DOD has used the Global Train and Equip program (“the program”), originally authorized under Section 1206 of the fiscal year 2006 NDAA and amended several times thereafter, to build the capacity of foreign military forces to conduct counterterrorism operations through the provision of training, equipment, and small-scale military construction activities. The fiscal year 2015 NDAA permanently authorized the Secretary of Defense, with the concurrence of the Secretary of State, to conduct programs to (1) build the capacity of a foreign country’s national military forces to conduct counterterrorism operations or participate in or support ongoing allied or coalition military or stability operations that benefit the national security interests of the United States, (2) build the capacity of a foreign country’s national maritime or border security forces to conduct counterterrorism operations, and (3) build the capacity of a foreign country’s national-level security forces that have among their functional responsibilities a counterterrorism mission in order for such forces to conduct counterterrorism operations. Presidential Policy Directive 23 on Security Sector Assistance, published in April 2013, was developed to strengthen the ability of the United States to help allied and partner nations build their own security capacity. The document identified principal goals of and guidelines for security sector assistance that highlight the importance of including the following elements in project design and execution: identifying objectives that address partner nation needs; considering partner nation absorptive capacity; integrating assessment, monitoring, and evaluation to provide policymakers, program managers, and implementers with information and evidence necessary to make effective decisions and maximize program outcomes; and anticipating sustainment needs. DOD’s interagency process for developing and reviewing project proposals, described in figure 1 below, incorporates these key elements. DOD’s Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations/Low-Intensity Conflict (SO/LIC) is responsible for providing policy guidance and oversight of the Global Train and Equip program. During the reporting period covered by this review, SO/LIC coordinated with State’s Bureau of Political-Military Affairs and other stakeholders in an interagency process to solicit project proposals annually, in accordance with guidelines and project proposal instructions that DOD revises each year to reflect lessons learned, congressional concerns, and other considerations. Figure 1 illustrates the conceptual framework of this process, which included developing, reviewing, and selecting project proposals; notifying Congress; implementing and delivering assistance; and assessing project results. In practice, different elements of the proposal development, review, selection, and notification process occurred simultaneously as proposal submission and review occurred on a rolling basis and agency-approved projects were notified to Congress in multiple groups throughout each fiscal year. DOD and State officials reviewed proposals—approved by the geographic combatant command and ambassador or chief of mission—and selected projects to recommend to the Secretaries of Defense and State. Following approval by the Secretary of Defense, with concurrence from the Secretary of State, DOD prepared and submitted congressional notifications for each project it intended to fund through the program. These notifications summarized project information such as objectives, the absorptive capacity of the recipient unit, baseline capabilities of the recipient unit, and arrangements for the project’s sustainment. Congressional notifications were submitted for each project to the appropriate congressional committees at least 15 days before initiation of activities. According to DOD, project implementation did not begin immediately following the 15-day notification period if additional time was needed to provide congressional briefings and ensure that the congressional committees agreed with proposed activities. Following congressional notification, the Defense Security Cooperation Agency assumed responsibility for overseeing the obligation of funds for training and equipment procurement before the end of the relevant fiscal year, while security assistance officers at U.S. embassies were responsible for coordinating in-country project implementation. Finally, DOD planned to conduct assessments of selected projects 6 to 18 months after the delivery of major project components, to evaluate the extent to which U.S. assistance had contributed to building recipient unit capabilities. Allocations for activities to be implemented under the Global Train and Equip authority increased from an average of about $275 million in fiscal years 2009 through 2014 to $675 million in fiscal year 2015, as shown in figure 2. Allocations for fiscal year 2015 significantly increased with the creation of two funding transfer accounts: the Counterterrorism Partnerships Fund (CTPF) and European Reassurance Initiative (ERI), both of which were authorized to fund Global Train and Equip projects. The CTPF is authorized to provide assistance to foreign security forces to conduct, support, or facilitate counterterrorism and crisis response activities, and to improve the capacity of the U.S. military to provide enabling support to counterterrorism and crisis response activities undertaken by foreign security forces. Congress appropriated $1.3 billion and $1.1 billion for the CTPF in fiscal years 2015 and 2016, respectively. ERI funds were appropriated, in part, to provide training, equipment, logistical supplies, and other services to Ukraine, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. Funds were transferred from both the CTPF and ERI accounts to be obligated for fiscal year 2015 projects. As seen in figure 3, $272 million of the $675 million, or 40 percent, of funding for fiscal year 2015 was allocated to projects for partner nations in Africa. For more information regarding the distribution of fiscal year 2015 Global Train and Equip assistance, see appendix II. As of the end of fiscal year 2015, DOD had no unobligated balances for fiscal year 2009 through 2015 funds and had disbursed the majority of funds obligated in fiscal years 2009 through 2012, as detailed in table 1. DOD has disbursed 10 percent of the funds obligated in fiscal year 2015 and has until the end of fiscal year 2020 to complete disbursement of those funds. DOD and State considered four key project planning elements called for by Presidential Policy Directive 23 on Security Sector Assistance (PPD 23) for fiscal year 2015 Global Train and Equip projects, but did not consistently document the consideration of those elements in proposal packages. PPD 23 states that U.S. agencies should target security sector assistance where it can be effective. To accomplish this goal, it identified key project planning elements to consider, including (1) project objectives that address partner nation needs, (2) partner nation absorptive capacity, (3) project assessments, and (4) project sustainment. While officials indicated that they considered each element, DOD consistently documented consideration for only one of those elements: project objectives. As seen in figure 4, documentation was incomplete for absorptive capacity, project baseline assessments, and project sustainment, despite officials’ indications that such factors were consistently considered during proposal development. According to agency officials, DOD and State consistently considered four key security assistance elements for all fiscal year 2015 project proposals we reviewed. PPD 23 identified key project planning elements for the United States to consider, including project objectives, absorptive capacity, baseline assessments, and sustainment plans. SO/LIC officials said that all four elements were discussed by program stakeholders, including global combatant command and State officials, during the proposal review process, prior to project approval by the Secretary of Defense with concurrence from the Secretary of State. For example, SO/LIC officials told us that absorptive capacity is consistently discussed among stakeholders during the proposal review process. Specifically, they noted that combatant command officials reported on the absorptive capacity of the recipient units during the project review process but noted that the SO/LIC policy oversight office lacked the resources to independently confirm the information. Combatant command officials confirmed that they consider elements such as absorptive capacity in developing project proposal packages. For example, officials from the U.S. European Command explained that absorptive capacity is one topic that they address in planning discussions with host nation officials. Officials from the U.S. Pacific Command noted that they have a well- established understanding of potential recipient unit absorptive capacity based on the persistent relationship between partner nation officials and U.S. officials imbedded with those units. Further, U.S. embassy officials who help draft project proposals also noted they can inform the consideration of potential recipient unit absorptive capacity, in part by considering the historic ability of potential recipient units to absorb previous assistance. DOD officials also told us that they consistently considered sustainment for fiscal year 2015 projects and State officials noted that they discuss project sustainment during proposal review and sometimes identify additional potential sources of sustainment funds for proposed projects. In addition, as a standard part of its proposal development process, DOD includes 2 years of spare parts to enable short-term sustainment, such as equipment maintenance, associated with program assistance. For example, in April 2015, we reported that project proposal templates since fiscal year 2011 indicated that each project should contain spare parts for 2 years of maintenance, and that proposal packages for fiscal year 2011 through 2014 projects for Yemen consistently included such spare parts. In addition, officials from SO/LIC, State, and DOD’s Defense Security Cooperation Agency told us that each project includes such short-term maintenance support. Congressional notifications for agency-approved fiscal year 2015 projects, prepared subsequent to approval by the Secretary of Defense and concurrence by the Secretary of State, included information related to the four elements, as required, implying that those elements had been considered. The fiscal year 2015 NDAA requires congressional notifications for each project to include, among other requirements, information about project objectives; absorptive capacity; a framework to be used for project assessment; and arrangements, if any, for project sustainment. Congressional notifications for 41 agency-approved fiscal year 2015 projects were prepared following the passage of the fiscal year 2015 NDAA. Each of these 41 notifications included (1) information about project objectives; (2) a similar statement, noting that the partner nation “has been assessed as capable to absorb effectively and benefit from the assistance proposed via this program;” (3) a description of the assessment framework; and (4) a statement about arrangements for sustainment, such as “while might provide some national funds to help sustain this capability, it is very likely that Foreign Military Financing (FMF) will also be required to support future year sustainment and training of this capability.” While DOD officials told us that they considered each of four key elements highlighted in PPD 23, fiscal year 2015 Global Train and Equip project proposal packages did not always document consideration of baseline assessments and sustainment plans, and rarely did so for absorptive capacity. Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government states that internal control activities aimed at ensuring effective use of resources should be clearly documented, and that documentation should be readily available for examination. As noted in table 2, DOD fiscal year 2015 project proposal packages requested information about three of four key elements—project objectives, baseline assessments, and sustainment plans. However, despite agency guidance, such documentation was not always complete. Further, DOD did not specifically request information about absorptive capacity. DOD requested, and fiscal year 2015 project proposals consistently documented, information about project objectives. DOD, in its fiscal year 2015 project proposal template, requested information related to project objectives. Our review of fiscal year 2015 project proposals indicated that they consistently included such information. For example, one proposal stated that “his proposal will enhance the ability to clear and successfully navigate through routes that contain [improvised explosive devices] laid by .” Another proposal stated that “his program will allow the to establish at least 3 defendable forward operating bases and a mobile forward aircraft refueling point that will have the capability to provide fuel, water, and sustainment of critical supplies to patrols that are operating in the desolate parts of the country.” DOD did not request, and project proposals did not consistently include, information about recipient units’ absorptive capacity. DOD’s fiscal year 2015 program guidance states that prior to proposal submission, embassy security cooperation officers are to ensure that proposals are appropriate for the partner nation’s absorptive capacity. However, DOD did not request officials to document their consideration of the recipient units’ absorptive capacity in fiscal year 2015 project proposal packages that agency officials used to make project approval decisions. Although the standard fiscal year 2015 project proposal template did not include a field specifically requesting such information, our review indicated that 10 of the 54 fiscal year 2015 project proposals did include information about the absorptive capacity of recipient units. For example, five proposals drafted by U.S. Africa Command stated that the partner nation’s “ability to absorb and sustain the training and equipment is well above average.” In addition, four projects to be funded through the ERI account were proposed using a template that had been modified to include a question specifically about the absorptive capacity of recipient units. The tenth proposal that included information about absorptive capacity did so in planning for equipment delivery. SO/LIC officials said that they plan to put additional focus on absorptive capacity during the proposal review process for fiscal year 2016 projects. However, the fiscal year 2016 project proposal template did not request any specific information regarding absorptive capacity, even though guidance for the program states that SO/LIC is interested in the absorptive capacity of the partner nation. Without documentation of absorptive capacity considerations, decision makers may not have sufficient information about recipient units’ ability to integrate proposed assistance projects as they consider proposed projects. For example, in documents supporting its fiscal year 2013 report to Congress on its assessment of the results of selected projects, DOD indicated that one partner nation recipient had a small armed force with few resources that had limited capability to absorb additional foreign military assistance. Despite having identified this challenge in an assessment completed during fiscal year 2013, DOD approved projects totaling more than $21 million for the same partner nation in fiscal years 2014 and 2015. DOD’s fiscal year 2015 project proposal package for this partner nation did not document any assessment of the recipient unit’s absorptive capacity. The project proposal packages submitted in response to DOD requests almost always included baseline assessment documents; however, those documents did not always include all information requested by DOD guidance. DOD’s assessment framework is based on a dual-purpose document that includes portions for assessing the recipient unit’s baseline capabilities and its capabilities following project delivery and implementation. DOD’s fiscal year 2015 program guidance states that a baseline assessment of recipient unit capabilities should be completed prior to submission of each proposal. While 51 of the 54 fiscal year 2015 project proposal packages included baseline assessments as required, they did not consistently include all information requested by agency guidance. DOD’s fiscal year 2015 guidance requests that geographic combatant command officials complete the baseline assessment section and the baseline portions of the project summary and certification sections of that document when projects are proposed. Program office officials said the baseline assessment section is the primary mechanism to document the capabilities of the recipient unit and identifies what the recipient unit is able to achieve at the time the project is proposed and what it needs to improve its capabilities to meet its mission. The baseline portion of the summary section provides an overview of the organizational status of the partner nation before project implementation, and the baseline assessment certification section requires the identification of the people involved in the preparation of the baseline assessment and their relevant experience. Thirty-four of the 51 baseline assessments we reviewed included completed baseline assessment sections. Only six (or 12 percent) of the 51 baseline portions of the summary and certification sections were complete. SO/LIC officials said they had not verified completion of baseline assessments because the policy oversight office was not staffed to provide this level of oversight. DOD officials said that the policy oversight office had increased its staff and that they are working to improve oversight of the baseline assessment process. The baseline assessments are intended to be completed, submitted with project proposals, and later used for project outcome assessments by assessment teams, policy officials, embassy staff, and other stakeholders. Incomplete assessments may affect DOD’s ability to design appropriate capacity building projects and to assess project outcomes, thus limiting information on program effectiveness that could help inform future assistance decisions. DOD’s fiscal year 2015 guidance requested information about planning for project sustainment; however, some aspects of sustainment planning are not consistently documented as requested by agency guidance. First, DOD’s fiscal year 2015 program guidance instructed officials developing proposals to provide context for any decisions to forego planning for the sustainment of training or equipment to be provided and to identify, if possible, the expected lifespan of the equipment if it will be used in a combat setting. Only one fiscal year 2015 project proposal included specific information about the applicability of project sustainment or the expected lifespan of the equipment in question. Nevertheless, several State and DOD officials told us that not all projects require or warrant sustainment. For example, officials explained that some assistance, such as ammunition, is expendable and does not require sustainment. Others noted that some assistance was never intended to be sustained. For instance, a project may have a discrete objective, such as enabling partner nation security forces to deploy in support of the International Security Assistance Force - Afghanistan. If the security forces had been deployed, then the return on investment would have been realized and long-term sustainment would be unnecessary. Officials explained that there was no process to substantively analyze the value of long-term project sustainment. Second, the fiscal year 2015 project proposal template requests information about (1) partner nation contributions, (2) partner nation sustainment capability, and (3) estimates of annual sustainment costs. The proposals we reviewed consistently included information regarding the first two items: partner nation contributions and sustainment capability. For example, 47 of 54 proposals indicated that the recipient partner nation may be able to contribute national funds for project sustainment, although State and DOD officials identified several reasons why they do not have full confidence in sustainment plans predicated on the availability of partner nation funds. With respect to the third category of information requested in project proposals, only 37 of 54 proposals included an estimate of annual sustainment costs as required. These 37 annual sustainment cost estimates ranged from $20,000 to sustain a $3 million project to develop the skills of a special operations force of a European partner nation, to more than $5 million to sustain a project building a counterterrorism company in an African partner nation. Four additional proposals indicated that sustainment costs would be “minimal” but did not include a specific estimate. The remaining 13 proposals did not include sustainment cost estimates. As seen in figure 2 above, fiscal year 2015 allocations for activities to be implemented under the authority increased significantly over past years. Clearly documenting information such as estimates of annual sustainment costs could help improve decision makers’ ability to assess the sustainability of proposed projects in making funding decisions. See appendix III for State and DOD views on the availability of funds for long-term sustainment. DOD reporting to Congress on the achievement of Global Train and Equip project objectives has not met reporting deadlines, but those reports—dating back to 2012—indicate that projects have made some progress building partner capacity to combat terrorism and conduct stability operations. The fiscal year 2013 assessment report was submitted to Congress nearly 2 years after the required due date, the fiscal year 2014 assessment report was submitted to Congress nearly 1 year later than required, and the fiscal year 2015 report was 1 month late. DOD’s fiscal year 2012, 2013, 2014, and 2015 reports included assessments of the recipient units of 61 of the 208 projects implemented in fiscal years 2006 through 2013, which represents 28 percent of the $2 billion in assistance implemented in those fiscal years. These assessments and supporting documents indicate that recipient units generally experienced progress in building capabilities. They also identified several factors—including proposal design, equipment procurement, partner nation shortfalls, and workforce management—that can affect the extent to which DOD is able to achieve project objectives. Assessments, if completed in a timely manner, could help provide valuable information to decision makers and policymakers as they seek to choose new projects and address reported challenges. DOD’s fiscal year 2013, 2014, and 2015 assessments reports were submitted to Congress late. The fiscal year 2012 NDAA required DOD, no later than 90 days after the end of each fiscal year, to submit to Congress a report including, in part, an assessment of the effectiveness of each program in building the capacity of the foreign country to conduct counterterrorism operations during the fiscal year covered by such report. The fiscal year 2015 NDAA, enacted in December 2014, included a similar requirement for DOD to submit a report to Congress no later than 90 days after the end of each fiscal year, from 2015 through 2020, including an assessment of the effectiveness of the program in achieving its intended purpose. This report is to summarize the findings of the assessments of projects carried out under the program. DOD’s annual reports for fiscal years 2012, 2013, and 2014 described some assessment activities and the relevant assessment framework but noted that reporting on the results of assessment activities would be submitted to Congress separately. As shown in table 3, DOD submitted its fiscal year 2012 assessment report in accordance with required deadlines. However, DOD submitted its fiscal year 2013 assessment report to Congress in September 2015, 21 months later than required, and submitted its fiscal year 2014 assessment report to Congress in December 2015, 12 months later than required. DOD’s assessment report for fiscal year 2015 was 1 month late. DOD officials informed us that, although the assessment teams had conducted the assessments during the associated fiscal year, DOD did not submit those assessments to Congress on time because they did not have sufficient resources to review and finalize them. According to DOD, the assessment process is intended to enable the U.S. government to make better decisions about project design and the types of projects that promise the greatest return on investment, that accomplish counterterrorism or stability operation missions, and that are likely to help recipient partner nations achieve the intended standards of capability and performance. Because the submissions to Congress were late, decision makers lacked full and current information about the extent to which projects achieved their objectives, which could have informed the direction of assistance—for both new projects and sustainment of previous efforts—in subsequent years. Further, program stakeholders were not afforded the opportunity to use lessons learned documented in those reports in designing related or similar projects. Officials from State told us that they, too, might have used the information in the reports in considering subsequent project proposals and during development of Global Train and Equip and other security assistance efforts. DOD’s reporting on the achievement of project objectives indicates some progress in enhancing recipient unit capabilities. As shown in figure 5, DOD’s fiscal year 2012, 2013, 2014, and 2015 assessment reports covered 61, or 29 percent, of the 208 projects implemented between 2006 and 2013. These 61 projects account for 28 percent of the $2 billion DOD allocated for this program in those years. To conduct these assessments, DOD uses a standard framework for evaluating the capabilities and performance of each recipient unit. Baseline assessments, discussed earlier, rate the recipient unit’s level of capability and performance before project implementation on a 5-point scale on which 1 is defined as the ability to perform some basic tasks to at least a low standard of performance and 5 is defined as the ability to perform most of the advanced tasks for the unit’s missions and to operate almost continuously throughout its assigned area of operations. Following implementation, DOD conducts assessments using the same 5-point scale to report on changes in the recipient unit’s level of capability and performance. Comparing the change in a recipient unit’s capability and performance rating between the baseline and post-implementation assessments indicates the recipient unit’s positive, neutral, or negative change since the provision of assistance. According to a DOD contractor who leads the project assessments, these ratings do not solely represent the effect of the provision of training and equipment on the recipient unit’s capability and performance, as other factors may contribute to the change in performance level. DOD implemented its Global Train and Equip assessment framework in fiscal year 2012 and baseline assessments became a requirement of project proposals in fiscal year 2013. Projects proposed and implemented in earlier years were not required to have a baseline assessment at the time of proposal. However, for the purpose of assessing changes in recipient unit capacity, DOD established hypothetical baseline ratings for some recipient units by inquiring about those units’ capabilities prior to receipt of assistance. Of the 61 projects assessed, 18 were for recipient units for which DOD had not conducted or established a hypothetical assessment of baseline capabilities. The remaining 43 projects, representing 21 percent of the 208 projects implemented in fiscal years 2006 through 2013, were for recipient units for which DOD conducted both an assessment of baseline capabilities and capabilities following project implementation. As shown in figure 6, of these 43 projects, the recipient units of 35 were assessed as having increased by at least one rating level—most often from level 1 to 2 or from level 2 to 3—following project implementation. For seven of those 35 projects, DOD reported that recipient unit capabilities increased by at least two levels. For example, DOD’s fiscal year 2012 assessment report noted that a project implemented in fiscal year 2010 intended to build partner nation air force capacity to execute precision-guided strikes against terrorist targets indicated that the recipient unit’s new capabilities enabled strikes on a terrorist target that diminished terrorists’ capacity to plan attacks. The remaining eight projects were directed to recipient units assessed as having realized no change in capability. For example, one of these four projects was intended to bolster a partner nation force’s ability to enable sustained border security operations. At the time of the assessment, the recipient unit was using assistance for pre-deployment activities rather than to conduct envisioned border operations. DOD’s assessment reports and supporting documents, as well as agency officials we interviewed, also described some factors that can affect the extent to which DOD is able to achieve Global Train and Equip project objectives, including proposal design and interpretation, equipment delivery and procurement, partner nation shortfalls, and workforce management. Proposal design and interpretation. Project proposal designs that did not adequately capture recipient unit needs and capabilities challenged the achievement of project objectives. For example, DOD’s fiscal year 2013 assessment of a fiscal year 2011 project indicated that the design of a light ballistic protection system for partner nation helicopters did not take into consideration the location of navigation lights and associated inspection and maintenance procedures. The assessment suggested that communication and design collaboration between the United States and the partner nation could have identified and eliminated this issue. The assessment also indicated that changes to the aircraft had to be certified by the original equipment manufacturer per an agreement between the partner nation and the Russian government. Since the changes had not been approved by the Russian authorities, the aircraft were not permitted to fly with troops. DOD’s assessment described this as a critical shortcoming. In addition, DOD’s fiscal year 2013 assessment of a fiscal year 2011 counterterrorism project indicated that several elements were not well designed. For instance, some vehicles provided were considered unsuitable for use in the terrain in which they would be used and did not have an identified need or associated concept of operations. As pictured in figure 7, this same assessment reported that spotting scopes provided to enhance counterterrorism capabilities were too tall for use in a prone position, exposing the spotter. Combatant command officials indicated that project proposals are at times developed by individuals who lack subject matter expertise. Unclear descriptions of desired capabilities in proposal documents may make it difficult for project implementers and officials conducting assessments to interpret the intent of the proposals. Further, DOD officials indicated that because of institutionalized staff turnover in U.S. embassies, the officials overseeing project implementation may not have been responsible for project development and are less likely to understand the capabilities of the intended recipient units or the capability gaps that could be addressed by equipment and training. Equipment delivery and procurement. Equipment delivery and procurement challenges can make it difficult to achieve desired capability-building objectives. For example, DOD’s fiscal year 2013 assessment report indicated that 7 of the 11 recipient units assessed experienced equipment procurement and delivery issues. The majority of projects provided to these recipients indicated discrepancies between the number of items requested in congressional notifications and the number of items delivered. For instance, a fiscal year 2013 assessment of a fiscal year 2009 project to equip the recipient unit to conduct counterterrorism operations in urban settings reported that the unit received half the desired number of body armor sets, one additional bulldozer, and 10 fewer night vision rifle scopes than originally proposed. The report indicated that it was unclear how the bulldozers were being employed in tactical operations. In addition, incorrect equipment was delivered to some partner nations. For example, one fiscal year 2013 project assessment indicated that a recipient unit received left-hand drive vehicles despite project plans for right-hand drive vehicles. Similarly, a fiscal year 2012 assessment of a fiscal year 2009 project to bolster the recipient unit’s aerial interdiction operations found that the incorrect surveillance equipment was delivered to the recipient unit. When the cockpit surveillance monitors were installed, the equipment was in the pilot’s line of sight, rendering the equipment unusable per original project design. Partner nation shortfalls. Shortfalls of partner nations, including their use of assistance for purposes other than those originally envisioned and inability to maintain and sustain equipment, can negatively affect the achievement of project objectives. For example, the fiscal year 2013 assessments and supporting documentation of fiscal year 2008 and 2009 projects to train and equip a partner nation counterterrorism unit indicated that the recipient unit had not been assigned to conduct counterterrorism operations as envisioned. In this instance, although the recipient unit, at the time of congressional notification, was intended to conduct urban counterterrorism operations, the assessment team found that the recipient unit had subsequently been assigned to execute urban internal defense operations. Nonetheless, DOD’s assessment indicated that the recipient units were more capable of conducting internal defense and counterterrorism operations. In addition, DOD’s fiscal year 2012 assessment of a fiscal year 2010 project to enhance maritime domain awareness found that a recipient unit’s inability to maintain related equipment limited operational performance. The recipient unit reportedly had difficulty recruiting and training personnel to operate and maintain the equipment, and also lacked spare parts. Similarly, DOD’s fiscal year 2012 assessment and supporting documentation of a fiscal year 2008 project intended to provide coastal radar surveillance noted that the delivered equipment and training might have helped the recipient unit earn a level 3 or 4 capability and performance rating, but maintenance and sustainment issues reduced its rating to level 2—an increase of only one level over its baseline assessment. Workforce management. DOD officials indicated that workforce challenges, particularly related to turnover and staffing levels, inhibit effective project design, program implementation, and oversight. They noted that workforce turnover within the policy oversight office was systemic and that program oversight responsibilities historically entail more work than available personnel can manage. DOD officials indicated that they increased office staff by three permanent positions in fiscal year 2015. According to SO/LIC officials, as of February 2016, the policy oversight office had six permanent employees—four civilians and two military—who provide oversight of Global Train and Equip and other DOD counterterrorism partnership program activities. In addition, other non-permanent staff and temporary detailees are sometimes assigned to help oversee the program’s key functions. In addition, DOD officials indicated that, for several projects, the associated embassy’s security cooperation office responsible for implementing projects in-country had staffing limitations that affected their ability to supervise project delivery and implementation, maintain equipment delivery records, and gauge the recipient units’ implementation of the projects. Further, a U.S. Africa Command official stated that combatant command and policy oversight office staffing challenges inhibit effective proposal development, implementation, oversight, and sustainment of projects. Building partner capacity is a central focus of the U.S. counterterrorism strategy, as underscored by the allocation of $675 million for Global Train and Equip program activities in fiscal year 2015—a sharp increase compared to the $275 million annual average in the preceding 6 years. Although DOD has established a methodical interagency process to develop and select security assistance project proposals that considers key security sector assistance planning elements, it did not require documentation of recipient unit absorptive capacity or fully document support for consideration of other key elements in planning fiscal year 2015 projects. Fully documenting the basis of project approval decisions could enhance transparency, provide additional assurance that resources are efficiently allocated, and help to ensure the long-term benefits of projects and careful use of scarce U.S. and partner nation resources. In addition, DOD has not consistently fulfilled its congressional reporting requirements for the program in a timely manner. DOD’s fiscal year 2013, 2014, and 2015 assessment reports were late. Without DOD’s timely fulfillment of its assessment reporting requirements, Congress may not have comprehensive and current information about past successes and failures that could help ensure that U.S. resources are effectively used to build partner capacity to combat terrorists. To improve management of and reporting on the Global Train and Equip program, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense take the following three actions: take steps to require that information about the absorptive capacity of recipient units be documented in project proposal packages, take steps to ensure that documentation requested in project proposal packages is complete, and take steps to develop a process for improving the timely completion and submission of required assessment reports to Congress. We provided a draft of this report to DOD and State for comment. DOD provided written comments concurring with all of our recommendations, which we have reprinted in appendix IV. State had no comments. We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional committees and the Secretaries of Defense and State. In addition, the report is available at no charge on the GAO website at http://www.gao.gov. If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 512-7331 or JohnsonCM@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made key contributions to this report are listed in appendix VI. The Carl Levin and Howard P. “Buck” McKeon National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2015, requires GAO to conduct biennial audits of such program or programs conducted or supported pursuant to 10 U.S.C. § 2282 during the preceding 2 fiscal years as GAO shall select, including in these reports (1) a description of the program(s), (2) an assessment of the capacity of recipient countries to absorb assistance, (3) an assessment of the arrangements, if any, for the sustainment of the program(s), (4) an assessment of the effectiveness of the program(s) in achieving their intended purpose, and (5) such other matters as GAO considers appropriate. This report examines (1) the extent to which the Department of Defense (DOD) considered and documented consideration of key security assistance planning elements for fiscal year 2015 project proposals and (2) the results that have been reported on the achievement of project objectives since fiscal year 2009. We assessed funding data including allocations, obligations, and disbursements for fiscal years 2009 through 2015. DOD provided data on allocations, amounts reallocated, unobligated balances, unliquidated obligations, and disbursements of funds for program activities. We analyzed these data to determine the extent to which funds had been disbursed. We assessed the reliability of these data by interviewing cognizant agency officials and comparing the data with previously published data, as well as verifying them with congressional notifications. We determined that the data were sufficiently reliable for our purposes. To address these objectives, we analyzed program guidelines, project proposal documents, and congressional notifications. We discussed topics regarding the project proposal process and key elements of project planning, project documentation, and project assessment with officials from the Department of State (State) and DOD, geographic combatant commands in whose areas of responsibility partner nations received fiscal year 2015 assistance, and three selected U.S. embassies in Kenya, Jordan, and Latvia. We selected these countries based on factors such as the amount of funds the countries have been allocated, the maturity of projects, project assessment experience, and geographic distribution. To assess the extent to which DOD considered and documented consideration of key elements of security sector assistance for projects it planned to implement in fiscal year 2015, we analyzed agency documents and interviewed agency officials. We reviewed Presidential Policy Directive 23 on Security Sector Assistance (PPD 23), which identified four key elements to be considered for security sector assistance programs: (1) project objectives that address partner needs, (2) the absorptive capacity of the recipient unit, (3) the baseline capabilities of the recipient unit, and (4) the arrangements for the sustainment of the project. To determine the extent to which DOD considered these elements, we interviewed State and DOD officials who develop and review proposals to discuss (1) how they use information included in project proposal packages to consider key planning elements and (2) other factors they consider in developing and reviewing proposals that may not be documented. Further, we reviewed congressional notifications SO/LIC develops subsequent to agency approval to determine the extent to which those documents include—and thus imply consideration of—information about the four key planning elements. To determine the extent to which DOD requested documentation about and fully documented consideration of these elements, we analyzed the agency guidance and the content of agency-approved fiscal year 2015 project proposals for their inclusion. DOD’s fiscal year 2015 program guidance states each project proposal package should include four documents: a completed standardized project proposal, a baseline assessment of the capabilities of the recipient unit, a proposed equipment list for the project, and a Chief of Mission concurrence letter. DOD guidance also requires a country team assessment for projects involving night vision devices or other sensitive technology. Each project proposal package was independently reviewed by two analysts for the inclusion of the four elements. The analysts resolved any disagreements through discussion of the information used to make their independent determinations. We ultimately reported on information included in 54 fiscal year 2015 project proposal packages. We excluded proposals for four fiscal year 2015 projects that redirected assistance originally approved and procured for Yemen in previous fiscal years but which could not be delivered because of political unrest. With respect to our reporting on support for information about baseline assessments, congressional notifications lay out a standardized assessment framework to be used to assess the effects of projects. This framework includes a baseline assessment that DOD requires to be completed for inclusion in project proposal packages. DOD provided baseline assessments for 51 of 54 fiscal year 2015 project proposals notified to Congress. We analyzed these 51 baseline assessment documents included in fiscal year 2015 project proposal packages against DOD internal guidance to assess the completion of the required baseline assessment sections. We also analyzed congressional notifications for projects DOD planned to implement in fiscal year 2015 to assess the extent to which they included required information related to the four key planning elements and with respect to requirements included in the fiscal year 2015 NDAA. Each congressional notification was independently reviewed by two analysts for the inclusion of eight required elements. The analysts resolved any disagreements through discussion of the information used to make their independent determinations. We ultimately reported on information included in congressional notifications for 41 fiscal year 2015 projects that were subject to the requirements in the fiscal year 2015 NDAA. For this analysis, we did not include the congressional notifications for 4 projects that redirected assistance originally approved and procured for Yemen in previous fiscal years but which could not be delivered because political unrest. Because these projects were planned in prior fiscal years, they were subject to different legislative and agency guidance. We also did not include 13 agency-approved project notifications to Congress submitted before the December 2015 passage of the fiscal year 2015 NDAA because these were not subject to the new requirements. To assess the extent to which DOD has reported on the achievement of project objectives since fiscal year 2009, we reviewed agency documents and interviewed agency officials. In particular, we analyzed DOD’s four annual project assessment reports and supporting documents from fiscal years 2012, 2013, 2014, and 2015 as well as the assessment framework handbook. We analyzed DOD project implementation and funding data to determine the number and value of implemented projects that DOD had assessed between fiscal years 2006 and 2013. We also analyzed submission dates for each assessment report against deadlines identified in the fiscal year 2012 NDAA. Further, to examine the extent to which DOD’s assessments and supporting documents reported progress in building partner capacity, we compared original baseline recipient unit capability and performance levels assessed at the time projects were proposed with recipient unit capability levels assessed following the delivery of program assistance. DOD uses a standard framework for evaluating the capabilities and performance of each recipient unit. DOD implemented its assessment framework for the Global Train and Equip program in fiscal year 2012, and baseline assessments became a requirement of project proposals in fiscal year 2013. Baseline assessments rate the recipient unit’s level of capability and performance before project implementation on a 5-point scale, with 1 defined as the ability to perform some basic tasks to at least a low standard of performance and 5 as the ability to perform most of the advanced tasks for the unit’s missions and to operate almost continuously throughout its assigned area of operations. Following implementation, project assessments and supporting documents use the same framework to report on changes in the recipient unit’s level of capability and performance on the same 5-point scale. Projects proposed and implemented in earlier years were not required to have a baseline assessment at the time of proposal. However, for the purpose of assessing changes in capacity, DOD established hypothetical baseline ratings of some recipient units by inquiring about those units’ capabilities prior to receipt of program assistance. Following implementation, project assessments and supporting documents use the same framework to report on changes in the recipient unit’s level of capability and performance on the same 5-point scale. DOD’s fiscal year 2012, 2013, 2014, and 2015 reports included assessments of the recipient units of 61, or 29 percent, of the 208 projects implemented in fiscal years 2006 through 2013. Of these 61 project assessments we reviewed, 43 were directed to recipient units where DOD had conducted both an assessment of recipient unit’s baseline capabilities and the recipient unit’s capabilities following project implementation. Assessing the change in a recipient unit’s capability and performance rating between the baseline and post- implementation assessments indicates the recipient unit’s positive, neutral, or negative change since the provision of assistance. To determine that the data included in DOD’s assessments were sufficiently reliable for our purposes of reporting on those assessments, we met with DOD and contracted officials responsible for conducting and reviewing project assessments to gather information about their processes for assessing recipient unit capabilities. We also reviewed the qualifications and experience of the officials conducting the project assessments, which included military experience that was relevant to the project and recipient units being assessed. In addition, we reviewed DOD’s project assessment guidance and their template for conducting project assessments, which was consistently used in the assessments we reviewed. Further, the preponderance of project assessments resulting in modest increases in recipient unit capabilities lends credibility to the assessment process. For example, our review of DOD’s project assessments indicated that the majority of the recipient units’ capability levels increased from level 1 to 2, or from level 2 to 3 following project implementation. None of the recipient units’ capability levels were assessed as having increased to level 5 following project implementation. We did not conduct independent assessments to systematically validate results included in DOD’s reports. We determined that the data were sufficiently reliable for our purposes. In addition, we reviewed the assessment reports to identify factors affecting the extent to which project objectives were achieved. We also gathered information about key factors affecting the extent to which project objectives were achieved from interviews with DOD officials responsible for implementing the program, including officials from DOD’s policy guidance and oversight office, Joint Staff, and geographic combatant commands, and embassies in three selected countries, and with officials at State’s Bureau of Political-Military Affairs and Africa Regional Bureau. We grouped the factors identified through our review of DOD’s assessments and supporting documents, and conversations with agency officials into four categories of key factors on which we reported: (1) proposal design and interpretation, (2) equipment delivery and procurement, (3) partner nation shortfalls, and (4) workforce management. We conducted this performance audit from May 2015 to April 2016 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. DOD’s fiscal year 2015 Global Train and Equip project proposal template did not request information about the sources of U.S. funds to be used for long-term sustainment. Nonetheless, all 54 project proposals identified at least one potential source of funds for sustainment purposes. The most often cited sources of funds identified in those statements were partner nation funds (47 of 54) and State’s Foreign Military Financing (FMF) program (16 of 54). As we have previously reported, DOD’s fiscal year 2016 project proposal template requests information on the availability of FMF and other available U.S. resources if a partner nation is unlikely to cover the expected costs of maintenance. State and DOD officials acknowledged that, regardless of the intentions documented in long-term sustainment plans for fiscal year 2015 projects, partner nation and State FMF funds—the two most commonly identified sources for long-term project sustainment—may not be available in future years. First, State and DOD officials identified several reasons why they do not have full confidence in sustainment plans predicated on the availability of partner nation funds. Officials explained that long-term sustainment plans for projects were not always discussed with partner nation officials. Projects are not guaranteed for funding until after proposals have been submitted and approved. Sensitive to the potential challenges of raising the expectations of partner nation counterparts, U.S. officials do not always have direct discussions about long-term planning for projects that might not come to fruition. In instances where long-term sustainment planning is discussed with partner nation officials, partner nation behavior may not conform to DOD and State’s plan. For example, embassy officials explained that their partner nation counterparts may indicate during planning discussions that they would sustain the equipment with national resources but then use those resources for other purposes because of unforeseen needs or changes in priorities. Furthermore, DOD and State officials added that the economic conditions of some recipients call into question the validity of long-term sustainment planning that relies on partner nation funds. For example, officials from both State and DOD noted that recipient partner nations in Africa (accounting for $272 million of the $675 million allocated in fiscal year 2015) do not likely have sufficient national funds available to sustain all approved projects. Second, DOD and State officials acknowledge that FMF program resources may not be sufficient to carry out plans for long-term project sustainment. We have previously reported that FMF funds may not be available as planned for the sustainment of some projects. Agency officials noted that this longstanding concern has been compounded by the additional Counterterrorism Partnerships Fund resources obligated for the program in fiscal year 2015. Even if sufficient FMF funds are available, U.S. officials were uncertain about the extent to which some partner nations would use FMF resources for project sustainment. State provides FMF assistance to certain partner nations as grants and loans for the acquisition of U.S. defense equipment, services, and training. State and DOD officials can work with partner nations to develop a spending plan to include funding to sustain projects, but partner nations could prioritize the use of FMF resources for other purposes. Officials from DOD’s policy oversight office are aware of the sustainment challenges that the program and recipient partner nations face. They suggested that the ability to use funding made available for the program to sustain projects implemented in previous fiscal years could help address some such challenges. However, fiscal year 2012 congressional committee report language accompanying that year’s NDAA notes that resources authorized for the program are not intended to fund long-term sustainment. DOD officials stated that they have drafted a legislative proposal that could modify this restriction. According those officials, as of February 2016, the proposal was undergoing interagency review in advance of being officially conveyed to Congress for consideration. Charles Michael Johnson, Jr., (202) 512-7331, or JohnsonCM@gao.gov. In addition to the contact named above, Jason Bair (Assistant Director), Kathryn Bolduc (Analyst-In-Charge), Mason Thorpe Calhoun, Christopher Hayes, Lynn Cothern, Martin de Alteriis, and Ashley Alley made key contributions to this report. Oziel Trevino also provided technical assistance.

Summary: The United States has undertaken several efforts, including DOD's Global Train and Equip program, to build the capacity of its foreign partners to counter terrorism. Funding allocated for this program totals $2.3 billion since 2009. DOD and State select projects from proposals that use a standard planning template. Once projects are approved by DOD with concurrence from State, DOD submits congressional notifications that summarize certain aspects of each project. The fiscal year 2015 National Defense Authorization Act included a provision for GAO to review the Global Train and Equip Program. This report examines (1) the extent to which DOD considered and documented consideration of key security assistance elements for fiscal year 2015 project proposals, and (2) the results that have been reported on the achievement of project objectives since fiscal year 2009. GAO analyzed agency data and program documents, and interviewed DOD and State officials in Washington, D.C., and at selected combatant commands and embassies. The Departments of Defense (DOD) and State (State) officials consistently considered four key security assistance project planning elements for fiscal year 2015 Global Train and Equip project proposals. However, project proposals did not always adhere to federal internal control standards for clearly documenting three of those elements—absorptive capacity, project assessment, and sustainment plans. For example, DOD did not require project proposal packages to document information about the recipient unit's absorptive capacity. In addition, assessments of recipient unit baseline capabilities did not always include all information required by agency guidance to facilitate project assessment. Lastly, 13 of 54 project proposals did not include required estimates of annual sustainment costs. The sharp increase in funding for program activities in fiscal year 2015, as shown in the figure above, heightens the importance of documenting consideration of key planning elements to provide decision makers sufficient information about recipient units' ability to use and sustain assistance. Moreover, incomplete baseline assessments may limit DOD's ability to conduct project assessments to inform future funding decisions. DOD reporting on Global Train and Equip project assessments has not met statutory deadlines but identifies some progress in building partner nation capabilities. Despite a legal requirement to complete and submit to Congress annual assessments within 90 days of the end of each fiscal year, DOD's fiscal year 2013, 2014, and 2015 assessment reports were submitted up to 21 months late. Untimely reporting may limit decision makers' ability to use assessments to inform future project selection and sustainment decisions. DOD's assessments—which cover 28 percent of funds allocated in fiscal years 2006 through 2013—indicate some progress in building capability to combat terrorism and conduct stability operations. They also identify factors that challenge the achievement of project objectives such as proposal design and interpretation and equipment delivery and procurement. For example, one country received sniper spotting scopes that were too tall for use in a prone position, exposing the spotter. GAO is making two recommendations to enhance DOD's documentation and management of the Global Train and Equip program and one to ensure timely completion of required assessment reporting to Congress. DOD concurred with GAO's recommendations.