The Federal Aviation Administration is responsible for managing the national airspace system and ensuring the safe and efficient movement of air traffic. In doing so, FAA controls the take-off and landing of nearly 200,000 planes per day, which carry over 700 million passengers per year. To accomplish this mission, FAA must have a sufficient number of adequately trained air traffic controllers working at its air traffic control facilities. In 1981 over 11,000 air traffic controllers went on strike and were subsequently fired by President Ronald Reagan. Between 1982 and 1990, FAA hired thousands of individuals to permanently replace the fired controllers. Most of this hiring took place between 1982 and 1986. Many of these controllers, as well as those controllers who did not participate in the strike, are now eligible or will soon be eligible to retire from FAA. Air traffic controllers play a critical role in the nation’s air transportation system by helping ensure the safe, orderly, and expeditious flow of air traffic in the air and on the ground. Controllers help ensure that aircraft maintain a safe distance between one another and that each aircraft is on proper course to its destination. Specific controller responsibilities for managing air traffic vary according to the type of air traffic control facility. For instance, controllers who work at airport control towers are responsible for ensuring the safe separation of aircraft on the ground and in flight in the vicinity of airports, generally within a 5-mile radius. These controllers manage the flow of aircraft during take-off and landing and coordinate the transfer of aircraft with adjacent control facilities as aircraft enter or leave an airport’s airspace. Controllers working at terminal radar approach control (TRACON) facilities use radar screens to track planes and manage the arrival and departure of aircraft within a 5- to 50–nautical mile radius of airports. At these TRACON facilities, a key function of an approach controller is to line up and sequence airplanes as they descend into an airport’s 5-mile radius. Controllers working at air route traffic control centers (commonly called en route centers) manage aircraft beyond a 50–nautical mile radius. These controllers assign aircraft to specific routes and altitudes while they fly along federal airways. These controllers also coordinate the transfer of aircraft control with adjacent en route or terminal facilities. The typical en route center is responsible for more than 100,000 square miles of airspace, which generally extends over several states. Figure 1 shows how controllers working at the different air traffic control facilities track aircraft during ground movements, take-off, in-flight, and landing operations. Currently, FAA operates 339 air traffic control facilities, consisting of 24 en route centers and 315 terminal facilities. In total, about 20,000 employees categorized as air traffic controllers directly control and manage the air traffic system, comprising several positions with differing responsibilities. (See table 1.) This total includes positions that actively control, or supervise the control of, traffic (air traffic control specialists, traffic management coordinators, and operational supervisors); and “off-line” positions that do not control traffic (former air traffic control specialists in management, training, or staff positions). As the table above indicates, the majority of air traffic controllers are classified as specialists. These controllers are represented by the National Air Traffic Controllers Association, which negotiated staffing levels with FAA in 1998. Under the terms of the agreement, nationwide staffing (in full- time equivalents) for these specialists was set at 15,000 for fiscal years 1999 through 2001. The agreement also called for 2 percent staff increases for fiscal years 2002 and 2003, arriving at a controller specialist staffing level of 15,606 by the end of fiscal year 2003. FAA has requested funding to meet the staffing levels called for in the agreement. Under the 1998 agreement, FAA headquarters officials and NATCA national representatives negotiate allocation of staffing levels for the air traffic control specialists among FAA’s nine regions. Figure 2 below shows the location of each FAA region and the number of controller specialists allocated to each region for fiscal year 2001. Once the regions receive their staff allocations, FAA regional managers and NATCA regional representatives negotiate staff allocations among the various field facilities in each region. The additional 606 controllers called for under the 1998 agreement are to be distributed to regions and field facilities in the same way, with FAA and NATCA officials negotiating allocations to each region and specific facility. In 1972, Congress passed Public Law 92-297, which authorized the secretary of transportation to set a maximum entry age for initial appointments to air traffic controller positions at the FAA. Pursuant to this authority, FAA requires that a potential controller candidate be hired before reaching his or her 31st birthday. This provision was established in recognition of the fact that younger trainees are more successful in completing the controller training programs, and that younger individuals may be better able to deal with the stress of controlling air traffic. One exception to this rule is the Employment of Retired Military Air Traffic Controllers Program, commonly known as the Phoenix Controller-20 program, under which FAA commits to hiring retired military controllers who are past the age of 30. This exception allows military controllers to stay with the military longer before moving to FAA to continue their controller activities. Controller retirement is also affected by special requirements. Controllers working at FAA’s air traffic control facilities and staff offices are eligible to retire under two sets of retirement provisions: the general retirement requirements for federal employees and special requirements for controllers. Depending on when a controller was hired, he or she is covered by either the Civil Service Retirement System or the Federal Employee Retirement System. As federal employees, controllers under these systems can retire if they meet certain age and years-of-service requirements. For example, under general CSRS, a controller who is 55 years old can retire after 30 years of federal service, or at 60 years old with 20 years of service, or at 62 with 5 years of service. Under the special controller retirement requirements, a controller may retire earlier than under the general CSRS and FERS requirements if he or she has enough service time as an active controller specialist, traffic management coordinator, or immediate supervisor. Time in these “covered” positions is generally known as “good time” because it counts toward the special retirement requirements. Controllers can retire at age 50 if they have spent at least 20 years in a covered position, or at any age if they have at least 25 years in a covered position. Under these provisions, controllers covered by CSRS are guaranteed a retirement annuity amounting to the greater of two figures: either 50 percent of their high average 3-year salary or the basic federal retirement annuity. Controllers covered by FERS receive an annuity amounting to 1.7 percent of their high average 3-year salary for the first 20 years of service plus 1 percent of their high average 3-year salary for each additional year of service. Table 2 summarizes the CSRS, FERS, and special retirement provisions. In addition to these basic retirement eligibility requirements, air traffic controllers covered by CSRS are also subject, pursuant to Public Law 92- 297, to a rule requiring mandatory separation at age 56. Controllers covered by FERS are subject to a similar rule, pursuant to Public Law 99- 335. Under this requirement, with some exceptions, controllers actively working in covered positions must separate by the last day of the month in which they turn 56. FAA relies on a number of sources to fill its controller positions. These sources are (1) individuals with no prior controller training or work experience in the air traffic control environment, (2) individuals with some controller training but generally no actual controller work experience, and (3) individuals with prior controller work experience. The first group includes individuals who respond to an Office of Personnel Management vacancy announcement. Referred to as off-the-street hires, these candidates must pass an OPM exam to qualify for employment with FAA and must pass a 15-week initial training program at FAA’s Academy in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, before being assigned to a facility. There have been no OPM job announcements for entry-level air traffic control specialist positions since 1992, because FAA has chosen to rely on other sources for new candidates. FAA estimates that approximately 150 people who responded to the last announcement and passed the OPM exam are still eligible for employment as controllers. The second group includes graduates of FAA-accredited collegiate programs who receive initial air traffic control training prior to being hired by FAA. This type of training introduces students to the terminology, airspace configurations, and technical skills necessary to manage air traffic and operate equipment. Students can receive general air traffic control training at one of 13 schools under FAA’s collegiate training initiative program, or specialized en route training at the Minneapolis Community and Technical College, formerly known as the Mid-American Aviation Resource Consortium school (see app. II for more detailed information on the schools). Collegiate training initiative schools offer either two- or four- year aviation related degrees. Unlike these schools, the Minneapolis Community and Technical College program is not part of a broader academic program, and the federal government subsidizes the cost of training its students. Collegiate training initiative graduates must pass an initial 12-week controller training program at the FAA academy to begin work at their assigned facility, while Minneapolis Community and Technical College graduates can immediately begin working at their assigned facilities. During fiscal years 1997 through 2001, FAA has hired 465 from the collegiate training programs and 291 from the Minneapolis Community and Technical College. The third group of candidates consists of controllers with previous air traffic control experience, including both former Department of Defense (DOD) controllers and controllers fired in the 1981 strike. DOD employs both active-duty military controllers and civilian controllers. In general, military controllers can leave DOD for FAA at the end of their enlistments, as long as they do so before turning 31 years of age. To help DOD minimize military controller losses, FAA and DOD designed a program in 1999 called the Phoenix Controller-20 program to give controllers an incentive to stay in the military past age 30. Under this program, military controllers can join FAA after they retire from military service. FAA may also hire controllers who previously held air traffic controller positions with the agency; most of them are among those fired in the 1981 controller strike. President Reagan banned the federal government from hiring any of these controllers, but President Bill Clinton lifted this ban in 1993, at which time FAA issued a job announcement for fired controllers interested in returning to work. Candidates in this group are not required to attend initial controller training at the academy but may be required to take refresher training there. During fiscal years 1997 through 2001, FAA hired 793 former DOD controllers and rehired 562 controllers who had been fired in 1981. Once assigned to an air traffic control facility, candidates are classified as “developmental controllers” until they complete all requirements to be certified for all of the air traffic control positions within a defined area of a given facility. It generally takes new controllers who have had only initial controller training between 2 and 4 years—depending on the facility and the availability of facility staff or contractors to provide on-the-job training—to complete all the certification requirements to become certified professional controllers. It normally takes individuals who have prior controller experience less time to become fully certified. In October 2000, the chairman and ranking democratic member of the Subcommittee on Aviation, House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, asked us to examine FAA’s efforts to address existing and future controller staffing needs. We were asked to (1) identify likely future attrition scenarios for FAA’s controller workforce and (2) examine FAA’s strategy for responding to its short- and long-term staffing needs, including how it plans to address the challenges it may face. To identify future attrition scenarios for FAA’s controller workforce, we (1) obtained and analyzed FAA estimates of future retirement and attrition; (2) analyzed FAA’s employee database to determine when controllers would reach retirement eligibility; (3) developed a computer model to simulate future attrition based on historic FAA air traffic controller rates; and (4) developed and mailed a survey to a sample of current air traffic controllers to determine their retirement plans. FAA’s estimates: To obtain FAA’s estimates of future retirements and attrition, we interviewed officials in FAA’s Office of Air Traffic Resource Management who are responsible for managing the controller workforce. These officials provided information on the data used to support FAA’s estimates of future controller attrition. They provided estimates only for the 15,000 controller specialists; similar estimates were not available for other categories of air traffic controllers. Analysis of FAA’s workforce: We used personnel data supplied by FAA to calculate the age and service characteristics of 20,021 air traffic controllers who were employed as of June 30, 2001, the most recent data available at that time. These included 15,120 controller specialists, 670 traffic management coordinators, 1,862 operational supervisors, and 2,369 managers and staff specialists. We used this information to determine the number of controllers reaching retirement eligibility over the next decade. Additional information on how we made these projections is contained in appendix III. Simulation model of attrition: We developed a computer simulation that projected the level of potential controller attrition through 2011. This model used age and years of service information for the controller workforce, in addition to past attrition rates and some assumptions about future attrition rates, to estimate the number of future losses FAA will face in its controller workforce. Additional information on the methodology of the computer simulation, including the assumptions we used, is given in appendix IV. Survey of controllers: We mailed a survey to controllers to obtain independent estimates of future controller attrition. After developing and pre-testing the survey, we sent it to a statistically representative sample of 2,100 current controllers. The survey asked the controllers about when they planned to retire or leave the agency and about factors that could affect their decision. We received responses from over 75 percent of our sample. Additional information on the survey methodology can be found in appendix V. To address the second objective of examining FAA’s strategy for responding to its short- and long-term staffing needs, including how it plans to address the challenges it may face, we obtained information on the availability of potential controller candidates, FAA’s process for hiring new controller candidates, and FAA’s training activities associated with new candidates. To obtain information on the availability of candidates, we interviewed officials at FAA headquarters, the 9 FAA regional offices, the 14 college or university air traffic control programs, and the Department of Defense to determine the number of controllers who are potentially available to FAA. We visited schools in California, Minnesota, New Hampshire, and Florida to better understand their activities. We did not verify the information provided by these sources. To understand FAA’s process for hiring new controller candidates, we interviewed officials at FAA’s headquarters and regional offices. At FAA’s headquarters we focused on the activities of the Air Traffic Resource Management office, which is responsible for monitoring air traffic controller hiring levels. In addition, we met with officials at FAA’s Civil Aeronautical Medical Institute to discuss their activities to develop a new screening test for potential controller candidates—referred to as Air Traffic Selection and Training exam (AT-SAT). In addition, we obtained information on how FAA uses staffing standards to determine staffing levels at its various facilities and interviewed officials with the National Academy of Sciences about their review of FAA’s staffing standards. To obtain information on FAA’s training activities, we visited FAA’s training academy in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, and discussed on-the-job training with each of FAA’s nine regional offices. We also interviewed officials with the Air Transport Association, NATCA, and representatives of all nine FAA regional offices to ensure that we obtained a nationwide perspective on controller staffing issues. Finally, we obtained and reviewed information from the Office of Personnel Management and our previous reports on good human capital practices in government agencies to evaluate FAA’s workforce plan regarding air traffic controller staffing. We conducted our review from January 2001 through April 2002, in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. We obtained oral comments on a draft of this report from senior FAA officials, which are discussed at the end of chapter 3. Although the exact number and timing of the controllers’ departure is impossible to determine, attrition scenarios developed by both FAA and GAO indicate that the total attrition will grow substantially in the short and long terms. As a result, FAA will likely need to hire thousands of air traffic controllers in the next decade to meet increasing traffic demands and to address the anticipated attrition of experienced controllers, predominately created by retirements. Depending on the scenario, total attrition could range from 7,200 to nearly 11,000 controllers over the next decade. GAO also found that the potential for retirement among frontline supervisors and controllers at some of FAA’s busiest facilities may be high. To identify likely future attrition scenarios, we (1) reviewed FAA’s 10-year hiring plan and associated attrition forecasts for approximately 15,000 controller specialists who actively control and separate traffic in the air and on the ground; (2) analyzed FAA’s workforce database to determine when the current controllers (those at FAA as of June 30, 2001) would become eligible to retire; (3) developed a computer model to predict future attrition based on historic levels; and (4) developed and administered a survey to a statistically representative sample of controllers so as to obtain information on when they might leave FAA. GAO’s analysis covers more than 20,000 controllers—the 15,000 controller specialists whom FAA analyzed and about 5,000 controllers who supervise and manage the air traffic control system. GAO included the additional personnel because attrition from these positions is generally filled from the controller specialist ranks and, thus, omitting them would understate potential attrition among all controllers. In May 2001 FAA prepared a 10-year estimate of its hiring needs that included a projection of the number of controller specialists who may be needed in the future and estimates of expected controller losses. The estimate shows that the number of controller specialists needed to help manage the air traffic system could grow from about 15,000 in fiscal year 2001 to over 17,000 by the end of fiscal year 2010, and that losses of controllers could increase from 428 in fiscal year 2001 to over 1,000 in 2010. FAA estimates that future air traffic increases will require it to hire more than 2,000 additional air traffic controllers over the next decade. FAA bases its future projections on a mathematical model, referred to as the staffing standard, which factors expected traffic levels and the amount of tasks a typical controller can perform in a given time frame in order to estimate the future number of controllers that FAA will need. As shown in table 3, FAA anticipates a growing requirement for controller specialists. FAA’s controller staffing levels in fiscal years 2002 and 2003 were established under the terms of FAA’s 1998 contract with NATCA, which represents the controller specialists. To estimate staffing needs for fiscal year 2004 and beyond, FAA used its air traffic control staffing standards. The standards estimate that FAA will need, on average, about 245 additional controllers each year from the end of fiscal year 2003 though fiscal year 2010, mainly because of increases in air traffic. The standards further estimate that FAA will need 17,309 controllers by fiscal year 2010— over 2,000 more controllers than are currently employed. The National Academy of Sciences examined FAA’s staffing standards in 1997. It found that the standards did a reasonable job of estimating future needs on a national or regional level, but that the standards were not as useful in determining facility level needs. It recommended that FAA modify its staffing process to produce more reliable facility staffing estimates. To date, however, FAA has not fully implemented this recommendation because of funding limitations, according to the branch manager, Resource Management. FAA’s projections show growing losses of controller specialists. FAA included estimates of three types of losses: retirements, nonretirements (for example, resignations, firings, and deaths), and non-attrition (controllers who leave to take other positions within FAA, such as supervisory and staff positions). According to the branch manager, Resource Management, the forecast is based on historic attrition levels. Table 4 displays FAA’s 10-year projections. As the table shows, FAA is estimating sizable increases in controller specialist retirements over the next decade, with retirements increasing each year and exceeding 700 by the end of fiscal year 2010. The average annual retirement level over the length of the forecast period is 423, which is three times higher than the average annual retirement level of 141 that FAA experienced over the 5-year period of 1996 through 2000. Combined with other losses, this estimate anticipates a nearly 50-percent turnover in the next decade from its current controller specialist contingent of approximately 15,000. The scenarios shown by our analysis of retirement eligibility trends, the results of our simulation model, and estimates from our controller survey all indicate that FAA may face a sizable increase in future attrition, primarily because of retirements. In addition, we examined attrition patterns for supervisors and for controllers at the busiest facilities because of their importance to the national air traffic control operations, and we found that attrition levels for these groups could be sizable over the next decade. Because many controllers were hired in the early 1980s, FAA is facing an aging controller workforce. As of June 30, 2001, the average age of an FAA controller was 43, and approximately 7,400 controllers were 45 or older. In addition, because of the special controller retirement provisions, many controllers may soon accrue enough years of service to meet the retirement eligibility requirements. Because FAA’s employee database does not identify the amount of time controllers have worked controlling traffic (good time), we examined the eligibility of FAA’s entire controller workforce (about 20,000 employees), using both the special controller retirement provisions and the CSRS/FERS retirement provisions. Although most of the employees would be expected to first reach eligibility under the special provisions (20 years of good time and age 50, or 25 years of experience at any age), some of those employees who were older when hired or were working at positions other than actually controlling traffic (like training) might first become eligible under CSRS or FERS provisions (age 55 with 30 years federal employment, age 60 with 20 years federal experience, or age 62 with 5 years experience). Our review of the eligibility data shows that about 2,500, or 12 percent of the current controller workforce, was eligible to retire at the end of fiscal year 2001. As figure 3 shows, an increasing percentage of current controllers will become eligible to retire between fiscal year 2002 and 2011, with nearly 11,200 of the current controllers becoming eligible for retirement over the next 10 years. In addition, those already eligible, coupled with the nearly 11,200 additional controllers becoming eligible over the next 10 years, will increase the number of current controllers eligible to retire to more than 13,600, or 68 percent of FAA’s total current controller workforce, by the end of fiscal year 2011. Our controller attrition simulation model projects that high numbers of controllers will leave the workforce between fiscal years 2002 and 2011. Probabilities for separation were based on controller attrition patterns between 1997 and 2000 and were applied to the 20,021 controllers at FAA as of June 30, 2001. Projections are therefore based on the June 2001 population, and there is no adjustment for new appointments. As shown in figure 4, the simulation model predicts that about 600 to 800 controllers will leave each year between fiscal years 2002 and 2011, which is one and one-half to two times higher than average attrition was over the past 5 years. It also indicates that nearly 7,500 controllers (about 37 percent of the current controller workforce) are projected to leave FAA by the end of fiscal year 2011. Based on the results of our survey of air traffic controllers, we estimate that many controllers plan to leave FAA soon. Of the 20,021 controllers working at FAA as of June 30, 2001, we estimate that approximately 5,000 controllers plan to leave (predominately because of retirement) between fiscal years 2002 and 2006, and about 10,900 by the end of fiscal year 2011. As shown in figure 5, we estimate that between fiscal years 2002 and 2011, approximately 1,100 controllers on average plan to leave each year, and about 1,300 controllers plan to leave in fiscal year 2007 alone—also the peak year for controllers reaching retirement eligibility. These estimates are more than double the recent attrition levels that FAA has experienced—on average, about 436 controllers separated each year for the past 5 years. We also estimate, based on the survey responses, that there are two time frames for when controllers said they might leave or retire. An estimated 40 percent of the controllers said they planned to leave or retire at age 50 or earlier, and another 26 percent said they planned to leave or retire around the maximum 56-separation age. In addition, we also found that approximately 51 percent of controllers said they planned to retire when they first become eligible. Because supervisors are important to air traffic control operations and because they tend to be older than others controlling traffic, we examined retirement eligibility and survey results of supervisors at FAA as of June 2001. We found that supervisors will become eligible and said they planned to leave FAA in very high numbers over the next decade. We found that 1,205, or 65 percent, of current supervisors will become eligible to retire between 2002 and 2011. (See fig. 6.) Given that 28 percent of current supervisors are already eligible to retire and that by 2011 another 65 percent will have reached eligibility, about 93 percent of current supervisors will be eligible to retire by the end of fiscal year 2011. As a result, FAA may face substantial turnover in its supervisory ranks over the next decade. In addition, estimates from our survey show sizable attrition through fiscal year 2011. As shown in figure 7, we estimate that 770 supervisors (about 39 percent of current supervisors) said they plan to leave between fiscal years 2002 and 2006, and 1,503 supervisors (about 76 percent of current supervisors) plan to leave FAA, primarily through retirement, through fiscal year 2011, an average of about 150 per year. The peak year in planned attrition is fiscal 2007, when we estimate that 221 supervisors plan to leave. This level of potential attrition for supervisors is higher than in the past 5 years, during which an average of 71 supervisors left each year. High levels of supervisor attrition could also affect the controller specialist workforce. To the extent that FAA replaces supervisors who leave, increases in supervisory retirements could further reduce the number of experienced controller specialists available to control traffic and increase controller specialist hiring needs in order to replace the controllers moving to supervisory positions. The overall impact of supervisor attrition is unclear at this time. Until recently, FAA was in the process of reducing the controller-to-supervisor ratio from 7-to-1 to 10-to-1, through attrition, as agreed to in the 1998 NATCA collective bargaining agreement. This strategy would help mitigate the flow of NATCA bargaining unit controllers into the supervisory ranks. The outcome of this strategy is uncertain because the Conference Report for the fiscal year 2002 Department of Transportation Appropriations (H. Rpt. 107-308) stated that the conferees were concerned about the impact of the reduction and directed FAA not to reduce supervisory staffing further. FAA intends to abide by this language for this fiscal year, and its future decisions on supervisory reductions are subject to congressional direction. Because of the crucial role played by en route centers and the busiest terminal facilities in the national air space system, we analyzed the impact of retirement eligibility on the 21 major en route centers, the 10 busiest airport towers, and the 10 busiest TRACON facilities. Based on our analysis of FAA’s employee database, we found that the en route centers and the busiest terminal facilities will experience a sizable increase in the number of controllers reaching retirement eligibility. As figure 8 shows, retirement eligibility in these facilities grows over the next decade. In analyzing retirement eligibility data for the en route centers, we found that 903, or about 11 percent, of the controllers currently at FAA’s 24 en route centers are already eligible to retire. Additionally, the cumulative percentage of current controllers becoming eligible to retire increases to about 28 percent by the end of fiscal year 2006 and reaches about 65 percent by the end of fiscal year 2011. In terms of the 21 major en route centers, the Jacksonville center had the highest proportion of retirement- eligible controllers at the end of fiscal year 2001, with 79 of its 376 controllers being eligible for retirement (21 percent). By the end of fiscal year 2006, at least 29 percent of current controllers will be eligible for retirement at 10 centers—Albuquerque, Atlanta, Boston, Fort Worth, Houston, Jacksonville, Los Angeles, Memphis, Seattle, and Washington, D.C. At the 10 busiest airport towers, 76, or about 10 percent, of current controllers are eligible to retire. The cumulative percentage rises to about 34 percent by the end of fiscal year 2006 and reaches 74 percent by the end of fiscal year 2011. Based on our analysis for these towers, we found that the Denver tower had the highest proportion of retirement-eligible controllers as of September 30, 2001, with 14 of its 51 (27 percent) controllers being eligible to retire. By the end of fiscal year 2006, 45 percent of Denver’s current controllers will be eligible to retire, and by the end of fiscal year 2011 it reaches 90 percent, as 46 of its 51 current controllers will reach retirement eligibility. At the 10 busiest TRACON facilities, about 199, or about 12 percent, of current controllers are eligible to retire. The cumulative percentage increases to about 36 percent by the end of fiscal year 2006 and reaches about 73 percent by the end of fiscal year 2011. Based on our analysis for these facilities, the Dallas/Fort Worth TRACON had the highest level of current controllers eligible to retire at the end of fiscal year 2001, with 36 of its 147 (24 percent) controllers being eligible. By the end of fiscal year 2006, the cumulative percentage grows to 46 percent, and by the end of fiscal year 2011 it reaches 87 percent, as 128 of the 147 controllers currently at the facility will have reached retirement eligibility. Attrition of air traffic controllers will increase substantially over the next decade, primarily because many controllers will retire. This condition is widespread across the various air traffic control facilities at the FAA, and the potential for massive turnover exists even at FAA’s most complex and busiest facilities. To effectively deal with expected attrition, government agencies must identify human capital needs, assess how current staff and expected future staff will meet those needs, and create strategies to address any shortfalls or imbalances. As we have reported, a high- performing organization typically addresses its current and future workforce needs by estimating the following: the number of employees it will need; the knowledge, skills, and abilities those employees will have in order for the organization to accomplish its goals; and the areas where employees should be deployed across the organization. We have developed a model that identifies strategic workforce planning as a critical success factor in effectively managing a human capital program, because such planning can help agencies ensure that they have adequate staff to accomplish their missions. Although FAA will be faced with unprecedented numbers of retirements of its air traffic controllers, it has not yet developed a comprehensive workforce plan to address this issue and therefore risks having a shortage of qualified controllers. Good workforce planning includes developing strategies for integrating hiring, recruiting, training, and other human capital activities in a manner that meets the agency’s long-term objectives. FAA generally hires new controllers only when current, experienced controllers leave, and it does not adequately take into account the time necessary to fully train these replacements. Furthermore, although FAA intends to increasingly hire individuals with no prior controller experience, its new aptitude test for potential candidates may not be as effective in screening them as initially planned. In addition, FAA has not provided its training academy with the resources necessary to handle the expected large increase in controller candidates. Finally, exemptions to the mandatory age 56-separation provision raise equity and safety issues. FAA therefore might face a shortage of experienced controllers, leading to an increase in overtime logged by its remaining controllers. Increased flight delays might also result from this situation, as fewer controllers might not be able to safely guide the same number of flights that would be possible with a fully staffed controller workforce. A key component of workforce planning is ensuring that appropriately skilled employees are available when and where they are needed to meet an agency’s mission. This means, in part, that an agency continually needs trained employees becoming available to fill newly opened positions. FAA’s current hiring process does not adequately ensure that qualified replacements are available to expeditiously assume the responsibilities of those who retire. The main objective of FAA’s branch manager for resource management is to ensure that controller-staffing levels meet the levels called for in FAA’s contract with the controller’s union (NATCA). To do this, he estimates how many controller specialists will leave during the year and allocates this number among regions as a target-hiring figure. On at least a quarterly basis, he informs the officials in the regions how many controller candidates they are allowed to hire for that period. If attrition is lower than expected during that period, he may tell them to delay hiring until a later quarter. For example, in fiscal year 2001, the plan called for hiring 425 controller candidates but, because of lower-than-expected attrition levels, FAA hired only 358 new controllers. According to this official, FAA does not have budgetary resources to maintain and develop an employee pipeline to ensure that fully certified replacements are available, so it has no plans to change these hiring practices. FAA’s approach of hiring new employees only when current employees leave does not adequately account for the time needed to train controllers to fully perform their functions, or for the increased retirements that are projected in the short and long terms. The amount of time it takes new controllers to gain certification depends on the facilities at which they will work, but it generally takes from 2 to 4 years and can take up to 5 years at some of the busiest and most complex facilities. The branch manager’s May 2001 hiring plan identifies a “hiring lead time adjustment” starting in fiscal year 2004 that provides for additional hiring in recognition of the time necessary to train employees. The numbers included, however, do not appear adequate to account for the large potential increases in controller attrition. For example, in fiscal year 2004, the adjustment is for hiring 70 extra candidates, which would respond to a potential attrition of about 700 to 1,100 controllers in 2006, when these new hires might be ready for certification at some facilities. In addition, the branch manager told us that budget constraints play a key role in determining the timing of hiring new candidates. For example, he said that budget requests are tied to the NATCA contract amounts and that FAA had no plans to request the additional funding necessary to go above those levels. FAA officials also stressed that staffing management is now a partnership between FAA and NATCA, and that this also creates constraints on FAA’s ability to hire and place new controllers at specific facilities. FAA regional officials, who are responsible for ensuring that FAA’s air traffic facilities are adequately staffed, are particularly concerned about FAA’s replacement-hiring policy. Eight of nine regional officials with whom we spoke stated that they would like for FAA to allow them to hire new controller staff above their authorized levels so that experienced, fully qualified controllers will be ready when current controllers retire. The officials were particularly concerned that significant increases in retirement rates among veteran controllers would leave the facilities short of qualified controllers while new trainees are hired and trained. Several regions stated that they had made formal and informal requests to FAA headquarters to obtain additional controllers who could be hired and trained in advance of future retirements. In May 2001, for example, officials from FAA’s Southwest Region formally requested 48 additional staff members to mitigate the impact of future retirements. The region asked for new hires at one of its en route centers to “ensure that quality customer service is maintained, budgetary concerns are addressed, and controller attrition is dealt with.” In April 2002, FAA headquarters informed the region that their request was denied because of operational constraints imposed by the 1998 agreement with the controllers’ union and because of the current fiscal year’s budgetary constraints. Furthermore, numerous FAA regional officials told us that they were frustrated by their agency’s insistence on staffing as close to the numbers called for in the NATCA contract as possible. A lack of experienced controllers could have many adverse consequences, according to several FAA regional officials. Several regional officials stated that if a facility becomes seriously short of experienced controllers, the remaining controllers might have to slow down the flow of air traffic through their airspace. If the situation became dire, FAA could require airlines to reduce their schedules, but this would be an unlikely, worst-case scenario, according to some FAA regional officials. Also, because there would be fewer experienced controllers available to work, some FAA facility officials stated that those controllers could see increased workloads and additional, potentially mandatory, overtime. Some facility managers told us that they expected this increased burden to result in additional work-related stress for the remaining controllers, which would increase sick leave usage. It could also cause experienced controllers to retire sooner than they otherwise might. For example, based on our survey results, we estimate that 33 percent of controllers would accelerate their decision to retire if forced to work additional mandatory overtime. Identifying sources of future potential employees with the requisite skills and aptitude is another key piece of a comprehensive workforce plan. As discussed in chapter 1, FAA historically has hired its new controllers from a variety of sources, including graduates of institutions in FAA’s collegiate training initiative program, the Minneapolis Community and Technical College, candidates already on a list maintained by OPM, controllers formerly employed by FAA who were fired by President Reagan in 1981, and former DOD controllers. Table 5 shows the sources and number of new controllers that FAA hired between fiscal years 1997 and 2001. DOD officials were concerned that increasing retirements of FAA’s controllers over the next 5 years will cause greater operational problems, and possibly affect defense readiness, if potentially thousands of DOD controllers were to fill openings at FAA. DOD has lost many controllers to FAA—about 35 percent of FAA’s hires in the past 5 years. FAA’s regional officials told us that they like to hire former military controllers because of their experience, maturity, and work ethic. DOD officials with whom we spoke explained that these losses had resulted in cutbacks for fighter training missions by at least one of the armed services and in the implementation of significant retention bonuses to military controllers. Although DOD employs both civilian and uniformed military controllers, there remains a pay disparity between DOD and FAA. These officials believe that the higher pay offered by FAA explains why DOD military and civilian controllers apply for FAA controller jobs. For example, in fiscal year 2001, the maximum base salary levels for DOD controllers were $48,730 for a DOD military controller and $74,553 for a DOD civilian controller, while FAA controllers could earn up to $128,386. DOD officials stated that both agencies (FAA and DOD) must meet their recruiting and retention goals to support national security and defense requirements. To that end, DOD officials said that the focus needs to be on the requirement for air traffic controllers as a whole and not on two competing systems. Along these lines, FAA headquarters officials said that because FAA hopes to achieve a more diverse workforce, it expects to concentrate increasingly on hiring off-the-street candidates. The success of the off-the-street hiring depends in large part on identifying potential candidates who have an appropriate aptitude for controllers’ work. Traditionally, FAA used the academy’s initial entry-training program to screen out candidates who could not become successful controllers. According to FAA officials, as many as 50 percent of off-the-street applicants have dropped out before finishing the required training program. These officials estimated that about $10 million per year was spent on training candidates who later failed the program. FAA therefore developed a new screening exam, known as AT-SAT, to better ensure that the new hires have the skills and abilities to succeed on the job. FAA plans to require that candidates without prior experience pass the 8-hour AT-SAT exam before they begin training at its academy. According to academy officials, the academy is planning to rely on AT-SAT as a way to screen out candidates unlikely to pass the academy’s training, and it has therefore revised its training program to emphasize teaching skill-sets rather than serving as a screening program. Uncertainty exists regarding the exam’s ability to screen out unsuccessful candidates and help ensure that new candidates have the aptitude to become successful controllers. For example, FAA has recently changed the exam to allow more candidates to pass, which creates some uncertainty about its ability to identify successful candidates. During initial validation of AT-SAT, FAA found that the test should predict, with a high level of validity, that those who passed it would become successful controllers. However, FAA found that only about 28 percent of non-FAA test subjects and about 62 percent of active controllers could pass the test. In addition, they found that passing rates for some applicant groups, including particularly African-Americans and females, might be significantly lower than the overall passing rates. Therefore, FAA concluded that the passing score on the test was set higher than the typical controller’s job expectations. As a result, the developers of the exam changed the weight given to different portions of the exam and adjusted the passing score to tie the test more accurately to the actual job performance of controllers. According to FAA, this will result in more applicants passing the exam (68 percent are now expected to pass). FAA plans to begin using the test in June 2002. Although FAA has not revalidated the effectiveness of the revised exam, FAA officials stated that they have long planned to perform an operational evaluation of the exam to assess how well the exam works in practice, and that they are currently considering two options for performing this evaluation. First, FAA could correlate candidates’ scores on the exam with how well they perform on a computer simulation of actual air traffic. In order to implement this option, FAA would have to develop a new computer-based performance measure for the terminal environment. Officials indicated that this would cost several hundred thousand dollars. The second option would be to validate the exam against initial training at the academy, field training, and job performance. This would require FAA to develop criteria for measuring success in each of these three areas. In any case, to evaluate the exam, the officials need to decide on an option, develop a detailed implementation plan, and identify funding for this purpose. Officials could not provide an estimate as to when they will decide on a specific option. Until the results are evaluated, the operational effectiveness of the exam will be unknown. Workforce planning should consider the approach and resources necessary for providing new employees with the means to acquire the knowledge, skills, and abilities to accomplish the agency’s mission. However, FAA has not adequately addressed the challenges associated with providing the training resources—specifically training staff, equipment, and opportunities for on-the-job training—needed for large increases in new hires. Most controller candidates undergo both 15 weeks of classroom exercises at FAA’s academy in Oklahoma City and on-the-job training at the facility where employees are assigned. As of March 2002, the academy was staffed with 91 FAA employees and 60 contractors. This number of employees and contractors has been used to train, on average, about 200 new hires for each of the past 5 years. The academy’s training plan anticipates that between 547 and 980 controller candidates might need training each year through fiscal year 2005. To meet the projected levels, these officials believe they will need up to 50 additional staff to provide training. The training academy may have difficulty recruiting current controllers to conduct portions of their training program. Academy officials told us that their recent attempts to persuade experienced controllers to volunteer to train new recruits have not been very successful. Academy officials explained that the 1998 pay raise, which in some cases increased salaries for controllers by more than 30 percent but applied only to periods when the controllers were actually guiding air traffic, has affected the controllers’ willingness to participate. Whereas a controller was once paid the same amount for providing training as for controlling traffic, under the new system a controller would lose pay by becoming a trainer at the academy. Academy officials said they recently put an announcement out asking for volunteers to conduct training and received 31 applications. They noted that before the pay raise they were receiving hundreds of applications for these positions, which provided them a greater opportunity to select from a broader pool. Equipment deficiencies also hamper the academy. For example, the academy is training en-route controllers on equipment that is not used at actual en-route centers, so controllers must retrain on different equipment once they reach their facilities. To efficiently train en-route and terminal controllers, academy officials told us that they need a specialized en-route simulator lab known as a Display System Replacement lab, which costs between $7 million to $45 million, depending on the sophistication of the model purchased. Academy officials have been trying to obtain this equipment for several years, and the academy has recently made another proposal regarding this equipment. FAA headquarters is expected to decide whether to purchase this lab in the near future. In addition, the academy uses tower simulators to give trainees experience with controlling traffic in a computer-simulated environment. However, academy officials said their current simulators are often broken, outdated, and lacking in the necessary capacity to train large numbers of new hires. The cost of the new equipment is estimated at $2 million. If FAA does not make these investments, academy officials said, controller candidates will need more training time when they reach their facilities. New controllers might also have difficulty obtaining on-the-job training, FAA regional officials stated. New controllers are to receive their facility training from fully certified controllers already working in that facility. Under FAA’s current hiring system and estimated attrition rates, however, there will be fewer experienced controllers to provide training and more new hires in need of training. More time will thus likely be needed to train new controllers. This situation could be particularly acute at FAA’s en-route centers and busy terminal facilities, because it takes longer to train replacement controllers at these facilities. Retirements at these facilities are expected to increase the burden on the remaining experienced controller staff. Ensuring that a workforce retains employees with the requisite skills and abilities is another important piece of workforce planning. As described in chapter 1, legislation passed in 1972 stipulates that air traffic controllers must separate at age 56. Some controllers are exempt from the retirement rule, however, and continue to work beyond age 56. This practice raises two concerns: (1) whether the skills and abilities of the older controllers have diminished, thus potentially compromising safety; and (2) whether the exemptions result in unequal treatment for some controllers. In 1972, Congress directed that “an air traffic controller shall be separated from the service on the last day of the month in which he becomes 56 years of age.” The House Report associated with this law justifies the provision by stating that “air traffic control is a young man’s business…and that because of the natural forces of aging, magnified by the stresses of control functions, the productive and proficient life of the controller is substantially less than that which prevails in most other occupations.” In addition, the report states, “the controllers themselves are convinced that the demands of their job are so great that only young, healthy adults can consistently do a safe, competent job of controlling the steadily growing volume of air traffic.” The House Report further states that “as the controller approaches age 50 his mental faculties of alertness, rapid decision making, and instantaneous reaction…begin a definite decline.” In addition, the associated Senate Report states, “like skilled athletes, most controllers lose proficiency to some degree after age 40, and in the interest of the public’s safety, should not be retained as controllers in busy facilities beyond the time they can perform satisfactorily.” The law’s provision requires mandatory separation at age 56 for controllers who separate and control air traffic; provide preflight, in-flight, or airport advisory service to aircraft operators; or serve as the immediate supervisors of any employee who performs these duties. These positions include controller specialists and their first-line supervisors as well as traffic management coordinators and their first-line supervisors. Some controllers who separate and control traffic are exempted from this provision, however, including controllers appointed by the Department of Transportation (DOT) before May 16, 1972, and controllers appointed by DOD before September 12, 1980. In addition, those controllers covered by the FERS retirement system can continue working past age 56 until they have reached 20 years of service in a covered position (so called good time under the special air traffic controller retirement provisions). Similarly, on November 12, 2001, the president signed a law allowing controllers covered by the CSRS retirement system to work in covered positions past age 56 until they first become eligible for retirement annuities under any retirement scenario. Our analyses of FAA’s employee database shows that approximately 700 of those controllers currently engaged in separation and control of traffic are exempt from the requirement and have already turned age 56, and another 1,200 will reach 56 by December 31, 2006, if they do not leave FAA before then. According to FAA, 287 controllers were appointed by DOT before May 16, 1972, and are exempt from the requirement. Most of the remaining exempted controllers were either appointed by DOD before September 12, 1980, or are covered by FERS provisions. FAA also has the statutory authority to waive the age provision on a case- by-case basis. The applicable law states that “the Secretary of Transportation, under such regulations as he may prescribe, may exempt a controller having exceptional skill and experience as a controller from the automatic separation provisions of this subsection until that controller becomes 61 years of age.” However, according to an FAA Headquarters official, FAA has never granted an age waiver to the mandatory separation provision. Further, since 1995, it has been FAA’s policy not to grant any age waivers. This official also stated that most controllers are aware of the difficulty in obtaining an age waiver and do not even apply for one—only seven controllers have applied for a waiver since 1995. Despite this view, many controllers said they would like the opportunity to work past the age of 56. Our survey indicates that many controllers would continue to work if they were permitted to do so; approximately 31 percent of respondents cited the opportunity to work past age 56 as a factor that could lead them to delay their retirement plans. In addition, regional FAA officials said they would like to have the flexibility to retain some of these experienced controllers. As mentioned above, safety concerns formed the basis of the age-56 separation provision. Only limited actions have been taken, however, to assess whether those controllers who are exempted from the provision have adequately retained the skills and abilities necessary to perform their duties. FAA requires all controllers to pass annual physical examinations that test sight, hearing, and overall health conditions. No additional tests— such as for mental acuity or changes in reaction time—are given to controllers who surpass age 56. The equity issues associated with the exemptions to the age-56 separation rule could become more prominent in the future if FAA continues to rehire controllers fired during the 1981 strike. In 1993 President Clinton, through presidential directive, lifted the ban on hiring former striking employees. In the past 5 years, FAA has rehired about 850 controllers who were fired in 1981. The average age of the 733 still working as of June 30, 2001, was 54, and about 35 percent were aged 56 or older. The oldest was 69 as of June 30, 2001. In addition, FAA officials said that most of the rehires are exempt from the mandatory separation provisions because they were originally hired before May 16, 1972. Further, recently a group of controllers fired during the 1981 strike filed a class action lawsuit alleging that FAA discriminates against such controllers because of their age. Depending on the outcome of this lawsuit, about 2,000 former controllers—many aged 50 and above—could be given hiring priority. Although the attrition scenarios projected by FAA and us reflect estimates of the future, and any particular estimate in any given year is subject to varying degrees of uncertainty, the overall results suggest that FAA will face significant personnel challenges. If controllers leave at a quicker pace than estimated, the situation may become even more difficult for FAA, as it would have to swiftly replace its seasoned controllers with new controllers possessing lesser experience. To the extent that controllers leave at a slower pace than estimated, FAA will have a larger window of opportunity to replenish its workforce. Ultimately, FAA’s ability to successfully plan for and manage this situation will dictate its overall impact on the nation’s air traffic control system and the safety and efficiency of air travel in the United States. The employees whom FAA will need to replace possess unique skills and are critical to the safety and efficiency of the nation’s air transportation system. FAA, as the agency responsible for managing this workforce, does not have a comprehensive workforce plan to help manage the expected turnover. An effective human capital process anticipates expected attrition and includes the development of a comprehensive workforce plan that (1) establishes an effective approach for hiring individuals with the requisite skills and abilities in time to accomplish agency missions, (2) provides new employees with the best training opportunities possible to maximize their potential, and (3) uses opportunities to retain qualified staff. FAA’s approach to workforce planning does not adequately address these strategies, raising the risk that the safety and efficiency of the nation’s air transportation system will be adversely affected. In addition, if FAA does not take steps to develop and implement a more comprehensive workforce strategy, increased traffic delays and overtime costs could result. FAA’s practice of hiring replacements for controllers only after a position is vacated leaves the agency vulnerable to skills imbalances, with inexperienced and uncertified controllers replacing seasoned veterans. This situation may be exacerbated at individual air traffic control facilities because the age and experience of controllers varies across the system, which could cause some locations to experience additional staffing challenges. Also of concern are the effects of the recent scoring changes that were made to the test used to screen potential candidates. Until the screening test results are examined, the ability of the exam to identify candidates who will make successful controllers will not be known. Further, the quality of the training that controllers receive could be compromised because FAA has not addressed the human resources and equipment needs of its training academy, despite the growing projected student population. Finally, safety and equity issues associated with the age-56 separation exemptions could affect the morale of the controller workforce and the safety of air traffic. To help meet the challenges presented by hiring thousands of new controller candidates, we recommend that the secretary of transportation direct the administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration to develop a comprehensive workforce plan that includes strategies for: Identifying the number and timing of hiring necessary to ensure that facilities have an adequate number of certified controllers available to perform needed duties. As part of this effort, FAA should determine and plan for the expected attrition levels and timing at each facility; Evaluating the newly developed screening test to determine whether it is identifying the most successful candidates; Addressing the resource and equipment needs at the training academy to help ensure that FAA is in a position to successfully train a growing number of controller candidates; and Assessing the safety and equity issues associated with exempting potentially large numbers of controllers from the mandatory age-56 separation requirement. In commenting on a draft of this report, senior FAA officials found that the report was generally accurate and indicated that they would consider our recommendations in FAA’s workforce planning. Overall, FAA stressed that it has a working human capital workforce strategy model that has enabled the agency to meet its staffing goals over the past few years. FAA officials agreed that the potential for sizable future attrition, in the range of 600–800 controllers per year, is likely over the next decade. The officials said, however, that although they have plans that extend to 2010, the uncertainty surrounding the future, along with labor contracts and budget constraints, limit their specific workforce planning for air traffic controllers to fiscal years 2002 through 2004. With general agreement between FAA and GAO that attrition will grow substantially over the next decade, we believe that the workforce challenges FAA faces extend well beyond fiscal year 2004. As such, we believe that sound workforce planning demands that FAA develop a strategic vision that includes a workable, long-term plan to meet staffing needs. Regarding our concern about FAA’s preparedness for the future, the FAA officials remarked that FAA’s ability to meet its past goals is an indication of its ability to meet future needs, and that there is nothing to indicate that its successful performance will not continue in the future. We recognize that FAA has been able to meet its recent staffing goals. However, the recent workforce climate for FAA could be significantly different from that which it will face over the next decade. Chapter two of the report highlights the workforce challenges, particularly the sizable anticipated increases in controller attrition, that are likely over the next decade, and this chapter identifies challenges in FAA’s planning that will make it difficult for FAA to maintain its past performance. In particular, the report points out the potential skills gap that FAA could face in the future because its current hiring process does not ensure that fully qualified controllers are available to replace experienced controllers when they leave. The officials also commented that FAA has long planned for an operational evaluation of the new screening exam, and that research associated with this evaluation has been underway for some time. The officials indicated that they are considering two options for evaluating the effectiveness of the exam. The officials commented, however, that limited work has been done on the evaluation process since 1998, and that they must determine which option to pursue, develop a detailed implementation plan, and identify funding for the evaluation. The officials further noted that continued funding for the ongoing research could not be assured. In response to this comment, we revised the text of the report to recognize FAA’s efforts and plans regarding evaluation of the new screening exam. As such, we are encouraged that FAA plans to conduct an operational evaluation of the exam, once it has been implemented. However, we remain concerned that FAA has not decided how it will conduct the evaluation or how it will fund it and has already highlighted potential funding issues that could serve as a constraint to performing the planned evaluation. Further, we believe that an evaluation of the revised exam is an integral part of a comprehensive workforce plan and have modified the recommendation to emphasize this belief. Finally, the FAA officials provided technical comments that we incorporated, as appropriate. For example, we added information in this chapter to highlight the constraints that FAA’s labor contract and budget impose on the timing of hiring controllers.

Summary: Thousands of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) controllers will soon be eligible to retire because of extensive hiring in the 1980's to replace striking air traffic controllers. Although the exact number and timing of the controllers' departures has not been determined, attrition scenarios developed by both FAA and GAO indicate that the total attrition will grow substantially in both the short and long term. As a result, FAA will likely need to hire thousands of air traffic controllers in the next decade to met increasing traffic demands and to address the anticipated attrition of experienced controllers, predominately because of retirement. FAA has yet to developed a comprehensive human capital workforce strategy to address its impending controller needs. Rather, FAA's strategy for replacing controllers is generally to hire new controllers only when current, experienced controllers leave. This does not take into account the potential increases in future hiring and the time necessary to train replacements. In addition, there is uncertainty about the ability of FAA's new aptitude test to identify the best controller candidates. Further, FAA has not addressed the resources that may be needed at its training academy. Finally, exemptions to the age-56 separation rules raise safety and equity issues.