The federal bureaucracy of the present day is the product of more than two centuries of legislative and administrative actions by successive generations of elected and appointed officials. As such, the diverse organizations and processes of the federal government are a consequence of the influence and decisions of thousands of officials with differing viewpoints about the role of government and diverse policy preferences. The federal bureaucracy's organizational arrangements are also reflective of ongoing competition between Congress and the President to influence the behavior of agencies. With its size, complexity, and idiosyncratic history, the federal bureaucracy is sometimes perceived as immutable. Notwithstanding this perception, federal organizational structures and processes are under continual congressional and administrative study and alteration in response to changing contexts and priorities. Most changes in organizational arrangements occur deep within departments and agencies, affecting a small number of subunits and not attracting wide notice. Occasionally, broader, more widely known changes, such as a structural reorganization establishing a new department or a redelegation of responsibilities among agencies, are undertaken. These activities are expected developments in a government that is evolving and adapting in response to changing needs, policy priorities, political contexts, and technology, among other factors. Government reorganization is a process that may be undertaken in pursuit of administrative and political goals. Such activities have been associated with both potential benefits and potential drawbacks, some of which are discussed in a text box near the end of this report. As used in this report, the term reorganization is used to encompass the "purposeful (intended) changes in purpose, functions, procedures, assignments, and relationships in organizations." It involves more than just structural rearrangement of organizational units and personnel, and it can occur within agencies as well as among two or more agencies. Government reorganizations can also entail changes in interagency processes or the distribution of resources and functions among agencies. The government organizations that are the focus of this report are those that exercise significant federal legal authority. Primary constitutional responsibility for the structural organization of the executive branch of the federal government, as well as the creation of the principal components of that branch, rests with Congress. Moreover, Congress has long sought to promote efficiency, transparency, accountability, public participation, and economy in the operations of the executive departments, agencies, and other governmental entities through specifications of both government-wide and agency-specific processes. Key tools that Congress uses to shape the contours of the federal government include authorizing legislation, appropriations legislation, and oversight. The President has often played a leadership role in reorganization of the executive branch by transmitting proposals and advocating legislative action in public statements and private negotiations. Presidents and their appointed agency heads also have a variety of administrative tools at their disposal for making smaller-scale structural and procedural organizational changes. Each of these governing actors has tried to bridge divides between entities with shared missions, similar functions, or overlapping jurisdiction by establishing interagency coordinative mechanisms of one kind or another. Such mechanisms may be considered tools of reorganization in that they often lead to changes in procedures, assignments, and relationships within and between organizations. This report begins with discussions of some tools available to Congress, the President, and agency leaders for initiation and implementation of executive branch reorganization. It then discusses interagency coordinative mechanisms that are sometimes used by each of these actors to bridge interorganizational gaps. The report concludes with general observations regarding federal reorganization efforts. Reorganizations that exceed the boundaries of one department or agency, or that are inconsistent with existing law, generally are accomplished through the legislative process. Consequently, Congress has a fundamental role in shaping and reshaping the federal agency landscape. It creates, structures, and locates or relocates offices; delegates to them specific or general missions, powers, duties, and functions; defines the parameters of personnel systems; confirms an agency's leadership; provides funding; and ultimately evaluates whether or not an agency shall continue in existence. At times, Congress has also specified, in statute, organizational process requirements, such as those that shape decisionmaking and coordination. Reorganization legislation may be initiated by Members, congressional committees, or the President, with proposals by the latter transmitted to Congress and introduced as a courtesy. Once introduced in the House or Senate, such legislation is routinely referred to each chamber's government operations committee: the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, and the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs. In the House, reorganization legislation may also be referred concurrently or sequentially to other committees with jurisdiction over the affected agencies and programs. The President may attempt to influence the development of reorganization legislation, including by threatening its veto. Efforts carried out through the statutory process can be narrowly targeted or far-reaching. Many reorganization proposals that have become law have been developed through hearings and antecedent legislative initiatives over the course of several Congresses. In addition, galvanizing events have sometimes created political climates favorable to structural reorganizations. For example, this was the case during the 2003 establishment of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks in 2001. In some cases, Congress has changed organizational arrangements within a department or agency by shifting funding and functions between offices. In 1987, for example, such an effort was undertaken in the House, with regard to the Agriculture Department appropriations act for FY1988. In this case, a Member sought to defund an assistant secretary office completely; in a compromise, funding for the assistant secretary position was maintained, but most of the funds and functions were shifted to the Office of the Secretary. According to the 1987 CQ Almanac, At the urging of Jamie L. Whitten, ... chairman of the House Appropriations Committee and its subcommittee on Agriculture, the House provided no administrative funds for the assistant secretary [for natural resources], who had authority over the Forest Service and the Soil Conservation Service. Whitten had long complained that the administration was trying to do away with traditional agricultural conservation programs in favor of a new Conservation Reserve Program that paid farmers to take erodible land out of production. He expressed his wrath by "z eroing out" the pay and office expenses of Assistant Secretary George S. Dunlop, although Whitten insisted he had "nothing personal" against him. Dunlop was staff director of the Senate Agriculture Committee under its previous chairman, Jesse Helms.... Whitten ultimately agreed to a compromise creating a new office of assistant secretary for unspecified "special purposes," funded at $416,000—the level earmarked by the Senate for the natural resources position. But the new office was given no authority over the Soil Conservation Service or the Forest Service. The directors of those agencies were required to report directly to the agriculture secretary. The provision regarding the Office of the Secretary in the resulting statute reflects this change. It begins, For necessary expenses of the Office of the Secretary of Agriculture, including the direct supervision of the Soil Conservation Service and the Forest Service. As noted below, under " Congressional Responses to Particular Agency Head Actions ," Congress has also used the appropriations process as a means of blocking or shaping administrative reorganizations initiated by the President or agency heads. As noted above, the President has often played a leadership role in reorganization of the executive branch by transmitting proposals and advocating legislative action in public statements and private negotiations. The President may also direct members of his Administration to conduct reorganizations using the authorities discussed below (" Agency Tools "). In some instances, Presidents have used executive orders to direct the establishment of offices. In addition, the President can redelegate functions that have been vested in him by Congress, as discussed below. Finally, Congress has sometimes delegated to the President circumscribed authority to conduct time- and agency-specific reorganization activities. During the middle of the 20 th century, Congress sometimes enacted so-called "presidential reorganization authority," which provided for a fast-track legislative process, led by the President, for certain reorganization activities. This authority is no longer operative, but it is discussed below nonetheless because it was an important mechanism for reorganization during the period in which it was in effect, and many reorganization plans from that era underpin current organizational arrangements in the executive branch. Where functions are statutorily vested in the President, they may be delegated and redelegated under authority provided in Section 301 of Title 3 of the U.S. Code . This provision states, The President of the United States is authorized to designate and empower the head of any department or agency in the executive branch, or any official thereof who is required to be appointed by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, to perform without approval, ratification, or other action by the President (1) any function which is vested in the President by law, or (2) any function which such officer is required or authorized by law to perform only with or subject to the approval, ratification, or other action of the President: Provided, That nothing contained herein shall relieve the President of his responsibility in office for the acts of any such head or other official designated by him to perform such functions. Such designation and authorization shall be in writing, shall be published in the Federal Register, shall be subject to such terms, conditions, and limitations as the President may deem advisable, and shall be revocable at any time by the President in whole or in part. By redelegating such functions, the President can effect a reorganization of authorities among executive branch agencies. The Administration cannot move the funds and other resources that might be necessary to carry out such functions among budget accounts, however, unless Congress provides transfer authority to do so. Through statute, Congress has sometimes provided the President with circumscribed authority to plan and implement a specified reorganization. Statutes providing such authority have specified, for example, the entity or entities within the executive branch that may be affected, the duration of the authority, and the means by which the President's plan may be modified. Congress has used this tool at least twice to empower the President to make organizational refinements during a statutory reorganization involving several agencies. Congress provided authority of this type in the Foreign Affairs Agencies Consolidation Act of 1998, for example. The applicable provision directed the President to submit to the appropriate congressional committees, within 60 days of enactment, a plan and a report regarding reorganizations of specified foreign affairs-related agencies. It also specified elements that were to be included in the plan and in the report. The provision permitted the President to modify the plan "on the basis of consultations with the appropriate congressional committees" until the plan's effective date. Congress provided similar authority of this type to the President in the Homeland Security Act of 2002, which established the Department of Homeland Security. Section 1502 of the act directed the President to submit to the appropriate congressional committees, within 60 days after enactment, a reorganization plan regarding the "transfer of agencies, personnel, assets, and obligations to the Department" pursuant to the act and "any consolidation, reorganization, or streamlining of agencies transferred to the Department" under the act. As with the authority discussed above, the provision specified plan elements that were to be included and a process for modifying the plan after congressional consultations during the period between submission and the plan's effective date. Between 1932 and 1984, Congress periodically delegated authority to the President that allowed him to develop plans for reorganization of portions of the federal government and to present those plans to Congress for consideration under special expedited procedures. The statute is no longer in effect, however. Prior to 1983, under these procedures, the President's plan would go into effect unless one or both houses of Congress passed a resolution rejecting the plan, a process referred to as a "legislative veto." This process favored the President's plan because, absent congressional action, the default was for the plan to go into effect. Unlike the dynamics under the regular legislative process, the burden of action under these versions of presidential reorganization authority rested with opponents rather than supporters of the plan. Presidents used this presidential reorganization authority regularly, submitting more than 100 plans between 1932 and 1984. The plans proposed a variety of changes, from relatively minor reorganizations within individual agencies to the creation of large new organizations, including the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW) in 1953; the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) in 1970; and an independent Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) in 1979. The terms of the delegation varied greatly over the century; in general, Congress tended to provide more restrictive versions of presidential reorganization authority over time. In 1983, the Supreme Court ruled in INS v. Chadha that the legislative veto process was unconstitutional. Subsequently, Congress approved the Reorganization Act Amendments of 1984, which extended the presidential reorganization authority from November 1984 to December 31, 1984. Under this authority, once the President submitted a reorganization plan, Congress was to consider, under an expedited procedure, a joint resolution approving the plan. The expedited procedure included limitations on the duration of committee consideration, the duration of floor debate, and amendments (although the President could amend or modify his plan during the first 60 days after submission). As a joint resolution, this vehicle had to be approved by the President to have the force of law. Unlike the legislative veto, the burden of action was placed on the proponents of the plan, rather than its opponents. As is the case under the regular legislative process, the default would be the status quo. The process of reorganizing the government was thus made somewhat more difficult than it would have been under earlier versions of presidential reorganization authority. This last statutory provision of presidential reorganization authority was never used, and it lapsed at the end of 1984. In the decades since this authority last expired, some presidential administrations have advocated for its restoration, and some have not. Neither the Reagan Administration, which did not use the authority in 1984, nor the George H. W. Bush Administration sought its extension. Initial reports issued by the Clinton Administration's National Performance Review included the recommendation that the reorganization authority be reauthorized, but President Clinton did not directly request this action from Congress. The George W. Bush Administration called for a renewal of presidential reorganization authority, and legislation introduced during the 108 th Congress included provisions that would have renewed the authority in modified form. This legislation was not enacted. President Barack Obama also called for a renewal of the authority, and legislation introduced during the 112 th Congress would have provided for a modified version. As was the case in the earlier legislative effort, the legislation was not enacted. In general, department heads have discretion, consistent with existing statutory mandates, to organize and manage the day-to-day operations of the organizations for which they are responsible. In addition, since the 1950s, the powers, duties, and functions of the component offices of most agencies have been vested in the agency head, who is, in turn, empowered to delegate these powers, duties, and authorities. Furthermore, Section 301 of Title 5 of the U.S. Code provides that the "head of an Executive department or military department may prescribe regulations for the government of his department, the conduct of its employees, the distribution and performance of its business." These authorities do not, however, supersede or conflict with specific statutory directives, limitations, or organizational arrangements. Congress has sometimes delineated secretarial reorganization authority for individual departments. In such cases, the scope and limitations of the Secretary's authority are more specific. For example, the Homeland Security Act of 2002, which established the Department of Homeland Security, granted the Secretary relatively broad reorganization authority: The Secretary may allocate or reallocate functions among the officers of the Department, and may establish, consolidate, alter, or discontinue organizational units with the Department, but only ... after the expiration of 60 days after providing notice of such action to the appropriate congressional committees, which shall include an explanation of the rationale for the action.... [This authority] does not extend to the abolition of any agency, entity, organizational unit, program, or function established or required to be maintained by statute. The first part of this provision arguably widens the scope of potential reorganizational actions beyond the range that would otherwise be available to the Secretary. In addition, it requires that Congress be informed in advance of an action under this authority, but includes no mechanism for congressional "veto" of that action. The final part of the cited provision explicitly prevents the Secretary from overriding statutes for the purpose of abolishing entities, programs, or functions. When an agency head has reorganized a portion of his or her agency under such delegated authority, Congress has, on occasion, endorsed the action without giving it statutory underpinnings. For example, Congress has sometimes validated an agency reorganization through the appropriations process, by adjusting the agency's appropriation to match the new configuration or by addressing the action in the conference report. In one such instance, the conference report for DHS appropriations included the following text: On July 13, 2005, the Department announced a major reorganization that reflects the findings of [an internal departmental review]. A budget amendment was submitted on July 21, 2005, requesting the appropriations structure be modified for fiscal year 2006 to reflect this reorganization proposal. For the most part, the conferees have complied with these requests. The conferees concur with the Department's decision to abolish the Office of the Under Secretary for Border and Transportation Security (BTS); BTS functions have been merged into other offices and component agencies throughout the Department. The conferees have agreed to split the Directorate of Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection into two new components—Analysis and Operations and the Preparedness Directorate—and move all State and local grants and associated activities to the new Preparedness Directorate. The conferees concur with the Secretary's recommendation to transfer the Federal Air Marshals to the Transportation Security Administration. Finally, the conferees have included and expanded the roles and responsibilities of the Office of Policy. A more detailed discussion of this reorganization is contained under statement of managers language for each impacted office. Similarly, Congress has recognized some newly created entities by delegating to them specific authorities, or otherwise making reference to them in statute. On the other hand, Congress can also register its disapproval of a reorganization by appropriating little or no funding for a new entity, by placing a limitation on related expenditures in appropriations bill language, by condemning the action in conference report language, or by redelegating authority to competing organizations. As a general matter, agency heads are limited in their reorganization actions by the provisions of the authorizing statute for the agencies they head. In some cases, Congress also has selectively limited secretarial reorganization authority by statute. For example, the Secretary of Energy is "authorized to establish, alter, consolidate or discontinue such organizational units or components within the Department as he may deem to be necessary or appropriate." This authority does not, however, extend to the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), which is located within the Department of Energy. Instead, Congress elected to delegate the authority to reorganize NNSA to the administrator of that organization. Likewise, although the Secretary of Homeland Security has the statutory authority, under Section 872 of the Homeland Security Act, to reorganize most parts of DHS, the Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act of 2006 exempts FEMA from that authority. In a related example, the Homeland Security Act transferred the U.S. Coast Guard to the Department of Homeland Security as a "distinct entity." In doing so, it explicitly provided that "the authorities, functions, and capabilities of the Coast Guard to perform its missions shall be maintained intact and without significant reduction after the transfer" and that [n]o mission, function, or asset (including for purposes of this subsection any ship, aircraft, or helicopter) of the Coast Guard may be diverted to the principal and continuing use of any other organization, unit, or entity of the Department, except for details or assignments that do not reduce the Coast Guard's capability to perform its missions. An appropriations limitation with regard to the reorganization authority of the Secretary of Homeland Security illustrates another tool Congress has used to generally proscribe such activity. Beginning in May 2007, Congress limited the use of appropriated funds for carrying out the Section 872 reorganizations described above. Section 3501 of the U.S. Troop Readiness, Veterans' Care, Katrina Recovery, and Iraq Accountability Appropriations Act, 2007, enacted on May 25, 2007, instituted such limitations for the balance of FY2007, stating, None of the funds provided in this Act, or P.L. 109-295 [Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2007], shall be available to carry out section 872 of P.L. 107-296 [Homeland Security Act of 2002]. Succeeding DHS appropriations acts included similar provisions. However, such an appropriation limitation was not included in the DHS appropriations for FY2017. For some agencies, appropriations legislation has included language limiting the use of funds for reorganization activities, for the agencies covered by the act, without consulting, or gaining the approval of, the two Committees on Appropriations. One such act provides as follows: Except as otherwise provided in this Act, none of the funds provided in this Act, provided by previous appropriations Acts to the agencies or entities funded in this Act that remain available for obligation or expenditure in fiscal year 2017, or provided from any accounts in the Treasury derived by the collection of fees and available to the agencies funded by this Act, shall be available for obligation or expenditure through a reprogramming of funds that: (1) creates a new program; (2) eliminates a program, project, or activity; (3) increases funds or personnel for any program, project, or activity for which funds have been denied or restricted by the Congress; (4) proposes to use funds directed for a specific activity by the Committee on Appropriations of either the House of Representatives or the Senate for a different purpose; (5) augments existing programs, projects, or activities in excess of $5,000,000 or 10 percent, whichever is less; (6) reduces existing programs, projects, or activities by $5,000,000 or 10 percent, whichever is less; or (7) creates or reorganizes offices, programs, or activities unless prior approval is received from the Committees on Appropriations of the House of Representatives and the Senate: Provided, That prior to any significant reorganization or restructuring of offices, programs, or activities, each agency or entity funded in this Act shall consult with the Committees on Appropriations of the House of Representatives and the Senate.... Federal government observers have identified potential duplication, overlap, and fragmentation of programs as areas of concern in executive branch organization. These concerns received renewed focus in the GPRA Modernization Act of 2010. Among other things, this statute established new processes related to setting goals and measuring performance in crosscutting policy areas, reflecting congressional interest in better coordination and cooperation among federal agencies in addressing issues that transcend any one agency's boundaries. Each of the three major governing actors discussed in this report—Congress, the President, and agency heads—has tried to bridge the interagency (and, sometimes, intra-agency) divide by establishing interagency coordinative mechanisms of one kind or another. Arguably, a mechanism set by statute could be more durable across Administrations, while one established by executive order reflects the incumbent President's interest and authority. An agency head's directive might be used to establish a working group to communicate across within-agency silos that are unique to that agency. Interagency coordinative mechanisms are often used in an effort to establish cooperation among agencies with shared missions, similar functions, or overlapping jurisdiction. Some arrangements provide for collaboration among equals, while others designate a lead agency with authority to direct activities. In many cases, interagency coordinative mechanisms lead to changes in procedures, assignments, and relationships within and between organizations. In this way, they are tools of reorganization. They are particularly noteworthy for their widespread use and generally low profile. Such mechanisms include, for example, interagency working groups, task forces, joint decisionmaking processes, memoranda of understanding (MOUs), and White House coordinators. These arrangements sometimes exist informally, but numerous arrangements have also been established formally by public law, executive order, administrative directive, or MOU. Among other effects, such formal agreements and directives may be helpful in clarifying relationships among different agencies that have overlapping jurisdiction or shared responsibilities, because such arrangements fall outside the control of any single agency head. Interagency coordinative groups, as well as other mechanisms, can address organizational problems while avoiding some of the potential pitfalls of a structural reorganization. Where effective, for example, such a group might reduce unnecessary policy fragmentation, improve policy formulation and implementation, provide a forum for mitigating misunderstanding and conflict among agencies, reduce unnecessary redundancy, increase efficiency, and facilitate oversight and accountability. It might also help program implementers to work around vague or imprecise legislative language, or statutory limitations on individual agencies that might hamstring effective or efficient administration of a shared program. In some circumstances, such arrangements might be used temporarily to facilitate effective implementation of a law with known imperfections until such time as Congress develops legislative remedies. Interagency coordinative groups are not always perceived as beneficial, however. In some cases, a coordinative entity could be perceived as too powerful, if it has substantial authority over others. Such arrangements might undercut existing programs or offices in one or more participating agencies. The effectiveness of a particular arrangement might be limited by a lack of control over budgetary or other resources. Such limitations might be especially troubling to agencies and congressional committees that lose jurisdiction. Some mechanisms might also be perceived as additional layers of bureaucracy, imposing greater costs and using scarce resources without demonstrating added value. In some cases, coordinative entities may become self-perpetuating and endure beyond the period during which they are needed or useful. As noted above, a memorandum of understanding might be used to establish an arrangement among agencies, or it might be a coordinative mechanism in and of itself. The interagency coordination it establishes could result in a reorganization of procedures, assignments, and relationships between agencies. Such agreements are common among agencies. Where two or more agencies have overlapping or closely related responsibilities, such an agreement might be used to specify the division of responsibility, establish processes or structured protocols for sharing information, and make mutual, lasting commitments for cooperating in a shared policy area. As noted by an observer of these agreements, they might serve one or more different purposes: (1) delineating jurisdictional lines, (2) establishing procedures for information sharing or information production, (3) agreeing to collaborate in a common mission, (4) coordinating reviews or approvals where more than one agency has authority to act in a particular substantive area, and (5) in rarer cases (and potentially subject to additional procedures under the Administrative Procedure Act) ... agreeing on substantive policy. Alternatively, agencies might enter into more formal interagency agreements or contracts. In some instances where interagency MOUs or contracts shift significant responsibilities for carrying out statutory functions from one agency to another, congressional action might be necessary to authorize or appropriate accompanying shifts in resources. Another kind of interagency mechanism might be used to increase adherence to the President's policy direction. Modern Presidents have sometimes tried to coordinate policy development and implementation among departments and agencies from the White House. To the extent that such efforts shift the locus of authority and decisionmaking from one agency to another, they might be considered reorganization actions. Presidents have, for example, sometimes appointed high-level presidential advisors and given them such a role. Such advisors have been referred to, by the Administration in some cases, and by the media, as "czars." The precise role and authority of such individuals in the policy development and implementation processes is often difficult for Congress and the public to discern. In some cases, this lack of clarity of role and authority and the perceived lack of accountability to Congress have been the source of controversy. Government reorganization is often cast in terms of potential administrative benefits. For example, whenever Congress has delegated general reorganization authority to the President (see " Presidential Reorganization Authority " above), it has clearly stated in the statutory provisions that the objective of reorganization is administrative improvement, and it has often required that reorganization plans submitted by the President articulate the plan's means of achieving such improvements. Administrative goals of reorganization include, for example, improved program effectiveness, greater efficiency, reduced cost, and improved policy integration across related programs. In addition to these administrative goals, reorganization efforts often have spoken or unspoken political goals and outcomes. The political nature of reorganization arises from the fact that it redistributes power and resources. Although it may have beneficial outcomes over time, it is axiomatic that a government reorganization is disruptive, at least in the short term, to the functioning of the organizations involved. Implementation of a reorganization plan can affect existing power dynamics, rearrange relationships, create uncertainty, and generally interrupt the flow of work. Government workers in the reorganized agencies will often be the most directly affected, but congressional committees of jurisdiction and outside interest groups are affected as well. These parties, including policy advocates, usually work toward obtaining the organizational outcome most beneficial to their own particular interests. Such efforts may continue through the implementation phase of the reorganization, where the distribution of power and resources may be decided in finer detail. Government reorganizations have potential benefits and drawbacks, some of which are identified in the text box below. The vantage point of the observer might influence the degree to which a particular reorganization is viewed as beneficial. For example, increased independence for a regulatory entity might be seen as beneficial by those who think that regulatory activities are best carried out with insulation from day-to-day political considerations and from the policy preferences of any one Administration. Others might view such independence as an unwarranted abridgement of the President's role in controlling and directing the executive branch bureaucracy. In addition, observers with different perspectives might weight potential benefits and drawbacks differently. For example, one observer might view potential efficiencies that might be gained from a reorganization to be insufficient to outweigh the disruption of functioning that the associated activities are expected to entail, while another observer might regard anticipated short-term disruption to be a small price to pay for the benefits of what is perceived to be long-overdue updating of an agency's mission and operations. Research suggests that successful governmental reorganizations—statutory or otherwise—are characterized by political consensus on the goals and approaches. Where goals are unarticulated or consensus has not been achieved prior to a reorganization, affected interests may intentionally or unintentionally undermine the success of the new arrangement. The result of such a situation may be instability leading to further reorganization within a relatively short time. Political consensus concerning new organizational arrangements may be achieved, in part, through negotiation and accommodation among affected interests. In an effort to achieve such consensus, a reorganization directive or statute might articulate its goals. Identifying these goals could also aid in determining, after implementation, whether or not they have been achieved. Reorganization directives or statutes might also include agreed-upon methods for assessing progress toward those goals. Absent such explicit goals and agreed-upon methods, Congress may find it difficult to evaluate the success or failure of a particular reorganization project.

Summary: The federal bureaucracy of the present day is the product of more than two centuries of legislative and administrative actions by successive generations of elected and appointed officials. As such, the diverse organizations and processes of the federal government are a consequence of the influence and decisions of thousands of officials with differing viewpoints about the role of government and diverse policy preferences. The federal bureaucracy's organizational arrangements are also reflective of ongoing competition between Congress and the President to influence the behavior of agencies. With its size, complexity, and idiosyncratic history, the federal bureaucracy is sometimes perceived as immutable. Notwithstanding this perception, federal organizational structures and processes are under continual congressional and administrative study and alteration in response to changing contexts and priorities. The term reorganization may be defined to encompass the intended alterations in the purpose, functions, procedures, assignments, and relationships within and among organizations. It involves more than just structural rearrangement of organizational units and personnel, and it can occur within agencies as well as among two or more agencies. Government reorganizations can also entail changes in interagency processes or the distribution of resources and functions among agencies. The government organizations that are the focus of this report are those that exercise significant federal legal authority. Primary constitutional responsibility for the structural organization of the executive branch of the federal government, as well as the creation of the principal components of that branch, rests with Congress. Congress also has delimited the operations of the executive departments, agencies, and other governmental entities through specifications of both government-wide and agency-specific processes. Key tools that Congress uses to shape the contours of the federal government include authorizing legislation, appropriations legislation, and oversight. The President has often played a leadership role in reorganization of the executive branch by transmitting proposals and advocating legislative action in public statements and private negotiations. Presidents and their appointed agency heads also have a variety of administrative tools at their disposal for making structural and procedural organizational changes that are not in conflict with statutes. In addition to the tools just mentioned, each of the three major governing actors discussed in this report—Congress, the President, and agency heads—has tried to address the challenge of coordination across organizational boundaries by establishing interagency coordinative mechanisms of one kind or another. These are often used in an effort to establish cooperation among agencies with shared missions, similar functions, or overlapping jurisdiction. Some arrangements provide for collaboration among equals, while others designate a lead agency with authority to direct activities. This report discusses some tools available to Congress, the President, and agency leaders, respectively, for initiation and implementation of executive branch reorganization. It also discusses the interagency coordinative mechanisms that are sometimes used by each of these actors to bridge interorganizational gaps. The report concludes with general observations regarding federal reorganization efforts.