In mid-2013, during a speech at the University of Cape Town, South Africa, President Obama announced that he would invite African heads of state to a summit in the United States "to help launch a new chapter in U.S.-African relations." The leaders' summit, to be held all day on August 6, 2014, will be preceded by two days of official summit-related events and followed by one heads-of-state post-summit event, alongside many unofficial events. For an overview of official events, see Appendix A . The summit is being organized around the theme "Investing in the Next Generation." It will consist of discourse between President Obama, attending African heads of state, and the chairperson of the African Union (AU) Commission. The theme pays heed to an increasing U.S. policy focus on expanding trade and investment ties with Africa, and the political, economic, and security-related opportunities and challenges associated with Africa's development, particularly those related to its overwhelmingly youthful population. The importance of Africa's newest generations and their potential was also underlined by a separate summit of Young African Leaders Initiative (YALI) Fellows, which occurred in late July. During the summit, according to comments by Administration officials in public and unattributed forums, President Obama is expected to orient discussion toward the issues addressed in his 2012 U.S. Strategy Toward Sub-Saharan Africa (henceforth, "Africa Strategy"). The summit program will be divided into three topical sessions— Investing in Africa's Future , Peace and Regional Stability , and Governing for the Next Generation —and is to be followed by a "presidential press conference." The Administration has characterized the summit format as being designed to enable a frank, mutual exchange of ideas on which to base U.S.-Africa cooperative relations, rather than to cap a pre-negotiated set of communiques. Administration officials have also stated that no bilateral meetings between President Obama and any African heads of state are planned, due to a desire to give all the African leaders an equal voice. Cabinet members and other top officials, however, will hold bilateral meetings with some countries' leaders. Summit side meetings on selected issues (e.g., the threat of the Ebola viral disease in West Africa and the Nigerian terrorist group Boko Haram and other armed Islamist groups in the Sahel) are also planned. The Administration has said that it decided to hold the summit, in part, to help define shared U.S.-African views on how to achieve common goals. Such objectives include more accountable, transparent, democratic governance; stronger rule of law; greater mutual economic growth, and trade and investment; greater peace and security; and enhanced socioeconomic opportunity and development outcomes. These goals are set out in President Obama's 2012 Africa Strategy. The summit will be the first such event hosted by the United States. The summit signals both continuity in long-standing U.S.-African cooperation and increasing U.S. engagement with Africa on numerous fronts—particularly with regard to trade and investment, following strong economic growth on the continent and a marked rise in U.S. development assistance to Africa since 2000. It may also be interpreted as a U.S. response to the increased pace of African economic and political engagement with a wide range of major or rising economic powers, including China, Japan, the European Union, France, India, Brazil, and Malaysia. The Administration invited the chairperson of the AU Commission and all African heads of state to the summit, except those whose governments are suspended from the AU or are "not in good standing with the United States" because they are subject to U.S. or U.N. sanctions. The countries whose heads of state were not invited include Central African Republic (CAR), due to its suspension from the AU, and Eritrea, Sudan, and Zimbabwe, due to sanctions. As of July 22, 2014, 45 heads of state were expected to attend the summit, according to a Commerce Department spokesperson. There are some indications of bipartisan Hill support for the summit, as indicated, for instance, by the introduction of S.Res. 522 , A resolution expressing the sense of the Senate supporting the U.S.-Africa Leaders Summit to be held in Washington, DC, from August 4 through 6, 2014, by Senator Coons, joined by co-sponsors Senator Menendez, Senator Corker, and Senator Flake, on July 24. Included among the official events is a White House-coordinated, congressionally hosted bicameral Congressional Reception for African Leaders on August 4. Some bills currently before Congress may also be discussed at the summit or other events (see Appendix B for a list of bills of potential interest). Some Members of Congress are slated to participate in other summit events, and several related congressionally hosted events are scheduled on the Hill during the three-day summit period. In addition to the Congressional Reception, unofficial events scheduled to take place on the Hill include: On August 6, senior civil society leaders will present the recommendations, goals, and demands of a series of African civil society thematic working groups. Issues, including freedom of assembly, freedom of speech and thought, human rights, and conflict and elections, will be discussed at a day-long, National Endowment for Democracy (NED)-led public meeting in the Cannon House Office Building. Multi-stakeholder discussions and debate will follow. Resulting feedback is to be incorporated into an "Action Program for Democracy in Africa" that will be shared with African governments, the international community, and civil society and citizens. Representative Karen Bass and Representative Chris Smith are expected to present remarks. On August 6, Representative Gregory W. Meeks, in his capacity as co-chair of the Congressional Black Caucus (CBC) Africa Task Force, will host a multi-part "Ask the Ministers" and "Dialogue with African CEOs" event in the Capitol. Representative Karen Bass, Task Force co-chair, and Representative Steny Hoyer, U.S. House Democratic Whip, are slated to deliver remarks. In addition to the three days of official events to be held in conjunction with the summit—described in this report's Appendix A —over 50 deliberation, learning, and advocacy-based forums on a wide variety of topics are scheduled to be held during or after the summit. Predominant themes and topics include: business, trade, and investment opportunities in Africa (e.g., infrastructure, supply chains, and prospects for the African Growth and Opportunity Act, AGOA, Title I, P.L. 106-200 , as amended); public policy and development issues (e.g., health, science and technology, agriculture, financing for development); and civil society group advocacy (e.g., good governance, natural resource transparency, human and civil rights, youth development, and gender equity). There will also be two U.S. Trade and Development Agency (USTDA)-sponsored "reverse" trade missions by African delegations to Houston (focusing on the energy sector, in coordination with the Energy Department) and Chicago (focusing on transport, in coordination with the Transportation Department). A number of unofficial events in Washington are expected to include Members of Congress, and many will feature contributions by African heads of state. Vice President Joe Biden and potentially three African heads of state are expected to deliver remarks at a Georgetown University/Coca Cola Company event titled The Future of Business and Development in Africa. The Obama Administration has launched several large development initiatives in Africa, such as Feed the Future, and the Global Climate Change and the Global Health initiatives. The latter incorporates President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR), a signature initiative of former President George W. Bush's Administration. In 2013, the President also announced two new Africa-specific initiatives, Power Africa and Trade Africa, and expanded his 2010 Young African Leaders Initiative (YALI). All initiatives are discussed further below. President Obama may well use the occasion of the summit to announce new U.S. commitments to Africa, but unattributed remarks by State Department officials and press reports suggest that the Administration does not plan to announce any new large-scale initiatives in relation to the summit. Factors that may have contributed to this decision include U.S. budget constraints and an Administration desire to use the summit to redefine jointly with African leaders the focus of and manner in which U.S.-African cooperation takes place—with an eye toward greater mutual contributions toward shared goals. Such an approach is reflected in the design and implementation of several Administration initiatives in Africa (e.g., Feed the Future, discussed below), and informs the Millennium Challenge Corporation's (MCC's) country-centered design and program execution paradigm, which was established during the Bush Administration. China, Japan, the European Union, France, and India have all held heads of state and other high-level ministerial summits with African leaders in recent years, and all have long had or are rapidly increasing their trade and investment relations with Africa. These foreign countries' summit styles and objectives have varied, but typically they culminate in mutually agreed announcements regarding multiple pledges of security, development, and trade and investment cooperation and assistance. China, in particular, has held repeated heads of state summits with Africa that have drawn substantial attention in recent years, during which it rolls out diverse, explicit policy pledges, multi-billion dollar trade, credit, and other financial commitments, along with some aid initiatives, and reports exhaustively on how it has met past pledges. Top Chinese leaders also personally visit Africa every year. These approaches, according to some observers, have helped advance Chinese interests in Africa, potentially at the expense of U.S. gains—although others do not view Chinese, U.S., and others' growing engagement with Africa as a zero-sum game. The Administration's reported plan to refrain from offering a concrete set of "deliverables" has drawn questions from some observers who suggest that reported plans not to issue a formal declaration, or communiques describing the summit's outcomes, or a roadmap for future engagement might diminish the summit's potential achievements. Similarly, despite a substantial focus on trade and investment—in the form of the all-day U.S.-Africa Business Forum, the AGOA Forum, and many unofficial business events involving African leaders—some have questioned whether the summit will adequately facilitate business-focused deal-making with African leaders. Comparisons to China on this count are likely. On July 22, a Commerce Department spokesperson announced that $900 million or more in business deals would be announced at the U.S.-Africa Business Forum summit event (see Appendix A ). Some observers also see the Administration's decision not to pursue U.S. presidential one-on-one bilateral meetings with African heads of state as a missed opportunity for positive engagement. Other foci of criticism have included the summit's timing; putatively outdated Administration views of Africa informing the summit; and what some observers—citing the kinds of observations noted above—view as conceptual framing of and planning for the summit (at least as publicly announced) that they maintain has been less effective than it could have been. Some critics have asserted that some African leaders who have been invited to attend the summit are responsible for grave human rights abuses, or for abuses of democratic governance and rule of law norms, and should therefore not have been invited. Some activists are pushing for a special focus on the rights of particular social groups, such as African women, whose rights President Obama addressed in a July 28 speech; and lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) persons, whose rights the Administration has sought to advocate. The Administration has responded that the United States must deal with "the governments that Africans have" and asserts that U.S. officials will forthrightly address human rights concerns in discussions with visiting leadership delegations. Other observers contend that such U.S. emphasis on democracy and human rights may, in fact, decrease the U.S. business facilitation prospects arising from the summit, when contrasted with summits held by China. China invites all African leaders to its leadership summits and, in line with a long-standing, stated policy of not interfering in the affairs of other sovereign governments, rarely addresses African countries' governance and rule of law records. In recent years, many sub-Saharan African countries have achieved rapid economic growth, albeit starting from a low base by global standards. This has spurred middle class expansion, massive increases in access to digital communications—notably economic activity boosting cell phone networks, and infrastructure construction. African economies nevertheless face many structural challenges, and poverty alleviation has been more limited than in other developing country regions with similar growth rates. Rising national incomes have often not been equally distributed or translated into regionally or sectorally balanced "inclusive" growth. Nor has growth always been effectively marshalled to address the region's extensive development challenges. Income growth has also not been as significant in real terms as it is in percentage terms: only a few sub-Saharan African countries (Angola, Botswana, Gabon, Mauritius, Namibia, Seychelles, and South Africa) qualify as "upper-middle-income" economies as defined by the World Bank. All others are either "lower-middle-income" or "low-income." Africa also has a proportionally very large youth population. These youth hold significant socioeconomic promise, but they also present governments with profound challenges related to the education, job creation, and socio-political enfranchisement necessary for younger generations' potential to be realized. On a per capita basis and by many other measures, Africa remains among the poorest global regions, and many African countries have achieved only limited progress toward attaining the U.N. Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), which closely mirror Africa's most pressing development challenges. The eight MDGs (each made up of further sub-components) seek to: eradicate extreme poverty and hunger; achieve universal primary education; promote gender equality and empower women; reduce child mortality; improve maternal health; combat HIV/AIDS, malaria, and other diseases; ensure environmental sustainability; and create global partnerships for development. Many countries lack the institutional capacity necessary for the delivery of effective public services (e.g., health and education) and goods (e.g., electricity and other infrastructure) widely seen as necessary for sustained economic growth. Corruption, weak democratic institutions, and lack of adherence to the rule of law are also major problems in much of Africa. Key additional democracy, governance, and security challenges are discussed below. U.S. trade and investment policy toward Africa is focused on economic development goals and encouraging African trade with the United States in order to promote economic growth, as well as enabling U.S. firms to tap emergent opportunities and invest in the region. There are indications that a number of Members support expanded efforts to pursue such goals. The Africa subcommittees of the House and Senate foreign affairs committees each have held multiple hearings addressing these topics in recent years. In addition, companion bills supportive of such ends— H.R. 1777 (Smith, Christopher) and S. 718 (Durbin), both entitled Increasing American Jobs Through Greater Exports to Africa Act of 2013—were introduced in the two chambers. The region is a key supplier of some U.S. natural resource imports. Improvements in some African countries' economic and political climates in recent years have led to increasing interest in the region as a destination for U.S. goods, services, and investment. Despite these trends, many U.S. businesses remain skeptical of the region's investment and trade potential. Many avoid engaging in business in the region, both for sometimes outdated perceptual reasons and because a number of African countries continue to confront many daunting economic governance challenges. New and ongoing security crises in parts of the continent may have also dampened investor interest. In 2013, the United States ran a trade deficit with sub-Saharan Africa, importing $39 billion worth of goods, and exporting $24 billion. Major U.S. exports to Africa are diverse. They include machinery, vehicles, refined fuel products, aircraft, and wheat. U.S. imports are largely concentrated in oil (nearly 60%, although U.S. energy imports from Africa have declined as U.S. energy production has grown). Major non-energy U.S. imports are metals, vehicles, and cocoa. Nigeria and South Africa have the largest economies in the region and are sub-Saharan Africa's largest U.S. trade partners, accounting for roughly half of all such trade. Nigeria is also a major oil exporter to the United States. The stock of U.S. foreign direct investment (FDI) in the region is also concentrated in a few countries, including Nigeria ($8.2 billion), Mauritius ($7.1 billion), South Africa ($5.5 billion), and Ghana ($3.6 billion). The stock of sub-Saharan African FDI in the United States is $5.3 billion, with South Africa ($1.5 billion) and Mauritius ($3.4 billion) accounting for virtually all such investment. Despite the impressive economic growth in many African countries in recent years, multiple factors continue to make many countries in the region difficult places to do business. Such challenges may limit investment in the region, despite new and emergent economic opportunities, and ultimately prevent sub-Saharan African countries from maximizing their economic growth potential. Some key factors include: Infrastructure . Africa, a vast region, has very poor land transport, maritime transport, and electrical infrastructure. Roads in the region are often poorly maintained and unpaved; rail networks are unreliable and limited; ports are inefficient and lack capacity; and electricity infrastructure is poorly developed. This increases production and transportation costs, adversely affects product quality, and leads to shipment delays. Market size . Often low per capita incomes mean that market demand is smaller than other global regions. It is also highly fragmented. There are ongoing efforts to improve regional integration, but most foreign business interest in the region continues to focus on major economies such as South Africa, Nigeria, and Kenya. Labor force . Much of the region suffers from a lack of skilled labor necessary to support advanced economic activity, often due to high illiteracy rates and under-investment in education. Population majorities in many countries remain employed in low-skill agriculture production. Economic diversification. Dependence on unrefined commodity production (especially in the energy, mining, and agricultural sectors) and many countries' inability to pursue value-added production processes limits the growth of an experienced skilled work force, resulting in lost potential income. Many African economies also remain highly dependent on labor-intensive, small-scale, and often low-profit and highly variable rain-fed agricultural production. Access to inputs . Capital markets, as well as those for other goods and services used in production processes, are limited compared to other regions, which often increases production costs. Such deficits also inhibit the growth of integrated manufacturing sectors and cross-sectoral linkages. Intra-regional trade, albeit growing, is also low by global standards. Regulatory and legal environments . Governments have often provided an inadequate enabling environment for private sector activity, including contract enforcement and protections for property rights. Corruption also remains a challenge. Duplicative and inefficient trade procedures may also impose high costs for import and export flows, both within and outside the region. Political instability and security . Despite improvements, many countries continue to be beset by political instability and conflict, undermining business confidence in the region. In the areas of trade and investment, the President's 2012 Africa Strategy seeks to enhance: legal, regulatory, and institutional frameworks to enable trade and investment; economic governance and greater regional economic and trade integration; and African capacity to participate in global markets. The strategy also seeks to increase U.S. firms' knowledge of the realities of sub-Saharan African business environments and markets, and provide more assistance to help the U.S. private sector to take advantage of trade and investment opportunities in the region. The African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA, discussed below) has been the cornerstone of U.S.-Africa trade policy since it was established by Congress in 2000. The Administration is seeking congressional reauthorization of AGOA, which expires in 2015, potentially in an amended form that might incorporate additional trade capacity building and related policy or program measures. To advance its strategic goals for African trade and investment, the Administration has also launched the Doing Business in Africa campaign and the Trade Africa Initiative (see below, under initiatives). Ongoing efforts initiated prior to the Obama presidency also include three African Trade Hubs, which work to increase African producers' export competitiveness and increase utilization of AGOA. Additional funding to improve trade capacity in the region is incorporated into USAID and MCC programs. Other U.S. trade and investment policy tools in place with African countries include Trade and Investment Framework Agreements (TIFAs)—forums for dialogue between governments on trade and investment issues—and bilateral investment treaties, which advance rules to facilitate and protect foreign investment. The United States has a U.S. Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with Morocco, in North Africa, but there are no existing U.S. FTAs with sub-Saharan African countries. Negotiations on a potential U.S.-Southern African Customs Union (SACU) FTA were initiated in 2003 but eventually suspended in 2006. AGOA is a non-reciprocal U.S. trade preference program that provides duty-free tariff treatment on certain imports from eligible sub-Saharan African countries. Congress first passed AGOA in 2000 as part of an ongoing U.S. effort to promote African development, deepen economic integration within the region, and strengthen U.S.-African trade and investment ties. AGOA has been amended five times since initial passage, most recently in 2012, when the special "third country fabric provision" was extended. AGOA is currently authorized until September 30, 2015. Crude oil is the top U.S. AGOA import (making up more than 75% of AGOA imports in 2013). Other key imports include vehicles (from South Africa), metals, refined petroleum products, and apparel. Among these top imports, apparel has the most widespread origins, coming primarily from Kenya, Lesotho, and Mauritius. Unlike other U.S. preference programs, AGOA directs the President to provide U.S. government technical and trade capacity building (TCB) assistance to AGOA beneficiary countries. This aid is intended to help African governments to: liberalize trade policy and harmonize laws and regulations with World Trade Organization (WTO) membership commitments; engage in financial and fiscal restructuring; and promote greater agribusiness linkages. AGOA also requires the President, in consultation with Congress and AGOA beneficiary governments, to hold an annual U.S.-Africa Trade and Economic Cooperation Forum. The original AGOA legislation states that the purpose of the Forum, which is held in alternate years in the United States and Africa, is to "discuss expanding [U.S.-Africa] trade and investment relations" and to encourage "joint ventures between small and large businesses," as well as to foster the broader goals of AGOA. Civil society and private sector events are typically held in conjunction with the Forum. The 13 th AGOA Forum will take place in Washington, DC, on August 4, 2014, in the form of a summit-linked AGOA ministerial meeting, and will likely focus on the potential renewal and expansion of AGOA. Generally, AGOA enjoys broad bipartisan support. One issue that reportedly may decrease support for AGOA's renewal is the reticence of some African countries to fully implement the World Trade Organization trade facilitation agreement reached in December 2013 at the WTO Bali Ministerial meeting. Statements by U.S. officials, however, suggest that this concern may relate only to a few countries. Despite general support for AGOA renewal, there is ongoing debate regarding potential changes to the program, including potential measures to advance its stated trade and development goals more effectively. Key reauthorization issues include: Country eligibility and reauthorization duration. Some argue that changes to the AGOA eligibility requirements—the President can and has terminated AGOA benefits for countries failing to meet these requirements—and a longer or indefinite reauthorization period for the program would induce more businesses to take advantage of AGOA by reducing uncertainty in investment projections (e.g., protection against a sudden withdrawal of AGOA eligibility). However, such changes could also reduce U.S. use of AGOA to advance non-economic foreign policy goals, such as democracy and human rights promotion. Indeed, some critics argue that successive Administrations have been overly hesitant to suspend or terminate AGOA benefits over human rights or governance concerns. Trade capacity building (TCB). Many argue that AGOA may be underutilized due to beneficiary countries' inability to take advantage of AGOA benefits. Although AGOA mandates that TCB assistance be provided to increase use of the program, there is debate over whether appropriate types and levels of TCB are provided, as well as over the effectiveness of TCB overall. Use of Benefits. Nearly 75% of U.S. non-energy imports under AGOA come from South Africa alone, and in 2013, over half of AGOA beneficiaries' exports to the United States were worth less than $1 million. Creation of AGOA country export strategies and greater targeting of TCB toward potentially competitive sectors is viewed by some commentators as an important way to increase use of the program. Product coverage. AGOA covers most products, but some, mostly agricultural products, remain excluded. Including more products under AGOA could increase use of AGOA benefits, but might be opposed by U.S. producers of such products. Duty-free quota-free beyond Africa. Some argue that all least-developed countries, including non-African ones, should receive AGOA preferences, but others are concerned that this could erode the competitiveness of African exports to the United States, as they might face greater competition. Reciprocal access and two-way trade . Like most other U.S. preference programs, AGOA provides preferential access to the U.S. market with no reciprocal preferential U.S. access to beneficiary African country markets. Given recent economic growth in Africa, some observers are now calling for a greater focus on two-way trade in AGOA and potentially reciprocal trade requirements with some AGOA-eligible countries, especially since some countries, such as South Africa, have negotiated reciprocal agreements with other parties, notably the European Union, which could conceivably disadvantage U.S. exports to Africa. U.S. support for African development targets the challenges described above, among many others. Aid is primarily administered by USAID, the State Department, and the MCC. The vast majority of this aid is administered by USAID, typically under country development strategies that target each country's specific development needs and, often, under multiple global and Africa-specific presidential development initiatives (discussed below). The MCC supports a limited number of compacts, typically five-year aid programs targeting a few crucial development goals (e.g., roads or agricultural production) that the recipient country itself carries out under MCC oversight. The State Department administers many rule-of-law, anti-trafficking, military training, counterterrorism, law enforcement, and other programs, often in coordination with other executive branch agencies. The Department of Defense (DOD) implements some State Department-funded assistance programs and in certain circumstances is also authorized to provide its own assistance to foreign militaries, including in Africa. DOD also carries out military-to-military cooperation activities in many African countries (see below) Sub-Saharan Africa receives over a quarter of all U.S. bilateral aid, the bulk of which supports health programs in the region. The United States also channels substantial aid to Africa through international financial institutions and United Nations (U.N.) entities. North African countries also receive substantial U.S. bilateral and regional aid, much of it focused on security programs. Egypt, Libya, Tunisia, Algeria, and Morocco were allocated an aggregate total of $1.59 billion in bilateral foreign aid in FY2013. Egypt is a top global recipient of U.S. assistance, and was appropriated $1.3 billion in Foreign Military Financing and $250 million in Economic Support Funds in FY2014, though Congress has restricted or placed conditions on certain types of assistance. Tunisia and, to a lesser extent, Libya have been provided additional aid to help support their ongoing political transitions. Aid for Tunisia has topped $450 million since early 2011. Morocco has also received assistance in support of a recently completed, roughly $700 million MCC compact. Much U.S. bilateral aid to African countries is provided under these presidential initiatives: Global Health Initiative. The Global Health Initiative (GHI) was created in 2009 to better coordinate and integrate the implementation of three global health initiatives launched during the Bush Administration: the President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR), the President's Malaria Initiative, and the Neglected Tropical Diseases Program. GHI also seeks to strengthen domestic health systems in developing countries, and promotes increased country "ownership" and financing of health assistance programs that U.S. assistance has supported. Key GHI program areas include maternal and child health; family planning and reproductive health; nutrition; social services for vulnerable children; HIV/AIDS prevention, care, and treatment programs; and a range of disease-specific and other pandemic outbreak efforts. Feed the Future (FtF)/New Alliance. FtF, a government-wide, USAID-led initiative, was launched in 2009 to fulfill U.S. commitments as a member of the Group of Eight (G-8). It seeks to reduce poverty and malnutrition, among other ends, by helping countries to boost agricultural production and expand related market value chains. It focuses such support on 19 so-called "focus countries," 12 of which are in Africa, and selected regions. FtF also supports the New Alliance for Food Security and Nutrition, which promotes the formation of public-private partnerships in Africa that foster agricultural policy reforms by African governments, marshal related private sector investments, and increase aid by G-8 countries. Global Climate Change Initiative (GCCI). Africa is widely viewed as among the global regions most likely to experience negative social and environmental impacts attributable to global climate change. The Administration's GCCI seeks to respond to anticipated climate shocks by: building social resilience and adaptation to extreme weather and climate events to reduce associated risk of damage, loss of life, and instability; promoting clean energy technologies, supportive regulatory environments, and low-emission development strategies in selected countries; and supporting environmental conservation and sustainable land and forest uses to reduce carbon emissions, preserve species, and protect biodiversity. In 2013, President Obama initiated or expanded several Africa-specific initiatives. They include: Power Africa , a five-year, USAID-led, multi-agency initiative to double access to electricity in energy-poor Africa. It is channeling up to $7.8 billion worth of varied U.S. technical and financial support, much of it in the form of loans or financial service products, toward Africa to help spur the expansion and efficacy of power generation, transmission, and distribution infrastructure. A key goal is to use public resources to help reform investment constraining regulations so as to attract and facilitate private power sector investments. There are six initial Power Africa "focus countries": Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Liberia, Nigeria, and Tanzania; and selected regional economic community beneficiaries. Two bills, S. 2508 , Energize Africa Act of 2014, and H.R. 2548 , Electrify Africa Act of 2014 have been introduced that lay out goals very similar to those set out under Power Africa, among others. Both envision continuing U.S. support for electrification in Africa beyond the period covered by Power Africa. Trade Africa , intended to expand U.S. trade and investment activities in Africa and boost levels of trade among African countries, with an initial focus on the East African Community (EAC, i.e., Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda, Rwanda, and Burundi). Trade Africa is a multi-agency, multi-faceted effort with two main goals: to deepen the U.S.-EAC Trade and Investment Partnership, begun in 2012, and to establish a USAID-led East Africa Trade and Investment Hub , an expansion and extension of an existing "trade hub" (one of three in Africa). Focal activities include expanding intra-EAC trade, especially of staple foods, and increasing U.S. imports of selected AGOA-eligible EAC products. Other goals are to reduce trade barriers and enhance the regional business climate through policy and regulatory reform, to build public and private trade institution capacity, and to foster U.S. investment in and expanded trade with the region. Young African Leaders Initiative (YALI) , begun in 2010 and expanded in 2013. YALI fosters the development of young African business, civic, and public management leaders through exchange-based fellowships. These support academic study, leadership training, and networking, first in the United States and then in Africa. YALI is administered by the State Department, which recruits Fellows and administers U.S. activities and USAID. The latter helps Fellows in Africa by facilitating access to networking resources and sources of seed funding for Fellows; and by helping Fellows access business, public service, and non-profit internships and professional opportunities. The Administration plans to expand the number of fellows from 500 to 1,000 in 2015. At a YALI summit in late July President Obama also announced that: the program is being renamed the Mandela Washington Fellowship for Young African Leaders; the 2015 program summit will be held in sub-Saharan Africa; and that YALI is providing a new set of online courses, mentoring, and networking resources for program fellows, and that the Administration will launch four regional Leadership Centers to house such resources and foster public and private sector management and leadership development through training, interpersonal networking forums, and related activities. Types of government and the degree of democratic accountability vary widely among Africa's 54 countries. Democracy, rule of law, and human rights trends have long been and remain a prominent focus of U.S. policy toward Africa, in part due to congressional interest and legislation. Democratic Progress. Since the early 1990s, nearly all African countries have transitioned from military or single-party rule to at least nominally multiparty political systems in which elections are regularly held. Countries such as Senegal, Cabo Verde, and Ghana have had multiple peaceful, democratic transfers of power. Southern African states, such as South Africa, Botswana, and Namibia, have developed strong and accountable institutions, though their political systems remain dominated by single parties that, in the case of South Africa and Namibia, were born of those countries' liberation struggles. Tunisia is in the midst of a widely heralded transition to democracy from authoritarianism. Challenges to Democracy. Despite this progress, the development of accountable, functional democratic institutions remains limited in much of Africa. While most countries hold regular elections, many are marred by fraud, violence, or irregularities. For example, disputed elections in Kenya in 2007 led to widespread violence; national elections in the Democratic Republic of Congo in 2011 were widely seen by international observers as lacking credibility; and analysts have expressed concerns about the potential for abuses in Nigeria's 2015 presidential vote. In countries such as Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Eritrea, The Gambia, and Sudan, viable democratic competition or independent civil society activism are very limited. In several other countries, elected governments have been ousted by military coups in recent years. Governance Hurdles. State institutions in Africa often inadequately respond to citizens' needs because they lack sufficient human and financial capacities to do so, or are beset by problems such as corruption and mismanagement. The corrosive impacts of transnational drug trafficking have also impaired institutional capacity in some countries, notably in West Africa. Countries such as Guinea-Bissau, Equatorial Guinea, Chad, and Burundi are ranked near the bottom of Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index. Endemic corruption also continues to corrode state effectiveness in Nigeria and has challenged or dimmed the reputation of purportedly reform-oriented leaders in countries such as Liberia, Malawi, and Mali. Conflict and State Collapse. In Somalia, the Central African Republic, Libya, and South Sudan, among other countries, state weakness and violent conflict impede the provision of even the most basic state social and public safety services. The first "pillar" of the 2012 Africa Strategy seeks to achieve the long-standing U.S. goal of strengthening democratic institutions. Several key tools are used by U.S. policy makers to promote democracy and human rights in Africa, including: Diplomacy and Reports. U.S. diplomats often publicly criticize or condemn undemocratic actions and human rights violations in Africa, and reportedly regularly raise human rights concerns in private meetings with African leaders. The State Department publishes annual, congressionally mandated reports on human rights conditions globally, and on other issues of concern, such as international religious freedom and trafficking in persons. The State Department and USAID also finance international election observer missions in Africa. Foreign Aid. Multiple U.S. aid programs support African electoral institutions; train African political parties, civil society organizations, and journalists; assist local government officials in improving service-delivery; or provide expert advice to African governments considering legal changes pertaining to more accountable governance. Some U.S. security aid programs are also designed to improve the human rights records of African security forces and/or advance the rule of law by building the capacity of judicial and law enforcement bodies. Foreign Aid Restrictions. Congress has imposed country-specific human rights-related aid restrictions or conditions on aid to the governments of Chad, Cote d'Ivoire, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, South Sudan, and Zimbabwe, among others. Aid to multiple African governments is also restricted due to legislation curtailing or denying aid to any country that fails to observe a range of human rights norms—regarding, for instance, religious freedom (e.g., Eritrea and Sudan); the use of child soldiers (e.g., CAR, Chad, DRC, Rwanda, South Sudan, Sudan, and Somalia); and trafficking in persons (e.g., Algeria, CAR, DRC, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Gambia, Guinea-Bissau, Libya, Mauritania, and Zimbabwe). Sanctions. Executive orders authorize U.S. sanctions targeting individuals implicated in human rights violations in the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Liberia, Somalia, Sudan, South Sudan, and Zimbabwe. Prosecutions. The United States has helped fund a special tribunal that investigated and prosecuted human rights violations in Sierra Leone and Liberia, as well as a special tribunal for Rwanda. The United States is not a state party to the International Criminal Court (ICC) but has provided diplomatic, informational, and logistical aid in support of some ICC prosecutions. U.S. courts have also tried some individuals accused of serious human rights abuses in African countries, notably Rwanda and Liberia. Armed conflict and instability in parts of Africa continue to threaten regional security, impede development and investment, and contribute to widespread human suffering. This is underscored by the fact that multiple African countries rank as being among the most fragile states globally, according to the Fund for Peace/Foreign Policy magazine 2014 Fragile States Index. A majority of the United Nations' (U.N.'s) peacekeeping operations are located in Africa, with nine missions currently authorized in the region. The U.N.-authorized African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) also carries out peacekeeping activities, as well as broader stabilization and counter-terrorist operations, primarily against the Al Qaeda-linked group Al Shabaab. The advisory U.N. Support Mission in Libya withdrew its staff from the country in July 2014 amid ongoing intense fighting among militia groups there. In addition to intrastate conflicts and localized instability, the continent faces diverse transnational and maritime threats, which are in many cases enabled by domestic state weakness. Across Africa, porous borders, weak government institutions, and corruption have created permissive environments for transnational threats, including operations by terrorist groups, illicit trafficking (e.g., of narcotics and people), and maritime piracy, which continue to pose a threat to both African and U.S. interests. Violent Extremism. Violent Islamist extremist groups in Northwest and East Africa—including Al Qaeda in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM, active in the North and West Africa), Al Shabaab (Somalia), Boko Haram (Nigeria), and several groups known as Ansar al Sharia in Libya and Tunisia—threaten state stability, regional security, and U.S. national security interests. Across North Africa and the Sahel region of West Africa, armed Islamist groups have grown in influence since 2011, amid political upheaval in the Arab world, governance and security crises in Libya and Mali, and a growing Islamist insurgency in northern Nigeria. These violent Islamist extremist groups are reportedly increasingly sharing training, tactics, and weapons, including those from former Libyan stockpiles. Other Transnational threats. In some parts of the continent, weak governing and justice mechanisms have allowed transnational crime networks to operate with relative impunity. In some countries these syndicates may threaten state stability. U.S. concern has grown over potential links between terrorist groups, like AQIM, and other rising transnational threats, including the increasing use of the region as a transshipment point for illicit drugs (notably Latin American cocaine bound to Europe); and other international drug trafficking networks. Reported links between armed extremist or insurgent groups and wildlife trafficking networks are another growing security concern, as is a rise in illegal poaching and wildlife trafficking generally. Maritime Security. Africa's coastal waters, particularly along the Gulf of Guinea, the Gulf of Aden, and the western Indian Ocean, have been highly susceptible to illegal fishing, trafficking, and piracy in recent years. African governments have generally been unable to adequately police the region's waters. Criminal elements exploiting this absence of state controls smuggle people, drugs, and weapons, and dump hazardous waste. Maritime commerce and off-shore oil production facilities in some regions have faced high rates of maritime piracy and sabotage. While the waters off the Somali coast have seen a marked reduction in pirate attacks in the past two years as a result of international anti-piracy efforts, Nigerian waters and the broader Gulf of Guinea rank as the most dangerous in the world for acts of piracy and armed robbery at sea. While several countries—including Sierra Leone, Liberia, and Angola, as well as Algeria in North Africa—continue to rebuild after years of civil wars in the 1990s and early 2000s, parts of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Somalia, and Sudan remain afflicted by long-running patterns of instability. Newer conflicts, some influenced by communal tensions and political grievances, have broken out in recent years in the Central African Republic (CAR), Libya, Mali, and South Sudan. Other African countries, such as Ethiopia, Kenya, and Nigeria, struggle to advance ambitious economic and development goals amid armed insurgent and/or extremist threats. These threats, combined with existing demographic, social, economic, and political pressures, could pose broader challenges to the domestic cohesion of these countries. Extremist groups and restive communities also pose potential threats to political stability in the fragile Sahel states. Major conflicts in Africa include the ones below: East Africa. The conflict in South Sudan , which erupted in late 2013, is of significant concern for U.S. and African policy makers. By some estimates, more than 10,000 people have been killed in ethnic and politically fueled violence, and more than 1.5 million people have been displaced. Some 4 million people now face alarming levels of food insecurity. Parts of South Sudan, which was already the world's largest recipient of humanitarian aid prior to the outbreak of the current conflict, may experience famine conditions in 2014. U.N. experts warn that parts of neighboring Sudan , notably the border state of Southern Kordofan, could also experience famine as a result of ongoing fighting between insurgents, the Sudanese military, and allied militias. The conflict in Sudan's western Darfur region also continues to elude resolution, and violence in the past year has resulted in population displacement at a level not seen since the early years of the conflict. By some estimates, more than 6 million people have been displaced or severely affected by the fighting in Sudan's conflict zones. The threat posed by the insurgent and terrorist group Al Shabaab in war-torn Somalia remains serious, despite some progress toward retaking territory from the group and rebuilding parts of the Somali state. Drought conditions, combined with security restrictions on humanitarian access, appear set to worsen the food security situation. More than 1 million people remain displaced in Somalia, and another 1 million live as refugees in neighboring countries and Yemen. Al Shabaab has demonstrated its intent and ability to conduct terrorist attacks against targets in the broader East Africa region, most notably Kenya , which has had a significant increase in attacks in the past three years. Uganda and Djibouti, along with Kenya, Ethiopia, and Sierra Leone, have also been targets of terrorist attacks in retaliation for their role in the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), which has led the military offensive against Al Shabaab. Central Africa. The March 2013 overthrow of CAR 's central government triggered a crisis that led to the collapse of an already fragile state. Widespread violence has followed, much of it playing out along ethno-religious lines, and has resulted in massive displacement and human suffering, sparking fears of further regional destabilization. Ongoing insecurity in eastern DRC continues to pose a threat to the broader Great Lakes region, despite the achievement of a regional peace framework agreement in early 2013 and a U.N. peacekeeping operation with a robust mandate to disarm militias that prey on civilians. The Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) , a small, armed group of Ugandan origin, has been somewhat contained through a combination of U.S. and multilateral efforts, but it continues to terrorize civilian populations in remote parts of Central Africa. West Africa. In Nigeria , a violent extremist group based in the northeast, Boko Haram, has grown increasingly active and deadly in its attacks against state and civilian targets since 2010. Thousands have been killed in Boko Haram attacks, and more than 300,000 have been displaced. Beyond the threat posed by Boko Haram, deadly, localized clashes between communities in central Nigeria have fueled massive displacement. Mali continues to emerge from its 2011-2013 political, humanitarian, and security crisis, with assistance from the French military and a U.N. peacekeeping operation. Prospects for a peace accord with northern rebels remain uncertain, and Malian and international troops continue to face asymmetric attacks from Islamist extremist groups. North Africa. The post-conflict transition in Libya has been disrupted by armed non-state groups and threatened by the indecision and infighting of interim leaders. U.S. officials now describe Libya as a terrorist safe haven and have issued warnings about threats posed by Libya-based extremists and flows of weaponry from Libya into surrounding countries. June 2014 elections appear unlikely to resolve the differences among Libya's warring militia groups, and some Libyans have begun to call for unspecified international intervention to help restore order. In Egypt , Islamist groups have been attacking state security targets, particularly in the volatile Sinai Peninsula, claiming that they are retaliating for government suppression of Muslim Brotherhood sympathizers. Tunisia and Algeria are also attempting to counter armed Islamist militants, including from AQIM and related groups, and are particularly concerned about border security. The United States has invested significant resources in promoting peace and security in Africa and countering threats to U.S. interests, such as those posed by drug traffickers, pirates, and violent extremist groups. The United States plays a key role in U.N. Security Council deliberations on African conflicts, notably, in recent years, on CAR, the DRC, Mali, Somalia, Libya, and the two Sudans. The United States is also a major funder of peacekeeping missions in the region, and has provided significant bilateral training, equipment, and logistical support to African militaries contributing troops to these missions. Much of this bilateral aid is provided under the State-Department run African Contingency Operations Training and Assistance (ACOTA) program. ACOTA is part of the broader Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI), which trains peacekeeping troops around the world. U.S. efforts have also sought to bolster the role of the AU and sub-regional entities in conflict mediation and peacekeeping efforts. U.S. security assistance in Africa also aims broadly to build more professional security forces, including through security sector reform efforts in countries, such as Liberia, the DRC, Somalia, and, until 2014, South Sudan. Among other security assistance programs, the State Department provides Foreign Military Financing to help selected countries buy or maintain U.S. military equipment. Additionally, the United States helps train police and other security force officials through a variety of programs, including through the International Law Enforcement Academy in Botswana. The State Department funds and oversees implementation of these programs, which commonly include human rights components and, in many cases, require human rights vetting of units being trained. U.S. military advisors are also periodically deployed to work with African countries and regional organizations. The Obama Administration's National Security Strategy, issued in 2010, focuses on advancing "effective partnerships" in Africa. Toward that end, the Departments of State and Defense (DOD) support efforts to build African security forces' capacity to deter and respond to crises. Both departments have had a long-standing role in U.S. security cooperation efforts in Africa, but in recent years, Congress has authorized increasing DOD funding for capacity-building programs, largely focused on counterterrorism, and DOD spending in Africa has increased. The DOD view of Africa is set out in the DOD 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review 2014 (QDR): In Africa, terrorists, criminal organizations, militias, corrupt officials, and pirates continue to exploit ungoverned and under-governed territory on the continent and its surrounding waters. The potential for rapidly developing threats, particularly in fragile states, including violent public protests and terrorist attacks, could pose acute challenges to U.S. interests. […T]here is also significant opportunity to develop stronger governance institutions and to help build professional, capable military forces that can partner with the United States… [In addition, U.N. and African regional] multilateral peace operations… are playing an increasingly prominent role in maintaining and restoring international security, including through prevention and mitigation of mass atrocities in threat environments that previously would have deterred multilateral action. U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM), established in 2008, leads U.S. military efforts in Africa, formerly shared among three regional commands. AFRICOM implements ongoing efforts to strengthen African peacekeeping, maritime security, counterterrorism and counter-narcotics capacities, among other activities to further U.S. security goals in the region. It also periodically conducts military operations. Planning for the rapid deployment of crisis response forces, particularly in the aftermath of the 2012 attacks on U.S. facilities in Benghazi, Libya, has become an increasing focus for AFRICOM. U.S. forces routinely conduct joint exercises with African militaries, and share disaster response, humanitarian assistance, maritime security, anti-piracy, and counterterrorism skills, among others. The Obama Administration's strategy for countering terrorism in Africa focuses on dismantling Al Qaeda elements in the region and empowering local partners "to serve as countervailing forces to the supporters of al-Qa'ida and the purveyors of instability that enable the transnational terrorist threat to persist." Under this strategy, State Department and USAID-managed programs, with some contributions from other agencies, seek to build regional intelligence, military, law enforcement, and judicial capacities; strengthen aviation, port, and border security; stem the flow of terrorist financing; and counter the spread of extremist ideologies. The State Department also leads two regional, interagency counterterrorism programs: the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP) and the Partnership for Regional East Africa Counterterrorism (PREACT). The QDR asserts that "our ability to project forces to combat terrorism in places as far away as Yemen, Afghanistan, and Mali—and to build capacity to help partners counter terrorism ... reduces the likelihood that these threats could find their way to U.S. shores." It also outlines DOD's intent to rebalance its counterterrorism (CT) efforts globally "toward greater emphasis on building partnership capacity, especially in fragile states, while retaining robust capability for direct action." AFRICOM works primarily indirectly, by training, equipping, and sustaining partner forces such as AMISOM to degrade extremist capabilities. U.S. intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) assets are also deployed in Africa to support counterterrorism operations in the region. Direct U.S. military action against terrorist targets in Africa has been limited. Appendix A. Summit: Overview of Official Events Appendix B. Legislation of Potential Summit Interest Many of the subjects addressed by the proposed or prospective legislation below—and a range of additional resolutions pertaining to the same and other topics, not all of which are listed below—may be of interest to summit and summit-related event participants. While there are not yet any AGOA reauthorization bills, potential AGOA reauthorization legislation may be discussed. Other proposed legislation or bills include: Foreign assistance and defense appropriations and authorizations H.R. 5013 (Granger)/ S. 2499 (Leahy), Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2015 H.R. 4435 (McKeon), Howard P. "Buck" McKeon National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015 H.R. 4870 (Frelinghuysen), Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2015 S.Rept. 113-211 on H.R. 4879 (Durbin), Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2015 Sub-Saharan Africa-Related H.R. 2548 (Royce), Electrify Africa Act of 2014 and S. 2508 (Menendez), Energize Africa Act of 2014 H.R. 1777 (Smith, Christopher), Increasing American Jobs Through Greater Exports to Africa Act of 2013 and S. 718 (Durbin), Increasing American Jobs Through Greater Exports to Africa Act of 2013 H.R. 4386 (Ellison) and S. 2208 (Kirk), Money Remittances Improvement Act of 2014 H.R. 3526 (Smith), Humanitarian Assistance Facilitation Act of 2013 H.R. 4434 (Nunes), Africa Counter Terrorism Initiative Act S.Res. 413 (Coons), A resolution recognizing 20 years since the genocide in Rwanda, and affirming it is in the national interest of the United States to work in close coordination with international partners to help prevent and mitigate acts of genocide and mass atrocities. S.Res. 288 (Flake), A resolution supporting enhanced maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea and encouraging increased cooperation between the United States and West and Central African countries to fight armed robbery at sea, piracy, and other maritime threats. S. 1545 (Menendez) and H.R. 3177 (Engel), PEPFAR Stewardship and Oversight Act of 2013 ( P.L. 113-56 ) H.R. 1793 (Connolly), Global Partnerships Act of 2013 H.R. 4997 (DeLauro), United States Leadership to Eradicate Obstetric Fistula Act of 2014 H.R. 1515 (Sires) and S. 2407 (Murray), 21 st Century Global Health Technology Act H.R. 3117 (Lee), Ending the HIV/AIDS Epidemic Act of 2013 S.Res. 426 (Coons), A resolution supporting the goals and ideals of World Malaria Day, H.Res. 570 (Crenshaw), Supporting the goals and ideals of World Malaria Day S.Res. 393 (Brown), A resolution supporting the goals of World Tuberculosis Day to raise awareness about tuberculosis. S.Res. 314 (Coons), A resolution commemorating and supporting the goals of World AIDS Day. H.R. 1087 (Ellison), Liberian Refugee Immigration Fairness Act of 2013 and S. 527 (Reed), Liberian Refugee Immigration Fairness Act of 2013 H.R. 1692 (McGovern), Sudan Peace, Security, and Accountability Act of 2013 H.R. 3827 (Grayson), To prohibit the United States from providing financial assistance to Benin until Mr. Mojaidou Soumanou is released from prison H.R. 4112 (Jackson Lee), Equal Rights and Access for the Women of South Sudan Act H.Res. 503 (Smith, Christopher), Expressing the sense of the House of Representatives regarding the need to bring the South Sudan conflict to a sustainable and lasting end and to promote reconciliation of longstanding and recent grievances to allow for a peaceful society with good governance. H.Res. 588 (Peterson)/ S.Res. 502 (Portman), Concerning the suspension of exit permit issuance by the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo for adopted Congolese children seeking to depart the country with their adoptive parents S. 1745 (Coons), Somalia Stabilization Act of 2013 H.Res. 573 and H.Res. 617 (Wilson), Condemning the abduction of female students by armed militants from the terrorist group known as Boko Haram in northeastern provinces of the Federal Republic of Nigeria; and S.Res. 433 (Landrieu) A resolution condemning the abduction of female students by armed militants from the Government Girls Secondary School in the northeastern province of Borno in the Federal Republic of Nigeria. H.Res. 601 (Franks) and S.Res. 453 (Rubio), Condemning the death sentence against Meriam Yahia Ibrahim Ishag, a Sudanese Christian woman accused of apostasy. S.Res. 375 (Coons), A resolution concerning the crisis in the Central African Republic and supporting United States and international efforts to end the violence, protect civilians, and address root causes of the conflict. North Africa-Related H.R. 301 (Wolf), To provide for the establishment of the Special Envoy to Promote Religious Freedom of Religious Minorities in the Near East and South Central Asia H.R. 4530 (Burgess)/ S. 1661 (Cruz), To require the Secretary of State to offer rewards of up to $5,000,000 for information regarding the attacks on the United States diplomatic mission at Benghazi, Libya, that began on September 11, 2012 H.R. 4599 (Duncan), To authorize the use of force against those nations, organizations, or persons responsible for the attack against United States personnel in Benghazi, Libya. H.Res. 567 (Sessions), Providing for the Establishment of the Select Committee on the Events Surrounding the 2012 Terrorist Attack in Benghazi. S. 1386 (Menendez), Chris Stevens, Sean Smith, Tyrone Woods, and Glen Doherty Embassy Security, Threat Mitigation, and Personnel Protection Act of 2013 H.R. 276 (Buchanan), To prohibit United States assistance to the country of Egypt H.R. 416 (Ros-Lehtinen), Egypt Accountability and Democracy Promotion Act H.R. 939 (Bentivolio), Support Democracy in Egypt Act H.R. 1039 (Fitzpatrick), To rescind unobligated amounts for foreign assistance to Egypt, and to appropriate funds for the Department of Defense tuition assistance program H.R. 1302 (Scott), To prohibit foreign military financing to Egypt H.R. 1922 (Gosar), Foreign Assistance Under Limitation and Transparency Act or the FAULT Act H.R. 2544 (Schweikert), Conditioning Economic Assistance and Support to Egypt Act or CEASE Act H.Res. 87 (Griffin), Expressing the sense of the House of Representatives that the President should suspend the delivery of F-16 fighter aircraft, M1 tanks, and other defense articles and defense services to the Government of Egypt S. 201 (Paul), A bill to prohibit the sale, lease, transfer, retransfer, or delivery of F-16 aircraft, M1 tanks, or certain other defense articles or services to the Government of Egypt S. 207 (Inhofe), A bill to restrict the sale, lease, transfer, retransfer, or delivery of F-16 aircraft, M1 tanks, or certain other defense articles or services to the Government of Egypt S. 984 (Toomey), Conditioning United States-Egypt Military Exercises Act of 2013 S. 1857 (Menendez), Egypt Assistance Reform Act of 2013 S. 2477 (Paul), Egyptian Military Coup Act of 2014 H.Res. 329 (Franks), Calling for the support of the fundamental rights of all Egyptian citizens, equal access to justice and due process of law, and transparent and accountable governance in Egypt Appendix C. Related CRS Products Selected Countries or Territories CRS Report RS21532, Algeria: Current Issues , by [author name scrubbed]. CRS Report R43166, Democratic Republic of Congo: Background and U.S. Policy , by [author name scrubbed]. CRS Report RL33003, Egypt: Background and U.S. Relations , by [author name scrubbed]. CRS Report R42967, U.S.-Kenya Relations: Current Political and Security Issues , by [author name scrubbed]. CRS Report RL33142, Libya: Transition and U.S. Policy , by [author name scrubbed]. CRS In Focus IF00031, Mali: Current Issues (In Focus), by [author name scrubbed]. CRS Report RS21579, Morocco: Current Issues , by [author name scrubbed]. CRS In Focus IF00030, Nigeria: Current Issues (In Focus), by [author name scrubbed]. CRS Report RL33964, Nigeria: Current Issues and U.S. Policy , by [author name scrubbed]. CRS In Focus IF00038, Rwanda: Current Issues (In Focus), by [author name scrubbed]. CRS Report R41369, Senegal: Background and U.S. Relations , by [author name scrubbed]. CRS Report R43130, South Africa: Politics, Economy, and U.S. Relations , by [author name scrubbed]. CRS In Focus IF00032, South Sudan: Current Issues (In Focus), by [author name scrubbed]. CRS In Focus IF00034, Sudan: Issues for Congress (In Focus), by [author name scrubbed]. CRS Report RS21666, Political Transition in Tunisia , by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed]. CRS Report RS20962, Western Sahara , by [author name scrubbed]. Peace, Security, and Human Rights CRS In Focus IF00029, U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) (In Focus), by [author name scrubbed]. CRS Report R43245, The September 2013 Terrorist Attack in Kenya: In Brief , by [author name scrubbed]. CRS Report R43558, Nigeria's Boko Haram: Frequently Asked Questions , by [author name scrubbed]. CRS Report R43377, Crisis in the Central African Republic , by [author name scrubbed]. CRS Report R43344, The Crisis in South Sudan , by [author name scrubbed]. CRS Video WVB00023, Conflict and Humanitarian Crisis in Africa: Central African Republic and South Sudan, by [author name scrubbed], [author name scrubbed], and [author name scrubbed]. CRS Report R42094, The Lord's Resistance Army: The U.S. Response , by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed]. CRS Report RL34395, International Illegal Trade in Wildlife: Threats and U.S. Policy , by Liana Rosen and [author name scrubbed]. CRS Report R42497, Trafficking in Persons: International Dimensions and Foreign Policy Issues for Congress , by Liana Rosen. Trade and Investment CRS In Focus IF00041, African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) (In Focus), by [author name scrubbed]. CRS Report R43173, African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA): Background and Reauthorization , by [author name scrubbed]. CRS Insight IN10015, Trade Africa Initiative, by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed]. CRS Report R43593, Powering Africa: Challenges of and U.S. Aid for Electrification in Africa , by [author name scrubbed] et al. Global Health, Humanitarian, and Social Issues and U.S. Foreign Aid CRS Report R43115, U.S. Global Health Assistance: FY2001-FY2015 Funding and Issues for Congress , by [author name scrubbed]. CRS Report R42776, The President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR): Funding Issues After a Decade of Implementation, FY2004-FY2013 , by [author name scrubbed]. CRS Report R42717, Global Access to Clean Drinking Water and Sanitation: U.S. and International Programs , by [author name scrubbed]. CRS Report R40213, Foreign Aid: An Introduction to U.S. Programs and Policy , by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed]. CRS Report R43569, State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs: FY2015 Budget and Appropriations , by [author name scrubbed], [author name scrubbed], and [author name scrubbed]. CRS Report R43043, State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs: FY2014 Budget and Appropriations , by [author name scrubbed], [author name scrubbed], and [author name scrubbed]. CRS Report R42827, Does Foreign Aid Work? Efforts to Evaluate U.S. Foreign Assistance , by [author name scrubbed]. CRS Report R41185, Foreign Aid: International Donor Coordination of Development Assistance , by [author name scrubbed]. CRS Report R41880, Foreign Assistance: Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs) , by [author name scrubbed]. CRS Report R41072, International Food Aid Programs: Background and Issues , by [author name scrubbed]. CRS Report RS21168, The Peace Corps: Current Issues , by [author name scrubbed]. CRS Report RL32427, Millennium Challenge Corporation , by [author name scrubbed]. CRS Report R41845, The Global Climate Change Initiative (GCCI): Budget Authority and Request, FY2010-FY2015 , by [author name scrubbed].

Summary: This report provides information about the early August 2014 U.S.-Africa Leaders Summit in Washington, DC, and policy issues likely to be addressed by participants in the summit and other events being held in conjunction with it. In providing background on key U.S.-Africa policy issues, the report addresses: Africa's development and economic challenges; U.S.-Africa trade, investment, and economic cooperation; U.S. aid to Africa; Governance, democracy, and human rights issues; and Peace and security issues, including selected U.S. responses. The summit is organized around the theme "Investing in the Next Generation." Summit participants—President Obama, the chairperson of the African Union, and an anticipated majority of African heads of state—will discuss investment issues, peace and security, governance, and other topics. No U.S.-African bilateral presidential meetings are planned, although Cabinet officials will hold bilateral meetings with some countries' leaders and summit side meetings on selected issues (e.g., the West African Ebola viral disease outbreak and regional terrorism challenges) are planned. All African heads of state, apart from four, were invited to the summit. The summit is designed to enable frank exchanges of ideas on which to base U.S.-African ties, rather than to formulate a set of pre-negotiated outcomes. The summit and associated events will highlight key goals in the Administration's 2012 Africa Strategy, which focuses on U.S. efforts to help African countries to foster: good governance; increased economic growth, trade, and investment, in partnership with U.S. firms; durable peace and security; and greater socioeconomic opportunity and development. There are some indications of bipartisan congressional support for the summit, as reflected by the introduction of S.Res. 522 (Coons, co-sponsored by Menendez, Corker, and Flake) on July 24. There will be one official congressional summit event, a reception, and several unofficial Capitol Hill discussion forums, in addition to dozens of other unofficial events, sponsored mostly by major firms, think tanks, non-profit advocacy groups, universities, and others. Key event topics include trade and investment, development, governance, and human rights. The summit focuses on the continent as a whole, both sub-Saharan Africa and North Africa, although the Administration's 2012 Africa Strategy focuses on sub-Saharan Africa alone. Likewise, sub-Saharan Africa is the main focus of this report, although some coverage of North Africa is included. The summit, the first such U.S.-hosted event, follows similar Africa summits hosted by China, France, the European Union, and others, and may be seen, in part, as a response to such events. No major new U.S. initiatives have been publicly announced ahead of the summit. The style of the U.S. summit distinguishes it from those held in other countries to date, which often culminate in pledges of large host financial commitments. This is notably the case for China, which has rapidly expanded economic and political ties with Africa in recent years. The summit has drawn some criticism focused on the lack of both "deliverables" and bilateral presidential engagement, resulting from the belief of some that inadequate attention will be focused on business deal-making, among other reasons. The report discusses some key social and economic issues in the region. This includes key development challenges—a need for health, education, and other social indicator improvements, especially catering to Africa's youthful population, and a need to address climatic and environmental shocks, among other ends. It also briefly addresses the recent positive shift in Africa's economic environment, including rapid economic growth and growing discretionary spending by consumers, while considering factors that may continue to limit business interest in the region. U.S. trade and investment aid programs, especially trade preferences and trade capacity building efforts under the African Growth and Opportunity Act, which expires in 2015 and may be reauthorized (as the report discusses), are also addressed, as is the nature of U.S. development aid. U.S. bilateral aid to Africa, funded at about $7 billion in FY2014 and supplemented by additional types of aid, including emergency humanitarian assistance, focuses on health, education, agriculture and food security, and, more recently, electrification. U.S. security assistance supports the professionalization of African militaries and the deployment of African peacekeeping troops. U.S. assistance to Africa is delivered largely under six major presidential initiatives, which the report discusses.