The United States now has a unified inspections operation at the borders; one inspector ischarged with examining people, animals, plants, goods, and cargo upon entry to the country. Thisreport delves into border inspections from the perspectives of the three major types of inspections: immigration, customs, and animal and plant health. The transfer of these functions to theDepartment of Homeland Security (DHS) marks a significant policy shift concerning all of thesefunctions, clarifying that -- although there are important commercial, economic, health,humanitarian, and immigration responsibilities -- ensuring the security of our borders is the toppriority. The decision by DHS officials to further integrate the inspection duties so that there is "oneface at the border" now means that Customs and Border Protection (CBP) inspectors are essentiallyinterchangeable and responsible for all primary inspections. Laws pertaining to border inspections date back to the earliest days of the United Statesfederal government, and border inspections historically were organized along functionalresponsibilities. The federal authority to assess and collect duties on goods, wares, and merchandiseimported into the country was established by the second act that the 1st Congress enacted in 1789,and later that year the administrative apparatus of the U.S. Customs Service was authorized as well. Although Congress' exclusive role over naturalization and immigration is found in Article 1 of theU.S. Constitution, the formal inspection of aliens entering the United States came later in our history. In 1882, Congress enacted a law providing for an examination of all aliens who arrive in the UnitedStates and in 1891 established the Bureau of Immigration, which later became the Immigration andNaturalization Service (INS). Laws regarding plant quarantine and inspection date back to 1912. For many years, the INS and Customs Service inspectors were "cross designated" so that theycould perform initial examinations in each other's functional responsibilities. In practice thisdivision of labor reportedly resulted in INS inspectors being the lead at land ports of entry andCustoms Service inspectors being the lead at air and sea ports of entry. The U.S. Department ofAgriculture (USDA) had always handled the inspection of plants and animals independently. Today, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is charged with overseeing most of theborder inspections functions. The Bureau of Customs and Border Protection (CBP) includescustoms inspectors, immigration inspectors, agricultural inspectors, and the border patrol. CBP islocated in the Directorate of Border and Transportation Security in DHS. (1) Some argue that this reorganization of border inspections has been long needed and willresult in a more streamlined and efficient set of procedures at the border with a clear, single, chainof command. Others warn that the different types of inspections are quite complex in their own rightand that the reorganization will serve to exacerbate competing priorities, ultimately resulting in manymore people and goods being sent to secondary inspections. This report opens with an overview of the parameters of the border, both physical and legal. It then presents the statutory basis for border inspections in the three major areas. At the crux of thereport is the third section that explains the policies and procedures for immigration, customs, andagricultural inspections. A section on trends by ports and modes of entry analyzes the volume andtypes of inspections in recent years leading up to the establishment of DHS. The fifth section of thisreport summarizes budget and staffing over the past five years for these three functions. The reportconcludes with a discussion of the issues and concerns that are emerging with the implementationof the unified border inspections policies and procedures. Ports of Entry. For the past several years, therehave been 317 official ports of entry (POE) into the United States. At a given port, inspectors maybe responsible for more than one mode of transportation, even processing all three conveyance typesof air, land, and sea. Buffalo and Detroit, for example, have air, sea, and land POEs, but thelikelihood of inspectors having multiple responsibilities are greater at the smaller POEs. CBPacknowledges that "the merging of agencies into one port of entry definition is currently a work inprogress," and the POE numbers do not neatly add up across categories. CBP currently reports thatthere 216 airports that are international POEs, 143 seaports, and 115 land POEs. Two locations areinland POEs. (2) Physical Boundaries. The land border withCanada spans 5,525 miles and is the longest non-militarized border in the world. There are 84 landPOEs along the northern border, which include but are not limited to three in Idaho, 13 in Maine,three in Michigan, five in Minnesota, 10 in Montana, 12 in New York, 18 in North Dakota, sevenin Vermont, and 12 in Washington. On a daily basis, reportedly over 250,000 people enter theUnited States from Canada. Canada is the single largest trading partner of the United States, withtotal merchandise trade (exports and imports) exceeding $372 billion in 2003. Indeed, the largesttrade link in the world is the Ambassador Bridge (connecting Detroit, Michigan and Windsor,Ontario) that has more than 7,000 trucks crossing daily transporting goods worth more than $120billion per year. The southern land border with Mexico is 1,933 miles across and has 25 land POEs, whichinclude but are not limited to six in California, six in Arizona, two in New Mexico, and 11 in Texas. Over 800,000 people arrive from Mexico daily. Mexico is our second largest trading partner, withtotal merchandise trade at $220.3 billion in 2003, down from $247.2 billion in 2000 . The POE atLaredo/Nuevo Laredo reportedly has the highest volume of trade on the southern border. The coast line of the United States is 12,479 miles long, and there are 143 sea POEs. Somesea and river POEs are principally commercial ports while others receive passengers. Legal Boundaries. From a legal perspective, theparameters of the border for inspection purposes are generally given a flexible reading by courts andoften vary from the geographical confines mentioned above. "Border searches" (3) may occur when entry is madeby land from the neighboring countries of Mexico or Canada, at the place where a ship docks in theUnited States after having been to a foreign port, and at any airport in the country where internationalflights first land. Courts have given the "border" a more flexible reading because of the significantdifficulties in detecting the increasingly mobile smuggler. Aside from searches at the actual physicalborder, the law recognizes two legal constructs that allow border searches to move beyond thegeographical confines of the actual port of entry. Functional Equivalent. Border searches may beconducted within the interior of the United States. The border search exception extends to thosesearches conducted at the "functional equivalent" of the border. The "functional equivalent" of aborder is generally the first practical detention point after a border crossing or the final port ofentry. (4) It is justifiedbecause in essence, it is no different than a search conducted at the border and occurs only becauseof the impossibility of requiring the subject searched to stop at the physical border. A search occursat the border's functional equivalent when: (1) a reasonable certainty exists that the person or thingcrossed the border; (2) a reasonable certainty exists that there was no change in the object of thesearch since it crossed the border; and (3) the search was conducted as soon as practicable after theborder crossing. (5) Placessuch as international airports within the country and ports within the country's territorial waters orstations at the intersection of two or more roads extending from the border exemplify such functionalequivalents. (6) Extended Border Search. The border search exceptionmay also be extended to allow warrantless searches beyond the border or its functional equivalent. Under the "extended border search" doctrine, government officials may conduct a warrantless searchbeyond the border or its functional equivalent if (1) the government officials have reasonablecertainty or a "high degree of probability" that a border was crossed; (2) they also have reasonablecertainty that no change in the object of the search has occurred between the time of the bordercrossing and the search; and (3) they have "reasonable suspicion" that criminal activity wasoccurring. (7) Thisthree-part test ensures that a suspect still has a significant nexus with a border crossing so that borderofficials can reasonably base their search on statutory and constitutional authority and to ensure thatthe search is reasonable. (8) While the Homeland Security Act (HSA, P.L. 107-296 ) transferred the inspection "functions"of INS and Customs Service to DHS, it did not revise the laws that authorize these inspections. HSAdid specify which laws DHS agricultural inspectors may utilize to conduct inspections, but it did notalter these underlying statutes. Consequently, understanding the legal authorities that guidedagricultural, customs and immigration inspections functions before and after their transfer to DHSbecomes increasingly important. At this point, it is unclear whether the "one face at the border"initiative promoted by DHS will also result in, or perhaps some could argue even require, the futureconsolidation of the authorities each legacy agency individually possessed. Immigration Inspections. The former INS,through the Attorney General (AG), was responsible for enforcing and administering theImmigration and Nationality Act of 1952 (INA) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. Â§Â§1101 et seq .). The HSA, as modified by the President, transferred administrative authority over immigrationenforcement to the Directorate of Border and Transportation Security. The HSA effectuated thetransfer of immigration authority in statutory language that is separate and apart from the INAitself. (9) According to DHSregulations, all authorities and functions of the DHS to administer and enforce the immigration lawsare now vested in the Secretary of DHS or his delegate. (10) The Attorney General, however, retains concurrent authority inmany key areas of immigration law. Immigration officials possess a wide variety of enforcement mechanisms to carry out theirmission of enforcing the INA. Immigration enforcement activities generally include providingborder security and management; conducting inspections of persons at U.S. international ports;enforcing immigration law; detaining and removing aliens found in violation of immigration andrelated laws; and providing immigration intelligence. Under 8 U.S.C. Â§1225(a)(3), all aliens whoare applicants for admission or are seeking entrance or readmittance to or transit through the UnitedStates shall be inspected by "immigration officers." If the immigration officer is satisfied that theapplicant is entitled to enter, the officer admits the applicant, though his decision may not be finaland the applicant may be subject to other inspections. In the event an alien is "not clearly andbeyond a doubt" (11) entitled to be admitted or further inquiry is required, the applicant may be detained pending a finaldetermination of admissibility by an immigration judge. 8 U.S.C. Â§1225(d) allows immigrationofficers to board any vessel, aircraft, railway car, or other conveyance in which an immigrationofficer believes aliens are being brought into the United States. The term "immigration officer" is statutorily defined in the INA to mean any employee orclass of employees of the INS or of the United States designated by the Attorney General,individually or by regulation, to perform the functions of an immigration officer specified by theINA. (12) DHS, however,has implemented regulations clarifying the meaning of "immigration officer" with respect to DHSpersonnel. The regulation (8 C.F.R. Â§103.1(b)) designates various categories of CBP and ICEofficials as immigration officers authorized to exercise the powers and duties of such officers asspecified by the INA and applicable regulations. The regulation also allows the Secretary of DHSto designate other employees of DHS or of the United States as immigration officers. Section 1357 of Title 8 of the U.S. Code gives any officer or employee of the Service authorized under regulation prescribed by the AG the authority to, without a warrant, interrogatealiens, make arrests, conduct searches, board vessels, and administer oaths. For example, 8 U.S.C.Â§1357(a)(2) authorizes an officer or employee of the INS to arrest without a warrant any alien whoin his presence is entering or attempting to enter the United States in violation of U.S. law regulatingthe admission, exclusion, expulsion, or removal of aliens. Section 1357(a)(3), among other things,authorizes an officer or employee of the INS, without warrant and within a reasonable distance fromany external boundary of the United States, (13) to board and search for aliens any vessel within the territorialwaters of the United States and any railway car, aircraft, conveyance, or vehicle. Sections 1357(a)(4)and (5) authorize officers or employees of the INS to make certain felony arrests. Under 8 U.S.C.Â§1357(c), officers or employees of the INS are authorized to search without a warrant any person(and their effects) seeking entrance into the United States for evidence which may lead to theindividual's exclusion from the country if the officer possesses reasonable cause to suspect thatgrounds exist to deny admission to the United States under the INA. 8 C.F.R. Â§287.5 designates theDHS officers or employees who are authorized to carry out the various law enforcement activitieslisted in Â§1357. Customs Inspections. Formerly located in theDepartment of the Treasury, customs inspectors enforced a number of laws to: ensure all importsand exports comply with U.S. laws and regulations; collect and protect U.S. revenues; and guardagainst the smuggling of contraband. (14) The HSA transferred generally all customs functions (except forcertain revenue functions) to the DHS in Â§403. Customs border activities are now conductedthrough the CBP and interior enforcement activities are carried out by ICE officers. Congress has provided customs with a significant amount of authority to inspect people andmerchandise at ports of entry. Federal authority to assess and collect duties on goods, wares, andmerchandise imported into the country was established in 1789. Additional authority for customsinspections was passed in 1866 (15) but generally derives from the Tariff Act of 1930. (16) Courts haveinterpreted19 U.S.C. Â§1581(a) as granting customs inspectors broad authority to conduct border searches. (17) Section 1581(a) states: Any officer of the customs may at any time go on boardof any vessel or vehicle at any place in the United States or within the customs waters or ... at anyother authorized place ... and examine the manifest and other documents and papers and examine,inspect, and search the vessel or vehicle and every part thereof and any person, trunk, package, orcargo on board, and to this end may hail and stop such vessel or vehicle, and use all necessary forceto compel compliance. Under 19 U.S.C. Â§1461, customs officers may inspect all merchandise and baggage imported orbrought in from any contiguous country at the first port of entry the merchandise or baggage arrives. 19 U.S.C. Â§1467 provides customs officers with authority to inspect and search persons, baggage,and merchandise discharged or unloaded from a vessel that arrives in the United States or VirginIslands (whether directly or via another port or place in the United States or Virgin Islands) from aforeign port, place or Territory or possession of the United States. Congress has granted customsthe authority, under 19 U.S.C. Â§1496, to search the baggage of persons arriving in the United Statesin order to ascertain what articles are contained therein and whether such articles are subject to dutyor prohibited. Pursuant to 19 U.S.C. Â§482, Congress has empowered customs to "stop, search, andexamine" any "vehicle, beast, or person" upon which an officer suspects there is merchandise whichis subject to duty or introduced to the United States contrary to law. Moreover, a customs officermay search any trunk or envelope wherever found, in which the officer has a reasonable belief tosuspect there is merchandise imported contrary to law. Finally, under Â§482, a customs officer may seize and secure for trial any merchandise found on any inspected vehicle, beast, or person, or in anyinspected trunk or envelope, which the officer has reasonable cause to believe is subject to duty orwas introduced unlawfully. Additionally, an officer of customs is authorized to search and conduct document and safetyinspections of any vessel or vehicle inside the United States, within customs waters, (18) or in any other authorizedplace. Customs officials generally may not search on the high seas; (19) however, officers of theCoast Guard, according to 19 U.S.C. Â§1401(i), are deemed to be customs officers (20) and may conductinspections on the high seas. (21) In order to carry out the various inspection provisions, 19 U.S.C.Â§1582 allows the Secretary of the Treasury to prescribe regulations for the search of persons andbaggage. Title 19, Part 162 of the Code of Federal Regulations describes the inspection, search, andseizure procedures for customs and makes all persons coming into the United States from foreigncountries liable to detention and search by authorized officers of the government under suchregulations. The law, however, makes clear that a customs inspection is not required of every piece ofmerchandise, goods or cargo brought into the United States, though there are reporting requirements. In terms of the entry examination for imported merchandise, the statute states that the CustomsService "shall inspect a sufficient number of shipments, and shall examine a sufficient number ofentries, to ensure compliance with the laws enforced by the Customs Service." (22) Agriculture Inspections. Agriculture inspectorsplay an integral part in the Department of Agriculture's role in supplying a safe and affordable foodsupply. In part, the Department of Agriculture's Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service(APHIS) was responsible for enforcing the laws that protect and promote U.S. agricultural healthfrom agricultural pests and diseases by conducting inspections at various ports of entry. Under theHSA, the Secretary of Agriculture's import and entry inspection activities (which are conductedthrough APHIS) relating to the laws specified below have been transferred to the DHS. (23) The Under Secretary forBorder and Transportation Security is responsible for conducting agricultural inspections at ports ofentry in accordance with the regulations, policies, and procedures issued by the Secretary ofAgriculture for the following Acts: (24) The Virus-Serum-Toxin Act (21 U.S.C. Â§Â§151 et seq .); The Honeybee Act (7 U.S.C. Â§Â§281 et seq .); Title III of the Federal Seed Act (7 U.S.C. Â§Â§1581 etseq .); The Plant Protection Act (7 U.S.C. Â§Â§7701 et seq .); The Animal Health Protection Act (7 U.S.C. Â§Â§8301 etseq .); The Lacey Act Amendments of 1981 (16 U.S.C. Â§Â§3371 et seq .);and Section 11 of the Endangered Species Act of 1973 (16 U.S.C.Â§Â§1540). As the previous list demonstrates, agriculture inspectors are responsible for enforcing variousanimal and plant protection laws. In some cases, agriculture inspectors have the authority to conductwarrantless searches of any person or conveyance entering the country in furtherance of those laws. For instance, under the Plant Protection Act and the Animal Health Protection Act, agricultureinspectors have the authority to conduct warrantless searches of any person or vehicle entering theUnited States to determine whether the person is carrying any plant or animal in violation of thestatute. (25) Agricultureinspectors also have the authority under the Lacey Act to detain for inspection any vessel, vehicle,aircraft, or any package, crate, or other container upon the arrival of such conveyance or containerin the United States from any point outside the United States. (26) The Endangered SpeciesAct also allows agriculture inspectors to detain for inspection any package, crate, or other containerand all accompanying documents, upon importation. (27) Although the HSA reorganized the administration of border inspections, it did not makesignificant changes in the policies and practices at the border. Most of the statutory revisions of theinspection process that were aimed at antiterrorism and border security were in place prior to theestablishment of CBP. In part a response to the 1993 World Trade Center bombing, Congress hadalready strengthened the anti-terrorism provisions in the INA and enacted provisions that shiftedimmigration inspectors from the "services" role to the "enforcement" role. (28) In 1996, Congress firstrequired the entry-exit system that is now known as US-VISIT. (29) In 2000 and 2002,Congress revised the plant and animal health protection statutes into a more compactframework. (30) Afterthe September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, Congress enacted further measures aimed at improvingimmigration inspectors' terrorist detection capabilities. (31) Congress also included antiterrorism provisions in legislationreauthorizing the U.S. Customs Service in 2002. (32) CBP inspectors now are tasked with more effectivelyaccomplishing the laws and policies of the legacy agencies. Primary Purpose. Having a visa or other formof travel document does not guarantee admission into the United States. The INA requires theinspection of all aliens who seek entry into the United States; (33) and in some cases allowsfor preinspection when departing a foreign country on route to the United States. (34) The purpose of theinspection is to determine the admissibility of a traveler to the United States. (35) Section 287 of the INAenumerates the following authorities for immigration officers, including immigration inspectors: to question, under oath any person seeking to enter the United States in orderto determine admissibility and, to search, without warrant, the person and belongings of any applicant seekingadmission. (36) In addition to conducting inspections, immigration inspectors enforce various criminal andadministrative statutes, apprehend violators, and adjudicate a variety of applications for variousimmigration benefits. Later in this report, Appendix A presents a sample of the immigrationinspector's workload. Primary Inspections. Primary inspection, the firstlevel of inspection, consists of a brief interview with an immigration inspector, a cursory check ofthe traveler's documents and a query of the Interagency Border Inspection System (IBIS). (37) Primary inspections arequick (usually lasting no longer than a minute); however, if the inspector is suspicious that thetraveler may be inadmissible under the INA or in violation of other U.S. laws, the traveler is referredto a secondary inspection. (38) At 115 airports and 14 seaports, many nonimmigrants areentered into the new US-VISIT system that uses biometric identification (finger scans) to checkidentity and track presence in the United States. (39) Secondary Inspections. During secondaryinspections, travelers are questioned extensively and travel documents are further examined. Severalimmigration databases are queried as well, including lookout databases. (40) The majority of travelers,however, are not subject to a secondary inspection. As Figure 2 later in this report depicts, onaverage less than one percent of all travelers were subjected to secondary inspections betweenFY1998 and FY2002. In addition to an inspector denying entry, an alien can withdraw his application for admissionin some cases. (41) Immigration inspectors take the following factors into consideration when determining if an alienshould be permitted to withdraw his admission application: "the seriousness of the immigration violation; previous findings of inadmissibility against the alien; intent on the part of the alien to violate the law; ability to easily overcome the ground of inadmissibility (i.e., lack ofdocuments); age or poor health of the alien; and other humanitarian or public interest considerations." (42) Although not as frequently used, allowing an alien to withdraw his application for admission permitsthe alien to apply for reentry at some later point without being penalized. Congressional ResearchService's (CRS) examination of INS' Performance Analysis System (PAS) data reveals that prior tothe terrorist attacks, immigration officials were allowing over 60% of inadmissible aliens towithdraw their application for admission. In the years following the terrorist attacks, however, thatfigure dropped to 37% in FY2001 and 34% in FY2002 (see Appendix B ). Expedited Removal. In 1996, Congress enactedthe expedited removal policy. (43) The goal of these provisions was to target the perceived abusesof the asylum process by restricting the hearing, review, and appeal process for aliens at the port ofentry. As a result, if an immigration inspector at the port of entry finds that an alien has arrivedwithout proper documentation, the officer can deny admission and order the alien summarilyremoved from the United States. Those in expedited removal who claim a legal right to reside inthe United States based on citizenship, legal permanent residence, asylee or refugee status are to beprovided with additional procedural protections, rather than being immediately returned. Alienswhose visas have been revoked by Department of State are subject to expedited removal. Theexpedited removal provisions provide very limited circumstances for administrative and judicialreview of those aliens who are summarily excluded or removed. (44) Deferred Inspections. In a small percentage ofcases, usually occurring in connection with arrivals by aircraft, the inspection process can be deferredand the individual referred to an immigration office in the area in which the individual will beresiding. Less than 20,000 travelers were referred to deferred inspections each year, from FY1998through FY2002. Deferred inspections occur when an immediate decision regarding admissibilitycannot be made at the port of entry and the alien does not appear to be in blatant violation ofadmissibility laws. Such cases may involve the review of incomplete documents. Departure Control. Departure control is aninspection of travelers departing Guam, Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands who are en routeto the continental United States. It also applies to crew members en route to the United States. (45) Departure control providesan added level of security to the inspection process because for those cases where the nationalinterest may be at stake, immigration officials can prevent the departure of persons to the UnitedStates. Electronic Passenger Manifest. Severalprovisions in law enacted after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks sought to provide a greaterlevel of border security by requiring airline carriers to provide the Attorney General with electronicpassenger manifests before arriving in or departing from the United States. (46) Passenger manifests aretransmitted to immigration officials through the Advance Passenger Information System (APIS). APIS was created in 1988, cooperatively with the former U.S. Customs Service, the former INS, andthe airline industry, and it is integrated with IBIS. The submission of the passenger manifestselectronically prior to arrival allows immigration officials to perform inspections on travelers inadvance of their arrival. Additionally, necessitated by concerns with respect to security, theEnhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act of 2002 ( P.L. 107-173 ) repealed a provisionthat required airport inspections be completed within 45 minutes of arrival. (47) Automated Inspections. The former INS had aseries of programs collectively referred to as Passenger Accelerated Service System (PortPASS) thatwere transferred to the CBP. PortPASS programs ease commuter traffic at land ports of entry byproviding dedicated commuter lanes to facilitate the speedy passage of low-risk, frequent travelers. Although enrollees in PortPASS are precleared for inspection purposes (i.e., they do not need tointeract with immigration or customs' inspectors at the border), they are subject to random cursorysearches. Although more commonly seen at land ports of entry, (48) A PortPASS program, theINS Passenger Accelerated Service System (INSPASS), is also used at selected international airports. INSPASS applicants must enter the United States on certain nonimmigrant visas (49) or under the Visa WaiverProgram. (50) Thenumber of travelers who took advantage of automated inspections has risen over recent years,peaking at 2.6 million in FY2002. Differences Between the Northern and SouthernBorders. The principal difference between the Northern and Southern borders froman immigration inspections perspective is the documentary requirements. Mexicans are required tohave the proper immigration documents. A special Mexican "laser visa" (formerly known as theMexican Border Crossing Card) is used by citizens of Mexico to gain short-term entry (up to sixmonths) for business or tourism into the United States. It may be used for multiple entries and isgood for at least 10 years. Mexican citizens can get a laser visa from the Department of State (DOS)Bureau of Consular Affairs if they are otherwise admissible as B-1 (business) or B-2 (tourism)nonimmigrants. Canadians, on the other hand, are waived from the documentary requirements. (51) These waivers, includingthe passport requirement, may be made on the basis of unforeseen emergency in individual cases,on the basis of reciprocity with respect to nationals of foreign contiguous territory, and for otherreasons specified in the law. Canadian citizens, except after a visit outside the Western Hemisphere,and American Indians born in Canada having at least 50% American Indian blood, are among thosewho currently are waived from the documentary requirements for admission. (52) In the past, the southwest border received more resources than its northern border counterpartas a result of a multi-year border patrol strategy that was implemented in 1994. The border patrolstrategy was aimed at strengthening enforcement of United States immigration laws and placed anemphasis on decreasing the number of illegal immigrants coming into the United States byincreasing controls at the nation's borders. Although the resources were primarily directed atstrengthening the border patrol along the southwest border, southwest ports of entry also havereceived additional resources aimed at increasing the number of immigration inspectors. Theterrorist attacks, however, brought attention to the northern border, which has historically beenunderstaffed and lacked the necessary infrastructure to adequately screen individuals seeking entryinto the United States. Several pieces of legislation passed in the 107th Congress authorized andappropriated funding for additional staffing and resources along the northern border. (53) Primary Purpose. Customs inspections aim atensuring the efficient flow of legitimate cross-border traffic while simultaneously preventing theentry of illegitimate goods or people into the United States (54) They play a major role infederal efforts to interdict terrorists and their weapons; illegal drugs; and other contraband beingsmuggled into the United States. Customs inspections monitor goods being imported into the UnitedStates, including collection of duties and tariffs. Customs inspections also involve U.S. export law,in part, by interdicting the export of unreported currency from narcotics trafficking and other illicitactivities; preventing international terrorist groups and rogue nations from obtaining sensitive andcontrolled commodities; and interdicting stolen vehicles and other stolen property. The challengefaced by CBP is to achieve a sufficient level of security while not jeopardizing the efficient flow ofcommercial trade at the border. Given this framework it is important to understand that customsinspections serve two different, yet intertwined purposes: border security; and commercial entry. Commercial Import Process. Generally, importedgoods may not legally enter the commerce of the United States until CBP has authorized deliveryof the goods. The commercial import process can be described as a series of steps: entry, inspection,appraisement, and classification and liquidation. For the purposes of this report only the entry andinspection steps will be discussed. Importers or their agents are required to file entry documentation with CBP for eachimportation, regardless of whether duty must be paid on the merchandise. To expedite clearance oftheir goods, importers often file entry documents electronically and pay surety bonds before themerchandise arrives at the port of entry. Most importers choose to hire customs brokers to transacttheir customs-related business. Entry documents include proper bills of lading, entry forms,invoices, and evidence of the right to make entry. Importers or their agents must file entrydocumentation within five working days of the arrival of a shipment at the port of entry. Importersmust then file an entry summary and deposit estimated duties within 10 working days of the time thegoods are entered and released by CBP. Upon arrival at a port of entry, the goods are considered 'imported' and are examined by CBPinspectors for admissibility before being released from CBP custody. CBP inspectors are requiredto examine a sufficient number of shipments and entries of merchandise to determine whether: the merchandise is properly marked to denote country of origin or other specialdesignations required by law; the merchandise or shipment contains prohibitedarticles; the merchandise or goods in the shipment are properly described on theinvoice; an excess or shortage of invoiced merchandise or goods exists;and duty is owed on the imported merchandise or goods. Following examination, CBP typically releases the goods to the importer, usually under bond tocover potentially unpaid duties, taxes and other charges. The amount of duty owed is determinedby tariff classification and valuation of the goods. In a process known as liquidation, CBP inspectorsmake a final calculation of the importer's liability (duties and charges owed). CBP inspectors rely on targeting mechanisms and random inspections to conduct theirinspection operations. CBP uses preclearance, (55) primary inspections, and secondary inspections in order to helpidentify those passengers and cargo considered high-risk from a customs perspective. Cargo Targeting and Inspection. Customs-relatedbusiness is increasingly conducted electronically. Entry documents are often filed electronicallythrough the Automated Broker Interface (ABI). ABI is a part of the Automated Commercial System(ACS) used by Customs to track, control, and process all commercial goods imported into the UnitedStates (56) ABI is avoluntary program available to brokers, importers, carriers, port authorities, and independent servicecenters, that allows qualified participants to file import data electronically with CBP. According toCBP, over 96% of all entries are filed through ABI. (57) The carrier or the shipper (airline, vessel operating company,trucking company, etc.) must also file manifest information with the director of the port where thecargo is entering the United States. The importer or broker uses ABI to file the entry documents, andthe carrier or shipper uses the Automated Manifest System (AMS) to file manifest information. There are several variations or components of AMS: Sea or Vessel AMS, Air AMS, and Rail AMS. There is a varying level of automation with each system. The most automated mode is the VesselAMS, the least automated being the truck system, which does not have a separate AMS module inACS. (58) Once themanifest and the entry documents are filed, they are matched up by ACS. (59) A risk assessment system is employed to focus customs inspections on high risk shipments. The Automated Targeting System (ATS) automatically flags the shipments deemed to be the highestrisks. ATS standardizes bill of lading and entry summary data received from ACS and createsintegrated records called "shipments." These shipments are then evaluated and scored by ATS usingweighted rules derived from the targeting methods of experienced personnel. The higher the score,the more attention the shipment requires, and the greater the chance it will be targeted for secondaryinspection. ATS sorts through records stored in a database containing detailed information on everyshipment that has entered the United States in the past 10 years. According to CBP, all nationalsecurity related targeting using ATS is done at CBP's National Targeting Center (NTC). When ahigh risk shipment is flagged by the NTC, this information (flag) is sent out to the field terminals sothat when an inspector at the border pulls up information on the shipment the flag is displayed andthe inspector will target the shipment for further inspection or review. Customs inspections are dependent on accurate manifest information arriving in a timelymanner in order to execute the risk assessment and targeting procedures before shipments reach theborder. To give inspectors adequate information and time to perform a risk assessment on cargoshipments, legacy Customs published a rule (known as the 24-hour rule) (60) requiring the submissionof certain manifest information to Customs 24-hours in advance of the vessel cargo being laden atthe foreign port. The Trade Act of 2002 ( P.L. 107-210 ), as amended by the Maritime TransportationSecurity Act of 2002 ( P.L. 107-295 ), required CBP to develop rules requiring the electronicsubmission of cargo manifest data. These new rules were published in their final version December5, 2003. (61) The newadvanced electronic manifest rules will require the electronic submission of cargo manifest dataaccording to the following time frames: Vessel -- 24 hours prior to lading in the foreign port; Air -- 'wheels up' or four hours prior to departure for the United States(depending upon where the flight originated); Rail -- two hours prior to arrival in the United States; Truck -- one hour prior to arrival for shipments entered through PAPS or ABI,and 30 minutes prior to arrival for shipments entered through FAST. While the enforcement of these regulations is currently rolling out in phases, the intent is that everyadvance manifest will be run through the ATS at the NTC before each shipment reaches a U.S. portof entry. Modal Differences. While the commercial importprocess is relatively uniform in terms of documentary requirements, differences in the level ofautomation in the AMS system lead to differences across the modes of transportation dependingupon whether the shipment is arriving by truck, railcar or by vessel. As mentioned above, the air,sea, and rail AMS modules are well automated, and thus targeting and commercial processing hasbeen conducted electronically through the process outlined above. Truck cargo entry is the least automated of all the modes and many truck drivers must presentCBP inspectors at the border with paper entry documents as they arrive at the inspection booths. TheCBP inspector reviews these documents, questions the driver, and decides whether or not to directthe truck to secondary inspection. The CBP inspector will collect any owed duties and release thecargo into the United States if he is satisfied with the documentation. ABI is functional at the land border for truck entry, and thus importers or customs brokerscan electronically pre-file entry documentation for truck shipments. Because there is no truck AMSmodule, however, most truck carriers do not file manifest information electronically. Automatedline release programs do exist at the northern and southern borders. For example, the Border ReleaseAdvanced Selectivity System (BRASS) allows drivers to present a pre-assigned bar code, along withthe invoice and manifest. The CBP inspector scans the bar code, verifies that the informationmatches the invoice data, enters the quantity and releases the cargo. The release data is thensubmitted to ACS which establishes an entry and the entry summary requirements, and notifies theABI participant of the release. As part of the Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT, which is discussedlater in this report) and Canada's Partners in Protection programs, the United States and Canadalaunched a bilateral initiative known as Free and Secure Trade (FAST) to establish complimentaryimport/export processes. Under FAST, both countries are working to harmonize their inspection andcommercial operations at the border. Expanding upon earlier initiatives that allow for the electronicsubmission of entry documents and, thus, result in expedited cargo releases, the FAST programallows major importers and their carriers to use dedicated inspection lanes. The electronic cargorelease system currently employed as part of FAST is the National Customs Automated Prototype(NCAP). As a module of the ACS, the Pre Arrival Processing System (PAPS) has been developedto replace NCAP and was brought online in FY2003. PAPS interacts with the Border CargoSelectivity program and the ATS to randomly select cargoes for examination to check forcompliance. The security of cargo containers loaded onto U.S.-bound vessels has been of significantconcern. (62) To beginaddressing this concern, the Container Security Initiative (CSI) was initiated by the former U.S.Customs Service in January of 2002 to "prevent global containerized cargo from being exploited byterrorists." CSI is one of a series of initiatives aimed at securing the supply chain. The rationalebehind CSI is that finding a nuclear weapon or a radiological "dirty bomb" at a U.S. port could betoo late. CSI is based around four core elements: developing criteria to identify high-risk containers; pre-screening high-risk containers at the earliest possible point in the supply chain; using technologyto pre-screen high risk containers quickly; and developing and using smart and secure containers. Under the CSI program, CBP officers are sent to participating ports where they collaborate with hostcountry customs officers to identify and pre-screen high-risk containers using non-intrusiveinspection technology before the containers are laden on U.S. bound ships. CBP has initiallytargeted CSI on the top 20 high-volume ports that account for nearly 70% of all containers shippedto U.S. seaports. As of September 2003, governments representing 19 of these 20 ports had signedagreements to implement CSI; and CSI had actually been implemented in 16. (63) Physical Inspection of Cargo. Cargo shipments maybe targeted or randomly selected for a secondary inspection for both security and trade compliancepurposes. This secondary inspection could involve: a more detailed document check; passing thecontainer through a radiation portal monitor; taking an x-ray or gamma ray image of the contents ofthe container; and/or the physical unloading and examination of the cargo itself. (64) CBP has deployed a number of non-intrusive inspection (NII) technologies at ports of entryto assist customs inspectors with the inspection of cargos. Large scale NII technologies include anumber of x-ray and gamma ray systems. The Vehicle and Cargo Inspection Systems (VACIS),which uses gamma rays to produce an image of the contents of a container for review by the CBPinspector, can be deployed in a mobile or stationary capacity depending upon the needs of the port. CBP has also deployed a rail VACIS system to screen railcars. Other large scale NII systems includetruck x-ray systems, which like the VACIS can be deployed in either a stationary or mobileconfiguration; the Mobile Sea Container Examinations Systems; and the Pallet Gamma Ray System. CBP is also continuing to deploy nuclear and radiological detection equipment including personalradiation detectors, radiation portal monitors, and radiation isotope identifiers to ports of entry. According to recent CBP figures, in FY2003, NII technology was used at ports of entry to conductmore than 4.8 million examinations, which resulted in 2,190 seizures totaling more than 1.1 millionpounds of narcotics. (65) Various canine teams are also deployed at ports of entry to assist in the inspection of cargoand passengers. CBP uses canine teams trained to detect several types of contraband includingnarcotics, explosives, chemicals, and currency. Passenger Targeting and Inspection. Customspassenger inspection is concerned with collecting duties on imported items brought into the countryalong with preventing the entry of contraband. A typical Customs primary inspection consists of aninterview in which individuals may be asked about their citizenship, their trip, and about any goodsthey may be bringing into the country that they did not have when they departed. Individualsentering the United States via land border crossing are required to make a verbal declaration. Individuals arriving in the United States by air or sea are required to fill out a Customs declarationform. These forms are usually provided by the airline or the cruise ship. The Customs declarationform requires individuals to provide certain personal information (e.g., name, date of birth, place andcountry of residence, passport information) and information about the nature of the trip (countriesvisited, airline or cruise ship information, nature of the trip: business or pleasure). The Customsdeclaration form also requires information concerning goods an individual is bringing into thecountry. Duty may be assessed on the value of goods exceeding personal exemption limits. Theprimary inspection for individuals arriving by air or sea will include a review of the Customsdeclaration as a part of the interview process. Based upon the results of the primary inspection, someindividuals may be referred to secondary inspection. Customs inspections are based upon a number of factors (e.g., behavioral analysis,observational techniques, inconsistencies, intelligence information, canine units, x-ray machines, andincidence of a seizure or arrest) to determine which individuals should be targeted for more intensivescrutiny. (66) Thesecondary inspection could involve a more thorough interview and review of identification and traveldocuments, baggage inspections, and under prescribed circumstances personal searches. Customs inspection currently relies on the Advance Passenger Information System (APIS)to screen passenger and crewmember lists prior to their arrival in or departure from the U.S, if theyare arriving by air or sea. At the land border, where Customs inspections do not have advancepassenger information, CBP has deployed license plate readers to assist them in targeting vehiclesand their passengers for additional inspection. (67) For example, when a passenger vehicle approaches a land borderport of entry, license plate readers automatically locate, read and communicate vehicle license platedata to the Treasury Enforcement Communication System (TECS) and the National CrimeInformation Center (NCIC) for possible record matches. (68) The primary inspectors at the port of entry receive instantaneousresponses from TECS. As of September 2003, CBP had installed 201 inbound and 50 outboundlicense plate readers on the southern border; and 104 inbound license plate readers on the northernborder. (69) Smuggling. The primary mission of CBP is toprevent terrorists and terrorist weapons from entering the country. However, other components ofCBP's mission include interdicting other prohibited items such as illegal drugs, ammunition,firearms, and counterfeit goods; and monitoring trade compliance. Theoretically, every person orconveyance crossing the border presents an opportunity for smuggling. The statistics in AppendixC illustrate the aggregate size of the so-called "smuggling window of opportunity." Appendix D provides data on Customs narcotics seizures from FY1997-FY2002. In addition, during FY2002Customs officers made 12,570 arrests, and seized 6.4 million rounds of ammunition, nearly 40thousand firearms, 7.5 million tablets of the drug "ecstasy," over $1.3 million worth of merchandise,and more than $60 million in counterfeit goods. Differences Between the Northern and SouthernBorder. Operational differences between Customs inspections on the northern andsouthern borders arise due to several factors. One is simply the nature of the cross-border traffic thatpredominates at ports of entry along each border. The ports of entry on the southern border mustdeal with a significantly greater amount of pedestrian and personal vehicle traffic than the northernborder; while the northern border contends with considerably more commercial traffic than does thesouthern border. Appendices E and F in this report illustrate these differences. For example, thetotal number of personally operated vehicles entering the United States crossing the southern andnorthern borders for Calendar Year (CY) 2002 was nearly 122.3 million. Of this total 89.8 million,or 73% entered across the southern border, while 32.5 million or 27% entered across the northernborder. Of the 11.3 million freight truck crossings in CY2002, 6.9 million or 61% entered acrossthe northern border, while 4.4 million, or 39% entered across the southern border. Of the 2.4 millionrail freight crossings, 1.8 million or 75% entered across the northern border. Operational differences at the northern and southern borders are also caused by differentlevels of progress that have been made on the bilateral agreements between the United States andCanada and the United States and Mexico. October 2, 2003, a progress report was issued on theUnited States-Canada Smart Border Declaration (signed December 12, 2001). FAST is a jointprogram for low-risk companies that allows for the expedited movement of shipments across thenorthern border in both directions. The United States-Canada Smart Border Declaration alsoincludes other efforts to harmonize commercial processing, conduct clearance operations away fromthe border, develop joint facilities, share customs data, improve container targeting at seaports,address infrastructure improvements, and develop intelligent transportation systems, among others. On March 22, 2002 President Bush and President Fox of Mexico met and endorsed theUnited States-Mexico Border Partnership accord that was signed by Santiago Creel, Secretary ofGovernance, and Colin Powell, Secretary of State. The accord was accompanied by a 22-pointaction plan that included several customs-related items similar to those contained in the UnitedStates-Canada Smart Border Declaration. On April 23, 2003, the Department of Homeland Securityissued a joint statement on progress achieved on the United States-Mexico Border Partnership. (70) Three working groupshave been created to develop and implement initiatives identified in the 22-point plan: the BorderWorking Group, the Enforcement Working Group, and the Technology and Customs ProceduresWorking Group. Another indicator of progress in cooperation is that as of September 2003, FASThas become operational at one commercial crossing along the southern border (El Paso). Primary Purpose. Animal and plant healthinspection contributes to national security by preventing the entry of exotic plant and animal pestsand diseases. Such pests and diseases pose a potential threat to domestic agricultural production,particularly in the fruit, vegetable and livestock sectors. Traditionally, these inspections have dealtwith all possible threats, regardless of whether they are deliberately or accidentally introduced. SinceSeptember 11, 2001, and the anthrax incidents, more attention has been given to preventing entryof agricultural pests and diseases that might be used as bioterrorism or agroterrorism agents againstU.S. agricultural and natural resources. Agricultural inspection occurs at U.S. borders, ports of entry, inland sites, and off-shorelocations. Inspections cover passengers arriving by vehicle, airplane, and ship, cargo andinternational mail, and commercial aircraft, vessels, trucks, and railcars. Inspection methods includehuman sensory examination, X-ray, and detector dog inspection, along with examination ofdocuments accompanying incoming cargo to assure compliance with health and trade agreements. Some agricultural items may be allowed to enter from certain countries but not others. Thesedeterminations are based on scientific risk assessments which are updated regularly using currentlyavailable information. Forbidden fruits and vegetables may harbor a range of invasive plant diseases and pests. Forexample, oranges from certain foreign locations can introduce diseases like citrus canker or pests likethe Mediterranean fruit fly. Similarly, sausages and other meat products from many countries cancontain animal disease organisms that can live for many months and even survive processing. Meatscraps from meals on foreign ships and airplanes could contaminate domestic livestock feed sourcesif not properly disposed of. Foot and mouth disease (FMD), a debilitating livestock disease, can betransmitted on footwear or clothing if passengers passed through FMD-affected areas. Outbreaksof plant and animal diseases can cost millions of dollars to eradicate, jeopardize U.S. agriculturalexports, disrupt domestic food supplies and industries, and erode public confidence in both the safetyof food and the government's ability to safeguard it. The transfer of approximately 2,680 APHIS inspectors to CBP accounts for about two-thirdsof the Agricultural Quarantine Inspection (AQI) program's personnel, and one-third of APHIS' totalstaffing. DHS personnel inspect international arrivals of passengers and their baggage, importedcargo and international package mail, and international conveyances. While combining agriculturalinspections with other border security activities can increase the number of inspectors who canmonitor the border for prohibited agricultural products, it requires diligence to maintain adequateagricultural inspections in light of more general customs and immigration concerns. Inspection Procedures. As with other inspectionfunctions by former Customs and INS personnel, animal and plant health inspectors use a "smartborder" or risk assessment approach to identify which people or containers to inspect. Intelligencebased on documents and advance notice frequently can add security away from the United States andmake the actual border more fluid for legitimate trade and immigration. Passenger Inspection. The passenger inspectionprogram utilizes a uniform inspection process at land, sea, and air ports of entry. Passenger baggageis inspected on a random basis, and also from information that passengers provide on declarationforms. Inspectors also speak with travelers at primary inspection stations to ascertain where theyhave come from and what agricultural and food products they may be carrying. Based on the pointof departure, inspectors judge whether passengers are more likely to be carrying, for example,prohibited fruit, spices, cheese, or meat. All agricultural products are subject to inspection and areconfiscated if they are found to be infested or are prohibited entry due to known pest and diseaserisks. To focus attention on the highest risk passengers, agricultural inspections are coordinatedwith other inspection functions, either physically or through intelligence sharing. Before DHS wascreated, APHIS cooperated with other inspectors through the Border Passenger Processing Initiative. The majority of passengers cleared through the system without delay. APHIS, Customs, INS, andthe State Department examined passenger lists and checked them against past violators and otherdata to determine the most effective targets for inspection. Inspector dog teams (commonly knownas the "beagle brigade") roam the baggage arrival areas and can effectively determine the presenceof agricultural products without opening individual bags. APHIS also uses x-ray technology toquickly screen certain targeted baggage. Pre-clearance of passengers is sometimes more feasible than inspection at ports of entry. Passenger pre-clearance responsibilities were not transferred to DHS. Passengers departing Hawaiiand Puerto Rico for the mainland pass through an APHIS pre-departure inspection. Even though partof the United States with respect to immigration and customs, these offshore locations could presentagricultural threats to the mainland. APHIS also operates passenger pre-clearance programs inBermuda, the Bahamas, Aruba, and at four cities in Canada (Montreal, Toronto, Vancouver, andCalgary). U.S. inspectors pre-clear passengers passing through Canada on their way to the UnitedStates, since Canadian passengers typically would not face the same level of agricultural inspectionat U.S. ports of entry. A pre-clearance program for military passengers expedites the arrival ofsoldiers returning from countries that have pests that could harm domestic agriculture. Cargo Inspection. Cargo shipments are targetedfor efficient inspections based on manifest descriptions of the containers. This assessment occursat ports of entry and, more commonly, at departure ports. Notification while in transit, especiallyfor ships, allows inspectors to target certain shipments upon arrival at port. Inspectors board ships, planes, rail cars, and trucks in order to thoroughly inspect shipments. In some cases, products are off-loaded at secure warehouses for a more thorough "strip-out"inspection. In addition to inspecting agricultural products, inspectors also examine shipments of autoparts or other products arriving in crates or pallets containing solid wood packing material that couldcontain harmful wood-boring pests. USDA personnel also typically oversee, and sometimes carryout, any necessary fumigation of agricultural cargo at ports of entry. In addition to visual, x-ray, and detector dog inspection, APHIS is adapting new technologiesfor finding biological agents in cargo shipments. The Ruggedized Advanced Pathogen IdentificationDevice (RAPID) is a handheld instrument that can identify pathogens in the field within 30 minutesinstead of up to several days in the laboratory. RAPID is currently being tested for possible use atports of entry. Pre-clearance of cargo adds to the security of agricultural inspections and reduces the demandon inspectors at the borders. Commodity pre-clearance activities were not transferred to DHS. Oftenit is more practical and effective to check and monitor commodities for pests or diseases at thesource. The goal is to intercept destructive pests in their native lands before being transported to theUnited States. APHIS has special arrangements with a number of countries and has a corps ofexperts stationed overseas to supplement domestic inspectors. APHIS conducts 35 commoditypre-clearance programs overseas including, for example, mangoes from Mexico, blueberries fromArgentina, bulbs from the Netherlands, and grapes from Chile. Many of the programs are seasonal. Importers pay for pre-clearance through user fees. Some agricultural commodities require inspection only prior to departure for the UnitedStates. Pre-cleared commodities are less likely to require intensive inspections at the port of entry,although they may be subject to random inspection and/or checks to ensure compliance with anyother mitigating steps that were required to take place between the time of the pre-clearanceinspection and arrival at the port of entry. Other commodities, however, require treatment beforethey can be cleared for entry. The most common types of pre-clearance treatments include hot waterimmersion, cold treatment, and fumigation. In addition to traditional cargo, food and garbage from international flights and cruises cancarry pests and diseases that could harm U.S. agriculture. All international trash must be handledand disposed of according to APHIS regulations. Inspectors regularly examine international modesof conveyance and consult with airlines, cruise lines, ship and rail companies to ensure that trash isbeing properly handled and discarded. Problems identified during these inspections can lead tocitations for violations. Smuggling and Trade Compliance. A SmugglingInterdiction and Trade Compliance staff (about 120 people) is part of APHIS' port operationspresence. This team monitors pathways through which prohibited products can enter the UnitedStates and cooperates with law enforcement officials to conduct unannounced inspections "blitzes"at markets, warehouses, and ports of entry. They seize prohibited items and help prosecutesmugglers. In FY2002, the staff seized 6,000 kilograms of prohibited plant products and 9,000kilograms of prohibited animal products. Difference Between Northern and SouthernBorders. Agricultural inspections are generally uniform at the land border crossingswith Canada and Mexico. Many of the pests and diseases of concern to agriculture have potentialpathways into the United States through both the northern and southern borders. For example, whileCanada cannot grow citrus in its colder climate, it does allow imports of tropical fruit from countrieswith known fruit fly populations, and thus is of concern to U.S. agriculture. Other pests and diseases vary between Canada and Mexico and necessitate differentprocedures. For example, live cattle being imported from Mexico are dipped in an insecticide bathprior to entry into the United States to prevent entry of exotic ticks. At the northern border, importsof cattle and beef products currently are prohibited due to BSE (mad cow disease) restrictions. Thesedifferences, however, are based on risk assessments of pest and disease differentials rather than theinherent location of the border. Similar differences in inspections or prohibitions apply to cargo andpassengers arriving from various international locations. While the focus of this report is border inspections, there are a few related policies andprocedures that warrant discussion because they are integral to the CBP inspections process. TheTransportation Security Administration (TSA) has responsibility for aviation security. The USDAretains a key policy role in plant and animal inspections. The Department of State's (DOS) Bureauof Consular Affairs issues the visas that enable foreign nationals to enter the United States. TheDepartment of Health and Human Services (HHS) sets the policies on screening travelers forcommunicable diseases. There are important Customs initiatives that aim to streamline inspectionsby securing the cargo and supply chain. These related policies and procedures are briefly discussedbelow. (71) Aviation Security. Among its many homelandsecurity responsibilities, TSA is the lead agency for airport security, air cargo security, baggagescreening and passenger pre-screening -- duties that extend well beyond the international air portsof entry. Established by legislation passed two months after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks,TSA is now located in BTS alongside CBP. TSA officials state that their first priority is to protectair travelers, and to do so they have set into place a system of reinforcing rings of security to mitigatethe risk of future terrorist or criminal acts. These security measures cover air traffic from curbsideto cockpit, supported overall by intelligence and threat analysis. (72) TSA relies on the Computer Aided Passenger Pre-Screening (CAPPS) system as a threatassessment tool for airline passengers. Since 1996, CAPPS analyzes data on ticket purchasingbehavior to identify air travelers who may pose a threat. The implementation of the secondgeneration, CAPPS II, is caught up in privacy protection and civil liberty concerns. In terms of aircargo, TSA reportedly is designing a random, threat-based, risk-managed freight screening processand continues to develop an automated and enhanced "known" shipper program. TSA estimates that2.8 million tons of cargo transported per year is now secured on passenger planes and 9.7 milliontons on cargo planes. (73) Agencies Conducting Agricultural Inspections. The Agricultural Quarantine Inspection (AQI) program of the USDA Animal and Plant HealthInspection Service (APHIS) is considered the most significant and prominent of agricultural and foodinspections. Because of this prominence, AQI was one of the many programs selected for inclusionwhen the Department of Homeland Security was created. A legislative compromise duringdeliberations on the legislation creating the new department transferred only the border inspectionfunction of APHIS, leaving other activities at USDA as described below. Even though the border inspection function of APHIS has moved to DHS, USDA-APHISretains a significant presence in border inspection activities. The nearly 1,300 AQI employees whowere not transferred continue to conduct certain domestic inspection functions, such as monitoringentry to the mainland from Hawaii and Puerto Rico. They continue to set agricultural inspectionpolicies to be carried out by DHS border inspectors, including determining what agriculturalproducts are allowed to enter the United States and what items are to be denied entry. APHISprovides training to DHS inspectors regarding agricultural inspections, manages the data collectedduring the inspections process, and monitors smuggling and trade compliance. APHIS alsocontinues to pre-clear certain commodities, inspect all imported propagative material, monitoranimals in quarantine, and conduct certain other port activities such as fumigations. To assure thatnecessary agricultural inspections are conducted, APHIS negotiates memoranda of understanding(MOUs) with DHS. Separating duties this way is intended to allow a consolidated border inspection function withcustoms and immigration personnel for intelligence and security goals, but preserves USDA'sexpertise and historical mission to set agricultural import policies to protect American agriculture. While APHIS is responsible for protecting the health of U.S. agriculture, other agencies suchas the USDA Food Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS) and HHS' Food and Drug Administration(FDA) focus on protecting public health. At ports of entry, FSIS and FDA personnel inspectshipments of food and food products imported into the United States from abroad to ensure that thefood and related products meet U.S. standards and do not present any risk to public health. As anexample, AQI personnel may inspect a shipment of sausage casings to ensure that the shipment doesnot pose any animal health risk, while FSIS personnel may inspect the same shipment to ensure thatthe product was prepared in an approved processing facility. The Department of Interior Fish andWildlife Service (FWS) inspects international cargo, baggage, passengers, and mail to enforce U.S.and international laws regarding trade in endangered and protected species. This report is limited,however, to agricultural inspections conducted by DHS and the continuing role of USDA-APHIS. Visa Procedures. Foreign nationals not alreadylegally residing in the United States who wish to come to the United States generally must obtaina visa to be admitted. (74) There are two broad classes of aliens that are issued visas: immigrants and nonimmigrants. (75) The Department of State'sBureau of Consular Affairs (Consular Affairs) is the agency responsible for issuing visas. DHS isresponsible for formulating regulations on visa issuances and may assign staff to consular postsabroad to advise, review, and conduct investigations. (76) DHS's United States Bureau of Citizenship and ImmigrationServices (USCIS) is charged with approving immigrant petitions, a prerequisite for obtaining a visato become a legal permanent resident. (77) The documentary requirements for visas are stated in Â§222 ofthe INA, with some discretion for further specifications or exceptions by regulation, most notablythe Visa Waiver Program. (78) All aliens seeking visas -- prospective immigrants and nonimmigrants -- must undergoadmissibility reviews performed by DOS consular officers abroad. (79) These reviews areintended to ensure that they are not ineligible for visas or admission under the grounds forinadmissibility, which include criminal, national security, health, and indigence grounds as well aspast violations of immigration law. As a result, all aliens arriving with visas have had backgroundchecks. For the past several years, moreover, Consular Affairs has been issuing machine-readablevisas. By October 2004, all visas issued by the United States must use biometric identifiers (e.g.,finger scans) in addition to the photograph that has been collected for some time. (80) Protection Against Communicable Diseases. TheCenters for Disease Control (CDC) in HHS take the lead in protection against communicablediseases at the border. (81) A medical examination is required of all aliens seeking to come as legal permanent residents (LPRs)and refugees, and may be required of any alien seeking a nonimmigrant visa or admission at the portof entry. As noted earlier, an immigration inspection includes a determination of whether the alienis inadmissible due to a health-related condition. The diseases that trigger inadmissibility in the INAare acquired immune deficiency syndrome (AIDS) and those communicable diseases of public healthsignificance as determined by the Secretary of HHS. Those diseases currently barred by regulationare: cholera, diphtheria, infectious tuberculosis, plague, smallpox, yellow fever, viral hemorrhagicfevers (Lassa, Marburg, Ebola, Crimean-congo, South American, and others not yet isolated ornamed), and severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS). Aliens are also required to havevaccinations against vaccine-preventable diseases, including mumps, measles, rubella, polio, tetanus,diphtheria, pertussis, influenza type B and hepatitis B. (82) CDC officials are not present at the border on a day-to-day basis, but there are quarantinestations located in the international airports in New York, Chicago, Miami, Atlanta, Los Angeles,San Francisco, Seattle, and Honolulu. The CDC, through their Division of Global Migration andQuarantine, train CBP inspectors to watch for ill persons and items of public health concern, andthey work with state and local health officials in jurisdictions that may be affected under particularcircumstances. They have been available at the border during immigration emergencies and otherperiods when public health may be threatened. (83) Cargo and Supply Chain Security. In order tomaximize its inspection resources, CBP has launched several initiatives focusing on enhancing thetargeting of high-risk shipments, and securing the entire supply chain from point of origin to finaldestination. One of these initiatives is the Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT). Initiated in April 2002, C-TPAT offers importers expedited processing of cargo if theycomply with CBP requirements for securing their entire supply chain. In order to participate in theC-TPAT, businesses must sign an agreement that commits them to the following actions: conducta comprehensive self-assessment of supply chain security using the C-TPAT security guidelinesjointly developed by CBP and the trade community; submit a supply chain security profilequestionnaire to CBP; develop and implement a program to enhance security throughout the supplychain in accordance with C-TPAT guidelines; communicate C-TPAT guidelines to other companiesin the supply chain; and work toward building the guidelines into relationships with these companies. Border inspections conducted each year number in the hundreds of millions. As Figure 1 depicts, the number of passenger inspections peaked in FY2000. Since immigration and customsinspectors were cross-designated, it appears that an unknown number of passengers were enumeratedin the data of both INS and Customs. Prior to the establishment of CBP, immigration inspectors didmost passenger inspections, followed by customs inspectors. Agricultural inspections were a distantthird, but APHIS still completed 44 million animal and plant inspections of passengers in FY2002. Unlike customs and immigration inspections data, APHIS data enumerate only those passengersreferred to secondary inspections for the purpose of an agricultural inspection. In FY2003, CBPreported that they inspected 412.8 million passengers. Analyses of workload trends prior to the establishment of DHS follow for each major typeof inspection -- immigration, customs, and agricultural inspections. Unless otherwise noted, the dataanalyses are based on data provided by the "legacy" agencies of the U.S. Immigration andNaturalization Service (INS), U.S. Customs Service and U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA). Figure 1. Passenger Inspections, FY1998-FY2002 In FY2000, 534 million travelers were inspected at U.S. ports of entry, a peak year forimmigration inspections. The number declined following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks,reducing the FY2001 total to 511 million and the FY2002 total to 448 million ( Figure 1 ). Thenumber of travelers referred to secondary inspections began to rise in FY2000, peaking at over 10million in FY2002 ( Figure 2 ). As Figure 2 indicates, however, the number of persons denied entryhas held steady from FY1998 to FY2002, during which an average of less than 1% of all travelers(and about 10% of all people referred to secondary) were denied entry. Figure 2. Immigration Inspections: Secondary Referrals and Denials Although the primary mode of travel into the United States is through land ports of entry, airand sea ports of entry have their share of travelers seeking entry into the country. Collectively, landports of entry in Texas and California led all other states with respect to the number of travelersinspected ( Figure 3 ). With respect to air ports of entry, New York, Miami and Los AngelesInternational Airports accounted for 32% of all inspections in FY2002 ( Figure 4 ). Sea ports of entryaccount for the smallest percentage of travelers seeking entry into the United States. Land Ports of Entry. The majority of travelers(approximately 80%) enter the United States at a land port of entry. Land ports of entry are oftenreferred to based on their geographic proximity to the northern or southwest border. Over the years,the southwest border has seen the highest volume of travelers seeking entry into the United States,as Figure 3 illustrates. Three southwest ports of entry made up five of the busiest ports of entrybetween FY1998 and FY2002. Those southwest ports of entry -- located in Texas, California andArizona -- accounted for over 70% of all inspections at the five busiest land ports of entry inFY2002. Figure 3. Top Five Busiest Land Ports of Entry by State CBP inspectors at land ports of entry must be cognizant of individuals attempting to smuggleillegal aliens into the country. (84) In FY2002, a little over 68,000 illegal aliens were caught beingsmuggled into the United States at land ports of entry, primarily along the southwest border. (85) Air Ports of Entry. In FY2002 air ports of entryaccounted for 15% of travelers who sought entry to the United States. Although the number ofpersons seeking entry at air ports of entry is relatively small in comparison to land ports of entry, theinspection process can be more complicated due to the diverse population seeking admission to theUnited States. As Figure 4 illustrates, California's airports had the largest volume of immigrationinspections, from FY1998 to FY2002, followed closely by Florida and New York. Texas held steadyat fourth place with Illinois and New Jersey competing for fifth place. Figure 4. Top Five Busiest Immigration Airports of Entry by State Prior to passage of IIRIRA, which mandated the DOJ to develop an automated entry and exitdata system to replace the manual system, (86) immigration inspectors at air ports of entry have long collectedthe I-94 form from aliens. The I-94 form is usually given to aliens while in transit to the UnitedStates and contains information such as the alien's identification and an address where the alien willbe staying while in the United States. After reviewing the alien's travel document and interviewingthe alien, the immigration inspector determines how long the alien can stay in the United States. Thelength of stay and immigration classification, both determined by the immigration inspector, isevident on a completed I-94 form. The information on the I-94 form is later put into theNon-Immigrant Information System (NIIS). (87) Although the I-94 form is routinely collected at air ports of entry,reportedly it is rarely collected upon exit. At this point it is not clear how the implementation ofUS-VISIT will affect NIIS and the use of the I-94 forms. Sea Ports of Entry. Immigration statistics for seaports of entry are separated into two categories: seaports and cruise ships. The two categories arefurther divided to reflect the number of U.S. citizens, aliens and crew personnel that were inspected. The majority of vessels are passenger cruise ships, mainly consisting of U.S. citizens. Similar toaliens entering the United States at an air port of entry, aliens who seek entry at a seaport mustsubmit an I-94 form prior to arrival at a sea port of entry. In FY2002, inspections at seaports and oncruise ships accounted for less than 1% of all travelers seeking entry into the United States. Floridaconsistently ranks as the state with the largest volume of immigration inspections at seaports. Figure 5. Top Five Busiest Sea Ports of Entry by State Inspection of Alien Crew Members. Alien crewmembers are inspected at air ports of entry usually at a separate location from the general public. According to INS Inspector's Field Manual, "at air ports of entry it is the general practice to expeditethe admission of arriving crewmen." With respect to sea ports of entry, alien crew members arrivingon vessels, like alien passengers, must submit an I-94 form prior to arrival at a sea port of entry. In FY2002, customs inspectors processed the importation of cargo valued at $1,183 billion,with most of the cargo (11.2 million conveyances) arriving by truck. Railcars (2.4 millionconveyances in FY2002) were the second most used conveyance, followed by vessels (0.2 millionconveyances in FY2002). Those vessels, however, include multiple cargo containers (7.3 millionin FY2002). Figure 6 illustrates the volume of cargo processed by the U.S. Customs Service forFY1998-FY2002. Appendix D provides more detail on the data presented in Figure 6 . Data on the number of cargo containers physically inspected by CBP were not available forinclusion in this report. The Commissioner of CBP, Robert Bonner, testified that two years ago that9% of rail containers, 2% of sea containers, and 10.3% of trucks entering the United States wereinspected either intrusively or non-intrusively. According to his testimony these numbers currentlystand at 22.6% of rail containers, 5.2% of sea containers, and 15.1% of trucks entering the UnitedStates. Commissioner Bonner testified that across all modes of transportation CBP is currentlyinspecting approximately 12.1% of all cargo containers entering the United States; up fromapproximately 7.6% two years ago. (88) Figure 6. Customs Cargo Processed by Type of Conveyance Cargo Inspections at Airports. Customsprocessed approximately 770,000 commercial aircraft, and approximately 210,000 private aircraftin FY2002, as noted in Appendix D . According to data from the Airports Council International, thetop ten United State airports by volume of international cargo for FY2002 were: Memphis (MEM),Los Angeles (LAX), Anchorage (ANC), Miami (MIA), New York (JFK), Louisville (SDF), Chicago(ORD), Indianapolis (IND), Newark (EWR), and Atlanta (ATL). Cargo Inspections at Seaports. In FY2002,Customs processed 7.3 million vessel cargo containers. Appendix C provides port level data forthe top 10 U.S. Container Ports from 1995-2002. In FY2002, the top 10 U.S. Container Portsaccounted for 84% of the total volume of 20-foot equivalent units (TEU's) moving through all U.S.seaports. Los Angeles handled the highest volume of TEU's, accounting for 21% of the total. Cargo Inspections at Land Ports. As discussedearlier, over 11 million trucks carrying cargo were processed by customs inspectors. In FY2002, thebusiest land port was Detroit, Michigan, with 1.7 million trucks crossing accounting for 24% of thetruck crossings at the northern border. Laredo, Texas, was the busiest POE for truck crossing alongthe southern border, with 1.4 million truck crossings. Northern POEs overall handled more truckcrossing than southern POEs, and Figure 7 illustrates the number of truck crossings at the northernand southern border for FY2000-FY2002. Appendices F and G include data on the total numberof trucks processed by Customs for FY1997-2002. Figure 7. Trucks Conveying Cargo, 2000-2002 In FY2002 Customs processed 2.4 million railcars. As indicated by Figure 8 , which depictsrailcar crossings at the northern and southern border for FY2000-FY2002, most of the railcarcrossing were with Canada. The data, tabulated by Bureau of Transportation Statistics, include bothloaded and unloaded railcars. For FY2002 the top five ports accounted for 72% of total railcarcrossings along the northern border. At the southern border, the top five ports accounted for 98%of the total crossings. Appendices F and G include data on the total number of railcars processedby Customs for FY1997-FY2002. Figure 8. Railcars Conveying Cargo, 2000-2002 Inspection Statistics. APHIS collects data on theinspections process through its Work Accomplishment Data System (WADS). Three types ofstatistics are particularly important for assessing the inspections process. (1) An inspection is asecondary level interview of a person or examination of his/her baggage based on entrancedocuments, detector dog identification, or random selection at a primary inspection station. X-rayor visual examination of baggage contents may occur. For cargo and international mail, aninspection occurs when the shipment is opened or x-rayed. (2) An interception is the identificationof items having quarantine significance that may be confiscated or transferred to another APHISfacility for subsequent evaluation or treatment, depending on the cargo. (3) A violation is countedwhen goods are found to be misrepresented on documents, import rules were violated, or items wereotherwise attempted to be smuggled. Ships or aircraft can incur violations for not following certainarrival procedures or for improper handling of garbage. Since APHIS uses a targeted inspection approach, it may be somewhat misleading to presenta ratio of goods or people inspected from the entire pool of international arrivals. The actualpercentage of all entries inspected would appear unusually small since only higher-risk entrants areinspected. By using intelligence and risk assessment models, the subset of passengers or goodstargeted for inspection should have notably higher rates of interceptions and violations than the entirepool of arrivals. Also, preclearance of certain cargo shipments removes another subset of importsfrom the same need for inspection at ports of entry. Finally, because APHIS tabulates cargoinspection statistics by bill of lading rather than by weight or value, an overall ratio of goodsinspected is infeasible to compute and would lack meaning. Thus, the percentages presented beloware interceptions or violations among the subset chosen for inspection. In general, about 2%-3% of passengers who are targeted for inspection are found carryingitems of quarantine significance (counted as interceptions). Only 1%-2% of inspected cargoshipments are found with such items, but the figure is higher for international mail (3%-8%). Theseresults are in line with APHIS' goals for the inspection program. Interception figures are higher forcertain modes of conveyance, especially for aircraft. Nearly half of inspected aircraft haveintercepted items, while 15% of inspected ships and 12% of inspected vehicles contain intercepteditems. Appendices H and I contain inspection statistics compiled by APHIS upon request for thisreport. Figure 9. Agricultural Inspections, FY1998-FY2002 Passengers. In FY2002, APHIS reported that 69million maritime, land border, and airline passengers entering the United States were subject toinspection. Of this number, APHIS actually inspected 33.8 million passengers and made 890,000interceptions of quarantine significance. The interception rate of 2.6% is fairly low, because of thetargeted nature of the inspections process. Nearly 13,000 inspections resulted in violations. Boththe interception rate and the violation rate have been declining slightly since 1998. Pre-clearance of passengers prior to departure supplements inspections at the border. InFY2002, APHIS conducted pre-clearance inspections of over 10.5 million passengers, including 1.5million passengers departing Hawaii and Puerto Rico for the mainland. The rate of interceptions inthe pre-clearance program (about 2%) is less than that for passenger inspections at ports of entry. This is likely due to the selected number of departure points having pre-departure programs andtheir below-average risk profile (such as Hawaii, Puerto Rico and Canada). Cargo and International Mail. Working withCustoms to target shipments for more efficient inspection, APHIS inspected 953,000 cargoshipments (bills of lading) in FY2002. The number of inspections has risen by nearly a third since1998, although the ratio of interceptions has remained fairly constant and generally under 3%. Violations doubled between 1998 and 2002, although the ratio is very small at one-twentieth of 1%percent. Figure 10. Agricultural Inspections by Type of Conveyance Inspections of international mail for agricultural pests and diseases has remained nearly levelsince 1998, with about 420,000 inspections in FY2002. The interception and violation rates arehigher than those for cargo, with 8.2% of inspected mail packages containing items of quarantinesignificance in 2002. This figure, however, is noticeably higher than in previous years and may notnecessarily reflect a trend. Ships, Aircraft, Vehicles, and Railcars. Inaddition to inspections of passengers and cargo, the mode of conveyance is also subject toagricultural inspection. In FY2002, APHIS inspected 64,000 ships, a similar number to previousyears. Fifteen percent resulted in interceptions, up from 9% in 1998, sometimes for improperhandling of garbage and waste within U.S. boundaries. The number of aircraft inspected in FY2002 was 423,000, up by 12% since 1998. The rateof agricultural pest interceptions for aircraft is very high compared to other types of agriculturalinspection. In FY2002, nearly half of inspected aircraft were found with items of quarantinesignificance, although this incidence has fallen steadily from 91% in 1998. As with the statistics forships, improper handling of garbage originating from a foreign source that could harbor forbiddenagricultural products or pests frequently contributes to the high rate positive findings. Inspections of vehicles, buses and rail cars entering the United States from Canada andMexico increased 60% from 1998 to 2002. In FY2002, APHIS conducted 2.9 million suchinspections and made 341,000 interceptions. The interception rate has fallen slightly from 15% in1998 to 12% in 2002. Border inspections are funded through a combination of federal discretionary appropriationsand user fees. For FY2004, CBP was given budget authority of $2,496 million for border security,inspections, and trade facilitation at POEs. CBP has requested $2,724 million for FY2005. TheHouse passed H.R. 4567 , the FY2005 DHS Appropriations Act, would provide $5.1billion for CBP. The Senate bill, S. 2537 as reported, would provide $5.0 billion forCBP. (89) This sectionof the report analyzes funding trends and staffing for the three functions prior to their merger intoCBP. These historic funding data are not comparable across agencies and, as noted below, mayinclude activities in addition to the inspection functions. As a result, the funding and staff datapresented below cannot be summed into total spending for inspections. Table 1. Inspections Staff for All Locations,FY2001-FY2004 Source: CRS presentation of CBP Field Operations data as of Jan. 10, 2004. Comparable data onagriculture inspections staff were not provided for FY2001 and FY2002. CBP's Office of Field Operations, however, has provided data on inspections staff that aredistinct from full-time equivalent (FTE) staffing used in budget and appropriations documents. As Table 1 presents, the overall number of inspectors grew from FY2001 through FY2003. As Table1 and the subsequent analysis reveals, there have been more customs inspectors than immigrationand agricultural inspectors combined over the period analyzed in this report. Prior to the transfer of the former INS to DHS, Congress funded the agency from severalsources. Funding for salaries and expenses was appropriated from general revenues, off-setting feereceipts, and the Violent Crime Trust Fund (VCTF). (90) Specific funding for the agency's construction projects wasappropriated from a construction account. The former INS' immigration appropriations account wasdivided between the agency's two main functions, immigration adjudications and services and enforcement and border affairs . The budget authority column in Table 2 represents the inspectionactivity of the former INS, but comparisons over time are limited due to the inclusion of funding forthe border patrol in the FY2001 and FY2002 budget figures. Nonetheless, funding for immigrationinspections had risen in the late 1990s. Table 2. Immigration Inspections Budget Source: Table prepared by CRS based on data from INS FY1999-FY2002 Congressional Budgetsand various Appropriations Acts (see below). a. The figure includes funding for the border patrol and inspections activities. b. The figure reflects what was enacted and the Counterterrorism Supplemental funding. The user fee account, which provided most of the funding for immigration inspections,includes a levy on aliens seeking entry into the United States on an international flight. (91) The user fee account alsoincludes the Land Border Inspection Fee, which levies a user fee for inspection services at land portsof entry and dedicated commuter lanes that are used by prescreened U.S. citizens and certain aliens(see discussion on Automated Inspections above). Fees are also generated through fines leviedagainst airlines and other carriers for not complying with immigration regulations. Immigrationinspections also drew on monies generated by the Examinations Fee Account, which is collected tocover the processing and adjudication of immigrant, nonimmigrant, refugee, asylum, and citizenshipbenefits. (92) Theconstruction account included appropriations for construction projects for the entire agency. As with immigration inspections, Customs activities are funded by direct appropriations andby fee revenue. Prior to the transfer of the U.S. Customs Service to DHS, Congress funded Customsactivities from several sources and into several different accounts. Most Customs funding wasappropriated into the Salaries and Expenses account, which in turn was allocated into two budgetactivities: commercial activities, and drug and other enforcement activities. The Customs inspectionfunction falls into commercial activities, and Table 3 reports Customs budget and staffing resourcesdevoted to the commercial activities from FY1998 to FY2002. Table 3. Budget Authority for Customs CommercialActivities Source: U.S. Customs Service, Budget Justifications, FY1999-FY2003 . a. FY2002 Commercial Activity Appropriation and FTEs are estimates contained within theFY2003 justification material. Final published FY2002 numbers were not available due tothe changes to the FY2004 budget justification materials reflecting the realignment of thelegacy Customs, INS, and APHIS in CBP. The off-setting receipt revenue generated from user fees is an important source of fundingfor customs inspections. (93) The Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985(COBRA '85; P.L. 99-272 ) established fees for inspection-related service. The COBRA fees arecomprised of eight separate user fees levied on passengers, conveyances, and brokers. (94) COBRA fee receipts arenot appropriated for obligation by Congress, but they are available to CBP for expenditure each year. COBRA fee receipts amounted to $271 million in FY2002, and are estimated to amount to $288million in FY2003. (95) The authorization to charge COBRA fees expires March 1, 2005. (96) CBP also collects merchandise processing fees (MPF) to offset the cost of processingformally entered imported merchandise. MPF collections were authorized by the Omnibus BudgetReconciliation Act of 1986 (COBRA '86; P.L. 99-509 ), and unlike COBRA fee receipts, MPF feesare appropriated for obligation by Congress. MPF receipts amounted to $955 million in FY2002,and are estimated to amount to $1,022 million in FY2003. (97) Authorization to chargeMPF also expires March 1, 2005. Agricultural animal and plant health inspections are funded through a combination of federalappropriations and user fees. Primary funding comes from user fees levied on international airpassengers and aircraft, as well as commercial aircraft, vessels, trucks and railcars. User fees havebeen authorized since 1990. These user fees support more than the border inspection functionstransferred to DHS and continue to be collected by USDA to carry out inspection-related activitiesin general. USDA will transfer funds periodically from the user fee account to cover DHS-relatedcosts. User fees are not collected, however, for any passengers or cargo entering from Canada. Pedestrians and vehicles entering from Mexico are also exempt from paying the user fees. Appropriated funding supports these activities, due in part to the logistics of collecting user fees atthese high-volume ports of entry. Appropriations also fund pre-departure inspections of passengersand cargo from Hawaii and Puerto Rico to the mainland. Table 4 indicates that 80%-85% of the funding for AQI has come from user fees. Fundinglevels grew by nearly 90% in nominal dollars from FY1998 to FY2002, and staffing levels grew bynearly 43%. The number of canine inspection teams more than doubled between 1998 and 2002,and has since increased to 110 in March 2003. Table 4. APHIS Agricultural Quarantine Inspection: Budget andStaffing Source: USDA-APHIS. The breadth of the AQI inspection and monitoring function is reflected by the dispersion ofstaff. In FY2002, 48 states had AQI personnel, although 19 states had fewer than 10 peopleassigned. The top five states in terms of the number of agricultural inspectors during FY2002included Florida (658), California (430), Hawaii (411), Texas (340), and New York (196). Thesefive states accounted for two-thirds of the AQI staffing total and have retained this ranking since atleast 1998. These states also accounted for two-thirds of the number of canine inspection teams. The top ten local offices of agricultural inspectors included Miami (325), Honolulu (230),Los Angeles (163), the Citrus Canker Project (150), New York City/JFK Airport (149), SanFrancisco (107), Chicago/O'Hare Airport (84), Elizabeth, NJ (80), Kahului-Maui (80), and Houston(70). These 10 offices accounted for nearly half of the FY2002 staffing level, and just over half ofthe canine inspection teams. As discussed above, CBP inspectors are charged with enforcing a host of laws andconducting hundreds of millions of inspections annually. When Congress enacted HSA, it kept theU.S. Customs Service intact and created the Bureau of Border Security to oversee immigrationinspections, the border patrol, and interior immigration enforcement activities. As provided for inHSA, the Administration opted to reorganize the major border inspections functions into CBP. Overthe past year since CBP was established, a variety of issues and concerns have emerged. This reportconcludes with discussions of selected policy, administrative, and constitutional considerations, anda few overarching questions. Competing Mandates. Tension exists betweenthe need to conduct thorough inspections searching for terrorists, weapons of mass destruction,illegal drugs and weapons, unauthorized aliens and improperly entered commercial goods, and theneed to process passenger and cargo inspections efficiently so as not to impede the flow of travel,trade, and tourism. One dramatic illustration of the effect that increased inspections can have on theflow of trade at the border occurred in the immediate aftermath of the September 11, 2001 terroristattacks. The wait time for trucks crossing the border was nearly 12 hours at some ports of entry. Theland border between United States and Canada was nearly closed, and as a result, some U.S. autoplants began to shut down due to lack of parts. (98) While most observers acknowledge that inspectors should strike a balance of their competinggoals, some warn that CBP inspectors are too concerned about facilitating trade and travel toscrutinize passengers and goods thoroughly. Critics cite the percentages of cargo inspected (22.6%of rail containers, 5.2% of sea containers, and 15.1% of trucks) and the brevity of the averageprimary immigration inspection (reportedly 45 seconds) as indications that the current inspectionsprocess is inadequate. Others maintain that CBP inspections are now conducted with much more sophistication,drawing on the combined knowledge and experience of the agriculture, customs and immigrationinspections processes. They assert that the development of analytical targeting units, whichemphasize high-risk passengers, conveyances, and cargo, is protecting border security while enablingthe smooth flow of goods and people. Targeting High-Risk Shipments. CBP's abilityto successfully target high-risk containers (a cornerstone of the CSI program) is dependent uponinformation regarding which containers are most likely to contain contraband. The rationale behindthe advance cargo manifest rules is to provide CBP with the necessary information it needs toconduct its targeting operations. While many observers note the importance of the development ofsophisticated targeting mechanisms and the significant progress CBP has made in collecting advancemanifest information, others have raised concerns. One issue is the use of the cargo manifest as the primary document by which CBP gathersinformation and conducts risk assessments on cargo shipments destined for the United States. Thecargo manifest has traditionally been used for commercial compliance purposes and has beencharacterized by some as error prone. Some have expressed concern that it may not contain thenecessary information (such as transshipment information) to conduct the security screeningcurrently being carried out by CBP. (99) Also, recent GAO testimony has raised concerns regarding CBP's targeting operations. GAOcredits CBP with establishing the National Targeting Center, promulgating regulations to improvethe quality and timeliness of cargo data, refining its targeting system, and instituting a nationaltraining program for personnel conducting targeting operations. However, GAO noted that whileCBP's targeting strategy incorporated some elements of risk management, it lacked a comprehensiveset of criticality, vulnerability, and risk assessments and does not follow certain recognized modelingpractices. (100) Screening Aliens at the Border. Since theSeptember 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, considerable concern has been raised because the 19 terroristswere aliens who apparently entered the United States legally on temporary visas. Although the INAbars terrorists, consular officers issuing the visas and immigration inspectors working at the bordersdid not have access to all the law enforcement and intelligence data that might identify potentialterrorists. Congress has enacted major laws requiring information sharing and interoperabledatabases to screen potential terrorists and criminal aliens, the most recent being the EnhancedBorder Security and Visa Reform Act of 2002. Whether these provisions are being successfullyimplemented remains an important policy question. (101) Last fall, the Administration announced the creation of the Terrorist Screening Center (TSC)to consolidate the various watchlists into a single terrorist screening database. (102) Recently, the directorof TSC, Donna Bucella, testified about the progress made in developing an unclassified lawenforcement sensitive database, containing identifying information of known or suspected terrorists.Some observers point out that no government-wide standards on how individuals get placed on orremoved from watchlists have been established, fueling civil liberty concerns. Some have alsowarned that the lack of clearly designated roles and responsibilities for TSC, Foreign TerroristTracking Task Force (FTTTF), the Terrorist Threat Integration Center (TTIC), the CounterterrorismCenter and other antiterrorist- related entities continue to foster turf battles and plague efforts to haveeffective information sharing. (103) While US-VISIT, the automated entry and exit data system, has been much heralded as a toolto enhance border security, critics question how many terrorists it will identify and whether it willeffectively track the entry-exit of suspicious foreign nationals. (104) Some have expressedconcern that most Canadians, the 6.4 million Mexicans with border crossing cards, and the 13-18million foreign nationals who enter through the Visa Waiver Program (VWP) have not been part ofUS-VISIT, thus establishing a variety of avenues for potential terrorists and criminals to eludedetection through US-VISIT's biometric background checks. The recent announcement to addforeign nationals who enter through VWP to US-VISIT may assuage some of these concerns aboutthe inclusiveness of US-VISIT, but does not resolve the issue that the nations participating in VWPare not expected to meet the program's October 1, 2004 deadline for biometric machine-readablepassports. (105) While almost all observers agree that the implementation of US-VISIT has proven to bechallenging, especially at land ports of entry, many express confidence that it will ultimately besuccessful. Administration officials cite the number of aliens apprehended or denied entry as theresult of the National Security Entry Exit Registration System (NSEERS) and the ConsolidatedConsular Data systems (CCD), (106) two systems that US-VISIT builds on, as evidence thatUS-VISIT can achieve its objectives. Recently the Administration reported that 100 aliens had "hits"on the biometrics in US-VISIT. (107) 9/11 Commission Recommendations. TheNational Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (also known as the 9/11Commission) issued several recommendations that directly pertain to inspection policies at theborder. (108) Theserecommendations underscore the urgency of implementing legislative provisions Congress enactedseveral years ago, as well as suggest areas in which Congress may wish to take further action. Thespecific recommendations are: Targeting travel is at least as powerful a weapon against terrorists as targetingtheir money. The United States should combine terrorist travel intelligence, operations, and lawenforcement in a strategy to intercept terrorists, find terrorist travel facilitators, and constrain terroristmobility. The U.S. border security system should be integrated into a larger network ofscreening points that includes our transportation system and access to vital facilities, such as nuclearreactors. The Department of Homeland Security, properly supported by the Congress,should complete, as quickly as possible, a biometric entry-exit screening system, including a singlesystem for speeding qualified travelers. (109) Other 9/11 Commission recommendations, notably those related to intelligence policy and structures,have been the focus thus far of congressional consideration and media attention. The 9/11Commission prepared a subsequent report that deals expressly with immigration issues. (110) Legislation implementing the 9/11 Commission recommendations ( S. 2845 , H.R. 10 , S. 2774 / H.R. 5040 and H.R. 5024 ) hadvarious provisions affecting border inspections. (111) H.R. 10, the 9/11 RecommendationsImplementation Act, as amended and passed by the House on October 8, 2004, and S.2845, the National Intelligence Reform Act of 2004, as amended and passed by the Senateon October 8, 2004 were the competing bills as the 108th Congress drew to a close. H.R. 10 as passed, S. 2845 as passed, S. 2774 / H.R. 5040 and H.R. 5024 all would hasten the development andinstallation of a biometric entry and exit data system that is integrated with various databases anddata systems that process or contain information on aliens, and would apply a system of biometricidentifiers uniformly across agencies and governments. H.R. 10 as passed, S.2845 as passed, S. 2774/H.R. 5040 and H.R. 5024 wouldrequire the Secretary of Homeland Security (Secretary) to develop and implement a plan to expeditethe processing of registered travelers through a single program (current registered traveler programsinclude NEXUS and the Secure Electronic Network for Travelers' Rapid Inspection (SENTRI)). Thebills would further require the Secretary to review and evaluate existing programs that expeditetravel and increase research and development efforts to accelerate the development andimplementation of a single program. The bills would also require the registered travelers programto be integrated into the entry and exit data system and would authorize DHS to improve the securityof passports and other travel documents, including through the strengthening of securityrequirements for documents that may be used to attain passports or other travel documents. In addition, H.R. 10 as passed would expand pre-inspection programs in foreigncountries and assistance to air carriers at selected foreign airports in the detection of fraudulentdocuments; would limit the President's ability to waive general statutory requirements for U.S.citizens traveling abroad or attempting to enter the United States to bear a valid U.S. passport, so thatsuch a waiver can only be exercised with respect to U.S. citizens traveling to or from foreigncontiguous territories who are bearing identification documents designated by DHS as (1) reliableproof of U.S. citizenship, and (2) of a type that may not be issued to an unlawfully present alienwithin the United States; and would amend the present waiver authority concerning documentrequirements for arriving nationals from foreign contiguous countries or adjacent islands, so thatsuch waivers may only be granted (in non-emergency situations) through a joint determination bythe Secretary of DHS and Secretary of State on the basis of reciprocity, and then only if the arrivingforeign national is in possession of identification documents deemed secure by the Secretary of DHS. The National Intelligence Reform Act of 2004 (P.L.108-458). The compromise version of S. 2845 that ultimately wasenacted into law, included some -- but not all -- of the border inspections provisions in both theHouse and Senate versions of S. 2845 . Foremost, P.L. 108-458 requires accelerated deployment of the biometric entry and exitsystem to process or contain certain data on aliens and their physical characteristics. The Act alsoexpands the pre-inspection program that places U.S. immigration inspectors at foreign airports,increasing the number of foreign airports where travelers would be pre-inspected before departureto the United States. Moreover, it requires individuals entering into the United States (including U.S.citizens and visitors from Canada and other Western Hemisphere countries) to bear a passport orother documents sufficient to denote citizenship and identity. The Act requires improvements in technology and training to assist consular and immigrationofficers in detecting and combating terrorist travel. It (1) establishes the Human Smuggling andTrafficking Center, which includes an interagency program devoted to countering terrorist travel;(2) requires the Secretary of Homeland Security, in consultation with the Director of the NationalCounter Terrorism Center, to establish a program to oversee DHS's responsibilities with respect toterrorist travel; and (3) establishes a Visa and Passport Security Program within the Bureau ofDiplomatic Security at the Department of State. Adequacy of Infrastructure. The FY2000Treasury-Postal Appropriations Act ( P.L. 106-58 ) required Customs, in consultation with theGeneral Service Administration (GSA) and the federal inspection service agencies, to assessinfrastructure needs on the northern and southwestern borders of the United States This studyidentified 822 projects at a projected cost of approximately $784 million. (112) Meanwhile, theTransportation Equity Act for the 21st Century ( P.L. 105-178 ) established the Coordinated BorderInfrastructure (CBI) program to "improve the safe movement of people and goods" across theborders with Canada and Mexico. Although CBI allows for funding of non-transportation projects,financing projects aimed at customs and immigration enforcement functions at the borders hasproven controversial because many supporters of CBI assert it should be used for transportationprojects. (113) The current infrastructure at most U.S. ports of entry, many warn, is not sufficient toaccommodate the demands of the automated entry and exit data system, US-VISIT. Thoseconcerned about infrastructure point out that in order to record the departure of every alien leavingthe United States through a land port, there need to be sufficient lanes, staff, and resources. According to some observers, additional lanes may be necessary at many land ports of entry toaccommodate the large number of individuals seeking entry into the United States. Some alsoexpress concern that the current infrastructure at air ports of entry may not be sufficient toaccommodate US-VISIT when it is fully operational. Although federal immigration inspectors havea presence at selected airports, the space that is occupied by them is not federally owned. Airportshave limited space and may not have additional resources to fund new construction. Some contendthat this could lead to significant delays as travelers try to make their way through ports of entry.Others maintain that as the technologies used at the border become more sophisticated and efficient,concerns about long lines and delays will abate. Infrastructure limitations, they assert, will beresolved by the time US-VISIT is fully implemented. (114) Inter-Agency and Inter-Department Coordination. Cooperation between CBP and other agencies is critical to the success of CBP's mission. Thisnecessity is highlighted by the recent spate of new regulations that have been promulgated by severalagencies charged with border security related activities. One example concerns advance notificationrequirements. While CBP is completing its rulemaking regarding electronic advanced manifestsubmissions, the FDA has promulgated advance notification regulations pertaining to certain foodimports. (115) TheFDA advance notice rules have different time frames from those being considered by CBP. TheFDA rules require electronically filed and complete notice before the shipment arrives at the firstU.S. port: no more than five days, and no less than eight hours for food arriving bywater; four hours for food arriving by air or by rail; and two hours for food arriving by truck. At this time, it is unclear as to how the two sets (FDA and CBP) of advanced notice requirementswill be integrated. The FDA rules indicate that importers or their agents must submit their advancenotice using CBP's ABI or ACS systems. Those food importers without ABI or ACS access will useFDA's Prior Notice (PN) System Interface. According to the FDA rule, the Commissioners of FDAand CBP will publish a plan detailing the integration and partial harmonization of these rules. Another example of the importance of inter-agency cooperation is evidenced in the variousfederal entities that have the responsibilities for aliens who seek asylum in the United States. Dutiesare spread across DHS's Coast Guard (interdiction), Customs and Border Protection (apprehensionsand inspections), Immigration and Customs Enforcement (detention), Citizenship and ImmigrationServices (determination of credible fear) and DOJ's Executive Office for Immigration Review(asylum and removal hearings). While the lead agencies for setting asylum standards and policy areUSCIS and EOIR, CBP inspectors are quite often the first point of contact with arriving asylumseekers. Training of Personnel. As is evident from thediscussions of the agricultural, customs, and immigration inspections, the CBP inspector must learna set of complex laws and procedures as well as develop a keen eye for violators and violations ofthe law. Some argue that it is too much to expect that those working in primary inspections areknowledgeable of the various types of travel documents, (116) as well as when a foreign national is required to have a traveldocument. (117) Someexpress concern that the ability to recognize these documents and differentiate fraudulent documentsfrom legitimate ones is learned only from experience and training. The customs inspector is attunedto targeting travelers and goods from a cargo perspective, a skill some argue, that is quite distinctfrom an immigration inspection. That the inspector must also be facile in accessing numerous datasystems and databases has raised further questions about the adequacy of training. (118) Specific concerns are being raised that primary inspectors in CBP from customs andimmigrations backgrounds may not have sufficient agricultural training. Some argue that currentCBP training in agriculture for new inspectors may be inadequate. Former APHIS inspectors hadrequired science and biology backgrounds, combined with extensive pest and disease training. Manystakeholders in the agricultural community are asking whether CBP administrators and front lineinspectors will pay enough attention to agricultural inspections. Others assert that these concerns about training needs are exaggerated and observe that CBPhas a new 14-week training course for inspectors. They point out that the immigration and customsinspectors have been cross-designated for years and are already familiar with the laws, procedures,and databases. They also observe that agricultural inspections will remain specialized for the timebeing and will occur during secondary inspections. Database Technology. Critics of the currenttechnological infrastructure contend that it poses a security risk. The Enhanced Border Security andVisa Entry Reform Act of 2002 ( P.L. 107-173 ) mandated the integration of immigration databases. In addition to integrating data systems that contain federal law enforcement and intelligenceinformation relevant to making decisions on visa admissibility and the removal of aliens, P.L.107-173 also mandated that immigration databases be integrated with other relevant data systems. The integration of law enforcement and intelligence data systems and databases with immigrationdata systems and databases continues to be a concern and is considered critical for the CBP inspectorto adequately screen individuals seeking entry to the United States. Many assert that the need for all agencies involved in admitting aliens to share intelligenceand coordinate activities is essential for U.S. immigration policy to be effective in guardinghomeland security. Some maintain that the reforms Congress made in the mid-1990s requiring allvisa applicants to be checked in the "look out" databases were inadequate because the databasesacross the relevant agencies were not interoperable and the various agencies were territorial withtheir data. They maintain that, in the long run, the most efficient and effective guard against theentry of aliens who would do us harm is an interagency and inter-departmental database that isaccessible in "real time" to consular officers, CBP inspectors, and key law enforcement andintelligence officials. Others point to the cost, time, and complexity of developing interoperable databases. Theycite the difficulty thus far in determining what biometric identifiers are most appropriate forscreening aliens. (119) They point out competing technologies of the existing databases in which various key agencies havealready heavily invested. Some maintain that success of the interoperable database technologydepends on 100% inclusion of aliens applying for visas and seeking admission, but that the sheerscope of such a system poses "real time" implementation issues. They also warn that if intelligencedata become too accessible across agencies, national security may actually be breached becausesensitive information may be more likely to fall into the wrong hands. Privacy concerns arise as wellas the data sharing and interoperability broadens. Meanwhile, CBP has been engaged in a long-term effort to acquire a new comprehensivedatabase system that dates back to the U.S. Customs Service. The Automated CommercialEnvironment (ACE) will replace ACS which has been characterized as outmoded andinefficient. (120) Difficulties with ACS are evident in the different levels of automation available for different modesof transportation. The most recent evidence of the difficulties raised by uneven automation can beseen in the different rollout deadlines for the new mandatory advance electronic manifest ruleproposed by CBP. The lack of consistent automation, particularly for commercial trucks, means thatseveral different programs will have to be utilized (FAST, PAPS, BRASS etc.) until ACE becomesfunctional. The ACE strategy is developing commercial automation protocols and procedures so thatexpeditious tracking and more effective screening and monitoring can develop over time. CBP is also working with other government agencies on developing the Integrated TradeData System (ITDS). ITDS will be an interconnected database of all government agencies involvedin the trade process, allowing users to submit data to one agency database available to other agencies. Questions remain however, because ACE and ITDS were envisioned prior to the merging of primaryborder agencies in DHS. Issues such as how ACE and ITDS will be incorporated into the largerDHS strategy, and how they will interact with other existing databases, remain a concern. Fourth Amendment. Through the laws of thelegacy agencies, inspectors have unique statutory authorizations to inspect and search individualsand merchandise at the border, as discussed above. Beyond these specific authorities, however,inspections at the border must still adhere to the protections afforded by the Constitution. The scopeof these protections may be more limited at borders and ports of entry than in the interior of theUnited States. The scope of protections also might vary with the particular laws being enforced. A related constitutional matter that arises in this realm is "racial profiling." Racial profilingis the practice of targeting individuals for law enforcement purposes based on their race or ethnicityin the belief that specific minority groups are more likely to engage in certain unlawful behaviors. Several courts have considered constitutional ramifications of the practice, as an "unreasonablesearch and seizure," and more recently, as a denial of equal protection of the laws. (121) In the past, some haveaccused Customs inspectors of racial profiling. (122) Others maintain that it is difficult to discern where legitimatetargeting based on risk management principles crosses the line into racial profiling. In theimmigration context, the constitutionality of making distinctions on grounds of race or nationalityis unsettled. (123) Withrespect to immigration inspections conducted near, but otherwise beyond the actual physical border,however, the case law seems to suggest that race alone cannot justify a stop by a roving patrol, (124) but can be moredeterminative when questioned at fixed immigration checkpoints. (125) Fifth Amendment. For purposes of proceduraldue process under the Fifth Amendment, immigration law has long made a distinction between thosealiens who have come to our shores seeking admission and those who are within the United Statesafter an entry, irrespective of its legality. In the latter instance, the Supreme Court has recognizedadditional rights and privileges not extended to those in the former category, who are merely "on thethreshold of initial entry." (126) Indeed, Supreme Court jurisprudence still questions whetherthe Constitution applies at all to aliens seeking entry at the border or a port of entry, particularly indetermining an alien's right to be here. With respect to due process in the immigration context,therefore, aliens seeking admission to the United States must generally accept whatever statutoryrights and privileges they are granted by Congress. (127) In cases where the arriving alien is suspected of being aterrorist, the alien may be summarily excluded by the regional director with no further administrativeright to appeal. This policy is especially controversial if a suspected terrorist is returned to a countryin which the person is "more likely than not to be tortured." (128) As Congress views border inspections through the lens of homeland security, a series ofquestions emerge. While not an exhaustive set, the selected questions below express a few of thecross-cutting concerns. Are the inspections reforms aimed at enhanced border security that Congressenacted being implemented with sufficient urgency? When the new technologies are fully implemented, such as US-VISIT at landports of entry, will people and goods move expeditiously? If additional resources and infrastructure are needed to secure and facilitateborder inspections, should fees be raised or funds appropriated, or should it be a combination ofboth? Is an inspections system geared up to protect against terrorism still versatileenough to also protect the nation against travelers with contagious diseases such as Severe AcuteRespiratory Syndrome (SARS) or flexible enough to recognize bona fide asylumseekers? Should any of the underlying laws be amended to further tighten or expand theinspections process (e.g., mandating physical inspections of a greater percentage of cargo orrequiring inspections of certain types of shipments)? Should the underlying laws be amended to reflect the reorganization offunctions? Striking the balance of facilitating legitimate travel and trade with protecting against foreignterrorism and other phenomena that would do us harm will remain a daunting challenge. Appendix A: Immigration Inspection Workload,FY2002 Source: CRS analysis of INS workload data. Note: Detail may not add to 100% due to rounding. Appendix B. Selected Immigration InspectionsData Source: CRS analysis of INS workload data. Appendix C. Top 10 U.S. Container PortsCY1998-CY2002 (thousands of TEUs) a Source: CY1995-CY2001 from Bureau of Transportation Statistics U.S. International Trade andFreight Transportation Trends, Table 11, p. 32 (Washington: Bureau of Transportation Statistics,2003), CY2002 CRS analysis of Maritime Administration (MARAD) published data. Note: Data includes imports, exports, and transshipments (transshipments do not originate and arenot destined for the United States, but merely pass through it from one foreign country to another). a. TEUs are 20-foot equivalent units, one 20-foot container equals one TEU, while one 40-footcontainer equals two TEUs. Appendix D. Customs Workload DataFY1998-FY2002 Source: U.S. Customs Service, Congressional Budget Justifications , FY2001-FY2003. Appendix E. Customs Narcotics SeizuresFY1998-FY2002 Source: U.S. Customs Service, Congressional Budget Justifications , FY2001-FY2004. Appendix F. U.S.-Canada Land Border: Number of Truck or Railcar Crossings(CY2000-CY2002) Source: U.S. Department of Transportation, Bureau of Transportation Statistics, special tabulation, July 2003. Based on the following primary datasource: U.S. Department of Treasury, U.S. Customs Service, Office of Field Operations, Operations Management Database (Washington, DC), 2002,published in U.S. Department of Transportation, Bureau of Transportation Statistics, National Transportation Statistics 2002, BTS02-08 (U.S. GPO:Washington, DC), Dec. 2002. Note: Truck data represent the number of truck crossings, not the number of unique vehicles. Data are for both loaded and empty trucks. Rail dataincludes both loaded and unloaded railcars. Appendix G. U.S.-Mexico Land Border: Number of Truck or Railcar CrossingsCY2000-CY2002 Source: U.S. Department of Transportation, Bureau of Transportation Statistics, special tabulation, July 2003. Based on the following primary datasource: U.S. Department of Treasury, U.S. Customs Service, Office of Field Operations, Operations Management Database (Washington, DC), 2002,published in U.S. Department of Transportation, Bureau of Transportation Statistics, National Transportation Statistics 2002, BTS02-08 (GPO:Washington, DC), Dec. 2002. Note: Truck data represent the number of truck crossings, not the number of unique vehicles. Data are for both loaded and empty trucks. Rail dataincludes both loaded and unloaded railcars. Appendix H. Agricultural Inspections ofInternational Passengers, Cargo, and Mail Source: USDA-APHIS, special tabulations of work accomplishment data. na = not applicable. Appendix I. Agricultural Inspections ofInternational Modes of Conveyance Source: USDA-APHIS, special tabulations of work accomplishment data.

Summary: The United States now has a unified inspections operation at the borders; a single inspectoris charged with examining people, animals, plants, goods, and cargo upon entry to the country. Thetransfer of these functions to the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) marks a significant policyshift for all of these functions, clarifying that -- although there are important commercial, economic,health, humanitarian, and immigration responsibilities -- ensuring the security of our borders is thetop priority. The decision by DHS officials to further integrate the inspection duties so that there is"one face at the border" now means that Customs and Border Protection (CBP) inspectors areessentially interchangeable and responsible for all primary inspections. A range of legal,administrative, and policy issues have emerged with unified border inspections. Legislationimplementing the 9/11 Commission recommendations -- the National Intelligence Reform Act of2004 ( P.L. 108-458 ) -- had various provisions affecting border inspections. CBP inspectors are charged with enforcing a host of laws. Immigration law requires theinspection of all aliens who seek entry into the United States, and every person is inspected todetermine citizenship status and admissibility. All goods being imported into the United States aresubject to a customs inspection, but an actual physical inspection of all goods is not required. Therealso are laws that subject animals and plants to border inspections. This report provides a discussionof these various laws and the procedural differences in what constitutes an "inspection." Border inspections conducted each year number in the hundreds of millions. Prior to thecreation of CBP, the Department of Justice's immigration inspectors did most passenger inspections-- peaking at 534 million in FY2000 -- since all foreign nationals seeking entry into the United Statesmust be inspected. In terms of customs inspections, approximately 22.6% of rail containers; 5.2%of sea containers; and 15.1% of trucks entering the United States were physically inspected. Unlikecustoms and immigration inspections data, animal and plant health inspections data enumerate onlythose passengers referred to secondary inspections for the purpose of an agricultural inspection. There were 44 million animal and plant inspections in FY2002. Border inspections are funded through a combination of federal discretionary appropriationsand user fees. In FY2004, CBP was given budget authority of $2,496 million for border security,inspections, and trade facilitation at ports of entry. Historic funding data for inspections are notcomparable across the "legacy" agencies as the budget data often included activities in addition tothe inspection functions. Some argue that this reorganization of border inspections has been long needed and isresulting in a more streamlined and efficient set of procedures at the border with a clear, single, chainof command. Others warn that the different types of inspections are quite complex in their own rightand that the reorganization is exacerbating the conflicting priorities at the border, ultimately resultingin many more people and goods being sent to secondary inspections. Key Policy Staff: Border Inspections