Our March 2011 and February 2012 reports identified 6 areas across DHS where overlap or potential unnecessary duplication exists, and 17 specific actions that the department or Congress could take to address these areas. In our March 2011 report we suggested that DHS or Congress take 11 actions to address the areas of overlap or potential unnecessary duplication that we found. Of these 11 actions, 1 has been fully addressed, 4 have been partially addressed, and the remaining 6 have not been addressed. In many cases, the existence of overlap, potential unnecessary duplication, or fragmentation can be difficult to determine with precision due to a lack of data on programs and activities. Where information has not been available that would provide conclusive evidence of overlap, duplication, or fragmentation, we often refer to “potential unnecessary duplication.” In some cases, there is sufficient information available to show that if actions are taken to address individual issues, significant financial benefits may be realized. In other cases, precise estimates of the extent of potential unnecessary duplication, and the cost savings that can be achieved by eliminating any such unnecessary duplication, are difficult to specify in advance of congressional and executive-branch decision making. However, given the range of areas we identified at DHS and the magnitude of many of the programs, the cost savings associated with addressing these issues could be significant. Tables 1 and 2 summarize the areas of overlap and potential unnecessary duplication that we identified at DHS, the actions we identified for DHS and Congress to consider to address those areas, and the status of those actions. Our 2011 and 2012 annual reports also identified 9 areas describing other opportunities for DHS or Congress to consider taking action that could either reduce the cost of government operations or enhance revenue collection for the Treasury. We identified 23 specific actions that the department or Congress could take to address these areas. In our March 2011 report, we suggested that DHS or Congress take 11 actions to either reduce the cost of government operations or enhance revenue collection. Of these 11 actions, 1 has been fully addressed and 10 have been partially addressed. In some cases, there is sufficient information to estimate potential savings or other benefits if actions are taken to address individual issues. In other cases, estimates of cost savings or other benefits would depend upon what congressional and executive branch decisions were made, including how certain GAO recommendations are implemented. Additionally, information on program performance, the level of funding in agency budgets devoted to overlapping or fragmented programs, and the implementation costs that might be associated with program consolidations or terminations, are factors that could impact actions to be taken as well as potential savings. Tables 3 and 4 summarize the cost-savings and revenue enhancing areas that we reported on in March 2011 and February 2012. Our work at DHS has identified three key themes—leading and coordinating the homeland security enterprise, implementing and integrating management functions for results, and strategically managing risks and assessing homeland security efforts—that have impacted the department’s progress since it began operations. As these themes have contributed to challenges in the department’s management and operations, addressing them can result in increased efficiencies and effectiveness. For example, DHS can help reduce cost overruns and performance shortfalls by strengthening the management of its acquisitions, and reduce inefficiencies and costs for homeland security by improving its R&D management. These themes provide insights that can inform DHS’s efforts, moving forward, as it works to implement its missions within a dynamic and evolving homeland security environment. DHS made progress and has had successes in all of these areas, but our work found that these themes have been at the foundation of DHS’s implementation challenges, and need to be addressed from a department wide perspective to effectively and efficiently position DHS for the future and enable it to satisfy the expectations set forth by the Congress, the administration, and the country. Leading and coordinating the homeland security enterprise. While DHS is one of a number of entities with a role in securing the homeland, it has significant leadership and coordination responsibilities for managing efforts across the homeland security enterprise. To satisfy these responsibilities, it is critically important that DHS develop, maintain, and leverage effective partnerships with its stakeholders, while at the same time addressing DHS-specific responsibilities in satisfying its missions. Before DHS began operations, we reported that the quality and continuity of the new department’s leadership would be critical to building and sustaining the long-term effectiveness of DHS and achieving homeland security goals and objectives. We further reported that to secure the nation, DHS must form effective and sustained partnerships between components and also with a range of other entities, including federal agencies, state and local governments, the private and nonprofit sectors, and international partners. DHS has made important strides in providing leadership and coordinating efforts. For example, it has improved coordination and clarified roles with state and local governments for emergency management. DHS also strengthened its partnerships and collaboration with foreign governments to coordinate and standardize security practices for aviation security. However, DHS needs to take additional action to forge effective partnerships and strengthen the sharing and utilization of information, which has affected its ability to effectively satisfy its missions. For example, in July 2010, we reported that the expectations of private-sector stakeholders have not been met by DHS and its federal partners in areas related to sharing information about cyber-based threats to critical infrastructure. In 2005, we designated information-sharing for homeland security as high risk because the federal government faced serious challenges in analyzing information and sharing it among partners in a timely, accurate, and useful way.failure to link information about the individual who attempted to conduct the December 25, 2009, airline bombing, prevented the individual from being included on the federal government’s consolidated terrorist watchlist, a tool used by DHS to screen for persons who pose risks to the country. The federal government and DHS have made progress, but more work remains for DHS to streamline its information sharing mechanisms and better meet partners’ needs. Moving forward, it will be important that DHS continue to enhance its focus and efforts to strengthen and leverage the broader homeland security enterprise, and build off the important progress that it has made thus far. In addressing ever-changing and complex threats, and with the vast array of partners with whom DHS must coordinate, continued leadership and stewardship will be critical in achieving this end. GAO, High-Risk Series: An Update, GAO-11-278, (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 2011). acquisition and information technology management policies and controls, to provide enhanced guidance on investment decision making. DHS also reduced its financial management material weaknesses and developed strategies to strengthen human capital management. For example, in fiscal year 2011, DHS moved from a Disclaimer of Opinion to a Qualified Audit Opinion on its Balance Sheet and Statement of Custodial Activity for the first time since 2003. However, DHS has not been able to obtain an unqualified audit opinion on its consolidated financial statements (i.e., prepare a set of financial statements that are considered fairly presented) though its current goal is to receive an unqualified, or clean opinion, on the departmentwide consolidated financial statement for fiscal year 2013. DHS needs to continue to demonstrate sustainable progress in addressing its challenges, as these issues have contributed to schedule delays, cost increases, and performance problems in major programs aimed at delivering important mission capabilities. For example, we reported on numerous cost, schedule, and performance risks, and concluded that DHS had not economically justified its investment in the Secure Border Initiative Network, DHS’s border security technology program. More specifically, DHS did not adequately define requirements, perform testing, or oversee contractors, delaying security enhancements on the southwest border. After initiating a departmentwide assessment of the program, the Secretary of Homeland Security froze program funding and, at the completion of the assessment in January 2011, the Secretary decided to end the Secure Border Initiative Network as originally conceived after investing nearly $1 billion in the program. DHS also has not yet fully implemented its roles and responsibilities for developing and implementing key homeland security programs and initiatives. For example, FEMA has not yet developed a set of target capabilities for disaster preparedness or established metrics for assessing those capabilities to provide a framework for evaluating preparedness, as required by the Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act of 2006. Moreover, DHS does not yet have enough personnel with required skills to carry out activities in various areas, such as acquisition management; and is in the process of modernizing its financial management system, impacting its ability to have ready access to reliable information for informed decision making. Moving forward, addressing these management challenges will be critical for DHS’s success, as will be the integration of these functions across the department to achieve efficiencies and effectiveness. GAO, Aviation Security: DHS and TSA Have Researched, Developed, and Begun Deploying Passenger Checkpoint Screening Technologies, but Continue to Face Challenges, GAO-10-128 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 7, 2009). using nuclear and radiological materials through coordinated activities. However, the strategic plan for the architecture did not include some key components, such as funding needed to achieve the strategic plan’s objectives, or monitoring mechanisms for determining programmatic progress and identifying needed improvements. Further, DHS has made important progress in analyzing risk across sectors, but it has more work to do in using this information to inform planning and resource-allocation decisions. Risk management has been widely supported by Congress and DHS as a management approach for homeland security, enhancing the department’s ability to make informed decisions and prioritize resource investments. Since DHS does not have unlimited resources and cannot protect the nation from every conceivable threat, it must make risk-informed decisions regarding its homeland security approaches and strategies. Moreover, we have reported on the need for enhanced performance assessment, that is, evaluating existing programs and operations to determine whether they are operating as intended or are in need of change, across DHS’s missions.programs is critical for helping the department, Congress, and other stakeholders more systematically assess strengths and weaknesses and inform decision making. In recent years, DHS has placed an increased emphasis on strengthening its mechanisms for assessing the performance and effectiveness of its homeland security programs. For example, DHS established new performance measures, and modified existing ones, to better assess many of its programs and efforts. However, our work has found that DHS continues to miss opportunities to optimize performance across its missions due to a lack of reliable performance information or assessment of existing information; evaluation among possible alternatives; and, as appropriate, adjustment of programs or operations that are not meeting mission needs. For example, we reported that CBP had invested $2.4 billion in tactical infrastructure (fencing, roads, and lighting) along the southwest border, but could not measure the impact of this investment in tactical Information on the performance of infrastructure on border security. As the department further matures and seeks to optimize its operations, DHS will need to look beyond immediate requirements; assess programs’ sustainability across the long term, particularly in light of constrained budgets; and evaluate trade-offs within and among programs across the homeland security enterprise. Doing so should better equip DHS to adapt and respond to new threats in a sustainable manner as it works to address existing ones. Given DHS’s significant leadership responsibilities in securing the homeland, it is critical that the department’s programs and activities are operating as efficiently and effectively as possible, are sustainable, and that they continue to mature, evolve, and adapt to address pressing security needs. Since it began operations in 2003, DHS has implemented key homeland security operations and achieved important goals and milestones in many areas. These accomplishments are especially noteworthy given that the department has had to work to transform itself into a fully functioning cabinet department while implementing its missions—a difficult undertaking for any organization and one that can take years to achieve even under less-daunting circumstances. However, our work has shown that DHS can take actions to reduce overlap and potential unnecessary duplication to improve the efficiency of its operations and achieve cost-savings in several areas. Further, while DHS has made progress, additional actions are needed to strengthen partnerships with stakeholders, improve its management processes and share information, and enhance its risk management and performance- measurement efforts to enhance effectiveness and achieve efficiencies throughout the department. Chairman McCaul, Ranking Member Keating, and Members of the Subcommittee, this concludes my prepared testimony. I would be pleased to respond to any questions that members of the Subcommittee may have. For further information regarding this testimony, please contact Cathleen A. Berrick at (202) 512-3404 or berrickc@gao.gov. In addition, contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this statement. Individuals who made key contributions to this testimony are Chris Currie, Emily Gunn, and Taylor Matheson. Key contributors for the previous work that this testimony is based on are listed within each individual product. This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the United States. The published product may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety without further permission from GAO. However, because this work may contain copyrighted images or other material, permission from the copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to reproduce this material separately.

Summary: The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, led to profound changes in government agendas, policies, and structures to confront homeland security threats facing the nation. Most notably, DHS began operations in 2003 with missions that included preventing terrorist attacks in the United States, reducing the nations vulnerability to terrorism, and minimizing damages from attacks. DHS is now the third-largest federal department, with more than 200,000 employees, and has an annual budget of almost $60 billion. Since 2003, GAO has issued over 1,200 products on DHSs operations in such areas as transportation security and emergency management, among others. Moreover, GAO has reported that overlap and fragmentation among government programs, including DHS, can cause potential unnecessary duplication, and reducing it could save billions of tax dollars annually and help agencies provide more efficient and effective services. As requested, this testimony addresses (1) opportunities for DHS to reduce potential unnecessary duplication in its programs, save tax dollars, and enhance revenue, and (2) crosscutting and management issues that have affected DHSs implementation efforts. This testimony is based on GAO reports issued from March 2011 through February 2012. In March 2011 and February 2012, GAO reported on 6 areas where the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) or Congress could take action to reduce overlap and potential unnecessary duplication, and 9 areas to achieve cost-savings. Of the 22 actions GAO suggested be taken in March 2011 to address such issues, 2 were fully implemented, 14 were partially implemented, and 6 have not been addressed. GAOs February 2012 report identified 18 additional actions to address overlap, potential duplication, and costs savings. In September 2011, GAO reported on three key themes that should be addressed to enhance the effectiveness and efficiency of DHSs operations. Leading and coordinating the homeland security enterprise. DHS has made important strides in providing leadership and coordinating efforts among its stakeholders. However, DHS needs to take additional action to forge effective partnerships and strengthen the sharing and utilization of information, which has affected its ability to effectively satisfy its missions, such as sharing information with private sector stakeholders on cyber-based threats to critical infrastructure. Implementing and integrating management functions for results. DHS has enhanced its management functions, and has plans to further strengthen the management of the department. However, DHS has not always effectively executed or integrated these functions, which has contributed to schedule delays, cost increases, and performance issues in a number of programs aimed at delivering important mission capabilities, such as border security technologies. Strategically managing risks and assessing homeland security efforts. While progress has been made, limited strategic and program planning and limited assessment to inform approaches and investment decisions have contributed to DHS programs not meeting strategic needs in an efficient manner, such as the lack of risk based plans for deploying aviation security technologies. While this testimony contains no new recommendations, GAO previously made about 1,600 recommendations to DHS. The department has addressed about half of them, has efforts to address others, and has taken action to strengthen its operations.