During the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union built a total of 27 nuclear reactors to produce weapons-grade plutonium for nuclear weapons. Although all nuclear reactors produce plutonium as a byproduct of their operation, plutonium production reactors are specifically designed to produce a concentrated isotope of plutonium that is more readily used in nuclear weapons. (See app. III for additional information about the plutonium production nuclear fuel cycle.) The United States constructed 14 plutonium production reactors of which only one, the N-reactor at Hanford, Washington, produced electricity in addition to weapons-grade plutonium. This reactor was shut down in 1987 for safety upgrades following the Chernobyl accident and never resumed operation. The United States had shut down all of its plutonium production reactors by 1989. The Soviet Union built 13 plutonium production reactors, and all but 3 have been shut down. (For a time line showing the history of these reactors and efforts to bring about their closure, see app. IV.) The three remaining reactors began operating between 1964 and 1968, and U.S. and Russian nuclear experts told us that these reactors are among the most dangerous in the world due to their age and poor design. In addition, the reactors lack safety features such as a containment structure, which is generally a steel- lined concrete, dome-like structure that serves as a barrier to the release of radioactive material during an accident. The lack of containment presents a greater risk for the two reactors at Seversk because, unlike the reactor at Zheleznogorsk, which is located inside a mountain, the Seversk reactors are above ground. Figure 1 shows the location of the Russian reactors. According to Russian officials in Seversk, the two reactors currently provide about 70 percent of the heat and electricity for the city’s residents. However, the reactors have the capacity to produce more heat and electricity than is needed to meet the demands of Seversk’s residents, and both heat and electricity have been sold to the nearby city of Tomsk since 1973. Officials in Zheleznogorsk told us that the reactor there provides 60 percent of the city’s heat and 98 percent of its electricity. The amounts of replacement heat and electricity that the United States and Russia agreed to in the March 2003 reactor shutdown agreement are less than what is currently provided by the reactors, but Russian officials from both cities told us the agreed upon amounts would be sufficient to meet their needs once the reactors are shut down. Commissioned in the mid-1960s, the three reactors have continued to operate although, according to Russian officials, they were originally designed to have an operating life of 20 years. Officials from Russia’s nuclear regulatory agency, Gosatomnadzor, told us that since the 1960s, there have been at least three serious accidents and several minor incidents at one of the Seversk reactors. For example, in 1966, a coolant pipe ruptured, resulting in the release of contaminants into the atmosphere near the reactor site. Subsequently, the same reactor experienced a partial meltdown that damaged part of the core. Finally, in 1999, the reactor experienced another serious incident when spent fuel was ejected onto the top of the reactor. Since the program was transferred from DOD to DOE in December 2002, DOE (1) has developed an overall program plan to manage the construction of the fossil fuel plants, (2) has selected two U.S. contractors to oversee work on the replacement fossil fuel plants, and (3) is working with its U.S. contractors to review design and construction plans for the plants. DOE plans to complete refurbishment of the plant in Seversk by 2008 and construction of the plant in Zheleznogorsk by 2011. However, U.S. and Russian officials expressed concern that the large number of U.S. and Russian organizations, 17, involved in the overall management of the program makes coordination difficult and has led to delays. Additionally, DOE and U.S. contractor officials told us that the primary Russian contractor, Rosatomstroi, has not previously worked with U.S. contractors on large-scale construction projects and currently lacks enough staff to effectively implement its part of the program, overseeing the Russian subcontractors, which could lead to delays. DOE has developed an overall management plan for its program that (1) emphasizes detailed project planning, (2) seeks to identify project risks, and (3) develops alternative strategies to reduce risks. The program management elements in DOE’s plan are detailed in DOE order 413.3, which the department uses for construction projects and the acquisition of capital assets in the United States. Under DOE order 413.3, the program will move through five critical decision points, the major stages of design and construction, upon the approval of DOE’s Deputy Secretary. These critical decisions are formal determinations that allow the project to proceed to the next phase and commit additional resources. Critical decisions are required during the planning and execution of a project, for example, before beginning conceptual design, before starting construction, and when beginning operations. (For more detailed information about DOE’s management plan, see app. V.) DOE has also selected two U.S. contractors to oversee work on the two plants. In mid-2003, DOE awarded contracts to (1) Washington Group International (WGI) to oversee Russia’s refurbishment of an existing fossil fuel plant at Seversk and (2) Raytheon Technical Services (Raytheon) to oversee Russia’s construction of a new fossil fuel plant at Zheleznogorsk. These contracts cover the preliminary design phase of the projects. DOE plans to evaluate the performance of both contractors at the conclusion of the preliminary design phase. According to DOE, an extension or new contract would be required to cover the final design phase, construction, and closeout phases. In addition, DOE employs the National Energy Technology Laboratory, a DOE national laboratory that has historically focused on the development of advanced technologies related to coal and natural gas, to accomplish various management support tasks. Finally, DOE, together with its contractors, is reviewing the detailed design and construction plans that Russian subcontractors are developing for the fossil fuel plants at Seversk and Zheleznogorsk. At Seversk, DOE plans to refurbish an existing fossil fuel plant, which was built in 1953. To meet the heat and electricity production levels specified in the March 2003 agreement, DOE plans to replace one boiler (boilers burn coal to produce heat and steam); upgrade the plant’s 12 existing boilers to improve their efficiency and performance; and replace three turbine-generators, which use the steam produced by the boilers to generate electricity. (See app. VI for more information about the operation of coal-fired power plants.) In addition, DOE plans to improve the infrastructure at the plant by, among other things, enhancing the coal-handling system and improving the plant’s water chemistry system. DOE plans to complete the refurbishment of the fossil fuel plant at Seversk by 2008. At Zheleznogorsk, DOE plans to construct a new fossil fuel power plant that is powered by coal to meet the heat and electricity production levels specified in the March 2003 agreement. This new plant is scheduled for completion in 2011. Since the plants are being built to Russian standards, DOE plans to use Russian environmental, safety, and health standards in the construction of the fossil fuel plants rather than U.S. standards. However, in addition to satisfying all Russian regulations, DOE’s contractors are responsible for identifying potential environmental concerns resulting from emissions at the plants and comparing the Russian environmental standards with applicable international standards. We identified 17 U.S. and Russian organizations that are participating in the program. In total, these organizations have a variety of roles and responsibilities, including setting policy and direction, providing technical assistance, and managing and overseeing the program. In addition, there are numerous Russian subcontractors who will be responsible for supplying, manufacturing, or installing equipment for the replacement fossil fuel plants. Specifically, in addition to DOE, the U.S. organizations participating in the program include the following: The National Nuclear Security Administration, a separately organized agency within DOE that oversees the program; Washington Group International is DOE’s primary integrating contractor for refurbishing the Seversk replacement fossil fuel plant; Raytheon Technical Services is DOE’s primary integrating contractor for building the Zheleznogorsk plant. Raytheon has subcontracted some of its work to the U.S. construction firm Fluor; The National Energy Technology Laboratory performs various management support tasks for DOE and has two primary subcontractors, Energy and Environmental Solutions and Concurrent Technologies Corporation, which provide management support to DOE’s program. Additionally, Concurrent Technologies Corporation subcontracts some work on the program to Parsons; and PNNL had been the lead contractor for DOE’s planned Nuclear Safety Upgrades Project. Though this project was cancelled in February 2004, PNNL will still have limited participation in developing a reactor shutdown plan. In addition to MINATOM, numerous Russian participants in the program include the following: Rosatomstroi, the primary Russian contractor working for MINATOM on building the replacement fossil fuel plants; Tvel-Finance supports WGI on the Seversk fossil fuel plant project and is a subcontractor to Rosatomstroi; The Siberian Chemical Combine in Seversk operates the two reactors there and owns the fossil fuel plant that DOE plans to refurbish; Tomsk Teploelectroproekt is a subcontractor to Rosatomstroi and is responsible for developing the refurbishment design for the replacement fossil fuel plant at Seversk; The Mining and Chemical Combine operates the reactor in The Experimental Design Bureau for Machine Building (OKBM) was involved in the development of many of DOE’s planned safety upgrades for the reactors and is involved in developing the reactor shutdown plan. Figure 2 shows the relationships between key program participants. DOE officials told us that the numerous organizations involved in managing this complex program makes coordination difficult and has led to delays. For example, at Zheleznogorsk, the acquisition of the proposed site to build the replacement fossil fuel plant was delayed for 9 months because a dispute over the value of the land among MINATOM; the Mining and Chemical Combine, which is responsible for operating the reactor; and a local Siberian power utility. Raytheon officials told us that the project experienced a “day-to-day” slippage while the land acquisition issue remained unresolved. To improve program management, DOE plans to hire a resident officer in charge of construction who will reside in Russia for the duration of the program. Specifically, the resident officer’s responsibilities will include (1) ensuring that contractual work is carried out, (2) providing daily reviews of contractor progress, (3) monitoring the quality of work being performed, and (4) assisting in early identification and resolution of construction problems. DOE and U.S. contractor officials also told us that the primary Russian contractor, Rosatomstroi, has not previously worked with U.S. contractors on large-scale construction projects and does not currently have staff to effectively implement its part of the program, which may lead to additional program delays. Rosatomstroi was created in 2002 and has a limited budget and little authority to make decisions on behalf of the Russian government without the approval of MINATOM. Because MINATOM designated Rosatomstroi as the primary Russian integrating contractor, DOE must rely on Rosatomstroi to manage Russia’s part of the program, which includes overseeing the numerous Russian subcontractors. Rosatomstroi officials told us in September 2003 that they had 8 employees dedicated to the program but that they plan to add about 40 additional staff as the Seversk and Zheleznogorsk fossil fuel plant projects progress from the design phase to construction. Officials from both U.S. contractors said that one of their most difficult initial tasks has been to mentor Rosatomstroi personnel on project management and Western business practices. WGI officials told us that this task has taken much-needed time away from other planning aspects of the Seversk project. For their part, Rosatomstroi officials expressed concern that DOE’s use of two U.S. integrating contractors to provide day-to-day project oversight is burdensome because it forces them to adapt to different management systems and reporting requirements. Despite their efforts to develop a sound management structure, DOE officials told us that successful program implementation ultimately depends on Russia’s commitment and cooperation. A recent assessment of DOE's program by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) reinforces the need for Russia’s cooperation to improve the program’s chances for success. OMB pointed out that DOE must rely on Russia to create conditions that will not limit the effectiveness and efficiency of the program to shut down the reactors. Furthermore, OMB stated that Russia’s creation of these conditions is largely out of DOE's control and is a potential flaw in the structure of the program. However, a Department of State official told us that he believes Russia has every incentive to cooperate in the program because shutting down the reactors and obtaining replacement heat and electricity sources is in Russia’s interest. Final shutdown of Russia’s three plutonium production reactors is uncertain because DOE faces challenges in implementing its program. Perhaps the most important of these challenges is ensuring Russia’s commitment to key aspects of the program. Russia’s recent rejection of DOE’s initiatives to reduce the amount of plutonium being produced by the reactors and to improve the safety of the reactors prior to their shutdown raises serious questions about Russia’s commitment to the fundamental nonproliferation and safety goals of the program. A second challenge DOE faces is that the existing reactor shutdown agreement does not specify the steps needed to complete the shutdown of the reactors and the specific requirements that must be met to license and commission the replacement fossil fuel plants. Furthermore, the agreement contains shutdown dates that are not realistic. Finally, thousands of Russian nuclear workers who are currently employed at the reactors and related facilities will be displaced when the reactors are closed. Although DOE officials told us that a failure to find jobs for these workers could threaten the success of the program, DOE has not developed a plan to coordinate the shutdown of the reactors with other DOE and Department of State efforts designed to find employment for Russian nuclear workers. The main nonproliferation goal of DOE’s program is to stop Russia’s production of weapons-grade plutonium. Because closure of the reactors will not occur until the fossil fuel plants are built and suitable heat and electricity sources are provided, DOE and MINATOM discussed interim measures to reduce the amount of plutonium produced by the reactors before they are shut down, as well as measures to accelerate the reactors’ shutdown. According to DOE officials, Russia’s support for this initiative would have clearly signaled a commitment to the nonproliferation goal of the program. In July 2003, DOE and Russian officials identified three options to reduce the reactors’ output of plutonium while the replacement fossil fuel plants are being built: (1) extending the period during the summer when the reactors are shut down for maintenance and refueling, (2) shutting down one of the two reactors at Seversk once the refurbishment of the fossil fuel plant reaches an agreed-upon level of completion, and (3) shutting down the reactor at Zheleznogorsk before the fossil fuel plant is completed but after it is able to supply an adequate amount of heat to the city. DOE believed that pursuing all of the reduction options could reduce the amount of weapons-grade plutonium produced by the reactors before their planned shutdown dates by up to 25 percent, or one-third metric ton, annually. DOE officials told us that the first option, extending summer outage periods, held the greatest promise for reducing plutonium production at the earliest possible date, which DOE believed could occur in the summer of 2004. Russian reactor officials in Zheleznogorsk told us that extending summer outage periods would be the easiest option to reduce the production of plutonium. Because the initiative to reduce the production of plutonium is outside the scope of DOE’s program to build replacement fossil fuel plants, DOE obtained funding from the Department of State’s Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund to support the estimated $380,000 cost of studying the three plutonium production reduction options. DOE also planned to solicit participation from other countries to help fund these efforts. In November 2003, the First Deputy Minister of MINATOM stated in a letter to DOE that Russia no longer wanted to explore the possibility of reducing the amount of plutonium produced while the reactors continue to operate and that pursuing such options could affect the time frame of closing the reactors. According to the letter, “ not find it worthwhile to waste efforts on a project for reducing plutonium production prior to the permanent shutdown of the reactors.” The letter also stated that Russia’s main objective was to shut down the reactors as soon as possible. In response to the letter, DOE is no longer pursuing extending summer outages at the reactors as an option for reducing the amount of plutonium produced. A Department of State official told us that Russia’s decision to reject this proposal was likely based on its security concerns about providing U.S. personnel with access to the reactors for the purpose of monitoring and verifying the reduced amount of plutonium that would be produced. In December 2003, MINATOM requested that DOE fund a study to examine the possibility of shutting down one of the Seversk reactors prior to the completion of the replacement fossil fuel plant. To achieve the early closure of one of the reactors, MINATOM proposed that the refurbishment of the Seversk plant could be accelerated through the advanced procurement of certain major components such as the boiler. However, unlike extending the summer outage periods, this option could not be implemented in mid-2004. As part of the reactor shutdown agreement, DOE pledged to improve the safe operation of the reactors; and to accomplish this goal, DOE planned to fund a $21 million effort, consisting of 28 safety upgrade projects—such as fire safety system improvements, enhancements to emergency electrical power systems, and risk assessments. DOE selected PNNL to oversee the installation of the safety projects. DOE’s original plan called for work on the upgrade projects, including design work and contracting activities, to take place during a 24-month period—beginning in mid-2003 and ending by mid-2005—in order to maximize the benefits of the safety enhancements before the reactors are shut down. (See app. VII for a summary of DOE’s planned safety upgrade projects.) However, the start of the program was delayed for several months because the United States and Russia were unable to agree on the amount of background information that Russia required of U.S. workers to submit for Russia’s national security review purposes before they would be granted access to the reactors. In February 2004, the failure to resolve this issue led MINATOM to reject DOE’s planned assistance to improve the safety of the reactors and instead to say it would undertake necessary safety improvements on its own. As a result, DOE officials told us they were canceling the safety upgrade project and are considering several options to transfer the remaining unspent project funds to other program areas, including accelerating the completion of the replacement fossil fuel plant at Zheleznogorsk. DOE’s Assistant Deputy Administrator, Office of International Nuclear Safety and Cooperation, told us that he was very pessimistic that Russia would perform the safety upgrades. Additionally, he noted that even if Russia decides to install the upgrades, they may not be of sufficient quality or quantity to reduce the risk posed by the reactors’ continued operation. A PNNL program official also expressed doubt that Russia would pursue upgrading the reactors. He noted that without DOE’s planned safety upgrades, the reactors would continue to deteriorate until they are finally shut down. None of the reactors would be licensed for operation in the United States or Western countries because they lack modern safety controls, and at least one reactor has experienced structural damage causing obstructions in the channels where control rods are inserted in case the reactor must be shut down in an emergency. The control rods are devices used to control the rate of nuclear reactions in a reactor. In the view of the PNNL official, it is likely that all three reactors have experienced such damage. The deteriorating safety conditions present a greater danger at the two Seversk reactors than at Zheleznogorsk, because unlike the Zheleznogorsk reactor, the reactors at Seversk are located above ground. Furthermore, one of the Seversk reactors has experienced multiple accidents, including one that resulted in the expulsion of fuel elements onto the top of the reactor in 1999. Based on our analysis, the reactors are showing the wear of having been run for a very long time at a high output. The danger that these reactors present is the risk of a catastrophic reactor failure—such as a loss of coolant accident—which would result in a fire expelling the highly enriched uranium fuel and its fission byproducts such as plutonium and strontium-90, all of which are highly toxic and carcinogenic. The danger from such a fire is that radioactive particles would be dispersed and breathed into the body, causing either kidney damage from particles of uranium or cancer from particles of strontium-90 and plutonium. (For our technical analysis of the safety problems posed by the reactors, see app. VIII.) Regardless of the safety condition of the reactors, Russian officials stated that they plan to run the reactors until replacement energy is provided to the residents of Seversk and Zheleznogorsk. Because winter temperatures in the region of the cities can reach -40 degrees Fahrenheit, officials from Gosatomnadzor told us that they would continue issuing operating licenses to the reactors each year unless a “calamity” occurred. Although the current agreement calls on Russia to shut down the reactors when the replacement fossil fuel plants produce a certain amount of heat and electricity, it does not specify what steps are needed to shut down the reactors; how long it will take to shut down the reactors; or the process for and time required to license and commission the replacement fossil fuel plants. DOE indicated that agreeing on these issues and developing a specific plan of action to complete the program is critical to success. As a result, DOE initiated discussions with Russia to develop a reactor shutdown plan that will detail the activities needed to shut down the reactors and commission the fossil fuel plants. Additionally, the reactor shutdown plan will analyze expenses associated with shutting down the reactors. Further, the current agreement contains shutdown dates that are unrealistic and do not reflect DOE’s planned completion dates for the replacement fossil fuel plants. Under the March 2003 agreement, the United States and Russia agreed that the two reactors in Seversk and the reactor in Zheleznogorsk would stop producing plutonium by December 31, 2005, and December 31, 2006, respectively. However, according to DOE, Department of State, and Russian officials, these dates are no longer realistic because DOE does not plan to complete the replacement fossil fuel plant in Seversk until 2008 or the plant in Zheleznogorsk until 2011. Russian officials have reiterated that they will not shut down the reactors until the agreed-upon replacement power and heat generating capacity are provided by the United States. DOE and Department of State officials told us that the current agreement would be amended to reflect DOE’s planned schedule for the completion of the fossil fuel plants once project designs are completed. Failure to secure specific agreement on these changes could put program success at risk as it has for other U.S. nonproliferation efforts. Specifically, in the past, some U.S. nonproliferation efforts that were dependent on Russian cooperation have been canceled or adversely affected in part because of a lack of specific agreements and coordination between relevant U.S. and Russian organizations. Notable examples include two large-scale construction projects in Russia that were managed by DOD under the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program—a facility to dispose of liquid propellant used to fuel Russian ballistic missiles at Krasnoyarsk and the Fissile Material Storage Facility at Mayak. In both cases, DOD did not secure specific provisions in the agreements that addressed all program risks to the projects. In 1993, DOD agreed to help Russia dispose of liquid propellant used to fuel Russian ballistic missiles and eventually agreed to finance the construction of a disposal facility. In February 2002, after $96 million had been spent on the project, DOD officials learned that Russia had used the liquid propellant in its space program but had failed to notify DOD. As a result, DOD canceled construction of the facility and terminated the project. The DOD Inspector General found that Russia used the rocket fuel without DOD’s knowledge because the agreements with Russia did not require it to provide the fuel to DOD for disposal and did not provide DOD with access rights over the fuel’s storage. In another case, the United States agreed to build a storage facility in Mayak, Russia, for fissile materials, including highly enriched uranium and plutonium. However, the agreement did not provide DOD with rights to verify the source of the fissile material to be stored in the facility, nor did it specify the amount or type of fissile material Russia was required to deposit in the facility. By July 2003, DOD had spent $372.8 million on fissile material containers and the design and construction of the facility. However, in July 2003, MINATOM notified DOD that Russia would store only 25 metric tons of plutonium at the facility, while converting its highly enriched uranium into low enriched uranium to sell to the United States for use in civilian nuclear power plants. As a result, only one-fourth of the facility’s storage capacity will be used. The DOD Inspector General concluded that for future CTR projects, implementing agreements should be negotiated that would “require Russia to provide the United States with all the necessary resources to assure that assistance is used for intended purposes.” As a result of congressional concern and in response to recommendations from the DOD Inspector General, the CTR program has taken several steps to protect the investment of U.S. funds and improve program oversight, including replacing good faith obligations from Russia with specific legal commitments before proceeding with any current or future CTR projects. DOE officials told us that worker transition issues at Seversk and Zheleznogorsk have the potential to undermine efforts to shut down the reactors and present major challenges for the program. In July 2002, Russia’s First Deputy Minister of Atomic Energy said that the most “acute” problem in downsizing Russia’s nuclear weapons complex was at Zheleznogorsk, where the closure of the reactor would lead to the loss of 5,000 to 7,000 jobs in a city where other employment opportunities are limited. He also predicted that the closure of the two reactors in Seversk would lead to the loss of 5,000 to 6,000 additional jobs. Russian officials from both Seversk and Zheleznogorsk told us that finding jobs for displaced workers is their highest priority. Although these officials recognize that Russia is primarily responsible for employing these workers, they are seeking assistance from the United States to help address this problem. Since many Russian nuclear workers have highly specialized experience manufacturing and processing weapons-grade nuclear material, their unemployment poses a significant proliferation risk because they might sell sensitive nuclear information to terrorists or countries of concern. Specifically, many nuclear workers in Seversk and Zheleznogorsk possess knowledge and skills in machining nuclear material and manufacturing nuclear weapons. Since 2001, Congress has appropriated about $40 million each year to support DOE’s efforts to assist Russia in finding employment for its displaced nuclear workers through the Russian Transition Initiatives (RTI) program. The RTI program is comprised of two nonproliferation programs, the Nuclear Cities Initiative (NCI), which currently has some projects in Zheleznogorsk, and the Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention (IPP), which has a few projects in both cities. Both the NCI and IPP programs seek to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons knowledge from unemployed Russian nuclear weapons scientists—a problem known as “brain drain.” As directed by the Congress, the NCI program works in 3 of Russia’s 10 closed nuclear cities: Snezhinsk, Sarov, and Zheleznogorsk. The IPP program can work in all of the closed nuclear cities. From 1999 to 2003, the NCI program spent about $15.7 million on 23 projects in Zheleznogorsk. During the same period the IPP program sponsored one project in Zheleznogorsk costing about $1.8 million and one project in Seversk that cost $1.2 million. However, NCI has not initiated any new projects since September 2003 because the government-to-government agreement guiding the program expired. The agreement has not been renewed because the United States and Russia have not agreed upon legal protections regarding liability claims that could be brought against the United States, its contractors, and their employees. DOE’s office that administers the reactor shutdown program (Office of International Nuclear Safety and Cooperation) and the DOE office that is responsible for the RTI program (Office of Nonproliferation and International Security) have begun to coordinate their efforts, which include attending regular meetings and planning for joint trips to the cities. However, as of April 2004, DOE had not developed a plan to formally coordinate the department’s program to facilitate the shutdown of the reactors with the ongoing DOE efforts to help Russia find employment for its displaced nuclear workers. DOE officials from both program offices told us they are starting to draft a joint action plan to address Russian workforce transition issues related to the shutdown of the plutonium production reactors. In addition, DOE is working with Swiss officials to organize an international conference to discuss potential employment projects at Seversk and Zheleznogorsk. Additionally, the United States and several other countries fund the International Science and Technology Center (ISTC) program. This program supports science centers in Russia and Ukraine and focuses on paying nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons scientists to conduct peaceful research in a variety of areas, such as developing new anticancer drugs, improving nuclear safety, and enhancing environmental cleanup techniques. The Department of State is responsible for implementing the program on behalf of the U.S. government and chairs an interagency group that conducts a policy review of all project proposals submitted for funding. As of March 2004, ISTC had three active projects in Seversk and Zheleznogorsk. According to DOE officials, DOE has not coordinated with the ISTC program on workforce issues related to the shutdown of the plutonium production reactors. They noted that DOE views the shutdown effort as a departmental initiative although DOE plans to seek support from other countries in its efforts to find employment opportunities for displaced workers. Department of State officials told us that clearer agreement on the problem and a coordinated U.S. government approach was needed before the ISTC could be used to address worker displacement issues at Seversk and Zheleznogorsk. They also stated that they are prepared to use the ISTC program in coordination with other U.S. efforts to address the problem. As of December 31, 2003, DOE had spent $7.8 million, about 4 percent of the funds available, to begin work on planning and developing the program. In addition, DOE officials told us that they expect the final cost of the program to be significantly higher than their initial estimate. DOE’s slow rate of spending on program activities has led to about $179.1 million in unobligated and unspent funds. Furthermore, the cost to build the replacement fossil fuel plants, which DOE had projected to be $466 million, is uncertain because the estimate is based on Russian cost projections that DOE has not yet validated. According to DOE officials, the actual construction costs for the plants are likely to be significantly higher than the original estimate, possibly as much as $1 billion. DOE and its contractors are currently revising the preliminary estimate to reflect changes in the projects’ schedule and scope. As of December 31, 2003, DOE had unobligated funds totaling $137.9 million and an additional $41.2 million that has been obligated, but not yet spent. Together, these funds represent DOE’s total carryover balance of $179.1 million, which represent about 96 percent of the funds available for the program. As table 1 shows, through December 31, 2003, DOE had received $186.9 million in funding for the program but had only spent about $7.8 million of these available funds to begin work on planning and developing the program. Specifically, DOE indicated that these funds were mainly spent on planning and developing the program and include travel, overhead, project administration, and document translation costs. According to DOE officials, three major factors account for DOE’s current carryover balances: After management of the program was transferred from DOD to DOE in December 2002, DOE received $74 million in unspent program funding from DOD. These funds were in addition to DOE’s appropriations for the program. According to DOE and U.S. industry officials, large-scale construction projects require “front end” funding because construction projects are executed over several years. DOE officials expect the program’s obligations and expenditures to increase significantly when the Seversk project moves from the design phase to the construction phase near the end of fiscal year 2004 and the Zheleznogorsk project moves into the construction phase in the second quarter of fiscal year 2005. Difficulties and unforeseen delays are frequently associated with doing work in Russia. Large carryover balances are not uncommon for DOE nonproliferation programs in Russia. In March 2003, DOE reported that its nuclear nonproliferation programs had a total carryover balance of almost $460 million. DOE indicated that the large carryover amounts were due to difficulties in negotiating and executing contracts with Russia and the multiyear nature of these programs. Despite the program’s large carryover balance, DOE has requested an additional $50.1 million for the program in fiscal year 2005. Specifically, the request includes $39.5 million for the Seversk fossil fuel plant construction, about $9.6 million for the Zheleznogorsk plant, and $1 million for technical support activities. In addition, DOE’s fiscal year 2005 budget projects the annual budget requests for fiscal years 2006 through 2009 to be between $56 million and $66.9 million. In April 2003, DOE estimated that it would cost $466 million to build the replacement fossil fuel plants. DOE estimated that the plant at Seversk would cost about $172 million and the Zheleznogorsk plant would cost approximately $295 million. However, because DOE’s estimates are based on Russian cost projections developed between 2000 and 2001, which DOE has not validated, the final cost to build the replacement fossil fuel plants is uncertain. According to DOE officials, revised cost estimates are currently being developed by DOE’s contractors and are likely to be significantly higher than the original estimate, possibly totaling as much as $1 billion. For example, the original estimate did not include the costs of U.S. and Russian integrating contractors. Several other factors contributing to the projected cost increase include the high rate of inflation in Russia, higher than expected Russian labor and overhead rates, and unanticipated problems with the design plans for both plants. For example, DOE officials told us that the initial cost estimates for the Seversk plant were based on an existing Russian design for the refurbishment, which DOE believed to be at an advanced stage. However, after DOE and WGI began examining the design documents, they found that much of the design was incomplete. As a result, Russian contractors will perform additional design work, which will contribute to increased project costs. As more of the design work is completed, refined overall cost and schedule estimates will be developed for the plants. According to DOE, firm cost estimates will be provided to the Congress by the end of 2004. DOE plans to fund the entire cost of the replacement fossil fuel plants, which will be based on a Russian design and constructed by Russian contractors. DOE, Department of State, and National Security Council (NSC) officials told us that the United States did not insist that Russia commit resources to building the plants when the March 2003 reactor shutdown agreement was signed. NSC and Department of State officials noted that the United States was concerned that Russia would not be able to fund its part of the effort, and it did not want the program to be subject to the unpredictability of the Russian budgetary process, which could delay the program. The Department of State official also noted that the U.S. government decided that the U.S. interest in pursuing the objective of the earliest possible shutdown of the reactors overrode its interest in a potentially fairer allocation of costs for building the replacement fossil fuel plants. DOE officials pointed out that Russia will be responsible for the maintenance and operation of the plants once they are completed and that Russia is sacrificing some electricity production capacity because the replacement fossil fuel plants will not produce as much electricity as the reactors. DOE considers these Russian efforts as “in-kind” contributions. Cost increases and schedule delays are not uncommon for U.S. nonproliferation programs in Russia. For example, the United States has had difficulties with past major construction projects in Russia, such as the Chemical Weapons Disposal Facility at Shchuch’ye, and many of these projects have experienced dramatic cost increases, significant delays, or other major setbacks. At Shchuch’ye, DOD is assisting Russia by building a chemical weapons destruction facility. As a result of changes in the project’s scope and other factors, the estimated cost for the project increased from about $750 million to about $1.04 billion. Congressional concern over Russia’s financial commitment to the project led to a congressional mandate that Russia commit at least $25 million annually toward its chemical weapons destruction activities. DOE’s effort to secure the shutdown of Russia’s three plutonium production reactors is a critical nonproliferation program because it seeks to eliminate the production of weapons-grade plutonium. However, implementing this complex and technically challenging program is becoming an increasingly risky undertaking for DOE. Some actions that Russia has taken raise serious questions about its commitment to the nonproliferation and safety-related goals of DOE’s program. We believe, as do some DOE officials, that Russia could have demonstrated good faith by reducing the amount of plutonium produced by the reactors in the period before they are shut down. This could have been accomplished by extending the amount of time the reactors are shut down for maintenance during the summer months—a proposal that Russian officials told us could be easily accomplished. However, Russia informed DOE that it had no interest in pursuing this opportunity. While Russia’s unwillingness to consider this proposal represents a setback, we believe that extending the summer outage periods for the reactors furthers U.S. nonproliferation objectives and would meet an important national security goal. In addition, DOE was willing to spend over $20 million to improve the safety of these reactors, which have been characterized as being among the most unsafe reactors operating today. In this case, Russia also rejected DOE’s planned assistance to improve the reactors’ safety and claims that it will make its own safety improvements. We believe that the continued operation of these reactors, given their current age and condition, presents a significant and growing safety risk. Without implementing DOE’s proposed safety upgrades, the safety risks posed by the reactors will continue to increase dramatically. Although the existing agreement between DOE and Russia’s Ministry of Atomic Energy governing the shutdown of Russia’s plutonium production reactors provides a general framework for cooperation, there are no guarantees that the reactors will be shut down within DOE’s projected time frames. Furthermore, the agreement does not specify what steps must be taken to shut down the reactors and what specific requirements must be met to certify the completion of the replacement fossil fuel plants. Without defining these steps and specific requirements, DOE will be unable to develop accurate estimates for the true scope and cost of its program or be able to determine more precisely when the reactors will be shut down. The history of U.S.-Russian nonproliferation activities has demonstrated that some well-intentioned programs have had limited success because the agreements governing them lacked specificity or oversight was inadequate. The lessons of the past should be carefully considered as DOE moves forward with its program. Furthermore, the existing time frames for shutting down the reactors reflected in the agreement are neither accurate nor achievable. DOE, Department of State, and Russian officials recognize that the shutdown dates in the agreement are unrealistic and will need to be revised to reflect DOE’s schedule for the completion of the fossil fuel plants. Because of the history of failed efforts to secure the reactors’ closure and the inability to achieve previously agreed upon shutdown dates for these reactors, we believe it would be in the best interests of the United States to revise the agreement in order to have increased assurances that the reactors will be permanently shut down. A major consequence of DOE’s program to assist Russia’s closure of the reactors will be the displacement of thousands of Russian nuclear workers who are currently employed at the reactors and related facilities. Many of these workers have received specialized training in the manufacture and reprocessing of weapons-grade nuclear material and could pose a serious proliferation risk if unemployed because they might sell sensitive nuclear information to terrorists or countries of concern. This looming problem, if left unaddressed, has the potential to undermine the program. Although DOE has started to coordinate the reactor shutdown program with the department’s other efforts to employ Russian nuclear workers— specifically the Russian Transition Initiatives—it has not developed a plan to coordinate these two nonproliferation programs. Moreover, there is no overall U.S. government strategy that would integrate the Department of State’s International Science and Technology Center program with DOE’s programs to employ Russian weapons scientists, particularly in the cities where the reactors will be shut down. A jointly planned effort could strengthen U.S. nonproliferation efforts by leveraging resources and expertise between these programs. Such a plan could also identify other options to support employment opportunities in the two cities, including seeking financial support from other countries. Estimated costs to construct the replacement fossil fuel plants are expected to increase dramatically. With the total cost for the program expected to be as much as $1 billion, DOE’s program has taken on greater financial risk and will require a more substantial investment of resources. Because the United States has agreed to fully fund the costs of the replacement plants, Russia has little incentive to control construction costs. Russia would be more likely to show fiscal restraint if it were responsible for funding a portion of the construction projects. In the final analysis, this program will provide Russia with significant capital assets that Russia would have had to finance itself if not for the assistance of the United States. Additionally, DOE’s approximately $179 million balance of unobligated and unspent program funding raises concerns, especially in light of the department’s request for an additional $50.1 million in fiscal year 2005. Although DOE officials believe that these carryover balances are justified, it is highly unlikely that DOE will be able to spend its entire available program funding by the end of fiscal year 2004 because construction at both plants is not expected to begin until at least fiscal year 2005. To help achieve important U.S. nonproliferation objectives, we recommend that the Secretary of Energy and the Administrator of the National Nuclear Security Administration continue efforts to reduce the amount of plutonium produced by the reactors as an interim measure before they are permanently shut down. Specifically, the Secretary and the Administrator should continue to pursue the option of extending summer outage periods at the reactors as a way to realize the immediate nonproliferation benefits of reduced plutonium production in Russia. To increase the chances for program success by clarifying the existing reactor shutdown agreement, we recommend that the Secretary of Energy, working with the Administrator of the National Nuclear Security Administration and Secretary of State, do the following: reach agreement with Russia on the steps that must be taken to permanently shut down the reactors and the specific requirements that must be met to complete the replacement fossil fuel plants; identify any additional costs that may surface as a result of refining the scope of work associated with shutting down the reactors and completing the replacement fossil fuel plants and revise cost and schedule estimates for the program accordingly; and amend the March 2003 reactor shutdown agreement as soon as practicable to accurately reflect DOE’s more realistic shutdown dates for Russia’s three plutonium production reactors. To maximize the benefits of related U.S. nonproliferation efforts, we recommend that the Secretary of Energy and the Administrator of the National Nuclear Security Administration do the following: Create a specific plan and take steps to formally coordinate DOE’s program to assist Russia’s closure of the three plutonium production reactors with the department’s efforts to find jobs for displaced Russian nuclear workers through the Russian Transition Initiatives. Such a plan should be coordinated with Russia and should include strategies for obtaining assistance from other countries in finding employment for these workers. Take the lead in developing a comprehensive plan that focuses on integrating U.S. efforts to employ Russian nuclear workers in the cities of Seversk and Zheleznogorsk. The plan should be developed in conjunction with the Secretary of State. Such a plan should consider ways to better ensure that future projects funded by DOE and the Department of State in Seversk and Zheleznogorsk are clearly focused on finding jobs for Russian workers who will be displaced once the plutonium production reactors and related facilities are closed. To help defray the escalating costs of DOE’s program to shut down Russia’s plutonium production reactors, we recommend that the Secretary of Energy and the Administrator of the National Nuclear Security Administration consider seeking financial support from Russia to construct the replacement fossil fuel plants. To the extent possible, these contributions should not be limited to in-kind contributions such as building materials, labor, or the value of land. To address concerns about large carryover balances of program funding, we recommend that the Secretary of Energy and the Administrator of the National Nuclear Security Administration monitor funding requirements to ensure that funds are obligated in a determine whether future funding requirements need to be reduced in light of the slow rate of spending to date on the program. We provided the Departments of Energy and State with draft copies of this report for their review and comments. DOE’s and State’s written comments are presented as appendixes IX and X, respectively. DOE’s National Nuclear Security Administration said the draft report provided a balanced evaluation of its program to shut down Russia’s three plutonium production reactors. DOE agreed to implement our recommendations. The Department of State agreed with all of our recommendations except one that DOE should consider seeking financial support from Russia to construct the replacement fossil fuel plants. DOE also expressed concern with our conclusion regarding this matter. Both agencies stated that relying on Russia to fund critical program elements would delay the program, something they did not want to risk. These concerns notwithstanding, we continue to believe that DOE should look for opportunities to have Russia fund a portion of the construction projects as a way to contain costs, which are expected to increase dramatically. DOE plans to pursue obtaining financial support from Russia provided that it does not delay the program. We agree with this approach. Both agencies also disagreed with our conclusion that Russia’s rejection of key initiatives to reduce the amount of plutonium produced by the reactors and to improve their safety before they are shut down signals Russia’s lack of commitment to the nonproliferation and safety goals of the program. Both agencies stated that Russia rejected these initiatives primarily due to its security concerns about granting U.S. officials access to the reactors. In our report, we recognized that Russia’s security concerns may have played a role in rejecting the extension of summer outages at the reactors as an option for reducing plutonium production. However, in a November 2003 letter from MINATOM to DOE, Russia did not cite security concerns as a reason for rejecting the proposal. In fact, as we noted in the report, MINATOM stated that “ not find it worthwhile to waste efforts on a project for reducing plutonium production prior to the permanent shutdown of the reactors.” Instead, MINATOM claimed that it wanted to focus on the earliest possible shutdown of the reactors. As we noted in our report, both U.S. and Russian officials told us that extending summer outages to reduce the current production of weapons-grade plutonium held great promise and would be an easy option to implement. Furthermore, in its comments, DOE stated that it was disappointed in Russia’s rejection of the proposal to study ways to reduce the amount of plutonium produced by the reactors as an interim step before they are shut down. Regardless of Russia’s basis for rejecting the proposal, it should be noted that the long-standing and ultimate U.S. goal of this program is to reduce and eliminate the production of weapons-grade plutonium in Russia as quickly as possible. From the U.S. perspective, shutting down these reactors is a major nonproliferation objective, and the United States is committing significant resources to this effort. Thus, it seems reasonable to us that Russia should reciprocate and show its commitment to the fundamental nonproliferation tenets of this program. Finally, although DOE and State objected to our characterization of the implications of Russia’s decision to reject key DOE initiatives, both agencies agreed with our recommendation that seeking summer outages as a way to reduce plutonium production should continue to be pursued. With regard to the reactors’ safety, we noted in the report that they are among the most unsafe in the world and that DOE was prepared to provide a substantial amount of assistance to improve their safety. Russia’s rejection of the assistance, regardless of the reasons, raises serious concerns about its commitment to ensuring the reactors’ safe operation until they can be shut down. As we noted in the report, DOE and national laboratory officials expressed doubt about whether Russia would perform sufficient safety upgrades on its own. State also objected to what it believed to be our conclusion that final shutdown of the reactors is uncertain because the reactor shutdown and implementing agreements are insufficiently clear regarding the steps to permanently and irreversibly shut down the reactors. We believe that State in its written response to our draft report has mischaracterized our conclusion. Specifically, our report cites the lack of clarity in the agreement as one of several challenges that DOE faces that could affect final shutdown. While State disagreed with our conclusion, it agreed with our recommendation that DOE should reach agreement with Russia on the steps that must be taken to shut down the reactors and the specific requirements needed to certify the completion of the fossil fuel plants. State also believes that we overstated the implications of the agreement’s lack of accurate shutdown dates. However, State acknowledged that the deadlines for reactor shutdown in the agreement are no longer consistent with current plans and agreed with our recommendation to revise the dates. State also disagreed with our conclusion that worker transition issues have the potential to undermine the program. However, as we noted in our report, Russian officials we spoke with considered the employment of displaced workers as their highest priority and DOE officials acknowledged this as a major concern. Furthermore, DOE and State agreed with our recommendations to address this problem. DOE and State also provided technical comments, which we incorporated in the report where appropriate. We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Energy; the Administrator, National Nuclear Security Administration; the Secretary of State; the Director, Office of Management and Budget; and interested congressional committees. We will also make copies available to others upon request. In addition, this report will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov. If you or your staff have any questions concerning this report, I can be reached at 202-512-3841 or aloisee@gao.gov. Major contributors to this report are included in appendix XI. This appendix provides information about the cities of Seversk and Zheleznogorsk, the two cities in Russia where the plutonium production reactors are located. Formerly known as Tomsk-7, the closed city of Seversk is located approximately 2,000 miles east of Moscow and about 9 miles northwest of Tomsk, a major industrial city in western Siberia. As of January 2000, the city had approximately 119,000 residents. In addition to plutonium production, a number of other nuclear related activities have been carried out in Seversk, including the fabrication of uranium and plutonium weapons components. Recently, Seversk was selected to be the site for a planned facility that will dispose of 34 metric tons of Russia’s weapons- grade plutonium by converting it into mixed oxide fuel. The planned conversion facility will be built with Department of Energy funding. Nonnuclear activities at the city include an oil refinery operation. Seversk is the location of the Siberian Chemical Combine, which is responsible for operating the plutonium production reactors. Construction of the Siberian Chemical Combine facilities began in 1949; and on July 26, 1953, the first output of enriched uranium-235 was produced. Since its inception, the Siberian Chemical Combine has housed the Siberian Atomic Power Station; a chemical separation plant; facilities for plutonium processing, blending, and pit fabrication; an enrichment plant; and nuclear waste management facilities. The first of the plutonium production reactors at Seversk came online in 1955, and by the 1970s five such reactors were operating at the site. Three of the reactors were shut down in the early 1990s. The city’s two remaining weapons-grade plutonium production reactors began operation in 1965 and 1968 and continue to provide heat and electricity to Seversk and the neighboring city of Tomsk. Currently, the Siberian Chemical Combine employs about 15,000 workers, most of whom are highly skilled nuclear experts. Zheleznogorsk is located approximately 2,500 miles east of Moscow and about 35 miles north of the city of Krasnoyarsk. As of early 2000, the city had a population of 103,000. Formerly known as Krasnoyarsk-26, the city was built to house the employees of the Mining and Chemical Combine, a complex engaged in producing and processing weapons-grade plutonium. Both the city and the Mining and Chemical Combine are located on the east bank of the Yenisei River in Siberia. In 1996, the residents of Zheleznogorsk voted to remain a closed city in an attempt to maintain the clean, village- like quality amidst harsher, more environmentally damaged towns. Since the end of the Cold War, the technical workforce in Zheleznogorsk has dropped; and the city is now in difficult financial straits. Zheleznogorsk has tried to diversify its economy through forays into satellite building and television assembly. The three plutonium production reactors operated by the Mining and Chemical Combine were built in a huge cavern approximately 250 meters beneath a mountain. Over 60,000 prisoners were forced to excavate the chambers containing the reactors when work began in 1950, but in 1953 over 100,000 military construction workers replaced these prisoners. Two of the reactors began operating in 1958 and 1961 but were both shut down in 1992. A third plutonium production reactor, active since 1964, still functions to provide heat and electricity to the city. The Mining and Chemical Combine currently employs about 9,500 workers who in addition to plutonium production are involved in other nuclear-related activities, including the stockpiling of plutonium. We performed our review of DOE’s Elimination of Weapons-Grade Plutonium Production program at DOE’s offices in Germantown, Maryland; DOE headquarters in Washington, D.C.; the Defense Threat Reduction Agency in Ft. Belvoir, Virginia; the Department of State (State) in Washington, D.C.; the National Security Council in Washington, D.C.; the Nuclear Regulatory Commission in Rockville, Maryland; and Moscow, Seversk, and Zheleznogorsk, Russia. To assess the progress of DOE’s recent efforts to shut down Russia’s three remaining plutonium production reactors, we reviewed documents and had discussions with officials from the Department of Defense (DOD); DOE; State; the National Security Council; the Nuclear Regulatory Commission; the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL); the National Energy Technology Laboratory; the U.S. Trade and Development Agency; DOE’s U.S. contractors—Washington Group International (WGI) and Raytheon Technical Services (Raytheon); and a number of nongovernmental entities, including nonproliferation and fossil fuel experts. In September 2003, we visited Russia to interview Russian officials and to see the sites for the replacement fossil fuel plants DOE plans to fund. While in Moscow, we spoke with officials from the Ministry of Atomic Energy of the Russian Federation; Rosatomstroi; the Kurchatov Institute, a leading Russian nuclear design institute; and Gosatomnadzor, the Russian nuclear regulatory agency. These officials provided Russia’s views of DOE’s program to build replacement fossil fuel plants and its efforts to shut down the reactors. We visited Zheleznogorsk and spoke with officials from the Mining and Chemical Combine, the city government, the planned fossil fuel plant, and the operators of the reactor. We toured the site of the planned fossil fuel plant and observed the current condition of the buildings at the site. We visited Seversk and interviewed officials from the Siberian Chemical Combine, the city government, operators of the reactors, and operators of the existing fossil fuel plant that DOE plans to refurbish. We toured the site of the existing fossil fuel plant and observed its current condition. To assess DOE’s management of the program we examined documents from DOE and DOE’s U.S. contractors—WGI and Raytheon. We interviewed officials from DOE’s Office of Engineering and Construction Management and from the Elimination of Weapons-Grade Plutonium Production program. In addition, while in Russia, we obtained views on DOE’s management of the program from a number of Russian officials from the Ministry of Atomic Energy of the Russian Federation; Rosatomstroi; the Kurchatov Institute; Gosatomnadzor; the Mining and Chemical Combine; the Siberian Chemical Combine; and the city governments of Zheleznogorsk and Seversk. To identify challenges DOE faces in implementing its program, we examined documents from DOE, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, PNNL, the National Energy Technology Laboratory, DOE’s U.S. contractors—WGI and Raytheon, and several nongovernmental entities including nonproliferation and fossil fuel experts. To describe the proposed upgrades DOE planned to fund to improve the safety of the reactors while replacement fossil fuel plants were being built, we reviewed documents from DOE, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and PNNL. We also interviewed nuclear safety officials from DOE, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, the Department of State, and PNNL. To determine the amount of money spent on U.S. efforts to eliminate weapons-grade plutonium production in Russia prior to the program’s transfer from DOD to DOE in December 2002, we analyzed documents and spoke with officials from DOE, DOD, the Department of State’s Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund, the U.S. Trade and Development Agency, PNNL, and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Dollar amounts for the historical spending on these efforts were adjusted to constant fiscal year 2003 dollars to reflect trends in inflation over time. Because they are being used for background purposes only, we did not assess the reliability of these historical data. To determine how much DOE had spent through December 31, 2003 on its efforts to eliminate weapons-grade plutonium production in Russia and DOE’s projected costs to implement the program, we reviewed DOE’s cost and schedule estimates for the replacement fossil fuel plants, interviewed appropriate agency officials, and posed a number questions to DOE to determine the reliability of the financial data provided to us. We determined that the data were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report based on work we performed to assure the data’s reliability. Specifically, we (1) met numerous times with program officials to discuss these data in detail; (2) obtained from key database officials responses to a series of questions focused on data reliability covering issues such as data entry access, internal control procedures, and the accuracy and completeness of the data; and (3) added follow-up questions whenever necessary. We conducted our review between June 2003 and April 2004 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Plutonium is a byproduct of the nuclear fuel cycle and is produced by all nuclear reactors. Weapons-grade plutonium, however, contains a high content of plutonium-239, which is the most suitable isotope for use in nuclear weapons. Plutonium of this type is formed in the Russian production reactors as a component of highly radioactive spent reactor fuel. Although at this point the plutonium is relatively protected against proliferation because it is diluted and surrounded by the highly radioactive spent fuel, it cannot be safely stored for long periods in this form at the “wet storage” areas at the reactors to preclude corrosion and cracking in the aluminum fuel cladding. The plutonium is taken to another facility where it is chemically separated from the spent fuel in an operation called “reprocessing.” There is also an optimal time to reprocess the spent nuclear fuel: reprocess too soon and the fuel is highly radioactive, reprocess too late and the fuel can contaminate the spent fuel pool. Although the reprocessed fuel requires containment and is easily incorporated into weapons, it is also relatively easier and less expensive to store than spent fuel. Figure 3 illustrates the plutonium production cycle. Figure 5 shows the project acquisition process and critical decision (CD) points used in the DOE order 413.3 program management structure, which DOE has adopted for the program. As figure 5 shows, the five CD points are: (1) CD-0, approve mission need; (2) CD-1, approve preliminary baseline range; (3) CD-2, approve performance baseline; (4) CD-3, approve start of construction; and (5) CD- 4, approve start of operation or project closeout. Figure 5 also shows the prerequisite documentation and project milestones, such as the acquisition and project execution plans, which must be provided before critical decision approval can be granted. DOE officials believe that this management approach will help improve program oversight and accountability. The fossil fuel plant construction projects at Seversk and Zheleznogorsk gained approval of mission need (CD-0) from the Deputy Secretary of Energy in December 2002. DOE officials told us that the Seversk project would proceed to CD-1 in April/May 2004 and to CD-2 near the end of fiscal year 2004. The Zheleznogorsk project is expected to move to CD-1 in August 2004 and to CD-2 in the second quarter of fiscal year 2005. This appendix describes how electricity and heat are produced by a coal- fired power plant. Although the plant described is not identical to ones that will be constructed in Russia, the description is generic and can generally be applied to all coal-fired power plants. Figure 6 shows how electricity is produced by a coal-fired power plant. Coal is pulverized into a fine powder as it leaves the coal bin. That powder is blown into a boiler where it is ignited. The walls of the boiler contain miles of tubing, through which water is circulated. Heat from the burning coal turns the water into steam. The steam passes through piping to a turbine. The steam is directed against blades of the turbine causing it to spin. The turbine shaft turns, rotating the generator, which creates electricity. After the steam is directed against the blades, it goes to a condenser beneath the turbine. Cool water in the condenser turns the steam back into water. The water is pumped back into the boiler tubes to be heated into steam again. Large fans blow air into the boiler to support the combustion of coal. Some of the air is directed to the pulverizer where it helps dry the coal and carry it to the boiler. Coal ash drops to the bottom of the boiler for disposal. Hot gases escape from inside the boiler. Impurities are removed from these gases through scrubbing systems before they are released through the stack. As part of the March 2003 reactor shutdown agreement signed by DOE and the Ministry of Atomic Energy of the Russian Federation, DOE pledged to improve the safe operation of Russia’s three remaining plutonium production reactors until they can be shut down. Prior to Russia’s decision to reject DOE assistance to improve the safety of the reactors, DOE had allocated $21 million to support 28 safety upgrade projects including fire safety system improvements, enhancements to emergency electrical power systems, and risk assessments. DOE planned to complete the safety upgrades within 24 months in order to improve the safety of the reactors during their remaining lifetime. To oversee the safety upgrade projects, DOE selected PNNL, which had managed prior efforts under DOD to modify the reactors’ cores and was thus familiar with the reactors and their design and safety problems. DOE selected the safety upgrade projects after determining that none of them would extend the operating life of the reactors. DOE chose the 28 projects out of a larger list of 40 projects that Russian reactor officials submitted. According to DOE and PNNL officials, some of the reactor upgrades that Russia initially proposed were rejected because they were potentially life extending or would require too much time to implement. For example, DOE rejected Russian upgrades to improve the primary coolant pipes of the reactors due to concerns that such improvements would be life extending. Table 2 provides information about each of DOE’s planned upgrades to improve the safety of Russia’s three plutonium production reactors. Russia’s three remaining weapons-grade plutonium production reactors are among the most dangerous reactors currently operating in the world. All three of the reactors were built using old designs derived from the original reactor run by Enrico Fermi in the 1940s. According to officials from MINATOM, the Russian nuclear regulatory agency Gosatomnadzor, and the Kurchatov Institute—the leading civilian nuclear research institute in Russia—the reactors must be shut down by 2010. However, the reactor managers at Seversk believed that the continuous repairs to the reactors over the years are increasing the operating life and that further safety upgrades could allow the reactors to operate until 2014. In our view, all three reactors are showing the wear of having been run for a very long time at very high output, and all have had accidents—some as recently as 5 years ago. The safety risks posed by these reactors are a function of three factors: (1) all three reactors have been running at a very high output, producing both high temperatures and high neutron flux (the number of neutrons passing through a sphere one square-centimeter in cross-section during a unit of time) for their entire lives; (2) all three reactors have run approximately twice as long as they were originally designed to operate; and (3) none of these reactors meet current reactor safety standards. The danger that these reactors present is the risk of a catastrophic reactor failure—such as a loss of coolant accident—which would result in a fire expelling the highly enriched uranium fuel and its fission byproducts such as plutonium and strontium-90, all of which are highly toxic and carcinogenic. The danger from such a fire is that radioactive particles would be dispersed and breathed into the body, causing either kidney damage from particles of uranium or cancer from particles of strontium-90 and plutonium. All three reactors are designed to run at rated power, which is the original power output level of a reactor in terms of temperature output (t), and electrical output (e). According to Gosatomnadzor, the rating for the reactors is 800 megawatts (t) each. A Gosatomnadzor official informed us that the reactors could run at 20 percent higher than their original rating, or at 960 megawatts (t), and that the reactors had run at an elevated level during a 20-year period. In our opinion, Gosatomnadzor’s estimates are probably conservative because, based on the amount of fuel that can be used by the reactors and the fuel type that has been used, each reactor has the ability to run at a power level up to 2,500 megawatts (t) and has been run at a power level of at least 2,000 megawatts. If these reactors were originally designed to run at 800 megawatts (t), then they may have run at three times their original design rating. This will definitely shorten the operating life of the reactors, which makes their continued operation risky. Russian officials that we met disagree over both the original life spans of the reactors and how much longer the reactors can be operated before the risk of a catastrophic failure becomes too high. According to officials from MINATOM, Gosatomnadzor, and the Kurchatov Institute, the original life span for each of the reactors was 25 years. However, according to the operators of the three Russian reactors, the original reactor life spans are 20 years. All three reactors have operated for approximately 40 years, or roughly twice as long as originally designed. Gosatomnadzor confirmed that the design life is a function of: (1) the graphite cladding—which forms the outer, protective layer of the fuel elements and (2) the steel containment that surrounds the core. If it is assumed that the reactors have operated at 2,500 megawatts (t) for 20 years, then the original design life of 20 years could be reduced by up to 10 years, since the super heating of the graphite and the high neutron flux at the core center will cause much higher degradation than if the reactors were run at their rated power levels for their entire lives. These two factors will make the integrity of both the graphite cladding and the steel containment highly questionable and will increase the risk of a catastrophic failure of the reactors. None of the reactors meets current Russian, U.S., or international safety standards because they lack modern safety controls and are therefore dependent on direct operator intervention for both monitoring and safety. MINATOM, Gosatomnadzor, and the Kurchatov Institute told us that the personnel working at the reactors pose a safety threat because the quality of the reactor staff is weakening due to attrition and old age. According to Gosatomnadzor, the average age of reactor workers is 50, and the reactors are experiencing an increased number of temporary emergency shutdowns due to operator error, not the technology itself. Conversely, reactor officials at Seversk were concerned that the attrition of older workers will result in the loss of the knowledge and the ability of people that have become familiar with the reactors over many years. Although the Russian organizations disagree over the cause of the increased rate of accidents, there is a consensus that workforce attrition will have an impact on the safe operation of the reactors because it is likely that the reactor workers are the first and last line of defense against reactor accidents. Jim Shafer, 202-512-3841. In addition to the individual listed above, R. Stockton Butler, Nancy Crothers, Glen Levis, Steve Rossman, and Keith Rhodes, GAO’s Chief Technologist, made key contributions to this report. The General Accounting Office, the audit, evaluation and investigative arm of Congress, exists to support Congress in meeting its constitutional responsibilities and to help improve the performance and accountability of the federal government for the American people. 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Summary: Russia's continued operation of three plutonium production reactors poses a serious proliferation threat. The Department of Energy's (DOE) Elimination of Weapons-Grade Plutonium Production program seeks to facilitate the reactors' closure by building or refurbishing replacement fossil fuel plants. This report (1) describes DOE's efforts to manage and implement the program, (2) assesses the challenges DOE faces in achieving its goal of shutting down the reactors, and (3) identifies DOE's current expenditures and projected program costs. DOE is financing and managing the construction of two fossil fuel plants in Russia that will replace the heat and electricity that will be lost with the shutdown of Russia's three plutonium production reactors. DOE (1) has developed an overall plan to manage its program, (2) has selected two U.S. contractors to oversee the construction of replacement fossil fuel plants, and (3) is working with its U.S. contractors to review specific design and construction plans for the plants. DOE officials expressed concern that the number of organizations, 17, involved in the program makes coordination difficult and has led to delays. Additionally, DOE and U.S. contractor officials said that the primary Russian contractor may not have adequate experience and currently lacks enough staff to implement its part of the program. Final shutdown of the reactors is uncertain because DOE faces a number of challenges in implementing its program, including (1) ensuring Russia's commitment to the nonproliferation and safety goals of the program, (2) clarifying the existing reactor shutdown agreement, and (3) working with Russia to find employment for thousands of Russian nuclear workers who will lose their jobs when the reactors are closed. Russia's rejection of DOE's proposals to reduce the amount of plutonium produced by the reactors and to improve the safety of the reactors before they are shut down raises serious questions about Russia's commitment to key program goals. Furthermore, the existing reactor shutdown agreement contains shutdown dates that do not reflect DOE's planned program schedule. Finally, the challenge of finding employment for Russian nuclear workers could undermine the program by creating the potential for Russia to continue operating the reactors longer than necessary to ensure jobs for the workers. DOE has not developed a plan to address this issue. As of December 31, 2003, DOE had spent $7.8 million--about 4 percent of available funds on planning and developing the program, including travel, overhead, project administration, and document translation costs. Regarding future program costs, DOE officials told us that they expect the projected costs to build the replacement fossil fuel plants to be significantly higher than their original estimate of $466 million, possibly as much as $1 billion.