The Federal Reserve System is involved in many facets of wholesale and retail payment systems in the United States, including providing wire transfers of funds and securities; providing for the net settlement of check clearing arrangements, automated clearinghouse (ACH) networks, and other types of payment systems; clearing checks and ACH payments; and regulating certain financial institutions and overseeing certain payment systems. Responding in part to a breakdown of the check-collection system in the early 1900s, Congress established the Federal Reserve System as an active participant in the payment system in 1913. The Federal Reserve Act directs the Federal Reserve System to provide currency in the quantities demanded by the public and authorizes the Federal Reserve System to establish a nationwide check clearing system, which has resulted in the Federal Reserve System’s becoming a major provider of check clearing services. Congress modified the Federal Reserve System’s role in the payment system through the Monetary Control Act of 1980 (MCA). One purpose of the MCA is to promote an efficient nationwide payment system by encouraging competition between the Federal Reserve System and private- sector providers of payment services. The MCA requires the Federal Reserve System to charge fees for its payment services, which are to be set to recover, over the long run, all direct and indirect costs of providing the services. Before the MCA, the Federal Reserve System provided payment services to its member banks for no explicit charge. The MCA expanded access to Federal Reserve System services, allowing the Federal Reserve System to offer services to all depository institutions, not just member banks. Congress again expanded the role of the Federal Reserve in the payment system in 1987 when it enacted the Expedited Funds Availability Act.This act expanded the Federal Reserve Board’s authority to regulate certain aspects of check payments that are not processed by the Federal Reserve System. Through specific regulatory authority and its general authority as the central bank, the Federal Reserve plays an important role in the oversight of the nation’s payment systems. The Federal Reserve Board has outlined its policy regarding the oversight of private-sector clearance and settlement systems in its Policy Statement on Payment Systems Risk. The second part of this policy incorporates risk management principles for such systems. The Federal Reserve System competes with the private sector in providing wholesale payment services. Wholesale payment systems are designed to clear and settle time-critical and predominantly large-value payments.The two major wholesale payment systems in the United States are the Fedwire funds transfer system, owned and operated by the Federal Reserve System, and the Clearing House Interbank Payments System (CHIPS), which is owned and operated by the Clearing House Service Company LLC, a subsidiary of the New York Clearing House Association LLC (NYCHA) for use by the participant owners of the Clearing House Interbank Payments Company LLC (CHIPCo). Fedwire is a real-time gross settlement (RTGS) system through which transactions are cleared and settled individually on a continuous basis throughout the day. CHIPS began operations in 1970 as a replacement for paper-based payments clearing arrangements. Since January 22, 2001, CHIPS has operated as a real-time settlement system. Payment orders sent over CHIPS are either simultaneously debited/credited to participants’ available balances or have been netted and set off with other payment orders and the resulting balance is debited/credited against participants’ available balances throughout the day. The transfer of balances into CHIPS and payments out occur via Fedwire. The Federal Reserve System oversees CHIPS’ compliance with its Policy Statement on Payment Systems Risk. The size and aggregate levels of wholesale transactions necessitate timely and reliable settlement to avoid the risk that settlement failures would pose to the financial system. Although wholesale payments constitute less than 0.1 percent of the total number of transactions of noncash payments, they represent 80 percent of the total value of these payments. Moreover, in 1999, the value of payment flows through the two major wholesale systems in the United States, Fedwire and CHIPS, was approximately 69 times the U.S. gross domestic product in that year. The Federal Reserve System also competes with the private sector in providing retail payment services. For example, the Federal Reserve System provides ACH and check clearing services. ACH systems are an important mechanism for high-volume, moderate to low-value, recurring payments, such as direct deposit of payrolls; automatic payment of utility, mortgage, or other bills; and other business- and government-related payments. The Federal Reserve System also competes with private-sector providers of check clearing services. To do this, the Federal Reserve operates a nationwide check clearing service with 45 check processing sites located across the United States. The Federal Reserve System’s market share of payment services as of year- end 1999 is represented in table 1. During forums held by the Federal Reserve System’s Committee on the Federal Reserve System in the Payments Mechanism, held in May and June, 1997, committee members and Federal Reserve staff met with representatives from over 450 payment system participants, including banks of all sizes, clearing houses and third-party service providers, consumers, retailers, and academics. Although a few large banks and clearing houses thought the Federal Reserve System should exit the check collection and ACH businesses, the overwhelming majority of forum participants opposed Federal Reserve System withdrawal. Participants were concerned that the Federal Reserve System’s exit could cause disruptions in the payment system. The Core Principles illustrates how the central banks see their roles in pursuing their objective of smoothly functioning payment systems.Further, the Core Principles outlines central banks’ roles in promoting the safety and efficiency of systemically important payment systems that they or others operate. The laws of the countries we studied support this aspect of the Core Principles. These countries charge their central banks with broad responsibility for ensuring the smooth operation and stability of payments systems. In their basic role as banks, central banks generally are charged with acting as a correspondent bank for other institutions, providing accounts, and carrying out interbank settlements. Nonetheless, countries’ laws vary regarding the specific roles a central bank should play in the payment system. Central banks in the G-10 countries and Australia have endorsed the Core Principles, which sets forth 10 basic principles that should guide the design and operation of systemically important payment systems in all countries as well as four responsibilities of the central bank in applying the Core Principles. (The principles and responsibilities are presented in app. II.) The overarching public policy objectives for the Core Principles are safety and efficiency in systemically important payment systems. Although the Core Principles generally is considered to apply to wholesale payment systems, some payments industry officials said that some payment systems that process retail payments could reasonably be considered systemically important because of the cumulative size and volume of the payments they handle. Providing for the safety of payment systems is mostly a matter of mitigating the risks inherent to the systems. These risks are listed and defined in table 2. Core Principle IV seeks to mitigate settlement risk by endorsing prompt final settlement, preferably during the day but, minimally, at the end of the day. The two major types of wholesale payment settlement systems are RTGS and multilateral netting systems. Recently, several hybrid systems have also been developed. (These two major types of systems are described further in app. III.) In general, multilateral netting systems offer greater liquidity because gross receipts and deliveries are netted to a single position at the end of the day. An institution can make payments during the day as long as its receipts cover the payments by the end of the day. However, multilateral netting systems without proper risk controls can lead to significant systemic risk. Because transactions are processed throughout the day, but not settled until the end of the day, the inability of a member to settle a net debit position could have large unexpected liquidity effects on other system participants or the economy more broadly. RTGS systems rely on immediate and final settlement of transactions, and these systems have much less exposure to systemic risk that could result from a settlement failure. Without a system for the provision of adequate intraday credit, these systems cause potential liquidity constraints because they require that funds or credit be available at the time that a payer initiates a transaction. Efficiency in payment systems can be characterized as both operational and economic. Operational efficiency involves providing a required level and quality of payment services for minimum cost. Cost reductions beyond a certain point may result in slower, lower quality service. This creates trade-offs among speed, risk, and cost. Going beyond operational efficiency, economic efficiency refers to (1) pricing that, in the long run, covers all of the costs incurred and (2) charging those prices in a way that does not inappropriately influence the choice of a method of payment. The Core Principles sets forth four responsibilities of the central bank in applying the core principles, two of which address oversight functions. The first is that the central bank should ensure that the systemically important systems it operates comply with the Core Principles, and the second is that the central bank should oversee compliance with the Core Principles by systems it does not operate, and it should have the ability to carry out this oversight. Therefore, the Core Principles affirms the importance of central banks’ oversight responsibility for their countries’ systemically important payment systems, including those that they do not own or operate. The laws of most of the countries we studied give the central bank broad responsibility for ensuring that payment systems operate smoothly. In addition, in their basic role as banks, central banks are generally charged with providing accounts to certain financial institutions and effecting interbank settlement. While some countries are specifically charged with providing additional payment services or regulating private payment systems, others are not. Similarly, regulatory and oversight authority is not always specified in laws but is obtained through historical development and the broader mission of the central bank. The European Central Bank (ECB) is the central bank for the countries that have adopted the euro. In conjunction with the euro area countries’ national central banks, the ECB oversees payment systems for the euro area and operates the Trans-European Automated Real-time Gross settlement Express Transfer (TARGET) system, the primary payment system for euro payments.The ECB’s powers and responsibilities are similar to those of national central banks. We therefore analyzed the ECB along with countries’ national central banks. In developing TARGET, the ECB set out strict rules regarding the national central banks’ provision of payment services, requiring each central bank to provide a RTGS system, which serves as a local component of TARGET. The laws of Canada, France, Japan, and the United Kingdom cast the central bank as a monitoring entity having general powers to ensure that payment systems do not pose systemic risk. The central banks in those countries are not specifically charged with providing particular payment clearing services. However, as a matter of practice, the central bank in France, which plans to discontinue its check clearing service in 2002, will continue to operate services related to check fraud. Although Australia’s law recognizes a limited role for the Reserve Bank of Australia to act as a service provider, the Reserve Bank of Australia’s primary purpose regarding payments systems is to serve as an oversight and regulatory mechanism designed to control risk to promote the overall efficiency of Australia’s financial system. German law authorizes the Bundesbank to furnish payments services, and the Bundesbank performs retail payment functions, including check processing, credit transfers, checks, and direct debits as well as owning and operating RTGSplus, which is an RTGS hybrid system for wholesale payments. The central banks we studied have general authority to take actions to protect against systemic risk. In some cases, the banks are to serve a particular regulatory function. For example, under Canadian law, the central bank decides upon the qualifications of payment systems determined by the central bank to pose systemic risk. However, except for Germany, Australia, and the United States, the laws of the countries we reviewed generally do not contemplate that the central bank is to regulate the provision of payment services for purposes unrelated to systemic risk. All of the central banks we studied provide settlement for wholesale payment systems. Moreover, these central banks participated in the design and development of, and have oversight over, wholesale payment systems. Most central banks play a role in providing these wholesale payment services. However, as demonstrated by the central banks we studied, central bank involvement in wholesale payment systems varies. Some central banks have full ownership and operational involvement in the payment system; others have little operational involvement beyond settlement services. Other central banks participate in partnerships. In some cases, the central bank is a major provider or perhaps the only provider of wholesale payment services. The Federal Reserve System, as previously noted, is a major provider of wholesale payment services. Each of the central banks we reviewed has participated in the design and development of its country’s wholesale payment system. For example, the Bundesbank collaborated in developing the RTGSplus system. The Bank of France played a major role in the development of France’s systems. The Bank of England cooperated with the Clearing House Automated Payment System (CHAPS) in the development of a new system, NewCHAPS; the Bank of Canada assisted in the design and development of the Large Value Transfer System. In the G-10 countries, the first automated RTGS system was Fedwire in the United States, which is owned and operated by the Federal Reserve System. Although there are some net settlement systems for wholesale payments today, many countries are transitioning to RTGS systems. In Europe, various decisions over the past 5 to 10 years have encouraged current and potential euro area countries to develop national RTGS systems. The trend toward RTGS systems extends beyond Europe’s boundaries, as countries worldwide are adopting RTGS systems. Central banks we studied played various roles in providing and overseeing wholesale payment services. All central banks provide key settlement services for wholesale payment systems. Some central banks own and operate wholesale payment systems that include clearance and settlement while others only provide oversight and settlement, leaving clearance and other processing activities to other parties. There is no clear pattern in the roles played by central banks in clearing wholesale payments. In addition to the United States, two of the central banks we studied, the Bundesbank and the Bank of France, have full ownership of their respective wholesale payment systems. The Bundesbank owns and operates the RTGSplus system, which was developed with the input of the German banking industry. The Bundesbank has full control over the practices of the system for large-value payments. The Bank of France owns and manages Transferts Banque de France, which is a RTGS system that is one of the two wholesale payment systems in France. The Bank of France is also a joint owner of the company that owns and operates France’s other wholesale payment system, which is a hybrid, real-time net settlement system. Although the Bank of France is only a partial owner of this system, it can exert considerable influence over it by virtue of its ownership role in the controlling company. The Bank of England is a member and shareholder of CHAPS Inc., which operates England’s sterling and euro RTGS systems. Although the Bank of England does not own or manage any payment clearing system, CHAPS payments settle by transferring funds among participating institutions’ Bank of England accounts. The Bank of England is the settlement bank for both the CHAPS Sterling and CHAPS Euro. The Bank of Canada has a more limited operational role in its system. The Bank of Canada entrusts the ownership and operation of the Large Value Transfer System (LVTS) to the Canadian Payments Association, which the Bank of Canada chairs. The Bank of Canada expressly guarantees settlement of LVTS in the event of the simultaneous default of more than one participant, and losses exceed available participant collateral. This guarantee is likened to “catastrophic insurance with a very large deductible,” with the latter being the collateral provided by the participants. Although the extent of central bank oversight over retail payment operations varies, central banks generally consider retail payments as an important component of the payment system. As such, central banks have some responsibility for promoting well-functioning retail payment systems. The operational role of the central bank in retail payment clearing varies considerably among the countries we studied. The basic structure of retail payment systems depends largely on the structure of the underlying financial system and on the historical evolution of payment processes. Factors that influence central bank involvement in retail payment systems include the history and structure of the country’s payment system and banking industry. While we identified several factors that influenced the involvement of a central bank in its country’s retail payment system, these factors interact uniquely and occur to varying degrees in the systems we studied. Retail payments are generally lower in value and urgency from the perspective of the financial system than wholesale payments, but retail payments occur more frequently. They typically include consumer and commercial payments for goods and services. Noncash retail payment instruments are generally categorized as paper-based (most commonly checks) or electronic (most commonly credit cards, credit transfer, debit cards, and direct debits). These payment instruments are further described in table 3. Central banks provide settlement for retail payments, but commercial banks also settle retail payments. Where the central bank provides settlement, it does so for “direct participants”—that is, institutions having settlement accounts at the central bank. Settlement of payments at the central bank sometimes requires tiering arrangements. Under these arrangements, “direct participants” settle payments through their accounts at the central bank, with indirect participants’ settling accounts with a direct participant with whom they have a settlement arrangement. Such is the case with the Bank of England, which acts as a banker to the settlement banks that are direct members of the United Kingdom’s primary payment clearing association. Settlement of retail payments may also occur through settlement agents, third-party arrangements, or correspondent accounts that institutions hold with each other for bilateral settlement. Although many central banks work to ensure that their retail payment systems are well-functioning, their approaches diverge. Some central banks play a prominent regulatory and operational role in retail payments and see these roles as keys to fostering well-functioning retail systems, while others assume more limited roles. Whatever the level of involvement in oversight or operations, most central banks consider retail payments as important components of the payment system and therefore assume some responsibility in promoting well-functioning retail payment systems. A number of structural factors influence the central bank’s role in retail payments. For example, the involvement of the central bank in check clearing can vary. In countries with a concentrated banking industry, on-us check clearing will occur with higher frequency. On-us checks are checks that are deposited at the same bank on which they are drawn, so that no third party, including the central bank, is required for clearing or settlement. For example, Canada has few banks, heavy check use, and little central bank involvement in clearing retail payments. On the other hand, the United States has a large number of banks and its central bank is heavily involved in providing check clearing services. If a country has many smaller banks, such as savings, rural, and cooperative banks, there will be more need for some kind of retail clearance system, thereby creating greater potential need for central bank involvement. Identifying the extent to which payment preferences influence central bank involvement in clearing payments is difficult. Some have suggested that central banks in countries that rely heavily on paper-based instruments are more involved in clearing retail payments, and that central banks of countries that are more reliant on electronic payments provide fewer clearing services. Central banks involved in check clearing include those in Germany, France, and the United States. France and the United States rely heavily on checks for retail payments. In contrast, the Bundesbank is heavily involved in clearing a variety of retail payment instruments, but Germany is not particularly reliant on checks as a means of payment. The physical size of a country determines the distances that payment instructions might have to travel between the paying and the drawing banks. This has particular relevance in countries that rely heavily on paper- based instruments such as checks, which might have to be physically moved great distances to be processed. For example, this is the case in the United States, which is much larger than any European country. The United States currently has approximately 19,000 depository institutions. Canada, on the other hand, has far fewer financial institutions but is also physically large and uses checks extensively. Private- sector correspondent banks clear many checks and compete with the central bank. The central bank, however, is perceived as a reliable and neutral intermediary to clear payments and provide settlement on a large scale for a diverse set of institutions. Table 4 shows the relative importance of noncash payment instruments in selected countries. A central bank’s role in the retail payment system reflects historical events and developments that have shaped retail payment systems in a particular country over many years. For example, the GIRO system serves as a primary retail payment in many European countries. The GIRO system was originally developed by the European Postal agencies, rather than by banks. Historically, European banking systems were largely decentralized and in most cases highly regulated. Therefore, in the absence of an efficient payment system for retail payments developed by the banking industry, payers in most European countries turned to national institutions, such as the postal service, which offered credit transfers (so-called GIRO payments) through a nationwide network of branches. Commercial banks subsequently began to offer GIRO services. As a result of these events, many European countries have well-developed systems that do not rely on central bank clearing for credit transfers. These systems were originally established by the public sector to respond to needs that were not being met by the private sector. Similarly, as previously noted, the Federal Reserve System was established to respond to events that pointed to the lack of a private remedy to market problems. We received comments on a draft of this report from the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. These comments are reprinted in appendix IV. Board staff also provided technical comments and corrections that we incorporated as appropriate. We are sending copies of this report to the chairman of the House Subcommittee on Domestic Monetary Policy, Technology, and Economic Growth; the chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System; the president of the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, and the president of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. We will make copies available to others on request. Please contact me or James McDermott, Assistant Director, at (202) 512-8678 if you or your staff have any questions concerning this report. Other key contributors to this report are James Angell, Thomas Conahan, Tonita W. Gillich, Lindsay Huot, and Desiree Whipple. The objectives of this report are to (1) identify internationally recognized objectives for payment systems and central bank involvement in those systems, (2) describe the roles of central banks in the wholesale payment systems of other major industrialized countries and the key factors that influence those roles, and (3) describe the roles of central banks in the retail payment systems of other major industrialized countries and the key factors that influence those roles. In analyzing the roles of other central banks in payment systems, we focused on countries with relatively modern, industrialized economies. These countries included Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States. To identify widely held public policy objectives for payment systems, we reviewed Core Principles for Systemically Important Payment Systems, which was developed by the Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems (CPSS), of the Bank for International Settlements. The CPSS established the Task Force on Payment System Principles and Practices in May 1998 to consider what principles should govern the design and operation of payment systems in all countries. The task force sought to develop an international consensus on such principles. The task force included representatives not only from G-10 central banks and the European Central Bank but also from 11 other national central banks of countries in different stages of economic development from all over the world and representatives from the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. The task force also consulted groups of central banks in Africa, the Americas, Asia, the Pacific Rim, and Europe. We also reviewed materials available on the Web sites of the central banks we studied; these sites often included mission statements, basic data, and authorizing statutes. We reviewed a variety of legal analyses and commentaries to analyze those statutes. Where we make statements regarding to central banks’ authorizing statutes, they are based on these sources rather than on our original legal analysis. To describe the roles of central banks in the wholesale and retail payment systems of other major industrialized countries and the key factors that influence those roles, we reviewed materials available on central bank Web sites as well as other articles and publications from various central banks. We reviewed publications available from the Bank for International Settlements, and also the European Central Bank’s Blue Book: Payment and Securities Settlement Systems in the European Union. We also reviewed numerous articles and commentaries on the roles of central banks as well as discussions of recent reform efforts. To enhance our understanding of these materials, we interviewed Federal Reserve officials, members of trade associations, and officials from private-sector payment providers. We conducted our work in Washington, D.C., and New York, N.Y., between June 2001 and January 2002 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. The core principles for systemically important payments systems (core principles) are shown in table 5. The responsibilities of the central bank in applying the core principles are as follows: The central bank should define clearly its payments objectives and should disclose publicly its role and major policies with respect to systemically important payments systems. The central bank should ensure that the systems it operates comply with the core principles. The central bank should oversee compliance with the core principles by systems it does not operate and should have the ability to carry out this oversight. The central bank, in promoting payment system safety and efficiency through the core principles, should cooperate with other central banks and with any other relevant domestic or foreign authorities. Different forms of settlement for wholesale payments result in different risks. Various wholesale payment systems in major industrialized countries use similar means to transmit and process wholesale payments. However, they sometimes use different rules for settling those transactions. In general, wholesale payments are sent over separate, secure, interbank electronic wire transfer networks and are settled on the books of a central bank. That is, settlement is carried out by exchange of funds held in banks’ reserve accounts at a central bank. However, various wholesale payment systems use different rules for settling these large-value payments. Some systems operate as real-time gross settlement (RTGS) systems, which continuously clear payment messages that are settled by transfer of central bank funds from paying banks to receiving banks. Other systems use net settlement rules, wherein the value of all payments due to and due from each bank in the network is calculated on a net basis before settlement. Each form of settling wholesale payments presents different risks to participants. Recently, some hybrid systems have been developed, building on the strengths and minimizing the risks associated with pure RTGS or netting systems. RTGS systems are gross settlement systems in which both processing and settlement of funds transfer instructions take place continuously, or in real time, on a transaction by transaction basis. RTGS systems settle funds transfers without netting debits against credits and provide final settlement in real time, rather than periodically at prespecified times. In most RTGS systems, the central bank, in addition to being the settlement agent, can grant intraday credit to help the liquidity needed for the smooth operation of these systems. Participants typically can make payments throughout the day and only have to repay any outstanding intraday credit by the end of the day. Because RTGS systems provide immediate finality of gross settlements, there is no systemic risk—that is, the risk that the failure to settle by one possibly insolvent participant would lead to settlement failures of other solvent participants due to unexpected liquidity shortfalls. However, as the entity guaranteeing the finality of each payment, the central bank faces credit risk created by the possible failure of a participant who uses intraday credit. In the absence of collateral for such overdrafts, the central bank assumes some amount of credit risk until the overdrafts are eliminated at the end of the day. In recent years, central banks have taken steps to more directly manage intraday credit, including collaterization requirements, caps on intraday credit, and charging interest on intraday overdrafts. Fedwire was established in 1918 as a telegraphic system and was the first RTGS system among the G-10 countries. Presently, account tallies are maintained minute-by-minute. The Federal Reserve Banks generally allow financially healthy institutions the use of daylight overdrafts up to a set multiple of their capital and may impose certain additional requirements, including collateral. In 1994, the Federal Reserve System began assessing a fee for the provision of this daylight liquidity. Other central banks have only recently adopted RTGS systems and have established a variety of intraday credit policies, such as intraday repurchase agreements, collateralized daylight overdrafts, and other policies. Other networks operate under net settlement rules. Under these rules, the value of all payments due to and due from each bank in the network is calculated on a net basis bilaterally or multilaterally. This occurs at some set interval—usually the end of each business day—or, in some newly developed systems, continuously throughout the day. Banks ending the day in a net debit position transfer reserves to the net creditors, typically using a settlement account at the central bank. Net settlement systems, with delayed or end of business day settlement, enhance liquidity in the payment system because such systems potentially allow payers to initiate a transaction without having the funds immediately on hand, but available pending final settlement. However, this can increase the most serious risk in netting systems, which is systemic risk. Recognizing that systemic risk is inherent in netting systems, central banks of the G-10 countries formulated minimum standards for netting schemes in the Lamfalussy Standards. The standards stress the legal basis for netting and the need for multilateral netting schemes to have adequate procedures for the management of credit and liquidity risks. Although netting arrangements generally reduce the need for central bank funds, they also expose the participants to credit risks as they implicitly extend large volumes of payment-related intraday credit to one another. This credit represents the willingness of participants to accept or send payment messages on the assumption that the sender will cover any net debit obligations at settlement. The settlement of payments, by the delivery of reserves at periodic, usually daily, intervals is therefore an important test of the solvency and liquidity of the participants. In recent years, central banks in countries using net settlement rules have taken steps to reduce credit risks in these systems as part of overall programs to reduce systemic risks. The General Accounting Office, the investigative arm of Congress, exists to support Congress in meeting its constitutional responsibilities and to help improve the performance and accountability of the federal government for the American people. GAO examines the use of public funds; evaluates federal programs and policies; and provides analyses, recommendations, and other assistance to help Congress make informed oversight, policy, and funding decisions. GAO’s commitment to good government is reflected in its core values of accountability, integrity, and reliability. 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Summary: The central banks of major industrialized countries have agreed on common policy objectives and presented them in the Core Principles for Systematically Important Payment Systems. Intended to help promote safer and more efficient payment systems worldwide, the Core Principles outline specific policy recommendations for systematically important payment systems and describe the responsibilities of the central banks. All of the central banks GAO studied seek to ensure that their wholesale payment systems operate smoothly and minimize systemic risk. All of the central banks provide settlement services for their countries' wholesale payment systems. Some central banks also provide wholesale clearing services. Other central banks own the system but have little operational involvement in clearing, while others participate in partnerships with the private sector. All of the central banks GAO studied provide settlement for some retail payment systems. Some, but not all, central banks exercise regulatory authority over retail payment systems in their countries. Central banks also tend to have less operational involvement in countries where there is a relatively concentrated banking industry. In some cases, laws governing payments and the structure of the financial services industry direct the involvement of central banks in retail payment systems.