The missions of DOE’s 23 laboratories have evolved over the last 55 years. Originally created to design and build atomic bombs under the Manhattan Project, these laboratories have since expanded to conduct research in many disciplines—from high-energy physics to advanced computing at facilities throughout the nation. DOE’s goal is to use the laboratories for developing clean energy sources and pollution-prevention technologies, for ensuring enhanced security through reductions in the nuclear threat, and for continuing leadership in the acquisition of scientific knowledge. The Department considers the laboratories a key to a growing economy fueled by technological innovations that increase U.S. industrial competitiveness and create new high-skill jobs for American workers. Missions have expanded in the laboratories for many reasons, including changes in the world’s political environment. Nine of DOE’s 23 laboratories are multiprogram national laboratories; they account for about 70 percent of the total laboratory budget and about 80 percent of all laboratory personnel. Three of these multiprogram national laboratories (Lawrence Livermore, Los Alamos, and Sandia) conduct the majority of DOE’s nuclear weapons defense activities. Facing reduced funding for nuclear weapons as a result of the Cold War’s end and the signing of the comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty, these three laboratories have substantially diversified to maintain their preeminent talent and facilities. The remaining laboratories in DOE’s system are program- and mission-dedicated facilities. (See app. I for a list of all DOE laboratories.) DOE owns the laboratories and contracts with universities and private-sector organizations for the management and operation of 19, while providing federal staff for the remaining 4. The Congress is taking a growing interest in how the national laboratories are being managed. Recently introduced legislation would restructure the missions of the laboratories or manage them in new ways. Some previously proposed organizational options include converting the laboratories that are working closely with the private sector into independent entities or transferring the responsibility for one or more laboratories to other federal agencies whose missions are closely aligned with those of particular DOE laboratories. We have reported to the Congress that DOE’s efforts to sharpen the focus and improve the management of its laboratories have been elusive and that the challenges facing the Department raise concerns about how effectively it can manage reform initiatives. Over the past several years, many government advisory groups have raised concerns about how DOE manages its national laboratory system. Major concerns centered on three issues: The laboratories’ missions are unfocused. DOE micromanages the laboratories. The laboratories are not operating as an integrated system. More recent advisory groups have reported similar weaknesses, prompting the Congress to take a close look at how the national laboratory system is meeting its objectives. We identified nearly 30 reports by a wide variety of advisory groups on various aspects of the national laboratories’ management and missions. (See app. II for a list of past reports.) Most of these reports have been prepared since the early 1980s. The reports include the following: In 1982, DOE’s Energy Research Advisory Board reported that the national laboratories duplicate private-sector research and that while DOE could take better advantage of the national laboratories’ capabilities, it needed to address its own management and organizational inefficiencies, which hamper the achievement of a more effective laboratory system.In 1983, a White House Science Council Panel found that while DOE’s laboratories had well-defined missions for part of their work, most activities were fragmented and unrelated to the laboratories’ main responsibilities.In 1992, DOE’s Secretary of Energy Advisory Board found that the laboratories’ broad missions, coupled with rapidly changing world events, had “caused a loss of coherence and focus at the laboratories, thereby reducing their overall effectiveness in responding to their traditional missions as well as new national initiatives. . . .” A 1993 report by an internal DOE task force reported that missions “must be updated to support DOE’s new directions and to respond to new national imperatives. . . .” The most recent extensive review of DOE’s national laboratories was performed by a task force chaired by Robert Galvin, former Chairman of the Motorola Corporation. Consisting of distinguished leaders from government, academia, and industry, the Galvin Task Force was established to examine alternatives for directing the laboratories’ scientific and engineering resources to meet the economic, environmental, defense, scientific, and energy needs of the nation. Its 1995 report identified many of the problems noted in earlier studies and called for a more disciplined focus for the national laboratories, also reporting that the laboratories may be oversized for their role. The Galvin Task Force reported that the traditional government ownership and contractor operation of the laboratories has not worked well. According to its report, increasing DOE’s administration and oversight transformed the laboratories from traditional contractor-operated systems into a virtual government-operated system. The report noted that many past studies of DOE’s laboratories had resulted in efforts to fine-tune the system but led to little fundamental improvement. Regarding the management structure of DOE’s non-weapons-oriented laboratories, the task force recommended a major change in the organization and governance of the laboratory system. The task force envisioned a not-for-profit corporation governed by a board of trustees, consisting primarily of distinguished scientists and engineers and experienced senior executives from U.S. industry. Such a change in governance, the task force reported, would improve the standards and quality of work and at the same time generate over 20 percent in cost savings. Other findings by the task force and subsequent reports by other advisory groups have focused on the need for DOE to integrate R&D programs across the Department and among the laboratories to increase management efficiencies, reduce administrative burdens, and better define the laboratories’ missions. In June 1995, DOE’s Task Force on Strategic Energy Research and Development, chaired by energy analyst Daniel Yergin, issued a report on DOE’s energy R&D programs. The report assessed the rationale for the federal government’s support of energy R&D, reviewed the priorities and management of the overall program, and recommended ways of making it more efficient and effective. The task force recommended that DOE streamline its R&D management, develop a strategic plan for energy R&D, eliminate duplicative laboratory programs and research projects, and reorganize and consolidate dispersed R&D programs at DOE laboratories. In August 1995, the National Science and Technology Council examined laboratories in DOE, the Department of Defense (DOD), and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA). The Council reported that DOE’s existing system of laboratory governance needs fundamental repair, stating that DOE’s laboratory system is bigger and more expensive than is needed to meet essential missions in energy, the environment, national security, and fundamental science. The Council recommended that DOE develop ways to eliminate apparent overlap and unnecessary redundancy between its laboratory system and DOD’s and NASA’s. DOE’s Laboratory Operations Board was created in 1995 to focus the laboratories’ missions and reduce DOE’s micromanagement. Members serving on the Board from outside DOE have issued four different reports, which have noted the need to focus and define the laboratories’ missions in relation to the Department’s missions, integrate the laboratories’ programmatic work, and streamline operations, including the elimination or reduction of administrative burdens. In March 1997, the Office of Science and Technology Policy reported on laboratories managed by DOE, DOD, and NASA. The Office cited efforts by the three agencies to improve their laboratory management but found that DOE was still micro-managing its laboratories and had made little progress toward reducing the administrative burdens it imposes on its laboratories. The Office recommended a variety of improvements in performance measures, incentives, and productivity and urged more streamlined management. In March 1997, a report by the Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA) found that DOE’s processes for managing environment, safety, and health activities were impeding effective management. According to IDA, DOE’s onerous review processes undermined accountability and prevented timely decisions from being made and implemented throughout the entire nuclear weapons complex, including the national laboratories. IDA specifically noted that DOE’s Defense Programs had confusing line and staff relationships, inadequately defined roles and responsibilities, and poorly integrated programs and functions. IDA concluded that DOE needed to strengthen its line accountability and reorganize its structure in several areas. At our request, DOE provided us with a listing of the actions it took in response to repeated calls for more focused laboratory missions and improved management. But while DOE has made progress—principally by reducing paperwork burdens on its laboratories—most of its actions are still in process or have unclear expectations and deadlines. Furthermore, the Department cannot demonstrate how its actions have resulted, or may result, in fundamental change. To analyze progress in laboratory management reform, we talked to DOE and laboratory officials and asked DOE to document the actions it has taken, is taking, or has planned to address the recommendations from several advisory groups. We used DOE’s responses, which are reprinted in appendix III, as a basis for discussions with laboratory and DOE officials and with 18 experts familiar with national laboratory issues. We asked these experts to examine DOE’s responses. Several of these experts had served on the Galvin Task Force and are currently serving on DOE’s Laboratory Operations Board (app. IV lists the experts we interviewed). The actions DOE said it is taking include creating various internal working groups; strengthening the Energy R&D Council to facilitate more effective planning, budgeting, management, and evaluation of the Department’s R&D programs and to improve the linkage between research and technology development; increasing the use of private-sector management practices; adopting performance-based contracting and continuous improvement concepts; improving the oversight of efforts to enhance productivity and reduce overhead costs at the laboratories; expanding the laboratories’ work for other federal agencies; evaluating the proper balance between laboratories and universities for basic research; improving science and technology partnerships with industry; reducing unnecessary oversight burdens on laboratories; developing the Strategic Laboratory Missions Plan in July 1996 that identified laboratory activities in mission areas; creating the Laboratory Operations Board, which includes DOE officials and experts from industry and academia, to provide guidance and direction to the laboratories; and developing “technology roadmaps,” a strategic planning technique to focus the laboratories’ roles. Most of the actions DOE reported to us are process oriented, incomplete, or only marginally related to past recommendations for change. For example, creating new task forces and strengthening old ones may be good for defining problems, but these measures cannot force decisions or effect change. DOE’s major effort to give more focus to laboratory missions was a Strategic Laboratory Missions Plan, published in July 1996. The plan describes the laboratories’ capabilities in the context of DOE’s missions and, according to the plan, will form the basis for defining the laboratories’ missions in the future. However, the plan is essentially a descriptive document that does not direct change. Nor does the plan tie DOE’s or the laboratories’ missions to the annual budget process. When we asked laboratory officials about strategic planning, most discussed their own planning capabilities, and some laboratories provided us with their own self-generated strategic planning documents. None of the officials at the six laboratories we visited mentioned DOE’s Strategic Laboratory Missions Plan as an essential document for their strategic planning. A second action that DOE officials reported as a major step toward focusing the laboratories’ missions is the introduction of its “technology roadmaps.” These are described by DOE as planning tools that define the missions, goals, and requirements of research on a program-by-program basis. Officials told us that the roadmaps are used to connect larger departmental goals and are a way to institutionalize strategic planning within the Department. Roadmaps, according to DOE, will be an important instrument for melding the laboratories into a stronger and more integrated national system. DOE reports that roadmaps have already been developed in some areas, including nuclear science, high-energy physics, and the fusion program. Experts we interviewed agreed that creating roadmaps can be a way to gain consensus between DOE and the laboratories on a common set of objectives while also developing a process for reaching those objectives. However, some experts also stated that it is too soon to tell if this initiative will succeed. One expert indicated that the Department has not adequately analyzed its energy R&D problems on a national basis before beginning the roadmap effort. Another was uncertain about just how the roadmaps will work. According to a laboratory director who was recently asked to comment on the roadmap process, more emphasis needs to be placed on the results that are expected from the roadmaps, rather than on the process of creating them. Furthermore, roadmapping may be difficult in some areas, especially for activities involving heavy regulatory requirements. When we asked DOE officials about roadmapping, we were told that it is still a work in progress and will not be connected directly to the budget process for months or even years. Other DOE actions are also described as works in progress. For example, the use of performance-based contracts is relatively new, and the results from the strengthened R&D Council are still uncertain. The R&D Council includes the principal secretarial officers who oversee DOE’s R&D programs and is chaired by the Under Secretary. According to DOE, the Council has a new charter that will promote the integration and management of the Department’s R&D. One area in which DOE reports that it has made significant improvements is reducing the burden of its oversight on the national laboratories. Although some laboratory directors told DOE that their laboratories are still micromanaged, most officials and experts we interviewed credited DOE with reducing oversight as the major positive change since the Galvin Task Force issued its report in 1995. DOE’s major organizational action in response to recent advisory groups’ recommendations was to create the Laboratory Operations Board in April 1995. The purpose of the Board is to provide dedicated management attention to laboratory issues on a continuing basis. The Board includes 13 senior DOE officials and 9 external members drawn from the private sector, academia, and the public. The external members have staggered, 6-year terms and are required to assess DOE’s and the laboratories’ progress in meeting such goals as management initiatives, productivity improvement, mission focus, and programmatic accomplishments. The Board’s external members have issued four reports, the results of which largely mirror past findings by the many previous advisory groups. These reports have also concluded that DOE has made some progress in addressing the problems noted by the Galvin Task Force but that progress has been slow and many of the recommendations need further actions. Several experts we interviewed generally viewed the Board positively. Some, however, recognized that the Board’s limited advisory role is not a substitute for strong DOE leadership and organizational accountability. One expert commented that the effectiveness of the Board was diminished by the fact that it meets too infrequently (quarterly) and has had too many changes in membership to function as an effective adviser. Other experts agreed but indicated that the Board still has had a positive influence on reforming the laboratory system. One expert said that the Board’s membership is not properly balanced between internal and external members (although originally specifying 8 of each, the Board’s charter was recently changed to require 13 DOE members and only 9 external members). Another expert indicated that the Board could increase its effectiveness by more carefully setting an agenda for each year and then aggressively monitoring progress to improve its management of the laboratory system. Laboratory officials we interviewed also viewed the Board in generally positive terms; some commented that the Board’s presence gives the laboratories a much needed voice in headquarters. Others noted that the Board could eventually play a role in integrating the laboratories’ R&D work across program lines, thereby addressing a major concern about the laboratories’ lack of integration noted by past advisory groups. Although the Board can be an effective source of direction and guidance for the laboratories, it has no authority to carry out reform operations. One expert said that even though the Board monitors the progress of reform and makes recommendations, it is still advisory and cannot coordinate or direct specific actions. “ remains in the future. We have seen nothing yet.” “The response appears to sidestep the important need for lab-focused budgeting and strategic planning. The response discusses strategic planning in terms of DOE roadmaps for each program, not in terms of plans for each lab. Many labs continue to have a broad mission which crosses several . . . . While there may be an ongoing review by the , the labs have no evidence this is occurring and there have been no actions to address this.” “The wanted one clear lead lab in each mission or program, and DOE did not do that; there are 2 to 4 “principal” labs for each major business. Even for major program areas, 12 of the 15 programs listed in the department’s laboratory mission plan have more than one laboratory listed as primary performer.” “. . . it is not clear that DOE has made any significant progress as the response implies. . . .” “ tone of the response in [DOE’s response] is a bit more optimistic than actual experience in the field justifies. . . . Only modest improvements have occurred to this point. . . .” “No reorganization has occurred . . . no integration has occurred.” “the examples provided to substantiate the labs working together as a system are not all new, some were in place when wrote report. Also, there have been a number of meetings between the multi-program labs but that is the extent of any progress in this area (little change has been made).” “The labs have largely been held at arm’s length rather than included as part of the team. There have been recent efforts to correct this but there is no plan or action in place to correct it.” Additionally, when we asked several laboratory officials for examples of their progress in responding to past advisory groups, most spoke of actions they have taken on their own initiative. Few could cite an example of a step taken in direct response to a DOE action. For example, several laboratory officials cited an increased level of cooperation and coordination among the laboratories involved with similar R&D activities. They also mentioned adopting “best business practices” to increase productivity, reduce overhead costs, and measure progress by improved metrics. However, many laboratory officials told us that many of their actions were taken to meet other demands, such as legislative and regulatory mandates, rather than as direct responses to the studies’ recommendations or to DOE’s policies. Despite its efforts to respond to the advisory groups’ recommendations, DOE has not established either a comprehensive plan with goals, objectives, and performance measures or a system for tracking results and measuring accountability. As a result, DOE is unable to document its progress and cannot show how its actions address the major issues raised by the advisory groups. Experts we contacted noted that while DOE is establishing performance measures for gauging how well its contractors manage the laboratories, DOE itself lacks any such measurement system for ensuring that the objectives based on the advisory groups’ recommendations are met. “lack of clarity, inconsistency, and variability in the relationship between headquarters management and field organizations has been a longstanding criticism of DOE operations. This is particularly true in situations when several headquarters programs fund activities at laboratories. . . .” DOE’s Laboratory Operations Board also reported in 1997 on DOE’s organizational problems, noting that there were inefficiencies due to DOE’s complicated management structure. The Board recommended that DOE undertake a major effort to rationalize and simplify its headquarters and field management structure to clarify roles and responsibilities. Similarly, the 1997 IDA report cited serious flaws in DOE’s organizational structure. Noting long-standing concerns in DOE about how best to define the relationships between field offices and the headquarters program offices that sponsor work, the Institute concluded that “the overall picture that emerges is one of considerable confusion over vertical relationships and the roles of line and staff officials.” DOE’s complex organization stems from the multiple levels of reporting that exist between the laboratories, field offices (called operations offices), and headquarters program offices. DOE’s laboratories are funded and directed by program offices—the nine largest laboratories are funded by many different DOE program offices. The program office that usually provides the dominant funding serves as the laboratory’s “landlord”. The landlord program office is responsible for sitewide management at the laboratory and coordinates crosscutting issues, such as compliance with environment, safety, and health requirements at the laboratories. DOE’s Energy Research is landlord to several laboratories, including the Brookhaven and Lawrence Berkeley laboratories. Defense Programs is the landlord for the Los Alamos and Lawrence Livermore national laboratories. The program offices, in turn, report to either the Deputy Secretary or the Under Secretary. Further complicating reporting, DOE assigns each laboratory to a field operations office, whose director serves as the contract manager and also prepares the laboratory’s annual appraisal. The operations office, however, reports to a separate headquarters office under the Deputy Secretary, not to the program office that supplies the funding. Thus, while the Los Alamos National Laboratory is primarily funded by Defense Programs, it reports to a field manager who reports to another part of the agency. As a consequence of DOE’s complex structure, IDA reported that unclear chains of command led to the weak integration of programs and functions across the Department, wide variations among field activities and relationships and processes, and confusion over the difference between line and staff roles. Weaknesses in DOE’s ability to manage the laboratories as an integrated system of R&D facilities is one the most persistent findings from past advisory groups, as well as from our 1995 management review of laboratory issues. We concluded that DOE had not coordinated the laboratories’ efforts as part of a diversified research system to solve national problems. Instead, DOE was managing the laboratories on a program-by-program basis. We recommended that DOE evaluate alternatives for managing the laboratories that would more fully support the achievement of clear and coordinated missions. To help achieve this goal, we said that DOE should strengthen the Office of Laboratory Management to facilitate the laboratories’ cooperation and resolve management issues across all DOE program areas. DOE did not strengthen this office. DOE’s primary response to our recommendations and those made by the Galvin Task Force was creating the Laboratory Operations Board. “DOE’s organization is a mess. You cannot tell who is the boss. DOE would be much more effective if layers were removed.” “DOE has not been responsive to recommendations for organizational changes and improvements in relationships.” Experts we consulted noted that DOE’s organizational weaknesses prevent reform. According to experts, DOE’s establishment of working groups to implement recommendations can be helpful for guiding reform, but these groups often lack the authority to make critical decisions or to enforce needed reforms. One expert commented that “the current DOE organizational structure is outdated . . . there is no DOE leadership to implement changes.” We believe these organizational weaknesses are a major reason why DOE has been unable to develop long-term solutions to the recurring problems reported by advisory groups. The absence of a senior official in the Department with program and administrative authority over the operations of all the laboratories prevents effective management of the laboratories on an ongoing basis. As far back as 1982, an advisory group recognized the need for a strong central focus to manage the laboratories’ activities. In its 1982 report, DOE’s Energy Research Advisory Board noted “layering and fractionation of managerial and research and development responsibilities in DOE on an excessive number of horizontal and vertical levels. . . .” The Board recommended that DOE designate a high level official, such as a Deputy Under Secretary, whose sole function would be to act as DOE’s chief laboratory executive. Although DOE did not make this change, the Under Secretary has assumed responsibility for ensuring that laboratory reforms are accomplished. Despite many studies identifying similar deficiencies in the management of DOE’s national laboratories, fundamental change remains an elusive goal. While the Department has many steps in process to improve its management of the laboratories—such as new strategic planning tools and the Laboratory Operations Board—the results of these efforts may be long in coming and may fall short of expectations. Other actions DOE is taking are focused more on process than on results, and most are still incomplete, making it difficult to show how DOE intends to direct the laboratories’ missions and manage them more effectively as an integrated system—a major recommendation of past advisory groups. The Department has not developed a way to show how its actions will result in practical and permanent laboratory reform. We believe that without a strategy for ensuring that reforms actually take place, DOE will make only limited progress in achieving meaningful reforms. Establishing accountability for ensuring that its actions will take place in a timely manner is a challenge for DOE. The Department’s complex organizational structure creates unclear lines of authority that dilute accountability and make reforms difficult to achieve. In our 1995 management review of DOE’s laboratories, we reported that if DOE is unable to refocus the laboratories’ missions and develop a management approach consistent with these new missions, the Congress may wish to consider alternatives to the present relationships between DOE and the laboratories. Such alternatives might include placing the laboratories under the control of different agencies or creating a separate structure for the sole purpose of developing a consensus on the laboratories’ missions. Because of DOE’s uncertain progress in reforming the laboratories’ management, we continue to believe that the Congress may wish to consider such alternatives. To ensure the timely and effective implementation of recommendations from the many past laboratory advisory groups, we recommend that the Secretary of Energy develop a comprehensive strategy with objectives, milestones, DOE offices and laboratories responsible for implementation actions, performance measures that will be used to assess success in meeting implementation objectives, a tracking system to monitor progress, and regular progress reports on the status of implementation. We provided a draft of this report to DOE for review and comment. Although DOE did not comment directly on our conclusions and recommendation, the Department said that we did not take into account the full range of changes that it has undertaken. Changes discussed by DOE include a series of initiatives implemented to strengthen management, streamline the strategic planning processes, and enhance interactions between DOE and the laboratories. The Department also said that the cumulative effect of these changes reflects significant progress in implementing the recommendations of past advisory groups. While stating that much has been accomplished to improve the management of the national laboratories, DOE also acknowledges that more needs to be done to ensure a fully integrated management system, including better focusing the laboratories’ missions and tying them to the annual budget process. DOE anticipates that these actions will take at least 2 more years to accomplish. In preparing our report, we considered the actions the Department reports it has taken to implement past recommendations from laboratory advisory groups. While the types of reported actions are positive, progress made toward the goals and objectives of reform cannot be determined without a plan for measuring progress. As we state in our report, some laboratory directors have reported to DOE that they have not seen the results of some of these actions at their level. We continue to believe that DOE needs to monitor, measure, and evaluate its progress in accomplishing reforms. If it does not do so, it will have difficulty holding its managers accountable for making the needed changes and determining if funds are being spent wisely on the reform process. Appendix VI includes DOE’s comments and our response. As arranged with your offices, unless you publicly announce its contents earlier, we plan no further distribution of this report until 30 days after the date of this letter. At that time, we will send copies to the Secretary of Energy and the Director, Office of Management and Budget. We will make copies available to other interested parties on request. Our review was performed from December 1997 through August 1998 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. See appendix V for a description of our scope and methodology. If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please call me at (202) 512-3841. Major contributors to this report are listed in appendix VII. Lockheed Martin Idaho Technologies Co. Sandia Corp. (Lockheed Martin) University Research Assoc., Inc. Southeastern Univ. Research Assoc., Inc. Westinghouse Electric Corp. KAPL, Inc. (Lockheed Martin) Westinghouse Savannah River Co. Department of Energy: Clearer Missions and Better Management Are Needed at the National Laboratories (GAO/T-RCED-98-25, Oct. 9, 1997). External Members of the Laboratory Operations Board Analysis of Headquarter and Field Structure Issues, Secretary of Energy Advisory Board, DOE (Sept. 30, 1997). Third Report of the External Members of the Department of Energy Laboratory Operations Board, Secretary of Energy Advisory Board, DOE (Sept. 1997). DOE Action Plan for Improved Management of Brookhaven National Laboratory, DOE (July 1997). The Organization and Management of the Nuclear Weapons Program, Institute for Defense Analyses (Mar. 1997). Status of Federal Laboratory Reforms. The Report of the Executive Office of the President Working Group on the Implementation of Presidential Decision Directive PDD/NSTC-5, Office of Science and Technology Policy, Executive Office of the President (Mar. 1997). Roles and Responsibilities of the DOE Nuclear Weapons Laboratories in the Stockpile Stewardship and Management Program (DOE/DP-97000280, Dec. 1996). Second Report of the External Members of the Department of Energy Laboratory Operations Board, Secretary of Energy Advisory Board, DOE (Sept. 10, 1996). First Report of the External Members of the Department of Energy Laboratory Operations Board, Secretary of Energy Advisory Board, DOE (Oct. 26, 1995). Future of Major Federal Laboratories, National Science and Technology Council (Aug. 1995). Energy R&D: Shaping Our Nation’s Future in a Competitive World, Final Report of the Task Force on Strategic Energy Research and Development, Secretary of Energy Advisory Board, DOE (June 1995). Interagency Federal Laboratory Review Final Report, Office of Science and Technology Policy, Executive Office of the President (May 15, 1995). Department of Energy: Alternatives for Clearer Missions and Better Management at the National Laboratories (GAO/T-RCED-95-128, Mar. 9, 1995). Report of the Department of Energy for the Interagency Federal Laboratory Review in Response to Presidential Review Directive/NSTC-1 (Mar. 1995). Alternative Futures for the Department of Energy National Laboratories, Secretary of Energy Advisory Board Task Force on Alternative Futures for the Department of Energy National Laboratories, DOE (Feb. 1995). Department of Energy: National Laboratories Need Clearer Missions and Better Management (GAO/RCED-95-10, Jan. 27, 1995). DOE’s National Laboratories: Adopting New Missions and Managing Effectively Pose Significant Challenges (GAO/T-RCED-94-113, Feb. 3, 1994). Changes and Challenges at the Department of Energy Laboratories: Final Draft Report of the Missions of the Laboratories Priority Team, DOE (1993). Final Report, Secretary of Energy Advisory Board (1992). U.S. Economic Competitiveness: A New Mission for the DOE Defense Programs’ Laboratories, Roger Werne, Associate Director for Engineering, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (Nov. 1992). A Report to the Secretary on the Department of Energy National Laboratories, Secretary of Energy Advisory Board Task Force on the Department of Energy National Laboratories, DOE (July 30, 1992). Progress Report on Implementing the Recommendations of the White House Science Council’s Federal Laboratory Review Panel, Office of Science and Technology Policy, Executive Office of the President (July 1984). The Management of Research Institutions: A Look at Government Laboratories, Hans Mark and Arnold Levine, Scientific and Technical Information Branch, National Aeronautics and Space Administration (1984). Report of the White House Science Council Federal Laboratory Review Panel, Office of Science and Technology Policy, Executive Office of the President (May 20, 1983). President’s Private Sector Survey on Cost Control Report on the Department of Energy, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (1983). The Department of Energy Multiprogram Laboratories: A Report of the Energy Research Advisory Board to the United States Department of Energy (Sept. 1982). Final Report of the Multiprogram Laboratory Panel, Volume II: Support Studies, Oak Ridge National Laboratory (Sept. 1982). The Multiprogram Laboratories: A National Resource for Nonnuclear Energy Research, Development and Demonstration (GAO/EMD-78-62, Mar. 22, 1978). Robert Galvin (Chairman) Chairman, Executive Committee Motorola, Inc.

Summary: Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the Department of Energy's (DOE) progress in making needed management reforms in its national laboratories, focusing on: (1) the recommendations made by various advisory groups for addressing management weaknesses at DOE and the laboratories; and (2) how DOE and its laboratories have responded to these recommendations. GAO noted that: (1) for nearly 20 years, many advisory groups have found that while DOE's national laboratories do impressive research and development, they are unfocused, micromanaged by DOE, and do not function as an integrated national research and development system; (2) weaknesses in DOE's leadership and accountability are often cited as factors hindering fundamental reform of the laboratories' management; (3) as a result, advisory groups have made dozens of recommendations ranging from improving strategic planning to streamlining internal processes; (4) several past advisory groups have also suggested major organizational changes in the way the laboratories are directed; (5) to address past recommendations by advisory groups, DOE, at GAO's request, documented the actions it has taken, from creating new task forces to developing strategic laboratory plans; (6) while DOE has made some progress--principally by reducing paperwork burdens on its laboratories--most of its actions are still under way or have unclear outcomes; (7) furthermore, these actions lack the objectives, performance measures, and milestones needed to effectively track progress and account for results; (8) consequently, the Department cannot show how its actions have resulted, or may result, in fundamental change; (9) for example, its Strategic Laboratory Missions Plan, which was developed to give more focus and direction to the national laboratories, does not set priorities and is not tied to the annual budget process; (10) few experts and officials GAO consulted could show how the plan is used to focus missions or integrate the laboratory system; (11) DOE's latest technique for focusing the laboratories' missions is the technology roadmap; (12) roadmaps are plans that show how specific DOE activities relate to missions, goals, and performers; (13) roadmaps are a promising step but have been used in only a few mission areas and are not directly tied to DOE's budget process; (14) moreover, several laboratory directors questioned both the accuracy of the actions DOE has reported taking and their applicability at the laboratory level; (15) DOE's organizational weaknesses, which include unclear lines of authority, are a major reason why the Department has been unable to develop long-term solutions to the recurring problems reported by advisory groups; and (16) although DOE created the Laboratory Operations Board to help oversee laboratory management reform, it is only an advisory body within DOE's complex organizational structure and lacks the authority to direct change.