DHS and DOJ have several components with law enforcement functions whose personnel are authorized to carry firearms in support of accomplishing their respective missions. Table 1 describes the various law enforcement and homeland security missions of the DHS and DOJ components within our review, as well as the number of personnel authorized to carry firearms in fiscal year 2013. In support of their law enforcement missions, both DHS and DOJ law enforcement officers and agents use a number of different types of firearms, which require a variety of ammunition. Examples of firearms include side arms, such as pistols, and long guns, such as rifles. Commonly used ammunition includes .40 caliber, .223 caliber, and 9 millimeter, according to our analysis of data provided by DHS. More examples of commonly used firearms and ammunition can be found in appendix II. In 2003, DHS began its strategic sourcing program to leverage its buying power and secure competitive prices for a variety of goods and services, resulting in cost savings through collective procurement actions (e.g., buying in bulk quantities at lower prices). DHS developed its first strategically sourced ammunition procurement in 2005. DHS’s strategic sourcing contract vehicles include contracts or agreements that have been established for use by two or more components, and these types of contracts have been used by DHS components to procure ammunition. The Office of Management and Budget’s Office of Federal Procurement Policy has cited DHS’s efforts among best practices for implementing federal strategic sourcing initiatives, and we have also reported on DHS’s strategic sourcing initiatives. DHS procures ammunition using two types of contracts—strategic sourcing and individual contracts. The decision of whether to use a strategic sourcing contract is driven by collective component needs, according to DHS officials. That is, if more than one component needs a specific type of ammunition, then that ammunition procurement is a candidate for strategic sourcing. Most of DHS’s ammunition contracts, whether strategically sourced or individual contracts, are indefinite delivery, indefinite quantity (IDIQ) contracts, which are typically negotiated for a base year with additional options for purchasing ammunition up to a certain maximum number of rounds, or contract ceiling. These IDIQ contracts allow components to lock in the price, specifications, delivery costs, and other requirements and then place purchase orders throughout the negotiated time frame of the contract (e.g., indefinite delivery) for varying quantities as needed (e.g., indefinite quantity), rather than placing a single order for large amounts of ammunition. DHS orders based on the contracts as needed and pays for the ammunition on delivery. DHS is required to buy only a minimum that represents about 1 month of the projected DHS requirement, according to DHS officials. In August 2012, DHS began requiring components to use strategic sourcing contract vehicles for procurements, including ammunition, unless procurements met certain exceptions, such as specialized types of ammunition not commonly used across components or ammunition requiring certain technical specifications. Ammunition that is either not commonly used or has specifications needed by a single component can be acquired through individual component contracts according to DHS officials. Within the DHS Office of the Chief Procurement Officer, the Strategic Sourcing Program Office helps components develop, implement, and maintain sourcing strategies to enhance acquisition efficiency. According to DHS officials, the strategic sourcing process for procuring ammunition for multiple components has saved an estimated $2 million since fiscal year 2008. See appendix III for a complete list of all active DHS ammunition contracts, as of October 2013. Given the number of law enforcement and security personnel across the department, DHS established the Weapons and Ammunition Commodity Council (WACC) in October 2003 to consolidate weapons, ammunition, and other enforcement equipment requirements. While DHS components are responsible for determining their own ammunition requirements and needs, WACC is to serve as the coordinating mechanism for DHS components’ ammunition and weapons procurements. Rather than have each component procure ammunition and weapons individually or draw exclusively on its own history for best practices, the members of WACC, as shown in figure 1, are to meet monthly to explore ways to maximize procurement savings, according to DHS officials. According to DHS officials, to further coordinate ammunition and weapons procurements, DHS is exploring the feasibility of broadening the scope of WACC to also track and approve ammunition purchases across the department. As of October 2013, DHS said these plans are in the development stage. DHS’s Office of the Chief Readiness Support Officer, within the Management Directorate, is responsible for department-wide asset management. Within each component, property management officers or firearm program managers are responsible for the component’s firearm program, including ammunition. In general, component firearm instructors or firearms and weapons custodians are responsible for maintaining oversight for the shipment, receipt, issuance and periodic inventory of firearms and ammunition. At the headquarters level, the DHS Assistant Deputy for Mobile Assets and Personal Property has overall responsibility for the oversight and management of DHS firearm assets. This includes ensuring that components have an approved firearm asset management system of record and documented firearm accountability policies and procedures. The Chief Readiness Support Officer disseminates DHS’s asset management program requirements, provides oversight of the program, and sets department policy. The DHS Office of the Chief Readiness Support Officer’s Sensitive Asset Manager’s responsibilities include evaluating, auditing, and assessing component-level firearm asset management systems of record and accountability programs to ensure compliance with laws, regulations, policies, and directives, and working with components to develop standard and uniform DHS-wide firearms accountability policies and guidelines. In fiscal year 2013, DHS purchased 84 million rounds of ammunition for its authorized firearm-carrying workforce, which is less than DHS’s ammunition purchases each year over the past 5 fiscal years. DHS ammunition purchases are driven primarily by the firearms training and qualification requirements for the firearm-carrying workforce, though other factors are also considered by DHS when making ammunition purchase decisions. For selected DOJ components, for fiscal years 2011 through 2013, the average number of rounds of ammunition purchased per authorized firearm-carrying personnel per year was comparable to that for DHS law enforcement components.identified similar considerations in determining their annual ammunition requirements. From fiscal year 2008 through fiscal year 2013, DHS purchased an average of 109 million rounds of ammunition per year. Yearly purchases ranged from a high of 133 million rounds in fiscal year 2009 to a low of 84 million rounds in fiscal year 2013. In comparison, the total consumer ammunition market for 2012 was approximately 9.5 billion rounds, according to the National Shooting Sports Foundation. DHS’s ammunition purchases over the 6-year period equate to an average of 1,200 rounds of ammunition purchased per agent or officer per year.The annual total cost for these ammunition purchases ranged from $19 million to $34 million per year, with an average of $29 million for the 6- year time period. In fiscal year 2013, DHS purchased 84 million rounds of ammunition for its authorized firearm-carrying workforce, equaling an average of 900 rounds per agent or officer that year, and a total annual cost of $19 million. According to senior DHS officials, the decline in ammunition purchases in fiscal year 2013 is the result of budget constraints, reduced training, and in one case the expiration of an ammunition contract. These officials said that although ammunition purchases declined in fiscal year 2013, DHS components relied on their ammunition inventories to maintain basic qualification and operational needs. In fiscal year 2014, DHS plans to purchase about 75 million rounds of ammunition (see fig. 2). According to DHS contract data as of October 1, 2013, the 29 existing DHS ammunition contracts extend over the next 4 fiscal years and have a remaining contract limit of approximately 704 million rounds (for various ammunition types), if every option for purchasing ammunition were exercised into fiscal year 2018. The total contract dollar ceiling on these 29 active contracts is about $285 million. The approximately 704 million rounds of ammunition represent the limit on the combined active contracts, against which orders from the manufacturers may be placed over the next several fiscal years. See appendix III for a complete list of all active DHS ammunition contracts, as of October 1, 2013. Although the amounts of DHS’s overall ammunition purchases have fallen since fiscal year 2009, the yearly changes in the amount of ammunition purchased by its component agencies have varied, as shown in figure 3. CBP—which has the most firearm-carrying personnel of the DHS components—purchased the largest amount of ammunition, on average, from fiscal year 2008 through 2013, accounting for approximately 46 percent of DHS’s average purchases of ammunition for this time period. The average amount of ammunition purchased by components from fiscal years 2008 through 2013 ranged from approximately 50 million rounds of ammunition for CBP to a low of approximately 1.9 million rounds of ammunition for FPS. A number of factors contribute to variation in ammunition purchases from year to year by component, such as changes in the size of the firearm- carrying workforce. For example, CBP and ICE increased their firearm- carrying workforces in fiscal years 2008 and 2009, which also increased ammunition needs for those components, as new hires needed to be trained to gain firearms proficiency prior to entering the field for duty. According to CBP data, new Border Patrol agents each use approximately 3,300 rounds during training and qualification, compared with experienced officers who might use about 600 rounds. DHS components provided data on the amount of ammunition typically used by a new law enforcement hire, which ranged from 2,000 to 5,000 rounds. From fiscal years 2008 through 2013, the DHS components in our review trained thousands of new law enforcement agents and officers, according to DHS data. Other factors that account for changes in ammunition purchases year to year include qualification and training requirements and amount of ammunition in inventory, as discussed later in this report. In addition, it is important to note that components purchase ammunition throughout the year, and orders placed in 1 fiscal year might not arrive or be used until future years, which can also contribute to variation in purchases from year to year. The amount of ammunition each component purchases for its firearm- carrying personnel also varies. We analyzed DHS data on ammunition purchases and the size of the firearm-carrying workforce for fiscal years 2008 through 2013 and found the average number of rounds of ammunition purchased per year per firearm-carrying agent or officer by component for this time period ranged between approximately 1,000 and 2,000 rounds, as shown in table 2. This variation exists because each component independently decides, based on its operational needs, how much ammunition to allocate to its firearm-carrying personnel for training and qualification each year. For example, FPS provides each officer 250 rounds per quarter per handgun for firearm qualification, while ICE provides 100 rounds per quarter per handgun for firearm qualification. When determining annual ammunition requirements, the primary consideration for DHS components is the amount of ammunition needed to support the training and qualification of the firearm-carrying workforce, according to DHS officials. Training and qualification requirements vary for the components in our review, as do the number of rounds of ammunition typically used for training and qualification purposes. However, for all the components in our review, most firearm-carrying personnel are required to qualify four times per year on their issued firearms. We analyzed available data on DHS’s ammunition requirements for the 6-year period from fiscal years 2008 through 2013. We found that the ammunition purchased by the components was reasonable given their annual expected training and operational needs. DHS’s more than 70,000 firearm-carrying personnel have qualification requirements they must fulfill to ensure firearms proficiency. Failure to qualify on firearms may result in the denial, suspension or revocation of credentials to carry firearms. Depending on how rigorous a component’s qualification requirements are and how many firearms an officer is authorized to carry, each DHS component may require a larger or smaller supply of ammunition to conduct its qualifications. Officers generally carry one or more firearms and must qualify on each firearm they carry. For example, a component may allow an officer to carry a personally owned firearm in addition to his or her duty-issued firearm, and the officer must qualify on both weapons, using ammunition provided by the relevant DHS component. DHS law enforcement officers across the department are typically required to perform quarterly firearms qualifications on their issued weapons (e.g., handgun), and in some cases demonstrate familiarity and proficiency on long guns, such as rifles and shotguns, even if they are not required to carry a long gun as part of their duties. For some officers, depending on the DHS component and the requirements of their unit, more frequent qualifications or advanced firearms training is required. For example, advanced firearms training may include “down and disabled” firearms training or reduced light firearms training, among others. DHS components also may have specialized units, such as tactical teams, that may require hundreds or thousands of rounds of ammunition during training activities. For example, CBP’s Border Patrol Tactical Unit and Special Response Team—which enhance field operations with specialized tactics and techniques—use specialized firearms that are not otherwise issued to other CBP firearm-carrying staff. Officers in these teams are required to qualify on these additional specialized weapons, and can use more ammunition during training activities, according to CBP officials. Along with the other five DHS components, FLETC’s purchases of ammunition are to support the training of law enforcement officials to help them fulfill their responsibilities safely and proficiently. From fiscal year 2008 through 2013, FLETC has trained over 398,000 federal, state, local, tribal, and international law enforcement personnel, according to FLETC data—approximately 66,000 on average per year. FLETC provides the ammunition for the training courses provided to these law enforcement officers. FLETC officials said they determine their annual ammunition requirements based on the projected number of classes, students, and ammunition needs per class.in FLETC’s ammunition needs occur throughout the year, as a result of canceled classes, added classes, and varying numbers of students. DHS components generally use the same type of ammunition for training and qualification as they use for duty (operational use). According to DHS, this is because delivering and storing different types of ammunition for training and operational use creates complex logistical challenges, and could create an officer safety issue if the wrong ammunition is used in the field. FLETC primarily uses Reduced Hazard Training Ammunition, which is free of lead and other toxic substances, in its firearms training curriculum. DHS components reported a combined total of 331 rounds of ammunition fired in the course of their duties compared with their total combined ammunition purchases of over 84 million rounds for that year. In addition to citing training and qualification requirements, senior DHS officials cited delivery and quality issues with ammunition, changes in firearms, historical usage rates, and the amount of ammunition currently in inventory as other factors they consider when making ammunition purchase decisions. Delivery and ammunition quality issues: Senior DHS component officials told us that another factor they consider when determining ammunition requirements is the time lag due to the ammunition delivery and quality testing process. Officials from all DHS components within our review reported time lags between placing orders for ammunition and receiving them. For example, the time lag can range from 3 to 18 months. Senior DHS component officials said that the Department of Defense gets first priority for ammunition orders from manufacturers, and supplying the military can delay orders for DHS and other federal law enforcement agencies, not only because of military priority, but also because production of other types of ammunition may be halted while manufacturers work to produce the ammunition needed by the Department of Defense. These officials also stated that while the ammunition they purchase comes from the same manufacturers that provide ammunition for commercial supply, the ammunition DHS purchases is manufactured according to DHS contract specifications, and is higher quality than commercial off-the-shelf ammunition. Senior component officials said they take this into account when determining how much and when to order ammunition, including when ammunition inventories need to be replenished. While awaiting delivery of ordered ammunition, DHS components reported using their existing ammunition inventories to meet mission requirements, such as for training and qualification. Ammunition quality and testing are also factors in developing annual ammunition requirements for DHS. Components, such as USSS, ICE, and FLETC, have testing facilities to help ensure the ammunition ordered meets the specifications outlined in contracts with manufacturers. For example, ICE’s National Firearms Tactical and Training Unit (NFTTU)— which purchases ammunition on behalf of ICE, CBP, and FPS, and provides technical assistance to TSA—operates a ballistics laboratory for the testing of ammunition, among other purposes. This unit conducts quality tests on a sample of each ammunition order before approving the According to acceptance and distribution of the total ammunition order.the Assistant Director of ICE’s NFTTU, if the ammunition tested does not meet NFTTU’s quality standards, the batch is returned to the manufacturer and the total order is not accepted and approved until the ammunition meets standards. According to NFTTU data, this has occurred 17 times from fiscal year 2009 through fiscal year 2013, representing 3 percent of total tested batches. Changes in firearms and ammunition types: Another factor components consider when developing their annual ammunition requirements is changes in the types of firearms and ammunition used by components, according to senior DHS officials. When these changes occur, additional ammunition is required to ensure officers’ proficiency on the new firearm or ammunition. For example, in August 2011, ICE management made changes to the types of authorized weapons officers could carry as their primary weapon—expanding the list of authorized 9 millimeter (mm) firearms. Prior to this change, the standard duty firearm was a .40 caliber firearm. After authorizing more 9 mm firearms, ICE experienced a 60 percent increase in the amount of 9 mm ammunition consumed, according to ICE, which resulted in ICE’s inventory of 9 mm ammunition to be depleted. According to ICE officials, ICE needed to amend the existing contract for 9 mm ammunition to allow for additional purchases of ammunition to ensure officers who chose to use those 9 mm firearms had sufficient ammunition for firearms qualification and operations. As this change came at the end of fiscal year 2011, purchases increased in fiscal year 2012, as previously shown in figure 3. Historical usage rates: Historical usage rates—that is, the amount of ammunition used in previous years—is also a factor components consider to determine how much ammunition to purchase, according to senior DHS component officials. DHS component officials told us they estimate how much ammunition they have used by reviewing how much ammunition they purchased in previous years, the number of authorized firearm-carrying personnel, and related training and qualification requirements. According to our analysis of estimated ammunition usage data provided by DHS components, for fiscal years 2008 through 2013, DHS components in our review estimated using, on average, approximately 110 million rounds of ammunition per fiscal year, with a high of about 141 million rounds in fiscal year 2009 to a low of about 89 million rounds in fiscal year 2013 (see figure 4). Ammunition inventory: The amount of ammunition components have in inventory is also a factor to determine how much and when to order more ammunition, according to DHS component officials. DHS components determine how much ammunition to keep in inventory, and when to replenish ammunition inventories. The six DHS components in our review stated they strive to maintain about 12 to 24 months’ of ammunition inventory to meet the training, qualification, and operational ammunition needs of firearm-carrying personnel. As stated earlier, there can be months-long delays between placing an order for ammunition and receiving it. To help ensure components have sufficient ammunition on hand to support the training and operational needs of their officers, DHS components maintain inventories of ammunition. For example, TSA officials said they try to keep a large ammunition inventory on hand, because the FFDOs (trained and armed pilots) are allowed to provide as little as 24 hours notice to perform their qualification, based on their fluctuating schedules. Ammunition is stored in limited supply in the field offices of the various components, as DHS component officials have said there is limited storage for ammunition in the field. Officials added that while ammunition is typically shipped directly from the manufacturers to the field offices that placed the orders, there are occasions when production delays require components to ship ammunition from their reserves stored in armories to resupply the field. It is important to note that inventory levels reflect a point in time and that inventory fluctuates throughout the year as ammunition orders arrive from manufacturers and ammunition is used for firearms qualification and other purposes in the field. Therefore, it is not possible to provide an average ammunition inventory for a year or past years, because the inventory is constantly fluctuating. Table 3 shows how much ammunition DHS components had in inventory (in both estimated rounds and approximate number of months’ supply) at three different points in time between November 2012 and October 2013, as reported to us by DHS components. We provide these estimates at three points in time to show, by component, how ammunition inventory fluctuates over the course of 1 year. Each component is responsible for maintaining and recording its own ammunition inventory, and, according to senior DHS component officials, ammunition balances may not always be up to date and generally are estimates. For example, a field location may show more ammunition in inventory than other field offices, but that could reflect that the officers have not yet completed a quarterly firearms qualification or the inventory tracking system has not yet been updated to reflect changes. In addition, components may also consider ammunition that has been ordered, but not yet arrived, to be part of their “current” inventory. For example, TSA reported an inventory level of almost 30 million rounds in November 2012, but TSA officials said that number included ammunition orders that had been placed with the manufacturer, but were not yet in physical inventory. According to TSA, the quantity of ammunition in TSA’s physical possession at the time of the inquiry was approximately 19 million rounds. Similar to DHS, the DOJ components in our review also purchase ammunition to ensure their personnel authorized to carry firearms are equipped to carry out their various law enforcement missions. For the three DOJ components in our review, ammunition purchases are driven primarily by the firearms training and qualification requirements for their firearm-carrying workforce. According to DOJ data, DOJ component firearm qualification requirements range from semi-annual to quarterly, depending on the component; however, most require quarterly firearms qualification on an officer’s primary weapon. As shown in table 4, the approximate number of rounds of ammunition purchased per firearm- carrying agent or officer for the three DOJ law enforcement agencies in our review for fiscal years 2011 through 2013 were similar to the amounts for DHS components in our review. For DOJ components, the average number of rounds of ammunition purchased per authorized firearm-carrying agent or officer per year across fiscal years 2011 through 2013 was approximately 1,300 rounds. For DHS, the average number of rounds of ammunition purchased per authorized firearm-carrying agent or officer per year for fiscal years 2011 through 2013 was approximately 1,000 rounds. Senior DOJ officials also reported similar considerations when making ammunition purchases, such as ammunition delivery lead time, quality issues, and the amount of ammunition in inventory. As with DHS officials, DOJ officials reported that the type of ammunition they use is manufactured to a higher standard than ammunition purchased by the civilian market and is not considered off-the-shelf. According to DOJ component officials, the ammunition purchased by DOJ is produced after an order is placed with a manufacturer, and the time between placing an order and receiving it can be several months. Quality testing of ammunition is also part of DOJ components’ procurement process, to help ensure ammunition performs as expected in the field. Additionally, DOJ components also consider the amount of inventory on hand when determining ammunition requirements. According to officials from the DOJ components in our review, the amount of inventory components try to maintain ranged from a minimum of 6 months to a maximum of 24 months. Ammunition inventory data provided by two of the three DOJ components indicated that inventory ranged from about 13 months’ worth to about 20 months’ worth.DHS components. Each of the DHS components in our review has policies, procedures, and processes that describe the requirements and guidance necessary to ensure inventory management, control and accountability for firearms and ammunition. These policies include describing who is responsible and accountable for firearms and ammunition, tracking and accounting for firearms and ammunition throughout their life cycles, and periodically conducting physical inventories to verify the existence and location of the firearms and ammunition recorded in the accountability records. For example, FLETC requires the firearms and weapons custodian to perform a daily audit of all ammunition issues and receipts occurring at specified issue points. TSA requires supervisors to conduct unannounced employee firearm inspections and recommends that TSA offices conduct random, selective, periodic, or unannounced internal audits to ensure proper inventory controls and accountability. In addition, ICE, CBP, and FPS use an automated system called Firearms, Armor, and Credentials Tracking System (FACTS) to provide visibility of and oversight over their firearms inventories. We did not assess if the components’ policies, procedures, and process for managing their firearms and ammunition inventories were working as intended. Department of Homeland Security Inspector General, DHS Controls over Firearms, OIG- 10-41, (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 25, 2010). report recommended, among other things, that DHS develop department-wide policies and procedures for safeguarding and controlling firearms. In response to the findings and recommendations of the report, in 2012 DHS issued the DHS Firearm Asset Policy (firearm policy) to govern the components’ management of firearms, including inventory management requirements. According to the firearm policy, components are responsible for developing their own controls and for overall management of their respective firearms programs, which includes adhering to DHS requirements for firearms management. The components are to integrate the firearm policy into their operations during fiscal year 2013, with a planned full implementation by the end of fiscal year 2014. Among other things, DHS’s firearms policy requires five specific inventory control measures, noted below: Establish policies and guidance: Components are responsible for establishing policies and guidelines to ensure that the firearm asset management system of record is updated throughout the asset life cycle to document all transactions and events. Conduct annual physical inventory: The component’s property management officer or firearm program manager is to ensure that the component’s inventory plan incorporates an annual physical inventory for all firearms. For internal control purposes, there are to be at least two individuals conducting a firearm physical inventory. Data on every firearm shall be recorded and maintained in the firearm asset management system of record. Conduct independent third party audits: Components or DHS’s Chief Readiness Support Officer’s Office are to engage independent third parties to conduct an annual audit of at least 15 percent of their firearm inventory. Ensure inventory accuracy: Supervisors are to conduct unannounced inventory verifications to ensure accuracy of firearms inventory. Verify issued firearms: In addition to an annual physical inventory, each component’s property management officers or firearm program managers are to ensure quarterly firearm inventory verifications are conducted for all firearms issued. For the six DHS components in our review, we found that each of the components established policies and guidelines to manage firearms assets, and some of the components were already implementing aspects of the new firearm policy. For example, all six components’ policies require that they conduct a complete annual physical inventory of all firearms. Two of the components’ policies require them to engage an independent third party to conduct an annual audit of at least 15 percent of their firearm inventories. In addition, three of the six components have procedures in place to ensure quarterly firearm inventory verifications are conducted for all firearms issued. DHS officials said that components are not expected to address all of the requirements in the DHS firearm policy until the end of fiscal year 2014. Therefore, it is too early to know if components will meet all of the requirements within this time frame. Component officials we spoke with said that the implementation time frame may require additional time to work through the feasibility of certain requirements. For example, ICE officials noted that components with collective bargaining units, such as CBP and ICE, for example, would need agreement by the collective bargaining unit representing a component’s law enforcement personnel before certain aspects of the new firearm policy can be implemented. DHS issued a manual in 2013 on personal property asset management that provides a general description of controls for managing property, including ammunition, which is considered a sensitive asset requiring certain controls. Specifically, with respect to inventory management of ammunition, the DHS manual requires that ammunition be physically inventoried at least annually. In accordance with the DHS property management manual, DHS relies on the components to establish specific policies and procedures for managing, safeguarding, and controlling their ammunition inventories. We found that all six DHS components in our review have policies and procedures for managing their ammunition inventories, including requiring that a physical inventory be conducted at least annually, which is in accordance with the DHS property management manual. For example, USSS guidance requires that field office personnel conduct annual inventories to ensure the completeness and accuracy of the ammunition inventory information within their inventory system. Officials from five of the six components reported that they do conduct physical inventories of their ammunition at least annually. For example, FLETC officials reported that personnel conduct an annual inventory in which they are to reconcile ammunition with control records through a dual verification process to ensure accuracy by performing a physical and visual verification. One component—ICE—reported that it does not conduct a distinct physical inventory of ammunition (that is, at one point in time reconcile ammunition on hand with ammunition expected to be in inventory). However, ICE officials stated that ammunition inventories are conducted by ICE field-level officials at various times during the year for determination of needs. According to ICE officials, ICE has treated ammunition as a consumable asset and has not subjected it to the same inventory process as firearms. Sensitive assets such as firearms are subject to the special requirements outlined in the DHS property management directive. ICE officials stated that although they have not conducted annual physical inventories, ammunition balances and inventory levels are continuously tracked in FACTS, and senior firearms instructors in local field offices manage and maintain their ammunition inventory in FACTS as well as on ammunition inventory control sheets that are maintained locally. ICE officials said beginning in fiscal year 2014, they plan to institute a separate and distinct physical inventory of ammunition in conjunction with the annual ICE-wide sensitive asset inventory. We provided a draft of this report to DHS and DOJ for official review and comment. DHS provided written comments, which are reproduced in full in appendix IV. DHS agreed that annual ammunition purchases have declined during the past 3 years and are comparable to those of DOJ law enforcement agencies. DOJ did not provide written comments on this report. DHS and DOJ provided technical comments, which we incorporated where appropriate. As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce the contents of this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days from the report date. At that time, we will send copies to the Secretary of Homeland Security, the Attorney General, selected congressional committees, and other interested parties. In addition, the report will be available at no charge on the GAO website at http://www.gao.gov. If you or your staffs have any questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 512-9627 or maurerd@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. Key contributors to this report are listed in appendix V. 1. What are the trends in the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) ammunition purchases since fiscal year 2008, what factors affect its purchase decisions, and how do DHS’s purchases compare with those of the Department of Justice’s (DOJ)? 2. What policies and guidance does DHS have for managing firearms and ammunition inventories? To obtain information on DHS’s acquisition practices for ammunition, we examined the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR); DHS’s acquisition and procurement policies and guidance, including the Homeland Security Acquisition Regulation (HSAR); and the Homeland Security Acquisition Manual (HSAM). We reviewed prior GAO reports and a Congressional Research Service memorandum on DHS acquisition and procurement. We also reviewed contracts for ammunition purchases and related pre- award documentation, including acquisition plans, market research, and cost estimates, but we did not review whether components’ ammunition procurements complied with the FAR, HSAR, or HSAM. We interviewed the Director for Procurement Policy and Oversight, the Director for Oversight and Strategic Sourcing, and the acquisition and program officials from six DHS components including U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), Transportation Security Administration (TSA), U. S. Secret Service (USSS), National Protection and Programs Directorate/Federal Protective Service (FPS), and Federal Law Enforcement Training Centers (FLETC) to discuss contracting procedures and practices for procuring ammunition, including the use of the Weapons Ammunition Commodity Council and strategic sourcing to coordinate and leverage their buying power. We reviewed relevant policies and guidance, examined department and component documentation, and interviewed officials from the DHS Office of the Chief Procurement Officer and components on practices they employ and contracts they have leveraged. Specifically, we interviewed officials from DHS’s strategic sourcing program office, as well as all six components, to gain an understanding of DHS’s strategic sourcing processes, the availability of strategic sourcing contracting vehicles for ammunition, and the potential of establishing component- specific strategic sourcing goals for procuring ammunition. We also interviewed Office of the Chief Procurement Officer Oversight and Pricing Branch officials regarding their tri-annual reviews of procurement operations. To determine any trends in DHS’s ammunition purchases since fiscal year 2008, we obtained available data from DHS law enforcement components with firearm-carrying personnel regarding their ammunition purchases, costs, usage, and the size of the authorized firearm-carrying workforce for fiscal years 2008 through 2013. Specifically, we selected all DHS law enforcement components with firearm-carrying personnel— CBP, ICE, TSA, USSS, FPS—as well as FLETC. The number of TSA federal air marshals and the number of federal flight deck officers authorized by TSA to carry firearms is considered sensitive security information. Accordingly, we excluded that information from this report. We also obtained data from DHS components on their estimated ammunition inventory balances for three points in time—November 2012, April 2013, and October 2013. Because we determined that it is not possible to provide an average ammunition inventory for a year or past years, as ammunition inventory is constantly fluctuating, we selected these points in time based on data that was previously reported by DHS to Congress prior to our review as well as data available at the start and end of our review. In addition, DHS components’ records may not always reflect the exact quantities of the ammunition inventory. For example, depending on how often components update their inventory data, the time lag may result in differences between quantities of ammunition actually available and those reflected on the inventory records. We also obtained data on planned ammunition purchases for fiscal year 2014. In deciding which DHS components to examine in our review, we excluded components that were not law enforcement components and had small numbers of personnel authorized to carry firearms and made small purchases of ammunition, such as the Office of the Inspector General and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). We also excluded the U.S. Coast Guard—a DHS component with firearm- carrying personnel—because the Coast Guard does not procure ammunition through DHS; rather, the U.S. Coast Guard procures its ammunition through Department of Defense contracts. Similarly, we selected all DOJ law enforcement components with firearm- carrying personnel regarding their ammunition purchases, costs, usage, and size of the workforce authorized to carry firearms for fiscal years 2011 through 2013. The specific DOJ law enforcement components included in our review are the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF), Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and U.S. Marshals Service. The Federal Bureau of Prisons could not provide ammunition purchase data comparable to that of the other components based on its method of record keeping and data retention policy. We determined that data from the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) were not sufficiently reliable for our purposes, because DEA could only provide estimates of purchases. We, therefore, excluded both agencies from our scope. We included the selected DOJ law enforcement agencies in our review to provide perspective and context to help understand DHS’s ammunition purchases and usage relative to those of other federal law enforcement agencies. We excluded FLETC from this analysis because FLETC has few firearm-carrying officers for which it purchases ammunition. Ammunition purchased by FLETC is utilized by all students who train on firearms at its facilities, including DHS and other federal law enforcement personnel, as well as state, local, tribal, and international law enforcement personnel. authorized to carry a firearm to account for the varying sizes of the different departments and components. We selected DOJ to provide a comparison with DHS’s ammunition purchases as it has the second largest number of personnel authorized to carry firearms. However, our DOJ analysis is not to suggest that the department represents a model or standard against which DHS is assessed. Differences in the amount of ammunition per firearm-carrying personnel reflect a number of factors, including unique mission requirements and training needs. To assess the reliability of the data we obtained from DHS components on ammunition purchases and costs, we reviewed the extent to which the components have procedures and controls for ensuring that the data are consistent and accurate, and interviewed knowledgeable officials responsible for collecting and reporting the data. In addition, for the data we obtained from DHS components on ammunition purchases and costs, we compared it with corroborating evidence to determine data consistency and reasonableness. Specifically, we obtained information on ammunition procurements using obligations data from fiscal years 2008 through 2012, and part of fiscal year 2013 from the Federal Procurement Data System (FPDS), which tracks all contracts using appropriated funds government-wide. We used the obligations data from the FPDS and compared ammunitions obligations for DHS with the sum of ammunition costs as provided to us by each of the components. We also compared estimated ammunition used with ammunition purchased under the assumption that in a given year, components would purchase ammunition to replace what was used. We calculated how much ammunition DHS components might be expected to use in a given year using data, provided by DHS, on the size of the firearm-carrying workforce, the number of staff qualified on various types of firearms, and the number of rounds of ammunition typically allotted for training and qualifications. We also reviewed selected DHS ammunition procurement contracts, which were readily available, for information on ammunition purchases, costs, and stated requirements. We found the data on ammunition purchases and costs for the DHS components to be sufficiently reliable for our purposes. To assess the reliability of the data we obtained from DHS components on ammunition inventory, we reviewed the extent to which the agencies have procedures and controls for ensuring that the data are consistent and accurate, and interviewed knowledgeable officials responsible for collecting and reporting the data. To determine the approximate number of months’ supply of ammunition in inventory for each component, we used fiscal year 2013 estimated ammunition usage data provided by DHS components and divided that number by 12 to get an estimate of monthly ammunition usage. We then divided the components’ inventory figures by the monthly ammunition usage estimate to get estimated months’ worth in inventory for those three points in time. Each component has policies in place to maintain and record its own ammunition inventory, but according to officials, ammunition balances may not always be up to date and generally are estimates. For example, depending on how often components update their inventory data, the time lag may result in differences between quantities of ammunition actually available and those reflected on the inventory records. On the basis of this information, we determined the data to be sufficiently reliable to be reported rounded to the millions. To assess the reliability of the data we obtained from DHS components on ammunition usage, we interviewed knowledgeable officials responsible for collecting and reporting the data. DHS components do not centrally track historical ammunition usage, in large part because their data management systems are not designed to track ammunition usage. However, components did provide us estimates of ammunition usage for fiscal years 2008 through 2013 based on how much ammunition they purchased in previous years, the number of firearm-carrying personnel, and related training and qualification requirements. We determined these data were sufficiently reliable to report general trends in usage when rounded to the hundred thousands. DHS components provided us with data on the number of personnel authorized to carry firearms for fiscal year 2008 through 2013 and information about how they compiled these data. Data sources varied by component and included personnel systems, the Firearms, Armor, and Credentials Tracking System (FACTS), and data from the National Finance Center. Workforce data provided by CBP is not precise because it included a rounded number of personnel for one of CBP’s sub- components. Therefore, we report CBP’s data rounded to the thousands. On the basis of this information, we determined these data were sufficiently reliable to be used for background purposes and in our calculations of the average number of rounds purchased per agent or officer. To assess the reliability of the inventory, workforce, and ammunition purchase data we obtained from DOJ, we interviewed knowledgeable officials responsible for collecting and reporting the data about the extent to which DOJ components have procedures and controls in place for ensuring that the data are consistent and accurate. We calculated the DOJ inventory months’ worth estimates in the same way we did for DHS components. On the basis of this information, we determined these data to be sufficiently reliable to report rounded estimates based on these data. We interviewed officials from the six DHS components in our review to discuss the ammunition procurement process and how ammunition requirements are determined at the component level and the purpose of quality testing the ammunition, and to understand the context of why proficiency among firearm-carrying personnel is important. In addition, DHS components provided examples of purchase and delivery orders in which the components experienced a variation in lag time between placing a purchase order and receiving a shipment of ammunition, which can result from the manufacturing lead time associated with ammunition purchases. Finally, for additional context, we conducted a site visit to the ICE National Firearms Testing Lab, which performs quality control testing on ammunition and firearms, and maintains an inventory of ammunition and firearms for distribution to DHS field locations. To address our second question, we examined the general requirements and policies DHS and its components had to manage and oversee firearms and ammunition, but we did not assess whether the directives, policies, and guidance were working as intended or if component personnel were adhering to them, as that was outside the scope of our review. We examined agency-wide directives and guidance, and component management policies and procedures for managing ammunition and firearms. This included reviewing the firearm policy manuals or related documentation from CBP, FLETC, FPS, ICE, TSA, and USSS to determine whether the manuals specifically addressed agency-wide firearm and ammunition inventory management requirements. We also interviewed officials from the Office of the Chief Readiness Support Officer and from DHS components, and reviewed components’ written responses regarding their policies and guidance for managing firearms and ammunition. In addition, we interviewed component officials responsible for conducting management and compliance reviews of component operations, including on-site review and self-inspection program findings and recommendations, which include, but are not limited to, ammunition and firearms management and controls. We also reviewed a 2010 DHS Inspector General report on DHS firearms controls. We conducted this performance audit from May 2013 to January 2014 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. Figure 5 shows some of the most commonly purchased types of ammunition for ICE, and figure 6 shows firearms commonly issued by DHS components. Most of DHS’s ammunition contracts, whether strategically sourced or individual contracts, are indefinite delivery, indefinite quantity (IDIQ) contracts, which are typically negotiated for a base year with additional options for purchasing ammunition up to a certain maximum number of rounds, or contract ceiling. As shown in the table below, the 29 existing DHS ammunition contracts extend over the next 4 fiscal years and have a remaining contract limit of approximately 704 million rounds (for various ammunition types) if every option for purchasing ammunition were exercised into fiscal year 2018. DHS’s strategic sourcing contract vehicles include contracts or agreements that have been established for use by two or more components to leverage their buying power and secure competitive prices resulting in cost savings through collective procurement actions (e.g., buying in bulk quantities at lower prices). Strategically sourced contracts are shaded. In addition to the contact named above, Adam Hoffman (Assistant Director) and Daniel Blinderman, Billy Commons, Lorraine Ettaro, Emily Gunn, Eric Hauswirth, Susan Hsu, Susanna Kuebler, Gary Malavenda, Linda Miller, and Anthony Pordes made significant contributions to this report.

Summary: DHS and its components have homeland security and law enforcement missions that require agents and officers to carry and be proficient in the use of firearms. DHS has more than 70,000 firearm-carrying personnel—the most of any department. DOJ has the next largest with approximately 69,000 firearm-carrying personnel. GAO was asked to examine DHS's ammunition purchases and management of ammunition and firearms. This report addresses trends in DHS's ammunition purchases since fiscal year 2008, how DHS's purchases compare with DOJ's, and what factors affect DHS's purchase decisions. GAO analyzed data from six DHS and three DOJ components that have law enforcement missions, require agents and officers to carry firearms, and purchase ammunition themselves or through their respective departments. Specifically, GAO analyzed data on ammunition purchases, usage, costs, and inventories, among other things, for fiscal years 2008 through 2013 for DHS, and for fiscal years 2011 through 2013 for DOJ. GAO assessed the reliability of these data and found them sufficiently reliable. Data on DOJ ammunition purchases prior to fiscal year 2011 were not readily available; therefore, GAO excluded them, as discussed in the report. The Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) annual ammunition purchases have declined since fiscal year 2009 and are comparable in number to the Department of Justice's (DOJ) ammunition purchases. In fiscal year 2013, DHS purchased 84 million rounds of ammunition, which is less than DHS's ammunition purchases over the past 5 fiscal years, as shown in the figure below. DHS component officials said the decline in ammunition purchases in fiscal year 2013 was primarily a result of budget constraints, which meant reducing the number of training classes, and drawing on their ammunition inventories. From fiscal years 2008 through 2013, DHS purchased an average of 109 million rounds of ammunition for training, qualification, and operational needs, according to DHS data. DHS's ammunition purchases over the 6-year period equates to an average of 1,200 rounds purchased per firearm-carrying agent or officer per year. Over the past 3 fiscal years (2011-2013), DHS purchased an average of 1,000 rounds per firearm-carrying agent or officer and selected DOJ components purchased 1,300 rounds per firearm-carrying agent or officer. DHS ammunition purchases are driven primarily by firearm training and qualification requirements. Most DHS firearm-carrying personnel are required to qualify four times per year, though requirements vary by component, as do the number of rounds of ammunition typically used for training and qualification. DHS components also reported considering other factors when making ammunition purchase decisions, such as changes in firearms, usage rates, and ammunition inventories. DHS components maintain inventories of ammunition to help ensure they have sufficient ammunition for the training and operational needs of their officers, as there can be months-long delays between placing an order for ammunition and receiving it. As of October 2013, DHS estimates it had approximately 159 million rounds in inventory, enough to last about 22 months to meet the training and operational needs of its firearm-carrying personnel. Ammunition inventory data provided by DOJ components indicated that inventory ranged from about 13 months' worth to about 20 months' worth. GAO is not making any recommendations.