In 1993, DOE and the Russian government began working together to secure sites housing weapons-usable nuclear material and, in 1995, DOE established the MPC&A program, which is now administered by NNSA. DOE’s Office of International Material Protection and Cooperation, within NNSA, consists of five offices whose collective efforts contribute to enhancing the security of nuclear material and warheads in countries of concern and to improving the ability to detect illicit smuggling of those materials (see fig. 1). Four of these offices implement DOE’s MPC&A program, which, among other things, provides security upgrades at nuclear sites in Russia and other countries, and the fifth office, the Office of the Second Line of Defense, works to improve detection of illegal nuclear trafficking activities at border crossings and seaports. The Office of Nuclear Warhead Protection works with the Russian Ministry of Defense, including the 12th Main Directorate—the Russian Defense Ministry’s organization for nuclear munitions, the Strategic Rocket Forces, and the Navy to install security upgrades at nuclear warhead storage sites. The Office of Nuclear Warhead Protection also oversees DOE’s security upgrades work at naval nuclear fuel sites. The Office of Weapons Material Protection upgrades MPC&A systems at sites within the Rosatom nuclear weapons complex and also oversees DOE efforts to sustain U.S.-funded security upgrades at nuclear sites within the former Soviet Union that are not in Russia, such as facilities in Ukraine and Uzbekistan. The Office of Material Consolidation and Civilian Sites works to install MPC&A upgrades at nonmilitary nuclear facilities throughout Russia and oversees efforts to consolidate nuclear material into fewer buildings and to convert excess weapons-usable nuclear material into less attractive forms. The Office of Material Consolidation and Civilian Sites also manages DOE’s efforts to provide nuclear security assistance to countries outside of the former Soviet Union. The Office of National Infrastructure and Sustainability manages a variety of crosscutting programs, including transportation and protective forces assistance, and oversaw the development of guidelines for DOE’s efforts to help ensure that Russia can sustain the operation of U.S.-funded security systems at its nuclear sites after U.S. assistance ends. DOD has also assisted Russia in securing nuclear warhead storage sites, both temporary sites, such as rail transfer points, and permanent sites containing storage bunkers. In 1995, DOD began assisting the Russian Ministry of Defense with enhancing transportation security for nuclear warheads and security at nuclear warhead sites. DOD’s efforts to help Russia secure its nuclear warhead storage sites and to improve the security of warheads in transit are implemented by the Defense Threat Reduction Agency. Oversight and policy guidance for this work is provided by DOD’s Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy. Additional information on the history of U.S. efforts to help Russia and other countries secure nuclear material and warheads can be found in appendix II. DOE spent about $1.3 billion between fiscal year 1993 and fiscal year 2006 to provide security upgrades and other related assistance to facilities that house weapons-usable nuclear material in Russia and other countries and reports to have “secured” 175 buildings containing about 300 metric tons of weapons-usable nuclear material in Russia and the former Soviet Union. The number of buildings that DOE reports as secured, however, does not recognize that additional upgrades remain to be completed at some buildings because DOE considers a building to be “secure” after it has received only limited MPC&A upgrades (rapid upgrades), even when additional comprehensive upgrades have yet to be completed. Further, in response to terrorist actions and rising threat levels in Russia, DOE is examining the impact of an increased design basis threat it uses to measure the adequacy of security upgrades provided to Russian nuclear facilities and providing additional assistance to protective forces at Russian nuclear sites. Finally, DOE and Rosatom have developed a Joint Action Plan that includes 20 civilian and nuclear weapons complex sites housing buildings with weapons-usable nuclear material. While the plan details the remaining scope of work to be accomplished by 2008, it does not include two key sites involved in manufacturing of Russian nuclear warheads that contain many buildings with hundreds of metric tons of weapons-usable nuclear material where DOE has been denied access. From fiscal year 1993 to fiscal year 2006, DOE spent about $1.3 billion to enhance security at buildings that house weapons-usable nuclear materials in foreign countries. The majority of these buildings are located in Russia and fall into three categories: Rosatom weapons complex sites, civilian sites, and naval fuel sites. DOE has also helped to secure buildings with weapons-usable nuclear material in nine other countries. Figure 2 shows a breakdown of DOE’s spending on MPC&A efforts. As figure 2 shows, DOE spent about $684.7 million to provide security upgrades to civilian, naval fuel, and Rosatom weapons complex sites with weapons-usable nuclear material in Russia and an additional $131.5 million to provide security upgrades to sites located outside of Russia. DOE also spent about $493.9 million on additional and related MPC&A efforts in Russia, such as assistance for transportation security, providing equipment for protective forces at nuclear facilities, and efforts to consolidate nuclear material into fewer buildings and sites. According to DOE officials, these efforts are important to increasing the overall security of nuclear materials in Russia and other countries, and they support DOE’s goal of enhancing the security of vulnerable stockpiles of weapons-usable nuclear material. For example, because DOE believes that nuclear materials are most vulnerable while they are in transit, the department has provided Russia with specialized secure trucks, armored escort vehicles, and secure containers—called overpacks—to improve the security of nuclear material transported within and between nuclear sites in Russia. Further, DOE’s assistance to protective forces at Russian nuclear sites, which includes such items as bulletproof vests, helmets, and response vehicles, helps ensure that guards at those sites are properly equipped and trained so that they can quickly respond to alarms. Additional information on other DOE efforts to improve security at sites with weapons-usable nuclear materials can be found in appendix IV. At the end of fiscal year 2006, DOE reported to have “secured” 175 buildings containing about 300 metric tons of weapons-usable nuclear material in Russia and the former Soviet Union, but 51 of the 175 buildings DOE reported to have “secured” as of the end of fiscal year 2006 do not have completed MPC&A upgrades. These 51 buildings are located at sites in the Rosatom weapons complex. In its program metrics, DOE defined a building to be “secure” after it has received only limited MPC&A upgrades (called rapid upgrades), even when additional comprehensive upgrades, which would further improve security, have yet to be completed. The buildings with weapons-usable nuclear material where DOE is working to improve security fall into four categories: Rosatom weapons complex, civilian, naval fuel, and sites outside of Russia. As table 1 shows, all planned upgrades have been completed at naval fuel sites and sites outside of Russia. The vast majority of remaining buildings that have not yet received security upgrades are in the Rosatom weapons complex, where DOE has historically had access difficulties, including being denied access to key sites and buildings housing weapons-usable nuclear material. While DOE officials told us that rapid upgrades offer a limited measure of risk reduction against some threats, they also noted that rapid upgrades fall short of meeting all of DOE’s risk reduction goals for buildings with weapons-usable nuclear material. For example, rapid upgrades generally include only limited measures designed to address the insider threat of theft, such as establishing a two-person rule and providing certain types of tamper indication devices that would set off alarms at guard stations in the case of an unauthorized attempt to access nuclear materials. According to NNSA, which implements the MPC&A program at DOE, the greatest threat DOE faces in its effort to help Russia secure nuclear materials is the threat of insider theft. However, the majority of measures to address the insider threat at Russian nuclear material sites, such as computerized nuclear material inventory databases and barcoding of nuclear material containers, are provided in the comprehensive upgrades phase. In response to terrorist actions and rising threat levels in Russia, DOE recently analyzed the implications of an increased design basis threat it uses to measure the adequacy of security upgrades provided to Russian nuclear facilities. The design basis threat is defined as the attributes and characteristics of potential adversaries (a group or groups of armed attackers) against which a facility’s physical protection systems are designed and evaluated. According to DOE, the design basis threat is critical to determining an MPC&A system’s effectiveness. In 2005, DOE began examining the impact of increasing the number of adversaries against which Russian sites with U.S.-funded security upgrades should be able to defend themselves. DOE is currently reassessing the effectiveness of the security upgrades it has provided through the MPC&A program and has increased its emphasis on providing assistance to the protective forces at Russian nuclear material sites. Specifically, DOE is currently working with a number of sites to relocate guard forces closer to the target nuclear material to improve their response times to an incident. For example, at all four of the nuclear material sites we visited in Russia, Russian officials told us that they were working with DOE to relocate guard forces closer to buildings that contain weapons-usable nuclear material at their sites. However, DOE is limited in the scope of assistance it can provide to protective forces at nuclear facilities in Russia and other countries. For example, DOE is neither allowed to provide weapons or ammunition to these forces, nor is it allowed to pay the salaries of protective forces at these sites. According to DOE officials, the department has provided assistance to the protective forces at all nuclear material sites where the department has access and agreement to work, including helmets, winter uniforms, radios, and other equipment intended to improve their effectiveness in responding to alarms and their survivability against potential adversaries. Historically, DOE has had difficulty obtaining access to some sensitive sites in Russia, especially within the Rosatom weapons complex. For example, we reported in 2003 that DOE’s lack of access to many buildings that store weapons-usable nuclear material in the Rosatom weapons complex was the greatest challenge to improving nuclear material security in Russia. DOE requires access to these buildings to validate Russian security system designs and to confirm the installation of equipment as intended. DOE signed an access agreement with the Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy (now called Rosatom) in September 2001 that described administrative procedures to facilitate access, such as specifying which DOE personnel are allowed to make site visits and the number and duration of those visits. We reported in 2003 that this access agreement had done little to increase DOE’s ability to complete its work at many key sites in the Rosatom weapons complex. Since that time, DOE has worked with Rosatom through a Joint Acceleration Working Group and other mechanisms to develop alternative access procedures, such as the use of remote video monitoring, that have allowed work to progress at some sensitive buildings and sites that had previously been inaccessible to DOE project teams. In June 2005, DOE and Rosatom signed a Joint Action Plan detailing the remaining scope of work to be completed by the 2008 deadline. Rosatom and DOE are using this plan to guide cooperative activities and to develop a multiyear budget for DOE’s MPC&A program. DOE officials told us that they have been granted access to almost all of the sites and buildings covered in the plan and that all security upgrades should be completed, as scheduled, by the end of 2008. DOE plans to spend about $98 million to complete its planned security upgrades at 210 buildings containing weapons-usable nuclear material in Russia and other countries by the end of calendar year 2008. The DOE–Rosatom Joint Action Plan covers 20 Russian civilian and nuclear weapons complex sites. However, the Joint Action Plan does not include two key sites in the Rosatom weapons complex where Russian nuclear weapons are assembled and disassembled. Because of the nuclear weapons manufacturing work conducted at these sites, DOE believes these two sites contain many buildings with hundreds of metric tons of weapons- usable nuclear material. According to DOE officials, the department has offered numerous alternative access proposals to try to obtain access to install security upgrades at these two sites. For example, in November 2004, DOE provided senior Russian officials with access to some of the most sensitive sites in the U.S. nuclear weapons complex, including the Pantex nuclear weapons plant in Texas, which is the only U.S. nuclear weapons assembly and disassembly facility. However, Rosatom has refused to grant DOE officials reciprocal access to analogous Russian sites. Because of the sensitive nature of the work conducted at these sites, Rosatom has denied DOE’s requests for access, rejected DOE offers to provide assistance without access, and informed DOE that it is not interested in pursuing MPC&A cooperation at these sites. DOE officials expressed very little optimism that Rosatom would allow DOE to help improve security at these facilities in the near future. Through the end of fiscal year 2006, DOE and DOD spent about $920 million to help Russia improve security at 62 nuclear warhead sites. The agencies plan to help Russia secure a total of 97 nuclear warhead sites by the end of 2008. Coordination between DOE and DOD has improved since 2003, when we reported that the agencies had inconsistent policies toward providing security assistance to Russian nuclear warhead sites. In addition, DOE and DOD are currently taking similar approaches to managing large contracts to provide security upgrades at Russian nuclear warhead sites. DOD has used EVM to identify cost and schedule variances for its contracts to install security upgrades at Russian warhead sites at early stages so they can be addressed in a timely manner. DOE has not used EVM on its fixed- price contracts to install security upgrades at Russian nuclear warhead sites, but, during the course of our review, the department augmented its contract performance management system to include additional reporting mechanisms to identify and address schedule variances, which DOE officials believe constitute a comparable alternative to an EVM system. DOE believes the benefits of EVM techniques do not justify the additional costs to implement them on fixed-price contracts. Through the end of fiscal year 2006, DOE had spent about $374 million to improve security at 50 Russian nuclear warhead sites and plans to install security upgrades at 23 additional sites by the end of 2008. Additionally, DOD spent approximately $546 million to help Russia secure 12 warhead sites and to provide security for nuclear warheads in transit. DOD plans to complete security upgrades at 12 additional sites by the end of 2008. Figure 3 shows a breakdown of U.S. funding to improve security of Russian nuclear warheads through the end of fiscal year 2006. DOE plans to provide security upgrades at 23 additional sites, and DOD plans to provide upgrades at 12 additional sites by the end of 2008. DOE and DOD gained authorization and access to work at 15 of these sites as a result of an agreement reached at the summit between President Bush and Russian President Putin in Bratislava, Slovakia, in February 2005. After this summit, Russia offered access to 15 additional nuclear warhead sites of which DOE has agreed to install upgrades at 7 sites, and DOD will help secure the remaining 8 sites. Table 2 provides an overview of DOE and DOD’s progress in improving security at Russian nuclear warhead sites. Despite the agencies’ optimism that all sites within this scope will be secured by the end of 2008, they face challenges in meeting this goal. For example, DOE and DOD officials stated that work in Russia involves extensive bureaucracy, changing requirements to meet Russian demands and, at times, difficult relationships and coordination with Russian subcontractors. DOD officials told us that there have been performance issues with a certain Russian subcontractor, but finding alternatives is difficult because there are only a limited number of Russian subcontractors qualified for this type of work and cleared by the Russian MOD to work at nuclear weapons sites. Additionally, the harsh environmental conditions at some remote sites have caused delays in the installation of security upgrades. Specifically, DOD officials stated that adverse weather conditions delayed the installation of security upgrades at four Russian warhead sites by about 1 month. In addition, DOD spent over $125 million through the end of fiscal year 2006 to improve the security of nuclear warheads during transportation by rail to consolidation and dismantlement sites. According to DOD officials, security experts consider nuclear warheads to be highly vulnerable to theft during transport. DOD has attempted to address this threat by providing the Russian MOD with security enhancements for railcars, hardened shipping containers for nuclear warheads to protect against small arms fire and other threats, and payment of railway tariffs associated with transporting nuclear warheads to consolidation and dismantlement sites. Since 1995, DOD has supported maintenance on 200 specialized, secure railcars for transporting nuclear weapons and provided 15 armored railcars for guard forces protecting shipments of nuclear weapons. DOD is in the process of procuring up to 100 additional nuclear warhead transport railcars for use by the Russian MOD. DOE and DOD have mechanisms for sharing information and avoiding duplication of effort. Coordination between the agencies has improved since 2003, when we reported that the agencies did not have consistent policies toward providing security assistance to Russian nuclear warhead sites. We recommended in 2003 that the departments work together to develop a standardized approach to improving security at Russian nuclear warhead sites. Since our 2003 report, DOD and DOE have expanded their efforts to share information about their work at Russian nuclear warhead sites. Specifically, the departments coordinate their efforts through an interagency working group, which reports to the National Security Council. According to DOE and DOD officials, this group was instrumental in coordinating the U.S. response to proposals for security upgrades at additional Russian nuclear warhead sites stemming from the summit between Presidents Bush and Putin at Bratislava, Slovakia, in 2005. In addition, DOE and DOD participate in joint coordinating groups that include key representatives from DOE, DOD, and the various branches of the Russian MOD. All of these groups meet regularly to discuss ongoing work at Russian nuclear warhead sites and resolve problems or issues that arise in this effort. Furthermore, DOE and DOD have jointly developed common designs for security upgrades at similar Russian warhead sites to ensure a level of consistency in the assistance provided to these sites. DOD officials stated that having a standardized design between the two agencies allows DOE and DOD leverage with the Russian MOD, to deny requests if they are made for items not in the site design plan of either agency. Further, DOE and DOD seek to present a united image to Russian officials by writing letters jointly on common issues and answering Russian site proposals together. In their efforts to provide security upgrades at Russian nuclear warhead sites, DOE and DOD are taking similar approaches to managing large contracts. Generally, OMB requires federal agencies to use EVM or an alternative performance management system on major acquisition contracts to identify cost and schedule variances at early stages so they can be addressed in a timely manner. DOD has used EVM to evaluate its contracts to install security upgrades at Russian warhead sites. DOE does not require its contractors to implement EVM to evaluate its contracts to install security upgrades at Russian warhead sites, but, during the course of our review, augmented its contract performance management system to include additional reporting mechanisms for identifying and addressing schedule variances, which DOE officials believe represent a comparable alternative to an EVM system. DOD officials stated that EVM is one of many tools that provide empirical data to validate testimonial information about the status of security upgrades provided in its contractors’ monthly and quarterly reports. Additionally, EVM enhances program management capabilities by providing an early warning system for deviations from plans and quantifies technical and schedule problems in terms of cost. This provides DOD with an objective basis for considering corrective action. DOD officials told us that their use of EVM allowed them to identify schedule variances due to poor contractor performance at one Russian nuclear warhead site where the department is installing security upgrades. DOD officials stated that this early detection allowed them to reassign the work to a different Russian subcontractor and formulate a plan to make up for the lost time and work in order to meet their scheduled completion date and critical path milestones. Similarly, DOE recently proposed requirements that its large contracts for security upgrades at nuclear warhead sites be managed with a system similar to EVM. In September 2006, DOE initiated security upgrades at four large nuclear warhead storage sites in Russia. Until January 2007, DOE managed these fixed-price contracts according to the NNSA Programmatic Guidelines, which do not require the use of EVM or an alternative system to assess contract performance for cost and schedule variances. In part, as a result of our inquiry into its contracting practices, DOE altered its oversight mechanisms for these contracts in January 2007 and will now require monthly reports and other measures to more accurately ascertain the progress of contracted items, including the identification of schedule variances due to inclement weather and other unforeseen events and, subsequently, the development of recovery plans. According to DOE officials, these new reporting mechanisms represent a comparable alternative to an EVM system and will give DOE project managers additional opportunities to identify potential schedule slippages and enable appropriate management intervention to take place in a timely manner. DOE has developed sustainability guidelines to help Russia prepare to take financial responsibility for maintaining U.S.-funded security upgrades at nuclear material and warhead sites without DOE assistance by 2013 as the Congress mandated. DOE and Rosatom are developing a joint sustainability plan that will provide an agreed-upon framework to guide DOE’s sustainability efforts at nuclear material sites in Russia. However, DOE’s ability to ensure that U.S.-funded security upgrades at nuclear material sites are being sustained may be hampered by access difficulties, funding concerns, and other issues. Finally, access difficulties at some Russian nuclear warhead sites may also prohibit DOE and DOD from ensuring that U.S.-funded security upgrades are being properly sustained. In May 2004, DOE issued interim guidelines (referred to as Sustainability Guidelines) to direct its efforts to assist Russia in developing sustainable MPC&A systems at Russian nuclear material and warhead sites by 2013 as the Congress mandated. In December 2006, DOE issued a final version of its Sustainability Guidelines for the MPC&A program. These guidelines require DOE program managers to develop assessments of each site’s existing capabilities to sustain MPC&A systems and to identify requirements that should be met before a site transitions from DOE support to full Russian responsibility. According to DOE, these assessments will be used to develop site-specific sustainability plans that detail the remaining cooperative activities required to address each of the seven elements of sustainability. The guidelines also require DOE project teams to develop site-specific transition plans, which would detail how sustainability activities will be funded as the sites move toward transition to full Russian responsibility by 2013. DOE’s Sustainability Guidelines set forth seven key elements of a sustainable MPC&A program at sites receiving MPC&A upgrades, such as the development of site operating procedures, which form the foundation for all of DOE’s sustainability activities at nuclear material and warhead sites in Russia and other countries where DOE has provided security upgrades. DOE uses a variety of sustainability indicators for each of the seven elements to determine the degree to which the individual elements are being addressed at Russian sites. Table 2 shows the seven elements of sustainability outlined in DOE’s Sustainability Guidelines and some of the indicators DOE uses to assess the degree to which each element of sustainability is being met at a given Russian site. According to DOE, the Sustainability Guidelines provide general criteria for DOE project teams to follow when working with their Russian counterparts in developing sustainability programs for sites where DOE has installed MPC&A systems. DOE officials noted that some sites may not require assistance to address issues in each of the seven categories. For example, many sites that store naval nuclear fuel are administered by the Russian Navy, which has its own human resource management system and would not require DOE assistance to address the human resource management and site training sustainability element. In addition, DOE and Rosatom are currently developing a joint sustainability plan that is intended to govern sustainability activities at the sites under Rosatom’s control where DOE has installed MPC&A systems. DOE officials told us that this joint sustainability plan may be completed in March 2007. DOE officials believe that this plan will be an important step in gaining Rosatom’s buy-in to the concepts of sustainability and will lead to a specific path forward and detailed plan for funding sustainability activities for DOE, while transitioning to full Russian responsibility in 2013. According to DOE officials, the plan will be based largely on DOE’s Sustainability Guidelines and will include the seven key elements of sustainability outlined in those guidelines. DOE anticipates spending about $437.8 million to provide sustainability support to sites in Russia and other countries between fiscal year 2007 and fiscal year 2013. While DOE’s Sustainability Guidelines provide a framework for the department’s approach to sustainability implementation, the guidelines do not call for a tracking system to assist MPC&A management in assessing the progress being made toward DOE’s goal of providing Russia a sustainable MPC&A system by 2013. Currently, DOE’s Metrics Information Management System (MIMS) contains data detailing the department’s progress in implementing the MPC&A program by tracking the number of buildings and sites where DOE has installed security upgrades, among other things. DOE also uses MIMS to track some measures of progress in their sustainability efforts, such as the development of site-specific plans that document how MPC&A site management will plan, budget, direct, monitor, and evaluate all MPC&A systems. DOE managers use MIMS as a tool in their oversight of the MPC&A program. However, DOE officials acknowledged that the current MIMS data do not provide an accurate picture of the department’s progress toward its goal of preparing Russia to take full responsibility for funding the maintenance and sustainability of U.S.-funded upgrades by 2013. Expanding MIMS to include tracking for all sustainability elements could give DOE managers an improved tool for monitoring the MPC&A program’s progress toward the goal of preparing Russia to take full responsibility for funding the maintenance and sustainability of U.S.-funded upgrades by 2013. Further, DOE officials told us that improved tracking of sustainability implementation would be useful to allow the department to provide more accurate information to the Congress on DOE’s progress in its sustainability efforts. Several challenges could impact DOE’s ability to prepare Russia to sustain security upgrades on its own at sites that house weapons-usable nuclear material, including: (1) access difficulties at some sites, (2) the limited financial ability of some Russian sites to maintain DOE-funded MPC&A equipment, (3) the lack of certification of some DOE-funded MPC&A equipment, and (4) delays in installing the MPC&A Operations Monitoring (MOM) system at Rosatom facilities. According to DOE officials, Russia has denied DOE access at some sites after the completion of security upgrades, making it difficult for the department to ensure that funds intended for sustainability of U.S.- funded upgrades are being properly spent. For example, at one facility where DOE completed upgrades in 1998, DOE officials were denied access from 1999 through 2002. DOE officials told us that after commissioning the MPC&A system at this facility, the department had not developed specific plans for sustaining the U.S.-funded security equipment. Upon returning to the facility in September 2002, DOE officials found that the U.S.-funded security upgrades were in a severe state of disrepair. As a result, DOE has had to spend about $800,000 to correct problems resulting from the site’s inability to properly maintain the U.S.-funded security upgrades. According to DOE officials, these security upgrade replacement efforts are scheduled to be completed in fiscal year 2007. Despite improvements in the Russian economy, some sites may not be financially able to maintain DOE-funded security upgrades. The Russian economy has improved since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 and the financial troubles of the late 1990s. In September 2006, the Deputy Head of Rosatom stated that Russia is no longer in need of U.S. assistance and that it is easier and more convenient for Russia to pay for its own domestic nuclear security projects. However, during our visit to Russia, officials at three of the four civilian nuclear research institutes we visited told us that they are concerned about their sites’ financial ability to maintain U.S.-funded security upgrades after U.S. assistance ends. Some of these sites do not receive regular funds from the Russian government to support the operation and maintenance of their MPC&A systems. As a result, Russian site officials told us that, after DOE financial support ends in 2013, they will likely face difficult choices about how to pay for maintenance of the security upgrades DOE has provided. Some U.S.-funded MPC&A equipment is not certified for use at Russian facilities, which means that the Russian government may not pay for its maintenance. Certification is a mandatory Russian regulatory requirement designed to ensure the functionality, safety, and security of specific equipment, products, and technology used in Russian nuclear sites. Certification of U.S.-funded MPC&A equipment must be obtained before it can be legally used at Russian nuclear sites. DOE has historically maintained that certification is a Russian responsibility, and current DOE policy generally precludes funding for certification of equipment. Despite repeated attempts to persuade Russia to fund equipment certification, DOE is paying for some equipment to be certified on a case-by-case basis. According to DOE officials, some sites have equipment or MPC&A systems that are not fully certified for use. For example, at eight sites that house weapons-usable nuclear material, DOE-funded equipment used to make accurate measurements of the type and quantity of nuclear material stored at these sites has not been certified for use. Unless this equipment receives certification in the near future, DOE may be forced to pay for maintenance longer than it intends. Rosatom and DOE also have established a Joint Certification Working Group that is developing a joint plan to certify key equipment items. DOE developed the Equipment Certification and Vendor Support project in 1998 to provide DOE project managers with accurate information on the Russian certification process. DOE spent $23.6 million on this project through the end of fiscal year 2006. There have been delays installing the MOM system at some Rosatom facilities. In February 2001, we recommended that DOE develop a system, in cooperation with Russia, to monitor, on a long-term basis, the security systems installed at the Russian sites to ensure that they continue to detect, delay, and respond to attempts to steal nuclear material. In response to this recommendation, DOE developed the MOM system, consisting of off-the-shelf video cameras and other equipment designed to allow Russian officials to ensure that MPC&A systems are properly staffed, personnel are vigilant, and key security procedures are enforced. DOE officials told us in 2002 they anticipated that the MOM system would be an integral part of DOE’s sustainability assistance to Russian sites. However, through the end of fiscal year 2006, only five sites with weapons-usable nuclear material where DOE installed security upgrades had the MOM system. While DOE also plans to install equipment at two additional sites in fiscal year 2007, none of the seven sites where DOE has installed or plans to install MOM systems is controlled by Rosatom. Rosatom has been unwilling to allow DOE to install MOM systems at sites under its control. Unfortunately, DOE was unable to anticipate Rosatom’s resistance to the MOM system and, in 2002, the department pre-purchased MOM equipment for use at Rosatom facilities. As a result, DOE has had to pay for storage and upkeep of 367 MOM cameras and other equipment since 2002. DOE officials told us that if Rosatom decides not to allow MOM equipment at its sites, the excess equipment may be used by other DOE programs, such as the Second Line of Defense program, which works with Russia to combat nuclear smuggling by installing radiation detection equipment at key border crossings. Through fiscal year 2006, DOE had spent a total of $20.5 million on the MOM project, including about $270,000 to pay for storage and upkeep of unused MOM equipment that has been in storage since 2002. DOE and DOD plan to provide Russia with assistance to sustain security upgrades at nuclear warhead sites, but access difficulties may prevent the agencies from carrying out their plans. Specifically, neither department has reached an agreement with the Russian MOD on access procedures for sustainability visits to 44 permanent warhead storage sites where the agencies are installing security upgrades. Site access is needed to ensure that U.S. funds are being used to help Russia maintain security upgrades at these sites. If DOE and DOD cannot reach an agreement with the Russian MOD on access procedures for sustainability activities at these 44 sites, or develop acceptable alternatives to physical access, the agencies will be unable to determine if U.S.-funded security upgrades are being properly sustained and may not be able to spend funds allotted for these efforts. DOE and DOD have formed an informal working group to more effectively coordinate their efforts on sustainability of security upgrades at Russian nuclear warhead sites. DOE and DOD have agreed in principle that the seven elements of sustainability outlined in DOE’s Sustainability Guidelines will be applied to the agencies’ efforts to help the Russian MOD sustain security upgrades at nuclear warhead sites. DOE and DOD’s joint plan to address sustainability at Russian nuclear warhead sites uses a three-phased approach, (1) addressing processes and procedural issues, (2) establishing regional training and maintenance centers, and (3) providing site-level assistance, such as warrantees and spare parts. First, DOE is assisting the Russian MOD with the development of regulations, operating procedures, and an independent inspections process to help ensure that security systems continue to operate as intended. Similarly, DOD has supported the development of a personnel reliability program for the 12th Main Directorate of the MOD and DOE is planning to support a similar program for the Russian Navy and Strategic Rocket Forces. Second, DOE and DOD have funded the construction of regional training and maintenance centers. For example, DOE recently completed construction of the Kola Technical Center, near Murmansk, Russia, which serves as the centralized training and maintenance facility for all Russian MOD sites in the Murmansk region, both naval nuclear fuel sites and nuclear warhead storage sites. The Kola Technical Center was commissioned in fall 2005, and Russian MOD officials told us that the facility will help them prepare to assume full financial responsibility for maintenance and sustainability when U.S. assistance ends. Finally, at the site level, once DOE and DOD come to agreement with the Russian MOD on verification of sustainability assistance, they will assist in sustaining the upgraded security systems with a focus on training and developing the Russian MOD’s capability to maintain the modernized systems. Initially, DOE and DOD will rely on contractor support for repair of failed security systems while the Russian MOD’s capability is being developed, gradually transitioning to full Russian system support. Although DOE and DOD are working closely to provide sustainability assistance at Russian nuclear warhead storage sites, differences exist in the length of time DOE and DOD intend to fund sustainability activities at these sites. Specifically, DOE intends to fund sustainability until 2013, while DOD plans to halt funding in 2011. This has the potential to cause difficulties for the Russian MOD when it comes to funding sustainability earlier at sites where DOD installed security upgrades. In addition, DOD plans no further support with respect to sustainability for warhead transportation upgrades it has provided to the Russian MOD, because, according to DOD officials, the Russian MOD has not requested assistance for this activity. DOE and DOD have made significant progress in helping Russia and other countries improve security at vulnerable sites housing weapons-usable nuclear material and nuclear warheads. Since our 2003 report, DOE has worked with Russia to resolve many of the access difficulties that we reported, especially at sites within the Rosatom weapons complex. However, in our view, DOE’s current metric for reporting progress on the number of buildings secured by its MPC&A program provides the Congress with a potentially misleading assessment of the security at these facilities. Specifically, DOE should not report to the Congress that buildings with weapons-usable nuclear material in Russia and other countries are “secure” until all DOE risk reduction goals have been achieved, and all planned upgrades at those buildings are completed. Currently, DOE considers buildings to be “secured” after only limited MPC&A upgrades (rapid upgrades) are installed, even when additional comprehensive upgrades are planned. Rapid upgrades do not include the majority of measures DOE uses to address the threat of insider theft at Russian nuclear sites, which DOE considers to be one of its most pressing concerns. DOE provides most upgrades designed to address the insider threat during the comprehensive upgrades phase. Further, DOE officials told us that comprehensive upgrades are necessary to achieve all risk reduction goals at buildings with nuclear material, calling into question DOE’s decision to report buildings without such upgrades completed as “secure.” As DOE nears the completion of its security upgrade work in its MPC&A program, the sustainability of U.S.-funded nuclear security upgrades in Russia and other countries has become increasingly important for ensuring that the substantial investment of U.S. funds over the past 15 years is not wasted. DOE and Rosatom have been cooperating to develop a joint sustainability plan for the majority of sites where DOE has installed MPC&A upgrades. We believe this is a critical step in gaining agreement on what remains to be done before DOE transfers full responsibility for sustainability of MPC&A upgrades to Russia in 2013. While DOE uses its Metrics Information Management System to track some measures of progress in its sustainability efforts, DOE officials acknowledged that the current MIMS data do not provide an accurate picture of the department’s progress toward its goal of preparing Russia to take full responsibility for funding the maintenance and sustainability of U.S.-funded upgrades by 2013. Creating a new management information system for sustainability or expanding MIMS to include tracking for all sustainability elements could give DOE managers an improved tool for monitoring the MPC&A program’s progress on sustainability and would aid the department in providing the Congress with a more accurate assessment of the progress made toward DOE’s goal of providing Russia with a sustainable MPC&A system by 2013. To increase the effectiveness of U.S. efforts to secure nuclear material and warheads in Russia and other countries, we recommend that the Secretary of Energy, working with the Administrator of NNSA, take the following two actions: revise the metrics used to measure progress in the MPC&A program to better reflect the level of completion of security upgrades at buildings reported as “secure;” and develop a sustainability management system or modify the Metrics Information Management System to more clearly track DOE’s progress in developing a sustainable MPC&A system across all sites where it has installed MPC&A upgrades, including evaluations of progress for each of the seven key elements of sustainability outlined in DOE’s Sustainability Guidelines. DOE generally agreed with our findings and recommendations. DOD had no written comments on our report. DOE and DOD also provided technical comments, which we incorporated, as appropriate. In its comments, DOE provided additional information about the metric it uses to track progress in the MPC&A program, its reasons for not using EVM on fixed-price contracts, and on its efforts to work with Rosatom on sustainability issues. DOE agreed that the current metric it uses to track progress in the MPC&A program may be confusing. DOE wrote that it is changing the metric to one that more accurately identifies the level of completion for upgrades. Similarly, DOE officials told us in January 2007 that they were taking steps to modify the progress metric. However, in February 2007, DOE issued its Fiscal Year 2008 Budget Request, which did not include modifications to clarify the confusions DOE agrees are present in its progress metric. As a result, DOE’s most recent budget justification continues to present the Congress with an unclear picture of the progress made in improving security at buildings with weapons-useable nuclear material in Russia and other countries because DOE’s progress metric does not recognize that additional upgrades remain to be completed at some buildings that the department lists as being “secure.” As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce the contents of this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days from the report date. At that time, we will send copies of this report to the Secretaries of Energy and Defense; the Administrator, National Nuclear Security Administration; the Director, Office of Management and Budget; and interested congressional committees. We also will make copies available to others upon request. In addition, this report will be made available at no charge on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov. If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 512-3841 or aloisee@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. The GAO contact and staff acknowledgments are listed in appendix VI. We performed our review of U.S. efforts to assist Russia and other countries in securing nuclear materials and warheads at the Departments of Energy (DOE), Defense (DOD) and State (State); the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) in Washington, D.C.; the Defense Threat Reduction Agency in Fort Belvior, Virginia; Oak Ridge National Laboratory in Oak Ridge, Tennessee; Los Alamos National Laboratory in Los Alamos, New Mexico; and Sandia National Laboratories in Albuquerque, New Mexico. We visited Russia to discuss the implementation of U.S. nuclear material and warhead security assistance programs with Russian officials. We also spoke with officials from the U.S. embassy in Moscow, DOE’s Moscow office, and the DOD’s Defense Threat Reduction Office in Moscow. While in Russia we met with officials from the Federal Agency for Atomic Energy of the Russian Federation (Rosatom), Rostekhnadzor (the Russian nuclear regulatory authority), and the Ministry of Defense (MOD)— including representatives from the 12th Main Directorate, Navy, and Strategic Rocket Forces. We requested visits to the Institute of Nuclear Materials, Institute of Physics and Power Engineering, Interdepartmental Special Training Center, Russian Methodological Training Center, and All- Russian Scientific Research Institute of Technical Physics (also known as Chelyabinsk-70 and Snezhinsk), but Rosatom denied us access to all facilities under its control, including these. In fact, we were denied access to some Russian sites GAO officials had visited during past reviews of U.S. nonproliferation programs. Rosatom officials told us that because our names were not on the list of 185 individuals provided by DOE for access under the terms of a 2001 access arrangement, we would not be allowed to visit any Rosatom facilities. Rosatom officials did not deny our request for access until we had already arrived in Russia to begin our fieldwork for this review. In addition, the Russian MOD denied our request to visit a naval nuclear fuel facility, Site 49, and a naval nuclear warhead facility near Murmansk, Russia, due to military exercises scheduled near these sites during the time of our visit. We were able meet our audit objectives by visiting four sites—civilian, educational, and research institutes that are not under Rosatom’s control— where DOE had provided security upgrades through NNSA’s Materials Protection, Control, and Accounting (MPC&A) program: Karpov Institute for Physical Chemistry, Kurchatov Institute, Joint Institute for Nuclear Research, and Moscow State Engineering and Physics Institute. During our visits to these sites, we discussed the implementation of the MPC&A program, sustainability of U.S.-funded MPC&A upgrades, and the future of DOE cooperation with Russian officials. In addition, we visited a training facility near Murmansk, Russia, built with DOE funds to provide training to Russian MOD personnel in the Murmansk region. To assess the progress DOE has made in helping Russia and other countries secure nuclear material, we had discussions with officials from NNSA’s MPC&A program, DOE’s contractors at Oak Ridge, Los Alamos, and Sandia National Laboratories, and experts from nongovernmental organizations that specialize in nuclear nonproliferation. We reviewed various program documents, including the MPC&A Programmatic Guidelines, MPC&A Program Management Document, project work plans, and the DOE- Rosatom Joint Action Plan. We also analyzed financial information detailing program expenditures, projected costs and schedule estimates, and contract data for expenditures of the MPC&A program through the end of fiscal year 2006. To assess the reliability of these data, we questioned key database officials about data entry access, internal control procedures, and the accuracy and completeness of the data, following up with further questions, as necessary. Although any caveats and limitations to the data were noted in the documentation of our work, we determined that the data we received were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report. To assess the progress DOE and DOD have made in assisting Russia with securing nuclear warheads, we reviewed documents and had discussions with officials from NNSA’s MPC&A program, DOE’s contractors at Oak Ridge and Sandia National Laboratories, DOD’s Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, and the Defense Threat Reduction Agency. We spoke with officials from the Russian MOD and visited a training facility near Murmansk, Russia, built with DOE funds to provide training to Russian MOD personnel. We analyzed financial information detailing program expenditures, projected costs and schedule estimates, and contract data from both DOE and DOD through the end of fiscal year 2006. To assess the reliability of these data, we questioned key database officials about on data entry access, internal control procedures, and the accuracy and completeness of the data, following up with further questions, as necessary. Although any caveats and limitations to the data were noted in the documentation of our work, we determined that these data were also sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report. In addition, we reviewed guidance on government contracting, including the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Circular No. A-11, DOD Earned Value Management (EVM) Implementation Guide, and DOE Order 413.3A. After reviewing this guidance, we requested copies of DOE and DOD’s ongoing contracts valued over $20 million for work to help Russia and other countries secure nuclear material and warheads. To determine how DOE’s large contracts were being managed, we reviewed contract documents and identified a requirement for quarterly reporting in the contracts. We contacted the Contracting Officers identified in the contracts to request information on how the contracts are managed in respect to applicable criteria required by OMB and DOE directives. Additionally, we reviewed DOD’s large contracts for installing security upgrades at Russian nuclear warhead sites and reviewed documentation from DOD’s contractors, Bechtel National, Inc., and Raytheon Technical Services. After analyzing these contracts and other related documentation, we determined that both of DOD’s contracts reflected an EVM system. DOD provided us with certification documentation for Bechtel and Raytheon’s EVM systems, a requirement called for by federal guidance for all EVM systems. Since the scope of work within the Bechtel contract was at or near completion, we evaluated only the contract performance management for Raytheon, in order to determine how DOD was executing and managing its large contracts for security upgrades at Russian warhead sites. DOD provided Raytheon’s cost performance reports which GAO contracting experts assessed for cost and schedule variances in contracted work. After review of Raytheon’s cost performance reports, we determined that shortfalls in scheduled work were resulting in a schedule variance equivalent to around $13 million. To assess the efforts undertaken by DOE and DOD to ensure the sustainability and continued use of U.S.-funded security upgrades, we had discussions with officials from NNSA’s MPC&A program; DOE’s contractors at Oak Ridge, Los Alamos, and Sandia National Laboratories; DOD’s Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy; and the Defense Threat Reduction Agency. We analyzed program documents, including DOE’s May 2004 interim Sustainability Guidelines, DOE’s December 2006 final Sustainability Guidelines, DOE-DOD Joint Sustainability Task Force documents, DOE-Rosatom Joint Sustainability Working Group documents, and project work plans. We interviewed program officials responsible for the development of DOE’s Sustainability Guidelines and program managers responsible for implementing them. We also discussed the sustainability of U.S.-funded upgrades with Russian officials at sites we visited. We performed our review from April 2006 to February 2007 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. The Congressass the Soviet Threat Reduction Act of 1991, (Pub. L. No. 102-228), poprly referred to as the Nnn-Lr Act. The Soviet Union dissolve. DOD egin it Coopertive Thret Redction progrm to asst Russ nd other former Soviet republic in ecring nd dintling wepon of mass detrction nd their delivery tem. DOE egin working with Russn ncler fcilitie to improve ecrity of ncler mteril. DOE egin it MPC&A progrm. DOD nd Rosatom ign greement to build Fissile MteriStorge Fcility to tore ncler mteril from dintled Russn ncler wrhe. DOD egin to work with the Russn Minitry of Defene to enhnce trporttion ecrity for ncler wrhe nd ecrity t ncler wrhetorge ite. December-DOE issu the firt MPC&A Progrmmtic Gideline. DOE expnd the cope of it effort with the Russn Nvy from protecting nl rector fel to helping ecre ncler wrhe. December-DOD complete contrction of the Fissile MteriStorge Fcility. September-DOE revi it MPC&A Progrmmtic Gideline. June-DOE nd the Federl Agency for Atomic Energy of Russ ign Joint Action Pln. May-DOE issu interim Susinability Gideline (Guidelines for Sustaining Effective Operations of Material Protection, Control, and Accounting Systems in the Russian Federation). December-DOE revi it MPC&A Progrmmtic Gideline. February 24-At their summit meeting in Brti, U.S. Preident Busnd Russn Preident Ptin issued joint tement on contined coopertion to prevent ncler terrorim. July-Rosatom inform DOD tht it has egn loding the Fissile MteriStorge Fcility. October-DOE egin MPC&A coopertion with the Chin Atomic Energy Athority y engging in Joint Technology Demontrtion on integrted ncler mteril mgement cility in Beijing. July 17-Preident Busnd Ptin reffirmed their commitment to completing ecrity pgrde t ncler mterind wrheite in Russ y the end of 2008. October 24-DOE nnonce completion of ecrity enhncement ll 50 Russn Nvy ncleite (oth ncler mterind wrheite) where pgrde were plnned. December-DOE issu finSusinability Gideline. December 31-DOE nd DOD pln to complete ll ecrity pgrde t ncler mterind wrheite in Russ y thite. January 1-Dte tht the Congress require DOE to hve developed “flly susinable” MPC&A tem with Russ. March 8-Soviet Nuclear Weapons: Priorities and Costs Associated with U.S. Dismantlement Assistance, GAO/NSIAD-93-154. March 8-Nuclear Nonproliferation: Status of U.S. Efforts to Improve Nuclear Materials Controls in Newly Independent States, GAO/NSIAD/RCED-96-89. April 13-Weapons of Mass Destruction: Effort to Reduce Russian Arsenals May Cost More, Achieve Less Than Planned, GAO/NSIAD-99-76. February 28-Nuclear Nonproliferation: Security of Russia’s Nuclear Material Improving; Further Enhancements Needed, GAO-01-312. March 6-Nuclear Nonproliferation: Limited Progress in Improving Nuclear Material Security in Russia and the Newly Independent States, GAO/RCED/NSIAD-00-82. March 24-Weapons of Mass Destruction: Additional Russian Cooperation Needed to Facilitate U.S. Efforts to Improve Security at Russian Sites, GAO-03-482. From fiscal year 1993 through fiscal year 2006, DOE spent a total of $131.5 million on efforts to help countries outside of Russia secure facilities with nuclear material (see fig. 4). Responsibility for managing DOE’s MPC&A efforts in countries outside of Russia has shifted among a number of offices within DOE and NNSA. Responsibility for sustainability of upgrades at sites in the former Soviet Union now rests with the Office of Weapons Material Protection within the Office of International Materials Protection and Cooperation in NNSA. The Office of Materials Consolidation and Civilian Sites within the Office of International Materials Protection and Cooperation in NNSA is responsible for implementing MPC&A efforts outside of the former Soviet Union, such as DOE’s efforts in China and India. DOE provided security upgrades to two buildings at one facility—the Sosny Scientific and Technical Center (now known as the Joint Institute of Power and Nuclear Research-Sosny)—in Belarus. DOE began work at this site in April 1994, and the initial phase of MPC&A upgrades was completed in December 1997. After this, DOE was unable to conduct additional work in the country due to sanctions the United States had placed on Belarus. However, in May 2003, the Department of State modified its position and allowed a team from DOE to visit Sosny solely to review the status of the MPC&A systems provided with U.S. funds. The DOE team visited the site in June 2003 and noted several security deficiencies that required immediate improvement. Shortly thereafter, DOE received approval from the Department of State to return to Belarus to perform a comprehensive vulnerability assessment at the Sosny site. According to DOE officials, the Department of State’s Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund allocated $250,000 for design work and $1.6 million for further upgrades in 2003 and 2005, respectively. Since there is currently no government-to-government agreement between the United States and Belarus, the project is being administered via the International Scientific and Technical Center’s Partners Program. However, no funding has been spent yet because the Belarusian government suspended the project due to concerns over sharing information with a foreign entity. In the fall of 2006, Belarus indicated that it was again ready to move forward with the project. DOE sent a team to Sosny in December 2006 and was able to re-establish relations, as well as, develop a statement of work for the design of a communications system for the site and a project work plan for material control and accounting. Additional trips are planned for February and April 2007. DOE hopes to complete a second phase of MPC&A upgrades at the site in fiscal year 2008. In total, DOE spent about $3.6 million through the end of fiscal year 2006 to provide MPC&A assistance to Belarus. DOE has a cooperative engagement program with China on issues related to nuclear material security. The purpose of the engagement is to increase awareness of our respective approaches to nuclear security issues, as well as MPC&A methodologies and applicable technologies, and to work cooperatively to improve security in these areas when and where appropriate. DOE is pursuing this objective through dialogue and technical collaboration with the China Atomic Energy Authority in China’s civilian nuclear sector and is attempting initial engagements with the China Academy of Engineering Physics in China’s defense nuclear sector. DOE is pursuing bilateral cooperation with the Chinese civilian nuclear sector under the Statement of Intent signed with the China Atomic Energy Authority in January 2004 and the DOE-China Atomic Energy Authority Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Technology Agreement. In February 2004, DOE and the China Atomic Energy Authority agreed to conduct a Joint Technology Demonstration on integrated nuclear material management in Beijing. The purpose of this demonstration project was to promote the adoption of modern security practices and technologies at civilian nuclear facilities by demonstrating established physical protection, nuclear material control and accounting, and international safeguards technologies that provide a first line of defense against nuclear material theft, diversion, and sabotage. The Joint Technology Demonstration took place in Beijing in October 2005. Following the completion of the technology demonstration project, DOE is currently discussing ideas for future bilateral work with the China Atomic Energy Authority and the Chinese Institute of Atomic Energy. Through fiscal year 2006, DOE had spent about $4.7 million on MPC&A cooperation with China. DOE provided security upgrades at one facility in Georgia, the Andronikashvili Institute of Nuclear Physics in Tbilisi. Work began at this site in January 1996 and was completed in May 1996, at a cost of about $0.2 million. All fresh and spent nuclear fuel was transferred from the facility to a secure nuclear site in Scotland in April 1998 under a multinational effort known as Operation Auburn Endeavor. DOE’s MPC&A program currently has no ongoing work in Georgia. DOE’s cooperative security engagement program with India is in its initial stages. DOE is investigating near-term opportunities to engage India on issues related to nuclear material security with the intent of initiating a cooperative program with India on nuclear security best practices. Potential issues for discussion include the theoretical framework for developing and implementing a design basis threat; the methodology for designing effective physical protection systems; a vulnerability assessment methodology; regulatory infrastructure for material control and accounting, and physical protection; and general nuclear security culture. DOE spent about $100,000 on MPC&A cooperation with India through the end of fiscal year 2006. DOE provided security upgrades at one facility in Latvia, the Latvian Academy of Sciences Nuclear Research Center (also known as the Latvian Institute of Nuclear Physics at Salaspils). Work began at this site in July 1994 and was completed in February 1996. Since fiscal year 1994, DOE has spent about $900,000 to install and maintain security upgrades at this facility. In May 2005, 2.5 kilograms of fresh highly enriched uranium (HEU) fuel were removed from the Salaspils reactor and returned to Russia. According to the Federal Agency for Atomic Energy of the Russian Federation (Rosatom), the HEU fuel will be downblended into low- enriched uranium nuclear fuel for use in civilian nuclear power plants. DOE’s MPC&A program currently has no ongoing work in Latvia. DOE provided security upgrades at one facility in Lithuania, the Ignalina Nuclear Power Plant. Work began at this site in October 1995 and was completed in August 1996. Since fiscal year 1996, DOE has spent about $900,000 to install and maintain security upgrades at this facility. DOE counted one building at this facility as secure in its progress metric for the MPC&A program that tracks the number of buildings with weapons-usable nuclear material secured, even though the facility never possessed such material. During the course of our review, we brought this to the attention of DOE management, and they agreed to remove the facility from the progress report in DOE’s fiscal year 2008 budget justification document. DOE’s MPC&A program currently has no ongoing work in Lithuania. DOE provided security upgrades to four sites in Kazakhstan: the Institute of Atomic Energy–Kurchatov, the Institute of Nuclear Physics at Alatau, the BN-350 breeder reactor at Aktau, and the Ulba Metallurgical Plant. In total, DOE spent about $45.3 million from fiscal year 1994 through fiscal year 2006 to provide MPC&A assistance to Kazakhstan. The Institute of Atomic Energy-Kurchatov, formerly called Semipalatinsk- 21, is a branch of the Kazakhstan National Nuclear Center. Two nuclear research reactors are located at the site. DOE began providing both physical security and material control and accounting upgrades to the site in October 1994, and the site was commissioned in September 1997. The perimeter security system at the site was commissioned in July 1998. DOE plans to continue to assist the Institute of Atomic Energy-Kurchatov with spare parts, extended warranties, and training to sustain its MPC&A systems in fiscal year 2007. The Institute of Nuclear Physics is a branch of the Kazakhstan National Nuclear Center located in the town of Alatau. The site operates a 10- megawatt research reactor used to manufacture radioisotopes as a radiation source for industrial and medical use, among other activities. DOE began work at the site in September 1995 and completed upgrades in October 1998. DOE plans to continue to assist the Institute of Nuclear Physics at Alatau with extended warranties and training to sustain its MPC&A systems in fiscal year 2007. DOE provided upgrades to two buildings at the BN-350 reactor site at Aktau. MPC&A upgrade work began in September 1994 and was completed in December 1998. In May 2002, HEU fuel was transferred from the BN-350 breeder reactor in Aktau to the Ulba Metallurgical Plant with the assistance of a nongovernmental organization involved in nonproliferation efforts— the Nuclear Threat Initiative. The HEU fuel will be downblended into low- enriched uranium nuclear fuel for use in civilian nuclear reactors. The Ulba Metallurgical Plant contains a low-enriched uranium fuel fabrication facility, among other resources. The fuel fabrication facility produces nuclear fuel pellets with a capacity of 1,000 metric tons per year. Security upgrades work began in September 1994 and was completed in September 1997. DOE plans to continue to assist the Ulba Metallurgical Plant with extended warranties and spare parts to sustain its MPC&A systems in fiscal year 2007. In addition, on November 21, 1994, 581 kilograms of HEU was transferred from the Ulba Metallurgical Plant to the United States in a highly secret project code-named “Sapphire.” The project was carried out with cooperation from the Kazakhstani government and DOE and DOD. The large stockpile of HEU, reportedly left over from the Soviet Union's secret Alfa submarine program, had been stored at the Ulba Metallurgical Plant in unsecured and unsafeguarded facilities without electronic means of accounting. Experts estimate the nuclear material was sufficient to make 20-25 nuclear bombs. The HEU was downblended into low-enriched uranium for use in civilian nuclear power plants in the late 1990s. DOE provided MPC&A assistance to four sites in Ukraine: Kharkiv Institute of Physics and Technology, Kiev Institute of Nuclear Research, Sevastopol National Institute of Nuclear Energy and Industry, and South Ukraine Nuclear Power Plant. In total, DOE spent about $37.7 million from fiscal year 1993 through fiscal year 2006 to provide MPC&A assistance to Ukraine, including installation of security upgrades, maintenance of installed MPC&A systems, and training for site personnel. The Kharkiv Institute of Physics and Technology conducts nuclear fuel cycle research and has important experimental physics facilities including a number of electron and ion accelerators. DOE provided upgrades to one building at this site. Security upgrades work began in May 1995 and was completed in January 1999. DOE plans to continue to assist the Kharkiv Institute of Physics and Technology with extended warranties and training to sustain its MPC&A systems in fiscal year 2007. The Kiev Institute of Nuclear Research was established in 1970 and is operated by the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences. The institute’s primary function is to perform research in low- and medium-energy nuclear physics. Security upgrades work began at one building at this site in December 1993 and was completed in October 1997. DOE plans to continue to assist the Kiev Institute of Nuclear Research with extended warranties and training to sustain its MPC&A systems in fiscal year 2007. The Sevastopol National Institute of Nuclear Energy and Industry’s mission is to support Ukraine’s nuclear power industry by training nuclear power plant personnel. The facility operates a 200-kilowatt, light-water cooled, research reactor. Security upgrades work began at one building at this facility in May 1996 and was completed in January 1999. DOE plans to continue to assist the Sevastopol National Institute of Nuclear Energy and Industry with extended warranties and training to sustain its MPC&A systems in fiscal year 2007. In addition to these facilities, DOE provided MPC&A upgrades to a fourth site that does not possess weapons-usable nuclear material, the South Ukraine Nuclear Power Plant. DOE began security upgrades work at this site in August 1994 and completed its upgrades work in January 1999. DOE counted this facility as secured in its progress metric for the MPC&A program, even though the facility never possessed such material. During the course of our review, we brought this to the attention of DOE management, and they agreed to remove the facility from their progress report in DOE’s fiscal year 2008 budget justification document. According to DOE officials, no further MPC&A assistance is planned at this site. In Uzbekistan, DOE’s project goal is to continue to enhance capabilities and commitment to operating and maintaining security improvements at two institutes: the Institute of Nuclear Physics in Tashkent and the Foton facility. In total, DOE spent about $4.4 million from fiscal year 1995 through fiscal year 2006 to provide MPC&A assistance to Uzbekistan. Founded in 1956 as part of the Uzbekistan Academy of Sciences, the Institute of Nuclear Physics operates a 10-megawatt research reactor. Often described as the largest facility of its kind in central Asia, the site has an ambitious program to become the primary nuclear research and isotope production facility for the region. The facility maintains fresh and irradiated nuclear fuel storage facilities to support continued reactor operations. Security upgrades at the site began in June 1995 and were provided by a joint team from the United States, Australia, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. Australia and Sweden agreed to provide assistance in the area of material control and accounting, while the United States and United Kingdom agreed to provide physical protection upgrades. Upgrades were provided in two phases. Phase I upgrades were completed in August 1996. After the attacks of September 11, 2001, DOE began to work with the facility to develop a plan to further improve its security system. Additional upgrades focused on the facility perimeter and included the installation of new fencing and exterior intrusion detection sensors. In addition, the Department of State provided about $0.6 million in fiscal year 2002 through its Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund to supply cameras and lighting for the facility’s perimeter. All Phase II upgrades were completed in September 2002. A commissioning ceremony was held in October 2002. In 2006, DOE announced the removal of 63 kilograms of HEU in the form of spent nuclear fuel from the facility. The HEU spent fuel was returned to Russia through DOE’s Global Threat Reduction Initiative. DOE plans to continue to assist the Institute of Nuclear Physics with extended warranties and training to sustain its MPC&A systems in fiscal year 2007. The Foton facility has a small research reactor containing less than 5 kilograms of HEU. MPC&A upgrades at the site began in January 2005 and were completed in May 2005. Physical security upgrades at the Foton facility focused on the research reactor building and included such things as intrusion detection sensors, improved access controls, and a central alarm station. DOE plans to continue to assist the Foton facility with extended warranties to sustain its MPC&A systems in fiscal year 2007. In addition to DOE’s efforts to provide security upgrades at sites with weapons-usable nuclear material and warheads in Russia and other countries, the department implements other crosscutting efforts to support the efforts of its MPC&A program, such as assistance for transportation security, equipment for protective forces at nuclear facilities, and efforts to consolidate nuclear material into fewer buildings and sites. According to DOE officials, these efforts support DOE’s goal of improving security of vulnerable stockpiles of weapons-usable nuclear material by contributing to the overall security systems at nuclear materials sites in Russia and other countries. As table 4 shows, through the end of fiscal year 2006, DOE spent about $493.9 million on these efforts. DOE’s Material Consolidation and Conversion project supports the transfer of HEU from Russian sites where it is no longer needed in order to secure locations within Russia for eventual conversion to low-enriched uranium. According to DOE, consolidation and conversion efforts significantly reduce the requirements and costs of securing material. For example, in 2006, DOE announced the completion of a 2-year cooperative effort to remove HEU from the Krylov Shipbuilding Research Institute, a Russian research facility located near St. Petersburg. DOE teams worked with their Russian counterparts to validate the inventory of nuclear material and confirm that it was securely packaged for transport. DOE paid for the HEU to be shipped to another facility in Russia where it will be converted (downblended) to low-enriched uranium, which will eliminate it as a proliferation concern. Through the Material Consolidation and Conversion project, DOE has also supported the secure storage and conversion of Russian-origin HEU that has been returned to Russia from countries such as Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Latvia, Serbia, and Uzbekistan. DOE reported in July 2006 that more than 8,000 kilograms of HEU had been downblended into low-enriched uranium under the project. Through the end of fiscal year 2006, DOE had spent about $128.8 million on the project. In the aftermath of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, DOE increased funding for its efforts to secure nuclear material during transit. By providing upgraded security for transport and guard railcars, specialized secure trucks and escort vehicles, and secure containers— called overpacks—DOE seeks to reduce the risks of theft and sabotage of nuclear material transported within and between nuclear facilities in Russia. The goal of the Secure Transportation project is to reduce the risk of theft or diversion of material or warheads during transportation operations in Russia by improving security for railcars and trucks, Russian nuclear material and warhead transport infrastructure, and communications interface with response forces. Through fiscal year 2006, DOE had spent about $88.1 million to improve the transportation security of nuclear material in Russia, by providing 76 cargo trucks, 86 escort vehicles, as well as 66 cargo railcars, 25 guard railcars, and 283 security overpacks. This included 54 refurbished cargo railcars, 25 new manufactured guard railcars, 12 new manufactured cargo railcars, and approximately 78 cargo trucks and 89 escort trucks to support both on-site and off-site nuclear material shipments. DOE provides a variety of training and technical support to both the Russian Navy and Rosatom to help these entities operate and maintain U.S.-funded security upgrades and MPC&A systems. One of the primary accomplishments of the project was the construction of the Kola Technical Center near Murmansk. The facility was designed and constructed by DOE to be a central training and maintenance center to support naval nuclear fuel and warhead sites in the Murmansk region. DOE completed construction of the Kola Technical Center in June 2005 at a cost of $24 million. We visited the facility during our trip to Russia. Russian officials told us that the Kola Technical Center is critical to help the Russian MOD transition to full financial responsibility for sustainability after U.S. funding ends. In addition, DOE provides support to Rosatom’s regional training facilities through the Rosatom Training and Technical Support Infrastructure project. These facilities, such as the Interdepartmental Special Training Center and the Russian Methodological and Training Center, seek to train specialists and guard forces to safeguard materials at Russian nuclear sites. Additionally, these centers seek to assist Rosatom by providing effective and sustainable training and technical support infrastructures. To date, DOE has spent $42.5 million on the establishment of these training and technological support centers. The Russian Federation Inspection Implementation project seeks to enhance nuclear material inspections by establishing a sustainable infrastructure with sufficient resources to enforce MPC&A regulations through federal and industry oversight. Under this project, DOE provides inspection support to Rostekhnadzor, Rosatom, and other Russian ministries and agencies. The project enhances MPC&A nuclear material inspections at the ministerial, agency, and site-level by providing comprehensive training, inspection, and technical assistance, as well as sufficient information technology to aid inspectors in conducting systematic inspections. For example, DOE assists Russian organizations in developing a systematic inspection approach that assures the MPC&A objectives are met and assists organizations in defining the inspection program by benchmarking proposed inspection methodologies against U.S. and other inspection approaches. Through fiscal year 2006, DOE has sponsored 83 inspections by Rosatom and Rostekhnadzor, and 980 Russian personnel have attended inspection courses. DOE’s goal for the project is to maintain a cadre of about 125 trained inspectors. DOE had spent about $43.1 million on this project through the end of fiscal year 2006. The objective of the Protective Force Assistance project is to ensure that a sufficient number of organized, equipped, and trained response forces are present and able to protect against threats to highly-desirable nuclear material at Russian and Ukrainian sites and during transit. The project includes efforts in Russia and Ukraine, although the bulk of the efforts and money are spent in Russia. As of fiscal year 2006, DOE spent about $26.7 million to purchase a variety of equipment, such as bulletproof vests, helmets, response vehicles, and cold-weather uniforms for use by the forces that protect sites that store weapons-usable nuclear material in Russia. As of fiscal year 2006, DOE spent about $3.4 million to purchase the same type of equipment for Ukrainian sites. The Federal Information System (FIS) is a computerized management information system designed to track the location and movement of nuclear material between organizations throughout Russia. The FIS provides information on the quantity of nuclear material located at facilities that report to Rosatom. The system is centralized and automated to ensure that information can be received, tracked, and monitored by Rosatom. The development of the FIS is important to the MPC&A program because, prior to its development, Russian nuclear facilities generally used paper-based systems to track nuclear material inventories. The FIS will allow the Russian government to maintain an accurate and complete inventory of its weapons-usable nuclear material. As of fiscal year 2006, DOE reported that 21 organizations and facilities throughout Russia report to the FIS. Through the end of fiscal year 2006, DOE had spent about $29.1 million to develop the FIS. The purpose of the Regulatory Development project is to assist Russian regulatory and operating agencies and services in developing a sustainable MPC&A regulatory system for civilian nuclear materials site security and to also provide assistance to regulatory agencies in Ukraine and Kazakhstan. The regulatory framework establishes legal requirements for MPC&A activities for relevant ministries, agencies, services, operating organizations, and facilities. DOE works with Rosatom, Rostekhnadzor— Russia’s civilian nuclear regulatory authority, and other agencies to develop consistent MPC&A requirements across ministries, operating organizations, and facilities. In doing so, DOE aims to create incentives for effective MPC&A procedures and sanctions for noncompliance with regulations in order to foster a strong MPC&A culture and help sustain U.S.-funded security upgrades. Through the end of fiscal year 2006, the project has achieved enactment of 67 regulations, which is 35 percent of the total planned. In addition, DOE has worked with the Russian MOD to develop a comprehensive regulatory base that ensures MPC&A practices are implemented consistently throughout all branches and services of the Russian MOD. DOE spent about $27 million through fiscal year 2006 on its regulatory development projects. The MPC&A Education project supports efforts in Russia to train existing and future MPC&A experts. The project consists of two educational degree programs at the Moscow Engineering Physics Institute and one degree program at Tomsk Polytechnic University. The first educational degree program is the MPC&A Graduate Program available only at the Moscow Engineering Physics Institute. DOE worked with both the Moscow Engineering Physics Institute and Tomsk Polytechnic University to develop an undergraduate engineering program, focusing on more technical, hands- on aspects of nuclear security. For each of these degree programs, DOE works with the two universities to develop curriculum; identify and acquire training aids; develop and publish textbooks; and strengthen instructor skills. In addition, DOE works with the Monterey Institute of International Studies to support the instruction of nontechnical nonproliferation courses at universities and high schools located outside of Moscow. Through the end of fiscal year 2006, DOE had spent about $13.4 million on the project. The Material Control and Accounting Measurements project provides support to Russia for developing a national system of reference materials (standards), nuclear material measurement methods, instruments, and infrastructure to support the accurate measurement and accounting of weapons-usable nuclear material at Russian facilities. Reference materials, measurement methods, and instruments are needed to accurately measure the quantity and isotopic composition of nuclear material during inventories and transfers for input into accountability databases. Accurate material control and accounting measurements are key components to any MPC&A system. Through fiscal year 2006, DOE had spent about $10.8 million under this project and has purchased and distributed transportable equipment that allows for the testing of uranium and plutonium. The MPC&A Security Culture project supports the overall MPC&A goal of assisting Russia with enhancing its capabilities and strengthening its commitment to operating and maintaining improved nuclear security by fostering the development of training centers and developing an outreach strategy to enhance partner countries’ awareness and understanding of MPC&A benefits, e.g., an MPC&A security “culture.” The main objective of this project is to establish an infrastructure that emphasizes the importance of MPC&A and increase the commitment throughout Russia to operate and maintain MPC&A systems with minimal U.S. support by reinforcing the necessary attitudes and beliefs required to instill a strong MPC&A culture. Accomplishments under this project include training 1,800 staff in security culture and initiating a pilot security culture coordinator project at nine sites. Through the end of fiscal year 2006, DOE had spent about $1.3 million on the MPC&A Security Culture project. In addition to its efforts to improve the security culture at Russian nuclear sites, DOE recently conducted a series of workshops for Russian officials on MPC&A best practices at U.S. nuclear sites. The workshops included presentations by U.S. MPC&A experts. In conducting this workshop series, DOE intends to further enhance the security culture at Russian sites by working to educate Russian site officials on the methods used at U.S. facilities, so that these best practices can be applied at Russian sites. The MPC&A Taxation and Customs project began in 1999 to meet a congressional mandate that U.S. nuclear safety and security programs not pay taxes in Russia. The MPC&A program must obtain a certified tax exemption when providing technical equipment and services. The Taxation and Customs project assists DOE project teams’ understanding of taxation and customs issues and ensures compliance with Russian laws. The project stays abreast of Russian taxation and customs legislation, as well as guidance on bureaucracy and requirements for tax exemption, by holding workshops for Russian sites; tracking the tax-exemption process; and maintaining a taxation Web site for DOE project teams. Through the end of fiscal year 2006, DOE had spent about $0.5 million on the project. In addition to the individual named above, R. Stockton Butler, Jeffery Hartnett, Lisa Henson, and Jim Shafer made significant contributions to this report. Other assistance was provided by John Delicath, Jennifer Echard, Brandon Haller, Gregory Marchand, Keith Rhodes, and Karen Richey. Nuclear Nonproliferation: Better Management Controls Needed for Some DOE Projects in Russia and Other Countries. GAO-05-828. Washington, D.C.: August 29, 2005. Cooperative Threat Reduction: DOD Has Improved Its Management and Internal Controls, but Challenges Remain. GAO-05-329. Washington, D.C.: June 30, 2005. Weapons of Mass Destruction: Nonproliferation Programs Need Better Integration. GAO-05-157. Washington, D.C.: January 28, 2005. Weapons of Mass Destruction: Additional Russian Cooperation Needed to Facilitate U.S. Efforts to Improve Security at Russian Sites. GAO-03-482. Washington, D.C.: March 24, 2003. Nuclear Nonproliferation: Security of Russia’s Nuclear Material Improving; Further Enhancements Needed. GAO-01-312. Washington, D.C.: February 28, 2001. Nuclear Nonproliferation: Limited Progress in Improving Nuclear Material Security in Russia and the Newly Independent States. RCED/NSIAD-00-82. Washington, D.C.: March 6, 2000. Weapons of Mass Destruction: Effort to Reduce Russian Arsenals May Cost More, Achieve Less Than Planned. NSIAD-99-76. Washington, D.C.: April 13, 1999. Nuclear Nonproliferation: Status of U.S. Efforts to Improve Nuclear Materials Controls in Newly Independent States. NSIAD/RCED-96-89. Washington, D.C.: March 8, 1996. Soviet Nuclear Weapons: Priorities and Costs Associated with U.S. Dismantlement Assistance. NSIAD-93-154. Washington, D.C.: March 8, 1993.

Summary: Safeguarding nuclear warheads and materials that can be used to make nuclear weapons is a primary national security concern of the United States. Since 1993, the Departments of Energy (DOE) and Defense (DOD) have worked to improve security at sites housing weapons-usable nuclear material and warheads in Russia and other countries. In 1995, DOE established the Materials Protection, Control, and Accounting (MPC&A) program to implement these efforts. GAO examined the (1) progress DOE has made in improving security at nuclear material sites in Russia and other countries, (2) progress DOE and DOD have made in improving security at Russian nuclear warhead sites, and (3) efforts DOE and DOD have undertaken to ensure the continued effective use of U.S.-funded security upgrades. To address these objectives, among other things, GAO analyzed agency documents, conducted interviews with key program officials, and visited four Russian nuclear sites. Through fiscal year 2006, DOE and DOD spent over $2.2 billion to provide security upgrades and other assistance at sites in Russia and other countries that house weapons-usable nuclear materials and warheads. With regard to securing nuclear material, DOE reports to have "secured" 175 buildings and plans to improve security at 35 additional buildings by the end of 2008. However, DOE's reported total of buildings "secured" does not recognize that additional upgrades remain to be completed at some buildings because DOE considers a building "secured" after it has received only limited MPC&A upgrades, even when additional comprehensive upgrades are planned. Further, DOE and Russia have developed a Joint Action Plan that includes 20 sites and details the remaining work to be accomplished by 2008. However, the plan does not include two sites containing many buildings with vast amounts of nuclear material where Russia has denied DOE access. DOE and DOD report to have improved security at 62 Russian warhead sites and plan to help secure 35 additional sites by the end of 2008. The departments have improved their coordination mechanisms since our 2003 report, in which GAO reported that the agencies had inconsistent policies for installing site security upgrades at Russian warhead sites. Additionally, DOE and DOD are using similar approaches to manage large security upgrade contracts at warhead sites. DOD has used earned value management (EVM), which at early stages can identify cost and schedule shortfalls. DOE has not used EVM on its fixed-price contracts, but, during the course of GAO's review, augmented its contract oversight to increase reporting frequency, which DOE officials consider a comparable alternative to EVM. DOE has developed broad guidelines to direct its efforts to help ensure that Russia will be able to sustain (operate and maintain) U.S.-funded security systems at its nuclear material and warhead sites after U.S. assistance ends and is working with Russia to develop a joint sustainability plan. However, DOE lacks a management information system to track the progress made toward its goal of providing Russia with a sustainable MPC&A system by 2013. DOE and DOD's abilities to ensure the sustainability of U.S.-funded security upgrades may be hampered by access difficulties, funding concerns, and other issues. Finally, DOE and DOD plan to provide Russia with assistance to sustain security upgrades at nuclear warhead sites but have not reached agreement with Russia on access procedures for sustainability visits to 44 sites. As a result, the agencies may be unable to determine if U.S.-funded security upgrades are being properly sustained.