At the federal level, the NRP provides a framework for how the federal government is to assist states and localities in managing emergencies and major disasters. NDMS is one of the programs identified in the NRP that can supplement state and local medical resources during emergencies, including providing resources to assist with evacuation. At the individual facility level, hospitals and nursing homes must comply with CMS requirements to participate in the Medicare and Medicaid programs. Several recently issued federal reports have looked at the adequacy of health care facility disaster planning, as prompted by Hurricane Katrina. In December 2004, DHS issued the NRP to consolidate existing federal government emergency response plans into a single coordinated plan, as mandated by the Homeland Security Act of 2002. The NRP provides a framework for how the federal government is to assist states and localities in managing domestic incidents, including an “emergency” or a “major disaster” declared by the President under the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (Stafford Act). On May 25, 2006, DHS revised the NRP to address certain weaknesses or ambiguities identified following Hurricane Katrina. The NRP includes a Catastrophic Incident Annex, which provides for an accelerated, proactive national response to catastrophic incidents— defined as any natural or manmade incident, including terrorism, resulting in extraordinary levels of mass casualties, damage, or disruption severely affecting the population, infrastructure, environment, economy, national morale, and/or government functions. By definition, a catastrophic incident almost immediately exceeds resources normally available to state, local, tribal, and private-sector authorities in the impacted area. A separate Catastrophic Incident Supplement, which was drafted but had not been approved at the time of Hurricane Katrina, provides additional detail on the roles and responsibilities of federal, state, and local responders during catastrophic incidents. However, as of June 2006, the supplement had not been finalized. Among its many components, the NRP establishes 15 emergency support functions (ESF), which identify resources and define the missions and responsibilities of various federal agencies in helping coordinate support during incidents of national significance. For each of the NRP’s 15 ESFs, which include Transportation, Communications, Firefighting, and Public Health and Medical Services, the NRP designates a federal agency as the ESF coordinator responsible for pre-incident planning and coordination. It also designates one or more primary agencies to be responsible for operational priorities and activities, coordinating with other agencies and state partners, and planning for incident management. HHS, for example, is designated as the ESF coordinator and the primary agency for ESF #8— Public Health and Medical Services. NDMS, one of the programs included in ESF #8—Public Health and Medical Services—of the NRP, was formed in 1984 to care for massive numbers of casualties generated in a domestic disaster or an overseas conventional war. It is a nationwide medical response system to supplement state and local medical resources during disasters and emergencies and to provide back-up medical support to the military and VA health care systems during an overseas conventional conflict. DOD, HHS, DHS, and VA are federal partners in NDMS. These partners most recently signed a memorandum of agreement in October 2005 that describes the roles and responsibilities of each partner. DHS has the authority to activate NDMS in response to public health emergencies, which include, but are not limited to, presidentially declared emergencies or major disasters under the Stafford Act. NDMS consists of three key functions: medical response, which includes medical equipment and supplies, patient triage, and other emergency health care services provided to disaster victims at a disaster site through NDMS medical response teams such as Disaster Medical Assistance Teams (DMAT); patient evacuation, which includes communication and transportation to evacuate patients from a mobilization center near the disaster site, such as an airport, to reception facilities in other locations; and “definitive care,” which is additional medical care—beyond emergency care—that begins once disaster victims are placed into an NDMS inpatient treatment facility (typically a nonfederal hospital that has signed an agreement with NDMS). DHS has lead responsibility for the medical response function of NDMS. DOD takes the lead in coordinating patient evacuation for NDMS, in collaboration with DOT, the other NDMS federal partners, and commercial transportation companies. VA and DOD share lead responsibility for arranging definitive care, including tracking the availability of beds in hospitals that participate in NDMS. NDMS was used to supplement state and local patient evacuation efforts during Hurricane Katrina and Hurricane Rita, which struck the Gulf Coast several weeks after Hurricane Katrina. NDMS officials told us that Hurricane Katrina was the first time that the patient evacuation and definitive care components of NDMS were used for a large number of patients. In response to state requests for assistance, NDMS moved people from Louisiana after Hurricane Katrina and from Texas before Hurricane Rita. In total, about 2,900 people were transported to NDMS patient reception areas due to the two hurricanes. CMS establishes federal regulations that hospitals and nursing homes must meet to participate in the Medicare and Medicaid programs. These regulations relate to many aspects of hospital or nursing home operations, such as health care services, dietetic services, and physical environment, including emergency management. Hospitals that are accredited by JCAHO or AOA are generally deemed to meet most of these Medicare and Medicaid requirements; no organizations have similar deeming authority for nursing homes. State agencies survey and certify nursing homes and nonaccredited hospitals to ensure that they follow CMS requirements. CMS provides guidance to state agencies in the CMS State Operations Manual, which includes interpretive guidelines and survey procedures for state agencies to assess compliance with CMS regulations. In addition to CMS requirements, JCAHO, AOA, and states can establish additional requirements for hospitals and nursing homes. A number of federal reports address the issue of evacuation and health care facility disaster planning. These reports have in various ways called for improvements in coordination. The White House report on lessons learned from the federal response to Hurricane Katrina recommended that agencies coordinate together to plan, train, and conduct exercises to evacuate patients when state and local agencies are unable to do so in a timely or effective manner. The House of Representatives Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina reported that medical care and evacuations suffered from a lack of advance preparations, inadequate communications, and difficulties in coordinating efforts. The select committee’s report and a DHS Office of Inspector General Performance Review of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) both noted that search and rescue efforts during Hurricane Katrina were effective but could have benefited from improved coordination among federal agencies. The Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs reported that federal agencies involved in providing medical assistance did not have adequate resources or the right medical capabilities to fully meet the medical needs arising from Katrina, such as meeting the needs of large evacuee populations, and were forced to use improvised and unproven techniques to meet those needs. Further, the committee reported that the federal government’s medical response suffered from a lack of planning, coordination, and cooperation. Hospital and nursing home administrators faced several challenges related to evacuation during recent hurricanes, including deciding whether to evacuate or stay in their facilities and “shelter in place”, obtaining transportation necessary for evacuations, and maintaining communication outside of their facilities. Administrators said they generally prefer to shelter in place, and when doing so must have the resources needed to provide care during a hurricane, and maintain self-sufficiency immediately after a hurricane to continue to care for patients until help can arrive. When evacuations were needed, facility administrators said that they had problems with transportation. Facilities had contracts with transportation companies, but competition for the same pool of vehicles created supply shortages. In addition, communication was impaired by damage to local infrastructure as a result of the hurricanes. For example, a nursing home in Florida was unable to communicate with local emergency managers. Hospital and nursing home administrators told us that they faced challenges in deciding whether to evacuate, including ensuring that they had sufficient resources to provide care or other services during the disaster and then in its aftermath until assistance could arrive. Administrators told us that they evacuate only as a last resort and that facilities’ emergency plans are designed primarily to shelter in place. Some hospitals provided a safe haven for devastated communities after a hurricane. In addition, some hospitals saw a surge in the number of people seeking care as a result of injuries sustained during the hurricane. For example, clinicians at a 153-bed hospital in Mississippi treated approximately 500 patients per day in the days after Hurricane Katrina, a substantial increase from their normal workload of about 130 patients per day. This hospital’s administrators told us that they felt obligated to remain open to serve the community’s needs. In addition, facility administrators and county representatives that we interviewed agreed that sheltering in place is generally safer than evacuating vulnerable hospital patients and nursing home residents. Although state and local governments can issue mandatory evacuation orders for certain areas, health care facilities may be exempt from these orders, as they were in a Mississippi county for Hurricane Katrina. When preparing to shelter in place, hospital administrators told us that they discharge patients when possible and stop performing elective surgeries to reduce the number of patients in the hospital. In anticipation of an inability to replenish resources during a hurricane, hospital and nursing home administrators take steps before hurricanes to ensure that the facilities have the resources needed to shelter in place and adequately care for patients and residents, including sufficient supplies, food, water, and power. For example, a nursing home administrator in Florida told us that the facility prepared for Hurricane Charley by obtaining 10 days of food and water for its 120 residents plus additional Meals, Ready-to-Eat to feed 500 people for up to 4 days, including staff and their families. Administrators from a hospital told us that they call their vendors 72 hours before a hurricane to order bulk supplies of milk, bread, and paper goods. Administrators from a Mississippi hospital noted that they prepare for hurricanes by ensuring that the facility has 3-4 days of clean linens and 5-6 days of medical supplies. Administrators must also make sure they have sufficient backup electrical power because life support systems require electricity to operate. One hospital administrator acquired an additional generator to extend the hospital’s capacity to supply backup power to 10 days. In addition, many of the administrators we interviewed noted that they maintain large fuel tanks to power the generators. For example, one hospital maintained a 20,000 gallon tank, which holds enough fuel to run the facility’s generators for 1 week. Some administrators told us that they also had difficulty obtaining sufficient fuel after the hurricanes. In addition to obtaining tangible supplies, administrators face the challenge of ensuring that facilities have the staff needed to provide adequate patient care during and after a hurricane. Hospital administrators noted the challenges involved with having sufficient numbers of clinical staff, such as doctors, available during hurricanes. Some facility administrators we interviewed identified “storm teams” of staff that were required to report to the facility before a hurricane and remain on site during the event. One hospital required the “storm team” to be prepared to stay at the facility for 3-4 days. Staff members were required to bring clothes, bedding, snacks, and other personal items. In some cases, facilities also allowed these staff members to bring their families and pets. One hospital administrator in Mississippi noted that the severity and destruction caused by Hurricane Katrina prevented the relief staff from taking over and the “storm team” remained at the facility for 14 days. Another hospital administrator in Florida noted that after Hurricane Charley, relief staff did not report for work. Hospital and nursing home administrators we interviewed reported that their facilities needed to be self-sufficient for a period of time immediately after a hurricane because new supplies may not arrive for several days. For example, a representative of a Florida nursing home association said that facilities need at least 10 days of supplies to effectively shelter in place until help can arrive. The need to be self-sufficient is especially important when disasters affect entire communities and delay response efforts, as demonstrated during hurricanes Charley and Katrina. Facilities that were part of networks were able to call on their corporate offices or sister facilities outside of the affected area to replenish needed supplies after a hurricane. For example, one administrator said that the company that owns his hospital has a division that tracks each facility’s preparedness resources, and the company’s supply warehouse has “disaster packs” of necessary supplies ready to be deployed in case of emergency. Additionally, the company has large contracts in place so that it can quickly obtain resources like fuel, generators, and staff. Facility administrators noted that they were not always able to obtain appropriate vehicles to accommodate their facilities’ patient needs. While some people can be moved using buses, some may require wheelchair- accessible vehicles, and others may need to be transported by ambulance. For example, one nursing home administrator noted that the facility contracted with a bus company, but stated that transportation remained a challenge because most of the facility’s residents used electric wheelchairs and needed vehicles with power lifts, which were not available. In addition, facilities also needed trucks to move staff and supplies to care for the patients. For example, one Florida nursing home administrator noted that the facility had arrangements with a trucking company to load and transport patient medical records, medications, laundry supplies, food, and water. Another nursing home administrator in Mississippi said that he rented a truck to move mattresses and other supplies for his residents. Having a contract with a transportation company or relying on the local government did not guarantee availability of transportation resources during a hurricane. Although facility administrators reported having contracts with transportation companies, competition for the same pool of vehicles created supply shortages. Hospital and nursing home administrators in several communities told us that their transportation companies also had contracts with other facilities in the community to provide services, a situation that may be sufficient for small evacuations but did not work when there were multiple facilities from the same area that needed to evacuate. In addition to contracting with multiple facilities, some companies’ vehicles were unavailable due to advance notice requirements, and others may have had vehicles that were badly damaged by the hurricane. For example, one nursing home administrator said that the bus company his facility contracted with required 24-hours notice before a bus could be chartered, and that providing this notice was difficult in a disaster situation. Some facilities relied upon local government resources to provide assistance with evacuations, but when an entire community was severely affected, local ambulances were damaged or in short supply and therefore unavailable. For example, one Florida hospital administrator had arranged for transportation through the local emergency operations center (EOC), but the hurricane destroyed the EOC. In contrast, when local officials in Mississippi faced a shortage of ambulances immediately after Hurricane Katrina, they called upon a national ambulance company, with which they had a contract, to provide additional resources from Texas and Alabama. Officials noted that state resources were not available after the storm and contracting with an ambulance company with national resources was beneficial. Hurricanes Charley and Katrina caused significant damage to the infrastructure of the surrounding communities, and left some hospital and nursing home administrators unable to communicate outside of their facilities. Several administrators that we interviewed reported that land- based telephone lines were not functional and cellular telephone reception was sporadic. Some administrators reported that cell phones based in other areas were more reliable than local cell phones. Since the 2004 hurricane season, some facilities in Florida have purchased satellite phones. For example, one nursing home administrator who faced communications difficulties after Hurricane Charley has since purchased satellite phones. However, during Hurricane Katrina, some Mississippi hospital administrators told us that their satellite phones did not function. Because no single communications technology is universally reliable, some facility administrators told us that they plan to diversify their communication capabilities by utilizing multiple forms of communication. Communication problems also affected county officials. Local EOC officials in both Mississippi and Florida reported being unable to communicate with state officials or local health care facilities. Because of communication problems at the local EOC, one nursing home administrator in Florida asked a staff member to drive to the EOC to communicate in person. In Mississippi, emergency managers relied on handheld radios and personal contact to communicate immediately after the hurricane. We have previously reported on communication difficulties during a public health emergency. NDMS has two limitations in its design that constrain its assistance to state and local governments with patient evacuation. First, NDMS is not designed to move patients or residents out of hospitals or nursing homes to mobilization centers. Second, NDMS was not designed nor is it currently configured for people who do not need hospital care, including nursing home residents. The first limitation of NDMS is that it is designed to move patients from a mobilization center, such as an airport, to other locations where they can receive necessary medical care, but it is not designed to move patients or residents out of hospitals or nursing homes to mobilization centers. NDMS officials told us that transportation from a health care facility to an NDMS mobilization center is the responsibility of local and state governments. Moreover, NDMS does not include helicopters, ambulances, or other short-distance vehicles necessary to move patients out of hospitals or nursing homes to mobilization centers. NDMS officials stated that NDMS transportation assets typically are large DOD airplanes designed to travel long distances, which can take approximately 24 hours or more to arrange. In addition, NDMS officials told us that to obtain ambulance or helicopter service, they would contract with private providers near a disaster site, which could lead to competition between the federal government and state and local authorities for the same pool of limited resources. Although NDMS evacuation efforts begin at mobilization centers, federal officials told us that no federal program is designed to move patients or residents out of hospitals or nursing homes to mobilization centers. NDMS and other documents that we reviewed also do not identify other federal programs that might assist in performing this function. We reviewed the NRP, the September 2005 draft Catastrophic Incident Supplement to the NRP, and NDMS documents. They do not indicate how the federal government is to assist state and local authorities in moving hospital patients and nursing home residents from their facilities. In particular, the September 2005 draft Catastrophic Incident Supplement to the NRP, which is intended to be used with the Catastrophic Incident Annex when a catastrophic incident almost immediately overwhelms the capabilities of state and local governments, states that collecting and transporting patients from health care facilities to mobilization centers is the responsibility of state and local authorities. The draft supplement does not describe what, if any, role the federal government may play in coordinating with state and local authorities for this kind of transportation. Despite this limitation of NDMS, some federal assistance was provided to move people out of health care facilities during Hurricane Katrina. Coast Guard officials told us that they evacuated about 9,400 people from hospitals and nursing homes as part of their search and rescue operations. NDMS officials reported that private, local, state, and federal resources transported hospital patients and nursing home residents to mobilization points, but there was a lack of coordination. For example, a report prepared by NDMS officials after Hurricane Katrina noted that, initially, transportation resources from the Coast Guard and DOD were not coordinated. The second limitation is that NDMS was not designed nor is it currently configured for people who do not need hospital care, including nursing home residents. As stated in the memorandum of agreement among the NDMS federal partners, the patient evacuation function of NDMS is intended to move patients so that they can receive medical care in NDMS hospitals—typically nonfederal hospitals that have agreements with NDMS. NDMS officials told us that they do not have agreements with nursing homes or other types of health care providers. However, because of the immediate demands posed by Hurricane Katrina, federal officials told us that NDMS had to move people who did not need hospital care, including nursing home residents and members of the general public who arrived at NDMS mobilization centers. NDMS flights evacuated people with various needs from mobilization centers to NDMS patient reception areas where officials assessed their health needs and arranged for them to receive additional medical care through the definitive care portion of NDMS. NDMS reception areas had to make special arrangements for people in need of nursing home care, because NDMS lacked preexisting agreements with nursing homes equipped to handle people with nonhospital health care needs. In a report prepared by NDMS after the hurricane, federal officials noted that NDMS was not optimally prepared to manage the nursing home requirements of evacuees who did not require hospitalization. The movement of nursing home residents during evacuations is not addressed elsewhere in the NRP. At the federal level, CMS has requirements related to hospital and nursing home disaster and evacuation planning as a condition of participation in the Medicare and Medicaid programs. For hospitals, a CMS requirement states that the overall hospital environment must be maintained to assure the safety and well-being of patients. According to CMS guidelines for interpreting this regulation, hospitals must develop and maintain comprehensive emergency plans, and when developing plans, should consider the transfer of patients to other health care settings or hospitals if necessary. For nursing homes, a CMS regulation states that facilities must have plans to meet all potential emergencies and disasters, although the interpretative guidelines do not specifically mention transfer of residents. CMS officials told us that, based on experiences during Hurricane Katrina, they have established a work group within CMS to review hospital and nursing home requirements and other provider standards, policies, and guidance related to emergency preparedness, including issues related to evacuations. The officials told us that they expect the work group to make initial recommendations for improvement in 2006. (See app. II for CMS regulations and interpretive guidelines related to evacuation planning and emergency preparedness.) In addition to CMS requirements, JCAHO, AOA, and states can establish additional emergency management requirements for health care facilities. For hospitals that it accredits, JCAHO requires that emergency plans include provisions for evacuating the entire building and transporting patients, supplies, staff, and equipment to alternate care sites if necessary. AOA requires that emergency plans for hospitals that it accredits include provisions for transferring patients and supplies to other settings for health care if necessary. (See app. III for a list of JCAHO and AOA requirements related to evacuation planning and emergency preparedness.) States can also establish additional requirements for facility evacuation planning that relate to transportation. For example, Florida requires hospitals and nursing homes to have comprehensive emergency management plans that document transportation arrangements to be used to evacuate residents. Mississippi requires nursing homes to maintain written transfer agreements with other facilities or alternative shelters in the event of a disaster. The state also requires hospitals to have written disaster preparedness plans that include relocation arrangements, including transportation arrangements, in the event of an evacuation. Federal requirements for hospitals and nursing homes include provisions that the facilities plan for disasters and emergencies. However, when hurricanes Charley and Katrina hit the Gulf Coast area, they created significant challenges for health care facility administrators that faced evacuation, including deciding whether to evacuate, securing transportation, and maintaining communications outside of their facilities. In particular, securing transportation was challenging because when multiple health care facilities within a community decided to evacuate, they had difficulty obtaining the number and type of vehicles needed and competed with each other for a limited supply of vehicles. A federal role related to evacuation is described in various documents, including the NDMS memorandum of agreement, the NRP, and its draft Catastrophic Incident Supplement. However, the challenges faced by hospitals and nursing homes during hurricanes Charley and Katrina also revealed two limitations in the federal government’s support to health care facilities that have to evacuate—the lack of assistance to states and localities to move people out of health care facilities to a mobilization point for federal transportation support and the lack of attention to nursing home residents needing evacuation. In terms of the first limitation, we found that the reliance in the NDMS design on local and state resources to move people directly out of facilities is inadequate when multiple facilities in the community have to evacuate simultaneously and compete for too few vehicles. In addition, DHS’s draft Catastrophic Incident Supplement to the NRP, which is intended to offer guidance for a situation in which state and local resources are overwhelmed, also would leave responsibility for moving people out of health care facilities on state and local authorities. It does not describe the role the federal government may play in coordinating with state and local authorities during hospital and nursing home evacuations. In terms of the second limitation, we noted that the evacuation of nursing home residents was not considered when NDMS was originally designed in 1984—nor is it currently addressed elsewhere in the NRP—but the experiences of these recent hurricanes also showed that the needs of this population when evacuations are required have been overlooked in the federal plans. DHS is the lead agency responsible for issuance and maintenance of the NRP, development of the draft Catastrophic Incident Supplement, and activation of NDMS. Until it addresses these limitations—within NDMS, the NRP, or through other mechanisms—vulnerabilities in the evacuation of hospitals and nursing homes will continue, and the federal government’s response will not be as effective as possible. To address limitations in how the federal government provides assistance with the evacuation of health care facilities, we recommend that the Secretary of Homeland Security take the following two actions: Clearly delineate how the federal government will assist state and local governments with the movement of patients and residents out of hospitals and nursing homes to a mobilization center where NDMS transportation begins. In consultation with the other NDMS federal partners—the Secretaries of Defense, Health and Human Services, and Veterans Affairs—clearly delineate how to address the needs of nursing home residents during evacuations, including the arrangements necessary to relocate these residents. We received written comments on a draft of this report from DHS, DOD, HHS, and VA. DHS stated that it will take our recommendations under advisement as it reviews the National Response Plan. According to DHS, all of the NDMS federal partners are currently reviewing the NDMS memorandum of agreement with a view towards working with state and local partners to alter, delineate, and otherwise clarify roles and responsibilities as appropriate. DHS confirmed that the primary responsibility for evacuations remains with state and local governments and that the federal government becomes involved only when the capabilities of the state and local governments are overwhelmed. However, as stated in the draft report, neither NDMS documents, the NRP, nor the draft Catastrophic Incident Supplement to the NRP—to be used in cases when the capabilities of state and local governments are almost immediately overwhelmed—describe the federal role in coordinating with state and local authorities during hospital and nursing home evacuations. We also noted that reliance on state and local resources was inadequate when multiple facilities in a community had to evacuate simultaneously. DHS’s written comments are reprinted in appendix IV. DOD disagreed with our conclusions concerning NDMS’s two limitations. First, DOD stated that our report implies that the provision of short- distance transportation is a federal responsibility, but DOD maintains that it is a state and local responsibility. However, during a catastrophic incident, the capabilities of state and local governments may almost immediately become overwhelmed. As we stated above in our response to DHS’s comments, the federal role in these situations has not been described. Second, DOD stated that our conclusion regarding the needs of nursing home residents was technically correct, but that we failed to describe the successful evacuation of nursing home residents during Hurricane Rita. Our draft report did describe NDMS’s evacuation of people, including nursing home residents and other people who did not need hospital care, during recent hurricanes due to the immediate demands posed by the storms. However, we also noted that the NDMS after-action report on hurricanes Katrina and Rita states that NDMS was not optimally prepared to manage the nursing home requirements of evacuees who did not require hospitalization. For this reason, we believe that explicit consideration of the needs of nursing home residents is warranted. DOD’s written comments are reprinted in appendix V. HHS concurred with our recommendations and made two general comments. First, HHS noted that we should address the role of DOT in the NRP to provide transportation support for domestic emergencies. Under ESF #8, DOT can assist with identifying and arranging for all types of transportation. However, as stated in the draft report, the NRP does not indicate how DOT or other federal agencies are to assist state and local authorities in moving hospital patients and nursing home residents from their facilities. Second, HHS commented that the report does not describe why NDMS was designed to focus on hospital evacuation, but HHS did not provide any additional information about NDMS’s origins. Although the draft report included available information on the origins of NDMS, our assessment focused on the program’s current status. HHS’s written comments are reprinted in appendix VI. VA agreed with our conclusions and recommendations and stated that it would continue to address issues raised in the draft report. VA’s written comments are reprinted in appendix VII. DHS and HHS also provided technical comments. In addition, DOT provided technical comments via email. We incorporated these comments where appropriate. We are sending copies of this report to the Secretaries of DOD, HHS, DHS, DOT, VA, and other interested parties. We will also make copies available to others on request. In addition, the report will be available at no charge on GAO’s Web site at http://www.gao.gov. If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 512-7101 or bascettac@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made major contributions to this report are listed in appendix VIII. To examine the challenges hospital and nursing home administrators faced related to recent hurricanes, we conducted case studies in two states—Florida and Mississippi. We selected these states based on their experience with previous disasters. During 2004, the state of Florida was hit by four hurricanes—Charley, Frances, Ivan, and Jeanne. Hurricane Charley was the strongest of these four, and the strongest hurricane to hit the United States since Hurricane Andrew hit southern Florida in 1992. In 2005, Mississippi received heavy storm damage from Hurricane Katrina caused by wind and an extremely high storm surge. In Florida, to understand the role of the state and local governments in evacuating hospitals and nursing homes, we interviewed and obtained documents from state and county officials. At the state level, we interviewed officials from the Florida Department of Health’s Office of Emergency Operations. We reviewed the Florida Comprehensive Emergency Management Plan, as well as Florida’s after-action report for the 2004 Hurricane season. At the local level, we selected two counties affected by Hurricane Charley—Charlotte and Volusia counties. Charlotte County, the entry point for the hurricane, is located on the Gulf Coast of Florida. Volusia County, the exit point for the hurricane, is located on the Atlantic Coast of the state. Within each county, we interviewed emergency management officials and reviewed county emergency management plans. To obtain information on the experiences of individual health care facilities in Florida, we identified hospitals and nursing homes within each of the selected counties, interviewed facility administrators, and reviewed documents. To select facilities, we asked emergency management officials in each county to provide contact information for hospitals and nursing homes that either evacuated or sheltered in place due to Hurricane Charley. In cases where the representatives identified by county officials were unavailable, we selected alternate health care facilities based on their proximity to the ocean. For each facility, we obtained and reviewed applicable emergency plans, hurricane plans, and/or evacuation plans. In total, we interviewed administrators from two hospitals and two nursing homes in Charlotte County and one hospital and two nursing homes in Volusia County. In addition to facility administrators, we interviewed officials from the Florida Hospital Association, the Florida Association of Homes for the Aging, and the Florida Health Care Association. In Mississippi, to understand the role of the state and local governments in evacuating hospitals and nursing homes, we interviewed and obtained documents from state and county officials. At the state level, we interviewed officials from the Mississippi Emergency Management Agency and Department of Health, and reviewed documents including the Mississippi Comprehensive Emergency Management Plan. At the local level, we selected the two coastal counties that were hit most directly by Hurricane Katrina—Hancock and Harrison counties. Hancock County, which includes the cities of Waveland and Bay St. Louis, was directly in the path of the storm and sustained extensive damage. Harrison County, which is adjacent to Hancock County and includes the cities of Gulfport and Biloxi, sustained extensive damage and has the area’s largest population. In each county, we interviewed emergency management officials. We also reviewed emergency management plans from Hancock and Harrison counties. To obtain information on the experience of individual health care facilities in Mississippi, we identified hospitals, nursing homes, and assisted living facilities within each of the selected counties; interviewed facility administrators; and reviewed documents provided. To locate health care facilities, we relied on a list of hospitals, nursing homes, and assisted living facilities in Hancock and Harrison counties from a June 2005 Mississippi Department of Health report on hospitals and a September 2005 Mississippi Department of Health report on institutions for the aged or infirm. We also identified facilities in Harrison County that were operated by the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA). We excluded nursing homes with fewer than 20 licensed beds. From this list, we selected facilities based on ownership type, vulnerability and proximity to the ocean, and size. For each facility, we obtained and reviewed emergency plans, hurricane plans, and/or evacuation plans. In total, we interviewed officials from one hospital and one nursing home in Hancock County and four hospitals and two assisted living facilities in Harrison County. We also interviewed representatives from the Gulf States Association of Homes and Services for the Aging. To examine the extent to which limitations exist in the design of the National Disaster Medical System (NDMS) or other federal programs to assist state and local governments with patient evacuations, we reviewed federal documents such as the National Response Plan, including Emergency Support Function #8—Public Health and Medical Services— and the Catastrophic Incident Annex. We also obtained and reviewed a September 2005 draft of the Catastrophic Incident Supplement to the NRP. We interviewed emergency preparedness officials from the Department of Defense, the Department of Health and Human Services, the Department of Homeland Security, the Department of Transportation, and the VA. To obtain additional information on NDMS, we reviewed program documents, including the memorandum of agreement that governs NDMS and an after- action report on the use of NDMS due to Hurricane Katrina. To examine the federal requirements for hospital and nursing home disaster and evacuation planning, we reviewed documents that identify the federal requirements and national standards related to emergency management, disaster preparedness, and patient evacuation. We reviewed documents provided by the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) and by accrediting organizations that assess compliance with CMS requirements—the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations and the American Osteopathic Association. We also interviewed officials from these organizations concerning the requirements and enforcement mechanisms, as well as officials from the American Hospital Association, Federation of American Hospitals, and the American Health Care Association. In addition, we interviewed and obtained documents from the Florida Agency for Health Care Administration officials responsible for the licensing and certification of health care facilities as well as officials from the Mississippi Department of Health. We performed our work from October 2005 through July 2006 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. The Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) establishes federal regulations that hospitals and nursing homes must meet to participate in the Medicare and Medicaid programs. CMS’s interpretive guidelines contain authoritative interpretations and clarifications of statutory and regulatory requirements and are to be used to make determinations about compliance with requirements. The tables below include regulations for hospitals and nursing homes that relate to disaster and evacuation planning. Table 1 includes CMS regulations and interpretive guidelines for hospitals. Table 2 includes CMS regulations and interpretive guidelines for nursing homes. CMS surveyors conduct health care facility surveys to evaluate the manner and degree to which the providers satisfy various CMS requirements or standards. Long-term care facilities include nursing homes. Hospitals that are accredited by the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations (JCAHO) or the American Osteopathic Association (AOA) are generally deemed to be compliant with the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services requirements. The document and table below include JCAHO and AOA requirements for hospitals that relate to evacuation planning and emergency preparedness. The document includes JCAHO hospital requirements, and table 3 includes AOA hospital requirements. In addition to the contact named above, key contributors to this report were Linda T. Kohn, Assistant Director; La Sherri Bush; Krister Friday; Nkeruka Okonmah; and William Simerl. Disaster Preparedness: Preliminary Observations on the Evacuation of Vulnerable Populations due to Hurricanes and Other Disasters. GAO-06- 790T. Washington, D.C.: May 18, 2006. Hurricane Katrina: Status of the Health Care System in New Orleans and Difficult Decisions Related to Efforts to Rebuild It Approximately 6 Months After Hurricane Katrina. GAO-06-576R. Washington, D.C.: March 28, 2006. Hurricane Katrina: GAO’s Preliminary Observations Regarding Preparedness, Response, and Recovery. GAO-06-442T. Washington, D.C.: March 8, 2006. Disaster Preparedness: Preliminary Observations on the Evacuation of Hospitals and Nursing Homes Due to Hurricanes. GAO-06- 443R. Washington, D.C.: February 16, 2006. HHS Bioterrorism Preparedness Programs: States Reported Progress but Fell Short of Program Goals for 2002. GAO-04-360R. Washington, D.C.: February 10, 2004. Bioterrorism: Public Health Response to Anthrax Incidents of 2001. GAO-04-152. Washington, D.C.: October 15, 2003. Hospital Preparedness: Most Urban Hospitals Have Emergency Plans but Lack Certain Capacities for Bioterrorism Response. GAO-03-924. Washington, D.C.: August 6, 2003. Bioterrorism: Information Technology Strategy Could Strengthen Federal Agencies’ Abilities to Respond to Public Health Emergencies. GAO-03-139. Washington, D.C.: May 30, 2003. Bioterrorism: Preparedness Varied across State and Local Jurisdictions. GAO-03-373. Washington, D.C.: April 7, 2003.

Summary: Hurricane Katrina demonstrated difficulties involved in evacuating communities and raised questions about how hospitals and nursing homes plan for evacuations and how the federal government assists. Due to broad-based congressional interest, GAO assessed the evacuation of hospital patients and nursing home residents. Under the Comptroller General's authority to conduct evaluations on his own initiative, GAO examined (1) the challenges hospital and nursing home administrators faced, (2) the extent to which limitations exist in the design of the National Disaster Medical System (NDMS) to assist with patient evacuations, and (3) the federal requirements for hospital and nursing home disaster and evacuation planning. GAO reviewed documents and interviewed federal officials, and interviewed hospital and nursing home administrators and state and local officials in areas affected by Hurricane Katrina in Mississippi and Hurricane Charley in Florida. Hospital and nursing home administrators faced several challenges related to evacuations during recent hurricanes, including deciding whether to evacuate or stay in their facilities and "shelter in place", obtaining transportation necessary for evacuations, and maintaining communication outside of their facilities. Administrators took steps to ensure that their facilities had needed resources--including staff, supplies, food, water, and power--to provide care during the hurricane and maintain self-sufficiency immediately after. However, when evacuations were needed, facility administrators said that they had problems with transportation, such as securing the vehicles needed to evacuate patients. Although facility administrators had contracts with transportation companies, competition for the same pool of vehicles created supply shortages when multiple facilities in a community had to be evacuated. In addition, communication was impaired by hurricane damage. For example, a nursing home in Florida was unable to communicate with local emergency managers. NDMS is a partnership of four federal agencies, and has two limitations in its design that constrain its assistance to state and local governments with patient evacuation. The NDMS partners are the Department of Defense, the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and the Department of Veterans Affairs; DHS is the lead agency. The first limitation is that NDMS evacuation efforts begin at a mobilization center, such as an airport, and do not include short-distance transportation assets, such as ambulances or helicopters, to move patients out of health care facilities to mobilization centers. The second limitation is that NDMS supports the evacuation of patients needing hospital care; the program was not designed nor is it currently configured to move people who do not require hospitalization, such as nursing home residents. Although NDMS moved nursing home residents due to Hurricane Katrina who were brought to mobilization centers, NDMS officials had to make special arrangements for people in need of nursing home care because NDMS lacked preexisting agreements with nursing homes. Neither of these limitations is addressed in other documents GAO reviewed, including DHS's National Response Plan (NRP). At the federal level, HHS's Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) has requirements related to hospital and nursing home evacuation planning as a condition of participation in the Medicare and Medicaid programs. CMS requires that hospitals maintain the overall hospital environment to assure patient safety, including developing plans that consider the transfer of patients to other health care settings. For nursing homes, CMS requires that plans meet all potential emergencies and disasters; however, requirements do not specifically mention the transfer of residents. In addition to assessing compliance with CMS requirements, the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations, the American Osteopathic Association, and states can also have additional emergency management requirements.