Between January 1999 and May 2000, the U.N. Security Council adopted 10 resolutions authorizing new peacekeeping operations or significantly expanding existing ones, including 8 resolutions for operations in East Timor, Sierra Leone, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Table 1 lists the eight decisions and the dates respectively of the executive branch decisions to support the operations, the letters informing the Congress of these decisions, and the U.N. Security Council votes. The U.N. and multilateral operations in these three locations were undertaken to help resolve long-standing internal conflicts. The estimated cost of the ongoing U.N. operations in these locations represented over half of the $2.7 billion estimated cost of U.N peacekeeping operations in 2001. Although peace agreements or cease-fires had been reached or were imminent in these three locations, violence continued and the political accords appeared tenuous. The following paragraphs briefly describe the situations in these three locations to provide some context for the eight executive branch decisions. Appendix III provides additional information about key events related to these decisions. Since 1975, when Indonesia forcibly incorporated East Timor, the United States had supported some form of self-determination for the former Portuguese colony with a population of about 800,000 people. In 1983, Portugal and Indonesia began regular talks aimed at resolving East Timor’s status; in June 1998, Indonesia agreed to enter U.N.-mediated talks about autonomy for East Timor. In January 1999, Indonesia’s President announced his support for offering the people of East Timor a choice between autonomy within Indonesia or independence. On May 5, 1999, Indonesia and Portugal concluded a general agreement that, among other things, called for the establishment of a U.N. operation to conduct a free and fair vote for the people of East Timor to choose the territory’s future status—either autonomy within Indonesia or independence. Despite this agreement, pro-autonomy factions, supported by local militia and the Indonesian military, attempted to use violence to intimidate pro- independence factions and influence the outcome of the vote. There also was uncertainty about the Indonesian security forces’ willingness to allow a free and fair vote. The conflict in Sierra Leone began in 1991, when rebel forces (the Revolutionary United Front) began attacking government forces near the Liberian border. Sierra Leone’s army at first tried to defend the government with the support of military forces provided by the Economic Community of West African States, but the army itself overthrew the government in 1992. Despite the change of power, the rebel forces continued their attacks. The army relinquished power in 1996 after parliamentary and presidential elections. Rebel forces, however, did not participate in the elections and did not recognize the results. A November 1996 peace agreement between the government and the rebels (the Abidjan Accord) was derailed by another military coup d’état in May 1997. This time the army joined forces with the rebels to form a ruling junta and the elected government was forced into exile in Guinea. In February 1998, the West African military forces launched an attack that led to the collapse of the junta and the restoration of the elected government. In July 1998, the U.N. Security Council established the U.N. Observer Mission in Sierra Leone to monitor the situation and help the combatants reach an overall peace agreement. In July 1999, the combatants signed the Lomé Peace Agreement, under which U.N. and West African peacekeeping forces would share in helping to provide security and disarm, demobilize, and reintegrate the combatants. During the 8 years of fighting, an estimated 500,000 Sierra Leone citizens were forced to flee to neighboring Guinea, Liberia, Gambia, and other locations. Of the estimated 6 million people remaining in Sierra Leone, 2.6 million could not be reached by humanitarian agencies and 370,000 were internally displaced. These populations suffered severe human rights abuses, including mutilations, amputations, summary executions, torture, and sexual abuse. The Congo conflict grew out of the instability that followed the Rwandan crisis of 1994 and eventually involved the armed forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and five regional states, several Congolese rebel groups, and groups responsible for the Rwandan genocide. According to a U.N. report, this conflict was “characterized by appalling, widespread and systematic human rights violations, including mass killings, ethnic cleansing, rape and destruction of property” and its effects had “spread beyond the subregion to afflict the continent of Africa as a whole.” In August 1998, the Southern Africa Development Community and the Organization for African Unity announced the start of a regional initiative to negotiate an end to the Congo conflict. On July 10, 1999, six states signed the Lusaka Cease-fire Agreement and 5 days later, on July 15, the U.N. Secretary General proposed establishing a U.N. operation to help monitor implementation of the cease-fire agreement. Directive 25 stated that U.S. and U.N. involvement in peacekeeping must be both selective and effective. This principle was underscored by the 1996 U.S. National Security Strategy Report, which stated that “the United States must make highly disciplined choices about when and under what circumstances to support” peacekeeping operations and directed officials to “undertake a rigorous assessment of requirements before voting to support operations.” To this end, Directive 25 required executive branch decision-makers to consider specific factors in deciding whether to support a proposed operation. These factors included questions about a proposed operation’s (1) political context, such as whether it advanced U.S. interests and the consequences of inaction were judged unacceptable, and (2) feasibility, such as whether it had appropriate forces, financing, and mandate to accomplish its mission and its anticipated duration was tied to clear objectives and realistic exit criteria. Directive 25 established these factors to help executive branch officials identify proposed operations’ basic political, military, and resource shortfalls but did not require that all or any particular factors be present in a proposed operation before it was approved. The directive stated that decisions would be based on the cumulative weight of the factors, with no single factor being an absolute determinant. However, the directive also stated that the United States generally would support only well-defined peace operations linked to concrete political solutions. Executive branch officials extensively considered all Directive 25 factors before deciding to support the authorization or expansion of the U.N. operations. Executive branch assessments of proposed operations identified concerns about some directive factors and shortfalls in others. Executive branch officials decided to support the operations because most factors were present and, in their judgment, U.S. interests were advanced by supporting regional allies, creating or maintaining regional stability, or addressing humanitarian disasters. Following interagency deliberations, senior executive branch officials directed State and Defense officials to strengthen the proposed operations before the U.N. Security Council voted or to develop plans to address the risks that the shortfalls posed. For the eight decisions, we found that the executive branch used a systematic process that resulted in a full consideration of all Directive 25 factors. The process for making these decisions involved the consideration of Directive 25 at the following three levels: Individual agencies. The State and Defense Departments and the National Security Council were the primary agencies that assessed the proposed operations. Individual agency deliberations included relevant regional, functional, legal, and legislative affairs experts. Peacekeeping Core Group. This interagency working group, chaired by the National Security Council’s Senior Director for Multilateral and Humanitarian Affairs, was comprised of assistant and deputy assistant secretaries of State, Defense, and other U.S. departments and agencies. The core group brought together the individual agency assessments and developed consensus recommendations for senior decision-makers for each of the eight decisions. Deputies Committee. This interagency decision-making group, chaired by the Deputy Adviser to the President for National Security Affairs or his designee, was typically comprised of the undersecretaries of State and Defense and similar officials from other agencies. For these eight decisions, the Deputies Committee made the final decision to vote for the proposed operation. Interactions between these three levels were iterative and supported by extensive intelligence reporting. Figure 1 illustrates the process used to make these eight decisions. For the eight decisions we reviewed, we found that executive officials prepared and reviewed hundreds of records considering all applicable Directive 25 factors before deciding to support the proposed operations. These records included decision memorandums, situation assessments, concept papers, and summaries of interagency discussions. For five of the eight decisions, the State Department prepared comprehensive Directive 25 analyses that candidly assessed the proposed operations, including identifying basic political, military, and resource shortfalls. Analysis of these records showed that executive branch officials considered all applicable Directive 25 factors before making their decisions. Before the late May 1999 decision to support the U.N. Mission in East Timor, for example, executive branch officials prepared 19 assessments of the proposed operation, including a comprehensive Directive 25 analysis. These assessments considered all applicable Directive 25 factors, for example, whether (1) there was support among U.N. member states for U.N. action in Indonesia and (2) the parties consented to the deployment of a U.N. force. Before the August 1999 decision to support the expansion of the U.N. Observer Mission in Sierra Leone, executive branch officials prepared 16 assessments of the proposed operation, including a comprehensive Directive 25 analysis. These assessments considered all applicable Directive 25 factors, for example, whether the expanded operation had adequate financing and forces to carry out its mission. In making all eight decisions, executive branch officials also considered assessments provided by other governments, the U.N. Secretariat, diplomatic envoys and negotiators, regional organizations, and others operating in the areas of concern. For the eight decisions, the Peacekeeping Core Group met several times specifically to consider applicable Directive 25 factors for the proposed operations and develop options and recommendations for senior decision- makers. The Deputies Committee met less frequently to consider and act on the options and recommendations developed by the core group. For example, our analysis of executive branch records showed that the core group met nine times between March and late May 1999 specifically to discuss the proposed U.N. Mission in East Timor. During this same period, the Deputies Committee met three times to consider and act on the core group’s recommendations. Similarly, between February and early August 1999, our analysis showed that the core group met eight times to discuss the proposed expansion of the U.N. Observer Mission in Sierra Leone. During this same period, the Deputies Committee met twice to consider and act on the core group’s recommendations. According to executive branch officials, these meetings were supplemented by frequent informal contacts between members of the core group and Deputies Committee. For example, core group members participated in weekly conference calls. At the time the eight decisions were made, executive branch assessments indicated that the proposed operations advanced U.S. interests. In defining U.S. interests, executive branch officials used the definitions in the annual U.S. national security strategy reports. These reports defined U.S. interests as (1) vital—those interests that affect the safety and survival of the United States; (2) important—those interests that affect U.S. national well-being, including commitments to allies; and (3) humanitarian and other—those interests related to U.S. values. Executive branch officials judged that the proposed operations in East Timor, Sierra Leone, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo advanced important and humanitarian and other U.S. interests. For all operations, the consequences of inaction also were judged unacceptable. Other than the definitions in the annual national security strategy reports, we could find no criteria to guide executive branch officials in making judgments about these two Directive 25 factors. At the time the eight decisions were made, executive branch assessments identified at least one Directive 25 shortfall in all of the proposed operations and several shortfalls in six of them. Most of these shortfalls were related to the proposed operations’ operational feasibility, such as whether they had adequate means for carrying out their missions and their duration was tied to clear objectives and realistic exit criteria. Executive branch assessments also identified concerns about some factors. On the basis of our analysis of executive branch records, figure 2 summarizes executive branch assessments of the Directive 25 factors for the proposed operations at the time of the eight Deputies Committee decisions. The following sections briefly describe the Directive 25 shortfalls identified in executive branch assessments of the proposed operations. As shown in figure 2, executive branch assessments of the proposed U.N. Mission in East Timor identified four Directive 25 shortfalls. First, assessments questioned whether the preconditions for a peacekeeping operation (a cease-fire in place and the parties consent to the deployment of a U.N. force) existed in East Timor. Violence against pro-independence factions continued and, despite the Indonesian government’s announced consent to the operation, Indonesian security forces appeared to be supporting this violence. Second, assessments questioned whether, in the face of this continuing violence, there was a clear understanding of where the proposed operation would fit between peacekeeping and peace enforcement. Third, assessments questioned whether the proposed operation’s mandate was appropriate. Despite concern about violence, the proposed operation did not include peacekeeping troops primarily because Indonesia objected to the deployment of such forces. Additionally, the role and objectives of the civilian police component were unclear given the scope of the violence. Fourth, assessments questioned whether the proposed operation’s exit criteria were realistic because there was a gap of several months between the end of the operation and a proposed follow-on U.N. operation. On May 27, 1999, the Deputies Committee decided the United States would vote in the U.N. Security Council to authorize the proposed peacekeeping operation. Factors considered in this decision included U.S. interests in aiding Australia and ending the violence in East Timor, regional support for U.N. action, and the judgment that U.N. action was East Timor’s best opportunity for democratic development. Executive branch assessments of the proposed International Force in East Timor identified one Directive 25 shortfall. As shown in figure 2, assessments questioned whether the operation’s duration was linked to realistic criteria for ending the operation. The operation’s general exit strategy was to restore peace and security to East Timor and then transfer responsibility for maintaining peace and security to the proposed U.N. Transitional Administration in East Timor. However, at the time executive branch officials made their decision, the specific timing and criteria for this transfer were uncertain. The Deputies Committee decided that the United States would vote in the U.N. Security Council to authorize the proposed multilateral peace enforcement operation. As before, factors considered in this decision included U.S. interests in aiding Australia and ending the violence in East Timor. Led by Australia, the multinational force began deploying in East Timor on September 20, 1999. Executive branch assessments of the proposed U.N. Transitional Administration in East Timor identified one Directive 25 shortfall. As shown in figure 2, assessments questioned whether the proposed operation had adequate means—specifically, forces and financing—to carry out its extensive nation-building tasks. In particular, assessments questioned whether the United Nations could recruit sufficient troops and international civilians to staff the operation. Although not identifying a clear shortfall in international support for U.N. action in East Timor, several assessments noted some members states’ concerns about whether the proposed operation would violate Indonesia’s sovereignty. On October 8, 1999, the Deputies Committee decided that the United States would vote for the proposed peace enforcement and nation-building operation. Factors considered in this decision included U.S. interests in aiding important regional allies and the judgment that a U.N. operation was the best choice for administering East Timor during its transition to independence. As shown in figure 2, executive branch assessments of the proposed expansion of the U.N. Observer Mission in Sierra Leone identified three shortfalls. First, assessments questioned whether the preconditions for a peacekeeping operation existed in Sierra Leone. Fighting continued in some areas of the country, and there was concern about whether the rebels and Liberia truly consented to the deployment of an expanded U.N. force. Second, assessments questioned whether the proposed operation had adequate means to carry out its mission in the face of potential rebel resistance. Third, assessments questioned whether the proposed operation’s duration was linked to realistic criteria for ending it. Concerns included whether the proposed milestones for completing some tasks were realistic and whether rebel forces would disarm and relinquish control of diamond-producing areas, as called for in the Lomé Peace Agreement. On August 5, 1999, the Deputies Committee decided to support the proposed expansion of the peacekeeping operation. Factors considered in this decision included U.S. interests in resolving the conflict in Sierra Leone, maintaining regional stability, and ending the violence against innocent civilians. Executive branch assessments of the proposed U.N. Mission in Sierra Leone identified four shortfalls, as shown in figure 2. First, assessments again questioned whether the preconditions for a peacekeeping operation existed in Sierra Leone. Fighting continued in some areas of the country, and there was continuing concern about whether the rebels and Liberia truly consented to the deployment of an expanded U.N. force. Second, assessments questioned whether, in the face of continuing violence, there was a clear understanding of where the proposed operation would fit between peacekeeping and peace enforcement. Third, assessments questioned whether the proposed operation had adequate means to carry out its mission—identifying shortfalls in its forces, financing, and mandate. One concern was whether some proposed troop contingents had adequate training and equipment to deal effectively with rebel resistance. Fourth, assessments questioned whether the proposed operation’s duration was linked to clear objectives and realistic criteria for ending it. One concern was whether rebel forces would disarm and relinquish control of diamond- producing areas. On October 8, 1999, the Deputies Committee decided that the United States would vote to authorize this new peacekeeping operation. Factors considered in this decision included the unacceptable humanitarian consequences of inaction, particularly continued human rights abuses by rebel forces, and support for U.N. action by U.N. Security Council members and important regional states, including Nigeria, Guinea, and Ghana. As shown in figure 2, executive branch assessments of the proposed expansion of the U.N. Mission in Sierra Leone identified three shortfalls. First, assessments questioned whether there was a clear understanding of where the proposed operation would fit between peacekeeping and peace enforcement. One concern was whether a peace enforcement operation could maintain the neutrality and consent needed to carry out some peacekeeping tasks. Second, assessments questioned whether the proposed operation had adequate means to carry out its mission, expressing concern about whether its forces, financing, and mandate were appropriate. One concern was whether some proposed troop contingents—which were poorly trained and equipped—could effectively carry out peace enforcement tasks. Third, assessments questioned whether the proposed operation’s duration was linked to clear objectives and realistic criteria for ending it. A continuing concern was whether the rebels would disarm and relinquish control of diamond-producing areas. On January 24, 2000, the Deputies Committee decided that the United States would vote to expand the U.N. Mission in Sierra Leone and authorize it to use force to accomplish some tasks. Factors considered in this decision included U.S. interests in preventing this conflict from spreading to neighboring states, the unacceptable humanitarian consequences of inaction, and international support for U.N. action. Executive branch assessments of the proposed U.N. Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo identified four shortfalls, as shown in figure 2. First, assessments questioned whether the preconditions for a peacekeeping operation existed in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Fighting continued in some areas of the country, and it was uncertain whether the warring parties consented to the deployment of a U.N. force. Second, assessments questioned whether, in the face of continuing violence, there was a clear understanding of where the proposed operation fit between peacekeeping and peace enforcement. Third, assessments questioned whether the proposed operation had adequate means—appropriate forces, financing, and mandate—to carry out its mission. Concerns included whether U.N. forces would have adequate protection and could move about the vast country effectively. Fourth, assessments questioned whether the proposed operation’s duration was linked to clear objectives and realistic criteria for ending it. One concern was the potential for the United Nations to become more deeply involved in the conflict. In recognition of such shortfalls, the United States rejected proposals to deploy a large (up to 30,000 troops) U.N. peacekeeping force in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Instead, the Deputies Committee decided on July 23, 1999, that the United States would vote to support a small monitoring operation. Factors considered in this decision included U.S. interests in resolving the conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, which involved several regional states; maintaining regional stability; and preventing the resurgence of genocide and mass killings in Central Africa. As shown in figure 2, executive branch assessments of the proposed expansion (phase II) of the U.N. Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo identified three Directive 25 shortfalls. These assessments reflected the same basic concerns identified in executive branch assessments of the initial operation (previously described). Again, in recognition of such shortfalls, the United States rejected proposals to deploy a large U.N. peacekeeping force. Instead, the Deputies Committee decided on January 24, 2000, that the United States would vote to support a proposed peacekeeping operation that would deploy up to 5,537 troops (including up to 500 observers) in phases. Under the proposal, these phased deployments were tied to the attainment of specific objectives related to the shortfalls, such as the parties establishing a durable cease- fire. As before, factors considered in the decision included U.S. interests in resolving the conflict, restoring regional stability, and humanitarian concerns. As part of the process of making the eight decisions, executive branch officials attempted to improve the operations’ chances of success by shaping their mandates and forces to eliminate identified shortfalls. For example, concerned that objectives for the U.N. Mission in Sierra Leone were unclear, the Peacekeeping Core Group directed officials at the U.S. Mission to the United Nations to work with other U.N. member states and U.N. officials to link the objectives more directly to helping the government and the rebels implement the Lomé Peace Agreement. This was accomplished before the Deputies Committee decided to support the operation and allowed executive branch officials to change their assessment of this Directive 25 factor to reflect that the operation had clear objectives (see fig. 2). Additionally, concerned that the presence of regional peacekeeping forces was vital to the success to this operation, the Deputies Committee and Peacekeeping Core Group directed State and Defense officials to develop options for providing financial and logistical support to encourage the continued engagement of regional forces. In other cases, for example, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, executive branch officials “helped shape the scope and scale of the U.N. mission…to ensure achievable objectives…and avoid overextending the and sending in peacekeepers before the conflict was ripe for resolution or a political settlement was still in the making.” In all eight decisions where Directive 25 shortfalls could not be addressed adequately before the U.N. Security Council voted, executive branch officials worked to mitigate the risks associated with these weaknesses by reducing the shortfalls’ impact on the operations. For example, concerned about the capability of forces serving in the U.N. Mission in Sierra Leone, the Deputies Committee and the Peacekeeping Core Group directed U.S. officials to (1) contact U.N. members and officials to seek more capable forces and (2) develop options for providing logistical support for some troop contingents. Furthermore, concerned about whether the cease-fire would hold in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Deputies Committee directed U.S. officials to monitor compliance closely and apply diplomatic pressure to the warring parties to observe the cease-fire agreement. Our analysis of executive branch records identified similar attempts to address other Directive 25 shortfalls for the eight decisions we reviewed. Appendix IV provides information about some of the actions taken by the executive branch to address Directive 25 shortfalls. The executive branch provided a substantial amount of information to the Congress about the proposed operations in consultations before or just after the decisions to support them. This information described how the proposed operations advanced U.S. interests, the conflicts that the proposed operations were intended to address, and other related considerations. Executive branch consultations about the two decisions regarding proposed operations in the Democratic Republic of the Congo also described Directive 25 shortfalls, which helped build support in the Congress for the decisions to vote for deploying these operations. However, for the other six decisions we found little or no evidence that executive branch officials informed the Congress about the proposed operations’ Directive 25 shortfalls either in consultations with the Congress before the executive branch decided on the operations or in the information provided to the Congress in writing just after the decisions were made. Additionally, aside from the shortfall issue, executive branch officials had considerable detailed information about the proposed operations well in advance of the time they provided this information to the Congress. Our analysis of executive branch records and transcripts of monthly peacekeeping briefings for the Senate, supplemented by our observation of similar briefings for the House, showed that the executive branch began providing information to the Congress about the proposed operations in East Timor, Sierra Leone, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo as long as 4 to 6 months before the eight decisions. At monthly peacekeeping briefings, executive officials provided information about the status of ongoing U.N. operations and proposals for new or expanded operations. At these briefings, executive branch officials provided copies of key U.N. Secretary General reports, the U.N. Security Council’s upcoming calendar and work program, and monthly reports of peacekeeping finances and troop contributions. Additionally, senior executive branch officials briefed Members of Congress and their staffs about the U.N. Secretary General’s proposals for proposed peacekeeping operations and related topics. For example, in February 2000, senior officials provided a special briefing to the Chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations about the conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The briefing included detailed information about the factions in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the role of neighboring states in the conflict, such as Rwanda, Uganda, and Zimbabwe. Administration officials also testified several times before the Congress about the operations and had separate telephone discussions and other meetings as noted in their log of congressional contacts. For seven of the eight decisions we reviewed, the executive branch informed the Congress in writing of its decision to support the proposed operation within a few days of the Deputies Committee’s decision. These letters were dated at least 15 days before the U.N. Security Council voted on the matter and were transmitted to the Congress for the purpose of meeting one of the peacekeeping reporting requirements in the U.N. Participation Act. The information required to be provided for each proposed operation includes the “anticipated duration, mandate, and command and control arrangements…the planned exit strategy, and the vital national interests to be served.” These letters provided the Congress with the most comprehensive and detailed information it received about the proposed operations. As discussed in the following section, executive branch consultations— such as briefings and reports—provided the Congress with substantial information about the U.S. interests in the proposed operations and details about their mandate, cost, and exit strategy. However, these consultations provided limited information about Directive 25 shortfalls. Figure 3 shows the typical timing and content of consultations with the Congress about the seven decisions. Although neither Directive 25 nor the U.N. Participation Act required that the executive branch consult with the Congress about operational shortfalls in the proposed operations, executive branch officials recognize that “U.S. policy-makers’ views on the shortfalls, challenges and risks associated with successfully undertaking an operation” should be addressed comprehensively during consultation discussions with the Congress. Our analysis of executive branch records and transcripts of monthly peacekeeping briefings for the Senate, supplemented by our observation of similar briefings for the House, showed that the executive branch provided the Congress with substantial information about the U.S. interests in all of the proposed operations and general information about their mandates, cost, and exit strategies. However, we found no evidence that the Congress was informed about most shortfalls identified in executive branch assessments of the proposed operations for East Timor and Sierra Leone. As previously discussed, these shortfalls included judgments that the proposed operations lacked adequate means to carry out their missions or their duration was not linked to realistic exit criteria. In contrast, our analysis showed that the Congress was informed about most shortfalls identified in executive branch assessments of the proposed operations in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. According to congressional staff, this information provided the Congress with an opportunity to develop a more informed opinion about the proposed operations and better convey to policy-makers its views about them. The following examples illustrate our findings about the content of executive branch consultations. Prior to the May 1999 decision to support the U.N. Mission in East Timor, executive branch assessments identified four Directive 25 shortfalls in the proposed operation. For example, 13 assessments questioned whether the operation’s mandate was appropriate, in part because the role and objectives of the civilian police component were unclear. Similarly, five assessments questioned whether the operation’s duration was tied to realistic exit criteria. In the months before the May decision, executive branch officials briefed the Congress at least 10 times about peacekeeping issues. Our analysis of executive branch and congressional records showed that those briefings provided substantial information about (1) how the proposed operation would advance the United States’ substantial security, political, and commercial interests in Indonesia; (2) the threat to international peace and security posed by the violent attacks in civilians; and (3) the necessity of U.N. action to ensure a free and fair vote. Additionally, these briefings provided information about one shortfall— concerns about whether the preconditions for a peacekeeping operation existed in East Timor. However, these briefings did not provide information about the other three shortfalls identified in executive branch assessments. Moreover, our analysis showed that these three shortfalls were not cited in the reports and other written material provided to the Congress. Prior to the August 1999 decision to support the expansion of the U.N. Observer Mission in Sierra Leone, executive branch assessments identified three shortfalls in the proposed operation. For example, six assessments questioned whether the rebels truly consented to the deployment of an expanded U.N. force and the proposed operation had adequate means to carry out its mission in the face of potential rebel resistance. In the months before the August decision, executive branch officials briefed the Congress at least 16 times about peacekeeping issues. Our analysis of executive branch and congressional records showed that six of those briefings provided substantial information about the threat to international peace and security posed by the humanitarian crisis and the danger of the conflict spreading to neighboring countries. These briefings also provided information about how the proposed operation would advance U.S. interests in supporting the West African peacekeeping force in providing regional security. Additionally, these briefings provided information about one shortfall—concerns about whether the preconditions for a peacekeeping operation existed in Sierra Leone because of uncertain rebel consent. However, these briefings did not provide information about the other two shortfalls; moreover, these two shortfalls were not cited in the reports and other written material provided to the Congress. Prior to the February 2000 decision to support the expansion of the U.N. Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, executive branch assessments identified three shortfalls in the proposed operation. For example, six assessments questioned whether the operation had adequate means—appropriate forces, financing, and mandate—to accomplish its mission and its duration was tied to realistic exit criteria. In the months before the February decision, executive branch officials briefed the Congress at least 12 times about peacekeeping issues. Our analysis of executive branch and congressional records showed that, in contrast to the previous two examples, those briefings provided substantial information about all three shortfalls. Moreover, our analysis showed that these three shortfalls were cited in the reports and other written material provided to the Congress. The February 7 letter informing the Congress of the decision to support the proposed operation, for example, clearly cited executive branch concerns that the warring parties were not observing the cease-fire and that the U.N. force would have to provide for its own security and protection in many areas because the parties lacked the capability. According to congressional staff, this information helped the Congress develop an informed opinion about the risks associated with this operation and reflected similar information provided in briefings and other consultations that occurred before the notification. Figure 4 summarizes our analysis of the information the executive branch provided to the Congress about the Directive 25 shortfalls that existed at the time the Deputies Committee decided the United States would vote for the operations. In each case in which the figure identifies a lack of consultation about a shortfall, our analysis of executive branch records showed that assessments consistently had identified a shortfall in this factor before the decision to support the operation in the U.N. Security Council. Our analysis also showed that executive branch assessments had identified shortfalls in other factors, but figure 4 does not include these shortfalls because assessments of these factors changed during the decision-making process. Senior executive branch officials told us that they did not consult with the Congress about some Directive 25 shortfalls because (1) the administration had not reached a consensus on whether they were actual shortfalls and (2) it had not decided whether to support the operations. Additionally, executive branch officials stated that congressional committees, members, and staff had ample opportunity to ask questions about the shortfalls but did not pose specific questions to the executive branch about Directive 25 weaknesses. Moreover, according to one executive branch official, the administration provided considerable negative information about the operations, but it was up to the Congress to reach its own conclusion. Finally, executive branch officials said that it could be more forthcoming in briefing the Congress if the briefings were held in secure settings. According to these officials, the information about shortfalls was sensitive, and many of the briefings were held in relatively open forums. If the information were to become publicly known, it could be used to undermine U.S. strategy and U.N. operations. Despite these issues, executive branch officials said that the concerns expressed by the Congress during the consultations were integrated into the executive branch’s decision-making deliberations. Our review of executive branch records showed that officials did consider anticipated congressional reactions during the decision-making process. For example, the executive branch often internally discussed the reaction of congressional Members and staff to the costs and availability of troops to support the operations, particularly with the proposed expansion of the operations in Sierra Leone and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The information provided to the Congress in writing by the executive branch for the purpose of meeting the consultation requirements established by the U.N. Participation Act provided the Congress with the most comprehensive and detailed information it received about the proposed peacekeeping operations. The executive branch provided this information at about the same time that the U.N. Secretary General first made recommendations to the U.N. Security Council about the composition and mandate of the proposed operations. However, U.S. officials knew many details about the likely shape of the operations well before this time, because they had been working with other U.N. members and U.N. officials to develop and refine them. Although neither Directive 25 nor the U.N. Participation Act required the executive branch to provide such information sooner than it did, earlier disclosure of this information would have provided the Congress with more time to assess and develop an informed opinion about the proposed operations. The following two examples involving East Timor illustrate this issue. The executive branch informed the Congress of its intent to vote for the U.N. Mission in East Timor in a letter dated May 27, 1999—just over 2 weeks before the U.N. Security Council authorized the operation. This letter provided the Congress with the most complete information it had received to date about the proposed operation’s purpose, composition, mandate, financing, exit strategy, and relationship to U.S. national interests. The letter also informed the Congress for the first time that the executive branch anticipated a U.N. operation to administer the transition to independence if the people of East Timor rejected autonomy and Indonesia ended the territory’s annexation. However, executive branch officials had been working since early April 1999 to develop a conceptual framework for a series of operations in East Timor. On April 8, for example, executive branch officials had completed a paper outlining a conceptual framework for three potential operations in East Timor. This paper proposed three sequential operations—one to organize and conduct a free and fair vote to determine East Timor’s future status, one to stabilize East Timor following the vote, and one to organize and direct its transition to autonomy or independence. This paper noted that the stabilization mission might require a multinational force and that the transition mission would involve development assistance and the creation of governmental and economic institutions. Additionally, on May 7, executive branch officials completed a detailed Directive 25 analysis of the proposed U.N. Mission in East Timor. During April and May 1999, executive branch officials briefed congressional staff four times about U.N. peacekeeping issues, but our analysis showed that they did not provide details about the proposed East Timor operations at these briefings. The executive branch informed the Congress of its intent to vote for the U.N. Transitional Administration in East Timor in a letter dated October 8, 1999—about 2-½ weeks before the U.N. Security Council authorized the operation. As before, this letter provided the Congress with the most complete information it had received to date about the proposed operation’s purpose, composition, mandate, financing, exit strategy, and relationship to U.S. national interests. However, in August 1999, the executive branch had completed a paper that (1) described in detail many components of the proposed operation (as one of several possible contingencies) and (2) directed U.S. officials to work with U.N. and other officials in developing more detailed plans for these components. By early September 1999, the executive branch had completed a full concept of operations for this operation. During August and September, executive branch officials briefed congressional staff several times about U.N. peacekeeping issues, but our analysis showed that they did not provide details about the proposed East Timor operation at these briefings. Executive branch officials told us that, although they provided considerable information to the Congress about potential or proposed peacekeeping operations in East Timor and other locations, they did not provide some detailed information sooner because it was related to (1) their routine, ongoing work with U.N. and other officials and did not represent a unified executive branch position and (2) the internal deliberative process of the executive branch. For the cases we examined, the driving factors in the decisions to support operations in East Timor, Sierra Leone, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo were the executive branch judgments that the operations advanced U.S. interests and that the consequences of inaction were unacceptable. Directive 25 served as a framework for identifying shortfalls and tasks to be undertaken to strengthen the proposed operations. Consequently, the decisions we examined clearly demonstrated a trade- off—proceed with operations judged to advance U.S. interests but accept the risk of failure inherent in operations having Directive 25 shortfalls. Consultation with the Congress did occur, but information about the full range of executive branch officials’ views on the benefits, challenges, and risks associated with supporting the operations in East Timor and Sierra Leone was not provided to the Congress so that it could develop a fully informed opinion and make decisions about appropriating funds for the operations. In contrast, more complete information about the benefits, risks, and challenges associated with supporting the operations in the Democratic Republic of the Congo was provided to the Congress. This positive model of consultation helped in developing congressional support for the executive branch’s decisions on these operations and was consistent with the expectations of Directive 25 and the spirit of the U.N. Participation Act. To improve executive branch consultations with the Congress, we recommend that the Secretary of State and other appropriate officials provide the Congress with timely, detailed, and complete information about Directive 25 shortfalls for all proposed new or substantially revised peacekeeping operations and the plans to mitigate the shortfalls. The timing of providing such information to the Congress is a matter of judgment; however, at a minimum, this information should be provided no later than at the time the Congress is informed in writing about the decisions to support such operations. Although Presidential Decision Directive 25 was issued by the Clinton administration, the Bush administration continues to use this guidance and is required by law to consult with the Congress about peacekeeping decisions. Accordingly, we obtained comments from the current administration (the National Security Council and the Departments of State and Defense) regarding its evaluation of this report and our recommendation on consultation. The National Security Council and the State Department provided written comments on this report. Their comments are reprinted in appendixes V and VI. The Defense Department elected not to provide written comments, but a Defense official told us that the Department concurred with State’s written comments. The Departments of State and Defense also provided technical comments, which we incorporated into this report as appropriate. The State Department did not characterize its views on this report. However, in reference to our recommendation, State said that it intended to continue to provide the Congress with timely, detailed and complete information about all new or substantially revised U.N. peacekeeping operations, including known potential and actual problem areas. Noting that the timing of the provision of this information is a matter of judgment, State said that it planned to continue to provide this information in a timely way, no later than the time that the Congress is informed in writing about decisions to support such operations. The National Security Council said that it appreciated the opportunity to review our report, had taken note of its findings, but did not have any comments on the report. The Acting Senior Director for Democracy, Human Rights, and International Operations wrote that the Council understood the importance of consulting with the Congress on peacekeeping missions and looked forward to working closely with the Congress on these and other important national security issues. As arranged with your office, we plan no further distribution of this report until 30 days from the date of the report unless you publicly announce its contents earlier. At that time, we will send copies to interested congressional committees and to the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs; the Secretary of State; and the Secretary of Defense. Copies will also be made available to other interested parties upon request. If you have any questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 512-4128. Other GAO contacts and staff acknowledgments are listed in appendix VII. Since the end of the Cold War, U.N. and other multilateral peacekeeping operations have been an important component of U.S. foreign policy. For the eight decisions we reviewed, annual U.S. national security strategy reports and several Presidential Decision Directives provided guidance to executive branch officials making decisions about U.S. support for these operations, managing these operations once authorized, and consulting with the Congress about these matters. Additionally, the Congress in recent years has enacted peacekeeping notification and reporting requirements to enhance its ability to play a more effective role on these matters. Several U.S. policies established the basic framework for executive branch decision-making about U.S. support for U.N. or other multilateral peacekeeping operations. Annual U.S. national security strategy reports defined U.S. national interests. Several Presidential Decision Directives established the basic framework for U.S. national security decision- making and provide specific guidance to executive branch officials for making decisions about U.S. support for peacekeeping operations and managing these operations once authorized. Annual U.S. national security strategy reports recognize that, since there are always many demands for U.S. action, U.S. national interests must be clear. Toward this end, these reports established a three-level basic hierarchy of U.S. interests to guide executive branch decisions about national security matters, including peacekeeping. Table 2 describes these interests. In addition to defining U.S. national interests, the 1996 U.S. National Security Strategy Report recognized that, to maximize the benefits (to U.S. interests) of U.N. peace operations, the United States must make highly disciplined choices about when and under what circumstances to support or participate in these operations. Presidential Decision Directive 2 (Organization of the National Security Council), issued in March 1993, established the basic framework for executive branch decision-making on national security issues, consistent with the National Security Act of 1947, as amended. This directive established two senior-level interagency committees, known as the Principals and the Deputies Committees. The Principals Committee was the senior interagency forum for the consideration of policy issues affecting U.S. national security. The committee’s function was to review, coordinate, and monitor the development and implementation of national security policy. It was intended to be a flexible forum for Cabinet-level officials to meet to discuss and resolve issues not requiring the President’s participation. Members of the committee were as follows in 1999-2000: Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (chair) Secretary of State (or Deputy Secretary) Secretary of Defense (or Deputy Secretary) U.S. Representative to the United Nations Director of Central Intelligence Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Assistant to the President for Economic Policy Assistant to the Vice President for National Security Affairs The Secretary of Treasury, the Attorney General, and other heads of departments and agencies were invited as needed. The Deputies Committee was the senior sub-Cabinet interagency forum for consideration of policy issues affecting U.S. national security. The committee’s function was to review and monitor the work of the interagency process and to focus attention on policy implementation. It assisted the Principals Committee by addressing policy decisions below the Principals’ level and was the main forum for making decisions on U.S. support for U.N. peacekeeping. Members of the committee were as follows in 1999-2000: Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (chair) Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Deputy Director of Central Intelligence Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Deputy Assistant to the President for Economic Policy Assistant to the Vice President for National Security Affairs Other senior department and agency officials were invited as needed. Presidential Decision Directive 25 (Clinton Administration Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations), issued in May 1994, charged executive branch officials with making “disciplined and coherent choices” about when and under what circumstances to support or participate in these operations. It directed executive branch officials to consider a range of factors to determine operations’ political and practical feasibility when deciding whether to vote in the U.N. Security Council for proposed U.N. or U.N.-authorized peacekeeping operations. Directive 25 stated that (1) these factors were an aid in executive branch decision-making and did not constitute a prescriptive device and (2) decisions would be made on the cumulative weight of the factors, with no single factor necessarily being an absolute determinant. Table 3 lists the Directive 25 factors. Directive 25 instructed U.S. officials to apply additional factors when deciding whether to recommend to the President that U.S. personnel participate in proposed multilateral operations. For operations that were likely to involve combat, it directed U.S. officials to apply even more rigorous factors in their decision-making. Directive 25 assigned the State Department primary responsibility for managing and funding peacekeeping operations in which U.S. combat troops did not participate. It assigned the Defense Department primary responsibility for managing and funding those peacekeeping operations in which U.S. combat troops participated and for all peace enforcement operations. However, the Defense Department never actually received this responsibility. An interagency working group—known as the Peacekeeping Core Group—managed day-to-day Directive 25 decision-making and implementation for U.N. peacekeeping operations. This group was chaired by the National Security Council’s Senior Director for Multilateral and Humanitarian Affairs and consisted of assistant and deputy assistant secretaries of U.S. government Departments and agencies. Directive 56 (Managing Complex Contingency Operations), issued in 1997, guided executive branch officials in managing implementation of ongoing, smaller-scale contingency operations, including some multilateral peacekeeping operations. Directive 68 (International Public Information), issued in 1999, guided executive branch officials in coordinating public information activities in support of complex contingency operations, including multilateral peacekeeping operations. Directive 71 (Strengthening Criminal Justice Systems in support of Peace Operations and Other Complex Contingencies), issued in 2000, guided executive branch officials in improving U.S. response to the criminal justice aspects of peacekeeping operations to aid in the successful transition to durable peace and a timely exit of peacekeepers. Presidential Decision Directive 25 recognized that sustaining U.S. support for U.N. and multilateral operations requires that the Congress and the American people understand and accept the value of such operations as tools for advancing U.S. interests. Toward this end, Directive 25 stated that the “Congress must…be actively involved in the continuing implementation of U.S. policy on peacekeeping” and that the “Congress and the American people must…be genuine participants in the processes that support U.S. decision-making on new and on-going peace operations.” Directive 25 recognized that the executive branch traditionally “has not solicited the involvement of Congress or the American people on matters related to U.N. peacekeeping.” It concluded that this “lack of communication is not desirable in an era when peace operations have become numerous, complex, and expensive.” Directive 25 instructed executive branch officials to undertake six specific initiatives “to improve and regularize communication and consultation” with the Congress about U.N. peacekeeping to ensure that sufficient public and congressional support existed for proposed operations. Additionally, the Congress has enacted peacekeeping consultation and reporting requirements to enhance its ability to play a more effective role on these matters. The U.N. Participation Act of 1945, as amended, for example, requires the President to (1) consult with and provide information to the Congress in writing at least 15 days before the U.N. Security Council votes to authorize or expand U.N. peacekeeping operations and (2) consult monthly with the Congress on the status of U.N. peacekeeping operations, including anticipated operations. Table 4 summarizes the consultation, notification, and reporting requirements for U.N. peacekeeping operations. Our study is based on a review of eight executive branch decisions made between May 1999 and February 2000 to vote in the U.N. Security Council to authorize or expand the operations in East Timor, Sierra Leone, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (see table 1). The Chairman of the House Committee on International Relations and the Chairman of the Subcommittee on the Middle East and South Asia, House Committee on International Relations, asked us to assess how executive branch officials used Presidential Decision Directive 25 in deciding to support the authorization or expansion of peacekeeping operations in these locations and how the officials consulted with the Congress about the decisions. Specifically, we assessed whether executive branch officials considered all applicable Directive 25 factors before making their decisions and identified shortfalls in any of these factors at the time the decisions were made and how the executive branch officials consulted with the Congress during the decision-making process, including the timing and content of the information provided. To assess whether executive branch officials considered all applicable Directive 25 factors, we collected and analyzed information from more than 200 National Security Council and State and Defense Department records related to these decisions. These records included summaries of conclusions of Deputies Committee and Peacekeeping Core Group meetings, decision memorandums, concept and briefing papers, and Directive 25 analyses (prepared for five of the eight decisions). We used a checklist of Directive 25 factors to collect information from these records about executive branch consideration and assessment of Directive 25 factors. We entered information into a database and analyzed it to determine whether executive branch officials (1) considered all Directive 25 factors before deciding to vote to authorize or expand U.N. operations, (2) identified Directive 25 shortfalls at the time they made their decisions, and (3) took actions to address identified shortfalls. To gain an understanding of the wider context in which these decisions were made, we supplemented this analysis by (1) reviewing several hundred other executive branch records, such as State and Defense Department intelligence analyses, and (2) discussing our analysis of the eight decisions with State and Defense Department and National Security Council officials. As we informed you several times, executive branch officials, citing deliberative process concerns, denied us full and complete access to records related to the eight decisions in our study, particularly records created during the earlier stages of the decision-making process.Although executive branch officials briefed us about some of the information in these records, as discussed in our auditing standards, this lack of full and complete access limited our ability to form independent and objective opinions and conclusions about the process used by U.S. decision-makers to weigh various assessments and arrive at an interagency position. As a result, we limited the scope of our study primarily to the outcome of the decision-making process—that is, whether executive officials considered Directive 25 factors in making decisions, not how they considered them and arrived at decisions. For example, although our analysis showed that State and Defense officials’ assessments of some Directive 25 factors differed at some points, we were unable to determine how executive branch officials reached consensus on these factors during the interagency process. Consequently, this report does not discuss such issues. Because most of the records we examined were classified, some of the information in this report is necessarily general. To assess executive branch consultations with the Congress about the eight decisions, we collected and analyzed information from both executive branch and congressional records. Executive branch records included State and Defense Department summaries of monthly and special briefings, notification letters and reports required by U.S. law, the State Department’s congressional contact log, and written statements of senior executive branch officials testifying before Senate and House committees. Congressional records included transcripts of monthly executive branch briefings for the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations and written statements by committee and subcommittee chairmen and other Members of Congress. We examined these records to determine whether executive branch officials had complied with the consultation and reporting requirements in Directive 25 and relevant laws. For example, we determined whether executive branch officials had notified the Congress in writing of their decisions before the U.S. Representative to the United Nations voted in the U.N. Security Council. We used a checklist of Directive 25 factors to collect information from executive branch and congressional records about executive branch consultations for the eight decisions. We entered this information into a database and analyzed it to determine the timing and content of information provided to the Congress. We conducted our work from March 2000 to July 2001 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. The following tables present timelines of the key international and U.S. events leading up to the approval of the proposed U.N. and multilateral operations in East Timor, Sierra Leone, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo for the eight decisions we reviewed. Table 5 presents a timeline of key events leading up to the approval of the U.N. Mission in East Timor (UNAMET), the International Force in East Timor (INTERFET), and the U.N. Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET). The shaded text highlights summaries of the mandates for these three operations. Table 6 presents a timeline of key events leading up to the approval of the U.N. Observer Mission in Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL), the U.N. Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL), and the expansion of UNAMSIL. The shaded text highlights summaries of the mandates for these three operations. Table 7 presents a timeline of key events leading up to the approval of the U.N. Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) and the expansion of this operation (Phase II). The shaded text highlights summaries of the mandates for these two operations. Our analysis of executive branch records showed that, for the eight decisions we reviewed, executive branch officials worked to reduce risks and maximize the chances of operational success by taking steps to eliminate, or reduce the impact of, Presidential Decision Directive 25 shortfalls on the proposed operations. Before the Deputies Committee or U.N. Security Council approved the operations, executive branch officials worked to shape the proposed operations’ objectives, mandates, and forces to eliminate shortfalls or reduce their impact. Where such shortfalls could not be addressed before operations were approved, executive branch officials undertook various activities to reduce their operational impact. Table 8 shows some of the actions taken by executive branch officials to address Directive 25 shortfalls for the eight decisions we reviewed. In addition to the persons named above, Michael Rohrback, Zina Merritt, Richard Seldin, Rona Mendelsohn, and Lynn Cothern made key contributions to this report.

Summary: Presidential Decision Directive 25 states that U.S. involvement in international peacekeeping operations must be selective and effective. Toward this end, the directive established guidance that U.S. officials must consider before deciding whether to support proposed operations, including whether the operations advanced U.S. interests, had realistic criteria for ending the operations, and had appropriate forces and financing to accomplish their missions. The directive established these factors as an aid for executive decision-making and not as criteria for supporting particular operations. Executive branch officials thoroughly considered all Presidential Decision Directive 25 factors before deciding to support the authorization or expansion of peacekeeping operations in East Timor, Sierra Leone, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. At the time the decisions were made, executive branch assessments identified at least one Directive 25 shortfall in all of the proposed operations and several shortfalls in six of them. Executive branch officials nonetheless decided to support the operations because they believed that these shortfalls were outweighed by the presence of other Directive 25 factors and various other factors, including U.S. interests in the region. Executive branch officials provided Congress with considerable information about the conflicts that the proposed operations were intended to address. However, GAO found no evidence that Congress was informed about most Directive 25 shortfalls identified in executive branch assessments of the proposed operations in East Timor and Sierra Leone or about U.S. plans to address the risks posed by these shortfalls. Congress was informed, about most shortfalls identified in executive branch assessments of the proposed U.N. operations in the Congo.