ICE has received funding specifically designated for removing criminal aliens. For example, the fiscal year 2008 DHS appropriations act made $200 million of ICE’s salaries and expenses appropriation available through the end of fiscal year 2009 to “improve and modernize efforts to identify aliens convicted of a crime, sentenced to imprisonment, and who may be deportable, and remove them from the United States, once they are judged deportable.” In response, ICE initiated Secure Communities and issued a plan that detailed how ICE would implement policies and modernize technologies to accomplish its overall goal of identifying and ICE’s Enforcement and Removal Operations removing criminal aliens.(ERO) is responsible for identifying and apprehending removable aliens, detaining these individuals when it deems it necessary, and removing them from the United States. ERO manages the Secure Communities program and has 24 field offices nationwide. Under Secure Communities, when an individual is arrested by a state or local law enforcement agency, the individual’s fingerprints are taken and automatically checked against the Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification System (IAFIS), a national fingerprint and criminal history system maintained by the FBI, and DHS’s Automated Biometric Identification System (IDENT) to identify a fingerprint match. IDENT contains fingerprint and other biometric information on immigration violators, known or suspected terrorists, criminal aliens, and foreign nationals who are enrolled in DHS’s United States Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology program, among others. When a law enforcement agency (LEA) arrests and books an individual on suspicion of committing a crime, the person’s fingerprints are routinely sent to the FBI for a criminal background check. FBI electronically forwards the fingerprints to DHS for a check against IDENT records. If there is a fingerprint match, ICE is to then determine whether the individual is subject to removal. On the basis of the match, the FBI is to send an Immigration Alien Query to ICE’s LESC. Using the Alien Criminal Response Information Management (ACRIMe) system, LESC specialists are to search multiple databases, such as the FBI’s National Crime Information Center (NCIC) and the Student and Exchange Visitor Information System for information on the individual’s criminal history and immigration status. LESC is to then send an Immigration Alien Response to the LEA and relevant ICE ERO field office or Interoperability Response Center (IRC)—offices established in the Los Angeles, Chicago, Miami, and Buffalo, New York, field offices to expand ICE’s ability to respond to Secure Communities matches. The ICE field office or response center is to then determine whether to send an immigration detainer (Form I-247) to the LEA that has custody of the individual. A detainer is an ICE request that the law enforcement agency maintain custody of the individual for up to 48 hours after that person would otherwise be released, excluding weekends and holidays, to allow ICE time to administratively arrest (i.e., assume custody of) the person. The decision whether to issue a detainer for a particular alien is based on whether the alien falls within ICE’s priorities for removal and other factors, such as whether ICE detention resources are available, and whether the individual is still in the custody of the arresting local or state law enforcement agency (under some circumstances a person may be held for only a few hours). If the individual is convicted and serves a criminal sentence, ICE is to wait until the sentence is completed to take the person into custody. Figure 1 describes the Secure Communities process. According to ICE, Secure Communities helps carry out ICE’s civil immigration enforcement priorities. In a March 2011 memorandum, ICE’s Director provided guidance to all ICE employees on ICE’s civil immigration enforcement priorities as they relate to the apprehension, detention, and removal of aliens across all ICE programs. The types of crimes included under the different priority classifications are described in table 1. In a June 2011 memorandum, ICE’s Director provided guidance to ICE officers, agents, and attorneys on the exercise of “prosecutorial discretion” to ensure that the agency’s immigration enforcement resources are focused on its enforcement priorities. As noted in the memorandum, because the agency is confronted with more administrative violations than its resources can address, the agency must regularly exercise prosecutorial discretion to prioritize its efforts. The memorandum provides a list of criteria for ICE personnel to use when assessing whether an individual case is appropriate for an exercise of prosecutorial discretion. In a second memorandum, also issued in June 2011, ICE provided additional guidance on the use of prosecutorial discretion for victims, witnesses, and plaintiffs. Specifically, the additional guidance stated that ICE is to exercise discretion on a case-by- case basis when making detention and enforcement decisions in the cases of (1) victims of domestic violence, human trafficking, or other serious crimes; (2) witnesses involved in pending criminal investigations, plaintiffs in nonfrivolous lawsuits regarding civil rights or civil liberties violations; and (3) individuals engaging in a protected activity related to civil or other rights, such as union organizing. In August 2011, DHS began to review all incoming cases in immigration court to identify the cases most clearly eligible and ineligible for exercising discretion to not pursue removal of the individual. DHS and DOJ launched pilot programs in which an intra-agency team of attorneys from ICE, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, and U.S. Customs and Border Protection applied the June 2011 memorandums to its review of existing cases in the Denver and Baltimore immigration courts.announced that in the next phase of its pilot, beginning in April 2012, it would extend its case reviews to immigration courts in Seattle, Detroit, New Orleans, Orlando, New York City, San Francisco, and Los Angeles. On March 30, 2012, DHS ICE has followed an incremental approach to activating Secure Communities interoperability in jurisdictions nationwide. 2011, ICE has been simultaneously activating all jurisdictions within a given state into Secure Communities. From October 2008 to August 2011, ICE activated 1,508 jurisdictions after signing individual memorandums of agreement with their respective state governments. In August 2011, ICE terminated all existing memorandums of agreement, stating that they were not required because once a law enforcement agency voluntarily submits fingerprint data to the federal government, no agreement with the state is legally necessary for one part of the federal government to share it with another part. As of June 5, 2012, ICE had fully activated Secure Communities in all jurisdictions in 48 states, the District of Columbia, and four United States territories. Additionally, the program has been partially activated in 2 states. The 50 states where Secure Communities has been fully or partially activated cover 97 percent of jurisdictions nationwide. ICE plans to have all jurisdictions in all 50 states and U.S. territories activated by March 2013. Figure 2 depicts the states activated under Secure Communities as of June 5, 2012. A jurisdiction is activated when interoperability between IAFIS and IDENT becomes functional for that location. For purposes of this report, jurisdiction is synonymous with county or a county-equivalent. ICE data show that from October 2008 through March 2012, Secure Communities led to the removal of about 183,000 aliens, of which approximately 74 percent had a criminal conviction and 26 percent did not have a criminal conviction known to ICE. All four ICE field offices we visited were using agency policies to help determine which aliens identified by Secure Communities should be selected for detention and removal. Additionally, ICE did not have a record of the state or local arrest charges for about 56 percent of the aliens that Secure Communities identified and ICE removed during fiscal year 2011 and the first half of fiscal year 2012, so we were unable to determine the most frequent arrest charges of aliens removed under the program. Of the data that ICE collected, traffic offenses were the most frequent arrest charges, of which over half were arrests for driving under the influence of alcohol. ICE data indicate that the percentage of removals attributable to Secure Communities has increased from fiscal year 2009 through the first 6 months of fiscal year 2012 and that nearly three-fourths of aliens removed under the program during this time frame had a criminal conviction. As shown in table 2, Secure Communities was responsible for identifying about 20 percent of the approximately 400,000 aliens that ICE removed in fiscal year 2011, up from approximately 4 percent of the aliens that ICE removed in fiscal year 2009. Other ICE enforcement programs such as CAP and 287(g) were responsible for identifying the majority of aliens that ICE removed in each year since fiscal year 2009. From October 2008 through March 2012, ICE removed 182,896 aliens identified by Secure Communities, as indicated by ICE’s data. According to ICE, all aliens removed committed an immigration violation and were removable on that basis. About 74 percent had been convicted of a criminal offense; that is, they were either convicted of the offense that led to their identification under Secure Communities or had a record of conviction for a previous offense. For these individuals, the current or prior criminal conviction served as the basis for ICE’s prioritization for removal. Twenty-one percent of aliens removed did not have a criminal conviction known to ICE prior to their removal, but were identified as one of ICE’s other removal priorities, including aliens who were fugitives or who reentered the country illegally after removal. The remaining 5 percent of aliens removed also did not have a known criminal conviction prior to their removal but were nonetheless removable because, for example, they entered the United States without inspection or violated the terms of their admission. ICE reports its removal data for aliens without a criminal conviction under three categories: ICE fugitives; prior removals and returns; and entries without inspection (EWI) and visa violators. Figure 3 provides information on the overall composition of Secure Communities removals by category and figure 4 provides this information for each activated state. ICE reported that the total number of Secure Communities removals has increased each year since fiscal year 2009, but there has been some variation across fiscal years in the proportion of aliens removed by criminal level, as shown in figure 5. For example, there was a decrease in the proportion of convicted criminal Level 3 offenders removed, from 40 percent of total removals in fiscal year 2009 to 26 percent during the first half of fiscal year 2012. According to ICE, the percentage of removals who are Level 3 offenders has been decreasing, in part because ICE has continued to prioritize its resources on the identification and removal of aliens convicted of felonies. Additionally, ICE redefined its criminal offense levels between fiscal years 2010 and 2011, causing some Level 3 offenders to be reclassified as Level 2 offenders based upon repeat misdemeanor offenses, which ICE officials said resulted in an increase in the percentage of removals who were Level 2 offenders to 19 percent in fiscal year 2011 as compared with 13 percent in fiscal year 2010, and a decrease in the percentage classified as level 3. ICE’s removal data do not reflect those aliens identified as removable through the Secure Communities program who are currently serving criminal sentences in state and local prisons, as ICE has not yet detained and removed them. For example, an alien arrested and identified through Secure Communities who is then convicted of a felony and classified by ICE as convicted criminal Level 1 offender is more likely to serve a longer criminal sentence than a Level 3 offender serving a sentence of less than 1 year. As a result, according to ICE, the percentage of Secure Communities removals who are Level 1 offenders—ICE’s highest removal priority—could increase over time as Level 1 offenders complete their sentences and are removed. Officials from the four ICE field offices we visited told us that they were following agency policies to help determine which aliens identified by Secure Communities should be selected for detention and removal, and establishing the criminal offense level for each alien. ICE officials said that aliens are initially classified as Level 1, 2, or 3, based on the offense category definitions explained in the March 2011 priorities memorandum, and available information on the aliens’ arrest charges and any previous convictions. ICE staff told us that they then use this offense level classification to prioritize which aliens should be detained. ICE officials said that investigative actions are first focused on aliens who are initially classified as Level 1, but those classified as Level 2 and 3 may also be investigated if field offices have the resources to do so. At all four field offices we visited, ICE officials said that they generally have the resources to investigate the immigration and criminal histories of aliens initially classified as Level 1 and Level 2. Officials at three of the field offices said they also investigate aliens initially classified as Level 3, but do so only when the office has no one in the Level 1 or 2 category awaiting review. At the fourth field office, officials said that with their current resources, they can investigate all aliens initially classified as Level 1, 2, and 3. ICE did not have a record of the state or local arrest charges for about 56 percent of the approximately 119,000 aliens that Secure Communities identified and ICE removed during fiscal year 2011 and the first half of fiscal year 2012, so we were unable to determine the most frequent arrest charges of aliens removed under the program. ICE officials said that their records are incomplete because arrest charge information is not always available at the time ICE agents record aliens’ criminal encounters and because agents may not have been familiar with a requirement, instituted by ICE in October 2010, to enter this information into ICE’s database of investigations, arrests, bookings, detention, and removals. ICE issued guidance in August 2010 in advance of this requirement, and began offering training to its agents in the field on the agency’s process for entering criminal arrest charge information into ICE’s database. Further, ICE instituted a measure in November 2011 that calls for its data analysis unit to check on a monthly basis the criminal history database entries of aliens who did not have convictions at the time of their removal. If the check returns updated conviction data for these aliens, according to its guidance, ICE is to update its database to ensure that all available arrest and conviction data are included. ICE officials told us in May 2012 that going forward they expect to have arrest and conviction history data on a higher percentage of aliens as a result of these steps. As these efforts have only recently been initiated, it is too early to assess the effectiveness of ICE’s efforts to improve the collection of arrest charge data. Of the data ICE did collect, about 37 percent of aliens identified by Secure Communities and removed during fiscal year 2011 and the first half of fiscal year 2012 were arrested for traffic offenses (of whom over half were charged with driving while under the influence of alcohol), about 12 percent were arrested for drug offenses (of whom almost one-third were charged with marijuana offenses), about 10 percent were arrested for assault (of whom over half were arrested for unspecified assaults), and the remaining 40 percent were arrested for other offenses. Table 3 provides the available arrest charge information of aliens that Secure Communities identified and ICE removed during fiscal year 2011 and the first half of fiscal year 2012. ICE is modernizing its ACRIMe system to make the process of determining an individual’s immigration status more efficient, but these efforts have experienced delays and cost overruns, and developed products that did not meet mission needs. ICE could mitigate the risk of further delays and cost overruns by better defining the ACRIMe program’s requirements and developing an integrated master schedule. ICE could also better plan its future workforce needs to help realize the anticipated efficiency gains of the modernized ACRIMe system. ICE is in the process of developing a modernized ACRIMe system to update its aging legacy system and meet the anticipated increase in the number of law enforcement queries as Secure Communities is implemented in more jurisdictions across the country. The modernized ACRIMe system is designed to be accessible throughout ICE and not just in LESC, as is currently the case. Additionally, to help determine an individual’s immigration status and offense category, modernized ACRIMe is intended to allow officials in LESC, ICE field offices, and response centers to automatically search multiple data sources with a single electronic query. Currently, LESC staff must conduct separate searches to obtain information from separate databases and, because of limitations in the legacy ACRIMe system, they cannot share the full results of their searches with staff in ICE field offices and response centers. Since the modernized ACRIMe system is intended to allow users to search, receive, distribute, and manage relevant immigration status information, ICE officials expect that the modernized system will eliminate the need for ICE field office and response center staff to duplicate LESC’s efforts to determine aliens’ immigration status. ICE initially planned to develop the modernized ACRIMe system through three contracts, each for a separate project. The first contract (referred to here as ACRIMe-1), awarded in March 2008, was to develop a modernized ACRIMe system so ICE staff could access multiple law enforcement and immigration databases to determine an individual’s immigration status and offense category. ICE awarded two additional contracts in September 2009 to develop six services to further enhance the functionality of the modernized ACRIMe system. One contract was to develop a web-based Automated Threat Prioritization (ATP) service that would allow modernized ACRIMe users to automatically retrieve prior conviction information from state and federal criminal history records to help prioritize ICE enforcement actions based on aliens’ criminal charges. The other contract, the Status Determination Support (SDS) contract, was to develop five web-based services to enhance the modernized ACRIMe system’s ability to determine immigration status. The five services were (1) Status Determination Support, (2) Automated National Crime Information Center Warrants, (3) Criminal Alien Tracking, (4) Jail Roster/Release Tracking, and (5) Integrated Case Management. Table 4 provides summary information on the three ACRIMe modernization projects and the contracts issued in 2008 and 2009. Weaknesses in ICE’s acquisition planning contributed to delays, cost increases, and products provided under the contracts that did not meet mission needs. As of April 2012, ICE had spent approximately $4 million over its original cost estimate to develop the modernized ACRIMe system—without the ATP and SDS services—and expected that it would begin deploying the system in LESC in July 2012 and in ICE field offices in December 2012. This date is over 2 years after the initial planned deployment date of March 2010 for the ACRIMe system. Further, the contractor that ICE selected for the ACRIMe-1 contract did not develop a system that met ICE’s performance requirements. As a result, ICE canceled the ACRIMe-1 contract, selected a new contractor in September 2011 to complete and deploy the modernized system, and expects to award another contract by September 2012 to develop call center functionalities within the modernized ACRIMe system that were originally supposed to be delivered through the ACRIMe-1 contract. In August 2011, ICE also canceled the original SDS contract because of the delays encountered with the ACRIMe-1 contract. Further, because of its dissatisfaction with the quality of the work completed on the SDS contract, ICE now plans to award additional contracts to different contractors to start over with developing the services it requires. ICE has also reduced the scope of the SDS services’ capabilities (as discussed below). As a result, ICE expects that the SDS services will be completed for about $22 million less than the baseline cost estimate, even though it spent $14.3 million on a contract that did not produce useable services. In contrast, ICE has expanded the scope of the ATP requirements and expects to exceed its baseline cost estimate by about $7.8 million. ICE projects that for the ATP and SDS services, it will be able to meet and potentially finish ahead of its estimated deployment dates. See appendix I for additional information on all of ICE’s ACRIMe-related contracts. Table 5 compares the baseline estimates for deployment and cost of the projects, and status as of April 2012. The schedule delays and cost increases can be attributed in part to weaknesses in ICE’s planning, including ICE (1) not fully defining requirements before awarding contracts and (2) not developing an integrated master schedule. According to ICE officials, the agency did not fully define its requirements before awarding the ACRIMe-1, ATP, or SDS contracts. We have previously reported that firm requirements should be established at the beginning of an acquisition program and that requirements should be well defined to ensure communication about what the government needs from the contractor providing services. Regarding the ACRIMe-1 contract, ICE officials stated that ICE’s requirements did not accurately reflect the needs of LESC system users or fully define technical expectations. Although ICE involved LESC users in the development of the system requirements, ICE officials told us that ICE did not ensure the users’ needs were clearly defined in the requirements documentation and the contractor did not routinely meet with the users to ensure its understanding of the requirements. As a result, the contractor misinterpreted some of the requirements, according to ICE officials. ICE revised the requirements after the contractor had already conducted a significant amount of work, contributing to delays. Further, ICE officials told us that ICE did not fully define its technical expectations of the contractor, such as specific requirements for the software code. According to the officials, ICE did not include more specific technical requirements because it wanted to encourage the contractor to develop innovative solutions and did not want to be too prescriptive. However, the officials also noted that not having more specific technical requirements contributed to the unsatisfactory performance by the contractor in producing software that did not meet ICE’s needs. Consequently, ICE deemed the modernized ACRIMe system the contractor delivered in April 2011 to be unusable, and ICE awarded a new contract in September 2011 to a different contractor to complete and deploy the system. ICE also plans to award another contract for $1.7 million by September 2012, to develop call center functionalities within the ACRIMe system that were originally supposed to be developed under the ACRIMe-1 contract. Shortcomings in defining requirements and changes in the scope of the requirements also contributed to cost increases on the ATP contract. Specifically, cost increases occurred when, in August 2011, nearly 2 years after the ATP contract was awarded, ICE added a new requirement that the contractor develop a “risk classification assessment score.” This score is meant to help standardize the method for determining if an alien should be detained by ICE or released on bond or other condition. According to ICE, the requirement for a risk classification assessment score was added to the ATP contract to support ICE detention reform initiatives based on revisions that were made in 2011 to ICE’s detention standards. Among other things, the 2011 detention standards call for detention facilities to take into account risk factors when making custody decisions. Officials told us it would be more efficient to add the risk classification assessment score requirement to the ATP contract than to develop this capability through a separate system. However, the officials also stated that ICE could do a better job of defining its requirements. As of April 2011, ICE had spent about $21.5 million on acquiring the ATP service, which is about 17 percent over ICE’s baseline cost estimate of $18.3 million. To complete the ATP service, ICE estimates that it may need to spend an additional $4.6 million, for a total cost of $26.1 million. This would be a 42 percent increase over ICE’s baseline cost estimate. With respect to the SDS contract, in September 2010, about a year after the SDS contract was awarded (and over 2 years after ACRIMe-1 was awarded), ICE determined that the SDS contract requirements overlapped significantly with those of the ACRIMe-1 contract. In response, ICE expanded the scope of the SDS contract to include all of the requirements for aggregating data from multiple law enforcement and immigration databases that had previously been spread between the ACRIMe-1 and SDS contracts, and eliminated the requirements from the ACRIMe-1 contract. ICE officials stated that not clearly defining how the SDS services would be integrated with the ACRIMe system was an oversight. As with the ACRIMe-1 contract, ICE officials stated that the technical requirements for the contract were not well defined, and this contributed to the contractor producing poor-quality software. Consequently, ICE spent $14.3 million for the SDS contract to develop services that ICE found to be unusable. ICE terminated the SDS contract in August 2011. As of April 2012, ICE officials planned to award four new contracts at an estimated total cost of $5.4 million that would involve the contractors starting over with developing services to enhance the functionality of the modernized ACRIMe system. In commenting on a draft of this report, in June 2012 ICE officials told us that to complete the SDS services, they now plan to award two (instead of four) new contracts and that they are incorporating the work that would have been done through the two other previously planned contracts into other ACRIMe modernization efforts. According to ICE officials, some of the documents the SDS contractor developed, such as the Concept of Operations, will be used to help inform future contractors’ work. ICE officials noted that despite spending $14.3 million on the SDS contract, which did not produce useable functionalities, ICE expects to spend about $22 million less than the original cost estimate of $41.7 million because the scope of capabilities to be provided by the contractor have been reduced. Specifically, ICE found after awarding the SDS contract that it would be more technically complicated and costly to develop the criminal alien tracking service than it had anticipated, so ICE does not plan to pursue the development of this functionality further. ICE officials acknowledged the importance of establishing well-defined requirements going forward, but as of April 2012, ICE had not developed the requirements for the contracts it planned to award starting in July 2012 through December 2012.of the challenges it has experienced as a result of unclear and changing requirements, ICE could be better positioned to help prevent delays and cost increases by establishing well-defined requirements that accurately reflect both user and technical needs prior to awarding additional contracts. Although ICE anticipates meeting its baseline deployment dates for the SDS services that it plans to develop through new contracts, it has not developed an integrated master schedule for completing ACRIMe modernization. Rather, ICE has used the separate schedules developed for each contract to manage the modernization effort. We have previously reported that one critical management tool for complex systems that involve the incorporation of a number of different projects—in this case, ACRIMe modernization—is an integrated master schedule that allows managers to monitor all work activities, how long the activities will take, and how the activities are related to one another. Because ICE lacked an integrated master schedule when it issued the first three ACRIMe modernization contracts in 2008 and 2009, it was not well positioned to understand how schedule changes in each individual contract would affect the overall modernization effort. For example, ICE assumed that the modernized ACRIMe system would be completed before work began on the ATP and SDS contracts. However, the deployment of the modernized ACRIMe system was delayed, and because ICE did not have an integrated master schedule, ICE was not in a position to effectively identify and resolve the effects of delays in the deployment of the modernized ACRIMe system on the development of the SDS and ATP services. Subsequently, the delays with the deployment of the modernized ACRIMe system contributed to the cancellation of the SDS contract and delayed the integration of the ATP service with the modernized ACRIMe system, according to ICE officials. ICE is using an incremental development approach called “Agile software development.” Agile software development is a philosophy based on selected values, such as the highest priority is to satisfy customers through early and continuous delivery of valuable software; delivering working software frequently; and that working software is the primary measure of progress. was based on their knowledge of the remaining work to be done and past experience developing schedules. However, they acknowledged that by not developing an integrated master schedule, ICE did not meet best practices for managing capital programs and recognized the importance of having an integrated master schedule moving forward. Accordingly, ICE officials said they began developing an integrated master schedule in April 2012, during the course of our review. While we recognize this as a positive step, it is too early to tell if ICE’s efforts will result in an integrated master schedule that reflects all of the tasks to be completed by the agency and contractors. For example, as of May 2012, ICE had not incorporated detailed project schedules for the four SDS services into its integrated master schedule. GAO’s Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide states that an integrated master schedule should include all tasks necessary to complete the project, including work to be performed by both the government and contractors. Given the number of new contracts ICE plans to award and its previous difficulties with accounting for all contract activities and their interrelationships, ICE could help ensure that its deployment schedule is reliable and mitigate schedule risks by developing an integrated master schedule that includes all activities and identifies dependencies among the complementary contracts it plans to award. Various developments could change ICE’s workforce requirements for responding to state and local law enforcement’s queries about aliens’ immigration and criminal status, providing ICE with an opportunity to examine the most efficient number and location of staff to accomplish the task. One development is the anticipated deployment of modernized ACRIMe to ICE field offices in December 2012, which could help reduce the existing duplication of effort in analyzing immigration and criminal status information. This duplication of effort involves ICE field office staff repeating database searches that LESC has already conducted because ACRIMe, which LESC uses to determine individuals’ immigration status, cannot generate reports or electronically transmit the results of LESC’s database searches to field offices; and field offices do not have access to ACRIMe, necessitating that they conduct their own database searches. According to ICE officials, such duplication of effort is necessary not only because of the current ACRIMe system’s limitations, but also because it serves as a quality control to minimize the likelihood of ICE making an incorrect arrest or detention decision. Modernized ACRIMe is expected to reduce the total number of immigration status database searches because the system is intended to be able to generate a report on the databases searched and electronically transmit the results of those searches. Another development is the anticipated increase in Secure Communities matches as the program is activated nationwide. ICE estimates indicate that when Secure Communities interoperability is activated in all jurisdictions in fiscal year 2013, it expects an additional approximately 90,000 Secure Communities queries will be generated each year. In calendar year 2011, LESC conducted database searches based on about 423,550 Secure Communities matches. As of April 2012, ICE had not determined or planned for how many staff it will need to conduct these searches. The new system will be accessible not only to LESC, as is currently the case, but also to field offices and interoperability response centers ( which were set up primarily to analyze an increased number of immigration status queries resulting from Secure Communities), making it possible for multiple organizational entities in ICE to conduct the database searches. LESC officials said that if they had 60 additional staff, LESC would be able to process all Secure Communities requests for database searches for the entire country when modernized ACRIMe is deployed; however, an expansion under way at the Los Angeles response center could also accommodate additional staff for processing Secure Communities database searches. ICE officials have not yet addressed the role that LESC, the field-based response centers, or other ICE components involved with immigration status determination will have after modernized ACRIMe becomes operational. In its April 2012 report, DHS’s Inspector General recommended that ICE develop procedures to eliminate duplication in the process of identifying potentially removable criminal aliens. Further, congressional staff requested that ICE brief members in March 2012 regarding the efficient allocation of resources between LESC and the response centers; however, the briefing had not been scheduled as of June 8, 2012. Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government identifies effective management of an organization’s workforce as essential to achieving results and maintaining internal control, and program management guidance states that successful execution of any program includes developing plans that include efficient use of workforce resources. ICE officials acknowledged the need for comprehensive workforce planning, but officials indicated to us and to DHS’s Office of Inspector General that the agency plans to wait until after Secure Communities is activated nationwide and modernized ACRIMe becomes operational in fiscal year 2013 to make decisions about how to effectively realign resources. In August 2011 ICE completed an Operational Workforce Analysis, which projected the additional ERO workforce needed for detention and removal when Secure Communities is fully activated. A separate ICE analysis provided estimates of the workforce needs at LESC for analyzing an additional 90,000 queries. ICE’s analyses, however, did not consider the impact of modernized ACRIMe on workforce requirements or how staff resources at response centers will be utilized for making status determinations. Agency officials also said that uncertainty about funding was a factor they would need to consider as part of their planning. While planning efforts can be subject to uncertainty about future funding, developing a workforce plan prior to full program and system deployment could help position ICE so it is ready to effectively align staff among components responding to law enforcement agency queries when the modernized ACRIMe system is deployed. ICE and CRCL jointly identified four safeguards used to help protect aliens’ civil rights under Secure Communities. These safeguards include providing detainees a revised detainer form with telephone numbers to call when they believe their civil rights have been violated or they are U.S. citizens or crime victims, developing training materials for state and local law enforcement and ICE officials on how to protect aliens’ civil rights, initiating a process to statistically monitor arrests under Secure Communities to identify and investigate potential patterns of civil rights abuses, and using DHS’s existing complaint process to investigate complaints about possible civil rights abuses related to Secure Communities. ICE began using a revised detainer form in December 2011, in part as a safeguard against potential abuse of detainees. Changes on the form include a request that law enforcement officials provide the detainee a copy of the form, and to notify ICE if the individual may be the victim of a crime. The revised form also includes a Notice to Detainee section printed in six languages with telephone numbers for arrested individuals to call. Calls for one number go to the LESC for individuals who believe they are U.S. citizens or victims of a crime and have been inappropriately identified for removal. The other number goes to the Joint Intake Center for individuals who believe their civil rights have been violated.detainer form is not specific to detainees identified under Secure Communities; ICE requests all detainees be given a copy of their detainer, regardless of how the detainees were identified. The English version of the notice is reproduced in figure 6. The Avoiding Racial Profiling; Explaining Secure Communities to Your Community; Witnesses, Refugees and Victims of Crime or Domestic Violence: Protecting Those in Need; Retaliation by Private Actors; and Speaking Their Language: Working with Non-English Speakers In May 2012, DHS established a dissemination plan for the Secure Communities videos, noting that ICE and CRCL plan to distribute the Secure Communities videos and materials to state and local LEAs. CRCL envisions that these agencies will share the information with law enforcement officers during routinely held briefings or in other settings. Beginning in June 2011, CRCL distributed the first video to 117 LEAs and 143 nongovernmental organizations during visits made to eight major cities and at major conferences, such as the National Sheriff’s Association conference. ICE also plans to provide the videos and materials to law enforcement training agencies and instructors in each state and to make the videos available as downloadable files on the Internet. To help determine whether local law enforcement agencies may be making inappropriate or unlawful arrests that could lead to removal through Secure Communities, CRCL and ICE developed a monitoring process in which Secure Communities–related statistics are reviewed on a quarterly basis. The monitoring process is designed to take place in three phases. In the first phase, CRCL’s plan calls for analyzing crime, arrest, and demographic data from activated jurisdictions to determine the extent to which foreign-born individuals are arrested at a rate that is proportional to their representation in the jurisdiction’s population, and the extent to which the types of charges for which foreign-born individuals are arrested are proportional to the types of arrest charges for all individuals in that jurisdiction. In the second phase, CRCL is conducting additional in-depth analyses of arrest, crime, and demographic data on the 10 large jurisdictions (those with populations over 100,000 that had over 30 Secure Communities submissions for the quarter), and 5 smaller jurisdictions (those with populations under 100,000) that produced the most anomalous results in the first phase of the analysis. CRCL stated that anomalies may indicate that police engaged in racial profiling, but they may also reflect local crime patterns and legitimate police practices. For example, they said, in a jurisdiction where highway patrol is a primary function, officers would be making more traffic stops, and higher rates of traffic offenses might be expected. According to CRCL, because its second-phase analysis relies in part on data collected by local and state law enforcement agencies, the data are frequently less consistent across jurisdictions. These variations present challenges for CRCL’s analysis. In the third phase, CRCL, in conjunction with ICE, plans to conduct inquiries into relevant policing practices in jurisdictions where the in-depth statistical analyses were unable to account for the anomalies in the Officials said the decision to proceed with the third statistical results.phase of monitoring will be made on a case-by-case basis, and could, among other things, involve interviewing law enforcement personnel or complainants, or requesting documents from a law enforcement agency. ICE and CRCL officials said they would decide what actions they may take at the conclusion of the inquiry phase. CRCL had planned to begin reporting the results of its statistical monitoring beginning with data from early fiscal year 2011, but began with the third quarter of fiscal year 2011. As of May 2012, CRCL was completing its analysis under the second phase for the third and fourth quarters of 2011. CRCL said the work and report have not yet been completed because of challenges with using multiple sources of data that were not designed for real-time monitoring. Examples of the data limitations and how CRCL plans to take the limitations into account in their analysis include the following: The FBI’s Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR) Program summary reporting system (a FBI national crime database that includes the number and types of arrests by police department) is used by CRCL for its foreign-born arrest charge comparisons. However, participation in the UCR Program is voluntary and not all police departments in the United States participate, including, for example, 21 counties in Illinois. In such cases, CRCL plans to identify and use other data, such as the National Incident-Based Reporting System (NIBRS), another FBI UCR Program method for collecting crime data, and arrest data, if available, that are publicly reported outside the summary UCR system, by some states, such as Florida, through its state UCR program. There is a lag between the time that the U.S. Census Bureau’s American Community Survey collects and releases demographic information on the foreign-born population in the United States. CRCL began working with the Community Survey data for the 2005-2009 period, and shifted to the 2006-2010 data when it became available in December 2011. Noncitizens in different parts of the country have different rates of inclusion in the IDENT database, making careful comparisons important and more difficult. Foreign-born residents who have not interacted with federal immigration agencies would not have been included in the IDENT database. The CRCL monitoring statistics could underestimate potential civil rights abuses in such jurisdictions, compared with jurisdictions in which IDENT includes a larger proportion of the foreign-born population. ICE stated that officials are working to better understand variation in IDENT coverage for improved comparisons. CRCL officials also said that in working with the actual arrest data for the first time, they are discovering and resolving such data problems as incongruous categorizations of crimes. For example, definitions of “serious” or “aggravated” arrests vary between the UCR and LESC. Consequently, CRCL’s work with the first data set to account for such differences is taking longer than subsequent analysis is expected to take. ICE, CRCL, and DHS headquarters officials met in May 2012 to assess the progress of the statistical monitoring effort, discuss potential changes to Secure Communities protocols as a result of the statistical analyses, determine what and how information from the monitoring effort will be reported, and decide on any actions to be taken at the conclusion of all monitoring phases. They determined that further development and analysis were required, and CRCL officials told us that follow-up sessions were scheduled for July 2012. CRCL officials explained that CRCL would issue its report when it is confident that everything possible had been done to resolve the statistical anomalies, because doing so would avoid inappropriately flagging jurisdictions whose statistics appeared anomalous, but were later explained. Once the first report is issued, according to CRCL officials, they expect to report quarterly. Under a complaint process applicable to all of DHS, CRCL has opened four investigations, all in fiscal year 2011, of civil rights complaints that CRCL identified as involving Secure Communities. CRCL has authority to review and assess civil rights or civil liberties complaints regarding DHS policies, activities, or actions taken by DHS personnel, and receives complaints submitted by mail, e-mail, fax, and the CRCL telephone hotline. CRCL also reviews a monthly list of complaints processed through the Joint Intake Center, and a complaint form is posted on the Secure Communities’ and CRCL’s websites.meet quarterly with community organizations and ask for allegations regarding Secure Communities to be forwarded. ICE and CRCL issued a joint memorandum on June 14, 2011, outlining how civil rights complaints involving state and local law enforcement and Secure Communities would be addressed. The memorandum noted that the strategy for Secure Communities differs from those of most other programs in that CRCL has no compulsory process that requires state and local LEAs to cooperate in CRCL investigations because CRCL and the LEAs do not have formal partnerships under Secure Communities. The memorandum stated that CRCL may initiate investigations based on complaints alleging misconduct, statistical information indicating anomalies in arrests that led to Secure Communities matches, or the results of third-party research. The investigation process can vary based on how the complaint was initiated and is described in the June memorandum. CRCL categorizes complaints by issue (what the complaint is about) and by the situation in which the issue occurred. There are 21 categories of issues, such as use of excessive force, sexual assault, or abuse, and 16 categories of situations, such as a complaint arising from a port of entry incident or a Secure Communities encounter. Knowing whether a complaint is actually related to Secure Communities is not always clear, CRCL officials stated. This is because not all of those who file complaints know that they were identified through Secure Communities, and conversely, some may mistakenly believe that Secure Communities was involved in their arrest when they were actually identified by other means. CRCL staff said they discuss each allegation to determine if it is related to Secure Communities by looking at the specifics of the complaint. CRCL officials said that under Secure Communities, likely complaint issues are those involving discrimination or profiling, Fourth Amendment rights, and language access issues. A CRCL Complaint Opening Meeting group, composed of CRCL management, including the Compliance Branch Deputy Director and other stakeholders, decides on a weekly basis whether to take further action on specific complaints, using their professional judgment. Four investigations have been initiated by CRCL based on complaints regarding Secure Communities, three of which were submitted by one nongovernmental organization in one region. The complaints involve allegations that each of the four arrests was made because the officers believed the individuals were in the country illegally, and the individuals were arrested to determine their immigration status. CRCL’s Compliance Branch Director said there is no “standard” investigation process for a complaint because each complaint is fact specific; but, in each case, CRCL requests documents from ICE and the local law enforcement agency that arrested the complainant. If available, the complainant is interviewed, in addition to relevant DHS personnel and witnesses. CRCL officials stated that CRCL is currently working through procedures for investigating Secure Communities complaints with two local law enforcement agencies and requested that officers sit for voluntary interviews. These complaints are taking longer than what is normal for investigations of DHS policy and practices, officials said, in part because of the need to create new procedures with local law enforcement for investigating the allegations. In 2009, about 11.5 million noncitizens were living in the United States without lawful immigration status, some of whom have been arrested and convicted of various crimes and incarcerated. Secure Communities assists in identifying those who have been incarcerated and are subject to removal. ICE has invested millions of dollars to modernize ACRIMe capabilities that are central to Secure Communities’ success, but has not followed best practices in its acquisition of the modernized technology. Effective management of future ACRIMe modernization efforts hinges on establishing well-defined requirements and the development of a reliable integrated master schedule. Likewise, a modernized ACRIMe, along with the extension of Secure Communities to all jurisdictions, will change ICE workforce requirements for the analysis of immigration status determinations. Developing a workforce plan to guide workforce resource decisions could help ensure workforce decisions are made in an effective and cost-efficient manner. To help ensure that ICE acquires effective technology to support the Secure Communities program and effectively uses its workforce, we recommend that the Director of ICE take the following three actions to follow sound management practices: establish well-defined requirements prior to awarding additional develop an integrated master schedule that identifies all tasks to be performed by the government and current and future contractors, and links activities being performed by different contractors; and develop a workforce plan to support the analysis of immigration status determinations under Secure Communities. We provided a draft of this report to DHS and DOJ for their review and comment. DHS provided written comments which are reprinted in full in Appendix II. DHS concurred with our three recommendations and described efforts underway to address them. For example, with respect to establishing well-defined requirements prior to awarding additional ACRIMe modernization contracts, DHS stated that ICE is piloting an incremental development and requirements definition process within ACRIMe, including using smaller requirements teams to complete requirements by the end of July 2012, before additional contracts are issued. These actions are consistent with the intent of the recommendation and should help ICE manage future ACRIMe modernization efforts. With respect to developing an integrated master schedule, DHS reiterated that it began developing such a schedule in April 2012 and expects to complete it by the end of December 2012. This action is consistent with the intent of the recommendation and should improve ICE’s understanding of how schedule changes in individual contracts may affect the overall modernization effort. With respect to developing a workforce plan, DHS noted that ICE plans to complete a proposal for consolidating Interoperability Response Centers into one central location by the end of December 2012. DHS stated that it will determine what, if any, additional workforce plans are needed after it completes the proposal. While this is a step in the right direction, we continue to believe that ICE would benefit from comprehensive workforce planning that includes examining how to reduce the existing duplication of effort between LESC and ICE field offices when ICE deploys modernized ACRIMe. DHS also provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. DOJ did not have formal comments on our draft report, but provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. As agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce the contents of this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days from the report date. At that time, we will send copies to the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security and other interested parties. In addition, the report will be available at no charge on the GAO website at http://www.gao.gov. If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 512-8777 or gamblerr@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. Key contributors to this report are listed in appendix III. As of April 2012, the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) had awarded four contracts and planned to award additional contracts to modernize its Alien Criminal Response Information Management (ACRIMe) system. In commenting on a draft of this report, in June 2012 ICE officials told us that they now plan to award three new contracts and that the work for the previously planned ACRIMe/ENFORCE Integration and Batch Processing contracts would be incorporated into other ACRIMe modernization efforts. Table 6 provides summary information on these contracts as of April 2012. In addition to the contact named above, Evi Rezmovic (Assistant Director), David Alexander, Frances Cook, Kevin Craw, Dorian Dunbar, Monica Kelly, Jason Lee, Heather May, Linda Miller, Karen Richey, and Nate Tranquilli made key contributions to this report.

Summary: Initiated in 2008, Secure Communities is an ICE program designed to identify potentially removable aliens, particularly those with criminal convictions, in state and local law enforcement custody. Fingerprints checked against a Federal Bureau of Investigation criminal database are checked against DHSs immigration database to help determine whether an arrested individual is removable. GAO was asked to review Secure Communities operations. This report addresses (1) enforcement trends under Secure Communities, (2) ICEs adherence to best practices in acquiring Secure Communitiesrelated technology, and (3) ICE safeguards to help protect against potential civil rights abuses under Secure Communities. GAO analyzed ICE data on removals from October 2008 through March 2012, and arrest charges from October 2010 through March 2012; reviewed program guidance, policies, and reports; and interviewed ICEs Law Enforcement Support Center and agency officials, local law enforcement and community groups in four locations selected for geographic diversity, among other factors. These perspectives are not generalizable, but provided insights into Secure Communities operations. Data from the Department of Homeland Securitys (DHS) Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) indicate that the percentage of its removals attributable to Secure Communities increased from about 4 percent in fiscal year 2009 to about 20 percent in fiscal year 2011. Of about 183,000 aliens removed under the program from October 2008 through March 2012, about 74 percent had a criminal conviction. ICE did not have state or local arrest charges for about 56 percent of alien Secure Communities removals from October 2010 (when ICE began collecting arrest charges) through March 2012, so we were unable to determine the most frequent arrest charges under the program. For the 44 percent of aliens removed on whom ICE collected arrest charge data, traffic offenses, including driving under the influence of alcohol, were the most frequent arrest charges. ICE is taking steps to improve the collection of arrest charge data, but it is too early to assess the effectiveness of its efforts. ICE has not consistently followed best practices in acquiring technology to help determine the immigration status of aliens identified by Secure Communities. ICE awarded contracts to modernize its technology without fully defining requirements or developing an integrated master scheduletwo best practices for managing capital programs. As a result, ICE encountered delays, cost increases, and products that did not meet ICEs needs. For example, ICE spent $14.3 million for one contract to develop services that ICE found to be unusable. Establishing well-defined requirements and developing an integrated schedule for completing technology modernization could better position ICE to prevent delays and cost increases. Further, ICE plans to develop a workforce plan after the systems are deployed. Developing a workforce plan prior to full system deployment, consistent with internal controls, could better position ICE to effectively use staff when it deploys the modernized technology. DHSs Office of Civil Rights and ICE identified four safeguards to help protect aliens civil rights under Secure Communities, including providing detainees with a revised detainer form with telephone numbers to call when they feel their civil rights have been violated. Officials are also developing briefing materials on how to protect aliens civil rights, statistically analyzing arrest and other information to identify potential civil rights abuses, and using an existing DHS complaint process for addressing Secure Communities concerns. GAO recommends that ICE develop well-defined requirements and an integrated master schedule that accounts for all activities for its technology contracts, and a plan for workforce changes in preparation for full technology deployment. DHS concurred with the recommendations.