According to State, a terrorist safe haven is an area of relative security that can be exploited by terrorists to undertake activities such as recruiting, training, fundraising, and planning operations. The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (9/11 Commission) noted that the physical safe haven in Afghanistan allowed al Qaeda the operational space to gather recruits and build logistical networks to plan the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks. Concluding that the dangers posed by terrorist safe havens were significant, the 9/11 Commission recommended that the U.S. government identify and prioritize terrorist safe havens, as well as develop strategies to address them. The United States highlights the denial of safe haven to terrorists as a key national security concern in a number of U.S. government and agency strategic documents. For example, National Security Strategies released in 2002, 2006, and 2010 emphasize the importance of denying safe haven to terrorists. In addition, plans issued by various U.S. agencies, such as DOD, DOJ, State, and USAID, as well as the National Intelligence Strategy issued by the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, include language emphasizing the importance of addressing terrorist safe havens (see fig. 1). “Wherever l-Q’id or it terroriffilite ttempt to eabli safe hven … we will meet them with growing pressure … Thee effort will focus on informtion-ring, lw enforcement coopertion, nd eablihing new prctice to conter evolving dversarie. We will o help te … build their ccity for reponle governnce nd ecrity throgh development nd ecrity ector assnce.” “The Wr on Terror … involve the ppliction of ll intrment of ntionl power nd inflence to kill or cptre the terrori; deny them safehven nd control of ny ntion; prevent them from gining ccess to WMD; render potentil terrorit trget less ttrctive trengthening ecrity; nd ct off their rce of fnding nd other rerce they need to operte nd survive.” “One of the mot importnt rerce to extremi safe hven. Safe hven provide the enemy with reltive freedom to pln, orgnize, trin, ret, nd condct opertion.” “The mot intrctable safe hven exiastride interntionorder nd in region where ineffective governnce llow their preence; we must develop the me to deny thee hven to terrori.” “Filed te nd ngoverned ce offer terrorind criminl orgniztion safe hven nd possle ccess to wepon of mass detrction (WMD).” “Deny safe hven to criminl orgniztion involved in drg-relted terrorictivitie.” State’s Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism coordinates policies and programs of U.S. agencies to counter terrorism overseas. According to State, the Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism works with all appropriate elements of the U.S. government to ensure integrated and effective counterterrorism efforts that utilize diplomacy, economic power, intelligence, law enforcement, and military power. These elements include those in the White House, DOD, DHS, DOJ, State, Treasury, USAID, and the intelligence community. The Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism’s role is to provide supervision of international counterterrorism activities, including oversight of resources. Its guiding principles reflect the goals of the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, including denying safe haven to terrorists. Congress has enacted several laws that require the submission of reports to Congress on issues related to the denial of terrorist safe havens. See table 1 for selected legislation. In response to reporting requirements, State annually releases the Country Reports on Terrorism. State’s August 2010 report includes a strategic overview of terrorist threats and a country-by-country discussion of foreign government counterterrorism cooperation. In addition, it includes chapters on weapons of mass destruction terrorism, state sponsors of terrorism, designated foreign terrorist organizations, and terrorist safe havens. According to State, the Country Reports on Terrorism aims to enhance understanding of the terrorist threat, as well as serve as a reference tool to inform policymakers, the public, and U.S. foreign partners about U.S. efforts, progress, and challenges in the campaign against international terrorism. While released by State’s Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, the Country Reports on Terrorism incorporates the views of the National Counterterrorism Center and National Security Staff, as well as other key agencies involved in addressing international terrorism. State identifies existing terrorist safe havens in its annual Country Reports on Terrorism, but does not assess these safe havens with the level of detail recommended by Congress. IRTPA requires State to include a detailed assessment in its annual Country Reports on Terrorism of each country whose territory is being used as a terrorist sanctuary, also known as a terrorist safe haven. The act further recommends that these assessments include, to the extent feasible, details regarding the knowledge of and actions taken to address terrorist activities by countries whose territory is being used as a terrorist safe haven. While State has identified existing terrorist safe havens since 2006, its assessments of these safe havens do not always include the details recommended by Congress. For instance, none of the assessments in State’s August 2010 report included information on the actions taken by countries identified as having terrorist safe havens to prevent trafficking in weapons of mass destruction through their territories. Including this information in State’s reporting could help inform congressional oversight related to terrorist safe havens. IRTPA requires State to include a detailed assessment in its annual Country Reports on Terrorism with respect to each foreign country whose territory is being used as a safe haven for terrorists or terrorist organizations. To fulfill this requirement, State first identifies and then assesses existing terrorist safe havens. Since 2006, State has identified existing terrorist safe havens in a dedicated chapter of its Country Reports on Terrorism. In August 2010, State identified 13 terrorist safe havens. See figure 2 for the terrorist safe havens identified. The online version of this map is interactive. Hover your mouse over each text box to read State’s August 2010 assessment of why each identified country or region is considered a terrorist safe haven. To view these assessments in the offline version, please see appendix II. State has made few changes to the terrorist safe havens identified in its report since the April 2007 Country Reports on Terrorism, which identified 15 terrorist safe havens. Since that report, State has removed two terrorist safe havens—the Afghan-Pakistan Border and Indonesia— from the Country Reports on Terrorism. State officials explained that the Afghan-Pakistan Border was removed in 2009, but Afghanistan and Pakistan are each still identified as terrorist safe havens to highlight the different safe haven issues facing each country. State officials said that Indonesia was removed in 2008 because the country passed counterterrorism legislation and captured several members of the terrorist group Jemaah Islamiyah. IRTPA includes congressional findings that the planning of complex terrorist operations requires safe haven from government and law enforcement interference and that terrorists remain focused on finding such safe havens. Further, IRTPA states that it is the sense of Congress that it should be U.S. policy to identify foreign countries that are being used as terrorist sanctuaries and assess current U.S. tools being used to assist foreign governments to eliminate these safe havens. Accordingly, IRTPA requires State to include detailed assessments of terrorist safe havens in its annual Country Reports on Terrorism. IRTPA also states that these detailed assessments should include, to the extent feasible, a variety of provisions, including information regarding knowledge of and actions to address terrorist activities taken by countries whose territory is being used as a terrorist safe haven. See table 2 for a list of these details. In its Country Reports on Terrorism, State includes a terrorist safe havens chapter with assessments of each terrorist safe haven it identifies to explain why that country or region has been classified as a terrorist safe haven. However, our analysis of the assessments in State’s August 2010 report determined that, while State included information on each identified terrorist safe haven, State did not assess them with the level of detail recommended by Congress. For instance, our evaluation determined that while State generally included information on the extent of knowledge by the government of the country with respect to terrorist activities, it did not include any information in its assessments about the actions countries took to prevent the proliferation of and trafficking in weapons of mass destruction in and through their territories. We also analyzed the “country reports” chapter of State’s August 2010 report and found that some of the information not included in the assessments in the terrorist safe haven chapter was contained in the country reports chapter. For instance, the country report for Yemen contained information regarding the Yemeni government’s actions to cooperate with U.S. counterterrorism efforts. However, like the terrorist safe haven assessments, none of these country reports contained information regarding the actions that countries took to prevent the proliferation of and trafficking in weapons of mass destruction in and through their territories. Table 3 shows the number of safe havens for which State included the recommended details. State officials agreed that details related to the trafficking of weapons of mass destruction through terrorist safe havens were not included in its August 2010 report. These officials stated that time constraints and a limited number of staff present challenges to including these details in the terrorist safe haven assessments. Despite these challenges, officials told us that, after reviewing our analysis, they will gather—and believe they will be able to include—details regarding weapons of mass destruction in the Country Reports on Terrorism to be released in 2011. In previous reporting, we have found that assessments can be used to define requirements and properly focus programs to combat terrorism. Moreover, in IRTPA, Congress has said that it should be U.S. policy to assess U.S. efforts to assist foreign governments to address terrorist safe havens. As such, including all of the details recommended by Congress in the safe haven assessments in State’s Country Reports on Terrorism could help improve congressional understanding and inform congressional oversight related to terrorist safe havens. The U.S. government has not fully addressed reporting requirements to identify U.S. efforts to deny safe haven to terrorists. Congress required the President to submit reports outlining U.S. government efforts to deny or disrupt terrorist safe havens in two laws, IRTPA and the National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 2010. While reports produced in response to IRTPA contain some information on U.S. efforts to address terrorist safe havens, none provides a comprehensive, governmentwide list of U.S. efforts. According to agency officials, compiling a list of U.S. efforts is challenging because of difficulties determining which U.S. efforts specifically address terrorist safe havens. However, a more comprehensive list of U.S. efforts would enhance oversight activities, such as assessing U.S. efforts toward the governmentwide goal of denying safe haven to terrorists. IRTPA required the President to submit a report to Congress that includes an outline of the strategies, tactics, and tools of the U.S. government for disrupting or eliminating the security provided to terrorists by terrorist safe havens. IRTPA also recommended that State update the report annually, to the extent feasible, in its Country Reports on Terrorism. IRTPA notes that it is the sense of Congress that it should be the policy of the United States to implement a coordinated strategy to prevent terrorists from using safe havens and to assess the tools used to assist foreign governments in denying terrorists safe haven. In response to IRTPA provisions, State submitted a report to Congress in April 2006, which it has updated annually as part of its Country Reports on Terrorism. These reports include a section on U.S. strategies, tactics, and tools that identifies several U.S. efforts to address terrorist safe havens. In the August 2010 Country Reports on Terrorism, State identified several U.S. efforts for addressing terrorist safe havens, including programs such as State’s Regional Strategic Initiative, Rewards for Justice, and Antiterrorism Assistance programs. See table 4 for the list of U.S. efforts identified in State’s August 2010 Country Reports on Terrorism. However, State’s August 2010 Country Reports on Terrorism did not include some U.S. efforts that may contribute to addressing terrorist safe havens according to our review of related budget information, strategic documents, and discussions with U.S. officials. Specifically, the list of U.S. efforts to address terrorist safe havens in the Country Reports on Terrorism did not include (1) all of the programs and activities State funds to address terrorist safe havens and (2) programs and activities funded by agencies other than State, such as DOD, DOJ, and Treasury that may contribute to addressing terrorist safe havens. State’s budget information, strategic documents, and discussions with State officials indicate that some State-funded efforts that may contribute to addressing terrorist safe havens were not included in the August 2010 Country Reports on Terrorism. First, budget information in State’s Foreign Assistance Coordination and Tracking System (FACTS) identifies programs and activities to eliminate safe havens that were not included in State’s August 2010 Country Reports on Terrorism. State identified in its budget database budget accounts that fund programs and activities for eliminating safe havens. However, certain activities funded by four of these accounts were not included in State’s August 2010 Country Reports on Terrorism. For example, activities in Chad, a Trans-Saharan country, funded by the development assistance budget account were identified in FACTS as eliminating safe havens, as were some activities in Pakistan funded through the Economic Support Fund. However, neither of these budget accounts was included in State’s August 2010 Country Reports on Terrorism. Second, selected State strategic documents identify additional efforts funded by State that may contribute to denying terrorists safe haven but were not included in the August 2010 Country Reports on Terrorism. For the Philippines, Somalia, and Yemen, we reviewed each country’s fiscal year 2012 mission strategic and resource plan (MSRP), submitted in April 2010, which included program funding information for goals related to addressing terrorist safe havens for fiscal years 2009 through 2015. (For more information on these three countries, see appendix IV.) Our review identified several examples of State-funded efforts that may contribute to addressing terrorist safe havens but were not included in State’s August 2010 Country Reports on Terrorism. For example, the Yemen MSRP indicates that the State-funded Foreign Military Financing program contributed to addressing safe havens in Yemen by funding activities to support border security and counter piracy. In addition, the MSRP for the Philippines included Foreign Military Financing program activities to sustain progress in developing the Philippine Defense Department capability to address terrorist safe havens. However, this program was not included in State’s August 2010 Country Reports on Terrorism. Moreover, USAID development assistance in the Philippines focuses on mitigating conflict, increasing economic opportunities, strengthening health services, and improving education, which, according to the country’s MSRP, can inhibit terrorists from exploiting those living under marginal conditions. Development assistance was not included in State’s August 2010 report. Third, according to State officials, additional efforts undertaken by State, but not identified in State’s August 2010 Country Reports on Terrorism, may contribute to addressing terrorist safe havens. For example, State officials indicated that activities funded through State’s Peacekeeping Operations account contributed to addressing the terrorist safe haven in Somalia because it helped the Transitional Federal Government of Somalia keep the terrorist group al-Shabaab from gaining control of the country’s capital city, Mogadishu. In addition, State’s International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs funded a DOJ International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program effort in the Philippines that may contribute to addressing the terrorist safe haven in that country by providing police development and capacity building programs in areas used by terrorists for illicit travel. Similarly, officials indicated that State- funded Immigrations and Customs Enforcement training for Filipino and Yemeni officials to combat money laundering and bulk cash smuggling may contribute to addressing the safe havens in their countries. State- funded Peacekeeping Operations, the International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program, and Immigration and Customs Enforcement training programs were not included in State’s August 2010 Country Reports on Terrorism. In total, our analysis identified nine examples of State-funded efforts in the Philippines, four examples in Somalia, and nine examples in Yemen not included in State’s August 2010 Country Reports on Terrorism that may contribute to addressing terrorist safe havens. Table 7 in appendix V describes U.S. efforts funded by State to address terrorist safe havens as identified by agency officials or MSRPs for the Philippines, Somalia, and Yemen and indicates which of these efforts were included in State’s August 2010 report. Agency officials explained that compiling a list of U.S. efforts, such as the one in State’s Country Reports on Terrorism, is challenging because of difficulties determining which U.S. efforts specifically address terrorist safe havens. According to State and USAID officials, counterterrorism programs and activities may simultaneously contribute to multiple foreign policy goals. For example, according to State officials, U.S. programs assisting refugees on the Somali border may be considered as combating violent extremism or denying terrorists safe haven. Similarly, USAID officials explained that governance programs in Yemen aim to help local governments meet community needs, but in doing so may contribute to addressing terrorist safe havens in Yemen by shrinking the terrorists’ operating spaces in those communities. However, documents authored and databases managed by State contain information on additional U.S. efforts to address terrorist safe havens that would be feasible to include in State’s reporting. Our discussions with officials from various agencies and our review of MSRPs from the Philippines, Somalia, and Yemen indicate that State’s reports also do not include efforts funded by agencies other than State that may contribute to addressing terrorist safe havens. First, officials from DOD, DOJ, and Treasury indicated that their agencies fund efforts that may contribute to addressing terrorist safe havens. Officials from DOD indicated that DOD-funded activities to build capacity of foreign partners’ security forces to combat terrorism are key DOD efforts to address terrorist safe havens. For example, some DOD train and equip activities funded through the department’s Global Train and Equip “Section 1206” and country-specific funding accounts, such as the Afghanistan and Iraq Security Forces Funds, contribute to addressing terrorist safe havens. For example, DOD has used Section 1206 funding to conduct train and equip programs to build the capacity of security forces in Yemen and the Philippines to conduct counterterrorism operations. U.S. Coast Guard officials indicated that some coastal security training and technical assistance activities funded largely by DOD and implemented by the U.S. Coast Guard may also contribute to addressing terrorist safe havens in Yemen and the Philippines. Second, our review of MSRPs for the Philippines, Somalia, and Yemen indicated that additional efforts funded by agencies other than State and not included in State’s August 2010 Country Reports on Terrorism may contribute to addressing terrorist safe havens. For example, the safe haven-related goal in the fiscal year 2012 MSRP for the Philippines indicated that efforts will be made through the DOD Joint Special Operations Task Force–Philippines to enhance counterterrorism capabilities of the Armed Forces of the Philippines. The safe haven-related goal in Yemen’s fiscal year 2012 MSRP indicated that DOJ’s Federal Bureau of Investigation legal attachés participate in activities that empower Yemeni law enforcement officials to better identify and prosecute suspected terrorists. These efforts were not included in State’s August 2010 Country Reports on Terrorism. In total, our analysis identified seven examples of non-State-funded efforts in the Philippines, one example in Somalia, and five examples in Yemen that were not included in State’s August 2010 Country Reports on Terrorism that may contribute to addressing terrorist safe havens, as shown in table 5. IRTPA calls for a report on the activities of the U.S. government to address terrorist safe havens, and a stated intention of the Country Reports on Terrorism is to provide policymakers with an overview of U.S. counterterrorism efforts. As such, State’s report is incomplete without including the contributions of its various interagency partners to address terrorist safe havens. As this information is included in State documents, and State approves certain activities funded by other agencies such as DOD’s Section 1206 and 1205 programs, it is feasible for State to include this information in its annual report. In addition to the provisions in IRTPA, Congress demonstrated an ongoing interest in the identification of U.S. efforts to deny terrorist safe havens in the National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 2010. The conference report accompanying the act noted that existing executive branch reporting on counterterrorism does not address the full scope of U.S. activities or assess overall effectiveness. The National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 2010 requires the President to submit a report to Congress on the U.S. counterterrorism strategy, including an assessment of the scope, status, and progress of U.S. counterterrorism efforts in fighting al Qaeda and its affiliates and a list of U.S. counterterrorism efforts relating to the denial of terrorist safe havens. The act required the President to produce this report by September 30, 2010, and every September 30th until September 30, 2012. According to the act, the report is to be submitted in an unclassified form to the maximum extent practicable and accompanied by a classified appendix, as appropriate. According to the conference report accompanying the act, the required report would help Congress in conducting oversight, enhance the public’s understanding of how well the government is combating terrorism, and assist the administration in identifying and overcoming related challenges. According to the President’s National Security Staff, the National Security Council has been assigned responsibility for completing the report required under the National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 2010. However, officials on the national security staff—who are taking the lead in drafting the report—stated that while they were working on a draft, no report had been submitted to Congress as of March 2011. They were unsure when the report—including information requested by Congress to assist it in assessing the success of counterterrorism efforts to deny terrorists safe haven—would be completed. Given that dismantling terrorist safe havens is a top U.S. national security priority, it is important that accurate assessments of and comprehensive information on terrorist safe havens and U.S. efforts to address them is available. Congress has expressed its desire to receive this type of information in order to better understand the status of efforts related to terrorist safe havens and to better assess U.S. efforts to address them. While some reports have been provided to Congress on these issues, critical details recommended by Congress are not included in these documents, such as complete assessments of the actions taken by countries identified as terrorist safe havens to address terrorist activities. Further, despite multiple requests from Congress, neither State nor the National Security Council has compiled a list of U.S. efforts to address terrorist safe havens that includes the contributions of all relevant U.S. agencies. Providing this type of information to Congress could better define the nature of the threats posed by terrorist groups, as well as the status of and challenges faced by U.S. efforts to address them. Without this information, Congress and other decision makers may lack facts essential to assessing progress toward the U.S. goal of denying terrorists safe haven, making decisions on the allocation of resources, and conducting effective oversight. To improve the information provided to Congress and other decision makers, we make the following three recommendations: 1. The Secretary of State should include in the Country Reports on Terrorism detailed assessments of identified terrorist safe havens using the provisions recommended by Congress in IRTPA. 2. The Secretary of State, in collaboration with relevant agencies as appropriate, should include a governmentwide list of U.S. efforts for addressing terrorist safe havens when it updates the report requested under IRTPA. 3. The National Security Council, in collaboration with relevant agencies as appropriate, should complete the requirements of the National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 2010 to report to Congress on a list of U.S. efforts related to the denial of terrorist safe havens. We provided a draft of this report to DOD, DHS, DOJ, State, Treasury, USAID, the Office of Management and Budget, the National Security Council, and members of the intelligence community for their review and comment. State and DHS provided written comments, which are reprinted in appendix VI and VII respectively. In addition, DOD, DHS, DOJ, State, and the Office of Management and Budget provided technical comments, which we have incorporated as appropriate. The National Security Council reviewed the report but did not provide comments on its recommendations. State concurred with our recommendation that it include detailed assessments of terrorist safe havens in its Country Reports on Terrorism, and noted it will implement this recommendation in its updated report to be released in 2011. Related to our recommendation for State to include a governmentwide list of efforts to address terrorist safe havens when it updates the report requested under the IRTPA, State concurred that reporting on U.S. efforts to deny terrorist safe havens should be more comprehensive. However, State did not agree that such a list should be part of its annual Country Reports on Terrorism, citing the fact that it completes other reports related to counterterrorism. However, in the IRTPA, Congress recommended that this information be included in the Country Reports on Terrorism. Moreover, while it is possible that other reports produced by State address IRTPA provisions, the antiterrorism assistance report cited by State in its comments does not constitute a governmentwide list of U.S. efforts to address terrorist safe havens, as it does not include the contributions of key agencies such as DOD. We maintain that such a list could assist decisionmakers in assessing progress toward the U.S. goal of denying terrorist safe havens and conducting effective oversight. DHS concurred with our report, noting its acknowledgement of several DHS training efforts to address terrorist safe havens in selected countries. DHS also stated it will continue to support, as appropriate, State and other relevant agency efforts to improve reporting on terrorist safe havens. We are sending copies of this report to DOD, DHS, DOJ, State, Treasury, USAID, the Office of Management and Budget, the National Security Council, and the intelligence community. In addition, the report will be available on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov. If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 512-7331 or johnsoncm@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made key contributions to this report are listed in appendix VIII. This report provides information on U.S. efforts to address physical terrorist safe havens since 2005. Specifically, we assess the extent to which (1) the Department of State (State) has identified and assessed terrorist safe havens in its Country Reports on Terrorism and (2) the U.S. government has identified efforts to deny terrorists safe haven consistent with reporting requirements. To address our objectives, we reviewed and analyzed relevant national security strategies, key congressional legislation, and planning documents related to U.S. efforts to address terrorist safe havens. Additionally, we discussed U.S. strategies, programs, and activities related to terrorist safe havens with U.S. officials from the Departments of Defense (DOD), Homeland Security (DHS), Justice (DOJ), State (State), and the Treasury (Treasury); the Office of Management and Budget; the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID); the National Security Staff; and the intelligence community. We focused on these agencies because they are involved in efforts that may contribute to addressing terrorist safe havens. We also spoke to 13 subject matter experts from academic, governmental, and nongovernmental organizations. We selected experts who met at least four of the following criteria: (1) knowledge of and experience in one or more of the following areas: (a) identification of terrorist safe havens or failed states, (b) factors that contribute to terrorist safe havens, or (c) process of terrorist recruitment or radicalization; (2) knowledge and experience regarding key safe havens; (3) travel to at least one key safe haven country or region; (4) writing and publishing of articles on key safe haven countries, regions, or issues; and (5) knowledge of and experience in government, for-profit organizations, nonprofit organizations, academia, or journalism. To evaluate the extent to which State has identified and assessed terrorist safe havens, we reviewed U.S. agency reports, such as State’s annual Country Reports on Terrorism. Moreover, we evaluated assessments of terrorist safe havens included in the chapter specific to terrorist safe havens in State’s August 2010 Country Reports on Terrorism against criteria recommended, to the extent feasible, by Congress in the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (IRTPA). To evaluate the assessments, two analysts independently analyzed the terrorist safe havens assessments against details included in IRTPA. Those analysts then discussed and resolved any differences in the results of their analyses; a supervisor reviewed and approved the final results of the analysis. We also interviewed U.S. agency officials to determine the process and criteria used to identify, assess, and prioritize these terrorist safe havens, and spoke with subject matter experts to obtain their views on the characteristics of and threats posed by terrorist safe havens identified by State. To assess the extent to which the U.S. government has identified efforts to deny terrorists safe haven consistent with reporting requirements, we evaluated national counterterrorism and security strategies; agency budget and planning documents, including reports from State’s Foreign Assistance Coordination and Tracking System (FACTS); and agency reports against requirements included in IRTPA. Although we did not independently audit the funding data in the FACTS database, and are not expressing an opinion on them, based on our examination of the documents received and our discussions with cognizant agency officials, we concluded that the FACTS data we obtained were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this engagement. We also examined country-specific strategies related to addressing terrorist safe havens by interviewing U.S. agency officials and reviewing mission strategic and resource plans (MSRP) for three countries identified as having terrorist safe havens—the Philippines, Somalia, and Yemen. We selected these countries based on consideration of the following criteria: (1) identification of a country or area as a terrorist safe haven by State in its August 2010 Country Reports on Terrorism, (2) priority placed on a particular safe haven as expressed U.S. officials and subject matter experts, (3) consideration of related GAO work, and (4) congressional interest. Our analysis does not include intelligence-related efforts. We also considered information obtained during our previous reviews of U.S. efforts to address terrorist safe havens in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iraq. To obtain a more in-depth understanding of specific programs and activities, we traveled to Kenya (where State’s Somalia unit is located) and the Philippines, where we met with U.S. government personnel involved in efforts to address terrorist safe havens in Somalia and the southern Philippines. We planned to travel to Yemen, but were unable to do so due to the unstable security environment during the time of our review. To supplement our understanding of U.S. efforts related to denial of terrorist safe haven in Yemen we spoke with officials based in Washington, D.C., from DOD, State, USAID, and the intelligence community. We compiled our list of U.S. efforts to address terrorist safe haven in the Philippines, Somalia, and Yemen based on: (1) the efforts identified by cognizant U.S. officials as those contributing to addressing terrorist safe havens and (2) programs and activities associated with MSRP goals related to addressing terrorist safe havens. Programs and activities identified are meant to serve as examples of U.S. efforts that may contribute to addressing terrorist safe havens not as an exhaustive list of efforts to address terrorist safe havens. We conducted this performance audit from September 2010 to June 2011 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. Appendix II: Terrorist Safe Haven Assessments as Included in State’s August 2010 Country Reports on Terrorism “The Government of Afghanistan, in concert with the International Security Assistance Force and the international community, continued its efforts to eliminate terrorist safe havens and build security, particularly in the country’s south and east where the main Taliban based insurgents threatened stability. Many insurgent groups, including Taliban elements, the Haqqani Network, Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin, al-Qa’ida (AQ), and Lashkar-e- Tayyiba, continued to use territory across the border in Pakistan as a base from which to plot and launch attacks within Afghanistan and beyond. Narcotics trafficking, poppy cultivation, and criminal networks were particularly prevalent, constituting a significant source of funding for the insurgency as well as fueling corruption within Afghanistan. AQ leadership in Pakistan maintained its support to militants conducting attacks in Afghanistan and provided funding, training, and personnel to facilitate terrorist and insurgent operations. Anti-Coalition organizations continued to operate in coordination with AQ, Taliban, and other insurgent groups, primarily in the east.” “Columbia’s borders with Venezuela, Ecuador, Peru, Panama, and Brazil include rough terrain and dense forest cover. These conditions, coupled with low population densities and historically weak government presence, create potential safe havens for insurgent and terrorist groups, particularly the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). The FARC, retreating in the face of Colombian military pressures, thus operated with relative ease along the fringes of Colombia’s borders, and also uses areas in neighboring countries along the border to rest and regroup, procure supplies, and stage and train for terrorist attacks with varying degrees of success. The FARC elements in these border regions often engaged the local population in direct and indirect ways, including recruitment and logistical assistance. This appeared to be less so in Brazil and Peru where potential safe havens were addressed by stronger government responses. Ecuador and Panama have responded with a mix of containment and non-confrontation with Colombian narco-terrorist groups, although some confrontations do occur depending on local decisions and cross-border relations.” “Iraq was not a terrorist safe haven in 2009, but terrorists, including Sunni groups like al- Qa’ida in Iraq (AQI), and Ansar al-Islam (AI), as well as Shia extremists and other groups, viewed Iraq as a potential safe haven. Together, U. S. and Iraqi security forces continued to make progress against these groups. The significant reduction in the number of security incidents in Iraq that began in the last half of 2007 continued through 2009, with a steady downward trend in numbers of civilian casualties, enemy attacks, and improvised explosive device (IED) attacks. AQI, although still dangerous, experienced the defection of members, lost key mobilization areas, suffered disruption of support infrastructure and funding, and was forced to change targeting priorities. A number of factors have contributed to the substantial degradation of AQI. The alliance of convenience and mutual exploitation between AQI and many Sunni populations has deteriorated. The Baghdad Security Plan, initiated in February 2007, along with assistance from primarily Sunni tribal and local groups, has succeeded in reducing violence to late 2005 levels and disrupted and diminished AQI infrastructure, driving some surviving AQI fighters from Baghdad and Anbar into the northern Iraqi provinces of Ninawa, Diyala, and Salah ad Din. New initiatives with tribal and local leaders in Iraq have led Sunni tribes and local citizens to reject AQI and its extremist ideology. The continued growth, professionalism, and improved capabilities of the Iraqi forces have increased their effectiveness in rooting out terrorist cells. Iraqis in Baghdad, Anbar and Diyala Provinces, and elsewhere have turned against AQI and were cooperating with the Iraqi government and Coalition Forces to defeat it.” “The Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) maintained an active presence in northern Iraq, from which it coordinated attacks into Turkey, primarily against Turkish security forces, local officials and villagers who opposed the organization. In October, the Turkish Parliament overwhelmingly voted to extend the authorization for cross-border military operations against PKK encampments in northern Iraq. Iraq, Turkey, and the United States continued their formal trilateral security dialogue as one element of ongoing cooperative efforts to counter the PKK. Iraqi leaders, including those from the Kurdistan Regional Government, continued to publicly state that the PKK was a terrorist organization that would not be tolerated in Iraq. Turkish and Iraqi leaders signed a counterterrorism agreement in October.” “Hizballah remained the most prominent and powerful terrorist group in Lebanon, with deep roots among Lebanon’s large Shia community, which comprises at least one third of Lebanon’s population. The Lebanese government continued to recognize Hizballah, a U.S.- designated Foreign Terrorist Organization, as a legitimate “resistance group” and political party. Hizballah maintained offices in Beirut and military-style bases elsewhere in the country and was represented by elected deputies in parliament. AQ associated extremists also operated within the country, though their presence was small compared to that of Palestinian groups operating in Palestinian refugee camps who were not aligned with AQ. The camps are officially controlled by the Lebanese government. While the Lebanese Armed Forces do not have a day-to-day presence in the camps, they have at times conducted operations in the camps to combat terrorist threats.” “Despite increased efforts by Pakistani security forces, al-Qa’ida (AQ) terrorists, Afghan militants, foreign insurgents, and Pakistani militants continued to find safe haven in portions of Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), North-West Frontier Province (NWFP), and Baluchistan. AQ and other groups such as the Haqqani Network used the FATA to launch attacks in Afghanistan, plan operations worldwide, train, recruit, and disseminate propaganda. The Pakistani Taliban (under the umbrella moniker Tehrik- e-Taliban or TTP) also used the FATA to plan attacks against the civilian and military targets across Pakistan. Outside the FATA, the Quetta-based Afghan Taliban and separate insurgent organizations such as Hizb-e-Islami Gulbuddin used the areas in Baluchistan and the NWFP for safe haven. Islamist Deobandi groups and many local tribesmen in the FATA and the NWFP continued to resist the government’s efforts to improve governance and administrative control. Despite the August death of the Pakistani Taliban’s leader Baitullah Mehsud and Pakistani military operations throughout the FATA and NWFP, the Pakistani Taliban, AQ, and other extremist groups remained dangerous foes to Pakistan and the international community. Despite international condemnation for its November 2008 attacks in Mumbai, Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LT) continued to plan regional operations from within Pakistan. LT is an extremely capable terrorist organization with a sophisticated regional network. It continued to view American interests as legitimate targets. While the Government of Pakistan has banned LT, it needs to take further action against this group and its front organizations, which find safe haven within Pakistan.” “A small number of al-Qa’ida (AQ) operatives remained in East Africa, particularly Somalia, where they posed a serious threat to U.S. and allied interests in the region. These elements were disrupted in late 2006 and early 2007 as a result of Ethiopian military actions and again by the death of AQ operative Saleh Nabhan in September 2009. Somalia remained a concern given the country’s long, unguarded coastline, porous borders, continued political instability, and proximity to the Arabian Peninsula, all of which provide opportunities for terrorist transit and/or safe haven and increased the regional threat level. AQ remains likely to make common cause with Somali extremists, most notably al-Shabaab. Al-Shabaab has expanded its area of control during its protracted insurgency against the Transitional Federal Government and particularly since the withdrawal of Ethiopian forces in early 2009. The group controlled most of southern Somalia at year’s end.” “Terrorist operatives have sought safe haven in areas of the southern Philippines, specifically in the Sulu archipelago and Mindanao. Philippine government control and the rule of law in this area is weak due to rugged terrain, poverty, and local Muslim minority resentment of central governmental policies. In addition to Jemaah Islamiya (JI) fugitives and Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) terrorists, the New People’s Army and Rajah Solaiman Movement also operated in the southern Philippines.” “In Southeast Asia, the terrorist organizations Jemaah Islamiya (JI) and Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) have sought safe haven in the vicinity of the Sulawesi Sea and the Sulu Archipelago, which encompasses the maritime boundaries of Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines. The area’s thousands of islands make it a difficult region for authorities to monitor, while a range of licit and illicit activities that occur there – worker migration, tourism, and trade, for example – pose another challenge to identifying and countering the terrorist threat. Although Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines have improved their efforts to control their shared maritime boundaries, the expanse nevertheless remains difficult to control. Surveillance is improved but remains partial at best, and traditional smuggling and piracy groups have provided an effective cover for terrorist activities, such as movement of personnel, equipment, and funds.” Trans-Sahara (Algeria, Mali, Mauritania, and Niger) “The primary terrorist threat in this region was al-Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). AQIM was based primarily in northeastern Algeria but factions also operated from a safe haven in northern Mali, from which they transited areas of the Maghreb and Sahel, especially Mali, Niger, and Mauritania. AQIM continued to conduct small scale ambushes and attacks on Algerian security forces in northeastern Algeria, but in 2009 the group was not able to conduct the “spectacular” attacks that were more common a few years ago such as their bombing of the UN and Algerian government buildings. AQIM factions in northern Mali used the safe haven to conduct kidnappings for ransom and murder of Western hostages and to conduct limited attacks on Malian and Mauritanian security personnel. AQIM derived financial support from the ransoms it collected, which were used to sustain the organization and plan further terrorist operations. AQIM routinely demanded the release of their operatives in custody in the region and elsewhere as a condition of release of hostages. Regional governments sought to take steps to counter AQIM operations, but there was a need for foreign assistance in the form of law enforcement and military capacity building in order to do so.” Tri-Border Area (Argentina, Paraguay, and Brazil) “No corroborated information showed that Hizballah, HAMAS, or other Islamic extremist groups used the Tri-Border Area (TBA) for military-type training or planning of terrorist operations, but the United States remained concerned that these groups use the region as a safe haven to raise funds. Suspected supporters of Islamic terrorist groups, including Hizballah, take advantage of loosely regulated territory and the proximity of Ciudad del Este, Paraguay and Foz do Iguaçu, Brazil to participate in a wide range of illicit activities and to solicit donations from within the sizable Muslim communities in the region. The Argentine, Brazilian, and Paraguayan governments have long been concerned with arms and drugs smuggling, document fraud, money laundering, trafficking in persons, and the manufacture and movement of contraband goods through the TBA. Concerns about the region moved the three governments to invite the United States to participate in the Three Plus One Group on Tri-Border Area Security, which focuses on practical steps to strengthen financial and border controls and enhance law enforcement and intelligence sharing. Brazil, Argentina, and Paraguay have made notable strides in launching initiatives to strengthen law enforcement institutions and cooperation, including developing financial intelligence units, broadening border security cooperation, augmenting information sharing among prosecutors responsible for counterterrorism cases, and establishing trade transparency units.” “Corruption within the Venezuelan government and military, ideological ties with the FARC, and weak international counternarcotics cooperation have fueled a permissive operating environment for narco-traffickers. Other than some limited activities, such as the bombing of remote dirt airstrips on the border, there is little evidence that the government of Venezuela is moving to improve this situation in the near future. The FARC, as well as Colombia’s second largest rebel group, the National Liberation Army (ELN), regularly used Venezuelan territory to rest and regroup, engage in narcotics trafficking, as well as to extort protection money and kidnap Venezuelans to finance their operations.” “The security situation in Yemen continued to deteriorate. As Saudi security forces have clamped down on terrorism and foreign fighters have returned from Afghanistan and Pakistan, Yemen’s porous borders have allowed many terrorists to seek safe haven within Yemen. Al-Qa’ida in Yemen (AQY) announced its merger with al-Qa’ida (AQ) elements in Saudi Arabia in January 2009, creating al-Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). The creation of AQAP coincided with fewer attacks within Yemen, possibly due to the desire of its leadership to use Yemen as a safe haven for planning of future attacks and recruitment because the central government lacks a strong presence in much of the country. The absence of effective counterterrorism legislation contributed to Yemen’s appeal as a safe haven and potential base of operations for terrorists. The Yemeni government’s response to the terrorist threat was intermittent, and its ability to pursue and prosecute suspected terrorists remained weak for most of the year due to a number of shortcomings, including the stalling of draft counterterrorism in Parliament. The government’s response improved dramatically in December with security forces taking strong action against a number of terrorist cells. Even with this turn of events, the government was often distracted by the “Sixth War” of the Houthi rebellion in the Sa’ada governorate in the north of the country and political unrest in southern Yemen.” We spoke with 13 subject matter experts with knowledge related to terrorist safe havens. We asked these experts to determine which five terrorist safe havens identified in the State’s August 2010 Country Reports on Terrorism posed the greatest risk to U.S. national security (see table 6). Although included in State’s August 2010 report, none of our experts identified Colombia’s border region, northern Iraq, the southern Philippines, the Sulu/Sulawesi Seas Littoral, the Tri-Border area, and Venezuela as among the top five terrorist safe havens posing the greatest risk to U.S. national security. Profiles on the Philippines, Somalia, and Yemen can be found on the following pages. Economy: The Philippines’ 2010 gross domestic product was estimated at about $353 billion, which represented a 7.3 percent growth rate that year. This growth was spurred by consumer demand, exports, and investments; yet because of high population growth rate and unequal distribution of income, poverty worsened. U.S. strategy in the Philippines combines security and development assistance to address several policy objectives, including counterterrorism, economic growth, and the development of responsive democratic institutions. To address the terrorist groups that find safe haven on the islands of Mindanao and the Sulu Archipelago, the United States has deployed military personnel to train and assist the Philippine armed forces and to engage in civil-military operations to change the conditions that allow terrorist safe havens. U.S. assistance to the Philippines has been more than $120 million in each of the past three years, and $135 million has been requested for fiscal year 2011. About 60 percent of this assistance has supported development programs in Muslim areas of Mindanao and the Sulu Archipelago with the aim of reducing the economic and political conditions that foster extremist ideologies and activities. U.S. military assistance is aimed primarily at Muslim insurgents and has supported intelligence gathering, operations planning, and communications support; supplied modern equipment; and provided U.S. special operations advisors to assist two Philippine Regional Combatant Commands in Mindanao and the Sulu Archipelago. Cognizant U.S. officials and agency reports note several challenges to addressing terrorist safe havens in the Philippines, including lawlessness, corruption, and poor economic conditions.  Lawlessness in the southern Philippines: According to State’s Country Reports on Terrorism 2009, Philippine government control and the rule of law are weak due to rugged terrain, poverty, and local Muslim minority resentment of central government policies.  Corruption of local leaders and police: Officials told us that corruption, as well as the limited capacity of the Philippine police, is a major challenge to denying terrorists safe haven. Corruption is rampant in the Philippine police, the group that implements law enforcement approaches to denying safe haven.  Poor economic conditions: Officials noted that poor economic conditions in the Philippines contribute to an environment that allows terrorist groups to increase recruitment. Economic development programs are essential to reduce the conditions that allow for terrorists to build safe havens in the Philippines. violence, such as crime, rioting, or tribl violence. U.S. strategy in Somalia is described as “dual-track”—providing continued support to the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) of Somalia and also recognizing the potential role of other actors in ending conflict and establishing basic governing institutions. Efforts include, among other things, degrading the abilities of al-Shabaab—a designated foreign terrorist organization based in Somalia—and increasing the capacity of the TFG while also increasing engagement and support for Somaliland, Puntland, and local administrative entities and civil society groups. The administration has requested almost $85 million for State and the U.S. Agency for International Development assistance for fiscal year 2011 to continue conflict mitigation, governance, and economic growth programs in Somalia. In addition, the Partnership for Regional East African Counterterrorism is the current State strategy for long-term engagement and capacity building in East Africa to combat evolving terrorism threats in, and emanating from, the Horn of Africa and along the Swahili Coast. The Partnership for Regional East African Counterterrorism aims to, among other things, contain and reduce the operational capacity of terrorist networks in Somalia; deter and reduce the appeal of and support for violent extremism across East Africa; and improve and expand border security in East Africa, particularly around Somalia. U.S. officials and agency reports note several challenges to addressing terrorist safe havens in Somalia, including limited access to the country as well as the lack of a central government.  Limited access: U.S. officials told us that because the United States does not have an embassy in Somalia and few personnel are allowed to travel there for safety reasons, implementing programs in the country is complicated. For example, the absence of U.S. diplomatic presence makes monitoring the implementation of security assistance activities difficult.  Lack of a central government: Officials stated that a lack of a central government in Somalia limits the number of credible partners with which U.S. agencies can work to implement assistance programs. According to officials, this void legally constrains agencies’ ability to use resources from some security assistance programs, such as Global Train and Equip “Section 1206” and Foreign Military Financing, to undertake assistance activities in Somalia. According to the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), al- Shabaab is not monolithic in its goals. State reports that many rank and file members of al-Shabaab are interested in issues within Somalia, rather than pursuing a global agenda. However, NCTC and State note that members of al-Shabaab’s core leadership is linked ideologically to al Qaeda and that some members of the group previously trained and fought with al Qaeda in Afghanistan. Government: Yemen is a republic with a legal system based on Islamic law, Turkish law, English common law, and local tribal customary law. Ali Abdullah Saleh, who served as the president of the Yemen Arab Republic (North Yemen) from 1978 to 1990, has been the president of Yemen since May 1990. U.S. strategy in Yemen, as articulated by the White House, takes a comprehensive approach, including both security assistance to counter al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and development assistance to address the environment that allows AQAP to exist. According to State testimony, this strategy has two parts: (1) strengthening the Yemeni government’s ability to promote security and minimize the threat from violent extremists within its borders, and (2) mitigating Yemen’s economic crisis and deficiencies in government capacity, provision of services, transparency, and adherence to the rule of law. The President’s fiscal year 2011 budget requests $106 million for Yemen. The United States is also engaged with international partners to provide assistance to Yemen. In 2006, an international donors’ conference in London pledged $5.2 billion for Yemen, although, according to State, a significant portion of this funding has yet to be provided. At a Friends of Yemen (an international coordination group) meeting in September 2010, the international community called for the creation of a development fund for Yemen and more coordination of international aid. the Department of Justice’s (DOJ) Overseas and Prosecutorial Development Assistance and Training program. Cognizant U.S. officials and agency reports note several challenges to addressing terrorist safe havens in Yemen, including the limited capacity of Yemeni security forces, inconsistent cooperation of the Yemeni government, and instability in Yemen.  Limited capacity of Yemeni security forces: Officials noted that Yemeni security forces have limited, but improving, capacity. This creates a problem for addressing terrorist safe havens, according to officials, because it limits the ability of the Yemeni government to control territory that AQAP may want to use as a safe haven. Inconsistent cooperation with the government of Yemen: According to State’s August 2010 Country Reports on Terrorism, the Yemeni government’s response to terrorism was intermittent. The report also cites the absence of effective counterterrorism legislation as contributing to Yemen’s appeal as a safe haven for terrorists. Instability in Yemen: Officials told us that instability in Yemen creates challenges to addressing safe haven. Specifically, they cited unstable conditions in northern and southern Yemen and political unrest resulting from the 2011 uprisings against President Saleh’s rule. We identified nine examples of State-funded efforts in the Philippines, four examples in Somalia, and nine examples in Yemen not included in State’s August 2010 Country Reports on Terrorism that may contribute to addressing terrorist safe havens. We compiled our list of U.S. efforts to address terrorist safe haven in the Philippines, Somalia, and Yemen based on: (1) the efforts identified by cognizant U.S. officials as those contributing to addressing terrorist safe havens and (2) programs and activities associated with MSRP goals related to addressing terrorist safe havens. Table 7 describes U.S. efforts funded by State to address terrorist safe havens as identified by agency officials or MSRPs for the Philippines, Somalia, and Yemen and indicates which of these efforts were included in State’s August 2010 report. In addition to the individual named above, Jason Bair, Assistant Director; Christy Bilardo; Kathryn Bolduc; Lynn Cothern; Martin de Alteriis; Mary Moutsos; Elizabeth Repko; and Celia Thomas made key contributions to this report. Tonita Gillich, Julia Jebo, Eileen Larence, Heather Latta, Marie Mak, Sarah McGrath, John Pendleton, Nina Pfeiffer, and Jena Sinkfeld provided additional support.

Summary: Denying safe haven to terrorists has been a key national security concern since 2002. Safe havens allow terrorists to train recruits and plan operations against the United States and its interests across the globe. As a result, Congress has required agencies to provide detailed information regarding U.S. efforts to address terrorist safe havens. In this review, GAO assesses the extent to which (1) the Department of State (State) has identified and assessed terrorist safe havens in its Country Reports on Terrorism and (2) the U.S. government has identified efforts to deny terrorists safe haven consistent with reporting requirements. To address these objectives, GAO interviewed U.S. officials and analyzed national security strategies; State reporting; and country-level plans for the Philippines, Somalia, and Yemen. State identifies existing terrorist safe havens in its annual "Country Reports on Terrorism" but does not assess them with the level of detail recommended by Congress. The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (IRTPA) requires State to include in its annual "Country Reports on Terrorism" a detailed assessment of each foreign country used as a terrorist safe haven. It also recommends that State include, to the extent feasible, details in the report such as actions taken to address terrorist activities by countries whose territory is used as a safe haven. Since 2006, State has identified terrorist safe havens in its "Country Reports on Terrorism." In August 2010, State identified 13 terrorist safe havens, including the southern Philippines, Somalia, and Yemen. However, none of the assessments in State's August 2010 report included information on one of the four elements recommended by Congress--the actions taken by countries identified as having terrorist safe havens to prevent trafficking in weapons of mass destruction through their territories. Also, about a quarter of the assessments in State's August 2010 Country Reports on Terrorism lacked information on another element recommended by Congress--the actions taken by countries identified as terrorist safe havens to cooperate with U.S. antiterrorism efforts. Including this information in State's reports could help better inform congressional oversight related to terrorist safe havens. The U.S. government has not fully addressed reporting requirements to identify U.S. efforts to deny safe haven to terrorists. In IRTPA and the National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 2010, Congress required the President to submit reports identifying such efforts. State responded to IRTPA with a 2006 report and subsequent annual updates to its "Country Reports on Terrorism." However, efforts identified in State's August 2010 report include only certain efforts funded by State and do not include some State and other U.S. government agency funded efforts, such as those of the Departments of Defense and Justice. For example, our discussions with agency officials and analysis of agency strategic documents identified at least 14 programs and activities not included in State's reporting that may contribute to denying terrorists safe haven in Yemen. According to officials from the National Security Staff, the National Security Council is responsible for producing the report required by the National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 2010. As of March 2011, the report, which was due in September 2010, was not completed. According to agency officials, compiling such a list is challenging because it is difficult to determine if a given activity addresses terrorist safe havens or contributes to different, though possibly related, foreign policy objectives. While we recognize this challenge, a more comprehensive list that includes the efforts of all relevant agencies could provide useful information to Congress to enhance oversight activities, such as assessing U.S. efforts toward the governmentwide goal of denying terrorists safe haven. GAO recommends State and the National Security Council (NSC) improve reporting on assessments of and U.S. efforts to address terrorist safe havens. State concurred with our recommendation on assessments. State partially concurred with our recommendation on U.S. efforts to address terrorist safe havens, citing other reports it completes related to counterterrorism. However, the additional reports cited by State do not constitute a governmentwide list of U.S. efforts to address terrorist safe havens. The NSC reviewed our report but did not provide comments on its recommendations.