HUD’s requirements for HOPE VI revitalization grants are laid out in each fiscal year’s notice of funding availability (NOFA) and grant agreement. NOFAs announce the availability of funds and set forth application requirements and the selection process. Grant agreements are executed between each grantee and HUD and specify the activities, key deadlines, and documentation that grantees must meet or complete. Both NOFAs and grant agreements also contain guidance on resident involvement in the HOPE VI process. For example, the fiscal year 2002 NOFA stated that residents and the broader community should be involved in the planning, proposed implementation, and management of revitalization plans. In additional guidance on resident involvement, HUD encourages grantees to communicate, consult, and collaborate with affected residents and the broader community through resident councils, consultative groups, newsletters, and resident surveys. HUD’s guidance states that residents should be included in all phases of HOPE VI development, but also states that grantees have the final decision-making authority. The majority of HOPE VI grants involve the relocation of residents from a public housing site prior to demolition or rehabilitation. Grantees must conduct the relocation process in accordance with laws such as the Uniform Relocation Act and HUD guidance. Before the relocation process can begin, the grantee must develop a HOPE VI relocation plan that includes the number of families to be relocated, a description of the counseling and advisory services to be offered to families, a description of housing resources that will be used to relocate families, an estimate of relocation costs, and an example of the notice the grantee will provide to residents concerning relocation. Residents are generally given three basic relocation options: (1) using a housing choice voucher (formerly Section 8) to move into the private market, (2) moving to a different public housing site, or (3) leaving federally assisted housing. Revitalized HOPE VI sites often contain fewer public housing units and have more stringent screening criteria. HUD guidance states that grantees must collaborate with residents and other stakeholders to establish criteria that residents must meet in order to return to the site. Residents are not guaranteed that they will automatically return to the site. Typically, grantees offer original residents who remain in good standing the first priority right to return to the revitalized site. Grantees must offer community and supportive services—such as child care, transportation, job training, job placement and retention services, and parenting classes—to all original residents, regardless of their intention to return to the revitalized site. HUD guidance states that services for original residents should begin as soon as possible following the grant award and help residents make progress toward self-sufficiency. Additionally, HUD guidance suggests that grantees offer residents community and supportive services that are specifically designed to help them meet the criteria for their return to the revitalized site. New households that move to the revitalized site also are eligible to receive services. HUD guidance emphasizes that HOPE VI grantees should use case managers to assess the needs and circumstances of residents and then make appropriate referrals to a range of service providers. Grantees must submit to HUD a community and supportive services plan that contains a description of the supportive services that will be provided to residents, proposed steps and schedules for establishing arrangements with service providers, plans for actively involving residents in planning and implementing supportive services, and a system for monitoring and tracking the performance of the supportive services programs, as well as resident progress. According to HUD data, the largest percentage of residents living at HOPE VI sites were relocated to other public housing. Because HUD has not always required grantees to track original residents during the development process, housing authorities lost track of some original residents. Overall, grantees estimated that 46 percent of the original residents would return to the revitalized sites. However, the percentage of original residents expected to return varied greatly from site to site. Several factors may affect planned and actual reoccupancy rates, including the planned mix of units and the criteria used to screen the occupants of the new units. As shown in figure 1, a majority of the almost 49,000 residents that had been relocated from HOPE VI sites, as of June 30, 2003, moved to other public housing (about 50 percent) or received vouchers (about 31 percent). Additionally, approximately 6 percent were evicted, and about 14 percent were classified as “other,” which includes either residents who moved without giving notice or who moved out of public housing. Grantees lost track of some original residents for a number of reasons. HUD did not emphasize the need to track original residents until 1998 and did not require grantees to report the location of residents until 2000. Also, four of the 1996 grantees we interviewed stated that it was difficult to track residents who had left federally-assisted housing (i.e., were no longer in public housing or using a voucher.) In a June 2002 report to Congress, HUD acknowledged that efforts to track original residents during the development process had been uneven and stated that the agency and grantees were working to improve resident tracking. All but one of the 1996 grantees developed some means of tracking original residents, although three stated that they only tracked a subset of original residents, such as those still in public housing or using a voucher. The Housing Authority of Louisville created a database to track residents and used it to determine the status of the 1,304 families that resided at Cotter and Lang Homes prior to relocation. The housing authority concluded that 65 percent had been relocated to other public housing or given vouchers, and 33 percent had vacated Cotter or Lang prior to being relocated. It could not determine if the remaining 2 percent had been relocated or vacated prior to relocation. In addition, two 1996 grantees took steps to locate original residents with whom they had lost contact. The Chicago Housing Authority hired a consultant to help it find relocated residents. To track down those original residents that did not remain in public housing or take a voucher, the Spartanburg Housing Authority posted public notices stating that the authority was trying to track down original residents and held meetings to get their addresses. Overall, grantees estimated that 46 percent of all the original residents of HOPE VI sites would return to the revitalized sites. However, as shown in figure 2, the percentage of original residents that were expected to return varied greatly from site to site. For example, at the 113 sites where reoccupancy was not yet complete, the planned reoccupancy rate was less than 25 percent at 23 sites; in contrast, the planned rate was 75 percent or greater at 24 sites. At the 39 sites where reoccupancy was complete, the actual reoccupancy rate was less than 25 percent at 17 sites and 75 percent or greater at 7 sites. Also, the percentage of residents that were expected to return decreased over time. As of September 30, 1999 (the earliest date for which we could obtain data), fiscal year 1993–1998 grantees estimated that 61 percent of the original residents would return to the revitalized sites. By June 30, 2003, the same grantees estimated that 44 percent of the original residents would return. Several factors may affect planned and actual reoccupancy rates, including the mix of units. To reduce the concentration of poverty at HOPE VI sites, HUD recommends a mix of public housing, affordable housing (low- income housing tax credit or other subsidized housing), and market-rate housing. As a result, grantees, as of June 30, 2003, had demolished or planned to demolish 76,393 public housing units and rebuild or renovate 44,781 replacement public housing units. At the 1996 sites, the percentage of public housing units being replaced ranged from 10 percent to 102 percent (see fig. 3). Resident and low-income housing advocates have criticized the HOPE VI program for reducing the number of public housing units. However, HUD, in its June 2002 report to Congress, pointed to the number of affordable units and vouchers that the program would provide. HUD also noted that over 20,000 of the units to be demolished were long- standing vacancies when the housing authorities applied for a HOPE VI grant, and that a majority of the vacant units were uninhabitable. As shown in figure 4, the percentage of revitalized units that are public housing units varied from site to site. Among the 143 sites where construction was not yet complete, as of June 30, 2003, public housing units constituted less than 50 percent of total units at 69 sites. At all but three of the 22 sites where construction was complete, 50 percent or more of the units were public housing units. Additionally, the number of planned public housing units decreased over time. As of September 30, 1999 (the earliest date for which we could obtain data), fiscal year 1993– 1998 grantees estimated that they would construct 34,199 public housing units. By June 30, 2003, the same grantees estimated that they would construct 30,772 public housing units—about a 10-percent decrease. (This decrease in the number of planned public housing units may help explain why the percentage of residents that the grantees expected to return decreased over time, as discussed previously in this report.) Another factor that may affect reoccupancy is the screening criteria that original residents must meet to return to the revitalized sites. HUD allows grantees to determine the screening criteria for each site. Consequently, the screening criteria varied at the 1996 sites we visited. For example, the Charlotte Housing Authority required returning Dalton Village residents to participate in the family self-sufficiency program. Residents that do not successfully complete the program within 5 years and are not in violation of their lease will be transferred to another public housing site. In addition to participation in the family self-sufficiency program, the Spartanburg Housing Authority required returning Tobe Hartwell residents to agree to random drug testing. In contrast, there were no special criteria at some sites. In Tucson, there were no new screening criteria for the original residents of the Connie Chambers site. Under a settlement agreement, all of the residents of Henry Horner Homes in Chicago, Illinois, were eligible to return. Other factors that may affect reoccupancy include resident preferences and the time between relocation and completion of construction of the new units. According to three of the 1996 grantees, some relocated residents did not want to return to the revitalized sites because they preferred a voucher or were satisfied at their new location. Another 1996 grantee observed that, because of the length of time between relocation and construction, some residents did not want to move again. For the 1996 grantees, the average time between the completion of relocation and the projected or actual completion of construction was 86 months (times ranged from 26 months to 129 months). The extent to which grantees involved residents in the HOPE VI process has varied at the 1996 sites. HUD has provided guidance on resident involvement in its NOFAs and grant agreements and on its Web site. The 1996 grantees have taken a variety of steps to involve residents in the HOPE VI process, ranging from holding informational meetings and soliciting input to involving residents in major decisions. HUD’s guidance on resident involvement in the HOPE VI process consists of annual NOFAs and grant agreements, as well as information located on its Web site. For example, the fiscal year 2002 NOFA stated that residents should be involved in the planning, proposed implementation, and management of revitalization plans. The NOFA required that, prior to applying for a HOPE VI revitalization grant, housing authorities conduct at least one training session for residents on the HOPE VI development process and at least three public meetings with residents and the broader community to involve them in developing revitalization plans and preparing the application. The fiscal year 2002 grant agreement (between HUD and the winning applicants) stated that grantees were required to foster the involvement of, and gather input and recommendations from, affected residents throughout the entire development process. Specifically, grantees were responsible for, among other things, holding regular meetings to provide the status of revitalization efforts, providing substantial opportunities for affected residents to provide input, and providing reasonable resources to prepare affected residents for meaningful participation in planning and implementation. HUD’s published guidance on resident involvement provides general guidelines that grantees must meet. For example, it states that full resident involvement is a crucial element of the HOPE VI program. HUD requires grantees to give all affected residents reasonable notice of meetings about HOPE VI planning and implementation and provide them with opportunities to give input. The guidance states that, at a minimum, grantees are required to involve residents throughout the entire HOPE VI planning, development, and implementation process and to provide information and training so that residents may participate fully and meaningfully throughout the entire development process. Although grantees are required to solicit and consider input from residents, the guidance makes it clear that the grantees have final decision-making authority. The amount and type of resident participation varied at the 1996 sites. All of the 1996 grantees held meetings to inform residents about revitalization plans and solicit their input. For example, residents of Dalton Village in Charlotte and Bedford Additions in Pittsburgh were asked to provide input on the design plans for the new sites. As the following examples illustrate, some of the grantees we visited took additional steps to seek a greater level of resident involvement in the HOPE VI process: In Tucson, the housing authority first asked residents to vote on the revitalization plan for the Connie Chambers site. Only after the residents expressed their support for the plan did the mayor and city council vote to submit the plan to HUD. The Chicago Housing Authority formed working groups at each of its HOPE VI sites to solicit input on plans and the selection of developers. These groups include representatives from the resident council, the housing authority, and city agencies. The Cuyahoga Metropolitan Housing Authority’s plans for its Riverview/Lakeview grant involved acquiring 54 off-site public housing units and, in many cases, the residents to be relocated selected the single-family homes that the housing authority then purchased for them. The Jacksonville and Chester Housing Authorities worked with residents to develop screening criteria used to select the occupants of the new development. The Holyoke Housing Authority asked residents to be part of its HOPE VI Implementation Team and the mayor’s HOPE VI Advisory Task Force. At one site we visited, the resident leader stated that residents were not adequately involved early in the HOPE VI process. Not until the residents at Robert Jervay Place in Wilmington, North Carolina, sent a letter to HUD describing the lack of progress at the site did the housing authority start moving forward with the project and involving residents in design meetings. In some cases, litigation or the threat of litigation has led to increased resident involvement. Due to a settlement agreement, any decisions regarding the revitalization of Henry Horner Homes in Chicago are subject to the approval of the Horner Resident Committee. According to the president of the St. Thomas resident council, the Housing Authority of New Orleans agreed to provide an additional 100 off-site public housing eligible rental units and change the screening criteria so that most of the original residents would be able to return in response to petitions filed by the attorney for St. Thomas residents with HUD’s Office of Fair Housing and Equal Opportunity. Grantees have provided a variety of community and supportive services, including case management and direct services such as job training programs. HUD data and information obtained during our site visits suggest that the supportive services yielded at least some positive outcomes. However, the data are limited and do not capture outcomes for all programs or reflect all services provided. Also, we could not determine the extent to which the HOPE VI program was responsible for these outcomes. Grantees are using HOPE VI and other funds to provide a variety of community and supportive services, including case management and direct services such as job training programs. In our November 2002 report on HOPE VI financing, we reported that the housing authorities that had been awarded grants in fiscal years 1993–2001 had budgeted a total of about $714 million for community and supportive services. In addition to their HOPE VI funds, grantees are encouraged to obtain in-kind, financial, and other types of resources necessary to carry out and sustain supportive service activities from organizations such as local boards of education, public libraries, private foundations, nonprofit organizations, faith-based organizations, and economic development agencies. Of the $714 million budgeted for community and supportive services, $418 million were HOPE VI funds (59 percent), and $295 million (41 percent) were leveraged funds. Although the majority of funds budgeted overall for supportive services were HOPE VI funds, we noted that the amount of non-HOPE VI funds budgeted for supportive services had increased since the program’s inception. In recent years, HUD has stressed the importance of grantees using community and supportive services funding to provide case management services to residents. In fact, all of the 1996 grantees have used the case management approach. For example, the Housing Authority of New Orleans hired a social service provider located near the St. Thomas site to perform assessments and provide case management plans for residents. The Holyoke Housing Authority has three case managers, who help residents of its 1996 grant site find employment, acquire General Educational Development (GED) certificates, take English as a Second Language courses, and receive homeownership counseling. The Chester Housing Authority established a “one-stop shop” at a local hospital, which serves as the coordinating point for all programs and partners servicing the authority’s residents. Grantees have also used funds set aside for community and supportive services to construct facilities where services are provided by other entities. For example, the Charlotte Housing Authority spent $1.5 million in HOPE VI funds to construct an 11,000-square-foot community and recreational center consisting of a gymnasium, four classrooms, and a computer lab near its 1996 grant site. In exchange, the residents annually will receive $60,000 in services from the center, which is run by the Mecklenburg County Parks and Recreation Department. The Tucson Community Services Department, which serves as Tucson’s public housing authority, used some of its 1996 HOPE VI funds to fund the construction of a child development center and learning center. Two day care programs— one operated by Head Start and the other by a local nonprofit organization—are operating in the child development center, and a computer library run by the Tucson-Pima Public Library is operating in the learning center. The Spartanburg Housing Authority used a portion of its HOPE VI funds to build a community center containing a computer center, health clinic, and gymnasium. The Spartanburg Technical College provides adult and student computer training, and the University of South Carolina Spartanburg School of Nursing performs health assessments and tracking at the center. Grantees also provided direct services such as computer and job training. For instance, the New York City Housing Authority instituted a computer incentive program that provides a personal computer system to Arverne and Edgemere residents who either work 96 hours volunteering on HOPE VI recruiting and other HOPE VI activities or who participate in a HOPE VI training program. HOPE VI residents enrolled in the San Francisco Housing Authority’s family self-sufficiency program can receive up to $1,200 per household to participate in training for various trades. The Detroit Housing Commission formed a number of partnerships to provide training in retail sales, computers, manufacturing, and child care to Herman Gardens residents. For example, 18 different unions formed a partnership that offers a preapprenticeship program. Limited HUD data on all 165 grants awarded through fiscal year 2001 and information collected during our visits to the 1996 sites indicated that HOPE VI community and supportive services have achieved or contributed to positive outcomes. We recommended in July 1998 that HUD develop consistent national, outcome-based measures for community and support services at HOPE VI sites. Since June 2000, HUD has used its HOPE VI reporting system to collect data from grantees on the major types of community and supportive services they provide and the outcomes achieved by some of these services. HUD collects data on services provided to both original and new residents. According to the data, as of June 30, 2003, for the 165 sites awarded grants through fiscal year 2001, about 45,000 of the approximately 70,000 original residents potentially eligible for community and supportive services made up the grantees’ caseload. The remaining original residents were not part of the caseload because, among other things, they declined or no longer needed services, or the grantee could not locate them. Additionally, about 8,000 new residents were included in the grantees’ caseload, bringing the total to approximately 53,000. As shown in table 1, the community and supportive services programs in which the most residents enrolled, as of June 30, 2003, were employment and counseling programs. HUD also collects data on the number of residents that have completed certain of these programs. For example, about 55 percent of the residents that enrolled in job skills training programs, as of June 30, 2003, completed the program. About 35 percent of the residents that signed up for high school or equivalent education classes completed them. HUD also collects data on selected outcomes such as employment and homeownership, although the outcomes cannot always be attributed to participation in or completion of HOPE VI programs or services. Other factors such as welfare-to-work requirements may have contributed to these outcomes. The data collected, as of the quarter ending June 30, 2003, showed that over 1,000 residents obtained jobs in that quarter. Overall, 22 percent of the grantees’ caseload was employed, and 16 percent had been employed 6 months or more. In addition, 344 resident-owned businesses had been started, as of June 30, 2003, and 967 residents had purchased a home. HUD has made modifications to the community and supportive services data that it collects and worked with grantees to help them better understand their reporting responsibilities. Seven of the 1996 grantees stated that they were not always certain about what to report, and 11 stated that the system did not reflect some of the services, such as those for youth and seniors, that they provided. To improve reporting, HUD hired the Urban Institute to help identify reporting problems and make refinements to the system. Also, HUD staff and one of two outside technical assistance providers review the data provided each quarter for consistency. As a result, the data are more reliable now than they were initially, according to the HOPE VI official that oversees community and supportive services. The same official stated that, while HUD encourages grantees to provide services to youth and seniors, it does not collect data on these services in order to limit the reporting burden on grantees. Limited data collected during our site visits also suggest that community and supportive services have helped achieve some positive outcomes. For example, the Housing Authority of the City of Pittsburgh offered in-home health worker training courses, in which 49 Bedford Additions residents have participated since October 2000. Thirty-one of the 49 participants obtained employment, and 12 were still employed, as of September 2003. In Louisville, 114 former Cotter and Lang residents had enrolled in homeownership counseling, as of June 2003, 41 had completed the counseling, and 34 had purchased a home. Between January and June 2003, 76 St. Thomas residents in New Orleans got a job, 12 residents got a GED, and 5 residents became homeowners. Finally, residents of Arverne and Edgemere Houses in New York City had earned 242 computers, as of July 2003, as part of the computer incentive program described in the previous section. According to our analysis of census and other data, the 20 neighborhoods in which the 1996 HOPE VI sites are located have experienced improvements in a number of indicators used by researchers to measure neighborhood change, such as educational attainment levels, average household income, and average housing values. However, for a number of reasons, we could not determine the extent to which the HOPE VI program was responsible for these changes. For example, we relied primarily on decennial census data (adjusted for inflation), comparing measures from 1990 with those of 2000. However, the HOPE VI sites were at varying stages of completion in 2000. We also used data available under the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act for numbers of home mortgage originations in 1996 and 2001. Further, a number of factors—such as changes in national or regional economic conditions—can influence the indicators we compared. In an attempt to more directly gauge the influence of the HOPE VI program, we compared each of four selected HOPE VI neighborhoods with a comparable non-HOPE VI public housing neighborhood in the same city. Some variables indicated greater improvements in the HOPE VI neighborhoods than their comparable neighborhoods, such as in mortgage lending activity, but other variables indicated inconsistent results among the sites. We also found that the demolition of old public housing alone may influence changes in neighborhoods. Analysis of six HOPE VI neighborhoods where the original public housing units have been demolished, but no on-site units have been completed, also shows improvements in educational attainment, unemployment rates, income, and housing. Finally, other studies have shown similar findings in HOPE VI neighborhoods. The 20 neighborhoods in which the 1996 HOPE VI sites are located have experienced positive changes in education, income, and housing indicators as measured by comparing 1990 and 2000 Census and 1996 and 2001 HMDA data. When using census data, we defined the neighborhood as consisting of the census block group or groups in which a public housing site is located and the immediately adjacent census block groups. When using HMDA data, which is not available at the census block group level, we defined the neighborhood as the census tract in which a public housing site is located (see app. II). Since 2000 data is the most recent census data available, it reflects the neighborhood conditions at the 1996 HOPE VI sites, which were at various stages of completion, at that time. Finally, not all of the changes in census data from 1990 to 2000 were statistically significant (see app. III). Moreover, at five sites, revitalization work had begun prior to receipt of HOPE VI funds with various non-HOPE VI funding sources. As a part of its fiscal year 2001 and 2002 performance goals, HUD specified that neighborhoods with substantial levels of HOPE VI investment would show improvements in such dimensions as household income, employment, homeownership, and housing investment. As a result, we used similar indicators, as well as other indicators generally used by researchers, to analyze neighborhood changes. However, it was not possible to determine the extent to which the HOPE VI program was responsible for the changes in these neighborhoods. Many factors, such as national and regional economic trends, can also affect neighborhood conditions. According to experts, it is extremely rare for any one program or actor to be able to change a neighborhood single-handedly. Our analysis of census and HMDA data for the 20 1996 HOPE VI neighborhoods showed the following positive changes: In 18 of the 1996 HOPE VI neighborhoods, the percentage of the population with a high school diploma or equivalent increased, from a minimum of 4 percentage points in Detroit to a maximum of 21 percentage points in Baltimore. In 11 of the HOPE VI neighborhoods, the percentage of the population with an associate’s degree or better increased, from a minimum of 3 percentage points in Tucson to a maximum of 14 percentage points in San Francisco. Average household income increased in 15 of the 1996 HOPE VI neighborhoods, from a minimum of 18 percent in Detroit to a maximum of 115 percent in Chicago (Henry Horner). The percentage of the population in poverty decreased in 14 of the HOPE VI neighborhoods, from a minimum of 4 percentage points in Atlanta and Detroit to a maximum of 20 percentage points in Baltimore. Despite these decreases, 9 of the HOPE VI neighborhoods remained “high-poverty neighborhoods” (having poverty rates of 30 percent or more), and 5 remained “extremely high-poverty neighborhoods” (having poverty rates of 40 percent or more). According to the Urban Institute, areas where 30-40 percent of the population lives in poverty represent significantly more deteriorated and threatening living environments than those with poverty rates below those thresholds. Average housing values increased in 13 of the 20 HOPE VI neighborhoods, ranging from a minimum of 11 percent in Tucson to a maximum of 215 percent in Chicago (Henry Horner). It is generally accepted among researchers that housing values represent the best available index of expectations regarding future economic activity in an area. Rental housing costs increased in 15 of the HOPE VI neighborhoods, from a minimum of 9 percent in Tucson to a maximum of 61 percent in Louisville. Increasing rental-housing costs are an indication that there is a greater demand for housing in that area. The number of mortgage loans originated in 10 of the HOPE VI neighborhoods increased between 1996 and 2001. These increases ranged from a minimum of 21 percent in Holyoke to a maximum of 728 percent in Charlotte—where the number of loans originated increased from 7 to 58. However, some of the HOPE VI neighborhoods showed negative changes for certain indicators. For example: The percent unemployed rose at 4 of the 20 sites, from a minimum of 2 percentage points in Charlotte to a maximum of 8 percentage points in Kansas City. In the Holyoke HOPE VI neighborhood, average housing values declined by 26 percent. The number of mortgage loans originated in seven of the HOPE VI neighborhoods decreased between 1996 and 2001. These decreases ranged from a minimum of 5 percent in Atlanta to a maximum of 58 percent in Wilmington. Appendix III shows the census and HMDA data for all of the indicators we analyzed for each of the 1996 HOPE VI sites. Comparison of four HOPE VI neighborhoods with neighborhoods in which comparable public housing sites are located (comparable neighborhoods) showed that HOPE VI neighborhoods experienced greater positive changes in some, but not all, of the variables that we evaluated. We conducted this comparative analysis to attempt to better isolate the effects of the HOPE VI program, although it was not possible to directly link changes to the HOPE VI program (see app. II). In addition, 2000 census data may not reflect some of the changes that could occur over time in these neighborhoods because the demolition and new construction at these sites did not begin until the late 1990s. Moreover, in these four HOPE VI neighborhoods, the units put back on-site were all public housing and, thus, not representative of the majority of HOPE VI projects, which are mixed-income. Three of the four HOPE VI neighborhoods experienced greater increases in mortgage loan originations than their comparable neighborhoods, according to HMDA data. From 1996 to 2001, the percentage of loans originated for home purchases increased 25 percent in Kansas City, 50 percent in Jacksonville, and 166 percent in Chester, while the percentage decreased in the comparable neighborhoods. In Spartanburg, the percentage of mortgage loans originated in the HOPE VI neighborhood decreased 33 percent, in contrast to a 46-percent decrease in the comparable neighborhood. While crime data summaries were not available at the neighborhood level, we were able to obtain crime data summaries for each of the sites being compared. Available crime data summaries show that three of the four HOPE VI sites experienced greater decreases in crime than their comparable sites (see app. III). Although incidents of crime generally decreased at both the HOPE VI and comparable site in Spartanburg, South Carolina, they decreased to a greater extent at the HOPE VI site. In both Chester, Pennsylvania, and Jacksonville, Florida, crime decreased at the HOPE VI sites while it increased at the comparable sites. In contrast, crime incidents at Kansas City’s HOPE VI site have generally increased. According to officials from the Housing Authority of Kansas City, Missouri, in 1996 the HOPE VI site had a 24-percent occupancy rate because most of the residents had already been relocated, and a 98-percent occupancy rate in 2002. They attribute the increase in crime during this time period to this increased occupancy rate. Officials from the Housing Authority of Kansas City, Missouri, also reported that crimes per household decreased from .51 to .31 at the HOPE VI site from 1996 to 2002. Comparison of census data for the HOPE VI and comparable neighborhoods between 1990 and 2000 showed some positive and some negative changes. However, we were able to compare only a small number of variables because the differences in the changes for others were not statistically significant (see fig. 5). Kansas City, Missouri, had the largest number of statistically significant differences between the HOPE VI and comparable neighborhoods; specifically, in Kansas City, the differences between the HOPE VI and comparable neighborhood were statistically significant for four variables. It should be noted that Kansas City’s HOPE VI neighborhood has been changing for a longer period of time than the other HOPE VI neighborhoods in our analysis. The first phase of revitalization in this neighborhood began in May 1995 with non-HOPE VI funds, whereas the other three sites in our comparative analysis did not begin revitalization activities until after being awarded HOPE VI revitalization grant funds in 1996. While the Kansas City HOPE VI neighborhood experienced greater positive changes in new construction, it also experienced a greater increase in unemployment, and a greater decrease in the percentage of the population with both a high school diploma and an associate’s degree or better. In Spartanburg, South Carolina, the differences between the HOPE VI and its comparable neighborhood were statistically significant for two variables. The percentage of the population with a high school diploma increased to a greater extent in the HOPE VI neighborhood than the comparable neighborhood, while new construction decreased to a greater extent in the HOPE VI neighborhood relative to the comparable neighborhood. In addition, in Jacksonville, Florida, the HOPE VI neighborhood experienced a greater increase in new construction relative to its comparable neighborhood. Even in the six 1996 HOPE VI neighborhoods where the original public housing units had been demolished, but no units had been completed on- site as of December 2002, a comparison of 1990 and 2000 Census data showed that positive changes occurred in educational attainment, unemployment, income, and housing. For example: The percentage of the population with a high school diploma or equivalent increased in all six neighborhoods, from a minimum of 4 percentage points in Detroit to a maximum of 21 percentage points in Baltimore. Similarly, the percentage of population with an associate’s degree or better increased in five neighborhoods, from a minimum of 4 percentage points in Atlanta and Baltimore to a maximum of 14 percentage points in San Francisco. The unemployment rate decreased in four of the six HOPE VI neighborhoods, from a minimum of 4 percentage points in Cleveland to a maximum of 6 percentage points in Baltimore and Detroit. Average household income increased in all of the neighborhoods, from a minimum of 18 percent in Detroit to a maximum of 46 percent in Cleveland. The poverty rate decreased in five of the neighborhoods, from a minimum of 4 percentage points in Atlanta and Detroit to a maximum of 20 percentage points in Baltimore. Average housing values increased in four of the neighborhoods, from a minimum of 26 percent in Atlanta to a maximum of 116 percent in Detroit. The percentage of occupied housing units increased in four neighborhoods, from a minimum of 4 percentage points in Atlanta to a maximum of 8 percentage points in Cleveland and New Orleans. Rental-housing costs increased in all six neighborhoods, from a minimum of 11 percent in New Orleans to a maximum of 38 percent in Baltimore. In contrast, the level of mortgage lending activity decreased in four of these neighborhoods from a range of 5 percent in Atlanta to 57 percent in Baltimore between 1996 and 2001. Moreover, new construction decreased by 2 percentage points in Cleveland, New Orleans, and San Francisco between 1990 and 2000. We cannot attribute these changes solely to the HOPE VI program. To the extent that they do reflect the program’s influence, however, they suggest that demolition of old, deteriorated public housing alone may influence surrounding neighborhoods. For example, average housing value and average household income increased even though no new units had been constructed. It is possible that the HOPE VI program influenced these indicators by removing blight from the neighborhoods and temporarily relocating large numbers of low-income households during demolition. Studies by housing and community development researchers have shown positive changes in HOPE VI neighborhoods as reflected in income, employment, community investment, and crime indicators. In reviewing the literature, we identified one report that discussed changes in the neighborhoods surrounding eight HOPE VI sites and two reports that evaluated changes at two of the sites we visited. While each study covered a small number of HOPE VI neighborhoods, they showed positive changes: Per capita incomes in eight selected HOPE VI neighborhoods increased an average of 71 percent, compared with 14.5 percent for the cities in which these sites are located between 1989 and 1999. The percentage of low-income households living in eight selected HOPE VI neighborhoods decreased from 82 to 69 percent from 1989 to 1999. Median income increased 80 percent from 1990 to 2000 in Chester’s 1996 HOPE VI neighborhood. Unemployment rates decreased from 24 to 15 percent between 1989 and 1999 in eight selected HOPE VI neighborhoods. The number of small business loans closed in seven selected HOPE VI neighborhoods grew by an average of 248 percent from 1998 to 2001, compared with 153 percent in the neighborhoods’ respective counties. The number of new business licenses issued in Tucson’s 1996 HOPE VI neighborhood increased from 6 in 1996 to 28 in 2002. In addition, the number of business closures in the neighborhood decreased from 23 in 1996 to 15 in 2001. The vacancy rate decreased from 9 to 6 percent between 1990 and 2000 in Chester’s 1996 HOPE VI neighborhood, while the vacancy rate for the city increased from 12 to 14 percent during the same period. Overall and violent crime rates decreased by 48 and 68 percent, respectively, between 1993 and 2001 in four of the HOPE VI neighborhoods where crime data were available. Overall and violent crimes decreased by 25 and 38 percent, respectively, during the same time period for the cities in which these sites are located. We provided a draft of this report to HUD for its comment and review. We received comments from the Assistant Secretary for Public and Indian Housing (see app. IV) who thanked GAO for its thorough review of the HOPE VI program and stated that HUD regards our study as an important tool in its continuing efforts to improve the program. As agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce the contents of this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days from the report date. At that time, we will send copies of this report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on Housing and Transportation, Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs; the Chairman and Ranking Minority Member, Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs; the Chairman and Ranking Minority Member, Subcommittee on Housing and Community Opportunity, House Committee on Financial Services; and the Chairman and Ranking Minority Member, House Committee on Financial Services. We also will send copies to the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development and the Director of the Office of Management and Budget. We also will make copies available to others upon request. In addition, the report will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov. Please call me at (202) 512-8678 if you or your staff have any questions about this report. Key contributors to this report are listed in Appendix V. Our objectives were to examine (1) the types of housing to which the original residents of HOPE VI sites were relocated and the number of original residents that grantees expect to return to the revitalized sites, (2) how the fiscal year 1996 grantees have involved residents in the HOPE VI process, (3) the types of community and supportive services that have been provided to residents and the results achieved, and (4) how the neighborhoods surrounding the sites that received HOPE VI grants in fiscal year 1996 have changed. To accomplish these objectives, we analyzed the data contained in HUD’s HOPE VI reporting system on the 165 sites that received revitalization grants in fiscal years 1993-2001. To assess the reliability of the data in HUD’s HOPE VI reporting system, we interviewed the officials that manage the system; reviewed information about the system, including the user guide, data dictionary, and steps taken to ensure the quality of these data; performed electronic testing to detect obvious errors in completeness and reasonableness; and interviewed grantees regarding the data they reported. We determined that these data were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report. For the second and fourth objectives, we then focused on and visited the 20 sites in 18 cities that received HOPE VI revitalization grants in fiscal year 1996. We selected the 1996 grants because they were the first awarded after HUD issued a rule allowing revitalization to be funded with a combination of public and private funds, which has become the HOPE VI model. We also analyzed Census and Home Mortgage Disclosure Act data and reviewed crime data summaries. In addition, we interviewed the HUD headquarters officials responsible for administering the HOPE VI program. To determine the types of housing to which the original residents of HOPE VI sites were relocated and the number of original residents that grantees expect to return to the revitalized sites, we analyzed the relocation and reoccupancy data in HUD’s HOPE VI reporting system. Specifically, we determined what percentage of the original residents that had been relocated as of June 30, 2003, were relocated to other public housing, given vouchers, or evicted. We also determined the percentage of original residents overall and at each site that was expected, as of June 30, 2003, to return to the revitalized sites. At the 113 sites where reoccupancy was not yet complete, we divided the number of original residents the grantee estimated would return by the total number of residents the grantee estimated would be relocated. At the 39 sites where reoccupancy was complete, we divided the number of original residents who actually returned by the total number of residents relocated. We excluded 10 of the 165 sites from our analysis because they did not involve relocation and an additional three sites because the reoccupancy data reported as of June 30, 2003, was incorrect. To determine how reoccupancy estimates changed over time, we compared the data in HUD’s HOPE VI reporting system as of September 30, 1999 (the earliest date for which we could obtain data) with data as of June 30, 2003. Finally, to determine what factors affected whether residents returned to the revitalized sites, we interviewed HUD officials, public housing authority (PHA) officials responsible for managing the fiscal year 1996 grants, and resident representatives at 19 of the 20 fiscal year 1996 sites. For all 165 sites, we used data from HUD’s HOPE VI reporting system to calculate the percentage of revitalized units that would be units under an annual contributions contract (that is, public housing units). At the 143 sites where construction was not yet complete, we divided the number of planned public housing units by the total number of planned units. At the 22 sites where construction was complete, we divided the actual number of public housing units by the total number of units. To determine how the number of planned public housing units has changed over time, we compared the number of public housing units planned as of September 30, 1999 (the earliest date for which we could obtain data) with data as of June 30, 2003. For 19 of the 20 1996 HOPE VI sites, we used data from HUD’s HOPE VI reporting system and data collected during our site visits to calculate the percentage of public housing units being replaced. To determine how the fiscal year 1996 grantees have involved residents in the HOPE VI process, we obtained and reviewed HUD’s guidance on resident involvement, including the portions of the fiscal year 2002 notice of funding availability and fiscal year 2002 grant agreement that address resident involvement. For the 1996 grants, we interviewed PHA officials and resident representatives to determine the extent to which residents had been involved in the HOPE VI process. Finally, we interviewed two resident advocate groups—Everywhere and Now Public Housing Residents Organizing Nationally Together and the National Low Income Housing Coalition—regarding resident involvement and other resident issues. To identify the types of community and supportive services that have been provided to residents of HOPE VI sites, we obtained and reviewed HUD’s draft guidance on community and supportive services. To obtain specific examples of community and supportive services provided at the fiscal year 1996 sites, we interviewed PHA officials and obtained and reviewed community and supportive services plans. We also obtained data from HUD’s HOPE VI reporting system to determine the number of residents that have participated in different types of community and supportive services. To determine the results that have been achieved, we obtained data from HUD’s HOPE VI reporting system on selected outcomes, including the number of new job placements and the number of residents that have purchased homes. We also obtained information during our site visits that documents the results achieved by various community and supportive services programs. To determine how the neighborhoods surrounding the sites that received a 1996 HOPE VI revitalization grant have changed, we analyzed nine key variables from 1990 and 2000 census data for each neighborhood, including the average household income, the percentage of the population in poverty, and the percentage of occupied housing units. When using census data, we defined a “HOPE VI neighborhood” as consisting of the census block group in which the original public housing site was located, as well as all of the immediately adjacent census block groups (see app. II). We also analyzed changes in mortgage lending activity using 1996 and 2001 Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA) data. These data are only available by census tract, which encompasses a larger area than a census block group. As a result, for this analysis we used only the census tract in which the original public housing site was located as the proxy for the neighborhood. In addition to using the census and HMDA data to analyze changes in the neighborhoods around all 20 1996 HOPE VI sites, we performed additional analysis for those sites where demolition, but no on-site construction, was complete and those that were the closest to completion. To explore the change in neighborhoods where only demolition had occurred, we used the HOPE VI reporting system to identify the six sites that had demolished all of the original public housing units, but not completed any on-site construction as of December 31, 2002. We also used the HOPE VI reporting system to identify the five sites where on-site construction was 75 percent or more complete as of December 31, 2002. We then compared changes in census, HMDA, and summary crime data for four of the five HOPE VI neighborhoods with changes in comparable public housing neighborhoods—neighborhoods containing public housing sites that PHAs identified as similar in condition to the HOPE VI sites prior to revitalization. However, these comparisons are not perfect. For example, in two cases the HOPE VI sites are about 10 years older than the comparable sites. In Chester, Pennsylvania, the comparable site was rehabilitated in 1997, and units were enlarged. We obtained crime data summaries for the Lamokin Village (HOPE VI) and Matopos Hills (comparable) sites from the Chester Housing Authority; for the Durkeeville (HOPE VI) and Brentwood Park (comparable) sites from the Jacksonville Housing Authority; for the Theron B. Watkins (HOPE VI) and West Bluff (comparable) sites from the Housing Authority of Kansas City, Missouri; and for the Tobe Hartwell/Extension (HOPE VI) and Woodworth Homes (comparable) sites from the Spartanburg Housing Authority. Each of these PHAs obtained site-specific crime data summaries from their local police departments. We reviewed the crime data summaries for reasonableness and followed up on anomalies. Because we did not have disaggregated crime data directly from each city’s police department, we were unable to perform tests of statistical significance on the summary crime trends. Although we did not do extensive testing of the summary crime data, we feel that it is sufficiently reliable for the informational purposes of this report. Finally, we obtained and reviewed reports by various universities and private institutions that discussed the social and economic impacts of the HOPE VI program. We focused on one report that discussed changes in the neighborhoods surrounding eight sites and two reports that evaluated changes at sites we visited. See appendix II for more detailed information on the methodology we used to determine how the 1996 HOPE VI neighborhoods have changed. We performed our work from November 2001 through October 2003 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. This appendix provides detailed information on the methodologies we used to analyze neighborhood changes observed in the HOPE VI neighborhoods (for recipients of 1996 HOPE VI revitalization grants) and, where applicable, four comparison neighborhoods. To analyze changes observed in HOPE VI neighborhoods, we first defined HOPE VI neighborhoods as the census block group in which the public housing site was located and the adjacent census block groups. This definition allowed us to examine changes observed in HOPE VI neighborhoods and the extent to which some of the goals of the HOPE VI program may have been addressed, such as improvements in household income, employment, and housing investment. Census block groups were used, as this geographic area was likely to better represent the area of the housing site and its adjacent neighborhood than a larger census entity, such as a census tract, would have. That is, use of block groups lessened the likelihood that both community residents and characteristics that are not influenced by the housing development were included in the analyses. The block groups in which HOPE VI sites were located, and the adjacent block groups, were identified by electronically mapping the addresses using MapInfo. Next, we obtained 1990 and 2000 census data on nine population and housing characteristics for the census block groups in which the HOPE VI sites were located and the adjacent block groups. In order to make valid and reliable comparisons between decennial censuses, we had to ensure that the geographic regions in 1990 and in 2000 shared the same, or nearly the same, physical boundaries and land area. We visually inspected a map of the 1990 boundaries for each of the block groups contained in a HOPE VI neighborhood and compared them with the 2000 boundaries. In some cases, we had to reclassify block groups in order to maintain comparability between the two census years. For example, in 2000, Wilmington's Jervay Place site was located in block group 11002. One of its adjacent block groups, part of the Jervay Place “neighborhood” (as defined by our study), was block group 10001. However, in 1990, the same area constituting block group 10001 had been partitioned into two block groups, 10001 and 10003, of which only 10003 was adjacent to the site block group, 11002. In order to have consistent and comparable geographic areas, we added the respondents of 1990 block group 10001 and their characteristics into the calculations for the 1990 descriptive statistics. We also obtained 1996 and 2001 Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA) data from the Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council. Specifically, for each of the 20 HOPE VI neighborhoods and the four comparable neighborhoods we compared the number of loans originated in 1996 with the number originated in 2001. However, the smallest geographic unit for which HMDA data are available is the census tract. Therefore, analyses of these data were conducted at the census tract level, and each neighborhood was defined as consisting of the census tract in which the site was located. We reviewed information related to the census data variables and performed electronic data testing to identify obvious gaps in data completeness or accuracy. We determined that the data were sufficiently reliable for use in this report. We conducted a similar review of information related to the HMDA variables. Finally, since we found no issues impacting the use of these data as a result of electronic data testing, we concluded that the data elements being used were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of the report. In evaluating community development initiatives such as HOPE VI, we note that it is difficult to determine the impact of a program or to definitely conclude that a program caused a specified outcome to occur. For example, several factors—such as other community initiatives, re- emphasis on the Community Reinvestment Act (Zielenbach, 2002), or national trends in the economy and unemployment (Zielenbach, 2002)—in conjunction with HOPE VI efforts may have contributed to observed changes in the geographic region surrounding a HOPE VI site. To attempt to isolate the influence of HOPE VI activities, an ideal evaluation research design would include the identification of a neighborhood identical to the HOPE VI community based on key characteristics (such as size, ethnic distribution, income distribution, number of social institutions, crime rates) and ideally use an in-depth, longitudinal case study to track changes in the HOPE VI and comparison communities from the inception of HOPE VI work until its completion. While we recognized that such a method would permit the greatest understanding of community changes and their relationship to HOPE VI, we could not utilize it for two reasons. First, in-depth, longitudinal case studies of multiple HOPE VI sites would be very resource-intensive and were outside the scope of this study. Second, it is unlikely that we or other analysts could identify a series of identical neighborhoods given the natural variation in population, business, and housing development characteristics that occurs within a city over the length of a longitudinal study. Therefore, in an attempt to limit the potential factors that could explain changes observed in HOPE VI communities, we worked with the public housing authorities that managed the four 1996 HOPE VI sites that had completed 75 percent or more of their on-site construction, as of December 31, 2002, to identify comparison neighborhoods. These comparison neighborhoods contained public housing sites that were comparable to the original HOPE VI sites in terms of age, size, or condition. Each of these comparison sites was located in the same city as the HOPE VI site, but had not received any HOPE VI revitalization funding. The decennial nature of the Census also constrained our analysis. The HOPE VI sites were awarded their grants in 1996; however, relocation did not begin at most sites until 1997 or later. Demolition did not begin at over half of the sites until 1999 or later, and construction did not begin at the majority of sites until 2000 or later. In addition, as of June 30, 2003, the majority of sites had not completed construction. Thus, data collected during the 2000 Census may not have detected neighborhood changes. However, the 2000 data are the most current available. Similarly, at the time of our analysis, 2001 HMDA data were the most current available. Despite these limitations, we believe that we have constructed a design that is as methodologically sound as possible given resource and data constraints and the varying stages of implementation of HOPE VI plans. To analyze census data, we selected nine population and housing characteristics. Those characteristics were average household income, percent of population living in poverty, percent unemployed, percent of the population with a high school degree, average housing value, percent of housing units constructed within the last 10 years, percent of occupied housing units, average gross rent, and population total. For the six percentage characteristics, we calculated the percent change by finding the difference between the 1990 sample estimate and the 2000 sample estimate. For the three average characteristics, we calculated the percent change by finding the difference between the 1990 sample estimate and the 2000 sample estimate and then dividing this difference by the 1990 sample estimate. In our comparison of four HOPE VI sites with comparable public housing sites, we also analyzed census data on population totals for each neighborhood. Populations were based on a 100 percent count of the individuals living in the block groups. With the exception of the population total, each of the census variables is based on sample data. Since this sample is only one of a large number of samples that might have been drawn and each sample could have provided different estimates, we express our confidence in the precision of this particular sample’s results as a 95 percent confidence interval (for example, plus or minus 7 percentage points). This is the interval that would contain the actual population value for 95 percent of the samples that could have been drawn. As a result, we are 95 percent confident that each of the confidence intervals in this report will include the true values for the population. We used the methodology described in the Census Bureau’s documentation for the 1990 and 2000 Censuses (Appendix C: Accuracy of the Data, 1990, and Chapter 8: Accuracy of the Data, 2000) to calculate standard errors and confidence intervals. Essentially, we used the Census Bureau’s formulas to compute the standard error for the sample estimate under the assumption of simple random sampling. We then multiplied this result by a design effect factor to adjust for the survey’s sample design to give the appropriate standard error. In order to determine whether the 1990 and 2000 percent change estimates were statistically significant, we interpreted the confidence interval. For example, if the confidence interval includes zero, then the difference between the 1990 and 2000 estimates is not considered a statistically significant difference. If the confidence interval does not include zero, then the percent change between the 1990 and 2000 estimates is considered statistically significant (see app. III). We also calculated 95 percent confidence intervals to determine whether there are statistically significant differences between the HOPE VI and non-HOPE VI (comparable) neighborhoods on the percent differences from 1990 to 2000. In addition to sampling errors, sample data (and 100 percent data) are subject to nonsampling errors, which may occur during the operations used to collect and process census data. Examples of nonsampling errors are not enumerating every housing unit or person in the sample, failing to obtain all required information from a respondent, obtaining incorrect information, and recording information incorrectly. Operations such as field review of enumerators’ work, clerical handling of questionnaires, and electronic processing of questionnaires also may introduce nonsampling errors in the data. The Census Bureau discusses sources of nonsampling errors and attempts to control in detail. To analyze the HMDA data for each of the 20 HOPE VI sites and the four comparable sites, we compared the number of loans originated in 1996 with the number originated in 2001 (see app. III). The HMDA data contain all of the loans originating in these time periods; therefore, it is not a sample, and confidence intervals did not need to be computed for these data. We obtained 1990 and 2000 census data for each neighborhood in which a 1996 HOPE VI site is located, as well as for four neighborhoods in which public housing that is comparable to selected 1996 HOPE VI sites is located. When using census data, we defined a neighborhood as consisting of the census block group in which a site is located, as well as the adjacent census block groups. We selected nine census data variables, which are generally used by researchers to measure neighborhood change, and analyzed the changes in these variables from 1990 to 2000 (see tables 2 through 4). We also determined whether these changes were statistically significant. For these same 20 HOPE VI and four comparable neighborhoods, we obtained 1996 and 2001 Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA) data. With this data, we compared the number of loans originated for the purchase of a home in 1996 with the number originated in 2001 (see table 5). When using HMDA data, we defined each neighborhood as consisting of the census tract in which each site is located. We also obtained 1996 and 2002 crime data summaries for each of the four HOPE VI sites that had completed 75 percent or more of their on-site construction (as of December 2002), as well as for four comparable public housing sites. This data was obtained from public housing authority officials and consisted of the total number of crimes that occurred in selected categories. We then calculated the percent change in the total number of crimes over time (see fig. 6). In addition to those individuals named above, Kristine Braaten, Jackie Garza, Catherine Hurley, Grant Mallie, Alison Martin, John McGrail, Sara Moessbauer, Marc Molino, Lisa Moore, Barbara Roesmann, Sidney Schwartz, Paige Smith, Ginger Tierney, and Carrie Watkins made key contributions to this report. The General Accounting Office, the audit, evaluation and investigative arm of Congress, exists to support Congress in meeting its constitutional responsibilities and to help improve the performance and accountability of the federal government for the American people. GAO examines the use of public funds; evaluates federal programs and policies; and provides analyses, recommendations, and other assistance to help Congress make informed oversight, policy, and funding decisions. GAO’s commitment to good government is reflected in its core values of accountability, integrity, and reliability. The fastest and easiest way to obtain copies of GAO documents at no cost is through the Internet. 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Summary: Congress established the HOPE VI program in 1992 to revitalize severely distressed public housing by demolition, rehabilitation, or replacement of sites. In fiscal years 1993-2001, the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) awarded approximately $4.5 billion for 165 HOPE VI revitalization grants to public housing authorities (grantees). GAO was asked to examine (1) the types of housing to which the original residents of HOPE VI sites were relocated and the number of original residents that grantees expect to return to the revitalized sites, (2) how the fiscal year 1996 grantees have involved residents in the HOPE VI process, and (3) how the neighborhoods surrounding the 20 sites that received HOPE VI grants in fiscal year 1996 have changed. The largest percentage of the approximately 49,000 residents that had been relocated from HOPE VI sites, as of June 30, 2003, were relocated to other public housing, and about half were expected to return to the revitalized sites. Although grantees, overall, expected 46 percent of relocated residents to return, the percentage of original residents that were expected to return (or the reoccupancy rate) varied greatly from site to site. The level of resident involvement in the HOPE VI process varied at the 1996 sites. While all of the 1996 grantees held meetings to inform residents about revitalization plans and solicit their input, some took additional steps to involve residents. For example, in Tucson, the housing authority submitted the revitalization plan for the Connie Chambers site to the city council for approval only after the residents had voted to approve it. The neighborhoods in which 1996 HOPE VI sites are located generally have experienced improvements in indicators such as education, income, and housing, although GAO could not determine the extent to which the HOPE VI program contributed to these changes. In a comparison of four 1996 HOPE VI neighborhoods to four comparable neighborhoods, mortgage lending activity increased to a greater extent in three of the HOPE VI neighborhoods. But, a comparison of other variables (such as education and new construction) produced inconsistent results, with HOPE VI neighborhoods experiencing both greater positive and negative changes than comparable neighborhoods.