The five countries in the Andean region—Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela—represent primary sources of or transit routes for cocaine entering the United States.  Bolivia. Bolivia is the world’s third largest producer of cocaine as well as a transit zone for cocaine products from Peru, primarily to neighboring countries in South America and to Europe. Although cocaine production is illegal in Bolivia, coca farming is permitted in some parts of the country.  Colombia. Colombia, within 3 hours flying time from Florida, produces 90 percent of the cocaine entering the United States and much of the heroin in the eastern United States. Several terrorist organizations in Colombia, which commit wide-scale violence and human rights abuses, engage in drug trafficking as a source of income.  Ecuador. Ecuador is a major transit route for cocaine produced primarily in neighboring Colombia and Peru. Since it uses the U.S. dollar as its currency, Ecuador is also an attractive venue for money laundering by individuals and organizations engaged in criminal activities.  Peru. Peru is the world’s second largest producer of cocaine. Drug trafficking also generates a significant amount of money laundering in Peru.  Venezuela. Venezuela is one of the major drug transit countries in the Western Hemisphere. Cocaine produced in Colombia is trafficked through Venezuela; transported to locations in the Caribbean, Mexico, or Central America; and then subsequently brought to the United States and other locations. The map in figure 1 shows the locations of the five Andean countries. Several U.S. departments and agencies are involved in planning and executing counternarcotics assistance in the Andean countries.  State. State manages and funds eradication, interdiction, and law enforcement assistance, including programs implemented by a variety of other U.S. agencies. State also funds security assistance programs generally implemented by DOD, including Foreign Military Financing and International Military Education and Training programs, which are intended to strengthen the overall capacity of foreign forces to address security threats such as the narcotics trade. In addition to these activities, State provides limited funding to the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to implement counternarcotics assistance in the Andean region. DHS components that implement this assistance include Customs and Border Protection (CBP), Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), and the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG). State also provides funding for the Department of Justice’s (DOJ) International Criminal Investigative Training and Assistance Program (ICITAP), which supports prosecution of members of paramilitary groups in Colombia.  USAID. USAID supports the U.S. counternarcotics effort through its rule-of-law and alternative development programs in several of the Andean countries.  DOD. DOD, primarily through its Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Counternarcotics and Global Threats (DASD-CN>), provides oversight and funds for counternarcotics activities in the Andean region.  DEA. DEA works, primarily through its Sensitive Investigative Unit (SIU) program, to dismantle and disrupt drug trafficking organizations that are active in the Andean region. DEA maintains SIU programs in three of the five Andean countries. For more information about each agency’s counternarcotics assistance in the Andean countries, see appendixes II and III. ONDCP produces the National Drug Control Strategy, which outlines the administration’s initiatives to reduce illicit drug use, manufacturing and trafficking, drug-related crime and violence, and drug-related health consequences. ONDCP is also responsible for evaluating, coordinating, and overseeing U.S. agencies’ counternarcotics activities. In December 2006, Congress directed ONDCP to produce an annual report describing the national drug control performance measurement system and identifying the efforts of agencies carrying out activities under the National Drug Control Program. In May 2007, ONDCP issued guidance requiring these agencies to submit annual performance summary reports to the ONDCP Director. According to the guidance, these reports must describe, among other things, performance measures used by the agency to assess its counternarcotics activities; the prior year’s performance targets and results; current fiscal year performance targets and methodology used to establish those targets; and procedures used to ensure that performance data are accurate, complete, and unbiased. Prior to submitting these reports to ONDCP, agencies must provide the reports to their Inspector General (IG) for attestation to the reliability of each assertion made in the report. As part of its counternarcotics efforts in the Western Hemisphere, the United States has launched several regional initiatives outside the Andean region—the Mérida Initiative, the Caribbean Basin Security Initiative (CBSI), and the Central American Regional Security Initiative (CARSI)—to combat rising drug-related crime in Mexico, the Caribbean, and Central America. See appendix IV for additional information about these regional initiatives. Although no single comprehensive U.S. counternarcotics strategy exists for the Andean region, mission strategic resource plans (MSRPs) for each of the countries in the region delineate the strategic approaches guiding U.S. counternarcotics assistance. According to State officials, the MSRPs incorporate high-level guidance from ONDCP’s annual National Drug Control Strategy, which also includes specific policy guidance for the Western Hemisphere. This strategy presents a broad framework for reducing illicit drug use and its harmful effects on the United States. Included in the strategy is a chapter on international partnerships focused on reducing the supply of illicit drugs in the United States via U.S. cooperative efforts, such as those with Colombia and Peru, the CBSI countries, and the CARSI countries, and initiatives to combat trafficking through transit countries such as Ecuador. The MSRPs for the Andean countries, developed by interagency teams at U.S. embassies in consultation with host country governments, summarize conditions in each country, specify U.S. foreign assistance goals, and describe in general terms the assistance planned to further those goals. Following are highlights of the strategic approaches described in MSRPs developed for each of the Andean countries in fiscal years 2007 through 2011. The MSRPs for Bolivia address counternarcotics assistance as one of the U.S. mission’s highest priorities. The MSRPs generally focus on developing the government of Bolivia’s capacity to interdict cocaine and precursor chemicals, supporting multilateral cooperation, assisting the government of Bolivia with demand reduction policies, and supporting alternative development programs. Similarly, as part of U.S. public diplomacy efforts to support understanding of U.S. policies, the MSRPs call for U.S. support of drug-awareness programs to communicate the damage done to Bolivian society caused by excess coca production, drug trafficking and consumption, and the benefits of alternative development. The MSRPs reflect a difficult bilateral relationship between the United States and Bolivia, which has adversely affected counternarcotics operations in that country. Bilateral ties were greatly strained in 2008, when coca growers expelled USAID from the Chapare region in June, followed by the Bolivian president’s declaring the U.S. Ambassador persona non grata in September and expelling DEA in November of that year. Although U.S. counternarcotics assistance in Bolivia has continued, State officials report that resources for interdiction have declined in the years since DEA’s departure. The MSRPs for Colombia characterize counternarcotics efforts as the cornerstone of the U.S. bilateral relationship with that country. The U.S. counternarcotics strategy in Colombia has focused on aerial eradication, alternative development, interdiction, counterterrorism, and demobilization of combatants. The MSRPs report a successful partnership with Colombia over a number of years, with Colombian authorities increasingly assuming responsibility for funding and sustaining counternarcotics programs. The MSRPs also note that Colombia has emerged as a provider of counternarcotics assistance to other countries in the region. Beginning in 2009, the MSRPs reflect the launch of the Colombian Strategic Development Initiative (CSDI). CSDI supports the government of Colombia’s National Territorial Consolidation Plan that aims to expand state presence in four priority geographic zones previously dominated by illegal armed groups. Many municipalities in the target areas suffer from weak local institutions, lack of civilian authority, limited police capabilities, and an ineffective or absent justice system, which undermine the rule of law and perpetuate a vicious cycle of drug trafficking and violence. CSDI supports the government of Colombia’s efforts by providing economic opportunities once security and basic public services are established. Through CSDI, the U.S. strategy intends to support the transfer of security responsibilities from the Colombian military to the police. The U.S. strategy also seeks to sharply curtail illicit crop cultivation and cocaine production in priority conflict zones, thereby removing a vital source of funding for illegal armed groups. The MSRPs for Ecuador describe a strategic approach that, owing to Ecuador’s role as a transit country for illicit drugs, has focused on improving security along the northern border with Colombia and other key transport choke points. The MSRPs generally reflect U.S. support in the form of technical and advisory assistance, as well as equipment and training for the Ecuadorian military and police forces to improve detection and interdiction of drug trafficking. The MSRPs also note efforts to provide licit employment opportunities for populations in regions vulnerable to penetration by drug traffickers, as well as advocacy of tougher penalties for money laundering. Until 2009, a key element of the U.S. counternarcotics strategy for Ecuador and the Andean Region was the Forward Operating Location at the Ecuadorian Air Force base at Manta. This facility allowed detection, monitoring, and tracking of drug trafficking activities in the Eastern Pacific Ocean. According to agency officials, since 2009 U.S. monitoring of drug trafficking has been moved to other locations in the region. For example, detection and monitoring are now primarily focused on areas of arrival in Central America rather than areas of departure in South America. The MSRPs for Peru note a number of factors affecting the strategy for counternarcotics assistance. Foremost among these factors is the cross- border nature of drug trafficking throughout the Andean region, where successes in Colombia, for example, increase pressures on Peru. In addition, these documents highlight the lack of a Peruvian government presence in the principal areas of the country where coca production and trafficking takes place, which has allowed narcotics traffickers to move in to fill the vacuum. Under the strategic goal of combating terrorism, the United States has supported the government of Peru’s efforts against domestic terrorists, who fund their operations and recruitment through drug production and trafficking. U.S. assistance also has targeted efforts to bring greater government control to border areas where Colombian terrorist organizations have obtained a foothold. The most recent MSRPs identify Mexican and Colombian drug cartels among the entities that benefit from drug trafficking in Peru. Funding support for the Peruvian government’s drug strategy is designated a priority. The Peruvian strategy focuses on preventing and reducing consumption, disrupting production and trafficking, and promoting alternative development, including helping farmers grow licit, rather than illicit, crops. According to the MSRPs, the eradication program combined with sustained alternative development supported by USAID over the last several years has reduced coca cultivation to nearly insignificant levels in San Martin department, once one of the key coca growing areas of the world, and replaced it with licit, high-value crops such as cacao, coffee, and oil palm. The U.S. strategy seeks to replicate that model in other areas of Peru and to encourage Peruvian authorities to assume greater responsibility for sustaining counternarcotics programs. The MSRPs also reflect concerns over the role that efforts to combat drug trafficking play in stemming other illicit activities, such as money laundering, illegal logging, and trafficking in wildlife. The MSRPs for Venezuela reflect continuing concern over increased trafficking of cocaine from neighboring Colombia, which apparently has led to rising cocaine consumption in Venezuela. The MSRPs note that the U.S. counternarcotics strategy for that country is constrained by the Venezuelan government’s antagonism toward the United States. The U.S. strategy has therefore aimed primarily at reducing demand for cocaine, primarily through cooperation with local and regional law enforcement. State, USAID, DOD, and DEA allotted a combined estimated total of nearly $5.2 billion in counternarcotics assistance to Andean countries in fiscal years 2006-2011. Of this amount, about $366 million (7 percent) was allotted for Bolivia; $3.92 billion (76 percent) for Colombia; $233 million (5 percent) for Ecuador; $659 million (13 percent) for Peru; and $7 million (less than 1 percent) for Venezuela (see fig. 2). Total estimated allotments for counternarcotics assistance programs in the Andean countries declined overall by about 51 percent from fiscal year 2006 to fiscal year 2011. Allotments for Bolivia declined by about $103 million (87 percent); for Colombia, by $377 million (45 percent); for Ecuador, by $32 million (59 percent); for Peru, by $87 million (52 percent); and for Venezuela, by $2 million (88 percent). In fiscal year 2008, allotments for counternarcotics assistance programs declined in all Andean countries. (See fig. 3.) Of the agencies’ combined estimated assistance in fiscal years 2006 through 2011, State provided about $3 billion (60 percent), USAID provided $1 billion (21 percent), DOD provided $956 million (19 percent), and DEA provided $25 million (less than 1 percent). As figure 4 shows, each agency’s allotments decreased during this time period. State’s allotments for counternarcotics assistance declined the most, dropping by about 60 percent from fiscal year 2006 to fiscal year 2011. According to agency officials, this decline in funding for counternarcotics assistance could be attributed to factors such as the ongoing nationalization of U.S. counternarcotics programs and assets in Colombia as well as a general reduction in available resources across the federal government in recent fiscal years. State, USAID, and DEA reported meeting or exceeding most of their annual targets related to key counternarcotics performance measures in the Andean countries, and each complied with the ONDCP requirement that each agency obtain its IG’s attestation to the reliability of the agency’s performance summary reports before submitting the reports to ONDCP. DOD also reported tracking counternarcotics performance measures, but we could not confirm the reliability of its performance data. Moreover, DOD did not comply with ONDCP’s requirement that the IG attest to the reliability of reported data. State, USAID, and DEA reported meeting or exceeding many performance targets related to key measures since 2007, when ONDCP called for these targets to be set. Performance measures are important in helping managers assess progress toward goals and promoting accountability by communicating agency performance to Congress and the public. In addition, in compliance with ONDCP’s 2007 requirement, each agency submitted IG attestations to the reliability of the data reported. State reported meeting or exceeding more than half of its annual targets for two key measures of its counternarcotics activities: (1) hectares of illicit crops eradicated and (2) kilos of narcotics seized. State reported meeting or exceeding a total of 16 of 28 annual targets related to these measures. State reported assisting in the eradication of about 915,000 hectares of illicit crops in Bolivia, Colombia, and Peru in fiscal years 2006 through 2010, meeting or exceeding its annual targets in those countries about half the time in the 4 years for which data are available. State also reported assisting in the seizure of approximately 2,300,000 kilos of narcotics in Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru in fiscal years 2006 through 2010, meeting or exceeding more than half of its annual interdiction targets in the four years for which data are available. State is currently revising its performance measurements. Officials told us that they are making efforts to develop more performance measures that do not focus on eradication, because eradication is not the sole factor influencing cultivation levels. State is also making efforts to develop metrics that demonstrate progress toward turning over control of counternarcotics programs to partner countries. (See app. II and app. III for further details of State’s counternarcotics efforts in each of the Andean countries.) State’s IG attested to the reliability of the department’s reporting of performance results for fiscal years 2007 through 2010, in accordance with ONDCP’s requirement. In January 2010, State’s Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs issued guidelines for program monitoring and evaluation. These guidelines were intended to help program managers determine whether projects are achieving their goals and adjust projects as necessary; plan effective programs; report program results to key stakeholders and oversight entities; justify resource requests; promote necessary changes in partner support, and contribute to constructive policy dialogue within the U.S. government and internationally. Departmentwide program evaluation guidance followed in November 2010, when State announced its first-ever evaluation policy for improving program management. USAID reported generally exceeding annual targets related to two key measures for its counternarcotics efforts in the Andean countries: (1) hectares of land devoted to cultivating licit crops in areas receiving USAID assistance and (2) number of jobs created by alternative development projects each year. USAID reported exceeding a total of 26 of 32 annual targets related to these measures. According to USAID data, 804,314 hectares were devoted to alternative crops and 761,031 full-time jobs were created in Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru in fiscal years 2006 through 2010. (See app. II and app. III for further details of USAID’s counternarcotics efforts in each of the Andean countries.) In accordance with ONDCP’s 2007 requirement, USAID’s IG attested to the reliability of the agency’s reporting of performance results for fiscal years 2007 through 2010. USAID conducts evaluations of its counternarcotics and development programs in the Andean countries. These evaluations provide historical and regional context for USAID projects, detailed descriptions of program activities and results, findings, conclusions, recommendations, and lessons learned. Some of the achievements reported in these evaluations include the following:  USAID’s alternative development program has met and surpassed annual targets for voluntary eradication of illicit crops in Peru.  USAID contributed to Plan Colombia, which reduced opium poppy cultivation by 50 percent and improved security by suppressing illegally armed groups.  USAID’s activities in Bolivia have contributed to improved poverty indicators, and hectares of principal alternative crops—such as bananas and citrus—have increased more than coca. DEA reported generally exceeding regional targets related to two key performance measures for its international counternarcotics efforts:(1) number of drug trafficking organizations, or priority target organizations (PTO), disrupted and (2) number of PTOs dismantled. DEA reported meeting or exceeding 8 of 10 annual targets related to these measures. DEA reported disrupting 73 PTOs and dismantling 144 in Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela in fiscal years 2006 through 2011, meeting or exceeding its regional targets for every year except 2007 and 2011. (See app. II and app. III for country-level details on the results of DEA’s counternarcotics activities in Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela.) DOJ’s IG attested to the reliability of DEA’s reporting of its performance results for 2007 through 2010, in accordance with ONDCP’s requirement. DOD reported a number of performance measures for its counternarcotics efforts in the Andean countries in fiscal years 2007 through 2011, such as training and military support. However, we could not confirm the reliability of the counternarcotics performance data DOD reported during these years. DOD is working to improve its counternarcotics performance measurement system, but DOD officials have reported challenges in measuring the performance of its counternarcotics activities, such as difficulty in creating performance measures that assess program outcomes, as well as dependence on host nations and third parties for the collection and reporting of data related to these results. DOD’s efforts to develop counternarcotics performance measures are long-standing. We reported in 1999 that DOD had taken initial steps to develop better counternarcotics performance measures. In a subsequent review, we found that DOD did not have an effective performance measurement system to track the progress of its counternarcotics activities. ONDCP also reported holding, since 2006, numerous consultations with DOD regarding the department’s development of a performance measurement system for its counternarcotics efforts. In 2010 we recommended that (1) DOD review the department’s performance measures for counternarcotics activities and revise the measures, as appropriate, to include the key attributes of successful performance measures that we had previously identified and (2) apply practices that we had identified to facilitate the use of performance data. In response to these recommendations, DOD issued standard operating procedures for the development and documentation of counternarcotics performance metrics. This guidance outlines procedures for selecting and evaluating counternarcotics performance measures, setting performance targets, and assessing the reliability and limitations of performance data with the purpose of using this information to provide oversight and guide management decisions about the allotment of counternarcotics resources. According to ONDCP, as a result of this standard operating procedure, DOD revised its performance measurement system in fiscal year 2011 to improve the system’s quality and usefulness. According to DOD officials, the department is currently developing its counternarcotics performance measures and plans to transition to a web-based system for reporting its performance metrics by fiscal year 2013. DOD did not submit IG statements attesting to the reliability of the department’s performance data as required by ONDCP. DOD IG cited a number of reasons for not attesting to the reliability of DOD’s performance data. For example, according to the IG, DOD’s performance reports for fiscal years 2007 through 2009 did not meet ONDCP requirements that the reports clearly describe the meaning and relevance of performance measures and explain why any targets were not met. In addition, according to information we obtained during a 2010 interview with the IG, DOD’s 2008 performance report did not include 4 consecutive years of data required for tracking improvements. Further, targets for several performance measures in the 2008 report appeared to have been set after the actual results for these measures were determined, therefore throwing the reliability of all the data into question. DOD IG saw no changes in DOD’s 2009 performance report and therefore decided not to dedicate resources to conducting a review for the 2009 report. ONDCP confirmed that DOD again failed to comply with the IG review requirement in fiscal year 2010. In June 2012, DOD IG stated that it was unable to attest to the reliability of DOD’s fiscal year 2011 performance report. Given the strategic importance of reducing drug production and trafficking in the Andean countries—the source of more than 95 percent of the cocaine seized in the United States and much of the heroin available east of the Mississippi River—accurate and reliable information on the results of this assistance is essential. State, USAID, and DEA have reported the required information, with attestations of its reliability, regarding the combined $4 billion in assistance that they provided in fiscal years 2006 through 2011. However, lacking attestations by DOD’s IG, ONDCP has minimal assurance of the reliability of DOD’s reporting on its estimated $956 million in counternarcotics assistance in those years. Without reliable information, ONDCP may be limited in its ability to carry out its responsibility for coordinating and overseeing implementation of the policies, goals, objectives, and priorities established by the national drug control program and to report accurately to Congress on counternarcotics assistance provided by agencies under ONDCP’s purview. Moreover, without reliable information, Congress and other decision makers, including ONDCP, may lack information that is essential to assessing progress toward the U.S. goal of curtailing illicit drug consumption in America, making decisions on the allocation of resources, and conducting effective oversight. To strengthen ONDCP’s ability to coordinate, oversee, and report to Congress on U.S. counternarcotics assistance in the Andean countries, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense ensure that DOD complies with the ONDCP requirement to submit to ONDCP performance summary reports that are accompanied by IG attestations of the reliability of the information reported. We provided a draft of this report to State, USAID, DOD, DEA, and ONDCP. State, DOD, DEA, ONDCP, and DHS provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. USAID and DOD also provided written comments, which are reproduced in appendixes VI and VII, respectively. In its written comments, DOD stated that it concurred with our recommendation. As discussed with your offices, unless you publicly announce the contents of this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days from the report date. At that time, we will send copies to the Secretary of State, the USAID Administrator, the Secretary of Defense, the Attorney General, and the Director of National Drug Control Policy. In addition, the report will be available at no charge on the GAO website at http://www.gao.gov If you or your staff members have any questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 512-7331 or johnsoncm@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Public Affairs and Congressional Relations may be found on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made key contributions to this report are listed in appendix VIII. To identify U.S. agencies that provided counternarcotics assistance in the Andean region during fiscal years 2006 through 2011, we reviewed past GAO reports and relevant legislation. To identify counternarcotics assistance activities, we reviewed funding amounts reported to us by agencies, congressional budget submissions, agency annual reports, and other program documents. We also interviewed officials from the Department of State (State), the Department of Defense (DOD), the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), and the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA). To describe the U.S. strategic approaches to counternarcotics assistance in the five Andean countries, we examined multiple U.S. government documents and interviewed U.S. government officials. Specifically, we obtained and analyzed State’s mission and bureau performance plans to understand U.S. foreign policy and security goals and priorities and the executive branch’s approach to formulating those goals. We also obtained State’s and USAID’s joint strategic 5-year plan, DOD’s Counternarcotics and Global Threats strategy, and DEA’s agency strategic plan. We interviewed officials from State, USAID, DOD, and DEA in Washington, D.C., who are responsible for administering and implementing the assistance programs to the five Andean countries. We reviewed department and agency planning, reporting, and budgeting documents and obtained and reviewed the various strategy documents produced by the United States that are the basis for overall drug control efforts, such as the Office of National Drug Control Policy’s (ONDCP) annual National Drug Control Strategy and the U.S. embassy’s mission strategic resource plans for fiscal years 2007 through 2011. We defined “counternarcotics assistance” as all funding provided primarily for the purpose of eradicating drug crop cultivation, interdicting trafficked narcotics, supporting alternative livelihoods and alternative crop cultivation, or training and equipping military and law enforcement for counternarcotics operations. In addition, we included small amounts of funding for assistance efforts in the region intended to support U.S. counternarcotics goals in the region, such as legal sector reform and drug demand reduction programs in Andean countries. The funding information presented in this report is based on allotment data. We used GAO’s definition of “allotment” as funds authorized by the head of an agency to be used for obligations. Each agency provided their funding amounts using internal, agency-specific budget terminology. This terminology varied among agencies; for example, some agencies referred to their funding amounts as ‘budget levels’ where other agencies referred to their funding amounts as ‘allocations.’ We discussed our definition of the term “allotment” with cognizant officials at each agency. At each agency, those officials stated that the funding amounts they provided could be characterized using our definition of allotment and thus could be presented in this report as funds available for obligation in support of counternarcotics efforts in each of the Andean countries. To identify the amounts of U.S. government funding allotted for counternarcotics, we requested funding data for counternarcotics assistance in the Andean region for fiscal years 2006 through 2011. We also interviewed cognizant agency officials and examined past GAO reports and congressional budget submissions, including State’s Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (State/INL) program and budget guides for fiscal years 2006 through 2011. In addition, we obtained technical comments from DHS to confirm that all DHS counternarcotics efforts in the region are implemented using funds from other U.S. agencies and international organizations. We collected data for fiscal years 2006 through fiscal year 2011 to show trends in counternarcotics assistance funding in the region. Each agency provided funding data organized by country (Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela) and by fiscal year (2006-2011). Based on our review of the data and discussions with agency officials, we determined that the data were sufficiently reliable for a broad estimate of U.S. government counternarcotics program allotments the Andean region, and to provide an indication of general trends over time as well as differences in funding provided by country and agency. The agencies took different steps and queried different systems to provide the funding data we requested. State. Officials from State’s Office of the Director of Foreign Assistance provided data from the Foreign Assistance Coordination and Tracking System (FACTS) database, which houses funding data on U.S. foreign assistance programs. The FACTS funding data included amounts from fiscal year 2006 through 2011 from the following foreign assistance accounts: Andean Counterdrug Initiative (ACI); Foreign Military Financing (FMF); International Military Education and Training (IMET); International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE); and Nonproliferation, Anti-terrorism, Demining and Related Programs (NADR). We requested the funding amounts for these accounts after determining, through discussions with State officials, that these accounts were the most relevant to our scope. In addition, we requested specific amounts allotted for security sector reform and combating transnational crime in the region from the Development Assistance (DA) and Economic Support Fund (ESF) accounts. In addition, State’s Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement (INL) provided records on appropriations, allotments, obligations, expenditures, and other budget categories. We used these records to provide data on funding allotted for assistance in Ecuador through DOD’s Section 1207 Assistance program; we did not obtain any additional data on 1207 program funding in the region. USAID. USAID’s Office of Latin America and the Caribbean consulted internal records and submitted a spreadsheet that combined (1) amounts of ACI assistance provided in fiscal years 2006 and 2007, which were not included in the State/F data and (2) data pulled by a query of the FACTS database to provide amounts allotted for counternarcotics assistance through the DA and ESF accounts for fiscal years 2008 through 2011. DOD. DOD’s Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Counternarcotics and Global Threats (DASD-CN>) provided a document with funding data from the CTA for Counternarcotics. DASD-CN> provides oversight of CTA funding through a Web- based database. DASD-CN> compiled funding data from this database— which tracks funds by project code— and then asked knowledgeable officials to provide estimated amounts of funds used in support of each Andean country. DEA. DEA reviewed interagency agreement documents with State to obtain data on allotments for DEA’s SIU program. DEA provided a spreadsheet with detail from those agreements on funding provided in support of the program. We combined the funding data provided by State, USAID, DOD, and DEA to obtain total estimated U.S. government funds allotted. These amounts are estimates because, according to agency officials, funding databases may have imperfect or incomplete information, and some agencies relied on manual estimates or manual review of agency documentation rather than a central data management system to provide funding information. Because State’s FACTS database was in the process of being created and launched in fiscal years 2006 and 2007, some data may be missing for those years. In addition, State officials told us that although assistance provided through the FMF and IMET accounts is often used for counternarcotics purposes, the main intent of these accounts is to provide assistance to partner nation militaries. Some of the FMF and IMET assistance included in this report may not have provided direct support to counternarcotics efforts of Andean countries. In addition, State/INL’s records on the allotments for the 1207 program may not be complete, because the program was originally managed by DOD; authority for the 1207 program expired on September 30, 2010. According to State, because State does not maintain separate records for the uses of funds in the ACI account, State was not able to provide complete data specific to this account. According to USAID, USAID’s Office for Latin America and the Caribbean relied on internal records that had been maintained by the staff since 2006 to provide GAO with data on ACI funding amounts allotted by USAID in each country for counternarcotics programs. Similarly, DOD provided manual estimates of amounts by country, because according to DOD, the department tracks CTA funding by project code—which indicates the general purpose of the funding—rather than by country. According to DOD, there is no standard procedure for estimating these amounts by country. Unlike funding data provided by other agencies, DEA amounts were obtained by a manual review of agency documentation, not pulled by query from a data management system, according to DEA officials. To assess State, USAID, DOD, and DEA reporting on their performance of counternarcotics activities in the Andean countries, we reviewed agency planning and reporting documents related to counternarcotics performance measures and targets. We also met with State, USAID, DOD, and DOJ officials to identify the most significant performance measures for their counternarcotics activities in the Andean countries. For the focus of our review, we selected two key measures for each agency that were identified by agency officials as significant indicators of the results of their counternarcotics activities, included in the agencies’ annual performance reports to ONDCP, and consistently reported to ONDCP over the past 5 years for all Andean countries. We assessed the reliability of agency performance data for these key measures by interviewing cognizant agency officials about the methods used to gather and verify this data. We also reviewed related documents, such as independent data quality assessments and statements from agency Inspector Generals (IG) attesting to the reliability of agency performance data. We found limitations with some of the performance data for these key measures, including (1) lack of available State and USAID data in Venezuela, and of DEA data in Bolivia, due to limited U.S. presence in these countries; (2) reliance on partner nations and third parties for collection and reporting of certain performance data; and (3) lack of IG authentication of DOD’s reported performance data. We used these data to describe each agency’s counternarcotics performance measures and the results related to these measures, as reported by the agencies, in relation to their counternarcotics performance targets. With the exception of DOD’s performance data, we determined that the performance data provided by the agencies were sufficiently reliable for our purposes. We conducted this performance audit from April 2011 through July 2012 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our work objectives. Each U.S. agency involved in CSDI has a designated area of responsibility. State focuses on eradication, USAID focuses on land reform and restitution, and DOD focuses on anti-insurgency support. DEA’s SIU program is not part of CSDI but provides training and equipment to a vetted unit within the Colombian National Police (CNP). State, USAID, DOD, and DEA coordinate counternarcotics efforts in country. DOD In fiscal years 2006 through 2011, DOD allotted about $752 million for counternarcotics-related security assistance in Colombia (see fig. 8). DOD has provided training and equipment for the Regional Helicopter Training Center and pilot training program in Melgar. DOD has also provided rotary-wing aircraft support to the Colombian Joint Task Force-Omega, which is the main Colombian task force charged with confronting the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (known by its Spanish acronym, FARC). DOD counternarcotics funds have also developed maritime interdiction capacity through the purchase of boats and construction of related infrastructure in Santa Marta, Cartagena and other locations. Some counternarcotics programs and assets are being transferred to Colombian control. For example, State’s Plan Colombia Helicopter Program, initiated in 2002, provides rotary-wing aircraft to develop Colombian Army aviation. State officials estimated that the last aircraft provided by the program would be transferred to the government of Colombia by the end of 2012. Similarly, State’s Colombian National Police Aviation program has nationalized the cost of fuel to the CNP and plans for the nationalization of rotary-wing aircraft in 2012. The CNP also plans to assume financial responsibility for the purchase, transport, and mixing of glyphosate, the chemical used in aerial eradication, in 2011 and 2012. Bolivia State supports manual eradication efforts in Bolivia by providing training and equipment to military and police and through aviation programs that provide aircraft with related training and maintenance to support transportation and logistics. State also makes aviation assets available for interdiction purposes, transporting manual eradication teams, supplies, and equipment to otherwise inaccessible regions of the country. State Department: Eradication and Interdiction State leads drug crop eradication efforts in Bolivia, Colombia, and Peru and supports law enforcement in each of these countries with training and equipment to enhance drug interdiction capacity. State’s primary effort in Ecuador supports training and equipment for Ecuador’s counternarcotics police. State provided limited assistance In Venezuela in fiscal years 2006 through 2011. However, State has used recently reprogrammed funds for administrative costs associated with closing its counternarcotics programs in Venezuela. Colombia State supports aerial and manual eradication in Colombia and provides assistance to enhance the country’s interdiction capacity. State supports aerial eradication primarily by hiring a private U.S. contractor to aerially spread herbicide over areas of coca cultivation. State supports manual eradication, planned by the Colombian government, by providing protective equipment for manual eradicators. State has also provided helicopters and related training and equipment to both the Colombian Army and the Colombian National Police to enhance the eradication and interdiction capabilities of those institutions. Ecuador Because Ecuador is a major transit route for narcotics passing from Colombia and Peru to the United States, State’s counternarcotics assistance in Ecuador focuses on interdiction efforts and law enforcement training. State supports programs to improve the institutional capabilities of Ecuador’s military, police, and judicial sectors to combat narcotics trafficking, money laundering, and other transnational crimes. Peru does not allow aerial eradication. The funding allotted by State, USAID, DOD, and DEA in the Andean countries primarily supported, respectively, eradication and interdiction, alternative development, military assistance, and law enforcement capacity building in Andean countries in fiscal years 2006 through 2011. Bolivia USAID works with the government of Bolivia to diversify the economies of coca-growing regions, strengthen productive capacities, improve access to essential social services, and improve rural road infrastructure. USAID’s alternative development program provides opportunities for farmers to transition from production of coca to other viable productive activities. USAID: Alternative Development USAID focuses on alternative development in Bolivia, Ecuador, and Peru and leads stabilization and alternative development programs in Colombia. Alternative development programs provide assistance to individuals and communities to facilitate the transition away from drug crop cultivation as a source of income. CSDI, the stabilization program in Colombia, supports the counternarcotics efforts of the government of that country. USAID reported that it did not provide assistance in Venezuela in fiscal years 2006 to 2011. Colombia In Colombia, USAID’s primary focus is supporting the stabilization efforts of the Colombian government to establish and reinforce the government’s credibility and legitimacy in regions where illegal armed narcotics-trafficking organizations are active. At the U.S. embassy in Bogotá, USAID leads CSDI, which coordinates U.S. programs in Colombia to support the Colombian government in establishing control over high-priority areas of the country that have been affected by drug-related conflict. This effort includes providing support to improve the management of Colombian institutions, such as the land-titling system. Ecuador In Ecuador, USAID’s counternarcotics effort includes a local business development program to generate licit employment and increase income for families along Ecuador’s northern and southern borders by supporting a market-driven expansion of private enterprises linked to rural producer groups and associations. Through local business development projects, USAID provides technical assistance, training, and small grants to stimulate investment in agribusinesses that are linked to both small producers and larger markets. Peru USAID supports efforts to help communities to transition from growing coca to cultivating licit crops. According to USAID, approximately 1 to 3 months after eradication of illicit crops in an area, communities are offered the opportunity to sign agreements with the government of Peru, in which the communities commit to remaining coca free. USAID and DEVIDA, the Peruvian drug control agency, commit to support the coca-free communities with a package of assistance tailored to each community’s priorities and needs. This assistance includes planting new crops, increasing farmers’ access to financial services, and strengthening producer associations and cooperatives to facilitate access to local and international markets. The funding allotted by State, USAID, DOD, and DEA in the Andean countries primarily supported, respectively, eradication and interdiction, alternative development, military assistance, and law enforcement capacity building in Andean countries in fiscal years 2006 through 2011. DOD reported providing minimal counternarcotics-related military support to members of the Bolivian armed forces since 2006. Generally, this support has been provided as training for selected members of the armed forces who receive instruction at U.S. military service schools. DOD: Military Support and Training DOD leads counternarcotics-related military support and training programs in all countries in the region. DOD reported minimal engagement with the armed forces of Bolivia. In Colombia and Peru, DOD provides support to fight armed groups that engage in narcotics production and trafficking in these countries. In Ecuador, DOD works jointly with the military to counter transnational criminal organizations operating in the Ecuador-Colombia border region. DOD reported minimal engagement with the armed forces of Venezuela. DOD counternarcotics funding in Colombia supports development of military air, maritime, river-based, and ground capabilities. For example, DOD provides funding for the Regional Helicopter Training Center pilot training program in Melgar, which has provided helicopter pilot training to counternarcotics forces throughout Latin America. DOD has also supported the helicopter capability of the Colombian Joint Task Force – Omega, responsible for countering the FARC. Similarly, DOD has purchased and funded the maintenance infrastructure necessary for boats used in the Colombian military’s maritime interdiction operations. DOD counternarcotics funding supports the Ecuadorian military in their operations against transnational criminal organizations, principally in the country’s northern border region with Colombia. DOD funding provides spare parts and tools to support a fleet of tactical vehicles used in operations to destroy narcotics processing locations. DOD also provides support for efforts to improve river-based patrol capabilities in the same northern border region. The U.S. Military Assistance Advisory Group focuses DOD counternarcotics support in the interior of Peru and along the northern coast. In the interior, DOD has provided communications and surveillance equipment to improve Peruvian forces’ ability to deploy for counternarcotics patrols. DOD’s assistance in these regions is intended to enhance the Peruvian military capacity to conduct operations against criminal and terrorist organizations in the region. Along the coast, DOD provides fuel, information sharing, training, and equipment to enhance detection and monitoring capabilities in Peru’s coastal areas. DOD reported providing limited counternarcotics support to Venezuela since 2006. Until 2009, this support included a tactical analysis team that provided actionable intelligence to both U.S. and select Venezuelan law enforcement agencies. Since 2009, DOD resources in the area have been used primarily in support of U.S. law enforcement. Figures 18 and 19 show DEA’s targets for disrupting and dismantling priority target organizations (PTOs) as well as the actual numbers of PTOs disrupted and dismantled in the Andean region from fiscal year 2006 through 2011. The funding allotted by State, USAID, DOD, and DEA in the Andean countries primarily supported, respectively, eradication and interdiction, alternative development, military assistance, and law enforcement capacity building in Andean countries in fiscal years 2006 through 2011. DEA: Sensitive Investigative Unit (SIU) Program The SIU program, an international drug enforcement initiative managed by DEA, is currently active in three countries of the Andean region— Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru. SIU members work with the relevant DEA country office to disrupt and dismantle drug-trafficking organizations. DEA operated the SIU program in Bolivia through 2008 but ended the program after DEA was expelled from the country by a declaration of President Morales. DEA has had no formal relationship with Venezuela since 2005. Coordinator of Citizens Security Initiatives in the Western Hemisphere State describes the Coordinator for Citizens Security Initiatives in the Western Hemisphere as being responsible for coordination of four initiatives: the Merida Initiative, the Caribbean Basin Security Initiative (CBSI), the Central American Security Initiative (CARSI), and the Colombian Strategic Development Initiative (CSDI). State reported that since 2008, it has allocated more than $1.6 billion for the Merida Initiative in law enforcement support for Mexico. The Merida Initiative guides U.S.-Mexico collaboration against violent drug trafficking organizations. The initiative aims to increase Mexican counter-drug capacity and to institutionalize the partnership focused on four goals or pillars: (1) disrupt organized criminal groups, (2) strengthen law enforcement and judicial institutions, (3) advance global competitiveness while providing for security along the U.S.-Mexico border, and (4) build strong and resilient communities. According to State, the Coordinator presides over a series of interagency executive committee meetings focused on counternarcotics efforts in the Hemisphere, including the four initiatives, as well as programs and activities in the Andean countries (see map.) The Coordinator has no dedicated staff or budget. Although the coordination meetings may result in adjustments in the implementation of programs, they do not determine policy, which is the purview of the National Security Council. CBSI is an initiative focused on citizen safety that brings all member countries of the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) and the Dominican Republic together to collaborate on regional security with the United States as a partner. To date, Congress has appropriated $203 million to CBSI. CBSI aims to strengthen Caribbean partner nations’ capabilities, including maritime security, law enforcement, information sharing, border and migration control, transnational crime, and criminal justice. CARSI seeks to address the corrosive impact of narcotics and weapons trafficking, gangs, and organized crime that exist in many Central American countries. Congress has appropriated $491 million for CARSI to integrate U.S. security efforts from Guatemala to Panama. The pillars of CARSI include (1) fostering streets free of violence and crime; (2) disrupting the movement of criminals and contraband; (3) supporting strong and accountable governments willing to combat the drug threats with trained and resourced law enforcement; and (4) building state presence in communities at risk. The National Drug Control Strategy includes information on the coordination of the regional initiatives as well as efforts in Colombia. Beginning in 2009, U.S. counternarcotics assistance to Colombia has focused on supporting the Colombian government’s National Consolidation Plan through CSDI. The plan represents the centerpiece of Colombian regional development and reform programs by responding to issues of rural poverty, violence, human rights, the needs of vulnerable groups, and the country’s internally displaced population. CSDI provides integrated support for civilian institution-building, rule of law, and alternative development programs coupled with security and counternarcotics efforts in Colombia. The initiative is intended to support the Colombian government’s goal of establishing and building state presence in areas contested by terrorist groups linked to narcotics trafficking, thereby integrating these priority regions into the country’s broader political, economic, social, and institutional fabric. Funding source Economic Support Fund (ESF) Foreign Military Financing (FMF) International Military Education and Training (IMET) Andean Counterdrug Program (ACP) International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE) Nonproliferation, Anti- terrorism, Demining, and Related Programs (NADR) Andean Counterdrug Program (ACP) Development Assistance (DA) Economic Support Fund (ESF) Annual agency appropriation Sensitive Investigative Unit (SIU) Totals have been rounded to the nearest million. Licit crops supported in the Andean region include cacao, coffee, and oil palm. In addition to the contact named above, key contributors to this report were Juan Gobel (Assistant Director), Claude Adrien, Joshua Akery, Martin de Alteriis, Bruce Kutnick, Reid Lowe, and Cristina Ruggiero. Etana Finkler, Ernie Jackson, and Jena Sinkfield provided technical support.

Summary: Hundreds of metric tons of cocaine flow annually from South America to the United States, threatening the security and well-being of U.S. citizens. South American cocaine production and trafficking is centered in the five countries in the Andean region. State, USAID, DOD, and DEA provide counternarcotics assistance to stem production and trafficking of narcotics in these countries. ONDCP oversees and coordinates this assistance. In this report, GAO (1) describes the U.S. strategic approaches to counter- narcotics assistance in the Andean countries; (2) identifies amounts allotted for such assistance by State, USAID, DOD, and DEA in fiscal years 2006 through 2011; and (3) reviews the agencies reporting on their performance. GAO reviewed agency and U.S. strategy documents, analyzed available agency data, and interviewed agency officials. No single U.S. counternarcotics strategy exists for the Andean region. In each countryBolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuelathe U.S. embassys mission strategic resource plan, developed in consultation with the countrys government, guides counternarcotics assistance provided by U.S. agencies. Department of State (State) officials told GAO that these plans incorporate high- level guidance from the Office of National Drug Control Policys (ONDCP) annual National Drug Control Strategy. In fiscal years 2006 through 2011, estimated allotments for counternarcotics assistance to the Andean countries by U.S. agenciesState, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), the Department of Defense (DOD), and the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA)totaled about $5.2 billion. Total allotments declined for each country during this time period. State, USAID, and DEA reported meeting or exceeding most annual targets for key measures of their counternarcotics activities in the Andean countries since 2007. For instance, State reported assisting in the eradication of illicit crops, USAID reported promoting alternative development, and DEA reported disrupting drug trafficking organizations. In addition, State, USAID, and DEA complied with an ONDCP requirement that each agencys Inspector General (IG) attest to the reliability of annual performance summary reports before submitting the reports to ONDCP. DOD reported tracking several performance measures, but DODs IG was unable to attest to the reliability of DODs reporting to ONDCP. As a result, ONDCP lacks assurance of the accuracy of information it receives from DOD and in turn reports to Congress. The Secretary of Defense should ensure that DOD submits performance summary reports to ONDCP including the Inspector Generals attestation that the reported information is reliable to facilitate good management and oversight. DOD concurred with this recommendation.