The National Response Framework establishes the principles that guide all response partners, including federal, state, local, private, and other entities, in preparing for and providing a unified national response to disasters—including those involving CBRNE materials. Under this framework, disaster response is tiered, beginning with local governments and agencies typically responding immediately following an incident. When additional resources are requested, a state may provide assistance with its capabilities, including its National Guard, or may request assistance from other states through interstate mutual agreements or the Emergency Management Assistance Compact. If an incident requires capabilities beyond those available at the local and state levels, the Governor can seek federal assistance. When coordination of federal response activities is required, the Department of Homeland Security— through the Federal Emergency Management Agency—is generally responsible for coordinating such federal assistance, including assistance provided by DOD. In February 2013, DOD released its updated Strategy for Homeland Defense and Defense Support of Civil Authorities, which highlights the objective to “maintain defense preparedness for domestic CBRN” incident in order to support the mission to provide defense support of civil authorities. DOD often is expected to play a prominent role supporting civil authorities and, in accordance with DOD guidance, must be prepared to provide rapid response when called upon. To facilitate defense support of civil authorities across the nation and at all organizational levels, DOD has assigned responsibilities for this mission within the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, the U.S. Northern Command, the U.S. Pacific Command, the National Guard Bureau, regional interagency liaisons, and a number of other DOD components, including roles and responsibilities with respect to military service units assigned the CBRN response mission. DOD’s CBRN Response Enterprise, which provides capabilities to support civil authorities under the National Response Framework, is composed of both active federal and state-controlled National Guard forces. The National Guard personnel comprise 56 percent of DOD’s CBRN Response Enterprise, including 10 HRF, 17 CERFP, and 57 Weapons of Mass Destruction-Civil Support Teams. The federal military forces comprise about 44 percent of DOD’s CBRN Response Enterprise, including the Defense CBRN Response Force and Command and Control CBRN Response Element A/B, which bring additional lifesaving and command and control capabilities to a CBRN response. The National Guard forces generally operate in State Active Duty or Title 32 status and remain under the command and control of respective state Governors, unless they are federalized under Title 10 and placed under the command and control of the President and the Secretary of Defense. Federal military response forces, such as the Defense CBRN Response Force, are always in Title 10 status. Table 1 identifies the respective response in statuses between National Guard and federal forces for a CBRN incident. As figure 1 shows, DOD intends that the National Guard forces, under a Governor’s control, will be the first DOD forces to respond to an incident. A HRF is expected to be ready to deploy within 6 to 12 hours of notification of an incident requiring its capabilities. A National Guard response, including the HRF if such capabilities are needed, can be followed by a federal response if requested by the Governor of the affected state. The HRF mission is assigned by the states’ National Guard and the mission may be rotated among units within the state. Figure 2 shows that one HRF is located in each of the Federal Emergency Management Agency’s 10 regions. As seen in figure 3, each of the 10 HRFs consist of 583 personnel divided among command and control (180 authorized personnel to the HRF and 16 authorized personnel to the CERFP), Joint Incident Site Communications Capability (6 authorized personnel), casualty assistance (200 authorized personnel), medical triage/stabilization (45 authorized personnel), decontamination (75 authorized personnel), search and extraction (50 authorized personnel), and fatality search and recovery (11 authorized personnel) capabilities. Additionally, for Army personnel, the HRF mission is a second mission to their Army National Guard wartime mission. The HRF mission is the primary mission for the Air National Guard. Finally, the HRF does not maintain Explosive Ordnance Disposal capabilities, those capabilities related to the “E” in CBRNE, but is able to provide capabilities to manage the consequence of a high-yield explosion during a post-blast response. The National Guard has determined, through established capabilities and readiness measures, that the 10 HRFs are maintaining their capabilities and are ready to conduct the HRF mission. The National Guard Bureau uses an evaluation process conducted by its Joint Interagency Training and Education Center as a primary means to measure HRF capabilities. In addition, HRF Commanders report in DOD’s Defense Readiness Reporting System—a primary means to measure readiness status—on the HRF’s readiness to conduct its mission. HRF Commanders also provide comments in the Defense Readiness Reporting System on any issues impacting readiness. The National Guard Bureau uses its evaluation as a primary means to measure and has validated the capabilities of the HRF to conduct the necessary tasks and actions to meet its mission. The National Guard’s Joint Collective Training Branch, Joint Interagency Training and Education Center, develops scenarios for each evaluation. The National Guard and the U.S. Northern Command conduct the evaluation of each HRF every 36 months or more frequently if significant personnel rotation or transfers occur. The criteria used to measure the HRF’s CBRN response capabilities during the evaluation includes the necessary tasks and actions—Joint Mission Essential Task List and Training and Evaluation Outlines— as identified in the National Guard CBRN Response Enterprise Joint Mission Essential Task List to meet the mission, as it is defined in the HRF/CERFP Concept of Operation. Figure 4 shows the Region X (Washington) HRF and the Region IV (Georgia) HRF, respectively, conducting decontamination tasks and practicing search and extraction tasks. The results of the evaluation are briefed to the HRF Commander and reviewed by the Commander of Army North. The evaluation report is then sent to the HRF’s state National Guard leadership, the Adjutant General, to validate the results of their HRF’s evaluation. According to the National Guard officials who manage the evaluation process, the evaluations provide the entire HRF an opportunity to demonstrate its capabilities, particularly since an entire HRF has not deployed in support of civil authorities in response to a CBRN incident. See appendix II for examples of HRFs that have deployed part of the HRF in support of civil authorities. In analyzing the National Guard’s evaluation reports from fiscal years 2013-15 (the most recently issued evaluations for each of the 10 HRFs), we found that the Joint Integrated Evaluation Team reported on individual HRF strengths that were observed and made recommendations to individual HRFs to improve operations. Based on our analysis, a summary of the strengths and areas for improvement identified during the evaluations are shown in table 2. This summary of observations provides the kinds of individual observations noted by the evaluation teams and does not indicate systemic strengths or areas for improvement. The Joint Integrated Evaluation Team observed and reported on individuals’ or teams’ performance. For example, four CBRN Task Forces, part of the HRF, provided communication systems and situational awareness to keep their colleagues informed of the operational environment during their evaluation. Figure 5 is an example of the CBRN Task Force command and control. Five Search and Extraction HRF teams ensured readiness of equipment prior to the start of their evaluation. Finally, five HRF medical personnel were recognized for proper care, including the attention to treatment of and the prioritization of transportation for actor-victims during their evaluations. In addition, the Joint Integrated Evaluation Team identified areas of improvement for individual HRFs. In our analysis of the evaluation reports to determine the status of HRF capabilities, we found individual HRF areas for improvement but did not find systemic areas for improvement that would indicate widespread problems. For example, the DOD evaluators found that five HRFs needed to develop a plan on how to manage information to support HRF Commanders’ decisions throughout the exercise. The five HRFs have taken some action to address this recommendation. For example, one HRF Commander stated that the HRF has maintained a full-time, trained officer on knowledge management to ensure that principles of knowledge management are integrated into day-to-day operations and exercises. A second HRF Commander told us that the HRF has assigned a knowledge management officer and the HRF has increased the number of personnel with a knowledge management role. A third HRF Commander told us that the HRF has increased the number of personnel with knowledge management roles and included information knowledge into its exercises. A fourth HRF Commander reported that personnel were sent to a knowledge management course at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. Upon return, those personnel provided seminars to their colleagues on what they learned during the course. In addition, according to the HRF Commander, the HRF was updating its standard operating guidance and procedures. Finally, the fifth HRF Commander reported that the HRF updated the standard operating procedures, sent personnel to additional training on incident command, and changed the setup of the HRF’s operations center. The Commander stated that these actions were to improve information flow across operations and administrative staff, to utilize the software system to increase the visibility of the HRF’s activities during a response, and to allow the HRF to provide the Commander with information to make decisions. Evaluators noted that three HRFs appeared to not check their Search and Extraction team equipment adequately before, during, or after the exercise operation. In two cases, rope equipment was not inspected, potentially putting team members at risk or delaying operations. In another case, medical equipment was not located where the medical staff was treating actor-victims during the evaluation. Finally, in three cases, HRF personnel did not use air monitoring equipment properly, resulting in a potential contamination of the HRF response area. According to National Guard Bureau officials who oversee collective HRF exercises, the HRFs are expected to address evaluation recommendations through their annual training, collective exercises, and the Standardization Evaluation and Assistance Team Program inspections. The HRF Commanders use the Defense Readiness Reporting System as a primary tool for tracking and reporting the status of HRF readiness and report through this system that their HRF is ready to conduct the necessary tasks and actions to meet its mission. DOD’s Defense Readiness Reporting System provides mission readiness assessments based on metrics and supporting data from authoritative data sources throughout DOD. The HRF/CERFP Concept of Operation identifies maintaining readiness with respect to personnel, related training, and equipment as a key task in preparing the HRF to perform its mission to save lives and reduce human suffering. The Defense Readiness Reporting System consists of two parts—a rating on whether the HRF is meeting personnel and equipment standards and the Commander’s comments on any issues impacting readiness. For example, at least 90 percent of the HRF personnel are expected to have received training to support deployment and 90 percent of the equipment is expected to be available for deployment. Each month, the HRF Commanders review the status of individual training and availability of equipment in their tracking systems. The status of the readiness of personnel and equipment to conduct the necessary tasks and actions to meet the HRF mission is input into the Defense Readiness Reporting System. From October 2012 through March 2016, each HRF Commander reported in the Defense Readiness Reporting System that his or her HRF had maintained readiness necessary to conduct its mission. In 2014, the Region X (Washington) HRF demonstrated its capabilities and readiness by deploying fatality search and recovery responders and logistics and operations personnel in support of civil authorities after a mudslide occurred. However, until an entire HRF is deployed in response to a CBRN incident, the HRF capabilities and mission readiness of the HRF will not be entirely known. In addition to our examination of the information presented in the Defense Readiness Reporting System, we surveyed individual HRFs on their readiness to conduct the mission. The HRF Commanders reported in our survey and in discussions during our site visits the steps they take to manage personnel and equipment. According to the National Guard Bureau’s 2015-16 planning guidance, the primary objective for training, which includes individual and collective training, is to attain and sustain maximum mission readiness for immediate response in support of the Governors and the President. Such training may enable the HRF to reduce response times. This guidance requires, among other things, that at least 90 percent of assigned personnel be trained to support an incident response. Six HRF Commanders told us that they have a goal to maintain or are maintaining between 10 percent and 30 percent additional, trained National Guard personnel with prior HRF or similar mission experience. According to the Commanders, these additional personnel, above the 583 authorized HRF personnel, help ensure that enough personnel are ready to support the HRF mission. According to some HRF Commanders, the additional personnel can mitigate the loss of personnel through turnover and other deployment disqualification factors, such as medical and personal factors. To obtain information on capabilities and readiness of the HRF personnel and equipment, we surveyed the 10 HRF Commanders. In response to our survey question on equipment readiness, the HRF Commanders reported, that in fiscal year 2015, at least one HRF experienced an equipment shortfall in each capability area except in the fatality search and recovery capability. The Joint Mission Essential Equipment List includes the equipment the 10 individual HRFs are authorized to have in their inventory to support the HRF mission. Of the nearly 300 different pieces of equipment on the list, the 10 HRF Commanders reported a combined 17 items of the nearly 2,800 total items of equipment held by the 10 HRFs were unavailable at some point in fiscal year 2015. The equipment fell into a variety of categories—primarily associated with vehicles (5 items); vehicle-related items (4 items); communications (3 items); a tent (1 item); equipment associated with protective masks (2 items); air monitoring (1 item); and an air conditioner/heater (1 item). To mitigate shortages, the HRF Commanders reported that they took action generally by using substitute equipment that was authorized by the National Guard Bureau. For example, 8 of the 10 HRF Commanders reported part of the shortfall in equipment reported above was related to the HRF command and control capabilities. However, the eight HRF Commanders reported using authorized substitute equipment to mitigate their shortfall in order to maintain readiness. Finally, during two of our site visits, HRF officials told us that the recommendations we made in 2011 to increase CERFP preparedness and the effectiveness of operations have focused attention on the National Guard’s CBRN Response Enterprise forces and positively impacted the capabilities and readiness of the HRF. For example, HRF officials told us that regular updates to the Joint Mission Essential Equipment List, to include equipment needed to perform tasks, and the addition of the Joint Incident Site Communications Capability to support communications during a response help ensure that the HRF has the capabilities and is ready to respond to an CBRN incident. Since the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review Report established the concept of the HRF, DOD has made progress in incorporating the HRF into the CBRN Response Enterprise by taking steps to update and develop plans, policies, guidance, and exercises. The U.S. Northern Command and the U.S. Pacific Command have incorporated the HRF in the CBRN Response Enterprise by updating their DSCA plans, which describe the capabilities the HRF can provide during a response to a CBRN incident in the United States or in U.S. territories. In addition, the National Guard Bureau has updated and issued its HRF/CERFP Concept of Operation, which covers the HRF, and drafted an instruction and supporting manual to provide policy and guidance on the management of the HRF. Further, the Army and the Air Force have taken actions to incorporate the HRF operationally by issuing joint guidance on doctrine and tactics, techniques, and procedures, as well as information setting the foundation for the tactical employment of the HRF. The U.S. Northern Command and the National Guard Bureau continue to make progress in incorporating the HRF into the CBRN Response Enterprise by synchronizing the timing of CBRN exercises. According to U.S. Northern Command and National Guard Bureau officials, the synchronization of these exercises for Title 10 and National Guard forces, beginning in fiscal year 2017, will increase the opportunity for CBRN Response Enterprise forces to exercise together and will focus the exercises on individual regional response. Aligned with the 2013 Strategy for Homeland Defense and Defense Support of Civil Authorities and their DSCA responsibilities in the Unified Command Plan, the U.S. Northern Command and the U.S. Pacific Command have developed plans to address their civil support roles, responsibilities, and capabilities. The U.S. Northern Command and the U.S. Pacific Command have incorporated the HRF into the CBRN Response Enterprise by updating their DSCA plans with a description of HRF capabilities to support a response to a CBRN incident within the United States and in U.S. territories, in response to the introduction of the HRF in the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review Report. In our discussions with U.S Northern Command officials, they highlighted the importance of the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review Report’s direction in establishing the HRF as part of the CBRN Response Enterprise and viewed this as a priority in achieving progress to increase regional distribution and integration of capabilities, among other things, and to improve the department’s mission of defense support of civil authorities. The U.S. Northern Command’s CBRN Response Branch Plan, contained within in its DSCA plan, points to the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review Report as part of the strategic guidance for establishment of the HRF. The branch plan describes how the Command plans for the use of the HRF as a key component of regional response to CBRN incidents within the United States and in U.S. territories. In particular, the branch plan identifies the HRF as part of the CBRN Response Enterprise and notes that the HRF serves as a key organization in activities supporting unity of effort among federal, state, and local responders. The branch plan also discusses HRF assistance to the states in the development of their CBRN response plans. In addition, the U.S. Northern Command’s DSCA plan highlights the HRF search and extraction capability as part of DOD’s support for ground search and rescue operations in response to a complex catastrophe, which are part of a core capability identified in the National Response Framework. The U.S. Pacific Command’s DSCA plan annex on consequence management support operations acknowledges the HRF’s important role in regional and state planning efforts for the CBRN Response Enterprise. The U.S. Pacific Command’s DSCA plan also notes the use of the HRF in its area of responsibility, which includes Hawaii and U.S. island territories such as Guam, in the event of a large-scale CBRN response. In particular, the plan strongly recommends the use of a dual-status commander for medium- and large-scale consequence management support operations requiring the deployment of a HRF, the Defense CBRN Response Force, or the Command and Control CBRN Response Element follow-on forces. U.S. Pacific Command officials stated that the command’s DSCA plan anticipates the use of Title 10 CBRN forces already assigned to the area of responsibility to provide immediate response if requested, and also noting a close working relationship with state leadership in Hawaii. The plan contains multiple pre-planned force packages, sets of capabilities, to support a response to various incident scenarios, several of which reference the California HRF capabilities. For example, the plan contains a scenario in which a pre-planned force package for CBRN capability would support a response in two geographically-separated areas or islands (e.g., Hawaii, Guam, or American Samoa) in the U.S. Pacific Command’s area of responsibility to provide support to CBRN search and extraction, decontamination, emergency medical, ground medical evacuation, aviation medical evacuation and casualty evacuation, and security and logistics. This pre- planned force package identifies active duty, reserve component, and National Guard forces that the U.S. Pacific Command can call upon, including the California HRF. The Joint Staff also has issued guidance that incorporates the HRF into CBRN response efforts. Specifically, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has issued an instruction on defense response to CBRN incidents in the homeland. This guidance acknowledges the HRF as part of the DOD CBRN Response Enterprise and that the HRF provides response support during CBRN incidents, primarily under state control. In addition, Joint Publication 3-41 on CBRN consequence management has been updated to incorporate the HRF as part of the DOD CBRN Response Enterprise, noting the HRF is part of DOD’s contribution to a layered CBRN response approach, which requires integration and synchronization of capabilities from the local, state, tribal, and federal levels of government. Further, in 2011, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff issued an execute order for CBRN response that includes the HRF as part of the CBRN Response Enterprise. Since the issuance of the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review Report and the National Guard Bureau’s Implementation Base Plan, the National Guard Bureau has made progress in supporting the inclusion of the HRF into DOD’s CBRN Response Enterprise by issuing a HRF/CERFP Concept of Operation and drafted an instruction and corresponding manual. This concept of operation includes an outline of the structure of the HRF elements through task organization charts, provides time frames for a response to CBRN incidents, and provides guidance and expectations for how the HRF will prepare for and respond to a request for support. The HRF/CERFP Concept of Operation reinforces the HRF mission as a support mechanism that responds to CBRN incidents when directed by the Secretary of Defense, coordinated by the Chief of the National Guard Bureau, and with the consent of the governors of the affected states. For example, the HRF/CERFP Concept of Operation describes the role of the National Guard Coordination Center to coordinate and synchronize notification and deployment of National Guard forces, such as the HRF and any additional follow-on National Guard CBRN forces, in response to a request for support after a CBRN incident. In addition, the National Guard Coordination Center coordinates information exchange between the state requesting support, the National Guard, the U.S. Northern Command, and the National Military Command Center to include information on deployment of National Guard and Title 10 CBRN Response Enterprise forces. In addition, the National Guard Bureau drafted an instruction and a manual for the management of the HRF, among other CBRN response forces, which National Guard Bureau officials stated will support the incorporation of the HRF into DOD CBRN response operations by informing DOD and state emergency managers about HRF capabilities and response operations. These two guidance documents will also include roles and responsibilities for HRF management and planning expectations, which will support regional response and unity of effort with combatant commands, states, and local first responders in a CBRN incident response. The instruction was issued in June 2016, as this report was in its final stages. National Guard Bureau officials said that the manual is under review. The guidance is intended for use by DOD’s CBRN Response Enterprise and all of the U.S. states’ and territories’ emergency management departments. Further, the Army and the Air Force have taken actions to incorporate the HRF by issuing joint guidance. The guidance provides doctrine and tactics, techniques, and procedures, as well as information setting the foundation for the tactical employment of the HRF. In addition, the guidance outlines the structure, element composition, capabilities, and planning considerations of the HRF, among other things. For example, the joint guidance describes the roles and responsibilities of the HRF personnel and capabilities. DOD is making progress in incorporating the HRF into the CBRN Response Enterprise by synchronizing National Guard Bureau- and U.S. Northern Command-sponsored exercise schedules, thereby increasing the opportunity for the HRF to exercise with the other National Guard and Title 10 CBRN Response Enterprise forces. The National Guard Bureau’s yearly planning guidance outlines exercise requirements for the HRF. At a minimum, the HRFs are expected to participate in collective training exercises with two or more HRFs and CERFPs. The guidance indicates that, during collective training, the HRF should be assessed using the Joint Mission Essential Task List, which includes the tasks likely to be used during a response to a CBRN incident. Each organization is synchronizing its exercise schedule with the primary collective exercises, Vibrant Response and Vigilant Guard. U.S. Northern Command officials told us that its exercises will be synchronized by fiscal year 2017. National Guard Bureau officials told us that it will take 2 more years to synchronize its exercise schedule because planning for exercises in fiscal years 2016 and 2017 is already underway. In particular, National Guard Bureau officials are in the process of synchronizing a 6-year exercise schedule from fiscal year 2018 through fiscal year 2023 that includes the consolidation and alignment of the evaluations, inspections, Vigilant Guard, collective training exercises, and special focus exercises for the HRF and other regional CBRN forces. According to U.S. Northern Command and National Guard Bureau officials, synchronization will increase the opportunity for National Guard and Title 10 forces to exercise together and will focus the exercises on individual regional response. In support of increasing the opportunity for Title 10 and National Guard forces to exercise together, U.S. Northern Command issued guidance that authorizes the deployment of part of the Title 10 Defense CBRN Response Force to participate in National Guard- sponsored Vigilant Guard exercises. This includes allowing personnel from the Defense CBRN Response Force participating in the exercise to be under the command and control structure established for the specific Vigilant Guard exercise, which may include operating under a dual-status commander construct. Figure 6 shows the Region X (Washington) HRF participating in a CBRN exercise. In response to our survey, about half of the HRF Commanders reported that they had exercised with Title 10 CBRN response forces in fiscal years 2013-15, as shown in figure 7. With the synchronization of these exercises with other scheduled events and exercises (i.e., special focus events, evaluations, inspections, deployment readiness exercises, and other collective training events), CBRN Response Enterprise forces will likely have more opportunities to practice command and control and the dual-status commander concept together. National Guard Bureau officials stated that the regional synchronization and alignment will provide the HRF and other National Guard units more opportunities to participate in exercises within their region and in neighboring regions, where they would be most likely to provide support in response to a CBRN incident. We are not making any recommendations in this report. DOD reviewed a draft of this report and provided written and technical comments, which we incorporated where appropriate. In its written response, DOD expressed appreciation that the report found DOD made improvements to ensure fulfillment of its support of civil authority in response to a CBRN incident. DOD’s written response is in appendix III. We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional committees; Secretaries of Defense, Energy, and Homeland Security; the Attorney General of the United States; the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy; the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Global Security; the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; Commanders, U.S. Northern Command and U.S. Pacific Command; the Secretaries of the Army and the Air Force; Chief, National Guard Bureau; Commanders of the Homeland Response Force; and the Directors, Federal Emergency Management Agency, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Office of Management and Budget; and Administrators, Environmental Protection Agency, National Nuclear Security Agency. In addition, the report is available at no charge on the GAO website at http://www.gao.gov. If you or your staff have any questions concerning this report, please contact Joseph W. Kirschbaum at (202) 512-9971 or kirschbaumj@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made key contributions to this report are listed in appendix IV. To describe the current status of the Homeland Response Force (HRF) capabilities, we examined evaluations of capabilities and surveyed all 10 HRF Commanders. We analyzed the most recent evaluation reports, issued in fiscal years 2013-15, on each of the 10 HRFs performance of necessary tasks within each capability to meet the HRF mission—to save lives and reduce human suffering—as presented in the HRF/CERFP Concept of Operation. We analyzed each HRF evaluation report to identify any systemic capability strengths or areas for improvement that the National Guard Bureau had identified during individual HRF evaluations. In addition, we reviewed summary results of evaluations conducted for fiscal years 2011-13 to understand the types of capabilities issues that were identified in the first 2 years of the establishment of the HRF. The National Guard Bureau’s Joint Interagency Training and Education Center relies on the use of standard actions and tasks, from the Joint Mission Essential Task List and Training and Exercise Outlines, for each HRF capability to ensure the validity of the evaluation. In addition, the Joint Interagency Training and Education Center uses a standard grading process during the evaluation to ensure the reliability of each HRF evaluation. We reviewed the process used by the Joint Interagency Training and Education Center to ensure the reliability and validity of its own evaluation process and determined that the evaluation process was sufficient for our use in assessing the status of HRF capabilities. We relied on the results of those 10 evaluations rather than conducting an independent assessment of HRF capabilities. To describe the status of HRF readiness, we examined readiness information and conducted a survey of all 10 HRF Commanders. In accordance with the HRF’s Concept of Operation and the Department of Defense’s (DOD) Defense Readiness Reporting System, we focused our review of readiness on the personnel, related training, and equipment necessary to conduct the HRF mission in response to a chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear (CBRN) incident. In the Defense Readiness Reporting System, training is reported as part of the assessment of HRF personnel. We reviewed readiness ratings for each HRF as recorded in DOD’s Defense Readiness Reporting System for fiscal year 2012, the first year all 10 HRFs were established, through March 2016. In addition, we reviewed the HRF Commanders’ comments input into the Defense Readiness Reporting System, to identify any issues impacting readiness. We conducted a data reliability assessment of the information in DOD’s Defense Readiness Reporting System. We provided a questionnaire on the readiness system to officials in the National Guard Bureau’s CBRN Enterprise Training and Readiness Office. We reviewed their responses to our questionnaire and interviewed the official responsible for maintaining the readiness data input by each HRF. During two site visits, we observed how the HRF personnel input information into their system. We determined that the readiness information from the Defense Readiness Reporting System was reliable for our purposes. In addition, we sent a survey to all 10 HRF Commanders on the personnel, the relevance of training on readiness, and on equipment needed to conduct the mission. As part of the survey development, we conducted an expert review and pre-tested the draft survey. We submitted the questionnaire for review by our survey specialist, our subject matter expert on CBRN, and HRF topic experts from the National Guard Bureau. The expert review phase was intended to ensure that content necessary to understand the questions was included and that technical information included in the survey was correct. To minimize errors that might occur from respondents interpreting our questions differently than we intended, we pre-tested our questionnaire with Commanders and senior staff from three HRFs. During the pre-tests conducted by video teleconference and telephone, we asked the HRF officials to read the instructions and each question aloud and to tell us how they interpreted the question. We then discussed the instructions and questions with officials to identify any problems and potential solutions by determining whether (1) the instructions and questions were clear and unambiguous, (2) the terms we used were accurate, (3) the questionnaire was unbiased, (4) the questionnaire did not place an undue burden on the officials completing it. We noted any potential problems and modified the questionnaire based on feedback from the expert reviewers and pre-tests, as appropriate. In addition, we provided the survey to the National Guard Bureau for a classification review to determine whether any of the survey questions would elicit classified responses and/or whether the compilation of the survey responses themselves would create a classified response. National Guard Bureau officials determined that the survey responses would not be classified. We sent an email to each HRF Commander beginning on November 16, 2015, notifying them about the topics of our survey and when we expected to send the survey. We then sent the self-administered Microsoft Word form questionnaire and a cover email to the HRF Commanders on November 18, 2015, and asked them to fill in the questionnaire and email it back to us within 2 weeks. We closed the survey on December 14, 2015. We received 10 completed questionnaires for an overall response rate of 100 percent. Because we collected data from every HRF rather than a sample of forces, there was no sampling error. However, the practical difficulties of conducting any survey may introduce errors, commonly referred to as non-sampling errors. For example, differences in how a particular question is interpreted, the sources of information available to respondents, how the responses were processed and analyzed, or the types of people who do not respond can influence the accuracy of the survey results. We took steps in the development of the survey, the data collection, and the data analysis to minimize these non-sampling errors and help ensure the accuracy of the answers that were obtained. For example, a social science survey specialist designed the questionnaire, in collaboration with our staff with subject matter expertise. Then, as noted earlier, the draft questionnaire was pre-tested to ensure that questions were relevant, clearly stated, and easy to comprehend. The questionnaire was also reviewed by external experts at the National Guard Bureau and our survey specialist, as mentioned above. Data were electronically extracted from the Microsoft Word questionnaires into a comma-delimited file that was then imported into a statistical program for analyses. Only one variable was manually entered (the HRF’s state) and that data entry accuracy was verified. We examined the survey results and performed computer analyses to identify inconsistencies and other indications of error, and addressed such issues as necessary. Quantitative data analyses were conducted by our survey specialist using statistical software and a review of open-ended responses was conducted by our staff with subject matter expertise. A data analyst conducted an independent check of the statistical computer programs for accuracy. In figure 8, we show the verbatim wording of key survey questions whose results are discussed in this report. Finally, we selected four HRFs to visit to discuss and observe the actions taken to maintain HRF capabilities and readiness that we examined in the National Guard Bureau’s evaluations and readiness reports. While our discussions and observations from these visits are not generalizable, the information we collected from the HRF Commanders and their personnel provide context for the evaluation results and the Commanders’ comments from the readiness reporting systems. The primary factor we considered in selecting which HRFs to visit was the deployment of HRF capabilities. We also considered information about: CBRNE threats to the homeland and U.S. territories; HRF unit readiness data; Exercise schedules of the individual HRF during our travel period; HRFs that had been deployed; The Federal Emergency Management Agency’s urban areas security HRFs with geo-specific or regional plans; and Input from officials with knowledge of the HRF or geographic region, including the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Global Security, the National Guard Bureau, and the Federal Emergency Management Agency. We chose to conduct four site visits to the HRFs located the Federal Emergency Management Agency Region III (Pennsylvania), Region IV (Georgia), Region VI (Texas), and Region X (Washington). We chose these HRFs because they deployed part of their force to support civil authority, had upcoming exercises scheduled, or were recommended by officials knowledgeable of the HRF. During our site visits, we interviewed HRF Commanders and personnel about mission capabilities and readiness and the actions they take to maintain capabilities and readiness. In addition, we reviewed equipment inventories and observed some of the temporary facilities used to support a CBRN response. To assess the extent to which DOD has made progress incorporating the HRF into its CBRN Response Enterprise, we collected plans, policies, and guidance from the National Guard Bureau; the Joint Chiefs of Staff; the U.S. Northern Command; the U.S. Pacific Command; the Army; and the Air Force. We reviewed DOD guidance and other documents including the Strategy for Homeland Defense and Defense Support of Civil Authorities as well as the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review Report to gain an understanding of the department’s priorities and efforts to restructure the enterprise and its support of civil authorities during CBRN incidents in the United States. We also reviewed U.S. Northern Command’s and U.S. Pacific Command’s Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA) plans to assess the extent to which the combatant commands incorporated the HRF into their plans. In addition, we examined the National Guard Bureau’s HRF policies and guidance, including the Implementation Base Plan (IMPLAN)–Homeland Response Force (HRF/CERFP) and the HRF/CERFP Concept of Operation, and a draft instruction and manual on the management of the HRF, to determine the extent to which the National Guard Bureau incorporated the HRF into its CBRN response. Further, we examined the Army and Air Force’s joint guidance for HRF operations, Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and High-Yield Explosives Enhanced Response Force Package (CERFP)/Homeland Response Force (HRF) Operations, to understand the military services’ inclusion of the HRF in their operations guidance. We compared these actions with the direction and guidance for DOD’s efforts to, among other things, create faster response times and increase regional distribution and integration of DOD CBRN response assets, outlined in the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review Report, the 2010 National Guard Bureau Implementation Base Plan for the introduction of the concept and establishment of the HRF, and the 2013 DOD Strategy for Homeland Defense and Defense Support of Civil Authorities. We interviewed DOD officials within the U.S. Northern Command, the U.S. Pacific Command, and the National Guard Bureau about the inclusion of the HRF into DOD’s CBRN Response Enterprise. Finally, we collected information and planning documents on the U.S. Northern Command- and the National Guard Bureau-sponsored exercises to determine whether the HRF was incorporated into DOD’s CBRN Response Forces exercises. We surveyed the 10 HRF Commanders about their participation in exercises with other DOD CBRN response forces. In addition, we interviewed DOD officials from the U.S. Northern Command, the National Guard Bureau, and the four HRF staffs during our site visits to Georgia, Pennsylvania, Texas, and Washington, about the types of exercises they conduct on CBRN response and opportunities to practice with other DOD CBRN forces. We obtained relevant documentation and interviewed officials from the following organizations: List of Organizations Where We Obtained Documentation and Interviewed Officials Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland National Guard Bureau Joint Staff U.S. Northern Command U.S. Pacific Command U.S. Marine Corps, Chemical Biological Incident Response Force Defense CBRN Response Force Command and Control CBRN Response Element A/B Department of Homeland Security Federal Emergency Management Agency National Nuclear Security Agency Federal Bureau of Investigation Office of Land and Emergency Management Region IX National Guard Homeland Response Force Georgia Emergency Management Agency Region IV National Guard Homeland Response Force Region I National Guard Homeland Response Force Region VII National Guard Homeland Response Force Region II National Guard Homeland Response Force Region V National Guard Homeland Response Force Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency Region III National Guard Homeland Response Force Texas State Operations Center Region VI National Guard Homeland Response Force Region VIII National Guard Homeland Response Force Washington State Emergency Operations Center Region X National Guard Homeland Response Force We conducted this performance audit from August 2015 to June 2016 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. Since their establishment by 2012, an entire Homeland Response Force (HRF) has not deployed in support of civil authorities during a chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear (CBRN) incident response. However, one HRF partially deployed to support a natural disaster response and other HRFs have participated in planning for, and were prepared to respond during, national special security events (e.g., political conventions, major sporting events, etc.) in case of an incident. The following are examples of the HRFs’ response in support of civil authorities: Washington landslide. Members of the Region X (Washington) HRF participated in the response to the March 22, 2014, Oso landslide in Snohomish County, Washington. The landslide claimed 43 lives— making it the deadliest landslide in U.S. history, completely destroying Steelhead Haven, a community of about 50 homes, and burying portions of State Route 530 for 2 months. A state of emergency was declared following the landslide and a request was made to deploy some of the Region X (Washington) HRF capabilities. The HRF provided personnel to assist civilian fatality search and recovery responders, and personnel, logistics, operations, and finance to support the National Guard headquarters staff during the operation. HRF personnel were on State Active Duty orders under the direct control of the Incident Commander. Figure 9 shows the Region X (Washington) HRF responding to the landslide in Snohomish County, Washington, in March 2014. Region III (Pennsylvania) HRF planning. According to officials with the Region III (Pennsylvania) Army National Guard, members of the Pennsylvania HRF participated in planning from March 2015 through September 2015 for the Papal visit to the United States in September 2015. The HRF worked with the other Pennsylvania Air National Guard forces, the Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency, the Federal Emergency Management Agency, the U.S. Secret Service, and the Philadelphia Fire Urban Search and Rescue. The Region III HRF used the Papal visit as a concurrent training exercise covering three national special security events for the Papal visit in Washington, D.C.; New York City, New York; and Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. The deliberate participation in the planning phase and in the on-site stand-by during the event provided members of the HRF with an opportunity to interact with city, county, state and commonwealth, and federal officials. This provided an opportunity to integrate the Region III HRF capabilities into a tiered response plan in the event of a CBRN incident during the Papal visit. Region IV (Georgia) HRF planning. According to officials with the Georgia National Guard, members of the Region IV (Georgia) HRF participated in planning for a coordinated response to a CBRN or other incident during the September 2012 Democratic National Convention held in Charlotte, North Carolina. Along with state and local responders, HRF personnel participated in the planning by providing state and local officials information about the capabilities it could provide in a response to a CBRN incident. In total, the Region IV HRF and other National Guard personnel were prepositioned during the event in Charlotte, North Carolina, as well as in Rock Hill and Columbia, South Carolina, to support any flow of response forces into the city to reduce response time, save lives, and reduce human suffering after an incident. In addition to the contact named above, GAO staff who made contributions to this report include Mark A. Pross, Assistant Director; Jennifer Cheung; Ashley Grant; Mae Jones; Amie Lesser; Amber Lopez Roberts; Elizabeth Morris; Richard Powelson; Bethann E. Ritter Snyder; Michael Shaughnessy; Michael Silver; and Maria Storts. Disaster Response: FEMA Has Made Progress Implementing Key Programs, but Opportunities for Improvement Exist. GAO-16-87. Washington, D.C.: February 5, 2016. Civil Support: DOD Is Taking Action to Strengthen Support of Civil Authorities. GAO-15-686T. Washington, D.C.: June 10, 2015. Civil Support: Actions Are Needed to Improve DOD’s Planning for a Complex Catastrophe. GAO-13-763. Washington, D.C.: September 30, 2013. Homeland Defense: DOD Needs to Address Gaps in Homeland Defense and Civil Support Guidance. GAO-13-128. Washington, D.C.: October 24, 2012. Homeland Defense and Weapons of Mass Destruction: Additional Steps Could Enhance the Effectiveness of the National Guard’s Life-Saving Response Forces. GAO-12-114. Washington, D.C.: December 7, 2011. Homeland Defense: DOD Can Enhance Efforts to Identify Capabilities to Support Civil Authorities during Disasters. GAO-10-386. Washington, D.C.: March 30, 2010. Homeland Defense: U.S. Northern Command Has a Strong Exercise Program, but Involvement of Interagency Partners and States Can Be Improved. GAO-09-849. Washington, D.C.: September 9, 2009. Homeland Defense: Steps Have Been Taken to Improve U.S. Northern Command’s Coordination with States and the National Guard Bureau, but Gaps Remain. GAO-08-252. Washington, D.C.: April 16, 2008. Homeland Security: Enhanced National Guard Readiness for Civil Support Missions May Depend on DOD’s Implementation of the 2008 National Defense Authorization Act. GAO-08-311. Washington, D.C.: April 16, 2008.

Summary: DOD is expected to play a prominent role supporting civil authorities in a CBRN incident. By 2012, DOD had established the HRF, comprising 10 geographically dispersed National Guard forces. Each of the 10 HRFs consists of 583 authorized Army National Guard and Air National Guard personnel who, as part of the HRF, are to respond within 6 to 12 hours of a request for assistance. The HRF, as part of DOD's CBRN Response Enterprise, is intended to bridge the gap between the National Guard's initial response to a CBRN incident and any need for additional capabilities that the DOD military services' active-duty personnel can provide, if requested. The HRF is to provide command and control, search and extraction, medical triage, decontamination, fatality search and recovery, and assistance and support capabilities. House Report 114-102 included a provision that GAO review matters related to the HRF. This report (1) describes the current status of HRF capabilities and readiness and (2) assesses DOD's progress incorporating the HRF into the CBRN Response Enterprise. GAO examined National Guard fiscal year 2013-15 evaluation reports and fiscal year 2012 through March 2016 readiness information; reviewed combatant command plans and DOD guidance; and surveyed all 10 HRF Commanders about HRF readiness. The National Guard has determined, through established capabilities and readiness measures, that the Homeland Response Force (HRF) is ready to conduct the HRF mission if called upon. The Department of Defense's (DOD) National Guard Bureau uses an evaluation of necessary tasks and actions as a primary measure of HRF capabilities and DOD's Defense Readiness Reporting System as a primary measure of readiness status. Six HRF Commanders told GAO that they have a goal to train between 10 percent and 30 percent additional National Guard personnel with prior HRF or similar mission experience. According to the HRF Commanders, these additional personnel, over the 583 authorized personnel, can mitigate the loss of personnel through turnover and other deployment disqualification factors, such as medical and personal factors. The capability and readiness measures indicate that the 10 HRFs are prepared for their mission. However, while the Federal Emergency Management Agency Region X (Washington) HRF partially deployed to support civil authorities after a mudslide occurred, until an entire HRF is deployed in response to a chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear (CBRN) incident, the HRF capabilities and mission readiness will not be entirely known. DOD has made progress in incorporating the HRF into the CBRN Response Enterprise by updating plans, guidance, and exercises. For example, GAO found that DOD is synchronizing major exercise schedules, thereby increasing the opportunity for the HRF to exercise with the other CBRN Response Enterprise National Guard and federal response forces. The figure below shows the plan for DOD's response to a CBRN incident. GAO is not making any recommendations. DOD's technical comments on a draft of this report were incorporated in the final product.