The struggle against international terrorism places new and difficult demands on the U.S. IntelligenceCommunity. Acquiring information about the composition,location, capabilities, plans, and ambitions of terrorist groups is an enormous challenge for intelligence agencies;meeting this challenge requires different skillsthan were needed to keep informed about the capabilities and intentions of Communist governments. At the sametime, requirements continue for coverage ofgeopolitical developments around the world and other transnational issues such as narcotics smuggling. Observers point to several major challenges that the Intelligence Community will likely encounter in supporting the counter terrorist effort. First is a renewed emphasis on human agents . Signals intelligence and imagery satellites have their uses in the counterterrorism mission,but intelligence to counter terrorism depends more on human intelligence (humint) such as spies and informers. Any renewed emphasis on human intelligencenecessarily will involve a willingness to accept risks of complicated and dangerous missions, and likely ties todisreputable individuals who may be in positions toprovide valuable information. Time and patience will be needed to train analysts in difficult skills and languages. Second, terrorist activities pose significant analytical challenges . In addition toacquiring analysts with esoteric language skills,intelligence agencies must develop expertise in many third world areas that had been of peripheral concern in yearspast. Much of the data available will be inopen, unclassified sources that intelligence agencies have often neglected. Third is the closer relationship between intelligence and law enforcement agencies . In counterterrorism efforts, intelligence agencieswork alongside law enforcement agencies that have far different approaches to gathering evidence, developing leads,and maintaining retrievable databases. Policies and statutes are being modified to facilitate a closer relationship between the two sets of agencies, but closercooperation has raised difficult questionsabout using intelligence agencies in the U.S. and about collecting information regarding U.S. persons. Finally, military operations against terrorists will reenforce requirements for collecting and transmitting precise intelligence to militarycommanders or operators through secure communications systems in real time. The growing reliance ofmilitary operations on the availability of preciseintelligence is well understood, but the availability of collection platforms such as reconnaissance aircraft,unmanned aerial vehicles, and reconnaissance satelliteshas been limited throughout much of the past decade. Such platforms are especially important for counterterroristoperations. In large measure, meeting these challenges will be the responsibility of executive branch officials. The primary role for Congress will be to decide appropriatelevels of budgetary resources and to oversee Intelligence Community efforts to ensure that resources are wellmanaged and that the nation's intelligence needs aremet. Some observers believe that Congress has special responsibilities to provide a clear statutory framework toguide the unprecedented and uncertain evolutionof intelligence-law enforcement relationships. Such a framework is necessary, they suggest, to minimize chancesfor a failure of the campaign against terrorists or,alternatively, serious erosion of the protections of individual liberties that have evolved over many centuries. In the aftermath of September 11, 2001, Congress moved rapidly to provide intelligence agencies with expanded authorities and increased funding to supportcounterterrorism. In the year 2002, congressional intelligence committees investigated the background of theSeptember attacks and recommended legislation toreorganize the U.S. Intelligence Community. Vast intelligence assets were deployed in support of militaryoperations in Iraq, and there are continuingrequirements in Afghanistan. Programs likely will be established to support the long-term struggle against terrorismand necessary budgetary resources identified. Intelligence support to the Department of Homeland Security is a key concern and one that remains under review. In November 2001, one media account suggested that a major reorganization of the Intelligence Community might be under consideration by the executivebranch. (1) Members of the two intelligencecommittees released a number of recommendations in December 2002 to strengthen management of intelligenceactivities. (2) The legislative future of such proposalsis uncertain, however. Whatever the organizational relationships, intelligence for counterterrorism will beaffected by the need for good humint, analysis, close ties to law enforcement agencies, and for capabilities to supportmilitary operations with precise locatingdata. During the Cold War, terrorism was not a major intelligence priority and, in many cases, terrorist groups wereperceived as acting on behalf of, or at least withimportant support by, Communist parties. The focus was on the other superpower and not terrorism perse . Nevertheless, the Intelligence Community has longdevoted significant resources towards the terrorist threat. As early as 1986, a Counterterrorism Center (CTC),comprised of officials from various intelligence andlaw enforcement agencies, was established within the Operations Directorate of the Central Intelligence Agency(CIA) to pull together information oninternational terrorism from all sources and devise counterterrorism plans. After the fall of the Soviet Union andthe Warsaw Pact, terrorism was perceived witheven greater concern, especially as U.S. military forces and installations repeatedly were attacked by terrorist groupsas in the 1996 Khobar towers barracks inSaudi Arabia, the August 1998 bombing of U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, and the attack on the USS Colein October 2000. Public statements by senior intelligence officials affirm that the threat to the United States posed by international terrorism was understood well before September11, 2001. In February 2001, the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) George Tenet, in prepared testimony beforethe Senate Intelligence Committee, stated: "thethreat from terrorism is real, it is immediate, and it is evolving. State sponsored terrorism appears to have declinedover the past five years, but transnationalgroups -- with decentralized leadership that makes them harder to identify and disrupt -- are emerging." Furthermore, "[Osama] bin Ladin and his globalnetwork of lieutenants and associates remain the most immediate and serious threat." (3) In this testimony, Tenet stated that Al Qaeda and other terrorist groupswill continue to plan to attack this country and its interest and have sought to acquire dangerous chemical agentsand toxins as well as nuclear devices. (4) The creation of CIA's Counterterrorism Center (CTC) was an early effort to bring together disparate data on terrorist activities. The CTC has not been considereda complete success; (5) collection on terrorist groupsdid not become an overriding priority and, although the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) hadrepresentatives in the CTC, the relationship with the law enforcement community did not evolve as fully as had beenhoped. Media accounts indicate that theCTC doubled in size in the month following the attacks. (6) It is difficult to judge how successful the overall counterterrorism effort has been. The September 11, 2001 attacks were successful, but other terrorist plans havebeen thwarted although few details have been revealed. A multi-faceted attack on the Los Angeles airport and otherU.S.-related targets to coincide withmillennium celebrations in January 2000 was foiled as a result of a chance apprehension of an individual with a carloaded with explosives by an alert CustomsService official. (7) Attacks on U.S. embassies andfacilities in Paris, Singapore, and other parts of the world have reportedly been thwarted because of intelligenceleads. Inevitably there has been public discussion of the question of whether September 11 was an "intelligence failure." (8) A joint investigation by the House andSenate intelligence committees was undertaken in 2002 by a Joint Inquiry Staff. The final report will not be publiclyavailable until mid-2003, but a number offindings and recommendations were made public in December 2002 that described inadequacies in the organizationof the Intelligence Community. (9) In theFY2003 Intelligence Authorization Act ( P.L. 107-306 ) Congress also established an independent commission toreview the review the evidence developed bygovernment agencies surrounding the 9/11 attacks. The commission has 18 months to submit its report. Some observers have suggested comparisons to the investigations that were undertaken during and after World War II concerning the Japanese attack on PearlHarbor. (10) Those investigations were viewed bymany observers as politicized -- either seeking or deflecting mistakes by the Roosevelt Administration. By thetime of the conclusion of the congressional investigation in July 1946, almost a year after the end of the war, thepublic was concentrating on other issues and, as aresult, there was little political fall-out. (11) Theinvestigations did, however, indicate the need for better coordination among intelligence agencies and betweenintelligence agencies, policymakers, and military commanders. It is argued that "lessons" of Pearl Harbor, as viewed by senior congressional and executive branch officials, laid the groundwork for the establishment of anational intelligence effort by the National Security Act of 1947. Similarly, the investigation of the events leadingup to the September 11 attacks might lay thegroundwork for a new relationship between intelligence and law enforcement. In the immediate wake of 9/11, Congress passed the USA Patriot Act, a principal purpose of which was to remove perceived restrictions on closer lawenforcement-intelligence cooperation in order to support counterterrorist efforts. (12) Modifications to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) for thesame purpose were enacted shortly thereafter as part of the FY2002 Intelligence Authorization Act ( P.L. 107-108 ),and further changes are being considered in2003. The need to integrate intelligence and law enforcement information greatly influenced the deliberations that resulted in the establishment of the Department ofHomeland Security (DHS) in early 2003. This legislation envisioned an analytical directorate in DHS that wouldbe the center of an integrative effort based oninformation from intelligence and law enforcement sources. The executive branch, however, has created a separateTerrorist Threat Integration Center (TTIC),under the direction of the DCI, that began operations in May 2003. At the same time, a number of observers have expressed serious concerns about closer ties between intelligence and law enforcement agencies and, especially,about the use of intelligence gathering techniques against U.S. citizens and resident aliens. The passage of the USAPatriot Act and related legislation in the wakeof 9/11 has been criticized as a fundamental weakening of civil liberties protections. Further legislative initiativesto align law enforcement and intelligenceefforts more closely are likely to result in greater opposition. Aside from the investigation into the background of the September 11 attacks, intelligence agencies will be adapting their efforts to the requirements of thecampaign against terrorism. Renewed emphasis is being placed on human intelligence, on improved analysis, oncooperation with law enforcement agencies, andon ensuring that real-time intelligence about terrorist activities reaches those who can most effectively counter it. Many observers believe that intelligence required for the campaign against terrorism will require significantchanges in the human intelligence (humint) collectioneffort. The CIA's Operations Directorate is responsible for the bulk of humint collection although the DefenseHumint Service within DOD is a smaller entitymore directly focused on military-related issues. Overall budget requirements for humint are dwarfed by the majorinvestment required for satellites and signalsintelligence collection. Humint, however, undoubtedly can be dangerous for those involved and it is, of course, formany in the media and the general public thecore intelligence discipline. (13) Both the emphasis on humint and on the exchange of data between intelligence and law enforcement agencies will influence the evolution of the U.S. IntelligenceCommunity in the coming decade. These two efforts will not in themselves have major budgetary implications --humint is both difficult and dangerous, but notnecessarily expensive and information exchanges between agencies ordinarily involve only information technologycosts. However, placing priorities on thesetwo aspects of the intelligence effort will almost inevitably detract from other missions and disciplines. In the viewof many observers there may be a tendency togive less emphasis to traditional intelligence collection and analysis regarding foreign political, economic, andmilitary developments. Whereas to some extentintelligence analysts experienced in looking at foreign policy, economic, and defense issues can shift from onecountry to another, it may be more difficult for ananalyst to turn from issues of diplomacy, economics, and warfare to the study of obscure terrorist groups that maybe involved in religious indoctrination orvarious criminal fund-raising activities. Although humint is not in itself an expensive discipline, it requires large amounts of support and an awareness by senior officials of possible negativeconsequences. Potential complications, including imprisonment of U.S. agents in foreign countries and loss offriendly lives, have to be given carefulconsideration. Major diplomatic embarrassment to the United States can result from revelations of covert efforts,especially those that go awry; suchembarrassment can jeopardize relationships that have been developed over many years. Collecting humint to support the counterterrorism effort will require significant changes in the work of intelligence agencies. (14) Terrorists do not usuallyappearon the diplomatic cocktail circuit nor in gatherings of local businessmen. In many cases they are also involved invarious types of criminal activities on themargins of society. Terrorist groups may be composed almost wholly of members of one ethnic or religious group. They may routinely engage in criminalactivities or human rights abuses. Developing contacts with such groups is obviously a difficult challenge for U.S.intelligence agencies; it requires long-lead timepreparation and a willingness to do business with unsavory individuals. It cannot in many cases be undertaken byintelligence agents serving under official coveras diplomats or military attaches. It may require an in-depth knowledge of local dialects and customs. Furthermore,the list of groups around the world that mightat some point in the future be involved in terrorist activities is not short; making determinations of where to seekagents whose reporting will only be importantunder future eventualities is a difficult challenge with the risk of needlessly involving the U.S. with corrupt andruthless individuals. Critics of the current U.S. humint collection effort point to these and other institutional problems. One report quotes a former CIA official: The CIA probably doesn't have a single truly qualified Arabic-speaking officer of Middle Eastern background whocan play a believable Muslim fundamentalist who would volunteer to spend years of his life ... in the mountains ofAfghanistan.... (15) Some observers have claimed that CIA personnel in key positions do not know the major languages of the areas for which they are responsible. (16) A former CIAofficial stationed in Tajikistan in the early 1990s recalled that "As the civil war in Afghanistan started to boil, Irepeatedly asked for a speaker of Dari or Pashtun,the two predominant languages in Afghanistan, to debrief the flood of refugees coming across the border intoTajikistan. They were a gold mine of information. We could have even recruited some and sent them back across the border to report on Afghanistan. I was told therewere no Dari or Pashtun speakers anywhere. Iwas also told the CIA no longer collected on Afghanistan, so those languages weren't needed." (17) Although such broad claims are disputed andcannot beevaluated without access to classified information, it is not clear what steps the Intelligence Community has takento realign its humint operations. Developing ahumint collection strategy under these circumstances is a difficult challenge for the Intelligence Community,especially for the CIA's Operations Directorate, theFBI, and the smaller Defense Humint Service. Observers suggest the need for a series of policy decisions involvedin a reorientation of humint collection. A move towards greater reliance on non-official cover (NOC). Non-official cover means that agents are working as employees or owners ofa local business and thus are removed from the support and protections of American embassies that would beavailable if the agent had cover as a U.S.government official of a non-intelligence agency. If the agent must be seen as engaged in business, considerabletime must be devoted to the "cover" occupation. Providing travel, pay, health care, administrative services, etc. is much more difficult. The agent will not havediplomatic immunity and cannot be readilyreturned to the U.S. if apprehended in the host country. He or she may be subject to arrest, imprisonment, or,potentially, execution. There is a potential foragents working in businesses to become entangled in unethical or illegal activities -- to "go into business forthemselves" -- that could embarrass the U.S. anddetract from their official mission. (18) Requirements for U.S. intelligence agents with highly developed skills in foreign languages are difficult to meet. Few graduates of U.S.colleges have such skills and language education is expensive. Recruiting U.S. citizens who have ethnicbackgrounds similar to members of the societies in whichthe terrorist groups operate may subject individuals to difficult pressures especially if the agent has family in thetargeted area. The House Intelligence Committeereported in September 2001 that the Intelligence Community's "most pressing need is for greater numbers of foreignlanguage-capable intelligence personnel, withincreased fluency in specific and multiple languages. The Committee has heard repeatedly from both military andcivilian intelligence producers and consumersthat this is the single greatest limitation in intelligence agency personnel expertise and that it is a deficiencythroughout the IntelligenceCommunity." (19) It is administratively difficult to develop resources throughout the world over a long period of time andcosts are higher than addingintelligence staff to embassies. Few observers could have predicted the intense U.S. concern with Somalia, Kosovo,or Afghanistan that eventually developed. Ten years from now there may be a whole set of challenges from groups that no one today is even awareof. In short, reorienting humint collection to give significantly greater attention to terrorist or potentially terrorist groups would have important administrativeimplications for the Intelligence Community. While budgetary increases would not necessarily be dramatic giventhe size of the existing intelligence budget (evenpaying hundreds of human agents would be far less costly than deploying a satellite), the infrastructure needed totrain and support numerous agents serving undernon-official cover would grow significantly. Extensive redundancy would be required to cover terrorist groups thatmay never pose significant threats to U.S.interests. With such considerations in mind, the Senate Intelligence Committee, in its report accompanying the FY2004 Intelligence Authorization bill ( S. 1025 ), noted interest among some Members in more vigorous humint collection, "especially unilateral -- collection-- under non-official cover and fromnon-traditional HUMINT 'platforms.' " The Committee further noted that some observers have even suggested "theneed for the creation of a small, highlyspecialized semi- or fully-independent HUMINT entity charged with collecting against non-traditional targets androgue states that traditionally have provenhighly resistant to HUMINT penetration involving traditional official-cover operations." The Committee did notendorse this concept but urged "diligent effortand new approaches to HUMINT management within existing agency components." (20) A central issue for Congress is the extent to which it and the public are prepared to accept the inherent risks involved in maintaining many agents with connectionsto terrorist groups. Statutory law (21) requires thatcongressional intelligence committees be kept aware of all intelligence activities; unlike the situation in the earlyCold War years when some intelligence efforts were designed to be "deniable," it will be difficult for the U.S.Government to avoid responsibility for majormistakes or ill-conceived efforts of intelligence agencies. Although there is a very widespread consensus that AlQaeda poses a threat to all Americans and tofundamental American interests, it cannot be assumed that the U.S. public, or Members of Congress, will view othergroups in the same light. Intelligenceprofessionals recall that earlier associations with anti-communist elements in Central America came under sustainedpublic criticism (because some of theanti-communists were guilty of human rights violations and because they were, or appeared to be, propping upreactionary and oppressive regimes). Thesecriticisms came to be shared by many Members of Congress and, as a result, intelligence agencies perceived thatthey were operating under excessive scrutiny anda cloud of suspicion for many years. (22) The directattacks on the U.S. homeland on September 11, 2001 may well have produced a willingness on the part of theAmerican public to accept greater risks, but intelligence professionals will undoubtedly be concerned to ensure thatthe work of their agencies not be jeopardizedby shifts in public opinion. Terrorist activities present intelligence analysts with major challenges. First, there must be an awareness of thesocial, ideological, and political environment inwhich terrorist movements develop. Such awareness usually requires detailed knowledge of geographic, ethnic,religious, economic, and political situations inobscure regions. There is no ready supply of analysts with command of such skills except perhaps among recentemigrants who may have complex ties to theirhomelands. Moreover, areas of concern are likely to shift over time. As one longtime observer has noted, suchanalysts could "serve their whole careers withoutproducing anything that the U.S. government really needs, and no good analyst wants to be buried in an inactiveaccount with peripheral significance." (23) Much of the information required to analyze terrorist environments derives from extensive study of open source documents -- newspapers, pamphlets, journals,books, religious tracts, etc. Some observers believe that the Intelligence Community overly emphasizessophisticated technical collection systems and lacks acomprehensive strategy for collecting and exploiting such open source information (osint). (24) Although efforts are underway by intelligenceagencies to expandthe use of osint, many observers believe that intelligence agencies should continue to concentrate on the collectionand analysis of secret information. In thisview, the Intelligence Community should not attempt to become a government center for research that can moreeffectively be undertaken by think tanks andacademic institutions. Once a terrorist group hostile to American interests has been identified, the Intelligence Community will be called upon to focus closely upon its membership,plans, and activities. Many collection resources will be targeted at it and much of the information will be classifiedand highly sensitive. The most challengingproblem for analysts at this point is to attempt to discern where the terrorists will strike and through what means. Open societies are inevitably vulnerable toterrorists, especially those persons willing to commit suicide in the process of seeking their goals. The skillsnecessary to anticipate the unpredictable areextremely rare; some suggest a useful approach may be to assemble a "war room" comprised of a number of analyststo sift through all available data. Such aneffort was created to follow Al Qaeda but did not foresee September 11. The bottom line is that anticipating suchattacks is intellectually difficult; hiring morepeople and spending more money do not guarantee success. (25) Others suggest greater reliance on outside consultants or an intelligence reserve corps when terrorist threats become imminent. Such an approach might also allowagencies to acquire temporarily the services of persons with obscure language skills. While there are securityproblems involved in bringing outside experts into ahighly classified environment, this may be one approach that can provide needed personnel without unnecessarilyexpanding the number of government analysts. In regard to analysis, major issues for Congress include holding intelligence agencies responsible for the quality of their work, the effective and efficient use ofopen source information, and the appropriate use of outside consultants. Analytical judgment is not easily mandatedor acquired; leadership is key, along withaccountability and a willingness to accept that even the best analysts cannot foresee all eventualities. In the past, the Intelligence Community focused on threats from the military forces of hostile countries and inlarge measure left terrorism to law enforcementagencies, especially the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). Since the end of the Cold War in the early 1990'ssteps have been taken both by the executivebranch and Congress to encourage closer coordination between the two communities. This effort was significantlyexpanded by P.L. 107-56 , the USA Patriot Act,enacted in the wake of the 2001 attacks. A recurring concern reflected in reports about the activities of those involved in the September 11 attacks has been the perception that information about possibleterrorist involvement of individuals may not be available to immigration and law enforcement officials whoencounter the individuals. There has not been acentralized database containing intelligence information by which individual names could be checked. Althoughthere are many potential concerns about theestablishment of centralized databases, most observers see the need to ensure that law enforcement agencies,including those of states and localities, have betteraccess to information acquired by intelligence agencies about potential terrorist activities. (26) Among some observers a major concern has been the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act. FISA was enacted in 1978 to establish a system for authorizingsurveillance to collect information related to national security concerns. The process for obtaining a warrant underFISA differs from that for obtaining a warrantfor criminal activities; there are different procedures and special FISA courts. The fundamental purpose is toprovide judicial branch overview of a process thatcould be abused by zealous investigators. Enactment of FISA resulted from congressional concern about instancesof politically-motivated surveillance effortsdirected at U.S. citizens and residents. Over the years there have been a number of modifications to FISA to extendits procedures to cover physical searches aswell as to cover new communications technologies. (27) FISA procedures, however, have been blamed by some for restraining efforts to track foreign terrorists. (28) They cite, for instance, the inability of the FBIinAugust 2001 to obtain a FISA warrant for one individual, Zacarias Moussaoui, who was reportedly connected toan Algerian terrorist group. (29) After September11, a warrant was obtained and Moussaoui's computer was found to contain information that suggested someinvolvement with terrorist activities. In the aftermathof the September 11 attacks, Congress passed modifications to FISA in the USA Patriot Act ( P.L. 107-56 ) and inthe FY2002 Intelligence Authorization Act ( P.L.107-108 ). Further changes have been proposed in the 108th Congress. (30) These initiatives reflect a determination to adapt FISA to the currentinternationalenvironment in which international terrorists may operate within and outside U.S. borders. The new Department of Homeland Security that began operations in early 2003 has the statutory responsibility of using both intelligence and law enforcementinformation to provide assessments of terrorist activities and threats. The Homeland Security Act ( P.L. 107-206 )established within DHS an intelligence analysisdirectorate designed to integrate intelligence and law enforcement information relating to potential or actual terroristthreat to the United States. Subsequently, theAdministration announced the establishment of a separate Terrorist Threat Integration Center under the directionof the DCI, which is to perform essentially thosefunctions. There are ongoing discussions regarding the respective roles of DHS and TTIC. (31) Placing emphasis on law enforcement by the Intelligence Community will have major implications for U.S. foreign policy. Over the years the U.S. governmenthas maintained good relations, based on shared appreciation of common interests, with many governments whoselegal systems are far different from our own. Insome cases the U.S. has chosen to accept the fact that a foreign government may shield narcotics smugglers ormembers of groups the U.S. considers terrorist andto try to build a relationship of mutual interests with the country in the hope that its involvement with terrorists willeventually abate. Such a policy inevitablyruns counter to the ethos of law enforcement agencies seeking to apprehend suspected criminals and put them ontrial. Reportedly senior FBI officials during theClinton Administration sought better cooperation from Saudi Arabia in prosecuting terrorists responsible for theKhobar Towers attack and resented a lack ofsupport from State Department officials who believed that pressing the Saudis would complicate efforts to workwith Riydah on other important issues. (32) The relationship of intelligence collection to law enforcement in dealing with terrorism poses complex issues for policymakers. Terrorism can, of course, beattacked militarily without concern for domestic law enforcement, but most observers believe that such an approachis appropriate and practical only whenterrorists directly threaten the U.S. homeland. In other cases, law enforcement may be the approach that caneffectively deal with the problem while notundermining support for larger policy interests or leading to significant U.S. casualties. Information used in judicial proceedings is often of a different type than that usually collected by intelligence agencies. (33) It is collected differently, storeddifferently, and must usually be shared to some extent with opposing attorneys. Nevertheless, over the past decadea series of initiatives have been undertaken toenhance the usefulness of information collected by intelligence agencies to law enforcement agencies and viceversa. (34) The barriers to flow of informationbetween the two communities were both administrative and statutory. Both types have been addressed by executivebranch policies (35) and by the passage of theUSA-Patriot Act of 2001 ( P.L. 107-56 ) which specifically lays the groundwork for making information collectedby law enforcement agencies, including grandjury testimony, available to intelligence agencies. Bringing law enforcement and intelligence closer together is not without challenges. First, the two sets of agencies have long-established roles and missions thatare separate and based on constitutional and statutory principles. The danger of using intelligence methods as aroutine law-enforcement tool is matched by thedanger of regularly using law enforcement agencies as instruments of foreign policy. Bureaucratic overlap andconflicting roles and missions are not unknown inmany governmental organizations, but such duplication is viewed with great concern when it affects agencies withpower to arrest and charge individuals or toaffect the security of the country. Congress may explore the ramifications of bringing the two communities closertogether. Most observers believe that, even if statutes and policies encourage closer cooperation between intelligence and law enforcement agencies, there will manybureaucratic obstacles to be overcome. Within the Intelligence Community there has been a tendency to retaininformation within agencies or to establish specialcompartments to restrict dissemination for security reasons. Similar tendencies exist among law enforcementagencies that guard information necessary for theirparticular prosecutions. Some observers suggest that channels for transferring information must be clearlyestablished and that close encouragement and oversightby both the executive branch and congressional committees would be required to ensure a smooth functioning oftransfer arrangements. A key issue is the overall direction of the effort. As has been noted, the only person with responsibility for the direction of both intelligence and law enforcementefforts is the President. The Bush Administration, like its recent predecessors, has instituted arrangements by whichthe Justice Department is included in thedeliberations of the National Security Council (NSC). (36) There are few complaints that such arrangements do not work effectively at present, but there weresituations during the Clinton Administration when it was believed that FBI Director Louis Freeh did not shareimportant information with the NSC and the WhiteHouse. (37) Law enforcement may require that someinformation be closely held and not shared outside the Justice Department, but if law enforcement andintelligence efforts are to work more closely in dealing with international terrorist threats, procedures will have tobe in place to ensure that important informationis shared. Such arrangements would arguably require close monitoring by the President himself, but that couldprove a burden upon his time. A significant issue for Congress is how to budget and conduct oversight of intelligence and law enforcement efforts engaged in counterterrorist efforts. The factthat intelligence and law enforcement agencies are in separate functional categories for budgeting purposes hascontributed, in the view of some observers, todifferent resource environments and indirectly to the acquisition of incompatible information technologies. Ingeneral, they argue that for many years the budgetsof law enforcement agencies have faced significantly tighter constraints than have those of intelligence agencies. In particular, sophisticated informationtechnology (IT) systems have been acquired by intelligence agencies that, while expensive, have absorbed only asmall percentage of annual national defensespending. Acquisition of the similar levels of IT capabilities by the FBI and other law enforcement agencies wasnot feasible since much higher percentages ofadministration of justice spending would have been needed. Hence a seamless system encompassing all echelonsof intelligence and law enforcement agencies forstoring and exchanging information in real time on potential terrorist threats has yet to be developed. Observers believe that any effort to enhance intelligence and law enforcement IT resources across agencies boundaries will require a determination by both theexecutive and legislative branches since the budgeting process is a shared responsibility. The Office of Managementand Budget (OMB) forwards to Congresseach year a proposed budget broken down into functional categories with most intelligence agencies falling into theNational Defense (050) category and the FBIand other law enforcement agencies being in the Administration of Justice (750) category. When Congress passesthe annual budget resolution, funding levels forthe various functional categories are allocated to separate Appropriations sub-committees (in a process known asthe 302(b) allocations). This process can createprocedural hurdles to the shifting of funds from one functional category to another. Therefore, both branches mayreview the need to make a coordinatedinter-agency examination of law enforcement and intelligence spending on counterterrorism. (38) Intelligence agencies are overseen by the two select intelligence committees, the appropriations committees, the armed services committees, and others thatmonitor intelligence efforts of various Cabinet departments. Most observers believe that the IntelligenceCommunity receives reasonably thorough oversight evenif comparatively little is shared with the public. Intelligence committees are widely perceived as taking a bipartisanapproach to oversight. Despite awidely-perceived need for greater centralized coordination of the Community, the fact that most of the nation'sintelligence effort is undertaken in the DefenseDepartment complicates oversight. Law enforcement agencies receive oversight from the two judiciary committeesand the appropriators, but observers point outthat the primary oversight of law enforcement agencies is provided by the courts in which success or failure isultimately judged. Judiciary committees have oftenreflected strong differences over legal issues and nominations. As a result, the nature and extent of congressionaloversight for intelligence and law enforcementagencies are different. Nevertheless, some observers believe that, given the scope of law enforcement involvement in the counterterrorism effort, there may be a need for greatercongressional scrutiny of the overall intelligence-law enforcement relationship. The emphasis on homeland defenseissues may lead some to call for differentforms of congressional oversight. The campaign against Afghan-based terrorists and the Iraq war of 2003 (which was characterized as related tothe war on terrorism) graphically demonstrated theimportance of changes in intelligence support to military operations since the end of the Cold War. Beginning withDesert Storm in 1991, U.S. military operationshave increasingly depended on precision guided munitions (PGMs) to hit targets while minimizing losses of civilianlives. Precision attacks in turn depend uponaccurate and precise intelligence. Some of this data is acquired by humint -- especially important in identifyingstructures in which key terrorist leaders may belocated. Much also derives from imagery collected overhead by unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), manned aircraft,and satellites. Other information derivesfrom the signals intelligence (sigint) effort. These new operational concepts, part of the larger effort to transformthe nation's defense strategy and force structure,have proven useful in operations conducted against terrorist organizations where the focus is on attacking smallgroups or facilities and avoiding wide-scale strikeson population centers. The growing dependence of U.S. military forces on precise and real-time intelligence support requires a significant investment by the Intelligence Community aswell as new organizational arrangements. Although satellite imagery is undoubtedly useful, especially in locatingfixed installations, much of the tacticalintelligence used in military campaigns against terrorist units is provided by manned aircraft such as the U-2s andUAVs such as the Predator and the long-range,high altitude Global Hawk. The linkage of such platforms to platforms armed with PGMs contributed significantlyto Allied success in the Persian Gulf War of1991 and to Operation Allied Force in Kosovo in 1999. (39) The Iraq War of 2003 and the Afghan campaign of 2001-2002 have once again graphicallydemonstrated their value in operations against terrorist targets. Although the value of such intelligence collection platforms is almost universally recognized, the numbers available to DOD are limited. (40) As recently asmid-2000 DOD was considering decommissioning U-2s in order to make additional funding available for futureGlobal Hawk procurement. (41) Secretary ofDefense Donald Rumsfeld noted in his National Defense University speech on January 31, 2002, "the experiencein Afghanistan showed the effectiveness ofunmanned aircraft -- but it also revealed how few of them we have and what their weaknesses are." He stated thatthe Defense Department plans to add "more ofwhat in the Pentagon are called 'Low Density/High Demand' assets -- a euphemism, in plain English, for 'ourpriorities were wrong and we didn't buy enough ofthe things we now find we need.'" FY2004 defense authorization legislation is expected to include significantlyincreased amounts for UAVs and other platforms. A recurring problem in tying together the sensors with the attack platforms has been the communications links. Major compatibility problems in Desert Stormmeant that some computer printouts had to be sent by air to various commands in the area. Many of the problemswere corrected by the time of Kosovooperations and information flowed freely in the theater and back and forth to U.S. agencies in real-time. Mediareports have not reflected such communicationsproblems in either Afghan operations or the Iraq War. The integration of intelligence analysis directly into military operations requires adjustments to organizational relationships among intelligence agencies. Imageryand sigint usually undergo some degree of analysis before the product can be used. Target identification can requireinput from a variety of intelligence disciplinesand in some cases must be approved by Washington-level agencies. Enabling agencies in Washington andelsewhere to support low-level combat units (on a24-hour basis) involves a high degree of responsiveness and flexibility. Such support may, in addition, come at thecost of other responsibilities. Some observersexpress concern that support to military operations, including counterterrorist operations, may detract fromtraditional, but still important missions of providingcontinuing strategic and geopolitical analyses for national policymaking. Congress has acknowledged the need for better displays of data, tied to geographical reference points, on computer links that would be available to all militaryechelons and civilian policymakers. The displays would incorporate information from all intelligence disciplines,including humint and open source materials andwould be made available in real-time. The issue for Congress is the extent to which the National Imagery andMapping Agency (NIMA), a relatively youngagency, should have the primary responsibility for maintaining a global system intended to be used throughout theDefense Department and IntelligenceCommunity. The U.S. military services are in a period of transformation that will pose many issues for Congress. (42) Requirements for capabilities to ensureinformationdominance and for large numbers of precision weapons will be reviewed alongside programs to replace agingplatforms. Ensuring that data collected from amyriad of sensors is available within essential time constraints will require coordination of programs some of whichare managed by DOD and others by CIA. The programs are overseen by intelligence and armed services committees. The coordinative process has beenimperfect in the past and observers believe that itwill continue to be difficult to ensure that weapons platforms and intelligence systems work together effectively. Ties between intelligence and armed servicescommittees are historically close, but observers may suggest new oversight structures. Effective counterterrorism -- political, diplomatic, and military -- requires good intelligence, butcounterterrorism intelligence differs in many ways from theintelligence support that was needed during the Cold War and for which the Intelligence Community remains inlarge measure organized. Significant challengeslie in the area of humint collection where practices that might produce much valuable information could beexpensive and involve the United States in activitiesthat, if revealed, could be highly controversial at home and abroad. Intelligence and law enforcement are becoming increasingly intertwined. Few doubt that valuable insights can derive from close correlation of information fromdiffering intelligence and law enforcement sources. Should the two communities draw too close together, however,there are well-founded concerns that either theU.S. law enforcement effort would become increasingly inclined to incorporate intelligence sources and methodsto the detriment of long-standing legal principlesand constitutional rights or, alternately, that intelligence gathering in this country or abroad would increasingly behamstrung by regulations and proceduralrequirements to the detriment of the national security. Difficult decisions will have to be made (some affectingorganizational responsibilities), and fine lines willhave to drawn. Observers believe that the campaign to counter terrorism will tend to reinforce the perceived need to transform the U.S. defense structure to take full advantage ofinformation technologies and precision munitions. Counterterrorist missions may not dictate the procurement ofplatforms, but they are likely to have animportant influence on the intelligence collection, communications, and information links. At the same time, observers caution that the current war on terrorism which has accentuated the need for law enforcement and intelligence cooperation may not,despite Administration projections, be a decades-long endeavor. They argue that even as Al Qaeda and otherterrorist organizations are being dealt with,traditional geopolitical concerns remain. Given the nature of organizational dynamics, they suggest, it may bedifficult to maintain adequate expertise oninternational military and geopolitical issues that will remain of vital concern in the future. Terrorist threats havebecome a central concern for the U.S.Intelligence Community, but the rest of the world has not disappeared from policymakers' horizons. As Secretaryof Defense Rumsfeld stated in his NationalDefense University speech, "we cannot and must not make the mistake, of assuming that terrorism is the only threat.The next threat we face may indeed beagainst terrorists -- but it could also be a cyber-war, a traditional, state-on-state war... or something entirelydifferent."

Summary: For well over a decade international terrorism has been a major concern of the U.S. Intelligence Community. Collection assets of all kinds have long been focusedon Al Qaeda and other terrorist groups. Intensive analytical expertise has been devoted to determining such groups'memberships, locations, and plans. Intelligence agencies had been acutely aware of the danger for years. In February 2001, Director of CentralIntelligence (DCI) George Tenet publicly testified toCongress that "the threat from terrorism is real, it is immediate, and it is evolving." Furthermore, "[Osama] binLadin and his global network of lieutenants andassociates remain the most immediate and serious threat." Nevertheless, the Intelligence Community gave no specific warning of the September 11, 2001 attacks. Although all observers grant that terrorist groups are verydifficult targets and that undetected movements of small numbers of their members in an open society cannotrealistically be prevented, serious questions remain. An extensive investigation by the two intelligence committees of the September 11 attacks was undertaken in 2002. Although the final report is not yet public, thecommittee members found that the Intelligence Community, prior to 9/11, was neither well organized nor equippedto meet the challenge posed by globalterrorists focused on targets within the U.S. A separate independent commission was established in early 2003 totake another look at the events precedingSeptember 11. Counterterrorism is highly dependent upon human intelligence (humint), the use of agents to acquire information (and, in certain circumstances, to carry outcovert actions). Humint is one of the least expensive intelligence disciplines, but it can be the most difficult andis undoubtedly the most dangerous forpractitioners. Mistakes can be fatal, embarrass the whole country, and undermine important policy goals. Congressmakes decisions regarding the extent towhich the importance of humint outweighs the inherent risks. Countering terrorism requires close cooperation between law enforcement and intelligence agencies; some terrorists will need to be brought to justice in courts,but others are dealt with by military forces or covert actions. In recent years, important steps have been taken toencourage closer cooperation between the twocommunities, but some believe terrorist acts may have been facilitated by continuing poor information exchangesbetween intelligence and law enforcementagencies and by blurred lines of organizational responsibility. Congress will oversee the implementation of theevolving relationship that affects importantprinciples of law and administration, and may choose to modify the roles and missions of intelligence and lawenforcement agencies. Military operations to counter terrorism are dependent on the availability of precise, real-time intelligence to support bombing campaigns using precision guidedmunitions. The linkage between sensor and "shooters" will be crucial as will access to global geospatial databases. As defense transformation progresses,Congress will also oversee the development of increased intelligence support to military operations including,especially, counterterrorist missions.