IRS has reported a substantial increase in IDT refund fraud; however, it is unclear whether this reported increase is due to an overall increase in IDT refund fraud, to an improvement in IRS’s ability to detect IDT refund fraud, or to a combination of the two. For example, IRS instituted IDT filters in 2012, which helped IRS find additional IDT incidents, but it is not known how much of the reported increase can be attributed to filters or to an increase in IDT refund fraud. There are two types of tax-related IDT fraud: (1) refund fraud and (2) employment fraud. IDT refund fraud occurs when a refund-seeking identity thief files a fraudulent tax return using the legitimate taxpayer’s identifying information. Employment fraud occurs when an identity thief uses a taxpayer’s name and Social Security number (SSN) to obtain a job. This report’s discussion focuses on IDT refund fraud and not employment fraud. IDT refund fraud takes advantage of the typical process of filing a tax return. Taxpayers receive information returns from third parties, such as the Form W-2, Wage and Tax Statement (W-2), and use this information to complete their tax returns. As shown in figure 1, taxpayers with wage income typically receive a Form W-2 from their employer by late January. Taxpayers copy the information from the W-2 to prepare their returns. Taxpayers filing paper returns are required to attach a copy of the W-2 to the return. Taxpayers filing electronically (e-file), as most do, are not required to send W-2s to the IRS. Most taxpayers entitled to a refund, along with many identity thieves attempting refund fraud, file early in the filing season—many in February. During return processing, IRS performs some compliance checks and issues refunds, but at this time it cannot verify the W-2 information for all returns (paper W-2s can be forged and fictitious wage information can be entered on a tax return). By the end of March, employers are also required to send a copy of the W-2 to SSA, which performs verification checks before sending the information to IRS. However, IRS only begins matching W-2 information from employers to tax returns in July. This gap between when IRS issues refunds and when IRS matches W-2s to tax returns creates the opportunity for fraudsters to file returns using a stolen identity and to receive a tax refund. Issuing refunds before fully verifying the information on tax returns is an example of what IRS officials refer to as a “look-back” compliance model: rather than holding refunds until all compliance checks can be completed, IRS issues refunds after doing some selected, automated reviews of the information the taxpayer submits to verify identity (e.g., name and SSN matching); filtering out returns with indicators of fraud such as a mismatched name and SSN; and correcting obvious errors, such as calculation mistakes and claims for credits and deductions exceeding statutory limits. IRS’s intent is to issue refunds quickly. After refunds are issued, IRS does further checks. Two of these checks enable IRS to detect significant amounts of IDT refund fraud after the fact. One, shown at the top of figure 2, is checking for duplicate returns. If an identity thief and a legitimate taxpayer file returns using the same name and SSN, IRS will have duplicate returns. The other is matching tax returns to third-party information provided to IRS by employers, financial institutions, and others (bottom of figure 2). Matching tax returns to W-2s is an example of these checks. As we have reported, these post-refund compliance checks can take a year or more to complete. Recognizing the limitations of the look-back compliance model, IRS’s efforts to combat IDT refund fraud occur at three different stages of the refund process: (1) before accepting a tax return, (2) during tax return processing, and (3) after issuing tax refunds. At each stage of the process, IRS uses specific tools to detect IDT refund fraud (see figure 3 for examples of IRS tools at each stage). Identity Protection Personal Identification Number (IP PIN). IP PINs are single-use identification numbers sent to IDT victims who have validated their identities with IRS. Tax returns with IP PINs pass through IRS’s IDT fraud filters, avoiding false positives—where a legitimate taxpayer is identified as an identity thief—and a delayed tax refund. Taxpayers who were issued an IP PIN but e-filed without using it or entered it incorrectly are prompted to enter the IP PIN on their tax return or to file on paper, according to IRS officials. Paper returns filed with the SSN of these taxpayers and without an IP PIN are subject to additional checks. (In January 2014, IRS offered a limited IP PIN pilot program to eligible taxpayers in Florida, Georgia, and the District of Columbia.) Duplicate return rejects. Once IRS receives an e-filed return for a given SSN, it automatically rejects subsequent returns filed using that SSN and sends a notice of duplicate filing, as shown at the top of figure 2. IDT and other fraud filters. IDT filters screen returns, using characteristics that IRS has identified in previous IDT refund fraud schemes. characteristics, such as the same bank account or address, which could indicate potential fraud. If an IDT filter flags a return, IRS stops processing the return and sends a letter asking the taxpayer to validate his or her identity. The filters also search for clusters of returns with similar IDT indicators. Indicators—account flags that are visible to all IRS personnel with account access—are a key tool IRS uses to resolve and detect IDT. IRS uses different indicators (e.g., to denote whether the incident was identified by the IRS or a taxpayer), depending on the circumstances in which IRS learns of an identity theft-related problem. Third-party leads. IRS receives third-party leads regarding suspected IDT refund fraud and other types of refund fraud through efforts including the External Leads Program and the Opt-In Program. The External Leads Program involves third parties providing lead information to IRS. If a questionable refund is confirmed as fraudulent, IRS requests that the financial institution return the refund. The Opt-In Program allows financial institutions to electronically reject suspicious refunds and return them to IRS, indicating why the institution is rejecting the refunds. Two of the tax-administration systems employing filters are the Dependent Database (DDb) and Electronic Fraud Detection System (EFDS). DDb incorporates IRS, Health & Human Services, and Social Security Administration data to identify compliance issues involving IDT, refundable credits, and prisoners. EFDS is a legacy system built in the mid- 1990s. To replace EFDS, IRS is developing the Return Review Program. IRS has income and/or payment information that does not match the information reported by the taxpayer on his return. A key practice in results-oriented management of federal agencies is the establishment of agency-wide, long-term strategic goals. IRS’s strategic plan for fiscal years 2014-2017 identifies two strategic goals: (1) deliver high quality and timely service to reduce taxpayer burden and encourage voluntary compliance and (2) effectively enforce the law to ensure compliance with tax responsibilities and combat fraud. The strategic plan also outlines several objectives relevant to its efforts to combat identity theft, including strengthening refund fraud prevention by balancing the speed of refund delivery with the assurance of taxpayer identity, using analysis of third-party and historical taxpayer data, and educating taxpayers and tax professionals on fraud risk factors and fraud prevention methods; implementing enterprise-wide analytics and research capabilities to make timely, informed decisions; and implementing and maintaining a robust enterprise risk management program, which includes establishing routine reporting procedures to external stakeholders on operational risks. As a complement to the potential benefits of strategic planning, internal control is a major part of managing an organization.comprises the plans, methods, and procedures used to meet missions, goals, and objectives: this supports performance-based management. Internal control helps agency program managers achieve desired results and provides reasonable assurance that program objectives are being achieved through—among other things—effective and efficient use of agency resources. Managers are to design internal controls based on related costs and benefits. In addition, internal control standards in the federal government call for agencies to record and communicate relevant, reliable, and timely information on internal and external events to agency managers and others who need it. Based on IRS’s preliminary Identity Theft Taxonomy (Taxonomy), the agency estimated that $29.4 billion in IDT refund fraud was attempted in filing season 2013. IRS estimated it prevented or recovered about $24.2 billion (82 percent) of the estimated attempted refund fraud. However, IRS estimated it paid $5.2 billion (18 percent) in IDT refunds during the same timeframe (see figure 4). IRS officials noted that they are updating their analysis and anticipate revising the Taxonomy’s estimate of IDT refunds paid. The officials said the revised estimates could be somewhat higher (perhaps by $0.6 billion) but the analysis was not completed in time for us to include it in figure 4. IRS’s Taxonomy demonstrates a significant effort on the part of IRS and is an important first step in estimating how much identified IDT refund fraud IRS is stopping or failing to stop. IRS has made substantial progress in its efforts to estimate IDT refund fraud. For example, IRS developed an estimate of IDT refund fraud by identifying characteristics of fraudulent returns, matching and analyzing information returns and tax returns based on these characteristics, and researching other sources. However, the estimates will continue to evolve as IRS updates its methodology to better reflect new IDT refund fraud schemes and to improve the accuracy of its estimates, according to IRS officials. IRS’s Taxonomy is a valuable tool to help inventory, characterize, and analyze available IDT refund fraud data and to assess the performance of IRS’s IDT refund fraud defenses. For example, the Taxonomy may help IRS Monitor progress. Given the evolving, persistent nature of IDT refund fraud, IRS will constantly need to monitor and adapt its IDT defenses to protect against new and emerging schemes. The Taxonomy provides IRS with a methodology for monitoring IDT refund fraud and the progress of IRS defenses over time. However, IRS will continue to face challenges in evaluating its defenses. For example, it is difficult to differentiate whether an increase in returns detected by the IDT filters is due to improved filter performance or to an increase in the overall number of IDT refund fraud attempts. In addition, future methodology updates which reflect evolving schemes and improve accuracy could make comparisons between filing seasons difficult. Identify schemes. The Taxonomy may help IRS develop a better understanding of taxpayer characteristics related to current, successful IDT refund fraud, including filing status, the size of the refund, filing method, and filing history. This could help IRS identify IDT refund fraud scheme trends and assist it in further developing and modifying its defenses. Communicate the extent of the problem to stakeholders. While the Taxonomy has limitations, it may help improve IRS managers’ understanding of the problem, allowing them to better communicate with policymakers about schemes and resource needs. It may also improve the ability of Congress (and other decision makers) to oversee IRS’s efforts. In addition, the data collected could be of use to IRS partners, including tax preparers and financial institutions. Although IRS’s Taxonomy estimates are valuable in helping estimate IDT refund fraud, they are, by their nature, incomplete. This is in part because IRS’s estimate of IDT refunds paid (the $5.2 billion shown in figure 4) is based on duplicate returns, information return mismatches, and criminal investigations identified after the refunds are paid. However, for cases where there are no duplicate returns, information returns, or criminal investigations associated with a tax return, IRS has been unable to estimate the amount of IDT refund fraud (the unidentified IDT refund fraud shown in figure 4). Also, certain Taxonomy estimates are based on assumptions using the characteristics of past IDT refund fraud. While the assumptions are based on IRS’s research from known cases and appear reasonable, we could not verify the accuracy and comprehensiveness of these assumptions. This is because the accuracy of the Taxonomy estimates is largely based on whether the estimate includes all true IDT refund fraud returns and excludes all legitimate returns. IRS officials acknowledged their estimates for returns flagged during information return matching could include legitimate returns that are not actual IDT refund fraud. that we identified in the Taxonomy include the The Taxonomy underestimates the number of IDT refund fraud returns and refund amounts for some IDT categories and overestimates others. The Taxonomy underestimates IDT refund fraud because, as previously discussed, IRS has been unable to estimate the amount of IDT refund fraud for cases where there are no criminal investigations, duplicate returns, or information returns—such as a W-2—associated with a tax return (the unidentified IDT refund fraud shown in figure 4). An example of an overestimated category is that of “refunds recovered,” which includes refunds returned to IRS as a result of external leads. However, IRS data on external leads do not distinguish whether the type of fraud was IDT refund fraud or some other type of fraud. Our analysis of the Taxonomy found that IRS did not adjust its estimate to account for other types of refund fraud. While IRS provided Taxonomy estimates for filing seasons 2012 and 2013, methodology changes make it difficult to compare these estimates over time. For example, the filing season 2013 estimate uses a different data source to estimate the number of IDT refunds paid and eventually detected after the filing season (when IRS matches tax returns to information return data, such as W-2s). In addition, it is unclear whether changes in the number of IDT refund fraud returns are due to overall changes in fraud patterns, such as an increase or decrease in fraud attempts; to improvements in IRS IDT defenses; or to identity thieves’ ability to file returns using schemes IRS has not yet learned to detect. IRS has responded to the problem of IDT refund fraud with new ways to combat fraud. However, according to IRS officials, identity thieves are “adaptive adversaries” who are constantly learning and changing their tactics as IRS develops new IDT strategies. Therefore, IDT refund fraud remains a persistent, evolving threat that requires stronger pre-refund and post-refund strategies to combat. A robust pre-refund strategy is important because preventing fraudulent refunds is easier and more cost-effective than trying to recover them after they have been issued. We have previously reported that implementing strong preventive controls can help defend against invalid payments, increasing public confidence and avoiding the difficult “pay and chase” aspects of recovering invalid refunds. According to IRS, the agency’s Return Review Program (RRP) is one way that IRS is trying to improve its pre-refund detection efforts. As IRS processes tax returns, other strategies can assist in identifying and stopping suspicious refunds. Moreover, improving post-refund programs may help IRS work with financial institutions to stop refunds that earlier controls have missed. However, recapturing a fraudulent refund after it is issued can be challenging—if not impossible—because identity thieves often spend or transfer the funds immediately, making them very difficult to trace. Agency officials and third-party stakeholders we spoke to identified the following potential pre- and post-refund strategies that may help IRS combat IDT refund fraud: Pre-refund. Improve W-2 matching by (1) adjusting W-2 deadlines, (2) lowering the threshold for e-filed W-2s,(4) delaying the filing season. (3) delaying refunds, and Post-refund. Improve external leads programs by providing timely, accurate, and actionable feedback to third parties. Characteristics of the current tax processing system hamper IRS’s ability to effectively verify taxpayer information prior to issuing refunds. As part of a broader proposal, the Department of the Treasury (Treasury) has proposed accelerating W-2 deadlines. This proposal will help ensure that IRS has accurate, timely W-2 data to conduct pre-refund matching. IRS has also requested funding to support timelier processing of W-2s. IRS issues most refunds before it has access to employers’ W-2 data. IRS issues most refunds months before receiving and matching information returns, such as W-2s. For 2012, IRS received more than 148.3 million tax returns and issued more than $309.6 billion in refunds to 110.5 million taxpayers. By March 1, 2012 IRS had issued about 50 percent of all 2012 refunds, but did not have access to most of the 2012 W-2 data verified by the Social Security Administration (SSA) (see figure As previously noted, IRS’s look-back compliance model does not 5).allow it to match tax returns to information returns until early summer. IRS is under pressure to issue refunds promptly. IRS is required by law to pay interest if it takes longer than 45 days after the due date of the return to issue a refund.refunds generally within 21 days after filing and actively tries to meet this target. For tax year 2013, IRS reported that for tax returns filed through IRS informs taxpayers to anticipate their early March, taxpayers received refunds an average of 9.6 days after filing. To facilitate the use of W-2 information in detection of noncompliance (which includes IDT refund fraud) earlier in the filing season, Treasury recently proposed to Congress that the W-2 deadlines be moved to January 31 (for both paper and e-filing). processing W-2s more quickly as part of its fiscal year 2015 budget request. The IRS Commissioner has also advocated for earlier deadlines, testifying that challenges with IDT refund fraud have led IRS to propose an accelerated W-2 filing deadline. Further, the National Taxpayer Advocate has repeatedly written about the need to develop an accelerated information reporting system to enable IRS to match third- party reports to return data before issuing refunds. Treasury, General Explanations of the Administration’s Fiscal Year 2015 Revenue Proposals, (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 2014). Each February, Treasury releases this publication in conjunction with the President’s budget. As part of its proposal to stagger tax return filing dates, Treasury proposed implementing an accelerated deadline for filing information returns and eliminating the extended due date for e-filed returns. Under the proposal, paper and e-filed W-2s would be due to SSA by January 31, the same date W- 2s are due to employees. of dollars of IDT refund fraud. Returns flagged during IRS’s information return matching make up a substantial portion of the $5.2 billion in IDT refunds that IRS estimated it paid in filing season 2013, according to IRS’s Taxonomy. With earlier access to W-2 data, IRS could validate information reported on a tax return (e.g., wages and compensation) with information reported by employers before issuing refunds. Even without automatic matching, IRS officials said that earlier W-2 data would speed up manual reviews of high-risk returns—such such as those flagged by the IDT filters—because the information they rely on to perform those checks would be readily available. Benefiting taxpayers and employers. In addition to protecting revenue, accelerated W-2 reporting and pre-refund matching could improve taxpayer service and reduce burden. IRS officials said that having W-2 data at the beginning of the filing season would reduce taxpayer burden by allowing IRS to verify income immediately and to release legitimate tax returns caught by the IDT filters (false positives). Earlier W-2 data could also help IRS reduce employer burden, as IRS would no longer have to contact employers of taxpayers whose returns are flagged by IDT and other fraud filters. Providing other benefits. Earlier W-2 matching could reduce IRS’s workload of collection cases and help taxpayers avoid penalties and interest on under-paid taxes, according to IRS officials. Implementing accelerated W-2 deadlines could result in an increased number of corrected W-2s filed as well as other technical and logistical challenges. SSA officials and all three payroll and information reporting associations we interviewed told us that accelerating the W-2 deadline (These are W-2s that would increase the number of corrected W-2s.employers correct after sending the first incorrect version to SSA.) Corrected W-2s represent less than 1 percent of the 213.5 million W-2s IRS received from SSA in tax year 2011, according to IRS data. The correction rate is currently low because the deadlines for filing with SSA are well after the January 31 deadline for sending W-2s to employees, giving employers a window of time to make corrections before they file with SSA. Based on data tracking payroll submissions and subsequent adjustments, the National Payroll Reporting Consortium estimated that should the deadline be accelerated to before January 31, corrections may To increase from 1 percent of filed W-2s to greater than 6 percent.mitigate potential corrections, SSA officials and all three payroll and information reporting associations we interviewed recommended allowing a corrections window of time (e.g., 1 to 2 weeks) between submission to employees and to SSA. Employers must submit W-2 forms to employees by January 31 and to SSA by February 29 (if filing on paper) and March 31 (if e-filing). during that timeframe; however, the computer experts are available to implement an accelerated W-2 filing date of February 29. While Treasury and IRS officials have proposed moving up W-2 deadlines, the costs and benefits have not been identified, estimated, or documented. How IRS decides to implement pre-refund matching using W-2 data would affect the costs and benefits for itself and other stakeholders. Some of the stakeholder issues that we identified and that remain unaddressed include the following: IRS. IRS has not identified cost-effective options for updating the information technology systems or work processes (such as the process for correcting refund amounts if mismatches are detected) needed to implement pre-refund matching using W-2 data. IRS officials said that a lack of budgetary resources is the primary reason IRS has not conducted planning and analysis of the costs and benefits related to accelerating W-2 deadlines. The full costs will not be known until IRS analyzes details regarding how the agency would implement this change (e.g., the thresholds IRS uses to match W-2s will influence the number of W-2 mismatches due to IDT refund fraud or false positives, where legitimate returns are flagged during matching). Similarly, IRS does not have a well-developed estimate of the magnitude of the benefits of pre-refund W-2 matching. Treasury developed revenue projections for moving all information reporting deadlines, but did not develop projections specific to the W-2 deadline. While IRS has a basis for estimating the revenue protected from pre-refund matching (from its Taxonomy), other benefits—such as employer savings from fewer queries from IRS—may be harder to estimate. SSA. Moving the deadline to January 31 would create logistical and technical challenges for SSA. As previously discussed, SSA officials told us that moving the deadline to January 31 or earlier would require shifting its software development cycle because SSA’s computer experts are working on another system during that timeframe; however, the computer experts are available to implement an accelerated W-2 filing date of February 29. If concurrent changes in the e-file threshold are not made, SSA may also incur administrative costs, should the number of W-2 corrections increase or a processing backlog occur (see next section for details). Third parties. The costs and benefits to employers and payroll providers have not been quantified. SSA officials stated that moving any W-2 deadline (other than the current e-file deadline of March 31) involves a degree of risk that cannot be quantified at present. They recommended surveying employers and payroll providers to better understand the impact of shortening or eliminating the time gap between when W-2s must be provided to employees and when they must be provided to SSA. Estimating the costs and benefits of options to accelerate W-2 deadlines and to conduct earlier W-2 matching is consistent with IRS’s strategic plan, which includes objectives to strengthen refund fraud prevention through the use of third-party data and to use analytics for timely, informed decision making. It is also consistent with Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government, which calls for IRS management to design and implement internal controls within its programs based on the related costs and benefits. However, without better analysis of the costs and benefits of options for implementing accelerated W-2 deadlines and pre-refund matching, Congress does not have the information needed to consider Treasury’s proposal and deliberate the merits of making such a significant change. Agency officials and third-party stakeholders we spoke to noted that other policy changes may also be needed in concert with moving W-2 deadlines. This is because W-2 matching is part of a much larger tax- administration system that provides IRS with information needed to help verify the identity, employment, and earnings of taxpayers. These changes could include lowering the e-file threshold for employers, delaying refunds, or delaying the start of the filing season. IRS has not yet undertaken efforts to understand the full costs of implementing earlier, pre-refund W-2 matching, and the costs associated with these other changes. Lowering the E-File Threshold for Employers Because of the additional time and resources associated with processing paper W-2s submitted by employers, SSA officials told us that a change in the e-file threshold would be needed to sufficiently increase the number of e-filed W-2s. Reducing the e-file threshold would allow IRS to obtain timely, accurate data from a significant number of employers and would enhance the benefits IRS could obtain from the accelerated W-2 deadline and pre-refund W-2 matching. Currently, employers who file 250 or more W-2s annually must e-file those forms. Low-volume filers (filing fewer than 250 information returns annually) can file on paper, and for tax year 2011 these employers sent about 27.6 million paper W-2s (13 percent of all W-2s filed), according to IRS data. Because of the additional time SSA needs to process paper W-2s before sending them to IRS, changes in the e-file threshold would be necessary for earlier W-2 deadlines to have the intended effect. Without a change in the e-file threshold, backlogs in paper W-2s could result in IRS receiving W-2 data after the end of the filing season. For example, SSA officials said they can have a large backlog of paper W-2s and can process some paper W-2s as late as August or September. Having more e-filed W-2s would speed processing time for SSA (as compared to paper W-2 processing time) and would enable IRS to receive a larger percentage of W-2 data earlier, according to SSA officials. More than 4.5 million establishments have fewer than 10 employees, and SSA officials estimated that the e-file threshold would need to be reduced to 5 to 10 information returns for the change to result in a meaningful increase in the number of e-filed W-2s. Many states have already implemented lower e-file thresholds. According to the American Payroll Association, 19 states, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico have a W-2 e-file threshold that is lower than IRS’s information return requirement. According to 2011 U.S. Census Bureau data. implementing a gradual reduction in the threshold and/or allowing employers to file for hardship waivers. Additionally, small employers can e-file W-2s at no cost through SSA’s web application, Business Services Online. In addition to contributing to the IRS’s ability to verify employment information on tax returns, lowering the e-file threshold could reduce administrative costs for SSA. Based on fiscal year 2013 data, SSA officials stated that an e-filed W-2 costs about $0.002 to process, while a paper W-2 costs about $0.53 to transcribe and process. officials said it is more difficult to ensure data quality with paper W-2s, as transcription errors can occur while processing paper W-2s. Treasury recently requested that Congress expand legal authority to allow a reduction of the 250-return e-filing threshold for a broad set of information returns, including W-2s. According to Treasury, benefits such as enhancing taxpayer compliance, improving IRS service to taxpayers, and modernizing tax administration make this change worthwhile. For example, expanding e-filing will help IRS focus its audit activities, as IRS will receive information in a useable form, according to Treasury. The cost savings described above, as well as compliance and other benefits, could be realized before Congress decides on whether to accelerate W-2 deadlines (as proposed by Treasury). The change would support IRS’s strategic objectives to encourage compliance while minimizing costs and taxpayer burden. In addition, increasing e-filing is consistent with internal controls, which require that information be recorded and communicated to management and others within the entity who need it and in a form and within a timeframe that enables them to carry out their internal control and other responsibilities. For an entity to run and control its operations, it must have relevant, reliable, and timely communications relating to internal as well as external events. We did not verify SSA’s estimates. Implementing a lower e-filing threshold would have the ancillary benefit (described above) of supporting pre-refund matching. Delaying Refunds and Delaying the Start of the Filing Season In conjunction with other strategies such as earlier filing of W-2s, delaying the filing season or delaying refunds would provide more time for IRS to receive W-2s, conduct pre-refund matching, and identify IDT refund fraud, according to IRS and third-party officials. IRS could delay the start of the filing season—the date IRS begins to process tax returns—but changing IRS’s obligation to issue refunds within 45 days of the due date of the return would require a statutory amendment. Both changes would have costs associated with educating taxpayers about the changes and potential costs to taxpayers who receive refunds later (discussed below). In our discussions with third parties about ways to prevent IDT refund fraud, 10 of the 22 groups we interviewed—ranging from financial institution associations to software companies to payroll associations— specifically suggested the option of delaying refunds or delaying the filing season until IRS could match W-2 data to tax returns. National Taxpayer Advocate, 2013 Annual Report to Congress, Vol. II. that interval may be increased by several months. This additional waiting time in the first year could be burdensome for some taxpayers; however, there should be no added burden in subsequent years (i.e. the interval between refunds will be approximately 12 months in those later years). Through its external leads programs, IRS collaborates with financial institutions, software companies, prepaid card companies, and other third parties. These partnerships provide valuable information about emerging IDT trends and fraudulent returns that have passed through IRS’s prevention and detection systems. External leads help IRS identify fraudulent refunds and understand emerging trends in IDT refund fraud and other refund fraud. According to IRS officials, the agency has used third-party leads to improve detection of IDT refund fraud. Between January 1, 2014 and May 31, 2014, IRS reported that more than 350 sources sent IRS successful leads for nearly 94,000 taxpayer accounts: these leads were for all types of refund fraud including, but not limited to, IDT refund fraud.million in fraudulent refunds during this period. IRS reported that financial institutions returned $214.8 Communicating with third parties is consistent with IRS’s strategic plan objective to implement a robust enterprise risk management program by establishing routine reporting procedures to inform external stakeholders about operational risks. Also, it is consistent with internal controls, which require relevant, reliable, and timely communications relating to external events. As such, management should ensure there are adequate means of communicating with external stakeholders and of obtaining information from them that could help IRS achieve its goal of reducing IDT refund fraud. Disclosure constraints limit what IRS can share. Section 6103 of the Internal Revenue Code limits the types of information IRS can share with external parties, even for fraudulent returns. However, section 6103 does not limit IRS’s ability to share general information about how to manage IDT refund fraud or emerging fraud trends. Disclosure of individual taxpayer information could be prevented by aggregating information so that no individual taxpayers could be identified. IRS officials told us that aggregated feedback to third parties may be possible, as long as a sufficient number of leads are discussed. IRS feedback to third parties is limited. While IRS’s feedback differs by external leads program, third parties receive limited feedback across both programs.associations/companies we interviewed said that IRS provides little to no feedback in response to leads sent through the External Leads Program or the Opt-In Program, or they told us they requested additional feedback from IRS. Furthermore, IRS officials told us that the agency has received millions of leads from software companies, but while IRS makes an effort to examine and address the highest priority leads (e.g., high refund dollars), IRS has not analyzed or provided feedback about many of these leads because it does not have the resources to do so. Without accurate, timely, and actionable feedback, external parties do not know if the leads they provide to IRS are useful. Five of these eleven financial institution associations and tax software associations/companies volunteered that Eight of the eleven financial institution and tax software they are not able to assess their success in identifying IDT refund fraud, or to improve their own detection tools. Useful feedback may include aggregated information about the share of each institution’s leads that helped to identify suspicious returns and other information about IDT refund fraud trends. This type of aggregated information would also comply with section 6103 disclosure requirements. IRS’s general and aggregated feedback is limited to particular groups. IRS shares general information about high-level schemes and IDT refund fraud trends during meetings with BITS, the technology policy division of the Financial Services Roundtable. institutions that are not part of that organization may not have the opportunity to learn from these discussions.said they provide aggregated data about leads received to tax software companies that request the information, but companies that do not request the information may not receive this feedback. According to a BITS official, the Financial Services Roundtable represents the largest integrated financial services companies providing banking, insurance payment and investment products and services to the American consumer. BITS addresses emerging technology and operational opportunities for the financial services industry, helping members manage risk, particularly in cybersecurity, fraud reduction, vendor management, and critical infrastructure protection. BITS is not an acronym. At one time, BITS stood for “Banking Industry Technology Secretariat.” However, with financial modernization and the emergence of integrated financial services companies, that term is no longer used. that submitted them. In addition, IRS officials said while IRS provides some overall data for the Opt-In Program, it does not track this information by financial institution. Because IRS does not track external leads by institution, it cannot use this information to improve IDT refund fraud programs or to provide feedback to third parties about the effectiveness of their leads. Strengthening IRS’s partnerships with third parties would require IRS to expend resources analyzing leads and providing feedback to third parties. These costs could vary, depending on the systems involved and the level of feedback IRS provides. IRS has some of the information needed to track leads in this way. For example, spreadsheets submitted through the External Leads Program contain the institutions’ names, so entirely new data collection systems may not be needed. Our past work has shown that developing metrics to track external leads by submitting party is consistent with practices that enhance the use of performance information, such as communicating that information frequently and effectively. In addition, tracking external leads would support IRS’s strategic goal of supporting effective tax administration by providing timely information to external partners in the tax community.allow IRS to communicate information to specific third parties, who could then adapt their own IDT detection tools. Given the millions of dollars in refund fraud returned by financial institutions in the first five months of 2014, even a modest increase in IDT refunds returned due to institution- specific feedback may be worth the investment of tracking external leads. IDT refund fraud is a large problem: IRS estimates it issued at least $5.2 billion in fraudulent IDT refunds in filing season 2013. Given the size and scope of IDT refund fraud, additional bold and innovative steps are needed from Congress and IRS. For IRS to successfully combat IDT refund fraud, it will need to develop heightened awareness in its understanding of emerging trends, and in its ability to leverage both internal and external resources. While there is no “silver bullet” available to resolve the problem, developing strategies that focus on both preventing IDT refund fraud and resolving it can help IRS respond to this evolving threat. These strategies are likely to include constantly adapting and strengthening present defenses while also developing new strategies for both electronic and paper returns that stop IDT refund fraud at all stages of return processing. Given the billions in dollars of successful IDT refund fraud, IRS must strive to stay one or more steps ahead of identity thieves, or the risk of issuing fraudulent IDT refunds could grow. Staying ahead of identity thieves will require a significant resource investment from IRS as it strengthens and develops new tools. Accelerating the W-2 deadline to January 31—as proposed by Treasury—would provide a powerful tool for IRS to detect and prevent IDT refund fraud. At the same time, the full costs and benefits are not known because IRS has not considered how it would implement pre-refund matching using W-2 data. The burden this would impose on employers, the costs to IRS for systems changes, and the likely need for other changes (such as increased e-filing) means this step should not be taken without an informed discussion among all stakeholders, including Congress. Further, taxpayers’ expectations about the filing season and when they can anticipate receiving refunds may need to shift. Also, IRS has not fully leveraged third parties, having provided only limited feedback on the IDT refund leads third parties are submitting and offering limited general information on IDT refund fraud trends. However, to provide this information, IRS will need metrics to track external leads by the third party that submitted them, which it currently does not have. While the cost of providing third-party feedback could vary depending on the level of feedback IRS provides, third-party leads returned hundreds of millions of dollars in all refund fraud to the IRS in 2014, and are a valuable information resource about fraudulent returns that have bypassed IRS’s prevention and detection systems. Congress should consider providing the Secretary of the Treasury with the regulatory authority to lower the threshold for electronic filing of W-2s from 250 returns annually to between 5 to 10 returns, as appropriate. We recommend the Commissioner of Internal Revenue fully assess the costs and benefits of accelerating W-2 deadlines and provide information to Congress on the IRS systems and work processes that will need to be adjusted to accommodate earlier, pre-refund matching of W-2s and then identify timeframes for when these changes could be made; potential impacts on taxpayers, IRS, SSA, and third parties; and what other changes will be needed (such as delaying the start of the filing season or delaying refunds) to ensure IRS can match tax returns to W-2 data before issuing refunds. We recommend that the Commissioner of Internal Revenue take the following two actions to provide timely, accurate, and actionable feedback to all relevant lead-generating third parties: provide aggregated information on (1) the success of external party leads in identifying suspicious returns and (2) emerging trends (pursuant to section 6103 restrictions); and develop a set of metrics to track external leads by the submitting third party. We provided a draft of this product to IRS and SSA for review and comment. In its written comments, reproduced in appendix III, IRS neither agreed nor disagreed with our recommendations. IRS stated that it is determining how potential corrective actions align with available resources and IRS priorities before deciding whether to implement the recommendations. With regard to our first set of recommendations, IRS acknowledged that accelerating W-2 deadlines or delaying the tax filing season represents a significant change to tax administration. IRS stated that in order to determine the best course of action, Congress needs an understanding of the costs and benefits for IRS and other stakeholders. With regard to our second set of recommendations, IRS stated that information sharing, as permitted under the law—such as providing feedback to third parties—fosters good working relationships and promotes ongoing program improvements. IRS provided technical comments that we incorporated, as appropriate. We recognize the need for IRS to assess its priorities given the fiscal constraints it faces. We previously reported that since fiscal year 2010, IRS has absorbed approximately $900 million in budget cuts while facing increasing workloads as a result of legislative mandates and priority programs, such as work related to the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act. Even with these constraints and other potentially competing priorities, we believe the size of the IDT problem warrants additional action now. Pre-refund matching of W-2 data is one option that IRS agrees has the potential to prevent a substantial portion of the estimated $5.2 billion in IDT refunds paid in filing season 2013. However, such a change may require a significant resource investment by IRS as well as impact taxpayers and employers. Without better information about the benefits and costs of such a significant change, Congress cannot make an informed decision about implementing it. With respect to our recommendations regarding the External Leads Program, IRS highlighted the fact that the program has generated more than $2.3 billion in refunds returned to the U.S. Treasury from 2010 to 2014. Given that IRS already has some of the information needed to better track external lead results, IRS should be able to control the costs of implementing our recommendations. In its written comments, reproduced in appendix IV, SSA stated that its implementation of a redesigned Annual Wage Reporting system for processing W-2s in January 2015 and W-2cs in January 2016 will position the agency to support an accelerated W-2 deadline as well as support lowering the threshold for e-filing W-2s. SSA also said that it transmits wage data to IRS immediately upon receiving electronic W-2s. Paper W- 2s require manual handling and therefore have a significantly longer processing time. SSA also recommended that IRS consider the impact of Form 1099 reporting in making decisions to accelerate the W-2 reporting and change IRS business processes. SSA also provided technical comments that we incorporated, as appropriate. As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce the contents of this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days from the report date. At that time, we will send copies to the Commissioner of Internal Revenue. In addition, the report will be available at no charge on the GAO website at http://www.gao.gov. If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 512-9910 or whitej@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made key contributions to this report are listed in appendix V. IRS developed the Identity Theft Taxonomy (Taxonomy) to monitor the volume of identity theft (IDT) refund fraud attempts and assess the impact of its IDT defenses over time, among other reasons. The Taxonomy is a matrix of IDT refund fraud categories that estimate the amount of identified IDT refund fraud IRS prevented or recovered, as well as the identified IDT refund fraud IRS paid. The estimates are based on IRS’s administrative records of known IDT refund fraud (e.g., data on the number of duplicate returns or returns detected by identity theft filters). The Taxonomy also estimates likely identity theft by identifying returns with the characteristics of IDT refund fraud, which are found when IRS matches returns to W-2 and other information return data after the tax filing season. The Taxonomy is a valuable step toward inventorying available IDT refund fraud data and assessing the performance of IRS’s IDT refund fraud defenses. However, we identified limitations in the Taxonomy, specifically Taxonomy estimates are preliminary. After we provided a draft for comment, IRS officials stated that the Taxonomy estimates are preliminary, as they are updating their analysis using information return matching to identify likely returns where IRS paid IDT refunds. They anticipate their estimates for IDT refunds paid will increase somewhat (perhaps by $0.6 billion), but an updated Taxonomy estimate was not completed in time for us to include in this report. Using administrative records could result in imprecise estimates. Taxonomy estimates could be imprecise because the returns identified may not accurately represent the true universe of IDT refund fraud. If only certain kinds of criminals (or fraudsters) are more likely to be detected by IRS defenses, IRS records on detected IDT refund fraud may not accurately represent all individuals attempting to commit IDT refund fraud. Certain Taxonomy estimates are based on assumptions using the characteristics of past IDT refund fraud. While the assumptions are based on IRS’s research from known cases and appear reasonable, we could not verify the accuracy and comprehensiveness of these assumptions. This is because the accuracy of the Taxonomy estimates is largely based on whether the estimate includes all true IDT refund fraud returns and excludes all legitimate returns. IRS officials acknowledged their estimates for returns flagged during information return matching could include legitimate returns that are not actual IDT refund fraud. For example, the estimate could include returns flagged due to taxpayer or employer error or other non-IDT fraud by taxpayers (e.g., the taxpayer deliberately enters false information on his tax return to obtain a larger refund). Changes in these assumptions can substantially affect the estimates, but this uncertainty is not reflected in IRS’s Taxonomy estimates for filing season 2013 (e.g., IRS does not present a range of estimates based on differing assumptions). IRS’s Taxonomy underestimates the number of IDT refund fraud returns and refund amounts for some IDT categories. IRS’s estimate of IDT refunds paid is based on duplicate returns, information return mismatches, and criminal investigations identified after the refunds are paid. However, for cases where there are no duplicate returns, information returns, or criminal investigations associated with a tax return, IRS has been unable to estimate the amount of IDT refund fraud. IRS officials have considered using surveys to estimate unidentified IDT refund fraud, but have not been able to come up with a survey method that would avoid significant taxpayer burden. IRS’s Taxonomy overestimates the number of IDT refund fraud returns and refund amounts for some IDT categories. For example, IRS’s estimates for “refunds protected” include refunds returned to IRS as a result of external leads. However, IRS data on external leads do not distinguish whether the type of fraud was IDT refund fraud or some other type of fraud. Our analysis of the Taxonomy found that IRS did not adjust its estimate to account for other types of refund fraud. Methodology changes and other factors prevent comparisons between filing seasons 2012 and 2013 estimates. For filing season 2012, IRS estimates it prevented or recovered about $21.6 billion (71 percent) of the estimated IDT refunds and paid $8.9 billion (29 percent). Comparing filing season 2012 and 2013 estimates is problematic because it is unclear whether the changes are due to methodological changes, such as using different data sources or changing the criteria for querying data. IRS officials said they update their methodology to better reflect evolving IDT refund fraud schemes and improve the accuracy of Taxonomy estimates, although they attempt to use consistent definitions to promote comparability of estimates across years. In addition, it is unclear whether changes are due to overall changes in fraud patterns, such as an increase or decrease in fraud attempts; improvements in IRS IDT defenses; or identity thieves’ ability to file returns using schemes IRS has not yet learned to detect. It is likely that IRS’s estimates of the IDT refund fraud for filing seasons 2012 and 2013 will continue to evolve as IRS improves the Taxonomy methodology. For example, during the course of our audit, we found that IRS’s methodology for counting returns did not include two categories of duplicate returns that should have been included in the estimates. IRS officials estimated that including these returns would increase IRS’s original 2013 estimates of refunds paid out by $0.47 billion, from $4.75 billion to $5.22 billion in filing season 2013. This report examines (1) what the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) knows about the extent of identity theft (IDT) refund fraud and (2) what additional actions IRS can take to combat IDT refund fraud using third-party information (for example, from employers and financial institutions). As described earlier, the report discusses IDT refund fraud and not employment fraud, unless otherwise noted. To understand what IRS knows about the extent of IDT refund fraud, we reviewed IRS’s Identity Theft Taxonomy (Taxonomy), which estimates the amount of IDT refund fraud that IRS is, and is not, preventing. We conducted manual data testing for obvious errors and compared underlying data to IRS’s Refund Fraud & Identity Theft Global Report. We confirmed Taxonomy components where we had data available to cross check. We also interviewed IRS officials to better understand the methodology used to create the estimates and the changes in methodology, data sources, and assumptions across the years of data available. For details on our findings about the Taxonomy components we evaluated, see appendix I. To identify opportunities to improve IRS’s IDT refund fraud efforts, we reviewed Internal Revenue Manual sections detailing IRS’s Identity Protection Program and IRS documentation for its External Leads Program, the Opt-In Program, and other third-party efforts. We also reviewed Treasury’s legislative proposals and Congressional testimony of IRS officials. We interviewed officials and reviewed documentation from the Social Security Administration (SSA) and several of the third parties shown in table 1 below, where applicable. We selected a nonprobability sample of 22 associations and stakeholders with differing positions and characteristics to help ensure our analysis covered a variety of viewpoints, based on IRS documentation and suggestions, our prior work, and other information. For example, to select associations representing financial institutions, we considered, among other factors, the size and type of institutions they represented (e.g., large or small banks, credit unions, and prepaid debit card companies). Because we used a nonprobability sample, the views of these associations are not generalizable to all potential third parties. When possible, we used a standard set of questions in interviewing these associations and summarized the results of the semistructured interviews. However, as needed, we also sought perspectives on additional questions tailored to these associations’ expertise and sought their opinions on key issues. We then discussed these options with officials from IRS offices, including (1) Privacy, Government Liaison, and Disclosure and (2) Return Integrity and Correspondence Services to determine the feasibility of various options and the challenges of pursuing them. To describe the timing of refunds issued compared to W-2 submissions, we analyzed SSA data for filing season 2013 and IRS data for filing season 2012. SSA provided data on the cumulative number of W-2s it received for filing season 2013. We assessed the reliability of SSA data by performing electronic tests to identify obvious errors and discussing the data with SSA officials. We found the data were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of providing contextual information on when SSA receives W-2s. For IRS data, we used analysis developed for of W-2s and tax returns. This analysis obtained data from IRS’s Compliance Data Warehouse (CDW) database, which provides a variety of tax return, enforcement, compliance, and other data.when tax returns were received by IRS, we used the cycle posting date (when IRS posts tax return data to the master file), as it represents when the tax return data are available for matching. Officials noted that IRS must refine the data prior to posting to IRS systems. This may include identifying and correcting incomplete or inaccurate data before posting the data to IRS systems. We assessed the reliability of CDW data by (1) performing electronic or manual testing of required data elements to identify obvious errors, (2) reviewing existing information about the data and the system that produced them, and (3) interviewing agency officials knowledgeable about the data. We determined that the data were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report. We conducted this performance audit from May 2014 to August 2014 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. James R. White, (202) 512-9110 or whitej@gao.gov. In addition to the individual named above, Neil Pinney, Assistant Director; Shannon Finnegan, Analyst-in-Charge; Amy Bowser; Deirdre Duffy; Michele Fejfar; Timothy Guinane; Katharine Kairys; Donna Miller; Dae Park; and Ellen Rominger made key contributions to this report. Gary Bianchi, Nina Crocker, Mary Evans, Ron Jones, David Lewis, Paul Middleton, Susan E. Murphy, Sabine Paul, Sara Pelton, Julie Spetz, Jim Wozny, and John Zombro also provided assistance. GAO. Financial Audit: IRS’s Fiscal Years 2013 and 2012 Financial Statements. GAO-14-169. Washington, D.C.: December 12, 2013. GAO. Internal Revenue Service: 2013 Tax Filing Season Performance to Date and Budget Data. GAO-13-541R. Washington, D.C.: April 15, 2013. GAO. Identity Theft: Total Extent of Refund Fraud Using Stolen Identities is Unknown. GAO-13-132T. Washington, D.C.: November 29, 2012. GAO. Financial Audit: IRS’s Fiscal Years 2012 and 2011 Financial Statements. GAO-13-120. Washington, D.C.: November 9, 2012. GAO. Taxes and Identity Theft: Status of IRS Initiatives to Help Victimized Taxpayers. GAO-11-721T. Washington, D.C.: June 2, 2011. GAO. Taxes and Identity Theft: Status of IRS Initiatives to Help Victimized Taxpayers. GAO-11-674T. Washington, D.C.: May 25, 2011. GAO. Tax Administration: IRS Has Implemented Initiatives to Prevent, Detect, and Resolve Identity Theft-Related Problems, but Needs to Assess Their Effectiveness. GAO-09-882. Washington, D.C.: September 8, 2009.

Summary: Identity theft tax refund fraud is a persistent, evolving threat to honest taxpayers and tax administration. It occurs when an identity thief files a fraudulent tax return using a legitimate taxpayer's identifying information and claims a refund. GAO was asked to review IRS's efforts to combat IDT refund fraud. This report, the first of a series, examines (1) what IRS knows about the extent of IDT refund fraud and (2) additional actions IRS can take to combat IDT refund fraud using third-party information from, for example, employers and financial institutions. To understand what is known about the extent of IDT refund fraud, GAO reviewed IRS documentation, including the Identity Theft Taxonomy . To identify additional actions IRS can take, GAO assessed IRS and SSA data on the timing of W-2s; and interviewed SSA officials and selected associations representing software companies, return preparers, payroll companies, and others. Based on preliminary analysis, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) estimates it paid $5.2 billion in fraudulent identity theft (IDT) refunds in filing season 2013, while preventing $24.2 billion (based on what it could detect). The full extent is unknown because of the challenges inherent in detecting IDT refund fraud. IDT refund fraud takes advantage of IRS's “look-back” compliance model. Under this model, rather than holding refunds until completing all compliance checks, IRS issues refunds after conducting selected reviews. While there are no simple solutions, one option is earlier matching of employer-reported wage information to taxpayers' returns before issuing refunds. IRS currently cannot do such matching because employers' wage data (from Form W-2s) are not available until months after IRS issues most refunds. Consequently, IRS begins matching employer-reported W-2 data to tax returns in July, following the tax season. If IRS had access to W-2 data earlier—through accelerated W-2 deadlines and increased electronic filing of W-2s—it could conduct pre-refund matching and identify discrepancies to prevent the issuance of billions in fraudulent refunds. Accelerated W-2 deadlines. In 2014, the Department of the Treasury (Treasury) proposed that Congress accelerate W-2 deadlines to January 31. However, IRS has not fully assessed the impacts of this proposal. Without this assessment, Congress does not have the information needed to deliberate the merits of such a significant change to W-2 deadlines or the use of pre-refund W-2 matching. Such an assessment is consistent with IRS's strategic plan that calls for analytics-based decisions, and would help IRS ensure effective use of resources. Increased e-filing of W-2s. Treasury has requested authority to reduce the 250-return threshold for electronically filing (e-filing) information returns. The Social Security Administration (SSA) estimated that to meaningfully increase W-2 e-filing, the threshold would have to be lowered to include those filing 5 to 10 W-2s. In addition, SSA estimated an administrative cost savings of about $0.50 per e-filed W-2. Based on these cost savings and the ancillary benefits they provide in supporting IRS's efforts to conduct more pre-refund matching, a change in the e-filing threshold is warranted. Without this change, some employers' paper W-2s could not be available for IRS matching until much later in the year, due to the additional time needed to process paper forms. GAO recommends that Congress should consider providing Treasury with authority to lower the annual threshold for e-filing W-2s. In addition, IRS should fully assess the costs and benefits of shifting W-2 deadlines, and provide this information to Congress. IRS neither agreed nor disagreed with GAO's recommendations, and it stated it is determining how these potential corrective actions align with available resources and IRS priorities.