Allegations of abuse of Iraqi prisoners by U.S. soldiers at the Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq raisequestions about the applicability of the law of war to interrogations for military intelligencepurposes. Particular issues involve the level of protection to which the detainees are entitled underthe Geneva Conventions of 1949. After photos of prisoner abuse became public, the DefenseDepartment (DOD) released a series of documents disclosing policy deliberations about appropriatetechniques for interrogating persons the Administration had deemed to be unprotected by the GenevaConventions with respect to the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT). (1) Investigations related to theallegations at Abu Ghraib revealed that some of the techniques discussed for "unlawful combatants"had come into use in Iraq, although none of the prisoners there was deemed to be an unlawfulcombatant. This report outlines the provisions of the Conventions as they apply to prisoners of war andto civilians, and the minimum level of protection offered by Common Article 3 of the GenevaConventions. The report analyzes key terms that govern the treatment of prisoners with respect tointerrogation, which include torture, coercion, and cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment. Finally,the report discusses and analyzes the various interrogation techniques approved or considered foruse during interrogations of prisoners at Abu Ghraib. Gathering of military intelligence has always been a top priority for belligerents, and capturedenemy soldiers could be expected to have at least some knowledge pertinent to militaryoperations. (2) As aconsequence, prisoners of war (POWs) can expect to be questioned by their captors, who can beexpected to employ whatever means are available to them for extracting such information. Possiblydue in part to the inherent interest of belligerents both in procuring intelligence information and inprotecting their own information and soldiers, ground rules developed for fair play in exploiting theintelligence value of captives. The emergence of "total war" in the twentieth century increased themilitary utility of economic data, industrial secrets, and other information about the enemy that incenturies past might have been of little interest to warriors, increasing the intelligence valuedetainees might have, but not necessarily improving their treatment. (3) The ill-treatment of prisoners of war, even for the purpose of eliciting information deemedvital to self-defense, has long been considered a violation of the law of war, albeit one that isfrequently honored in the breach. (4) The practice was understood to be banned prior to the AmericanCivil War. The Lieber Code, (5) adopted by the Union Army to codify the law of war as it thenexisted, explained: "Honorable men, when captured, will abstain fromgiving to the enemy, information concerning their own army, and the modern law of war permits nolonger the use of any violence against prisoners in order to extort the desired information or topunish them for having given false information" (Art. 80). The Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (GPW) (6) Article 17, paragraph 4provides the general rule for interrogation of prisoners of war: No physical or mental torture, nor any other form ofcoercion, may be inflicted on prisoners of war to secure from them information of any kind whatever.Prisoners of war who refuse to answer may not be threatened, insulted, or exposed to unpleasant ordisadvantageous treatment of any kind. This language replaced a provision in the 1929 Geneva Convention that stated "[n]o pressureshall be exerted on prisoners to obtain information regarding the situation in their armed forces ortheir country." (7) According to the ICRC Commentary, (8) the many violations that occurred during World War II led draftersof the 1949 Convention to expand the provision to cover "information of any kind whatever," andby "prohibiting not only 'coercion' but also 'physical or mental torture.'" (9) The provision does notprohibit the detaining power from seeking any particular kind of information, but prohibits only themethods mentioned. (10) Coercion is also prohibited to elicit confessions from prisoners of war to be used against them attrial. (11) Other articles that apply at all times during captivity are also relevant. They suggest thatprisoners of war may not be singled out for special treatment based on the suspicion that they mayhave valuable information. Article 13 provides, in part, that "[p]risoners of war must at all times behumanely treated" (12) and they "must at all times be protected, particularly against acts of violence or intimidation..."Furthermore, it describes as a "serious breach" of the GPW "[a]ny unlawful act or omission by theDetaining Power causing death or seriously endangering the health of a prisoner of war in itscustody." Article 14 states that "[p]risoners of war are entitled in all circumstances to respect for theirpersons and their honor." (13) Reprisal against prisoners of war is explicitly prohibited in Article 13. Article 16 requires thatall prisoners of war must be treated equally: Taking into consideration the provisions of the presentConvention relating to rank and sex, and subject to any privileged treatment which may be accordedto them by reason of their state of health, age or professional qualifications, all prisoners of war shallbe treated alike by the Detaining Power, without any adverse distinction based on race, nationality,religious belief or political opinions, or any other distinction founded on similar criteria. Article 16 does not prohibit more favorable treatment (14) Article 25 provides for a minimum level of living conditions, suggesting that themanipulation of environmental conditions below these standards is not permitted: Prisoners of war shall be quartered under conditions asfavourable as those for the forces of the Detaining Power who are billeted in the same area. The saidconditions shall make allowance for the habits and customs of the prisoners and shall in no case beprejudicial to their health. .... The premises provided for the use of prisoners of war individually orcollectively, shall be entirely protected from dampness and adequately heated and lighted, inparticular between dusk and lights out. Articles 21 and 22 address physical conditions of confinement, and do not appear to allowthe placement of prisoners in solitary confinement in order to prepare them for interrogation. Article21 provides: Subject to the provisions of the present Conventionrelative to penal and disciplinary sanctions, prisoners of war may not be held in close confinementexcept where necessary to safeguard their health and then only during the continuation of thecircumstances which make such confinement necessary. Article 22 provides: Prisoners of war interned in unhealthy areas, or wherethe climate is injurious for them, shall be removed as soon as possible to a more favourable climate.The Detaining Power shall assemble prisoners of war in camps or camp compounds according totheir nationality, language and customs, provided that such prisoners shall not be separated fromprisoners of war belonging to the armed forces with which they were serving at the time of theircapture, except with their consent. The first important modern effort to protect civilians in occupied territory is reflected inHague Convention IV of 1907 and its accompanying Regulations. (15) Article 44 forbids theoccupying power "to force the inhabitants of territory occupied by it to furnish information about thearmy of the other belligerent, or about its means of defense." In 1949, the treatment of enemycivilians was addressed for the first time in a separate instrument, the Fourth Geneva Convention("GC"). (16) The GC governs the treatment of civilians who fall into the hands of the enemy, includingthose residing in the territory of that power as enemy aliens and the civilian population of occupiedterritory. Civilians in occupied territory are "protected persons" under the fourth Geneva Convention("GC"), and are entitled under article 27 "in all circumstances, to respect for their persons, theirhonor, their family rights, their religious convictions and practices, and their manners andcustoms." (17) While anoccupying power is permitted to "take such measures of control and security in regard to protectedpersons as may be necessary as a result of the war," Article 27 provides further that "[t]hey shall atall times be humanely treated, and shall be protected especially against all acts of violence or threatsthereof and against insults and public curiosity." Article 32 forbids any "measure of such a characteras to cause the physical suffering or extermination of protected persons in their hands. . . [including]not only . . . murder, torture, corporal punishment, mutilation and medical or scientific experimentsnot necessitated by the medical treatment of a protected person but also to any other measures ofbrutality whether applied by civilian or military agents." Reprisals against protected persons andtheir property are prohibited. Civilians may be detained or interned by an occupying power only if "security requirementsmake such a course absolutely necessary." (GC art. 42). (18) Article 5 provides for the detention of civilians who pose adefinite threat to the security of the occupying power: Where in occupied territory an individual protectedperson is detained as a spy or saboteur, or as a person under definite suspicion of activity hostile tothe security of the Occupying Power, such person shall, in those cases where absolute militarysecurity so requires, be regarded as having forfeited rights of communication under the presentConvention. In each case, such persons shall nevertheless be treatedwith humanity and, in case of trial, shall not be deprived of the rights of fair and regular trialprescribed by the present Convention. They shall also be granted the full rights and privileges of aprotected person under the present Convention at the earliest date consistent with the security of theState or Occupying Power, as the case may be. Internment or assigned residence is the most severe measure allowed in the cases of protectedcivilians who pose a definite security threat (GC art. 41(1)), and these measures are to be reviewedby a court or administrative board at least twice annually. (GC art. 43). Article 31 addresses interrogation explicitly. It provides that "[n]o physical or moral coercionshall be exercised against protected persons, in particular to obtain information from them or fromthird parties." (19) Inaddition, protected persons may not be held as hostages, which would appear to preclude anoccupying power from detaining civilians as a method of persuading others to cooperate in providinginformation about possible threats to the security. Protected civilians may be imprisoned as a punitive measure only after a regular trial, subjectto the protections in articles 64 through 77. Additionally, article 33 provides that "[c]ivilians maynot be punished for an offence he or she has not personally committed," and prohibits all forms ofcollective penalties and intimidation. Article 100 addresses discipline in internment camps: The disciplinary regime in places of internment shallbe consistent with humanitarian principles, and shall in no circumstances include regulationimposing on internees any physical exertion dangerous to their health or involving physical or moralvictimization. Identification by tattooing or imprinting signs on the body is prohibited. In particular,prolonged standing and roll-calls, punishment drills, military drill and maneuver, or the reductionof food rations, are prohibited. Like prisoners of war, protected civilians are entitled to equal treatment, "[w]ithout prejudiceto the provisions relating to their state of health, age and sex, all protected persons shall be treatedwith the same consideration by the Party to the conflict in whose power they are, without any adversedistinction based, in particular, on race, religion or political opinion." The 1949 Geneva Conventions share several types of common provisions. The first threearticles of each Convention are identical. Common Article 3 provides minimal rules applicable to"armed conflicts not of an international character occurring in the territory of one of the HighContracting Parties." It provides that each Party to the conflict shall be bound to apply, as aminimum, the following provisions: 1. Persons taking no active part in the hostilities,including members of armed forces who have laid down their arms and those placed hors de combatby sickness, wounds, detention, or any other cause, shall in all circumstances be treated humanely,without any adverse distinction founded on race, colour, religion or faith, sex, birth or wealth, or anyother similar criteria. To this end, the following acts are and shall remainprohibited at any time and in any place whatsoever with respect to the above-mentioned persons: (a) Violence to life and person, in particular murder ofall kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment and torture; (b) Taking of hostages; (c) Outrages upon personal dignity, in particularhumiliating and degrading treatment; 2. The wounded and sick shall be collected and caredfor. . . . Common Article 3 has been described as "a convention within a convention" to provide a generalformula covering respect for intrinsic human values that would always be in force, without regardto the characterization the parties to a conflict might give it. (20) Originally a compromisebetween those who wanted to extend POW protection to all insurgents and rebels and those whowanted to limit it to soldiers fighting on behalf of a recognized State, Common Article 3 is nowwidely considered to have attained the status of customary international law. (21) The prohibition againstill-treatment applies during interrogations. (22) Despite the absolute-sounding provisions described above, whether certain techniquesemployed by interrogators are per se violations of the Geneva Convention remains subject to debate. Presumably, all aspects of prisoner treatment fall into place along a continuum that ranges frompampering to abject torture. The line between what is permissible and what is not remainselusive. (23) Tocomplicate matters, interrogators may employ more than one technique simultaneously, and thecourts and tribunals that have evaluated claims of prisoner abuse have generally ruled on the totalityof treatment without specifying whether certain conduct alone would also be impermissible. Notsurprisingly, governments may view conduct differently depending on whether their soldiers are theprisoners or the interrogators, and may be unwilling to characterize any conduct on the part of theadversary as lawful. Human rights advocates may tend to interpret the treaty language in a strictlytextual fashion, while governments who may have a need to seek information from prisoners appearto rely on more flexible interpretations that take into account military operational requirements. Nonetheless, it may be possible to identify some threshold definitions. The following sections explore relevant terms that provide boundaries for the conduct of aDetaining Power under the Geneva Convention with respect to prisoners of war, civilian internees,and other detainees. Torture. Torture is proscribed by all four of theGeneva Conventions and their additional Protocols, (24) as well as customary international law. (25) Torture, which can beeither mental or physical, is not explicitly defined in the Conventions. Modern tribunals may lookto the United Nations Convention Against Torture ("CAT") (26) for a definition of torture: For the purposes of this Convention, the term "torture"means any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionallyinflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him or a third person information or aconfession, punishing him for an act he or a third person has committed or is suspected of havingcommitted, or intimidating or coercing him or a third person, or for any reason based ondiscrimination of any kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or withthe consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity. It doesnot include pain or suffering arising only from, inherent in or incidental to lawfulsanctions (27) The International Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) has identified the followingelements of the crime of torture in a situation of armed conflict: (i) . . . the infliction, by act or omission, of severe painor suffering, whether physical or mental; in addition (ii) this act or omission must be intentional; (iii) it must aim at obtaining information or aconfession, or at punishing, intimidating, humiliating or coercing the victim or a third person, or atdiscriminating, on any ground, against the victim or a third person; (iv) it must be linked to an armed conflict. . . . (28) Physical Torture. The U.S. Army Field Manual (FM)34-52, Intelligence Interrogation (29) ("FM 34-52") lists the following as examples of physical torture:electric shock; infliction of pain through chemicals or bondage (other than legitimate use of restraintsto prevent escape); forcing an individual to stand, sit, or kneel in abnormal positions for prolongedperiods of time; food deprivation; and any form of beating. (30) The International Military Tribunal for the Far East (IMTFE) found that Japanese soldiershad used the following forms of torture: water treatment, burning, electric shocks, the knee spread,suspension, kneeling on sharp instruments and flogging. (31) The U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia found thatU.S. POWs during the First Gulf War were tortured in Iraq: The torture inflicted included severe beatings, mockexecutions, threatened castration, and threatened dismemberment. The POWs were systematicallystarved, denied sleep, and exposed to freezing cold. They were denied medical care and theirexisting injuries were intentionally aggravated. They were shocked with electrical devices andconfined in dark, filthy conditions exposing them to contagion and infection. The POWs sufferedserious physical injuries, including broken bones, perforated eardrums, nerve damage, infections,nausea, severe weight loss, massive bruises, and otherinjuries. (32) In the context of a non-international war, the conflict in the former Yugoslavia, frequentexamples of torture were said to include "beating, sexual violence, prolonged denial of sleep, food,hygiene, and medical assistance, as well as threats to torture, rape, or kill relatives. . ." (33) Mental Torture. According to FM 34-52, examplesof mental torture include mock executions, abnormal sleep deprivation, and chemically inducedpsychosis. (34) TheInternational Military Tribunal for the Far East noted in its judgement of the major Japanese warcriminals after World War II that mental torture had been commonly employed, (35) and cited the case of theDoolittle fliers to illustrate what mental torture entailed: After having been subjected to the various other formsof torture, they were taken one at a time and marched blindfolded a considerable distance. The victimcould hear voices and marching feet, then the noise of a squad halting and lowering their rifles asif being formed to act as a firing squad. A Japanese officer then came up to the victim and said: "Weare Knights of the Bushido of the Order of the Rising Sun; We do not execute at sundown; weexecute at sunrise." The victim was then taken back to his cell and informed that unless he talkedbefore sunrise, he would be executed. (36) A more recent example of mental torture, as found by a U.S. court, involved the treatmentof American POWs by Iraqi agents during the 1991 Gulf War: Iraqi agents caused the POWs to experience severemental anguish by falsely reporting that they had killed Americans, including a pilot's wingman,other American POWs, and the President of the United States. The POWs suffered from knowingthe agony that their families were enduring because the Iraqi authorities refused to inform thefamilies that the POWs were alive. (37) According to the ICTY, the following treatment may amount to mental torture: For instance, the mental suffering caused to anindividual who is forced to watch severe mistreatment inflicted on a relative would rise to the levelof gravity required under the crime of torture. [B]eing forced to watch serious sexual attacksinflicted on a female acquaintance was torture for the forced observer. The presence of onlookers,particularly family members, also inflicts severe mental harm amounting to torture on the personbeing raped. (38) Physical / Mental Suffering. Not all physical ormental suffering amounts to torture. While most people would likely accept that severe physicalbeatings or conduct such as electrocution and intentional cigarette burns amount to torture, relativelyless physically brutal conduct, what might be described as psychological pressure (threats, verbalintimidation) and non-impact physical abuse (forcing detainee to remain in an uncomfortableposition for a prolonged period) invite greater debate. Most forms of physical or psychologicalpressure are susceptible of being applied with varying degrees of intensity or duration. Relativelyhumane-sounding techniques applied at great length or in combination could cause physical andmental suffering that might be characterized as torture. (39) Distinguishing between physical and mental forms of pressuremay not be particularly helpful in determining whether torture has occurred. (40) Physical abuse may causemental suffering that outlasts the physical suffering. Non-violent physical methods (playing loudmusic), especially over an extended period of time may cause physical as well as psychologicalsuffering. Some victims may be more susceptible to certain types of pressure and thereforeexperience suffering that might not affect another. Permanent injury is not required. (41) According to the ICTY [T]he severity of the pain or suffering is a distinguishingcharacteristic of torture that sets it apart from similar offences. A precise threshold for determiningwhat degree of suffering is sufficient to meet the definition of torture has not been delineated. Inassessing the seriousness of any mistreatment, the Trial Chamber must first consider the objectiveseverity of the harm inflicted. Subjective criteria, such as the physical or mental effect of thetreatment upon the particular victim and, in some cases, factors such as the victim's age, sex, or stateof health will also be relevant in assessing the gravity of the harm. (42) For Interrogation Purposes. Some experts take theposition that the purpose of eliciting information from the victim is a necessary element of torture,and that behavior that is cruel and causes suffering, but does not entail coercion to elicit a confessionor information, is not torture. (43) Others take the view that cruel treatment for other purposes, oreven for no purpose, can constitute torture. (44) Under the Geneva Conventions, it appears to matter littlewhether certain treatment is described as torture; the Conventions protect against treatment that iscruel, inhumane, and degrading even if such treatment does not amount to torture. Coercion. The Geneva Conventions do not definecoercion. Their prohibition against coercion may vary somewhat depending on the status of theperson undergoing interrogation. In the case of protected civilians, "[n]o physical or moral coercionshall be exercised against [them], in particular to obtain information from them or from thirdparties." (45) Prisonersof war, on the other hand, may be subjected to no coercion of any kind , nor can they be "threatened,insulted, or exposed to unpleasant or disadvantageous treatment." The conclusion might be drawnthat some other kind of coercion, neither moral nor physical, may be permissible with respect tocivilians but not for POWs. Perhaps "moral" coercion is distinct from "mental" coercion. However,we have found no references purporting to describe techniques in this category. Common Article 3does not explicitly forbid coercion. The essence of coercion is the compulsion of a person by a superior force, often agovernment, to do or refrain from doing something involuntarily. The intentional application of anunlawful force that robs a person of free will is coercive. However, circumstances that cause a personto reevaluate a course of action, even if deception is instrumental, may arguably be non-coercivepressure. Under the interpretation set forth in FM 34-52, "physical or mental torture and coercionrevolve around the elimination of the source's free will." (46) These activities, along with "brainwashing," are not authorized,it explains, but are not to be confused with the psychological techniques and ruses presented in themanual. FM 34-52 includes in the definition of mental coercion "drugs that may induce lasting andpermanent mental alteration and damage." This appears to reflect a change from earlier doctrine,which prohibited the use of any drugs on prisoners unless required for medical purposes. (47) In the context of U.S. criminal law, coercion is usually asserted as a defense to a crime (48) or as an element of a crime,or to render a confession inadmissible in court as involuntary. The standards differ depending onthe purpose. To assert coercion as a defense to a criminal charge, a defendant generally has to showa well-grounded fear of imminent injury or death. (49) On the other hand, a confession is the product of coercion if adefendant's "'will was overborne' or if his confession was not 'the product of a rational intellect anda free will.'" (50) Prolonged questioning has been held to be inherently coercive, (51) as has incommunicadodetention (52) andinterrogation by a psychiatrist trained in hypnosis, (53) the use of violence, (54) threats, (55) and other mental "modes of persuasion." (56) The standards that apply in criminal cases, however, probably do not apply to a determinationof coercion under the Geneva Conventions. (57) The pertinent question appears to be whether the person subjectto treatment designed to influence his conduct is able to exercise a choice and complies willingly orhas no choice other than to comply. Asserting coercion by the enemy as a defense to treason or aiding the enemy has not beenfruitful; courts have tended to apply the same test that would govern in other criminal cases. (58) In the post-WWII treasonprosecution of Iva Ikuko Toguri D'Aquino (Tokyo Rose), the court stated its belief that despite thehostilities: there was no occasion for departing from the ordinaryrules applicable to the defense of duress and coercion. We know of no rule that would permit onewho is under the protection of an enemy to claim immunity from prosecution for treason merely bysetting up a claim of mental fear of possible future action on the part of the enemy. We think that thecitizen owing allegiance to the United States must manifest a determination to resist commands andorders until such time as he is faced with the alternative of immediate injury or death. Were any otherrule to be applied, traitors in the enemy country would by that fact alone be shielded from anyrequirement of resistance. The person claiming the defense of coercion and duress must be a personwhose resistance has brought him to the last ditch. (59) However, the failure of an asserted coercion defense does not mean that the behavior givingrise to the claim is lawful. Acts intended to coerce need not succeed to meet the definition ofcoercion as an element of a crime. (60) In the case of prisoners held by the Chinese during the KoreanWar, courts referred to conditions in the prisoner of war camps as brutal and inhumane, in violationor international law. The conditions under which American prisoners of warin Korea were required to live were at best abominable and at worst intolerable. During the earlystages, lack of adequate food, clothing, housing, and medical service resulted in a death rate whichbespeaks man's inhumanity to man. Nevertheless, the accused was not subjected to any discomfortswhich were not shared by his comrades, and if his lot was harsh, so was theirs. . . . It goes withoutsaying that all men cannot stand firm against torture, physical violence, starvation or psychologicalmistreatment. But in this instance, the record discloses that the accused weakened when others stoodfast, and it does not reveal that he was compelled to sacrifice his countrymen because of the use ofthose influences. (61) Yet soldiers who succumbed to the ill-treatment and collaborated with the enemy were unsuccessfulin asserting the defense of coercion. The infliction of any type of physical or mental suffering that would amount to torture wouldalmost certainly qualify as "coercion." However, States have sought to find methods of applying"pressure" to convince a detainee that cooperation would be in his best interest, thereby persuadinghim to disclose information voluntarily. It may be useful to consider theories about coercion fromthe field of counterintelligence. Non-coercive Interrogation. According to a 1963 CIAmanual (62) oninterrogation: The term non-coercive is used . . . to denote methodsof interrogation that are not based upon the coercion of an unwilling subject through the employmentof superior force originating outside himself. However, the non-coercive interrogation is notconducted without pressure. On the contrary, the goal is to generate maximum pressure, or at leastas much as is needed to induce compliance. The difference is that the pressure is generated insidethe interrogatee. His resistance is sapped, his urge to yield is fortified, until in the end he defeatshimself. (63) The manual describes the following techniques for non-coercive counterintelligenceinterrogation: "Nobody Loves You" (pointing out that all of the information about an interrogationsubject has come from persons other than himself, eliciting a desire to tell his side of the story); "TheAll-Seeing Eye (or Confession is Good for the Soul)" (by manipulating information already knownabout the subject, the interrogator can convince a subject that all his secrets are already out and thatfurther lies would be futile or even counterproductive); (64) "The Informer" (planting an informant as the source'scellmate); (65) "Newsfrom Home" (allowing a detainee to receive carefully selected letters from home); (66) "The Witness" (bringingan alleged witness with knowledge of subject's misdeeds within the subject's view to create a desireto refute charges); (67) "Joint Suspects" (causing the subject to believe that another person involved in the crime is tryingto throw all blame upon the subject); (68) "Ivan Is a Dope" (pointing out that the adversary is incompetentor ignores the welfare of its agents, but that the interrogator's entity will treat the subject better); (69) "Joint Interrogators" (goodcop/bad cop routine: the brutal, angry, domineering interrogator contrasted with the friendly, quietinterrogator, with multiple variations). (70) Coercive Interrogation. Coercive methods, accordingto the same CIA manual, "are designed not only to exploit the resistant source's internal conflicts andinduce him to wrestle with himself but also to bring a superior outside force to bear upon thesubject's resistance." Further, it noted, "[a]ll coercive techniques are designed to induce regression,"which is described as "the loss of those defenses most recently acquired by civilized man:. . . thecapacity to carry out the highest creative activities, to meet new, challenging, and complex situations,to deal with trying interpersonal relations, and to cope with repeated frustrations." These functions,it posited, could be impaired through the use of "relatively small degrees of homeostaticderangement, fatigue, pain, sleep loss, or anxiety" (71) to bring about the typical response to coercion: "debility,dependency, and dread." (72) The following were named as the "principal coercive techniquesof interrogation: arrest, detention, deprivation of sensory stimuli through solitary confinement orsimilar methods, threats and fear, debility, pain, heightened suggestibility and hypnosis, narcosis [useof drugs], and induced regression." (73) Inhumane or Degrading Treatment. The prohibition of inhumane treatment of prisoners of war was already understood to be partof the law of war during the 19th century. Art. 56 of the Lieber Code provided: A prisoner of war is subject to no punishment for beinga public enemy, nor is any revenge wreaked upon him by the intentional infliction of any suffering,or disgrace, by cruel imprisonment, want of food, by mutilation, death, or any otherbarbarity. Both the Union and Confederate governments accused the other of inhumane treatment of prisonersof war. The North was accused of exposing prisoners of war to cold weather as well as deprivationof adequate food, clothing, and fuel. (74) The South was accused of "subjecting [prisoners of war] totorture and great suffering, by confining in unhealthy and unwholesome quarters, by exposing to theinclemency of winter and to the dews and burning sun of summer, by compelling the use of impurewater, and by furnishing insufficient and unwholesome food," as well as using bloodhounds to trackescaped prisoners, thereby allowing recaptured prisoners to be "cruelly and inhumanly injured." (75) The barbarities complained of during the Civil War were repeated or multiplied duringsubsequent wars, despite the inclusion of provisions in treaties to protect prisoners of war. (76) The ICRC Commentaryto the Geneva Conventions views humane treatment as the fundamental theme running throughoutthe Convention. (77) GPW art. 13 is viewed as embodying the principal elements of humane treatment. (78) Paragraph 1 of article 13requires that POWs "at all times be humanely treated." (79) It goes on to identify as inhumane any "unlawful act or omissionby the Detaining Power causing death or seriously endangering the health of a prisoner of war,""physical mutilation or to [unjustified] medical or scientific experiments" and exposure to "acts ofviolence or intimidation and against insults and public curiosity." "Inhuman treatment" is definedin GPW art. 130 to constitute a grave breach of the Convention. (80) The prohibition on "acts of violence or intimidation and against insults and public curiosity"appears to have resulted from the World War II practice in Europe and the Far East of paradingcaptive soldiers through the streets for propaganda purposes. (81) The ICRC has interpretedGPW art. 13 to prohibit the public display of prisoners through the news media. The ICRC considersthe use of any image "that makes a prisoner of war individually recognizable" to be a violation,because the condition of being taken prisoner might be considered degrading or humiliating in itself,and that representations of captives could also have an impact on families. (82) The Department ofDefense interprets the provision to protect POWs from being filmed or photographed in such amanner that viewers would be able to recognize the prisoner. Photos and videos depicting POWswith their faces covered or their identities otherwise disguised does not, in the view of theDepartment of Defense, violate GPW art. 13. Other experts would make an exception for reportingon prisoners and their conditions of captivity, in order to enforce international humanitarian law andto improve their conditions in captivity. (83) However, it appears to be well-accepted that broadcastingimages of POWs for humiliation or propaganda purposes is inhumane. (84) Other examples of treatment deemed degrading or humiliating in the context of the GenevaConventions include urinating on POWs and forcing them to undergo inspections of their genitalsto determine if they were Jewish (Gulf War I), (85) forcing captured Royal Marines to lie down on the ground forthe benefit of television cameras (Falklands War), (86) and the Communist practices for indoctrinating POWs andpressuring them to sign confessions. (87) Acts causing severe humiliation or degradation may rise to thelevel of "outrages upon human dignity." (88) Belligerents have sometimes argued that certain prisoners are not entitled to protection underthe laws of war and relevant treaties, and that such prisoners might be subjected to harsher treatmentthan that accorded to prisoners of war. For example, during the Civil War, the Union initiallypromised to treat Confederate soldiers and sailors as common criminals and brigands, but laterrelented, with respect to regular Confederate soldiers and partisans (but not "guerrilla marauders")in order to secure better treatment for captured Union soldiers. The Confederate States deniedprisoner-of-war status to Union soldiers who were black. This policy was a point of contentionbetween the two sides throughout the war, and afterward, when Johnson granted amnesty toparticipants in the rebellion, the amnesty did not extend to those who had refused to treat blacksoldiers as prisoners of war. (89) During World War II, Germany and Japan adopted different standards for various types ofprisoners. The Germans regarded Bolshevists as undeserving of POW status under the GenevaConvention, and those prisoners were to be shot on the slightest provocation without anywarning. (90) TheSecurity Police and Gestapo adopted a series of harsher techniques for interrogating certain (mainlycivilian) prisoners who were thought to possess valuable information and who resisted questioning. Known as the "Third Degree," the methods included a "simple diet (bread and water), hard bunk,dark cell, deprivation of sleep, exhaustive drilling, [and] flogging for more than twenty strokes adoctor must be consulted." (91) Such methods were restricted to "Communists, Marxists, Jehova's Witnesses, saboteurs, terrorists, members of resistance movements, parachute agents, anti-social elements, Polish or Soviet Russian loafers or tramps," and for any other case wherepermission from the Gestapo Chief was first obtained. (92) At Nuremberg, defendants argued that the treatment of Sovietprisoners was not unlawful because the Soviet Union had not ratified the Geneva Convention. Forthe most part, the international and national military tribunals did not accept this defense. (93) Countries fighting terrorism or insurgencies have sometimes adopted special methods ofinterrogating suspects. For example, Great Britain in the 1970's implemented sensory deprivationinterrogation methods known as the "five techniques" against suspected members of the terroristIrish Republican Army (IRA). (94) Some of the subjects of such interrogation brought suit in theEuropean Court of Human Rights. The court described these techniques as follows: (a) wall-standing: forcing the detainees to remain forperiods of some hours in a 'stress position,' described by those who underwent it as being'spreadeagled against the wall, with their fingers put high above the head against the wall, the legsspread apart and the feet back, causing them to stand on their toes with the weight of the body mainlyon the fingers'; (b) hooding: putting a black or navy colored bag over the detainees' heads and, atleast initially, keeping it there all the time except during interrogation; (c) subjection to noise:pending their interrogations, holding the detainees in a room where there was a continuous loud andhissing noise; (d) deprivation of sleep: pending their interrogations, depriving the detainees of sleep;(e) deprivation of food and drink: subjecting the detainees to a reduced diet during their stay at thecenter and pending interrogations. The ECHR held that "use of the five techniques did not constitute a practice of torture within themeaning of Article 3 [of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights andFundamental Freedoms]," but did constitute "inhuman and degrading treatment." (95) Israel's General Security Service ("GSS") has employed interrogation methods involving"psychological pressure" and "moderate physical pressure" to obtain information from suspectedterrorists. (96) A judicialcommission headed by the former Israeli Supreme Court President, Justice Moshe Landau,investigated the interrogation practices of the GSS. The Landau Commission justified the use ofphysical pressure as necessary in the face of hostile acts, and recommended that rather than coveringup the use of such tactics, the government should "acknowledge that some measure of coercion ispermissible, and then codify and carefully monitor the allowable techniques." (97) The Knesset endorsed thefindings of the Commission and enacted statutory authority adopting the Commission's guidelines. The Landau Commission recommended: The means of pressure should principally take the formof non-violent psychological pressure through a vigorous and extensive interrogation. However,when these do not attain their purpose, the exertion of a moderate measure of physical pressurecannot be avoided. (98) The contours of methods were detailed in a classified annex to the report and have not beenmade public, but later reports by human rights groups and a 1999 decision by the Israeli High Courtshed light on the types of pressure the GSS employed. (99) The methods reportedly included position abuse, imposing hoodson subjects to produce disorientation, sleep deprivation, "shaking," the use of excessively tighthandcuffs, and exposure to uncomfortable temperatures and loud noises. (100) The Israeli High Courtruled that while such techniques did not constitute torture, they were nonetheless barred because theytreated the suspects in an 'inhuman and degrading' manner. (101) In the aftermath of the disclosure of photographs and reports of abuses at the Abu Ghraibprison in Bagdad, the Defense Department released a series of documents related to policy withrespect to the interrogation of prisoners there and at the U.S. Naval Station at Guantanamo Bay,Cuba, where detainees captured in Afghanistan or elsewhere are being held as (unlawful) "enemycombatants." The released documents reveal deliberations about appropriate techniques forinterrogating persons the Administration had deemed to be unprotected by the Geneva Conventions. The following sections analyze the interrogation methods that were suggested or approved for useat the Abu Ghraib prison. The descriptions of the various methods in the DOD documents aresomewhat sketchy, however, and the sensitive nature of intelligence methods and the lack of detailedinformation about how the methods have been put into practice make comparison between thesemethods and past practices difficult. The list of approved methods for interrogation of terror suspects consisted, for the most part,of methods described in FM 34-52. (102) According to FM 34-52, "the Geneva and Hague Conventionsand the UCMJ set definite limits on the measures which can be used to gain the willing cooperationof prisoners of war." It does not, however, elaborate on what the "definite limits" are, (103) or the extent to whichthey apply to persons who are not prisoners of war. (104) Some of the techniques might be considered coercive for thepurposes of a criminal prosecution, and would likely be inadmissible were they used to elicitstatements from an accused soldier prior to a court-martial. (105) Some techniqueswould very likely be unpleasant, possibly contravening GPW art. 17 if used against POWs whorefuse to answer, but it appears to be the Army's position that the approved techniques below do notbreach the law. (106) Most of the techniques do not appear to violate any provisions of the Geneva Conventions on theirface, but military experts do not always agree among themselves as to their propriety and boundaries. The "approach phase" begins when the interrogator first comes in contact with thesource (107) andcontinues until the prisoner begins answering questions pertinent to the objective of theinterrogation." (108) The effort generally consists of the establishment of control over the source and the interrogation,establishment of rapport between the interrogator and the source, and the manipulation of thesource's emotions and weaknesses to gain his willing cooperation. (109) An interrogator mayemploy more than one technique simultaneously to elicit the desired information. Direct. This approach involves thestraightforward questioning of the detainee without the interrogator adopting any of the tacticsdescribed below. The interrogator simply asks the prisoner for the information, without concealingthe interrogator's purpose or using deception of any kind, and is most effective when the prisoner iscooperative. As long as there is no exploitation of circumstances to cause fear or suffering, theGeneva Conventions' prohibition on coercion would not seem to be implicated. While it may beacceptable to exploit a detainee's initial shock upon capture to obtain information, (110) exploiting a detainee'ssuffering by interrogating a wounded prisoner would be more problematic, and could constitute abreach of the obligation to provide medical treatment. (111) As noted above, it is generally agreed that the GenevaConventions allows any question to be posed to a prisoner of war, so long as the prisoner is notunlawfully compelled to give an answer. (112) Incentive / Incentive Removal. The incentiveapproach rewards the source for his cooperation. According to FM 34-52, the approach is based on"the application of inferred discomfort upon [a detainee] who lacks willpower." (113) It states thatinterrogators are not to withhold anything the prisoner is entitled to receive by right under theGeneva Conventions, but may withhold privileges. (114) Under this view, it would be improper to use as an incentivesomething that is required for the health or survival of the detainee, such as adequate nutrition andnecessary medical care. However, comfort items might serve as lawful incentives. (115) For example, it wouldbe improper to withhold water or food until a prisoner begins to cooperate, but it would not beimproper to reward a cooperative prisoner with food he may regard as a "treat." What qualifies as a "comfort item" or a "privilege" may be subject to debate, but the languageof the Geneva Conventions suggests that in addition to items necessary for basic subsistence, itemsnecessary for human dignity, such as clothing, would make inappropriate incentives. (116) However, it might notbe considered inhumane or degrading to compel prisoners to wear prison uniforms or clothing notto their particular liking, so long as the clothing is adequate for conditions (GPW art. 27) and theresult is not degrading or dehumanizing. (117) Such a practice might nonetheless breach other provisions,for example, GPW art. 18 (POWs are entitled to retain their personal articles other than weapons andmilitary equipment not for personal protection or identification); GPW art. 40 (POWs are allowedto wear their badges of rank and nationality, as well as decorations); GPW art. 34 and GC 38 (rightto practice religion); GC art. 27 (protected persons are entitled to respect for their religiousconvictions and practices, and their manners and customs). FM 34-52 suggests that "realistic incentives" be used to establish rapport, such as "a meal,shower, [opportunity to] send a letter home" for the short term, or for the long term, repatriation orpolitical asylum. (118) Whether the use of "privileges" or "entitlements" is appropriate under the Geneva Conventions maydepend on the circumstances. Prisoners of war and interned civilians are entitled to adequatenutrition and hygiene and, except for civilian internees who are definitely suspected of posing asecurity threat, to communicate with family members. Making these privileges available (or varyingtheir quantity and quality) based on the cooperation of each detainee during interrogations could runafoul of the GPW prohibition on disadvantageous treatment of any kind, (119) as well as otherprovisions outlining rights. (120) For example, one U.S. court found that depriving POWs ofany opportunity at all to communicate with the outside world amounted to "torture." (121) However, allowinga cooperative detainee the opportunity to send three letters home per month, where other prisonersare only allowed to send the two required by GPW art. 71 and GC art. 107, may be permissible. States whose prisoners of war have been subjected to the use of incentives to elicitinformation have criticized the technique as inhumane under the particular circumstances. Indescribing the conditions to which the U.S. prisoners of war (122) held by North Koreawere subjected, the Defense Department told Congress: Water was often scarce; bathing became difficult.Barracks were foul and unsanitary. In the best of the camps the men behind the barbed wire weresometimes given tobacco, a few morsels of candy, occasional mail. As will be noted, such itemswere usually offered as rewards for "cooperative conduct." (123) A British report describing the lot of their POWs held by the Chinese noted that supplies of food,medicine, and standards of accommodation the POWs received depended "to a large extent on thedegree of cooperation with their captors," and deplored the use of physical violence and solitaryconfinement as "incentives" for cooperation. (124) The report also described how the Chinese manipulated mailas an inducement for cooperation, commenting that the refusal to allow POWs the chance to writehome to let their families know they were alive was a breach of the Geneva Convention. (125) Emotional Love / Hate. Using the emotionalapproach, an interrogator seeks to exploit the source's emotions in order to override his rationale forresisting. According to FM 34-52, love or fear for one person may be exploited or turned into hatefor someone else. (126) For the emotional love approach, the interrogator focuses on the source's anxiety brought on by hispredicament. The interrogator then makes use of the love the source feels toward his family,homeland, comrades, etc., to devise an effective incentive, such as communication or promisedreunification with the source's family, a quicker end to the war to save his comrades' lives, and soforth. FM 34-52 states that a "good interrogator will usually orchestrate some futility with anemotional love approach to hasten the source's reaching the breaking point. This places a burden onthe source and may motivate him to seek relief through cooperation with the interrogator." The emotional hate approach focuses on any genuine feelings of hatred, or possibly a desirefor revenge, the source may feel toward his country's regime, his immediate superiors, officers ingeneral, his fellow soldiers or the like. The interrogator might hint at an opportunity for revenge ifthe source cooperates and divulges certain information. The manipulation of emotions as described does not seem to violate any prohibitions of theGeneva Conventions on its face. The success of the technique relies on the arts of perception andpersuasion, which most commentators agree are not out of bounds. However, if the emotional lovemethod, for example, were to involve threats against the lives of family members, for example, itsuse could contravene the Conventions' prohibitions of threats. Fear Up Harsh / Mild. According to FM 34-52,the aim of the "increased fear up harsh" technique is to convince the source who appears to behiding something that he does indeed have something to fear (not necessarily from the interrogator)and that he has no option but to cooperate. The interrogator will behave in a heavy, overpoweringmanner, using a loud and threatening voice, and perhaps throwing objects around the room toheighten the source's implanted feelings of fear. (127) Of the questioning methods approved by the manual, thisapproach is said to have greatest potential to violate the law of war, (128) presumably becauseit could lead to threats or violence against the subject. The 'mild' version of the 'fear up' approach seeks to exploit circumstances that point to theinterrogatee's involvement in some activity that could bring harsh punishment. The interrogator doesnot raise his voice or behave in an overbearing manner; instead, he uses a "credible distortion of thetruth" as a subtle means to blackmail the subject into cooperating. The interrogator persuades thesubject that he has good cause for fear under the circumstances, but the interrogator might intimatethat he might be willing to conceal or alter the reported circumstances of the source's capture, as longas the source cooperates. Reduced Fear. The "decreased fear down"approach is to be used primarily on a source who is already in a state of fear. The technique involvescalming the source and convincing him that he will be properly and humanely treated, or that he issafer in captivity than in combat, for example. (129) Using a soothing tone of voice, the interrogator attempts tocreate rapport with the source by engaging in small talk until the source is ready to answer morepressing questions. It is difficult to conceive of an implementation of this approach that would causea violation of the Conventions. Pride & Ego Up / Down. The "pride and ego"approach concentrates on tricking the source into revealing pertinent information through the use offlattery or abuse. The pride and ego up variation is used on sources who feel inferior, especially lowranking enlisted personnel or junior grade officers, who might respond to the opportunity todemonstrate their intellect or importance. The interrogator speaks as if he is very impressed with theaccomplishments of the subject, engendering positive feelings on the source's part that he is finallygetting the recognition he deserves. The source may reveal pertinent information in order to solicitmore laudatory comments from the interrogator. The "pride and ego down approach," in contrast, exploits a source's sense of inferiority by attacking the source's sense of personal worth, criticizing his loyalty, intelligence, abilities, technicalcompetence, leadership qualities, slovenly appearance, or any other perceived weakness. Theinterrogator uses a sarcastic, caustic tone of voice to express distaste or disgust. If the tactic works,the source will become defensive and try to prove the interrogator wrong. In his attempt to vindicatehis pride, according to FM 34-52, the source will usually involuntarily provide pertinentinformation. (130) Theapproach could contravene the Geneva Conventions' prohibition of insults and degrading treatment. Futility. The "futility" approach is used to exploitthe doubts and misgivings already in the source's mind to make him believe that it is useless to resistthe interrogation efforts. FM 34-52 describes multiple techniques for accomplishing the desiredeffect. (131) By makingthe situation appear hopeless, the interrogator allows the source to rationalize his cooperation. Thisapproach, as described, appears to be permissible as "guile," but extreme treatment designed toinduce a feeling of overall futility could cause mental suffering severe enough to raise questionsunder the Geneva Conventions. We Know All. The "we know all" approachinvolves making a source believe that the interrogator already knows everything about thesource. (132) Theinterrogator compiles all available data on the source and his unit. The interrogator then asksquestions to which he already has the answer. When the source refuses to answer or provides anincomplete or false response, the interrogator himself supplies the correct answer. The interrogatortries to convince the source that all information is already known, so he may as well cooperate. When the source begins to give accurate and complete information, the interrogator beginsinterjecting questions for which he does not have the answers. This appears to be an unobjectionabletactic involving more wile than coercion, and seems to be widely accepted as legitimate. Establish Your Identity. In the "establish youridentity approach," the interrogator insists that the source has been identified as an infamous criminalwho is merely posing as someone else to avoid punishment. (133) The source may betricked into giving detailed information on his unit to establish or substantiate his true identity inorder to refute the interrogator's allegations. The technique appears to involve trickery that mightbe acceptable under the Geneva Conventions, but could conceivably be applied in a threatening orcoercive manner. Repetition. The interrogator may repeat the samequestion many times in order to get a hostile source to cooperate. (134) The source becomesbored with the procedure and may give more complete and candid answers simply in order to gainrelief from the monotony. (135) Taken to extremes, for example, during prolongedinterrogations, it might be said to induce mental suffering File & Dossier. The "file and dossier" approachis a variation of the "we know all approach," but uses a prop. Prior to the session, the interrogatorprepares a dossier containing all available information obtained from records and documentsconcerning the source or his organization, possibly padding it with extra paper to create the illusionthat it contains much more information than is really there. The interrogator confronts the sourcewith the dossier, exploiting the known facts about the source to convince him that resistance wouldbe futile. Rapid Fire. FM 34-52 describes the "rapid fire"approach as a "psychological ploy based upon the principles that everyone likes to be heard whenhe speaks, and it is confusing to be interrupted in midsentence with an unrelated question." (136) One or twointerrogators ask a series of questions without allowing the source time to answer them completelybefore the next question is asked. The source may become confused and contradict himself, whichthe interrogator can exploit by confronting the source with the inconsistencies. The source mayreveal more than he intends in attempting to clarify his answers. Silence. The silence approach involves aninterrogator who says nothing to the source, but "looks him squarely in the eye, preferably with aslight smile on his face," in an effort to make the subject nervous and force him to break eye contactfirst (137) . The sourcemay begin to talk or ask questions to break the tension. When the interrogator eventually begins toask questions, the subject may feel relieved and more willing to divulge information. The methods listed below were authorized to be used under certain conditions but requiredthe approval of the Commanding General. These methods are not described in FM 34-52, althoughsome resemble techniques described as coercive by the CIA manual. (138) Some appear toinvolve the "environmental control" techniques of the sort that led to the revision of FM 34-52 in1992, (139) to cause"debility," (140) or fear. Some have argued that these techniques amount to torture, but Pentagon officials reportedly said thatsuch methods can be applied within the framework of the Geneva Convention, as long as theprisoner's basic physical needs are met. (141) Change of Scenery Down. For this technique,the interrogator removes the detainee from the standard interrogation setting to one that may be lesscomfortable, but would not constitute a "substantial change in environmental quality." (142) The purpose of achange of scenery is to throw the detainee off balance psychologically. As long as it is not seen aspunishment for failure to cooperate, and the environment does not fall below the standards for healthand hygiene, a change of scenery would not seem to violate the Geneva Conventions. Dietary Manipulation. This technique involveschanging the diet of a detainee, not in such a way as to deprive him of food or water, affect hishealth, or interfere with his religious practices. This could involve a substitution of cold rations forhot, according to the DOD Working Group Report. The object is probably to disorient the detaineeby upsetting his regular routine. (143) Environmental Manipulation. This methodinvolves alteration of the environment to create moderate discomfort, by means of adjusting theroom temperature or introducing an unpleasant smell, without bringing about conditions that wouldinjure the detainee. (144) Subjecting prisoners of war to inhospitable climate conditions has long formed the basis forcomplaints about inhumane treatment in violation of the law of war. (145) Purposeful exposureof prisoners of war to temperature extremes for interrogation purposes has been found to beill-treatment under the 1929 Geneva Conventions. (146) Sleep Adjustment. The detainee's ordinary sleepschedule is disturbed by, for example, reversing the sleep cycles from night to day, but withoutdepriving the detainee of sleep. The method likely induces a feeling of disorientation similar to "jetlag." "Sleep management" for a maximum of 72 hours was approved for use at Abu Ghraib with thecommander's approval. The DOD Working Group distinguished "sleep management" from "sleepdeprivation," which it defined as "[k]eeping the detainee awake for an extended period of time(allowing individual to rest briefly and then awakening him, repeatedly) NOT to exceed four daysin succession." (147) The DOD Working Group noted, "as a matter of policy," that other nations consider sleepdeprivation to amount to torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment. (148) Sleep deprivation is an age-old method for weakening the subject physically. However, theCIA manual recommended sleep disruption as a more effective method of coercion: Another objection to the deliberate inducing of debilityis that prolonged exertion, loss of sleep, etc., themselves become patterns to which the subjectadjusts through apathy. The interrogator should use his power over the resistant subject's physicalenvironment to disrupt patterns of response, not to create them. Meals and sleep granted irregularly,in more than abundance or less than adequacy, the shifts occurring on no discernible time pattern,will normally disorient an interrogatee and sap his will to resist more effectively than a sustaineddeprivation leading to debility. (149) Isolation. The detainee would be isolated fromother detainees (for no longer than 30 days (150) ), but otherwise complying with the basic standards oftreatment. The DOD Working Group recommended isolation as an "exceptional" (151) technique, and notedthat its use could implicate the definitions of torture or cruel, inhumane and degrading treatmentunder CAT, (152) andthat, if applied to POWs, it would violate articles 13 (prohibiting intimidation), 14 (requiring respectfor the person), 34 (prohibiting coercion) and 126 (entitlement to access and basic standards oftreatment). (153) Presence of Military Working Dogs. Introducingthe presence of military dogs without directly threatening action or endangering the detainee wassuggested as a method for creating anxiety but not terror or mental trauma. (154) The DOD WorkingGroup framed the technique as an example of "increasing anxiety by use of aversions," which itflagged as inconsistent with policies followed by U.S. allies and possibly violating the CAT. Sensory Deprivation. The DOD Working Groupdid not describe "sensory deprivation," but the CIA manual offered a discussion of it as a byproductof solitary confinement and isolation: The chief effect of arrest and detention, and particularlyof solitary confinement, is to deprive the subject of many or most of the sights, sounds, tastes, smells,and tactile sensations to which he has grown accustomed. (155) Artificially limiting the extent to which a person is able to sense his environment has beenfound to induce stress and when taken to the extreme, can cause hallucinations and delusions. The apparent reason for these effects is that a personcut off from external stimuli turns his awareness inward, upon himself, and then projects the contentsof his own unconscious outwards, so that he endows his faceless environment with his ownattributes, fears, and forgotten memories. [One expert] notes, "It is obvious that inner factors in themind tend to be projected outward, that some of the mind's activity which is usually reality-boundnow becomes free to turn to phantasy and ultimately to hallucination and delusion." (156) The CIA theorized that The more completely the place of confinementeliminates sensory stimuli, the more rapidly and deeply will the interrogatee be affected. Resultsproduced only after weeks or months of imprisonment in an ordinary cell can be duplicated in hoursor days in a cell which has no light (or weak artificial light which never varies), which issound-proofed, in which odors are eliminated, etc. An environment still more subject to control, suchas water-tank or iron lung, is even more effective. (157) Stress Positions. The DOD Working Group didnot define stress position, but suggested "prolonged standing" (not to exceed four hours in a 24-hourperiod), which it described as lengthy standing in a "normal" position (non-stress). . .not enforcedby physical restraints. (158) Prolonged standing is explicitly prohibited against civilianinternees as inhuman treatment. (159) The use of stress positions has been found to constitute tortureor cruel, inhumane and degrading treatment in the past. The KUBARK manual included prolongedstanding in its discussion of "coercive interrogation" methods, recommending that a subject's"resistance is likelier to be sapped by pain which he seems to inflict upon himself" rather than bydirect torture, and suggests forcing the detainee to stand at attention for long periods of time. (160) It seems likely that theuse of stress positions would violate the Geneva Conventions for all categories of persons under theirprotection if were to induce the requisite amount of suffering or humiliation, but the extent ofsuffering necessary to cross that line is not firmly established. Removal of Clothing. Depriving detainees ofclothing probably serves to divest them of their identity, but could endanger a detainees healthdepending on environmental conditions. The DOD Working Group stated its goal as creating afeeling of helplessness and dependence, but cautioned "it must be monitored to ensure theenvironmental conditions are such that this technique does not injure the detainee." (161) Forced nudity withoutthreats or sexual assault may not rise to the level of an "outrage upon human dignity," but wouldprobably be considered inhumane and degrading. Removal of All Comfort Items, Including ReligiousItems. This technique is a harsher version of the "Removal of Incentives" approachdescribed above. Whether it violates the Geneva Conventions depends on the nature of the itemsconsidered to fall under the "comfort" rubric. The removal of religious items could entail a violationof GC art. 27, providing that protected persons are entitled to respect for their religious convictionsand practices, or GPW art. 14, respect for the person of the prisoner of war. Forced Grooming. The DOD Working Groupdescribed forced grooming as shaving of hair or beard (accomplished without risking injury to thedetainee). It may be viewed as a violation of the respect for the person under GPW art. 14, or as aviolation of a prisoner's religious rights under GC art. 27. By itself, it would not seem to constitutean outrage on human dignity, (162) but could be seen as inhumane or degrading. Use of Scenarios Designed to Convince the Detainee that Deathor Severely Painful Consequences are Imminent. This technique was listed as a"Category III technique" that could only be used to interrogate the most uncooperative detainees atGuantanamo with the approval of the Commanding General. (163) Category III techniquesalso included exposure to cold weather or water (with medical monitoring) and "the use of a wettowel and dripping water to induce a feeling of suffocation." (164) There seems to be littledoubt that such methods would violate the Geneva Conventions, (165) as constitutingcoercion, threats, and possibly mental torture. (166) As such, these techniques are also likely to be consideredinhumane by Geneva Convention standards. 

Summary: Allegations of abuse of Iraqi prisoners by U.S. soldiers at the Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq haveraised questions about the applicability of the law of war to interrogations for military intelligencepurposes. Particular issues involve the level of protection to which the detainees are entitled underthe Geneva Conventions of 1949, whether as prisoners of war or civilian "protected persons," orunder some other status. After photos of prisoner abuse became public, the Defense Department(DOD) released a series of internal documents disclosing policy deliberations about the appropriatetechniques for interrogating persons the Administration had deemed to be "unlawful combatants"and who resisted the standard methods of questioning detainees. Investigations related to theallegations at Abu Ghraib revealed that some of the techniques discussed for "unlawful combatants"had come into use in Iraq, although none of the prisoners there was deemed to be an unlawfulcombatant. This report outlines the provisions of the Conventions as they apply to prisoners of war andto civilians, and the minimum level of protection offered by Common Article 3 of the GenevaConventions. There follows an analysis of key terms that set the standards for the treatment ofprisoners that are especially relevant to interrogation, including torture, coercion, and cruel, inhumanand degrading treatment, with reference to some historical war crimes cases and cases involving thetreatment of persons suspected of engaging in terrorism. Finally, the report discusses and analyzessome of the various interrogation techniques approved or considered for use during interrogationsof prisoners at Abu Ghraib.