OAM resources are divided among 70 air and marine locations across three regions (southeast, southwest, and northern); the National Capital area; and National Air Security Operations Centers (NASOC) throughout the continental United States, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands as shown in figure 1. OAM also has mission support facilities including those for maintenance, training, and radar-tracking to detect and direct interdiction of illegal aircraft and maritime vessels. OAM strategic assumptions in deploying its resources include the ability to provide a 24- hour, 7-day a week response to border penetrations anywhere along the U.S. border, with a 1-hour response time for areas designated as high priority. Considerations in OAM allocation decisions include historical location, congressional direction, and differences in geography and relative need for air and marine support to address threats. As of May 2011, OAM had placed about half of its air assets on the southwest border region and the remainder on the northern and southeast regions, while marine resources were distributed fairly evenly across the northern, southwest, and southeast regions. OAM has 23 branches and 6 NASOCs across these regions, and within the branches, OAM may have one or more air or marine units. OAM performs various missions in response to requests for air and marine support from other DHS components—primarily Border Patrol and ICE; as well as other federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies. In addition, OAM is a representative on the Joint Interagency Task Force- South, located in Key West, Florida, a unified command sponsored by the White House Office of National Drug Control Policy that facilitates transnational cooperative counter-narcotic and counterterrorism efforts throughout the South America source zone and the Caribbean, eastern Pacific, Central America, and Mexico transit zone. OAM’s NASOCs perform specialized missions nationwide and in the Caribbean, eastern Pacific, and Central America, using unmanned aircraft systems, long- range patrol aircraft, and other aircraft. Control of OAM resources to respond to these support requests differs by location. For the northern and southwest regions, OAM branches and units are under the tactical control of the local Border Patrol sector chief, who has authority to approve, deny, and prioritize requests for air and marine support. In contrast, OAM branch directors have the authority to control how air and marine resources are used in the southeast region— where there is less Border Patrol presence, as well as in the National Capital area and in NASOCs. The majority of OAM operations is in support of customer or self-initiated law enforcement missions.patrols to detect illegal activity; search for illegal aliens; surveillance; and transport of Border Patrol, ICE, and other law enforcement officers and their equipment. OAM also performs non-enforcement missions including those to support maintenance, training, public relations, and to provide humanitarian aid. Over the last 3 years, the proportion of air and marine mission hours (flight hours or hours a vessel was on duty) for law enforcement related missions has increased, as shown in table 1. The percentage of OAM air and marine support requests met differed by location, customer, and mission type, with unmet air support requests primarily due to aircraft maintenance and unmet marine requests due to adverse weather in fiscal year 2010. In addition, OAM, Border Patrol, and ICE officials reported that OAM resources were constrained in some locations. Further, although OAM has taken actions to address challenges in providing air and marine support, its efforts to increase aircraft availability have not been fully realized. OAM met 73 percent of the 38,662 total air support requests that it received in fiscal year 2010, according to our analysis of AMOR data.OAM tracks its ability to meet air support requests by location, customer, and mission in its AMOR system. Our analysis of these data showed that the percentage of air support requests OAM met differed by region or branch location, and to a lesser extent, by customer and mission type. Specifically, the percentage of air support requests met ranged by 29 percentage points across regions (from 60 to 89 percent) and ranged by over 50 percentage points across branches (from 43 to 96 percent), while the percentage of requests met across customers ranged by about 14 percentage points (from 76 to 90 percent) and the percentage of requests met across mission types ranged by 24 percentage points (from 61 to 85 percent). OAM air support requests met differed by up to 29 percentage points across five different OAM regional areas of responsibility (i.e., regions). The highest percentage of support requests met was provided to OAM’s NASOCs and the lowest percentage of support requests met was provided to the U.S. southeast region, as shown in figure 2. The percentage of air support requests met across branches and NASOCs showed greater differences than across regions, particularly across branches in the southwest region, as shown in table 2. There were smaller differences in OAM’s ability to meet requests for air support across customers than across locations. The overall percentage of air support requests met across customers ranged from a low of 76 percent for Border Patrol and OAM to a high of 90 percent for all other federal agencies, as shown in figure 3. Border Patrol has control over OAM mission support priorities in the northern and southwest regions, and OAM has control over its priorities in the southeast region. To increase transparency of ICE support requests, OAM, Border Patrol, and ICE established a process requiring that ICE requests that are denied at the field level be elevated to management. Finally, our analysis of AMOR data showed that there were few concurrent support requests that resulted in denial of one agency’s request to support another agency. For example, of the 38,662 requests for air support in fiscal year 2010, 2 percent (915) could not be met due to a competing mission request from the same or another agency. OAM headquarters officials gave the following possible explanations as to why state and local, and all other federal agencies had higher support rates than Border Patrol or OAM. State and local support frequently involved OAM diverting a flight already in progress; in such cases, aircraft availability challenges were not an issue. As a result, OAM was able to provide the support to the state and local agency resulting in higher support rates. Federal agencies (as in the “all other federal agencies” category in figure 3) and state agencies (as in the “state and local agencies” category in figure 3) often require types of aircraft that have greater availability in general. Standing, daily requests—which were most common to Border Patrol—were more likely than ad hoc requests to be canceled as a result of adverse weather, maintenance, or aircraft and personnel restrictions. As a result, Border Patrol may have more unmet requests than other agencies. The difference in percentage of support requests met across mission categories ranged from 61 to 85 percent, with higher levels of support for miscellaneous enforcement activities such as reconnaissance, photography, or information. The percentage of air support was lower for mission activities classified as search, interdiction, or radar patrol, as shown in figure 4. OAM officials told us that there were too many variables, such as budget and resource constraints, weather, and conflicting mission priorities, to explain why there were differences in percentages of support requests met for different mission types. OAM was unable to meet 27 percent, or 10,530 of the 38,662 air support requests it received from customers in fiscal year 2010. The primary reason for unmet requests was the unavailability of aircraft in maintenance, but adverse weather and unavailable aircrew were also factors, as shown in figure 5. OAM survey respondents were generally satisfied with the type and number of air assets they had to perform various missions; however, some survey respondents and field officials we interviewed identified capability gaps, such as the lack of maritime patrol aircraft. In addition, survey respondents and field officials reported general dissatisfaction with the number of personnel to perform air operations. Finally, OAM has taken actions to increase aircraft availability—including creating an aircraft modernization plan and conducting an aged-aircraft investigation—but these efforts have not been fully realized. The majority of officials that responded to our survey questions from 18 OAM air locations across the southwest, northern, southeast, and National Capital regions, and NASOCs generally reported that they were either satisfied with, or neutral—neither satisfied nor dissatisfied—toward the type and number of OAM aircraft they had at their locations to perform various mission activities. For example, 16 of 18 respondents reported satisfaction with the type of aircraft available for surveillance; and 12 of 18 respondents reported satisfaction with the number of aircraft they have to perform information gathering. A majority of respondents also expressed satisfaction or neutrality toward the type and number of aircraft they have to perform 12 other mission activities. Some respondents, however, identified capability gaps and resource limitations for certain mission activities. For example, officials from 7 of the 14 air locations that perform air-to-water radar patrols reported that they were very dissatisfied with the type of aircraft available to conduct these missions.respondents from 7 of the 17 air locations that perform interdictions expressed dissatisfaction with the number of aircraft available to conduct these missions. One respondent reported that his/her location had no maritime or air radar interdiction capabilities, despite having a border that was entirely water. See appendix IV for a summary of survey results by location for respondents’ satisfaction with the type and number of assets for various mission activities. The Northern Border Regional Director said, among other things, he would like to see an additional interceptor aircraft placed in one branch location, but that the runway is too short—the current runway is 4,000 feet and a Citation needs at least 7,000 feet. OAM headquarters officials said that the branch is routinely required to get additional support from neighboring branches. the maritime environment and that two branches needed more maritime patrol aircraft. The Southwest Regional Director said he did not have information regarding what the southwest region’s needs were in terms of air assets because the southwest region had not performed an assessment in 2 years. OAM, Border Patrol and ICE officials at field locations we visited in the northern, southeast, and southwest regions expressed various levels of satisfaction with OAM’s air support and capabilities. For example, Border Patrol and ICE officials in one northern border location said they were generally satisfied with OAM’s air support. Similarly, the Acting Special Agent in Charge for the ICE office in the southeast region said he was generally satisfied with OAM’s air support; however, a Border Patrol Assistant Chief for a southeast region sector said OAM had not been responsive to their air support requests. branch officials said the air assets at their location were barely sufficient to meet support requests for its various missions, and ICE officials said they would like to see OAM procure better aircraft for their surveillance needs. In addition, Border Patrol officials in the same southwest location said that while the sector receives substantial OAM air support, OAM as an agency is not adequately resourced in budget, facilities, air frames, or technology to meet operational requirements. Similarly, Border Patrol, OAM, and ICE field officials in another southwest region location said OAM lacked the capability to perform effective maritime (air to water) patrols, and ICE officials in that southwest region location said that helicopters were often not available on short notice. A Border Patrol Assistant Chief for one southeast sector said that in some instances, Border Patrol agents may not have asked for air support in fiscal year 2010 because they thought they might not receive it. He said that agents are currently encouraged to ask for support whether or not they believe they will receive it. Lastly, officials from the Joint Interagency Task Force-South (JIATF-S) said they were pleased with the support they received from OAM, but they would like higher levels of support. According to OAM officials, OAM provided aircraft support to JIATF-S primarily for long-range patrols in the source zones of South America and the transit zones of the Caribbean, eastern Pacific, Central America, and Mexico. JIATF-S officials said that OAM had specialized aircraft that were instrumental to their operations. While OAM provided more than its committed 7,200 flight hours in fiscal year 2010 to support the anti-drug mission in this area, JIATF-S officials said they would like to receive higher levels of OAM support, particularly as support from Department of Defense and other partners had been decreasing. Our survey of 18 OAM air locations found that the majority of respondents (11 of 18) were either somewhat or very dissatisfied with the extent to which they had adequate air personnel to effectively meet mission needs. In addition, field officials we interviewed in the southwest and southeast regions reported shortages in air personnel. Although the Northern Border Regional Director told us most air branches along the northern border were staffed sufficiently to meet mission needs, the Southeast and Southwest Regional Directors cited shortfalls in the level of air personnel. The Southeast Regional Director said air staff were frequently assigned to temporary duty in support of UAS and surge operations in the higher priority southwest region; and the Southwest Regional Director said they did not have adequate personnel to be able to respond 24-hours a day at each of its locations. OAM officials at the field locations we visited reported shortages in air personnel. For example, the Director of Air Operations at a northern border branch said that the branch was originally slated to have 60 pilots, but instead had 20 pilots. In addition, officials from two branches in the southwest region told us they lacked personnel due to staff being away for such reasons as temporary duty assignments, military leave, sick leave, and training, among other reasons; they said these shortages were negatively affecting their ability to meet air support requests. Further, the Deputy Director of Air Operations for one southeast region branch told us that when they received the new DASH-8 maritime patrol aircraft, they did not receive the necessary increases in personnel to operate them, and as a result, the branch could not fully utilize the capabilities of these technologically advanced aircraft. According to the branch officials, personnel problems were further exacerbated by budget constraints. OAM reported that it had taken actions to increase aircraft availability, but the results of these efforts have not yet been fully realized. OAM created an aircraft modernization plan in 2006 to replace aging aircraft, and updated this plan in 2007 with a model of projected investments over the next 10 years. OAM officials told us that due to changes in mission needs and changes in the aviation market, as well as limited funding, they have had to modify the plan and continue to maintain older and less supportable aircraft, which require more maintenance. OAM officials reported that because they have not been able to replace aircraft as postulated, they have not been able to standardize their fleet by reducing aircraft types—which would reduce costs associated with training materials and equipment, parts and spares inventories, and personnel Due to the slow pace of aged aircraft replacement and qualifications. the prospect of a constrained resource environment, OAM conducted an aged aircraft investigation in fiscal year 2010 to determine the operating life limitations of aircraft most at risk. Based on the results of this investigation, OAM plans to either retire aircraft or create sustainment regimens for certain aircraft to lengthen their service lives. Finally, OAM headquarters officials said they still plan to acquire new aircraft and reduce the number of older aircraft to eventually achieve the needed type reductions, consistent with available funding. In its 2006 aircraft modernization plan, OAM planned to reduce the number of aircraft types from 18 to 8, but as of September 2011, OAM had 20 aircraft types (including unmanned aircraft systems). OAM headquarters officials said they have deployed all-weather aircraft to locations where their capabilities will yield the highest operational dividends. They also said they would like to acquire additional all- weather aircraft, but current funding structures preclude the acquisition of more all-weather assets beyond what is currently approved. OAM officials said they are exploring additional technology and instrumentation solutions to increase their ability to conduct missions in adverse weather conditions, and that this is an ongoing process. OAM headquarters officials stated that they were also limited in their ability to increase the availability of aircrew due to staff reductions and budgetary constraints. OAM conducted a re-evaluation of its staffing in 2009, but it was never approved, as OAM had significant reductions to its work force in fiscal year 2010. Headquarters officials said the effort to redefine their work force is on hold since future funding projections prohibit program growth. OAM officials told us they have not increased staff over the past 2 fiscal years. OAM met 88 percent of the 9,913 total marine support requests that it received in fiscal year 2010, according to our analysis of AMOR data.Similar to our analysis of air support data, our analysis of marine data showed that the percentage of requests OAM supported differed by location; specifically, the percentage of marine support requests met ranged by 9 percentage points across regions (from 84 to 93 percent), and by as much as 28 percentage points across branches (from 71 to 99 percent). AMOR tracks OAM’s ability to meet marine support requests by location, customer, and mission; but data by customer were not reliable for our reporting purposes due to inconsistencies in OAM data entry practices. The percentage of marine support requests met ranged from 84 to 93 percent across three OAM regional areas of responsibility. The percentage of support requests met was fairly similar for the northern and southwest regions, exceeding 90 percent; however, support was lower (84 percent) for the southeast region, as shown in figure 6. OAM officials said possible reasons for the differences in support rates could include the fact that OAM has placed higher priority on the northern and southwest regions, and that since 2008 OAM has added assets to these regions in response to congressional direction. Within each region, the percentage of marine support requests met across branches showed disparities, particularly across branches in the southwest region. Marine support requests met ranged by 15 percentage points across branches in the southeast region (from 80 to 95 percent), by about 10 percentage points across branches in the northern region (from 89 to 99 percent), and by about 28 percentage points across branches in the southwest region (from 71 to 99 percent). Our analysis of AMOR data indicated that 94 percent of all support requests in fiscal year 2010 were for radar patrol missions, while the remaining 6 percent of requests involved interdiction, surveillance, and other miscellaneous enforcement missions. The percentage of support requests met for the remaining 6 percent of requests varied but was 86 percent overall, while the support rate for radar patrol missions was 88 percent. We were unable to report on the percentage of marine support by customer due to reliability concerns associated with data in AMOR. Specifically, when inputting data into the AMOR system for unmet marine requests, OAM staff left the data field blank that identified the customer making the request in over 90 percent of the cases in fiscal year 2010. OAM reported that they are replacing the AMOR system with a web- based system, which officials said will not allow users to leave important fields blank. Officials also said they are strengthening other internal controls—such as training and supervisory review of data entry—to ensure complete and accurate reporting. Such actions, if implemented effectively, should help improve the reliability of marine customer data— as well as other air and marine operations data—maintained in OAM’s system. OAM was unable to meet 12 percent, or 1,176 of the 9,913 marine support requests they received in fiscal year 2010. OAM officials said one reason that the percentage of support requests met was higher for marine support than for air support is because the requirements for launching aircraft are more stringent than for launching marine vessels, due to the relative risk of failure. The primary reason for unmet marine requests was adverse weather (6 percent of total requests),with an additional 4 percent due to other mission priorities and crew unavailability, as shown in figure 7. According to our survey of 27 OAM marine units, respondents reported they were generally satisfied with the type and number of vessels at their location. However, OAM Regional Directors and field location officials cited limitations, such as the lack of platform class vessels to perform undercover operations and funding for fuel. In addition, survey respondents and field officials cited shortages in personnel. Lastly, OAM has taken actions to increase its ability to meet marine requests, including purchasing “all-weather” vessels and cold-weather marine gear. Our survey of 27 OAM marine locations across the northern, southwest, and southeast regions found that respondents were generally satisfied with the type and number of OAM marine vessels they had at their locations to perform various mission activities. For example, greater than 21 of 27 respondents reported that they were satisfied with both the type and number of vessels they had to perform radar patrol and interdiction missions. Of the remaining 10 activities we asked about, the majority of respondents expressed satisfaction toward the type and number of vessels they had to perform in 7 activities. The activity where respondents expressed the greatest dissatisfaction with the type and number of vessels they had was undercover support—with 12 of the 24 marine units that perform undercover support expressing dissatisfaction with the type of vessels, and 10 of the 24 units expressing dissatisfaction with the number of vessels. See appendix IV for a summary of survey results by location for satisfaction with the type and number of assets provided by mission activity. OAM Regional Directors expressed differing levels of satisfaction with the type and number of marine vessels in their regions. The OAM Northern Regional Director said the northern region had the appropriate number and type of vessels to meet mission needs. Although the Southeast Regional Director said the southeast region had the appropriate number of interceptor vessels to meet mission needs, he also said the southeast region needed two other types of vessels to increase mission capability. The Southwest Regional Director said that given the region’s distribution of personnel, it had the appropriate number of assets; however, he said the region did not have the appropriate number of qualified marine personnel to meet mission needs. Field officials at locations we visited in the northern, southeast, and southwest regions expressed varied levels of satisfaction with OAM’s marine support and capabilities. For example, while Border Patrol and ICE officials in a northern border location said they were satisfied with the marine support they received from OAM, the Director of Marine Operations for an OAM branch in the northern region said that it was not feasible to provide a sufficient number of vessels and crew to ensure full coverage of the maritime border, and that the greatest need was for marine radar to queue marine assets to perform interdictions. An OAM branch official from the southeast region said that while the number and type of vessels met their needs, for a period of time, they could use their vessels only about half of each month due to budget constraints limiting fuel. Finally, officials at an OAM branch in the southwest region told us one of their chief resource needs was platform vessels to perform undercover operations. Our survey of 27 OAM marine units found that the majority of respondents (18 of 27) reported they were either somewhat or very dissatisfied with the extent to which they had adequate personnel to effectively meet mission needs. The OAM Regional Director for the Northern Region said that marine personnel levels across his region were adequate; however, Regional Directors for the Southeast and Southwest Regions cited shortages in marine personnel. Specifically, the Southeast Regional Director said that one southeast branch did not have an adequate number of marine personnel to address increasing threat, and the Southwest Regional Director said one location in the southwest region did not have an appropriate number of personnel to meet mission needs. OAM officials at field locations reported shortages of personnel. For example, an official at one OAM marine unit in the northern region said that sometimes the lack of marine personnel affects operational readiness and that allowing for training and leave are consistently concerns. Similarly, OAM officials from a southwest branch said that sufficient numbers of personnel were not always available due to training, sick days, annual leave, and reservists being called to active duty; and an ICE official in a southwest border location agreed that OAM needed additional marine interdiction agents. Lastly, an OAM survey respondent from a marine unit in the southeast region said that although marine staffing was increased in the past few years for new locations, the pre-existing locations were short on manpower and a realignment of personnel was needed. OAM headquarters officials reported that they have taken actions to address capability gaps due to adverse weather. For example, OAM officials told us that they purchased “all-weather” vessels with enclosed cabins, and that along with additional vessels acquired from USCG, they will have sufficient assets to meet mission needs. Officials said that while enclosed cabins do not enable OAM to launch in rough sea states, they do enable marine agents to operate in cold weather. They said that while larger vessels could reduce the impact of adverse weather on marine operations, these vessels would not be capable of achieving sufficient speeds to conduct interdictions or, if they were capable of maintaining sufficient speeds, would be cost prohibitive.said they purchased marine dry suits and cold weather gear to further address their ability to operate in adverse weather. In addition, OAM officials In regards to personnel, OAM officials told us that with the rapid growth in the marine program during fiscal years 2008 and 2009, OAM will be able to meet its immediate needs for marine agents, but some of those hired were still in the process of being trained and certified. OAM headquarters officials said unmet requests due to other mission priorities are often the result of exigent and unanticipated requests for marine support that are outside of the normal mission-tasking process, and that they continually evaluate the need to re-assign marine assets to meet evolving mission needs. OAM has not documented its analyses to support its resource mix and placement decisions across locations, and challenges in providing higher rates of support to high priority sectors indicate that a reassessment of its asset mix and placement may provide benefits. OAM action to document analyses behind its deployment decisions and reassess where its assets are deployed using performance results could better ensure transparency and help provide reasonable assurance that OAM is most effectively allocating its scarce resources to respond to mission needs and threats. OAM could also improve public accountability by disclosing data limitations that hinder the accuracy of OAM’s reported performance results for fiscal year 2011. OAM has not documented significant events, such as its analyses to support its asset mix and placement across locations, and as a result, lacks a record to help demonstrate that its decisions to allocate resources are the most effective ones in fulfilling customer needs and addressing threats. To help ensure accountability over an agency’s resource decisions, Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government call for agencies to ensure that all significant events be clearly documented and readily available for examination. OAM issued a National Strategic Plan in 2007 that included a 10-year plan for national asset acquisitions, and a strategic plan briefing the same year that outlined strategic end- states for air assets and personnel across OAM branches.documents included strategic goals, mission responsibilities, and threat information, we could not identify the underlying analyses used to link these factors to the mix and placement of resources across locations. The 2010 update to the strategic plan stated that OAM utilized its forces in areas where they would pay the “highest operational dividends,” but OAM did not have documentation of how operational dividends were determined or analyzed to support deployment decisions. Furthermore, while OAM’s Fiscal Year 2010 Aircraft Deployment Plan stated that OAM deployed aircraft and maritime vessels to ensure its forces were While these positioned to best meet the needs of CBP field commanders and respond to the latest intelligence on emerging threats, OAM did not have documentation that clearly linked the deployment decisions in the plan to mission needs or threats. Similarly, OAM did not document analyses supporting the current mix and placement of marine assets across locations. In addition, DHS’s 2005 aviation management directive requires operating entities to use their aircraft in the most cost-effective way to meet requirements. Although OAM officials stated that it factored cost-effectiveness considerations, such as efforts to move similar types of aircraft to the same locations to help reduce maintenance and training costs into its deployment decisions, OAM does not have documentation of analyses it performed to make these decisions. OAM headquarters officials stated that they made deployment decisions during formal discussions and ongoing meetings in close collaboration with Border Patrol, and considered a range of factors such as operational capability, mission priorities, and threats. OAM officials said that while they generally documented final decisions affecting the mix and placement of resources, they did not have the resources to document assessments and analyses to support these decisions. However, such documentation of significant events could help OAM improve the transparency of its resource allocation decisions to help demonstrate the effectiveness of these resource decisions in fulfilling its mission needs and addressing threats. OAM did not meet its national air support goal and did not provide higher rates of support to locations Border Patrol identified as high priority, which indicates that a reassessment of OAM’s resource mix and placement could help ensure that it meets mission needs, addresses threats, and mitigates risk. According to DHS’s Annual Performance Report for fiscal years 2008 through 2010, the primary and most important measure for OAM is its capability to launch an aircraft when a request is made for aerial support. In addition, DHS’s May 2010 policy for integrated risk management stated that components should use risk information and analysis to inform decision making, and a key component of risk management is measuring and reassessing effectiveness. OAM assessed its effectiveness through a performance goal to meet greater than 95 percent of Border Patrol requests for air support in fiscal year 2010, excluding unmet requests due to adverse weather or other factors OAM considered outside of its control. Our analysis showed that OAM met 82 percent of the 22,877 Border Patrol air support requests in fiscal year 2010. While OAM officials stated that this goal does not apply to specific locations, we used their stated performance measure methodology to determine support rates across Border Patrol sectors and found that they ranged from 54 to 100 percent in fiscal year 2010, and that OAM did not provide higher rates of support to locations Border Patrol identified as high priority (see table 3). This occurred at both the regional and sector levels. For example, while the southwest border was Border Patrol’s highest priority for resources in fiscal year 2010, it did not receive a higher rate of OAM air support (80 percent) than the northern border (85 percent). At the sector level, while Border Patrol officials stated that one sector was a high priority based on the relative threat of cross-border smuggling, our analysis showed that the sector had the fifth highest support rate across all nine sectors on the southwest border. Findings were similar on the northern border, where the Border Patrol’s and OAM’s 2007 Northern Border Resource Deployment Implementation Plan prioritized four sectors based on potential terrorist threats.found that two high-priority northern border sectors had lower support rates than three other sectors in the region that were not designated as high-priority. OAM headquarters officials said that they did not use support rate performance results to assess whether the mix and placement of resources is appropriate. OAM officials stated that they managed operations by allocating assets, personnel, and flight hours across locations, but these factors do not assess the outcomes of their operations, specifically the extent to which OAM provided air and marine support when requested to meet mission needs and address threats. GAO, Executive Guide: Effectively Implementing the Government Performance and Results Act, GAO/GGD-96-118 (Washington, D.C.: June 1996), and GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1. they will begin to replace the AMOR system in March 2012.headquarters officials expect that the new information system will be more reliable, user-friendly, and have more robust reporting capabilities; however, officials stated that they did not have plans to change how they will use these capabilities to inform resource mix and placement decisions. OAM officials stated that while they deployed a majority of resources to high-priority sectors, budgetary constraints, other national priorities, and the need to maintain presence across border locations limited overall increases in resources or the amount of resources they could redeploy from lower-priority sectors. For example, in fiscal year 2010, 50 percent of OAM’s assets and 59 percent of OAM’s flight hours were in the southwest border, Border Patrol’s highest-priority region. While we recognize OAM’s resource constraints, the agency does not have documentation of analyses assessing the impact of these constraints and whether actions could be taken to improve the mix and placement of resources within them. Thus, it is unclear the extent to which the current deployment of OAM assets and personnel, including those assigned to the Southwest border as cited above, most effectively utilizes its constrained resources to meet mission needs and address threats. Looking toward the future, Border Patrol, CBP, and DHS have strategic and technological initiatives under way that will likely affect customer requirements for air and marine support and the mix and placement of resources across locations. Border Patrol officials stated that they are transitioning to a new risk-based approach and Border Patrol National Strategy in fiscal year 2012 that would likely affect the type and level of OAM support across locations. Border Patrol officials said that the new strategy would likely rely more heavily on intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities to detect illegal activity and increased rapid mobility capabilities to respond to changing threats along the border. OAM headquarters officials said that they have received a high-level briefing of the anticipated changes in June 2011, but have not yet received information necessary to incorporate these changes into its current mix and placement of air and marine resources. CBP and DHS also have ongoing interagency efforts under way to increase air and marine domain awareness across U.S. borders through deployment of technology that may decrease Border Patrol’s use of OAM assets for air and marine domain awareness. Border Patrol officials in one sector, for example, stated that they prefer deployment of technology to detect illegal air and marine activity; OAM officials there said that air patrols are used due to the lack of ground-based radar technology. OAM officials stated that they will consider how technology capabilities affect the mix and placement of air and marine resources once such technology has been deployed. OAM’s fiscal year 2010 aircraft deployment plan stated that OAM deployed aircraft and maritime vessels to ensure its forces were positioned to best meet the needs of CBP Field Commanders and respond to emerging threats; however, our analysis indicates that OAM did not provide higher rates of air support in response to customer need in locations designated as high priority based on threats. In addition, as discussed, OAM did not use performance results to assess the mix and placement of resources. Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government stresses the need for agencies to provide reasonable assurance of the effectiveness and efficiency of operations, including the use of the entity’s resources. As such, to the extent that the benefits outweigh the costs, reassessing the mix and placement of its assets and personnel, and using performance results to inform these decisions could help provide OAM with reasonable assurance that it is most effectively allocating its scarce resources and aligning them to fulfill its mission needs and related threats. OAM officials continue to use performance data from its AMOR system to meet requirements of the Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA), but have not disclosed limitations affecting the accuracy of these data reported to Congress and the public in CBP’s Performance and Accountability Report. OAM inaccurately reported its performance results from fiscal years 2007 to 2010. OAM headquarters officials stated that they were not aware that they had calculated their performance results inaccurately—due to limitations with AMOR reporting functions— before we brought it to their attention in July 2010. In fiscal year 2010, for example, OAM reported that it exceeded its performance goal and met Border Patrol support requests greater than 98 percent of the time, but the actual rate of support based on our subsequent analysis was 82 percent. After we informed them of the error, OAM officials stated they plan to use the same methodology for calculating GPRA performance results in fiscal year 2011 because they plan to continue to generate the results from the AMOR system. Thus, OAM’s performance results will continue to be calculated and reported inaccurately. The GPRA Modernization Act of 2010 requires that agencies identify (1) the level of accuracy required for the intended use of the data that measures progress toward performance goals and (2) any limitations to the data at the required level of accuracy. Disclosure of the data limitations relating to the accuracy of OAM’s reported performance results for fiscal year 2011 could help improve transparency for achieving program results and provide more objective information on the relative effectiveness of the program, as intended by GPRA. This is also important because, if a performance goal is not met, GPRA, as amended, requires agencies to explain why the goal was not met and present plans and schedules for OAM headquarters officials initially stated that its achieving the goal.new information system will allow OAM to calculate and analyze performance results starting in fiscal year 2012; however, this may not be possible due to the technical problems that have delayed its implementation to March 2012. OAM and USCG officials we surveyed across proximately located air and marine units reported varying levels of coordination across missions, activities, or resources and that to different extents, the coordination that occurred between the agencies was effective and resulted in reduced duplication and cost savings. However, OAM and USCG officials identified one or more areas where improved coordination was needed, and several officials identified opportunities to colocate facilities that, if implemented, could achieve cost savings. DHS oversight to maximize interagency coordination across locations could better ensure the most efficient use of resources for mission accomplishment. Our survey showed that the extent of coordination between OAM and USCG air and marine units varied by mission activity. We surveyed officials from 86 OAM and USCG air and marine units that were proximately located about the frequency of interagency coordination across five mission-related and four mission support activities.cited a multilayered approach to border security which relies on close coordination with partner agencies to reduce reliance on any single point or program that could be compromised and extends the zone of security. Across mission-related activities, 54 percent of responding units reported sharing intelligence on a frequent basis and 43 percent reported sharing schedules, on a frequent basis. For example, personnel from USCG, Department of Defense, and Federal Aviation Administration are assigned to OAM’s Air and Marine Operations Center to facilitate interagency CBP has coordination.mission activities, such as prioritizing missions (22 percent) and dividing up mission assignments (20 percent), as shown in figure 8. OAM and USCG headquarters officials told us that a number of factors may affect the opportunities and frequency of interagency coordination including the extent that there is overlap between agency missions and geographic areas of responsibility. For detailed survey results, see appendix II. The limited resources that OAM has to provide support to OBP, ICE, and other customers highlights the importance of effectively assessing the extent to which the mix and placement of OAM resources best meets competing needs and addresses threats across locations and documenting analyses to support those decisions. While OAM has developed strategic and deployment plans, it did not document analyses that clearly linked such factors as threats and mission needs to its resources deployment decisions. Further, while OAM has taken actions that could increase its ability to meet support requests, our analysis indicates potential issues with the mix and placement of resources, such as challenges in meeting its support goal and lower support rates in locations identified as high priority based on threats. As such, documenting analyses to support decisions regarding the mix and placement of OAM assets and personnel could help improve transparency of OAM’s resource decisions. Moreover, to the extent that the benefits outweigh the costs, taking action to ensure reassessment of the mix and placement of its assets could help provide OAM with reasonable assurance that it is most effectively allocating its scarce resources and aligning them to fulfill its mission needs and related threats. Furthermore, while OAM has established a performance measure to assess support provided to its customers, OAM did not disclose data limitations relating to the accuracy of its reported performance results for support provided. Such disclosure could help improve transparency for achieving program results and provide more objective informative on the relative effectiveness of the program. With regard to coordination, survey respondents reported that coordination that occurred between OAM and USCG, such as intelligence sharing, was effective and resulted in reduced duplication and cost savings. However, our survey and interviews also highlighted activities where additional coordination could help leverage existing resources, eliminate unnecessary duplication and enhance operational efficiencies, including an assessment of whether proximate OAM and USCG units should be colocated. Thus, DHS could benefit from assessing actions it could take to improve coordination across a range of air and marine activities, including reconstituting the DHS Aviation Management Council and Marine Vessel Management Council. To help ensure that OAM assets and personnel are best positioned to effectively meet mission needs and address threats, and improve transparency in allocating scarce resources, we recommend that the Commissioner of U.S. Customs and Border Protection take the following three actions: document analyses, including mission requirements and threats, that support decisions on the mix and placement of OAM’s air and marine resources; to the extent that benefits outweigh the costs, reassess the mix and placement of OAM’s air and marine resources to include mission requirements, performance results, and anticipated CBP strategic and technological changes; and disclose data limitations relating to the accuracy of OAM’s reported performance results for support provided. To help DHS to better leverage existing resources, eliminate unnecessary duplication and enhance efficiencies, we further recommend that the DHS Deputy Secretary assess the feasibility of actions that could be taken to improve coordination across a range of air and marine activities, including reconstituting the DHS Aviation Management Council and Marine Vessel Management Council. Areas under consideration for increased coordination could include the colocation of proximate OAM and USCG units and the five activities identified by officials as resulting in cost savings, including sharing intelligence, dividing up responsibilities for missions, advance sharing of mission schedules, joint training, and logistics. We provided a draft of this report to DHS and DOD for their review and comment. DOD did not comment on the report, but DHS provided written comments which are reprinted in Appendix V. In commenting on the draft report, DHS concurred with the recommendations and described actions underway or planned to address them. While DHS did not take issue with the recommendations, DHS provided details in its response that merit additional discussion in two areas. In its letter, DHS states that additional context regarding CBP’s processes and documentation was necessary to provide a more balanced assessment of the manner in which OAM allocates scarce resources in support of its air and marine asset deployment and describes the historical development of OAM as well as its processes for allocating resources. We believe that the report presents appropriate context, balanced and fair analyses of the allocation of OAM personnel and flight hours using OAM’s data, and measures OAM’s performance results using its primary and most important performance measure for fiscal year 2010—OAM’s capability to launch an aircraft when a request is made for support. In addition, in commenting on the draft report, DHS also states CBP was unable to verify or duplicate GAO’s analysis of fiscal year 2010 data from TECS, but was taking steps to confirm actual figures. As the report states, we worked closely with OAM system officials to extract the underlying data from the AMOR system and discussed our preliminary analyses with OAM officials along with the methodology we used in calculating OAM’s performance results. OAM officials stated that they could not duplicate our analyses due to limitations with AMOR’s reporting capabilities. DHS states that OAM has coordinated with the Office of Information and Technology to develop and test a TECS report following a methodology that will accurately report performance results within 60 days. In regard to the recommendation that CBP document analyses, including mission requirements and threats, that support decision on the mix and placement of OAM’s air and marine assets, DHS concurred. DHS stated that CBP is finalizing its Fiscal Year 2012-2013 Aircraft Deployment Plan and that in the next iteration of this plan, which CBP plans to initiate in the third quarter of fiscal year 2013; CBP will provide additional documentation of its analysis supporting decision of the mix and placement of air and marine resources, including mission requirements and threats. Such actions should increase transparency and demonstrate that resource deployment decisions are responsive to customer need and threat. DHS also concurred with the recommendation to reassess the mix and placement of OAM’s air and marine resources to include mission requirements, performance results, and anticipated CBP strategic and technological changes to the extent that the benefits outweigh the costs stating that it planned to complete such actions as part of the next iteration of the Aircraft Deployment Plan. Further, DHS states that based on budgetary forecasts, OAM expects that its budget will continue to decrease and that as a result, OAM will meet a lower percentage of requests for air support in coming years. We acknowledge these concerns and believe that a reassessment of the right mix and placement of resources is particularly important in a constrained budgetary environment and should provide reasonable assurance that it is most effectively allocating its scarce resources and aligning them to fulfill its mission needs and related threats. Regarding the recommendation to disclose data limitations relating to the accuracy of OAM’s reported performance results for support provided, DHS concurred. It also reported that CBP is modifying its performance measure beginning with the reporting of fiscal year 2011 results and plans to disclose applicable data limitations related to performance results. Such actions should improve transparency for achieving program results and provide more objective information on the relative effectiveness of the program. In regard to the recommendation that DHS assess the feasibility of actions it could take to improve coordination across a range of air and marine activities, including reconstituting the DHS Aviation Management Council and Marine Vessel Management Council, DHS concurred and described multiple initiatives it had underway to improve coordination across air and marine activities. Such activities included DHS meetings between CBP and USCG aviation officials to explore options for joint acquisitions, colocation, air operations, and aviation governance; and a cost-benefit assessment analyzing potential efficiencies with DHS aviation activities including maintenance, training, and ground handling equipment. DHS also identified coordination efforts of its component-level Boat Commodity Council to transfer used vessels from USCG to CBP. DHS discussed attendance at a January 2012 interagency meeting hosted by CBP that discussed helicopter and marine vessel acquisitions, the P-3 aircraft Service Life Extension Program, potential opportunities for consolidation of facilities and locations of new support units and the Fiscal Year 2012-2013 Aircraft Deployment Plan. While these are positive initial steps and could help improve coordination, we continue to believe that it will be important for DHS to assess the feasibility of actions to further improve coordination of air and marine activities on a more permanent basis, such as reconstituting the DHS Aviation Management Council and Marine Vessel Management Council, among other possible actions. DHS also provided technical comments that we incorporated as appropriate. As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce the contents of this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days from the report date. At that time, we will send copies of this report to the Secretary of Homeland Security, the Secretary of Defense, and interested congressional committees as appropriate. The report will also be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov. If you or your staff have any further questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 512-8777 or gamblerr@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. Key contributors are listed in appendix VI. This report addresses the extent that the U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) has the right mix of air and marine assets in the right locations to meet customer needs, and effectively coordinated with the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG). Specifically, we reviewed the extent that the Office of Air and Marine (OAM): (1) met air and marine support requests across locations, customers, and missions, (2) has taken steps to ensure that its mix and placement of resources met its mission needs and addressed threats, and (3) coordinated the operational use of its air and marine assets and personnel with the USCG. For all three objectives, we collected and analyzed relevant operational documents; annual reports; cooperation agreements and memoranda among federal agencies; budget information; and other relevant information issued by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), DHS’s Program Analysis and Evaluation office, CBP’s Office of Border Patrol and OAM, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), USCG, and the Department of Defense (DOD). We also collected relevant information, data and documentation, such as cooperative agreements between local agencies, at each of the site visits. We also interviewed officials from DHS’s Program Analysis and Evaluation office, Division of the Office of the Chief Financial Officer, as well as headquarters officials from CBP, OAM, Border Patrol, ICE, and USCG. In addition, we met with DOD officials responsible for programs intended to enhance maritime and air domain awareness and obtained relevant reports and documents on these efforts. We also reviewed past GAO reports and DHS studies discussing opportunities for increased coordination and discussed ongoing DHS efforts to increase oversight over air and marine assets with officials from DHS’s Chief Administrative Officer. We also conducted a site visit to OAM’s Air and Marine operations Center at Riverside, California where we interviewed officials and were provided a briefing on the Air and Marine Operations Center operations, including a tour of the center. We conducted site visits to 4 of the 23 OAM branch offices, including air and marine units associated with those branches. At the site visits, we conducted semi-structured interviews with personnel from OAM operational air and marine units, USCG, ICE, and the Border Patrol, as well as some local law enforcement officials (OAM marine and the USCG are not present at one location we visited). We selected these 4 locations because they illustrated OAM operations at both the northern and southern U.S. borders, a mix of threats (terrorism, drug smuggling, and illegal immigration), operating environments for air (desert, forest, urban and rural), as well as marine operations along the coasts, on the Great Lakes, and, in the case of a southeast location, interactions with the Joint Interagency Task Force-South (JIATF-S) at Key West, Florida. All 4 also provide support for ICE and Border Patrol operations in the interior of the country. In addition, the 4 sites provided coverage in terms of the three geographic regions into which OAM units are divided administratively (southwest, southeast, northern). Three of the 4 sites include both OAM and USCG entities with air and/or marine assets in close geographic proximity, and the agencies use an array of air and marine assets under varying operational conditions. We also interviewed officials from JIATF-S to obtain information on that location’s coordinated operations covering parts of the Gulf of Mexico, the straits of Florida, the Caribbean and the Central and South America transit zone for illegal smuggling of persons and contraband. To address objectives 1 and 2, we obtained performance data for fiscal year 2010 covering the time period of October 1, 2007, through September 30, 2010, from OAM’s system of record—the Air and Marine Operations Reporting System (AMOR)—which is a module in ICE’s Case Management System, which is in turn part of TECS, a legacy DHS system. This performance data primarily included the number of air and marine support requests that were met and not met, and the reasons why the requests were not met. Due to the lack of (1) documentation as to the number and identity of the AMOR tables, (2) the keys required to join them, (3) the business rules required to use the data correctly, and (4) AMOR subject matter experts, we were unable to obtain copies of the AMOR data files. Instead, we obtained copies of the temporary data extract files produced when individual reports are requested and produced by the AMOR system for the following reports: Enforcement Support Report 02: Support Requests by Agency Miscellaneous Report 01: No Launch Activities by Branch Flight Hours Report 06: Flight Hours by Type of Aircraft Flight Hours Report 09: Flight Hours by Mission Service Hours Report 03: Service Hours by Type of Vessel We found that data on unmet air and marine support requests prior to fiscal year 2010 may not have been entered consistently and only used data from fiscal year 2010 in our analysis. For example, at two of the four locations we visited, we found that a number of unmet air support requests were not entered properly prior to fiscal year 2010. We also found that many of the data entries for unmet support requests identifying which agency an activity (e.g., flight) supported were left blank for fiscal year 2010, including 16 percent in support of requests for air enforcement activities and 93 percent in support of requests for marine enforcement activities. In interviews with OAM officials, they said these blank entries represented unmet support requests most likely in support of OAM. Based on these limitations, we did not report unmet support requests by customer for marine activities. We used the 2010 Air data from Enforcement Support Report 02 and Miscellaneous Report 01 to replicate OAM’s performance measure calculation by branch. First, we determined which Miscellaneous Report 01 no launches were in support of Border Patrol (BPL) as follows: Include only no launches where BPL is listed in any of the five in support of codes Exclude the following no launch categories: 39: Canceled by requester 01: Target Legal 03: Lost Target- prior to launch 07: Visual sighting 08: Locate only 11: Insufficient/Inadequate 16: Weather 17: Information not timely 27: Target return to foreign 40: Request did not meet GSA requirements 41: Suspect no show 42: Geographic limitation/Distance too 44: No launch/Ground 45: No launch/NAV violation 46: No country clearance 56: Static display—not operated for display 57: Certificate of Authorization Restrictions We then determined the number of BPL launches from Enforcement Report 02 and calculated the OAM performance measure for BPL support as follows: Total requests = launches + no launches Percentage of support requests met = launches / total requests Finally, we mapped the Border Patrol sectors to the OAM branches as follows: As part of our data reliability assessment, we performed electronic data testing for the data elements in the report extract files that we used; reviewed available system and user documentation, including user guides and data dictionaries; compared totals for the same time periods between similar variables from different reports; and reviewed our preliminary analyses with knowledgeable OAM officials, including the TECS Systems Control Officer. We determined that the AMOR data used in the report were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report. To address objectives 1 and 3, we conducted a web-based, self- administered questionnaire survey about coordination and related issues with all OAM air, OAM marine, USCG air and USCG marine units nationwide and in the Caribbean identified as being likely to coordinate with each other by OAM and USCG headquarters. We asked OAM and USCG headquarters points of contact to identify the USCG units that were most likely to be coordinating their operations in some regard with proximately located OAM air and marine units. A total of 86 OAM and USCG units were identified by the headquarters’ points of contact and senior officers from these units were asked to respond. The survey questions, although nearly identical, were tailored specifically to each type of unit—OAM air, OAM marine, USCG air and USCG marine. OAM air and OAM marine were asked about the sufficiency of their assets to perform certain types of missions; this was not included in the USCG questionnaires, as it was considered outside the scope of the engagement. The survey questions and summary results are included in appendix II. The questionnaire was pre-tested with two OAM air units and two OAM marine units. In addition, draft versions were reviewed by cognizant OAM and USCG headquarters’ personnel, and by a survey methodologist at GAO. We made adjustments to question wording and order based on pre-test results and review comments we received. The survey was conducted using a self-administered questionnaire posted on the web. We contacted intended recipients via e-mail before the survey to establish that the correct respondent had been identified, and later with passwords and links to the questionnaire. We made follow- up contacts with nonrespondents by e-mail and phone throughout the field period. Headquarters (USCG and OAM) points of contact were also sent email reminders to those not yet responding. The survey data were collected from May 4 through May 24, 2011. We received completed questionnaires from all the recipients, for a 100 percent unit-level response rate, although not all units answered each question in the survey. Table 5 below shows the proximately located OAM and USCG air and marine units to which the survey was sent. We conducted this performance audit from June 2010 through February 2012 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. The questions we asked in our survey of OAM and USCG air and marine units are shown below. Our survey was comprised of closed-ended and open-ended questions. In this appendix, we include all the survey questions and aggregate results of responses to the closed-ended questions; we do not provide responses to the open-ended questions for ease of reporting. The tables of aggregated response totals to each question are broken down by branch and type of unit. Not all eligible respondents answered each question. Questions 16, 17, and 18 were included only in the OAM surveys. For a more detailed discussion of our survey methodology see appendix I. Survey of Coordination of Air Operations and Assets at OAM/USCG Locations U.S. Government Accountability Office The U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) is reviewing the assets and operations of CBP's Office of Air and Marine (OAM). As part of this effort, GAO is reviewing the coordination between OAM and the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG). This questionnaire gathers information on coordination-related issues regarding air missions (including air patrols, interdiction of contraband or other illegal activities, surveillance, etc.), air-related training, determining air asset requirements, and the extent to which you have the appropriate resources for mission activities. If you would like to see or print the questionnaire before completing it online, click here to open. You will need Adobe Acrobat Reader to view this. If you do not have this program, click here to download this software. About You and Your Location Question 1: Who is the person primarily responsible for completing this questionnaire whom we can contact in case we need to clarify a response? Enter text or numbers in each of the spaces below. (e.g., Great Lakes Air and Marine Branch) Coordination of Air/Maritime Mission Activities Question 2: We realize that different OAM locations may have varying needs for coordination with the USCG unit there or nearby, and may not need to coordinate if operating areas and activities do not overlap. The next two questions ask whether your unit participates in any formal or informal entities intended to enhance or promote coordination, and in what specific ways, if any, it coordinates with the USCG. IF OTHER: Question 4: IF ANY AIR/MARITIME MISSION COORDINATION TAKES PLACE: What is the one USCG/OAM unit with which your unit has the most coordination? Please enter approximate distance between your unit and the coordinating unit as a whole number of miles. IF NO AIR/MARITIME MISSION COORDINATION IN QUESTIONS 2 AND 3: Click the link below to skip to question 13, the next applicable question. (If you do coordinate, continue with next page.) Click here to skip to Question 13 Question 6A: Are any of the following types of written guidance (including policies, agreements, MOUs) used to govern, guide or carry out any coordination prior to air/maritime missions between OAM and USCG at or near your location? Please click yes or no for each type. agreements - Used? USCG guidance - Used? MOU - Used? Other guidance - Used? Question 6B: If yes, how helpful are they to furthering coordination on air/maritime missions? For those used, please additionally click one "helpfulness" button. [Table II.6 Answers to Survey Question 6] Question 7: IF YES TO ANY GUIDANCE: If an electronic copy of the guidance is available, please upload that file(s) by browsing to its location on your computer, using the box below. Please only upload files under 2Mb in size. [Open-ended answers not displayed] Question 13: In your opinion, should there be more, less, or about the same amount or frequency of coordination on air/maritime missions, activities, or resources between OAM and USCG at or near your location in each of the following ways? If there is currently no coordination in a particular way, and that is the appropriate level, click "About the same" for that row. IF OTHER: [Open-ended answers not displayed] Question 18: Overall, considering the number, availability, and qualifications of personnel at your location, how satisfied or dissatisfied are you with the extent to which you have adequate personnel to effectively meet mission needs? [Table II.15 Answers to Survey Question 18] Question 19: Do you have any additional explanations of your answers or comments on any of the issues in this questionnaire? [Open-ended answers not displayed] Question 20: Are you done with this questionnaire? Clicking "Yes" below tells GAO that your answers are final. We will not use your answers unless the "Yes" button is checked when you last exit the questionnaire. Figure 14 displays the number of air and marine assets assigned to OAM’s regions, which include its 23 branches and 6 National Air Security Operations Centers (NASOCs). In this appendix, survey responses from questions 16 and 17 are presented. Only Office of Air and Marine (OAM) air and marine units were surveyed about their satisfaction with aircraft and marine vessels (USCG was not) respectively. Not all eligible respondents answered all parts of each question. Respondents who did not report performing a specific type of mission or who answered “don’t know” to a question about that type of mission were not included in the response counts. For a more detailed discussion of our survey methodology see appendix I and for complete survey responses, see appendix II. Rebecca Gambler, (202) 512-8777 or gamblerr@gao.gov. In addition to the contact named above, Cindy Ayers (Assistant Director), Chuck Bausell, Alexander Beata, Richard D. Brown, Frances A. Cook, Jeff R. Jensen, Nancy Kawahara, Stanley Kostyla, Linda S. Miller, Carl M. Ramirez, Richard M. Stana, Clarence Tull, Jonathan Tumin, and Johanna Wong, made significant contributions to this report.

Summary: Within DHS, the U.S. Customs and Border Protections (CBP) OAM deploys the largest law enforcement air force in the world. In support of homeland security missions, OAM provides aircraft, vessels, and crew at the request of the its customers, primarily Border Patrol, which is responsible for enforcing border security, and tracks its ability to meet requests. GAO was asked to determine the extent to which OAM (1) met its customers requests; (2) has taken steps to ensure its mix and placement of resources effectively met mission needs and addressed threats; and (3) coordinated the use of its assets with the USCG, which is to execute its maritime security mission using its assets. GAO reviewed DHS policies, interviewed OAM, Border Patrol, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, and USCG officials in headquarters and in 4 field locations selected on factors, such as threats and operating environments. Results from these field visits are not generalizable. GAO analyzed OAM support request data for fiscal year 2010, and surveyed OAM and USCG officials at 86 proximately located units to determine the extent of cooperation between the two agencies. This report is a public version of a law enforcement sensitive report GAO issued in February 2012. Information deemed sensitive has been redacted. GAOs analysis of the Office of Air and Marine (OAM) data found that OAM met 73 percent of the 38,662 air support requests and 88 percent of the 9,913 marine support requests received in fiscal year 2010. The level of support differed by location, customers, and type of mission. For example, in its northern region OAM met air support requests 77 percent of the time and in its southeast region, it met these requests 60 percent of the time. The main reasons for unmet air and marine support requests were maintenance and adverse weather, respectively. OAM has taken actions, such as developing an aircraft modernization plan and purchasing all-weather vessels, to address these issues. OAM could benefit from taking additional steps to better ensure that its mix and placement of resources meets mission needs and addresses threats. GAOs analysis of OAMs fiscal year 2010 performance results indicate that OAM did not meet its national performance goal to fulfill greater than 95 percent of Border Patrol air support requests and did not provide higher rates of support in locations designated as high priority based on threats. For example, one high-priority Border Patrol sector had the fifth highest support rate across all nine sectors on the southwest border. OAM could benefit from reassessing the mix and placement of its assets and personnel, using performance results to inform these decisions. Such a reassessment could help provide OAM with reasonable assurance that it is most effectively allocating scarce resources and aligning them to fulfill mission needs and related threats. Additionally, OAM has not documented its analyses to support its asset mix and placement across locations. For example, OAMs fiscal year 2010 deployment plan stated that OAM deployed aircraft and maritime vessels to ensure that its forces were positioned to best meet field commanders needs and respond to emerging threats, but OAM did not have documentation that clearly linked the deployment decisions in the plan to these goals. Such documentation could improve transparency to help demonstrate the effectiveness of its decisions in meeting mission needs and addressing threats. GAOs analysis of OAM and U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) air and marine survey responses indicated that they coordinated with their proximately located counterparts more frequently for activities directly related to carrying out their respective agencies missions (mission-related activities) than for mission support activities. For example, within mission-related activities, 54 percent of the 86 respondents reported sharing intelligence on a frequent basis and, within mission-support activities, about 15 percent reported that they frequently coordinated for maintenance requests. Survey respondents, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) analyses, and GAO site visits confirm that opportunities exist to improve certain types of coordination, such as colocating proximate OAM and USCG units, which currently share some marine and no aviation facilities. In addition, DHS does not have an active program office dedicated to the coordination of aviation or maritime issues. DHS could benefit from assessing actions it could take to improve coordination across a range of air and marine activities, including reconstituting departmental oversight councils, to better leverage existing resources, eliminate unnecessary duplication, and enhance efficiencies. GAO recommends, among other things, that CBP reassess decisions and document its analyses for its asset mix and placement, and that DHS enhance oversight to ensure effective coordination of OAM and USCG resources, and DHS concurred.