Shortly after the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, Congress passed, and the President signed into law, the Aviation and Transportation Security Act, which established TSA and gave the agency responsibility for securing all modes of transportation, including the nation’s civil aviation system, which includes domestic and international commercial aviation operations. In accordance with 49 U.S.C. § 44907, TSA assesses the effectiveness of security measures at foreign airports served by a U.S. air carrier, from which a foreign air carrier serves the United States, that pose a high risk of introducing danger to international air travel, and at other airports deemed appropriate by the Secretary of Homeland Security. This provision of law also identifies measures that the Secretary must take in the event that he or she determines that an airport is not maintaining and carrying out effective security measures based on TSA assessments. TSA also conducts inspections of U.S. air carriers and foreign air carriers servicing the United States from foreign airports pursuant to its authority to ensure that air carriers certificated or permitted to operate to, from, or within the United States meet applicable security requirements, including those set forth in an air carrier’s TSA-approved security program. The Secretary of DHS delegated to the Assistant Secretary of TSA the responsibility for conducting foreign airport assessments but retained responsibility for making the determination that a foreign airport does not maintain and carry out effective security measures. Currently, TSA’s Security Operations and Transportation Sector Network Management divisions are jointly responsible for conducting foreign airport assessments and air carrier inspections. Table 1 highlights the roles and responsibilities of certain TSA positions within these divisions that are responsible for implementing the foreign airport assessment and air carrier inspection programs. TSA conducts foreign airport assessments to determine the extent to which foreign airports maintain and carry out effective security measures in order to ensure the security of flights bound for the United States. Specifically, TSA assesses foreign airports using 86 of the 106 aviation security standards and recommended practices adopted by ICAO, a United Nations organization representing nearly 190 countries. (See app. II for a description of the 86 ICAO standards and recommended practices TSA uses to assess security measures at foreign airports.) While TSA is authorized under U.S. law to conduct foreign airport assessments at intervals it considers necessary, TSA may not perform an assessment of security measures at a foreign airport without permission from the host government. During fiscal year 2005, TSA scheduled assessments by categorizing airports into two groups. Category A airports—airports that did not exhibit operational issues in the last two TSA assessments—were assessed once every 3 years, while category B airports—airports that did exhibit operational issues in either of the last two TSA assessments, or were not previously assessed—were assessed annually. Based on documentation provided by TSA, during fiscal year 2005, TSA assessed aviation security measures in place at 128 foreign airports that participated voluntarily in TSA’s Foreign Airport Assessment Program. TSA’s assessments of foreign airports are conducted by a team of inspectors, which generally includes one team leader and one team member. According to TSA, it generally takes 3 to 7 days to complete a foreign airport assessment. However, the amount of time required to conduct an assessment varies based on several factors, including the size of the airport, the number of air carrier station inspections to be conducted at the airport, the threat level to civil aviation in the host country, and the amount of time it takes inspectors to travel from the international field office (IFO) to the airport where the assessment will take place. An additional 2 weeks is required for inspectors to complete the assessment report after they return to the IFO. As shown in figure 1, regarding the process for conducting a foreign airport assessment, before TSA can assess the security measures at a foreign airport, the Transportation Security Administration Representative (TSAR) must first obtain approval from the host government to allow TSA to conduct an airport assessment and to schedule the date for an on-site visit to the foreign airport. During the assessment, the team of inspectors uses several methods to determine a foreign airport’s level of compliance with international security standards, including conducting interviews with airport officials, examining documents pertaining to the airport’s security measures, and conducting a physical inspection of the airport. For example, the inspectors are to examine the integrity of fences, lighting, and locks by walking the grounds of the airport. Inspectors also make observations regarding access control procedures, such as looking at employee and vehicle identification methods in secure areas, as well as monitoring passenger and baggage screening procedures in the airport. At the close of an airport assessment, inspectors brief foreign airport and government officials on the results of the assessment. TSA inspectors also prepare a report summarizing their findings on the airport’s overall security posture and security measures, which may contain recommendations for corrective action and must be reviewed by the TSAR, the IFO manager, and TSA headquarters officials. If the inspectors report that an airport’s security measures do not meet minimum international security standards, particularly critical standards, such as those related to passenger and checked baggage screening and access controls, TSA headquarters officials are to inform the Secretary of Homeland Security. If the Secretary, based on TSA’s airport assessment results, determines that a foreign airport does not maintain and carry out effective security measures, he or she must, after advising the Secretary of State, take secretarial action. Figure 2 describes in detail the types of secretarial action the Secretary may take during such instances. There are three basic types of secretarial action: 90-day action—The Secretary notifies foreign government officials that they have 90 days to address security deficiencies that were identified during the airport assessment and recommends steps necessary to bring the security measures at the airport up to ICAO standards. Public notification—If, after 90 days, the Secretary finds that the government has not brought security measures at the airport up to ICAO standards, the Secretary notifies the general public that the airport does not maintain and carry out effective security measures. Modification to air carrier operations—If, after 90 days, the Secretary finds that the government has not brought security measures at the airport up to ICAO standards: The Secretary may withhold, revoke, or prescribe conditions on the operating authority of U.S.-based and foreign air carriers operating at that airport, following consultation with appropriate host government officials and air carrier representatives, and with the approval of the Secretary of State. The President may prohibit a U.S.-based or foreign air carrier from providing transportation between the United States and any foreign airport that is the subject of a secretarial determination. Suspension of service— The Secretary, with approval of the Secretary of State, shall suspend the right of any U.S.-based or foreign air carrier to provide service to or from an airport if the Secretary determines that a condition exists that threatens the safety or security of passengers, aircraft, or crew traveling to or from the airport, and the public interest requires an immediate suspension of transportation between the United States and that airport. Along with conducting airport assessments, the same TSA inspection team also conducts air carrier inspections when visiting a foreign airport to ensure that air carriers are in compliance with TSA security requirements. Both U.S. and foreign air carriers with service to the United States are subject to inspection. As of February 2007, TSA guidance required TSA to inspect each U.S. air carrier station once a year, except for those airports in which TSA has determined to be an “extraordinary” location, where inspections are to occur twice a year. Foreign air carriers are to be inspected twice in a 3-year period at each foreign airport, except in extraordinary locations, where they are to be inspected annually. According to documentation provided by TSA, during fiscal year 2005, TSA conducted 529 inspections of foreign and U.S. air carriers serving the United States from foreign airports. When conducting inspections, TSA inspectors examine compliance with applicable security requirements, including TSA-approved security programs, emergency amendments to the security programs, and security directives. Air carrier security programs are based on the Aircraft Operator Standard Security Program for U.S.-based air carriers and the Model Security Program for foreign air carriers, which serve as guidance for what an air carrier needs to include in its own security program. The Aircraft Operator Standard Security Program is designed to provide for the safety of passengers and their belongings traveling on flights against acts of criminal violence, air piracy, and the introduction of explosives, incendiaries, weapons, and other prohibited items onboard an aircraft. Likewise, the Model Security Program is designed to prevent prohibited items from being carried aboard aircraft, prohibit unauthorized access to airplanes, ensure that checked baggage is accepted only by an authorized carrier representative, and ensure the proper handling of cargo to be loaded onto passenger flights. When TSA determines that additional security measures are necessary to respond to a threat assessment or to a specific threat against civil aviation, TSA may issue a security directive or an emergency amendment to an air carrier security program that sets forth additional mandatory security requirements. Air carriers are required to comply with each applicable security directive or emergency amendment issued by TSA, along with the requirements already within their security programs and any other requirements set forth in applicable law. Appendix III provides additional information on security requirements for U.S. and foreign air carriers serving the United States from foreign airports. Although U.S.-based and foreign air carriers are guided by different standards within the Aircraft Operator Standard Security Program and the Model Security Program, inspections for both of these entities are similar. As in the case of airport assessments, air carrier inspections are conducted by a team of inspectors, which generally includes one team leader and one team member. An inspection of an air carrier typically takes 1 or 2 days, but can take longer depending on the extent of service by the air carrier. Inspection teams may spend several days at a foreign airport inspecting air carriers if there are multiple airlines serving the United States from that location. During an inspection, inspectors are to review applicable security manuals, procedures, and records; interview air carrier station personnel; and observe air carrier employees processing passengers from at least one flight from passenger check-in until the flight departs the gate to ensure that the air carrier is in compliance with applicable requirements. Inspectors evaluate a variety of security measures, such as passenger processing including the use of No-Fly and Selectee lists, checked baggage acceptance and control, aircraft security, and passenger screening. Inspectors record inspection results into TSA’s Performance and Results Information System (PARIS) system, a database containing security compliance information on TSA-regulated entities. If an inspector finds that an air carrier is violating any applicable security requirements, additional steps are to be taken to record those specific violations and, in some cases, pursue them with further investigation. Figure 3 provides an overview of the air carrier inspection and documentation process, including the options for what type of penalty, if any, should be imposed on air carriers for identified security violations. When an inspector identifies a violation of a security requirement, a record of the violation is opened in PARIS. According to guidance issued by TSA to inspectors, there are various enforcement tools available to address instances of noncompliance discovered during an inspection: On-the-spot counseling is generally to be used for noncompliance that is minor and technical in nature, and can be remedied immediately at the time it is discovered. When this course of action is taken, the inspector notes that the noncompliance issue was closed with TSA counseling in the finding record and no further action is required. Administrative action is generally to be used for violations or alleged violations that are unintentional, not the result of substantial disregard for security, where there are no aggravating factors present, or first- time violations. An administrative action results in either a letter of correction or a warning notice being issued to the air carrier. Civil penalties in the form of fines are generally to be used in response to cases involving egregious violations, gross negligence, or where administrative action and counseling did not adequately resolve the noncompliance. Fines can range between $2,500 and $25,000 based on the severity of the violation. If the violation is severe enough, TSA may also recommend revocation of the air carrier’s certification to fly into the United States, but this action has not yet been taken by TSA. If a violation is resolved with on-the-spot counseling, that fact is recorded in the finding record of PARIS and the matter is closed. However, if the inspector opts to pursue administrative action or a civil penalty against the air carrier, an enforcement investigation record is opened, and an investigation is conducted. Based on the investigation findings, the inspector recommends either an administrative action or a civil penalty, depending on the finding and the circumstances. If the investigation does not provide evidence that a violation occurred, the matter is closed with no action taken. If the inspector makes a recommendation for an administrative action, the supervisory inspector or IFO manager will typically review the recommendation and, if appropriate, approve and issue the action. The supervisory inspector may also recommend that the action be changed to no action or to a civil penalty. In the case of the latter, the case will be referred to the Office of Chief Counsel for further review. In those cases where the inspector recommends that a civil penalty be assessed on the air carrier, it is referred to the Office of Chief Counsel for review. The office is responsible for ensuring that the action is legally sufficient, and that the recommended fine is consistent with agency guidelines. TSA’s Office of Chief Counsel makes the final determination for any legal enforcement action. The office may approve the proposed action or make a recommendation for other actions, including administrative action or no action at all. Based on the results of TSA’s foreign airport assessments, during fiscal year 2005, some foreign airports and air carriers complied with all relevant aviation security standards, while others did not. The most common area of noncompliance for foreign airports was related to quality control— mechanisms to assess and address security vulnerabilities at airports. The Secretary of Homeland Security determined that the security deficiencies at two foreign airports assessed during fiscal year 2005 were so serious that he subsequently notified the general public that these airports did not meet international aviation security standards. In addition to assessing the security measures implemented by the airport authority at foreign airports, TSA also inspected the security measures put in place by air carriers at foreign airports. When security deficiencies identified during air carrier inspections could not be corrected or addressed immediately, TSA inspectors recommended enforcement action. TSA officials stated that while it is difficult to determine whether the assessment and inspection results are generally positive or negative, the cumulative foreign airport assessment and air carrier inspection results may be helpful in identifying the aviation security training needs of foreign aviation security officials. TSA does not have its own program through which aviation security training and technical assistance are formally provided to foreign aviation security officials. However, TSA officials stated that they could use the results of TSA’s foreign airport assessments to refer foreign officials to training and technical assistance programs offered by ICAO and several other U.S. government agencies. Of the 128 foreign airports TSA assessed during fiscal year 2005, TSA data show that at the completion of these assessments, 46 (about 36 percent) complied with all ICAO standards reviewed by TSA, while 82 (about 64 percent) did not meet at least one ICAO standard reviewed by TSA. For these 82 foreign airports, the average number of standards not met was about 5, and the number of standards not met by an individual airport ranged from 1 to 22. Foreign airports were most frequently not meeting ICAO standards related to quality control. TSA data show that about 39 percent of foreign airports assessed during fiscal year 2005 did not comply with at least one ICAO quality control standard, which include mechanisms to assess and address security vulnerabilities at airports. For example, one airport did not meet an ICAO quality control standard because it did not have a mechanism in place to ensure that airport officials implementing security controls were appropriately trained and able to effectively perform their duties. In another instance, an airport did not comply with an ICAO quality control standard because, during its previous two assessments, inspectors found that the airport did not require or have records of background investigations conducted for individuals implementing security controls at the airport. Another area in which airports were not meeting ICAO quality control standards was the absence of a program to ensure the quality and effectiveness of their National Civil Aviation Security Program. TSA officials stated that quality control deficiencies may be prevalent among foreign airports in part because there is no international guidance available to aviation security officials to help them develop effective quality control measures. However, TSA officials stated that ICAO and other regional aviation security organizations offer training courses to help aviation security officials worldwide in developing effective quality control measures. TSA data also identified that at the completion of the assessment, nearly half of the foreign airports assessed during fiscal year 2005 did not meet at least one of the 17 ICAO standards that TSA characterized as “critical” to aviation security. According to TSA, access control, screening of checked baggage, and screening of passengers and their carry-on items are critical aspects of aviation security because these measures are intended to prevent terrorists from carrying dangerous items, such as weapons and explosives, onto aircraft. TSA data identified that some foreign airports assessed during fiscal year 2005 did not meet at least one access control standard. TSA data also identified that some foreign airports did not meet ICAO standards related to checked baggage screening. One of the baggage screening deficiencies TSA identified involved foreign airports not taking steps to prevent checked baggage from being tampered with after the baggage had been screened, prior to the baggage being placed on the aircraft. TSA data also identified that some foreign airports assessed during fiscal year 2005 did not meet ICAO standards related to passenger screening. One of the passenger-screening problems identified by TSA involved screening personnel not resolving hand-held metal detector or walk-through metal detector alarms to determine whether the individuals being screened were carrying prohibited items. Even if a foreign airport does not meet multiple aviation security standards, including critical standards, TSA may determine that such deficiencies do not warrant review by the Secretary of Homeland Security. However, if TSA determines that secretarial action may be warranted and the Secretary of Homeland Security, based on TSA’s assessment, determines that a foreign airport does not maintain and carry out effective security measures, he or she must take secretarial action. Since the inception of DHS in March 2003, the Secretary of Homeland Security has taken action against five foreign airports he determined were not maintaining and carrying out effective security measures, four of which received 90-day action letters. The Secretary notified the public of his determination with respect to two of these airports—Port-au-Prince Airport in Haiti and Bandara Ngurah Rai International Airport in Bali, Indonesia—both of which were assessed during fiscal year 2005. TSA officials told us that the decision to take secretarial action against an airport is not based solely on the number and type of security deficiencies identified during TSA airport assessments. Rather, the secretarial action decision is based on the severity of the security deficiencies identified, as well as past compliance history, threat information, and the capacity of the host government to take corrective action. For example, there were other foreign airports assessed during fiscal year 2005 that did not comply with about the same number and type of critical ICAO standards as the five airports that received secretarial action. However, according to the former Deputy Director of TSA’s Compliance Division, secretarial action was not taken against these airports either because the security deficiencies were determined to be not as severe, the host country officials were capable of taking immediate corrective action to address the deficiencies, or TSA did not perceive these airports to be in locations at high risk of terrorist activity. Table 2 demonstrates how two foreign airports—one for which secretarial action was taken and the other for which no secretarial action was taken—have about the same number and types of critical deficiencies, but differ in the severity of the deficiencies and their capability to take immediate corrective action to address identified deficiencies. According to TSA, secretarial actions are lifted when the Secretary, in part based on TSA’s assessment of the airport, determines that the airport is carrying out and maintaining effective security measures. TSA lifted the secretarial action at Port-au-Prince airport in Haiti in July 2006, 19 months after the public notification was issued. During this 19-month period, TSA assisted Haitian officials in developing a national civil aviation security plan and provided training on how to properly screen passengers and their carry-on baggage. According to the former Deputy Director of TSA’s Compliance Division, although TSA determined earlier during 2006 that all of the security deficiencies at the airport had been addressed by Haitian officials, based on specific intelligence information regarding threats to the airport in Haiti, the Secretary delayed lifting the secretarial action until July 2006. As of February 2007, the public notification for the airport in Bali was still in place. TSA officials stated that they are in frequent contact with Indonesian officials to discuss Indonesia’s progress in addressing security deficiencies at the airport. TSA officials also stated that they are awaiting Indonesian officials’ request for TSA to conduct an airport assessment to determine whether the security deficiencies at the airport in Bali have been addressed. In addition to assessing the security measures implemented by the airport authority at foreign airports, TSA also inspected the security measures put in place by air carriers at foreign airports. According to air carrier inspection data maintained by TSA, during fiscal year 2005, of the 529 inspections of air carriers operating out of foreign airports, there were 373 inspections (about 71 percent) for which the air carrier complied with all TSA security requirements, and 156 inspections (about 29 percent) for which the air carrier did not comply with at least one TSA security requirement. For these 156 inspections, the average number of TSA requirements not met was about 3, and the number of TSA requirements not met by an individual inspected air carrier ranged from 1 to 18. The total number of security requirements against which air carriers were inspected generally ranged from about 20 to 80, depending on the location of the foreign airport in which the air carrier operated, the extent of a carrier’s operation at the airport, and whether the carrier was a U.S.-based or foreign-based carrier. During fiscal year 2005 air carrier inspections, TSA identified security deficiencies in several areas, including aircraft security and passenger and checked baggage screening. Because TSA has authority to regulate air carriers that provide service to the United States from foreign airports, TSA inspected air carriers against specific security requirements established by TSA and included in the air carriers’ TSA-approved security programs. TSA officials told us that they view operational security requirements for air carriers as critical—as opposed to documentary requirements associated with the air carrier’s approved security program—because these requirements are designed to prevent terrorists from carrying weapons, explosives, or other dangerous items onto aircraft. When TSA inspectors identify deficiencies that cannot be corrected or addressed immediately, the inspectors are to recommend enforcement action. Based on data provided by TSA, TSA inspectors identified 419 violations (security deficiencies) as a result of the 156 air carrier inspections conducted during fiscal year 2005 where TSA identified at least one security deficiency. Data from TSA showed that 259 violations (about 62 percent) were corrected or addressed immediately. TSA inspectors submitted 76 violations (about 18 percent) for investigation because the violations were considered serious enough to warrant an enforcement action. TSA can impose three types of enforcement action on air carriers that violate security requirements—a warning letter, a letter of correction, or a monetary civil penalty. Based on information included in TSA’s investigation module within PARIS, for the 47 investigations we could link to fiscal year 2005 inspections, warning letters were issued in 26 cases, and letters of correction were issued in 14 cases. Fines ranging from $18,000 to $25,000 were recommended in the 7 cases where inspectors recommended civil penalties be imposed. Of those, fines ranging from $4,000 to $15,000 were ultimately levied in 3 cases, in 1 case a warning notice was issued instead of a civil penalty, and in 2 cases no action was taken. As of December 2006, 1 case remained unresolved. TSA officials stated that it is difficult to draw conclusions about the cumulative foreign airport assessment and air carrier inspection results— such as whether the results are generally positive or negative—because the primary concern is not whether security deficiencies are identified. Instead, TSA officials are more concerned about whether foreign countries have the capability and willingness to address security deficiencies. According to TSA, some foreign countries do not have the aviation security expertise or financial resources to adequately address security deficiencies. TSA officials also stated that some foreign countries do not regard aviation security as a high priority, and therefore do not intend to correct security deficiencies identified during TSA assessments. Further, TSA officials stated that foreign officials’ capability and willingness also influence the extent to which air carriers comply with security requirements. Although TSA has not conducted its own analysis of foreign airport assessment and air carrier inspection results, TSA officials stated that our analysis of the results was consistent with their assumptions regarding the most prominent security deficiencies identified at foreign airports and among air carriers. Additionally, TSA officials stated that the cumulative foreign airport assessment and air carrier inspection results may be helpful in identifying the aviation security training needs of foreign aviation security officials. TSA does not have an internally funded program in place that is specifically intended to provide aviation security training and technical assistance to foreign aviation security officials. However, TSA officials stated that they coordinate with other federal agencies, such as the Department of State and the U.S. Trade and Development Agency, to identify global and regional training needs and provide instructors for the aviation security training courses these federal agencies offer to foreign officials. (See app. IV for a description of the aviation security training and technical assistance programs offered by U.S. government agencies.) While TSA does not always determine which foreign countries would receive aviation security training and technical assistance offered by other federal agencies, TSA officials stated that they could use the cumulative results of TSA’s foreign airport assessments to refer foreign officials to these assistance programs. TSA used various methods to help foreign officials and air carrier representatives address security deficiencies identified during TSA assessments and inspections. However, opportunities remain for TSA to enhance oversight of its foreign airport assessment and air carrier inspection programs. To help foreign airport officials and host government officials address security deficiencies identified during foreign airport assessments, TSA inspectors provided on-site consultation to help address security deficiencies in the short term, made recommendations for addressing security deficiencies over the long term, and recommended aviation security training and technical assistance opportunities for foreign officials to help them meet ICAO standards. During fiscal year 2005, TSA resolved 259 of the 419 security deficiencies identified during TSA inspections through on-site consultation. Additionally, TSA assigned all U.S. air carriers and foreign air carriers to a principal security inspector and international principal security inspector, respectively, to provide counseling or clarification regarding TSA security requirements. Although TSA has assisted foreign airport officials and air carrier representatives in addressing security deficiencies, TSA did not track the status of scheduled airport assessments and air carrier inspections, document foreign governments’ progress in addressing security deficiencies at foreign airports, track enforcement actions taken in response to air carrier violations, and measure the impact of the foreign airport assessment and air carrier inspection programs on security. Such information would have provided TSA better assurance that the foreign airport assessment and air carrier inspection programs are operating as intended. TSA officials stated that while the primary mission of the foreign airport assessment program is to ensure the security of U.S.-bound flights by assessing whether foreign airports are complying with ICAO standards, a secondary mission of the program is to assist foreign officials in addressing security deficiencies that TSA identified during its foreign airport assessments. As part of the foreign airport assessment program, TSA officials assisted foreign authorities in addressing security deficiencies in various ways, including providing on-site consultation to help airport officials or the host government immediately address security deficiencies, making recommendations to airport officials or the host government for corrective action intended to help sustain security improvements, and helping to secure aviation security training and technical assistance for foreign governments. Based on our review of TSA foreign airport assessment reports, during fiscal year 2005, TSA provided on-site consultation to help foreign officials immediately address security deficiencies that were identified during airport assessments and made recommendations to help foreign officials sustain security improvements in the longer term. One type of security deficiency identified during TSA’s fiscal year 2005 foreign airport assessments involved a particular passenger checkpoint screening function. As a short-term solution to this security deficiency, on at least two occasions, TSA inspectors provided on-site training to instruct screeners on proper passenger screening techniques. As a longer-term solution, the assessment reports identify that in some cases, TSA inspectors recommended that the airport conduct remedial training for screeners and routinely test screeners who work at the passenger checkpoint to determine if they are screening passengers correctly. Another security deficiency identified at foreign airports during fiscal year 2005 related to the security of airport perimeters. After identifying this deficiency, inspectors consulted with foreign airport officials who, in a few cases, took immediate action to address the deficiency. According to the assessment reports, in some cases, TSA inspectors recommended measures that would help the airport sustain perimeter security in the longer term. In cases when a short-term solution may not be feasible, TSA inspectors may have only recommended longer-term corrective action. For example, in some cases, TSA inspectors recommended that foreign airport officials embark upon a longer-term construction project to address a particular type of security deficiency. During fiscal year 2005, TSA also assisted foreign governments in securing training and technical assistance provided by TSA and other U.S. government agencies to help improve security at foreign airports, particularly at airports in developing countries. For example, four of the seven TSA Representatives—TSARs—-with whom we met said that they had assisted foreign governments in obtaining training either through the State Department’s Anti-Terrorism Assistance Program or through the U.S. Trade and Development Agency’s aviation security assistance programs. The goals of the Anti-Terrorism Assistance Program are to (1) build the capacity of foreign countries to fight terrorism; (2) establish security relationships between U.S. and foreign officials to strengthen cooperative anti-terrorism efforts; and (3) share modern, humane, and effective anti- terrorism techniques. The State Department addresses the capacity- building goal of the Anti-Terrorism Assistance Program by offering a selection of 25 training courses to foreign officials, 1 of which focuses on airport security. The State Department provided the airport security course, which is taught by TSA instructors, to seven foreign countries during fiscal year 2005—Bahamas, Barbados, Dominican Republic, Kazakhstan, Philippines, Qatar, and United Arab Emirates. The U.S. Trade and Development Agency also provides aviation security training and technical assistance to help achieve its goal of facilitating economic growth and trade in developing countries. During fiscal year 2005, the U.S. Trade and Development Agency provided aviation security training for government officials in Haiti, Malaysia, and sub-Saharan Africa. During the same year, the agency held regional workshops for various countries worldwide on developing quality control programs. Government officials from two of the five countries we visited identified the importance of obtaining quality control training, particularly given that they have not yet established their own quality control function. Appendix IV includes a detailed description of aviation security training and technical assistance provided to foreign officials by the State Department and the U.S. Trade and Development Agency, as well as other U.S. government agencies. Government and airport officials from five of the seven foreign countries we visited and officials from 5 of the 16 foreign embassies we visited stated that TSA’s airport assessments and the resulting assistance provided by TSA have helped strengthen airport security in their countries. For example, officials from one country said that TSA assessments enabled them to identify and address security deficiencies. Specifically, officials stated that the government could not independently identify security deficiencies because it did not have its own airport assessment program—a condition that TSA officials told us exists in many countries. Airport officials in another country stated that TSA’s airport assessments and on-site assistance led to immediate improvements in the way in which passengers were screened at their airport, particularly with regard to the pat-down search procedure. Embassy officials representing another country also stated that TSA’s assessments reinforce the results of other assessments of their airports. In addition, these officials stated that they appreciated the good rapport and cooperative relationships they have with TSA inspection officials. Airport officials in another country we visited stated that TSA assisted them in developing their aviation security management program, and that the results of TSA’s assessments provided them with examples of where they need to concentrate more efforts on meeting ICAO standards. Government officials in this same country said that the TSAR has helped them to comply with ICAO standards related to the contents of a member state’s national aviation security program. At the recommendation of the TSAR, these officials also planned to participate in an aviation security workshop provided by the Organization of American States, which they also felt would be beneficial in helping the government formulate its national aviation security programs and associated security regulations. In addition to assisting foreign officials in addressing security deficiencies identified during airport assessments, TSA also assisted air carrier representatives in addressing security deficiencies that were identified during air carrier inspections. Of the 419 instances in which TSA inspectors identified noncompliance with TSA security requirements during fiscal year 2005, TSA data show 259 were resolved through counseling—that is, the security deficiencies were resolved as a result of on-site assistance or consultation provided by TSA. For example, during one inspection, TSA observed that the security contractor employed by the air carrier was not properly searching the aircraft cabin for suspicious, dangerous, or deadly items prior to boarding. TSA instructed the contractor to fully inspect those locations that were not searched properly, and obtained assurance that the air carrier would provide information to the contractors to ensure proper searches were conducted. In another instance, inspectors identified a security deficiency related to catering carts. The inspectors notified appropriate catering facility officials, who stated that the security deficiency was highly unusual and that it would not happen again. The inspectors also informed the air carrier of the finding and recommended that during the carrier’s internal audits, they ensure that catering carts are properly secured. In addition to counseling provided by inspectors when deficiencies are identified, TSA assigns each air carrier to either a PSI, for U.S.-based air carriers, or an IPSI, for foreign air carriers with service to the United States, to assist air carriers in complying with TSA security requirements. Although PSIs and IPSIs do not participate in air carrier inspections, they do receive the inspection results for the air carriers that they work with. According to the three PSIs and four IPSIs with whom we met, PSIs and IPSIs provide counsel to the air carriers and provide clarification when necessary on TSA security requirements. For example, they provide air carriers with clarification on the requirements contained in security directives and emergency amendments issued by TSA. Several of the foreign air carriers we met with told us that the IPSIs are generally responsive to their requests. In other instances, when an air carrier cannot comply with a TSA security requirement—such as when complying with a TSA security requirement would cause the air carrier to violate a host government security requirement—the air carrier will work with the IPSI or PSI to develop alternative security procedures that are intended to provide a level of security equivalent to the level of security provided by TSA’s requirements, according to the PSIs and IPSIs with whom we met. These alternative procedures are reviewed by the PSI or IPSI and then approved by TSA headquarters officials. TSA has several controls in place to ensure that the agency is implementing the foreign airport assessment and air carrier inspection programs as intended. However, there are opportunities for TSA to improve its oversight of these programs to help ensure that the status and disposition of scheduled foreign airports assessments and air carrier inspections is documented and to assess the impact of the assessment and inspection programs. Regarding the foreign airport assessment program, TSA required inspectors and TSARs to follow standard operating procedures when scheduling and conducting foreign airport assessments. These procedures outline the process for coordinating with host government officials to schedule assessments, conduct foreign airport assessments, and report the results of the assessments. TSA also provided inspectors with a job aide to help them ensure that all relevant ICAO standards are addressed during an assessment. The job aide prompts inspectors as to what specific information they should obtain to help determine whether the foreign airport is meeting ICAO standards. For example, in assessing measures related to passenger-screening checkpoints, the job aide prompts the inspector to describe the means by which the airport ensures there is no mixing or contact between screened and unscreened passengers. In addition to the standard operating procedures and the job aide, TSA requires inspectors to use a standard format for reporting the results of foreign airport assessments and has implemented a multilayered review process to help ensure that airport assessment reports are complete and accurate. With regard to the air carrier inspection program, TSA uses the automated Performance and Results Information System to compile inspection results. PARIS contains results of air carrier inspections conducted by TSA at airports in the United States as well as inspections conducted at foreign airports. For air carrier inspections conducted at foreign airports, a series of prompts guides inspectors regarding what security standards U.S. carriers and foreign carriers operating overseas must meet. PARIS also includes a review process whereby completed inspection results can be reviewed by a supervisory inspector before being approved for release into the database. While TSA has controls such as these in place for the foreign airport assessment and air carrier inspection programs to ensure consistent implementation and documentation, we identified four additional controls that would strengthen TSA’s oversight of the foreign airport assessment and air carrier inspection programs: tracking the status of scheduled airport assessments and air carrier inspections, documenting foreign governments’ progress in addressing security deficiencies, tracking air carrier violations, and measuring the impact of the foreign airport assessment and air carrier inspection programs. TSA has established some controls for tracking the status of scheduled airport assessments and air carrier inspections, but additional controls are needed. TSA provided us with a list of foreign airport assessments that were scheduled to take place during fiscal year 2005 and identified which of the assessments were actually conducted and which assessments were deferred or canceled. We compared the list of scheduled assessments provided by TSA to the fiscal year 2005 airport assessment reports we reviewed and identified several discrepancies. Specifically, there were 10 airport assessments that TSA identified as having been conducted, but when we asked TSA officials to provide the reports for these assessments, they could not, and later categorized these assessments as deferred or canceled. Conversely, there was 1 airport assessment that TSA identified as having been deferred, but according to the assessment reports we reviewed, this assessment was actually conducted during fiscal year 2005. There were also five foreign airports for which TSA provided us with the fiscal year 2005 assessment report, but were not included on TSA’s list of assessments scheduled for fiscal year 2005. Further, there were three foreign airports listed under one IFO as having been deferred, whereas these same airports were listed under another IFO as having been canceled during fiscal year 2005. TSA also did not maintain accurate information on the status of air carrier inspections scheduled for fiscal year 2005. TSA provided us with a list of all air carrier inspections conducted during fiscal year 2005. We compared the list to the results contained in the PARIS database and found numerous inconsistencies. Specifically, we identified 46 air carrier inspections at 18 airports that were not included on TSA’s list, but were included in PARIS as having been conducted during fiscal year 2005. Federal standards for internal controls and associated guidance suggest that agencies should document key decisions in a way that is complete and accurate, and that allows decisions to be traced from initiation, through processing, to after completion. TSA officials acknowledged that they have not always maintained accurate and complete data on the status of scheduled foreign airport assessments and air carrier assessments, in part due to the lack of a central repository in which to maintain assessment information and the lack of standardization in the way in which each IFO manager maintains assessment information. Additionally, IFOs had not always documented the reasons why assessments and inspections were deferred or canceled. TSA officials stated that in August 2006 they began standardizing and refining the existing databases used by IFO staff for tracking the status of foreign airport assessments and air carrier inspections by including data elements such as the dates of previous and planned assessments. TSA officials also stated that IFO staff are now encouraged to identify the reasons why assessments and inspections were deferred or canceled in the comment section of the database. While TSA has made some improvements to the way in which it tracks the status of scheduled foreign airport assessments and air carrier inspections, there are opportunities for additional refinements to TSA’s tracking system. For example, according to our review of TSA’s fiscal year 2007 foreign airport assessment and air carrier inspection schedules, TSA did not provide an explanation for why 13 of 34 foreign airport visits—that is, either assessments or inspections—had not been conducted according to schedule. TSA officials acknowledged that their assessment and inspection tracking system is a work in progress and that they need to make additional decisions regarding the tracking system, such as which data elements to include. Without adequate controls in place for tracking which scheduled assessments and inspections were actually conducted and which were deferred or canceled, it may be difficult for TSA to ensure that all scheduled airport assessments and air carrier inspections are actually conducted. TSARs—the primary liaisons between the U.S. government and foreign governments on transportation security issues—are responsible for following up on progress made by foreign officials in addressing security deficiencies identified during TSA assessments. Although the TSARs we interviewed stated that they conducted such follow-up, the TSARs did not consistently document the progress foreign governments had made in addressing airport security deficiencies. We found 199 instances in the 128 fiscal year 2005 foreign airport assessment reports we reviewed where it was written that the TSAR would follow up or was recommended to follow up on the progress made by foreign officials in addressing security deficiencies identified during airport assessments. However, TSA may not be able to determine whether TSARs had actually followed up on these security deficiencies because TSARs did not consistently document their follow-up activities. We interviewed 8 of the 20 TSARs stationed at embassies throughout the world and one Senior Advisor and DHS attaché. Six of those TSARs stated that they followed up on outstanding security deficiencies in various ways, depending on the severity of the deficiency and the confidence that the TSAR had in the host government’s ability to correct the deficiency. For example, one TSAR told us that for less critical security deficiencies, she may inquire about the foreign government’s status in addressing the deficiency via electronic mail or telephone call. On the other hand, for a critical deficiency, the TSAR said she may follow up in person on the host government’s progress in addressing the deficiency. However, another TSAR stated that she only follows up on the foreign government’s progress in addressing national program issues. She stated that she does not follow up on operational security deficiencies— such as screening of passengers and checked baggage—because she believes this is the responsibility of the TSA inspection staff. While 4 of the 8 TSARs we interviewed told us that they were able to follow up on the status of most or all security deficiencies within their area of responsibility, not all of these TSARs reported the results of their follow- up to TSA inspection staff, in part because they were not required to do so. In addition, TSARs stated that when they did document the results of their follow-up, it was not done consistently. For example, follow-up results were sometimes documented in weekly trip reports (generally electronic mail messages) TSARs send to their immediate supervisor in TSA headquarters or in action plans. In addition, these weekly reports did not always contain information from the TSARs’ follow-up activities with host government or airport officials. Federal standards for internal controls and associated guidance suggest that agencies should document key activities in such a way that maintains the relevance, value, and usefulness of these activities to management in controlling operations and making decisions. TSA headquarters officials acknowledged that it is important to consistently document foreign governments’ status in addressing security deficiencies identified during TSA assessments, because this information could be helpful to TSA inspection staff when determining where to focus their attention during future assessments. Additionally, documenting foreign governments’ progress toward addressing deficiencies would enable TSA to have current information on the security status of foreign airports that service the United States. TSA established a working group in September 2006 to explore how the results of TSAR follow-up should be documented and used by TSA inspection staff. Because of the logistical challenges of coordination among working group members who are located around the world, TSA has not set a time frame for when the working group is expected to complete its efforts. TSA does not maintain air carrier inspection data in a way that would enable the agency to determine what enforcement actions were taken in response to identified security violations and thus could not readily determine whether appropriate penalties, if any, were given to air carriers that violated security requirements. We found two factors that contributed to this situation. First, information on violations and findings was not consistently recorded, and second, TSA does not link enforcement actions to inspection findings. For example, when an inspector identifies a violation during an inspection, that information is recorded in the inspections database in PARIS and a record is to be opened in the findings database. The findings database record includes information related to the violation, including whether the violation was closed with counseling or an investigation was opened. However, we found that information is not maintained in a way that enables TSA to readily determine the enforcement action that was taken in response to a particular violation. For example, the findings database did not include information on the action taken by TSA inspectors for all security violations that were identified in the inspections database. Specifically, the inspections database indicated that during fiscal year 2005, 419 air carrier violations were identified during 156 inspections. However, the findings database only identified the actions taken by TSA inspectors for 335 violations. On further analysis we found that of the 156 inspections where violations were identified, the number of violations for 79 (51 percent) of those inspections were not properly recorded in the findings database. We determined that for 66 inspections, the number of violations identified in the findings database was less than the number of violations identified in the inspections database. Therefore, there is no record of what action was taken, if any, by TSA inspectors to address the additional violations identified during these inspections. We also determined that for 13 inspections, the number of violations identified in the findings database was greater than the number of violations identified in the inspections database. Another reason TSA could not readily identify what enforcement actions were taken in response to specific security violations was that TSA often issued one enforcement action for multiple security violations, where inspectors were not required to identify each individual violation that was addressed by a particular enforcement action. Without being able to readily identify what enforcement action was taken in response to specific security violations, TSA has limited assurance that the inspected air carriers received appropriate penalties, if deemed necessary, and that identified security violations were resolved. TSA officials told us that they are currently developing updates to PARIS that will automatically open a finding each time a violation is recorded in the inspection database. By doing so, this will require a link between a violation and the planned course of action to resolve the violation. However, TSA has not established a time frame for when these updates will be implemented. TSA is taking steps to assess whether the goals of the foreign airport assessment and air carrier inspection programs are being met, but identified several concerns about doing so. As previously discussed, the goal of the foreign airport assessment and air carrier inspection programs are to ensure the security of U.S.-bound flights by evaluating the extent to which foreign governments and air carriers are complying with applicable security requirements. The Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 requires executive branch departments to use performance measures to assess progress toward meeting program goals and to help decision makers assess program accomplishments and improve program performance. Performance measures can be categorized either as outcome measures, which describe the intended result of carrying out a program or activity, or as output measures, which describe the level of activity that will be provided over a period of time, or as efficiency measures, which show the relationship between outcome or output of a program and the resources used to implement program activities—inputs. TSA developed the following output and efficiency measures to evaluate its international aviation regulatory and enforcement efforts, which include foreign airport assessments and air carrier inspections: percentage of countries with last-point-of-departure service to the United States that are provided aviation security assistance at the national or airport level, percentage of countries that do not have last-point-of-departure service to the United States that are provided aviation security assistance at the national or airport level, and average number of international inspections conducted annually per inspector. While output measures are useful in determining the number of foreign countries for which TSA has provided aviation security assistance and the rate at which such assistance is being provided, outcome-based measures would be particularly useful because they could be used to determine the extent to which TSA has helped to improve security at foreign airports that service the United States. However, TSA officials identified several challenges in developing outcome measures, particularly measures for the foreign airport assessment program. TSA officials said that it is difficult to develop meaningful outcome measures because TSA does not have control over whether foreign authorities implement and meet ICAO standards. Additionally, TSA officials stated that if the agency develops outcome measures for the foreign airport assessment program, it would suggest that TSA has control over whether foreign airports meet ICAO standards, which these officials believe may give the appearance that TSA does not respect the sovereignty of the countries it assesses. TSA officials further stated that if foreign officials perceive that TSA has no regard for their country’s sovereignty, foreign officials may prohibit TSA from conducting assessments in their countries. We recognize that whether or not foreign governments meet ICAO standards is not within TSA’s control and that foreign officials’ concerns about sovereignty are important. However, TSA officials have acknowledged that the assistance the agency provides and, in rare cases, secretarial actions contribute to whether foreign governments meet ICAO standards. Also, there is precedent within the federal government for developing outcome-oriented performance measures to evaluate efforts that are not within an agency’s control but can be influenced by the agency. For example, the State Department developed performance measures and targets for its Anti-Terrorism Assistance Program to evaluate the agency’s impact on helping foreign countries improve their anti-terrorism capabilities. Specifically, during fiscal year 2006, the State Department set a performance target that two of the six countries that received assistance through the Anti-Terrorism Assistance Program would achieve a capability to effectively deter, detect, and counter terrorist organizations and threats and sustain those capabilities. Another performance target for the program that is beyond the State Department’s control is for all 191 United Nations member states to implement a particular United Nations resolution that requires all states to take sweeping measures to combat terrorism. TSA headquarters officials, including the Director of Compliance and Area Directors, who oversee implementation of the foreign airport assessment program, questioned whether it would be appropriate to measure improvements made by foreign countries as a result of the assessment program. They stated that the primary purpose of the foreign airport assessment program is not to help foreign officials improve security at their airports; rather, the primary purpose of the foreign airport assessment program is to identify—not correct—security deficiencies at foreign airports and inform the Secretary of Homeland Security of such deficiencies. These officials also stated that the agency’s efforts to assist foreign officials in addressing security deficiencies are voluntary and, therefore, do not warrant performance measurement. Although TSA may not be required to assist foreign officials in addressing security deficiencies identified during foreign airport assessments, TSA is in fact using its inspector and TSAR resources to this end. Consistent with the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993, developing performance measures and associated targets, such as the percentage of security deficiencies that were addressed as a result of TSA on-site assistance and TSA recommendations for corrective action, would enable TSA to evaluate the impact of its assistance on improving security at foreign airports and be held more accountable for the way in which it uses its resources. TSA could also evaluate the impact that secretarial actions have on helping foreign airports address security deficiencies in order to meet ICAO standards. Another challenge faced by TSA officials in developing outcome-based measures for the foreign airport assessment program is the lack of an automated system to collect and compile assessment results. TSA officials stated that in the absence of an automated system to input data and information obtained from airport assessments, they do not have enough resources to manually compile and analyze airport assessment data that could be used to feed into outcome measures. Currently, TSA headquarters maintains airport assessment reports either electronically or in hard copy, which makes it difficult to conduct systematic analysis of assessment results across foreign airports and over time to evaluate the impact TSA’s airport assessment program has had on helping foreign countries meet ICAO standards. TSA officials told us that $1 million was budgeted to develop a secured, automated database—the Foreign Airport Assessment Reporting System—to track airport assessment results. However, TSA officials stated that the development of the Foreign Airport Assessment Reporting System has been slow due to challenges TSA has experienced in linking the existing electronic systems in which previous airport assessment reports are stored with the new database. However, upon completion of the Foreign Airport Assessment Reporting System, which is scheduled for fiscal year 2008, TSA expects that the database will enhance standardization of assessment reports as well as accessibility to the results of previous foreign airport assessments. TSA also expects that the Foreign Airport Assessment Reporting System will enable TSA to conduct analysis of foreign airport assessment results. As with the foreign airport assessment program, TSA has also not developed outcome-based performance measures for its overseas air carrier inspection program. However, TSA officials have begun to collect and analyze data on air carrier inspections that could be used to measure the impact of TSA’s inspection program on helping air carriers comply with TSA security requirements. During fiscal year 2006, TSA officials who manage PARIS began analyzing air carrier inspection results in an effort to assist the agency in evaluating the impact that enforcement actions— including on-site counseling, administrative actions, and civil penalties— have had on ensuring air carrier compliance with TSA security requirements. These officials plan to assess whether there is a relationship between the severity of civil penalties and the reoccurrence of security violations. The analysis that is being conducted by these officials is consistent with our reviews of agency compliance inspection programs, which have cited the need for evaluations of enforcement activities and the effectiveness of using sanctions such as civil penalties to increase compliance. However, while the TSA officials managing PARIS are conducting such analysis of performance information, officials who manage the air carrier inspection program did not intend to use the results of this analysis to develop performance measures or to influence program decisions. According to TSA officials, considering that overall compliance rates are very high among air carriers, and the number of enforcement actions taken by TSA is relatively low, there may not be enough data to conduct meaningful analysis of the impact of enforcement actions. In addition, TSA officials said that they were not convinced that air carrier compliance is influenced by enforcement actions, especially since air carriers are known to intentionally set aside funds when developing their annual budgets in anticipation that they will be fined for some type of security violation during the year. One TSA official stated that air carrier compliance with TSA security requirements is not always within the air carrier’s control and is largely influenced by the security measures in place at the airport, as well as restrictions placed on air carriers by host government laws and regulations. When analyzing the fiscal year 2005 air carrier inspection results, we identified only one instance where noncompliance due to a conflict between TSA requirements and host government law resulted in an inspector requesting that enforcement action be taken against the air carrier. However, TSA chose not to take enforcement action against the air carrier and instead decided to work with the host government to resolve the conflict. Despite the concerns raised by TSA officials, using the analysis of air carrier inspection results to develop performance measures, TSA managers may not be able to identify which approaches for improving air carrier compliance are working well and which approaches could be improved upon. TSA is taking action to address challenges—particularly the lack of available inspectors and various host government concerns—that have limited its ability to conduct foreign airport assessments and air carrier inspections according to schedule. TSA has developed a risk-based approach to scheduling foreign airport assessments, and is in the process of developing a risk-based approach for scheduling air carrier inspections, to enhance the agency’s ability to focus its limited inspector resources on higher-risk airports. The risk-based scheduling approach is also expected to reduce the number of visits TSA conducts at low-risk foreign airports, which may help address some host governments’ concerns regarding the resource burden that results from frequent airport assessments by TSA and others. Harmonization—that is, mutual recognition and acceptance— of TSA, host government, and third party (e.g., European Commission) aviation security standards and assessment and inspection processes may also help TSA address host government concerns regarding resource burden. Specifically, when the opportunity is available, TSA is considering conducting joint assessments with some host governments or third parties, such as the European Commission, which would reduce the number of airport visits experienced by some countries. In addition to addressing concerns regarding the resource burden placed on host governments as a result of frequent airport visits, TSA has taken steps to address some country-specific challenges that have limited TSA’s ability to conduct foreign airport visits. Various challenges have affected TSA’s ability to maintain its schedule of conducting foreign airport assessments and air carrier inspections. The ability to conduct these assessments and inspections as scheduled is important, according to TSA officials, because foreign airport and air carrier compliance with applicable security requirements may deteriorate significantly between assessments. As time between visits increases, the likelihood may also increase that security deficiencies at foreign airports and among air carriers may arise and go undetected and unaddressed. TSA officials also stated that conducting assessments and inspections on a consistent basis helps to ensure that foreign countries continue to comply with ICAO standards and are operating with effective security measures. TSA data show that the agency deferred 90 of the 303 (about 30 percent) foreign airport visits that were scheduled for fiscal year 2005, which include both foreign airport assessments and air carrier inspections. According to TSA, these deferments resulted primarily from a lack of available inspectors to conduct the assessments and inspections. Our analysis identified that the reported shortage of available inspectors reflected the fact that (1) the inspector staff available to conduct the assessments and inspections was less than the number authorized at each of TSA’s five IFOs at some point during fiscal year 2005 and (2) TSA scheduled more foreign airport visits during the fiscal year than available inspectors could complete. TSA officials cited several reasons why the IFOs operated in fiscal year 2005 with fewer inspectors than had been budgeted. First, TSA officials stated that due to State Department limitations on the number of inspectors that can be staffed at IFOs overseas, TSA did not have the budgeted number of inspectors on board to complete assessments and inspections scheduled for fiscal year 2005. Second, TSA officials stated that significant turnover among international inspectors and the subsequent lengthy process for filling vacant inspector positions also contributed to the lack of available inspectors. TSA officials attributed the turnover of international inspectors to various factors, including TSA’s policy that limits the term of international inspectors at overseas IFOs to 4 years, the lack of opportunities for career advancement when stationed at an IFO, and unique difficulties inspectors experience when living and working overseas, such as disruptions to family life. As of January 2007, TSA officials did not have any specific efforts under way to help reduce turnover of international inspectors. Further, TSA officials stated that it takes an average of about 6 months to fill a vacant inspector position, due to the lengthy process for vetting newly hired inspectors. Specifically, once hired, international inspectors must be processed through the State Department, which entails applying for and receiving medical clearances, security clearances, a diplomatic passport, and visas. TSA officials stated that expediting the process of filling vacant positions is largely outside of TSA’s control. However, TSA assigned a headquarters official to oversee this process to identify opportunities for accelerating it. Table 3 shows the number of inspectors budgeted for and available at the IFOs each month during fiscal year 2005. Even if TSA had been operating at its budgeted inspector staffing level, the agency may still have deferred some of the foreign airport assessments and air carrier inspections scheduled for fiscal year 2005 because, according to TSA officials, internal policy required them to schedule more foreign airport visits than the budgeted number of inspectors could reasonably have conducted. According to TSA officials, this internal policy was developed by the Federal Aviation Administration, which was responsible for conducting foreign airport assessments and air carrier inspections prior to TSA. TSA officials also stated that the Federal Aviation Administration had more available inspectors to conduct assessments and inspections than TSA. TSA officials stated that each international inspector should reasonably be able to conduct between 8 and 12 foreign airport visits per year, depending on the amount of time inspectors remain on site to assist foreign officials and air carrier representatives in addressing security deficiencies that are identified during assessments and inspections. However, according to data provided by TSA, each of the 5 IFOs scheduled more than 12 foreign airport visits per inspector for fiscal year 2005. Table 4 shows the average number of foreign airport visits scheduled per international inspector for fiscal year 2005. TSA officials acknowledged that for fiscal year 2005 they scheduled more foreign airport visits than the budgeted level of inspectors could have reasonably conducted. However, TSA has taken steps to compensate for the shortage of international inspectors by utilizing domestic inspectors to help complete the foreign airport assessments and air carrier inspections that were scheduled for fiscal year 2005. Specifically, domestic inspectors were used to assist with about 34 percent of foreign airport assessments and about 35 percent of air carrier inspections. However, despite the use of domestic inspectors, TSA still had to defer foreign airport assessments and air carrier inspections. TSA headquarters officials and IFO staff further stated that the heavy reliance on domestic inspectors to conduct foreign airport assessments and air carrier inspections is not desirable because domestic inspectors lack experience conducting assessments using ICAO standards or inspecting foreign operations of air carriers, as well as working in the international environment. Additionally, using domestic inspectors sometimes presents challenges in planning and coordinating foreign airport visits. Specifically, it can be difficult to obtain clearance from the State Department and host government to allow domestic inspectors to enter foreign countries because TSA may not always be able to provide sufficient notice that domestic inspectors will be participating in airport visits, particularly when the need for a domestic inspector is determined on short notice. Moreover, according to TSA officials, the availability of domestic inspectors may change unexpectedly when they are needed to remain in the United States. TSA officials also said that domestic inspectors may not be available for the entire 4-week period that it takes to prepare for, conduct, and write reports for foreign airport assessments and air carrier inspections. Last, TSA officials stated that compared to international inspectors, some domestic inspectors are not effective at taking notes while conducting observations at foreign airports, nor are some domestic inspectors effective at preparing foreign airport reports—specifically, their word choices for describing security conditions at airports are not always sensitive to the concerns of foreign officials. According to TSA officials, if foreign officials take offense at the way in which TSA portrays the security deficiencies at their airports, foreign officials may no longer allow TSA to conduct airport assessments in their countries. TSA officials stated that they enhanced the notetaking module for the training provided to personnel conducting assessments and inspections overseas. However, for the reasons discussed above, TSA international officials plan to lessen their reliance on domestic inspectors. Risk-Based Approach A risk-based approach entails consideration of terrorist threats, vulnerability of potential terrorist targets to those threats, and the consequences of those threats being carried out when deciding how to allocate resources to defend against these threats. Risk-based, priority-driven decisions can help inform decision makers in allocating finite resources to the areas of greatest need. During October 2006, TSA began implementing a risk-based approach to scheduling foreign airport assessments in order to focus its limited inspector resources on higher- risk airports. Another potential benefit to TSA’s new approach is that it may allow TSA to reduce its reliance on domestic inspectors. The objectives of TSA’s risk-based scheduling approach are to (1) determine the appropriate frequency of foreign airport visits, and (2) identify the appropriate number of inspectors needed for each IFO based on the deployment availability of inspectors, the risk- based priority of each location, and the number of visits required each year. Under the risk-based approach, when fully implemented, foreign airports are categorized based on risk level, and depending on the category in which they are placed, are scheduled to be assessed once a year, once every 2 years, or once every 3 years. According to information provided by TSA, under this approach, the number of foreign airport assessments scheduled each year will decrease by about 38 percent (from 170 to 105 assessments). TSA officials stated that the reduction in the number of annual foreign airport assessments will help enable inspectors to complete foreign airport assessments according to schedule. Based on our analysis, TSA’s risk-based approach for scheduling foreign airport assessments is consistent with generally accepted risk management principles. While it appears that this risk-based approach will reduce the number of foreign airport assessments international inspectors are expected to conduct in a year, it is too soon to determine the impact of this approach on TSA’s ability to complete scheduled foreign airport visits—including assessments and inspections—for two key reasons. First, TSA has not yet finalized its risk-based approach to scheduling air carrier inspections. In February 2007, TSA officials stated that the draft version of the risk-based approach to scheduling air carrier inspections was being vetted through the agency, but they do not expect the final version to be approved until spring 2007. TSA officials stated that in developing the risk-based approach for scheduling air carrier inspections, they determined that, unlike the situation with airports, using previous inspection results was not the best way to determine air carrier vulnerability. Rather, TSA officials expect to use foreign airport assessment results to determine the vulnerability of air carriers operating out of those airports, especially considering that the security status of foreign airports influences TSA’s decision to impose additional security requirements on air carriers operating out of foreign airports. In addition, it is uncertain how TSA’s upcoming audits of foreign repair stations will affect the workload of international inspectors. In December 2003, Congress passed the Vision 100—Century of Aviation Reauthorization Act (Vision 100), which mandated that TSA issue regulations to ensure the security of foreign and domestic repair stations and, in coordination with the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), complete a security review and audit of foreign repair stations certified by FAA within 18 months of issuing the regulations. Currently, there are approximately 665 FAA-certified repair stations in foreign countries that TSA is required to audit. Of these, 93 are deemed substantial with regard to safety and security in that they perform work on the airframe, flight controls, or propulsion systems. In addition, another 38 are located in countries that, pursuant to Vision 100, TSA and FAA must give priority to because they have been identified as posing the most significant security risks. TSA plans to initiate security audits of the repair stations during fiscal year 2007. Specifically, TSA expects to conduct 127 audits of foreign repair stations during the initial year, focusing on those located in high- threat areas. According to TSA, the majority of repair stations deemed substantial (65 of 93)—are located on or near foreign airports already subject to assessment by TSA. TSA expects that it will take inspectors 3 days to complete initial audits if the foreign repair stations are collocated with foreign airports being assessed, and 5 days to complete for stations which are not collocated. According to TSA, the agency’s fiscal year 2006 funding levels were sufficient to allow for an additional 13 international inspector positions, including a program manager position, to supplement its current international inspector staff and help meet the requirement to conduct foreign repair station security audits. As of January 2007, all 13 positions were filled, but TSA had not yet begun to conduct these audits. Therefore, it is not yet known how these audits and additional inspector positions will actually affect overall inspector workload or TSA’s ability to complete its foreign assessments and inspections as scheduled. Harmonization of TSA, host government, and third party (e.g., European Commission) security standards and the processes used to assess foreign airports and air carriers would address concerns regarding the resource burden placed on host governments as a result of frequent airport visits conducted by TSA and others. Officials from 3 of the 7 foreign countries we visited in March 2006, as well as officials representing the European Commission—the executive arm of the European Union (which is composed of 27 countries), stated that the frequency of airport assessments and air carrier inspections conducted by TSA and others had placed a significant resource burden on the host government. In addition, a representative of the Association of European Airlines and IATA stated that frequent security inspections by TSA, the host government, and other countries, as well as safety inspections, including inspections conducted by FAA, burdened the limited personnel resources available to air carriers. Specifically, for each inspection, the air carrier must assign one of its employees to escort the inspection team around the airport. (In general, TSA officials must be accompanied by host government officials when conducting foreign airport assessments and air carrier inspections because TSA officials are not allowed to enter restricted areas of the airport unescorted.) Belgian officials, for example, proposed to shorten TSA’s fiscal year 2006 assessment of the airport in Brussels, stating that being assessed by TSA, as well as ICAO, the European Commission, and the European Civil Aviation Conference within a short span of time would pose a significant resource burden on the Belgian aviation security department. Host government officials in Germany raised concerns regarding the resource burden placed on their aviation security department due to the frequency of TSA visits. German officials said that TSA scheduled 10 airport visits between January 2006 and September 2006, which German officials viewed as excessive. In addition to individual European countries, the Director of Security for the Protection of Persons, Goods, and Installations for the European Commission’s Directorate General of Transport and Energy wrote a letter to the TSA Assistant Secretary dated March 9, 2006, expressing concern about the frequency of TSA airport assessments and air carrier inspections in Europe. The Director suggested that TSA consider the high level of quality control exercised within the European Union by the European Commission as well as the European Union member states when determining the frequency of airport assessment visits and that TSA and the European Commission embark upon a joint effort to improve coordination of airport visits to alleviate the resource burden placed on member states. TSA’s risk-based approach for scheduling foreign airport assessments could help address some host governments’ concerns regarding the resource burden placed on them in part due to the frequency of airport assessments conducted by TSA. In addition to implementing a risk-based approach to scheduling, there are other potential opportunities for TSA to address host country concerns regarding the resource burden experienced as a result of frequent airport visits. Industry representatives and some host government officials stated that if TSA and other inspecting entities either conducted joint airport assessments and air carrier inspections or used the results of each other’s assessments and inspections in lieu of conducting their own, the frequency of airport visits could be reduced, in turn reducing the resource burden placed on host governments and air carriers. Airports Council International officials we interviewed, who represent airport operators worldwide, stated that if TSA and other inspecting entities were to conduct joint assessments, the resource burden experienced by airport operators would also be reduced. Moreover, officials from 2 of the 7 countries we visited suggested that TSA review the results of airport assessments conducted by the host government or by third parties either in lieu of conducting its own airport assessments or to target its assessments on specific security standards. These officials said that by doing this, TSA could reduce the length of the assessment period, thereby reducing the resource burden placed on host government officials. According to TSA, the agency must physically observe security operations at foreign airports to determine whether airports are maintaining and carrying out effective security measures in order to satisfy its statutory mandate to conduct assessments of foreign airports. This interpretation precludes TSA from relying solely on third party or host government assessments to make this determination. However, TSA officials stated that they may be able to use host government or third party assessments— provided that foreign officials make these assessments available to TSA— to help refine the agency’s risk-based approach to scheduling foreign airport assessments, such that TSA would be able to focus its limited inspection resources on foreign airports that pose the greatest security risk to the United States. For example, instead of visiting a foreign airport that TSA considers low risk once every 3 years, TSA, hypothetically, could visit such airports once every 5 years, and review third party or host government assessments between visits to help determine whether the airport is maintaining and carrying out effective security measures. This would enable TSA to reduce the number of visits to foreign airports, thus addressing host government officials’ concerns regarding the resource burden they experience as a result of frequent airport assessments. However, three of the five IFO managers we interviewed said that the option of using host government assessments is not currently available to them because host governments in their areas of responsibility generally do not have airport assessment programs in place. These IFO managers said that even if host governments had assessment programs in place, they would be cautious about using the assessment reports and conducting joint assessments for one of two reasons: (1) TSA has not independently evaluated the quality of the assessments conducted by host governments and third parties or the quality of the inspectors conducting these assessments, and (2) host governments and third party inspectors base their assessments on different aviation security standards than TSA. Similarly, foreign government officials and industry representatives have cited differences in security standards as an impediment to conducting joint assessments and using host government or third party assessments. Harmonization In the homeland security context, “harmonization” is a broad term used to describe countries’ efforts to coordinate their security practices to enhance security and increase efficiency by avoiding duplication of effort. Harmonization efforts can include countries’ mutually recognizing and accepting each other’s existing practices— which could represent somewhat different approaches to achieve the same outcome, as well as working to develop uniform standards. TSA headquarters officials stated that harmonization of airport and air carrier security standards and airport assessment and air carrier inspection processes would make them less cautious about using other assessment reports and conducting joint assessments. To this end, TSA has taken steps toward harmonizing airport assessment processes and some airport and air carrier security standards with the European Commission. In May 2006, in responding to the European Commission’s concerns regarding the frequency of TSA airport assessments and air carrier inspections in Europe, the TSA Assistant Secretary suggested that TSA and the European Commission develop working groups to address these concerns. Further, in June 2006, TSA initiated efforts with the European Commission that will enable each party to learn more about the other party’s quality control programs. As part of these efforts, TSA and the European Commission established six working groups. TSA and the European Commission have not established firm time frames for when the working groups are to complete their efforts. The objectives and the status of the working groups are described in table 5. In December 2006, the TSA Assistant Secretary stated that the agency had primarily coordinated with the European Commission on harmonizing aviation security standards because airports in the European Union generally have a high level of security. The Assistant Secretary further stated that TSA should not focus its inspector resources on foreign airports that are known to have a high level of security, such as several European airports; rather, TSA should focus its limited resources on foreign airports that are known to be less secure. The Assistant Secretary added that a number of options for better leveraging inspector resources are being considered by one of the European Commission-TSA working groups, including scheduling European Commission and TSA assessments to overlap for 1 or 2 days to enable both parties to share their assessment results, which could enable TSA to shorten the length of its assessments. The Assistant Secretary also stated that TSA could eventually recognize European Commission airport assessments as equivalent to those conducted by TSA and have TSA inspectors shadow European Commission assessment teams to periodically validate the results. However, in January 2007, European Union member states reached consensus that they would not share the results of European Commission assessments of their airports with TSA until the following occur: (1) TSA and the European Commission agree upon protocols for sharing sensitive security information; (2) TSA inspectors shadow European Commission inspectors on an assessment of a European airport, and European Commission inspectors shadow TSA inspectors on an assessment of a U.S. airport; and (3) TSA agrees to provide the European Commission with the results of U.S. airport assessments. TSA and European Commission officials stated that they expect information-sharing protocols to be established and shadowing of airport assessments to take place during spring 2007. TSA officials also stated that once the information-sharing protocols are finalized, they would be willing to provide European Union member states with the results of U.S. airport assessments. Aviation industry representatives stated that in addition to facilitating joint assessments and use of third party assessments, harmonization of aviation security standards between countries would enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of international aviation security efforts. For example, IATA representatives we interviewed stated that they have met with TSA officials about harmonizing the list of items prohibited onboard aircraft with the European Commission. IATA officials stated that having different security requirements to follow for different countries leads to confusion, and perhaps noncompliance with security requirements, among air carriers. The Chairman of the Security Committee for the Association of European Airlines stated that there are numerous redundancies in the international aviation security system that could be reduced through harmonization, particularly with regard to screening transfer passengers— passengers who have a layover en route from their originating airport to their destination airport. For example, for a passenger traveling from Frankfurt to Chicago who has to change planes in New York, upon landing in New York, the passenger must be rescreened and have his or her checked baggage rescreened before boarding the flight for Chicago. According to officials from various air carrier and airport operator associations, the rescreening of transfer passengers is costly and is only required because individual countries do not formally recognize each other’s aviation security measures as providing an equivalent level of security. Air carrier representatives also stated that because air carriers must use their limited resources to implement redundant security measures, they are not able to focus their resources on implementing other security measures that may be more effective at preventing a terrorist from carrying out an attack. The TSA Assistant Secretary agreed that rescreening transfer passengers that originate from airports that have a high level of security may be unnecessarily redundant. The Assistant Secretary said that TSA plans to assess the effectiveness of the checked baggage screening system commonly used at European airports to determine if that system provides at least the same level of security as TSA’s baggage screening system. However, TSA officials said that even if the agency determines that the baggage screening system in place at European airports provides an equivalent level of security, TSA would still have to rescreen checked baggage for transfer passengers arriving from Europe because the Aviation and Transportation Security Act requires passengers and baggage on flights originating in the United States to be screened by U.S. government employees. According to an attorney in TSA’s Office of Chief Counsel, Congress would have to change the law in order for TSA to discontinue the screening of transfer passengers. TSA also made efforts to harmonize some aviation security measures with other countries outside of the European Union. For example, TSA officials worked with Canadian officials to develop a common set of security requirements for air carriers that have flights between the United States and Canada. Additionally, in response to the alleged August 2006 liquid explosives terrorist plot, TSA initially banned all liquids, gels, and aerosols from being carried through the checkpoint and, in September 2006, began allowing passengers to carry on small, travel-size liquids and gels (3 fluid ounces or less) using a single quart-size, clear plastic, zip-top bag. In an effort to harmonize its liquid screening procedures with other countries, in November 2006, TSA revised its procedures to allow 3.4 fluid ounces of liquids, gels, and aerosols onboard aircraft, which is equivalent to 100 milliliters—the amount permitted by the 27 countries in the European Union, as well as Canada, Australia, Norway, Switzerland, and Iceland. According to the Assistant Secretary of TSA, this means that approximately half of the world’s air travelers will be governed by similar measures with regard to this area of security. ICAO also adopted the liquid, gels, and aerosol screening procedures implemented by TSA and others as a recommended practice. As we reported in March 2007, DHS has also taken steps toward harmonizing international air cargo security practices. As part of this effort, TSA has worked through ICAO to develop uniform international air cargo security standards. In addition to concerns regarding the resource burden placed on host governments as a result of frequent airport visits by TSA and others, TSA, on a case-by-case basis, has also had to address host government concerns regarding sovereignty—more specifically, concerns that TSA assessments and inspections infringe upon a host government’s authority to regulate airports and air carriers within its borders. According to TSA officials and representatives of the European Commission, several foreign governments have stated that they consider TSA’s foreign airport assessments as an infringement on their sovereignty. For example, government officials in one country have prevented TSA from assessing the security at their airports and from inspecting non-U.S. air carriers because they do not believe TSA has the authority to assess airports outside of the United States and that the host government is the sole regulator of air carriers that are based out of their country. Based on the results of air carrier inspections provided to us by TSA, we found that during fiscal year 2005, TSA conducted only one inspection of an air carrier that was based out of this particular country. According to TSA, officials from this country allowed TSA to conduct this particular inspection to accommodate TSA’s request to inspect the security of air carriers that had flights originating in Europe and arriving in Washington, D.C., during the January 2005 U.S. presidential inauguration activities. We also found that TSA conducted assessments of four airports in this particular country during fiscal year 2005. TSA officials said that they were able to conduct these assessments under the guise of a TSA “visit” to—versus an “assessment” of—the airport. TSA officials, however, stated that because officials from this country do not believe TSA has the authority to assess the security at their airports, these officials would not accept—neither orally nor in writing— the results of TSA airport assessments. TSA officials also stated that officials from this country prohibited TSA inspectors from assessing airport perimeter security as well as the contents of the country’s individual airport security programs. TSA officials identified that there are at least 3 additional countries that raised concerns regarding sovereignty. According to TSA, officials from one of these countries stated that they did not know of any international requirements compelling them to allow TSA to assess their airport and that TSA had too many internal flaws to assess airports in other countries. In response to this country’s concerns, TSA sent a representative to meet with the country’s Minister of Transportation. At the meeting, the Minister granted TSA future access to the country’s airports for assessments after being offered the opportunity to visit U.S. airports to observe security measures. Additional countries, according to TSA, were concerned about their sovereignty being violated and TSA gathering intelligence information for the U.S. government through the airport assessment program. TSA officials stated that when unique concerns arise in the future, they will continue to work with countries on a case-by-case basis to try to address their concerns. The alleged August 2006 terrorist plot to detonate liquid explosives on U.S.-bound flights from the United Kingdom illustrates the continuing threat of international terrorism to commercial aviation and the importance of TSA’s foreign airport assessment and air carrier inspection programs. As part of these programs, TSA has provided on-site consultation and made recommendations to foreign officials on how to resolve security deficiencies. In rare cases, DHS and TSA have taken more aggressive action by notifying the traveling public that an airport does not meet minimum international standards or issuing warning letters and letters of correction to air carriers. While foreign government officials and air carrier representatives acknowledged that TSA’s efforts have helped to strengthen the security of U.S.-bound flights, there are several opportunities for TSA to strengthen oversight of its foreign airport assessment and air carrier inspection programs. First, although TSA has made some efforts to improve its tracking of foreign airport assessments and air carrier inspections, until additional controls are in place to track the status of foreign airport assessments and air carrier inspections, such as whether scheduled assessments and inspections were actually conducted, TSA has limited assurance that all assessments and inspections are accounted for and that appropriate action was taken for airports and air carriers that did not comply with security standards. Second, while TSA has helped to strengthen security at foreign airports by providing assistance to foreign officials, because TSA does not consistently track and document foreign officials’ progress in addressing security deficiencies, it may be difficult for TSA to assess the impact of its efforts on meeting program goals—to ensure that foreign airports and air carriers servicing the United States are meeting, at a minimum, applicable ICAO standards and TSA’s security requirements, respectively. Third, although TSA has established some output performance measures and targets related to the assessment and inspection programs, the current measures do not enable TSA to draw particularly meaningful conclusions about the impact of its foreign airport assessment and air carrier inspection programs on the security of U.S.-bound flights and how to most effectively direct its improvement efforts. TSA has faced several challenges in meeting the goals of its assessment and inspection programs, including a lack of available staff and concerns regarding the resource burden placed on host governments as a result of frequent airport visits conducted by TSA and others. TSA’s development of a risk-based approach to scheduling airport assessments and air carrier inspections is a step in the right direction to address host government concerns and better leverage limited inspector resources. However, it is too soon to determine the extent to which the risk-based approach will help to improve TSA’s ability to complete scheduled foreign airport assessments and air carrier inspections, and the extent to which the approach will alleviate host government concerns regarding the frequency of airport visits. The collaboration between TSA and the European Commission regarding opportunities for conducting joint airport assessments and sharing assessment results, as well as efforts to harmonize aviation security standards—including those related to the screening of liquids, gels, and aerosols—with the European Commission and others, are key steps toward addressing host government concerns regarding the resource burden that results from frequent assessments by TSA and others. It will be important for TSA to continue working with foreign officials to address their concerns, such as sovereignty issues, in order to continue assessing the security at foreign airports that service the United States. To help strengthen oversight of TSA’s foreign airport assessment and air carrier inspection programs, in our April 2007 report that contained sensitive security information, we recommended that the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security direct the Assistant Secretary for the Transportation Security Administration to take the following five actions: develop controls to track the status of scheduled foreign airport assessments from initiation through completion, including the reasons why assessments were deferred or canceled; develop controls to track the status of scheduled air carrier inspections from initiation through completion, including the reasons why inspections were deferred or canceled, as well as the final disposition of any investigations that result from air carrier inspections; develop a standard process for tracking and documenting host governments’ progress in addressing security deficiencies identified during TSA airport assessments; develop outcome-oriented performance measures to evaluate the impact TSA assistance has on improving foreign airport compliance with ICAO standards; and develop outcome-oriented performance measures to evaluate the impact TSA assistance and enforcement actions have on improving air carrier compliance with TSA security requirements. On April 13, 2007, we received written comments on the draft report, which are reproduced in full in appendix V. DHS generally concurred with the findings and recommendations in the report and stated that the recommendations will help strengthen TSA’s oversight of foreign airport assessments and air carrier inspections. With regard to our recommendations that TSA develop controls to track the status of scheduled airport assessments and air carrier inspections from initiation through completion, including the reasons for any deferments or cancellations, and the final disposition of investigations related to air carrier inspections, DHS stated that TSA plans to enhance its tracking system to include the reason for any deferment or cancellation of an airport assessment or an air carrier inspection. The tracking system also incorporates the risk-based methodology and criteria for scheduling foreign airport assessments that TSA adopted in October 2006. Enhancing the tracking system should provide TSA greater assurance that airport assessments and air carrier inspections are conducted within applicable time frames. If properly implemented and monitored, this tracking system should address the intent of our recommendation. Regarding the disposition of investigations related to air carrier inspections, DHS stated that TSA’s Office of Chief Counsel currently documents the final disposition of investigations in PARIS, but TSA will enhance PARIS to ensure that inspection activities are linked to investigations so that comprehensive enforcement information is readily available. A clear link between violations identified as a result of an inspection and the final disposition of those violations is important for maintaining comprehensive inspection and enforcement information. As we reported, TSA often pursued one enforcement action in response to multiple violations, and inspectors were not required to identify which violations were included in the enforcement action. Without being able to readily identify what enforcement action was taken in response to specific security violations, TSA cannot readily ensure that air carriers receive appropriate penalties, and that security violations are resolved. Concerning our recommendation that TSA develop a standard process for tracking and documenting host governments’ progress in addressing security deficiencies identified during assessments, TSA stated that it is currently developing a system whereby outstanding deficiencies identified during an assessment will be tracked along with deficiency-specific information, deadlines, and current status. TSA plans to archive this information for future trend analysis and to provide a historical understanding of each airport’s security posture. This effort, if properly implemented, will provide additional relevant, useful information to TSA in performing its oversight responsibilities. TSA concurred with our recommendation that it develop outcome- oriented performance measures to evaluate the impact TSA assistance has on improving foreign airport compliance with international security standards, and on improving air carrier compliance with TSA security requirements. TSA is considering several elements to include in the performance measures, such as the number of assessments conducted, corrective actions recommended, TSA assistance provided, and corrective actions achieved. TSA indicated that its outcome-based performance measures would be structured to recognize the collaborative nature of the process, particularly where corrective action by a foreign government is concerned. Such outcome-based performance measures, if properly developed and utilized, will enable TSA to determine the impact of its airport assessment program and assistance provided for improving security at foreign airports. Likewise, these types of measures can be applied to air carrier inspections at foreign airports to determine he impact that such inspections have on compliance, and to identify which approaches to for improving air carrier compliance with security requirements work well and which could be improved upon. If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 512-3404 or berrickc@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. GAO staff that made major contributions to this report are listed in appendix VI. This report will also be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov. To examine efforts by the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) to ensure the security of international aviation, and in particular flights bound for the United States from other countries, we addressed the following questions: (1) What were the results of TSA’s fiscal year 2005 foreign airport assessments and air carrier inspections, and what actions were taken, if any, when TSA identified that foreign airports and air carriers were not complying with security standards? (2) How, if at all, did TSA assist foreign countries and air carriers in addressing any deficiencies identified during foreign airport assessments and air carrier inspections, and to what extent did TSA provide oversight of its assessment and inspection efforts? (3) What challenges, if any, affected TSA’s ability to conduct foreign airport assessments and air carrier inspections, and what actions have TSA and others taken to address these challenges? To determine the results of TSA’s foreign airport assessments we reviewed 128 fiscal year 2005 assessment reports, the most recent year for which complete foreign airport assessment reports were available. To determine the extent to which foreign airports complied with International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) standards and recommended practices, we looked at the following information contained in the reports: (1) ICAO standards or recommended practices with which the airport did not comply; (2) whether issues of noncompliance were “old” (identified during the previous assessment) or “new” (identified during the current assessment); (3) explanation of the problems that existed that caused the airport not to comply with ICAO standards or recommended practices, and, if provided, any actions taken by the host government to address the problems; (4) TSA’s recommendations for how the airport could correct security deficiencies in order to meet ICAO standards or recommended practices; and (5) whether issues of noncompliance remained “open” (unresolved) or “closed” (resolved) prior to the completion of the assessment. We developed an electronic data collection instrument to capture information from copies of the assessment reports. All data collection instrument entries, with the exception of the problem descriptions and recommendations, were verified to ensure they had been copied correctly from the assessment reports. Considering that we only intended to discuss the problem descriptions and the recommendations anecdotally, and given the resources available to verify this information, we verified that the problem descriptions and recommendations had been copied correctly for a random sample of 20 assessment reports from fiscal year 2005. We analyzed the data to determine the frequency with which foreign airports complied with particular categories of ICAO standards and recommended practices, such as passenger screening, checked baggage screening, access controls, etc., and the number of airports that resolved deficiencies upon completion of the assessment. To determine the results of TSA’s air carrier inspections, we obtained inspection data from TSA’s Performance and Results Information System (PARIS). For the purposes of our review, we analyzed the results of inspections conducted in fiscal year 2005 to be consistent with the analysis performed on the results of foreign airport assessments for fiscal year 2005. TSA’s inspections database contained information on 529 air carrier inspections at 145 foreign airports in 71 countries conducted by TSA during fiscal year 2005. Specifically, the inspections database included the date and location of the inspection, the inspected air carrier, the security requirements being inspected, as well as the inspector’s determination as to whether the air carrier was or was not in compliance with security requirements. Prior to conducting any analysis, we assessed the reliability of the inspection data by performing electronic testing for obvious errors in accuracy and completeness. Our testing revealed a few errors, such as inconsistencies in the names of individual air carriers or incorrectly identifying the airport as the assessed entity rather than the air carrier. We also found instances of inspections conducted at domestic airports that were included in the data; those inspection records were removed. We also interviewed agency officials familiar with the data, and worked with them to resolve the data problems we identified. Based on our electronic testing and discussions with agency officials, we found the data to be sufficiently reliable for the purposes of our report. For our analysis, we also added additional information to the inspection records to include the country where the inspection occurred, and whether the air carrier being inspected was a U.S.-based air carrier or a foreign air carrier. Finally, to facilitate our analysis, we grouped the security requirements being inspected into several categories, such as aircraft security, cargo, checked baggage, passenger and carry-on screening and special procedures. To determine the actions taken by TSA when foreign airports did not comply with ICAO standards and recommended practices, we reviewed TSA’s Foreign Airport Assessment Program Standard Operating Procedures (SOP). We also reviewed relevant statutory provisions that identify specific actions to be taken by the Secretary of Homeland Security when the Secretary determines that a foreign airport does not maintain and carry-out effective security measures. To determine the actions taken by TSA when air carriers did not comply with TSA security requirements, we reviewed fiscal year 2005 information from the findings and investigations databases in PARIS. As with the inspection data, to facilitate our analysis, we included additional information in the findings database, such as the country where the inspection occurred, and whether the air carrier being inspected was a U.S.-based air carrier or a foreign air carrier. Further, we grouped the security requirements being inspected into several categories, such as aircraft security, cargo, checked baggage, passenger and carry-on screening, and special procedures. To assess the reliability of the findings data, we performed electronic testing for obvious errors and completeness and interviewed agency officials knowledgeable about the data. We identified two issues of concern during our reliability assessment. First, we found that the findings database is not linked to the inspections database to allow for ready determination of the actions taken by TSA in response to specific deficiencies. Second, the findings database did not consistently include accurate information on actions taken in response to findings. According to TSA officials knowledgeable about the data, the findings database should contain information on actions taken by TSA for each response of “not in compliance” in the inspections database. However, we found that in half of the inspections where deficiencies were identified, such information was not properly recorded in the findings database. Considering the amount of information excluded from the findings database and that this information could not be readily provided by TSA, we determined that the findings data were not sufficiently reliable for conducting evaluative analysis of the actions taken by TSA when security violations were identified during air carrier inspections. However, we determined that the findings data were sufficiently reliable for conducting descriptive analysis of TSA’s actions, while including appropriate statements as to its reliability, and for anecdotal purposes. To assess the reliability of the investigations data included in PARIS, we conducted electronic testing and interviewed agency officials knowledgeable about the data. We found that information in the investigations database is not recorded in such a way that one can readily determine which air carrier inspection, and in particular which specific security violations identified, were the impetus behind a particular investigation. TSA officials explained that inspectors are not required to link an investigation to the inspection which it stemmed from. When we performed our analysis, TSA officials were, however, able to provide links to inspections for some of the investigations. For the remainder of the investigations data, we attempted to make the link between inspections and investigations by using information from the inspections database such as the date when the investigation record was created and the narrative fields, which in some cases identified whether the investigation was a result of an inspection or some other offense, such as an air carrier allowing a passenger on the No-Fly list to board a U.S.-bound flight. Our analysis of actions taken by TSA when air carriers did not comply with security requirements is, therefore, based on those investigations that we were able to link to fiscal year 2005 inspection activity. We found these data to be sufficiently reliable for purposes of this report. For additional information on actions taken by TSA when foreign airports and air carriers did not comply with security requirements, we interviewed TSA headquarters and field officials in the Office of Security Operations— the division responsible for conducting foreign airport assessments and air carrier inspections and making recommendations for corrective action— and the Transportation Security Network Management division—the unit responsible for working with foreign officials to coordinate TSA foreign airport visits and monitoring host government and air carrier progress in addressing security deficiencies. To identify actions taken by TSA to help foreign officials address security deficiencies identified at foreign airports during the fiscal year 2005 airport assessments, we obtained and analyzed information from the fiscal year 2005 foreign airport assessment reports. To obtain information on TSA’s efforts to assist air carrier representatives in addressing identified security deficiencies, we reviewed information in the findings and investigations databases from TSA’s PARIS. As previously discussed, we assessed the reliability of the findings and investigations data by performing electronic testing for obvious errors in accuracy and completeness, and interviewed agency officials knowledgeable about the data. While we identified errors during our reliability assessment, many of which remained unresolved, we determined that the findings and investigations data were sufficiently reliable for anecdotal descriptions of the assistance TSA provided air carriers to help them address security deficiencies. To obtain additional information on actions taken by TSA to address security deficiencies identified during foreign airport assessments and air carrier inspections, we interviewed TSA headquarters officials from the Office of Security Operations and the Transportation Sector Network Management division. We also made site visits to TSA’s five international field offices (IFO) located in Los Angeles, Dallas, Miami, Frankfurt, and Singapore, where we met with the IFO managers; international aviation security inspectors, who conduct foreign airport assessments and air carrier inspections; 10 of the 20 TSA Representatives (TSAR), who schedule TSA airport visits and follow up on host governments’ progress in addressing security deficiencies; and 4 of the 6 International Principal Security Inspectors (IPSI), who are responsible for assisting foreign air carriers in understanding and complying with TSA security requirements. We also met with 3 of the 15 Principal Security Inspectors (PSI) located at TSA headquarters that are responsible for helping U.S. air carriers understand and comply with TSA security requirements. During each of these interviews, we discussed these officials’ responsibilities related to the foreign airport assessment and air carrier inspection programs, including their role in assisting foreign officials and air carrier representatives in correcting security deficiencies identified during assessments and inspections. Information from our interviews with government officials, members of the aviation industry, and TSA officials and inspectors cannot be generalized beyond those that we spoke with because we did not use statistical sampling techniques in selecting individuals to interview. To obtain a greater understanding of the foreign airport assessment and air carrier inspection processes, as well as the assistance TSA provides, we accompanied a team of TSA inspectors and a TSAR during the assessment of E.T. Joshua International Airport in Kingstown, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, and the inspection of Caribbean Sun Airlines at that location. Moreover, we identified and met with officials from other U.S. government agencies that assist foreign officials in enhancing security at foreign airports. Specifically, we met with officials from the Department of Justice, Department of State, Department of Transportation, and the U.S. Trade and Development Administration. To obtain information on the extent to which TSA provided oversight of its assessment and inspection efforts, we reviewed the agency guidance for each program. We also reviewed sections of the fiscal year 2005 foreign airport assessment reports for completeness and general consistency with TSA guidance for preparing assessment reports. In addition, we reviewed the inspections, findings, and investigations databases in PARIS for completeness and the ability to track air carrier inspection activity from initiation through completion, including actions taken against air carriers who did not comply with security requirements. We compared TSA’s guidance and reporting mechanisms for the assessment and inspection programs with federal standards for internal controls and associated guidance. We also met with TSA headquarters officials, IFO managers, TSARs, and aviation security inspectors to discuss the extent to which they documented assessment and inspection activity from initiation through completion and follow-up activity for unresolved security deficiencies. We obtained additional information on TSA’s oversight of the foreign airport assessment and air carrier inspection programs, particularly with regard to assessing the impact of these programs, by reviewing TSA’s fiscal year 2006 Performance Assessment Rating Tool (PART) submissions. The Office of Management and Budget describes PART as a diagnostic tool meant to provide a consistent approach to evaluating federal programs as part of the executive budget formulation process. PART includes information on an agency’s program goals and performance measures used to assess whether program goals are being met. We compared the program goals identified in TSA’s PART submission with the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 (GPRA), which identifies requirements for the types of measures federal agencies should use to assess the performance of their programs. We also interviewed TSA headquarters and field officials to obtain their perspectives on appropriate ways to assess the performance of the foreign airport assessment and air carrier inspection programs. To identify challenges that affected TSA’s ability to conduct foreign airport assessments and air carrier inspections at foreign airports, we met with TSA headquarters and field officials in the Office of Security Operations and the Transport Sector Network Management division regarding their efforts to obtain access to foreign airports to conduct assessments and inspections. We also visited the embassies of 16 nations and the Delegation of the European Commission in Washington, D.C., to obtain perspectives of foreign transportation security officials on TSA’s airport assessment and air carrier inspection program. In addition, we conducted site visits to meet with aviation security officials in Belgium, Canada, Germany, the Philippines, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Thailand, and the United Kingdom to discuss their perspectives on TSA’s foreign airport assessment and air carrier inspection activity. We selected these locations because they met one or more of the following criteria: a relatively high volume of passengers fly to the United States each year, TSA assigned a relatively high threat ranking to the country, the country received aviation security training or technical assistance from a U.S. government agency, or a TSA international field office was located in the country. We also met with individuals representing 11 air carriers, including both U.S. and foreign airlines, to obtain their perspectives on TSA’s foreign airport assessment and air carrier inspections programs. Additionally, we met with officials from the European Commission, the European Civil Aviation Commission, and ICAO to discuss similar efforts these organizations have in place to ensure compliance with international aviation security standards. Information from our interviews with foreign government officials and members of the aviation industry cannot be generalized beyond those that we spoke with because we did not use statistical sampling techniques in selecting individuals to interview. We also reviewed documentation associated with TSA’s risk-based methodology for scheduling foreign airport assessments and air carrier inspections, which TSA intended to address some of the challenges in conducting assessments and inspections, and compared the methodology to our risk management guidance. In addition, we interviewed 4 Federal Security Directors and 7 aviation security inspectors stationed in the United States to discuss their support of the foreign airport assessment and air carrier inspection programs as well as the impact, if any, that their involvement in these programs has had on their operations at U.S. airports. We conducted our work from October 2005 through March 2007 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. The aircraft operator standard security program (AOSSP) is designed to provide for the safety of persons and property traveling on flights against acts of criminal violence and air piracy, and the introduction of explosives, incendiaries, weapons, and other prohibited items on board an aircraft. TSA requires that each air carrier adopt and implement a security program approved by TSA for scheduled passenger and public charter operations at locations within the United States, from the United States to a non-U.S. location, or from a non-U.S. location to the United States, and from a non- U.S. location to a non-U.S. location (for example, an intermediate stop such as Singapore to Tokyo to the United States). The AOSSP developed by TSA and used by U.S.-based carriers is divided into chapters and lays out security requirements for operations. Table 6 summarizes requirements applicable to flights operating from a non-U.S. location to the United States. When TSA determines that additional security measures are necessary to respond to a threat assessment or to a specific threat against civil aviation, TSA may issue a Security Directive setting forth mandatory measures. Each air carrier required to have a TSA-approved security program must comply with each Security Directive issued to it by TSA, within the time frame prescribed in the Security Directive for compliance. TSA requires that the security program of a foreign air carrier provide passengers a level of protection similar to the level of protection provided by U.S. air carriers serving the same airports. The security program must be designed to prevent or deter the carriage onboard airplanes of any prohibited item, prohibit unauthorized access to airplanes, ensure that checked baggage is accepted only by an authorized agent of the air carrier, and ensure the proper handling of cargo and checked baggage to be loaded onto passenger flights. In addition, carriers are requested to provide an acceptable level of security for passengers by developing and implementing procedures to prevent acts of unlawful interference. TSA’s foreign air carrier model security program was prepared to assist foreign airlines in complying with security requirements for operations into and out of the United States. Table 7 summarizes requirements applicable to foreign carriers’ flights operating from a non-U.S. location to the United States. When TSA determines that additional security measures are necessary to respond to an emergency requiring immediate action with respect to safety in air transportation, it may issue an emergency amendment. An emergency amendment mandates additional actions beyond those in the air carrier’s security program. When TSA issues an emergency amendment, it also issues a notice indicating the reasons for the amendment to be adopted. Air carriers are required to comply with emergency amendments immediately. The State Department’s Anti-Terrorism Assistance (ATA) program seeks to provide partner countries the training, equipment, and technology they need to combat terrorism and prosecute terrorists and terrorist supporters. The Anti-Terrorism Assistance program was established in 1983. Countries must meet at least one of the four following criteria to participate in the ATA program: The country or region must be categorized as having a critical or high threat of terrorism and unable to protect U.S. facilities and personnel within the country There are important U.S. policy interests with the prospective country, which may be supported through the provision of antiterrorism assistance. For example, officials in one country received assistance through the ATA program because they allowed the United States to establish air bases in their country. The prospective country must be served by a U.S. air carrier, or is the last point of departure for flights to the United States. The prospective country cannot be engaged in gross human rights violations. The State Department determines whether and what training and assistance to provide countries based on needs assessments done by State Department personnel along with a team of interagency subject matter experts. The assessment team evaluates prospective program participants using 25 Antiterrorism Critical Capabilities. Program officials stated that the assessment is a snapshot of the country’s antiterrorism capabilities, including equipment, personnel, and available training. ATA program officials stated that the assessment includes a review at several levels, including tactical capabilities (people and resources), operational management capabilities (overall management and ability), and strategic capabilities. Two of the 25 capabilities reviewed during the needs assessments are related to aviation security. Those are Airspace Security and Air Port of Entry Security. The first is an assessment of how a country controls what goes through its airspace. The second is an assessment of security at the country’s main airport. According to program officials, when doing an assessment, the ATA team will usually visit the busiest airport within the country to examine the operational security of the airport and assesses training provided to airport security management. The results of the needs assessments determine what type of assistance the State Department will offer to countries participating in the ATA program. The various types of training and assistance offered through the program include crisis management and response, cyber-terrorism, dignitary protection, bomb detection, border control, kidnap intervention and hostage negotiation and rescue, response to incidents involving weapons of mass destruction, counter terrorist finance, interdiction of terrorist organizations, and airport security. During fiscal year 2005, 146 countries received antiterrorism training through the ATA program; 7 countries received training for aviation security. The ATA program offers one course in aviation security, “Airport Security Management.” This is a 1-week seminar that is generally taught in-country. According to State Department officials, TSA employees teach the course. State Department officials stated that this course helps countries to meet internationally recognized aviation security standards established by ICAO. State Department officials stated that while most countries’ officials know about ICAO, and can obtain ICAO manuals and standards, many of the countries do not have the resources or equipment to operationalize ICAO standards. State Department officials stated that the ATA program offers countries the resources to implement ICAO standards. For fiscal year 2005, aviation security training was provided to 7 countries through the ATA program, Philippines ($94,723), Kazakhstan ($98,200), Bahamas ($95,000), Barbados ($45,900), Dominican Republic ($45,900), Qatar ($98,046), and United Arab Emirates ($95,000). TSA employees teach in-country aviation security training to foreign officials through the ATA program. In addition, ATA uses TSA staff as subject matter experts when performing needs assessments. The U.S. Trade and Development Agency (USTDA) works to advance economic development and U.S. commercial interests in developing and middle-income countries. The agency funds various forms of technical assistance, training, and business workshops to support the development of a modem infrastructure and a fair and open trading environment. USTDA’s use of foreign assistance funds to support sound investment policy and decision making in host countries is intended to create an enabling environment for trade, investment, and sustainable economic development. In carrying out its mission, USTDA gives emphasis to economic sectors that may benefit from U.S. exports of goods and services. For example, according to USTDA, the agency obligated approximately 24 percent of its program funding in support of transportation sector projects. More specifically, according to USTDA, 5.6 percent of the agency’s budget is obligated toward projects in the aviation security sector. The general goals of USTDA’s work in the aviation security field are to help foreign airports achieve “Category I” status (the FAA classification for an airport that meets minimum safety standards, which allows foreign air carriers to fly from their country of origin directly to the United States), to help countries prepare to pass and adhere to ICAO standards, and to offer training to increase aviation security. According to USTDA, assistance projects and recipients are selected within the framework of USTDA’s development and commercial mandate. Generally, projects are not selected based strictly on security (i.e., not selected based on threat) but on the likelihood of a country implementing the recommended actions to obtain greater aviation safety and security. USTDA projects are developed through consultations by USTDA staff and U.S. and foreign embassies, foreign officials (public or private) that have decision-making authority to implement the assistance project, or U.S. industry officials that identify a need for assistance. According to USTDA, when developing the project, the agency evaluates a number of factors, including the priority the government places on the project and if the entity has the technical capability to implement the project. According to USTDA, this evaluation is conducted in order to ensure that U.S. taxpayers’ dollars are wisely used on projects that will help strengthen a foreign countries’ ability to transport passengers and goods to the United States. After an initial evaluation by USTDA staff, USTDA employs a technical expert to conduct an independent evaluation of the proposed assistance project. That technical evaluation can take two forms: a Desk Study or a Definitional Mission. The Desk Study is completed for proposals where sufficient information is provided that allows for a technical expert to make an informed decision as to whether or not USTDA should fund the project. If the project proposal does not contain sufficient detail to evaluate without conducting a field site visit, USTDA then employs a small business contractor—or consultant—to conduct a Definitional Mission, which, according to USTDA, costs between $25,000 and $40,000. The consultant undertaking the Definitional Mission takes 1 to 2 weeks to meet with the stakeholders in the foreign country, including the potential grant recipients, in order to review project ideas and generate additional project opportunities. Upon return from the site visits, the consultant prepares a report for USTDA on the findings of the Definitional Mission. According to USTDA, consultants typically assess more than one proposed assistance project at a time when in the field. To avoid conflicts of interest, the consultant that undertakes the Definitional Mission is prohibited from participating in any of the follow-on work, including the early investment analysis or training recommended in the report. Early investment analysis is the main form of USTDA assistance. According to USTDA, the cost of such assistance typically ranges from $100,000 to $500,000. These technical assistance programs may take from 6 to 18 months to complete. The studies are undertaken by U.S. consulting firms under a grant program and are intended to evaluate the technical, financial, environmental, legal, and other critical aspects of infrastructure development projects that are of interest to potential lenders and investors. Host country project sponsors select the U.S. companies, normally through open competitions. USTDA organizes Annex 17 workshops to help bring developing countries into compliance with lCAO Annex 17. These workshops are designed to give countries assistance before lCAO inspections so that they meet minimum standards and pass inspections. According to USTDA, the workshops suggest ways that relatively poor countries can meet ICAO standards with a low level of technological sophistication. According to USTDA, the workshops focus on enhancing training and improving human resources related to aviation security. According to USTDA, for fiscal year 2005, the agency awarded Chile ($359,000), Haiti ($150,000), Iraq ($243,000), Malaysia ($100,000), Tanzania ($371,000), Ukraine ($625,000), West Africa Regional Training ($353,000) and Worldwide Aviation Security training ($596,000) grant assistance in the aviation security sector. USTDA consults with TSA on an ongoing basis. USTDA used TSA personnel as instructors for the Annex 17 workshops. The Department of Transportation (DOT) manages the Safe Skies for Africa presidential initiative (Safe Skies), which started in 1998. Safe Skies is a technical program that assists participating countries in meeting international aviation safety and security standards. According to DOT officials, Safe Skies is a small program with an annual budget— including operating and administrative costs—between $1 million and $3 million. According to DOT officials, approximately one-fourth of the Safe Skies budget goes toward aviation security. Funding for Safe Skies is provided by the State Department and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). The original Safe Skies participants were selected in 1998 by an interagency committee made up of Department of Defense, Department of Transportation, State Department, and the U.S. Trade and Development Agency. The committee held a series of meetings to consider priority lists created by each agency, cables exchanged with U.S. embassies across sub- Saharan Africa, and responses to questionnaires sent to various states. The committee selected countries that it believed had the highest likelihood of successfully complying with international aviation safety and security standards set by ICAO and requirements set by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and TSA. The committee also considered U.S. trade interests and regional diversity issues. In the end, countries from across sub-Saharan Africa were selected to participate in the program. Since 1998 only two countries have been added to the list of Safe Skies participants. Both Uganda and Djibouti became Safe Skies countries after President Bush announced the East Africa Counterterrorism Initiative in 2003. All Safe Skies countries receive some degree of aid, with priority going to those countries that demonstrate political will. DOT gauges political will based on consultations with embassies and TSA and whether a country implements recommended safety and security practices. The Administration’s priorities are communicated through the State Department. According to DOT, all participants except Zimbabwe have had aviation security, safety, and air navigation surveys of their civil aviation systems performed at their airports by U.S. government subject - matter experts. Since September 11, 2001, the State Department has provided $5 million in additional resources for DOT to provide security equipment to Safe Skies countries. DOT officials stated that they worked with their TSA (formerly FAA security) colleagues to perform site visits to help agency officials determine country-specific security equipment needs for the screening of passengers and baggage. According to DOT, Safe Skies has an East Africa aviation security advisor stationed in Nairobi, Kenya to provide direct advice and technical assistance to Djibouti, Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda in meeting ICAO standards and to assist these states in addressing potential threats to civil aviation. According to DOT, fiscal year 2005 recipients of Safe Skies assistance were Angola, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Djibouti, Kenya, Mali, Namibia, Tanzania, and Uganda. TSA and DOT responsibilities are laid out in a 2004 TSA-DOT memorandum of agreement. Under this agreement, TSA provides advice, technical assistance, and training through the TSA Enforcement Academy, in addition to providing an aviation security advisor to Safe Skies. These activities are funded by DOT, with funds that were appropriated to USAID and transferred to DOT for the purposes of implementing Safe Skies. TSA also works in partnership with DOT to prioritize recipient countries based on need. The Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) of the Department of State has a program under way aimed at combating alien smuggling and improving border security. The part of the program relating to border security contains elements relating to maritime security and airport security. These efforts are undertaken in cooperation with the Organization of American States’ (OAS) Inter-American Committee against Terrorism (CICTE). The INL-OAS efforts began with maritime security and were broadened to include aviation security in 2003. INL officials worked with CICTE officials to select the appropriate OAS member countries to receive training. As of August 2006, the aviation security effort under way was focused on Caribbean nations, and fiscal year 2006 funding was also intended to provide funding for some Central and South American nations. Roughly $264,000 was spent in 2004, $187,110 in 2005, and $236,610 in 2006 on aviation security. INL funds pay for aviation security training courses, and the courses are taught by TSA officials. These training courses are aimed at helping countries to develop national civil aviation security programs and other essential plans based on the ICAO standards as well as crisis management. INL funds were used to pay for national development workshops for Caribbean countries. These workshops were taught by TSA staff who spent 1 week in each Caribbean country. While in country, TSA representatives reviewed the country’s security program, looked for deficiencies within the security program, and attempted to build a program that would resolve the deficiencies they identified. According to OAS, participants in these workshops identified recommendations to improve aviation security and combat terrorism and submitted the recommendations to their respective governments. The workshops addressed enhancements to the national security program, national legislation, oversight, national security committees, and program approval processes. According to OAS, in 2006, these workshops took place in Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Belize, Dominican Republic, Grenada, Guyana, Jamaica, St. Kitts and Nevis, and St. Vincent and the Grenadines. According to OAS, starting in September 2006, this program began functioning in Central America, where national development workshops were planned to take place in Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Panama. According to OAS, in addition to the national development workshops, this program also offers a 5-day crisis management workshop for midlevel to senior-level aviation management and other government officials. INL, through CICTE, also funds aviation security courses that are taught by ICAO instructors. According to OAS, the recipient countries of CICTE-sponsored aviation security training for calendar year 2006 were Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Bolivia, Columbia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Grenada, Guatemala, Guyana, Honduras, Jamaica, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Trinidad andTobago, and Uruguay. TSA officials are the instructors for the on-site workshops. CICTE established an memorandum of agreement with TSA, and discussed the best approach for helping OAS members develop a long-term international aviation security program. CICTE and TSA decided that in-country, on-the- ground visits would be the best approach, since these allow CICTE and TSA to see which problems are present. According to OAS, during the fourth quarter of 2006, CICTE received grant funding to provide aviation security training courses for the nine countries that will host the 2007 Cricket World Cup. According to OAS, grant funding was used to support two aviation security training courses—the Basic Security Training Course and the Aviation Security Training Course. The Basic Security Training Course is a 7-day course focused on improving aviation security screeners’ ability to detect threat items using X-ray machines, metal detection portals, physical search techniques, and explosive trace detection technologies. According to OAS, the Aviation Security Training Course is a 9-day course that addresses concepts and principles of managing aviation security operations within the unique environment of an international airport. Course content is also based on ICAO standards and recommended practices and focused on the protection of passengers, crew, ground personnel, the general public, the aircraft, and airport facilities. According to OAS, practical exercises are used to reinforce classroom learning. This course provided training to midlevel managers and supervisors who are responsible for aviation security program planning, oversight, and operations. According to OAS, TSA instructors train these officials in identifying vulnerabilities at their airports, developing preventive measures, and allocating resources to handle the flow of passengers while maintaining adequate security. The recipient countries for calendar year 2006 and the first half of 2007 are Antigua and Barbuda, Grenada, Guyana, Jamaica, St. Kitts and Nevis, and St. Lucia. The Department of Justice’s (DOJ) International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program (ICITAP) aims to develop law enforcement agencies and systems. Training is only one component of ICITAP’s holistic approach to this mission. ICITAP has an ongoing relationship with the Department of State to offer various types of training. Since 2000, ICITAP facilitated Department of State-initiated aviation security training in Ghana and the Dominican Republic, and conducted an assessment in Benin. The Department of Justice’s involvement can begin when a foreign government makes a request to the U.S. embassy for training to rectify perceived weaknesses in aviation security. The embassy then collaborates with DOJ to put together a proposal for action, which is then sent to the Department of State’s Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement. INL attempts to obtain a country-specific appropriation for the project, and alerts DOJ as to whether funding is available. According to DOJ, INL sometimes targets certain countries for assistance and then asks ICITAP to prepare proposals and budgets to support training activities and technical assistance to improve law enforcement capacity in the host countries. ICITAP assistance included on-site aviation security needs assessments, with ICITAP serving as facilitator and current and former TSA (previously FAA) employees performing the aviation security needs assessments. The assessment was based on standards laid out in ICAO Annex 17. The assessment attempted to broadly gauge the adequacy of the available security systems and each country’s ability to manage the systems. As of February 2007, the most recent recipients are Benin ($79,500 in 2002), Ghana ($79,500 in 2002), and the Dominican Republic ($32,000 in 2003). In 2003, as a result of information gathered from TSA’s foreign airport assessment report, ICITAP provided drug interdiction training to customs officials in Ghana stationed at the airport. According to DOJ, INL granted $79,500 each to Ghana and Benin for the purpose of providing airport security training. Former and current TSA officials have conducted needs assessments and provided training to foreign officials through ICITAP. In addition to the person named above, Maria Strudwick, Assistant Director; Amy Bernstein; Kristy Brown; Alisha Chugh; Emily Hanawalt; Christopher Jones; Stanley Kostyla; Kyle Lamborn; Thomas Lombardi; Jeremy Manion; and Linda Miller made key contributions to this report. Aviation Security: Federal Efforts to Secure U.S.-Bound Air Cargo Are in the Early Stages and Could Be Strengthened. GAO-07-660. Washington, D.C.: April 30, 2007. Aviation Security: TSA's Change to its Prohibited Items List Has Not Resulted in Any Reported Public Safety Incidents, but the Impact of the Change on Screening Operations is Uncertain. GAO-07-623R. Washington, D.C.: April 25, 2007. Aviation Security: Risk, Experience, and Customer Service Drive Changes to Airline Passenger Screening Procedures, but Evaluation and Documentation of Proposed Changes Could Be Improved. GAO-07-634. Washington, D.C.: April 16, 2007. Aviation Security: TSA’s Staffing Allocation Model Is Useful for Allocating Staff among Airports, but Its Assumptions Should Be Systematically Reassessed. GAO-07-299. Washington, D.C.: Feb. 28, 2007. Aviation Security: Progress Made in Systematic Planning to Guide Key Investment Decisions, but More Work Remains. GAO-07-448T. Washington, D.C.: Feb. 13, 2007. Aviation Security: TSA Oversight of Checked Baggage Screening Procedures Could Be Strengthened. GAO-06-869. Washington, D.C.: Jul. 28, 2006. Aviation Security: TSA Has Strengthened Efforts to Plan for the Optimal Deployment of Checked Baggage Screening Systems but Funding Uncertainties Remain. GAO-06-875T. Washington, D.C.: June 29, 2006. Aviation Security: Management Challenges Remain for the Transportation Security Administration’s Secure Flight Program. GAO-06-864T. Washington, D.C.: June 14, 2006. Aviation Security: Further Study of Safety and Effectiveness and Better Management Controls Needed if Air Carriers Resume Interest in Deploying Less than Lethal Weapons. GAO-06-475. Washington, D.C.: May 26, 2006. Aviation Security: Enhancements Made in Passenger and Checked Baggage Screening, but Challenges Remain. GAO-06-371T. Washington, D.C.: Apr. 4, 2006. Aviation Security: Transportation Security Administration Has Made Progress in Managing a Federal Security Workforce and Ensuring Security at U.S. Airports, but Challenges Remain. GAO-06-597T. Washington, D.C.: Apr. 4, 2006. Aviation Security: Progress Made to Set Up Program Using Private- Sector Airport Screeners, but More Work Remains. GAO-06-166. Washington, D.C.: Mar. 31, 2006. Aviation Security: Significant Management Challenges May Adversely Affect Implementation of the Transportation Security Administration’s Secure Flight Program. GAO-06-374T. Washington, D.C.: Feb. 9, 2006. Aviation Security: Federal Air Marshal Service Could Benefit from Improved Planning and Controls. GAO-06-203. Washington, D.C.: Nov. 28, 2005. Aviation Security: Federal Action Needed to Strengthen Domestic Air Cargo Security. GAO-06-76. Washington, D.C.: Oct. 17, 2005. Transportation Security Administration: More Clarity on the Authority of Federal Security Directors Is Needed. GAO-05-935. Washington, D.C.: Sept. 23, 2005. Aviation Security: Flight and Cabin Crew Member Security Training Strengthened, but Better Planning and Internal Controls Needed. GAO-05-781. Washington, D.C.: Sept. 6, 2005. Aviation Security: Transportation Security Administration Did Not Fully Disclose Uses of Personal Information During Secure Flight Program Testing in Initial Privacy Notes, but Has Recently Taken Steps to More Fully Inform the Public. GAO-05-864R. Washington, D.C.: July 22, 2005. Aviation Security: Better Planning Needed to Optimize Deployment of Checked Baggage Screening Systems. GAO-05-896T. Washington, D.C.: July 13, 2005. Aviation Security: Screener Training and Performance Measurement Strengthened, but More Work Remains. GAO-05-457. Washington, D.C.: May 2, 2005. Aviation Security: Secure Flight Development and Testing Under Way, but Risks Should Be Managed as System Is Further Developed. GAO-05-356. Washington, D.C.: Mar. 28, 2005. Aviation Security: Systematic Planning Needed to Optimize the Deployment of Checked Baggage Screening Systems. GAO-05-365. Washington, D.C.: Mar. 15, 2005. Aviation Security: Measures for Testing the Effect of Using Commercial Data for the Secure Flight Program. GAO-05-324. Washington, D.C.: Feb.23, 2005. Transportation Security: Systematic Planning Needed to Optimize Resources. GAO-05-357T. Washington, D.C.: Feb.15, 2005. Aviation Security: Preliminary Observations on TSA’s Progress to Allow Airports to Use Private Passenger and Baggage Screening Services. GAO-05-126. Washington, D.C.: Nov.19, 2004. General Aviation Security: Increased Federal Oversight Is Needed, but Continued Partnership with the Private Sector Is Critical to Long-Term Success. GAO-05-144. Washington, D.C.: Nov. 10, 2004. Aviation Security: Further Steps Needed to Strengthen the Security of Commercial Airport Perimeters and Access Controls. GAO-04-728. Washington, D.C.: Jun. 4, 2004. Transportation Security Administration: High-Level Attention Needed to Strengthen Acquisition Function. GAO-04-544. Washington, D.C.: May 28, 2004. Aviation Security: Challenges in Using Biometric Technologies. GAO-04-785T. Washington, D.C.: May 19, 2004. Nonproliferation: Further Improvements Needed in U.S. Efforts to Counter Threats from Man-Portable Air Defense Systems. GAO-04-519. Washington, D.C.: May 13, 2004. Aviation Security: Private Screening Contractors Have Little Flexibility to Implement Innovative Approaches. GAO-04-505T. Washington, D.C.: Apr. 22, 2004. Aviation Security: Improvement Still Needed in Federal Aviation Security Efforts. GAO-04-592T. Washington, D.C.: Mar. 30, 2004. Aviation Security: Challenges Delay Implementation of Computer- Assisted Passenger Prescreening System. GAO-04-504T. Washington, D.C.: Mar. 17, 2004. Aviation Security: Factors Could Limit the Effectiveness of the Transportation Security Administration’s Efforts to Secure Aerial Advertising Operations. GAO-04-499R. Washington, D.C.: Mar. 5, 2004. Aviation Security: Computer-Assisted Passenger Prescreening System Faces Significant Implementation Challenges. GAO-04-385. Washington, D.C.: Feb. 13, 2004. Aviation Security: Challenges Exist in Stabilizing and Enhancing Passenger and Baggage Screening Operations. GAO-04-440T. Washington, D.C.: Feb. 12, 2004. The Department of Homeland Security Needs to Fully Adopt a Knowledge-based Approach to Its Counter-MANPADS Development Program. GAO-04-341R. Washington, D.C.: Jan. 30, 2004. Aviation Security: Efforts to Measure Effectiveness and Strengthen Security Programs. GAO-04-285T. Washington, D.C.: Nov. 20, 2003. Aviation Security: Federal Air Marshal Service Is Addressing Challenges of Its Expanded Mission and Workforce, but Additional Actions Needed. GAO-04-242. Washington, D.C.: Nov. 19, 2003. Aviation Security: Efforts to Measure Effectiveness and Address Challenges. GAO-04-232T. Washington, D.C.: Nov. 5, 2003. Airport Passenger Screening: Preliminary Observations on Progress Made and Challenges Remaining. GAO-03-1173. Washington, D.C.: Sept. 24, 2003. Aviation Security: Progress since September 11, 2001, and the Challenges Ahead. GAO-03-1150T. Washington, D.C.: Sept. 9, 2003. Transportation Security: Federal Action Needed to Enhance Security Efforts. GAO-03-1154T. Washington, D.C.: Sept. 9, 2003. Transportation Security: Federal Action Needed to Help Address Security Challenges. GAO-03-843. Washington, D.C.: Jun. 30, 2003. Federal Aviation Administration: Reauthorization Provides Opportunities to Address Key Agency Challenges. GAO-03-653T. Washington, D.C.: Apr. 10, 2003. Transportation Security: Post-September 11th Initiatives and Long- Term Challenges. GAO-03-616T. Washington, D.C.: Apr. 1, 2003. Airport Finance: Past Funding Levels May Not Be Sufficient to Cover Airports’ Planned Capital Development. GAO-03-497T. Washington, D.C.: Feb. 25, 2003. Transportation Security Administration: Actions and Plans to Build a Results-Oriented Culture. GAO-03-190. Washington, D.C.: Jan. 17, 2003. Aviation Safety: Undeclared Air Shipments of Dangerous Goods and DOT’s Enforcement Approach. GAO-03-22. Washington, D.C.: Jan. 10, 2003. Aviation Security: Vulnerabilities and Potential Improvements for the Air Cargo System. GAO-03-344. Washington, D.C.: Dec. 20, 2002. Aviation Security: Registered Traveler Program Policy and Implementation Issues. GAO-03-253. Washington, D.C.: Nov. 22, 2002. Airport Finance: Using Airport Grant Funds for Security Projects Has Affected Some Development Projects. GAO-03-27. Washington, D.C.: Oct. 15, 2002. Commercial Aviation: Financial Condition and Industry Responses Affect Competition. GAO-03-171T. Washington, D.C.: Oct. 2, 2002. Aviation Security: Transportation Security Administration Faces Immediate and Long-Term Challenges. GAO-02-971T. Washington, D.C.: Jul. 25, 2002. Aviation Security: Information Concerning the Arming of Commercial Pilots. GAO-02-822R. Washington, D.C.: Jun. 28, 2002. Aviation Security: Vulnerabilities in, and Alternatives for, Preboard Screening Security Operations. GAO-01-1171T. Washington, D.C.: Sept. 25, 2001. Aviation Security: Weaknesses in Airport Security and Options for Assigning Screening Responsibilities. GAO-01-1165T. Washington, D.C.: Sept. 21, 2001. Homeland Security: A Framework for Addressing the Nation’s Efforts. GAO-01-1158T. Washington, D.C.: Sept. 21, 2001. Aviation Security: Terrorist Acts Demonstrate Urgent Need to Improve Security at the Nation’s Airports. GAO-01-1162T. Washington, D.C.: Sept. 20, 2001. Aviation Security: Terrorist Acts Illustrate Severe Weaknesses in Aviation Security. GAO-01-1166T. Washington, D.C.: Sept. 20, 2001.

Summary: The Transportation Security Administration's (TSA) efforts to evaluate the security of foreign airports and air carriers that service the United States are of great importance, particularly considering that flights bound for the United States from foreign countries continue to be targets of coordinated terrorist activity, as demonstrated by the alleged August 2006 liquid explosives terrorist plot. For this review, GAO evaluated the results of foreign airport and air carrier evaluations; actions taken and assistance provided by TSA when security deficiencies were identified; TSA's oversight of its foreign airport and air carrier evaluation programs; and TSA's efforts to address challenges in conducting foreign airport and air carrier evaluations. To conduct this work, GAO reviewed foreign airport and air carrier evaluation results and interviewed TSA officials, foreign aviation security officials, and air carrier representatives. Of the 128 foreign airports that TSA assessed during fiscal year 2005, TSA found that about 36 percent complied with all applicable security standards, while about 64 percent did not comply with at least one standard. The security deficiencies identified by TSA at two foreign airports were such that the Secretary of Homeland Security notified the public that the overall security at these airports was ineffective. Of the 529 overseas air carrier inspections conducted during fiscal year 2005, for about 71 percent, TSA did not identify any security violations, and for about 29 percent, TSA identified at least one security violation. TSA took enforcement action--warning letters, correction letters, or monetary fines--for about 18 percent of the air carrier security violations. TSA addressed most of the remaining 82 percent of security violations through on-site consultation. TSA assisted foreign officials and air carrier representatives in addressing identified deficiencies through on-site consultation, recommendations for security improvements, and referrals for training and technical assistance. However, TSA's oversight of the foreign airport assessment and air carrier inspection programs could be strengthened. For example, TSA did not have adequate controls in place to track whether scheduled assessments and inspections were actually conducted, deferred, or canceled. TSA also did not always document foreign officials' progress in addressing security deficiencies identified by TSA. Further, TSA did not always track what enforcement actions were taken against air carriers with identified security deficiencies. TSA also did not have outcome-based performance measures to assess the impact of its assessment and inspection programs on the security of U.S.-bound flights. Without such controls, TSA may not have reasonable assurance that the foreign airport assessment and air carrier inspection programs are operating as intended. TSA is taking action to address challenges that have limited its ability to conduct foreign airport assessments and air carrier inspections, including a lack of available inspectors, concerns regarding the resource burden placed on host governments as a result of frequent airport visits by TSA and others, and host government concerns regarding sovereignty. In October 2006, TSA began implementing a risk-based approach to scheduling foreign airport assessments, which should allow TSA to focus its limited inspector resources on higher-risk airports. TSA is also exploring opportunities to conduct joint airport assessments with the European Commission and use the results of airport assessments conducted by the European Commission to potentially adjust the frequency of TSA airport visits.