The United States signed the Chemical Weapons Convention in the last days of the first Bush Administration (1/13/93), and the Convention was submitted to the Senate for its advice and consentin the midst of the 103rd Congress (11/23/93). In the 103rd, 104th, and 105th Congresses, anextensive series of 13 hearings were held by the Foreign Relations, Armed Services, Intelligence,and Judiciary Committees, complemented with classified briefings from the intelligence community.(See For Additional Reading ) Under a unanimous consent agreement, the CWC ratificationresolution was to have been brought to the Senate floor in mid-September 1996. However, uncertainof sufficient votes to ensure passage, its supporters postponed its consideration. In his 1997 State of the Union address, President Clinton pledged he would make the CWC a high priority in 1997, pressing for Senate consent early in the 105th Congress. After extensivenegotiations between the White House and key Senators, and within the Senate itself, a unanimousconsent agreement was reached to bring the Chemical Weapons Convention ratification resolution( S.Res. 75 ) to the Senate floor on April 23, 1997. The resolution contained 33conditions, 28 of which were agreed to by the White House and within the Senate. Under theunanimous consent agreement, these were not subject to further amendment or motions. Fiveconditions were not agreed to, and each was struck by roll-call vote during floor debate, prior topassage of the resolution. The summary of the conditions below provides only the general intent ofeach; the ratification resolution itself should be consulted for a full understanding of therequirements each condition establishes. The CWC ratification resolution, including agreed upon conditions: Asserts the Senate's right under the Constitution to add reservations to the Convention. Assures congressional oversight of all funds provided under theCWC. Requires Presidential certification that the OPCW has an Inspector-Generaland specifies report requirements. Requires cost-sharing for R&D expenditures forverification. Establishes standards for U.S. intelligence sharing and reports toCongress. Requires submission of any CWC amendments to theSenate. Requires the President to obtain assurances from Australia Group members thatArticle XI is consistent with continued export controls. Requires a report on the assurances offered to countries that forswear the useof nuclear weapons. Requires Presidential certification that restrictions on Schedule 1 chemicalsdo not adversely affect the chemical, biotechnology, and pharmaceuticalindustries. Requires annual country reports of CW activities, compliance, and intelligencemonitoring. Requires the Secretary of Defense to ensure the Armed Forces are effectivelyequipped, organized, trained, and exercised for operations in CBW environments. Asserts the primacy of the U.S. Constitution. Requires the President to use the full range of his authority to enforce compliance. Requires the United States to reject any Russian effort to make its ratificationcontingent on U.S. financial assistance. Requires the United States to limit its CW defensiveassistance under Article X, when extended to countries of concern, to medical antidotes andtreatments. Prescribes U.S. responses to unauthorized release of confidential businessinformation by the OPCW or other parties. States the sense of the Senate that U.S. negotiators should not agree to treatiesthat bar reservations. Prohibits transfer of inspection samples collected in the United States tolaboratories outside the United States. States the Senate finding that chemical weapons terrorism is still athreat. States the Senate declaration that the United States should not be denied itsvote in the CWC organization. Sense of the Senate that the U.S. On-Site Inspection Agency should provideassistance to facilities subject to routine inspection under the CWC. Limits U.S. assessment for OPCW to $25 million; ties increases to theConsumer Price Index; provides for certain exceptions (e.g., verification costs). Reaffirms theSenate's role in treaty interpretation. Reaffirms the Senate's role regarding arms controltreaties. Requires Presidential certification that the CWC does not restrict U.S. use ofriot control agents in certain specified circumstances. Requires notification and consultation whena chemical is added to CWC Schedules. Requires the President to explore alternative technologies for the destructionof the U.S. chemical weapons stockpile. Requires criminal search warrant for challenge inspectionsand administrative search warrant for routine inspections, if not permitted voluntarily. In the 105th Congress, on May 23, 1997 the Senate unanimously passed S. 610. This legislation, as reported by the Judiciary Committee, was an amendment in the nature of a substitutefor the Administration's implementing legislation. CWC supporters with objections to provisionsof S. 610 as reported hoped they could be resolved before final enactment, perhaps inHouse-Senate conference. (Congressional Record, May 23, p. S5078). However, In October 1998,the House incorporated S. 610's language, without amendment, into the FY1999 OmnibusAppropriations Act. This passed the House and Senate, and was signed into law October 20th, 1998( P.L. 105-277 ; 22 USC 75) The implementing legislation sets criminal and civil penalties for the development, production, acquisition, stockpiling, transfer, possession, or use of chemical weapons. These penalties wouldalso apply to anyone who assists, encourages, induces, attempts, or conspires to carry out theseproscribed activities. It also establishes: 1) procedures for seizure, forfeiture, and destruction ofcontraband chemical weapons; 2) statutory authority for record-keeping and reporting requirementsrelevant to the CWC; 3) various restrictions on certain chemicals, depending on their likelihood ofbeing used to produce chemical weapons; and 4) a protective regime for confidential businessinformation gathered from private corporations. It also provides detailed procedures to be used foron-site inspections by the OPCW, including limitations on access and search warrant procedures,should they be required. The provisions, now enacted into law, which raise concerns from CWC supporters and the OPCW include: Section 213 -- sets procedures for U.S. firms to seek compensation from the U.S. government, should they suffer the loss of proprietary information through the actions ofOPCW employees. Critics, however, maintain that, as worded, this section does not place a highenough burden of proof on the claimants, and consequently could lead to excessive and unfoundedclaims against the government. Sections 237 -- grants the President the right to deny a request forinspection if it "may cause a threat to U.S. national security interests." The CWC contains noprovision permitting denial of an inspection, and critics note that doing so could place the UnitedStates in non-compliance. They maintain that even if never exercised, this section's existence willencourage other nations to enact similar exemptions, thereby weakening the CWC verificationregime. Section 253 -- exempts discrete organic chemicals not on the CWC control lists and incidental chemical by-products or waste-streams from reporting and inspectionrequirements. This is intended to ease potential burdens, particularly on paper manufacturers, butcritics believe the exemption is too broadly worded and would rule out an effective non-intrusivesampling technique for inspectors. Sections 212 & 238 prohibit requiring that governmentcontractors waive any constitutional rights for any purpose related to the CWC. Some believe thatthis could hinder the CWC routine inspection regime. U.S.-Soviet Memorandum of Understanding (Wyoming MOU),September 1989. In 1989, as the multilateral negotiations slowed, the U.S.-Sovietbilateral talks took on greater importance and assumed a much higher public profile. On September23, 1989, the United States and the Soviet Union signed a bilateral Memorandum of Understanding(MOU) agreeing to data declarations on CW stockpiles and trial inspections. U.S. intelligenceofficials believe that Russian declarations have been incomplete, particularly in the area of binarychemical weapons and novel chemical agents. High level consultations continue to try to resolvethese discrepancies. Compliance with this agreement is a factor in the Bush Administration'sdecision not to provide the certification of Russia's commitment to arms control upon which furtherNunn-Lugar Threat Reduction aid is contingent. The Russian chemical weapons destructionprogram is a beneficiary of this aid program. U.S.-Russian Chemical Weapons Destruction Agreement, June1990. On June 1, 1990, the United States and Russia signed an agreement coveringthe production of chemical weapons and the destruction of current CW stockpiles. This agreement,as yet not implemented, would permit routine bilateral monitoring and challenge inspections of theCW destruction process conducted in accordance with the provisions of the Chemical WeaponsConvention. Russia has communicated to the Administration that the Bilateral DestructionAgreement (BDA) described below has "outlived its usefulness", and should be superseded by theChemical Weapons Convention. U.S. officials, however, still support the BDA and are continuingtalks on the issue. Russian cost estimates concluded that the BDA verification regime would bemore expensive than OPCW monitoring and inspections. More than 100 years of international efforts to ban chemical weapons culminated January 13,1993, in the signing of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). The CWC bans the development,production, stockpiling, and use of chemical weapons (CW) by its states parties. It also requires thedestruction of all chemical weapons and production facilities. The Convention provides the mostextensive and intrusive verification regime of any arms control treaty, extending its coverage to notonly governmental but also civilian facilities. The verification package includesinstrument-monitoring, both routine and random onsite inspections, and challenge inspections forsites suspected of CW storage or production. The Convention also requires export controls andreporting requirements on chemicals that can be used as warfare agents and their precursors. Administratively, the Convention established the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), located in The Hague, Netherlands, to oversee the Convention's implementation. It is a permanent international organization charged with ensuring compliance with the Convention,and monitoring the chemical industry worldwide. The OPCW has three components: 1) theConference of States Parties, comprising all signatories; 2) the Executive Council, composed of 41signatories chosen in a rotation based upon geographic region and significance of commercialchemical production; and 3) the Technical Secretariat, which will conduct day-to-day administrationof the Convention. Each signatory also designates a National Authority to be the liaison with theOPCW, and administer the implementation of the CWC domestically. On June 25, 1999, PresidentClinton issued an Executive Order designating the State Department as the National Authority forthe implementation of the CWC, and establishing an interagency group http://www.cwc.gov/ comprising the Secretaries of State, Defense, Commerce, and Energy, and the Attorney-General tocoordinate the implementation. Declarations required from each state party by the CWC include: Location and detailed inventory of all chemical weapons storage sites. Location and capacities of all chemical weapons production and researchfacilities. All transfers of chemical weapons and CW production equipment since 1946.A detailed plan and schedule for the destruction of chemical weapons and CW production facilities.Location and activities of any facilities using or producing controlledchemicals. These declarations, and ensuing reports to the OPCW are released only to other States Parties to provide evidence of treaty compliance. Other information obtained by the OPCW (e.g. throughinspections) is neither published or otherwise released without the permission of the countriesconcerned. Destruction of chemical weapons agents, munitions, and production facilities is to be completed within 10 years of the Convention's entry into force (1997) or a State Party's ratification date,whichever is earlier. In "extraordinary circumstances", this deadline can be extended for up to fiveyears, with the approval of two-thirds of the states parties. Both the United states and Russia haveapplied for and been granted extensions. The Convention establishes three lists (Schedules) http://www.opcw.org/html/db/chemind_frameset.html of chemical warfare agents and theirprecursor chemicals arranged in order of their importance to CW production and range of legitimatepeaceful uses. These chemical Schedules are to be updated as needed by the OPCW TechnicalSecretariat. Above certain quantitative thresholds, these chemicals' production, use, or transfer mustbe projected and subsequently reported annually to the OPCW. All facilities capable of producing,or that use scheduled chemicals must be registered. In addition, all facilities that produce over 30metric tons of a discrete chemical containing phosphorous, sulphur, or fluorine must be registered. For the chemicals included in the Schedule 1, there is a total ban on transfers to States not Party to the Convention. There is also the obligation to notify the OPCW of any transfer of the compounds to States Parties, irrespectively of the quantity, and retransfer is prohibited. In keeping with theCWC's provisions, there has been a ban on transfers of Schedule 2 chemicals to non-State Partiesplace since the 29th of April 2000. Additionally, the State Parties shall declare annually the totalquantities transferred among of them, by chemical and by country. For the chemicals included inSchedule 3, the Convention establishes the same obligation in terms of declaration of the total annualimports and exports per country and per chemical, and there is also the obligation to require anexport licence, called an End Use Certificate for exports to non-State Parties. It is currently beingdiscussed in the OPCW whether other kinds of restrictions or a total ban of these transfers will beput in place in the future. For the United States, the export controls are administered by theDepartment of Commerce's Bureau of Industry and Security http://www.bxa.doc.gov/ , whichmaintains an informational website -- U.S. Chemical Weapons Web http://www.cwc.gov/ to assistU.S. industry in compliance with these controls The OPCW's facility inspection regimes vary, depending on the type of facility: Declared CW production, storage, or destruction sites: systematic on-site inspection and continuous instrument monitoring. Declared non-CW chemical facilities: routine or random inspections,depending on the Schedule and amounts of chemicals produced or used. All other facilities: on-site challenge inspections upon request of a state party,and approval of the OPCW Executive Committee. The CWC raises a variety of issues for congressional consideration. Although the vast majorityof the world's nations have signed the CWC, some nations suspected of having chemical weaponshave not -- Egypt, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, Syria. What effect does this lack of universality haveupon the value of the Convention? The CWC's verification provisions are extensive, but they havenot stilled the debate over whether they are effective enough to deter violations. And, if violationsare detected, are enforcement procedures and sanctions sufficiently stringent? Because the CWCextends its provisions to the civilian sector, the impact of inspections, reporting requirements, andexport controls on commercial enterprise raises concerns unique to arms control treaties. Thedestruction of the U.S. chemical weapon stockpile, though congressionally-mandated independentlyof the CWC, presents technical, environmental, and financial challenges. Issues deserving attentioncan be grouped in six general areas: 1) universality; 2) verification; 3) impact on U.S. industry; 4)enforcement; 5) technology transfer; 6) destruction of chemical weapons here and in Russia; and 7)costs. How many nations are willing to ratify the CWC and, more importantly, which nations are not? 153 nations have ratified the Convention, 24 nations have signed but not ratified the Convention,and 15 nations have not signed. (See Appendix 1) Examining the signatory list, most are heartenedto see China, Iran, Israel ,and Russia -- nations known or believed to have, or be developing,significant CW capability. However, Israel has not ratified the Convention, and China, Iran, andRussia remain under suspicion with regard to compliance. (See Verification and Compliance ) Some particularly troublesome nations, such as Iraq, Libya, North Korea, and Syria have not signed. In addition, a number of middle eastern states, notably Egypt and Jordan, have refused to sign,linking their participation to the removal of Israel's suspected nuclear capability. At the April 2003 CWC Review Conference, the U.S. delegation called for "powerful incentives - both positive and negative -- to those states remaining outside the Convention to join",pointing particularly to Libya, North Korea, and Syria. (1) Critics of the CWC believe that its value is significantly reduced if all nations with thecapability to develop and use chemical weapons are not parties, particularly in a region as volatileas the Middle East. The rationale is that even one nation having chemical weapons will create anincentive for its neighbors to follow suit. They believe that it is unwise for the United States torelinquish its chemical weapons capability while other nations retain theirs. Some also maintain thatthe possibility of retaliation in kind (i.e. with chemical weapons) could be an important componentof CW deterrence. CWC supporters, while agreeing to the importance of persuading all CW-capable nations to join, believe that a small number of hold-outs does not pose a sufficient threat to justify not ratifyingthe Convention. They note that in the first Persian Gulf War (1990-1991), the United Statesforswore retaliation with chemical weapons, even if Iraq were to use them against coalition forces. This decision was based on the assessment that the U.S. arsenal was adequate for both limited ormassive retaliation without the use of chemical weapons. CWC supporters further argue that withoutthe Convention there would be even greater incentive to acquire chemical weapons, and it would beeasier to accomplish. They assert that CWC now provides an international regime of export controlsand a widely accepted international norm, to which all nations -- signatories or not -- can be held. Verification of compliance is undoubtedly the thorniest issue. Devising an acceptable verification regime was the most difficult task for CWC negotiators and is the most challenging forthose implementing the Convention. The CWC provides for the most intrusive and extensiveverification regime of any arms control agreement to date. The regime, for the first time in armscontrol, provides for routine monitoring and inspection not only of military facilities but also ofcertain civilian chemical facilities. In addition, challenge inspection provisions expand complianceverification to suspect facilities of any sort. The Organization for the Prohibition of ChemicalWeapons http://www.opcw.org/ oversees the Convention's compliance verification. The most serious question is whether the OPCW will be able to detect all clandestine production or stockpiling of chemical weapons. Ironically, the CWC's supporters and detractorsgenerally agree: the answer is no. Acknowledging that the verification regime will not be absolutecarries differing significance for the Convention's critics and advocates. Those who question theConvention's value believe that if compliance verification cannot be guaranteed, and undetected CWpossession may be possible, the Convention is not worth the cost and effort. Worse, perhaps, they are concerned that the Convention would engender a false sense of security. They point out that incertain circumstances, the selective use of relatively small amounts of chemical weapons could besignificant militarily, particularly against unprotected personnel. Consequently, would-be violatorsneed not produce or stockpile vast amounts. Advocates argue that, though CWC may be imperfect, it can provide the most intrusive and extensive verification regime in the history of disarmament and represents a notable improvementover current CW non-proliferation regimes. For signatories, this fact could change the cost/benefitanalysis of CW production or stockpiling enough to deter violations. Provision for challengeinspections creates the likelihood that violations would become public breaches of the internationalnorm, something not possible without the CWC. The most difficult challenge is to detect existing chemical weapons that a nation does not declare and continues to store clandestinely. Detecting illicit transfers of controlled chemicals is alsoa challenging task. Covert production of chemical warfare agents and the subsequent manufactureof chemical munitions are higher-profile activities and consequently more vulnerable to detection. This assessment assumes that the OPCW and signatories' national intelligence resources will seekto uncover Convention violators. Consequently, the extent of intelligence sharing has a significantimpact on the CWC's effectiveness. It is not clear, however, to what extent the States Parties aresharing relevant intelligence information with the OPCW. It is possible that concerns over possibleleaks or compromising intelligence sources have weighed more heavily than the desire to assist theOPCW in its mission. Another factor that affects the OPCW's verification capabilities is the amount and reliability of its funding by the Convention's signatories. Without adequate funding to maintain thetechnological and personnel resources necessary to monitor the international chemical industry andgovernment activities, the rigor of the verification regime suffers. Budgetary difficulties haveplagued the OPCW for the last several years. The United States has not supported requested budgetincreases in the past two years sought by the OPCW Administration to maintain inspectionschedules, but rather directed the OPCW instead to establish " more efficient, appropriate,cost-effective approaches". (2) However, with a new Director General overseeing the OPCW, theUnited States has now approved an overall OPCW budget increase of 6.7% for 2004, raising the totalbudget to $86.5 million. In 2002, the United States negotiated a reduction of its OPCW dues to 22%of the operating budget, which amounts to $19.03 million for 2004. Delinquent dues and inspectionreimbursements still remain a significant problem for the OPCW, amounting in total to about $4.2million as of July 2003. The Arms Control and Disarmament Act (22 USC 2551) requires an annual report from the State Department titled Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control and NonproliferationAgreements and Commitments. (3) The mostrecent of these reports (August 2003) assesses thatChina, Iran, Russia, and Sudan are carrying out "activities inconsistent with the CWC" as follows: China -- Maintains an active offensive R&D program, a possible CW stockpile, and undeclared CW-related facilities Iran -- Is retaining and modernizing elements of its CW program, including R&D, an undeclared stockpile, and an offensive production capability. Russia -- Has not made complete declarations regarding CW production, CW development facilities, and CW agents/weapons. Sudan -- Has established an offensive R&D program. At the CWC's First Review Conference (April, 2003), Assistant Secretary of State for Arms Control Stephen Rademaker reiterated U.S. assertions against Iran and Sudan. Though SecretaryRademaker said that the OPCW "must not shrink from the task of confronting those States Partiesthat are violating the Convention", the United States did not request formal OPCW action regardingthese allegations. (4) Responding to those whoquestioned why the U.S. did not avail itself of theCWC's challenge inspection provisions to address its suspicions, the U.S. delegation maintained thatchallenge inspections would be ineffective in finding illicit weapons, and could falsely exoneratenations. (5) No specific reference was made to concernsover Russia or China in SecretaryRademaker's presentation to the OPCW Review Conference. With regard to Russia, the concerns over verification are primarily focused on Russia's failure to acknowledge research and development on binary chemical weapons (binary chemical weaponsuse two non-lethal chemicals that combine to form a lethal agent after launching). The United Statesworked on developing binary weapons sporadically from the 1950s, ending the effort in 1992, whenthe signing of the CWC became imminent. U.S. intelligence has long believed that Russia wasundertaking a similar program. In 1992, a Russian scientist, Vil Mirzayanov, publicly claimed thatRussia had developed a binary agent significantly more effective than current nerve agents. He alsoasserted that the Russian military leadership continued the program after President Gorbachevdeclared Russia's chemical weapons development at an end. Concern over this Russian programrekindled in 1997 with the leaking of a classified DOD report to the press. Written at the U.S.Ground Intelligence Center, the report supposedly maintains that the new agent can be manufacturedin significant amounts in modified pesticide plants from chemicals not covered by the CWC.( Washington Times , February 4, 1997, p.1) CWC opponents believe this information highlights thedifficulties of verification and the lack of Russian trustworthiness. CWC supporters have respondedthat without the CWC such a program is legal, but with the CWC and accession to it, it would beillegal and suspect facilities would be subject to inspection. The United States, having specifically requested an accounting of the Russian binary program and received inadequate responses, is continuing discussions to resolve these discrepancies. Although the current data exchange is independent of the CWC, Russian recalcitrance on this issuecould adversely affect support for the Convention. If Russia is unwilling to be forthright in what isgenerally judged to be an "open secret," it raises the question of how seriously it considers theprohibitions of the CWC, and consequently places greater emphasis on effective verification. TheBush Administration has highlighted this point by its decision not to provide the certification ofRussia's commitment to arms control, upon which Nunn-Lugar Threat Reduction aid is contingent,unless Russia provides further information on these programs (See below, Chemical WeaponsStockpiles and Facilities Destruction). Many U.S. enterprises do not meet the CWC threshold requirements for reporting, and others may have minimal obligations (e.g. one-page reports) because of the nature of the chemicals theyhandle. For the most part, the heaviest burden (annual reports on production/consumption/transferand at least one initial inspection) falls upon enterprises that deal with substantial amounts ofchemicals that could be very useful in the production of CW warfare agents. Implementing legislation for the CWC addressed some issues that are novel for arms control agreements. The Convention grants the OPCW inspection rights (routine, random, and challenge)over purely civilian, privately owned facilities. These inspection rights are harmonized with U.S.constitutional protections against unreasonable search and seizure through procedures for obtainingadministrative or criminal search warrants if necessary. (22 USC 6725) Loss of Proprietary Information (Trade Secrets). Potential loss of trade secrets is of great concern to private industry. And, the question ariseswhether forced or incidental disclosure of such information during a CWC inspection wouldconstitute a "seizure" under the Fourth Amendment. Implementing legislation addressed this issueby restricting information collection, providing non-disclosure protection, and penalties forunauthorized disclosure of Convention-related information. To date, there have been noprosecutions for unlawful disclosures. Chemical industries emphasize that it is essential to protectproprietary information (or trade secrets) to maintain a competitive advantage in the marketplace. And, the CWC, through its enforcement and verification procedures, will require a greater level ofopenness regarding production processes and rates, product composition, and market distribution. However, the U.S. chemical industry -- represented through the Chemical Manufacturer'sAssociation (now the American Chemistry Council) and the Pharmaceutical ManufacturersAssociation -- strongly endorsed the Convention's confidentiality measures and supported theCWC's ratification. Export Controls. The CWC requires restrictions on the export or transfer of controlled chemicals to non-States Parties. These restrictions vary inseverity depending upon the chemicals involved. Also, as an incentive for nations to sign the CWC,the restrictions tighten in the years following the Convention coming into force. As noted earlier,there is a total ban on the export of chemicals on Schedules 1 & 2; there are on-going discussionson whether to apply this ban to Schedule 3 chemicals in the near future. (See above, Provisions ofthe Chemical Weapons Convention) The United States already had a variety of export controls onCW-related chemicals, equipment, and technology. (6) These stem from both unilateral action, andsteps the United States has taken as a member of the Australia Group (AG). (7) The CWC exportcontrol provisions have consequently not engendered significant controversy domestically. Theexport control regime of the Australia Group remains an issue of contention with developingcountries, who maintain that it inhibits legitimate technology transfer, and should not be applied tonations that are CWC States Parties. The Australia Group members have not found this argumentpersuasive, and remain convinced that the AG regime remains a useful complement to the CWC,particularly given that its control lists are more extensive than those negotiated for the Convention. The question of sanctions was addressed late in the CWC negotiations. The consultative nature of the Convention's provisions and the lack of specificity regarding sanctions to be levied againstconvention violators reflect the difficulty of those negotiations. It is generally anticipated thatinternational sanctions would consist of trade and, perhaps, arms embargoes. CWC critics believethat its enforcement sanctions are too vague to be an effective deterrent. They question theeffectiveness of economic and arms embargoes, maintaining that 1) embargoes are almost impossibleto enforce internationally; 2) they historically have seldom achieved their foreign policy objectives;and 3) if they are effective at all, it is only over the long term. CWC supporters argue that the lackof specificity regarding possible sanctions heightens a potential violator's uncertainty about breakingthe Convention. They believe that this uncertainty and the international approbation that would begenerated by the enforcement procedure will sufficiently affect the "cost/benefit" analysis ofchemical weapons production to deter a potential violator. They also do not accept the assertion thatinternational sanctions are without effect, maintaining that at a minimum they significantly degradea nation's ability to maintain a CW program. They point to the evidence that the internationalsanctions and inspection regime imposed upon Iraq in the 1990's apparently stymied Iraq's CWproduction and research to a far greater extent than initially believed by many. The CWC mandates the destruction of all chemical weapons stockpiles and production facilities within 10 years of the Convention's coming into force (i.e. , April 2007). The Convention alsospecifies the order in which different types of weapons shall be destroyed, and interim deadlines. A clause permitting an extension of up to five years, upon approval of the Conference of StateParties, was included specifically in anticipation of Russia's not being able to meet the destructiondeadline, given its political and economic instability in the 1990's. However, now both Russia andthe United States have had to request extensions of both interim and final destruction deadlines. U. S Chemical Weapons Destruction Program. In October, the United States acknowledged that it would not be able to destroy 45% of its CWstockpile by the interim deadline of April 29, 2004 . Of particular interest, is that the United Statesrequested an extension of the 45% interim deadline to December 2007 -- full eight months afterthe Convention's deadline for the destruction of the entire stockpile. This request, and itsimplication that the United States will not be able to meet the final destruction deadline of April2007, reflects the many difficulties the destruction program has encountered over the last 18 years. Accepting that the United States is undertaking a good faith effort to destroy its stockpile, onOctober 24, the Eighth OPCW Conference of States Parties approved the extension of the 45%deadline to December 2007, and the extension of the final deadline in principle, with no datespecified. These deadline extensions notwithstanding, The United States is by far the country most advanced in its CW destruction program. In the early 1980s, DOD declared approximately 90% ofthe U.S. chemical stockpile (28,000 agent tons) obsolete. This decision, coupled with a 1985congressional directive to destroy these munitions, led DOD to begin planning a destruction programalmost two decades ago. Nevertheless, it is now entirely clear that the United States will be not ableto meet the 2007 CWC deadline. Until very recently, DOD estimates have called for completingdestruction on time, but critics of the program have maintained for some time that these expectationswere unrealistic. Indeed, in October 1998, an independent analysis commissioned by DOD andconducted by the Arthur Anderson firm estimated that none of the CW destruction facilities had evena 5% chance of meeting their destruction deadlines. DOD rebutted the audit, maintaining that it wasbased on old data, and did not reflect increased efficiencies. (8) In 2001, the controversy arose again when the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on Defense obtained an internal Army report -- Operations Schedule Task Force 2000-Final Report , -- thatfirst indicated that it was doubtful that even an extended final deadline of 2012 could be met. Thereport detailed the actual munition destruction rates at the Johnston Atoll depot, showing them tobe much lower than previous official estimates, and indicated that substantially the same destructionrates should be expected at other incineration facilities. If so, the CW stockpile destruction programwould extend beyond 2014. DOD initially contended that the report was a "worst case scenario," but then the DOD Selected Acquisition Report, released in April, 2002, revealed an 80% increasein the destruction program's costs owing specifically to "revised destruction rates" and "scheduleextensions." The Task Force 2000-Final Report reflects the challenges at depots where incineration is the destruction method (Anniston Army Depot, AL; Pine BluffArsenal, AR; Tooele Army Depot, UT;and Umatilla Depot Activity, OR). At the Lexington-Bluegrass Army Depot, KY and Pueblo DepotActivity, CO, neutralization methods developed at congressional direction ( P.L. 104-28 ) throughthe Assembled Chemical Weapons Assessment Program [ http://www.pmacwa.army.mil ] have justentered the pilot-plant phase. The remaining two storage depots, Aberdeen Proving Ground, MDand Newport Army Ammunition Plant, IN, house only agent in bulk tanks, which will also bedestroyed through chemical neutralization. However, the neutralization process still produces achemical residue which must be treated as a hazardous material, and its safe disposal has becomean issue of public concern. (9) Among the factors DOD has identified as contributing to the delays are: revised destruction rates, new environmental regulations, worse-than-expected stockpile condition, and unanticipatedemergency preparedness requirements. In addition to these factors, which are mostly out of DOD'scontrol, there has been fairly consistent criticism of the destruction program's management almostsince its inception. The General Accounting Office has issued several program assessments, withthe most recent continuing to emphasize significant administrative problems: "The Chemical Demilitarization Program remains in turmoil because a number of long-standing leadership, organizational, and strategic planning issuesremain unresolved. The program lacks stable leadership at the upper management levels. Forexample, the program has had frequent turnover in the leadership providing oversight. Further, recentreorganizations have done little to reduce the complex and fragmented organization of the program.As a result, roles and responsibilities are often unclear and program actions are not alwayscoordinated. Finally, the absence of a comprehensive strategy leaves the program without a clearroad map and methods to monitor program performance. Without these key elements, DOD and theArmy have no assurance of meeting their goal to destroy the chemical stockpile in a safe and timelymanner, and within cost estimates." (10) GAO issued several recommendations to improve program management, e.g.: establish long-term objectives, define roles and responsibilities of DOD and Army offices, and developshort-term performance measures. DOD has concurred with those recommendations, and has begunimplementation. However, given that the U.S. request to the OPCW for destruction deadlineextensions left the date for final completion unspecified, it would seem that uncertainty about thepace of the destruction program remains high. Difficulties that the United States has encountered with the chemical weapons destruction program have been reflected in the significant cost estimate growth since its inception. In 1985, forexample, DOD estimated the total program cost would be between $1.2 to $2.0 billion. These costestimates routinely increased, reaching $13.2 billion in 2001. Then, in April 2002, acknowledgingthe program delays noted above, the Department of Defense Selected Acquisition Report announceda new 80% increase in the total cost estimate, raising it to $23.7 billion. For FY2004, the DefenseDepartment requested a total of $1.65 billion for the chemical demilitarization program: R&D --$251 million, Procurement -- $79 million, Operations & Maintenance -- $1.2 billion, and MilitaryConstruction -- $119million. Congress appropriated these funds as requested. Russian CW Destruction Program. Russia possesses the world's largest chemical weapons stockpile, estimated to be 40,000 to 50,000 tons. Russian officials have made it clear that both technological and financial assistance is needed todestroy its chemical weapons. As part of the comprehensive threat reduction assistance programs(often called "Nunn-Lugar" programs), the United States has appropriated approximately $437million Between FY1992-FY2003 to assist in the design and construction of a nerve agentdestruction facility in Shchuch'ye. In addition, the United States has agreed to share destructiontechnology and participate in the exchange of technical experts. To facilitate these efforts, theUnited States has opened a Chemical Weapons Destruction Support Office (CWDSO) in Moscow. (11) During consideration of the FY2000 DOD budget request, both the House and Senate Armed Services Committees expressed strong reservations about Russia's ability to fund operation of theShchuch'ye facility if constructed, and noted the relative paucity of assistance from other nations forthis program. Consequently, the FY2000 DOD Authorization Act ( P.L. 106-65 , Sec. 1305) forbadefurther funding for a chemical weapons facility in Russia. DOD's efforts in the FY2001 budgetconsiderations to have this provision repealed and $35 million appropriated for a Shchuch'ye facilitymet continued congressional skepticism. House and Senate Armed Services Committee confereesaccepted a Senate amendment in the DOD FY2001 Authorization Act ( H.R. 4205 )which amended the existing statutory prohibition to permit Shchuch'ye funding only after DODcertification that: Russia has agreed to provide $25 million annually for construction and operation. Russia has agreed to use the facility to destroy its four other nerve agentstockpiles. The United States has obtained multi-year commitments from the internationalcommunity to assist infrastructure improvement around Shchuch'ye. Russia has agreed to destroy its CW production facilities at Volgograd andNovocheboksark. These conditions were coupled with a DOD reporting requirement on Russian and international financial contributions towards the safeguarding and destruction of Russia's nerve agent stockpiles. For FY2002 and FY2003, Congress, satisfied that sufficient progress has been made in meeting theseconditions, approved appropriation of $35 million and $55 million for the Shchuch'ye facility,though these amounts were substantially below DOD's budget request. For FY2004, the Congressagreed to appropriate the Administration's full budget request of $200 million. Even with foreign assistance, Russia will not be able to meet CWC destruction deadlines. It has requested an extension until 2012, but few believe that extension will be sufficient. Consequently, the CWC Conference of States Parties has approved an extension of Russia's interimdeadline to destroy 20% of its stockpile to April 2007, and also agreed to an extension of subsequentdeadlines in principle, with no date specified. The General Accounting Office has estimated thatwithout additional destruction facilities, it could take at least 40 years for Russian to completedestruction of its nerve agent stockpile. (12) U.S. Congress. Chemical Weapons Convention: A Message from the President of the UnitedStates . Treaty Document 103-21. 103 Congress, 1st Session. U.S. Congress. Chemical Weapons Convention . Hearings, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations,103rd Congress, 2nd Session, S.Hrg. 103-869. U.S. Congress. Iran Missile Proliferation Sanctions Act of 1997. Report, House Committee onInternational Relations, 105 Congress, 2nd Session, H.Rept. 105-375 . U.S. Congress. Military Implications of the Chemical Weapons Convention . Hearings, Senate Armed Services Committee. 103rd Congress, 2nd Session, S.Hrg. 103-835. U.S. Congress. U.S. Capability to Monitor Compliance with the Chemical Weapons Convention . Report, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. 103rd Congress, 2nd Session, S.Rept.103-390. U.S. Congress. Convention on Chemical Weapons . Hearing, Senate Foreign Relations Committee,104th Congress, 2nd Session, S.Hrg. 104-668. The following 153 countries have either signed and ratified or acceded to the Chemical Weapons Convention: Albania, Algeria, Andorra, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Belarus, Belgium, Benin, Bolivia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei, Bulgaria, BurkinaFaso, Burundi, Cameroon, Canada, Chile, China, Cook Islands, Costa Rica, Cote d'Ivoire, Croatia,Cuba, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Dominica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea,Eritrea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, Former Republic of Yugoslavia, Former Yugoslav Republicof Macedonia, France, Gabon, Gambia, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea,Guyana, Holy See, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan,Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kiribati, Kuwait, Laos, Latvia, Lesotho, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Macedonia,Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Micronesia, Moldova,Monaco, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Nauru, Nepal, Netherlands, Nicaragua, Niger,Nigeria, Mauritania, New Zealand, Niger, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea,Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Russian Federation, Samoa, SanMarino, Santa Lucia, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Singapore, Slovak Republic, Slovenia,South Korea, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Sudan, Suriname,Swaziland, Sweden, Switzerland, Tajikistan, Tanzania, Thailand, Timor Leste, Togo, Tonga,Trinidad-Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, theUnited Kingdom, the United States, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Venezuela, Vietnam, Yemen, Zambia andZimbabwe The following 25 countries have signed, but not ratified the Chemical Weapons Convention: Afghanistan, Bahamas, Bhutan, Cambodia, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Congo, Democratic Republic of Congo, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Grenada, Guinea-Bissau,Haiti, Honduras, Israel, Kyrgyzstan, Liberia, Madagascar, Marshall Islands, Myanmar, Rwanda,Saint Kitts and Nevis, Sierra Leone. Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, Belize, North Korea, Egypt, Iraq, Lebanon, Libya, Niue, Sao Tome and Principe, Solomon Islands, Somalia, Syria, Tuvalu, Vanuatu.

Summary: More than 100 years of international efforts to ban chemical weapons culminated January 13, 1993, in the signing of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). The Convention entered intoforce April 29, 1997. One hundred fifty-three of the 178 signatories have ratified the Convention. On April 24, 1997, the Senate passed the CWC resolution of ratification ( S.Res. 75 ,105th Congress) by a vote of 74-26. President Clinton signed the resolution and the United Statesbecame the 75th nation to ratify the CWC Convention, and Congress retains a continuing oversightrole in its implementation. The CWC bans the development, production, stockpiling, and use of chemical weapons by members signatories. It also requires the destruction of all chemical weapons stockpiles andproduction facilities. Neither the United States nor Russia will be able to meet the original CWC'sdeadlines for destruction of their CW stockpiles, and have been granted extensions to at least 2012. The Convention provides the most extensive and intrusive verification regime of any arms controltreaty, extending its coverage to not only governmental but also civilian facilities. The Conventionalso requires export controls and reporting requirements on chemicals that can be used as warfareagents and their precursors. The CWC establishes the Organization for the Prohibition of ChemicalWeapons (OPCW) to oversee the Convention's implementation. Chemical Weapons Convention implementing legislation ( P.L. 105-277 ) provides the statutory authority for domestic compliance with the Convention's provisions. It sets criminal and civilpenalties for the development, production, acquisition, stockpiling, transfer, possession, or use ofchemical weapons. It also establishes: 1) procedures for seizure, forfeiture, and destruction ofcontraband chemical weapons; 2) statutory authority for record-keeping and reporting requirementsrelevant to the CWC; 3) various restrictions on certain chemicals, depending on their likelihood ofbeing used to produce chemical weapons; and 4) a protective regime for confidential businessinformation gathered from private corporations. The legislation also provides detailed proceduresto be used for on-site inspections by the OPCW, including limitations on access and search warrantprocedures, should they be required. CWC advocates continue to express concerns over so-called "treaty-breaking "sections of the implementing legislation, and lobby for their amendment. Of particular concern are provisions thatallow the President to block challenge inspections, and that prohibit the OPCW inspectors fromsending chemical samples outside the United States for analysis. These provisions are intended toprotect U.S. national security interests and proprietary commercial information. CWC supporters,however, believe that blocking a challenge inspection violates a basic premise of the convention, andthat forcing inspectors' analysis to be conducted within the United States undermines confidence inthe verification regime. These provisions may also provide an excuse for other nations to adoptsimilar positions. This report will be updated as events warrant.