International, national, state, and local requirements regulate maritime safety and security. At the international level, IMO is responsible for developing an international maritime regulatory framework. IMO member states (nations) have adopted the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS), which is designed to help ensure maritime security and safety worldwide. Among other things, SOLAS provides that companies and vessels should comply with the requirements of the International Safety Management Code (ISM Code), which was adopted by IMO in 1993. Federal laws, regulations, and guidance direct federal agencies and vessel operators within U.S. ports and waters, and state and local requirements may also further direct activities of vessel operators within their jurisdictions. The enforcement of safety and security requirements for all maritime vessels is governed by two different systems: flag state control and port state control. A flag state that signed on to the SOLAS Convention has responsibility for verifying that vessels flying its flag meet international safety and security standards and that the flag state’s standards are at least as stringent as those included in the convention’s ISM Code. A port state is the country where a port is located. Port state control is the process by which a nation exercises its authority over foreign-flagged vessels operating in waters subject to the port state’s jurisdiction. Port state control is generally intended to ensure that these visiting vessels comply with the various international and domestic requirements established to help ensure the safety of the visited port, its environment, and its personnel. Figure 1 shows the regulatory oversight regime affecting cruise vessels; however, there are many additional international and domestic stakeholders with roles contributing to the security and safety of cruise vessels. For a list of key stakeholders and their activities, see appendix I. The Coast Guard administers the U.S. port state control program for foreign-flagged cruise vessels that enter U.S. waters or a U.S. port, to The Coast enforce maritime safety and security in the United States.Guard exercises this enforcement through port state control activities, which include initial, annual, and periodic examinations of foreign flag cruise vessels. These exams allow the Coast Guard to examine vessels at various times: Initial exams: Conducted on vessels with potential U.S. itineraries, these exams include concept reviews during the very earliest stages of design, preconstruction plan reviews by Coast Guard naval architects and fire protection engineers, and mid-construction inspections at the shipbuilder’s yard by Coast Guard marine inspectors. Annual inspection: The Coast Guard inspects each cruise vessel visiting the United States at least twice a year. The first inspection, an annual inspection, focuses on the vessel’s fire protection, lifesaving, and emergency systems as well as any modifications to the vessel that would affect its structural fire protection and means of escape. Periodic inspection: The second Coast Guard inspection, a periodic inspection, focuses on the performance of the officers and crew, with specific attention paid to their training and knowledge of the vessel’s emergency procedures, fire fighting, lifesaving systems, and performance during drills. From January 2008 through March 2013, the Coast Guard performed 1,208 cruise vessel examinations (71 initial, 673 annual, and 464 periodic) and identified 1,802 deficiencies. Nearly half of these deficiencies were related to fire-fighting systems. For example, according to the Coast Guard’s Cruise Ship National Center of Expertise, the most common deficiency identified in 2012 was the improper operation of fire screen doors. In 2011, the most commonly identified deficiency was the improper stowage of combustibles. According to Coast Guard officials, most deficiencies are corrected on the spot or within the time frames allowed by the Coast Guard. Moreover, officials reported that the Coast Guard rarely detains cruise vessels based on substandard compliance— for example, from January 2008 through March 2013, they have detained seven cruise vessels as a result of their 1,208 cruise vessel examinations. Four of the seven cruise vessels made corrections and were released from detention the same day, while the others took 2, 3, and 8 days to make corrections. As part of its regulatory role, the Coast Guard also maintains data on marine casualties (accidents) that occur upon the navigable waters of the United States and its territories or possessions, or whenever an accident involves a U.S. vessel. Coast Guard regulations require that certain types of accidents be reported to the Coast Guard—including accidents that result in the loss of main propulsion or primary steering, or that materially and adversely affect the vessel’s seaworthiness, among other things. Our analysis of Coast Guard data shows that from January 2008 through March 2013, there were 256 marine casualties that involved cruise vessels: 128 of these were classified as failures of equipment or material; 64 were classified as accidents that caused damage to the environment (mostly discharge of oil); and 64 were classified in a variety of other categories—such as fire, loss of electrical power, or collision. 46 C.F.R. pt. 4. On January 13, 2012, an Italian-flagged cruise vessel, the Costa Concordia, ran aground with over 4,000 passengers and crew onboard off the coast of Giglio Island, Italy. The vessel was so badly damaged that five contiguous watertight compartments—which housed machinery and equipment vital for the propulsion and steering of the vessel—rapidly flooded. The vessel then lost propulsion and suffered intermittent power outages, as the emergency backup systems could not handle an emergency on such a scale. The accident resulted in 32 deaths, including 2 U.S. citizens. The Costa Concordia accident triggered an investigation led by the Italian government to ascertain the reasons that the vessel went aground. In May 2013, the Italian government issued its findings and recommendations. The investigation found that the root cause of the accident rested with the vessel’s master for transiting too close to the coastline. According to the investigation, the accident was compounded because of poor emergency management by the master, some staff deck officers, and the vessel’s hotel director. However, the report also offered additional recommendations, including improvements in bridge resource management, emergency power generation, and search and rescue operations, among other things. In 2011, the Coast Guard issued guidance on most of the provisions in the CVSSA, and the cruise lines had already implemented most of the safety measures required by the law. However, as of December 2013, the Coast Guard and MARAD were in the process of developing and publicizing new regulations before moving forward with the implementation of the remaining provisions related to items such as new technology and training certifications required or authorized by the CVSSA. Provisions regarding the publication of information on crimes on cruise vessels have been fully implemented by the FBI and Coast Guard in accordance with the law. Even so, efforts are under way that could address remaining concerns related to the thoroughness, timeliness, and context of reported crime data. The Coast Guard issued guidance for 11 of the 15 CVSSA provisions in June 2011. The Coast Guard guidance was issued in the form of internal Coast Guard policy letters with the main purpose of providing instructions to Coast Guard port state control officers regarding CVSSA requirements. Guidance was provided in the following 11 areas: (1) rail heights; (2) peepholes in passenger stateroom doors, (3) security latches and time-sensitive keys for stateroom doors, (4) safety information provided to passengers, (5) medical licensing and proper equipment to perform sexual assault exams, (6) patient access to information and communications in the event of sexual assault, (7) confidentiality of sexual assault examination and support information, (8) crew access to passenger staterooms, (9) logbook and reporting requirements for CVSSA crimes, (10) availability of crime data on the Coast Guard’s website and the link on cruise lines’ webpages to the Coast Guard’s website, and (11) training standards and curricula—which resulted in the development of the required course on crime scene preservation. Coast Guard officials stated that the guidance was necessary to help clarify some aspects of the CVSSA, especially in those areas that are outside the Coast Guard’s normal area of expertise. For example, the guidance provides specific questions for inspectors to ask medical personnel to verify that adequate training, equipment, and medicine are in place in the event of a sexual assault. Officials from all five of the cruise lines we spoke with, as well as CLIA, told us that there were minor issues with implementing these 11 CVSSA requirements and that most of the safety and security measures required by the law were already in place when the CVSSA was enacted, in July 2010. For example, each of the cruise line officials we met with told us that their vessels already were in compliance with most CVSSA provisions including having peepholes in stateroom doors, using certified medical personnel for sexual assault exams, and carrying rape kits onboard. As a result, according to all of the cruise lines we spoke with, meeting the CVSSA deadline for most of the requirements was not difficult. In the case where a modification was needed to meet a CVSSA requirement, the cruise lines we spoke with described the modification as minor. For example, officials from CLIA stated that, for the most part, the rail heights on their members’ vessels already met the 42-inch height specified in the CVSSA. In one case, officials from a cruise line identified isolated locations where the rail height was below the requirement—such as around entrance gangways and by lifeboat stations—and thus they took steps to modify the railing height to meet the new standard. CLIA officials also reported that developing security information guides for passenger staterooms required a moderate amount of effort for the cruise lines because of the variations in their vessels’ itineraries, which required cruise lines to collect and update information for all of their vessels’ ports of call. Additionally, officials from one cruise line we spoke with discussed going beyond what the CVSSA requires. For example, this cruise line told us it was involved in discussions with officials from a victim advocacy group to evaluate and enhance the cruise line’s procedures for preventing sexual assault and responding to sexual assault allegations. Additionally, this cruise line also told us it uses strict criteria to credential its professional staff to meet at least the minimum guidelines of the American College of Emergency Physicians and uses outside vendor software to help ensure credentials are kept up to date. Furthermore, these officials stated that an electronic medical record system is being introduced to improve the documentation and accessibility of health care information for guests and crew. There are four CVSSA provisions that require the development of regulations and policy for enforcement, and these are in development by the Coast Guard and MARAD. These provisions are (1) man overboard technology, which detects and alerts the crew to a person falling overboard; (2) video recording requirements, which are to assist in documenting crimes on the vessel and in providing evidence for the prosecution of such crimes; (3) acoustical hailing and warning devices, which provide communication capability around a vessel operating in high-risk waters; and (4) certification of training providers that teach the CVSSA training course on crime prevention, detection, evidence preservation, and reporting. The Coast Guard is responsible for developing regulations for the first three provisions, while MARAD is responsible for developing policy for the training certification provision. The Coast Guard issued a Request for Information (RFI) in May 2011 to obtain the public’s input on the CVSSA requirements on man overboard technology and video recording because they involved complex technology and the CVSSA language was not specific enough, according to Coast Guard officials, for them to use it to verify compliance on cruise vessels. In response to its RFI, the Coast Guard received comments from nine entities: CLIA, two cruise victim advocacy groups, five companies stating that they had effective technology in these areas, and one private citizen. In addition to the RFI responses, officials that we interviewed from CLIA, cruise lines, and cruise victim advocacy groups also provided insights on some of the challenges associated with two of the technology provisions of the CVSSA. Comments from the RFI as well as additional information provided to us from interested stakeholders are discussed in tables 1 and 2: The Coast Guard’s RFI did not solicit feedback on the final provision, on acoustical hailing; however, Coast Guard officials told us that this provision would still be part of the final regulation as the technology already exists for acoustical hailing and warning devices. The term “high- risk waters” used in the provision was problematic to some cruise victim advocacy groups, according to Coast Guard officials, as they perceived the definition to be different from the Coast Guard’s definition. For example, Coast Guard officials said that some cruise victim advocacy groups believe that those places that may be high-risk terrorism targets near land should be considered high-risk waters (e.g., New York Harbor and waterways). However, Coast Guard officials told us they have a long- standing definition of high-risk waters, and that they are typically waters where terrorism, piracy, and armed robbery occur (i.e., the waters off the Horn of Africa, etc.). Therefore, Coast Guard officials said that they felt it was necessary to include this provision in the proposed rule to allow for public comments because it was not clear from the law how the provision should be implemented. In July 2013, Coast Guard officials told us that they had drafted a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) that will encompass these three provisions of the CVSSA. They added that the regulation will likely be performance based—focusing on what must be achieved—rather than prescriptive. Coast Guard officials noted that the NPRM is currently going through final agency review. According to the website of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), which is the final reviewer in the rulemaking process, the NPRM will be issued in June 2014. There is no timetable for when the final regulation will be issued. All cruise line officials we spoke with reported that one of their key frustrations with the implementation of the CVSSA was not having timely information related to these three technology areas of the CVSSA. They expressed concern with how long it has taken to develop the regulations as well as concern about the lack of interim communication from the Coast Guard on the status of the rulemaking process. Cruise line officials stated that this affects their business, and that they want to be in full compliance with the law. Coast Guard officials commented that the time they have taken to develop the proposed rule was to ensure that they were adequately addressing CVSSA requirements and incorporating all viewpoints, while MARAD officials said that the time they took was to determine the best approach for implementation. Furthermore, Coast Guard officials told us that once a rulemaking process is under way, federal agencies generally do not discuss it with outside parties to avoid concerns regarding ex parte communications. According to Coast Guard officials, engaging with outside parties to update them on the process, as cruise line officials wished had been done, could hinder transparency, unless the agency gave all parties and the public the same opportunity to comment and provide information. While the Coast Guard is drafting its NPRM to address these three outstanding CVSSA provisions, in July 2013, legislation was introduced that would amend the video recording requirements of the CVSSA, among other items. The proposed bills detail requirements for placement of video surveillance equipment on cruise vessels, access to video records, and video retention standards, among other items. As of December 2013, the two bills have been referred to the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation and the House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure’s Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation, respectively, and have not been voted on. It is unclear what effect these bills may have on the impending regulation from the Coast Guard if they become law. For the fourth CVSSA provision, MARAD issued a notice of proposed new policy in the Federal Register in May 2013 for certifying providers of the CVSSA training course on crime prevention, detection, evidence While the CVSSA did not mandate that preservation, and reporting.MARAD develop a training provider certification—the language of the CVSSA states that MARAD “may” develop a certification—MARAD officials stated that they were intent on pursuing certification because there were requests from both the Coast Guard and CLIA to provide clarity on the certification portion of the CVSSA. MARAD proposed a voluntary certification program for training providers to assure the general public that passenger cruise vessel security and safety personnel have received training that is in strict compliance with the CVSSA-mandated model training course. According to MARAD, certification would serve to assist the cruise industry in identifying and obtaining qualified training services. Training providers seeking to be certified by MARAD would be required to submit training plans and supporting information for review. If the training provider’s plans meet the CVSSA model course criteria, the agency would offer its certification subject to the training provider entering into an agreement that, in addition to other terms, would subject the organization to program audits. Four comments were received on the proposed policy from CLIA, ICV, the American Association for Justice, and a practicing maritime attorney. Their comments on the proposed policy are summarized in table 3. MARAD is reviewing the comments, and officials said that it will promulgate a final policy as soon as practicable. The FBI and the Coast Guard have fully implemented the CVSSA provisions regarding crime data reporting. Specifically, the FBI is responsible for implementing two main areas of the CVSSA: reviewing safety guides that the cruise lines prepare and reporting CVSSA crime data (regarding crimes that occur onboard cruise ships) to the Coast Guard which publishes it on a public website. FBI officials reported that they provide data for cases no longer under investigation, as stated in the CVSSA. The CVSSA identifies eight crimes that, if within the FBI’s jurisdiction, cruise lines must report to the FBI. These crimes are homicide, suspicious death, missing U.S. national, kidnapping, assault with serious bodily injury, firing or tampering with the vessel, theft of money or property in excess of $10,000, and certain sexual assault offenses. The CVSSA then requires the Coast Guard to publish on its website a statistical compilation of all allegations of CVSSA crimes reported to the FBI that are no longer under FBI investigation. The data are to be updated at least quarterly, aggregated by cruise line, and each type of crime is to be identified including whether it was committed by a passenger or a crew member. Figure 2 explains the FBI’s general process for receiving a CVSSA-related crime report and, if appropriate, opening and closing its investigation of a CVSSA-related crime. When an alleged crime occurs aboard a cruise vessel, according to cruise line officials, the security officer onboard the vessel typically receives notification of the alleged crime. If the alleged crime is believed to be a CVSSA-related crime, the security officer is usually required to notify the vessel owner, since under the CVSSA it is the owner’s responsibility to report any CVSSA crime to the FBI and the Coast Guard as soon as possible. FBI officials stated that initial reports of crimes can come in varying forms, but generally for CVSSA crimes, they are notified within 24 hours by telephone. FBI officials also stated that, in most instances, they are relying on cruise vessel personnel to preserve the crime scene aboard the vessel since the FBI cannot typically get to a cruise vessel until it arrives in a United States port. To help address these circumstances, the FBI has provided the cruise lines with a standard form for detailing initial information about the alleged crime that includes a description of the incident; the names of victims, witnesses, and suspects; any statements made by those involved; and any evidence preserved (rape kits, video recordings, photos, etc.). The cruise lines are to send this form to the FBI and Coast Guard as soon as possible after the crime is reported. The FBI considers the information as it determines what further actions need to be taken. According to a cruise victim advocate group’s official, this “pre-opening” phase has been a stated source of concern for the group because of the following issues: Law enforcement response: At sea, unlike on land, generally, a crime victim cannot call 911 to reach an independent local law enforcement authority. Instead, it is the responsibility of the cruise line’s security personnel to respond. This can be disconcerting to the victim of a crime, particularly if the alleged perpetrator is a cruise line employee. An ICV official stated that the group realizes that it is the cruise line’s responsibility to respond initially, but the ICV believes that victims should be given immediate access to a private phone and contact information to call the FBI directly, and other support organizations. Jurisdiction: Cruise vessels generally sail through multiple local and foreign jurisdictions during a cruise. A cruise victim advocate group official stated that this can result in a victim feeling confused in dealing with the different legal systems. Depending on where the reported crime occurs, there can be several foreign ports that the cruise line may visit before arriving back in the United States. Each of these foreign jurisdictions may investigate the crime if it so chooses. Evidence integrity: Cruise vessel personnel preserve crime scene evidence until law enforcement personnel board the vessel to begin reviewing the allegations, generally upon the vessel arriving at a U.S. port. For cruise victim advocates, this raises questions about evidence preservation, conflict of interest, the feasibility of conducting an investigation days after a crime may have occurred, and the potential contamination of a crime scene if other jurisdictions investigate prior to the vessel arriving back in the United States. In response to these concerns, FBI officials stated that they believe it is important to have cruise line security officials begin some evidence preservation work. They added that this is important given that there is no law enforcement agency onboard and that the FBI interviews and evidence collection are generally conducted when the cruise vessel has arrived in a U.S. port. To help support this effort, the FBI has provided CLIA with information on how to preserve crime scenes. FBI officials in all field offices we visited told us they have never been concerned about the information they received or the integrity of an investigation as a result of the security officer being a cruise line employee. Most cruise line officials mentioned that the circumstances of an international cruise— where no independent law enforcement agency is available in international waters—may make it necessary for their security personnel to begin preserving evidence and collecting information while the vessel is still at sea to assist law enforcement personnel. FBI officials in one port city noted that they had seen an improvement in evidence preservation since the CVSSA came into law. Upon boarding the vessel, the FBI can more readily gather evidence, interview witnesses, and survey the crime scene. If the alleged crime meets the standard for opening an investigation, the FBI will open an investigation and certain statistics about the case are to be published on the Coast Guard’s website when the case is closed. Whether the FBI opens an investigation depends on a number of factors related to the facts and circumstances of each case. However, for a crime allegation to eventually appear on the Coast Guard’s public website, under the law, an investigation would have to have been officially opened by the FBI. According to FBI officials, an open case may no longer be under investigation if (1) the case has reached a final disposition in court (e.g., a verdict was rendered and appeals have concluded); (2) the statute of limitations has run out; and (3) at some point following the opening of an official investigation, the U.S. Attorney declines prosecution. Once a case is closed, FBI provides statistics on these closed cases to the Coast Guard for posting on the website. However, there is a difference between the number of reported cases and the number of closed cases. Table 4 identifies alleged CVSSA crimes reported to the FBI by year, and table 5 identifies closed CVSSA cases published on the Coast Guard’s public website by year. As tables 4 and 5 demonstrate, there were 287 alleged CVSSA crimes reported to the FBI during this nearly 4-year time period and 81 CVSSA crimes that were published on the website as closed. While the FBI reporting of CVSSA crime data is consistent with the law, these data have some limitations. For example, the crime data currently reported are limited in that (1) allegations for which investigations are not opened are not reported, (2) the data reported are not timely, and (3) the data reported are not put into context that would provide the public with the magnitude of crime on vessels, as discussed below. Allegations for which investigations are not opened are never published: As shown in tables 4 and 5, there are more than three times the number of alleged crimes reported to the FBI by the cruise lines than the CVSSA requires the FBI to post publicly. The data in table 4 on alleged crimes are not available publicly. According to a cruise victim advocate we interviewed, and to some members of Congress, there are questions about whether the public is adequately informed about the numbers of alleged CVSSA crimes on cruise lines. An official from a cruise victim advocacy group we interviewed stated that without complete data on the crimes that have occurred on cruise vessels, the public may not have the necessary information to make informed decisions about cruise travel. However, information on allegations of crime also may not accurately reflect crime on cruise vessels, as some allegations may be unfounded. Data reported are not timely: There can be a lag between the time an alleged crime is reported to the FBI and the time a case is closed. According to an FBI official, the crime data that are posted on Coast Guard’s website represent incidents that may have occurred months or years in the past. Depending on the progression of a case, this may be due to the length of the investigation, criminal trial, or any appeals. As a result, crimes published on the public website often do not align with the quarter, and sometimes the year, in which the crime occurred. An official from a cruise victim advocacy group we interviewed commented that the significant time lapse from when a crime allegedly occurs to when it is ultimately reported on the public website results in the public getting less valuable information about crimes that may have occurred onboard cruise vessels. Data reported without any context for comparison: According to a CLIA official, appropriate context is needed when presenting the CVSSA crime data figures so that the public can determine how cruise vessel crime rates compare with land-based crime rates. The FBI’s Uniform Crime Reports (UCR) collects crime statistics from over 18,000 city, university and college, county, state and tribal, and federal law enforcement agencies. In an effort to provide more detail on the comparative prevalence of cruise crimes, one cruise line and CLIA have included data that compare cruise line crime rates for homicide, rape, and assault with serious bodily injury with similar land- based crime rate statistics from the UCR for homicide, forcible rape, and aggravated assault. As we discuss below, while the UCR comparison has some limitations, CLIA officials commented that providing this comparison would provide potential cruise passengers with more transparent and comprehensive crime statistics. In addition to using rates to compare the prevalence of cruise vessel crime with the prevalence of land-based crime, presenting cruise crime data in a rate-based format may also be useful in comparing crime statistics among cruise lines. In July 2013, CLIA officials stated that certain cruise lines would begin reporting additional crime data on their websites. According to CLIA, in August 2013, six cruise lines—which account for over 90 percent of the North American cruise passengers—began to voluntarily report on their respective websites the number of alleged CVSSA crimes that had been reported onboard their cruise vessels. Officials from one of these cruise lines stated that they were volunteering to report this information to be more transparent about alleged crimes reported on their vessels. The data presented on their respective websites provide more information than they are required to report to the FBI—as the cruise line website information includes all alleged CVSSA crimes that have been reported regardless of FBI jurisdiction, even if the allegation of a crime is later determined to be unfounded. However, methodological factors may limit the usefulness of these data for consumers. For example, there are some limitations associated with the UCR data comparisons that one cruise line and CLIA are making, in that, only certain CVSSA crimes—violent crimes—can be reasonably compared with the UCR crimes because of definitional differences and the lack of comparison crimes identified in the UCR. In addition, some factors that explain the relatively low rate of alleged cruise vessel crimes compared with UCR land-based crime rates include the fact that passengers are in a confined cruise vessel environment where all persons and items brought onboard are screened, camera surveillance is ubiquitous, security personnel are present, and the demographic profile of the passengers on cruise vessels does not necessarily compare well with the profile of a major U.S. city (average income, for example). As a result, the differences presented by these two environments make the comparison between a cruise vessel environment and a land-based community challenging. A CLIA official commented that despite these limitations, the UCR is still viewed as the only national data set of reported crimes that can be used to make crime comparisons. According to a criminal justice researcher familiar with the cruise industry data, the UCR is being used as a comparison baseline in part because of the lack of an alternative baseline for comparing crime data, and while there may While the be some limitations, the comparative analysis is appropriate.presentation of the data on the cruise lines’ and CLIA’s websites may have limitations, the methodology for comparison generally appears sound and this voluntary crime data reporting is more comprehensive than what CVSSA currently requires. S.1340, 113th Cong. (2013); H.R. 2800,113th Cong. (2013). their investigative status, would be publicly posted, quarterly, on a new website maintained by the Department of Transportation. Under the proposed legislation, the allegation data would identify whether each crime was committed (or allegedly committed) by a passenger or crew member and whether it was against a minor. The bills also propose that cruise lines report CVSSA-type crimes within the FBI’s jurisdiction to the FBI and the nearest U.S. consulate within 4 hours of the crime occurring, among other items. In July 2013, these bills were referred to the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation and the House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure’s Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation, respectively. The efforts of both the cruise lines and Congress could improve the completeness, timeliness, and context for crime data on cruise vessels. However, as previously stated, the cruise lines are publishing their information voluntarily, and it is unknown if they will continue to do so. Also, there are some consistency issues in how the data are reported, with one cruise company reporting its data in aggregate—combining the crime data of all of its North American subsidiary cruise lines into a single data set for reporting—while other cruise companies report crime data by individual company or by subsidiary cruise line. In addition, the cruise lines currently do not report crime in a rate-based format, which would allow for easier comparison among cruise lines. If enacted into the law, the proposed amendments to the CVSSA, introduced in July 2013, could also improve the timeliness, relevance, and transparency of cruise vessel crime data available to the public. As of November 2013, however, the cruise lines’ voluntary reporting had just begun and the CVSSA bills remained in committee, and thus we cannot assess whether, or to what extent, these efforts may address the data limitations. The cruise industry responded to the Costa Concordia accident by reviewing safety practices and implementing changes across the industry and potential international regulatory actions are under consideration at the IMO. The Coast Guard began witnessing passenger musters in February 2012, soon after the Costa Concordia accident, and has participated in a mass rescue exercise involving a cruise vessel. In response to the Costa Concordia accident, CLIA initiated an operational safety review and member cruise lines adopted 10 safety- related policies. According to CLIA’s Operational Safety Review Executive Summary, the review was guided by cruise industry members with the advice and input of an independent panel of safety experts. Suggested policies were discussed and developed within CLIA’s Operational Safety Review’s Task Force, made up of senior industry executives from CLIA’s member lines with responsibility for maritime safety, and approved by the chief executive officers (CEO) of member lines. The resulting 10 policies relate to various safety enhancements, such as improvements to passenger musters, vessel passage planning, and life jacket stowage. CLIA announced these policies throughout 2012, as shown in figure 3. As a condition of CLIA membership, CEOs of all member cruise lines had to attest in writing that their companies had adopted the 10 policies and had included them in their companies’ safety management systems (SMS), according to CLIA officials. These officials said they expected cruise lines to implement most of the policies upon the dates of their announcement. Officials noted that they received written attestations from member cruise line CEOs at different times following the announcements; however, all had provided them as of July 2013. As a matter of international regulation, once a policy has been included in a company’s SMS, the policy is subject to routine external audits. These audits are conducted by vessels’ flag states (or classification societies acting on their behalf), which are responsible for ensuring that a vessel’s SMS is in compliance with the ISM Code and that the company operates the vessel in accordance with the SMS, among other things. Almost all cruise vessels visiting U.S. ports are registered (flagged) in other countries, and are therefore subject to SMS compliance audits by their flag states. When foreign-flagged cruise vessels visit U.S. ports, their SMSs are also subject to verification by the Coast Guard in its role as a port state control authority. Coast Guard officials said their port state control boarding officers review the validity of the certificates issued by a vessel’s flag state and also perform spot checks of a vessel’s compliance with its SMS, and noted that their review of a vessel’s SMS is less in- depth than a flag state’s review. Officials also explained that the Coast Guard may check items in a vessel’s SMS that go beyond domestic or international regulations—such as the 10 CLIA policies shown in figure 3—but said that any deficiencies found would merely be subject to correction rather than vessel detention because such items are self imposed rather than part of any regulation. However, Coast Guard officials noted that a series of such deficiencies might indicate a lack of implementation of the SMS which could result in more serious actions by Coast Guard. To facilitate CLIA’s operational safety review following the Costa Concordia accident, each member cruise line was to conduct a review of its own safety practices and procedures and collaborate to share best practices. The reviews conducted by the five cruise lines we interviewed varied in scope and outcomes. For example, according to a document provided by one company, it conducted a safety review that examined nine areas of its cruise operations—such as emergency management and damage control—and officials said this review resulted in over 500 recommendations. Another cruise line provided documentation showing that its review, conducted by an outside entity, focused on six objectives that in many cases relate to the human aspect of safety and emergency response—such as leadership involvement, teamwork and training, and safety culture—and the review resulted in 26 observations for further consideration. Representatives of the five cruise lines we spoke with identified some examples of changes they have made, or are making, after reviewing their safety procedures following the Costa Concordia accident. They include the following: One cruise line, as part of its quality assurance processes, reported that it has its most qualified captains visit vessels and observe staff to determine whether they are fostering an open atmosphere on the bridge. These captains are to ensure that senior bridge officers are making their thoughts and intentions known, and that junior bridge officers challenge senior officers if they are unclear about orders or have concerns. This emphasis on bridge team management aligns with the new CLIA “Passage Planning” policy where, among other things, bridge team members are encouraged to raise operational concerns without fear of retribution. Another cruise line reported that it changed the duty of managing the vessel mustering process from the captain of the vessel to the hotel director, to alleviate extra burden on the captain during an emergency. It also changed its mustering policy, so if a passenger refuses to muster prior to departure, then that passenger is not allowed to travel. Another cruise line reported that it sent its officers to receive testing to assess how they will react during the stress of an emergency; the suitability of their leadership style; and human factors such as approachability, reliability, and acceptance of change. CLIA officials also said testing of crew to assess how they will react during the stress of an emergency was a topic of in-depth discussion during its operational safety review following the Costa Concordia accident. Representatives from all five cruise lines we spoke with said they have included, or plan to include, the safety-related changes they have made as a result of their internal reviews into their SMSs. IMO’s Maritime Safety Committee (MSC)—a key IMO committee charged with addressing all matters related to the safety of shipping—has adopted one regulation, issued 18 interim safety recommendations, and is considering additional safety-related measures that it may take following the Costa Concordia accident. Specifically, MSC adopted a regulation in June 2013 to be effective on January 1, 2015, which requires that newly embarked passengers muster prior to or immediately upon departure, instead of within 24 hours, as stated in current regulations. According to a Coast Guard official, in the case of the Costa Concordia accident, the passengers that had embarked at the previous port had not yet participated in a muster drill before the accident occurred. IMO’s MSC has also issued 18 interim safety recommendations for passenger vessel companies to implement on a voluntary basis. Many of these recommendations closely align with the 10 CLIA policies discussed above. For example, as with CLIA’s policy, IMO recommends that companies record the nationality of persons onboard for purposes of coordination during emergencies. However, in some cases the IMO recommendations offer additional guidance. For example, in addition to recommending that passenger vessels carry additional life jackets in public spaces (similar to CLIA’s policy), IMO recommends that companies consider providing life jackets that are similarly designed and can be donned in a similar manner to avoid confusion. Following the release of the Costa Concordia safety technical accident investigation report in May 2013, the MSC working group responsible for developing these 18 interim recommendations expressed the view that, in the future, a decision will need to be made on their final status. Following the Costa Concordia accident, the MSC created a long-term action plan to facilitate the consideration of measures resulting from the accident. According to a MSC report, MSC uses the action plan to document proposals from IMO member governments and international organizations. The action plan is not publicly available; however, a Coast Guard official present at the June 2013 MSC meeting said the plan contains about 20 items and can be viewed as a list of issues—similar to the list of 18 interim safety recommendations—on which the MSC may take further action.including the development of international regulations. Figure 4 summarizes the main actions of IMO following the Costa Concordia accident. We provided a draft of this report to the Department of Homeland Security, the Department of Justice, the Department of Transportation, the National Transportation Safety Board, and the Department of State for review and comment. The Department of Homeland Security, Department of Justice, and Department of State provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. As arranged with your office, unless you publicly announce its contents earlier, we plan no further distribution of this report until 30 days after its issue date. At that time we will send copies of this report to the Secretary of Homeland Security, the Attorney General, the Secretary of Transportation, the Chairman of the National Transportation Safety Board, the Secretary of State, appropriate congressional committees, and other interested parties. This report will also be available at no charge on the GAO website at http://www.gao.gov. If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 512-9610 or caldwells@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. Key contributors to this report are listed in appendix III. This appendix provides information on the international and domestic organizations that play a role in the safety and security of cruise vessels. The non-U.S. stakeholders are diverse; have wide-ranging roles and responsibilities; and include international organizations, governments of nations where cruise vessels make stops or are registered, and private organizations that help ensure the safe operation of vessels. See table 6 for a list of some of the relevant international and domestic stakeholders involved in implementation of the Cruise Vessel Security and Safety Act of 2010 (CVSSA) and cruise vessel safety and security issues. This appendix provides summary information on the provisions of the Cruise Vessel Security and Safety Act, including time frames for implementation. Stephen L. Caldwell, (202) 512-9610 or caldwells@gao.gov. In addition to the contact named above, Dawn Hoff, Assistant Director; Jeff Jensen; Daniel Klabunde; and Michelle R. Su made significant contributions to this report. In addition, David Alexander, Michele Fejfar, and Stan Kostyla assisted with design and methodology; Tracey King provided legal support; Jessica Orr provided assistance in report preparation; and Eric Hauswirth developed the report’s graphics.

Summary: In 2011, almost 11 million passengers took a cruise from a U.S. port. Media reports about passenger personal safety while aboard cruise vessels--including those related to the January 2012 grounding of the cruise vessel Costa Concordia off the coast of Italy, which resulted in 32 deaths--combined with the increasing number of passengers taking cruises has raised questions about passenger safety and security. With the enactment of the CVSSA in 2010, cruise vessels that visit U.S. ports were required to meet certain security and safety requirements, such as having rail heights of at least 42 inches and reporting allegations of certain crimes to the FBI. GAO was asked to review cruise vessel safety as well as security issues--related to keeping passengers safe from crime. GAO reviewed (1) the extent to which the cruise vessel industry and federal agencies have implemented the CVSSA, and (2) any actions taken following the Costa Concordia accident to enhance the safety of cruise vessels visiting U.S. ports. GAO reviewed the CVSSA and related agency and industry documents, and interviewed officials from the Coast Guard, FBI, CLIA, five cruise lines which accounted for over 80 percent of North American cruise vessel passengers in 2012, and two crime victim advocacy groups. The cruise lines were selected based on several factors including their volume of North American passengers. Crime victim advocacy groups were selected based on their knowledge about cruise ship crime issues. GAO is not making any recommendations in this report. The cruise industry and federal agencies have implemented 11 of 15 Cruise Vessel Security and Safety Act (CVSSA) provisions, but implementation of 4 provisions requires the development of regulations and policy, and is underway. Officials from all five cruise lines GAO met with said most required measures were in place when the CVSSA was enacted. According to U.S. Coast Guard officials, a notice of proposed rulemaking is in development to address 3 of the 4 remaining provisions. The 3 provisions relate to technologies to (1) detect a person going overboard, (2) maintain a video surveillance system to assist in documenting crimes on the vessel, and (3) transmit communications and warnings from the ship to anyone in surrounding waters. A policy linked to the fourth provision on the certification of trainers who provide the CVSSA course on crime scene preservation to cruise line personnel, is, as of December 2013, undergoing review at the Department of Transportation. With respect to CVSSA crime-reporting requirements, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the Coast Guard have implemented these provisions as required. Accordingly, the agencies publish on a website information on reported crimes that are no longer under investigation. However, GAO identified some limitations in the usefulness of the publicly reported data. Specifically, (1) allegations for which investigations are not opened are never published; (2) the data are not timely--due to the length of the criminal justice process--and thus, crime data may be posted months or years after the alleged crime occurred and (3) the data reported are not put into context, such as a city's crime rate, to provide the public with the information needed to compare rates and make decisions. However, some cruise lines are making efforts to improve reported crime data. In August 2013, several cruise lines began voluntarily disclosing alleged crime data on their websites. Also, in July 2013, legislation was introduced to amend the CVSSA that would revise and expand crime-reporting requirements, among other items. As of November 2013, however, these actions were either new or pending. Thus, GAO could not assess whether, or to what extent, the voluntary reporting or potential legislation might provide more useful data than current requirements. Following the Costa Concordia accident, the cruise industry, an international maritime organization, and the Coast Guard took actions to improve passenger safety. The Cruise Lines International Association (CLIA)--which represents over 98 percent of cruise lines in the United States--identified 10 safety-related policies in 2012 that were adopted by all member cruise lines by July 2013. These policies include improvements to vessel passage planning and life jacket stowage, among other things. The International Maritime Organization (IMO)--a United Nations agency responsible for maritime matters--has also adopted a regulation, effective January 2015, requiring passengers to participate in a safety and evacuation exercise (muster drill) prior to or immediately upon departure--rather than within 24 hours of departure. CLIA member cruise lines adopted a similar muster policy weeks after the Costa Concordia accident. The Coast Guard is monitoring IMO's consideration of additional regulations. The agency has also started witnessing predeparture muster drills and has reported no major concerns. In addition, the Coast Guard has worked with the cruise industry for several years to plan and hold disaster exercises, including one in April 2013 to practice a mass rescue from a cruise vessel.