Wildland fires play an important ecological role on the nation’s landscapes. Fires have long shaped the composition of forests and grasslands across every region of the United States, including ponderosa pine forests in the Northwest and the Rocky Mountain West, chaparral in the Southwest, sagebrush steppe in the Great Basin, tallgrass prairies in the Midwest, longleaf pine forests in the South, and the pine barrens of the Atlantic Coast. Fires periodically reduce vegetation densities and stimulate seedling regeneration and growth in some species. Wildland fires can be ignited by lightning or by humans, either accidentally or intentionally. As we have described in previous reports from our body of work on wildland fire management, however, various land use and management practices over the past century—including fire suppression, grazing, and timber harvesting—have reduced the normal frequency of fires in many forest and rangeland ecosystems and have reduced these ecosystems’ resiliency to fire. We have reported that these practices contributed to abnormally dense, continuous accumulations of vegetation, which not only can fuel uncharacteristically large or severe wildland fires but also—with more homes and communities built in or near areas at risk from wildland fire—threaten lives, health, property, and infrastructure. In addition, changing climate conditions, including drier conditions in certain parts of the country, have increased the length and severity of wildfire seasons, according to many scientists and researchers. For example, in the western United States, the average number of days in the fire season increased from approximately 200 in 1980 to approximately 300 in 2013, according to the 2014 Quadrennial Fire Review. In Texas and Oklahoma, the average fire season increased from fewer than 100 days to more than 300 during this time frame. According to the U.S. Global Change Research Program’s 2014 National Climate Assessment, projected climate changes suggest that western forests in the United States will be increasingly affected by large and intense fires that occur more frequently. Figure 1 shows the Forest Service’s assessment of wildfire hazard potential across the country as of 2014. Working collaboratively across federal-nonfederal boundaries to address the wildland fire issue can involve any mix of the nation’s 2.3 billion acres of federal, state, local, private, or tribal lands. Historical settlement and development of the nation resulted in the intermingling of lands among these different entities. As we reported in 2008, about 60 percent of the nation’s land is privately owned and managed, and about 30 percent is managed by five federal land management agencies, with the Forest Service and BLM managing the majority of those lands. Of the remainder, about 8 percent of the nation’s land is owned and managed by state and local governments, and about 2 percent is owned and managed by the federal government for purposes such as military installations and water infrastructure. Under the National Forest Management Act and the Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976, respectively, the Forest Service and BLM manage lands for various uses such as protection of fish and wildlife habitat, forage for livestock, recreation, timber harvesting, and mineral production. FWS and NPS manage federal lands under legislation that primarily calls for conservation; activities such as harvesting timber for commercial use are generally precluded. As noted, BIA is responsible for the administration and management of lands held in trust by the United States for Indian tribes, individuals, and Alaska Natives. Each of the five agencies has regional or state offices that oversee individual field units. State forestry agencies and other nonfederal entities—including tribal, county, city, and rural fire departments—have primary responsibility for managing wildland fires on nonfederal lands, and share responsibility for protecting homes and other private structures. State and local governments can also adopt laws requiring homeowners and homebuilders to take measures to help protect structures from wildland fires. Regulating land use on nonfederal and nontribal lands is primarily a state and local responsibility. The challenge of balancing the benefits of periodic fires with fire’s negative effects on communities is particularly difficult in the WUI. Development in the WUI increased over the last several decades, in turn increasing the risk to life and property from wildland fire. According to the 2014 Quadrennial Fire Review, 60 percent of new homes built in the United States since 1990 were built in the WUI, which contains 46 million single-family homes, representing about 40 percent of single-family homes in the United States. Most development in the WUI occurs on nonfederal lands, and, according to the National Association of State Foresters, approximately 76,000 communities nationwide are considered to be at risk from wildland fire. According to the National Interagency Fire Center, the average number of structures burned by wildfire each year from 1999 through 2015 was 2,750; in 2015 alone, the total number of structures destroyed by wildfire was 4,636, of which 2,638 were residences. In addition to residential development, other assets that support communities can be located in the WUI, including power lines, highways, and resources that provide economic benefits to communities, such as timber, oil and gas wells, and recreational opportunities. WUI communities can be very different from each other—for example, seasonal resort towns located in valleys, with homes in close proximity and surrounded by fire-prone vegetation, or major suburban or metropolitan areas adjacent to wildlands. The risk each community faces also varies depending on such things as the flammability of the vegetation in and around the community, structure location and building materials, and local land use decisions. While the degree of risk can vary from one place to another, under specific conditions, wildfire can affect people and their homes in almost any location where vegetation is found. Even structures not immediately adjacent to wildland vegetation can be vulnerable because wind can transport embers and ignite homes more than a mile from a fire. Figure 2 provides examples of variation across communities by showing characteristics of the communities included in our review. See appendix II for the full text of this graphic. Federal agencies and nonfederal entities collaborate in a variety of ways to reduce the risk of wildland fire before a potential wildland fire incident occurs, through fuel reduction, fire preparedness, prevention, and education activities. In addition, individuals and communities may take action to mitigate fire risk by, for example, using fire-resistant building materials or building in low-risk areas. Collectively, these activities are generally intended to contribute to helping communities become more fire adapted. Fuel reduction—the removal of flammable vegetation that can fuel fires— can reduce the severity of wildland fires that occur, slow fire spread, or otherwise make fires more manageable. Fuel reduction can occur through mechanical treatment (i.e., thinning of trees and underbrush) or planned ignitions (known as prescribed fires), which often replicate the positive effects of naturally occurring wildfire. Federal agencies have collaborated with nonfederal entities to prioritize, plan, and conduct fuel reduction activities. For example, federal agencies have assisted local communities or counties in developing Community Wildfire Protection Plans— documents that outline ways individual communities plan to reduce their risk from wildland fire, such as by identifying priority areas for fuel reduction. Federal agencies have also funded landscape-scale fuel reduction projects that span multiple jurisdictions and include multiple partners. Federal initiatives involving such projects include the Collaborative Forest Landscape Restoration Program and the Reserved Treaty Rights Lands Program. Preparedness activities can help communities protect themselves during a wildland fire by ensuring they have access to fire suppression equipment, personnel, and emergency dispatch services. To prepare for wildfire seasons, federal agencies, states, and others sign agreements— such as State Cooperative Wildland Fire Management and Stafford Act Response Agreements—to document their commitment to coordinate and exchange personnel, equipment, supplies, services, and funds among the agencies for responding to wildland fires. At the local level, federal land management officials may meet with nonfederal entities, such as local fire department officials, ahead of the wildland fire season to discuss roles and responsibilities for wildland fire response and to train together by simulating incident responses. Prevention activities can reduce the likelihood of fires caused by humans. From 2001 through 2011, approximately 85 percent of wildfires in the United States were human-caused, according to the National Interagency Fire Center. Such fires can occur unintentionally—for example, when people burn leaves or trash or leave campfires unattended—or they may be deliberately set. According to research, communities with effective wildfire prevention programs are likely to have fewer human-caused fire starts. To help provide information about fire prevention, federal agencies work with nonfederal entities. For example, under the Cooperative Forest Fire Prevention program, established under the Smokey Bear Act of 1952, the Forest Service works with the National Association of State Foresters and the Ad Council to develop and distribute materials for the Smokey Bear campaign. Education activities can help reduce risk by helping homeowners and communities understand actions they can take to reduce risk. For example, communities may help minimize their risk by reducing vegetation and flammable objects around structures—an activity often called creating defensible space. They also may help minimize their risk by using fire-resistant building materials in construction and building in low-risk areas. To help provide information about these activities, federal agencies worked with stakeholder groups to develop a guide “designed to help leaders, planners, emergency professionals, and citizens learn the best approaches and programs to help their community become more fire adapted.” Some communities have encouraged the use of voluntary programs aimed at improving fire risk awareness and promoting steps to reduce their risk, such as the Firewise Communities program. In addition, some states have adopted legislation to encourage or require wildfire mitigation in high-risk areas. For example, some state and local governments have adopted laws and ordinances requiring property owners to establish and maintain defensible space. Figure 3 shows various actions federal agencies and nonfederal entities may take to reduce wildfire risk in and around communities. Some federal-nonfederal collaboration at the national level encompasses all types of risk-reduction efforts. For example, federal agencies and nonfederal entities participate in the Wildland Fire Leadership Council (WFLC), an intergovernmental committee of federal, tribal, state, county, and municipal government officials. The WFLC is to provide strategic oversight to help ensure policy coordination, accountability, and effective implementation of long-term strategies to address wildfire preparedness and suppression, hazardous fuel reduction, restoration and rehabilitation of the nation’s wildlands, and assistance to communities. After emphasizing the need to suppress all fires for much of the 20th century, federal agencies in recent decades reassessed their approach to wildland fire management. As part of this reassessment, and as a result of several wildfires and associated firefighter fatalities, the agencies developed the Federal Wildland Fire Management Policy of 1995. Under this policy, the agencies sought to make communities and resources less susceptible to damage from wildland fires and to respond to fires to protect communities and important resources at risk while considering the cost and long-term effects of that response. The policy was reaffirmed and updated in 2001, and guidance for its implementation was issued in 2003 and 2009. To address the increase in wildland fires threatening communities, over the past 2 decades, federal land management agencies have also placed greater emphasis on coordinating efforts with nonfederal entities to reduce the risk of fire. For example, in 2000, the President asked the Secretaries of Agriculture and the Interior to submit a report on managing the impact of wildland fires on communities and the environment. The report, along with congressional approval of increased appropriations for wildland fire management for fiscal year 2001, as well as other related activities, formed the basis of what is known as the National Fire Plan. As part of this effort, Congress directed the Secretaries of Agriculture and the Interior to work with state governors to develop a strategy. The resulting strategy—the 10-Year Comprehensive Strategy—was developed by federal, state, tribal, and local government and nongovernmental representatives and outlined a collaborative framework to facilitate implementation of proactive and protective measures to reduce the risk of wildland fire to communities and the environment. For example, the strategy recognized that while suppressing fires—especially near homes and communities—is important, a continued shift in fire management emphasis from reactive to proactive is also important in order to address the root of the problem rather than react only when faced with costly emergencies. Specifically, the strategy emphasized, among other things, the importance of reducing human-caused fires through fire-prevention education, increasing incentives for private landowners to address defensible space and fuel reduction on private property through local land use policies, promoting local government initiatives to implement fire- sensitive land use planning, and prioritizing fuel reduction where the negative impacts of wildland fire are greatest. As noted, in 2014, the federal agencies, in collaboration with partners from multiple jurisdictions, issued the Cohesive Strategy. The vision of the Cohesive Strategy is “to safely and effectively extinguish fire, when needed; use fire where allowable; manage our natural resources; and as a nation, live with wildland fire.” The Cohesive Strategy identified three goals: (1) landscapes across all jurisdictions are resilient to fire-related disturbances in accordance with management objectives, (2) human populations and infrastructure can withstand wildfire without loss of life or property, and (3) all jurisdictions participate in developing and implementing safe, effective, and efficient risk-based wildfire management decisions. The Cohesive Strategy calls for a set of national outcome measures to assess progress in meeting these goals. Since 2003, Congress has passed several laws aimed at actions federal agencies can take to reduce wildland fire risk across federal and nonfederal jurisdictions. For example, the Good Neighbor Authority contained in the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2014, authorizes the Forest Service and BLM to enter into agreements allowing states to perform watershed restoration activities, including hazardous fuel reduction projects, on federal lands when the state is performing similar activities on adjacent state or private lands. In addition, the Tribal Forest Protection Act of 2004 authorizes the Secretaries of Agriculture and the Interior to enter into agreements or contracts with Indian tribes to carry out projects to protect Indian forest lands. See appendix III for additional details about these and other relevant laws. Federal officials and stakeholders we interviewed identified federal authorities, agency initiatives, joint community-level planning, leadership, community engagement, and agency resources for collaboration as directly affecting federal-nonfederal collaboration aimed at reducing wildland fire risk to communities. In some cases these factors enhanced collaboration, according to officials, while in other cases they hindered collaboration. Federal officials and stakeholders also identified factors that indirectly affect federal and nonfederal collaboration to reduce wildland fire risk in the WUI. These included community education, fire prevention messaging, and state and local requirements for private property owners to reduce risk. Many federal officials and stakeholders said that certain federal legal authorities that allow federal agencies to work across jurisdictions with nonfederal entities facilitate federal-nonfederal collaboration to reduce wildland fire risk. Among the specific authorities they mentioned were the Good Neighbor Authority and the Tribal Forest Protection Act of 2004. For example, under the Good Neighbor Authority, the Forest Service and BLM may enter into cooperative agreements or contracts with states to allow the parties to conduct restoration and forest management activities across jurisdictional boundaries. Using this authority, the Forest Service’s Eldorado National Forest and the California Department of Forestry and Fire Protection signed an agreement in 2016 allowing the agencies to work together on large-scale fuel reduction projects that both entities identified as critical to meeting fire protection objectives. The agreement is to allow the agencies to complete treatment on 500 acres located in the WUI along a major highway corridor between Sacramento and Lake Tahoe where five major wildfires have burned in the last 40 years. According to Forest Service officials, as of October 2016, the agency had executed 54 agreements using the Good Neighbor Authority in 20 states. The Tribal Forest Protection Act of 2004 authorizes the Secretaries of Agriculture and the Interior to enter into agreements or contracts with Indian tribes that meet certain criteria in order to carry out projects to protect Indian forest lands. Using this authority, the White Mountain Apache Tribe and the Forest Service’s Apache-Sitgreaves National Forest in Arizona completed the Los Burros Project on the national forest, which borders the Fort Apache Indian Reservation. According to BIA’s Fort Apache Agency officials, the project was important for reducing the risk of fire spreading onto the reservation from adjacent national forest land. According to Forest Service officials, as of November 2016, six projects had been completed using this authority, and at least six more were ongoing. Some federal officials and stakeholders said that federal and nonfederal entities are reluctant to use the Good Neighbor Authority and the Tribal Forest Protection Act of 2004 because the authorities are unclear or because not all agency staff are aware of how to use them. Forest Service headquarters officials said that since 2015, they have taken steps to provide greater clarity about using the authorities. For example, they said that Forest Service staff hosted webinars in 2015 about resources available to facilitate the use of the Good Neighbor Authority and that the agency’s website provides links to agreement templates, agency contacts, and training materials for federal and nonfederal employees working to develop agreements under this authority. Regarding the use of the Tribal Forest Protection Act of 2004, Forest Service officials said they partnered with the Intertribal Timber Council to improve working relationships with tribes and accomplish more cross-boundary landscape level restoration. According to Forest Service officials, they conducted workshops on the use of this authority in three forest service regions in 2015 and 2016, which they said contributed to six new projects pursued using the authority. Federal officials and stakeholders identified other federal and state environmental laws, including the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) and the Clean Air Act, as affecting their efforts to collaborate to reduce risk. For example, some federal officials and stakeholders said that the time it takes federal agencies to complete the NEPA process can hamper joint efforts. As we have previously reported, NEPA environmental reviews have been identified by critics as a cause of delay for projects due to time-consuming environmental analysis requirements, while they have been praised by proponents for, among other things, bringing public participation into government decision making. We also found that little data exist on the costs and benefits of NEPA analysis. With respect to the Clean Air Act, see appendix IV for additional information about the act and its effect on risk-reducing activities. Several federal officials and stakeholders identified landscape-scale restoration efforts and other programs that cross jurisdictional boundaries as helpful in bolstering collaboration to reduce wildland fire risk to communities. Among the efforts mentioned were the Department of Agriculture’s Joint Chiefs’ Landscape Restoration Partnership and BIA’s Reserved Treaty Rights Lands Program. In addition, many federal officials and stakeholders identified the Cohesive Strategy as enhancing federal-nonfederal collaboration to reduce wildland fire risk to communities. The Forest Service and the Natural Resources Conservation Service (NRCS) within the Department of Agriculture initiated the Joint Chiefs’ Landscape Restoration Partnership program in 2014 to improve the health and resilience of forest ecosystems where public and private lands meet. The program’s objectives include reducing wildfire threats to communities and landowners. In 2017, the Department of Agriculture is to invest in 10 new projects under the program while providing funding to 26 existing projects. The projects are located in 29 states across the country. For example, in 2016, the Forest Service and NRCS selected the Greater La Pine Basin project in Central Oregon as a recipient of funding under the program. The project is to take place over 3 years and is to target restoration on nearly 345,000 acres of federal, state, and private land. NRCS is to offer assistance to private landowners conducting fuel reduction treatments, while the Forest Service is to perform similar treatments on the project area located within the Deschutes National Forest. Figure 4 shows an example of tree thinning in the Greater La Pine Basin in Oregon. In 2015, BIA initiated the Reserved Treaty Rights Lands Program to treat and restore tribal landscapes within and adjacent to reserved treaty rights lands. Through this program, tribes may participate in and leverage funding for collaborative projects with nontribal landowners to enhance the health of priority tribal natural resources at high risk from wildland fire and move tribal landscapes toward long-term resilience to wildland fire. In fiscal year 2016, Interior directed $10 million toward the program, which funded 21 projects. In addition, many officials and stakeholders said that the Cohesive Strategy, issued in 2014, enhances collaboration because it emphasizes the importance of coordination across multiple agencies through an “all lands approach” and frames comprehensive goals that, taken together, may mitigate wildland fire risk. As noted, the Cohesive Strategy identified three goals: (1) landscapes across all jurisdictions are resilient to fire- related disturbances in accordance with management objectives, (2) human populations and infrastructure can withstand wildfire without loss of life or property, and (3) all jurisdictions participate in developing and implementing safe, effective, and efficient risk-based wildfire management decisions. Unlike the other initiatives described above, implementation of the Cohesive Strategy is not separately funded because the agencies do not consider it a program. One stakeholder involved in its implementation described the Cohesive Strategy as a framework designed to be applied differently in various locations and scales to best suit a particular circumstance or address a need or opportunity, rather than a one-size-fits-all approach. Even with these officials and stakeholders citing the Cohesive Strategy as enhancing collaboration, however, many officials and stakeholders also stated that improvements could be made to its implementation, as we discuss later in this report. Many federal officials and stakeholders said that joint planning, including prioritizing and developing community plans and regularly sharing information regarding wildland fire issues in person, has enhanced collaboration to reduce wildland fire risk to communities. For example, several federal officials and stakeholders said that developing annual operating plans—which outline roles, responsibilities, and resources involved in wildland fire management—between federal and nonfederal entities has been helpful for collaborating on fire preparedness activities. In addition, many federal officials and stakeholders said developing Community Wildfire Protection Plans (CWPP)—which outline ways communities aim to reduce their risk from wildland fire by, for example, prioritizing areas for fuel reduction in or near the community—enhances collaboration. Communities are not required to develop CWPPs, but when they do, the Healthy Forests Restoration Act of 2003 directs that CWPPs be developed collaboratively by local and state government representatives, in consultation with federal agencies and other interested parties. Under the act, agencies can prioritize funding for fuel reduction projects that implement CWPPs. Communities may benefit from CWPPs in several ways. For example, according to a 2015 Forest Stewards Guild report, CWPPs provide a structure for collaboration and building community capacity. The report also suggested that fuel reduction treatments completed in New Mexico communities with CWPPs have changed fire behavior, and that projects identified in CWPPs are less likely to be canceled or postponed compared to projects conducted in areas without CWPPs. Eldorado National Forest officials said that a CWPP completed in 2016 that covers an area managed by state, federal, and private landowners has helped enhance collaboration with community members to reduce risk because participants came together to jointly determine priority projects, including the placement of fuel reduction treatments. In addition, Florida state forestry officials said they used information from CWPPs to develop their statewide wildland fire risk assessment. According to these officials, the assessment helps identify communities at high risk and inform state land management decisions. Some federal officials and stakeholders also said that regularly sharing information about wildland fire issues in person can enhance collaboration to reduce wildland fire risk. For example, community members near the Eldorado National Forest said that pre-season wildland fire response training simulations, which included approximately 15 federal and nonfederal entities, helped participants develop relationships and gain a better understanding of each stakeholder’s responsibilities and concerns ahead of a potential wildland fire. These community members said that after participating in one such simulation, the state highway patrol agency began to understand the community’s concerns about impediments to safe evacuation. In addition, meeting regularly to discuss wildland fire risk reduction also helps create and facilitate collaboration, according to some officials from federal and nonfederal entities. For example, a Deschutes County official in Oregon said he participates in monthly meetings with BLM officials and community members to exchange information about upcoming activities, including efforts to reduce risk from wildland fire. He also said such meetings help develop and maintain trust between federal and nonfederal entities. Similarly, a study titled Fighting Fires with Education reported that in-person communication can increase community mitigation efforts. Many federal officials and stakeholders said that dedicated federal agency and community leadership enhances collaboration to reduce wildland fire risk to communities. Federal officials and stakeholders characterized leadership as seeking input from others, providing encouragement and support, committing, and collaborating. For example, according to Eldorado National Forest officials, leaders who actively seek input from multiple perspectives, including those with whom they may not agree, help strengthen relationships. Merritt Island National Wildlife Refuge officials said agency management’s encouragement to engage in partnerships helps employees initiate collaboration with nonfederal entities. Some Forest Service officials said that committed leaders who stay in their positions over a long period can help sustain relationships, which in turn help partners accomplish their goals of reducing wildland fire risk. For example, an Apache-Sitgreaves National Forest official said the length of time he has been at the forest—about 30 years—has helped him develop strong relationships with community members. In addition, federal officials and community members said that engaged leaders enhance federal- nonfederal collaboration. For example, Eldorado National Forest officials said that the forest supervisor, who respects community members with differing views, has helped the forest successfully complete NEPA requirements for fuel reduction projects. A National Association of Counties representative said that having federal officials who are willing to engage with communities by providing frequent updates about agency risk reduction efforts shows people that federal officials consider themselves part of the community; in doing so, they can help reduce communities’ risk of wildland fire. Similarly, a Forest Service official said that in cases in which federal, state, and local representatives work together, mitigation actions are more likely to occur and be sustained. Community members in Southern California cited an example of leadership they said enhanced collaboration. These community members said officials from NPS’ Santa Monica Mountains National Recreation Area initiated a meeting with local agencies in early 2016 to address public concern regarding standing dead oak trees in the area. Some of these characteristics align with a set of leading practices we previously identified as enhancing collaboration. For example, we previously found that, while collaborative mechanisms differ in complexity and scope, they all benefit from certain key features, including leadership. Many federal officials and stakeholders said an engaged community— that is, a community that understands the issues associated with wildland fire and is willing to take action to reduce risk—enhances federal- nonfederal collaboration to reduce wildland fire risk. According to federal officials and stakeholders, communities tend to be more engaged in wildland fire risk reduction activities if they have experienced recent fires, have resources to carry out risk reduction projects, and have a group of stakeholders from multiple jurisdictions dedicated to working collaboratively on wildland fire risk reduction. According to a 2013 Forest Service report, efforts to create and maintain fire-adapted communities must involve the entire community—including residents, government agencies, emergency responders, businesses, land managers, and others—if these efforts are to succeed. Officials and stakeholders provided examples of actions on the part of engaged communities, including working to identify priority locations and actions for reducing risk, creating defensible space on properties, and establishing WUI codes and ordinances aimed at reducing risk. Several federal officials and community members said that communities that have recently experienced nearby wildfires are often more eager to take action and work with federal agencies to reduce risk. For example, community members in Calabasas, California, and Topanga, California, said they created a multiagency fire council after the Old Topanga Fire in 1993, which burned about 18,000 acres, destroyed 359 homes, and resulted in three deaths. The community members said that working together through the council has helped them provide wildland fire education to community members and implement fuel reduction projects. FWS officials said that agencies and others should harness this interest in reducing risk because once a fire ends and time has passed, some community members may no longer feel the same urgency to reduce risk. In 2015, the Forest Service started a pilot program that officials said tries to take advantage of the “teachable moment” in communities recently affected by wildfires by deploying a “Community Mitigation Assistance Team” to these communities. Forest Service officials said the team focuses on, among other things, risk mitigation education and building local capacity to undertake mitigation actions. Some federal officials and stakeholders also said communities that have access to financial or other resources tend to be more engaged in carrying out risk-reduction projects. For example, Oregon Department of Forestry officials said state funding has helped establish collaborative groups, consisting of diverse stakeholders, that focus on forest-related issues around the state. California officials said federal grant funds aimed at community risk reduction help communities purchase equipment for fuel reduction projects, thereby keeping these communities engaged in mitigation efforts. Some officials and stakeholders also said it can be helpful when communities have a designated person assigned to work on wildland fire mitigation by facilitating coordination, communication, activities, and projects aimed at reducing risk. For example, Deschutes County in Oregon hired a forester who is dedicated to collaborating with the community to reduce risk, providing education about risk reduction, and initiating and implementing fuel reduction projects, among other duties. Similarly, the Forest Stewards Guild reported in 2015 that having dedicated WUI specialists helped accelerate fuel reduction work and expand public outreach in a county in New Mexico. In addition, community engagement increases when groups of stakeholders from multiple jurisdictions are involved, according to BIA headquarters officials we interviewed. For example, 27 states have prescribed fire councils, in which federal agencies, nonfederal entities, and others gather to discuss priority areas for fuel reduction treatments and adopting building codes to mitigate wildfire risk, among other issues. In contrast, some federal officials and stakeholders identified several potential impediments to community engagement. For example, some federal officials in certain areas said that residents are resistant to government intervention, including requirements that they take steps to reduce their risk on their own properties. On the other hand, an NPS official and stakeholders from western Colorado said some people expect firefighters to intervene and save their homes, and as a result these residents are not interested in taking steps to reduce risk. Furthermore, other stakeholders said that some residents resist fuel reduction treatments because they perceive the treatments as damaging the environment or because they want the privacy provided by the vegetation near their homes. Additionally, some federal officials and stakeholders said the public’s tolerance of smoke from prescribed burns can be limited, which results in fewer prescribed fire treatments. Many federal officials and stakeholders said that the availability of agency resources, including funds provided to states and localities as well as funding for agency activities, affects federal-nonfederal collaboration to reduce wildland fire risk to communities and federal efforts to reduce wildland fire risk more broadly. Regarding funding for states and localities, federal officials and stakeholders cited cooperative agreements and grants provided under the Forest Service’s State Fire Assistance (SFA) and Volunteer Fire Assistance (VFA) programs, and Interior’s assistance aimed at rural fire districts and communities, as helping communities in their efforts to reduce risk. For example, the Forest Service’s SFA program provides financial assistance through partnership agreements with state foresters for fire management activities, including helping communities become fire adapted. According to the Forest Service’s fiscal year 2017 budget justification, SFA is a critical part of the agency’s efforts to reduce wildland fire risk to communities, residents, property, and firefighters, because the program helps ensure that state, local, and private landowners have the capacity and tools they need to prepare for, respond to, and mitigate fire risk in the WUI and other critical areas. (See app. V for descriptions of selected federal programs that provide risk- reduction funding to states and localities.) Several federal officials and stakeholders said the uncertainty of federal funding through grants and assistance makes some nonfederal entities reluctant to undertake joint efforts to reduce risk. For example, California state officials said that landowners and other nonfederal entities may be reluctant to commit to joint efforts because federal funding may decrease, resulting in incomplete projects. In addition, several federal officials and stakeholders said that, in contrast to the cost-sharing mechanisms available for fire suppression activities, leveraging dollars for fuel reduction projects can be difficult because no standard procedures or agreements exist for sharing costs for such projects. According to a senior official from the National Association of State Foresters, state and federal agencies drafted a new “Supplemental Project Agreement” appendix for the Master Cooperative Wildland Fire Management and Stafford Act Response Agreement template that includes standard procedures and agreements for sharing costs associated with non- suppression projects, such as fuel reduction projects. As of February 2017, the updated Master Agreement template was undergoing review and awaiting final approval from the Departments of Agriculture and the Interior. Many federal officials and stakeholders expressed concern about the amount of funding available for risk-reducing activities carried out by the agencies. Some federal officials and stakeholders said the growing percentage of Forest Service funding spent to suppress fire has hampered the agencies’ ability to invest in activities on federally managed lands that may reduce risk. Similarly, several Interior officials said that Interior’s funding reductions, and shifts in wildland fire management priorities over the past 2 years to include a greater emphasis on sagebrush steppe ecosystems, have affected their ability to carry out wildland fire risk reduction activities. The officials also said that proposed changes to the department’s process for determining funding distribution to its four agencies may have similar effects. Funding constraints can have various effects, according to officials and stakeholders. For example, Forest Service officials said that limiting agency travel can reduce the agency’s ability to establish or maintain collaborative relationships with nonfederal entities. Forest Service officials also said that fire prevention efforts have been diminished in cases in which the agency has eliminated fire prevention positions or not filled them when they became vacant. A BIA official said that decreased fuel reduction funding reduced the number of acres the agency could treat on the Warm Springs Indian Reservation. Many federal officials and stakeholders identified other factors that indirectly affect federal-nonfederal collaboration to reduce wildland fire risk in the WUI. These include community education, fire prevention messaging, and state and local requirements for private property owners to take steps to reduce risk. Many federal officials and stakeholders identified community education efforts, such as the Firewise program and individual home risk assessments, as helping reduce community wildland fire risk. Some federal officials and stakeholders said Firewise, which encourages homeowners to take responsibility for their own properties by using fire resistant building materials and establishing defensible space, has helped reduce risk through community education. For example, a Florida Forest Service official said the Firewise program helped communicate to communities across the state the importance of reducing wildland fire risk. This official said the Firewise program works well in the state because it primarily relies on voluntary action rather than regulations. Figure 5 shows an example of a Firewise presentation at a community event and an advertisement for a Firewise event. Federal officials also said they have used the Ready, Set, Go! program to educate the public. For example, officials from the Apache-Sitgreaves National Forest in Arizona said they use this program to help members of the public understand actions they can take to prepare for a wildland fire incident, such as making sure car gas tanks are at least half full so that homeowners can evacuate quickly in case of a wildfire. Some federal officials said that conducting property risk assessments has been helpful to educate property owners about the steps they can take to reduce their risk of wildland fire. For example, BIA officials said fire managers at the Fort Apache Indian Reservation reach out to homeowners individually to teach them about risk-reducing actions they could take based on their home’s characteristics; these actions could include clearing vegetation or relocating firewood to a spot away from their home. BIA officials said that because they make the effort to reach people at home, rather than provide general information to the broader public, homeowners are more likely to undertake risk-reducing activities pertinent to their homes. However, some officials said homeowners are not always receptive to having their properties evaluated, and some stakeholders said not all counties can afford to conduct risk assessments and not all homeowners want to pay to create defensible space. More broadly, a Forest Service headquarters official said that, while community education has been successful in increasing awareness about reducing risk, it does not necessarily result in individuals or communities taking action. In addition, this official said programs such as Firewise have increased risk awareness, but the extent of the risk reduction is unclear. To help address this, the official said the agency expects to complete a study in late 2017 that examines mitigation actions resulting from the Firewise program; the Forest Service is conducting this study in partnership with the National Wildfire Coordinating Group, the Wildland Urban Interface Mitigation Committee, and the National Association of State Foresters. Also, this Forest Service official said the agency and the National Fire Protection Association are discussing making changes to the Firewise program to emphasize mitigation actions. Another factor that several federal officials and stakeholders identified as helping reduce wildland fire risk to communities is providing both consistent and targeted messaging to prevent human-caused wildfires. Regarding consistent prevention messaging, Forest Service officials said that numerous federal and state agencies in the western United States have used the One Less Spark–One Less Wildfire campaign, which started in California in 2012 and has since been used in other states. In addition, some federal officials we spoke with said they use the Smokey Bear campaign and materials as part of fire prevention efforts in their communities. A community in Arizona, which attracts recreation visitors but is prone to fires, created a working group to improve the consistency of local fire prevention messages. Specifically, officials from the Apache-Sitgreaves National Forest, the BIA Fort Apache Agency, surrounding counties, the Pinetop-Lakeside community, and other entities formed the White Mountain Fire Restrictions Working Group. Working group members said they issue unified, cross-jurisdictional fire restrictions (i.e., limitations on activities such as building campfires or using fireworks) to help ensure the consistency of information provided to the public. According to working group members, before they formed this group, the area was at greater risk of human-caused fire because each jurisdiction issued its own level of fire restriction, which led to public confusion because the fire restrictions often differed across jurisdictions. Working group members said that as a result of their efforts, the risk of fire has decreased because the public is less confused about where and when fire-related activities can be conducted. Regarding targeted fire prevention messaging, Forest Service officials cited National Fire Prevention Education Teams as an example of federal-nonfederal efforts to provide targeted fire prevention information. These officials said the National Wildfire Coordinating Group sends teams—which may include members from the Departments of Agriculture and the Interior, states, and others—to areas at high risk of wildland fire to raise awareness of actions communities can take to reduce their risk. According to the National Interagency Fire Center, these teams can help reduce the loss of human life, property, and resources. They can also improve interagency relations. BIA officials said that, in part because of targeted efforts aimed at reducing arson, the number of human-caused fires on the Fort Apache Indian Reservation in Arizona decreased from several hundred in 2004 to 40 in 2016. BIA officials estimated that these types of efforts also helped reduce the number of fires caused by youths on the Warm Springs Indian Reservation in Oregon from 17 in 2009 to 2 in 2016. A study conducted by the Forest Service and Interior agencies found that large-scale wildfire prevention programs on tribal lands are highly effective and such programs have reduced the number of wildfire ignitions caused by campfire escapes, arson, and youth-ignited wildfires, among others. Several federal officials and stakeholders noted that state and local laws governing home location, construction, and landscaping can reduce wildland fire risk to communities. Some states and local governments require homeowners in certain locations to use fire-resistant building materials or to create a certain amount of “defensible space” around structures on their properties by removing or reducing potentially flammable vegetation. For example, under Oregon’s Forestland-Urban Interface Fire Protection Act, property owners in identified forestland- urban interface areas must reduce excess vegetation around structures and along driveways that can fuel a fire. According to Oregon state officials, the law, at the time of our review, was applicable to 17 of Oregon’s 36 counties identified as having a higher wildland fire risk. Oregon state officials said it is helpful that the state legislature recognizes the need for individual homeowner action in risk mitigation, and they said they are reviewing the law to determine ways it could be improved. California state law also requires property owners in certain areas to maintain a specified amount of defensible space around structures. Local governments in several states have codes or ordinances aimed at wildland fire risk reduction by requiring fire resistant building materials, requiring the creation of defensible space, or limiting where homes can be built. For example, the San Diego, California, municipal code’s Landscape Regulations aim to reduce the risk of fire through site design and management of flammable vegetation. An official from the National Association of Counties said that local policies promoting resiliency and fire readiness through building codes and zoning ordinances can be helpful but also resource intensive. As a result, this official said, county decision-makers should weigh the costs of requiring such actions against the benefits gained through reduced risk. Forest Service headquarters officials said codes and ordinances can help reduce wildland fire risk in some circumstances, but they said no data are available to show what type of community planning is instrumental in reducing risk. These officials also noted that taking action does not guarantee that a home will be spared, given the conditions and severity of a fire. According to a nonfederal researcher we interviewed, it is also helpful when communities integrate actions or requirements to reduce risk into comprehensive county land-use plans. For example, the Community Planning Assistance for Wildfire program, established in 2015 by Headwaters Economics and Wildfire Planning International, is a grant program that works with communities to help reduce wildfire risk through improved land-use planning. In Wenatchee, Washington, the program developed recommendations to help the community improve its land-use plans specific to its wildland fire risk. While the community has high- frequency fires, they are not high intensity and most are grass fires, though many buildings have been lost in recent fires. Through the program, community planners determined that it was unnecessary to require the entire community to use fire-resistant building materials and create defensible space; instead, they decided to place such requirements on homes located in the community’s highest risk areas. Federal officials and stakeholders we interviewed said that improving implementation of the Cohesive Strategy, increasing collaborative planning, expanding education, increasing prevention efforts, and improving local timber-processing capabilities could improve federal agencies’ and nonfederal entities’ ability to reduce wildland fire risk to communities. Officials and stakeholders also identified actions that, while not necessarily within federal agencies’ control, could help reduce wildland fire risk to communities. These include increasing state and local adoption of laws and ordinances that encourage fire-resistant building and landscaping and that limit development in certain areas, and providing insurance incentives to encourage property owners and communities to adopt risk-reducing measures. Many federal officials and stakeholders said that improving the implementation of the Cohesive Strategy could help reduce wildland fire risk to communities. For example, some stakeholders said that federal agencies could improve communication about the Cohesive Strategy, which could further its implementation. One such stakeholder said that he believes some federal land management officials still have not heard of the Cohesive Strategy (issued in 2014), and that roles and responsibilities for implementing the strategy are not well defined at the national level. Some officials and stakeholders said it is important to increase accountability for implementing the Cohesive Strategy, such as through the use of performance measures as part of implementing the strategy. The Cohesive Strategy states that its successful implementation depends in part on monitoring and accountability, noting that “A set of national outcome performance measures will allow Congress, the national wildland fire management community, and other stakeholders to monitor and assess progress toward achieving the results for each of the three national goals.” This emphasis on monitoring and accountability is consistent with key characteristics we have described for developing and implementing effective national strategies. Likewise, one of the key collaboration practices we have identified is that federal agencies engaged in collaborative efforts should develop mechanisms to monitor, evaluate, and report on results. We found that reporting on these activities can help key decision makers within the agencies, as well as clients and stakeholders, obtain feedback for improving both policy and operational effectiveness. The agencies use “success stories” to share what they consider successful or effective efforts at implementing the Cohesive Strategy. However, the success stories we reviewed focus on individual projects or efforts and do not generally indicate the role, if any, that the Cohesive Strategy played or describe the extent to which the projects or efforts have individually or cumulatively contributed to achieving the strategy’s goals. More broadly, the Wildland Fire Leadership Council (WFLC)—the interagency organization responsible for oversight and leadership in implementing the Cohesive Strategy (and which includes the Forest Service and Interior as members)—has not developed measures to assess progress on the part of federal and nonfederal participants in meeting the national goals of the Cohesive Strategy. According to a December 2016 WFLC report, a performance measure task group was convened in January 2013 and proposed several performance measures that could be used to track progress in achieving the broad goals of the Cohesive Strategy. One such measure was the percentage of communities at risk with a high probability of withstanding wildfire without loss of life and infrastructure; this measure was intended to assess the extent to which the threat to communities at risk from wildfire had decreased. However, the Wildland Fire Executive Council, a former advisory council to WFLC, concluded that, while performance information for many of the 2013 task group’s proposed measures could be collected using reporting measures the agencies already had in place, fully implementing the proposed performance measures would likely place undue burden on the agencies and nonfederal partners. The Forest Service and Interior each have performance measures to monitor and assess their wildland fire management efforts. For example, one of Interior’s performance measures is the amount of fuel reduction conducted in the WUI, which is consistent with the Cohesive Strategy’s emphasis on resilient landscapes. However, these agency measures are intended to separately assess each agency’s performance—or, in some cases the performance of specific programs—and do not represent the set of measures to assess national progress toward meeting the Cohesive Strategy’s goals, as called for in the strategy. The 2016 WFLC report states that the use of research findings, remote sensing, and modelling can help quantify the effects of activities over time and can contribute to showing accountability and success in meeting the goals of the Cohesive Strategy. Because the report was issued in December 2016, Forest Service and Interior officials said they have not had sufficient time to determine which, if any, research findings can be useful in this effort. By working with their WFLC partners to develop measures, the Forest Service and Interior could better assess national progress toward achieving the goals of the Cohesive Strategy. Many federal officials and stakeholders said increasing collaborative planning could help reduce fire risk to communities. Several federal officials and stakeholders said such planning could occur by developing or improving CWPPs, and some said increasing the frequency of collaborative in-person meetings ahead of fire seasons could help reduce risk. These suggested actions align with a 2013 Forest Service study that found that, while individual homeowner actions are essential to reduce the potential for wildfire damage to property, it is also critical for entire communities to work together on a broader planning and development scale. Regarding CWPPs, some officials and stakeholders said that more communities developing CWPPs and taking steps to improve their usefulness could enhance collaborative efforts to reduce wildland fire risk to communities. The National Association of State Foresters estimates that, as of fiscal year 2015, about 20 percent of the approximately 76,000 communities identified as being at risk from fire were covered by a CWPP. Because it is helpful to collaboratively plan, a stakeholder with the Northeast Regional Cohesive Strategy Committee said the committee is encouraging more communities to develop CWPPs or equivalent plans and to make collaborative planning a priority. In addition, some stakeholders said that updating and assessing CWPPs is important to maintaining their usefulness because some are outdated and many are not comprehensive, suggesting that the plans do not reflect changing circumstances such as increased housing development or altered landscape conditions. Community members in Southern California said their CWPP states that the plan should be updated every 5 years, or sooner if social, political, or economic factors warrant. This language aligns with the Forest Service’s Best Management Practices for Creating a Community Wildfire Protection Plan, which includes as a best practice to “quickly identify changes affecting the CWPP and adapt the plan to new conditions as they arise.” In some locations we visited, we found that CWPPs outlined communities’ plans to monitor and evaluate their risk-reduction efforts every 5 years or on an annual basis, such as in Central Oregon’s Greater La Pine CWPP. Forest Service and Interior officials said they participate in community efforts to develop and implement CWPPs, but they said it is not their role to direct communities about how and when to develop and maintain CWPPs or to oversee their implementation. As another way to improve collaborative planning, a senior NPS official and community members in California said the frequency of collaborative in-person meetings ahead of fire seasons should increase. For example, these community members said it would be beneficial to resume pre-fire season meetings that the community formerly held with local fire chiefs, state and county officials, and Eldorado National Forest officials, during which participants discussed issues such as resources and evacuation plans in the event of a wildfire. These community members said these meetings were a good way to foster trust and develop relationships, thereby increasing the chances of a successful response in the event of a wildland fire. Many federal officials and stakeholders said that expanding the amount of education provided to communities about the benefits of wildland fire and the steps individuals can take to reduce their risk could help reduce wildland fire risk to communities. Some stakeholders said it is important to provide more education on the ecological role of fire and the benefits it can provide. For example, a representative of the Southern Group of State Foresters said it would be helpful for private landowners across the United States to understand the benefits of prescribed burning because this could help landowners reduce risk on their properties and become more accepting of prescribed burning as a treatment on adjacent public lands. Some federal officials and stakeholders also said that expanding education about mitigation steps communities and individuals can take can help reduce risk. For example, some federal officials and stakeholders said sharing success stories about ways communities have reduced their wildland fire risk could help increase awareness about actions other communities could take. Some community members also said that tailored and more creative public education materials (i.e., those that reflect the unique topography, vegetation, culture, and building type of a particular community) describing steps individuals can take to reduce their wildland fire risk could prompt homeowners to act. For example, community members in Estes Park, Colorado, said that their county’s Firewise materials were tailored to reflect the community’s characteristics. These community members said the Colorado State Forest Service has provided such materials to counties in Colorado for approximately 20 years. According to 2006 and 2013 Forest Service reports, among the key ingredients for successful educational programs are publications that are geared toward specific geographic areas, as well as varied educational approaches and information pathways that meet differing learning styles. Some federal officials and stakeholders said that a clearinghouse that provides information about resources could help communities better understand actions they could take to reduce their risk. Interior Office of Wildland Fire officials said that a cooperative effort between the Forest Service and the Interior agencies resulted in a website, www.forestsandrangelands.gov, that provides fire, fuels, and land management information to government officials, land and fire management professionals, businesses, communities, and other interested organizations and individuals. Many federal officials and stakeholders said that increasing fire prevention efforts could help reduce wildland fire risk to communities, because many wildland fires are caused by humans. According to the National Interagency Fire Center, from 2001 to 2011, approximately 85 percent of wildland fires in the United States were caused by humans. Some federal officials we interviewed said consistent prevention messaging across locations, such as through the nationwide Smokey Bear campaign, is important; this is because it helps the public identify with the message no matter where they travel. Federal officials said that, in addition, targeting prevention messages to specific groups is important because the origin of human-caused fires varies depending on the location and characteristics of the community. For example, some areas may have more instances of juvenile arson, while other areas may have more instances of campers not fully extinguishing their campfires. A senior Forest Service official said that communities can benefit from developing prevention plans that identify a targeted prevention audience. Otherwise, this official said, communities and federal officials “throw darts at a board” rather than targeting prevention efforts at specific fire-causing activities unique to a particular area. Similarly, Oregon Department of Forestry officials said that better studies and analyses on how human- caused fires start could help target prevention efforts. Both Forest Service and Interior officials, however, said limited resources affect their ability to take additional steps to increase targeted prevention messaging. Many community and tribal members said that improving their timber- processing capability could help reduce wildland fire risk. Some said that their community’s timber-processing capability no longer exists, thereby affecting the market for timber or other materials removed as part of fuel reduction projects. Community members in northern California said limited timber-processing capability affects their ability to process the vegetation removed as part of fuel reduction efforts. Because timber is valuable to some communities, the ability to process it can help support jobs and the local economy. Apache-Sitgreaves National Forest officials in Arizona cited the usefulness of establishing biomass processing facilities near communities, noting that such facilities located near the neighboring community of Snowflake have helped facilitate a local timber- processing market. One stakeholder said a more developed biomass industry could help reduce wildland fire risk by providing an outlet for removed vegetation but noted that it is a more localized solution that may not work in every community. The Forest Service has multiple efforts aimed at maintaining and spurring the timber industry. For example, through its Wood Innovations grant program, formerly known as the “Woody Biomass Utilization Grant” program, the Forest Service has awarded grants to stimulate widespread use of forest byproducts for renewable energy, wood products, and innovative wood building materials. From fiscal years 2005 through 2016, the program awarded more than $54 million to more than 200 grant recipients, including small businesses, non-profit organizations, tribes, and state agencies. Many federal officials and stakeholders said that increased state and local adoption of laws and ordinances that encourage fire-resistant building and the removal of potentially flammable vegetation around structures could help reduce wildland fire risk. Some stakeholders also said that local nonfederal land-use plans should discourage development in areas at high risk from wildland fire. A 2013 Forest Service study found that 91 percent of WUI residents interviewed in California, where defensible space ordinances are in place, have lowered fire risk by removing flammable vegetation from their properties. Community members in western Colorado said it would be helpful if communities that develop such ordinances track their effectiveness in reducing wildland fire risk and publicize the results to help other communities make informed decisions about implementing their own ordinances. Community members in central Florida said that without such ordinances, homeowners and developers are less likely to take steps to reduce their risk. Some stakeholders said that increasing communities’ responsibility for the costs of suppressing fires could create an incentive for communities to take actions to reduce their wildland fire risk. One state recently took action to create such an incentive. In 2016, the Utah state legislature passed a law under which the state will assume certain wildland fire suppression costs for local governments that implement prevention, preparedness, and mitigation actions to reduce the risk and cost of wildfire. Local governments that do not implement such actions will be responsible for wildland fire costs within their jurisdictions. This new law was developed with the involvement of the Utah Association of Counties, the Utah League of Cities and Towns, the Utah State Fire Chiefs Association, local fire departments, various policy workgroups, and others. Many federal officials and stakeholders said that it can be helpful for insurance companies to provide incentives such as discounts or lower rates on insurance premiums for actions homeowners take to reduce their vulnerability to wildfire. Such discounts are provided in some areas; for example, according to the National Fire Protection Association, one insurance company provides homeowners in Arizona, California, Colorado, New Mexico, Oregon, Texas, and Utah with a discount on their insurance premiums if they are located in a Firewise-designated community. Stakeholders in Southern California also said some insurance companies have refused to provide homeowner’s insurance to property owners unless they undertake risk-reducing actions. For example, these stakeholders said that property owners in a community identified as being at particularly high wildland fire risk successfully obtained insurance only after using fire-safe building materials on their homes and other structures and clearing their properties of vegetation within 200 feet of their structures. Some federal officials and stakeholders, however, suggested that the effects of such insurance incentives may be limited. For example, a senior Forest Service official said insurance discounts may not be large enough to incentivize property owners to make risk-reducing changes. This official also noted that providing discounts to homeowners in Firewise communities does not guarantee that every homeowner within the community has taken action to reduce risk. Similarly, a 2016 review by Headwaters Economics reported, based in part on conversations with insurance industry experts, that it is unlikely that insurance rates and policies alone will determine whether a landowner decides to build a new home on wildfire-prone land. The 2015 Forest Stewards Guild report stated that some residents see insurance as a substitute for risk-reducing efforts, and that insurance therefore becomes a disincentive to such efforts. Abnormally dense accumulations of vegetation, combined with drought and other climate stressors, have contributed to larger and more severe wildland fires; at the same time, more people are choosing to live in fire- prone locations. Because fire can cross jurisdictions, efforts to reduce the risk of fire to communities involve a multitude of entities working together, including federal land management agencies, state and local governments, Indian tribes, and others. One area of focus for both federal and nonfederal entities has been the development of the Cohesive Strategy, which emphasizes the importance of coordination across entities and frames comprehensive national goals for mitigating the risk of wildland fire. However, WFLC has not developed performance measures to assess the combined efforts of federal and nonfederal participants in meeting the goals of the Cohesive Strategy. The Forest Service and Interior each have performance measures to monitor and assess their wildland fire management efforts, but those measures apply to the agencies individually and do not represent the set of national measures called for in the Cohesive Strategy. By working with the interagency body WFLC to establish such measures, the Forest Service and Interior, together with federal and nonfederal partners, could better assess national progress toward achieving the goals of the Cohesive Strategy. To help determine the extent to which the goals of the Cohesive Strategy are being met, we recommend that the Secretaries of Agriculture and the Interior direct the Chief of the Forest Service and the Director of the Office of Wildland Fire, respectively, to work with WFLC to develop measures to assess national progress toward achieving the strategy’s goals. We provided a draft of this report for review and comment to the Departments of Agriculture and the Interior. We received written comments from the Forest Service (responding on behalf of the Department of Agriculture), which are reproduced in appendix VII. In its letter, and in a subsequent discussion with the Forest Service audit liaison, the Forest Service stated that it generally agreed with our findings and recommendation, and that it is committed to implementing the Cohesive Strategy and will continue to work with WFLC and other entities towards reducing the risk of wildland fire on all lands in the United States. We also received written comments from Interior, which are reproduced in appendix VIII. Interior did not concur with our recommendation, citing three primary areas of disagreement. First, while acknowledging that measures to assess national progress toward achieving the goals of the Cohesive Strategy could be beneficial, Interior noted in its letter that the Wildland Fire Executive Council had previously determined that instituting the measures that had been presented to it would place undue burden on the agencies and nonfederal partners. Interior also stated that assessing national progress toward achieving the Cohesive Strategy’s goals would cost taxpayers more than it would save, and cited a 2013 study that noted the challenging nature of efforts to assess the effectiveness of fuel reduction and restoration treatments. More recently, however, as we note in our report, a December 2016 WFLC report stated that the use of research findings, remote sensing, and modelling can help quantify the effects of activities over time and can contribute to showing accountability and success in meeting the goals of the Cohesive Strategy. During our review, Interior officials said they had not had sufficient time to determine which, if any, research findings could be useful in this effort, and Interior’s letter does not refer to this aspect of the 2016 WFLC report. As a result, it is not clear whether Interior has fully considered the potential for using research findings or other tools described in the 2016 report to measure national progress in a cost-effective way. Second, Interior stated that in 2014 it changed its strategic performance metrics to demonstrate departmental progress toward meeting the strategy’s goals. Our report describes an example of one such departmental measure that is consistent with the Cohesive Strategy’s emphasis on resilient landscapes. However, as we note in our report, agency performance measures are intended to separately assess each agency’s performance—or, in some cases the performance of specific programs—and do not represent a set of measures to assess national progress toward meeting the Cohesive Strategy’s goals, as called for in the strategy. Such measures could, as noted in the Cohesive Strategy, allow Congress and other stakeholders to monitor and assess progress toward achieving the strategy’s goals. Interior did not indicate any steps it would take to meet the Cohesive Strategy’s call for measuring national, rather than departmental, progress in meeting the strategy’s goals. Third, Interior noted that federal entities cannot control or mandate response or participation from non-federal partners. However, given the Cohesive Strategy’s emphasis on collaboration between federal and nonfederal entities to achieve its goals, the WFLC—as the interagency body charged with implementing the strategy—is an appropriate forum for working to develop measures. While we understand that federal entities cannot control or mandate response or participation from non-federal partners, we believe that, as members of WFLC, Interior and other federal agencies can provide leadership in helping ensure accountability for the mutually agreed upon goals of the Cohesive Strategy. Interior also provided technical comments regarding the Cohesive Strategy. In response, we incorporated additional information to note that implementation of the Cohesive Strategy is not separately funded. As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce the contents of this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days from the report date. At that time, we will send copies to the appropriate congressional committees, the Secretaries of Agriculture and the Interior, and other interested parties. In addition, the report will be available at no charge on the GAO website at http://www.gao.gov. If you or your staff members have any questions regarding this report, please contact me at (202) 512-3841 or fennella@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made key contributions to the report are listed in appendix IX. This report examines (1) factors federal officials and nonfederal stakeholders cited as affecting federal-nonfederal collaboration aimed at reducing wildland fire risk to communities and (2) actions federal officials and nonfederal stakeholders said could help improve their ability to reduce wildland fire risk to communities. To perform this work, we reviewed various laws, policies, guidance, state and local zoning codes and ordinances, agency budget justifications, academic literature, and reviews related to federal wildland fire management. Among the laws we reviewed were the Federal Land Assistance, Management, and Enhancement Act; Healthy Forests Restoration Act of 2003; Good Neighbor Authority; Wyden Amendment; and Tribal Forest Protection Act of 2004. In addition, we reviewed policy documents and agency budget justifications, such as the 2009 Guidance for Implementation of Federal Wildland Fire Management Policy, the National Cohesive Wildland Fire Management Strategy, and the Forest Service fiscal year 2017 budget justification. We also reviewed other documents such as the 2014 Quadrennial Fire Review Final Report, the U.S. Global Change Research Program’s 2014 National Climate Assessment, Headwaters Economics’ paper Do Insurance Policies and Rates Influence Home Development on Fire-Prone Lands?, and the Forest Stewards Guild report Evaluating the Effectiveness of Wildfire Mitigation Activities in the Wildland-Urban Interface. We conducted a basic assessment of these studies’ methodologies, assumptions, and limitations and determined them to be sufficiently credible for our purposes. We also interviewed headquarters officials from each of the five federal land management agencies responsible for wildland fire management—the Forest Service in the Department of Agriculture and the Bureau of Indian Affairs, Bureau of Land Management, Fish and Wildlife Service, and National Park Service in the Department of the Interior—as well as Interior’s Office of Wildland Fire. Because our report addresses reducing risk to communities, we focused our review on federal wildland fire management activities intended to reduce risk before a potential wildland fire occurs, through fire preparedness, fuel reduction, prevention, and education. To address our first objective, we interviewed fire management officials from 10 federal land management units, such as national forests and national parks, as well as representatives of communities near these lands. We selected land management units from each of the five federal agencies using the following criteria: the size of the estimated population in nearby wildland-urban interface areas, as defined by the Forest Service, with high wildland fire hazard potential; the size in acres of the land management unit; input from regional land management agency officials; and the geographic location of the land management unit, with units selected to provide geographic diversity. We then selected communities adjacent to the federal land management units by considering input from local land management agency officials. For each community selected, we interviewed representatives from nonfederal entities with which land management unit officials interacted; these representatives included county officials, local fire department officials, and homeowners. Using these criteria, we selected land management units and adjacent communities in five states: Arizona, California, Colorado, Florida, and Oregon. During our interviews with federal officials and community representatives, we asked about ways in which federal and nonfederal entities collaborated and factors that enhanced or hindered their ability to collaborate. In addition, for the five states we selected, we interviewed officials with state wildland fire and forestry agencies. To gain a wider range of perspectives from states that were not included in our site selection, we interviewed officials with the National Association of State Foresters, the Southern Group of State Foresters, and the Northeastern Area Association of State Foresters, which represent states across the country. In addition, to gain a better perspective on the Cohesive Strategy, we interviewed members of the Wildland Fire Leadership Council (WFLC) and the three regional committees—Northeast, Southeast, and West—responsible for overseeing the Cohesive Strategy’s implementation. We also interviewed representatives of nongovernmental organizations that were identified by federal officials we interviewed or in reports we reviewed as being involved in federal- nonfederal efforts to reduce wildland fire risk. During these interviews we asked about ways in which they collaborated with federal land management agencies and factors that enhanced or hindered their ability to collaborate. Table 2 provides a list of nonfederal associations, organizations, and committees included in our review. We reviewed and analyzed interviewees’ responses and identified broad categories of factors they said enhance or hinder federal-nonfederal collaboration to reduce fire risk to communities and actions they said could improve their ability to reduce such risk. In response to our interview questions about factors that affect collaboration efforts aimed at reducing risk to communities, officials and stakeholders described factors that we defined as having affected direct collaboration and indirect collaboration. For example, direct collaboration (i.e., situations involving a tangible relationship between two or more parties) includes federal policies and authorities that require or enable collaboration. Factors that affect indirect collaboration (i.e., situations in which actions by one entity may affect other entities attempting to achieve a similar outcome) include community education, which can affect communities’ ability to take risk reduction actions that may or may not include collaboration with others. We include both types of factors in our report, distinguishing between direct and indirect collaboration as appropriate. Based on the frequency of factors identified, as well as information we obtained through our review of documents mentioned above related to this topic, we reported on factors associated with nine categories. The list of factors and associated definitions we used for analytical purposes were: Federal authorities: laws that authorize federal and nonfederal entities to conduct risk-reducing efforts across jurisdictions. State and local authorities: state and local laws or ordinances that may require homeowners, businesses, or communities to conduct certain risk-reducing actions or meet specified building requirements. Initiatives: federal efforts aimed at conducting cross-jurisdictional projects to reduce risk. Joint planning: federal-nonfederal efforts to discuss and document future risk reduction activities. Agency resources for collaboration: the ability of federal and nonfederal entities to share staff or funding and the presence of staff or funding to engage in collaborative activities. Leadership: efforts to collaborate, communicate, and seek input from others, among other characteristics. Education: efforts to educate individuals about steps they can take to reduce risk. Wildfire prevention messaging: efforts to provide prevention information or materials. Community engagement: the extent to which communities are aware of and engaged in taking actions to reduce risk, such as establishing defensible space. Two analysts coded each response into these categories. Because many of the responses were broad in nature and could be categorized into multiple categories, analysts verified each other’s categorizations. After completing the categorization of responses, we assessed the frequency with which responses occurred in each category to help identify factors to discuss in our report. Our report generally does not discuss infrequently identified factors. To address our second objective, we interviewed federal officials and nonfederal entities described above to obtain information about actions they said could reduce risk to communities from wildland fire. We categorized and coded their responses using the method described above. Based on the frequency of solutions identified, as well as information we obtained through our review of documents mentioned above related to this topic, we reported on solutions associated with seven categories: improving implementation of the Cohesive Strategy, increasing collaborative planning, expanding education, increasing prevention efforts, improving timber-processing capability, adopting state and local ordinances, and providing insurance incentives. To increase our understanding of the actions identified, we reviewed information about related programs and initiatives, including information about the Forest Service’s Wood Innovations grant program, documents such as Best Management Practices for Creating a Community Wildfire Protection Plan, and information about the Smokey Bear campaign. We reviewed the Cohesive Strategy and action plans for implementing it, various “success story” project descriptions, guiding documents for WFLC and its regional committees, and other relevant documents. We also reviewed Cohesive Strategy implementation guidance and a 2016 report on the Cohesive Strategy by WFLC’s National Strategic Committee. We then compared agency efforts to assess progress toward achieving the Cohesive Strategy’s goals against guidance contained in the strategy and associated action plans. To obtain additional insight into the use of performance information on the part of federal agencies, we reviewed our previous reports related to interagency strategies and agencies’ efforts to collaborate. We also reviewed various state and local ordinances that encourage fire-resistant building and the removal of potentially flammable vegetation around structures and that discourage development in areas at high risk from wildland fire. In addition, upon completing our analysis of interviewee responses, we followed up with Forest Service and Interior headquarters officials to learn the extent to which the agencies were implementing or considering the actions the interviewees suggested. For both objectives, when providing general statements to describe factors that affect collaboration and actions to reduce risk, we use the term stakeholders to refer to representatives of the nonfederal entities listed above. When describing individual examples, we often refer to the specific type of stakeholder, such as community members. In addition, because this is a nonprobability sample, the information we report is not generalizable to all land management units and communities. It does not represent a comprehensive list of collaborative programs or efforts nationwide or in these states but, rather, provides illustrative examples from a geographically diverse range of land management units and communities that are at high risk of experiencing wildland fire. We conducted this performance audit from October 2015 to May 2017 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. Table 3 shows various characteristics of the communities included in our review. Table 4 describes several federal laws aimed at reducing wildland fire risk through collaboration. Several federal officials and stakeholders we interviewed said that some national and state air quality standards under the Clean Air Act have the effect of limiting fuel reduction treatments that rely on prescribed burning. Under the act, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) establishes standards for controlling air pollution. Pollutants in smoke, including those emitted from prescribed fires, can cause health issues and also cause air quality to exceed EPA’s health standards for fine particulate matter and ozone. Wildfire smoke can reach hazardous levels in downwind communities for long periods of time, while prescribed fire can cause nuisance and shorter but still significant smoke impacts. To help ensure that EPA’s standards are met, state officials responsible for enforcing the act might not in all cases provide land managers with the permits necessary to conduct prescribed burns. Federal agencies have taken steps to address the issue of balancing the need to protect public health with conducting prescribed burns as a method of fuel reduction. Specifically, since 2015, the Wildland Fire Leadership Council’s priorities have included smoke and air quality, and in January 2016, EPA and the Departments of Agriculture and the Interior issued a joint Wildland Fire and Air Quality summary. Among other things, the summary describes EPA’s commitment to working with land managers to effectively use prescribed fire to reduce the effects of wildfire-related emissions. EPA’s Exceptional Events Rule provides regulatory relief for states that exceed national air quality standards because of emissions from certain sources of pollution, including wildfires and certain prescribed fires. EPA finalized updates to the rule in October 2016 intended to simplify and shorten the process for state air quality agencies to address the impacts of wildfire smoke in their air quality plans. EPA also released a guidance document in 2016 intended to help state air quality agencies develop supporting information for wildfires that affect monitored ozone concentrations. This appendix provides information about selected federal programs that provide risk-reduction funding to states and localities. The Forest Service’s State Fire Assistance (SFA) program provides financial assistance through partnership agreements with state foresters for fire management activities, including helping communities become fire adapted. According to the Forest Service’s fiscal year 2017 budget justification, SFA is a critical part of the agency’s efforts to reduce wildland fire risk to communities, residents, property, and firefighters because it helps ensure that state, local, and private landowners have the capacity and tools they need to prepare for, respond to, and mitigate fire risk in the wildland-urban interface (WUI) and other critical areas. In each fiscal year from 2014 through 2016, approximately $78 million was enacted for the program. Of the total $78 million enacted for SFA in fiscal year 2015, $15.9 million was spent on hazardous fuel reduction treatments in the WUI, directly paying for the treatment of 148,020 acres of hazardous fuel and contributing to the treatment of another 126,368 acres with in-kind partner support, according to the Forest Service’s fiscal year 2017 budget justification. In addition, SFA funding supports national partnerships and agreements, including, among others, the National Fire Protection Association’s Firewise program, the wildfire prevention campaign with the Ad Council, and The Nature Conservancy Fire Learning Network. The Forest Service’s Volunteer Fire Assistance (VFA) program provides technical and financial assistance to local volunteer fire departments serving rural communities with a population of 10,000 or fewer. According to the Forest Service’s fiscal year 2017 budget justification, rural fire departments represent the first line of defense in addressing fires and other emergencies, and without the cooperation of rural fire departments, the agency would be unable to provide the level of fire response needed to keep fires near communities small. In each fiscal year from 2014 through 2016, $13 million was enacted for the program. In 2015, this funding helped 9,318 communities to train 22,272 firefighters and purchase, rehabilitate, and maintain $8.1 million in equipment, according to the 2017 budget justification. The Department of the Interior’s Rural Fire Assistance program (RFA) provided assistance in education and training, as well as supplies and equipment, to rural fire districts. However, funding for this program ended in fiscal year 2012 because of the increased availability of other fire assistance grant programs outside of Interior, according to officials with Interior’s Office of Wildland Fire. Interior’s Community Assistance is intended to support activities that improve and sustain community and individual responsibilities to adapt to, prepare for, and respond to wildfire. Unlike the Forest Service’s VFA or Interior’s now-expired RFA, Interior does not manage Community Assistance as a grant program, but as an activity under the existing wildland fire management programs of fuel reduction and preparedness, with funding levels determined by each Interior agency. Interior officials estimated that overall Community Assistance funding decreased from fiscal year 2009 through fiscal year 2013. For example, during this period, funding for Community Assistance decreased from an estimated $4.5 million to $2.1 million for BLM and from an estimated $1.2 million to $355,000 for Bureau of Indian Affairs, according to these officials. Since 2014, the Department of the Interior’s Office of Wildland Fire has been developing a Risk-Based Wildland Fire Management model, which it plans to use to help support decisions about how to distribute funding for preparedness and fuel reduction to four Interior agencies: Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA), Bureau of Land Management (BLM), Fish and Wildlife Service, and National Park Service. The proposed system is to assess the probability and likely intensity of wildland fire, values at risk, and the expected value of acres likely to burn. Several Interior officials we interviewed raised concerns about the equity of the model because it makes determinations based on priority values at risk across the four Interior agencies, which can be challenging given the variation in agency missions and types of land they manage. For example, a threatened species located primarily on BLM lands may be among that agency’s highest priorities, but a forested area relied upon by an Indian tribe for its livelihood may be among BIA’s highest priorities. We found in 2015 that Interior officials said they expected to identify the prioritized values and issue guidance on the proposed system by the end of calendar year 2015 and use its results to inform their fiscal year 2016 funding distributions to the four agencies. As of February 2017, officials with Interior’s Office of Wildland Fire said they had not completed final revisions to the model but planned to do so in 2017. In addition to the individual named above, Steve Gaty (Assistant Director), Ulana M. Bihun, Mark Braza, Richard P. Johnson, and Keesha Luebke made key contributions to this report. Important contributions were also made by Martin (Greg) Campbell, William Carrigg, Lee Carroll, Charles Culverwell, Christopher P. Currie, Dan Royer, and Sarah Veale.

Summary: Dense vegetation, drought, and other factors have resulted in more severe wildland fires in recent years. At the same time, development in and around wildlands continues to increase, with some communities experiencing devastating effects from wildland fire. To reduce risk to communities, federal agencies and nonfederal stakeholders can collaborate in various ways. GAO was asked to review collaboration to reduce wildland fire risk to communities. This report examines federal officials' and stakeholders' views on (1) factors that affect federal-nonfederal collaboration aimed at reducing wildland fire risk to communities and (2) actions that could improve their ability to reduce risk to communities. GAO reviewed laws and documents about collaboration on wildland fire management; compared agency efforts with guidance; and interviewed officials from a nongeneralizable sample of 10 federal land management units selected based on wildland fire potential, geographic diversity, and other factors. GAO also interviewed stakeholders including community members near the selected units and representatives of nonfederal entities involved in fire risk-reduction efforts. Officials GAO interviewed from the five federal agencies responsible for wildland fire management—the Forest Service within the Department of Agriculture and the Bureau of Indian Affairs, Bureau of Land Management, Fish and Wildlife Service, and National Park Service within the Department of the Interior—and nonfederal stakeholders, including state and local officials, homeowners, and representatives of nongovernmental organizations, identified several factors as affecting federal-nonfederal collaboration aimed at reducing wildland fire risk to communities. In some cases these factors were cited as enhancing collaboration, while in other cases they were cited as hindering it. Among the factors identified were federal authorities, agency initiatives, joint community-level planning, and others. For example, several officials and stakeholders cited laws such as the Good Neighbor Authority and Tribal Forest Protection Act of 2004 as enhancing collaboration because they provide federal and nonfederal entities the authority to work across jurisdictions on projects to reduce risk. In addition, several officials and stakeholders cited the 2014 National Cohesive Wildland Fire Management Strategy (Cohesive Strategy) as helpful for collaboration because it emphasizes the importance of coordination across multiple agencies and includes comprehensive fire management goals. In contrast, some officials and stakeholders said collaboration on certain types of projects was hindered by the difficulty in sharing project costs between federal and nonfederal entities. Federal officials and nonfederal stakeholders also identified several actions they said could improve federal agencies' and nonfederal entities' ability to reduce wildland fire risk to communities. Among the actions cited was improving the implementation of the Cohesive Strategy. Some agency officials and stakeholders noted the importance of increasing accountability for implementing the Cohesive Strategy, such as through the use of performance measures. The strategy states that its success depends in part on monitoring and accountability, and calls for national outcome measures. This is consistent with previous GAO findings regarding national strategies. However, GAO found that the Wildland Fire Leadership Council (WFLC)—the interagency body charged with overseeing and implementing the Cohesive Strategy and which includes the Forest Service and Interior as members—has not developed measures to assess progress on the part of federal and nonfederal participants in meeting the national goals of the Cohesive Strategy. In 2013, WFLC proposed several measures but concluded that implementing them could place undue burden on the agencies and nonfederal partners. In 2016, however, WFLC reported that recent research findings could help quantify the strategy's effects over time. By working with WFLC to develop such measures, the Forest Service and Interior, together with federal and nonfederal partners, could better assess national progress toward achieving the goals of the Cohesive Strategy. Federal officials and nonfederal stakeholders also identified actions that, while not necessarily within the federal agencies' control, could be taken to reduce wildland fire risk to communities. For example, these actions include adopting state laws that require property owners to take risk-reducing actions such as using fire-resistant building materials or reducing vegetation around their homes. Some states have adopted laws to promote such actions. GAO recommends that the Forest Service and Interior work with WFLC to develop measures to assess progress toward achieving the Cohesive Strategy's goals. The Forest Service agreed with GAO's recommendation, while Interior did not. GAO believes the recommendation is valid, as discussed in the report.