DOD space systems support and provide a wide range of capabilities to a large number of users, including the military services, the intelligence community, civil agencies, and others. These capabilities include positioning, navigation, and timing; meteorology; missile warning; and secure communications, among others. Space systems can take a long time to develop and often consist of multiple components, including satellites, ground control stations, terminals, and user equipment. DOD satellite systems are also expensive to acquire. Unit costs for current DOD satellites can range from $500 million to over $3 billion, and ground systems can cost as much as $3.5 billion. The cost to launch just one satellite can climb to well over $100 million. Most major space programs have experienced significant cost and schedule increases. For instance, program costs for the Advanced Extremely High Frequency (AEHF) satellite program, a protected satellite communications system, had grown 116 percent as of our latest review, and its first satellite was launched over 3.5 years late. For the Space Based Infrared System High (SBIRS High), a missile warning satellite program, costs grew nearly 300 percent and the launch of the first satellite was delayed roughly 9 years. Last year, we reported that contract costs for the Global Positioning System (GPS) ground system, designed to control on-orbit GPS satellites, had more than doubled and the program had experienced a 4-year delay. The delivery of that ground system is now estimated to be delayed another 2 years, for a cumulative 6-year delay. Some DOD officials say even that is an optimistic timeline. Table 1 below provides more details on the current status of DOD’s major space programs. Cost and schedule growth in DOD’s space programs is sometimes driven by the inherent risks associated with developing complex space technology; however, for at least the past 7 years we have identified a number of other management and oversight problems that can worsen the situation. These include overly optimistic cost and schedule estimating, pushing programs forward without sufficient knowledge about technology and design, and problems in overseeing and managing contractors, among others. Some of DOD’s programs in operation were also exceedingly ambitious, which in turn increased technology, design, and engineering risks. While satellite programs have provided users with important and useful capabilities, their cost growth has significantly limited DOD’s buying power—at a time when more resources may be needed to protect space systems and to recapitalize the space portfolio. Since 2013, I have testified that DOD has implemented actions to address space acquisition problems, and most of its major space programs have transitioned into the production phase where fewer problems tend to occur. These range from improvements to cost estimating practices and development testing to improvements in oversight and leadership, such as the addition of the Defense Space Council, designed to bring together senior leaders on important issues facing space. DOD has also started fewer new programs and even those are less ambitious than prior efforts, which helps to reduce the risk of cost and schedule growth. Given the problems we have identified in the GPS program, however, it is clear that more needs to be done to improve the management of space acquisitions. Our past work has recommended numerous actions that can be taken to address the problems we typically see in space programs. Generally, we have recommended that DOD separate the process of technology discovery from acquisition, follow an incremental path toward meeting user needs, match resources and requirements at program start, and use quantifiable data and demonstrable knowledge to move programs forward to next phases. We also have identified practices related to cost estimating, program manager tenure, quality assurance, technology transition, and an array of other aspects of acquisition program management that could benefit space programs. Right now, DOD is at a crossroads for space. Fiscal constraints and increasing threats—both environmental and adversarial—to space systems have led DOD to consider alternatives for acquiring and launching space-based capabilities. For satellites, our reports since 2013 have described efforts such as: disaggregating large satellites into multiple, smaller satellites or payloads; relying on commercial satellites to host government payloads; and procuring certain capabilities, such as bandwidth and ground control, as services instead of developing and deploying government-owned networks or spacecraft. For space launch this includes continuing to introduce competition into acquisitions as well as eliminating reliance on Russian-built rocket engines. In some cases, such as space launch, changes are being implemented. For example, as we reported in April 2015, DOD has introduced competition into acquisitions. In other areas, such as space-based environmental (or weather) monitoring, decisions have just recently been made. In still others, such as protected satellite communications and overhead persistent infrared sensing, decisions on the way forward, including satellite architectures, have not yet been made though alternatives have been assessed. Figure 1 describes some changes DOD is considering in some areas for space. In multiple reports since our last testimony on this subject in April 2015, our work has touched on these and other potential changes. Our reports have specifically covered issues associated with protecting space assets, transforming launch acquisitions, and improving purchases of commercial satellite bandwidth, as well as the development of the GPS ground control system and user equipment. We are also currently examining the analysis used to support decisions on future weather system acquisitions as well as space leadership. All of this work is summarized below. Together, these reports highlight several major challenges facing DOD as it undertakes efforts to change its approaches to space acquisitions. First, though DOD is conducting analyses of alternatives to support decisions about the future of various programs, our preliminary work suggests there are gaps in cost and other data needed to weigh the pros and cons of changes to space systems. Second, most changes being considered today will impact ground systems and user equipment, but these systems continue to be very troubled by cost and schedule overruns. Third, leadership for space acquisitions is still fragmented, which may hamper the implementation of changes, especially those that stretch across satellites, ground systems and user equipment. Space Situational Awareness Costs. According to Air Force Space Command, U.S. space systems face intentional and unintentional threats, which have increased rapidly over the past 20 years. These include radio frequency interference (including jamming), laser dazzling and blinding, kinetic intercept vehicles, and ground system attacks. Additionally, the hazards of the already-harsh space environment (for example, extreme temperature fluctuations and radiation) have increased, including numbers of active and inactive satellites, spent rocket bodies, and other fragments and debris. In response, recent government-wide and DOD-specific strategic and policy guidance have stressed the need for U.S. space systems to be survivable or resilient against such threats. The government relies primarily on DOD and the intelligence community to provide Space Situational Awareness (SSA)—the current and predictive knowledge and characterization of space objects and the operational environment upon which space operations depend—to provide critical data for planning, operating, and protecting space assets and to inform government and military operations. In October 2015, as mandated by the Senate Armed Services Committee, we reported on estimated costs of SSA efforts over the next 5 years. Specifically, we reported that the government’s planned unclassified budget for SSA core efforts—DOD, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) operations of sensors, upgrades, and new developments—averages about $1 billion per year for fiscal years 2015 through 2020. Operations and payroll accounts for about 63 percent of the core budget during fiscal years 2015 through 2020, while investments for new sensors and systems, as well as upgrades for existing ones, account for the rest. Moreover, we could not report total costs since SSA is not the primary mission for many of the sensors that perform this mission. This is partly because DOD leverages systems that perform other missions to conduct SSA. This is a good practice since it reduces duplication and overlap but it makes accounting for SSA costs difficult. For example, missile defense sensors also perform SSA missions. The Missile Defense Agency has not determined what percentage of its budget for operating its missile defense sensors, which averages about $538 million per year over the next several years, would be allocated to the SSA mission. Moreover, these sensors would be procured by the Missile Defense Agency even if they were not involved in the SSA mission. Responsive Launch. In light of DOD’s dramatically increased demand and dependence on space capabilities and that operationally responsive low cost launch could assist in addressing such needs, DOD was required to report to the Congress on “responsive launch,” which generally means the ability to launch space assets to their intended orbits as the need arises, possibly to augment or reconstitute existing space capabilities. In October 2015, we reported that DOD did not yet have a consolidated plan for developing a responsive launch capability since there were no formal requirements for such a capability. DOD and contractor officials we spoke with also highlighted several potential challenges DOD faces as it pursues operationally responsive launch capabilities. For example, DOD officials told us that existing national security space program architectures (including payloads, ground systems, user equipment, and launch systems) may need to be modified to improve responsiveness, which could present challenges. That is, modifying one program could have repercussions for another, including changes to infrastructure and command and control elements. Further, while smaller, simpler satellites may require less time and effort to develop, build, and launch, a larger number of satellites may be needed to provide the same level of capability, and the transition from existing system designs could increase costs. DOD plans to validate future responsive launch requirements as it gains knowledge about emerging threats. Once this is done, having a single focal point for prioritizing and developing its responsive launch capabilities will be important, especially since different components of DOD already have ongoing efforts in place to develop responsive launch capabilities. Competitive Launch Acquisition. The Air Force is working to introduce competition into the Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV) program. For almost 10 years, the EELV program had only one company capable of providing launches. In working to introduce competition into launch contracts, the Air Force is changing its acquisition approach for launch services, including the amount of cost and performance data that it plans to obtain under future launch contracts. Given these expected changes, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015 included a provision for us to examine the advisability of requiring that launch providers establish or maintain business systems that comply with the data requirements and cost accounting standards of the Department of Defense. The United Launch Alliance (ULA)—EELV’s incumbent provider—currently provides national security space launch services under a contract with cost-reimbursable provisions awarded using negotiated procedures. Under this type of contract, the Air Force is able to obtain from ULA cost and performance data from contractor business systems. The Air Force uses this business data for a variety of purposes, including monitoring contractor performance and identifying risks that could affect the program’s cost, schedule, or performance. However, for at least the first phase of future launches, the Air Force chose to change its acquisition approach to procure launch services as a commercial item using a firm-fixed-price contract, which will prevent the service from collecting business data at the same level of detail. As a result, the Air Force will have significantly less insight into program costs and performance than what it has under the current contract with ULA, though according to the Air Force the level of information gathered is sufficient for monitoring launch costs in a competitive, fixed-price environment. In August 2015, we reported that the acquisition approach chosen for the first competitive launches offers some benefits to the government, including increased competition, but it could limit program oversight and scheduling flexibility. The Air Force asserts that the use of full and open competitive procedures in a commercial item acquisition will increase the potential to keep more than one launch company viable. The Air Force’s use of commercial item contracts eliminates the need for contractors to develop the business systems associated with a cost-reimbursement contract and generally places greater responsibility upon the contractor for cost control. However, the Air Force has struggled with EELV program management and lack of oversight in the past, and removing the requirement for cost and performance data could leave it vulnerable to similar problems in the future in an uncertain commercial market. Also, the first competitive contracts may limit the Air Force’s flexibility in modifying its launch schedule, and schedule changes resulting from satellite production delays may result in added costs. Satellite delays have historically been an issue for the program, and the Air Force’s ability to modify the launch schedule is an important component of the current acquisition approach with ULA. We also reported that the Air Force is at risk of making decisions about future EELV acquisitions without sufficient knowledge. The Air Force plans to develop an acquisition strategy for the next phase of competitive launches before it has any actionable data from the first competitive launches. In addition, the Air Force views competition as crucial to the success of its new acquisition strategy, yet the viability of a competitive launch industry is uncertain. The launch industry is undergoing changes, and the ability of the domestic industry to sustain two or more providers in the long-term, while desirable, is unclear. Presently, there is only one company certified to compete with ULA for national security launches, and there are no other potential competitors in the near future. To adequately plan for future competitions and ensure informed decision making before committing to a strategy, it will be important for the Air Force to obtain knowledge about its new acquisition approach and on the launch industry. The Air Force concurred with our recommendation to ensure the next phases incorporate lessons learned. Purchases of commercial satellite bandwidth. DOD depends on commercial satellite communications (SATCOM) to support a variety of critical mission needs, from unmanned aerial vehicles and intelligence to voice and data for military personnel. Data from fiscal year 2011, the most recent information available, show that DOD spent over $1 billion leasing commercial SATCOM. In prior work, we found that some major DOD users of commercial SATCOM were dissatisfied with the Defense Information Systems Agency’s (DISA) acquisition process, seeing it as too costly and lengthy. These users also indicated that the contracts used were too inflexible. The Senate Armed Services Committee’s report accompanying a bill for the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014 included a provision for DOD to provide a report detailing a 5-, 10-, and 25-year strategy for using a mix of DOD and commercial satellite bandwidth, and for us to review DOD’s acquisition strategy of the report, issued in August 2014. In July 2015, we reported that DOD procurement of SATCOM is fragmented and inefficient. DOD policy requires all of its components to procure commercial SATCOM through DISA but we found that some components were independently procuring SATCOM to meet their individual needs. DOD’s most recent SATCOM usage report estimates that over 30 percent of commercial SATCOM is bought independently by DOD components, even though DOD found the average cost of commercial SATCOM bought through DISA is about 16 percent lower than independently bought commercial SATCOM. Fragmentation such as this limits opportunities for DOD to bundle purchases, share services, and streamline its procurement of commercial SATCOM. DOD is taking steps to improve its SATCOM procurement and address challenges through “pathfinder” efforts aimed at identifying short- and long-term options. For example, DOD intends to study the potential benefits of using innovative contracting approaches as it procures military and commercial SATCOM, and refine its understanding of DOD’s global SATCOM requirements. However, it may be several years before DOD is able to evaluate the results of its pathfinder efforts. For example, all of the 10 pathfinders planned or already underway are expected to be completed in or beyond fiscal year 2017. DOD’s efforts to improve its procurement of military and commercial SATCOM will also be hampered by two long-standing challenges—lack of knowledge of what DOD is spending on commercial SATCOM and resistance to centralized management of SATCOM procurement. We reported on and made recommendations to improve both in 2003. Specifically, we recommended that DOD strengthen its capacity to provide accurate and complete analyses of commercial bandwidth spending and implement a strategic management framework for improving the acquisition of commercial bandwidth. DOD generally concurred with our 2003 recommendations and developed a plan to address them, but none of DOD’s corrective actions were carried out as intended. These challenges are commonly faced by organizations seeking to strategically source procurements of services, but our work has shown they can be overcome by employing best practices, to include conducting detailed spend analyses and centralized management of service procurements to identify procurement inefficiencies and opportunities. GPS Ground System and User Equipment. In 2009, we reported that development of space systems is not optimally aligned, and we recently noted that development of satellites often outpaces that of ground systems and user terminals (such as those on airplanes, ground vehicles, and ships), leading to underutilized on-orbit satellites and delays in getting new capabilities to end users. In some cases, gaps in delivery can add up to years, meaning that a satellite is launched but not effectively used for years until ground systems become available. The reasons for the gaps in the delivery of space system segments include funding instability, and poor acquisition management (requirements instability, underestimation of technical complexity, and poor contractor oversight). Our September 2015 report on GPS showed that these problems still persist. Specifically, we reported that the Air Force awarded the contract to begin GPS Next Generation Operational Control System (OCX) development— the command and control system for GPS III satellites—without following key acquisition practices such as completing a preliminary design review before development start as called for by best practices and generally required by statute. In addition, key requirements, particularly for cybersecurity, were not well understood by the Air Force and contractor at the time of contract award. The contractor, Raytheon, experienced significant software development challenges from the onset, but the Air Force consistently presented optimistic assessments of OCX progress to acquisition overseers. Further, the Air Force complicated matters by accelerating OCX development to better synchronize it with the projected completion time lines of the GPS III satellite program, but this resulted in disruptions to the OCX development effort. As Raytheon continued to struggle developing OCX, the program office paused development in late 2013 to fix what it believed were the root causes of the development issues, and significantly increased the program’s cost and schedule estimates. However, progress reports to DOD acquisition leadership continued to be overly optimistic relative to the reality of OCX problems. OCX issues appear to be persistent and systemic, raising doubts whether all root causes have been adequately identified, let alone addressed, and whether realistic cost and schedule estimates have been developed. Furthermore, since we reported in September 2015, the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics has directed the OCX program to add an additional 24 months to its delivery schedule, increasing the delay to roughly 6 years from what was estimated at contract award. And some DOD officials believe the program could realistically need another 2 years beyond that before the first increment of the OCX ground system is delivered. We also reported that the Air Force revised the Military GPS User Equipment (MGUE) acquisition strategy several times in attempts to develop military-code (or M-code) capability—which can help users operate in jamming environments. Even so, the military services were unlikely to have sufficient knowledge about MGUE design and performance to make informed procurement decisions starting in fiscal year 2018 because it was uncertain whether an important design review would be conducted prior to that time and because operational testing would still be under way. Again, GPS is not the only program where we have seen these types of problems. AEHF and the Mobile User Objective System have encountered significant delays with the delivery of user equipment and the SBIRS High ground system was not fully completed when satellites were launched. Moreover, we have reported that these challenges could intensify with the potentially larger numbers and novel configurations of satellites, payloads, and other components of a disaggregated approach. Analysis of Alternatives for Weather Systems. DOD has been conducting analyses of alternatives (AOA) to assist in deciding what space assets should be acquired for its missile warning, protected communications and environmental monitoring (weather) missions. AOAs provide insight into the technical feasibility and costs of alternatives and can carry significant weight in the decision-making process, in part because they involve participation and oversight by a diverse mix of military, civilian, and contractor personnel. We testified last year that the time frames for making decisions about the way forward are narrowing, and if not made in time, DOD may be forced to continue with existing approaches for its next systems. As of today, only the weather AOA has been completed and approved by DOD. We were required by the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015 to review this particular AOA. We are currently in the process of completing this review and expect to issue our final report in mid-March 2016. Our preliminary findings are that the AOA provided thorough analysis of some of the 12 capabilities identified for the assessment, but ineffective coordination with NOAA, among other issues, imposed limitations on the analysis of the two highest-priority capabilities—cloud characterization and theater weather imagery. Specifically, DOD did not employ a formal collaboration mechanism that identified roles and responsibilities for DOD and NOAA in conducting the AOA, which contributed to DOD making an incorrect assumption about the continued availability of critical data from European partner satellites. As a result, the two capabilities were not as thoroughly analyzed for potential solutions, and they are now being re-assessed outside of the AOA process as near-term gaps approach. We plan to recommend that DOD ensure the leads of future planning efforts establish formal mechanisms for coordination and collaboration with NOAA that specify roles and responsibilities to ensure accountability for both agencies. DOD concurred with this recommendation in its review of our draft report. A positive aspect of the weather AOA was that DOD took a relatively new approach to analyzing alternatives with cost-efficiency in mind, including considering which capabilities DOD needed to provide and which could be provided by leveraging other sources of data. This should help DOD find cost-effective ways for meeting some of its needs. Space Leadership. The DOD’s space acquisition portfolio has numerous stakeholders, including each of the military services; intelligence community organizations; research agencies; multiple DOD headquarters offices; civil government agencies; and the Executive Office of the President. Over more than the last 15 years, we have noted—along with congressional committees, and various commissions and reviews—concern about the fragmented nature of DOD’s space system acquisition processes and acquisition oversight. In September 2015, we began a review based on language in the Senate Report accompanying a bill for the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016 which is looking at: (1) how DOD’s management and oversight of space system acquisitions are structured; (2) whether past recommendations for improving this structure have been implemented; and (3) what challenges, if any, result from this current structure. Our preliminary findings indicate that the structure of space system acquisitions and oversight continues to be complicated. It involves a large number of stakeholders, and there is no single individual, office, or entity in place that provides oversight for the overall space program acquisition structure. A number of commissions and study groups have recommended substantive changes to the way the government plans for, acquires, and manages space systems, including centralizing planning and decision-making authority for space systems and establishing oversight authority outside the Air Force. Additionally, various DOD officials and experts that we spoke with noted other problems with the process of acquiring and managing space systems, including long acquisition timelines and extensive review processes, decision-making authority being at too high a level, and little long-term planning or system architecture work. DOD does point to a recent change in DOD’s organizational structure for space programs that attempts to mitigate these problems. The Deputy Secretary of Defense designated the Secretary of the Air Force as the Principal DOD Space Advisor, with responsibility for overseeing all defense space policies, strategies and plans, and serving as an independent advisor on all space matters to the Secretary of Defense and other DOD leadership. This is a new position and its responsibilities are still being fully established according to DOD officials; however at this point it is too early to tell whether this position will have sufficient enforcement authority and the extent to which it will address the leadership problems raised in the past. Our reviews in recent years have made a number of recommendations aimed at putting DOD on a better footing as it considers and implements significant changes for space programs. For example, we recommended that when planning for the next phase of competition for launches, the Air Force use an incremental approach to the next acquisition strategy to ensure that it does not commit itself to a strategy until data is available to make an informed decision. For purchases of commercial bandwidth, we recommended that DOD conduct a spend analysis identifying procurement inefficiencies and opportunities; and assess whether further centralization of commercial SATCOM procurement could be beneficial. DOD concurred. It is too early to determine the extent to which DOD will implement these and other recommendations made this year but we have seen considerable efforts to address recommendations from other reports. For instance, in 2013, we recommended that future DOD satellite acquisition programs be directed to determine a business case for proceeding with either a dedicated or shared network for that program’s satellite control operations and develop a department-wide long-term plan for modernizing its Air Force Satellite Control Network and any future shared networks and implementing commercial practices to improve DOD satellite control networks. DOD has taken initial steps toward making a significant transformation in its satellite control operations. We look forward to assessing its plans in the near future in response to a mandate from this Committee. As noted earlier, we have also made numerous recommendations related to acquisition management and our ongoing review of space leadership will highlight what past recommendations may still be worth addressing. Overall, it is exceedingly important that DOD address acquisition governance and management problems in the near future. Work is already underway on recapitalizing the space portfolio, yet fiscal constraints and past problems have limited resources available for new programs. Moreover, protecting space assets will likely require more investments as well as more effective coordination. Chairman Sessions and Ranking Member Donnelly, this concludes my statement for the record. For further information about this statement, please contact Cristina Chaplain at (202) 512-4841 or chaplainc@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this statement. Individuals who made key contributions to this statement include Rich Horiuchi, Assistant Director; Claire Buck; Maricela Cherveny; Alyssa Weir; Emily Bond; and Oziel Trevino. Key contributors for the previous work on which this statement is based are listed in the products cited. Key contributors to related ongoing work include Raj Chitikila; Laura Hook; Andrea Evans; Brenna Guarneros; Krista Mantsch; and James Tallon. Space Acquisitions: GAO Assessment of DOD Responsive Launch Report. GAO-16-156R. Washington, D.C.: October 29, 2015. Space Situational Awareness: Status of Efforts and Planned Budgets. GAO-16-6R. Washington, D.C.: October 8, 2015. GPS: Actions Needed to Address Ground System Development Problems and User Equipment Production Readiness. GAO-15-657. Washington, D.C.: September 9, 2015. Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle: The Air Force Needs to Adopt an Incremental Approach to Future Acquisition Planning to Enable Incorporation of Lessons Learned. GAO-15-623. Washington, D.C.: August 11, 2015. Defense Satellite Communications: DOD Needs Additional Information to Improve Procurements. GAO-15-459. Washington, D.C.: July 17, 2015. Space Acquisitions: Some Programs Have Overcome Past Problems, but Challenges and Uncertainty Remain for the Future. GAO-15-492T. Washington, D.C.: April 29, 2015. Space Acquisitions: Space Based Infrared System Could Benefit from Technology Insertion Planning. GAO-15-366. Washington, D.C.: April 2, 2015. Defense Acquisitions: Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs. GAO-15-342SP. Washington, D.C.: March 12, 2015. Defense Major Automated Information Systems: Cost and Schedule Commitments Need to Be Established Earlier. GAO-15-282. Washington, D.C.: February 26, 2015. DOD Space Systems: Additional Knowledge Would Better Support Decisions about Disaggregating Large Satellites. GAO-15-7. Washington, D.C.: October 30, 2014. Space Acquisitions: Acquisition Management Continues to Improve but Challenges Persist for Current and Future Programs. GAO-14-382T. Washington, D.C.: March 12, 2014. U.S. Launch Enterprise: Acquisition Best Practices Can Benefit Future Efforts. GAO-14-776T. Washington, D.C.: July 16, 2014. Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle: Introducing Competition into National Security Space Launch Acquisitions. GAO-14-259T. Washington, D.C.: March 5, 2014 The Air Force’s Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle Competitive Procurement. GAO-14-377R. Washington, D.C.: March 4, 2014. 2014 Annual Report: Additional Opportunities to Reduce Fragmentation, Overlap, and Duplication and Achieve Other Financial Benefits. GAO-14-343SP. Washington, D.C.: April 8, 2014. Defense Acquisitions: Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs. GAO-14-340SP. Washington, D.C.: March 31, 2014. Space Acquisitions: Assessment of Overhead Persistent Infrared Technology Report. GAO-14-287R. Washington, D.C.: January 13, 2014. Space: Defense and Civilian Agencies Request Significant Funding for Launch-Related Activities. GAO-13-802R. Washington, D.C.: September 9, 2013. Global Positioning System: A Comprehensive Assessment of Potential Options and Related Costs is Needed. GAO-13-729. Washington, D.C.: September 9, 2013. Space Acquisitions: DOD Is Overcoming Long-Standing Problems, but Faces Challenges to Ensuring Its Investments are Optimized. GAO-13-508T. Washington, D.C.: April 24, 2013. Launch Services New Entrant Certification Guide. GAO-13-317R. Washington, D.C.: February 7, 2013. Satellite Control: Long-Term Planning and Adoption of Commercial Practices Could Improve DOD’s Operations. GAO-13-315. Washington, D.C.: April 18, 2013. Defense Acquisitions: Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs. GAO-13-294SP. Washington, D.C.: March 28, 2013. Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle: DOD Is Addressing Knowledge Gaps in Its New Acquisition Strategy. GAO-12-822. Washington, D.C.: July 26, 2012. Space Acquisitions: DOD Faces Challenges in Fully Realizing Benefits of Satellite Acquisition Improvements. GAO-12-563T. Washington, D.C.: March 21, 2012. Space Acquisitions: DOD Delivering New Generations of Satellites, but Space System Acquisition Challenges Remain. GAO-11-590T. Washington, D.C.: May 11, 2011. Space Acquisitions: Development and Oversight Challenges in Delivering Improved Space Situational Awareness Capabilities. GAO-11-545. Washington, D.C.: May 27, 2011. Space and Missile Defense Acquisitions: Periodic Assessment Needed to Correct Parts Quality Problems in Major Programs. GAO-11-404. Washington, D.C.: June 24, 2011. Global Positioning System: Challenges in Sustaining and Upgrading Capabilities Persist. GAO-10-636. Washington, D.C.: September 15, 2010. Defense Acquisitions: Challenges in Aligning Space System Components. GAO-10-55. Washington D.C.: October 29, 2009. Satellite Communications: Strategic Approach Needed for DOD’s Procurement of Commercial Satellite Bandwidth. GAO-04-206. Washington D.C.: December 10, 2003. This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the United States. The published product may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety without further permission from GAO. However, because this work may contain copyrighted images or other material, permission from the copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to reproduce this material separately.

Summary: DOD is shifting its traditional approach to space acquisitions, bolstering its protection of space systems, and engaging with more commercial providers. Given the time and resource demands of DOD's space systems and today's budget environment, challenges that hinder these transitions must be addressed. This statement focuses on (1) the current status and cost of major DOD space system acquisitions, and (2) challenges and barriers DOD faces in addressing future space-based mission needs. This statement highlights the results of GAO's work on space acquisitions over the past year and presents preliminary observations from ongoing work. We obtained comments from DOD on a draft of preliminary findings contained in this statement. Most major space programs have experienced significant cost and schedule increases. For instance, program costs for the Advanced Extremely High Frequency satellite program, a protected satellite communications system, have grown 116 percent as of our latest review, and its first satellite was launched more than 3 years late. For the Space Based Infrared System High, a missile warning satellite program, costs grew almost 300 percent and its first satellite was launched roughly 9 years late. Last year, we reported that contract costs for the Global Positioning System (GPS) ground system, designed to control on-orbit GPS satellites, had more than doubled and the program had experienced a 4-year delay. The delivery of that ground system is now estimated to be delayed another 2 years, for a cumulative 6-year delay. Some DOD officials say even that is an optimistic timeline. Though steps have been taken to improve acquisition management in space, problems with GPS show that much more work is needed, especially since DOD is considering going in new directions for space programs. Right now, DOD is at a crossroads for space. Fiscal constraints and increasing threats—both environmental and adversarial—to space systems have led DOD to consider alternatives for acquiring and launching space-based capabilities, such as: disaggregating large satellites into multiple, smaller satellites or payloads; relying on commercial satellites to host government payloads; and procuring certain capabilities, such as bandwidth and ground control, as services instead of developing and deploying government-owned networks or spacecraft. This year, GAO's work on space acquisitions continued to show that DOD faces several major challenges as it undertakes efforts to change its approaches to space acquisitions. Our work assessed a range of issues including DOD's analysis supporting its decisions on future weather satellites, space leadership, and the introduction of competition into space launch acquisitions. These and other studies surfaced several challenges: First, though DOD is conducting analyses of alternatives to support decisions about the future of space programs, there are gaps in cost and other data needed to weigh the pros and cons of changes to space systems. Second, most changes being considered today will impact ground systems and user equipment, but these systems continue to be troubled by management and development issues. Third, leadership for space acquisitions is still fragmented, which will likely hamper the implementation of new acquisition approaches, especially those that stretch across satellites, ground systems and user equipment. Past GAO reports have generally recommended that DOD adopt best practices. DOD has generally agreed and taken actions to address these recommendations. Consequently, GAO is not making any recommendations in this statement.