Decades of conflict have left Afghanistan a poor nation with high illiteracy, weak government institutions, and a high level of corruption. According to Transparency International’s index of perceived corruption, Afghanistan is tied with Burma as the world’s second most corrupt nation. The United States has allocated about $56 billion for fiscal years 2002 to 2010 to reconstruct Afghanistan, as shown in table 1. The United States allocated nearly half of these funds—about $27 billion—in fiscal years 2009 and 2010 alone. For fiscal year 2011, DOD has allocated more than $12.6 billion in additional funds for Afghan reconstruction. While the allocation of fiscal year 2011 State and USAID funds for Afghanistan had not been finalized as of June 2011, State’s fiscal year 2011 budget request included more than $5 billion for Afghan international affairs programs and operations. In 2009, the executive branch adopted the Integrated Civilian-Military Campaign Plan to guide U.S. reconstruction activities in Afghanistan. The plan, which is currently being updated, categorizes reconstruction activities in terms of three overarching lines of effort—development, governance, and security. State officials have informed us that U.S. agencies do not track Afghan reconstruction funds by the lines of effort. U.S. agencies have used various means to implement Afghan reconstruction projects with these funds. In some cases, they have hired contractors and nongovernment organizations. In other cases, U.S. reconstruction funds have been provided directly to the Afghan government’s national budget to be used by Afghan ministries and other government entities. In 2010, the United States announced plans to increase direct assistance to Afghanistan. In January 2010, the Secretary of State announced that the United States would increase direct assistance to the Afghan government to help Afghan ministries and other government entities build their capacity to manage funds. At two international conferences in 2010, the United States and other donors pledged to provide half or more of their development aid in the form of direct assistance to the Afghan government within 2 years, contingent on Afghan actions to reduce corruption and strengthen public financial management capacity. In February 2011, DOD formally authorized direct contributions of DOD funds to two Afghan security ministries to build their capacity and support Afghan security forces. USAID awards direct assistance to Afghanistan through two means. It awards direct assistance to several Afghan government entities through bilateral agreements overseen by its mission in Afghanistan. These entities include the Independent Directorate for Local Governance and the ministries of Agriculture, Irrigation, and Livestock; Communications and Information Technology; Finance; Public Health; and Transport and Civil Aviation. Some of the bilateral agreements finance Afghan government procurement of goods and services, while others fund a range of other government expenses and activities, including operating costs, salaries, agricultural development programs, and infrastructure projects. USAID also provides direct assistance by awarding funds to the multilateral World Bank-administered Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF). ARTF was established in 2002 as a vehicle for donors to pool resources and coordinate support for Afghanistan’s reconstruction. As of April 2011, 32 donors had contributed about $4.3 billion to ARTF. ARTF provides these funds through the Afghan government national budget to finance the government’s recurrent operating costs (e.g., wages for civil servants, operations and maintenance costs) and national development programs. DOD provides direct assistance bilaterally to Afghanistan’s Ministry of Defense (MOD) and Ministry of Interior (MOI) through contributions of funds overseen by DOD’s Combined Security Transition Command– Afghanistan (CSTC-A). According to DOD guidance, these contributions are used to procure food, salaries, goods, services, and minor construction in direct support of the Afghan National Army (ANA) and the Afghan National Police (ANP). CSTC-A also contributes funds to the multilateral UNDP-administered Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan (LOTFA), which receives contributions from several donor nations. Most LOTFA funds are used to provide salaries to ANP personnel. The United States more than tripled its awards and contributions of USAID and DOD direct assistance funds to the Afghan government in fiscal year 2010 compared with fiscal year 2009 (see fig. 1). In fiscal year 2010, most of the direct assistance funds (about 71 percent) were awarded by USAID for activities related to development and governance, either bilaterally (about 6 percent) or through preferenced contributions to ARTF (about 65 percent), as shown in figure 2. For example, USAID has contributed funding to a community development and local governance program that is being implemented in all of Afghanistan’s 34 provinces through ARTF. The remainder was contributed by DOD for security assistance, either bilaterally to MOD and MOI or through LOTFA. As shown in table 2, USAID awards of direct assistance to Afghanistan increased from over $470 million in fiscal year 2009 to more than $1.4 billion in fiscal year 2010. These awards included a $1.3 billion grant to ARTF, more than triple what it awarded to ARTF in 2009. USAID may obligate and disburse funds awarded to an Afghan entity or trust fund over multiple years, depending on the agreement’s terms. DOD direct assistance to MOD and MOI, including contributions to LOTFA, grew from about $195 million in fiscal year 2009 to about $576 million in fiscal year 2010. DOD contributions to LOTFA more than doubled from about $68 million in fiscal year 2009 to about $149 million in fiscal year 2010. Risk assessments and internal controls to mitigate identified risks are key elements of an internal control framework to provide reasonable assurance that agency assets are safeguarded against fraud, waste, abuse, and mismanagement. USAID conducted preaward risk assessments in most cases. However, we found that USAID’s policies for assessing direct assistance risks do not require preaward risk assessments in all cases. USAID has not updated its policies to reflect the USAID Administrator’s July 2010 commitment to Congress that USAID would assess all Afghan public institutions before providing them with direct assistance. We found that in August 2010 and January 2011, USAID did not complete preaward risk assessments before awarding funds to two Afghan government entities. USAID has established various financial and other controls in its bilateral direct assistance agreements with ministries that go beyond what is required by its policies. However, it has not always ensured compliance with those controls. DOD personnel in Afghanistan have assessed the risk of providing funds to MOD and MOI through quarterly reviews of each ministry’s capacity. DOD established formal procedures on risk assessment for Afghan direct assistance in June 2011 after we informed DOD officials that DOD lacked such procedures. DOD officials also stated that they review records of MOD and MOI expenditures to assess whether funds have been used as intended, as required by DOD policies established in February 2011. USAID mission staff have complied with USAID risk assessment policies for awarding bilateral direct assistance funds to finance Afghan procurement activities under what USAID refers to as a host country contract. USAID policies, as outlined in its Automated Directives System (ADS), require USAID staff to conduct a preaward risk assessment for a host government entity if the entity is to use the award to procure goods and services. Specifically, staff are required under ADS to (1) assess the entity’s procurement system and (2) obtain the Mission Director’s certification of the entity’s capability to undertake the procurement. Of USAID’s eight bilateral direct assistance agreements, we identified two involving the financing of Afghan procurement activities. In both cases, we found that USAID mission staff, in compliance with ADS, had (1) assessed the financial and procurement management capabilities of the Afghan recipients (the Ministry of Communications and Information Technology and the Ministry of Public Health) before awarding funds (see table 3) and (2) obtained the required certifications. Of six bilateral direct assistance agreements that did not involve financing Afghan government procurement activities, we found that USAID had completed such assessments before awarding funds in four cases (see table 3). Although USAID did not conduct preaward assessments in two cases, it was in compliance with its risk assessment policies. Those policies state that USAID staff “should” assess the capacity (e.g., financial management, procurement, and personnel management capacity) of prospective recipients in cases that do not involve financing Afghan government procurement activities. USAID has not updated its risk assessment policies to reflect its Administrator’s commitment that USAID would assess the capabilities of Afghan government recipients in all cases before awarding them direct assistance funds. On July 28, 2010, USAID’s Administrator responded to concerns expressed by Members of the House Appropriations Committee’s Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs regarding corruption and weak government capacity in Afghanistan by committing that USAID would not proceed with direct assistance to an Afghan public institution until USAID had ensured that the institution had an accountable organizational structure and sound financial management capabilities and met USAID standards. State’s Office of the Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan made a similar commitment in January 2010, when it stated that “to receive direct assistance, Afghan ministries must be certified as having improved accountability and transparency.” However, we found that current USAID policy for direct assistance not involving the financing of Afghan government procurement activities does not require USAID to assess a prospective recipient’s capacity to implement a proposed activity. We also found that following the Administrator’s July 2010 commitment, USAID awarded direct assistance funds to two Afghan government recipients before completing risk assessments. As shown in table 3, USAID signed a $40 million agreement with the Independent Directorate for Local Governance in August 2010, 5 months before completing an assessment of that entity. It also signed a $6 million bilateral direct assistance agreement with the Ministry of Transport and Civil Aviation in January 2011, 2 months before completing an assessment of the ministry. The completed risk assessments identified areas of high risk in both entities. For example, the Ministry of Transport and Civil Aviation was assessed as “high risk” in the four core function areas covered by the assessment—control environment, financial management and accounting, compliance with applicable laws and regulations, and accountability environment. Similarly, the Independent Directorate for Local Governance was assessed as “high risk” in 5 of 14 areas covered, including financial management and procurement. USAID officials told us that USAID awarded these funds before completing the risk assessments because the projects were urgently needed. USAID has established various financial and other controls in its bilateral direct assistance agreements, although USAID policies do not establish minimum standard conditions for such agreements, according to USAID officials. Shown in table 4 are selected examples of financial controls USAID has established within its bilateral direct assistance agreements. USAID also required Afghan government recipients to provide documentation demonstrating their compliance with the selected controls. As shown in table 4, in each applicable case, USAID ensured compliance with the selected controls. In two cases, USAID also hired contractors to help control risks identified in preaward assessments. For example, USAID’s assessment of the Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation, and Livestock (MAIL) determined that MAIL would not be able to independently manage and account for direct assistance funds. As a result, USAID awarded a $49.1 million contract to a U.S.-based firm to establish a unit to manage a USAID-funded agriculture development fund, to transition that unit to local control within 4 years, and to provide technical assistance. Similarly, USAID’s October 2007 assessment of the Ministry of Public Health noted concerns that the ministry would continue needing technical assistance to effectively and efficiently manage donor funds. As a result, USAID amended an existing contract to an international nonprofit organization to improve the capacity of the ministry at the central level and in target provinces. USAID has also established procurement-specific controls in its bilateral direct assistance agreements with the Ministry of Communications and Information Technology and the Ministry of Public Health. These agreements provide funds to Afghan ministries to enter into contracts for goods and services and require USAID to monitor and approve certain steps of the procurement process for contracts over $250,000, as applicable. While USAID generally complied with this requirement, USAID mission officials could not provide us with documentation showing that USAID had done so in all cases, as shown in table 5. Specifically, USAID mission officials either did not approve or document that they had approved prior to execution any of 6 contracts that the Ministry of Communications and Information Technology entered into (in table 5, see step 7 of the procurement process). In addition, USAID mission officials told us that USAID did not approve any of the ministry’s 6 prefinancing contract documents (step 8 of the procurement process). USAID stated that no clearance or approval was provided because the final signed documents did not need concurrence. Similarly, USAID documented only three instances in which it had approved any of the Ministry of Public Health’s 19 prefinancing contract documents. USAID also did not conduct follow- up reviews of the ministry to ensure its compliance with USAID contracting and financial management requirements, as called for in the assistance agreement. USAID has taken steps to ensure that bilateral direct assistance awards are audited. USAID policy requires audits of recipients, including host government entities, that expend $300,000 or more in USAID awards during a fiscal year. USAID has asserted its right to audit Afghan recipient use of funds in all of its bilateral direct assistance agreements, including those involving procurement. According to USAID mission officials, USAID has contracted with audit firms to initiate audits of three Afghan ministries (the Ministries of Finance, Communications and Information Technology, and Public Health) that disbursed a total of $28.8 million in USAID awards in fiscal year 2010. CSTC-A has recently established procedures that require CSTC-A personnel to assess the risks of direct assistance in advance of providing funds to Afghan ministries. On June 12, 2011, CSTC-A established standard operating procedures for direct assistance, as required under DOD guidance issued on February 4, 2011. The CSTC-A procedures identify risk assessment as the first of four steps CSTC-A personnel must take before the direct contribution of the funds. CSTC-A adopted these procedures after we informed DOD officials that DOD lacked risk assessment guidance for bilateral direct assistance. The CSTC-A procedures specify that the primary method CSTC-A is to use to assess risks is the Ministerial Development Board. The board oversees CSTC-A efforts to develop the capacity of MOD and MOI. CSTC-A officials informed us in January and February 2011 that CSTC-A has been using this method to assess the capacity of MOD and MOI in connection with direct assistance. They stated that CSTC-A advisers embedded in MOD and MOI participate in quarterly assessments of MOD and MOI progress toward meeting defined capability objectives. For example, CSTC-A assesses MOI development in 26 different areas, including finance and budget, procurement, and personnel management. The assessments focus on the extent to which the ministries are capable of achieving the objectives and identify specific strengths and weaknesses. For example, in April 2011, CSTC-A assessed the MOD budget and finance section responsible for ANA pay support operations. CSTC-A determined that its strengths included experienced staff and a willingness to tackle corruption and its weakness was a lack of budget authority. DOD’s February 4, 2011, guidance requires CSTC-A to establish financial controls for its contributions to MOD and MOI.  The guidance specifically requires CSTC-A to conduct quarterly reconciliations of CSTC-A advance payments to MOD and MOI against records of MOD and MOI expenditures. CSTC-A officials informed us that CSTC-A reconciles CSTC-A advance contributions against MOD and MOI expenditure data drawn from the Ministry of Finance (MOF) Afghan Financial Management Information System and has adjusted future contributions accordingly. DOD officials acknowledged the reconciliation process does not address the extent to which aggregated line items from the system may contain inaccurate ANA and ANP payroll data.  The guidance also requires CSTC-A to monitor MOD and MOI use of the contributed funds down to the subcontractor level. CSTC-A officials informed us that they would be unable to monitor MOD and MOI subcontractors, as called for in the DOD guidance. They stated that the risk of sending personnel to vet MOD and MOI subcontractors in certain regions of Afghanistan was too great. In addition, CSTC-A advisers monitor MOD and MOI use of U.S. funds, according to CSTC-A officials. CSTC-A informed us that it has embedded about 500 advisers in MOD and MOI, including 6 in MOD financial offices and 13 in MOI finance and budget offices. Also, CSTC-A personnel participate in internal control teams that review ANA pay processes in a different ANA corps every month. USAID and DOD generally rely on the World Bank and UNDP to ensure accountability over U.S. direct assistance provided multilaterally through ARTF and LOTFA. USAID, however, has not consistently complied with its multilateral trust fund risk assessment policies in awarding funds to ARTF. For example, in March 2010, USAID did not conduct a risk assessment before awarding an additional $1.3 billion to the World Bank for ARTF. During our review, DOD established procedures in June 2011 requiring that it assess risks before contributing funds to LOTFA. World Bank and UNDP controls over ARTF and LOTFA funds include the use of hired monitoring agents to help ensure that ministries use donor contributions as intended. However, these controls face challenges posed by security conditions and by weaknesses in Afghan ministries. For example, the ARTF monitoring agent resigned in June 2011 due to security concerns, while weaknesses in MOI’s systems for paying wages to Afghan police challenge UNDP efforts to ensure that MOI is using LOTFA funds as intended. USAID has not consistently followed its own policies for assessing the risk associated with its awards to the World Bank for ARTF, which have increased from $5 million in 2002 to a total of more than $2 billion. When the grant agreement and subsequent modifications between the World Bank and USAID were signed, USAID policies on grants to public international organizations (PIO), such as the World Bank, called for preaward determinations that the PIO was a responsible grantee. This requirement applied to both the original grant and to any subsequent modification of the grant that significantly increased the amount of the award. Under USAID policy, the preaward determination should have addressed factors such as whether the grantee’s program was an effective and efficient way to achieve a USAID objective and whether there were any reasons to consider the grantee to be “not responsible.” USAID could not provide us with a preaward responsibility determination of the World Bank prior to awarding ARTF an initial grant of $5 million in 2002. While USAID did not follow its policies to complete a preaward determination for its initial $5 million grant, it determined, after it signed the agreement, that (1) ARTF had a comprehensive system in place for managing the funds and (2) the World Bank had a long history in managing multidonor pooled funding mechanisms, in an approved 2002 memorandum requesting a deviation from incorporating its then- mandatory standard provisions into its ARTF grant agreement. However, USAID did not conduct preaward determinations for 16 of the 21 subsequent modifications to the grant. For the instance in which USAID increased the value of the award by $1.3 billion in March 2010, USAID provided us with an unsigned and undated memorandum that applied to a $15 million obligation. For the 5 preaward responsibility determinations that were conducted, USAID documentation stated that the World Bank was a responsible grantee but did not document the analysis used to support the determinations. In April 2011, in response to GAO recommendations and our follow-up meetings, USAID revised and expanded its guidance on how to conduct preaward determinations for all PIOs. The revised guidance continues to require the USAID officer in charge of the agreement to document preaward responsibility determinations for PIOs. Under the new guidance, a group of USAID headquarters officials will first place the PIO, such as the World Bank, into one of three categories, based on USAID’s experience with the PIO and its determination of the PIO’s level of responsibility. The revised guidance requires USAID to consider several factors in determining a PIO’s level of responsibility, including the quality of its past performance, its most recent audited financial statements, and any other information to fully assess whether it has the necessary management competence to plan and carry out the intended activity. After a responsibility determination has been made, the USAID officer in charge of the agreement must still document the determination before making an award. USAID’s policy is to generally rely on a PIO’s financial management, procurement, and audit policies and procedures. The World Bank has established financial controls over donor contributions to ARTF. For example, the World Bank hired a monitoring agent responsible for monitoring the eligibility of salaries and other recurrent expenditures that the Afghan government submits for reimbursement against ARTF criteria. According to the World Bank, it conducts advance reviews of ARTF development procurement contracts. The amount of prior review of Afghan government procurement by the bank varies according to the method of selection or procurement, the type of good or service being procured, and the bank’s assessment of project risk, according to the bank. The World Bank also reports that it assesses projects semi- annually as part of regular World Bank supervision as per World Bank policies, procedures and guidelines based in part on project visits. Also, the bank informed us that it manages and administers ARTF according to a set of World Bank global policies and procedures. ARTF is part of a single audit of all trust funds administered by the bank, and includes both an annual management assertion over internal controls surrounding the preparation of trust fund financial reports and a combined financial statement for all modified cash basis trust funds. Also, the Afghan government’s external audit agency, the Control and Audit Office (CAO), conducts annual audits of ARTF-financed projects with the technical assistance of a firm of international accountants that are funded by the World Bank. As part of its supervision of ARTF- financed activities, a World Bank financial management team reviews the CAO audit reports, discusses its observations with government counterparts, and follows up to ensure resolution of any outstanding issues. Following the government’s annual submission of CAO audit reports to the World Bank, the bank sends a letter to the donors summarizing the timeliness and results of the CAO’s annual audits. The CAO’s audits of 16 ARTF development projects for the Afghan fiscal year that began in March 2009 had 16 unqualified (or “clean”) results. The World Bank shares CAO audit and monitoring agent reports with donors when requested. World Bank financial controls over ARTF face challenges posed by oversight entities’ limited movement in Afghanistan’s high-threat environment and the limited capacity of Afghan ministries to meet agreed- upon procurement and financial management standards, as shown in these examples.  Security conditions prevented CAO auditors from visiting most of the provinces where ARTF funds were being spent. They were able to conduct audit tests in 10 of Afghanistan’s 34 provinces from March 2009 to March 2010 and issued a qualified opinion of the financial statements of ARTF’s salary and other recurrent expenditures as a result.  According to the Department of the Treasury (Treasury), the ARTF monitoring agent recently resigned from its contract with the World Bank due to security concerns. USAID stated in July 2011 that the monitoring agent informed the bank in May 2011 that its contract should not be extended due to security concerns. The World Bank reports that it is seeking a new monitoring agent, has received many expressions of interest, and does not anticipate a gap in monitoring.  Previously, security concerns prevented the ARTF monitoring agent from physically verifying ARTF salary and other recurrent expenditures outside of Kabul province from March 2009 through March 2010. The World Bank had required the monitoring agent or its subcontractor to visit sites in at least 12 provinces to verify expenditures made during the Afghan fiscal year that began in March 2010.  The CAO lacks qualified auditors and faces other capacity restraints, according to the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) and USAID. However, it uses international advisers and contracted auditors, funded by the World Bank, to help ensure that its audits of ARTF comply with international auditing standards. The World Bank recently reported that the overall timeliness of the CAO audits have been improving since 2006.  The World Bank and donors have expressed concern over the level of ineligible expenditures submitted by the Afghan government for reimbursement. While ineligible expenditures are not reimbursed, the bank considers the level of ineligible expenditures to be an indicator of weaknesses in the Afghan government’s ability to meet agreed-upon procurement and financial management standards. The ARTF monitoring agent has questioned whether Afghan government civil servants have the experience and knowledge necessary to perform transactions in a manner eligible for reimbursement and whether ministries’ internal procedures fully reflect Afghan government laws and regulations. Partly as a result of recommendations from a 2008 independent evaluation of ARTF by a Norwegian-based firm and discussions with donors, the World Bank is currently seeking to revise its 2002 grant agreements with donors to reflect its efforts to strengthen ARTF governance. According to the World Bank, the recommended changes include clarifying and strengthening donors’ oversight roles and responsibilities over ARTF. In response to our inquiries, the World Bank stated in April 2011 that it is considering incorporating its current standard provisions, applicable to multidonor trust funds, in the amended grant agreements with donors. These provisions would allow donor countries greater access to accounting and financial records and information. Under the current agreement with all donors, the World Bank provides donors with periodic reports, such as quarterly status reports, and an annual management assertion together with an attestation from the bank’s external auditors on the satisfactory performance of the bank’s procedures and controls. During our review on June 12, 2011, CSTC-A issued new procedures for direct assistance that require CSTC-A to conduct precontribution risk assessments before contributing funds to LOTFA. CSTC-A staff had previously informed us in February 2011 that CSTC-A had not assessed the risks of providing funds to LOTFA. Instead, CSTC-A had regularly assessed the capabilities and weaknesses of MOI. For example, CSTC-A assessed MOI’s finance and budget section in March 2011 and determined that while the section’s strengths included a responsiveness to pay issues, its weaknesses included a lack of well-trained staff and an unwillingness to change. CSTC-A generally relies on UNDP’s financial controls to ensure the accountability of funds it has contributed to LOTFA. CSTC-A contribution letters to LOTFA request that UNDP provide CSTC-A with quarterly reports, which UNDP posts on its Web site. CSTC-A officials informed us that CSTC-A reconciles its contributions to LOTFA annually. UNDP’s LOTFA project manager in Kabul informed us that UNDP makes copies of audits of LOTFA available upon request. CSTC-A officials told us they have not requested LOTFA audits. UNDP has established financial controls over the funds it provides to MOI for ANP expenses. It has stated that it reconciles its contributions with MOF records of MOI expenses on a quarterly and annual basis. UNDP recently reported that it deducted $17.6 million from its contribution to MOI as a result of ineligible expenses identified during its annual reconciliation for March 2009 through March 2010. UNDP has also hired a monitoring agent to review and monitor ANP remunerations and generate independent reports. UNDP staff told us that the LOTFA monitoring agent has offices in all regional police zones, which cover all of Afghanistan’s provinces. UNDP has reported that the monitoring agent operates in all ANP zones and conducts sample verifications of 30 percent of the total number of police. Similar to the World Bank’s controls over ARTF, UNDP’s financial controls over LOTFA face challenges stemming from Afghanistan’s security environment. SIGAR reported in April 2011 that security issues had impaired efforts by LOTFA’s monitoring agent to (1) recruit staff in a high-threat province and (2) travel in 7 of Afghanistan’s 34 provinces for half of 2010. SIGAR also reported that security concerns had delayed LOTFA’s reconciliation of 2009 salaries. UNDP officials also told us that security concerns had restricted UNDP movements in Afghanistan. UNDP’s financial controls also face challenges stemming from MOI’s institutional weaknesses. UNDP has reported that MOI’s “insufficient ownership and capacity development” remains one of LOTFA’s risks and that it has taken steps to mitigate this risk. Some problems that have been identified with MOI include the following: In 2009, we reported that MOI did not have an accurate staffing roster, according to CSTC-A, and that the number of ANP personnel was unclear. We found that uncooperative ANP commanders were impeding State and MOI efforts to implement a new ANP identification card system to positively identify all police for pay purposes, according to State officials. According to State officials, these commanders were preventing State and MOI from determining the status of nearly 30,000 individuals whose names had been submitted to receive ANP identification cards. We recommended that DOD and State consider provisioning future U.S. contributions to LOTFA to reflect the extent to which U.S. agencies had validated the status of MOI and ANP personnel to help ensure that the United States was not funding salaries of unverified personnel. In 2011, SIGAR reported that MOI’s payroll system provides little assurance that MOI is paying only working ANP personnel or that LOTFA funds are reimbursing only eligible ANP costs. MOI is also unable to pay all police through relatively secure systems. We have previously reported concerns regarding MOI pay systems. UNDP and CSTC-A have worked with MOI to develop electronic systems to reduce opportunities for skimming and corruption. One such system transfers funds directly into individual bank accounts established by individual Afghan police. Although progress has been made in establishing these systems, more than 20 percent of ANP staff are still paid using manual cash systems that are more vulnerable to abuse. The recent tripling of U.S. direct assistance awards to Afghan government entities, coupled with the vulnerability of this assistance to waste, fraud, and abuse in the uncertain Afghan environment, makes it essential that U.S. agencies assess risks before awarding funds and implement controls to safeguard those funds. Direct assistance to the Afghan government involves considerable risk given the extent of corruption, the weak institutional capacity of the Afghan government to manage finances, the volatile and high-threat security environment, and that the U.S. funds may be obligated months or years after they are awarded. Because conflict in many parts of Afghanistan poses significant challenges to efforts to ensure that funds are used as intended, the level of risk in Afghanistan warrants, to the extent feasible, sound internal controls and oversight over the billions of dollars that the U.S. government has invested in Afghanistan. Although risk assessment is a key component of internal controls, current USAID policy does not require preaward risk assessments of all Afghan government recipients of U.S. direct assistance funds. To safeguard U.S. direct assistance funds, it is important that (1) the USAID Administrator follow through on his July 2010 commitment to Congress to assess risks associated with each Afghan government entity before awarding funds, (2) USAID consistently implement controls it establishes in bilateral direct assistance agreements, and (3) USAID consistently adhere to its risk assessment policies for multilateral trust funds in awarding funds to ARTF. We recommend that the Administrator of USAID take the following three actions:  Establish and implement policy requiring USAID to complete risk assessments before awarding bilateral direct assistance funds to Afghan government entities in all cases.  Take additional steps to help ensure that USAID consistently implements controls established in its bilateral direct assistance agreements with Afghan government entities, such as requiring the retention of documentation of actions taken.  Ensure USAID adherence with its policies for assessing risks associated with multilateral trust funds in awarding funds to ARTF. We provided a draft of this report for comment to the Administrator of USAID, and to the Secretaries of Defense, State, and the Treasury. Defense, State, and the Treasury declined to provide comments. Treasury provided us with technical comments, which we incorporated in this report as appropriate. The World Bank and UNDP provided us with technical comments on the portions of the draft report that we provided them describing ARTF and LOTFA. We have incorporated these technical comments in this report as appropriate. USAID provided written comments on a draft of our report, which are reprinted in appendix II. With regard to our recommendation that USAID establish and implement policies requiring USAID staff to complete risk assessments before awarding bilateral direct assistance funds to Afghan government entities in all cases, USAID stated that its existing policies and procedures in ADS already include requirements for risk assessment for each form of government-to-government assistance mechanism. USAID noted that for host country contracts, ADS requires an advance assessment of a host government’s procurement systems (ADS 305). USAID also stated that for cash transfer agreements, ADS requires an analysis of a host government’s ability to comply with the agreements. USAID further stated that its general activity planning guidance contains a recommendation that USAID offices should consider the capacity of potential partners to implement planned functions (ADS 201). Although USAID policy in ADS includes some form of risk assessment for the funding mechanisms in use in Afghanistan, it does not require that a risk assessment be conducted in all cases. Specifically, ADS 305’s requirement for preaward assessment of host country contracts did not apply to six of the eight bilateral direct assistance cases we identified, because these six cases do not involve procurement. Further, according to the USAID comptroller, these six cases were not cash transfer agreements. As a result, these six cases fall under USAID’s general activity planning guidance (ADS 201), which recommends—but does not require--that USAID offices assess the capacity of potential partners in advance. As noted in this report, the lack of specific requirement resulted in USAID making awards in two cases prior to completing a risk assessment. Therefore, we retained our recommendation that USAID establish and implement policies requiring preaward risk assessments in all cases in Afghanistan. USAID also commented that it has taken additional steps to ensure that, going forward, risk assessments are completed in advance for each type of funding mechanism, in line with the Administrator’s July 2010 statement to Congress. Further, these steps are being undertaken “in light of” the Department of State’s July 14, 2011, certification to Congress that the U.S. and Afghan governments have established mechanisms within each implementing agency to ensure that certain fiscal year 2010 funds will be used as intended. On July 14, 2011, State did make this certification to Congress. However, the certification applies only to certain fiscal year 2010 funds, underscoring the need for USAID to establish a requirement for preaward assessments in Afghanistan in all cases in its policies and procedures. With regard to our recommendation that USAID take additional steps to help ensure that it consistently implements controls established in its bilateral direct assistance agreements with Afghan government entities, USAID agreed to take such steps concerning its host country agreements with Afghan government entities. In doing so, USAID noted that USAID policy is to be as sparing in exercising its prior approval rights as sound management permits. With regard to our recommendation that it adhere to its policies for assessing risks associated with multilateral trust funds in awarding funds to ARTF, USAID acknowledged that it had not always prepared or adequately documented its determinations for several ARTF grant amendments. USAID stated that it will follow its new procedures for such determinations, which it revised in April 2011. USAID also provided us with technical comments, which we have incorporated as appropriate. We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional committees; the Secretaries of Defense, State, and the Treasury; the Administrator of USAID; and other interested parties. The report also is available at no charge on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov. If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 512-7331 or johnsoncm@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Public Affairs and Congressional Relations may be found on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made key contributions to this report are listed in appendix III. This report assesses (1) the extent to which the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and the Department of Defense (DOD) have increased direct assistance, (2) USAID’s and DOD’s steps to ensure accountability for bilateral direct assistance, and (3) USAID’s and DOD’s steps to ensure accountability for multilateral direct assistance. To identify the extent to which USAID and DOD had increased their direct assistance, we first met with officials from the Department of State and USAID to define the scope of the term “direct assistance” for the purpose of this review. We then adopted USAID’s definition of direct assistance (or “on-budget” assistance) as U.S. funds provided through the Afghan government national budget for use by Afghan ministries or other government entities. This definition is consistent with guidance and procedures developed by the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) and DOD’s Combined Security Transition Command- Afghanistan (CSTC-A). We focused on fiscal year 2009 and fiscal year 2010 to identify funding developments tied to the President’s 2009 announcement of a new U.S. strategy for Afghanistan and subsequent pledges concerning direct assistance to the Afghan government.  To identify the extent to which USAID had increased its direct assistance, we obtained financial information from USAID’s mission in Kabul, Afghanistan. This information included USAID quarterly financial reports and USAID direct assistance agreements with Afghan government entities and the World Bank (including any modifications to the agreements). We used this information to identify the value of the direct assistance USAID awarded in fiscal years 2009 and 2010. For the value of each award, we used what USAID refers to as the “total estimated contribution” that it has committed to provide, subject to the availability of funds, in signing a direct assistance agreement. For the date, we used each agreement’s signature date, in keeping with USAID’s use of the signature date as the effective date of the funded activity. We used the signature dates to allocate each award’s value to either fiscal year 2009 or fiscal year 2010. In using this data in the report, we noted that once it has awarded funds on a specific date, USAID may obligate and disburse those funds over multiple years, depending on the terms of the agreement. We assessed these data to be sufficiently reliable for our purposes.  To identify the extent to which DOD had increased its direct assistance, we obtained financial information from DOD’s Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller). This information included funds contributed to the Afghan Ministry of Defense (MOD) and the Afghan Ministry of Interior (MOI) by CSTC-A and the Defense Security Cooperation Agency. According to the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), each DOD contribution to MOD, MOI, and the Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan (LOTFA) was awarded, obligated, and disbursed in close succession. We allocated each contribution’s value to the fiscal year in which the contribution was made. We assessed these data to be sufficiently reliable for our purposes. To assess steps taken by USAID and DOD to help ensure the accountability of their bilateral direct assistance to Afghan ministries and other government entities, we reviewed the policies and practices the agencies use to assess risks associated with direct assistance and to establish control mechanisms over the use of direct assistance funds.  Our assessments were based on criteria drawn from GAO’s Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government. Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government, issued pursuant to the requirements of the Federal Managers’ Financial Integrity Act of 1982, provides the overall framework for establishing and implementing internal control in the federal government. Minimum internal control standards for providing reasonable assurance that agency assets will be safeguarded against fraud, waste, abuse, and mismanagement include risk assessment and control activities. Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government defines risk assessment and control activities as key elements of an internal control framework. Risk assessment includes identifying internal and external risks an organization faces and their potential effect. Control activities are the policies and procedures (such as approvals, reconciliations, and reviews) agencies implement to mitigate identified risks and are essential for accountability of government resources.  To evaluate relevant USAID policies and practices against these criteria, we reviewed information from both headquarters and the USAID mission in Afghanistan. We reviewed USAID agencywide policies for awarding bilateral direct assistance funds to host government entities, as outlined in (1) USAID’s Automated Directives System (ADS) and (2) interim guidance USAID provided to its mission on the use of direct assistance. We reviewed bilateral direct assistance program information from the USAID mission in Afghanistan, including preaward assessment procedures and reports, training material, direct assistance agreements, compliance documentation, approval memorandums, memorandums of understanding, and mission orders. To identify USAID controls established over the use of direct assistance funds and determine whether USAID ensured compliance with its controls, we (1) reviewed all USAID bilateral direct assistance agreements, (2) identified the controls USAID established in each agreement, and (3) reviewed documentation USAID provided to us to demonstrate it had ensured compliance with its controls. We limited our analysis to controls triggered per the terms of each agreement before February 15, 2011. We also reviewed information from the USAID Office of Inspector General in Afghanistan regarding the mission’s preaward assessment process. We interviewed USAID officials in Washington, D.C., and in Kabul, Afghanistan.  To assess DOD policies and practices, we reviewed information from the Office of the Undersecretary of Defense (Comptroller) and CSTC- A. This information included the Under Secretary’s February 4, 2011, Interim Guidance on Afghanistan Security Forces Fund (ASFF) Contributions to the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA), CSTC-A’s standard operating procedures for direct contributions, DOD contribution letters to MOD and MOI, and DOD assessments of the strengths and weaknesses of these ministries. We also interviewed DOD officials in Washington, D.C., and Kabul. To assess steps taken by USAID and DOD to help ensure the accountability of their direct assistance to Afghan ministries through multilateral trust funds, we reviewed the policies and practices the agencies use to assess risks associated with direct assistance and to establish control mechanisms over the use of direct assistance funds.  Our assessments were again based on criteria drawn from GAO’s Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government, which defines risk assessment and control activities as key elements of an internal control framework.  To evaluate relevant USAID policies and practices regarding multilateral trust funds against these criteria, we reviewed USAID agencywide policies for awarding direct assistance to multilateral trust funds such as the World Bank-administered Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF), as outlined in USAID’s Automated Directives System. We also reviewed ARTF-related program and budget documents from the USAID mission in Afghanistan, including USAID’s 2002 grant agreement with ARTF and modifications to the agreement. We also met with officials of the Department of the Treasury to coordinate our work regarding the World Bank. We reviewed World Bank documents concerning ARTF and interviewed USAID and World Bank officials in Washington, D.C., and in Kabul.  To assess DOD policies and practices regarding multilateral trust funds against these criteria, we reviewed information from the Office of the Undersecretary of Defense (Comptroller) and CSTC-A. This information included the Under Secretary’s February 4, 2011, Interim Guidance on Afghanistan Security Forces Fund (ASFF) Contributions to the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA) and CSTC-A’s standard operating procedures for direct contributions. We also reviewed United Nations Development Program (UNDP) documents and reports concerning the Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan and interviewed DOD officials in Washington, D.C., and in Kabul, as well as UNDP officials in Kabul. Major contributors to this report were Tetsuo Miyabara, Assistant Director; Emily Gupta; Bruce Kutnick; Esther Toledo; and Pierre Toureille. Ashley Alley, Pedro Almoguera, Diana Blumenfeld, Jeffrey Baldwin-Bott, Gergana Danailova-Trainor, Martin De Alteriis, Karen Deans, Christopher Mulkins, Mona Sehgal, and Eddie Uyekawa also provided technical assistance.

Summary: The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and the Department of Defense (DOD) award direct assistance to Afghanistan, using bilateral agreements and multilateral trust funds that provide funds through the Afghan national budget. GAO assessed (1) the extent to which the United States, through USAID and DOD, has increased direct assistance, (2) USAID and DOD steps to ensure accountability for bilateral direct assistance, and (3) USAID and DOD steps to ensure accountability for direct assistance via multilateral trust funds for Afghanistan. GAO reviewed USAID, DOD, and multilateral documents and met with U.S. officials and staffs of multilateral trust funds in Washington, D.C., and Afghanistan. The United States more than tripled its awards of direct assistance to Afghanistan in fiscal year 2010 compared with fiscal year 2009. USAID awards of direct assistance grew from over $470 million in fiscal year 2009 to over $1.4 billion in fiscal year 2010. USAID awarded $1.3 billion to the World Bank-administered Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF) in fiscal year 2010, of which the bank has received $265 million as of July 2011. DOD direct assistance to two ministries grew from about $195 million in fiscal year 2009 to about $576 million in fiscal year 2010, including contributions to fund police salaries through the United Nations Development Program-administered (UNDP) Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan (LOTFA). USAID and DOD have taken steps to help ensure the accountability of their bilateral direct assistance to Afghan ministries, but USAID has not required risk assessments in all cases before awarding these funds. For example, USAID did not complete preaward risk assessments in two of the eight cases GAO identified. Although current USAID policy does not require preaward risk assessments in all cases, these two awards were made after the USAID Administrator's July 2010 commitment to Congress that USAID would not proceed with direct assistance to an Afghan public institution before assessing its capabilities. In these two cases, USAID awarded $46 million to institutions whose financial management capacity were later assessed as "high risk." USAID has established various financial and other controls in its bilateral direct assistance agreements, such as requiring separate bank accounts and audits of the funds. USAID has generally complied with these controls, but GAO identified instances in which it did not. For example, in only 3 of 19 cases did USAID document that it had approved one ministry's prefinancing contract documents. DOD personnel in Afghanistan assess the risk of providing funds to two security ministries through quarterly reviews of each ministry's capacity. DOD officials also review records of ministry expenditures to assess whether ministries have used funds as intended. DOD established formal risk assessment procedures in June 2011, following GAO discussions with DOD about initial findings. USAID and DOD generally rely on the World Bank and UNDP to ensure accountability over U.S. direct assistance provided multilaterally through ARTF and LOTFA, but USAID has not consistently complied with its risk assessment policies in awarding funds to ARTF. During GAO's review, DOD established procedures in June 2011 requiring that it assess risks before contributing funds to LOTFA. The World Bank and UNDP use ARTF and LOTFA monitoring agents to help ensure that ministries use contributions as intended. However, security conditions and weaknesses in Afghan ministries pose challenges to their oversight. For example, the ARTF monitoring agent recently resigned due to security concerns. The World Bank is now seeking a new monitoring agent and does not anticipate a gap in monitoring. In addition, weaknesses in the Ministry of Interior's systems for paying wages to police challenge UNDP efforts to ensure that the ministry is using LOTFA funds as intended. GAO recommends that USAID (1) establish and implement policy requiring risk assessments in all cases before awarding bilateral direct assistance funds, (2) take additional steps to help ensure it implements controls for bilateral direct assistance, and (3) ensure adherence to its risk assessment policies for ARTF. In commenting on the first recommendation, USAID stated that its existing policies call for some form of risk assessment for all awards and that it has taken new steps to ensure risk assessment. GAO retained its recommendation because existing USAID policies do not require preaward risk assessments in all cases. USAID concurred with GAO's other recommendations.