In June 1995, NASA and DOD agreed to identify cooperative actions that could lead to significant reductions in investments and cost of operations.The agencies identified seven areas of mutual interest, one of which was major aerospace test facilities—specifically, wind tunnels, aeropropulsion test cells, rocket engine test stands, space environmental simulation chambers, arc-heaters, and hypervelocity gas guns and ballistic ranges.The cooperation initiative was done under the auspices of the joint NASA/DOD Aeronautics and Astronautics Coordinating Board (AACB). Figure 1 shows the location of these test facilities. The number of active major test facilities declined from 260 in 1993 to 186 in 1996. The AACB’s major test facilities study team concluded that, in most areas, the present number of major test facilities “very nearly represents the minimum required to conduct the aeronautical- and space-related research and development programs identified for this country.” The study team further stated that (1) closing facilities without eliminating programs does not generate big savings, (2) NASA and DOD are not on a common track to developing comparable facility-cost accounting, (3) there is inadequate coordination of investments, upgrades, and operations between NASA and DOD, and (4) NASA and DOD’s rocket propulsion test facilities have excess capacity for current and future workload. To address these issues, the team recommended in April 1996 that NASA and DOD form six cooperative alliances to coordinate investment to avoid unnecessary duplication, coordinate test schedules to spread the workload across facilities, and develop standardized and common business processes. Notwithstanding a history of NASA/DOD cooperation on aerospace test facility-related issues prior to 1996, these goals collectively represent an effort to develop a broader national perspective on such issues. In September 1996, Congress added to this effort by requiring NASA and DOD to prepare a joint plan on rocket propulsion test facilities. The institutional centerpiece of future NASA/DOD cooperation on aerospace test facilities is six alliances approved by the AACB in April 1996. Twenty months later, NASA and DOD signed agreements formally establishing these alliances. However, with one exception, the new alliances did not meet regularly during that time, and the rocket propulsion alliance—which predates the cooperation initiative—met only once. The one exception was the space environmental simulation alliance, which met four times and evaluated a proposed new investment at Kennedy Space Center. The rationale given by most alliances for not meeting was the lack of an approved charter. Despite not having official charters, the space environmental simulation alliance met four times and the rocket propulsion test alliance met once between May 1996 and October 1997. The other alliances could have conducted business without formal charters, but did not. At its inaugural meeting in November 1996, the space environmental simulation alliance noted the absence of a charter, but agreed to conduct business deemed to be in the “best national interest.” The alliance also met in February, May, and August 1997. Similarly, the rocket propulsion test alliance met in October 1996 and members noted other alliances “do not appear to be meeting,” but agreed the rocket propulsion alliance “cannot wait.” As of November 30, 1997, this alliance has not met again. A NASA official told us the alliance did not meet because there was little business to discuss until NASA implemented its plan, as discussed below, to consolidate NASA’s management of rocket propulsion testing. In addition, NASA and DOD officials disagreed over who in their respective agencies should sign the alliance’s charter. An example of how the promise of closer cooperation on test facility-related issues can be met by alliances was provided by the space environmental simulation alliance in March 1997. In early 1997, officials at NASA’s Kennedy Space Center proposed to build a vacuum chamber to (1) test for leaks in the pressurized parts of the International Space Station prior to their launch and assembly in space and (2) support an environmental test capability at Kennedy. In February 1997, NASA headquarters officials asked the space environmental simulation alliance to evaluate the proposal. In March 1997, the alliance’s evaluation team concluded that there was “no compelling reason” to construct such a facility to support space station requirements. With regard to Kennedy’s proposed test capability, the team recommended a “rigorous” thermal vacuum chamber requirements and cost-benefits analysis that, in part, would include determination of the national thermal vacuum chamber capabilities. On June 25, 1997, the Kennedy Space Center introduced another approach to justify acquiring a vacuum chamber. This time, Kennedy officials solicited comments from industry, for planning purposes only, on the design, construction, and procurement methodology for a thermal vacuum chamber to simulate environments on other planets. Kennedy officials estimated the chamber would cost from $35 million to $60 million. NASA’s Office of the Inspector General is currently doing a review to determine whether (1) the alliance’s recommended cost-benefit analysis was performed, (2) the vacuum chamber is needed to support present and future NASA missions and programs, and (3) funding will be available for the project’s construction, installation, and operation. The Inspector General has not set a completion date for this review. Despite the formation of the rocket propulsion alliance, NASA’s and DOD’s relationship over this type of testing has been recently marked by competition. Partly to improve its competitive position, NASA has consolidated rocket propulsion test management in one center, but is struggling to define the center’s authority for this role. Testing engines in the next phase of the EELV program was the focus of NASA and Air Force competition. In July 1997, an EELV engine contractor provisionally selected NASA’s Stennis Space Center to test engines in the next phase of the program. Consequently, the future role of the Air Force’s test center for this program is uncertain. “resulted in facility duplication and higher overall infrastructure-related costs. Substantial investments have been made in facilities based on local insight and local funding provided by programs, institutions, and non-NASA customers rather than on an Agency-wide perspective.” In May 1996, NASA’s Associate Administrator for Space Flight unilaterally designated Stennis Space Center the center of excellence “not only for NASA, but DOD, other government agencies, academia and industry.” He noted, the “unique capabilities currently in place” at Stennis “permit us to centralize the major propulsion test facilities of NASA, DOD, and industry.” NASA’s rocket propulsion testing is managed by the Rocket Propulsion Test Management Board. It determines the location of each test, reviews investment recommendations, and establishes annual budget requirements. For example, in November 1996, the Board accepted a recommendation to relocate a 5,000 gallon high pressure liquid hydrogen tank from a component test stand at Marshall to the one at Stennis, as part of NASA’s plan to complete this facility and consolidate test capabilities at Stennis. The Board has also decided to move four other liquid oxygen tanks from Marshall. Although NASA has consolidated management of rocket propulsion testing at Stennis, it has struggled to define Stennis’ authority to make investment decisions. For example, the early goals of consolidation went beyond relocation to include mothballing and abandoning test assets as necessary to reduce or eliminate unnecessary duplication and lower costs. In January 1997, Stennis officials proposed a plan that would have greatly reduced testing at Marshall and Plum Brook; some stands would have been abandoned and others would have had their capabilities reduced and transferred to Stennis and White Sands. The draft plan was based on known requirements for NASA’s test services. But, by June 1997, NASA’s management decided to abandon Stennis’ plan rather than the test stands at other centers. Nearly all of the test stands and facilities that would have been deactivated by the January plan will remain open. According to Stennis officials, the June plan is based on possible future customers, which are estimated to be more plentiful than funded customers. The Air Force tests rocket engines at Phillips Laboratory, Edwards Air Force Base, California; and Arnold Engineering Development Center, Tennessee. In April 1997, the Air Force established the Air Force Research Laboratory consisting of Phillips Laboratory, three other laboratories, and the Air Force Office of Scientific Research. However, Arnold, as a test center, is not part of the consolidation. Phillips Laboratory’s Test Stand 1A was built in the late 1950s and has recently been altered to give it a liquid oxygen/liquid hydrogen capability. Phillip’s Test Stand 2A also has been changed for a high-pressure liquid oxygen/liquid hydrogen capability for testing engine components. So far, changes to these stands have cost about $49 million. Test stand 1A’s changes are for EELV engine testing and 2A for the government—and industry—sponsored Integrated High Payoff Rocket Propulsion Technology program to boost engine performance over the next 15 years. The federal government currently uses a fleet of expendable launch vehicles—Delta, Atlas, and Titan—to transport national security and civil satellites into space. According to DOD, these vehicles currently operate at or near their maximum performance capability. In 1994, Congress directed DOD to develop a space launch modernization plan that led to the initiation of the EELV program. On December 20, 1996, the Air Force selected McDonnell Douglas’ Delta IV and a Lockheed Martin proposal for the “preliminary engineering and manufacturing development” phase of the competition to build the Air Force’s EELVs consisting of small, medium, and heavy launchers. Lockheed Martin’s EELV will use the Russian-designed RD-180 engine to be built by Pratt and Whitney. Rocketdyne Division of Boeing North American is building the Delta IV’s first-stage RS-68 engine. In November 1996, Rocketdyne selected Phillips to test its engines in the second, or pre-engineering and manufacturing development, phase of the program. Originally, a single contractor for the third, or engineering and manufacturing development, phase of the EELV program was to have been selected in June 1998. The anticipated contract value for the third phase was $1.6 billion over approximately 6 years. However, on November 6, 1997, the Air Force announced a change in acquisition strategy to fund both Boeing’s and Lockheed Martin’s EELVs in the third phase of the program. Testing EELV engines in the next phase of the program is important to Stennis and Phillips. According to a Stennis official, Stennis has two test stands available for EELV engine testing in 1998, but without EELV engine testing, there are no identifiable customers starting in 1999 for these and another of its large test stands. And, as noted previously, the Air Force refurbished Phillip’s Test Stand 1A for EELV engine testing. This test stand has no other funded customers. Despite the Air Force’s efforts, it may have lost its EELV engine customer to NASA. On July 19, 1997, Boeing stated that it had selected Stennis to conduct development, certification, and production acceptance testing of the RS-68 engine. Boeing has not yet fully defined its test requirements, and its intention to test at Stennis is conditional pending a satisfactory resolution of such issues as the amount of Stennis’ user fees. Boeing may also test this engine on Phillip’s Test Stand 1A, but it has not made a formal commitment to do so. The rocket propulsion alliance last met in October 1996 but did not discuss such major current issues as (1) consolidation of propulsion testing at NASA or elsewhere, (2) competition between NASA and the Air Force to test engines, and (3) investment decisions. According to NASA officials, the alliance is likely to be reactive and unlikely to initiate a consolidation-related evaluation on its own. At the October meeting, NASA described the reasons for making Stennis NASA’s center of excellence for rocket propulsion testing and noted its consolidation plan would be completed by early 1997. At the time of the alliance meeting in October, NASA and the Air Force were competing to test EELV engines in the current phase of the program. Upgrades to Phillips’ test stands for EELV testing were noted at the meeting, but this investment was not critically discussed. Also not discussed was the role the alliance might play in evaluating future investment decisions or NASA’s effort to complete the component test facility at Stennis after the Air Force had started to refurbish its own component test stand at Phillips. According to a DOD official associated with the alliance, a test of its effectiveness is the ability of alliance members to review a proposed investment in test facilities. “joint plan for coordinating and eliminating unnecessary duplication in the operations and planned improvements of rocket engine and rocket engine component test facilities managed by the [Air Force and NASA]. The plan shall provide, to the extent practical, for the development of commonly funded and commonly operated facilities.” In a January 1997 response to congressional committees, DOD acknowledged that although NASA and the Air Force “do not yet have a formal plan,” a range of efforts was underway that would “form the basis for such a plan.” The efforts cited were Vision 21, the Quadrennial Defense Review, and the rocket propulsion alliance. The first two efforts cited are unlikely to form the basis of a joint plan because NASA is not a formal part of the Vision 21 review, and DOD does not intend that its 5-year plan to consolidate and restructure its laboratories and test and evaluation centers be a joint plan with other federal agencies. NASA also was not a formal part of the Quadrennial Defense Review of defense strategy. Nevertheless, NASA concurred with DOD’s response. DOD did not state in its letter whether it would prepare a joint plan for submission to Congress in the future. The rocket propulsion test alliance’s possible role in joint planning is problematical at this time in as much as the alliance has not met since October 1996 and the requirement for a joint plan was not formally discussed at the meeting. There is an additional reason why Vision 21 cannot serve as the basis of the joint plan. DOD prepared, but did not submit, a legislative package for Vision 21; instead, it opted to include consolidation of its laboratories and test and evaluation centers in future BRAC rounds. But Congress, so far, has not accepted the need for such rounds. As a consequence, Vision 21’s future is unclear until Congress either changes its position on BRAC or new guidelines for Vision 21 are developed. NASA and DOD took a step toward creating a national perspective on testing in the area of aeronautics by agreeing in May 1997 to consider joint strategic management of their test facilities. And in October 1997, NASA and Air Force officials reached a verbal understanding on the scope and approach for joint strategic management, but have yet to agree on key aspects of a management organization. Ultimately, if joint strategic management of aeronautics testing is successfully established, its adaption to other types of test facilities could be considered. The October understanding was preceded by an agreement on May 5, 1997, between senior NASA and DOD officials to discuss issues associated with joint strategic management. In so doing, they rejected the two aeronautical alliances (wind tunnels and aeropropulsion) as the way to address a variety of management and investment issues. “Each agency and Service manages its wind tunnel facilities independently. There is no structured oversight of the various facilities in the nation . . . . As a result, there is no focused approach to what the national needs are for the various facilities.” The DOD assessment team was skeptical that the two aeronautical alliances could effectively overcome this tradition of independence and recommended, in part, that DOD (1) establish a new office with NASA to manage the investment and test-technology-related funds for the nation’s core government wind tunnel facilities and (2) immediately initiate with NASA and industry a long-term program to build a new transonic wind tunnel. The DOD assessment team proposed a new organization—National Aeronautical Facility Base—with members from the three military departments and NASA. The members would reside within their parent agencies, and, in ad hoc fashion, comprise the new organization. The organization would not have authority over operations and maintenance funds, which would remain under the separate authorities of DOD and NASA. But the management organization would “make investments based on a national perspective without regard to whether the wind tunnel facility is DOD- or NASA-owned.” NASA’s aeronautical officials also were doubtful about the adequacy of the cooperative alliances, and in November 1996, before the AACB’s aeronautics panel, recommended formation of an independent organization to strategically manage selected NASA and DOD wind tunnels and aeropropulsion test cells. However, in NASA’s proposal, the new organization would receive funding from participating agencies and possibly industry, and its staff would be full-time members of the organization. In proposing their different versions of joint management, NASA and DOD officials noted that in 1994 seven European aeronautical research establishments had combined to form a joint management organization called the Association of European Research Establishments in Aeronautics, which now manages five wind tunnels in four countries. NASA and DOD officials believe relatively new European wind tunnels and the association of research establishments have combined to make Europe’s facilities especially competitive in attracting new test-related business. In October 1997, NASA and Air Force officials reached a verbal understanding on a scope and approach for a joint strategic management organization. The understanding proposes that NASA and DOD will continue to own, operate, and fund their own test facilities. The purpose of the new management organization will be to provide strategic management in four areas: (1) planning (includes making foreign competitive assessments and developing an associated strategy), (2) test technology (includes advocacy for resources), (3) operations policy (includes reviewing, coordinating, and recommending facilities’ test schedules), and (4) business management (includes, as discussed below, cost accounting and charging policy). The new organization will be under the review authority of the AACB. However, basic questions remain about strategic joint management, including the new organization’s structure and authority to make binding decisions and recommendations. NASA and DOD officials have not agreed on a charter for the new management organization. The major facilities study team recognized that consolidation of test facilities depended on the development of “consistent/comparable” cost models because currently NASA and DOD differ on the issues of how much and whom to charge for testing. Generally, NASA does not charge for use of its aeronautical test facilities, while DOD does. The major facilities study team developed some information on cost models. The team noted that although NASA’s and DOD’s “direct” and “indirect” costs were comparable at summary levels, differences over what to charge users of test services remained. In 1993, Congress gave DOD increased flexibility to adjust charges for indirect costs for commercial users of its Major Range and Test Facility Base. NASA does not charge customers of its aeronautical facilities unless they receive “special benefits” over and beyond those which accrue to the public at large. For example, NASA charges commercial customers to use its wind tunnels if their tests are not officially supported by a government contract or letter of intent, or, if so supported, they are beyond the scope of testing requested by the government. On the other hand, DOD’s Major Range and Test Facility Base charges other federal agencies and commercial customers 100 percent of direct costs and a portion of indirect costs. By agreeing to the recommendation to establish cooperative alliances, the AACB accepted the proposition that institutionalizing cooperative behavior in this way would add value to the already established cooperative relationship between NASA and DOD. Progress towards validating this proposition has been slow and sporadic. The alliances appear to offer the opportunity for an ongoing evaluation of test-related issues and cost-saving efficiencies of mutual interest to NASA and DOD, and thereby, create the basis for the testing community itself to construct a national perspective on these issues. While this perspective may be emerging in some cases, it is essentially absent in others. By not convening most alliances, the development of a national perspective from the bottom up remains largely untested. While the effect of such a delay is unclear, it may indicate that some NASA and DOD test officials do not see the alliances as having practical value, and that, with few exceptions, they would not object to continuing the pre-alliance status quo. In 1996, Congress began to push for a national perspective with the requirement for joint planning, common funding, and common operations of NASA and DOD’s rocket propulsion test facilities. NASA’s and DOD’s formal reply to this requirement was not responsive. Consequently, it may be appropriate to reaffirm and extend the search for a national perspective on test facility issues begun in the 1996 legislation. Congressional intent, as reflected in the statutory requirement for joint planning of rocket propulsion test facilities, is not being fully met by NASA and DOD. Congress may wish to consider reaffirming its intention in this regard and extend its joint planning requirement to other types of aerospace test facilities, including a requirement that NASA and DOD assess the possible extension of joint management of aeronautical facilities to other types of test facilities, especially rocket propulsion. In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD concurred that NASA and DOD need to coordinate more on infrastructure planning, but partially concurred that progress in institutionalizing cooperation was slow and sporadic. While DOD agreed that progress was slow in some areas, it believed we should give more credit to the progress that has been made. DOD noted that, without formal alliance charters, increases have occurred in interagency communications, interagency meetings on coordination of test technology, joint management alternatives and data bases, and the agencies’ understanding of each other’s policies and capabilities. DOD also partially concurred with our suggestion that Congress may wish to consider reaffirming its intention for joint planning of rocket propulsion test facilities and assess the possible extension of joint planning to other types of aerospace test facilities. DOD emphasized that it fully intends to meet congressional requirements and said that further legislation is either not needed or premature. DOD’s comments and our evaluation of them are included in appendix III. While an objective of our report is to determine the extent to which cooperative alliances have been operating on a regular basis, we recognized cooperative activities that preceded the signing of the alliances’ charters in January 1998. For example, we noted cooperation on (1) testing in subsonic wind tunnels, (2) testing the effects of icing on aircraft, (3) developing wind tunnel test technology plans, (4) discussing rocket engine test issues, and (5) boosting rocket engine performance over the next 15 years. In particular, one activity cited by DOD—joint management alternatives—is discussed in some detail. In responding to our conclusion and matter for congressional consideration, DOD did not state when it intends to comply with the statutory requirement. Therefore, because DOD and NASA have not been responsive to the congressional requirement, we believe that a reaffirmation of congressional intent, which would not necessarily require additional legislation, might be appropriate. We did not suggest that Congress extend joint management to other types of aerospace test facilities, only that Congress consider requiring an assessment of that possibility. We believe our matter for congressional consideration remains valid. In its written comments, NASA said the report could be strengthened by including updated information and identifying past cooperative activities made by the alliances. As discussed previously, we believe our report identified past cooperative activities. We updated the report where appropriate. NASA’s comments are reprinted in appendix IV. NASA and DOD also provided technical comments which we have incorporated where appropriate. To accomplish our objectives, we obtained documents from and interviewed officials at NASA headquarters in Washington, D.C.; NASA’s Langley Research Center, Virginia; Goddard Space Flight Center, Maryland; and John C. Stennis Space Center, Mississippi. We also held discussions with and obtained documents from officials in the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology, the Air Force’s Test and Evaluation Directorate, Washington, D.C.; the Air Force’s Phillips Laboratory Propulsion Directorate, Edwards Air Force Base, California (now part of the Air Force Laboratory, Wright Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio); the Air Force’s EELV program office, Los Angeles Air Force Base, California; and the Air Force Materiel Command’s Arnold Engineering Development Center, Arnold Air Force Base, Tennessee. To evaluate NASA and DOD’s formal cooperation, we interviewed cognizant officials about the chartering and perceived value of the test facility alliances and reviewed the minutes of all formal alliance and AACB panel meetings held between May 1996 and August 1997. With regard to competition to test EELV rocket engines, we interviewed cognizant officials and reviewed documents at Stennis Space Center and the Propulsion Directorate of Phillips Laboratory on the perceived advantages and disadvantages of each test facility in relation to EELV testing. We also discussed EELV testing with officials at the Air Force’s EELV program office and with officials of one of the EELV engine contractors. To evaluate NASA and DOD’s response to a congressional requirement to prepare a joint plan on rocket propulsion test facilities, we interviewed officials about DOD’s response and analyzed documents obtained at the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology. To review proposals for joint management of wind tunnels, we interviewed cognizant officials about the perceived need for a new management arrangement and reviewed joint-management proposals at the Langley and Arnold centers. We performed our work between November 1996 and December 1997 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. We are sending copies of this report to the NASA Administrator; the Secretary of Defense; and the Director, Office of Management and Budget. We will also make copies available to others upon request. If you or your staff have any questions, I can be reached at (202) 512-4841. Major contributors to this report are listed in appendix V. The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) and the Department of Defense (DOD) formed cooperative alliances for the following types of test facilities: Wind tunnels are used to test aerodynamic forces (lift, drag, and side force) acting on scale models of air and spacecraft in a controlled airstream at different airspeeds. The challenge to testing in a wind tunnel is the applicability of results obtained with a scale model to full-sized air and spacecraft. Figure I.1 depicts a NASA wind tunnel that consisted of three test sections fed by one power source consisting of 4 coupled electric motors capable of 180,000 horsepower when operating on a continuous basis. Aeropropulsion test cells are used to test air-breathing engines under simulated flight conditions. (See fig. I.2.) Rocket engine test stands are used to test chemical, solar, electric, and other types of rocket engines, and engine components such as fuel pumps and injector systems. Some test stands can simulate high altitudes. The test stand in figure I.3 is 160 feet high and can test engines capable of producing 1.5 million pounds of thrust. Space environmental simulation chambers are used to test spacecraft, instruments and components in ground handling, launch, and powered and orbital flight environments. Test facilities include acoustic and thermal vacuum chambers. Some simulation chambers are capable of creating a vacuum of less than one billionth of atmospheric pressure. (See fig. I.4.) Arc-heated facilities are used for two fundamental purposes: aerothermal testing of materials and structures to simulate the aerodynamic heating environment of hypersonic flight, and aeropropulsion testing of engines that operate at high velocities and temperatures. NASA tests heating of Earth and planetary entry vehicles, and DOD tests heating of ballistic and other types of missiles. The arc heated facility illustrated in figure I.5 is capable of heating gas to more than 10,000 degrees Fahrenheit and directing it under pressure at an object or material to be tested. Heat Transfer And Pressure Gauges Electrical Power (-) Hypervelocity gas guns are used for impact testing. NASA tests meteoroid/orbital debris-sized particles impacting on space structures such as the international space station. DOD tests ballistic missile intercept systems. In figure I.6, a powder charge drives the piston into trapped hydrogen, compressing it. The petal valve ruptures, forcing the projectile and sabot down the launch tube. The sabot is machined plastic that protects the launch tube from the projectile. The following are GAO’s comments on DOD’s letter dated December 23, 1997. 1. Refer to the “agency comments and our evaluation” section of the report. 2. We do not indicate that the alliances were not pursuing the intentions of their charters. 3. We did not review the basis of the Air Force’s decision to upgrade some of Phillips Laboratory’s test stands, nor did we evaluate the EELV program. The point of our discussion of EELV engine testing was to establish that the NASA/DOD relationship on rocket engine testing is defined by both competitive and cooperative behavior. We used EELV engine testing to illustrate the competitive aspect of this relationship. The congressional requirement for joint planning of rocket propulsion test facilities establishes the context of our discussion because joint planning is one possible way to manage the NASA/DOD relationship in this area. With respect to DOD’s comment on the rocket propulsion alliance, we did not state that the alliance should have reviewed the decision to upgrade Phillip’s test stands. Our point is that, in the opinion of some alliance members, a test of the alliance’s future relevance is its determination and ability to evaluate investment issues of the type that had been made at Phillips and Stennis Space Center. 4. Determining test capacity of rocket engines was not an objective of our report. We note that when DOD states that “Both NASA and Air Force officials have challenged the assumption that there is excess rocket test capacity with the two agencies,” it is, in fact, disagreeing with the conclusion of its own May 1996 report on NASA/DOD cooperative initiatives. DOD’s response does not provide specific information as to why NASA’s and DOD’s perception changed from May 1996 to October 1996 when DOD says the rocket propulsion alliance determined that there was no excess test capacity in the alliance for the next 2 years. Subsequent to DOD’s response, we analyzed the minutes of the October 1996 meeting of the rocket propulsion alliance and concluded that these minutes do not clearly reflect that a discussion on test capacity took place or that a determination about capacity was made. 5. We share DOD’s concern about the premature expansion of joint strategic management to other types of test facilities. As we stated in the report, ultimately, if joint strategic management of aeronautics test facilities is successfully established, its adaption to other types of test facilities could be considered. Ambrose McGraw Jeff Webster The first copy of each GAO report and testimony is free. Additional copies are $2 each. 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Summary: GAO reviewed the National Aeronautics and Space Administration's (NASA) and Department of Defense's (DOD) cooperation in developing a national perspective on aerospace test facilities, focusing on: (1) the extent to which NASA/DOD working groups on major test facilities have been operating on a regular basis; (2) NASA's and DOD's actions in response to a future need to test an engine for new Air Force rockets; (3) whether NASA and DOD prepared a congressionally required joint plan on rocket propulsion test facilities; and (4) whether NASA and DOD are implementing a DOD assessment team's recommendation in March 1997 to jointly manage with NASA certain aeronautical test facilities. GAO noted that: (1) the promise of closer NASA/DOD cooperation and the development of a national perspective on aerospace test facilities remains largely unfulfilled because NASA and DOD: (a) have not yet convened most test facility alliances; (b) compete with each other to test engines for new rockets; and (c) did not prepare a congressionally required joint plan on rocket propulsion test facilities; (2) although NASA and DOD have agreed to go beyond cooperative alliances in aeronautics and jointly manage their aeronautical test facilities, they have not yet reached agreement on key aspects of management organization; (3) NASA and DOD took 20 months (May 1996 through December 1997) to negotiate and sign agreements formally establishing the six test facility-related cooperative alliances; (4) despite the formation of the rocket propulsion alliance, NASA and DOD compete against each other to test engines for new rocket programs; (5) a principal arena of competition is the next phase of the Air Force's Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle program; (6) DOD did not prepare a legislatively mandated joint plan with NASA to coordinate rocket propulsion test facilities; (7) in a letter to congressional committee chairs and other members, DOD said that the bases of such a plan are: (a) ongoing activities such as Vision 21; (b) the May 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review of defense strategy; and (c) activities of the rocket propulsion alliance; (8) however, these efforts are unlikely to form the basis of a joint plan because NASA is not participating in either Vision 21 or the Defense Review; (9) in October 1997, NASA and Air Force officials took a step toward creating a national perspective on test facilities in the aeronautics area; (10) specifically, they reached an understanding on the scope and approach for joint strategic management of their aeronautical test facilities, including a new management organization; (11) however, they have not yet resolved basic issues, such as the organization's structure and authority; and (12) ultimately, if joint strategic management of aeronautics test facilities is successfully established, its adaption to other types of test facilities could be considered.