Foreign ballistic and cruise missiles pose a potential threat to the national security interestsof the United States. While weapons of mass destruction (WMD) can be delivered by a variety ofmeans including aircraft, artillery, and asymmetric means, it is missile-delivered WMDs that garnerthe most domestic and international attention. Countries with a WMD missile capability have thepotential to influence the actions of other countries in their regions or even countries on anothercontinent and, in some cases, destroy population centers and national infrastructure. At the presenttime, the United States is within range of the ballistic missiles of Russia, China, and perhaps NorthKorea, as well as France and the United Kingdom. Several other countries have missiles withinrange of U.S. overseas facilities and interests. A number of countries are attempting to eitherprocure or develop longer-range ballistic missiles to accurately deliver WMDs over great distancesand many fear that one day such an attack may be launched against the United States by a regionalpower or rogue state where stringent political and military controls over these weapons are notexercised. Estimates of the missile threat to the United States continue to be controversial for a numberof reasons. One is that many missile programs have moved underground and can also be hidden ina country's civilian space or aerospace industry, making it much harder for intelligence organizationsto track development. There is also some controversy still surrounding the 1995 NationalIntelligence Estimate and 1998's Report of the Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threatto the United States ( P.L. 104-201 ) also known as the Rumsfeld Commission Report. Despitenumerous recent developments in missile programs world-wide, the Rumsfeld Commission Reportcontinues in 2005 to be the open source benchmark for missile proliferation. While there is stilldisagreement about the extent of the missile threat, the Bush Administration's unwaveringcommitment to ballistic missile defense has resulted in the deployment of ballistic missileinterceptors at Ft. Greely, Alaska and Vandenberg Air Force Base in California. (1) Estimates released by the U.S. Intelligence Community vary little from those issued in thelate 1990s by the Rumsfeld Committee. Iran is still assessed as being capable of developing anintercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) (2) capable of reaching the United States by 2015 (3) although in the1995 NationalIntelligence Estimate (NIE) most intelligence agencies believed that this could happen before 2015. The NIE also cites North Korea as posing an ICBM threat to the United States before 2015. Likewise, North Korea's ballistic missile development time lines may need to be re-evaluated as newmissile programs are apparently underway. While not posing a direct threat to the United States, theproliferation of shorter range ballistic missiles and cruise missiles has resulted in heightened regionaltensions in the Middle East, between India and Pakistan, and between China and Taiwan. Some maintain that the long-range ballistic missile threat has decreased significantly sincethe Cold War, primarily due to nonproliferation treaties and arrangements. (4) The most significantreduction, they argue, are in ICBMs, SLBMs, IRBMs, and MRBMs, and that even SRBMs are"beginning to decrease as aging inventories are retired." (5) Given these decreases, the threat is characterized by some asfollows: There is a widespread capability to launch short-rangemissiles; There is a slowly growing, but limited, capability to launch medium-rangemissiles; A decreasing number of long-range missiles from Cold War levels that willcontinue to drop significantly over the next fifteen years; A possibility that one or two new nations could acquire a limited capability tolaunch long-range missiles over the next two decades; Likelihood of a nation attacking the United States or Europe with a ballisticmissile is exceptionally low. (6) Others also note the increase in SRBMs - particularly in the 100 to 200 km range - as wellan increase in programs that modify existing surface-to-surface unguided rockets with guidance andcontrol sections, which adds a further low-cost SRBM capability. (7) Ballistic missiles are alsoconsidered "less expensive to maintain than an air force," and since "technologies can be transferredacross to satellite launch vehicles, earning hard currency," some analysts suggest that these factorswill insure the continued proliferation of ballistic missiles. (8) Given this possibility of increased proliferation, some conjecturethat the "ballistic missile and nuclear warhead threat situation is going to become more complex andinternational in nature, with whole regions likely to be involved rather than just individualcountries." (9) One significant trend is the increasing number of missile production and developmentfacilities. Fifteen countries are known to produce ballistic missiles: the United States, France,Russia, China, North Korea, South Korea, Taiwan, India, Pakistan, Iran, Israel, Egypt, Syria,Ukraine, and Argentina. Several other countries, including Germany, Japan, Great Britain, SouthAfrica, and Brazil could produce ballistic missiles but have chosen not to. When a country has amissile production facility, its ability to produce large quantities of missiles is limited only by itsability to obtain certain critical materials and components. When a country acquires a large numberof missiles and launchers, it may be able to launch sustained attacks and to overwhelm missiledefense systems. Production and research facilities also enable these regional powers to enhance therange, accuracy, destructiveness, and missile defense penetration aids of their missiles. Anotherimportant factor is that countries with an indigenous missile production capability also avoid exportcontrol restrictions when trying to import missiles and missile technology from outside sources. Finally, once a country produces missiles it can consider exporting them as well as the productiontechnology to still more countries for financial, political, or ideological rewards. North Korea hasbeen exporting missiles and missile production facilities for a number of years, and there is concernthat more countries will enter the missile market as suppliers. Russian and Chinese organizationshave been primary sources of missile technology and, in the past, Western firms also have transferredmissile technology. The primary cause for concern with missile proliferation is that missile systems can providecountries an effective vehicle for delivering nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons over longdistances. The most worrisome trend is the growing number of countries with both long-rangemissile and WMD programs. India and Pakistan have tested MRBMs and nuclear explosivedevices. North Korea, Iran, and Israel are suspected to have nuclear, chemical, and biologicalweapons programs as well as a variety of short and medium range missiles. Over the last several years, nuclear weapons programs have declined in number. SouthAfrica reportedly dismantled the nuclear weapons and missiles that it had developed. Argentina,Brazil, South Korea, and Taiwan also abandoned earlier nuclear weapon programs. Belarus,Kazakhstan, and Ukraine transferred to Russia the nuclear weapons they inherited from the SovietUnion. Recent revelations about the possibility of North Korea's development of nuclear weaponsand Iran's revitalized nuclear program could reverse this favorable trend. (11) Several other countries that have missiles also have chemical weapons, and some havechemical warheads for their missiles. Bulk filled chemical warheads for shorter-range ballisticmissiles are considered relatively easy to develop while chemical submunitions are consideredsomewhat more challenging. Biological warheads are considered fairly difficult to develop becauseof the difficulties associated with working with biological agents in terms of their sensitivity toenvironmental conditions during missile flight and upon dispersal.It has been reported that duringthe 1991 Gulf War, Iraq had missile warheads filled with a variety of nerve agents and others withbotulinum toxin and anthrax. China, Egypt, India, Iran, Israel, North Korea, Pakistan, Russia, SaudiArabia, Serbia, South Korea, Syria, Taiwan, and Vietnam, all have missiles and reportedly havechemical weapons. Several countries reportedly have biological weapons programs, includingChina, Egypt, Iran, Israel, North Korea, Pakistan, and Russia. (12) Ballistic missiles armed with conventional high-explosive warheads proved to be importantweapons of terror when used against cities in the Iran-Iraq war and the 1991 Gulf War. Thedevelopment of advanced conventional warheads, such as cluster bombs and fuel-air explosives, andenhanced missile reliability and accuracy will increase the military effectiveness of missiles armedwith conventional warheads. The United States has demonstrated the military effectiveness ofcruise missiles in several conflicts and a new generation of stealthy, more capable cruise missiles ispresently in development in a number of countries. (13) As missiles and missile production technology have become widely available, the demandfor longer-range missiles and nuclear, biological, and chemical warheads has increased. Becauseof their relatively low cost, ability to penetrate defenses, strike deep into an enemy's homeland, andto deliver nuclear or biological weapons that could threaten the survival of an enemy country,missiles have become a delivery system of choice and a symbol of national might for some countries. The technological and military prowess of the United States was demonstrated for the worldduring the 1991 Gulf War and again in Afghanistan and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). As a result,adversarial countries and non-state groups may be more likely to avoid direct conventional militaryconfrontation with the United States. Some potential adversaries, such as Iran and North Korea,continue to develop missiles and WMD as means to counter U.S. military strength in their regionand to intimidate or deter their neighbors. At the same time, several allies and neutral countries arealso building missiles and developing WMD to promote their perceived national security interests. Any stigma associated with the possession or use of missiles was significantly reduced bythe Iran-Iraq War, the Afghan War, the Gulf War, Chinese intimidation of Taiwan, Russian use inits Chechen conflicts, and by U.S. use of cruise missiles in Iraq, Bosnia, Afghanistan, and Sudan. In regional wars, missile attacks and artillery fire on civilian population centers have become astandard form of combat, as the use of standoff weapons (usually cruise missiles or air-to-surfaceguided weapons) against hostile military units, intelligence centers, terrorist camps, and WMDfacilities has become a commonly-accepted U.S. military practice. About three dozen countries have been publicly identified as having ballistic missiles, andhalf of those countries are in Asia and the Middle East (see Table 1). About 30 of these countrieshave, or are developing, ballistic missiles that can deliver a 500-kilogram warhead 300 kilometersor further. (14) Of thenon-European countries, fourteen have produced ballistic missiles (Argentina, China, Egypt, India,Iran, Iraq, Israel, North Korea, Pakistan, South Korea, Syria, Taiwan, Ukraine, and South Africawhich no longer produces missiles). In addition to these regional powers, which are often discussedas missile proliferators, several Western and Eastern European countries and republics of the formerSoviet Union have missiles. International pressures and domestic policy decisions have eliminated certain missileprograms in Brazil, Egypt, South Africa, Poland, Hungary, and former Soviet Republics. While thelong-standing Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) is credited with slowing missileproliferation, it is not known what effect -- if any -- the International Code of Conduct AgainstBallistic Missile Proliferation (ICOC) will have on proliferators. (15) MTCR. The United States, Canada, France, Germany,Italy, Japan, and the United Kingdom established the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR)on April 16, 1987. The MTCR was designed to slow the proliferation of ballistic and cruise missiles,rockets, and unmanned air vehicles (UAV) capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction. Itis an informal arrangement, not a treaty, consisting of guidelines for transfers of missiles and relatedtechnology, and an annex listing items to be controlled. The Regime is based on the premise thatforeign acquisition or development of delivery systems can be delayed and made more difficult andexpensive if major producers restrict exports. The MTCR has no independent means to monitor orenforce its guidelines. Nations adopt the guidelines as national policy and are responsible forrestraining their own missile-related transfers. ICOC. On November 25, 2002, ICOC wasinaugurated at the Hague, the Netherlands. The ICOC, like the MTCR, is not a treaty but instead aset of "fundamental behavioral norms and a framework for cooperation to address missileproliferation." The ICOC focuses on addressing the demand side of proliferation and is viewed ascomplementing the supply side oriented MTCR. It seeks to achieve transparency by usingconfidence building measures, such as information transfer on ballistic missile programs. It alsocalls for pre-launch notification of ballistic missile flight tests. Unlike the MTCR, the ICOC intendsto establish a formal standing organization to collect information and oversee the development ofits confidence building measures and information control mechanisms. Table 1. Missiles by Categories of Range Note: See the Missile Inventory Appendix at the end of this report for a listing of each missileprogram by country. Russia's ICBM force - although greatly diminished in size over the years - continues to posea significant threat to U.S. national security. Russia reportedly plans to reduce the number of ICBMson active duty from 496 at present to 313 by 2010. (16) Some experts estimate that by 2010, these 313 ICBMs willconsist of 154 silo-based missiles and 159 mobile land versions, and the number of ICBM nuclearwarheads will be cut from 1,770 to 923. (17) At the end of 2004, Russia reportedly made a number of claimsabout impending deployments in 2005 of new generations of Russian missiles. (18) While specifics werelacking, some speculate that the Russian government was referring to the following four systems: Topol-M (SS-27 "Sickle"). Russia is phasing inthe silo and mobile versions of the Topol-M to replace a variety of older ICBMs -- some of whichwere developed in the mid to late 1960s. The Topol-M -- which began development in the late1980s -- is widely believed to have a maneuverable reentry vehicle -- possibly includingcountermeasures -- which Russia claims negates U.S. missile defenses. (19) The silo-based version ofthe Topol-M is currently operational with four regiments (each regiment has 10 launchers) and a fifthregiment of silo-based missiles is due to be commissioned in 2005. (20) The production of themobile version is scheduled to begin in 2005, with between three to nine systems scheduled to enterservice in 2006 and a similar number of systems being developed annually in the followingyears. (21) Press reportsthat Russia will develop a new heavy ICBM successor to the Topol-M are viewed by many asunlikely to be true, given Russia's limited defense budget - a budget that supposedly was responsiblefor slowing Topol-M production to only four missiles in 2005. (22) Bulava (SS-N-30). The Bulava is asubmarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) that has been in design since 1986. (23) This 10 warhead missileis intended to be used with the new Borey-class nuclear powered ballistic missile submarine, the firstof which is scheduled for launch in 2006. (24) The Bulava is also believed to have a maneuverable warheadand a relatively short burn time, which is intended to make it less susceptible to boost-phaseintercept. (25) Iskander (SS-26 "Stone"). The Iskander, whichis reportedly currently being brought into frontline service in Russia, was designed to defeat Westernballistic missile defense systems -- particularly the U.S. Patriot 2/3 system. (26) It comes in two versions,the "M" version for domestic use with a 400 km range and the "E" or export version with a reported200 km range. (27) According to the Russian press, the Iskander has four principal countermeasures: boost phasemaneuvering, depressed trajectory, low radar signature due to construction with composite materials,and terminal phase maneuvering. Syria expressed interest in acquiring Iskander-Es from Russia inearly 2005 (28) but strongprotests from Israel -- who was supposedly concerned that the highly accurate and stealthy Iskanderswould be used to either destroy or evade Israel's Arrow ballistic missile defense system -- havereportedly kept the acquisition from proceeding as intended. (29) Conventional Cruise Missiles. Russia hasreportedly deployed its first conventional air launched cruise missile. (30) The Kh-555 is a derivativeof its Kh -55SM nuclear cruise missile and reportedly has a range of between 3,000 and 3,500 km,an accuracy of between 5 to 10 meters, and a 400 kg conventional warhead capacity. (31) These missiles, designedto be carried on Russian long-range strategic bomber aircraft, are described by Russian press as aweapon for use in "local conflicts and counter-terrorist operations." (32) A number of unarmed Kh-55 cruise missiles -- left in the Ukraine after the withdrawal ofRussian forces -- were reportedly illicitly transferred to Iran and China. (33) According to Ukraniangovernment officials, 12 missiles were supplied to Iran and six missiles to China in 2001. SomeWestern analysts believe that more missiles could have been supplied than the 18 acknowledged bythe Ukranian government and that North Korea might have also received missiles. Some areconcerned that these Kh-55s could be modified into precision guided Kh-555s and that they couldbe modified to be fired from smaller aircraft -- such as SU-24s -- which would increase the utilityof the missile among nations that do not have large, long- range bomber aircraft. Chinese military modernization has been called " a threat to the United States" which couldconceivably "alter the regional balance of power" in the Pacific. (34) As part of this overallprogram, China is putting significant emphasis on missile programs. China's ICBMs. China is believed to have arelatively small arsenal of nuclear-armed, liquid propellant (35) ICBMs capable of reachingportions of the United States. (36) Some experts believe that China has between 20 to 30 CSS-4-- also known as Dong Feng (DF)-5 -- and DF-5A nuclear ICBMs in service and in storage, althoughit is possible that these numbers may be low due to the commonality between these missiles andsimilar Chinese space launch vehicles. (37) It is believed that the DF-5 series of missiles will be taken outof action starting in 2005 in favor of newer, solid propellant missiles. (38) China is continuing its development of its DF-31 road-mobile ICBM, a three-stage, solidpropellant missile carried inside of a canister on a transporter-launcher vehicle. (39) According to theDepartment of Defense (DOD), the DF-31 will achieve an initial operational capability (IOC) in2005-2006. (40) TheDF-31 is assessed as being capable of striking targets throughout Europe and Asia, parts of Canada,and the northwestern United States. (41) A longer range DF-31A road mobile version also is reportedlyunder development with a projected IOC of 2007-2009. (42) The DF-31A will enable China to strike almost the entire UnitedStates as well as Australia and New Zealand. (43) Some reports suggest that an even longer range DF-41, whichcould conceivably range the entire United States, is under development for both road mobile and silouse. (44) Although therehave been a number successful test flights of the DF-31, the DF-31 is not yet believed to be fully inservice and some experts maintain that China will have from 75-100 nuclear warheads on ICBMscapable of threatening the United States by 2018. (45) Some suggest, however, that the main purpose of China's ICBMprogram is not so much the ability to attack and defeat the United States but instead to "throw amonkey wrench into the decision-making process in Washington," particularly in terms of U.S.intervention in Taiwan. (46) Chinese SLBMs. The Chinese are continuing todevelop their JL-2 SLBM for use in China's new Type 094 ballistic missile submarine. The JL-2'srange is estimated to be approximately 12,000 kilometers and will likely have multiplewarheads. (47) TheJapanese press reported that China had test-fired what was believed to be a JL-2 on June16, 2005from a ballistic missile submarine off the coast of China near Qingdao to a test area in the westernChinese desert several thousand kilometers away. (48) The Type-094 submarine is believed to be capable of carrying16 JL-2 SLBMs and, according to one expert, when both systems become fully operational it willbe "China's first truly intercontinental strategic nuclear delivery system." (49) The U.S. DefenseIntelligence Agency (DIA) reportedly expects China to put its first Type-094 submarine with JL-2SLBMs into service by 2010 with the second entering service by 2020. (50) China currently has asingle XIA-class ballistic missile submarine which can carry 12 CSS-NX-3 SLBMs (range of 1,600km) (51) but the XIAsubmarine is considered so "noisy" to underwater detection systems that its chances of evading attacksubmarines is considered "limited." (52) According to U.S. intelligence officials, the Type-094/JL-2combination will permit China, for the first time, to target portions of the United States fromoperating areas near the Chinese coast. (53) Chinese Missiles and Taiwan. In testimony tothe Senate Armed Services Committee on March 17, 2005, on Current and Projected NationalSecurity Threats to the United States, the Director of the DIA, Vice Admiral Lowell E. Jacoby stated: China also is developing new SRBMs, Medium RangeBallistic Missiles (MRBMs), and Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles (IRBMs). They are a keycomponent of Beijing's military modernization program. Many of these systems will be fielded inmilitary regions near Taiwan. In 2004, it added numerous SRBMs to those already existing inbrigades near Taiwan. In addition to key Taiwanese military and civilian facilities, Chinese missileswill be capable of targeting U.S. and allied military installations in the region to either deter outsideintervention in a crisis or attack those installations if deterrent efforts fail. (54) There are numerous unclassified estimates of how many ballistic missiles China has arrayedagainst Taiwan, with many of these estimates originating from Taiwanese government officials. According to DOD (55) China has deployed between 650-730 mobile CSS-6 and CSS-7 SRBMs to garrisons oppositeTaiwan, with deployments of these systems increasing by about 100 missiles per year. Althoughvirtually all of China's SRBMs are garrisoned opposite Taiwan, they are mobile and can deploythroughout China to take up firing positions to support other regional contingencies. Newer versions of these missiles that are being deployed feature improved range and accuracy andis believed to be exploring how these and other ballistic missiles can be used for anti-access andsea-denial purposes. Chinese Land-Attack Cruise Missiles. In April2005, a Taiwanese intelligence source reported that China would soon begin to deploy a new,subsonic land-attack cruise missile (LACM). (56) This missile is "expected to approximate the performance andtactical flexibility of the U.S. RGM/UGM-109 Tomahawk and will eventually be fielded in ground,submarine, ship and air-launched versions." (57) This missile, known as the "Hong Niao" or HN-class LACMcomes in three versions with the HN-2 version having a 1,800 km range from ground or ships anda 1,400 km range when fired from a submarine. (58) It is also believed that this LACM can carry both nuclear andconventional payloads. (59) According to Taiwanese press reports, China is expected todeploy some 200 additional LACMs - including the new HN series - within striking distance ofTaiwan by the end of 2006. (60) Satellite Guidance. China's participation in theEuropean Union's (EU) Galileo satellite navigation system reportedly has some Western defenseexperts concerned that China could significantly enhance the accuracy of its ballistic and cruisemissiles and precision-guided munitions. (61) The Galileo system is expected to consist of a network of 30satellites and ground navigation systems that are intended to provide a highly accurate navigationalsystem for both civilian and military use and is expected to enter service in 2008. (62) By increasing the accuracyof its missiles, China would be able to strike more targets with its missile force with significantlyenhanced accuracy and would not have to employ multiple missiles to insure that each target issufficiently covered. North Korea's ballistic missile program continues to trouble both the United States and itsallies from a variety of perspectives. Despite international pressure and trade sanctions, North Koreais continuing to increase, diversify, and improve its missile fleet. In conjunction, North Koreapublically declared itself a nuclear power in 2003 and many analysts believe that its nuclear programis focused on developing nuclear warheads for both short, medium, and longer-range ballisticmissiles. North Korea is also widely believed to have either acquired or developed chemical andpossibly biological warheads for its ballistic missiles. North Korea has allegedly exported ballisticmissiles and associated technologies to a number of countries and some analysts suggest that thesetransfers have advanced the recipient's missile programs by many years. Finally, North Korea hasconducted a number of missile test firings during and between negotiations, which many analystsfeel were intended to influence the United States and countries in the region. North Korea's March2005 announcement that it was no longer observing a self-imposed moratorium on long-rangemissile testing (64) hasfueled speculation that North Korea may be preparing to test its longer range missiles. North Korea's Missiles. North Korea's arsenalconsists primarily of shorter-range Scuds, and a number of longer range No Dong and Taepo Dongmissiles. North Korea is believed to have approximately 700 Scud C (Hwasong 6) SRBMs with a500 km range and some analysts believe that a considerable portion of North Korea's estimated 250tons of chemical and biological agents would be delivered by these missiles. (65) North Korea's Scud-Cshave sufficient range to strike targets throughout South Korea. North Korea's estimated 100, 1,300km range, No Dong missiles enable North Korea to strike U.S. military bases in Japan with bothconventional and WMD warheads. (66) North Korea launched a version of its Taepo Dong missile inAugust 1998 over the Japanese islands, allegedly to put a satellite into orbit. Since this launch therehas been speculation that other Taepo Dong versions were under development. Prior to September 9, 2003 -- the 55th anniversary of the founding of the Democratic People'sRepublic of Korea -- U.S. and international press speculated that North Korea might display a new,longer-range version of the Taepo Dong missile, as well as an unnamed intermediate range missile,during military parades held in Pyongyang. U.S. government officials referred to the allegedlylonger-range version of the Taepo Dong as "Taepo Dong X." (67) According to U.S. intelligence officials, the Taepo Dong X is believed to be based on theformer Soviet Navy SS-N-6 submarine launched ballistic missile that North Korea may havepossibly obtained from Russia between 1992 and 1998. (68) An unnamed congressional source reportedly noted that theRussian Pacific Fleet, which deployed the SS-N-6, was "desperately disorganized and underfunded"during the period between 1992 and 1998, suggesting that North Korea might have obtained SS-N-6technology from the Russian Navy or the missile's designer, the Makeyev Design Bureau, withoutthe knowledge or approval of the Russian government. The South Korean press reported on September 8, 2003, that South Korean intelligenceofficials had identified what they believed were 10 new intermediate range ballistic missiles and fivelaunch pads at North Korea's Mirim Aerodrome. (69) South Korean officials also suggested that this new missile hadbeen under development since the early 1990s and could have a maximum range of 3,600 kms. (70) According to the report,Japanese, South Korean, and U.S. intelligence officials inferred from the shape of the missile thatthe new North Korean missiles were based on the Soviet-designed SS-N-6. (71) According to one U.S.press report, unnamed U.S. officials confirmed the accuracy of South Korean press reports andfurther elaborated by stating that the unnamed intermediate range ballistic missile was roadmobile (72) , making thesemissiles more difficult to locate and destroy. With the capability to accommodate a reentry vehicleweighing approximately 1,500 lbs (680 kgs) (73) a North Korean missile derived from the SS-N-6 couldconceivably accommodate a heavier and less sophisticated nuclear weapon -- the type which manyexperts believe North Korea is capable of producing. While there appears to be some disagreement in the ranges for the SS-N-6 and the possibleNorth Korean SS-N-6 variant (3,000 to 3,600 kilometers, depending on the source) a missile witha 2,500 kilometer range would enable North Korea to strike U.S. military forces in Japan andOkinawa and with a 3,500 kilometer range to strike Guam, a U.S. territory with a substantial andgrowing U.S. military presence. (74) If this is the case, such a missile would represent a significantincrease in North Korea's ability to deliver a nuclear weapon at extended ranges. Current Assessments. While specifics on NorthKorea's missile development programs continue to be vague, statements by U.S. military officialsin early 2005 suggest that North Korea's missile programs continue to evolve. U.S. Army GeneralLeon LaPorte, Commander of U.S. Forces in Korea, reportedly stated in March 2005 that "theregime's continued development of a three-stage variant of the Taepo Dong missile, which could beoperational within the next decade, could also provide North Korea with the capability to directlytarget the United States." (75) General LaPorte also expressed his concerns over North Korea'smedium and intermediate range missiles and their potential to strike Okinawa, Guam, and possiblyAlaska. (76) In opentestimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee on April 28, 2005, Vice Admiral LowellJacoby, Director, DIA stated in response to questions on North Korean missile capabilities that NorthKorea had the capability to arm a missile with a nuclear device and that a two-stage nuclear missilewhich could reach portions of the United States was also within North Korean capabilities. (77) Admiral Jacoby qualifiedthese controversial statements during the hearing, saying that without flight testing, these attributedcapabilities were theoretical in nature. (78) These statements, suggesting that North Korea had achieved anuclear missile capability, resulted in a great deal of controversy - reportedly "stunning senators" atthe hearing and eliciting a response from the Pentagon later that day suggesting that Admiral Jacobyhad overstated North Korea's nuclear missile capabilities. (79) While most experts agree that North Korea's ballistic missile program is progressing, otherssuggest that the North Korean missile program suffers from a number of significant problems. PeterHayes, the Director of the Nautilus Institute for Security and Sustainability, in Berkeley, California,who specializes in North Korean nuclear and energy issues, notes that North Korean missiles areunreliable. (80) In termsof reliability, he suggests that the combined probability that a North Korean missile would both takeoff and then stage as intended was around 49 percent and that any hostile North Korean launchguaranteed an almost 100 percent retaliatory strike by the United States. (81) Hayes also maintains that"the North Koreans are terrible at systems engineering," and that each new missile type becomes "anew type of unknown operating characteristic" suggesting that a North Korean missile attack mightlook like an "uncontrolled fireworks display." (82) Although there are a variety of assessments as to the state andviability of North Korea's long-range missile program, some suggest that these missiles serve anotherpurpose. The London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) offers the possibilitythat North Korea's longer range missiles are: designed more for bargaining leverage and trading forpolitical and economic benefits than for military use. In a sense, both are probably true - bydeveloping greater missile capabilities, North Korea can drive up the price for agreeing to restrainor abandon parts of its missile programme and at the same time be in a stronger position to test anddeploy such systems if negotiations fail. (83) Missile Proliferation. North Korea has beencalled "the world's most prolific exporter of ballistic missiles and related equipment, materials andtechnology." (84) Overthe past 20 years, North Korea is credited with having sold several hundred Scuds and NoDongmissiles, components, related technologies, and production facilities, primarily to Middle Easterncountries such as Egypt, Iran, Syria, Libya, Pakistan, Yemen, and the United Arab Emirates. Thesemissile sales - possibly amounting to several hundred million dollars - constituted a significantportion of North Korea's hard currency earnings over the years and likely were also exchanged withIran for oil and with Pakistan for nuclear technology. There is speculation, however, that revenuesfrom missile sales have been declining in recent years as some of North Korea's traditionalcustomers, Iran for example, have developed an indigenous missile production capability and otherssuch as Yemen, Egypt, Pakistan, and the United Arab Emirates have been pressured by Washingtonto end their missile-related dealings with North Korea. A Resumption of Ballistic Missile Test Flights? On March 3, 2005, NorthKorea announced a end to their 1999 self-imposed moratorium on test firing long-rangemissiles. (85) On May1, 2005, North Korea launched a short-ranged ballistic missile - believed to be an upgraded versionof a Soviet-era SS-21 - with a range of about 75 miles into the Sea of Japan, short of the Japanesecoast. (86) A similar testin April 2004 of an SS-21 reportedly failed and South Korean defense experts speculate the thisupgraded SS-21 has the capability to reach south of Seoul where U.S. military bases are to berelocated. (87) Whilesome do not expect that North Korea will test longer-range ballistic missiles such as 1998's TaepoDong missile test over the island of Japan due to the political fallout, the possibility exists that NorthKorea could conduct such a test if they feel that its nuclear or missile program is threatened byWestern pressure. Figure 1. Figure 2. Iran's long-range ballistic missile program is the focus of significant interest, largely due to Iran'sresurgent nuclear program. (88) Some experts are concerned that Iran may developnuclear-armed ballistic missiles that can not only strike targets throughout the Middle East - Israel,in particular - but also parts of Europe and beyond. (89) Iran's Space Program? On January 5, 2004, Iran'sDefense Minister reportedly announced that Iran would launch a satellite within the next 18months. (90) Although this deadline has passed without a launch, some U.S. intelligence analysts remainconcerned that such a launch - likely involving a modified Shahab-3 missile - would not only elevateIran's stature but also serve as a "Trojan Horse" "to help Iran develop both range and warheadimprovements to the already upgraded Shahab-3 under the cover of a civilian space program. (91) This upgraded Shabab-3,which was flight tested three to four times between July and October 2004, reportedly has a numberof modifications that suggest that this missile is being modified to accommodate a nuclearwarhead. (92) Theupgraded Shahab-3, with a more bulbous nose and up to 15% more propellant capacity, suggests a reentry vehicle similar to the Russian SS-9 ICBM. (93) Experts also maintain that this new configuration could facilitateadditional modification for the addition of a small solid propellant upper stage and satellitepayload. (94) This Shahabversion could therefore become a "dual-use" missile, thereby making it more difficult for intelligenceanalysts to separate ballistic missile development activities from space launch ones. Nuclear Warhead Development. Iran isreportedly also developing a missile reentry vehicle containing a small nuclear warhead for use inits Shahab missiles. (95) U.S. officials, commenting after former Secretary of State Colin Powell's November 17, 2004,disclosure that Iran was developing nuclear warheads for its missiles, stated that the warhead is basedon an indigenous Iranian design and includes the "physics package" - the nuclear weaponscomponents designed to fit inside of the reentry vehicle. (96) The anonymous U.S. officials stated the information on Iranianwarhead development "came from reliable intelligence sources" and not from Iranian oppositiongroups that have provided unreliable information in the past. (97) Another report suggeststhat Iran is smuggling ceramic matrix composite (CMC) - a composite graphite material that, inaddition to a variety of commercial uses, is considered ideal for use as heat shields on missile reentryvehicles. (98) InternationalCMC trading for use in reentry vehicles and missile warheads is controlled under the MissileTechnology Control Regime -- a voluntary arrangement on the export of missiles and associatedtechnologies. (99) Solid Propellant Tests. On May 31, 2005, Iranreportedly announced that it had successfully tested a new solid-fuel motor which could beincorporated into the upgraded Shahab-3, which is currently based on liquid-fuel technology. (100) If these claims are true,this could represent a significant breakthrough for Iran's ballistic missile program. Solidpropellant-based missiles, unlike liquid propellant ones, can be kept in storage for years, require lessmaintenance, and are generally more reliable and accurate. In addition, a solid propellant capabilityis generally considered a pre-requisite for developing longer range missiles. The maximum rangefor a single stage missile is approximately 2,000 kms and in order to achieve greater ranges, a twoor three stage missile is required. The in-flight separation and ignition of these additional stages are considered a very complex scientific and engineering processes and "in order to maintain theaccuracy of the missile, it needs to be using solid fuel." (101) Shahab 4/5? There has been a great deal ofspeculation surrounding upgraded versions of the Shahab 3 - the so-called Shahab-4/5. On October3, 2002, Iranian Brigadier General Ahmad Vahid, the chairman of the Iranian Aerospace IndustriesOrganization, told journalists that Iran "had no plans to develop long-range missiles in order to strikethe United States, since the U.S. is not one of Iran's strategic defense targets and instead had orientedits ballistic missile development against its principal regional adversary - Israel." (102) Some believe that thisstatement suggests that Iran will not pursue specific Shahab-4/5 programs as the upgrdaed Shahab-3is capable of striking Israel and regional targets. One expert postulates that Iran's previouslydiscussed "improved Shahab-3" might in fact be Iran's way of developing more capable, longer rangeShahab missiles without hanging politically contentious Shahab-4 or 5 labels on such programs. (103) Figure 3. India has an extensive missile and space program. In addition to antitank, surface-to-air, andair-to-air missiles, it produces SRBMs and is developing MRBMs and IRBMs. India's test of nucleardevices in 1998, its possibly arming some missiles with nuclear warheads, and its long-runningconflict with Pakistan over Kashmir make its missile force a cause of concern. The Prithvi seriesof liquid fuel theater missiles includes a 150 km and a 250 km model that are in production and a350 km model currently in development. The Dhanush is reportedly a naval version of the Prithviwith a range of 250 km. The Agni I reportedly has a 700 - 750 km range and is both rail androad-mobile. (105) TheAgni II, also rail and road-mobile, is said to have a range of at least 1,500 km, much more range thannecessary to reach all of Pakistan. (106) India has long refused to sign the Nuclear Non-ProliferationTreaty as a non-weapon state, has not signed the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, and is not apartner of the Missile Technology Control Regime or other multilateral export control mechanisms. While India claims it needs these strategic weapons to deter China, many analysts believe that theyare a destabilizing factor in South Asia. India also obtained the lease of a Russian submarine capableof carrying nuclear-capable cruise missiles with a 300 km range in December 2002. (107) This capability willlikely not only further destabilize the region but will also greatly enhance the survivability of India'snuclear weapons by providing them with a triad -- a land, air, and sea-based nuclear weaponsdelivery capability. India reportedly tested an Agni I missile on January 9, 2003. (108) In September 2003,the Indian government announced that they would create two additional Prithvi missile groups armedwith conventional warheads and an Agni I regiment and an Agni II regiment which could be armedwith nuclear warheads. (109) There was also speculation that India was preparing to testtheir 3,000 km Agni III missile. The Indian government reportedly hinted in October 2003 that theywould test the Agni III as early as November 2003 (110) but government statements later that month suggested that atest flight would be postponed until 2004 pending the completion of additional testing. (111) In March 2005, it wasreported that the first Agni III test fight was expected by the end of 2005 and some believe thatdevelopmental difficulties as well as pressure from the United States have caused delays in the testlaunch. (112) India alsosuccessfully test-fired its supersonic, 290 km range, Brahmos cruise missile on October 30, 2003. (113) India is alsotesting its Dhanush naval variant, with a reported test launch in October 2004 from an underwatercontainer simulating a ballistic missile submarine launch tube. (114) India jointly developedthe supersonic Brahmos, which can carry a 200 kg payload, with Russia. (115) In December 2004,Russia and India agreed to build between 360 and 370 missiles annually, with first deliveries goingto the Indian Armed Forces. (116) India reportedly also plans to export the Brahmos. (117) While it says it is not in an arms race with India, Pakistan has reacted to India's missileprograms with its own and has tested nuclear devices following India's nuclear tests. It has receivedextensive help from China and North Korea in developing and producing missiles. China alsohelped Pakistan with the development of nuclear weapons. The Hatf-2 and 3 are solid fuel SRBMsthat are probably based on the Chinese M-11 and M-9 respectively. The Ghauri-I and Ghauri-II arereportedly based on (or copies of) North Korea's Nodong or even its Taepo Dong-1 missile. TheShaheen/Ghaznavi series are reportedly solid fuel missiles of uncertain origin. The Pakistanimissiles and nuclear weapons are said to constitute a deterrent force against India'snumerically-superior conventional forces, but are seen by many as greatly increasing the possibilityof nuclear warfare. Pakistan and India have been characterized by some analysts as having conducted routineflight tests of their missiles in 2004 - 2005 and in March 2004, Pakistan made its first flight test ofits Shaheen-II missile, a two-stage, solid propellant missile with a reported range of 2,000 km. (119) The Shaheen-II wasreportedly successfully test fired again in March 2005. (120) On November 7, 2003, during a meeting in Seoul with South Korean government officials,Pakistani President, General Pervez Musharraf, reportedly stated that Pakistan had obtainedshort-range missiles and technology from North Korea but that Pakistan could now make the missilesitself. (121) During thesame meeting, he stated that Pakistan had not traded nuclear technology for missiles and that therewas currently "no interaction with North Korea whatsoever on any defense related matters." (122) Analysts suggest thatthis statement may indicate that Pakistan is now capable of producing Ghauri missiles, consideredby many experts to be copies of the North Korean No Dong, indigenously and that publicallysevering ties with North Korea might lessen U.S. pressure regarding Pakistani-North Koreancooperation. Having publically proclaimed the end to this relationship, Pakistan would assumeconsiderable risk if they re-initiated missile-related dealings with North Korea. According to the latest published unclassified assessment from the DOD's National Air andSpace Intelligence Center: Proliferation of land attack cruise missiles willexpand in the next decade. At least nine countries will be involved in producing theseweapons. The majority of new LACMs will be very accurate, conventionally armed, andavailable for export. The high accuracy of many LACMs will allow them to inflict seriousdamage on important targets, even when the missiles are armed only with conventionalwarheads. U.S. defense systems could be severely stressed by low-flying stealthy cruisemissiles that can simultaneously attack a target from several directions. (124) U.S. vulnerability to cruise missile attack was highlighted during the 2003 Iraq War. Duringthe conflict, U.S. and Kuwaiti Patriot theater missile defense batteries intercepted and destroyed allnine Iraqi ballistic missiles launched against the Coalition but failed to detect or intercept the fiveHY-2/CSSC-3 Seersucker cruise missiles launched against Kuwait. (125) All the more troublingwas the fact that the HY-2/CSSC-3 missiles were developed in the 1970s and are considered largeand slow compared to more modern cruise missiles. This demonstrated vulnerability could furtherthe attractiveness of cruise missiles to countries looking for a means to strike U.S. targets. Developmental and Acquisition Efforts. (126) As already discussed,China is developing the HN series of land attack cruise missiles as well as a number of otheranti-ship, and air, ground, submarine and ship-launched cruise missiles. China is also reportedlydeveloping a ram-jet powered (127) cruise missile (FF-1 and YJ-91) and has sold YJ-1 and YJ-2missiles to Iran, where these missiles are now being indigenously produced under license to theChinese government. It is not unreasonable to assume that China will export more cruise missilesin the future and that more countries will, in turn, begin building cruise missiles under license, withsome eventually achieving self-sufficiency in cruise missile production. India has reportedly purchased the Russian SS-N-27 cruise missile for land, ship, andsubmarine use in addition to its joint Brahmos program. There have also been reports that Taiwanhas tested a ramjet powered Hsiung-Feng 3 cruise missile and that Israel is developing a nucleararmed cruise missile, reports which the Israeli government denies. France, Germany, Sweden, Italy,South Africa, and the United Kingdom all have either individual or cooperative land attack cruisemissile programs ongoing and, like the Chinese, some of these advanced missiles could be exportedto other countries, further complicating the security environment. Based on reported program progress, it is reasonable to conclude that the development andacquisition of ballistic and cruise missiles continues to remain a central security goal for a numberof countries of concern to the United States. While shorter-range ballistic missiles are of concern,particularly in terms of their use on the battlefield, a number of combat proven and developmentalballistic missile defense systems -- such as the U.S. Patriot and the Israeli Arrow -- provide a meansto counter these systems. China, a country that has had long-range ballistic missiles and nuclearwarheads for a number of decades, appears to be modernizing and upgrading its capability, notnecessarily to directly rival or surpass the United States but, as some suggest, as a means to obtaineven greater strategic "freedom of action." Some speculate that Iran and North Korea -- countrieswith a significant U.S. military presence near their borders -- are attempting to achieve a basicnuclear missile capability in order to deter U.S. military action. Some believe that these countriesin various stages of nuclear missile development can be deterred from further progress, eitherthrough diplomacy or some form of coercion. Others say that, short of physical destruction of theirprograms, countries like North Korea and Iran will eventually achieve the capability to delivernuclear weapons to various ranges with ballistic missiles. Cruise missile programs are far morewidespread than ballistic missile programs, largely due to their relative affordability and the dual usenature of their technology. While cruise missiles may not be able to deliver significant payloads overgreat distances, their stealth and accuracy afford their possessors a potential asymmetric advantage. In order to address the implications of progressively improving and diversified ballistic andcruise missile threats, the United States has relied on nonproliferation and counterproliferationactivities in various combinations and in varied degrees of application. Some analysts contend thatpast Administrations relied too heavily on nonproliferation activities (which are considerably lessexpensive and controversial than many counterproliferation programs) and blame this imbalance forthe current state of missile proliferation. The current Bush Administration is accused by otherexperts as being too heavily skewed in the direction of counterproliferation, as witnessed by theNational Missile Defense Program and the Proliferation Security Initiative, but still other expertsnote that much of the emphasis on counterproliferation is an inevitable result of the events ofSeptember 11, 2001. The National Security Strategy of the United States of America published in September 2002calls for "proactive counterproliferation efforts" and "strengthened nonproliferation efforts" againstterrorist and hostile states. (129) While missiles are not singled out in the strategy, they areimplicitly part of the Administration's definition of WMD. The December 2002 National Strategyto Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction goes into far greater detail on how the threat of WMDs andmissiles will be dealt with. (130) This strategy explicitly states that "The United States, ourfriends and allies, and the broader international community must undertake every effort to preventstates and terrorists from acquiring WMD and missiles." The primary means by which this goal isto be achieved is through counterproliferation and nonproliferation activities. The strategy states that"effective interdiction is a critical part of the U.S. strategy to combat WMD and their deliverymeans." Another approach is the widely publicized concept of preemption. While preemption hasbeen an underlying assumption in previous national security strategies, it has assumed a prominentrole in the current strategy. Some have called for preempting WMD and missile programs in NorthKorea and Iran, but the use of eliminating Iraq's WMDs as the basis for going to war in Iraq in 2003and the subsequent revelation that Iraq had previously eliminated these programs, has likelyeliminated preemption from further practical consideration. In the area of nonproliferation, the strategy calls for the "strengthening of the MissileTechnology Control Regime (MTCR), including the support for universal adherence to theInternational Code of Conduct Against Ballistic Missile Proliferation." Also part of this strategy isthe implementation of bilateral and multilateral agreements to stop the spread of missileproliferation. The Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), announced by President Bush on May 31, 2003,is an international initiative which focuses on the interdiction of shipment of WMD and associateddelivery systems and technology. (131) More than 60 countries currently support the PSI and whiledetails surrounding its implementation are few -- largely attributed to intelligence and securityconsiderations -- U.S. Secretary of State Rice noted that the PSI was responsible for stopping 11WMD-related transfers since 2004 - although it is unclear how many of these transfers weremissile-related. On June 29, 2005, President Bush issued an unclassified Executive Order titled "BlockingProperty of Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferators and Their Supporters" (132) intended to freezeassets of individuals or companies in the United States that are doing business with entities in Iran,North Korea, an Syria suspected to be involved in WMD proliferation. The Executive Order Annexcontains the name of eight companies and freezes their U.S. assets and prohibits U.S. citizens orcompanies from conducting business transactions with them. While there appears to be little emphasis placed on the MTCR and Code of Conduct by theAdministration, the PSI and moves to freeze assets of companies involved in WMD proliferationsuggest that the Administration is embarking on a more aggressive form of nonproliferation. Whilesome may consider these moves confrontational and, in the case of the PSI, somewhat questionablefrom a legal perspective, others suggest that traditional treaties and agreements -- which generallyare not subscribed to by nations of concern -- have done little to deter more aggressive countries suchas North Korea and Iran from advancing their missile programs. (See Footnote 3 on page CRS-2 for abbreviations - blank spaces indicate data unknown)

Summary: This report provides a current summary of ballistic and cruise missile activity in selectedcountries and discusses implications for U.S. national security policy. The Defense ThreatReduction Agency's Weapons of Mass Destruction Terms of Reference Handbook defines a ballisticmissile as "a missile that is guided during powered flight and unguided during free flight when thetrajectory that it follows is subject only to the external influences of gravity and atmospheric drag"and a cruise missile as "a long-range, low-flying guided missile that can be launched from air, sea,and land." Ballistic and cruise missile development and proliferation continue to pose a threat toU.S. national security interests both at home and abroad. Approximately 35 countries currentlypossess operational ballistic missiles of various ranges and approximately 25 countries haveoperational cruise missiles with a range greater than 150 km (90 miles). Some analysts considercruise missile proliferation to be of more concern than that of ballistic missile proliferation, primarilydue to their low threshold of use, availability, affordability, and accuracy. This report will beupdated annually. With the fall of Iraq and the voluntary termination of Libya's ballistic missile program, manyview North Korean and Iranian missile and WMD programs as the primary "rogue nation"long-range ballistic missile threat to U.S. national security. Russia and China continue to be the onlytwo countries that could conceivably attack the United States with intercontinental ballistic missilesarmed with nuclear weapons, but improved relationships with both countries have done a great dealto diminish this threat over past decades. India's and Pakistan's ongoing missile developmentprograms are viewed by many as highly aggressive and even provocative, but are generally viewedin a regional context as opposed to a direct threat to the United States. The renewal of dialoguebetween these two countries in an attempt to settle their disputes by diplomatic means may also helpin slowing proliferation as well as preventing their potential use in this region. The implications of ballistic and cruise missile proliferation to the United States hasnecessitated both nonproliferation and counterproliferation approaches in trying to stem thedevelopment, deployment, and export of missiles. Past Administrations have been characterized asnonproliferation-oriented by some analysts while the current Bush Administration is viewed by someas having abandoned traditional nonproliferation for a more action-oriented approach towardsmissile proliferation. Other experts have suggested that the United States must somehow find theright balance between missile nonproliferation and counterproliferation policies if meaningful,long-term progress is to be made. While some believe that missile proliferation can be "rolled back"by some combination of these approaches, others note that both ballistic and cruise missiles havebecome such an integral part of many countries' national security frameworks, that it is highlyunlikely that countries will abandon their programs in deference to U.S. pressure.