During a war, the U.S. national leadership expects the military forces to conduct large-scale, sustained combat operations with the goal of winning quickly with as few casualties as possible. Interdiction missions are part of the strategy for achieving this goal. These missions are part of the effort aimed at denying the enemy sanctuary and freedom of action. Targets may include such things as tanks, bridges, and factories that when destroyed make opponents easier to attack and defeat. Combat aircraft have predominately been used to fulfill interdiction missions because they generally offer the versatility and capability to strike at the enemy when and where needed. In recent years, U.S. military services’ interdiction and other combat mission priorities have changed. During the Cold War, the enemy was more clearly identified, and defense forces were geared to fight that enemy. The threat has changed dramatically, from a single global threat to smaller, less defined regional threats, and the size and structure of defense forces are changing as well. As the services draw down their forces, the Department of Defense (DOD) is grappling with questions about how to maintain technological superiority over potential adversaries within expected budgets. During the Cold War, the national military strategy was to contain communism through nuclear and conventional deterrence. DOD emphasized aspects of military power most useful for that purpose, including standby nuclear forces that combined bombers and land- and sea-based missile systems, forward-deployed forces in Europe and Northeast Asia, and reinforcements ready to deploy from the United States. With the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union, the United States faces no immediate threat to its survival. Therefore, the national military strategy is being altered to meet new, lessened threats. For example, the President, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Secretary of Defense identified the involvement in two nearly simultaneous major regional conflicts (MRC) as the most demanding threat—one in the east, another in the west. In addition to preparing to counter these threats, DOD will more likely be distracted by less easily defined and smaller contingencies. The modernization of U.S. forces is considered vital to preserving the combat edge they now enjoy and to ensuring future readiness. The strategy cautions against making major modernization investments unless there is “substantial payoff.” DOD’s Defense Planning Guidance for fiscal years 1997-2001 states its commitment to developing an affordable, long-term modernization and recapitalization program. This program is to (1) inject new technologies to modernize existing platforms and upgrade mission capabilities, (2) introduce modernized replacements for existing systems that substantially upgrade capabilities and lower operation and support costs, and (3) field new systems for which there is no like item in the inventory. DOD asserted that introducing these capabilities should better leverage joint warfighting capabilities and, in some instances, allow consideration for making compensating reductions elsewhere in the force. In November 1993, Congress established the Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces to study the way the services allocate roles and missions, to consider alternatives, and to recommend changes to the process to better meet future needs. The Commission comprised civilian and retired military officials appointed by the Secretary of Defense in consultation with Members of Congress. In Directions for Defense (May 24, 1995), the Commission reported that while each service develops valuable capabilities, considering these capabilities jointly is key to effective future unified operations. As part of the national military strategy and as reported in the Secretary of Defense’s January 1994 Annual Report to the President and the Congress, the military services have planned for four phases of operations: halting the invasion, building up U.S. combat power while reducing the enemy’s, defeating the enemy, and providing post-war stability. Interdiction may play a role in the first three phases. The significance of the role may vary according to the circumstances. During phase 1, the services seek to quickly minimize the territory and strategic facilities the invader can capture and ensure that the threatened ally can continue its crucial role in the collective effort to defeat the aggressor. High priority missions for U.S. forces during this phase include direct attacks on advancing enemy forces; air defense and ballistic missile defense to protect rear areas; attacks on selected high-value strategic assets, such as centralized command and control sites; interdiction of lines of communication critical to the enemy’s offensive; and suppression of enemy air defenses. Once the enemy attack has been stopped, phase 2 begins, and U.S. and allied efforts focus on continuing to build up combat forces and logistics support in theater, reducing the enemy’s capacity to fight and ensuring that the enemy does not regain the initiative. During phase 3, U.S. and allied forces may mount a large-scale, air-land counteroffensive to defeat the enemy by attacking its centers of gravity, retaking territory it occupies, destroying its war-making capabilities, and successfully achieving other operational or strategic objectives. In many cases, U.S. forces would also threaten or carry out amphibious assault landings in the enemy’s rear areas. Following a U.S.-coalition victory, military forces remain in theater to ensure that the conditions that resulted in conflict do not recur. These forces may also help repatriate prisoners, occupy and administer some or all of the enemy’s territory, assist in reestablishing friendly governments in liberated areas, or ensure compliance with the provisions of a cease-fire agreement or peace accord. Under DOD Directive 5100.1, the Air Force is primarily responsible for air interdiction missions, but the Army, the Navy, and the Marines are expected to interdict enemy forces as a collateral mission. While the services do not limit interdiction to any particular area on the battlefield, they generally strike at targets beyond the close fire support area to avoid hurting friendly forces. In line with the changes proposed by the Commission on Roles and Missions, the services are working out how to better conduct joint operations. Joint commanders can use interdiction to divert, disrupt, delay, or destroy the enemy’s surface military potential before it can effectively be used against friendly forces. Military guidance on joint interdiction operations is still evolving, however. Joint Publication 3-0, entitled Doctrine for Joint Operations and issued in 1995, states that the services should fight together and cites examples of joint interdiction missions. The Air Force and the Army have draft joint doctrine publications that provide more details on how joint interdiction operations would work. Joint Publication 3-03, Doctrine for Joint Interdiction Operations, drafted by the Air Force, describes how the services should coordinate the use of their forces during the joint missions. The Army’s draft of Joint Publication 3-09, Doctrine for Joint Fire Support, describes how the services might better synchronize the use of firepower in all missions to ensure success. According to an official in the Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, these publications may be approved in the fall of 1996. During two major regional conflicts, U.S. military forces expect to encounter over 100,000 mobile or fixed targets. Mobile targets include tanks, personnel carriers, artillery, trucks, and missile launchers. Fixed targets include bridges, highways, railyards, fuel storage sites, and power production sites. Striking at various targets becomes more critical at different times during a war, depending on how the targets support the enemy or threaten friendly forces. For example, during phase 1 of a war, halting the enemy’s movement may make it critical for the services to interdict mobile targets such as tanks and artillery. The services’ weapons for interdicting targets include aircraft, missiles, and helicopters. Each service traditionally has individually determined the capabilities it needs to fulfill its missions. The Air Force, the Navy, and the Marines expect to use large portions of their combat aircraft for interdiction missions. These aircraft can also be used for other roles, such as close air support or air superiority. During the Gulf War, however, most of the combat sorties by U.S. attack aircraft were flown for interdiction missions (see table 1.1). In addition to fixed-wing aircraft, weapons such as the Navy’s Tomahawk Land Attack Missile (TLAM), the Army’s Tactical Missile System (ATACMS) and attack helicopters, and the services’ precision-guided munitions can also be used to interdict targets. To illustrate the need to compare the services’ plans for improving their interdiction capabilities, we evaluated (1) the services’ current and future aggregate interdiction assets for striking identified enemy targets and (2) the effect of the services’ planned modernization programs on total interdiction capabilities and alternatives to those programs. This report is one of a series of reports assessing how DOD might better adapt its combat air power to meet future needs. Other reports in this series address close fire support, air superiority, suppression of enemy air defense, surveillance and reconnaissance, and aerial refueling. To assess the services’ aggregate interdiction capabilities, we identified how the services plan to hit expected targets now and in the future. We relied on threat assessments by the Defense Intelligence Agency and the military services to identify the number and type of targets. We also reviewed doctrine of the Office of Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Air Force Doctrine Center, the Navy Doctrine Command, and the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command to identify how the services have been authorized to perform interdiction missions. Officials from the Office of the Secretary of Defense and from the Air Force, the Army, the Marine, and the Navy headquarters provided information on current interdiction capabilities and modernization plans. Additional views on capability and operational perspectives were provided by the Air Force’s Air Combat Command, the Army’s Training and Doctrine Command, the Navy’s Commander in Chief (CINC) Atlantic Fleet, and the Marine Forces Atlantic. We also obtained data on how each service plans to hit interdiction targets identified for two MRCs now and in the 2002 time frame. Air Force headquarters officials provided an extract from the database it uses to determine wartime conventional munition requirements. This data linked targets to the likely munitions and the aircraft to be used against them. The Air Force’s analyses ensure it has sufficient capability to interdict the targets it is apportioned by the Unified CINCs. Navy headquarters officials provided a similar database for the targets that the Navy and the Marine Corps are assigned to hit with their fixed-wing aircraft. In addition, information on the targets that might be hit by the TLAM was also provided by the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations. In compiling their data, the Air Force and the Navy assumed the availability of all munitions in the inventory and suppression of enemy air defense aircraft. The U.S. Army Field Artillery and the U.S. Army Aviation Warfighting Center also provided information on the targets that the ATACMS and Apache and Comanche helicopters might hit. We compiled the services’ data to determine aggregate capabilities to interdict ground targets (see app. I for the aircraft and missile launch system combinations). We analyzed this data in several ways to identify redundant capabilities in the services. We then assessed whether various service modernization proposals would add new capability or more redundancy to the ways the services have to hit the targets. The database we developed had the following limitations: The data represents a snapshot of capability at points in time. Changes in threat, force structure, budget, or national military strategy could significantly alter its validity. We did not validate the Air Force’s and the Navy’s models linking targets to munitions and aircraft. We added Navy TLAM and Army ATACMS data to show the targets they might hit, even though the services had not used the weapons in their model for determining their sufficiency to interdict designated targets. We could not evaluate the full impact of some modernization proposals because they will not be completely implemented by 2002, the last year of the services’ data. We discussed the modernization proposals and some alternatives with officials at the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the services’ headquarters, and the U.S. Atlantic Command, Central Command, European Command, and Pacific Command. We also interviewed officials at the Air Combat Command; the U.S. Air Forces and Army Europe; and the U.S. Pacific Air Forces, Army, and Navy. We also reviewed documents they provided relevant to our analysis. In our analysis of current capabilities and future force options, we considered information from our prior reports, the Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces, RAND, the Institute for Defense Analysis, the Center for Strategic and International Studies, the Congressional Research Service, and the Congressional Budget Office. We conducted this review from April 1994 to November 1995 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. When viewed in the aggregate, the services’ weapons constitute a major force capable of interdicting targets in numerous overlapping, and often redundant ways during two MRCs. The services have concluded, and we concur, that they have enough capability to carry out the national military strategy. Furthermore, the Congressional Research Service reported concern about and the Commission on Roles and Missions concluded that the United States may have more than enough interdiction capabilities. Nevertheless, the services are proposing to add to their interdiction capabilities by modernizing some weapons and buying more of others between 1995 and 2010. Combat air power has been and is expected to remain the primary interdiction force, as it was during the Gulf War. However, other weapons are increasingly available for interdiction missions—the TLAMs and ATACMS and potentially the Army’s Apache helicopters. As shown in table 2.1, the interdiction forces available in 1995 significantly exceed the combat air power and missiles used during the Gulf War. DOD and the services assert that current interdiction forces are sufficient to successfully execute the national military strategy, that is, to fight in concert with regional allies and decisively win two nearly simultaneous MRCs. They base this assertion on target and other information that served as the basis for several analyses testing the sufficiency of the U.S. forces proposed in DOD’s bottom-up review and to support future requirements. According to the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff’s recent “Nimble Dancer” extensive war games included an air campaign exercise that tested the ability of the 1997 and 2001-05 forces to win two conflicts based on hitting the designated targets. The results of these tests, according to the Secretary of Defense, validated the ability of these forces to meet the challenge. Our analyses of the services’ data show that they have more than enough capability to hit the identified ground targets for the east and west MRCs. In fact, we found that in the aggregate, the services’ responsibilities for hitting targets overlap considerably, and the services have many ways to hit the same target. In doing our analyses, we assessed information from a variety of sources, including the Air Force and the Navy data used in their Capabilities Based Munitions Requirements (CBMR) development process. Following DOD’s CBMR process, the Air Force and the Navy assessed the munitions needed to defeat the threat from 1995 through 2002. Using Defense Intelligence Agency target data, they matched the interdiction targets to be hit to the services’ 29 munition and 14 combat aircraft types. The Unified CINCs associated with the east and west regional conflicts determined the percentage of targets each service would be expected to hit. The sum of munitions required to adequately destroy each region’s targets became part of the basis for the services’ total munitions requirements. The Air Force and the Navy databases linking targets to munitions and combat aircraft were of particular value because they allowed us to assess the adequacy of the expected combat air forces to meet mission needs based on the Unified CINCs’ apportionment of targets to the services. Our databases confirmed that the Air Force, the Navy, and the Marines have sufficient munitions and aircraft in 1995 and 2002 to interdict the targets. By adding target information on the Navy’s TLAM and the Army’s ATACMS to the combat air forces’ target data, we identified the services’ aggregate interdiction capabilities available for each MRC. This approach also enabled us to identify redundancies in interdiction capabilities. These redundancies were expressed two ways: as overlapping service responsibility for the same targets, and as multiple ways to hit the same target. The Unified CINCs apportion more than 100 percent of the targets to the services. For example, one CINC assigned the Army 5 to 10 percent, the Navy 20 to 30 percent, the Marines 15 to 25 percent, and the Air Force 65 to 75 percent of one target type—a total apportioned range of 105 to 140 percent coverage—even though the CINC’s objective was to destroy only 80 percent of the target quantity. This over-apportionment creates a margin of safety and allows flexibility to ensure targets will be hit even if some expected capabilities are not available. However, it also establishes the expectation that the services would acquire and maintain sufficient forces to provide this level of target coverage and thus would be maintaining a significant amount of redundancy. Figure 2.1 shows the apportionment of targets for one MRC (providing specific target names would require the figure to be classified). Redundancy can also be expressed in the number of ways the services have to hit targets. As an example, table 2.2 shows the number of aircraft or other means of delivery and the munition combinations the services designated to interdict one type of target (the specific name of the target is classified). All 21 combinations involving 6 different aircraft types and a missile launcher shown in table 2.2 might not be used, but the services assume that these combinations will be available. Moreover, the number of options represented is not unusual. The services currently have 10 or more ways designated to hit nearly 65 percent of the Defense Intelligence Agency-identified ground targets. By adding the additional ways envisioned in 2002 to those ways designated in 1995 that would continue to be available, 86 percent of the targets can be hit 10 or more ways. As shown in figure 2.2, some targets can be hit more than 25 different ways. Despite the fact that the services have ample forces to meet current and future interdiction missions, they plan to add even more capability by modernizing some platforms, missiles, and munitions and buying more of others over the next 15 to 20 years, at a cost exceeding $213 billion. The services expect these improved weapons to interdict targets with more accuracy and lethality and to increase aircraft and pilot survivability. Each service has proposed the following: The Air Force plans to (1) upgrade its B-1B bomber for conventional use, (2) buy and develop more conventional precision-guided munitions, and (3) retire the F-111 aircraft (due to an Office of the Secretary of Defense decision) and buy the new F-22 and Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) aircraft to replace other aircraft. The Navy plans to replace and/or retire its A-6, F/A-18A/C/D, and F-14 aircraft with the new F/A-18E/F and the JSF aircraft and to continue to buy and develop more of the improved TLAMs and precision-guided munitions. The Marines plan to replace the AV-8B and F/A-18C/D aircraft with a short takeoff and vertical landing version of the JSF aircraft. The Army plans to buy 2,800 improved ATACMS, upgrade its Apache helicopters, and buy nearly 1,300 new Comanche helicopters. All services plan to buy more precision-guided munitions. In total, these plans will affect the current mix of aircraft and missile types in 2001 and 2010 (see table 2.3). According to the Congressional Research Service and the Commission on Roles and Missions, the services have more interdiction capabilities than may be needed now and in the future. They based their conclusion on their assessment of the current forces and their view that the services’ requirements development processes tend to yield competing, sometimes redundant, service-specific solutions. The Congressional Research Service reported in 1993 and again in 1995 that critics complained about the overlap in the services’ airpower and the excessive costs incurred to provide that capability. It also expressed the belief that duplicative capabilities should be eliminated but may remain because the services are reluctant to rely on each other. The Commission was more pointed in its conclusions. It reported in May 1995 that DOD may have greater quantities of strike aircraft and other deep attack weapons than it needs and noted that the total capability is increasing. The Commission attributed the increase to the addition of conventional bombers, growing inventories of improved precision-guided munitions, and plans to buy stealth aircraft. Because of these concerns, the Commission recommended the prompt initiation of a DOD-wide cost-effectiveness study focused on finding the appropriate combination and quantities of deep attack capabilities currently fielded and under development by all services. This effort, entitled “The Deep Attack Weapons Mix Study,” is now under way at the direction of the Secretary of Defense. DOD agreed that the services appear to have an abundant interdiction capability but said that these capabilities must be viewed in terms of flexibility, multimission capability, and availability. We agree that these are considerations in assessing the sufficiency of assets in relation to expected requirements. However, independent analyses and DOD’s own statements suggest that it also believes that aggregate capabilities could be excess to requirements. For example, the most recent program assessment by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of staff concluded that procurement plans included more than tactical aircraft resources could pay for and therefore recommended that the services identify programs that could be slowed or terminated. Taken together, we believe that the conclusions of both external experts and statements by DOD suggest that there may be cost-saving alternatives to planned modernization programs. DOD also noted that we had overstated available interdiction assets by adding together all the possible weapons that a single aircraft might employ. We acknowledge that a single aircraft can deliver only the munitions it carries on a single sortie. However, the services would not expect to attack all targets at the same time. Given the likelihood of multiple sorties by many aircraft, we do not believe that our analysis overstates the services’ capabilities. Finally, DOD said that today’s interdiction forces exceed those used during the Persian Gulf War because that war represented a single major regional contingency, whereas current assets are geared for two such contingencies. We do not agree with this line of reasoning in that the interdiction assets available at the time of the Gulf War were those planned to counter the former Soviet Union in a possible global war—a much more demanding scenario than the current two MRC strategy. Given questions about future defense spending levels, the diminished threat to U.S. security, and the services’ statements that they have ample interdiction capability, some modernization proposals may not be sound investments. Some of these investments offer limited or unknown additional capability to the current abundant interdiction assets. For example, the Air Force’s planned upgrade to the B-1B bomber and the Navy’s F/A-18E/F procurement appear to add more redundancy at a high cost. Also, it is uncertain what value the Army’s ATACMS and Apache Longbow and Comanche helicopters and the services’ thousands of precision-guided munitions will add to interdiction capabilities. The Commission on Roles and Missions concluded, and our analysis confirms, that the appropriate combination and quantities of capabilities should be assessed because the services plan to add more redundancy to that which already exists. We have included options in this chapter based on our analysis of the services’ total capabilities to hit targets designated by the CINCs. While the options presented here are not the only ones possible, they illustrate the kind of trade-offs DOD should find useful when evaluating whether the investments called for in current and future service modernization plans provide substantial payoff. Consideration of the services’ capabilities in the aggregate, with an understanding of how the weapons will be used and how that use will affect other services’ forces, could yield more cost-effective alternatives to the services’ current proposals. Modernization plans such as those currently proposed evolve from each service as its solution to a perceived need. Because each service proposes improvements to its capabilities separately, the services do not necessarily recognize that, together, their improvements result in substantial, sometimes redundant, military capabilities. The services’ modernization plans are developed through a requirements generation process that also encourages each service to maintain its own view of how its own capabilities should be enhanced to ensure interdiction targets are hit. As noted by the Commission in its 1995 report, “each Service is fully engaged in trying to deliver to the CINCs what the Service views as the best possible set of its specific capabilities—without taking into account the similar capabilities provided by the other Services.” The Commission report states that, on one hand, this is desirable because “competition among the Services produces innovation in weapon systems, forces, doctrine, and concepts of operations that yield the dramatically superior military capabilities we need.” However, this decision process does not ensure that the services consider the capabilities available in the total force. For example, in a 1993 report, we asserted that the need for the F/A-18E/F had not been adequately justified based on threat or as a cost-effective solution to a recognized military need. Furthermore, the Navy had not explored options other than Navy fixed-wing aircraft. While analyses of capability based on threat or cost-effectiveness are advantageous, a DOD examination of the contribution of a new capability in the context of the total force could yield a different investment decision. Because DOD and the services do not routinely assess the services’ capabilities in the aggregate, there is no assurance that modernization proposals will yield substantial payoffs. This acquisition environment has existed for some time. In a 1992 report,we noted the similarity of major acquisition issues addressed in work over the preceding 15 years. The report noted that acquisition programs begin as individual service solutions to mission needs. The organizations responsible for developing requirements for new weapons generally represent individual branches within the services that analyze their own mission area deficiencies and recommend solutions in terms of their own type of assets. Therefore, while the general threat may be legitimate and individual program analyses objective, the processes for developing weapon system requirements tend to narrow consideration of alternatives and favor the promotion of particular weapons that may be the services’ preferred solution, not the best solution to a valid need. These service organizations’ institutionalized advocacy of the weapons under their purview helps perpetuate the funneling of successor weapons into the acquisition process. In leading up to its recommendation that DOD conduct a cost-effectiveness study of the appropriate combination and quantities of deep attack capabilities by all services, the Commission indicated the environment described above still exists. Also, the Commission pointed out that no one in DOD has specific responsibility for making this decision. The Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) was established, led by the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to oversee the services’ requirements generation processes. JROC assessed 10 joint warfighting areas, such as “strike” and “air superiority,” to determine whether the effectiveness of existing and planned capabilities can be enhanced. These joint warfighting capability assessments became the basis for the Chairman’s program and budget recommendations to the Secretary of Defense. Most of the Chairman’s 1995 guidance concerned the financial implications of the services’ current plans, but the assessments did not explore ways to reduce costs by suggesting specific trade-offs among major modernization proposals. With a high level of uncertainty surrounding future defense spending, the services’ proposed modernization of interdiction capabilities—at a projected cost of more than $213 billion over the next 15 to 20 years—could pose a significant problem. According to our analysis of DOD’s Future Years Defense Plan (FYDP) data, the services’ modernization programs will cost at least $45 billion in fiscal years 1995-2001. Moreover, the services’ planned $213 billion plus modernization costs do not include the $72 billion that the F-22 is estimated to cost or the eventual cost of the JSF aircraft. These costs will affect DOD’s budgets out to 2010 and later. The Commission and others conclude that today’s threat is considerably different from the Soviet threat that previously dominated U.S. military force planning, preparation, and funding. A single enemy no longer poses an immediate, nuclear threat to U.S. survival, and no one is expected to achieve military capabilities challenging those of the United States during the next 20 years. Overt attacks on the United States and its strategic interests are unlikely because few nations will have the resources to succeed in such attacks. Instead, America faces a broad range of less serious but more likely challenges such as regional strife, insurgencies, civil wars, and operations other than war. While the proliferation of weapons and technology is expected to allow some nations to buy state-of-the-art systems or upgrade those they have, the extent of their investment will be limited by budget constraints. In addition, an investment in a few improved systems does not equate to an integrated, modernized force. By comparing the expected contribution of weapons resulting from the services’ modernization plans to current total U.S. military interdiction capability, we assessed the significance of their impact on the forces’ ability to hit targets associated with two MRCs. Our analysis indicated that some proposals may not be sound investments. For example, the Air Force’s B-1B upgrade and the Navy’s F/A-18E/F procurement may add more redundancy at a high cost. Others, like the Army’s ATACMS, the Apache Longbow and Comanche initiatives and the services’ precision-guided munitions proposals, may add expensive new capabilities without a clear understanding of the extent they are needed or their potential impact on other services’ forces. We determined how the services’ plan to hit interdiction targets for the two MRCs based on Air Force and Navy CBMR data, possible TLAM and ATACMS targets, and CINC target allocations. After aggregating this data, we assessed the interdiction contribution of various weapons. We identified which targets each weapon was designated to hit in 1995 and 2002, how these designations changed between those points in time, and other possible ways to hit those same targets. This allowed us to focus on the interdiction contribution of those weapons if they are modified or added to the services’ capabilities. Our analysis caused us to question whether some investments yielded a substantial payoff, and to develop options for some modernization proposals. We recognize that some systems have multimission capabilities and that in making decisions impacting them, the potential contribution to those other missions should be considered. In light of the ample capability to hit the few targets assigned the B-1B, retiring the aircraft could save almost $4 billion in modernization costs and nearly $1 billion annually in operating costs that could be used for other initiatives. Retirement of the aircraft would increase U.S. forces’ dependency on other capabilities and therefore the risk that some targets might not be hit as quickly as desired. However, it is reasonable to expect that the targets could be hit by other U.S. military assets, including missiles such as ATACMS and TLAM. Should the risk associated with retiring the B-1B be unacceptable, another option is to use the nearly $4 billion to buy up to 80 more F-15Es. Considered the Air Force’s premier air-to-ground fighter, the F-15E launches a wide variety of munitions, adds flexibility to air operations, and would still save operating funds. The Air Force plans to spend nearly $4 billion to increase the conventional capability and sustainability of the B-1B to make it the backbone of its conventional bomber force. Currently, the B-1B’s ability to conduct conventional missions is limited because it can carry only the 500-pound unguided, general-purpose bomb. The Air Force therefore plans to (1) upgrade the avionics to enable the B-1B to drop cluster bomb units and mines, (2) improve the electronic countermeasures system to ensure that the B-1B is not vulnerable to sophisticated enemy air defenses, and (3) add a global positioning system and other modifications to integrate the use of precision-guided munitions with its other systems. By 2002, the improved B-1B will be expected to deliver several precision-guided munitions: the Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM) and the Wind Corrected Munitions Dispenser (WCMD), with either the Combined Effects Munition (CEM) or the Sensor Fuzed Weapon (SFW). Eventually, the B-1B will also deliver the Joint Standoff Weapon (JSOW). Many other aircraft are also expected to launch these and other more potent weapons. The nearly $4 billion modernization also includes $400 million for the B-1B’s sustainment modifications. Changes include engine upgrades to correct safety and high maintenance problems, enhancements to simulator systems used by flight crews and maintenance personnel for initial qualification and continuation training, and improvements to the antenna. According to Air Force modeling, even after the proposed modifications, the B-1B’s contribution to interdiction is expected to be minor when compared to the services’ total interdiction capability. The specific percentage of targets to be destroyed by the B-1B is classified. However, figure 3.1 shows the B-1B’s expected contribution in 2002 compared to other Air Force aircraft in terms of target types it is designated to hit. According to the Air Force, the B-1B’s greatest contribution would be to halt enemy aggression during the early days of a conflict. While officials in the Unified Commands agreed that bombers would be valuable, they also said they expect to use far fewer than the 100 bombers the bottom-up review cited might be necessary for a MRC. Furthermore, the Air Force’s analysis of its bomber force in the years 2001-05 shows that the B-1B does not make a unique contribution because other bombers or fighters hit the same types of targets it hits in the first 7 days of a conflict. As shown in table 3.1, the target the B-1B would most frequently strike in 2001 can be hit 20 other ways. Air Force modeling shows that, as the conflict continues, the B-1B’s relative contribution to the war becomes even smaller. Moreover, service data shows that as in the first 7 days, the B-1B’s targets are not unique, and in 2002 the services are expected to hit the same 18 target types numerous (one over 35) other ways (see fig. 3.2). Eight of the target types designated for the B-1B in 2002 were different from those assigned in 1995. These new B-1B targets are already designated to be hit in 1995 by 4 to 21 other combinations. The two B-1B target types hit the fewest other ways in 2001 are currently designated to be attacked at least four other ways. With the exception of one aircraft, all missiles, aircraft, and munitions comprising these four ways are still expected to be available in 2002, but they are not the preferred way designated for hitting these targets. In direct response to a draft of this report, DOD said that our cost for the B-1B upgrade appeared to include operations and maintenance items other than the specific cost required for the upgrade. However, the $4 billion cited is the expected total program cost for modernizing the B-1B. In addition to funds for the Conventional Munition Upgrade Program, it includes the amounts for modifications to enhance the B-1B’s sustainability and to upgrade equipment in the squadrons. If the B-1B were retired, more of the associated costs would be avoided. As an option for saving funds and at the same time retaining interdiction capabilities, the Navy could reconsider its F/A-18E/F aircraft procurement plans and instead consider procuring more F/A-18C/Ds to meet its needs. The Navy is still purchasing the C/D model, and ongoing and planned modifications costing about $1.5 billion will improve the aircraft’s survivability and ability to acquire and accurately strike targets. Changes in the F/A-18 procurement plans could save billions of dollars. The Navy plans to buy 1,000 F/A-18E/F fighter aircraft at a total estimated cost of nearly $90 billion. The Navy will buy the first E/Fs in fiscal year 1997 and expects to own almost 700 by 2010. The E/F was designed to replace the A-6, F/A-18C/D, and F-14 aircraft as they reach the end of their service lives and are retired. Compared to the C/D, the E/F was projected to perform the same mission but to be more survivable, carry more weapons, and have greater range. However, more recent assessments show that F/A-18E/F capabilities will be marginally improved over the F/A-18C/D model. Our analysis of the Navy’s target database shows the F/A-18C/D’s interdiction role is virtually identical to that of the F/A-18E/F. Both aircraft are expected to hit the same targets with the same type weapons. The C/D can carry all the Navy’s current strike weapons and is expected to carry precision-guided munitions such as the JDAM and the JSOW. While the E/F’s range advantage could allow it to more effectively employ the additional weapons it can carry, a Congressional Budget Office memorandum reported the Secretary of the Navy as stating that about 85 percent of the service’s targets are within 200 miles of shore and are therefore within the C/D’s range. According to the Gulf War air power survey commissioned by the Air Force, the F/A-18C/D proved its combat capabilities and effectiveness during Operation Desert Storm when it dropped more than 17,500 tons of ordnance on a variety of ground targets. It was the only aircraft that during a single mission acquired, identified, and in air-to-air combat destroyed two enemy aircraft and then delivered munitions to a ground target. Further, the E/F’s contribution to the interdicting ground targets is not expected to be unique relative to the services’ total capabilities. For example, table 3.2 shows the expected interdiction contribution of the E/F in 2002 against one of its targets and the 20 other ways also expected to be available to hit that target. The difference in the unit cost of the two models is substantial. The Navy plans to buy 1,000 F/A-18E/F fighter aircraft for the Navy and the Marine Corps at an estimated total program cost of nearly $90 billion. Based on total program costs, each F/A-18E/F would cost about $89 million under a 1,000-aircraft buy while the current unit procurement cost of the F/A-18C/D is about $51 million based on procurement of 12 aircraft.However, if the Marine Corps does not buy F/A-18E/Fs, the Navy could reduce the E/F procurement quantity. The C/D model, which proved its capabilities in the Gulf War, is still in production and is being improved at a cost of $1.5 billion. In its comments on our draft report, DOD said that we should use the expected flyaway costs rather than total program costs in comparing the costs of the two aircraft. Although we acknowledge that DOD often uses flyaway costs in this manner, we believe that it is appropriate to use the total program costs for the F/A-18E/F since the focus of our comparison is on future budgetary impacts. In contrast to the C/D model that the Navy has procured for a number of years, most of the research and development costs and the investment in operations and support for the E/F model have not yet been incurred. When considered in concert with other interdiction capabilities, the ATACMS and Army helicopters as well as the services’ planned precision-guided munitions could affect the future force structure. However, the potential value of these weapons is unknown because the services have not resolved how they fit into joint interdiction operations. At a minimum, these weapons appear to introduce more redundancy into the services’ aggregate interdiction capabilities, but they could also add new capability that would reduce the need for some aircraft. Even if the force structure cannot be reduced, a further examination of their value to interdiction in light of the total capability could help in deciding how much money to invest in each. The Army and the Air Force have not yet resolved doctrinal differences about the use of Army weapons for interdiction. The ATACMS, as well as Army helicopters, could provide significant, sometimes unique, capabilities to interdiction missions. However, how the Army should use these weapons, unilaterally or in support of joint interdiction operations, must be resolved before the contribution of these weapons can be calculated. Decisions about the joint use of Army interdiction weapons could also better define the amount of these capabilities the Army actually needs to buy. Planned purchases of precision-guided munitions could allow for other force options in the future. DOD’s bottom-up review cited the use of precision-guided munitions as a means of minimizing risk as the force size is reduced. However, the extent to which current procurement plans meet or exceed this expectation is not clear. Since precision-guided munitions are expected to be more accurate, aircraft would be required to fly fewer sorties, fewer aircraft may be needed, and survivability is expected to increase. Should these attributes be realized, weighing their potential contribution instead of modernizing or purchasing some aircraft could save money. While acknowledging that the Air Force’s air power dominates interdiction missions, the Army plans to increase and improve its deep battle capabilities at a cost of about $63 billion. The Army’s modernization programs are intended to give ground commanders the ability to rapidly detect, select, and destroy targets in support of ground maneuvers through the depth of the battlefield. Planned expenditures include $4.6 billion for 2,800 ATACMS, including over 20,000 brilliant anti-armor(BAT) and BAT pre-planned product improvement submunitions; $8.4 billion for improvements to its 758 Apache helicopters; and more than $50 billion for the development and acquisition of 1,292 Comanche helicopters. ATACMS is a family of munitions that will be phased in through 2008; all will be fired from the MLRS M270 launcher. The Block I munition has an antipersonnel, antimaterial warhead with a range exceeding 150 kilometers. The Block Ia munition, scheduled for delivery in fiscal year 1998, will carry a smaller warhead but attack the same targets as the Block I munition, with increased accuracy over 300 kilometers away. The Block II munition, with a range of 140 kilometers, will be fielded in fiscal year 2001. It will carry 13 BAT submunitions effective against moving or stationary hard targets plus mobile surface-to-surface missile launchers. Last, the Block IIa munition, scheduled to be delivered in fiscal year 2004, will deliver improved BAT submunitions to ranges greater than 280 kilometers. It will be used against the same targets as Block II at greater ranges. In addition to the ATACMS, the Army plans to upgrade its 758 AH-64A (Apache) helicopters to the AH-64D (Apache Longbow) model during fiscal years 1997 through 2013. The upgraded Apaches will be easier to navigate; have the Longbow’s Global Positioning System; improved communication, survivability, and reliability; and the millimeter-wave radar. In addition, 227 of the 758 Apaches will also be equipped with the Longbow fire-control radar and upgraded engines. This upgrade will give the Army its first fire-and-forget missile capability. The fire control radar will detect, classify, and prioritize targets at night, through smoke and dust and in adverse weather. The Apache Longbow could be effective against most interdiction targets and will continue to be capable of firing the Hellfire and Longbow Hellfire missiles. The Comanche is expected to be a multimission helicopter capable of armed reconnaissance and attack. It features technology that will make it less detectable, enable it to engage multiple targets simultaneously with high lethality, and provide day/night, adverse weather fire-and-forget capability. Under current plans, the Comanche will be fielded starting in fiscal year 2006. It can be used against almost all of the Apache’s targets plus radar sites and will fire the Hellfire, Longbow Hellfire, and Stinger missiles. The extent to which ATACMS are needed is not clear because the services have not resolved how they will be used and who will control them. The Army is developing ATACMS to interdict enemy targets because of its unique attributes. It can hit enemy targets up to 200 kilometers away less than 12 minutes after target acquisition, day or night, in any weather, with increased survivability over manned systems. Based on the Army’s ATACMS target data, these missiles would be appropriate to employ against up to 27 percent of the target types in one MRC and 41 percent of the target types in the other. The services have not yet resolved disputes over the control and coordination of deep battle assets such as ATACMS; however, the Air Force and the Army disagree about whether the Joint Force Air Component Commander (usually Air Force) or the Land Component Commander (usually Army) can best control the deep battle and consequently operational use of ATACMS. Army officials believe the Joint Force Commander should address the question of control during the initial planning for a conflict. Until these issues are settled through doctrine or some other means, the expected battlefield contribution or the possible force structure implications of buying 2,800 more ATACMS is in question. The Army is buying significant interdiction capability with the acquisition and modernization of its helicopters. The Apache helicopter can perform multiple roles and missions, including deep attack operations and suppression of enemy air defenses. The Comanche will also be able to perform multiple roles, including armed reconnaissance and air combat. Both helicopters are capable of attacking most interdiction targets, but no interdiction targets have been designated for helicopters. The Army considers attack helicopters to be responsive, precise, highly lethal deep strike systems. However, because the Army considers helicopters maneuver assets, it has restricted their use from joint interdiction operations. The extent to which the helicopters could be used for joint interdiction missions is therefore unclear because the same dispute about who should control the use of ATACMS appears to also apply to the Army’s attack helicopters. The services have invested or plan to invest over $40 billion to acquire 23 different types of precision-guided munitions (including the TLAM) and over 260,000 total munitions (see app. II). They expect these munitions to offset reductions in force size by increasing their accuracy and lethality through the use of target location information from inertial navigation systems, laser guidance systems, Global Positioning System satellites, or a combination of these and other sources. The services identified a specific need for increased munitions accuracy during Operation Desert Storm, when 37 percent of the Air Force’s and the Navy’s strike sorties were ineffective due to bad weather. The services expect precision-guided munitions such as JDAM to add accuracy and lethality against ground targets and increase aircraft survivability. Some of these munitions can be dropped from higher altitudes with greater accuracy than conventional gravity bombs, and some can be launched from outside the effective range of enemy defenses. An Air Force-sponsored analysis of JDAM operational effectiveness, for example, shows that the use of the munition could result in a decrease of 16 to 20 percent of aircraft lost to enemy fire. It is also expected to allow each aircraft to accurately attack a greater number of targets during each sortie. The increased standoff capability provided by the WCMD and the JSOW are also expected to enable fighters and bombers to hit targets more effectively and thereby increase aircraft survivability. WCMD provides increased high-altitude accuracy and the capability for all-weather operations and independent targeting. The JSOW is likewise expected to be effectively launched outside enemy point defenses during day or night and in adverse weather conditions. The services consider precision-guided munitions the asset they need to offset the reduced force structure and to sustain their lethal capability. DOD’s bottom-up review emphasized that precision-guided munitions are one of the improvements needed to ensure that U.S. forces can operate successfully in future MRCs. However, the services’ future force structure plans do not indicate that they expect the increased use of these munitions to reduce force structure any more than that cited in the review. Our analysis of the Air Force and the Navy munitions requirements shows that, by 2002, the two services expect to reduce the number of sorties flown during two MRCs by about 28 percent. Most of this reduction is attributable to precision-guided munitions, which can correct errors in flight, resulting in the same or higher levels of success as could be achieved with larger numbers of unguided weapons. In addition, the services expect precision-guided munitions’ accuracy and lethality to increase aircraft survivability. For example, as cited above, the number of aircraft lost to enemy fire could decrease by up to 20 percent with use of the JDAM. According to the analysis, aircraft are less vulnerable to enemy air defense when using JDAM than when using other weapons like the GBU-24, AGM-130, or AGM-65G (Maverick). Moreover, JSOW is expected to hit several targets with its multiple submunitions; consequently, the services would need to fly fewer sorties to hit the desired number of targets. Therefore, in addition to ensuring the adequacy of the current force to meet warfighting needs, further reductions in sorties appear to raise the possibility that the number of aircraft to be modernized, purchased, or retained in the force could be reduced. While modernization may be vital to preserving U.S forces’ edge and ensuring future readiness, modernizing or buying capability that adds little or unknown value to the interdiction mission and costs more than $213 billion may not be a sound investment. The upgrade to the B-1B and the purchase of additional F/A-18E/Fs, Apache and Comanche helicopters, and precision-guided munitions constitute a significant investment. Some of these modernization programs may be worth the cost if they materially strengthen interdiction capabilities, but until DOD’s decision processes give sufficient attention to interdiction capabilities in the aggregate, there can be little assurance that the appropriate, most cost-effective mix of weapon systems is being identified, developed, and fielded for interdiction missions. If they do materially improve capabilities, then, as suggested in the Defense Planning Guidance, their acquisition may also allow DOD to consider reductions elsewhere in the force. The need for such an assessment has been borne out by the Commission and our analysis of the services’ interdiction capabilities and proposed modernization. We recommend that the Secretary of Defense routinely review service modernization proposals based on how they will increase the current aggregate ability of the U.S. military to perform the interdiction mission. Such a process should prioritize funding for those capabilities that contribute most to meeting the joint operation requirements and assist in determining the appropriate mix and quantities of interdiction capabilities. Moreover, proposals that add redundancy—such as the B-1B and Apache modifications and the purchase of F/A-18E/Fs, ATACMS, attack helicopters, and precision-guided missiles—should be examined in the context of the additional interdiction capability they offer as well as the contributions they make to other mission areas. This analysis could serve as the basis for deciding funding priorities, the sufficiency of investment, and the future force structure. We recognize that some weapon systems are multimission and this recommended assessment should consider the potential contribution to those other missions. DOD agreed with our recommendation that the Secretary of Defense routinely review service modernization proposals based on how they would enhance the current aggregate capability of the U.S. military to perform the interdiction mission. It further agreed that assessing total capabilities offers opportunities to seek alternatives when modernizing. DOD acknowledged that there are problems regarding joint-service planning and agreed that it needs to modify its requirements determination process to assess modernization proposals in terms of threat, adequacy of current aggregate capabilities, and the contributions of the proposed modernization to this aggregate capability. However, DOD said that (1) it could best accomplish this goal by making changes to its existing process, rather than creating an entirely new process and (2) it was already acting on some of the criticisms of its joint-service planning. On this latter point, DOD cited its deep attack weapons mix study, whose first phase results are due in the summer of 1996. Our intention was not to suggest an entirely new and separate process to conduct the envisioned assessments. Rather, our intent is that DOD’s process incorporate the necessary analysis to assess the aggregate capabilities of the services to perform interdiction before deciding on the need for force modernization. DOD disagreed with our finding that it plans more interdiction capability at high cost despite the fact that it has ample forces to meet current and future interdiction needs. DOD asserted that its planned acquisitions are necessary to keep its modernization program proactive rather than reactive. In making this point, it said that the portion of the acquisition budget devoted to interdiction-capable assets is not excessive given their multirole capabilities. We acknowledge the multiple roles that some interdiction assets are expected to perform and agree that their contributions to other missions must be considered in performing the broad assessments that we recommend. However, DOD officials and external experts have achieved a consensus that current interdiction capabilities are already adequate. For example, the most recent Chairman of the Joint Chiefs program assessment points out that tactical aircraft procurement plans call for more resources than may be forthcoming. Accordingly, he recommended that the services identify programs that could be slowed or terminated. The deep attack weapons mix study that DOD cites is in fact being done to identify how plans can be modified to achieve such savings. Given the high cost of planned upgrades and questions about whether funding will be forthcoming to cover all of them, DOD is likely to be faced with difficult trade-off decisions on which enhancements it can pursue. The broad assessments of aggregate capabilities that we recommend compared to the contribution of planned upgrades to this capability should assist the Secretary in making these difficult choices. DOD partially concurred with other issues discussed in the report. We considered its comments, which appear in appendix III.

Summary: GAO evaluated the military services' current aggregate interdiction assets for striking enemy targets and the contribution of planned modernization programs to total interdiction capabilities, focusing on the reasonableness of the planned enhancements. GAO found that: (1) although the services have determined that they have enough capability to carry out the national military strategy of being able to engage and win in two nearly simultaneous major regional conflicts, the services plan to spend over $213 billion to modify and purchase weapons; (2) the services' independently developed modernization plans do not consider the other services' capabilities, sometimes resulting in interdiction redundancies; (3) some weapons modernization proposals may not be sound investments because they may add expensive new capabilities that may be redundant or unnecessary; and (4) until the Department of Defense assesses interdiction capabilities in the aggregate, there can be little assurance that the appropriate, most cost-effective mix of weapons systems is being identified, developed, and fielded for interdiction missions.