In August 2005, Pakistan held two-phase municipal-level elections in 110 districts. Althoughthe exercise ostensibly was a non-party affair, officials from the opposition Pakistan People's Partycomplained in July that President Musharraf was violating the code of conduct by urging voters tocast ballots for candidates favored by the ruling Pakistan Muslim League. Then, in a blow to thehopes of Islamist sympathizers, the Pakistan Supreme Court ruled that candidates with religiouseducation were ineligible to run in municipal elections unless they have studied English, Pakistanstudies, and Urdu. Islamist leaders criticized the ruling. (1) During the polling, tens of thousands of troops were deployed forsecurity purposes, yet scores of Pakistanis were killed and as many as 1,000 were injured inpoll-related violence around the country. Claims of widespread vote-rigging and women beingbarred from polling stations in the Frontier Province spurred Pakistan's major opposition parties --both secular and Islamist -- to issue a joint call for a national strike to protest President Musharraf's"military takeover," "dictatorial behavior," and "blatant rigging." Ensuing protests were onlymoderate in scale (with Quetta being an exception) and Information Minister Rashid called the strike"a total failure." (2) Candidates favored by Pakistan's ruling party appear to have fared quite well in all fourprovinces, and Muslim League gains were seen as a major boost for President Musharraf, who mayhave to rely on the ruling party to win the presidency in 2007. Musharraf expressed satisfaction with"a victory for the moderates" and "a defeat for the extremists." However, one Pakistani analystopined that the outcome would be unlikely to yield political harmony and had only exacerbated thesense of bitterness and alienation felt among opposition parties. Others warn that apparentirregularities could in fact harm Musharraf's image; a former Pakistani ambassador called the processa "typically vice-regal electoral exercise." Still, many non-Pakistani observers, especially those frominternational aid organizations such as the Asian Development Bank, see the local governancesystem as a bright spot in otherwise faltering efforts at Pakistani democratization. (3) In June 2005, the U.S. State Department's lead official for South Asia, Christina Rocca,reiterated for the House International Relations Committee the important role Pakistan continues toplay in assisting U.S.-led efforts to defeat terrorism, stabilize neighboring Afghanistan, and end thetransfer of nuclear weapons material and technologies. She noted that "Pakistan's government hastaken steps necessary ... to set it on the path of becoming a modern, prosperous, and democraticstate," but conceded "there's still a way to go" toward that goal. Calling democratization a "centralfocus" and one of the "top priorities" in U.S.-Pakistan relations, Secretary Rocca expressed a U.S.expectation that Pakistan's 2005 local and 2007 general elections "be free and fair throughout theentire process. ... [W]e believe that democracy, freedom, and rule of law are the best counters tohatred, extremism, and terrorism" (the State Department did not comment on ensuing reports ofirregularities in the August 2005 elections). Some Members in attendance expressed skepticismabout Pakistan's democratization under Musharraf, with one calling the country a "poster child forthe President's forward strategy of freedom." (4) On the political front, Pakistan's moderate, secular parties continued to face governmentalrepression. In April, in an effort to block a rally planned to welcome the return to Lahore of AsifZardari, the husband of former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto, police arrested thousands of activistsof the opposition Pakistan People's Party (PPP) and some senior party leaders, and blocked travelroutes around the city. When Zardari arrived in Lahore, he was placed in "protective custody" byauthorities (PPP members said he had been arrested). New York-based Human Rights Watch laterappealed to the Pakistani government to release the "thousands" of opposition PPP supporters whohad been arrested in nation-wide sweeps. (5) Meanwhile, the Islamist political coalition saw thousands of their supporters arrested duringlarge street protests and strikes against the Musharraf government; tens of thousands rallied inKarachi and Lahore in late March. Religious parties and others in Pakistan also were disturbed bya May story in Newsweek magazine report alleging that a copy of the Koran had been desecrated atthe U.S. facility at Guantanamo Bay. The Islamabad government expressed "serious concern" toU.S. officials about the allegations and the U.S. State Department called any such desecration"deplorable and entirely inconsistent with American values of religious freedom and tolerance." Pakistan's National Assembly passed a resolution condemning the alleged desecration. (6) U.S. Policy. Pakistan, a strategically importantcountry that is home to one of the world's largest Muslim populations, has been a key cooperatingnation in U.S.-led counterterrorism efforts in South Asia. (7) On October 12, 1999, Pakistan's Chief of Army Staff (COAS) Gen.Pervez Musharraf replaced Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif in a bloodless coup. In the wake of themilitary overthrow of the elected government, Islamabad faced considerable internationalopprobrium and was subjected to automatic coup-related U.S. sanctions under section 508 of theannual foreign assistance appropriations act. The September 2001 terrorist attacks on the UnitedStates and Musharraf's ensuing withdrawal of support for the Afghan Taliban regime, however, hadthe effect of greatly reducing Pakistan's international isolation. Congress temporarily removedrestrictions, and large-scale U.S. aid to the country resumed, in the final months of 2001(coup-related sanctions are still in place; since March 2003 President Bush has exercised annuallythe one-year waiver authority on coup-related sanctions granted to him by Congress). The State Department's Country Reports on Terrorism 2004 characterized Pakistan as oneof the most important U.S. partners in the war on terrorism. While top-tier U.S. emphases in theregion after September 2001 have remained combating religious extremism and ending illicit nuclearweapons proliferation, the United States expresses a strong interest in the improvement of Pakistan'shuman rights situation, especially as regards the restoration and strengthening of the country'scivilian democratic institutions. There exists a debate among analysts over the exigency of thisissue. Some observers urge patience, contending that a "true" democratic system will require timeand that "military-guided" governance is required in an unstable setting and to deter extremistpolitical influences. Others argue that Pakistan's underdeveloped democracy and rule of law arethemselves a central cause of the country's instability. Some believe that Pakistan's Islamist forcesare manipulated by and at times in collusion with the military as it manages skewed civil-militaryrelations wherein moderate political parties play a decreasing role. A number of top U.S. diplomats,along with many in Congress, have called for more and accelerated development of Pakistanidemocracy. Some sections of legislation passed by the 108th Congress addressed this concern andpending legislation in the 109th Congress ( S. 12 ) contains Pakistan-specific languageregarding that country's governmental system. The United States now considers Pakistan to be a vital ally in the international anti-terrorismcoalition. The Bush Administration has refrained from expressing any strong public criticisms ofPakistan's internal political practices, while still asserting that the strengthening of civilian politicalinstitutions in Islamabad is "a requirement for the development of a stable, moderate Islamic state." The State Department and the U.S. Agency for International Development have identified"democratic stability in South Asia's frontline states" of Pakistan and Afghanistan as one of elevenkey democracy and human rights-related initiatives for the world in FY2006. (8) According to U.S.Ambassador to Pakistan Nancy Powell in August 2004, America wants to see strong Pakistani democraticinstitutions and practices, including a National Assembly, Senate, and Provincial Assemblies thatplay a vigorous and positive role in governance and an independent judiciary that promotes the ruleof law. We also would like to see Pakistan's civil society play an active role in governance. (9) In March 2005, while unveiling the Bush Administration's "new strategy for South Asia," anunnamed senior State Department official said, The goal, then, has to be a fully democratic,economically promising Pakistan that feels secure and is thus at peace with its neighbors, with thepreviously high tide of anti-Americanism and Islamist extremism gradually receding. (10) Since becoming Secretary of State in early 2005, Condoleezza Rice has made several statementsabout Pakistan's governance system, offering that trends in Pakistan were moving that country "inthe right direction," and insisting that the United States "will continue to press toward eventualelections and a full democratic process in Pakistan." During the lead-up to Pakistan's August 2005municipal elections, Assistant Secretary of State for South Asia Rocca told an interviewer, "A levelplaying field for [Pakistan's] local body elections, as well as for the election in 2007, is critical forthe elections to be free and fair" (the State Department did not comment on ensuing reports ofirregularities in the August 2005 elections). (11) The 9/11 Commission Report and CongressionalAction. The 9/11 Commission Report (released in July 2004) claims that -- evenafter acknowledging problems in U.S.-Pakistan relations and President Musharraf's role in them -- "Musharraf's government is the best hope for stability in Pakistan and Afghanistan." In addition toidentifying Pakistan as a principal transit country for the 9/11 hijackers and naming the westernregions of the country as one of six "actual or potential terrorist sanctuaries" worldwide, theCommission offers a key recommendation for U.S. policy toward Pakistan: If Musharraf stands for enlightened moderation in afight for his life and for the life of his country, the United States should be willing to make hardchoices too, and make the difficult long-term commitment to the future of Pakistan. Sustaining thecurrent scale of aid to Pakistan, the United States should support Pakistan's government in itsstruggle against extremists with a comprehensive effort that extends from military aid to support forbetter education, so long as Pakistan's leaders remain willing to make difficult choices of theirown. (12) In passing the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 ( P.L. 108-458 ), the 108thCongress broadly endorsed this recommendation by calling for long-term and comprehensive U.S.support for the government of Pakistan in an effort to ensure a "stable and secure future" for thatcountry. The act expresses the "sense of Congress" that U.S. assistance should in particularencourage and enable Pakistan to make progress in eight specific areas, one of which is "becominga more effective and participatory democracy." Congressional attention to Pakistan's domestic political developments is ongoing. In June2005 ( S.Rept. 109-96 ), the Senate Appropriations Committee recommended approval of theAdministration's request for FY2006 aid to Pakistan while expressing concern with "the slow paceof the democratic development of Pakistan" and an expectation that the State Department andUSAID "continue to make democracy and governance programs a priority." Weeks later, the Housepassed the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, FY2006 and FY2007 ( H.R. 2601 ),which includes a provision requiring the President to report to Congress on the extent to which a"fully functional democracy" has been restored in Pakistan. The Senate-passed version of theForeign Operations FY2006 Appropriations bill ( H.R. 3057 ) would require theSecretary of State report to Congress on steps taken by Pakistan to protect the rights and safety ofPakistani human rights lawyers and journalists. Pending legislation in the 109th Congress (theTargeting Terrorists More Effectively Act of 2005, S. 12 ) includes Pakistan-specificlanguage regarding "a number of critical issues that threaten to disrupt" U.S.-Pakistan relations. Government institutions, democracy, and rule of law are among these. "Enlightened Moderation". The concept of"enlightened moderation," as expounded by Musharraf himself, is a direct response to a growingworld perception that Islam is linked to fundamentalism, and thus to extremism, and thus toterrorism. It is a strategy meant to both shun the militancy that is rooted in "political injustice,denial, and deprivation,"and to bring "socioeconomic uplift"in the Muslim world. Musharraf hascalled upon Muslims to "adopt a path of moderation and a conciliatory approach to fight the commonbelief that Islam is a religion of militancy in conflict with modernization, democracy andsecularism." Pakistan's prime minister, Shaukat Aziz, a close ally of Musharraf and his financeminister since 1999, took office in August 2004 vowing to pursue a policy of "enlightenedmoderation." (13) ManyPakistanis appear to welcome the approach and see religious extremists as the main obstacle. However, one maverick Islamabad politician takes the view that Musharraf's tack was born ofexpediency, not conviction, and only serves to strengthen the perception that neither he nor theUnited States have a genuine interest in Pakistani democracy. (14) The Bush Administrationrejects criticism that it is overly focused on the person of Musharraf and has called the Pakistanipresident "the right man in the right place at the right time for the right job." (15) U.S. interest in Pakistani democratization exists in tandem (some would say in conflict) withthe perceived need to have a stable and effectively-administered front-line ally in the internationalanti-terrorism coalition. While many observers believe that U.S. interests in combating terrorismand weapons proliferation in South Asia entail a "trade-off" with regard to other concerns, somecontend that the human rights situation in Pakistan may itself be a crucial aspect of the incidence ofterrorism and religious extremism. (16) Congressional oversight of U.S.-Pakistan relations in a March2003 hearing included Member expressions of concern about problems with Pakistanidemocratization and the danger of the United States "giving full recognition to a military takeover"through continuous waivers of coup-related aid restrictions. (17) Pakistan's militarycontinues to dominate the country's centralized decision-making process, and, while in office, PrimeMinister Jamali referred to President Musharraf as being his "boss." (18) The military appears to have increased its control over Pakistan; as articulated by a Pakistaniauthority on civil-military relations, "The corporate interests of the military have expanded so muchunder General Musharraf that the army is now overwhelming all the major sectors of the state, theeconomy, and the society." (19) Military agencies are blamed for abusing human rights and somecritics have suggested that Musharraf's "Faustian bargain" with Islamists serves to strengthen thevery extremism that he publicly opposes. (20) One senior Western observer contends that "the generals cannotgovern Pakistan, but they will not let anyone else govern it;" a Pakistani commentator sees theproblem as "a military that wants to control things without being overtly seen to be doing so." (21) Although a civilianParliament has been seated for three years, most of Islamabad's policy making process is opaque; anabsence of transparency may be most noticeable with Pakistan's defense budget, which appears asa single line in the federal budget. Numerous opposition figures have complained that removing thedetails of military spending from public scrutiny is nondemocratic and allows the country'sintelligence services, in particular, to remain unaccountable to the people. (22) Although it is possible to argue that Pakistan is more democratic since October 2002elections, many analysts note that the country's democratic institutions and processes are inflexibleand unaccommodating of dissent, and they see Pakistan's political parties seriously weakened inrecent years, with the military's influence correspondingly more profound. (23) Moreover, numerouscommentators reject the 9/11 Commission's "best hope" label for Musharraf himself as myopic andrepetitive of past U.S. reliance on Pakistani military regimes, especially in light of signs thatPakistan's seemingly decreasing political stability is rooted in Musharraf's policies and in hispatronage by the United States. (24) The perceived U.S. need for a stable and reliable regional ally in its ongoing counterterrorismefforts in South Asia have some analysts concluding that Musharraf remains in a position to takefurther domestic political advantage of current geopolitical dynamics. Yet, at a July 2004 hearingof the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, there appeared to be consensus among the panel of threeveteran Pakistan watchers about the potential problems inherent in a real or perceived U.S.over-reliance on the individual of Musharraf at the potential cost of more positive development ofPakistan's democratic institutions and civil society. Many commentators believe such developmentis key to the long-term success of stated U.S. policy in the region. Calling Musharraf a "marginalsatisfier" who will do only the minimum expected of him, one hearing witness recommended that,"The United States must alter the impression our support for Pakistan is essentially support forMusharraf." (25) Thisconception is echoed by a Pakistani analyst, who contends that all of Musharraf's major policy shiftsafter September 2001 have come through compulsion by external pressure or events and that, whilethe direction of Pakistan's policy change has been appropriate, "the momentum of change is too slowand awkward and unsure to constitute a critical and irreversible mass." (26) Many Pakistani andWestern commentators insist that only by allowing the country's secular political parties fully intothe system can the country realize stable and enduring democracy. (27) In June 2005 statements before a House panel, one senior U.S. scholar warned Congressabout Pakistan's "dysfunctional social order, its dangerous sectarianism and its distorted politicalsystem," saying the country has achieved "sustainable failure." When asked by members of theHouse International Relations Committee about the country's governance system, this expert opinedthat Pakistan's military has sought to "prevent any of the mainstream parties from emerging as analternative to the military." Yet he finds this strategy harmful to the military's own interests, viewingthe army as demonstrably unable to effectively govern a progressively deteriorating Pakistani system. Thus, "it's in the army's own interest that it retreats from politics [and] allow moderate, centristparties to fill the space." He called Sharif's and Bhutto's return from exile a requirement for trulyfree elections in 2007. However, the Musharraf government has indicated that the two former PrimeMinisters would not be allowed to return to Pakistan before the 2007 elections. (28) Numerous American policymakers believe that U.S. interests are for the time being bestserved by the presence of a strong and secure Islamabad leadership. Thus, while early optimismabout Musharraf's potential as a reformer has waned considerably, there are those who still concludethat the existence of an unstable and possibly Islamicized or failed state between Afghanistan andIndia -- a state in possession of nuclear weapons -- is a far less desirable circumstance than thepresent one in which a powerful and secular military institution maintains a reasonable degree oforder in Pakistan. (29) For some, this argument has become less persuasive as the country's law-and-order situationappeared to deteriorate in 2004-2005 and uncertainty about political succession in Islamabad causestrepidation in numerous world capitals. Pakistan's fragile democratic institutions are undercontinuous threat emanating from the authoritarian influences of the country's powerful military andquasi-feudal economic structures. Given a stated U.S. position that, "Democratic institutions arerequired if Pakistan is to thrive economically and to develop further into an enlightened andmoderate Muslim state," (30) Pakistan's domestic political developments likely will be closelymonitored by the United States. The history of democracy in Pakistan is a troubled one marked by ongoing tripartite powerstruggles among presidents, prime ministers, and army chiefs. Military regimes have ruled Pakistanfor more than half of the country's 57 years in existence, and most observers agree that Pakistan hasno sustained history of effective constitutionalism or parliamentary democracy. The country has hadfive constitutions, the most recent being ratified in 1973 (and significantly modified several timessince). From the earliest days of independence, the country's armed forces have thought ofthemselves as "saviors of the nation," a perception that has received significant, though limited,public support. The military, usually acting in tandem with the president, has engaged in threeoutright seizures of power from civilian-led governments: Gen. Ayub Khan in 1958, Gen.Zia-ul-Haq in 1977, and Gen. Musharraf in 1999. (31) Since 1970, five successive governments have been voted intopower, but not a single time has a government been voted out of power -- all five were removed bythe army through explicit or implicit presidential orders. Of Pakistan's three most prominent primeministers, one (Z.A. Bhutto) was executed, another (Benazir Bhutto) exiled and her husband jailedon corruption charges, and the last (Nawaz Sharif) remains in exile under threat of life in prison forsimilar abuses should he return. Such long-standing turmoil in the governance system may partiallyexplain why, in a 2004 public opinion survey, nearly two-thirds of Pakistanis were unable to providea meaning for the term "democracy." (32) Pakistan Muslim League. The Pakistan MuslimLeague (PML) is the country's oldest political party and was the only major party existing at the timeof independence. Long associated with the Quaid-e-Azam (Father of the Nation) Muhammed AliJinnah and his lieutenant, Liaquat Ali Khan, the PML was weakened upon their premature deathsin 1948 and 1951 (Jinnah by natural causes, Khan by assassination). Not until the 1988 elections-- when Nawaz Sharif, who had been Gen. Zia's finance minister, led a PML-Islamist coalition toa strong second-place showing and became Punjab chief minister -- was the party again to be a playeron the national scene. Sharif was elected prime minister in 1990 and, three years later, establishedthe offshoot PML-Nawaz (PML-N), which went on to dominate the 1997 elections. In the lead upto the 2002 elections, most former (but still influential) Sharif loyalists joined the newPML-Quaid-e-Azam (PML-Q), a group seen to enjoy overt support from the military. In May 2004,five PML factions united and named Punjabi politician and industrialist Chaudhry Shujaat Hussainas their leader. Nawaz Sharif and most of his immediate family live in exile in Saudi Arabia. Hisfamily's legal status is unclear, but reports indicate that, shortly after the 1999 coup, the Sharif familyand the Musharraf government concluded an "arrangement" that would bar any family member fromreturning to Pakistan for a period of ten years. The PML's electoral strength typically is found in thedensely populated Punjab province. Pakistan People's Party. The left-leaning PakistanPeople's Party (PPP) was established in 1967 in reaction to the military dictatorship of Gen. AyubKhan. (33) The partyslogan was and remains "Islam is our Faith, Democracy is our Polity, Socialism is our Economy." Under the leadership of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, who had resigned his position as Khan's foreignminister, the PPP won a majority of West Pakistan's assembly seats in 1970 elections and held powerfrom 1971 until 1977, when Bhutto's government was overthrown by his army chief, Gen.Zia-ul-Haq. Bhutto, who oversaw the establishment of a parliamentary system with the 1973Constitution and who launched Pakistan's nuclear weapons program, was executed by the militarygovernment in 1979. When Zia's ban on political parties was lifted in 1986, Bhutto's daughterBenazir emerged as the PPP leader and won the prime ministership in 1988 and again in 1993. Today, she lives in exile in London and Dubai under threat of imprisonment should she return toPakistan (she has thrice been convicted of corruption in absentia). In an effort to skirt legal barriersto its electoral participation in 2002, the PPP formed a separate entity, the PPP Parliamentarians(PPPP), that pledged to uphold Bhutto's political philosophy. This group is headed by MakhdoomAmin Fahim. The PPP historically has done especially well in the southern Sind province. Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal (United Action Front). The Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA or United Action Forum) is a loose coalition of six Islamistparties formed for the 2002 elections. (34) Its largest constituent is the Jamaat-i-Islami (JI), founded byMaulana Maududi in 1941 and considered to be Pakistan's best-organized religious party. JI chiefQazi Hussein Ahmed serves as MMA president. Another long-standing Islamist party is the JamiatUlema-i-Islam faction led by Maulana Fazlur Rehman (JUI-F). The JUI is associated with religiousschools that gave rise to the Afghan Taliban movement. In addition to promoting a central role forreligion in Pakistani affairs, Islamists have been opposed to Westernization in both its capitalist andsocialist forms. Although Pakistan's religious parties enjoy considerable "street" power and werestrengthened by Zia's policies of the 1980s, their electoral showing has in the past been quite limited(they won only two parliamentary seats in the 1993 and 1997 elections). On October 12, 1999, Army Chief Gen. Pervez Musharraf overthrew the elected governmentof Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, dismissed the National Assembly, and appointed himself "ChiefExecutive." The proximate cause of Musharraf's action appears to have been Sharif's attempt toremove him from his Army leadership position and prevent his return from abroad, but widespreaddissatisfaction with Sharif's authoritarian and allegedly corrupt regime -- both within the Pakistanimilitary and among the general public -- are believed to have been important broader factors. Undera "Provisional Constitution Order" (PCO), Musharraf declared a state of emergency, suspended theConstitution, and, by special decree, ensured that his actions could not be challenged by any court. He promised to end corruption and revive "genuine democracy." In January 2000, members ofPakistan's Supreme Court were required to take an oath promising to uphold the PCO; six jurists,including the Chief Justice, refused and stood retired. Five months later, the new Supreme Courtissued a sweeping validation of Musharraf's actions, including the PCO and the dissolution of thenational and provincial assemblies, but it also ordered that elections to reseat these bodies be heldno later than three years from the date of the coup (i.e., by October 12, 2002). These developmentsleft Pakistan with a "seemingly benign, but nonetheless very real, military dictatorship." (35) General Musharraf's October 1999 seizure of power initially was met with widespreadapproval among the Pakistani people, many of whom considered the Sharif government to beincorrigibly corrupt. Even many of the country's more liberal-minded opinion-makers acquiescedwith the hope that Musharraf might succeed in improving Pakistan's lot where civilian-ledgovernments had failed, and/or because they believed that a military-led government was the onlyremaining alternative to a radical Islamic regime in Islamabad. (36) Yet Musharraf'ssubsequent actions became widely interpreted as indicating his intention to impose a more or lesspermanent authoritarian rule over the country, and they thus alienated many of the early optimists. While maintaining his promise to hold national elections in October 2002, Musharraf spent ensuingyears taking actions that bolstered his ruling position and that of the military. Proponents ofMusharraf's political choices since 1999 insist that the country is becoming more stable, and lesscorrupt and personality-centered through "military-guided" administration. (37) In June 2001, President Mohammad Rafiq Tarar was forced to resign under the PCO and wasreplaced by Gen. Musharraf. Musharraf later sought to legitimize his status as president with anApril 2002 referendum. Islamabad reported resounding public approval for Musharraf's continuedrule in the results of this exercise, with 98% of votes cast in favor. Yet opposition parties hadboycotted the vote, and charges of widespread coercion and fraud marred the outcome. Musharraflater apologized for "irregularities" in the process. (38) In August 2002, President Musharraf took unilateral action in announcing a "LegalFramework Order" (LFO) of constitutional changes. The most important of these provide greatlyenhanced powers to the Pakistani President. Musharraf maintained that the amendments werenecessary to bring "true" and stable democracy to the country. Critics contended that Musharraf(who retained his position as Army Chief) was seeking to legitimize the military'sextra-constitutional role in governance, as well as ensure his own continued power in contraventionof democratic principles. The key constitutional change was a provision allowing the President todismiss the National Assembly. (39) Other controversial clauses called for presidential appointmentsof military chiefs and creation of a military-dominated National Security Council (NSC) authorizedto oversee the country's security policies, as well as monitor the process of democracy andgovernance in the country. (40) Many saw the NSC providing Pakistan's armed forces with apermanent and unprecedented institutional role in the country's governance. Pakistan's majoropposition parties decried Musharraf's action as illegal, claiming that only Parliament has the powerto amend the constitution. For numerous critics, the proposed changes harked back to Zia-ul-Haq'scontinuous and years-long efforts to avoid any form of electoral or judicial challenge to his rule. Inresponse to Musharraf's LFO announcement, the United States indicated that full U.S. support forthe Pakistani President would continue, even if some of the changes "could make it more difficultto build strong, democratic institutions in Pakistan." (41) Following the October 1999 coup, the Pakistani Supreme Court ordered that nationalelections be held within a period of no more than three years, and President Musharraf set and heldto a poll date of October 10, 2002. Given the country's poor historical record with democraticprocesses, many observers lauded Musharraf for the mere act of holding elections as promised. However, and despite the government's insistence that the exercise was free and fair, oppositionparties and numerous independent observers called the election deeply flawed. Widely asserted wasthat the military regime's machinations substantively weakened the main secular oppositionparties. (42) Voter turnoutwas estimated by the Pakistan Election Commission to have been above 40%, but still lower thanany previous Pakistani national election. Major parties offer even lower estimates, with most fallingbetween 20% and 30%. The PML-Q -- also called the "king's party" due to its perceived pro-military bent -- won 118of the total 342 parliamentary seats, almost all of them from Punjab, and the affiliated NationalAlliance won 16 more. (43) This number gave the pro-Musharraf parties a plurality in theNational Assembly, but fell well short of the majority representation needed to control the bodyoutright. The PPP won the largest number of votes overall, but Pakistan's electoral rules awardedit runner-up status only, with a total of 81 national seats. Perhaps the most surprising outcome ofthe elections was the strong third-place showing of the MMA Islamist coalition that now controlsthe provincial assembly of the North West Frontier Province (NWFP) and leads a coalition in thatof Baluchistan, as well as seating 68 legislators in the National Assembly (up from two previously)-- about 20% of the total. (44) The new National Assembly sat in November 2002. The three leading national parties -- thePML-Q, PPP, and MMA -- had engaged in convoluted and ultimately failed coalition-buildingnegotiations. Both the secular opposition PPP and the Islamist parties maintained a strident rejectionof the Legal Framework Order changes to the Constitution. A PPP-Islamist alliance would have setthe pro-military parties in opposition, a possibility that reportedly sent the Musharraf regime into"panic." (45) Signals thata PML-Q-Islamist alliance was in the offing ended when President Musharraf refused to acceptMMA demands that he resign his position as Army Chief. Some political analysts opined that anoutcome in which no party secured a majority served President Musharraf's interests by allowing himto retain preeminent power, and such an outcome may well have been his intent. (46) In an unexpected circumstance, the pro-Musharraf parties succeeded in forming a thinworking coalition without the participation of either the PPP or the MMA, a development madepossible by the defection of several PPP members, some of whom were rewarded with high-profileministerships of their own. (This group of PPP "Patriots" has continued to be stronglypro-Musharraf.) In November 2002, PML-Q favorite and former Baluchistan Chief Minister MirZafarullah Jamali was elected to serve as Prime Minister. (47) Speculation abounded over whether or not the PakistaniPresident intended for the Islamist coalition to make as strong a showing as it did; Benazir Bhutto,for one, suggested that Musharraf "handed over the areas bordering Afghanistan to religious parties"in an effort to ensure continued U.S. support while simultaneously placating domesticopponents. (48) Althougha full National Assembly was seated, the body remained stalled on procedural issues for more thanone year; only a single piece of legislation (a budget) was passed in that time. In July 2003, morethan 20 groups representing nearly all of Pakistan's non-Islamist opposition parties issued a jointrejection of the LFO and called for Musharraf's resignation. Shortly after, the MMA announced its"final" refusal to accept the LFO and Musharraf's status as Army Chief. (49) The fractious 14-month-long dispute between President Musharraf's allies and oppositionparties in the National Assembly came to an end with a surprise December 2003 deal betweenMusharraf and the Islamist MMA. Under the arrangement, Musharraf pledged to resign his militarycommission by the end of 2004. He also agreed to put a slightly altered version of the LFO beforeParliament. It was passed and, on the final day of 2003, became the 17th Amendment to theConstitution. (50) Finally,Musharraf submitted to a vote of confidence by Pakistan's Electoral College (comprised of themembership of all national and provincial legislatures). On January 1, 2004, Musharraf's presidencythrough 2007 was legitimized when he won about 60% of the total vote. (51) Officials in Islamabadcontended that the developments augured well for Pakistani democracy and stability, butnon-Islamist opposition parties unified under the Alliance for the Restoration of Democracy (ARD)accused the MMA of betrayal and insisted that the new arrangement merely institutionalized militaryrule in Pakistan. (52) When the 17th Amendment to the Constitution was passed in December 2003, one of the keychanges to President Musharraf's original August 2002 LFO proposal was the removal of the NationalSecurity Council. In something of a concession, Musharraf and the military allowed the NSC to becreated through a legislative rather than constitutional process, meaning that Parliament will have at leastnominal power to alter or dissolve the body. Draft legislation was completed in January 2004. Secularand Islamist opposition parties vowed to oppose the bill, saying an NSC would curtail Parliament'spowers, but their vehement protest failed to sway the ruling party and they boycotted voting when thebill passed in April. The first formal meeting of the NSC took place in June and focused on Pakistan'sdeteriorating law-and-order situation. (53) Notably absent was Maulana Fazlur Rehman, whose status as Leaderof the Opposition provides an NSC seat. Musharraf reportedly was unhappy with the Islamist'sboycotting of the inaugural session. (54) Musharraf and his supporters in Parliament insist that the NSC willreduce the likelihood of future military coups by providing a "safety valve" -- a forum in which the armycan play a role short of dissolving the National Assembly. Opponents still contend that amilitary-dominated body headed by the President will only undercut the already tenuous power ofParliament. (55) The Pakistani military and intelligence services have a long history of involving themselvesin and even manipulating their country's political system, oftentimes to the benefit of Islamist forcesand at significant cost to more moderate, secular interests. (56) Pakistan's non-Islamistparties unified under the Alliance for the Restoration of Democracy consider themselves to be thecountry's "true" opposition, given past MMA accommodation with the ruling party. People's Partyleaders and loyalists of Nawaz Sharif's PML-N warn the United States that military dictators are notreliable over time and that Pakistan's civilian political forces may soon become so marginalized asto become ineffective. (57) The October 2003 arrest of opposition political figure Makhdoom Javed Hashmi spurred some toidentify renewed governmental repression. Hashmi, leader of the ARD, was jailed after hepublicized a letter allegedly written by an army officer criticizing President Musharraf's policies. In April 2004, Hashmi was sentenced 23 years in prison for sedition, mutiny, and forgery. TheUnited States expressed regret at the "closed nature of the proceedings" against Hashmi and calledon Pakistan to administer justice fairly and in a transparent manner in his case. Islamabad respondedby accusing the United States of "unwarranted and misplaced" interference in its internalaffairs. (58) In May 2004, Shabaz Sharif, a former Punjab Chief Minister and the brother of deposed PMNawaz Sharif, attempted to return to Pakistan from exile, but was "dragged away by commandos"and deported to Saudi Arabia after less than two hours in Lahore in what some termed a "massiveover-reaction" by authorities. Police arrested as many as 2,200 supporters from Sharif's PML-Nparty who had gathered to welcome him. The events were widely viewed as indicating that themilitary intends to maintain its hold on civil society. (59) Furthermore, the May elevation of Jamiat-Ulema-Islami chiefMaulana Fazlur Rehman to the position of Leader of the Opposition in Parliament spurredcommentary that the "mullah-military alliance" had become a "Musharraf-Maulana alliance," furthermarginalizing Pakistan's more secular opposition parties. (60) There also are reports of other more subtle forms of harassmentand suppression of opposition political figures. (61) Late 2004 saw reports that President Musharraf and the Pakistan Muslim League werepreparing the ground for a reconciliation with the country's non-Islamist opposition. In November2004, Asif Zardari -- the husband of former PM Benazir Bhutto and political figure in his own rightwho had been imprisoned for eight years without conviction -- was released on bail after a SupremeCourt ruling. Zardari, who still faces legal action in eight pending criminal cases, later receivedpermission to leave the country to visit his wife. The developments fueled talk of a pending dealbetween Musharraf and the PPP. Information beyond rumor was sparse, but there have been reliablereports of ongoing communication between government officials and the top leadership of both thePPP and the PML-N, contacts that many believed were preliminary efforts at "deal-making." (62) A major development came with the February 2005 meeting in Saudi Arabia of former PrimeMinisters Nawaz Sharif and Benazir Bhutto. The two top opposition leaders, both living in exile,are longtime rivals, but appear to have set aside their differences in the interest of establishing a"minimum program for the restoration of democracy" in Pakistan. Both parties vowed to worktogether to achieve this "sacred goal." Bhutto was accompanied to the meeting by her husband, AsifZardari. Some analysts saw Zardari's release from prison in November 2004 -- and the apparentlyoverdue December elevation of PPP Senator Raza Rabbani as Leader of the Opposition inparliament's upper house -- as part of an effort by Musharraf to seek reconciliation with Pakistan'smoderate political parties, perhaps to dilute international and domestic criticism of his decision toretain dual offices. (63) However, PPP leaders continue to flatly reject an accommodation with the Musharraf government. At the time of this writing, Pakistan has its third prime minster since the October 2002elections. There were in 2004 increasing indications that Musharraf was unhappy with PrimeMinister Jamali's perceived ineffectiveness and lack of enthusiasm on key issues such as the NSCand Musharraf's possible continuation as Army Chief. (64) On June 26, 2004, Jamali announced his resignation at therequest of President Musharraf. Opposition parties and independent analysts called Jamali's "smoothsacking" further evidence of the military's supreme power. (65) Jamali nominated PMLpresident and Parliament Speaker Chaudhry Shujaat Hussain as his successor. However, Shujaat'stenure was meant to be transitional only, as the person called "Musharraf's favorite candidate,"Senator and Finance Minister Shaukat Aziz, was constitutionally obligated to win a seat in theNational Assembly to be eligible for the prime ministership. After he did so, opposition partiesnominated jailed political figure Javed Hashmi as their candidate for the position. However, theAssembly Speaker ruled that Hashmi could not attend the vote, and Aziz won 192 of 342 ballots,with the opposition boycotting the process as "sham democracy." (66) The choice of Aziz appears to fit with the military's preference for a "task-orientedtechnocrat" who approaches economic development and governance as a "mechanical process." (67) Aziz's elevation was seenas being less about the will of the electorate than about the will of President Musharraf, who is seenas seeking to secure his grip on the civilian components of his regime by installing a prime ministerwho will have little real power over most domestic and international political matters. (68) As was noted above, a central complaint of Pakistan's opposition parties has been Musharraf'sconcurrent standing as both President and Chief of Army Staff, a circumstance they believe violatesthe Constitution and perpetuates overt military rule. Despite apparent legal proscriptions set forthin the 17th Amendment, (69) and his own nationally televised promise to resign hiscommission before January 2005, there were in 2004 increasing signs that Musharraf would chooseto retain dual offices in what often was described as the "national interest." Musharraf's lieutenantsand party supporters spent months urging him to stay on so as to maintain "political stability" inPakistan, and their outspokenness peaked in September 2004. Among independent observers, sucha decision came to be expected and for some was viewed as an expression of Musharraf'sinsecurity. (70) TheUnited States responded by stating that it expected to see continuing progress toward the goal of"fully functioning democracy" in Pakistan and that it continued to view Musharraf's planned militaryretirement as "progress in this general direction." (71) The British Commonwealth, which in May 2004 lifted afour-year suspension of Pakistan, had insisted that Musharraf stand by his pledge to resign from themilitary or risk further opprobrium. (72) In October 2004, the ruling PML-Q party -- ostensibly acting to "bring stability and ensurea smooth continuation of democracy" -- pushed through the National Assembly a bill that wouldallow President Musharraf to remain in uniform for the remainder of his tenure as president. Themove brought waves of criticism from opposition parties that saw it as yet another undemocraticpractice; they disrupted parliamentary proceedings in protest. The debate further widened the alreadyconsiderable government-opposition rift. (73) The United States responded to the parliamentary act by againexpressing the expectation that Pakistan continue transition to fully functioning democracy andrepeating the opinion that Musharraf's retirement from the army would be a "good thing," but wasa decision internal to Musharraf and Pakistan. When pressed to state whether or not retirement wasa fundamental step toward democracy, a U.S. State Department spokesman would say only that"steps toward democracy are good and we will continue to urge them." A top BritishCommonwealth diplomat said the move would be democratic if approved by Parliament, then"clarified" that it would not meet Commonwealth expectations. (74) In November, thechairman of the Pakistani Senate signed the "dual role" bill into law as acting president whileMusharraf was out of the country. In December 2004, Musharraf announced his widely expected decision to retain his army postin what was described as being the interest of domestic political and economic stability. Oppositionparties, which Musharraf called "a threat to democracy," vowed to launch a national "agitation" inprotest of Musharraf's continued rule. Ensuing anti-Musharraf rallies were only modest in size (atleast partly due to inclement weather) and the Pakistan People's Party declined to enter into analliance with the Islamists in the effort. (75) Both the Western and Pakistani press were generally critical ofMusharraf's decision, with some observers expressing new concerns that the United States is "givinga pass" to Musharraf on nuclear proliferation and human rights concerns in exchange for Pakistan'scontinued cooperation with U.S.-led anti-terrorism efforts. (76) The Bush Administration, which earlier had called Musharraf's planned retirement from themilitary a "good thing" in the context of movement toward democracy, declined to directly criticizeMusharraf's reversal, but reiterated a U.S. expectation that Pakistan continue to make progresstoward the goal of a "fully functioning and stable democracy." (77) When Musharraf paid aDecember visit to Washington, DC, President Bush expressed his support and lauded the PakistaniPresident for "very strong" cooperation with the United States and "focused efforts" to combatterrorism. The issues of Pakistani democracy and governance were not raised during a brief jointpress conference held by the leaders, but an unnamed senior Bush Administration official laterinsisted that Pakistan's democratic institutions were strong and that Musharraf was making themstronger. Musharraf told an American television interviewer that "democracy is fully restored" inPakistan. Musharraf later averred that President Bush has never raised the uniform issue indiscussions between the two leaders. (78) In August 2000, the Musharraf government announced a Local Government Plan to reinstateelected local governance bodies, with Musharraf saying "genuine democracy starts from thegrassroots upward ..." (79) Previous Pakistani military rulers, beginning with Gen. Ayub Khan in 1958, had employed likeefforts as part of their political reforms. According to one report, "Local governments have provedto be key instruments in the military's manipulation of the Pakistani polity to ensure regimesurvival." (80) Musharraf's plan was similar to that of former ruler Gen. Zia in calling for a three-tiered system atthe union, tehsil (town), and zila (district) levels, each with its own nazim (mayor) and naib (deputy) nazim . Notably, nazims were given nominally full administrative autonomy, thus bypassingprovincial governments, and the elections were held on a non-party basis. The first such polling tookplace in early 2001. While noting that the devolution plan did provide some benefits -- includinggreater attention to local needs and more facile public access to government officials -- analysts havebeen skeptical of the system's susceptibility to rigging, a lack of democratic accountability (there isno direct election of district nazims ), and an apparent absence of genuine fiscal and administrativeautonomy. Still, many non-Pakistani observers, especially those from international aid organizationssuch as the Asian Development Bank, see the nazim system as a bright spot in otherwise falteringefforts at Pakistani democratization. (81) Although August 2005 municipal elections ostensibly were non-party affairs, officials fromthe opposition PPP complained in July that President Musharraf was violating the code of conductby urging voters to cast ballots for candidates favored by the ruling PML-Q. Then, in a blow to thehopes of Islamist sympathizers, the Pakistan Supreme Court ruled that candidates with religiouseducation were ineligible to run in municipal elections unless they have studied English, Pakistanstudies, and Urdu. Islamist leaders criticized the ruling. (82) The voting for candidates in 110 districts, which came in twophases on August 18 and August 25, involved deployment of tens of thousands of troops for securitypurposes, yet scores of Pakistanis were killed and as many as 1,000 were injured in poll-relatedviolence around the country. Claims of widespread vote-rigging and women being barred frompolling stations in the Frontier Province spurred Pakistan's major opposition parties -- both secularand Islamist -- to issue a joint call for a national strike to protest President Musharraf's "militarytakeover," "dictatorial behavior," and "blatant rigging." Ensuing protests were only moderate inscale (with Quetta being an exception) and Information Minister Rashid called the strike "a totalfailure." (83) Candidates favored by Pakistan's ruling party appear to have fared quite well in all fourprovinces, and PML-Q gains were seen as a major boost for President Musharraf, who may have torely on the ruling party to win the presidency in 2007. Musharraf expressed satisfaction with "avictory for the moderates" and "a defeat for the extremists." However, one Pakistani analyst opinedthat the outcome would be unlikely to yield political harmony and had only exacerbated the senseof bitterness and alienation felt among opposition parties. Others warn that apparent irregularitiescould in fact harm Musharraf's image; a former Pakistani ambassador called the process a "typicallyvice-regal electoral exercise." (84) In February 2005, the U.S. State Department released its annual Country Reports on HumanRights Practices , which found that the Pakistan government's human rights record in 2004 "remainedpoor." The discussion of Pakistan, authored by State's Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, andLabor, does not contain the words "democracy" or "democratic," and notes that the right of citizensto change their government "was restricted in practice." A March 2005 State Department report onhuman rights and democracy claimed that Pakistan's political parties "are generally weak,undemocratic institutions centered on personalities instead of policies. The judiciary is corrupt,inefficient, and malleable to political pressure." In May 2005, the U.S. Commission on InternationalReligious Freedom released an annual report claiming that, "The response of the government ofPakistan to persistent and religiously motivated violence in Pakistan continues to be inadequate" andagain recommending Pakistan be designated a Country of Particular Concern. Islamabad rejects U.S.criticism of its human rights record, saying that "no country is perfect" and insisting that efforts areunderway to improve the situation. (85) Numerous independent observers identify major ongoing problems with Pakistan's humanrights situation in general and lack of full democracy in particular. In its Freedom in the World 2005 report, and for the sixth consecutive year, the often-cited Freedom House rated Pakistan as "not free"in the areas of political rights and civil liberties. Human rights groups have issued reports criticalof the military-dominated Musharraf government for its "violent repression" of opposition politicalrallies, for protecting its "grip" on the country's economic resources, especially land, and for usingPakistan's role in the "war on terrorism" to maintain an oppressive, nondemocratic hold on nationalpower. A coalition of Western human rights groups has chided the United States for providingmilitary aid to "states carrying out persistent human rights violations," including Pakistan. Pakistan'sleading human rights organization holds the government responsible for increasing violations ofbasic human rights and for failing to maintain law and order in the country. (86) Other developments in 2005 spurred Pakistan's secular opposition parties and independenthuman rights groups to accuse the Islamabad government of taking actions that contradict PresidentMusharraf's stated policy of "enlightened moderation." For example, in March, ruling partyparliamentarians allied with Islamists to reject legislation which sought to strengthen national lawsagainst "honor killings" (the murder of women determined to have shamed themselves and their families). Prime Minister Aziz's cabinet later called for a restoration of a religious column onPakistani passports, thus reversing an earlier decision to remove the column (Islamist politicians hadlaunched a campaign to protest the government's decision to exclude the column). (87) In April, police in the eastern city of Gujranwala clashed with Islamist protestors opposedto women's participation in a foot race there. Some 900 Islamist party supporters, reportedly busedinto the area from the North West Frontier Province, had attacked race participants with batons,Molotov cocktails, and other weapons. When a group of human rights activists later staged another"mixed marathon" including both men and women in Lahore, police used force to disperse them, anda former chairwoman of the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan was among those "brutallydragged" into police vans and detained for several hours. Some Pakistani observers saw in thegovernment's actions further evidence that the Islamist parties are able to exert great influence onIslamabad. (88) Also inMay, police in Islamabad and Lahore used batons to break up gatherings of journalists markingWorld Press Freedom Day, injuring nine and detaining 30 more. The arrests came hours afterPakistan's information minister told a seminar that the media were free in Pakistan. (89) The treatment of women in Pakistan has been scrutinized in 2005. During the House hearing,Secretary Rocca expressed dismay at travel restrictions placed on Pakistani gang rape victimMukhtaran Mai, a woman gang-raped at the order of a tribal council as punishment for relativelyminor alleged trespasses by her younger brother. A State Department spokesman later said, "TheUnited States expects Pakistan's leaders to honor their pledge to protect the basic human rights oftheir citizens, including freedom to travel." President Musharraf reportedly said he had imposedtravel restrictions on Mai to protect Pakistan's image from Western nongovernmental organizationswhich are "as bad as the Islamic extremists." A New York Times editorial chided Musharraf for hishandling of the case, which BBC News later called "a public relations disaster" and a leadingPakistani commentator called "a monumental blunder." (90) Facing criticism over this and other high-profile rape cases inhis country, Musharraf came to the U.N. General Assembly gathering in New York in September2005 with repairing Pakistan's image as one of his stated goals. However, his reported comment thatrape in Pakistan was a "money-making concern" brought waves of criticism from both Western andPakistani civil rights groups. (91) Adding to U.S. concerns about Pakistan's domestic political developments are signs of"Islamization" and anti-American sentiment there. Pakistanis are a pious people, many or most ofwhom are unlikely to want separation between Islam and governance: A 2004 survey found nearlytwo-thirds of citizens saying "religion should play a paramount role in politics" and only 6% seeingno role for religion in politics. (92) In June 2003, the Islamist coalition in the conservative NorthWest Frontier Province passed a Shariat bill in the provincial assembly, and the government ofBaluchistan later established an Islamist legal council. In July 2005, the NWFP assembly passed a"Hasba" (accountability) bill that many fear will create a parallel Islamic legal body and be harmfulto human rights. These efforts may seek to replicate in Pakistan the harsh enforcement of Islamiclaw seen in Afghanistan under the Taliban. Such developments alarm Pakistan's moderates andlikely elicited President Musharraf's August 2003 vow to "finish off religious extremism" (a vowrepeated in July 2005). (93) In August 2005, following a request from Musharraf that it rejectthe "Hasba" provisions, the Pakistan Supreme Court ruled that the controversial bill containedseveral unconstitutional clauses and blocked its implementation. Pakistan's Islamists routinely denounce Pakistani military operations in western tribal areas,resist government attempts to reform religious schools that teach militancy, and harshly criticizeIslamabad's cooperation with the U.S. government. One senior MMA leader went so far as tosuggest that Western governments may have "engineered" the 7/7 London bombings. (94) Most analysts contend thattwo December 2003 attempts to assassinate President Musharraf were carried out by Islamicmilitants angered by Pakistan's post-September 2001 policy shift. Yet Islamists' political influencein Pakistan's two western provinces is viewed by many as contingent upon the MMA's continuedbasic acceptance of the current political system. This leads some to a conclusion that the Islamists-- and Fazlur Rehman's JUI-F, in particular -- will not push against the Musharraf regime so far asto lose their own standing. By emitting a consistent message with little regard for the potential tooffend Pakistani government or foreign officials, the Islamists' issues resonate with the conservative,anti-Western sentiments of many Pakistanis. MMA power at the polling booth, however, continuesto be limited. (95) Anti-American sentiment among Pakistani citizens is not limited to Islamic groups: A July2005 Pew Center opinion poll found 51% of Pakistanis expressing confidence in Al Qaeda founderOsama bin Laden to "do the right thing in world affairs." An earlier Pew survey found only 6% ofPakistanis believing the United States was sincere in its efforts to combat terrorism; about halfviewed the United States as seeking to "dominate the world." The Pakistani army, which wassignificantly radicalized by Gen. Zia's policies in the 1980s, continues to be home to Muslimhardliners at the middle and lower ranks. In 2004 testimony before the Senate Foreign RelationsCommittee, one senior expert opined that "Pakistan is probably the most anti-American country inthe world right now, ranging from the radical Islamists on one side to the liberals and Westernizedelites on the other side." Support for this claim came from a June 2005 opinion poll which found23% of Pakistanis expressing a favorable view of the United States, the lowest percentage for anycountry surveyed. (96) The leadership of the MMA's two main constituents -- the Jamaat-i-Islami's (JI) Qazi HusseinAhmed and the Jamiat-Ulema-Islami (JUI)-Fazlur's Maulana Fazlur Rehman -- are notable for theirsometimes virulent anti-American rhetoric; they have at times called for "jihad" against what theyview as the existential threat to Pakistani sovereignty that alliance with Washington entails. (97) In addition to decryingand seeking to end President Musharraf's cooperation with the United States, many clerics also areviewed as opposing the U.S.-supported Kabul government. Despite their sometimes grating rhetoric,Pakistan's Islamists have benefitted greatly from Musharraf's undermining of the country'smainstream parties, and today the MMA can be considered a fairly cohesive political force thatcontinues to present a serious challenge to Musharraf's policies of moderation. (98) Musharraf repeatedly hascalled on Pakistan's Muslim clerics to assist in fighting extremism and improving Pakistan's imageas a moderate and progressive state. (99) Pakistan is among the world's top recipients of U.S. assistance, with more than $2.6 billionin U.S. aid allocated for FY2002-FY2005, including about $1.1 billion for security-related programs. In June 2003, President Bush hosted President Musharraf at Camp David, Maryland, where hepledged to work with Congress on establishing a five-year, $3 billion aid package for Pakistan tocover FY2005-FY2009. General Musharraf's extra-constitutional seizure of power in October 1999triggered penalties under Section 508 of the annual foreign assistance appropriations act, which bansnon-humanitarian U.S. assistance "to any country whose duly elected head of government is deposedby military coup or decree." (100) In October 2001 ( P.L. 107-57 ), Congress waived coup-relatedaid restrictions for FY2002 and granted the President waiver authority for FY2003. President Bushexercised this in March 2003. A November 2003 emergency supplemental appropriations bill ( P.L.108-106 ) included a provision extending the President's waiver authority through FY2004; this wasexercised in March 2004. In December 2004, Congress extended the President's waiver authoritythrough FY2006 with the passage the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004( P.L. 108-458 ). (101) Pending legislation in the 109th Congress (the Targeting Terrorists More Effectively Act of 2005, S. 12 ) includes Pakistan-specific language regarding "a number of critical issues thatthreaten to disrupt" U.S.-Pakistan relations. Government institutions, democracy, and rule of laware among these. Since August 2003, Pakistan and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID)have been cooperating on a five-year grant program to support more participatory, representative,and accountable democracy in Pakistan. Six "good governance" projects have been funded withmore than $32 million to date; the total over five years is expected to roughly double that amount. Three programs -- Strengthening National and Provincial Legislative Governance in Pakistan,Support Democratic Local Government and Decentralization, and Improve Justice Sector/LegalFramework -- account for the great majority of budgeted funds. According to USAID, the projectsaim to support Pakistan's progress toward more democratic, responsive, and transparent governanceby helping to strengthen legislative bodies, political parties, and civil society. (102) Figure 1. U.S. Assistance to Pakistan, FY2001-FY2005 and 2006Administration Request Sources : U.S. Department of State and U.S. Agency for International Development. Notes: FY2005 amounts are estimates; FY2006 amounts are requested. FY2005 amounts includeEmergency Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2005 ( P.L. 109-13 ) allocations of $150 million inForeign Military Financing and $4 million in additional counternarcotics funding for Pakistan. An acute concern of many U.S. policymakers is the issue of political succession in Pakistan,especially as it relates to potential domestic upheaval and control of that country's nucleararsenal. (103) Theconstitutionally designated successor to the President is the Chairman of the Senate, currently PML-Q member and Musharraf loyalist Muhammadmian Soomro, an international banker from awell-known Sindhi family. It is the President's prerogative to appoint Army Chiefs. The consensusview among analysts has the Pakistani military maintaining its substantive administration of thecountry in the event of President Musharraf's premature removal. The nature of such a potentialremoval likely would influence the scope and intensity of military governance. For example, ifMusharraf were removed through violent means, it is quite possible that the army would declaremartial law and rule directly for a period. In any case, it is widely assumed that the hierarchicalsolidarity and historic professionalism of Pakistan's military would result in its continuedeffectiveness as a stabilizing force, at least in the short- and perhaps middle-term. Despite theapparent sturdiness of the military's command structure, there remains widespread pessimism aboutthe ability of political institutions built by Musharraf to survive his sudden removal, and so doubtsremain about the viability of political succession mechanisms. Moreover, it is not clear thatMusharraf's successor would carry on his strongly pro-U.S. policies: in March 2005, DefenseIntelligence Director Jacoby told a Senate Armed Services Committee panel, "If Musharraf wereassassinated or otherwise replaced, Pakistan's leader would be less pro-U.S." (104) After his September 2001 policy shift, Musharraf moved to purge pro-Taliban Islamists fromthe higher ranks of the military. Vice-Chief of Army Staff (COAS) Gen. Mohammed Yusuf, amoderate, was seen as the most likely successor to the position of COAS, although some observersidentified the Chairman of the Joints Chiefs of Staff Committee, Gen. Mohammad Aziz, as acontender. While considered fully loyal to the army, of Pakistan's 30 highest-ranking officers, Gen.Aziz may have been the only remaining officer with meaningful links to Islamist groups. (105) Both Gen. Yusuf andGen. Aziz retired in October 2004. President Musharraf named two close allies to replace them: Lt. Gen. Ahsan Salim Hayat, the Karachi Corps Commander, is the new Vice-COAS and thesenior-most army officer after Musharraf; ISI chief Lt. Gen. Ehsan ul-Haq, a moderate who oversawthe removal of pro-Taliban officers from Pakistan's intelligence service after September 2001, wasappointed Chairman of the Joints Chiefs of Staff Committee. Gen. Hayat narrowly escapedassassination in a bloody June 2004 attack on his motorcade, an event that appeared to confirm hisstatus as an enemy of Islamic extremists. The newly promoted four-star general is believed to be oneof Musharraf's closest allies in the military and his most likely successor as Army Chief. (106) Outlook. There continues to be few signs thatthe government of President Musharraf and its supporters in parliament and the military will moveto relinquish power before scheduled 2007 general elections. A continuing lack of unity amongopposition groups remains a serious constraint on their ability to pressure the Musharraf-ledgovernment. Beyond obvious differences over the role religion should play in Pakistan's governance,the MMA and the ARD find themselves with opposing views on such sensitive issues as proposedamendments to the controversial blasphemy law and Hudood Ordinances (related to women's rights),both of which are criticized as unjust and oppressive by human rights groups, but which areconsidered sacrosanct by the Islamists. Some analysts identify less obvious factors behindopposition disunity, including an active campaign of "divide-and-rule" by the military, and previoushints of an accommodation between Musharraf and the ARD have not panned out. There are,however, signs that a below-board accommodation between the Pakistani military and the Islamistparties is disintegrating. (107) Pakistan's unstable and even deteriorating domestic security circumstances -- seen in stilltense relations with Pashtun tribesmen in border regions near Afghanistan, and continuing sectarianviolence and Islamic militancy in urban centers -- can have the effect of improving the army'sstanding among some sectors of the Pakistani public. One U.S. scholar suggests that criticism ofPakistan's apparently slow movement toward democracy is arbitrary and ignores the potential costto U.S. policy interests that faster movement might entail. Such cost could include a moreconstrained Pakistani military and political leaders in Islamabad whose greater responsiveness topublic opinion might mean reduced cooperation with the United States. (108) However, and as notedabove, this view is disputed by numerous observers who insist that the strengthening of Pakistan'sdemocratic institutions and civil society is itself a fundamental requirement for the creation of astable and prosperous Pakistani state. (109) Pakistan has come a long way since the 1990s, when "potential failed state" was not anunusual label for this important country. During President Musharraf's tenure, Pakistan'smacroeconomic indicators are greatly improved and relations with India have warmed. The country'sinternational standing is at least partially rehabilitated, especially with the government's status as akey member of the international anti-terrorism coalition. Even some of Musharraf's most vocalcritics have acknowledged the concrete benefits of his leadership. (110) Yet, despite thepotentially brightened prospects for future civilian governance in Pakistan, military rule substantivelycontinues, and most analysts foresee little or no power being transferred to the country's civilianpolitical leaders in the near- and middle-term. When, in May 2005, Musharraf declared his intention to seek to remain in office beyond2007, many analysts saw him following a nondemocratic path similar to that taken by previousPakistani military rulers. In the same month, a senior Pakistani journalist and editor declared onbehalf of his staff, "We are tired of pious lectures on democracy and constitutionalism" from officialswho pursue neither with sincerity. In addition, fewer and fewer independent onlookers findMusharraf's repeated pledges to defeat Pakistani religious extremism as anything more than"rounding up the usual suspects." (111) Pakistan's foreign and defense ministers have issued separateassurances that President Musharraf will contest 2007 elections as a civilian, but Musharraf himselfhas not ruled out remaining in uniform beyond 2007. (112) So long as the military continues to exert preeminent controlover Pakistan's governance -- and Islamist forces continue to succeed in blocking efforts to altercontroversial civil laws and reform religious schools -- there will be doubt cast on Musharraf's claimsto be pursuing a policy of "enlightened moderation." Policy Options. U.S. policy options regardingPakistan's governance system and civil society can be seen to fall into four broad categories: statusquo, increased pressure, increased incentives, and adjusting emphases of current aid programs. Some of the policies could be employed in tandem. Status quo: At present, the United States provides large-scale assistanceto Pakistan under annual waivers of coup-related sanctions granted by Congress and exercised bythe President. The Bush Administration has not issued strong public criticisms of Pakistan'sapparently halting process of democratization while still encouraging movement towardestablishment of full democracy. No conditions have been placed on U.S. aid to Pakistan. Acontinuation of this policy would seek to prod Pakistan's power brokers in the military to createcircumstances in which fully free and fair national and provincial elections could take place in 2007,at which point the U.S. President might be in a position to determine that Pakistani democracy hadbeen restored and Section 508 aid restrictions could permanently be removed. Continuedmarginalization of Pakistan's moderate opposition parties and controversy over reported irregularitiesin August 2005 municipal polls fuel skepticism that status quo policies areeffective. Increased Pressure: The United States has several options that would seekto increase pressure on the Pakistan government so as to spur more full and rapid movement ondemocratization in Pakistan. These include ending or reducing U.S. aid and/or placing conditionson continued U.S. aid, for instance by setting democracy-related benchmarks. Ending or reducingassistance to a Major Non-NATO Ally at a time when Pakistan plays a key role in U.S.-ledanti-terrorism efforts is likely to be counterproductive in the context of broader U.S. interests, somesay, and sanctions in the recent past resulted in greatly reduced U.S. influence in Islamabad and littlesuccess in attaining U.S. objectives. There are those who argue, however, that without conditionalityon U.S. aid, the Pakistani military will have little motivation to fully remove itself from Pakistan'sgovernance. Increased Incentives: Another option for U.S. policy would involveoffering additional aid to Pakistan linked to that country's progress with its domestic reform agenda(and perhaps also with its cooperation in counterterrorism and nonproliferation). Such incentivescould be for the benefit of the country generally or for the military in particular (many saw the March2005 decision by President Bush to resume F-16 sales to Pakistan as a "reward" for the Musharrafgovernment's cooperation on counterterrorism). For example, the future sale of major U.S. weaponsplatforms to Pakistan could be offered as a "bonus" that would follow successful implementation offull democracy in Islamabad or, short of that, for certain substantive actions on the path to that goal(e.g., the return to Pakistan of exiled opposition figures). This form of positive reenforcement couldbe employed in tandem with a policy of negative conditionality noted above. Adjusting Emphases of Current Aid Programs: President Bush's2005-2009 aid plan for Pakistan calls for a 50-50 split of funds for economics and funds for militaryfinancing. A policy of continuing current aid allocations while emphasizing economic aid overmilitary aid -- a policy recommended by a Council on Foreign Relations and the Asia Societytaskforce (113) -- couldserve to more effectively bolster Pakistan's social and economic development, and could quicken thepace of democratization and education reform there. Skeptics of this approach emphasize thatongoing security threats, especially as related to instability in neighboring Afghanistan, requireensuring that Pakistan's military feels secure and well-equipped. Given Pakistan's strategic setting, large Muslim population, experience with religiousextremism, weapons proliferation activities, and historical involvement in regional conflict, the levelof stability and quality of governance there are likely to remain of keen interest to most U.S.policymakers. Figure 2. Map of Pakistan

Summary: Pakistan is a strategically important country and home to one of the world's largest Muslimpopulations. In October 1999, Pakistan's Chief of Army Staff Gen. Pervez Musharraf replaced PrimeMinister Nawaz Sharif in a bloodless coup. Following the military overthrow of an electedgovernment, Islamabad faced considerable international opprobrium and was subjected to automaticcoup-related U.S. sanctions. The September 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States andMusharraf's ensuing withdrawal of support for the Afghan Taliban regime, however, had the effectof greatly reducing Pakistan's international isolation. Congress temporarily removed restrictions,and large-scale U.S. aid to the country resumed, in late 2001. The United States views Pakistan asa vital ally in the international anti-terrorism coalition. The Bush Administration refrains fromexpressing any significant public criticisms of Pakistan's internal political practices, while stillasserting that the strengthening of civilian political institutions in Islamabad is "a requirement forthe development of a stable, moderate Islamic state." While top-tier U.S. emphases in the region after September 2001 remain combating religiousextremism and ending illicit weapons proliferation, the United States expresses a strong interest inthe improvement of Pakistan's human rights situation, especially as regards the restoration andstrengthening of democratic institutions. There is a debate among analysts over the exigency of thisissue. Some observers urge patience, contending that a "true" democratic system will require timeand that "military-guided" governance is required in an unstable setting and to deter extremistpolitical influences. Others argue that Pakistan's underdeveloped democracy and rule of law arethemselves a central cause of the country's instability. October 2002 general elections nominally fulfilled President Musharraf's promise to restorethe National Assembly that was dissolved after his extra-constitutional seizure of power. Apro-military alliance won a plurality of seats while a coalition of Islamist parties made a surprisinglystrong showing. Yet subsequent developments -- including an agreement between Musharraf andthe Islamist opposition to bring controversial constitutional changes before Parliament, a brokenpromise from Musharraf to resign his military commission before 2005, and widespread accusationsof rigging in August 2005 municipal elections -- have fueled concerns that Pakistan's civiliandemocratic institutions are being weakened. National and provincial level elections are to take placein 2007. The 9/11 Commission Report called Musharraf's government the "best hope" for stability inPakistan and Afghanistan, and recommended the provision of long-term and comprehensive supportto Pakistan so long as its government remains committed to combating extremism and to a policyof "enlightened moderation." In passing the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of2004 ( P.L. 108-458 ), Congress broadly endorsed this recommendation and sought to encouragePakistan's transition to full democracy. The act also extended the President's authority to waivecoup-related sanctions on Pakistan through FY2006. See also CRS Issue Brief IB94041, Pakistan-U.S. Relations and CRS Report RL32259 , Terrorism in South Asia . This report will beupdated periodically.