The Department of State is the lead agency in formulating and implementing U.S. foreign policy. The department represents the United States in about 172 countries, operating approximately 266 embassies, consulates, and other posts. During several years in the 1990s, State lost more staff than it hired, and the resultant shortfalls of staff and skills endangered diplomatic readiness. To address these shortfalls, in 2002, State implemented DRI, a $197 million effort designed to address a range of goals. In particular, the goals of DRI were to hire 1,158 new foreign and civil service employees over a 3-year period, support training opportunities for staff, enhance the department’s ability to respond to crises and emerging priorities overseas and at critical domestic locations, improve State’s hiring processes to recruit personnel from more diverse experiences and cultural backgrounds, and fill critical skill gaps. Table 1 shows DRI hiring goals for fiscal year 2002 through fiscal 2004. As of October 2005, State had about 19,000 American employees, including FSOs, also called generalists; foreign service specialists; and civil servants. FSO generalists help formulate and implement the foreign policy of the United States and are grouped into five career tracks: management, consular, economic, political, and public diplomacy. Foreign service specialists provide support services at overseas posts worldwide or in Washington, D.C., and are grouped into seven major categories: administration, construction engineering, information technology, international information and English language programs, medical and health, office management, and security. Civil service employees support the foreign policy mission from offices in Washington, D.C., and across the United States. About 65 percent of Foreign Service employees serve overseas. State’s policy is that foreign service employees are to be available for service worldwide. The process of assigning Foreign Service staff to their positions begins when the staff receive a list of upcoming vacancies for which they may compete. Staff then submit a list of positions for which they want to be considered, or “bids,” and consult with their career development officer. The process varies, depending on an officer’s grade and functional specialty. Figure 1 describes this process. About 64 percent of full-time FSOs serving overseas are assigned to hardship posts. State defines hardship posts as those locations where the U.S. government provides differential pay incentives—an additional 5 to 35 percent of base pay, depending on the severity or difficult of the conditions—to encourage employees to bid on assignments at these posts and to compensate them for the hardships they encounter there. A hardship differential is established for a location only when that location involves extraordinarily difficult living conditions, excessive physical hardship, or notably unhealthful conditions affecting the majority of employees officially stationed or detailed there. Living costs are not considered in differential determination. Among the conditions that State considers in determining hardship pay are poor medical facilities, substandard schools for children, severe climate, high crime, political instability, physical isolation, and lack of spousal employment opportunities. Some hardship posts have greater difficulty in attracting qualified bidders than others. In response to severe staffing shortages at such posts, State established the Service Need Differential (SND) Program, which began with the 2001 summer assignments cycle. Under this program, an employee who accepts a 3-year assignment at a post designated for SND is eligible to receive an additional hardship differential over and above existing hardship differentials, equal to 15 percent of the employee’s base salary. However, chiefs of mission, principal officers, and deputy chiefs of mission are not eligible to receive SND regardless of the length of their tours. Entry-level employees on 2-year tours directed by the Office of Career Development and Assignments (HR/CDA) are also ineligible for SND. State’s geographic bureaus initially identified the posts designated to offer SND in 2001 and may add or remove posts once per year. The program included 38 posts the first year. Table 2 lists the fiscal year 2006 SND posts. In addition, in 2002, State established a working group to examine incentives to encourage bidding on hardship posts. The working group evaluated over 80 suggestions and ideas, such as requiring hardship service for promotion to the senior foreign service and allowing employees to negotiate shorter tours of duty. State implemented about 25 of the suggestions. As of October 2005, State had 3,267 positions—43 percent of all foreign service positions overseas—designated as requiring some level of foreign language proficiency. These positions span about 69 languages. State places the required languages into three categories based on the amount of time it takes to learn them. Category I languages are world languages, such as Spanish and French, which relate closely to English. Fifty-five percent of the language- designated positions require proficiency in a world language. Category II languages, such as Albanian or Urdu, are languages with significant linguistic or cultural differences from English. State refers to such languages as “hard” languages. Twenty-nine percent of the language- designated positions require proficiency in a hard language. Category III, the “superhard” languages, include Arabic and Chinese, and are exceptionally difficult for native English speakers to learn. Sixteen percent of the language-designated positions require proficiency in a superhard language. Figure 2 shows the percentage of language-designated positions by category. State’s philosophy is to hire officers with a wide range of skills that it believes are predictors of success in the foreign service. It does not hire exclusively for skills that State can train, such as foreign languages. As a result, State’s primary approach to meeting its language requirements is through language training, primarily through classes provided at its training arm, the Foreign Service Institute (FSI). FSI’s School of Language Studies offers training in more than 60 languages. FSI also provides full- time advance training in superhard languages at FSI field schools and programs overseas. In addition, overseas posts offer part-time language training through post language programs funded by the regional bureaus and their posts. Although State’s main emphasis is on enhancing its foreign language capability through training, it does have special mechanisms to recruit personnel with foreign language skills. For example, applicants who pass the oral assessment can raise their ranking by passing a language test in any foreign language used by State. Additional credit is given to candidates who pass a test in languages that State has deemed as critical needs languages, including Arabic; Chinese; Korean; Russian; Turkic languages (Azerbaijani, Kazakh, Kyrgyz, Turkish, Turkmen, and Uzbek); Indic languages (Urdu, Hindi, Nepali, Bengali, Punjabi); and Iranian languages (Farsi/Persian, Tajiki, Pashto). Officers hired under this initiative must serve in a post that requires the language for which they were recruited, for their first or second tour. Although DRI brought in a large number of new FSOs, it made minimal impact in addressing the staffing gaps at hardship posts, largely because of new staffing demands in Iraq and Afghanistan. The department has implemented new incentives to address the chronic mid-level shortfalls at hardship posts; however, since implementing these incentives, State has not yet evaluated their effectiveness. In our review, we found that mid- level staffing gaps persist; bids for mid-level positions at hardship posts have not increased significantly since we reported in 2002; and positions normally held by mid-level officers are typically staffed by junior officers, sometimes on their first assignment, with few mid-level officers to provide supervision or guidance. Recently, State launched the Global Repositioning Initiative, which will move positions from places like Europe and Washington D.C., to critical posts in areas such as Africa and the Middle East. However, it is too early to evaluate the effectiveness of this initiative, and State’s reluctance to direct its employees to serve in locations where they have not bid on, means that these redirected positions may remain vacant. Since 2002, under its DRI, State has increased its number of permanent positions and available staff worldwide for both the foreign and civil service, but these increases were largely offset by urgent staffing demands at critical posts in countries such as Iraq and Afghanistan. In 2002, State had more than 500 unstaffed foreign service positions; in 2005, there were fewer than 200 such openings. However, the deficit in civil service staffing has increased. In 2002, State had over 800 unfilled civil service positions; in 2005, there were over 1,700 such positions. State hired most of its new staff through DRI, bringing in more than 1,000 new employees above attrition, thus achieving its numerical hiring goals. These employees were hired primarily to allow staff time for critical job training—also referred to as a “training float”—to staff overseas posts, and to be available to respond to new emerging priorities. However, according to State’s Human Resources officials, DRI’s goals became quickly outdated as new pressures resulted from staffing demands for Iraq and Afghanistan. For example, the department has currently levied what it calls an “Iraq tax” on all its bureaus in order to support its operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. In the past 2 years, bureaus have had to give up a total of 280 mid-level generalist and specialist positions for Iraq, and it is anticipated that another such tax will be imposed for 2007. Beginning in 2001, in an effort to address the growing number of mid-level vacancies at hardship posts, State created a series of incentives—including extra pay and negotiated tour lengths—to attract mid-level employees to hardship posts around the world. For example, the SND Program offers employees an extra 15 percent pay for an additional year of service at the most difficult to staff posts. While State has information on the number of officers actually enrolled in the program, it was not able to provide data on the number of eligible officers who did not. State’s Director General and officials from its HR/CDA said that State has not completed any formal evaluations of the incentives; instead, officials from the HR/CDA meet informally to discuss how well the incentives are working. Without formal evaluations, the department has not been able to systematically measure whether the extra hardship pay incentive has had a significant impact on staffing at hardship posts. Senior officials with whom we spoke in Washington, D.C., and FSOs at hardship posts had mixed views on whether the SND program has been effective. Some officers stated that the pay differential was indeed a factor in their decision to bid on the post. However, several former ambassadors and the Executive Director of the Bureau of African Affairs said they believe the program has not attracted additional bidders to African posts. These officials stated that the incentive has had limited impact at posts that were already offering a 25 percent pay differential because the additional incentive is offset by the harsh conditions at such posts. While it may be too early too assess the effectiveness of more recently implemented initiatives, such as negotiated tour lengths, former and current ambassadors with whom we spoke stated that this initiative may not benefit posts. In particular, they noted that although negotiating a shorter tour length might initially attract bidders to hardship posts, such frequent rotations negatively affect a post’s ability to carry out the United States’ foreign policy goals. For example, according to State, the average length of tours at posts in the Muslim world is about 22 percent shorter than those elsewhere. Noting the prevalence of 1-year tours in the Muslim world, a senior official at State said that officers with shorter tours tend to produce less effective work than those with longer ones. In addition to incentives, State has implemented a new career development program—the Generalist Career Development Program— that stipulates service at a hardship post as a requirement for consideration of promotion to the senior foreign service. The new requirements include a mandatory tour at a 15 percent differential or greater hardship post. Officials from HR/CDA stated that it was too early to tell whether this new requirement for promotion to the senior foreign service will be effective in attracting mid-level officers to hardship posts. State’s largest staffing gaps continue to be at mid-level. These and other gaps are exacerbated by continued low bidding for positions at hardship posts. Furthermore, many mid-level vacancies are filled by junior officers. Staff have cited family issues and the lack of locality pay comparable with what they would receive in Washington, D.C., as being among the key disincentives to bidding for hardship positions. As of December 2005, State had a combined deficit of 154 officers, with the largest staffing deficits continuing to affect mid-level positions across all career tracks. Table 3 shows staffing surpluses and deficits by career track for foreign service generalists as of December 31, 2005. In 2003, State officials told us that it would take about 9 to 10 years to eliminate the mid-level gap. Officials whom we met with more recently said it would take several years for DRI hiring to begin addressing the mid- level staffing shortages because the earliest DRI hires are just now being promoted to the mid-level. On average, it takes approximately 4.3 years for a junior officer to receive a promotion to the mid-level. According to State’s comments on this report, the department expects to eliminate mid- level deficits by 2010. Although bidding for hardship posts with the smallest pay differentials has increased slightly since we last reported on this issue in 2002, it remained about the same for posts with the highest differentials, such as those with 20 and 25 percent. Figure 3 shows the average number of bids on FS-02, FS-03, and tenured FS-04 mid-level positions at overseas posts by differential rate for the 2005 summer assignments cycle. Overall, posts in Africa, the Middle East, and South Asia continue to receive the lowest number of bids, averaging about 4 or 5 bids per position, while posts in Europe and the Western Hemisphere receive the highest bids, averaging 15 and 17, respectively. For example, in 2005, posts in Bujumbura, Burundi; Lagos and Abuja, Nigeria; Riyadh, Saudi Arabia; and Calcutta, India; received, on average, between zero and two bids per mid-level officer position. In addition, we found that in the 2005 assignments cycle, 104 mid- level positions had no bidders at all, including 67 positions in Africa and the Middle East. Consular positions in the posts with the highest hardship differential (25 percent) continued to receive some of the lowest number of bids in 2005. As shown in figure 4, consular positions at 25 percent differential posts received, on average, only 2.5 bids per position compared with 18 for nonhardship posts. Low numbers of bids at hardship posts have resulted in positions remaining vacant for long periods of time. For example, a senior consular position in Lagos, Nigeria, has been vacant since July 2001, and a consular chief position in Shenyang was vacant from December 2003 until August 2004. Such gaps negatively impact a post’s ability to carry out its mission. In 2005 consular and public diplomacy positions were the hardest to fill, with 91 percent of the vacancies in these two tracks at the mid-level. Although the department has seen an increase in spending on U.S. public diplomacy programs, several embassy officials stated that they do not have the capacity to effectively utilize increased funds. Moreover, these staffing gaps also limit the amount of training public diplomacy officers receive, because many officers are sent to fill a position quickly and never benefit from full training, ultimately limiting the success of their public diplomacy outreach efforts. Further, due to staffing shortages in consular sections around the world, there are fewer staff to implement the new interview requirements and screening procedures for visas, resulting in extensive wait times for applicants for visa interviews at consular posts overseas. From November 2004 through May 2005, there were 63 posts reporting wait times of 30 or more days on a given month, signaling a significant resource problem for State. In order to fill vacancies, primarily at hardship posts, State sometimes allows stretch assignments, which enable staff to bid for a position at either a higher grade than their current grade level (called an “upstretch”) or a lower grade (a “downstretch”). Often, upstretch assignments are offered as a reward and career-enhancing opportunity for staff who have demonstrated outstanding performance, and many officers successfully fulfill the duties requested of the higher grade level. However, a 2004 report by State’s Inspector General found that in many African posts, for example, there were significant deficiencies in the ability, training, and experience of FSOs serving in upstretch assignments. At posts we visited in early 2006, we found staffing conditions similar to those we reported on in 2002, when we found experience gaps and other staffing shortfalls at hardship posts. For example, in 2002, we reported that, in the 10-officer consular section in Lagos, only the consul had more than one tour of consular experience. In addition, we reported that the office had many unfilled mid-level positions, many of which were at the time being staffed by first-tour junior officers and civil service employees who had never served overseas. In our most recent visit, we found that the consulate in Lagos was staffed by a mix of officers, including numerous junior officers in stretch positions. Moreover, many officers in stretch positions at hardship posts continue to lack the managerial experience or supervisory guidance needed to effectively perform their job-duties. Junior officers in consular sections at hardship posts consistently reported that they lack management guidance. In addition, junior officers in stretch assignments at the various posts we visited stated that, without mid-level officers to guide them, many times they can only turn to senior management, including the ambassador, for assistance. According to a 2004 State Inspector General report, more time is spent by senior staff, including ambassadors, on operational matters, and less time is devoted to overall planning, policy, and coordination than should be the case. Many junior officers also stated that, although they were filling stretch positions at the mid-level, they were not allowed to receive management training from State due to their lower grade status. According to one officer, she requested management training to help her manage staff in accordance with her role as acting chief of a key section of the embassy, but was denied the opportunity because, despite her current assignment, she was not a tenured mid-level officer. Senior management at posts we visited shared some of these concerns. A former Deputy Chief of Mission in Nigeria stated that it is extremely difficult for junior officers to work in stretch assignments when there are few mid-level officers to guide them. Ambassadors at these posts also stated that, although many junior officers entering the foreign service are highly qualified, they did not have sufficient training to handle some of the high stress situations they encounter and often end up making mistakes. For example, according to the U.S. Ambassador to Nigeria—the third largest mission in Africa with nearly 800 employees—the embassy presently had only three senior officers at the time of our visit, and public affairs were handled entirely by first tour junior officers. Also, according to U.S. officials in Beijing, the mid-level consular manager positions in Shenyang and Chengdu, China—two locations with high incidence of visa fraud—were held by first tour junior officers at the time of our visit. We observed similar shortages and employees staffed above their grades in consular sections in Africa and China when we reported on staffing of hardship posts in 2002. Consular chiefs in Beijing raised concerns about the lack of management guidance and supervision available to junior officers due to the lack of mid-level officers at constituent posts in China. One consular chief stated that the lack of adequate supervision at constituent posts requires that he or his deputy frequently travel to the posts outside of Beijing to provide guidance to the junior officers. Another was concerned that her caseload limited the amount of guidance she was able to give to her constituent posts. Other areas, such as regional security, are also compromised as a result of mid-level vacancies. Security officers at one hardship post told us that, without mid-level staff, they sometimes lack the resources to adequately perform basic duties, such as accompanying the ambassador on diplomatic travel or, as was the case during a recent visit by the First Lady, providing adequate personnel to accompany her staff. Former ambassadors with whom we spoke expressed serious concerns about the department’s diplomatic readiness and conveyed their belief that a post’s ability to carry out critical duties is significantly compromised when the proper staffing levels, and particularly well-trained officers, are not in place. Many of the overseas staff we whom we met cited family considerations— child-related and spousal employment concerns, in particular—as the greatest obstacle to attracting mid-level officers to hardship posts. The spouses and other household members of FSOs who responded to a State internet survey listed spousal employment as the primary reason why officers do not bid for hardship posts. In many hardship posts, it is extremely difficult for spouses to find employment, particularly in China and most of South Asia, where bilateral work agreements are not in place. State officials told us that the department has recently initiated new programs to mitigate this problem, such as providing fellowships for spouses to continue their professional development, offering online courses or entrepreneurial workshops to encourage small business development, or training spouses to find employment in the local economy. The department plans to expand these programs in the future with a particular emphasis on spouses in hardship locations. The survey respondents also listed child-related issues as a major factor in the officers not bidding for positions. A particular concern is that many hardship posts do not have appropriate schooling for American children, thus limiting options for employees with families. In Sana’a, Yemen, for example, post positions are only available to staff with children under age 5 or over 21 due to a lack of schools. This has been an outstanding concern for the Sana’a post, and post officials told us that post management is heavily engaged in trying to find a solution to the problem. In addition, the number of unaccompanied posts has increased in recent years, making it difficult for employees with families to bid on them. As of April 2006, there were 21 unaccompanied and limited accompanied posts and more than 700 positions at such posts. Moreover, State officials said that this number will probably increase due to increasing security concerns around the world. Lastly, officers and State personnel we interviewed both, at hardship posts and in Washington, D.C., consistently cited the lack of locality pay as a deterrent to bidding at hardship positions. In 2002, we reported that the differences in the statutes governing domestic locality pay and differential pay for overseas service had created a gap in compensation penalizing overseas employees. This gap grows every year, as domestic locality pay rates increase, creating an ever-increasing financial disincentive for overseas employees to bid on hardship posts. After accounting for domestic locality pay for Washington, D.C., a 25 percent hardship post differential is eroded to approximately 8 percent. As estimated in our 2002 report, differential pay incentives for the 15 percent differential hardship posts are now less than the locality pay for Washington, D.C., which is currently 17 percent and can be expected to soon surpass the 20 percent differential hardship posts. Currently, there is legislation pending in Congress to alleviate the locality pay disparity by providing FSOs stationed outside the United States with locality-based pay equal to that of Washington, D.C. However, there has been no final action in Congress regarding this legislation since 2005. Despite chronic staffing shortages at hardship posts, especially at the mid- level, State is reluctant to use its authority to direct assignments based on risk and priorities at particular posts; rather, it assigns employees to posts for which they have expressed interest. According to State officials, State has rarely directed FSOs to serve in locations for which they have not bid on a position, including hardship posts or locations of strategic importance to the United States, due to concerns of an increase in poor morale or lower productivity. With continuing budgetary limitations, it will be increasingly difficult for the department to increase financial incentives for hardship posts; moreover, given the lack of an increase in bidders, the effectiveness of such incentives is questionable. State’s Global Repositioning Initiative, announced in January 2006, will move positions from Washington and Europe to critical posts in Africa, South Asia, and the Middle East. However, there is no guarantee that these positions will be filled because bidding will continue to be on a voluntary basis. Throughout the past decade, some State officials have urged the department to employ a more aggressive strategy to ensure that employees serve where their skills are needed most. Additionally, despite concerns of an increase in low morale, several officials whom we spoke with at hardship posts believe that in order to effectively address these persistent staffing gaps, State needs to direct assignments more often, particularly to hard-to-fill posts. State has made several efforts in recent years to enhance its foreign language capabilities, in particular by increasing the number of its language-designated positions and its efforts to recruit and hire staff with foreign language skills, as well as by creating additional language requirements and incentives for staff. However, significant foreign language gaps remain, and State has not assessed the effectiveness of its efforts to increase its language capabilities. State has made several efforts to improve its foreign language capabilities, including creating additional language-designated positions and enhancing recruiting efforts. State has increased the number of language-designated positions by 27 percent. In 2001, there were 2,581 (29 percent) of all foreign service positions that required some level of foreign language proficiency. As of October 2005, there were 3,267 positions (43 percent) that required some level of foreign language proficiency. These positions span about 69 languages. State has also enhanced its efforts to recruit and hire FSOs with language skills. For example, State’s Office of Recruitment has targeted its recruiting outreach efforts to universities with strong language programs and conferences of language professionals, as well as associations and professional organizations, such as the Arab American Institute, that have members already fluent in critical needs languages. In addition, State offers bonus points on the foreign service exam to candidates who demonstrate proficiency in critical needs languages. State then requires these officers to serve in positions that will employ their language skills during their first or second assignment. As of April, 2006, almost 80 percent of entry level officers who received additional exam points for their critical language skills were assigned to locations that could utilize their language within their first or second tour. State has also implemented career development criteria, effective January 1, 2005, that require, among other things, foreign language proficiency as a prerequisite for consideration for promotion. Specifically, in order to become eligible for promotion to the senior foreign service, generalists must demonstrate the ability to read and write a foreign language at a general professional level. State’s career development criteria for some specialists also contain language proficiency requirements. In addition to these requirements, State has developed financial incentives for officers with certain proficiency levels in critical languages. Moreover, State has enhanced its overseas language programs through various initiatives, including expanded use of overseas language schools and post language programs, as well as by increasing the number of weeks of training offered in certain critical languages and by providing language immersion courses for officers transitioning to new posts. Despite its efforts to enhance the language capabilities of its staff, State continues to fill language-designated positions with staff who do not meet the proficiency requirements. Even some officers who met the requirements told us their language ability was not adequate for them to effectively perform their job-related responsibilities. Furthermore, some officers believe that State’s assignment and promotion system hindered their ability to maintain their language skills over time. Officials whom we met with at several posts described a number of situations in which the posts’ operations were adversely effected by their lack of language proficiency. State has not assessed the effectiveness of its efforts to increase its language capabilities or conducted a risk assessment to prioritize the allocation of foreign language resources. State assesses language proficiency based on a scale established by the federal Interagency Language Roundtable. The scale has six levels—0 to 5—with 5 being the most proficient (see table 4). Proficiency requirements for language-designated positions at State tend to congregate at the second and third levels of the scale. When proficiency substantially exceeds one base skill level yet does not fully meet the criteria for the next base level, a plus sign (+) designation may be added. We compared the language proficiency of staff in all language-designated positions as of October 2005 with the requirements for the positions, and our analysis showed that 71 percent of all worldwide language-designated positions were filled by individuals who met the position’s proficiency requirements, while 29 percent of the positions were not. Language deficiencies exist world-wide, but were among the greatest in the Middle East, a region of great importance to the war on terror, where 37 percent of all language-designated positions were filled by staff without the language skills required of their positions. The skills gap was even greater at some critical posts; for example, 59 percent in Cairo, Egypt; and 60 percent in Sana’a, Yemen. See appendix III for the worldwide percentages of staff filling language-designated positions that did not meet the language speaking and reading requirements of their positions. To further illustrate how skill gaps differ among languages of varying levels of difficulty, we analyzed data on superhard, hard, and world language-designated positions. Our analysis showed that the greatest deficiencies existed for positions requiring superhard languages, such as Arabic, compared with hard and world languages. Almost 40 percent of superhard language-designated positions worldwide (465 positions) were filled by individuals who did not meet the language requirements of their position; this figure was 30 and 25 percent for hard and world language designated positions, respectively. Further, the highest percentage— almost 40 percent—of superhard positions filled by officers that did not meet the speaking and reading language requirements were among positions requiring Arabic, Chinese, and Japanese. (See fig. 5). 25% (393) 62% (289) 38% (176) 75% (1162) (66) (80) 60% (120) (25) (38) Further analysis of Arabic and Chinese, two languages spoken in regions of strategic interest to the United States, showed that the percentage of staff that did not meet language requirements for their positions varied by career tracks. For example, 100 percent of the staff filling positions in the management career track requiring Arabic and 88 percent of the staff filling positions in the management career track requiring Chinese did not meet the language requirements of their positions. Foreign service specialists—staff who perform security, technical, and other support functions—also had high percentages of staff that did not meet the Chinese or Arabic language requirements of their positions. In particular, 72 and 75 percent of specialist positions requiring Chinese and Arabic, respectively, were filled by staff who did not meet the language requirement. (See table 5). Six of the specialists we met with in Beijing said they did not receive sufficient language training before arriving at post. State officials have acknowledged that foreign service specialists have not received the required amount of training, and FSI officials attributed this situation to time constraints. Most specialists only have enough time to participate in FSI’s Familiarization and Short-term Training language courses designed for beginners with 2 months or less time to devote to training. State’s Director General, in a cable issued in January 2006, stated that the department has been shortsighted in not providing training to specialists, especially office management specialists, and stated that required training would be available for specialists in the future. Some officers whom we met with who attained the proficiency requirements for their assignments stated that they were not sufficiently fluent to effectively perform their jobs. For example, the 50 language- designated, junior officer consular positions at posts requiring Chinese require proficiency at a speaking level of 2 and reading level of 0. Consular officers we met with in China who tested at that level said they could ask appropriate questions during consular interviews, but could not always understand the answers. They pointed out that Spanish or French language-designated consular positions require a level-3 speaking and reading language proficiency. Moreover, a survey of junior officers currently serving in China revealed that most of the officers not interested in serving in China again cited language issues as the primary reason. According to the Deputy Chief of Mission in Sana’a, the level-3 Arabic speaking and reading proficiency requirements for senior officers do not provide staff with the proficiency needed to participate in debates about U.S. foreign policy. He described an instance when he was asked to appear as an embassy spokesperson on an Arabic language media program. The program, which involved a debate format and addressed U.S. politics, lasted 1 hour and was conducted entirely in Arabic. The official said that, given his 4+proficiency in Arabic, he was the only official at the embassy capable of engaging in such a debate. According to a State Inspector General report on Embassy Tel Aviv, the duties inherent in consular positions require staff to have better speaking and reading Hebrew language skills than the required level 2. Therefore, the Office of the Inspector General recommended that entry-level officers be given the opportunity to study Hebrew for 4 weeks in Tel Aviv before they begin work at the embassy. Another Inspector General report said that staff in Cairo who speak Arabic below the required level-3 would prefer to be able to speak at a more advanced level to conduct effective public outreach. Officials from the Foreign Service Institute agreed that a level-3 speaking and reading language proficiency in Arabic and Chinese was more appropriate for junior officers assigned to consular positions, but they explained that language-designated position requirements are set at a level officers can realistically achieve in the limited amount of time available to obtain training. Several FSOs we met with said they believe State’s current assignment and promotion system may hinder officers’ ability to enhance and maintain their language skills over time, as well as State’s ability to take advantage of those skills and the investment it makes in training. For example, State’s requirements for tenure stipulate that junior officers work in a variety of regions and jobs to prepare them for careers as generalists, while State’s assignment regulations do not allow junior officers and specialists to serve consecutive tours at the same post. As a result, junior officers are often assigned to second tours that do not utilize the language skills they acquired for their first tour. For example, according to FSI, assignments to Russian-speaking posts would be complemented by assignments elsewhere in the world or Washington, D.C., to provide the broader experience required at the senior level. There is also a perception among some officers that spending too much time in one region can lead to being labeled as too narrowly specialized, which could adversely impact the officers’ career. However, a senior State official asserted that the belief that regional specialization hurts an officer’s career is untrue, and, further, that State’s new career development plan supports regional specialization. In addition, the short length of some tours, such as 1-year unaccompanied assignments, may not give an officer sufficient time to master a language. According to State’s Inspector General, as long as unaccompanied assignments are restricted to 1 year, there is little incentive for officers to seek extensive language training. In an effort to make better use of the department’s training investment, the FSI has encouraged officers and specialists to take FSI courses to refine their language skills and achieve greater facility when dealing with the local community. But officers in both Yemen and China stated that State’s assignment system does not allow for sufficient time between assignments to utilize FSI’s continued language training. Compounding this problem, officers stated that their language skills often diminish when a new assignment takes them to a region requiring different language skills. According to FSI, the need to fill gaps at posts, the lack of a training float, and other circumstances particular to individual staff—such as family issues, learning difficulties and aptitude, and application—hinder FSI’s language training efforts. State’s foreign language gaps may negatively impact posts’ operations. According to the Assistant Secretaries of State for Education and Cultural Affairs and Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, deficits in foreign language education negatively affect our national security, diplomacy, law enforcement, intelligence gathering efforts, and cultural understanding by preventing effective communication in foreign media environments, impeding counter-terrorism efforts, and limiting our capacity to work with people and governments in post conflict zones. We found examples of this negative impact involving a variety of officers and specialists serving in language-designated positions without the required foreign language skills. Consular officers: Officials at one high visa fraud post that we visited stated that, due to language skill deficiencies, consular officers sometimes adjudicate visas without fully understanding everything the applicants tell them during visa interviews. In Jakarta, where almost all visa interviews are conducted in Indonesian, the consul general position was filled, at the time of our review, by an officer with a language waiver, making supervision and monitoring of the six first tour junior consular officers problematic. Economic and political officers: An economic officer in a superhard language-speaking country had been conducting several important negotiations in English with foreign government officials over a number of months with little results. When the officials began discussing the same issue in the host country language, the whole tenure of the negotiations changed. According to the officer, one of the foreign government officials who did not understand English, and was therefore silent throughout the initial meetings, had actually been the most valuable source of information all along, yet could only convey that information when the meeting was conducted in his own language. Additionally, according to senior officials in two of the countries we visited, officers without fluent language skills who accompany them to high-level meetings often produce inaccurate notes. Since these notes provide a basis for the embassy’s reporting, the officials spend a great deal of time correcting notes rather than addressing more pressing concerns. Furthermore, in Beirut, State’s Inspector General reported that most of the political and economic officers did not receive the Arabic-language training needed to work professionally in Lebanon, limiting opportunities to expand their contacts to the less sophisticated urban areas and into the countryside. Public diplomacy officers: Officers at many posts cannot communicate effectively with foreign audiences in local languages, hampering their ability to cultivate personal relationships and explain U.S. foreign policy. According to a recent GAO report many public diplomacy officers in the Muslim world cannot communicate with local audiences as well as their positions require. For example, an information officer in Cairo stated that his office does not have enough Arabic speaking staff to engage the Egyptian media effectively. According to a State Inspector General inspection report on the U.S. embassy in Damascus, public affairs officers need Arabic language skills to maintain and expand contacts with nongovernmental, human rights, and civil society groups, but the language training offered in Damascus fails to prepare them for the idiomatic Arabic spoken in the country. Management officers: According to one ambassador we met with, a senior level embassy official, who did not have sufficient speaking and reading language requirements for his position, met with a prime minister, but was unable to participate fully in the top-secret discussion without an outside translator present. However, because the prime minister would not speak freely with the translator present, the meeting was not productive. Foreign service specialists: A regional security officer stated that lack of foreign language capability may hinder intelligence gathering because local informants are reluctant to speak through locally hired interpreters. State has yet to evaluate the effectiveness of its efforts to improve its foreign language capabilities. In 2002, we reported that State did not know whether its language incentives had helped to close skill gaps for certain languages. We recommended that State adopt a strategic, results-oriented approach to its human capital management and workforce planning. We recommended an approach that included setting strategic direction, assessing agency gaps in foreign language skills, developing an action plan, and monitoring its implementation and level of success. In response, State described a number of activities it was undertaking as examples of how it had addressed many of the elements of workforce planning. However, we noted that State still needed to develop an action plan for correcting foreign language shortfalls and institute a monitoring process to assess the action plan’s implementation and performance. In 2003, we reported that State had not established numerical targets for the number of individuals with hard-to-learn language skills it aimed to hire. We also reported that State could not provide current or historical data showing the number of individuals it hired as a direct result of its targeted outreach efforts. We further recommended that State collect and maintain data on the effectiveness of its efforts to address language gaps. At the time of that review, State said that it maintains data on its recruitment efforts. More recently, State’s Director of Recruitment, Examination, and Employment told us that State has made greater use of technology to track the results of its outreach efforts. However, State was not using these data to routinely and systematically evaluate the effectiveness of its efforts. For example, when we asked for data to demonstrate whether the percentage of new hires with foreign language skills had increased since our last review, State initially told us that such data were not available. State also told us that it still could not link the results of its hiring to its targeted outreach efforts. In its comments on this report, State provided a skills gap analysis, which it submitted to the Office of Management and Budget under the President’s Management Agenda, as an example of how it evaluates the effectiveness of its efforts to increase the language proficiency of its FSO generalists and specialists. This submission included targets for increasing the number of officers who speak and read a language at a level 3 or above in fiscal year 2007. However, these targets were not linked to individual languages. GAO’s internal control standards instruct agencies to identify risks that could impede the efficient and effective achievement of their objectives and assess their impact. State has not conducted an assessment that would prioritize the resources it devotes to specific languages based on risk. However, a number of potential risks are associated with not having staff with the right language skills at critical posts, including the risks of (1) adjudicating visas to the wrong applicants, thereby jeopardizing U.S. national security; (2) missing opportunities to advance U.S. foreign policy positions due to ineffective communication with foreign media environments; and (3) compromising U.S. intelligence gathering as a result of lost information from potential informants. State’s Director General has said that State has not conducted the type of risk assessment that would potentially reallocate resources from one area to another based on strategic importance. Instead, State refines its critical needs languages list on a yearly basis. Despite the progress made under the DRI, critical gaps in staffing at hardship posts and shortages of staff with foreign language proficiency in critical languages continue to impact State’s diplomatic readiness. State has provided a variety of incentives and taken a number of other actions to attract staff to hardship posts and to improve its foreign language capabilities since we last reported on this issue in 2003; however, State has not evaluated these efforts. Further, some mid-level positions at hardship posts continue to remain vacant for years, and we found that bids for such positions have not increased significantly. Moreover, State has resisted using its authority to direct staff to hardship posts to fill critical vacancies. Similarly, State has not conducted the type of risk assessment of its critical language needs that would allow it to reallocate limited staffing, training, and other resources to fill critical language gaps in areas of high priority. Because State does not currently have a sufficient level and mix of staffing and language resources to immediately fill all of its gaps in these areas, choices must be made about diplomatic readiness priorities, given the risk and strategic interests in particular regions and countries. Without taking a risk-based approach to the allocation of these limited resources, these gaps will continue to compromise State’s ability to carry out its foreign policy objectives and execute critical mission functions, including reaching out to foreign audiences in regions of critical importance to the war on terror. To enhance staffing levels and skills at hardship posts as well as the language proficiency of FSOs and other staff, this report recommends that the Secretary of State take the following five actions: Consider using directed assignments, as necessary, using a risk-based approach, to fill critical positions with fully qualified officers who have the skills and experience necessary to effectively manage and supervise essential mission functions at hardship posts; Systematically evaluate the effectiveness of the department’s incentive programs for hardship post assignments, establishing specific indicators of progress and adjusting the use of the incentives based on this analysis; Consider an assignment system that allows for longer tours, consecutive assignments in certain countries, and more regional specialization in certain areas, in order to hone officers’ skills in certain superhard languages and better leverage the investment State makes in language training; Systematically evaluate the effectiveness of its efforts to improve the language proficiency of its FSOs and specialists, establishing specific indicators of progress in filling language gaps and adjusting its efforts, accordingly; and Conduct a risk assessment of critical language needs in regions and countries of strategic importance, make realistic projections of the staff time and related training float necessary to adequately train personnel to meet those needs, and target its limited resources for language training, as needed, to fill these critical gaps. State provided written comments on a draft of this report. The comments and our responses to specific points are reprinted in appendix IV. State generally concurred with the report’s observations, conclusions, and recommendations. For example, State said it would consider using directed assignments when necessary and evaluate the effectiveness of its incentives programs. The department also stated that it is examining its assignment system and expects to make significant changes that will address many of the concerns noted in this report. State described a number of programs that it has initiated to address staffing and foreign language shortfalls. State cited the Generalist Career Development Program and its Global Repositioning Initiative as examples of efforts to encourage service at hardship posts and enhance foreign language proficiency. State commented that it is evaluating the effectiveness of its efforts to improve the language capabilities of its staff. However, while State is evaluating some components of its efforts to enhance language capabilities, it is not doing so routinely and systematically. For example, it did not compile data to determine whether the percentage of new hires with language skills had increased until we requested it, and State acknowledged that the department still could not link the results of its hiring to its targeted outreach efforts. In addition, State commented that it conducts a risk assessment when the department reassesses its language needs when realigning positions to support administration priorities, conducts annual reviews of language designations of positions, and modifies its critical language requirements to align with its diplomatic strategies. However, State does not conduct the type of assessment that we are recommending, which would allocate language resources based on the strategic importance of a country or region and the risks associated with not having language-proficient staff at posts in those locations. We are sending this report to other interested Members of Congress and to the Secretary of State. We will also make copies available to others upon request. In addition, the report will be available at http://www.gao.gov. If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 512-4128 or fordj@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made major contributions to this report are listed in appendix V. To assess the Department of State’s (State) progress in eliminating staffing gaps, we reviewed GAO and State Office of Inspector General reports, reviewed documentation on the goals and results of the Diplomatic Readiness Initiative (DRI) and reports on incentives to attract bidders to hardship posts, analyzed staffing and vacancy data, including State surplus/deficit reports, analyzed 2004 and 2005 bidding data to determine the average number of bids per posts by hardship differential and by career track, and interviewed officials in State’s Bureau of Human Resources and Bureau of Consular Affairs and six regional bureaus regarding vacancy and staffing issues. To determine the total staff surplus/deficit at the Department of State, we analyzed State staffing data and compared the number of positions in each career track with the number of FSOs in each track. To calculate the deficit for the mid-level officers, we used data for FS-01, FS-02, and FS-03. For example, if the total number of employees in the consular career track is 1,055 and the total number of consular positions is 1,866, the deficit in officers would be 811. We analyzed data for each career track to determine the surplus/deficit for each. We analyzed bidding data to determine the average number of position bids by posts, the median average bid for each differential rate, and the areas of specialization that are difficult to staff. For these analyses, we used the mid-level bidding data for the 2005 summer assignments cycle. In order to compare 2005 data with 2002 data from our previous report and remain consistent, we used FS-04 tenured, FS-03, and FS-02 bid data. To obtain the average number of bids for each post, we took the total number of bids received on all positions at each post and divided it by the total number of positions to be filled at the post. For example, in the 2002 summer assignments cycle, Lagos had eight positions to be filled and received a total of 11 bids, resulting in an average of 1.38 bids for this post. To obtain the median bid at each differential rate, as represented in the line in figure 3, we arranged in ascending order the average bid for each post at the corresponding differential rate and used the middle average bid. For example, assuming there are only five posts at the 25 differential rate and their average bids are 3, 5, 7, 9, and 16, the median of the average bids is 7. The bidding data include the number of positions to be filled at each post and the number of bids received for each position. We used the mid-level bidding data because mid-level positions comprised 56 percent of the total foreign service workforce. We also used the bidding data for the summer assignments cycle because, according to State officials, most employees are transferred during this cycle, compared to the winter cycle. Although we analyzed data for the two cycles, we provided information for only the 2005 cycle because the results for 2004 were similar. To assess State’s progress in filling gaps in the language proficiency of foreign service officers and other staff, we performed the following: reviewed GAO and State Office of Inspector General reports; analyzed data on the foreign language requirements of State and its efforts to enhance its foreign language capability; analyzed worldwide data on language-designated positions by post, languages, career track, specialty, and grade; analyzed data on the language proficiency of staff at specific posts by career track, specialty, and grade; and interviewed officials of the Office of Recruitment and the Office of Resource Management and Organizational Analysis of the Bureau of Human Resources, State’s Office of Inspector General, and the Foreign Service Institute (FSI) regarding the hiring and training of language proficient staff. We compared the number of language designated positions in fiscal year 2001 with the number in 2005 to determine whether the number of language-designated positions had increased, decreased, or remained the same. We also compared staff’s language proficiency skills with their position’s language requirements to determine whether they met the requirements for the positions. For this analysis we considered language- designated generalist and specialist positions that were filled as of October, 2005. We compared the positions’ speaking and reading requirements against their occupants’ tested scores in the designated languages. In cases where the occupants of language-designated positions had no tested score, we deemed that they had failed to meet the requirements. Several posts had “dual-language” positions; for example, Tunis had a number of positions that could either be filled by an Arabic or a French speaking officer. For some dual-language positions, the occupants tested for both languages, and in those instances we selected either the designated primary language, according to State’s records, or the secondary language if the occupant failed to meet the primary language’s requirements but met the second language’s requirements. In our tabulations, we classified those dual language positions according to the ones we selected, which were usually, but not always, the designated primary languages. There were a number of dual language positions whose occupants met the requirements for both languages. As our analysis was designed to test whether the positions’ requirements were being met, not to estimate the number of occupants with language abilities at each post or for each language, we did not include those secondary languages. For a few positions, State had created two sets of language requirements; when that occurred, we compared the higher of the requirements against the tested scores. We obtained bidding, assignment, and foreign language data from State’s Global Employee Management System (GEMS) database, which tracks State personnel actions. The data in GEMS are compiled from a variety of sources. For example, the Office of Career Development and Assignments (HR/CDA) in State’s Bureau of Human Resources enters data in GEMS on the results of the bidding and the assignment of employees to overseas posts. FSI provides the data on the language proficiency of FSOs and specialists. We reviewed the data for reasonableness and interviewed officials from the Office of Resource Management and Organizational Analysis and HR/CDA, and officials of the Foreign Service Institute concerning the reliability of the data. The officials stated that all employees are knowledgeable about their data, which serves as a reliability check on the system. Based on our analysis of the data and discussions with the officials, we determined the data are sufficiently reliable for our purposes. We conducted fieldwork in Abuja and Lagos, Nigeria; Sana’a, Yemen; and Beijing, China, to study the impact of staffing and language gaps at selected posts. We developed a matrix containing information on staffing vacancies, number of bids per position, officers in stretch positions, foreign language requirement, and the foreign language capabilities of staff in language-designated positions to identify potential fieldwork locations. We selected the posts in Nigeria because of the low number of staff applying for each position. We selected Sana’a because of the low number of staff applying for each position, because it requires staff proficient in Arabic, which is a difficult language to learn, and because of Yemen’s importance to the war on terrorism. We selected Beijing because it requires staff proficient in Chinese, which is also a difficult language to learn, and because of its strategic importance to the United States. We performed our work from August 2005 to May 2006 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. As of September 30, 2005, the Department of State (State) had about 19,000 full-time American employees, including foreign service generalists, foreign service specialists, and civil servants. Table 6 illustrates State’s staffing by position type, as of September 30, 2005. The following are GAO’s comments on the Department of State’s letter dated July 17, 2006. 1. We have modified our discussion of staffing at posts in Nigeria and China to show that there is a mix of officers. 2. Any analysis of bidding data will necessarily involve “snapshots” in time. Our analysis of the 2005 bidding data was intended to demonstrate whether posts with higher hardship differentials have difficulty attracting applicants compared to posts with low or no differentials. Our approach was identical to the one we used in 2002, and State raised no such concerns then. Our analysis shows that State has not made much progress since 2002 in attracting employees to bid on hardship posts. 3. We acknowledge that State has a system for identifying its language requirements. However, State continues to fill language-designated positions with staff who do not meet the language requirement. As noted in this report, foreign language gaps may negatively impact posts’ operations. For example, consular officers at one post told us they sometimes adjudicate visas without fully understanding everything the applicants tell them during visa interviews. A risk-based approach will allow State to make choices given its current mix of staffing and language resources. 4. State did not provide these reports to us until after our report was drafted, and we did not have sufficient time to assess them. The language competency assessment State provided shows the total number of officers with certain levels of proficiency in critical needs languages and corresponding ratios of officers with language proficiency to language designated positions. The assessment also establishes out-year targets for increasing the number of officers with level-3 language proficiency. However, it does not break out the data and targets by individual language. Thus, State’s overall targets could be achieved, even if serious proficiency gaps remained for some languages but not for others. We also note that the report does not include targets for specialists. Further, State has acknowledged that it has not collected data to link its recruitment efforts to the number of people it hires with foreign language skills. 5. Our analysis of the language proficiency of officers in language designated positions is based on State’s own established requirements for these positions, whether for generalists or specialists. We provided information on the language proficiency of the two different groups for Arabic and Chinese, and we noted that specialists had some of the highest percentages of staff that did not meet their position’s requirements. We further noted that State’s Director General had stated, in a cable issued in January 2006 that the department had been shortsighted in not providing sufficient language training to specialists. We have included additional information on the overall percentages of officers meeting language requirements for the two different groups. 6. We have included additional information on the percentages of officers meeting either the speaking or reading requirement, but not both requirements. We note that the differences are only 3 percentage points. 7. We added a statement to the discussion of 1-year tours noting that employees may extend their tours. In addition to the individual named above, Michael Courts, Assistant Director; Joseph Carney, Martin de Alteriis, Gloria Hernandez-Saunders, Julia Roberts, Josie Sigl, and La Verne Tharpes made key contributions to the report.

Summary: GAO has reported in recent years on a number of human capital issues that have hampered the Department of State's ability to carry out U.S. foreign policy priorities and objectives, particularly at posts central to the war on terror. In 2002, State implemented the Diplomatic Readiness Initiative (DRI) to address shortfalls in the number and skills of State employees. This report discusses State's progress in (1) addressing staffing shortfalls since the implementation of DRI and (2) filling gaps in the language proficiency of foreign service officers and other staff. To accomplish these objectives, GAO analyzed staffing and language data and met with State officials. State has made progress in addressing staffing shortages since implementing the DRI. However, the initiative did not fully meet its goals, and mid-level vacancies remain a problem at many posts, including some critical to the war on terror. State implemented various incentives to attract more mid-level officers to these locations, including offering extra pay to officers who serve an additional year at certain posts. However, it has not evaluated the effectiveness of these incentives and continues to have difficulties attracting qualified applicants. Mid-level positions at many posts are staffed by junior officers who lack experience, have minimal guidance, and are not as well-equipped to handle crises as more seasoned officers. This experience gap can severely compromise the department's readiness to carry out foreign policy objectives and execute critical post-level duties. State has made progress in increasing its foreign language capabilities, but serious language gaps remain. State initiated a number of efforts to improve its foreign language capabilities. However, it has not evaluated the effectiveness of these efforts, and it continues to experience difficulties filling its language-designated positions with language proficient staff. Almost one third of the staff in these positions do not meet the language requirements. The percentage is much higher at certain critical posts--for example, 60 percent in Sana'a, Yemen. Several factors--including the perception that spending too much time in one region may hinder officers' and specialists' promotion potential--may discourage employees from bidding on positions where they could enhance and maintain their language skills over time and limit State's ability to take advantage of those skills and the investment it makes in training. Gaps in language proficiency can adversely impact State's ability to communicate with foreign audiences and execute critical duties.