Awareness of the environmental and economic importance of the Arctic region is growing. The Arctic region is a very harsh operating environment, making research expensive and risky. NSF is the largest federal provider of funds for research in this region. The U.S. Coast Guard, part of the Department of Transportation, is charged with providing and operating icebreakers to meet U.S. military, logistic, and research needs in the Arctic and Antarctic regions. From 1966 to 1991, the U.S. Coast Guard operated the nation’s icebreakers. The mission of the Coast Guard’s Ice Operations Division, Office of Navigation Safety and Waterways Services, includes assisting other governmental and scientific organizations in scientific research and supporting national interests in the polar regions. Investigators representing or sponsored by universities, private institutions, and government agencies—including the Office of Naval Research, the U.S. Geological Survey, and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration—conduct research aboard the Coast Guard icebreakers. The Arctic Research and Policy Act of 1984, as amended, calls for coordination among agencies over the use of logistics resources, including icebreakers, in the conduct of research. The act established the Arctic Research Commission to promote research in the Arctic region and to recommend Arctic research policy. Also under the act, responsibility for promoting the coordination of all Arctic research activities among agencies, including logistics (e.g., icebreaker support), rests with the Interagency Arctic Research Policy Committee. The Committee is headed by NSF and includes the Coast Guard among its members. Furthermore, in a 1987 agreement aimed at minimizing conflict and serving national interests, NSF and the Coast Guard pledged “to plan together, to the maximum extent possible, for the use of U.S. icebreakers in the support of polar research.” The Arctic research community has sought a vessel dedicated to Arctic research for many years. The Arctic Research Commission recommended that such a vessel be acquired. The Interagency Arctic Research Policy Committee echoed this recommendation. Beginning in 1987, the scientific community, through the University National Oceanographic Laboratory System (UNOLS), used funds from NSF to study the requirements for, and possible designs of, an Arctic research vessel. Comments from the Arctic scientific community from 1990 to 1992, discussions in the Interagency Arctic Research Policy Committee, and other forums were used to define the characteristics of the vessel. From 1990 to the present, NSF and UNOLS, working with a private engineering firm, developed preliminary designs for Arctic research vessels of increasing size and icebreaking capability. The first design called for a 200-foot vessel with modest icebreaking capability whose estimated cost was about $40 million. After the Arctic scientific community reviewed and commented on this design, it was agreed that a larger vessel with greater icebreaking capacity was needed. Accordingly, a 340-foot vessel was designed with significant icebreaking capability and the capacity to perform 90-day missions in the Arctic region. This vessel is expected to cost about $120 million. Acquisition of the proposed vessel is not supported by a quantified analysis of the nation’s requirements for icebreakers or by the scientific community’s criticism of the Coast Guard’s support for research. Moreover, records of actual and projections of future icebreaker use suggest that a fifth icebreaking vessel may not be needed. A 1990 interagency study of national polar icebreaker requirements (PIRS),the most recent such quantified study, did not call for the construction of the proposed vessel. NSF justifies the proposed vessel on the grounds that (1) Arctic research needs are increasing and (2) the United States does not have a vessel dedicated to Arctic research. However, NSF has not demonstrated that another icebreaker is required to meet research needs. The study documented the nation’s icebreaker requirements and recommended a fleet of four icebreakers. These are the Polar Sea and Polar Star (currently operating Coast Guard icebreakers); Nathaniel B. Palmer (an Antarctic icebreaking research vessel); and Michael A. Healy (a planned Coast Guard icebreaker). The proposed vessel would be the fifth U.S. icebreaker, one more than recommended by the 1990 study. Funds for the Healy have been approved, and the vessel is scheduled to begin duty in 1998. According to Coast Guard officials, the Healy will serve primarily as an Arctic research vessel except when circumstances require its use elsewhere. To determine icebreaker requirements, the 1990 study quantified operational and research mission needs. To quantify needs, the number of days icebreakers were required to accomplish the missions was totaled. Operational missions consisted of the annual resupply of the Thule Air Force Base in Greenland and the McMurdo Antarctic research station (an NSF mission), as well as treaty inspection duties in the Antarctic. Research requirements for icebreaker support were also quantified and used in the study. However, these requirements do not reflect subsequent changes in users’ needs, such as the military’s reduced needs for icebreaker services resulting from the end of the Cold War and other agencies’ increased needs attributed to higher priorities for Arctic research. Areas of increased research emphasis include Arctic fisheries, because of concern over fluctuating fish catches, and Arctic water quality, because of concern over radionuclide and other contamination originating in the former Soviet Union. The scientific community has produced several reports recommending the acquisition of an icebreaking vessel dedicated to Arctic research. None of these reports attempts to justify the proposed vessel by comparing the realistic demand for icebreakers to be used for research with the availability of existing and planned Coast Guard icebreakers. Reports of the Polar Research Board of the National Academy of Sciences, the U.S. Arctic Research Commission, and the Interagency Arctic Research Policy Committee justify an additional vessel on the basis of (1) the increasing (although not quantified) needs for research in the Arctic and (2) the observation that the United States does not possess a vessel dedicated to Arctic research. These reports do not balance the increased needs for icebreakers to support research with the decreased needs for icebreakers to support defense missions. Nor do the reports state why existing and planned Coast Guard icebreakers, whose missions include supporting Arctic research, cannot meet these needs. Finally, the reports do not consider where the additional funding for research will be obtained to fully employ a five-icebreaker fleet. To address these shortcomings, NSF requested that the National Research Council, which is affiliated with the National Academy of Sciences, examine the scientific community’s needs for icebreaker support and how they can best be met. Neither the NSF program manager nor the study’s director is certain whether the study will attempt to quantify the needs for icebreakers to support research in the Arctic. Planning for the study began in November 1994, and the final results are expected in the summer of 1995. The potential for underutilizing existing and planned Coast Guard icebreakers has led that agency to oppose the construction of the proposed vessel. Both the actual use of Coast Guard vessels for research in the Arctic over the past 4 years and the projected use in 1995 and 1996 are lower than estimated in the 1990 study. Coast Guard records for 1994 show 83 days of icebreaker use for the Arctic research of NSF and others, compared with the 143 days of use projected for NSF’s research in the 1990 PIRS. Furthermore, no use of Coast Guard vessels for research in the Arctic region is scheduled, or likely, for 1995. Prospects for a scientific mission in 1996 are not good, according to Coast Guard and NSF officials, because of funding constraints. Many in the Arctic scientific community justify the acquisition of the proposed vessel on the grounds that the Coast Guard, because it has multiple missions, does not possess the desire, skills, or facilities to provide adequate support for Arctic science. However, this justification is not convincing, given improvements in the Coast Guard’s commitment and ability to support research in the region. Some Arctic scientists assert that the Coast Guard values its other missions over supporting science. As a result, say these scientists, the Coast Guard lacks the desire to ensure the successful completion of scientific cruises to the Arctic. For example, supporting the U.S. military is a significant and traditional Coast Guard mission. The Coast Guard’s adherence to this mission may result in approaches and goals on cruises that differ from those of the scientists on board. For instance, the strict chain of command on Coast Guard vessels has made communication between the chief scientist and the Captain of the vessel cumbersome, limiting flexibility in the accomplishment of research. Scientists, on the other hand, are generally not accustomed to seeking authorization for minor changes in the conduct of research projects. In recent years, the Coast Guard has placed greater emphasis on its role in supporting science. This increased priority is evidenced by an agreement between the Coast Guard and NSF on support for polar research, Coast Guard directives concerning such research, and a decline in the military mission for the Coast Guard’s icebreaker fleet. The Coast Guard’s operating authority includes supporting oceanographic research as a Coast Guard mission. In addition, in 1987, the Coast Guard pledged in an agreement with NSF to maintain trained personnel and icebreakers with adequate facilities to support polar research. Also, following an unsuccessful and contentious scientific cruise in 1991, high-ranking Coast Guard officials, including the Commandant, issued several directives stressing the importance of supporting Arctic science as a Coast Guard mission. Finally, Coast Guard officials in the Division of Ice Operations observed that the scientific mission has taken on added importance for the Coast Guard icebreaker fleet as emphasis on the military mission for these vessels has declined. Arctic scientists who participated in scientific cruises aboard Coast Guard icebreakers have noted significant improvements in the willingness of Coast Guard personnel to work with and support scientists. However, many Arctic scientists have maintained that Coast Guard personnel lack the skills necessary to adequately support research in the Arctic. Furthermore, some of the scientists believe that acquiring the proposed vessel would allow them to employ a crew that is highly skilled in supporting research. Scientists also point to Coast Guard rotation policies that prevent personnel from acquiring and maintaining skills in planning scientific cruises, navigating and maneuvering in ice, and maintaining and operating scientific equipment, such as oceanographic winches. The Coast Guard recognizes these shortcomings and has taken steps to address them. First, to represent the needs of scientists before the Coast Guard, the agency created a position for a liaison with the civilian scientific community at the icebreakers’ home port of Seattle, Washington. This representation includes ensuring that scientists’ needs are met when the vessels are prepared for scientific cruises. Second, the Coast Guard arranged with the Canadian Coast Guard for an informal officer exchange/training program to improve the officers’ skills and began sending new officers on trips aboard the icebreakers to familiarize them with icebreaker operations. In addition, the liaison has arranged training for Coast Guard technicians with equipment manufacturers on the proper use of scientific equipment found aboard the icebreakers. Some Arctic scientists believe that the two currently operating Coast Guard icebreakers are unreliable and lack necessary scientific facilities. The scientists cite mechanical failures that have hindered or prevented the completion of research projects. Scientists also cite poor laboratory facilities and research equipment as limiting research opportunities. The Coast Guard has taken steps to enhance the reliability of its two icebreakers and boost their basic scientific capabilities. First, the Coast Guard strengthened and rebuilt the faulty propeller hubs on the icebreakers to improve their reliability. From 1987 to 1992, the two icebreakers underwent the Polar Science Upgrade Project to improve the scientific capabilities of both vessels. This project upgraded laboratory spaces, oceanographic instrumentation, and communication equipment and provided new oceanographic and trawling winches. These upgrades improved the vessels’ ability to support Arctic research. In addition, beginning in the spring of 1995, the Coast Guard plans to conduct midlife refits of its two existing icebreakers as part of the Reliability Improvement Project, which is designed to correct original design flaws and replace deteriorated and outdated equipment, although it will not result in further significant upgrades of scientific equipment and facilities. In addition to improving its two existing icebreakers, the Coast Guard is acquiring another icebreaker with significant research support capabilities. The Healy was justified and designed, in part, to support polar research. Coast Guard officials told us that the Healy will be used primarily as an Arctic research vessel. Compared with the two existing Coast Guard icebreakers, this icebreaker will provide significantly improved facilities for supporting science. Although the Healy was justified largely as a research vessel, the Coast Guard requires that it be capable of supporting other Coast Guard missions, namely, annually breaking the channels to allow the resupply of Thule Air Force Base, Greenland, and McMurdo Station, Antarctica. Accordingly, the Healy was designed with greater icebreaking and seakeeping capabilities than the vessel proposed by NSF. The Arctic scientific community is largely dissatisfied with the design compromises the Coast Guard made to the Healy. As a result, some scientists believe that the vessel’s overall design does not adequately reflect the scientific community’s needs and suggestions for changing the vessel’s design. The scientists point to factors such as an outdated hull design, poor fuel efficiency (high costs), and an inefficient deck layout resulting from the engines’ placement as areas that the scientists had rejected. The Coast Guard maintains that the hull’s design is not outdated and that, while it may not be the most efficient icebreaking design, it is necessary to ensure the Healy’s open-ocean transit capability. The Coast Guard conferred with leading Arctic scientists when designing the scientific facilities for the Healy through a survey and during several meetings. Some of the scientists’ suggestions were incorporated into the vessel’s design. For example, the arrangement of laboratory spaces was changed, and hatch sizes were increased to accommodate scientific equipment. However, the scientific community was not consulted on the vessel’s basic design. According to Coast Guard officials, the procurement of the Healy involved the use of performance-based specifications that were defined in consultation with the user community. The officials said that the shipbuilder relied heavily on consultants who had designed and built the majority of the world’s icebreakers. NSF and the Arctic scientific community have not demonstrated that the proposed vessel is needed. The most recent (1990) quantified assessment of national icebreaker requirements did not support a need for the proposed vessel. Reports identified by NSF as justifying the acquisition of the proposed vessel cite only increasing research needs and the lack of a dedicated research icebreaker without quantifying those needs and explaining why the current arrangement with the Coast Guard is inadequate. NSF recognizes the deficiencies in its justification for the proposed vessel, as evidenced by its recently contracting with the National Research Council, affiliated with the National Academy of Sciences, to study the need for icebreakers to support polar research. Furthermore, the Coast Guard improved its responsiveness to the needs of the scientific community, enhanced the capabilities of existing vessels, and is building a vessel whose primary mission is to support Arctic research. Further cooperation between the Coast Guard and the scientific community should facilitate more cost-effective research and the achievement of other national goals in the Arctic region. NSF provided written comments on a draft of this report. (See app. III for NSF’s comments and our evaluation of them.) NSF had three general comments: (1) the agency does not agree with our conclusion that NSF and the scientific community have not demonstrated the need for the proposed vessel; (2) the agency believes that final judgment on the need for a dedicated Arctic research vessel should be deferred until the National Academy of Sciences has completed its study of this issue; and (3) the agency recognizes that interagency communication must be improved. We disagree with NSF’s assessment that adequate need for the proposed vessel has been demonstrated. In our view, though scientific needs are important, fiscal constraints and the capacity of existing and planned icebreakers with scientific capability have not been taken into account when justifying an Arctic research vessel. We agree with NSF that the National Academy of Sciences’ study is important. We note that our report is not, nor does it purport to be, the final judgment on the acquisition of an Arctic research vessel. We also support NSF’s efforts to improve interagency cooperation in order to increase the effective use of resources for Arctic research. We discussed a draft of this report with Department of Transportation officials, who generally agreed with our findings and conclusions. On the basis of NSF’s comments and our discussion with Transportation officials, we have made changes to our report, where appropriate. In examining the justification for the proposed vessel, we reviewed the Arctic Research Policy Act, as amended, and other relevant laws, regulations, and publications. We also reviewed the 1984 and 1990 Polar Icebreaker Requirements studies; relevant congressional testimony; correspondence from and for NSF and the Coast Guard; Coast Guard policies and procedures; design reports for the proposed Arctic research vessel and the planned Coast Guard icebreaker Healy; and data on the use of icebreakers. We interviewed officials from the Coast Guard, NSF, the U.S. Geological Survey, and the U.S. Navy’s Naval Sea Systems Command and Office of Naval Research. We also interviewed officials from the University of Alaska and other universities and research institutions. Finally, we interviewed officials from the Arctic Research Commission, the University National Oceanographic Laboratory System, and the Polar Research Board of the National Academy of Sciences. Appendix II contains a more detailed discussion of our objectives, scope, and methodology. We conducted our review between June and December 1994 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. We will send copies of this report to the Director, National Science Foundation; the Secretary of Transportation; the Commandant of the Coast Guard; the Director, Office of Management and Budget; and other interested parties. We will also make copies available to others on request. If you have any questions or need additional information, please contact me at (202) 512-3841. Major contributors to this report are listed in appendix IV. The Ranking Minority Member, Subcommittee on VA, HUD, and Independent Agencies, Senate Committee on Appropriations, asked us to examine the National Science Foundation’s (NSF) analysis of options for buying and leasing the proposed Arctic research vessel. We found that NSF’s analysis closely follows the Office of Management and Budget’s (OMB) guidelines and shows buying as the best option. However, because the analysis is necessarily preliminary, NSF plans to solicit both purchase and lease proposals, should it proceed in acquiring the proposed vessel. As required by OMB Circular A-94, NSF compared the cost to the federal government of two different methods of financing the proposed vessel: (1) full purchase of the vessel and (2) long-term leasing from a private builder/operator, covering its 20-year expected life. This analysis, which took into account both construction and operating costs, found that the federal government would have the least cost if it purchased the proposed vessel. However, because the design phase is preliminary, the cost estimates represent only rough approximations of the proposed vessel’s costs. Moreover, in order to compare the expected costs of leasing and buying, NSF needed to make several simplifying assumptions. While NSF’s analysis conforms reasonably well to the OMB guidelines for lease-purchase comparisons, the analysis is based on preliminary cost estimates and relies on a variety of assumptions for which alternative hypotheses might be reasonable as well. In addition, assumptions also needed to be made for key variables, such as private sector borrowing costs on maritime loans. Moreover, because of the difficulty of determining a unique methodology for analyzing more complex forms of financing, such as a lease with an option to buy, or some cost sharing that might be offered by the state of Alaska, NSF’s analysis does not include all relevant options. The cost advantage of government purchase over long-term leasing of the vessel is related to two factors. First, under a lease arrangement, the costs of private sector financing—which are higher than the government’s borrowing costs—are passed on to the federal government in lease payments, thereby increasing the vessel’s financing costs over what they would be under outright government purchase. Second, NSF assumed that the cost of building the vessel is the same under both the buy and the lease scenarios, but that under the lease arrangement, an additional profit accrues to the lessor for services related to its retained ownership of the vessel. Under the base-case analysis, roughly half of the cost advantage of purchasing over leasing is related to the gap in federal and private sector borrowing costs, and the remainder is related to the assumption of an additional profit stream to the lessor. NSF’s base-case estimates use a 5.8-percent government borrowing rate because that was the federal Treasury rate on 20-year bonds (a time horizon equal to the expected life of the vessel) as of early 1994. The cost of private sector capital was assumed to be 8.5 percent. In this case, NSF found the advantage of purchase over lease to be $55.7 million in present-value terms. NSF also looked at the sensitivity of the advantage of purchase over lease by using alternative interest rates for both the government and private sector borrowing costs. Throughout these analyses, government purchase was favored over leasing, but the range by which purchase was advantageous ranged from $22.9 million to $99.6 million, each in terms of present value. NSF’s decision to delay choosing a method of financing the proposed vessel until after bids are solicited from shipbuilders for any of several financing options is appropriate. After bids are solicited, NSF will need to perform a financial analysis similar to the one it has performed, but it will then have the advantage of performing such an analysis on more detailed data derived from the bid solicitation. To determine whether the proposed vessel has been justified, we reviewed the Arctic Research Policy Act, as amended; other relevant laws and regulations; findings and recommendations of the Arctic Research Commission and the Interagency Arctic Research Policy Committee; the University National Oceanographic Laboratory System (UNOLS) Fleet Improvement Plan Update; and several other publications. We also reviewed the 1984 and 1990 Polar Icebreaker Requirements studies; relevant congressional testimony; correspondence from and for NSF, the Coast Guard, and UNOLS; Coast Guard policies, procedures, and Arctic research cruise reports; design reports for the proposed Arctic Research Vessel and the planned Coast Guard icebreaker Healy; and icebreaker usage and research cost data. We also obtained written statements from NSF and the Coast Guard on the appropriateness of agencies other than the Coast Guard acquiring and operating icebreakers. In addition, we interviewed officials at Coast Guard headquarters in Washington, D.C.; Seattle, Washington; and Alameda, California. We also interviewed NSF officials from the Office of Polar Programs, Oceanographic Centers and Facilities Section, Budget Division, and officials from the U.S. Geological Survey, the U.S. Navy’s Naval Sea Systems Command, and Office of Naval Research. We interviewed officials from the University of Alaska, the University of Washington, Texas A&M University, the Lamont Dougherty Earth Observatory, and companies that conduct Arctic research. In addition, we interviewed officials from the Arctic Research Commission, the University National Oceanographic Laboratory System, and the Polar Research Board of the National Academy of Sciences. In order to evaluate NSF’s analyses of leasing versus buying the proposed vessel, we reviewed OMB Circular A-94 and NSF’s own analysis of the lease-buy option. We did not independently verify and validate the cost data that NSF used in the analyses, but rather, given NSF’s cost estimates for building and operating the vessel, we reviewed the methodology NSF used to compare the costs of leasing with the costs of buying. In addition, we talked with OMB officials. The following are GAO’s comments on the National Science Foundation’s letter dated February 17, 1995, in addition to the comments discussed on page 9 of this report. 1. We have reviewed many relevant studies, including those written by the Interagency Arctic Research Policy Committee, the Arctic Research Commission, the Polar Research Board, the University National Oceanographic Laboratory System, and NSF. As we note on pages 4-5 in the report, these studies do not take into consideration the two existing and one planned icebreaker—each of which possesses some research support capabilities. In fact, the planned Coast Guard vessel Healy was partially justified as a research vessel. In addition, according to the Coast Guard, the Healy will serve primarily as an Arctic research vessel. The observation that the United States does not possess a dedicated Arctic research vessel is insufficient justification for spending $120 million to construct the proposed vessel, as well as committing substantial funds to operate and maintain it. NSF also needs to consider fiscal constraints and the availability of existing and planned U.S. Coast Guard icebreakers in assessing icebreaker needs. 2. We disagree with NSF’s statement that “the report misinterprets the roles of the U.S. Coast Guard and the National Science Foundation with respect to the acquisition and operation of research vessels for use in Arctic settings.” We do not dispute NSF’s authority to acquire or lease icebreakers. In our view, the issue is not whether NSF has the authority to acquire the proposed vessel but whether NSF has demonstrated the need for an additional icebreaker. 3. The proposed vessel is an icebreaker. Special consideration was given to the proposed vessel’s icebreaking capabilities. For example, the icebreaking requirements for the proposed vessel were increased twice between 1990 and 1994. Our report does not imply that any ship capable of breaking through ice can be considered a research vessel. However, we do state that the two existing Coast Guard icebreakers and the planned vessel Healy, while capable of breaking ice, also have been upgraded or were specifically designed to support research. We agree that none of the three Coast Guard vessels represent the ideal research platform. We disagree with NSF’s view that we discuss the proposed vessel and the existing Coast Guard icebreakers as if they were equal research platforms. On page 7, we state that equipment and other facilities necessary to support science have been added and improved. The largely successful 1994 scientific mission to the Arctic confirms that the existing Coast Guard vessels are capable of supporting the accomplishment of a significant body of Arctic research. 4. We disagree that we imply a reduced need for scientific research in the Arctic. Rather, on page 5 we state that funding constraints have contributed to underutilization of existing Coast Guard vessels. 5. As we note on pages 4-5, neither the design of the Healy nor the availability of Coast Guard vessels are explicitly put forth, with supporting analysis, in the various studies NSF cites in this letter as supporting acquisition of the proposed vessel. 6. The 1993 U.S. Arctic Research Plan mentions the Coast Guard role of supporting Arctic research and describes an Arctic research vessel (the proposed vessel) but does not demonstrate a need for the vessel. NSF states in its comments that the planned vessel Healy is not suited for year-round dedicated research. However, the Coast Guard has stated its intent to make the Healy available for Arctic research 144 days a year. We also note that, according to the 1990 Polar Icebreaker Requirements Study, NSF approved the design of the Healy as a member of the Polar Icebreaker Users Council (an interagency group of icebreaker users that includes NSF). With three Coast Guard icebreakers available, it should be easier to schedule two vessels for central Arctic missions. Again, while it might be ideal to have a dedicated vessel available for research in the less hazardous Arctic waters, the acquisition (about $120 million), maintenance, and operations costs (at least $34,000 per day)—coupled with the costs of maintaining underutilized Coast Guard icebreakers in a state of readiness—raise doubts as to the net benefit to the nation of acquiring the proposed vessel. 7. While it appears that NSF has concluded that the proposed vessel is justified, NSF also states that final judgment should be withheld pending the National Academy of Science’s (NAS) study. We believe that our report points to significant issues that must be addressed before any final judgment is made. The report does identify weaknesses in the justifications found in previous studies and will, in our opinion, help to guide the current NAS effort. Accordingly, we are encouraged that the NAS study commissioned by NSF will include an assessment of the roles of NSF and other agencies and the resources available to support Arctic research programs, including evaluations of their operating costs and management options. 8. The 1990 Federal Oceanographic Fleet Coordinating Committee (FOFCC) report that NSF cites is not a study of national icebreaker requirements, of which research is a significant part, as is the 1990 PIRS study we refer to in this report. While NSF criticizes the 1990 Polar Icebreaker Requirements Study (PIRS), NSF, as well as the Departments of Transportation and Defense and OMB, developed that report. The 1990 PIRS study points to a broader scope of national needs and research community needs and not specifically to the Coast Guard vessel. We found the quantitative assessment of icebreaker needs in the 1990 PIRS study persuasive while the 1990 FOFCC study focuses on fleet requirements for a variety of vessel types. 9. Coast Guard officials told us that the agency is opposed to the acquisition of the proposed vessel because of funding constraints that would likely lead to underutilization of existing and planned Coast Guard vessels. 10. We do not dispute the fact that the Coast Guard icebreakers have experienced reliability problems. As we note on page 7, the Coast Guard is continuing efforts to improve the reliability of its two existing icebreakers. 11. As we note on pages 7-8, the Coast Guard surveyed the scientific community and held meetings that included officials from NSF and UNOLS. Although the Healy will primarily be used to support Arctic research, it is a multipurpose vessel. So while significant scientific capabilities were designed into the vessel, it is not surprising that it does not meet every scientific requirement laid out by the scientific community for the proposed vessel. 12. We agree that the ability of Coast Guard icebreakers to support Arctic science is a serious issue and the report treats them as such. Referring to the Healy as a military icebreaker is misleading given the multiple missions for which the vessel was designed and the research for which the Coast Guard states the Healy will be used. The Coast Guard stated that the funding for the Healy is in place, the contract for construction of the Healy has been let, and assembly of component parts has begun in several locations. As noted on page 8, the Coast Guard solicited, and, in some cases, implemented input from the scientific community. Mindi G. 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Summary: Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the justification for the National Science Foundation's (NSF) proposed procurement of an icebreaking research vessel. GAO found that: (1) NSF and the scientific community have not demonstrated an increase in icebreaker requirements since 1990 to sufficiently justify a fifth icebreaker vessel; (2) the three icebreakers currently in operation are underutilized and no research cruises in the Arctic region are planned for 1995 or 1996; (3) a fourth icebreaker is being built for the Coast Guard to serve as an Arctic research vessel; and (4) many Arctic scientists justify the acquisition of the proposed vessel on the grounds that the Coast Guard is unwilling and unable to provide reliable support to Arctic research activities, although the Coast Guard's commitment to Arctic research has recently improved.