The Coast Guard employs a multi-level organizational structure, as shown in figure 1. The Coast Guard provides commanders at each level the authority and discretion to conduct operations within their operational areas. Command and control begins at Coast Guard headquarters, which is responsible for developing national strategies and policies for operations. However, Coast Guard headquarters does not exercise direct operational control of assets. Rather, the Commandant apportions this control to the two Area commanders. The two Area commanders—one for the Atlantic Area Command and one for the Pacific Area Command—are responsible for translating policy into operational objectives through theater plans for Coast Guard missions. The Coast Guard has nine districts that report to the Area Commands. District commanders are responsible for regional operations and they assume tactical control of allocated resources to execute operations and missions within their areas of responsibility. The nine Coast Guard districts are supported by 37 sectors. Sector commanders are responsible for local operations within each district. Sector commanders assume tactical control of allocated resources to execute operations and missions within their areas of responsibility. Each of the Coast Guard Area commands, districts, and sectors is responsible for managing its assets and accomplishing missions within its geographic area of responsibility and for the purposes of this report are referred to as field units. The Coast Guard uses a variety of assets to conduct its mission responsibilities. The Coast Guard’s assets consist of aircraft and vessels. The Coast Guard operates two types of aircraft—fixed wing (airplanes) and rotary wing (helicopters). Fixed wing aircraft operate from Air Stations and airports, whereas rotary wing aircraft operate from Air Stations, flight- deck equipped cutters, or other locations that could support flight operations. Similarly, the Coast Guard operates two types of vessels— cutters and boats. A cutter is any vessel 65 feet in length or greater, having adequate accommodations for crew to live on board. Larger cutters (major cutters), over 179 feet in length, are generally under the control of Area Commands and cutters 175 feet or less in length come under control of District Commands. In contrast, all vessels less than 65 feet in length are classified as boats and usually operate near shore and on inland waterways. As of the end of fiscal year 2015, the Coast Guard’s assets included 61 fixed wing aircraft, 142 rotary wing aircraft, 40 major cutters, 205 cutters, and 1,750 boats. For a more detailed listing of these Coast Guard’s assets, see appendix I. To crew its aircraft and vessels and to plan, manage, and carry out its mission responsibilities, the Coast Guard relies on a staff of active duty, reserve duty, and civilian personnel. As of the end of fiscal year 2015, the Coast Guard had 54,425 employees—39,116 active duty (6,566 officers, 1,728 Chief Warrant Officers, and 30,822 enlisted) personnel; 7,109 reservists; and 8,200 civilians. Strategic commitments are annual, up-front commitments of resources made at the headquarters level and are deemed by the Coast Guard as critical to the implementation of national, Department of Homeland Security, and Commandant strategic priorities. Among other things, strategic commitments specify the amount of time certain types of Coast Guard assets are to be operating in support of these activities, and these resource allocations serve as minimum levels of activity that field unit commanders are expected to provide. An example of a strategic commitment is supporting counter drug missions in the Western Caribbean and Eastern Pacific in coordination with other federal law enforcement or Department of Defense agencies. Strategic commitments represent the Coast Guard’s highest priorities, so the Coast Guard allocates resources to these activities before it allocates the remaining resources to meet other field units’ missions. The Coast Guard is responsible for 11 statutory missions, which are divided into non-homeland security and homeland security missions, as shown in table 2. The Homeland Security Act of 2002 requires that the authorities, functions, and capabilities of the Coast Guard to perform its missions be maintained intact and without significant reduction, except as specified in subsequent acts. It also prohibits the Secretary of Homeland Security from reducing “substantially or significantly…the missions of the Coast Guard or the Coast Guard’s capability to perform those missions.” Each fiscal year, the Coast Guard allocates resource hours to its field units for carrying out its 11 statutory missions based on the number and type of assets in those units at that time. During fiscal years 2010 through 2016, some missions were allocated more asset resource hours than others, as shown in figure 2. For example, for fiscal year 2016, the two missions with the highest allocation of asset resource hours were ports, waterways, and coastal security and aids to navigation. Conversely, the two missions with the lowest allocation of asset resource hours during that year were other law enforcement and marine environmental protection. In prior reports and testimonies, we have raised concerns about the Coast Guard’s difficulties in clearly and systematically allocating resources to accomplish its diverse missions. For example, in March 2004, we found that although the Coast Guard used a variety of mission performance measures, it did not have a systematic approach that would allow it to understand the linkage between resources expended and performance results achieved. We recommended, among other things, that the Coast Guard proceed with initiatives to account more completely for resources expended. In response, the Coast Guard developed the Mission Cost Model, which was to accurately capture the costs of mission-direct activities and the allocation of mission-support costs as they are incurred. We also previously reported that although the Coast Guard reports summary financial data by homeland security and non- homeland security missions to the Office of Management and Budget, as a multi-mission agency, the Coast Guard can be conducting multiple missions simultaneously. As a result, we stated that it is difficult to accurately determine the level of resources dedicated to each mission. Recognizing the difficulty of determining resource needs in a multi- mission agency, the Coast Guard developed a process to help it better allocate its assets in line with its strategic commitments and statutory mission responsibilities. Specifically, since being implemented in fiscal year 2008, the Coast Guard has used the Standard Operational Planning Process (SOPP) for annually developing and communicating strategic commitments and allocating resource hours, by asset type (i.e., types of aircraft, cutters, and boats), throughout its chain of command for meeting mission needs. The SOPP is to provide guidance and direction, while preserving some autonomy for field unit commanders to conduct operations, as events require. As shown in Figure 3, as part of the SOPP, Coast Guard headquarters issues an annual Strategic Planning Direction, which is to be the primary mechanism for allocating resources and providing strategic direction to operational commanders at the Area, District, and Sector levels. To determine and plan for how assets are to be allocated, Coast Guard headquarters are to rely on mission priorities, data on historical and current-year mission performance, and operational and intelligence assessments. As part of the planning process, field commands are allocated resource hours by asset type to be used for meeting strategic commitments and executing the 11 statutory missions. The Strategic Planning Direction is annually disseminated to the two Area Commands that are then to disseminate their own Operational Planning Directions through their command levels, with each District command developing its own plan to cover its area of responsibility. The Area commanders develop a plan known as the Area Operational Planning Direction and District commanders develop a district level Operational Planning Direction. After assets are deployed, staff at the field units are to enter the assets’ actual resource hours used, by mission, into data systems. The asset resource hour data are consolidated on a quarterly basis as part of Operational Performance Assessment Reports. The historical and current-year operational data from these reports, as well as Planning Assessments, are to be communicated back to Coast Guard headquarters as part of the information to be used to develop the Strategic Planning Direction for the following year. The Coast Guard has also developed management tools to help it align its personnel with its missions. In particular, the Coast Guard has developed the Manpower Requirements Determination (MRD) system and the Sector Staffing Model (SSM) to facilitate management decisions on personnel requirements (see table 3). The Coast Guard collects and reports the number of hours its assets— aircraft, cutters, and boats—spend conducting missions. Coast Guard field unit personnel are to record asset resource hours used to accomplish a mission(s), by mission category (such as domestic ice breaking or marine environmental protection operations), into one of two operational reporting databases. The Asset Logistics Maintenance Information System (ALMIS) and the Abstract of Operations System (AOPS) capture asset resource hour data to support mission responsibilities. According to Coast Guard instructions, field units are to record at least one type of activity, such as one of the Coast Guard’s 11 statutory missions, within 24 hours after an asset is deployed. Staff at the relevant field units are to review and certify that the data entered are accurate. After the data have been entered, the Coast Guard Business Intelligence system is used to extract and combine resource and performance data each quarter to create Operational Performance Assessment Reports. Data on resource hours used by field units’ assets are included in these reports and are part of the feedback component of the SOPP whereby field units report data on asset usage to Coast Guard headquarters on a quarterly basis. Coast Guard headquarters does not provide field units with strategic, realistic goals for allocating assets, by mission. Rather, headquarters’ allocations of assets in the Strategic Planning Directions that we reviewed for fiscal years 2010 through 2016 were based on assets’ maximum performance capacities. For example, the Strategic Planning Directions allocated each Hercules fixed wing aircraft (HC-130H) 800 hours per year, each Jayhawk helicopter (MH-60T) 700 hours per year, and each 210-foot or 270-foot medium endurance cutter (WMEC) 3,330 hours per year, irrespective of the condition, age, or availability of these assets. As a result, as shown in figure 4, the asset resource hours allocated in the Strategic Planning Directions have consistently exceeded the asset resource hours actually used by Coast Guard field units during fiscal years 2010 through 2015. For example, in fiscal year 2015, the Strategic Planning Direction allocated a total of 1,075,015 resource hours for field unit assets whereas the actual asset resource hours used was 804,048 hours, or about 75 percent of the allocated hours for that year. Coast Guard field unit officials we spoke with and Coast Guard planning documents we reviewed indicate that the Coast Guard is not able to achieve the resource allocation capacities set by the headquarters’ Strategic Planning Directions for several reasons, including asset condition and unscheduled maintenance. The field unit officials told us they provide Coast Guard headquarters with information on their assets’ availabilities through Operational Planning Directions, Operational Performance Assessment Reports, and Planning Assessments. For example, in its Planning Assessment for fiscal years 2015-2016, an Area Command noted that one of its classes of cutters was 50 years old and the cutters were hampered by mechanical failures requiring emergency dry dock repairs resulting in reduced availability to carry out their missions during the year. In another example, an Area Command stated in its fiscal year 2015 Operational Planning Direction that based on historical use, it planned for 575 hours per vessel for one type of cutter instead of the 825 hours performance capacity, as specified in the Strategic Planning Direction. Further, district officials we interviewed told us that they do not expect to use all of the boat asset resource hours allocated to their units because they do not have sufficient crews available, or needed maintenance prevents them from operating the boats at their capacity resource hours. Our analyses of Coast Guard resource hour data across asset types for fiscal years 2011 through 2015 show that actual asset use differed by asset type, but overall fell below asset resource hour projected capacities, as shown in figure 5. During this time period, the percent difference between resource hour capacities and actual resource hours used for rotary-wing aircraft were relatively close—for example, about 7 percent fewer hours were used than allocated for fiscal year 2015. In contrast, the percent difference between boat resource hour capacities and actual boat resource hours used during fiscal years 2011 through 2015 were more sizable—for example, about 35 percent fewer hours were used than allocated for fiscal year 2015. Our review of Coast Guard planning documents and discussions with field unit officials also show that Operational Planning Directions developed by field unit commands can differ from headquarters’ Strategic Planning Directions. For example, officials from one district told us that based on their analyses, they determined that their district could realistically use only about two-thirds of the performance capacity hours for boats allocated for one mission. Specifically, in fiscal year 2013, for the ports, waterways, and coastal security mission, the district’s Operational Planning Direction included 8,126 hours, or 63 percent, of the 13,000 hours allocated in headquarters’ Strategic Planning Direction, as shown in figure 6. The district officials stated that allocating 13,000 hours (total assets’ capacity) was not practical based on their analysis of the boat station locations and events requiring protection, among other things. District officials we met with told us that actual asset use for other missions was similarly below performance capacities, such as cutters that used about 75 percent of the capacity hours for the aids to navigation mission. These officials stated that the differences did not reflect an underutilization of their assets; rather, they considered the boat stations to be appropriately staffed with sufficient numbers of boats to meet mission demands. Thus, the capacity resource hours allocated to the district’s various missions through the SOPP do not align with the district’s actual asset resource hours used—as reported in the Operational Performance Assessment Reports. Because actual asset use has consistently fallen below asset performance capacities, headquarters’ Strategic Planning Directions have steadily overstated the amount of asset resource hours available to achieve the Coast Guard’s strategic commitments and missions, and there is not a direct alignment between the Coast Guard’s strategic goals and its prospects for achieving those goals. As a result, the headquarters’ strategic intent is not effectively communicated to field units when allocating asset resource hours. According to a Coast Guard Commandant Instruction, the SOPP is to effectively translate strategic intent to mission execution by, for example, issuing guidance and direction; setting performance targets; allocating resources; and providing effective feedback, including operational status and desired outputs. The Coast Guard Instruction also states that the intent of the Operational Performance Assessment Reports is for operational commanders to inform pertinent stakeholders about their resource utilization and mission performance, identify operational gaps, and provide a forecast of operational requirements for the next 4 quarters. In addition to the Coast Guard Commandant Instruction, Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government states that for an agency to run and control its operations, it must have relevant, reliable, and timely communications relating to internal, as well as external events. Moreover, agencies should use quality information to achieve objectives and address related risks. Quality information should be appropriate, current, complete, accurate, accessible, and timely. Agency management can then use this information to make informed decisions and evaluate performance in achieving key objectives and addressing risks. Further, agencies should internally communicate the necessary, quality information to achieve the agency’s objectives. Coast Guard headquarters officials told us that they use assets’ maximum performance capacities as a basis for asset allocations in the Strategic Planning Directions because (1) they do not have the necessary information and methods to realistically predict the operational availability of all assets, and (2) they need to identify assets’ maximum performance capacities available to field units in the event of needed surge operations or to respond to emergency situations. With regard to asset operational availability, the Coast Guard is in the process of implementing the Coast Guard Logistics Information Management System (CG-LIMS), which is intended to improve information on assets’ operational availability by consolidating its legacy logistics systems into one system, and providing timely and accurate information on the location, movement, and operational status of assets, among other things. According to Coast Guard officials, CG-LIMS could provide more centralized and systematic information on the operational availability of the assets, such as when assets are scheduled to be in maintenance during the year. For example, beginning in fiscal year 2017, one major cutter—a National Security Cutter—is expected to be out of commission for about 1 year for needed structural enhancements. An official from a Coast Guard Area Command stated that the Area Command has planned for the reduction in available resource hours for this cutter, but it would be useful to have more systematic information on operational availability across all assets. In December 2014, CG-LIMS began consolidating data on one aircraft type and the system is to expand to support all Coast Guard aircraft and some of its boats by the end of 2018. Coast Guard officials noted, though, that a decision has not yet been made to expand CG-LIMS to consolidate the logistics systems of other assets, such as cutters. The officials said that if the Coast Guard makes a determination to include all of its assets into the new CG-LIMS system, it should provide more systematic and centralized operational data across all assets. With regard to the use of asset capacities, we do not disagree that information on assets’ performance capacities can help inform decisions regarding surge operations or emergency situations. However, in addition to asset capacities, information on assets’ actual performance in the Strategic Planning Directions would more effectively communicate the Coast Guard’s strategic intent and more closely align asset allocations to the field units’ actual use of the assets in carrying out their various missions. For example, as stated earlier, one district had sufficient numbers of assets to meet demands in one mission while about 25 percent under capacity hours. Coast Guard officials stated that although they consider Operational Performance Assessment Report data when determining the number of asset resource hours to allocate among the missions in the annual Strategic Planning Directions, they do not reduce the estimates of total asset capacity and align actual resource hour use accordingly. Until the Coast Guard implements CG-LIMS or another system for asset allocation, using current and accessible information from field units, such as Operational Performance Assessment Reports and Planning Assessments, to inform asset hour allocations in the annual Strategic Planning Directions—in addition to the asset performance capacities currently used—will better ensure that the Coast Guard is effectively communicating strategic intent to its field units, realistically identifying any operational limitations of its assets, and making more informed asset resource hour allocation decisions that are aligned with its strategic goals. Further, without this alignment, Coast Guard headquarters does not know the extent to which field units are effectively and meaningfully carrying out the intent of the Strategic Planning Directions, and field units do not have the benefit of headquarters’ strategic direction in terms of the actual use of their assets in carrying out missions. Coast Guard field officials we met with told us that total asset resource hours recorded in Operational Performance Assessment Reports are accurate, but noted that data on asset resource hours used to support each mission may not be accurate. As stated earlier, Coast Guard guidance states that units should report at least one primary employment category, such as one of the 11 statutory missions, for the time an asset is deployed. The officials told us that data on resource hours, by mission, for all assets may not be accurate because the Coast Guard does not have a systematic way for field units to (1) record time spent on more than one mission during an asset’s deployment or (2) consistently account for time assets spend in transit to designated operational areas. For example, officials from six of the nine Coast Guard districts we interviewed told us that they generally record one mission per asset deployment, even though each asset’s crew may have performed two or more missions during a deployment. Officials from the remaining three districts told us that if their assets’ crews perform more than one mission per deployment, the crews generally apportion the number of hours spent on each mission performed. Thus, for example, if a cutter is deployed on a ports, waterways, and coastal security mission and is diverted to an emergency search and rescue mission, the cutter’s crew would record the hours spent on each respective mission. The officials noted, though, that this may not be a consistent practice across all units. In September 2013, the Coast Guard began drafting guidance for field units to capture assets’ transit times in order to better account for both the direct and indirect costs of conducting missions. Area and district officials we met with told us that it is important to accurately capture the time an asset is in transit because, for example, it can sometimes take a number of days for a cutter to transit to an operational area to conduct its mission because of vast geographic areas of responsibility. As of February 2016, Coast Guard officials informed us that the Coast Guard was investigating potential solutions to enhance the current software and information technology systems’ capabilities, but did not have an estimated date for finalizing the guidance. The Coast Guard has acknowledged these data limitations and Coast Guard officials stated that the resource hour data were accurate enough for operational planning purposes. Further, the Coast Guard officials stated that the Coast Guard was in the process of determining how best to account for time spent by assets on multiple missions and in transit in order to obtain more accurate and complete data on the time assets spend conducting each of its missions. For example, in April 2014, the Coast Guard issued instructions to its field units to provide definitions, policies, and processes for reporting their operational activities and also established a council to coordinate changes among the various operational reporting systems used by different field units. These are positive steps and should help the Coast Guard address limitations that currently hinder its ability to accurately capture assets’ operational data. In the headquarters’ Strategic Planning Directions, according to Coast Guard headquarters’ officials, the allocations of certain assets’ hours in support of strategic commitments has grown from fiscal year 2010 to fiscal year 2016, including commitments in support of the Coast Guard’s Western Hemisphere Strategy issued in September 2014 and the Department of Homeland Security’s Southern Borders and Approaches Campaign Plan issued in January 2015. These strategic commitments of assets are made at the headquarters level and, as stated earlier, are deemed critical to the implementation of national, Department of Homeland Security, and the Commandant’s strategic priorities. Headquarters and field unit officials we met with told us that it has become increasingly difficult to fulfill these growing strategic commitments when asset performance levels have generally remained the same or declined in recent years. For example, one Area Command stated that its ability to meet the strategic commitments and other priority missions was severely strained because of concerns over the reliability of some cutters in its fleet that are 50 years old and operating beyond their useful service lives. Area command officials stated that after meeting these priority missions, it has been challenging to respond to threats within their areas of responsibility with the remaining asset resource hours. Further, the Coast Guard Commandant testified before a congressional subcommittee in February 2015 that the Coast Guard’s mission demands continue to grow and evolve and that given the age and condition of some of its legacy assets, the success of future missions relies on the continued recapitalization of Coast Guard aircraft, cutters, boats, and infrastructure. To address these challenges, the Coast Guard is taking steps to provide more transparency regarding asset resource hours needed to support strategic commitments and the remaining resource hours available to field unit commanders. For example starting in fiscal year 2015, the Coast Guard began using a new data field to track the time assets spent supporting its Arctic strategy. Moving forward, these efforts will continue to be important if current trends continue—that is, actual asset performance levels remaining the same or declining and strategic commitments and other mission needs increasing. The Coast Guard does not maintain documentation on the extent to which risk factors have affected the allocation of resource hours to missions through its Strategic Planning Directions. For example, Coast Guard officials told us that the Coast Guard conducts a National Maritime Security Risk Assessment every 2 years to inform its asset allocations; however, the Coast Guard does not document how these risk assessments have affected asset allocation decisions across its missions. Further, these officials told us that they consider this risk assessment, as well as other information, such as intelligence reports, to establish planning priorities across its 11 statutory missions in the Strategic Planning Directions. The officials added that changes made to Strategic Planning Directions’ resource allocations, by mission, are discussed in verbal briefings but are not formally documented. Specifically, Coast Guard officials stated that the National Maritime Security Risk Assessment informs allocations for 7 of the 11 statutory missions. For the remaining 4 missions, the Coast Guard relies on other factors—such as historic use of asset resource hours by mission and field unit Planning Assessments—to inform allocations for those 4 missions. Written statements provided to us by the Coast Guard indicate that all projections and changes to resource hours, such as changes made to allocations among missions in the Strategic Planning Directions, are to be documented throughout the planning process. In addition, SOPP guidance states that risk-informed methods and processes are to be incorporated to support establishing planning priorities across missions, performance targets, and force apportionment to better understand and articulate the impacts of shifting resources from one mission to another. Further, Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government state that agencies should identify, analyze, and respond to changes and related risks that may impact internal control systems as part of its risk assessment process; and create and maintain documentation to provide evidence of the execution of these control activities. Coast Guard officials told us that while they have identified, analyzed, and incorporated risk factors as part of the SOPP, it is not their practice to maintain documentation on the extent to which risk factors have affected resource allocation decisions. Without documenting how risk factors have informed the asset allocation decisions, the Coast Guard lacks a record to help ensure that its decisions are transparent and the most effective ones for fulfilling its missions given existing risks. As stated earlier, a manpower requirements analysis (MRA) is to turn documented mission requirements into manpower requirements, which a unit can use to compare against actual personnel assigned. As shown in table 4, for its 134 unit types, the Coast Guard has completed 9 MRAs along with the accompanying manpower requirements determinations (MRD); as well as an additional 42 MRAs, as of December 2015. According to Coast Guard officials, unit types can represent an asset, such as the National Security Cutter, or an office, such as the Office of Civilian Human Resources. In June 2015, Coast Guard officials told us that based on current staffing levels, they estimate it could take 10 years to complete baseline MRAs for all Coast Guard units and were working on a strategy to prioritize and complete them. Further, these officials said that they cannot meet the demand for MRAs in a timely manner and that the units that can fund a contractor to conduct an MRA are the ones that are most likely to be completed. As of February 2016, the Coast Guard had not made progress on this strategy or established a process for prioritizing the MRA workload. Coast Guard guidance states that the MRA sponsor—such as the heads of the 134 unit types mentioned above—are to use the data provided in MRAs and decide if the personnel requirements recommended by the MRAs are feasible in the context of the program’s overall strategies, goals, and objectives. Coast Guard MRA guidance states that the Coast Guard should seek efficient staff, overhead, and support organizations with a goal of ensuring that high priority mission activities are fully supported. Further, the Coast Guard’s January 2016 Human Capital Strategy states that when an adjustment to personnel strength or competencies is necessary, the MRD process is the primary tool to be used by planners to define the human capital required to accomplish the mission. The Standard for Program Management calls for agencies to engage in (1) resource planning to determine which resources are needed and when they are needed to successfully implement the program, and (2) resource prioritization to allow the program manager to prioritize critical resources that are not available in abundance and to optimize their use across all program components. A Coast Guard official in charge of MRAs and MRDs told us in December 2015 that the Coast Guard has not issued the strategy because it does not have sufficient resources. In particular, the official noted that the Coast Guard does not have enough staff and lacks a system to store analyses from previously completed MRAs—such as standard workweek calculations for different personnel—that could help analyze the MRA workload and facilitate better risk management decision making. Because the Coast Guard does not have a systematic process that allows it to prioritize critical resources and to optimize their use across all program components, it faces risks in its ability to identify and prioritize the most important MRAs to complete and does not have reasonable assurance that the high priority mission activities are fully supported with the appropriate number of staff possessing the requisite mix of skills and abilities. In 2012, the Coast Guard implemented what it called the Sector Staffing Model (SSM) to redistribute and balance existing personnel across its sectors, based on its analyses of the sectors’ workloads from about 2009 through 2012. Coast Guard officials told us that, given overall limited resources, the sectors were staffed at lower staffing levels than were identified in the SSM. Officials we interviewed at the two Area Commands and nine districts stated that they thought that implementing the SSM was an important step in analyzing sector workload and balancing personnel across the sectors to meet workload demands. In total, the SSM involved the redistribution of about 1,400 positions, including about 1,280 active duty and 122 civilian personnel. Coast Guard officials told us that beginning in 2014, active duty positions identified in the SSM began to be redistributed through normal active duty transfer cycles and the officials noted that they expected all active duty position redistributions to be completed by the end of 2017. As of the end of 2015, 1,167 of the 1,280 active duty positions and 57 of the 122 civilian positions identified in the SSM had been redistributed. According to business rules the Coast Guard established for implementing the SSM, changes to civilian positions identified by the SSM did not require mandatory transfers or positions to be vacated in order to minimize disruption to the civilian workforce. This has resulted in staffing challenges for some field units. Officials we spoke with at seven of the nine districts stated that they faced staffing challenges because targeted civilian positions could not be redistributed until the civilians voluntarily transfer to a different position or retire. For example, officials from one district told us that one of its sectors was waiting for a civilian specialist to help manage hazardous materials, but they could not fill the position until a targeted civilian position was vacated. Further, officials at another district told us that one of its sectors was waiting for a civilian port security specialist, but the sector could not fill this position until a civilian administrative position was vacated in another sector. Because the business rules state that changes to civilian positions were not mandatory, it could be a number of years before some civilian positions are vacated, if the civilians in those positions have no desire to move to a different position and have years to work before they retire. Coast Guard headquarters officials told us they recognized that staffing gaps would remain in some civilian positions after SSM implementation, but noted they were waiting for the normal active duty transfer cycles to be completed by the end of 2017 before considering any updates to the SSM. Further, the officials said they were cognizant of the difficulties that some field units are facing since some needed civilian positions have not been filled or some unneeded civilian positions have not been vacated as identified in the SSM. These officials noted, though, that SSM business rules state that field units can request headquarters’ consideration of staff reprogramming proposals to make changes to their existing staff to align with the SSM and that they have been working to rectify these staffing imbalances and accommodate staffing changes as field units make staff reprogramming requests. Given the declining availability of its aging assets and the constrained budgets in recent years to replace legacy assets, together with growing strategic commitments, the Coast Guard will continue to face critical decisions about how to best allocate its limited assets to meet its mandated mission responsibilities. The Coast Guard uses the Standard Operational Planning Process (SOPP) to allocate asset resource hours to its field units for meeting their missions, but this planning process allocates maximum asset resource hour capacities and does not also include more realistic operational targets. However, by incorporating data that field units provide to Coast Guard headquarters on assets’ performance—such as Operational Performance Assessment Reports and Planning Assessments—to inform asset hour allocations in headquarters’ annual Strategic Planning Directions, the Coast Guard would be better positioned to ensure it is identifying any operational limitations of its assets, making more informed asset resource hour allocation decisions, and more effectively communicating strategic intent to its field units. The Coast Guard does not maintain documentation on the extent to which risk factors have affected the allocation of asset resource hours to missions through its annual Strategic Planning Directions. Without such documentation, the Coast Guard lacks transparency and a record to help ensure that its asset allocation decisions are the most effective ones for fulfilling its missions given existing risks. The Coast Guard has developed management tools, such as manpower requirements determinations, to help it strategically align its personnel with its missions, but Coast Guard officials state they cannot meet the demand for these analyses and have not established a process to prioritize them because they do not have sufficient staff and lack a system to help analyze the MRA workload. Because the Coast Guard does not have a systematic process for identifying and prioritizing the most important manpower requirements analyses to complete, it does not have reasonable assurance that the highest priority missions are fully supported with the appropriate number of staff possessing the requisite mix of skills and abilities. We recommend that the Commandant of the Coast Guard take the following three actions: To improve the strategic allocation of assets, the Coast Guard should incorporate field unit input, such as information on assets’ actual performance from Operational Performance Assessment Reports and Planning Assessments, to inform more realistic asset allocation decisions—in addition to asset performance capacities currently used—in the annual Strategic Planning Directions to more effectively communicate strategic intent to field units. To improve transparency in allocating its limited resources, and to help ensure that its resource allocation decisions are the most effective ones for fulfilling its missions given existing risks, the Coast Guard should document how the risk assessments conducted were used to inform and support its annual asset allocation decisions. To ensure that high priority mission activities are fully supported with the appropriate number of staff possessing the requisite mix of skills and abilities, the Coast Guard should develop a systematic process that prioritizes manpower requirements analyses for units that are the most critical for achieving mission needs. In April 2016, we requested comments on a draft of this report from the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the Coast Guard. Both DHS and the Coast Guard provided technical comments, which we have incorporated into the report, as appropriate. In addition to its technical comments, DHS provided an official letter for inclusion in the report, which can be seen in appendix II. With regard to the first two recommendations, the Coast Guard stated that it was taking actions, such as incorporating field unit input contained in Operational Performance Assessment Reports and Planning Assessments, and documenting how risk assessments conducted were used to inform its annual asset allocation and program direction to field units. If implemented as described in the fiscal year 2017 Strategic Planning Direction to be issued by October 2016, this would meet the intent of these recommendations. Further, with regard to the third recommendation, the Department stated that the Coast Guard would be prioritizing manpower requirements analyses of unstudied units and incorporating all available manpower data into future personnel decisions, as resources permit, by October 2016. If implemented as described, this would meet the intent of the recommendation. As agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce the contents of this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days from the report date. At that time, we will send copies to the Secretary of Homeland Security and the Commandant of the Coast Guard. In addition, the report will be available at no charge on the GAO website at http:www.gao.gov. If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 512-7141 or groverj@gao.gov. Contact Points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made key contributions to this report are listed in appendix III. In addition to the contact above, Christopher Conrad, Assistant Director; Nancy Kawahara, Analyst in Charge; Dominick Dale; Michele Fejfar; Holly Halifax; Eric Hauswirth; Carol Henn; Bonnie Ho; Tracey King; Ying Long; Alexandra Squitieri; and John Yee all made key contributions to this report. Coast Guard Acquisitions: Enhanced Oversight of Testing Could Benefit National Security Cutter Program and Future DHS Acquisitions, GAO-16-314T. Washington, D.C.: February 3, 2016. National Security Cutter: Enhanced Oversight Needed to Ensure Problems Discovered during Testing and Operations Are Addressed, GAO-16-148. Washington, D.C: January 12, 2016. Coast Guard: Timely Actions Needed to Address Risks in Using Rotational Crews, GAO-15-195. Washington, D.C.: March 6, 2015. Coast Guard Acquisitions: Better Information on Performance and Funding Needed to Address Shortfalls, GAO-14-450. Washington, D.C.: June 5, 2014. Coast Guard: Clarifying the Application of Guidance for Common Operational Picture Development Would Strengthen Program, GAO-13-321. Washington, D.C.: April 25, 2013. Coast Guard: Portfolio Management Approach Needed to Improve Major Acquisition Outcomes, GAO-12-918. Washington, D.C.: September 20, 2012. Coast Guard: Legacy Vessels’ Declining Conditions Reinforce Need for More Realistic Operational Targets, GAO-12-741. Washington, D.C.: July 31, 2012 . Homeland Security: Observations on the Coast Guard’s and the Department of Homeland Security’s Fleet Studies, GAO-12-751R. Washington, D.C.: May 31, 2012. Coast Guard: Action Needed As Approved Deepwater Program Remains Unachievable, GAO-11-743. Washington, D.C.: July 28, 2011. Coast Guard: Observations on Acquisition Management and Efforts to Reassess the Deepwater Program, GAO-11-535T. Washington, D.C.: Apr. 13, 2011. Coast Guard: Deepwater Requirements, Quantities, and Cost Require Revalidation to Reflect Knowledge Gained, GAO-10-790. Washington, D.C.: July 27, 2010. Coast Guard: Service Has Taken Steps to Address Historic Personnel Problems, but It Is too Soon to Assess the Impact of These Efforts. GAO-10-268R. Washington, D.C.: January 29, 2010. Coast Guard: Better Logistics Planning Needed to Aid Operational Decisions Related to the Deployment of the National Security Cutter and Its Support Assets, GAO-09-497. Washington, D.C.: July 17, 2009. Coast Guard: As Deepwater Systems Integrator, Coast Guard Is Reassessing Costs and Capabilities but Lags in Applying Its Disciplined Acquisition Approach, GAO-09-682. Washington, D.C.: July 14, 2009. Coast Guard: Observations on Changes to Management and Oversight of the Deepwater Program, GAO-09-462T. Washington, D.C.: Mar. 24, 2009.

Summary: Following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the Coast Guard has been charged with expanded missions. Further, constrained budgets in recent years have underscored the importance of strategically allocating its assets and personnel to meet these missions. GAO was asked to review the Coast Guard's resource allocation process. This report addresses the extent to which the Coast Guard: (1) employs an effective process to strategically allocate assets to meet its missions, and (2) has determined workforce requirements and addressed identified personnel needs. GAO reviewed Coast Guard planning and workforce requirements documents and asset performance data for fiscal years 2010 through 2015. GAO also discussed the planning process and personnel needs with Coast Guard officials at headquarters; as well as at the two Area and nine District Commands. The Coast Guard developed and uses the Standard Operational Planning Process to annually allocate asset (aircraft and vessels) resource hours to field units for meeting missions, but the headquarters' Strategic Planning Directions used in this process do not provide field units with strategic, realistic goals. Rather, headquarters' Strategic Planning Directions allocate maximum resource hour capacities for each asset—such as 700 hours per Jayhawk helicopter per year. As shown below, these asset allocations have consistently exceeded actual asset resource hours used by field units. By better incorporating data on assets' actual use that field units provide to Coast Guard headquarters—such as Operational Performance Assessment Reports —to inform asset allocation goals in its Strategic Planning Directions, the Coast Guard would better ensure that it effectively communicates strategic intent to its field units and makes more informed asset allocation decisions that are aligned with its strategic goals. The Coast Guard has developed management tools, such as manpower requirements analyses, to help it determine workforce requirements and help align its personnel with its missions. However, a Coast Guard official responsible for these analyses stated that the Coast Guard cannot meet the demand for these analyses because it does not have sufficient staff and a system to help analyze and prioritize the manpower requirements analyses that need to be completed. Without a systematic process for prioritizing the most important manpower requirements analyses to complete, consistent with leading program management practices, the Coast Guard does not have reasonable assurance that the highest priority missions are fully supported with the appropriate number of staff possessing the requisite mix of skills and abilities. GAO is making three recommendations to the Coast Guard, including to incorporate field unit input to inform its allocation decisions and to develop a systematic process that prioritizes the most critical manpower requirements analyses to complete. DHS concurred with the recommendations and stated it is taking actions, such as including field unit input into its planning process and prioritizing manpower requirements analyses of unstudied units, as resources permit.