The State Partnership Program (SPP) is a Department of Defense (DOD) security cooperation program run by the National Guard. It also serves as a mechanism for training National Guard personnel. The current goals of the program are listed in Figure 1 . The SPP relates to several areas of potential interest to Congress, including improving the capabilities of partner nations to protect their citizens; strengthening relationships with partners to facilitate cooperation, access, and interoperability; improving cultural awareness and skills among U.S. military personnel; and fostering the integration of reserve and active component forces into a "total force." The SPP evolved from an effort begun in 1992 to use professional contacts between the U.S. military and the militaries of the newly independent nations of the former Soviet Union to help reform the defense establishments of those nations. The program has expanded greatly since then. Today, it is a significant component of DOD's security cooperation efforts, linking state and territorial National Guards in 63 partnerships with 70 partners nations (listed in Appendix A ). Nearly every state National Guard participates in the SPP, as do the National Guard of Guam, Puerto Rico, the U.S. Virgin Islands, and the District of Columbia. The SPP's rapid expansion has led to congressional scrutiny of the conformity of some SPP activities with the law, the effectiveness of the program, and the relationship of SPP activities to the priorities of U.S. geographic combatant commanders and U.S. ambassadors abroad. Congressional interest in SPP is also tied to broader concerns that some DOD security cooperation activities may encroach on, complicate, or conflict with State Department and U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) responsibilities and prerogatives. As previous published research on the program is limited, this report relies heavily on interviews with individuals at DOD, the National Guard Bureau (NGB), and the Department of State (DOS) who are involved with the program. As the Soviet Union disintegrated between 1989 and 1991, U.S. government officials explored options to minimize instability and encourage democratic governments in the former Soviet bloc nations. One effort to address these policy goals was to expand military-to-military contacts with the newly independent states of Central and Eastern Europe to promote subordination to civilian leadership, respect for human rights, and a defensively oriented military posture. At the time, most of these newly independent states had militaries that were based on the Soviet model and focused on countering threats from NATO nations. The United States European Command (USEUCOM) took the lead in this effort by establishing the Joint Contact Team Program (JCTP) in 1992. The JCTP was originally composed of active component personnel and included members of the special forces because of their language skills. However, when the JCTP began to engage the Baltic nations of Latvia, Estonia, and Lithuania, senior defense officials insisted that National Guard and Reserve personnel play a leading role in any military liaison teams operating in those countries, apparently in response to those governments' desire to establish reserve-centric defense establishments and to assuage Russian concerns about U.S. expansion into its former satellites. In November 1992, Lieutenant General John Conway, the Chief of the National Guard Bureau, and Brigadier General Thomas Lennon, head of the JCTP, visited the Baltics. A few months after their trip, in early 1993, the National Guard initiated the first state partnerships: New York-Estonia, Michigan-Latvia, and Pennsylvania-Lithuania. Additional partnerships were proposed later in 1993 for Albania, Belarus, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Kazakhstan, Romania, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Ukraine. The SPP benefited the JCTP by providing additional personnel, funding, and access to military personnel from U.S. ethnic-heritage communities who often had relevant language and cultural skills. Today, USEUCOM has 22 state partnerships. The SPP has also expanded beyond USEUCOM to other combatant commands (COCOMs) as shown in Figure 2 . United States Central Command (USCENTCOM) established its first partnership in 1995, between Arizona and Kazakhstan, and now has five partnerships. United States Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM) established four partnerships in 1996–Missouri-Panama, Louisiana-Belize, Kentucky-Ecuador, and West Virginia-Peru –and today has 21 partnerships. United States Pacific Command (USPACOM) established a partnership with two states–Guam and Hawaii–and the Philippines in 2000. It currently has six partnerships. United States Africa Command (USAFRICOM) established its first partnership, New York-South Africa, in 2003, while much of Africa was still part of USEUCOM. It currently has eight partnerships. United States Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) has one partnership, Rhode Island-Bahamas. It was established in 2005, when the Bahamas was within the USSOUTHCOM area of responsibility. See Appendix A for a full list of current state partnerships. The SPP conducts a variety of activities in support of partner nations. A list of some common types of partnership activities are provided below, along with a brief summary and an illustrative example. According to NGB, the typical SPP event is a week-long subject matter expert exchange, with three to five National Guard subject matter experts participating, with an average cost of approximately $20,000. Subject Matter Expert Exchanges. During these events, National Guard personnel with expertise in a certain area share their knowledge with partner nation personnel. For example, in 2005 [t]he Uruguayan Army's Infantry and Engineer units in Montevideo and Maldonado hosted the visit of U.S. Army National Guardsmen from Connecticut. During the [subject matter expert exchange], delegates visited Uruguayan Army units and discussed a wide range of topics to include peacekeeping and humanitarian de-mining operations, infantry and engineer training, as well as soldier and officer training at unit level. Familiarizations. These are demonstrations of certain capabilities that the Army or Air National Guard has, or discussions of policy issues related to those capabilities. For example, in the late 1990s, the Pennsylvania National Guard was instrumental in assisting Lithuania with the development of their Non-Commissioned Officer (NCO) Academy, which was modeled after the U.S. NCO Education System. A total of 26 Lithuanian officers participated in five train-the-trainer familiarization visits to Pennsylvania, with the focus on curriculum development for NCO course preparation at the newly created Lithuanian NCO Academy in Kaunas. These officers became acquainted with a diversity of topics such as medical specialist instructor course development; field artillery NCO course development; leadership; training management; democratic civil-military relations; NCO development; interoperability; and emergency operations. Senior Leader Visits. These are visits between senior leaders of the state National Guard, such as the adjutant general, and senior leaders of the partner nation's armed forces. For example, [i]n May 2001, the Georgia Guard had the honor of hosting 12 representatives from the Republic of Georgia along with representatives from the United States Department of State, [the] Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff and others for the Bilateral Working Group in Savannah, Georgia. The high-level discussions focused on Defense Reform, the Georgia Guard State Partnership Program, the Georgia Border Security Program, and the Helicopter Program. Participants were also able to observe a B-1B bombing demonstration at Hunter Army Airfield and activities at the Georgia Air National Guard Combat Readiness Training Center. Operational Mentor and Liaison Teams. Operational Mentor and Liaison Teams (OMLTs) provide mentoring and training for the Afghan National Army (ANA) and serve as liaisons between the ANA and the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan. They are composed of 13-30 personnel from one or more countries. National Guard personnel have embedded with their partner nation's OMLTs and accompanied them throughout their deployments to Afghanistan (they have also conducted similar embedded operations with partner nation forces in Iraq and Kosovo). One such deployment from 2010 is described as follows: Eleven Colorado Army National Guard Soldiers will pair up with 90 Slovenian soldiers and deploy to Afghanistan this October to form an Operational Mentor and Liaison Team. Their combined mission will be to train and mentor an Afghan National Army infantry battalion, better empowering it in the use of infantry maneuvers and tactics, so the ANA can ultimately take control of its military operations ... The [Colorado National Guard] and the Republic of Slovenia have become strong allies over their 17-year collaboration through the National Guard's State Partnership Program. The focus of SPP activities varies depending on the needs of the partner nation, the capabilities of the state National Guard, the goals of the respective U.S. ambassador and the combatant commander, and statutory authorities and restrictions. Some common focus areas are disaster management and disaster relief activities, military education, non-commissioned officer development, command and control, search and rescue, border operations, military medicine, port security, and military justice. The SPP is based upon a variety of statutory authorities (detailed in the section entitled " Statutory Authorities "). None of these authorities are specific to the SPP. They are authorities used generally by active and reserve component forces to conduct security cooperation activities. Accordingly, the SPP shares many similarities with other security cooperation activities carried out by the military. However, there are at least four factors that make the SPP unique. One unique aspect of the SPP is the ability to forge relationships between particular individuals over a long period of time. For active component personnel, a duty assignment that includes regular contact with the military of a foreign nation would typically last for about two to three years. At the end of the tour of duty, the U.S. servicemember would normally be reassigned as part of his or her career progression. In contrast, National Guard personnel participating in the SPP may well participate in engagements with partner nation military personnel repeatedly throughout their career. This is due to both the duration of the state National Guard and foreign nation partnership—some of which have been in existence for nearly two decades—and the frequency with which National Guard personnel serve their entire reserve careers within one state National Guard. Thus, for example, individuals who joined the Michigan National Guard in 1993 and continued to serve to the present would have had the opportunity to participate in SPP activities with Latvia numerous times over the past 18 years. In that time, both the Guard personnel and the foreign military personnel with whom they engaged will have been promoted to higher ranks, potentially providing for strong relationships between the now fairly senior National Guard and foreign military personnel. The ability to develop such long-term relationships are rare for active component personnel because of career assignment policies. An additional benefit of an enduring relationship is that it provides National Guard personnel with the opportunity to develop cultural knowledge, and potentially even language skills, based on their recurring contacts with the partner nation. Another aspect of the SPP that distinguishes it from similar engagements by active component forces stems from the National Guard's dual status as both a state and a federal organization. In its federal status, the National Guard is a reserve component of the Army and the Air Force and is trained, organized, and equipped to conduct a wide spectrum of military activities. However, the National Guard is also the organized militia of each state and in that capacity it routinely operates under the control of its state governor, typically to respond to disasters and civil disorders. National Guard personnel in a "Title 32 status" have also conducted counterdrug, border security, and airport security missions. The practical expertise the National Guard has acquired in these areas may be complemented by the skills that National Guard personnel develop in their civilian occupations. For example, a National Guard soldier may serve as an infantryman in his Guard unit, but may be a state trooper, paramedic, or emergency dispatcher in his civilian job. The expertise that National Guard units have acquired in conducting these types of operations are often in demand among foreign militaries, which frequently play a major role in their nation's disaster response plans, and which may play significant roles in their nation's border security, civil disorder, or counterdrug operations. Although active component forces have significant expertise in these areas—as evidenced, for example, by the role played by active component personnel in responding to the earthquake in Haiti and the floods in Pakistan in 2010—it is typically not exercised with the frequency of National Guard forces and, in certain cases, is intentionally limited by law. There is a limited supply of U.S. forces available to conduct security cooperation activities with foreign nations. Thus, combatant commanders target security cooperation activities toward foreign nations that they deem most important to engage at a given time. Some nations do not "compete well" in this process and are passed over for security cooperation activities. Combatant commanders target SPP activities toward their engagement priorities as well, but so long as a partnership exists a baseline level of roughly three SPP events per year are conducted even if the foreign nation is considered to be a comparatively low priority for engagement. From one perspective, this may be considered a long-term investment in nations that, while not currently priorities for engagement, may well become so in the future. From another perspective, this can be interpreted as a misallocation of limited resources; the National Guard assets might be better used engaging with higher priority nations. A final area in which the SPP differs from active component security cooperation activities lies in the role of individual states in the relationship. Active component security cooperation activities are purely federal in nature; there is no connection with any U.S. state. SPP activities have both a federal and a state connection, and this latter relationship can be important from several perspectives. For the state and the foreign nation, the SPP provides a link between senior state and foreign nation officials. The adjutant general (the head of a state National Guard) is typically a senior official in his or her state government, normally heading up the state department of military affairs, and sometimes leading the state department of emergency management or homeland security. This can provide a conduit for the state and the foreign nation to develop relationships beyond that with the state National Guard—for example, enhancing economic ties or conducting educational exchanges. From the federal perspective, a strong relationship between a state and a foreign nation could potentially contribute to a stronger relationship between the United States and the foreign nation. On the other hand, conflicts of interest could conceivably develop between the state and the United States in their relationships with the partner nation. The SPP has no dedicated statutory authority; rather, SPP activities are currently carried out under one or more Title 10 (Armed Forces), Title 32 (National Guard) and National Defense Authorization Act authorities that are related to the types of missions conducted. The main authorities that may be used by SPP are discussed below and summarized in Appendix B . There are circumstances in which a state National Guard may operate under Title 22 (Foreign Relations and Intercourse) authorities in support of their partner nation, but these activities are not considered to be "SPP events" by NGB. For a fuller discussion of such Title 22 activities, see Appendix C . One authority under which SPP activities may be carried out is 10 U.S.C. 168. It provides authority for the Secretary of Defense to fund military-to-military contacts "that are designed to encourage a democratic orientation of defense establishments and military forces of other countries." Under 10 U.S.C. 168, the Secretary may provide funds for nine specific purposes: (1) the activities of traveling contact teams, including transportation, translation services, or administrative expenses; (2) the activities of military liaison teams; (3) exchanges of civilian or military personnel between DOD and defense ministries of foreign governments; (4) exchanges of military personnel between units of the armed forces and units of foreign armed forces; (5) seminars and conferences held primarily in a theater of operations; (6) distribution of publications primarily in a theater of operations; (7) personnel expenses for DOD civilian and military personnel to the extent that these expenses relate to participation in an activity described at (3), (4), (5), or (6) above; (8) reimbursement of military personnel appropriations accounts for the pay and allowances paid to reserve component personnel for service while engaged in any of these activities; and (9) the assignment of personnel described in (3) and (4) can be made on a non-reciprocal basis if the Secretary of Defense considers such an assignment in the interest of the United States. SPP activities may also use other authorities, including 10 U.S.C. 1051 (Bilateral or Regional Cooperation Programs). This provision authorizes the Secretary of Defense to pay the travel, subsistence, and similar personal expenses of defense personnel of developing countries in connection with their attendance at a bilateral or regional conference, seminar, or similar meeting, with certain restrictions. An amendment in 2002 specifically extended this authority to NATO Partnership for Peace (PfP) country personnel traveling to other PfP countries. Section 1051 requires that the Secretary of Defense determine whether payment of authorized expenses is in the interest of U.S. national security. 10 U.S.C. 1050 (Latin American Cooperation). Section 1050 is similar to Section 1051, but specifically applies to the travel, subsistence, and special compensation of officers and students of Latin American countries and other expenses that the Secretary considers necessary for Latin American cooperation. 10 USC 1050a (African Cooperation). Section 1050a is nearly identical to Section 1050, except that it applies to officers and students of African nations. 10 U.S.C. 2010 (Combined Exercises). This provision authorizes the Secretary of Defense, after consultation with the Secretary of State, to pay incremental expenses incurred by a developing country as a direct result of participation in bilateral or multilateral military exercises. It requires that the exercises be undertaken primarily to enhance the security interests of the United States and that the Secretary of Defense determine whether a country's participation is necessary to achieve the fundamental objectives of the exercise. Another set of authorities revolve around humanitarian and civic assistance. Of the Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster Assistance, and Civic Assistance (OHDACA) programs, officials interviewed by CRS specifically mentioned 10 U.S.C. 401 and 2561. 10 U.S.C. 401 (Humanitarian and Civic Assistance). This provision authorizes DOD to carry out humanitarian and civic assistance activities in host nations in conjunction with military operations, if the activities promote the security interests of both nations and benefit the operational readiness skills of participating armed forces personnel. Humanitarian and civic assistance is defined to include medical, surgical, dental, and veterinary care in rural and underserved communities, rudimentary construction and repair of public buildings, well drilling, and construction of sanitary facilities and rudimentary surface transportation systems. 10 U.S.C. 2561 (Humanitarian Assistance) . This provision authorizes the expenditure of humanitarian assistance funds for the transportation of humanitarian relief and other humanitarian purposes. Other humanitarian assistance authorities may also be used, however, including 10 U.S.C. 402, 404, and 2557 (see Appendix B for a brief description of each). Several other security cooperation authorities have also been used in conjunction with SPP activities according to those interviewed by CRS. One is 10 U.S.C. 2249c, the Regional Defense Combating Terrorism Fellowship Program (CTFP), which authorizes the use of funds to pay the costs associated with the attendance of foreign military officers, ministry of defense officials, or security officials at U.S. military educational institutions, regional centers, conferences, seminars, and at civilian venues, or other training programs conducted under the CTFP. Another is the "Section 1206" building partnership capacity funding authority established by Section 1206 of the FY2006 National Defense Authorization Act ( P.L. 109-163 , as extended and amended). A third is the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program, which funds expenses related to preventing weapons proliferation and other activities. For SPP events conducted overseas, National Guard members are typically placed in a duty status by orders issued under the authority of 10 U.S.C. 12301. For SPP events conducted within the United States, National Guard members are placed in a duty status by order issued under 32 U.S.C. 502. This permits the participating members to receive appropriate military pay and benefits. Current funding for SPP activities includes the pay and allowances for the National Guard participants, which are normally funded by the Army and Air National Guard Personnel accounts of DOD appropriations. However, those who serve overseas full-time in support of the program (see " Institutional Arrangements " section) have their pay and allowances covered by the active component Army or Air Force Personnel account. Other significant costs for SPP are travel-related expenses, such as transportation, lodging, and meals. These expenses may be incurred by National Guard personnel or foreign military personnel participating in an SPP event. Such travel-related expenses are typically paid for out of one of the Operations and Maintenance (O&M) accounts, although some of the travel expenses for National Guard personnel may be paid out of Personnel accounts. This O&M funding has historically flowed to SPP through a number of programs and activities: Traditional Combatant Commander's Activities (TCA) National Guard Bureau's International Affairs Division Combatant Commander's Initiative Fund (CCIF) Warsaw Initiative Fund/Partnership for Peace (WIF/PfP) Combating Terrorism Fellowship Program (CFTP) Cooperative Threat Reduction Program (CTR) Asia-Pacific Regional Initiative Fund (APRI) Latin American Cooperation (LATAM COOP) Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster, and Civic Assistance (OHDCA) Minuteman Fellowship (MMF; no longer in existence) Much of the management of SPP activities is handled by SPP coordinators assigned to each state's National Guard headquarters, and by military officers assigned full-time to the U.S. embassy accredited to the partner nation—normally from the state National Guard involved in the partnership—whose duty description includes coordinating SPP and often other DOD security cooperation activities. The COCOMs manage this latter group, providing for their pay and performance evaluations. These officers serve in a Title 10 status, typically hold the rank of Captain through Lieutenant Colonel, but have different titles and tours of duty depending on the COCOM to which they are assigned. For example, officers serving in embassies within the USEUCOM area of responsibility are known as Bilateral Affairs Officers (BAOs) and serve two-year tours, which can be extended. Those in the USSOUTHCOM area of responsibility are known as Traditional Commander's Activities coordinators (TCAs) and are usually on six-month temporary duty assignments, which can be extended. In nations without a BAO, TCA, or similar officer, the state's SPP coordinator travels to the partner nation to coordinate SPP activities. The National Guard Bureau would prefer to have a BAO, TCA, or similar officer stationed at the U.S. embassy for each of the 63 partnerships, and it is currently working on a plan to fund this. According to NGB representatives interviewed for this report, the U.S. ambassador to a given country must approve the establishment of a state partnership with that nation, as well as all SPP activities conducted therein. The process normally requires approval by the ambassador, combatant commander, and the state National Guard before activities are conducted. If NGB funds are used for an activity, the NGB must also approve the activity. In a "model" flow scheme, proposed activities are (1) developed by the BAO, TCA, or SPP coordinator with the partner countries; (2) discussed with and approved by the home state National Guard; (3) presented to the ambassador for approval; and (4) presented to the combatant commander for final approval. However, the actual process for coordinating SPP activities varies by country and COCOM. Three broad concerns about the SPP have arisen. First, some past SPP events have included funding for engagements involving U.S. civilians and foreign civilians when such funding appears to have been beyond the scope of the law. Second, some allege that SPP activities have not always been effectively linked to the priorities of the combatant commander and the U.S. ambassador. Third, at a more general level, some are concerned that DOD security cooperation activities, including SPP events, extend the influence of the U.S. military too far into the domain of the Department of State and the U.S. Agency for International Development, resulting in a "militarization of foreign policy." Each of these concerns is discussed below. The SPP relies on a wide variety of statutory authorities to conduct its activities. Some of these authorities are more permissive than others in terms of civilian engagement. For example, 10 U.S.C. 401 authorizes U.S. military personnel to provide "humanitarian and civic assistance" in certain circumstances. Coordinating such assistance might require engagement with civilian officials from the partner nation's health, public safety, or transportation ministries. On the other hand, 10 U.S.C. 168 is targeted toward "military-to- military contacts and comparable activities" and most of the authorized activities under this provision involve U.S. or foreign military personnel only. Funding for exchanges with foreign civilian personnel are authorized, but only if they are part of the defense ministry of a foreign government. Concerns have been raised that certain past SPP events may have funded U.S. or foreign civilian participation when such funding was outside the scope of the statutes involved. Such concerns appear to be the genesis of the statutory language in the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for FY2010 to require regulations on the use of funds for SPP activities and to mandate reports on "civilian engagement activities" conducted under SPP (see " Recent Legislative and Executive Branch Activity "). While DOD has not yet submitted the required reports to Congress on civilian engagement activities, it appears that during 2009 and 2010, the SPP spent slightly more than $1 million per year on costs associated with U.S. and foreign civilians participating in SPP events, although it is unclear what proportion of these civilian engagements, if any, were not in compliance with statutory requirements. According to some DOD representatives, combatant commanders have recently been told to carefully examine programs to ensure that any foreign civilians participating in SPP activities are there at the request of the partner country's Ministry of Defense (MOD) and contribute to the MOD's ability to carry out its assigned mission. The NGB has stressed that the SPP no longer funds purely non-defense related civilian engagements, but simply acts as a sort of "clearing house" for information between interested civilian parties from the state and partner nation. A second concern about the SPP is that its activities in certain countries have not been well coordinated with the combatant command and the U.S. embassy, and as a result the activities have not always been effectively linked with the priorities of the combatant commander or the ambassador. It is difficult to assess the validity of this criticism with the limited data available. However, if accurate, these comments might indicate the need for more robust and standardized event coordination procedures to ensure that the priorities of the combatant commander and the ambassador are incorporated throughout the SPP activity planning process. In the past few years, the NGB has implemented procedures to address this concern for all of the SPP activities that it funds, but this does not necessarily apply to SPP activities funded in other ways. Statute now prohibits funds from being expended for SPP activities in foreign countries unless the activities are jointly approved by the combatant commander and the chief of mission for the U.S. embassy (see " Recent Legislative and Executive Branch Activity "). This is designed to ensure that all future SPP activities are fully coordinated with the combatant command and the U.S. embassy. However, the degree to which this requirement aligns SPP activities with combatant commanders' and ambassadors' priorities will depend on how it is implemented in each country. Events with a limited connection to these priorities could potentially be approved, simply because the National Guard is able to conduct the event and the partner nation wants to participate. Some SPP activities are conducted in conjunction with authorities that are the subject of a broader concern about the "militarization" of U.S. foreign assistance. These include, in particular, the "Section 1206" global train and equip authority ( P.L. 109-163 ) and 10 U.S.C. 401 humanitarian and civic assistance authority. For several years, some policymakers and experts have criticized Section 1206 as a prominent example of the expansion of DOD authorities to train and educate foreign military forces. (For the past 50 years, programs to train, equip, and educate foreign military forces have generally been conducted under State Department authority). In addition, DOD's use of humanitarian and civic assistance exercises has been criticized as at times inconsistent with or detrimental to long-term development goals in the countries where they are carried out. In many cases these experts argue, such activities should be conducted by military personnel under the aegis and funding of the State Department or USAID. The use of the National Guard for these activities may add further dimensions to the militarization debate. Deployed abroad, National Guard personnel are equivalent to other U.S. military personnel under U.S. law, but they may also bring to bear a civilian's skills, experiences, and sensibilities that may alleviate some concerns when and if drawn upon for missions abroad. The Senate version of the National Defense Authorization Act for FY2010 contained a provision (Section 1212) addressing the availability of appropriated funds for the SPP. This provision permitted the Secretary of Defense to use funds appropriated to DOD in FY2010 to pay the costs incurred by the National Guard in conducting SPP activities to "(1) support the objectives of the commander of the combatant command for the theater of operations in which such activities are conducted" or "(2) to build international civil-military partnerships and capacity on matters relating to defense and security." The provision also prohibited funds to be expended for activities in foreign countries unless the activities were jointly approved by the combatant commander and the chief of mission for the U.S. embassy. Finally, it allowed members of other federal agencies to participate in SPP activities, with their agencies reimbursing DOD for the cost associated with their participation. The House version of the FY2010 NDAA had no similar provision. The conferees agreed to revised language (Section 1210) to require the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the Secretary of State, to prescribe regulations regarding the use of funds appropriated to DOD to pay for costs incurred by the National Guard in conducting activities under the SPP. It did not specify what types of activities were authorized as the Senate provision had. It included the prohibition on funds being expended for SPP activities in foreign countries unless the activities were jointly approved by the combatant commander and the chief of mission, but dropped the language concerning participation and reimbursement of expenses by personnel from other federal agencies. It also added a requirement that the Secretary of Defense submit a report to the Armed Services and Foreign Affairs Committees in the House and Senate describing "the civilian engagement activities conducted under the State Partnership Program, including a detailed description of the activities undertaken and funds expended in the previous fiscal year under the State Partnership Program." In response to the FY2010 NDAA requirement that the Secretary of Defense prescribe regulations regarding the use of funds for SPP activities, DOD has drafted a Directive Type Memorandum (DTM) which is in the final stages of approval. In the interim, the NGB sent out a planning guidance memorandum in October 2010, which addressed the appropriate types and objectives of SPP events that use NGB funding. Among other things, this guidance requires that "[t]he event must be designed and executed such that the MoD of the PN [partner nation] is the focal point of SPP interaction," "[t]he event objective(s) must clearly serve to support the U.S. Chief of Mission (CoM) and GCC's [Geographic Combatant Commander's] theater and country security objectives," and "the event must be approved by the appropriate GCC and the U.S. CoM of the affected PN." The FY2010 NDAA also mandated that DOD provide certain congressional committees with a series of reports "describing the civilian engagement activities conducted under the State Partnership Program." The first of these reports was due January 26, 2010, with additional reports on the topic due at the end of FY2010 through FY2013. As of this writing, neither the initial report nor the FY2010 report had been submitted to Congress as required. However, it appears that during 2009 and 2010, the SPP spent slightly more than $1 million per year on costs associated with U.S. and foreign civilians participating in SPP events. Some decision makers have raised concerns about the nature of SPP activities. Some past SPP events may have included funding for U.S. civilian and foreign civilian participation when such funding was outside the scope of the statutes involved (see " Civilian Engagements "). The NGB has issued guidance intended to prevent such occurrences, and the Department of Defense is expected to release a Directive Type Memorandum in the near future more clearly specifying authorized SPP activities. In October 2010, the State Department in conjunction with the National Guard conducted a survey of U.S. ambassadors, asking them for their perspective on various aspects of the SPP. Of the 62 embassies surveyed, 41 responded. All but one respondent agreed that "the SPP was valuable in helping meet [the] Post's goals and objectives." Several combatant commanders have also commented favorably on the program during recent congressional testimony. To date, however, written assessments of SPP have been limited in scope and focused on "outputs"—for example, the number and type of events conducted with partner nations—rather than on "outcomes," such as improvements in specified capabilities of a partner nation or the impact on specific defense reform initiatives of a partner nation. This lack of data is not specific to SPP but, according to a recent RAND report, is common to security cooperation programs in general: Security cooperation activities conducted by DoD entities with other nations' defense organizations range from the very visible—training, equipping, and exercising together—to those that are less obvious, such as holding bilateral talks, workshops, and conferences and providing education. Yet, it is often challenging to determine if these activities have contributed to U.S. objectives—whether at the level of national security, department, COCOM, or service—and if so, by how much or in what ways. Because security cooperation is both dispersed and long-term, it is difficult to measure. At present, program assessments are inconsistent and of varying quality. They may lack objectivity since they are frequently conducted by the organizations that implement the programs. A comprehensive framework for assessing is lacking, although efforts are in place to remedy that deficiency. The NGB's International Affairs Division is currently developing "measures of effectiveness" that will be used in the future to measure progress toward achieving program goals. Some policymakers may argue for a larger State Department role in SPP administration and oversight from Washington, especially if they are concerned about the expansion of DOD into foreign assistance-type activities. The Secretary of State is, by law, responsible for the direction and oversight of all military education and training programs, no matter what title they fall under. This duty is exercised directly for the traditional education and training programs governed by Title 22 (Foreign Affairs) authorities. For Title 10 and other DOD authorities with a training and education aspect, as well as for other foreign assistance activities, specific requirements for the Secretary of State's concurrence or consultation are sometimes written into the law. In addition, the DOS has primary responsibility and authority for all foreign assistance activities. Nevertheless, Congress has increasingly authorized DOD, through Title 10 or annual legislation, to conduct security assistance and security cooperation programs. Some policymakers and analysts have viewed this trend as detrimental to coherent U.S. foreign policymaking and conduct over the long run. Others view security cooperation as an increasingly important "core competency" of the U.S. military and advocate a broader role for the Department of Defense in security assistance and security cooperation. SPP activities are currently conducted under Title 10, Title 32 and National Defense Authorization Act authorities. A few of these authorities require a State Department role, but even then the mandates are not consistent. Events conducted under 10 U.S.C. 168 (Military to Military Contacts), 10 U.S.C. 401 (Humanitarian and Civic Assistance), and Section 1206 ( P.L. 109-163 , as amended, Building Partnership Capacity) require the approval of the Secretary of State; 10 U.S.C. 2010 (Participation of Developing Countries in Combined Exercises) requires consultation with Secretary of State; and 10 U.S.C. 2557 (Excess-Non-Lethal Supplies) involves the Secretary of State. (For most of these, however, the Secretary of State apparently has delegated coordination responsibility.) The remaining authorities used for SPP events (see Appendix B ) have no statutory requirement for any level of State Department involvement. However, in the case of at least one authority, 10 U.S.C. 2249c (Regional Defense Combating Terrorism Fellowship Program), DOD and the State Department have established an informal coordination system. Currently, the State Department does not play a systematic role in SPP administration and oversight globally. Unlike some other DOD security cooperation activities, no one at the State Department is charged with the responsibility of overseeing all SPP programs. State Department involvement is focused at the embassy level, where the ambassador (or other chief of mission) must approve SPP proposals. At the State Department itself, country desk officers are informed of SPP activities. Issues arising from SPP missions are handled by the country desks and their regional bureaus. In addition, the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs and Office of the Special Representative for Global Intergovernmental Affairs (S/SRGIA) often engage the NGB on policy matters pertaining to the SPP. To some Members of Congress, the expansion of the SPP to 63 partnerships over the past two decades requires that they be conducted under a new, coherent, overarching SPP authority, rather than under multiple and diverse Title 10 and NDAA authorities. From this perspective, a single statute could provide a clear, coherent, and permanent framework for the National Guard to conduct SPP activities, clarifying purposes and permitted events, standardizing interagency coordination, and regulating the use of funds. For instance, a dedicated SPP statute might be used to set a single standard for State Department input. It might also be used to mandate centralized oversight of the program. Currently, the NGB approves activities that it funds, and the COCOMs exercise approval over SPP activities that they fund. No single organization, however, is responsible for overseeing and standardizing all activities. The lack of a set of standards for SPP and of a single oversight body may have contributed in the past to confusion about what constitutes an appropriate SPP event; some past SPP events might have been outside the scope of the statutes involved. Among those interviewed for this report, a number who were directly involved with SPP suggested that the program could better serve U.S. interests if it were modified in one or more of the following ways. One approach would focus the program on specific mission sets in which the National Guard has particular expertise or civilian acquired skills. Another approach would allow greater participation by U.S. civilians in SPP events. A third perspective would include a wider range of foreign civilians as participants. However, such changes were critiqued by other individuals interviewed. The National Guard is a unique organization in that it is both a state and a federal entity. In its federal status, the National Guard is a reserve component of the Army and Air Force, and focuses on developing and using military skills. As a state organization, however, it focuses largely on emergency management, particularly with respect to natural disasters, and responding to civil disorders. This expertise can be especially valuable to partner nations in which the military plays a leading role in responding to natural disasters, securing the nation's borders, or controlling civil unrest. Some supporters of the SPP argue that the program should be reshaped to recognize this unique niche that the National Guard can fill. On the other hand, this could open the program and participants to scrutiny if partner nation personnel were trained in a manner inconsistent with military doctrine, were trained on topics not covered by military doctrine, or received inconsistent training due to the varied backgrounds of the instructors. Some supporters of the SPP argue that, while remaining "Guard-centric," it should be adapted to become a "whole of government" program. From this perspective, the National Guard would remain the backbone of the program, but federal, state, and local government employees should also be allowed to participate in the program if they could contribute effectively to a given event. Under this vision, if a SPP event in a foreign country were to focus on emergency management, there might be participants from the Federal Emergency Management Agency, the state emergency management agency, and local first responders in addition to the National Guard participants. Another aspect of this concept would allow National Guard personnel to participate based on their civilian acquired skills, rather than just their military skills. This would allow the National Guard to provide a broader array of expertise to foreign nations in support of U.S. objectives. For example, some National Guard personnel have civilian employment with police or other law enforcement institutions. Their civilian expertise could be used to share information and advice with countries in which the United States had a strong interest in enhancing the administration of justice and rule of law. However, permitting this would likely raise concerns about the content of the information provided, to ensure that it supports U.S. objectives, and the need to standardize the program of instruction for the purpose of consistency. Such a shift in the staffing and nature of SPP events might call into question the management of the SPP by DOD. With a broader array of governmental participation, the DOS might be better suited to oversee the program, perhaps with DOD as the executive agent. The NGB recently issued guidance for SPP events that it funds which limits participation by foreign civilians (see " Recent Legislative and Executive Branch Activity "). Under this guidance, foreign civilians could participate in an SPP event in certain circumstances—for example, if they worked for the foreign nation Ministry of Defense (MOD), or in certain cases if they were invited by the MOD—but funding for engagements with other foreign civilians were generally not authorized. Some supporters of SPP argue that these restrictions do not always correspond well with the structure of foreign governments, and that they erect a barrier to what have in the past been fruitful areas of cooperation. With respect to the first point, supporters note that some countries have armed forces that do not fall under the MOD, but may instead fall under a border security agency or an independent counterterrorism agency. With respect to the second point, supporters argue that foreign civilian agencies often play a critical role in the stability and security of their nations, and interacting with these agencies can advance U.S. security interests. For example, they note that non-defense ministries—such as a Ministry of Interior or a Ministry of Emergency Situations—often have "security sector" type responsibilities. The DOD regulations regarding funding for activities conducted under the SPP, as required by Section 1210 of the FY2010 National Defense Authorization Act, are supposed to be finalized in the near future by way of a Directive Type Memorandum (DTM). The DTM will subsequently be converted into a Department of Defense Instruction (DODI). Monitoring its implementation will allow Congress to determine whether it effectively defines appropriate activities and constrains unauthorized activities. It should also provide Congress with additional information on areas of the program that merit particular attention if Congress later elects to codify the program in law. However, as the DTM is bound by existing statutory guidance, it will have a limited ability to resolve some of the tensions relating to types of missions performed, authorized participants, and oversight responsibilities. To ensure that the SPP is contributing substantially to U.S. objectives, and in a cost-effective manner, Congress may wish to review the SPP's program goals, assessment methodology, and internal assessments. Congress may also wish to evaluate how robustly SPP events support key plans, including combatant commanders' Theater Campaign Plans (TCPs) and U.S. ambassadors' Mission Strategic and Resource Plans (MSRPs). It could do this through committee hearings or by requiring periodic reports to Congress on the topic. Alternatively, it could direct a review by an external agency, such as the Government Accountability Office. NGB currently exercises approval authority over any activities that it funds, but not over activities that COCOMs fund. Each COCOM exercises approval authority over SPP activities within its area of responsibility, but not over activities elsewhere. There is no centralized oversight of the program. This may increase the possibility of mistakes being made in the administration of the program. Requiring a single organization—such as NGB, the Defense Security Cooperation Agency, or the Department of State—to have approval authority over all SPP activities might facilitate a more standardized approach to the program and thereby improve program administration. On the other hand, adding an additional layer of management could make event coordination cumbersome. Because of the wide array of statutory authorities and funding sources that SPP currently draws upon, it takes significant effort and legal guidance to determine which SPP activities are permissible and which are not. This may generate confusion and lead to approval of SPP activities that are outside the scope of the law. Therefore, Congress may consider establishing specific parameters for SPP activities in law. Depending on the content of the DTM that DOD is currently developing for the SPP, Congress may consider a variety of statutory responses. Congress could codify that guidance if it sets adequate standards and procedures to ensure the appropriate use of funds and adequate oversight. If the DOD guidance lacks those elements, Congress may develop its own guidelines for the program. This authority might contain a list of the type of events permitted, the purposes they are to serve, the appropriate funding sources, a mandate for State Department approval or consultation, and periodic reports to Congress. This approach might have drawbacks. Depending on how it is drafted, such a law might restrict the current broad range of SPP activities and impose new requirements that limit flexibility and timeliness. SPP activities may also be more difficult to implement under a law if it contains more coordination requirements than under current authorities governed by unifying DOD guidance. If Congress chooses to codify the program in law, some areas that may deserve particular attention are detailed below. Some have advocated modifications to the current program focusing on missions sets in which the National Guard has particular military expertise or in which National Guard personnel have civilian expertise, allowing certain U.S. civilians and a wider range of foreign civilians to participate in SPP events. Congress may include language that details the scope of authorized activities, the extent to which U.S. citizens other than members of the National Guard can participate, and the types of foreign personnel they can engage. It may require standardized programs of instruction for topics that fall outside of current military doctrine. If state, local, or private sector individuals are allowed to participate in SPP, Congress may establish the circumstances under which their participation can be funded by the federal government and provide for reimbursement mechanisms in other circumstances. Though determining the effectiveness of security cooperation programs such as SPP is inherently challenging, it is an area that Congress may wish to address in any SPP statute. To this end, Congress may consider defining certain program goals in law, provide some guidance on an assessment methodology, stipulate the frequency of assessments, assign responsibility to a particular office, and require periodic reports from the executive branch on the topic. If Congress were to adopt a new statute governing the SPP, some may question whether it should be placed under Title 10 of the U.S. Code , which covers the armed forces, or Title 22, in which the State Department generally has the lead. Those who prefer Title 10 would note that SPP activities are currently conducted under Title 10 and NDAA authorities, and that SPP funding is provided through the DOD budget. In addition, SPP programs may be more flexible and easier to implement under Title 10. On the other hand, the State Department has used the National Guard for Title 22 training activities with their foreign partners (see Appendix C ), and some Members may prefer that SPP events be placed under Title 22. SPP events may have side effects for foreign policy not anticipated by state government and DOD planners or ambassadors. Some may argue for greater State Department oversight to ensure that state governments are aware of foreign policy concerns and guidelines, especially if these events are accompanied by or lead to non-defense-related engagements of U.S. and foreign civilians. If placed under Title 22, the program could take on more of a public diplomacy role. For example, Congress might more readily provide authority under Title 22 for SPP to use National Guard troops for activities using their civilian skills instead of just their military skills. Similarly, under Title 22 authority Congress might be more willing to dispense with the requirement under some Title 10 authorities used for SPP that the primary purpose of training events be the training of U.S. forces, possibly providing a broader range of activities for SPP. Placing SPP under Title 22, however, may well add another layer of complexity for state-based organizations with little experience operating with the Department of State. It might weaken the ability of the combatant commanders to use SPP to engage with foreign militaries, and thereby reduce their interest in supporting the program. In addition, placing SPP under Title 22 might shift the focus away from using the military skills of the National Guard personnel in favor of their civilian expertise, which could limit the utility of SPP in exercising the military skills of participants. Finally, State Department capacity to oversee military programs is viewed as having limitations and some may argue for augmenting this capacity before adding additional duties. Appendix A. State Partnerships: Table and World Map Appendix A. Appendix B. Title 10 and National Defense Authorization Act Authorities That May Be Used by the SPP Appendix C. State Partnerships and Title 22 Authorities According to NGB representatives, the SPP currently operates only under Title 10, Title 32 and National Defense Authorization Act authorities. Under this definition, therefore, SPP events do not occur under Title 22 authorities at the present time. However, there are circumstances in which a state National Guard might operate under Title 22 authorities in support of their partner nation. For example, a nation that is approved to receive peacekeeping training under the Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI) may request that the state National Guard it is partnered with provide some of the trainers. If such a request were approved by the appropriate DOS and DOD officials, then GPOI funds would be used to fund some of the expenses associated with the state National Guard training of its partner nation's forces. While these are not considered to be "SPP events" by NGB, the distinction may not be apparent to many of those participating in the training. Individuals interviewed for this report referred to three Title 22 authorities that have been used in the past to fund training by a state National Guard with its partner nation. They are listed below. Determining the frequency of such Title 22 events was outside the scope of this report, but they appear to have been relatively infrequent in comparison to the frequency of Title 10 SPP events. Appropriations for these three Title 22 programs are provided under the State Department's Security Assistance (previously the Military Assistance) account. Global Peace Operations Initiative. Through GPOI the U.S. government provides foreign military forces from developing countries with training in peacekeeping skills and helps develop associated peacekeeping capacity. GPOI was built on the earlier African Contingency Operations Training and Assistance (ACOTA) program and its Africa component often is still referred to by that acronym. The State Department is primarily responsible for the program, but works closely with DOD to plan and implement programs through DOD's Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) and the geographic Combatant Commands. Authorization is provided by Section 551 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (FAA, P.L. 87-195; 22 U.S.C. 2348), as amended. International Military Education and Training Program. The IMET program provides foreign military personnel with the opportunity to attend a variety of U.S. military educational institutions and training courses. The Expanded-IMET (E-IMET) component provides foreign civilian and military leaders and mangers of foreign military establishments with opportunities to enhance their skills in managing and administering military establishments and budgets, creating and maintaining effective military judicial systems and military codes of conduct (including observance of international recognized human rights), and fostering respect for the principle of civilian control of the military. The State Department, with input from DOD, decides which foreign countries will be permitted to participate and their respective funding levels. DOD's DSCA implements the program. Authorization is provided by Section 541 of the Foreign Assistance Act (FAA, P.L. 87-195; 22 U.S.C. 2347), as amended. Foreign Military Sales and Foreign Military Financing Programs . The FMS program is the United States government's primary vehicle for sales of weapons and associated equipment and training to friendly foreign governments. Through the FMF element of the program, the U.S. government may extend loans to countries that have difficulty paying for needed weapons, military equipment, and related items, or it may forgive payments altogether. The State Department is primarily responsible for determining which nations receive military assistance from this program. DOD's DSCA bears primary responsibility for implementing the program. FMS is authorized by Sections 1-4 of the Arms Export Control Act (AECA, P.L. 90-629; 22 U.S.C. 2751 - 2754), as amended; FMF is authorized by Section 23 of the AECA (22 U.S.C. 2763). 

Summary: The State Partnership Program (SPP) is a Department of Defense (DOD) security cooperation program run by the National Guard. It also serves as a mechanism for training National Guard personnel. Since the program began in 1992, it has expanded to the point where nearly every state National Guard participates, as do the National Guard of Guam, Puerto Rico, the U.S. Virgin Islands, and the District of Columbia. The SPP relates to several areas of potential interest to Congress, including improving the capabilities of partner nations to protect their citizens; strengthening relationships with partners to facilitate cooperation, access, and interoperability; improving cultural awareness and skills among U.S. military personnel; and fostering the integration of reserve and active component forces into a "total force." In addition, the rapid expansion of the SPP has led to congressional scrutiny of the conformity of some SPP activities with the law, the effectiveness of the program, and the relationship of SPP activities to the priorities of U.S. geographic combatant commanders and U.S. ambassadors abroad. Congressional interest in SPP is also tied to broader concerns that some DOD security cooperation activities may encroach on, complicate, or conflict with State Department and U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) responsibilities and prerogatives. The SPP conducts a variety of activities in support of partner nations, including exchanges of subject matter experts, demonstrations of certain military capabilities, discussions of policy issues, and visits between senior leaders of a state National Guard and senior leaders of the partner nations armed forces. These interactions commonly focus on topics such as disaster management, command and control, search and rescue, border operations, military medicine, and military education. In some of the more developed partnerships, teams of National Guard personnel have embedded with the military forces of its partner nations as they prepared for and deployed to Afghanistan, Iraq, and Kosovo. The SPP is based on general statutory authorities used by active and reserve component forces to conduct security cooperation. Some unique aspects of the SPP include the potential for establishing enduring relationships between individuals in the state National Guard and their peers in the partner nation's armed forces; the ability to share specialized expertise about topics such as disaster response, civil disorder, counter-narcotics operations, and border security; and the ability to link senior officials of a state with senior officials of a foreign nation, which can open avenues for greater cooperation between the state and the partner nation in non-military areas. This report traces the origin and development of the program; summarizes its unique aspects; and outlines its statutory basis, funding mechanisms, organization, and activities. It details recent legislative and executive branch actions. It also explores issues that may merit congressional attention and provides options for policymakers who may be interested in modifying the program.