The collapse of the Soviet Union left Russia with the largest arsenal of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in the world. Unclassified U.S. estimates of the current number of Russia’s nuclear warheads range from 18,000 to 25,000, and Russia inherited an estimated 600 metric tons of the uranium and plutonium that could be used to build nuclear devices. Russia also assumed control of more than 40,000 metric tons of chemical weapons and an extensive complex of sites used in research on dangerous biological pathogens, such as smallpox and anthrax, and the development of those pathogens as biological weapons. In the closed Soviet system, security systems emphasized heavy surveillance of site workers with severe penalties imposed on those who violated security procedures. The Soviets relied on closed cities and physical security measures to stem any threats posed by outsiders. However, the dissolution of the Soviet Union and subsequent social, political, and economic changes in Russia not only revealed gaps in the physical security surrounding sites containing WMD but made evident weaknesses in Russia’s ability to deter threats from inside those complexes. A senior member of the Russian Ministry of Defense stated in 1999 that the greatest threat to nuclear warhead security stems from insider knowledge of security systems and procedures. Both enhanced insider threat and decreased ability to protect against external threat have created opportunities for agents from countries of concern to obtain WMD. In response to this threat, Congress authorized the Department of Defense (DOD) to establish the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) Program in 1992 to help Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan secure and protect nuclear weapons. Members of Congress were concerned that nuclear weapons or materials might be lost, stolen, or sold and that nuclear scientists and technicians might be persuaded to sell their knowledge to nations or terrorists seeking to develop such weapons. Between 1992 and 2003, Congress authorized $6.4 billion for a wide array of threat reduction and nonproliferation programs implemented by DOD, the Department of Energy (DOE), the Department of State, and other agencies. As shown in figure 1, these appropriations have been directed into destruction and dismantlement, demilitarization (the conversion of military facilities and research to civilian purposes), and security efforts. Most funds have been for programs in Russia. Destruction and dismantlement projects, for which $2.65 billion has been appropriated, are designed to help with the elimination of nuclear, chemical, and other weapons and their delivery vehicles. For example, DOD has helped Russia destroy missiles and submarines to meet arms control requirements and is currently helping Russia design a destruction facility for its chemical weapons stockpile. In addition, DOD has financed the destruction of silos that contained intercontinental ballistic missiles. Demilitarization efforts—projects that encourage Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan to convert military facilities and research to civilian purposes—have been appropriated $1.1 billion. These include funds to pay scientists of the former Soviet Union who once developed nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and missile systems to conduct peaceful research. Demilitarization funds also support projects that seek to convert defense facilities in the former Soviet Union to factories that produce civilian products such as medical treatments. Security programs have been appropriated $2.65 billion from 1992 through 2002. These efforts help Russia and other former Soviet nations secure their WMD. For example, DOD and DOE have provided Russia with fences, sensors, video surveillance systems, and computerized inventory control systems. As shown in figure 2, as of September 2002, DOD and DOE had obligated a total of $1.8 billion to upgrade security at sites where Russia has WMD material. Most of these funds have been used to help secure nuclear warheads and nuclear material. Two percent of these funds have been used to address security threats at chemical weapons storage sites and institutes with dangerous biological pathogens. Since 1995, DOD has obligated $796 million to enhance security at Russian nuclear weapons sites. The department has installed fences, developed warhead inventory control systems, and upgraded railcars used to transport warheads. In 1998, DOD expanded its program by providing assistance to improve security over sites in Russia with dangerous biological pathogens. As of September 2002, DOD had obligated about $14 million for these programs. In 1999, Congress became concerned about the threat of chemical weapons and appropriated $20 million for security enhancements at chemical weapons storage sites in Russia. DOD had obligated $19.8 million of these funds as of September 2002. In 1993, DOE and the Russian government began working together to secure sites housing weapons-usable nuclear material. In 1995, DOE established the Material Protection, Control, and Accounting (MPC&A) program. Under MPC&A, DOE has installed modern nuclear security systems with three components: physical protection systems such as fences around the buildings containing nuclear materials; metal doors protecting rooms where material is stored; and video surveillance systems to monitor storage rooms; material control systems such as seals attached to nuclear material containers to indicate whether material has been stolen from the containers and badge systems that allow only authorized personnel into areas containing nuclear material; and material accounting systems such as inventories of nuclear material and computerized databases to track the amount and type of nuclear material contained in specific buildings. DOE has obligated $835 million for these programs since 1995. In 1998, at Russia’s request, DOE expanded the scope of its efforts with the Russian Navy from protecting naval reactor fuel to helping secure nuclear warheads. Since 1999, when DOE started working with the Russian Navy to protect sites where warheads are stored, DOE has obligated $159 million for this effort. The Ranking Minority Member, Subcommittee on Financial Management, the Budget, and International Security, Committee on Governmental Affairs, U.S. Senate, asked us to report on U.S. programs to help improve security at Russian WMD sites. To address these issues, we assessed U.S. efforts to enhance security at sites in Russia that store (1) weapons-usable nuclear material, (2) nuclear warheads, (3) dangerous biological pathogens, and (4) chemical weapons. For each area, we assessed U.S. plans to address these security threats at WMD sites in Russia; U.S. progress in implementing these plans, and the primary challenges and unresolved issues facing DOD and DOE in their efforts to secure Russian sites. Our review focused on U.S. efforts to secure WMD material and did not include U.S. programs to employ WMD scientists or destroy WMD material. To assess U.S. efforts to help secure weapons-usable nuclear material in Russia, we reviewed program documents from DOE and the Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy (MINATOM). We also visited two sites in Russia that have received security assistance from DOE: the Moscow State Engineering Physics Institute (MEPhI) and the Russian naval fuel storage Site 49. We requested visits to the Novosibirsk Chemical Concentrates Plant and the nuclear weapons complex facility at Mayak (also known as C- 65), but were denied access by the Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy. We were able to meet with managers from these sites outside their facilities. We also visited Los Alamos National Laboratory to observe U.S. approaches to securing nuclear material. We collected and analyzed reports and other publications on nuclear material security issues from the federal government and nongovernmental organizations. Our analysis of DOE’s financial spending patterns was based on our previous work and budget data on fiscal year 2001 and 2002 appropriations, obligations, and expenditures, which we obtained from DOE. We met with officials from DOE; Los Alamos, Lawrence Livermore, and Sandia National Laboratories; the Ministry of Atomic Energy in Russia; Gosatomnadzor, the Russian nuclear regulatory authority; and site officials from the Moscow State Engineering Physics Institute, the Russian Navy’s Site 49, Novosibirsk Chemical Concentrates Plant, and Mayak. To assess U.S. efforts to help secure nuclear warheads in Russia, we reviewed program documentation from DOE, DOD, the National Security Council, and Los Alamos, Lawrence Livermore, and Sandia National Laboratories. During our site work in Russia, we visited several locations related to securing nuclear warheads: We visited two Russian Navy sites where DOE had installed security improvements. During these visits, we toured inside the facilities, saw the security equipment DOE had installed, and spoke with officials from the Russian Navy. We visited the Fissile Material Storage Facility, where Russia says it will store plutonium from dismantled nuclear warheads. At the time of our visit, the facility was still under construction, so we were not able to see all of the planned security features in place. During our visit, we spoke with officials from DOD, which is financing the construction of the facility, and the Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy, which will operate the site after it is completed. We visited a factory in Russia, where the United States pays to have railcars refurbished and repaired. We saw the factory and met with factory officials. We visited the Security Assessment and Training Center (SATC), where we saw examples of the security systems DOD plans to install at warhead storage sites in Russia and some of the equipment the Russian Ministry of Defense uses to screen personnel who work with nuclear warheads. During this visit, we met with officials from the Russian Ministry of Defense and DOD. We also visited a location in the United States where nuclear warheads are stored to gain an understanding of how the United States secures its own warheads. During our work, we met with officials from DOD and DOE, the National Security Council, Sandia, Los Alamos and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratories, the Russian Ministry of Defense, and the Russian Navy. To assess U.S. efforts to help secure dangerous biological pathogens in Russia, we reviewed program documents from DOD; the Department of State; the National Security Council; the Russian Ministry of Health; the International Science and Technology Center; and four former WMD facilities where the United States has developed biosecurity assistance programs. We collected and analyzed reports and other publications on biosecurity issues from the federal government and nongovernmental organizations, and we met with officials from the United States Army Medical Research Institute for Infectious Diseases and Sandia Laboratory to discuss their approaches to biosecurity. We also met with officials of DOD and the Department of State, the National Security Council, the Russian ministries of Health and Science, Industry and Technology, the International Science and Technology Center, and DOD biosecurity contractors Bechtel and SAIC. We visited all four former Soviet biological weapons facilities in Russia that now receive U.S. biosecurity assistance: (1) State Research Center for Virology and Biotechnology (Vector), (2) the State Research Center for Applied Microbiology (Obolensk), (3) the Russian Research Institute of Phytopathology at Golitsino (Golitsino) and (4) the Pokrov Biologics Plant (Pokrov). At these facilities, we met with directors and scientists to discuss biosecurity issues, and we toured the facilities. Our review of DOD’s biosecurity program focused on assistance provided since 1998 to improve the security of biological sites in Russia. DOD has other programs to address the risks posed by the spread of dangerous pathogens or biological weapons expertise from Russia, including collaborative research projects with former Soviet biological weapons scientists and projects to enhance safety at biological sites. Congressional appropriations for DOD’s Biological Weapons Proliferation Prevention (BWPP) projects in the former Soviet Union that include biosecurity, biosafety, and collaborative research assistance have grown from $17 million in 2002 to $55 million in 2003. To assess U.S. efforts to help secure chemical weapons in Russia, we reviewed program documents from DOD and the Russian Munitions Agency, the executive agency in Russia charged with securing and destroying chemical weapons. We visited both chemical weapons storage sites in Russia that now receive U.S. security assistance: Kizner and Shchuch’ye. At these facilities, we met with base commanders and security personnel, we toured the facilities to observe the installed U.S. security upgrades, and we were shown U.S.-funded security equipment for site perimeter upgrades that had yet to be installed. We collected and analyzed reports and other publications on chemical weapons security issues from the federal government and nongovernmental organizations. We visited Anniston Chemical Activity and Edgewood Chemical Activity to see and discuss the U.S. approach to chemical weapons security with officials there. We met with officials from DOD, the Russian Munitions Agency, as well as officials from the two chemical weapons storage sites in Russia that are receiving U.S.-funded security upgrades. We performed our work from April 2002 through March 2003 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. The Department of Energy (DOE) plans to secure all weapons-usable nuclear material in Russia by 2008. Over the past 10 years, DOE has made steady progress toward this goal and has nearly completed its work at civilian sites and naval fuel storage sites. However, DOE has made limited progress in securing nuclear material in Russia’s nuclear weapons complex, a network of sites involved in the construction of nuclear weapons where most of the material is stored. Because it lacks access to most of these sites, DOE has shifted its new spending on the program from improving physical security over buildings with nuclear material to other programs, such as transportation security and guard force equipment and training. DOE faces significant challenges to continued progress with its program, in particular the lack of access to many of the most sensitive sites in Russia’s nuclear weapons complex. Although DOE and MINATOM signed a new access agreement in September 2001, DOE has not gained access to sites where work is planned but not yet begun. Weapons-usable nuclear material is highly enriched uranium or plutonium that can be used directly in a nuclear weapon without further enrichment or processing. This material is considered to be highly attractive to theft because it (1) is not very radioactive and therefore relatively safe to handle and (2) can easily be carried by one or two people in portable containers. Terrorists and countries seeking nuclear weapons could use as little as 25 kilograms of highly enriched uranium or 8 kilograms of plutonium to build a nuclear weapon. DOE estimates that Russia has about 600 metric tons of weapons-usable nuclear material. Russia stores weapons-usable nuclear material at three types of sites: (1) civilian sites, which produce or store nuclear fuels and materials for civilian application and research; (2) naval fuel storage sites, where the Russian Navy stores stockpiles of highly enriched uranium to be used as reactor fuel in submarines and icebreakers; and (3) the nuclear weapons complex, a network of 10 nuclear cities that fabricate, refurbish, or dismantle nuclear weapons and their components. Most weapons-usable nuclear material in Russia is in the nuclear weapons complex. MINATOM oversees operations at sites in the weapons complex and at some civilian sites. DOE plans to improve security over Russia’s entire stockpile of weapons- usable nuclear material to protect against both internal and external threats by 2008. In 1998, DOE issued guidelines that provide criteria for effectively reducing the risk of nuclear material theft in Russia. The guidelines provide a categorization scheme for ranking the relative threat posed by different types and quantities of material, which is used to determine the extent and type of upgrades necessary to secure the material. DOE has determined that 243 buildings at 40 sites in Russia (including central alarm stations) require improved security systems to better protect weapons-usable nuclear material from theft. Although DOE may not yet have identified all buildings, DOE’s assessment serves as a relatively stable baseline for planning, budgeting, and measuring the progress of its assistance. DOE is installing security improvements that protect against both the internal and external threats of theft. DOE installs security upgrades in two phases—rapid upgrades and comprehensive upgrades. Buildings that contain material of high proliferation threat receive both rapid and comprehensive upgrades, and buildings with material of less concern only receive rapid upgrades. According to DOE officials, rapid upgrades are primarily designed to delay and detect external adversaries. They include bricking up windows in storage buildings; installing strengthened doors, locks, and nuclear container seals; establishing controlled access areas around nuclear material; and implementing procedures that require the presence of two people when nuclear material is handled. Comprehensive upgrades include electronic sensors, motion detectors, and closed circuit television systems to detect intruders; central alarm stations, where guards can monitor cameras and alarms; and computerized material accounting systems. According to DOE officials, these comprehensive upgrades secure against both internal and external threats. DOE has developed time frames for completing the program, including schedules for individual sites, to assist in planning and budgeting. In our February 2001 report, we reported that DOE anticipated completing security improvements in Russia at all buildings with nuclear material by 2010. In fiscal year 2001, the Congress appropriated $101.1 million to help protect Russian weapons-usable nuclear material. Congress increased the appropriation for the program to $163.3 million in fiscal year 2002, and after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, further increased DOE’s appropriation by $150 million. Because of these additional funds, DOE revised its time frame for protecting all weapons-usable nuclear material in Russia to 2008. Specifically, DOE plans to complete its work at naval fuel storage sites in 2006, at civilian sites in 2007, and at the nuclear weapons complex in 2008. DOE’s progress in protecting weapons-usable nuclear material has varied widely, depending on the type of site. As of January 2003, DOE had completed security improvements at most of the buildings at civilian sites and naval fuel storage sites. In contrast, DOE has not started work at the majority of the buildings in the nuclear weapons complex, which contains most of the remaining unprotected weapons-usable nuclear material in Russia. Although DOE has now protected 38 percent, or about 228 metric tons, of Russia’s weapons-usable nuclear material, the vast majority of the remaining material is at sites in the nuclear weapons complex where, due to Russian national security concerns, DOE has not gained access and begun work. Because DOE has been largely unable to start new work in the weapons complex, most of DOE’s new spending for fiscal years 2001 and 2002 was on programs other than installing security improvements at buildings containing weapons-usable nuclear material. As seen in figure 3, DOE has made the least progress in providing security at Russia’s nuclear weapons complex, where it has completed work at only 14 of the 133 buildings, or 11 percent. DOE has not started work at the majority of the remaining buildings in the nuclear weapons complex because MINATOM has not provided the necessary access. As of January 2003, DOE’s efforts to install security systems at all three types of sites have protected 38 percent of Russia’s weapons-usable nuclear material. The vast majority of the remaining material is in the nuclear weapons complex, where some buildings hold several tons of uranium or plutonium. Due to lack of access, DOE is installing security improvements in the nuclear weapons complex at a much slower pace than it anticipated when it issued its first cost and schedule estimate in 2000. At that time, DOE planned to complete these upgrades by 2010. For example, DOE originally anticipated beginning at least preliminary work in fiscal year 2001 at Russia’s four nuclear weapons assembly and disassembly sites (the most sensitive parts of the nuclear weapons complex). As of January 2003, according to DOE officials, work had not begun at any of these sites. Progress at weapons complex sites where DOE has access can dramatically increase the amount of material protected. For example, since February 2001, DOE has increased the amount of material it has secured at the Mayak Production Association, from 15 metric tons to 28 metric tons. In contrast to Russia’s nuclear weapons complex, DOE has made significant progress protecting buildings at civilian and naval fuel storage sites and is nearing completion of its security upgrades at these sites. As of January 2003, DOE had completed work at 78 percent (85 of 110) of the buildings at these locations. DOE’s progress at the civilian and naval fuel storage sites has been facilitated by generally good access to buildings with weapons-usable nuclear material because Russia has fewer national security concerns about these sites. For example, at Novosibirsk Chemical Concentrates Plant, one of the largest civilian sites, DOE had adequate access to construct a single storage facility to replace nine dilapidated buildings that stored nuclear material. Furthermore, at one site in Russia’s civilian sector where DOE suspended work in 1999 due to lack of access, negotiations resumed for providing assistance in 2001, according to DOE officials. DOE has since been granted access and made several trips to the site and anticipates beginning work at that site early in 2003. Because progress in installing security upgrades to buildings in the nuclear weapons complex has been slowed, the majority of DOE’s additional funding in 2001 and 2002 shifted to transportation security, guard force support, and other assistance. These other assistance efforts included supporting the operation and maintenance of security systems already installed at sites, converting highly enriched uranium to a form that cannot be used for weapons, and developing nuclear regulations. As seen in figure 4, expenditures for security enchancements at buildings at civilian, naval fuel, and nuclear weapons complex sites decreased from the average of 72 percent in fiscal years 1993 to 2000 to 43 percent in fiscal years 2001 and 2002. The majority of DOE’s expenditures during fiscal years 2001 and 2002 were for activities other than securing buildings such as securing material during transport and maintaining previously installed equipment. While these efforts are important, they do not directly advance DOE’s goal of securing all buildings in Russia with weapons-usable nuclear material by 2008. DOE’s lack of access to many buildings that store weapons-usable nuclear material, in particular to buildings in the nuclear weapons complex, is the greatest challenge to providing assistance to improve nuclear material security in Russia. As set forth in its guidelines for improving nuclear material security in Russia, DOE requires access to the buildings to design security systems and confirm their installation. However, despite DOE’s efforts to gain access since 1995, MINATOM has continued to deny DOE access to buildings in the nuclear weapons complex due to Russia’s concerns about national security and laws that protect state secrets. As of January 2003, DOE had obtained or anticipated obtaining access to 35 of the estimated 133 buildings in Russia’s nuclear weapons complex with nuclear material. At the remaining 98 buildings (74 percent of the total), DOE had no access to design or confirm the installation of security systems. The level of access changed little since our February 2001 report, which also found that DOE did not have access to about three quarters of the buildings in Russia’s nuclear weapons complex. Russian officials in the nuclear weapons complex told us that it is very unlikely they would ever grant DOE physical access to the most sensitive areas. As a result of the lack of access, DOE has not been able to improve security at many buildings containing hundreds of metric tons of weapons-usable nuclear material—the majority of the remaining nuclear material in Russia. DOE has placed much of this material in its highest threat category and would make it first priority for receiving security improvements if DOE had access. The lack of access is likely to prevent DOE from accelerating completion of security improvements in the nuclear weapons complex from 2010 to 2008. In addition, DOE has not been able to confirm the installation of security improvements at several sites in the nuclear weapons complex where it funded security improvements before a stricter policy requiring access to buildings receiving assistance was enforced. For example, DOE spent approximately $1 million to install rapid and comprehensive upgrades at a building in Snezhinsk (also known as Chelyabinsk-70) where DOE has never had access. A DOE official said that DOE would not have approved assistance to that building under the current access policy. To gain access to buildings in the weapons complex where it had not been allowed to work, DOE signed an access agreement with MINATOM in September 2001. In April 2002, DOE stated that this agreement would enable DOE to begin new work at several buildings in the weapons complex where it lacked access. However, the agreement did not facilitate DOE’s access to these buildings. The agreement only described administrative procedures, such as specifying which DOE personnel are allowed to make site visits and the number and duration of those visits. DOE and Russian officials stated that this agreement did little to improve DOE’s access to new buildings, and in some cases, the agreement reduced U.S. access. In fact, during our July 2002 visit, MINATOM used the agreement as a rationale for denying GAO access to two sites in Russia on the grounds that GAO staff were not on the access list. DOE is exploring the use of alternative access procedures, as allowed in its access policy. For example, at Snezhinsk, DOE used video and photographs instead of physical access to conduct a vulnerability assessment for part of a building where DOE did not have access. (DOE officials said that they had access to the rest of the building.) However, DOE has not yet expanded the use of alternative access beyond this building. In addition, DOE has proposed building new central storage facilities at some sites in the nuclear weapons complex as a way to accelerate security upgrades. Instead of improving security at many separate buildings, DOE would pay to build or convert one building to store the nuclear material from other buildings. DOE has agreed in principle to such an approach, at least at one site in the nuclear weapons complex, but DOE and MINATOM have not reached a final agreement or begun construction on a central storage facility. DOE has made progress installing improved security systems for 38 percent of the weapons-usable nuclear material in Russia. However, DOE will likely be unable to complete its work in Russia by 2008, as currently planned, largely due to Russia’s lack of cooperation on access to sensitive sites in the nuclear weapons complex. Because DOE has made little progress gaining access to new sites in the Russian weapons complex, it has shifted its funding from securing buildings with nuclear material to other program objectives. These other efforts, such as supporting the operation and maintenance of the security systems, are essential to the long-term success of the program and can contribute to the overall security of Russia’s weapons-usable nuclear material. Nevertheless, the trend toward these supporting activities raises potential concerns about the program’s focus and direction. While these other program activities are needed and relevant, they do not directly advance DOE’s objective of securing all buildings in Russia with weapons-usable material. In addition, in light of Russia’s long-standing and continued unwillingness to allow access to most of the sites in the weapons complex, DOE needs to seriously reconsider its ambitious goal of protecting all of Russia’s weapons-usable nuclear material by 2008. Given the current lack of access to many nuclear weapons complex sites, the Secretary of Energy should reassess the department’s expedited plans to provide security enhancements to Russian facilities housing weapons- usable nuclear material. DOD and DOE plan to improve security of nuclear warheads at Russia’s storage sites and rail transfer points, where warheads are stored apart from their delivery vehicles. However, the departments do not know the total number of sites they plan to assist because Russia has provided only limited information about site locations and security conditions. DOE has scaled back its plans to assist operational sites, which support deployed nuclear weapons, to comply with January 2003 U.S. interagency guidelines that preclude assistance to most operational sites out of concern that U.S. assistance could enhance Russia’s military capability. DOD’s and DOE’s progress in improving security at nuclear warhead sites has been mixed. DOD has made limited progress because its counterpart, the 12th Main Directorate of the Russian Ministry of Defense, has installed less than half of the fencing DOD has provided to protect sites against external threat. In addition, the Ministry has not provided access to sites so that DOD can address internal threats. In contrast, DOE has improved security at 33 of 36 sites because the Russian Navy has provided sufficient access to these sites. However, DOE has improved security at some sites that would have been prohibited from receiving assistance under U.S. interagency guidelines. Russia stores its nuclear warheads at three types of sites—storage sites, operational sites, and rail transfer points. Table 1 provides an overview of plans that the DOD and DOE have to improve security at Russian nuclear warhead sites. DOD and DOE both provide assistance to improve nuclear warhead security in Russia because they work with different branches of the Russian military. DOD has focused on improving security at storage sites under the command of the 12th Main Directorate of the Russian Ministry of Defense, the branch of the Russian military specifically responsible for warhead security and maintenance. In contrast, DOE has focused on improving security at Russian Navy sites, which include storage, operational, and rail transfer sites, and has recently considered expanding its assistance to Strategic Rocket Forces sites. DOE efforts to increase security at operational sites, which support deployed nuclear weapons, raised concerns in the Administration that security assistance might enhance the military capability of Russia’s offensive nuclear force. However, the Administration did not have a policy balancing the benefit of increasing security at operational sites against the possibility of enhancing military capability. In January 2003, U.S. interagency guidelines precluded DOD and DOE assistance to most operational sites. The guidelines allow the departments to improve security at storage sites and rail transfer points that support warhead storage, consolidation, dismantlement, or force reductions, where security assistance it less likely to enhance operational capability. The guidelines do not support assistance to operational sites where mated or unmated warheads may be handled in the course of training or deployment. While DOD’s security plans included only storage sites and therefore complied with the guidelines, DOE has scaled back its plans to comply with the guidelines. DOD has focused on improving security at all of Russia’s storage sites, including both the large national stockpile sites and smaller sites at Navy, Air, and Strategic Rocket Forces bases. In 1995, DOD and the Russian Ministry of Defense signed an agreement and began discussions on improving security at Russia’s nuclear warhead sites. DOD chose to focus on storage sites because it works solely with the 12th Main Directorate of the Russian Ministry of Defense, which has jurisdiction over the large national stockpile sites and shares jurisdiction over the smaller storage sites located at military bases. According to DOD officials, the storage sites may contain warheads for both tactical and strategic weapons and warheads that Russia has slated for dismantlement. The 12th Main Directorate has not provided DOD with information on the total number or location of storage sites because it considers this information to be classified or sensitive. However, the Directorate has stated that it needs 123 kilometers of new perimeter fencing for 52 geographic locations throughout Russia. DOD has used this information to estimate the total magnitude of security needs at Russia’s storage sites and to develop its assistance plan. DOD estimates that security improvements under this plan will be complete by 2010. DOD has considered expanding its assistance to rail transfer points, locations used to transfer warheads between trains and trucks and for temporary warhead storage. While the U.S. interagency guidelines permit assistance to rail transfer points, DOD has not yet developed a security assistance plan for rail transfer points because the 12th Main Directorate has provided little information on these sites. DOD officials stated that warheads are most vulnerable at rail transfer points. The absence of a security plan for these sites is a significant gap in DOD’s current plans for enhancing security around Russian nuclear warheads. DOE is addressing security at 36 Russian Navy nuclear warhead sites: 5 storage sites, 27 operational sites, and 4 rail transfer points. DOE estimates that it will complete security improvements at the existing sites by 2006. However, the U.S. interagency guidelines prohibited security assistance to most operational sites. As a result of the guidelines and its own internal review of assistance to operational sites, DOE has scaled back its plans for enhancing security at Navy operational sites. At these sites, warheads may be mated with delivery vehicles in preparation for deployment or loaded onto ballistic missile submarines. Prior to the interagency guidelines, DOE officials provided security assistance to Russian Navy sites because they believed that security improvements to such sites would not enhance Russia’s military capability. In 2002, DOE also began work in response to a request from the Russian Ministry of Defense for assistance in securing Strategic Rocket Forces nuclear warhead sites. DOD and DOE have plans to provide a range of security improvements to address both external and internal threats. Examples of security improvements that protect primarily against external threat include new perimeter fencing with sensors to detect intruders trying to penetrate the fence, new guard towers and fighting positions to better detect and defend against intruders, and reinforced vehicle entrance gates. Security improvements that protect against both internal and external threats include access control systems that limit the site personnel who can enter nuclear warhead storage areas and other systems that detect unauthorized entry into bunkers by site personnel or outsiders. DOD and DOE install security improvements in two phases. During the first phase, DOD and DOE provide quick fixes and rapid upgrades, respectively, to improve the security of site perimeters to protect against external threats. During the second phase, DOD and DOE provide comprehensive upgrades—the full range of security improvements that protect against external and internal threats. The first phase costs about $1 million per site and requires little analysis of existing security conditions. Comprehensive upgrades cost about $10 million per site and require vulnerability assessments—site-specific evaluations of the security conditions—to plan and design the improved security systems. Both DOD and DOE require physical access to a site before providing comprehensive upgrades. DOD has other programs to help secure warheads that Russia plans to dismantle and to improve the reliability and effectiveness of the guard forces that protect nuclear warhead sites. The programs include transportation security enhancements, a computerized warhead inventory system, a facility to store nuclear material from dismantled warheads, and equipment for guard forces and to test guard forces for drug and alcohol abuse. For additional information on these programs, see appendix III. DOD and DOE have made mixed progress in securing nuclear warheads in Russia. DOD has made limited progress in securing storage sites. In contrast, DOE has made significant progress in improving security at Russian Navy sites, but many of the operational sites DOE has assisted would have been prohibited from receiving assistance under the January 2003 U.S. interagency guidelines. Since beginning discussions with the Russian Ministry of Defense in 1995 on providing security assistance to nuclear warhead sites, DOD has made limited progress in improving security at the storage sites where it has focused its efforts. DOD purchased 123 kilometers of perimeter fencing to meet the requirements defined by the Russian Ministry of Defense for the storage sites under its jurisdiction. The Russian Ministry of Defense agreed to install the fencing at its own expense but has made limited progress in doing so. The fencing consists of three layers, including sensors to detect intruders, and protects primarily against threats from outsiders. DOD began delivering the fencing in late 1997, but the Ministry of Defense reported in spring 2002 that it had installed about one third of the fencing— 42 kilometers at 52 locations—and was more than 2 years behind schedule in installing the remainder. The Ministry of Defense has not provided DOD with the location or number of sites where fencing has been installed, but has indicated only the number of kilometers of fencing installed. Furthermore, the Ministry of Defense has not updated the amount of fencing installed since spring 2002 or given DOD a revised estimate of the completion date for installing the fencing. According to DOD, the Ministry of Defense lacks funding to cover the cost of paying experienced contractors to install the fencing, which DOD estimates to be about $1 million per kilometer. DOD will not pay to install the fencing because the Ministry of Defense has not provided DOD access to the sites. DOD has not yet provided comprehensive upgrades—security systems that protect against internal and external threats—at any of the storage sites. DOD has tested and evaluated the comprehensive upgrades at the Security Assessment and Training Center (SATC) near Moscow, but Russia has not provided DOD access to the sites for the purpose of installing the upgrades. DOD requires physical access to the sites because the installation of comprehensive upgrades demands a greater level of design and security expertise. In September 2002, in anticipation of reaching an agreement on access with the Russian Ministry of Defense, DOD signed a contract for $83 million to install the comprehensive upgrades at eight storage sites. According to DOD, work at these sites is expected to begin spring 2003. DOD was unable to sign this contract earlier in 2002 as originally planned because, in January 2002, the administration temporarily suspended the Cooperative Threat Reduction program after it refused to certify that Russia was complying with arms control agreements. This resulted in an 8- month suspension of contracting for new nuclear warhead security projects. Since DOE began providing assistance to Russian Navy nuclear warhead sites in 1999, it has installed security improvements at 33 of the 36 sites where the Navy requested assistance. At all 33 sites, DOE installed rapid upgrades that primarily protect against external threats. As of January 2003, DOE had also installed comprehensive upgrades that protect against internal threats at 8 of the 33 sites. At five sites, DOE started but had not yet completed comprehensive upgrades. The rapid upgrades include installing or repairing perimeter fencing, replacing guard towers around the perimeter of the sites to provide better protection for the guard forces, and installing vehicle barriers at entrance gates. The comprehensive upgrades are based on site-specific vulnerability assessments and include systems to detect and assess intruders, control personnel access to the sites, and improve the ability of guard forces to respond to alarms. The 33 sites that received upgrades include the 5 storage sites over which the Russian Navy and the Ministry of Defense share jurisdiction. The remaining sites include 4 rail transfer points and 24 operational sites— facilities where nuclear warheads are mated to delivery vehicles, piers for loading and unloading nuclear weapons onto ballistic missile submarines, and piers where ballistic missile submarines loaded with nuclear weapons are docked. The January 2003 U.S. interagency guidelines precluded further DOE assistance to many operational sites. The guidelines permitted assistance to storage sites and rail transfer points that support warhead storage, consolidation, dismantlement, or force reductions. However, while it allowed for exceptions, the policy prohibited assistance to operational sites where mated or unmated warheads may be handled in the course of training or deployment, such as piers where submarines loaded with nuclear weapons are docked. The change in policy reflected concern that U.S. assistance might enhance Russia’s military capability. To implement this policy, DOE curtailed its plans to provide comprehensive security improvements at operational sites where it had already installed rapid upgrades. In addition, DOE will not provide further assistance to operational sites that do not meet the policy’s guidelines. The departments face two challenges in securing Russia’s nuclear warhead sites. The Russian Ministry of Defense has not allowed DOD to have access to Russia’s nuclear warhead sites. In addition, in spite of the U.S. interagency guidelines, DOD and DOE face challenges in coordinating their programs. DOD and DOE require physical access to nuclear warhead sites to help design security improvements and confirm that Russia has installed security improvements as agreed before paying for the work. In particular, they require access to site perimeters, entry control facilities, and guard facilities where the bulk of the security improvements are installed. DOD and DOE officials said that they do not require access inside the bunkers or other areas where nuclear warheads are stored because they provide minimal security improvements to those areas. With the exception of visits to two sites that were used to demonstrate how DOD would assess security needs and install security improvements, the Russian Ministry of Defense has denied DOD access to nuclear warhead sites to install security improvements. This lack of access has blocked DOD from installing comprehensive upgrades, the full set of security improvements that protect against both internal and external threats of theft, despite DOD’s investment of $35 million to test and evaluate these security improvements at the Security Assessment and Training Center near Moscow. In addition, while DOD has purchased perimeter fencing for the sites, it will not pay for installation without site access, even though Russia is behind schedule in installing the fencing with its own funds. DOD signed an access agreement with the Russian Ministry of Defense in February 2003 and plans to begin providing comprehensive security improvements at eight of the storage sites in spring 2003. The access agreement provides for limited access by DOD representatives to Ministry of Defense nuclear warhead sites where the Ministry requests DOD security assistance. However, given previous delays and setbacks in gaining Russia’s permission to visit nuclear warhead sites, additional delays beyond spring 2003 are possible. For example, the Russian government approved a law in spring 2002 that would allow DOD access to nuclear warhead sites; however, negotiations with the Ministry of Defense on procedures for implementing the law took longer than expected and prevented DOD from obtaining access to sites as soon as it anticipated. Unlike DOD, DOE has obtained sufficient access to Russia’s nuclear warhead sites to provide both rapid upgrades and comprehensive security improvements. DOE has visited most of the Russian Navy nuclear warhead sites—some sites as many as four times—to gather information to help design security systems and observe the security improvements it has paid to install. As part of this review, we also obtained access to two Navy sites and saw vehicle barriers, perimeter fencing, guard towers, and entry control facilities provided by DOE. Nevertheless, DOE has not visited 9 of the 33 nuclear warhead sites where it has provided assistance. The Ministry of Defense has restricted DOE’s access to some of these sites, and according to DOE officials, they have not visited other sites because they can realistically go to a limited number of sites each year. DOE officials stated that they plan to eventually visit all of the Navy sites where they have installed security improvements. DOD and DOE officials said various factors might explain why DOE has received better access from the Russian Navy than DOD has received from the 12th Main Directorate of the Russian Ministry of Defense. For example, the Russian Navy may be more willing to provide access because DOE teams are composed of civilian security experts, whereas the 12th Main Directorate may be reluctant to provide access to DOD military personnel. Alternatively, according to DOD officials, the 12th Main Directorate, under Russian law, may consider its storage sites to be more sensitive than operational sites. DOD and DOE coordinate their efforts to improve nuclear warhead security in Russia through an interagency working group and a joint working group with their Russian counterparts. DOD and DOE have avoided duplication of effort, but they have not followed uniform policies. Furthermore, they face several implementation issues that will require continued coordination. The interagency working group includes key representatives from DOD and DOE and reports to the National Security Council. The group formed after DOE began providing assistance to Russian Navy nuclear warhead sites in 1999 and meets at least once a quarter and frequently every month. The joint working group meets about every 6 months and includes key representatives from DOD, DOE, the Russian Navy, and 12th Main Directorate of the Russian Ministry of Defense. DOD and DOE officials said that their interagency coordination was initially not good but had improved, and they pointed to these working groups as a positive development in coordination. Specifically, the officials said that they had avoided duplication of assistance, a primary objective of the working groups. Despite these efforts, DOD and DOE have pursued two different policies on assistance to operational sites. While it did not specifically have a policy against assistance to operational sites, DOD focused on storage sites, where warheads are stored separate from their delivery vehicles. DOD officials stated that focusing on storage sites helped avoid potentially difficult policy decisions that could arise from directly assisting operational military sites. In contrast, DOE structured its warhead security program based on requests for assistance from the Russian Navy. Much of DOE’s security assistance went to operational sites where warheads are deployed with delivery vehicles because those were the sites for which the Russian Navy requested upgrades. Only after U.S. interagency guidelines were issued in January 2003, 3 years after DOE began providing assistance, did DOE and DOD resolve this difference and institute a common policy that balanced nuclear warhead security against the possibility of enhancing Russia’s military capability. While the U.S. interagency guidelines have resolved this primary issue, DOD and DOE face other coordination issues. For example, DOD and DOE have not determined which department will improve security at sites they both include in their plans. The departments’ plans overlap because the 12th Main Directorate and the Russian military services (the Navy, Air, and Strategic Rocket Forces) share jurisdiction over many nuclear warhead sites. For example, five Russian Navy sites are storage sites that fall under the jurisdiction of the Russian Navy and the 12th Main Directorate. The Russian Navy requested assistance for these five sites from DOE, and the 12th Main Directorate requested assistance from DOD. Similarly, DOD and DOE have not resolved which department will improve security at the Strategic Rocket Forces’ nuclear warhead sites. Initially, DOD included these sites in its plan, but in 2002 DOE received a request from the Russian Ministry of Defense for assistance to these sites. DOE is pursuing this request, has visited two sites, and has requested $24 million from Congress to help secure Strategic Rocket Forces’ nuclear warhead sites in fiscal year 2004. DOD and DOE officials said that they do not have a position on which department should provide security assistance to sites identified in both their plans. Rather, they said that whichever agency has the best access and cooperation from their Russian counterpart should install security improvements. These decisions will be made on a site-by-site basis in the interagency working group. Since DOD has already purchased perimeter fencing for the Strategic Rocket Forces sites, DOD officials said that if DOE provides assistance to those sites, it should avoid duplication of assistance and use DOD equipment. In addition, under the current policy guidelines, it is possible that DOD and DOE could both help secure sites for the Strategic Rocket Forces. DOD and DOE are also using different vendors to purchase security equipment for Russian warhead storage sites. For example, DOD and DOE used different vendors to purchase different alarm communication and display systems that will perform essentially the same function. According to agency officials, using different vendors and different systems can have advantages such as accounting for different weather conditions. However, they also stated that more training and maintenance are required if agencies provide multiple, nonstandardized systems. The Departments do not have a plan to jointly evaluate and deploy equipment that balances the advantages and disadvantages of using standardized equipment. DOD officials stated that the equipment DOE uses should be tested at the SATC, the equipment testing and evaluation center that DOD established near Moscow. However, DOE officials said that they believed most, if not all, of the equipment they provide is standardized with DOD equipment and have not committed to testing the equipment DOE provides at the SATC. DOD and DOE may need to coordinate their assistance in other areas to ensure consistent policy. For example, both agencies provide assistance to improve guard force effectiveness. DOE is considering developing two guard force training centers for the Russian Navy, and DOD has provided assistance to use the SATC as a training center for the 12th Main Directorate. The approaches that DOD and DOE have taken to improve the security of Russia’s nuclear warhead sites are complementary but have key differences. In particular, DOD has focused on Russia’s storage sites, and DOE has focused on Russian Navy sites that, with some exceptions, are largely separate from the sites receiving DOD assistance. Furthermore, the agencies’ different approaches have so far avoided overlap and allowed the United States to protect a greater number of sites. For example, DOE has obtained sufficient access to install security improvements at most Russian Navy sites, including rail transfer points, which are considered to be more vulnerable to theft than storage sites. In contrast, while DOD has made limited progress because it has not yet obtained the necessary access, it has plans in place to improve security at Russia’s storage sites if the Ministry of Defense provides access under its February 2003 access agreement with DOD. However, because DOD and DOE have different approaches to achieving a common objective critical to U.S. national interests, coordination is essential. DOD and DOE established mechanisms to share information and avoid duplication, but they did not, until January 2003, have consistent plans that balance nuclear warhead security improvements against the possibility of enhancing the operational capability of Russia’s nuclear forces. DOD and DOE now have consistent plans to follow as they implement their programs. However, the departments will need to work closely together on several areas as they proceed with their efforts to improve the security of Russia’s nuclear warhead sites. Because of the different approaches taken by DOD and DOE, it will be important to address issues such as agency jurisdiction over Russian sites, equipment standardization, and common approaches to training guard forces. The Secretaries of Defense and Energy should develop an integrated plan to ensure that their related programs to help secure Russia’s nuclear warheads work together to address implementation issues, such as determining which department will provide assistance to certain sites and resolving equipment standardization concerns. DOD has limited information on the location and security of Russian sites with dangerous biological pathogens because the Russian government has provided limited access to and information about these sites. While DOD plans to address internal and external security threats at biological sites in Russia, it has no time frames for completing this work, and it has not determined how many biological sites in Russia should receive security improvements. After more than 4 years of effort, DOD has made little progress in addressing security concerns at these sites. As of December 2002, DOD had installed security equipment at two sites to protect against external security threats but had not addressed insider threats by increasing controls over access to materials or improving physical security within labs. U.S. efforts to secure biological sites in Russia have faced significant challenges. For example, the Russian government has closed many sites to U.S. security assistance programs, and the United States has been unable to negotiate an agreement with Russia that would expedite DOD’s ability to provide security assistance. DOD’s plans to secure Russia biological sites are based on limited information about the number, location, pathogen collections, and security conditions at these facilities. DOD does not know how many sites in Russia have dangerous biological pathogens. Thus far, DOD has focused its security program on sites where it has identified dangerous pathogen collections and where it has access. However, DOD does not know how many sites it plans to help secure and has no time frames for completing its work. DOD plans to address both internal and external security concerns at sites where it has provided assistance. During the Cold War, the Soviet Union developed the world’s largest and most sophisticated offensive biological weapons program, a program that developed weapons to spread smallpox, anthrax, plague, and other dangerous pathogens. Although it had ratified the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC) in 1972, the Soviet Union secretly continued its biological weapons program for 2 more decades, employing 60,000 personnel at more than 50 sites. They researched and developed a broad range of pathogens with varying degrees of lethality for humans, animals, and plants. In 1992, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russian President Boris Yeltsin publicly confirmed the program’s existence and announced its termination. However, Russia has not disclosed the locations of all of its biological sites and the types of dangerous pathogens stored at these sites. In the 1990’s, Russian security systems and supporting infrastructure at biological sites deteriorated as the Russian government decreased funding and reduced staff size. At some sites, perimeter security systems are more than 25 years old and can no longer be repaired. Figure 5 shows unstable perimeter fencing around a biological site in Russia. Additionally, biological pathogens are small and difficult to detect, making them easy to steal. Once stolen, they can be grown almost anywhere. Russian biological sites have weak internal controls over access to pathogen collections. For example, as shown in figure 5, a lock and a seal of string pressed into wax secure an area at a former biological weapons site where dangerous pathogens are stored. The Russian government has not provided DOD with a complete inventory of all the sites in Russia that store dangerous pathogens. The United States and Russia have collaborative research projects at 49 Russian biological sites, a number that includes many former biological weapons facilities. These sites have provided participating U.S. agencies with opportunities to observe the security needs at these sites. However, DOD has projects under way and thus direct knowledge of the security needs at only 14 of the 49 sites. DOD’s information on the other sites is limited because DOD officials have to rely on other U.S. agencies to notify the department if they observe dangerous pathogen collections or have biosecurity concerns at the facilities where they operate. However, U.S. agencies have not received full access to information at the biological sites because the managers of these facilities are concerned about Russian national security and want to conceal former participation in the Soviet biological weapons program, according to a DOD official. To help focus its assistance, DOD began work on a strategic plan in April 2002. As of January 2003, the draft plan had not been approved by the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense. The plan is expected to set policy for DOD’s biological security assistance and other biological weapons facility programs, including collaborative research, biological facility safety projects, and new initiatives to provide early warning of outbreaks of dangerous diseases in Central Asia. DOD officials said that after the strategic plan is approved, DOD will prepare an implementation plan with schedules and deadlines for the biological security project and other biological weapons facility projects it implements. Despite uncertainty over the exact number of biological facilities in Russia, a DOD official estimated that the department may eventually help upgrade security at about 20 Russian biological sites housing dangerous pathogens. DOD plans to encourage Russian ministries to consolidate biological pathogen collections from smaller centers at larger facilities and thereby decrease the number of facilities that store dangerous pathogens. According to DOD, not all former bioweapons facilities currently have dangerous pathogens and therefore would not be considered by DOD for biosecurity assistance. Currently there is no time frame for completing this work. DOD plans to address both internal and external security threats at biological sites but to date has focused on protecting against external threats. Biological sites have unique characteristics that make them especially vulnerable to internal security threats, however. Experts have stated that there is a greater threat of potential proliferation of dangerous pathogens from insiders than from an outside attack because biological pathogens are small and can be smuggled out of a site without detection. According to a U.S. biosecurity expert, managers at Russian biological sites have been slow to acknowledge the potential of internal security threats. For example, officials at the Russian biological sites we visited stated that they knew their staff well and would notice if an individual posed a security threat because laboratory staff live and work in close quarters. These officials recognized the potential for insider security threats and said they would consider measures to mitigate these threats. According to a DOD official, the department intends to include measures to improve personnel screening and install systems to keep track of the pathogen collections. U.S. efforts to upgrade security at Russian biological institutes have been directed at facilities with dangerous pathogens that the Russians have been willing to let DOD assist. Since 1998, DOD has upgraded security at the two largest former biological weapons facilities in Russia: the State Research Center for Virology and Biotechnology (Vector) and the State Research Center for Applied Microbiology (Obolensk). Also, in 2002, DOD began assessments for physical security improvements at two additional centers: the Russian Research Institute of Phytopathology at Golitsino (Golitsino) and the Pokrov Biologics Plant (Pokrov). As of September 2002, DOD estimates that it had obligated about $14 million to improve security at Russian biological facilities. As of December 2002, biosecurity projects are under way at 4 of the 49 biological sites in Russia that may require assistance. DOD officials stated that the department’s efforts to help secure biological pathogens started later than work to secure other WMD because biological pathogen security was viewed as a lower priority. Also, according to DOD officials, relationships with the management of biological facilities have to be built before they will consider U.S. biosecurity assistance. Vector, one of the world’s two declared sites of smallpox storage, contains a large collection of viral pathogens. Obolensk maintains a large collection of pathogens that includes genetically engineered anthrax. Golitsino and Pokrov were part of the Soviet Union’s extensive bioweapons program that was directed toward the development of plant and animal pathogens. Other sites, including Russia’s system of antiplague sites, which are believed to store various strains of the plague and other pathogens, may have more dangerous pathogens than Golitsino and Pokrov, but the United States has no access to them, according to DOD officials. At Vector and Obolensk, biosecurity projects have improved perimeter and building entrance security. However, biosecurity assistance provided at Vector and Obolensk has not addressed the threat of theft by insiders or improved security over areas where research with hazardous materials is conducted or collections are stored. At both sites, biosecurity improvements involved construction and relocation of fences, installation of electronic sensors, strengthening of entrances to laboratory buildings where high hazard pathogens were stored or used in research, construction of guard facilities, and installation of equipment at central alarm stations. These projects progressed slowly in part because a second set of threat and vulnerability assessments was required after DOD found the initial set to be incomplete. At Vector and Obolensk, a second set of threat and vulnerability assessments was undertaken in September 2002 by a U.S. contractor and was completed in December 2002. Figure 7 shows new fencing installed at Vector and figure 8 shows two cabinets of computer equipment installed at Obolensk to monitor security video and electronic sensors. The projects at the Golitsino and Pokrov agricultural centers illustrate the slow progress of biosecurity projects. After 2 years of discussion and planning, initial threat and vulnerability assessments began in September 2002 and were completed in December 2002. DOD has yet to determine when it will begin security improvements at these sites. Although DOD’s slow start and Russia’s limited cooperation were major reasons for the lack of progress in biosecurity assistance, DOD officials point to the suspension of new projects in 2002 as the cause of further delays. In January 2002, the administration temporarily suspended the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program in Russia when it refused to certify that Russia was complying with arms control agreements. This resulted in an 8-month suspension of contracting for new biological security projects. DOD was unable to obligate funds to conduct threat and vulnerability assessments to initiate a second phase of security assistance at Vector and Obolensk, nor was it able to start threat and vulnerability assessments at Golitsino and Pokrov. U.S. efforts to help secure former biological weapons facilities in Russia face many challenges. First, DOD has been unable to work directly with Russian biological sites due to stalled negotiations on an interministerial implementing agreement. Second, the United States does not have access to former biological weapons sites. As a result, the biological security program has taken longer and accomplished less than expected. The United States cannot efficiently provide assistance to Russian institutes without having an implementing agreement with the Russian government. According to DOD officials, an implementing agreement between all the relevant Russian ministries and DOD would expedite the installation of security projects because DOD could work directly with the institutes. Multiple Russian organizations and ministries have jurisdiction over the military and civilian centers that were part of the former biological weapons complex in Russia. Jurisdiction resides in nine Russian government organizations: The Ministries of Defense, Health, Science, Agriculture, and Education; the Russian Academy of Medical Sciences; the Russian Academy of Agricultural Science; the Russian Academy of Natural Sciences; and Biopreparat, an organization that now develops pharmaceuticals but previously controlled the Soviet Union’s biological weapons technology centers. In addition, the Ministry of Health has five antiplague institutes and numerous regional field stations that maintain pathogen collections and had a lead role in the Soviet Union’s bioweapons program. The lack of a single Russian focal point for DOD’s bioweapons security projects is a major barrier to successfully negotiating an agreement between the United States and Russia. Since 1992, an umbrella agreement between the United States and Russia has allowed U.S. Cooperative Threat Reduction projects for biosecurity, biosafety, and dangerous pathogens, as it has for nuclear and chemical projects in Russia. However, additional interministerial implementation agreements are needed to facilitate DOD’s biosecurity assistance. In 1999, the Russian Government rejected a draft implementing agreement between DOD and the Ministry of Health on the grounds that it was not appropriate for that ministry to enter into an exclusive agreement with DOD. The Russian government similarly rejected a subsequent U.S.-proposed implementing agreement between the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services and the Russian Ministry of Health. The Department of State approached individual Russian ministries directly and also suggested that the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs sign a separate agreement with the United States that would allow implementing agreements with multiple Russian ministries. None of these efforts has been successful. Without an interministerial implementing agreement, DOD cannot begin to directly secure Russia’s former biological weapons facilities. As a result, DOD has to provide assistance through an intermediary organization that has an agreement with the Russian government. DOD has negotiated implementing agreements and avoided this problem in three Eurasian republics, Georgia, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan, and is finalizing an agreement with Ukraine. As an alternative to an implementing agreement, DOD has used an existing program, the International Science and Technology Center (ISTC), to begin security projects at Russian biological sites. However, ISTC was implementing hundreds of research projects and was unable to accord DOD projects as high a priority as DOD wished. ISTC is an international organization in Moscow founded by the United States, Russia, the European Union and Japan to engage former weapon scientists in peaceful scientific research. ISTC was created to prevent the proliferation of former Soviet WMD expertise by offering nuclear, biological and chemical weapons and missile scientists peaceful research opportunities and thus discouraging them from selling their expertise to countries of concern or terrorist groups. The bulk of ISTC’s funding pays scientists for their work, with some limited spending for laboratory equipment or computers. ISTC agreed to facilitate DOD’s biosecurity projects in Russia because the U.S. government had an existing agreement with ISTC that allowed it to finance a range of research projects and other activities. However, ISTC’s procurement system was not set up to handle the large contracts necessary for engineering and construction projects. In addition, approval of all ISTC proposals, including the biosecurity proposals, took time, partly because ISTC had to obtain host-government concurrence for each proposal from the Ministry of Atomic Energy; the Ministry of Industry, Science and Technology; the Ministry of Defense or the Academy of Science. Also, according to DOD officials, a shortage of administrative and managerial staff at ISTC impeded ISTC’s efforts to process DOD’s biosecurity projects. In 2001, DOD funded additional staff positions at ISTC to help expedite the processing of its security projects. According to DOD officials, until an interministerial implementing agreement is negotiated, DOD biosecurity projects will continue to be managed through ISTC. Despite frustration with ISTC’s slow pace, DOD officials stated that ISTC’s role was critical in implementing U.S. assistance at Russian bioweapons facilities. While DOD has identified several former biological weapons sites in Russia where it would like to provide biological security assistance, the Russian government has consistently refused to grant DOD access to certain facilities managed by the ministries of Health, Defense, and Agriculture. For example, the Russian Ministry of Health maintains five antiplague institutes and a network of numerous antiplague field stations. These institutes and stations were part of the former Soviet system of medical facilities housing dangerous pathogen collections for research and are completely closed to U.S. assistance programs. Bioweapons experts have reported that, as part of the Soviet bioweapons program, the anti-plague network helped identify new virulent strains of pathogens and participated in research on defensive measures. These facilities specialized in animal diseases that are communicable to man, such as plague, tularemia, anthrax, and cholera. According to DOD officials, the ministry was concerned that participation in Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) programs would be an admission that the antiplague centers had taken part in the Soviet biological weapons program. DOD also lacks access to four former Ministry of Defense biological weapons sites. These laboratories were involved in pathogen- and toxin-related research and maintained large pathogen collections. A major animal pathogen institute of the Ministry of Agriculture also remains closed to biosecurity assistance. DOD has made some progress in gaining access to one of the four Ministry of Defense facilities. In August 2002, U.S. Senator Richard Lugar was instrumental in initiating discussions with the management of the former Ministry of Defense facility, Kirov-200 (Strizhi), about potential collaborative research projects, according to a DOD official. The Russian government has nearly completed a transfer of ownership of the facility from the Ministry of Defense to the Ministry of Education. This institute’s new civilian status is expected to enable future security projects with DOD. DOD has accomplished little to date to help protect Russian sites with dangerous biological pathogens because the department has little information about biological sites in Russia and has received limited Russian cooperation. Presently, DOD plans to improve security at two sites that are of lesser security concern than others because the department has access to those two sites. By targeting sites where it has access, DOD maintains relationships with the Russian bioweapons establishment, which is an important objective. However, in the long term, this approach means that DOD will not be able to improve security at locations with dangerous pathogens that are of greatest security concern to the United States. DOD could benefit from DOE’s past experience in assessing site security requirements around buildings with weapons-usable nuclear material. Specifically, DOE developed a categorization scheme for ranking the relative threat posed by different types of material, which it used to decide on the extent of upgrades to be installed at specific buildings. Without complete assessments of the locations, pathogen collections, and security needs at sites in Russia that have dangerous biological weapons, DOD will have difficulty guiding its program. In developing the department’s plan to enhance security at Russian biological sites, the Secretary of Defense should clearly articulate criteria the department should use to rank the relative threat posed by different types of pathogens and review the security under which they are kept to identify the biological sites that pose the greatest security risks and would therefore have highest priority for and receive the most extensive U.S. assistance. Since the early 1990s, DOD has focused its nonproliferation efforts on the construction of a facility to destroy Russia’s 40,000 metric ton stockpile of chemical weapons. Because construction of the facility was taking longer than expected, in fiscal year 2000, Congress directed DOD to develop additional plans to protect Russia’s chemical weapons storage sites. DOD has since developed plans to address external threats at two chemical weapons sites that store nerve agent in small portable munitions. DOD plans to complete this work in fall 2003 but has no plans to extend the program to the five other sites, three of which store nerve agent and two that store blister agent. As a result, a large quantity of chemical weapons in Russia will remain vulnerable to theft or diversion. In 1998, under the terms of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), Russia declared that it had stockpiled 40,000 metric tons of chemical weapons, the largest stockpile in the world. The Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), the implementing agency of the CWC, conducts inspections at chemical weapons facilities and reports its findings to member states, including the United States. OPCW regularly inspects Russia’s chemical weapons stockpile. DOD has information concerning the quantity, location, and physical security conditions at Russia’s declared chemical weapons storage sites and has plans to address external security at two sites. However, chemical weapons are stored at seven sites in Russia (see table 2). Five of these sites store nerve agent, which is considered the most dangerous form of chemical weapon. DOD officials stated that two of these sites, Kizner and Shchuch’ye, pose the greatest threat to U.S. national security interests because they house nerve agent stored in small artillery shells, some light enough to be transported by an individual. The three other nerve agent sites store large air-delivered bombs and spray tanks. Two remaining sites store blister agents in bulk containers, which are considered less of a threat to U.S. national security interests. Further, a destruction facility for blister agents funded mainly by Germany began operation in December 2002. DOD has focused its efforts on the construction of a chemical weapons destruction facility at the Shchuch’ye chemical weapons storage site. According to DOD officials, the destruction of Russia’s chemical weapons stockpile, especially its nerve agents, would significantly reduce the threat faced by the United States. Planning began in 1994, and completion of the facility is scheduled for 2006. Russia plans to destroy all its nerve agent munitions at the facility. As of November 2002, DOD had obligated more than $218 million on the design and preliminary construction of the destruction facility. Although the Russian Munitions Agency, which is charged with the safe storage and destruction of Russia’s chemical weapons stockpile, plans to destroy all of its declared chemical weapons by the CWC mandated deadline of 2012, the lack of progress and financial difficulties thus far make it doubtful that this deadline will be met. Current estimates, based on the capacity of the facility, indicate that Russia will not be able to completely destroy its nerve agent stockpile for at least 40 years unless it builds additional destruction facilities. In 1999, we reported that the Shchuch’ye destruction facility was behind schedule and might not fully achieve U.S. objectives. In response, Congress denied funding for the project in fiscal year 2000 and directed DOD to address security concerns at Russia’s chemical weapons storage sites. Congress appropriated $20 million in fiscal year 2000 for security enhancements at chemical weapons storage sites in Russia. As a result of this congressional direction, DOD chose to address the external threat at the two chemical weapons storage sites in Russia that store nerve agent in small portable munitions, Kizner and Shchuch’ye. Figure 9 shows an official taking inventory of small nerve agent artillery shells at the Shchuch’ye storage site. DOD’s strategy for upgrading chemical weapons site security to address external threat at these two sites involves two phases. First, a series of upgrades were installed around individual buildings. Second, upgrades will be installed around the perimeter of each site and the central alarm stations. DOD plans to complete these upgrades by fall 2003. As of October 2002, DOD had obligated $19.8 million of its $20 million appropriation for chemical weapons site security. In November 2001, DOD began installing the first phase of its security enhancement package for chemical weapons sites: the installation of microwave sensors and fencing around individual storage buildings or groups of storage buildings that contain small portable munitions, according to DOD. These upgrades cost $220,000 per site and were installed at both Kizner and Shchuch’ye. The sensors are the primary deterrent to proliferators because they alert guards to any access to the protected buildings. During our visit to these sites, we observed that the U.S.-funded fences around individual buildings were approximately 3 feet high and were primarily designed to reduce the number of false alarms caused by animals. A total of 8 buildings at Shchuch’ye and 23 buildings at Kizner have been protected by the first phase of DOD upgrades. This first phase of upgrades was completed in February 2002. In July 2002, DOD began work on the second phase of its security enhancement package at Kizner and Shchuch’ye. These upgrades include the installation of enhanced site perimeters with two layers of fencing, sensors, lights, and closed circuit television cameras and improved central alarm stations. DOD plans to complete these upgrades by fall 2003. Once these security upgrades are complete, DOD will have secured 35 percent of Russia’s stockpile of nerve agent chemical weapons. The remaining 65 percent of nerve agent stocks are stored at three sites where no U.S.- funded security enhancements are planned. In addition, according to DOD officials, no plans exist to install a personnel reliability program, an improved accounting system, or other equipment to address insider threats at any chemical weapons storage site in Russia. Progress in implementing site security upgrades at chemical weapons storage sites has been expedited by good access and cooperation from the Russian government. DOD officials stated that access to Russia’s chemical weapons storage sites has not slowed the progress of the program and that they have been able to obtain the information necessary to perform the work. DOD officials believe that access has been good because Russia has declared its stockpile and OPCW inspectors are periodically present. We also had good access to both Kizner and Shchuch’ye when we visited Russia in July 2002. We were shown examples of the upgrades installed around individual buildings at both sites, saw the equipment for the site perimeter upgrades awaiting installation, and had access to portions of the site perimeters and entry control points. DOD officials have expressed concerns about the security of Russia’s chemical weapons storage facilities, yet no further security upgrades are planned. One reason is because the Russian government has expressed little interest in expanding the security enhancement program. The head of the Russian Munitions Agency, the agency charged with the safe storage and destruction of Russia’s chemical weapons stockpile, stated that his preference is that the United States fund the completion of the planned chemical weapons destruction facility at Shchuch’ye rather than improve the security around Russia’s chemical weapons storage sites. He maintained that the only real long-term security for Russia’s chemical weapons is their destruction, though he was unopposed to an expansion of the site security upgrade program. An additional challenge is ensuring that Russia’s chemical weapons have adequate security as they are transported to the destruction facility. DOD has not begun discussions with Russia on the security that will be required for chemical munitions as they are transferred from storage sites to the planned chemical weapons destruction facility at Shchuch’ye. DOD officials and security experts acknowledge that dangerous materials are very vulnerable during transport. Because Russia plans to destroy all of its nerve agent chemical weapons at the U.S.-funded destruction facility at Shchuch’ye, Russia will be transporting thousands of metric tons of chemical nerve agent from five storage sites, most of which are more than 500 miles from the planned facility. According to DOD officials, Russia has yet to develop a practical plan for securing chemical weapons in transit to the planned destruction facility. The United States already has programs in place to aid Russia in securing nuclear weapons and material during transport. Although this security concern will not arise before the scheduled completion of the destruction facility in 2006, none of the U.S. officials we interviewed had assessed the potential implications for security or whether the United States would need to assist Russia with the expense of transportation and security of chemical weapons during transit. DOD and Russia’s plans for securing only two chemical weapons sites appears to be based less on an assessment of the potential long-term security risks of leaving 65 percent of Russia’s nerve agent unsecured, than on a desire to focus on building a destruction facility. With a lengthy destruction process yet to begin for Russia’s nerve agent stockpile, concerns about the security of these weapons will persist. The further challenge of securing chemical weapons in transit to the planned destruction facility looms on the horizon, though DOD has no plans to address it. Given the lengthy time frame for the destruction of Russia’s chemical weapons stockpile, the Secretary of Defense should consider: reassessing the need to provide improved security at the three sites in Russia that store nerve agent but have not received U.S. security assistance; and working with Russian officials to develop practical plans for securing chemical weapons while in transit to the planned destruction facility at Shchuch’ye. Congress may wish to consider allocating additional funds for improving security at the three remaining sites in Russia that store nerve agent but have not received U.S. security assistance.

Summary: Terrorists and countries of concern may be able to gain access to poorly secured weapons of mass destruction at sites throughout Russia. To address this threat to U.S. national security, the Departments of Defense (DOD) and Energy (DOE) have obligated more than $1.8 billion since 1992. GAO was asked to report on U.S. programs to help improve security at sites where Russia stores (1) weapons-usable nuclear material, (2) nuclear warheads, (3) dangerous biological pathogens, and (4) chemical weapons. For each area, GAO assessed U.S. plans to address security threats at sites in Russia, U.S. progress in implementing those plans, and the primary challenges facing DOD and DOE. The Departments of Defense and Energy have made slow progress in helping improve the security of sites in Russia with weapons of mass destruction against the threat of theft or diversion because Russia is not providing needed access to many sites. Unfortunately, there is little reason to believe this situation will change in the near future. DOE plans to help secure Russia's weapons-usable nuclear material by 2008; however, the department lacks access to many sites. As a result, most of DOE's expenditures in the past 2 years went to functions other than securing buildings, such as maintaining previously installed equipment and developing nuclear security regulations. While important, these efforts do not advance DOE's objective of protecting all buildings with weapons-usable nuclear material. DOD and DOE have pursued different approaches to securing nuclear warhead sites. DOE recently scaled back its plans, and the two agencies will face coordination issues, such as deciding which agency will secure sites in both of their plans. DOD has made little progress in securing dangerous pathogens at the 49 sites where Russia and the United States have collaborative programs. Russia has consistently refused DOD access to sites and has closed some sites to U.S. security programs. Negotiations on a bilateral agreement to implement this assistance have also stalled. DOD's efforts to secure chemical weapons have focused on a destruction facility that will not be complete until 2006. It may be 40 years before Russia's nerve agent stockpile can be destroyed. DOD has improved security at two sites, but two thirds of Russia's stockpile remains vulnerable to theft.