Sudan is the largest country in Africa (see fig. 1), and its population, estimated at about 40 million, is one of the continent’s most diverse. Sudan’s population comprises two distinct major cultures, Arab and black African, with hundreds of ethnic and tribal subdivisions and language groups. More than half of Sudan’s population lives in the northern states, which make up most of Sudan and include the majority of the urban centers; most residents of this area are Arabic-speaking Muslims. Residents of the southern region, which has a predominantly rural, subsistence economy, practice mainly indigenous traditional beliefs, although some are Christian. The South contains many tribal groups and many more languages than are used in the North. Darfur is another distinct region of Sudan, located in the west, and was an independent sultanate for most of the period between 1600 and 1916, when the British captured it and incorporated it into the Sudanese state. Darfur’s population is predominantly Muslim. For most of its existence since gaining independence from Britain and Egypt in 1956, Sudan has endured civil war rooted in cultural and religious divides. The North, which has traditionally controlled the country, has sought to unify it along the lines of Arabism and Islam, whereas non- Muslims and other groups in the South have sought, among other things, greater autonomy. After 17 years of war, from 1955 to 1972, the government signed a peace agreement that granted the South a measure of autonomy. However, civil war began again in 1983, when the President of Sudan declared Arabic the South’s official language, transferred control of Southern armed forces to the central government, and, later that year, announced that traditional Islamic punishments drawn from Shari’a (Islamic law) would be incorporated into the penal code. The South’s rebellion was orchestrated by the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A). In 1989, the conflict intensified when an Islamic army faction, led by General Omar Hassan al-Bashir, led a coup of the government and installed the National Islamic Front. In 2001 President Bush named former Senator John Danforth as his Presidential Envoy for Peace in Sudan, assigning him to explore a U.S. role in ending the civil war and enhance the delivery of humanitarian aid to Sudan’s affected population. On January 9, 2005, the Sudanese government and the SPLM/A signed a set of agreements called the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, providing for a new constitution and new arrangements for power sharing, wealth sharing, and security applicable throughout Sudan. On July 9, 2005, Bashir assumed the presidency under the new arrangements, with the SPLM/A Chairman assuming the office of First Vice President. In 2011, Southern Sudan will hold a vote to determine whether to become independent. To assist in implementing the peace agreement, the UN Security Council established the UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS), which currently has a force of more than 7,000. While the North-South agreement was nearing completion, a rebellion broke out in Darfur, located in western Sudan with an estimated preconflict population of about 6 million (see fig. 2). The South’s success motivated rebel groups in Darfur to fight for a similar outcome. In early 2003, Darfur rebels attacked Sudanese police stations and the airport in El Fasher, the capital of North Darfur (see fig. 3 for an interactive timeline of key events associated with Darfur and app. II for a related description of events). In El Fasher, the rebel groups destroyed numerous military aircraft, killed several Sudanese soldiers, and kidnapped a Sudanese general. After the government armed and supported local tribal and Arab militias—the Janjaweed—fighting between the rebel groups and the Sudan military and Janjaweed intensified during late 2003. The principal rebel groups, the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), represent agrarian farmers who are black African Muslims. The SLM/A has recently split into two factions—one faction, with the larger military force, led by Minni Minawi and the other led by Abdulwahid El Nour. In addition to disrupting the lives of almost 4 million Darfurians, Janjaweed and Sudanese government attacks in Darfur have resulted in many thousands of deaths. The Agreement on Humanitarian Ceasefire was signed by the Sudanese government, the SLM/A and the JEM on April 8, 2004, in N’Djamena, Chad. In signing the agreement, the parties agreed to accept an automatically renewable cessation of hostilities; to refrain from any military action and any reconnaissance operations; to refrain from any act of violence or any other abuse on civilian populations; to ensure humanitarian access; and to establish a Ceasefire Commission to monitor the agreement, along with a Joint Commission to which the Ceasefire Commission would report. The African Union was to monitor cease-fire compliance. Peace negotiations continued under African Union auspices with Chadian participation, and additional interim agreements were also reached. However, after a relatively calm 2005, cease-fire violations and violent incidents reportedly began to increase in the final months of that year and into 2006. On May 5, 2006, the government of Sudan and the Minawi faction of the SLM/A signed the Darfur Peace Agreement, establishing agreements in key areas such as power sharing, wealth sharing, and security arrangements. Power sharing. The Darfur Peace Agreement creates the position of Senior Assistant to the President—the fourth-highest position in the Sudanese government—appointed by the President from a list of nominees provided by the rebel movements. The Senior Assistant to the President will also serve as Chairperson of the newly created Transitional Darfur Regional Authority, which is responsible for the implementation of the agreement and coordination among the three states of Darfur. Further, a referendum will be held by July 2010 to allow Darfurians to decide whether to establish Darfur as a unitary region with a single government or to retain the existing three regions. Wealth sharing. The Darfur Peace Agreement creates a Darfur Reconstruction and Development Fund to collect and disburse funds for the resettlement, rehabilitation, and reintegration of internally and externally displaced persons. The government of Sudan will contribute $300 million to the fund in 2006 and at least $200 million annually in 2007 and 2008. Further, the government of Sudan will place $30 million in a fund for monetary compensation for those negatively affected by the conflict in Darfur. Security arrangements. The Darfur Peace Agreement calls for the verifiable disarmament of the Janjaweed by the Sudanese government by mid-October 2006. This disarmament must be verified by the African Union before rebel groups undertake their own disarmament and demobilization. Demilitarized zones are to be established around IDP camps and humanitarian assistance corridors, into which rebel forces and the Sudanese military cannot enter, and buffer zones are to be established in the areas of the most intense conflict. Rebel group forces will be integrated into the Sudanese military and police: 4,000 former combatants will be integrated into the armed forces; 1,000 former combatants will be integrated into the police; and 3,000 will be supported through education and training programs. The UN estimates that displaced and affected persons are located in more than 300 locations, including camps and other gatherings, with populations up to 90,000 people. Figure 4 shows the camp dispersion and estimated population at many of the camps throughout Darfur, as of October 2005. Since 2004, the African Union has been responsible for peace support operations in Darfur through AMIS. Subsequent to its establishment of an African Union observer mission in Darfur in May 2004, the African Union Peace and Security Council established a specific mandate for AMIS in October 2004 (see app. III for a discussion of the evolution of AMIS). AMIS’s mandate has three components: To monitor and observe compliance with the April 2004 humanitarian cease-fire agreement and all such agreements in the future; To assist in the process of confidence building; and To contribute to a secure environment for the delivery of humanitarian relief and, beyond that, the return of IDPs and refugees to their homes, in order to assist in increasing the level of compliance of all parties with the April 2004 cease-fire agreement and to contribute to the improvement of the security situation throughout Darfur. Regarding the first component of the mandate, per the terms of the cease- fire agreement, related agreements, and African Union Peace and Security Council guidance, military observers were to investigate and report on allegations of ceasefire violations, with a protection force presence as needed. Final investigation reports, prepared by the Ceasefire Commission headquartered in El Fasher, Darfur, were to be submitted to the Joint Commission. The Joint Commission was mandated to make consensus- based decisions on matters brought before it by the Ceasefire Commission. According to a senior African Union official, the Joint Commission was to submit Ceasefire Commission reports to African Union headquarters in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, for appropriate action. (Fig. 5 illustrates the established process for investigating, and reporting on, cease-fire agreement violations.) The council determined that AMIS would, in the framework of its mandate, “protect civilians whom it encounters under imminent threat and in the immediate vicinity, within resources and capability, it being understood that the protection of the civilian population is the responsibility of the government of Sudan.” The council also determined that AMIS would have, in addition to military observers and protection force troops, civilian police, to monitor the actions of Sudanese police and interact with IDPs and civilians, as well as appropriate civilian personnel. The AMIS force authorized and deployed in Darfur to execute its mandate has grown incrementally over time from several hundred personnel in 2004 to 7,271 personnel (military observers, protection force troops, and civilian police) deployed as of April 30, 2006. Numerous studies by the African Union, the UN, and others reviewing the performance of AMIS have been conducted that discuss the operations of this effort undertaken by the newly created African Union (see the bibliography for a listing of these reviews). The May 2006 Darfur Peace Agreement establishes several new responsibilities for AMIS, such as verifying the eventual disarmament of the Janjaweed by the Sudanese government. The 2006 agreement also designates AMIS as responsible for actions such as designing and running awareness programs in Darfur to ensure that local communities and others understand, among other things, the AMIS mandate; patrolling and monitoring demilitarized zones around IDP camps; patrolling buffer zones established in areas of the most intense conflict; and developing and monitoring implementation of a plan for the regulation of nomadic migration along historic migration routes. The U.S. government has been active in addressing the Darfur conflict. After the conflict began, senior State officials traveled to Sudan on a half- dozen occasions, stressing the need to end the violence. On July 22, 2004, the U.S. House and the Senate each passed separate resolutions citing events in Darfur as acts of genocide. Further, on September 9, 2004, in testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, the U.S. Secretary of State announced that “genocide” had been committed in Darfur, and noted that the Sudanese government had supported the Janjaweed, directly and indirectly, as they carried out a “scorched earth” policy toward the rebels and the African civilian population in Darfur. In a press release the same day, President Bush stated that genocide was occurring and requested the UN to investigate events in Darfur, as the Secretary of State had also done. On October 13, 2006, President Bush signed into law the Darfur Peace and Accountability Act of 2006, which imposes sanctions against persons responsible for genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity; supports measures for the protection of civilians and humanitarian operations; and supports peace efforts in Darfur. Although the UN has not identified the events in Darfur as genocide, it has repeatedly expressed concern over the continuing violence. In July 2004, the UN, with the government of Sudan, issued a communiqué emphasizing a commitment to facilitating humanitarian assistance to the region and establishing a commitment by the Sudanese government to disarm the Janjaweed. In September 2004, the UN Security Council adopted a resolution stating that the UN Secretary-General should “rapidly establish an international commission of inquiry in order immediately to investigate reports of violations of international humanitarian law and human rights law in Darfur by all parties, to determine also whether or not acts of genocide have occurred, and to identify the perpetrators of such violations with a view to ensuring that those responsible are held accountable.” In January 2005, the UN issued a report stating that “the Government of Sudan and the Janjaweed are responsible for serious violations of international human rights and humanitarian law amounting to crimes under international law.” The report concluded that a policy of genocide had not been pursued but noted that “the crimes against humanity and war crimes that have been committed in Darfur may be no less serious and heinous than genocide.” The UN Security Council has also adopted resolutions establishing a travel ban and asset freeze for those determined to impede the peace process or violate human rights and referring the situation in Darfur to the prosecutor of the International Criminal Court and calling on the government of Sudan and all other parties to the conflict to cooperate with the court. Further, in creating UNMIS to support implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, the council requested the UN Secretary- General to report to the council on options for the mission to reinforce the effort to foster peace in Darfur through appropriate assistance to AMIS. Large-scale international humanitarian response to the displacement in Darfur did not begin until fiscal year 2004. In October 2003, USAID’s Office of Food for Peace began to contribute food aid to the UN World Food Program for distribution in Darfur and USAID set an internal goal of meeting at least 50 percent of Sudan’s food aid needs as assessed by the World Food Program. In addition, USAID’s Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance established a Disaster Assistance Response Team in Darfur to respond to the humanitarian needs of the population affected by the conflict once the cease-fire agreement was signed. The United States was the largest donor of humanitarian assistance for Darfur in fiscal years 2004 to 2006, providing approximately 47 percent of all humanitarian assistance to the region (the UN has reported $1.9 billion in total pledges and obligations of assistance from all donors). The European Union and the United Kingdom provided the largest amounts of assistance pledged or obligated by other international donors. Figure 6 shows the percentages of total humanitarian assistance pledged or obligated for Darfur by international donors. In fiscal years 2004 through 2006, the United States provided almost $1 billion for food and other humanitarian aid in Darfur. More than 68 percent of the U.S. obligations as of September 30, 2006, supplied food aid in the form of commodities provided to the UN World Food Program and the International Committee of the Red Cross. In addition, the United States provided assistance to meet a range of nonfood needs, such as health care and water. During this period, humanitarian access and coverage for IDPs and affected residents of Darfur improved significantly. In addition, IDP malnutrition and mortality rates decreased over time, a trend that U.S., UN, and other officials attribute in part to humanitarian assistance. U.S. obligations for food and other humanitarian aid in Darfur totaled approximately $996 million in fiscal years 2004 through 2006 (see fig. 7). From 2004 to 2005, obligations for food and nonfood assistance increased from about $186 million to $444 million, or by 58 percent. In fiscal year 2006, obligations decreased to about $366 million, or by 18 percent. Funds provided in supplemental appropriations accounted for about $71 million— 16 percent of the total—in 2005 and $205 million—56 percent of the total—in 2006. For fiscal years 2004 through 2006, USAID provided $681 million (over 68 percent) as food aid for Darfur—approximately $113 million in 2004, $324 million in 2005, and $243 million in 2006 (see table 1). As table 1 shows, after rising from fiscal year 2004 to fiscal year 2005, U.S. food aid funding for Darfur decreased from fiscal year 2005 to fiscal year 2006 by approximately 25 percent and the quantity of food provided decreased by almost 13 percent. The UN World Food Program planned assistance to Sudan also fell by more than 16 percent between calendar years 2005 and 2006, while the food aid component of planned assistance decreased by 29 percent. According to World Food Program and USAID officials, in fiscal years 2005 and 2006, USAID supplied at least half of the 2005 and 2006 food aid assistance requested for Sudan by the UN World Food Program. A World Food Program official in Washington, D.C., stated that the U.S. government provided essential food aid contributions in fiscal year 2006 and that the reduction in the level of U.S. funding did not negatively impact the food situation in Darfur. USAID Food for Peace obligated aid for Darfur for fiscal years 2004 through 2006, primarily for commodities intended to meet minimum nutritional requirements, to the UN World Food Program and the International Committee of the Red Cross. Obligations to the UN World Food Program. As table 1 shows, USAID Food for Peace obligated $658.6 million for commodities, including transportation and other shipping costs, to the World Food Program to address emergency food needs in Darfur in fiscal years 2004 through 2006. According to a USAID official, this assistance included commodities previously allocated for assistance to southern Sudan, which Food for Peace and the World Food Program reallocated to respond to the emergency situation in Darfur before the official emergency program began. World Food Program officials said that U.S. food aid funding allowed the program to preposition food in various storage facilities in Darfur, enabling the program to avoid costly air drops. World Food Program officials indicated that prepositioning food helps avoid shortfalls during rainy seasons resulting from the typical 6- month time lag between confirmation and distribution of food aid donations. Obligations to the Red Cross. USAID Food for Peace obligated $22.8 million for commodities to the International Committee of the Red Cross. This assistance was intended particularly for rural village residents who had not been displaced by the ongoing conflict and whose needs had not been addressed by other agencies in the region. During our field work in Darfur, we visited World Food Program warehouses outside Nyala, in South Darfur, built to expedite the distribution of food aid during the rainy season; we observed local staff repackaging U.S. wheat from bags that were damaged in transit to the storage facility in Nyala (see fig. 8). Additionally, we witnessed NGOs distributing rations in Zam Zam IDP camp (although the funds and commodities are transferred to the UN World Food Program, NGOs operating in Darfur distribute the rations in IDP camps), where U.S.-provided sorghum, vegetable oil, lentils, and wheat were distributed as part of the monthly rations (see fig. 9). In addition to providing food aid, as of September 30, 2006, the United States had obligated approximately $315 million for other humanitarian assistance in a range of sectors, including shelter, water and sanitation, health care, and nutrition. This assistance was provided through USAID’s Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance and Office of Transition Initiatives as well as State’s Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration. The U.S. government has provided nonfood assistance to the affected residents of Darfur through 31 NGOs and 10 UN agencies, which implement programs and activities to aid the people of Darfur (see app. IV for a list of NGOs and UN agencies that received U.S. nonfood assistance funding for fiscal years 2004 to 2006). Of this assistance, the largest amounts have been obligated for health care, water and sanitation, logistics, protection, and food security/agriculture (see fig. 10). Health. The United States obligated $57.4 million for the health sector, supporting activities such as medical clinics, immunizations, and maternal health care. We visited five NGO-operated health clinics in Darfur IDP camps. These clinics, which served between 110 to 1,200 IDPs per day, provided basic medical examinations, referring serious illnesses to Sudanese hospitals. The clinics also provided vaccinations, reproductive health services for pregnant women, and medical services for victims of gender-based violence (see fig. 11). Water and sanitation. The United States provided about $53.5 million for water and sanitation activities, which consisted of building and rehabilitating wells, installing hand pumps and latrines, and conducting hygiene programs. According to NGO officials, the Kalma camp water facilities we visited served approximately 45,000 IDPs and dispensed approximately 18 liters of chlorinated water per person per day (above the Sphere standard of 15 liters) to provide for IDPs’ personal needs and to allow them to water their animals. According to NGO officials, in Abu Shouk camp, a water tank and hand pumps provided 13.5 liters of water per person per day (see fig. 12). Protection and income-generation activities. The United States provided about $28.6 million for protection activities and $9.1 million for income- generation activities, which USAID and NGO officials indicated helped protect women and girls by minimizing their exposure to violence. We observed women building fuel-efficient stoves, which, by requiring less wood, are intended to reduce the frequency of women’s wood-collecting forays outside the camp and, thus, their vulnerability to attacks (see fig. 13). We also observed IDPs preparing goods that could be sold—including making baskets and other goods, preparing fresh pasta, and sewing garments—to provide sources of income that would reduce their need to go outside the camps to earn money. Literacy and educational training was also provided to IDPs in camps in conjunction with income-generation and protection activities. Since fiscal year 2004, when the United States and other international donors began providing humanitarian assistance, the numbers of humanitarian organizations and staff have grown, and the amount of humanitarian assistance and the coverage for IDPs and affected residents have increased. Also, since 2004, malnutrition and mortality rates among IDPs and affected residents have diminished. Increased presence of humanitarian organizations. According to UN and NGO officials, U.S. assistance contributed to growth in the number of humanitarian organizations and staff in Darfur. UN humanitarian profiles show that from April 2004 to July 2006, the number of international and national humanitarian aid workers in Darfur expanded from 202 to about 13,500 staff of 84 NGOs and 13 UN agencies. NGO and UN officials in Darfur indicated that the U.S. contribution was essential to their operations, in some cases making up the totality of their budget, and that they would be unable to provide services inside and outside the camps without U.S. funding. Increase coverage for affected residents and IDPs. Each aid sector in Darfur provided humanitarian assistance to increasing numbers of affected residents or IDPs between April 2004 and July 2006 (see fig. 14). The total affected population receiving assistance such as food, water, and health care increased, although substantial numbers of affected persons did not receive assistance, especially in inaccessible areas, owing to continued security concerns. In addition, after August 2005, the percentage of the targeted population receiving such assistance began to decrease, according to the UN, as continued conflict and insecurity in Darfur limited access to, and distribution of, humanitarian aid. NGOs and UN agencies reported that assistance provided only to IDPs also expanded. For example, the number of IDPs receiving sanitation assistance increased more than sixtyfold, from about 21,000 IDPs in April 2004 to more than 1.4 million IDPs in July 2006. Reduced malnutrition and mortality rates. Since 2004, malnutrition rates recorded in Darfur have decreased significantly. A UN World Food Program survey in Darfur showed that malnutrition rates were significantly lower in 2005 than in 2004. In addition, although nutrition among IDPs in Darfur remains precarious, UN nutritional reports show improvement since 2004 and attribute the improvement partly to external assistance and large-scale food aid. According to UN Emergency Food Security and Nutrition Assessments, the prevalence of global acute malnutrition in Darfur was reported at 11.9 percent in March of 2006, a significant decrease from the 21.8 percent reported in October 2004. Furthermore, several mortality surveys have concluded that mortality rates in Darfur decreased from 2004 to 2005. For example, surveys conducted by the World Health Organization and Médecins Sans Frontières (also known as Doctors Without Borders) reported mortality rates ranging between 1.5 to 9.5 deaths per 10,000 people per day in 2004. In September 2005, the UN World Food Program reported that the crude mortality rate in Darfur had dropped below the emergency threshold of 1 death per 10,000 persons per day, as defined by Sphere. Humanitarian assistance provided for Darfur by the United States and other international donors has been cited as contributing to improved mortality rates in Darfur. Experts and NGO, UN, and U.S. officials noted that other factors, such as reduced violence, can also contribute to a decrease in mortality rates. Despite the efforts of the humanitarian organizations to increase the numbers of people receiving humanitarian assistance, as well as provide assistance to help reduce malnutrition and mortality rates, the situation in Darfur remains precarious. Continued insecurity restricts humanitarian organizations’ access to IDPs and affected residents of Darfur. In addition, NGO and UN officials indicated that mortality and malnutrition rates would likely rise above emergency levels if necessary funding were not continued. Since the beginning of the humanitarian crisis in Darfur, entities delivering U.S. humanitarian assistance to affected residents and IDPs have faced numerous challenges. Continued insecurity in the region has limited the ability of NGOs and UN agencies to access parts of Darfur and reach all affected residents and IDPs. In addition, the Sudanese government and rebel groups have placed restrictions and requirements on NGOs that have severely limited the NGO staffs’ ability to travel to and in Darfur and to provide services to affected residents and IDPs. Further, the late timing of U.S. funding in 2006 initially limited the operations of NGOs and UN agencies and threatened to force some reduction in services in Darfur. Meanwhile, the large size of Darfur and the large quantity of U.S. humanitarian assistance have challenged USAID’s ability to ensure accountability for the assistance provided. In addition, targeting of humanitarian assistance for IDPs is complicated by the difficulty of counting and managing the numbers of people who receive assistance and their use of the goods provided. The frequent violence and continued conflict within all three Darfur states have negatively impacted the ability of NGOs and UN agencies to provide humanitarian assistance within Darfur. Attacks on, and harassment of, humanitarian staff, as well as banditry and theft of humanitarian convoys, have increased throughout Darfur since the beginning of the humanitarian response; and according to the UN, violence, sexual abuse, and displacement have dramatically increased since May 2006. NGO, UN, and U.S. personnel have been injured, abducted, and killed in attacks against the humanitarian community, and humanitarian staff have regularly reported harassment from Sudanese government officials. According to UN and USAID reports, UN and NGO humanitarian staff were attacked and harassed with increasing frequency in 2005, and NGO staff members were attacked and abducted. In several instances, drivers and other humanitarian staff were abducted or killed during attacks on humanitarian aid convoys. USAID reported more than 200 incidents of harassment, arrest, or attack against UN, NGO, or AMIS personnel in 2005. USAID and the UN also reported that increasing violence had resulted in the deaths of nine humanitarian staff in July 2006—more than the number of staff killed in the past 2 years. Further, in August 2006, the UN reported that attacks against humanitarian staff were at a record high. In addition, banditry and looting of NGO convoys occur with regularity, according to UN and USAID reports. USAID reported and some UN officials confirmed the theft of vehicles, cash, food, and other humanitarian aid. However, many NGO and UN officials told us that the banditry has mainly resulted in the theft of communications equipment and cash, rather than the humanitarian aid in the convoy. A World Food Program official estimated that less than 1 percent of total food aid in Darfur was lost to banditry, but that the incidents typically resulted in the theft of petty cash, fuel, or the trucks carrying the World Food Program supplies. Furthermore, humanitarian access to affected residents and IDPs has been curtailed as a result of continued conflict, especially in rural areas. USAID, NGO, and UN officials in Darfur stated that the lack of security has forced humanitarian organizations to limit access to insecure areas. For example, in response to continued attacks and insecurity in West Darfur, in January 2006, the UN Department of Security and Safety announced the withdrawal of UN staff from most of West Darfur for 2 months, and USAID also removed its staff from West Darfur. (Although UN access was restricted, some NGOs did not evacuate the area and were able to continue operations.) According to USAID, the situation dramatically curtailed the ability of organizations to access the affected residents and IDP population in the area and to implement life-saving programs in West Darfur. Additionally, the UN reported that, as a result of significant insecurity in North Darfur, approximately 460,000 Darfurians were cut off from emergency food aid in July 2006, and in August 2006, 355,000 Darfurians remained blocked from receiving food aid. According to the UN, as of August 2006, humanitarian aid organizations’ access to IDPs and affected residents in Darfur was at its lowest levels since 2003, and areas of inaccessibility were expanding. Meanwhile, an estimated 50,000 people were displaced between June and August 2006. The government of Sudan and, to a lesser extent, the rebel groups have hindered the humanitarian community from accessing affected residents and IDPs in Darfur. According to UN and NGO officials and USAID, as well as UN reports, the government of Sudan has restricted access to Darfur for NGOs and UN agencies since the initial international humanitarian response by delaying or denying visas and travel permits. NGO officials noted that issuance of visas for staff is often delayed or denied without explanation. In addition, according to NGO officials, although the government of Sudan requires NGO officials to purchase travel permits for all travel within Darfur, government police and other authorities do not always accept the permits and often deny access to NGO staff. According to USAID officials, in September 2006, the government of Sudan restricted movement of U.S. government personnel to within 25 miles of the presidential palace in Khartoum, which has forced USAID to remove all personnel from Darfur. This travel ban remained in place as of October 20, 2006. Rebel groups also place requirements on NGOs that delay transportation of humanitarian aid or services into rebel-controlled areas. For example, NGO and UN officials stated that they must contact numerous rebel leaders to safely transport humanitarian aid into a rebel- controlled area. Sudanese government officials in Darfur deny NGO and UN officials allegations that the government restricts access and travel in Darfur and insist that the government attempts to help NGOs and UN agencies provide assistance to the people of Darfur. However, USAID, NGO and UN officials indicated that although the Sudanese government has an official policy of cooperation with humanitarian assistance in Darfur, the government’s actions have severely limited humanitarian assistance within the region. Delayed provision of more than half of U.S. humanitarian aid for 2006 limited NGO and UN agency partners’ ability to supply needed food assistance and negatively affected their ability to plan for nonfood assistance. The initial U.S. appropriation for fiscal year 2006 supplied approximately 44 percent of the total U.S. humanitarian aid funding for Darfur in fiscal year 2006. With the passage of the supplemental appropriation on June 15, 2006—9 months into the fiscal year—total U.S. food and nonfood assistance for 2006 reached the intended levels, including meeting at least half of the World Food Program’s appeal for Sudan. However, because NGOs and UN agencies in Darfur did not receive the funds until late in the fiscal year, they were forced to reduce food rations and temporarily interrupt some humanitarian aid services. Impact on food assistance. The provision of approximately 56 percent of 2006 U.S. food aid funding late in the fiscal year made it difficult for the UN World Food Program to distribute supplies throughout Darfur in a timely fashion. In particular, because of the 6-month lag between confirmation and distribution of donations, the delay made it difficult for the program to preposition food prior to the rainy season, according to a World Food Program official. Owing in part to this delay, the program announced in April 2006 that, beginning in May, it would reduce rations in Darfur to half the minimum daily requirement (from 2,100 calories to as few as 1,050 calories per day) to extend limited food stocks. In response, the Sudanese government donated sorghum, and the President of the United States directed USAID to ship emergency food stockpiles to Darfur, raising the rations to 84 percent (1,770 kilocalories) of the daily requirement for Darfurians receiving food aid. In June, the cereal component of the ration was fully restored. However, as of October 2006, the World Food Program continued to face gaps in food aid, and, according to program officials, it planned to maintain the 84 percent ration through the end of the calendar year. According to a World Food Program official in Khartoum, if the current level of funding had been available earlier in the year, the ration cuts could have been avoided entirely. A USAID official told us that, although the reduction in 2006 U.S. funding did not significantly decrease the food aid contribution for Darfur, the delay of $137 million (56 percent) of the 2006 U.S. food aid funding until late in the fiscal year negatively affected the food situation in Darfur earlier in the year. This outcome aligns with previous GAO findings that lack of sufficient, timely donations contributed to food aid shortfalls in other emergency situations. Impact on nonfood assistance. The delay of U.S. nonfood humanitarian assistance, as well as a reduction in funding from other international donors, led NGO and UN officials to anticipate a negative impact on nonfood humanitarian operations in Darfur. In February 2006, these officials told us that the initial U.S. funding for the year had been less than planned for and needed to ensure continued levels of assistance to Darfur’s affected residents and IDPs. As a result of the funding delays, the NGO officials said, their organizations would be forced to make cuts in the services and programs they provided or to reduce their humanitarian aid staff in Darfur. For example, one NGO official indicated that the reduction in funding had forced the organization to downsize its health program and to transfer responsibility for the clinics to the Sudanese government. Several NGO and UN officials also indicated that without additional funds, key indicators such as the malnutrition and mortality rates, which had improved in 2005, would likely rise again above emergency levels. USAID officials told us in October 2006 that after receiving the supplemental funding, USAID’s partners had been able to restore humanitarian programs in Darfur to their previous levels and coverage. USAID’s ability to provide oversight and measure the impact of U.S. humanitarian assistance in Darfur has been limited by reductions in its staff who could directly monitor U.S. assistance or ensure that implementing partners fulfilled reporting requirements. From April 2004 to July 2006, as NGO and UN humanitarian staff in Darfur significantly increased—from 202 to 13,500—USAID’s staff in Darfur decreased. During the first 2 years of the conflict, USAID staff ranged between 10 and 20 personnel; within the last 9 months, that number has been reduced to 6 to 8 USAID personnel. USAID officials believe that the remaining number of USAID personnel is adequate to oversee the implementation of U.S. humanitarian assistance and USAID grant agreements, among other responsibilities. USAID officials indicated that other, external factors, such as UN and U.S. Embassy security requirements and restrictions imposed by the government of Sudan, limit the number of staff in Darfur. In addition, USAID officials indicated that they visited camps and communicated with NGO and UN agency officials regularly to discuss operations and difficulties and to assist in delivering humanitarian assistance. However, USAID officials told us that owing to limited time and staff in Darfur, security restrictions throughout the region, the size of Darfur, and the scale of U.S. assistance provided, they could not monitor compliance with all of the grant agreement indicators at locations in Darfur that were targeted for assistance. Furthermore, required NGO reporting has been incomplete. As a result, USAID lacks information to evaluate NGO operations, monitor their performance, and measure the impact of the assistance provided. According to USAID’s Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance Guidelines for Proposals and Reporting, NGOs must submit proposals outlining the indicators and outcomes expected from the humanitarian activities and services provided for with U.S. funds. Each grant agreement also specifies that 90 days after the agreement’s expiration, the NGO must submit a final report that includes the cumulative achievements and a comparison of actual accomplishments against the goals, objectives, indicators, and targets established for the agreement. Examples of indicators used by NGOs in proposals include, for example, the crude mortality rate in the target population or the number of latrines constructed. However, we found that 6 of 15 final reports that NGOs were required to submit by June 1, 2006, had not been submitted to USAID. Moreover, most of the reports that NGOs submitted did not include all required information. USAID’s Darfur Program Manager stated that because officials maintain constant communication with NGOs and conduct evaluations of activities in Darfur, the agency is aware of implementing partners’ accomplishments, or lack thereof, in Darfur, despite the incompleteness of most NGO reports. However, the reports and indicators are essential in monitoring and evaluating humanitarian operations, given that USAID staff are often constrained by limited access due to insecurity and violence throughout Darfur. In response to our observations USAID acknowledged the importance of obtaining required reports and has taken efforts to ensure reporting compliance from its NGO partners. As a result, USAID reported that in July 2006 it received all quarterly reports from current NGO partners. Challenges in accurately counting the populations of IDP camps have made it difficult for NGOs and UN agencies to ensure that all U.S. humanitarian assistance was provided to the intended recipients. In addition, some IDPs used humanitarian assistance for purposes other than those for which it was intended. In part because the IDP camps’ large size makes it difficult to control who receives assistance, some assistance has been distributed to recipients other than those targeted. For example, UN humanitarian profiles show that between December 2004 and October 2005, IDPs in Kalma camp, the largest camp in Darfur, were estimated at between 103,000 and 163,000. The World Food Program distributed food aid for IDPs based on these estimates. Prior to October 2005, several efforts to count the actual number of IDPs in Kalma camp were determined to be invalid because of problems with the counts and an inability to stop non- IDPs from participating. An October 2005 count was completed by more than 400 staff from six NGOs, with help from USAID staff, and with assistance from Sudanese government troops—who surrounded the camp to stop non-IDPs from entering—and AMIS civilian police, who provided security inside the camp. On October 4, 2005, a count of 87,000 was declared accurate, approximately 70,000 IDPs less than the previous estimate. According to a USAID official, residents from the nearby state capital of Nyala had previously received improper food distributions at the camp. According to USAID, without accurate counts of camp populations, the humanitarian community struggles to distribute food aid appropriately to the populations with the greatest need. Not all resources and assistance are being used as intended, although USAID and NGO officials indicated that this is typical of any emergency situation, especially one of this size and duration. For example, in Abu Shouk camp, we observed IDPs using treated drinking water to make bricks, either for their own shelters or for sale on the market. According to a UN official, IDPs in the camp used approximately 30 percent of available water in the camp to make bricks and, as a result, 8 of the 30 water pumps in Abu Shouk dried up. Although the African Union’s peace support operation has reportedly contributed to a reduction of large-scale violence in Darfur, AMIS’s actions to fulfill its mandate in Darfur have been taken in an incomplete or inconsistent manner. To monitor compliance with the cease-fire agreement, the first component of its mandate, AMIS military observers in Darfur have actively investigated alleged cease-fire agreement violations. However, the resulting reports have not been reviewed according to established procedure or widely publicized to identify parties who have violated the agreement. To build confidence and to improve security, the second and third components of its mandate, AMIS troops have taken actions such as conducting patrols and escorting IDP women who leave camps to forage for firewood. In addition, AMIS troops have intervened to stop impending violence against civilians and provided escorts for NGO convoys in some instances, although AMIS has not intervened in other instances. Further, the AMIS civilian police are working with Sudanese police to improve law enforcement, but the civilian police have encountered difficulties with the Sudanese authorities. To support AMIS’s efforts to meet its mandate, the U.S. government provided about $280 million from June 2004 through September 2006, according to State, primarily to build and maintain the 32 camps that house AMIS forces throughout Darfur. AMIS is viewed by many as having made an important contribution in Darfur. U.S. and other officials cite AMIS as responsible for decreasing large-scale violence simply by the deterrent effect of its presence in the region. State officials have emphasized that AMIS participants have a strong desire to be effective and make the AMIS initiative work and that the presence of AMIS’s patrols has had a positive impact. Further, a senior UN official told us that AMIS “jumped into Darfur” with few resources in a genuine attempt to “put out this fire” and that AMIS’s presence has had a notable impact. Further, State and UN officials noted that AMIS forces were deployed to Darfur quickly in comparison with other international peacekeeping missions. AMIS has taken a number of positive actions in Darfur in response to its mandate to (1) monitor compliance with the cease-fire agreement, (2) assist in confidence building, and (3) contribute to improving security. However, some of these actions have been executed in an incomplete or inconsistent manner, limiting the extent to which AMIS has been able to fulfill its mandate. To address the first component of its mandate, AMIS military observers in Darfur investigated and identified a number of violations of the 2004 cease- fire agreement. However, the Joint Commission has not consistently reviewed the resulting Ceasefire Commission investigation reports. Further, the publicly available record of recent cease-fire violation investigations is incomplete, making it impossible to establish how many total cease-fire violations have been identified by the Ceasefire Commission since its creation in 2004 and which parties have been responsible for recent cease-fire agreement violations. Ceasefire Commission reports provide specific information regarding violations. The commission found that all three parties to the conflict had committed violations, many of which occurred in South Darfur. Of the 80 allegations of cease-fire agreement violations that we reviewed, the Ceasefire Commission was unable to make a determination in 30 instances, often because an outside party (such as the Janjaweed) had allegedly committed the violation. These cases involved acts such as the killing of numerous civilians at a time and attacks on villages. In several cases, the Sudanese government was accused of fighting alongside the Janjaweed. In three of the cases we reviewed, the Ceasefire Commission determined that no violation had occurred. For the remaining 47 allegations of cease-fire agreement violations, the Ceasefire Commission found 54 violations. Sudanese government. The commission found that the Sudanese government had committed 27 cease-fire agreement violations. Among these violations, 9 involved civilian deaths; 10 involved village attacks; 7 involved attacks, harassment, or intimidation of civilians; and 7 involved Sudanese troop movements into new territory without proper notification to the Ceasefire Commission. SLM/A. The commission found that the SLM/A had committed 25 cease- fire agreement violations. Among these violations, six involved attacks on Sudanese facilities (e.g., military camps, police stations, convoys); seven involved abductions of civilians, local political representatives, or Sudanese government personnel; two involved village attacks; and two involved civilian deaths. JEM. The commission found that the JEM had committed two cease-fire agreement violations, both of which involved attacks on Sudanese facilities. The Ceasefire Commission’s recommendations in the reports vary from general to specific. General recommendations include urging the parties to the conflict to adhere to the cease-fire agreement; reminding them that they are required to give the commission prior notice of any administrative troop movements; and requesting party leaders to educate their members about the provisions of the agreement. More specific recommendations include those recommending that the Sudanese government disarm, neutralize, or restrain the Janjaweed and that SLM/A stop looting, or return looted goods, and release those whom it had abducted. In reports issued after November 2004, the Ceasefire Commission frequently appealed to the Joint Commission to become more involved in various aspects of the monitoring process. However, although the reports provide detailed information regarding parties that violated the cease-fire agreement and the nature of the violations, African Union and U.S. officials told us that the Joint Commission had not met regularly, had been ineffective in reviewing reports, and had no means of forcing the violating parties to take action based on report results. Further, although the Joint Commission has condemned cease-fire violations by the parties to the conflict and asked all parties to end all attacks, a DOD official noted that officials at African Union headquarters were not pushing the Joint Commission to review or approve Ceasefire Commission reports. African Union and U.S. officials emphasized that because the reports are available on the African Union’s Web site and publicly identify violators of the cease-fire agreement, the reports pressure the parties to the conflict to improve compliance with the agreement. The officials viewed this transparency and resulting pressure as a central benefit of the reports. However, we found that the public record of investigated cease-fire violations is incomplete, making it impossible to establish the total number of alleged or confirmed violations and to identify all responsible parties. For example, we were unable to open 37 of the 116 Ceasefire Commission reports listed as available on the African Union’s Web site. Further, we were unable to locate any reports subsequent to September 2005 to validate other claims regarding violations. For example, no Ceasefire Commission reports are publicly available to substantiate or refute a January 2006 report, which was prepared by the Chairperson of the African Union Commission and submitted to the Peace and Security Council, stating that cease-fire violations had escalated since October 2005 and that some of the most serious violations had occurred since that time. To fulfill the second and third components of the mandate, AMIS forces have provided patrols and escorts for IDPs, NGOs, and U.S. contractor staff; intervened to prevent violence; and collaborated with Sudanese government police. However, in some instances, AMIS patrols and escorts have not been able to prevent attacks or to provide needed services; AMIS forces have not intervened consistently to prevent violence; and AMIS civilian police have had difficult relations with the Sudanese police. AMIS Has Provided Patrols and Escorts but Has Not Prevented All Attacks or Provided All Needed Protection To build confidence among affected residents and IDPs and create a more secure environment, AMIS troops have taken actions such as conducting patrols and providing escorts for vulnerable groups. However, AMIS escorts and the escorted groups have sometimes encountered violent attacks, and AMIS has had insufficient resources to provide all needed escort services. Patrols. AMIS officials at several AMIS camps we visited told us that AMIS military observers or civilian police try to conduct about two patrols each day, for example, to make AMIS’s presence known and to interact positively with local communities, collect information, or investigate an alleged cease-fire agreement violation. We accompanied one confidence-building patrol near the North Darfur town of Kabkabiya; AMIS military observers interviewed local residents and a community leader to identify any problems that required AMIS attention. (See fig. 15.) Escorts. To further build confidence and improve security, AMIS troops have also provided escorts for groups of women foraging for firewood outside IDP camps. According to African Union and U.S. officials, the presence of AMIS troops has prevented these groups from being attacked. We accompanied an AMIS escort of a group of women as they walked more than 9 miles outside the town of Kass in South Darfur to find firewood for the next several days. Escorted by AMIS protection force troops and civilian police, as well as Sudanese government police, the 79 women went about their activities freely and without incident (see fig. 16). AMIS officials also told us that they have escorted NGO convoys to prevent theft and banditry. However, in several instances, AMIS troops or those being escorted have been threatened or killed. For example, several people were killed in rebel attacks on convoys, including four Nigerian soldiers and two local contractor staff in October 2005. In July 2006, 32 AMIS soldiers escorting a fuel convoy in North Darfur were abducted by one SLM/A faction; although the soldiers were eventually released, two fuel tanker drivers, the fuel tankers, and four AMIS vehicles were not released at that time. According to a senior U.S. contracting official working in Darfur, the drivers and tankers were released in October 2006, and the vehicles have not been returned. According to a December 2005 African Union-led assessment of AMIS (with participation from the UN, European Union, and United States), such incidents “undermine the Mission’s credibility in the eyes of civilians and embolden those who may target AMIS.” Further, a UN official emphasized that AMIS’s ability to provide services such as firewood escorts is limited and that AMIS cannot begin to cover all instances where such escorts would be useful. AMIS Has Intervened to Prevent Violence in Some Cases but Not in Others AMIS troops have also intervened to protect civilians under imminent threat of violence, as directed by the African Union mandate. For example, according to the December 2005 assessment of AMIS, AMIS troops were deployed to Zalingei in West Darfur to prevent retaliation against IDPs when there was heightened tension following the kidnapping of civilians by the SLM/A. Another AMIS deployment to Muhajariya halted a Sudanese military advance on the town that could have resulted in the substantial displacement of IDPs. In addition, following attacks on the town of Labado in South Darfur in late 2004, a deployment of AMIS troops in January 2005 deterred further attacks and led to the return of many town residents, who began to repair their homes and rebuild their lives. However, in other instances, AMIS has not intervened to prevent violence. For example, according to UN and U.S. documentation, AMIS did not maintain a regular presence around Mershing and its surroundings in South Darfur despite concerns about security in the area and repeated requests from the international community for a continuous AMIS presence. Ultimately, armed militia attacks resulted in the death of several IDPs and subsequent displacement in early 2006. In addition, an NGO official told us that AMIS was slow in responding to requests for assistance from NGOs caught in a battle between SLM/A and Sudanese government forces in the Jebel Marra area; however, AMIS did help evacuate NGO staff from the area 24 hours after the conflict began. According to an AMIS commander, although AMIS has taken preemptive action to stop attacks or skirmishes, the territory is too large for AMIS to be able prevent such violence overall. AMIS Has Collaborated with Sudanese Police, but Relations Have Been Difficult AMIS has worked with the Sudanese police to improve security, but some of its relations with the Sudanese police have been problematic. AMIS civilian police officers reported to us that they were working to ensure that the Sudanese police are acting on cases provided by the AMIS civilian police. AMIS civilian police also noted that, where appropriate, they have encouraged the use of village councils to resolve disputes, rather than referring every case to the Sudanese authorities. However, some AMIS civilian police officers reported that relations with the Sudanese police had at times been difficult. AMIS civilian police officers told us that Sudanese police had been slow to act on cases provided by AMIS, that these cases often do not result in convictions or adequate punishment, and that it can be difficult to obtain information from the Sudanese police regarding the status of referred cases. In addition, AMIS civilian police mentioned that Sudanese police have at times perpetrated violent acts against citizens of Darfur and AMIS police. Moreover, the civilian police have had difficulty gaining access to some areas that are controlled by rebel groups and lack an official Sudanese police presence. Further, the limited and misunderstood role of AMIS’s civilian police frustrated IDPs and NGO staff, who expressed the view that these police provided limited useful services. IDPs and NGOs told us that they did not understand why civilian police did not get involved when problems arose. Their frustration was heightened by the fact that civilian police have visible stations adjacent to IDP camps. AMIS and UN officials also noted that because the civilian police are unarmed, they require AMIS protection force escorts, which are not always available. The United States has supported AMIS primarily by funding the construction and maintenance of AMIS camps in Darfur by a contractor, PAE Government Services, Inc. (PAE). Other international donors have provided funding or goods and services to support AMIS’s peacekeeping operations. To support AMIS’s efforts to carry out its mandate, the U.S. government expended about $240 million from June 2004 to August 2006 and obligated another $40 million in September of 2006, primarily to build and maintain the 32 camps that house AMIS forces throughout Darfur, according to a State official who tracks this funding. African Union and U.S. officials told us that camp sites were chosen to be near population centers and known conflict areas. State contracted with PAE to build and maintain the camps as well as to maintain AMIS vehicles and communication equipment (see fig. 17). PAE is also maintaining armored personnel carriers provided by Canada; the Canadian government has provided State with more than $20 million for fiscal year 2006 for this purpose. Finally, PAE is responsible for hiring, housing, and compensating U.S. military observers (referred to by State officials in Darfur as “U.S. representatives” owing to their range of contributions to AMIS beyond observing activities). Although 16 U.S. military observers are authorized, only 11 were on the ground in Darfur during our February 2006 visit. Construction of the 32 camps, between June 2004 and December 2005, involved a number of challenges. According to a senior PAE official in Darfur, key costs associated with building the camps included supplying generators and, particularly as construction was beginning, transporting supplies and equipment via aircraft. Construction of the camps, which together can house 9,300 people, was complicated by the difficulty of finding international staff willing to come to Darfur and local staff possessing adequate skills. In addition, the remote locations of camp sites, combined with the inadequate condition of roads throughout the region, made it difficult to transport building supplies to the sites; PAE officials told us that in some cases, supplies were transported across insecure areas via donkeys. Further, the various augmentations of AMIS over time (including the introduction of the civilian police component) had to be incorporated into preexisting building plans. Moreover, the relatively small size of some of the land parcels provided by the government of Sudan made it difficult for PAE to, for example, construct sufficient perimeter protection around camps. Other sites provided by the government are in vulnerable locations; for instance, PAE officials identified one camp that was built in a natural “bowl,” making protection problematic, although steps were recently taken to relocate portions of this camp. According to PAE and State officials, PAE’s current costs for maintaining the camps, as well as AMIS communications equipment and vehicles, are about $7.8 million per month. PAE faces additional challenges in maintaining AMIS facilities, with the provision of water a key difficulty. According to a PAE situation report dated May 5, 2006, there are significant concerns regarding the provision of an uninterrupted supply of water to several AMIS camps. In some cases, unprotected water bore holes have been sabotaged. In the past, PAE also experienced the theft of jet fuel. A PAE official noted that other environmental challenges to maintaining the camps include heat, ultraviolet rays, and sand. The European Union, also a key AMIS donor, has provided about $200 million as direct budget support for AMIS operational costs such as per diem and food, according to a State official. Many other donor contributions have been “in kind”—that is, goods and services rather than direct funding. For example, the Canadian government loaned AMIS 25 helicopters and 105 armored personnel carriers; the British government provided vehicles and ground fuel; the Dutch government provided communications equipment; and the Norwegian government is building civilian police stations near IDP camps. Further, since October 2004, the UN has provided assistance to AMIS via a technical assistance cell working in Addis Ababa and funded by the UN Mission in Sudan. According to an official in the cell, it has provided services such as technical support (including an August 2005 UN-led exercise to prepare AMIS for troop deployments and identify areas where capacity building was required) and training (such as arranging training for military observers and bringing a financial officer to African Union headquarters for 3 months to assist with financial management). NATO has also provided training for AMIS personnel and has assisted with troop rotation efforts. Numerous factors have been identified by AMIS and U.S. government officials, among others, as contributing to AMIS’s difficulties in meeting its mandate. These factors include inadequacies in management, organization, and capacity; a relatively small force; resources that have been constrained or inefficiently allocated; and a lack of information regarding, and cooperation from, parties to the conflict. As AMIS has faced operational and other challenges, the UN has approved a UN peacekeeping operation in Darfur when AMIS’s mandate expires; however, as of October 2006, the Sudanese government had rejected the proposal. In June 2006, following a NATO offer, the African Union formally requested assistance from NATO in, among other things, identifying lessons learned from AMIS operations; however, according to a State official, African Union headquarters had taken no further action to pursue this review as of August 2006. Meanwhile, instability and violence have continued in Darfur. AMIS has reportedly experienced numerous difficulties in its management, organization, and capacity that have limited its ability to carry out its mandate. Regarding AMIS management, U.S., UN, and other sources have commonly expressed the view that AMIS’s command and control has been inadequate and confused. A UN-led assessment of AMIS in August 2005 stated, “The evolution of the mission has been such that it has depended on individual components conducting their own planning rather than tackling problems from a mission perspective. This has led to considerable disparity between components, duplication of effort, and the potential for planning at cross purposes.” A State official emphasized that AMIS has had no clear lines of authority between Addis Ababa, El Fasher, and the field and that a lack of coordination has made a rapid response to crisis situations problematic. A Refugees International study reported that “AMIS has suffered from language and cultural barriers between officers from various countries, confusion in procedures, limited future planning, and ineffective communications systems. Much of this stems from lack of peacekeeping experience.” The Brookings Institution–University of Bern study also stated that AMIS command and control had been slow and cumbersome and that “he unwieldy bureaucracy at African Union headquarters hampered all aspects of deployment; there is no institutional expertise for peace operations yet in the .” Moreover, AMIS leadership has demonstrated inconsistency in interpreting the AMIS mandate, creating confusion among AMIS troops and civilians and limiting its protection of civilians within its capabilities. AMIS leadership’s willingness to take certain actions to meet the mandate—for example, to protect civilians—has varied throughout Darfur, as already noted. State officials have observed that AMIS’s willingness to actively protect Darfur residents to the extent provided for in the mandate has been “uneven.” A U.S. official we met with in Sudan noted that in some cases, the degree to which AMIS’s mandate was robustly interpreted seemed to depend on leadership personalities. According to the December 2005 African Union-led assessment of AMIS, “military and police mission components are not operating in a sufficiently joint and coordinated manner.” The Brookings Institution--University of Bern study noted a similar problem, stating that the civilian police “rely on the AMIS protection force for their movements, but they are not currently integrated into military planning structures.” Many parties, including U.S. and UN officials, have called for the creation of a joint operations center that would serve as the focal point for the coordination and integration of AMIS military and civilian police operations; however, such a unit has not yet been created. On the other hand, a joint logistics operations center has been established to improve the logistical coordination of the AMIS components. African Union, U.S., and other sources have identified problems with the capacity and experience of African Union and AMIS as a key factor negatively affecting AMIS performance. According to the Brookings Institution–University of Bern study, “For many commanders, this African Union mission is their first operational experience.” Troops are also viewed as having limited experience. For example, according to a Human Rights Watch report, “ troop–contributing countries have sometimes struggled to identify and deploy properly trained staff officers, particularly those with appropriate language skills…. Most troop- contributing countries have previously contributed to UN missions that were often western-led operations, thus leaving the troops with limited operational experience above the tactical level.” An African Union official and a U.S. official noted separately that, although AMIS has training standards, little is done to verify that AMIS troops arriving in Darfur have received appropriate training. Further, according to the Brookings Institution–University of Bern study, the quality of AMIS police is not adequate, with limited screening prior to deployment to Darfur. The AMIS force, with its 7,271 personnel, has been characterized as a relatively small contingent that cannot effectively monitor and patrol all of Darfur, an area almost the size of France with a punishing environment (however, some regions in Darfur, such as the far north, are largely unpopulated ). According to State officials, the small size of the force has limited AMIS’s ability to patrol such a large, difficult region and sufficiently interact with residents and other parties in Darfur. Further, according to a Refugees International report, “AMIS doesn’t have enough troops to sufficiently protect itself, let alone protect displaced civilians and humanitarian organizations.” In addition, an International Crisis Group document stated in July 2005 that as many as 15,000 troops were needed in Darfur to protect villages and IDPs, provide security for humanitarian operations, and neutralize militias. The December 2005 African Union-Led Joint Assessment of AMIS reported that the absence of an authorized battalion had a significant operational impact and overstretched existing personnel. African Union and other parties have stated that AMIS does not have sufficient resources, including equipment and translators, to conduct the activities necessary to fulfill its mandate. A senior African Union official told us that AMIS’s reliance on outside donors has resulted in a lack of control for the mission because basic operational elements, such as facilities, logistics, and funding rest in the hands of other parties. According to January 2006 African Union documentation, the African Union has not been able to provide critical resources, such as vehicles and communications equipment, in a timely fashion; as a result, AMIS has functioned with about half of the needed logistical capacity. U.S. officials have countered that the African Union has at times been slow to respond to offers of assistance or to prioritize resource needs. During some periods, donor support for AMIS has been less than what the African Union had expected, with African Union documentation stating that a lack of funds has been a major constraint. According to African Union officials, a lack of resources such as vehicles and long-range communications equipment has complicated AMIS operations. For example, one AMIS commander told us that AMIS has inadequate transportation equipment and communications equipment, as well as a lack of night vision equipment. AMIS officials whom we interviewed expressed their concern that the lack of adequate communications equipment limited their ability to interact with different camps in the region. Further, an AMIS civilian police official noted that the civilian police often receive less equipment than the military component of AMIS, which has resulted in situations such as the need to rely on military colleagues’ equipment to communicate with their civilian police colleagues. One AMIS commander also noted that AMIS required more printers, computers, and photocopiers. However, a DOD official noted that until AMIS makes the most efficient use of its current resources, such as vehicles and communications equipment, it is unclear whether more resources are needed. Further, the December 2005 African Union–led report on AMIS notes that, where civilian police matters are concerned, equipment is both insufficient and incorrectly distributed. A lack of translators who can facilitate discussions between AMIS and the residents of Darfur has also been repeatedly cited as a central problem hindering AMIS’s ability to monitor compliance with the cease-fire agreement or build confidence. According to an official from the African Union’s Darfur Integrated Task Force, AMIS needs about 200 interpreters; however, as of February 2006, AMIS had only about 70 interpreters. The lack of interpreters has been attributed to the difficulty in finding people who speak both Arabic and English. One U.S. military observer told us that many uneducated people in Darfur speak only their tribal language, further complicating AMIS’s ability to ensure effective communication. In addition, we were told that at times, AMIS patrols used representatives of the parties to the conflict as translators, which meant that AMIS officials could not verify that translators were conducting the interview in an objective fashion, asking the required questions, or reporting responses accurately. In one example provided by an AMIS civilian police official in El Daein in South Darfur, an SLM/A translator stated that a woman had said she was “helped” in a particular instance, when in fact she had stated that she had been violently attacked. Someone within the investigative team was able to discern that this mistake had been made and communicate it to the rest of the team. IDPs also voiced frustration over the lack of civilian police translators able to communicate with IDPs and respond to IDPs reporting violence in the camps. Several analyses of AMIS have commented on its lack of capacity to collect needed intelligence regarding the situation in Darfur. The International Crisis Group has noted that “AMIS does not have an intelligence apparatus or collection capacity and does not actively analyze or disseminate intelligence.” The Brookings Institution–University of Bern study further stressed that “ood intelligence is vital in Darfur, yet AMIS’s capacity to gather, analyze and act on information has been very weak.” According to a former U.S. military observer to AMIS, “The African Union does not understand the importance of having an ‘intelligence cell’ and of having good information on the command structure, for example, of the Janjaweed.” The December 2005 African Union-led assessment of AMIS emphasized, “If AMIS operations are to be effective, the use of intelligence is essential,” and further noted that the lack of intelligence collection, analysis, and dissemination seriously reduces the effectiveness and focus of operations. The effectiveness of AMIS is directly related to the level of cooperation it receives from the parties to the conflict. Thus far, that cooperation has been extremely inconsistent. The government continues to create bureaucratic obstacles to AMIS’s ability to operate freely. These include curfews, early airport closings, and long delays in issuing permits and visas. AMIS has not, as they should have, protested against these restrictions on movements, notably the curfew. The government’s use of white vehicles and aircraft (which resemble AMIS) in military operations is also inconsistent with its commitments to support the Mission…. The and JEM bear an equal responsibility for accepting and supporting the presence of AMIS. Ongoing obstruction of activities by the rebels has included obstruction of movement, threatening patrols, harassment, theft of equipment, and even abduction of personnel. U.S. and UN officials emphasized an instance where the government of Sudan detained the 105 Canadian armored personnel carriers at the border and released them only after intense external pressure. A U.S. embassy official in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, noted that Dutch communications equipment had been in Khartoum customs for months, demonstrating how the Sudanese government can obstruct, rather than facilitate, AMIS operations. In addition, all parties to the conflict—the Sudanese government, the SLM/A, and the JEM—have been cited several times for violating the 2004 cease-fire agreement. Representatives of these parties to Ceasefire Commission investigations, particularly the Sudanese government, routinely file objections to final report conclusions. According to an International Crisis Group report, “AMIS was born out of the N’djamena agreement , which lacked a true enforcement mechanism and was based on the assumption of compliance and goodwill by the parties. International pressure on those parties to respect their commitments has been ineffective, thus undermining the mission.” While AMIS has faced challenges in Darfur, the UN and NATO have offered to assist the African Union in, respectively, supplying a peacekeeping force when AMIS’s mandate expires at the end of December 2006 and identifying lessons learned from AMIS operations. The U.S. government and other parties have supported the proposed transition of AMIS responsibilities to a UN peacekeeping operation. In January 2006, the African Union’s Peace and Security Council officially declared its approval, in principle, for the transition of AMIS to a UN operation. In March, the council reaffirmed this position, and in May it declared that “concrete steps should be taken to effect the transition from AMIS to a UN peacekeeping operation.” The UN Security Council subsequently adopted a resolution endorsing this African Union decision to transition AMIS to a UN peacekeeping operation and emphasizing that a UN operation would have, to the extent possible, a strong African participation and character. In August 2006, the UN Security Council adopted a resolution expanding UNMIS’s mandate and calling for an UNMIS deployment to Darfur. According to a State official, a UN operation would be expected to build on AMIS efforts. Some portion of troops already participating in AMIS would be “bluehatted”—that is, could transition to UNMIS. According to a State official, under this scenario, the UN mission would have a unified command for the entire operation, with separate commanders for UNMIS efforts in southern Sudan and Darfur. According to the Department of State fiscal year 2007 budget request and a State official, this UN effort in Sudan would cost the U.S. government about $442 million in fiscal year 2007; a State official roughly estimated that the Darfur portion of this operation would cost the United States between $160 million and $180 million for the year. As of October 2006, the Sudanese government had refused a transition to a UN force in Darfur. However, in October the Sudanese president expressed support for a September offer by the UN Secretary-General to provide assistance to AMIS. The UN assistance package consists of equipment and personnel dedicated to supporting AMIS in the following ways: logistical and material support, military staff support, advisory support to civilian police, and other staff support in the areas of assistance in implementing the Darfur Peace Agreement, public information, mine action, and humanitarian coordination. In addition, in June 2006, following an offer by NATO, the Chairperson of the African Union Commission requested that NATO provide, among other things, assistance in reviewing AMIS operations in Darfur to identify “lessons learned,” which could help the African Union better execute any future peace support efforts. However, a State official reported that, although the Chairperson of the African Union Commission formally accepted NATO’s offer of this assistance, as of August 2006, the African Union headquarters had taken no further action to pursue the review. Such reviews are typically conducted after peacekeeping operations are completed; for example, the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operation’s Best Practices Section undertakes such reviews following UN peacekeeping efforts. Meanwhile, instability and violence continued in Darfur, furthering calls for UN involvement. According to a report prepared by the Chairperson of the African Union Commission, as of May 2006, “the region has continued to witness persistent insecurity, with ceasefire violations, banditry activities, hijacking of vehicles, attacks on villages and killing of unarmed civilians by the various parties, particularly the janjaweed.” One NGO reported 200 sexual assaults around Kalma camp in South Darfur within 5 weeks during the summer of 2006 and the African Union reported that two AMIS soldiers were killed in mid-August. In August 2006, the environment in Darfur remained insecure, with attacks and displacement continuing and, during some periods, worsening over time. State has noted that the Sudanese government offensive that began in August 2006 against parties that did not sign the Darfur Peace Agreement has directly impacted the ability of AMIS to conduct operations, the African Union’s ability to implement the agreement, and the delivery of humanitarian aid. A senior State official reported that “Darfur is on the verge of a dangerous downward spiral. The parties are rearming and repositioning to renew their fighting.” The level of acceptance of the peace agreement overall in Darfur is uncertain, owing to a general lack of information throughout the population regarding the terms of the agreement as well as concern over the fact that the smaller SLM/A faction and the JEM declined to sign the deal. UN officials have warned that continued militia attacks on IDPs are affecting implementation of the peace agreement and emphasized that successful implementation of the agreement is key to peace in Darfur, in the Sudan, and in the wider region. In September 2006, an African Union Peace and Security Council communiqué noted that “the security situation remains volatile and continues to deteriorate even further in some parts of Darfur, consequently worsening the humanitarian and human rights situation, and the current build-up of forces by all the parties poses further risks and challenges to the peace efforts.” On September 19, 2006, the U.S. President named former USAID Administrator Andrew Natsios as a Presidential Special Envoy to lead U.S. efforts to resolve outstanding disputes in Darfur. As the primary donor of humanitarian assistance for Darfur, the United States has provided essential aid for the people of Darfur and improved the health and livelihood of IDPs and affected residents. Without U.S. assistance, the humanitarian organizations responding to the crisis would likely have been incapable of providing coverage to many of the affected population. The U.S. contribution to building and maintaining all AMIS facilities has also been essential, along with other donor assistance, to AMIS’s ability to pursue its mandate. As insecurity continues in Darfur, such support may be required well into the future. At the same time, delayed humanitarian assistance has hindered NGO and UN operations, jeopardizing these USAID partners’ ability to provide services to affected and IDP communities needed to maintain improved levels of health. Further, continued resistance and lack of cooperation from the government of Sudan, as well as continued insecurity and conflict within Darfur, have made it nearly impossible for humanitarian organizations to provide consistent and complete coverage to the affected residents and IDPs throughout Darfur. Although USAID has taken steps to ensure more complete reporting, the limitations in its oversight of U.S. assistance have made it difficult to accurately determine the impact of U.S. humanitarian assistance. The fact that the violence in Darfur has not abated, and has even worsened in some instances, indicates the region’s need for continued assistance. Although AMIS is seen as having contributed, through its presence in Darfur, to decreasing large-scale violence, its fulfillment of its mandate has been limited by the incompleteness or inconsistency of some of its actions—such as efforts to protect civilians—in addition to numerous operational challenges. Some of these challenges—for example, AMIS’s small size, its resources constraints, and the lack of cooperation from the parties to the conflict—have remained beyond its control. However, other challenges, such as AMIS’s inadequate management, organization, and capacity, may stem from the African Union’s lack of experience with peace support efforts. At the same time, the ongoing and increasing violence in Darfur, as well as AMIS’s added responsibilities under the May 2006 peace agreement, make it likely that the challenges AMIS has faced will intensify. The proffered NATO assistance in reviewing AMIS operations---a typical “lessons learned” activity following a peacekeeping initiative—could provide a useful critical analysis of these challenges and their root causes. The resulting insights could assist the African Union in strengthening AMIS, if its mandate is renewed, as well as in planning and executing any future peace support efforts. Absent a stronger AMIS or intervention by another international party such as the UN, the conflict in Darfur could continue indefinitely to disrupt and destroy the lives of Darfurians. We recommend that the Secretary of State encourage the Chairperson of the African Union Commission to ensure that an appropriate body, such as NATO, provide assistance for an assessment of AMIS operations to identify the key challenges AMIS has faced and the reasons for those challenges. Such a “lessons learned” assessment would provide information necessary to allow (1) the African Union to strengthen its future peace support planning and operations and (2) the donor community to support future African Union peace support efforts in a manner that could minimize difficulties such as those encountered by AMIS. We provided a draft of this report to the Departments of State and Defense as well as USAID. We received written comments from the Department of State and USAID. The Department of State supported our recommendation and noted that the report presents a balanced and accurate picture of the situation in Darfur. The department also suggested that the report provide additional details or characterizations regarding certain, primarily AMIS, issues. For example, State suggested that the report should (1) emphasize the speed with which AMIS forces were deployed to Darfur and (2) note that the Sudanese government's offensive against parties that did not sign the Darfur Peace Agreement has directly impacted the ability of AMIS to conduct operations. We incorporated such information into the report as appropriate. See appendix V for a reproduction of State's letter and our response. USAID commented that in general, it found the report to be a comprehensive assessment of USAID’s involvement in Darfur but said that we should include additional information in our discussions of areas such as the number of USAID staff working in Darfur and the variety of efforts used by the agency to monitor grants. Specifically, USAID stated that our reference to reduced staff in Darfur was incomplete and felt that our discussion of incomplete reporting did not highlight other monitoring efforts, such as site visits and meetings with NGOs. We made adjustments as appropriate. See appendix VI for a reproduction of USAID’s letter and our response. DOD provided no comments on the draft report. As arranged with your offices, unless you publicly announce the contents earlier, we plan no further distribution of this report until 30 days after the date of this letter. At that time, we will send copies of this report to the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Director of U.S. Foreign Assistance and USAID Administrator, relevant congressional committees, and other interested parties. We will also make copies available to others upon request. In addition, the report will be available on GAO’s Web site at http://www.gao.gov. If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 512-3149 or at gootnickd@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. Other contacts and major contributors are listed in appendix VII. This report examines (1) U.S. humanitarian assistance provided to help relieve the crisis in Darfur, (2) challenges that the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and its implementing partners have encountered, (3) the African Union’s efforts to fulfill its peace support mandate in Darfur, and (4) factors affecting the implementation of this mandate. We collected data on international contributions (in dollar amounts) for Darfur provided by the UN Resource Tracking Service from September 2003 through June 2006. The amounts provided by the UN contain both amounts committed and amounts pledged for Darfur by international donors. We did not include pledges and commitments from international donors that support the refugees located in Chad, because we did not review U.S. obligations to refugees in Chad. We made this decision because (1) security restrictions and conflict in the area prevented us from observing U.S.-funded activities in Chad and (2) the support for refugees in Chad was small in comparison with assistance provided to Darfur. We determined that the data were sufficiently reliable for the purpose of broadly comparing the United States’ contributions with those of other international donors. We noted several limitations in the data, notably, that the data include verbal pledges that were self-reported to the UN Resource Tracking System by the donors. According to a UN official, the data may exceed other, similar UN data on donor contributions, because they include verbal pledges that have not been formally submitted to and verified by UN sources. Furthermore, we were unable to determine the reliability of financial records and the dollar amounts reportedly pledged by donors. To review U.S. funding of humanitarian assistance—our first objective—we collected and reviewed U.S. obligations data for assistance for Darfur from USAID’s Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance, Office of Transition Initiatives, and Office of Food for Peace, as well as The Department of State (State) Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration. To assess the reliability of these data, we interviewed State and USAID officials regarding their methods for managing and tracking the obligation data, and we compared these data with the amounts listed in State’s and USAID’s agreements with nongovernmental organizations (NGO) and UN agencies. According to a USAID official, expenditure data for the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance are not tracked in the office’s reporting system, but the data are reconciled on a daily basis and include any amounts that may have been de-obligated. A USAID Food for Peace official also indicated that the office’s tracking system is also reconciled on a regular basis. Therefore, we concluded that the data we collected on obligations from each agency are sufficiently reliable for the purpose of reviewing U.S. humanitarian assistance for Darfur from October 1, 2003, through September 30, 2006. To review the activities and programs undertaken with U.S. humanitarian assistance, we reviewed USAID grant agreements. We interviewed USAID and State officials in Washington, D.C., as well as UN officials located in New York who were involved in humanitarian assistance for Darfur. In February 2006, we traveled to Khartoum and Darfur, Sudan, to examine the activities supported by U.S. humanitarian assistance. In Khartoum we met with U.S. implementing partners from NGOs and UN agencies, as well as an official from the government of Sudan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In addition, we visited seven camps for internally displaced persons (IDP)— Abu Shouk, Al Salaam, El Serif, Kalma, Kass, Otash, and Zam Zam—located in North and South Darfur to observe activities and programs implemented with U.S. funds. We observed a variety of programs and activities supported by U.S. assistance, including food distribution, medical clinics, clean water and sanitation facilities, income-generation activities, provision of shelter materials, and nutritional feeding centers. We spoke with officials from the NGOs and UN agencies implementing these activities programs in Darfur. We also spoke with IDPs in the camps to obtain their perspectives on the provision of humanitarian assistance in the camps. Restrictions placed on our travel by the State Regional Security Officer in Khartoum because of security concerns limited the area in which we traveled and observed NGO and UN operations in Darfur. To examine the results of the humanitarian assistance activities, we reviewed the 15 final reports submitted by NGOs to USAID’s Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance. We reviewed the original NGO proposals to identify the indictors used to identify performance, and we also reviewed USAID guidance for reporting. We compared the indicators included in the original proposals to the reported indicators in each final report and identified the indicators that were absent from the final reports. We interviewed USAID officials to identify USAID’s efforts to monitor and evaluate NGO and UN activities in Darfur as well as efforts to motivate NGOs to submit final reports. We also reviewed the Office of Food for Peace performance review questionnaires submitted by implementing partners providing food aid for Darfur. In addition, we spoke with an official from the USAID Office of Transition Initiatives to discuss an ongoing program review. We also reviewed UN Humanitarian Profile reports that provide an overview of humanitarian assistance from April 2004 to July 2006. These reports were also used to identify the IDP and affected resident population in Darfur, by month. According to UN officials and the profiles, NGOs and UN agencies operating throughout Darfur submitted the information from the reports to the UN on a monthly basis until January 2006, and now submit it quarterly. Although the data contained in the reports are self-reported, UN officials indicated that they confirm data to the extent possible and update the data each month. Furthermore, the UN Humanitarian Profiles are the only source of information regarding the total number of IDPs and affected residents in Darfur and the number of IDPs receiving assistance in each sector. We determined that the population data and the data regarding the population receiving assistance were reliable for the purposes of presenting a general overview of assistance in Darfur. To determine the obstacles and challenges facing NGOs and UN agencies— our second objective—we reviewed UN and USAID reports and cables discussing humanitarian operations and problems in Darfur. We interviewed USAID, UN, and NGO officials in Darfur to discuss the challenges they face in implementing assistance program and activities in Darfur. We also met with officials from the Sudan government Humanitarian Assistance Committee to discuss the obstacles and concerns of NGOs and UN officials operating in Darfur and obtain the perspective and input of the Sudan government regarding these issues. In order to identify African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) efforts and the operational challenges AMIS has faced—our third and fourth objectives— as well as resources available to AMIS to pursue its mandate, we used numerous African Union sources. We reviewed African Union Peace and Security Council communiqués, as well as reports prepared by the Chairperson of the African Union Commission that were submitted to the council. We also reviewed African Union-led reviews of AMIS, conducted in March and December 2005, as well as a UN-led assessment of AMIS performance conducted in August of that year. In February 2006, we met with AMIS leadership (military and civilian police) at AMIS headquarters in El Fasher and the following AMIS group sites in North and South Darfur— Zam Zam, Kabkabiya, Sarif Umra, Um Kadada, Nyala, Kass and El Daein— where we discussed the AMIS mandate and AMIS activities at each location. We also discussed AMIS efforts with the U.S. representative to the African Union-led Ceasefire Commission, as well as U.S. representatives (military observers) in four locations. We were unable to travel to AMIS sites in West Darfur owing to security concerns. At African Union headquarters in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, we met with senior African Union officials, including the Commissioner for the African Union’s Peace and Security Council and the head of the Darfur Integrated Task Force in February 2006. To assess reports prepared by the AMIS Ceasefire Commission, we analyzed the contents of all publicly available reports from the African Union’s Web site, www.africa- union.org/DARFUR/CFC.htm. We also discussed the African Union’s initiative in Darfur and external donor efforts with officials from the Departments of State (in Washington, D.C.; Khartoum and El Fasher, Sudan; and Addis Ababa, Ethiopia) and Defense (DOD). At State headquarters in Washington, we discussed the situation in Darfur and AMIS efforts with the following bureaus and offices: Administration, African Affairs; International Organization Affairs; Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor; Population, Refugees, and Migration; and War Crimes Issues. At DOD, we met with the staff from the Office of the Secretary of Defense. Further, we reviewed UN Security Council resolutions, UN reports that addressed the situation in Darfur, and a UN August 2005 report that assessed AMIS operations. We met with officials from the UN’s Department of Peacekeeping Operations in New York. We also met with European Union and UN officials at African Union headquarters in Addis Ababa. In addition, we met with officials from, and reviewed reports prepared by, expert and advocacy groups such as the International Crisis Group, Human Rights Watch, and Refugees International. Finally, we met with Sudanese government officials in Khartoum and Washington, D.C. To review the U.S. government’s support for AMIS, we discussed this support with officials from the African Union and Departments of State and Defense. To identify contractor activities, we reviewed the contract documentation defining the terms for tasks performed by PAE Government Services, Inc., (PAE) in Darfur. Further, we reviewed PAE weekly situation reports, describing events related to camp construction and maintenance and submitted to State, and met with officials from PAE in Washington, D.C., and North and South Darfur. We also discussed PAE’s efforts with an official who was working on contract in Darfur as State’s Contracting Officer’s Technical Representative. PAE and State officials accompanied us on our visit to AMIS camps, providing tours of each AMIS site, as well as to the logistics operating base in El Fasher and the forward operating base in Nyala, explaining the process for constructing and maintaining AMIS facilities. We determined that data obtained from PAE were sufficiently reliable for inclusion in our report. To identify the amount of U.S. funding that has been provided to construct and maintain AMIS camps, we spoke with State officials from the African Affairs and Administration bureaus. In particular, we had detailed discussions with a key official from the African Affairs Bureau who provided information on funding, provided by fiscal year, and the funding source. The official prepared a calculation of U.S. funding for PAE efforts independently. All figures addressing State funding to support AMIS provided in the report are attributed to this State official and were not independently verified. However, after discussions with multiple State officials knowledgeable about State support for PAE who cited the State official as a key source within State for this information, combined with a review of State’s information by PAE officials, we have determined that the funding information provided is sufficiently reliable for inclusion in our report with appropriate attribution. We discussed oversight regarding this funding with State officials in Darfur and Washington. We conducted our work from September 2005 to November 2006 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. In early 2003, Darfur rebels attacked Sudanese police stations and the airport in El Fasher, the capital of North Darfur. In El Fasher, the rebels destroyed numerous military aircraft, killed numerous soldiers, and kidnapped a Sudanese general. In response, the government armed and supported local tribal and other militias (the Janjaweed). Fighting between the rebel groups and the Sudan military and other armed militia intensified during late 2003. The principal rebel groups are the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM). In April 2004, there was limited humanitarian presence in Darfur, with only 202 humanitarian staff working in the region. In addition, some of the nongovernmental organizations (NGO) operating in Darfur provided only limited humanitarian assistance, since their primary focus was on development assistance. On December 21, 2004, Save the Children-UK announced that it was discontinuing humanitarian operations in Darfur following two incidents in October and December that resulted in the deaths of four staff members. Save the Children had operated in Darfur for 20 years. At the end of 2004, total pledges and commitments for Darfur from international donors in 2004 totaled more than $890 million. The United States committed or pledged more than $271 million (31 percent). The population of Darfur estimated to be affected by the violence, both internally displaced persons (IDP) and affected residents, rose to more than 3.2 million people, 1.9 million of whom are IDPs. The number of humanitarian aid workers in Darfur grew to a total of 13,715 workers from 13 UN agencies and 82 NGOs. Total pledges and commitments for Darfur in 2005, from all donors, totaled almost $675 million. The United States committed or pledged nearly $365 million (54 percent). Following an escalation of violence in the Jebel Mara area of West Darfur, on January 25, 2006, GOAL, an international NGO, evacuated all staff in the region and abandoned operations. During the evacuation of staff, a helicopter crash resulted in the death of one GOAL aid worker. On April 28, the UN WFP announced that shortages in funds would force WFP to begin reducing the daily food rations for the people of Darfur in May. WFP indicated that the reduced rations would extend limited food stocks during the “hunger season,” when needs are greatest. Owing to contributions by the U.S. and Sudanese governments, the rations were only cut to 84 percent of the daily requirement. As of June 2006, international pledges and commitments for Darfur in 2006 totaled almost $331 million. According to the UN, this amount was approximately $320 million less than the required funding for 2006. The United States committed almost $240 million (72 percent). On May 25, 2004, the African Union’s Peace and Security Council issued a communiqué stressing the need for the three parties to the conflict—the government of Sudan, the SLM/A, and the JEM—to implement the April 2004 Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement. Further, the Peace and Security Council authorized the initial deployment of an African Union Observer Mission to support the work of the newly created Ceasefire Commission. On October 20, 2004, the African Union’s Peace and Security Council issued a communiqué that established an AMIS presence in Darfur of 3,320 personnel. These personnel were to include 2,341 military personnel, among them 450 observers, and up to 815 civilian police as well as appropriate civilian personnel. Further, AMIS was given a specific mandate to monitor and observe compliance with the ceasefire agreement, assist in the process of confidence building, and contribute to a secure environment for the delivery of humanitarian relief. This was the first time the council called for a civilian police presence. On April 28, 2005, the African Union’s Peace and Security Council issued a communiqué praising AMIS efforts and noting improvements where the mission was deployed in Darfur but concluding that the current force was overstretched. The communiqué increased AMIS’s strength to a total of 6,171 military personnel, with an appropriate civilian component, including up to 1,560 civilian police personnel, for a total force of at least 7,731. From August 2005 on, 35 AMIS personnel were abducted; 4 Nigerian protection force soldiers were killed; and vehicles, communications equipment, weapons, and ammunition were lost. According to an African Union assessment of AMIS, these attacks on AMIS undermined the mission’s credibility in the eyes of civilians and emboldened those who might target AMIS. In July 2006, 32 AMIS personnel were abducted. On March 10, 2006, the African Union’s Peace and Security Council confirmed its January 2006 expression of support for a transition of AMIS to a UN operation. The council requested that the African Union Commission vigorously pursue its efforts toward reaching, as quickly as possible, the authorized AMIS strength of 7,731. On April 30, 2006, AMIS deployment reached 7,271 (755 military observers, 5,086 protection force troops, and 1,430 civilian police). In addition, another 155 personnel were serving as air crew or interpreters or in other roles. Of total AMIS deployment, 312 were women. Protection force troops came from Rwanda, Nigeria, Senegal, Gambia, and South Africa. AMIS deployment was below the authorized level of about 7,731, primarily because an expected contingent of South African troops was never deployed. On September 20, the African Union Peace and Security Council extended the mandate of AMIS from September 30, 2006 to December 31, 2006. The initial cease-fire agreement between the parties to the conflict (the Sudanese government and SLM/A) and mediated by the government of Chad, is signed; the agreed collapsed by December of 2003. On April 8, 2004 the three parties to the conflict signed the “Agreement on Humanitarian Ceasefire on the Conflict in Darfur” in N’djamena, Chad. The parties agreed to, among other things, refrain from any act of violence or any other abuse on civilian populations. The parties further agreed to establish a cease-fire commission to, among other things, plan, verify, and ensure implementation of the cease-fire agreement provisions. On November 9, 2004, the three parties to the conflict signed two protocols in Abuja, Nigeria. (1) “Protocol Between the Government of the Sudan (GOS), the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) on the Improvement of the Humanitarian Situation in Darfur” commits the parties to, among other things, guarantee unimpeded and unrestricted access for humanitarian workers and assistance to reach all needy people throughout Darfur and take all steps required to prevent all attacks against civilians by any party or group, including the Janjaweed. The protocol also requests the UN to expand the number of human rights monitors in Darfur. (2) “Protocol Between the Government of the Sudan (GOS), the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) on the Enhancement of the Security Situation in Darfur in Accordance with the N’djamena Agreement” commits the parties to, among other things, recommit themselves to ensuring an effective cease-fire by refraining from all hostilities and military actions, submit to the cease-fire commission all information needed to carry out its mandate, and release all persons detained in relation to the hostilities in Darfur. The Sudanese government also agreed to implement its stated commitment to neutralize and disarm the Janjaweed. On July 5, 2005, the three parties to the conflict signed the “Declaration of Principles for the Resolution of the Sudanese Conflict in Darfur.” This declaration established 17 principles to guide future deliberations and constituted the basis for a settlement of the Darfur conflict. These principles address issues such as respect for the diversity of the Sudanese people, democracy, political pluralism, rule of law, independence of the judiciary, and freedom of the media; effective representation in all government institutions by the citizens of Sudan, including those from Darfur; equitable distribution of national wealth; provision of humanitarian assistance; return to places of origin for IDPs; rehabilitation/reconstruction of Darfur; and broad security arrangements. On May 5, 2006, the Sudanese government and the SLM/A faction with the largest military force signed the Darfur Peace Agreement. This agreement has provisions on power sharing (including the creation of the Senior Assistant to the President, the fourth-highest position in the Sudanese government, appointed by the President from a list of nominees provided by the rebel movements); wealth sharing (including the creation of a Darfur reconstruction and development fund that will receive $700 million in funds from the Sudanese government between 2006 and 2008); and security arrangements (including a requirement for verifiable disarmament of the Janjaweed militia by the Sudanese government). The smaller SLM/A faction and JEM did not sign the agreement. In 2003 and 2004, USAID/Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) deployed field staff to Sudan to assess the extent of the Darfur crisis. In April 2004, responding to the growing humanitarian emergency, USAID/OFDA mobilized a Disaster Assistance Response Team. USAID continued a phased deployment of humanitarian personnel as official access and improved security allowed for its increased presence in Darfur. Secretary Powell visited Sudan, the first U.S. Secretary of State to do so in 26 years. Powell met with Sudan’s President Omar Al-Bashir, emphasizing the need to dismantle the Janjaweed to restore security to the region and enable IDPs to return home. The government of Sudan agreed to this objective as well as to removing restrictions on humanitarian aid and participating in a political resolution of the Darfur crisis facilitated by the African Union. PAE, a U.S. company, via a contract with the U.S. Department of State and with assistance from another U.S. contractor, began building camps for AMIS troops in Darfur. PAE initially constructed five camps (in El Fasher, Nyala, El Geneina, Tine, and Kabkabiya) for AMIS troops. Significant challenges were identified in building these camps, such as transporting materials to building sites and providing water to AMIS personnel. PAE eventually built a total of 32 AMIS camps. On July 22, 2004, the U.S. House of Representatives and Senate unanimously passed separate resolutions [H.Con.Res. 467, 108th Cong. (2004); S.Con.Res. 133, 108th Cong. (2004)] declaring the crisis in Darfur to be genocide, based on articles of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide of 1948. These resolutions declare that the government of Sudan has violated the Convention and call upon the member states of the United Nations to undertake measures to prevent genocide in Darfur from escalating further. The resolutions also commend the administration’s efforts in seeking a peaceful resolution to the conflict and in providing humanitarian assistance and urge it to continue to lead an international effort to stop the genocide in Darfur. On September 9, 2004, Powell testifies before Senate Foreign Relations Committee and declares atrocities in Darfur to be genocide, based on evidence collected by the Department of State. Further, he states that the government of Sudan and the Janjaweed are responsible and that the United States, as a contracting party to the Genocide Convention, will demand that the UN initiate a full investigation. President Bush made similar statements that day. On May 9, 2006, addressing the UN Security Council Ministerial on Sudan, Secretary of State Rice reaffirmed the administration's declaration that the violence in Darfur constitutes genocide. Additionally, Secretary Rice stated that the Darfur Peace Agreement is an opportunity to end the crisis in the region and allow people to return to their homes, emphasizing a role for UN troops to implement the peace agreement. Secretary Rice also stated that the United States had provided nearly all of the support that the WFP's mission in Darfur had received. On October 13, 2006, President Bush signed into law the Darfur Peace and Accountability Act of 2006 which imposes sanctions against persons responsible for genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity; supports measures for the protection of civilians and humanitarian operations; and supports peace efforts in Darfur. On December 5, 2003, the UN Under-Secretary-General in charge of the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs stated, “The humanitarian situation in Darfur has quickly become one of the worst in the world.” On July 3, 2004, the government of Sudan and the UN signed a joint communiqué in which the Sudanese government pledged to remove obstacles to humanitarian assistance in Darfur and committed to disarming the Janjaweed and other armed outlaw groups. The UN Security Council called for the Sudanese government to fulfill its commitment to facilitate humanitarian relief in Darfur and remove restrictions that might hinder humanitarian aid to Darfur. In addition, the council called for the government to disarm the Janjaweed militias and bring perpetrators of human rights and international humanitarian law violations and other atrocities to justice. On January 25, 2005, the International Commission of Inquiry, established by the UN, issued a report stating that the government of Sudan has not pursued a policy of genocide. However, the commission reported that the Sudanese government and the Janjaweed, have committed international offences such as crimes against humanity and war crimes that may be no less serious and heinous than genocide. On March 24, 2005, the UN Security Council established the UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) after determining that the situation in Darfur continued to threaten international peace and security. UNMIS was mandated to support implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement; to facilitate and coordinate the voluntary return of refugees and IDPs and humanitarian assistance; to contribute to international efforts to protect and promote human rights in Sudan; and to coordinate international efforts to protect civilians. The council also called on all Sudanese parties to take immediate steps to achieve a peaceful settlement to the Darfur conflict and take all necessary action to prevent further violations of human rights and international humanitarian law. On March 31, 2005, the UN Security Council referred the situation in Darfur to the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, taking note of the International Commission of Inquiry report on violations of international law and human rights in Darfur. On March 24, 2006, the UN Security Council called for preparatory planning for a transition of AMIS to a UN operation. The plan was to include options for reinforcing the Darfur peace effort through additional appropriate transitional assistance to AMIS, including assistance in logistics, mobility and communications. On August 31, 2006, the UN Security Council commended the efforts of the African Union for the successful deployment of AMIS but reaffirmed its concern that ongoing violence in Darfur might further negatively affect the rest of the Sudan as well as the region. The UN Security Council expanded UNMIS’s mandate and determined that UNMIS should deploy to Darfur. As of October 2006, the Sudanese government had refused a transition to a UN force in Darfur. The African Union mission in Sudan (AMIS) evolved as the African Union has authorized the incremental deployment of thousands of personnel to carry out its responsibilities in Darfur. In May 2004, after three parties signed the April 2004 humanitarian cease-fire agreement, the African Union’s Peace and Security Council authorized an observer mission to Darfur. This mission began operations in June 2004 with 60 military observers and 300 protection force soldiers as well as observers from the Sudanese parties. In July, the Peace and Security Council called for a comprehensive plan to enhance the effectiveness of the mission, including the possibility of transforming the mission into a full-fledged peacekeeping mission to ensure the effective implementation of the cease-fire agreement. In October 2004, in conjunction with the issuance of an African Union report that discussed the status of the mission and described the situation in Darfur, the council decided to enhance AMIS to a total of 3,320 personnel, including 2,341 military personnel (military observers and protection force troops), among them 450 observers; up to 815 civilian police personnel (the first time that a civilian police component was formally established); and appropriate civilian personnel. The African Union Peace and Security Council provided AMIS II with the following specific mandate for its peace support efforts: (1) to monitor and observe compliance with the 2004 humanitarian cease-fire agreement; (2) to assist in the process of confidence building; and (3) to contribute to a secure environment for the delivery of humanitarian relief and, beyond that, the return of IDPs and refugees to their homes, and to contribute to the improvement of the security situation throughout Darfur. In working to meet this mandate, the council decided that AMIS II would, among other tasks, “protect civilians whom it encounters under imminent threat and in the immediate vicinity, within resources and capability, it being understood that the protection of the civilian population is the responsibility of the government of Sudan.” In early 2005, the African Union decided to augment AMIS once again. In April 2005, the Peace and Security Council authorized increasing the size of AMIS to 6,171 military personnel, in addition to an appropriate civilian component, including up to 1,560 civilian police personnel (for a total of more than 7,700). This further expansion is referred to as AMIS II-E. These AMIS personnel operate throughout eight sectors in Darfur that have been established to help organize AMIS efforts. A Darfur Integrated Task Force was established at African Union headquarters in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, to assist with planning, force generation, procurement and logistics, and administrative support and to interact with AMIS donors. The African Union did not call for an AMIS civilian police presence until AMIS operations were well under way. The civilian police component was added to AMIS in October 2004 to, according to a senior UN official, further the “rule of law” by working with Sudanese police. The European Union was a strong proponent of a civilian police component, and European Union officials told us that the civilian police gave European Union member states the opportunity to play a direct role in AMIS by providing police staff. Specifically, the role of the civilian police is, among other things, to establish and maintain contact with the Sudanese police, observe and report on Sudanese police service delivery, and monitor the security of IDPs. As of April 30, 2006, AMIS had 7,271 personnel in Darfur (755 military observers, 5,086 soldiers/protection force, and 1,430 civilian police). According to a UN official, AMIS deployed its troops much faster than the UN could have done (although UN efforts have higher standards regarding aspects of deployment such as required troop skills and equipment). The majority of AMIS soldiers have come from Rwanda and Nigeria, with additional troops from Senegal, Gambia, and South Africa. Military observers from more than 20 countries (numerous African countries and the United States, the European Union, and the three parties to the conflict) and civilian police are participating in AMIS. The total number of the AMIS force deployed in Darfur is far less than the authorized AMIS size of more than 7,700—according to African Union sources, primarily because expected South African troops were never fully deployed to Darfur. In January 2006, the African Union’s Peace and Security Council officially declared its approval, in principle, for the transition of AMIS to a UN operation. In March, the council reaffirmed this position, and in May it declared that “concrete steps should be taken to effect the transition from AMIS to a UN peacekeeping operation.” The UN Security Council subsequently adopted a resolution commending AMIS’s role in reducing large-scale, organized violence in Darfur; endorsing this African Union decision to transition AMIS to a UN peacekeeping operation; and stressing that a UN operation would have, to the extent possible, a strong African participation and character. In August 2006, the UN Security Council adopted a resolution expanding UNMIS’s mandate and calling for an UNMIS deployment to Darfur. The mandate of AMIS expires on December 31, 2006. Agency for Technical Cooperation and Development Community, Habitat, Finance Development Alternatives, Inc. Harvard School of Public Health International Committee of the Red Cross United Methodist Committee on Relief United Nations Development Program (UNDP) United Nations Department of Safety and Security United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees United Nations Children's Fund United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (Continued From Previous Page) Following are GAO’s comments on the Department of State’s letter dated October 2, 2006. 1. We have added the U.S. contribution of training and equipping Rwandan and Nigerian battalions through the African Contingency Operations Training and Assistance (ACOTA) program to footnote 65. 2. We have added State’s perspective regarding the quick deployment of AMIS troops, as well as a similar view expressed by a senior UN official working in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. 3. The report’s discussion of rebel group control over humanitarian access reflects the views of UN and NGO officials. Further, the report cites banditry and looting, as well as more violent acts, such as attacks and the killing of humanitarian workers. 4. Owing to scope and time limitations, our review of specific AMIS operations did not cover the period subsequent to the signing of the Darfur Peace Agreement in May 2006. However, we have added State’s point regarding Sudanese government actions against parties that did not sign the agreement. 5. As noted above, our review did not assess AMIS operations subsequent to the signing of the Darfur Peace Agreement in May 2006, although we have identified instances of violence against the AMIS civilian police since that time, such as (1) the burning of a civilian police station and three vehicles by IDPs in Hassahisa IDP camp at Zalengei and (2) the killing of a civilian police language assistant and the attack of eight civilian police officers by IDPs in Kalma IDP camp at Nyala. Such incidents appear contrary to the portrayal of the relationship between the civilian police and IDPs provided here by State. 6. The report states that the improvements in mortality in Darfur have been attributed, in part, to the humanitarian assistance provide by the United States. 7. We have added this point to footnote 5. Following are GAO’s comments on USAID’s letter dated October 17, 2006. 1. The current number of USAID staff in Darfur has been reduced from as many as 20 people to the current number of 6 staff in Darfur, although the crisis in Darfur has resulted in increased number of IDPs and affected residents that require assistance and a greater number of NGOs and UN agencies operating in Darfur. We understand that USAID does not always have control over staffing decisions and is sometimes limited by staff ceilings set by State. However, we believe that in the absence of complete reporting by NGOs, a reduction in USAID staff, complicated by the current inability of these staff to work in Darfur, affects USAID’s ability to provide comprehensive oversight of U.S.- funded humanitarian assistance in Darfur. 2. We determined that 6 of the 15 required final reports were not submitted by USAID partners and that most of the reports did not provide all required information. The lack of required reporting prevented USAID from fully monitoring NGO performance and measuring the impact of U.S. humanitarian assistance to Darfur. However, we report additional USAID monitoring and evaluation efforts, such as regular communication with NGOs, performed by USAID in Darfur. In addition, we note that such efforts can be limited by issues identified in our report such as travel restrictions imposed by the Sudanese government and continuing insecurity throughout the region. We also have added information to the report noting recent USAID efforts to collect reports from its implementing partners that reportedly resulted in 100 percent compliance with quarterly reporting requirements in July 2006. USAID’s recent emphasis on collecting required reports may improve its ability to conduct oversight of U.S.- funded humanitarian operations in Darfur. 3. In late October, we identified a UN humanitarian profile for July 1, 2006, that had become available to the public. This document stated that the number of IDPs stood at 1.85 million as of July 1, 2006. In addition to the person named above, Emil Friberg, (Assistant Director), Martin De Alteriis, Etana Finkler, Leslie Holen, Theresa Lo, Reid Lowe, Grace Lui, John F. Miller, and Chhandasi Pandya made key contributions to this report. -Led Joint Assessment Mission 10 – 20 December 2005. African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS), MAPEX Exercise AMIS Renaissance After Action Review, August 2005. The Assessment Mission to Darfur, Sudan 10-22 March 2005: Report of the Joint Assessment Team. Human Rights Watch, “Sudan: Imperatives for Immediate Change, The African Union Mission in Sudan,” January 2006 (available at http://hrw.org/reports/2006/sudan0106). International Crisis Group, “The ’s Mission in Darfur: Bridging the Gaps,” Africa Briefing No. 28, July 2005 (available at http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?l=1&id=3547). International Crisis Group, “The / Partnership in Darfur: Not Yet a Winning Combination,” Africa Report No. 99, October 2005 (available at http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=3766). Sally Chin and Jonathan Morgenstein, “No Power to Protect: The African Union Mission in Sudan,” Refugees International, November 2005 (available at http://www.refugeesinternational.org/content/publication/detail/7222). William G. O’Neill and Violette Cassis, “Protecting Two Million Internally Displaced: The Successes and Shortcomings of the African Union in Darfur,” Occasional Paper, The Brookings Institution–University of Bern Project on Internal Displacement, November 2005 (available at http://www.brookings.edu/comm/news/200511_au_darfur.htm).

Summary: In 2003, violent conflict in Darfur, Sudan broke out between rebel groups, government troops, and government-supported Arab militias, known as the Janjaweed. The conflict has displaced about 2 million Darfurians and has so affected over 1.9 million others that they require assistance. Since October 2003, the U.S. government has provided humanitarian assistance in Darfur and supported African Union Mission in Sudan's (AMIS) efforts to fulfill a peace support mandate. This report reviews (1) U.S. humanitarian assistance provided to Darfur and the challenges that have been encountered and (2) African Union efforts to fulfill its mandate and challenges that have affected these efforts. The United States has been the largest donor of humanitarian aid to Darfur, obligating nearly $1 billion from October 2003 through September 2006. Although more than 68 percent of this assistance consisted of food aid, U.S. assistance has also supported other needs, such as water and sanitation, shelter, and health care. Since 2003, humanitarian organizations have made significant progress in increasing the number of people in Darfur receiving aid. In addition, malnutrition and mortality rates in Darfur dropped, a trend that U.S. and other officials attribute in part to humanitarian assistance efforts. However, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and the entities providing U.S. humanitarian assistance have encountered several challenges that have hampered delivery of, or accountability for, humanitarian services in Darfur. These challenges include continued insecurity in Darfur; Sudanese government restrictions on access to communities in need; the timing of funding; and an incapacity to ensure monitoring of, and reporting on, U.S.-funded programs. AMIS has taken several positive actions in Darfur to pursue its mandate, although some actions have been incomplete or inconsistent. For example, to monitor compliance with a 2004 cease-fire agreement--one mandate component--AMIS investigated alleged cease-fire violations and identified numerous violations; however, the resulting reports were not consistently reviewed at higher levels or made fully publicly available to identify those violating the agreement. The U.S. government, via private contractors, provided about $280 million from June 2004 through September 2006 tobuild and maintain 32 camps for AMIS forces in Darfur, according to the Department of State. Numerous challenges have been identified by African Union or U.S. officials, among others, as negatively affecting AMIS's efforts in Darfur. These challenges include inadequacies in AMIS's organization, management, and capacity, such as inconsistent interpretation of the AMIS mandate; its relatively small forces; limited or poorly allocated resources; and a lack of intelligence regarding, and cooperation from, the parties to the conflict. A transition from AMIS to a UN peacekeeping operation is being considered, although the Sudanese government has rejected such a transition. A possible NATO-assisted review of AMIS operations has not been conducted. Meanwhile, insecurity and violence continue in Darfur.