According to DOD and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI), the space domain is becoming increasingly congested, contested, and complex. Consequently, space systems are increasingly vulnerable to a variety of intentional and unintentional threats, such as radio frequency interference (including jamming); laser dazzling and blinding; kinetic intercept vehicles; ground system attacks; an increase in the number of orbiting space objects (including active and inactive satellites, spent rocket bodies, and other fragments and debris); and space weather environmental effects. The government’s SSA efforts are designed to mitigate these threats via a variety of space- and ground-based sensors and systems that detect, track, and characterize space objects and space- related events and forecast which assets may be at risk. Recent events, such as the January 2007 Chinese antisatellite weapon test—when China used a missile to destroy one of its old weather satellites—and the February 2009 collision between an operational Iridium commercial communications satellite and a nonfunctioning Russian communications satellite, have created thousands of additional debris objects and called attention to the need for better SSA capabilities. SSA is fundamental to conducting space operations and forms the foundation for accomplishing space control, which DOD defines as operations to ensure freedom of action in space for the United States and its allies, and when directed, denying an adversary freedom of action in space. Top-level guidance for SSA efforts includes the Administration’s 2010 National Space Policy of the United States of America—a Presidential Policy Directive that establishes overarching national policy that governs the conduct of U.S. space activities—and the Department of Defense’s 2006 Space Control Joint Capabilities Document. The National Space Policy states that the Secretary of Defense and the Director of National Intelligence shall maintain and integrate space surveillance, intelligence, and other information to develop accurate and timely SSA, as well as to improve, develop, and demonstrate, in cooperation with relevant departments and agencies and commercial and foreign entities, the ability to rapidly detect, warn, characterize, and attribute natural and man-made disturbances to space systems of U.S. interest. The National Space Policy assigns the Secretary of Defense the responsibility, with support from the Director of National Intelligence, for the development, acquisition, operation, maintenance, and modernization of SSA capabilities governmentwide. It assigns the Director of National Intelligence the responsibility for providing robust, timely, and effective collection, processing, analysis, and dissemination of information on foreign space and supporting information system activities and for integrating all-source intelligence of foreign space capabilities and intentions with space surveillance information to produce enhanced intelligence products that support SSA. The 2006 Space Control Joint Capabilities Document identifies SSA as a key capability needed to enable freedom of action in space, identifies capability gaps in SSA capabilities, and contains overarching SSA requirements for addressing the gaps in the following task areas: Orbital and network information—detect, track, identify, and catalog man-made space objects and provide services including overflight warning, signal/laser deconfliction, and conjunction assessment. Environmental information—monitor, characterize, predict, and report on the space-related environment. Event information—detect, process, and report space events, such as launches, orbital maneuvers, satellite breakups, space object reentries, orbital decay, space object separations, dockings, and changes in baseline status beyond nominal operating parameters; also, characterize, assess, and resolve anomalies/attacks on all space systems. U.S., allied, and coalition space system information—maintain the status and characteristics of U.S., allied, and coalition space forces and assets. Space intelligence information—provide status and characterization of foreign and adversary space-related assets, strategies, tactics, intent, activities, and knowledge. The requirements contained in the Space Control Joint Capabilities Document form the basis for ongoing and planned DOD SSA acquisition efforts. U.S. Strategic Command is responsible for planning and conducting DOD space operations. The Joint Functional Component Command for Space, a component of U.S. Strategic Command, coordinates, plans, integrates, commands, and controls space operations through its Joint Space Operations Center (JSpOC). A major function of the JSpOC is to maintain SSA. A multitude of tasks and functions must be performed to meet the broad definition of SSA. For example, according to the Space Posture Review interim report, SSA includes, at a minimum, continual awareness of orbiting objects; real-time search and high-fidelity information; threat detection, identification, and location; predictive intelligence collection and analysis of foreign space capability and intent in a geopolitical context; and a global reporting capability for friendly space systems. The interim report divides SSA into four major functional capabilities: (1) detect, track, and identify—the ability to discover, track, and differentiate among space objects; (2) threat warning and assessment—the ability to predict and differentiate among potential or actual attacks, space weather environment effects, and space system anomalies; (3) intelligence characterization—the ability to determine performance and characteristics of current and future foreign space and counterspace system capabilities, as well as foreign adversary intentions; and (4) data integration—the ability to correlate and integrate multisource data into a single common operational picture and enable dynamic decision making. Consequently, the JSpOC relies on numerous sources of data and information to maintain SSA, including space surveillance sensors; the intelligence community; and academic, commercial, and foreign collaboration. A significant aspect of SSA involves tracking many thousands of man- made space objects that typically travel 9 times the speed of a bullet and reside in a search volume 220,000 times the volume of Earth’s oceans. SSA also involves knowing where each of these objects came from (who owns them), where it is and where it is going, its purpose, and its capabilities. And, if an anomaly occurs, such as satellite communications interference or loss of satellite functionality, ascertaining the reasons why. The JSpOC relies on the space surveillance network (SSN) to detect, track, identify, and catalog space objects. The SSN, primarily operated and maintained by the Air Force, consists of a worldwide network of 29 ground-based radars and optical sensors, data processing capabilities, and supporting communication systems. DOD started to build the SSN subsequent to the former Soviet Union’s launch of its first Sputnik satellite in 1957. Some of the sensor systems built in the 1960s and 1970s have undergone modernization and sustainment efforts and are still operational today. Appendix II discusses the composition of the SSN. The JSpOC uses SSN data to accomplish the following: maintain the space object catalog; analyze new space launches; detect new man-made objects in space, perform conjunction assessments (predict potential collisions between space objects and inform NASA and other government, commercial, and foreign entities if objects may interfere with the orbits of the Space Shuttle, International Space Station, and operational satellite platforms); and conduct space object atmospheric reentry assessments (predict when and where a space object will reenter the Earth’s atmosphere, determine who owns the object, prevent a returning space object—which to radar looks like a missile—from triggering a false alarm in missile-attack warning sensors of the United States and other countries, and predict surface impacts of reentering objects). SSN information is also used for developing space intelligence, which, in turn, is used to support SSA operations. The JSpOC also relies on ground- and space-based sensors that make space weather observations to detect and forecast solar storms that may be harmful to space system operations. These sensors are owned, operated, and developed by DOD, NASA, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), and foreign providers. Examples of space weather observations include bursts of solar energy called solar flares, solar winds, geomagnetic activity associated with solar storms, solar X-ray images and fluctuations, and solar ultraviolet images and fluctuations. These observations are associated with geomagnetic storms, electromagnetic radiation, ionospheric scintillation, high-energy particles, and solar radio bursts that can adversely impact space and ground assets and operations, terrestrial communications, and transmissions between Global Positioning System satellites and ground-based receivers. According to Air Force and NOAA officials, the subject area of space weather is relatively immature, and is comparable to the maturity of terrestrial weather research and prediction capabilities that existed 20 to 30 years ago. SSA mission complexity is also exemplified by the many and varied organizations that are SSA stakeholders (users and providers of SSA information). For example, according to Air Force Space Command and the National Security Space Office (NSSO), 39 organizations across the military, intelligence, and civil government are involved in efforts to develop a new SSA architecture (discussed later in this report). This becomes more complex with the addition of commercial and foreign organizations. Such a diverse array of stakeholders complicates architecture and requirements development, acquisition program oversight, as well as SSA operations. The SSA mission is also becoming more difficult. For example, as shown in figure 1, the number of space objects has been increasing over the past 50 years, resulting from increasing use of space as well as events such as the 2007 Chinese antisatellite test and 2009 Iridium/Cosmos satellite collision, which, according to NASA, together had increased the number of cataloged space objects by more than 60 percent. DOD has significantly increased its investment and planned investment in SSA acquisition efforts in recent years to address growing SSA capability shortfalls. Most efforts designed to meet these shortfalls have struggled with cost, schedule, and performance challenges which are rooted in systemic problems that most space acquisition programs have encountered over the past decade. Consequently, in the past 5 fiscal years, DOD has not delivered significant new SSA capabilities as originally expected. To its credit, the Air Force recently launched a space-based sensor that is expected to appreciably enhance SSA. In addition, two of the acquisition efforts that are to provide significant capability increases are scheduled to begin product development within the next 2 years— Space Fence and the Joint Space Operations Center Mission System (JMS). However, both face challenges and risks, such as the use of immature technologies and planning to deliver all capabilities in a single, large increment, versus smaller and more manageable increments. While DOD plans to begin delivering other new capabilities in the coming 5 years, it is too early to determine the extent to which these additions will address capability shortfalls. DOD has significantly increased its investment and planned investment in SSA acquisition and sustainment efforts in recent years to address growing SSA capability shortfalls, and has many separate development efforts—at least 17—ongoing. DOD plans to spend a total of about $5.3 billion on SSA projects from fiscal year 2006 through fiscal year 2015, as shown in figure 2. DOD has invested almost $2 billion from fiscal year 2006 to fiscal year 2010 in SSA projects, and plans to invest an additional $3.3 billion from fiscal year 2011 through fiscal year 2015, representing about a 65 percent increase over the preceding 5 years. In the coming 5 years, DOD expects to spend about 66 percent of this investment on new sensors to detect, track, and characterize emerging space threats; about another 21 percent on a new command and control system that is to integrate data to provide real-time information for SSA and command and control of space forces; and the remainder on continuing to extend the life of existing sensors to forestall degradation to current capabilities—according to the Air Force, the primary risks associated with the SSN are related to the age of the sensor systems—and other SSA-related programs. The Air Force is, and has been, responsible for the vast majority of DOD’s SSA acquisition investments (accounting for about 94 percent of the total). Additional details of DOD’s SSA-related investments are provided in appendix III. Despite recent investments, existing SSA capabilities continue to fall short of operational needs and space policy objectives. In the past 5 fiscal years, while DOD continued its investments in SSA, it has not delivered significant new SSA capabilities to the warfighter as originally expected. Capabilities that were delivered served to sustain or modernize existing systems versus closing gaps. For example, DOD has extended the service lives of some sensors supporting SSA capabilities and has added additional processors and servers to the SSA’s command and control system’s computer, as well as adding analysts and operational personnel. However, Joint Functional Component Command for Space officials did not characterize these efforts as delivering significant increases in capability. DOD plans to begin delivering major new additions in capability in the coming 5 years, including the Air Force’s recently launched space-based sensor that is expected to appreciably enhance SSA. However, it is too early to determine the extent to which these new capabilities or additions will address capability shortfalls. As described below, many of these efforts—those expected to provide the biggest gains in capability—have struggled or are struggling with cost, schedule, and performance challenges and face risks to meeting their acquisition goals, potentially exacerbating SSA capability shortfalls. Two new SSA acquisition efforts are scheduled to begin product development within the next 2 years— Space Fence and JMS, which are described below, together with five other key efforts. JMS will be essential to providing and enhancing future space command and control and SSA capabilities, while Space Fence is to be the single largest SSA investment. The challenges and risks these programs face include the potential employment of immature critical technologies, program office staffing and skill shortages, complex integration tasks, the integration of data from numerous heterogeneous sources, operations in a multiple security level environment (information assurance), not utilizing an incremental development approach, and overloading of DOD’s current space object tracking system with data from new sensor systems coming on line over the next 5 years. Table 1 describes, in more detail, the status of SSA development efforts that are expected to deliver large gains in capability over the next 5 years and the challenges and risks they face. The cost, schedule, and performance challenges we have identified with SSA efforts are reflective of systemic acquisition problems affecting the space portfolio. Our past work has identified a number of causes behind the cost growth and related problems, but several consistently stand out. First, DOD often takes a schedule-driven versus a knowledge-driven approach to the acquisition process. As a result, activities essential to containing costs, maximizing competition among contractors, and testing technologies are shortchanged. Second, on a broad scale, DOD starts more weapon programs than it can afford, creating a competition for funding that encourages low cost estimates, overly optimistic scheduling, overpromising, suppressing bad news, and for space programs, forsaking the opportunity to identify and assess potentially more executable alternatives. Third, DOD has tended to start its space programs too early, that is, before it has the assurance that the capabilities it is pursuing can be achieved within available resources and time constraints. This tendency is caused largely by the funding process, since acquisition programs attract more dollars than efforts concentrating solely on proving technologies. Nevertheless, when DOD chooses to extend technology invention into acquisition, programs experience technical problems that require large amounts of time and money to fix. Moreover, there is no way to accurately estimate how long it would take to design, develop, and build a satellite system when critical technologies planned for that system are still in relatively early stages of discovery and invention. Fourth, programs have historically attempted to satisfy all requirements in a single step, regardless of the design challenge or the maturity of the technologies necessary to achieve the full capability. This has stretched technology challenges beyond current capabilities in some cases and vastly increased the complexities related to software. Fifth, we have reported that space programs are particularly affected by the wide disparity of users with competing interests, including DOD, the intelligence community, other federal agencies, and in some cases, other countries, U.S. businesses, and citizens. In addition, we have reported in the past that shortages of skilled and experienced space acquisition personnel, and personnel who are technically proficient to meet security space needs, have magnified the challenge of developing complex and intricate space systems. These shortages are the result of a combination of factors including funding limitations, recruiting challenges, and limited training and education opportunities. Moreover, problematic implementation of an acquisition strategy in the 1990s, known as Total System Performance Responsibility, for space systems resulted in losses of technical expertise (including cost estimating and systems engineering staff) and weaknesses in contracting strategies—the effects of which space programs are still dealing with. The existence of these problems was confirmed by a congressionally directed independent assessment panel (also known as the Allard Commission), which cited the reduced availability of technically competent government personnel as a major factor that has reduced the government’s capability to acquire space systems and a likely cause of acquisition program failures. Our work—which is largely based on best practices in the commercial sector—has recommended numerous actions that can be taken to address the problems we identified. Generally, we have recommended that DOD separate technology discovery from acquisition, follow an incremental path toward meeting user needs, match resources and requirements at program start, and use quantifiable data and demonstrable knowledge to make decisions to move to next phases. DOD has generally concurred with our recommendations and has modified its acquisition guidance to incorporate them. One exception for space systems is that DOD has not adopted our recommendation that critical technologies be matured to a point where they are demonstrated in a realistic (for hardware) or operational (for software) environment (TRL 7) because it is exceedingly expensive to test technologies in space. However, it does require that space systems demonstrate that critical technologies can operate in a relevant environment (TRL 6). We have also identified practices related to cost estimating, program manager tenure, quality assurance, technology transition, and an array of other aspects of acquisition program management that could benefit space programs. These practices are highlighted in table 2. We have found that when DOD chooses to extend technology development into acquisition, programs generally experience technical problems that require large amounts of time and money to fix. Moreover, there is no way to accurately estimate how long it would take to design, develop, and build a weapon system when critical technologies planned for that system are still in relatively early stages of discovery and invention. Most of the major space programs we have studied over the past decade, for example, have incurred substantial cost increases and schedule delays because they were approved without demonstrating that their technologies could work as intended in a relevant or realistic environment. In fact, at the time DOD made multibillion-dollar commitments to start certain programs, technologies were sometimes still in a proof-of-concept or component validation phase (TRL 3 and 4), that is, components had not yet been built or integrated beyond a laboratory environment. As a result, significant technology-related rework was needed in the costlier and more complex phases of the acquisition process. In addition, most of the programs we studied could not reliably estimate costs because there were too many unknowns about technology and requirements. A factor that contributed to the tendency to extend technology invention into later phases of acquisition is that programs have historically attempted to satisfy all requirements in a single step, regardless of the design challenge or the maturity of the technologies necessary to achieve the full capability, stretching technologies beyond current capabilities in some cases and vastly increasing the complexities related to software. Given the early stages of the Space Fence and JMS acquisition efforts, the high estimated acquisition costs, and the challenges and risks they face, opportunities exist to help ensure the acquisition problems that have affected or are affecting other SSA development efforts are avoided. For example, utilizing an incremental development approach that would facilitate, prior to beginning product development, (1) the identification and assessment of all critical technologies and (2) the inclusion of only fully mature technologies, would significantly increase the reliability of, and chances of meeting, program cost, schedule, and performance goals. Because both the Space Fence and JMS are to be ground-based systems, technologies developed to a level they can be demonstrated in a realistic or operational environment (TRL 7) would be considered mature according to our best practices criteria. One way to mitigate technology maturity risk is to rely on backup technologies, should newer technologies not mature in time or otherwise be problematic during product development. However, the use of backup technologies would likely present cost, schedule, and performance implications, such as with the Space Fence effort. Additionally, establishing comprehensive plans to mitigate other key risks, such as those relating to protecting national security information, would also help ensure acquisition success. DOD has already adopted similar practices for its newest major space acquisition— the Global Positioning System IIIA program—and has embraced the knowledge-based concepts behind our previous recommendations as a means of preventing large cost overruns and schedule delays. There are significant inherent challenges to executing and overseeing the SSA mission, largely due to the sheer number of organizations and assets involved in the mission, and the fact that, while the new National Space Policy assigns SSA responsibility to the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary does not necessarily have the corresponding authority to execute this responsibility. However, actions are being taken that could help facilitate management and oversight governmentwide. Additionally, the recently issued National Space Policy, which recognizes the importance of SSA, and among other things, directs the determination of roles, missions, and responsibilities to manage national security space capabilities and the need to develop specific measures for improving SSA capabilities, is also a positive step. Lastly, though the commercial sector and the international community are to play pivotal roles in the SSA mission, it is too early to tell whether DOD’s efforts to expand and make permanent its Commercial and Foreign Entities SSA data-sharing pilot program will be effective in integrating efforts to develop SSA capabilities. Establishing effective commercial and international relationships will be another significant challenge given decisions that will be required on how much and what types of data can and should be shared. Because SSA encompasses a broad range of needed capabilities, it involves a large number of stakeholders. While DOD and the intelligence community comprise the vast majority of organizations involved in SSA, the civil government, commercial sector, and foreign entities also play, or are expected to play, key roles. For example, key civil government organizations include: NASA—which works with officials from the Joint Functional Component Command for Space to conduct conjunction assessments, that is, close approach predictions, to avoid collisions between NASA’s space assets and other known resident space objects. The Department of Commerce’s National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration—which provides space weather information to the Air Force as well as NASA and others. The Department of Energy—which has classified and unclassified sensors that collect space weather data that can be used for SSA. Also, its laboratories are currently utilizing and modifying existing computer modeling and simulation capabilities, and are collaborating with the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency and the Air Force Research Laboratory on several risk reduction efforts to develop data integration capabilities for JMS. The Department of State—which is responsible for international matters including SSA, such as orbital debris mitigation and space surveillance for debris monitoring and awareness. The Department of Transportation’s Federal Aviation Administration Office of Commercial Space Transportation—which is responsible for regulating the commercial space transportation industry, including matters relating to SSA, such as space debris management. Moreover, commercial and foreign entities are expected to provide SSA data in the future under an expanded SSA data-sharing program described later. Figure 3 shows the stakeholders involved in SSA. At the governmentwide level, while current National Space Policy assigns SSA responsibility to the Secretary of Defense to develop capabilities, plans, and options, the Secretary does not necessarily have the corresponding authority to execute this responsibility. That is, the Secretary cannot direct resources to the highest priority sensors or systems if they belong to an agency outside DOD, adjudicate among competing requirements, or ensure that agencies are setting aside funding needed for SSA over the long term. This is made even more difficult because of differing missions among the large range of SSA stakeholders. However, several actions are being taken that could help address these differences, and therefore facilitate SSA management and oversight governmentwide, including the following: Initial capabilities document. An initial capabilities document summarizes and justifies the requirements for a materiel or nonmateriel approach, or an approach that is a combination of both, to satisfy specific capability gaps. The document is typically required for a materiel development decision review and is to support a milestone A decision in DOD’s acquisition process, which determines whether an acquisition effort may move into the technology development phase. The NSSO and Air Force Space Command have developed a draft national SSA Initial Capabilities Document to highlight the capabilities required to satisfy national-level SSA needs called for in the National Space Policy. The development of this document has a governmentwide perspective. Specifically, according to NSSO documentation, development efforts have included input from DOD and intelligence community organizations (including ODNI), as well as civilian government agencies, such as NASA, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Agency, the Department of Commerce, the Department of Energy, the Department of State, and the Department of Transportation. According to ODNI, the intelligence community plays a critical role in SSA, especially for analytical support. The draft SSA Initial Capabilities Document was submitted to U.S. Strategic Command in August 2010. The U.S. Strategic Command, responsible for planning and conducting space operations including SSA, is to review and sponsor this document through the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System review process. Due to common interests between DOD and the intelligence community for SSA, the document will be processed in accordance with joint DOD and ODNI guidelines. National SSA architecture. A national SSA architecture is under development to highlight the required capabilities to satisfy national- level SSA needs identified in the SSA Initial Capabilities Document. In April 2008, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Networks and Information Integration (ASD/NII)—the principal staff assistant for SSA capabilities responsible for assuring SSA efforts track toward top- level architecture end states—tasked the Air Force and the Executive Agent for Space to develop an interim SSA architecture to support the fiscal year 2010 to 2015 program and budget review. Subsequently, the Joint Requirements Oversight Council requested further action from the Air Force, which tasked NSSO to serve as the architecture integrator across DOD and to coordinate with ODNI in the development of a more broadly focused national SSA architecture. NSSO and Air Force Space Command cochair the current architecture development effort initiated in November 2008. As with the development of the initial capabilities document, the architecture has a governmentwide perspective. According to NSSO, in light of the new National Space Policy, one of the biggest challenges in developing the national SSA architecture is the amount of limited analyses available to support the broader Presidential direction to have an SSA system that uses commercial and foreign data. Subsequent iterations of the national SSA architecture are expected to address commercial and foreign capabilities. Drafting of the national SSA architecture was slated for completion in the October/November 2010 time frame, after which the document was to be approved through the DOD’s and the intelligence community’s requirements review processes. National Security Space Strategy. We have recommended since 2003 that space activities (which include SSA) need to include a national security space strategy tied to overall department-level space goals, time lines, and performance measures to assess space activities’ progress in achieving national security space goals identified in the National Space Policy. In January 2011, DOD and ODNI issued the National Security Space Strategy. In June 2010, the White House issued a new National Space Policy which emphasizes the need to strengthen stability in the space environment, including improved information collection and sharing for space object collision avoidance; protection of critical space systems and supporting infrastructures, with special attention to the critical interdependence of space and information systems; and strengthening measures to mitigate orbital debris. The space policy also emphasizes the need to improve, develop, and demonstrate, in cooperation with relevant departments and agencies and commercial and foreign entities, the ability to rapidly detect, warn, characterize, and attribute natural and man-made disturbances to space systems of U.S. interests. Furthermore, the space policy identifies specific implementation actions by key national security space stakeholders, including directing the following: The Secretary of Defense and the Director of National Intelligence, in coordination with the Secretary of State, to develop options, due in 180 days of the issuance date of the policy, to determine roles, missions, and authorities with respect to the management of national security space capabilities. The Secretaries of Defense and Transportation, the Director of National Intelligence, and the NASA administrator, in coordination with the Secretary of State and other relevant departments and agencies, to provide, in 270 days, options for the development, communication, and implementation of new space collision warning measures to the National Security Advisor, the Assistant to the President for Science and Technology, and the Director of the Office of Science and Technology Policy. These options are to include measures for improving SSA capabilities; maintaining and improving space object databases; pursuing common international data standards; disseminating orbital tracking information; and improving and disseminating predictions of space object conjunction. The Secretary of Transportation, in coordination with the Secretaries of Defense and Commerce, as well as other relevant departments and agencies, due in 180 days, to identify options, requirements, and potential implementing structures for providing space traffic management services, which fuse and coordinate SSA, space environmental information, air traffic services, radio frequency spectrum, and orbital debris mitigation policies, to reduce risk and enhance safe space launch, operations in space, and return from space. The new National Space Policy increases the number of stakeholders that must participate in the development of planning documents that, among other things, identify the roles to manage national security space capabilities and develop specific measures for improving SSA capabilities. While identifying roles and having input from more SSA stakeholders are positive first steps and may result in more inclusive and robust planning efforts, it is too early to assess the effect of these provisions on managing and overseeing governmentwide SSA efforts. The United States is recognized as a key player in SSA. However, the U.S. government realizes that no single nation has the necessary resources or geography to precisely track every object in order to support the long-term sustainability of safe space operations for all space-faring nations. Therefore, in order to improve its ability to conduct SSA, the U.S. government has emphasized the need to reach out to the international community for greater cooperation and information sharing. In 2004, DOD established, pursuant to congressional authorization, the Commercial and Foreign Entities pilot program to provide non-U.S. government entities, state and local governments, and foreign governments and entities, SSA data to, among other things, avoid damage to satellites in space. Through the National Defenses Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010, Congress made the Commercial and Foreign Entities pilot a permanent program, commonly known as U.S. Strategic Command’s SSA sharing mission. U.S. Strategic Command manages and is creating policies and procedures to execute the mission, which expands data sharing and consists of three levels of SSA services to commercial entities and international governments: (1) a basic service consisting of information posted to an internet Website, (2) advanced services available to entities under a negotiated agreement, and (3) emergency notifications alerting satellite operators to hazardous situations. U.S. Strategic Command’s mission is also to enhance the U.S. government’s SSA capabilities by utilizing SSA information provided by commercial and foreign entities. The U.S. Department of State intends to reach out in the near future to all space- faring nations to ensure that the JSpOC has current contact information for both government and private sector satellite operations centers. Additionally, U.S. Strategic Command plans to begin reaching out to international and commercial partners to seek a dialogue and agreement for information exchange. Key issues remaining to be addressed include developing mechanisms for: making SSA data more useable—according to a DOD study of the Iridium/Cosmos satellite collision, as well as a 2009 European Union study, the United States does not fully disclose data on satellite orbits and debris objects (because of the sensitivity of the information), rendering the data available on the internet Web site insufficiently accurate for collision avoidance purposes; this includes determining what data to share, the mechanisms for sharing, and at the same time protecting sensitive U.S. government and other stakeholders’ SSA information; and verifying and validating SSA information provided by commercial and foreign entities to help ensure the reliability of U.S. SSA data products. Because the SSA sharing mission is undergoing development, it is too early to tell whether it will be an effective mechanism for integrating SSA capability development efforts. Recent events, such as the Chinese antisatellite test and the Iridium and Cosmos satellite collision, have highlighted the need for better SSA capabilities governmentwide. DOD has recognized that its existing SSA systems fall short of capability needs and has significantly increased its dollar investments to enhance SSA capabilities. Moreover, the Air Force successfully launched its SBSS satellite—after several years of delays— which is anticipated to appreciably enhance SSA. However, most other SSA acquisition efforts that focus on fielding major additions in capability over the next 5 years have or are facing significant challenges and risks, such as the use of immature technologies; planning to deliver all capabilities in a single, large increment, versus smaller and more manageable increments; technical requirements instability; operations in a multiple security level environment; and data integration issues. If these efforts do not progress as planned, risk of continuing or worsening SSA capability gaps will result. Therefore, while it is too early to determine the extent to which these new capabilities will address existing shortfalls, it is essential that new SSA system acquisitions are placed on a solid footing at the start of development to help ensure capabilities from these systems are delivered to the warfighter as and when promised. Should DOD decide to proceed on a path that leaves open important questions, including those about technologies, then it is important that this footing be based on thorough analyses of the risks involved—such as with the use of backup technologies—including cost, schedule, and performance implications. Such analyses could provide the knowledge needed to determine whether the acquisition program is worth pursuing or what trade-offs would need to be made with other investments should additional resources be required. We have consistently made recommendations for establishing reliable acquisition business cases, such as maturing technologies prior to development start, utilizing evolutionary development, and stabilizing requirements, and DOD has already embraced these for its newest major space acquisition—the Global Positioning System IIIA program. A critical aspect in strengthening the SSA mission is ensuring there is effective coordination and collaboration across the federal government, especially given the many organizations involved with SSA, along with their differing missions. While the Secretary of Defense does not have explicit authority to execute his responsibility to develop capabilities, plans, and options for SSA, his responsibility has been clarified by the National Space Policy and there are some actions in place or under development to facilitate SSA acquisitions, such as a national architecture and initial capabilities document. Nevertheless, given past difficulties in coordinating space acquisitions that span DOD and federal agencies, coordination and collaboration need to be carefully monitored and new oversight tools, such as the National Security Space Strategy, provide opportunities to clearly lay out expectations, responsibilities, and authorities. Because implementation of the National Space Policy is, in part, intended to address these issues, and given the National Security Space Strategy has only recently been issued, we are not making recommendations regarding coordination and collaboration at this time. For major space acquisition programs, we have consistently made recommendations to help ensure acquisition efforts are placed on a solid footing at program start. For SSA in particular, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics to take the following two actions: Assure—as part of the approval for the Space Fence and JMS acquisition efforts to initiate product development—that all critical technologies are identified and matured to a level they can be demonstrated in a realistic or operational environment, and that other key program risks have been fully assessed to help ensure cost, schedule, and performance goals will be met (for JMS in particular, implementing this recommendation may require dividing the program into separate increments). If a determination is made that the effort should move forward into product development with less mature technologies, then conduct an assessment of available backup technologies that may lessen capability and add cost to the programs and the additional time, money, and effort that may be required to meet performance objectives. We provided a draft of this report to the Secretary of Defense and ODNI. Written comments from DOD are included in this report as appendix V. ODNI did not have any comments. DOD concurred with our recommendation that the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics assure—as part of the approval for the Space Fence and JMS acquisition efforts to initiate product development—that all critical technologies are identified and matured to a level they can be demonstrated in a realistic or operational environment, and that other key program risks have been fully assessed to help ensure cost, schedule, and performance goals will be met. DOD noted that the requirement to validate required technology maturity levels and assess other key program risks to ensure cost, schedule, and performance goals is part of the milestone B—which signifies the start of product development and the engineering and manufacturing development phase in DOD’s acquisition process—review, approval, and certification process required by DOD guidance and statute. While DOD guidance and law require acquisition efforts to mature technologies to a level commensurate with TRL 6—demonstration in a relevant environment—our recommendation is based on our best practices work which has shown that achieving a TRL 7—demonstration in a realistic or operational environment—is the level of technology maturity that constitutes low risk for starting a product development program. We ordinarily regard satellite technologies that have achieved TRL 6 as fully mature because of the difficulty and expense of demonstrating maturity in a realistic environment—space—which is what would be required to reach TRL 7; however, this does not apply to programs such as Space Fence and JMS which are ground-based. Additionally, we remain concerned that the JMS effort does not intend to identify all critical technologies prior to starting development. Although our best practices work and DOD guidance call for critical technologies to be identified and matured by development start, the JMS plans are only to identify and assess critical technologies prior to and specific for each release. Consequently, as currently planned, the JMS effort will not have assurance that all needed technologies will be mature when needed and that cost estimates—based on the development of all five releases—are reliable as of the start of product development. DOD partially concurred with our recommendation that if a determination is made that the Space Fence or JMS effort should move forward into product development with less mature technologies, then conduct an assessment of available backup technologies that may lessen capability and add cost to the program and the additional time, money, and effort that may be required to meet performance objectives. DOD noted that an assessment of required technology readiness and appropriate mitigation plans is part of the process required for technology readiness decisions for milestone B, but that trades between cost, schedule, performance, and technology risks are more appropriately addressed after milestone B— during the integrated system design portion of the engineering and manufacturing development phase where overall system-level risks are considered. We continue to believe an assessment of utilizing backup technologies should occur prior to the start of system development, as the results of such an assessment could provide knowledge needed to determine whether the acquisition program is still worth pursuing or what tradeoffs would need to be made with other investments should additional resources be required. DOD also provided technical comments that have been incorporated where appropriate. We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional committees, the Secretary of Defense, the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, and other interested parties. The report also is available at no charge on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov. If you have any questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 512- 4841 or chaplainc@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. Key contributors to this report are provided in appendix VI. Our objectives were to (1) review key systems being planned and acquired to provide space situational awareness (SSA) with focus on their progress in meeting cost, schedule, and performance goals; and (2) determine the extent to which an integrated approach is being used to oversee and plan efforts to develop SSA capabilities. Our work is based on the most current information available as of October 1, 2010. To review key systems being planned and acquired to provide SSA, we examined Department of Defense (DOD) acquisition efforts that are expected to deliver large gains in SSA capabilities during fiscal years 2010 through 2015, including Space Surveillance Network sensor upgrade and life-extension efforts aimed to avoid gaps in operational capabilities; development of new sensors, such as the Space Based Space Surveillance, Space Fence, and Space Surveillance Telescope efforts; and the development of the Joint Space Operations Center Mission System to integrate data and provide real-time information for SSA and command and control of space forces. We analyzed documentation and interviewed officials on the status and progress of SSA development efforts in areas such as requirements, budgets, cost, funding, schedule, contracting, technology maturation, testing, and personnel. We assessed, using criteria we developed through our best practices work on commercial sector acquisitions, the levels of knowledge the acquisition efforts had attained at their current development stages and related risks. For example, we have found that fully maturing technologies critical to the success of an acquisition program prior to beginning product development, following an incremental development path toward meeting user needs, and matching available resources (that is, technology, time, money, and people) to requirements at program start can significantly reduce risks to achieving cost, schedule, and performance goals. In assessing whether programs are adopting this practice, we reported the readiness of critical technologies (as assessed by DOD), using technology readiness levels, a metric originally developed by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) and used across space programs. We also analyzed program-specific cost performance data obtained from various SSA acquisition program offices for which we did not perform data reliability assessments. For past and future DOD SSA-related investment amounts, we used DOD budget request documentation for fiscal years 2006 through 2011. Our analysis included not only efforts traditionally categorized as SSA, but also selected SSA-related efforts, typically budgeted for and included under space control and counterspace systems, that are closely tied to the SSA mission. To assess the reliability of these budget estimates in determining DOD investments in SSA programs and projects, we reviewed and assessed Office of Management and Budget documentation related to the federal budget and DOD’s Financial Management Regulations relating to preparation of budget reports and concluded that this documentary review was sufficient to determine that the data were reliable for purposes of this report. To determine the extent to which an integrated approach is being used to manage and oversee efforts to develop SSA capabilities, we analyzed documents and interviewed officials from 30 organizations within the SSA stakeholder community—users and providers of SSA information represented by DOD, the intelligence community, civil government agencies, and commercial industry—to examine (1) management and oversight efforts to develop, acquire, and manage SSA capabilities; and (2) planning activities for SSA architectures, investments, and requirements. We also analyzed documentation and interviewed officials from DOD and commercial industry to assess the benefits and challenges relating to DOD’s implementation of its SSA sharing program (formerly the Commercial and Foreign Entities program) under which SSA information is to be shared among DOD, industry, and foreign entities for collision avoidance purposes. For both objectives, we analyzed documentation from and interviewed officials of the following organizations: Air Force—Office of the Under Secretary of the Air Force, Directorate of Space Acquisition, Arlington, Virginia; Air Force Space Command, Peterson Air Force Base, Colorado; Air Force Space and Missile Systems Center, Los Angeles Air Force Base, California; Air Force 850th Electronic Systems Group, Electronic Systems Center, Peterson Air Force Base, Colorado and Hanscom Air Force Base, Massachusetts; Air Force Weather Agency, Offutt Air Force Base, Nebraska. Other Defense—Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, Washington, D.C.; Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, Washington, D.C.; Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Washington, D.C.; Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Networks and Information Integration, Washington, D.C.; Office of the Director, Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation, Washington, D.C.; National Security Space Office, Fairfax, Virginia; Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, Arlington, Virginia; Missile Defense Agency, Arlington, Virginia; Directorate for Intelligence and Directorate for Force Structure, Resources, and Assessment, Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Washington, D.C.; Capability and Resource Integration Directorate, U.S. Strategic Command, Offutt Air Force Base, Nebraska; Joint Functional Component Command for Space, Vandenberg Air Force Base, California. Intelligence Community—Office of the Director of National Intelligence, Washington, D.C.; National Air and Space Intelligence Center, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio; National Geospatial- Intelligence Agency, Bethesda, Maryland; National Reconnaissance Office, Chantilly, Virginia; National Security Agency, Fort Meade, Maryland; Space Protection Program Office, Colorado Springs, Colorado. Other—Orbital Debris Program Office, National Aeronautics and Space Administration, Houston, Texas; Space Weather Prediction Center, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, Boulder, Colorado; Aerospace Industries Association, Arlington, Virginia; Analytical Graphics, Inc., Washington, D.C.; Massachusetts Institute of Technology Lincoln Laboratory, Lexington, Massachusetts; Institute for Defense Analyses, Alexandria, Virginia. We conducted this performance audit from October 2009 to December 2010 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. The current space surveillance network includes 29 ground-based Department of Defense (DOD) and privately and foreign owned radar and optical sensors at 17 worldwide locations, a communications network, and primary and alternate operations centers for data processing. Most of the sensors are mechanical tracking, phased-array, and continuous-wave radars, but optical telescopes are also used. The most common radar type is a movable radar antenna with a mechanical tracker, whereby energy is transmitted into space and reflected back by a space object to the same radar antenna. A phased- array radar consists of thousands of smaller individual antennas that produce and steer energy beams to different locations in space. A continuous-wave radar consists of several transmitters and receivers, each placed in a different physical location across a horizontal plane. Optical telescopes possess sensors that are capable of detecting the light reflected from space objects and tracking and characterizing the objects using this reflected light. The support that the sensors provide to the space surveillance network is categorized as being dedicated, collateral, or contributing. Dedicated sensors support the space surveillance network as their primary purpose. Collateral sensors primarily support other missions, such as ballistic missile warning or launch vehicle range support, but also provide some space surveillance capabilities. Contributing sensors support the space surveillance network when requested by the U.S. Strategic Command and are operated under contract or agreement. Space surveillance data needs are coordinated by the Joint Functional Component Command for Space through the Joint Space Operations Center, located at Vandenberg Air Force Base, California, or the alternate space control center, located at Dahlgren, Virginia. These operations centers direct the network sensors to collect data on a space object’s metrics, or orbital position, such as the time that the space object is observed, its angle (elevation) from the point of observation, its direction (azimuth), and its distance (range) from the sensor. Information about a space object’s characteristics, such as size, shape, motion, orientation, and surface materials, can also be obtained and is used for space object identification. Table 3 lists the network sensors by category, with the sensor names and locations, types, and descriptions. Figure 4 graphically depicts the locations of these sensors. Fiscal years 2006 through 2009 are actual funding amounts; fiscal years 2010 through 2015 are budget estimates. Totals may not add due to rounding. RDT&E refers to Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation; OPAF refers to Other Procurement, Air Force. Data not supplied for these projects in fiscal years 2012 through 2015. Appendix IV: Technology Readiness Levels Lowest level of software technology readiness. A new software domain is being investigated by the basic research community. This level extends to the development of basic use, basic properties of software architecture, mathematical formulations, and general algorithms. Basic research activities, research articles, peer-reviewed white papers, point papers, early lab model of basic concept may be useful for substantiating the TRL. Once basic principles are observed, practical applications can be invented. Applications are speculative, and there may be no proof or detailed analysis to support the assumptions. Examples are limited to analytic studies using synthetic data. Applied research activities, analytic studies, small code units, and papers comparing competing technologies. Active R&D is initiated. The level at which scientific feasibility is demonstrated through analytical and laboratory studies. This level extends to the development of limited functionality environments to validate critical properties and analytical predictions using non-integrated software components and partially representative data. Basic software components are integrated to establish that they will work together. They are relatively primitive with regard to efficiency and robustness compared with the eventual system. Architecture development initiated to include interoperability, reliability, maintainability, extensibility, scalability, and security issues. Emulation with current/legacy elements as appropriate. Prototypes developed to demonstrate different aspects of eventual system. Advanced technology development, stand- alone prototype solving a synthetic full- scale problem, or standalone prototype processing fully representative data sets. Level at which software technology is ready to start integration with existing systems. The prototype implementations conform to target environment/interfaces. Experiments with realistic problems. Simulated interfaces to existing systems. System software architecture established. Algorithms run on a processor(s) with characteristics expected in the operational environment. System architecture diagram around technology element with critical performance requirements defined. Processor selection analysis, Simulation/Stimulation (Sim/Stim) Laboratory buildup plan. Software placed under configuration management. Commercial-off-the-shelf/government-off- the-shelf (COTS/GOTS) components in the system software architecture are identified. Level at which the engineering feasibility of a software technology is demonstrated. This level extends to laboratory prototype implementation on full-scale realistic problems in which the software technology is partially integrated with existing hardware/software systems. Results from laboratory testing of a prototype package that is near the desired configuration in terms of performance, including physical, logical, data, and security interfaces. Comparisons between tested environment and operational environment analytically understood. Analysis and test measurements quantifying contribution to system-wide requirements such as throughput, scalability, and reliability. Analysis of human-computer (user environment) begun. Level at which the program feasibility of a software technology is demonstrated. This level extends to operational environment prototype implementations, where critical technical risk functionality is available for demonstration and a test in which the software technology is well integrated with operational hardware/software systems. operational environment. Level at which a software technology is fully integrated with operational hardware and software systems. Software development documentation is complete. All functionality tested in simulated and operational scenarios. Published documentation and product technology refresh build schedule. Software resource reserve measured and tracked. Level at which a software technology is readily repeatable and reusable. The software based on the technology is fully integrated with operational hardware/software systems. All software documentation verified. Successful operational experience. Sustaining software engineering support in place. Actual system. Production configuration management reports. Technology integrated into a reuse “wizard.” In addition to the contact named above, key contributors to this report were Art Gallegos (Assistant Director), Kristine Hassinger, Arturo Holguín, Laura Holliday, Rich Horiuchi, Roxanna Sun, Robert Swierczek, Jay Tallon, and Peter Zwanzig. Defense Acquisitions: Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs. GAO-10-388SP. Washington, D.C.: March 30, 2010. Best Practices: Increased Focus on Requirements and Oversight Needed to Improve DOD’s Acquisition Environment and Weapon System Quality. GAO-08-294. Washington, D.C.: February 1, 2008. Best Practices: An Integrated Portfolio Management Approach to Weapon System Investments Could Improve DOD’s Acquisition Outcomes. GAO-07-388. Washington, D.C.: March 30, 2007. Best Practices: Stronger Practices Needed to Improve DOD Technology Transition Processes. GAO-06-883. Washington, D.C.: September 14, 2006. Best Practices: Better Support of Weapon System Program Managers Needed to Improve Outcomes. GAO-06-110. Washington, D.C.: November 30, 2005. Best Practices: Setting Requirements Differently Could Reduce Weapon Systems’ Total Ownership Costs. GAO-03-57. Washington, D.C.: February 11, 2003. Best Practices: Capturing Design and Manufacturing Knowledge Early Improves Acquisition Outcomes. GAO-02-701. Washington, D.C.: July 15, 2002. Defense Acquisitions: DOD Faces Challenges in Implementing Best Practices. GAO-02-469T. Washington, D.C.: February 27, 2002. Best Practices: Better Matching of Needs and Resources Will Lead to Better Weapon System Outcomes. GAO-01-288. Washington, D.C.: March 8, 2001. Best Practices: A More Constructive Test Approach Is Key to Better Weapon System Outcomes. GAO/NSIAD-00-199. Washington, D.C.: July 31, 2000. Defense Acquisitions: Employing Best Practices Can Shape Better Weapon System Decisions. GAO/T-NSIAD-00-137. Washington, D.C.: April 26, 2000. Best Practices: Better Management of Technology Development Can Improve Weapon System Outcomes. GAO/NSIAD-99-162. Washington, D.C.: July 30, 1999. Defense Acquisition: Best Commercial Practices Can Improve Program Outcomes. GAO/T-NSIAD-99-116. Washington, D.C.: March 17, 1999. Best Practices: Successful Application to Weapon Acquisition Requires Changes in DOD’s Environment. GAO/NSIAD-98-56. Washington, D.C.: February 24, 1998. Global Positioning System: Challenges in Sustaining and Upgrading Capabilities Persist. GAO-10-636. Washington, D.C.: September 15, 2010. Polar-Orbiting Environmental Satellites: Agencies Must Act Quickly to Address Risks That Jeopardize the Continuity of Weather and Climate Data. GAO-10-558. Washington, D.C.: May 27, 2010. Space Acquisitions: DOD Poised to Enhance Space Capabilities, but Persistent Challenges Remain in Developing Space Systems. GAO-10-447T. Washington, D.C.: March 10, 2010. Space Acquisitions: Government and Industry Partners Face Substantial Challenges in Developing New DOD Space Systems. GAO-09-648T. Washington, D.C.: April 30, 2009. Space Acquisitions: Uncertainties in the Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle Program Pose Management and Oversight Challenges. GAO-08-1039. Washington, D.C.: September 26, 2008. Defense Space Activities: National Security Space Strategy Needed to guide Future DOD Space Efforts. GAO-08-431R. Washington, D.C.: March 27, 2008. Space Acquisitions: Actions Needed to Expand and Sustain Use of Best Practices. GAO-07-730T. Washington, D.C.: April 19, 2007. Space Acquisitions: DOD Needs to Take More Action to Address Unrealistic Initial Cost Estimates of Space Systems. GAO-07-96. Washington, D.C.: November 17, 2006. Defense Space Activities: Management Actions Are Needed to Better Identify, Track, and Train Air Force Personnel. GAO-06-908. Washington, D.C.: September 21, 2006. Space Acquisitions: Improvements Needed in Space Systems Acquisitions and Keys to Achieving Them. GAO-06-626T. Washington, D.C.: April 6, 2006. Space Acquisitions: Stronger Development Practices and Investment Planning Needed to Address Continuing Problems. GAO-05-891T. Washington, D.C.: July 12, 2005. Defense Acquisitions: Risks Posed by DOD’s New Space Systems Acquisition Policy. GAO-04-379R. Washington, D.C.: January 29, 2004. Defense Acquisitions: Improvements Needed in Space Systems Acquisition Management Policy. GAO-03-1073. Washington, D.C.: September 15, 2003. Military Space Operations: Common Problems and Their Effects on Satellite and Related Acquisitions. GAO-03-825R. Washington, D.C.: June 2, 2003. Defense Space Activities: Organizational Changes Initiated, but Further Management Actions Needed. GAO-03-379. Washington, D.C.: April 18, 2003.

Summary: The United States' growing dependence on space systems makes them vulnerable to a range of threats. DOD has undertaken a variety of initiatives to provide space situational awareness (SSA)--the knowledge and characterization of space objects and the environment on which space operations depend. GAO was asked to (1) review key systems being planned and acquired to provide SSA, and their progress meeting cost, schedule, and performance goals; and (2) determine how much an integrated approach is being used to manage and oversee efforts to develop SSA capabilities. To achieve this, GAO analyzed documentation and interviewed key officials on major SSA development efforts and oversight and management of SSA. This report is an unclassified version of a classified report issued in February 2011. DOD has significantly increased its investment and planned investment in SSA acquisition efforts in recent years to address growing SSA capability shortfalls. Most efforts designed to meet these shortfalls have struggled with cost, schedule, and performance challenges and are rooted in systemic problems that most space acquisition programs have encountered over the past decade. Consequently, in the past 5 fiscal years, DOD has not delivered significant new SSA capabilities as originally expected. To its credit, the Air Force recently launched a space-based sensor that is expected to appreciably enhance SSA. However, two critical acquisition efforts that are scheduled to begin development within the next 2 years--Space Fence and the Joint Space Operations Center Mission System (JMS)--face development challenges and risks, such as the use of immature technologies and planning to deliver all capabilities in a single, large increment, versus smaller and more manageable increments. It is essential that these acquisitions are placed on a solid footing at the start of development to help ensure their capabilities are delivered to the warfighter as and when promised. GAO has consistently recommended that reliable acquisition business cases be established, such as maturing technologies prior to development start, utilizing evolutionary development, and stabilizing requirements in order to reduce program risks. For efforts that move forward with less mature technologies, assessments of the cost, schedule, and performance implications of utilizing backup technologies, if they exist, could provide the knowledge needed to determine whether the efforts are worth pursuing or the investment trade-offs that may need to be made. DOD plans to begin delivering other new capabilities in the coming 5 years, but it is too early to determine the extent to which these additions will address capability shortfalls. There are significant inherent challenges to executing and overseeing the SSA mission, largely due to the sheer number of governmentwide organizations and assets involved in the mission. Additionally, while the recently issued National Space Policy assigns SSA responsibility to the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary does not necessarily have the corresponding authority to execute this responsibility. However, actions, such as development of a national SSA architecture, are being taken that could help facilitate management and oversight governmentwide. The National Space Policy, which recognizes the importance of SSA, directs other positive steps, such as the determination of roles, missions, and responsibilities to manage national security space capabilities and the development of options for new measures for improving SSA capabilities. Furthermore, the recently-issued National Security Space Strategy could help guide the implementation of the new space policy. GAO has recommended since 2003 that such a strategy be issued. Finally, though the commercial sector and the international community are to play a pivotal role in the SSA mission, it is too early to tell whether DOD's efforts to expand and make permanent its Commercial and Foreign Entities SSA data-sharing pilot program will be effective in integrating efforts to develop SSA capabilities. GAO recommends that DOD assure--in approving the Space Fence and JMS acquisition efforts to initiate product development--that all critical technologies are identified and matured, and that other key risks have been fully assessed. If DOD determines that the programs should move forward with less mature technologies, DOD should assess available backup technologies and additional resources required to meet performance objectives. DOD agreed with the first recommendation and partially agreed with the second. GAO continues to believe DOD should assess required resources earlier than its stated intent.