Historically, the U.S. textile and apparel (clothing) industries, including yarn, fabric, apparel, and a variety of home furnishings and industrial products, have faced intense competition in the U.S. marketplace from countries with low labor costs. Textile and apparel imports represented 7 percent of total U.S. imports in 1994. In that same year, there was a $34-billion trade deficit in textile and apparel products. (See app. I for data concerning the U.S. textile and apparel industries.) CITA is chaired by the Department of Commerce and composed of representatives from the Departments of State, Labor, and the Treasury; and the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR). CITA was established in 1972 to supervise the implementation of all U.S. international textile agreements. (See app. II for a discussion of CITA’s role.) One of CITA’s main functions is to decide whether and when to impose quotas on textile and apparel products. Because these products have historically been vulnerable to low-priced imports, textile and apparel trade has not been subject to General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) disciplines (practices). Rather, textile trade has been primarily governed by successive multilateral agreements that set forth a separate framework of rules, including the authority to impose quotas. From 1974 though 1994, CITA supervised the U.S. implementation of MFA, which governed worldwide textile trade and sought to provide for its sustained, orderly expansion. Among other things, under MFA, the United States entered into a number of bilateral agreements containing negotiated textile import quota levels. MFA also contained a “safeguard” provision, which allowed importing countries to impose unilateral quotas when it determined that imports were causing actual or threatened serious damage to the U.S. domestic market based on factors specified in MFA. CITA is now responsible for supervising the U.S. implementation of ATC. Along with continuing its role of implementing textile agreements, under ATC, CITA is to supervise a 10-year phaseout of textile and apparel quotas in four stages ending in 2005. ATC will have a major long-term impact on the U.S. textile and apparel industry by integrating all textile products into GATT rules and disciplines. During the first stage (1995-97), virtually no products currently under quota are to be integrated into GATT trade rules by any of the major importing countries. That is, the products integrated in the first stage are products that have never been under quota. The U.S. Statement of Administrative Action (SAA) accompanying the Uruguay Round implementing legislation provided that CITA would ensure that integration of the most sensitive products would be deferred until the end of the 10-year period. In fact, under the U.S. integration schedule, 89 percent of all U.S. apparel products (apparel products are considered sensitive), 47 percent of all textile products (textile products are considered less sensitive), and 67 percent of textile and apparel products combined, under quota in 1990, will not be integrated until the final stage in 2005. Importer and retailer representatives have referred to the final stage as “the cliff,” because of the potential shock to the U.S. domestic market when a majority of textile and apparel quotas will be lifted at one time. During the 10-year transition period, the United States may impose a temporary quota on another World Trade Organization (WTO) member country under ATC only through the use of a “transitional safeguard.” This safeguard applies to products not yet integrated into GATT rules. After determining that imports of a particular product are causing “serious damage or actual threat thereof” to domestic producers, CITA issues a “call,” or a request for consultations to discuss the matter with an exporting country believed to be causing the damage. Following the consultations, CITA may impose a quota—with or without the agreement of the exporting country. (See app. III for detailed information on ATC and MFA.) As of May 1996, CITA had 884 quotas in place on individual textile and apparel categories. These quotas covered 44 countries and 123 out of 148 CITA categories. CITA has broad authority to carry out its main function of regulating textile imports on behalf of the United States through implementing textile agreements, including determining the existence of serious damage to support a safeguard action. This mandate remains the same under ATC as it was under MFA. The U.S. Constitution vests in Congress the power to regulate commerce between the United States and foreign nations. In the case of textiles and apparel, Congress has granted to the President extraordinary discretion to regulate U.S. imports. The President, in turn, has delegated authority for implementing textile agreements to CITA. Neither Congress, nor the President since 1989, has provided procedural requirements to guide CITA in making its safeguard determinations. Moreover, CITA’s decisions are conclusive and are not reviewed or approved by other executive branch officials. Finally, given that CITA has been allowed significant discretion to regulate textile imports, courts have held that CITA’s serious damage determinations and the underlying reasoning for those determinations are not subject to judicial scrutiny. According to CITA officials, CITA’s primary function under ATC is to “ensure that there is a gradual and orderly liberalization of trade which will allow U.S. companies sufficient time to further modernize and prepare for greater international competition.” During the 10-year transition period, CITA can issue calls under the ATC transitional safeguard mechanism. Bilateral agreements in place with WTO members under MFA are now folded into ATC, obviating the need for CITA to renegotiate these agreements. CITA is expected also to continue performing many other pre-ATC functions. The committee will continue to participate in negotiations (led by USTR) for bilateral quota agreements with non-WTO member countries. It also has a role in efforts aimed at preventing the illegal routing of textile and apparel imports through third countries (transshipment violations) and commenting on regulations concerning the origin of textile and apparel products. CITA has no budget of its own, but portions of the individual budgets of the five principal agencies related to CITA functions added up to $3.6 million in fiscal year 1995. The Department of Commerce’s Office of Textiles and Apparel (OTEXA) has a staff of 41, 33 of whom support CITA’s operations, monitoring and analyzing textile trade and production data. About 17 percent (or $2.8 million) of OTEXA’s budget supports CITA operations.OTEXA’s resources and costs remained constant between fiscal years 1994 and 1995, the first year of ATC. CITA does not expect to undergo any significant reduction in its work load in the near term due specifically to the 10-year quota phaseout, according to representatives of the five CITA agencies. CITA is proactive in determining whether to impose a quota, relying heavily on OTEXA’s continuous monitoring and analysis of trade and economic data as a source for its information. OTEXA’s data monitoring generally provides the impetus for CITA to issue a call. Although OTEXA considers an array of data, it focuses primarily on two factors: a surge in imports and a decline in domestic production. OTEXA also examines some other economic factors listed in ATC, including domestic employment, prices, and market share. Under U.S. law, CITA does not have procedural requirements it must follow to determine whether to make a call. To date, CITA has not published guidelines or documented procedures that describe its decision-making process for imposing quotas. Once OTEXA’s analysis identifies a potential case of serious damage, OTEXA may contact domestic producers to obtain additional information on the effect of imports on the domestic industry. OTEXA then prepares a proposal (also known as a “statement of serious damage or actual threat thereof” and referred to hereafter as a “market statement”) for CITA to request consultations with an exporting country. The proposal serves as the basis for CITA to vote on whether to request consultations with a foreign government. According to CITA officials, the committee currently uses majority voting to make decisions on calls. Generally speaking, each CITA agency considers the need for import restraints while taking into account the concerns of U.S. industry, workers, importers and retailers, consumers. However, each agency brings a unique perspective to the decision process. Commerce and Labor consider the interests of textile and apparel producers and workers, State evaluates U.S. foreign policy concerns, and the Treasury analyzes the net economic benefit to consumers, producers, and importers and retailers. (The Treasury is also concerned with the appropriateness and enforceability of CITA recommendations and directives.) Some balancing of views is provided by USTR. In theory, if CITA decided by consensus, one CITA principal would have the ability to block a request for consultation. For example, CITA principals did not reach consensus on 64, or about 30 percent, of the 204 votes taken on whether to impose a quota from 1990 through 1995, since these votes were not unanimous. CITA is not required to publish its voting records or minutes of its monthly meetings, and it does not do so. If CITA votes in favor of issuing a call, the committee requests consultations with the exporting country through diplomatic note to impose a quota. Under ATC, once the exporting country receives the note, the two governments have 60 days to consult. No quota is put in place during the consultation period. Once CITA contacts the exporting country to request consultations, OTEXA publishes in the Federal Register details of the request, a summary of the market statement supporting the call, and a request for written comments from interested parties. Before the consultations take place, CITA also notifies and generally schedules meetings with both U.S domestic producers and importers and retailers to brief them and obtain their input. For a number of years, importers and retailers have advocated the use of open, public hearings that would allow for public comment before CITA makes a decision on whether to call a foreign government. Importers and retailers currently have an opportunity to provide input after CITA requests consultations with a foreign government but not to comment before a call is made. However, according to CITA officials, if importers and retailers were notified before a call is made, imports might surge further as firms attempt to import products before a quota is applied, and domestic producers might subsequently be hurt. Although importers and retailers maintain that they would not have enough time to place an import order and thereby enhance an import surge, CITA officials have not been convinced by this argument. U.S. importers and retailers and domestic producers also disagree about the amount of information OTEXA provides them about consultations after the call is made. Importers and retailers said they are not provided with as much information as domestic producers about upcoming consultations; on the other hand, domestic producers said that, in their view, importers and retailers receive additional information from the foreign exporting country involved in the consultations. CITA does not keep written records of its meetings or contacts with industry representatives, so the amount of information provided to domestic producers and the importer and retailing community cannot be determined. (See app. IV for further information on CITA’s decision-making process.) In deciding whether to impose quotas, CITA uses government statistics collected by the U.S. Customs Service, the Census Bureau, and the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS). These statistics are subject to the internal quality control processes of the three agencies. OTEXA officials attempt to match these data, including production, domestic price, and employment data, to CITA’s product categories. However, because Customs, Census, and BLS use different methods to collect their data, some compatibility problems occur when OTEXA attempts to make this match. CITA’s textile and apparel categories consist of combinations of International Harmonized Tariff Schedule (HTS) codes, but not all of the previously mentioned government agencies collect the data under an HTS-based system. While Customs collects import data using HTS, the Census Bureau collects production and domestic price data using Census’ product descriptions. BLS collects employment data using Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) product codes. We found that OTEXA can match the production data with a high degree of accuracy, but for price and employment data this matching is necessarily done with a much lesser degree of accuracy. Therefore, while import and production data were generally reliable and valid, price and employment data may only provide OTEXA with broad indications of trends in the domestic textile and apparel industries. (See app. V for more information on OTEXA’s data collection.) In the 166 market statements we examined for calls CITA issued between 1990 and 1995, we found that the committee relied primarily on data contained in OTEXA market statements for evidence of import surges and production declines, and to a lesser degree on price and employment data. CITA officials told us that they exercise considerable judgment, treat their determinations on a case-by-case basis, and apply no specific numerical threshold (such as a minimum increase in imports or a minimum decline in production) in making their decisions. Our review of import increases and production falls in the 166 market statements indicated the following: CITA issued calls when production declined by a median of 6.4 percent during the most recent period for which this data were available, while comparable yearly imports of a particular category of textiles or apparel increased by a median of 9.6 percent. The most recent median import increase was 17.6 percent. The change in the most recent import data ranged from a decrease of 15 percent to an increase of 195 percent. The change in domestic production ranged from a decrease of 51 percent to an increase of 25 percent. CITA did not issue calls in some cases where there were import increases and production falls. In examining annual import and production data between 1992 and 1994 for 94 CITA categories, including categories both called and not called, no calls were made in 21 instances where yearly production fell in a category by more than 5 percent and yearly imports rose in a category by 5 percent or more. CITA issued some calls when either domestic production fell or import increases were fairly small. For example, 26 percent of the calls occurred when the most recent year’s production declines were less than 2 percent; 20 percent of the calls occurred when the most recent year’s import increases were less than 2 percent. Both small production declines and small import increases occurred at the same time in less than 4 percent of the calls. CITA requested consultations with countries whose imports of the product in question represented a median of 2.5 percent of total U.S. imports of that commodity in the most recent 12 months for which data were available. The percent of total imports from individual countries ranged from 0.09 percent to 84 percent. In the 166 market statements we reviewed, CITA assumed a causal link between import rises and production falls because, according to OTEXA officials, this link is extremely difficult to prove. CITA also assumed in the market statements that textile and apparel imported products falling under the same CITA product category were like and/or competitive products to those being produced by domestic manufacturers of items under that category. However, we found that the HTS codes under some CITA categories represent varied products. Since CITA imposes quotas at the category level, all of the items under that category then become the product subject to quota. For example, in a 1995 call, CITA requested consultations with India over imports of category 435—women’s and girls’ wool coats—and imposed a quota. Category 435 includes suit-type jackets as well as overcoats and ski jackets. Thus, the quota was imposed not only on wool coats but also on suit-type jackets and ski jackets. (CITA later rescinded the restraint.) The producer prices of some HTS codes within CITA categories also varied, illustrating that the products may not be like and/or directly competitive. (See app. VI for more information on CITA’s use of data.) In 1995, CITA issued 28 calls. Under ATC, all safeguard decisions are to be reviewed by a newly created international Textiles Monitoring Body in Geneva, consisting of representatives from 10 countries, including the United States. TMB supervises the implementation of ATC. Among other responsibilities, TMB conducts examinations of all safeguard actions, including those involving disputes and those resulting in agreements, and makes appropriate recommendations. To date, TMB has completed its review of seven of the U.S. calls (where initially no agreement was reached with the exporting country) and found that the United States had demonstrated the threat of serious damage to domestic industry attributable to the called country in one case. In three cases, TMB found that the United States had not demonstrated serious damage to its domestic industry, and the United States subsequently rescinded the quotas; in three other cases, TMB could not reach consensus. TMB has not published details about the reasons for its recommendations, but some individual TMB members expressed concerns to us about the nature and timing of the 1995 U.S. calls (as of May 1996, the United States was the only country that had imposed quotas under ATC). Some TMB members told us that they considered ATC a liberalizing agreement and, thus, had not expected over 20 calls early in its first year. Although 28 calls was not unusually large compared to the number of calls made in previous years under MFA, some TMB members were concerned that the United States was treating calls under ATC as “business as usual.” In addition, individual TMB members we interviewed questioned how the United States used data to justify its calls. For example, they questioned (1) whether in some cases import increases had been “sharp and substantial” as required under ATC, (2) why changes occurred in the direction of data levels—in one case in U.S. domestic production levels and in another case in U.S. employment levels—between the consultation period and the TMB review, (3) whether the United States had adequately considered the exporting country’s world market share of the products in question, and (4) whether reimports under the U.S. Special Access Program could damage U.S. producers. In addition, some TMB members wanted to see more evidence that the United States had considered the extent to which the domestic producers being damaged by imports were producing like and/or competitive products. (See app. VII for more information on 1995 calls.) The data Canada and the EU use to make determinations of serious damage are similar to the type of data used by CITA. However, the Canadian and EU processes for making safeguard calls differ from the U.S. safeguard process in several ways. For example, the EU’s decisions to request consultations to impose quotas have been initiated by complaints from domestic producers rather than based on their own governments’ monitoring efforts. While importers and retailers can lobby the EU Commission, which chairs the intergovernmental committee responsible for setting quotas, they are not notified officially when a call is being considered. The Canadian government monitors trade flows and initiates safeguard actions. If the government intends to make a call, it notifies Canadian manufacturers, retailers, and importers and allows them to comment 2 to 3 weeks before issuing the call. In addition, Canadian and EU officials stated that they are not concerned about possible import surges before a call is made, for various reasons. Japan has not invoked safeguard measures under MFA or ATC. (See app. VIII for more information on the foreign systems.) Like CITA, ITC has the authority to determine whether an article is being imported into the United States in such increased quantities as to damage domestic industry, although their respective processes differ. ITC administers the GATT safeguard provision under section 201-04 of the Trade Act of 1974 as amended. Specifically, any relief imposed through the section 201 process applies to merchandise from all countries. ITC has no consultation period with any foreign government. The act requires ITC’s investigation to be triggered by a petition from an affected party and sets out specific procedures and time frames that must be followed. The act mandates that ITC hold public hearings, solicit briefs from interested parties, and issue public reports throughout the course of its investigation. During the past few years, retail and importer trade associations have maintained that the ITC process for imposing import restraints could be a potential alternative to CITA’s safeguard process. In addition, in 1995, a bill was introduced in the U.S. House to transfer CITA activities relating to ATC safeguard measures to ITC. (See app. IX for more information on the ITC safeguard process.) We believe that the material and analyses we have presented are the most comprehensive recent examination of the way that CITA operates and arrives at its decisions related to invoking ATC transitional safeguards. On the basis of this information, Congress may decide that it is satisfied with CITA as it is, or it may want to consider changing some of CITA’s operations. For example, if Congress is dissatisfied with the amount of transparency in CITA’s operations, it might wish to consider such measures as requiring CITA to publish its operating procedures, the minutes of its meetings (edited to protect proprietary or other sensitive information), and voting records. In the area of decision-making, Congress might wish to consider establishing threshold levels for import increases or production declines that would prompt consideration of imposing quotas. Or, Congress might wish to consider directing CITA to make quota decisions on the basis of consensus among its members. In the area of oversight, Congress might wish to consider establishing a high-level interagency body to review CITA’s decisions to impose quotas. This body could be similar to the Textile Trade Policy Group that existed between 1975 and 1987. In commenting on a draft of this report, CITA stated that much of the report represented a thorough and factual account of the operation of the U.S. textile program. However, CITA expressed some concern about our methodology for analyzing its use of data to support safeguard calls. CITA maintained that we did not accurately characterize how it applied data to issue a call. We evaluated CITA’s specific concerns and made some modifications to the report. However, we disagree with CITA’s overall comment on our assessment of CITA’s use of data. We believe our methodology and analysis are sound and accurately reflect how CITA uses data in deciding to impose an import quota. CITA’s comments are provided in their entirety in appendix XI, along with our point-by-point response. We did not provide CITA an opportunity to comment on the Matters for Congressional Consideration. (See app. X for information on our scope and methodology.) Unless you publicly announce its contents earlier, we plan no further distribution of this report until 30 days from the date of this letter. At that time, we will send copies of this report to the Secretaries of Commerce, State, Labor, and the Treasury; and the U.S. Trade Representative; and appropriate congressional committees. We will also make copies available to others upon request. Please contact me at (202) 512-8984 if you or your staff have any questions concerning this report. Major contributors to this report are listed in appendix XII. The U.S. textile and apparel industries accounted for 0.8 percent of the U.S. gross domestic product (GDP) in 1993, making it the 10th largest manufacturing sector. Yet, with about 1.6 million workers employed in U.S. textile and apparel manufacturing industries, it was the second largest source of nondurable manufacturing employment in the United States in 1995. In the same year, the U.S. textile and apparel industry represented 1.4 percent of total employment in all sectors in the United States. The textile industry generally consists of producers of yarn and thread, fabric, and various finished goods. These goods include home furnishings, such as sheets, towels, furniture covering, and carpets; and goods used for industrial purposes, ranging from automobile upholstery to industrial bags and belts. According to the U.S. International Trade Commission (ITC), the apparel industry consists of both vertically integrated firms (that make both the fabric and the finished products) producing various knitwear products, such as hosiery, underwear, and sweaters, and firms that principally cut and sew products from purchased materials. While the apparel industry is dominated by small establishments, a few segments of the industry are highly concentrated. Employment in the U.S. textile and apparel industries has been shrinking over the past two decades. At its peak in the early 1970s, the textile industry employed 1 million people, while the apparel industry employed 1.4 million. In 1995, the textile industry employed 667,000, and the apparel industry employed 930,000. According to Census Bureau statistics, the number of U.S. textile and apparel establishments declined from 31,021 in 1982 to 28,935 in 1992. Wages in the textile and apparel industries are relatively low. Although average hourly earnings have been rising at an average rate of 2.8 percent in the textile industry, and by 2.5 percent in the apparel industry over the period 1988-95, wages in both industries are still relatively low when compared to the manufacturing sector as a whole. In 1995, a textile worker on average earned $9.41 per hour, and an apparel worker $7.64 per hour, compared to $12.37 per hour for manufacturing workers overall. The U.S. textile and apparel industries, and the apparel products industry in particular, have traditionally been very sensitive to import competition from lower-cost, developing country suppliers. However, the textile industry has gradually become relatively competitive and is less labor intensive than the apparel industry. According to the Congressional Budget Office, the textile industry is approximately as labor intensive as the rest of U.S. manufacturing. According to ITC, U.S. textile and apparel industries have implemented a number of strategies in recent years to respond to growing market competition. These strategies include adopting new technologies and improving manufacturing, marketing, and distribution methods. Table I.1 shows the top 10 import categories in 1994. Textile and apparel imports were the fourth largest import category in 1994, with a higher value than crude oil and natural gas imports that year. In contrast, textile and apparel exports, at $11.3 billion in 1994, were 2.3 percent of all exports, the 10th largest category of exports. Total textile imports reached 9.1 billion square meter equivalents (SME) in 1995, an increase of 2.3 percent from the prior year. Table I.2 shows the top 10 suppliers of U.S. textile imports in 1995, the most recent year that data were available. European Union (EU) The total dollar value of U.S. textile exports rose by nearly 52 percent between 1990 and 1995, approaching $7 billion by 1995. Half of U.S. textile products were shipped to Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries in 1995. Table I.3 shows the top 10 markets for U.S. textile products. Apparel imports have risen dramatically in the last decade. According to ITC, during the last 10 years, notwithstanding quota restrictions and relatively high tariffs, U.S. apparel imports grew by 90 percent, to $34 billion, and doubled their share of the U.S. market to more than 40 percent. Between 1989 and 1993, U.S. apparel imports rose by 38 percent. U.S. apparel manufacturers face growing competition from low-wage developing countries. Table I.4 shows the top 10 suppliers of apparel to the United States in 1995, all of which were developing countries. China continues to be the largest apparel supplier to the U.S. market, followed by Hong Kong. In 1995, Mexico displaced Taiwan as the third largest apparel supplier to the United States. However, combined exports of these three countries only accounted for 26 percent of total U.S. apparel imports in 1995; imports originated from at least another 68 countries as well. According to ITC, in the past 30 years approximately half of the productive capacity in the apparel industry has shifted from developed to developing countries. This is part of a global trend for apparel producers to shift production offshore in order to lower production costs. In addition, in the past few years apparel importers have shifted their sourcing of goods to countries that do not face U.S. quotas. From 1993 to 1995, apparel imports from Mexico and the Caribbean increased 63 percent, and in 1995 they accounted for 30 percent of total U.S. apparel imports. Several trade initiatives provide incentives to U.S. and foreign producers to assemble apparel products in these countries from U.S. fabric or fabric cut in the United States. For example, the United States provides special access arrangements to Caribbean Basin countries. In addition, there is a partial duty exemption for goods assembled abroad from U.S. components (the tariff is applied only to the value added abroad), and Mexico benefits from provisions in the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), which took effect in 1994. The United States is not the only developed country experiencing significant import penetration. Table I.5 shows the level of and change in world apparel imports by developed countries and country groups from 1990 to 1993. For example, while U.S. imports increased 32 percent from 1990 to 1993, imports to Japan increased 44 percent over that period, and imports to the EU increased 33 percent from 1990 to 1992 (the latest year for which data were available). NA = Not available. The total dollar value of U.S. apparel exports nearly tripled from 1990 to 1995, reaching $6.2 billion by 1995. Table I.6 shows the top 10 markets for U.S. apparel exports. Over 90 percent of this increase can be attributed to increased U.S. exports to Mexico, Japan, Canada, and Caribbean Basin countries. The majority of apparel exports to Caribbean Basin countries are cut fabric goods shipped there for assembly and reimported to the United States. Current data do not allow the separation of apparel parts exported for assembly from those that are wholly consumed abroad. The Committee for the Implementation of Textile Agreements CITA carries on several functions beyond overseeing the gradual integration of quotas and utilizing the Agreement on Textiles and Clothing’s (ATC) transitional safeguard mechanism. As under MFA, CITA’s work load includes a number of tasks related to assuring compliance with U.S. trade agreements that are not directly associated with imposing quotas. These tasks involve coordinating U.S. government efforts to prevent fraud and illegal routing of U.S. textile and apparel imports through third countries (transshipment violations), implementing penalties against violators and assuring that the U.S. Customs Service enforces these penalties, and reviewing and commenting on regulations concerning the origin of textile and apparel products in cooperation with the U.S. Customs Service. CITA is also responsible for performing many functions that are not associated with ATC, including negotiating new, and periodically renewing old, bilateral and memorandum of understanding (MOU) agreements, with non-World Trade Organization (WTO) member countries, such as China (according to an OTEXA official, in 1995 CITA negotiated 16 such agreements with foreign governments, including both bilateral and MOU agreements); implementing a program that provides, under certain circumstances, special access arrangements to Caribbean Basin countries to export apparel products to the United States; and overseeing the implementation of provisions within NAFTA that pertain to textile and apparel trade. As under MFA, OTEXA provides CITA with its principal support staff; 33 of OTEXA’s 41 staff work on CITA-related matters. OTEXA has three divisions that perform CITA-related functions—the Agreements, Industry Assessment, and Trade and Data Divisions. Their functions include monitoring import activity for safeguard and transshipment purposes, conducting evaluations of the general state of the U.S. textile and apparel industries, and participating in any U.S. negotiations that may affect those industries. The fourth division is the Market Expansion division, whose work has nothing to do with CITA. This division’s main objective is to promote U.S. textile and apparel exports by sponsoring domestic and international export seminars, trade shows, missions, and exhibits; and by providing counseling to companies on export issues. According to the division’s Director, since the program began in 1979, about 2,570 U.S. companies have participated in export trade events that the division has sponsored. OTEXA officials report that they believe the companies’ participation generated about $3.5 billion in U.S. exports. Table II.1 shows each CITA agency’s fiscal year 1995 CITA-related costs, share of total CITA costs, and number of staff that supported CITA’s operations. In fiscal year 1995, OTEXA accounted for over 79 percent of CITA’s total $3.6 million costs, at $2.8 million. Table II.2 shows that from fiscal year 1990 to fiscal year 1995, OTEXA’s budget more than doubled. However, over 96 percent of the budget increase was due to increases in the two research and development (R&D) technology transfer grant programs administered by OTEXA—one to the Textile/Clothing Technology Corporation ([TC]) and another to the National Textile Center (NTC). In fiscal year 1995, these two grants accounted for over 75 percent of OTEXA’s $16.4 million budget. According to OTEXA, although funds for the grant programs are included in OTEXA’s budget by Congress and OTEXA has a role in administering the grants, the grant funds do not cover any of OTEXA’s administration costs. Other costs include all those other than payroll and other benefits (travel, equipment, etc.). ’s R&D effort and the NTC’s work are funded solely by federal grant funds. The primary change in multilateral textile rules under ATC is the required integration of textile and apparel products into GATT rules in four stages over a 10-year period ending in 2005. Product integration entails the permanent removal of textile and apparel quotas maintained under ATC, with freedom to choose which products to integrate at each stage. Table III.1 shows the list of products to be integrated at each of the four stages specified in ATC, as published by the Department of Commerce. Table III.1: Integration Schedule for Textile and Apparel Products Under Quota Stage 1 (Jan. 1, 1995-Dec. 31, 1997) Stage 2 (Jan. 1, 1998-Dec. 31, 2001) Stage 3 (Jan. 1, 2002-Dec. 31, 2004) Stage 4 (Jan. 1, 2005) Textured filament Nontextured filament Other stable fiber yarn Silk blend and vegetable fiber (Table notes on next page) ATC also contains provisions that ensure that any quota levels imposed pursuant to MFA and in place when ATC went into effect will increase and become less restrictive with time. MFA required that bilateral agreements contain provisions to ensure the automatic increase in the quota quantities over time, that is, “quota growth.” Table III.2 provides an example of how, through a mechanism called “growth-on-growth,” the size of quotas on products not yet integrated will increase in three stages over the 10-year period. Under ATC, baseline quota rates previously set under MFA bilateral agreements will increase by 16, 25, and 27 percent in stage 1 (1995-97), stage 2 (1998-2001), and stage 3 (2002-04), respectively. The growth-on-growth mechanism would result in, for example, an original 6-percent growth rate increasing to an 11-percent growth rate for the third stage. All quotas imposed under ATC transitional safeguard provisions will have growth rates of at least 6 percent per year and can last up to 3 years (with the exception of wool products, which can increase only 2 percent yearly). MFA growth rates(percent) Stage I 16% increase (1995-1997) Stage II 25% increase (1998-2001) Stage III 27% increase (2002-2004) ATC also changes the rules concerning the imposition of new quotas during the 10-year period. Because its purpose is to integrate textile products into GATT, article 6 of ATC, unlike MFA, does not permit countries to negotiate and impose quotas unless the importing country finds actual or threat of serious damage to its domestic industry. Under article 4 of MFA, countries were permitted to enter into bilateral agreements limiting imports in order to eliminate “real risks of market disruption.” Under ATC, a WTO member country may impose a quota on another WTO member country only through the use of a transitional safeguard—a temporary quota on a particular foreign supplier. The standard for applying a transitional safeguard under ATC is comparable to article 3 of MFA. Before making a direct comparison between the two standards, however, it is useful to describe the ATC standard. Article 6 of ATC provides that a safeguard action may be taken based on a determination that total imports of a particular product are being imported in such increased quantities as to cause “serious damage or actual threat thereof, to the domestic industry producing like and/or directly competitive products.” The serious damage or actual threat thereof must be “demonstrably caused by” an increase in quantities in “total imports of that product” and not by such other factors as “technological changes or changes in consumer preference.” ATC further provides that the importing country shall examine the effect of those imports on the state of the industry as reflected in relevant economic variables. It lists 11 variables that may be considered but states that none, either alone or combined with other factors, “can necessarily give decisive guidance.” (These factors are output, productivity, utilization of capacity, inventories, market share, exports, wages, employment, domestic prices, profits, and investment.) According to CITA, language on these factors was developed specifically because of the difficulty of establishing formulas to account for varying situations. Once the importing country determines that imports are causing serious damage or actual threat thereof to its domestic industry, it must attribute the serious damage on a country-by-country basis. Country attribution may be made on the basis of “a sharp and substantial increase in imports” from a particular country and on the basis of “the level of imports from other sources, market share, and import and domestic prices.” The ATC safeguard standard is very similar to the MFA standard and contains essentially the same terminology (see fig. III.1). Both safeguard provisions allow a country to request consultations to impose quotas on an exporting country’s product based on its determination of serious damage or actual threat thereof. Like MFA, ATC affords countries broad discretion in choosing among listed (similar but not identical) factors to be considered as well as the weight, if any, to be given any one factor. Neither agreement provides guidance on how the criteria are to be applied. For example, ATC and MFA do not specify a minimum increase in imports or a minimum decrease in domestic production to justify imposing a quota. The primary difference between the two safeguard standards is that ATC requires a finding that total imports of the product are causing serious damage or actual threat thereof, while no such finding was required by MFA. The MFA safeguard provision required that a country determine that imports of a particular product from a particular source were causing serious damage or actual threat thereof. Similar to language in MFA, ATC specifies that transitional safeguards are to be applied “sparingly.” Factors that may be consideredProductivity Utilization of capacity Profits Investment Exports Employment Market share Inventories Wages Domestic prices Output (2) Damage caused by increase in total imports of that product (3) Damage is attributable to imports from a particular country Sharp and substantial increase in imports from country Level of imports as compared with imports from other sources Market share Import and domestic prices (at comparable stage of commercial transaction) Although article 3 of MFA described the safeguard standard as “market disruption,” Annex A to MFA provided that the determination of market disruption shall be based on the existence of serious damage to domestic producers or actual threat thereof. MFA provided that “no one or several of these factors can necessarily give decisive guidance.” Serious damage or actual threat thereof cannot be caused by other factors such as technological changes or changes in consumer preferences. ATC provides that none of these factors, “either alone or combined, can necessarily give decisive guidance.” Through OTEXA’s continuous monitoring of industry data, CITA is generally proactive in identifying cases of actual or threatened serious damage. On a weekly and monthly basis, OTEXA is responsible for monitoring U.S. import and domestic production data, which are the key indicators OTEXA uses to identify changes in data that may show that imports are causing serious damage to U.S. textile and apparel producers. In addition, OTEXA monitors other economic factors that are outlined in ATC. (See fig. IV.1 for an illustration of CITA’s quota imposition process.) Notice placed in Federal Register requesting public comment; copy of to public in Commerce's Trade Reference Room Is agreement on restraint reached unilaterally? government? Non-WTO member countries are not subject to ATC requirements; therefore, quota determinations involving those countries are not notified or referred to the Textile Monitoring Body (TMB), and negotiations with them do not have specified time limits. The first step in the process is for OTEXA to identify an import increase that could indicate a “surge” in a particular product category. OTEXA then looks at domestic production data and gathers other relevant economic information for the same category . While OTEXA usually initiates tracking of likely cases of potential damage, industry representatives also maintain contact with OTEXA staff to inform them of their industry’s economic conditions. When OTEXA believes that the economic indicators appear to signal serious damage to domestic producers, OTEXA staff contacts industry representatives and/or their trade associations to obtain more detailed information on the current situation and confirm production figures. When a case for serious damage appears strong, OTEXA staff forwards it to Commerce’s Deputy Assistant Secretary for Textiles, Apparel, and Consumer Goods Industries, who is also the CITA Chair, to decide whether to propose a call to the other CITA principals. If the CITA Chair decides positively, then the OTEXA staff prepare a statement of serious damage or actual threat thereof. The statement, which is classified as confidential at this point, is distributed to the CITA principals about 1 week before a CITA meeting. At the meeting the principals have an opportunity to discuss the merits of and vote on the cases presented. If the principals approve the call by majority vote, the Department of State then prepares a diplomatic note. The note, sent to the foreign government, contains the statement and requests consultations. In cases involving WTO member countries, TMB is simultaneously notified. The decision to request consultations does not cause a quota to be imposed immediately on the product. After CITA receives confirmation that the diplomatic note has been delivered, the statement is declassified and made public through a Department of Commerce telephone recording announcing the call. It is also published in the Federal Register, which provides notice of the request for consultations and a summary of the statement along with a request for public comment. Commerce opens a public comment file on each call. Commerce also makes the statement available in its Trade Reference Room. Before consultations with the foreign government begin, affected parties have an opportunity to meet with U.S. negotiators. USTR notifies industry advisors, including representatives of both the domestic producers and the importing and retailing community that may be affected. USTR and OTEXA officials meet with industry representatives for various reasons, including advising them of the call, obtaining information about the current market situation, and seeking guidance on the appropriate quota level. In addition, industry advisors, on their own initiative and expense, may accompany the U.S. government negotiating team on consultations abroad. However, they do not participate in the actual negotiations. ATC requires that consultations with WTO governments are to be completed within 60 days of the date on which the request was received. If agreement is reached between the countries, a quota reflecting the agreed-to level may be imposed at the end of the consultation period, and details of the agreed quota level are notified within 60 days to TMB. TMB, established to supervise the implementation of ATC, is a 10-person body made up of 5 representatives from importing countries and 5 representatives from exporting countries. TMB will review all safeguard actions under ATC and will determine whether agreements are justified and have been reached in accordance with ATC provisions. It will make all decisions on a consensus basis. However, if the countries are unable to reach agreement within 60 days, the country proposing to take action may impose the quota within the following 30-day period. The restraint will be imposed at a level not lower than the import level during the 12-month period ending 2 months before the month the consultations were requested. TMB will examine the case, including the determination of serious damage, and make recommendations within 30 days. During this period, the two parties to the dispute will present their cases before TMB, responding to TMB members’ questions and providing information that may support their case. CITA officials match U.S. government import, production, domestic price, and employment data with CITA’s textile and apparel categories. Our review found that CITA combines import categories and production categories to match the broader CITA categories. We also found that some compatibility problems exist between the domestic producer price and employment data CITA uses and the CITA categories. Because of the difficulty in matching price and employment data to these categories, the data CITA uses may only provide broad indications of trends in the domestic textile and apparel industry. CITA uses textile and apparel categories that are aggregations based on Harmonized Tariff Schedule (HTS) codes. Table V.1 shows the varied number of different HTS codes that are included in one CITA category—women’s and girls’ wool coats. For example, 36 HTS codes, including 6102.90.9010 (overcoats), 6104.31.0000 (suit-type jackets), and 6202.91.2011 (ski-jackets), are all under one CITA category, number 435. W/G overcoats, carcoats, etc., of wool/fine animal hair, knit W/G overcoats, etc., of manmade fiber containing >= 23% weight wool/fine animal hair, knit W/G overcoats, etc., of other textile material subject to wool restraint, knit W/G ensembles of garments of tariff heading 6102 & 6104 of wool knit W/G ensembles of overcoats, jackets, etc., of synthetic fiber >= 23% wool, knit W/G ensembles of overcoats, etc., other textile material subject to wool restraint, knit W/G suit-type jackets and blazers of wool, knit W/G suit-type jackets of synthetic fiber containing 23% more wool, knit W/G suit-type jackets of other textile material subject to wool restraint, knit Parts of coats and jackets of wool, knit Women’s overcoats, carcoats & smaller coats of wool, not knit (continued) Girls’ overcoats, carcoats & smaller coats of wool, not knit Women’s overcoats and smaller coats of MMF >= 36% wool, not knit Girls’ overcoats and smaller coats of MMF >= 36% wool, not knit W/G overcoats and smaller coats of other material subject to wool restraint, not knit Women’s anorak ski-jackets and smaller of artificial wool, not knit Girls’ anorak ski-jackets and smaller of artificial wool, not knit Women’s anorak and smaller articles of MMF >= 36% wool, not knit Girls’ anorak and smaller articles of MMF >= 36% wool, not knit W/G anoraks and smaller articles of textile material subject to wool restraint, not knit W/G ensembles of tariff heading 6202 & 6204 of wool, not knit W/G ensembles of tariff heading 6202 & 6204 synthetic fiber >= 36% wool/fine animal hair, woven W/G ensembles of tariff heading 6202 & 6204 other textile material subject to wool restraint, woven Women’s suit-type jackets of wool >= 30% silk, not knit Girls’ suit-type jackets of wool >30% silk, not knit Women’s suit-type jackets of wool not >30% silk, not knit Girls’ suit-type jackets of wool Women’s suit-type jackets of synthetic fiber >36% wool, not knit Girls’ suit-type jackets of synthetic fiber >36% wool, not knit Women’s suit-type jackets of artificial fiber >36% wool, not knit Girls’ suit-type jackets of artificial fiber >36% wool, not knit W/G suit-type jackets of other textile material subject to wool restraint, not knit (continued) Table V.2 shows the collection method (coding schemes) of the U.S. government agencies from which CITA obtains data, the extent to which they are compatible with CITA categories, and OTEXA’s procedures to facilitate a category match. Import (quantity) data, production (quantity) data, and import price data are relatively more compatible with the CITA categories than are domestic production price and employment data. HTS codes are combined to match each CITA category. OTEXA combines HTS codes. Data already combined like CITA category but not identical. Data collected in fiber-specific way. OTEXA uses judgment to complete match. Data already combined like CITA category but not identical. Data not collected in fiber-specific way. Data not compatible to CITA categories. OTEXA relies on own judgment and manufacturers’ reports to convert Census data into CITA categories. HTS codes must be combined to match each CITA category. OTEXA calculates an average price of the HTS codes in each category. Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) Data collected by manufacturer’s primary product.Data not fiber specific. Data not compatible with CITA categories. OTEXA applies a complex formula and its own judgment and uses manufacturers’ reports to adjust for better match. Because of the difficulty in matching the price and employment data to the CITA categories, CITA may only be able to obtain broad indications of trends in the domestic textile and apparel categories. The U.S. Customs Service collects import (quantity) data from submissions required of all importers or their brokers for all imports entering the United States. After performing a series of edit checks, Customs sends the import data to Census, which performs its own edit checks and prepares data tapes it makes available to OTEXA on a monthly basis. U.S. import data, in general, are considered to provide reasonably good estimates of imports because of the revenue-generating aspect of merchandise imports. Textile and apparel import data, in particular, are subject to special scrutiny because of the need to ensure that import quotas are not exceeded. However, Customs officials caution that because of some importers’ efforts to circumvent quotas, the textile and apparel data may not be as reliable as other import data. CBI was adopted in 1982 to promote investment and expand the economies of Caribbean Basin countries through several mechanisms, including tax incentives for investment and duty-free import access to the U.S. market. consider the data, requesting additional information from the importer of record if necessary. Textile and apparel import data are particularly prone to a number of problems, according to Customs. Exporters in nations subject to quota can use illegal routing of textile and apparel imports through third countries (i.e., textile transshipments) to circumvent quotas. Intentional or unintentional misclassification is also a major issue for textile and apparel imports. Intentional misclassification occurs when importers falsely claim their shipments are in a category not under quota or when they deliberately mislabel the shipment’s country of origin. Unintentional misclassification can occur because of the large number of codes for textile and apparel commodities. According to Customs, there are more than 4,000 HTS codes with which to classify textile and apparel imports and exports. Some importers can make honest mistakes when they classify their commodities because of their limited knowledge of these codes. Overall, Customs notes that textile and apparel import data receive more scrutiny than any other commodity’s import data. They do not know if the extra scrutiny counterbalances the additional problems. However, Customs does not believe that any CITA calls have been made based on erroneous import data. Apparel production (quantity) data are collected on a quarterly and annual basis by the Census Bureau, as part of its Census of Manufactures, Current Industrial Reports (CIR) program. This program has compiled data on industry activity since the beginning of this century. In 1983, we reported that, while the data were considered thorough and accurate, there were problems with timeliness. At that time, CITA relied on annual production surveys, and the data used were between 10 and 32 months old. Since then, quarterly surveys have been implemented, and Census currently makes apparel production data available to OTEXA about 2 to 3 months after the end of each quarter. The quarterly apparel survey covers manufacturers, government contractors, and jobbers that cut and sew apparel. It is mailed to more than 1,200 large manufacturers that account for over 90 percent of total cuttings of apparel items. In addition, approximately 3,000 small manufacturers receive an annual short form of this survey. Both surveys collect data on the quantity of production and the total value of shipments for men’s, women’s, children’s, and infants’ apparel. The data collected include garments cut in the United States and sent outside the country to be sewn. According to Census, the quarterly survey has response rates that usually exceed 90 percent and coverage rates that are usually about 95 percent. Census officials believe that coverage, which is the percent of shipments accounted for by the respondents, is the more important measure. According to Census, the quarterly and annual surveys combined have coverage rates of about 96 to 97 percent of total U.S. apparel shipments. Census uses computerized edit checks to identify responses that vary significantly from those provided in previous surveys and telephones respondents to verify the accuracy of these responses. Census does not perform any site visits to check on responses. In addition to Census’ own verification procedures, an OTEXA official is authorized to examine the production data before they are published, thus providing another level of cross-checks. The Census Bureau collects production data at a fairly aggregated level. Before OTEXA can use these product description data, it must match the Census product descriptions to CITA’s own categories, which are also fairly aggregated even though they are based on data collected at a very disaggregated level. In general, the Census product descriptions, when broken down by the type of fiber used, are very similar to the CITA categories. Nevertheless, Census’ product descriptions and CITA’s categories cannot be matched exactly primarily because (1) respondents to the apparel quarterly surveys do not always specify the type of fabric by fiber they used; when this occurs, OTEXA makes judgments on what proportion of fiber is to be given to the various product categories and (2) a complete concordance between Census’ product descriptions and CITA categories does not exist. Typically, the product descriptions contain a few products that are not in the corresponding CITA category, while the CITA categories contain a few products that are not in the corresponding Census product description. In some cases, adjustments are made, based on an OTEXA official’s industry knowledge, other data sources, and judgment. Census also collects data on textile production through a series of annual and quarterly surveys. Because some of these surveys are annual instead of quarterly or monthly, some textile production data are much less timely than apparel production data. It is important to note that there are a few textile and apparel categories for which Census does not collect any data, including luggage, handkerchiefs, and hosiery. OTEXA monitors these categories using industry data sources, such as the National Cotton Council’s “Cotton Counts its Customers” production surveys. According to industry representatives, OTEXA has discussed the surveys and methodologies used by these representatives, and OTEXA is satisfied that their data are reliable and valid. Census’ quarterly and annual production surveys also collect data on the net value of the products produced, or the production price. However, value data are not collected by fiber type and therefore cannot be accurately matched to CITA’s fiber-specific categories. For example, the Census value data do not distinguish between the prices of clothing made of cotton, wool, MMF or other fiber types. Whenever CITA is considering issuing a call, OTEXA contacts a limited number of manufacturers based on industry recommendations and adjusts the Census value data based on the information obtained. Given the limitations of the Census data and OTEXA’s data collection methods, the producer price data published in the market statements provides broad approximations of producer prices by category, rather than precise estimates. BLS collects employment, payroll, and hours worked data from textile and apparel manufacturers on a monthly basis. While these data are generally considered timely, they are collected using the SIC system’s categories for textile and apparel products. These categories are neither fiber specific nor directly compatible with CITA’s categories. Moreover, the BLS data are collected by the primary manufacturing activity, according to the SIC categories, of the establishment surveyed. For example, an apparel manufacturer who produces three product categories is reported as producing only the one it makes in the greatest quantity, and all its employment and payroll data will be attributed to that category. In 1995, OTEXA developed a new methodology to derive textile and apparel employment data by CITA categories. This methodology involves a number of stages and apportions the SIC employment data to CITA categories using algorithms derived from CIR production data and other data that Census supplies. After deriving employment data by CITA categories, OTEXA also considers data from the Labor Department’s and the Commerce Department’s Trade Adjustment Assistance programs and consults industry representatives and manufacturers. OTEXA officials may make adjustments to the data by category, on a case-by-case basis, depending on what they learn from these sources. While this methodology utilizes the available data sources in a reasonable fashion, it cannot overcome all the problems involved in matching SIC-collected data with HTS-collected data aggregated into CITA categories. Therefore, employment data by CITA categories provide approximations of actual trends rather than precise estimates. CITA bases its determinations of serious damage, and its decision to request consultations to impose quotas, in part on the data and analysis presented by OTEXA in its market statements. We examined all of the market statements provided by OTEXA for calls issued over the last 6 years—from 1990 through 1994 under MFA, and in 1995 under ATC. In the market statements, OTEXA generally focused on import surges and domestic production declines and assumed a causal link between the two factors. OTEXA also included in the market statements the import price and the domestic producer price of the product in question. In the 1995 statements, OTEXA also provided employment data, but as noted in appendix V, there are problems relating these data to CITA categories. The import and production data in the market statements describe changes for time periods that usually ended several months before the statement’s issuance. The statements did not always present data over a standardized time period. Typically, the data go back 2 to 5 years.Because of the way the data are presented in the statements, we could only consistently examine yearly change over the most recent 2 years of data for each of the 166 statements. Recognizing that OTEXA also considered longer-term historical trends before issuing a request for consultations, we examined changes over the last 3 calendar years for the 126 market statements that contained these longer-term data. Consistent with its authority under U.S. law, MFA, and ATC, the range in import and domestic production levels in the market statements indicated that CITA made its serious damage determinations on a case-by-case basis rather than on specific import rises or production falls. For example, in 1995, the most recent comparable yearly increases of imports reported in the market statements ranged from 4 percent to 116 percent, and production declines ranged from less than 1 percent to 24 percent. Over the full 6-year period, the most recent yearly import data ranged from a decline of 15 percent to an increase of 195 percent; the most recent comparable year production data ranged from an increase of 25 percent to a decrease of 51 percent. In the statements, CITA supported its decisions to request consultations on import surges and production declines that had occurred over differing time periods. For example, in some instances CITA emphasized changes that had occurred over the last 3 calendar years; in others, it emphasized changes that had occurred in the last 2 calendar years, and in still others it emphasized changes since the beginning of the calendar year. We analyzed a total of 166 market statements from 1990 through 1995 (see table VI.1). The number of calls averaged 28 per year. The 166 calls involved imports from 43 different countries and 59 different joint or combined textile and apparel categories. Thailand was the nation that received the most calls (22), followed by the United Arab Emirates (15) and India (11). The categories called the most frequently were cotton and MMF nightwear and pajamas (14); cotton and MMF men’s and boy’s shirts, not knit (10); and cotton and MMF underwear (8). From 1990-1995, the most recent production data showed a median yearly decline of 6.4 percent, and the comparable import data showed an increase of 9.6 percent. Furthermore, the U.S. domestic market sharedeclined by a median of about 4 percentage points for calls issued from 1990 through 1995. As previously noted, OTEXA officials stated that they also considered longer-term historical trends, as well as more recent changes. Although the available data limited our ability to analyze these longer-term trends, we examined production declines and import increases for the 3 full calendar years prior to the call when these data were available. In the 126 market statements that contained these data, the median production decline was 17 percent and the median import increase was 12.4 percent. Import data are more current than production data because it is provided monthly, while production data is provided quarterly. In our analysis, we considered both import data comparable to production data and the most recent import data, which are generally not comparable. The most recent import data rose by 17.6 percent. The data in table VI.2 show the median changes over the most recent comparable years for imports, production, and domestic market share, from 1990 to 1995. Table VI.2: Median Import Rises, Production Declines, and Domestic Market Share Falls for CITA Calls, 1990-95 Import increases comparable to production data (percent) Declines in production (percent) Declines in domestic market share (percent) Note 1: Median yearly changes are for the most recent 2 years of comparable import and production data presented in the market statements. Note 2: The decline in market share is calculated as the change in percentage points. Therefore, the declines are not directly comparable with the changes in imports or production, which are calculated as percentages of actual production. Although some calls were supported by either a small recent production decline or a small import increase, very few were supported by both a small production decline and a small import increase. Between 1990 and 1995, 45 calls were issued when the most recent year’s production falls were less than 2 percent, and 32 calls were issued when the most recent year’s import increases were less than 2 percent. Our review of the market statements found many instances when small production falls were accompanied by larger import increases, or vice versa. We found only 6 instances (out of 166) of calls being issued between 1990 and 1995 when production had fallen by less than 2 percent and imports had risen by less than 2 percent (see table VI.3). Of these, only one occurred in the last 3 years, and none occurred under ATC. As shown in table VI.4, in 102 of the 166 calls made by CITA during 1990-95, production declined and total category imports rose during the most recent calendar year where data existed for both variables. In 56 other calls, either production rose or imports declined (in 8 calls, data were incomplete). Most of the calls issued when production rose or imports fell during the most recent year occurred before 1993; none of these calls were issued in 1995 under ATC. OTEXA officials told us that, in those calls where imports had fallen in the most recent comparable year, they had risen over a shorter or a longer time period. Similarly, they told us that even if production had increased over the most recent time period, it had decreased over an alternative time period. Our data analysis confirmed these points. For example, in some cases OTEXA compared the most recent calendar year production data with that of 2, 3, or 4 years earlier. Further, OTEXA sometimes compared the most recent year-ending or partial year production data with a comparable time period. OTEXA used similar time period comparisons in those calls where calendar year imports declined over the previous year. In a few instances, the import increase occurred after the decline in domestic production. Regarding import data, OTEXA presented the most recent import data available. Since production data lag behind data, CITA often presented import data that were from a different time period than production data. From 1990 through 1995, CITA requested consultations with many countries that were small suppliers of U.S. textile and apparel imports. Over this period, half of the countries called were responsible for less than 2.5 percent of the total category imports from all sources (see table VI.5). As it was fairly common for CITA to request consultations with more than one country for a particular category, we calculated the combined percentages of world imports for all countries called per category per year and found that this had a median of 4.8 percent. As described in appendix V, CITA classifies goods into 148 categories that consist of a total of 4,000 HTS codes averaging 27 HTS codes per category. Because CITA imposes quotas at the category level, any quota imposed restricts imports of the category and its corresponding HTS codes. Article 6 of ATC provides that a WTO member country may take a safeguard action on imports of products causing serious damage to its domestic industry producing like and/or competitive products. ATC, however, does not define the standard “like and/or competitive products.” In making its determinations on damage to domestic industry, CITA assumed that the HTS codes within the same CITA category were like and/or directly competitive products to those being produced by domestic manufacturers of items under that category. However, we found that some of the categories CITA called from 1990 to 1994 contained HTS codes that appeared to include dissimilar products based on their descriptions and the import and producer prices reported in the market statements. Along with product descriptions, product prices also varied within CITA categories. In the 138 market statements we examined for 1990-94, OTEXA reported estimated domestic producer prices and import prices at the HTS level. We found that in some market statements, (1) U.S. producer prices and import prices within the same category differed from one HTS code to another and (2) U.S. producer prices and import prices for the same HTS code varied significantly from one call to another. For example, in July 1991, CITA issued a call to the Philippines for category 359-C/659-C—cotton and MMF fiber overalls and coveralls. The market statement indicated that approximately 73 percent of the imports in this category entered the United States under two HTS codes. Table VI.6 shows the import prices and U.S. producer prices listed in the market statement for each code. The import prices for each code were $145.43 and $9.47, respectively. The U.S. producer price was $230-$240 for one code and only $25-$35 for the other code. Import prices (U.S. dollars) U.S. producer prices (U.S. dollars) In response to our question about the variation in prices among HTS codes within this category, OTEXA officials responded in writing that the price difference reflected the fact that the items imported under these HTS codes were very different garments, with different prices. However, the officials also said that the garments were “like and/or competing garments” because they were both being used for the same purpose—“to cover and protect the under clothing and the body.” They said that this common purpose “will dictate the type and quality one purchases.” This appendix examines in detail the transitional safeguards invoked in 1995 under ATC, including the number of safeguards, their status, an analysis of data CITA applied to its decision to impose the safeguards, and information on the TMB’s review of the safeguards. Finally, a case study on one category—nightwear and pajamas—presents an overview of a disputed safeguard action. CITA issued 28 calls in 1995, covering 10 product categories, to 11 WTO member countries and 7 non-WTO member countries. Of the 28 calls, the United States and the exporting countries reached agreement on 14 and the United States ultimately rescinded 11. For the remaining calls, quotas remain without agreement on two, and consultations between the United States and the exporting country are ongoing for one case (see table VII.2). Table VII.1 shows U.S. domestic production, import, and world import data by country for the 28 calls issued in 1995. The data shows that CITA does not apply any standard numerical thresholds in finding damage to U.S. industry and in deciding to request consultations to impose quotas. The rise in total imports for each category ranged from 3.7 percent for category 342/642 (cotton and MMF suits) to 116 percent for category 440 (woven wool shirts and blouses). Production declines ranged from 1.7 percent for category 670-L (MMF luggage) to 23.9 percent for category 444 (women’s and girls’ wool suits.) In 1995, CITA requested consultations with some small suppliers. Table VII.1 also shows the country percent of world imports—countries called according to their import share of the category in question, from the entire world. Under ATC, the United States called countries with world import shares of a particular product of less than 2 percent in seven instances, and world import shares of less than 5 percent in 17 instances. For category 351/651 (nightwear), all four countries called had world import shares of less than 5 percent, as did three countries called under category 435 (women’s and girls’ wool coats.) The country with the highest world import market share was India, for woven wool blouses and shirts (category 440), at 54.2 percent. The data did not show any significant differences in CITA calls issued to WTO member countries as compared to nonmember countries. Men’s and boys’ wool coats Women’s and girls’ wool coats Woven wool shirts and blouses Women’s and girls’ wool suits (continued) Among other things, TMB is charged with reviewing quotas that are disputed as well as those agreed to following a call to ensure that the safeguard conforms to the terms of ATC. The 10 TMB members are broadly representative of WTO member countries; 1995 members included representatives from Brazil, Canada, the EU, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Japan, Norway, Pakistan, and the United States. With respect to disputed safeguard actions, TMB’s examination typically results in a determination of whether serious damage or actual threat thereof, within the meaning of ATC, has been demonstrated. In one case, however, TMB issued a recommendation on the basis of interpreting other ATC provisions. TMB is required to promptly conduct examinations and make appropriate recommendations. ATC provides that member countries will endeavor to accept in full those recommendations. TMB does not have formal rules of practice and procedure or rules of evidence. While its working procedures state that TMB reports of disputed cases shall include “a factual presentation of the issues examined” and “the common rationale” for its recommendations, the reports to date have not provided detailed reasoning supporting TMB’s conclusions about the existence of serious damage or actual threat thereof. In this regard, a TMB member stated that TMB recommendations should not be viewed as precedent or definitive guidance to member countries; instead, he noted that safeguard cases are reviewed on a case-by-case basis. One TMB member emphasized the role of TMB as a facilitator of ATC implementation, noting that TMB is not a substitute for WTO dispute settlement. WTO’s Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) can consider disputes that were the subject of TMB reviews or recommendations. Much of TMB’s review requires interpreting ATC provisions. TMB members hold differing views about the meaning of various ATC provisions. Despite the number of TMB members, their diverse cultural backgrounds, and ATC language that is often subject to interpretation, TMB makes all of its recommendations by consensus. During 1995, TMB completed its review of and issued reports on seven disputed U.S. safeguard actions involving five product categories. TMB found that one call was justified based on a finding that the United States had demonstrated the threat of serious damage to domestic industry attributable to the called country. For two calls, TMB found that the United States had not demonstrated serious damage or threat thereof to its domestic industry. For three calls, involving two categories, TMB stated that the United States had not demonstrated serious damage, but TMB members could not reach a consensus on whether a threat of serious damage had been demonstrated. Finally, TMB found that one call was not justified under ATC but did not address the propriety of the U.S. determination of serious damage or its attribution to the called country(see table VII.2). TMB review? 351/651 Cotton & MMF nightwear and pajamas (continued) TMB review? Agreement (canceled) Spun yarn containing 85% or more by weight artificial staple fiber 444 Women’s & girls’ 351/651 Cotton & MMF nightwear and pajamas 351/651 Cotton & MMF nightwear and pajamas 434 Men’s & Boys’ wool coats other than Suit type 342/642 Cotton & MMF skirts NA (continued) TMB review? 444 Women’s & girls’ 435 Women’s & Girls’ 44 W omen’s & N Girls’ * = TMB must eventually review all agreements. ** = No unilateral quota imposed on country. *** = Referred to WTO DSB. NA = Not applicable. TMB found no serious damage or threat thereof. TMB found no serious damage but did not reach consensus on threat thereof. TMB found no serious damage but found threat thereof. TMB members discharge their functions on an ad personam basis—they do not necessarily represent their respective home country views, but rather offer opinions and make recommendations as individuals. The views expressed in this section are purely the general observations of the individual TMB members given to us in interviews. Some TMB members we interviewed indicated that they had not expected the United States to issue over 20 calls in the early part of 1995 under ATC. Although calls under MFA had actually averaged about 28 per year over the previous 5 years, the members emphasized their belief that ATC was a liberalizing agreement and was not expected to result in the same level of safeguard activity as occurred under MFA. Some members questioned whether import increases and production declines had been sharp enough to trigger calls, although members did not support issuing specific numerical thresholds for either factor. Some of the members believed that the United States had not adequately considered the amount of a country’s world market share of the category in question when making a call. Some TMB members expressed concerns about U.S. calls involving products exported under the Special Access Program. The program provides for more favorable quota treatment for imports from Caribbean Basin countries of apparel assembled from fabric formed and cut in the United States. Some members questioned how such “reimports” could damage U.S. domestic industry, when U.S. apparel manufacturers cut the parts, sent them offshore for assembly, and reimported them for finishing and marketing. To better illustrate the complex process of imposing quotas, the following case study provides an account of a CITA call on category 351/651—cotton and MMF nightwear and pajamas. The case study includes (1) background on the category called, (2) CITA’s support for imposing the quota based on information presented in OTEXA’s market statement, (3) the outcome of the U.S. consultations with the exporting countries, (4) the U.S. and the exporting countries’ presentations before TMB, and (5) TMB’s final recommendations. Following an import increase of cotton and manmade fiber nightwear and pajamas in 1994, CITA requested consultations in March 1995 with the governments of Jamaica and Honduras under ATC. CITA also requested consultations with El Salvador, which at that time was not a WTO member. Asserting that a sharp and substantial increase of total imports of category 351/651 was causing serious damage to U.S. domestic industry, CITA said that the damage could be attributed to these countries. In June 1995, CITA requested consultations with Costa Rica. In the June call, CITA provided updated data from its March statement. The United States and Honduras were unable to reach an agreement within the 60 days required under ATC. Thus, the United States imposed a quota on Honduras, and the case was referred to TMB. After reviewing the case and hearing presentations by both the U.S. and Honduran delegations, TMB found that neither serious damage nor a threat had been demonstrated; TMB recommended that the United States rescind the quota. In September 1995, the United States did so. The United States and Costa Rica also failed to reach agreement, and the United States imposed a quota. The United States later rescinded the restraint, before any TMB consideration on the matter. Concerning Jamaica and El Salvador, each of the two countries signed an MOU with the United States agreeing to establish a specific limit on imports as well as a guaranteed access level (GAL). Domestic production of cotton and MMF nightwear and pajamas in CITA category 351/651 has been trending downward in recent years. As illustrated in figure VII.1, from 1987-91 U.S. domestic production fell from 16.2 million dozen to 10.8 million dozen (a 33.5-percent decrease); from 1992-95 production dropped from 11.6 million dozen to 8.8 million dozen (a 24-percent decrease). Total imports from all sources rose at an average annual rate of 11.6 percent in 1987-94, while total imports rose from 11.4 million dozen to 11.9 million dozen (a 4.5-percent increase) in 1994-95. As shown in table VII.3, since 1982 (the earliest data made available to GAO) CITA has issued calls on category 351/651 in every year except 1987 and 1988. China (351 only) Haiti (351 only) Hong Kong (651 only) China (651) Taiwan (651) Hong Kong (651 only) Sri Lanka (351 only) Brazil Fiji Mauritius Thailand United Arab Emirates Jamaica El Salvador Costa Rica Honduras Note 1: Due to a new benchmark established with the 1992 Census of Manufacturers Survey, domestic production data for 1992 forward is not comparable to previous years’ data. Production data for 1995 was not available at time of printing. Note 2: Data presented in this table does not necessarily reflect data available to CITA at the time of the call. In both its March and June 1995 market statements, CITA included a list of category 351/651 suppliers to the U.S. market. Information from the June statement is excerpted in table VII.4. The table shows the volume of total imports from each supplier for 1993 and 1994. Table VII.4 shows that in 1994 over 76 percent of total imports of category 351/651 items came from countries already under a specific limit (quota). Including the 1995 calls, 85 percent of category 351/651 imports came from countries subject to quotas. Table VII.4 also shows that some suppliers whose imports have increased have not been subject to quotas. For example, in 1994, imports from Egypt were 6.5 times its 1993 level. Yet imports from Egypt are not subject to specific limits. Percent of total imports, year ending 3/95 (continued) FTAs designates the countries that have signed free trade agreements with the United States: Canada, Mexico, and Israel. Imports from Macau in CITA categories 351 and 851 are subject to an SL. CITA supported its request for consultations to impose quotas for category 351/651 products with data presented in two market statements. CITA provided category 351/651 data on imports, domestic production, employment, and both import price and producer price in its March and June statements. It updated all but the import price data in its June statement. Anecdotal information about loss of jobs in the industry was repeated in both statements. The import increase from the countries called in the March statement was dramatic. Imports from Jamaica rose by nearly 30 percent in 1993 over 1992. In 1994, Jamaican imports nearly doubled. Imports from Honduras rose nearly fivefold from 1992 to 1993. Imports from El Salvador reached nearly 260,000 dozen by 1994, an increase of over sevenfold from their 1992 level. Regarding Costa Rican imports, CITA noted in its June statement that “t the time of the initial determination of serious damage imports from Costa Rica were down. Imports from Costa Rica are now surging, increasing 17 percent for the year ending March 1995 when compared with the same period a year earlier, and are up 129 percent during the first quarter of 1995 when compared with the same period in 1994.” Both market statements supplied the same anecdotal industry information, which, OTEXA said, was collected through a survey of individual firms producing cotton and MMF nightwear. The information described the loss of jobs occurring as a result of low-priced imports and the movement of production offshore. According to the statement, “Sales of U.S.-manufactured nightwear are estimated by the industry to have dropped as much as 65-70 percent in the past two years.” Further, “Profits have been non-existent for some firms.” In an effort to reflect the most current available data, CITA presented revised data in its June statement that differed significantly from that in its March statement. For example, data changed for its domestic production, number of establishments, number of production workers, and estimate of annual shipments. The June revised and updated domestic production data indicated that production was not falling by as much as was indicated in March, when the most up-to-date data was listed through September 1994. In June, the full 1994 calendar year data showed domestic production levels falling by 0.4 percent over 1993. Domestic production data in the March statement indicated a 10.3 percent decline in 1993 from 1992; for the year ending September 1994, production fell by 3 percent. The domestic industry described in the June market statement was much larger than the one described in the March statement. This is indicated by the following data revisions supplied in June: The number of U.S. establishments manufacturing category 351/651 products was revised from 37 to 130. The percentage of apparel workers employed in the U.S. industry changed from 1 percent in the March statement to 2 percent in the June statement. The number of production workers changed from 3,527 in the March statement to 14,275 in June. The estimate of annual shipments from establishments in the industry changed from $265 million in the March statement to $1 billion in June. In addition, the domestic industry portrayed in the June market statement was different than that described in the March statement, as the following revisions indicate: The rate of decline in employment decreased in the revised statistics. The figures supplied in March indicated employment declines of 7.5 percent in 1993 and 2.2 percent in 1994. The June figures indicated employment declines of 3.8 percent in 1993 and 1.6 percent in 1994. Total annual wages, previously listed as $44.7 million for 1994, were revised to $187.4 million in the June statement. While the March statement indicated that total annual wages fell by nearly 1 percent in 1994 over 1993, the June statement indicated that total annual wages rose by just over 1 percent in 1994 compared to 1993. Total category imports showed a slightly more moderate rate of increase. Imports rose by 5.3 percent in calendar year 1994, according to the March statement. The June statement showed that imports rose by 4.8 percent for the year ending March 1995. As described earlier, the United States reached agreement by signing an MOU with Jamaica and El Salvador on quotas in June and July 1995, respectively. The United States did not reach agreement with Costa Rica or Honduras. Table VII.5 shows the quotas agreed to between the United States and Jamaica, and the United States and El Salvador. The table also shows the U.S. quotas, later rescinded, imposed on Honduras and Costa Rica. NA = Not applicable. The U.S. safeguard action with Honduras was referred to TMB for review.Representatives from the United States and Honduras made presentations to TMB in July 1995. The following excerpt from TMB’s published report summarizes the reasons presented by the U.S. representative to TMB about why imports of category 351/651 products were causing actual or threatened serious damage. It also summarizes the reasons presented by the Honduran representative concerning why the United States had not presented credible evidence of damage to U.S. industry. The U.S. delegation explained that the increase in total category 351/651 imports was causing actual or threatened serious damage to the U.S. industry for the following reasons. These reasons were supported by the data CITA had provided in its market statements. A decrease in domestic production, a loss in domestic market share, an increased import penetration reaching very high levels, and a decline in employment, average work hours, total annual production and workers’ wages had occurred; A significant number of facilities producing goods ascribed to category 351/651, or of workers employed in such facilities, had received trade adjustment assistance, as it was found that they were adversely affected by imports; Imports were entering the United States at prices below the average U.S. producer price. The inability of U.S. producers to compete with these lower prices was cited as the main reason for “declines in domestic operations.” The Honduran delegation presented the following arguments before TMB: The United States had not shown that any possible serious damage was caused by a sharp and substantial rise in imports of like and/or directly competitive products at prices below those prevailing for similar goods of comparable quality in the U.S. market. The two U.S. market statements contained some inconsistencies, in particular with respect to U.S. producers’ prices, employment, and work hours. These called into question the validity of the U.S. determination of actual or threatened serious damage. The Honduran representative objected to using information that had not been provided when the quota had been introduced as a basis for TMB’s recommendation. The United States had not taken into account the importance of outward processing trade with Honduras in this category. The representative claimed there could be no conclusion that serious damage had occurred to an industry that depended on this coproduction for up to 30 percent of its output. The import level agreed to in U.S. bilateral agreements with two other countries following the determination of serious damage in this category was substantially above the level of Honduran imports. In reviewing the U.S. safeguard measure against category 351/651 imports from Honduras, TMB found that neither serious damage, nor actual threat thereof, had been demonstrated. TMB recommended that the United States rescind the measure. The United States rescinded the quota against Honduras on September 29, 1995. As of June 1996, no country other than the United States had imposed safeguards under ATC. Both the EU and Canada imposed quotas under MFA and have well-established processes for determining whether to make a call to a foreign country for consultations. While Japan has never invoked quotas under either MFA or ATC, the Japanese government recently published a document noting the increase in textile and apparel imports and outlining guidelines related to imposing quotas. The EU’s textile and apparel industries together employ about 2.3 million workers (about 6 percent of the EU’s total manufacturing work force), down from over 3 million in 1988. In 1994, the EU exported about $25 billion in textile and apparel goods and imported approximately $37 billion (about a $12-billion trade deficit). The textile and apparel industries account for about 6 percent of EU exports. The EU textile industry alone employed about 1.3 million workers in 1994, down from 1.7 million in 1988. In 1994, the EU imported about $11.6 billion in textiles (approximately 7 percent of its domestic market), up from almost $8 billion in 1988. Switzerland and India were the EU’s main textile suppliers, each exporting approximately $1 billion to the EU, followed closely by the United States ($878 million), and China ($860 million). The EU textile industry exported approximately $14.2 billion in 1994. Its primary export markets were the United States, Poland, and Austria. The EU apparel industry employed around 971,000 workers in 1994, a 19-percent decrease from 1988. In 1994, the EU imported about $25 billion in apparel items, up from $16 billion in 1990. Its primary supplier, China, exported $3.6 billion to the EU, followed by Turkey with $2.4 billion, and Hong Kong with $2.2 billion. India was the EU’s fourth largest supplier, exporting $1.8 billion in apparel to the EU. In 1994, the EU apparel industry exported approximately $11 billion in apparel goods, up from about $8 billion in 1990. Switzerland was its primary customer, importing $1.5 billion. Austria and the United States each imported approximately $1.2 billion, with Japan importing about $1.1 billion. The EU also has a program similar to the U.S. Special Access Program. The outward processing trade program, or OPT, was established in 1992 and maintains separate quotas for goods made with European fabric. Tariffs are based on the value added in assembling the goods. OPT goods comprise about 4 to 5 percent of total EU imports. During 1990-94, the EU made 42 calls under MFA. (Twelve of these were made in 1992 to replace previous member state restrictions with EU-wide restraints when the single EU market came into being.) All of these calls were made under the EU’s “basket exit” mechanism, which was introduced into all bilateral agreements in the early 1980s. The mechanism was used to “trigger” bilateral calls under MFA. When ATC was enacted, the basket exit mechanism was abolished for WTO countries. The EU’s Chief Textile Negotiator told us that the EU is unlikely to invoke safeguards under ATC because more than 400 EU product categories are already under quota. He also noted that the EU has free trade agreements with many of its neighbors. The EU’s Chief Textile Negotiator also told us that the EU Commission believes that the criteria for imposing quotas under ATC are more rigorous than those under MFA. If, however, the EU decides to make a call under ATC, he stated that the call process itself would work the same as it did under MFA, but without the basket exit mechanism. Because all 15 EU member countries are involved in deciding whether a safeguard call should be made, the EU process for making quota decisions is somewhat more cumbersome than that of the United States or Canada. The EU call process begins when the Textile Inter-Service Group, housed within the EU Commission, receives a complaint from a member state or industry. (The Textile Inter-Service Group comprises all the executive level departments of the EU Commission that have some interest in textiles, including those that focus on competition, employment, consumer protection, legal services, customs, and commerce.) An industry may submit the complaint to its own government or directly to the EU Commission. In practice, however, an industry usually submits the complaint to the Commission. The entity submitting the complaint must include in its petition detailed information on how a surge in imports has affected its industry. According to the EU’s Chief Textile Negotiator, the EU Commission primarily examines whether an import increase has adversely affected domestic production and/or prices, and what, if anything, has changed regarding domestic demand. For example, the Chief Textile Negotiator told us that even if a country’s exports to the EU had increased over 500 percent, the EU would not impose quotas if the Commission determined that the import increase was due to a growth in demand for a product not produced by EU manufacturers. Such a situation occurred several years ago when EU producers were slow to react to changes in European apparel fashion trends. The Chief Textile Negotiator emphasized that the relationship between imports, domestic production, demand, and prices is critical to whether a call is made—not, for example, only an increase in imports or decrease in production. He also stated that while the EU does not have any specific threshold levels, in practice, calls under MFA were not made if imports of a good from a country had risen less than 25 percent and if domestic production had fallen less than 20 percent. Based on the information provided by the petitioner, the Textile Inter-Service Committee decides whether the complaint has sufficient merit to be passed on to member state representatives. If the Committee believes the petitioner has a reasonable case, the complaint is sent forward to the Textile Management Committee. This committee, chaired by the EU Commission, includes representatives from each of the 15 member states (one from each member’s import licensing department and one from each member’s trade department). Committee members review the complaint and make comments regarding its validity. The EU Commission then decides whether to recommend that quotas be imposed, taking into account the opinions of the member state representatives. The Textile Management Committee then votes on whether to impose a quota. A qualified majority in favor of the complaint is needed for the Committee to move forward on the complaint. If a qualified majority is not reached, the EU Commission may withdraw the complaint. If the Commission believes the complaint should be approved, regardless of the vote by member state officials, the case is sent to a committee that deals with trade regulations and is seated on the EU’s Council of Ministers. According to the Chief Textile Negotiator, cases are rarely sent to this committee. In almost all cases under MFA, the EU Commission’s recommendation was approved by consensus or a qualified majority vote of member state representatives on the Textile Management Committee. The EU call process can be completed as quickly as 3 to 4 weeks after the complaint is sent to the Commission. However, if there is a problem with the data, the process could last several months. While the EU has no formal advisory committees, the Chief Textile Negotiator told us that importers and retailers have been “very active” in the EU’s call process. Importers and retailers are free to lobby the EU Commission, the Textile Management Committee, and individual member states. He said the importers and retailers are able to make their point “loud and clear.” However, he also commented that the EU member states that have large textile and apparel industries are not as concerned with the views of importers and retailers. They are more concerned about protecting their domestic industries. The Director of Euratex explained that while organizations such as his are not official advisors to the EU, they do informally advise the EU Commission and believe they are part of the system in an informal way. On the other hand, an official from an EU importer and retailer association stated that he does not believe importers and retailers are part of the system. He noted that while word spreads quickly in the EU that a call is pending, importers and retailers are not notified officially. Finally, the EU’s Chief Textile Negotiator commented that the EU Commission is not concerned about possible import surges before a call is made and quotas applied. He said that because of the cumbersome EU call procedures, “Everybody knows everything anyway.” He said that it is counterproductive to try and keep the call a secret and that, generally, a surge has already occurred—which is why the call was made in the first place. Canada’s textile and apparel industries account for 4.4 percent of its GDP for all manufacturing industries and employ about 8 percent of its manufacturing work force. In addition, $11.8 billion of Canada’s $310 billion in manufacturing shipments (domestic shipments plus exports) can be attributed to these two industries. Canada’s textile and apparel industries ran a trade deficit of about $4.8 billion in 1994. Two major segments constitute the Canadian textile industry: producers of primary textiles, including MMF and filaments, yarns, and broadwoven fabrics; and producers of textile products (excluding clothing) such as carpets and canvas goods. According to a 1992 Canadian government document, Canada’s textile industry is highly modernized and capital intensive. In 1994, about 45,000 workers were employed in the Canadian textile industry, down from about 63,000 in 1988. In 1993, 85 percent of Canadian textile firms (945 establishments) had fewer than 100 employees. The United States is by far Canada’s most important textile trading partner. In 1994, Canada imported $4.3 billion in textiles, up from about $3 billion in 1990. Canada’s 1994 imports constituted about 48 percent of its $9-billion domestic textile market, with about $2.7 billion coming from the United States. China was the next largest supplier, exporting $233 million in textiles to Canada. In that same year, Canada exported almost $1.9 billion in textiles (up from about $1 billion in 1990), with the United States purchasing almost 80 percent of the exports. According to a Canadian government document, many Canadian producers have adopted aggressive strategies to increase productivity by incorporating leading technologies at all levels of textile production. While this document notes that the Canadian textile industry is not a “major player on the world stage,” it points out that the investments the industry is making, such as in state-of-the-art machinery and equipment, will help the industry compete internationally. In 1994, about 84,000 workers were employed in the apparel industry, down from 103,000 in 1990. In 1993, about three-quarters of apparel companies had fewer than 50 employees in a total of about 1,900 establishments. In 1994, Canada imported about $3.3 billion in apparel, up from $2.9 billion in 1990. Canadian imports in 1994 constituted approximately 40 percent of its $8.4-billion domestic apparel market. Its top supplier that year was China, with $606 million, followed closely by the United States ($573 million). Hong Kong was Canada’s third largest supplier, exporting $471 million. In 1994, Canada exported about $1 billion in apparel, compared to $322 million in 1990. In 1994, U.S. purchasers imported most of Canada’s apparel exports (over $944 million). Canadian apparel products do not usually compete directly with low-cost imports. However, in the market segments where these products do compete, Canadian apparel manufacturers have developed marketing strategies to influence the customer’s buying decisions, such as using strategic pricing. Nevertheless, according to a 1995 Canadian government document, imports are expected to increase their share of the Canadian market due to the value they offer to retailers and consumers. Canada does not have an import program similar to the U.S. special access program. However, according to a Canadian government official, about 40 percent of all Canadian apparel imports under quota are imported by Canadian manufacturing firms. While, in general, Canadian apparel firms are not establishing offshore affiliates, they are entering into contracts with foreign suppliers to produce goods specifically for their firms. As of May 1996, 43 countries exported products to Canada that were under quota from MFA. Thirty-one of these are WTO countries. Of the 12 remaining countries, 11 had entered into bilateral agreements with Canada, and Canada had taken unilateral action against the remaining one. All textile and apparel categories have at least one product under quota. From 1990 to 1994, Canada made 29 calls under MFA. As of May 1996, Canada had made no calls under ATC. According to the Deputy Director of the Textile and Clothing Section of Canada’s Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT), there has been little or no interest on the part of the textile and apparel industry in initiating new safeguard calls since ATC’s inception. He stated that the apparel industry has adjusted considerably to global competition over the last few years and has not pushed recently for new quotas. He also noted that the textile industry has begun producing more sophisticated goods, which have found a niche in Canadian and foreign markets. The possibility exists for calls in the future, and this official indicated that Canada maintains its right under ATC to initiate calls if necessary. Canada’s call process works as follows: Canada’s DFAIT monitors trade flows and watches for sharp increases in imports of a specific product from a particular country. All textile and apparel products are on an import control list (which includes products that are under quota and those that are not), and all importers are required to have an import permit. The permit is presented at the border, and the import data are inputted into a computer log. The key factors in determining whether a call is made include import surges, domestic production, and market share. (These were the key factors Canada considered under MFA and will remain the salient factors in determining the extent of market disruption under ATC.) The Deputy Director we interviewed noted the difficulty in assessing how domestic employment is affected by trade flows because of the complexity in ascribing a decline in employment to imports from any one country. Import surges are usually analyzed first. While the Canadian government does not have any formal thresholds that trigger a call, it has several general “rules of thumb” that guide its decision-making. For example, a steady upward trend in imports of a certain category at a relatively sharp rate will alert DFAIT to a possible problem. The Canadian government is also particularly sensitive to unrestrained shipments coming in at levels higher than those from countries with restraints. DFAIT consults with Canada’s Department of Industry regarding the possibility of a call. If the government decides to make a call, DFAIT notifies manufacturers and brokers by electronic mail that a call is pending. (Brokers then, in turn, notify the importers and retailers they work with.) Interested parties are given 2 to 3 weeks to respond. According to the Deputy Director we interviewed, this 2 to 3 week window gives importers time to take care of their immediate commitments before the call is made and is short enough in duration to prevent traders from circumventing, at the last minute, an impending quota. He noted that orders are usually made months in advance and that Canadian manufacturers are not particularly concerned about surges during this time period. Importers and retailers concerned about an impending call will usually contact DFAIT to make their position known. The official noted that in almost all cases, the importers and retailers oppose the call. He stated that his department has traditionally been more concerned with protecting Canadian textile and apparel producers than retailers and importers. However, because so many goods are now imported by Canadian manufacturers, producers themselves are usually cautious about advocating calls. The Minister for International Trade, one of DFAIT’s ministers, decides whether a call will be made, based in part on the views of manufacturers, importers, and retailers. (In some cases, the Canadian government decides not to proceed with a call because of a lack of concern on the part of Canadian manufacturers.) DFAIT sends written notices to interested parties announcing that a call has been made and publishes the outcome of these negotiations in a bulletin. In 1993, the Japanese textile industry employed about 543,000 workers; its apparel industry employed approximately 580,000. (These two industries together employed about 10 percent of all workers in Japan’s manufacturing sector in that same year.) In 1994, Japan exported $5.4 billion in textile products and $575 million in apparel products. In that same year, Japan imported about $3 billion in textiles (for a trade surplus of more than $2 billion) and $17.3 billion in apparel (resulting in a trade deficit of about $16.8 billion). In 1995, Japan imported about $25 billion in textile and apparel products, up from $16 billion in 1991 (an increase of 57 percent). In that same year, Japanese imports of these products comprised about 58 percent of its domestic textile and apparel market. China was Japan’s top supplier of these goods in 1995, accounting for about 51 percent of textile and apparel imports. Although Japan has not invoked safeguards under either MFA or ATC, a 1994 Japanese government document notes the increase in Japanese imports of textiles and apparel since 1987. It lays out a framework for determining when to implement textile quotas, based in part on increases in imports and their effect on domestic industry (such as on domestic production and employment). The Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) officials we interviewed briefly summarized how their safeguard process would proceed if an industry requests an investigation. They explained that the Minister of International Trade and Industry may initiate an investigation within 2 months from the time industry makes a request and that the investigation should be concluded within 12 months. Interested parties are given a specific time period in which they can submit their arguments, and MITI may also gather data from these parties by sending them a questionnaire. These officials also noted the efforts of the Japanese textile and apparel industries to restructure within a 5- to 10-year period in order to become more “consumer-oriented.” Japanese government officials explained that the industries are trying to become more responsive to changes in consumer tastes. Under GATT article XIX (the so-called GATT “escape clause”), member countries are permitted to escape from international obligations and take temporary safeguard action to protect a domestic industry from actual or threatened serious injury caused by imports. The Uruguay Round Agreement on Safeguards spells out the conditions under which WTO countries may impose the temporary safeguards. In the United States, ITC determines whether an industry is eligible for relief and, if so, recommends an appropriate action to the President. The President makes the final decision on whether to impose quotas authorized by article XIX. Under sections 201-04 of the Trade Act of 1974, as amended (19 U.S.C. §§ 2251-54), ITC conducts investigations concerning whether an article is being imported into the United States in such increased quantities as to be a substantial cause of actual or threatened serious injury to the domestic industry producing a like or directly competitive product (see fig. IX.I for an illustration of the ITC’s safeguard process). Interagency committee reviews ITC report and Remedy or no remedy? In practice, ITC investigations under section 201 are usually initiated as a result of a petition by industry. ITC investigations are generally conducted in two phases—(1) an injury phase, during which ITC considers issues related to injury and, if the injury determination is affirmative and (2) a remedy phase. During the injury determination phase, ITC sends out questionnaires to domestic producers that ask for data relating to sales, production, employment, and financial performance for the preceding 5-year period. The questionnaires also address such issues as whether the imported and domestically produced goods are directly competitive, what factors have precipitated changes in demand for the imported goods, and what injury has occurred to domestic producers. In addition, producers are asked about their efforts to compete with imports and the competitive adjustment measures they are likely to undertake if relief is granted. ITC holds a public hearing during the injury phase of a section 201 case. Pre- and post-hearing briefs are submitted. Any interested party can participate in the hearing and may submit a brief and other written statements. Each side is given about 1 hour to present its case, and the Commissioners usually spend 1 or 2 additional hours questioning each of the two opposing sides. During the injury phase, ITC is also required to seek information on actions being taken, and/or planned to be taken, by firms and workers in the industry to adjust to import competition. Petitioners are encouraged to submit, at any time before the ITC injury determination, a plan to promote positive adjustment to import competition. After the injury hearing is held, questionnaire results compiled, and field work completed, ITC staff send the Commissioners a report that contains the information developed. The Commissioners are responsible for determining whether the industry is seriously injured or threatened with serious injury. They are also required to take into account all the economic factors specified in the statute. Generally, the Commissioners must make their injury determination no later than 120 days after ITC receives the petition or request. The Commissioners vote on injury in a public meeting. If ITC makes a negative determination, it does not recommend a remedy. If the Commissioners decide that injury has occurred, they must recommend an action to the President that would address the injury and be effective in facilitating efforts by domestic industry to make a positive adjustment. (If the Commissioners are equally divided on injury, the President has the option of accepting the determination of either group of Commissioners. In practice, the President has always accepted the negative determination.) Before the Commissioners make their remedy recommendation, ITC holds a second hearing on the remedy measures. Parties are provided an opportunity to testify and submit briefs. ITC staff then generally furnish the Commissioners with an analysis of the various remedy options. The Commissioners have 60 days to decide on appropriate remedies and usually indicate the nature of the remedy recommendation at a public meeting. The Commissioners then send a report to the President that includes their injury determinations, any remedy recommendations, their written “views” in support of their determinations and recommendations, and a summary of the information obtained from the investigation. This report is referred to an interagency committee, chaired by USTR, which also makes a recommendation to the President. (Shortly after the report is sent to the President, ITC releases a public version of this report that contains no confidential business information.) The President has 60 days to decide whether to provide relief and, if so, in what form and amount. The President can choose among various remedy options, including an increase or imposition of a duty, imposition of a tariff-rate quota systemor quantitative restriction, implementation of one or more adjustment measures (including trade adjustment assistance), the negotiation of agreements with foreign countries, or any other action within the President’s power. In determining what action is appropriate, the President must consider a number of factors, including the adjustment plans of the firms and/or industry, the probable effect of the remedy measures on adjustment, and other factors related to U.S. national economic and security interests. Relief measures are subject to a number of limitations. For example, the President may impose relief for an initial period of no more than 4 years and may extend the measure one or more times. However, the overall period of relief may not exceed 8 years. (Safeguard action under ATC may be imposed for a maximum of 3 years.) If the President imposes safeguards, ITC is required to monitor developments in the industry, including efforts by the domestic industry to adjust during the time that the remedies are in effect. The President may reduce, modify, or terminate the safeguard if either (1) the domestic industry requests it on the basis that it has made a positive adjustment or (2) the President determines that changed circumstances warrant a change in the measure. Before extending a safeguard, and upon request of the President or a petition on behalf of the industry concerned, ITC is required to conduct an investigation to determine whether (1) relief measures continue to be necessary to prevent or remedy serious injury and (2) there is evidence that the industry is making a positive adjustment to import competition. ITC must hold a public hearing in the course of its investigation and send a report to the President 60 days before the measure is due to expire. After the measure ends, ITC is required to evaluate how well it has facilitated adjustment by the domestic industry and submit a report to the President and Congress within 180 days. When ITC submits a report containing an affirmative injury determination and remedy recommendation, the President often determines either to take no action or to impose a different or less restrictive measure than that recommended by the ITC Commissioners. From 1975 to 1995, ITC conducted 64 section 201 investigations. In 34 of these cases (including 5 tie votes), ITC Commissioners decided injury had occurred. In only 13 of the 34 cases did the President decide to provide relief, and in many of these cases relief measures imposed were less onerous than those recommended by ITC. In six additional cases, the President directed that the Secretaries of Commerce and Labor give expeditious consideration to petitions filed for trade adjustment assistance. According to ITC officials, this reflects the latitude the President has in considering all economic and political concerns when making a decision on possible remedies. To identify and describe CITA’s authority, functions, resources, and costs under MFA and ATC, we reviewed pertinent CITA agency and other government documents, including (1) the executive order establishing CITA’s authority in textile trade matters; (2) U.S. legislation to implement ATC; and (3) budget data provided to us by officials of USTR and the Departments of Commerce, Labor, State, and the Treasury. We also interviewed officials of all the CITA agencies, including all CITA principals. In addition, we interviewed and obtained documentation from officials of the U.S. Customs Service concerning CITA’s coordination of certain functions with Customs. We also reviewed and compared the MFA and ATC agreements. We sent a letter to CITA requesting information about CITA’s implementation of ATC, and we reviewed documentation CITA provided in response. In addition, we reviewed CITA’s plans to implement ATC quota liberalization mechanisms. Finally, we obtained and reviewed (1) testimonial statements concerning CITA’s integration plans; (2) public comments to Federal Register notices; and (3) reports on ATC implementation and other documentation from representative associations of domestic textile and apparel producers, importers, and retailers. To understand CITA’s decision-making process for imposing quotas and the framework for the transitional safeguard mechanism, we relied primarily on interviews with Commerce officials and reviewed ATC provisions. However, we also sought the perspectives of officials from the other four CITA agencies and representatives of the U.S. private sector, including various textile and apparel trade associations. Specifically, we interviewed six representatives of the domestic textile and apparel producers’ community and eight representatives of importer and retailer groups, whose representatives also discussed issues related to the transparency of CITA’s decision-making process. In addition, we reviewed congressional testimony from 1994 to 1996 related to textile and apparel issues. We studied how CITA uses textile and apparel import data, production data, price data, and employment data by reviewing expert studies of these data and previous reports on these data. In addition, we interviewed officials of Customs, Census, and OTEXA. statements issued between January 1, 1990, and December 31, 1995. We computerized all the data contained in those statements and studied trends and patterns for the period in question. To better illustrate the complex process of invoking safeguards, we conducted a case study of one call on one CITA category using market statements and TMB’s publicly available reports. We interviewed CITA officials, including CITA principals, to understand the extent to which CITA invoked the transitional safeguard mechanism in 1995 and to learn about the outcome of these calls. We also met with several countries’ representatives to TMB to obtain their perspective on the U.S. calls and TMB’s review of these calls. Specifically, we met with the Chair of TMB and seven TMB representatives. We also reviewed official TMB reports on 1995 TMB proceedings. To determine the EU, Canadian, and Japanese use of quotas under MFA and ATC and describe their safeguard procedures, we interviewed officials from these three governments in Geneva, Brussels, and Tokyo and reviewed available government documents. We also conducted phone interviews with Canadian government officials in Ottawa and representatives of the Canadian textile, apparel, and importer/retailers trade associations in Ottawa and Toronto. In addition, we met with representatives from the EU’s textile and apparel trade association and an importer/retailer trade group in Brussels. To understand ITC’s process for imposing safeguard measures, we interviewed ITC officials, reviewed ITC documents regarding the disposition of section 201 cases since 1975, and reviewed the U.S. trade statute regarding safeguard procedures. We did our work from May 1995 through May 1996 in Washington D.C.; Brussels, Belgium; Geneva, Switzerland; and Tokyo, Japan, in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. The following are GAO’s comments on the Department of Commerce’s letter dated July 29, 1996. 1. We note in our report the many procedural and statutory differences between section 201 safeguard actions administered by ITC and CITA’s administration of the U.S. textile program under ATC (see p. 5 and app. IX). With regard to MFN (most-favored-nation treatment), we note that the 201 process “applies to merchandise from all countries,” that is, on a most-favored-nation basis. Throughout our report we repeatedly highlight the flexibility granted to CITA in safeguarding U.S. textile and apparel products. 2. We disagree with CITA’s comment that we did not analyze the most recent import data, given that we refer to these data several times in our report. On page 4, we note that the most recent median import increase was 17.6 percent, a point we develop in footnote 9 and repeat on page 10. On page 55, we also explain that import data is more current than production data, and subsequently present the most recent import data, year by year, in table VI.2. The median represents the best descriptive statistic for the data elements we considered (see fn. 7, p. 55, for a more technical explanation of this point), and we used medians to summarize the output of CITA’s deliberations, variable by variable, for each of the 6 years we considered. In order to provide more information regarding these statistics, we also present the ranges around some medians (for example, on pp. 4 and 54) and breakdowns on the number of import and production calls that fell below particular thresholds (on pp. 10 and 56-57). Finally, we note that the data we used to establish our medians were contained in CITA’s market statements, to which we believe the CITA principals had access at the time of their deliberations. year, median imports represent 4.8 percent of all that category’s imports into the United States. (See p. 58.) We found no evidence to support CITA’s conclusion that this median of 4.8 percent demonstrates that their actions forestall “country hopping.” Even when suppliers are aggregated by category by year, the total imports from the countries called are still small. For example, about 25 percent of the categories called affected suppliers whose combined imports were less than 2 percent of U.S. imports of that category. 4. We state on page 33 that ATC allows the “freedom to choose which products to integrate at each stage.” We do not imply in our report that the U.S. integration schedule was inconsistent with ATC. Finally, while we agree that the EU and Canada generally only included those products not under quota in the first stage of integration, Canada did include one item that had been under quota. 5. We believe our discussion of TMB member views on pages. 63-64 and 66-67 is appropriately qualified. 6. Regarding the comment pertaining to page 7, we recognize that ultimately the United States, through USTR, consults with foreign governments. However, it is CITA’s responsibility to decide whether consultations should be requested. 7. See our discussion of the liberalizing effects of ATC, on page 34. 8. We state on page 2 that CITA is a committee with representation from five different agencies and on page 6 that CITA has no budget of its own. We reported fiscal year 1995 data because we wanted to examine fiscal year data for a full year for all CITA agencies, and the costs of several agencies are not known until the end of the fiscal year. Our discussion in appendix II describes CITA’s responsibilities for implementing textile agreements and OTEXA’s role as CITA’s principal support staff. This discussion also includes information on OTEXA’s non-CITA related responsibilities (see pp. 30-32). 9. We believe our description of CITA functions on pages 4, 7, and 8 are accurate. The distinct role that USTR and other CITA member agencies have in facilitating CITA’s decision-making process for imposing quotas is explained in appendix IV. 10. There is no formal review mechanism with authority to overturn CITA decisions. In addition, our interviews with CITA officials indicate that consultation with higher-level officials occurs infrequently. 11. See our description of the call process in appendix IV. 12. ATC does not contain procedural requirements detailing how individual countries make these determinations. We believe we have adequately described the substantive requirements of ATC in appendix III. 13. Our 1983 report found that CITA made decisions on the basis of consensus; this point was not refuted by CITA officials at the time. More recently, a former CITA Chairman told us that prior to 1983, CITA operated on a consensus basis. 14. We believe that our analysis is an accurate characterization of CITA’s use of data to make safeguard decisions. (See comment 2.) Our review of all 166 market statements found that CITA bases its recommendations for safeguards almost exclusively on changes in imports and production. While other factors were sometimes mentioned, the basis for the calls always rested with changes in imports and production (see pp. 6 and 53). Even in 1995, after more data were included in the market statements, this remained the case. We note the importance of import and production data on pages 6 and 53 of our report. We focused on comparable import and production data precisely because of the need to demonstrate that import surges harm U.S. industry. While CITA states it “should be apparent” that increased imports displace domestic production, its own data show this is not always the case. For example, import and production data for all CITA categories show many instances where imports and production both rose or fell for the same category during the same time periods. Our main point regarding calls with fairly small changes in production and imports is that although some calls were supported by either a small recent production decline or a small import increase, very few were supported by both a small production decline and a small import increase (see p. 56). This point remains true no matter what time periods we considered, including the most recent import data that CITA states is “key” in its decision-making process. In our analysis of CITA’s data use, we considered all data elements that CITA cites. For example, we present data on domestic market share for 1990-95 (see p. 56). Although we considered partial year data, we concentrated on the year-ending data to avoid distortions that might result from products imported on a seasonal basis. We could not consider data on productivity, capacity utilization, inventories, profits, and investment because CITA provided these data in its market statements only on an ad hoc basis. Moreover, the data was based on anecdotal information. Finally, we did not analyze CITA’s data on domestic prices, employment, and wages because of the data’s serious limitations at the category level. We explain these limitations in appendix V. 15. We cannot respond to this comment without more specific information. (Also see comment 2.) 16. We point out on page 10 that CITA assumes that imports and domestically produced goods within a given CITA category are substitutes. As noted in footnote 3 of appendix VI, OTEXA officials told us that they had not empirically examined the relationship between imports and domestic production. It is standard practice in economic analysis to examine the degree to which the products under study are substitutable for one another. 17. We did not recommend increasing the number of CITA categories. We point out that in some cases, a consequence of reducing over 4,000 HTS codes into 148 CITA categories is that some categories may contain products that do not appear to be like products. This has a direct bearing on the issue of whether or not changes in imports cause changes in domestic production. If the imports in question have different characteristics than domestically produced goods, the goods would be unlikely to compete with each other in the same market, weakening the assumption that changes in all imports in a CITA category cause changes in domestic production. 18. We believe our characterization of TMB rulings is accurate. 19. Footnote deleted. 20. As indicated on page 30, our discussion is not intended to include an exhaustive list of CITA’s functions related to non-ATC work. 21. Our graphic is not intended to imply that these are steps, but as noted, are elements required for imposing safeguards under ATC. 22. We believe our footnote adequately describes OTEXA’s analysis under MFA and ATC. As we note in comment 2, we based our analysis on the information provided in the market statements. CITA did not provide us with any additional data or analysis to supplement the market statements. 23. Our determination that 28 calls were made when production had risen in the most recent year (indicated in table VI.4) is based on data in market statements produced and available to CITA at the time CITA issued the calls. (See also comment 2.) 24. On page 59, we present one example from CITA’s commentary (out of three examples provided by CITA) on the differences in prices within categories. All three examples presented similar scenarios. We determined that the example we chose provided the best illustration of the issue in question. 25. Table VII.1 presents data that CITA examines in order to support the two necessary conditions under ATC for a call: (1) total category imports are rising at a sharp and substantial rate and (2) domestic industry is being injured as a result. In addition to determining that a call is warranted under ATC, the importing country determines that individual countries are responsible for the increase in total category imports. To make such a determination, we believe the more relevant variable is country imports as a percentage of total category imports because it serves as a base-line. For example, a 20-percent increase in in country imports from a base-line of 2 percent is less significant than a 20-percent increase in country imports from a base-line of 10 percent. 26. See table note, page 70. 27. We were not given access to documents explaining why calls were not made. We note that imports from Egypt had risen and that Egypt was a larger supplier than some countries that were subject to quotas, yet Egypt was not called. 28. See page 73 for a discussion of CITA’s use of revised data. Elizabeth J. Sirois, Assistant Director Nina Pfeiffer, Evaluator-in-Charge Elizabeth Morrison, Senior Evaluator Carolyn M. Black-Bagdoyan, Evaluator Mary M. Park, Evaluator Rona Mendelsohn, Senior Evaluator (Communications Analyst) Richard P. Burkard, Senior Attorney The first copy of each GAO report and testimony is free. Additional copies are $2 each. Orders should be sent to the following address, accompanied by a check or money order made out to the Superintendent of Documents, when necessary. VISA and MasterCard credit cards are accepted, also. Orders for 100 or more copies to be mailed to a single address are discounted 25 percent. U.S. General Accounting Office P.O. Box 6015 Gaithersburg, MD 20884-6015 Room 1100 700 4th St. NW (corner of 4th and G Sts. 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Summary: Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the U.S. Committee for the Implementation of Textile Agreements' (CITA) role in administering the U.S. textile program, focusing on: (1) CITA authority, functions, resources, and costs under the Multifiber Arrangement (MFA) and the 1994 Agreement on Textiles and Clothing (ATC); (2) the CITA process for imposing quotas; (3) CITA use of data to make quota decisions; (4) CITA use of ATC temporary import quota safeguards in 1995; (5) European Union (EU), Canadian, and Japanese use of quotas under MFA and ATC and their processes for imposing quotas; and (6) the U.S. International Trade Commission's (ITC) safeguard process. GAO found that: (1) CITA has broad delegated authority to impose quotas when it determines that imports are causing or threatening to cause damage to the domestic textile industry; (2) since its main function, to implement textile agreements, has not changed under ATC, CITA does not expect its workload to increase significantly, but it will continue to participate in negotiations for bilateral quota agreements; (3) CITA received about $3.6 million in fiscal year 1995 from five agencies and had a staff of 33 provided by the Department of Commerce to support CITA operations; (4) CITA has not published guidelines or procedures describing its quota decisionmaking process; (5) CITA tries to match import data and domestic production data to establish a causal link between imports and damage to domestic producers on a case-by-case basis before requesting consultations with exporting countries and seeking comments from interested parties; (6) CITA uses U.S. government statistics in its quota decisionmaking process, but some data compatibility problems occur due to varying collection methods; (7) the United States has been the only country to impose quotas under ATC; (8) EU and Canada have imposed quotas under MFA, but Japan has never imposed any quotas; (9) although EU and Canada use similar import data, their decisionmaking processes are different; and (10) the ITC quota decisionmaking process differs significantly from CITA because it is based on U.S. legislation that stipulates specific procedures and time-frames for imposing quotas and holding public hearings.