted our review from July 2005 through March 2006 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. The Military Community and Family Policy Office has managed and provided the Family Violence Policy Office with approximately $23 million to implement task force recommendations since mid-2003. Table II shows funding and projects for fiscal years 2003 through 2005. Tables 3 through 7 contain the task force recommendations broken out by descriptive categories: Community Collaboration, Education and Training, Offender Accountability, Victim Safety, and Other. Each table groups the recommendations, by our analysis of the Department of Defense’s (DOD) actions taken. We split the Completed Actions group into two sections (1) actions that DOD took that directly implemented the task force recommendations and (2) completed actions taken that they believe meet the intent of the recommendation. The No Action Required group consists of recommendations DOD classified as complete, but actually disagreed with and took no action; recommendations DOD shows as having no action required because the recommendation was not applicable to DOD; or those recommendations where DOD indicated that the recommended actions were already being done. The Pending Actions group consists of those recommendations in which DOD, at the time of our review, was still working on or weighing its response. Not all tables contain recommendations that fit under each group identified above. As of March 2006, the Department of Defense (DOD) has issued 16 directive-type memoranda to implement the task force’s recommendations. Table 8 lists the memoranda and dates of issuance. DOD also issued 3 other memoranda that were not identified as directive- type memoranda but were related to the task force recommendations. These included the Deputy Secretary of Defense memorandum titled “Domestic Violence” dated November 19, 2001; the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Force Management Policy memoranda titled “Enlistment Waivers for Domestic Violence-Related Convictions” dated January 22, 2002; and the memorandum titled “Domestic Violence Prosecution Training” dated March 18, 2002. In addition to the person named above, Laura L. Durland, Assistant Director; James R. Bancroft; Renee S. Brown; Robert B. Brown; Carissa D. Bryant; Marion A. Gatling; Nicole Harms; Amanda Miller; J. P. Newton; Jeanett H. Reid; and Sonja S. Ware made key contributions to this report.

Summary: Due to concerns about domestic violence in the military and its adverse effect on mission readiness, Congress required the Department of Defense (DOD) to establish a task force to assess the services' response to domestic violence and recommend improvements. The task force issued three reports containing 194 recommendations. The Fiscal Year 2004 National Defense Authorization Act required GAO to review DOD's progress in implementing the recommendations. This report discusses (1) DOD's ability to report on domestic violence incidents and disciplinary actions, (2) the resources DOD has provided to implement the recommendations, and (3) DOD's specific actions to ensure victim confidentiality and the education of commanding officers, senior enlisted personnel, and chaplains. GAO also examined whether DOD has established an oversight framework to monitor implementation. DOD's ability to report on domestic violence incidents and disciplinary actions taken by commanders is hampered because the systems that the department uses to collect domestic violence information do not contain complete data. DOD's domestic violence database does not capture data from all law enforcement systems and, therefore, does not provide a complete accounting of reported incidents and actions taken by commanders. Notwithstanding the task force's recommendation to report on the number of domestic violence incidents, DOD and the services have not developed any plans to address the data limitations, which do not allow for visibility over domestic violence incidents. Without complete information on reported incidents of domestic violence and the steps taken by commanders to address these incidents, DOD will not know the size and nature of the problems or be able to assess the effectiveness of its actions. DOD has provided about $23 million to implement the recommendations and has made progress in this regard. Specifically, GAO identified 94 recommendations of varying potential importance as completed, 60 as pending further action, and 40 in which no action had been taken because DOD either disagreed with the recommendations or determined that they were not applicable to the department. Nonetheless, DOD faces challenges in completing the pending recommendations in a timely manner because of potential shortages of essential personnel in the office overseeing implementation. In addition, DOD's method of communicating its policy changes resulting from the recommendations has not ensured consistent practices and widespread understanding of the policies among DOD and the services. While DOD is taking steps toward ensuring confidentiality for victims and to train its personnel on domestic violence issues, additional efforts are needed. To ensure victim confidentiality, DOD issued a policy, effective April 22, 2006, allowing victims to report domestic violence to specified people without notifying command. In addition, DOD issued guidance requiring training and is providing several educational options. However, data regarding which chaplains have completed training are not available because the department and the services do not track this training. Chaplains play a special role in assisting domestic violence victims and, without complete training data, DOD may be unable to determine if chaplains have been provided the needed resources to assist victims. DOD has not established an oversight framework to monitor compliance with and evaluate implementation of the task force recommendations. While the task force recommended and DOD's draft domestic violence instruction requires monitoring and evaluation of domestic violence efforts, DOD has not established a process to do so. Without an overall management framework, DOD and Congress have limited visibility and oversight to evaluate DOD's implementation efforts and make needed improvements.