Suicide attacks by terrorist organizations have become more prevalent globally, and assessingthe threat of future suicide attacks against the United States has gained in strategic importance. While suicide attacks have been employed internationally for centuries, the degree to which thistactic could be used to carry out operations against Americans was more widely appreciated after9/11. The vulnerability of the U.S. homeland to suicide attacks was amply demonstrated: virtuallyall previous such attacks by foreign actors against U.S. citizens had happened on foreign soil, leadingto a mistaken belief that Americans were only vulnerable when they were abroad. Adding to the concern about suicide attacks is their potential connection to increasingly available new technologies. Although so-called "weapons of mass destruction" were not used in theSeptember 11th attacks, the destruction was nonetheless unquestionably "massive." The prospect ofcombining modern weapons technology (especially chemical, biological, nuclear or radiologicalweapons) with an age-old willingness to die in the act of committing an attack could beunprecedentedly dangerous. The degree to which Al Qaeda and other groups have recently steppedup their public advocacy of so-called martyrdom operations, combined with captured evidence oftheir interest in these weapons, is also worrisome. (1) With increasing numbers of casualties fromsuicide attacks occurring globally in places such as Israel, Saudi Arabia, Morocco, Russia/Chechnya,and post-conflict Iraq, a focus on the threat of future suicide attacks against Americans and theirinterests, in the United States and elsewhere, merits consideration. This report focuses on the following questions: What are suicide attacks? What have been the patterns and motivations for terrorist organizations using suicide attacks in the past? What terroristgroups and other organizations are most likely to launch such attacks? How great a threat areterrorist suicide attacks to the United States, at home and abroad? How can the United Statescounter such a threat? In short, the goal of this report is to summarize the key lessons of theinternational experience with suicide attacks in the modern era and examine their relevance to theUnited States in the current threat environment. Some argue that the language used to describe terrorism plays a role in how it is perceived, sowords used in describing it must be very carefully chosen. For example, there are many phrases usedto describe the phenomenon to be discussed here. Some people use the phrase "suicide bombings,"but that is too restrictive for this report, as it seems to refer only to attacks that are carried out withthe use of explosives. Suicide attacks can occur with other types of weapons, including jetliners."Genocide bombings" and "homicide attacks" are phrases frequently used by those who identify withthe unwilling victims of attacks; these terms emphasize the criminal nature of the violence andde-emphasize the self-inflicted death of the perpetrator. On the other hand, "martyrdom operations"places the emphasis upon the cause of the perpetrators, implying a connection to the notions of "holywar" and/or self defense, even in the killing of civilians. (2) Finally "suicide operations" places theemphasis on the organization's role in staging the episodes, implying a military-type character tothem. None of the currently used terms is perfect. For the purposes of this report, the phrase used will be "suicide attacks," by which is meant, in the sense used here, events where the "success" ofthe operation cannot occur without the death of the perpetrator, and he or she is apparently aware ofthis in advance. (3) Likewise, this report concentrateson suicide attacks that are carried out by"terrorists," by which is meant nonstate actors whose goal is the threat or use of violence for politicalends against noncombatant or civilian targets. (4) Theseare off-the-battlefield episodes, with theattackers not integrated into units in a formal military sense. Therefore, specifically excluded arehigh risk military operations, where, although the perpetrator may expect his chances of survival tobe virtually nil, he or she is not deliberately seeking his or her own death. And this report also doesnot include self-inflicted deaths that occur without any violence directed outward, like hungerstrikes or cult suicides. (5) The phenomenon of suicide attacks cannot be fully understood without placing it within itsbroader historical context. Self-sacrifice in the interest of a broader cause is not unusual in humanhistory, especially in military settings; but terrorist suicide attacks as they are defined here also havea lengthy pedigree. Members of premodern groups without access to dynamite did not have the immediacy and certainty of their own demise that is currently the case, nor could they expect the publicity for theirattacks that is seen today; but they did engage in deliberate, calculated self-sacrifice in the act ofkilling civilian targets for symbolic effect. For example, among the earliest groups that have been thoroughly studied, the Muslim Assassins (also known as Ismailis-Nazari) operated from 1090-1275, C.E. They prepared theirmembers to die in the execution of an attack, deliberately seeking martyrdom as they used daggersto kill their victims. (6) The Assassins assuredthemselves publicity by attacking prominent officialsin public places, usually on holy days when there were many witnesses. (7) The group's descriptionof the assailants as "fedayeen" (meaning consecrated ones or dedicated ones) and their admirationfor martyrdom in the course of killing is an often-cited historical precursor for some of the suicideattacks by Islamic terrorist organizations seen today. (8) Another historical example of the use of suicide attacks is found among Muslim communitiesin Asia during the eighteenth, nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, particularly on the Malabarcoast of Southwestern India, in Atjeh in Northern Sumatra, and in Mindanao and Sulu in theSouthern Philippines. Muslims in these regions engaged in suicidal jihads aimed at inflictingpunishment and instilling fear among the European colonial powers. In all of these places, theperpetrators engaged in religious rituals prior to carrying out the attacks, aspired to a perceivedheroic status of martyrdom, and carried out their killings as religious acts intended to serve theinterests of their own community. In each case, a shift to the use of suicide attacks followed a periodof unsuccessful open warfare against the militarily much stronger Europeans. The suicidal jihadagainst civilians was seen as a means of desperate counterattack and even a means of keepingawareness of the cause alive. (9) The employment of suicide attacks as a terrorist technique is not exclusive to one culture or religion: with the invention of dynamite in the late 19th century, the use of bombs in terrorist attacksbecame a generally favored method, and this also applied to suicide tactics. For example, the Russianradicals of the late 19th century, in putting themselves close enough to the target to assure success,usually also consciously sought their own demise. Proximity was important to the successfultargeting of the crude explosions. In those instances where the terrorists survived and were captured,they often refused offers of clemency and were executed. (10) Dying for the cause was a highly valuedfate, a source of legitimacy for the cause, and a rallying point for future recruits. It was not, on theother hand, an effective long-term strategy in this case: the Russian regime successfully rooted outsuch well-known groups as Narodnaya Volya (People's Will) well before the Russian revolution,and they were not admired by the Bosheviks. Ironically, with the development of better explosives and means of detonating them, suicide attacks became less common in the twentieth century. More advanced technological means meantthat it was not necessary to sacrifice a member of the organization. Favored methods in themid-twentieth century included pre-placed or remotely detonated explosives, hostage-taking, andattacks on airliners. As counterterrorist methods began to improve, however, methods of terroristattack began to evolve as well. Faced with metal detectors at airports, increased security perimetersaround valuable targets, and many other antiterrorism measures, terrorist organizations began toinnovate tactically. The reintroduction of the use of suicide attacks, especially by ethno-nationalistgroups or religiously-motivated groups, was one of the results. Although it was not the first such attack, many people date the initiation of a wave of contemporary suicide attacks to the October 1983 destruction of the U.S. Marine barracks in Beirutby a truck bomb, a watershed particularly for Americans. (11) The explosion lifted the entire buildingoff its foundation and caused it to implode upon itself, killing 241 off-duty U.S. soldiers and injuringmore than 100 others. (12) At almost precisely thesame time, a similar truck bomb exploded at theFrench peacekeeping compound nearby, killing 58 soldiers and wounding 15 others. (13) The 1983Beirut attacks resulted in the withdrawal of U.S. and French forces from Lebanon. Thesewithdrawals have subsequently been pointed to by Al Qaeda and other groups as important signs thatsuicide attacks can be extremely effective against Western democratic powers. Between 1983 and 1986, the apparent success of the Beirut suicide attacks against the U.S. and France was followed by a redirection of targeting toward the Israeli Defense Forces in Lebanon andthen South Lebanese Army posts. (14) The 1983Marine barracks bombing also led at least indirectlyto the initiation of perhaps the most ruthless and bloody suicide campaign in modern history by theTamil Tigers (LTTE). Their first attack occurred in Sri Lanka in May 1987. (15) The Tamil Tigers,whose leader Velupillai Prabhakaran later claimed that he was inspired by the 1983 attacks, havesince been responsible for more than half of all suicide attacks carried out worldwide. (16) While the technique was by no means historically unprecedented, the 1983 attacks signaled the beginning of a growing use of suicide attacks in the late 20th and early 21st centuries. In moderntimes, suicide attacks have been employed by a large variety of groups, including Muslim (bothShi'ite and Sunni), Christian, Hindu, Sikh, Jewish and secular organizations, especially in the MiddleEast but also many other regions of the world. (17) A partial list of terrorist groups that actively usesuicide attacks includes Hamas, the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, the al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades of YassirArafat's Fatah movement, Al-Ansar Mujahidin in Chechnya, the Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ),Hezbollah, Lashkar-e-taiba of Pakistan/Kashmir, the Armed Islamic Group (GIA) of Algeria, BarbarKhalsa International(BKI) of India, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE or Tamil Tigers)of Sri Lanka, the Kurdistan Worker's Party (PKK) of Turkey, and Al Qaeda. (18) It is the apparentlygrowing use of suicide attacks internationally and the increased targeting against Americans thatconcerns counterterrorism experts. The trend may have important implications for future U.S.security. One perception about suicide attacks is that they are carried out by individual deranged fanaticsbut this is almost never the case. Research on suicide attacks indicates that most terrorist operativesare psychologically normal, in the sense that psychological pathology does not seem to be present,and the attacks are virtually always premeditated. (19) There have been instances of coercion ordeception in recruiting suicide attackers and/or executing the attacks, (20) but most perpetrators are asaware of their imminent fate as they are of the fate of their victims. Why would anyone choose to engage in such an attack? The answer to this question requires an insight into the psychological and cultural aspects of terrorism. The motivations for suicideattacks are not so different in many ways from the motivations for other types of terrorism, includingattention to a cause, personal notoriety, anger, revenge and retribution against a perceived injustice. (21) From the perspective of the individual attacker, the act of "martyrdom" may offer an opportunity toimpress an audience and be remembered, an act that may be a powerful incentive for individuals whoperceive their lives as having little significance otherwise. (22) Suicide attackers are sometimes widowsor bereaved siblings who wish to take vengeance for their loved one's violent death. In the case ofwidows, for example, the death of the spouse may cut the woman off from productive society and/orleave her with a sense of hopelessness, especially in very traditional societies. Increasing numbersof women seem to be carrying out suicide attacks in recent years, a development that may be partlytraced to this factor and will be discussed further below. A longing for religious purity and/or a strong commitment to the welfare of the group may drive individuals to engage in suicide attacks. The role of the central religious, political, or ethnicculture or ideology is important. Suicide attacks among Palestinian groups, for example, seem tohave inspired a self-perpetuating subculture of martyrdom. (23) Children who grow up in such settingsmay be subtly indoctrinated in a culture glorifying ultimate sacrifice in the service of the Palestiniancause and against the Israeli people. There are social, cultural, religious, and material incentivespresented in such a context, sometimes including spiritual rewards in the after life, vast celebrity,cash bonuses, free apartments and/or the guarantee of a place with God for the attackers' families. Other attackers seem to be driven apparently by a sense of humiliation or injustice, a worrisome development that has appeared for example among young Egyptians. (24) Some argue, for example,that perceptions regarding the plight of the Palestinian people may have had an influence upon thewillingness of young Egyptians to participate in suicide attacks, especially among those who areunemployed and frustrated for other reasons. (25) Indeed, desperation is often mentioned in pressreports: Palestinians in particular are quoted as saying that suicide attacks are the "weapon of lastresort." (26) In some conflicts, increasing use of suicide attacks is seen widely as a potential sign that the struggle is being "Islamicized." The historical connection to the Muslim Assassins groups is oftenmentioned. Al Qaeda's use of suicide attacks is well-known, and growing links between thatorganization and many other, more local indigenous groups are sometimes demonstrated at least inpart by a shift in the local group's tactics. (27) Forexample, the recent use of suicide attacks byChechen militants is seen by some as a worrisome indicator of growing influence of radical Islamistfactions within Chechnya and/or links with radical groups like Al Qaeda. (28) Recent suicide attacksin Morocco are likewise viewed this way. (29) TheAugust 2003 suicide attacks on the JordanianEmbassy and the UN Headquarters in Iraq may also reflect a shift from local nationalistic resistanceto the more active involvement of outside Islamist fighters. So-called "martyrdom" is not just a religious concept, however. The tradition of heroic martyrdom, where the hero sacrifices to save the life of his community, nation, or people, is apowerful element in many secular traditions. Among Palestinian groups non-religious nationalistmotivations are sometimes dominant, especially with respect to groups such as the al-Aqsa Martyrs'Brigades, which is an offshoot of militant elements of the essentially secular PLO's Fatah faction. Indeed, globally, an apparently larger proportion overall of the suicide attacks of the last twenty yearshas been carried out by secular groups like the Tamil Tigers and the PKK, who both appeal primarilyto traditional concepts of nationhood and sacrifice, than by religiously-motivated groups. Following the September 11th attacks, one of the important developments among those who study terrorism has been the reexamination of the concept of a "profile" or typical characteristics ofsuicide attackers. (30) Some people had argued onthe basis of research done especially on Hamasmembers, that suicide terrorists were typically male, aged 18-27 years, unmarried, relativelyuneducated, and highly susceptible to suggestion. (31) This description proved to be inadequate,however, especially after the 9/11 attacks in which older, well-educated operatives like MohammedAtta participated. In the Palestinian intifada, as well, previous assumptions are being reexamined,with suicide attacks being carried out by operatives as diverse as a college student, a middle-agedmarried men with children, and the son of a wealthy businessman, not to mention increasingnumbers of women and children. (32) Some haveargued that there is no pattern to these "profiles" atall. (33) In any case, as we move into the twenty-firstcentury, stereotypes about who is likely to carryout terrorist suicide attacks are evaporating. Although research indicates that individual suicide attackers make choices and are nottechnically "crazy," according to experts they are often manipulated by the pressures and beliefstructures of the group. (34) Because of this, it isimportant to study the role of the organization in thephenomenon. The organization is crucial in the execution of most suicide attacks, in planning, acquiringweaponry, choosing operatives, targeting, and carrying them out. (35) Indeed, most terrorism expertsargue that the role of the organization is a much more powerful factor than is the nature of theindividual, since the individual has often yielded his or her identity to the group. (36) With very fewexceptions, suicide attacks in the modern era have involved a fairly well developed organization, andhistorically they have been employed by terrorist groups when they are both strong and weak. (37) There is a chilling logic in the choice of suicide operations by terrorist organizations. From anorganizational perspective, there are arguably numerous advantages in using such attacks as part ofa terrorist campaign. First, suicide attacks generally result in a larger number of casualties on average than do other types of terrorist attacks. From 1980 to 2001, suicide attacks reportedly represented only 3% of allterrorist attacks but accounted for 48% of total deaths due to terrorism. (38) Looking just at Palestinianattacks between 2000 and 2002, suicide attacks represented only 1% of the total number of attacksbut they caused about 44% of the Israeli casualties. (39) The larger number of casualties causes morephysical and psychological damage to the targeted state or community and, especially in ademocracy, arguably increases the likelihood that the government will be compelled to respond. Whether that response takes the form of concessions or retaliations, it can potentially serve the interests of the terrorist campaign. Concessions may advance the terrorist organization's goals andincrease its psychological leverage against a militarily stronger foe; retaliations may drawinternational condemnation and increase the pool of recruits from which the organization may draw. If an organization is at a significant military disadvantage, this may be a calculation it is willing tomake. Or the organization may engender a more specific reaction such as disrupting negotiationsin the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, for example. Second, suicide attacks usually attract more publicity than do other types of attacks. The fate of the bomber him- or herself is part of the story, and the large number of victims, again, ensurespublic attention. Sometimes the goal of an organization is simply to draw attention to itself and toits cause: in an age of ubiquitous media, suicide attacks are more likely to be noticed. Since themain effect of the violence is intended to be impressed upon an audience, the shocking nature of theattack is part of the calculation. From the perspective of the victims and their sympathizers, on theother hand, the media coverage that is a natural part of the terrible tragedy does help to publicize theterrorists' cause. A related aspect is the symbolic value of martyrdom for a cause, not only in Islamic cultures but in other cultures as well. Even in secular groups, the death of a member contributes to the senseof legitimacy and dramatic community investment in a cause. The message is that there is no goingback. Some groups engage in glorification of the act, deliberately hyping a "culture ofmartyrdom"that may include posters, songs, legends, etc., lionizing the attacker. (40) This celebrity canbe powerfully attractive to potential recruits, and with the suicide often comes greater generalattention as well to the motivation for the act. (41) Third, suicide attackers are sometimes seen by sponsoring organizations as assets whose loss generates a net gain. (42) The gains can be politicalor monetary. As for political gain, in situationswhere groups are competing for power, there is evidence that suicide attacks are seen as a means ofgaining relative advantage vis-a-vis rival groups; according to one report, this may have been thecase for Palestinian groups such as Hamas and the Islamic Jihad. (43) The organization's role in theattack is made obvious in the style and content of the videotapes that attackers usually make on theeve of their operation: typically, the so-called "living martyr" is standing in front of the terroristgroup's flag, holding an assault rifle and perhaps also a copy of the Koran, as he or she explains themotivation behind his or her attack. (44) The imageof the now-deceased becomes a powerful tool forwinning adherents. Suicide attacks are also used to boost morale, engendering greater cohesionamong members of a group; the PKK and the Tamil Tigers apparently used suicide attacks in thisway. Indeed, the Tamil Tigers have even filmed some of the suicide attacks themselves and usedthem for recruitment and motivation. (45) In cost/benefit terms, suicide attacks are financially inexpensive: according to one expert, the price of materials used in a suicide attack in Israel is about $150. (46) Monetary rewards for terroristorganizations, on the other hand, can be large. Suicide attackers sometimes draw sympathy fromsources distant from the location of the attacks, especially donors who are willing to enable others to die in the service of a cause. For example, following a supermarket bombing by an 18-year-oldPalestinian girl, a Saudi telethon reportedly raised more than $100 million for the Palestinians. (47) Support from the diaspora is also common: the Tamil Tigers have been funded by 800,000 Tamilsliving abroad, in Canada, Australia, and elsewhere, who have sent back as much as $150 millionannually, according to one estimate. (48) Paymentsand other benefits are given to the individualfamilies of the dead Palestinian attackers. (49) Incold cost/benefit terms, the organizational incentivesseem to be far more compelling than the personal ones. Fourth, the use of suicide operatives helps to control the timing and placement of attacks. If there is no need to provide an escape route for the attacker, the complexity of the plan is greatlyreduced. Suicide attackers can often get closer to the target at the desired time than can otherterrorist methods. The human being is in control until the moment of detonation. The human beingis the delivery system, and the attacker together with his weapon is the ultimate "smart bomb." Thesuicide attack may be less dangerous to an organization's viability, as there is no risk thatintelligence will be leaked. Likewise, for his or her part, the attacker does not need to fear capture,interrogation, trial, imprisonment and the accompanying humiliation-fates that, in some settings andsome cultures, may seem worse than death. Finally, suicide attacks can be especially intimidating for the target population. There is a perception that suicide attacks are unstoppable, an impression perpetuated not only by the logisticalchallenges of detecting and repulsing the threat but also by the impression that the attacker is drivenby a desperate determination. While many suicide attackers may be normal psychologically, thereis benefit to be gained on the part of the terrorist organization in perpetuating the stereotype that theyare fanatics. Likewise, the message (true or not) that there are dozens more recruits waiting to takethe dead attacker's place serves the organization's interests and is often difficult to verify, one wayor another. There is often a sense of desperation or almost inhuman determination on the part of a suicide attacker. The rituals in which the prospective attacker typically engages are designed to make itvirtually impossible to back out of an attack without losing honor and a place in society. Sometimesprospective attackers are encouraged to lie down in graves to have the feeling of peace that they aretold they will experience after death. (50) Therelationship with other recruits can be very close, withthe "living dead" competing to be the first to be sent on a mission. They often write letters or makevideo tapes for relatives left behind. Secular groups use such techniques as well. Members of theLTTE typically enjoy a meal with their leader and are photographed on their last night before theattack. With nowhere to turn, captured operatives who have failed to carry out their mission haveconsigned themselves to ignominy as "half martyrs" and may consider themselves as good as dead. After such elaborate psychological preparation, the attack is meant to seem almost an afterthought. (51) Another aspect to the intimidating nature of suicide attacks, particularly among Palestinian groups, is the deliberate effort to maximize human suffering not only in the immediate explosion butalso in the minutes, days, and even years following it. Planners of suicide attacks in Israel have oftenpacked explosives with foreign objects. Long after the attack, victims can have imbedded in theirbodies pieces of shrapnel, nails, bolts, screws, ball bearings and other projectiles that were built intothe bombs. Another recent innovation is the addition of chemicals such as rat poison, which is ananticoagulant and makes it much more difficult for rescue workers to stem the bleeding from injuredvictims. (52) Over time, suicide attacks thatincorporate such elements can be psychologically morepunishing, not only to the victims but to the population at large. Finally, trying to stop a suicide attack can result in a premature detonation of the explosive that kills the defenders and the attacker. This can lead to increased wariness on the part of police orsoldiers, who then may be more inclined to shoot otherwise innocent-looking civilians who couldconceivably be carrying explosives. This is a particular problem if the suicide attackers areidentifiable as members of a different race or ethnicity than the target population. The result can bedeep polarization and a cycle of violence that may destabilize the target society and perpetuate thegoals of the terrorist group. The role of women in carrying out suicide attacks has been the focus of increasing concern. The use of women in suicide attacks may point to a broadening to include members of society notusually recruited by contemporary terrorist organizations for this type of mission. Although femaleparticipation in terrorism is not historically unusual (notably among left-wing groups), participationin suicide attacks is less common. Growing numbers of female suicide attackers may reflect anumber of different factors. The most prominent examples of female suicide attackers have been among the members of the Tamil Tigers (LTTE). In the conservative societies of the Middle East and South Asia, there is morereluctance to search a woman, which gives such attackers an advantage over men. They are alsoassumed to be potentially less dangerous and may be able to approach the target with greater ease. Among the Black Tigers, as the Tamil suicide attack squad is known, both male and female childrenas young as 10 years old are chosen to be prepared to carry out missions. About a third of thesuicide operations carried out by the LTTE have been conducted by women. (53) Most famously, afemale suicide bomber killed Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi in 1991 while he was campaigningfor reelection. The attacker was wearing an explosive device under her robes that made it appear thatshe was pregnant. In December 1999 another woman blew herself up at a rally for Sri LankanPresident Chandrika Kumaratunga; the blast killed 23 people and wounded the president, who lostthe sight in her right eye. (54) In the Middle East, it is often forgotten in the focus on the very recent past that women engaged in suicide missions years earlier, during the 1980s. In southern Lebanon, women who were fightingas part of the National Resistance Front engaged in suicide attacks against Israelis. On 9 April 1985,for example, San Mheidleh, a 16-year-old Shi'a school girl, drove a car packed with 450 pounds ofdynamite into an Israeli check point, killing herself and two Israeli soldiers. Just before the attack,she made a video tape explaining her mission which was later shown on Lebanese television. Anumber of other women followed her example. Since these attacks were technically against militarytargets, they do not fit our definition exactly; however, the form of the attack and the organizationalplanning are directly reflective of the phenomenon occurring among Palestinian groups attackingIsraeli civilians today. (55) The use of female suicide bombers in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has been seen by some as an act of desperation on the part of Palestinian women. (56) Others consider it a result of calculatedevolution in the terrorist organization's tactics; as the Israelis began to frisk young Palestinian men,for example, reportedly older men and then women began to step forward. (57) The first confirmed useof a Palestinian female suicide attacker in Israel occurred in January 2002. (58) Wafa Idrees,28-year-old Palestinian woman, blew herself to pieces outside a shoe shop in Jerusalem on 28January 2002, killing an 81-year-old Israeli man and injuring more than 100 people. (59) Among theinjured was an American lawyer from New York who had survived the September 11th attacks. (60) Following that incident, other attacks by women have occurred, including by Daria Abu Aysha, aPalestinian student who killed herself and wounded three soldiers at a West Bank checkpoint inFebruary 2002; and 18-year-old Ayat Akhras, who killed herself and two Israelis near a Jerusalemsupermarket in March 2002. (61) All of thesewomen were prepared and armed by the al-AqsaMartyrs' Brigades, which, according to one source, has set up a special unit for female suicidebombers. (62) Another group with a history of using women for suicide attacks is the PKK, whose campaign of suicide attacks began on 30 June 1995 and ended on 5 July 1999. About two-thirds of theattacks--eleven of fourteen--were undertaken by women. (63) The large majority of attackers did notvolunteer but were chosen by the leadership for their missions, a distinguishing feature of the PKK. Much coercion was reportedly used in forcing PKK members to participate: one of those selectedwho then refused the 'honor' was said to have been killed in front of another who had been chosen; a different person who tried to escape was turned over to the police. According to interviews, thePKK's preference for using female suicide attackers reflected a number of causes, including thebelief among the leadership that the presence of the women was burdening the men in theirhit-and-run operations, and the general perception in the group that the women were moreexpendable than the men. (64) Although the act of committing suicide and the participation of women in combat are both contrary to Chechen social tradition, increasing numbers of Chechen women are participating insuicide attacks against Russian targets. There have been numerous attacks involving womenperpetrators, including two apparently Chechen female suicide attackers who detonated themselvesoutside a rock concert in July 2003 on the outskirts of Moscow, killing more than a dozen youngpeople. (65) The motivations for female Chechensuicide attackers are reported to be often related tothe deaths of husbands, brothers, fathers and sons at the hands of Russian forces; indeed, the Kremlincalls them "black widows." (66) Some argue thatthe traditional nature of Chechen society pusheswomen into suicide missions because they are excluded from joining regular guerrilla units. (67) Theunprecedented prominence of women suicide attackers among Chechen fighters is also seen as a signof desperation in the struggle, and a transition to a "Palestinization" of the so-called war ofindependence from Russia. (68) Over the long term, terrorist organizations would not use women or children if the population at large did not actively or at least passively support it. There is polling data that clearly indicatessupport on the part of most Palestinians for the terrorist organizations carrying out these operations,support that seemed to grow immediately after the increase in suicide attacks using both male andfemale perpetrators, although enthusiasm for the violence then later declined. (69) Longer termacquiescence of the broader population, particularly in Chechnya and among the Palestinians, wouldbe most concerning and could be indicative of the staying power of this phenomenon. Until very recently, most of the groups engaging in suicide attacks have been interested in pursuing a cause that is geographically distant from the United States, usually limited to territory thatis connected somehow to the origin of the group. The groups that were most likely to use suicideattacks, including Hamas, Islamic Jihad, the PKK, the Tamil Tigers and others described here, hadno interest in directly targeting a suicide attack against U.S. citizens or interests at home or abroad. But suicide attacks are no longer primarily a local phenomenon. Looking at the evolution of the use of suicide attacks globally, the geographical distribution of the phenomenon seems to bewidening, as is the targeting of the attacks. In recent years, suicide attacks have been perpetuatedacross borders and even continents, for example in Croatia, Argentina, Algeria, Panama, and nowthe United States. The most effective globalized network of terrorist organizations is associated with Al Qaeda--the only organization that has successfully used suicide attacks on U.S. soil. Indeed, themost likely future use of suicide attacks against Americans would come from Al Qaeda and its manyassociated groups. Al Qaeda's global networking of militant Islamic groups derives from its genesisin the struggle against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan and the subsequent development under theTaliban regime there of numerous training camps, where attendees were schooled in many differenttechniques of fighting, including the use of explosives and suicide attacks. Al Qaeda has relied upon suicide attacks frequently, especially as the organization has evolvedfrom a primary focus on supporting Islamist insurgencies throughout the world to an increasinglywidespread and direct role in attacking American and other Western targets through any availablemeans. Notable suicide attacks include the 1998 truck bombings of the U.S. Embassies in Dar esSalaam, Tanzania, and Nairobi, Kenya. (Twelve Americans died and 7 were wounded in thoseattacks, while 291 Africans were killed and about 5100 wounded. (70) ) The October 2000 attack onthe U.S.S. Cole in Yemen was a suicide operation, albeit clearly directed against a military notcivilian target. (Seventeen American sailors died and thirty-nine were wounded.) And finally, theSeptember 11th attacks, in which more than 3,000 people were killed, were carried out by nineteenAl Qaeda suicide operatives. There have been numerous other planned but thwarted apparent suicideattacks directly or indirectly attributable to Al Qaeda. And suicide assaults in Saudi Arabia andMorocco in May 2003 also appear to have had ties to Al Qaeda. (71) Suicide tactics seem to be gainingimportance in the organization's arsenal. At this point there is no evidence that Palestinian groups like Hamas and Islamic Jihad have developed ties with Al Qaeda. There is clear evidence, however, of Al Qaeda connections withChechen militant groups, and, as mentioned above, the increasing use of suicide attacks in Russiaand Chechnya is seen as a worrisome sign of potentially growing influence on the part of radicalIslamist elements among the Chechens. Al Qaeda has also provided support for Pakistani groupslike Lashkar-e-taiba of Pakistan/Kashmir. And there are worrisome indications of outside fighterspossibly being responsible for major suicide attacks in Iraq, including the Jordanian Embassy andthe UN Headquarters in Baghdad. While a transition to the use of suicide techniques among groups with Muslim members is often seen as a reflection of Islamist militancy, the role of Al Qaeda in these attacks is becoming blurredby their increasing globalization. The knowledge needed to carry them out is increasingly availableand being disseminated internationally through means such as the Internet. Al Qaeda's JihadManual and its thirteen volume Encyclopedia of Jihad, for example , are bothavailable on the worldwide web and can be downloaded easily to discs, sent as attachments via e-mail, and transferred toCD-Rom. (72) The increasing globalization ofterrorism also means increasing globalization of suicidetactics, because, for all the reasons described above, they are sometimes perceived as being uniquelyeffective. (73) There has been no specific evidence in open literature thus far that Al Qaeda is preparing to use women to engage in suicide attacks. Given Al Qaeda's ideology, some might argue that theorganization would consider it difficult to use women in its so-called "jihad." However, a numberof factors have led the FBI to warn that female suicide attackers could be used by Al Qaeda againstthe United States in the future. First, an interview published in an Arabic-language newspaper inmid-March 2003 quotes a woman who claims that Al Qaeda is setting up training camps to preparewomen for "martyrdom operations," and specifically cites the successful use of female suicideattackers by Palestinian and Chechen organizations. (74) Apparently as a result, the FBI has issuednotices to law enforcement agencies to be alert to the possibility of a growing role for women in AlQaeda. (75) Second, at least in theory, it is possiblethat the capture of senior leaders and othermembers of Al Qaeda could increase the likelihood of women operatives being used to carry outmissions. Other terrorist organizations have innovated in this way when advances incounterterrorism have forced them to adapt. There are two types of suicide attacks that have been in evidence in Iraq: those specificallydirected against U.S. military forces, and those specifically directed against noncombatant targets. These will be dealt with in turn. Technically suicide operations against military targets such as U.S. soldiers in Iraq do not qualify as "terrorist" operations because the victims are not civilians or noncombatants. (76) Nonetheless, some of the techniques that have been described here have appeared in both wartimeand postwar Iraq, including suicide attacks carried out by Iraqi women. (77) Techniques for suicide attacks are regularly copied between groups, and this can make it difficult to distinguish between perpetrators, especially in the early hours after an attack. Al Qaedahas called for attacks on U.S. forces in Iraq, and at one point an unknown group calling itself theArmed Islamic Movement for Al Qaeda, the Fallujah Branch, claimed responsibility for attacks onU.S. military targets. (78) (A connection to AlQaeda has not been independently verified.) There havealso been uncorroborated reports, attributed to the Arab television network al-Jazeera, of trainingcamps for Arab volunteers willing to carry out suicide bombings against U.S. forces. (79) In April, theBritish reportedly found a stash of weapons in Basra that was believed to be meant for suicidebombers, (80) and Americans reportedly found acache of about fifty explosives vests in a school inBaghdad. Some apparently regular Iraqi soldiers used suicide explosives vests to try to kill moreAmerican soldiers, particularly when the Iraqis were ostensibly surrendering. (81) From the end of major hostilities to August 2003, much of the postwar violence in Iraq seemed to have been carried out by Saddam Hussein loyalists, particularly members of the Ba'ath party, andperhaps also members of the disbanded Iraqi army. According to U.S. military commanders, mostattacks on U.S. forces displayed characteristics of traditional guerrilla or insurgency campaigns,involving weapons such as rocket propelled grenades, remotely detonated explosives, and gunfire. (82) There were also attacks on elements of the Iraqi infrastructure, including the water and powersystems, ostensibly designed to disrupt postwar rebuilding and stabilization efforts. These types ofattacks had not generally involved suicide tactics, although such operations by quasi-military groupsare not uncommon in situations of occupation. But the August 2003 suicide attacks on civilian soft targets such as the Jordanian Embassy and the U.N. Headquarters building in Baghdad seemed to bring an added dimension to the threat. Theywere classic terrorist suicide attacks using a car bomb and a truck bomb. Many terrorism expertspoint to the change in targeting and the style of attack as evidence of a possible broadening of thestrategy from mainly a guerrilla insurgency against U.S. forces to include a coordinated terroristcampaign that could involve foreign elements. How the threat will evolve is hard to predict. As mentioned above, it is difficult to prevent or counter suicide attacks. Nonetheless, there are both offensive and defensive measures that may reduce the number and/or severity of attacks. Among the offensive measures are preemptive strikes against the organizations that orchestratesuicide attacks (especially their leaders), vigorous intelligence collection, and efforts to reduce theability of terrorist organizations to recruit suicide candidates. Since the organization is a crucial element in orchestrating suicide attacks, preemptive attacks are most promising if they undermine the ability of the organization to operate. This can mean, forexample, military operations to destroy the physical infrastructure of the group, efforts to cut offfunding, and/or preemptive strikes designed to capture or kill leaders. These types of measures areoften employed by the Israeli Defense Forces, for example, especially the very controversial policyof targeted killings (also called targeted assassinations). Sometimes preemptive attacks areemployed in order to intimidate, harass, or disable a group: the goal can be to keep the organizationso worried about staying ahead of potential military or police action that carefully indoctrinatingfuture suicide attackers becomes difficult. According to this strategy, targeting known operativesor training camps disrupts imminent operations and/or reduces the ability of the group to indoctrinatepeople toward being prepared to kill themselves and others. Others assert that although capturing or killing a leader can undermine the organization, it can also energize the followers into acting in the name of the "martyr." Likewise, operations that enragethe surrounding population can result in an increase in recruitment and rapid reconstruction of thegroup's capabilities. But this can also work the opposite way: when indigenous civilians arevictimized by terrorist attacks, the organization can be marginalized by the local population. Itdepends upon the group and the political context. In this regard, the second offensive measure, vigorous human and technical intelligence gathering, is vital. Good intelligence can provide critical information on a terrorist group'sdynamics. Successful intelligence gathering can occur at many points along the process, from theinitial contact with individuals, to the indoctrination, targeting, equipping, training and launchingof the attackers. These terrorist group activities require such acts as purchases of equipment,reconnaissance of possible target areas, and other potentially observable activities. It is importantto have international cooperation in intelligence gathering, especially in regions of the world whereAmericans are unfamiliar with the culture and language, or may not know the local population well. Intelligence can be crucial to prevent attacks before they occur, and to retaliate effectively in theaftermath, if necessary. Suicide attacks cannot occur in a population that does not provide individuals who are willing to die for the cause. The last of the offensive measures therefore relates to efforts to reducing thepotential recruitment ability of terrorist groups. These measures are the most controversial and canbe frustrating to those who are primarily concerned with preventing imminent attacks: they wouldinclude policies that alter the political, cultural and socio-economic contexts that perpetuate suicideattacks, such as improving quality of life, increasing social stability, providing opportunities forproductive political expression, employment, education, and so on. Other important means ofreducing recruitment include methods to undermine the ideology of the individual attacker,especially his or her dedication and faith in the meaningful nature of his or her death. Historicalexperience demonstrates that terrorist organizations can not continue to employ methods that alienateactual or potential constituents. The ultimate active measure over time is to remove the constituencies. Defensive measures against suicide attacks include preventing perpetrators from physically getting at the target. The goal is to make it much more difficult for an organization to achieve asuccessful attack, increasing the costs in relation to the benefits gained through the attackers' death. These include the full range of measures in homeland defense, from physical barriers to securityscreening to strict border controls. Some also suggest decreasing the quantity or profile ofpotentially symbolic targets, by measures such as restricting unnecessary travel in dangerous areasabroad or controlling the availability of sensitive information on the Internet, for example. Preparingthe public to respond calmly in the face of an attack is another way to reduce the potentialattractiveness of the attack in advance. Such anti-terrorism means are often greatly underrated in the general discussion of how to stop suicide attackers, but their role can be crucial. The purpose is to deny the terrorist organization itsmost attractive targets. The cost/benefit calculations undertaken by the organization as well as theindividuals must be manipulated to the point where achieving a spectacular symbolic strike with itsattendant publicity becomes increasingly difficult and unattractive. The question of how to reduce the threat of suicide attacks against the United States and its interests at home and abroad is extremely important to Congress. Most central to Congress'sinterests is determining the appropriate future funding levels for homeland security, the Departmentof Defense, and foreign operations, especially the balance between measures like homeland securityand force protection, and more pro-active measures like targeted foreign aid programs, publicdiplomacy, multilateral cooperation, military/law enforcement operations, and intelligence forcounterterrorism. (83) The competing requirementsto spend for the operations in Iraq and Afghanistan,for example, as well as on domestic homeland security, are likely to continue to be an area ofconcern. Additional suicide attacks at home or in the field will affect these calculations, especiallyif they result in increasing numbers of casualties. Another area of concern is the question of instituting better and more comprehensive threat assessments with respect to suicide attacks on U.S. interests in advance of potentially painfulepisodes, placing such assessments within the historical context of the considerable internationalexperience with this phenomenon. Spending on counterterrorism and antiterrorism measures to dealwith the evolving threat will be increasingly difficult to gauge in the absence of better analysis of thethreat. This includes not just concentrating upon potential imminent attacks, but also longer-termrigorous, focused and dispassionate evaluation of the terrorist organizations and their constituencies,informed by an indepth understanding of their political, social, and cultural context. Spending onintelligence for counterterrorism will continue to be a serious concern, both in the domestic andinternational arenas, (84) as will having a sufficientquantity of well-qualified people to fillcounterterrorism positions in the relevant U.S. agencies. In this respect, the number of people well-trained to analyze terrorist organizations in depth is currently quite small in the United States, especially compared to other major powers who have inthe past faced a serious terrorist threat. As mentioned above, suicide attacks usually depend uponan organization to be successful. Traditional academic institutions do not, on the whole, supportterrorism studies as a discipline and are wary of devoting resources to a policy-relevant field that hasin the past waxed and waned with the perception of the threat. (85) In an age of globalization, goodanalysis comes not only from access to classified sources, but also from thorough analysis of opensource literature that is often not fully exploited. This approach could involve providing support foradditional civilian and/or military training programs, possibly associated with academic institutionsor government agencies, to be devoted to the study of terrorist organizations, similar to those thatwere implemented to face the Soviet threat. In addition to vigorous military responses, longer-term measures for reducing the constituencies for terrorist organizations and the number of candidates for suicide attacks will continue to beimportant. Nonmilitary measures can involve both "carrots" and "sticks." Funding for initiativessuch as the recently-created Middle East Partnership Initiative, or other such programs devoted topromoting political, economic and educational development in regions where terrorist organizationsrecruit, may provide effective alternatives to those who would otherwise engage in terrorism. (86) Efforts at better public diplomacy may also help. (87) Other measures to deter or reduce the attractiveness to individuals and their families of suicideattacks might lessen the organizations' ability to find candidates. Some have suggested thatpayments to families of suicide attackers be specifically outlawed, or that all states from which suchpayments emerge be held specifically accountable for supporting terrorist activity. Anothersuggestion is to deny family members of suicide attackers visas to the United States. Other measuresmay attempt to undercut the ideology of the potential recruit, for example by increasing the profileof moderate Islamic clerics who condemn suicide attacks. Finally, Congressional oversight of Defense Department activities in Iraq, including funding of reconstruction and stability operations in future months and years, will almost inevitably beaffected by the future evolution of the resistance forces there. Continued suicide attacks in Iraq willnot only victimize American soldiers, as well as international, U.S., and Iraqi civilians, but couldpotentially have important larger effects on perceptions of the postwar effort as well. Developingthe best possible countermeasures to potential suicide attacks in Iraq and elsewhere may be centralto the success of U.S. policy there in future months and years. 

Summary: Suicide attacks by terrorist organizations have become more prevalent globally, and assessing the threat of suicide attacks against the United States and its interests at home and abroad hastherefore gained in strategic importance. This report focuses on the following questions: What are suicide attacks? What have been the patterns and motivations for terrorist organizations using suicide attacks in the past? What terroristgroups and other organizations are most likely to launch such attacks? How great a threat areterrorist suicide attacks to the United States, at home and abroad? How can the United Statescounter such a threat? It analyzes the key lessons of the international experience with suicide attacksand examines their relevance to the United States. Important conclusions include evidence that suicide attackers generally make choices and are not impulsive or "crazy." They are usually carefully recruited, indoctrinated and then targeted byorganizations. It is important, therefore, to concentrate on analyzing the culture and structure of theorganization when fashioning a response. Historically, suicide attackers have been used by bothsecular and religious groups. The Tamil Tigers, a secular group, carried out the most ruthlesscampaign of suicide attacks in the 20th century; but there has been an increasing number of casualtiesinternationally, notably as a result of attacks by Palestinian groups against Israelis and byorganizations in various countries believed associated with or incited by Al Qaeda. The use ofwomen as suicide attackers is not historically unprecedented, but its frequency among groups suchas the Sri Lankan Tamil Tigers (or LTTE), the Turkish Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), and nowthe Palestinian Fatah-affiliated al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades and the Chechens, may indicate a socialbroadening of the phenomenon. While the organization is predominant in the execution of the attack,over time it cannot recruit and sustain itself without the acquiescence of the larger society. The greatest threat to U.S. citizens comes from the possibility of further attacks orchestrated or inspired by Al Qaeda, either in the U.S. or abroad. Furthermore, suicide attacks on U.S. citizensand civilians in Iraq are a mounting concern. To counter the threat, the United States may use bothoffensive and defensive measures. Offensive measures include counterterrorism efforts such aspreemptive strikes against terrorist organizations, vigorous intelligence collection, and longer termefforts to reduce the ability of terrorist organizations to recruit suicide candidates. Defensivemeasures include physical protection of U.S. assets, psychological preparation of the population,and the full range of anti-terrorism efforts required for a robust homeland defense. The report concludes with a discussion of the implications for Congress of the increase in suicide attacks, and a range of options for meeting the threat. It will not be updated.