Radioactive material in sealed sources is used in equipment designed to diagnose and treat illnesses (particularly cancer), irradiate food and medical products for sterilization purposes, detect flaws and other failures in pipeline and other types of metal welds, and determine the moisture content of soil and other materials. Until the 1950s, only naturally occurring radioactive materials, such as radium-226, were available to be used in sealed sources. Since then, sealed sources containing radioactive material produced artificially in nuclear reactors and particle accelerators have become widely available, including cobalt-60, strontium-90, technetium-99m, cesium-137, and iridium-192. Under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, the states retain sole regulatory authority over most naturally occurring radioactive material as well as radioactive material produced in particle accelerators. Federal jurisdiction extends only to those materials used as a source of material for nuclear fuel or created as a result of irradiation in nuclear reactors. Radioactive material can be found in various forms. For example, cobalt-60 is a metal, while the cesium-137 in some sealed sources is in a powder form closely resembling talc. Radioactive materials never stop emitting radiation, but their intensity decays over time at various rates. The term “half-life” is used to indicate the period during which the radioactivity decreases by half as a result of decay. Radioactive materials are measured by their level of activity. The greater the activity level—measured in units called curies—the more radiation emitted, which increases the potential risk to the public if the radioactive materials are lost or stolen. Two types of licenses are associated with the use of radioactive materials— general licenses and specific licenses. A generally licensed device usually consists of a sealed source within a shielded device, such as gas chromatograph units, fixed gauges, luminous exit signs, or reference and check sources. These devices are designed with inherent radiation safety features so that persons with little or no radiation training or experience can use it. General licensees are automatically licensed without having to apply to NRC or an agreement state for a license and are subject to a variety of requirements under NRC’s or agreement states’ regulations. Furthermore, manufacturers are required to report quarterly to NRC the names of customers who purchase generally licensed devices. Examples of requirements general licensees are subject to under NRC’s regulations include: general licensees shall not abandon the devices; complying with instructions and precautions listed on device labels; performing tests to ensure radioactivity is not leaking from the device at least every 6 months, and, if leakage is detected, suspend operation of the device and have it repaired or disposed of by the manufacturer or another entity authorized to perform such work; and reporting to NRC or an agreement state the transfer of a device to another licensee or the disposal of the device. A company seeking radioactive material for uses that do not qualify for a general license must apply to NRC or, if it conducts business in an agreement state, to the appropriate state for a specific license. Its application must demonstrate how the use of the materials will meet the safety requirements in NRC’s or agreement states’ regulations. Applicants must provide information on the type, form, and intended quantity of material, the facilities in which the material will be used, the qualifications of users of the materials, and radiation protection programs the applicant has in place to protect their workers and the public from receiving excessive doses of radiation. The number of sealed sources in use today in the United States is unknown primarily because no state or federal agency tracks individual sealed sources. Instead, NRC and the agreement states track numbers of specific licensees. NRC and DOE have begun to examine options for developing a national tracking system, but to date, this effort has had limited involvement by the agreement states. NRC had difficulty locating owners of certain generally licensed devices it began tracking in April 2001 and has hired a private investigation firm to help locate them. Twenty-five of the 31 agreement states that responded to our survey indicated that they track some or all general licensees or generally licensed devices, and 17 were able to provide data on the number of generally licensed devices in their jurisdictions, totaling approximately 17,000 devices. NRC estimates that there are approximately 2 million licensed sealed sources in the United States. However, there is no single source of information in the United States to verify authorized users, locations, quantities, and movements of sealed sources. Separate systems are in place at NRC and in each agreement state to track the identities of specific licensees and the maximum quantity of radioactive material that they are authorized to possess. These systems do not, however, record the number of sealed sources actually possessed by specific licensees nor do the systems track movements (such as purchase, transfer, or disposal) of sealed sources by specific licensees. Licensees are required to maintain records for the acquisition and disposition of each sealed source it receives and inspections by NRC and/or an agreement state includes confirming inventory records. The Secretary of Energy and the Chairman of NRC established a working group in June 2002 to address, among other things, the options for establishing a national source tracking system and the potential for the use of technological methods for tagging and monitoring sealed sources in use, storage, and transit. This working group reported in May 2003 that a national source tracking system should provide a “cradle to grave” account of the origins of each high-risk source, and record how, by whom, and where a source has been transported, used, and eventually disposed of or exported. According to the report, such a system would help NRC and DOE to: monitor the location and use of sealed sources, detect and act on discrepancies, conduct inspections and investigations, communicate sealed source information to other government agencies, respond in the event of an emergency, verify legitimate ownership and use of sealed sources, and further analyze hazards attributable to the possession and use of sealed sources. The working group did not determine how data on sealed source licensees in the agreement states would be integrated into a national level system. While there are no complete data on the number of sealed sources in the United States, data are available on the number of specific licensees authorized to use sealed sources. Analysis of NRC’s specific license database and responses to our survey of the agreement states indicates that there are about 20,000 specific licensees in the United States (see figs. 1 and 2). The majority (nearly 80 percent) are regulated by the 32 agreement states, the remaining 20 percent of specific licensees are regulated by NRC. Our analysis of NRC’s license tracking system and responses to our survey of agreement states indicates that sealed sources for medical uses comprise the largest portion of specific licenses issued (see table 1). Fixed and portable gauges used in industry to measure density, moisture content, thickness, and so forth, are the next most prevalent use of sealed sources, with nearly 7,100 specific licenses issued nationwide. Over 570 specific licenses have been issued for industrial radiographers. In addition, there are 70 large irradiators (containing high levels, between 10,000 and 15 million curies, of cobalt-60) across the United States used for the sterilization of food and medical products, and 284 smaller irradiators (containing less than 10,000 curies of, in most cases, cesium-137 and cobalt-60) used in hospitals and other facilities for sterilization of smaller products, such as units of blood. The remaining specific licenses in the United States are issued for a variety of purposes, including, among other things, manufacturing and distribution of smoke detectors (containing small amounts of americium-241), academic research, and disposal of radioactive waste. While data exist on the numbers and locations of specific licenses in the United States, complete data are not available on the numbers of general licenses. In most cases general licensees are not required to apply to NRC or an agreement state for a license to possess and use a device. Therefore, in the past, data on general licensees have come from manufacturers of generally licensed devices that are required to report quarterly to NRC or the agreement states the names of customers purchasing generally licensed devices. According to NRC, approximately 40,000 general licensees possess an estimated 600,000 generally licensed devices in the United States. Although general licensees are required to follow NRC’s regulations, they traditionally have little contact with NRC. Mishandling and improper disposition of generally licensed devices has, on occasion, resulted in limited radiation exposure to the public and, in some cases, entailed expensive investigation, cleanup, and disposal activities. For example, two incidents occurred in New Jersey in 1997 involving luminous exit signs containing tritium. In May 1997, a 14-year old removed three tritium exit signs from a demolition site near his home and opened one sign exposing himself to radioactive material and contaminating his home. In October 1997, a patient at a state-run psychiatric hospital broke a tritium exit sign. While no injuries resulted, the state spent more than $200,000 cleaning up the hospital and disposing of the more than sixty barrels of radioactive waste—primarily contaminated carpeting, furniture, bedding, and other debris—from the incident. NRC amended its regulations effective February of 2001, to, among other things, better enable NRC to verify and track the location, use, and disposition of generally licensed devices. NRC focused its efforts to improve accountability over generally licensed devices on a small subset of devices that were determined to be of higher risk. The amended regulations include a requirement for general licensees to register with NRC devices that contain certain levels of radioactive material. General licensees would be charged $450 to cover the costs of the registration program. Beginning in April 2001, NRC mailed registration forms to about 2,800 of its general licensees. As of May 2003, approximately 61 percent of them had responded. Twenty-eight percent of the registration forms were returned as undeliverable and the remaining 11 percent were not returned by the general licensee, a response rate significantly lower than NRC expected. According to NRC, a significant amount of the submitted information is incomplete or inaccurate, requiring additional follow up that was not anticipated. To help increase the response rate, phone calls are being made in advance to locate general licensees before registration forms are sent to ensure the responsible individuals at the correct addresses receive them. In addition, NRC has contracted with a private investigation firm to help find general licensees whose addresses in the database are incorrect. Twenty-five of the 31 agreement states that responded to our survey said that they require registration of some or all generally licensed devices. Seventeen of these states were able to provide us with data on the number of generally licensed devices they regulate. These 17 states estimate that approximately 17,000 generally licensed devices are used in their jurisdictions. Since 1998, there have been more than 1,300 incidents where devices containing sealed sources have been reported lost, stolen, or abandoned in the United States, an average of about 250 per year. The majority of these lost devices were subsequently recovered. Both NRC and DOE recognize the importance of not only determining how many sealed sources are present in the United States, but also which sealed sources pose the greatest risk if used in a dirty bomb. NRC and DOE are working together to categorize sealed sources by their level of risk. However, NRC’s and DOE’s efforts have not, to date, addressed sealed sources in the agreement states. Analysis of NRC’s Nuclear Materials Events Database indicates that, between 1998 and 2002, there were over 1,300 incidents of lost, stolen, and abandoned sealed sources. These losses averaged about 250 per year. Many of these incidents involved stolen portable gauges that are used to measure the moisture content and density of soils, concrete, or asphalt on construction sites. By themselves, these gauges contain low amounts of radioactive material and pose relatively little risk to the public. Portable gauges are most often stolen from construction sites or from vehicles such as pickup trucks. According to NRC and agreement state officials, individuals stealing gauges are usually unaware that they contain radioactive material, and they often abandon or return them once discovering their contents. Nevertheless, responding to these incidents takes time and resources. Well logging sources also account for a relatively large number of lost and abandoned sources. One major oil services company accounts for over 30 of the 132 total well logging sources abandoned since 1998. These sources contain several curies of americium- 241 and cesium-137. These losses usually consisted of a sealed source becoming lodged down a well and subsequently abandoned. The well is filled with concrete and a marker is attached warning of the presence of radioactive materials. In addition, sealed sources are occasionally abandoned when companies owning them go bankrupt. According to NRC, most sealed sources that are lost, stolen, or abandoned are subsequently recovered. In the past 5 years, few incidents have occurred involving what NRC considers high-risk sealed sources. For example, in March 1999, an industrial radiography camera containing over 88 curies of iridium-192 (a quantity NRC considers to be of concern) was stolen from a trailer at the radiographer’s home in Florida. The Florida radiation control program, local law enforcement, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation conducted an investigation, but never recovered the sealed source. According to NRC, the iridium-192 in the sealed source has now decayed to the point where it is no longer a high risk to the public. Another example of lost or stolen sealed sources took place in a North Carolina hospital in March 1998. During a quarterly inventory of a hospital’s sealed sources, it was discovered that 19 sealed sources were missing, containing an aggregate of over 600 millicuries of cesium-137—a highly dispersible radioactive material. These sources included 18 cesium-137 sealed sources—which had been locked in a safe at the time of the disappearance—and a new cesium-137 sealed source still stored in its shipping container. The North Carolina radiation control program, NRC, DOE, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation conducted an extensive joint investigation. The investigation included air and ground searches using radiation detection equipment. However, the sealed sources were not recovered and a conclusion about the cause of the incident was not reached. The working group established by the Secretary of Energy and the Chairman of NRC in June 2002 was also tasked with determining which radioactive materials pose the greatest risk if used in a dirty bomb. Their analysis was to provide a relative ranking of the degree of risk posed by specific materials as a basis on which initial judgments can be made regarding specific protective measures to be developed for these materials. Using experts from DOE’s Sandia National Laboratory, the task force developed a methodology to systematically evaluate radioactive materials for a dirty bomb. Researchers at Sandia considered the potential dispersability of radioactive materials, the number of locations possessing the material, the quantity of material possessed at each facility, and the protective measures already applied to the material. The combination of these factors yielded a “hazard index,” which serves as an expression of relative concern. Specific radioactive materials were rated high, medium, low, or very low, depending upon the degree of health risk posed for their use in a dirty bomb. The analysis focused on the potential health effects of the use of radioactive materials in a dirty bomb and did not explicitly address the psychological and economic consequences. According to an NRC official, no specific data exists regarding how the public would react to a dirty bomb, which complicates efforts to analyze its psychological consequences. The working group’s analysis included materials under an NRC license and DOE’s control in the United States, excluding nuclear weapons materials, radioactive materials in nuclear power plants, spent fuel, and other radioactive waste. DOE’s and NRC’s report, however, did not consider sealed sources held by the approximately 15,000 specific licensees in the agreement states. Although the agreement states and NRC have similar types of licensees, agreement states often have greater numbers of licensees with certain types of sealed sources than NRC-regulated states. For example, our survey of agreement states indicates that Texas has more well logging specific licensees than any other state. In addition, states exclusively regulate the use of naturally occurring and accelerator produced radioactive materials. Agreement state officials told us that any consideration of the risks presented by sealed sources needs to include all materials regulated by NRC and the agreement states because the psychological and economic consequences of a dirty bomb are likely to be similar whether the radioactive material is naturally or artificially produced. NRC plans to work with the states to implement follow-up actions based on the recommendations in the DOE/NRC report. Vulnerability studies have been initiated to identify security vulnerabilities and appropriate security enhancements. Scenarios involving the aggregation of sources in a single location will be considered. In addition, methods for improved tracking of the locations of sources will be developed. Weaknesses exist in federal and state controls over the security of sealed sources. Security for devices containing sealed sources varied among facilities we visited in 10 states. In addition, NRC’s licensing process to obtain sealed sources presents a potential security weakness, namely that approved applicants may purchase sealed sources as soon as a new license is issued by mail. Because the process assumes that the applicant is acting in good faith, it is possible that sealed sources can be obtained for malicious intent. It can take as long as 12 months before NRC conducts its first inspection of the sealed source holder, potentially allowing sealed sources to be obtained and used maliciously without NRC’s knowledge. During visits to licensees, regulated by both NRC and agreement states, we found a varied level of security provided to sealed sources. A medical device manufacturer we visited in an agreement state had extensive security measures in place to protect sealed sources. For example, a heavy iron fence surrounds the building and guards are on duty to monitor the facility 24 hours per day, 7 days per week. For shielding and security, the concrete walls and ceiling containing the radioactive materials are more than 6 feet thick. All areas housing materials have electronic locks requiring a 4-digit code and card access. Visitors must be pre-arranged and escorted at all times. Background and drug checks are conducted on all personnel before hiring. Once hired, they are provided with varying degrees of building access, depending upon their duties. Eighteen staff members are fully trained in emergency response for hazardous materials and every employee is required to complete a 3-hour training course on radioactive materials and refresher training sessions are held frequently. Following the events of September 11, 2001, the company examined risks for the facility and established an in-house task force to develop scenarios of potential terrorist attacks. To test the company’s security and employees’ preparedness, the company’s chief executive officer had a helicopter land, unannounced, on the roof of one of the company’s buildings. Following this drill, emergency plans were developed that were integrated with the national Homeland Security Advisory System. For example, whenever the national threat level is raised to orange, the facility’s front gates are closed and locked at all times. If the threat level were ever increased to red, no visitors would be allowed. Furthermore, the company has entered an agreement with the local police to hire armed off-duty police to provide additional security for the facility should the national threat level be raised to red. Extensive security measures were also present at a facility we visited in an agreement state that manufactures portable moisture density gauges. Sealed sources, shipped to the manufacturer for installation in moisture density gauges, are immediately placed in a shielded basement storage room that is kept locked at all times. Only three staff members have keys to access the room. Entrances to the manufacturing facility are kept locked at all times, with an alarm system activated after closing time. Visitors must be escorted during visits. Finally, the company has initiated a computerized “cradle to grave” tracking system where all sealed sources installed in moisture density gauges are tracked from manufacture, use, and eventual disposal. In the course of visits to a medical licensee, we observed poor security practices with sealed sources. For example, during a visit to a hospital in an agreement state, we were told that sealed sources, including strontium-90, cesium-137, and iridium-192, were securely stored in a room equipped with an electronic lock with limited access. Later, during a tour of the hospital, we found the room unlocked, unattended, and the door propped open. The hospital official explained that this practice was very unusual; he locked the room door after inspection and continued the tour. Shortly thereafter, we passed the room for a second time. Again, the room was unlocked, unattended, and the door propped open. The storage room was in close proximity to the hospital’s laundry and maintenance facility, which is accessible to any hospital employee. In addition, an entry to the hospital from the outside was also nearby, and this entrance was not guarded nor equipped with radiation detection equipment to notify security if any sealed sources were being removed or stolen. We also saw potential vulnerabilities at industrial radiography licensees we visited in agreement states. Industrial radiographers use high radioactivity iridium-192 sources to produce an image on photographic film to inspect metal parts and welds for defects. These devices are very portable because they are often used at remote locations. The devices are also subject to limited security at the locations we visited—primarily a series of padlocks on storage cases for the device. Personnel are not required to have background checks and training was historically only on-the-job. Most agreement states now require classroom training and testing to enhance radiographers’ knowledge and skills. One industrial radiographer we visited added extra security measures consisting of a motion detector alarm system—monitored by the local police—and an extra lock to the gate of the storage room at its facility. However, this additional security would not prevent the theft of the sealed source when the device is being used in the field or at a customer’s facility. This industrial radiographer had taken additional steps to train his workers to be aware of security threats and required—even before it was required by NRC and agreement state regulations—for two people to be present whenever the sealed source was being used. To qualify for a specific license to use sealed sources, an applicant must demonstrate that their use of sealed sources will meet safety requirements set forth in NRC regulations or in comparable agreement state regulations (if the license applicant is located in an agreement state). NRC requires license applications to include information on, among other things, types of sealed sources that will be used, details of the applicant’s radiation protection program for workers dealing with sealed sources, and qualifications of users of sealed sources. NRC reviews this information for adherence to procedures and criteria documented in NRC licensing guidance. If the application meets approval criteria, a license is issued. NRC licensing procedures do not require inspection of licensee facilities before the issuance of a license. Instead, NRC performs initial inspections no later than 12 months after issuance of a license. However, as pointed out by an agreement state official, a licensee can purchase sealed sources as soon as a license has been acquired by mail. As a result, licensees may purchase sealed sources legally without first verifying that they will use the material as intended. Several agreement states have developed methods to verify the legitimacy of potential licensees. For example, one program we visited conducts prelicensing inspections. Another state program hand- delivers licenses at the end of the application process. An agreement state official explained that pre-licensing inspections and hand delivery enabled regulators to establish authenticity of the prospective licensee and whether information provided in the application is indeed valid. NRC conducts periodic evaluations of NRC regional materials programs and agreement state radiation control programs to ensure that public health and safety is adequately protected. Accidents and injuries resulting from the use of sealed sources are relatively few. For example, analysis of NRC’s Nuclear Materials Events Database and responses to our survey of the agreement states indicates that in fiscal year 2002, only 25 of the approximately 20,000 licensees in the United States reported radiation exposures in excess of regulatory limits. In addition, according to NRC, there were only 32 reported accidents in fiscal year 2002 involving medical use of sealed sources out of tens of thousands of medical procedures conducted. To evaluate the performance of its and agreement states’ programs, NRC developed the Integrated Materials Performance Evaluation Program, which uses several performance indicators in assessment of program effectiveness, including timeliness and quality of licensee inspection, program staffing and training, licensing activity, and response to incidents and allegations. Officials from NRC and agreement states participate in these periodic evaluations. During these evaluations, NRC and agreement state officials review program documentation and interview officials with the state or regional program to assess the program’s performance. When the results of each performance indicator have been determined, a final report is issued. Agreement state or NRC regional programs can be evaluated as: adequate to protect the public health and safety, adequate but needs improvement, and inadequate to protect public health and safety. Figure 3 outlines the results of the most recent reviews of agreement state and four NRC regional programs. NRC’s most recent reviews of the 32 agreement states and NRC regional programs, dating back to 1998, found that all programs are adequately protecting public health and safety. Of the last 35 program reviews, 31 programs were found adequate to protect public health and safety—the highest evaluation. Four programs were found “adequate but needs improvement” and were placed on “heightened oversight.” A program placed on heightened oversight must follow a plan to improve performance or it will be placed on probation for failing to correct programmatic deficiencies. Furthermore, NRC reserves the right to suspend a state’s agreement if the state does not comply with one or more of the requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954. The Integrated Materials Performance Evaluation Program is intended to ensure that the NRC and the agreement states adequately protect the health and safety of the public in accordance with NRC standards. For example, in February 2003, the Rhode Island program was found “adequate but needs improvement.” As a result of its evaluation, the Rhode Island program was placed on heightened oversight and was instructed to follow a detailed plan to improve performance, which includes NRC monitoring of progress through bimonthly teleconferences. In addition, the Rhode Island program must periodically submit a progress report to NRC. The review team found that a deficiency in staffing and training had led to Rhode Island’s performance problems. Therefore, as part of the plan to improve performance, Rhode Island was instructed to address staffing and training concerns. In November 2003, a follow-up review will be conducted to establish whether the program has improved enough to remove it from heightened oversight status. The review program also encourages states and NRC regions to learn good practices from one another. For example, an NRC official recommended that Florida be cited for a good practice for its in-house training efforts for the program’s staff, including the creation of a new “training coordinator” position. As a result of participation by an Ohio official during Florida’s last evaluation, Ohio’s program decided to hire a training coordinator. Furthermore, because review results are available to the public and a good practices report is periodically distributed to all agreement states and NRC regions, all programs have access to the good practices of other programs. The report not only shares the good practices, but also the reasons for poor performance. Agreement state and NRC regional programs can take action to improve performance by examining the strengths and weaknesses of other programs. Efforts undertaken by NRC and agreement states to strengthen the security of sealed sources for medical, industrial, and research use have only, to date, required large irradiator facilities to take specific actions. Additional orders to licensees that possess high-risk sealed sources are expected to follow. NRC and agreement states disagree over the appropriate role of the states in efforts to improve security. NRC intends to develop and implement all additional security measures on licensees with sealed sources, including those licensed by agreement states. However, 82 percent of agreement states responding to our survey feel they should be responsible for inspecting and enforcing security measures for sealed sources in their states under their authority to ensure public health and safety. Since the events of September 11, 2001, NRC efforts have focused on issuing advisories and orders for nuclear reactor and nuclear fuel licensees and implementing changes within NRC to streamline its security responsibilities. Specifically, NRC has issued over 30 advisories and 20 security orders requiring action to nuclear power plants, decommissioning power reactors, fuel cycle facilities, and spent fuel facilities. Between November and December 2001, NRC’s Office of Investigations visited 80 nuclear facilities, law enforcement agencies, and first responders nationwide to interview officials and review records to identify potential terrorist risks. NRC forwarded potential leads to the Federal Bureau of Investigation. In addition, NRC has revised the “design basis threat” for nuclear power plants—the largest reasonable threat against which a regulated private guard force should be expected to defend under existing law—and issued a corresponding order in April 2003 requiring power plants to implement additional actions to protect against sabotage by terrorists and other adversaries. NRC also made a series of internal administrative changes, such as consolidating the agency’s security responsibilities in establishing an Office of Nuclear Security and Incident Response, which includes a Threat Assessment Team responsible for working directly with the Central Intelligence Agency and the Federal Bureau of Investigation on security issues. The Office of Nuclear Security and Incident Response also works with the Department of Homeland Security and other agencies concerned with terrorism to assess and respond to potential threats. In an effort to more effectively communicate and respond to threats, NRC developed a Threat Advisory and Protective Measures System based on the national Homeland Security Advisory System, and increased staffing at its 24-hour Emergency Operations Center. NRC also conducted a review of information available to the general public on the NRC Web site for potential security risks. Efforts to strengthen the security of sealed sources for medical, industrial, and research use—by both NRC and agreement states—have been limited. Since September 11, 2001, NRC has issued a total of six advisories urging licensees to ensure security of sources and advising them to be more aware of the possibility of theft and sabotage. Licensees were also advised to double-check shipping documents and inform local police authorities of their possession of sealed sources. On June 5, 2003, NRC issued its first security order for large irradiator facilities—70 facilities nationwide that expose products, such as medical supplies, to radiation for sterilization— that requires licensees to take action to strengthen security. The decision to select irradiators first has been questioned by agreement state officials and licensees, as they feel other uses of sealed sources pose a higher risk. For example, 93 percent of agreement states responding to our survey identified industrial radiographers as of greater concern. Reasons for this may include that the sealed sources in these devices are portable, have high radioactivity, and are widely available (over 570 licensees in the United States). Although irradiator facilities contain larger amounts of radioactive material than industrial radiographers, they are specially designed to include thick concrete and steel walls, security interlocks, and other protective equipment to protect against radiation exposure. In addition, the irradiator facilities we visited had taken the initiative to implement supplementary security measures, such as installing motion detectors, more extensive security alarms and monitoring, and employee identification badges. Other uses identified by agreement states officials in our survey as requiring stricter regulation include portable gauges and well- logging devices—over 4,600 and over 200 licensees nationwide, respectively. Transportation was also identified as needing additional security. Although most agreement states surveyed indicated that the Department of Transportation’s (DOT) regulations are adequate to ensure safe transportation of sealed sources, 81 percent of them identified weaknesses in current regulations and 77 percent indicated that communications and coordination needs to be improved between their state program and DOT. Some DOT officials we spoke with disagreed that sealed sources were particularly vulnerable during transportation. However, one DOT official noted that large quantities of iridium-192 are regularly shipped to the United States from Europe and South America using regular commercial freight services. Such sources are shipped in stainless steel transport kegs that require no special tools or equipment to open. Once loaded with up to 10,000 curies of iridium-192, the transport keg weighs only 150 to 200 pounds. While this official believed that, overall, security is sufficient during transport, he told us that at certain phases such shipments could be vulnerable to terrorist diversion. NRC and the agreement states have formed a materials security working group to develop and issue new security orders by the end of the year for approximately 2,100 licensees—located throughout the United States— that have been determined to be of the greatest risk based upon NRC’s and DOE’s work to categorize sealed sources. When these orders are issued, affected licensees will have a certain specified time period to comply with the order and implement required security measures. At the end of this period, licensees will be subject to inspections to ensure compliance and face enforcement actions if actions have not been taken. Agreement states’ efforts to strengthen the security of sealed sources have focused primarily on facilitating NRC actions, such as forwarding NRC advisories, increasing attention on security when conducting inspections and license reviews, and coordinating with local law enforcement and first responders to develop emergency response procedures. Eighty-six percent of agreement state officials responding to our survey indicated that they are adequately addressing post-September 11, 2001, heightened security concerns involving malicious use of radioactive material. The Atomic Energy Act of 1954 authorizes NRC to issue rules, regulations, or orders to promote the common defense and security, while granting agreement states the authority to ensure public health and safety. Following the events of September 11, 2001, NRC determined that security- related efforts for all medical, industrial, and research licensees—including those licensed by agreement states—should be the responsibility of NRC under its common defense and security authority. However, 82 percent of agreement states responding to our survey noted that they want to have responsibility for inspection and enforcement of security measures for sealed sources under their authority to ensure public health and safety. Agreement states already enforce NRC’s existing security regulations under this authority. In addition, 74 percent of agreement states responding to our survey indicated they could effectively respond to a radiological incident with their current resources. Individual commissioners at NRC have expressed concern with budget shortfalls many states are currently experiencing. These commissioners said that states experiencing budgetary difficulties may not be able to assume additional responsibilities and that it may impact their program’s performance. When asked whether their state had sufficient resources to support new efforts, 60 percent of agreement states responding to our survey indicated they would need additional resources. However, officials from organizations representing agreement states and non-agreement states have met with NRC and advised NRC that, although many states are facing budget cuts, funding of the radioactive materials programs in these states have largely been stable and the programs have been able and will likely be able to adequately fulfill their responsibilities. According to our discussions with NRC officials, NRC is also facing budget and staffing constraints, largely as a result of its dependence upon fees from the licensees it regulates—only 20 percent of the total sealed sources licensees nationwide—for funding of its sealed source licensing and inspection activities. As more states become agreement states, NRC has fewer licensees to support its licensing and inspection programs. To address the potential effect this reduction in funding may have on its licensing and inspection programs, NRC and the agreement states have entered into a partnership—called the National Materials Program—to better share the responsibility for protecting public health and safety. Since the agreement states regulate about 80 percent of the nation’s sealed source licensees, the National Materials Program allows them to participate more actively in the development of regulations and guidance, particularly in areas where they possess expertise. For example, Texas, an agreement state, regulates more well logging specific licensees than exist in all NRC-regulated states. Thus, according to NRC officials, Texas could take the lead in developing any new public health and safety regulations for well loggers. Both NRC and the agreement states are currently conducting pilot projects to determine how the National Materials Program can and will work. In addition, states remain solely responsible for regulating certain radioactive materials, such as naturally occurring radioactive material like radium and material produced in particle accelerators, increasing the importance of federal and state cooperation in developing and implementing additional safety and/or security measures. NRC and the agreement states are continuing to work cooperatively to develop information on how responsibilities can be shared under the National Materials Program. NRC officials said that NRC lacks sufficient staff to conduct inspections of all licensees expected to receive security orders—large irradiator facilities and approximately 2,100 licensees that NRC has identified as presenting the greatest risk. To mitigate this staffing shortage, NRC intends to enter into contracts with agreement states or independent contractors to assist in carrying out these inspections. According to agreement state officials we spoke with, however, agreement states may be reluctant to participate in these efforts if they have had no role in developing the additional security requirements or are not provided additional funding. NRC would remain responsible for taking appropriate enforcement action for any security violation found during these inspections. According to NRC, although final details regarding funding have yet to be determined, NRC anticipates increasing its licensees’ fees and using funds NRC has received from emergency supplemental appropriations to cover costs associated with additional security. The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, have changed the focus of radioactive sealed sources regulation. Where NRC and the agreement states previously concentrated on ensuring the safe and effective use of sealed sources, they must now increasingly consider how to prevent terrorists from obtaining and using the material. Efforts to improve controls over sealed sources face significant challenges, especially how to balance the need to secure these materials while not discouraging their beneficial use in academic, medical, and industrial applications. The first step to improve security is to conduct a threat assessment that would identify sealed sources most likely to be used in a terrorist attack and the consequences of such an attack. Defining the types of sealed sources that are of the greatest concern will allow federal and state efforts to be appropriately prioritized. NRC’s and DOE’s current efforts to categorize sealed sources by the greatest amount of risk and their efforts to establish a national-level tracking system for the highest risk sealed sources are commendable. However, these efforts could be strengthened by involving the agreement states, which regulate 80 percent of the nation’s radioactive materials licensees, in determining risk. In addition, these efforts could be further strengthened by determining the economic consequences of a dirty bomb and how to effectively mitigate any resulting psychological consequences. In addition, NRC’s current regulations leave sealed sources at risk of malicious use. Modifying its regulations to eliminate general licensing of devices containing sealed sources could improve accountability, potentially reducing the number of sources that are lost, stolen, or abandoned. Furthermore, modifying NRC’s licensing and/or inspection process to verify—before a licensee purchases radioactive material—that it will be used as intended may increase the security of sealed sources. The President’s National Strategy for Homeland Security recognizes the critical importance of integrating federal, state, local, and private sector efforts to prepare and respond to terrorist attacks, including those using sealed sources. The initial responsibility, however, falls upon state and local governments and their organizations—such as police, fire departments, emergency medical personnel, and public health agencies— which will almost invariably be the first responders to any terrorist event involving sealed sources. Because of state and local governments’ role in responding to incidents—in addition to the fact that the federal government lacks authority over naturally occurring and accelerator produced radioactive material—it is critical to involve state and local governments in the development and implementation of additional security over sealed sources. State radiological protection agencies can provide valuable expertise on the licensees that they have been regulating, in many cases, for decades. Developing criteria and performance measures to gauge NRC’s and agreement states’ effectiveness at implementing additional security as part of NRC’s performance evaluation process would help ensure the consistent application of additional security measures across the United States. NRC and the agreement states have a proven record of cooperation in regulating the safe use of radioactive materials, including sealed sources. As increasing demands are placed on budgets at all levels of government, effectively leveraging the knowledge and resources of federal, state, and local agencies will be crucial to ensuring that sealed sources continue to be used safely and remain secure against terrorist use. To determine the sealed sources of greatest concern, we recommend that the Chairman of NRC collaborate with the agreement states to identify the types, amount, and availability of the highest risk sealed sources and the associated health and economic consequences of their malicious use. In addition, we recommend that NRC and the agreement states determine how to effectively mitigate the psychological effects of their use in a terrorist attack. In addition, accountability over generally licensed devices needs to be improved and gaps in the current licensing process need to be addressed. Because new efforts will involve additional licensing and inspection of potentially thousands of licensees and devices, we recommend that the Chairman of NRC: determine, in consultation with the agreement states, the costs and benefits of requiring owners of devices that are now generally licensed to apply for specific licenses and whether the costs are commensurate with the risks these devices present and modify NRC’s process of issuing specific licenses to ensure that sealed sources cannot be purchased before NRC’s verification—through inspection or other means—that the materials will be used as intended. Finally, to ensure that the federal and state governments’ efforts to provide additional security to sealed sources are adequately integrated and evaluated for their effectiveness, we recommend that the Chairman of NRC: determine how officials in agreement and non-agreement states can participate in the development and implementation of additional security measures and include criteria and performance measures of the NRC’s and the agreement states’ implementation of additional security measures in NRC’s periodic evaluations of its and agreement states’ effectiveness. We provided NRC, CRCPD, and OAS with draft copies of this report for their review and comment. NRC’s written comments are presented as appendix VI. NRC, CRCPD, and OAS also provided technical comments, which we incorporated into the report as appropriate. NRC stated that the draft report does not fully present either the current status of NRC’s efforts to improve the security of high-risk radioactive sources or the large effort that it has devoted to this issue since September 11, 2001. According to NRC, the draft report does not fully reflect its existing statutory framework and does not recognize that several of our recommendations would require statutory changes at both federal and state levels. Furthermore, NRC commented that our draft report should have focused on high-risk radioactive sources that are of greatest concern for malevolent use by a terrorist rather than radioactive sources of all types. Regarding NRC’s comments that our draft report does not fully discuss its activities to increase the security of the highest-risk sealed sources, we note that our draft report detailed all advisories issued by NRC to sealed source licensees urging them to ensure security of sealed sources following September 11, 2001, as well as NRC’s efforts with DOE to define the radioactive isotopes of concern. We have added information on the organization and goals of NRC’s new materials security working group. Furthermore, our report discusses that NRC’s security order to large irradiators was issued on June 5, 2003. This order was issued four days after our meeting with NRC officials to discuss our preliminary findings, conclusions, and recommendations. At the meeting, NRC officials told us that it could take until the end of 2003 for the order to be issued. It is important to note that this is the first and only security order related to sealed sources issued since the September 11, 2001, attacks and that it applies only to 70 large irradiator facilities in the United States. As discussed in our draft report, 93 percent of agreement states responding to our survey identified industrial radiographers, of which there are over 500 nationwide, as of greater concern than large irradiator facilities. Regarding NRC’s comment that our draft report does not recognize that several of our recommendations would require statutory changes at both federal and state levels, we have clarified our report to recommend that NRC determine how officials in agreement and non-agreement states can participate in the development and implementation of additional security measures. We agree with NRC that its statutory framework reserves to NRC the authority to promote the common defense and security and our report discusses the distinction between federal and state authority. However, we continue to believe, as do state officials we spoke with, that involving the agreement and non-agreement states in the development and implementation of additional security measures would be beneficial. As our draft report stated, state and local governments will almost invariably be the first responders to any terrorist event involving sealed sources. States can also provide valuable expertise on licensees that they have been regulating for decades and which NRC has had no prior contact with. In its comments, NRC states that the possibility of state budget shortfalls played absolutely no role in its decision to develop and implement additional security measures under its common defense and security authority. However, numerous NRC officials told us during our review that budget difficulties could impact the performance of state radiation protection programs and NRC’s former Chairman discussed the issue at a January 2003 meeting. NRC acknowledges in its comments that cooperation with agreement states is vital to the success of its efforts. We are encouraged that NRC stated in its comments that it will examine changes to its statutory framework in its new materials security working group and intends to work with the states to the maximum extent possible under existing statutes. Regarding NRC’s comment that the draft report should have focused only on high-risk sources rather than radioactive sources of all types, we note that the objectives of our review included determining the known number of all sealed sources in the United States and the number of sources lost, stolen, or abandoned. Our draft report noted that defining the types of sealed sources that are of the greatest concern would allow federal and state efforts to be appropriately prioritized. As we did when responding to a similar comment NRC made in our May 2003 report, we agree that the highest-risk sources present the greatest concern as desirable material for a dirty bomb. However, other sealed radioactive sources could also be used as a terrorist weapon. No one can say with certainty what the psychological, social, or economic costs of a dirty bomb—regardless of the radioactive material used to construct it—would be. We are concerned that NRC’s and DOE’s identification of the highest-risk sealed sources focuses solely on the health risks of their use and does not address the psychological, social, or economic costs of a dirty bomb. It is also important to note that NRC is still working with the International Atomic Energy Agency to reconcile differences between their definitions of high- risk sealed sources. Furthermore, many of the radioactive isotopes identified by NRC and DOE as high-risk are used only at DOE facilities or by very few NRC licensees in the United States. NRC and DOE did not consider radioactive materials licensees in the agreement states, which constitute 80 percent of the nation’s licensees. Without addressing the total consequences of a dirty bomb and considering the availability of sealed sources nationwide, we believe NRC’s and DOE’s determination of risk is incomplete. In general, both CRCPD and OAS agreed with the recommendations in the report. However, both organizations noted that our use of the term “sealed source” to refer to all radioactive materials used in medical, industrial, and research purposes may exclude many radioactive isotopes that could be used in a dirty bomb that are loose and not in sealed form, especially those used in medical and research facilities. We used the term “sealed source” for simplicity to distinguish medical, industrial, and research radioactive isotopes from material used in nuclear weapons and as fuel in nuclear reactors. We did not intend to exclude unsealed radioactive material from our discussion of radioactive materials of concern and have clarified our use of the term. CRCPD stated that the report does not address four critical areas of potential risk. First, CRCPD believes that a major area of risk is at bankrupt facilities where sealed sources can be left unattended and/or unsecured for long periods of time, leaving the sources easy targets for theft. We acknowledge this risk and have revised our discussion of lost, stolen, and abandoned sources appropriately. Second, CRCPD noted that radioactive materials licensed for “storage only” tend to be neglected by the licensee and the regulatory agency. While we agree that this is a potential weakness in sealed source security, individual state practices on “storage only” licenses differ. We did not specifically examine these practices during our review. Third, CRCPD stated that the report does not adequately address the radioactive material under the control of DOE and naturally occurring and accelerator produced radioactive material. While DOE does control a large amount of radioactive material, discussion of the security provided to it was outside of the scope of our review. We believe our report adequately discusses the challenges of regulating naturally occurring and accelerator produced materials. Finally, CRCPD states that the report does not consider transportation hubs through which very large quantities of radioactive material pass each day. While we do not specifically discuss transportation hubs, our draft report noted that weaknesses have been identified in the transportation of sealed sources and, at certain phases of transport, these shipments could be vulnerable to terrorist diversion. OAS agreed with our recommendation that NRC should include criteria and performance measures of the agreement states’ implementation of additional security measures in NRC’s periodic evaluations of agreement states’ effectiveness. OAS stated that such evaluation is not possible given the current intention of NRC to issue and implement security orders under its common defense and security authority. However, we believe that the recommendation in our draft report that NRC determine how states can participate in the development and implementation of additional security measures addresses this concern. OAS also noted that our draft report stated that licensees are tracked instead of individual sealed sources and that the draft report lends support to the formation of a national tracking system for sealed sources. OAS commented that our discussion does not accurately describe the current system. Licensees are required to maintain records for the acquisition and disposition of each source it receives and maintain an accurate inventory of sources in their possession. While we agree with this comment and have revised our discussion of license tracking, our draft report was accurate in that there is no single source of information in the United States to verify authorized users, locations, quantities, and movements of sealed sources. OAS goes on to state that there are serious concerns with the practicality and accuracy of a national tracking system and that the development of such a system should be further evaluated with input from the states and private industry. We agree with OAS’s comments, but believe that our recommendation to collaborate with the agreement states in order to determine the types, amount, and availability of the highest risk sealed sources and the health, psychological, and economic consequences of their use in a terrorist attack addresses OAS’s concerns. Finally, OAS commented that the states have long requested that the federal government seriously consider placing the use and regulation of all radioactive materials in a single federal agency. According to OAS, the current approach results in a disjointed regulatory structure and different standards for the same public health issue. While we agree that consistency and avoiding duplication is important, addressing the overall regulation of radioactive material in the United States was outside the scope of our review on security of sealed sources. We conducted our work from August 2002 through June 2003 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Appendix I presents our scope and methodology in detail. As agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce the contents of this report earlier, we plan no further distribution of it until 30 days from the date of this letter. We will then send copies to the Chairman and Commissioners of NRC; the Secretary of Homeland Security; the Secretary of Energy; the Administrator, National Nuclear Security Administration; the Director, Office of Management and Budget; the Chairman of the Organization of Agreement States; the Chairman and Executive Director of the Conference of Radiation Control Program Directors; the directors of the radiation control programs in the 32 agreement states; interested congressional committees; and other interested parties. We will also make copies available to others who request them. In addition, the report will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov. If you or your staff have any questions about this report, I can be reached at (202) 512-3841. Key contributors to this report are listed in appendix VII. At the request of the Ranking Minority Member, Subcommittee on Financial Management, the Budget, and International Security, Committee on Governmental Affairs, U.S. Senate, we examined the following questions: 1. What is the known number of sealed sources in the United States? 2. How many of these sealed sources have been lost, stolen, or abandoned? 3. How effective are federal and state controls over sealed sources? 4. What efforts have been initiated or considered since September 11, 2001, to better safeguard radiological sources? To answer these questions, we distributed surveys to 32 agreement states, 18 non-agreement states, Puerto Rico, the District of Columbia, and to NRC’s 4 regional offices. We focused the survey on information about each state’s radiation control program, specific and general licensing activities, enforcement actions, effectiveness of controls over sealed sources, program evaluation processes, transportation of sealed sources, and the impact of September 11, 2001, on regulatory programs. We acquired a list of the appropriate agreement and non-agreement state officials from NRC’s Office of State and Tribal Programs Web site and from the Conference of Radiation Control Program Directors. Because this was not a sample survey, but rather a census of all states, there are no sampling errors. However, the practical difficulties of conducting any survey may introduce errors, commonly referred to as nonsampling errors. For example, measurement errors are introduced if difficulties exist in how a particular question is interpreted or in the sources of information available to respondents in answering a question. In addition, coding errors may occur if mistakes are entered into a database. We took extensive steps in the development of the questionnaires, the collection of data, and the editing and analysis of data to minimize total survey error. To reduce measurement error, we conducted two rounds of pretesting to make sure questions and response categories were interpreted in a consistent manner with both agreement and non-agreement states. We also provided draft copies of the questionnaires to NRC, the Organization of Agreement States (OAS), and the Conference of Radiation Control Program Directors (CRCPD) for their review and comment. Based on both pretesting and comments received from NRC, OAS, and CRCPD, we made relevant changes to the questions based upon these pretests. Copies of the agreement and non-agreement state questionnaires, along with the results to each question, are in appendixes IV and V, respectively. In addition, we edited all completed surveys for consistency and, if necessary, contacted respondents to clarify responses. All questionnaire responses were double key-entered into our database (that is, the entries were 100 percent verified), and a random sample of the questionnaires was further verified for completeness and accuracy. In addition, all computer syntax was peer reviewed and verified by separate programmers to ensure that the syntax was written and executed correctly. We made extensive efforts to encourage respondents to complete and return the questionnaires, including sending up to four reminder electronic mail messages to non-respondents, calling state radiation control program directors directly, and collaborating with OAS to promote completion of this survey. Our efforts yielded responses from 31 of 32 (96.8 percent response rate) agreement states and 11 of 18 (61.1 percent response rate) non-agreement states. We also received responses from Puerto Rico and the four NRC regional offices. In total, we achieved an overall response rate of 80.4 percent, receiving 45 of the 56 surveys disseminated. We did not receive a response from one agreement state: Arizona. The non-agreement states of Alaska, Connecticut, Minnesota, Missouri, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, and Wyoming did not respond to our survey, nor did we receive a response from the District of Columbia. Although we did not receive surveys from these states, we obtained data on incidents involving sealed sources and numbers and types of licensees from NRC. Three states (New York, South Carolina, and Texas) have multiple agencies with jurisdiction over sealed sources. We sent and received surveys from the appropriate agencies in each of these states. To determine the number and types of sealed source licenses in the United States and the number of sealed sources lost, stolen, or abandoned, we relied upon information provided by state radiation control programs in their responses to our survey. In addition, we obtained data from NRC’s license tracking system database on licensees NRC regulates—both in the non-agreement states and on federal facilities in the agreement states. To determine the number of sealed sources lost, stolen, or abandoned over the past 5 years, we obtained data on incidents from NRC’s Nuclear Materials Events Database. We chose to examine the past 5 years because information was readily available through this database. Because each state uses different systems to track its licensing activities, we did not attempt to independently assess the reliability of data provided by the states in their responses to our survey. However, we did ask states in what ways and how frequently information in their databases is validated. To assess the reliability of NRC’s databases, we interviewed officials at NRC in charge of maintaining its license tracking system database and the Nuclear Materials Events Database to determine if data in these systems are reasonably complete and accurate. As a result of these interviews, we did not find any reasons to question the reliability of these data. In addition, we also performed limited testing on NRC’s license tracking system database to find missing data or data outside expected ranges. We did not find significant errors or incompleteness as a result of these tests and concluded that the use of the data would not lead to incorrect or unintentional findings. These are the only data on NRC licensing activities in the United States and program managers at NRC regularly use the data. In addition to data on state programs obtained through our survey, we obtained information through interviews with officials from state radiation control programs. We visited the following states during our review: Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Maryland, New Jersey, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, and Utah. We also interviewed officials from the Massachusetts, Nevada, New York, and Ohio state radiation control programs. We selected states to visit based upon the numbers of licensees regulated by the state and the different uses of sealed sources. We selected states with a low number of licensees (Rhode Island, South Carolina, and Utah), a medium number of licensees (Georgia, Maryland, New Jersey, North Carolina, and Pennsylvania), and a high number of licensees (Florida and Illinois). In addition, we considered the types of licensees in each state. For example, we visited South Carolina and Utah because they have two of the nation’s three low-level radioactive waste disposal facilities—the Chem- Nuclear Systems, L.L.C. facility in Barnwell, South Carolina and the Envirocare of Utah, Inc., facility in Clive, Utah. When visiting states, we met with officials from selected licensees that represented the major uses of sealed sources. We also visited manufacturers because they may possess larger quantities of radioactive material for installation in devices for sale. In summary, we visited three sites being decommissioned and decontaminated, two low-level radioactive waste disposal facilities, two moisture/density gauge manufacturers, two industrial radiographers, two medical licensees (hospitals), two large irradiator facilities, a well-logging licensee, a nuclear pharmacy, a research and development licensee, and an academic licensee to obtain their views on the effectiveness of NRC and state regulations, including the challenges associated with sealed source security. Additionally, we examined physical security measures during tours of these facilities. We also visited Rhode Island, Florida, and the NRC Region III office in Lisle, Illinois, because they were undergoing NRC program performance evaluation reviews under the Integrated Materials Performance Evaluation Program. Visiting a program while it was being evaluated gave us the opportunity to witness review procedures for evaluating performance, consistency of application of NRC’s review criteria, transparency of the review process, and the level of cooperation and involvement between NRC officials and representatives from agreement states. To follow up our review of the program evaluation process, we attended a 2-day NRC training class on the Integrated Materials Performance Evaluation Program and observed two program evaluation Management Review Board meetings at NRC headquarters in Rockville, Maryland. We attended two conferences related to sealed source regulation—the May 2002 CRCPD annual meeting held in Madison, Wisconsin, and the annual OAS Conference held in October 2002, in Denver, Colorado. We also obtained a position paper from the Health Physics Society on the regulation of sealed sources. Furthermore, we met with the chairman of the Southeast Compact for low-level radioactive waste and the Advisory Committee on the Medical Uses of Isotopes to elicit views on the regulation and security of sealed sources. At the federal level, we interviewed numerous NRC officials representing several different offices and programs. During these interviews, NRC provided us with information and documents about the regulation of sealed sources and the challenges it faces in the post September 11, 2001, security environment. We met with NRC’s Office of Enforcement, Office of Investigation, Office of Nuclear Materials Safety and Safeguards, Office of Nuclear Security and Incident Response, and Office of State and Tribal Programs. Additionally, we attended an August 2002 meeting between representatives of OAS and CRCPD and the Commissioners of NRC. Finally, to gain the perspective of federal regulators at the regional level, we visited three of the four NRC regional offices, including NRC Region I located in King of Prussia, Pennsylvania; Region II located in Atlanta, Georgia; and Region III located in Lisle, Illinois. In addition to officials at NRC, we interviewed several other federal government agency officials. To learn about sealed source transportation regulations and issues, we interviewed officials from the Department of Transportation, including the Office of Hazardous Materials Safety. To establish the role of the Environmental Protection Agency in regulating sealed sources, we met with officials from the Office of Radiation and Indoor Air. We also met with officials from the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and observed a FEMA evaluated exercise in March 2003 in Springfield and Morris, Illinois, that simulated a radiological release at a nuclear power plant. We also interviewed Department of Justice and Department of Energy officials. We performed our review from August 2002 through June 2003 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Irradiators are devices or facilities that expose products to radiation for sterilization, such as spices, milk containers, and hospital supplies. Irradiator facilities are relatively few in number and contain very high activity sources, which vary in physical size. Non-self shielded irradiators do not provide shielding from the radiation beam; therefore, the facilities that contain the irradiation must be specially designed, often including thickly shielded walls, interlocks, and other protective equipment. Self- shielded irradiators do not emit external radiation beams and are usually small cabinet type devices. These irradiators are commonly used in research applications or for blood irradiation. According to our survey and NRC specific license data, there are a total of approximately 350 irradiator specific licensees in the United States, about 70 of which are large irradiators. Teletherapy is commonly referred to as external beam radiation. Fixed multibeam teletheraphy units focus gamma radiation from an array of over 200 cobalt-60 sources on cancer lesions. The facilities within which the units are located are specifically designed to include thickly shielded walls and have other protective equipment, due to the high activity sources. According to our survey and NRC specific license data, there are approximately 60 teletherapy licensees and about 60 gamma knife licensees in the United States. internal features on photographic film to inspect metal parts and welds for defects. Industrial radiography sources and devices are generally small in terms of physical size, although the devices are usually heavy due to the internal shielding. The sources are attached to specially designed cables for their operation. The use of radiography sources and devices is very common—a total of over 570 licensees nationwide—and their portability may make them susceptible to theft or loss. Further, the small size of the source allows for unauthorized removal by an individual, and such a source may be placed into a pocket of a garment. Industrial radiography cameras typically contain a high radioactivity iridium-192 source that is capable of inflicting extensive radiation burns if handled improperly. Brachytherapy is an advanced cancer treatment in which radioactive seeds or sources are placed in or near the tumor itself, giving a high radiation dose to the tumor while reducing the radiation exposure in the surrounding healthy tissues. Brachytheraphy applications are of three slightly different varieties, generally referred to as low dose rate, medium dose rate, and high dose rate. These applications use sealed sources that are small physically (less than 1 centimeter in diameter and only a few centimeters long), and, thus, are susceptible to being lost or misplaced. High and medium dose rate sources, and some low dose rate sources, may be in the form of a long wire attached to a device (a remote after loading device). The after loading device may be heavy, due to the shielding for the sources when not in use, and the device may be on wheels for transport within a facility. The remote after loading device may also contain electrical and electronic components for its operation. Brachytherapy sources and devices are located in hospitals, clinics, and similar medical institutions, and such facilities may have a large number of sources. Well logging is a process that uses sealed sources and/or unsealed radioactive materials to determine whether a well, drilled deep into the ground, contains minerals, such as coal, oil, and natural gas. The sources are usually contained in long (1 to 2 meters, typically) and thin (less than 10 centimeters in diameter) devices that also contain detectors and various electronic components. The actual size of the sources inside the devices is generally small, but the device is heavy, due to the ruggedness needed for the environments in which they are to be used. Our analysis of NRC’s license tracking system and responses to our survey of agreement states indicates that there are about 210 well logging licensees in the United States. material density, flow, level, thickness, weight, and so forth. The gauges— possessed by over 1,600 specific licensees and an unknown number of general licensees—contain sealed sources that radiate through the substance being measured to a readout or controlling device. Depending upon the specific application, industrial gauges may contain relatively small quantities of radioactive material, or may contain sources with activities approaching 30 curies. The devices generally are not large, but may be located some distance from the radiation detector, which may have electrical or electronic components located within the detector. A facility may have a large number of these gauges and the locations of such devices or sources within a facility may not be recognized, since the devices may be connected to process control equipment. This lack of recognition may result in a loss of control if the facility decides to modernize or terminate operations. Portable gauging devices, such as moisture density gauges, are used at field locations and contain the sources, detectors, and electronic equipment necessary for the measurement. These gauges—over 4,600 licensees in the United States—contain a gamma emitting sealed source, usually cesium- 137, and a sealed neutron source, usually americium-241 and beryllium. The source is physically small in size, typically a few centimeters long by a few centimeters in diameter, and may be located either completely within the device or at the end of a rod/handle assembly. The portability of the device makes it susceptible to loss of control or theft. Amends the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 to include the following major efforts: (1) based on a new classification system, develop a national system for recovery of sealed sources that are stolen or lost; (2) develop a national tracking system that takes into account the new classification system; and (3) establish procedures to improve the security of sealed sources in use, transport, and storage. Establishes a task force to develop a classification system for sensitive sealed sources that is based on the potential for use by terrorists and the extent of the threat to public health and safety. Directs a task force to (1) determine which sealed sources should be classified as sensitive sealed sources, (2) develop a national system to recover sensitive sealed sources that are lost or stolen, (3) develop a national tracking system for sealed sources, and (4) establish procedures to improve the security of sensitive sealed sources. Establishes a multiagency task force to evaluate the security of sealed sources and recommends administrative and legislative actions to provide the maximum degree of security against radiological threats. Directs a task force to (1) establish or modify a classification system for sealed sources based on sealed source attractiveness to terrorists, (2) establish or modify a national tracking system, (3) establish a system to impose refundable fees for proper disposal, and (4) improve the security of sealed sources. Establishes a multiagency task force to, in consultation with state agencies, make recommendations for appropriate regulatory and legislative changes to strengthen controls over sealed sources. Changes the definition of byproduct material to include naturally occurring and accelerator produced radioactive material and, within 4 years, transition regulatory authority over this material from non-agreement states to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. None. Instructs the Secretary of Energy to establish a research and development program to develop alternatives to sealed sources that reduce safety, environmental, or proliferation risks to workers using the sources or the public. Directs the Secretary of Energy to conduct a survey of industrial applications of large radioactive sources. Requires the survey to include information on the management and disposal of sealed sources. Directs the Secretary of Energy to (1) identify options for disposal of low-level radioactive waste, (2) develop a report for Congress on a permanent disposal facility for greater-than-Class C waste, and (3) submit to Congress a plan to ensure continued recovery of greater-than-Class C waste until a permanent disposal facility is available. None. Authorizes the Secretary of Energy to engage in activities with the International Atomic Energy Agency to (1) propose and conclude agreements with up to 8 countries under which the countries would provide temporary secure storage for orphaned, unused, and surplus sealed sources, (2) promote the discovery, inventory, and recovery of sealed sources in member nations, and (3) authorizes the Secretary of Energy to make voluntary contributions to the International Atomic Energy Agency to achieve the aforementioned goals. None. E-mail: RuedelP@gao.gov abandoned? 2. How effective are federal and state controls over radiological sources? September 11, 2001, to improve the controls over radiological sources? Due to increased security put in place following number and types of radiological sources being the anthrax incidents of October 2001, please do regulated by the state and obtain states’ views on not use the U.S. Postal Service to return surveys the effectiveness of the current federal and state to GAO. regulatory framework. Congress on the current state of regulatory completion. Please list that person’s name control over radioactive materials. To be below in case we have questions or need follow- included in our report, your response within 3 up. Thank you. weeks of receipt is greatly appreciated. Directions for Completing this Questionnaire Please complete this questionnaire and return it via email (ColesR@gao.gov), fax (202-512- 6880), or FedEx within 3 weeks of receipt. GAO will take steps to safeguard the privacy of your responses. 1. First, we’d like to get some basic information about your state’s radiation control program. Please provide the following information. State department/division/office (e.g. Department of Health): City the main office is located in: Current director of program: 2. Please list your program’s total budget for the following calendar years: 2000 (Actual) $51,463,128 (N=30) 2001 (Actual) $56,975,299 (N=31) 2002 (Actual) $59,712,939 (N=32) 2003 (Projected) $61,039,121 (N=31) 3. What are the sources of your program’s funding? (Mark all that apply ) (N=35) 94.3% Fees charged to licensees 45.7% Appropriations from state general fund 60.0% Other, please specify: 4. How many full-time equivalent (FTE) staff does your program currently employ? (N=35) 5. Of the total number of staff reported in question #3, how many FTEs do you have in the following categories? 6. How many of your technical staff (including inspectors and license reviewers) are professionally certified (e.g. certified health physicists, nuclear medicine technologists, etc.)? 7. How many staff were employed in your state in the following categories on January 1, 1998? (N=34) Number on January 1, 1998 8. Over the next five years, do you estimate your total full-time equivalent positions will increase or decrease for technical and non-technical staff? (Mark only one response for each type of staff) (N=34) 70.6% Stay about the same 70.6% Stay about the same 9. In what year did your agreement with the NRC, or its predecessor, the Atomic Energy Commission, first enter into force? SPECIFIC LICENSING ACTIVITIES OF THE AGREEMENT STATES 10. Please complete the following table on the total number of active specific licenses for Atomic Energy Act materials issued by your state as of December 31, 2002: 10 CFR part(s) or the applicable agreement 380 (N=29) 248 (N=29) 417 (N=29) 4,795 (N=29) 134 (N=29) 167 (N=29) 137 (N=28) 95 (N=27) 10,611 (N=32) 153 (N=20) 324 (N=19) 11. Next, we’d like to obtain data on the number of active specific licenses issued by your state program as of December 31, 2002 and how often licensees are inspected. Enter number and mark only one response in each row for most common inspection frequency within that particular code. If none, please enter “0” (zero). (N=35) Please check this box if the license information below includes non-Atomic Energy Act materials (i.e. naturally occurring or accelerator produced radioactive materials) program code and license use 8 (N=33) Inspection Not Required program code and license use 03251 Application of byproduct material 0 (N=33) More than once per year into devices exempt from regulation 03252 Manufacture of resins containing 2 (N=33) More than once per year 03253 Manufacture, distribution, and 15 (N=32) More than once per year transfer of exempt quantities of 03256 Manufacture, preparation, or 14 (N=33) More than once per year carbon-14 urea for “in vivo” Inspection Not Required program code and license use 03254 Manufacture, process, produce, or 6 (N=33) More than once per year 03255 Manufacture, process, produce, or 1 (N=33) More than once per year initially transfer gas and aerosol 03240 Manufacture or initially transfer 74 (N=33) More than once per year 03241 Manufacture, assemble, repair, or 1 (N=33) Inspection Not Required program code and license use 03242 Manufacture or initially transfer 5 (N=32) More than once per year 03243 Manufacture or initially transfer ice 1 (N=33) More than once per year 03244 Manufacture and distribution of 25 (N=33) More than once per year clinical or laboratory testing under 02511 Manufacture, preparation, or 62 (N=33) More than once per year byproduct material for medical use under part 35. Inspection Not Required program code and license use 02513 Manufacture and distribution of 20 (N=33) More than once per year byproduct material for medical use 01100 Academic type A specific license of 100 (N=33) More than once per year 03211 Manufacturing and distribution type 11 (N=33) A specific license of broad scope 03610 Research and development type A 57 (N=33) Inspection Not Required program code and license use 01110 Academic type B specific license of 21 (N=33) More than once per year 03211 Manufacturing and distribution type 8 (N=33) B specific license of broad scope 03611 Research and development type B 7 (N=33) More than once per year specific license of broad scope 01120 Academic type C specific license of 31 (N=33) More than once per year Inspection Not Required program code and license use 03213 Manufacturing and distribution type 1 (N=33) C specific license of broad scope 03612 Research and development type C 14 (N=33) More than once per year specific license of broad scope 95 (N=33) More than once per year 379 (N=33) More than once per year Inspection Not Required program code and license use 2,519 (N=32) More than once per year 1,805 (N=32) More than once per year 187 (N=32) More than once per year 02210 Eye applicators (strontium-90) 74 (N=33) More than once per year Inspection Not Required program code and license use 55 (N=33) More than once per year 45 (N=33) More than once per year 110 (N=33) More than once per year 147 (N=33) More than once per year Inspection Not Required program code and license use 280 (N=33) Irradiators self shielded less than 176 (N=33) Irradiators other less than 10,000 17 (N=33) Irradiators self shielded greater than 9 (N=33) More than once per year Inspection Not Required program code and license use 03521 All other irradiators greater than 40 (N=33) More than once per year 03110 Well logging byproduct and/or 70 (N=33) More than once per year special nuclear material tracer and 03111 Well logging byproduct and/or 40 (N=33) More than once per year 03112 Well logging byproduct only 64 (N=33) More than once per year Inspection Not Required program code and license use 1,193 (N=33) More than once per year 3,715 (N=33) More than once per year 369 (N=33) More than once per year 212 (N=33) More than once per year 146 (N=33) More than once per year Inspection Not Required program code and license use 104 (N=33) More than once per year only—source less than 100 curies 21 (N=33) More than once per year Inspection Not Required 12. Please complete the following table for radioactive materials licenses issued by your state program that are NOT LISTED IN YOUR RESPONSE TO QUESTION 11. Enter the license use, number of active licenses issued by your program, and mark only one response in each row for most common inspection frequency within that particular use. Please copy and paste above table for additional uses. 13. In your opinion, which 3 uses of radioactive materials, from the license uses listed in questions 11 and 12, require the strictest and least strict regulation to protect public health and safety? 1. 1. 2. 2. 3. 3. 14. In your opinion, which 3 uses of radioactive materials, from the license uses listed in questions 11 and 12, require the strictest and least strict regulation to ensure security? (i.e. to prevent the materials’ use by terrorists in a radiological weapon) 1. 1. 2. 2. 3. 3. 15. Does your state program require generally licensed devices to be registered? Mark only one response ) (N=31) 80.6% Yes, all generally licensed devices are required to be registered. (skip to question 17) 16.1% Yes, but only certain generally licensed devices are required to be registered. No, generally licensed devices are not required to be registered with the state. (skip to question ) 16. If only certain generally licensed devices are required to be registered, what criteria determine the devices required to be registered with the state program? 17. If generally licensed devices are required to be registered with your state program, does the program maintain a database of registered generally licensed devices? Mark only one response ) No (skip to question 19) 18. If yes, how many generally licensed devices are currently registered in your state? 19. If your state program does not require any generally licensed devices to be registered or your state program does not maintain a database of registered generally licensed devices, how many such devices would you estimate are present in your state? Number of enforcement actions per year (N=24) (N=25) (N=27) (N=28) (N=28) action) 45 (N=23) 50 (N=24) 47 (N=24) 66 (N=26) 57 (N=25) 3 (N=25) 3 (N=26) 8 (N=26) 9 (N=27) 9 (N=27) 24 (N=25) 25 (N=26) 26 (N=26) 27 (N=27) 53 (N=27) 1 (N=24) 0 (N=25) 1 (N=25) 0 (N=25) 1 (N=25) 0 (N=24) 0 (N=25) 2 (N=25) 0 (N=26) 2 (N=26) 7 (N=15) 6 (N=16) 14 (N=16) 56 (N=19) 87 (N=19) Other: 29. How are fines/civil penalties collected by your program utilized? (N=35) 25.7% Available for use by the state radiation control program 45.7% Deposited into state general fund 11.4% Other, please specify: 30. Please briefly describe any enforcement cases since January 1, 1998, that have been difficult to resolve, have generated above average public or press interest, have challenged your regulatory authority, or have or will result in high clean up costs financed by state or federal funds. EFFECTIVENESS OF CONTROLS OVER RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS 31. To what extent, if at all, do you agree that communications and coordination needs to be improved between your state program and the following group? (Mark only one response in each row) a) Commission (NRC) (N=35) b) the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) (N=35) c) Agency (EPA) (N=35) d) the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) (N=35) e) the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) (N=35) f) Transportation (DOT) (N=35) g) other agreement states (N=35) h) non-agreement states (N=35) i) Organization of Agreement States (OAS) (N=34) j) Conference of Radiation (CRCPD) (N=34) 32. To what extent, if at all, do you agree with the following statements? (Mark only one response in each row) (N=35) b) The current division of NRC, DOE, EPA, DOT and FDA is the most effective c) Consistent radiation protection standards need to be developed that would apply across all programs. d) My state program currently has e) My state program currently has sufficient technology (e.g. f) My state program currently has g) My state program currently has h) NRC’s Nuclear Materials Events Database (NMED) radioactive materials in my state i) DOT’s regulations adequately ensure safe and secure transport j) The federal government should have a greater role in regulating k) Additional federal training radioactive material in my state l) My state’s public safety/law additional training to respond to m) My state program can n) In the event of a major federal resources can be brought to bear in a timely manner o) My state program is adequately addressing the post-September 11th heightened security use of radioactive material (i.e. possible use as a “dirty bomb”) p) Over the next five years, my q) Over the next five years, my sufficient technology (e.g. sources r) Over the next five years, my s) Over the next five years, my 33. Please fill in the following table on the number of reportable incidents (under NRC or equivalent agreement state regulations) involving radiological materials that have occurred in your state from 1998 through 2002. If no incidents, please enter “0” (zero). Number of incidents per year 48 (N=24) 32 (N=26) 26 (N=25) 33 (N=25) 47 (N=26) 18 (N=26) 33 (N=26) 33 (N=28) 32 (N=28) 21 (N=28) Lost, stolen, or abandoned 100 (N=28) 129 (N=27) 129 (N=27) 167 (N=28) 220 (N=28) 101 (N=24) 107 (N=24) 123 (N=27) 114 (N=27) 91 (N=26) 30 (N=26) 37 (N=26) 47 (N=28) 38 (N=28) 34 (N=27) 9 (N=25) 20 (N=27) 19 (N=27) 14 (N=27) 23 (N=28) 341 (N=29) 388 (N=29) 408 (N=30) 454 (N=30) 540 (N=30) 34. For those materials that have been reported lost, stolen, or abandoned from 1998 through 2002, how many were subsequently recovered? (N=22) INTEGRATED MATERIALS PERFORMANCE EVALUATION PROGRAM 35. Do you conduct periodic internal evaluations of your program’s effectiveness? (Mark only one response ) (N=35) 36. Apart from the Integrated Materials Performance Evaluation Program, does an outside party regularly evaluate your program? (Mark only one response ) (N=35) 37. In your opinion, how adequate or inadequate are the following Integrated Materials Performance Evaluation Program performance indicators in evaluating your state’s radiological protection programs? (Mark only one response in each row) a) Status of evaluation program (N=35) b) Technical quality of inspections (N=35) c) Quality of technical staffing and training (N=35) d) Technical quality of licensing actions (N=35) e) Quality of response to incidents and allegations (N=35) f) Sealed source and device evaluation program (N=34) g) Low-level radioactive waste disposal program (N=34) h) Legislation and program elements required for compatibility (N=35) 38. What are the strengths of the Integrated Materials Performance Evaluation Program? 39. What are the weaknesses of the Integrated Materials Performance Evaluation Program? 40. Briefly, what improvements, if any, should be made to the Integrated Materials Performance Evaluation Program process? 41. Overall, is the Integrated Materials Performance Evaluation Program process an adequate means to assess the effectiveness of your state’s regulatory program? (Mark only one response ) (N=35) 0.0% No 42. Does your program regulate the transportation of radioactive material through your state? (N=35) 43. Do you require licensees to notify your program of shipments of radioactive material? (N=35) 2.9% No (skip to question 46) 44. If yes, which types of cargo do you require that your program be notified of shipments of? 45. Which of the following types of shipments does your state monitor? (N=35) 60.0% Spent nuclear fuel 57.1% DOE waste material (i.e. shipments to the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant) 51.4% Byproduct material with high radioactivity 37.1% Other, please specify: 2.9% No shipments monitored 46. Please describe any coordination efforts undertaken by your state with other state and/or federal agencies regarding the transportation of radioactive material. 47. What are the strengths of the current regulations on transporting radioactive materials? 48. What are the weaknesses of the current regulations on transporting radioactive materials? 49. Under current regulations, to what extent is the transportation of radioactive materials vulnerable to terrorist sabotage or other malicious use? IMPACT OF SEPTEMBER TO YOUR STATE’S REGULATORY PROGRAM 50. What impact, if any, has the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks had on your state’s program in the following areas? (Mark only one response in each row) a) State radiological protection laws (N=33) b) State radiological protection regulations (N=33) c) License review procedures (N=34) d) Inspection frequency (N=34) e) Inspection procedures (N=34) f) Number of enforcement actions (N=32) g) Severity of enforcement actions taken (N=34) h) Incident response procedures (N=34) i) procedures (N=34) j) Coordination with federal agencies (N=34) k) Coordination with other states (N=34) l) Coordination with state law agencies (N=34) m) Financial support from state legislature (N=33) n) Monitoring of transportation of your state (N=33) o) Federal financial aid to your state program (N=33) p) Federal training support to your state program (N=33) q) Federal technology support to your state program (N=33) 51. Please describe specific efforts that have been initiated or considered by your state since September 11, 2001, to better safeguard radiological sources. 52. In your opinion, should post-September 11 security measures be developed and enforced by the NRC under the common defense and security authority given it by the Atomic Energy Act or by the agreement states under their health and safety authority? Why? (N=34) States = 82.4%; NRC = 5.9%; Both = 11.8% 53. Does your state have sufficient resources to support these new efforts or are additional resources needed? (N=35) Yes = 34.3%; No = 65.7% CHANGES NEEDED AT THE FEDERAL LEVEL 54. In your opinion, what are the 3 most significant changes (in rank order) that could be made at the federal level to improve the regulation of radioactive material to protect public health and safety? #1. #2. #3. 55. In your opinion, what are the 3 most significant changes (in rank order) that could be made at the federal level to improve the security of radioactive material? #1. #2. #3. 56. In your opinion, what are the 3 most significant changes (in rank order) that could be made at the federal level to improve the transportation of radioactive material? #1. #2. #3. 57. Please use the space below to list any additional information about issues related to radioactive sources or concerns raised in this survey. Thank you for your assistance in our survey. E-mail: RuedelP@gao.gov abandoned? 2. How effective are federal and state controls over radiological sources? September 11, 2001, to improve the controls over radiological sources? Due to increased security put in place following number and types of radiological sources being the anthrax incidents of October 2001, please do regulated by the state and obtain states’ views on not use the U.S. Postal Service to return surveys the effectiveness of the current federal and state to GAO. regulatory framework. Congress on the current state of regulatory assume responsibility for coordinating its control over radioactive materials. To be completion. Please list that person’s name included in our report, your response within 3 below in case we have questions or need follow- weeks of receipt is greatly appreciated. up. Thank you. Directions for Completing this Questionnaire Please complete this questionnaire and return it via email (ColesR@gao.gov), fax (202-512- 6880), or FedEx within 3 weeks of receipt. GAO will take steps to safeguard the privacy of your responses. E-mail: 1. First, we’d like to get some basic information about your state’s radiation control program. Please provide the following information. State department/division/office (e.g. Department of Health): City the main office is located in: Current director of program: 2. Please list your program’s total budget for the following calendar years: 2000 (Actual) $3,825,733 (N=10) 2001 (Actual) $4,340,987 (N=10) 2002 (Actual) $4,661,911 (N=10) 2003 (Projected) $5,331,768 (N=11) 3. What are the sources of your program’s funding? (Mark all that apply ) (N=12) 50.0% Fees charged to licensees 83.3% Appropriations from state general fund 50.0% Other, please specify: 4. How many full-time equivalent (FTE) staff does your program currently employ? (N=12) 5. Of the total number of staff reported in question #3, how many FTEs do you have in the following categories? 6. How many of your technical staff (including inspectors and license reviewers) are professionally certified (e.g. certified health physicists, nuclear medicine technologists, etc.)? 7. How many staff were employed in your state in the following categories on January 1, 1998? (N=12) Number on January 1, 1998 8. Over the next five years, do you estimate your total full-time equivalent positions will increase or decrease for technical and non-technical staff? (Mark only one response for each type of staff) Technical Staff (N=12) Non-Technical Staff (N=11) LICENSING ACTIVITIES OF THE NON-AGREEMENT STATES 9. As of December 31, 2002, how many active licenses are currently issued by your state program for the production and/or use of naturally occurring or accelerator produced radioactive materials (N=12) 10. Next, we would like to obtain information on licenses issued by your program for uses of naturally occurring radioactive material and accelerator produced radioactive material Enter the license use, mark whether it is for naturally occurring OR accelerator produced radioactive material, and enter the number of active licenses issued by your state program. Mark only one response in the column for most common inspection frequency within each license use. Please copy and paste above table for additional uses. 11. In your opinion, which 3 uses of radioactive materials—byproduct, naturally occurring, or accelerator produced—require the strictest and least strict regulation to protect public health and safety? 1. 1. 2. 2. 3. 3. 12. In your opinion, which 3 uses of radioactive materials—byproduct, naturally occurring, or accelerator produced—require the strictest and least strict regulation to ensure security? (i.e. to prevent the materials’ use by terrorists in a radiological weapon) 1. 1. 2. 2. 3. Number of enforcement actions per year 302 (N=9) 340 (N=9) 265 (N=9) 303 (N=9) 519 (N=10) action) 5 (N=6) 4 (N=6) 7 (N=6) 10 (N=6) 7 (N=6) 0 (N=7) 0 (N=7) 0 (N=7) 1 (N=7) 0 (N=7) 0 (N=6) 0 (N=6) 0 (N=6) 1 (N=6) 2 (N=7) 0 (N=6) 0 (N=6) 0 (N=6) 0 (N=6) 0 (N=6) 0 (N=5) 0 (N=5) 0 (N=5) 0 (N=5) 0 (N=5) 0 (N=1) 0 (N=1) 0 (N=1) 1 (N=1) 0 (N=1) Other: 22. How are fines/civil penalties collected by your program utilized? (N=12) 16.7% Available for use by the state radiation control program 41.7% Deposited into state general fund 16.7% Other, please specify: 23. Please briefly describe any enforcement cases since January 1, 1998, that have been difficult to resolve, have generated above average public or press interest, have challenged your regulatory authority, or have or will result in high clean up costs financed by state or federal funds. EFFECTIVENESS OF CONTROLS OVER RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS 24. To what extent, if at all, do you agree that communications and coordination needs to be improved between your state program and the following group(s)? (Mark only one response in each row) (N=12) a) Commission (NRC) b) the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) c) Agency (EPA) d) the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) e) the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) f) Transportation (DOT) h) other non-agreement states i) Organization of Agreement States (OAS) j) Conference of Radiation (CRCPD) 25. To what extent, if at all, do you agree with the following statement? (Mark only one response in each row) (N=12) b) The current division of NRC, DOE, EPA, DOT and FDA is the most effective c) Consistent radiation protection standards need to be developed that would apply across all programs. d) My state program currently has e) My state program currently has sufficient technology (e.g. f) My state program currently has g) My state program currently has h) NRC’s Nuclear Materials Events Database (NMED) radioactive materials in my state i) DOT’s regulations adequately ensure safe and secure transport j) The federal government should have a greater role in regulating k) Additional federal training radioactive material in my state l) My state’s public safety/law additional training to respond to m) My state program can n) In the event of a major federal resources can be brought to bear in a timely manner o) My state program is adequately addressing the post-September 11th heightened security use of radioactive material (i.e. possible use as a “dirty bomb”) p) Over the next five years, my q) Over the next five years, my sufficient technology (e.g. sources r) Over the next five years, my s) Over the next five years, my 26. Please fill in the following table on the number of reportable incidents (under your state regulations, if any) involving naturally occurring or accelerator produced radiological materials that have occurred in your state from 1998 through 2002. If no incidents, please enter “0” (zero). Number of incidents per year 0 (N=7) 0(N=7) 0(N=7) 0(N=7) 0(N=7) 0 (N=7) 0(N=7) 2 (N=8) 2(N=7) 1(N=7) Lost, stolen, or abandoned 26 (N=9) 32(N=9) 13 (N=10) 18 (N=10) 19 (N=10) 6 (N=7) 4 (N=7) 0 (N=8) 2 (N=8) 5 (N=8) 16 (N=8) 23 (N=8) 9 (N=8) 10 (N=9) 5 (N=8) 1 (N=7) 0 (N=7) 0 (N=7) 0 (N=7) 0 (N=7) 115 (N=11) 140 (N=11) 89 (N=11) 94 (N=11) 109 (N=12) 27. For those materials that have been reported lost, stolen, or abandoned from 1998 through 2002, how many were subsequently recovered? (N=12) 28. Do you conduct periodic internal evaluations of your program’s effectiveness? (Mark only one response ) (N=12) 29. Does an outside party (i.e. consultants or auditors) regularly evaluate your program? (Mark only one response ) (N=12) 91.7% No 30. Does your program regulate the transportation of radioactive material through your state? (N=12) 31. Do you require licensees to notify your program of shipments of radioactive material? (N=12) 83.3% No (skip to question 34) 32. If yes, which types of cargo do you require that your program be notified of shipments of? 33. Which of the following types of shipments does your state monitor? 100% Spent nuclear fuel 85.7% DOE waste material (i.e. shipments to the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant) 100% Byproduct material with high radioactivity 62.5% Other, please specify: 34. Please describe any coordination efforts undertaken by your state with other state and/or federal agencies regarding the transportation of radioactive material. 35. What are the strengths of the current regulations on transporting radioactive materials? 36. What are the weaknesses of the current regulations on transporting radioactive materials? 37. Under current regulations, to what extent is the transportation of radioactive materials vulnerable to terrorist sabotage or other malicious use? IMPACT OF SEPTEMBER TO YOUR STATE’S REGULATORY PROGRAM 38. What impact, if any, has the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks had on your state’s program in the following areas? (Mark only one response in each row) (N=12) a) State radiological protection b) State radiological protection c) License review procedures f) Number of enforcement actions g) Severity of enforcement actions h) Incident response procedures i) j) Coordination with federal k) Coordination with other states l) Coordination with state law m) Financial support from your n) Monitoring of transportation of o) Federal financial aid to your p) Federal training support to your q) Federal technology support to your state program 39. Please describe specific efforts that have been initiated or considered by your state since September 11, 2001, to better safeguard radiological sources. 40. Does your state have sufficient resources to support these new efforts or are additional resources needed? (N=12) 91.6% of states responding to the survey indicated they do not have sufficient resources to support new efforts. 8.3% of states responding to the survey indicated they have sufficient resources to support new efforts. CHANGES NEEDED AT THE FEDERAL LEVEL 41. In your opinion, what are the 3 most significant changes (in rank order) that could be made at the federal level to improve the regulation of radioactive material to protect public health and safety? #1. #2. #3. 42. In your opinion, what are the 3 most significant changes (in rank order) that could be made at the federal level to improve the security of radioactive material? #1. #2. #3. 43. In your opinion, what are the 3 most significant changes (in rank order) that could be made at the federal level to improve the transportation of radioactive material? #1. #2. #3. 44. Please use the space below to list any additional information about issues related to radioactive sources or concerns raised in this survey. Thank you for your assistance in our survey. In addition to the individual named above, Ryan T. Coles, Robert G. Crystal, Doreen S. Feldman, Judy K. Pagano, Terry L. Richardson, Peter E. Ruedel, Rebecca Shea, and Heather W. Von Behren also made key contributions to this report. The General Accounting Office, the audit, evaluation and investigative arm of Congress, exists to support Congress in meeting its constitutional responsibilities and to help improve the performance and accountability of the federal government for the American people. 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Summary: Sealed radioactive sources, radioactive material encapsulated in stainless steel or other metal, are used worldwide in medicine, industry, and research. These sealed sources could be a threat to national security because terrorists could use them to make "dirty bombs." GAO was asked to determine (1) the number of sealed sources in the United States, (2) the number of sealed sources lost, stolen, or abandoned, (3) the effectiveness of federal and state controls over sealed sources, and (4) the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and state efforts since September 11, 2001, to strengthen security of sealed sources. The number of sealed sources in the United States is unknown because NRC and states track numbers of licensees instead of individual sealed sources. Users of certain devices containing sealed sources are not required to apply to NRC for a license. Accounting for these devices has been difficult. In addition, since 1998, more than 1,300 incidents have taken place in the United States where sealed sources have been lost, stolen, or abandoned. The majority of these lost devices were recovered. Security for sealed sources varied among the facilities GAO visited in 10 states. Also, a potential security weakness exists in NRC's licensing process to obtain sealed sources. Approved applicants may buy sealed sources as soon as a new license is issued by mail. Because the process assumes that the applicant is acting in good faith and it can take NRC as long as 12 months before conducting an inspection, it is possible that sealed sources can be obtained for malicious intent. In addition, NRC currently evaluates the effectiveness of state regulatory programs, but these evaluations do not assess the security of sealed sources. Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, NRC and states have notified licensees of the need for heightened awareness to security, but have not required any specific actions to improve security. NRC has been developing additional security measures since the attacks, and issued the first security order to large facilities that irradiate such items as medical supplies and food on June 5, 2003. Additional orders to licensees that possess high risk sealed sources are expected to follow. NRC and states disagree over the appropriate role of states in efforts to improve security. NRC intends to develop and implement all additional security measures on licensees with sealed sources, including those licensed by states. However, over 80 percent of states responding to our survey feel they should be given responsibility to inspect and enforce security measures.