In April 2001 budget submissions, President Bush requested $882.29 million in FY2002economic and counter-narcotics assistance for Colombia and regional neighbors in an initiativecalled the "Andean Regional Initiative," with $731 million of the counter-narcotics assistance calledthe "Andean Counterdrug Initiative." According to the Administration, there are two distinctivefeatures of this program, compared to Plan Colombia assistance, (1) both of which aim to promotepeace and to stem the flow of cocaine and heroin from the Andean region. The differences are thatthe assistance for economic and social programs is roughly equal to the assistance forcounter-narcotics programs, and that more than half of the assistance is directed at regional countriesthat are experiencing the spill-over effects of illicit drug and insurgency activities. (2) In the presentation of the International Affairs budget, the Administration noted that the Andean Counterdrug Initiative would build upon the resources provided in the FY2000 EmergencySupplemental Appropriations for Plan Colombia and ongoing regional funding. It set ascounter-narcotics goals to reduce Colombian coca production by 30% in 2000-2002, to eliminate allillicit coca production in Bolivia by the end of 2002, to negotiate revised coca and poppy controlgoals with the new Peruvian Government, and to set aggressive and achievable goals by mid-August2001 with other countries in the region. In presenting the broader Andean Regional Initiative to Andean regional leaders at Summit of the Americas III in Quebec City, Canada, in mid-April 2001, President Bush said: "The United Statesis responsible to fight its own demand for drugs. And we will expand our efforts to work withproducer and transit countries to fortify their democratic institutions, promote sustainabledevelopment, and fight the supply of drugs at the source .... The United States appreciates thedifficult challenges [Andean countries] face in fighting drugs - and stands ready to be their partner." (3) Requested ARI funding of $882.29 million for FY2002 is to be distributed as follows, taking into account only international affairs funding: Colombia: $399 million Socio-economic aid: $146.5 million for programs such as alternativedevelopment, judicial reform, human rights, anti-corruption measures, and support for the peaceprocess. Counter-narcotics aid: $252.5 million for aviation and infrastructure supportfor air assets provided under Plan Colombia, training and equipping security forces, and interdictionand eradication efforts. Peru: $206.15 million Socio-economic aid: $128.15 million for alternative development, promotionof democracy, health and education programs. Counter-narcotics aid: $78 million for upgrading helicopters and riverineinterdiction efforts, eradication, and demand reduction and policydevelopment. Bolivia: $143.48 million Socio-economic aid: $88.48 million for programs such as alternativedevelopment, judicial reform, poverty alleviation, health and environment. Counter-narcotics aid: $55 million for ground-based and air interdictionsupport, eradication efforts, counter-narcotics training, and narcotics awareness and preventionprograms. Ecuador: $76.48 million Socio-economic aid: $56.48 million for border area development, povertyreduction, judicial reform, and environmental programs. Counter-narcotics aid: $20 million for northern border security, lawenforcement and border checkpoints, and sea and airport control efforts. Brazil: $26.18 million Socio-economic aid: $11.18 million for health and environmental programs. Counter-narcotics aid: $15 million for training and equipping bordercounter-narcotics forces, and for drug awareness and demand reductionprograms. Panama: $20.5 million Socio-economic aid: $8.5 million for judicial reform, watershed management,and economic growth opportunities. Counter-narcotics aid: $12 million for upgrading interdiction and lawenforcement forces, and for modernizing criminal justice institutions. Venezuela: $10.5 million Socio-economic aid: $0.5 million for legal and judicialreform. Counter-narcotics aid: $10 million for law enforcement and interdictionreforms, efforts to counter money-laundering, and demand reduction. Another aspect of the Andean Regional Initiative is U.S. support for the extension and broadening of the Andean Trade Preferences Act (ATPA), expiring in December 2001, that givesduty free or reduced-rate treatment to the products of Bolivia, Peru, Ecuador and Colombia. Thiswas the centerpiece appeal of Colombian President Pastrana at his mid-April 2001 meeting with thePresident Bush, and the U.S. President replied that he favored extension of the Act and would workwith Congress to broaden the coverage. President Bush repeated that pledge when he met withAndean leaders at the Summit of the Americas meeting in Canada. Colombia especially wantstextiles and apparel to be covered, while Ecuador wants tuna to be covered. The countries arelooking for parity with Central American and Caribbean preferences, provided in the U.S.-CaribbeanTrade Partnership Act approved in 2000, in order to prevent a diversion of trade and investment fromthe Andean region to Mexico, Central America, or the Caribbean. (4) In a mid-May 2001 briefing on the Andean Regional Initiative, Administration spokesmen noted that democracy is under pressure in all regional countries, that economic development is indoubt, and that Andean countries pose a direct national security threat because they produce virtuallyall of the world's cocaine and increasing amounts of heroin. The policy makers suggested threeoverarching goals in the Andean Ridge that could be called the three D's - democracy, development,and drugs. The first goal is to promote and support democracy and democratic institutions bysupport for judicial reform, anti-corruption measures, human rights improvement, and the peaceprocess in Colombia. The second goal is to foster sustainable economic development and tradeliberalization through alternative economic development, protection of the environment, and renewalof the Andean Trade Preference Act (ATPA). The third goal is to significantly reduce the supply ofillegal drugs to the United States at the source, while simultaneously reducing U.S. demand, througheradication, interdiction and other efforts. (5) The Administration's Andean Regional Initiative if enacted as requested will significantly increase funding to some Latin American drug producing countries. It would place Colombia, Peru,and Bolivia among the top eight U.S. foreign aid recipients in FY2002, with Colombia in thirdplace, Peru in fifth place, and Bolivia in eighth place. (6) Critics of the Andean Regional Initiative argue that it is a continuation of what they regard as the misguided approach of Plan Colombia approved in 2000, with an overemphasis on military andcounter-drug assistance, and with inadequate support for human rights and the peace process inColombia. They argue that support for the military will weaken and undermine the peace processas the only viable solution, particularly if the military's ties to the para-military groups and humanrights abuse are not ended. They also argue that forced eradication of crops through aerial sprayingwill cause environmental damage and internal displacement in the entire region, and is likely to failultimately as new sources of supply emerge elsewhere. Supporters argue that the Andean RegionalInitiative continues needed assistance to Colombia when Plan Colombia assistance is just beginningto take effect, while providing more support for endangered regional neighbors and more assistancefor social and economic programs. (7) The Andean Regional Initiative is designed to provide assistance to seven important countriesin the broadly defined Andean region (8) , or what theAdministration has called the Andean Ridge: Colombia (the major producer of cocaine and the central challenge); Peru and Bolivia (where pastsuccesses in reducing cocaine production could be threatened by expected progress in Colombia);Ecuador (the most exposed neighbor because of its proximity to Colombian areas controlled by drugproducers and guerrillas); and Brazil, Venezuela and Panama (where the threat is primarily confinedto common border areas with Colombia). This area has some of the most heavily populated countries in Latin America, including the first (Brazil), third (Colombia), fifth (Peru), sixth (Venezuela), and eighth (Ecuador) most populous. Itincludes three major drug producing countries (Colombia, Bolivia, and Peru) where virtually all theworld's cocaine, and more than two thirds of the heroin consumed in the U.S. East Coast areproduced. It also includes two major oil producing countries (Venezuela and Ecuador) which supplysignificant quantities of oil to the United States and are members of the Organization of PetroleumExporting Countries (OPEC). While the designated countries have diverse trading relationships, theUnited States is the major trading partner by far for all of them. For the five traditional Andeancountries (Colombia, Venezuela, Ecuador, Peru, and Bolivia) the Andes mountain range that runsthrough South America poses geographical obstacles to intra-state and inter-state integration, but thecountries are linked together in the Andean Community economic integration pact. While Colombiaand Venezuela have largely European-Indian mixed race (mestizo) populations, Bolivia, Peru, andEcuador have significant indigenous populations. With a population of 42.8 million, Colombia is the third most populous country in Latin America after Brazil and Mexico, with a largely mixed race (mestizo) population, and a spaciousterritory separated by three parallel mountain ranges. It is known for a long tradition of democracy,but also for continuing violence, including guerrilla insurgency dating back to the 1960s, andpersistent drug trafficking activity. Negotiated settlements were achieved with some of the guerrillagroups in the 1980s, but fell apart by 1990 when former guerrillas participating in political activitieswere assassinated. Recent administrations have had to deal with a complicated mix of leftistguerrillas, rightist para-military forces, and drug traffickers associated with both forces. President Andres Pastrana was elected and inaugurated in 1998 for a four year term largely on the basis of pledges to bring peace to the country by negotiating with the guerrillas, strengtheningthe Colombian military and counter-narcotics forces, and seeking international support for theseefforts and other reforms to address the country's unusually serious economic difficulties. (9) In 1999, President Pastrana, with U.S. assistance, developed a $7.5 billion plan called Plan Colombia, with $4 billion to come from Colombia and $3.5 billion to come from internationaldonors, although funding from Colombia and the international community has been lagging. Inresponse to Colombian requests, the Clinton Administration developed and the U.S. Congressapproved a $1.3 billion package of assistance in 2000, also called Plan Colombia assistance. Some$860.2 million or 67% of this assistance was to support programs in Colombia, with $416.9 millionfor helicopter, training, and other assistance to three Colombian Army counternarcotics battalions. This plan was targeted mainly at Colombia and expenses for big ticket items were weighted towardsupport for military and counter-narcotics activities, although there was funding for alternativedevelopment, governance, and human rights programs, and conditions to encourage an improvementin the military's human rights performance. (10) President Pastrana is approaching the end of his term, which expires in August 2002, and the selection process to determine his successor is under way. While peace talks had been reinvigoratedby President Pastrana's direct talks with Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) guerrillaleader Manuel Marulanda in February 2001, prospects are still very uncertain. Although manyelements of Plan Colombia counter-drug assistance were just beginning to be put in place, the StateDepartment reported in March 2001 that Colombian production of cocaine had increased 11% in theyear 2000. Despite the FARC's murder in late September 2001 of the popular former Minister ofCulture, President Pastrana decided in early October 2001 to extend the demilitarized zone throughJanuary 20, 2002, after the FARC agreed to stop random highway kidnappings and to discuss aceasefire. Shortly thereafter, however, the Army accused the FARC of kidnapping six people on ahighway in Narino province, and killing four others in an attack on a small town there. While international support for Plan Colombia had been lagging, with European countries previously pledging only about $200 million for social development (not military) projects, the shiftin focus of the U.S. Andean Regional Initiative gained wider diplomatic support. In part becauseof the change in emphasis, the international community pledged an additional $580 million at thethird meeting of the International Support Group for the Peace Process in Colombia on April 30,2001, although some double counting may be involved. The European Union pledged $297 million,the United States pledged $146 million, the Andean Development Corporation pledged $100 million,and other countries pledged $37 million. Under the FY2002 Andean Regional Initiative request, Colombia would have received $399 million, with $146.5 million in socio-economic aid for programs like alternative development,judicial reform, human rights, anti-corruption measures, and support for the peace process; and$252.5 million in counter-narcotics aid for aviation and infrastructure support for air assets providedunder Plan Colombia, training and equipping security forces, and interdiction and eradication efforts. Under final allocations for FY2002, Colombia received $380.50 million, with $137 million ineconomic and social programs, and $243.50 million in counter-narcotics aid. With a population of 25.7 million (45% Indian, 37% mestizo, 15% European), Peru is the fifth most populous country in Latin America. It has been in flux since the constitutionally questionablethird term re-election in June 2000 of President Alberto Fujimori. Although President Fujimori hadconsiderable support during his presidency (1990-2000) for restoring the economy, defeating theguerrilla insurgency, and reducing drug trafficking activity, he was criticized for corruption, humanrights violations, and authoritarian tendencies. The political uncertainty in Peru was compoundedwhen President Fujimori suddenly resigned and fled into exile in December 2000, followingallegations of corruption associated particularly with security chief Vladimiro Montesinos. Peru was governed by Acting President Valentin Paniagua during a transition period until president-elect Alejandro Toledo was inaugurated as President on July 28, 2001, following the wellregarded two-round presidential elections in April and June 2001. Toledo, a longtime anti-Fujimoriopposition leader, was elected on June 3, 2001, with 53% of the valid vote, against formerleft-leaning Peruvian President Alan Garcia with 47% of the vote. (11) President Toledo has promisedto end corruption and to stabilize the economy, and most observers worry that the expectations ofthe populace, especially poor, indigenous groups, are almost impossible to achieve. Representatives of Peru and the United States launched an investigation into the circumstances and procedures leading to an accident on April 20, 2001, when a Peruvian military plane shot downa small plane, killing an American missionary woman and her infant daughter, after a CIAsurveillance plane indicated that the small craft might be involved in drug trafficking activities. Asa result of this accident, U.S. surveillance of drug-related flights in Peru and Colombia weresuspended pending clarification of procedures. The State Department released the report of theU.S.-Peruvian investigative team on August 2, 2001, concluding that "communications systemsoverload" and "cumbersome procedures" played a role in the accident. Peru is viewed as a success story in counter-narcotics efforts because six years of joint U.S.-Peru air and riverine interdiction operations, aggressive eradication efforts, and promisingalternative development programs have reduced coca production by 70%. However, Peruvianspokesmen have worried about spillover effects of illicit drug activities from Colombia into Peru,and a possible increase in coca production. They have denounced Colombian plantings of coca andpoppies in Peru, and international trafficking of arms through Peru to FARC guerrillas in Colombia. Because of these threats, Peru has moved a fleet of MI-17 helicopters from its border with traditionalrival Ecuador, where tensions have diminished, to the border with Colombia. As part of the FY2000 Plan Colombia emergency supplemental funding, Peru received $25 million for KMAX helicopters for the Peruvian National Police, and benefitted from regionalinterdiction funding . Under the FY2002 Andean Regional Initiative request, Peru would have received $206.15 million in assistance, with $128.15 in socio-economic aid for alternative development, promotionof democracy, health and education programs; and $78 million in counter-narcotics aid for upgradinghelicopters and riverine interdiction efforts, eradication, and demand reduction and policydevelopment. Under final allocations for FY2002, Peru received $194.87 million, with $119.87million in economic and social programs, and $75 million in counter-narcotics aid. With a population of 7.9 million (roughly 60% indigenous and 40% mestizo and European), Bolivia is the eleventh most populous country in Latin America. It has been governed by PresidentHugo Banzer, elected and inaugurated in 1997, who was serving the second time as President, thistime as a democratically elected President, following his earlier period of military rule in the 1970s. In late June 2001, President Banzer was diagnosed with lung and liver cancer and flew to the UnitedStates for treatment. Banzer resigned on August 6, and Vice President Jorge Quiroga becamePresident on August 7, 2001, vowing to continue the economic reforms and to rid the country of cocaproduction in line with his predecessor's promises. With a large indigenous population, Bolivia experienced a significant social revolution under one party in the 1950s with sweeping land reform, universal suffrage, rural education, andnationalization of the country's important tin mines. The period of military control ran from themid-1960s to the mid-1980s and was followed by a series of ineffective and largely corruptgovernments with linkages to drug traffickers. Beginning in the mid-1990s, reformist governmentsin Bolivia carried out major privatization programs and put the country on a sound economic footing. President Banzer continued the economic reforms and set the goal of eliminating illegal cocacultivation and narco-trafficking during his five year term. While Bolivia is actively involved withthe Andean Community, it is an associate member of the Southern Common Market (Mercosur)formed by Brazil, Argentina, Paraguay and Uruguay. In support of Bolivia's counter-narcoticsefforts, the United States has provided significant interdiction and alternative development assistanceand it has forgiven all of Bolivia's debt for development assistance projects, and most of the debtfor food assistance. Bolivia, like Peru, is viewed by many as a counter-narcotics success story, with joint air and riverine interdiction operations, successful eradication efforts, and effective alternative developmentprograms reducing coca cultivation to the lowest level in five years, with a net reduction ofapproximately 70%. Bolivia does not have a common border with Colombia, but the principalconcern in Bolivia is that the successes of the last few years could be turned back and cocacultivation and drug trafficking could return to Bolivia to meet world-wide demand ifcounter-narcotics efforts are successful in Colombia. Some critics have also charged that, whileeradication has been successful in dramatically reducing coca cultivation, it has hurt the overall economy. As part of the FY2000 Plan Colombia emergency supplemental funding, Bolivia received $25 million for regional interdiction assistance and $85 million in alternative development assistance. Under the FY2002 Andean Regional Initiative request, Bolivia would have received $143.48 million. This would have included $88.48 million in socio-economic aid for programs such asalternative development, judicial reform, poverty alleviation, health and environment; and $55million in counter-narcotics aid for ground-based and air interdiction support, eradication efforts,counter-narcotics training, and narcotics awareness and prevention programs. Under final allocationsfor FY2002, Bolivia received $122.96 million, with $74.46 million in economic and socialassistance, and $48.50 million in counter-narcotics aid. With a population of 12.6 million, Ecuador is the eighth most populous country in Latin America. While more than half of the population is mixed race mestizo, about a quarter of thepopulation is indigenous. Ecuador is the most exposed neighbor in the region because it is situatedadjacent to southern Colombian areas that are guerrilla strongholds and heavy drug producing areas. Ecuador is led by President Gustavo Noboa, the former Vice President who took office in January2000, after an uprising by elements of the military and indigenous groups. He is the fifth presidentin five years, with several of the previous presidents leaving as a result of corruption charges. Thecountry has experienced hyperinflation for several years in the past, and is still struggling witheconomic austerity following dollarization of the currency in early 2000. According to press reports, Colombian guerrillas pass into Ecuadoran territory for rest, recuperation, and medical treatment, and there are reports that Colombians are buying ranches andfarms in the Ecuadoran border region, possibly for drug cultivation. Ecuadoran officials say theyhave uncovered and destroyed several small cocaine processing labs in the area. The Ecuadoranborder region is experiencing a constant flow of Colombian refugees into the poor areas, and fighterswith Colombian paramilitary organizations have been arrested for running extortion rings inEcuadorian border regions. The FARC has been accused of kidnaping people in Ecuador, althoughthe FARC denies the allegations. (12) As part of the FY2000 Plan Colombia emergency supplemental funding Ecuador received $20 million in U.S. assistance, of which $12 million was to support drug interdiction efforts, and $8million was for alternative development assistance. Another $61.3 million has been allocated forthe construction of a Forward Operating Location in Manta, Ecuador for counter-narcotics aerialsurveillance. There have been numerous press reports that Ecuadoran officials have been requestingsignificantly increased U.S. assistance for some time. Under the FY2002 Andean Regional Initiative request, Ecuador would have received a total of $76.48 million in assistance, with $56.48 million in socio-economic aid for border areadevelopment, poverty reduction, judicial reform, and environmental programs; and $20 million incounter-narcotics aid for northern border security, law enforcement and border checkpoints, and seaand airport control efforts. Under final allocations for FY2002, Ecuador received $46.86 million,with $31.85 million in economic and social programs, and $15 million in counter-narcotics aid. With a population of 170 million (of European, African, and mixed stock), Brazil is the largest and most populous country in Latin America, with most of the population concentrated in the moredeveloped southeastern areas of the country and along the Atlantic coast. The country is led byPresident Fernando Henrique Cardoso who is approaching the end of his second and final term. Heis credited with leading the country into a period of growth after ending years of inflation with hisReal Plan and after weathering the international financial crisis with IMF assistance in late 1998 and1999. New presidential elections are approaching in 2002, with doubts about whether the governingcoalition can hold together and carry out needed reforms. Brazilians have long been concerned aboutthe sparsely populated territory in the huge Amazon region, and they have been fearful historicallyof foreign designs and intervention in this territory. In an effort to exercise control over this vast territory Brazil has constructed a $1.4 billion radar project called the Amazon Vigilance System, or SIVAM from its acronym in Portuguese, and it hasoffered to share data from this system with neighbors and the United States. It has established amilitary base at Tabatinga, with 25,000 soldiers and policemen, with air force and navy support, todeal with spillover effects from Colombia. Press accounts suggest evidence of Colombian drugtraffickers encouraging indigenous communities in Brazil to plant coca, and the threat of FARCincursions along the border. In one example in late 1998, the FARC captured a city on theColombian border, forcing Colombian troops to withdraw into Brazilian territory, before recapturingthe city. In another example, a plane from Suriname with arms for FARC guerrillas was discoveredwhen it was forced to make an emergency landing in Brazil. Brazil is not an illicit drug producing country, but it is a growing transit area for cocaine moving from the Andean Ridge to Colombia. Although Brazil was not designated as a recipient of PlanColombia assistance, under the FY2002 Andean Regional Initiative request, it would have received$26.18 million. This would have included $11.18 million in socio-economic aid for health andenvironmental programs; and $15 million in counter-narcotics aid for training and equipping bordercounter-narcotics forces, and for drug awareness and demand reduction programs. Under finalallocations for FY2002, Brazil would receive $18.63 million. With a population of 23.5 million (of largely mestizo stock), Venezuela is the sixth most populous country in Latin America. The country is presently led by President Hugo Chavez, aformer disgruntled military leader and a populist, who was initially elected in late 1998 on acampaign to rewrite the constitution, rid the country of corruption, and more adequately meet theneeds of the people. During 1999, at Chavez's request, Venezuelan voters approved the creationof a National Constituent Assembly, elected members of the new assembly, and approved the newlywritten constitution which lengthened and expanded presidential powers. On July 30, 2000, in aso-called mega-election, President Chavez easily won election to a new six year term of office. (13) Because of his previous attacks on the legislature and other institutions, many observers fear that hehas authoritarian tendencies somewhat like those of disgraced former President Fujimori in Peru. Chavez has established close ties with Fidel Castro and other leftist leaders, and he often employsanti-U.S. rhetoric. He has denounced Plan Colombia as a U.S.-dominated military strategy, and hehas denied the United States overflight rights over Venezuela territory. Reports persist that he hasestablished friendly relations with Colombian guerrillas. At the April 2001 Summit of the Americas in Quebec City, President Chavez reserved the position of Venezuela in the Declaration of leaders committing to move forward to achieve a FreeTrade Area of the Americas (FTAA) by January 2005, and he also expressed alternative views onU.S. policy and Plan Colombia. Venezuela is not an illicit drug producing country but it is a transit route for cocaine and heroin from neighboring Colombia to the United States and Europe. Despite various policy disagreementswith the United States, the Chavez government has cooperated with the United States incounter-narcotics efforts. While Venezuela was not designated specifically as a recipient of PlanColombia assistance, under the FY2002 Andean Regional Initiative request, it would have received$10.5 million. This amount would have included $0.5 million in socio-economic aid for legal andjudicial reform; and $10 million in counter-narcotics aid for law enforcement and interdictionreforms, efforts to counter money-laundering, and demand reduction. Under final allocations forFY2002, Venezuela would receive $5.5 million. With a population of 2.8 million (of largely mestizo and West Indian stock), Panama is the twentieth most populous country in Latin America. Its history has been heavily influenced by itsstrategic location and the transit of commerce through the Panama Canal in the center of the countrywhere the major cities are located. It is led by Mireya Moscoso, elected and inaugurated in 1999,who has been dealing with economic difficulties in Panama, and Panamanian responsibilities for thePanama Canal since the U.S. withdrawal on the last day of 1999. Despite considerable effort in theperiod leading up to the U.S. withdrawal, Panama was unwilling to allow the United States to retaina formal military presence in Panama for counter-narcotics surveillance purposes. (14) This forced theUnited States to develop the Forward Operating Locations in El Salvador, Aruba/Curacao andEcuador as substitute locations for such activities. Panama has been the scene of cross-borderincursions by Colombian guerrillas and by Colombian paramilitary groups, and there is someevidence that paramilitary groups are being founded in Panama, with support from Colombiangroups, because of the perception that the Panamanian government has left some areas unprotected. Panama is not an illicit drug producing country, but it is a major transshipment point for illicit drugs, especially cocaine, smuggled from South America. In recent years Panama has cooperatedwith the United States in bilateral counter-narcotics efforts, seizing significant amounts of illicitdrugs and passing anti-money laundering legislation. While Panama was not designated as arecipient of Plan Colombia assistance, under the FY2002 Andean Regional Initiative request, itwould have received $20.5 million. This would have included $8.5 million in socio-economic aidfor judicial reform, watershed management, and economic growth opportunities; and $12 millionin counter-narcotics aid for upgrading interdiction and law enforcement forces, and for modernizingcriminal justice institutions. Under final allocations for FY2002, Panama is to receive $13.50million. House Action. On July 10, 2001, the House Appropriations Committee approved H.R. 2506 , with a reduction of $55 million in theACI portion of the ARI, after defeating several amendments to reduce the funding even more. OnJuly 24, 2001, the House approved H.R. 2506 , reducing counter-drug assistance by anadditional $1 million, and approving amendments relating to caps on personnel in Colombia and arequired report on the April 20 accidental shootdown of a missionary plane in Peru. As passed bythe House, the bill provides $826 million for the ARI, of which $675 million is for the ACI, areduction of $56 million from the President's request. Subcommittee Action. On June 27, 2001, the House Appropriations Committee's Foreign Operations Subcommittee marked up and passed a $15.2billion FY2002 foreign operations funding bill, which contained funding for the BushAdministration's Andean Regional Initiation (ARI). The subcommittee action funded the entire billat the level requested by the President, but considerably reduced funding for the Andean CounterdrugInitiative portion of the ARI. The subcommittee action would provide $55 million less than the President's $731 million request for the State Department's International Narcotics Control "Andean Counterdrug Initiative"portion, funding that account at $676 million. The subcommittee did not specify which among theinitiative's programs were to be affected by the funding reduction. This would reduce funding forthe total ARI from $882 million to $827 million. Two amendments regarding Colombia were offered and withdrawn during the subcommittee mark-up. The Pelosi amendment would have limited funding for Colombia's military to no morethan $52 million, and transferred the other approximately $100 million of funding requested for theColombian military to a Child Survival account for infectious diseases. The Rothman amendmentwould have placed a temporary moratorium on U.S. supported fumigation efforts in Colombia untilthe State Department presented Congressional appropriations committees with conclusive evidencethat the United States and Colombian governments had commenced implementation of viablealternative development plans in 75% of all communities that have signed alternative developmentpacts. Committee Action. On July 10, the House Appropriations Committee passed H.R. 2506 , retaining the subcommittee-approved$827 million funding level for the ARI, with the $676 million funding level for the AndeanCounterdrug Initiative. The Committee provided no explanation in the report ( H.Rept. 107-142 ) forits action, but recommended there that the $55 million reduction "should be evenly distributedamong all programs, projects, and activities referred to in the Administration's request for theAndean Counterdrug Initiative." The bill itself recommends a limit of $14.24 million foradministrative expenses. As reported by the committee, the bill also would exempt any programssupported through the ACI funds from the cap of 300 on civilian contractors established by the PlanColombia legislation (Section 3204(b)(1)(B), P.L. 106-246 ). (It does not, however, exempt the capof 500 on the number of U.S. military personnel in Colombia established by the same legislation.)The bill would also exempt ACI funds from the prohibition under Section 482 (b) of the ForeignAssistance Act of 1961, as amended, on the use of funds for the procurement of weapons andammunition, with exceptions for counternarcotics activities. The exceptions, requiring an advancenotification to Congress, apply to the defensive arming of aircraft used for counternarocticsactivities, and the provision of firearms and related ammunition for defensive purposes toDepartment of State employees or contract personnel engaged in such activities. The Section 482(b)exemption was also contained in the Plan Colombia legislation. The full committee rejected two Colombia-related amendments: (1) the Pelosi amendment, which had been withdrawn in subcommittee, to transfer approximately $100 million from theColombian military to the Child Survival account, failed 22 to 39; and (2) the Obey amendment, towithdraw all Andean counter-drug funding and shift it to domestic drug treatment and preventionprograms, failed 18 to 43. In H.Rept. 107-142 , however, the Committee adopted language requiring the Secretary of State to report to the appropriations committees by January 1, 2002, and quarterly thereafter, on the humanhealth and environmental effects of the materials used in aerial eradication of coca and opium poppyin Colombia, and of the spraying of those illegal narcotic crops in Colombia. "Such reports shallinclude a description of the areas sprayed, materials and methods used, compliance with the sprayguidelines, and the human and environmental impacts of such spraying." The Committee also requested two semi-annual reports from the Secretary of State, both beginning March 1, 2002. One would provide information on all aircraft, vehicles, boats, and lethalequipment transferred to military and police forces under the ACI. This report is also to include thenumber of U.S. military personnel deployed or assigned to duty in the Andean region or othercountries using fund provided under the ACI during the previous 180 days, and the length, purpose, costs, and risks of their deployment or assignment. Another would provide information on "thespecific efforts being made by AID, the State Department and the Colombian government to expeditethe delivery of non-cash assistance to communities in Colombia that have signed pacts to voluntarilyeradicate their coca crops." This report is to include the percentages of available alternativedevelopment funds disbursed to Colombian communities that have signed such pacts. The Appropriations Committee report also contains extensive language on Colombia and other Andean countries. On Colombia, the Committee stated that it believes that a negotiated settlement"offers the only viable resolution to the complex conflict" in Colombia, and that efforts to reducethe cultivation of illegal crops "will continue to face enormous challenges" until a peace accord isreached. The Committee strongly urged the Secretary of State "to work with all parties in the talksto encourage rapid progress toward a firm and lasting peace." Noting that "stronger trade betweenColombia and the United States is crucial to managing the vulnerabilities of the Colombianeconomy," the Committee urged the President "to seek renewal and expansion of the Andean TradePreference Act (ATPA)." It expressed concern that alternative development projects were not beingimplemented in a timely fashion in Southern Colombia. For the Andean region in general, the Committee report called on the Department of State to ensure that all U.S. laws regarding human rights, including Section 556 of the bill, "are strictlyapplied in Colombia and each of the Andean nations." Regarding Bolivia, the Committee took"special note" of the country's progress in counternaroctics efforts, and stated that its "enormoussuccess" was due "in large part, to the support of the U.S. Government." It urged the Administrationto continue to strongly support Bolivia "when deciding on its allocation of aid." Floor Action. On July 24, the House adopted H.R. 2506 , by a vote of 381-46. It reduced the ACI account by $1 million from thelevel approved by the Appropriations Committee, to $675 million, despite efforts to reduce it bymuch larger amounts, and altered committee provisions regarding the cap on civilian contractors. (See the first bullet under approved amendments, below.) In floor action on July 24, three amendments pertaining to the ARI were approved, two were defeated, and two were withdrawn. Nine others, which had been printed in the record and thereforewere eligible for debate under the initial rule were barred from debate under an order of procedureadopted in the course of floor consideration. The three amendments approved were: An amendment offered by Rep. Conyers to allow the President to waive the 300 person cap on civilian contractors set by the Plan Colombia legislation, provided that thePresident certifies that the aggregate ceiling of 800 personnel (for military personnel and civiliancontractors combined) set by that legislation would not be exceeded, and if Congress is informed ofthe extent to which the 300 civilian contractor limitation is exceeded. Agreed to by voicevote. Amendment 44 offered by Rep. Hoekstra to withhold $65 million of ACI funds until the Secretary of State submits to Congress a full report on the April 20, 2001, aircraftshootdown by the Peruvian Air Force in which U.S. missionary Veronica "Roni" Bowers and herdaughter were killed. Agreed to by voice vote. A substitute Kolbe amendment (to amendment 12 offered by Rep. Crowley) to transfer $1.0 million from the ACI to the International Disaster Assistance account. (The Rep.Crowley amendment would have transferred $10 million.) The two amendments defeated were: Amendment 26, offered by Rep. Lee, to transfer $60 million to the Child Survival and Health Programs fund, where it was to be available for HIV/AIDS programs. Of the$60 million, $38 million would be taken from the ACI. Failed 188-240. Amendment 27, offered by Rep. McGovern, to reduce ACI funding by $100 million, and transfer half of that funding to the infectious diseases account to combat tuberculosisand the other half to the child survival and maternal health account. (In a floor speech, Rep.McGovern stated that the intent of the amendment was that the full $100 million should be cut fromfunding for the Colombian military.) Failed 179-249. The two amendments withdrawn were: Amendment 47 offered by Rep. Jackson-Lee to transfer $100 million from the ACI to the Child Survival and Health Programs Fund. Withdrawn by unanimousconsent. Amendment 11 offered by Mr. Conyers to prohibit the use of funds provided as part of Plan Colombia and the ACI for aerial fumigation to eradicate illicit crops in Colombia. Withdrawn by unanimous consent. On July 19, during the first day of consideration of H.R. 2506 , two amendments regarding Colombia were offered and withdrawn after points of order were raised. Rep. Souder offered and withdrew Amendment 35 to earmark $27 million of International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement funds for the purchase of two Buffalotransport/supply aircraft for the Colombian National Police, $12 million for the purchase of six HueyII patrol helicopters for the Colombian Navy, and $5 million for assistance in purchasing operatingfuel for drug interdiction along Colombia's north coast and its on rivers. In effect, this wouldsupplement funding for Andean regional counterdrug efforts that would be made available throughthe ACI. Rep. Delahunt offered and withdrew Amendment 17 to require quarterly reports from the Secretary of State on the implementation of the Colombian national securitylegislation passed by the Colombian Congress on June 20, 2001. According to Rep. Delahunt, thatlegislation "contains ambiguous provisions that could threaten civilian oversight of the military inColombia and place at risk the progress that has ben made toward reforming the military..." Senate Action. The Senate Appropriations Committee marked up its version of the Foreign Operations Appropriations bill on July 26, andreported out H.R. 2506 , with an amendment in the nature of a substitute ( S.Rept.107-58 ) on September 4, 2001, reducing ACI funding by $164 million, and imposing conditions onthe safety of aerial fumigation programs in Colombia, and requiring reports on human rightsconditions in the country. The Senate passed H.R. 2506 on October 24, 2001, afterdefeating on a point of order an amendment to fund the ACI and the ARI at the level requested bythe President, and approving two amendments that transferred $20 million from the ACI to otherprograms. As passed by the Senate, the bill provides $698 for the ARI, of which $547 is for the ACI,a reduction of $184 million from the President's request, and includes conditions on the safety ofaerial fumigation and the implementation of alternative development programs.. Committee Action. In the July 26 mark-up, the Senate Appropriations Committee cut $164 million from the President's requested ACI funding, andearmarked not less than $200 million of the total of $567 million that would remain in that accountfor direct apportionment to the U.S. Agency for International Development (AID) for economic andsocial programs. The ACI cut would bring total ARI funding down to $718 million. The committee bill would condition the release of funds to purchase chemicals used for the aerial coca fumigation program. To release those funds, the Secretary of State, in consultation withthe Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services and with the Surgeon General, wouldhave to determine and report to Congress on the human health and safety effects of the chemicalsand the manner of their application. Specifically, the Secretary would have to report that 1) "thechemicals used in the aerial fumigation of coca, [and]...the manner in which they are being applied,do not pose an undue risk to human health or safety;" and 2) that the fumigation "is being carriedout according to the health, safety, and usage procedures recommended by the EnvironmentalProtection Agency, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, and the manufacturers of thechemicals." The Secretary would also have to report that "effective mechanisms are in place toevaluate the claims of local citizens that their health was harmed or their licit agricultural crops weredamaged by such aerial coca fumigation, and provide fair compensation for meritorious claims." In contrast to House action, the Senate Appropriations Committee incorporated by reference in its bill the Plan Colombia legislation's cap of 500 on the number of U.S. military personnel and300 on the number of U.S. civilian contractors in Colombia (Section 3204(b) of P.L. 106-246 ). TheCommittee also included a Plan Colombia human rights restriction, requiring the immediate returnto the United States of any helicopter purchased with ACI funds that "is used to aid or abet theoperations of any illegal self-defense groups or illegal security cooperative." Like the House,however, it would waive the restrictions of Section 482(b) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961. The Committee would limit by law funding for Department of State administrative expenses to$14.24 million, whereas the House bill merely recommends that limit. In the report accompanying the bill ( S.Rept. 107-58 ), the Committee stated that it "recognizes some progress on human rights" in Colombia, but also expressed concern about "the surge inparamilitary violence, persistent reports of cooperation between the military and the paramilitaries,and the impunity of military officers who order or commit atrocities." It stated that the U.S.government should make it a priority to promote "far more aggressive action...by the ColombianGovernment and the military, to thwart it." Deploring the "ongoing abuses by the FARC," theCommittee called on other nations, "particularly Mexico and the Scandinavian countries, to exertgreater influence on the FARC to repudiate these tactics and participate seriously in negotiationstoward a settlement of the conflict." The Committee also called for the Secretary to State to submit to the appropriations committees reports containing information on several areas of human rights and other concerns. The Committeewould expect the first report within 60 days of enactment and every 120 days after that. This report would include information on two human rights topics for which reporting was also required by the Plan Colombia legislation. These are: the extent to which the Colombian armed forces have suspended members credibly alleged to have committed gross violations of human rights, and are providing civilianprosecutors and judicial authorities requested information on the nature and cause of suspension;and the extent to which the Colombian armed forces are cooperating with civilian authorities, including providing access to witnesses and relevant military information, in prosecutingand punishing in civilian courts those members credibly alleged to have committed gross violationsof human rights or aided or abetted paramilitary groups. Two other human rights topics are also to be included: the extent to which the Colombian armed forces are severing links, including intelligence sharing, at the command, battalion, and brigade levels, with paramilitary groups, andexecuting outstanding arrest warrants for members of such groups; and the extent to which attacks against human rights defenders, trade unionists, and government prosecutors, investigators and civilian judicial officials are being investigated, andalleged perpetrators brought to justice. The report would also be expected to provide information on the actions taken by the United States, Colombia, and other governments to promote and support peace negotiations, and on financialsupport for Plan Colombia provided by the Colombian government and the international community. A second report including information on other areas of human rights concerns would be expected only if national security legislation passed by the Colombian Congress on June 20, 2001,were to become law. In that case, the Secretary of State would be expected to submit a report within90 days of enactment of the security law and 120 days thereafter on incidents of and any rising trendin arbitrary and prolonged incommunicado detention by members of the Colombian armed forcesand police; an assessment of the effectiveness of investigations conducted by military personnelunder the new security law compared to investigations by civilian authorities; and an analysis of thesecurity law's implications for Colombia's commitments under international treaties. The Committee also expressed concern in its report about the spill-over effects of the Colombian narcotics trade into Bolivia, Ecuador, and Peru. Floor Action. After considering H.R. 2506 for two days, the Senate approved the measure on October 24, 2001, largely retaining the basicfeatures of the bill relating to the ARI as reported by the Senate Appropriations Committee. Fiveamendments relating to the ARI were approved, with the last two reducing ACI funding by $20million; and one amendment, seeking to restore funding cuts, was defeated on a point of order. The five amendments that were approved were: Senate Amendment 1929 by Senator Leahy that not less than $101 million of ACI funds be made available for Bolivia, and not less than $35 million of ACI funds be madeavailable for Ecuador. Senate Amendment 1942 by Senator Helms that up to two million of ACI funds be made available to support democracy-building activities inVenezuela. Senate Amendment 1951 by Senators Feingold and Wellstone that added another condition relating to aerial fumigation upon which the Secretary of State is to report, namelythat alternative development programs be in place in areas where fumigation is beingimplemented. Senate Amendment 1960 by Senators Hutchison and Inouye that reduced ACI funding by $10 million, and made those funds available for the prevention, treatment, and controlof tuberculosis. Senate Amendment 1961 by Senator Bingaman that reduced ACI funding by $10 million, and made those funds available for relief and reconstruction assistance for victims ofearthquakes and drought in El Salvador and elsewhere in Central America. The amendment that was defeated on a point of order was Senate Amendment 1950 by Senators Graham, Hagel, and Dodd to increase funding for the Andean Counterdrug Initiative to$731 million, the amount of the President's request, which would have effectively overridden theCommittee-reported cut of $164 million in that portion of the ARI. Proponents of the amendmentargued that full support was necessary to assist troubled Colombia and to deal with the flow of drugsto the United States. Opponents argued that extensive assistance was being provided to the region,that needs elsewhere in the world were great, and that evidence of progress was lacking despite themajor contribution of resources in recent years. A point of order was raised by Senator Leahy thatthe amendment was in violation of the Congressional Budget Act for failing to identify offsets forthe proposed $164 million increase in funding, and a motion by Senator Graham to waive therequirements of the Budget Act was defeated 27-72, thereby defeating the amendment. Conference Action. The conference version of H.R. 2506 ( H.Rept. 107-345 ) was passed by the House on December 19, and by theSenate on December 20, 2002. It was signed into law ( P.L. 107-115 ) on January 10, 2002. Itincludes $625 million for the "Andean Counterdrug Initiative" (ACI) portion of the Andean RegionalInitiative. (This is $50 million less than the House's $675 million, but $78 million more than theSenate's $547 million in ACI funding.) Of the conference version amount, $215 million isearmarked for U.S. Agency for International Development (AID) economic and social programs, andno more than $14.2 million may be used for administrative expenses of the Department of State, andno more than $4.5 million for AID's administrative expenses. Authority is also provided to transfer up to $35 million to the ACI from other International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement funds in this and in prior foreign operations appropriationsacts, subject to regular notification procedures. The managers' statement of the conference report( H.Rept. 107-345 ) notes that, "In the event of such a transfer, the managers intend for the funds tosupport interdiction, alternative development, or other economic assistance to the Andean countries. The managers emphasize that there are other funds for Andean nations in this Act that may be madeavailable for the Andean Regional Initiative (ARI)." The conference version of H.R. 2506 contains several conditions on the use of funds. These include the following. Fumigation and Alternative Development . No funds can be used for aerial coca fumigation programs until the Secretary of State reports to the Appropriations Committees onfour matters: the first, after consultation with the heads of the Environmental Protection Agency(EPA), the Department of Agriculture, and if appropriate, the Center for Disease Control andPrevention, is that such programs are being carried out according to EPA regulatory controls thatpertain to programs in the United States; the second, after consultation with the Colombiangovernment, is that such programs are in accordance with Colombian laws; the third is that thechemicals used in the fumigation programs and the manner in which they are applied do not poseunreasonable risks or adverse effects to human beings or to the environment; and the last is thatprocedures are in place to provide fair compensation for valid claims by local citizens that theirhealth was harmed or their licit agricultural crops were damaged by such spraying. (As of the dateof this report, these funds are on hold awaiting the Secretary's report. The status of this hold willbe tracked in CRS Report RL31383(pdf) , Andean Regional Initiative (ARI): FY2002 Supplemental andFY2003 Assistance for Colombia and Neighbors .) The funds are not to be available after six monthsfrom the date of enactment unless alternative development programs have been put in place inconsultation with communities and local authorities. Peruvian Interdiction. No funds can be used for a Peruvian air interdiction program until 30 days after the Secretary of State and the CIA Director certify to Congress thatenhanced safeguards and procedures are in place for any air interdiction program that permits theshootdown of aircraft. Limitations on Personnel in Colombia. Limits on U.S. personnel in Colombia established for previous Plan Colombia funding are modified, with a cap of 400 set on both thenumber of U.S. military personnel and U.S. civilian contractors supported by funding from the ACIaccount. Helicopters. Any helicopter procured with this funding is to be immediately returned to the United States if it is used to aid or abet the operations of any illegal self-defensegroup or illegal security cooperative. Human Rights . Section 567 (a) of the bill provides that the Secretary of State must determine and certify to Congress that the Colombian armed forces are meeting three humanrights criteria before any of the funds by this act or prior foreign operations appropriations acts canbe made available to Colombia's armed forces. These criteria are: (1) that the ColombianCommander General is suspending soldiers and officers credibly alleged to have committed grossviolations of human rights or to have aided or abetted paramilitary groups ; (2) that the Colombianarmed forces are cooperating with civilian prosecutors and judicial authorities in prosecuting andpunishing in civilian courts any members credibly alleged to be involved in such offenses; and (3)that the Colombian armed forces are taking steps to sever links with paramilitary groups and toexecute outstanding orders for the capture of their members. (As of the date of this report, thesefunds are on hold awaiting the Secretary's certification. The status of this hold will be tracked in CRS Report RL31383(pdf) , Andean Regional Initiative (ARI): FY2002 Supplemental and FY2003Assistance for Colombia and Neighbors .) After such a determination and certification, no more than60% of such funds can be made available to the Colombian armed forces through May 31, 2002. After June 1, 2002, the balance of such funds may be obligated if the Secretary determines andcertifies that the Colombian armed forces are continuing to meet those criteria. Every 120 days afterthe bill's enactment, the Secretary must report to the appropriations committees regarding theColombian armed forces' observance of these criteria. Denial of Visas to Supporters of Colombian Illegal Armed Groups. No alien shall be issued a visa if the Secretary of State has determined that he or she (1) has willfullyprovided any support to either of Colombia's two major leftist guerrilla groups (the FARC and theELN) or to the rightist illegal self-defense group (the AUC), or (2) has committed, ordered, incited,assisted, or otherwise participated in the commission of gross violations of human rights inColombia, unless the issuance of such a visa is necessary to support the Colombian peace processor for urgent humanitarian reasons. House Action. The House International Relations Committee reported out H.R. 1646 on May 4, 2001, with four reporting requirementson Colombia and a prohibition on the issuance of visas to illegal armed groups in Colombia. Thebill was passed by the House on May 16, 2001, without additions or modifications in that area. Therequired reports relate to the elimination of Colombian opium, the effects of Plan Colombia onEcuador, alternative development and resettlement programs, and the Colombianization ofcounter-narcotics activities. Committee Action. H.R. 1646 was introduced by Representative Hyde on April 27, 2001, with two reporting requirements concerningthe elimination of Colombian opium poppy crops and the effect of Plan Colombia on Ecuador (seebelow for details). The measure was referred to the House Committee on International Relations. When the Committee marked up the bill on May 2, it adopted by voice vote two amendments offeredby Representative Delahunt: the first imposed reporting requirements on Department of Stateactivities and on the "Colombianization" of counternarcotics activities; the second prohibited theissuance of visas to supporters of Colombian illegal armed groups (see below for details). The billwas reported out amended ( H.Rept. 107-57 ) by the Committee on May 4. Floor Action. After floor consideration on May 10 and 16, with no additional amendments on Colombia or the Andean region, H.R. 1646 was approved by the House on May 16, and sent to the Senate on May 17, with the followingprovisions relating to the Andean Regional Initiative: Reporting Requirement Concerning Elimination of Colombian Opium. Sec. 204 requires the Secretary of State, through the Bureau of International Narcotics and LawEnforcement, to submit, not later than 60 days after enactment, a report which outlines acomprehensive strategy to address the crisis of heroin in the United States due to opium originatingfrom Colombia, including destruction of opium at its source. Reporting Requirement Concerning Effect of Plan Colombia on Ecuador. Sec. 211 requires the Secretary of State, through the Bureau of International Narcotics and LawEnforcement, to submit, not later than 60 days after enactment, a report which outlines acomprehensive strategy to address the spillover effect of Plan Colombia onEcuador. Reporting Requirement on Department of State Activities. Sec. 213 (a) requires the Secretary of State to submit within 180 days of enactment, and every 180 days thereafter,a report on State Department funded and authorized activities to promote alternative development,recovery and resettlement of internally displaced persons, judicial reform, the peace process, andhuman rights. This report would include summaries of activities undertaken during the previous 180days, estimated timetables for the next period, an explanation of any delays in meeting plannedtimetables, and an assessment of steps to be taken to correct such delays. Reporting Requirement on the "Colombianization" of U.S. Funded Counternarcotics Activities . Sec. 213 (b) states that U.S. policy "encourages" the transfer ofcounternarcotics activities in Colombia now carried out by U.S. businesses under agreements withthe State Department to Colombian nationals, "in particular personnel of the Colombianantinarcotics police, when properly qualified personnel are available." It also requires the Secretaryof State to report within 90 days of enactment and subsequently not later than March 1 on thecounternarcotics activities carried out by U.S. businesses under State Department agreements. Thereport must include the names of such businesses, the total State Department payments to eachbusiness, a statement justifying the agreement, an assessment of risks to personnel safety andpotential involvement in hostilities incurred by employees of each such business, and a plan toprovide for the transfer of these activities to Colombians. Denial of Visas to Supporters of Colombian Illegal Armed Groups . Sec. 236 prohibits the issuance of visas to any alien who the Secretary of State determines has wilfullyprovided direct or indirect support to either of the two leftist guerrilla groups (the RevolutionaryArmed Forces of Colombia, i.e., the FARC, and the National Liberation Army, i.e., the ELN) or tothe rightist United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (the AUC); or "has wilfully conspired to allow,facilitate, or promote the illegal activities of any of those groups. A waiver is provided for caseswhere a visa "is necessary to support the peace process in Colombia, for urgent humanitarianreasons, for significant public benefit, or to further the national security interests of the UnitedStates." Senate Action. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee approved the Senate version of the Foreign Relations Authorization for FY2002-FY2003( S. 1401 ) on August 1, 2001, and reported out the bill on September 4, 2001, with arequirement for a report outlining a strategy to eradicate opium in Colombia. Committee Action. The Committee on Foreign Relations reported out S. 1401 on September 4, 2001, with a provision in section 606,similar to a provision in the House version of the bill, requiring the Secretary of State to submit toappropriate congressional committees within 60 days after enactment a report that outlines acomprehensive strategy to eradicate all opium at its source in Colombia. House Action. The House Armed Services Committee marked up H.R. 2586 on August 1, 2001, and reported out the bill ( H.Rept.107-194 ) on September 4, 2001, with a provision containing a cap on U.S. military personnel inColombia, and this was retained when the House approved the bill on September 25, 2001. Committee Action. As reported by the House Armed Services Committee, the FY2002 defense authorization bill, H.R. 2586 , would cap thenumber of U.S. military personnel on duty in Colombia that could be supported from Departmentof Defense funding at 500. This provision, Section 1208, would exclude any military personnel inColombia (1) serving tours of duty of 30 days or less for the purpose of rescuing or retrieving U.S.military or government personnel, (2) serving with the U.S. Embassy in Colombia as an attache oras part of the security assistance office or Marine Corps security group, (3) participating in naturaldisaster relief efforts, or (4) traveling through Colombia but not involved in operations there. Floor and Conference Action. After floor consideration on September 20, 24-25, the House approved H.R. 2586 on September25, 2001, with the Committee-reported cap on military personnel in Colombia. The Senate bill, S. 1438 , had no corresponding provision. This House provision was not retained in theconference version of S. 1438 ( H.Rept. 107-333 ), which passed by both chambers onDecember 13, 2001. House Action. On October 5, 2001, the House Ways and Means Committee ordered reported H.R. 3009 , the Andean Trade Promotionand Drug Eradication Act, that would extend the ATPA through December 31, 2006. On November16, 2001, the House passed H.R. 3009 , the Andean Trade Promotion and DrugEradication Act, which would offer expanded trade benefits to the Andean region through December31, 2006. Committee Action. On October 5, 2001, the House Ways and Means Committee approved and ordered reported H.R. 3009 , the AndeanTrade Promotion and Drug Eradication Act, that would extend the ATPA through December 31,2006, and provide duty-free treatment to selected apparel, tuna, and other products previouslyexcluded. The bill would also expand the conditions countries would have to meet to remain eligiblefor program benefits. Floor Action. On November 16, 2001, the House passed H.R. 3009 , the Andean Trade Promotion and Drug Eradication Act, whichwould offer expanded trade benefits to the Andean region through December 31, 2006. Senate Action. The Senate Committee on Finance reported out a version of H.R. 3009 on November 29, 2001, but no floor actionhas been taken thus far. Committee Action. On November 29, 2001, the Senate Committee on Finance reported out an amendment in the nature of a substitute to H.R. 3009 (containing the substance of S. 525 ). This version would extendthe ATPA through February 28, 2006, and provide expanded benefits, but more limited benefits thanthe House-passed version. Source: ARI Reference Sheet, 150 Account, provided by the Department of State, May 14, 2001. Note : For detail on Plan Colombia and pre-Plan Colombia funding, see CRS Report RL30541 , Colombia: Plan Colombia Legislation and Assistance(FY2000-FY2001). Sources: General Accounting Office (GAO -01-26), Department of State, CongressionalBudget Justification for Foreign Operations for FY2001; U.S.Agency for International Development Budget Justification for FY2001, Annex IV; and information provided byDepartment of State and Departmentof Defense officials. This chart includes direct U.S. foreign assistance (i.e., the categories usually counted as U.S.foreign aid, which are in italics), aswell as the costs of goods and services provided to Colombia from other U.S. government programs supportingcounternarcotics efforts in Colombia. The United States also provides a small amount of DOD Excess Defense Articles (EDA) to Colombia. Other fundsare spent in Colombia oncounternarcotics and other activities that are considered part of U.S. programs: for instance, the Drug EnforcementAdministration (DEA) spends its ownfunds on joint operations in Colombia. Figures on FY2000 and FY2001 State Department INC funding providedJanuary 10-11, 2001. Figures on DODSections 1004, 124, 1004/124, and 1033 funding provided June 29, 2001. DOD Sections 124, 1004, and 1033funding is taken from regional accountsand the tentative allocations for Colombia can be shifted to respond to developing needs in other areas. (Section124 covers U.S. operated radar systemsin Colombia and elsewhere, and other costs of U.S. detection and monitoring of drug flights.) a FY2000 non-DOD Plan Colombia supplemental funds were all assigned to the State Department INC account; the State Department is transferring themto the other agencies carrying out programs in Colombia with those funds. The AID FY2000 and FY2001 figuresare all ESF. These AID figuresdo not include funds provided to AID from the INC account. The following discussion of the controversy over spray eradication (i.e.,fumigation) of illegal coca crops in southern Colombia was prepared in response tothe controversy over this effort in southern Colombia. This short synopsis of available information on the effects of fumigation of coca crops in Colombia is onlymeant to provide a summary of various claims; it is not a judgment on their validity. In its U.S.-supported coca eradication program, the government of Colombia sprays coca crops from aircraft with a mixture of the herbicide glyphosate,manufactured by the U.S. company Monsanto and marketed as "Roundup," and twoadditives or "adjuvants." (15) According to the StateDepartment (in its report ofJanuary 23, 2001, submitted to Congress consistent with the provisions of theStatement of Managers accompanying Title III, Chapter 2 of the EmergencySupplemental Appropriations Act. P.L. 106-246 , which provided funding for PlanColombia), the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has found that "the use ofglyphosate, as labeled for use in the U.S., is acceptable provided that the regulatorycontrols required by the EPA - the labeled instructions - are followed." The StateDepartment also claims that the ingredients in the two additives (COSMOFLUX-411F, a surfactant, and COSMO-iN-D, an anti-foaming additive (16) ), bothproduced in Colombia, are on an EPA list of acceptable chemicals "for use on foodcrops when the label instructions are followed." This report states an EPA review of "adequate scientific studies" shows that when properly used glyphosate "will notcause adverse effects in humans," and "does not cause risks of concern for birthdefects, mutagenic effects, neurotoxic effects, reproductive problems, or cancer." Itdoes, however, state that "splashes" of glyphosate "can cause transient irritation toskin and eyes,"although at the same level of irritation as baby shampoo according toone cited study. For its conclusion that there are "no grounds to suggest concern forhuman health" from the spray mixture used in Colombia, the State Department citeda recent study published in Regulatory Toxicology and Pharmacology. (17) Since spraying began in December 2000 in Colombia's Putumayo province (where it is now indefinitely suspended), however, there have been many allegationsthat the spray mixture has caused extensive harm to humans, other crops, andlivestock. The ill health effects on thousands of children and adults most commonlyreported in the areas of Putumayo fumigation include fever, eye and gastrointestinalirritation, and skin and bronchial irritation and infections. There have also beenallegations of increased incidence of brain damage in children in these areas sincefumigation was started. In addition, critics claim, many crops other than coca havebeen sprayed, depriving peasants of food crops and other sources of income, andlivestock reportedly have suffered ill effects, including hair loss in cattle frommoderate exposure, abortion among pregnant cows (possibly due, one source notes,from stampedes caused by the noise of overhead helicopters) and the death of fowlfrom spraying or drinking contaminated water. (The effects on livestock and fowlare taken from the "Counter-Fact Sheet" of February 9, 2001, prepared by AcciÃ³nAndina, which is a non-governmental organization, and posted online at http://usfumigation.org/Literature/FactSheets/ContraDoS/AA-IPS-RAPAL%20Fact%20Sheet%20-English.htm .) Supporters of aerial fumigation, however, state that negative health and environmental effects can be attributed to drug producersthemselves, whom, they claim, also use Roundup to suppress weeds around cocabushes, and who pollute Colombian rivers with chemicals used in processing andrefining coca into cocaine in their drug labs. Some U.S. officials assert that many of the complaints come from those with an interest in continuing coca production, especially as aerial spraying of coca crops hastaken place for many years in other areas of Colombia without the outcry that thespraying in Putumayo has produced. However, according to a Washington Post article of January 7, 2001, about the spraying in Putumayo: "Until recently, sprayingfocused almost entirely on remote industrial-sized coca and poppy plantations....Nowthe planes are targeting more populous farming areas ... where coca ... is often grownside by side with corn, yucca, pineapple and livestock. Often it shares a plot next tothe farmer's tin-roofed shack." ("Aerial Attack Killing More than Coca," by ScottWilson.) Regarding crop damage, the Post reporter stated that his "inspection offields in the area suggested that food crops have been hit at least as hard as coca." Critics have attributed food crop damage to the side-by-side plantings of legal andillegal crops in Putumayo, but also charge that spray planes fly higher than normal for crop dusting operations elsewhere in order to avoid ground fire, and underunacceptable wind conditions, thus leading to the dispersion of spray beyondintended targets. (18) Some analysts, however, have noted that complaints of ill effects to humans and animals may not be entirely inconsistent with State Department assertions of safetyunder controlled circumstances as the health and environmental effects could varydepending on the exact formulation of the spray mix, the manner of its application,and the conditions under which it was used. Some critics have argued that Roundupis not being applied in a manner consistent with U.S. usages and with themanufacturer's recommendations, and that not all issues related to ingredients usedin the mixture applied in Colombia have been explored. The World Wildlife Fund, in an October 30, 2000 statement, "Comments on Glyphosate," states that existing studies "may not be adequate toassess the impacts resulting from Plan Colombia's actual use of glyphosate (aerialapplications, product formulation, frequency and rate of application, etc.), especiallygiven the soils, topography, climatic conditions (temperature, rainfall, etc.) plant andanimal species found in Colombia." (Available online from the WWF at: http://www.ciponline.org/colombia/103001.htm ). In a February 9, 2001 statement calling for the end of aerial eradication, representatives of three non-governmental organizations claimed that"there is evidence that herbicide concentrations much higher than ones recommendedare being applied in Colombia" and that "there are no toxicological studies ...regarding the effects of mixing the Cosmoflux-4111F surfactant with pesticides." (19) The statement also noted that Roundup Ultra (which opponents say is the actualvariety of Roundup being used in Colombia, although the State Department reportcited above does not refer to either trade name) "contains other ingredients besidesglyphosate and the two adjuvants." The World Wildlife Fund, in the October 2000statement cited above, found that studies on the effects of Roundup "focus on thepesticide active ingredient alone, not the combination of inert ingredients actuallyapplied, thereby giving an incomplete assessment of the toxic threat," and assertedthat "the inert ingredients mixed with the Roundup to increase its effectiveness canbe as, or more, toxic to humans, wildlife and foodwebs than the pesticide itself." TheMonsanto website states that the "new ingredients" in Roundup Ultra are on an EPAapproved list (#4B), but the specific "new" ingredients are notnamed. An analysis by agronomist Elsa Nivia, identified as associated with the non-governmental Red de AcciÃ³n en Plaguicidas y Alternativas - AmÃ©ricaLatina , RAP-AL. PAN-Colombia (Pesticide Action Network), claims that the aerialfumigation of illegal crops in Colombia with Roundup is "very different from therecommended agricultural use in the United States," citing the concentration as 26times greater than that recommended, with negative effects intensified by the use ofCosmoflux 411F. Even though the authors of the report cited by the StateDepartment had found glyphosate and Roundup to be at most mildly toxic, Ms.Nivia's conclusion from their discussion of the effects of accidental and occupationalexposures to higher concentrations, and of the doses that proved lethal in peopleattempting suicide, is that higher than recommended concentrations or applicationscould help to explain the severe ill effects reported in the fumigated areas. (See Lasfumigaciones aÃ©reas sobre cultivos ilÃ­citos si son peligrosas - Algunasaproximaciones , by Elsa Nivia. Paper given at a conference on The Wars inColombia: Drugs, Guns and Oil, held at the University of California at Davis, May17-19, 2001, accessible through http://www.usfumigation.org .) The State Department is funding a study, with design assistance supplied by the Center for Disease Control (CDC) and the EPA, of the health effects of aerialeradication in Putumayo Department. Results are anticipated by late 2001. Source: Office of the Secretary of State. International Affairs Function 150 Fiscal Year 2003 Budget Request Summary and Highlights. February 2002. The ARI does not include International Military Education and Training (IMET) funds. These will range in FY2002from an estimated $170,000 forPanama to an estimated $1,180,000 for Colombia. Prepared by [author name scrubbed], Specialist in InternationalSecurity Affairs, CRS, February 12, 2002. * The ARI for FY2002 also did not include Foreign Military Finance Funding (FMF). The small amount for Bolivia is included here, even though it wasnot specifically for counternarcotics purposes, in order to facilitate comparisons with the FY2003 request, whichincludes FMF for Andean RegionalInitiative countries. **NA = Not Available. A breakdown by purpose is not available for Brazil, Panama and Venezuela as the INLfigures for those countries was not brokendown by purpose. Source: Office of the Secretary of State, Resources, Plans and Policy. International Affairs Function 150 Summary and Highlights, Fiscal Year 2003Budget Request. The ARI totals do not include International Military Education and Training funds, which rangein the FY2003 request from $200,000for Panama to $1,180,000 for Colombia. Prepared by [author name scrubbed], Specialist in International Security Affairs,February 12, 2002. * Includes funds previously cited under Child Survival and Diseases. 

Summary: In April and May 2001, the Bush Administration proposed $882.29 million in FY2002 economic and counter-narcotics assistance, as well as extension of trade preferences and othermeasures, for Colombia and regional neighbors in an initiative called the "Andean RegionalInitiative" (ARI). Critics of the Andean Regional Initiative argue that it is a continuation of what they regard as the misguided approach of Plan Colombia assistance approved in 2000, with an overemphasis onmilitary and counter-drug assistance, and with inadequate support for human rights and the peaceprocess in Colombia. Supporters argue that it continues needed assistance to Colombia, whileproviding more support for regional neighbors and social and economic programs. In action on the FY2002 Foreign Operations Appropriations bill ( H.R. 2506 ), the House passed the bill on July 24, 2001, with $826 million for the ARI, of which $675 million is forthe counter-narcotics "Andean Counterdrug Initiative" (ACI) portion, a reduction of $56 millionfrom the President's ACI request. The Senate passed the bill on October 24, 2001, with $698 millionfor the ARI, of which $547 million is for the ACI, a reduction of $184 million from the President'sACI request. The conference version of H.R. 2506 , as approved by the House onDecember 19, and the Senate on December 20, includes $625 million for the ACI, $106 million lessthan the President's ACI request, with $215 million earmarked for AID programs and a variety ofconditions, including an alteration of the cap on military and civilian contractors serving inColombia. In February 2002 budget submissions, the Bush Administration allocated $645 millionto the ACI account for FY2002, including $20 million transferred from the general InternationalNarcotics Control account. In action on the Foreign Relations Authorization Act for FY2002-FY2003, the House passed H.R. 1646 on May 16, 2001, with four reporting requirements on activities in Colombiaand a prohibition on the issuance of visas to illegal armed groups in Colombia. The Senate ForeignRelations Committee reported out S. 1401 on September 4, 2001, with a requirementfor a report that outlines a comprehensive strategy to eradicate all opium cultivation at its source inColombia. No further action occurred on either of these bills in the first session of the 107thCongress. In action on the National Defense Authorization Act for FY2002, the House passed H.R. 2586 on September 25, 2001, with a cap of 500 on the number of U.S. militarypersonnel in Colombia, with some exceptions. This provision was not retained in the conferenceversion of S. 1438 which was passed by both chambers on December 13, 2001. In action on the Andean Trade Preference Act, on November 16, 2001, the House passed H.R. 3009 , the Andean Trade Promotion and Drug Eradication Act, which wouldextend and expand the ATPA through December 31, 2006. The Senate Finance Committee reporteda more limited version, S. 525 , on November 29, 2001, in the context of otherlegislation.