DHS has taken action to address a backlog of potential overstay records we previously identified in April 2011. Specifically, in April 2011, we reported that, as of January 2011, ADIS contained a backlog of 1.6 million potential overstay records, which included prior nonpriority overstay leads that had not been reviewed, nonpriority leads that continued to accrue on a daily basis, and leads generated in error as a result of CBP system changes. DHS uses ADIS to match departure records to arrival records and subsequently close records for individuals with matching arrival and departure records because either (1) the individual departed prior to the end of his or her authorized period of admission and is therefore not an overstay or (2) the individual departed after the end of his or her authorized period of admission and is therefore an out-of-country overstay. Unmatched arrival records—those records in ADIS that do not have corresponding departure records—remain open and indicate that those individuals are potential in-country overstays. To determine whether an unmatched arrival record is likely to be an in-country overstay, DHS agencies review multiple databases to determine if any information is available to document a departure or a change in immigration status. For example, the review process includes both automated searches, such as searching for immigration benefit application information through a U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services database, and manual searches, such as determining whether the individual applied for refugee or asylum status. provided them to CTCEU for further review and consideration for enforcement action. Table 1 describes how CTCEU resolved these leads. Since completing this review of the backlog of potential overstay records in the summer of 2011, DHS has continued to review all potential overstay records through national security and law enforcement databases to identify potential threats, regardless of whether the subjects of the records meet ICE’s priorities for enforcement action. This occurs on an ongoing basis such that DHS may identify threats among individuals who were not previously identified as such when new information becomes available in various national security and law enforcement databases. As of April 2013, DHS continues to maintain more than 1 million unmatched arrival records in ADIS (that is, arrival records for which ADIS does not have a record of departure or status change). Some of these individuals are overstays, while others have either departed or changed immigration status without an ADIS record of their departure or status change. For example, the individual may have departed via a land port of entry without providing a record of departure or the individual may have applied for immigration benefits using a different name. In addition, these records include those from the previous backlog of unmatched arrival records that were not prioritized for enforcement in the summer of 2011 and have not subsequently been matched against a departure or change of status record. As part of our ongoing work, we are analyzing these data to identify various trends among these unmatched arrival records. For example, our preliminary analysis shows that 44 percent of the unmatched arrival records are nonimmigrants traveling to the United States on a tourist visa, while 43 percent are also tourists but were admitted under the Visa Waiver Program. Figure 1 presents our preliminary analysis of the breakdown of unmatched arrival records by admission class. We also analyzed the records to assess the amount of time that has elapsed since travelers were expected to depart the country, based on travelers’ “admit until” date. CBP assigns certain nonimmigrants an “admit until” date, by which they must leave the country to avoid overstaying. Figure 2 presents our preliminary analysis of the breakdown of the amount of time elapsed, as of November 2012, since the “admit until” date. The average amount of time elapsed for all unmatched arrival records was 2.7 years. As of April 2013, DHS has not analyzed its unmatched arrival records to identify whether there are any trends in these data that could inform the department’s overstay enforcement efforts. We will continue to evaluate these data as part of our ongoing work. Since April 2011, DHS has taken various actions to improve its data on potential overstays. In April 2011, we reported that DHS’s efforts to identify and report on overstays were hindered by unreliable data, and we identified various challenges to DHS’s efforts to identify potential overstays, including the incomplete collection of departure data from nonimmigrants at ports of entry, particularly land ports of entry, and the lack of mechanisms for assessing the quality of leads sent to ICE field offices for investigations. Since that time, DHS has taken action to strengthen its processes for reviewing records to identify potential overstays, including (1) streamlining connections among DHS databases used to identify potential overstays and (2) collecting information from the Canadian government about those exiting the United States and entering Canada through northern land ports of entry. First, DHS has taken steps to enhance connections among its component agencies’ databases used to identify potential overstays and reduce the need for manual exchanges of data. For example: In August 2012, DHS enhanced data sharing between ADIS and IDENT. This improved connection provides additional data to ADIS to improve the matching process based on fingerprint identification. For example, when an individual provides fingerprints as part of an application for immigration benefits from U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services or a visa from the State Department, or when apprehended by law enforcement, IDENT now sends identity information, including a fingerprint identification number, for that individual to ADIS. This additional source of data is intended to help allow ADIS to more effectively match the individual’s entry record with a change of status, thereby closing out more unmatched arrival records. Beginning in April 2013, ICE’s Student and Exchange Visitor Information System (SEVIS) began automatically sending data to ADIS on a daily basis, allowing ADIS to review SEVIS records against departure records and determine whether student visa holders who have ended their course of study departed in accordance with the terms of their stay. Prior to this date, DHS manually transferred data from SEVIS to ADIS on a weekly basis. According to DHS officials, these exchanges were unreliable because they did not consistently include all SEVIS data—particularly data on “no show” students who failed to begin their approved course of study within 30 days of being admitted into the United States. Also in April 2013, DHS automated the exchange of potential overstay records between ADIS and CBP’s Automated Targeting System (ATS), which is intended to allow DHS to more efficiently (1) transfer data between the systems for the purpose of identifying national security and public safety concerns, and (2) use matching algorithms in ATS that differ from those in ADIS to close additional records for individuals who departed. These changes have resulted in efficiencies in reviewing records for determining possible overstay leads; however, they do not address some of the underlying data quality issues we previously identified, such as incomplete data on departures through land ports of entry. Furthermore, because many of these changes were implemented in April 2013, it is too early to assess their effect on the quality of DHS’s overstay data. Second, DHS is implementing the Beyond the Border initiative to collect additional data to strengthen the identification of potential overstays. In October 2012, DHS and the Canada Border Services Agency began exchanging entry data on travelers crossing the border at selected land ports of entry. Because an entry into Canada constitutes a departure from the United States, DHS will be able to use Canadian entry data as proxies for U.S. departure records. We have previously reported that DHS faces challenges in its ability to identify overstays because of unreliable collection of departure data at land ports of entry. This effort would help address that challenge by providing a new source of data on travelers departing the United States at land ports on the northern border. In the pilot phase, DHS exchanged data with the Canada Border Services Agency on third-country nationals at four of the five largest ports of entry on the northern border. These data covered entries from September 30, 2012, through January 15, 2013. DHS plans to expand this effort to collect data from additional ports of entry and to share data on additional types of travelers. According to DHS officials, after June 30, 2013, DHS plans to exchange data for third-country nationals at all automated ports of entry along the northern border. At that time, DHS also plans to begin using these data for operational purposes (e.g., taking enforcement action against overstays, such as revoking visas or imposing bars on readmission to the country based on the length of time they remained in the country unlawfully). After June 30, 2014, DHS plans to exchange data on all travelers, including U.S. and Canadian citizens, at all automated ports of entry along the northern border. DHS has not reported overstay rates because of concerns about the reliability of its data on overstays. According to federal law, DHS is to submit an annual report to Congress providing numerical estimates of the number of aliens from each country in each nonimmigrant classification who overstayed an authorized period of admission that expired during the fiscal year prior to the year for which the report is made. Since 1994, DHS or its predecessors have not reported annual overstay rates regularly because of its concerns about the reliability of the department’s overstay data. In September 2008, we reported on limitations in overstay data, such as missing data for land departures, that affect the reliability of overstay rates. In April 2011, we reported that DHS officials stated that the department had not reported overstay rates because it had not had sufficient confidence in the quality of its overstay data. DHS officials stated at the time that, as a result, the department could not reliably report overstay estimates in accordance with the statute. Although the new departure data DHS is collecting as part of the Beyond the Border initiative may allow DHS to close out more potential overstay records in the future, these data are limited to land departure at northern border ports of entry, and as the initiative has not yet been fully implemented, it is too early to assess its effect on helping strengthen the reliability of DHS’s overstay data for reporting purposes. In February 2013, the Secretary of Homeland Security testified that DHS plans to report overstay rates by December 2013. As of April 2013, DHS was working to determine how it plans to calculate and report these overstay rates. As part of our ongoing review, we are assessing how the changes DHS has made to its processes for matching records to identify potential overstays may affect the reliability of overstay data and DHS’s ability to report reliable overstay rates. Developing a biometric exit capability has been a long-standing challenge for DHS. Beginning in 1996, federal law has required the implementation of an integrated entry and exit data system for foreign nationals. The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 required the Secretary of Homeland Security to develop a plan to accelerate full implementation of an automated biometric entry and exit data system that matches available information provided by foreign nationals upon their arrival in and departure from the United States. Since 2004, we have issued a number of reports on DHS’s efforts to implement a biometric entry and exit system. For example, in November 2009, we reported that DHS had not adopted an integrated approach to scheduling, executing, and tracking the work that needed to be accomplished to deliver a comprehensive exit solution. We concluded that without a master schedule that was integrated and derived in accordance with relevant guidance, DHS could not reliably commit to when and how it would deliver a comprehensive exit solution or adequately monitor and manage its progress toward this end. We have made recommendations to address these issues, including that DHS ensure that an integrated master schedule be developed and maintained. DHS has generally concurred with our recommendations and has reported taking action to address them. For example, in March 2012, DHS reported that the US-VISIT office was adopting procedures to comply with the nine scheduling practices we recommended in our November 2009 report and has conducted training on our scheduling methodology. DHS has not yet implemented a biometric exit capability, but has planning efforts under way to assess options for such a capability at airports and seaports. In 2009, DHS conducted pilots for biometric exit capabilities in airport scenarios, as called for in the Consolidated Security, Disaster Assistance, and Continuing Appropriations Act, 2009. In August 2010, we reported on the results of our review of DHS’s evaluation of these pilot programs. Specifically, we reported that there were limitations with the pilot programs—for example, the pilot programs did not operationally test about 30 percent of the air exit requirements identified in the evaluation plan for the pilot programs—which hindered DHS’s ability to inform decision making for a long-term air exit solution and pointed to the need for additional sources of information on air exit’s operational impacts. According to DHS officials, the department’s approach to planning for biometric air exit has been partly in response to our recommendation that DHS identify additional sources for the operational impacts of air exit not addressed in the pilot programs’ evaluation and to incorporate these sources into its air exit decision making and planning. As of April 2013, the department’s planning efforts are focused on developing a biometric exit system for airports, with the potential for a similar solution to be rolled out at seaports, according to DHS officials. However, in October 2010, DHS identified three primary reasons why it has been unable to determine how and when to implement a biometric air exit solution: (1) the methods of collecting biometric data could disrupt the flow of travelers through air terminals; (2) air carriers and airport authorities had not allowed DHS to examine mechanisms through which DHS could incorporate biometric data collection into passenger processing at the departure gate; and (3) challenges existed in capturing biometric data at the point of departure, including determining what personnel should be responsible for the capture of biometric information at airports. According to DHS officials, these challenges have affected the department’s planning efforts. In 2011, DHS directed its Science and Technology Directorate (S&T), in coordination with other DHS component agencies, to research “long-term options” for biometric exit. In May 2012, DHS reported internally on the results of S&T’s analysis of previous air exit pilot programs and assessment of available technologies, and the report made recommendations to support the planning and development of a biometric air exit capability. In that report, DHS concluded that the building blocks to implement an effective biometric air exit system were available. However, DHS reported that significant questions remained regarding (1) the effectiveness of current biographic air exit processes and the error rates in collecting or matching data, (2) methods of cost- effectively integrating biometrics into the air departure processes (e.g., matching arrival and departure records based on biometric information like fingerprints rather than based on biographic information, such as names and dates of birth), (3) the additional value biometric air exit would provide compared with the current biographic air exit process, and (4) the overall value and cost of a biometric air exit capability. The report included nine recommendations to help inform DHS’s planning for biometric air exit, such as directing DHS to develop explicit goals and objectives for biometric air exit and an evaluation framework that would, among other things, assess the value of collecting biometric data in addition to biographic data and determine whether biometric air exit is economically justified. DHS reported that, by May 2014, it planned to take steps to address the recommendations in its report; however, according to DHS Office of Policy and S&T officials, the department has not yet completed actions in response to these recommendations, although DHS officials reported that DHS has plans to do so to help support development of a biometric air exit concept of operations. For example, DHS’s report recommended that DHS develop explicit goals and objectives for biometric air exit and use scenario-based testing rather than operational pilot programs to inform the concept of operations for biometric air exit. As of April 2013, DHS officials stated that they expect to finalize goals and objectives in the near future and are making plans for future scenario-based testing. In addition, DHS’s report stated that new traveler facilitation tools and technologies— for example, online check-in, self-service, and paperless technology— could support more cost-effective ways to screen travelers, and that these improvements should be leveraged when developing plans for biometric air exit. However, DHS officials stated that there may be challenges to leveraging new technologies to the extent that U.S. airports and airlines rely on older, proprietary systems that may be difficult to update to incorporate new technologies. Furthermore, DHS officials stated they face challenges in coordinating with airlines and airports, which have expressed significant reluctance about biometric exit because of concerns over its effect on operations and potential costs. To address these concerns, DHS is conducting outreach and soliciting information from airlines and airports regarding their operations. DHS officials stated that the goal of its current efforts is to develop information about options for biometric exit and to report to Congress in time for the fiscal year 2016 budget cycle regarding (1) the additional benefits that biometric exit provides beyond enhanced biographic exit and (2) costs associated with biometric exit. As part of our ongoing work, we are assessing DHS’s progress in meeting its goals for addressing the recommendations in its biometric exit report by May 2014. We plan to report on the results of our analysis in July 2013. Chairman Miller, Ranking Member Jackson Lee, and members of the subcommittee, this completes my prepared statement. I would be pleased to respond to any questions that you may have at this time. For information about this statement please contact Rebecca Gambler at (202) 512-8777 or gamblerr@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this statement. Other individuals making key contributions included Kathryn Bernet, Assistant Director; Susan Baker; Frances A. Cook; Alana Finley; Lara Miklozek; Amanda Miller; and Ashley D. Vaughan.

Summary: Each year, millions of visitors come to the United States legally on a temporary basis either with or without a visa. Overstays are individuals who were admitted into the country legally on a temporary basis but then overstayed their authorized periods of admission. DHS has primary responsibility for identifying and taking enforcement action to address overstays. Within DHS, U.S. Customs and Border Protection is tasked with inspecting all people applying for entry to the United States. U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement is responsible for enforcing immigration law in the interior of the United States. In April 2011, GAO reported on DHS's actions to identify and address overstays and made recommendations to strengthen these processes. DHS concurred and has taken or is taking steps to address them. Since April 2011, DHS has reported taking further actions to strengthen its processes for addressing overstays. This testimony discusses GAO's preliminary observations on DHS's efforts since April 2011 to (1) review potential overstay records for national security and public safety concerns, (2) improve data on potential overstays and report overstay rates, and (3) plan for a biometric exit system. This statement is based on preliminary analyses from GAO's ongoing review of overstay enforcement for this subcommittee and other congressional requesters. GAO analyzed DHS documents and data related to overstays and interviewed relevant DHS officials. GAO expects to issue a final report on this work in July 2013. DHS provided technical comments, which were incorporated as appropriate. Since GAO reported on overstays in April 2011, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has taken action to address a backlog of potential overstay records by reviewing such records to identify national security and public safety threats, but unmatched arrival records remain in DHS's system. In April 2011, GAO reported that, as of January 2011, DHS's Arrival and Departure Information System (ADIS) contained a backlog of 1.6 million potential overstay records. DHS uses ADIS to match departure records to arrival records and subsequently close records for individuals with matching arrival and departure records. Unmatched arrival records--those that do not have corresponding departure records--remain open and indicate that the individual is a potential overstay. In the summer of 2011, DHS reviewed the 1.6 million potential overstay records. As a result, DHS closed about 863,000 records and removed them from the backlog. Since that time, DHS has continued to review all potential overstay records for national security and public safety concerns. However, as of April 2013, DHS continues to maintain more than 1 million unmatched arrival records in ADIS. GAO's preliminary analysis identified nonimmigrants traveling to the United States on a tourist visa constitute 44 percent of unmatched arrival records, while tourists admitted under a visa waiver constitute 43 percent. The remaining records include various types of other nonimmigrants, such as those traveling on temporary worker visas. DHS has actions completed and under way to improve data on potential overstays and report overstay rates, but the impact of these changes is not yet known. DHS has streamlined connections among databases used to identify potential overstays, among other things. Although these actions have resulted in efficiencies in processing data, they do not address underlying data quality issues, such as missing land departure data. Further, because many of these changes were implemented in April 2013, it is too early to assess their effect on the quality of DHS's overstay data. DHS continues to face challenges in reporting reliable overstay rates. Federal law requires DHS to report overstay estimates, but DHS or its predecessors have not regularly done so since 1994. In September 2008, GAO reported on limitations in overstay data that affect the reliability of overstay rates. In April 2011, GAO reported that DHS officials said that they have not reported overstay rates because DHS has not had sufficient confidence in the quality of its overstay data and that, as a result, DHS could not reliably report overstay rates. In February 2013, the Secretary of Homeland Security testified that DHS plans to report overstay rates by December 2013. DHS faces challenges planning for a biometric exit system at air and sea ports of entry. Beginning in 1996, federal law has required the implementation of an integrated entry and exit data system for foreign nationals. As of April 2013, DHS's planning efforts are focused on developing a biometric exit system for airports, with the potential for a similar solution at sea ports. However, in October 2010, DHS identified key challenges as to why it has been unable to determine how and when to implement a biometric air exit capability, including challenges in determining what personnel should be responsible for the capture of biometric information. GAO is assessing DHS's plans and efforts in these areas and plans to report on its results in July 2013.