The U.S.–Japan alliance dates back to the U.S. occupation of Japan after its defeat in World War II. The alliance is supported by the 1960 Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security and a related Status of Forces Agreement. As a result of the treaty, the Status of Forces Agreement, and related agreements, U.S. forces are able to use nearly 90 installations throughout mainland Japan and Okinawa for the purpose of contributing to the security of Japan and the maintenance of international peace and security in the region. One issue that remains at the forefront of the alliance is the realignment of U.S. forces in Japan. Efforts to realign U.S. forces in Japan date back to 1995. We have previously reported that discontent among the people of Okinawa regarding the U.S. military presence led to efforts in the 1990s to consolidate, realign, and reduce U.S. facilities and areas and adjust the operational procedures of U.S. forces in Okinawa to reduce the impact on local communities. However, as we had reported, realignment efforts did not make much progress until the end of 2002, when the United States and Japan launched a series of realignment initiatives called the Defense Policy Review Initiative (DPRI). Under DPRI, both countries were seeking to reduce the U.S. footprint in Okinawa, enhance interoperability and communication, and better position U.S. forces to respond to a changing security environment. The major realignment initiatives under DPRI were outlined in the U.S.–Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation (2006 Roadmap) and subsequently adjusted, most recently through a joint statement issued in April 2012. There are four initiatives under DPRI that are specific to the realignment of Marine Corps forces in the Pacific: 1. Constructing and moving forces to the Futenma Replacement Facility, 2. Relocating Marine Corps units from Okinawa to Guam, Hawaii, the continental United States, and Australia, 3. Consolidating installations on Okinawa, and 4. Moving Marines to Iwakuni. As envisioned by the 2006 Roadmap, the U.S. government would return to Japan the Marine Corps Air Station Futenma in Okinawa once the government of Japan constructed a fully operational replacement facility (Futenma Replacement Facility), including a runway, in a northern, less- populated area of the island. This facility was originally projected to be completed by 2014, but delays have slowed its progress. According to the officials, as of June 2016, 9 of 184 projects have been constructed at the planned site of the realignment—Camp Schwab. Figure 1 shows the planned location of the runway at Camp Schwab and how high landfill material must rise to build the runway. After several years of planning to move approximately 8,000 Marines from Okinawa to Guam, DOD revised its plan in April 2012 to, among other things, relocate 4,100 Marines to Guam, 2,700 to Hawaii, and 800 to the continental United States, as shown below in figure 2. Additionally, the plan includes establishing up to a 2,500-person rotational Marine Corps presence in Australia, 1,300 of whom would come from Okinawa— a move that, according to DOD officials, stems from a November 2011 announcement between the United States and Australia. DOD expects relocation to Guam to occur between fiscal years 2022 and 2026. To provide additional training opportunities for Pacific Command’s service components, DOD is planning to construct training ranges on the nearby Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands (CNMI), specifically the islands of Tinian and Pagan. However, no forces are expected to relocate to CNMI. DOD estimates that the total cost to relocate Marines to Guam and training on CNMI will be $8.7 billion in fiscal year 2012 dollars, with approximately $3.1 billion being provided by Japan. DOD expects relocation to Hawaii to occur between 2027 and 2031. According to DOD documentation, its baseline rough order-of-magnitude cost estimates for development on Hawaii range from approximately $1.3 billion to $2.5 billion in fiscal year 2012 dollars, although actual costs will vary depending upon the mix of units and the facilities needed. For the relocation to the continental United States, the Marine Corps currently has no plans, time frames, or cost estimates. According to Marine Corps officials, the decision to relocate 800 Marines to the continental United States was made because there was a need to further reduce the Marine Corps presence on Okinawa. Additionally, senior officials at Marine Corps Headquarters and Marine Corps Pacific Command stated there was no strategic need to move the Marines to the continental United States, and they assume that this move may never happen—for example, they said that if the global Marine Corps presence continues to downsize, then perhaps the positions for the 800 Marines slated to move to the continental United States may be eliminated from the global Marine Corps presence. Additionally, in November 2011, the U.S. and Australian governments announced the intent to establish a rotational presence of up to a 2,500 person Marine Air-Ground Task Force in Darwin, Australia—1,300 of which would come from Okinawa, according to DOD. Rotations would occur from approximately April through September or October, during Australia’s dry season. To date the Marine Corps has held five 6-month rotations, ranging from a 200 Marine infantry company rotation in 2012 to a 1,250 Marine infantry battalion rotation in 2016. The April 2012 statement noted that the United States is committed to returning lands on Okinawa to Japan as designated Marine Corps forces are relocated and as facilities become available for units and other tenant activities relocating to other locations on Okinawa. Figure 3 depicts U.S. installations on Okinawa and identifies which installations have been designated to be partially or fully returned to Japan or are staying as part of the U.S. presence, according to the April 2012 statement. On the basis of the 2006 Roadmap, the Marine Corps would relocate its tanker aircraft and facilities from Marine Corps Air Station Futenma to Marine Corps Air Station Iwakuni, as well as develop a training capability at Kanoya Air Base. Additionally, a Navy carrier wing currently located at Naval Air Station Atsugi (about 35 miles southwest of Tokyo, Japan) would relocate to Marine Corps Air Station Iwakuni. The relocation to Iwakuni is expected to be completed in 2019, with the Marine Corps tanker aircraft unit having already relocated in 2014. Within DOD, several offices have roles in the relocation of Marines from Okinawa to Guam and Hawaii, the establishment of a rotational Marine presence in Australia, and the realignment of Marines within Okinawa and Iwakuni. These offices are located throughout the United States and Pacific Command’s area of responsibility. Figure 4 identifies DOD offices with roles and responsibilities related to the Asia-Pacific relocation, along with their locations. DOD has coordinated its efforts to relocate Marines from Okinawa by developing a high-level synchronization plan that combines the various programs related to relocating Marines from Okinawa and organizing various working groups to increase coordination among stakeholders. However, DOD officials have not fully resolved selected identified capability deficiencies associated with the planned relocation to Guam and Hawaii and establishment of a rotational presence in Australia. The Marine Corps has coordinated its efforts to relocate Marines from Okinawa by developing a high-level synchronization plan that combines the programs related to relocating Marines in one document. Headquarters Marine Corps officials described the synchronization plan as an overarching tool for simultaneously scheduling the various relocation initiatives and graphically depicting how these relocations are interconnected and affected by both unit movements and facilities construction. In June 2013, we reported that this synchronization plan was in development, with the goal of establishing the appropriate sequencing of events needed to complete all relocation initiatives. In January 2015, the Marine Corps completed the synchronization plan, which contains information pertaining to the Futenma Replacement Facility, Guam, the Joint Training Range Complex in CNMI, Hawaii, Australia, Okinawa consolidation, and Iwakuni. Subsequently, in June 2016 the Marine Corps updated the synchronization plan to incorporate its latest time frames. Figure 5 shows how major milestones and actions may interface with each other, up to 2030. In addition, DOD has coordinated relocation initiatives through organizing various working groups that bring together representatives from the respective stakeholders involved in the relocation efforts. For example, U.S. Forces–Japan participates in several working groups called Alliance Transformation Ad-Hoc Working Groups and subcommittees that address DPRI. One group works on Okinawa initiatives, which includes all topics related to Okinawa Consolidation and the Futenma Replacement Facility. Another group addresses progress in mainland Japan with Marine Corps Air Station Iwakuni and Kanoya Air Base. Pacific Command officials said they also participate in several working groups such as the Joint Facilities Working Group and the DPRI Planning Group. The officials stated that the Joint Facilities Working Group is led by Pacific Command and consists of the Office of the Secretary of Defense and representatives from each of the services, including Naval Facilities Engineering Command, and their Australian counterparts. They added that this group plans facilities and is working on resolving cost estimate differences for Australia. The DPRI Planning Group includes participants from Marine Corps offices including Marine Corps Plans, Policies and Operations; Marine Corps Installations Command; Marine Corps Forces Pacific; Marine Corps Activity Guam; and III Marine Expeditionary Force. The group is responsible for developing and submitting all requirements for the future Marine Corps Base Guam. DOD has not yet fully resolved selected identified capability deficiencies related to the relocation of Marines from Okinawa, which may cause units to be unprepared or not fully prepared for their missions. Specifically, DOD has not fully resolved the operational challenges related to moving Marine units to Guam; limited training facilities in Iwakuni, Hawaii, and CNMI; the runway length at the Futenma Replacement Facility; and challenges for operating in Australia. According to DOD’s Unified Facilities Criteria 2-100-01, in the context of developing installation master plans, mission requirements—which would include the capabilities needed to fulfill the mission—largely determine land and facility support requirements. This DOD guidance states that data on current and proposed mission requirements will be used to establish limitations and conditions that directly affect the installation’s ability to execute mission support. However, DOD began planning facility requirements before resolving selected identified capability deficiencies that can affect the missions of the relocating units, and it has not yet resolved needed capabilities for the Marine Corps units that will be relocated as part of the realignment in the Asia-Pacific region. DOD has not resolved operational challenges associated with the movement of Marine Corps units before beginning to develop facility requirements. Officials with III Marine Expeditionary Force stated that they began working on capability planning in January 2013, after being given the facilities plan for Guam. As a result of working on capability planning after facility planning, III Marine Expeditionary Force officials identified several capability concerns regarding the relocation. For example, III Marine Expeditionary Force officials stated they would like the Guam relocation to occur within an 18-month time frame to help ensure that forces move together based on capabilities. According to officials from III Marine Expeditionary Force, it makes more sense to move a maintenance battalion at the same time it moves the units the battalion supports rather than move that battalion based on facility completion dates; otherwise, the supported units would remain in Okinawa for some time without maintenance capability. Marine Corps and Pacific Command officials stated that, based on the capability concerns regarding the relocation expressed by III Marine Expeditionary Force, in the summers of 2015 and 2016 Marine Corps Forces Pacific conducted simulated wartime scenarios to assess these capability concerns. As a result of the simulated wartime scenarios, the Marine Corps and Pacific Command officials stated that some of III Marine Expeditionary Force’s concerns were validated and proposed solutions are currently being analyzed. However, the analysis on how to move forces has not yet been resolved, and the officials said that decisions need to be made about force structure and positioning of forces to affect facility planning adjustments. According to DOD’s Unified Facilities Criteria 2-100-01, mission requirements will be used to largely determine land and facility support requirements. Instead, DOD has focused on facility planning before capability planning. By considering options to resolve this capability deficiency, such as striking the balance between moving forces together based on capabilities with not leaving facilities vacant, DOD could help ensure that mission requirements are being met and are not hindered during the relocation. DOD has not fully resolved some identified Marine Corps training capability deficiencies in Iwakuni, Hawaii, and CNMI. As a result, it may take additional time, effort, and resources to resolve these deficiencies and it is uncertain whether the Marine Corps units will be able to complete necessary training in these locations. Iwakuni—DOD has not fully resolved training requirements needed for the Marine Corps units that relocated from Okinawa to Marine Corps Air Station Iwakuni. According to officials from U.S. Forces– Japan, there are no training locations near Iwakuni that are sufficient for relocated Marine Corps units’ training needs, resulting in the units returning to Okinawa for training and spending additional money for fuel and equipment maintenance. Kanoya Air Base is currently the only location that is being considered for training, but it is not sufficient for the relocated units’ needs because there are training requirements that cannot be satisfied at Kanoya Air Base, according to U.S. Forces–Japan and Marine Corps officials. DOD has formed a working group to consider training in mainland Japan for Iwakuni units, but planning has stalled because DOD has not identified other training areas. Although, according to officials from U.S. Forces–Japan, the government of Japan is ultimately generally responsible for building training locations, DOD’s identification of other training areas could be presented to the government of Japan to help resolve this issue, in particular given that DOD may ultimately be responsible for sustaining whatever training facility the government of Japan builds. DOD could also continue to raise the concern about the training deficiency in normal bilateral channels such as the Security Consultative Committee. With respect to training capacity, as indicated by Unified Facilities Criteria 2-100-01, DOD has identified limitations and conditions that affect the Iwakuni installation’s ability to execute mission support. However, it has not identified other training areas that would support mission requirements. Marine Corps officials stated that, as of October 2016, the bilateral arrangement with Japan was modified to allow for alternative training areas other than Kanoya Air Base. However, Marine Corps officials did not provide evidence that any further locations have been identified. In February 2017, officials from U.S. Forces–Japan said that bilateral consensus was reached on an agreement to establish a working group to study other possible locations beyond Kanoya for training. Without identifying training areas for its units based in Iwakuni, DOD risks having spent significant resources in expanding the Marine Corps Air Station Iwakuni while still spending additional time and money sending units back to Okinawa. Hawaii—DOD has not resolved the training needs of the approximately 2,700 additional Marines that are planned to relocate to Hawaii beginning in 2027. The addition of the Marines will likely cause additional strain on already stressed training ranges in Hawaii. As of April 2016, Marine Corps officials have not identified a timeline for when they plan to develop training plans, stating that planning for Hawaii is not yet a priority. However, citing a March 2014 Hawaiian islands training study, Marine Corps officials noted that installations in Hawaii lack sufficient range capabilities to fully support training of units already stationed there. Because the sites are not sufficient, the officials stated that about 90 percent of the Marine Corps training occurs on Army training ranges in Hawaii. However, there are capacity issues with those sites because the Marine Corps has to share the space with the Army. According to the March 2014 study, the limited ranges in Hawaii have historically been used at a close-to- capacity level. Furthermore, infrastructure planning takes years to complete in advance of allocating resources for particular needs in a budget. Without infrastructure planning to support mission requirements, as identified in the Unified Facilities Criteria 2-100-01, the Marine Corps risks not having the necessary infrastructure to fulfill its needed capabilities. It is important to resolve this capability deficiency now because these training issues will become exacerbated as additional Marines begin to relocate to Hawaii. CNMI—DOD has not fully resolved the training requirements in the region of CNMI, and may have to spend more time and resources to identify other, potentially more costly, locations for training. According to DOD’s study on training requirements in CNMI, there are 42 unfilled training requirements throughout Pacific Command’s area of responsibility. DOD officials stated that training ranges in CNMI would solve all of the unfulfilled live-fire and unit-level training deficiencies in the Asia-Pacific region. Pacific Command officials described the potential training capabilities in CNMI as a crucial initiative. However, as of the time of our review, the environmental impact statement recommending training ranges in CNMI has not been finalized, and instead it is being revised. The draft environmental impact statement received 27,000 comments expressing concerns about the plans regarding training facilities in CNMI. Many of these comments expressed concerns about potential impacts on water, wastewater, and public health. In order to address the multitude of comments, the Department of the Navy stated it is conducting a revised study. While some DOD officials offered hypothetical alternatives for training in CNMI, such as training in foreign countries, they have not yet conducted any specific planning and stated that there are no Pacific-based alternatives to consider on U.S. territories. Rather, DOD officials stated that fulfillment of any of the 42 unfilled training requirements through the training ranges in CNMI would be an improvement, and they could plan for alternatives once they determine if any requirements will remain unfulfilled. Until the training issue is resolved, DOD may have to spend more time and resources to identify other, potentially more costly, locations for training Marines relocated to Guam. DOD has not fully resolved the capability deficiency of the planned runway at Camp Schwab, which will replace the 9,000-foot runway at Marine Corps Air Station Futenma but will be shorter. Mission operations at Marine Corps Air Station Futenma support operations involving a variety of fixed-wing, rotary-wing, and tilt-rotor aircraft. Marine Corps Air Station Futenma also supports the use of a runway if needed for a United Nations contingency, such as disaster response, for which U.S. Forces– Japan is a key partner. The proposed runway at Camp Schwab will not adequately support these same mission requirements, according to Marine Corps officials. Instead, there will be two 5,900-foot V-shaped runways that, according to Marine Corps officials, will be too short for certain aircraft. As we reported in March 1998 and is still the case based on our discussions with Marine Corps officials, the loss of Marine Corps Air Station Futenma’s runway equates to the loss of an emergency landing strip for fixed-wing aircraft in the area and the loss of the United Nations use of a runway. According to an official from the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, the office has not yet developed a plan for other alternate runways in Okinawa because it is not a priority. Although it does not yet have a plan for other alternate runways in Okinawa, DOD did take an initial step in April 2014 when it sent a letter to the government of Japan seeking approval for bilateral site surveys for locations that could support contingency operations. While a good first step, this letter did not specifically focus on other alternatives in Okinawa—only 1 of the 12 options was located in Okinawa, and some suggested alternatives were located over 1,500 miles away. Moreover, not all of the site surveys have been completed, and Marine Corps and U.S. Forces–Japan officials we spoke with stated that the need remained for alternate runways to be identified. As indicated by Unified Facilities Criteria 2-100-01, DOD has identified limitations and conditions that affect Camp Schwab’s installation’s ability to execute mission support with respect to the runway. Although Marine Corps and Pacific Command officials said the government of Japan is ultimately responsible for replacing the lost requirements by providing a longer runway elsewhere, DOD could be identifying other runways in Okinawa that would support mission requirements, which it could present to the government of Japan to help resolve this issue. By planning to construct a runway at Camp Schwab that does not have the needed capabilities, and until the site surveys are completed and an alternate runway is selected to replace those needed capabilities, DOD risks not supporting needed mission requirements and the issue remains unresolved. DOD has not resolved challenges related to the rotation of Marines to Australia, including seasonal changes (i.e., where to operate in the rainy season) and equipment downtime that will likely affect capabilities and increase costs (see fig. 6). DOD has not resolved where Marine units will be stationed during the rainy season (November to April) because, according to Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and Marine Corps officials, it is still early in the planning process and those plans are not yet a priority. Flooding during the rainy season is a significant issue in the Darwin area, as seen in figure 7. Presently, some of the rotational force is returning to Okinawa, but they will need to find a new location as the Marine Corps presence on Okinawa is reduced. DOD officials are considering multiple options for the Marines’ location during the rainy season, but no decisions have been made, and the options being considered will take years to implement. Without infrastructure planning to support mission requirements, as identified in the Unified Facilities Criteria 2-100-01, the Marine Corps risks not having the necessary infrastructure to fulfill its needed capabilities. By not resolving this capability deficiency now, DOD does not know what the financial or operational consequences will be for this decision, and decision makers in DOD and Congress cannot plan accordingly to help ensure sufficient funding is in place to support the operational and facility requirements of that location. Moreover, DOD has not resolved what to do about the government of Australia’s biosecurity requirements that affect equipment downtime. According to officials at Pacific Command, the biosecurity requirements could result in some Marine Corps equipment being nonoperational for approximately 2 months out of the 6-month rotation. DOD documentation discusses Australian biosecurity requirements regarding weeds, pests, and diseases. According to government of Australia and DOD officials, equipment that enters Australia is subject to inspection and cleaning due to the country’s biosecurity requirements. Marine Corps officials stated that, during the approximately 2 months it generally takes to break down, clean, and reassemble the Marine Corps equipment, the equipment is not functional and this hinders capability and training. Officials with the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy stated that the biosecurity requirements are a risk to the Marine Corps units’ capability. Marine Corps officials stated that leaving a set of equipment in Australia is one option being considered to ease these requirements. However, according to a senior Pacific Command official and officials with III Marine Expeditionary Force, this is an expensive option and also requires a location for the equipment to be stored. Pacific Command and Marine Corps officials stated that the Marine Corps has identified an additional equipment set that could be left in Australia to minimize biosecurity inspection requirements, but challenges remain to fund and source this equipment. Unified Facilities Criteria 2-100-01 identifies that DOD should plan its infrastructure needs to support mission requirements. By not resolving the selected identified capability deficiencies associated with equipment downtime prior to operating in Australia, the Marine Corps risks not having the equipment needed to conduct its mission since, depending on the course of action, it could take years to allocate resources to mitigate this issue. As of December 2016, DOD has not resolved selected identified capability deficiencies in the four areas noted above. According to Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and Marine Corps officials, some of these deficiencies have not been resolved because it is still early in the planning process. Even though the relocation of Marines from Okinawa to other locations is years away, this does not preclude DOD from taking action to resolve selected capability deficiencies in the identified four areas. It is important to resolve these identified capability deficiencies in the near term because it can take many years to plan, allocate resources, and develop facilities. If DOD does not resolve the identified capability deficiencies in these four areas, the Marine Corps may be unable to maintain its capabilities or face much higher costs to do so. DOD has taken steps to develop infrastructure plans and schedules for the proposed locations for the relocation of Marines from Okinawa; however, we found that the Marine Corps’ schedule for Guam did not meet the characteristics of a reliable schedule identified in the GAO Schedule Assessment Guide. With respect to risk planning, the Navy plans to establish an office to address coordination and communication of risks associated with its infrastructure planning in CNMI, but the Marine Corps has not completed risk planning for its construction efforts in Guam, and the Navy has completed limited planning for sustainment of infrastructure in Okinawa. DOD has taken steps to develop infrastructure plans for relocations to Guam, CNMI, Japan, Hawaii, and the rotational presence of Marines in Australia. In Guam, CNMI, and Japan, DOD developed plans that identified alternatives for its infrastructure in each location, such as the development of base configuration and environmental analyses. Moreover, DOD has developed plans for infrastructure requirements that will support the planned relocation to Hawaii and rotational presence of Marines in Australia. DOD has developed plans that outline the base configuration and environmental impacts of the infrastructure that will support the relocation of Marines to Guam. In June 2014, the Navy developed a master plan, which is a plan that outlines the infrastructure configuration, requirements, and construction sequence, for the relocation to Guam. In July 2015, the Navy conducted an analysis that outlined the environmental impacts of the relocation to Guam, issuing a final supplemental environmental impact statement, which changed the location of military family housing in Guam from the location identified in the master plan, specifically from the Naval Base Guam Telecommunications Site Finegayan to Andersen Air Force Base. DOD officials told us they expect this alternative to be cheaper than the initial proposal since DOD will be constructing military family housing using existing utilities. In addition, DOD officials stated that this alternative would reduce the impact on endangered species and thus the need for environmental mitigation and the costs associated with it. In April 2015, the Navy released a draft environmental impact statement to the public that identified its preferred alternative for live-fire training ranges on Tinian and Pagan, two islands that are a part of a chain that make up CNMI. The draft environmental impact statement received more than 27,000 comments from the people and government of CNMI. DOD officials stated that the people and the government of CNMI had expressed concerns over the potential effect on public infrastructure on Tinian and cultural sites on Pagan. According to Navy officials, they have tentative plans to release a revised draft environmental impact statement in November 2017 that takes into account the concerns raised by the people and the government of CNMI, with the final environmental impact statement expected in April 2019. However, DOD officials added that this date could change if DOD determines it needs to conduct additional studies. DOD has taken steps to complete infrastructure plans in Japan, including developing bilateral plans and master plans for the infrastructure related to the Marine realignment. In April 2013, the United States and the government of Japan released a bilateral plan for the consolidation of infrastructure in Okinawa related to the Marine realignment, which identified the land areas that DOD plans to return to Okinawa, general time frames for those returns, and the sequence of steps that will need to occur to facilitate those returns. According to Marine Corps officials, they had plans to update the bilateral plan with additional details before the end of 2016, including potential updates to dates for land returns in Okinawa. Officials with the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy stated that U.S. Forces–Japan began talks with the government of Japan in late 2016 about revising the bilateral plan, but as of January 2017 there was no combined work product or documentation. In preparing for the various Asia-Pacific realignment activities, DOD has also developed master plans that identified its development strategy to meet Okinawa consolidation objectives. DOD has developed some initial infrastructure requirement plans for both Hawaii and Australia. DOD officials told us that they prioritized planning for Guam over planning for Hawaii or Australia, as DOD is using money from the government of Japan for the relocation to Guam. In preparation for future master plans and environmental analyses, DOD has developed some initial infrastructure assessments for the relocation of Marines to Hawaii and for expanded rotations to Australia. In December 2014, the Navy completed a siting plan for Hawaii, which provided an analysis of opportunities for future growth of existing installations and new construction on DOD-owned land in Hawaii that would support a Marine relocation. Marine Corps officials plan to use the Hawaii siting plan as a starting point for the development of future infrastructure plans. Additionally, DOD has completed two infrastructure studies that identify Marine Corps’ requirements for housing and for aircraft support for an expansion of Marine rotations in Darwin, Australia. Moreover, DOD officials told us that they began developing a master plan for the infrastructure that will support Marine rotations to Australia. The Marine Corps has taken steps to develop integrated master schedules—schedules used for planning, executing, and tracking the status of a program—for the realignment efforts in Japan and relocation to Guam. The Marine Corps is developing master schedules for its realignment activities in Okinawa; hence, we did not evaluate the reliability of these schedules. We also did not assess the reliability of the integrated master schedule for Marine Corps Air Station Iwakuni because most of the construction projects for this base had already begun. In reviewing the Marine Corps’ integrated master schedule for Guam from July 2016, we found that the schedule does not meet all of the characteristics of a reliable schedule—comprehensive, well-constructed, credible, and controlled—identified as best practices in the GAO Schedule Assessment Guide. A reliable schedule allows program management to decide between possible sequences of activities, determine the flexibility of the schedule according to available resources, predict the consequences of managerial action or inaction in events, and allocate contingency plans to mitigate risk. Further, the success of a program depends in part on having an integrated and reliable master schedule that defines when and how long work will occur and how each activity is related to the others. Our analysis found that the Marine Corps’ integrated master schedule is not reliable as it did not substantially or fully meet all four of the GAO Schedule Assessment Guide’s characteristics for a reliable schedule. If any of the characteristics are not met, minimally met, or partially met, then the schedule cannot be considered reliable. We found the integrated master schedule substantially met one of the four characteristics for a reliable schedule, partially met two characteristics, and minimally met one characteristic; see table 1, below. According to Marine Corps officials, the integrated master schedule is an enterprise-level summary of resource and duration information from lower-level project schedules. Officials stated that contractors identify resources for construction activities in project schedules that the Marine Corps uses to update the integrated master schedule. However, a lower- level construction schedule examined was not fully resource loaded; in addition, the integrated master schedule includes a majority of activities unrelated to construction efforts, such as information technology and design activities. According to the GAO Schedule Assessment Guide, a schedule should reflect all resources necessary to complete the program to help ensure the program can use the schedule to make important management decisions, such as the reallocation of resources between projects. Because the reliability of an integrated schedule depends in part on the reliability of its subordinate schedules, schedule quality weaknesses—including lack of resource information—in these schedules will transfer to an integrated master schedule derived from them. If the integrated master schedule is unreliable and includes, for example, unjustified date constraints and inaccurate critical paths to key milestones, DOD may not have reliable information on potential sources of delays to support the relocation of Marines to Guam. Further, DOD may not have a reliable schedule to assess progress, identify potential problems, and promote accountability for the relocation to Guam. The Navy has taken steps to conduct risk planning for infrastructure in CNMI by establishing an office to help coordinate and communicate its infrastructure efforts. However, the Marine Corps has not completed risk planning for the construction of infrastructure in Guam through the completion of a risk-management plan, and the Navy has completed limited planning for sustainment of infrastructure in Okinawa in its master plan. Infrastructure risk planning for each location—CNMI, Guam, and Okinawa—is unique and at different stages, thus necessitating different actions and approaches by DOD. In October 2016, the Navy began establishing an office to plan for risks to proposed infrastructure in CNMI, specifically related to plans for live-fire training ranges on the islands of Tinian and Pagan. The Navy, which oversees the environmental analyses that will precede infrastructure construction in CNMI, released a draft environmental impact statement in April 2015 that discussed potential alternatives for the configuration of the live-fire training. However, the Navy is revising that draft environmental impact statement, due to concerns from the people and government of CNMI regarding the effects of the ranges on Tinian and Pagan. According to DOD officials, the concerns include the potential effects on public infrastructure in Tinian and cultural sites on Pagan. In May 2016, the Navy proposed establishing an office located on the island of Saipan in CNMI to facilitate coordination and communication between DOD and the people and government of CNMI, so that it can help address risks related to environmental impact, land acquisition, and cultural sensitivities. In October 2016, Navy officials told us they hired an individual to supervise the office in Saipan and that they have identified a physical office space. Further, Navy officials stated that they plan to hire additional staff for the office in Saipan to assist with coordination and communication with the people and government of CNMI. Marine Corps officials have conducted limited risk planning and have not completed a risk-management plan that identifies a strategy to address construction risks that may affect the cost and schedule for infrastructure in Guam. Specifically, DOD has identified risks, including construction labor shortages, explosive ordnance detection, cultural artifact discovery and preservation, and endangered-species protection, which can affect the cost or the schedule for each of the various individual projects on the island. DOD manages these risks on a project-by-project basis; however, DOD officials acknowledged that construction risks may become challenging to address as the Marine Corps begins to manage more ongoing construction projects. As of July 2016, the Marine Corps had four construction projects under way, but it will be initiating significantly more construction projects beginning in fiscal year 2018. Specifically, the Marine Corps identified that it will have 15 active construction projects in fiscal year 2018 and will increase the number of construction projects each year until fiscal year 2021 when the Marine Corps will peak at 43 active construction projects. Further, Marine Corps officials have not completed a risk-management plan that identifies a strategy for collectively addressing construction risks on Guam. A risk-management plan is a document that outlines the service’s approach to identify, analyze, handle, and monitor risks across a program. Therefore, while the Marine Corps manages risks on a project-by-project basis, the Marine Corps has not identified its strategy for the collective impact of risks to infrastructure resulting from an increase in construction projects. The following are examples of construction risks that may affect the relocation of Marines to Guam: Construction labor shortage: DOD officials identified that there is a risk of a construction labor shortage that may affect their ability to meet the labor demand necessary for the increase in construction projects. Specifically, the Navy expects that construction contractors will need to supplement their labor workforce with 2,800 foreign laborers to meet the demand for labor during the peak of construction. According to Navy and government of Guam officials, construction contractors on Guam have experienced challenges in getting approvals for H-2B visas to fill skilled labor gaps. According to data from the Guam Department of Labor, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services approved approximately 4 percent of H-2B visa applications for Guam between January and September 2016. According to government of Guam officials, the approval percentage for H-2B visas is significantly lower than the percentage in fiscal years 2014 and 2015, when the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services approved over 98 percent of H-2B visa applications for Guam. Navy officials stated that challenges in getting approval for foreign labor applications will in turn affect DOD’s ability to meet the construction labor demand for the increase in projects in fiscal year 2018. Explosive-ordnance detection: According to DOD officials, there is a risk of cost overruns or schedule delays related to the process for the detection of explosive ordnance on construction worksites. Navy officials stated that they account for cost and schedule implications related to the detection of explosive ordnance when the Navy solicits bids for projects from contractors; however, DOD officials told us that they frequently discover anomalies, such as tin cans or scrap metal, when detecting for explosive ordnance. In one instance, Navy officials stated that they had to modify the contract for a utilities project that resulted in a $4.9 million cost increase and a 10-month schedule delay because the contractor detected more anomalies that DOD had to address than predicted in the initial contract. In May 2016, the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations issued an exemption to aspects of the Navy’s guidance on the detection of explosive ordnance in an attempt to ease standards that resulted in cost overruns and schedule delays in Guam. Under the exemption, civilian construction labor does not need to evacuate a site during the detection process for explosive ordnance in certain circumstances. DOD officials stated that the exemption reduced some of the cost and schedule risks related to detecting explosive ordnance, but the current process for the detection of explosive ordnance may still affect the cost and schedule for a project. Figure 8 illustrates an example of the detection and removal of explosive ordnance at a utilities project in Guam. Cultural-artifact discovery and preservation: DOD discovery and preservation of cultural artifacts following the initiation of a project can affect that project’s cost and schedule. According to DOD officials, they plan for potential costs and time needed for artifact discovery and preservation in the construction contracts for particular projects, but there may be additional costs or schedule delays after they discover artifacts on construction sites. For example, the Marine Corps has plans to build a live-fire training range on the northwest end of Guam that may require the discovery and preservation of artifacts on 21 sites that, according to the Navy, are eligible for listing on the National Register of Historic Places, which may result in additional costs or schedule delays. Navy officials noted that they have taken steps to streamline the documentation of its artifact discovery and preservation process in preparation for each site, but they expect challenges in meeting cultural-artifact discovery and preservation requirements. Figure 9 shows examples of artifacts discovered during construction at various DOD sites in Guam. Endangered-species protection: According to the Navy, DOD has experienced schedule delays as it has waited for the Fish and Wildlife Service to complete biological opinions that outline protection strategies for endangered species located in construction areas. For example, DOD experienced delays on two construction projects due to the discovery of endangered orchid and butterfly species on site, which, according to the Navy, has caused delays in awarding the contracts for both construction projects. The Marine Corps has not completed its risk-management plan for Guam infrastructure. In October 2015, the Marine Corps began developing its risk-management plan, defining roles and responsibilities for risk planning efforts in Guam. Based on our review of the draft risk-management plan—which has been included in the Guam program management plan—we found that the Marine Corps has not identified a strategy within its risk-management plan to address the four risks identified above for infrastructure in Guam, among other construction risks. Officials from the Marine Corps stated that risk is consistently assessed at multiple levels and managed through biweekly coordination meetings with all stakeholders. However, while risks may be assessed on a project-by- project basis, Marine Corps officials have not completed in the draft risk- management plan a strategy to collectively address construction risks on Guam. Officials from Pacific Command expect the identification of specific risks, assessments, and mitigations to be included in a risk assessment tool to be purchased for the Guam program. DOD guidance notes that risk management is integral to effective program management. Moreover, the guidance indicates that a risk-management plan should be developed early in a program’s formulation and notes that the plan should document an integrated approach for managing risks. Any schedule delays to the construction of infrastructure in Guam may have broader effects on other locations involved in the Asia-Pacific realignment. For example, DOD may need to support infrastructure in Okinawa for a longer period and at additional costs if risks are not planned for adequately. Without a risk-management plan that identifies the Marine Corps’ strategy for addressing risks to the infrastructure buildup in Guam, DOD may not have complete information to address risks to the design and construction of its infrastructure that may result in cost overruns and schedule delays related to the relocation of Marines. DOD has completed limited risk planning for the sustainment of infrastructure in Okinawa by developing a master plan. However, DOD did not identify its short- or long-term sustainment needs for the Marine Corps’ infrastructure in its master plan. Figure 10 shows the infrastructure DOD identified that will require sustainment while it waits on various relocation activities to take place. In June 2013, we found that DOD had not developed master plans that included sustainment plans for the majority of the infrastructure on Okinawa it would need while waiting on other, related Asia-Pacific realignment activities to take place. Therefore, we recommended that DOD update its master plans to include sustainment requirements and costs for its infrastructure on Okinawa, including short-term and long-term sustainment needs to account for uncertainty regarding the time needed to complete realignment activities. In December 2015, the Navy developed a master plan for the Marine Corps infrastructure on Okinawa. However, the Navy did not identify in the master plan short- or long-term needs to account for uncertainty regarding the time needed to complete related realignment activities as we recommended. Not identifying in the master plan short- or long-term sustainment needs puts DOD at risk of not having the information necessary to make informed decisions about maintaining its infrastructure at an acceptable level to carry out its mission. DOD guidance on real property management requires DOD components to develop master plans for installations that outline their annual construction plans for at least a 10-year period and to update the master plan at least every 5 years. Furthermore, the guidance requires that DOD components include a specific, annual listing of major repair and sustainment projects. In addition, Unified Facilities Criteria guidance regarding installation master planning indicates that installation planning and programming staff must capture facility requirements and propose solutions to meet those requirements from the options available. Therefore, we continue to believe that fully implementing our June 2013 recommendation to update Okinawa installation master plans to include short- or long-term sustainment needs is important to aid DOD in obtaining sufficient information to make prudent investment decisions for infrastructure sustainment in Okinawa. DOD improved its cost estimates for Guam since our June 2013 report by adding a documented technical baseline description and clear documentation of ground rules and assumptions for its military construction cost estimates, and including life-cycle costs for its nonmilitary construction cost estimates. However, we found that DOD’s updated cost estimates partially met the best practices for a reliable cost estimate. According to GAO’s Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide: Best Practices for Developing and Managing Capital Program Costs, a cost estimate is considered reliable if it fully or substantially meets the best practices of all four characteristics: comprehensive, well- documented, accurate, and credible (see fig. 11). In addition, Office of Management and Budget guidance from July 2016 containing best practices states that credible cost estimates are vital for sound management decision making and for any program to succeed. To assess DOD’s cost estimates for infrastructure in Guam, we compared DOD’s cost estimates for both military construction and nonmilitary construction activities to the best practices of the four characteristics of a reliable cost estimate. We assessed each best practice as not met, minimally met, partially met, substantially met, or fully met. We found that the cost estimates for military construction activities in Guam substantially met best practices for the comprehensive, well-documented, and accurate characteristics but minimally met best practices for the credible characteristic. In addition, we found that the cost estimates for nonmilitary construction activities in Guam partially met best practices for the comprehensive and accurate characteristics, and minimally met best practices for the well-documented and credible characteristics. Appendix IV includes our detailed assessment of DOD’s military construction and nonmilitary construction cost estimates for Guam regarding each of the best practices for the four characteristics for reliable cost estimates, including the reasons best practices were not fully met. Table 2 provides a summary of our assessment, for each of the four characteristics, of DOD’s military construction and nonmilitary construction cost estimates for Guam. DOD officials acknowledged that their cost estimates for Guam did not include all best practices for reliable cost estimates. For example, officials stated that they did not include a unifying Work Breakdown Structure for the estimates for nonmilitary construction because they do not complete a Work Breakdown Structure at the programming stage. However, according to the GAO cost estimating guide, the Work Breakdown Structure should be set up when the program is established and should become successively detailed over time, as it provides a basic framework for estimating costs, determining where risks may occur, and measuring program status. Further, officials stated that they did not resource the level of effort to conduct a risk or sensitivity analysis for the estimates for military and nonmilitary construction because it is not warranted. The GAO cost estimating guide states that a risk analysis and a sensitivity analysis are part of every high-quality cost estimate, as a risk analysis captures the cumulative effect of additional risk and a sensitivity analysis helps mitigate uncertainty by explaining how changes to key assumptions and inputs affect the estimate. In addition, officials stated that an independent cost estimate was performed for the estimates for nonmilitary construction. However, we reviewed DOD’s documentation and found that what they identified as an independent cost estimate was actually a review of a cost summary. The GAO cost estimating guide states that an independent cost estimate should be completed as it provides an independent view of expected program costs that tests the estimate for reasonableness. Without a revision of cost estimates for Guam to include all of the best practices established by GAO’s cost estimating guide, including a Work Breakdown Structure, risk and sensitivity analyses, and an independent cost estimate, decision makers in DOD and Congress will not have reliable cost information to inform their funding decisions regarding infrastructure for the Marine Corps relocation to Guam. DOD partially met the comprehensive characteristic for a reliable cost estimate for its planned infrastructure for Hawaii and Australia by documenting ground rules and assumptions associated with the military construction costs. However, DOD did not include other best practices established by the GAO cost estimating guide for the comprehensive characteristic, such as having all life-cycle costs or a Work Breakdown Structure in its cost estimates. Since the efforts for Hawaii and Australia are still early in the planning process, we did not evaluate the DOD cost estimates for infrastructure in Hawaii and Australia against the best practices for the other three characteristics of a reliable cost estimate. Table 3 provides a summary of our assessment of DOD’s cost estimates. Appendix V includes our detailed assessment of DOD’s cost estimates for Hawaii and Australia, including the reasons that DOD’s cost estimates partially met GAO’s comprehensive characteristic. According to the GAO cost estimating guide, in order for a cost estimate to be considered comprehensive, it should include government and contractor costs over the full life cycle of the program and the estimate should be based on a product-oriented Work Breakdown Structure that allows a program to track cost and schedule by defined deliverables, among other best practices. In addition, DOD guidance on economic analysis for decision making indicates that, as part of assessing the costs and benefits of alternatives, an economic analysis should include comprehensive estimates of the expected costs and benefits that are incident to achieving the stated objectives of the project. DOD officials acknowledged that their cost estimates for Hawaii and Australia did not include all best practices, such as a life-cycle cost estimate and a Work Breakdown Structure, for the comprehensive characteristic because the planning for Hawaii and Australia is still in the early stages and the cost estimates will become more detailed as the planning progresses. A DOD official stated that DOD does not plan to develop a life-cycle cost estimate for Hawaii until at least fiscal year 2018 because DOD is focused on completing the Marine relocation to Guam before beginning detailed planning for Hawaii. Based on best practices in the GAO cost estimating guide, the life-cycle cost estimate for the relocation to Hawaii should be examined and understood early in the planning process regardless of other projects, as a life-cycle cost estimate enhances early decision making and enables planning studies to be evaluated on a total-cost basis. According to the GAO cost estimating guide, a life-cycle cost estimate can support budgetary decisions, key decision points, and investment decisions. Without fully accounting for life-cycle costs, management will have difficulty successfully planning program resource requirements and making informed decisions. In addition, the GAO cost estimating guide states that the Work Breakdown Structure should initially be set up when the program is established and should become successively detailed over time, as it provides a basic framework for estimating costs, determining where risks may occur, and measuring program status. Without a Work Breakdown Structure, the program lacks a framework to develop a schedule and cost plan that can easily track resources spent and completion of activities and tasks. Without a revision of cost estimates for Hawaii and Australia to include all of the best practices established by GAO’s cost estimating guide for the comprehensive characteristic, decision makers in DOD and Congress will not have reliable cost information to inform their funding decisions regarding infrastructure for Hawaii and Australia and to help them determine the viability of the relocation of Marines to Hawaii and the establishment of a rotational presence in Australia. The ability of DOD to coordinate its multiple relocation efforts and maintain the operational capabilities of its forces is important to the success of the U.S. presence in the Asia-Pacific region. DOD has developed a high-level synchronization plan and organized working groups that coordinate the relocation of Marines to Okinawa, but DOD has not fully resolved selected identified capability deficiencies associated with the relocation of Marines. If DOD officials do not resolve the selected identified capability deficiencies, they may be challenged in maintaining operational capabilities and could face higher costs in order to do so. It is important to resolve these selected identified capability deficiencies in the near term because it can take many years to plan, allocate resources, and develop facilities. DOD has taken steps to develop its infrastructure plans for the relocation of Marines from Okinawa, such as the development of plans that identified alternatives for its infrastructure in Guam, CNMI, and Japan and the initial infrastructure plans for Hawaii and Australia. However, the Marine Corps’ infrastructure schedule for Guam does not meet GAO’s best practices for a reliable schedule. Without a reliable integrated master schedule, DOD may not have reasonable assurance of the reliability of information on current progress as well as potential sources of delays for the design and construction of infrastructure to support the relocation of Marines to Guam. Furthermore, DOD does not have a reliable schedule to assess progress and identify potential problems for the relocation to Guam. In addition, the Marine Corps has not completed its risk- management plan for Guam that documents its strategy for how it will address known construction risks, among other risks that may be present. Without a risk-management plan that identifies the Marine Corps’ strategy for addressing risks to the infrastructure buildup in Guam, DOD will not have the information necessary to address risks for its infrastructure design and construction that will likely result in cost overruns and schedule delays related to the relocation. Moreover, DOD has taken steps to implement our June 2013 recommendation to update Okinawa installation master plans, but it has not identified short- or long-term sustainment needs for facilities in Okinawa. By fully implementing our June 2013 recommendation to include short- or long-term sustainment needs, DOD would be better positioned to mitigate infrastructure sustainment risks in Okinawa and could better ensure that facilities are adequate to carry out its mission until related realignment activities are completed. DOD would also limit its risk of experiencing cost overruns resulting from having to sustain facilities longer than expected because of delays or uncertainties related to other Asia-Pacific relocation activities that officials project will need to occur before consolidating infrastructure. DOD has made overall progress in developing its cost estimates for Guam since June 2013, but its estimates partially met best practices for reliable cost estimates for infrastructure in Guam, Hawaii, and Australia. Specifically, the cost estimates for Guam do not include a unifying Work Breakdown Structure, risk and sensitivity analyses, and an independent cost estimate. The cost estimates for Hawaii and Australia do not include a life-cycle cost estimate or a Work Breakdown Structure. Without a revision of current cost estimates for Guam, Hawaii, and Australia to fully address all of the best practices established by GAO’s cost estimating guide, decision makers in DOD and Congress will not have reliable cost information to inform their funding decisions and to help them determine the viability of these options for the relocation and the establishment of a rotational presence. We recommend that the Secretary of Defense take the following nine actions. To improve the Department of Defense’s ability to maintain its capability in the Asia-Pacific region, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the appropriate entities to resolve selected identified capability deficiencies associated with the relocation in four areas: the movement of Marine Corps units by, for example, reconsidering when units should move to Guam to minimize leaving facilities vacant; training needs in Iwakuni, Hawaii, and CNMI by, for example, identifying other suitable training areas; reduction in runway length at the Futenma Replacement Facility by, for example, selecting other runways that would support mission requirements; and challenges in Australia regarding seasonal changes and biosecurity requirements that affect equipment downtime by, for example, deciding on a location for the wet season and identifying a solution for biosecurity requirements. To provide DOD with reliable information on potential sources of delays for the design and construction of infrastructure in Guam, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the appropriate entities to update the Marine Corps’ integrated master schedule for Guam so that it meets the comprehensive, well-constructed, and credible characteristics for a reliable schedule. For example, the update to the schedule should include resources for nonconstruction activities. To provide DOD and Congress with sufficient information to mitigate risks for infrastructure construction and sustainment, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the appropriate entities to complete a Risk Management Plan for Guam, and include, at a minimum, plans to address: (1) construction labor shortages, (2) explosive--ordnance detection, (3) cultural-artifact discovery and preservation, and (4) protection of endangered species. To provide DOD and Congress with more-reliable information to inform funding decisions associated with the relocation of Marines to Guam, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the appropriate entities to revise the cost estimates for Guam to address all best practices established by GAO’s cost estimating guide. Specifically, the revisions to the cost estimates should include: a unifying Work Breakdown Structure, risk and sensitivity analyses, and an independent cost estimate. To provide DOD and Congress with more-reliable information to inform funding decisions associated with the relocation of Marines to Hawaii and the establishment of a rotational presence in Australia, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the appropriate entities to revise the DOD cost estimates for Hawaii to address all best practices for the comprehensive characteristic established by the GAO cost estimating guide, specifically to capture entire life-cycle costs and develop a Work Breakdown Structure and revise the DOD cost estimates for Australia to address all best practices for the comprehensive characteristic established by the GAO cost estimating guide, specifically to capture entire life-cycle costs and develop a Work Breakdown Structure. We provided a draft of this report for review and comment to DOD and the Department of State. In written comments, DOD concurred with two recommendations, partially concurred with six recommendations, and nonconcurred with one recommendation. After receiving a draft of the sensitive report in December 2016, DOD provided additional information and documentation in January and February 2017 based on new developments in the bilateral negotiations between the governments of the United States and Australia, actions taken by DOD during our review in response to our draft report, and roles and responsibilities in the Asia- Pacific region. As a result of our review of the documentation provided and discussions with officials, we revised some of our findings to reflect this additional information, and we revised the wording of some of our recommendations. Specifically, in discussions in January 2017, DOD officials raised concerns about the stakeholders to whom we directed our recommendations, noting that multiple stakeholders have roles in the relocation. We agree there are multiple stakeholders and modified some recommendations to allow the Secretary of Defense to direct the appropriate entities to implement the recommendations, rather than identify the specific stakeholders. Additionally, we removed one finding and its related recommendation regarding challenges reaching an agreement between the United States and Australia relating to the mission of the Marine Corps units in Australia, given new documentation provided by DOD and updates in the bilateral negotiations. DOD’s comments on this report are summarized below and reprinted in their entirety in appendix VI. In e-mail, the audit liaison from the Department of State indicated that the department did not have formal comments. DOD and the Department of State also both provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. DOD partially concurred with our first four recommendations that the Secretary of Defense direct the appropriate entities to resolve selected identified capability deficiencies associated with the movement of Marine Corps units; training needs in Iwakuni, Hawaii, and CNMI; reduction in runway length at the Futenma Replacement Facility; and challenges in Australia regarding seasonal changes and biosecurity requirements. In its letter, DOD stated that the Marine Corps has already addressed, where applicable, the selected identified capability deficiencies. We disagree that the Marine Corps has addressed these capability deficiencies, given the ongoing concerns as noted in our report. Moreover, in January 2017, both the Marine Corps and Pacific Command provided additional documents to us stating that the four selected identified capability deficiencies were not yet resolved, and we address the specific points in the following paragraphs related to each recommendation. With regard to our first recommendation that the Secretary of Defense direct the appropriate entities to resolve selected identified capability deficiencies associated with the movement of Marine Corps units, DOD stated that the Marine Corps’ plans for movement of units from Okinawa to Guam has considered many factors, including, among others, the capabilities required to support Pacific Command and the logistical requirements associated with the movement of forces. In its response, DOD stated it disagrees with our assessment that adequate planning with regard to minimizing operational downtime of III Marine Expeditionary Force during the movement to Guam has not been done. Rather, DOD stated that both the Marine Corps and Pacific Command have done extensive planning and analysis to determine how best to posture, move, and support forces from III Marine Expeditionary Force. In its response, DOD further noted Pacific Command’s explanation that the existing plan cannot be considered fixed and final because of the requirement to adapt to changing conditions. DOD also noted that those conditions do not materially impact the infrastructure required. DOD added that the pace at which this movement is executed will continue to take into account the rate at which the required infrastructure is developed. Moreover, DOD’s response stated that the Marine Corps is already working to ensure that its plan is continually refined to balance fiscal and construction realities with operational risk, capability requirements, and readiness. Although DOD has taken initial steps to consider how to move Marine Corps units from Okinawa to Guam, we continue to believe it has not yet fully resolved this capability deficiency. We agree that DOD has taken some steps to analyze capability deficiencies regarding the movement of Marine Corps units, and we stated in our report that Marine Corps Forces Pacific conducted simulated wartime scenarios to assess the capability concerns that had been expressed by III Marine Corps Forces. However, as we also stated in our report, DOD has not completed its analysis or reached any decisions on how to move the forces. Further, as we stated, DOD anticipates that it will soon be rapidly increasing the number of construction projects in Guam, increasing from 4 projects as of July 2016 to 15 projects in fiscal year 2018. Those projects, which are already in the planning and development stage, will be affected if DOD has not made decisions on the movement of forces. Further, any changes could result in costly adjustments to the construction if decisions are made too late or could result in vacant facilities if the movement of units needs to be adjusted. DOD has not provided us evidence that, if plans are adapted to changing conditions, the effect on infrastructure will be minimal; in contrast, we have historically found that infrastructure changes can be costly to the department. Moreover, in January 2017, Marine Corps and Pacific Command officials continued to express concerns that decisions with regard to force structure and positioning of forces will ultimately affect facility planning adjustments. As a result, until DOD resolves how to move units from Okinawa to Guam, it risks hindering its mission requirements during the relocation. With regard to our second recommendation that the Secretary of Defense direct the appropriate entities to resolve selected identified capability deficiencies associated with training needs in Iwakuni, Hawaii, and CNMI, DOD stated that it has already conducted an extensive analysis of training needs. Specifically concerning training requirements for CNMI, DOD stated that Pacific Command identified 42 combatant command– level training deficiencies to be fulfilled through the development of training ranges in Pacific Command’s area of responsibility. DOD added that, due to the complexity and scale of these training deficiencies, CNMI emerged as the only viable location on U.S. territory to address these deficiencies. DOD further stated it disagrees that a study to reexamine these and other potential training locations in the event that DOD is not able to meet all of its identified training requirements in CNMI is warranted or worthwhile years prior to the development of new training ranges in the CNMI. With respect to the department’s assertion that DOD has already conducted an extensive analysis of training needs for the Marine Corps and the joint force in Iwakuni, Hawaii, and CNMI, we disagree. The assertion is contrary to evidence provided to us in documents and discussions we held with DOD officials. In particular, in February 2017, officials from U.S. Forces–Japan said that bilateral agreement was reached to establish a working group to study other possible locations beyond Kanoya Air Base for training, thus indicating that identification of other training locations near Iwakuni has not yet been resolved. With respect to Hawaii, in April 2016, Marine Corps officials told us they had not identified a timeline for when they plan to develop training plans, and in January 2017 Marine Corps officials added that there is significant work to be done to fully determine training requirements and conduct planning to meet those requirements. With respect to CNMI, in January 2017 both Pacific Command and the Marine Corps stated that DOD has not fully resolved the challenges associated with training areas. As noted in our report, the department received more than 27,000 comments in response to the draft environmental impact statement, and to address the multitude of comments the Department of the Navy stated it is developing a revised draft environmental impact statement. However, the Marine Corps synchronization matrix, as of June 2016, still showed construction scheduled to begin in Tinian as soon as 2017. We continue to believe that DOD should take actions to resolve capability deficiencies associated with training needs in Iwakuni, Hawaii, and CNMI; otherwise, it may take additional time, effort, and resources to resolve these deficiencies and it is uncertain whether the Marine Corps units will be able to complete necessary training in these locations. With regard to our third recommendation that the Secretary of Defense direct the appropriate entities to resolve selected identified capability deficiencies associated with the reduction in runway length at the Futenma Replacement Facility, DOD stated that it disagreed that the length of the runway planned at the Futenma Replacement Facility is a capability deficiency for the Marine Corps. DOD stated that, at the time of its agreement with Japan, it understood that the Futenma Replacement Facility would not possess a long runway and that the Marine Corps drove the final requirements to support the capabilities required for their missions at the Futenma Replacement Facility. While we agree that the shorter runway is not a deficiency for the Marine Corps, it is a deficiency that is ultimately connected with infrastructure plans for the Marine Corps in the context of relocation—specifically, infrastructure plans associated with Marine Corps relocation from Marine Corps Air Station Futenma. As such, we directed our recommendation to the Secretary of Defense to direct the appropriate entities for whom the shorter runway is a deficiency. As we wrote in our report, the shorter runway equates to the loss of an emergency landing strip for fixed-wing aircraft in the area and the loss of the United Nations use of a runway. These capability deficiencies affect the Air Force and U.S. Forces–Japan and have not yet been resolved. Additionally, as we stated in our report, senior officials from U.S. Forces–Japan said that, given the large Japanese investment into the Futenma Replacement Facility, it may be likely that the United States becomes pressured by the government of Japan to return Marine Corps Air Station Futenma even if the replacement runway deficiency is not resolved. If this return were to occur without a replacement runway identified, DOD mission capabilities could be hindered. Until this deficiency is resolved, DOD may be unable to maintain all mission capabilities or face higher costs to do so. With regard to our fourth recommendation that the Secretary of Defense direct the appropriate entities to resolve selected identified capability deficiencies associated with challenges in Australia regarding seasonal changes and biosecurity requirements that affect equipment downtime, DOD stated that these factors are not capability deficiencies but rather real-world constraints around which DOD and Australia are working to develop the most bilaterally beneficial annual program possible. DOD also stated that the Marine Corps continues to coordinate closely with the Australian Department of Agriculture, Fisheries, and Forestry to develop best practices to train Marines as assistant inspectors to minimize the cost, in time and money, to conduct biosecurity inspections. We agree that the department likely understood these issues when it first began planning for the rotational presence to Australia, but knowing about these issues does not negate the fact that DOD has not yet determined how it plans to resolve them. These issues remain relevant to the Marine Corps, as it will need to determine where to place up 2,500 Marines when some units can no longer return to Okinawa and how to reduce readiness risks when its equipment is unusable due to biosecurity screening requirements. As we noted in our report, DOD officials are considering multiple options for the wet season, but no decisions have been made, and Marine Corps officials have identified constraints for each option being considered. Moreover, as stated in our report, in January 2017 Pacific Command and Marine Corps officials stated that challenges remain to fund and source a dedicated equipment set. Initial force flow has already begun, and the cost-sharing arrangement between the governments of the United States and Australia was signed in January 2017, which will likely allow for construction decisions to be made in the near term. DOD has the opportunity now—before force flow increases and DOD spends additional effort and resources—to make prudent decisions to avoid needing to make costly corrections later. As a result, we continue to believe that DOD should take actions to resolve these challenges in Australia in order to help ensure that its plans are fully developed and resources are identified so that DOD and Congress can make prudent and informed funding decisions to resolve these challenges. DOD concurred with our fifth recommendation that the Secretary of Defense direct the appropriate entities to update the Marine Corps’ integrated master schedule for Guam so that it meets the comprehensive, well-constructed, and credible characteristics for a reliable schedule. In its response, DOD stated that, in September 2016, it began updating its integrated master schedule based on our review to conform to the GAO Schedule Assessment Guide and plans to adopt the best practices of assigning resources and establishing activity durations to ensure the schedule is comprehensive. Also, DOD plans to continue to work to verify that the schedule can be traced horizontally and vertically and conduct a schedule risk analysis. If fully implemented, we believe that DOD’s proposed actions will better provide DOD with reliable information on potential sources of delays for the design and construction of infrastructure in Guam. DOD concurred with our sixth recommendation that the Secretary of Defense direct the appropriate entities to complete a risk-management plan for Guam, and include, at a minimum, plans to address: (1) construction labor shortages, (2) explosive-ordnance detection, (3) cultural-artifact discovery and preservation, and (4) protection of endangered species. In its response, DOD cited actions it has previously taken and plans to mitigate risks for infrastructure construction and sustainment, such as coordinating with the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services to address foreign-worker visas, approving an explosive-safety exemption for construction projects in Guam and CNMI, and developing a monitoring and mitigation tracking plan to ensure Navy compliance and execution of environmental requirements. These past and planned actions, as well as DOD’s concurrence with our recommendation, should better address risks to the design and construction of its infrastructure and, in turn, reduce the potential for cost overruns and schedule delays. DOD nonconcurred with our seventh recommendation that the Secretary of Defense direct the appropriate entities to revise the cost estimates for Guam to address all best practices established by GAO’s cost estimating guide. In its response, DOD stated that the department does not accept the assertion that GAO’s best practices are universally applicable to a wide range of activities that includes military construction, acquisition, or basing. DOD stated that the Guam program was developed and communicated to Congress consistently with statute and the department’s long-standing supporting policies. Specifically, DOD noted that DOD Financial Management Regulation, Volume 2B, Chapter 6, requires inclusion of a form for each project submitted with the budget request, containing certain information. According to DOD, per this guidance, a contractor develops a detailed Work Breakdown Structure when the construction contract is awarded, which is much later in the project execution timeline than our expectations. DOD further stated that it is unrealistic for DOD to develop detailed Work Breakdown Structures for over 100 independent construction projects prior to any construction project getting under way. Moreover, DOD states that it provides sufficient information to support military construction decisions, and in cases where Congress desires additional information on a particular project, it routinely requests and receives that information. We continue to believe that our cost estimating guide provides a consistent methodology that is based on best practices and that can be used across the federal government—including DOD—for developing, managing, and evaluating capital program cost estimates. Moreover, as noted in our report, there is no Work Breakdown Structure to tie the cost estimates and schedule together. A Work Breakdown Structure is the cornerstone of every program because it defines in detail the work necessary to accomplish a program’s objectives, and it provides a consistent framework for planning and assigning responsibility for the work. Further, we do not state that DOD should develop detailed Work Breakdown Structures for over 100 independent construction projects. Rather, we state that DOD should have a unifying Work Breakdown Structure to align the Guam Rainbow Chart—DOD’s program- management tool that summarizes detailed program inputs—to the schedule or the cost estimate. Per GAO’s cost estimating guide, a Work Breakdown Structure should be initially set up when the program is established and becomes successively detailed over time as more information becomes known about the program. In its response, DOD did not dispute our findings and related recommendation that the revisions to the Guam cost estimates should include risk and sensitivity analyses and an independent cost estimate; we believe these revisions remain relevant as well. We continue to believe that, without a revision of cost estimates for Guam to include the best practices established by GAO’s cost estimating guide, decision makers in DOD and Congress will not have reliable cost information to inform their funding decisions regarding infrastructure for the Marine Corps relocation to Guam. Finally, DOD partially concurred with our eighth and ninth recommendations that the Secretary of Defense direct the appropriate entities to revise the DOD cost estimates for Hawaii and Australia to address all best practices for the comprehensive characteristic established by the GAO cost estimating guide, specifically to capture entire life-cycle costs and develop a Work Breakdown Structure. In its response, the department agreed that good cost estimating practices are prudent for good decision making but did not agree that it should expend effort to update its cost estimates for the Hawaii and Australia programs due to reasons of timing, in the case of Hawaii, and international agreements, in the case of Australia. Specifically, DOD stated that, for Hawaii, high-level cost estimates are sufficient at this early planning stage and a detailed Work Breakdown Structure is not needed. Moreover, in its response, DOD stated that it disagrees with what constitutes the program life cycle. DOD stated it believes that the program is complete when forces move and occupy the new facilities. Regarding Australia cost estimates, DOD stated in its response that the costs borne by DOD under this program will be subject to international agreement rather than the GAO cost estimating guide. Per GAO’s Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide, we are not recommending a Work Breakdown Structure for specific construction projects, but rather a Work Breakdown Structure that combines all of the different projects involved in the overall program. We continue to believe that DOD should develop a Work Breakdown Structure that lays out the costs at a high level so that DOD can easily see and track accomplishments. Then, as the program continues, DOD can add detail to those areas of the Work Breakdown Structure when they are further defined. Additionally, life-cycle costing enhances decision making, especially in early planning and concept formulation of acquisition. While DOD notes that it incorporates best practices for minimizing facility maintenance and sustainment costs into its construction costs, a full life- cycle cost estimate is important in budgetary decisions, key decision points, milestone reviews, and investment decisions. Without considering operations and support throughout the entire life cycle, DOD is not considering all possible costs of what the facilities will cost over time. With regard to Australia’s cost estimate, costs could still be identified in a Work Breakdown Structure and then later assigned to either the United States or Australia. We continue to believe that revising cost estimates for Hawaii and Australia to include all of the best practices established by GAO’s cost estimating guide for the comprehensive characteristic will better enable decision makers in DOD and Congress to make informed funding decisions and determine the viability of the relocation of Marines to Hawaii and the establishment of a rotational presence in Australia. We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional committees; the Secretary of Defense; the Secretaries of the Army, Navy, and Air Force; the Commandant of the Marine Corps; and the Department of State. In addition, the report is available at no charge on the GAO website at http://www.gao.gov. If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 512-4523 or leporeb@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made key contributions to this report are listed in appendix VII. The objectives of our review were to examine the extent to which the Department of Defense (DOD) has (1) coordinated its efforts and resolved selected identified capability deficiencies related to the relocation of Marines from Okinawa, (2) developed infrastructure plans and schedules for its relocation efforts and completed risk planning for its infrastructure that will support the relocation, and (3) developed reliable cost estimates for infrastructure for the relocation to Guam and Hawaii and for the rotational presence in Australia. This report is a public version of a sensitive report that we are issuing concurrently. DOD deemed some of the information in the sensitive report as For Official Use Only, which must be protected from public disclosure. Therefore, this report omits For Official Use Only information and data on some of the Navy and Marine Corps plans and programs associated with the realignment effort, deployment and allies’ considerations, and estimates of future actions and political concerns associated with Marine Corps forward stationing. Although the information provided in this report is more limited in scope, it addresses the same objectives as the sensitive report. Also, the methodology used for both reports is the same. For all objectives, we scoped our review to actions taken since GAO last reviewed Marine Corps realignment initiatives in the Asia-Pacific region in June 2013. We reviewed relevant policies and procedures, and collected information by interviewing and communicating with officials from the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Policy), the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), the Air Force, the Army, the Navy, the Marine Corps, and the State Department. We also conducted site visits in the following areas: Hawaii, where we met with Pacific Command and its service components; Japan, where we met with U.S. Forces– Japan and the services, Marine Corps Installation Command Pacific, III Marine Expeditionary Force, the U.S. Embassy in Tokyo, and the U.S. Consulate on Okinawa, and observed infrastructure conditions in Okinawa and Iwakuni; and Guam, where we met with DOD and government of Guam officials, and observed infrastructure conditions and the buildup of Marine Corps Base Guam. Additionally, we interviewed DOD officials and officials from the U.S. Embassy in Australia. We also met with DOD’s construction agents, specifically the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and the Naval Facilities Engineering Command. To determine the extent to which DOD has coordinated efforts and resolved selected identified capability deficiencies related to the relocation of Marines from Okinawa, we reviewed DOD documentation and interviewed knowledgeable officials. Specifically, we reviewed documentation such as the Marine Corps’ Asia-Pacific Realignment Synchronization Matrix; capability documents such as bilateral agreements between the United States and Japan or Australia as well as training requirement documentation; and other documentation including program management plans for the various locations supporting the relocation. We reviewed capability deficiencies that were identified by DOD through interviews. We compared DOD’s decision-making process for plans to resolve the identified capabilities to DOD Unified Facilities Criteria regarding identifying mission needs to determine land and facility support requirements. To determine the extent that DOD has developed plans and schedules for its relocation efforts and completed risk planning for its infrastructure, we reviewed DOD guidance related to the development of installation plans, integrated master schedules, and risk planning. We identified current infrastructure plans and integrated master schedules. Specifically, we assessed the Guam integrated master schedule to determine whether this schedule reflects best practices needed to implement a program as well as the extent to which projects and activities were properly sequenced. GAO schedule specialists reviewed the Guam schedule and compared it with best practices in GAO’s Schedule Assessment Guide to determine the extent to which it reflects 10 key schedule estimating practices that are fundamental to having a reliable schedule. These practices address whether the schedule (1) captured all activities, (2) sequenced all activities, (3) assigned resources to all activities, (4) established the duration of all activities, (5) can be traced horizontally and vertically, (6) established a valid critical path, (7) identified reasonable total float between activities, (8) identified a level of confidence using a schedule risk analysis, (9) was updated using progress and logic to determine dates, and (10) maintained a baseline schedule. To do so, we independently assessed the program’s integrated master schedule compared to these 10 best practices and determined an assessment rating for each best practice. Then we determined an overall assessment rating for the 4 characteristics of a reliable schedule based on averages of the 10 best practices. When the program office made updates to the integrated master schedule, we conducted our review again to reflect those updates. We also received two detailed construction project schedules and assessed them for resource assignments. In addition, we interviewed cognizant program officials to discuss their use of best practices in creating the program’s current schedule to better understand how the schedule was constructed and maintained. Moreover, we reviewed documentation and conducted interviews with DOD officials to determine any identified risks to the schedule and actions DOD has taken to address those risks. We compared DOD’s risk-planning efforts outlined in that documentation to DOD guidance on addressing risk, such as guidance that identifies the characteristics needed in a risk-management plan and guidance on how DOD plans for infrastructure sustainment in base master plans. To determine the extent to which DOD has developed reliable cost estimates for infrastructure for the relocation to Guam and Hawaii and for the rotational presence in Australia, we reviewed DOD’s cost estimates and analyses and interviewed DOD and Department of State officials about costs and funding sources related to infrastructure in locations considered for relocation. GAO cost estimation specialists compared those estimates and analyses to the best practices included in GAO’s Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide. We also reviewed the Office of Management and Budget’s Capital Programming Guide, and DOD’s guidance on Economic Analysis for Decision-making, which support our best practices for developing reliable cost estimates. Specifically, GAO’s Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide identifies best practices that represent work across the federal government and are the basis for a high-quality, reliable cost estimate. A cost estimate created using best practices exhibits four broad characteristics: accurate, well-documented, credible, and comprehensive. In assessing program cost estimates for Guam, GAO cost estimation specialists evaluated the Marine Corps program office estimating methodologies, assumptions, and results to determine whether the official cost estimates were comprehensive, accurate, well-documented, and credible. As the basis of our assessment, we used our GAO Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide on estimating program schedules and costs, which was developed based on extensive research of cost estimating best practices. Our Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide considers an estimate to be accurate if it is not overly conservative, is based on an assessment of the most likely costs, and is adjusted properly for inflation; comprehensive if its level of detail ensures that all pertinent costs are included and no costs are double-counted or omitted; well-documented if the estimate can be easily repeated or updated and can be traced to original sources through auditing; and credible if the estimate has been cross-checked with an independent cost estimate and a level of uncertainty associated with the estimate has been identified and quantified. We also interviewed the Marine Corps program office’s cost estimating team to obtain a detailed understanding of the cost models provided, and met with Marine Corps headquarters, Marine Corps Forces Pacific Command, and Naval Facilities Engineering Command Pacific to understand their methodology, data, and approach in developing their independent cost estimate (if applicable). In doing so, we interviewed cognizant program officials, including the Program Manager and cost analysis team, regarding their respective roles, responsibilities, and actual efforts in developing and reviewing the cost estimate. In assessing program cost estimates for Hawaii and Australia, GAO cost estimation specialists conducted a limited assessment focused on the comprehensive characteristic because the estimates developed and provided by DOD are early in the program life cycle (e.g., they are Rough Order of Magnitude estimates), and as such the information is immature and inadequate to support a full analysis. Therefore, we chose to review only the comprehensive characteristic because, according to GAO’s Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide, if the cost estimate is not comprehensive then it cannot fully meet the well-documented, accurate, or credible best practice characteristics. For instance, if the cost estimate is missing some cost elements, then the documentation will be incomplete, the estimate will be inaccurate, and the result will not be credible due to the potential underestimating of costs and the lack of a full risk and uncertainty analysis. We conducted this performance audit from January 2016 to April 2017 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. The Defense Policy Review Initiative (DPRI) is a bilateral force-posture realignment program between the U.S. and Japanese governments. Led by the U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee, DPRI consists of a package of 19 interrelated and interdependent initiatives for Japan and Guam with touch points to other areas in the U.S. Pacific Command area of responsibility, such as Tinian in the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands. According to the Department of Defense (DOD), implementation of 17 of the 19 DPRI initiatives is managed by subcommittees, panels, and working groups established and operating under the auspices of the U.S.-Japan Joint Committee. The other two initiatives—the Guam Master Plan and Missile Defense initiative—are managed on the U.S. side by the Joint Guam Program Office and the Missile Defense Agency, respectively. See table 4 for a list of the 19 initiatives and a short summary describing each effort. This appendix summarizes our assessment of the integrated master schedule for Guam compared to GAO’s Schedule Assessment Guide. We found the integrated master schedule is not reliable because it did not meet the characteristics of a reliable schedule identified in the guide. Specifically, there are 10 best practices associated with a reliable schedule that are summarized in 4 characteristics: comprehensive, well- constructed, credible, and controlled. For this analysis, we had five assessment categories: not met (provided no evidence that satisfies any of the criterion), minimally met (provided evidence that satisfies a small portion of the criterion), partially met (provided evidence that satisfies about half of the criterion), substantially met (provided evidence that satisfies a large portion of the criterion), and fully met (provided complete evidence that satisfies the entire criterion). We determined an assessment rating for each of the 10 best practices, and then determined an overall assessment rating for each characteristic based on the ratings for the best practices within each characteristic in table 5. A schedule is considered reliable if the overall assessment ratings for each of the four characteristics are substantially or fully met. GAO shared this analysis with Department of Defense officials. Table 5 only includes the reasons why best practices were not met, minimally met, or partially met. For this analysis, GAO cost estimating specialists assessed the realignment cost estimates for military construction and nonmilitary construction in Guam against the best practices for each of the four characteristics—comprehensive, well-documented, accurate, and credible—for reliable cost estimates, and also provided an overall assessment for each characteristic. This analysis has five assessment categories for the best practices and the characteristics: not met (provided no evidence that satisfies any of the criterion), minimally met (provided evidence that satisfies a small portion of the criterion), partially met (provided evidence that satisfies about half of the criterion), substantially met (provided evidence that satisfies a large portion of the criterion), and fully met (provided complete evidence that satisfies the entire criterion). A cost estimate is considered reliable if the overall assessment ratings for each of the four characteristics are fully or substantially met. Tables 6 and 7 include our detailed assessment of the Department of Defense’s (DOD) military construction and nonmilitary construction cost estimates for Guam, respectively, regarding each of the best practices for the four characteristics for reliable cost estimates. GAO shared this analysis with DOD officials. Tables 6 and 7 only include the reasons why best practices were not met, minimally met, or partially met. For this analysis, GAO cost estimation specialists assessed the realignment cost estimates for Hawaii and Australia against the best practices of the comprehensive characteristic for reliable cost estimates and provided an overall assessment for the characteristic. This analysis has five assessment categories for the characteristic: not met (provided no evidence that satisfies any of the criterion), minimally met (provided evidence that satisfies a small portion of the criterion), partially met (provided evidence that satisfies about half of the criterion), substantially met (provided evidence that satisfies a large portion of the criterion), and fully met (provided complete evidence that satisfies the entire criterion). A cost estimate is considered comprehensive if the assessment rating is fully or substantially met. Table 8, below, includes our detailed assessment of the Department of Defense’s (DOD) cost estimates for Hawaii and Australia, including the reasons that DOD’s cost estimates partially met GAO’s comprehensive characteristic. In addition to the contact named above, Laura Durland (Assistant Director), Emily Biskup, Scott Bruckner, Juana Collymore, Jennifer Echard, Jason Lee, Jennifer Leotta, Amie Lesser, Carol Petersen, Richard Powelson, Karen Richey, Jodie Sandel, Nancy Santucci, Michael Shaughnessy, Amber Sinclair, and Erik Wilkins-McKee made key contributions to this report. Defense Management: Further Analysis Needed to Identify Guam’s Public Infrastructure Requirements and Costs for DOD’s Realignment Plan. GAO-14-82. Washington, D.C.: December 17, 2013. Defense Management: More Reliable Cost Estimates and Further Planning Needed to Inform the Marine Corps Realignment Initiatives in the Pacific. GAO-13-360. Washington, D.C.: June 11, 2013. Force Structure: Improved Cost Information and Analysis Needed to Guide Overseas Military Posture Decisions. GAO-12-711. Washington, D.C.: June 6, 2012. Military Buildup on Guam: Costs and Challenges in Meeting Construction Timelines. GAO-11-459R. Washington, D.C.: June 27, 2011. Defense Management: Comprehensive Cost Information and Analysis of Alternatives Needed to Assess Military Posture in Asia. GAO-11-316. Washington, D.C.: May 25, 2011. Defense Infrastructure: The Navy Needs Better Documentation to Support Its Proposed Military Treatment Facilities on Guam. GAO-11-206. Washington, D.C.: April 5, 2011. Defense Infrastructure: Guam Needs Timely Information from DOD to Meet Challenges in Planning and Financing Off-Base Projects and Programs to Support a Larger Military Presence. GAO-10-90R. Washington, D.C.: November 13, 2009. Defense Infrastructure: DOD Needs to Provide Updated Labor Requirements to Help Guam Adequately Develop Its Labor Force for the Military Buildup. GAO-10-72. Washington, D.C.: October 14, 2009. Defense Infrastructure: Planning Challenges Could Increase Risks for DOD in Providing Utility Services When Needed to Support the Military Buildup on Guam. GAO-09-653. Washington, D.C.: June 30, 2009. Defense Infrastructure: High-Level Leadership Needed to Help Guam Address Challenges Caused by DOD-Related Growth. GAO-09-500R. Washington, D.C.: April 9, 2009. Defense Infrastructure: Opportunity to Improve the Timeliness of Future Overseas Planning Reports and Factors Affecting the Master Planning Effort for the Military Buildup on Guam. GAO-08-1005. Washington, D.C.: September 17, 2008. Defense Infrastructure: High-Level Leadership Needed to Help Communities Address Challenges Caused by DOD-Related Growth. GAO-08-665. Washington, D.C.: June 17, 2008. Defense Infrastructure: Planning Efforts for the Proposed Military Buildup on Guam Are in Their Initial Stages, with Many Challenges Yet to Be Addressed. GAO-08-722T. Washington, D.C.: May 1, 2008. Defense Infrastructure: Overseas Master Plans Are Improving, but DOD Needs to Provide Congress Additional Information about the Military Buildup on Guam. GAO-07-1015. Washington, D.C.: September 12, 2007.

Summary: For two decades, DOD has planned to realign its presence in the Asia-Pacific region. The Marine Corps has plans to consolidate bases in Okinawa, relocating 4,100 Marines to Guam, 2,700 to Hawaii, 800 to the continental United States, and a rotational presence of 1,300 to Australia. The Joint Explanatory Statement accompanying the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016, included a provision that GAO study the realignment initiatives in the Asia-Pacific region. This report assesses the extent to which DOD has (1) coordinated its efforts and resolved selected identified capability deficiencies related to the relocation of Marines, (2) developed infrastructure plans and schedules and completed risk planning for its infrastructure that will support the relocation, and (3) developed reliable cost estimates for infrastructure for the relocation of Marines to Guam and Hawaii and the rotational presence in Australia. GAO reviewed relevant policies and plans; analyzed cost documents; interviewed DOD officials; and visited U.S. military installations in the Asia-Pacific region. The Department of Defense (DOD) has coordinated the relocation of Marines from Okinawa to other locations in the Asia-Pacific region through developing a synchronization plan and organizing working groups. However, DOD has not resolved selected identified capability deficiencies related to the relocation of Marine units; training needs in the region; the reduction in runway length at the Futenma Replacement Facility in Okinawa; and challenges for operating in Australia. DOD guidance indicates that mission requirements—which would include the capabilities needed to fulfill the mission—largely determine land and facility support requirements. If DOD does not resolve the selected identified capability deficiencies in its infrastructure plans, DOD may be unable to maintain its capabilities or face much higher costs to do so. DOD has taken steps to develop infrastructure plans and schedules for its relocation efforts, but it did not develop a reliable schedule for the Marine relocation to Guam and has not completed its risk planning for infrastructure in Guam. DOD developed plans that will support construction efforts in Guam and Japan, and developed some initial infrastructure plans for Hawaii and Australia. However, GAO found the Marines Corps' integrated master schedule for Guam did not fully meet the comprehensive, well-constructed, and credible characteristics for a reliable schedule. For example, the schedule does not include resources needed for nonconstruction activities, such as information technology and design activities. Additionally, the Marine Corps has not completed its risk-management plan for infrastructure construction in Guam. Specifically, the Marine Corps has not identified its strategy to address construction risks including labor shortages and endangered-species protection. If DOD does not have a reliable schedule or has not completed risk planning for Guam, it may not have complete information to identify and address risks that may result in cost overruns and schedule delays. DOD has made progress in developing cost estimates for Guam, but its estimates partially met GAO best practices for reliable cost estimates for the relocations to Guam and Hawaii and the establishment of a rotational presence in Australia. For cost estimates related to Guam military construction activities, DOD included ground rules and assumptions, but did not include some elements of a reliable cost estimate, such as a risk analysis. Additionally, DOD developed cost estimates for nonmilitary construction activities that provide a high-level planning overview of the requirements, but they did not incorporate several other best practices, including a unifying Work Breakdown Structure that defines in detail the work necessary to accomplish a program's objectives. For Hawaii and Australia, the cost estimates are not considered reliable because they did not include all life-cycle costs or a Work Breakdown Structure. If DOD does not revise the cost estimates for these locations, decision makers in DOD and Congress will not have reliable cost information to inform funding decisions and to help them determine the viability of relocation of Marines to Hawaii and the establishment of a rotational presence in Australia. GAO recommends that DOD resolve capability deficiencies in the four selected identified areas, update its schedule for Guam infrastructure, complete a risk-management plan for Guam infrastructure, and revise its three cost estimates. DOD concurred with two recommendations, partially concurred with six, and did not concur with one. GAO continues to believe its recommendations are valid, as discussed in this report.