The Federal Aviation Administration’s (FAA) mission is to promote the safe, efficient, and expeditious flow of air traffic in the U.S. airspace system, commonly referred to as the National Airspace System (NAS). To accomplish its mission, FAA provides services 24 hours a day, 365 days a year, through its air traffic control (ATC) system—the principal component of the NAS. Predicted growth in air traffic and aging equipment led FAA to initiate a multibillion-dollar modernization effort in 1981 to increase the safety, capacity, and efficiency of the system. However, over the past 17 years, FAA’s modernization program has experienced substantial cost overruns, lengthy schedule delays, and significant performance shortfalls. Consequently, many of the benefits anticipated from the modernization program—new facilities, equipment, and procedures—have not been realized, and the efficiency of air traffic control operations has been limited. In addition, the expected growth in air traffic will place added strains on the system’s capacity. To get the modernization effort back on track and thereby address the limitations of the present system and meet the growing demand for increasing its capacity, FAA—in consultation with the aviation community—is developing plans to implement a phased approach to modernization, including a new concept of air traffic management known as “free flight.” To enable free flight, FAA intends to introduce a host of new technologies and procedures that will allow the agency to gradually move from its present system of air traffic control, which relies heavily on rules, procedures, and tight control over aircraft operations, to a more collaborative system of air traffic management. Under such a system, users would have more flexibility to select optimal flight paths, whose use would lower costs, improve safety, and help accommodate future growth in air traffic through the more efficient use of airspace and airport resources. Implementing this new air traffic management system will require FAA to introduce new technologies and procedures. FAA plans to test other new technologies and procedures through an initiative called Flight 2000 (now the Free Flight Operational Enhancement Program). FAA’s air traffic controllers direct aircraft through the NAS. Automated information-processing and display, communication, navigation, surveillance, and weather equipment allow air traffic controllers to see the location of aircraft, aircraft flight plans, and prevailing weather conditions, as well as to communicate with pilots. FAA controllers are primarily located in three types of facilities: air traffic control towers, terminal area facilities, and en route centers. The functions of each type of facility are described below. • Airport towers control the flow of aircraft—before landing, on the ground, and after take-off—within 5 nautical miles of the airport and up to 3,000 feet above the airport. A combination of technological and visual surveillance is used by air traffic controllers to direct departures and approaches, as well as to communicate instructions and weather-related information to pilots. • Terminal area facilities—known as Terminal Radar Approach Control (TRACON) facilities—sequence and separate aircraft as they approach and leave busy airports, beginning about 5 nautical miles and extending to about 50 nautical miles from the airport and up to 10,000 feet above the ground. • Air Route Traffic Control Centers (ARTCC)—or en route centers—control planes in transit over the continental United States and during approaches to some airports. Planes are controlled through regions of airspace by en route centers responsible for the regions. Control is passed from one en route center to another as a plane moves across a region until it reaches TRACON airspace. Most of the en route centers’ controlled airspace extends above 18,000 feet for commercial aircraft. En route centers also handle lower altitudes when dealing directly with a tower or after agreeing with a terminal facility. Aircraft over the ocean are handled by en route centers in Oakland and New York. Beyond the radars’ sight, controllers must rely on periodic radio communications through a third party—Aeronautical Radio Incorporated (ARINC), a private organization funded by the airlines and FAA to operate radio stations—to determine aircraft locations. • Flight Service Stations provide weather and flight plan services, primarily for general aviation pilots. See figure 1.1 for a visual summary of air traffic control over the continental United States and oceans. FAA will continue to operate en route, terminal, and tower facilities under the new air traffic management system; controllers in these facilities will be able to manage flight operations more collaboratively through the use of new decision support tools. For example, two new traffic management tools will allow en route and terminal controllers to better sequence aircraft as they move into the terminal environment—potentially increasing the system’s safety and efficiency. Free flight is a new way of managing air traffic that is designed to enhance the safety, capacity, and efficiency of the NAS. Under this new management system, air traffic control is expected to move gradually from a highly structured system based on elaborate rules and procedures to a more flexible system that allows pilots, within limits, to change their route, speed, and altitude, notifying the air traffic controller of the new route. In contrast, under the present system, while flight plans are developed in conjunction with air traffic control personnel, aircraft are required to fly along specific routes with minimal deviation. When deviations from designated routes are allowed—to, for example, avoid severe weather—they must be pre-approved by an air traffic controller. Under free flight, despite the availability of flexibilities to pilots, the ultimate decision-making authority for air traffic operations will continue to reside with controllers. While FAA and the aviation community have recently increased their efforts to implement free flight, the concept of free flight—allowing pilots to fly more optimal routes—is not new. In fact, the idea has been around for decades. With the development of navigation technology in the 1970s that allowed aircraft to fly directly from origin to destination without following fixed air routes (highways in the sky), the possibility of providing pilots with flexibility in choosing routes became viable. However, until recently, movement to develop the procedures and decision support systems needed to fully use this type of point-to-point navigation has been slow. In the last several years, because of the need to meet demands for increasing the system’s capacity and efficiency, FAA and aviation system users and their major trade organizations, representatives of air traffic control personnel, equipment manufacturers, the Department of Defense (DOD), and others (collectively referred to as stakeholders) have been working on plans to accelerate the implementation of free flight. To enable this new system of air traffic management, FAA plans to introduce a range of new technologies and procedures that will give pilots and controllers more precise information about the location of aircraft. This information will eventually allow for the distances between aircraft to be safely reduced—in turn, allowing more aircraft to operate in the system. For example, a new tool planned for use primarily in the en route environment will give controllers better information about the location of aircraft so that they can detect and resolve potential conflicts sooner than they can using current technology. Similarly, pilots will have more precise information about the location of their aircraft in relation to other aircraft. The use of these technologies will help to improve the system’s safety and capacity. While free flight will provide pilots with more flexibility, different situations will dictate its use. For instance, in clear, uncrowded skies, pilots may be able to use free flight fully, but some restrictions may be necessary during bad weather or in highly congested areas. “a safe and efficient flight operating capability under instrument flight rules in which the operators have the freedom to select their path and speed in real time. Air traffic restrictions are only imposed to ensure separation, to preclude exceeding airport capacity, to prevent unauthorized flight through Special Use Airspace (SUA), and to ensure safety of flight. Restrictions are limited in extent and duration to correct the identified problem. Any activity which removes restrictions represents a move toward Free Flight.” Stakeholders generally agree with the above broad concept—especially the idea that any activity that removes restrictions represents a move toward free flight. However, because users have different priorities based on their use of the system, they have different ideas about how best to implement this concept. RTCA has found that the implementation of free flight will affect a wide range of users—from part-time pilots to major airlines—depending on the operating environment. For example, in the en route environment, users will be allowed to fly more optimal routes between airports, thus saving time and money. In addition, under certain conditions, these users may be allowed to safely reduce the distance between themselves and other aircraft. Similarly, in airspace between 5 and 50 miles from the airport, the improved sequencing of traffic for approaches and landings will provide the potential for users to operate more efficiently than under the present system. Improved sequencing is expected to increase the number of aircraft that can safely operate in this environment at a given time. In addition, improved information sharing between pilots and controllers on the location of aircraft on an airport’s surface, for example, is expected to allow for better use of the airport’s surface capacity (such as runways and gates). Efficient use of this limited capacity is key to allowing users to maximize the benefits of operations under free flight. In light of FAA’s current efforts to replace its aging infrastructure and keep pace with increasing demands for air traffic services through the new system of air traffic management known as free flight, the chairmen and ranking minority members of the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation and its Subcommittee on Aviation asked us to monitor the implementation of FAA’s efforts and provide them with a series of reports. This initial report provides (1) an overview of FAA’s progress to date in implementing free flight, including Flight 2000 (now the Free Flight Operational Enhancement Program), and (2) the views of the aviation community and FAA on the challenges that must be met to implement free flight cost-effectively. To address the first objective, we met with key FAA officials responsible for the programs involved in the agency’s free flight implementation efforts to gain a better understanding of how FAA is coordinating the agencywide and program-specific elements of free flight. The issues discussed with these officials included (1) the definition/philosophy of free flight; (2) details on key agencywide and program-specific initiatives, such as Flight 2000 (now the Free Flight Operational Enhancement Program); and (3) the status of the agency’s efforts to develop, deploy, and integrate new technologies; mitigate risk; develop metrics; collaborate with other FAA program offices and stakeholders; improve certification procedures; develop cost/benefit analyses; and gain buy-in to free flight implementation efforts among FAA staff and the aviation community. We discussed these same issues with a broad range of stakeholders to get their views on the agency’s progress to date in implementing free flight. These stakeholders, who have collaborated with FAA to implement free flight, included representatives of RTCA, trade organizations (such as the Air Transport Association, Airports Council International, Regional Airline Association, National Business Aircraft Association, and Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association), employee unions (including the National Air Traffic Controllers Association, Air Line Pilots Association, and Professional Airways Systems Specialists), DOD, academic institutions (Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) and University of Illinois, Champaign) and research and contracting organizations (MIT Lincoln Laboratory, Department of Transportation/Volpe Center, National Aeronautics and Space Administration, and MITRE), major airlines, cargo carriers, and aircraft and avionics manufacturers. In addressing the second objective, we asked the same FAA officials and stakeholders to identify the key challenges that must be met for free flight to be implemented cost-effectively. As part of our review for both objectives, we researched the current literature and reviewed relevant FAA documents (such as the NAS architecture and operational concept, capital investment plan, and cost and schedule information for key projects). In addition, we obtained and reviewed documentation from stakeholders in support of their positions on outstanding issues related to implementing free flight. We provided copies of a draft of this report to FAA for its review and comment. We met with FAA officials, including the Director, Program Office, Free Flight Phase 1, and the Acting Program Directors for Flight 2000 and Architecture and Systems Engineering, who generally agreed with the contents of the report and provided clarifying comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. We conducted our audit work from November 1997 through August 1998 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Under its air traffic control modernization program, FAA is upgrading its facilities and equipment—including replacing aging infrastructure, such as controllers’ workstations and the Host computer—and ensuring that its systems comply with Year 2000 requirements. While these efforts are not part of free flight, they will provide the infrastructure that is critical for its implementation. To define free flight and develop recommendations, associated initiatives, and time frames for its implementation, FAA has worked with stakeholders under the leadership of RTCA—a nonprofit organization that serves as an advisor to FAA. As of July 1998, 1 of 44 recommendations had been completed, and substantial progress has been made in implementing many of the initiatives that fall under the remaining recommendations. While working to implement the 44 recommendations, FAA and stakeholders agreed on the need to focus their efforts on deploying technologies designed to provide early benefits to users. These efforts led to consensus on a phased approach to implementing free flight—beginning with Free Flight Phase 1—including the core technologies to be used and the locations where the technologies will be deployed under this first phase, scheduled to be implemented by 2002. FAA has been working with stakeholders to resolve differences among them and to better define its planned limited demonstration, known as Flight 2000 (now the Free Flight Operational Enhancement Program), which is designed to identify and mitigate the risks associated with using free-flight-related communication, navigation, and surveillance technologies and associated procedures. As a result of these collaborative efforts, FAA and stakeholders—through RTCA—have agreed to a general roadmap for a restructured demonstration to be conducted in fiscal years 1999-2004. However, unresolved issues remain, including the need to secure funding and develop additional plans. In its October 1995 report, RTCA discussed the benefits of free flight and included recommendations and time frames for users and FAA to consider for implementing free flight. These recommendations, many of which have several initiatives, emphasized, among other things, the (1) consideration of human factors during all phases of developing free flight, (2) use of streamlined methods/procedures for system certification, and (3) expansion of the National Route Program. The vast majority of these recommendations (35 of 44) were to be completed in the near term (1995 through 1997), 6 are focused on the midterm (1998 through 2000), and 3 are to be completed in the far term (2001 and beyond). See appendix I for a list of these recommendations. Since late 1995, FAA and stakeholders have been working on various free flight recommendations and many associated initiatives and, in August 1996, agreed on an action plan to guide their implementation. According to FAA, through July 1998, they have fully implemented only 1 of the 35 near-term recommendations—to incorporate airline schedule updates, such as delays and cancellations, into FAA’s Traffic Flow Management system to help it reduce unnecessary restrictions and delays imposed on airline operations. However, FAA and stakeholders have made substantial progress in implementing many of the initiatives under the near-term recommendations. For example, as outlined under a recommendation to extend the benefits of data exchange, FAA has deployed digital pre-departure clearances at 57 sites, which provide pilots with departure information via digital cockpit displays and reduce the need for voice messages. In addition, 49 of these sites have Digital Automatic Terminal Information Service, which provides information about current weather, airport, and facility conditions around the world. Digital communications provide an advantage over voice communications by helping to relieve congested voice frequencies and reduce the number of operational errors that are caused directly or indirectly by miscommunication. Under another recommendation, FAA is working with stakeholders through an RTCA task force to find ways to reduce the time and cost associated with the agency’s process for approving new technologies for flight operations. To address another recommendation, FAA has deployed a technology, on a limited basis, for controllers’ use that is expected to improve the sequencing of air traffic as aircraft enter, leave, and operate within terminal airspace. Work is under way on six midterm and three far-term recommendations and their associated initiatives. For the most part, these recommendations focus on incremental improvements to the core technologies that are being deployed under Free Flight Phase 1 and those planned for deployment under Flight 2000 (now the Free Flight Operational Enhancement Program). For example, in the midterm, FAA has begun to modify controllers’ workstations and supporting computer equipment to accept, process, and display data received from satellites. In addition, under a far-term recommendation, FAA is studying the feasibility of using satellite-based information to provide more precise information for landing during periods of limited visibility. FAA also noted that while it was in the early stages of planning for the implementation of free flight, it took steps to maximize the air traffic control system’s capacity and efficiency by extending flexibilities to users—to select and fly more efficient flight paths when operating in designated altitudes/areas—through programs such as the National Route Program (NRP). FAA has two early efforts under way to allow users (under certain conditions) to select routes and procedures that will save them time and money—NRP and the Future Air Navigation System (FANS). Established in 1990, NRP is intended to conserve fuel by allowing users to select preferred or direct routes. FAA estimates that NRP saves the aviation industry over $40 million annually. These savings are realized, in part, because pilots are allowed to take advantage of favorable winds or minimize the effects of unfavorable winds, thereby reducing fuel consumption. Initially allowed only at higher altitudes, the program has been expanded to include operations down to 29,000 feet. FAA is also working to decrease, where appropriate, the present restriction that flights must be 200 miles from their point of departure before they can participate and must end their participation 200 miles prior to landing. FANS uses new technologies and procedures that enhance communication between pilots and air traffic controllers and provide more precise information on the position of aircraft—allowing for improvements in air navigation safety and in the ability of air traffic controllers to monitor flights. Used primarily over the oceans and in remote areas normally out of the range of ground-based navigation aids, FANS uses digital communication more than voice communication to exchange information such as an aircraft’s location, speed, and altitude. Although FANS is gradually being implemented in many regions and countries, the aviation community believes that for its full operational benefits (such as time and fuel savings) to be realized, air traffic control procedures need to be modified to shorten the distance currently required between aircraft. They also contend that FAA needs to deploy the promised hardware and software (Automatic Dependent Surveillance or ADS) infrastructure for FANS in facilities that support airline operations primarily over the Pacific Ocean in order for these benefits to be realized. In November 1997, the FAA Administrator began an outreach effort with the aviation community to build consensus on and seek commitment to the future direction of the agency’s modernization program. As part of this effort, she formed a task force of senior transportation officials, union leaders, and executives and experts from the aviation community to assess the agency’s modernization program—including the NAS architecture—and develop a plan for moving forward. Much as we found in reviewing the system’s logical architecture in February 1997, the task force found that the architecture under development appropriately built on the concept of operations for the NAS and identified the programs necessary to meet users’ needs. However, the task force found that the architecture was insufficient because of issues associated with cost, risk, and lack of commitment from users. In response, the task force recommended a phased approach that would cost less, focus more on providing near-term benefits to users, and modernize the NAS incrementally. Many of the initiatives identified under the near- and midterm recommendations will be included under this phased approach because these initiatives are expected to provide early benefits for users. A central tenet of this approach is the “build a little, test a little” concept of technology development and deployment—intended to limit efforts to a manageable scope, identify and mitigate risks, and deploy technologies before the system is fully mature when they can immediately improve the system’s safety, efficiency, and/or capacity. Such a phased approach to implementing free flight was designed to help the agency avoid repeating past modernization problems associated with overly ambitious cost, schedule, and performance goals and to restore users’ faith in its ability to deliver on its promises. As a first step toward the phased implementation of free flight, FAA—in coordination with stakeholders—outlined a plan for Free Flight Phase 1 in early 1998. This plan is expected to be implemented by 2002. As currently envisioned, Free Flight Phase 1 calls for the expedited deployment of certain NAS technologies. The technologies—which are at various stages of development and will be further refined and tested are the (1) Controller Pilot Data Link Communications (CPDLC) Build 1, (2) User Request Evaluation Tool (URET), (3) Single Center Traffic Management Advisor (TMA), (4) Collaborative Decision Making (CDM), (5) Surface Movement Advisor (SMA), and (6) Passive Final Approach Spacing Tool (pFAST). In general, these technologies are expected to provide tools for controllers that will help to increase the safety and capacity of the air traffic control system and benefit users through savings on fuel and crew costs. For example, FAA and many stakeholders believe that TMA and pFAST should improve controllers’ ability to more efficiently sequence traffic to improve its flow in crowded terminal airspace. Similarly, they believe the URET conflict probe will improve controllers’ ability to detect and resolve potential conflicts sooner than present technology allows. However, in June 1998, the air traffic controllers’ union at one of the two en route centers where URET is being tested asked that its use be terminated until several concerns about its use in the current environment can be resolved. Termination did not occur at this facility, and the issue has been elevated to the regional level within FAA for resolution. See appendix II for a summary of the status of the recommendations related to Free Flight Phase 1. The aviation community generally agrees on the core technologies for Free Flight Phase 1 and on the locations proposed for deploying and testing these technologies. See figure 2.1 for these sites. In addition, FAA is currently developing a Free Flight Phase 1 plan that will provide more details on implementing the program and recently appointed a program manager to lead this effort. As a companion effort, FAA has charged RTCA with responsibility for building consensus within the aviation community on how best to revise the vision for modernization (operational concept) and to develop the blueprint (architecture/framework) for carrying out the modernization. It is critical that the vision for modernization and the blueprint for implementing this vision be tightly integrated to help ensure that free flight activities are coordinated and working toward common goals. In January 1997, Vice President Gore announced an initiative—Flight 2000—to demonstrate and validate the use of navigation capabilities to support free flight. FAA then expanded Flight 2000 to include communication and surveillance technologies. FAA viewed Flight 2000 as an exercise for testing free flight technologies and procedures in an environment where safety hazards could be minimized. FAA expected the Flight 2000 program to validate the benefits of free flight, evaluate transition issues, and streamline the agency’s procedures for ensuring that new equipment is safe for its intended use. Proposed primarily for Alaska and Hawaii, Flight 2000 would have tested communication, navigation, and surveillance technologies, such as the Global Positioning System (GPS) and its augmentations, the Wide Area Augmentation System (WAAS) and the Local Area Augmentation System (LAAS); Controller Pilot Data Link Communications (CPDLC); and ADS-B technology. FAA initially selected these locations because they offer a controlled environment with a limited fleet, which includes all classes of users, all categories of airspace, and wide ranges of weather conditions and terrain. However, many in the aviation community questioned whether the lessons learned in Alaska and Hawaii would apply to operations in the continental United States. At their urging, FAA agreed to add at least one site within the continental United States to the Flight 2000 demonstration. Collaborative efforts between FAA and stakeholders on Flight 2000—through RTCA—have led to broad consensus on a general roadmap for restructuring this demonstration program, including four criteria for selecting the candidate operational capabilities to be demonstrated. In general, under these criteria (1) industry and FAA must address all aspects of modernization to be successful in moving toward free flight; (2) expected benefits are the major reason for implementing a given capability; (3) the capability does not interfere with or slow down any near-term activities; and (4) the risks associated with operational capabilities that require integrating multiple communication, navigation, and surveillance technologies should be addressed. Using these criteria, FAA and stakeholders reviewed over 70 potential operational capabilities and selected 9 of them. They also recommended demonstration locations in the Ohio Valley and Alaska. (See app. III for a description of these capabilities and the expected operational benefits.) For example, under this proposal, FAA would provide more accurate weather information to pilots and controllers to improve safety and potentially reduce flight times. In addition, FAA would improve airport surface navigation capabilities by providing pilots (and operators of other surface vehicles) with moving maps that display traffic in low-visibility conditions. FAA and stakeholders also recommended that the program be renamed the “Free Flight Operational Enhancement Program.” Stakeholders and FAA recognize that more detailed planning is needed—to identify risk-mitigation activities, select the final site, and estimate costs, schedules, and the number of required aircraft—and that this planning will require close coordination between FAA and industry to ensure that plans are consistent with stated operational capabilities and are achievable by FAA and users. FAA is currently considering the proposed RTCA roadmap for the restructured Flight 2000 demonstration and expects to reach a decision in the fall of 1998. If approved as scheduled, a detailed plan is expected by the end of 1998. FAA’s plan to implement free flight through an evolutionary (phased) approach is generally consistent with past recommendations that we and others have made on the need for FAA to achieve a more gradual, integrated, and cost-effective approach to managing its modernization programs. However, FAA and stakeholders recognize that significant challenges must be addressed if the move to free flight—including Free Flight Phase 1 and Flight 2000 (now the Free Flight Operational Enhancement Program) is to succeed. While FAA must address many of the challenges, stakeholders recognize that, as partners, they must assist the agency. The challenges for FAA are to (1) provide effective leadership and management of modernization efforts—including cross-program communication and coordination; (2) develop plans—in collaboration with the aviation community—that are sufficiently detailed to move forward with the implementation of free flight—including the identification of clear goals and measures for tracking the progress of the modernization efforts; (3) address outstanding issues related to the development and deployment of technology—such as the need to improve the agency’s process for ensuring that new equipment is safe for its intended use and methods for considering human factors; and (4) address other issues, such as the need for FAA to coordinate its modernization and free flight efforts with those of the international community and integrate free flight technologies. FAA and stakeholders identified a number of managerial issues that will need to be addressed if free flight is to be implemented successfully. For example, (1) provide strong senior leadership to guide the implementation of free flight both within and outside the agency and (2) implement an evolutionary rather than a revolutionary approach to modernization. Successfully addressing these issues will help the agency effectively implement free flight. Some FAA officials and stakeholders said that the agency will need to provide strong leadership both inside the agency and within the aviation community for free flight to be implemented successfully. For example, some FAA officials and stakeholders said that the agency will need to improve the effectiveness of its internal operations by encouraging communication and cooperation between the various program offices responsible for its free flight efforts. Additionally, some FAA officials and stakeholders said that the agency will need to continue efforts to build consensus among the aviation community and gain its commitment to the direction of the agency’s plans for modernization. Some FAA officials and stakeholders told us that improvements in communication and coordination across FAA program offices are needed to implement free flight successfully. For example, one FAA official told us that the primary challenge facing the agency in its efforts to implement free flight is developing effective communication and coordination across program lines. Some stakeholders shared this concern, observing that the various program offices within FAA do not communicate well or effectively coordinate their activities. Thus, according to some within FAA and stakeholders, despite the agency’s move to using cross-functional, integrated product teams to improve accountability and coordination across FAA, these teams have become insular and some team members tend to be motivated primarily by the priorities and management of the offices that they represent rather than the goals of a given team. One stakeholder stressed that the effectiveness of these teams has also been limited by (1) inadequate training of members on how to operate a team and (2) the fact that these teams are given responsibility for projects without the commensurate authority they need to carry out their responsibilities. Some stakeholders also noted that the agency has not made a number of decisions about modernization because of ongoing disagreements among various program offices over how best to proceed with its various components, such as the selection of new free flight technologies for communicating information digitally rather than by voice. The concerns cited above are consistent with our prior work on FAA’s culture as it affects acquisition management. In particular, we found that the agency has previously had difficulty communicating and coordinating effectively across traditional program lines. In addition, we learned from some FAA staff and functional managers that FAA has encountered resistance to the integrated product team concept and these teams’ operations. As we reported, one major factor impeding coordination has been FAA’s organization into different divisions whose “stovepipes,” or upward lines of authority and communication, are separate and distinct. Because FAA’s operational divisions are based on a functional specialty, such as engineering, air traffic control, or equipment maintenance, getting the employees in these units to work together has been difficult. Internal and external studies have found that the operations and development sides of FAA have not forged effective partnerships. To its credit, FAA is currently attempting to improve cross-agency communication and coordination by developing incentives for staff to work toward the agency’s goals and priorities. Plans are also under way to develop contracts with each integrated product team to hold its members accountable for developing and deploying a given operational capability. According to FAA officials, these contracts are intended to improve accountability for delivering technologies; in the past, such accountability has not been clearly assigned. In addition, efforts are under way to work with the aviation community to resolve disagreements that have persisted among FAA program offices, such as how to proceed with the use of digital communication. While stakeholders generally applaud FAA’s efforts to build consensus among stakeholders, some believe that the agency must be prepared to exercise strong leadership by (1) making difficult decisions after weighing stakeholders’ competing priorities, (2) holding to these decisions even amidst new and conflicting opinions about the value of one course of action over another, and (3) delivering on its commitments. Some stakeholders said they were particularly frustrated when, after announcing a planned course of action, FAA later delayed its implementation or retracted it and moved in a different direction. Some stakeholders told us that such indecision makes it very difficult for them to make plans for the future—such as determining investments for avionics upgrades—and further erodes their confidence in the agency’s ability to manage modernization programs and provide leadership to the aviation community. For example, several stakeholders cited FAA’s failure to deliver the ground-based infrastructure, needed for users to accrue benefits from equipping with new technologies under the Future Air Navigation System program, as a warning signal to them to proceed cautiously, since the agency may not deliver on its promises. In particular, users are concerned that if they invest in new technologies, they will not realize benefits in a timely manner to offset these investments. Some stakeholders believe that for FAA to successfully implement free flight, it must demonstrate that it can effectively manage its air traffic control modernization programs and deliver promised capabilities. To do so, FAA will need to implement an evolutionary approach to technology development and deployment. According to FAA, under such an approach, it will limit the scope of project segments so that it can deploy, test, evaluate, and refine a given technology until it obtains the desired capabilities. One stakeholder familiar with this approach emphasized the importance for FAA, in implementing it, of (1) assessing risks, (2) developing metrics, (3) limiting the scope of each phase of development, (4) evaluating progress before moving forward with the next phase of development, and (5) retraining staff. These steps would be applied to each cycle of the development process to help ensure that each completed iteration results in enhanced capabilities and moves a given technology closer to its desired level of maturity. FAA agreed that each of these steps will be important for successfully implementing this approach. FAA has not yet developed detailed plans for implementing this approach; however, in concept, it is consistent with our past recommendations that the agency avoid taking on unrealistic cost, schedule, and performance goals. For example, the recently developed plans for revising the Flight 2000 demonstration recommend an incremental approach, under which operational capabilities will be introduced over time into planned field demonstration sites. FAA and users expect such an approach will allow them to achieve success by taking smaller, less risky, more manageable steps. Some stakeholders told us that although they are encouraged by FAA’s efforts to date, they are taking a wait-and-see attitude as to whether the agency can effectively implement this approach to technology development and deployment. FAA and stakeholders have identified a wide range of concerns that need to be addressed to help ensure that efforts to implement free flight are sufficiently well developed as the agency moves forward with related modernization activities. These concerns include, among others, the need for (1) FAA—in collaboration with stakeholders—to develop clear goals and objectives for what it intends to achieve, as well as a measurement system for tracking progress, and (2) FAA and stakeholders to develop detailed plans that will allow for the cost-effective implementation of free flight. Stakeholders believe that more detailed plans are needed to provide the aviation community with assurances that moving forward with free flight is warranted. They believe that these plans should include the results of cost/benefit analyses, new procedures, and schedules for equipment installation. Because they expect that equipping with free flight technologies will be expensive, many users believe that FAA needs to demonstrate the near-term benefits of the new equipment—especially given FAA’s poor record of delivering promised benefits. As part of its efforts to develop plans for implementing free flight, FAA has conducted cost/benefit analyses to provide justification for free flight investments. However, stakeholders have raised concerns that these analyses have focused almost exclusively on the benefits to FAA. As a result, they believe that these analyses are of little value to users that must make business decisions about investing in new technologies. As one airframe manufacturer noted, FAA should develop a convincing case for changing the functions of the present system before selecting new technologies. While users expressed a desire for studies that consider their business needs, one airline official told us that meaningful cost/benefit analyses are very difficult to establish for the airline industry because the costs and benefits of equipping will vary considerably both among and within airlines. For example, the cost of investments and associated benefits will vary with factors such as (1) the cost of installing new avionics—including the cost of retrofitting older aircraft, (2) the timing of requirements for completing the installation of equipment, and (3) the routes flown. Even though these factors vary from one airline to another, some airlines expect FAA to conduct analyses that demonstrate that technology investments will be cost-effective for them. Similarly, DOD and general aviation users are concerned about potential penalties for not equipping their aircraft with technologies that will be needed to conduct operations under free flight. For example, DOD officials told us that they need more detailed information about whether—or under what circumstances—they may be excluded from certain airspace if they fail to equip with free flight technologies. DOD is also concerned that the lack of specificity in FAA’s plans may negatively affect its ability to meet its mission readiness requirements—including the ability to fly cost-efficient and effective routes. Some stakeholders have expressed concern that the cost of equipping with avionics for participation in the free flight environment may be prohibitive for the recreational end of the general aviation community. FAA is aware of this concern and plans to use the Flight 2000 demonstration (now the Free Flight Operational Enhancement Program) as a means for streamlining its process for ensuring the safety of new equipment for flight operations and developing affordable avionics for general aviation. A number of stakeholders told us that in order for FAA and users to fully exploit new capabilities to maximize the air traffic control system’s safety, capacity, and efficiency, the agency will need to develop procedures that will be used in the free flight environment. Such procedures will affect a wide range of operations. For example, new procedures will be required to approve, integrate, and deploy new technologies. New procedures will also be needed to enable pilots and controllers to use the new technologies. Hence, some stakeholders noted that it will be important for FAA to make explicit any changes in pilots’ and controllers’ roles and responsibilities. For example, if pilots and controllers are to share responsibility for making decisions about altitudes, speeds, and routes, the procedures need to be well defined. Under Free Flight Phase 1, the agency plans to implement new procedures as needed to demonstrate the use of new air traffic management tools that controllers will use to improve conflict detection and air traffic sequencing, among other things. Similarly, under Flight 2000 (now the Free Flight Operational Enhancement Program), FAA plans to develop new procedures for the new communication, navigation, and surveillance technologies that will be used by pilots and controllers. FAA is aware of the need to develop procedural changes for operations under free flight and is currently working with the aviation community to develop these new procedures. However, some stakeholders are concerned that the development and implementation of new procedures will not occur in a timely fashion. One of these stakeholders further stressed that having new equipment and technology working together is not enough, without new procedures, to deliver the benefits promised under free flight. Commercial airlines and DOD require adequate lead time to plan for the cost-effective installation of new equipment. To facilitate an efficient equipment installation process, FAA will need to work with users to consider their unique needs as they develop plans for moving to free flight operations. For example, to minimize costs, airlines would prefer to install new avionics within an aircraft’s regularly scheduled maintenance cycle. In addition, airlines do not want to install new equipment too early because they want to be able to take advantage of opportunities to purchase the best technologies at the lowest cost; however, they do not want to equip too late and miss out on the benefits. Similarly, because DOD must request funding well before installing new equipment, it needs ample lead time to develop budget requests and installation schedules for many of its aircraft, which number more than 16,000. Therefore, it is important for FAA to make timely decisions about future technology requirements and stick with those decisions to give all aviation user groups the lead time needed to ensure that their purchases are cost-effective and their installation schedules are efficient. To provide for a smooth transition, FAA has been working with DOD and other users to move forward with the selection of new technologies for operations under free flight. FAA’s most recent draft NAS architecture (blueprint) represents the agency’s attempt to provide the level of detail requested by the aviation community. However, some stakeholders have expressed concern that the draft architecture is too general to use in planning for future technology upgrades. For example, an airline representative noted that when airlines place orders for new aircraft, they request systems that provide maximum flexibility for later modifications or upgrades. However, future free flight equipment upgrades will still be costly, and the sooner FAA decides which technologies will be required for operations under free flight, the more effectively airlines can plan for those upgrades. Collaboration between FAA and stakeholders is critical to developing plans that will have the level of buy-in needed to start implementing free flight. FAA’s recent experiences in developing modernization plans have pointed to the need to work collaboratively with the aviation community from the onset of a given program to help ensure the effective resolution of issues as plans are developed. In March 1998, FAA and the aviation community reached consensus to begin implementing Free Flight Phase 1—including consensus on which technologies will be deployed and where. In addition, under this first phase, steps will be taken to identify and mitigate the risks associated with inserting new technologies and procedures into an operating air traffic control system. In contrast, until recently FAA and stakeholders have been sharply divided over the agency’s plans for conducting Flight 2000—a limited demonstration of free-flight-related communication, navigation, and surveillance technologies—primarily in Alaska and Hawaii. Problems began when the proposal was announced without consulting users and have persisted, despite FAA’s efforts to work collaboratively with stakeholders to resolve them. While many stakeholders we interviewed agreed with the need for FAA to conduct an operational demonstration of free flight technologies and related procedures, they had strong reservations about the utility of conducting such a demonstration in Alaska and Hawaii. In their view, few of the lessons learned would be transferable to operations in the continental United States, where free flight implementation will ultimately focus. In addition, stakeholders expressed concern that FAA has not focused enough attention on developing the detailed plans that it needs for conducting the demonstration, as required by the agency’s acquisition management system. In fact, the Department of Transportation’s fiscal year 1998 appropriation act prohibited FAA from spending any fiscal year 1998 funds on the Flight 2000 program. In the accompanying Conference Report for the act, the conferees noted that additional financial and technical planning was needed before the Flight 2000 demonstration program could be implemented. The Congress has not yet decided whether to fund this demonstration program in fiscal year 1999. To address these concerns, FAA has been working collaboratively with stakeholders—through RTCA—to develop a roadmap (general plans) for restructuring Flight 2000. These efforts have resulted in the (1) development of selection criteria for the operational capabilities to be used, (2) selection of demonstration sites in Alaska and the Ohio Valley, (3) selection of nine operational capabilities (see app. III), (4) proposed change of the program’s name from Flight 2000 to the “Free Flight Operational Enhancement Program,” and (5) revision of the time frame (1999-2004) for conducting the demonstration program. FAA is currently considering this RTCA proposal. FAA and stakeholders realize that they will need to continue to work collaboratively to refine these plans. The latest collaborative efforts appear to be a positive step toward developing the type of detailed plans FAA needs to carry out the demonstration and secure the necessary funding. Stakeholders and FAA officials identified several concerns about technology development and deployment that need to be resolved. Key among these were (1) the pace and cost of the agency’s process for ensuring that new equipment is safe for its intended use, (2) issues related to human factors, (3) uncertainties surrounding the use of GPS as a sole means of navigation, and (4) issues associated with the use of digital communication technologies. Many stakeholders and FAA officials stated that FAA’s certification process—methods for ensuring that new equipment is safe for its intended use—is a key challenge to the implementation of free flight because it takes too long and costs too much; they urged that the process be streamlined. The certification process could be problematic for free flight because many new types of equipment, such as those that are required for the use of new digital communication technology, will need to be certified before they can be implemented. As one aviation community stakeholder noted, “If something is going to change the aviation system, it has to go through the certification knot hole.” Recognizing that the certification process poses a barrier to implementing free flight, FAA has taken a number of steps to address this problem. For example, FAA asked, and RTCA agreed, to convene a task force to examine ways to improve the agency’s existing certification practices. The first meeting took place in June 1998, and the task force expects to report to FAA within 6 months. Among other things, this task force will (1) develop baseline information on the current system—including a review of avionics, infrastructure, and satellite needs; (2) consider human factors in the certification process—including how best to integrate human factors into the system’s design and operations; (3) identify ways to improve the current certification process—including an attempt to determine an acceptable range of failure for technologies and metrics for technology design and performance; and (4) review FAA’s certification services—including what customers should expect from the agency and alternative methods of satisfying certification requirements, such as granting approval authority for specific types of technologies to Centers of Excellence or individuals. In addition, RTCA has a special committee that is reviewing the use of digital communication technologies for free flight, including the development of standards that FAA could use to develop certification requirements. Furthermore, the agency plans to use the Flight 2000 (now the Free Flight Operational Enhancement Program) demonstration of free flight communication, navigation, and surveillance technologies as an opportunity for streamlining the agency’s equipment certification process. Several stakeholders told us that while the certification process could be streamlined, both FAA and stakeholders need to take a careful approach. They noted that the present system may be cumbersome, but it is providing the desired level of safety. If standards are going to be relaxed, then redundancies need to be built into the system to ensure that modifications to the certification process either maintain or improve upon existing levels of safety. Many stakeholders told us they believe that the successful implementation of free flight hinges on issues related to human factors, such as the ability and willingness of pilots, controllers, and maintenance staff to shift to a new system of air traffic management. Among the concerns raised are the need to (1) define the type of training that will best prepare human operators for the transition; (2) provide a reasonably paced training schedule to help ensure that pilots, controllers, and maintenance staff, in particular, are not overburdened with too many changes at one time; and (3) identify the risks associated with changes in technologies and procedures and the potential effects of these changes on human operations in a free flight environment. For example, a recent report by the National Research Council on human factors and automation raised concerns that, among other things, the increased use of automation may lead to confusion among pilots, controllers, and airline operations personnel over where control lies, especially in a free flight environment.As a result, the report recommended that until these and other human factors issues are better understood, the introduction of automated tools should proceed gradually and decision-making authority should continue to reside on the ground with controllers. A related issue is the need to incorporate the consideration of human factors into the product development cycle to avoid costly and cumbersome changes at the end of the development process. An FAA human factors official told us that FAA has learned a lot from its experience with the Standard Terminal Automation Replacement System (STARS) about the need to involve users in considering human factors throughout the product development cycle—from the mission needs statement, forward. This official stressed that the agency can pay to consider human factors throughout the acquisition cycle or pay more later, as it is doing with STARS, to fix the problems that arise when these factors are not considered. Furthermore, when human factors are not considered along the way, problems cannot always be fixed. Fewer options are available at the end of a development cycle for modifying a given technology. Stakeholders agreed with this assessment. While FAA has developed guidelines for considering human factors during the technology development process, it has not established a formal requirement for using these guidelines. In June 1996, we reported that FAA’s work on human factors was not centralized, and we recommended that the Secretary of Transportation direct FAA to ensure that all units coordinate their research through the agency’s Human Factors Division.According to some FAA officials and one stakeholder, such coordination is still lacking and the agency’s programs would benefit from assigning responsibility for human factors to a higher level within FAA so that these issues can receive sufficient attention from the agency’s senior management. In addition, several stakeholders stressed the importance of retaining the same members on teams that address concerns about human factors through the entire development process. One of these stakeholders believes that such continuity will help ensure that the team’s efforts are not derailed late in the process by the inclusion of new members and the introduction of a range of new issues and methods of resolving them. Human factors must also be considered in the operating environments where technologies will be deployed. According to one stakeholder involved in human factors work, because the air traffic control system has evolved—rather than being designed—it does not operate in a homogeneous fashion, and when the system is changed, the effects on humans can vary widely. For example, both en route and terminal facilities tailor their operations in many ways to factor in local conditions. As a result, this stakeholder stressed that as many as 1,000 letters of agreement between various components of FAA and users making adjustments to operating rules and procedures may exist—making it difficult for the agency to generalize across the system when considering the introduction of changes or improvements. In addition, under free flight, users and controllers (as well as maintenance staff) will rely more heavily on automated technologies to carry out their responsibilities—making the integrity of the system even more critical than it is now and increasing the need for more redundant systems and training to ensure that controllers can successfully switch, if necessary, to manual control techniques. Satellite navigation provides precise information on the position of aircraft and offers the potential for the required distances between aircraft to be safely reduced and, in turn, for the air traffic control system’s capacity to be increased. FAA initially planned its augmented satellite navigation system to be a sole means of navigation under free flight. However, FAA and stakeholders have expressed concerns about the vulnerability of an augmented satellite system to both intentional and unintentional (e.g., radio frequency interference) jamming, and about problems associated with the system’s weak signal. In view of these concerns, the Air Transport Association and the Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association have, in coordination with FAA, developed plans for a risk assessment of augmentations to satellite navigation. A research organization was selected in July 1998 to conduct the assessment, and a final report is expected in January 1999. An Air Transport Association official told us that this risk assessment will address concerns about the vulnerability of satellite navigation and stressed that such a study is critical because the use of satellite navigation as a sole means of navigation is the centerpiece of FAA’s architecture (blueprint) and is the basis for the agency’s cost/benefit analyses. According to this official, a risk assessment is needed to identify the risks and develop mitigation plans and cost estimates for mitigating each risk. The results of this study could affect both the costs and benefits for FAA and users because if FAA does not use the augmented system as a sole means of navigation, it could incur additional costs to retain some portion of its ground-based navigational aids. Similarly, users may find it necessary to maintain existing equipment and to purchase new equipment under free flight. FAA and stakeholders consider digital communication technologies—commonly referred to as data link—as critical to implementing free flight. FAA expects that the use of data link—in combination with other free flight technologies—will improve safety, increase capacity, reduce costs, and enhance the productivity of humans and equipment. Data link will replace or supplement many of the routine voice interactions between pilots and controllers with nonvocal digital data messages. For example, during peak periods, one controller often may be required to communicate on a single radio channel with 25 or more aircraft—leading to possible operational errors and system delays. FAA believes that using data link will (1) reduce nearly one-quarter of all domestic operational errors—caused directly or indirectly by miscommunication between pilots and controllers, (2) relieve highly congested voice communication channels, and (3) save the airlines millions of dollars annually on communication-related delays that occur during both taxi and in-flight operations. Data link comprises three components: (1) software applications—including Controller Pilot Data Link Communications (CPDLC), weather information, and Automatic Dependent Surveillance (ADS); (2) hardware systems installed on the ground and avionics in the cockpit; and (3) the communication medium that allows for the transfer of data between the ground and airborne equipment. FAA is responsible for implementing ground systems, and the aviation community is responsible for implementing airborne systems. As partners, both FAA and the aviation community are responsible for ensuring the interoperability of these systems. Stakeholders told us that despite the importance of data link, many issues remain unresolved. Chief among these issues is the lack of agreement within FAA on how, when, and at what pace to proceed with the use of data link. This lack of agreement may be attributed, at least in part, to the fact that data link efforts are being managed and implemented by different organizational elements of FAA and by the aviation community. Recognizing this, FAA has been working with stakeholders to reach agreement on data link issues. In May 1998, a group of FAA officials and stakeholders under the Administrator’s NAS Modernization Task Force began developing a consensus plan for implementing controller pilot data link in the en route environment. In July 1998, this group presented its plan to RTCA for consideration. In August 1998, RTCA modified the plan and endorsed the implementation of CPDLC Build 1 as part of Free Flight Phase 1—recommending that the location and communication medium for CPDLC Build 1 be changed. FAA—in consultation with stakeholders—intends to further develop the plans for deploying CPDLC Build 1 by the end of 1998. FAA’s approval is expected by early 1999. A number of other issues were identified by FAA officials and stakeholders as needing resolution for free flight to be implemented successfully. Among these issues were the need to (1) coordinate modernization activities with the international aviation community, (2) integrate free flight technologies, and (3) address airport capacity issues. Airlines that operate internationally and DOD believe that FAA needs to work diligently to ensure that, to the extent possible, carriers do not have to purchase multiple types of avionics to operate in different parts of the world. Currently, both FAA and various elements of the aviation community are working collaboratively with their international counterparts on a number of modernization issues. For example, FAA is a member of an airline-led group with international participation—including Eurocontroland several foreign airlines—known as the Communication, Navigation, and Surveillance/Air Traffic Management Focused Team. The purpose of this team is to facilitate the implementation of new communication, navigation, and surveillance and air traffic management technologies by developing consensus among global airlines on economic issues. In addition, the agency is working with the European community on human factors issues and data link applications. However, some stakeholders question the sufficiency of the agency’s efforts to coordinate technology selection decisions that will allow users to operate worldwide. Because the airline industry is becoming increasingly global, it requires the development of compatible operational concepts, technologies, and systems architectures throughout the world. One airframe manufacturer noted that the airlines are increasingly demanding global solutions to minimize the cost of changes to avionics and flight systems. The costs of purchasing new avionics, retrofitting them into the aircraft (and the down time required), and training pilots in their use for a large fleet of airplanes will quickly exceed any benefits if these benefits are not realized as soon as additional or improved capabilities are introduced. According to some stakeholders, FAA has historically been the international leader in air traffic control modernization efforts—a position that has given the agency the flexibility to develop and deploy technologies that best serve the needs of users in the United States. However, many stakeholders expressed concern that FAA’s position as the international leader in this arena has eroded in recent years. According to some of these stakeholders, the United States may have to follow the lead of the European community in selecting the types of new technologies that will be used under free flight. For example, some stakeholders noted that Europe is at least 3 years ahead of the United States in developing and deploying the data link technology that will serve as a centerpiece for implementing free flight. While several stakeholders noted that valuable lessons may be learned from the Europeans’ work on data link, one stakeholder stressed that it is important for the United States to position itself so that it can make decisions about technology requirements that best reflect the needs of U.S. operations. Some FAA officials and stakeholders told us that the agency needs to integrate free flight technologies with one another and into the operating air traffic control system. This integration is expected to allow FAA and users to fully exploit the capabilities of these technologies to help ensure that promised improvements in safety, capacity, and efficiency are realized. For example, as noted in chapter 2, FAA has new technologies that are expected to improve the efficiency of operations at high altitudes, close to the terminal, and on the ground. Because some of these technologies have not been designed to work together, some stakeholders and FAA officials contend that their potential benefits—e.g., allowing the distance between aircraft to be safely reduced, when practical, throughout a flight’s operation—will not be maximized unless they are integrated. One airframe manufacturer noted that the key impediment to changing the NAS is not new technology, but how to integrate that technology into an operating NAS. As a result, care must be taken to help ensure that planned changes in operations, procedures, and airspace usage will not adversely affect safety and will meet users’ future needs. Another stakeholder noted that integrating new technologies (and associated procedures) into the present operating system is difficult because there are complex interdependencies between the technologies currently being used—making incremental changes to the system complex and the consequences of introducing abrupt changes unpredictable. Stakeholders have raised concerns that FAA does not have sufficient internal expertise to complete integration tasks. FAA officials acknowledge that they do not have the internal expertise or experience to do the avionics systems integration work for Flight 2000 (now the Free Flight Operational Enhancement Program); the agency plans to hire an integration contractor to do this work. FAA believes that it has sufficient expertise to do the remainder of the integration work required for free flight. However, to enhance expertise within the agency, FAA has identified competencies essential to efficiently manage complex acquisition programs and is providing a variety of opportunities for staff to further develop their expertise. Stakeholders questioned whether FAA is paying enough attention to increasing airport capacity. Many stakeholders stressed that using free flight in the en route environment may get aircraft to their destinations sooner, but the planes may then be delayed by limits on airport surface capacity, such as too few runways and gates. Several stakeholders also stressed that poor weather conditions limit airports’ capacity and said that more sophisticated technology is needed to predict hazardous weather conditions so that airports’ capacity can be optimized. In June 1998, we reported that FAA has not assigned weather information a high priority in its plans for the NAS architecture. Because weather information is not considered critical, research on weather systems is often among the first to be cut—potentially jeopardizing mulityear studies of weather problems affecting aviation. Given the significant impact of hazardous weather on aviation safety and efficiency, improving the weather information available to all users should be one of FAA’s top priorities. The agency is taking steps to address its shortcomings in this area, and in fiscal year 1999, FAA is elevating weather research as a funding priority.

Summary: Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the: (1) status of the Federal Aviation Administration's (FAA) efforts to implement free flight, including a planned operational demonstration formerly known as Flight 2000 and now called the Free Flight Operational Enhancement Program; and (2) views of the aviation community and FAA on the challenges that must be met to implement free flight in a cost-effective manner. GAO noted that: (1) since 1994, FAA officials and stakeholders, under the leadership of the Radio Technical Commission for Aeronautics (RTCA), have been collaborating to implement free flight; (2) these early efforts led to a definition of free flight, a set of recommendations, and an action plan to gradually move toward a more flexible operating system; (3) while working to implement the recommendations, FAA and stakeholders agreed on the need to focus their efforts on deploying technologies that will provide early benefits to users; (4) in early 1998, FAA and stakeholders developed a strategy that calls for the phased implementation of free flight, beginning with Free Flight Phase 1; (5) under this first phase, FAA and stakeholders have agreed upon the core technologies that are expected to provide these early benefits, as well as the locations where they will be deployed; (6) however, until recently, FAA and many stakeholders have not agreed on how best to conduct a limited operational demonstration of free-flight-related technologies and procedures--known as the Flight 2000 Program; (7) FAA is currently prohibited from spending any fiscal year 1998 funds on the Flight 2000 demonstration itself; (8) stakeholders concurred that FAA had yet to develop a detailed plan for conducting this demonstration; (9) to address the concerns of stakeholders, FAA has been working with them--under the leadership of RTCA--to restructure the Flight 2000 demonstration; and (10) FAA and stakeholders have identified numerous challenges that will need to be met if free flight--including Flight Phase 1 and Flight 2000--is to be implemented cost-effectively: (a) stakeholders told GAO that FAA will need to provide effective leadership and management of the modernization efforts both within and outside the agency; (b) stakeholders cited the need for FAA to further develop its plans for implementing free flight, including establishing clear goals for what it intends to achieve and developing measures for tracking the progress of modernization and free flight; (c) FAA and stakeholders agreed on the need to address outstanding issues related to technology development and deployment; and (d) FAA and stakeholders also identified a range of other challenges that will need the agency's attention, including coordinating FAA's modernization and free flight efforts with those of the international community and integrating the various technologies that will be used under free flight operations with one another as well as into the air traffic control system.