Calls to reform the UN began soon after its creation in 1945. Despite cycles of reform, UN member states continue to have concerns about inefficient management operations. As the largest contributor of 192 member states, the United States has played a significant role in promoting UN management reform, including calling for various financial and administrative changes. The United States, through the Department of State in Washington, D.C., and the U.S. Mission to the United Nations in New York, continues to advocate reform of UN management processes. In July 1997, the Secretary-General proposed a broad reform agenda to transform the UN into an efficient organization focused on achieving results as it carried out its mandates. In May 2000, we reported that while the Secretary-General had substantially reorganized the Secretariat’s leadership and structure, he had not yet completed reforms in human resource management and planning and budgeting. In September 2002, to encourage the full implementation of the 1997 reforms, the Secretary- General released a second set of reform initiatives, some expanding on those introduced in 1997 and others reflecting new priorities. In February 2004, we reported that 60 percent of the 88 reform initiatives in the 1997 agenda and 38 percent of the 66 initiatives in the 2002 agenda were in place. In 2004 and 2005, a series of UN and expert task force reports recommended a comprehensive reform of UN management and the UN human rights apparatus. In September 2005, world leaders gathered at the UN World Summit in New York to discuss global issues such as UN reform, development, and human rights, as well as actions needed in each of these areas. The outcome document from the World Summit, endorsed by all members of the UN, outlines broad UN reform efforts in areas such as oversight and accountability and human rights. The document also called for the Secretary-General to submit proposals for implementing reforms to improve management functions of the Secretariat. In April 2006, we reported on weaknesses in the UN’s oversight and procurement systems, both of which have been identified as important areas for reform. We found that UN funding arrangements constrained the ability of the UN Secretariat’s Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) to operate independently and direct resources toward high-risk areas as needed. In addition, we found serious weaknesses in procurement internal controls. Specifically, the UN lacked an effective organizational structure for managing procurement, had not demonstrated a commitment to improving its procurement workforce, and had not adopted specific ethics guidance. In October 2006, we reported slow progress in five key UN management reform areas—management operations of the Secretariat, oversight, ethics, review of programs and activities (known as mandates), and human rights. Numerous reform proposals were either awaiting General Assembly review or had been recently approved, and many of the proposed or approved reforms lacked an implementation plan with time frames and cost estimates for the goals stated in the 2005 outcome document. We also identified several factors that could affect the UN’s ability to fully implement management reforms, including (1) disagreements among member states about the implications of the reforms, (2) the difficulty of holding managers accountable for completing reform efforts due to the absence of time frames and cost estimates, and (3) administrative policies and procedures that could complicate the implementation process. Since October 2006, the progress of UN management reform efforts has varied from little or no progress to substantial progress in the five areas we reviewed—ethics, oversight, procurement, management operations of the Secretariat, and review of programs and activities (known as mandates). The UN has taken steps to improve organizational ethics since the fall of 2006. In the past year, the ethics office has hired a permanent director and additional staff and has developed and provided ethics standards, training, and guidance. The office has begun to enforce a whistleblower protection policy, but concerns have been raised about the policy’s lack of jurisdiction over UN funds and programs and weaknesses in the UN’s internal justice system. Finally, the ethics office has collected financial disclosure forms for 2005 and 2006 and a private consultant has begun to review them, but the review has been delayed by the development of an e- filing system for the forms. Progress on UN ethics reform is shown in figure 1. In the past year, the UN has made substantial progress in staffing its ethics office by hiring a permanent director and additional permanent staff. In the fall of 2006, we reported concerns of UN experts that the newly created UN ethics office was insufficiently staffed with a temporary director and four professional and two administrative staff members. In May 2007, a new director of the ethics office was appointed to a 3-year term. As of October 2007, the ethics office had six professional and three administrative staff. At that time, the director of the office told us the office had sufficient staff to carry out its responsibilities. As of October 2007, the UN ethics office had made some progress in developing and circulating ethics standards and guidance and had begun to develop a systemwide code of ethics. The office reported that it had received 287 requests for services from staff at different levels of the Secretariat between August 2006 and July 2007, including ethics advice on issues such as potential and actual conflicts of interest, protection against retaliation for reporting misconduct, and training. The ethics office has increased ethics training within the organization, including half-day ethics training workshops for over 3,000 staff members at all levels of the Secretariat and consultations on the acceptance and disposal of gifts received by staff in their official capacity. The office has also developed new ethics standards, such as postemployment restrictions standards. In May 2007, the ethics office published, and disseminated throughout the Secretariat, the booklet Working Together: Putting Ethics to Work. This guide highlights the main challenges to professional and ethical conduct, clarifies the reasons behind ethical standards in the context of the UN’s mission and values, and provides staff with resources to put ethical principles to use, such as contact information for reporting abuse. In addition, in August 2007, the office published four brochures that have been used in outreach, training, and communication activities. The ethics office has begun to develop a systemwide code of ethics for all UN personnel, including those of UN bodies and agencies other than the Secretariat as requested by the General Assembly in the 2005 World Summit outcome document. The director of the ethics office told us the development of a systemwide code of ethics was one of his top priorities and would be undertaken in the near future, in consultation with staff and management from multiple UN entities. The UN has made substantial progress in enforcing a whistleblower protection policy. The ethics office has begun receiving complaints of retaliation, and several concerns have arisen during the handling of cases. Between August 1, 2006, and July 31, 2007, the ethics office received 52 complaints of whistleblower retaliation. After its initial assessment, the ethics office determined that 16 complaints warranted a preliminary review. Of these 16, the ethics office referred two cases to OIOS for further investigation following a determination that a prima facie case of retaliation had been established. Of the remaining 36 complaints, the ethics office determined that 19 fell outside the scope of its responsibilities and/or referred them to other offices, and provided advice and guidance on more appropriate actions to address 11 complaints. In addition, the office was copied on six complaints that were primarily addressed to other offices or departments in the UN; in these instances, the ethics office keeps track of and follows up on any pending action by other offices. UN and State officials have raised concerns regarding the UN’s whistleblower protection policy. Officials from the ethics office and a nonprofit public interest group, the Government Accountability Project, informed us that the success of the UN’s whistleblower protection policy could be, in part, dependent on successful reform of the UN’s internal justice system. UN and Government Accountability Project staff told us that some UN staff members might not trust the current system to be fair or impartial and, consequently, might not come forward with claims of retaliation. In its August 2007 annual activities report, the ethics office expressed a concern that it had not had an opportunity to provide input into its role in the proposed new internal justice system in relation to other offices, such as OIOS and the Office of the Ombudsman, and the office expressed the importance of its inclusion in the justice reform process. UN and State officials told us another concern about the whistleblower protection policy is its lack of jurisdiction over UN funds and programs. In August 2007, after initially reviewing a whistleblower retaliation case of an employee at the UN Development Program, the ethics office and the Office of Legal and Procurement Services concluded that the UN’s whistleblower protection policy applies only to employees directly under the Secretary-General. They also concluded that the office has no formal jurisdiction over various UN funds and programs, including the UN Development Program. UN and State officials told us that the whistleblower protection policy is limited in its effectiveness if it is not applied to the entire UN system. Similarly, the Government Accountability Project has criticized the effectiveness of the current UN whistleblower protection policy and recommended that the jurisdiction of the ethics office be extended to UN funds and programs and possibly to specialized agencies. In his August 2007 report on the activities of the ethics office, the Secretary-General recommended that the General Assembly consider broadening the jurisdiction of the ethics office to cover all UN entities and to provide further guidance on this issue. The UN has made some progress in collecting and analyzing financial disclosure forms for 2005 and 2006. Financial disclosure forms have been collected from UN staff members, and a private contractor has begun to review them. The primary purpose of the financial disclosure program is to identify potential conflicts of interest arising from staff members’ financial holdings, private affiliations, or outside activities and to provide advice when conflicts are found. About 1,700 staff members were required to file financial disclosure or declaration of interest statements for 2005. About 98 percent of staff complied, and the remaining 2 percent were referred to the Office of Human Resources Management for disciplinary action. A total of 2,548 staff members were required to file forms for 2006. The office reported that the increase in staff required to file likely reflects an increased awareness of the program by the heads of departments and their staff members. In addition, as a confidence-building measure, the current UN Secretary-General and Deputy Secretary-General voluntarily made their recent financial disclosure forms public. The financial disclosure statements for 2005 were reviewed by a private contractor and analyzed to determine any potential conflicts of interest between the staff members’ confidentially disclosed private interests and their official duties and responsibilities. In May 2007, the contractor identified potential conflicts of interest in 17 of the cases reviewed, or about 1 percent. Of these cases, 14 staff members accepted the advice of the private contractor to address the potential conflict and 3 cases were referred to the ethics office for final resolution due to disagreements with the contractor. The 2006 review is not yet complete. The deadline for submitting forms for 2006 was delayed until May 31, 2007, as a consequence of the development of an online e-filing system. In order to enhance efficiencies and standardize procedures, the private contractor developed an online e-filing system in liaison with the ethics office to simplify and expedite filing requirements. The director of the ethics office told us that the process for the 2006 review was ongoing, and, as a result, the compliance rate was not finalized as of September 2007. The ethics office plans to review the online financial disclosure form and accompanying guidelines in consultation with other UN offices to decide whether modifications need to be made. In addition, the office reported that it is conducting a review to determine whether financial disclosures should be required of officials other than those of the Secretariat. Steps have been taken to improve UN oversight capabilities. After almost 2 years of discussions that included negotiating its composition and responsibilities, member states established an Independent Audit Advisory Committee (IAAC) in June 2007. Since our October 2006 report, OIOS has worked to improve the capacity of individual divisions, including internal audit and investigations. However, UN funding arrangements continue to constrain OIOS’s ability to audit high-risk areas, and the General Assembly has not authorized OIOS’s financial and operational independence. Progress on UN oversight reform is shown in figure 2. The UN has made some progress in creating IAAC, but the committee is not expected to be operational until January 2008. In June 2007, member states established IAAC to provide an external, independent assessment of UN oversight capabilities based on best practices in the private sector as well as the experiences of other international institutions. In approving the creation of IAAC in June 2007, the General Assembly also established the committee’s terms of reference. These terms include the following guidelines and requirements: membership of 5 individuals, preferably from a pool of at least 10 candidates proposed by member states, based on regional and geographical representation and selected by the General Assembly; an evaluation process for candidates through consultations with an external relevant institution, such as the International Organization of Supreme Audit Institutions; and membership appointment for a term of 3 years, with the possibility of one- time re-election. The IAAC’s responsibilities include, but are not limited to examining OIOS’s work plan, taking into account the work plans of the other UN oversight bodies; reviewing the adequacy of OIOS’s budget, taking into account OIOS’s work plan; advising on the effectiveness, efficiency, and impact of OIOS’s audit and advising the General Assembly on potential oversight issues based on review of UN financial statements and Board of Auditors reports. The guidelines and requirements represent a compromise among the member states, according to member state representatives and State Department officials. Member states disagreed on some of the initially proposed responsibilities of IAAC. For example, the United States and several other countries had originally favored that candidates for membership be referred by the International Organization of Supreme Audit Institutions and that members not be eligible for re-election. Other member states disagreed. In addition, State wanted IAAC to be responsible for assessing the work of all UN oversight bodies, including the UN Board of Auditors and the UN Joint Inspection Unit. However, both of these bodies strongly resisted having IAAC oversee their respective functions, and it was ultimately decided that IAAC would focus primarily on the work of OIOS while taking into account the work plans of the other UN oversight bodies. State Department officials told us they were satisfied overall with the creation of IAAC despite the various compromises. The five members of the newly created IAAC were elected in November 2007, and the committee is expected to be operational in January 2008. The UN has made some progress in strengthening the Office of Internal Oversight Services. The office has strengthened the capacity of its internal audit, investigation, and evaluations and inspections sections. However, OIOS funding arrangements continue to hinder its operational independence. Since our last report, OIOS has strengthened the capacity of its internal audit, investigation, and evaluations and inspections sections. For example, OIOS created nine new audit posts for its internal audit division and combined two previously separated internal audit divisions in New York and Geneva within a single division. OIOS established a professional practices section—fully staffed with six regular staff and three general services staff—that is responsible for (1) implementing OIOS’s risk assessment framework, (2) implementing a quality assurance program, (3) devising productivity tools, and (4) improving performance reporting to management. OIOS also established an information and communication technology section, which has developed an audit strategy and conducted risk assessments for the information and communication technology functions of various departments at headquarters. Several steps have also been taken to improve OIOS’s investigations division. Member states decided to keep investigations in OIOS rather than move it to the Secretariat’s Office of Legal Affairs, despite a July 2006 external evaluation’s recommendation to shift the investigations function to a department in the Secretariat. OIOS argued that such a shift would significantly diminish the UN’s oversight functions by potentially compromising the independence of investigations and creating a potential conflict of interest. Since 2006, about 16 new posts have been created for the investigations division. OIOS has established a separate special investigations task force for sexual exploitation and abuse, as well as a procurement investigations task force. Finally, OIOS has made progress in reducing its range of functions and improving the capacity of its evaluations and inspections sections. For example, in order to reduce some of its multiple responsibilities and focus more directly on its oversight responsibilities, the office has shifted several nonoversight related functions to the UN Department of Management, including its consulting function. In addition, in 2006, the evaluation section was strengthened by the addition of two posts to increase the number of evaluations that can be undertaken. Funding arrangements at OIOS continue to impede the independence of internal auditors. OIOS is designed to be an operationally independent entity responsible for assisting the Secretary-General in fulfilling his internal oversight responsibilities of the resources and staff of the UN through internal audit, monitoring, inspection, evaluation, and investigations. However, OIOS faces two conflicts that have been impeding its independence: (1) OIOS’s budget is subject to the review of the Department of Management, for which OIOS has oversight responsibility, and (2) OIOS must negotiate funding for nearly two-thirds of its budget with the entities it is chartered to audit. Without operational independence, OIOS is constrained in its ability to prevent or mitigate risks to the UN’s resources and personnel. These risks include fraud, waste, abuse, inefficiencies, and mismanagement. In April 2006, we reported that UN funding arrangements adversely affect OIOS’s budgetary independence and constrain its ability to audit high-risk areas. For example, OIOS depends on the resources of the funds, programs, and other entities it audits, and the managers of these programs can deny OIOS permission to perform work or not pay OIOS for services. State and OIOS generally agreed with our overall findings and recommendations. Discussion of the revision of OIOS’s funding arrangements was deferred from the 61st to the 62nd session of the General Assembly due to a lack of consensus on funding issues. In its report to the 62nd session on its activities between July 1, 2006, and June 30, 2007, OIOS reiterated that the UN does not yet have a formal and structural internal control framework that would provide reasonable assurance to management that its financial resources are being handled effectively and that its objectives are being achieved. OIOS pointed out that serious deficiencies in internal controls have left the UN susceptible to mismanagement and fraud, particularly regarding procurement activities in Sudan and Congo. OIOS reported that its internal audit division continues to rely directly on organizations funded from extra-budgetary resources to provide the resources necessary to finance a portion of its functions. This reliance does not allow the division to focus its attention on the areas of highest risk and constrains the implementation of its audit work plan. For example, it reported that OIOS is unable to provide reasonable assurance that all high-risk areas have been identified and are being addressed in the United Nations Environment Programs. OIOS concluded that its dependence on extra- budgetary funding significantly affects its independence. The UN Secretariat has improved the UN procurement process, but a number of reform issues have not moved forward since our October 2006 report. Some progress has been made in strengthening the procedures for its procurement staff and suppliers, developing a comprehensive training program for procurement staff, and developing a risk management framework. However, the UN has made little or no progress in establishing an independent bid protest system and creating a lead agency concept for procurements, whereby specific UN organizations would procure certain goods and services in order to enhance division of labor, reduce duplication, and reduce costs. In addition, since our October 2006 report, other organizational issues have arisen that may affect the UN’s procurement reform efforts. Progress on UN procurement reform is shown in figure 3. The UN Secretariat has made some progress in strengthening the operating procedures for its procurement staff and suppliers. In December 2006, the Secretariat issued a bulletin on postemployment restrictions for former UN staff involved in procurement. The bulletin was issued following several incidents in recent years in which UN officials and former officials were involved in unethical and improper procurement activities. The December 2006 bulletin requires that former UN staff members, for 1 year following UN employment, are prohibited from accepting employment or compensation from any UN contractor and, for 2 years, are prohibited from acting on behalf of others in procurement- related matters. In an additional measure to strengthen its procedures, the UN also issued, in May 2007, a revised supplier code of conduct. The code requires that suppliers are responsible for adhering to the postemployment restrictions by not employing former UN staff members for at least 1 year following a staff member’s separation from the UN. However, a proposal to increase the minimum threshold for contracts required to be reviewed by the Headquarters Committee on Contracts from $200,000 to $500,000 has not been approved. OIOS previously recommended that the threshold be increased, and, according to Procurement Division officials, increasing the threshold would assist in expediting procurements and better utilizing their time. The UN Procurement Division has made some progress in developing a comprehensive training program for procurement staff. Although the program is not expected to be formally in place until early 2008, procurement staff are currently being trained in contracting, acquisition, and other specialized subjects. The training is part of a development plan to provide a career path for procurement staff—those who complete the training will be eligible to be certified by internationally recognized procurement institutions. In addition, according to UN Procurement Division officials, all procurement staff in headquarters received ethics training in 2007. As of October 2007, some field staff had received the ethics training and, according to UN officials, the UN expects to have provided the training to all field staff by the end of March 2008. The UN Procurement Division has made some progress in its efforts to develop a risk management framework. In July 2007, a Planning, Compliance, and Monitoring Section was established and a chief was appointed to establish tools to detect potential transaction problems and minimize risks. Also, a proposal for implementing the concept of best- value-for-money is under development and expected to be put into practice by the Procurement Division in March 2008. In addition, the UN Department of Management is in the initial planning stages of establishing a UN-wide risk management framework, known as the Enterprise Risk Management concept. However, as of September 2007, the concept is still in the planning stages, time frames and costs for its implementation have not been established, and risks associated with procurement activities remain. For example, the OIOS Procurement Task Force reported in October 2007 that it had found multiple instances of fraud, waste, and mismanagement—including 10 instances of fraud and corruption in cases with an aggregate value of over $610 million—resulting in misappropriation of resources or the unjust enrichment of vendors and their agents in excess of $25 million. The task force reported that a number of cases have been referred to national authorities for criminal prosecution or to the UN for consideration of subsequent legal action. It has also recommended civil recovery of monetary damages. As of October 2007, an independent bid protest system had not been established. The lack of an independent bid protest system limits the transparency of the procurement process by not providing a means for a vendor to protest the outcome of a contract decision to an independent official or office. Such a system would provide reasonable assurance that vendors are treated fairly when bidding and would also help alert senior UN management to situations involving questions about UN compliance. According to the UN Procurement Division, a draft process, which includes an emphasis on best practices from public- and private-sector procurements, is expected to be finalized by the first quarter of 2008. Procurement Division officials told us that, in the meantime, they have enhanced communications with vendors, including developing a more systematic debriefing procedure for vendors whose bids were unsuccessful. The UN has made little or no progress in establishing a lead agency concept, whereby specific UN organizations would procure certain goods and services in order to enhance division of labor, reduce duplication, and reduce costs. For example, the World Food Program might be best suited to procure items for air transport needs, while the UN Inter-Agency Procurement Services Office might be best at procuring certain vehicles. In a report on procurement reform submitted to the General Assembly in June 2006, the UN projected that implementation of the lead agency concept would take 6 to 12 months. However, in December 2006, the General Assembly did not approve a proposal to adopt the concept. In the absence of the General Assembly’s approval, Procurement Division officials told us they have established informal relationships with several UN organizations that, under current rules and regulations, facilitate the procurement of certain specialized goods and services, as needed. The General Assembly did not consider several procurement reform issues during the recently completed 61st session because of the UN’s June 2007 reorganization of the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO). Issues that are currently unclear include operational procedures, such as establishing lines of accountability, delegation of authority, and the responsibilities of the Departments of Management and Peacekeeping Operations. Because of the reorganization, announced by the Secretary-General in February 2007, the Secretariat did not submit several reports on procurement during the 61st session, as requested by the General Assembly. According to Secretariat officials, they did not submit the reports mainly because the reorganization of the DPKO created several procurement-related concerns that have not yet been addressed. The UN has taken actions to improve some of the management operations of the Secretariat, but many reform proposals still have not moved forward. Some progress has been made on issues involving human resources and information technology, while little or no progress has been made in reforming the UN’s internal justice system, reforming certain budgetary and financial management functions, and improving the delivery of certain services. Since our October 2006 report, the Secretariat has issued several reports on management operations that the General Assembly is expected to consider during the current (62nd) session. Progress on reforming management operations of the UN Secretariat is shown in figure 4. The UN has made some progress in improving human resource functions. Since we issued our October 2006 report, the UN Secretariat has issued several reports with proposals that, if implemented, could improve some human resource functions. However, the proposals are, in large part, still awaiting General Assembly review. In addition, the Secretariat has not completed reviews and analyses of other human resource reform proposals. In late September 2006—too late for inclusion in our October 6, 2006 report—the Secretary-General released a report entitled Investing in People that included a human resources management framework aimed at strengthening the UN’s human resources goals. The report included discussions of several human resources issues and specifically stated that staff mobility is essential to creating a more-versatile, multiskilled, experienced staff capable of handling the UN’s operations, which have changed dramatically in the last 20 years; an effective career development policy serves both the UN and its staff members by building and maintaining an international civil service capable of meeting the UN’s present and future needs, as well as meeting the development needs and aspirations of the staff; and a one-time staff buyout could enable the Secretary-General to realign staff to meet the UN’s changing priorities, while facilitating retirement or separation of staff who can no longer meet their career aspirations. The General Assembly considered the report during the 61st session and, in large part, postponed making decisions on key issues. For example, in a January 2007 resolution, the General Assembly postponed decisions regarding streamlining contractual arrangements and harmonizing conditions of service and rejected the proposed one-time staff buyout. Also, since its May 2006 rejection of the concept, the General Assembly has not taken steps to redefine the role of the Deputy Secretary-General to assume formal authority and accountability for the management and overall direction of the operational functions of the Secretariat. From March to May 2007, the Secretariat submitted reports to the General Assembly, as requested, on human resource issues such as recruiting and staffing, conditions of service, and contractual arrangements. However, because of the General Assembly’s focus on the reorganization of the DPKO and other issues during that time frame, the General Assembly did not consider these issues, which are currently rescheduled for consideration during the 62nd session. According to U.S. and UN officials and most of the 17 member state delegates we spoke with, reforming these and other human resource functions is likely to continue to be difficult because of long-standing disagreements among member states. The UN has made some progress in improving information technology. The position of chief information technology officer (CITO), created by the General Assembly in August 2006, was filled in July 2007, and the official took office in September 2007. The leadership of a CITO is necessary to help ensure greater integration of the Secretariat’s workflow and knowledge management by allowing program objectives to be integrated with budgetary and financial data into one process, with the goal of enabling the Secretariat to act more transparently and efficiently in managing staff and procuring goods and services of greater quality and quantity, at lower levels of risk. The CITO is especially important at the present time because the UN is in the process of developing a new organizationwide information system—known as the Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) system—to replace its antiquated integrated management information system. Creation of the ERP has been in the planning process for several years, and, according to Secretariat officials, implementation of the system is expected to start in 2008. During the planning process, the UN has worked with potential vendors to help ensure that the new system, when implemented, will adequately support the global functions of the UN, including an ever-growing number of peacekeeping missions. As of October 2007, the Secretariat had not selected the firm that will implement the new system. According to UN officials, the Secretariat is expected to announce a decision in 2008. The Secretary-General did not submit a comprehensive report on information management, including cost estimates, in March 2007, as requested by the General Assembly. According to UN officials, the report was not submitted because the ERP planning process was ongoing, a CITO had not yet been named, and the Secretariat was still collecting data on information technology and other issues. The Secretariat plans to present reports on information technology to the General Assembly during the 62nd session, on topics such as the implementation of the ERP and governance of information and communications technology. The UN has made little or no progress in reforming its internal justice system. According to a July 2006 report by an independent external panel of experts, the UN’s internal justice system was outdated, ineffective, and compromised. The panel’s report concluded that effective reform of the UN is not possible without an efficient, independent, and well-resourced internal justice system that safeguards the rights of staff members and effectively helps ensure the accountability of managers and staff members. Although the General Assembly agreed in April 2007 to establish a new internal justice system, many issues involving organizational relationships, personnel, and funding of the new system are still unclear. As of October 2007, the General Assembly had yet to decide who would be covered by the new system, how judges within the Office of the Ombudsman would be nominated and selected, and what resources would be needed. According to the Secretariat, member states aim to implement the new system by January 2009. Since our October 2006 report, the UN has made little or no progress in improving certain budgetary and financial management functions. The General Assembly has rejected some proposed reforms and taken no action on others. For example, to improve cash management and operational flexibility, the Secretary-General proposed that peacekeeping accounts be consolidated. In July 2007, the General Assembly rejected this proposal. The Secretary-General also proposed to improve strategic budgetary planning and implementation by reducing the number of sections in the budget from 35 sections to 13, and provided detailed information on this proposal in May 2006. However, as of October 2007, the General Assembly had not taken action on the proposal. Other financial management reform proposals that have not been adopted include retaining budget surpluses for use in subsequent periods, charging interest on arrears of member states’ assessed contributions, and creating a separate account to cover certain unanticipated expenditures arising from exchange rate fluctuations and inflation. The Secretariat has prepared a number of reports that the General Assembly is scheduled to review during the current (62nd) session and is reviewing other proposed reform actions, such as the management of trust funds. The UN has made little or no progress in improving the delivery of certain services. In May 2006, the General Assembly asked the Secretary-General to conduct several cost-benefit analyses to determine whether certain UN services could be improved. Among the services are internal printing and publishing processes; medical insurance plan administration; information technology support; payables, receivables, and payroll processes; and staff benefits administration. Subsequently, the Secretariat initiated several projects to address these reform proposals but has not completed its analyses. For example, the Secretariat is currently collecting data from staff participants in the UN medical plan and reviewing alternative delivery methods for payroll and other functions. The Secretariat has not issued a comprehensive report on public access to UN documentation, which the General Assembly requested be submitted during the 61st session. The Secretariat developed a detailed policy proposal that includes resource requirements, financing mechanisms, and proposal of a fee structure. However, according to Secretariat officials, the Secretary-General intends to discuss the proposal with member states before formally submitting it. Although UN member states agreed to continue a review of UN programs and activities (known as mandates) in 2007, no actions have been taken to eliminate or consolidate mandates. Member states continue to disagree on the scope and process of the review and lack the capacity to carry out the review, according to State. Consultations among member states on how to move forward on the issue will continue into the 62nd session. Progress in reviewing UN programs and activities is shown in figure 5. In 2005, UN member states agreed to complete a review of all UN mandates with the goal of strengthening and updating them to more accurately reflect the needs of the organization. After some initial minor progress, this effort has diminished substantially due to member states’ ongoing disagreements on the scope and process of the review. In addition, the review has not advanced due to the lack of capacity among member states to evaluate the mandates in a substantive matter, according to State. Phase I of mandate review, which covered all mandates 5 years old or older and not renewed that originated from the General Assembly, was completed in November 2006. We reported in 2006 that throughout the Phase I review, member states disagreed on which mandates to include in the review and what to do with any savings generated by the potential elimination or consolidation of mandates, which led to limited or slow progress. Members of the G-77 contended that the scope of the review should include only those mandates 5 years old or older that have not been reviewed since they were adopted. Phase I thus consisted of a review of 626 mandates originating from the General Assembly. As a result of Phase I, member states agreed to set aside 74 completed mandates and requested more information from the Secretariat on 15 mandates. No agreement was reached on the remaining mandates, and no mandates were consolidated or eliminated as a result of the review. Member states agreed to carry out a Phase II review of mandates to include mandates both renewed and not renewed. The planned approach was to review mandates by thematic cluster. The initial goal for beginning Phase II was January 2007. Phase II was delayed by the lack of a co-chair on the Informal Working Group on Mandate Review from January 2007 to April 2007 and again from July to October 2007. In October 2007, the process was far from complete, with only one of the nine clusters addressed. On September 17, 2007, the General Assembly, per the request of the outgoing President of the General Assembly, adopted an oral decision to continue consultations among member states on how to proceed with mandate review in the 62nd session. State officials told us that a new approach is necessary for the review and that it would be meaningless to proceed unless member states identify a process that can achieve meaningful results. State also informed us that there was no implementation plan for mandate review. New parameters for the continuation of the mandate review process have been proposed, but progress remains to be seen. Various factors have slowed the UN’s efforts to improve the management of the Secretariat, and many remaining UN management reforms cannot move forward until these factors are addressed. During our review, we identified four key factors that hinder progress on UN management reforms: (1) disagreements among member states on UN management reform efforts, (2) lack of comprehensive implementation plans for some management reform proposals, (3) administrative policies and procedures that continue to complicate the process of implementing certain complex human resource initiatives, and (4) competing UN priorities, such as the proposal to reorganize the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, that limit the capacity of General Assembly members to address management reform issues. Disagreements within the General Assembly continue to limit the implementation of management reforms. Progress on UN management reform efforts is dependent in large part on member states reaching consensus, which can be a time-consuming process as the UN is composed of 192 diverse member states that have differing views on a wide array of issues. (App. III shows the typical management reform decision-making process at the UN for issues requiring General Assembly approval.) In October 2006, we reported that disagreements between G-77 and developed countries over the broader implications of management reforms may affect the UN’s ability to fully implement them. From April through September 2007, we discussed management reform efforts with delegates from 17 member states representing Africa, Asia, Europe, Latin America, the Middle East, and North America. In these discussions, 15 of the 17 delegations told us that the number one challenge to continued progress on management reform efforts is member state disagreements on the priorities and importance of the remaining reform efforts. For example, member states continue to disagree on the scope and process of the review of UN mandates, and some member states are concerned that mandates important to them will be eliminated. For that reason, no mandates have been eliminated or consolidated as a result of the reviews—two of the goals of the process, according to State. Representatives of member states we spoke with repeatedly stated a clear need for more constructive engagement on reform efforts, particularly between the United States and G-77 countries. For example, four member states—Chile, South Africa, Sweden, and Thailand—have launched the Four Nations Initiative in an effort to provide new ideas and perspectives on governance and management of the UN Secretariat. A State official told us the process appears to be a “credible effort” by member states that complements the UN management reform process. However, he added that other member states’ views on this initiative and the potential of the initiative to overcome disagreements among member states are unclear. The UN has not developed comprehensive long-term implementation plans for some management reform proposals. Establishing implementation plans is a practice that increases the transparency and accountability of the reform process. We previously recommended that State work with other member states to encourage the General Assembly and the Secretary-General to include cost estimates and expected time frames for implementation and completion of each reform effort as it is approved. During our current review, we found little evidence that time frames, completion dates, and cost and savings estimates for completing the long- term implementation of specific management reforms had been established. In addition, most of the approximately 20 cost-benefit analyses and other assessments of management reform issues that the Secretariat had planned to complete by March 2007 have not yet been submitted to the General Assembly. As a result, the total long-term costs of the reform efforts, including the U.S. government’s share, remain unclear. Moreover, the UN currently has no formal plan to evaluate the effectiveness of its management reform efforts to determine whether they have achieved the goals set out in the 2005 World Summit outcome document. Administrative policies and procedures, such as staff regulations and rules that are directed by the General Assembly, continue to complicate and sometimes restrict the process of implementing certain human resources initiatives. Such guidance, some of which has been in existence for decades, is part of the UN’s existing resource management framework that, according to the Secretary-General, still lacks flexibility and is largely headquarters-based, though more than half of the UN’s staff are currently serving in the field. Although the Secretariat has made progress on some administrative reform initiatives relating to human resources and information technology, it has not addressed several other administrative policies and procedures issues, including conducting a one-time staff buyout and outsourcing and telecommuting for certain administrative services, such as payroll processes, staff benefit administration, and information technology support. As we discussed in our October 2006 report, the overall restrictiveness of these policies and procedures continues to complicate the management reform process. Since our October 2006 report, competing priorities within the Secretariat and General Assembly have limited the capacity of General Assembly members to address the remaining management reform issues. In February 2007, for example, several procurement-related reform issues, such as clear lines of responsibility and accountability, delegation of authority, and internal controls, were not taken into consideration by the General Assembly during the spring 2007 session, as planned. The General Assembly did not address these issues because the new Secretary-General concurrently proposed a reorganization of the DPKO, which absorbed much of the General Assembly’s attention throughout the session. As a result, the Secretariat decided not to issue several procurement reports during the spring 2007 session, without which member states told us they were unable to formally consider certain procurement-related reform issues. Reforming the management of the United Nations has been a priority of the U.S. government for many years, as long-standing weaknesses and inefficiencies in UN management functions have persisted. Although there has been progress in implementing several components of the 2005 reform agenda, some key components remain to be implemented. Completion of the reform agenda will require overcoming several factors, particularly disagreements among member states regarding how to achieve the goals they agreed to at the 2005 World Summit. Some past reform efforts remain incomplete because they did not get sustained and broad support of member states. The current effort faces this same risk. Moreover, while implementation of the reform agenda is a necessary element in meeting the goals of the 2005 World Summit outcome document, it is not in itself sufficient. Successful management reform requires that its components are ultimately effective in modernizing the management functions of the United Nations. To encourage UN member states to continue to pursue the reform agenda of the 2005 World Summit, we recommend that, as management reforms are implemented over time, the Secretary of State and the U.S. Permanent Representative to the UN include in State’s annual U.S. Participation in the United Nations report an assessment of the effectiveness of the reforms. We requested comments on a draft of this report from the Department of State and the UN Secretariat. State’s comments are reprinted in appendix II, along with our responses to specific points. The UN Secretariat did not provide written comments. State endorsed the main findings and conclusions of our report and noted that our assessment of UN progress on management reform efforts was accurate and balanced. State also agreed fully with the need to keep Congress informed of the effectiveness of management reforms, adding that the department will continue to monitor and inform Congress, as we recommended. In addition, State agreed with us that more could be done to ensure credible oversight at the UN. Furthermore, State noted that we correctly recognize the need for the UN to establish a formal internal control framework. State did not agree with our statement that successful whistleblower protections cannot be established without substantial reform of the UN’s internal justice program. During our review, we found that UN and nongovernmental organization staff had concerns about weaknesses in the UN internal justice system and the potential impact of these weaknesses on the implementation of a successful whistleblower protection policy. We agree with these concerns. State also notes that the General Assembly’s approval of the creation of an independent bid protest system was a critical first step toward enhancing transparency in the UN’s procurement award process. However, per our methodology, we categorize this reform effort under “little or no progress” because there was evidence that few or no steps had been taken towards actual implementation of the system. State said it understood that this assessment was consistent with our evaluation methodology. State and the UN Secretariat provided technical comments that we have incorporated into the report, as appropriate. We are sending copies of this report to interested congressional committees, the Secretary of State, and the U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations. We will also make copies available to others upon request. In addition, the report will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov. If you or your staffs have any questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 512-9601 or melitot@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made contributions to this report are listed in appendix V. To identify and examine the progress of UN management reforms, we reviewed key documents proposing United Nations (UN) management reforms and interviewed officials from several UN departments in New York. We obtained and reviewed official reports of the Secretariat and the Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS), Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions (ACABQ) documents, General Assembly resolutions, Secretary-General bulletins, Web sites, related budget documents, and statements from UN officials. We also interviewed senior officials from UN departments in New York City. Specifically, we met with officials from the General Assembly Office of the President, the Office of the Deputy Secretary-General, the Department of Management, and OIOS. During the course of our review, we discussed the status of UN management reforms with officials from the Department of State in Washington, D.C., and the UN in New York. We also met with representatives from 17 of 192 member states representing various geographic regions, including Africa, Asia, Europe, the Middle East, North America, and South America, to obtain a balance of views on the most critical challenges to reforming UN management. We selected management reform issues in the key areas of ethics, oversight, management operations of the Secretariat, and review of programs and activities (known as mandates) to examine in more detail. We determined that these were the key areas of management reform through our review of UN documents and our discussions with UN and U.S. officials. We focused our work on management reforms that began in 2005 and did not specifically address the 1997 and 2002 reform agendas. The 2005 reforms applied to the Secretariat and the UN’s governing bodies, including the General Assembly, the Economic and Social Council, and the Security Council. We did not include in our review reforms targeted at UN specialized agencies or UN funds and programs; we also excluded efforts such as the UN Peace Building Commission and Security Council and governance reforms. We did not evaluate the effectiveness of the reform efforts because of the recentness of their implementation. To assess the progress of the UN reform efforts we reviewed, we developed the following three categories: Little or no progress: There is evidence that few or no steps have been taken on the reform effort. Some progress: There is evidence that some steps have been taken on the reform effort, while others remain. Substantial progress: There is evidence that the reform effort has been mostly or fully implemented. During our review, we determined which category of progress to assign to each reform effort based on documents we collected and discussions we had with State, UN, and other officials. After we made our initial assessments of progress, three other GAO staff members not involved in this review used the evidence and the categories to make their own assessments independently of each other. These staff members then met with each other to reconcile any differences in their initial assessments. Finally, they met with us and confirmed that we were all in agreement on our assessments. To identify factors slowing the progress of the UN reforms we examined, we reviewed reports and documentation of the Secretariat, General Assembly, OIOS, and the ethics office. In addition, we spoke with UN officials in New York. These included officials from the Office of the Deputy Secretary-General, the Department of Management, ACABQ, and OIOS. We also met with representatives from several member states and spoke with U.S. officials in Washington, D.C., and New York. We also interviewed outside observers of the UN system, including nongovernmental organizations and members of academia. Many cost estimates for the proposed reform initiatives are preliminary, and detailed longer-term cost estimates are being developed; therefore, we did not analyze the assumptions underlying these estimates to determine whether they are reasonable and reliable. However, we believe that the cost estimates and the associated funds that the General Assembly has appropriated to date for reform efforts are sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report. We conducted our work from March to November 2007 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 1. During our review, we found that UN and nongovernmental organization staff had concerns about weaknesses in the UN internal justice system and the potential impact of these weaknesses on the implementation of a successful whistleblower protection policy. We agree with these concerns. As we state in our report, without a fair and impartial justice system that effectively executes corrective action in cases of retaliation or threatened retaliation, staff may not submit cases to the ethics office. Also, the annual activities report of the ethics office states that protection against retaliation is linked to the internal justice system. 2. State notes that the General Assembly’s approval of the creation of an independent bid protest system was a critical first step toward enhancing transparency in the UN’s procurement award process. Per our methodology, approving the creation of a protest system, while demonstrating intent, is not equivalent to actual implementation of the system, which has yet to begin. We categorize this reform effort under “little or no progress” because there was evidence that few or no implementation steps had been taken. As State notes in its comments, our assessment that the UN has made little or no progress in establishing an independent bid protest system for UN procurements is consistent with our evaluation methodology. The management reform decision-making process at the UN involves multiple entities. For example, when a management reform has budgetary implications, the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions and the Administrative and Budgetary Committee (the Fifth Committee) are involved in the process. The Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions, a subsidiary organ of the General Assembly, consists of 16 members appointed by the assembly in their individual capacity. The functions and responsibilities of the advisory committee include advising the General Assembly concerning any administrative and budgetary matters referred to it. The Fifth Committee is the General Assembly’s committee for administrative and budgetary matters and is composed of all 192 member states. Figure 6 depicts the typical management reform decision-making process at the UN for issues requiring General Assembly approval. We reported in October 2006 that the Secretariat’s estimated costs for implementing certain management reform initiatives were approximately $40 million. Since then, due to additional actions taken during the 61st session, the Secretariat’s revised cost estimate, as of October 2007, had risen by about $13 million to approximately $53 million, as shown in table 1 below. In addition to the contact named above, Phillip Thomas, Assistant Director; Sarah Chankin-Gould; Debbie J. Chung; Lyric Winona Clark; and George Taylor made key contributions to this report. Michael Derr, Etana Finkler, Grace Lui, Amanda Miller, and Jena Sinkfield provided technical assistance. United Nations Organizations: Oversight and Accountability Could Be Strengthened by Further Instituting International Best Practices. GAO-07-597. Washington, D.C.: June 18, 2007. United Nations: Management Reforms Progressing Slowly with Many Awaiting General Assembly Review. GAO-07-14. Washington, D.C.: October 5, 2006. United Nations: Weaknesses in Internal Oversight and Procurement Could Affect the Effective Implementation of the Planned Renovation. GAO-06-877T. Washington, D.C.: June 20, 2006. United Nations: Oil for Food Program Provides Lessons for Future Sanctions and Ongoing Reform. GAO-06-711T. Washington, D.C.: May 2, 2006. United Nations: Internal Oversight and Procurement Controls and Processes Need Strengthening. GAO-06-710T. Washington, D.C.: April 27, 2006. United Nations: Funding Arrangements Impede Independence of Internal Auditors. GAO-06-575. Washington, D.C.: April 25, 2006. United Nations: Lessons Learned from Oil for Food Program Indicate the Need to Strengthen UN Internal Controls and Oversight. GAO-06-330. Washington, D.C.: Apr. 25, 2006. United Nations: Procurement Internal Controls Are Weak. GAO-06-577. Washington, D.C., April 25, 2006. United Nations: Preliminary Observations on Internal Oversight and Procurement Practices. GAO-06-226T. Washington, D.C.: October 31, 2005. United Nations: Sustained Oversight Is Needed for Reforms to Achieve Lasting Results. GAO-05-392T. Washington, D.C.: March 2, 2005. United Nations: Oil for Food Program Audits. GAO-05-346T. Washington, D.C.: February 15, 2005.

Summary: The United States has advocated reforms of United Nations (UN) management for many years. In October 2006, GAO reported that UN management reforms were progressing slowly and that many were still awaiting review by the General Assembly. For this review, GAO was asked to (1) determine the progress of UN management reform initiatives in five key areas--ethics, oversight, procurement, management operations of the Secretariat, and review of programs and activities (known as mandates)--and (2) identify factors that have slowed the pace of reform efforts. To address these objectives, GAO reviewed documents relating to UN management reform and interviewed U.S. and UN officials. The progress of UN management reform efforts has varied in the five areas that GAO reviewed--ethics, oversight, procurement, management operations of the Secretariat, and review of programs and activities (known as mandates). To determine the status of these reform efforts, GAO developed three categories of progress, defined as follows: (1) Little or no progress = Few or no steps have been taken; (2) Some progress = Some steps have been taken, while others remain; and (3) Substantial progress = The reform effort has been mostly or fully implemented. The ethics office has made substantial progress in staffing its office and implementing a whistleblower protection policy, as well as some progress in developing ethics standards and collecting and analyzing financial disclosure forms. Member states made some progress in improving oversight at the UN when they created an Independent Audit Advisory Committee, which is expected to be operational by January 2008. Additionally, the Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) improved the capacity of individual divisions, including internal audit and investigations. However, UN funding arrangements continue to constrain the independence of OIOS and its ability to audit high-risk areas. Some progress has been made in the area of procurement, such as developing a comprehensive training program for procurement staff. However, the UN has made little or no progress in establishing an independent bid protest system. Some progress has been made in reforming management operations of the UN Secretariat, such as improving human resource functions and information technology. In contrast, little or no progress has been made in reforming the UN's internal justice system for resolving and adjudicating staff grievances and safeguarding the rights of staff members, certain budgetary and financial management functions, and the delivery of certain services. Finally, despite some limited initial actions, the UN's review of programs and activities (known as mandates) has not advanced due in part to a lack of support by many member states. Various factors have slowed the pace of UN management reforms, and a number of reforms cannot move forward until these factors are addressed. Four key factors that have slowed the pace include (1) disagreements among member states on the priorities and importance of UN management reform efforts, (2) the lack of comprehensive implementation plans for some management reform proposals, (3) administrative policies and procedures that continue to complicate the process of implementing certain complex human resource initiatives, and (4) competing UN priorities, such as the proposal to reorganize the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, that limit the capacity of General Assembly members to address management reform issues.