The U.N. Secretary-General’s Representative on Internally Displaced Persons estimates that there are 20 million internally displaced persons in the world, scattered across more than 50 countries. (Fig. 1 depicts the countries with internally displaced persons from which we received surveys.) However, lack of access to some of these populations due to insecure environments and governments’ assertions of sovereignty prevents international organizations from obtaining accurate accounts of the numbers, locations, or physical conditions of a large percentage of displaced persons. Further complicating the issue of internal displacement is the lack of a universally accepted definition for “internally displaced persons,” including criteria for determining when a person no longer should be considered displaced. Since the end of the Cold War, the number of internally displaced persons has grown steadily (and now surpasses the number of refugees), as has the international community’s awareness of their plight. By all accounts, internally displaced persons suffer extreme deprivation; are subject to threats to their physical security during flight and while displaced; and are unlikely to have adequate shelter, health care, and the ability to earn a livelihood. Mortality rates among internally displaced populations are much higher than among stable populations, especially among the more vulnerable segments of the populations—children, the elderly, and pregnant women. Women and girls are especially vulnerable to sexual assault, rape, and discrimination in receiving assistance. Psychological and social distress due to violence and the breakdown of family and community structures is endemic in internally displaced populations. (Fig. 2 depicts a community of internally displaced persons in Burundi who are receiving assistance from the U.S. Agency for International Development.) The plight of the internally displaced generally did not begin to draw the attention of the international community until 1992, when the U.N. Commission for Human Rights requested that the Secretary-General appoint a special representative to study the problems of the internally displaced and devise solutions to improve their situation. Despite a subsequent series of reports, books, briefings, and U.N. resolutions identifying shortcomings in and recommending solutions for the international community’s response, little progress was made in addressing the needs of internally displaced persons throughout most of the 1990s. Prompted into action after strong criticism from the U.S. Representative to the United Nations in early 2000, international organizations began a period of reassessing their policies, programs, and coordinating mechanisms. Field-level officials of international organizations in 48 countries who responded to our survey reported that some modest success had been achieved in extending protection interventions to internally displaced persons. Nonetheless, international organizations’ officials also reported that they have not been able to secure adequate protection for internally displaced persons in most countries we surveyed. Several obstacles prevent international organizations from protecting displaced populations, including the limitations of working in active war zones, attacks on and death threats to aid workers, and government assertions of sovereignty that block the organizations’ access to displaced persons. While these limitations hamper their work, international organizations often have not taken proactive measures they could have taken to protect internally displaced persons, such as being more assertive on protection matters, implementing training programs on protection issues for relief workers, and establishing country-level coordination mechanisms. International organizations have generally not been able to secure for internally displaced persons the fundamental rights set forth in the Guiding Principles. The vulnerability of internally displaced persons is reflected by our survey responses, which indicates they are at risk of direct physical attack in 90 percent of the countries and at risk of forced migration, sexual assault, and conscription or forced labor in many countries. Figure 3 provides data on various types of protection threats faced by internally displaced persons. According to human rights officials, based on existing international humanitarian and human rights law, international organizations act to help ensure the internally displaced have protection and are afforded the fundamental right to be free from the threats noted in Figure 3. In some instance (such as in Kosovo), organizations are explicitly mandated by the United Nations and their governing boards to provide protection and assistance to internally displaced persons. To accomplish this, the organizations undertake protection activities in almost all countries we surveyed. For example, as shown in figure 4, in 63 percent of the countries, the organizations reported that to a great or very great extent they are engaging and meeting with both government and opposition forces to try to get them to respect the rights of internally displaced persons. In 79 percent of the countries, international organizations indicated they are to some extent providing the displaced with information about a voluntary return to their homes. In 90 percent of the countries, international organizations said they are, to a small extent or greater, establishing systems to document human rights violations of the displaced. Overall, however, the extent of protection activities is limited, and in many countries some protection activities are not being carried out at all. A senior official of the International Committee of the Red Cross told us that there is not a single country in the world that can serve as a successful model for the protection of internally displaced persons. From providing core protection actions, such as providing a visible in-country presence of international staff to help protect the displaced, to replacing lost personal documentation and preserving the right to asylum, to alerting the displaced about threats, international organizations have taken limited action. Figure 4 shows the extent to which protection interventions identified in the Guiding Principles had taken place in the 48 countries from which we received survey responses. Only 1 of the 14 protection interventions— engaging both government and opposition forces—was being undertaken to a great or very great extent in at least half the countries. Conversely, 7 of the 14 interventions were not being undertaken in half the countries. Several factors inhibit the international community’s response on protection matters. The danger of operating in conflict zones and the personal security risks to aid workers are major limitations to involvement in protection matters. (In 75 percent of countries in our survey, humanitarian organizations indicated that personal security fears impact their ability to provide protection or assistance to internally displaced persons.) State sovereignty is also a significant factor, as many countries, such as Algeria, Burma, and Turkey, bar international involvement with their internally displaced populations. In August 2000, the Group of 77, a group of more than 130 developing countries, blocked the U.N.’s Economic and Social Council from endorsing a U.N. approach to dealing with internally displaced persons for fear that humanitarian intervention and protection of human rights would infringe upon their countries’ sovereignty. Finally, scarce or declining budgetary resources provided by the international donor community inhibit agencies from expanding their protection (and assistance) activities. According to officials of these organizations, it is difficult to get the funding they request for refugees and other specifically mandated programs; and there is increasing donor fatigue because of humanitarian crises that have been ongoing for years without resolution. Given this environment, officials said it is even more difficult to get funding for internally displaced persons, who outnumber refugees by nearly 2 to 1 and where no international organization has an absolute right to intervene to protect and assist them. Table 1 shows the amount of funds international organizations’ requested from international donors in 2000 and the shortfall from their budget requests. According to numerous relief and human rights officials we spoke with, their organizations and their representatives at the country level are often reluctant to speak out and challenge governments on protection matters for fear of jeopardizing relationships and continued access for ongoing relief or development programs. In Sudan, for example, U.N. officials told us some of its offices were often reticent about pressing the Khartoum government on its restrictive flight clearance process in the south (impeding emergency relief efforts) due to concern of putting at risk U.N. development activities in the north. Also, in Burundi, the U.N.’s Humanitarian Coordinator (the lead U.N. official in country) was criticized by U.N. agency, nongovernmental organization, and U.S. government officials for weak leadership: the Coordinator was said to be more interested in maintaining good relations with the government than in serving as the main advocate for humanitarian and internally displaced persons’ concerns. Furthermore, U.N. Resident Coordinators from several countries were unwilling to respond to our survey on internally displaced persons despite assurances of confidentiality because of their concern about antagonizing the host government if their participation in the survey became known. According to Department of State officials, in some internal displacement circumstances, international organizations have little leverage to affect the conduct of governments toward their citizens. In those cases, international forums, such as the U.N.’s Security Council or Economic and Social Council, offer the best opportunity to address issues of internal displacement within the context of underlying political and security factors. For example, the U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations advocated increased assistance and protection for the internally displaced in the U.N. Security Council and in other forums. As a result, U.N. officials said this raised the awareness of the plight of the internally displaced, prompted other governments to respond, and prompted an assessment of international organizations’ policies, programs, and coordinating mechanisms on the internally displaced. Organizations with the mandate and staff expertise to provide protection— the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights, and the International Committee of the Red Cross—are often not present to take a proactive role in the protection of internally displaced populations, according to representatives from these international organizations and protection experts. Despite a March 2000 policy pronouncement by the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees to become more engaged with the internally displaced, we found the number of internally displaced persons assisted and country programs in place declined in the last year (from 5 to 4 million and from 13 to 11, respectively), although the total number of worldwide displacements are reported to have remained relatively stable. According to State Department officials and other knowledgeable observers, the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights has few officials working directly in the field and currently lacks the capability to intervene in human rights situations. As for the International Committee of the Red Cross, it has a specific protection mandate during armed conflict, but it generally does not conduct protection activities for displaced populations caught up in nonconflict circumstances. Table 2 shows the number of countries where these organizations said they have a staff presence and engage in protection activities. During our fieldwork, we observed in two of the three countries we visited, that despite the presence of hundreds of thousands of internally displaced persons, agencies did not have protection officers to monitor conditions or had assigned only two or three officers for this purpose. Protection experts acknowledge that a simple visible field presence is sometimes the most effective means to prevent harm to internally displaced persons. (Fig. 5 shows International Committee of the Red Cross staff accompanying Rwandan civilians fleeing ethnic fighting in 1994.) In our three case study countries, only the International Committee of the Red Cross in Colombia provided a robust staffing presence of significant size (54) to help monitor conditions and provide protection activities. In Burundi and southern Sudan, the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees did not have a protection presence even though there were refugees repatriating into internally displaced communities. In Burundi, none of the agencies were engaged in protection activities directed toward internally displaced persons, although geographically nearly half the country is experiencing internal displacement. According to officials from these organizations, the number of protection officers working in these countries is not sufficient given the level of threat against internally displaced persons. Table 3 shows the number of protection officials assigned in Burundi, Colombia, and southern Sudan in 2000 to 2001. International organizations do not have mechanisms at the country level to promote and coordinate actions that could help protect the internally displaced. Unlike international organizations’ efforts to provide assistance (e.g., food aid and health care) to internally displaced persons where there are established working groups to share information and plan and coordinate action, there are no counterpart coordination mechanisms for protection concerns. For example, in our three case-study countries, we were told that there was little to no discussion among international organizations concerning protection issues. There were no focal points to raise the profile of protection or ensure its place on the agenda of those organizations working in the field. Officials engaged in protection activities in these countries told us that because there are no established mechanisms to share information, there is a lack of (1) basic information on where protection officers are posted, (2) common thinking and approaches to protection, and (3) knowledge about what protection interventions work or do not work. We noted that in countries where international organizations have not assigned staff to monitor for protection concerns, the organizations do provide relief assistance and are often in direct contact with displaced persons and are knowledgeable about their conditions. However, according to U.N. and other international organization officials, they have not established working groups or other mechanisms in these countries that could alert the international staff about potential dangers to the internally displaced or provide advice about how to record and report on abuses they witness in their routine of providing assistance. Officials in the field who provide assistance to internally displaced persons lack knowledge about how to incorporate protection considerations and techniques into their assistance activities. As was shown earlier in figure 3, 79 percent of the countries in our survey indicated that no action is taken to set up and manage camps for internally displaced persons to prevent attacks, such as ensuring vulnerable female-headed households are not isolated to remote areas in the camp. Relief officials told us there is little consideration given to protection concerns when designing programs--their focus is on providing assistance as quickly as possible. Forty percent of the countries in our survey also indicated that no training had been received on how to undertake protection actions for internally displaced persons, although officials we spoke with stated they would strongly welcome such training. During our fieldwork, we found numerous examples of how relief agencies both incorporated and failed to incorporate protection measures into the design and implementation of their programs. These examples include: In southern Sudan, protection considerations were taken into account when water bore holes were drilled in locations that drew internally displaced populations away from conflict zones into more secure areas. In Burundi, when relief workers did not take into consideration the timing of bulk food deliveries during periods of intense fighting (as opposed to dispersed deliveries in locations outside the battle zone), the result was armed attacks and theft of supplies by combatants. In both Colombia and southern Sudan, the provision of assistance to internally displaced persons, while equally vulnerable local populations were ignored (as opposed to provision of some aid to both communities), led to conflict between the two groups. Recognizing that the state of training for internally displaced persons issues has been deficient, in March 1998 the U.N.’s Inter-Agency Standing Committee ordered the development of a comprehensive training program focused on protection issues for the international organizations working with the displaced. The U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees was tasked with developing the training module for protection but did not do so until the end of 2000. To date, no training has occurred. Despite the overall poor state of protection for internally displaced persons, we learned that practical actions, as advised by the Handbook for Applying the Guiding Principles were successful in the countries we visited. Even in highly insecure environments, reasonable advocacy on the part of senior officials and the presence of human rights observers and monitors can have positive effects. For example, In Colombia, International Committee for the Red Cross protection officers negotiated with rebel and paramilitary groups to relocate internally displaced individuals and families away from areas where death threats were being issued; they also successfully negotiated with these groups to resolve kidnappings and prevent executions by death squads. In Burundi, the U.S. Ambassador sent demarches (diplomatic messages) to the highest level of the Burundi government in mid-2000 challenging government troops who were intimidating patients in rural health clinics near the capital Bujumbura. This helped end the troops’ harassment and occupation of the rural health clinics, which were used heavily by displaced populations. In southern Sudan, the government and factional commanders increased the risk to internally displaced persons by requiring that food drops and the provision of aid be provided in strategic locations at specific times to coincide with their strategies. The relief organizations tailored methods to circumvent these requirements and safely accomplish their relief goals. (Fig. 6 shows a food airdrop in southern Sudan.) Overall, international organizations believe they have been generally successful in meeting the emergency food needs for those internally displaced persons to whom they have access. However, in numerous countries with active emergencies and hostile, insecure environments, such as in Burundi, and southern Sudan, large numbers of internally displaced persons were outside the reach of international organizations’ relief efforts, according to relief experts to whom we spoke and observed during our case study fieldwork. Other emergency assistance provisions such as health care, water and sanitation, and shelter were also generally being provided to displaced populations, although to a lesser extent, according to relief officials with whom we spoke. According to our survey, 54 percent of countries reported that basic needs, such as food, water, and health care, are being met to a great or very great extent. Figure 7 provides the results of our survey on the extent to which assistance interventions identified in the Guiding Principles have taken place. In Colombia, for example, largely through the combined efforts of the International Committee of the Red Cross and the World Food Program, the emergency needs (food, shelter, and health care) of the internally displaced were reported being met during the first 90 days of displacement. Although international organizations were generally able to meet the initial emergency needs of the internally displaced, we found a number of programming gaps in the overall response scheme. First, international organizations were less effective in meeting the assistance needs of internally displaced persons after the initial displacement phase. In southern Sudan, for example, we were told that internally displaced persons who relocated to nonconflict areas were generally not receiving assistance from international organizations. Gaps in assistance areas we identified include providing clothing, education, and income-generation training and opportunities; psychological and social assistance for traumatized persons; and nonfood items, such as kitchen utensils, tools, and personal hygiene items. Figure 8 provides information from our survey of country-level officials on why internally displaced persons were not receiving assistance. Foremost among the obstacles were problems in assistance logistics and distribution. Also, internally displaced persons who were congregated in camps or identifiable communities were more likely to have their assistance needs met. In contrast, those displaced persons who were dispersed throughout the countryside, such as in Burundi, or merged into urban communities, such as in Colombia, were generally not receiving assistance, according to U.N. officials with whom we spoke. International organizations have difficulty identifying and obtaining access to these populations, as some internally displaced persons purposely keep a low profile for fear of discrimination or retribution at the hands of the government or rebel groups. Figure 9 provides officials views on whether the source of protection threat to internally displaced persons comes from the government, nonstate actors (such as rebel groups), or both. Internally displaced persons were thought to be generally less likely to receive assistance the more time had lapsed since their initial displacement. According to relief and development experts we spoke with, there is a tendency among donors and aid agencies to provide short-term relief assistance rather than longer-term development or life-sustaining assistance. This funding and program trend particularly affects internally displaced persons, since most internal displacement situations are long- standing in nature. Similarly, assistance to internally displaced persons is negatively affected by international organizations’ difficulty in transitioning or redirecting their programs from the immediate relief phase to the longer- term rehabilitation/development phase. Finally, the volatile nature of complex emergencies often results in sudden surges of mass displacement. In two of our case study countries—Burundi and Sudan-- fighting accompanied by drought had resulted in the sudden movement of thousands to tens of thousands of people within the last few years. According to relief officials, international organizations do not have adequate food reserves to respond immediately to these quick surges in displacement populations. For example, according to World Food Program officials, the organization only had a 1 month reserve of food for Sudan, and only 40 percent of its food appeal for Burundi had been met. During our fieldwork in central Burundi, we were told of rising levels of malnutrition caused by displacement and drought, and relief officials were fearful that a failure in the upcoming harvest could lead to significant food shortages. According to U.N. officials, it takes a lead time of 5 to 6 months before requested food aid is delivered in-country. The U.S. government addresses the needs of the internally displaced by providing funds to international organizations and by directly implementing programs. However, the U.S. government does not have an overall policy or agency-specific guidelines for dealing with internally displaced persons, nor has the Department of State designated a lead office to help coordinate and direct the U.S. government’s response for internally displaced persons. According to State officials, the lack of a lead office has been identified as a problem and discussed within the department, but no policy decisions have been taken to address this issue. Some State and Agency for International Development (USAID) officials said that as a result of a lack of policy and a lead office, the U.S. government has difficulty coordinating and managing its programs to aid the internally displaced. A study by the State Department’s Office of Policy Planning and an assessment by the former director of the USAID’s Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance concluded that the absence of a U.S. policy for internally displaced persons has resulted in limited awareness, overlapping bureaucratic mandates, and fragmented and duplicative efforts. The reports noted the multifaceted nature of displacement crises and that U.S. efforts were undermined by the absence of a single, responsible office managing the interrelated assistance, protection, advocacy, peace processes, and international cooperation components. Both studies concluded that U.S. humanitarian interests would be better served with clear policy direction and senior leadership within the federal bureaucracy on internal displacement issues. We identified six offices within State and USAID that directly assist internally displaced persons, plus several other agencies and offices that are involved in such related functions as intelligence gathering and representing U.S. interests in international organizations. The Department of State’s Bureau of Population, Migration, and Refugees and USAID’s Bureau for Humanitarian Response are the two main sources of U.S. assistance to internally displaced persons. Based upon our discussions with officials from these agencies and a review of program documents, we found that there is duplication of effort and little coordination among the various agencies. For example, in Colombia, we learned that the World Food Program received funds from four different U.S. funding sources— State’s Bureau for Population, Refugees, and Migration; USAID’s Office of Transition Initiatives; the Department of Agriculture; and Plan Colombia— to support the same type of food assistance programs. However, the evidence shows that this funding was provided without coordination and knowledge about whether this would be complementary or duplicative. Furthermore, these offices were not able to determine how much of the $2.5 billion the U.S. government spends annually on humanitarian assistance goes to internally displaced persons, because agencies do not track how much money they spend on internal displacement. According to State and USAID program officials with whom we spoke, there are numerous drawbacks to not having a lead office or interagency working group to direct policy and activities related to internally displaced persons activities. Some of these drawbacks are listed as follows: Responding to crises is inefficient. It takes longer and is labor intensive to launch a response to an internal displacement crisis, as planning meetings are ad hoc and usually staff generated. There is no lead office or person to settle policy disputes among various agencies. For example, in Sudan, State and USAID had unresolved disagreements over aid policies and the content of assistance inputs to refugees and internally displaced persons, resulting in confusion among the nongovernmental organization implementing partners about which groups should be provided assistance. It is unclear whom to consult within the U.S. government. It is difficult for regional bureaus and other programming offices to take a proactive role for their countries or areas of responsibility. In the critical area of providing protection for internally displaced persons, we were told that good intelligence information exists about protection threats against internally displaced persons, but without a lead office to receive the information and direct it, the information does not pass smoothly to the organization needing it, as was the case in Kosovo and Rwanda. There is no senior-level representation or single voice to consider and address internally displaced persons’ issues during political-military crises deliberations within the highest level of the U.S. government. There is no clear locus of accountability for internal displacement issues within the U.S. government, especially on policy issues. According to the acting Assistant Secretary of State for Population, Refugees, and Migration, there are pros and cons to designating a lead office, some of which were pointed out in the interagency review. Primarily, the issue of internally displaced persons involves human rights, diplomacy, political-military affairs, humanitarian concerns, and designating a lead office either within State or USAID could skew the U.S. approach toward one of these concerns. Without a thorough review of all concerns and the related organizational structure of several departments, it would be difficult to determine if a designated lead would improve the situation. He said that the current administration is addressing the issue through improved coordination and cooperation among the offices involved. Furthermore, there is a coordinating committee led by the National Security Council that could be used to address specific situations. However, he said that if problems arose in coordinating a U.S. government response to internally displaced persons, the administration might consider designating a lead office. There is no overall policy on the funding priority for internally displaced persons within the U.S. government. The Department of State’s Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration and USAID’s Bureau for Humanitarian Affairs each has general legislative authority to address the assistance and protection needs of persons in need, such as provisions authorizing contributions to international organizations, assistance to victims of disasters and complex emergencies, help for victims of human rights abuses, and aid to those needing food assistance. But the legislation does not specifically refer to internally displaced persons. Thus, according to Department of State officials, the Bureau for Population, Refugees, and Migration does not see itself as the initial source of the U.S. government response to the internally displaced and has not requested appropriations for these populations. Similarly, USAID officials told us that internally displaced persons are not a direct focus of development assistance monies provided under the 1961 Foreign Assistance Act. Officials from both agencies told us that they interpret their current statutory authorities as putting a priority on funding for refugees, development, or emergency programs. Therefore, they manage their funds to meet these legislative priorities with no overall direction to coordinate their efforts on internally displaced persons. The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, requires the State Department to report annually to the Congress on the status of internationally recognized human rights. Although internally displaced persons are particularly vulnerable to human rights violations, the Department of State’s annual Country Reports on Human Rights Practices do not contain much information on the subject. These reports generally serve as an authoritative source and a basis for advocacy by U.S. diplomats both bilaterally and in international forums. Our examination of several country reports in State’s Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2000 and a Brookings Institution analysis of 1996 and 1997 reporting, indicated that State generally provides only a cursory account of internally displaced persons. In eight country reports we examined for 2000, three country reports provided some information on specific incidents of displacement, three reports noted that internal displacement exists and made estimates of the populations affected; but two reports made no mention of internal displacement issues, although such issues existed. The country reports neglected or provided insufficient information on the protection and assistance problems that internally displaced persons face or the conduct of the government and opposition groups toward these populations. For example, the country report for Afghanistan noted only that drought and conflict were causing an increase in internal displacement. Furthermore, there is no standard format for reporting on internal displacement that would allow for systematic data gathering and analysis. Unlike a standard format for reporting on refugee issues, discussion of internal displacement issues are dispersed throughout various sections, for example, freedom of movement, respect for political rights, and torture, making identification of internally displaced persons reporting difficult in the lengthy country reports. In addition, the reports use various terms to refer to internally displaced persons—“IDPs,” “forcibly displaced,” and “village re-evacuation”—increasing the difficulty in identifying internal displacement issues and sometimes blurring the distinction between internally displaced persons and refugees. Although some protection has been provided to internally displaced persons, international organizations have been unable to meet the protection needs of internally displaced persons in most locations, partly because of the danger of operating in conflict zones, the presence of personal security risks to aid workers, and the decline in budgetary resources, but also because international organizations have not taken a proactive approach toward protection. Also, international relief workers have not received training on how to incorporate protection considerations and interventions into their assistance activities, and in the three countries we visited, international organizations do not coordinate their protection actions within the countries in which they operate. Without such coordination, international organizations are unable to share basic information about the location of their protection officers and effective approaches to protection interventions. The U.N. Security Council is one forum where these matters can be addressed in the context of underlying political and security factors. The U.S. government has no overall policy or lead office to coordinate its efforts for dealing with internally displaced persons. Instead, government activities aimed at this effort are dispersed among different agencies and offices. Some State and USAID officials believe that providing assistance to the internally displaced in this way is labor and time intensive, lacks a locus of accountability, and leads to duplication of activities. Although the Department of State is required to provide the Congress with an annual report on human rights violations, these reports include only limited information about the treatment of internally displaced persons. Moreover, the country reports do not have a standardized format for providing information about the internally displaced and their human rights condition that would allow concerned parties to access the information readily. Increased and more systematic reporting that provided some focus on internally displaced persons would identify what we found to be a significant problem and would provide U.S. government and international and nongovernmental organizations’ officials with country-level data to craft a cohesive program and policy response. To strengthen the international response to the plight of the internally displaced, we recommend that the Secretary of State and the Permanent Representative of the United States to the United Nations (1) work to advance more proactive policies and programs to protect and assist internally displaced persons and (2) seek with other member states to strengthen international organizations’ protection efforts by encouraging them to implement a training program for international organizations and to form country-level protection working groups. We also recommend that the Secretary of State include a focus on internal displacement issues in State’s annual Country Reports on Human Rights Practices. State, USAID, the United Nations, and the Red Cross Movement provided written comments on a draft of this report. (See app. III to VI) Both State and the United Nations emphasized that lack of resources seriously undermines international efforts to address the protection and assistance needs of the internally displaced. This report recognizes that shortfalls in funding for internally displaced persons programs have had a negative impact on the international response; nevertheless, we believe our recommendations can be implemented by international organizations within existing resources. State said this report is useful in drawing attention to the phenomenon of internal displacement and identifying areas of concern that the State Department and USAID are working to address. State agreed with our recommendations to work toward more proactive programs to protect internally displaced persons and in-country training programs and working groups for protection. Concerning our recommendation for improved reporting on internal displacement in its annual Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, State said that it recognizes the importance of reporting on issues related to internally displaced persons and stated that such information is found throughout the report. State said it strives to use systematic language when referring to internally displaced persons, and it will continue its efforts to report on internally displaced persons. USAID stated that the report identifies issues of concern that it is actively working to address. USAID agreed with our recommendation to work with other countries and international organizations to advance programs that protect and assist internally displaced persons. Regarding the report’s discussion about the lack of an overall policy and a lead office for addressing the issue of internal displacement, USAID noted that its efforts are directed by the Foreign Assistance Manual, which states that “AID/OFDA has responsibility for assisting people displaced within their own country as a result of natural or man-made disasters.” State said that there are pros and cons to designating a lead humanitarian office. The United Nations and the Red Cross Movement noted that steps are being taken to improve coordination among international agencies at the headquarter level and that initiatives such as the U.N.’s Senior Inter-Agency Network on Internally Displaced Persons are examining the institutional arrangements within and between the United Nations, the Red Cross Movement, and nongovernmental organizations. We recognize that some coordinating activities have been recently initiated; however, as discussed in this report, we believe particular focus should be placed on improving country-level coordination mechanisms, especially in the area of protection. The World Food Program, the World Health Organization, the High Commissioner for Refugees, the Brookings Institution, and the Norwegian Refugee Council provided technical comments on this report, which we incorporated as appropriate. As we agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce the contents of this report earlier, we plan no further distribution of it until 30 days from the date of this letter. We will then send copies of this report to the Chairman and Ranking Minority Member of the House Committee on International Relations, the Secretary of State, the Administrator of the U.S. Agency for International Development, the U.N. Secretary General, and the President of the International Committee of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement. We will also then send copies to others who are interested and make copies available to others on request. Please contact me at (202) 512-4128 if you or your staff have any questions about this report. Other GAO contacts and staff acknowledgments are listed in appendix VII. At the request of the Chairman and the Ranking minority member of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, we assessed (1) whether international organizations have adequately protected internally displaced persons, and if not, what impediments these agencies face; (2) whether international organizations have met the food and other assistance needs of displaced populations; and (3) whether the U.S. government has a coordinated and effectively managed program to help ensure the protection of and assistance to internally displaced persons. To assess whether international agencies have adequately provided protection and assistance to internally displaced persons, we interviewed officials and analyzed policy, program, and budgetary documents from the U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights, the World Food Program, the U.N. Development Program, the U.N. Children’s Fund, the International Committee of the Red Cross, and the International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies. We met with officials and reviewed reports pertaining to humanitarian and internal displacement issues from numerous think tanks and nongovernmental organizations, including the Brookings Institution’s Project on Internal Displacement, the U.S. Committee for Refugees, InterAction, and the Norwegian Refugee Council. To assess the extent to which the U.S. government coordinates and manages its efforts to ensure protection and assistance to internally displaced persons, we interviewed officials and analyzed policy and program documents from the Department of State’s Office of Policy Planning; the Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration; the Ambassador at Large for War Crimes Issues; and the U.S. Missions to the United Nations in New York City and Geneva, Switzerland. We also analyzed a judgmental sample of country reports from the Department of State’s Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2000 to determine the extent to which the issue of internal displacement is addressed. We met with officials and analyzed program documents for the U.S. International Agency for Development’s (USAID) Bureau of Humanitarian Response, including the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance, the Office of Transition Initiatives, and the Office of Food for Peace. We also developed a field-level survey that was completed by U.N. Resident and Humanitarian Coordinators and officials from the Red Cross Movement and nongovernmental organizations. The survey solicited information on demographics, the effectiveness of international programs, and program management of aid and protection efforts for internally displaced persons. The survey asked for information based upon criteria set forth in the normative framework of protection and assistance principles outlined in the 1998 U.N. Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement and included modifications based upon recommendations from relief and protection experts from the United Nations, the Red Cross Movement, and think tanks. We sent an electronic copy of the survey directly, and through points of contact at the headquarters of the United Nations, the Red Cross Movement, and nongovernmental organizations, to field-level officials in more than 50 countries. A total of 120 usable surveys from 48 countries were returned from the various organizations; an additional 10 surveys were received but could not be used because key questions were not answered. The number of surveys returned from each country varied from one to eight. To provide equal weight to the opinions coming from each country, we computed a countrywide average response for each item. Thus, the unit of analysis was the 48 countries, rather than the 120 surveys. For questions that asked for a “yes” or “no” answer, the countrywide answer was coded “yes” if 50 percent or more of the respondents from the country responded “yes.” Countrywide mean ratings were also computed for questions that asked for the extent to which aid/protection concerns were being addressed (rating scale: 1 = Not applicable/Not at all, 2 = Small extent, 3 = Moderate extent, 4 = Great extent, 5 = Very great extent). The countrywide means were rounded (and collapsed to three categories) so that the percentage of countries at each point on the extent scale could be ascertained. If the countrywide mean was 1.00 to 1.49, the aid/protection intervention was judged to be not occurring at all. If the mean was 1.50 to 3.49 or 3.50 to 5.00, the intervention was characterized as occurring to a small/moderate extent or a great/very great extent, respectively. Because we were unable to determine the total number of countries or officials that received the survey in each country, we were unable to project the findings with a specified degree of precision to the population of all countries with internally displaced persons. We also performed fieldwork in our case study countries of Burundi, Colombia, and southern Sudan to determine the effectiveness of international organizations’ responses to the protection and assistance needs of internally displaced persons. These three countries are experiencing long-standing internal displacement crises, with large population movements and programs operated by the U.N. system, the Red Cross Movement, nongovernmental organizations, and the U.S. government. During our fieldwork, we met with officials from these organizations responsible for providing protection and assistance to the internally displaced. We also met with other donor governments and their aid agencies, with host government and opposition groups involved in the displacement crisis, and with internally displaced persons who were recipients of international assistance. We observed first-hand assistance programs designed to assist displaced populations and attended coordination meetings by country teams. Due to security concerns, we were unable to travel within southern Sudan; however, we met with agency and nongovernmental organization officials in Nairobi and Lokichoggio, Kenya, who conduct relief activities in southern Sudan both within and outside the U.N.-sponsored Operation Lifeline Sudan program. We performed our review from September 2000 through June 2001 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Burundi is a poor, densely populated country in East Africa. More than 90 percent of the country’s 6.6 million population is dependent on subsistence agriculture for survival. Over 3 million people—half the population— needed food assistance in 2000 because of drought or war. Burundi’s majority ethnic Hutu and minority ethnic Tutsi populations have struggled against each other for economic and political power for 30 years, with a small number of Tutsi elite having dominated the country’s politics and military since independence in 1962. Periodic military crackdowns slaughtered hundreds of thousands of people during the 1970s and 1980s. The victims were overwhelmingly Hutu. The first democratic election in 1993 elected a Hutu president. However, elements within the Tutsi-dominated military assassinated the President in 1993, triggering a wave of violence. A 1996 coup eliminated the rest of the democratically elected government, and the Tutsi elites shifted back into power. An insurgency by Hutu rebels and a counterinsurgency campaign by the government have claimed tens of thousands of lives and caused mass internal displacement in an ongoing civil war that continues today. The military has pursued a regroupment policy starting in 1996, requiring an estimated 350,000 persons (mostly Hutus) to live in forced regroupment camps, to prevent those living in the countryside from supporting the rebels. The camps had inadequate sanitation and insufficient access to water, food, shelter, and medicine, according to the U.S. Committee for Refugees. International organizations could not reach many of the government’s forced regroupment camps due to inadequate infrastructure or because they were prevented from doing so by security forces. The government’s and the rebels’ human rights record are poor, according to the Department of State’s human rights report. Combatants on both sides deliberately uprooted civilian populations and targeted displacement camps for attack. Government forces and rebels committed large-scale atrocities against civilians. According to Amnesty International, the armed forces and rebel groups have continued to show complete disregard for human life, acting with little or no accountability. Scores of civilians were killed in ambushes. Humanitarian workers were also killed and attacked. On numerous occasions, rebel groups killed unarmed civilians in reprisal for alleged collaboration with the government or for failing to support them. The U.S. government has made humanitarian relief its priority response in Burundi. Inadequate harvests during the last three seasons due to conflict and drought have caused severe malnutrition in several provinces. USAID- funded programs implemented by nongovernmental organizations and U.N. agencies primarily focused on life-sustaining activities such as food security assistance (provision of livestock, seeds, and tools), health care, and supplementary nutrition programs. In fiscal year 2001, the U.S. government provided an estimated $5.8 million in food aid and another $3 million to combat HIV/AIDS and promote human rights and democracy. In addition, the U.S. government is a significant contributor to the programs of the World Food Program and the U.N.’s Children Fund in Burundi. Figure 10 shows a USAID-assisted family. The roots of the conflict in Colombia go back to a power struggle between liberals and conservatives in the late 1940s. Between 1947 and 1957, the fighting claimed more than 300,000 lives and forced more than 1 million Colombians to abandon their homes, according to the International Committee of the Red Cross. In subsequent years, rural defense groups sprung up in various parts of the country. Some of them turned into guerilla groups with strong Marxist leanings. In later years, paramilitary groups appeared. The addition of a flourishing drug trade combined to create a complex and violent civil conflict that has resulted in the cumulative displacement of millions of people. Attempts to end the violence over the years have produced neither substantive agreements nor a decrease in the levels of violence. In 1999, the Colombian government launched Plan Colombia, a $7.5 billion, multiyear strategy designed to support the peace process, an antinarcotics strategy, democratization, and the provision of humanitarian assistance. However, the Colombian government faces serious challenges, as armed paramilitary groups, guerrillas, and narcotic traffickers exert influence over more than one-third of the country’s municipalities. Furthermore, the government’s human rights record is poor. According to the Department of State’s human rights reporting, government forces commit serious abuses, including extrajudicial killings. Members of security forces collaborate with paramilitary groups that committed abuses, in some instances allowing them to pass through roadblocks, sharing information, or providing ammunition and supplies. Paramilitary groups and guerillas were responsible for the vast majority of political and other killings, according to the Department of State’s human rights report. Throughout the country, paramilitary groups killed, tortured, and threatened civilians suspected of sympathizing with guerrillas in an orchestrated campaign to terrorize them into fleeing their homes, thereby depriving guerrillas of civilian support and allowing paramilitary forces to challenge the guerrilla groups for control of narcotic cultivations and strategically important territories. The two main guerrilla groups—the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the National Liberation Army (ELN)—are reported by the Department of State to regularly attack civilian populations and commit massacres and summary executions. They are also reported to have killed religious and medical personnel. Plan Colombia is being supported by the U.S. government with a $1.3 billion assistance package that was approved in June 2000. In addition to drug eradication and interdiction efforts, U.S funding is supporting (1) democracy programs and the peace process, (2) reduction of opium and cocoa cultivation through alternative development, and (3) assistance to internally displaced persons. USAID programs were focused on providing assistance to internally displaced persons in the reestablishment, or post- flight, stage of displacement. This phase of displacement represents a major gap in the international community’s response in Colombia. USAID- funded activities focused on secondary cities bearing the brunt of internally displaced populations and included food-for-work community projects, income generation and long-term economic opportunities, primary education, and shelter. State-funded activities of the World Food Program and the Pan American Health Organization focused on areas of capacity- building to improve health care delivery to displaced persons and supplementary feeding programs for women and children. Figure 11 shows Colombian women engaged in an income generation project. Sudan, geographically the largest country in Africa, has been at war nearly its entire independent existence. The conflict started just before independence in 1955, when the ruling north refused to share power with the south. This phase of the conflict, which lasted 17 years and claimed several hundreds of thousands of lives, ended in 1972 with the signing of a peace agreement in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. However, fighting resumed in 1983 when southern black troops in the national army created the Sudanese People’s Liberation Army and demanded a change of government in the capital, Khartoum, and a fair share of the resources for all regions in the country. In addition to the conflict between the regular army and the Sudanese People’s Liberation Army, fighting has raged between various militias allied with these two parties. The civil war, which is estimated to have resulted in the death of 2 million persons, and the internal displacement of several million more has continued into its 18th year. There has been no significant progress toward peace in years and Department of State officials believe the current situation is likely to go on indefinitely. Neither side appears to have the ability to win the war militarily, although oil revenues have allowed the government to invest increasingly in military hardware. Presently, the government controls virtually all of the northern two-thirds of the country but is limited to garrison towns in the south. The drive for oil and territorial control over newly operational oil fields is now central to the conflict that has long been rooted in racial, cultural, religious, and political differences. Government forces have pursued a scorched earth policy aimed at removing populations from around a newly built oil pipeline and other oil production facilities. These forces have killed and injured civilians, destroyed villages, and driven out inhabitants in order to create an unoccupied security zone, according to Department of State reporting. The government has also blocked or harassed humanitarian relief operations. The Sudanese People’s Liberation Army has been guilty of property theft from nongovernmental organizations and U.N. agencies operating in the south, according to the Department of State. Militia factions have manipulated humanitarian aid programs to gain food for their troops and have conscripted new soldiers from camps housing refugees and internally displaced persons. The militias are also guilty of committing serious human rights abuses. According to Amnesty International, militia forces frequently change sides depending on their perceived interests or the supply of arms. The government pursues a policy of providing support and weapons to the various militia commanders and encouraging interfactional fighting. It is estimated that more people have died as a result of interfactional fighting between militias than in armed encounters with government forces. Since 1991, the United States has provided $1.2 billion in humanitarian assistance to Sudan. Because the government of Sudan is involved in gross human rights violations and support of international terrorism, the United States provides only humanitarian assistance in government-controlled areas but both development and humanitarian assistance in opposition- controlled areas. USAID programs provide emergency food and nonfood aid (blankets, kitchen items, and plastic sheeting) in areas of displacement and resettlement. With increased emergency needs related to the many active conflict zones and large simultaneous displacements, USAID is providing life-sustaining assistance to extremely vulnerable populations. Most assistance is provided through Operation Lifeline Sudan, which is a consortium of U.N. agencies and more than 40 international nongovernmental organizations. In fiscal year 2001, the U.S. government provided an estimated $4 million in direct program assistance, in addition to U.S. contributions to the programs of international organizations, such as the International Committee of the Red Cross and the U.N. Children’s Fund. In addition to those named above, Patrick Dickriede, Norman Thorpe, Jack Edwards, Ernie Jackson, Zina Merritt, and Rona Mendelsohn made key contributions to this report. The first copy of each GAO report is free. Additional copies of reports are $2 each. A check or money order should be made out to the Superintendent of Documents. VISA and MasterCard credit cards are accepted, also. Orders for 100 or more copies to be mailed to a single address are discounted 25 percent. Orders by mail: U.S. General Accounting Office P.O. 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Summary: Internally displaced persons--those forced to flee their homes because of armed conflict and persecution but who remain within their own country--are among the most at-risk, vulnerable populations in the world. Although some protections have been provided to internally displaced persons, international organizations have been unable to fully meet their needs in most locations, partly because of the danger in operating in conflict zones, the presence of personal security risks to aid workers, and the decline in budgetary resources, but also because international organizations have not taken a proactive approach toward protection. Also, international relief workers have not received training on how to incorporate protection considerations and interventions into their assistance activities. In the three countries GAO visited, international organizations do not coordinate their protection actions within the countries in which they operate. Without such coordination, international organizations are unable to share basic information on the location of their protection officers and effective approaches to protection interventions. The U.N. Security Council is one forum in which these matters can be addressed in the context of underlying political and security factors. The U.S. government has no overall policy or lead office to coordinate its efforts for dealing with internally displaced persons. Instead, government activities aimed at this effort are dispersed among different agencies and offices. Some Department of State and U.S. Agency for International Development officials believe that providing assistance to the internally displaced in this way is labor and time intensive, lacks accountability, and leads to duplication of activities. Although State is required to provide Congress with an annual report on human rights violations, these reports include only limited information on the treatment of internally displaced persons. Moreover, the country reports do not have a standardized format for providing information on the internally displaced and their human rights conditions which would allow concerned parties to access the information readily. Increased and more systematic reporting that provided some focus on internally displaced persons would identify a significant problem and would provide the U.S. government and international and nongovernmental organizations' officials with country-level data to craft a cohesive program and policy response.