Charter schools are public schools established under contracts that grant them greater levels of autonomy from certain state and local laws and regulations in exchange for agreeing to meet certain student performance goals. D.C. charter schools must comply with select laws, including those pertaining to special education, civil rights, and health and safety conditions. In addition, charter schools are accountable for their educational and financial performance, including the testing requirements under the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, as amended (ESEA). A wide range of individuals or groups, including parents, educators, nonprofit organizations, and universities, may apply to create a charter school. Charter schools in the District are nonprofit organizations and, like other nonprofits, are governed by a board of trustees. The board of trustees, which is initially selected by the school founders, oversees compliance with laws, financial management, contracts with external parties, and other school policies. School board trustees are also responsible for identifying existing and potential risks facing the charter school and taking steps to reduce or eliminate these risks. Charters to operate a school are authorized by various bodies, and may include local school districts, municipal governments, or special chartering boards. In 1996, Congress passed the District of Columbia School Reform Act of 1995 (School Reform Act), creating PCSB as a chartering authority. PCSB was established with the purpose of approving, overseeing, renewing, and revoking charters. After granting charters to schools, PCSB is responsible for monitoring charter schools’ academic achievement, operations, and compliance with applicable laws. While the Mayor and Chancellor of the District of Columbia Public Schools (DCPS) oversee traditional public schools, PCSB is responsible for holding the District’s charter schools accountable for academic results and compliance with applicable laws. PCSB is comprised of seven unpaid board members with expertise relevant to charter school operation and approximately 25 employees who implement the board’s policies and oversee charter schools. Under D.C. law, the seven-member board is appointed by the Mayor, and members of PCSB may serve up to two 4-year terms. To support its operations, PCSB receives local funds through the annual D.C. Appropriations Act. PCSB also receives administrative fees from charter schools based on the number of students enrolled as well as revenue from grants. PCSB’s largest expenditures are for its personnel and program-related costs, such as technology upgrades and charter school reviews that are conducted, in part, by consultants (see table 1). The D.C. School Reform Act allows PCSB to grant up to 10 charters per year. Each charter remains in force for 15 years, and may be renewed for an unlimited number of times. PCSB is required to review each charter at least once every 5 years to determine whether the charter should be revoked. Each year PCSB is required to submit an annual report to the Mayor, the District of Columbia Council, the U.S. Secretary of Education, the appropriate congressional committees, and others that includes information on charter renewals, revocations, and other actions related to public charter schools. A total of 76 charter schools have opened in the District since BOE and PCSB began chartering schools in 1996 and 1997, respectively. However, between 1998 and 2010, 24 charter schools closed, many for fiscal mismanagement discovered through PCSB monitoring. As of the 2010-11 school year, 52 charter schools across 93 campuses are in operation, serving over 29,000 students at all education levels, including early childhood and adult education. Charter schools in the District represent varied instructional and academic models. For example, some schools have a particular curricular emphasis, such as math and science, art, or foreign language, while other charter schools focus on specific populations, such as students with learning disabilities, students who have dropped out or are at risk of doing so, youth who have been involved in the criminal justice system, and adults. In addition, one charter school is a college preparatory boarding school. See appendix I for more information on D.C. charter school characteristics. Unlike traditional public schools, which are generally part of a larger local educational agency (LEA), or school district, each D.C. charter school operates as its own LEA for most purposes. As a result, charter schools are responsible for a wide range of functions associated with being a local school district, such as applying for certain federal grants and acquiring and maintaining facilities. Charter schools may operate in a variety of facilities, such as surplus D.C. school buildings, shared spaces with other schools, and converted commercial buildings, including warehouses. However, public charter schools in D.C.—like charter schools across the nation—face challenges in acquiring facilities and funding facilities-related projects. GAO has previously reported that charter schools consistently encountered problems obtaining cost-effective and appropriate facilities. The District provides various forms of assistance to charter schools for facilities, including preference in leasing or purchasing former D.C. school buildings. The District prefers to lease rather than sell these buildings to charter schools so that they remain assets to D.C. residents. While the Mayor appoints members to the board, PCSB functions as an independent agency within D.C. government. As such, it operates outside of the policies and direction of the Mayor, and operates outside of DCPS and the Chancellor’s purview (see figure 1). While PCSB functions as an independent agency, PCSB and the Office of the Deputy Mayor for Education coordinate on issues of mutual concern. The School Reform Act, which created PCSB, outlines the operations of PCSB and grants the board the power to appoint, terminate, and fix the pay of its executive director and other staff who carry out the daily operations of PCSB. The appointed seven-member board developed by- laws that established its operational procedures, including how appointed board members will be removed. The by-laws also include a reference to the board’s rules on gifts and conflicts of interest, which board members must follow. In addition, the appointed board members establish policies and procedures for evaluating the financial management, governance, and performance of charter schools. PCSB staff implement the policies set by the board and handle the day-to-day charter school oversight activities. According to PCSB, its staff comply with all applicable D.C. laws and regulations, including those related to procurement, ethics, and employment. While several agencies may conduct activities to review the performance and operations of PCSB, the most regular and comprehensive activities are conducted by the D.C. Council and Office of the Chief Financial Officer (OCFO) (see figure 2). Similar to hearings the D.C. Council conducts for other District agencies, boards, and commissions, its Committee of the Whole holds annual performance hearings for PCSB to examine its expenditures and performance. In preparation for these hearings, the Committee generally requests information from PCSB on the following: budget, including approved budget and actual spending; programs and policies, including information on all policy initiatives, studies PCSB prepared or contracted for, and a description of the activities taken to meet key performance indicators; ongoing or completed investigations or audits of PCSB or any of its employees, and actions taken to address all recommendations identified during the previous 3 years by the D.C. Office of the Inspector General or Auditor; and contracting and procurement. In addition, OCFO oversees PCSB’s financial management. According to OCFO and PCSB, OCFO’s oversight of PCSB includes reviewing budget estimates and proposals, reviewing financial processes, and overseeing cash management and procurement activities. OCFO manages PCSB’s accounts payable, ensures procurement activities are administered according to approved PCSB financial policies, and provides monthly reports to the PCSB executive director and board members on financial activities and budget variance. OCFO also oversees and coordinates PCSB’s fiscal year-end process which includes ensuring the accurate and timely closing of books for auditing purposes. In addition to the oversight by OCFO, the School Reform Act requires PCSB to provide for an audit of its financial statements by an independent certified public accountant and forward the findings and recommendations of these audits to the Mayor, Council, and OCFO of the District. According to an OCFO official, OCFO may also conduct audits of PCSB. Other agencies may conduct audits or investigations when issues arise. The D.C. Office of Campaign Finance monitors appointed PCSB members’ submission of annual financial disclosure statements, has the authority to investigate conflict of interest violations, and may impose fines and refer cases to the United States Attorney for the District of Columbia. In 2009, the Office of Campaign Finance conducted investigations of allegations of conflicts of interest in response to concerns raised in local news reports and concluded that the appointed PCSB members under investigation did not violate conflict of interest laws. The District of Columbia Office of the Attorney General (OAG) conducted a similar conflict of interest inquiry regarding one of the same board members. OAG did not find any violations, but made recommendations that the board strengthen its ethics standards and formal policies which have largely been implemented. These include recusal, financial disclosure, gift rules, and participation in regular ethics training. PCSB has participated in ethics training but has not yet established formal policies for implementing such training on a regular basis. The D.C. Inspector General and the D.C. Auditor may also conduct investigations or audits of PCSB. To improve oversight of charter schools, PCSB launched a new accountability system—called the Performance Management Framework (PMF)—to capture school performance information for the 2009-2010 school year (see figure 3 for the current version of the PMF). However, in October 2010, about 2 weeks before the PMF results were to be released, the board voted to withhold the results from the public, citing concerns about the accuracy of the school-level data collected. For example, some elementary, middle, and high schools had data accuracy issues with the re- enrollment and demographic numbers, and high schools were inconsistently reporting graduation rates. In addition to withholding the results to resolve data accuracy issues, PCSB later communicated that it also wanted to thoroughly review components of the PMF to ensure their analyses were accurate and fair. PCSB decided to use the data collected for the 2009-2010 school year to further develop and test the new system, while it continues implementing the system. Results from the current 2010- 2011 school year are expected to be released in fall 2011. As it revises the new system, PCSB is working collaboratively with charter school leaders. For more information on the PMF measures and components that are under development or review, see appendix II. According to PCSB officials, the PMF is designed to allow PCSB to assess and compare all schools using common academic measures, target more intense reviews to schools that are not performing well relative to other schools, and use technology to streamline document submission and review. The PMF is based on a common set of five academic indicators, as well as nonacademic measures to evaluate school performance, as shown in figure 3. Weights are assigned to each academic measure and these academic measures are then combined to yield a final PMF score for each school. This final score determines the level of additional support or oversight a school receives from PCSB. The PMF is also designed to assess schools’ nonacademic performance in finance, governance, and compliance with ESEA and other applicable laws. Nonacademic reviews are to be conducted annually. According to PCSB officials, although a school’s PMF score does not include nonacademic indicators, charter schools may face consequences, including charter revocation, for poor financial performance or violations of law discovered during governance and compliance reviews. To conduct various academic and nonacademic reviews, PCSB uses internal staff, consultants, and a recently established audit management unit that will analyze and monitor schools’ financial statements and audits. In addition, the PMF will be supported by a new electronic system to streamline the review process and enable PCSB and charter schools to exchange and share documents more efficiently. For example, under the PMF, schools will submit academic performance data, annual reports, and financial statements electronically for review. This review will allow PCSB to identify potential issues and schools needing additional help or more thorough, in-depth review. According to PCSB, the new electronic system is expected to make the process of sending, receiving, filing, tracking, and reviewing electronic versions of reporting requirements under the PMF more efficient for PCSB and charter school operators. Although charter schools initially received limited information about PCSB’s plans for implementing the revised system, PCSB has more recently taken steps to keep charter schools informed. In January 2011— about 3 months after PCSB decided to withhold initial PMF results—PCSB provided information to charter schools about when it would revise and implement components of the PMF and its timeline for soliciting feedback. PCSB also provided charter schools with its timeline for collecting and validating data, as well as information on how it would resolve data accuracy issues, including developing data collection templates. PCSB plans to solicit feedback from charter schools on the revised PMF model for elementary, middle, and high schools in April 2011, and plans to hold these schools accountable under the PMF for the 2010-2011 school year, with results released to the public in November 2011. For adult and early childhood schools, PCSB expects to implement the PMF for the 2012-2013 school year. Moving forward, PCSB plans to provide updates to charter schools on its progress in revising the PMF in weekly e-mail messages. D.C. charter schools may receive funding for their operations and facilities from a range of sources. Like traditional public schools in the District, the primary source of funding for charter schools is local appropriations, which is allocated on the basis of a per-pupil formula that takes several factors into consideration. As shown in table 2, the amount charter schools and DCPS receive per pupil varies based on grade level, ranging from $6,578 for adult students to $11,752 for preschool students in school year 2009-2010. Schools also receive add-on amounts to account for differences in the cost of educating certain student populations, such as special education and limited English proficient students. For example, schools that served kindergarten students who require more than 24 hours per week of special education services received a total of $36,220 per pupil for such students in school year 2009-2010. In addition, to help cover the cost of charter school facilities, most of which are commercial buildings around the city, charter schools receive a local per-pupil facilities allowance. For the 2009-2010 school year, the facilities allowance was $2,800 per pupil for nonresidential students and $8,395 per pupil for schools that provide residential room and board. Although local funding for operations for both charter schools and traditional schools is determined based on the same formula, charter schools receive funding based on actual, or audited, enrollment while DCPS receives funds based on projected enrollment. Charter schools receive four payments during the fiscal year, which are reconciled based on audited enrollment figures. For example, if a charter school’s audited enrollment is higher or lower than projected, subsequent payments will be increased or decreased accordingly. DCPS receives spending authority at the beginning of the fiscal year based on enrollment projections, and it is not adjusted based on audited enrollment, according to District officials. Charter schools may also receive federal and private funding for their operations and facilities. Like all public schools in D.C., charter schools are eligible to receive federal formula grants through various programs under ESEA and the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA). Because charter schools in the District are considered individual LEAs, they may also be eligible to compete for federal discretionary grants from agencies, such as the Department of Education, the Department of Health and Human Services, and the Department of Justice. Furthermore, between fiscal years 2004 and 2010, Congress appropriated over $104 million directly to the District to fund programs intended to expand public charter schools. Some of the programs for which federal payments were used included facilities financing for charter schools through which the District awarded more than 80 grants and loans to help charter schools build, improve, lease, or purchase facilities. In addition, charter schools may engage in fundraising activities and accept grants and gifts from corporations, foundations, and other organizations, as long as the gift is not subject to any condition contrary to law or their charters. For example, some of the charter schools we visited held yearly fundraisers and received annual gifts from corporations. Charter schools may also generate income by charging tuition and fees for students who live outside of the District or renting out property. In addition, charter schools may take out private loans to secure their facilities. D.C. charter schools may receive local personnel and services from the District. Officials at some of the schools we visited told us they have been able to obtain school police officers, nurses, crossing guards, and other city services. In addition, 14 of 52 charter schools elected to use DCPS as their LEA for special education services. For these schools, DCPS is responsible for special education evaluations, placements, litigation, and other services, according to school officials. However, charter schools that serve as their own LEA for special education services are responsible for carrying out these functions. All charter schools, including those that use DCPS as the LEA, are responsible for providing direct special education services, such as specialized instruction or staff. Charter schools may also lease former D.C. public school buildings through a provision in D.C. law, enacted in late 2004, which provides a “right of first offer” to charter schools for school buildings DCPS determines it no longer needs. This allows charter schools to submit proposals for these buildings to the District before other entities, such as private development firms. As shown in figure 4, DCPS transfers buildings it no longer needs to the D.C. Department of Real Estate Services (DRES)—an agency under the purview of the Mayor—which is responsible for the District’s real estate portfolio management, among other duties. The District then determines whether there is another governmental need for the building before making it available to charter schools under the “right of first offer” preference. Some former D.C. school buildings have been used as homeless shelters, space for local agencies, and additional space for DCPS during school renovations, among other uses. If DRES determines there is no governmental need for the building, DRES may issue a Request for Offers (RFO) from charter schools. As of December 2010, 52 former D.C. school buildings have been transferred from DCPS to DRES and charter schools occupy or will occupy 18 of these buildings (see figure 5). Twenty-five of the 52 buildings transferred to DRES have been made available for first offers from charter schools. The remaining 27 buildings were exempt from the right of first offer provision due to a pre-existing lease, resolution of the D.C. Council, or governmental use by the District. To date, charter schools have submitted offers for 17 of the 25 buildings made available under the right of first offer provision, and offers have been accepted for 10 of these buildings. For accepted charter school offers, the property is appraised and a lease is negotiated and, if required, executed with approval from the D.C. Council. If no charter school submits an offer or the offers are rejected, DRES may use the building for other governmental purposes or lease the building for other purposes, such as use by a nonprofit entity, according to agency officials. DRES may also transfer buildings to the Office of the Deputy Mayor for Planning and Economic Development (DMPED) if there is potential use for economic development, according to DRES officials. DMPED will then issue another solicitation for offers and proposals from private developers or other entities. Some former school buildings that were transferred to DMPED were awarded to development corporations for residential and retail projects. For the offers that are rejected, we found that the RFO does not detail all of the factors the District may consider in deciding whether to award a school building to a charter school and that the basis for the District’s decision to reject a charter school’s offer is not always sufficiently documented. Specifically, the RFO states that the selection panel, which is comprised of officials from DRES and the Office of the Deputy Mayor for Education, will evaluate offers in the context of six evaluation criteria: (1) educational vision, (2) project vision, (3) capability of respondent to execute its vision, (4) past experience with similar project(s), (5) financial feasibility, and (6) best interest of the District. Although the RFO criterion “best interest of the District” is rather broad and could conceivably encompass other factors the District may consider in evaluating offers, the only additional information provided for this criterion in the RFO pertains to whether the offer requires a District subsidy and maximizes community involvement. However, the D.C. rule regarding disposition of former school property states that the long- or short-term community development; economic development; cultural, financial, or other goals of the Mayor or the District may be also considered by the selection panel when deciding whether to accept or decline charter school offers. Only by looking at the D.C. rule would an offeror know that these additional factors may be considered. Because the RFO does not clearly indicate that additional factors beyond the stated criteria can affect whether a proposal is accepted, potential offerors may not have a clear understanding of the criteria that will be used to evaluate their offers. While District officials felt that the criteria listed in the RFO were inclusive of all factors that may be considered, some charter school officials and advocates we spoke with expressed a lack of understanding and confidence in the fairness and transparency of how the District made decisions to accept and reject offers. We also found that the selection panel does not always sufficiently document the reasons for recommending that a particular charter school’s offer be rejected. After consensus is reached on a charter school’s offer, the selection panel provides a memorandum documenting its recommendation for accepting a charter school’s offer to the Director of DRES and Deputy Mayor for Education. According to District officials, the Director of DRES and the Deputy Mayor for Education then make a recommendation to the Mayor, who ultimately decides whether an offer is accepted. For rejected offers, however, the selection panel does not always document its recommendation, and although DRES notifies the charter schools of its decision in writing, it does not include the reasons that offers were rejected. While DRES officials told us that charter schools may request a briefing to understand why their offers were rejected, the rejection letter does not state that charter schools have this option. Because DRES does not always document its recommendations for rejecting charter school offers and the notification letter does not include the reasons offers were rejected, charter schools may lack information that could help them better understand the process and develop future offers. In the District, charter schools, which enroll nearly 40 percent of all public school children in the city, offer parents more educational choice. These schools offer varied approaches to instruction and some target specific subpopulations of students. Charter schools in the District, and in general, were designed to operate with more autonomy and flexibility than traditional schools, but like all schools, are accountable for ensuring that every student receives a quality public education. PCSB has oversight over all 52 charter schools, and its new PMF has the potential to be a valuable tool for overseeing and monitoring charter schools. The PMF also has the potential to provide more information to parents, school leaders, and other stakeholders about the relative and collective performance of charter schools across a range of indicators. As such, it is important that PCSB take the necessary steps to ensure that its PMF is designed and implemented well. PCSB plans to collaborate with charter schools to develop and revise the system, and has more recently begun providing more detailed information to charter schools about its plans for implementing the revised system for the 2010-2011 school year. We believe that ongoing collaboration and communication such as this is vital to the successful implementation of the PMF. The District faces tough trade-offs in how it uses its resources. Former D.C. school buildings may be attractive locations for a range of city uses, including charter school facilities. The growing charter school population in the District makes appropriate, affordable space to educate students a critical resource to the success of individual charter schools and the District’s charter school movement as a whole. Therefore, it is also important that criteria used to determine whether a charter school receives a former D.C. school building are as transparent as possible and that the basis for the District’s decision is clear and sufficiently documented. Additional clarity and transparency regarding how the District decides to use former D.C. school buildings may increase charter schools’ understanding of the process and may help to avoid the appearance of a lack of fairness among charter school officials and advocates. To ensure that the criteria for evaluating offers from charter schools to use surplus D.C. school buildings are clear and the reasons for denial of offers are communicated, we recommend that the Mayor of the District of Columbia direct DRES to take the following two actions: ensure the RFO on former D.C. school buildings clearly indicates all factors that may be considered by the selection panel, and inform charter schools, in writing, of the reasons their offers were rejected or of the opportunity to request a briefing to obtain such information. We provided a draft of this report to PCSB, the D.C. Mayor’s Office, and the U.S. Department of Education. PCSB and the Mayor’s Office provided written comments, which are reproduced in appendixes III and IV, respectively. The U.S. Department of Education did not have comments on the report. We also received technical comments from various offices cited in the report, including DRES, D.C. Office of the Attorney General, and the D.C. Council, which we incorporated throughout the report where appropriate. In its letter, PCSB stated that it has redoubled its efforts to work with nationally recognized experts in school accountability systems as it further validates certain elements of its new accountability system. The District agreed with our recommendations and stated that DRES has begun taking steps to improve the process for awarding former D.C. school buildings to charter schools and will continue to identify ways to improve the selection process. We are sending copies of this report to PCSB, the D.C. Mayor’s Office, U.S. Department of Education, and appropriate congressional committees. In addition, the report will be available at no charge on GAO’s Web site at http://www.gao.gov. If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 512-7215 or scottg@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs can be found on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made major contributions to this report are listed in appendix V. Appendix I: D.C. Charter School Characteristics adequate yearly progress (AYP) Type of building(s) Prekindergarten (PreK) Mission, curriculum, or target population adequate yearly progress (AYP) Type of building(s) Mission, curriculum, or target population adequate yearly progress (AYP) Type of building(s) Mission, curriculum, or target population adequate yearly progress (AYP) Type of building(s) Commercial Reflects schools’ AYP status for 2010. Under ESEA, states are required to establish performance goals and hold their schools accountable for students’ performance by determining whether or not schools have made AYP. The Act requires states to set challenging academic content and achievement standards in reading or language arts, mathematics, and science, and determine whether school districts and schools make AYP toward meeting these standards. To determine AYP, the District uses student test scores on the statewide exam in grades 3 through 8 and 10. “N/A” is listed for schools that did not serve the tested grades at the time of the statewide exam or whose sample size was too small to calculate AYP. Individual charter schools may operate in several locations. The building types are for school year 2008-2009, except for National Collegiate Prep which opened in 2009. We were unable to obtain current building information for all charter schools in the District. Sherri Doughty, Assistant Director; Charlene J. Lindsay, Analyst-in-Charge; Raun Lazier, Vernette Shaw, Brian Egger, Vida Awumey, James Bennett, Nora Boretti, Russell Burnett, Susannah Compton, Sheila McCoy, Sara Pelton, and James Rebbe also made significant contributions to this report. Charter Schools: Education Could Do More to Assist Charter Schools with Applying for Discretionary Grants. GAO-11-89. Washington, D.C.: December 7, 2010. District of Columbia Public Education: Agencies Have Enhanced Internal Controls Over Federal Payments for School Improvement, But More Consistent Monitoring Needed. GAO-11-16. Washington, D.C.: November 18, 2010. District of Columbia Public Schools: Important Steps Taken to Continue Reform Efforts, But Enhanced Planning Could Improve Implementation and Sustainability. GAO-09-619. Washington, D.C.: June 26, 2009. D.C. Charter Schools: Strengthening Monitoring and Process When Schools Close Could Improve Accountability and Ease Student Transitions. GAO-06-73. Washington, D.C.: November 17, 2005. Charter Schools: Oversight Practices in the District of Columbia. GAO-05-490. Washington, D.C.: May 19, 2005. Charter Schools: To Enhance Education’s Monitoring and Research, More Charter School-Level Data Are Needed. GAO-05-5. Washington, D.C.: January 12, 2005. No Child Left Behind Act: Education Needs to Provide Additional Technical Assistance and Conduct Implementation Studies for School Choice Provision. GAO-05-7. Washington, D.C.: December 10, 2004. District of Columbia: FY 2003 Performance Report Shows Continued Improvements. GAO-04-940R. Washington, D.C.: July 7, 2004. Charter Schools: New Charter Schools Across the Country and in the District of Columbia Face Similar Start-Up Challenges. GAO-03-899. Washington, D.C.: September 3, 2003. Public Schools: Insufficient Research to Determine Effectiveness of Selected Private Education Companies. GAO-03-11. Washington, D.C.: October 29, 2002. DCPS: Attorneys’ Fees for Access to Special Education Opportunities. GAO-02-559R. Washington, D.C.: May 22, 2002. District of Columbia: Performance Report Reflects Progress and Opportunities for Improvement. GAO-02-588. Washington, D.C.: April 15, 2002. Charter Schools: Limited Access to Facility Financing. GAO/HEHS-00-163. Washington, D.C.: September 12, 2000. Charter Schools: Federal Funding Available but Barriers Exist. GAO/HEHS-98-84. Washington, D.C.: April 30, 1998. Charter Schools: Issues Affecting Access to Federal Funds. GAO/T-HEHS-97-216. Washington, D.C.: September 16, 1997.

Summary: Almost 40 percent of all public school students in the District of Columbia (D.C. or District) were enrolled in charter schools in the 2010-11 school year. The D.C. School Reform Act established the Public Charter School Board (PCSB) for the purpose of authorizing and overseeing charter schools. Congress required GAO to conduct a management evaluation of PCSB. GAO addresses the following: (1) the mechanisms in place to review the performance and operations of PCSB, (2) the procedures and processes PCSB has in place to oversee and monitor the operations of D.C. charter schools, and (3) the resources available to charter schools for their operations and facilities. GAO interviewed officials from D.C. agencies and 7 charter schools and reviewed oversight procedures for PCSB and charter schools. GAO also reviewed the processes for providing resources to charter schools and analyzed data on these resources. Although the Mayor appoints members to the board, PCSB has operated outside of the control of the Mayor and the Chancellor of traditional D.C. public schools; however, several agencies review PCSB's performance and operations. The D.C. Council holds annual hearings to examine PCSB's organization, personnel, budget, programs, policies, contracting, and procurement. The Office of the Chief Financial Officer oversees PCSB's budget development, operations, and financial reporting and reviews PCSB's monthly financial reports and year-end audits. Other offices monitor compliance with applicable laws and may conduct investigations or audits of PCSB when issues arise. PCSB launched its new performance accountability system to oversee the District's charter schools in school year 2009-2010. However, in October 2010, just weeks before the results were to be released, PCSB decided to withhold the results from the public due to concerns about data accuracy and plans to use the data collected to further test and develop the system. The new system, called the Performance Management Framework (PMF), is designed to assess charter schools using common measures for academic performance, compliance with applicable laws, and financial management, among other things. As it implements the new system for the 2010-2011 school year, PCSB is currently collaborating with charter schools to develop and revise the system, and has more recently begun providing more detailed information to charter schools about how it will revise the system. D.C. charter schools may receive funding from local, federal, and private sources for their operations and facilities and also have access to other District resources, including former D.C. school buildings; however, the criteria for awarding former school buildings to charter schools could be more transparent. The primary source of support for charter schools is local per-pupil funding, which is allocated to charter schools on the same basis as all public schools in the District. Charter schools also receive a per-pupil allotment from the District for facilities. In addition to local funds, charter schools are eligible to receive federal formula funding, federal discretionary grants, and private funding, such as foundation grants and commercial loans to purchase or renovate school buildings. To date, charter schools lease or will lease about half of the former D.C. school buildings that have been made available pursuant to a provision in D.C. law that provides charter schools with a right of first offer for these buildings. However, we found that the District does not include in its requests for offers all factors it may consider, such as economic development or other goals of the Mayor, when determining whether to accept or reject an offer. In addition, the District does not sufficiently document the basis for rejecting offers. Charter school officials and advocates expressed concern about the transparency and fairness in how the District makes decisions regarding former D.C. school buildings. GAO recommends that the Mayor of the District of Columbia direct the Department of Real Estate Services to disclose all factors considered in reviewing charter school offers for former D.C. school buildings and make available to schools, in writing, the reasons the offers were rejected. The District agreed with our recommendations and noted that the Department of Real Estate Services has already taken steps to improve the process for awarding former D.C. school buildings to charter schools.