According to ONDCP, disrupting the illicit flow of drugs will reduce their availability, increase their cost, and eventually, reduce the rate of illicit drug usage. One part of the ONDCP strategy to disrupt the illicit drug market focuses interdiction efforts on seizing cocaine and other illicit drugs in the transit zone that are bound for the United States (arrival zone) from South America (source zone). Virtually all of the cocaine shipped to the United States travels through the transit zone from South America—entering Central America, Mexico, and the Caribbean en route to the United States. The transit zone is a 6 million square mile area that encompasses Central America, Mexico, the eastern Pacific Ocean, the Gulf of Mexico, and the Caribbean Sea. The transit zone is divided into four maritime trafficking routes: Eastern Pacific, Western Caribbean, Central Caribbean, and Eastern Caribbean. Drug traffickers use go-fast boats, fishing vessels, submersible vessels, noncommercial aircraft, and other types of conveyances to smuggle cocaine from the source zone to Central America, Mexico, and the Caribbean en route to the United States. ONDCP’s strategy for drug interdiction in the transit zone is focused on cocaine because ONDCP has identified cocaine as a leading drug threat to the United States. According to Coast Guard officials, the largest estimated share of cocaine has been smuggled through the Eastern Pacific and Western Caribbean routes of the transit zone for nearly two decades. For example, the principal source of information about cocaine flow in the transit zone is the CCDB. According to the CCDB, in fiscal year 2013, approximately 84 percent of the estimated cocaine flow, as measured in metric tons, was by noncommercial maritime means through these two routes. Figure 1 shows a map indicating the source, transit, and arrival zones—with the fiscal year 2013 estimated noncommercial maritime cocaine flow through the four smuggling routes and the locations of Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands within the transit zone. As the southernmost points of entry into the United States and the only U.S. territories within the transit zone, Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands are key entry points for illicit drugs being smuggled into the United States. Like the continental United States, Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands are considered part of the arrival zone, yet they are located geographically within the Eastern Caribbean route of the transit zone. According to a 2011 Department of Justice National Drug Intelligence Center report, Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands are attractive targets for illicit drug smuggling because of their proximity to the source zone and Puerto Rico’s location within the United States’ Customs zone. According to Coast Guard officials, the illicit drug flow through the Central and Eastern Caribbean routes generally consists of maritime smuggling from South America to the Dominican Republic and eventual transshipment to Puerto Rico (secondary flow) and, to a lesser extent, maritime smuggling directly from South America to Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands (primary flow). CCDB drug flow estimates show that in fiscal year 2013, about 3 percent of the cocaine flow in the transit zone was smuggled toward Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands. The Department of Justice has reported that most of this flow is destined for the continental United States—with the rest remaining on the islands for local consumption. However, estimates indicate that illicit cocaine smuggling toward Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands has increased each year since fiscal year 2009. For example, according to CCDB estimates, cocaine flow toward Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands has more than doubled in recent years, from 6.4 metric tons in fiscal year 2009 to 17.3 metric tons in fiscal year 2013. Federal and local government officials in Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands have raised concerns about the illicit drug flow and have identified it as a key contributor to the high levels of murder and other violent crime on the islands. In particular, homicide rates in the two territories have risen in recent years, and federal and local officials have linked the rise of the homicide rates, in part, to illicit cocaine trafficking on the Island. According to a 2014 study by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, the 2010 homicide rate in Puerto Rico was about 27 per 100,000 persons and in the U.S. Virgin Islands it was about 53 per 100,000 persons—more than 5 times (Puerto Rico) and 11 times (U.S. Virgin Islands) the U.S. national rate. According to a 2011 report issued by the High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area office that oversees the territories, most of this violence is associated with turf wars for control over the local drug market. JIATF-S relies on DHS (Coast Guard and CBP) and the Department of Defense (Navy) to provide vessels and aircraft for conducting drug interdiction operations in the transit zone. JIATF-S also receives operational resources from allied countries, with Canada, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom providing maritime detection and monitoring assistance. According to JIATF-S and Coast Guard officials, the JIATF-S strategy is to use its available vessel and aircraft resources to patrol the transit zone far from U.S. shores and close to the source zone countries in South America in order to increase chances the interdictions are of larger load sizes and higher purity than would otherwise be the case and to cause greater disruption to illicit drug- smuggling organizations. JIATF-S officials reported deploying the majority of available vessels and aircraft to patrol the Eastern Pacific and Western Caribbean routes of the transit zone because the routes have accounted for the largest drug flow—and therefore deploying resources to these routes will have the greatest impact on efforts to disrupt cocaine flow. The Coast Guard is the lead federal agency for maritime drug interdiction in the transit zone, and its operations with JIATF-S are a key element of the Coast Guard’s counter-drug efforts. Overall, the Coast Guard is a major contributor of JIATF-S vessel and aircraft resources. The resources the Coast Guard provides to JIATF-S generally include major cutters, maritime patrol aircraft (planes), and helicopters capable of deploying airborne use of force (AUF). In addition, the Coast Guard provides JIATF-S with deployable specialized forces—specifically Law Enforcement Detachments (LEDET)—embarked on U.S. naval and allied vessels. We discuss AUF and LEDETs in more detail later in this report. The Coast Guard’s process for allocating drug interdiction resources is focused on meeting commitments for strategic priorities, such as JIATF-S transit zone operations, first, before dividing up its remaining resources between its Atlantic and Pacific Area Commands. According to Coast Guard guidance and discussions with DHS officials, the Coast Guard determines the amount of resource levels—targets for the amount of time selected vessels, aircraft, and LEDETs are provided to JIATF-S—through an annual operational planning process that considers factors, including resource requirements for strategic priorities, evolving maritime risks, and the availability of the Coast Guard’s fleet of vessels and aircraft. JIATF-S requests for resource requirements specify the capabilities (types of vessels or aircraft) and corresponding capacities (number of days for vessels or resource hours for aircraft) for the Coast Guard, CBP, and the Department of Defense. The Coast Guard reviews JIATF-S resource requirement requests, sets resource deployment targets for JIATF-S, and communicates these targets to DHS for inclusion in a DHS-wide Statement of Intent of planned deployments to JIATF-S. The Coast Guard then allocates its remaining available resources to the Atlantic and Pacific Area Commands, which further allocate the resources for implementing the Coast Guard’s 11 missions, including drug interdiction. See appendix I for more details on the Coast Guard’s drug interdiction mission resource allocation process. Unlike with overall transit zone operations, JIATF-S does not oversee detection and monitoring efforts for drug smuggling in the U.S. territories.and coordinating operations to interdict the maritime flow of illicit drugs in Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands because they are U.S. territories and part of the arrival zone. In addition to the Coast Guard, CBP’s Puerto Rico-based Caribbean Air and Marine Branch conducts marine interdiction and patrol operations using a mix of planes, helicopters, and Rather, DHS has the lead federal responsibility for planning small boats for coastal drug interdiction operations, generally within U.S. territorial waters. The Puerto Rico Police Department also deploys small boats for drug interdiction operations. Overall, from fiscal years 2009 through 2013, the amount of resources the Coast Guard provided to JIATF-S—including vessels, aircraft, and LEDETs—varied. During this period, the Coast Guard generally did not meet annual targets for its primary drug interdiction mission performance measure. Coast Guard officials cited the declining readiness of the Coast Guard’s aging major cutter fleet; delays in the delivery of new, more capable replacement cutters; and budget constraints, including sequestration, as key factors affecting the Coast Guard’s ability to meet its resource deployment and drug interdiction mission performance targets. Figure 2 shows the key resources the Coast Guard uses to support drug interdiction operations. The Coast Guard’s deployment of vessels to JIATF-S to carry out drug interdiction operations in the transit zone varied during fiscal years 2009 through 2012, and then sharply declined in 2013. Specifically, the Coast Guard’s coverage targets—the planned number of days major cutters (national security cutters, high endurance cutters, and medium endurance cutters) are to operate under JIATF-S tactical control throughout the year—have varied since fiscal year 2009, and the Coast Guard has not fully met them. For example, according to Coast Guard documents, in fiscal year 2009, the Coast Guard’s cutter coverage target was 2,555 days (the equivalent of 7 major cutters under JIATF-S tactical control throughout the year) and the Coast Guard provided 2,036 days—about 80 percent of its target. In fiscal year 2013, the cutter coverage target was 2,008 days (or 5.5 major cutters) and the Coast Guard provided 1,346 days—about 67 percent of its target. Overall, the Coast Guard met an average of 76 percent of its annual JIATF-S cutter coverage targets Figure 3 compares the Coast during fiscal years 2009 through 2013.Guard’s cutter coverage targets with the actual cutter days provided to JIATF-S for fiscal years 2009 through 2013. The Coast Guard’s primary aircraft deployments to JIATF-S are long- range maritime patrol aircraft—generally the HC-130—to detect and monitor drug smuggling activity in the transit zone. The Coast Guard also deploys helicopters—generally modified MH-65s—with marksmen on board in what is known as airborne use of force. AUF-capable helicopters are deployed aboard major cutters and allied vessels to conduct short-range patrols and pursuit actions in the transit zone using marksmen who are trained to shoot out and disable the engines of fleeing drug-smuggling vessels—a capability JIATF-S and Coast Guard officials cite as being critical to drug interdiction success. Maritime patrol aircraft: According to Coast Guard data, the number of maritime patrol aircraft hours the Coast Guard provided to JIATF-S varied during fiscal years 2009 through 2012, ending with an overall decline in 2013, although the numbers remained below target levels. As can be seen in figure 4, since fiscal year 2009, the Coast Guard’s annual maritime patrol aircraft hour allocation target (the number of hours the aircraft are to be under JIATF-S tactical control) has been 4,700 hours. According to Coast Guard data, the Coast Guard approached the target in fiscal year 2011, when the Coast Guard provided 4,416 resource hours—or about 94 percent of its target. Since 2011, though, the Coast Guard has reduced the number of maritime patrol aircraft hours that it has provided to JIATF-S. Coast Guard officials attributed this reduction to a smaller HC-130 fleet size and maintenance needs, including modifications to extend the HC-130s’ airframe life. In fiscal year 2013, the Coast Guard provided 3,506 maritime patrol aircraft resource hours— roughly 75 percent of its targeted level. Airborne use of force: The Coast Guard measures its deployment of AUF to JIATF-S in the number of days AUF-capable helicopters are deployed under JIATF-S tactical control. Coast Guard data show the Coast Guard increased its AUF deployments to JIATF-S during fiscal years 2009 through 2012, before declining in 2013, while remaining below target levels. Specifically, the Coast Guard’s AUF deployments increased from 1,030 days in 2009 to 1,232 days in fiscal years 2012, before declining to 1,169 days in fiscal year 2013. According to Coast Guard data, in fiscal year 2013, the Coast Guard’s AUF deployment target was 1,460 days and the Coast Guard provided 1,169 days—approximately 80 percent of its AUF days target goal. Figure 5 shows the AUF deployment day targets compared with actual AUF days provided to JIATF-S during fiscal years 2009 through 2013. Beyond vessels and aircraft, the Coast Guard provides JIATF-S with LEDETs—specially trained personnel who deploy primarily aboard U.S. Navy and allied vessels to conduct maritime law enforcement operations such as boarding suspect vessels and taking custody of suspected drug smugglers in the transit zone. The Coast Guard is the only JIATF-S resource provider that has law enforcement authority and LEDET personnel deployed in maritime areas far from U.S. waters. By deploying LEDETs on Navy and allied vessels, JIATF-S increases the resources it has available for apprehending suspected drug smugglers, their contraband, and their vessels. According to Coast Guard data, and as shown in figure 6, the Coast Guard’s deployment of LEDETs to JIATF-S (as measured in days) varied from fiscal years 2009 through 2013, but experienced an overall decline during this time period. The Coast Guard has not met its LEDET allocation target levels to JIATF-S since establishing targets in fiscal year 2010. The Coast Guard provided its lowest LEDET allocation to JIATF-S in fiscal year 2013, when it provided 895 days, or just under half of its targeted level of 1,825 days. According to Coast Guard officials, the Coast Guard’s ability to deploy LEDETs to JIATF-S is largely dependent on the availability of Navy and allied vessels, as discussed later in this report. The Coast Guard has generally not met targets for its primary drug interdiction performance measure—removal rate for cocaine from noncommercial vessels in the maritime transit zone. According to Coast Guard officials, this measure focuses on transit zone drug operations because the Coast Guard’s drug interdiction mission priority is removing illicit drugs as close to their origins in South America and as far from U.S. shores as possible, where drug shipments are in their most concentrated bulk form. The measure assesses the percentage of cocaine directly seized or observed being jettisoned, scuttled, or destroyed as a result of Coast Guard actions relative to the total known flow of cocaine through the transit zone using noncommercial maritime vessels, as estimated in the CCDB. According to Coast Guard data, since establishing performance targets for this measure in fiscal year 2009, the Coast Guard met its target in 1 year—fiscal year 2013.Coast Guard reported a cocaine removal rate of 15.3 percent in the transit zone, exceeding its performance target rate of 14.1 percent. Figure 7 shows the Coast Guard’s performance in meeting this primary drug interdiction performance measure from fiscal years 2009 through 2013. The Coast Guard is supporting a DHS-wide effort to combat the growing level of violence associated with drug trafficking in Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands. Specifically, in September 2012, DHS implemented Operation Caribbean Guard to address violence and drug trafficking into The Coast Guard’s and within Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands.role in this DHS-wide effort has been to increase vessel and aircraft operations to interdict the flow of drugs being trafficked by noncommercial maritime vessels toward the islands. Since September 2012, the Coast Guard’s Seventh District has implemented a surge operation, known as Operation Unified Resolve, which has provided Sector San Juan—the Coast Guard field unit whose area of responsibility includes Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands—with additional vessels and aircraft to regularly patrol Puerto Rico and the eastern approaches of the U.S. Virgin Islands. Operation Unified Resolve initially began as a surge operation, but in October 2013, the Coast Guard made the surge operation a standing operation—and, according to Coast Guard officials, established a new baseline for drug interdiction operations in support of Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands. Under Operation Unified Resolve, the Coast Guard has placed special emphasis on targeting the primary and secondary flow of illicit drugs from South America to Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands. According to Sector San Juan officials, a key challenge for the Coast Guard is the relatively short distance between the Dominican Republic and Puerto Rico. For example, officials noted that it would take approximately 4 hours for a go-fast vessel to transit the 70 to 80 miles between the Dominican Republic and Puerto Rico. Coast Guard officials reported that this places a premium on the need for good intelligence on potential drug-smuggling vessels and the effective placement of assets to interdict them. According to Coast Guard officials, the Coast Guard’s decision to provide additional resources to Sector San Juan resulted from Coast Guard analyses that found Sector San Juan lacked sufficient vessels and aircraft to reduce maritime drug smuggling into Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands. For example, according to an August 2012 Coast Guard memorandum, Sector San Juan’s fleet of vessels faced readiness concerns and lacked the capability to effectively conduct operations against the primary drug flow of go-fast boats smuggling illicit drugs from South America into Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands. Further, the memorandum notes that the Coast Guard did not have maritime patrol aircraft permanently assigned to the territories. According to the memorandum, the only permanently assigned Coast Guard aircraft in Puerto Rico were helicopters based in the northwest corner of the island and their endurance and position made them impractical for patrolling the eastern approaches to Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands. Coast Guard officials reported that the Coast Guard has not received additional resources to support Operation Unified Resolve. Rather, to implement the operation, the Coast Guard reported that it supplemented its annual allocation of vessels and aircraft to Sector San Juan by reallocating medium endurance cutters and maritime patrol aircraft to Puerto Rico from other locations within the Coast Guard—largely from the Coast Guard’s Seventh District. According to Coast Guard officials, these vessels and aircraft, in general, had previously been allocated for alien migrant interdiction operations. As noted earlier and as further described in appendix I, the Coast Guard’s process for allocating drug interdiction resources is focused on meeting commitments for strategic priorities, such as JIATF-S transit zone operations, first, before dividing up its remaining resources among its field locations such as Sector San Juan. In this way, the Coast Guard reported that the additional resources provided for Operation Unified Resolve did not come at the expense of its JIATF-S deployments. Beyond Operation Unified Resolve, the Coast Guard is scheduled to modernize Sector San Juan’s vessel fleet. According to Coast Guard officials, during fiscal years 2015 and 2016, the Coast Guard plans to replace Sector San Juan’s six 110-foot patrol boats with six new 154-foot fast response cutters (FRC). According to Coast Guard officials, the FRCs’ impact on the drug interdiction mission will be significant, as the FRC is expected to provide (1) increased interdiction capabilities; (2) improved sea keeping; (3) greater endurance; (4) the ability to deploy a pursuit-capable small boat; (5) improved weapons systems; and (6) improved command, control, and communications systems. Coast Guard officials reported that Sector San Juan would accommodate a mix of the new FRCs and 110-foot patrol boats until the 110-foot patrol boats are phased out by the end of fiscal year 2016. According to senior officials from Sector San Juan, the additional resources Sector San Juan is utilizing for Operation Unified Resolve, along with the scheduled arrival of the six FRCs by the end of 2016, will put Sector San Juan in a better position to meet its mission needs. According to Coast Guard data, the total amount of vessel hours in support of drug interdiction operations in the Sector San Juan area of responsibility more than tripled in recent years—from 2,051 hours in fiscal year 2009 to 6,839 hours in fiscal year 2013. According to the data, much of the increase in vessel drug interdiction operational hours occurred from fiscal years 2012 through 2013, when the Coast Guard was implementing Operation Unified Resolve. Coast Guard data show that medium endurance cutters accounted for a rising share of the drug interdiction vessel operational hours, increasing from 3 percent in fiscal year 2011 to 28 percent in fiscal year 2013. In fiscal year 2013, drug interdiction operations accounted for 40 percent of reported medium endurance cutter and patrol boat hours in the Sector San Juan area of responsibility.operational hours in support of the drug interdiction mission has risen since 2009 in response to increased drug-smuggling events and the additional resources provided for Operation Unified Resolve beginning in late fiscal year 2012. According to Coast Guard officials, the number of vessel Figure 8 shows the total vessel hours (major cutter and patrol boat hours) the Coast Guard reported for conducting drug interdiction operations in the Sector San Juan area of responsibility during fiscal years 2009 through 2013, as well as, the relative share of the vessel hours provided by Sector San Juan and other Coast Guard locations. According to Coast Guard data, maritime patrol aircraft resource hours reported for drug interdiction operations in the Sector San Juan area of responsibility declined during fiscal years 2009 through 2011, before increasing considerably in fiscal years 2012 and 2013. For example, in fiscal year 2011, the Coast Guard reported conducting 148 flight hours patrolling Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands, and this number more than tripled to 502 hours in fiscal year 2012 before doubling to 1,000 hours in fiscal year 2013. The Coast Guard attributes this considerable increase of flight hours in recent years to increased aircraft provided in support of Operation Unified Resolve. Since implementing Operation Unified Resolve in September 2012, the Coast Guard has conducted surveillance patrols of Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands using maritime patrol aircraft and crews forward deployed from Coast Guard field locations in the continental United States. Figure 9 shows the Coast Guard’s maritime patrol aircraft hours in support of drug interdiction operations in the Sector San Juan area of responsibility during fiscal years 2009 through 2013. Coast Guard officials reported that the additional resources the Coast Guard provided for Operation Unified Resolve have led to increasing interdictions of illicit drugs being smuggled in and around Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands. According to Coast Guard officials, as of March 25, 2014, Operation Unified Resolve had led to the removal of 32,669 kilograms of cocaine and roughly 11,000 pounds of marijuana. Further, Coast Guard officials reported that since deploying additional vessels and aircraft for Operation Unified Resolve in September 2012, the Coast Guard found the estimated primary flow of cocaine into Puerto Rico to be considerably higher than previously thought. For example, according to CCDB data provided by the Coast Guard, the estimated noncommercial maritime primary flow of cocaine toward Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands more than doubled, from 7.1 metric tons in fiscal year 2012 to 14.9 metric tons in fiscal year 2013.and secondary noncommercial maritime drug flow toward Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands during fiscal years 2009 through 2013. We are not making recommendations in this report. We provided a draft of this report to DHS, the Department of Justice, ONDCP, and JIATF-S for review and comment. We received technical comments that we have incorporated, as appropriate. We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Homeland Security, the Commandant of the Coast Guard, and appropriate congressional committees. In addition, this report is available at no charge on GAO’s web-site at http://gao.gov. If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 512-9610 or caldwells@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. Staff acknowledgments are provided in appendix III. This appendix provides a summary of the Coast Guard’s process for allocating vessels, aircraft, and other resources for its drug interdiction mission. The Coast Guard’s process for allocating drug interdiction resources is focused on meeting commitments for strategic priorities, including for the Joint Interagency Task Force South (JIATF-S)—a reporting unit of the Department of Defense’s Southern Command that oversees detection and monitoring operations of drug-smuggling events in the transit zone. The Coast Guard allocates drug interdiction resources for these strategic priorities, first, before dividing up its remaining resources among its Atlantic and Pacific Area Commands for further allocation to Coast Guard districts and sectors across the United States. The Coast Guard determines the targets for the amount of time selected vessels, aircraft, and law enforcement detachments (LEDET) are provided to JIATF-S for transit zone operations—through an annual operational planning process that considers factors including resource requirements for strategic priorities, evolving maritime risks, and the availability of vessels and aircraft. Through this process, the Coast Guard reviews JIATF-S resource requests and sets resource targets. The Coast Guard then allocates the remaining resources among its field locations across the United States for implementing 11 missions, including drug interdiction. In general, the Coast Guard’s annual drug interdiction resource allocation planning process includes four steps. First, JIATF-S submits its resource allocation requirements for meeting National Drug Control Strategy targets to the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the Department of Defense as directed by the National Interdiction Command and Control Plan. These requirements specify the capabilities (types of vessels or aircraft) and corresponding capacities (number of days for vessels or resource hours for aircraft). The DHS Office of Policy’s Counter Illicit Trafficking Section communicates the resource requests to the Coast Guard with resource hour requests for Coast Guard cutters, boats, aircraft, and LEDETs. Second, Coast Guard planners determine the amount of resources that the Coast Guard intends to provide in the upcoming fiscal year. The Coast Guard considers its support for JIATF-S drug interdiction operations as one of three strategic commitment priorities. In this way, Coast Guard planners determine the number of vessel days and aircraft hours to provide to JIATF-S before allocating remaining vessels and aircraft to its field locations across the United States for other missions (as described in more detail below). The Coast Guard determines its JIATF-S resource targets based on various factors, including strategic priority and resource availability. Third, the Coast Guard provides its JIATF-S resource target—or Statement of Intent—to the DHS Office of Counter Illicit Trafficking, which liaises with JIATF-S and the Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP). The Statement of Intent details target levels of resources the Coast Guard intends to provide to JIATF-S for the next fiscal year. The Statement of Intent outlines asset availability level targets for major cutters, maritime patrol aircraft, and other resources, such as deployable forces. DHS then combines the Coast Guard Statement of Intent with those of Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and submits an overall DHS Statement of Intent to ONDCP and JIATF-S. Fourth, after allocating resources for JIATF-S and other strategic commitments, the Coast Guard divides its remaining resource hours for vessels and aircraft between its Pacific and Atlantic Area Commands. Coast Guard officials reported that the Coast Guard’s field units use a greater variety of vessels for coastal drug interdiction operations than provided to JIATF-S. These generally include the 110-foot patrol boats in addition to a variety of smaller boats. For example, whereas the Coast Guard generally provides major cutters to JIATF-S, field units rely on a greater variety of smaller vessels to conduct coastal drug interdiction operations because the missions are conducted much closer to shore than are JIATF-S operations. Outside of JIATF-S, the Coast Guard’s Seventh District (headquartered in Miami, Florida, and having responsibility for the Caribbean area including Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands) and Eleventh District (headquartered in Alameda, California, and having responsibility for the Eastern Pacific area, including coastal areas from the U.S.-Mexico border to South America) have accounted for the largest shares of the Coast Guard’s drug interdiction resource hours. According to Coast Guard officials, these districts’ areas of responsibility include high drug-trafficking areas, and therefore drug interdiction accounts for a larger mission focus than at other Coast Guard districts. From fiscal years 2009 through 2013, the Coast Guard’s budget included about $1.2 billion per year for its drug interdiction mission. This mission accounted for between 10 and 12 percent of the Coast Guard’s budget during this time. The Coast Guard reported, based on the enacted fiscal year 2014 budget, that its fiscal year 2014 estimate to perform the drug interdiction mission is $1,305,271,000. Figure 10 shows the flow of the Coast Guard drug interdiction resource allocation process. This appendix identifies and describes the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) component agencies involved in Operation Caribbean Guard. In September 2012, DHS implemented Operation Caribbean Guard to intercept illegal weapons, drugs, and money flowing to and from Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands. Operation Caribbean Guard is a DHS-wide surge effort involving multiple component agencies. Table 2 identifies DHS component agencies involved in Operation Caribbean Guard and reported examples of actions they have taken. In addition to the contact named above, Christopher Conrad (Assistant Director), Jason Berman, Michele Fejfar, Eric Hauswirth, Susan Hsu, Tracey King, and Lerone Reid made key contributions to this report. Coast Guard: Observations on Progress Made and Challenges Faced in Developing and Implementing a Common Operational Picture. GAO-13-784T. Washington, D.C.: July 31, 2013. Coast Guard: Clarifying the Application of Guidance for Common Operational Picture Development Would Strengthen Program. GAO-13-321. Washington, D.C.: April 25, 2013. International Affairs: Status of Funding, Equipment, and Training for the Caribbean Basin Security Initiative. GAO-13-367R. Washington, D.C.: March 20, 2013 Coast Guard: Portfolio Management Approach Needed to Improve Major Acquisition Outcomes. GAO-12-918. Washington, D.C.: September 20, 2012. Coast Guard: Legacy Vessels’ Declining Conditions Reinforce Need for More Realistic Operational Targets. GAO-12-741. Washington, D.C.: July 31, 2012. Observations on the Coast Guard’s and the Department of Homeland Security’s Fleet Studies. GAO-12-751R. Washington, D.C.: May 31, 2012. Coast Guard: Action Needed as Approved Deepwater Program Remains Unachievable. GAO-11-743. Washington, D.C.: July 28, 2011. Coast Guard: Deepwater Requirements, Quantities, and Cost Require Revalidation to Reflect Knowledge Gained. GAO-10-790. Washington, D.C.: July 27, 2010. Drug Control: Cooperation with Many Major Drug Transit Countries Has Improved, but Better Performance Reporting and Sustainability Plans Are Needed. GAO-08-784. Washington, D.C.: July 15, 2008. Drug Control: Agencies Need to Plan for Likely Declines in Drug Interdiction Assets, and Develop Better Performance Measures for Transit Zone Operations. GAO-06-200. Washington, D.C.: November 15, 2005.

Summary: One part of the U.S. National Drug Control Strategy is to disrupt the flow of cocaine through the transit zone. Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands, the only U.S. territories located geographically within the transit zone, have served as entry points for cocaine destined for the continental United States. In recent years, federal and local government agencies have cited growing levels of violent crime in these territories and attribute this violence to illicit drug trafficking. Within DHS, the U.S. Coast Guard is the lead federal agency for maritime drug interdiction and a key provider of resources to support drug interdiction operations in the transit zone and the two territories. GAO was asked to examine the Coast Guard's drug interdiction efforts in the transit zone, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands. This report addresses (1) trends in the Coast Guard's deployment of resources in the transit zone and the extent to which the Coast Guard met its performance targets; and (2) actions taken by the Coast Guard to combat drug smuggling into Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands, and trends in vessel and aircraft deployments. GAO analyzed Coast Guard data for fiscal years 2009 through 2013 on drug interdiction resource deployments and mission performance, and interviewed Coast Guard and DHS officials involved in drug interdiction operations. The Coast Guard provided varying levels of resources for drug interdiction operations in the “transit zone”—the area from South America through the Caribbean Sea and the eastern Pacific Ocean that is used to transport illicit drugs to the United States—during fiscal years 2009 through 2013, and generally did not meet its performance targets for several reasons. As the figure shows, Coast Guard resources included vessels (cutters), aircraft, and law enforcement detachments. The number of cutter days, aircraft hours, and law enforcement detachment days the Coast Guard provided for drug interdiction operations in the transit zone varied during fiscal years 2009 through 2012, and then sharply declined in fiscal year 2013. For example, in fiscal year 2012, the Coast Guard provided 1,947 cutter days for transit zone operations and in fiscal year 2013 the Coast Guard provided 1,346 days—a 30 percent decline. During fiscal years 2009 through 2013, the Coast Guard met targets for its primary drug interdiction mission performance measure—the removal rate of cocaine from noncommercial vessels in the transit zone—once, in fiscal year 2013. Coast Guard officials cited the declining readiness of its aging vessels, delays in the delivery of replacement vessels, and sequestration as factors affecting Coast Guard resource deployments and the ability to meet its drug interdiction mission performance targets. In support of a Department of Homeland Security (DHS) effort to address the increased violent crime associated with illicit drug smuggling into Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands, the Coast Guard has increased vessel and aircraft operations for drug interdiction efforts in these territories by reallocating resources from elsewhere in the Coast Guard. According to Coast Guard officials, these additional resources are drawn from other missions, such as alien migrant interdiction. Beginning in September 2012, the Coast Guard implemented a surge operation to provide additional vessels and aircraft to regularly patrol Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands. According to Coast Guard officials, the increased vessel and aircraft deployments have since become the new baseline level of resources to be provided for drug interdiction operations there. According to Coast Guard data, the number of vessel hours spent conducting drug interdiction operations in these territories more than tripled from fiscal years 2009 through 2013. Similarly, the number of maritime patrol aircraft hours spent conducting drug interdiction operations in the territories increased—from about 150 flight hours in fiscal year 2011 to about 1,000 hours in fiscal year 2013. GAO is not making recommendations in this report. DHS provided technical comments on a draft of this report, which were incorporated, as appropriate.