Prior to September 11, 2001, the federal government’s role in supporting emergency preparedness and management was limited primarily to providing resources before large-scale disasters like floods, hurricanes, and earthquakes, and response and recovery assistance after such disasters. Historically, FEMA developed mitigation programs designed to minimize risk to property or individuals from natural or manmade hazards. These mitigation programs included the post-disaster Hazard Mitigation Grant Program and the pre-disaster Project Impact program. In addition, the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, as amended, established the process for states to request a presidential disaster declaration in order to respond and recover from a large-scale emergency event. However, in response to the events of September 11, 2001, the federal government has provided billions of dollars to state and local governments for planning, equipment, and training to enhance the capabilities of first responders to respond to terrorist attacks and, to a lesser extent, natural and accidental disasters. These extensive resources reflect a growing federal role in promoting emergency preparedness. The nation’s first responders have the lead responsibilities for carrying out emergency management efforts. The role of first responders is to prevent, protect against, respond to, and assist in the recovery from emergency events. Traditionally, first responders have been trained and equipped, in the event of an emergency—natural or accidental disasters and terrorist attacks—to arrive on the scene and take action immediately. In the first hours of an event, first responders from various disciplines, which could include police, fire, emergency medical personnel and public works, must attempt to enter the scene, set up a command center, establish a safe and secure perimeter around the site in order to save lives and protect property, evacuate those within or near the site, tend to the injured and dead and transport them to care centers or morgues, restrict and redirect traffic and pedestrians, reroute and restore public utilities, remove debris, and begin the process of recovery. Since September 11, 2001, the roles and responsibilities for first responders to prevent emergency events and protect the public and property have expanded. In July 2002, prior to the creation of DHS, the President developed a National Strategy for Homeland Security which recommended steps that federal, state and local governments, private companies and organizations, and individual Americans should take to improve homeland security. The National Strategy identified the need to improve tactical counterterrorist capabilities of the various federal, state, and local response assets that can intercede and prevent terrorists from carrying out attacks. These assets include state and local law enforcement and emergency response personnel which the National Strategy considers crucial to preemption of terrorists, no matter if they are part of the local SWAT team or the FBI’s Hostage Rescue Team. First responder organizations across the county are to various degrees, trained, staffed, and equipped to prepare for and respond to various events. These organizations may differ in governmental role, size, structure, and capabilities. For example, activities of local law enforcement departments in smaller communities may be limited to day- to-day law enforcement while, in larger communities, departments may include specialized teams such as bomb squads or special weapons and tactics units. Likewise, local fire departments may be volunteer operations with basic firefighting capabilities or, in larger communities, may include teams specializing in hazardous materials response, search and rescue, or structural collapse. The local public health system can consist of public or private emergency medical services that provide immediate victim care and transport victims to the area’s public or private hospitals to receive patient care, along with the state and local medical staff that monitor and detect disease outbreaks. Supporting the response and recovery efforts of first responders are other state and local officials who provide preparedness planning, administration, and the communications systems needed to command and control activities on the scene. Natural and accidental disasters have provided all levels of government in many locations with experience in preparing for different types of emergency events. However, terrorist attacks potentially impose a relatively new level of fiscal, economic, and social disruption within this nation’s boundaries. Today’s threat environment includes not only the traditional spectrum of large-scale manmade and natural hazards— wilderness and urban fires, floods, oil spills, hazardous materials releases, transportation accidents, earthquakes, hurricanes, tornadoes, pandemics, and accidental or natural disruptions to the nation’s energy and information technology infrastructure—but also the deadly and devastating arsenal of chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high- yield explosive weapons as exemplified by the attacks on New York City and Oklahoma City. These attacks have resulted in greater public and governmental focus on the role of first responders and their capabilities to respond to large-scale emergency events. Two DHS organizational units have the primary responsibilities for leading national emergency preparedness efforts—the Emergency Preparedness and Response Directorate and the Office of State and Local Government Coordination and Preparedness. The Homeland Security Act assigned responsibility to the Emergency Preparedness and Response Directorate, which includes the Federal Emergency Management Agency, for building a comprehensive national incident management system that defines the roles and responsibilities of federal, state, and local governments, and the various first responder disciplines at each level during an emergency event. The Act also charged the directorate with consolidating existing federal government emergency response plans into a single, coordinated national response plan, as called for by HSPD-5. DHS assigned responsibility for developing a national preparedness goal to its Office of State and Local Government Coordination and Preparedness, which includes the Office for Domestic Preparedness. The Office of State and Local Government Coordination and Preparedness also awards and administers the majority of DHS’s first responder preparedness federal grant programs. In large part these grants are directed to the governor of each state, who in turn makes these funds available to local jurisdictions within the state. To comply with HSPD-5 and HSPD-8, DHS has established a national plan for emergency event response, a national management system to be used during emergency events, and an interim national preparedness goal. DHS also plans to develop national strategies for assessing and reporting the status of first responders’ capabilities, prioritizing federal, state, and local resource investments to enhance these capabilities, and standardizing training and exercise programs for first responders to practice and improve emergency response capabilities. The presidential directives on which these efforts are based correspond to the major initiatives first developed in the National Strategy for Homeland Security. Our analysis of the documents resulting from, and plans for, these efforts showed that DHS has taken an all-hazards approach to promote first responders’ emergency management capabilities. Figure 2 illustrates the timeline of DHS’s efforts to develop these national initiatives and identifies the anticipated results. To comply with the initiatives of the National Strategy and the timeframes and requirements established in HSPD-5, DHS implemented an integrated all-hazards approach to emergency event management by establishing the National Incident Management System (NIMS) and the National Response Plan (NRP). NIMS is a policy document that defines roles and responsibilities of federal, state and local first responders during emergency events. The intent of this system described in the document is to establish a core set of concepts, principles, terminology and organizational processes to enable effective, efficient, and collaborative emergency event management at all levels. These concepts, principles, and processes are designed to improve the ability of different jurisdictions and first-responder disciplines (e.g., fire and police) to work together in various areas—command, resource management, training, and communications. The NRP is designed to integrate federal government domestic prevention, protection, response, and recovery plans into a single operational plan for all hazards and all emergency response disciplines. Using the framework provided by NIMS, the NRP describes operational procedures for federal support to state, local, and tribal emergency managers and defines situations where the federal authorities are to provide support and situations where the federal authorities are to assume control. The NRP organizes capabilities and staffing and equipment resources in terms of functions that are most likely to be needed during emergency events, describes common processes and specific administrative requirements (e.g., public affairs, financial management, public health, etc.), and outlines core procedures. The NRP also augments NIMS by defining roles and responsibilities for specific types of emergencies. To develop NIMS and NRP, DHS assembled a variety of stakeholders from federal, state, and local levels such as national professional associations, and state and local responders representing the full range of response disciplines. During the development of NIMS, stakeholder groups reacted to initial drafts developed by DHS. The final draft of NIMS incorporated, in part, key elements of a widely-used, interdisciplinary system of command—first used in conjunction with wildfires in California during the 1960s—into a standardized, national system that would apply across all emergency response disciplines and levels of government. Similarly, the NRP was based on a consensus among stakeholders of best practices to apply in integrating prevention, protection, response, and recovery plans into one all-discipline, all-hazards plan. HSPD-5 requires all federal departments and agencies to adopt and use NIMS in their individual preparedness efforts, as well as in support of all actions taken to assist state and local governments. Further, the directive requires federal departments and agencies to make adoption of NIMS by states a condition, to the extent permitted by law, of federal preparedness assistance beginning in fiscal year 2005. For fiscal year 2005 DHS required states and other jurisdictions that receive direct funding to incorporate NIMS into existing training programs and exercises, emergency operations plans, and intrastate mutual aid agreements; to institutionalize the use of the Incident Command System; and will require states and other jurisdictions to certify as part of their fiscal year 2006 grant applications that they have met the fiscal year 2005 NIMS requirements. However, final requirements for fiscal year 2006 self certification have not been formulated, according to DHS officials. DHS encouraged, but did not require, local governments to implement these activities to the maximum extent possible. We assessed NIMS and NRP to determine the extent to which the policy documents discuss and emphasize different types of emergency events. Our analysis showed that both documents had been developed in a manner that reflects an all-hazards approach. For example, both NIMS and NRP use the generic term “incident management” rather than specifying the cause(s) of events, such as a terrorist act, accident, or natural disaster. Moreover, NIMS and NRP are designed to promote interdisciplinary efforts that consider the involvement of multiple jurisdictions and multiple responders. The common processes and specific administrative requirements listed in NRP also are described in terms that are not specific to any type of threat or emergency. For example, according to NRP, the plan is to be implemented during “incidents of national significance.” First responders we visited affirmed that NIMS and the NRP do take an all hazards approach—that is, they apply to natural and accidental disasters, as well as terrorist attacks. For example, 12 first responder officials we interviewed told us that they have long used the incident command system upon which NIMS was based for a variety of emergency events. Similarly, one homeland security director in a large urban city said NIMS had only had a moderate impact on their operations because the city has already been using an incident command system in its all-hazards approach. To comply with the requirements established in HSPD-8, DHS is developing a National Preparedness Goal. While NIMS defines “how” to manage a large-scale emergency event and NRP defines “what” needs to be done, the National Preparedness Goal is intended to generally define “how well” it needs to be done. DHS issued an interim version of the goal in March 2005. The interim version will remain in effect until superseded by the Final National Preparedness Goal, which DHS intends to issue in October 2005. According to officials from DHS’s Office of State and Local Government Coordination and Preparedness, the final version is expected to remain largely the same as the interim; however, the office is working with its state and local government stakeholders to define appropriate jurisdictional tiers, and plans to add this information to the final version of the goal. According to the Interim National Preparedness Goal, the primary purpose of establishing tiers is to account for reasonable differences in target levels of capability (or system-specific elements of capability) among groups of jurisdictions based on differences in risk factors such as total population, population density, and critical infrastructure. Our review of the interim goal indicates that it reflects an all-hazards focus by consistently citing both natural and accidental disasters and terrorist attacks as emergencies and the extent to which the nation’s first responders must develop their capabilities to address all hazards. To develop the goal and determine the tasks and capabilities needed by first responders on a nation-wide basis, DHS is using an approach known as capabilities-based planning. The purpose of this approach is to provide capabilities suitable for a wide range of threats and hazards, in an environment of uncertainty and within an economic framework that necessitates prioritization for allocation of finite resources, according to DHS. As figure 3 shows, DHS’s application of the capabilities-based planning process model to the development of the goal and related products involves three stages: (1) defining target levels of capability; (2) achieving target levels of capability; and (3) assessing preparedness. DHS began the first stage of the capabilities-based planning process identifying concerns using 15 National Planning Scenarios that were developed by the Homeland Security Council, as illustrated in table 1. The 15 scenarios include 12 terrorist attacks (incorporating chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, explosive, and cyber attacks) and 3 natural disasters—an earthquake, a hurricane and a pandemic influenza outbreak. According to DHS, the Homeland Security Council excluded scenarios for which they considered well-developed and tested response capabilities to be already available and scenarios where the set of response capabilities would be a subset of one of the 15 scenarios chosen. Examples of excluded scenarios are industrial and transportation accidents and frequently occurring natural disasters, such as floods, the nation’s most frequent natural disaster. According to DHS officials, there was less concern about planning for natural disasters because there is a tremendous amount of experience, actuarial data, geographical and seasonal patterns, and other information that is not available in the context of terrorism. Officials told us that the department chose to focus the identification of its concerns on event consequences rather than event probabilities, given the high degree of uncertainty related to preparing for terrorist events. According to DHS’s National Preparedness Guidance, the planning scenarios are intended to illustrate the scope and magnitude of large-scale, catastrophic emergency events for which the nation needs to be prepared. Some state and local officials and experts in the field of emergency preparedness said that the scenarios did not appear to reflect an assessment of risk or a relative ranking related to risk. As a result, they questioned whether the scenarios were appropriate inputs for preparedness planning, particularly in terms of their plausibility and the number of scenarios (12 of 15) that are based on terrorist attacks. Officials in DHS’s Office of State and Local Government Coordination and Preparedness said that the scenarios were not ranked according to risk, noting that this was unnecessary given the purposes for which the scenarios were developed. They stated that the 15 planning scenarios are not meant to be proscriptive, predictive, or exhaustive nor were they intended to be ranked according to risk. According to DHS’s National Preparedness Guidance, the objective of developing the scenarios was to provide a minimum number of credible scenarios that covered the range of response requirements. DHS’s executive summaries of the planning scenarios state that the scenarios were not ranked according to risk and probability because they were developed to test the full range of response capabilities and resources for federal, state, and local governments as well as the private sector, each of which could have different risks and rankings. As it moved to the step in the process to develop a sense of preparedness needs and potential capabilities, DHS created a list of tasks that would be required to manage each of the 15 National Planning Scenarios. Then, in consultation with federal, state, and local emergency response stakeholders, it consolidated the list to eliminate redundancies and create a Universal Task List of over 1,600 discrete tasks. This list was further refined to identify critical tasks that would need to be performed at various levels of government to prevent, protect against, respond to, and recover from large-scale emergency events. Next, DHS identified target capabilities that encompassed these critical tasks. The relationship between the scenarios, tasks, and capabilities is shown in figure 4. According to DHS, the Universal Task List is intended to include all unique, potential tasks at all levels of government that are needed to prevent, protect against, respond to, and recover from all large-scale emergency events, although every task would not necessarily be applicable to each of the 15 planning scenarios and no single jurisdiction or agency would be expected to perform every task. From this universe of potential tasks, DHS worked with stakeholders to identify a subset of about 300 critical tasks that must be performed during a large-scale event to reduce loss of life or serious injuries, mitigate significant property damage, or are essential to the success of a homeland security mission. The final step of the first stage of DHS’s planning process is to decide goals, requirements, and metrics. To complete this step, DHS, working with its stakeholders, developed a Target Capabilities List that identifies 36 capabilities needed to perform the critical tasks for the events illustrated by the 15 scenarios. An example of a desired outcome for the target capability of mass prophylaxis—prevention of or protective treatment for disease—is to effectively reach an entire affected population in time to prevent loss of life and injury. The relationship between the Universal Task List, critical tasks, and target capabilities for the pandemic flu scenario is illustrated in figure 5. The Target Capabilities List, according the National Preparedness Goal, provides guidance on the specific capabilities and levels of capability that federal, state, local, and tribal first responders will be expected to develop and maintain. DHS has defined these capabilities generically and expressed them in terms of desired operational outcomes and essential characteristics, rather than dictating specific, quantifiable responsibilities to the various jurisdictions. In the final version of the National Preparedness Goal, DHS plans to organize classes of jurisdictions that share similar characteristics such as total population, population density, and critical infrastructure into tiers to account for reasonable differences in capability levels among groups of jurisdictions. According to the Interim National Preparedness Goal, the purpose of defining these groups of jurisdictions is to be able to appropriately apportion responsibility for development and maintenance of capabilities among levels of government and across these jurisdictional tiers, because both the risk and the resource base vary considerably among jurisdictions across the United States. According to observations from 12 of the first responder departments we interviewed, radiological and biological attacks are among potential emergency events they may face which they are least prepared for and most concerned about their capabilities. However, because these types of attacks may require that a greater number of capabilities be exercised simultaneously or that a greater number or wider variety of first responders be employed to provide specific capabilities, these capabilities would necessarily be drawn from regional, federal, or private resources. In this regard the National Response Plan defines the roles and responsibilities of federal, state, local, private-sector, and nongovernmental organizations and citizens involved in support of domestic incident management, noting particularly that when state resources and capabilities are overwhelmed, state governors are responsible for requesting federal assistance when it becomes clear that state or tribal capabilities will be insufficient or have been exceeded or exhausted. As we have previously reported, state and local resources alone will likely be insufficient to meet the terrorist threat, given the specialized resources that are necessary to address some types of terrorist attacks, the range of governmental services that could be affected, and the vital role played by private entities in preparing for and mitigating risks. Because no single jurisdiction or agency would be expected to perform every task, possession of a target capability could involve enhancing and maintaining local resources, ensuring access to regional and federal resources, or some combination of the two. DHS encourages planning for regional cooperation and notes in the NRP that mutual aid agreements provide mechanisms to mobilize and employ resources from neighboring jurisdictions to support the incident command. Facilitating effective regional coordination may present some challenges. For example, our work in the National Capital Region found that no regional coordination methods had been developed for planning for the use of 15 of the 16 funding sources we reviewed. While the National Capital Region has experience with working together for regional emergency preparedness and response, officials from the National Capital Region told us that they had not worked together to develop plans and coordinate expenditures for the use of federal funds. DHS also issued National Preparedness Guidance in April 2005 that provides information, instructions and examples on how to prepare for implementation of the goal at the federal, state and local levels of government. The guidance identifies the most urgent needs for enhancing national first responder preparedness capabilities in terms of 7 national priorities: (1) implementation of NRP and NIMS; (2) implementation of the interim National Infrastructure Protection Plan; (3) expanding regional cooperation; (4) strengthening capabilities in interoperable communications; (5) strengthening capabilities in information sharing and collaboration; (6) strengthening capabilities in medical surge and mass prophylaxis; (7) strengthening capabilities in detection and response for chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and explosive weapons. Our review also indicated that the National Preparedness Guidance largely reflects an all-hazards approach and was developed in a manner that recognizes a range of possible threats and origins. Six of the 7 national priorities established and described by the guidance are generally applicable to all hazards. In addition to implementation of the 7 national priorities, the guidance identifies other all-hazards planning requirements for federal, state, and local governments. We reported in our 21st century challenges work that federal investments in national preparedness have not been guided by a clear, risk-based strategic plan. The objective of the second stage of DHS’s capabilities based planning process is to develop such a plan by creating a decision framework that will allow first responders at all levels of government to assess needs, update preparedness strategies, and allocate resources to address capability gaps and make the greatest improvements in preparedness. To support its planning efforts in the second stage of implementing HSPD-8, DHS has developed program implementation plans for (1) a national assessment and reporting of capability status, (2) an approach for balancing national investments in capabilities, and (3) programs for national training, national exercises, and collection and dissemination of lessons learned and best practices. To develop these program implementation plans, DHS established task teams composed of various stakeholders from within DHS as well as representatives from state and local first responders and representatives from their professional associations such as the International Association of Fire Chiefs and Chiefs of Police, and the International Association of Emergency Managers. These stakeholder groups, called Integrated Concept Teams, developed the three program implementation requirement plans. According to DHS, implementation will be led by designated DHS program management offices along with stakeholders comprised of federal, state, local, tribal officials and private sector advisors; operational tasks will be performed by contractors. DHS plans to issue contracts during fiscal year 2005, to develop systems to meet the goals of the implementation plans, and complete implementation of the three national systems by September 30, 2008. According to DHS’s Assessment and Reporting Implementation Plan, DHS intends to implement an assessment and reporting system to collect preparedness data to inform decision-makers at all levels on the capabilities of the federal government, states, local jurisdictions, and the private sector. According to the plan, DHS intends to collect data from all governmental recipients of direct funding, using states to collect data from local jurisdictions and using federal regulatory agencies and other appropriate sources to collect private-sector data. According to DHS, aggregating this data at all levels will provide information needed to allocate resources, execute training and exercises, and develop an annual status report on the nation’s preparedness. The purpose of the assessment and reporting system is to provide information about the baseline status of national preparedness and to serve as the third stage of DHS’s capability- based planning approach to ensure that state and local first responder capabilities fully support the National Preparedness Goal. The proposed system is to include the following components: Capability assessment: Using target capabilities, first responders would be able to assess their preparedness to identify gaps, excesses, or deficiencies in their existing capabilities or capabilities they will be expected to access through mutual aid. In addition, this information is to measure the readiness of federal civil response assets and the use of federal assistance at the state and local level and provide a means of assessing how federal assistance programs are supporting the National Preparedness Goal. Compliance assessment: By establishing a mechanism for monitoring compliance with mandated guidance such as compliance with NIMS, and conformity with guidance on the preparation of homeland security strategies and grants, the compliance assessment is intended to serve as a check and balance on the self-reported information in the capability assessment. Performance assessment: By using a standardized reporting that documents performance in specific tasks relevant to the target capabilities, first responders will be expected to demonstrate accomplishments in exercises and real-world operations. Part of the performance assessment is to include corrective action plans to highlight and address areas in need of improvement. As DHS implements the assessment and reporting system, it may encounter several challenges, which were identified by the assessment and reporting concept team in developing the implementation plan. These challenges include: Determining how to aggregate data from federal state, local, and tribal governments; private sector owners/operators; non-profit agencies; and citizen volunteers; Determining assessment timeframes (i.e., snapshot, annual, real time), and when and how often they should take place; Integrating self-assessment and external assessment approaches; and Resolving security classification limitations on information sharing among participants. According to DHS’s National Balanced Investment Implementation Plan, DHS intends to establish an approach to support improved investment decision-making, using the capability, compliance, and performance information provided by the assessment and reporting system. The purpose of the balanced investment program, according to the plan, will be to direct federal preparedness assistance to the highest priority capability gaps, balanced by significant risk factors. The proposed system is to include the following components: All-Hazards Needs Assessment: Using information on preparedness gaps and redundancies identified by the assessment and reporting system, DHS intends to use state-developed needs assessments to identify and quantify planning, equipment, training and exercises, and other organizational needs. These needs assessments are to include input from the first responder community, the private sector, the research and academic community, citizen groups, and tribal entities. DHS plans to direct the states to prioritize the needs they identify in the needs assessments based on various factors, including threats and vulnerabilities, tiers, universal tasks, probability, impact, risk, and cost/benefit analysis. Then, DHS expects to use the needs assessments to develop guidance, specifically tailored to state and local funding recipients, to guide the allocation of federal funding and resources in order to fill capability gaps. All-Hazards Preparedness Strategies: Needs assessments will provide a consistent basis for developing preparedness strategies for federal, regional, state, urban area, local and tribal first responders. DHS plans to develop and provide guidance and requirements so that strategies at all levels will align with the National Preparedness Goal and facilitate cooperation, mutual aid, and standardization across jurisdictions. All-Hazards Decision Framework: DHS intends to design a framework for allocating resources to implement federal, regional, state, urban area, local and tribal first responders’ strategies. Using a structured process to estimate the relative impact of alternative investments and identify the optimal mix of investments for funding, DHS plans to assess, prioritize and develop optimized ranking of potential investments based on factors such as population concentrations, critical infrastructure and other significant risk factors. In the implementation of its balanced investment program DHS intends to devise a process to prioritize investments in planning, personnel, equipment, training, and exercises to close capability gaps identified by the national assessment and reporting system. A key challenge will be establishing a standardized approach for measuring and reporting the risks faced by diverse states and localities in order to effectively prioritize and allocate federal resources. Given that the 15 national planning scenarios DHS used to identify capability gaps were selected without regard to relative risk (i.e. probability of occurrence), it is not yet clear how DHS will prioritize investments in capability gaps on a national level. We have consistently advocated a risk management approach as a basis for ensuring that specific programs and related expenditures are prioritized and properly focused. Although risk management is an evolving practice, we have encouraged the application of certain key elements of a risk management approach, including a risk assessment that defines risks based on the likelihood that they will occur and the consequences of their occurrence. Another key element of the risk management approach we have advocated is the identification of risk mitigation alternatives and the ability to select among those alternatives based on risk, cost, and effectiveness. The intent of DHS’s planned all-hazards decision framework to prioritize and optimize investments based on population, critical infrastructure, and other significant risk factors appears to offer the opportunity for such an approach to managing risk. However, as DHS does not expect to fully implement its balanced investment program before October 2008, it continues to operate its federal preparedness assistance programs without a solid risk-based decision framework, and we were unable to evaluate whether and the extent to which such a framework will incorporate these key elements of risk management. For example, it is not clear how DHS will use the data collected in the all-hazards needs assessment to consistently and comprehensively prioritize resource allocations based on national threats and vulnerabilities or how the department will define acceptable risks as it sets priorities. According to DHS’s National Training and Exercises and Lessons Learned Implementation Plan, DHS intends to implement a system to develop and maintain state and local responders’ all-hazards capabilities. The goal of this system is to provide integrated national programs for training, exercise, and lessons-learned that will reorient existing initiatives at all government levels in order to develop, achieve, and sustain the capabilities that are required to achieve the National Preparedness Goal. The proposed system is to include the following components: National training program: Based on training needs defined by the Universal Task List, Target Capabilities List, and the National Incident Management System, the program is intended to provide criteria for accreditation of training courses, a national directory of accredited training providers, and a National Minimum Qualification Standards Guide. National exercise program: This program is intended to reorient the existing National Exercise Program to incorporate the capabilities-based planning process and provide standardized guidance and methodologies to schedule, design, develop, execute, and evaluate exercises at all levels of government. This program is also intended to provide requirements for the number and type of exercises that communities of varying sizes should conduct to meet the National Preparedness Goal. National lessons-learned program: This program is intended to create a centralized source for sharing lessons learned information that will be reviewed and validated at a national level using a standardized reporting format and process. DHS faces challenges to coordinate this effort across the many state and local jurisdictions and among the variety of first responder disciplines. According to this integrated concept team’s meeting minutes, its efforts were essential in order to develop a management system to ensure there are standard processes across all agencies. Among other things, DHS faces challenges related to: Disparate training requirements across disciplines, Different processes to manage training and exercises, and Different terms and definitions among disciplines related to emergency response functions. Terrorist attacks share many common characteristics with natural and accidental disasters. Our analysis of DHS’s Target Capabilities List and our discussions with first responders and other emergency management stakeholders revealed that the capabilities required to address terrorist attacks and to address natural and accidental disasters are most similar for protection, response, and recovery, and differ most for prevention. More specifically, 30 of the 36 target capabilities yielded by DHS’s capabilities based planning process apply across all types of emergency events. It is possible that terrorist attacks could be prevented through actionable intelligence (i.e., information that can lead to stopping or apprehending terrorists), but there is no known way to prevent natural disasters, such as hurricanes, earthquakes, and tornadoes. Natural or accidental disasters differ from terrorist attacks in that they are unintentional and unplanned rather than the result of deliberate, planned action. It is the deliberate, planned nature of terrorist attacks that makes preventive efforts for such attacks principally the responsibility of intelligence and law enforcement agencies. Because terrorist attacks share many common characteristics with natural and accidental disasters, many of the capabilities first responders need to support national preparedness efforts are similar. As shown in table 2, many terrorist attacks are analogous to natural and accidental disasters. For example, chemical attacks would resemble hazardous materials spills that release similar chemicals on highways or accidents that cause toxic gases to leak from rail cars, a small-scale biological attack using a common disease organism would resemble a natural outbreak, the tasks required to respond following large explosions are analogous to those necessary for responding to the aftermath of tornadoes, and preparedness for “dirty bomb” attacks requires practices that responders whose jurisdictions encompass nuclear power plants regularly exercise, according to other emergency professionals we consulted and the observations of selected officials from first responder departments we interviewed. As one expert explained, managing the Pentagon scene on September 11, 2001, consisted of five interrelated all-hazards response routines: plane crash, building fire, collapsed structure, crime scene, and crowd control. According to DHS officials, their analysis of the Homeland Security Council’s 15 scenarios revealed that approximately 80 percent of necessary tasks would need to be performed regardless of the scenario. To achieve the performance of critical homeland security tasks, DHS has adopted an approach to the implementation of HSPD-8 that centers on building specific prevention, protection, response, and recovery capabilities within and among four related homeland security mission areas. Table 3 describes each mission area. Because of the similarities between the effects of terrorist attacks and natural or accidental disasters, much of the planning, personnel, training, and equipment that form the basis of protection, response, and recovery capabilities are similar across all emergency events, though certain mission areas are more similar than others. Specifically, our analysis of DHS’s detailed definitions and descriptions of the 36 target capabilities showed that only 6 of the capabilities are described as being specific to terrorist attacks. Five of these 6 capabilities fall into DHS’s prevention mission area, and one is in the protection mission area. The remaining 30 capabilities address preparedness for all hazards. DHS officials reviewed our analysis and agreed with our assessment of the relative applicability of the 36 target capabilities to various hazards. Table 4 lists the 36 target capabilities, the respective homeland security mission area where the capability is found, and the extent to which the various components of the capability address preparedness for all hazards. Although almost all target capabilities in the areas of protection, response, and recovery are similar across emergency events, terrorist attacks could require that more of the specific prevention, protection, response, or recovery capabilities be exercised simultaneously, or that a greater number or wider variety of capability elements (e.g., personnel, planning, and equipment) could be employed to provide the capability. Nonetheless, many emergency response representatives we consulted agreed that substantial overlap exists between capabilities that are needed for natural and accidental disasters and those that are needed for terrorist attacks. These shared capabilities would allow for the performance of broad tasks such as controlling entry to emergency areas, recovering victims, treating the ill and injured, providing basic living needs for survivors and their families, transporting the dead, restoring essential services, handling public inquiries, providing a basis for recovery, and maintaining law and order. Terrorist attacks differ from natural and accidental disasters because they are intentionally perpetrated acts that could possibly be prevented or deterred. As a result, all five of the prevention capabilities on DHS’s target capabilities list focus exclusively on terrorist attacks. Although first responders from the law enforcement community are active in the prevention of crime, and all terrorist attacks are crimes, the prevention of terrorist attacks differs from traditional crime prevention in its heavy reliance on actionable intelligence—information that can lead to stopping or apprehending terrorists. Reflecting this reliance within the prevention mission area are the capabilities to collect information of value to counterterrorism and analyze this intelligence for possible threats; recognize the wider threat picture and potentially harmful patterns that may emerge from collected intelligence; and share this intelligence across disciplines and jurisdictions. Reliance on actionable intelligence also is used within the prevention mission area to support investigation of terrorist activities and to interdict weapons of mass destruction by preventing the import, transport, manufacture, or release of chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and explosive materials. During our interviews, 29 of 52 first responder departments who replied to a question about the extent to which prevention capabilities differ between terrorist and other emergencies said that terrorism prevention is either more different than similar or very different. Although the Target Capabilities List states that the purpose of protection capabilities is to reduce the likelihood of attack and to limit the damage should an attack occur, four of the five capabilities that compose this mission area could also be applied to limit the damage from natural and accidental disasters. For example, the protection mission area includes capabilities such as the identification and prioritization of hazards, vulnerabilities, and risks; the identification and eradication of contaminants in the nation’s food supply; the investigation of disease outbreaks, both deliberate and naturally occurring; and the involvement of citizens in exercises and ongoing volunteer programs. The only protection capability that DHS links exclusively to terrorist attacks is Critical Infrastructure Protection. This capability is intended to reduce the threat to and vulnerability of high-risk targets such as the nation’s infrastructure. The capability summary states that this capability applies to all terrorist attack scenarios. However, many of the critical tasks that compose this capability are traditional mitigation activities: pre-event actions that involve lasting, often permanent reduction of the exposure to, probability of, or potential loss from a variety of emergency events. These actions could include tasks as simple as fastening bookshelves to walls to keep them from falling during earthquakes or as involved as rewriting building codes and zoning ordinances to minimize future flood damage. These types of actions are applicable to multiple emergency scenarios—for example, installing shatterproof glass protects against damage and injury from flying glass in the event of both a heavy storm and a terrorist bombing. Similarly, taking protective measures to improve the safety of rail cars in a mass transit system—an example of a vital system as described in the Critical Infrastructure Protection capability—could reduce the damage from terrorist attacks while also mitigating the effects of accidental collisions. DHS’s response mission area includes 21 response capabilities that are each applicable to terrorist attacks and to natural and accidental disasters. Examples of response capabilities include the ability to: manage an emergency operations center; relocate affected and at-risk members of the population to safer areas through emergency evacuation; advise and update citizens through emergency public information; conduct and support fire suppression operations; isolate and quarantine individuals who are ill, exposed, or likely to be exposed during a contagious disease outbreak; provide mass prophylaxis following the onset of a biological event; distribute medical supplies and provide adequate medical evaluation and care during events that exceed the limits of the normal medical capacity of an affected community—referred to as medical surge; direct and control an emergency event site through an incident command system; coordinate and conduct search and rescue operations in collapsed structures; and protect first responder health and safety during a response. During our interviews, 37 of 54 first responder departments who replied to a question about the extent to which response differs between terrorist incidents and natural or accidental disasters stated that terrorism response is either more similar than different or very similar. For example, the capability to distribute medical supplies and manage a medical surge could be needed in both a terrorist attack and a natural disaster. According to the Homeland Security Council, the number of uninjured or “worried well” who sought medical treatment after the 9/11 World Trade Center attack was approximately 15 times the number of people who sought medical treatment due to smoke inhalation. According to one public health official we interviewed, physicians would observe a similar “worried well” phenomenon in non-terrorism scenarios, for example, among otherwise healthy patients who incorrectly attribute common symptoms to a feared severe acute respiratory syndrome or SARS infection. The capability to successfully disrupt and dispose of an explosive device, though generally directed toward an intentional act, is not limited to terrorism preparedness. Eliminating explosive devices of varying sizes and sophistication is part of a police department’s regular operations, and many public safety agencies had bomb squads dedicated to this purpose before the attacks of September, 11, 2001, focused the nation’s attention on terrorism. One of the capabilities in the response mission area—Weapons of Mass Destruction/Hazardous Incident Response and Decontamination— explicitly includes weapons of mass destruction in its title, indicating that the capability may be terrorism-focused. However, this capability is combined with the capability to respond to all hazardous materials sites. Therefore, it is by definition an all-hazards capability. In the case of weapons of mass destruction, however, depending upon the size of the weapon, an emergency event could require that a host of related response and recovery capabilities be exercised simultaneously and that a greater number or wider variety of first responders be asked to deliver these capabilities than might typically occur during a natural or accidental disaster. Initial awareness of the possibility of terrorist involvement has become part of first responders’ protocols for responding to any event. For example, officials from 5 first responder departments we met with said that they have developed protocols for entering the site of an incident and have heightened their awareness of secondary devices or attacks. These protocols have increasingly become part of the standard response to any emergency event because responders must consider attacks that are intended to kill and injure response personnel and to otherwise impede response efforts. One fire department official explained that the events of September 11, 2001, raised the department’s general awareness level and that, in the post-9/11 environment, response personnel are likely to think of terrorism first when a catastrophic event occurs, which may lead to a greater assessment of the situation before entering the scene. Moreover, according to local fire department officials we visited in several locations, fire departments have long been aware of secondary events, like explosions or collapsing structures; the difference now is the possible presence of intent, which means that these secondary events may be targeted instead of random, and thus may be more likely to kill, injure, and destroy. There are three capabilities that compose DHS’s recovery mission area, and all three are all-hazards in nature. They consist of the capability to: conduct damage and safety assessments in public and private structures; restore transportation, communication, utilities, and other essential services; and implement short-term and long-term economic and community recovery processes. During our interviews, 31 of 51 first responder departments who replied to the question about the extent to which recovery differs between terrorist incidents and natural or accidental disasters said that recovery capabilities were either more similar than different or very similar. For example, a community’s buildings would need to be assessed after an earthquake or after a terrorist attack that topples multiple structures. The capability to restore transportation services would also be necessary whether a city’s bus service has been suspended due to a winter storm or to a terrorist bombing. Long-term recovery processes may be necessary in the case of terrorist events that result in long-term or permanent evacuation from a geographic area: for example, an intentional radiological release could contaminate the surrounding area in the same way that accidental releases have done in past radiological events. In this way, the aftermath of large- scale terrorist events could be similar to the long-term or permanent evacuation from flood zones and environmentally-compromised hazardous waste sites. Federal grant funding since September 11, 2001, has largely emphasized enhancing first responders’ capabilities to respond to terrorist attacks. Legislative language has directed DHS to use these funds chiefly to prevent, protect, respond to and recover from acts of terrorism. Additionally, HSPD-8 directs DHS to take an all-hazards approach to national emergency preparedness with a special emphasis on terrorism. As a result, DHS grant guidance has contained, in large part, explicit direction that state and local grant recipients use the funds to enhance first responders’ capabilities for terrorist attacks. State preparedness officials and local first responders we interviewed said that DHS’s emphasis for grant funding was too heavily focused on terrorism; rather, they preferred to invest in dual use equipment and training (i.e., could be used for all hazards, whether the source was a terrorist act or a natural or accidental disaster.) In response, DHS promoted flexibility to allow such dual usage within the grant program requirements for fiscal year 2005, according to DHS officials. To ensure grant funds are used for their designated purpose, the states and localities we visited reported they all have financial controls methods and monitoring procedures in place designed to ensure that whatever flexibilities for dual uses exist, they remain within DHS’s program guidelines. DHS grant programs have largely focused on enhancing first responders’ capabilities to respond to terrorist attacks based on HSPD-8 and legislation that emphasize preparedness assistance for catastrophic terrorism as the highest priority for federal funding. For example, HSPD-8 directs DHS to take an all-hazards approach to national emergency preparedness assistance and directs the department to place special emphasis on terrorism in doing so. Moreover, legislative requirements associated with the larger grant programs for first responders focus on terrorist attacks, while smaller grant programs focus on all-hazards preparedness. For example, the legislative requirements associated with the 3 largest grant programs specify that funds be used for preparedness against terrorist attacks: State Homeland Security Grant program funds are to be used to enhance the capability of state and local jurisdictions to prepare, for and respond to, acts of terrorism, including those involving the use of chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear and explosive weapons. Urban Area Security Initiative grant funds are to be used to enhance high threat, high density urban areas’ ability to prepare for and respond to threats or acts of terrorism involving weapons of mass destruction. The Law Enforcement Terrorism Prevention Program is, as its name suggests, to provide funds to assist state and local law enforcement communities in their activities to prevent terrorist attacks. The only other first responder grant programs that received an appropriation of greater than $100 million in fiscal year 2005 were two long standing programs that have historically had an all-hazards focus: The Emergency Management Performance Grant program was authorized to provide emergency management planning and assistance to states for multi-hazard preparedness and mitigation. The Assistance to Firefighters Grant program provides assistance to fire departments for the purpose of protecting the health and safety of the public and firefighting personnel against fire and fire-related hazards, including incidents of terrorism or use of weapons of mass destruction. As shown in figure 6, almost 3 of every 4 grant dollars appropriated to DHS for first responders in fiscal year 2005 were for 3 primary programs that had an explicit focus on terrorism. Congress appropriated almost $2.4 billion in fiscal year 2005 for the three largest grant programs: the State Homeland Security Grant program (about $1.1 billion), the Urban Area Security Initiative ($885 million) and the Law Enforcement Terrorism Prevention Program ($400 million). Congress appropriated about $960 million in fiscal year 2005 for all-hazards grant programs: the Emergency Management Performance Grant program ($180 million), the Assistance to Firefighters Grant program ($715 million), and other grant programs ($65 million)—such as Citizen Corps and the Metropolitan Medical Response System. Our analysis of appropriations between fiscal years 2001 and 2005 for these key first responder grant programs showed that while funding for all grant programs increased substantially, funding for grant programs with an all-hazards emergency management focus increased at a lesser rate than funding for terrorism-specific programs, as shown in figure 7. This increase in terrorism-focused funding was due mainly to the funding increases for appropriated programs related to the State Homeland Security Grant program and the Urban Area Security Initiative grant program, which increased from about $109 million and $21 million, respectively, in fiscal year 2001, to almost $1.1 billion and $885 million, respectively, in fiscal year 2005. For fiscal year 2006, the Administration has proposed spending almost $3.4 billion for homeland security preparedness grants, continuing DHS’s emphasis on terrorism and spending about 3 of every 4 dollars or about $2.6 billion for terrorism-focused grant programs. About $720 million would go toward those grant programs with an all-hazards emergency management focus. The Administration’s budget request also proposes to merge the program activities currently under the terrorism-focused grant programs by merging the program activities under the Law Enforcement Terrorism Prevention Program into the State Homeland Security Grant and the Urban Area Security Initiative. Under this proposal states and localities would be required to earmark no less than 20 percent of their spending under these programs toward terrorism prevention activities. Finally, the fiscal year 2006 budget request reflects a continuation of decreased funding for the Assistance to Firefighters Grant Program. In fiscal year 2006, the proposed budget for this program is $500 million compared to $715 million in fiscal year 2005 and $750 million in fiscal year 2004. More than 87,000 state and local jurisdictions across the nation are potentially eligible to receive first responder grants funds. Legislative funding criteria affect allocation of these funds to states who in turn allocate funds to local first responders. For example, the fiscal year 2005 Homeland Security Grant Program, allocated a minimum of 0.75 percent of the available first-responder funding to each state, which accounted for 40 percent of the total allocations for this program. Alternative approaches for the formula to allocate State Homeland Security Program grants with varying degrees of attention to the risks and threats of terrorism and natural or accidental disasters are being considered by Congress. For example, one proposed change in this formula would focus mainly on higher population areas with critical infrastructure that may be more attractive to terrorists. This approach is currently the basis for the Urban Area Security Initiative program funds that are provided to 50 selected urban areas that are chosen on the basis of population, population density, presence of critical national infrastructure, threat and presence of mutual aid compacts. The priorities of some first responders we interviewed did not align with DHS’s priorities for enhancing capabilities. For example, during our interviews, 31 of 39 first responder departments who replied to a question about DHS’s training programs, exercise activities and grant funds, disagreed that these were focused on all-hazards. In addition, officials from four first responder departments went on to say that DHS required too much emphasis on terrorism-related activities in requests for equipment and training—for example, combating weapons of mass destruction and preventing and responding to terrorist attacks using chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and explosive materials. However, responders said that they had a greater need for assistance preparing for natural and accidental disasters. During our interviews, 37 of the 69 first responder departments who responded to a question about the programmatic challenges they face cited the need for additional flexibility from DHS or state agencies in order to use grant funds to enhance their ability to respond to events that were more likely to occur in their jurisdictions. State and local officials said they have been able to identify uses for most of the training and equipment they receive that include both terrorism and other hazards. Moreover, local first responder departments and state officials we interviewed also noted that they favored dual-use purchases for many reasons: to prevent equipment from “rotting on the shelf,” according to one official; to maintain a level of comfort and proficiency with equipment on hand for counterterrorism by using it for everyday responses; and to build stronger all-hazards capabilities that will allow them to better respond to terrorist attacks. We have reported in the past that achieving national preparedness and response goals hinges on the federal government’s ability to form effective partnerships with nonfederal stakeholders. By working collectively with state and local governments, the federal government gains the resources and expertise of the people closest to the challenge. Just as partnerships offer opportunities, they also create challenges based upon the different interests reflected by each partner. From the federal perspective, there is the concern that state and local governments may not share the same priorities for use of federal funds. For example, in 10 first responder departments we interviewed, officials pointed out that they were much more likely to face the threat of hurricanes, floods, or wildland fires than an attack by terrorists using weapons of mass destruction or chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and explosive materials and that their priorities focused on fortifying their efforts to deal with these natural and accidental disasters. In addition, 61 first responder departments we interviewed reported that their emergency operations plans and procedures are all-hazards plans and structured around the full range of potential emergencies, incidents and risks. In response, DHS promoted flexibility to allow such dual usage within the grant program requirements for fiscal year 2005, according to DHS officials. Officials from the Office of State and Local Government Coordination and Preparedness said that the majority of the assistance they offer to state and local first responders is required to be linked to emergency management tasks related to terrorist attacks but that some authorized equipment, training, and exercises can be used for emergencies that are not related to terrorism. Officials stated, even prior to fiscal year 2005, grant requirements allowed for dual usage and state grantees are responsible for contacting DHS when questions regarding application of grant guidelines arise. They also said that although the DHS equipment list was not created with the intention that equipment would be used for non- terrorism purposes, flexibility for dual use was reasonable, acceptable, and expected. Given that DHS now defines its targets for protection, response and recovery capabilities in terms of all-hazards applicability, approved training and equipment that are intended to enhance these capabilities of first responders inherently have an all-hazards applicability. First responders we interviewed also expressed concerns about both current and sustained future funding for the personnel, training, and equipment they need to respond to large-scale emergency events. In addition to the start-up costs—the initial investment in new equipment and training needed to enhance first responders’ capabilities—the costs of maintaining equipment, providing ongoing training and exercises for responders, and replenishing perishable supplies and stock are also likely to be significant. During our interviews, 48 of 69 first responder departments who replied to a question about challenges said their departments faced funding challenges for personnel, maintenance, equipment, training, and multi-year funding sources for sustaining preparedness capabilities. In addition, in 59 of 69 first responder departments we visited first responders cited multi-year funding as one of their top program challenges. For example, officials from three state and local departments we interviewed observed that a connection exists between multi-year funding and sustainability because without multi-year funding, local first responders cannot commit to sustaining the equipment purchased on an ongoing basis. One first responder official worried that their department is buying new equipment but were concerned that DHS might not provide future funding for them to sustain the equipment. In another locality, officials told us that equipment they had purchased could not be maintained without continued DHS assistance. In response to these types of concerns, state and local officials have different options to ensure that capabilities can be sustained; for example, contracts for equipment purchases could be designed to include maintenance during the useful life of the equipment, according to DHS. The states and localities we visited reported they have financial controls and procedures in place designed to ensure that whatever flexibilities for dual uses exist, they remain within DHS’s program guidelines. State governments and local first responders we visited identified various purchasing controls and monitoring procedures that are in place at different levels of government to review the purchase of goods and services. For example, first responder departments that we met with said they are required to submit their grant requests to other local, state or regional government bodies, or steering committees. In some cases these interagency committees were made up of multiple jurisdictions and multiple first responder disciplines working collaboratively to develop the annual list of equipment and training programs to be acquired for those jurisdictions. State preparedness agencies and local first responders also identified internal review processes that exist within the state’s administrative agency for homeland security grants and local internal controls. We have previously reported on the management of first responder grant programs and efforts to improve accountability and have examined these procedures and processes in greater detail. In February 2005, we reported that in fiscal year 2004, DHS completed site visits to 44 of 56 states and territories that received grants as part of its monitoring of states’ grant reporting and state homeland security strategy implementation. We also reported that in fiscal year 2004 DHS revised its method of reporting on grant expenditures, moving away from requiring itemized lists of expenditures toward a more results-based approach where grant managers must demonstrate how grant expenditures link to larger projects that support one or more goals in the states’ homeland security strategies. Finally, in the absence of some basic, comparable standards for first responder performance, it has been difficult to assess the effect of grant expenditures on first responder capabilities and performance. Prior to September 11, 2001, the federal government’s role in supporting emergency preparedness and management was limited primarily to providing guidance and grants for planning, mitigation, and equipment before large-scale disasters like floods, hurricanes, and earthquakes, and response and recovery assistance after such disasters. Since September 11, 2001, the federal government has awarded billions of dollars to state and local governments for planning, equipment, and training to enhance the capabilities of first responders to respond to terrorist attacks and, to a lesser extent, natural and accidental disasters. These extensive resources reflect a growing federal role in promoting emergency preparedness. However, as we reported in our 21st century challenges work, this federal financial assistance has not been guided by a clear, risk-based strategic plan that would provide a basis for realistic budgeting and resource planning. Ultimately, the federal government must determine how much developing and maintaining the national emergency preparedness capabilities needed for homeland security will cost and what the nation’s federal, state and local governments can afford to pay. DHS, as the primary executive department with responsibilities for national emergency preparedness efforts, faces the challenge of working with state and local governments to coordinate preparedness activities and formulate realistic budgets and resource plans to share these costs and support and sustain implementation of an efficient and effective an all-hazards national preparedness program. DHS’s development of an all-hazards national preparedness goal, along with related products and program implementation plans and requirements, if properly planned and executed, may help guide the development of realistic budget and resource plans. However, DHS may confront several challenges in its attempts to fully realize the preparedness goal and implement the three programs described by its program implementation plans. For example, DHS’s assessment and reporting implementation plan, intended to accurately identify the status of capabilities at the state, regional, and local levels is vital for establishing a baseline and providing an ongoing feedback loop, upon which decisions at these multiple levels of government about preparedness needs will rest. However, DHS plans to rely extensively on self-reported data. Therefore, as the team that devised DHS’s assessment and reporting implementation plan pointed out, it is likely to be a challenge for DHS to determine how to aggregate data from multiple governmental and nongovernmental emergency preparedness actors. An effective assessment system will also have to balance self-assessment approaches with appropriate external assessment checks in order to provide consistent and accurate data that can drive these budgeting and resource planning decisions. A related challenge DHS may face is in continuing to coordinate efforts to enhance first responder all-hazards capabilities among and across various states and jurisdictions and to manage stakeholder expectations. First, DHS’s tiered approach to defining first responders’ required capabilities— either to possess or to secure access—suggests that finding effective approaches for local jurisdictions to work together to develop funding plans and coordinate expenditures for the use of federal funds for regional emergency preparedness and response will be an important step in the process of developing a realistic budget. However, as our work on emergency preparedness in the National Capital Region demonstrates, facilitating effective regional coordination can be particularly challenging. Additionally, as we have reported, achieving national preparedness and response goals hinges on the federal government’s ability to work collectively with state and local governments in order to leverage resources and expertise. Inconsistent expectations about dual use and concerns about how to coordinate the national training and exercise program, among other things, illustrate the importance of careful attention to establishing and maintaining strong nonfederal partnerships. Finally, DHS’s proposal for a national system to balance resource investments may help to provide a strategic, risk-based approach to prioritize federal, state and local resource investments, to the extent that the department uses a systematic, comprehensive risk management approach. We have consistently advocated such a risk based approach to guide federal investments in homeland security that would consider threats, vulnerabilities, and criticalities, as well as the expected value of investments in developing first responders’ capabilities to prevent terrorist attacks and to protect critical infrastructure balanced with the potential costs of developing and maintaining capabilities for responding and recovering from all types of emergency events. Such an approach could provide a basis to formulate realistic budget and resource plans at the national level. The intent of DHS’s planned all-hazards decision framework to prioritize and optimize investments based on population, critical infrastructure, and other significant risk factors appears to offer the opportunity for such an approach to managing risk; however establishing a standardized approach for measuring and reporting the risks faced by diverse states and localities in order to effectively prioritize and allocate federal resources will be a key challenge. Moreover, as DHS does not expect to fully implement its balanced investment program before 2008, it continues to operate its federal preparedness assistance programs without a solid risk-based decision framework, and it is not yet clear whether and to what extent, when established, the proposed framework will incorporate the key elements of risk management that we recommend. We provided a draft of this report to DHS, which had no comments or concerns with the information included in this report. DHS also provided technical comments which we incorporated as appropriate. As we agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce the contents of this report earlier, we plan no further distribution of it until 30 days from the date of this letter. We then plan to provide copies of this report to the Secretary of DHS. Copies of this report will also be made available to others upon request. In addition, this report will be available at no charge on GAO’s Web site at http://www.gao.gov. If you or your staff has any questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 512-8777 or jenkinswo@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. GAO staff that made major contributions to this report is listed in appendix IV. This report addresses the following questions: 1) What actions has DHS taken to provide policies and strategies that promote the development of the all-hazards emergency management capabilities of first responders? 2) How do first responders’ emergency management capabilities for terrorist attacks compare to capabilities needed for natural or accidental disasters? 3) What emphasis has DHS placed on funding awarded to state and local first responders to enhance all-hazards emergency management capabilities? To address these questions, we met with local first responder officials in ten states (California, Florida, Michigan, Missouri, New Hampshire, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, and Washington) and 31 local jurisdictions with a total of 69 first responder departments. We selected states and localities to reflect variations in dimensions such as: geographic diversity; population density including metropolitan and non- metropolitan locations; fiscal capacity differences between states; critical infrastructure issues such as ports and international borders; governmental structure differences at the local level (local focus versus strong county government structure); differences in the states’ homeland security/emergency management organization and leadership models; and a sample of states containing sovereign American Indian tribal lands. Within each state we selected a sample of two to three localities, such as a combination of jurisdictions for our visits, in order to maximize the range of dimension described above. For example, we visited one of the large urban areas within the state along with an adjacent suburban jurisdiction. We also visited medium, small cities, rural jurisdictions or Indian tribes. These local site visits included seven localities that received Urban Area Security Initiative funding for fiscal years 2004 and 2005—Detroit, Michigan; Charlotte, North Carolina; Kansas City, Missouri; San Diego, California; Tampa, Florida; New York, New York; and Seattle, Washington—that we identified after selecting which states to visit. At the local jurisdictions we visited, we requested to meet with first responder officials from the following departments: fire and emergency medical services, law enforcement, emergency management, public health and public works. We also selected two American Indian tribes that possessed their own public safety departments—police and fire—to identify some of the challenges and issues that these jurisdictions face. Our selection of localities was to some extent dependent on the availability of officials to meet with us, travel schedule limitations, and our effort to avoid any respondent’s bias due to overlaps with recent and current GAO engagement teams. Because of the manner in which we selected our locations, our results, however, cannot be generalized beyond the individual locations. Using a structured interview guide, we solicited local first responder officials’ insights and perspectives on a variety of topics, including: the extent to which DHS uses an all-hazards approach in assisting state and local first responders’ emergency management capabilities, how DHS coordinates its activities, how locations use federal homeland security grant funds, what mechanisms DHS has in place to ensure that grant funds are spent in accordance with grant guidelines, how local departments assess and report their preparedness status, what gaps, if any, they believe exist between current and needed capabilities in selected locations, and what challenges, if any, they face in their emergency management responsibilities. Using a similar structured interview guide, we asked similar questions to states’ office of emergency management, their homeland security office, their State Administrative Agency point of contact who is the official recipient of DHS grants, and state-level public health officials. In addition, we met with officials from various professional organizations that represent state government organizations and first responders to capture their insights and perspectives on the extent to which DHS has used an all-hazards approach in assisting state and local first responders’ emergency management capabilities, and how DHS coordinates these activities externally with state and local first responders. To determine what actions DHS has taken to provide policies and strategies that promote the development of the all-hazards emergency management capabilities of first responders, we reviewed DHS products developed to comply with Presidential Homeland Security Directives 5 and 8. We reviewed the final documents for the National Incident Management System (NIMS) and the National Response Plan (NRP). We also obtained and analyzed documents related to the development of the National Preparedness Goal and its related products that were developed by DHS and the Office of State and Local Government Coordination and Preparedness in order to implement HSPD-8. These documents include the National Planning Scenarios, Universal Task List and Target Capabilities List, the Interim National Preparedness Goal, National Preparedness Guidance and program implementation plans for balancing national investments and resources, training and exercises, and assessment and reporting. Our work did not include assessing either the appropriateness of the scenarios used to identify needed first responder capabilities or the tasks and capabilities developed based on neither those scenarios, nor DHS’s process and resulting work on the three program implementation plans. In addition, we met with DHS officials from the Office of State and Local Government Coordination and Preparedness, including the Office for Domestic Preparedness. We also met with officials from DHS’s Emergency Preparedness and Response directorate, which includes the Federal Emergency Management Agency. Finally, we met with officials from 3 of the Federal Emergency Management Agency’s 10 regional offices— Atlanta, Kansas City and Seattle—selected in order to capture one regional office in an eastern, central and western location, and selected based on the states and localities we selected for our site visits. To determine how first responders’ emergency management capabilities for terrorist attacks differ from capabilities needed for natural or accidental disasters, we reviewed relevant research on homeland security and domestic preparedness developed by professional organizations and other subject matter experts and research organizations. We also reviewed the documents developed by DHS’s Office of State and Local Government Coordination and Preparedness designed to establish a National Preparedness Goal. These included various drafts of the National Preparedness Goal and Guidance, the Target Capabilities List, the Universal Task List, and the National Planning Scenarios. We also met with officials from first responder departments and professional associations, as described above, to address this question. To determine the emphasis on grant funding awarded to state and local first responders to enhance all-hazards emergency management capabilities, we reviewed DHS budget information and authorizing and appropriations legislation. We also asked first responders a series of questions related to DHS funding and their perceptions of DHS grant guidance and, at our meetings with the professional organizations that represent state government organizations and first responders, we asked similar questions to obtain their views on these issues. We conducted our work from May 2004 through May 2005 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Mr. Christopher Keisling was the Assistant Director for this report. In addition to the contact named above, David A. Brown, James Cook, Alice Feldsman, Kathryn Godfrey, Wil Holloway, Dawn Locke, Nettie Richards, and John Vocino made key contributions to this report.

Summary: The events of September 11, 2001, have resulted in a greater focus on the role of first responders in carrying out the nation's emergency management efforts. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is the primary federal entity responsible for ensuring that first responders, such as police, fire, emergency medical, and public health personnel, have the capabilities needed to provide a coordinated, comprehensive response to any large-scale crisis. In the last 4 years DHS has awarded $11.3 billion to state and local governments to enhance capabilities, primarily to prevent, prepare for, respond to and recover from acts of terrorism. Presidential directives instruct DHS to develop a national all-hazards approach--preparing all sectors of society for any emergency event including terrorist attacks and natural or accidental disasters. This report addresses the following questions: (1) What actions has DHS taken to provide policies and strategies that promote the development of the all-hazards emergency management capabilities of first responders? (2) How do first responders' emergency management capabilities for terrorist attacks differ to capabilities needed for natural or accidental disasters? (3) What emphasis has DHS placed on funding awarded to state and local first responders to enhance all-hazards emergency management capabilities? DHS has undertaken three major policy initiatives aimed at creating a national, all-hazards coordinated and comprehensive response to large-scale incidents: (1) a national response plan (what needs to be done); (2) a command and management process (how it needs to be done); and (3) a national preparedness goal (how well it should be done). GAO reviewed these products and determined that each supports a national, all-hazards approach. DHS has developed plans to implement three related programs to enhance first responder capabilities: (1) to assess and report on the status of first responders' capabilities; (2) to prioritize national resource investments; and (3) to establish a national training and exercise program. Implementing these programs will likely pose a number of challenges for DHS including integrating internal and external assessment approaches, assessing state and local risks in a national context to effectively prioritize investments, and establishing common training requirements across responder disciplines. Because terrorist attacks share some common characteristics with natural and accidental disasters, 30 of DHS' 36 capabilities first responders need to support preparedness and response efforts are similar. GAO's analysis found that the baseline capabilities required for terrorist attacks and natural or accidental disasters are more similar for response and recovery and differ most for prevention. Because terrorist attacks are planned, intentional acts, all of DHS' prevention capabilities focus on terrorist attacks, while almost all other baseline capabilities focus on all hazards. Legislation and presidential directives call for DHS to place special emphasis on preparedness for terrorism and DHS has directed that the majority of first responder grant funding be used to enhance first responder capabilities to prevent, protect against, respond to, and recover from terrorist attacks. Nonetheless, grants funds can have all-hazards applications.