RS20721 -- Terrorist Attack on USS Cole: Background and Issues for Congress Updated January 30, 2001 On October 12, 2000, the U.S. Navy destroyer Cole (1) was attacked by a small boat laden with explosives during a brief refueling stop in the harbor ofAden,Yemen. (2) The suicide terrorist attack killed 17members of the ship's crew, wounded 39 others, and seriously damaged the ship. (3) The attack has been widelycharacterized as a "boat bomb" adaptation of the truck-bomb tactic used to attack the U.S. Marine Corps barracksin Beirut in 1983 and the Khobar Towers U.S.military residence in Saudi Arabia in 1996. The FBI, in conjunction with Yemeni law-enforcement officials, is leading an investigation to determine who is responsible for the attack. At least six suspects arein custody in Yemen. Evidence developed to date suggests that it may have been carried out by Islamic militantswith possible connections to the terrorist networkled by Usama bin Ladin. (4) In addition to the FBI-ledinvestigation, Secretary of Defense William Cohen has formed a special panel headed by retired GeneralWilliam W. Crouch, former Vice Chief of Staff of the Army, and retired Admiral Harold W. Gehman, Jr, formercommander-in-chief of U.S. Joint ForcesCommand. The panel, in a report released January 9, 2001, avoided assigning blame but found significantshortcomings in security throughout the region andrecommend improvements in training and intelligence designed to thwart terrorist attacks. A Navy investigation,the results of which were released by theCommander of the Atlantic Fleet on January 19, 2001, concluded that many of the procedures in the ship's securityplan had not been followed, but that even ifthey had been followed, the incident could not have been prevented. Consequently, no single individual should bedisciplined for the incident, i.e. blame must bedistributed at a number of administrative levels. Members and staff have also held classified meetings on the attackwith Administration officials. The attack on the Cole raises potential issues for Congress concerning (1) procedures used by the Cole and other U.S. forces overseas to protect against terroristattacks; (2) intelligence collection, analysis, and dissemination as it relates to potential terrorist attacks; and (3) U.S.anti-terrorism policy and how the U.S. shouldrespond to this attack. These issues are discussed below. Force-protection procedures. Before it arrived at Aden for its brief refueling stop, the Cole, like all visitingU.S. ships, was required to file a force-protection plan for the visit. This plan was approved by higher U.S. militaryauthorities, and was implemented during theship's visit. In accordance with the plan, the Cole at the time of the attack was operating under threat conditionBravo, which is a heightened state of readinessagainst potential terrorist attack. (The lowest condition of heightened readiness is Alpha; Bravo is higher; Charlieis higher still, and Delta is the highest.) Thisthreat condition includes steps that are specifically intended to provide protection against attack by small boats. Members of the House and Senate Armed Services committees and other observers have raised several issues concerning the force-protection procedures beingused by the Cole and by other U.S. military forces and bases in the region, including the following: What were the elements of the Cole's force-protection plan and how were these elements determined? Did the Cole effectively implement all the elements of this plan? If not, why not? If so, does this indicate that the plan was not adequate fordefending against this type of attack? Was the force-protection plan, including the use of threat condition Bravo, appropriate in light of the terrorist threat information that wasavailable to military officials in the days leading up to the ship's visit? Was the ship's threat condition consistentwith the very high threat condition beingmaintained at that time by the U.S. embassy in Yemen? What changes, if any, should be made in force-protection policies for ships and other U.S. military forces and bases overseas, particularly inthe Middle East and Persian Gulf region? Given the need for Navy ships to periodically refuel and receive otherservices from local sources, as well as thepotential difficulty of identifying hostile craft in often-crowded harbors, how much can be done to reduce the riskof future attacks like this one? What can be doneto protect against more sophisticated terrorist tactics for attacking ships, such as using midget or personalsubmarines, scuba divers with limpet mines, orcommand-detonated harbor mines? Should the Navy reduce its use of ports for refueling stops and instead rely moreon at-sea tanker refuelings? How manyadditional tankers, at what cost, might be needed to implement such a change, and how would this affect the Navy'sability to use such stops to contribute to U.S.engagement with other countries? In addition to these issues, members of the House and Senate Armed Services committees at the hearings also raised an underlying question on whether the Cole'srefueling stop was necessary from an operational (as opposed to political/diplomatic) point of view. (5) Intelligence collection, analysis, and dissemination. Members of the Armed Services and Intelligencecommittees as well as other observers have raised several questions relating to the role of intelligence collection,analysis and dissemination in the Cole attack andin preventing other terrorist attacks against the United States. In some cases, these questions have been spurred bypress reports about the existence of informationand analyses from the U.S. Intelligence Community that, some argue, might have helped prevent the attack had itbeen given greater consideration or beendisseminated more quickly. (6) The details of theseclaims are currently under investigation by the Executive Branch and Committees in Congress. Questionsinclude the following: Does the United States have sufficient intelligence collection capacity, particularly in the form of human intelligence (as opposed tointelligence gathering by satellites or other technical means), for learning about potential terrorist attacks,particularly in the Middle East or Persian Gulf? Doesthe attack on the Cole represent a U.S. intelligence failure, or does it instead reflect the significant challenges oflearning about all such attacks soon enough tohead them off? In the days and weeks prior to the attack on the Cole, was all the available intelligence information about potential terrorist attacks in theMiddle East and Persian Gulf given proper weight in U.S. assessments of the terrorist threat in that region? Werereports providing information and analyses ofpotential terrorist attacks in the region disseminated on a timely basis to U.S. military and civilian officials in theregion who have responsibility for providingadvice or making decisions about ship refueling stops or other military operations? Was there adequate coordination, prior to the attack on the Cole, between the Defense Department [including the National Security Agency],the State Department, and the U.S. Central Command (the regional U.S. military command for the Middle East andPersian Gulf) in sharing and using availableintelligence information and analyses on potential terrorist attacks? What actions, if any, should be taken to improve U.S. intelligence collection and analysis, particularly as it relates to potential terroristattacks on U.S. assets in the Middle East and Persian Gulf or elsewhere? U.S. anti-terrorism policy and potential response. Beyond these more specific issues, the attack on the Coleposes several additional potential issues relating to U.S. anti-terrorism policy in general. Some of these issueshighlight dilemmas and concerns inherent inpolicies designed to prevent or mitigate terrorist acts. These issues include the following: Why was Yemen chosen for refueling? U.S. Navy ships began making refueling stops in Aden in January 1999. Since then, Navy ships have stopped there 27 times to refuel, twice to make port visits, and once to take on supplies. Members of the Armed Services Committeesand other observers have asked why the U.S. Central Command decided in 1998 to begin using Yemen for refuelingstops rather than continuing to use nearbyDjibouti on the Horn of Africa (which U.S. Navy ships had used for refueling for several years) - and why CentralCommand continued to use Yemen this year forrefuelings when an April 2000 State Department report on worldwide terrorism characterized Yemen as a havenfor terrorists but did not mention Djibouti. Members and others have asked whether the risk of a terrorist attack against a U.S. ship in Yemen was properlybalanced against the political/diplomatic goals ofimproving relations with Yemen and encouraging its development toward a stable, pro-Western, democratic countrythat does not support terrorism and cooperateswith U.S. efforts to contain Iraq. In response, General Tommy R. Franks, the current Commander-in-Chief of U.S.Central Command, stated the followingregarding the process that led his predecessor, General Anthony C. Zinni, to the decision to use Yemen for refuelingstops: The decision to go into Aden for refueling was based on operational as well as geo-strategic factors and included anassessment of the terrorist and conventional threats in the region. As you know, the Horn of Africa was in greatturmoil in 1998. We had continuing instability inSomalia, the embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania, an ongoing war between Ethiopia and Eritrea, and aninternal war in Sudan....As of December 1998, 14 ofthe 20 countries in the USCENTCOM AOR [U.S. Central Command area of responsibility] were characterized as"High Threat"countries. Djibouti, which had been the Navy refueling stop in the Southern Red Sea for over a decade, began to deteriorate as auseful port because of the Eritrea-Ethiopia war. This war caused increased force-protection concerns for our ships,as well as congestion in the port resulting inoperational delays. The judgment at this time was that USCENTCOM needed to look for more refueling options,and Aden, Yemen was seen as a viablealternative. At the time the refueling contract was signed, the addition brought the number of ports available in theUSCENTCOM AOR to 13. Selection of whichof these ports to use for a specific refueling operation involves careful evaluation of the threat and operationalrequirements. The terrorism threat is endemic in the AOR, and USCENTCOM takes extensive measures to protect our forces.... Thethreat situation was monitored regularly in Yemen and throughout the AOR. The intelligence community andUSCENTCOM consider this AOR a High Threatenvironment, and our assessments of the regional threat and the threat in Yemen were consistent in their evaluation.We had conducted a number of threatassessments in the port, and throughout the area. However, leading up to the attack on USS Cole on 12 October,we received no specific threat information forYemen or for the port of Aden that would cause us to change our assessment. Had such warning been received,action would have been taken by the operatingforces in response to the warning. (7) Anticipating new modes of terrorist attack. Truck bombs have been used to attack U.S. targets for at least 17 years. Did U.S. intelligence and counter-terrorism agencies anticipate or consider sufficiently plausible the possible useof the maritime equivalent of a truck bombagainst a U.S. Navy ship in a harbor? If not, what changes, if any, should be made to improve the ability of U.S.intelligence and counter-terrorism agencies toidentify and give sufficient prominence to modes of terrorist attack that have not been previously used? Should U.S.officials reach out more to non-governmentalorganizations and individuals for help in this regard? Protecting against threats posed by persons with legitimate access. What is the best way to defend against terroristattacks by persons with legitimate access to U.S. installations or forces? The Cole was refueled by a private Yemeniship supply company that had advanceinformation on the ship's itinerary. Although it now appears that the attack may have been carried out by personswith no connection to this firm, the attack stillraises questions about the security implications of relying on private foreign companies to refuel U.S. Navy ships. What steps can be taken to reduce the riskposed by relying on such firms? Should, for example, the State Department's Anti-Terrorism Assistance program(ATA) be enhanced so that it can better assistforeign governments, when needed, in personnel screening and security procedures? The role of the FBI in overseas counter-terrorism investigations. Some observers have asked whether (or underwhat circumstances) it is appropriate for the FBI, traditionally a domestic U.S. law-enforcement agency, to take a de facto lead role in overseas investigations ofterrorist attacks. Although the FBI's investigative skills are critical to such investigations, some observers argue thatother skills outside the FBI's area ofspecialization, including having an in-depth understanding of foreign countries and cultures and the diplomaticability to ensure host nation cooperation, areequally important components of such investigations. Clearly, small nations may feel overwhelmed by largenumbers of FBI agents and the political sensitivitiesof their insistence on questioning local witnesses/suspects. Conferees on the FY2001 Foreign OperationsAppropriations bill ( H.R. 4811 ) made $4million for counter-terrorism training in Yemen contingent on FBI certification that Yemen is fully cooperating inthe Cole investigation. Insuring coordination of any retaliatory response. An important challenge facing U.S. counter-terrorism officials isto ensure that U.S. actions for military/economic retaliation for terrorist attacks are adequately planned. The needfor maintaining secrecy in planning militaryactions can discourage interagency coordination, which in turn can create a potential for making a planning mistake. Some observers argue that the U.S. cruisemissile attack on what some believe was a legitimate pharmaceutical factory in Sudan in response to the 1998embassy bombings in East Africa was a mistakecaused in part by lack of interagency coordination that deprived decisionmakers of important data which might haveinfluenced the target-selection process. (8) If itis determined that the attack was linked to Bin Ladin, a major issue is how the U.S. responds and prevents furtherattacks from a network that is believedresponsible for several anti-U.S. attacks since 1992. The U.S. retaliatory attack on Afghanistan in August 1998,a response to the East Africa Embassy bombings,did little to damage Bin Ladin's network or his ability to plan attacks.

Summary: On October 12, 2000, the U.S. Navy destroyer Cole was attacked by a small boat ladenwith explosives during a briefrefueling stop in the harbor of Aden, Yemen. The suicide terrorist attack killed 17 members of the ship's crew,wounded 39 others, and seriously damaged theship. Evidence developed to date suggests that it may have been carried out by Islamic militants with possibleconnections to the terrorist network led by Usamabin Ladin. The FBI, Defense Department, and Navy launched investigations to determine culpability for the attackand to review procedures. A broad DoD reviewof accountability was conducted by a special panel. On January 9, 2001, the panel issued its report which avoidedassigning blame but found significantshortcomings in security against terrorist attacks, including inadequate training and intelligence. On January 23,2001, Senate Armed Services CommitteeChairman, John Warner, announced intentions for the Committee to hold its own investigation. Issues for Congressinclude the adequacy of (1) procedures byU.S. forces to protect against terrorist attacks; (2) intelligence related to potential terrorist attacks; and (3) U.S.anti-terrorism policy and response. This report willbe updated if major new developments warrant.