On October 18, the Senate agreed to the conference report ( H.Rept. 106-948 ) on H.R. 4461 , the FY2001 agriculture appropriations bill, by a vote of 86-8. It was signedinto law October 28 ( P.L. 106-387 ). Title IX of this bill allows the export of food and medicine toCuba and other countries against whom the United States has imposed economic sanctions forforeign policy purposes. In the case of Cuba, however, no U.S. assistance or financing may beprovided by any U.S. entity, public or private, for such sales. (The President may waive theprohibition of U.S. assistance for commercial exports to Iran, Libya, North Korea, or Sudan fornational security or humanitarian reasons.) Sales of food and medicine to Cuba may only be paidfor by cash in advance or through third country financing. The bill also codified existing embargoregulations by prohibiting both the importation of merchandise from Cuba and travel for tourismto Cuba. (For more, see sections on "Travel Restrictions" and on"Food and Medical Exports"below.) In the Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000 ( P.L. 106-386 ), sections 2002 and 2003 direct the Secretary of the Treasury to pay compensatory damages for certain claimsagainst Cuba (and Iran). As provided for in this bill, President Clinton waived such payments inthe interest of national security when he signed the bill into law on October 28, 2000. With the cutoff of assistance from the former Soviet Union, Cuba experienced severe economicdeterioration from 1989-1993, although there has been some improvement since 1994. Estimatesof economic decline in the 1989-93 period range from 35-50%. The economy reportedly grew 0.7%in 1994, 2.5% in 1995, and 7.8% in 1996. While the Cuban government originally was predictinga growth rate of 4-5% for 1997, growth for the year was just 2.5%, largely because of disappointingsugar production. For 1998, the government's goal was for a growth rate of 2.5-3.5%, but anotherpoor sugar harvest, a severe drought in eastern Cuba, and the effects of Hurricane Georges resultedin an estimated growth rate of just 1.2%. In 1999, the economy grew 6.2%, and a growth rate of 5%is projected for 2000. Socialist Cuba has prided itself on the nation's accomplishments in health and education. For example, according to the World Bank, the literacy rate is 94% and life expectancy is 76 years,compared to 79% and 68 years average for other middle-income developing countries. The UnitedNations Children's Fund (UNICEF) reports that Cuba's infant mortality rate (per 1,000 live births)was just 7.9 in 1996, the lowest rate in Latin America and among the world's top 20 countries forthis indicator. Nevertheless, the country's economic decline has reduced living standardsconsiderably and resulted in shortages in medicines and medical supplies. When Cuba's economic slide began in 1989, the government showed little willingness to adopt any significant market-oriented economic reforms, but in 1993, faced with unprecedented economicdecline, Cuba began to change policy direction. Since 1993, Cubans have been allowed to own anduse U.S. dollars and to shop at dollar-only shops previously limited to tourists and diplomats. Self-employment was authorized in more than 100 occupations in 1993, most in the service sector,and by 1996 that figure had grown to more than 150 occupations. Other Cuban economic reformsincluded breaking up large state farms into smaller, more autonomous, agricultural cooperatives(Basic Units of Cooperative Production, UBPCs) in 1993; opening agricultural markets in September1994 where farmers could sell part of their produce on the open market; opening artisan markets inOctober 1994 for the sale of handicrafts; allowing private food catering, including home restaurants( paladares ) in June 1995 (in effect legalizing activities that were already taking place); approvinga new foreign investment law in September 1995 that allows fully owned investments by foreignersin all sectors of the economy with the exception of defense, health, and education; and authorizingthe establishment of free trade zones with tariff reductions typical of such zones in June 1996. InMay 1997, the government enacted legislation to reform the banking system and established a newCentral Bank (BCC) to operate as an autonomous and independent entity. Despite these measures, the quality of life for many Cubans remains difficult, characterized by low wages, high prices for many basic goods, shortages of medicines, and power outages. Moreover,some analysts fear that the government has begun to backtrack on its reform efforts. Regulationsand new taxes have made it extremely difficult for many of the nation's self-employed (at one pointestimated at more than 200,000, but now estimated at 160,000 or lower, out of a total labor force ofsome 4.5 million). Some home restaurants have been forced to close because of the regulations. Some foreign investors in Cuba have also begun to complain that the government has backed out ofdeals or forced them out of business. (1) Although Cuba has undertaken some limited economic reforms, politically the country remainsa hard-line Communist state. Fidel Castro, who turned 73 on August 13, 1999, has ruled since the1959 Cuban Revolution, which ousted the corrupt government of Fulgencio Batista from power. Castro soon laid the foundations for an authoritarian regime by consolidating power and forcingmoderates out of the government. In April 1961, Castro admitted that the Cuban Revolution wassocialist, and in December 1961, he proclaimed himself to be a Marxist-Leninist. From 1959 until1976, Castro ruled by decree. A constitution was enacted in 1976 setting forth the Communist Party as the leading force in the state and in society (with power centered in a Politburo headed by Fidel Castro). Theconstitution also outlined national, provincial, and local governmental structures. Executive poweris vested in a Council of Ministers, headed by Fidel Castro as President. Legislative authority isvested in a National Assembly of People's Power, currently with 601 members, that meets twiceannually for brief periods. While Assembly members were directly elected for the first time inFebruary 1993, only a single slate of candidates was offered. Elections for the National Assemblywere held for a second time in January 1998. Voters again were not offered a choice of candidates.From October 8-10, 1997, the Cuban Communist Party held its 5th Congress (the prior one was heldin 1991) in which the party reaffirmed its commitment to a single party state and reelected Fidel andRaul Castro as the party's first and second secretaries. Pope John Paul II visited Cuba from January 21-25, 1998, and conducted a series of open-air masses across the country that were televised in Cuba. Numerous Catholic groups from the UnitedStates traveled to Cuba for the Pope's visit as did thousands of journalists from around the world. While much of his visit was spent on pastoral issues, such as encouraging Cubans to come back tothe Church, the Pope also made more political statements. He criticized the U.S. embargo as "unjustand ethically unacceptable," but also criticized the Cuban government for denying freedom to theCuban people. He asked the government to release "prisoners of conscience," and Vatican officialsgave Cuba a list of more than 200 prisoners. On February 12, 1998, the Vatican announced that Cubahad freed dozens of detainees, noting that this step represented a prospect of hope for the future. There was much speculation about what effect the Pope's trip to Cuba might have on the political situation. The trip did not spark unrest from those opposed to the regime, nor did thegovernment take any actions to loosen the tight political control of the state and party. Over thelonger-term, however, the Pope's visit could result in elevating the profile of the Catholic Churchin such a way that it emerges as an important actor in Cuba's civil society. An enhanced profilecould improve its chances to influence the policies and actions of the government. Cuba has a poor record on human rights, with the government sharply restricting basic rights, including freedom of expression, association, assembly, movement, and other basic rights. It hascracked down on dissent, arrested human rights activists and independent journalists, and stageddemonstrations against critics. Although some anticipated a relaxation of the government'soppressive tactics in the aftermath of the Pope's January 1998 visit, government attacks againsthuman rights activists and other dissidents have continued since that time. Estimates of the number of political prisoners in Cuba vary considerably since the Cuban government does not allow human rights organizations to monitor prisons. According to the StateDepartment's human rights report covering 1999, human rights groups inside Cuba estimate thenumber of political prisoners at between 350 and 400. The overall number of political prisonersprobably increased slightly in 1999, compared to 1998, when Cuba released almost 100 prisoners,many of whom were on a list given to Castro by Vatican officials during the Pope's visit. On July 23, 1999, Human Rights Watch issued a highly critical report on the human rights situation in Cuba, Cuba's Repressive Machinery: Human Rights Forty Years After the Revolution . The report describes how Cuba "has developed a highly effective machinery of repression," and hasused this "to restrict severely the exercise of fundamental human rights of expression, association,and assembly." According to the report: "In recent years, Cuba has added new repressive laws andcontinued prosecuting nonviolent dissidents while shrugging off international appeals for reform andplacating visiting dignitaries with occasional releases of political prisoners." (The full report isavailable on the Human Rights Watch site on the Internet at http://www.hrw.org/hrw/reports/1999/cuba/ .) The State Department maintains that the human rights situation deteriorated in 1999. According to its human rights report: "The authorities routinely continued to harass, threaten,arbitrarily arrest, detain, imprison, and defame human rights advocates and members of independentprofessional associations, including journalists, economists, doctors, and lawyers, often with the goalof coercing them into leaving the country." In early March 2000, the Cuban Commission for HumanRights and National Reconciliation noted that political repression increased considerably fromNovember 1999, when Cuba hosted the Ibero-American summit, through February 2000. In May 2000, Cuba released three prominent dissidents from prison. On May 23, Cuba released Rene Gomez Manzano, while Marta Beatriz Roque was set free on May 15 and Felix Bonne on May12. All three were leaders of the "Dissident Working Group" and had been imprisoned since July1997. All three have vowed to continue their peaceful opposition to the Cuban government. Oneremaining leader of the group, Vladimiro Roca, remains in prison. The four leaders were convictedby a Cuban court on March 15, 1999, on charges of "sedition" under the Cuban penal code after aone-day trial on March 1. Sentences ranged from 3 ï¿½ years for Roque to 4 years for Bonne andGomez Manzano and 5 years for Roca. Just before the dissidents' trial, scores of human rightsadvocates, independent journalists, and other activists were detained so that they could not cover orprotest the trial. The four dissidents had released a document in June 1997 entitled, "The HomelandBelongs to Us All" http://www.cubanet.org/CNews/y97/jul97/homdoc.htm that strongly criticizeda draft report of the 5th Congress of the Cuban Communist Party that was going to be held thatOctober. The dissidents also urged Cubans not to vote in legislative elections and encouragedforeign investors not to invest in Cuba. UNCHR Resolutions. From 1991 until 1997, the U.N. Commission on Human Rights (UNCHR) called on the Cuban government to cooperate witha Special Representative (later upgraded to Special Rapporteur) designated by the Secretary Generalto investigate the human rights situation in Cuba. But Cuba refused to cooperate with the SpecialRapporteur, and the UNCHR annually approved resolutions condemning Cuba's human rightsrecord. On April 21, 1998, however, the UNCHR rejected -- by a vote of 16 to 19, with 18abstentions -- the annual resolution sponsored by the United States that would have condemnedCuba's rights record and would have extended the work of the Special Rapporteur for another year. U.S. officials and human rights activists expressed deep disappointment with the vote. Observersmaintained that the vote did not signify any improvement in human rights in Cuba, but rather wasan expression of disagreement with the United States over its policy toward Cuba. In 1999 and 2000,the UNCHR again approved resolutions criticizing Cuba for its human rights record, although it didnot appoint a Special Rapporteur. On April 23, 1999, the UNCHR resolution was approved by a voteof 21-20, with 12 abstentions. On April 18, 2000, the UNCHR resolution, sponsored by the CzechRepublic and Poland, was approved by a vote of 21-18, with 14 abstentions. Observers are divided over whether the Castro government will endure. While some believe that the demise of the government is imminent, there is considerable disagreement over when or howthis may occur. Varying scenarios range from a coup or popular uprising, possibly with support fromor acceptance by the Cuban military, to the voluntary resignation and self-exile of Castro. Somepoint to Castro's age and predict that the regime will collapse without Fidel at the helm. Otherobservers maintain that reports of the impending collapse of the Cuban government have beenexaggerated and that Castro may remain in power for years. They point to Cuba's strong securityapparatus and the extraordinary system of controls that prevents dissidents from gaining popularsupport. Moreover, observers maintain that Cuba's elite has no interest in Castro's overthrow, andthat Castro still enjoys some support, in part because of the social benefits of the Cuban revolution,but also because Cubans see no alternative to Castro. Even if Castro is overthrown or resigns, theimportant question remaining is the possibility or viability of a stable democratic Cuba after Castro. Analysts point out that the Castro government has successfully impeded the development ofindependent civil society, with no private sector, no independent labor movement, and no unifiedpolitical opposition. For this reason, they contend that building a democratic Cuba will be aformidable task, one that could meet stiff resistance from many Cubans. In the early 1960s, U.S.-Cuban relations deteriorated sharply when Fidel Castro began to build a repressive communist dictatorship and moved his country toward close relations with the SovietUnion. The often tense and hostile nature of the U.S.-Cuban relationship is illustrated by such eventsand actions as: U.S. covert operations to overthrow the Castro government culminating in theill-fated April 1961 Bay of Pigs invasion; the October 1962 missile crisis in which the United Statesconfronted the Soviet Union over its attempt to place offensive nuclear missiles in Cuba; Cubansupport for guerrilla insurgencies and military support for revolutionary governments in Africa andthe Western Hemisphere; the 1980 exodus of around 125,000 Cubans to the United States in theso-called Mariel boatlift; the 1994 exodus of more than 30,000 Cubans who were interdicted andhoused at U.S. facilities in Guantanamo and Panama; and the February 1996 shootdown by Cubanfighter jets of two U.S. civilian planes, resulting in the death of four U.S. crew members. (2) Since the early 1960s, U.S. policy toward Cuba has consisted largely of isolating the island nation through comprehensive economic sanctions. The Clinton Administration has essentiallycontinued this policy of isolating Cuba. The principal tool of U.S. policy remains comprehensivesanctions, which were made stronger with the Cuban Democracy Act (CDA) of 1992 and with theCuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996 ( P.L. 104-114 ), often referred to as theHelms/Burton legislation. The CDA prohibits U.S. subsidiaries from engaging in trade with Cubaand prohibits entry into the United States for any vessel to load or unload freight if it has engagedin trade with Cuba within the last 180 days. The Helms/Burton legislation -- enacted in theaftermath of Cuba's shooting down of two U.S. civilian planes in February 1996 -- combines avariety of measures to increase pressure on Cuba and provides for a plan to assist Cuba once itbegins the transition to democracy. Among the law's sanctions is a provision in Title III that holdsany person or government that traffics in U.S. property confiscated by the Cuban government liablefor monetary damages in U.S. federal court. Acting under provisions of the law, President Clintonhas suspended the implementation of Title III at six-month intervals. Another component of U.S. policy consists of support measures for the Cuban people, a so-called second track of U.S. policy. This includes U.S. private humanitarian donations, U.S.government support for democracy-building efforts for Cuba, and U.S.- sponsored radio andtelevision broadcasting to Cuba, Radio and TV Marti. According to the Administration, thetwo-track policy of isolating Cuba, but reaching out to the Cuban people, meets both U.S. strategicand humanitarian interests. In the aftermath of the Pope's January 1998 visit to Cuba, the Clinton Administration made several changes to U.S. policy intended to augment U.S. support for the Cuban people. In March1998, President Clinton announced: 1) the resumption of licensing for direct humanitarian charterflights to Cuba (which had been curtailed after the February 1996 shootdown of two U.S. civilianplanes); 2) the resumption of cash remittances up to $300 per quarter for the support of closerelatives in Cuba (which had been curtailed in August 1994 in response to the migration crisis withCuba); 3) the development of licensing procedures to streamline and expedite licenses for thecommercial sale of medicines and medical supplies and equipment to Cuba; and 4) a decision towork on a bipartisan basis with Congress on the transfer of food to the Cuban people. The Presidentstated that his actions would "build further on the impact of the Pope's visit to Cuba," "support therole of the Church and other elements of civil society in Cuba," and "help prepare the Cuban peoplefor a democratic transition." In January 1999, President Clinton announced five additional measures to support the Cuban people: 1) a broadening cash remittances to Cuba, so that all U.S. residents (not just those with closerelatives in Cuba) are allowed to send $300 per quarter to any Cuban family and licensing largerremittances by U.S. citizens and non-governmental organizations to entities independent of theCuban government; 2) an expansion of direct passenger charter flights to Cuba from additional U.S.cities other than the current flights from Miami, and to cities other than Havana (direct flights laterin the year began from Los Angeles and New York); 3) the re-establishment of direct mail serviceto Cuba, which was suspended in 1962 (this measure has not yet been negotiated with the Cubangovernment); 4) authorization for the commercial sale of food to independent entities in Cuba suchas religious groups and private restaurants and the sale of agricultural inputs to independent entitiessuch as private farmers and farmer cooperatives producing food for sale in private markets and 5)an expansion of people-to-people contact through two-way exchanges among academics, athletes,and scientists. Over the years, although U.S. policymakers have agreed on the overall objective of U.S. policy toward Cuba -- to help bring democracy and respect for human rights to the island -- there havebeen several schools of thought about how to achieve that objective. Some advocate a policy ofkeeping maximum pressure on the Cuban government until reforms are enacted, while continuingcurrent U.S. efforts to support the Cuban people. Others argue for an approach, sometimes referredto as constructive engagement, that would lift some U.S. sanctions that they believe are hurting theCuban people, and move toward engaging Cuba with dialogue. Still others call for a swiftnormalization of U.S.-Cuban relations by lifting the U.S. embargo. In general, those advocating a loosening of the sanctions-based policy toward Cuba make several policy arguments. They assert that if the United States moderated its policy toward Cuba -through increased travel, trade and diplomatic dialogue, that the seeds of reform would be plantedin Cuba, which would stimulate and strengthen forces for peaceful change on the island. They stressthe importance to the United States of avoiding violent change in Cuba, with the prospect of a massexodus to the United States and the potential of involving the United States in a civil war scenario.They argue that since Castro's demise does not appear imminent, the United States should espousea more realistic approach in trying to induce change in Cuba. Supporters of changing policy alsopoint to broad international support for lifting the U.S. embargo, to the missed opportunities to U.S.businesses because of the embargo, and to the increased suffering of the Cuban people because ofthe embargo. Proponents of change also argue that the United States should adhere to someconsistency in its policies with the world's few remaining Communist governments, and alsomaintain that moderating policy will help advance human rights in Cuba. On the other side, opponents of changing U.S. policy maintain that the current two-track policy of isolating Cuba, but reaching out to the Cuban people through measures of support, is the bestmeans for realizing political change in Cuba. They point out that the Cuban Liberty and DemocraticSolidarity Act of 1996 sets forth a road map for what steps Cuban needs to take in order for theUnited States to normalize relations, including lifting the embargo. They argue that softening U.S.policy at this time without concrete Cuban reforms would boost the Castro regime politically andeconomically, enabling the survival of the Communist regime. Opponents of softening U.S. policyargue that the United States should stay the course in its commitment to democracy and human rightsin Cuba; that sustained sanctions can work; and that the sanctions against Cuba have only come tofull impact with the loss of large subsidies from the former Soviet bloc. Opponents of looseningU.S. sanctions further argue that Cuba's failed economic policies, not the U.S. embargo, are thecauses of the economy's rapid decline. Numerous measures have been introduced in the 106th Congress that reflect the range of views on U.S. policy toward Cuba. Legislative action in the second session has focused on initiatives toease restrictions on U.S. food and medical exports to Cuba and initiatives to ease restrictions ontravel to Cuba. At the same time, there has been legislative action to increase sanctions: byconditioning aid to Russia on closing the Russian signals intelligence facility at Lourdes, Cuba; andby making it easier for enforcement of anti-terrorism judgments in U.S. courts, thereby allowing fora $187.6 million 1997 judgment against Cuba to be paid from Cuba's frozen assets in the UnitedStates to the families of three U.S. citizens killed when Cuba shot down two U.S. planes in 1996. Other initiatives introduced in the 106th Congress deal with such issues as Cuba's poor human rightssituation, cooperation with Cuba on drug trafficking efforts, and the Elian Gonzalez immigrationcase. (For a full list of initiatives, see "Legislative Initiatives in the 106th Congress" below.) On February 24, 1996, Cuban Mig-29 fighter jets shot down two Cessna 337s in the Florida Straits, which resulted in the death of four members of the Cuban American group Brothers to theRescue. The group was known primarily for its humanitarian missions of spotting Cubans fleeingtheir island nation on rafts but had also become active in flying over Cuba and dropping leaflets. In 1996, President Clinton authorized $300,000 to each of the families of the four victims, which was drawn from a pot of $148.3 million in Cuban assets frozen in the United States. However, on December 17, 1997, a U.S. federal judge awarded $187.6 million ($49.9 million incompensatory damages and $137.7 million in punitive damages) to the families of three of theshootdown victims who sued under a provision in the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Actof 1996 ( P.L. 104-132 ). (The fourth shootdown victim was not a U.S. citizen, and therefore noteligible to sue under the Act.) Cuba refused to recognize the court's jurisdiction. In a federal lawsuit, relatives of three of the shootdown victims who were U.S. citizens are attempting to collect the judgment against the Cuban government through proceeds to Cuba fromU.S. telephone companies. On March 18, 1999, a federal judge awarded $6.2 million of thetelephone payments to the families' victims. Of this amount, $4.15 million would come from AT&T,$1.05 million would come from MCI, and the remainder would come from LDDS Communications,IDB Telecommunications Services, and WilTel LLC. On August 11, 1999, however, a federalappeals court overturned the lower court's decision and ruled that the families could not collect the$6.2 million, because the Cuban telephone company, ETECSA, is an entity separate from the Cubangovernment. A provision in the FY1999 omnibus appropriations measure ( P.L. 105-277 , H.R. 4328 ) could have affected the payment of the December 1997 judgment from Cuba's frozen assetsin the United States. That provision stipulates that foreign states are not immune from U.S.judgments for violations of international law. However, the provision also includes a presidentialwaiver for national security interests, which the President exercised October 21, 1998. The ClintonAdministration opposed the provision, maintaining that it would undermine the authority of thePresident to use assets of countries under economic sanctions as leverage when sanctions are usedto modify the behavior of a foreign state. Supporters maintain that it would let those nations whosponsor terrorism know that if they are found guilty in U.S. court, their assets will be liquidated inorder to serve justice. A provision in Section 118 of the Senate-approved version of H.R. 2490 , the FY2000 Treasury Appropriations bill, would have limited the ability of the President to preventfrozen assets from being seized, but the provision was not included in the September 14, 1999conference report. Subsequently, the provision was introduced as a freestanding bill, S. 1796 (Lautenberg), on October 26, 1999. S. 1796 would amend the enforcement of certainanti-terrorism judgments in U.S. courts under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (28 USC1602-11) against foreign states designated to be state sponsors of terrorism, taking away the currentpresidential waiver for national security interests except for the protection of diplomatic property. The Senate Judiciary Committee reported the bill March 9, 2000, and the measure was placed on theSenate Legislative Calendar under General Orders. An identical House bill, H.R. 3485 (McCollum), was introduced November 18, 1999. The House Committee on the Judiciary reportedthe bill July 13, 2000 ( H.Rept. 106-733 ) and the measure was placed on the Union Calendar. Asupplemental report on H.R. 3485 was filed July 18, 2000 ( H.Rept. 106-733 , Part II). The House approved H.R. 3485 by voice vote on July 25, 2000. It was received in theSenate and placed on the Senate Legislative calendar under General Orders July 26, 2000. According to press reports, on July 21, 2000, the Clinton Administration reportedly proposed a settlement with the families of the three shootdown victims that would allow them to collectaround $50 million in compensatory damages from frozen Cuban assets in the United States. Thefamilies of the victims rejected the deal, saying it was unacceptable because they judged it would notpunish the Cuban government, but they said they would continue to negotiate if the ClintonAdministration agreed to include punitive damages in the settlement. (3) In the Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000 ( P.L. 106-386 ), sections 2002 and 2003 direct the Secretary of the Treasury to pay compensatory damages for certain claimsagainst Cuba (and Iran). As provided for in this bill, President Clinton waived such payments in theinterest of national security when he signed the bill into law on October 28, 2000. Major Provisions. As enacted into law March 12, 1996, the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act, P.L. 104-114 , contains three significantprovisions. Title I, Section 102(h) , codifies all existing Cuban embargo Executive Orders andregulations. No presidential waiver is provided for any of these codified embargo provisions. Thisprovision is significant because of the long-lasting effect on U.S. policy options toward Cuba. Ineffect, the Clinton Administration and subsequent administrations will be circumscribed in anychanges in U.S. policy toward Cuba. Title III allows U.S. nationals to sue for money damages in U.S. federal court those persons that traffic in property confiscated in Cuba. It extends the right to sue to Cuban Americans whobecame U.S. citizens after their properties were confiscated. The President has authority to delayimplementation for a period of six months at a time if he determines that such a delay would be inthe national interest and would expedite a transition to democracy in Cuba. Title IV of the law denies admission to the United States to aliens involved in the confiscationof U.S. property in Cuba or in the trafficking of confiscated U.S. property in Cuba. This includescorporate officers, principals, or shareholders with a controlling interest of an entity involved in theconfiscation of U.S. property or trafficking of U.S. property. It also includes the spouse, minor child,or agent of aliens who would be excludable under the provision. This provision is mandatory, andonly waiveable on a case-by-case basis for travel to the United States for humanitarian medicalreasons or for individuals to defend themselves in legal actions regarding confiscated property. Implementation of Title III and IV. With regard to Title III, since July 1996 President Clinton has suspended -- for six month periods, as providedfor under the act -- the right of individuals to file suit against those persons benefitting fromconfiscated U.S. property in Cuba. At the time of the first suspension on July 16, 1996, the Presidentannounced that he would allow Title III to go into effect, and as a result liability for trafficking underthe title became effective on November 1, 1996. According to the Clinton Administration, this putforeign companies in Cuba on notice that they face prospects of future lawsuits and significantliability in the United States. At the second suspension on January 3, 1997, President Clinton statedthat he would continue to suspend the right to file law suits "as long as America's friends and alliescontinued their stepped-up efforts to promote a transition to democracy in Cuba." The President hascontinued, at six-month intervals, to suspend the rights to file Title III lawsuits, with the most recentsuspension on January 15, 2000. With regard to Title IV of the legislation, to date the State Department has banned from the United States a number of executives and their families from three companies because of theirinvestment in confiscated U.S. property in Cuba: Grupos Domos, a Mexican telecommunicationscompany; Sherritt International, a Canadian mining company; and BM Group, an Israeli-ownedcitrus company. In 1997, Grupos Domos disinvested from U.S.-claimed property in Cuba, and asa result its executives are again eligible to enter the United States. Action against executives ofSTET, an Italian telecommunications company was averted by a July 1997 agreement in which thecompany agreed to pay the U.S.-based ITT Corporation $25 million for the use of ITT-claimedproperty in Cuba for ten years. In the 105th Congress, the FY1999 omnibus appropriations measure( P.L. 105-277 , H.R. 4328 ) included a provision that requires the Administration toreport on the implementation of Title IV of the Helms/Burton legislation. The State Department isinvestigating a Spanish hotel company, Sol Melia, for allegedly investing in property that wasconfiscated from U.S. citizens in Cuba's Holguin province in 1961. Foreign Reaction and the EU's WTO Challenge. Many U.S. allies -- including Canada, Japan, Mexico, and European Union (EU) nations -- havestrongly criticized the enactment of the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act. Theymaintain that the law's provisions allowing foreign persons to be sued in U.S. court constitute anextraterritorial application of U.S. law that is contrary to international principles. U.S. officialsmaintain that the United States, which reserves the right to protect its security interests, is wellwithin its obligations under NAFTA and the World Trade Organization (WTO). Until mid-April 1997, the EU had been pursuing its case at the WTO, in which it was challenging the Helms/Burton legislation as an extraterritorial application of U.S. law. Thebeginning of a settlement on the issue occurred on April 11, 1997, when an EU-U.S. understandingwas reached. In the understanding, both sides agreed to continue efforts to promote democracy inCuba and to work together to develop an agreement on agreed disciplines and principles for thestrengthening of investment protection relating to the confiscation of property by Cuba and othergovernments. As part of the understanding, the EU agreed that it would suspend its WTO disputesettlement case. Subsequently in mid-April 1998, the EU agreed to let its WTO challenge expire. Talks between the U.S. and the EU on investment disciplines proved difficult, with the EU wanting to cover only future investments and the U.S. wanting to cover past expropriations,especially in Cuba. Nevertheless, after months of negotiations, the EU and the United States reacheda second understanding on May 18, 1998. The understanding sets forth EU disciplines regardinginvestment in expropriated properties worldwide, in exchange for the Clinton Administration'ssuccess at obtaining a waiver from Congress for the legislation's Title IV visa restrictions. Futureinvestment in expropriated property would be barred. For past illegal expropriations, governmentsupport or assistance for transactions related to those expropriated properties would be denied. ARegistry of Claims would also be established to warn investors and government agencies providinginvestment support that a property has a record of claims. These investment disciplines would be applied at the same time that President Clinton's new Title IV waiver authority was exercised. Reaction was mixed among Members of Congress to the EU-U.S. accord, but opposition to the agreement by several senior Members has forestalled any amendment of Title IV in Congress. In aletter to Secretary of State Albright, Representative Gilman and Senator Helms criticized theunderstanding for not covering companies already invested in expropriated property. Among othercriticisms, they argued that the understanding only proposes a weak sanction (denying governmentsupport) that may not deter companies that are willing to invest in Cuba. (4) On the other side,however, some Members support the EU-U.S. understanding. They maintain that the understandingis important because it increases protection for the property of Americans worldwide and discouragesinvestment in illegally confiscated property in Cuba. Another potential EU challenge of U.S. law regarding Cuba in the WTO involves a dispute between the French spirits company, Pernod Ricard , and the Bermuda-based Bacardi Ltd. PernodRicard entered into a joint venture with the Cuban government to produce and export Havana Clubrum, but Bacardi maintains that it holds the right to the Havana Club name. A provision in theFY1999 omnibus appropriations measure (Section 211 of Division A, title II, P.L. 105-277 , signedinto law October 21, 1998) prevents the United States from accepting payment for trademark licensesthat were used in connection with a business or assets in Cuba that were confiscated unless theoriginal owner of the trademark has consented. The provision prohibits U.S. courts from recognizingsuch trademarks without the consent of the original owner. Although Pernod Ricard cannot marketHavana Club in the United States because of the trade embargo, it wants to protect its futuredistribution rights when the embargo is lifted. After Bacardi began selling rum in the United States under the Havana Club label, Pernod Ricard's joint venture unsuccessfully challenged Bacardi in U.S. federal court. In February 2000,the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in New York upheld a lower court's ruling that thejoint venture had no legal right to use the Havana Club name in the United States. Pernod Ricard has vowed to take the issue to the U.S. Supreme Court. (5) Formal U.S.-EU consultations on the issue were held in September and December 1999 without resolution. In late 1999 EU.-U.S. talks, the EU reportedly proposed a resolution for the issue thatwould involve making the law only prospective, but the United States has not responded to thatproposal. (6) In July 2000, the EU requested a WTOdispute resolution panel to consider the issue,maintaining that it violates the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property(TRIPS), but the United States blocked the EU's request. Reportedly the EU will make anotherrequest for the WTO dispute settlement body to rule on the issue when the body meets again in lateSeptember 2000, in which case the United States would not be allowed to block the EU's requestfor a second time. (7) The Clinton Administration did not support the trademark provision in the FY1999 omnibus appropriations bill. According to an internal memo prepared for the United States TradeRepresentative that was cited in the press, the language of the provision "violates our obligationsunder the TRIPS (Trade Related Aspects on Intellectual Property Rights) Agreement." (8) However,the Administration did not move to make any changes to the provision of the law. In recent years, the U.S. sanctions regime has allowed the sale of both food and medical exports, but with restrictions. The agricultural appropriations bill for FY2001 that was passed byCongress in October 2000 ( P.L. 106-387 ) terminates unilateral medical and agricultural sanctions,broadening what can be sold and to whom. But it also maintains the prohibition against the U.S.financing of such sales, and limits licenses to one year. Several restrictions on commercial medical exports were set forth in the Cuban Democracy Act of 1992. On March 20, 1998, President Clinton announced that the Administration would developlicensing procedures to streamline and expedite licenses for the commercial sale of medicines andmedical supplies and equipment to Cuba. The simplified procedures were put in place by theCommerce and Treasury Departments in May 1998. With regard to commercial food sales, in 1999 President Clinton authorized the sale of food and agriculture inputs to independent entities in Cuba, such as religious groups, private farmers, andprivate restaurants. Treasury and Commerce Department regulations for these sales were issued May13, 1999 (with an effective date of May 10.) The Administration hoped the policy change wouldsupport Cuba's small private sector. To date, however, it appears that actual food sales have beennegligible. Some in the business community argue that the changes in policy have not amounted to much because they still do not allow financing for the sales. Nevertheless, U.S. agribusiness companiescontinue to explore the Cuban market for potential future sales. The Cuban government told a groupof U.S. farmers who traveled there in November, after passage of the new law, that it was interestedin buying U.S. agricultural exports but refuses to buy any U.S. food under the financing restrictionsimposed by that new law. Opponents of easing restrictions maintain that U.S. policy does not deny medical sales to Cuba, and since May 1999, does not deny food sales to independent groups in Cuba. Moreover, accordingto the State Department, since the Cuban Democracy Act was enacted in 1992, the United States haslicensed more than $2.5 billion in private humanitarian donations, including $227 million indonations of medicines and medical equipment. Opponents of easing U.S. sanctions further arguethat easing pressure on the Cuban government would in effect be lending support and extending theduration of the Castro regime. They maintain that the United States should remain steadfast in itsopposition to any easing of pressure on Cuba that could prolong the Castro regime and its repressivepolicies. Supporters of easing restrictions on food and medical exports to Cuba argue that the restrictions harm the health and nutrition of the Cuban population. They argue that licensing procedures set upfor the commercial sale of medical exports to Cuba are so complex that they essentially constitutea ban on such exports because of long delays and increased costs. They argue that although the U.S.government may have licensed more than $2.5 billion in humanitarian donations to Cuba since 1992,in fact much smaller amounts have actually been sent to Cuba. Some supporters of easing sanctionsbelieve the embargo plays into Castro's hands by allowing him to use U.S. policy as a scapegoat forhis failed economic policies and as a rationale for political repression. Other supporters of easedrestrictions argue that U.S. policy has complicated relations with our allies who have adopted a"constructive engagement" approach toward Cuba. U.S. agribusiness companies that support theremoval of trade restrictions on agricultural exports to Cuba believe that U.S. farmers are missingout on a market of some $700 million so close to the United States. Legislative Initiatives in the 106th Congress. Themost significant action in the first session of the 106th Congress occurred during August 4, 1999Senate consideration of the FY2000 Agriculture Appropriations bill, S. 1233 . Amodified Ashcroft amendment was approved requiring congressional approval before the impositionof any unilateral agricultural or medical sanction against a foreign country. However, under themodified amendment, agricultural and medical exports to state sponsors of international terrorism-- which includes Cuba -- would be allowed pursuant to one year licenses issued by the U.S.government, and without any federal financing or export assistance. An attempt to table the Ashcroftamendment, before it was modified to restrict exports to sponsors of international terrorism, wasdefeated by a vote of 28 to 70 on August 3, 1999. The Senate subsequently approved S. 1233 and incorporated the language into H.R. 1906 , with the Ashcroft amendmentincluded as subsection 748 (k). The House version of the bill had no such provision, and ultimatelythe Ashcroft provision was not included in the conference report. Several Senators expressed strongdisapproval with the manner in which the issue was decided. When the conference committee cameto a stalemate over the Ashcroft provision on sanctions and another provision on dairy prices, theHouse and Senate Majority Leadership brokered an agreement that dropped the Ashcroft provision. In the second session of the 106th Congress, there have been efforts in three legislative vehicles - the foreign aid authorization bill ( S. 2382 ), FY2001 agriculture appropriations bill( H.R. 4461 ), and the FY2001 Treasury Department appropriations bill( H.R. 4871 )- to lift restrictions on food and medical exports to Cuba. On March 23,2000, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee included a provision in its FY2001 foreign aidauthorization bill, S. 2382 , the Technical Assistance, Trade Promotion, andAnti-Corruption Act. As reported by the Committee on April 7, 2000 ( S.Rept. 106-257 ), the billcontains a provision similar to the Ashcroft provision on sanctions in the Senate version of theFY2000 agriculture appropriations bill described above. Title I, Subtitle C of S. 2382 would lift restrictions on food and medicine exports and allow licensed exports of these goods tocountries classified as state sponsors of international terrorism, which includes Cuba. Agriculturaland medical exports to these countries would be allowed pursuant to one-year licenses issued by theU.S. government. Both the House and Senate versions of the FY2001 agriculture appropriations bill ( H.R. 4461 and S. 2536 ) as reported out of their respective committeesincluded a provision similar to that in the foreign aid authorization bill that effectively would allowU.S. food and medical exports to Cuba. In the Senate bill, the provision was approved by voice votein the Senate Appropriations Committee on May 9 through an amendment offered by Senator ByronDorgan. The full Senate approved H.R. 4461 on July 20, 2000, which included the titleallowing food and medical exports to Cuba. In the House version of the bill, on May 4, 2000, the House Appropriations Committee's Subcommittee on Agriculture approved an amendment by Representative George Nethercutt thatwould lift restrictions on food and medical exports and allow licensed exports of these goods tocountries classified as state sponsors of international terrorism, which includes Cuba. Subsequently,on May 10, the full House Appropriations Committee defeated (by a vote of 24-35) an attempt byRepresentative Tom DeLay to delete the title in H.R. 4461 that would lift restrictionson U.S. food and medical exports worldwide. Continued opposition by the House GOP leadershipand some Members to the sanctions-loosening effort led to a June 27 compromise agreementhammered out among the House GOP leadership, the House sponsors of the provision, and Memberswho opposed the initiative. Under the reported compromise, U.S. food and medical exports to Cubawould be allowed pursuant to one-year licenses, but no U.S. government or U.S. private financingcould be provided for the transactions. The agreement includes a provision stating that licensed U.S.travel to Cuba may not include travel for tourist activities, as well as another provision that wouldprohibit all U.S. government assistance to Cuba without any presidential waiver authority. Criticscharged that the restrictions were so great that sales would be practically impossible, and that thenew provisions on travel would tighten restrictions on certain categories of non-tourist travelcurrently allowed by the Treasury Department regulations. When the House debated H.R. 4461 , on July 10, 2000, the title dealing with food and medical exports was deleted on a point of order by Representative Diaz-Balart against legislationin an appropriation measure. However, the compromise language agreed to on June 27 wasreportedly the basis of the House position in the conference to H.R. 4461 . TheSenate-passed provision was less restrictive than the June 27 compromise agreement. Another Housefloor amendment by Representative Rangel that sought to ease restrictions on trade with Cuba byeliminating funding to implement provisions in the foreign assistance and other statutes that prohibitU.S. exports to Cuba was ruled to be non-germane. In the final version of the FY2001 Agriculture appropriations bill that was signed into law on October 28, 2000, the sale of agricultural and medical products to Cuba is allowed, but any U.S.financing - public or private - is prohibited. The bill also codified existing embargo regulations byprohibiting imports from Cuba and travel for tourism to Cuba. During House consideration of the FY2001 Treasury Department appropriations bill, H.R. 4871 , the House approved (301-116) a Moran (KS) amendment that wouldprohibit any funds in the bill from being used to implement any U.S. sanction on private commercialsales of agricultural commodities or medicine or medical supplies to Cuba. Although passage of theamendment marked a significant departure from the longstanding sanctions-oriented policy towardCuba, its language was eliminated from a new version of the FY2001 Treasury Departmentappropriations bill, H.R. 4985 , introduced on July 26. This version, with no mentionof Cuba, was subsequently appended to the Legislative Branch appropriations bill, H.R. 4516 , on July 27. Restrictions on travel to Cuba have been a key component in U.S. efforts to isolate the communist government of Fidel Castro for much of the past 40 years. Over time there have beennumerous changes to the restrictions and for 5 years, from 1977 until 1982, there were no restrictionson travel. On June 30, 1999, an attempt in the Senate to end the restrictions was defeated (55-43)during consideration of the foreign aid appropriations bill, S. 1234 , but similar freestanding legislation was introduced in each body, S. 1919 (Dodd), H.R. 259 (Serrano), and H.R. 4471 (Sanford). Moreover, on July 20, 2000, duringconsideration of the FY2001 Treasury Department appropriations bill, H.R. 4871 , aSanford amendment was approved (232-186) that would prohibit funds in the bill from being usedto administer or enforce the Cuban Assets Control Regulations with respect to any travel ortravel-related transaction. While passage of the amendment marked a significant departure from thelongstanding sanctions-oriented policy toward Cuba, the language of the amendment was eliminatedfrom a new version of the FY2001 Treasury Department appropriations bill, H.R. 4985 ,which was appended to the conference report ( H.Rept. 106-796 ) on the Legislative Branchappropriations bill, H.R. 4516 , on July 27. As noted above in the discussion of H.R. 4461 , the FY2001 agriculture appropriations bill, the final version of the food and medical provision states that licensed U.S. travelto Cuba may not include travel for tourist activities. Moreover, the law imposed tighter restrictionson non-tourist travel previously allowed by the Treasury Department regulations. Major arguments made for lifting the Cuba travel ban are: it hinders efforts to influence conditions in Cuba and may be aiding Castro by helping restrict the flow of information; it abridgesthe rights of ordinary Americans; and Americans can travel to other countries with communist orauthoritarian governments. Major arguments in opposition to lifting the Cuba travel ban are:American tourist travel would support Castro's rule by providing his government with millions ofdollars in tourist receipts; there are legal provisions allowing travel to Cuba for humanitarianpurposes that are used by thousands of Americans each year; and the President should be free torestrict travel for foreign policy reasons. (For more details, see CRS Report RS20409, Cuba: U.S.Restrictions on Travel and Legislative Initiatives in the 106th Congress. ) Because of Cuba's geographic location, its waters and airspace are used by drug traffickers to transit low levels of cocaine and marijuana for ultimate destination to the United States. Cubanofficials have expressed concerns over the use of their waters and airspace for drug transit as wellas increased domestic drug use by way of the growing tourist sector. Cuba has made a number of lawenforcement efforts to deal with the drug problem, including legislation to stiffen penalties fortraffickers and cooperation with a number of countries on anti-drug efforts. The United Statescooperates with Cuba on anti-drug efforts on a case-by-case basis, and there are undergoing effortsto make bilateral cooperation more systematic. On June 21, 1999, U.S. and Cuban officials met in Havana to discuss ways of improving anti-drug cooperation. According to the State Department, Cuba accepted an upgrading of thecurrent telex link between the Cuban Border Guard and the U.S. Coast Guard as well as thestationing of a U.S. Coast Guard officer at the U.S. Interests Section in Havana. Barry McCaffrey,Director of the Office of National Drug Control Policy, has stated that Cuba had demonstrated awillingness to help the United States in anti-narcotics efforts but has been ineffective because of alack of resources. Some Members have called for closer U.S.-Cuban cooperation on anti-drugmeasures (see H.R. 2365 ), while some, strongly opposing such efforts, have called onCuba to be added to the State Department's list of major-drug producing or transit countries (see H.R. 2422 ). They believe that the Cuban government is involved in the drug trade,although the State Department asserts that the United States has no credible evidence of recenthigh-level official drug-related corruption in Cuba. H.R. 3427 , the Foreign RelationsAuthorization Act for FY2000 and FY2001, enacted into law by reference in P.L. 106-113 , requiresa report within 120 days on the extent of international drug trafficking through Cuba since 1990. On November 10, 1999, the Clinton Administration decided not to add Cuba to the annual list of major drug transit countries. According to the Department of State, "Cuba was not placed on thelist of major drug transit countries because there is no clear evidence that cocaine or heroin aretransiting Cuba on the way to the United States in quantities that significantly affect the UnitedStates." (Daily Press Briefing, November 10, 1999) Some Members of Congress strongly objectedto Cuba not being included on the list. A hearing on the issue was held November 17, 1999, beforethe House Government Reform Committee's Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, andHuman Resources. During June 21, 2000 Senate consideration of the FY2001 foreign aid appropriations bill, S. 2522 , the Senate approved by voice vote an amendment offered by Senator Specterfor up to $1 million to fund the Secretary of Defense to work with Cuba to provide for greatercooperation, coordination, and other assistance in the interdiction of illicit drugs. The final billomitted that language. Some Members of Congress have raised concerns about the Russian signals intelligence facility at Lourdes, Cuba. The facility at Lourdes was built in the aftermath of the Cuban missile crisis of1962. It allows Russia to monitor U.S. communications, including military communications thatRussians contend ensure compliance with arms control agreements. In the 104th Congress, the enacted Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act ( P.L. 104-114 ) contains a provision that would reduce U.S. assistance for Russia by an amount equal to the sum ofassistance and credits provided in support of intelligence facilities in Cuba. However, the legislationalso provides that such a restriction does not apply to most categories of assistance. Moreover, thelegislation also provides a presidential waiver if such assistance is important to U.S. national security and ifRussia has assured the United States that it is not sharing intelligence collected at the Lourdes facilitywith officials or agents of the Cuban government. In the 106th Congress, on July 19, 2000 the House approved (275-146) H.R. 4118 , the Russian-American Trust and Cooperation Act of 2000, that would have prohibited therescheduling or forgiveness of any outstanding bilateral debt owed to the United States by Russiauntil the President certified that Russia had ceased all its operations at, removed all personnel from,and permanently closed the intelligence facility at Lourdes, Cuba. The bill would have provided thePresident with a national interests waiver for the prohibition against rescheduling bilateral debt owedto the United States by Russia, but not for debt forgiveness. The bill also required the President toinstruct the U.S. representative to the Paris Club of official creditors to use the voice and vote of theU.S. to oppose rescheduling or forgiveness of any outstanding bilateral debt owed by Russia. Nopresidential waiver was provided for this provision. The Senate version, S. 2748 ,remained in committee. Those supporting the bill argue that the listening post, which reportedly has been upgraded in recent years, permits the collection of U.S. military, diplomatic, and commercial data and allows theinvasion of Americans' privacy. They argue the compensation paid by Russia to Cuba, estimated atbetween $100-$300 million annually, helps prop up the Castro government financially. Thoseopposed to the bill argue that facilities such as that at Lourdes help both Russia and the United Statesto have confidence that international arms controls agreements are being respected. They maintainthat the bill attempts to undermine U.S. leadership on engagement with Russia and could threatenU.S. leadership in Paris Club negotiations for debt rescheduling and forgiveness. The ClintonAdministration opposes the legislation, maintaining that it could call into question U.S. signalsintelligence facilities that perform activities similar to the facility at Lourdes. (Also see CRS Report RS20636, Russia's Paris Club Debt: U.S. Interests ) In mid-October 1998, Senator John Warner along with 14 other senators from both parties wrote to President Clinton calling for the formation of a "National Bipartisan Commission on Cuba," to conduct an analysis of current U.S. policy that would help shape and strengthen the futureU.S.-Cuban relationship. Another 9 senators signed on to the letter in December, bringing the totalnumber of senators to 24. The senators recommended that the commission members be chosen froma bipartisan list of distinguished Americans experienced in international relations representing across section of U.S. interests. Some Members opposed the formation of such a commission,maintaining that the idea was intended to alter U.S. policy. On January 4, 1999, State Departmentofficials stated that the Clinton Administration had decided not to set up a bipartisan commissionat that time. A year and half later, the issue of a bipartisan commission was raised in a legislative proposal by Senator Christopher Dodd. On June 20, 2000 during consideration of S. 2549 , theFY2001 defense authorization bill, the Senate tabled, by a vote of 59-41, a Dodd amendment thatwould have established a National Bipartisan Commission on Cuba to evaluate U.S. policy towardCuba. The original proponent of such a commission, Senator Warner, did not support the Doddamendment because he believed it could be an impediment to the passage of the defenseauthorization measure. Those arguing in favor of such a commission maintained: that the work ofthe commission would provide new ideas and thoughts for the next presidential administration totake office in 2001; that human rights activists inside Cuba support a rethinking of U.S. policy; andthat there is a double standard regarding the sanctions-based U.S. policy toward Cuba, whichcontrasts with the U.S. policy of engagement toward such nations as China, Vietnam, and now evenNorth Korea. Those opposing the establishment of such a commission argued: that it was a politicalattempt to change U.S. policy toward Cuba outside of the normal conduct of foreign policy by thelegislative and executive branches; that it would tie the hands of the next President to set his ownCuba policy; and that there should be no movement to change U.S. policy until there is politicalchange in Cuba. U.S.-government sponsored radio and television broadcasting to Cuba (Radio and TV Marti), begun in 1985 and 1990 respectively, have at times been the focus of controversies, includingadherence to broadcast standards. Over the years there have been various attempts to cut fundingfor the programs, especially for TV Marti which has not had an audience because of Cuban jammingefforts. TV Marti offers its daily broadcasts between the hours of 3:30 am - 8:00 am. (Forbackground on Cuba broadcasting through 1994, see CRS Report 94-636(pdf) F, Radio and TelevisionBroadcasting to Cuba: Background and Issues Through 1994 .) FY2000 Funding. For FY2000, the Administration requested $22.743 million for broadcasting to Cuba, with $13.12 million for RadioMarti operations and $9.623 million for TV Marti operations. The FY2000 omnibus appropriationsmeasure, P.L. 106-113 , which enacts H.R. 3421 by reference, appropriates $22.095million for Cuba broadcasting. The omnibus bill also enacted by reference H.R. 3427 ,the Foreign Relations Authorization Act for FY2000 and FY2001, which authorizes $22.743 millionfor Cuba broadcasting for each of FY2000 and FY2001. FY2001 Funding. For FY2001, the Administration requested $23.456 million for broadcasting to Cuba for both Radio and TV Marti. Of that amount, $650,000 is for the purchase of a 100 kilowatt solid state transmitter to improve theoperation, reliability, and efficiency of Radio Marti broadcasts to Cuba. The House-passed versionof H.R. 4690 , the FY2001 Commerce, Justice, and State Department appropriations bill,provided for Cuba broadcasting within the larger funding account for international broadcastingoperations. However, in the report to the bill ( H.Rept. 106-680 ), the House AppropriationsCommittee recommended $22.806 for Cuba broadcasting. The Senate version of H.R. 4690 , reported on July 21, 2000, would have provided $22.095 million for radio and televisionbroadcasting to Cuba. H.R. 5548 , a subsequent bill making appropriations for the Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State; the Judiciary; and related agencies, was incorporated into the H.R. 4942 conference report ( H.Rept. 106-1005 ). Signed into law December 21, 2000( P.L. 106-553 ), it provides $22.095 million for radio and television broadcasting to Cuba. In 1994 and 1995, Cuba and the United States reached two migration accords designed to stem the mass exodus of Cubans attempting to reach the United States by boat. On the minds of U.S.policymakers was the 1980 Mariel boatlift in which 125,000 Cubans fled to the United States. Inresponse to Castro's threat to unleash another Mariel, U.S. officials reiterated U.S. resolve not toallow another exodus. Amidst escalating numbers of fleeing Cubans, on August 19, 1994, PresidentClinton abruptly changed U.S. migration policy, under which Cubans attempting to flee theirhomeland were allowed into the United States, and announced that the U.S. Coast Guard and Navywould take Cubans rescued at sea to the U.S. naval base at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. Despite thechange in policy, Cubans continued fleeing in large numbers. As a result, in early September 1994, Cuba and the United States began talks that culminated in a September 9, 1994 bilateral agreement to stem the flow of Cubans fleeing to the United Statesby boat. In the agreement, the United States and Cuba agreed to facilitate safe, legal, and orderlyCuban migration to the United States, consistent with a 1984 migration agreement. The UnitedStates agreed to ensure that total legal Cuban migration to the United States would be a minimumof 20,000 each year, not including immediate relatives of U.S. citizens. In a change of policy, theUnited States agreed to discontinue the practice of granting parole to all Cuban migrants who reachthe United States, while Cuba agreed to take measures to prevent unsafe departures from Cuba. In May 1995, the United States reached another accord with Cuba under which the United States would parole the more than 30,000 Cubans housed at Guantanamo into the United States, butwould intercept future Cuban migrants attempting to enter the United States by sea and would returnthem to Cuba. The two countries would cooperate jointly in the effort. Both countries also pledgedto ensure that no action would be taken against those migrants returned to Cuba as a consequenceof their attempt to immigrate illegally. On January 31, 1996, the Department of Defense announcedthat the last of some 32,000 Cubans intercepted at sea and housed at Guantanamo had left the U.S.Naval Base, most having been paroled into the United States. Periodic U.S.-Cuban talks have beenheld on the implementation of the migration accords. Since the 1995 migration accord, the U.S. Coast Guard has interdicted more than 3,500 Cubans at sea and returned them to their country, while those deemed at risk for persecution have beentransferred to Guantanamo and then found asylum in a third country. Those Cubans who reach shoreare allowed to apply for permanent resident status in one year. Tensions in South Florida heightened after a June 29, 1999 incident -- televised live by local news helicopters -- in which the U.S. Coast Guard used a water cannon and pepper spray to preventsix Cubans from reaching Surfside beach in Florida. The incident prompted outrage from the CubanAmerican community in Florida and several Members of Congress. President Clinton characterizedthe incident as "outrageous," and stated that the treatment was not authorized (Associated Press, July1, 1999). Another incident occurred on July 9, 1999, when a boat being interdicted by the CoastGuard capsized and resulted in the drowning of a Cuban woman. The State Department expressedregret over the incident and noted that the Department of Justice and the Immigration andNaturalization Service would investigate whether this was a case of alien smuggling. The Cuban government has taken forceful action against individuals engaging in alien smuggling. Prison sentences of up to three years may be imposed against those engaging in aliensmuggling, and for incidents involving death or violence, a life sentence may be imposed. As of lateJuly 1999, 30 U.S. residents were being held by the Cuban government on charges of aliensmuggling, and Cuba has offered to return them to the United States to stand trial. In late September1999, a Cuban court convicted two U.S. residents to jail terms of life and 30 years, respectively, forthe smuggling of migrants. Elian Gonzalez Case. On November 25, 1999, a boat with 13 Cubans attempting to reach the United States capsized off the coast of Florida.Among the 3 survivors was a 5-year old boy, Elian Gonzalez, who was found clinging to an innertube off the coast of Fort Lauderdale. The boy's mother drowned in the incident. The Immigrationand Naturalization Service released the boy into the care of relatives in Florida, who said that theywould request political asylum for the child. The boy's father in Cuba called for his return. After interviewing the boy's father in Cuba and the boy's great-uncle and lawyers in Miami, the INS ruled on January 4, 2000, that the boy's father "has the sole legal authority to speak onbehalf of his son, Elian, regarding Elian's immigration status in the United States." According tothe INS ruling: "Both U.S. and international law recognize the unique relationship between parentand child, and family reunification has long been a cornerstone of both immigration law and INSpractice." The INS decision called for Elian to be returned to his father by January 14, 2000. Subsequently, efforts by the boy's Miami relatives to challenge the ruling resulted in the AttorneyGeneral extending the January 14, 2000 deadline in order to accommodate any federal courtproceedings. On January 10, a Florida circuit court judge ruled that the boy's return to Cuba couldcause the child "imminent harm" and scheduled a hearing on the case for March 6. Meanwhile, theFlorida judge issued a temporary protective order for the child to keep him with his Miami relativesuntil the March hearing. However, on January 12, 2000. Attorney General Janet Reno reaffirmedthe INS January 4 ruling, and asserted that the Florida state court had no right to intervene in thecase. She maintained that Florida's court order has no force or effect with regard to the INS'sadministration of immigration laws and that any challenge must take place in federal court. On January 19, 2000, attorneys for the boy's Miami relatives filed a federal lawsuit in Miami in an effort to block Elian's return to Cuba. The lawsuit contended that the boy's constitutionalrights were violated when petitions for political asylum filed on his behalf were not considered. OnMarch 21, federal district court judge Michael Moore dismissed the request to force the INS to grantElian an asylum hearing. On April 6, Elian's father, Juan Miguel Gonzalez, traveled to Washingtonwith his wife and six-month old son, with the intention of reuniting with his son Elian and takinghim back to Cuba. On April 19, a U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit in Atlanta orderedthat Elian must stay in the United States for the duration of the Miami family's court appeal. On April 22, Attorney General Janet Reno ordered the forced removal of Elian from the home of the Miami relatives by INS agents, after which he was flown to Andrews Air Force Base in Marylandand reunited with his father. Critics of the boy's removal argued that the INS used excessive force,while supporters contended that the government was forced to act by the intransigence of the Miamirelatives. Elian Gonzalez and his father stayed at the secluded Wye River Plantation in Marylanduntil May 25, when they (along with other family members, a teacher, and classmates who joinedthem in late April) moved to a home in Washington, D.C. owned by the Youth for UnderstandingInternational Exchange. In the next legal phase of the case, on May 11, the U.S. Court of Appeals in Atlanta heard oral arguments on whether the INS should be instructed to consider the asylum request filed for ElianGonzalez by his Miami relatives. The three-judge panel ruled on June 1 that the INS acted withinthe law and its policy rights when it refused to consider the asylum request. On June 23, the fullAppeals court rejected another appeal by the Miami relatives and refused to reconsider its June 1ruling. On June 26, the Miami relatives petitioned the Supreme Court to block Elian's return toCuba. On June 28, the Supreme Court rejected an appeal by the Miami relatives to block Elian'sreturn to Cuba and to seek a political asylum hearing for him. The previous injunction of theAppeals Court for Elian to remain in the United States expired at 4:00 p.m. on June 28, and the boyand his father returned to Cuba the same day. In late January 2000, it appeared that Congress would consider legislative action on the issue. Some Members supported legislation granting U.S. citizenship or legal residency to the boy( S. 1999 , H.R. 3531 , H.R. 3532 , S. 2314 ). Thosesupporting citizenship argued that the case should have been considered in family court and that thelegislation would ensure this. In contrast, other Members, who believed that Congress should notintervene in the matter, maintained that the INS should proceed with its decision to return the boyto his father ( H.Con.Res. 240 and S.Con.Res. 79 ). Administration officialsmaintained that the issue should be resolved in federal court, not in Congress. The Senate JudiciaryCommittee held a hearing on the issue on March 1, 2000, and the Committee planned hearings toinvestigate the INS's armed removal from the home of the Miami relatives. In Cuba, Fidel Castro demanded the return of the boy in early December 1999, and Cuba held numerous mass demonstrations until the boy's return in June 2000. While the Cuban governmentorganized the mass demonstrations and used the media to influence the Cuban population, the issuein itself generated an outpouring of emotion among the Cuban population as well as in south Florida. Any legislation passed by the 106th Congress is noted as Public Law (P.L.) at the top of eachsection. The latest action made before the end of the 106th session is noted on all other legislation. P.L. 106-113 ( H.R. 3194 ) Consolidated Appropriations Act for FY2000. Enacts by reference H.R. 3421 , theCommerce, Justice and State appropriations bill for FY2000, and H.R. 3427 , theForeign Relations Authorization Act for FY2000 and FY2001, as introduced November 17, 1999. H.R. 3194 signed into law November 29, 1999. H.R. 3421 appropriates$22.095 million for Cuba broadcasting for FY2000. H.R. 3427 includes the followingCuba provisions: Section 108 (b) (3) authorizes $6,000 for each of FY2000 and FY2001 for theinvestigation and dissemination of information on violations of freedom of expression by Cuba;Section 121 authorizes $22.743 million for broadcasting to Cuba for each of FY2000 and FY2001;Section 206 requires a report from the Secretary of State not later than 120 days after enactment ofthe Act on the extent of international drug trafficking through Cuba since 1990. P.L. 106-429 ( H.R. 4811 ) FY2001 Foreign Operations appropriations bill. On October 28, the conference report ( H.Rept.106-997 ) struck H.R. 4811 and enacted by reference H.R. 5526 . Section507 prohibits direct funding of assistance or reparations to Cuba (and other countries). Section 523prohibits indirect assistance or reparations to Cuba unless the President certifies that withholdingsuch funds is contrary to U.S. national interests. P.L. 106-386 ( H.R. 3244 ) Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000. Sections 2002 and 2003 directthe Secretary of the Treasury to pay compensatory damages for certain claims against Cuba (andIran). As provided for in the bill, President Clinton waived such payments in the interest of nationalsecurity when he signed the bill into law on October 28, 2000. S. 1796 (Lautenberg) / H.R. 3485 (McCollum) S. 1796 would amend the enforcement of certain anti-terrorism judgments in U.S.courts under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (28 USC 1602-11) against foreign statesdesignated to be state sponsors of terrorism, taking away the current presidential waiver for nationalsecurity interests except for the protection of diplomatic property. The Senate Judiciary Committeereported the bill March 9, 2000, and the measure was placed on the Senate Legislative Calendarunder General Orders. An identical House bill, H.R. 3485 (McCollum), was introducedNovember 18, 1999. The House Committee on the Judiciary reported the bill July 13, 2000 ( H.Rept.106-733 ) and the measure was placed on the Union Calendar. A supplemental report on H.R. 3485 was filed July 18, 2000 ( H.Rept. 106-733 , Part II). The House approved H.R. 3485 by voice vote on July 25, 2000. It was received in the Senate and placed onthe Senate Legislative calendar under General Orders July 26, 2000. H.R. 181 (McCollum) Introduced January 6, 1999; referred to House Committee on International Relations. March23, 1999 referred to House subcommittee. Repeals the authority of the President to suspend theeffective date of Title III of the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act. H.R. 3329 (Rothman) Introduced November 10, 1999; referred to Committee on International Relations. November17, 1999 referred to House subcommittee. Amends the Cuban Liberty and Democratic SolidarityAct to require, in order to determine that a democratically elected government in Cuba exists, thegovernment extradite to the United States convicted felon Joanne Chesimard and all other U.S.fugitives from justice. H.R. 4118 (Ros-Lehtinen) / S. 2748 (Mack) Russian-American Trust and Cooperation Act of 2000. Prohibits the rescheduling orforgiveness of any outstanding bilateral debt owed to the United States by Russia until the Presidentcertifies to Congress that Russia has closed the intelligence facility at Lourdes. H.R. 4118 introduced Mar. 29, 2000. House International Relations Committee approved by voice voteMay 4, 2000, after it was amended to include a presidential national interest waiver. Reported byHouse International Relations Committee June 12, 2000 ( H.Rept. 106-668 ). House approved(275-146) July 19, 2000. S. 2748 , introduced June 16, 2000 and referred to theCommittee on Foreign Relations, is identical to the House-approved bill. S. 1796 (Lautenberg) / H.R. 3485 (McCollum) Justice for Victims of Terrorism Act. Modifies the enforcement of certain anti-terrorismjudgments in U.S. courts under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (28 USC 1602-11) againstforeign states designated to be state sponsors of terrorism, taking away the current presidentialwaiver for national security interests. The two bills relate to Cuba because they could affect thepayment of a December 1997 $187.6 million U.S. Federal court judgment against Cuba to be paidfrom Cuba's frozen assets in the United States to the families of three victims killed in Cuba's 1996shootdown of two U.S. civilian planes. S. 1796 introduced October 26, 1999; SenateJudiciary Committee reported the bill March 9, 2000, and the measure was placed on the SenateLegislative Calendar under General Orders. H.R. 3485 introduced November 18, 1999;House Committee on the Judiciary reported the bill July 13, 2000 ( H.Rept. 106-733 ) and July 18,2000 ( H.Rept. 106-733 , Part II) and the measure was placed on the Union Calendar. The Houseapproved H.R. 3485 by voice vote on July 25, 2000; received in Senate and placed onSenate Legislative Calendar under General Orders July 26, 2000. S. 1829 (Helms) Introduced October 29, 1999; referred to Committee on Foreign Relations. Prohibits thepayment of debts incurred by the communist government of Cuba. P.L. 106-387 ( H.R. 4461 / S. 2536 ) Agriculture, Rural Development, Food and Drug Administration, and Related AgenciesAppropriations Act, FY2001. Title IX of the bill, Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement,terminates unilateral sanctions on food and medical exports from economic sanctions imposed forforeign policy purposes. It allows one-year licenses for exports of these goods to countries classifiedas state sponsors of international terrorism, which includes Cuba, but without any U.S. financing (thePresident may waive the prohibition of U.S. assistance for commercial exports to Iran, Libya, NorthKorea, or Sudan for national security or humanitarian reasons but may not do so for Cuba). Prohibitstravel to Cuba for tourism, restricts non-tourist travel to Cuba to that expressly authorized in currentfederal regulations. Signed into law October 28, 2000. H.R. 229 (Rangel) Introduced January 6, 1999; referred to Committee on International Relations, and in additionto Committees on Ways and Means, Commerce, and Government Reform. March 23, 1999 referredto House subcommittee. Lifts the trade embargo on Cuba and for other purposes. H.R. 230 (Rangel) Introduced January 6, 1999; referred to Committee on International Relations, and in additionto the Committee on Ways and Means. March 23, 1999 referred to House subcommittee. Makesan exception to the embargo on trade with Cuba for the export of food, medicines, medical supplies,medical instruments or medical equipment. H.R. 256 (Serrano) Introduced January 6, 1999; referred to Committee on International Relations. March 23, 1999referred to House subcommittee. Repeals the Cuban Democracy Act of 1992 and the Cuban Libertyand Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996. H.R. 257 (Serrano) Introduced January 6, 1999; referred to Committee on International Relations. March 23, 1999referred to House subcommittee. Reinstates the authorization of cash remittances to family membersin Cuba under the Cuban Assets Control Regulations. H.R. 258 (Serrano) Introduced January 6, 1999; referred to Committee on International Relations. March 23, 1999referred to House subcommittee. Allows for news bureau exchanges between the United States andCuba. H.R. 259 (Serrano) Introduced January 6, 1999; referred to Committee on International Relations. March 23, 1999referred to House subcommittee. Allows travel and cultural exchanges between the United Statesand Cuba. H.R. 262 (Serrano) Introduced January 6, 1999; referred to Committee on International Relations, and in additionto the Committee on the Judiciary. March 23, 1999 referred to House subcommittee. Waives certainprohibitions with respect to nationals of Cuba coming to the United States to play organizedprofessional baseball. H.R. 1181 (Paul) Introduced March 18, 1999; referred to Committee on International Relations, and in additionto the Committees on Ways and Means, Commerce, and Government Reform. April 7, 1999referred to House subcommittee. Lifts the trade embargo on Cuba and for other purposes. H.R. 1644 (Serrano) / S. 926 (Dodd) Cuban Food and Medicine Security Act of 1999. H.R. 1644 introduced April 29,1999; referred to House Committees on International Relations and on Agriculture. June 15, 1999referred to House subcommittee. S. 926 introduced April 29, 1999; referred toCommittee on Foreign Relations. Eases restrictions on the sale of food and medicines to Cuba. H.R. 4471 (Sanford) Introduced May 16, 2000; referred to Committee on International Relations. June 12, 2000referred to House subcommittee. Allows travel between the United States and Cuba. H.R. 4856 (Rangel) / S. 2896 (Baucus) H.R. 4856 introduced July 13, 2000; referred to Committee on Ways and Means. S. 2896 introduced July 20, 2000; referred to the Committee on Finance. Identical billsto normalize trade relations with Cuba. H.R. 4871 (Kolbe) S. 2900 (Campbell) FY2001 Treasury appropriations bill. H.R. 4871 reported by House AppropriationsCommittee July 18, 2000 ( H.Rept. 106-756 ). House passed (216-202) July 20, 2000. During floorconsideration July 20, the House approved two amendments that would loosen economic sanctionson Cuba. A Sanford amendment was approved (232-186) that would prohibit funds in the bill frombeing used to administer or enforce the Cuban Assets Control Regulations with respect to any travelor travel-related transaction. A Moran (KS) amendment was approved (301-116) that would prohibitany funds in the bill from being used to implement any U.S. sanction on private commercial salesof agricultural commodities or medicine or medical supplies to Cuba. A broader Rangel amendmentwas defeated (174-241) that would have prohibited funds in the bill from enforcing the economicembargo of Cuba. S. 2900 reported by Senate Appropriations Committee July 20, 2000.(Note: a new version of the Treasury appropriations bill, H.R. 4985 , was introduced July26, 2000, which did not include the two House-approved Cuba amendments. On July 27, H.R. 4985 as introduced was appended to the conference report ( H.Rept. 106-796 ) onthe Legislative Branch appropriations bill, H.R. 4516 .) S. 73 (Moynihan) Introduced January 19, 1999; referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations. Makes availablefunds under the Mutual Educational and Cultural Exchange Act of 1961 to provide Fulbrightscholarships for Cuban nationals to undertake graduate study in the social sciences. S. 566 (Lugar) Introduced March 8, 1999; reported by Committee on Agriculture September 13, 1999 (SenateReport 106-157) and placed on the Senate Legislative Calendar under General Orders. Exemptscommercial sales of agricultural commodities, livestock, and value-added products from unilateraleconomic sanctions. S. 1771 (Ashcroft) / H.R. 3140 (Nethercutt) S. 1771 introduced October 22, 1999; placed on Senate Legislative Calendar underGeneral Orders October 25, 1999. H.R. 3140 introduced October 25, 1999; referred toCommittee on International Relations, and in addition to Committees on Rules and on Agriculture. November 16, 1999 referred to House subcommittee. Requires congressional approval before theimposition of any unilateral agricultural or medical sanction against a foreign country or foreignentity. S. 1919 (Dodd) Introduced November 10, 1999; referred Committee on Foreign Relations. Permits travel to orfrom Cuba. S. 2382 (Helms) Technical Assistance, Trade Promotion, and Anti-Corruption Act of 2000. Senate ForeignRelations Committee ordered reported Mar. 23, 2000; reported by Committee April 7, 2000 ( S.Rept.106-257 ). Referred to Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs April 11, 2000.Title I, Subtitle C, of the bill would lift restrictions on food and medicine exports, albeit with someconditions on exports to countries classified as state sponsors of international terrorism, whichincludes Cuba. Agricultural and medical exports to these countries would be allowed pursuant toone-year licenses issued by the U.S. government. S. 2617 (Baucus) Introduced May 24, 2000; referred to Committee on Finance. Lifts the trade embargo on Cuba. H.Res. 99 (Ros-Lehtinen) Introduced March 9, 1999. House approved March 23, 1999, by voice vote. Expresses the senseof the House regarding the human rights situation in Cuba, including a condemnation of Cuba'srepressive crackdown against the internal opposition and independent press; a call for theAdministration to secure support for a UNCHR resolution condemning Cuba for its human rightsabuses and for the reinstatement of a UNCHR Special Rapporteur on Cuba; and a call for theAdministration to nominate a special envoy to advocate internationally for the establishment of therule of law for the Cuban people. S.Res. 57 (Graham) Introduced March 4, 1999. Senate approved (98-0) March 25, 1999. Expresses the sense ofthe Senate that the United States should make all efforts to pass a UNCHR resolution criticizingCuba's human rights abuses and securing the appointment of a Special Rapporteur. S.Res. 289 (Torricelli) Introduced April 12, 2000; reported by the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations April 13,2000, without written report; placed on Senate Legislative Calendar under General Orders April 13,2000. Expresses the sense of the Senate supporting a United National Commission on Human Rightsresolution on Cuba. H.R. 4537 (Diaz-Balart) Introduced May 24, 2000; referred to Committee on International Relations. Assists the internalopposition in Cuba. H.R. 2365 (Rangel) Introduced June 25, 1999; referred to Committee on International Relations. Authorizes theDirector of the Office of National Drug Control Policy to enter into negotiations with representativesof Cuba to provide for increased cooperation between Cuba and the United States on druginterdiction efforts. H.R. 2422 (Burton) Introduced July 1, 1999; referred to Committee on International Relations. Provides for thedetermination that Cuba is a major drug-transit country for purposes of Section 490(h) of the ForeignAssistance Act of 1961. H.R. 4811 (Callahan)/ S. 2522 (McConnell) FY2001 Foreign Operations appropriations bill. House approved (239-185) H.R. 4811 July 13, 2000. Senate approved H.R. 4811 July 18, 2000 by unanimous consent,substituting the language of S. 2522 , which had been approved (95-4) by the SenateJune 22; asked for conference. Senate version of H.R. 4811 , section 599F, providesfor up to $1 million to fund the Secretary of Defense to work with Cuba to provide for greatercooperation, coordination, and other mutual assistance in the interdiction of illicit drugs beingtransported over Cuban airspace and waters. Before such assistance may be provided, the Presidentmust determine and certify to Congress that 1) Cuba has appropriate procedures in place to protectagainst innocent loss of life in the air and on the ground in connection with interdiction of illegaldrugs; and 2) that there is no evidence of the involvement of the government of Cuba in drugtrafficking. This provision was dropped in conference from final version of bill. On October 28,the conference report ( H.Rept. 106-997 ) struck H.R. 4811 and enacted by reference H.R. 5526 . Section 507 prohibits direct funding of assistance or reparations to Cuba(and other countries). Section 523 prohibits indirect assistance or reparations to Cuba unless thePresident certifies that withholding such funds is contrary to U.S. national interests. S. 2549 (Warner) Department of Defense authorization bill FY2001. Reported by Senate Committee on ArmedServices May 12, 2000 (Senate Report 106-292). During floor consideration on June 20, the Senatetabled, by a vote of 59-41, a Dodd amendment that would have established a National BipartisanCommission on Cuba to evaluate U.S. policy. Senate incorporated this measure in H.R. 4205 as an amendment on July 13, 2000. H.Con.Res. 240 (Rangel)/ S.Con.Res. 79 (Dodd) H.Con.Res. 240 introduced January 24, 2000; referred to House Committee on theJudiciary. July 11, 2000 referred to House subcommittee. S.Con.Res. 79 introducedJanuary 26, 2000; referred to Senate Committee on the Judiciary. Both resolutions express the senseof Congress that Elian Gonzalez should be reunited with his father in Cuba. H.R. 3532 (Menendez) Introduced January 24, 2000; referred to Committee on the Judiciary. July 11, 2000 referredto House subcommittee. Provides for legal residency for Elian Gonzalez. H.Res. 480 (Shadegg) Introduced April 13, 2000; referred to Committee on the Judiciary. July 11, 2000 referred toHouse subcommittee. Urges the Attorney General to take no irrevocable action with respect to ElianGonzalez until a hearing concerning an asylum application is held. S. 1999 (Mack) / H.R. 3531 (McCollum) S. 1999 introduced January 24, 2000; placed on Senate Legislative Calendar underGeneral Orders January 25, 2000. H.R. 3531 introduced January 24, 2000; referred toHouse Committee on the Judiciary. July 11, 2000 referred to House subcommittee. Provides thatElian Gonzalez shall be considered a naturalized U.S. citizen. S. 2314 (Smith) Introduced March 29, 2000; placed on Senate Legislative Calendar under General Orders March30, 2000. Provides permanent resident status for Elian Gonzalez and other family members. P.L. 106-553 ( H.R. 4942 ) Appropriations for the District of Columbia government and for other purposes. H.R. 5548 , making appropriations for the Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State;the Judiciary; and related agencies, was incorporated into the H.R. 4942 conferencereport ( H.Rept. 106-1005 ). Signed into law December 21, 2000. Provides $22.095 million for radioand television broadcasting to Cuba. H.R. 4690 (Rogers) Department of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related AgenciesAppropriations Act, 2001. House Committee on Appropriations reported the bill June 19, 2000( H.Rept. 106-680 ). House passed (214-195) on June 26, 2000. Senate Appropriations Committeereported its version of the bill on July 21, 2000, without written report, and the measure was placedon the Senate Legislative Calendar under General Orders. House version would provide for Cubabroadcasting within the larger funding account for international broadcasting operations. However,in the report to the bill ( H.Rept. 106-680 ), the House Appropriations Committee recommends $22.806 for Cuba broadcasting. The Senate version of H.R. 4690 would provide$22.095 million for radio and television broadcasting to Cuba. Senate filed report ( S.Rept. 106-404 )September 8, 2000. CRS Report RS20450(pdf) , The Case of Elian Gonzalez: Legal Basics, by [author name scrubbed]. CRS Report RL30386(pdf) , Cuba-U.S. Relations: Chronology of Key Events Since 1959, by Mark P.Sullivan. CRS Report 94-759(pdf) , Cuba-U.S. Relations: Should the United States Reexamine Its Policy? , by MarkP. Sullivan. CRS Report RS20409, Cuba: U.S. Restrictions on Travel and Legislative Initiatives in the 106thCongress, by [author name scrubbed]. CRS Report RS20468 , Cuban Migration Policy and Issues, by [author name scrubbed]. CRS Report RL30108(pdf) , Economic Sanctions and U.S. Agricultural Exports, by Remy Jurenas. CRS Report RL30384 , Economic Sanctions: Legislation in the 106th Congress, by Dianne E.Rennack. CRS Report 97-949(pdf) , Economic Sanctions to Achieve U.S. Foreign Policy Goals: Discussion and Guide to Current Law, by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed]. CRS Report RL30570, Elian Gonzalez: Chronology and Issues, by [author name scrubbed]. CRS Issue Brief IB10061, Exempting Food and Agriculture Products from U.S. Economic Sanctions: Current Issues and Proposals, by [author name scrubbed]. CRS Report RS20449, Private Bills for Citizenship or Permanent Residency: A Brief Overview, by[author name scrubbed]. CRS Report 94-636(pdf) , Radio and Television Broadcasting to Cuba: Background and Issues Through 1994, by [author name scrubbed] and [author name scrubbed].

Summary: Cuba remains a hard-line Communist state, with a poor record on human rights. Fidel Castro has ruled since he led the Cuban Revolution, ousting the corrupt government of Fulgencio Batistafrom power in 1959. With the cutoff of assistance from the former Soviet Union, Cuba experiencedsevere economic deterioration from 1989-1993, although there has been some improvement since1994 as Cuba has implemented limited reforms. Since the early 1960s, U.S. policy has consisted largely of isolating the island nation through comprehensive economic sanctions. The Clinton Administration essentially continued this isolationpolicy. The principal tool of policy remains comprehensive sanctions, which were made strongerwith the Cuban Democracy Act (CDA) in 1992 and the Cuban Liberty and Democratic SolidarityAct in 1996, often referred to as the Helms/Burton legislation. Another component of U.S. policyconsists of support measures for the people of Cuba. This includes private humanitarian donationsand U.S.-sponsored radio and television broadcasting to the island. Under this rubric of support forthe Cuban people, President Clinton announced several policy actions in March 1998. Theseincluded the resumption of direct charter flights and cash remittances to Cuba and the streamliningof licensing procedures for the sale of medicines. In January 1999, the President announcedadditional measures, including a broadening of permissible cash remittances, increasing directcharter flights, expanding people-to-people contact, and authorizing the sale of food and agriculturalinputs to independent entities in Cuba. Although U.S. policymakers agree on the overall objective of U.S. policy toward Cuba -- to help bring democracy and respect for human rights to the island -- there have been several schoolsof thought about how to achieve that objective. Some advocate a policy of keeping maximumpressure on the Cuban government until reforms are enacted, while continuing current U.S. effortsto support the Cuban people. Others argue for an approach, sometimes referred to as constructiveengagement, that would lift some U.S. sanctions that they believe are hurting the Cuban people andmove toward engaging Cuba in dialogue. Still others call for a swift normalization of U.S.-Cubanrelations by lifting the U.S. embargo. Numerous measures were introduced in the 106th Congress that reflected the range of views on U.S. policy toward Cuba. Legislative initiatives proposed both easing and increasing sanctions. Inthe end, legislation passed reflected both approaches: it allowed the export of food and medicine butprohibited any U.S. financing, both public and private, of such exports. Travel to Cuba for tourismwas also prohibited. Another law facilitated enforcement of anti-terrorism judgments in U.S. courtsto allow for the payment of a $187.6 million 1997 judgment against Cuba to be paid from Cuba'sfrozen assets in the United States to the families of three U.S. citizens killed when Cuba shot downtwo U.S. planes in 1996. President Clinton waived the provision, however, upon signing the rest ofthe bill into law.