The National Guard has two elements—the Army National Guard and the Air National Guard—that mostly consist of part-time forces responsible for both federal and state missions. The Army Reserve and Air Force Reserve (Reserves) also largely consist of part-time forces and are responsible for only federal missions. In addition to these part-time forces, both the National Guard and the Reserves use full-time personnel for duties that can include pay processing, personnel actions, preparing and monitoring training schedules, and other tasks that cannot be effectively executed through the use of part-time personnel. These full-time positions—which DOD calls full-time support—in general are more expensive than part-time personnel because they are paid as full-time employees and receive greater compensation and benefits such as retirement, health-care, and education. As table 1 shows, the Army National Guard is authorized approximately 358,000 soldiers, and the Army Reserve approximately 205,000 soldiers, which collectively constitute about 50 percent of the Army’s total authorized end strength. Likewise, the Air National Guard has approximately 105,000 military personnel, and the Air Force Reserve has approximately 71,000 military personnel, which collectively are about 35 percent of the Air Force’s authorized end strength. Each state’s National Guard forces have a dual role as both a state and federal force, while the Reserves are strictly a federal force. Although the National Guard has a dual role, the federal government provides funding for National Guard personnel when they are conducting training and other federal missions. In fiscal year 2013, federal funding for National Guard personnel totaled about $11.1 billion. In addition, the federal government provides about 90 percent of the funding for National Guard installation base-operation and maintenance costs. The National Guard’s dual state and federal role means that state Governors have command and control over National Guard units when they are not performing federal missions or other federal service. The National Guard and Reserves maintain a number of nondeployable headquarters that are responsible for managing and overseeing subordinate units. Of the 75 headquarters we identified, 57 reside within the National Guard. The National Guard’s headquarters include the National Guard Bureau, Army National Guard Directorate, Air National Guard Readiness Center, and the National Guard’s 54 Joint Force headquarters—which DOD refers to as Joint Force Headquarters-State— located in each state, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, and Guam. In addition, appendixes III and IV provide detailed information on the locations, missions and responsibilities of these headquarters. Figure 1 shows the organizational structure of the National Guard. The National Guard Bureau is managed by the Chief of the National Guard Bureau—a 4-star General who was placed on the Joint Chiefs of Staff in 2011. Reporting to the Chief are two Lieutenant Generals who manage the Army National Guard Directorate and the Air National Guard Readiness Center, respectively. When not activated for federal missions, each state’s National Guard’s forces are commanded by the Adjutants General who also command the states’ Joint Force headquarters. The state Joint Force headquarters each consist of a Joint staff element, Army staff element, and Air staff element. Each of these elements is subject to different processes for reassessing and validating personnel requirements. These headquarters are responsible for coordinating the planning, training, and execution of National Guard homeland defense, civil support, and other domestic emergency missions within the United States. They also manage the National Guard’s readiness and prepare National Guard units for federal mobilization. The Army National Guard provides a balance of maneuver (combat), maneuver support, and maneuver sustainment capabilities. The Air National Guard provides a broad range of ready combat and combat-support capabilities such as tactical airlift and special operations. The Army Reserve and Air Force Reserve maintain 18 nondeployable headquarters that manage or oversee subordinate units. The Army Reserve provides maneuver support and maneuver sustainment capabilities as well as individual soldiers through the Individual Ready Reserve and Individual Mobilization Augmentation programs. We identified 13 nondeployable Army Reserve headquarters that include the Office of the Chief of the Army Reserve, U.S. Army Reserve Command, 4 regional support commands, and 7 functional commands. See appendixes V through VII for detailed information on the locations, missions, and responsibilities of these headquarters. The Office of the Chief of the Army Reserve and the U.S. Army Reserve Command are commanded by the same Lieutenant General who, by law, also sits on the Army Staff. Reporting to the Chief are 11 General officers who command support and functional commands, ensure the readiness of personnel, and maintain reserve installations within the United States, as shown in figure 2. The Air Force Reserve provides a broad range of combat and combat- support capabilities. We identified five nondeployable headquarters that include Headquarters, Air Force Reserve; Air Force Reserve Command; and the 4th, 10th, and 22nd Air Forces. See appendixes VIII and IX for detailed information on the locations, missions and responsibilities of these headquarters. Headquarters, Air Force Reserve, and Air Force Reserve Command are commanded by the same Lieutenant General who, by law, also sits on the Air Staff. Reporting to the Chief are three General officers who help to ensure the readiness of Air Force Reserve forces, as shown in figure 3. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Army, and the Air Force have processes to size and structure headquarters organizations. In general, these processes seek to provide the minimum number of personnel needed to accomplish missions and performance objectives. Additionally, Congress requires DOD to report personnel data for its Major DOD Headquarters Activities to support congressional oversight of these headquarters. These headquarters are listed in a DOD instruction. Prior to 2008, Congress placed a cap on the number of personnel that could be assigned to such headquarters; however, Congress removed this cap in 2008. Our analysis found that the overall number of funded military and civilian positions at the Army’s and Air Force’s reserve-component headquarters has steadily increased since fiscal year 2009, primarily due to DOD’s reassignment of workload from contractors to full-time federal civilians and increased mission requirements. These increases have come amid broader DOD efforts since 2010 to constrain or reduce headquarters. Between fiscal year 2009 and 2013, the total number of positions funded for the 75 reserve-component headquarters we identified grew from about 30,200 to about 31,900—an increase of nearly 6 percent, as shown in figure 4. Overall, the National Guard increased by about 1,350 funded positions (5 percent) and the Reserves by about 330 funded positions (7 percent). The National Guard’s growth was driven by increases in the Army National Guard Directorate, which grew by about 750 funded positions over the period (about 44 percent). The National Guard Bureau, Air National Guard Readiness Center, and 54 state Joint Force headquarters increased about 17 percent, 21 percent, and 1 percent, respectively. The number of funded positions also increased at the Army Reserve’s headquarters, which grew by about 15 percent, but decreased at the Air Force Reserve’s headquarters by about 4 percent over the same period. Of the nearly 1,700 positions DOD added to these headquarters, approximately 37 percent (more than 620 positions) were for full-time support positions. The percentage of funded positions that were allocated for full-time personnel varied by headquarters. For example, nearly 100 percent of the positions funded for the National Guard Bureau, Air National Guard Readiness Center, Army National Guard Directorate, U.S. Army Reserve Command, and Headquarters, Air Force Reserve, were for full-time support in fiscal year 2013. In contrast, approximately 45 percent of funded positions at the state Joint Force headquarters and 33 percent of funded positions at the Army Reserve’s functional commands were for full-time positions in fiscal year 2013. Appendixes III through IX provide more-detailed analysis of positions funded at the headquarters we identified. Our analysis shows that the National Guard has consistently allocated a greater percentage of its funded military and civilian positions to its headquarters than the other reserve components. Specifically, funded positions at the Army National Guard headquarters we identified equaled 6 percent of its estimated military and civilian funded positions in fiscal year 2013 (about 22,800 of its 389,350 estimated civilian and military funded positions). This contrasts with the other reserve components we examined, which have 2 to 3 percent of their military and civilian funded positions in nondeployable headquarters. National Guard officials said that the Army National Guard has allocated more funded positions to its headquarters for several reasons, including the National Guard’s need to prepare for and execute homeland defense and civil support missions, recruit its own personnel, and maintain a U.S. Property and Fiscal office in each state. National Guard and Reserve officials told us that there are two main drivers of growth since 2009 in funded positions at reserve-component headquarters—DOD’s 2010 effort to reduce its reliance on contractors by reassigning their workload to federal civilian positions, referred to as “in- sourcing,” and expanded mission requirements. In April 2009, the Secretary of Defense announced his intention to reduce DOD’s reliance on contractors and increase the number of civilian positions. Reserve component officials said that DOD’s in-sourcing effort was a significant driver of growth in civilian positions. For example, Army National Guard officials said that DOD’s in-sourcing effort contributed to an increase in over 700 civilian positions at the Army National Guard Directorate. Likewise, Air National Guard officials said that DOD’s in-sourcing effort caused the Air National Guard Readiness Center to add 180 funded positions. The other driver of growth in funded positions identified by reserve- component officials was expanded mission requirements. Army Reserve officials noted that the 7th Civil Support Command’s increase of 71 funded positions from fiscal year 2009 to fiscal year 2011 was the result of the Army closing a second Army activity and adding missions at the command. In a second instance, Army Reserve officials attributed growth at the Office of the Chief of the Army Reserve to the addition of new functions such as the Employer Partnership Office. National Guard officials attributed the increase of over 250 funded positions at the state Joint Force headquarters to mission growth resulting from the establishment of civil-support capabilities such as implementation of the Homeland Response Forces beginning in fiscal year 2011. National Guard officials also said that the National Guard Bureau may grow in the future as a result of the Chief of the National Guard Bureau’s placement on the Joint Chiefs of Staff in 2011. Although DOD has processes in place that generally seek to provide the minimum number of personnel needed to accomplish missions and performance objectives, these processes have not been consistently applied at 68 of the 75 headquarters we identified. For instance, the National Guard Bureau has been determining its own personnel requirements with no external review and validation since 2010 and has been growing steadily since 2009. In addition, DOD has not included data on the National Guard Bureau in its required Defense Manpower Requirements Report to Congress. In fiscal year 2013, the National Guard had about 21,900 funded positions at its 54 state Joint Force headquarters, but the processes for determining personnel requirements for these headquarters are fragmented among the National Guard Bureau’s Joint staff, the Army National Guard, and the Air National Guard. Finally, the Army and Air Force have not determined personnel requirements or fully reassessed within required time frames the personnel requirements at 13 of the 20 headquarters. Consequently, DOD lacks assurance that the Army’s and Air Force’s reserve-component headquarters are being staffed with the minimum personnel needed to perform their assigned missions. Department of Defense Directive 1100.4, Guidance for Manpower Management (Feb. 12, 2005). Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Instruction 1001.01a (Oct. 1, 2010). Department of the Army, Manpower Management, Regulation 570-4 (Feb. 8, 2006). GAO, Human Capital: A Model of Strategic Human Capital, GAO-02-373SP (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 15, 2002). applicable to reserve-component headquarters organizations are discussed in table 2. Under an informal agreement with the Joint Staff, the National Guard Bureau has been determining its own personnel requirements without validation by a higher-level command or external organization. Since 2010, the number of funded positions at the bureau increased by 17 percent and could grow further, according to National Guard Bureau officials. The DOD directive governing the National Guard Bureau provides that the National Guard Bureau’s personnel requirements should be managed in the same manner as other joint activities to the greatest extent possible. Joint activities are generally subject to the Joint Staff’s Joint Manpower and Personnel Program. According to officials, this program includes review, approval, and documentation of a headquarters’ personnel requirements by an external organization. According to Joint Staff and National Guard officials, in 2010, the Joint Staff and the National Guard Bureau reached an informal agreement that the bureau would maintain control for determining and validating its own personnel requirements. However, this agreement is inconsistent with the Joint Staff’s regular personnel requirements reassessment process and differs from the military-service practices. National Guard Bureau and Joint Staff officials gave three reasons for this agreement. First, Joint Staff officials said that this agreement was reached because the bureau wanted to maintain control over its personnel requirements. Second, the National Guard Bureau is too dissimilar from other joint activities—such as the combatant commands—for which the Joint Staff is responsible. Third, the Joint Staff lacks the resources to assume responsibility for validating the bureau’s personnel requirements. Recognizing that recent developments warrant a re-evaluation of the National Guard Bureau’s personnel requirements, the National Guard Bureau started two efforts intended to enable it to define its personnel requirements. The National Guard Bureau has started an initiative called “Project Muster” to realign its headquarters processes to support the new roles and responsibilities of the Chief and Vice Chief of the National Guard Bureau and determine the personnel requirements needed to execute these responsibilities following the Chief’s placement on the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Officials responsible for the study said that it may show that the bureau will need to grow beyond its current size. In part because one of Project Muster’s baseline assumptions is that the bureau’s current manpower will be retained to meet preexisting requirements. In July 2013, while our review was underway, the Vice Chief for the National Guard Bureau asked that the U.S. Army Manpower Analysis Agency—with assistance from the Air Force Personnel Center—conduct an advisory analysis of positions at the National Guard Bureau to include its joint staff and the Office of the Chief of the National Guard Bureau. According to the U.S. Army Manpower Analysis Agency official responsible for the analysis, an advisory analysis entails a strategic look at a headquarters’ organizational structure. It is different from a personnel requirements study, which would assess individual workload, validate missions, and map processes. The Vice Chief’s request for an analysis was accepted by the U.S. Army Manpower Analysis Agency in August 2013 and is currently scheduled for calendar year 2014. Although both of these efforts are significant attempts to determine the bureau’s personnel requirements, neither of them will establish a process to periodically validate and reassess those requirements. Additionally, National Guard Bureau officials said that the Chief of the National Guard Bureau will continue to be the final authority on what requirements are approved for the bureau. By creating a system whereby an external organization is not independently assessing the National Guard Bureau’s personnel requirements the bureau has removed an independent check that could help ensure that the bureau is staffed with the appropriate number of personnel needed to execute its assigned missions and workload. . Our analysis of DOD’s reserve-component headquarters found that DOD’s list of its Major DOD Headquarters Activities did not include the National Guard Bureau, even though the bureau meets the headquarters criteria specified in DOD’s instruction and is now commanded by a 4-star General who sits on the Joint Chiefs of Staff. DOD uses an instruction issued by the Office of the Secretary of Defense’s Director for Administration and Management that establishes the definitions and criteria that should be used to identify DOD’s Major DOD Headquarters Activities. This instruction also contains an enclosure that lists DOD’s Major DOD Headquarters Activities and this list is the basis for reporting required personnel data to Congress. In this instruction, DOD defines major DOD headquarters activities as those headquarters (and the direct support integral to their operation) whose primary mission is to manage or command the programs and operations of DOD, the DOD components, and their major military units, organizations, or agencies. In practice, DOD includes those headquarters that are commanded by a General or Admiral, or Lieutenant General or Vice Admiral or their equivalents. The National Guard Bureau meets both these criteria. In 2012, we reported that some other organizations that fit the definition of Major DOD Headquarters Activities were not included in DOD’s instruction. We recommended at that time that DOD revise its instruction to include all of its Major DOD Headquarters Activities. Our review found that DOD has not updated its list to include the National Guard Bureau or the headquarters we identified in our 2012 report. DOD officials said that the National Guard Bureau was not included in its list of major DOD headquarters activities in the past because the National Guard Bureau had previously been a subactivity of the Army and Air Force; the National Guard Bureau has a National Guard mission that relates to the states, which is unusual for DOD’s headquarters; and officials did not focus on the National Guard Bureau being a headquarters that drives the department’s active-duty or Reserve missions. Officials from the Office of the Director of Administration and Management and the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs agreed that the National Guard Bureau (including both the Office of the Chief and the Joint staff element) should be considered a major DOD headquarters activity and listed in DOD’s instruction; however, at the time of our review these officials did not have a schedule for further updating the instruction or the list of major DOD headquarters activities. Having complete information about such headquarters activities is important for oversight because Congress has established reporting requirements that it can use to oversee the size of specific kinds of DOD’s headquarters, such as the National Guard Bureau. DOD is required to provide Congress with an annual Defense Manpower Requirements Report on a variety of personnel issues, including the number of military and civilian personnel assigned to major DOD headquarters activities in the previous year, and estimates of such numbers for the current and subsequent year. Prior to 2008, DOD was subject to a statutory cap on the total number of personnel that could be assigned to Major DOD Headquarters Activities. The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 repealed this cap, but required DOD to continue to report certain information about the size and composition of the staff assigned to Major DOD Headquarters Activities. When fulfilling its reporting requirement, DOD uses the definitions and criteria in its instruction to identify DOD’s Major DOD Headquarters Activities and lists these headquarters in an enclosure. This list is the basis for reporting required personnel data to Congress, and because the bureau was not included in DOD’s list, its personnel data were not reported to Congress. Unless DOD revises its instruction to include the National Guard Bureau in its list of major DOD headquarters activities and reports the bureau’s personnel requirements data, Congress will continue to have limited information available to support oversight of this expanding headquarters activity. The National Guard has not fully reassessed the personnel requirements of the 54 state Joint Force headquarters or their predecessor organizations—which collectively contain nearly 21,900 funded positions—since the 1980s despite changes in their organization and assigned missions. Our prior work has shown that cost savings may be achieved by consolidating and centralizing overlapping functions and eliminating unnecessary overlap and duplication. The state Joint Force headquarters consist of a Joint staff element, Army staff element, and Air staff element each of which is subject to different processes for reassessing and validating personnel requirements. Additionally, these headquarters have personnel that are assigned as the personal staff and special staff of the Adjutant General. The National Guard Bureau, Army National Guard Directorate, and Air National Guard Readiness Center share responsibility for overseeing personnel requirements at the state Joint Force headquarters and there is not a process in place that enables the holistic assessment of personnel requirements at these headquarters. In the absence of a process that provides a holistic assessment of the state Joint Force Headquarters, National Guard officials noted that they have begun two efforts that are intended to assess personnel requirements at the state Joint Force headquarters: (1) a National Guard Bureau study evaluating personnel requirements for the Joint staff element at these headquarters and (2) an Army National Guard Directorate evaluation of functions—some of which include both Army National Guard and Air National Guard personnel—within these headquarters. We found that these efforts are limited and do not constitute a process that holistically assesses these headquarters’ personnel requirements. Without implementing a process to holistically assess personnel requirements for all three staff elements at these headquarters’, DOD lacks assurance that they are sized and structured to be efficient. National Guard officials said that they have not reassessed the personnel requirements for the National Guard’s 54 state Joint Force headquarters since the 1980s, even though there have been changes in the organization of these headquarters, including the missions assigned to them. The Army and the Air Force determined the personnel requirements for the Army and Air staff elements at the state Joint Force headquarters’ predecessor headquarters in 1982 on the basis of the number of personnel authorized for the state or territory as well as its population. The Army staff and Air staff elements are filled with Army National Guard and Air National Guard personnel respectively. The Joint staff element and the Adjutant General’s staff can be comprised of personnel from the Army National Guard, the Air National Guard, or both. Responsibility for overseeing personnel requirements of these staff elements is shared by the National Guard Bureau, Army National Guard Directorate, and Air National Guard Readiness Center, which have separate processes for determining, validating, and reassessing requirements for their respective staff elements, as shown in table 3. We have previously found that government can reduce costs and improve operations through the elimination of unnecessary fragmentation, overlap, and duplication. Additionally, our 2012 report examining DOD’s headquarters and support organizations found that there may be additional opportunities for DOD to achieve cost savings by consolidating and centralizing overlapping functions and services. In our 2012 report, we recommended that DOD continue to examine opportunities to centralize administrative and command support services, functions, or programs. National Guard officials noted that they have two ongoing efforts that are intended to assess personnel requirements at the state Joint Force headquarters; however, we found that these efforts were limited and were not based on a process that holistically assessed personnel requirements for all three staff elements at these headquarters. First, as previously discussed, the National Guard Bureau has begun a two-phased study reassessing the personnel requirements for these headquarters’ Joint staff element; however, National Guard Bureau officials stated that the study would not examine the Army staff element or Air staff element portion of the state Joint Force headquarters. National Guard Bureau officials determined that on average each Joint staff element would need 30 personnel to perform core functions during the first phase of the study, which was completed January 2012. However, National Guard officials noted that the ultimate size and structure of the joint staff element will vary by state and should correlate with the state’s assigned missions and personnel. The second phase of the study is intended to develop a joint manpower document that would document the state headquarters’ ultimate size and structure. National Guard Bureau officials expect to complete this phase by fiscal year 2015. Second, in addition to the National Guard Bureau’s study, Army National Guard Directorate officials said that the absence of a holistic assessment of the state Joint Force headquarters contributed to their completing assessments of 17 functions, some of which are performed at these headquarters and are staffed with both Army National Guard and Air National Guard personnel. Army National Guard officials identified five offices within the Adjutant General’s personal staff that typically have both Army National Guard and Air National Guard personnel: the Chaplain’s Office, the Human Resources Office, the Office of the Judge Advocate General, the Public Affairs Office, and the Office of the Inspector General. Army National Guard officials said they are not required to collaborate with the Air National Guard when determining personnel requirements for these functions—although individual analysts may choose to do so at their discretion—and assessments only examine Army personnel requirements. Army National Guard officials also said that a recently completed study of the Chaplain’s office and an ongoing study of the Human Resources office had minimal collaboration with the Air National Guard. Further, Army National Guard officials noted that even if the Air National Guard were to be more heavily involved in the Army National Guard’s studies, there is not a process in place to estimate the workload for functions that have both Air National Guard and Army National Guard personnel. Three different organizations are responsible for assessing personnel requirements at the state Joint Force headquarters, and there is no process in place that provides a holistic assessment. As a result, the state Joint Force headquarters may be missing opportunities to consolidate or centralize overlapping functions and services and may be allowing personnel gaps or overlaps to develop or persist. For example, our review of the personnel requirements documents for the 54 state Joint Force headquarters shows that a number of similar positions are approved for both the Army staff element and the Air staff element within the same state. In one state’s Joint Force headquarters, the Army staff element allocated positions for five Judge Advocate Generals, two Public Affairs officials, and one Chaplain, while the Air Staff element allocated positions for two Judge Advocate Generals, one Public Affairs official, and two Chaplains. In a second state Joint Force headquarters, we found that the Army staff element allocated positions for three Judge Advocate Generals, three Public Affairs officials, and two Chaplains, while the Air staff element allocated positions for one Judge Advocate General, two Public Affairs officials, and one Chaplain. However, it is not clear whether these positions are all justified because the National Guard Bureau has not completed a holistic assessment of all the staff elements at these headquarters. While the National Guard Bureau’s and the Army National Guard’s efforts are important steps in determining personnel requirements at the state Joint Force headquarters, they are limited because the National Guard has not established a process for holistically assessing all three elements at these headquarters. Further, the Army National Guard and Air National Guard are not required to collaborate when determining personnel requirements, do not use a formal process to estimate workload for joint functions in their entirety, and do not have a means for ensuring these functions are staffed to be efficient. As a result, these studies are unlikely to ensure that the state Joint Force headquarters avoid gaps or overlaps in positions and have the minimum personnel required to perform their assigned missions. The Army and Air Force have not consistently implemented processes for ensuring their reserve-component headquarters have the minimum number of personnel, thereby hindering their ability to determine whether these headquarters have been sized to be efficient. Our analysis shows that 13 of the 20 Army and Air Force reserve-component headquarters have not been fully reassessed. Our analysis shows that 5 of the 7 organizations that have been reassessed shrank from fiscal year 2009 through fiscal year 2013. In contrast, several of the headquarters that showed significant growth were among those that have not been reassessed including the Office of the Chief of the Army Reserve and Air National Guard Readiness Center. As we previously noted, our work in the area of strategic human-capital management has shown that reassessing resource requirements—including personnel—enables organizations to achieve their missions and match resources to their needs. Table 4 shows the status of personnel requirement assessments at the Army and Air Force reserve-component headquarters we identified. According to Army Manpower Analysis Agency officials, most Army reserve-component headquarters have not had their personnel requirements fully reassessed because the U.S. Army Manpower Analysis Agency has a backlog of reassessments needing review and approval. The U.S. Army Manpower Analysis Agency validates the headquarters’ reassessment of their requirements. The Army’s manpower-management regulation requires that Army headquarters be reassessed not less than every 5 years and optimally every 3 years. Army officials said that a reassessment should generally include a review of the entire headquarters; however, there are some instances where commanders conduct a partial assessment—for example of a single function or type of position. Army officials said that the manpower analysis agency has prioritized its review and approval of personnel requirements reassessments and worked with the Army Reserve to establish a schedule through fiscal year 2016 for reassessing some headquarters; however, we found that several of the headquarters included in our review that had not recently been reassessed were not included in this schedule. Once the U.S. Army Manpower Analysis Agency validates an assessment, it is submitted to the Office of the Army Operations and Plans for approval. If an Army headquarters does not have a validated personnel requirements document, its personnel requirements could be removed from its personnel requirements document during periodic force-structure reviews and excluded from the Army’s annual budget request. Air Force officials told us that one Air Force reserve-component headquarters we identified did not have its personnel-requirements assessed because such a periodic reassessment is not currently required in the Air Force’s guidance. Specifically, the guidance only requires headquarters embedded in its operational wings be reassessed at least every 2 years. In contrast, reassessments for the Air Force’s reserve- component headquarters are done on an ad hoc basis. In 2011 and 2012, the Air Force Reserve reassessed five of its headquarters as part of its efforts to streamline its operations, not due to any requirement in guidance. Following this reassessment, the Air Force Reserve shrank the three numbered Air Force headquarters by more than one-third, and Headquarters, Air Force Reserve, by more than 10 percent. Another headquarters that was reassessed, the Air Force Reserve Command, grew in size by about 7 percent. According to Air Force officials, changes in headquarters personnel requirements are typically driven by changes in force structure, made in response to efficiency initiatives, or initiated by the headquarters’ commanding officer. Air Force officials said that it would be beneficial to apply a reassessment standard to all of the Air Force’s reserve-component headquarters, but the Air Force has not taken steps to initiate such reviews or revise the guidance to require them in the future. Unless the Army and Air Force periodically reassess their reserve- component headquarters, they will lack assurance that these headquarters are sized with the minimal staff required and structured appropriately. Amid DOD’s recent efforts to trim budgets by finding efficiencies and reducing overhead, some reserve-component headquarters have grown. While some of this growth is due to reducing reliance on contractors and expanding missions, DOD does not know whether its reserve-component headquarters are sized with the appropriate personnel needed to accomplish their missions today and in the future. Human-capital practices suggest that the size and structure of organizations need to be reassessed periodically. In total, 68 of 75 the reserve-component headquarters we reviewed have not been recently reassessed. Until these organizations are assessed, the Army and Air Force will lack assurance that they are sized and structured appropriately. Additionally, until DOD externally validates the National Guard Bureau’s personnel requirements, holistically assesses personnel requirements for its 54 state Joint Force headquarters, and schedules reassessments for reserve component headquarters it will lack assurance that these headquarters are appropriately sized to accomplish their assigned mission. The National Guard Bureau—whose Chief was recently placed on the Joint Chiefs of Staff—has grown about 17 percent since 2010 and is anticipating further growth related to its elevated role. However, the oversight process currently in place allows the National Guard Bureau to determine its personnel requirements without validation by a higher-level command or external organization. Furthermore, reports used to support congressional oversight have not included information on the bureau. Unless the bureau’s personnel requirements are validated by an external organization and related information is included in DOD’s report to Congress, both DOD and Congress will lack assurance that the bureau’s size and structure is appropriate for its mission. For the 54 state Joint Force headquarters, fragmented review processes across the National Guard Bureau, Army National Guard, and Air National Guard have created an environment where similar and possibly overlapping positions have been approved for the three interconnected staff elements in each state. Their requirements have not been reassessed since the 1980s, and ongoing studies by the National Guard are too limited in scope to provide a comprehensive reassessment. As a result, no organization has examined the multiple staff elements at these headquarters for potential personnel gaps or overlaps that could hinder their ability to perform their missions or could waste resources. Finally, for those headquarters overseen by the Army and Air Force— specifically 13 Army Reserve headquarters, 5 Air Force Reserve headquarters, the Army National Guard Directorate, and the Air National Guard Readiness Center—DOD has processes in place that if consistently implemented could help ensure that these headquarters are sized and structured appropriately. The Army and Air Force have not reassessed 13 of these 20 headquarters, and of the seven headquarters that were recently reassessed five shrank, some markedly. Until the Army and the Air Force reassess the remaining headquarters that they oversee DOD will lack assurance that these headquarters are sized and structured appropriately. To facilitate oversight of the size of DOD’s reserve-component headquarters and ensure that they have the minimum personnel needed to complete their assigned missions, we are making the following six recommendations. To independently validate the personnel requirements for the National Guard Bureau, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Chief of the National Guard Bureau to implement the Joint Chief of Staff’s Joint Manpower and Personnel Process and have its personnel requirements periodically validated by a DOD organization external to the National Guard Bureau. To provide Congress the data it requires to oversee DOD’s Major DOD Headquarters Activities, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense include the National Guard Bureau among its list of Major DOD Headquarters Activities and report personnel associated with the National Guard Bureau in the Defense Manpower Requirements Report. To minimize the potential for gaps or overlaps at the National Guard’s state Joint Force headquarters, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Chief of the National Guard Bureau to: develop a process for the Army National Guard and Air National Guard to collaborate when determining personnel requirements for joint functions at these headquarters and assess and validate all personnel requirements at the state Joint Force headquarters to include the Army staff element and Air staff element. To ensure that Army Reserve headquarters and the Army National Guard Directorate are properly sized to meet their assigned missions, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of the Army to ensure that these headquarters are reassessed and have their personnel requirements validated within required time frames by including them in the U.S. Army Manpower Analysis Agency’s schedule for reassessment and validation. To ensure that Air Force Reserve headquarters and the Air National Guard Readiness Center are properly sized to meet their assigned missions, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of the Air Force to modify the Air Force’s guidance to require that these headquarters have their personnel requirements reassessed on a recurring basis, and establish and implement a schedule for reassessing personnel requirements for its reserve-component headquarters. We provided a draft of this report to the Department of Defense for review and comment. In response, we received written comments which are reprinted in appendix XI. DOD concurred with three of our recommendations and partially concurred with the remaining three recommendations. DOD also provided technical comments which we incorporated into the report as appropriate. DOD partially concurred with our first recommendation that the Secretary of Defense require the Chief of the National Guard Bureau have its personnel requirements periodically validated by a DOD organization external to the National Guard Bureau. DOD stated that while the department agrees that external validation is appropriate, it is DOD’s view that the appropriate means for obtaining this external validation is by establishing a vetting process that includes representatives from the Army, Air Force, and the National Guard Bureau. DOD therefore suggested that we modify our recommendation to reflect this. We believe DOD retains the flexibility to develop a vetting process that includes representatives from the organizations identified above so long as this process follows the guidelines described in DOD guidance and requirements are periodically validated by an organization external to the bureau. As a result we did not modify our recommendation as DOD suggested. DOD concurred with our recommendation that the Secretary of Defense include the National Guard Bureau among its list of Major DOD Headquarters Activities and report personnel associated with the National Guard Bureau in its Defense Manpower Requirements Report. In its response to our recommendations DOD provided several technical comments that we addressed in the body of our report. The department also partially concurred with our recommendations that the Chief, National Guard Bureau modify the scope of its ongoing manpower study to reassess personnel requirements at the state Joint Force headquarters and validate these requirements including those for the Army and Air staff elements. In DOD’s response, the department detailed ongoing efforts to validate personnel requirements and stated that revising the scope of the National Guard Bureau’s study would eliminate the ability of the Army National Guard and Air National Guard to identify their own personnel requirements. The department further stated that when shared functions are being studied, coordination should be increased between the staff elements to ensure that the correct workload is captured, requirements are not duplicated, and process efficiencies are maximized. However, we found minimal coordination on studies examining the five functions that the National Guard identified as being staffed with both Army National Guard and Air National Guard personnel. For example, Army National Guard officials told us that a study of the Chaplain’s office was completed with minimal Air National Guard participation and only captures the Army National Guard’s personnel requirements. Similarly, Army National Guard officials said that the Air National Guard has been minimally involved in an ongoing evaluation of the Human Resources Office. We agree that closer coordination is warranted and have revised our recommendation to emphasize this while retaining the recommendation that the National Guard Bureau review and validate all personnel requirements at the state Joint Force headquarters including the Army staff element and Air staff element. DOD also concurred with our recommendation that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of the Army to ensure that Army Reserve’s headquarters and the Army National Guard Directorate have their personnel requirements validated within required time frames by including them in the U.S. Army Manpower Analysis Agency’s schedule for reassessment and validation. In its response to our recommendations, DOD noted it has several ongoing efforts that are intended to assess Army Reserve full-time support requirements, and institutional and operational headquarters. DOD also noted that the draft report was not specific as to whether this recommendation is intended to be applicable to the Army National Guard. We clarified our recommendation in response to DOD’s comments to specify that the Army Reserve’s headquarters and Army National Guard Directorate be included in the U.S. Army Manpower Analysis Agency’s schedule for reassessment and validation. DOD agreed with our last recommendation that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of the Air Force to modify the Air Force’s guidance to require that these headquarters have their personnel requirements reassessed on a recurring basis, and establish and implement a schedule for reassessing personnel requirements for its reserve-component headquarters. In its response to our recommendations, DOD noted that the Air Force agreed to modify its guidance to require that reserve component headquarters have their personnel requirements reassessed on a recurring basis. Additionally, the Air Force intends to establish and implement a schedule for reassessing personnel requirements at these headquarters. If implemented, these steps would satisfy the intent of our recommendation. As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce the contents of this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days from the report date. At that time, we will send copies to the appropriate congressional committees and the Secretary of Defense; the Secretary of the Army; the Secretary of the Air Force; the Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Chief, National Guard Bureau; the Chief, Army Reserve; and the Chief, Air Force Reserve. This report is also available at no charge on the GAO website at http://www.gao.gov. Should you or your staffs have any questions about this report, please contact John Pendleton at (202) 512-3489 or pendletonj@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made contributions to this report are listed in appendix XII. To conduct this work and address our objectives, we reviewed data on funded positions at the Army’s and Air Force’s reserve-component headquarters from fiscal year 2009 through fiscal year 2013. We selected these years because senior officials stated that the current reserve- component headquarters structure has remained relatively constant over this period of time. We did not review contractor positions as part of this review because officials told us that they were unable to determine the number of contractor positions at the reserve-component headquarters we identified. On the basis of a review of Department of Defense (DOD) and service guidance, organization charts, and discussions with officials, we focused our review on 75 headquarters within the Army National Guard, Air National Guard, Army Reserve, and Air Force Reserve. We limited our review to nondeployable headquarters that perform many of the functions DOD identified as being characteristics of management headquarters. For the Army, these headquarters had their personnel requirements documented on tables of distribution and allowance, and we collaborated with Army National Guard and Army Reserve officials when developing our list. For the Air Force, we interviewed Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve officials to identify headquarters units that met our criteria. We then provided DOD, Joint Staff, National Guard, and Reserve officials with an opportunity to comment on our final list of 75 headquarters and these officials agreed the headquarters we identified met these criteria, but noted that they were not all Major DOD Headquarters Activities. For all of the headquarters we identified, we limited our assessment of personnel requirements to positions that: were assigned to the headquarters, included military personnel or civilians, were funded by the federal government, and did not complete work in support of more than one component (for example, recruiting positions were excluded because the Army Reserve and the active-duty Army share recruiting resources). To ensure the reliability of the personnel data, we interviewed knowledgeable officials about the data and internal controls on the systems that contain them. We also analyzed the data in order to identify outliers or invalid data and removed these data from our dataset where appropriate. Finally, we shared our analysis with knowledgeable agency officials and asked them to verify its accuracy. On the basis of these steps we determined that the data were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this audit. To evaluate the extent to which DOD established and implemented processes to efficiently size its reserve-component headquarters and provide information for congressional oversight we took the following steps: 1. We evaluated the Joint Staff’s implementation of its process for assessing personnel requirements at the National Guard Bureau by reviewing relevant guidance and documentation and interviewing officials from the Joint Staff and the National Guard Bureau. Where available, we analyzed manpower assessments and manpower documents for the National Guard Bureau from fiscal year 2009 through fiscal year 2013 and evaluated whether they met standards. We also compared the steps taken to assess the National Guard Bureau’s personnel requirements with Army and Air Force guidance and practices. 2. We assessed DOD’s efforts to identify Army and Air Force reserve component major DOD headquarters activities and report personnel data for these headquarters by reviewing DOD guidance on major DOD headquarters activities; reviewing documentation and interviewing officials to identify reserve-component headquarters with those characteristics; and comparing identified headquarters’ functions to characteristics of Major DOD Headquarters Activities identified in DOD’s guidance. We assessed section 194 of Title 10 of the United States Code to determine whether the statutory cap identified in that section applies to the headquarters we identified. We also reviewed the Defense Manpower Requirements Report for fiscal year 2012 and fiscal year 2013 to determine which headquarters were included in reports to Congress. Where we identified discrepancies, we spoke with DOD and service officials to identify the cause of these discrepancies. Finally, we assessed the National Guard Bureau’s ongoing study (Project Muster) seeking to establish baseline requirements for the National Guard Bureau by collecting relevant documentation and interviewing knowledgeable staff from the National Guard Bureau. 3. We evaluated the National Guard Bureau’s implementation of its process for assessing personnel requirements at the 54 state Joint Force headquarters by reviewing relevant guidance and documentation and interviewing officials from the Joint Staff and the National Guard Bureau. We analyzed manpower assessments and manpower documents from fiscal year 2009 through fiscal year 2013 for the state Joint Force headquarters and evaluated whether they met standards established in guidance. We also conducted site visits to the state Joint Force headquarters for Delaware, Georgia, New Jersey, and Texas to determine whether manpower documents and assessments accurately documented these headquarters’ requirements given assigned personnel, missions, and workload. We selected these headquarters to obtain perspectives from state officials from states of varying size and with different numbers of National Guard, Army Reserve, and Air Force Reserve personnel. Finally, we assessed the National Guard Bureau’s ongoing state Joint Force headquarters requirements study seeking to establish baseline personnel requirements for these headquarters’ Joint staff element by collecting relevant documentation and interviewing knowledgeable staff from the National Guard Bureau. We evaluated the Army’s and Air Force’s implementation of their processes for assessing personnel requirements at service-specific headquarters by reviewing relevant guidance and documentation and interviewing officials from numerous Army and Air Force offices including the U.S. Army Manpower Analysis Agency, the Air Force Personnel Center, and Air Force Reserve Command. We then analyzed manpower assessments for each of the 20 service-specific headquarters we identified for fiscal year 2009 through fiscal year 2013 to determine (1) when the headquarters was most recently reassessed, (2) the scope of the assessment, and (3) whether they met requirements established in guidance for recurring reassessment and validation of headquarters’ personnel requirements. One analyst analyzed the assessments and a second analyst reviewed the analyst’s work. Any disagreements in the determination were resolved through discussion. We also visited the headquarters listed in table 5 to determine whether manpower documents and assessments accurately documented these headquarters’ personnel requirements given assigned personnel, missions, and workload. To discuss whether DOD has studied merging the Army’s and Air Force’s reserve components to improve efficiency, we conducted a literature search, analyzed past studies, reviewed our prior work, and reviewed white papers by DOD and subject-matter experts examining mergers and the factors organizations use when evaluating the merits of a merger. We reviewed statutes as well as DOD and military-service guidance describing the organization and function of the Army's and Air Force’s reserve-component headquarters to understand their missions and how they are organized. To obtain perspectives on the implications of a merger, we interviewed officials from numerous offices including the Office of the Secretary of Defense; the National Guard Bureau; the Department of the Army; the Office of the Chief, Army Reserve; the Department of the Air Force; and the Office of the Chief, Air Force Reserve. We also reviewed documentation and met with officials from four state Joint Force headquarters and select headquarters in the Army Reserve and Air Force Reserve. We interviewed officials and, where appropriate, obtained documentation at the organizations listed in table 6. We conducted this performance audit from July 2012 to November 2013, in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. Department of Defense (DOD), special commissions, and some nondefense organizations have studied the concept of merging the Air Force’s and the Army’s reserve components. DOD considered merging some reserve components after World War II, during the Vietnam era, and during the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. In addition, the Congressional Budget Office examined the costs and benefits of merging multiple components. Additionally, the 2005 Base Closure and Realignment Commission recommended that National Guard and Reserve units share facilities. Finally, DOD has taken steps, short of merging its reserve components, to address concerns about access to the federal reserves to assist the National Guard in domestic duties such as responding to floods or hurricanes. Department of Defense, Committee on Civilian Components, Reserve Forces for National Security (June 1948). its report, which criticized the Secretary’s plan for its negative effect on morale, and because it did not address issues related to reserve- component recruiting, retention, and equipment. The report also noted opposition from Army and reserve-component advisory boards. The Secretary of Defense did not implement the proposed approach. The Secretary’s second plan proposed merging all of the Army’s Guard and Reserve units under the management of the National Guard at the federal level. Under this plan, the Army Reserve’s units would have been eliminated and Army Reservists would be organized, trained, and equipped as individuals and not as units. Like the Secretary’s first plan, this proposal was not implemented due to congressional opposition. Commission on the National Guard and Reserves. While large numbers of reservists were being deployed to Afghanistan, Iraq, and elsewhere, the Ronald W. Reagan National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005 created a 13-member, independent Commission on the National Guard and Reserves. Congress chartered the commission to assess a variety of issues related to the reserve components of the U.S. military and to make recommendations on those issues. The commission’s stated mission was to ensure that the National Guard and reserves are organized, trained, equipped, compensated, and supported to best meet the needs of U.S. national security. The commission issued three reports between 2006 and 2008 studying, among other things, the roles and missions of the National Guard and other reserve components. The commission’s third report focused on the organizational and structural changes required to support an operational reserve force. A former staff member for the commission stated that the commission studied the feasibility and advisability of merging the National Guard with the Army Reserve and the Air Force Reserve, but it ultimately concluded that doing so would not better enable the reserve component to execute its missions, and the process would be extremely difficult— both politically and logistically—as well as costly to implement. The commission ultimately focused its report on (1) changes that could be made to remove cultural barriers that hamper the effective use of the reserve components, (2) changes to the categories used to manage the reserve components, (3) changes to the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and (4) changes within the reserve components and their headquarters. The commission made several recommendations across these areas; however, it did not recommend significant changes to the structure. GAO, Federal Land Management: Observations on a Possible Move of the Forest Service into the Department of the Interior, GAO-09-223 (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 11, 2009). dual state and federal status of the current Army National Guard. In its report, the Congressional Budget Office noted that laws and court rulings had removed many impediments to the President’s power to call up National Guard units, potentially making the federal reserves redundant. In addition, according to the Congressional Budget Office, many capabilities currently in the Army Reserve—such as helicopter transport units and medical units—might be useful to Governors during domestic crises. At the time, the Congressional Budget Office estimated that by eliminating duplicative administrative organizations and eliminating approximately 43,000 personnel from the Reserve, the Army could save over $500 million annually. It is unclear, however, whether similar cost savings could still be realized. 2005 Base Closure and Realignment Commission. For the 2005 Base Realignment and Closure round, the Base Closure and Realignment Commission approved 44 recommendations that pertain to the reserve components which primarily directed the Army National Guard and the Army Reserve to create 125 Armed Forces Reserve Centers capable of accommodating both National Guard and Reserve units. According to DOD, these Armed Forces Reserve Centers should significantly reduce operating costs; however, we reported in 2013 that DOD officials estimated the total cost to implement the 44 recommendations was about $3 billion, and it is unclear whether the consolidations will result in cost savings over the long term. In June 1993, following Hurricane Andrew, we noted that a large percentage of the type of DOD capabilities that are needed in disasters— such as engineers, military police, supply and transportation personnel, and chaplains—reside in DOD’s reserve components, particularly in the Army Reserve. At that time, and again in May 2006, in our report on the military’s response to Hurricane Katrina, we reported that the Reservists who responded to the disaster—all of whom were volunteers—constituted a relatively small portion of the response when compared to National Guard and active component forces because, while states were able to mobilize National Guard forces, no similar provisions existed to specifically mobilize Reserve forces for disaster response. Since Hurricane Katrina, two key steps have been taken to address DOD’s response to domestic incidents: (1) implementation of a command construct whereby a single military officer exercises authority over both federal military forces and state National Guard forces; and (2) implementation of new mobilization authorities. Dual-Status Commanders. The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 provided that a dual-status commander—military officers with authority over both federal military forces and state National Guard forces—should be the usual and customary command and control arrangement in situations when the armed forces and National Guard are employed simultaneously in support of civil authorities, including missions involving major disasters and emergencies. When an officer is appointed as a dual-status commander, he or she serves on federal active duty, sometimes referred to as Title 10 status, as well as on duty in or with the National Guard of a state, sometimes referred to as Title 32 status. Dual- status commanders exercise command on behalf of both the federal and the state chains of command and serve as the link between these two chains of command. According to DOD officials, dual-status commanders are intended to provide unity of effort, ensuring coordination of National Guard and federal military resources in response to domestic emergencies, natural disasters, or designated planned events. According to DOD officials, dual-status commanders have been used for select planned events since 2004 and helped coordinate response to Hurricane Sandy in 2012, wildfires in Colorado, and the bombing at the Boston Marathon in 2013. Mobilization Authorities. DOD officials said that following Hurricane Katrina it was clear to them that the military needed to be empowered to respond more quickly to disasters. Ultimately, Congress approved new authorities in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012, one of which provided DOD with greater access to the federal reserve during domestic incidents. Section 12304a of Title 10 of the United States Code states that when a Governor requests federal assistance in responding to a major disaster or emergency the Secretary of Defense may mobilize any individual or unit of the federal reserves involuntarily for up to 120 days to respond to the Governor’s request. The military services were using interim implementation guidance for these authorities at the time of our review and were waiting for DOD to finalize its guidance in September 2013. Additionally, DOD officials told us that Hurricane Sandy is the only domestic disaster thus far to use the new mobilization authorities under section 12304a. Since DOD is still developing its process for implementing these new authorities and has had limited experience using them it is too early to know whether they will better enable the states to access federal capabilities when responding to domestic disasters. Appendix III: Profile for the National Guard Bureau, Army National Guard Directorate, and Air National Guard Readiness Center In addition to having full-time civilian and Active Guard and Reserve personnel, the Army National Guard Directorate has a group of personnel that are categorized as “Active Duty for Operational Support”. Active Duty for Operational Support is an authorized voluntary tour of active duty that is performed at the request of an organizational or operational commander, or as a result of reimbursable funding, among other things. The purpose of this category is to provide the necessary skilled manpower assets to support existing or emerging requirements. We included subordinate headquarters in the National Guard Bureau’s list of capabilities because these headquarters are under the management of the Chief of the National Guard Bureau. Appendix IV: Profile for the National Guard State Joint Force Headquarters These data reflect funded civilian and military positions. Some DOD personnel, referred to as “dual- status technicians,” are required, as a condition of employment, to be a drilling member of the National Guard or Reserves and thereby fill both a full-time civilian position and a part-time military position. Additionally, some DOD personnel, referred to as “Active Guard and Reserve,” occupy both a full-time military position as well as a part-time military position. Consequently, in our calculations, we included them in both the Active Guard and Reserve and the part-time Guardsmen categories. DOD Directive 5105.83, National Guard Joint Force Headquarters-State (NG-JFHQs-State) (Jan. 5, 2011). Appendix V: Profile for the Office of the Chief of the Army Reserve and U.S. Army Reserve Command These data reflect funded civilian and military positions. Some DOD personnel, referred to as “dual- status technicians,” are required, as a condition of employment, to be a drilling member of the National Guard or Reserves and thereby fill both a full-time civilian position and a part-time military position. Additionally, some DOD personnel, referred to as “Active Guard and Reserve,” occupy both a full-time military position as well as a part-time military position. Consequently, in our calculations, we included them in both the Active Guard and Reserve and the part-time reservist categories. Appendix VI: Profile for the Army Reserve Regional Support Commands These data reflect funded civilian and military positions. Some DOD personnel, referred to as “dual- status technicians,” are required, as a condition of employment, to be a drilling member of the National Guard or Reserves and thereby fill both a full-time civilian position and a part-time military position. Additionally, some DOD personnel, referred to as “Active Guard and Reserve,” occupy both a full-time military position as well as a part-time military position. Consequently, in our calculations, we included them in both the Active Guard and Reserve and the part-time Reservist categories. Appendix VII: Profile for the U.S. Army Reserve Functional Commands These data reflect funded civilian and military positions. Some DOD personnel, referred to as “dual- status technicians,” are required, as a condition of employment, to be a drilling member of the National Guard or Reserves and thereby fill both a full-time civilian position and a part-time military position. Additionally, some DOD personnel, referred to as “Active Guard and Reserve,” occupy both a full-time military position as well as a part-time military position. Consequently, in our calculations, we included them in both the Active Guard and Reserve and the part-time reservist categories. Appendix VIII: Profile for Air Force Reserve Command and Headquarters, Air Force Reserve These data reflect funded civilian and military positions. Some DOD personnel, referred to as “dual- status technicians,” are required, as a condition of employment, to be a drilling member of the National Guard or Reserves and thereby fill both a full-time civilian position and a part-time military position. Additionally, some DOD personnel, referred to as “Active Guard and Reserve,” occupy both a full-time military position as well as a part-time military position. Consequently, in our calculations, we included them in both the Active Guard and Reserve and the part-time reservist categories. Appendix IX: Profile for the Air Force Reserve Numbered Air Forces These data reflect funded civilian and military positions. Some DOD personnel, referred to as “dual- status technicians,” are required, as a condition of employment, to be a drilling member of the National Guard or Reserves and thereby fill both a full-time civilian position and a part-time military position. Additionally, some DOD personnel, referred to as “Active Guard and Reserve,” occupy both a full-time military position as well as a part-time military position. Consequently, in our calculations, we included them in both the Active Guard and Reserve and the part-time reservist categories. Headquarters type National Guard Bureau A joint activity of the Department of Defense (DOD). Participate with the Army and the Air Force staffs in the formulation, development, and coordination of all programs, policies, concepts, and plans pertaining to the National Guard; Administer programs. Assist in the organization, maintenance, and operation of National Guard units. Focal point at the strategic level for National Guard matters that are not under the authority of the military service. Air National Guard Air National Guard Readiness Center Office of the Chief of the Army Reserve Channel of communications between DOD and the states. Located in all 50 states, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, and Guam. Comprised of a Joint staff, Army staff, and Air staff. The Adjutant General’s federal responsibilities include the following: Establishing temporary joint task force command elements ready to provide command and control for domestic operations. Accepting mutually agreed-upon federal liaison elements. Designating officers eligible to serve in dual-status and ensure that these officers facilitate unity of effort between state and federal military forces. Ensures homeland defense– and civil support–unique equipment is available for use should the unit owning the equipment deploy. Advises the Governors and collaborates with DOD leadership. Assists the Chief, National Guard Bureau, in carrying out the functions of the National Guard Bureau as they relate to the Army National Guard. The Director, Army National Guard, under the supervision and control of the Chief, National Guard Bureau, performs those administrative and operational functions of the Chief pertaining to the Army National Guard and the Army National Guard of the United States. Assists the Chief, National Guard Bureau, in carrying out the functions of the National Guard Bureau as they relate to the Air National Guard. The Director, Air National Guard, under the supervision and control of the Chief, National Guard Bureau, performs those administrative and operational functions of the Chief pertaining to the Air National Guard and the Air National Guard of the United States. Serves as the Headquarters Army principal staff organization to organize and equip Army Reserve Forces. Provides direct support to the Chief of Staff of the Army in the execution of his function and Title X responsibilities, and commands the U.S. Army Reserve Command. Responsible, subject to certain exceptions, for justification and execution of certain Army Reserve budgets, and is the director and functional manager of those appropriations; directing and managing the Army Reserve’s appropriations; managing the Army Reserve’s full-time support program; and submitting annual reports to the Secretary of Defense. Provides command, control, and support to Army Reserve forces assigned. Organizes, trains, and prepares Army Reserve units for mobilization and commitment to wartime theater of operations. Ensures wartime readiness of Army Reserve forces. Provides administrative and logistical support to all Army Reserve units and commands within their geographic area of responsibility. Manages all Operation and Maintenance, Personnel, Military Construction, and other appropriations for which requirements are justified as allocated by the U.S. Army Reserve Command and the Office of Chief, Army Reserve. Supervises all area maintenance support activities and equipment- concentration sites within its area of responsibility. Provides facility support to all Army Reserve units within its area of responsibility. The Command Group of these commands is responsible for the following: Providing direction, guidance, and regional base-operations support to supported units within the region. The base-operations support is provided in functional areas of personnel, logistics, force integration, programming and budgeting, finance and accounting, information management, emergency services, public works, historian, inspector general, religious, medical, legal, safety, public affairs, internal review, and management controls. Managing and executing appropriations as authorized by U.S. Army Reserve Command and the Assistant Chief of Staff for Installation Management for base-operations support. Implementing policies and intent of the U.S. Army Reserve Command commanding general. Representing the Army Reserve before military and civilian organizations and agencies at various levels of command and government to include speaking engagements. Assisting with local community relations and representing the U.S. Army Reserve Command to foreign dignitaries on various occasions. Functional Commands Maintain and provide training and, in certain cases, generate specific Headquarters, Air Force Reserve capabilities. Deploy subordinate units in support of federal missions. Provides direct support to the Chief of Staff of the Air Force in the execution of his or her function and Title X responsibilities, and commands the U.S. Air Force Reserve Command. Subject to certain exceptions, justify and execute the budgets for Air Force Reserve. Manages the full-time support program. Provides an annual report to the Secretary of Defense on the state of the Air Force Reserve and its ability to meet its missions. Provides citizen airmen to defend the United States and to protect its interests through air and space power. Organizes, trains, and equips combat-ready forces. Directs operation of the three numbered Air Forces and provides all required major command–level support for all Air Force Reserve units and personnel. Maintains overall supervision of Air Force Reserve matters supporting Air Force war plans, programming documents, and mobilization actions. Retains administrative control over all Air Force Reserve units except for forces attached to the Commander, Air Force Forces. readiness according to Air Force standards to include combat readiness, medical readiness, and inspection readiness. Provide assistance to, and operational readiness assessment of, assigned units through Operational Readiness Exercises and other discretionary events when warranted. Supervise and assist assigned units in planning for deployment and redeployment actions, major events, and contingencies. Advocate for assigned units. Implement plans, policies, and programs as developed and directed by Headquarters, Air Force Reserve Command. Communicate with Lead Major Command on matters relating to training, inspection, operational mission coordination, and logistical support. Assist units to implement command operational readiness and compliance processes. Manage resources across units. In addition to the contact named above, Suzanne K. Wren, Assistant Director; Timothy J. Carr; Joanna Chan; Susan C. Ditto; Michael J. Hanson; Tobin J. McMurdie; Anna Maria Ortiz; Michael D. Silver; Amie M. Steele; Karen N. Willems; Michael A. Willems; Alex Winograd; and Delia P. Zee made key contributions to this report.

Summary: DOD has sought to reduce costs by assessing headquarters and overhead functions. Both the Army and Air Force have two reserve components--a National Guard and Reserve--that have at least 75 headquarters located throughout the United States, its territories, and overseas that manage subordinate units or perform overhead functions. These headquarters have a mix of full-time and part-time personnel. GAO was asked to review issues related to reserve-component headquarters. This report (1) discusses trends in funded positions at reservecomponent headquarters and (2) evaluates the extent to which DOD has established and implemented processes to efficiently size its reservecomponent headquarters. To do so, GAO reviewed statutes and DOD guidance, analyzed personnel data and headquarters assessments, and interviewed DOD and state officials. Between fiscal years 2009 and 2013, the total number of funded positions--both full-time support and part-time--at the Department of Defense's (DOD) 75 Army Reserve and Air Force Reserve (Reserves) component headquarters grew from about 30,200 to 31,900 positions (about 6 percent overall). Some organizations grew more markedly, among them the National Guard Bureau (17 percent); Army National Guard Directorate (44 percent); Air National Guard Readiness Center (21 percent); and the Office of the Chief of the Army Reserve (45 percent). DOD officials attribute growth to the conversion of contractor workload into civilian positions and increased missions assigned at certain headquarters. Over the same period, staff levels at the National Guard's 54 state Joint Force headquarters remained flat and the Air Force Reserve shrank by 4 percent. DOD has processes in place that are intended to ensure that the number of funded positions at its reserve-component headquarters are set at the minimum level needed to accomplish their mission, but it has not consistently followed those processes at 68 of the 75 headquarters that GAO reviewed. As a result, DOD is unable to determine whether National Guard and Reserve headquarters are sized to be efficient. The National Guard has begun evaluating some personnel requirements, but its efforts do not fully address the management issues GAO identified: The National Guard Bureau, which may continue to grow to accommodate its Chief's placement on the Joint Chiefs of Staff, is determining its own requirements without external validation. This is inconsistent with Joint Staff, Army, and Air Force processes, which generally involve an external review. In addition, Congress's ability to oversee the bureau's size is limited because DOD's annual report on its Major DOD Headquarters Activities does not include data on the bureau and its more than 600 staff. The National Guard has not fully assessed its 54 state headquarters--which contain nearly 21,900 funded positions--since the 1980s. GAO's prior work shows that agencies can reduce costs by consolidating and centralizing functions and eliminating unneeded duplication. The National Guard Bureau, Army National Guard Directorate, and Air National Guard Readiness Center each assess a portion of the state headquarters, but there is no process to assess the headquarters' personnel requirements in their entirety and ongoing efforts do not provide a holistic review. The Army and Air Force have not fully reassessed 13 of the 20 reserve component headquarters for which they are responsible. The Army has a reassessment backlog, and the Air Force does not require periodic reassessments and reassesses its headquarters on an ad hoc basis. Some headquarters with significant growth are among those that have not been reassessed, including the Office of the Chief of the Army Reserve and the Air National Guard Readiness Center. In contrast, 5 of the 7 reassessed organizations subsequently reduced their staff levels such as the Air Force Reserve's three numbered air forces, which have shrunk by more than a third since 2009. The Army and Air Force agree their headquarters should be reassessed, but they have not scheduled reassessments across their reserve components. GAO recommends that DOD externally validate the National Guard Bureaus personnel requirements and include the bureau in its annual report to Congress; reassess requirements for the 54 state Joint Force headquarters; and develop schedules for reassessing headquarters overseen by the Army and Air Force. DOD concurred with recommendations to report data to Congress and establish schedules for reassessing headquarters and partially concurred with recommendations to externally validate the bureaus personnel requirements and assess requirements for the state Joint Force headquarters. GAO continues to believe these recommendations are valid as discussed in the report.