A resolution of inquiry is a resolution that formally calls on the executive branch to provide specified factual information to Congress. The use of resolutions of this type as a tool of oversight dates to the earliest days of Congress. Although there are historical examples of resolutions of inquiry being used in the Senate, they are far more common in the House of Representatives, and this report examines their use only in that chamber between 1947 and October 20, 2017. House resolutions of inquiry are simple resolutions (designated "H.Res."), which are submitted in the same manner as other legislation. Under House rules and precedents, however, resolutions of inquiry, if properly drafted and under specific circumstances, are afforded a privileged parliamentary status. Clause 7 of House Rule XIII makes a resolution of inquiry privileged for consideration at any time after it is reported or discharged from committee, consistent with the normal three-day layover period required of most committee reports. If a resolution of inquiry is not reported to the House within 14 legislative days after its introduction (not counting the days of introduction and discharge), a motion to discharge a committee from its further consideration is in order on the House floor. Should the committee or committees of referral report (or be discharged under a time limit imposed by the Speaker) within the 14-day period, however, only a Member acting at the formal direction of the committee may move to proceed to its consideration on the floor. Thus, even when a House committee opposes a resolution of inquiry, the committee will virtually always mark it up and report it, often adversely, in order to retain control over the measure and prevent a supporter from making the privileged motions on the House floor to discharge the committee and call up the resolution. To retain the privileged parliamentary status described above, resolutions of inquiry may not contain a preamble and must call only for facts within the executive branch's control. Such resolutions may not seek opinions or require an investigation and are traditionally framed as "requesting" the President or "directing" the head of a Cabinet-level agency to respond. As is the case with other types of privileged business, committee reports accompanying resolutions of inquiry are presented from the floor, rather than submitted through the hopper. If the House chooses to consider a resolution of inquiry, it is considered under the One-Hour Rule. When raised, such resolutions may be agreed to, rejected, or tabled by majority vote. In prior eras it was common for the majority party Member managing a resolution of inquiry on the House floor to quickly move to table it, either because he or she opposes its provisions, or because the request has been rendered moot by the executive branch having provided some or all of the requested information. Finally, but importantly, as simple resolutions, resolutions of inquiry have no legal force. Thus, compliance by the executive branch with the House's request for factual information in such a resolution is entirely voluntary, resting largely on a sense of comity between coequal branches of government and recognition of the necessity for Congress to be well-informed as it legislates. While there is no direct way for the House to enforce its request for information, executive branch compliance with resolutions of inquiry might be indirectly influenced by a general respect for congressional legislative and oversight power, including Congress's power to appropriate or withhold money for agency functions. The Congressional Research Service has identified 313 resolutions of inquiry submitted in the House between 1947 and October 20, 2017—an average of just under 9 per Congress. These statistics are represented in Table 1 and the resolutions are described in detail in Table 7 . The number of resolutions of inquiry introduced in individual Congresses over this 70-year period varies widely. Two distinct periods, however (as shown in Figure 1 ), saw a number of resolutions of inquiry introduced in the House that far exceeded the overall average: the 92 nd -94 th Congresses (1971-1976), during which a total of 87 resolutions of inquiry were introduced, and the 108 th and 109 th Congresses (2003-2006), during which 53 resolutions were put forward. The number of resolutions of inquiry introduced in these five Congresses alone accounts for a full 45% of all such resolutions submitted during the 70-year period examined. The number of House resolutions of inquiry introduced in the 108 th (2003-2004) and 109 th (2005-2006) Congresses reflected a sharp increase in the number introduced over the preceding decade. In each Congress between the 102 nd (1991-1992) and 107 th (2001-2002) Congresses, an average of 1 resolution of inquiry was introduced. In the 108 th Congress, 14 such resolutions were introduced, and 39 resolutions of inquiry were submitted in the 109 th Congress. The 53 resolutions of inquiry introduced in these two Congresses exceeded the total number of such resolutions introduced in the previous two decades combined. During the period under examination (1947-October 20, 2017), the 39 resolutions of inquiry introduced in the 109 th Congress are exceeded only by the 44 resolutions introduced in the 93 rd Congress (1973-1974). But this latter total may be misleadingly high due to parliamentary rules in effect at that time. In the 93 rd Congress, House rules limited the cosponsorship of measures to a maximum of 25 Representatives. Several of the 44 resolutions of inquiry introduced in the 93 rd Congress appear to be identically worded resolutions introduced separately, apparently to enable more than 25 Members to cosponsor them. When these "doubles" are taken into account, more resolutions of inquiry were introduced in the 109 th Congress than in any single Congress since World War II. In the 111 th Congress (2009-2010), 29 resolutions of inquiry were introduced. Subsequent Congresses have seen activity on House resolutions of inquiry below historic averages. Three resolutions of inquiry were submitted in the 112 th Congress (2011-2012), five were submitted in the 113 th Congress (2013-2014), and no resolutions of inquiry were put forward in the 114 th Congress (2015-2016). Early indications suggest, however, that the House may be entering another period of high resolution of inquiry activity: The 13 resolutions submitted thus far in the 115 th Congress (2017-2018) exceed the average for a Congress and are more than the number of resolutions of inquiry put forward in the previous three Congresses combined. The reason for the sharp increase in the number of such resolutions introduced during some recent Congresses is open to interpretation. Some have charged that instead of using resolutions of inquiry as an oversight tool to obtain information from the executive branch, in at least some instances, minority party Members have purposely used the privileged status such resolutions enjoy as a way to "force" committees to act on a given subject or get Members to record votes on politically controversial policy questions, in essence, enabling the minority party to "schedule" a committee markup meeting on a subject of its choosing. Those holding this view point to the high number of resolutions introduced during periods when the House and the President are of the same political party as evidence of the "political" use of resolutions of inquiry. The sharp uptick in such resolutions submitted in the GOP-controlled 115 th Congress, where a Republican President has taken over for a Democratic chief executive, arguably supports this viewpoint. One 2005 committee report took a skeptical view of several resolutions of inquiry referred to the committee that sought information on pre-Iraq war intelligence, saying, "[these] resolutions are politically-calculated attacks on the ... administration." Still another report argued that "the Minority [party] is attempting to use this parliamentary tool for political means. Perhaps most importantly, as a matter of procedure, [the resolution of inquiry] challenges the Majority's prerogatives and its right to set the legislative agenda, and for that reason alone should be rejected." Members holding this viewpoint argue that recent activity on resolutions of inquiry is more about "message politics" than obtaining information from the executive branch. Other Members have taken a different view, arguing that resolutions of inquiry have increased in number recently because the executive branch has frequently responded "grudgingly" to information requests from Congress, particularly those made by minority party Members relating to politically sensitive issues. Such Members argue that the White House has treated letters from lawmakers requesting information "as if they are junk mail, routinely tossing them aside without responding." This executive branch behavior, these Members contend, coupled with what they characterize as an ambivalence by majority parties to the rights of the minority in the House, has led to the increased use of such resolutions. Members holding this view argue that resolutions of inquiry, precisely because they are privileged, are one of the few parliamentary tools available to individual Representatives—including those in the minority—to hold the executive branch to account. The most commonly identified subjects of House resolutions of inquiry over the past seven decades have been defense, foreign affairs, and intelligence. This may help to explain in part the significant increases noted above during the 92 nd -94 th (1971-1976) and 108 th -109 th (2003-2006) Congresses, periods where Members were focused on military conflicts in Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan and on foreign affairs and intelligence issues stemming from the so-called Global War on Terrorism. When resolutions of inquiry are submitted, the Speaker, acting through the Parliamentarian, refers them to committee based on the subject matter of the measure and the jurisdiction of House committees as codified in clause 1 of Rule X. With the exception of the Committees on Budget, Rules, and Ethics, every standing committee of the House has, at some point over the 70 years examined, had at least one resolution of inquiry referred to it. However, as is reflected in Figure 2 , and as may be inferred from the most common subjects of such resolutions mentioned above, three House committees have received the greatest share of such referrals: Armed Services, which was referred 74 resolutions of inquiry over this period; Foreign Affairs, with 71; and Judiciary, which received 42. These three panels were the committees of primary referral for 60% of all resolutions of inquiry introduced between 1947 and October 20, 2017. The referral of legislation to more than one House committee has been permitted in the House since 1975, and over the period examined, several resolutions of inquiry were multiply referred. The House Parliamentarian has recently written, however, that "the modern practice is to refer [resolutions of inquiry] to a single committee only." Since 2004, three resolutions of inquiry have been multiply referred. It is not clear if this is the case because the subject of recent resolutions fell exclusively into the jurisdiction of one committee, because resolution sponsors have introduced separate resolutions directed to different officials (as opposed to one multiply-referred resolution directed to all of them), or because House Speakers, acting through the Parliamentarian, have consciously chosen to avoid the multiple referral of resolutions of inquiry wherever possible. As has been noted, privileged resolutions of inquiry are directed to the President of the United States, or, under House Rule XIII, to the "head of an executive department." Under chamber precedents, the "head of an executive department" has been interpreted to mean the Secretary of a Cabinet-level executive agency—that is, those listed in 5 U.S.C. 101, not subordinate government officials such as the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency or the Director of National Intelligence. As such, although a resolution of inquiry directed to an officer below the Cabinet level could be introduced, it would not enjoy privileged status. The inclusion of lesser officials is viewed as destroying the privilege of an entire resolution, even in cases where the resolution is also directed to the President or a Cabinet Secretary. Since 1947, 114 of the 313 resolutions of inquiry introduced in the House (36%) have been directed to the President of the United States; 59 (19%) have been directed to the Secretary of Defense or his predecessor; 38 resolutions (12%) sought information from the Secretary of State; and 27 (9%) sought information from the Attorney General. Various other executive branch officials, including the Secretaries of Commerce, Energy, Health and Human Services, Homeland Security, Labor, and the Treasury, have been the target of House resolutions of inquiry. These statistics are represented in Figure 3 . A small number of resolutions of inquiry introduced during the period examined were directed solely or in part to sub-Cabinet officials, including the Directors of Central Intelligence and National Intelligence, the Chairman of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and the Internal Revenue Service Commissioner. As noted, such resolutions were arguably not privileged for consideration in the House, and, in at least once instance, the Speaker sustained a point of order to that effect when an effort was made to raise the measure on the floor. A committee has a number of choices after a resolution of inquiry is referred to it. It may mark up and report the resolution without amendment, or it may recommend amendments to it. It may report the resolution to the House favorably, adversely, or without recommendation. It may also take no action; however, as has been noted, in failing to act, it risks a Member, after the expiration of the 14-legislative-day period, making a privileged motion on the House floor to discharge the committee of further consideration of the resolution. Just over half of the resolutions of inquiry introduced between 1947 and October 20, 2017, were acted on by the primary House committee of referral. Approximately 52% (162 of 313) of the resolutions of inquiry submitted were actively considered at the committee level. As is discussed in more detail below, however, in recent Congresses, House committees have chosen to mark up virtually every privileged resolution of inquiry referred to them, presumably in order to retain control of the resolution and prevent another Member from triggering floor votes on the motion to discharge the committee. As is reflected in Table 2 , during the period examined, committees which chose to mark up a resolution of inquiry and report it to the House chose frequently (73%) to report the resolution "adversely," a parliamentary designation which means that the committee did not recommend that the House agree to the resolution. In a smaller percentage of cases during the time period examined, House committees have chosen to report resolutions of inquiry favorably (13%) or without recommendation (14%). On occasion, the committees have reported amendments to the resolution, oftentimes recommending the adoption of a full substitute. No generalizations can be made about adverse reports on resolutions of inquiry. A House committee may choose to report a resolution adversely because they oppose it or to ensure that no Member except a designee of the committee may try to call up the resolution on the floor. In several instances over the period examined, however, an adverse report was clearly made because the executive branch had produced some or all of the requested information, and the committee did not want the House to expend its time on a moot question. It has also been common for committees to report adversely with the rationale that production of the information would compromise an ongoing investigation. An adverse report might also occur because, in the view of the committee, the requested information was too sensitive to be provided or, conversely, was already widely available, and thus, not the proper subject of a privileged resolution. As mentioned, data show that since the 108 th Congress (2003-2004), committees have almost universally marked up every properly drafted resolution of inquiry referred to them regardless of its subject, sponsor, or how the committee viewed the resolution. This was not the case in earlier Congresses during the 70-year period studied. This suggests that, today, committees are acting on resolutions of inquiry at least in part to retain control of the resolution. The fact that more resolutions of inquiry have been introduced in some recent Congresses, and House committees are marking up virtually every such resolution referred to them, has led some to question whether resolutions of inquiry are improperly increasing the workload of House committees. Those holding such a view argue that if committees feel they "have to" mark up a resolution of inquiry because it is privileged, the potential exists for minority party Members to flood a committee with such resolutions and wrest partial control over a committee's markup agenda from the majority. Those holding this view note that certain House committees are disproportionately affected by such resolutions, and they argue that using resolutions of inquiry in this way is not the purpose such measures were created for or given privileged status under chamber rules. They note, for example, that in the 109 th Congress (2005-2006), 45% (10 out of 22) of the reports made to the House by the Committee on International Relations (now named Foreign Affairs) were on minority-party sponsored resolutions of inquiry. During the same period, 21% (3 out of 14) of the reports made to the House by the Committee on Armed Services were on minority-party sponsored resolutions of inquiry. Members holding the opposite view argue that although resolutions of inquiry may have increased in number in recent years, they still represent a small fraction of the overall legislative workload and are easily managed by the chamber's committee system. They further argue that such resolutions actually aid the House, by compelling its committees to seek information from the executive branch that Members need to legislate effectively. Those holding this view might argue that resolutions of inquiry motivate committees to focus not just on legislating but also on the oversight responsibilities they have been charged with by the House. As is reflected in Table 3 , House floor consideration of resolutions of inquiry during the 70-year period examined was generally rare. In recent Congresses it has been virtually nonexistent. In the last 26 years, two resolutions of inquiry have received action on the House floor. Between 1947 and October 20, 2017, 64 resolutions of inquiry have been considered on the House floor, about 20% of those introduced, and approximately 40% of those reported by the chamber's committees. Of the resolutions receiving floor action, 52 (81%) were laid on the table by majority vote, effectively killing them. Eleven resolutions of inquiry have been agreed to by the House since 1947, the most recent occurring in the 104 th Congress (1995-1996). It is worth reiterating that the tabling of a resolution on the House floor may have been undertaken because the question had been made moot by the executive branch being in substantial compliance with the request. For example, in a handful of instances during the period examined, it was the sponsor of the resolution of inquiry who moved to lay the resolution on the table, apparently satisfied it had produced the desired result. During the 91 st -95 th Congresses, several resolutions of inquiry that were submitted received no action either in committee or on the floor. This might be due to the fact that, as has been noted, several of the resolutions of inquiry introduced during this period appear to be identically worded resolutions introduced separately, apparently to enable more Members to cosponsor them. One might speculate that no action was taken on other resolutions during this period because the executive branch provided the requested information. In current practice, House committees will virtually always mark up and report a resolution of inquiry in order to retain control of the measure and avoid floor votes. Resolutions of inquiry are sometimes assumed to be an oversight tool that is used disproportionately, or even exclusively, by congressional minorities. This view is, in a sense, understandable. The majority party in the House arguably has far more effective oversight tools at its disposal than nonbinding resolutions of inquiry: committee hearings, subpoenas, and the ability to pass legislation. An examination of resolutions of inquiry introduced between 1947 and October 20, 2017, however, reveals a far more bipartisan overall picture than this view might suggest. Over the 70 years examined, the party affiliation of resolution of inquiry sponsors is fairly evenly divided. Of the 313 resolutions of inquiry introduced between 1947 and October 20, 2017, 132 were introduced by Members of the congressional majority party and 181 by minority party Members. The political affiliation of resolution of inquiry sponsors versus that of the President is more divided. Of the 313 resolutions of inquiry submitted in the House between 1947 and October 20, 2017, 239 (76%) were introduced by Members of Congress belonging to the opposite political party of the President. If one examines only recent Congresses, the statistical picture is much starker and supports the view that resolutions of inquiry have become overwhelmingly a minority party tool. In recent years, the sponsorship of resolutions of inquiry has become far more partisan and more lopsided in party division than at any time during the seven decades studied. Since 2005, 2 of the 91 resolutions of inquiry submitted were authored by a Member of Congress having the same political party as the President. The others were submitted by Members directed at Presidents of the opposite party. Because resolutions of inquiry are primarily intended to be an information-gathering tool, one question is whether available evidence suggests such resolutions have been successful in producing information from the executive branch. The data in Table 6 and in Figure 3 are gleaned from an examination of legislative history documents, such as committee reports and floor debate, accompanying resolutions of inquiry introduced between 1947 and October 20, 2017. Based on these documents and the measures themselves, resolutions of inquiry were divided into three categories: (1) Yes, evidence suggests the resolution did produce full or partial information from the executive branch; (2) No, the evidence suggests that no information was received from the executive branch in response to the resolution; or (3) Whether information was produced is unknown, unclear, or in dispute. In half of the resolutions submitted between 1947 and October 20, 2017, whether the resolution resulted in the production of information was unknown, unclear, or in dispute based on an examination of the legislative history. Twenty-eight percent of the resolutions of inquiry introduced over the period studied appear to have resulted in the production of some or all of the information requested of the executive branch. Twenty-two percent of the resolutions authored during this period appear to have failed to produce any requested information. When a similar examination is limited to the most recent period of high resolution of inquiry activity noted above, 2003-2006, the effectiveness of such resolutions in producing information from the executive branch is far less. During these years, such resolutions failed to produce information 64% of the time and succeeded in 19% of cases. As these statistics suggest, making determinations about the "success" of resolutions of inquiry can be difficult. As has been noted, slightly under half of the resolutions of inquiry introduced between 1947 and October 20, 2017, were never marked up by House committee or considered on the chamber floor. In such cases there are no legislative history documents to examine to find clues as to whether the Member's information request was answered or ignored. It is easy to imagine that, in at least some of these instances, information was in fact obtained. This supposition seems particularly likely in cases of resolutions introduced in the early years studied, where requests were commonly made for routine, noncontroversial data, such as labor statistics or documents about the government's use of railroad cars. It seems reasonable to suppose that such resolutions' sponsors never tried to call the measures up on the floor precisely because their request had been satisfied; in such a scenario, inaction on a resolution would be an indication of its success. But that is only a supposition. Likewise, the very introduction of a resolution of inquiry might encourage an executive department to hand over information, but it may not be immediately apparent that the resolution was the motivating factor. Although the established purpose of a resolution of inquiry is to acquire factual information, that may not be the only goal a Member has when authoring such legislation. Calling attention to an issue, seizing a committee's agenda from the majority party, forcing other legislative action (such as a hearing), getting Members on the record with difficult policy votes, or demonstrating interest in a particular subject area may all be possible goals for introducing a resolution of inquiry. As has been noted above, in recent Congresses, some have argued that the increase in resolutions of inquiry introduced is precisely because the resolutions are being used for goals such as these, rather than as a purely information-gathering mechanism. An examination of resolutions of inquiry introduced in the House between 1947 and October 20, 2017, raises several questions for the potential consideration of policymakers. Overall, the data suggest that resolutions of inquiry have become more common in some recent Congresses, have resulted in more work at the committee level, and have increasingly been used by minority party Members in the House. As noted, the data examined raise the question of whether increases in the number of House resolutions of inquiry submitted in some recent Congresses are affecting the workload of certain chamber committees. If policymakers were to determine that this is the case, and that it merits action, they might consider whether changes in the treatment of such resolutions under House rules are warranted. The House might respond, for example, by making such resolutions privileged only if a House committee chose to report them favorably. Or, the House might choose instead to extend the time period that committees have to report a privileged resolution of inquiry from the present 14 legislative days to a longer period of time. A change of this latter type might preserve the traditional use of resolutions of inquiry for all Members and give committees more freedom to choose when they will act on them. It might also discourage resolutions of inquiry from being introduced in an attempt to gain political advantage by highlighting important, but transient, hot-button political issues. Perhaps the clearest picture emerging from a systematic examination of resolution of inquiry activity in the post-WWII period, however, relates to the efficacy of such resolutions. Although the data show that in some cases—particularly in earlier eras—such resolutions have produced information, half the time it is unclear if resolutions of inquiry result in the production of any information to the House, and if so, to what degree. The possibility that the standing committees of the House are spending an increased amount of time acting on resolutions whose efficacy is largely unknown may lead policymakers to try to institute a more rigorous accounting of future resolutions of this type. Lawmakers might do so in a number of ways. Committees, for example, might direct the agencies they oversee to formally catalogue and submit to them what response, if any, they have made to recently introduced resolutions of inquiry. Committees might be encouraged to report this information to the House in the activities report they are already required to submit to the House each Congress under clause 1(d)(1) of Rule XI, or by some other mechanism. Executive branch communications to the House in response to a resolution of inquiry might be designated as such in the Congressional Record , or noted in a special category when received by the Clerk of the House, so that the cause and effect (or lack thereof) of such resolutions might become clearer. Policymakers might also consider standardizing the procedures House committees use to handle resolutions of inquiry, for example, by requiring them to transmit the resolution to the executive branch within a stated time frame with a letter from the chairman formally requesting executive comment on the resolution. Other options also exist. The House Committee on Rules, as the panel with jurisdiction over chamber rules, might examine whether resolutions of inquiry, as a mechanism rooted in the earliest days of Congress, should continue to enjoy privileged parliamentary status considering advances in information technology, including the development of oversight tools available to Members in recent decades. The House Oversight and Government Reform Committee, which has special duties under House Rule X to report committee oversight plans to the House along with any recommendations to promote "more effective and coordinated oversight," might also consider examining the use of such resolutions as oversight tools. Whether policymakers ultimately determine that changes in the use of resolutions of inquiry are warranted or not, such an examination might arguably give all Members of the House a better understanding of the resolution's use in the ongoing oversight relationship between the legislative and executive branches of government.

Summary: A resolution of inquiry is a simple resolution making a direct request or demand of the President or the head of an executive department to furnish the House with specific factual information in the Administration's possession. Under the rules and precedents of the House of Representatives, such resolutions, if properly drafted, are given a privileged parliamentary status. This means that, under certain circumstances, a resolution of inquiry can be brought to the House floor for consideration even if the committee to which it was referred has not reported it and the majority party leadership has not scheduled it for action. Between 1947 and October 20, 2017, 313 resolutions of inquiry were submitted in the House of Representatives. Two periods in particular, 1971-1975 and 2003-2006, saw the highest levels of activity on resolutions of inquiry during the 70 years studied. Early evidence suggests that the House may be entering another period of heightened activity on resolutions of inquiry: The number of such resolutions submitted thus far in the 115th Congress (2017-2018) already exceeds the number introduced in the previous three Congresses combined. Although nearly every standing House committee has been referred at least one resolution of inquiry during the post-World War II period, the Committees on Armed Services, Foreign Affairs, and the Judiciary have received the largest share of references because the most commonly sought information has related to matters of defense, foreign relations, and intelligence. Most resolutions of inquiry are directed to the President himself, but other executive branch officials have been the subject of such information requests as well. Just over half of the resolutions of inquiry introduced between 1947 and October 20, 2017, were reported by the House committee to which they were referred—in most cases adversely, indicating that the committee opposed the resolution. This opposition might be because the resolution had been made moot by the executive branch complying in whole or in part with the request, or because such a request would, in the view of the committee, compromise an ongoing investigation, endanger sensitive information, or seek already-available information. Approximately one-fifth of the resolutions of inquiry introduced during the period studied received House floor action, the last one in 1995. Although Representatives of both political parties have utilized resolutions of inquiry, in recent Congresses, such resolutions have overwhelmingly become a tool of the minority party in the House. This development has led some to question whether resolutions of inquiry are being used primarily for partisan gain or are unduly increasing the workload of certain House committees. Others have attributed the increase to a frustration among minority party Members over their inability to readily obtain information from the executive branch. Available data suggest that 28% of the time, a resolution of inquiry has resulted in the production of information to the House. In half of the cases examined here, however, it is simply unknown, unclear, or in dispute whether the resolution of inquiry produced any of the requested information, a fact which might suggest the need for additional investigation of the efficacy of this parliamentary oversight tool by policymakers. This report will be updated as events warrant.