In the early 1990s, DOD officials recognized that the proliferation of chemical, biological, and nuclear materials that could be used to develop WMD was a growing threat. A series of terrorist attacks highlighted by the 1995 Aum Shinrikyo sarin gas attack in Tokyo’s subway system heightened concerns about U.S. vulnerability to a terrorist attack involving WMD. Senior DOD leaders, supported by a Defense Science Board study, concluded that DOD was not properly organized to focus on nonproliferation and counterproliferation. On October 1, 1998, DTRA was established, with a budget of approximately $1.7 billion and almost 2,000 military and civilian personnel, to address all aspects of the WMD threat. The agency reports to the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, with the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy providing input into several of DTRA’s programs. Additionally, DTRA responds to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff pertaining to the agency’s support of military commanders. Table 1 provides data on DTRA’s budget and personnel since the agency’s inception. DTRA’s budget has increased by over $650 million (about 40 percent) since its establishment, of which over $450 million was due to increases in the funding of the Chemical and Biological Defense Program (CBDP). Total personnel at DTRA also have increased. DTRA is currently headquartered at Fort Belvoir, Virginia; maintains test facilities in the United States; maintains a Defense Nuclear Weapons School in New Mexico; and maintains permanent staff at other locations, including Germany, Japan, and the Russian Federation, as seen in figure 1. DTRA also maintains liaison officers at several locations, including the combatant commanders’ headquarters, the National Guard Bureau, and the Pentagon. DTRA was established in 1998 through the consolidation of three agencies and two programs, as shown in figure 2. The Defense Special Weapons Agency tested, analyzed, and provided assistance in developing new technologies for maintaining and modernizing the nation’s nuclear weapons. The agency also worked to counter the effects of the use of chemical and biological weapons against U.S. military bases and forces. The Defense Technology Security Administration managed the DOD license review process for the export of munitions and critical technologies that have both civilian and military applications. As part of this effort, the Defense Technology Security Administration oversaw U.S. satellites launched abroad. The On-Site Inspection Agency, established as a result of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces treaty, carried out on-site inspections to verify that treaty implementation was done in accordance with all treaty requirements. Throughout the 1990s, the agency’s responsibilities were expanded as new treaties were ratified, and, in 2000, the agency was asked to support the United Nation’s mission to monitor and eliminate WMD in Iraq. The two additional programs included in DTRA’s formation dealt extensively with the threats posed by WMD and related materials. The Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program implemented a congressionally mandated program to assist the nations of the former Soviet Union in securing and eliminating their WMD stockpiles. We have undertaken several reviews of the DTRA-managed CTR program. A list of our reports concerning the CTR program appears at the end of this report. In addition, CBDP was established in 1994 to consolidate, coordinate, and integrate the chemical and biological defense requirements of all the services into a single DOD program. DTRA was given the responsibility to administer the distribution of program funds, but the agency did not directly manage the program. To integrate these components, DTRA began a strategic planning process in January 1999 and published its first strategic plan in March 2000. DTRA used the principles of the Government Performance and Result Act of 1993 (GPRA) to guide its planning process. The act calls for agencies to develop long-term strategic plans, annual performance plans, and annual assessment reports. Also in 2000, DTRA realigned itself around four core functions (1) threat control, (2) threat reduction, (3) combat support (support to military forces), and (4) technology development. Among these core functions, DTRA officials have stressed combat support as its first priority. Three major changes have occurred in the agency’s responsibilities, as illustrated in figure 2. First, in August 2001, responsibility for the export license review process shifted from DTRA to the reestablished Defense Technology Security Administration. According to senior officials, the export license review process did not integrate well with other DTRA functions and was more appropriately placed under the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. Second, in March 2003, DTRA was assigned the mission to support the elimination of WMD materials found in Iraq. Third, in April 2003, DTRA was given the responsibility for managing the CBDP’s science and technology program rather than just overseeing the funds disbursement. DTRA carries out its mission to address the threat posed by WMD through four core functions: (1) threat control, (2) threat reduction, (3) combat support, and (4) technology development. First, the agency controls the threat of WMD through inspections of Russian facilities to ensure compliance with treaties limiting WMD, as well as supporting inspections of U.S. facilities by foreign inspectors. Second, DTRA works to reduce the WMD threat by securing and eliminating WMD materials, such as destroying aircraft and missiles, through the CTR program in the former Soviet Union. Third, DTRA supports military commanders by providing technical and analytical support regarding WMD threats on the battlefield and U.S. installations. Finally, DTRA develops technologies to assist in its threat control and reduction efforts and in the support of military operations, such as developing weapons and sensor technologies to destroy or detect WMD and related materials. Figure 3 provides examples of DTRA activities in each of these areas. DTRA implements U.S. responsibilities established under four arms control treaties dealing with WMD and other treaties and agreements. DTRA conducts on-site inspections at other nations’ WMD facilities and supports on-site inspections of U.S. facilities by foreign inspectors. These inspections are carried out in accordance with agreements between the U.S. and other governments. The agency provides inspectors, transportation, and linguists in support of inspection efforts, and also provides visa and passport support for visiting inspection teams. Table 2 shows nine treaties and agreements and DTRA’s role in each. DTRA works to reduce the threat of WMD primarily through its activities with the CTR program, which assists the states of the former Soviet Union to (1) destroy WMD in the former Soviet Union, (2) safely store and transport weapons in connection with their destruction, and (3) reduce the risk of the WMD proliferation. Our previous reviews of the CTR program have found that it has faced two critical challenges: the Russian government has not always paid its agreed-upon share of program costs, and Russian ministries have often denied U.S. officials access to key nuclear and biological sites (see the list of prior GAO reports at the end of this report). In addition to the CTR program, DTRA was recently tasked to secure and destroy any WMD or related materials that might be found in Iraq. The CTR program has removed nuclear weapons from Kazakhstan, Ukraine, and Belarus inherited from the former Soviet Union, and the United States continues to work with Russia and other former Soviet states in WMD elimination programs. According to agency documents, the CTR program had, as of October 31, 2003, overseen the destruction of 520 of 1,473 intercontinental ballistic missiles, 451 of 831 missile silos, 122 of 205 strategic bombers, and 27 of 48 strategic missile submarines that the United States and former Soviet Union agreed to destroy. WMD destruction programs continue with CTR overseeing projects to eliminate missile fuel and launcher equipment. DTRA personnel have also supervised the securing of chemical weapons and are overseeing the construction of a chemical weapons destruction facility at Shchuch’ye, Russia. DTRA also assists with the storing and transporting of WMD materials as part of the CTR program. For example, DTRA is overseeing the construction of a facility that will be used to securely store nuclear materials from weapons at Mayak, Russia. This project, however, has suffered from both a lack of committed Russian funding and access to the site. As a result, the project, once scheduled to begin accepting nuclear materials for storage in 1998, will not begin to do so until 2004. Additionally, DTRA works through the CTR program to enhance the security and safety of biological pathogens located at research centers in the former Soviet Union, such as at Novosibirsk and Obolensk. However, lack of Russian cooperation has affected DTRA’s ability to access other suspected biological facilities, and, after 4 years of effort, DOD has made little progress in addressing security concerns at the 49 biological sites where Russia and the United States have collaborative programs. DTRA works to prevent the spread of WMD through continuing contacts with former Soviet Union military personnel and providing expertise and equipment to the countries of the former Soviet Union to enhance border security. According to agency documents, in fiscal year 2002, the CTR program sponsored 423 contacts with former Soviet Union military personnel in support of various efforts to halt the spread of WMD. In March 2003, DTRA was also assigned the responsibility of destroying any WMD materials found in Iraq. Agency personnel accompanied combat forces into Iraq during Operation Iraqi Freedom. For example, DTRA teams were involved in searching the Tuwaitha Nuclear Research Center to recover, inventory, and safeguard several tons of non-weapons-grade uranium and other radiological materials. DTRA personnel remain in Iraq and continue to support efforts to search for WMD and WMD-related materials. If WMD are found, DTRA personnel would have the responsibility for securing and eliminating them. DTRA provides a wide variety of support to military commanders in their efforts to address WMD threats. DTRA provides liaison officers to assist military commanders in their planning and conduct of military operations. For example, DTRA personnel assisted military commanders during the recent conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq by providing information on the appropriate weapons to use on suspected WMD storage sites, how to counter the effects of WMD that might be used on coalition forces, and how to secure and dispose of any WMD or WMD-related materials that might be found. DTRA also developed a handbook used by troops in Iraq for how to recognize and handle WMD and WMD-related materials. In addition, these efforts are supported by DTRA’s operations center, which responds to WMD-related requests for expertise, computer modeling of potential events, and support for training exercises. DTRA teams evaluate the security of personnel and facilities worldwide and assess the survivability of specific infrastructure crucial to maintaining command and control of U.S. forces. According to agency documents, DTRA evaluates 80 to 100 DOD installations per year through Joint Staff Integrated Vulnerability Assessments, which are broad in scope and focus on the overall safety and security of personnel. For example, agency teams assess physical security plans, review architectural and structural drawings, and perform analyses of potential blast effects to recommend procedural, structural, or other enhancements to reduce vulnerabilities. These assessments were instituted in the aftermath of (1) the Khobar Towers bombing in 1996 and (2) the publication of a subsequent DOD report in 1997 that determined there were no published standards for securing personnel and facilities. In addition, DTRA conducts Balanced Survivability Assessments to evaluate specific U.S. and allied infrastructure crucial in maintaining command and control of all U.S. forces. These assessments evaluate the ability of power, heating, computer, and communications systems to continue functioning in the event of a WMD attack, accident or natural disaster, technological failure, or sabotage. According to agency officials, DTRA teams conduct an average of 8 Balanced Survivability Assessments per year, but that number rose temporarily to 30 to meet additional requirements. DTRA provides additional support to military commanders through the Defense Nuclear Weapons School and Consequence Management Advisory Teams (CMAT). DTRA operates the Defense Nuclear Weapons School in Albuquerque, New Mexico, to train military and civilian personnel in various aspects of WMD. The school originally focused on training military personnel in the aspects of U.S. nuclear weapons and their effects. The school now includes other areas of the WMD threat, such as addressing the civil and military responses to radiological, chemical, and biological attacks or accidents and preventing the spread of WMD. Additionally, DTRA maintains and deploys teams to deal with the effects of WMD use. The agency has CMATs whose purpose is to mitigate the effects of WMD use or accidents. CMATs also work with military and civilian authorities by conducting training exercises that simulate the effects of WMD use or accidents in the United States and overseas. To assist in WMD threat control activities, DTRA has developed technologies that detect WMD. For example, the agency has been developing sensors to help countries of the former Soviet Union prevent smuggling of WMD or WMD-related materials across borders. DTRA has also developed computer-tracking systems to help member countries comply with the reporting obligations stated in treaties and other agreements. The agency also works to develop ways to protect military equipment and personnel from WMD effects and manages and operates various technology testing facilities, such as facilities that simulate the effects of electromagnetic energy or radiation on military equipment in the event a nuclear weapon is detonated. Additionally, DTRA has also developed software to model nuclear, chemical, and biological attacks or accidents. DTRA does not have its own laboratories. Rather, the agency uses existing institutions, such as the service laboratories (Departments of the Army, Navy, and Air Force), and national laboratories as well as academic institutions. For example, in response to the military requirement for a specialized weapon to bomb caves and tunnels in Afghanistan, DTRA organized a team that employed products and expertise from the Navy, Air Force, Energy, and industry, which allowed DTRA to develop, test, and deploy a weapon that could be used to attack cave and tunnel targets. DTRA has also worked to develop specialized incendiary devices that would destroy WMD material held in a storage facility. To support DTRA’s efforts to address the WMD threat, the agency’s Advanced Systems Concepts Office (ASCO) works to address ways to identify, anticipate, and address technology gaps to improve agency capabilities. For example, ASCO personnel with scientific expertise work to analyze the potential threat to military forces of pathogens such as bubonic plague, E. coli, and Ebola. DTRA also has overseen a project to test the ability of military facilities to protect against and recover from the consequences of chemical and biological attacks. From 2001 to 2003, DTRA and other military personnel undertook a series of exercises, technology demonstrations, and assessments at the U.S. Air Force base at Osan, Korea, to determine different ways to defend military forces and facilities against chemical and biological attacks. As the DOD agency responsible for addressing all aspects of WMD threats, DTRA possesses specialized capabilities and services that can assist civilian entities, including Energy and DHS. DTRA has a formal relationship with Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) that coordinates and supports legislatively mandated joint DOD- Energy responsibilities for the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile. DTRA also works with NNSA to secure nuclear materials in Russia. DTRA works with DHS offices on programs related to WMD issues, such as the International Counterproliferation Program and crisis response exercises. DTRA’s interface with DHS is through DOD’s newly established Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense. DTRA’s relationship with DHS may be subject to change as the broader DOD-DHS relationship evolves. In addition to its relations with NNSA and DHS, DTRA also works with and supports other federal agencies, state and local governments, and governments with which the United States has bilateral agreements. DTRA works closely with Energy’s NNSA in matters pertaining to the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile. This relationship has its roots in the 1946 Atomic Energy Act, which establishes joint DOD and NNSA responsibility for the U.S. nuclear weapons program, including ensuring the safety, security, and control of the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile. These activities are conducted through the Nuclear Weapons Council (NWC), the senior-level body dedicated to these activities. DTRA plays an active role in all activities of the NWC, from participating as an observer on the NWC to membership on its subordinate bodies. In addition, both DTRA and NNSA are responsible for providing the working staff for the NWC. DTRA also works with NNSA on various nuclear weapons issues associated with the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile stewardship program, such as nuclear surviviability, nuclear surety, and nuclear weapons effects. According to both DTRA and NNSA officials, coordination between DTRA and NNSA on activities related to these issues takes place at various levels, such as serving on committees and working groups, cooperating on research, and participating on various ad hoc working groups. For example, DTRA and NNSA are currently engaged in a joint study to understand nuclear weapons effects and develop simulation techniques to address survivability of U.S. weapons systems in nuclear environments. DTRA also works with Energy to implement various agreements, research projects, and training and exercises. According to DOD documents, DTRA works with Energy on a variety of agreements related to nuclear weapons, including the Plutonium Production Reactor Agreement, the Plutonium Disposition Agreement, and the Threshold Test Ban Treaty. In addition, DTRA works with Energy laboratories on joint research projects, working groups, and field tests. For example, DTRA is currently working with the laboratories on the development of DOD’s unconventional nuclear warfare defense program, which is developing tools for detecting an unconventionally delivered nuclear or radiological weapon. DTRA and Energy work on programs to secure nuclear warheads in Russia, but, as we reported in March 2003, these efforts face several coordination issues, such as deciding which agency will secure sites identified in both of their plans and coordinating the type of equipment used and guard force training. DTRA worked and continues to work with several government entities that are now part of DHS. For example, DTRA works with the U.S. Customs Service on the congressionally mandated International Counterproliferation Program, which is designed to prevent the illicit movement of WMD material, technology, and expertise. As the executive agent, DTRA implements this program in cooperation with the U.S. Customs Service and the Federal Bureau of Investigation. DTRA works with these two agencies to develop courses and training exercises that provide training and equipment to customs, border guards, and law enforcement personnel in 25 countries of the former Soviet Union, the Baltic region, and Eastern Europe. DTRA also works with DHS on joint exercises and interagency working groups. For example, DTRA, DHS, and Energy recently sponsored and participated in a joint atmospheric dispersion study in Oklahoma City. According to documentation, the study conducted a series of experiments to evaluate current outdoor atmospheric dispersion models and to advance the knowledge of the dispersion of contaminants in urban environments and building interiors. In addition, DTRA participates with DHS entities in interagency working groups that address issues of homeland security and preparedness. According to DTRA officials, the agency is working to share information and experiences with DHS for homeland security applications. For example, DTRA has shared with DHS information regarding its experience on demonstrations conducted as part of the unconventional nuclear warfare defense program. In addition, DTRA has also shared with DHS the WMD crisis decision guides that it developed for DOD. These guides provide response plans for various WMD scenarios. According to DTRA officials, DHS used the response plans for WMD scenarios that are outlined in these crisis decision guides to develop its own WMD response plans. The Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense, within the Office of the Secretary of Defense, was recently established as the focal point for DOD’s interaction with DHS and the interagency community for homeland security issues. This newly established office is responsible for ensuring internal coordination of DOD policy direction and for coordinating activities with DHS. Therefore, the coordination of all new activities, programs, and assistance related to the threat of WMD that involve DTRA and DHS is the responsibility of this office. DTRA’s relationship with DHS is subject to the broader DOD-DHS relationship and therefore may change. The new relationship between DOD and DHS itself is still evolving because the roles and responsibilities of the two departments are still under development. DTRA has provided various capabilities and services, such as vulnerability assessments and first-responder training programs to civilian government entities. DTRA’s capabilities for conducting vulnerability assessments are used to perform vulnerability assessments of civilian facilities and personnel. After the events of September 11, 2001, DTRA was called upon to complete vulnerability assessments of several federal buildings, such as the U.S. Capitol Building and U.S. Supreme Court, as well as vulnerability assessments of commercial U.S. ports. DTRA shares its capabilities and expertise by providing training programs to civilian entities. For example, the agency provides training to the National Guard for performing vulnerability assessment of infrastructure. DTRA also provides WMD and first-responder awareness training to state and local government entities. In addition, DTRA provides informational support—ranging from modeling to subject matter expertise—to civilian government entities and bilateral partners through the services of its operations center. For example, the operations center modeled the potential spread of contamination resulting from a chemical spill of a derailed train by using the agency’s software for chemical weapon attack models. Finally, DTRA’s expertise is also shared with governments with which the United States has bilateral agreements. For example, according to senior DTRA officials, the WMD handbooks developed by DTRA were provided to allied forces supporting U.S. efforts in Iraq, and DTRA has conducted vulnerability assessments for allies. Finally, DTRA is also involved in interagency programs that address issues related to WMD threats. For example, DTRA supports the integration of the DOD Technical Support Working Group that conducts a national interagency response and development program for combating terrorism. Participants in this program include DOD, Energy, State, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the Federal Aviation Administration. DTRA uses a strategic planning process, guided by the principles of GPRA, to prioritize its resources and assess its progress. It has developed strategic plans identifying long-term goals and short-term objectives by which it measures progress in meeting its goals. These objectives are affected by funding that comes from several appropriations, some of which must be spent on specific activities, such as the funding for the CTR program. Both the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Office of the Secretary of Defense assess DTRA every 2 years. In 2002, DTRA completed its first internal self-assessment, which it intends to do annually. We found that the performance report resulting from the self-assessment summarized the agency’s accomplishments and activities but did not assess its progress against established annual performance goals. DTRA has incorporated GPRA principles in its planning process. Under GPRA, agencies should prepare 5-year strategic plans that set the general direction for their efforts. These plans should include comprehensive mission statements, general and outcome-related goals, descriptions of how those goals will be achieved, identification of external factors that could affect progress, and a description of how performance will be evaluated. Agencies should then prepare annual performance plans that establish connections between the long-term goals in the strategic plans with the day-to-day activities of program managers and staff. These plans should include measurable goals and objectives to be achieved by a program activity, descriptions of the resources needed to meet these goals, and a description of the methods used to verify and validate measured values. Finally, GPRA requires that the agency report annually on the extent to which it is meeting its goals and the actions needed to achieve or modify those goals that were not met. DTRA’s current strategic plan, issued in 2003, contains most of the elements in a strategic plan developed using GPRA standards. This plan lays out the agency’s five goals, which serve as the basis of its individual units’ annual performance plans: (1) deter the use and reduce the impact of WMD, (2) reduce the present threat, (3) prepare for future threats, (4) conduct the right programs in the best manner, and (5) develop people and enable them to succeed. These long-term goals are further broken down into four or five objectives, each with 6 to 17 measurable tasks under each objective. These tasks have projected completion dates and identify the DTRA unit responsible for the specific task. For example, under the goal “deter the use and reduce the impact of WMD” is the objective “support the nuclear force.” A measurable task under this objective is to work with Energy to develop support plans for potential resumption of underground nuclear weapons effects testing. The technology development unit in DTRA is expected to complete this task by the 4th quarter of fiscal year 2004. The strategic plan does not discuss external factors that could affect goal achievement, but it does have a discussion of how performance will be measured externally, by other DOD components, and internally through an annual performance report. Each unit within DTRA develops its own annual performance plan that identifies the activities to be completed each year with available funding. These plans do not use the same format, but they all include goals, performance measures by which to measure achievement of those goals, and a link to the strategic plan to show how they support the long-term goals of the agency. DTRA’s leadership discusses each unit’s plan to validate the prioritization of resources and establish the unit’s priorities. DTRA’s annual performance plan consists of these units’ plans and detailed budget annexes. DOD guidance now requires DTRA to submit a consolidated annual performance plan to the DOD comptroller to facilitate DOD’s GPRA reporting. DTRA is in the process of making the unit plans more consistent for fiscal year 2004. Most of DTRA’s funding is appropriated only for specific programs over which it has various levels of control. First, it administers the funding for CBDP. Second, it receives money that Congress provides solely for the CTR program that DTRA is in charge of managing with congressional direction. Third, it receives funding that it can spend according to its own priorities, while meeting certain mission requirements, such as treaty implementation work. Fourth, it receives reimbursements from other federal entities for some activities, such as vulnerability assessments conducted for non-DOD agencies. Figure 4 shows the funding profile for DTRA in fiscal year 2004. Chemical Biological Defense Program (CBDP) Funds to DTRA from Department of Defense Cooperative Threat Reduction Program (fenced off funding) As shown in figure 4, DTRA’s administration of CBDP includes funds that it uses, distributes, and manages. DTRA uses a portion of the CBDP funds for large-scale technology demonstration projects, such as a project that focused on restoring operations at bases attacked by chemical or biological agents. The agency distributes a large portion of the CBDP funds to others for various purposes, such as procuring chemical suits for the military forces. Recently, in April 2003, DTRA was given the responsibility for managing the CBDP’s Science and Technology projects, which are conducted by various laboratories and research institutes throughout the country. DTRA undergoes two DOD reviews—the Biennial Defense Review commissioned by the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Combat Support Agency Review conducted for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. These reviews focus on how well DTRA meets its customers’ requirements as a combat support agency. Overall, these two reviews have concluded that DTRA supports the requirements of the operating military forces and provides useful products and services. The most recent biennial review was issued December 2002. DTRA was assessed on its combat support, technology development, and threat reduction and control efforts. DTRA’s efforts at threat reduction and control received high satisfaction ratings from the customers surveyed. The agency received acceptable satisfaction ratings in combat support but had below average ratings in the area of technology development. In 2001, the Combat Support Agency Review Team conducted an assessment of DTRA’s responsiveness and readiness to support operating forces in the event of war or threat to national security. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is required by law to conduct assessments of all combat support agencies every 2 years. The review team went to the commands supported by DTRA and conducted extensive interviewing and fieldwork regarding the support provided by DTRA. In the 2001 assessment, DTRA was commended for significant improvements in customer orientation and combat support focus. DTRA was found to be ready to support the requirements of the operating forces. A major finding in the assessment concerned DTRA’s ongoing work on decontamination standards for airbases and strategic air and sealift assets. The study acknowledged that DTRA was supporting the development of these standards, but, as DOD’s center of WMD expertise, it needs to provide commanders with the best possible information currently available, rather than wait until all studies have been completed. A Combat Support Agency Review Team official stated that DTRA has addressed the findings of the 2001 assessment, and that the 2003 assessment was delayed by operations in Iraq but should be released in early 2004. As part of the GPRA process, DTRA produced its first annual performance assessment in 2002. GPRA requires that agencies report on the extent to which they are meeting their annual performance goals and the actions needed to achieve or modify the goals that have not been met. DTRA’s performance report did not compare the agency’s achievements to its goals, discuss the areas where DTRA fell short of its goals, or discuss DTRA’s plans to address goals that it did not achieve. For example, in the threat control area, the agency discussed the number of missions conducted and the equipment provided under the International Counterproliferation Program without stating the program’s goals. In the threat reduction area, the report discussed the number of weapons systems eliminated in the former Soviet Union and other achievements, such as implementing security measures over chemical stockpiles at two sites, again, without discussing the goals of the program. In the area of combat support, the report discussed the number of vulnerability and survivability assessments, training exercises of all types, and number of training courses provided, but does not discuss how many of each were planned. Finally, in the technology development area, the report discussed several technologies developed or under development but does not discuss the agency’s plans for the year. See figure 5 for a comparison of what is expected in an annual performance report and what DTRA’s report contained. Although this information is not in DTRA’s performance report, we found that DTRA leadership meets quarterly to assess progress in meeting each unit’s goals and discuss activities that are not on track. Further, DTRA leadership discusses what needs to be done to get on track and whether goals are unrealistic or not within its control. For example, according to agency officials, they have in the past transferred funding from CTR programs that were having problems into successful CTR programs to prevent those funds from being lost because congressionally provided funds must be spent within a certain time frame. When DTRA was established in 1998, it modeled its strategic planning process on GPRA to prioritize resources and assess progress toward its organizational goals. Although DTRA officials do measure progress against these goals in quarterly reviews, the agency’s performance report does not capture the findings from these reviews. The performance report does not compare accomplishments and activities with established goals and objectives, nor does it explain what actions are needed to achieve or modify goals that are not met. Providing this information would allow decision makers outside of DTRA to have better information regarding DTRA’s performance. We recommend that the Director of DTRA improve the agency’s annual performance report by comparing the agency’s actual performance against planned goals and, where appropriate, explaining why the goals were not met and the agency’s plan for addressing these unmet goals in the future. DTRA provided written comments on a draft of this report, which are reproduced in appendix I. In these comments, DTRA concurred with our recommendation to improve DTRA’s annual performance report by including a comparison of the agency’s actual performance against planned goals and, where appropriate, explain why goals were not met, and the agency’s plan for addressing these unmet goals in the future. DTRA stated that it is refining its performance report methodology to better address the linkage of reported performance to planned goals and future efforts. DTRA also separately provided technical comments that we discussed with relevant officials and included in the text of the report where appropriate. To report on DTRA’s mission and the efforts it undertakes to fulfill that mission, we reviewed agency documentation. Specifically, we reviewed historical documents, including documentation of interviews of the DOD senior officials responsible for the creation of DTRA, and other agency mission documentation. We relied on our prior work that reviewed specific DTRA projects. In addition, we interviewed DTRA officials, including the agency’s Director, senior leadership from each of DTRA’s units responsible for the agency’s mission, other DTRA staff, and DTRA contractor personnel. Finally, we attended a 3-day DTRA liaison officer training class to learn how DTRA trains its liaison officers about the variety of capabilities and services it can offer to military forces in the field. We did not assess the effectiveness of DTRA’s programs. To discuss DTRA’s relationship with other government entities, we reviewed the agency’s documentation of programs and activities that it undertakes with other government entities. We reviewed documents provided by DTRA and NNSA staff regarding NWC responsibilities. In addition, we interviewed DTRA, DOD, Energy, and NNSA officials about DTRA’s coordination with Energy and NNSA. We relied on documentation and discussions with DOD officials regarding the nature of DTRA’s relationship with DHS. We also relied upon our previous audits reviewing DHS and DOD to ascertain the nature of the relationship. To determine how DTRA prioritizes its resources to meet its mission objectives, we reviewed DTRA’s 2000, 2001, and 2003 strategic plans. We reviewed supporting documentation, including budget documents, program and project plans, and internal and external assessments of DTRA. Specifically, we compared DTRA’s strategic plan, each unit’s annual performance plans for fiscal years 2002 and 2003, and documentation on the units’ ongoing assessments of their activities with what we have reported should be found in GPRA-based documents. We met with DTRA officials to discuss the agency’s planning and review process and with officials from the Office of the Secretary of Defense to discuss their assessments of DTRA. We also relied on related prior GAO reports. We performed our review from April 2003 to December 2003 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. We are sending copies of this report to other interested congressional committees, the Secretary of Defense, and the Director of the Defense Threat Reduction Agency. We will also make copies available to others upon request. In addition, this report will be available at no cost on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov. Please contact me at (202) 512-8979 if you or your staff have any questions about this report. Key contributors to this report were F. James Shafer, Hynek Kalkus, Monica Brym, Tim Wilson, Etana Finkler, Lynn Cothern, Martin de Alteriis, and Ernie Jackson. Cooperative Threat Reduction Program Annual Report. GAO-03-1008R. Washington, D.C.: July 18, 2003. Cooperative Threat Reduction Program Annual Report. GAO-03-627R. Washington, D.C.: April 8, 2003. Weapons of Mass Destruction: Additional Russian Cooperation Needed to Facilitate U.S. Efforts to Improve Security at Russian Sites. GAO-03-482. Washington, D.C.: March 24, 2003. Weapons of Mass Destruction: Observations on U.S. Threat Reduction and Nonproliferation Programs in Russia. GAO-03-526T. Washington, D.C.: March 5, 2003. Cooperative Threat Reduction Program Annual Report. GAO-03-341R. Washington, D.C.: December 2, 2002. Nuclear Nonproliferation: U.S. Efforts to Help Other Countries Combat Nuclear Smuggling Need Strengthened Coordination and Planning. GAO- 02-426. Washington, D.C.: May 16, 2002. Cooperative Threat Reduction: DOD Has Adequate Oversight of Assistance, but Procedural Limitations Remain. GAO-01-694. Washington, D.C.: June 19, 2001. Biological Weapons: Effort to Reduce Former Soviet Threat Offers Benefits, Poses New Risks. GAO/NSIAD-00-138. Washington, D.C.: April 28, 2000. Weapons of Mass Destruction: Some U.S. Assistance to Redirect Russian Scientists Taxed by Russia. GAO/NSIAD-00-154R. Washington, D.C.: April 28, 2000. Cooperative Threat Reduction: DOD's 1997-98 Reports on Accounting for Assistance Were Late and Incomplete. GAO/NSIAD-00-40. Washington, D.C.: March 15, 2000. Weapons of Mass Destruction: U.S. Efforts to Reduce the Threats from the Former Soviet Union. GAO/T-NSIAD/RCED-00-119. Washington, D.C.: March 6, 2000. Weapons of Mass Destruction: Effort to Reduce Russian Arsenals May Cost More, Achieve Less Than Planned. GAO/NSIAD-99-76. Washington, D.C.: April 13, 1999. Cooperative Threat Reduction: Review of DOD's June 1997 Report on Assistance Provided. GAO/NSIAD-97-218. Washington, D.C.: September 5, 1997. Cooperative Threat Reduction: Status of Defense Conversion Efforts in the Former Soviet Union. GAO/NSIAD-97-101. Washington, D.C.: April 11, 1997. Weapons of Mass Destruction: DOD Reporting on Cooperative Threat Assistance Has Improved. GAO/NSIAD-97-84. Washington, D.C.: February 27, 1997. Weapons of Mass Destruction: Status of the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program. GAO/NSIAD-96-222. Washington, D.C.: September 27, 1996. Nuclear Nonproliferation: U.S. Efforts to Help Newly Independent States Improve Their Nuclear Material Controls. GAO/T-NSIAD/RCED-96-118. Washington, D.C.: March 13, 1996. Nuclear Nonproliferation: Status of U.S Efforts to Improve Nuclear Material Controls in Newly Independent States. GAO/NSIAD/RCED-96-89. Washington, D.C.: March 8, 1996. Weapons of Mass Destruction: DOD Reporting on Cooperative Threat Reduction Assistance Can Be Improved. GAO/NSIAD-95-191. Washington, D.C.: September 29, 1995. Weapons of Mass Destruction: Reducing the Threat from the Former Soviet Union-An Update. GAO/NSIAD-95-165. Washington, D.C.: June 17, 1995. Weapons of Mass Destruction: Reducing the Threat from the Former Soviet Union. GAO/NSIAD-95-7. Washington, D.C.: October 6, 1994. Soviet Nuclear Weapons: U.S. Efforts to Help Former Soviet Republics Secure and Destroy Weapons. GAO/T-NSIAD-93-5. Washington, D.C.: March 9, 1993. Soviet Nuclear Weapons: Priorities and Costs Associated with U.S. Dismantlement Assistance. GAO/NSIAD-93-154. Washington, D.C.: March 8, 1993. Russian Nuclear Weapons: U.S. Implementation of the Soviet Nuclear Threat Reduction Act of 1991. GAO/T-NSIAD-92-47. Washington, D.C.: July 27, 1992. The General Accounting Office, the audit, evaluation and investigative arm of Congress, exists to support Congress in meeting its constitutional responsibilities and to help improve the performance and accountability of the federal government for the American people. GAO examines the use of public funds; evaluates federal programs and policies; and provides analyses, recommendations, and other assistance to help Congress make informed oversight, policy, and funding decisions. 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Summary: The Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA), within the Department of Defense (DOD), plays a key role in addressing the threats posed by weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Since the September 11, 2001, attacks, the visibility of DTRA's role has increased as federal agencies and military commanders have looked to the agency for additional support and advice. GAO was asked to report on DTRA's (1) mission and the efforts it undertakes to fulfill this mission; (2) relationship with other government entities, specifically the Department of Energy and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS); and (3) process that it uses to prioritize resources and assess progress toward organizational goals. Since its establishment in 1998, DTRA has worked to address the threat of WMD. DTRA addresses WMD threats through four core functions: threat control, threat reduction, combat support, and technology development. The agency supports the implementation of arms control treaties by conducting inspections in other countries and by supporting inspections of U.S. facilities, reduces the threat of WMD by eliminating and securing weapons and materials in the former Soviet Union, supports military commanders by providing technical and analytical support regarding WMD, and develops technologies that support efforts to address the WMD threat. DTRA also uses its specialized capabilities and services in various ways to support other government efforts to address WMD threats. DTRA has a formal relationship with Energy to maintain the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile. DTRA's relationship with DHS is subject to the broader DOD-DHS relationship and may change as the relationship between DOD and DHS evolves. The agency uses a strategic planning process modeled on the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 (GPRA) to prioritize its resources and assess progress toward its organizational goals. DTRA's planning process identifies long-term goals, establishes short-term objectives by which to measure progress in meeting goals, and collects data to assess progress. DTRA's planning process is influenced by funding, most of which is appropriated for specific programs. GAO found that the performance report resulting from its internal review summarized DTRA's accomplishments and activities but did not compare them with established goals and objectives nor explain the actions needed to achieve or modify these unmet goals as called for under GPRA.