Afghanistan, while considered a water-scarce nation, has significant water resources, originating from precipitation in its high mountains. Average annual precipitation is estimated to be approximately 180 billion cubic meters, of which 80 percent originates from snow in the Hindu Kush mountain range. While some of this water is lost to evaporation, the balance recharges Afghanistan’s surface and groundwater systems, which serve as the nation’s primary sources of water. Only about 30 percent of agricultural land receives adequate supplies of water, and Afghanistan now uses less than a third of its available water resources. Furthermore, the lack of infrastructure to store and control river flow results in severe flooding in some years and drought in others. Almost 80 percent of Afghanistan’s population derives their livelihood from the agriculture sector, which is highly dependent on irrigation. Afghanistan is mountainous and much of its land is not naturally arable (see fig. 1). Specifically, irrigation makes up 93 percent of Afghanistan’s total water usage. The agriculture sector, however, has been severely impacted by years of civil strife and war, droughts and damaging floods, and breakdowns in community-based and government institutions operating the Afghan irrigation systems. As a consequence, irrigation infrastructure seriously deteriorated and many farmers returning to their land cannot get a reliable irrigation water supply. In addition, access to safe drinking water, sanitation, social services, and markets among the rural population is the lowest in the region and among the lowest in the world. It is estimated that four out of five Afghans in rural areas may be drinking contaminated water. Countrywide, 28 percent of rural Afghans use surface water (rivers, lakes, and irrigation ditches) as their primary source of drinking water. Afghanistan’s water sector faces many other challenges. According to the 2007- 2008 National Risk and Vulnerability Assessment for Afghanistan, published in January 2010, 27 percent of the population has access to safe drinking water and 5 percent has access to improved sanitation, which is among the lowest rates in the world. The World Bank has reported that current access to piped water infrastructure is among the lowest in the world at 18 percent, and because of poor operation and maintenance, the water service reaches an even lower share of the population. In addition, a report prepared by a USAID Afghanistan Program Manager for Power and Water noted that while Kabul has an estimated 35 percent of the city’s population served by piped water, it has no municipal wastewater system. Consequently, microbial contamination of water resources by domestic wastewater has increased substantially. Activities in Afghanistan could have an impact on resource availability in neighboring countries. Four of Afghanistan’s five major river basins flow into the territory or boundary waters of five of its six neighbors—Pakistan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and Iran. The construction of large water storage or diversion facilities could affect these countries. The ability of the government of Afghanistan to achieve sustainable and multipurpose use of its abundant water resources will depend on its capacity to engage in dialogue, negotiate, and establish relationships and agreements with its neighbors. Water’s importance cuts across all facets of life: its availability impacts food production and nutrition, city development and growth, income generation and livelihood, and human health and hygiene, among other areas. While the water issues that need to be addressed in any particular nation are unique, examples of water-sector issues include: Drinking water, sanitation, and hygiene: Improving access to, and effective use of, safe water and basic sanitation, and promoting better hygiene. Irrigation: Rehabilitating and improving existing irrigation systems, developing new irrigation schemes, and implementing strategies to reduce water losses and monitor use. Water governance and regulation: Investing in policy and legal reforms, building local capacity, and strengthening water resources planning, management, and governance. Environment: Promoting good environmental stewardship through actions such as controlling erosion, reducing industrial pollution, protecting watersheds, managing river basins, and implementing disaster risk reduction activities to reduce vulnerability to droughts and floods. A number of U.S. government agencies, Afghan ministries, international partners, and nongovernmental organizations (NGO) assist in developing the Afghan water sector. As table one shows, there are several U.S. agencies involved in the U.S. effort to improve Afghanistan’s water sector. These agencies include: USAID, DOD, through CERP and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE), the Department of State (State), the U.S. Geological Service (USGS), and the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA). As shown in table 2, seven Afghan government bodies have authority over water-related issues. The international community also assists Afghanistan with the development of the water sector. Afghanistan’s international partners include the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank, the European Commission, the Canadian International Development Agency, the German Agency for Technical Cooperation, and the Japanese International Cooperation Agency, as well as various agencies within the United Nations. Many foreign and domestic NGOs are also involved in a wide range of activities. USAID and DOD, through CERP, have been the primary sources of U.S. government assistance for the development of the Afghan water sector. As illustrated in figure 2, USAID awarded $168 million for its water-sector efforts between fiscal year 2002 and the second quarter of fiscal year 2010 to fund a wide range of completed and ongoing water projects in Afghanistan. A more detailed discussion of USAID’s funding of U.S. water projects in Afghanistan is discussed in appendices II and III. DOD, through CERP, has awarded approximately $81 million in funds for water-related projects carried out under its stewardship between fiscal year 2006 and the second quarter of fiscal year 2010. As figure 3 shows, DOD has disbursed approximately $28 million for CERP water-related projects and carried an unliquidated obligations balance of approximately $53 million. While this report focuses primarily on USAID and DOD, other U.S. agencies identified in table 1 have funded efforts to improve Afghanistan’s water sector. For example, the Good Performers Initiative (GPI), an Afghan government initiative supported by the U.S. government through State and USAID has provided high-impact development assistance to provinces that have demonstrated counter-narcotics achievements. This includes the funding of water-sector projects. As of the end of March 2010, nine GPI projects included water activities, with awards totaling approximately $5.5 million. Further information on the GPI projects is located in appendix IV. Our analysis indicates that the water-sector goals articulated in the U.S. Government’s Inter-Agency Water Strategy for Afghanistan generally align with the goals of the ANDS and the ANDS water-sector strategy. Since 2002, the U.S. government—led primarily by USAID and DOD—has implemented a wide range of water projects throughout Afghanistan and, while some preceded the ANDS and the U.S. interagency water strategies, implemented projects generally addressed the needs and goals of the Afghan water sector. The U.S. government plans to accelerate water-sector development efforts from fiscal year 2010 through fiscal year 2014. The goals contained in the U.S. Inter-Agency Water Strategy for Afghanistan are generally consistent with the goals of the water strategy of the government of Afghanistan. In 2008, the Afghan government issued its ANDS Water Resource Management Sector Strategy for the period 2008- 2013. In March 2010, the Obama administration approved the U.S. Government Inter-Agency Water Strategy for Afghanistan to serve as the guiding strategic approach behind U.S. water-sector development efforts in Afghanistan for fiscal year 2009 through fiscal year 2014. According to this document, the U.S government’s water strategy is intended to be consistent with the direction set by the government of Afghanistan and as reflected in national law, policy, and strategic direction in ANDS. Both the U.S. Inter-Agency Water Strategy and the Afghan government strategy aim to improve the management of Afghanistan’s water resources and to provide improved social and economic benefits that will help reduce poverty and improve the quality of life for the people of Afghanistan. Our analysis of the documents shows that the two strategies have articulated goals within six key areas, and these goals generally align between the two strategy documents, as depicted in figure 4. The key areas are (1) Water Supply and Sanitation; (2) Agriculture; (3) Hydropower; (4) Environment; (5) Governance and Management; and (6) Transboundary issues. Figure 4 summarizes the goals and alignment between the two documents. USAID began implementing a number of water projects in Afghanistan as far back as 2002. It developed a strategic plan for water in December 2004. The 2004 USAID strategic plan, covering fiscal year 2005 through 2010, was focused on one strategic objective: expanding access to water supplies and sanitation. Specifically, it stated that USAID planned to assist Afghan ministries responsible for water supplies and sanitation to promote access to water and sanitation services, especially in the rural and underserved areas. Not withstanding the lack of an earlier water strategy for Afghanistan, and as illustrated in a USAID Action Memo, the need in the Afghan water sector during the early 2000s was great. In fact, work done by USAID and DOD during this period addressed development needs in the Afghan water sector that still exist today. Other U.S. agencies, such as State, USDA, and USGS, had limited involvement in implementing water-sector projects during this period. Since 2002, the U.S. government, led by USAID and DOD, has implemented a wide range of projects in Afghanistan that are either exclusively water projects or have water-related activities as a part of other larger development projects. Many projects were completed before the U.S. and Afghan water strategies were developed; nevertheless, they addressed aspects of Afghan water-sector needs and are generally in alignment with the Afghan water-strategy goals. Water-Exclusive Projects: According to data provided to us by USAID staff in Afghanistan, since 2003, USAID has completed four water exclusive projects and continues work on three. These projects, though completed or initiated prior to the Afghan and U.S. strategies, addressed Afghan water-sector needs and were consistent with the goals of the Afghan water strategy. The projects primarily focused on water supply and sanitation and, to some extent, on governance and management emphasizing capacity building, as shown in table 3. The water-exclusive projects represented about 50 percent, or $65 million, of the total funding of $129 million disbursed by USAID for water projects in Afghanistan from fiscal year 2002 through the 2nd quarter of fiscal year 2010. As noted earlier, appendix II provides a summary table of funding information on USAID’s water-exclusive projects in Afghanistan. The projects are geographically widespread, with certain projects providing benefits to rural communities, and others providing benefits to urban communities throughout Afghanistan, including such volatile provinces as Kandahar and Helmand, the two provinces considered to be the heart of the ongoing Taliban insurgency. Appendix V shows details of the provincial locations of the USAID water-exclusive projects. USAID’s effort to extend development assistance in such areas is consistent with the administration’s COIN strategy, but work in such areas presents challenges for monitoring the performance of such projects as well as for their long-term sustainability. Water-Related Activities: In addition to the water-exclusive projects discussed above, our analysis identified hundreds of water-related activities that USAID has implemented as part of larger infrastructure and economic rehabilitation projects implemented between fiscal year 2002 and the 2nd quarter of fiscal year 2010. Specifically, according to data provided by USAID, there were a total of 19 such infrastructure projects with water-related activities. From 13 of these projects, we identified 511 water-related activities. According to our analysis, USAID’s water-related activities accounted for about 50 percent or $64 million of total USAID water-sector disbursements (see app. III for detailed funding information on these activities). Also, while many preceded the Afghan and U.S. interagency strategies, these activities were broadly consistent with the Afghan water-sector goals. Examples of water-related activities included drilling wells for potable water supply, rehabilitating irrigation systems, and cleaning irrigation canals, and mostly addressed the goals of irrigation, water supply, and sanitation and, to a lesser extent, capacity building (see app. VI for more details). We attempted to identify the provincial locations of USAID’s water-related activities, but, while USAID had data for the location of the parent infrastructure projects, the data provided by USAID that we analyzed did not always contain provincial or project location information. DOD has implemented a large number of water-related projects in Afghanistan under CERP. Based on our analysis of DOD CERP data, DOD implemented 1,663 water-related projects under CERP from fiscal year 2006 through the second quarter of fiscal year 2010. See table 4 for a summary of CERP water-related projects implemented by DOD in Afghanistan. These were mostly small-scale, low-budget projects with funding ranging from $30 for a well and water storage tank to approximately $953,000 for a pipe scheme in Konar province. Table 4 shows that large portions of CERP water-related projects were devoted to water supply and sanitation (1,128 of 1,663, or 68 percent) and agriculture and irrigation projects (438 of 1,663, or 26 percent). CERP water-related projects were implemented across at least 33 of the 34 provinces in Afghanistan. However, while the data did not allow us to identify projects’ exact district or village locations, the CERP data we analyzed demonstrated that CERP-funded water-related projects were implemented in both rural and urban areas, and in some provinces where USAID’s water-related activities have been implemented. CERP projects are part of the U.S. COIN strategy of extending development benefits to win the hearts and minds of the Afghan populace. However, the volatile security situation throughout Afghanistan, particularly in the south (the historic heartland of the Taliban) and east, has presented serious problems to the implementation of CERP-funded water-related projects. According to documents provided to us by USAID and our discussions with agency officials involved in development work in Afghanistan, the U.S. government plans to accelerate water-sector development efforts in Afghanistan for fiscal year 2010 through fiscal year 2014. Under the government’s Inter-Agency Water Strategy for Afghanistan approved in March 2010, U.S. agencies involved in water-sector efforts in Afghanistan have estimated that an additional $2.1 billion is needed between 2010 and 2014 to support water-sector development activities in Afghanistan. This is a significant increase over the approximately $250 million that U.S. agencies had awarded for water-sector development efforts from 2002 through March of 2010. Under their projected Afghan water development efforts, U.S. agencies envision three tiers of water projects that would be supported by this funding over the period. Many of these projects are the types of large- scale, capital-intensive projects, such as large dams, for which some of the Afghan government officials have expressed a preference. Appendix VII summarizes the water projects envisioned by U.S. agencies in Afghanistan for fiscal year 2010 through fiscal year 2014. The majority of these projected U.S. water efforts in Afghanistan do not currently identify what role each agency will play in the implementation of these projects. The Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 (GPRA) and several U.S. strategic documents concerning operations in Afghanistan emphasize the importance of interagency coordination in Afghanistan. Moreover, we have previously reported on the importance of interagency coordination and collaboration when multiple U.S. agencies are involved in U.S. counterterrorism-related efforts. U.S. agencies involved in water sector development efforts in Afghanistan have recently undertaken some steps to improve interagency coordination of water-sector projects. For example, U.S. agencies have developed an Infrastructure Working Group for Afghanistan (IWG), a U.S. Interagency Water Strategy for Afghanistan that emphasizes the importance of coordination, and have started to meet on a regular basis to coordinate some of their projects. The interagency strategy called for the development of an interagency implementation plan by August 2010. However, as of September 2010, an interagency implementation plan has not been completed. Additionally, USAID and DOD still have not developed a centralized database, which we previously recommended was needed to help ensure that adequate information exists to manage and make decisions on development projects in Afghanistan. Such a database would help the U.S. government identify and coordinate ongoing and completed water and other development projects among relevant U.S. agencies. Moreover, despite some recent efforts, additional steps are needed to enhance U.S. coordination with the Afghan government, and with other members of the donor community. For example, U.S. agencies generally do not meet on a regular basis with all the relevant ministries in the Afghan government, and they do not have complete data concerning other donor projects in order to best leverage resources and maximize investments. These additional steps could help the United States to more effectively leverage resources of U.S. agencies and enhance coordination with Afghan government and other members of the donor community. GPRA recognizes the importance of coordinating program areas where responsibility for achieving results is shared among agencies. Moreover, we have also reported on the importance of interagency coordination and collaboration and broadly defined it as any joint activity that is intended to produce more public value than could be produced when organizations act alone. Several other U.S. documents concerning operations in Afghanistan also emphasize the importance of interagency coordination. The U.S. government has taken several steps to enhance coordination among agencies assisting the development of the Afghan water sector. The IWG was created in 2009 to coordinate, review, and oversee U.S. government-funded national, regional, and district-level activities in the areas of energy, transportation, and water. U.S. agencies began meeting thereafter to discuss water-related infrastructure projects, such as the rehabilitation of hydroelectric dams, water resources assessments, and the commercialization of water service delivery in Afghanistan. Prior to the creation of the IWG, interagency coordination for the Afghan water sector was limited; U.S. agencies conducting water-related activities in Afghanistan generally operated on their own and did not regularly coordinate or consult other agencies from 2002 to 2008, according to U.S. officials. As a result, U.S. officials we met with acknowledged that opportunities to leverage resources and to establish synergy among projects were often overlooked. According to USAID officials, water was not a U.S. development priority in Afghanistan until 2008, and this contributed to the lack of formal organization among U.S. agencies. These officials noted that coordination on water projects, when it occurred, was informal. Agencies did not meet on a regular basis to discuss ongoing projects. As noted earlier, in addition to USAID efforts, DOD funds Afghan water and other development-related projects through CERP and carries them out primarily through PRTs. However, USAID and U.S. government agencies other than DOD generally maintained a minimal representation on PRTs prior to 2008, which, according to USAID officials, affected the ability of U.S. agencies to coordinate projects. Since this time, the United States developed an Integrated Civilian-Military Campaign Plan for Support to Afghanistan in August 2009. This plan directed that integrated planning and operations between civilian and military components occur at all levels. The document directs that U.S. Embassy and civilian-military working groups will organize along functional rather than agency lines, and in the field, civilian-military teams will organize at the district, provincial, and regional level to implement the U.S. counterinsurgency mission and to reduce the tendency of agencies to operate on their own. In addition, the March 2010 U.S. Government Inter-Agency Water Strategy for Afghanistan, discussed earlier, also emphasizes the importance of coordinating U.S. government efforts in the water sector in order to facilitate greater synergy and developmental impact. The water strategy recognizes the role of the IWG in helping to coordinate the U.S. government water development activities in Afghanistan and states that the IWG will coordinate with other U.S. government working groups to enable development and implementation of cross-cutting and mutually supportive strategies. While in Afghanistan in December 2009, we attended a meeting of the IWG in Kabul, and a meeting on the Southeast Afghanistan Water Resources Assessment at Bagram Air Force Base, to observe interagency coordination. The IWG meetings continued into 2010. The U.S. Inter-Agency Water Strategy further states that the IWG is responsible for helping coordinate water-development activities in Afghanistan and that PRTs can play an important facilitating role in the coordination of water projects. CERP rules and guidance note that commanders should consider complementary programs provided by USAID and other non-governmental agencies operating in their areas of responsibility. In addition to PRT coordination, for projects greater than $1 million, CERP guidance requires coordination with the U.S. Forces Afghanistan’s CERP Review Board, where USAID is a voting member. According to USAID officials, these processes provide useful opportunities to exchange information about ongoing and future projects. In March 2010 congressional testimony, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Partnership Strategy and Stability Operations stated that USAID’s participation in the CERP Review Board prevents duplication of effort and also helps identify any problems with sustainment for CERP-nominated projects. This official also stated that the increase of U.S. government civilians in the field significantly improves the integration and coordination of reconstruction projects. A senior USAID official responsible for coordinating USAID’s representatives who work at PRTs stated that, at the various levels of coordination with the U.S. military, USAID staff does their best to share information concerning activities by USAID project implementers. U.S. agency officials have identified the importance of sharing critical data and project information with each other. The U.S. Inter-Agency Water Strategy for Afghanistan, which seeks to define and articulate a common approach to water-sector development in Afghanistan, including short, medium, and long-term goals, and outlines an interagency strategy, called for the development of an aggregate interagency implementation plan by August 2010. However, the interagency implementation plan has not been completed. As we have previously reported, best practices indicate that agencies can enhance and sustain their collaborative efforts by, among other things, defining and articulating a common outcome, establishing mutually reinforcing or joint strategies, identifying and addressing needs by leveraging resources, agreeing on roles and responsibilities, and establishing means to operate across agency boundaries. The development of an interagency implementation plan that identifies and addresses the leveraging of U.S. resources, establishes agreements on roles and responsibilities of the various U.S. agencies, and outlines means to operate across agency boundaries could further enhance U.S. efforts to improve interagency coordination. We previously reported that DOD and USAID relied on separate data systems to track and manage development projects in Afghanistan, and recommended the agencies take steps to develop a centralized database to ensure that adequate information exists to manage and make decisions. For example, USAID used its GeoBase tracking system to capture and maintain information on all its reconstruction and development activities in Afghanistan, and DOD did not have access to this system. DOD, at the time of our previous reviews, used the Combined Information Data Network Exchange (CIDNE)—a classified database to track CERP projects as well as other types of information concerning U.S. military operations. As of September 2010, a central database that contains information on all U.S.-funded development projects in Afghanistan still does not exist, and each U.S. agency continues to maintain its own project tracking system that identifies agency-specific information on water projects in Afghanistan. USAID initiated a new database system in late 2009 known as Afghan Info to replace the GeoBase system, which it had been using previously for development and reconstruction project management. According to USAID, the purpose of Afghan Info is to provide “a comprehensive and transparent interagency picture of how project implementers use foreign assistance resources to support the United States’ foreign assistance objectives in Afghanistan.” USAID officials stated that they would like the Afghan Info system designated as the official system for data on U.S. assistance activities in Afghanistan; however, as of September 2010, they were still awaiting ambassador-level approval for this designation. The USAID official responsible for developing the database told us that the Afghan Info system did not include data from any other U.S. agency, aside from the quarterly CERP data, and he did not know whether the system was being used to coordinate water-sector development in Afghanistan. Senior DOD officials in Afghanistan who are involved in implementing CERP-funded water projects told us in August 2010 they were not familiar with the Afghan Info system or the data it contained. DOD continues to use the CIDNE database for its CERP-related data. According to DOD officials, CIDNE is a classified system and was not meant as a platform for interagency coordination. We have previously reported that compatible data systems or other mechanisms would enable U.S. agencies to share information about ongoing and completed projects with each other. Maintaining an accessible data system that promotes information sharing among agencies is particularly important in an environment such as Afghanistan where officials from different agencies are involved in similar development efforts that are dispersed throughout the country. U.S. agency officials told us that having access to project data from other agencies would contribute to better project planning, eliminate potential overlap, and allow agencies to leverage each other’s resources more effectively. We further reported that without a mechanism to improve the visibility of individual development projects, the U.S. government may not be in a position to fully leverage the resources available to develop Afghanistan and risks duplicating efforts and wasting taxpayer dollars. As previously noted, the U.S. government is one of many international players involved in the efforts to provide substantial development assistance to Afghanistan, including efforts to enhance the Afghan water sector. As such, it is important that the United States coordinates its efforts to address goals and objectives outlined in its interagency water sector strategy with the Afghan government and the various other international partners. With respect to the U.S. government’s coordination with the Afghan government, U.S. agency officials told us that they meet on an as-needed basis with individual Afghan ministry officials to discuss water issues. The U.S. government provides technical advisers (contractors) and assistance to the Technical Secretariat of the Supreme Council for Water Affairs Management. The Technical Secretariat assists the Supreme Council by performing functions such as obtaining, reviewing, and analyzing documents relevant to the water sector; collecting and compiling technical data and legal documentation; and submitting relevant documentation and recommendations for action to the Supreme Council. U.S. advisers to the Supreme Council’s Technical Secretariat assist the Secretariat in carrying out its responsibilities. U.S. advisers attend the Technical Secretariat meetings and share the meeting minutes with U.S. agency officials if U.S. officials are not in attendance at the meetings. One recent example of cooperation between the United States, Afghan government, and donor community concerns transboundary water issues. Representatives of the Afghan government along with officials from the U.S. government and other donor governments began meeting on a regular basis in 2009 to discuss related issues and formulate a plan for capacity building within the Afghan government to handle transboundary water issues. These monthly transboundary water meetings have proven to be useful as an opportunity for the Afghan government to discuss sensitive issues in cooperation with the international community, according to USAID and international donor officials, and to better understand the importance of incorporating transboundary water considerations in development projects. The consequence of not obtaining concurrence from the Afghan government on transboundary issues could affect the willingness of certain Western governments and international entities to provide water-sector development assistance in Afghanistan, as occurred already in one case involving an international donor. Afghan Ministry officials involved in water-sector development expressed some disappointment over the U.S. government’s failure to involve them in the development of the U.S. Inter-Agency Water Strategy and viewed this as evidence that the U.S. government did not consider the Afghan government as an equal partner in the development of the Afghan water sector. USAID officials told us that they briefed Afghan government representatives at the start of the project and solicited the government’s input but that the Afghan government did not take part in the development of the U.S. strategy. The U.S. Inter-Agency Water Strategy for Afghanistan was signed in March 2010 and U.S. officials stated that they briefed Afghan officials in January 2010 on the finalized strategy. U.S. officials acknowledged, however, that more effective and consistent communication would improve the relationship on water-related issues, including the selection and prioritization of U.S.-funded projects. With regard to donor coordination, U.S. government officials and representatives of the donor community with whom we met acknowledged that until 2010, minimal coordination had occurred among them on the broad range of water-sector issues in Afghanistan. These officials stated that a key challenge to donor coordination is that international donors have their own portfolios that are linked to national objectives from their home countries. Because of this, international donors often want to pursue their own plans. International donor representatives told us that while such lack of coordination among donors can lead to duplication of efforts, it was unlikely that duplications had occurred given the extent of the development assistance needed in the Afghan water sector, even in the absence of coordination. However, these representatives said that donors have likely missed opportunities to maximize their investments and leverage the contributions of other donors by not systematically coordinating their water-sector development programs. In January 2010, at the initiative of USAID, the water-sector donor community in Afghanistan met to discuss a range of issues concerning urban water supply and sanitation and to discuss ways of coordinating their efforts in Afghanistan. At the meeting, donors agreed that the German development organizations would lead the monthly donor coordination meetings for the first 6 months, and USAID would lead meetings for the 6 months that follow. As a first step to providing better visibility of donor activities, donors agreed at their first coordination meeting to take steps to share data concerning their completed and ongoing urban water and sanitation projects. The plan was to capture information in a spreadsheet and share with respective donors. Donors agreed that an improved information-sharing system would be useful in coordinating their projects and leveraging their resources. However, our review of the most recent effort to capture such information on a spreadsheet revealed missing donor data on the status of ongoing and completed urban water projects. In addition, according to USAID officials, no further effort has been undertaken to complete the spreadsheets. We were unable to assess whether such duplication had taken place because of the lack of effort to capture consolidated information on donor efforts. According to a USAID official involved in these discussions, donor participants have raised the possibility of meeting on a quarterly basis with the Afghan government’s Technical Secretariat of the Supreme Council for Water Affairs Management to coordinate activities in the Afghan water sector. Donors noted, however, that they preferred to focus in the near term on donor-specific issues before expanding to include issues that involve officials of the Afghan government. USAID and other U.S. agency officials who were knowledgeable about both the energy and water sectors in Afghanistan stated that the Inter- Ministerial Commission on Energy has worked well as a coordination mechanism and could be a model for enhancing U.S. coordination of water-sector efforts with the Afghan government and the donor community. This energy-sector Commission meets on a monthly basis and participants include officials from the Afghan ministries, the U.S. government, and other international donors. U.S. participants have stated that coordination through the Inter-Ministerial Commission has been very effective and has provided opportunities to discuss energy development priorities and ongoing and future projects. In addition to the monthly meetings, U.S. government advisers and advisers from other governments provide a wide variety of technical services on all aspects of the electrical power sector to the Commission secretariat. The United States and other international donors have stated that the Technical Secretariat of the Supreme Council for Water Affairs Management could be the appropriate forum for institutionalizing coordination in the water sector among the Afghan and U.S. governments and other international donors, similar to the role the Inter-Ministerial Commission on Energy has played in enhancing the coordination of U.S., Afghan, and international donor community energy-sector efforts. USAID has established performance management and monitoring procedures, including for implementers of water sector projects. USAID’s Automated Directives System documents the agency’s performance management and monitoring procedures. Project implementers must follow requirements outlined in USAID award documents. We recently reported that USAID had some gaps in performance management of both its agricultural programs in Afghanistan as well as its development assistance efforts in Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas. We found similar gaps existed in USAID’s performance management efforts for its Afghanistan water-sector projects. For example, while USAID collected quarterly progress reports from its implementing partners for five of the six water projects included in our review, agency staff did not analyze and interpret this information. As we previously reported, the security situation in Afghanistan poses a significant challenge to U.S. project-monitoring efforts. USAID and others have identified several alternative monitoring procedures agency staff can employ to help mitigate the security challenges; however, agency staff we met with were unaware of this guidance. DOD has certain performance management requirements for its CERP projects. We found various weaknesses in DOD’s efforts to monitor CERP water projects in Afghanistan, which prevent the department from being able to assess project progress or results. USAID has established performance management procedures, including for implementers of water-sector projects, at the agency, mission, and project level. We reviewed six selected water-sector projects and found USAID’s performance management efforts had some gaps, and that Afghanistan’s security environment presents a challenge to these efforts. To assess USAID’s performance management and monitoring of its Afghan water projects, we reviewed five of the seven exclusive water projects discussed earlier in this report, as well as one water-related project, the Village-Based Watershed Restoration in Ghor Province project, which has a large water component. These six projects encompass a range of project costs, are both rural and urban-based, and include varying implementation periods, including completed and ongoing projects. USAID’s Automated Directives System establishes performance management and evaluation procedures USAID is expected to follow with respect to planning, monitoring, and evaluating its programs. While USAID has noted that Afghanistan is an insecure environment in which to implement its programs, the agency has generally maintained the same performance management and evaluation procedures as it does in other countries in which it operates. In October 2008, USAID adopted new guidance endorsing several alternative monitoring methods in high threat environments. However, this guidance was not disseminated until December 2009, and USAID staff in Afghanistan responsible for water sector activities said during a July 2010 meeting that they were not aware of this guidance. Nonetheless, we incorporated this guidance in our review where applicable. Figure 5 presents a summary of the planning, monitoring, and evaluating requirements that make up USAID’s performance management and evaluation procedures the agency expects its staff to follow. For the purpose of our review, we focused on those elements of the Automated Directives System performance management and evaluation procedures that we determined to be generally consistent with the requirements stipulated by USAID in the applicable implementing partners’ contracts, cooperative agreements, or grant award documents. Mission-Level Compliance: Planning provides a structure for project management and helps to clarify what needs to be done and why, and how well it should be done. At the mission level, USAID’s Automated Directives System requires USAID officials to complete a Mission performance management plan (PMP) for each of its high-level objectives as a tool to manage its performance management and evaluation procedures. In line with this requirement, USAID’s Mission to Afghanistan developed its first PMP in 2006, covering 2006, 2007, and 2008. Overall, the 2006-2008 Mission PMP incorporated key planning activities. For example, the PMP identified indicators, established baselines and targets, planned for data quality assessments, and described the frequency of data collection for four high- level objectives for all USAID programs in Afghanistan. However, this Mission PMP for Afghanistan did not include performance indicators specific to water-sector projects. As we previously reported, the Mission has operated without an up-to-date PMP for 2009 and 2010. However, according to USAID officials, the agency is in the process of developing a new missionwide PMP, which is expected to be completed by the end of fiscal year 2010. USAID attributed the delay in creating the new PMP to the process of developing new strategies in different sectors and gaining approval from the Embassy in Afghanistan and from agency headquarters in Washington. Implementing Partner Compliance: At the project level, implementing partners are required to develop and submit monitoring and evaluation plans to USAID for approval, with the specific requirements for each project outlined in USAID contract, cooperative agreement, and grant award documents. We reviewed the award documents for these six projects and found that they generally required implementers to carry out similar performance planning, monitoring, and evaluating activities. The lone grant award, the Rural Water Supply and Sanitation project, had fewer specified performance management requirements. For the six water projects we examined, we assessed whether project implementers established goals and objectives, a requirement outlined in USAID’s Automated Directives System; as well as whether implementers identified performance indicators and expected targets, and defined the frequency of and methods for data collection and reporting, which are required by both USAID’s Automated Directives System and in all but one of the USAID contracts and cooperative agreements for the projects we reviewed. We found that implementing partners for all six projects defined project goals and objectives in their project planning documents. Implementers for the four ongoing projects we reviewed defined the frequency of and methods for data collection and reporting. The Afghanistan Urban Water and Sanitation project work plan did not meet this requirement, and the Rural Water Supply and Sanitation project was not required to do so. As table 5 shows, four out of six implementers established performance indicators, though some did not always establish targets for the indicators as required. These targets enable officials to measure progress against performance indicators. Performance monitoring is critical to agencies’ determination of whether or not projects are on track and meeting established goals and objectives. According to USAID’s Automated Directives System, monitoring efforts, among other things, should include collecting performance data, assessing data quality, and analyzing and interpreting data to make necessary program adjustments. We have previously reported on challenges relating to USAID’s efforts to monitor projects in Afghanistan and Pakistan due to the security situation in these countries. To assess USAID’s performance monitoring of the six selected water projects, we examined the extent to which USAID collected performance data, including its ability to conduct site visits and its efforts to analyze and interpret implementing partner performance data. We found USAID generally collected quarterly reports that it required its project implementers to submit. In particular, implementers of five of the six projects we reviewed provided quarterly reports on a regular basis, as was required in their project award documents. These reports generally contained project information, such as on activities, challenges, and expenditures. With respect to the remaining project included in our review, the Afghanistan Urban Water and Sanitation project, the USAID Office of Inspector General reported that there were inconsistencies in implementing partner reporting requirements, as well as compliance with those requirements. According to Automated Directives System guidance, conducting site visits is one recommended way to assess whether reports accurately reflect what occurs in the field. However, we saw limited evidence of documented site visit or other monitoring efforts. For example, only two of the projects we reviewed— the Afghanistan Urban Water and Sanitation project and the Afghanistan Water, Agriculture, and Technology Transfer project—had documented site visits. In addition, USAID provided documentation of one third-party monitoring report—from November to December 2009, USAID hired contractors to conduct a third-party monitoring effort of the Afghanistan Water, Agriculture, and Technology Transfer project in light of staffing limitations and security-related travel restrictions that prevented agency staff from monitoring the project on site. USAID officials we met with in Afghanistan acknowledged the importance of and expressed a desire for site visits to the locations of water projects; however, they pointed out that several factors, particularly the security situation, as well as staff shortages and heavy workloads, prevented them from doing so. USAID has predicated the success of its development programs in Afghanistan on a stable security environment; however, as we have reported, the lack of a secure environment in Afghanistan has continued to challenge reconstruction and development efforts. One agency official told us that it is sometimes difficult to get the U.S. military to provide security for staff site visits due to the military’s many other responsibilities. According to this official, the inability to conduct more site visits limits the agency’s ability to build relationships with local partners and, in turn, presents a challenge to project management in general. This official noted the agency has recently hired additional staff and believed they would help to alleviate some of these monitoring concerns. USAID approved new guidance endorsing several alternative monitoring methods in high threat environments where it is difficult for USAID staff to make site visits. However, this guidance, which was promulgated in October 2008, was not disseminated to USAID staff until December 2009. Further, the USAID Mission to Afghanistan water sector staff with whom we spoke in late July 2010 said they were unaware of the new guidance. Alternative methods in the new guidance include using new technologies, working with third parties and coordinating with other agencies to monitor activities, and establishing flexible performance targets. These methods are similar to those developed by the agency to mitigate the difficulty it faced directly monitoring its programs in Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas due to these areas’ dangerous security environment, and to those developed by the World Bank and used for World Bank projects in Afghanistan in areas where staff cannot travel. While USAID collected implementing partner quarterly reports, the agency did not consistently analyze and interpret, as required, the performance information in these reports for the programs in our review. USAID officials told us that they regularly communicated with and collected progress reports from project implementers, but staff shortages and heavy workload have prevented them from consistently reviewing the reporting documents. As a result, Mission staff may not be fully aware of key project information typically contained in quarterly reports, such as project progress, key accomplishments, and challenges. As noted earlier, the U.S. Mission Afghanistan continues to lack an approved PMP with performance indicators. Additionally, as table 5 previously illustrated, only one of the six implementing partners for U.S.- funded water projects included in our review had established targets for each of its performance indicators. As such, we are unable to provide a reliable assessment of U.S.-funded water projects in Afghanistan. Project evaluation identifies the reasons for success or lack thereof, can illustrate which project activities work most effectively and efficiently, and can provide lessons for future initiatives. ADS requires USAID to undertake at least one evaluation for each of its high-level objectives. In September 2007, International Relief and Development (IRD) issued an assessment of the Rural Water Supply and Sanitation project. Though the IRD report noted beneficiaries were generally happy with project results, it also highlighted several problems, including some project wells did not provide enough water, and some project pump handles and latrines were of low quality or poorly constructed. The assessment made several recommendations, including to improve the drilling and building of wells, namely through improved use of geological data; to consult with communities prior to project development; to test water quality prior to handing projects over to communities; to train local communities in the proper and safe use of equipment; and to improve the construction of latrines. According to USAID officials in Afghanistan, the results of this evaluation, and the lessons learned it presented, were used to inform development of the Afghan Sustainable Water Supply and Sanitation project. In addition, according to USAID officials in Afghanistan, no overall evaluation had been done for the other completed project— Afghanistan Urban Water and Sanitation—that we reviewed. However, these officials provided us with two evaluations of more limited scope, each of which examined subprojects contained within the overall project. According to these officials, these two evaluations were used to inform the Commercialization of Afghanistan Water and Sanitation Activity project, which they told us was developed to address some of the problems the Afghanistan Urban Water and Sanitation project faced. Regarding the four ongoing selected projects that we reviewed, USAID officials told us they planned to schedule an evaluation for the Afghan Sustainable Water Supply and Sanitation and Commercialization of Afghanistan Water and Sanitation Activity projects, though they did not indicate if or when the Afghanistan Water, Agriculture, and Technology Transfer or Village-Based Watershed Restoration in Ghor Province projects were due for a formal evaluation. DOD CERP regulations, which govern projects in Afghanistan, require certain performance management activities, including the establishment of performance metrics and monitoring of CERP projects. The DOD regulations for CERP state, among other things, that performance indicators must be provided for proposed CERP projects of $50,000 or more and that all projects must be monitored to ensure that payments are commensurate with the work accomplished and engineering standards are met. Although DOD regulations require the development of performance indicators or metrics for CERP projects of $50,000 or more, it is still not clear how such indicators are and will be used to assess progress. We previously reported in July 2008 that although CERP-funded road development projects in Afghanistan contained measures of desired impact, DOD had not stated how these indicators would be measured. Additionally, we found that while CERP guidance for Afghanistan required project proposals to have an “adequate” plan to measure success in achieving the desired impact, it did not contain criteria for developing such a plan for performance measurement and evaluation. Our review of CERP-funded water projects in Afghanistan revealed that this situation has not been fully addressed. According to USFOR-A, DOD has an effort underway to formulate terms to be used to address measures for effectiveness that will be included in CERP’s standard operating procedures. However, USFOR-A officials acknowledged there is currently no additional training provided to program managers to assist with identifying performance metrics. Additionally, DOD officials we met with said that there was a lack of CERP project monitoring and that project results are not always being used to inform future project planning decisions. According to a senior USFOR-A official responsible for managing CERP projects in Afghanistan, the extent to which DOD personnel are able to conduct site visits depends on the geographic location, difficulty of the terrain, and the existing security situation. He also noted that understaffing hampered DOD’s ability to monitor CERP water projects in Afghanistan. We have previously reported on actions needed to improve DOD’s ability to monitor CERP projects in Afghanistan. For example, in 2009 we found that the program faced significant oversight challenges due to an insufficient number of trained personnel, and we recommended that DOD evaluate workforce requirements and ensure that adequate staff are available to administer CERP. DOD responded in May 2009 that the increase in forces in Afghanistan has also increased the number of personnel who manage CERP on a full-time basis. In addition, in December 2009, the Department of the Army published an execution order that included several new requirements for CERP personnel, including that certain key CERP personnel receive training for their assigned responsibilities. USFOR-A officials we met with in Afghanistan later in December 2009 commented that DOD still did not have enough personnel to effectively manage CERP, including juggling the duties of building projects and overseeing them in remote villages. Sustainability is one of the U.S. government’s key principles for development and reconstruction assistance in Afghanistan, and recent U.S. strategies have emphasized the importance of project sustainability. We have previously reported on challenges facing U.S. development efforts in Afghanistan, including developing a sustainable roads program—such as a lack of resources, an untrained Afghan population, and limited Afghan government ministerial capacity to maintain and sustain donor-funded projects given Afghanistan is one of the world’s poorest countries. (See our July 2010 e-supplement relating to poverty in Afghanistan— GAO-10-756SP.) Based on our review of the U.S. Government Inter- Agency Water Strategy and discussions with agency staff, the U.S. government has identified two key elements to help ensure water project sustainability: (1) enhancing technical and managerial capacity to maintain projects within the institutions with water sector responsibilities, and (2) ensuring funding is available to keep projects operational after they have been completed. USAID project implementers have incorporated a number of sustainability-related initiatives into the water sector projects we reviewed. DOD and CERP guidance also emphasizes sustainability. Our review of various U.S. government planning and strategy documents and discussions with U.S. government officials identified several efforts underway by the U.S. government to focus on sustainability of U.S.-funded water projects in Afghanistan. We identified sustainability in the following U.S. plans and strategies. USAID’s Afghanistan Strategic Plan for 2005-2010 defines sustainability as a core value and indicates activities are designed so that Afghan institutions, communities, and individuals “own” the principles, processes, and benefits introduced. Projects that entail construction of infrastructure, reform of processes and procedures, and provision of services have components that help ensure Afghans have the capacity needed to carry them on, once USAID assistance is complete. The USAID Afghanistan Mission PMP for 2006-2008 discusses development in the context of sustainability and identifies capacity building as a means of ensuring the sustainability of development projects. As we noted earlier, the mission is in the process of developing a new missionwide PMP. The 2009 U.S. Government Integrated Civilian-Military Campaign Plan for Support to Afghanistan lists as its first core principle “Afghan Leadership, Afghan Capacity, Afghan Sustainability,” and notes U.S. efforts in Afghanistan must be designed to assist the Afghan government to assume a more effective leadership role. The U.S. Government Inter-Agency Water Strategy for 2009-2014 notes that water is critical for the long-term stability and economic development of Afghanistan and directs U.S. agencies to ensure projects are designed, constructed, and maintained properly to ensure they remain operational over time. The strategy also outlines several goals that will enhance water project sustainability. Among them is a focus on two key elements: (1) enhancing technical and managerial capacity to maintain projects within the institutions with water-sector responsibilities, and (2) ensuring funding is available to keep projects operational after they have been completed. USAID identifies sustainability as one of its Nine Principles of Development and Reconstruction Assistance and considers sustainability to be the design of programs to ensure their impact endures. We reviewed four ongoing USAID funded water projects to determine the extent of focus on sustainability as outlined in the recent U.S. strategies. The results of our review of these four projects showed that USAID water projects included sustainability related initiatives. For example: Building technical and managerial capacity: Implementers of the Afghanistan Water, Agriculture, and Technology Transfer and Village- Based Watershed Restoration in Ghor Province projects are providing technical training to Afghan farmers on more sustainable farming practices. The Commercialization of Afghanistan Water and Sanitation Activity project also includes a training component, such as apprenticeship and on-the-job training, to enhance the capacity of managers and technical staff responsible for operating local water systems. Examples of activities to build managerial capacity include the Afghanistan Water, Agriculture, and Technology Transfer and Village- Based Watershed Restoration in Ghor Province projects’ provision of training and technical exposure to Afghan ministry staff to help them identify and develop improved water and land use policies. The Afghanistan Sustainable Water Supply and Sanitation project seeks to improve the sustainability of rural water infrastructure by strengthening the capacity of local governing structures to monitor the use and maintenance of water facilities, as well as by developing written instructions on operating and maintaining them. Financial sustainability: The Commercialization of Afghanistan Water and Sanitation Activity project’s plan to ensure financial sustainability includes billing customers for water services, with an eventual goal of cost-recovery, according to USAID and implementing partner officials. The project also includes activities to ensure all project improvements are reinforced and sustained over time. In addition, the Afghanistan Sustainable Water Supply and Sanitation project plan includes a performance indicator of ensuring long-term financing for community water systems, namely through the establishment of community water user groups as well as a mechanism to charge community members for water services. In addition, the Village-Based Watershed Restoration in Ghor Provice project includes an effort to ensure sustainable water supply in one town through the creation of a water-user association, responsible for operation and maintenance of the system. Officials of USAID and one of its implementing partners acknowledged that the long-term financial viability of such projects could be affected by the inability or unwillingness of Afghan customers to pay for water because of the level of poverty among the Afghan population and because Afghan citizens have not historically paid for their water. CERP regulations include consideration of project sustainability. According to DOD regulations, CERP is intended for small-scale, urgent humanitarian relief and reconstruction projects that, optimally, can be sustained by the local population or government. CERP procedures for evaluating proposed projects of $50,000 or more note that responsible staff are required to consider the sustainability of the project, including preparing a memorandum of agreement and obtaining the signature of the responsible Afghan official acknowledging responsibility and his or her commitment to budget for this agreement. These regulations also state staff should address whether recipients of CERP funding for projects equal to or greater than $500,000 have a plan for sustainability and who will be providing long-term maintenance and sustainability for the project. In addition, CERP officials we met with in Afghanistan acknowledged the importance of Afghan technical and managerial capacity and the availability of funds for post-project operations and maintenance of CERP water projects, but pointed out that DOD is not responsible for establishing long-term sustainability strategies. DOD officials have acknowledged the difficulty of sustaining CERP projects in Afghanistan. CERP and U.S. Army Corps of Engineers officials acknowledged that the physical sustainability of projects and maintenance is a problem. A DOD official noted that building capacity and ensuring projects can be sustained is more difficult than building the projects themselves. Another DOD official stated that having Afghans with the necessary skills and funding for operations and maintenance of projects was essential for the long-term sustainability of water projects. This official and others acknowledged a number of CERP projects, once completed and handed over to Afghans, were not sustained because the Afghans lacked the capacity to sustain them. The development of the Afghan water sector is critical to the stability of Afghanistan, given the role of water in enhancing agriculture productivity and improving the health and well-being of the Afghan populace. Thus, the U.S. government’s assistance in the water sector is an important element of U.S. development and counter-insurgency efforts. The approximately $250 million that the United States awarded from fiscal year 2002 through the second quarter of fiscal year 2010 has funded a significant number of water projects, but it pales in comparison to the over $2 billion the United States has projected would be needed to meet U.S. assistance obligations for water in the next 5 years. Because of this, planning, coordination, and oversight are particularly important. While the U.S. efforts and the goals are outlined in the 2010 U.S. Inter-Agency Water Strategy, the U.S. government lacks an interagency implementation plan called for in its strategy and that best practices have shown is critical to enhancing the coordination of multi-agency efforts. In addition, a centralized database that tracks all U.S. development projects in Afghanistan—including water- sector development, which we previously reported was lacking— does not currently exist. This is especially important in light of the U.S. Inter- Agency Water Strategy that indicates that multiple agencies would become involved in Afghan water-sector activities going forward. Lack of coordination and information sharing creates the potential for duplication of efforts and missed opportunities for synergy and the leveraging of resources among U.S. agencies. USAID did not ensure that its implementing partners had established indicators or performance targets as required and did not consistently analyze and interpret implementing partner performance data, which is vital to making program adjustments, higher level decisions, and resource allocations. Without a set of agreed upon performance indicators and targets, it becomes more difficult for USAID to accurately assess the performance of USAID-funded water projects in Afghanistan. Also, it is important that USAID routinely analyze and interpret data from project reports submitted by implementers, as its monitoring procedures require. Further, given security challenges may impede site visits to some project locations, it is important that USAID take steps to more effectively disseminate previously-approved alternative monitoring methods for “high threat” environment to its mission staff. Without effective monitoring, the U.S. government cannot be certain whether U.S.-funded water projects are achieving their intended results. To enhance the coordination of U.S.-funded water projects, we recommend that the Administrator of USAID, in conjunction with the Secretaries of DOD and other relevant agencies take the following actions: Develop an interagency implementation plan, as called for in the 2010 U.S. Government Inter-Agency Water Strategy that (1) establishes agreement on roles and responsibilities of the various U.S. agencies with respect to the short, medium, and long-term goals identified in the strategy; (2) identifies and address the leveraging of U.S. resources; and (3) outlines means to operate effectively across agency boundaries. Consider designating Afghan Info or some other database as the centralized U.S. government project-development database for U.S. development efforts in Afghanistan. This database should, among other things, ensure that the information in the database (1) captures all agency development efforts, and (2) is accessible to all U.S. government agencies involved in U.S.-funded development projects in Afghanistan. Take steps, in coordination with relevant international donors, to explore options for establishing a formal mechanism to enhance coordination on water sector development among the donor community and the Afghan government. To enhance performance management of U.S.-funded water projects, we recommend that the Administrator of USAID take the following actions: Ensure that implementing partners establish targets for all indicators. Consistently analyze and interpret program data, such as determining the extent to which annual targets are met. Take steps to ensure that Mission Afghanistan staff are aware of new Automated Directives System guidance on monitoring in high-threat environment, such as reissuing the guidance or incorporating a discussion of the guidance as part of pre-deployment training. We provided a draft of this report to USAID and DOD for their review and comment. USAID provided written comments, which are reprinted in appendix VIII. USAID concurred with all of our recommendations and said it was taking steps to address them. USAID concurred with our recommendation to develop an interagency implementation plan and stated that a final interagency implementation plan would be developed in consultation with the U.S. government Infrastructure Working Group. USAID concurred with our recommendation to designate Afghan Info or some other database as the centralized U.S. government project- development database for U.S. development efforts in Afghanistan. USAID stated it has begun to utilize Afghan Info for this purpose and will continue to do so further in the future. USAID concurred with our recommendation to take steps, in coordination with relevant international donors, to establish a formal mechanism to enhance coordination on water-sector development among the donor community and the Afghan government. USAID noted that it meets frequently with other international donors to discuss coordination on the water sector and annually plans a national water conference. Additionally, USAID stated it would take steps to establish a more formal and regularly occurring forum to discuss coordination efforts among all donors in the water sector. Finally, USAID concurred with our recommendation to enhance performance management by ensuring implementing partners establish targets for all indicators, consistently analyzing and interpreting program data, and taking steps to ensure Mission of Afghanistan staff is aware of new guidance on monitoring in high-threat environments. DOD also provided written comments on a draft of this report. The comments are reprinted in appendix IX. DOD noted that, because Afghanistan is a war zone, DOD, USAID, and other relevant U.S. agencies have an obligation to work closely together to develop mutually agreed upon plans and strategies. DOD concurred with two of our recommendations and partially concurred with one of them. DOD concurred with our recommendation to develop an interagency implementation plan. DOD also concurred with our recommendation to take steps, in coordination with relevant international donors, to explore options for establishing a formal mechanism to enhance coordination of water-sector development among the donor community and the Afghan government. DOD noted that the infrastructure working group in Kabul has been established to help coordinate these activities. DOD generally concurred with our recommendation that Afghan Info or some other database be designated as the centralized U.S. government project- development database for U.S. development efforts in Afghanistan. DOD pointed out that such a database, if designed to allow easy data access and sharing with not only the interagency but coalition and Afghan partners, would make a positive contribution. Furthermore, DOD cautioned that interagency database requirements should not impact its own needs and requirements for centralized project management, nor create additional requirements for its field personnel. DOD also stated that progress has been made in improving monitoring of CERP water projects and some of the other areas we highlighted, but did not provide specific examples of this progress in its official comments or when we met with DOD officials in August 2010 to discuss our findings. DOD also provided technical comments, which we have included throughout this report as appropriate. We are sending copies of this report to interested congressional committees, USAID, and DOD. In addition, the report will be available at no charge on GAO’s Web site at http://www.gao.gov. If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 512-7331 or johnsoncm@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. Key contributors to this report are listed in appendix X. This report examines (1) U.S. water projects in Afghanistan since 2002 and the extent to which U.S. goals for Afghan water-sector development assistance align with the goals of the Afghan government; (2) U.S. agencies’ coordination of water-sector efforts among themselves and with the Afghan government and the donor community; (3) U.S. agencies’ performance management efforts for water-sector projects; and (4) U.S. agencies’ efforts to build sustainability into their water-sector projects. To provide Afghanistan’s water sector, w for International D (DOD) and State (State), and implementing pa and Kabul, Afghanistan. In officials, such as the Controller managing the Commander’ fo water-related activities, and on completed completed water projects funded through the Good Performers Initiative, elatively small compared with USAID and although the total funding was r ID’s three ongoing water-exclusive DOD funding. We reviewed USA projects and USAID’s four T by USAID for water projects i the 2nd quar infrastructure projects com water-related activ related activities. These activities together accounted for of total USAID disbursed funding for water project fiscal year 2002 through th an overview of U.S. government assistance to develop e spoke with officials from the U.S. Agency evelopment (USAID), the Departments of Defense rtners in Washington, D.C., Kabul, we met with USAID program and budget , and with DOD officials responsible for s Emergency Response Program (CERP). We cused on USAID’s ongoing and completed water-exclusive projects and DOD’s CERP-funded ongoing and water-related projects. We also included State’s ongoing and water-exclusive projects completed since 2003. hese projects represent about 50 percent of the total funding disbursed n Afghanistan from fiscal year 2002 through ter of fiscal year 2010. We also reviewed USAID’s 19 larger pleted or ongoing since 2002 that contained ities. From 13 of these projects, we identified 511 water- about 50 percent e 2nd quarter of fiscal year 2010. We obtained and reviewed pr performance management oject documents, such as project plans, quarterly and annual reports, contracts, and contract modifications; project work plans; and financial data to assess USAID water-exclusive projects. We calculated funds awarded, funds disbursed, and the unliquidated obligations balance for the w exclusive projects. In order to further assess USAID’s efforts to develop Afghanistan’s water sector, we also obtained project details and finan cial data on water-related activities of larger USAID infrastructure projects. W analyzed the types of water-related activities completed under these projects and identified the total number of water-related activities and the amount of funds disbursed for each water-related activity. To asses water-related projects, we reviewed CERP checkbook data, which we obtained from DOD, to identify water-related projects where funding could be directly attributed to the water sector and exclude those projects that did not fall under the scope of this report. DOD officials concurred with the approach we took to identify projects, and with our final selection. Additionally, we calculated totals for funds awarded, funds disbursed, and the unliquidated obligations balance for the CERP water- related projects identified through this analysis. To determine the extent to which U.S. and Afghanistan water-sector development strategies aligned, we obtained and reviewed copies of the U.S. Government Inter-Agency Water Strategy for Afghanistan (2009 the Afghanistan National Development Strategy, and the accompanying Water Resource Management Sector Strategy. We compared the strategie and relevant goals of the U.S. and Afghan documents, and based on this analysis, we identified the six key areas of water-sector development a the goals associated with those issue areas. We also interviewed relevan U.S. and Afghan officials regarding the U.S. and Afghan water sector strategies. To assess how U.S. efforts have been coordinated among th government agencies and with the Afghan government and the donor community, we reviewed pertinent U.S. documents, such as the U.S. Government Integrated Civilian-Military Campaign Plan for Support to Afghanistan, the U.S. Government Inter-Agency Water Strategy for Afghanistan, the Government Performance and Results Act, and other GAO reports to identify requirements for coordination. We reviewed GAO and Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction reports concerning U.S. agency coordination in Afghanistan and elsewhere and met with officials from USAID, and the departments of Defense, State, and Agriculture in Kabul to obtain an understanding of how they coordinated their efforts to develop the Afghan water sector, the nature and frequency of their coordination, and the extent to which they had institutionalized their coordination efforts. We met with officials from DOD, USAID, and e various U.S. other agencies to discuss their respective project management data systems for development projects and the extent to which they are interoperable. We also met with Afghan ministry officials, as well as othe members of the donor community, to obtain their views of coordination with U.S. agencies. We attended a meeting of the Infrastructure Working Group in Kabul, and a meeting of the Southeast Afghanistan Water Resources Assessment at Bagram Air Force Base, to observe interage coordination on water-related issues. We also attended a meeting of the Technical Secretariat of the Supreme Council for Water Affairs Management and talked with Afghan officials to obtain their views of U Afghan coordination on water-related issues. We attended a meeting o donor community concerning transboundary issues and obtained their views of the nature and extent of donor coordination. We reviewed minutes from a donor coordination meeting in January 2010 and re a spreadsheet that documented initial efforts at coordinating urban wa development in Afghanistan. In addition, we discussed the effectiveness U.S.-Afghan coordination in other sectors, such as the energy sector, to identify lessons learned and best practices that could be applied to the water sector. The information on foreign law in this report is not a pr of our original analysis but is derived from interviews and secondary sources. To assess USAID’s and DOD’s efforts to manage and monitor water sector projects, we reviewed pertinent GAO evaluations of performance management practices to identify best practices. In addition, we examined USAID’s Automated Directives System requirements to identify the agency’s procedures, requirements, and guidance. We did not address all of the Automated Directives System performance management procedures outlined in figure 6 of our report, and restricted our analysis to information we were able to obtain over the course of our review. We focused on those elements of the Automated Directives System performance management and evaluation procedures that we determined to be generally consistent with the requirements stipulated by USAID in the applicable implementing partners’ contracts, cooperative agreements, or grant award documents. Our review of these elements focused on five of the seven USAID water-exclusive projects where we could find sufficient program documentation of performance management activities, and one of USAID’s large infrastructure projects—the Village-Based Water Restoration in Ghor Province—that had a large water component. For these projects, we reviewed USAID award documents, as well as implementing partner planning, funding, and reporting documents, including quarterly reports. Our review of these documents provided us with information regarding the programs’ performance management structure, goals, objectives, indicators, and targets. We examined the and other documents to determine the extent to which the Mission a implementers followed requirements, guidance, and best practices. We also reviewed DOD Financial Management Regulation, volume 12, chapte 27, which addresses CERP, as well as Money as a Weapon System, USFOR-A Pub 1-06, the CERP SOP. These two documents outlined planning and monitoring requirements for CERP projects. In addition, we reviewed prior GAO reports on CERP, which addressed performance management. We discussed these issues with USAID and DOD officials in Washington and Afghanistan, as well as staff from implementing partner organizations. To assess USAID’s and DOD’s efforts to address water project sustainability in Afghanistan, we reviewed recent strategic documents on Afghanistan, including the U.S. Government Inter-Agency Water Strategy for 2009-2014, USAID’s Afghanistan Strategic Plan for 2005-2010, and the USAID Afghanistan Mission PMP from 2006-2008. Based on our review o these documents, as well as our discussions with agency officials, we f identified two key elements to ensuring project sustainability: enhancing technical and managerial capacity to maintain projects within the institution s with water-sector responsibilities, and ensuring funding is available to keep projects operational after they have been completed. Moreover, USAID staff with water-sector responsibilities concurred with iewed these elements at our exit conference with the agency. We also rev project documents for the six selected USAID water-sector projects we ter- included in our review of USAID’s efforts to manage and monitor wa sector projects. Our review of these documents provided us with information regarding the projects’ approaches to sustainability. We also apter 27, reviewed DOD Financial Management Regulation, volume 12, ch -A which addresses CERP, as well as Money as a Weapon System, USFOR ainability- Pub 1-06, the CERP SOP. These documents outline required sust related procedures for CERP projects. We also discussed these issues with USAID and DOD officials in Washington and Afghanistan, as well as staff from implementing partner organizations. Total funding disbursed for ater activities 15,000,000 (Planned) /Afghanistan. Afghanistan Water, Agriculture, and Technology Transfer (AWATT) Afhanitan Urban Water and Sanitation Project (AUWSP) $7. $19. Rural Water Supply and Sanitation Commercialization of Afhanitan Water and Sanitation Activity (CAWSA) Kabul Environmental Sanitation and Health Project Emerency Health and Water for Kabul 0 5 10 15 20 25 5 40 Total project award (doll in million) Afhanitan Urban Water and Sanitation Project (AUWSP) $7. $19. Rural Water Supply and Sanitation Commercialization of Afhanitan Water and Sanitation Activity (CAWSA) Kabul Environmental Sanitation and Health Project Emerency Health and Water for Kabul 0 5 10 15 20 25 5 40 Total project award (doll in million) Afhanitan Urban Water and Sanitation Project (AUWSP) $7. Afhanitan Water, Ariculture, and Technoloy Tranfer (AWATT) $19. The Afhan Stainable Water Supply and Sanitation Project (SWSS) Rural Water Supply and Sanitation Commercialization of Afhanitan Water and Sanitation Activity (CAWSA) 0 5 10 15 20 25 5 40 Total project award (doll in million) Appendix VI: Chronology of USAID Water- Related Activities water activities Description of project’s water activities $17,465,370 The REFS program sought to promote economic recovery and political stability by repairing infrastructure in Afghanistan. Water projects under this program focused on repairing irrigation systems, drilling wells for potable water, and cleaning and repairing irrigation canals. 10,000,000 The water projects carried out under this program focused on the construction and rehabilitation of irrigation structures and drainage canals. 469,802 This project completed 5 water projects. The projects included the construction of piped water supply systems, the digging of a well, and the construction of a water intake system. 2,765,908 Approximately 36 water projects were completed as part of the larger parent project. They included projects such as the construction of a water supply network; the provision of potable water; the construction of flood control protection walls; irrigation system improvements; canal rehabilitation; and the construction of dams and irrigation systems. Initiative to Promote Afghan Civil Society (IPACS) Expanding Access to Private Sector Health Products and Services 1,000,000 The Human Resources and Logistical Support program was launched to provide a broad range of human resources and logistical support to help design, monitor, and support the activities of USAID-funded contractors. In addition, the program also sought to provide consulting services to selected ministries of the Afghan government. Subsequently, the program provided a transboundary water-rights adviser to help the Ministry of Energy and Water develop water policies for negotiations with neighbors in other countries. Support for Basic Package of Health Services and Essential Package of Hospital Services Delivery Support for Service Delivery and Quality of Basic Services in Afghanistan 8,229,833 The Local Governance and Community Development Project included approximately 174 water projects. Projects included the rehabilitation of irrigation canals; the construction of wells for drinking water; repairs of drinking water pipe schemes; the cleaning of kareezes; the installation of drinking water hand pumps; the construction of water reservoirs; and the construction of check dams, among others. 1,059,449 This project included approximately 28 water projects. Specific water projects included the construction of a school drinking water reservoir with filter system; wells for drinking water; water supply pipe schemes; irrigation canal cleaning; the construction of irrigation culverts; irrigation canal rehabilitation; and the construction of an irrigation system. 187,950 The ASMED program included approximately 18 water projects. These projects included the construction of latrine facilities; market sanitation system improvements; wells for drinking water; and drainage system improvements. Description of project’s water activities 1,491,589 This program focuses on the conservation o n natural resources and increasing vegetatio critical watersheds. Water projects have included increasing access to improved drinking water; providing hygiene promotion training sessions; and increasing the number of hectares with sustainable improvement to irrigation water. 118,163 AMSP included one water project, a two-ph water supply construction project in Khost province. Alternative Development and Alternative Livelihoods Program Expansion North and West Project 367,477 This project completed approximately 17 wate projects. Thirteen of these projects involved the cleaning of canals and the four others focused on the rehabilitation of kareezes. While the water projects are still consid be planned projects, they will focus on the construction of multipurpose dams and impoundments. a provided by USAID/Afghanistan. Improve comm management o watershed ma unity and farm level supply and demand f irrigation water resources and upstream n new reservoir gates and powerhouse that would raise th allow for signifi e water level and provide additional power plus igation of agricultural lands Install new reservoir gates and powerhouse that would raise the water level and provide additional power plus allow for significantly increased irrigation of agricultural lands urpose Dams (Plan & Design) 15 Next step in th the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers to design 25 small dams for irrigation and power production with associated watershed managemen o reduce soil erosion and siltation t t ) Urban Water Supply and Sanitation (Plan & Design) cision Memorandum, March 2010. In addition, the following staff contributed to the report: Godwin Agbara, Assistant Director; Elizabeth Guran; Kevin Remondini; Joseph Carney; Burns Chamberlain; Emily Gupta; Bruce Kutnick; Karen Deans; Cindy Gilbert; Jena Sinkfield; Etana Finkler; Elizabeth Curda; Terrell Dorn; Anu Mittal; and Marcus Oliver.

Summary: Water is critical to the stability of Afghanistan and is an essential part of U.S. efforts in Afghanistan. Since 2002, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and the Department of Defense (DOD) have awarded $250 million for water projects. This report examines (1) the alignment of U.S. water goals and projects with Afghan water-sector development goals; (2) U.S. agencies' coordination of water-sector efforts among themselves, with the Afghan government and the donor community; (3) U.S. efforts to manage and monitor these water projects; and (4) U.S. efforts to build sustainability into water-sector projects. GAO reviewed and analyzed planning, funding, and performance documents from U.S. agencies and implementing partners, and interviewed U.S. officials in Washington, D.C., and U.S., Afghan, and donor officials in Afghanistan. The goals outlined in the U.S. government's 2010 Inter-Agency Water Strategy generally align with Afghan government strategic goals for the water sector. The Strategy identifies short, medium, and long-term goals to be achieved between 2010 and 2014. Additionally, since 2002, the U.S. government has implemented a wide range of water projects throughout Afghanistan to improve access to safe drinking water and sanitation, agriculture irrigation, and water-sector management. These projects generally align with Afghan water-sector goals. The United States expects to accelerate development efforts in the water sector and estimates that an additional $2.1 billion will be needed to fund these efforts from fiscal year 2010 through fiscal year 2014. The Government Performance and Results Act and several U.S. strategic documents concerning operations in Afghanistan emphasize the importance of interagency coordination. GAO has reported on the importance of interagency coordination and collaboration when multiple U.S. agencies are involved in U.S. counterterrorism-related efforts. GAO's review showed that the United States has taken steps to better coordinate water-sector development projects but that additional efforts are needed. For example, the U.S. government has developed an Infrastructure Working Group, an Inter-Agency Water Strategy, and has started to meet on a regular basis. However, an interagency implementation plan called for in the strategy has not been completed. Also, USAID and DOD have not developed a centralized database to enhance coordination, which GAO previously recommended. Moreover, U.S. agencies generally do not meet on a regular basis with all the relevant ministries in the Afghan government, and they lack complete data concerning other donor projects to maximize the U.S. investment in development projects. USAID's Automated Directives System outlines USAID's performance management and monitoring procedures. GAO found that gaps existed in USAID's performance management and monitoring efforts for water sector projects in Afghanistan. For example, while 4 of the 6 implementers of projects GAO reviewed established performance indicators, some did not always establish targets for the indicators as required. In addition, although USAID collected quarterly progress reports from 5 of the 6 water project implementers for the projects GAO reviewed, it did not analyze and interpret this information as required. Finally, though USAID has identified several alternative monitoring procedures staff can use to help mitigate monitoring challenges in high threat environments, USAID has not effectively ensured that such guidance was disseminated to staff in Afghanistan. The U.S. government has included a focus on building sustainability into U.S.-funded water projects in Afghanistan. Recent U.S. strategies have emphasized the importance of project sustainability. GAO has identified two key elements to ensuring water project sustainability: enhancing technical and managerial capacity to maintain projects within the institutions with water-sector responsibilities, and ensuring funding is available to keep projects operational after they have been completed. Ongoing USAID water projects included in this review have incorporated sustainability initiatives. DOD guidance also emphasizes sustainability. However, DOD officials have acknowledged the difficulties of sustaining water projects in Afghanistan. GAO makes several recommendations to the USAID Administrator, in conjunction with DOD and other relevant agencies, to improve planning, coordination, and management of U.S.-funded water projects in Afghanistan. This includes developing an interagency plan and designating a centralized database. GAO also recommends steps the USAID Administrator needs to take to improve performance management. USAID and DOD generally concurred with our recommendations.