[author name scrubbed], [phone number scrubbed] (Last updated April 22, 2003) For a day-by-day summary of Iraq-related developments through the end of the combat phase of the war, see Iraq-U.S. Confrontation: Daily Developments http://www.crs.gov/products/browse/iraqdocs/iraqdaily.shtml . This report was created to provide information and analysis on the buildup to the 2003 war with Iraq and on the war itself. Since the combat phase of this conflict has ended, the report will not befurther updated. For current CRS products related to Iraq, see the CRS home page at http://www.crs.gov . The Background section of this report outlines the evolution of the conflictwith Iraq after September 11, 2001. This section is followed by a more detailed description andanalysis of U.S. policy and a survey of congressional actions on Iraq. The report then reviews arange of issues that the Iraq situation has raised for Congress. These issue discussions have beenwritten by CRS experts, and contact information is provided for congressional readers seekingadditional information. In this section and elsewhere, text boxes list CRS products that providein-depth information on the topics under discussion or on related topics. The final section links thereader to additional sources of information on the Iraq crisis. Bush Administration concerns about Iraq's alleged weapons of mass destruction programs intensified after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. President Bush named Iraq, Iran, and NorthKorea as the "axis of evil" nations in his January 2002 State of the Union address. Vice PresidentCheney, in two August 2002 speeches, accused Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein of seeking weaponsof mass destruction to dominate the Middle East and threaten U.S. oil supplies. (1) These speechesfueled speculation that the United States might soon act unilaterally against Iraq. However, in aSeptember 12, 2002 speech to the United Nations General Assembly, President Bush pledged towork with the U.N. Security Council to meet the "common challenge" posed by Iraq. (2) H.J.Res. 114 , which became law ( P.L. 107-243 ) on October 16, authorized the use offorce against Iraq, and endorsed the President's efforts to obtain prompt Security Council action toensure Iraqi compliance with U.N. resolutions. On November 8, 2002, the Security Council, actingat U.S. urging, adopted Resolution 1441, giving Iraq a "final opportunity" to comply with thedisarmament obligations imposed under previous resolutions, or face "serious consequences." Prelude to War. During January-March 2003, theU.S. military buildup in the Persian Gulf intensified, as analysts speculated that mid- to late Marchseemed a likely time for an attack to be launched. Officials maintained that it would be possible toattack later, even in the extreme heat of summer, but military experts observed that conditions forfighting a war would be far better in the cooler months before May. Statements by President Bush,Secretary of State Colin Powell, and other top officials during January, February, and Marchexpressed a high degree of dissatisfaction over Iraq's compliance with Security Council disarmamentdemands. The President said on January 14, that "time is running out" for Iraq to disarm, adding thathe was "sick and tired" of its "games and deceptions." (3) On January 26, 2003, Secretary of StatePowell told the World Economic Forum, meeting in Davos, Switzerland, that "multilateralismcannot be an excuse for inaction" and that the United States "continues to reserve our sovereign rightto take military action against Iraq alone or in a coalition of the willing." President Bush presented a sweeping condemnation of Iraq in his State of the Union Address on January 28, 2003. "With nuclear arms or a full arsenal of chemical and biological weapons," thePresident warned, "Saddam Hussein could resume his ambitions of conquest in the Middle East andcreate deadly havoc in the region." The President told members of the armed forces that "somecrucial hours may lie ahead." Alleging that Iraq "aids and protects" the Al Qaeda terroristorganization, the President also condemned what he said was Iraq's "utter contempt" for the UnitedNations and the world. On February 5, 2003, Secretary of State Powell detailed to the UnitedNations Security Council what he described as Iraq's "web of lies" in denying that it has weaponsof mass destruction programs. On February 26, President Bush gave a major address on Iraq. Hesaid that the end of Hussein's regime would "deprive terrorist networks of a wealthy patron .... Andother regimes will be given a clear warning that support for terror will not be tolerated." ThePresident returned to an earlier Administration theme in declaring that post-Hussein Iraq would beturned into a democracy, which would inspire reform in other Middle Eastern states. (For analysisof the issues raised by the President, see below, The Administration ; Weapons of MassDestruction Issues ; Post-War Governance Issues ; and Implications for theMiddle East .) Final Diplomatic Efforts. Despite the resolve of U.S. officials, international support for an early armed confrontation remained limited. PresidentJacques Chirac of France was a leading critic of the U.S. approach while the Iraq issue remainedbefore the U.N. Security Council, maintaining that he was not convinced by the evidence presentedby Secretary of State Powell. On February 10, at a press conference in Paris with President Putinof Russia, Chirac said "nothing today justifies war." Speaking of weapons of mass destruction,Chirac added "I have no evidence that these weapons exist in Iraq." (4) France, Germany, and Russiaadvocated a strengthened inspections regime rather than an early armed conflict with Iraq, and Chinatook a similar position. On February 24, 2003, the United States, the United Kingdom, and Spain introduced what was called a "second resolution" at the U.N. Security Council, stating that Iraq had failed "to take thefinal opportunity afforded to it by Resolution 1441" to disarm. The proposed resolution wasregarded as authorizing the immediate use of force to disarm Iraq. On March 10, President Chiracsaid that his government would veto the resolution, and Russian officials said that their governmentwould likely follow the same course. Chirac's stance, and the Administration's lack of success in garnering other support for the "second resolution," seemed to convince U.S. officials that further diplomatic efforts at the UnitedNations would prove fruitless. President Bush flew to the Azores for a hastily-arranged meeting withthe prime ministers of Britain and Spain on Sunday, March 16, 2003. The meeting resulted in apledge by the three leaders to establish a unified, free, and prosperous Iraq under a representativegovernment. At a press conference after the meeting, President Bush stated that "Tomorrow is theday that we will determine whether or not democracy can work." On March 17, the threegovernments announced that they were withdrawing the proposed Security Council resolution, andPresident Bush went on television at 8:00 p.m. (EST) that evening to declare that unless SaddamHussein fled Iraq within 48 hours, the result would be "military conflict, commenced at the time ofour own choosing." The war began on the night of March 19, 2003, with an aerial attack against a location where Saddam Hussein was suspected to be meeting with top Iraqi officials. U.S. and British troopsentered Iraq on March 20, and while the invasion encountered resistance, particularly in its earlystages, U.S. forces had largely gained control of Baghdad, the capital, by April 9. The northern citiesof Kirkuk and Mosul fell shortly afterward, and on April 14, U.S. troops entered Tikrit, Saddam'sbirthplace and the last major population center outside coalition control. On April 15, PresidentBush declared that "the regime of Saddam Hussein is no more." (5) (For information and analysisrelated to the war itself, see below, Military Issues .) Public Reactions. In mid-January 2003, pollsshowed that a majority of Americans wanted the support of allies before the United States launcheda war against Iraq. The polls shifted on this point after the State of the Union message, with amajority coming to favor a war even without explicit U.N. approval. (6) Polls shifted further in theAdministration's direction following Secretary Powell's February 5 presentation to the SecurityCouncil. (7) Although subsequent polls showed someslippage in support for a war, President Bush'sspeech on the evening of March 17 rallied public support once again. A Washington Post-ABC News poll taken just afterward, showed that 71% supported war with Iraq and that 66% supported thePresident's decision not to seek a U.N. Security Council vote. (8) With the fighting underway, pollsshowed that more than seven in ten Americans continued to support the war, (9) and WashingtonPost-ABC News polling found that 69% felt that the right decision had been made even if noweapons of mass destruction were found in Iraq. (10) Nonetheless, many Americans opposed the war,and large anti-war demonstrations took place in several cities on the weekend of March 15-16,followed by sharp protests in San Francisco and a large demonstration in New York after the fightingbegan. Major anti-war demonstrations had also occurred on the weekends of January 19-20 andFebruary 15-16, and there were demonstrations in support of Administration policy as well. Many reports have noted that U.S. policy on Iraq has led to a rise in anti-Americanism overseas, particularly in western Europe, where polls showed strong opposition to the war, (11) and in the MiddleEast. Demonstrations against the war in European cities on February 15-16 were widely describedas "massive," and, as in the United States, large demonstrations also took place on March 15-16. Large demonstrations were reported in many cities worldwide after the fighting began, and effortsto launch boycotts of U.S. products were launched in some countries. Some observers dismiss foreign protests as of little lasting significance, but others argue that rising anti-Americanism couldcomplicate U.S. diplomacy in the years ahead. (12) Secretary of State Powell has said in an interviewthat the United States will seek to change foreign perceptions of U.S. policy by supporting asignificant role for the United Nations in post-war Iraq, "aggressively" restarting the Arab-Israelipeace process, (13) and reaching out to "friends withwhom we may have been having somedifficulty." (14) (For further discussion, see below, Diplomatic Issues ). Some reports suggest thatEuropean opposition to the war is moderating in light of the successful overthrow of the Iraqidictator, and the welcome given to coalition troops in some places. (15) At the same time, manyEuropeans are concerned by images of disorder in Iraq, and large anti-war demonstrations occurredagain on April 12. [author name scrubbed], [phone number scrubbed] (Last updated April 21, 2003) On March 17, 2003, as noted above in Background , President Bush addressed the American people and announced that Iraq would face conflict with the United States if Saddam Hussein andhis sons, Uday and Qusay, did not leave Iraq within 48 hours. On March 19, 2003, after theexpiration of the 48-hour ultimatum, President Bush told the American people that militaryoperations against Iraq had been authorized, and the effort began that evening. On April 11, 2003,two days after Iraq's regime had fallen from power in Baghdad, President Bush said he woulddeclare a U.S. victory when U.S. military commanders tell him that all U.S. war objectives had beenachieved. As of April 22, combat had wound down and the main focus of U.S. forces had becomerestoring security and fostering the conditions for economic and political reconstruction, searchingfor members of Iraq's former regime, and hunting for banned WMD programs. In making its case for confronting Iraq, the Bush Administration characterized the regime of Saddam Hussein in Iraq as a grave potential threat to the United States and to peace and security inthe Middle East region. The Administration maintained that the Iraqi regime harbored activeweapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs that could be used to attain Saddam Hussein'slong-term goal of dominating the Middle East. These weapons, according to the Administration,could be used directly against the United States, or they could be transferred to terrorist groups suchas Al Qaeda. The Administration said that the United States could not wait until Iraq made furtherprogress on WMD to confront Iraq, since Iraq could then be stronger and the United States mighthave fewer military and diplomatic options. In January 2003, the Administration revived assertions it had made periodically since the September 11, 2001 attacks that the Baghdad regime supported and had ties to the Al Qaedaorganization and other terrorist groups. According to the Administration, Iraq provided technicalassistance in the past to Al Qaeda to help it construct chemical weapons. A faction based in northernIraq and believed linked to Al Qaeda, called the Ansar al-Islam, had been in contact with the Iraqiregime, according to the Administration. The Ansar base near Khurmal was captured by coalitionforces during Operation Iraqi Freedom. Other experts are said to believe that there might have beensome cooperation when Osama bin Laden was based in Sudan in the early 1990s but that any Iraq-AlQaeda cooperation trailed off after bin Laden was expelled from Sudan in 1996 and went toAfghanistan. Bin Laden issued a statement of solidarity with the Iraqi people on February 12,exhorting them to resist any U.S. attack, while also criticizing Saddam Hussein's Baath Party regimeas "socialist" and "infidel." In attempting to win international support for its policy, the Administration asserted that Iraq was in material breach of 17 U.N. Security Council resolutions - including Resolution 1441 ofNovember 8, 2002 - mandating that Iraq fully declare and eliminate its WMD programs. A numberof U.S. allies and Security Council members, including France, Germany, Russia, and China agreedthat Iraq did not fully comply with Resolution 1441, but opposed military action, maintaining insteadthat U.N. inspections were working to disarm Iraq and should have been continued. Diplomaticnegotiations to avert war ended after the United States and Britain could not muster sufficientsupport for a proposed U.N. Security Council resolution that would have authorized force if Iraq didnot meet a final deadline for Iraq to fully comply with WMD disarmament mandates. The Bush Administration's September 2002 decision to seek a U.N. umbrella for the confrontation with Iraq led officials to mute their prior declarations that the goal of U.S. policy wasto change Iraq's regime. The purpose of downplaying this goal may have been to blunt criticismfrom U.S. allies and other countries that argued that regime change is not required by any U.N.resolution. The United States drew little separation between regime change and disarmament: theAdministration believed that a friendly or pliable government in Baghdad was required to ensurecomplete elimination of Iraq's WMD. As the U.N. option drew to a close, the Administration againstressed regime change as a specific goal of a U.S.-led war, and some argue that the President'sultimatum that Saddam and his sons leave Iraq was an indication that the regime change goal wasalways paramount, and WMD concerns secondary. Since the war began, senior officials havestressed the goal of liberating the Iraqi people and downplayed the hunt for alleged WMD stockpiles. Policy Debate. Several press accounts indicate that there were divisions within the Administration on whether to launch war against Iraq, and someof these divisions re-emerged on post-war issues such as the degree to which the United Nationsshould be involved in political and economic reconstruction. Secretary of State Powell had been saidto typify those in the Administration who believed that a long-term program of unfettered weaponsinspections could have succeeded in containing the WMD threat from Iraq. (16) He reportedly was keyin convincing President Bush to work through the United Nations to give Iraq a final opportunity todisarm voluntarily. However, after January 2003, Secretary Powell insisted that Iraq's failure tocooperate fully with the latest weapons inspections indicated that inspections would not succeed indisarming Iraq and that war would be required, with or without U.N. authorization. Press reports suggest that Vice President Cheney and Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld, among others, were consistently skeptical that inspections could significantly reduce the long-term threatfrom Iraq and reportedly have long been in favor of U.S. military action against Iraq. These andother U.S. officials reportedly believed that the overthrow of Saddam Hussein would pave the wayfor democracy not only in Iraq but in the broader Middle East, and reduce support for terrorism. Ina speech before the American Enterprise Institute on February 26, 2003, President Bush said that theoverthrow of Saddam Hussein by the United States could lead to the spread of democracy in theMiddle East and a settlement of the Israeli-Palestinian dispute. [author name scrubbed], [phone number scrubbed] (Last updated April 21, 2003) Overview. Congress was overwhelminglysupportive of Operation Iraqi Freedom, and Members expressed their strong backing for U.S.military forces in the region and for their families at home. On March 20, 2003, the House ofRepresentatives, by a vote of 392 in favor to 11 opposed, passed H.Con.Res. 104 , aresolution that expressed the support and appreciation of the nation for the President and themembers of the armed forces who participated in Operation Iraqi Freedom. That same day, theSenate passed a similar resolution, S.Res. 95 by a vote of 99-0. Congress also backedthe war effort by approving the largest supplemental appropriations bill in U.S. history. On April 3,2003, both the House and the Senate approved a supplemental funding measure, H.R. 1559 ( P.L. 108-11 ), to provide financing for military operations in Iraq, economic aid for foreigngovernments, and support for homeland security. (For more information, see below, Cost Issues. ) Background. After the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990, Congress played an active role in supporting U.S. foreign policy objectives to contain theregime of Saddam Hussein and force it into compliance with U.N. Security Council resolutions.Congress restricted aid and trade in goods to some countries found to be in violation of internationalsanctions against Iraq. Congress also called for the removal of Saddam Hussein's regime from powerand the establishment of a democratic Iraqi state in its place. In 1991, Congress authorized thePresident to use force against Iraq to expel Iraqi forces from Kuwait in accordance with UnitedNations Security Council Resolution 678 ( P.L. 102-1 ). On October 16, 2002, the President signed H.J.Res. 114 into law as P.L. 107-243 , the "Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002." The resolutionauthorized the President to use the armed forces to defend the national security of the United Statesagainst the threat posed by Iraq and to enforce all relevant U.N. resolutions regarding Iraq. Theresolution conferred broad authority on the President to use force and required the President to makeperiodic reports to Congress "on matters relevant to this joint resolution." The resolution expressedcongressional "support" for the efforts of the President to obtain "prompt and decisive action by theSecurity Council" to enforce Iraq's compliance with all relevant Security Council resolutions. In the months after the passage of H.J.Res. 114 , Congress continued to play a role in formulating U.S. policy in Iraq. Many Members who voted in favor of the resolution offeredstrong support for President Bush's attempts to force Iraq into compliance with U.N. resolutions.Other lawmakers, including some who supported the resolution, commended the Administration forapplying pressure on Saddam Hussein's regime but called on the Administration to be moreforthcoming with plans for the future of Iraq and to be more committed to achieving the broadestpossible international coalition of allied countries. Still others, including some Members who votedin favor of H.J.Res. 114 , questioned the urgency of dealing with Iraq, particularly inlight of developments in North Korea and Iran. Finally, many Members who voted against H.J.Res. 114 ( P.L. 107-243 ) continued to look for ways to forestall the use of forceagainst Iraq, in part by proposing alternative resolutions that called for a more comprehensiveinspections process. In one instance, several Members initiated a lawsuit to curtail the President'sability to authorize the use of force. (See below, International and Domestic Legal Issues Relatingto the Use of Force .) Legislation. During the diplomatic phase of the confrontation with Iraq, a period that covered the beginning of the 108th Congress until mid-March2003, bills introduced ranged from measures that would forestall military action to calls for punitiveaction against European nations that did not support the use of military force against Iraq. Manyanalysts suggested that these proposals were mostly symbolic gestures and had insufficient supportfor passage. The Senate did pass S. 205 , (17) which would have granted visas and theadmission of residency to Iraqi scientists who would be willing to provide the United States withvital information on Iraqi weapons of mass destruction programs. The Senate also passed S.Con.Res. 4 , a concurrent resolution welcoming the expression of support of 18European nations for the enforcement of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1441. Neither S. 205 nor S.Con.Res. 4 received floor action in the House. After the start of the war, the House of Representatives passed H.Con.Res. 118 , a resolution condemning Iraq's failure to observe international rules on the treatment of prisonersof war. The House also passed H.Res. 153 , a resolution that recognized the "need forpublic prayer and fasting in order to secure the blessings and protection of Providence for the peopleof the United States and our Armed Forces during the conflict in Iraq and under the threat ofterrorism at home." In addition, the Senate passed S.Con.Res. 30 , a resolution ofgratitude to nations that are partners of the United States in its action against Iraq and S. 718 , the Troops Phone Home Act of 2003, a bill that would provide a monthly allotment of freetelephone time to U.S. troops serving in Iraq or Afghanistan. Indirectly related to the war in Iraq,both houses of Congress passed the Armed Forces Tax Fairness Act ( H.R. 1307 ), a billthat authorizes tax relief to members of the armed services and their families. A number of other proposed resolutions on the Iraq war may or may not see floor action during the post-war phase of Operation Iraqi Freedom. H.Res. 198 urges France, Germany, andRussia to help create a governmentally administered debt forgiveness program to assist Iraq in itsreconstruction. S. 876 would require public disclosure of noncompetitive contractingfor the reconstruction of the infrastructure of Iraq. H.R. 1828 calls on Syria to "halt itssupport for terrorism, end its occupation of Lebanon, stop its development of weapons of massdestruction, and cease its illegal importation of Iraqi oil and illegal shipments of weapons and othermilitary items to Iraq." Finally, S.Con.Res. 34 , H.Con.Res. 143 , and H.Res. 203 call for the persecution of Iraq's former leaders for war crimes. Congress and Post-War Iraq. With the transition of Operation Iraqi Freedom from a military to a reconstruction phase, Congress started to becomemore vocal in requesting specific information from the Bush Administration on plans for thepost-war future of Iraq. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee was particularly active in tryingto obtain credible reconstruction costs from Bush Administration officials. On April 20, 2003,Chairman Richard Lugar commented on the NBC News program "Meet the Press" that it could takeat least five years to create a functioning democracy in Iraq. In addition, many analysts believe thatthe costs of rebuilding Iraq will require Congress to appropriate additional funds in the future. Intestimony before Congress, Andrew S. Natsios, Administrator of the United States Agency forInternational Development, remarked that supplemental funding for Iraq's reconstruction will notcarry very far into fiscal year 2004. (18) Manybelieve that international organizations and foreigngovernments should make considerable contributions to the post-war rebuilding effort. At theinternational level, several Members submitted a letter to President Bush, expressing their supportfor widening the role of the international community in helping to rebuild Iraq. The letter noted thatby engaging the United Nations in the immediate aftermath of the war, the United States could helpbridge rifts in our international relationships while "strengthening ties with our allies as we continuein the war against international terrorism." (19) Overall, Congress recognized that, following thedownfall of Saddam Hussein's regime, significant portions of Iraq will be dependent onhumanitarian aid from the United States and the international community, as well as significantnumbers of police and military forces to maintain civil order. However, lawmakers have questionedhow long Iraq will require U.S. assistance, and how much assistance will need to be provided. [author name scrubbed], [phone number scrubbed] (Last updated April 22, 2003) All organized Iraqi military resistance has ceased, and coalition forces are in control of all major cities and oilfields. The operations of the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), which has overseenthe war in Iraq, are now focused on establishing public order, restoring basic services in urban areas,tracking down former regime leadership members, and locating chemical, biological, and nuclearweapons. CENTCOM has created three command regions, roughly centered on Mosul (north),Baghdad (central), and Basra (south). Retired Army Major General Jay Garner, head of DOD'sOffice of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance, has arrived in Iraq and begun his initial toursof the region. Until Baghdad is more stabilized, Garner and his upporting personnel will be basedin the south of Iraq. In the Iraq campaign, CENTCOM pursued a strategy of rapid advance, by-passing urban centerswhen possible, pausing only when encountering Iraqi resistance. CENTCOM spokesmen generally characterized Iraqi resistance as sporadic and uncohesive. Oilfields and port facilities have beensecured, as have air bases in northern and western Iraq. Though a few oil wells were set afire, allfires were quelled, and there has been no widespread environmental sabotage. Allied forces did notencounter the mass surrenders characteristic of the 1991 campaign; however DOD reports that over 6,500 Iraqis have been taken prisoner, and believes that many more simply deserted their positions.Iraqi paramilitary forces, particularly the Saddam Fedayeen, engaged in guerrilla-style attacks fromurban centers in the rear areas, but did not inflict significant damage. Nevertheless, greater attentionthan anticipated had to be paid to protecting extended supply lines and securing urban centers,particularly around an-Nasiriyah and Najaf, and in the British sector around Umm Qasr and Basra.The anticipated support for the invasion from the Shiia population in southern Iraq was slow indeveloping, but now some cooperation is forthcoming throughout Iraq, despite some outbreaks offactional fighting and some popular opposition to the U.S. presence. Without permission to use Turkish territory, CENTCOM was unable to carry out an early ground offensive in Northern Iraq. However, Special Operations forces, the 173rd Airborne Brigade,and air-lifted U.S. armor, operating with Kurdish irregulars seized Mosul and Kirkuk. Cooperationwith Kurdish militias in the north has been excellent. Even a mistaken airstrike against a Kurdishvehicle convoy, killing or wounding senior Kurdish leaders, did not adversely affect this cooperation. The situation in the north could potentially be complicated by the Turkish desire to possibly augmentthe 8,000+ troops it has had stationed in Kurdish-held territory in order to block possible Kurdishrefugees and influence the accommodations made to the Kurds in a post-conflict Iraq. Turkishmiliary spokesmen have indicated that no additional Turkish forces will move into Iraq at this time. The United States has assured Turkey that the Kurdish forces involved in seizing Mosul and Kirkukwill be withdrawn and replaced with U.S. troops. With the onset of widespread looting and some breakdown of public services (electricity, water) in the cities, coalition forces are confronted with the challenges of restoring public order andinfrastructure. Though U.S. forces have come under some criticism for not having done more toprevent looting, the transition from combat to police roles is a difficult one, particularly when animportant objective is winning popular support. Harsh reactions risk alienation of the population,yet inaction reduces confidence in the ability of coalition forces to maintain order. The situation isfurther complicated by continuing small-scale attacks on coalition troops in relatively secure areas. Increased patrols, the return of many Iraqi policemen to duty, and the emergence of civilian "watchgroups" are assisting what appears to be a natural abatement of looting. Coalition forces will alsohave to ensure that factional violence and retribution against former government supporters do notderail stabilization efforts. The United States continues to introduce new ground force units in the Persian Gulf region, while withdrawing some air and naval units. The Department of Defense has released limitedofficial information on these deployments; but press leaks have been extensive, allowing a fairlygood picture of the troop movements underway. The statistics provided below, unless otherwisenoted, are not confirmed by DOD and should be considered approximate. The number of U.S.personnel deployed to the Persian Gulf region (both ashore and afloat) reportedly exceeds 340,000. Additional units that have been alerted for deployment, and elements of which have begun to transit, include the 1st Armored Division, and 1st Mechanized Division. The 4th MechanizedInfantry Division, originally intended to attack through Turkey, has arrived in Iraq and deployednorth of Baghdad. The 101st Airborne (Air Assault) Division has also deployed to positions withinIraq. Some airborne elements ( 173rd Airborne Brigade) have moved into positions in northern Iraq,and the 2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment has started deployment from the United States. The U.S. haswithdrawn two carrier battle groups, leaving three in the region, and has ceased Operation NorthernWatch that enforced the no-fly zone in northern Iraq. Air Force units throughout the theater are alsobeginning to re-deploy to home bases. In addition to U.S. deployments, British forces include an armor Battle Group, a naval Task Force (including Royal Marines), and Royal Air Force units, totaling reportedly about 47,000personnel. (20) Australia has deployedapproximately 2,000 personnel, primarily special operationsforces operating in western Iraq. Poland has approximately 200 special operations troopsaugmenting British forces in the Basra region. DOD has announced that, as of April 16, 2003, morethan 223,000 National Guard and Reservists from all services are now called to active duty. (21) DODhas not indicated which of these personnel are being deployed to the Persian Gulf region and howmany will be "backfilling" positions of active duty personnel in the United States, Europe, andelsewhere. (See below, Burden Sharing .) The United States has personnel and materiel deployed in the Persian Gulf states of Kuwait,Qatar, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates. Though there had been speculationabout what level of cooperation/participation could be expected from these nations if the UnitedNations Security Council did not pass another resolution specifically authorizing the use of forceagainst Iraq, throughout the conflict they continued to support U.S. military operations. Because of significant popular opposition to this support in some countries, governments have sought tominimize public acknowledgment of their backing. U.S. and Australian forces, both ground and air,deployed from Jordan and secured Iraqi military facilities in the western part of the country. Only the United Kingdom, Australia, and Poland offered combat force contributions. Germany, Slovakia, the Czech Republic, and Ukraine have military nuclear-chemical-biological (NBC) defenseteams in Kuwait, but these will not enter Iraq. The United States is actively seeking military forcesfrom other countries to assist in the post-conflict stabilization effort. To date, the followingadditional countries have indicated a willingness to participate: Albania, Bulgaria, the CzechRepublic, Denmark, Italy, Poland, Romania, and Turkey. As military operations shift from combat to stabilization, the issues that move to center stage are how many ground forces will be required to maintain order while the reconstruction of the Iraqistate is undertaken and how long this process will take. There has been no consensus on either ofthese issues. Estimates of troop requirements have ranged from 75,000 to over 200,000, andestimates for the length of the operation have ranged from several months to a decade. The keyelement, and currently the most unpredictable, is the willingness of the Iraqi population to cooperatenot only with coalition forces but also among themselves. [author name scrubbed], [phone number scrubbed] (Last updated April 22, 2003) The March 17, 2003 announcement by the United States, Britain, and Spain that they were withdrawing their proposed "second resolution" at the United Nations Security Council (see above, Background ), was followed that evening by President Bush's nationwide address giving SaddamHussein an ultimatum to flee or risk military conflict. These events marked the end of a major U.S.diplomatic effort to win the support of a Security Council majority for action against Iraq. Relations with European Allies. The end of the diplomatic phase of the confrontation left a bitter aftermath among many U.S. officials and theEuropean opponents of the U.S. and British intervention. After the war was launched on March 19,Russia's Prime Minister Vladimir Putin charged that "This military action cannot be justified in anyway." (22) German Chancellor Gerhard Schroedersaid "A bad decision was taken: the choice of thelogic of war has won over the chances for peace." (23) French President Jacques Chirac, as expected,was also highly critical. As the war went forward, however, European rhetoric moderated as leaderssought to avoid deepening the rift with the United States. Chancellor Schroeder and French PrimeMinister Jean-Pierre Raffarin both said that they were hoping for a U.S. victory and the earlyinstallation of a democratic regime in Iraq, while President Putin affirmed that Russia wanted tocontinue to work with the United States to resolve world problems. (24) President Chirac telephonedPresident Bush on April 15, reportedly saying he was pleased with Saddam's overthrow and that thewar had been short and offering to be pragmatic about arrangements for postwar reconstruction. (25) U.S. leaders also took steps to ease tensions with the Europeans. President Bush telephoned Putinon April 5, and the two leaders agreed on continued dialog with respect to Iraq. (26) Earlier, Secretaryof State Powell attended a meeting of European foreign ministers in Brussels, where the atmospherewas described as "relatively harmonious." (27) Role of the United Nations. The wounds of the Iraq debate remain nonetheless, and further diplomatic complications seem possible, particularly withrespect to the United Nations role in post-war Iraq. These complications could extend even toU.S.-British relations, since Prime Minister Blair is a leading advocate of a major U.N. role, whereasU.S. officials seem to favor confining the U.N. to humanitarian relief operations. The Britishgovernment reportedly had favored the appointment of a U.N. special coordinator for Iraq, whowould oversee the creation of an interim authority consisting of Iraqis, the drafting of a newconstitution, and an eventual handover to an Iraqi government. (28) However, statements by U.S.officials, including Secretary Powell, National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice, and DeputyDefense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz indicate that they foresee the United States orchestrating theseevents. (29) President Bush and Prime Minister Blairdiscussed the issue during their summit on Belfaston April 7-8, and the President affirmed that the United Nations had a "vital role" to play in post-warIraq. Wolfowitz, however, testified on April 10, that the U.N. "can't be the managing partner. Itcan't be in charge." (30) The European critics of the U.S. and British intervention, by contrast, advocate a "central role" for the United Nations in administering Iraq and in overseeing a transition to a democratic regime. (31) On April 11, 2003, after a meeting in St. Petersburg, Schroeder, Putin, and Chirac affirmed that theywere glad the Saddam dictatorship had been overthrown, but insisted that Iraq should be rebuiltthrough a broad-based effort under U.N. control. (32) On April 17, the European Union also called fora "central role" for the U.N. during a summit meeting in Athens attended by both supporters andcritics of the war. According to the statement, the U.N. should be involved in the process leadingto self government in Iraq. (33) Many in Europe seea U.N. administration as essential to legitimizingwhatever government emerges in Iraq, and many also want to assure that their governments and theEuropean private sector participate through the United Nations in the recovery and reconstructionof Iraq. A similar debate could also occur over the extension of the Oil-for Food Program, whichunder U.N. Security Council Resolution 1472 remains under U.N. administration until May 12,2003. France, Russia, and Germany want this arrangement to continue, but some in the BushAdministration favor U.S. management of Iraq's oil exports. (34) (For more information, see below, Post-war Governance Issues and Humanitarian Issues .) President Bush, speaking in St. Louis on April 16, called for all U.N. sanctions against Iraq to be lifted, and some observers are expecting this appeal to lead to further diplomatic complications. Ending the sanctions would likely mean ending the Oil-for-Food Program and remove any rationalefor U.N. weapons inspectors to return to Iraq to verify the destruction of weapons of massdestruction. Both the Oil-for-Food Program and the weapons inspections gave the Europeans a voicein the Iraq situation through the United Nations, and European firms benefitted from contracts madeunder the Oil-for-Food Program. Consequently, European governments may oppose the early liftingof sanctions, but this is not yet certain. Debate on Improving Relations. How heavily the United States should invest in achieving compromise with European allies on these and other issuesis an issue in debate. Some see little value in mending relations with European critics of the war ongrounds that the capabilities of their countries for contributing to global threat reduction arelimited. (35) In this view, Atlantic cooperation andmultilateral approaches to world problems may haveplayed a useful role during the Cold War, but today may restrict the ability of the United States torespond to the threats it faces. There is concern that President Chirac in particular may see it as therole of France and the European Union (EU) to "balance" and constrain U.S. power, so that any U.S.move to compromise with European critics could play into this objective and damage U.S.interests. (36) The counter-view is that thecontroversy over Iraq has placed great strains on the UnitedNations, NATO, and the European Union - international institutions that many see as importantcomponents of global stability in the years ahead. From this perspective, healing relations withEuropean critics of the United States can reduce tensions within these organizations and help themto recover. (37) Moreover, some maintain that theUnited States will have an easier time of achievingits objectives in world affairs generally if it is regarded as a friendly and cooperative country byEuropeans and others. Specifically, some note that a major EU financial contribution to therecovery of Iraq or to the resolution of other world problems is more likely if U.S. relations withGermany and France improve. These two countries are central EU financial backers. Those whofavor greater understanding of European positions point out that many European countries havesignificant Muslim populations and see developments in the nearby Middle East as directly affectingtheir security interests. Use of Diplomatic Instruments in Support of the War. With the onset of war, the United States asked countries having diplomaticrelations with Iraq to close Iraqi embassies, freeze their assets, and expel Iraqi diplomats. U.S.officials argued that the regime in Iraq would soon change and that the new government would beappointing new ambassadors. Press reports suggest that the U.S. request met with a mixed response. Australia did expel Iraqi diplomats and close the embassy, while a number of other countriesexpelled individual diplomats suspected of espionage and left embassies open. Some countriesexplicitly refused the U.S. request. (38) On March20, 2003, President Bush issued an executive orderconfiscating Iraqi assets, frozen since Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in 1990, for use for humanitarianpurposes. The United States asked other countries holding Iraqi assets to do the same, but thisrequest too seems to have met with a mixed response to date. (39) U.S. policymakers are concerned that Turkey might send a large number of troops into northern Iraq, but have been successful in using diplomatic means to prevent this from happening. Turkeyfears that any drive by Iraqi Kurds toward independence would encourage Kurdish separatists inTurkey, but fighting between Turks and Kurds in northern Iraq would greatly complicate U.S. effortsto stabilize the country. Turks also worry that Turkmen in northern Iraq, regarded as ethnic kin, willbe persecuted by Kurds. President Bush warned Turkey not to come into northern Iraq on March24. (40) Secretary of State Powell visited Turkeyon April 2, 2003, and an agreement was reachedpermitting Turkey to send a small monitoring team into northern Iraq to assure that conditions didnot develop that might compel Turkey to intervene. Turkey also agreed that nonlethal supplies forU.S. troops in Iraq would be permitted to transit Turkey. (41) To date, Turkey seems to be acceptingassurances that Kurdish guerrillas who entered the cities of Kirkuk and Mosul will not remain. Finally, U.S. officials applied firm diplomatic pressure to end any foreign support for the Iraqi war effort. The U.S. government delivered a protest to the government of Russia for failing toprevent Russian firms from selling military equipment to Iraq in violation of United Nationssanctions. The sales reportedly included electronic jamming equipment and night vision goggles. On March 28, Defense Secretary Rumsfeld accused the Syrian government of "hostile acts"for thedelivery of military goods, including night vision goggles, across the Syrian border to Iraq, and saidthat the passage of armed Iraqi opposition elements from Iran into Iraq was a threat to U.S. forces. These opposition forces, known as the Badr Brigade, oppose Saddam Hussein, but U.S. officials fearthey could sow disunity in post-war Iraq. The warnings against Syria intensified on April 13, whenPresident Bush accused Syria of harboring leaders of the Saddam regime and of possessing chemicalweapons, while Defense Secretary Rumsfeld charged that Syria was allowing busloads ofmercenaries to cross into Iraq to attack American troops. (42) On April 14, Secretary Powell threateneddiplomatic, economic, or other economic sanctions against Syria. However, tensions with Syriaeased considerably on April 20, when President Bush said that he was confident the Syriangovernment had heard U.S. warnings and wanted to cooperate. (43) Use of Diplomatic Means to Promote Iraq's Recovery. Secretary of the Treasury John Snow is heading an effort to persuadethe international financial community, including the World Bank and the International MonetaryFund, to support the rebuilding of Iraq. On April 12, Snow reported that representatives of the G-7industrialized nations had reached a preliminary agreement on multilateral effort to help Iraq aftera meeting in Washington - if the U.N. Security Council grants authorization. Efforts to persuadegovernments to forgive debt owed by Iraq are facing difficulties, however. Russia, which is oweda reported $8 billion by Iraq and is heavily in debt itself, seems particularly resistant. (44) [author name scrubbed], [phone number scrubbed] ( Last updated April 22, 2003 ) Iraq's chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons programs, along with its long-range missile development and alleged support for terrorism, were the justifications put forward for forciblydisarming Iraq. However, weapons of mass destruction (WMD) were not used by Iraqi forces andU.S. forces did not discover any WMD during the war. General Amir Saadi, Sadaam Hussein's topscientific advisor, reiterated on April 12, as he gave himself up, that Iraq did not possess WMD; butfew observers find his assertions credible. However, it is not clear whether there are any remainingWMD for post-war inspections to find, given at least one report by an Iraqi scientist that Husseinordered the destruction of WMD prior to the war. Many observers believe it critical for the UnitedStates to find evidence of WMD to justify invading Iraq, but some have suggested public supportat home and abroad does not depend on discoveries of WMD. (45) If WMD are found, many analystsbelieve that international verification will be necessary. (46) Iraq's Deployable Weapons of Mass Destruction? U.S. intelligence reports suggested that Hussein had chemical and biological weapons dispersed,armed, and ready to be fired, with established command and control. (47) Some observers suggestedthat U.S. forces toppled Iraq's military command structure and with it, the authorization to use suchweapons. Others suggested that Iraq had few incentives to use such weapons, for several reasons:they would have had limited military utility against U.S. forces, which moved fast; Iraq had fewdelivery options, given U.S. and allied command of the air; and the use of such weapons would haveturned world opinion against Iraq. (48) Manybelieved the threat of WMD use would increase the closerU.S. forces got to Baghdad, and then decrease once they were in the city (presumably because ofcollateral effects). The Search for WMD. Many observers believed U.S. forces would quickly find Iraq's weapons of mass destruction. Despite misleading reports ofchemical weapons discoveries, U.S. forces, at this writing, have not located WMD or WMD-relatedsites. Although it appeared that U.S. forces at an Iraqi military compound at Albu Muhawish wereexposed to nerve agents, later tests indicated that they were exposed to chemical pesticides. A reportabout medium-range missiles potentially containing sarin and mustard gas was not verified by thePentagon or CENTCOM. As in the U.N. inspections, a key to unlocking Iraq's WMD past may be interviews with 3000 former weapons experts. Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld stated that "The U.N. inspectors didn't findanything and I doubt that we will. What we will do is find the people who will tell us." (49) On April12, as noted above, General Saadi, a key figure in Iraq's chemical weapons program, surrenderedto U.S. forces; Dr. Jaffar Jaffar, head of the nuclear program, was located a few days later in anundisclosed country. On April 16, U.S. forces reportedly raided the home of Iraq's head biologicalweapons scientist, Dr. Rihab Taha. On April 17, a scientist involved in the chemical weaponsprogram, told U.S. forces that Iraq destroyed chemical weapons and biowarfare equipment daysbefore the war began. (50) Interviewing these andother scientists and examining documents forevidence will likely take time before conclusions can be drawn. If they fear being prosecuted for warcrimes, scientists may be less forthcoming. The Army's 75th Exploitation Task Force has been leading teams of weapons experts to hunt on the ground for WMD. These teams include former United Nations inspectors and U.S. civilianand military personnel. According to one report, the teams will be focusing on 36 priority sites ofa potential 1000 sites. (51) The task force reportedlywill come under the command of a much largerIraq Survey Group, which will be comprised of about 1000 civilian scientists, technicians,intelligence analysts and other experts led by a U.S. general. (52) The Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) has been negotiating contracts with private companies to destroy WMD stocks that are found. This approach contrasts sharply with the 1991Gulf War experience. In that war, first U.S. air strikes and then ground forces destroyed significantportions of Iraq's WMD and WMD capabilities. Air strikes were able to target well-known chemicalweapon and missile capabilities, in contrast to lesser known biological or nuclear capabilities. (53) Inadvertent destruction of WMD could pose environmental and safety issues, should it occur. During the 1991 Gulf War, U.S. and coalition forces destroyed warehouses that contained chemicalwarheads, including at the Khamisiyah site, and a Department of Defense investigation concludedthat as many as 100,000 U.S. personnel could have been affected by environmental releases. (54) According to one report, the United States' nuclear, biological and chemical (NBC) units "havemade major advancements since the Persian Gulf War of 1991," when Czech NBC units detectedsarin and mustard gas, but American detection units could not verify the results. (55) The impact ofpotential inadvertent destruction would depend on what kind of WMD is present (e.g., biologicalweapons pose fewer problems in destruction than chemical weapons, because dispersal is less likelyand they do not require such high temperatures for destruction); how the material or weapons arestored; and geographic, geological, and temporal circumstances. Role for U.N. Inspectors? From November 2002 to March 2003, the United Nations Monitoring, Verification, and Inspection Commission(UNMOVIC) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) conducted approximately 750inspections at 550 sites. Those inspections uncovered relatively little: empty chemical weaponsshells not previously declared; two R-400 aerial bombs at a site where Iraq unilaterally destroyedBW-filled aerial bombs; 2,000 pages of undeclared documents on uranium enrichment; undeclaredremotely piloted vehicles; and cluster bombs that could be used with chemical or biological agents. As a result of the inspections, however, Iraq destroyed 70 (of a potential 100-120) Al-Samoud-2missiles. On the eve of war, about 200 U.N. staff left Iraq. UNMOVIC's Executive Chairman Dr.Hans Blix expressed disappointment at the unfinished job of the inspectors. Thus far, the U.N. hasnot been asked to help verify whatever WMD U.S. forces might uncover. Reportedly, the White House is considering international verification of what it finds in Iraq, but this may not include U.N. inspectors. Blix, who has stated he will retire in June 2003 at the endof his contract, has said UNMOVIC would not accept "being led, as a dog" to sites that allied forceschoose to display. (56) U.N. officials hope to revivea role for U.N. inspectors; U.N. Secretary GeneralKofi Annan, has stated that inspectors will return after the war. At a minimum, the IAEA willconduct inspections per Iraq's nuclear safeguards agreement under the Nuclear Non-ProliferationTreaty. A post-Hussein Iraq might consent to sign and ratify the Chemical Weapons Convention,but there are no equivalent international inspection regimes for biological weapons or missiles atpresent. (57) Some have suggested that the UnitedStates, if it took possession of Iraq's chemicalweapons, would be bound, as a party to the Chemical Weapons Convention, to allow internationalinspections of destruction. (58) The worldcommunity's confidence in Iraq's disarmament, and hence,the necessity for an ongoing monitoring regime, may depend on the level of verifiable disarmamentduring and after the war, and on the assurances of the future leaders of Iraq. [author name scrubbed], [phone number scrubbed] (Last updated April 21, 2003) The same U.S. concerns about fragmentation and instability in a post-Saddam Iraq that surfaced in prior administrations were present in the Bush Administration debates over post-war policy inIraq. One of the concerns cited by the George H.W. Bush Administration for ending the 1991 Gulfwar before ousting Saddam was that a post-Saddam Iraq could dissolve into chaos. It was feared thatthe ruling Sunni Muslims, the majority but under-represented Shiites, and the Kurds would fighteach other, and open Iraq to influence from neighboring Iran, Turkey, and Syria. Because of thecomplexities of various post-war risks to stability in Iraq and the region, some observers believedthat post-war Iraq might most effectively be governed by a military or Baath Party figure who is notnecessarily committed to full democracy but would comply with applicable U.N. resolutions. However, no such figure stepped forward to offer to play a leadership role. Administration Policy on Governance. Although the Administration wanted to keep much of the civilian bureaucracy of the former regime intact, theAdministration has long insisted that it will do what is necessary to bring about a stable anddemocratic successor regime that complies with all applicable U.N. resolutions. In press interviewson April 6, 2003, Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz indicated that the Administrationhoped to turn post-war governance over to an Iraqi interim administration within six months. Experts note that all projections, including the duration of the U.S. military occupation and thenumbers of occupation troops, could be determined by the amount of Iraqi resistance, if any, thenumber of U.S. casualties taken, and the speed with which a successor regime is chosen. The Chiefof Staff of the Army, General Eric Shinseki, told the Senate Armed Services Committee on February24, 2003, that as many as 200,000 U.S. troops might be needed for a postwar occupation, althoughother Administration officials, including Wolfowitz, disputed the Shinseki assessment. Under plans formulated before hostilities began, Lt. Gen. Jay Garner (ret.) is directing civilian reconstruction, working through a staff of U.S. diplomats and other U.S. government personnel whowill serve as advisers and administrators in Iraq's various ministries. He heads the Office ofReconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance, within the Department of Defense, created by aJanuary 20, 2003 executive order. After spending the combat phase of the war in neighboringKuwait, Garner and some of his staff of about 200 deployed to Baghdad on April 21, 2003, to beginwork. During the interim period, the United States goals are to eliminate remaining WMD andterrorist cells in Iraq, begin economic reconstruction, and purge Baath Party leaders. Iraq's oilindustry is to be rebuilt and upgraded. The exact nature of post-war governance might depend on the outcome of discussions between the United States and its European allies over a U.N. role in post-war Iraq, which was the focus ofPresident Bush's meeting in Belfast with British Prime Minister Blair on April 7 and 8, 2003. Britain and most European countries believe that the Iraqi people would more easily accommodateto a U.N.- administered post-war Iraq. Senior U.S. officials, with the reported exception of Secretaryof State Powell, want to keep the U.N. role limited to humanitarian relief and economicreconstruction, reserving most decisions about a post-war Iraqi power structure to the United Statesand Britain. U.S. officials want a new U.N. Security Council resolution that would endorse a newgovernment, and, with U.S. support, Secretary-General Annan said on April 7 that he was appointinga U.N. coordinator, Pakistani diplomat Rafeuddin Ahmed, to run U.N. operations in Iraq. However,U.S. officials note that some of the countries that opposed the war might object to adopting aresolution that they believe might legitimize a U.S.-British occupation. (For further discussion, seeabove, Diplomatic Issues .) Establishing an Interim Administration. Those Iraqi groups who were opposed to the regime of Saddam Hussein, including those groups mostclosely associated with the United States, generally oppose a direct role for U.S. officials in runninga post-war Iraqi government. The opposition groups, including the U.S.-backed Iraqi NationalCongress, fear that the Administration might yield substantial power to former Baath Party members. The opposition met in northern Iraq in late February 2003 to plan its involvement in a post-Saddamregime. At that meeting, against U.S. urging, the opposition named a six-man council to prepare fora transition government: Iraqi National Congress director Ahmad Chalabi; Patriotic Union ofKurdistan leader Jalal Talabani; Kurdistan Democratic Party leader Masud Barzani; Shiite Muslimleader Mohammad Baqr Al Hakim, who heads the Iran-backed Supreme Council for the IslamicRevolution in Iraq (SCIRI); Iraq National Accord leader Iyad Alawi; and former Iraqi foreignminister Adnan Pachachi. After the fall of the regime, these leaders appeared to be competing forpower in post-war Iraq rather than cooperating. The Bush Administration asserted that it wants Iraqis who stayed in Iraq and were not part of the exiled opposition to participate in an interim government, and that it would not play a major rolein choosing who leads Iraq next. However, the U.S. military airlifted about 700 opposition fighters(Free Iraqi Forces), led by INC leader Ahmad Chalabi, into the Nasiriyah area on April 6, 2003,appearing to give him and the INC an endorsement for key roles in an interim government. Chalabiand some of the Free Iraqi Forces subsequently went to Baghdad to help U.S. forces restore civilorder after the regime fell. The Administration organized an April 15 meeting, in Nasiriyah, to begina process of selecting an interim administration. However, SCIRI, along with several Shiite clericsthat have appropriated authority throughout much of southern Iraq since the fall of the regime,boycotted the meeting and called for an Islamic state and the withdrawal of U.S. forces. At the sametime, some recent violence in the Shiite-dominated areas of Iraq, including the early April killing ofprominent cleric Abd al-Majid Khoi, could be connected with a jockeying for power within theShiite community, and between it and other contenders. Reconstruction and Oil Industry Issues. It is widely assumed that Iraq's vast oil reserves, believed second only to those of Saudi Arabia, will beused to fund reconstruction. Presidential spokesman Ari Fleischer said on February 18, 2003,referring to Iraq's oil reserves, that Iraq has "a variety of means ... to shoulder much of the burdenfor [its] own reconstruction." U.S.-led forces have secured all of Iraq's oil fields, and, contrary towhat was feared, only about nine oil wells were set on fire by the retreating regime. All fires havebeen extinguished. The remaining problems for the United States and Britain are to get Iraqi oilworkers to return to work and to establish a successor government with legal authority to contractfor sales of Iraq's oil to international buyers. Press reports on April 14, 2003 said the United Statesis considering former senior Iraqi oil professional Fadhil Othman to be an interim oil minister,reportedly with some oversight by a U.S. oil administrative official. A related issue is long-term development of Iraq's oil industry, and which foreign energy firms, if any, might receive preference for contracts to explore Iraq's vast reserves. Russia, China, andothers are said to fear that the United States will seek to develop Iraq's oil industry with minimalparticipation of firms from other countries. Some press reports suggest the Administration isplanning to exert such control, (59) although someobservers speculate that the Administration hadinitially sought to create such an impression in order to persuade Russia to support use of forceagainst Iraq. Continuation of the Oil-for-Food Program/U.N. Sanctions. Before the war, about 60% of Iraqis received all their foodstuffs fromthe U.N.-supervised Oil-for-Food Program. The program, which is an exception to thecomprehensive U.N. embargo on Iraq put in place after the 1991 Persian Gulf war, began operationsin December 1996. It was suspended just before hostilities began, when U.N. staff in Iraq that runthe various aspects of the program departed Iraq. At the time the war started, about $9 billion worthof humanitarian goods were in the process of being delivered or in production. On March 28, 2003,the U.N. Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 1472 that restarted the program'soperations and empowered the United Nations, for a 45-day period, to take direct control of allaspects of the program. Under the resolution, the United Nations set priorities for and directed thedelivery of already-contracted supplies. On April 17, 2003, President Bush called for the lifting ofU.N. sanctions against Iraq that, if implemented by the United Nations, would presumably lead toa phasing out of the oil-for-food program in favor of normal international commerce with Iraq. Inan FY2003 supplemental appropriation ( P.L. 107-11 ), Congress has given the President the authorityto suspend most U.S. sanctions in place against Iraq. [author name scrubbed] ([phone number scrubbed]) (Last updated April 22, 2003) In November 2002, the U.S. government reportedly contacted the governments of 50 countries with specific requests for assistance in a war with Iraq. On March 18, 2003, the Administrationreleased a list of 30 countries that had publicly stated their support for U.S. efforts to disarm Iraq,and Secretary of State Powell said that 15 other countries were giving private backing; according tothe White House, the number of countries publicly providing a range of types of support has sincerisen to 49. Nevertheless, only three countries supplied ground combat troops in significantnumbers- in contrast to the 1991 Gulf war when more than 30 countries provided military supportor to the 2002 campaign in Afghanistan, when 21 sent armed forces. (60) Political and Military Factors. On the international political front, analysts contend that it was important for the United States to enlistallies in order to demonstrate that it was not acting unilaterally-that its use of force to disarm Iraqhad been endorsed by a broad global coalition. Although the political leaders of some Islamiccountries were reportedly sympathetic to the Bush Administration's aims, they had to considerhostility to U.S. actions among their populations. Analysts have suggested that some countries sidedwith the United States out of mixed motives; former U.S. ambassador to the North Atlantic TreatyOrganization (NATO) Robert Hunter characterized the nations backing U.S. policy as "a coalitionof the convinced, the concerned, and the co-opted." (61) Some governments that provided supportasked that the Bush Administration remove their names from the coalition list. (62) From a strictly military standpoint, active allied participation was not critical. NATO invoked Article 5 (mutual defense) shortly after the September 11, 2001 attacks against the United States, butduring the subsequent war in Afghanistan, the United States initially relied mainly on its ownmilitary resources, accepting only small contingents of special forces from a handful of othercountries. Allied combat and peacekeeping forces arrived in larger numbers only after the Talibanhad been defeated. Analysts speculate that the Administration chose to "go it alone" because theunique nature of U.S. strategy, which entailed special forces ground units locating and then callingin immediate air strikes against enemy targets, necessitated the utmost speed in command andcommunications. (63) An opposing view is that the United States lost an opportunity in Afghanistan to lay the political groundwork for an allied coalition in the conflict against terrorism. However, during OperationAllied Force in Kosovo in 1999, some U.S. policy-makers complained that the requirement for alliedconsensus hampered the military campaign with a time-consuming bombing target approval process. Another military rationale for having primarily U.S. forces conduct operations against Iraq was thatfew other countries possess the military capabilities (e.g., airborne refueling, air lift, precision guidedmunitions, and night vision equipment) necessary for a high-tech campaign designed to achievevictory with minimum Iraqi civilian and U.S. casualties. Direct and Indirect Contributions. Britain, the only other country that had warplanes patrolling the no-fly zones in Iraq, sent or committed 45,000ground troops, as well as air and naval forces, and Australia committed 2,000 special forces troops,naval vessels, and fighter aircraft. Poland authorized 200 troops, including both special forces andnon-combat personnel. In a non-combat capacity, Denmark sent two warships and a medical unit,South Korea approved the deployment of 700 engineers and medics, and Spain dispatched threenaval vessels. Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Germany, Romania, Slovakia, and Ukraine pledgedcontingents of anti-chemical and -biological weapons specialists. (64) Romania dispatched non-combattroops (engineers, medics, and military police), and about 1,000 U.S. personnel were stationed inConstana, which acted as an "air bridge" to the Persian Gulf. Japan, constitutionally barred fromsending ground troops, was reportedly prepared to help in the disposal of chemical and biologicalweapons, and also reinforced its naval fleet patrolling the Indian Ocean. (65) Other forms of support were also valuable. For example, countries granted overflight rights or back-filled for U.S. forces that might redeploy to Iraq from Central Asia or the Balkans: Canada isplanning on sending up to 3,000 troops to Afghanistan, freeing up U.S. soldiers for Iraq. In addition,gaining permission to launch air strikes from countries close to Iraq reduced the need for mid-airrefueling, allowed aircraft to re-arm sooner, and enabled planes to respond more quickly to groundforce calls for air strikes; several countries, including Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kuwait, Spain, Italy,Portugal, Romania, and Bulgaria allowed the use of their airbases and seaports. At the BushAdministration's request, Hungary approved the use of its Taszar airbase for the training of Iraqidissidents as non-combatant interpreters and administrators; the initial plan was to train up to 3,000Iraqi expatriates, but on April 1 it was announced that the program had been suspended after 100-150had been trained. (66) On January 15, the United States formally requested several measures of assistance from the NATO allies, such as airborne warning and control systems aircraft (AWACS), refueling, andoverflight privileges; the request was deferred. On February 10, France, Germany and Belgiumvetoed U.S. and Turkish requests to bolster Turkish defenses on the grounds that assent wouldimplicitly endorse an attack on Iraq; German Chancellor Schroeder sought to sharpen the distinctionby announcing that his government would provide defensive missiles and AWACS crews to helpprotect Turkey on a bilateral basis. The impasse was broken by an agreement over languageindicating that such assistance "relates only to the defense of Turkey" and would not imply NATOsupport for a military operation against Iraq. (67) Despite the compromise, many observers believe thetemporary rift may have lasting consequences for NATO. On April 16, NATO announced that, sinceTurkey no longer believed itself to be threatened, the defensive missiles and surveillance aircraftwould be returned to their home bases. The Bush Administration asked permission of the Turkish government to use Turkish bases and ports and to move American troops through southeast Turkey to establish a northern front againstIraq. The talks over troop access proceeded in tandem with negotiations over a U.S. aid package. (68) An initial agreement was struck, permitting 62,000 U.S. troops in Turkey; in return, the UnitedStates would provide $6 billion in assistance. On March 1, however, the Turkish parliamentrejected the deal by a three-vote margin. Prime Minister Erdogan urged Washington to wait, but byMarch 18, the U.S. military cargo vessels that had been standing anchored off the Turkish coast weresteaming to the Gulf. On March 20, the Turkish parliament authorized overflight rights but alsoagreed to send Turkish troops into Iraq, a move opposed by the United States and other countries. After an early April visit by Secretary Powell, it was announced that Turkey would permit thetransshipment of nonlethal military supplies and equipment to U.S. forces in Iraq. (See above, Diplomatic Issues ). Some Members of Congress criticized Turkey, claiming it sought to leverageU.S. strategic needs to squeeze aid out of Washington. However, Turkish officials argued that morethan 90% of their country's population opposed war and that Turkey suffered severe economic lossesfrom the 1991 Gulf War. Ankara also was concerned that the Iraq conflict might re-kindle effortsof Kurdish separatists to carve out a Kurdish state; such a move would likely prompt Turkishintervention. Finally, Turkey has sought assurances that Iraq's 2-3 million ethnic Turkmen wouldbe able to play a post-war role in Iraq. (69) In late February 2003, Jordan's prime minister acknowledged the presence of several hundred U.S. military personnel on Jordanian soil; the troops were reportedly there to operate Patriot missiledefense systems and to conduct search-and-rescue missions; the deployment marked a reversal fromJordan's neutral stance during the 1991 Gulf war. (70) Egypt is permitting the U.S. military to use itsairspace and the Suez Canal. Although the Persian Gulf states generally opposed an attack on Iraqin public statements, more than 225,000 U.S. military personnel were ashore or afloat in the regionin late March, and Saudi Arabia and Qatar host large U.S. military command centers; according torecent reports, the Saudi government sanctioned limited use of the Prince Sultan airbase commandcenter and permitted search-and-rescue operations to be conducted along the Saudi-Iraqi border. TheSaudis also pledged to step up their oil output to compensate for any drop in Iraqi production. Kuwait served as the launch pad for the U.S.-led ground attack against Iraq. In addition, five U.S.aircraft carriers were in the region. Post-Conflict Assistance. After the 1991 Gulf War, several nations - notably Japan, Saudi Arabia and Germany - provided monetary contributionsto offset the costs of the conflict; it is not yet known if such will be the case for the Iraq war. However, U.S. policymakers hope that many countries will contribute to caring for refugees and tothe post-war reconstruction of Iraq by providing humanitarian assistance funding, programs fordemocratization, as well as peacekeeping forces. Before hostilities, several countries, includingFrance, Japan, Sweden, Russia, Estonia, Lithuania, and Romania indicated that they might play arole. In late April, it was announced that U.S. diplomats had approached 65 governments requestingassistance in reconstruction efforts, and that 58 countries had responded favorably. Deputy DefenseSecretary Wolfowitz stated that the Bush Administration would "pressure all our friends and alliesto contribute as much as they can." (71) Varioustypes of commitments already are being announced;for example, the Japanese and Canadian governments have pledged $100 million and $65 millionin assistance, respectively, and Rome has said that it would dispatch up to 3,000 troops to help inhumanitarian activities. In addition, Denmark has proposed the creation of an ad hoc peacekeepingforce. (72) [author name scrubbed], [phone number scrubbed] ( Last updated April 22, 2003 ) The U.S.-led military campaign to disarm Iraq and end the regime of Iraqi President Saddam Hussein could have widespread effects on the broader Middle East. The opportunity to craft a newgovernment and new institutions in Iraq is likely to increase U.S. influence over the course of eventsin the Middle East. Conversely, U.S. military intervention could create a significant backlash againstthe United States, particularly at the popular level, and regional governments may feel even moreconstrained in accommodating future U.S. policy goals. Middle East governments that providedsupport to the U.S. effort against Iraq did so with minimal publicity and expect to be rewarded withfinancial assistance, political support, or both, in the war's aftermath. Allegations by senior U.S. officials, including President Bush, that Syria facilitated the movement of military equipment into Iraq and offered safe haven to Iraqi leaders have fedspeculation that Syria and possibly other Middle East countries may follow Iraq as future targets ofU.S. military action. Such warnings could encourage more cooperation on the part of other MiddleEastern countries with U.S. policy goals in an effort to forestall possible U.S. reprisals against them. On the other hand, the U.S. warnings could have the opposite effect by inducing resentment withinthe region over what many may regard as unwarranted U.S. interference in Middle East affairs. Democracy and Governance. Some commentators, including officials in the Bush Administration, believe that the war with Iraq and theoverthrow of Saddam Hussein will lead to a democratic revolution in large parts of the Middle East.Some link democracy in the Middle East with a broader effort to pursue development in a region thathas lagged behind much of the world in economic and social spheres, as well as in individualfreedom and political empowerment. In a speech at the Heritage Foundation on December 12, 2002,Secretary of State Colin Powell announced a three-pronged "Partnership for Peace" initiativedesigned to enhance economic development, improve education, and build institutions of civilsociety in the Middle East. Separately, Crown Prince Abdullah of Saudi Arabia has reportedlyproposed an "Arab Charter" that would encourage wider political participation, economicintegration, and mutual security measures. In his ultimatum to Saddam Hussein on March 17, 2003,President Bush commented that after Saddam's departure from the scene, the Iraqi people "can setan example to all the Middle East of a vital and peaceful and self-governing nation." Skeptics, however, charge that U.S. Middle Eastern policy has traditionally been tolerant of autocratic or corrupt regimes as long as they provide support for U.S. strategic or economicobjectives in the region. Other critics argue that the minimal amount of assistance contained in thePowell initiative ($29 million during the first year) reflects only a token effort to supportdemocratization and development, although the Administration is requesting significantly morefunding for this initiative-$145 million-in FY2004. Still others fear that more open political systemscould lead to a takeover by Islamic fundamentalist groups, who often constitute the most viableopposition in Middle East countries, or by other groups whose goals might be inimical to U.S.interests. Some commentators are concerned that lack of prior experience with democracy mayinhibit the growth of democratic institutions in the Middle East. Finally, a U.S.-installed governmentin Iraq may find it difficult to gain acceptance within the Arab world (73) and may thus have onlylimited appeal in the region as a role model. Arab-Israeli Peacemaking. Administration officials and other commentators argue that resolving the crisis with Iraq may have created a morefavorable climate for future initiatives to resume currently stalled Arab-Israeli peace negotiations. Proponents of this view cite the experience of the first Bush Administration, which brought Arabsand Israelis together in a landmark peace conference at Madrid in 1991, after first disposing of theIraqi occupation of Kuwait. Officials of the present Bush Administration have continued to speakof their vision of pursuing an Arab-Israeli peace settlement after eliminating threats from Iraq. In astatement to the press on March 14, 2003, President Bush affirmed that "America is committed, andI am personally committed, to implementing our road map toward peace" between Arabs andIsraelis. Others believe, however, that resentment within the region over the U.S. campaign againstIraq may have reduced the willingness of Arabs and Muslims to cooperate with the United States ina peacemaking endeavor. Security Arrangements in the Gulf Region. Large-scale deployment of U.S. troops to the Middle East to wage war against Iraq and the likelihoodof a continued major U.S. military presence in the region will exert added pressures on Middle Eastgovernments to accommodate U.S. policies in the near term. However, some fear that long-lastingmajor U.S. military commitments in the region could heighten resentment against the United Statesfrom Islamic fundamentalists, nationalists, and other groups opposed to a U.S. role in the MiddleEast; such resentment could manifest itself in sporadic long-term terrorism directed against U.S.interests in the region. Even friendly Middle East countries may eventually seek a reduction in U.S.military presence. According to a Washington Post report on February 9, 2003, Saudi Arabia'sCrown Prince Abdullah plans to request the withdrawal of U.S. armed forces from Saudi territoryafter Iraq has been disarmed. U.S. and Saudi officials declined to comment on this report, which anunnamed White House official described as "hypothetical." In the altered environment after thecollapse of Saddam Hussein's regime, however, senior U.S. Defense officials reportedly arecontemplating a significant reduction in U.S. military presence in the Middle East at some point inthe future. (74) [author name scrubbed], [phone number scrubbed] (Last updated April 22, 2003) Funding for Humanitarian Assistance. Large-scale humanitarian and reconstruction assistance programs are expected to be undertaken by the United States during and following the war in Iraq. Initial U.S. assistance expenditures wereaimed at preparations for the delivery of humanitarian aid, focusing mostly on contingency planningand prepositioning of commodities. The United States has pledged to release 610,000 tons of food. To date, $560.7 million in FY2003 funds has been allocated, of which only $43 million is forreconstruction activities. However, with the main fighting now finished in Iraq, attention is alsoquickly turning to plans for reconstruction. (75) FY2003 Supplemental. The FY2003 Supplemental Appropriations ( P.L. 108-11 ) provides $2.48 billion for a special Iraq Relief andReconstruction Fund to be directed at aid efforts in a wide range of sectors, including water andsanitation, food, electricity, education, and rule of law. It gives the President control over the Fundand does not prohibit funds from going to DOD. The President, however, must consult with theAppropriations Committees prior to allocation of funds, and all obligations must be notified to theCommittees five days in advance. Funds transferred to agencies other than the State Department andUSAID are also subject to notification procedures. Reportedly, there are still tensions between theState Department and DOD over policy matters in the reconstruction of Iraq; however, USAID haspointed out that the same coordinated delivery system applied to other conflicts is being used in Iraq. Oil-for-Food Program (OFFP). The OFFP was suspended between March 18 and March 28, 2003. Prior to its suspension, approximately $10billion worth earmarked for humanitarian supplies were in the process of being delivered orproduced, of which one quarter covered food needs. On March 28, the U.N. Security Councilunanimously approved Resolution 1472, which gives Secretary General Annan authority to prioritizeand coordinate the immediate humanitarian needs of Iraqi civilians for an initial 45-day period, oruntil May 12, under an expanded OFFP. The OFFP is dependent upon Iraq's future cooperation withthe OFFP (and use of its distribution network) and the security of the personnel working for theUnited Nations once inside Iraq. (76) Furthermore,a number of agencies have indicated they plan touse the OFFP system, but how the provision of aid is to be coordinated among multiple donorsremains to be worked out. On April 21, the OFFP Director, Benon Sevan, said that politicalobstacles involving the Oversight Committee and contracting arrangements under the OFFP madeit very unlikely that even 10% of the funds could be released, even if the emergency authorizationwere extended to June 3, a proposal Sevan is putting before the Security Council on April 22. Thedebate over the reactivation of the OFFP has also been highlighted by the larger question of whatrole the U.N. will play in reconstruction. The ability of the United States to use oil resources for more long-term reconstruction purposes would require a Security Council resolution providing legitimacy to any interim Iraqi authority thatmight be the recipient of oil profits. On April 16, President Bush urged the U.N. to lift the sanctionson Iraq that prevent it from selling oil. U.S. officials reportedly believe that the U.N. will take stepsto lift the sanctions during the week of April 21. (77) Some argue this request has called into questionthe future of the OFFP in that it was created to ease the burden of sanctions, and once those sanctionsare lifted, the OFFP will also end. (78) In addition, the United States has initiated an effort to obtain support from creditors for Iraq debt relief. On March 20, President Bush issued an executive order confiscating non-diplomaticIraqi assets held in the United States. Of the total assets seized, an estimated $1.74 billion areexpected to be available for reconstruction purposes and as much as $600 million more may beseized in other countries. In addition, the United States, seeking to locate formerly unknown assetscontrolled by Saddam Hussein, has identified roughly $1.2 billion that might be used for relief andreconstruction purposes. (79) Other Donors. On March 28, 2003, U.N. agencies issued a $2.2 billion "flash appeal" for humanitarian aid and postwar relief to Iraq to coverexpenditures for a six-month period. Of that total, $1.3 billion would be for food aid. As of April5, $1.2 billion in pledges had been received. U.S. diplomats have reportedly asked more than 65 nations for assistance in the relief, reconstruction, and peacekeeping effort in Iraq. (80) Although the European Union (EU) has agreed tounite to provide humanitarian aid to Iraq, its plans are unclear with respect to reconstruction andlong-term aid. The EU has designated 100 million euros for humanitarian relief agencies. Japan haspledged $100 million in humanitarian aid. International contributions have been pledged or receivedfrom a number of other donors in funds for Iraq, for humanitarian relief in neighboring countries,and for in-kind emergency supplies. U.S. Aid Policy Structure in Iraq. To prepare forthe use of aid, a post-war planning office was established on January 20, 2003, by a presidentialdirective. The Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA), although locatedin the Defense Department, is staffed by officials from agencies throughout the government. Whileimmediate overall responsibility for the war and management of U.S. activity in post-war Iraqbelongs to General Tommy Franks, Commander of U.S. Central Command, the ORHA is chargedwith producing plans for his use in carrying out that role. In addition, it is responsible forimplementing U.S. assistance efforts in Iraq. The Office, headed by retired Army Lt. Gen. Jay M.Garner, has three civilian coordinators - for reconstruction, civil administration, and humanitarianrelief. (81) Plans formulated before the war startedcall for three regional coordinators - for north,south, and central Iraq - to serve under the functional coordinators. (82) Regional coordinator officeswould reportedly be mostly staffed by so-called "free Iraqis," those who have been living outsideIraq in democratic countries, who would act as advisors. Indigenous Iraqi groups are expected tobe formed in each province to propose assistance activities to be implemented in their area. (83) Whilemost of the staff awaits deployment from Kuwait, General Garner has sent advance teams to Iraq toestablish offices in the three regions and to begin to assess relief and reconstruction needs. He touredBaghdad and other parts of Iraq on April 21. According to planners, U.S. armed forces will initially take the lead in relief and reconstruction, later turning to existing Iraqi ministries, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and internationalorganizations to assume some of the burden. (84) The U.S. Agency for International Development(USAID) has put together Disaster Assistance Response Teams (DARTs) that are slowly beingdeployed around the country. Reportedly, some U.S. humanitarian groups are objecting to the U.S.military taking charge of all relief efforts. They are concerned that operating under DOD jurisdictioncomplicates their ability to help the Iraqis, jeopardizes their neutrality, and increases the risk to aidworkers because they will be perceived as being closely allied with the U.S. campaign. Many NGOsview the U.N. leadership as important because it could add legitimacy and encourage wider NGOparticipation. Humanitarian Assistance: Relief Operations. Background. Until it was suspended on the eve of war, U.N. and other humanitarian agencies were providing aid to Iraq through the OFFP, which usedrevenue from Iraqi oil sales to buy food and medicines for the civilian population. (85) Sixty percentof Iraq's estimated population of 24 to 27 million were receiving monthly food distributions underthe OFFP. Prior to the war, sources said the average Iraqi had food supplies lasting a few months,but food security remains uncertain, just as the amount of food stored in OFFP warehouses is alsounclear. (86) WFP officials argue that while foodmay not be an issue at the moment, supplies needto be entering the country now in order to prevent a crisis in a few weeks. (87) Contingency Preparations. In the weeks leading up to the war, aid organizations planned for humanitarian needs amid great uncertainty about conditionsin the aftermath of conflict. (88) They report thatemergency supplies such as water, food, medicine,shelter materials, and hygiene kits are in place in countries bordering Iraq. While some arguedinitially that there was still a huge shortfall of resources and funding available for humanitarianassistance, the fact that the borders have remained quiet has allowed more time for furtherpreparation. Although population movements now appear less likely, there were concerns about theabsorptive capacity of neighboring countries, whether they could provide adequately for thesepopulations, and the impact of refugee flows on stability in the region. Iran, Turkey, Jordan, Syria,Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait have all publicly stated that they will prevent refugees from entering theircountries, although each has continued to make preparations for assistance either within Iraq'sborders or at transit areas at border crossing points. The U.N. Humanitarian Coordinator in Iraq,Ramiro Lopez da Silva, has set up an interim logistics hub in Cyprus. Although NGOs have alsobeen putting together plans, the absence of international organizations and NGOs with experienceoperating in and around Iraq means there are few networks in place and some concern over theimplementation of relief operations. Current Operating Environment. The war is destroying critical infrastructure, disrupting delivery of basic services and food supplies, andaffecting the humanitarian situation inside Iraq. So far it has not reached the crisis levels predictedbefore the start of hostilities. Widespread hunger and massive population movements have notmaterialized. Still, lack of electricity, water shortages, inadequate sanitation, and greatly reducedmedical care are creating hardship for many. The humanitarian situation continues to evolve as thewar progresses. The amount of assistance that is ultimately needed will obviously depend on thenature and duration of the conflict. The United Nations reportedly expects that nearly 40% of theIraqi population could require food assistance within weeks. (89) Relief and Security. In the short term, security of humanitarian aid delivery and distribution is a top priority. During the height of the militarycampaign, when small amounts of aid got through, logistical problems and unruly mobs madedistribution very difficult. Since then, looting and lawlessness, particularly in places where heavyfighting took place, have been widespread and even included hospitals and water supplyinstallations, which is having an increased impact on health care. Most aid agencies remain on Iraq'sborder unwilling to enter for security reasons. Some U.N. staff are said to be returning to certainparts of Iraq, security permitting. (90) Despite theprecarious situation on the ground, a small numberof private humanitarian groups are operating in southern Iraq, working independently from themilitary and in advance of the full return of U.N. staff. In Baghdad, roughly 18 NGOs have formedthe NGO Coordination Committee in Iraq (NCCI) to more effectively provide assistance. Deliveriesof water, food, and medical supplies are slowly getting through, even though at times the chaos andviolence hampers the efforts of those trying to provide the most minimal vital assistance. In general,the overall situation still has not not resulted in consistent, comprehensive provision of aid. Regularnon-military flights into Baghdad are pending approval by the military. The U.N. has appealed to coalition forces to act quickly to avoid the complete breakdown of aid efforts, calling for them to protect essential infrastructure such as hospitals and water supplysystems and to enable full-scale efforts to get food, water, and medical aid in to Iraq. Althoughpockets of resistance continue throughout the country, coalition troops are now also patrolling citiesand appear to be controlling much of the looting. In addition, they are beginning to assist with therestoration of basic public services. Despite the obvious destruction from bombing and looting, insome places, such as Baghdad, there are signs of a return to normal life in the form of traffic jams,lines at gas stations, and food stalls with produce. Post-War Relief Priorities. The United States has not yet declared victory in Iraq, but a new phase, to bring about law and order and humanitarian relief, appears to be underway. (91) Under the Fourth Geneva Convention theoccupying forces are obligated to provide for these basic needs. Throughout the country, logisticalproblems continue to complicate the security of supply routes. Once security is established,questions remain about delivery of aid (whether roads used by the military will be usable or whetherseparate supply routes will need to be put in place); availability of cargo and water trucks (currentlyin short supply); and distribution (particularly in cities where the military is may not have gained fullcontrol over population centers.) Aid agencies plan to establish bases within Iraq to support relief operations. However, they fear that receiving protection from coalition-led forces could mean an increase in security risks for theirstaff. The EU is also concerned about the "independence and integrity of delivering humanitarianaid." (92) Continuing instability has preventedattempts to assess the needs of local people and providehumanitarian assistance. The apparent bitterness towards the coalition forces also remains an issue. Water and Sanitation. An insufficient water supply is proving to be one of the biggest humanitarian challenges. Deliveries by tanker to some towns,building an extension to the pipeline from Kuwait to Umm Qasr, and mobile teams working to repairand maintain generators are mechanisms underway to address the problem. (93) UNICEF is alsoplanning its first shipment of water to southern Iraq. (94) Lack of electricity is a huge issue for manyIraqis. Shortages of fuel have also been reported. Many sewer treatment plants are not functioning,allowing sewage to drain into water systems. Health. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) has been operating in Iraq since the war began. They have now been joined by ahandful of NGOs. ICRC teams report that hospitals have varying levels of capacity and security. Some have been overwhelmed by casualties and are in need of additional medical supplies and staff. It is impossible to get accurate statistics on casualties and treatment provided. Dedicated staff havecontinued to work under difficult conditions, even protecting records and equipment from looting. An ICRC convoy was fired on in Baghdad on April 8 and one of its aid workers was killed. Civiliancasualties have been reported as a result of hostilities and also from unexploded ordinance and landmines. Summer heat, poor sanitation, and lack of electricity have some concerned about the highrisks of epidemic disease. There are reports of dramatic increases in diarrheal cases, especiallyamong children. The WHO is making plans to conduct a full assessment of hospital situations. (95) South of Baghdad a large U.S. Army hospital is treating both wounded and sick Iraqis. Food Security. At present, food supplies appear to be adequate, in part because extra rations were distributed prior to the war. The WFP has increasedits delivery of food from Turkey into northern Iraq and has made plans to open another humanitariancorridor in Iran and to dispatch food through Syria and Jordan. On April 17, the WFP sent its firstfood aid convoy from Jordan to Baghdad. (96) Security concerns result in many delays and slowtransportation. The WFP predicts that the food program in Iraq will be the largest in history,providing four times the amount supplied to Afghanistan after the Taliban was ousted. The WFPwants to reach a target of having enough food for 27 million people by early May but has a long wayto go to meet this objective, partly because it needs to secure warehouses and make mills and silosoperational. It will also need to reactivate the OFFP distribution system, which relies on 44,000outlets throughout Iraq, by reestablishing contact with recent or active suppliers to begin providingfood and other humanitarian assistance. (97) Population Movements. Limited or no access by the United Nations and aid agencies makes it difficult to confirm reports of population displacement.According to the United Nations, there is a reported increase in the number of people leavingBaghdad for the countryside and small towns. (98) There have been some increased populationmovements within Iraq, which appeared to be occurring mainly in the north. Many have eitherreturned home or were able to find local accommodation with friends and relatives. Emergencysupplies have been provided to aid agencies assisting Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs). Innorthern Iraq, the ICRC has continued to monitor the condition of the IDPs and provided emergencyand non-aid items to displaced families. There are reports of Arab families under pressure to leavebecause they are being displaced by Kurds. Few refugees have been moving out of Iraq. However, for several weeks some people were gathering close to the Iraq/Iran border in the south. Since the fall of Baghdad, up to 30,000 displacedIraqi have reportedly gathered at the Iraqi border near western Iran. (99) UNHCR, the United Nationsrefugee agency, is responding with assistance and reports that these IDPs do not intend to cross intoIran. And more recently, approximately 1,000 people have fled to a no-man's land on Jordan'sborder. Jordanian authorities are requiring those admitted to sign waivers agreeing to return to Iraq. In response to U.S. demands not to grant asylum to members of the former Iraqi regime, Syriaapparently sealed its border to all but those carrying visas. UNHCR reports that several dozen Iraqirefugees were removed from a Syrian refugee camp and taken back into Iraq. Third CountryNationals (TCNs) represented the main bulk of individuals leaving Iraq. Asylum seekers have beenreported at several border areas, but there are no confirmed arrivals. Transition Initiatives. The now coalition-controlled port of Umm Qasr, Iraq's main outlet to the Persian Gulf, is a crucial gateway for humanitariansupplies. British and Australian forces continue to sweep it for mines, but massive dredging andrebuilding is required to prepare the port for large cargo ships. Two Australian cargo ships carryingfood aid have been delayed entry into the port because they are unable to dock due to their size. (100) Once the port is operational, some sources fear that offloading will be slow and inefficient, leadingto risks of delay in the delivery and distribution of relief materials. The Royal Fleet Auxiliary shipSir Galahad, containing humanitarian supplies, arrived at the port on March 28. The food will bestored in a warehouse until the OFFP can be revived. The WFP met with national staff in Umm Qasrto discuss resuming a distribution role under the OFFP. (101) A team of port management specialistsand engineers are reported to be assessing the damage to the port and determining what needs to bedone to make it operational for the distribution of humanitarian aid. (102) It is quite possible that the situation in Iraq may move more quickly than anticipated through the humanitarian phase to reconstruction. Already transition initiatives are underway. Accordingto UNICEF, some schools in southern Iraq have reopened. And plans are being developed forlong-term reconstruction: reestablishing the educational system and health sector, restarting theeconomy, rebuilding the infrastructure (such as airports, water, and electric systems, road, railroads,and ports), and promoting democratic governance. Richard Grimmett [phone number scrubbed]; David Ackerman [phone number scrubbed] (Last Updated April 14, 2003) The use of United States military force against Iraq raised a number of domestic and international legal issues - (1) its legality under Article I, ï¿½ 8, of the Constitution and the WarPowers Resolution; (2) its legality under international law if seen as a preemptive use of force; and(3) the effect of United Nations Security Council resolutions on the matter. The followingsubsections give brief overviews of these issues and provide links to reports that discuss thesematters in greater detail. The Constitution and the War Powers Resolution. Domestic legal issues raised by the use of military force against Iraq concerned both the Constitutionand the War Powers Resolution. Article I, Section 8, of the Constitution confers on Congress thepower to "declare War"; and historically Congress has employed this authority to enact bothdeclarations of war and authorizations for the use of force. Article II of the Constitution, in turn,vests the "executive Power" of the government in the President and designates him the "Commanderin Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States ...." Because of these separate powers, andbecause of claims about the inherent authority that accrues to the President by virtue of the existenceof the United States as a sovereign nation, controversy has often arisen about the extent to which thePresident may use military force without congressional authorization. While all commentators agreethat the President has the constitutional authority to defend the United States from sudden attackwithout congressional authorization, dispute still arises concerning whether, and the extent to which,the use of offensive force in a given situation, as in Iraq, must be authorized by Congress in orderto be constitutional. The War Powers Resolution (WPR) ( P.L. 93-148 ), in turn, imposes specific procedural mandates on the President's use of military force. The WPR requires, inter alia , that the President,in the absence of a declaration of war, file a report with Congress within 48 hours of introducingU.S. armed forces "into hostilities or situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearlyindicated by the circumstances." Section 5(b) of the WPR then requires that the President terminatethe use of the armed forces within 60 days (90 days in certain circumstances) unless Congress, in theinterim, has declared war or adopted a specific authorization for the continued use of force. TheWPR also requires the President to "consult" with Congress regarding uses of force. With respect to Iraq, these legal requirements were met. As noted earlier in this report, P.L. 107-243 , signed into law on October 16, 2002, authorized the President "to use the Armed Forcesof the United States as he determines to be necessary and appropriate in order to (1) defend thenational security of the United States against the continuing threat posed by Iraq; and (2) enforce allrelevant United Nations Security Council resolutions regarding Iraq." As predicates for the use offorce, the statute required the President to communicate to Congress his determination that the useof diplomatic and other peaceful means would not "adequately protect the United States ... or ... leadto enforcement of all relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions" and that the use of forcewould be "consistent" with the battle against terrorism. On March 18, 2003, President Bush sent aletter to Congress making these determinations. P.L. 107-243 also specifically stated that it was "intended to constitute specific statutory authorization within the meaning of section 5(b) of the War Powers Resolution." Thus, it waivedthe time limitations that would otherwise have been applicable under the WPR. The statute alsorequired the President to make periodic reports to Congress "on matters relevant to this jointresolution." P.L. 107-243 expressed congressional "support" for the efforts of the President to obtain"prompt and decisive action by the Security Council" to enforce Iraq's compliance with all relevantSecurity Council resolutions, but it did not condition the use of force on prior Security Councilauthorization. The authorization did not contain any time limitation. Subsequent to enactment of the authorization but prior to the initiation of military action, twelve members of the House of Representatives, along with a number of U.S. soldiers and the families ofsoldiers, filed suit against President Bush seeking to enjoin military action against Iraq on thegrounds it would exceed the authority granted by the October resolution or, alternatively, that theOctober resolution unconstitutionally delegated Congress' power to declare war to the President. On February 24, 2003, the trial court dismissed the suit on the grounds it raised a nonjusticiablepolitical question; and on March 13, 2003, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed,albeit on different grounds. The appellate court stated that, although the mobilization of U.S. forcesclearly imposed hardships on the plaintiffs soldiers and family members, the situation was too fluidto determine whether there was an irreconcilable conflict between the political branches on thematter of using force; and, thus, the separation of powers issues raised by the suit were not ripe forjudicial review. On the delegation issue, the appellate court ruled that the Constitution allowsCongress to confer substantial discretionary authority on the President, particularly with respect toforeign affairs, and that in this instance there was no "clear evidence of congressional abandonmentof the authority to declare war to the President." "[T]he appropriate recourse for those who opposewar with Iraq," the First Circuit concluded, "lies with the political branches." See Doe v. Bush, 240F.Supp.2d 95 (D. Mass. Feb. 24, 2003), aff'd , 322 F.3d 109 (1st Cir. March 13, 2003), rehearingdenied , 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 4830 (1st Cir. March 18, 2003). International Law and the Preemptive Use of Force. Given that the United States had not itself been attacked by Iraq, onequestion that arose with respect to the use of force against Iraq concerned its legitimacy underinternational law, if considered apart from Security Council resolutions. International lawtraditionally has recognized the right of States to use force in self-defense, and that right continuesto be recognized in Article 51 of the U.N. Charter. Self-defense has also traditionally included theright to use force preemptively. But to be recognized as legitimate under international law,preemption has had to meet at least two tests: (1) the perceived threat of attack has had to beimminent, and (2) the means used have had to be proportionate to the threat. In the past the imminence of a threat has usually been readily apparent due to the movement of enemy armed forces. But some contend that the advent of terrorism, coupled with the potentialavailability of weapons of mass destruction, has altered that equation. The Bush Administration, inparticular, argued in a national security strategy document released in 2002 that "we must adapt theconcept of imminent threat to the capabilities and objectives of today's ... rogue states and terrorists"by expanding the parameters of preemptive self-defense to include war against potential threats, i.e. ,preventive war. (103) Subsequently, with respectto the legality under international law of its use offorce against Iraq, the Administration relied primarily on prior resolutions of the United NationsSecurity Council. (104) But it also claimed thatits use of force was justified on the basis of our"inherent right of self defense, recognized in Article 51 of the UN Charter." (105) There is considerable doubt that Iraq posed a threat of attack on the U.S. sufficiently imminent to fall within the traditional justification for preemption. Arguably, therefore, the use of forceagainst Iraq can be seen as an exercise not of the traditional right of self-defense but of theAdministration's expanded doctrine of preemption that incorporates preventive war. To the extentthat is the case, critics argue that the military action against Iraq has loosened the legal constraintsthe international community has attempted to impose on the use of force since World War II andpresages similar justifications for the use of force against other states deemed to be potential, but notimminent, threats. India, in particular, it is noted, has been drawing parallels between Iraq andPakistani actions regarding Kashmir; and, it is argued, other states may do so as well. Thus, the useof force against Iraq has provided a singular opportunity to examine whether the international legalstandards governing preemption have been violated and, if so, whether the traditional standardsought to be reformulated. Security Council Authorization. Prior to widespread adoption of the Charter of the United Nations (U.N.), international law recognized anation's use of force against another nation as a matter of sovereign right. But the Charter wasintended to change this legal situation. The Charter states one of its purposes to be "to savesucceeding generations from the scourge of war." To that end it mandates that its Member states"refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrityor political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of theUnited Nations" and that they "settle their disputes by peaceful means ...." It also creates a systemof collective security under Chapter VII to maintain and, if necessary, restore international peace andsecurity, effectuated through the Security Council. While that system was often frustrated by theCold War, the Security Council has directed its Member states to impose economic sanctions in anumber of situations and to use military force in such situations as Korea, Iraq's invasion of Kuwait,and the Balkans. In addition, the Charter in Article 51, as noted above, continues to recognize the"inherent right" of States to use force in self-defense. On March 17, 2003, the United States, Great Britain, and Spain abandoned efforts in the Security Council to obtain a new explicit authorization for the use of force against Iraq. Nonetheless,the U.S. and Great Britain both contended that earlier resolutions of the Security Council adoptedin the wake of Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in 1990 provided sufficient and continuing authority for theuse of force. They noted that after a number of resolutions in 1990 calling on Iraq to withdraw hadgone unheeded, the Council in Resolution 678, adopted on November 29, 1990, authorized Memberstates "to use all necessary means to uphold and implement Resolution 660 (1990) and allsubsequent relevant resolutions and to restore international peace and security in the area." Theyfurther noted that following Gulf War I, the Council on April 3, 1991, adopted Resolution 687,which set forth numerous obligations that Iraq had to meet as conditions of securing a cease fire,including total disarmament and unconditional agreement not to develop or acquire chemical,biological or nuclear weapons or facilities or components related to them, and that Iraq acceptedthose obligations. Resolution 687, they also observed, specifically reaffirmed previous U.N. resolutions on Iraq, including Resolution 678. Noting that the Council had on numerous occasions - most recently inResolution 1441 in the fall of 2002 - found Iraq to be in material breach of its disarmamentobligations and contending that it was in material breach of that resolution as well, the U.S. andGreat Britain argued that the use of force continued to be authorized to remedy those breaches andto restore the conditions of the cease fire. Thus, the Attorney General of Great Britain in a legalopinion released on March 17, 2003, and the White House in a report to Congress released on March19, 2003, asserted that "a material breach of resolution 687 revives the authority to use force underresolution 678." Nonetheless, that was not the view of a number of Members of the Security Council, including some of the permanent Members, or of many international legal specialists. They contended that thequestion of whether past Security Council resolutions continue to authorize the use of force is forthe Security Council to decide and not individual Member states. In particular, they noted that Iraq'sagreement to the conditions of the cease fire, embodied in Resolution 687, was with the SecurityCouncil and not with the Member states that had forced its withdrawal from Kuwait. They furtherstressed that Resolution 1441, while deeming Iraq to be in "material breach" of its obligations underearlier resolutions, imposed "an enhanced inspections regime" in order to give Iraq "a finalopportunity to comply with its disarmament obligations," and stated that Iraq would face "seriousconsequences" if it continued to fail to meet its obligations. They also emphasized that Resolution1441 did not itself authorize Member states to use force but mandated that the Council "conveneimmediately" in the event Iraq interfered with the inspections regime or otherwise failed to meet itsdisarmament obligations. Thus, they concluded, Resolution 1441 contemplated that the use of forceagainst Iraq would be legitimate only upon the adoption of another resolution. In the absence of a judicial forum that might provide a final resolution of this legal debate, what may be most significant is that both supporters and opponents of the military action against Iraq found it necessary, or at least advantageous, to argue the legality of the action within the frameworkof the U.N. Charter. Pronouncements about the demise of that legal framework, in other words, mayhave been premature. [author name scrubbed], [phone number scrubbed]; [author name scrubbed], [phone number scrubbed] (Last updated April 21, 2003) On April 12, 2003, the House and Senate passed the conference version of the FY2003 supplemental appropriations ( H.R. 1559 ) providing funding for the war with Iraq,foreign assistance, homeland security, and aviation assistance ( P.L. 108-11 / H.Rept. 108-76 ). (106) FinalCongressional action was completed less than three weeks after the Administration's request wassubmitted shortly after the beginning of the war. For a more detailed discussion of the FY2003supplemental, see CRS Report RL31829 , Supplemental Appropriations FY2003: Iraq Conflict,Afghanistan, Global War on Terrorism, and Homeland Security . With the conclusion of hostilities and passage of the supplemental, debate about costs is likely to shift from the cost of the war itself to the scope and sharing of post-war costs by the Departmentof Defense, other government agencies, and the international community. For DOD, the adequacyof the $62.6 billion provided in the FY2003 supplemental may hinge on the number of troops whowill remain deployed in Iraq in FY2003. The size of troop deployments needed to ensure securityand stability has been debated both in Congress and among think tanks (see below). (107) Because DOD has not publicly identified the planned troop deployments assumed within the funding levels in the supplemental, it is difficult to assess whether the supplemental is likely to beadequate. DOD Comptroller Dov Zakheim recently suggested that the supplemental funding levellooks to be about right in light of current estimates (see below), but others have voiced concern thatDOD may be assuming too rapid a draw down. Since DOD's occupation costs in FY2004 are notincluded in its FY2004 appropriation request, a supplemental next year is likely. The other major cost issue that may arise is DOD's role in Iraqi relief and reconstruction efforts. The enacted version of the FY2003 supplemental appropriates $2.4 billion for those tasks to bedistributed to agencies by the President. In a National Security Presidential Directive issued in lateJanuary, DOD was given responsibility for the rebuilding of Iraq, suggesting that DOD may play amajor role in managing those funds. (108) Thelong-term costs of both occupation and reconstructionmay also be debated in Congress. Final Congressional Action on the FY2003 Supplemental. The conference version of H.R. 1559 provides the$62.6 billion requested for the Department of Defense for the war in Iraq, the continued U.S.presence in Afghanistan, enhanced security at U.S. military bases, postwar occupation costs in Iraq,and repair of equipment and replacement of munitions and equipment lost in the war. Of the $62.6billion total, DOD requested $59.9 billion in the Defense Emergency Response Fund (DERF), atransfer account where DOD can exercise discretion about where the monies would be spent andthen move the funds to the appropriate account, and $2.6 billion for specified activities. That proposal aroused considerable concern among many Members of Congress. (109) AlthoughDOD provided Congress with estimates of where the funds would be spent, these proposedallocations would not be binding. In response to that concern, the conference version of the billdistributes all but $15.7 billion of the funds for DOD to regular appropriations accounts. To givethe additional flexibility requested, Congress appropriated $15.7 billion to a new Iraq Freedom Fundthat can be spent by DOD as desired as long as it stays within certain ceilings and floors set withinthe bill and gives five days advance notification of transfers to the defense committees. Thisapproach blends the two different approaches for allocating the funds that were devised by Houseand Senate appropriators. Since these funds can be used in either FY2003 or FY2004, DOD couldfinance next year's occupation costs if funds proved to be greater than needed in FY2003 (seesection below, Recent Estimates of Cost of War ). DOD Request and Congressional Action. According to DOD's justification materials, the request assumed a "short but extremely intense" warand covered deployment and return of forces and equipment, repair and replenishment of equipmentand munitions damaged or used during the war, mobilization of reserve forces, special pays foractive-duty forces, and a "lower-intensity" operations phase after the war is over. The request alsoincluded funds for the cost of the U.S. presence in Afghanistan and enhanced security in the UnitedStates for the remainder of the fiscal year. (110) The request included several controversial proposals that broadened DOD's role in military assistance including $1.4 billion for aid to Pakistan, Jordan, and other nations for logistical andmilitary-related support; $150 million that DOD could use to pay irregular or "indigenous" foreignmilitary forces; and $50 million for foreign military regular forces of unspecified countries whocooperate with the U.S. in the "global war on terrorism." Although the Secretary of Defense wouldneed the concurrence of the Secretary of State for the aid to regular or irregular foreign militaryforces, congressional oversight would be limited because reporting of expenditures would be afterthe fact. (111) The conference version requires15-day advance notifications for the $1.4 billion inlogistical and military support, eliminates the Administration's request for $150 million for irregularforces, and reduces the $50 million for regular foreign military forces and limits that funding tocounter terrorism training. In addition to funds for DOD, the Administration requested $2.4 billion for an Iraqi Relief and Reconstruction Fund, with the Administration retaining flexibility both as to how to spend the fundsand which agency would manage those funds. The prospect that much of these funds would bemanaged by DOD, rather than by USAID and the State Department as is the norm for foreignassistance programs, created controversy within the Administration, among American internationalnon-governmental organizations (NGOs), and internationally. Critics argue that military control ofcivilian operations would be inappropriate. The conference version places the new Relief andReconstruction Fund under the control of the president, and permits funds to be transferred to DOD,reversing earlier action by the House and Senate appropriators. The conference version requiresconsultation prior to transfers and 5-day advance notification to the appropriations committees beforeobligation of funds. (112) Based on press reportsand the President's decision to give DOD majorresponsibility for reconstruction, DOD may play a major role in managing these funds. The FY2003 supplemental also included specified requests for aid to 22 countries that have assisted the U.S. in some fashion in Iraq or the global war on terrorism and that face economic andpolitical risks because of the Iraqi war. This request totaled $4.7 billion. Major recipients wouldinclude Jordan ($700 million), Israel ($1 billion plus $9 billion in guaranteed loans), Turkey ($1billion which could be applied to $8.5 billion in loans), $325 million for Afghanistan, $300 millionfor Egypt for grants or loan guarantees, and $200 million for Pakistan. The conference versiongenerally provides the funds requested by Administration but reduces the request for Afghanistanto $167 million. (113) The FY2003 supplemental only addresses costs for the war itself, initial occupation, and replenishment of equipment and supplies for the remainder of the fiscal year. The Administration'srequest does not specify its assumptions about how many or how long troops would remain deployedin Iraq as an occupation force after the war is over, a controversial issue. Some current and retiredArmy leaders suggest that large numbers would be needed and that the Army's readiness could beaffected (see Occupation, below). To address the issue of long-term costs, the FY2004 budget resolution as passed by the Senate included an amendment that created a $100 billion reserve fund for the next 10 years to cover thecost of the war in Iraq, to be financed by reducing the size of the tax cut by $10 billion annuallybetween 2003 and 2013. The conference version of H.Con.Res. 95 eliminated thisprovision. (114) DOD Believes FY2003 Supplemental Will be Adequate. In a recent press conference, DOD Comptroller Dov Zakheim suggestedthat DOD's estimates of costs in its FY2003 supplemental request appear to be about right based oncosts experienced thus far. Based on its cost reports, it appears that DOD's costs in FY2003 for Iraqand Afghanistan and the global war on terrorism could range from $55.4 billion to $65.0 billion. The midpoint of the two estimates is $61.1 billion or close to the $62.6 billion provided by Congressin the supplemental. (see Table 1 below). (115) Table 1. DOD Estimate of Adequacy of FY2003 Supplemental for Cost of War in Iraq and Afghanistan (in billions of dollars) Source: CRS calculations based on DOD Press Transcript, Dov Zakheim,OSD/Comptroller , April16, 2003; see the related Department of Defense web site page at http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/2003/tr20030416-0111.html . a Covers personnel and personnel support costs for second half of FY2003; first half iscovered incategory, "Spent Thus Far." b Provides military and logistical support to Pakistan, Jordan and other "key cooperating"nations inthe global war on terrorism. c DOD estimates cost of Afghanistan and global war on terrorism runs about $1.1 billionto $1.2billion per month; CRS assumes the last seven months of costs are covered in the FY2003supplemental with the previous months funded in the $6 billion received by DOD in theFY2003 Consolidated Appropriations Resolution ( P.L. 108-7 ) d DOD's and Senator Steven's estimates of effect of congressional action to increaseimminentdanger pay and family separation allowances for deployed troops for FY2003 in P.L. 108-7 . e Congress set a floor of $1.1 billion for fuel costs due to higher prices compared to the $430millionassumed by DOD in its request. f Based on discussions with the services, Congress allocated $1.7 billion more for militarypersonnelthat DOD included in its request; however, if DOD's estimates are correct and the funding isnot needed, DOD can transfer the funds elsewhere (see H.Rept. 108-56 , p. 10). g May not add to total due to rounding. Estimates of the Total War and Postwar Costs. Because of uncertainties about both the course of the war itself and post-war needs, estimates of thetotal cost of war and war-related costs by observers outside the Administration ranged widely (see Table 2 below). Some observers emphasized that the cost for the United States could besubstantially higher than in the first Persian Gulf war because U.S. allies were unlikely to contributeto either the cost of the war itself or to postwar occupation. (116) The Administration is hopeful,however, that other countries will contribute to postwar reconstruction of Iraq. (117) The role of allies in postwar occupation is a particular concern of Army officials who worry that if a large postwar occupation force is required for one or two years, the readiness of U.S. forcescould be taxed. (118) Estimates of the numberof occupation forces needed have ranged from50,000-75,000, an estimate reportedly under consideration by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to over200,000, an estimate proposed by both General Eric K. Shinseki, Chief of Staff of the Army, andretired military and other experts with recent experience in the Balkans or the 1991 Gulf war. (119) TheAdministration's estimate appears to include funding for a relatively small occupation force for sixmonths. Members of Congress voiced concerns about the effect of war costs on the deficit. It now appears unlikely that total war costs in FY2003 will reach $100 billion in the first year, which wouldhave increased the FY2003 deficit by one-third from about $300 billion to $400 billion, setting a newrecord in real terms (i.e. when adjusted for inflation) though still a smaller percent of the GDP thanin 1983. (120) The effect of war costs on thedeficit was part of the ongoing debate on the FY2004budget resolution. War and related costs could rise if DOD's assumption about the size of theoccupation force needed proves to be optimistic, and continuation of those costs could increasefuture deficit levels. The full costs of a war with Iraq could include not only the cost of the war itself but also the cost of aid to allies to secure basing facilities and to compensate for economic losses (e.g. Pakistan,Israel, Egypt, and Jordan), post-war occupation costs, reconstruction costs, humanitarian assistance,and paying Iraqi government officials. Post-war costs could prove to be higher than the cost of thewar itself according to the estimates below. Those estimates suggest that direct war costs could range between $33 billion and $60 billion, while the costs of aid to allies, occupation, reconstruction, and humanitarian assistance could rangebetween $35 billion and $69 billion in the first year depending on the size of the occupation force,the amount for aid to allies, the scope of humanitarian assistance, and the sharing of reconstructionaid. Estimates of total costs in the first year ranged from about $68 billion to $129 billion. (see Table 2 below). (The FY2003 supplemental covers costs for Iraq that begin with initialdeploymentof forces in December 2002 and January 2003.) The Defense Department has not provided anyofficial estimates of the potential costs of the war with Iraq beyond FY2003. Earlier, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld had stated that $50 billion would be "on the high side for the cost of the war." (121) The Office ofManagement and Budget had reportedly estimated costsof $50-60 billion, but it did not issue the estimate publicly or explain the assumptions underlying itsprojections. An earlier estimate by former chief White House economist Larry Lindsey of $100billion to $200 billion was dismissed by the Administration. Table 2. Earlier Estimates of First Year Cost of a War with Iraq (in billions of dollars ) Notes and Sources: a Lower end reflects CBO revised estimate of cost of one-month war reflecting currentdeployments,a 10 month occupation of 100,000 troops, the U.S. paying half of the U.N.'s estimate of $30billion for reconstruction over three years, humanitarian aid for 10 % of the population, and $10billion in aid to allies based on State Department sources cited in Los Angeles Times , "Iraq WarCost Could Soar, Pentagon Says," February 26, 2003. b Higher end estimate reflects House Budget Committee estimate of cost of a 250,000 force,a10-month occupation of 200,000 troops, the U.S. paying the full cost of reconstruction,humanitarian aid for 20% of the population and $18 billion in aid to allies based on StateDepartment sources cited in Los Angeles Times , "Iraq War Cost Could Soar, Pentagon Says,"February 26, 2003. Previous Estimates of War Costs. In March 2003, on the basis of then current deployments, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) revised itsestimates of the costs of a war. Using its assumptions, a one-month war would cost $33 billion anda two-month war would cost $41 billion. (122) Adding $19 billion cost of an occupation force of100,000 to the cost of a one-month war, CBO's estimate would be about $51 billion, fairly closeto the Administration's request taking into account that the request included about $10 billion innon-Iraq costs. (123) Using a methodology based on the costs of the Persian Gulf War of 1991, the Democratic staff of the House Budget Committee estimated that a two-month war that deployed 250,000 troops wouldcost $53 billion to $60 billion, an estimate closer to that used by Secretary Rumsfeld. (124) An estimateby the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (CSBA) that blends the two approaches,suggested that the direct costs of a two-month war would be about $35 billion. A six-month war,with the same force size, could cost substantially more, ranging from $50 billion using CBO'sfigures to $85 billion using CSBA's approach. (125) Related Aid to Allies. The long-term cost of assistance to allies that could be affected by the war is uncertain. The supplemental includesassistance requests for the next 12 months totals $4.5 billion including both grants and loans but doesnot address any longer term cost issues. (126) Occupation. The cost of a post-war occupation would vary depending on the number of forces and the duration of their stay. The FY2003supplemental includes $12 billion for "stabilization" costs for the remainder of FY2003, but it is notclear what the Administration is assuming about troop levels. (127) Using factors based on the recentexperience for peacekeepers, CBO estimated that monthly occupation costs would range from $1.4billion for 75,000 personnel to $3.8 billion for 200,000 personnel, a force size that was consideredby the U.S. Central Command. (128) A year-long occupation force of 100,000 troops would cost $22.8 billion and a force of 200,000 troops would cost $45.6 billion using these factors. That estimate was recently buttressed bytestimony from the Army Chief of Staff, General Eric Shinseki, stating his view that several hundredthousand troops could be needed initially. (129) Deputy Secretary of Defense Wolfowitz disavowed thisestimate, suggesting that a smaller U.S. force was likely and that Allies would contribute as well. An estimate by the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments has pegged the post-war occupation cost at between $25 billion and $105 billion over 5 years depending on the size of theoccupation force that could range from a higher estimate of an initial peacekeeping forces of 150,000troops declining to 65,000 troops by the third year to a smaller occupation force of 50,000 decliningto 10,000 by the third year. (130) If thepeacekeeping role were shared with the U.N. or other nations,the costs to the United States would be lower. Press reports suggested that the Administration isconsidering an occupation of about 2 years but the Administration has not addressed the issue oflonger-term occupation costs though press reports cite discussion of $20 billion in annual costs. (131) Reconstruction. According to United Nations agencies, the cost of rebuilding Iraq after a war could run at least $30 billion in the first 3 years. (132) Nobel prize-winning economist William D. Nordhaus has indicated that reconstruction in Iraq couldcost between $30 billion over 3 to 4 years, based on World Bank factors used in estimatingrebuilding costs elsewhere, to $75 billion over 6 years using the costs of the Marshall Plan as aproxy. (133) If Iraqi oil fields are not substantially damaged, observers have suggested that oil revenues could pay for occupation or reconstruction. To help ensure that those revenues would be available,the FY2003 supplemental included a DOD request for $489 million for a Natural ResourceRemediation Fund to cover DOD costs for emergency firefighting and repair of Iraqi oil wells towhich other nations could also contribute; this request was enacted. (134) Most of Iraq's oil revenues,however, have been used for imports under the U.N. Oil-for-Food-Program or for domesticconsumption. Although expansion of Iraqi oil production may be possible over time, additionalrevenues might not be available for some time. Humanitarian Assistance. Costs of post-war humanitarian assistance for emergency food and medical supplies have been estimated at about $2.5billion the first year, and $10 billion over 4 years, assuming that about 20% of Iraq's population of24 million needed help. (135) If the numberneeding help were lower or other nations or the U.N.contributed, the cost to the United States would be lower. Economic Repercussions. Some observers suggested before the war that a conflict with Iraq could lead to a spike in the cost of oil generatedby a disruption in the supplies that could, in turn, tip the economy into recession, imposing majoradditional costs on the U.S. economy. (136) During the war itself, oil prices have fluctuated widely. For an analysis, see below, Oil Supply Issues . Larry Kumins, [phone number scrubbed] (Last updated April 14, 2003) The armed conflict in Iraq raised concerns over the supply and price of crude oil in world markets. The International Petroleum Encyclopedia 2001 reports that Iraq held 112.5 billion barrelsof proven crude oil reserves - 11% of the world's currently known reserves - second only to SaudiArabia's 259 billion barrels. Despite holding such large reserves, Iraq's pre-war rate of oilproduction is much below its ultimate potential. With investment in facilities, technology, and betteroperating methods, Iraq could rank as a top producer, a development that could change world oilmarket dynamics. Under the now-suspended Oil-for-Food Program (OFFP), Iraq's oil exports varied greatly. In some weeks virtually no oil was exported, in others as much as 3.0 million barrels per day (mbd)entered world markets. On March 17, 2003, the U.N. withdrew its staff from Iraq, leaving theprogram in limbo. Fighting in the southern part of Iraq - source of roughly half the oil exportedunder the program - caused the halt of exports from the Persian Gulf port at Umm Qasr. Theremainder of Iraq's exports, mainly produced in and around the Kirkuk field in the north, had beenshipped via twin pipelines across Turkey to the Mediterranean port of Ceyhan. Tanker loadings therereportedly halted shortly after the fighting began because of vessels' unwillingness to call. Storagefacilities at Ceyhan are virtually full, and the pipeline has likely stopped shipping. Conditions in thenorthern oil fields near Kirkuk, where this oil is produced, are not clear at this update, although itdoes appear that damage to wells and infrastructure is minimal. On average, prior to the onset of fighting, the U.N. Office of the Iraq Program reported that exports averaged 1.7 mbd under the OFFP. In addition, Iraq likely supplied another 400,000 barrelsto adjacent countries outside the U.N.-run program as well as producing for internal consumption.Despite the off-and-on nature of Iraq's international oil flow, the oil market relied on Iraqi supply,and it played a role in the determination of crude oil prices and other supplier-consumerarrangements. Iraq accounted for about 10% of average oil production by the Organization ofPetroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). Iraq is an OPEC member but does not participate in thecartel's quota program (as do the 10 other members) because Iraqi exports have been controlled bythe U.N. The U.N. has expressed an interest in restarting the Oil-for-Food Program as soon as ispractical, and Security Council Resolution 1472 of March 28, 2003, authorized the program underU.N. administration through May 12. (For further information, see above, Post-War GovernanceIssues and Humanitarian Issues .) It is too early to predict, however, when Iraqi exportsmightresume, under whose auspices, and in what quantity they may flow. Crude prices recently touched $40 per barrel, equaling levels reached during 1990-1991. The price spike resulted from supply difficulties due to an oil workers' strike in Venezuela, as well asoverriding concerns about Persian Gulf oil supply. The Venezuelan strike, which began on December2, 2002, seems at least partially resolved; oil exports appear to be slowly approaching pre-strikeamounts, although it is not clear if and when old levels might be re-attained. But tribal violence inNigeria, another important world market supplier, has resulted in output cuts as much as 800,000barrels per day. These intermittent difficulties present add variables to the international oil supplyshortfall situation, where Iraq is the largest component. War jitters about crude supply appear to ebb and flow. But the cessation of exports from Iraq, and Venezuelan and Nigerian supply concerns have combined to create volatile market conditions.Prices, which have fallen from March highs, now range in the mid-to-upper $20s. Were the supplyshortfalls from Venezuela and Nigeria to continue through spring, and Iraq's crude oil supply remainshut-in, OPEC members-who upped output by nearly 2 million barrels per day to offset the impactof Iraq-would be hard pressed to make up further crude supply losses. Were events in the PersianGulf, Nigeria or Venezuela to adversely effect the availability of petroleum for the world market, agenuine oil shortfall of significant proportion would result, with dramatic impact on supply andprice. At this update, as noted, prices are well off recent highs, but oil markets are extremely volatileand prices can fluctuate markedly depending on events and their interpretation. For the longer outlook, under a future Iraqi government, the country could have the resources to become a much larger oil producer, increasing world supply and changing the oil price paradigmthat has prevailed since the Iranian political upheaval of 1978-1979. This eventuality could unleasha new set of political and economic forces in the region; it could also change the complexion of theworld oil market by enhancing future crude oil availability. This section provides links to additional sources of information related to a possible war withIraq. A list of CRS experts on Iraq-related issues may be found at http://www.crs.gov/experts/iraqconflict.shtml . Those listed include experts on U.S. policy towards Iraq, Iraqi threats, U.N. sanctions and U.S. enforcement actions, policy options and implications, war powers and the use of force,nation-building and exit strategies, and international views and roles. Information research expertsare also listed. For a list of CRS products related to the Iraq situation, see http://www.congress.gov/erp/legissues/html/isfar12.html . The reports listed deal with threats, responses, and consequences; international and regional issues and perspectives; and authorities and precedents for the use of force. For information on U.S. armed forces deployed in connection with the Iraq crisis, see CRS Report RL31763, Iraq: Summary of U.S. Forces . CRS Report RL31766 , Iraq, United Nations and Humanitarian Aid Organizations. For background information on Iraq, including geography, population, ethnic divisions, government structure, and economic information, see the World Factbook, 2002 published by theU.S. Central Intelligence Agency. http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/iz.html For basic maps related to the Iraq situation, see CRS Report RS21396 , Iraq: Map Sources . The html version of the report includes hot links to a wide range of map resources. The following CRS page focuses on official sources, including sources in both the legislative and executive branches of the U.S. government, foreign government sources, and sources ofinformation at international organizations. http://www.crs.gov/products/browse/iraqdocs.shtml . On November 8, 2002, the United Nations Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 1441, holding Iraq in "material breach" of its disarmament obligations. For background and text,see http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2002/SC7564.doc.htm For a compendium of resolutions since 1992, see CRS Report RL31611(pdf) , Iraq-Kuwait: United Nations Security Council Texts, 1992-2002. 

Summary: The Iraq war was launched on March 19, 2003, with a strike against a location where Iraqi President Saddam Hussein and top lieutenants were believed to be meeting. On March 17, PresidentBush had given Saddam an ultimatum to leave the country or face military conflict. Although someresistance was encountered after U.S. troops entered Iraq, all major Iraqi population centers had beenbrought under U.S. control by April 14. In November 2002, the United Nations Security Councilhad adopted Resolution 1441, giving Iraq a final opportunity to "comply with its the disarmamentobligations" or "face serious consequences." During January and February 2003, a U.S. militarybuildup in the Persian Gulf intensified and President Bush, other top U.S. officials, and BritishPrime Minister Tony Blair repeatedly indicated that Iraq had little time left to offer full cooperationwith U.N. weapons inspectors. However, leaders of France, Germany, Russia, and China urged thatthe inspections process be allowed more time. The Administration and its supporters assert that Iraq was in defiance of 17 Security Council resolutions requiring that it fully declare and eliminate its weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Further delay in taking action against Iraq, they argued, would have endangered national security andundermined U.S. credibility. Skeptics, including many foreign critics, maintained that theAdministration was exaggerating the Iraq threat and argued that the U.N. inspections process shouldhave been extended. In October 2002, Congress authorized the President to use the armed forcesof the United States to defend U.S. national security against the threat posed by Iraq and to enforceall relevant U.N. resolutions regarding Iraq ( P.L. 107-243 ). Analysts and officials are concerned about the risk of instability and ethnic fragmentation in Iraq after the war. U.S. plans for post-war governance of Iraq are just starting to be implemented,and the role of the United Nations in administering Iraq, if any, is still under debate. Whether theoverthrow of Iraq President Saddam Hussein will lead to democratization in Iraq and the widerMiddle East, or promote instability and an intensification of anti-U.S. attitudes, is also an issue indebate. The Iraq war has created concerns over the humanitarian situation, particularly in Baghdadand other cities affected by the war, but large-scale refugee flows have not occurred. Constitutional issues concerning a possible war with Iraq were largely resolved by the enactment of P.L. 107-243 , the October authorization. International legal issues remain, however,with respect to launching a pre-emptive war against Iraq and the prospective occupation. Estimatesof the cost of a war in Iraq vary widely. If war or its aftermath leads to a spike in the price of oil,economic growth could slow, but oil prices have fluctuated widely during the conflict to date. Conceivably, global oil production could increase significantly after the war. This CRS report provides information and analysis with respect to the 2003 war with Iraq, reviews a number of war-related issues, and provides links to additional sources of information. Itwill not be further updated. For current CRS products related to Iraq, see the CRS home page at http://www.crs.gov .