We primarily focused the performance expectations on DHS’s homeland security-related functions. We generally did not identify performance expectations related to DHS’s nonhomeland security functions, although we did identify some performance expectations that relate to these functions. We also did not apply a weight to the performance expectations we developed for DHS, although qualitative differences between the expectations exist. We recognize that these expectations are not time bound, and DHS will take actions to satisfy these expectations over a sustained period of time. Therefore, our assessment of DHS’s progress relative to each performance expectation refers to the progress made by the department during its first 4 years. Our assessment of DHS’s progress relative to each performance expectation is not meant to imply that DHS should have fully achieved the performance expectation by the end of its fourth year. To identify the performance expectations, we examined responsibilities set for the department by Congress, the Administration, and department leadership. In doing so, we reviewed homeland security-related legislation, such as the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, the Homeland Security Act of 2002, the Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002, the Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act of 2002, and the Aviation and Transportation Security Act. We also reviewed DHS appropriations acts and accompanying conference reports for fiscal years 2004 through 2006. We did not consider legislation enacted since September 2006 in developing the performance expectations. To identify goals and measures set by the Administration, we reviewed relevant homeland security presidential directives and executive orders. For the goals and measures set by the department, we analyzed the DHS Strategic Plan, Performance Budget Overviews, Performance and Accountability Reports, and component agencies’ strategic plans. For management areas, we also examined effective practices identified in our prior reports. We analyzed these documents to identify common or similar responsibilities for DHS mission and management areas and synthesized the responsibilities identified in the various documents to develop performance expectations for DHS. We obtained and incorporated feedback from our subject matter experts on these performance expectations. We also provided the performance expectations to DHS for review and incorporated DHS’s feedback. Based primarily on our prior work and DHS IG work, as well as updated information provided by DHS between March and June 2007, we examined the extent to which DHS has taken actions to achieve the identified performance expectations in each area and make a determination as to whether DHS has achieved the key elements of each performance expectation based on the criteria listed below: Generally achieved: Our work has shown that DHS has taken actions to satisfy most of the key elements of the performance expectation but may not have satisfied all of the elements. Generally not achieved: Our work has shown that DHS has not yet taken actions to satisfy most of the key elements of the performance expectation but may have taken steps to satisfy some of the elements. No assessment made: Neither we nor the DHS IG have completed work and/or the information DHS provided did not enable us to clearly assess DHS’s progress in achieving the performance expectation. Therefore, we have no basis for making an assessment of the extent to which DHS has taken actions to satisfy the performance expectation. An assessment of “generally achieved” indicates that DHS has taken sufficient actions to satisfy most elements of the expectation; however, an assessment of “generally achieved” does not signify that no further action is required of DHS or that functions covered by the expectation cannot be further improved or enhanced. Conversely, “generally not achieved” indicates that DHS has not yet taken actions to satisfy most elements of the performance expectation. An assessment of “generally not achieved” may be warranted even where DHS has put forth substantial effort to satisfy some but not most elements of an expectation. In cases when we or the DHS IG have not completed work upon which to base an assessment of DHS actions to satisfy a performance expectation and/or the information DHS provided did not enable us to clearly determine the extent to which DHS has achieved the performance expectation, we indicated “no assessment made.” We analyzed the extent of our work, the DHS IG’s work, and DHS’s updated information and conferred with our subject matter experts to determine whether the work and information were sufficient for a making a determination of generally achieved or generally not achieved. Between March and June 2007, we obtained updated information from DHS and met with program officials to discuss DHS’s efforts to implement actions to achieve the performance expectations in each mission and management area. We incorporated DHS’s additional information and documentation into the report and, to the extent that DHS provided documentation verifying its efforts, considered them in making our assessments of DHS’s progress. For each performance expectation, an analyst on our staff reviewed our relevant work, DHS IG reports, and updated information and documentation provided by DHS, including information received during meetings with DHS officials. On the basis of this review, the analyst made a determination that either DHS generally achieved the performance expectation or generally did not achieve the performance expectation, or the analyst identified that no determination could be made because neither we nor the DHS IG had completed work and DHS did not provide us with updated information and documentation. A second analyst then reviewed each determination to reach concurrence on the assessment for each performance expectation by reviewing the first analyst’s summary of our reports, relevant DHS IG reports, and DHS’s updated information and documentation. In cases when the first and second analyst disagreed, the two analysts reviewed and discussed the assessments and relevant documents to reach concurrence. Then, our subject matter experts reviewed the summary of our reports, relevant DHS IG reports, and DHS’s updated information and documentation to reach concurrence on the assessment for each performance expectation. To develop criteria for assessing DHS’s progress in each mission and management area, we analyzed criteria used for ratings or assessments in our prior work, in DHS IG reports, and in other reports and studies, such as those conducted by the 9-11 Commission and the Century Foundation. We also reviewed our past work in each mission and management area and obtained feedback from our subject matter experts and DHS officials on these criteria. Based on this analysis, we developed the following criteria for assessing DHS’s progress in each mission and management area: Substantial progress: DHS has taken actions to generally achieve more than 75 percent of the identified performance expectations. Moderate progress: DHS has taken actions to generally achieve more than 50 percent but 75 percent or less of the identified performance expectations. Modest progress: DHS has taken actions to generally achieve more than 25 percent but 50 percent or less of the identified performance expectations. Limited progress: DHS has taken actions to generally achieve 25 percent or less of the identified performance expectations. After making a determination as to whether DHS has generally achieved or generally not achieved the identified performance expectations, we added up the number of performance expectations that we determined DHS has generally achieved. We divided this number by the total number of performance expectations for each mission and management area, excluding those performance expectations for which we could not make an assessment. Based on the resulting percentage, we identified DHS’s overall progress in each mission and management area, as (1) substantial progress, (2) moderate progress, (3) modest progress, or (4) limited progress. Our subject matter experts reviewed the overall assessments of progress we identified for DHS in each mission and management area. Our assessments of the progress made by DHS in each mission and management area are based on the performance expectations we identified. The assessments of progress do not reflect, nor are they intended to reflect, the extent to which DHS’s actions have made the nation more secure in each area. For example, in determining that DHS has made modest progress in border security, we are not stating or implying that the border is modestly more secure than it was prior to the creation of DHS. In addition, we are not assessing DHS’s progress against a baseline in each mission and management area. We also did not consider DHS component agencies’ funding levels or the extent to which funding levels have affected the department’s ability to carry out its missions. We also did not consider the extent to which competing priorities and resource demands have affected DHS’s progress in each mission and management area relative to other areas, although competing priorities and resource demands have clearly affected DHS’s progress in specific areas. In addition, because we and the DHS IG have completed varying degrees of work (in terms of the amount and scope of reviews completed) for each mission and management area, and because different DHS components and offices provided us with different amounts and types of information, our assessments of DHS’s progress in each mission and management area reflect the information available for our review and analysis and are not necessarily equally comprehensive across all 14 mission and management areas. For example, as a result of the post-September 11, 2001, focus on aviation, we have conducted more reviews of aviation security, and our methodology identified a much larger number of related performance expectations than for the department’s progress in surface transportation security. Further, for some performance expectations, we were unable to make an assessment of DHS’s progress because (1) we had not conducted work in that area, (2) the DHS IG’s work in the area was also limited, and (3) the supplemental information provided by DHS was insufficient to form a basis for our analysis. Most notably, we were unable to make an assessment for four performance expectations in the area of immigration enforcement. This affected our overall assessment of DHS’s progress in that area as there were fewer performance expectations to tally in determining the overall level of progress. We conducted our work for this report from September 2006 through July 2007 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. In July 2002, President Bush issued the National Strategy for Homeland Security. The strategy set forth overall objectives to prevent terrorist attacks within the United States, reduce America’s vulnerability to terrorism, and minimize the damage and assist in the recovery from attacks that may occur. The strategy set out a plan to improve homeland security through the cooperation and partnering of federal, state, local, and private sector organizations on an array of functions. The National Strategy for Homeland Security specified a number of federal departments, as well as nonfederal organizations, that have important roles in securing the homeland. In terms of federal departments, DHS was assigned a prominent role in implementing established homeland security mission areas. In November 2002, the Homeland Security Act of 2002 was enacted into law, creating DHS. This act defined the department’s missions to include preventing terrorist attacks within the United States; reducing U.S. vulnerability to terrorism; and minimizing the damages, and assisting in the recovery from, attacks that occur within the United States. The act also specified major responsibilities for the department, including to analyze information and protect infrastructure; develop countermeasures against chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear, and other emerging terrorist threats; secure U.S. borders and transportation systems; and organize emergency preparedness and response efforts. DHS began operations in March 2003. Its establishment represented a fusion of 22 federal agencies to coordinate and centralize the leadership of many homeland security activities under a single department. According to data provided to us by DHS, the department’s total budget authority was about $39 billion in fiscal year 2004, about $108 billion in fiscal year 2005, about $49 billion in fiscal year 2006, and about $45 billion in fiscal year 2007. The President’s fiscal year 2008 budget submission requests approximately $46 billion for DHS. Table 15 provides information on DHS’s budget authority, as reported by DHS, for each fiscal year from 2004 though 2007. Since creating and issuing its first strategic plan, the department has undergone several reorganizations. Most notably, in July 2005, DHS announced the outcome of its Second-Stage Review, an internal study of the department’s programs, policies, operations, and structures. As a result of this review, the department realigned several component agencies and functions. In particular, the Secretary of Homeland Security established a Directorate of Policy to coordinate departmentwide policies, regulations, and other initiatives and consolidated preparedness activities in one directorate, the Directorate for Preparedness. In addition, the Secretary established a new Office of Intelligence and Analysis and the Office of Infrastructure Protection composed of analysts from the former Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection directorate. The Office of Infrastructure Protection was placed in the Directorate for Preparedness. The fiscal year 2007 DHS appropriations act provided for the further reorganization of functions within the department by, in particular, realigning DHS’s emergency preparedness and response responsibilities. In addition to these reorganizations, a variety of factors have affected DHS’s efforts to implement its mission and management functions. These factors include both domestic and international events, such as Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, and major homeland security-related legislation. Figure 2 provides a timeline of key events that have affected DHS’s implementation. Based on the performance expectations we identified, DHS has made progress in implementing its mission and management functions, but various challenges have affected its efforts. Specifically, DHS has made limited progress in the areas of emergency preparedness and response; science and technology; and human capital and information technology management. We found that DHS has made modest progress in the areas of border security; immigration services; and acquisition and financial management. We also found that DHS has made moderate progress in the areas of immigration enforcement, aviation security, surface transportation security; critical infrastructure and key resources protection, and real property management, and that DHS has made substantial progress in the area of maritime security. The United States shares a 5,525 mile border with Canada and a 1,989 mile border with Mexico, and all goods and people traveling to the United States must be inspected at air, land, or sea ports of entry. In 2006, more than 400 million legal entries were made to the United States—a majority of all border crossings were at land border ports of entry. Within DHS, CBP is the lead agency responsible for implementing the department’s border security mission. Specifically, CBP’s two priority missions are (1) detecting and preventing terrorists and terrorist weapons from entering the United States, and (2) facilitating the orderly and efficient flow of legitimate trade and travel. CBP’s supporting missions include interdicting illegal drugs and other contraband; apprehending individuals who are attempting to enter the United States illegally; inspecting inbound and outbound people, vehicles, and cargo; enforcing laws of the United States at the border; protecting U.S. agricultural and economic interests from harmful pests and diseases; regulating and facilitating international trade; collecting import duties; and enforcing U.S. trade laws. Within CBP, the United States Border Patrol is responsible for border security between designated official ports of entry, and CBP‘s Office of Field Operations enforces trade, immigration, and agricultural laws and regulations by securing the flow of people and goods into and out of the country, while facilitating legitimate travel and trade at U.S. ports of entry. As shown in table 16, we identified 12 performance expectations for DHS in the area of border security and found that overall DHS has made modest progress in meeting those expectations. Specifically, we found that DHS has generally achieved 5 of its performance expectations and has generally not achieved 7 of its performance expectations. Table 17 provides more detailed information on the progress that DHS has made in taking actions to achieve each performance expectation in the area of border security and our assessment of whether DHS has taken steps to satisfy most of the key elements of the performance expectation (generally achieved) or has not taken steps to satisfy most of the performance expectation’s key elements (generally not achieved). DHS is responsible for enforcing U.S. immigration laws. Immigration enforcement includes apprehending, detaining, and removing criminal and illegal aliens; disrupting and dismantling organized smuggling of humans and contraband as well as human trafficking; investigating and prosecuting those who engage in benefit and document fraud; blocking and removing employers’ access to undocumented workers; and enforcing compliance with programs to monitor visitors. Within DHS, ICE is primarily responsible for immigration enforcement efforts. In particular, ICE’s Office of Investigations is responsible for enforcing immigration and customs laws and its Office of Detention and Removal Operations is responsible for processing, detaining, and removing aliens subject to removal from the United States. As shown in table 18, we identified 16 performance expectations for DHS in the area of immigration enforcement, and we found that overall DHS has made moderate progress in meeting those expectations. Specifically, we found that DHS has generally achieved 8 of the performance expectations and has generally not achieved 4 other performance expectations. For 4 performance expectations, we could not make an assessment. In meeting its performance expectations, ICE faced budget constraints that significantly affected its overall operations during fiscal year 2004. For example, ICE was faced with a hiring freeze in fiscal year 2004 that affected its ability to recruit, hire, and train personnel. Over the past 2 years, ICE has reported taking actions to strengthen its immigration enforcement functions and has, for example, hired and trained additional personnel to help fulfill the agency’s mission. Table 19 provides more detailed information on the progress that DHS has made in taking actions to achieve each performance expectation in the area of immigration enforcement and our assessment of whether DHS has taken steps to satisfy most of the key elements of the performance expectation (generally achieved) or has not taken steps to satisfy most of the performance expectation’s key elements (generally not achieved). USCIS is the agency within DHS that is responsible for processing millions of immigration benefit applications received each year for various types of immigration benefits, determining whether applicants are eligible to receive immigration benefits, and detecting suspicious information and evidence to refer for fraud investigation and possible sanctioning by other DHS components or external agencies. USCIS processes applications for about 50 types of immigration benefits with a goal of ensuring that processing of benefits applications takes place within a 6 month time frame. USCIS has introduced new initiatives to modernize business practices and upgrade information technology infrastructure to transform its current, paper-based data systems into a digital processing resource to enhance customer service, prevent future backlogs of immigration benefit applications, and improve efficiency with expanded electronic filing. As shown in table 20, we identified 14 performance expectations for DHS in the area of immigration services and found that overall DHS has made modest progress in meeting those expectations. Specifically, we found that DHS has generally achieved 5 performance expectations and has generally not achieved 9 others. Table 21 provides more detailed information on the progress that DHS has made in taking actions to achieve each performance expectation in the area of immigration services and our assessment of whether DHS has taken steps to satisfy most of the key elements of the performance expectation (generally achieved) or has not taken steps to satisfy most of the performance expectation’s key elements (generally not achieved). DHS has implemented a variety of programs to help secure the aviation sector. Within the department, TSA is the primary agency with responsibility for aviation security efforts. TSA was established in 2001 with the mission to protect the transportation network while also ensuring the free movement of people and commerce. Since its inception, TSA has focused much of its efforts on aviation security and has developed and implemented a variety of programs and procedures to secure commercial aviation. For example, TSA has undertaken efforts to strengthen airport security; provide and train a screening workforce; prescreen passengers against terrorist watch lists; and screen passengers, baggage, and cargo. TSA has implemented these efforts in part to meet numerous mandates for strengthening aviation security placed on the agency following the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks. These mandates set priorities for the agency and guided TSA’s initial efforts to enhance aviation security. In addition to TSA, CBP, and DHS’s Science and Technology Directorate play roles in securing commercial aviation. In particular, CBP has responsibility for conducting passenger prescreening—or the matching of passenger information against terrorist watch lists—for international flights operating to or from the United States, as well as inspecting inbound air cargo upon its arrival in the United States. The Science and Technology Directorate is responsible for the research and development of aviation security technologies. As shown in table 22, we identified 24 performance expectations for DHS in the area of aviation security, and we found that overall DHS has made moderate progress in meeting those expectations. Specifically, we found that DHS has generally achieved 17 performance expectations and has generally not achieved 7 performance expectations. Table 23 provides more detailed information on the progress that DHS has made in taking actions to achieve each performance expectation in the area of aviation security and our assessment of whether DHS has taken steps to satisfy most of the key elements of the performance expectation (generally achieved) or has not taken steps to satisfy most of the performance expectation’s key elements (generally not achieved). DHS has undertaken various initiatives to secure surface transportation modes, and within the department, TSA is primarily responsible for surface transportation security efforts. Since its creation following the events of September 11, 2001, TSA has focused much of its efforts and resources on meeting legislative mandates to strengthen commercial aviation security. However, TSA has more recently placed additional focus on securing surface modes of transportation, which includes establishing security standards and conducting assessments and inspections of surface transportation modes such as passenger and freight rail; mass transit; highways, including commercial vehicles; and pipelines. Although TSA has primary responsibility within the department for surface transportation security, the responsibility for securing rail and other transportation modes is shared among federal, state, and local governments and the private sector. For example, with regard to passenger rail security, in addition to TSA, DHS’s Office of Grant Programs provides grant funds to rail operators and conducts risk assessments for passenger rail agencies. Within the Department of Transportation, the Federal Transit Administration and Federal Railroad Administration have responsibilities for passenger rail safety and security. In addition, public and private passenger rail operators are also responsible for securing their rail systems. As shown in table 24, we identified five performance expectations for DHS in the area of surface transportation security, and we found that overall DHS has made moderate progress in meeting those performance expectations. Specifically, we found that DHS has generally achieved three of these performance expectations and has generally not achieved two others. Table 25 provides more detailed information on the progress that DHS has made in taking actions to achieve each performance expectation in the area of surface transportation security and our assessment of whether DHS has taken steps to satisfy most of the key elements of the performance expectation (generally achieved) or has not taken steps to satisfy most of the performance expectation’s key elements (generally not achieved). DHS has undertaken various programs to secure the maritime sector. In general, these maritime security programs fall under one of three areas⎯port and vessel security, maritime intelligence, and maritime supply chain security. Within DHS, various component agencies are responsible for maritime security efforts, including the Coast Guard, CBP, TSA, and the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office. The Coast Guard is responsible for port facility inspections and has lead responsibility in coordinating maritime information sharing efforts. CBP is responsible for addressing the threat posed by terrorist smuggling of weapons in oceangoing containers. TSA is responsible for the implementation of the transportation worker identification credential program. The Domestic Nuclear Detection Office is responsible for acquiring and supporting the deployment of radiation detection equipment, including portal monitors, within the United States. As shown in table 26, we identified 23 performance expectations for DHS in the area of maritime security, and we found that overall DHS has made substantial progress in meeting those expectations. Specifically, we found that DHS has generally achieved 17 performance expectations and has generally not achieved 4 others. For 2 performance expectations, we did not make an assessment. Table 27 provides more detailed information on the progress that DHS has made in taking actions to achieve each performance expectation in the area of maritime security and our assessment of whether DHS has taken steps to satisfy most of the key elements of the performance expectation (generally achieved) or has not taken steps to satisfy most of the performance expectation’s key elements (generally not achieved). Several federal legislative and executive provisions support preparation for and response to emergency situations. The Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (the Stafford Act) primarily establishes the programs and processes for the federal government to provide major disaster and emergency assistance to state, local, and tribal governments; individuals; and qualified private nonprofit organizations. FEMA, within DHS, has responsibility for administering the provisions of the Stafford Act. FEMA’s emergency preparedness and response efforts include programs that prepare to minimize the damage and recover from terrorist attacks and disasters; help to plan, equip, train, and practice needed skills of first responders; and consolidate federal response plans and activities to build a national, coordinated system for incident management. DHS’s emergency preparedness and response efforts have been affected by DHS reorganizations and, in the wake of the 2005 Gulf Coast hurricanes, reassessments of some initiatives, such as the National Response Plan and its Catastrophic Incident Supplement. DHS is undergoing its second reorganization of its emergency preparedness and response programs in about 18 months. The first reorganization was initiated by the Secretary of Homeland Security in the summer of 2005 and created separate organizations within DHS responsible for preparedness and for response and recovery. The second reorganization was required by the fiscal year 2007 DHS appropriations act and largely took effect on April 1, 2007. As shown in table 28, we identified 24 performance expectations for DHS in the area of emergency preparedness and response and found that overall DHS has made limited progress in meeting those performance expectations. In particular, we found that DHS has generally achieved 5 performance expectations and has generally not achieved 18 others. For 1 performance expectation, we did not make an assessment. Table 29 provides more detailed information on the progress that DHS has made in taking actions to achieve each performance expectation in the area of emergency preparedness and response and our assessment of whether DHS has taken steps to satisfy most of the key elements of the performance expectation (generally achieved) or has not taken steps to satisfy most of the performance expectation’s key elements (generally not achieved). Critical infrastructure are systems and assets, whether physical or virtual, so vital to the United States that their incapacity or destruction would have a debilitating impact on national security, national economic security, and national public health or safety, or any combination of these matters. Key resources are publicly or privately controlled resources essential to minimal operations of the economy or government, including individual targets whose destruction would not endanger vital systems but could create a local disaster or profoundly damage the nation’s morale or confidence. While the private sector owns approximately 85 percent of the nation’s critical infrastructure and key resources, DHS has wide-ranging responsibilities for leading and coordinating the overall national critical infrastructure and key resources protection effort. The National Infrastructure Protection Plan identifies 17 critical infrastructure and key resources sectors: agriculture and food; banking and finance; chemical; commercial facilities; commercial nuclear reactors, materials, and waste; dams; defense industrial base; drinking water and water treatment systems; emergency services; energy; government facilities; information technology; national monuments and icons; postal and shipping; public health and healthcare; telecommunications; and transportation systems. DHS has overall responsibility for coordinating critical infrastructure and key resources protection efforts. Within DHS, the Office of Infrastructure Protection has been designated as the Sector-Specific Agency responsible for the chemical; commercial facilities; dams; emergency services; and commercial nuclear reactors, materials, and waste sectors. TSA has been designated as the Sector-Specific Agency for postal and shipping, and TSA and the Coast Guard have been designated the Sector-Specific Agencies for transportation systems. The Federal Protective Service within ICE has been designated as the Sector-Specific Agency for government facilities. The Office of Cyber Security and Telecommunications has been designated the Sector-Specific Agency for Information Technology and Telecommunications. As shown in table 30, we identified seven performance expectations for DHS in the area of critical infrastructure and key resources protection, and we found that overall DHS has made moderate progress in meeting those performance expectations. Specifically, we found that DHS has generally achieved four performance expectations and has generally not achieved three others. Table 31 provides more detailed information on the progress that DHS has made in taking actions to achieve each performance expectation in the area of critical infrastructure and key resources protection and our assessment of whether DHS has taken steps to satisfy most of the key elements of the performance expectation (generally achieved) or has not taken steps to satisfy most of the performance expectation’s key elements (generally not achieved). DHS’s Science and Technology Directorate was established to coordinate the federal government’s civilian efforts to identify and develop countermeasures to chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and other emerging terrorist threats to our nation. To coordinate the national effort to protect the United States from nuclear and radiological threats, in April 2005, the President directed the establishment of the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office within DHS. The new office’s mission covers a broad spectrum of responsibilities and activities, but is focused primarily on providing a single accountable organization to develop a layered defense system. This system is intended to integrate the federal government’s nuclear detection, notification, and response systems. In addition, under the directive, the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office is to acquire, develop, and support the deployment of detection equipment in the United States, as well as to coordinate the nation’s nuclear detection research and development efforts. As shown in table 32, we identified six performance expectations for DHS in the area of science and technology, and we found that overall DHS has made limited progress in meeting those performance expectations. In particular, we found that DHS has generally achieved one performance expectation and has generally not achieved five other performance expectations. Table 33 provides more detailed information on the progress that DHS has made in taking actions to achieve each performance expectation in the area of science and technology and our assessment of whether DHS has taken steps to satisfy most of the key elements of the performance expectation (generally achieved) or has not taken steps to satisfy most of the performance expectation’s key elements (generally not achieved). Federal agencies use a variety of approaches and tools, including contracts, to acquire goods and services needed to fulfill or support the agencies’ missions. DHS has some of the most extensive acquisition needs within the U.S. government. In fiscal year 2004, for example, the department obligated $9.8 billion to acquire a wide range of goods and services—such as information systems, new technologies, weapons, aircraft, ships, and professional services. In fiscal year 2006, the department reported that it obligated $15.6 billion to acquire a wide range of goods and services. The DHS acquisitions portfolio is broad and complex. For example, the department has purchased increasingly sophisticated screening equipment for air passenger security; acquired technologies to secure the nation’s borders; purchased trailers to meet the housing needs of Hurricane Katrina victims; and is upgrading the Coast Guard’s offshore fleet of surface and air assets. DHS has been working to integrate the many acquisition processes and systems that the disparate agencies and organizations brought with them when they merged into DHS in 2003 while still addressing ongoing mission requirements and emergency situations, such as responding to Hurricane Katrina. As shown in table 34, we identified three performance expectations for DHS in the area of acquisition management and found that overall DHS has made modest progress in meeting those expectations. Specifically, we found that DHS has generally achieved one and not achieved two of the three performance expectations. Table 35 provides more detailed information on the progress that DHS has made in taking actions to achieve each performance expectation in the area of acquisition management and our assessment of whether DHS has taken steps to satisfy most of the key elements of the performance expectation (generally achieved) or has not taken steps to satisfy most of the performance expectation’s key elements (generally not achieved). Effective financial management is a key element of financial accountability. With its establishment by the Homeland Security Act of 2002, DHS inherited a myriad of redundant financial management systems from 22 diverse agencies, along with about 100 resource management systems and 30 reportable conditions identified in prior component financial audits. Additionally, most of the 22 components that transferred to DHS had not been subjected to significant financial statement audit scrutiny prior to their transfer, so the extent to which additional significant internal control deficiencies existed was unknown. DHS’s Office of the Chief Financial Officer is responsible for functions, such as budget, finance and accounting, strategic planning and evaluation, and financial systems for the department. The Office of the Chief Financial Officer is also charged with ongoing integration of these functions within the department. For fiscal year 2006, DHS was again unable to obtain an opinion on its financial statements, and numerous material internal control weaknesses continued to be reported. DHS’s auditor had issued a disclaimer of opinion on DHS’s fiscal years 2003, 2004, and 2005 financial statements. As shown in table 36, we identified seven performance expectations for DHS in the area of financial management and found that overall DHS has made modest progress meeting those performance expectations. Specifically, we found that DHS has generally achieved two performance expectations and has generally not achieved five others. Table 37 provides more detailed information on the progress that DHS has made in taking actions to achieve each performance expectation in the area of financial management and our assessment of whether DHS has taken steps to satisfy most of the key elements of the performance expectation (generally achieved) or has not taken steps to satisfy most of the performance expectation’s key elements (generally not achieved). Key human capital management areas for all agencies, including DHS, are pay, performance management, classification, labor relations, adverse actions, employee appeals, and diversity management. Congress provided DHS with significant flexibility to design a modern human capital management system. DHS and the Office of Personnel Management jointly released the final regulations on DHS’s new human capital system in February 2005. The final regulations established a new human capital system for DHS that was intended to ensure its ability to attract, retain, and reward a workforce that is able to meet its critical mission. Further, the human capital system provided for greater flexibility and accountability in the way employees are to be paid, developed, evaluated, afforded due process, and represented by labor organizations while reflecting the principles of merit and fairness embodied in the statutory merit systems principles. Although DHS intended to implement the new personnel system in the summer of 2005, court decisions enjoined the department from implementing certain labor management portions of it. Since that time, DHS has taken actions to implement its human capital system and issued its Fiscal Year 2007 and 2008 Human Capital Operational Plan in April 2007. As shown in table 38, we identified eight performance expectations for DHS in the area of human capital management and found that overall DHS has made limited progress in meeting those performance expectations. Specifically, we found that DHS has generally achieved two performance expectations and has generally not achieved six other expectations. Table 39 provides more detailed information on the progress that DHS has made in taking actions to achieve each performance expectation in the area of human capital management and our assessment of whether DHS has taken steps to satisfy most of the key elements of the performance expectation (generally achieved) or has not taken steps to satisfy most of the performance expectation’s key elements (generally not achieved). DHS has undertaken efforts to establish and institutionalize the range of information technology management controls and capabilities that our research and past work have shown are fundamental to any organization’s ability to use technology effectively to transform itself and accomplish mission goals. Among these information technology management controls and capabilities are centralizing leadership for extending these disciplines throughout the organization with an empowered Chief Information Officer, having sufficient people with the right knowledge, skills, and abilities to execute each of these areas now and in the future; developing and using an enterprise architecture, or corporate blueprint, as an authoritative frame of reference to guide and constrain system investments; defining and following a corporate process for informed decision making by senior leadership about competing information technology investment options; applying system and software development and acquisition discipline and rigor when defining, designing, developing, testing, deploying, and maintaining systems; and establishing a comprehensive, departmentwide information security program to protect information and systems; Despite its efforts over the last several years, the department has significantly more to do before each of these management controls and capabilities is fully in place and is integral to how each system investment is managed. As shown in table 40, we identified 13 performance expectations for DHS in the area of information technology management and found that overall DHS has made limited progress in meeting those expectations. In particular, we found that DHS has generally achieved 2 performance expectations and has generally not achieved 8 others. For 3 other performance expectations, we did not make an assessment. Table 41 provides more detailed information on the progress that DHS has made in taking actions to achieve each performance expectation in the area of information technology management and our assessment of whether DHS has taken steps to satisfy most of the key elements of the performance expectation (generally achieved) or has not taken steps to satisfy most of the performance expectation’s key elements (generally not achieved). DHS has taken actions to implement its real property management responsibilities. Key elements of real property management, as specified in Executive Order 13327, “Federal Real Property Asset Management,” include establishment of a Senior Real Property Officer, development of an asset inventory, and development and implementation of an asset management plan and performance measures. In June 2006, the Office of Management and Budget upgraded DHS’s Real Property Asset Management Score from red to yellow after DHS developed an approved Asset Management Plan, developed a generally complete real property data inventory, submitted this inventory for inclusion in the governmentwide real property inventory database, and established performance measures consistent with Federal Real Property Council standards. DHS also designated a Senior Real Property Officer as directed by Executive Order 13327. As shown in table 42, we identified nine performance expectations for DHS in the area of real property management and found that overall DHS has made moderate progress in meeting those expectations. Specifically, we found that DHS has generally achieved six of the expectations and has generally not achieved three others. Our assessments for real property management are based on a report on DHS’s real property management released in June 2007. Table 43 provides more detailed information on the progress that DHS has made in taking actions to achieve each performance expectation in the area of real property management and our assessment of whether DHS has taken steps to satisfy most of the key elements of the performance expectation (generally achieved) or has not taken steps to satisfy most of the performance expectation’s key elements (generally not achieved). Our work has identified homeland security challenges that cut across DHS’s mission and core management functions. These issues have impeded the department’s progress since its inception and will continue as DHS moves forward. While it is important that DHS continue to work to strengthen each of its mission and core management functions, it is equally important that these key issues be addressed from a comprehensive, departmentwide perspective to help ensure that the department has the structure and processes in place to effectively address the threats and vulnerabilities that face the nation. These issues include: (1) transforming and integrating DHS’s management functions; (2) establishing baseline performance goals and measures and engaging in effective strategic planning efforts; (3) applying and improving a risk management approach for implementing missions and making resource allocation decisions; (4) sharing information with key stakeholders; and (5) coordinating and partnering with federal, state, local, and private sector agencies. We have made numerous recommendations to DHS to strengthen these efforts, and the department has made progress in implementing some of these recommendations. DHS has faced a variety of difficulties in its efforts to transform into a fully functioning department, and we have designated DHS implementation and transformation as high-risk. We first designated DHS’s implementation and transformation as high-risk in 2003 because 22 disparate agencies had to transform into one department. Many of these individual agencies were facing their own management and mission challenges. But most importantly, the failure to effectively address DHS’s management challenges and program risks could have serious consequences for our homeland security as well as our economy. We kept DHS implementation and transformation on the high-risk list in 2005 because serious transformation challenges continued to hinder DHS’s success. Since then, our and the DHS IG’s reports have documented DHS’s progress and remaining challenges in transforming into an effective, integrated organization. For example, in the management area, DHS has developed a strategic plan, is working to integrate some management functions, and has continued to form necessary partnerships to achieve mission success. Despite these efforts, we reported that DHS implementation and transformation remains on the 2007 high-risk list because numerous management challenges remain, such as in the areas of acquisition, financial, human capital, and information technology management. We stated that the array of management and programmatic challenges continues to limit DHS’s ability to carry out its roles under the National Strategy for Homeland Security in an effective risk-based way. We have recommended that agencies on the high-risk produce a corrective action plan that defines the root causes of identified problems, identifies effective solutions to those problems, and provides for substantially completing corrective measures in the near term. Such a plan should include performance metrics and milestones, as well as mechanisms to monitor progress. In the spring of 2006, DHS provided us with a draft corrective action plan that did not contain key elements we have identified as necessary for an effective corrective action plan, including specific actions to address identified objectives. As of May 2007, DHS had not submitted a corrective action plan to the Office of Management and Budget. According to the Office of Management and Budget, this is one of the few high-risk areas that has not produced a final corrective action plan. Our prior work on mergers and acquisitions, undertaken before the creation of DHS, found that successful transformations of large organizations, even those faced with less strenuous reorganizations than DHS, can take at least 5 to 7 years to achieve. We reported that the creation of DHS is an enormous management challenge and that DHS faces a formidable task in its transformation efforts as it works to integrate over 170,000 federal employees from 22 component agencies. Each component agency brought differing missions, cultures, systems, and procedures that the new department had to efficiently and effectively integrate into a single, functioning unit. At the same time it weathers these growing pains, DHS must still fulfill its various homeland security and other missions. To strengthen its transformation efforts, we recommended, and DHS agreed, that it should develop an overarching management integration strategy, and provide the then DHS Business Transformation Office with the authority and responsibility to serve as a dedicated integration team and also to help develop and implement the strategy. We reported that although DHS has issued guidance and plans to assist management integration on a function by function basis, it has not developed a plan that clearly identifies the critical links that should occur across these functions, the necessary timing to make these links occur, how these interrelationships will occur, and who will drive and manage them. In addition, although DHS had established a Business Transformation Office that reported to the Under Secretary for Management to help monitor and look for interdependencies among the individual functional management integration efforts, that office was not responsible for leading and managing the coordination and integration itself. We understand that the Business Transformation Office has been recently eliminated. We have suggested that Congress should continue to monitor whether it needs to provide additional leadership authorities to the DHS Under Secretary for Management, or create a Chief Operating Officer/Chief Management Officer position which could help elevate, integrate, and institutionalize DHS’s management initiatives. The Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007, enacted in August 2007, designates the Under Secretary for Management as the Chief Management Officer and principal advisor on management-related matters to the Secretary. Under the Act, the Under Secretary is responsible for developing a transition and succession plan for the incoming Secretary and Under Secretary to guide the transition of management functions to a new administration. The Act further authorizes the incumbent Under Secretary as of November 8, 2008 (after the next presidential election), to remain in the position until a successor is confirmed to ensure continuity in the management functions of DHS. In addition, transparency plays an important role in helping to ensure efficient and effective transformation efforts. With regard to DHS, we have reported that DHS has not made its management or operational decisions transparent enough so that Congress can be sure it is effectively, efficiently, and economically using the billions of dollars in funding it receives annually. More specifically, in April 2007, we testified that we have encountered access issues in numerous engagements, and the lengths of delay have been both varied and significant and have affected our ability to do our work in a timely manner. We reported that we have experienced delays with DHS components that include CBP, ICE, FEMA, and TSA on different types of work such as information sharing, immigration, emergency preparedness in primary and secondary schools, and accounting systems. The Secretary of DHS and the Under Secretary for Management have stated their desire to work with us to resolve access issues and to provide greater transparency. It will be important for DHS to become more transparent and minimize recurring delays in providing access to information on its programs and operations so that Congress, GAO, and others can independently assess its efforts. DHS has not always implemented effective strategic planning efforts and has not yet fully developed performance measures or put into place structures to help ensure that the agency is managing for results. We have identified strategic planning as one of the critical success factors for new organizations. This is particularly true for DHS, given the breadth of its responsibility and need to clearly identify how stakeholders’ responsibilities and activities align to address homeland security efforts. The Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA) of 1993 requires that federal agencies consult with the Congress and key stakeholders to assess their missions, long-term goals, strategies, and resources needed to achieve their goals. It also requires that the agency include six key components in its strategic plan: (1) a mission statement; (2) long-term goals and objectives; (3) approaches (or strategies) to achieve the goals and objectives; (4) a description of the relationship between annual and long-term performance goals; (5) key factors that could significantly affect achievement of the strategic goals; and (6) a description of how program evaluations were used to establish or revise strategic goals. Other best practices in strategic planning and results management that we have identified include involving stakeholders in the strategic planning process, continuously monitoring internal and external environments to anticipate future challenges and avoid potential crises, holding managers accountable for the results of their programs, and aligning program performance measures and individual performance expectations at each organizational level with agencywide goals and objectives. DHS issued a departmentwide strategic plan in 2004 that addressed five of six GPRA-required elements. The plan included a mission statement, long- term goals, strategies to achieve the goals, key external factors, and program evaluations, but did not describe the relationship between annual and long-term goals. The linkage between annual and long-term goals is important for determining whether an agency has a clear sense of how it will assess progress toward achieving the intended results of its long-term goals. While DHS’s Performance Budget Overview and other documents include a description of the relationship between annual and long-term goals, not including this in the strategic plan made it more difficult for DHS officials and stakeholders to identify how their roles and responsibilities contributed to DHS’s mission. In addition, although DHS’s planning documents described programs requiring stakeholder coordination to effectively implement them, stakeholder involvement in the planning process itself was limited. Given the many other organizations at all levels of government and in the private sector whose involvement is key to meeting homeland security goals, earlier and more comprehensive stakeholder involvement in the planning process is essential to the success of DHS’s planning efforts. Such involvement is important to ensure that stakeholders help identify and agree on how their daily operations and activities contribute to fulfilling DHS’s mission. To make DHS a more results-oriented agency, we recommended that DHS’s strategic planning process include direct consultation with external stakeholders, that its next strategic plan include a description of the relationship between annual performance goals and long-term goals, and that the next strategic plan adopt additional good strategic planning practices, such as ensuring that the strategic plan includes a timeline for achieving long-terms goals and a description of the specific budgetary, human capital, and other resources needed to achieve those goals. According to DHS officials, the department is planning to issue an updated strategic plan, but they did not provide a target time frame for when the plan would be issued. We have also reported on the importance of the development of outcome- based performance goals and measures as part of strategic planning and results management efforts. Performance goals and measures are intended to provide Congress and agency management with information to systematically assess a program’s strengths, weaknesses, and performance. A performance goal is the target level of performance expressed as a tangible, measurable objective against which actual achievement will be compared. A performance measure can be defined as an indicator, statistic, or metric used to gauge program performance. Outcome-oriented measures show results or outcomes related to an initiative or program in terms of its effectiveness, efficiency, or impact. A number of DHS’s programs lack outcome goals and measures, which may hinder the department’s ability to effectively assess the results of program efforts or fully assess whether the department is using resources effectively and efficiently, especially given various agency priorities for resources. In particular, we have reported that some of DHS’s components have not developed adequate outcome-based performance measures or comprehensive plans to monitor, assess, and independently evaluate the effectiveness of their plans and performance. For example, in August 2005 we reported that ICE lacked outcome goals and measures for its worksite enforcement program and recommended that the agency set specific time frames for developing these goals and measures. In March 2006, we reported that USCIS had not yet established performance goals and measures to assess its benefit fraud activities, and we recommended that they do so. Further, we have also reported that many of DHS’s border- related performance goals and measures are not fully defined or adequately aligned with one another, and some performance targets are not realistic. Yet, we have also recognized that DHS faces some inherent difficulties in developing performance goals and measures to address its unique mission and programs, such as in developing measures for the effectiveness of its efforts to prevent and deter terrorist attacks. DHS has not fully adopted and applied a risk management approach in implementing its mission and core management functions. Risk management has been widely supported by the President and Congress as a management approach for homeland security, and the Secretary of Homeland Security has made it the centerpiece of departmental policy. We have previously reported that defining an acceptable, achievable (within constrained budgets) level of risk is an imperative to address current and future threats. Many have pointed out, as did the Gilmore and 9/11 Commissions, that the nation will never be completely safe and total security is an unachievable goal. Within its sphere of responsibility, DHS cannot afford to protect everything against all possible threats. As a result, DHS must make choices about how to allocate its scarce resources to most effectively manage risk. A risk management approach can help DHS make decisions systematically and is consistent with the National Strategy for Homeland Security and DHS’s strategic plan, which have called for the use of risk-based decisions to prioritize DHS’s resource investments regarding homeland security related programs. Several DHS component agencies have taken steps toward integrating risk-based decision making into their decision making processes. For example, the Coast Guard has taken actions to mitigate vulnerabilities and enhance maritime security. Security plans for seaports, facilities, and vessels have been developed based on assessments that identify their vulnerabilities. In addition, the Coast Guard used a Maritime Security Risk Assessment Model to prioritize risk according to a combination of possible threat, consequence, and vulnerability scenarios. Under this approach, seaport infrastructure that was determined to be both a critical asset and a likely and vulnerable target would be a high priority for funding security enhancements. By comparison, infrastructure that was vulnerable to attack but not as critical or infrastructure that was very critical but already well protected would be lower in priority. In the transportation area, TSA has incorporated risk-based decision-making into number of its programs and processes. For example, TSA has started to incorporate risk management principles into securing air cargo, but has not conducted assessments of air cargo vulnerabilities or critical assets (cargo facilities and aircraft)—two crucial elements of a risk-based management approach without which TSA may not be able to appropriately focus its resources on the most critical security needs. TSA also completed an Air Cargo Strategic Plan in November 2003 that outlined a threat-based risk management approach to securing the nation’s air cargo transportation system. However, TSA’s existing tools for assessing vulnerability have not been adapted for use in conducting air cargo assessments, nor has TSA established a schedule for when these tools would be ready for use. Although some DHS components have taken steps to apply risk-based decision making in implementing their mission functions, we also found that other components have not always utilized such an approach. DHS has not performed comprehensive risk assessments in transportation, critical infrastructure, and the immigration and customs systems to guide resource allocation decisions. For example, DHS has not fully utilized a risk-based strategy to allocate resources among transportation sectors. Although TSA has developed tools and processes to assess risk within and across transportation modes, it has not fully implemented these efforts to drive resource allocation decisions. We also recently identified concerns about DHS’s use of risk management in distributing grants to states and localities. For fiscal years 2006 and 2007, DHS has used risk assessments to identify urban areas that faced the greatest potential risk, and were therefore eligible to apply for the Urban Areas Security Initiative grant, and based the amount of awards to all eligible areas primarily on the outcomes of the risk assessment and a new effectiveness assessment. Starting in fiscal year 2006, DHS made several changes to the grant allocation process, including modifying its risk assessment methodology, and introducing an assessment of the anticipated effectiveness of investments. DHS combined the outcomes of these two assessments to make funding decisions. However, we found that DHS had limited knowledge of how changes to its risk assessment methods, such as adding asset types and using additional or different data sources, affect its risk estimates. As a result, DHS had a limited understanding of the effects of the judgments made in estimating risk that influenced eligibility and allocation outcomes for fiscal year 2006. DHS leadership could make more informed policy decisions if it were provided with alternative risk estimates and funding allocations resulting from analyses of varying data, judgments, and assumptions. We also reported that DHS has not applied a risk management approach in deciding whether and how to invest in specific capabilities for a catastrophic threat, and we recommended that it do so. In April 2007, DHS established the new Office of Risk Management and Analysis to serve as the DHS Executive Agent for national-level risk management analysis standards and metrics; develop a standardized approach to risk; develop an approach to risk management to help DHS leverage and integrate risk expertise across components and external stakeholders; assess DHS risk performance to ensure programs are measurably reducing risk; and communicating DHS risk management in a manner that reinforces the risk-based approach. According to DHS, the office’s activities are intended to develop a risk architecture, with standardized methodologies for risk analysis and management, to assist in the prioritization of risk reduction programs and to ensure that DHS component risk programs are synchronized, integrated, and use a common approach. Although this new office should help to coordinate risk management planning and activities across the department, it is too early to tell what effect this office will have on strengthening departmentwide risk management activities. The federal government, including DHS, has made progress in developing a framework to support a more unified effort to secure the homeland, including information sharing. However, opportunities exist to enhance the effectiveness of information sharing among federal agencies and with state and local governments and private sector entities. As we reported in August 2003, efforts to improve intelligence and information sharing needed to be strengthened. In 2005, we designated information sharing for homeland security as high-risk. We recently reported that the nation still lacked an implemented set of governmentwide policies and processes for sharing terrorism information, but has issued a strategy on how it will put in place the overall framework, policies, and architecture for sharing with all critical partners—actions that we and others have recommended. The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 required that the President create an “information sharing environment” to facilitate the sharing of terrorism information, yet this environment remains in the planning stage. An implementation plan for the environment, which was released on November 16, 2006, defines key tasks and milestones for developing the information sharing environment, including identifying barriers and ways to resolve them, as we recommended. We noted that completing the information sharing environment is a complex task that will take multiple years and long-term administration and congressional support and oversight, and will pose cultural, operational, and technical challenges that will require a collaborated response. DHS has taken some steps to implement its information sharing responsibilities. For example, DHS implemented a system to share homeland security information. States and localities are also creating their own information “fusion” centers, some with DHS support. DHS has further implemented a program to protect sensitive information the private sector provides it on security at critical infrastructure assets, such as nuclear and chemical facilities. However, the DHS IG found that users of the information system were confused with it and as a result did not regularly use it; and DHS had not secured of the private sector’s trust that the agency could adequately protect and effectively use the information that sector provided. These challenges will require longer-term actions to resolve. Our past work in the information sharing and warning areas has highlighted a number of other challenges that need to be addressed. These challenges include developing productive information sharing relationships among the federal government, state and local governments, and the private sector; and ensuring that the private sector receives better information on potential threats. In addition to providing federal leadership with respect to homeland security, DHS also plays a large role in coordinating the activities of other federal, state, local, private sector, and international stakeholders, but has faced challenges in this regard. To secure the nation, DHS must form effective and sustained partnerships between legacy component agencies and also with a range of other entities, including other federal agencies, state and local governments, the private and nonprofit sectors, and international partners. We have reported that successful partnering and coordination involves collaborating and consulting with stakeholders to develop and agree on goals, strategies, and roles to achieve a common purpose; identify resource needs; establish a means to operate across agency boundaries, such as compatible procedures, measures, data, and systems; and agree upon and document mechanisms to monitor, evaluate, and report to the public on the results of joint efforts. We have found that the appropriate homeland security roles and responsibilities within and between the levels of government and with the private sector are evolving and need to be clarified. The implementation of the National Strategy for Homeland Security further underscores the importance for DHS of partnering and coordination. For example, 33 of the strategy’s 43 initiatives are required to be implemented by 3 or more federal agencies and the National Strategy identifies the private sector as a key homeland security partner. If these entities do not effectively coordinate their implementation activities, they may waste resources by creating ineffective and incompatible pieces of a larger security program. For example, because the private sector owns or operates 85 percent of the nation’s critical infrastructure, DHS must partner with individual companies and sector organizations in order to protect vital national infrastructure, such as the nation’s water supply, transportation systems and chemical facilities. In October 2006 we reported that all 17 critical infrastructure sectors established their respective government councils, and nearly all sectors initiated their voluntary private sector councils in response to the National Infrastructure Protection Plan. The councils, among other things, are to identify their most critical assets, assess the risks they face, and identify protective measures, in sector-specific plans that comply with DHS’s National Infrastructure Protection Plan. DHS has taken other important actions in developing partnerships and mechanisms for coordinating with homeland security partners. For example, DHS formed the National Cyber Response Coordination Group to coordinate the federal response to cyber incidents of national significance. It is a forum of national security, law enforcement, defense, intelligence, and other government agencies that coordinates intragovernmental and public/private preparedness and response to and recovery from national level cyber incidents and physical attacks that have significant cyber consequences. In the area of maritime security, DHS has also taken actions to partner with a variety of stakeholders. For example, the Coast Guard reported to us that as of June 2006, 35 sector command centers had been created and that these centers were the primary conduit for daily collaboration and coordination between the Coast Guard and its port partner agencies. We also found that through its Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism Program, CBP has worked in partnership with private companies to review their supply chain security plans to improve members’ overall security. However, DHS has faced some challenges in developing other effective partnerships and in clarifying the roles and responsibilities of various homeland security stakeholders. For example, in February 2007 we testified that because DHS has only limited authority to address security at chemical facilities it must continue to work with the chemical industry to ensure that it is assessing vulnerabilities and implementing security measures. Also, while TSA has taken steps to collaborate with federal and private sector stakeholders in the implementation of its Secure Flight program, in 2006 we reported these stakeholders stated that TSA has not provided them with the information they would need to support TSA’s efforts as they move forward with the program. In addition, we reported in September 2005 that TSA did not effectively involve private sector stakeholders in its decision making process for developing security standards for passenger rail assets We recommended, and DHS developed, security standards that reflected industry best practices and could be measured, monitored, and enforced by TSA rail inspectors and, if appropriate, by rail asset owners. We have also made other recommendations to DHS to help strengthen its partnership efforts in the areas of transportation security and research and development. Further, lack of clarity regarding roles and responsibilities caused DHS difficulties in coordinating with its emergency preparedness and response partners in responding to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. For example, the Red Cross and FEMA had differing views about their roles and responsibilities under the National Response Plan, which hampered efforts to coordinate federal mass care assistance. Department of Labor and FEMA officials also disagreed about which agency was responsible for ensuring the safety and health of response and recovery workers. This lack of clarity about each other’s roles and procedures resulted in delayed implementation of the National Response Plan’s Worker Safety and Health Support Annex. We recommended that DHS take steps to improve partnering and coordination efforts as they relate to emergency preparedness and response, including to seek input from the state and local governments and private sector entities, such as the Red Cross, on the development and implementation of key capabilities, including those for interoperable communications. Given the dominant role that DHS plays in securing the homeland, it is critical that the department’s mission programs and management systems and functions operate as efficiently and effectively as possible. In the more than 4 years since its establishment, the department has taken important actions to secure the border and the transportation sector and to defend against, prepare for, and respond to threats and disasters. DHS has had to undertake these critical missions while also working to transform itself into a fully functioning cabinet department—a difficult undertaking for any organization and one that can take, at a minimum, 5 to 7 years to complete even under less daunting circumstances. At the same time, a variety of factors, including Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, threats to and attacks on transportation systems in other countries, and new responsibilities and authorities provided by Congress have forced the department to reassess its priorities and reallocate resources to address key domestic and international events and to respond to emerging issues and threats. As it moves forward, DHS will continue to face the challenges that have affected its operations thus far, including transforming into a high- performing, results-oriented agency; developing results-oriented goals and measures to effectively assess performance; developing and implementing a risk-based approach to guide resource decisions; and establishing effective frameworks and mechanisms for sharing information and coordinating with homeland security partners. DHS has undertaken efforts to address these challenges but will need to give continued attention to these efforts in order to efficiently and effectively identify and prioritize mission and management needs, implement efforts to address those needs, and allocate resources accordingly. Efforts to address these challenges will be especially important over the next several years given the threat environment and long-term fiscal imbalance facing the nation. To address these challenges, DHS will need to continue its efforts to develop a results-oriented mission and management framework to guide implementation efforts and progress toward achieving desired outcomes. In moving forward, it will also be important for DHS to routinely reassess its mission and management goals, measures, and milestones to evaluate progress made, identify past and emerging obstacles, and examine alternatives to address those obstacles and effectively implement its missions. We have made nearly 700 recommendations to DHS on initiatives and reforms that would enhance its ability to implement its core mission and management functions, including developing performance goals and measures and setting milestones for key programs, making resource allocation decisions based on risk assessments, and developing and implementing internal controls to help ensure program effectiveness. DHS has generally agreed with our prior recommendations. Moreover, taking those actions that we have suggested for agencies on our high-risk list provides a good road map for DHS as it works to further develop management structures that, once in place, could help the department more efficiently and effectively implement its mission and management functions. To be removed from our high-risk list, agencies first have to produce a corrective action plan that defines the root causes of identified problems, identifies effective solutions to those problems, and provides for substantially completing corrective measures in the near term. Such a plan should include performance metrics and milestones, as well as mechanisms to monitor progress. In the spring of 2006, DHS provided us with a draft corrective action plan that did not contain key elements we have identified as necessary for an effective corrective action plan, including specific actions to address identified objectives, and this plan has not yet been approved by the Office of Management and Budget. Second, agencies must demonstrate significant progress in addressing the problems identified in their corrective action plans. It will be important for DHS to become more transparent and minimize recurring delays in providing access to information on its programs and operations so that Congress, GAO, and others can independently assess its efforts. Finally, agencies, in particular top leadership, must demonstrate a commitment to sustain initial improvements in their performance over the long term. Although DHS leaders have expressed their intent to integrate legacy agencies into the new department, they have not dedicated the resources needed to oversee this effort. A well-managed, high-performing Department of Homeland Security is essential to meeting the significant homeland security challenges facing the nation. As DHS continues to evolve, implement its programs, and integrate its functions, we will continue to review its progress and performance and provide information to Congress and the public on its efforts. We requested comments on this report from the Secretary of Homeland Security. In comments dated July 20, 2007, and signed by the Undersecretary for Management (reprinted in their entirety in appendix II), DHS took issues with our methodology and disagreed with the conclusions we reached for 42 of the 171 performance expectations (specifically 41 of the 84 performance expectations where we assessed DHS as not having achieved the expectation and 1 of the 9 performance expectations for which we did not make an assessment). DHS also provided technical comments, which we considered and incorporated where appropriate. DHS raised five general issues with our methodology. First, DHS believes that we altered the criteria by which we would judge the department’s progress in changing our terminology from “generally addressed” to “generally achieved.” As we communicated to DHS, we did not change the underlying assessment approach or evaluation criteria. Rather, we changed the way that we characterized DHS’s progress for each performance expectation. For example, our definition for “generally addressed” and “generally achieved” did not change: “Our work has shown that DHS has taken steps to effectively satisfy the key elements of the performance expectation but may not have satisfied all of the elements.” The change from “addressed” to “achieved” was not a change in methodology, criteria, or standards but only a change in language to better convey, in the context of results-oriented government, the legislative and executive intent behind these performance expectations that DHS achieve these expectations rather than merely begin to take steps that apply or are relevant to them. Second, DHS took issue with the binary standard we used to assess each performance expectation. While we acknowledge the binary standard we applied is not perfect, we believe it is appropriate for this review because the administration generally has not established quantitative goals and measures for the performance expectations in connection with the various mission and management areas. Thus, we could not assess where along a spectrum of progress DHS stood for individual performance expectations. We chose the 2-step process for assessing DHS’s progress—using a binary standard for individual performance expectations and a spectrum for broad mission and management areas—and fully disclosed it to and discussed it with DHS officials at the outset and throughout the review. Third, DHS was concerned about how we defined our criteria for assessing DHS’s progress in achieving each performance expectation and an apparent shift of criteria we applied after the department supplied us additional information and documents. With regard to how we defined our criteria and the performance expectations, the key elements for the expectations were inherent to each one, and we discussed these elements in each assessment. Further, we did not shift our criteria. Rather we employed a process by which we disclosed our preliminary analysis and assessments to DHS, received and analyzed additional documents and statements from DHS officials, and updated (and in many cases changed) our preliminary assessments based on the additional inputs. This process resulted in an improvement, a diminution, or no change in our assessment of the applicable area. In some cases, we added language to clarify the basis of our assessment after our review of the additional information DHS provided. Fourth, DHS raised concerns that we did not “normalize” the application of our criteria by the many GAO analysts who had input to this review. Our methodology involved significant input by these analysts because they have had experience with the mission and management areas we were evaluating and were knowledgeable about the programs, specific performance expectations, activities, data, and results from each area. A core team of GAO analysts and managers reviewed all the inputs from these other GAO staff to ensure the consistent application of our methodology, criteria, and analytical process. In addition, our quality control process included detailed reviews of the facts included in this report, as well as assurance that we followed GAO’s policies and generally accepted government auditing standards. Finally, DHS points out that we treated all performance expectations as if they were of equal significance. In our scope and methodology section we recognize that qualitative differences between the performance expectations exist, but we did not apply a weight to the performance expectations because congressional, departmental, and other stakeholders’ views on the relative priority of each performance expectation may be different and we did not believe it was appropriate to substitute our judgment for theirs. DHS disagreed with our assessment of 42 of the 171 performance expectations—including 41 of the 84 performance expectations we assessed as generally not achieved—contending that we did not fully take account of all the actions it has taken relative to each expectation. Specifically, DHS believes that we expected DHS to achieve an entire expectation in cases where both DHS and we agree that ultimate achievement will not be possible for several more years, such as in the areas of border security and science and technology. This report provides Congress and the public with an assessment of DHS’s progress as of July 2007 and does not reflect the extent to which DHS should have or could have made more progress. We believe that it is appropriate, after pointing out the expectation for a multiyear program and documenting the activities DHS has actually accomplished to date, to reach a conclusion about whether DHS had not implemented the program after 4 years. DHS’s concern that we have not adequately used or interpreted additional information it provided us, such as for performance expectations in the areas of aviation security and emergency preparedness and response, has little basis. We fully considered all information and documents DHS provided and described how we applied this information in the assessment portion of each performance expectation. In some cases DHS only provided us with testimonial information regarding its actions to achieve each performance expectation, but did not provide us with documentation verifying these actions. In the absence of such documentation to support DHS’s claims, we concluded that DHS had generally not achieved the expectations. In other cases, the information and documents DHS provided did not convince us that DHS had generally achieved the performance expectation as stated or as we had interpreted it. In these cases, we explain the basis for our conclusions in the “GAO Assessment sections”.Further, in some cases the information and documents DHS provided were not relevant to the specific performance expectation; in these situations we did not discuss them in our assessment. In addition, in some of its comments on individual performance expectations, DHS referenced new information that it did not provide to us during our review. In these cases we either explain our views on the information, or in one case we have changed our conclusion to “no assessment made”. Overall, we appreciate DHS’s concerns and recognize that in a broad- based endeavor such as this, some level of disagreement is inevitable, especially at any given point in time. However, we have been as transparent as possible regarding our purpose, methodology, and professional judgments. In table 44, we have summarized DHS’s comments on the 42 performance expectations and our response to those comments. As arranged with your offices, unless you publicly announce the contents of this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days after the date of this report. At that time, we will send copies of this report to the Secretary of Homeland Security, the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, and appropriate congressional committees. We will also make copies available to others upon request. In addition, the report will be available at no charge on GAO’s Web site at http://www.gao.gov. If you or your staff has any questions regarding this report, please contact me at (202) 512-8777, or rabkinn@gao.gov. Contact points for each mission and management area are listed in appendix I. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on this last page of this report. GAO staff who made major contributions to this report are listed in appendix III. In addition to the person named above, Christopher Keisling, Assistant Director; Jason Barnosky; Cathleen A. Berrick; Sharon Caudle; Virginia Chanley; Michele Fejfar; Rebecca Gambler; Kathryn Godfrey; Stephanie Hockman; Tracey King; Thomas Lombardi; Jan Montgomery; Octavia Parks; and Sue Ramanathan made key contributions to this report. Other contributors to this report included Eugene Aloise; John Bagnulo; Mark Bird; Nancy Briggs; Kristy Brown; Stephen Caldwell; Frances Cook; Stephen Donahue; Jeanette Espinola; Jess Ford; Amanda Gill; Mark Goldstein; Ellen Grady; Samuel Hinojosa; Randolph Hite; Daniel Hoy; John Hutton; William O. Jenkins, Jr.; Casey Keplinger; Kirk Kiester; Eileen Larence; Leena Mathew; Kieran McCarthy; Tiffany Mostert; Shannin O’Neill; Bonita Oden; David Powner; Jerry Seigler; Katherine Siggerud; Richard Stana; Bernice Steinhardt; John Stephenson; Sarah Veale; John Vocino; Gregory Wilshusen; Eugene Wisnoksi; and William T. Woods. Homeland Security: Prospects For Biometric US-VISIT Exit Capability Remain Unclear. GAO-07-1044T. Washington, D.C.: June 28, 2007. Border Patrol: Costs and Challenges Related to Training New Agents. GAO-07-997T. Washington, D.C.: June 19, 2007. Homeland Security: Information on Training New Border Patrol Agents. GAO-07-540R. Washington, D.C.: March 30, 2007. Homeland Security: US-VISIT Program Faces Operational, Technological, and Management Challenges. GAO-07-632T. Washington, D.C.: March 20, 2007. Secure Border Initiative: SBInet Planning and Management Improvements Needed to Control Risks. GAO-07-504T. Washington, D.C.: February 27, 2007. Homeland Security: US-VISIT Has Not Fully Met Expectations and Longstanding Program Management Challenges Need to Be Addressed. GAO-07-499T. Washington, D.C.: February 16, 2007. Secure Border Initiative: SBInet Expenditure Plan Needs to Better Support Oversight and Accountability. GAO-07-309. Washington, D.C.: February 15, 2007. Homeland Security: Planned Expenditures for U.S. Visitor and Immigrant Status Program Need to Be Adequately Defined and Justified. GAO-07-278. Washington, D.C.: February 14, 2007. Border Security: US-VISIT Program Faces Strategic, Operational, and Technological Challenges at Land Ports of Entry. GAO-07-378T. Washington, D.C.: January 31, 2007. Border Security: US-VISIT Program Faces Strategic, Operational, and Technological Challenges at Land Ports of Entry. GAO-07-248. Washington, D.C.: December 6, 2006. Department of Homeland Security and Department of State: Documents Required for Travelers Departing From or Arriving in the United States at Air Ports-of-Entry From Within the Western Hemisphere. GAO-07-250R. Washington, DC: December 6, 2006. Border Security: Stronger Actions Needed to Assess and Mitigate Risks of the Visa Waiver Program. GAO-06-1090T. Washington, D.C.: September 7, 2006. Illegal Immigration: Border-Crossing Deaths Have Doubled Since 1995; Border Patrol’s Efforts to Prevent Deaths Have Not Been Fully Evaluated. GAO-06-770. Washington, D.C.: August 15, 2006. Border Security: Continued Weaknesses in Screening Entrants into the United States. GAO-06-976T. Washington, D.C.: August 2, 2006. Border Security: Stronger Actions Needed to Assess and Mitigate Risks of the Visa Waiver Program. GAO-06-854. Washington, D.C.: July 28, 2006. Process for Admitting Additional Countries into the Visa Waiver Program. GAO-06-835R. Washington, D.C.: July 28, 2006. Intellectual Property: Initial Observations on the STOP Initiative and U.S. Border Efforts to Reduce Piracy. GAO-06-1004T. Washington, D.C.: July 26, 2006. Border Security: Investigators Transported Radioactive Sources Across Our Nation’s Borders at Two Locations. GAO-06-940T. Washington, D.C.: July 7, 2006. Border Security: Investigators Transported Radioactive Sources Across Our Nation’s Borders at Two Locations. GAO-06-939T. Washington, D.C.: July 5, 2006. Information on Immigration Enforcement and Supervisory Promotions in the Department of Homeland Security’s Immigration and Customs Enforcement and Customs and Border Protection. GAO-06-751R. Washington, D.C.: June 13, 2006. Homeland Security: Contract Management and Oversight for Visitor and Immigrant Status Program Need to Be Strengthened. GAO-06-404. Washington, D.C.: June 9, 2006. Observations on Efforts to Implement the Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative on the U.S. Border with Canada. GAO-06-741R. Washington, D.C.: May 25, 2006. Homeland Security: Management and Coordination Problems Increase the Vulnerability of U.S. Agriculture to Foreign Pests and Disease. GAO-06-644. Washington, D.C.: May 19, 2006. Border Security: Reassessment of Consular Resource Requirements Could Help Address Visa Delays. GAO-06-542T. Washington, D.C.: April 4, 2006. Border Security: Investigators Transported Radioactive Sources Across Our Nation’s Borders at Two Locations. GAO-06-583T. Washington, D.C.: March 28, 2006. Border Security: Investigators Successfully Transported Radioactive Sources Across Our Nation’s Borders at Selected Locations. GAO-06-545R. Washington, D.C.: March 28, 2006. Homeland Security: Better Management Practices Could Enhance DHS’s Ability to Allocate Investigative Resources. GAO-06-462T. Washington, D.C.: March 28, 2006. Combating Nuclear Smuggling: DHS Has Made Progress Deploying Radiation Detection Equipment at U.S. Ports-of-Entry, but Concerns Remain. GAO-06-389. Washington, D.C.: March 22, 2006. Combating Nuclear Smuggling: Corruption, Maintenance, and Coordination Problems Challenge U.S. Efforts to Provide Radiation Detection Equipment to Other Countries. GAO-06-311. Washington, D.C.: March 14, 2006. Border Security: Key Unresolved Issues Justify Reevaluation of Border Surveillance Technology Program. GAO-06-295. Washington, D.C.: February 22, 2006. Homeland Security: Recommendations to Improve Management of Key Border Security Program Need to Be Implemented. GAO-06-296. Washington, D.C.: February 14, 2006. Homeland Security: Visitor and Immigrant Status Program Operating, but Management Improvements Are Still Needed. GAO-06-318T. Washington, D.C.: January 25, 2006. Border Security: Strengthened Visa Process Would Benefit from Improvements in Staffing and Information Sharing. GAO-05-859. Washington, D.C.: September 13, 2005. Border Security: Opportunities to Increase Coordination of Air and Marine Assets. GAO-05-543. Washington, D.C.: August 12, 2005. Border Security: Actions Needed to Strengthen Management of Department of Homeland Security’s Visa Security Program. GAO-05-801. Washington, D.C.: July 29, 2005. Border Patrol: Available Data on Interior Checkpoints Suggest Differences in Sector Performance. GAO-05-435. Washington, D.C.: July 22, 2005. Combating Nuclear Smuggling: Efforts to Deploy Radiation Detection Equipment in the United States and in Other Countries. GAO-05-840T. Washington, D.C.: June 21, 2005. Homeland Security: Performance of Foreign Student and Exchange Visitor Information System Continues to Improve, But Issues Remain. GAO-05-440T. Washington, D.C.: March 17, 2005. Homeland Security: Some Progress Made, but Many Challenges Remain on U.S. Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology Program. GAO-05-202. Washington, D.C.: February 23, 2005. Border Security: Streamlined Visas Mantis Program Has Lowered Burden on Foreign Science Students and Scholars, but Further Refinements Needed. GAO-05-198. Washington, D.C.: February 18, 2005. Border Security: Joint, Coordinated Actions by State and DHS Needed to Guide Biometric Visas and Related Programs. GAO-04-1080T. Washington, D.C.: September 9, 2004. Border Security: State Department Rollout of Biometric Visas on Schedule, but Guidance Is Lagging. GAO-04-1001. Washington, D.C.: September 9, 2004. Border Security: Consular Identification Cards Accepted within United States, but Consistent Federal Guidance Needed. GAO-04-881. Washington, D.C.: August 24, 2004. Border Security: Additional Actions Needed to Eliminate Weaknesses in the Visa Revocation Process. GAO-04-795. Washington, D.C.: July 13, 2004. Border Security: Additional Actions Needed to Eliminate Weaknesses in the Visa Revocation Process. GAO-04-899T. Washington, D.C.: July 13, 2004. Border Security: Agencies Need to Better Coordinate Their Strategies and Operations on Federal Lands. GAO-04-590. Washington, D.C.: June 16, 2004. Overstay Tracking: A Key Component of Homeland Security and a Layered Defense. GAO-04-82. Washington, D.C.: May 21, 2004. Homeland Security: First Phase of Visitor and Immigration Status Program Operating, but Improvements Needed. GAO-04-586. Washington, D.C.: May 11, 2004. Homeland Security: Risks Facing Key Border and Transportation Security Program Need to Be Addressed. GAO-04-569T. Washington, D.C.: March 18, 2004. Border Security: Improvements Needed to Reduce Time Taken to Adjudicate Visas for Science Students and Scholars. GAO-04-443T. Washington, D.C.: February 25, 2004. Border Security: Improvements Needed to Reduce Time Taken to Adjudicate Visas for Science Students and Scholars. GAO-04-371. Washington, D.C.: February 25, 2004. Homeland Security: Overstay Tracking Is a Key Component of a Layered Defense. GAO-04-170T. Washington, D.C.: October 16, 2003. Security: Counterfeit Identification Raises Homeland Security Concerns. GAO-04-133T. Washington, D.C.: October 1, 2003. Homeland Security: Risks Facing Key Border and Transportation Security Program Need to Be Addressed. GAO-03-1083. Washington, D.C.: September 19, 2003. Security: Counterfeit Identification and Identification Fraud Raise Security Concerns. GAO-03-1147T. Washington, D.C.: September 9, 2003. Land Border Ports of Entry: Vulnerabilities and Inefficiencies in the Inspections Process. GAO-03-1084R. Washington, D.C.: August 18, 2003. Federal Law Enforcement Training Center: Capacity Planning and Management Oversight Need Improvement. GAO-03-736. Washington, D.C.: July 24, 2003. Border Security: New Policies and Increased Interagency Coordination Needed to Improve Visa Process. GAO-03-1013T. Washington, D.C.: July 15, 2003. Border Security: New Policies and Procedures Are Needed to Fill Gaps in the Visa Revocation Process. GAO-03-908T. Washington, D.C.: June 18, 2003. Border Security: New Policies and Procedures Are Needed to Fill Gaps in the Visa Revocation Process. GAO-03-798. Washington, D.C.: June 18, 2003. Homeland Security: Challenges Facing the Department of Homeland Security in Balancing its Border Security and Trade Facilitation Missions. GAO-03-902T. Washington, D.C.: June 16, 2003. Counterfeit Documents Used to Enter the United States From Certain Western Hemisphere Countries Not Detected. GAO-03-713T. Washington, D.C.: May 13, 2003. Information Technology: Terrorist Watch Lists Should Be Consolidated to Promote Better Integration and Sharing. GAO-03-322. Washington, D.C.: April 15, 2003. Border Security: Challenges in Implementing Border Technology. GAO-03-546T. Washington, D.C.: March 12, 2003. Alien Detention Standards: Telephone Access Problems Were Pervasive at Detention Facilities; Other Deficiencies Did Not Show a Pattern of Noncompliance. GAO-07-875. Washington, D.C.: July 6, 2007. Employment Verification: Challenges Exist in Implementing a Mandatory Electronic Verification System. GAO-07-924T. Washington, D.C.: June 7, 2007. Foreign Workers: Information on Selected Countries’ Experiences. GAO-06-1055. Washington, D.C.: September 8, 2006. Information Technology: Immigration and Customs Enforcement Is Beginning to Address Infrastructure Modernization Program Weaknesses, but Key Improvements Still Needed. GAO-06-823. Washington, D.C.: July 27, 2006. Immigration Enforcement: Benefits and Limitations to Using Earnings Data to Identify Unauthorized Work. GAO-06-814R. Washington, D.C.: July 11, 2006. Immigration Enforcement: Weaknesses Hinder Employment Verification and Worksite Enforcement Efforts. GAO-06-895T. Washington, D.C.: June 19, 2006. Information on Immigration Enforcement and Supervisory Promotions in the Department of Homeland Security’s Immigration and Customs Enforcement and Customs and Border Protection. GAO-06-751R. Washington, D.C.: June 13, 2006. Homeland Security: Better Management Practices Could Enhance DHS’s Ability to Allocate Investigative Resources. GAO-06-462T. Washington, D.C.: March 28, 2006. Information Technology: Management Improvements Needed on Immigration and Customs Enforcement’s Infrastructure Modernization Program. GAO-05-805. Washington, D.C.: September 7, 2005. Immigration Enforcement: Weaknesses Hinder Employment Verification and Worksite Enforcement Efforts. GAO-05-813. Washington, D.C.: August 31, 2005. Combating Alien Smuggling: The Federal Response Can Be Improved. GAO-05-892T. Washington, D.C.: July 12, 2005. Combating Alien Smuggling: Opportunities Exist to Improve the Federal Response. GAO-05-305. Washington, D.C.: May 27, 2005. Information on Certain Illegal Aliens Arrested in the United States. GAO-05-646R. Washington, D.C.: May 9, 2005. Department of Homeland Security: Addressing Management Challenges that Face Immigration Enforcement Agencies. GAO-05-664T. Washington, D.C.: May 5, 2005. Information on Criminal Aliens Incarcerated in Federal and State Prisons and Local Jails. GAO-05-337R. Washington, D.C.: April 7, 2005. Homeland Security: Performance of Foreign Student and Exchange Visitor Information System Continues to Improve, But Issues Remain. GAO-05-440T. Washington, D.C.: March 17, 2005. Alien Registration: Usefulness of a Nonimmigrant Alien Annual Address Reporting Requirement Is Questionable. GAO-05-204. Washington, D.C.: January 28, 2005. Homeland Security: Management Challenges Remain in Transforming Immigration Programs. GAO-05-81. Washington, D.C.: October 14, 2004. Immigration Enforcement: DHS Has Incorporated Immigration Enforcement Objectives and Is Addressing Future Planning Requirements. GAO-05-66. Washington, D.C.: October 8, 2004. Homeland Security: Performance of Information System to Monitor Foreign Students and Exchange Visitors Has Improved, but Issues Remain. GAO-04-690. Washington, D.C.: June 18, 2004. Investigations of Terrorist Financing, Money Laundering, and Other Financial Crimes. GAO-04-464R. Washington, D.C.: February 20, 2004. Combating Money Laundering: Opportunities Exist to Improve the National Strategy. GAO-03-813. Washington, D.C.: September 26, 2003. Department of Homeland Security: Adjustment of the Immigration and Naturalization Benefit Application and Petition Fee Schedule. GAO-07-946R. Washington, D.C.: June 15, 2007. Immigration Benefits: Sixteenth Report Required by the Haitian Refugee Immigration Fairness Act of 1998. GAO-07-796R. Washington, D.C.: April 27, 2007. DHS Immigration Attorneys: Workload Analysis and Workforce Planning Efforts Lack Data and Documentation. GAO-07-206. Washington, D.C.: April 17, 2007. Foreign Physicians: Data on Use of J-1 Visa Waivers Needed to Better Address Physician Shortages. GAO-07-52. Washington, D.C.: November 30, 2006. Immigration Benefits: Fifteenth Report Required by the Haitian Refugee Immigration Fairness Act of 1998. GAO-07-168R. Washington, D.C.: November 9, 2006. Immigration Benefits: Additional Efforts Needed to Help Ensure Alien Files Are Located when Needed. GAO-07-85. Washington, D.C.: October 27, 2006. Estimating the Undocumented Population: A “Grouped Answers” Approach to Surveying Foreign-Born Respondents. GAO-06-775. Washington, D.C.: September 29, 2006. Executive Office for Immigration Review: Caseload Performance Reporting Needs Improvement. GAO-06-771. Washington, D.C.: August 11, 2006. H-1B Visa Program: More Oversight by Labor Can Improve Compliance with Program Requirements. GAO-06-901T. Washington, D.C.: June 22, 2006. H-1B Visa Program: Labor Could Improve Its Oversight and Increase Information Sharing with Homeland Security. GAO-06-720. Washington, D.C.: June 22, 2006. Immigration Benefits: Circumstances under Which Petitioners’ Sex Offenses May Be Disclosed to Beneficiaries. GAO-06-735. Washington, D.C.: June 14, 2006. Immigration Benefits: Fourteenth Report Required by the Haitian Refugee Immigration Fairness Act of 1998. GAO-06-589R. Washington, D.C.: April 21, 2006. Information Technology: Near-Term Effort to Automate Paper-Based Immigration Files Needs Planning Improvements. GAO-06-375. Washington, D.C.: March 31, 2006. International Remittances: Different Estimation Methodologies Produce Different Results. GAO-06-210. Washington, D.C.: March 28, 2006. Immigration Benefits: Additional Controls and a Sanctions Strategy Could Enhance DHS’ Ability to Control Benefit Fraud. GAO-06-259. Washington, D.C.: March 10, 2006. Social Security Administration: Procedures for Issuing Numbers and Benefits to the Foreign-Born. GAO-06-253T. Washington, D.C.: March 2, 2006. Immigration Benefits: Improvements Needed to Address Backlogs and Ensure Quality of Adjudications. GAO-06-20. Washington, D.C.: November 21, 2005. Immigration Benefits: Thirteenth Report Required by the Haitian Refugee Immigration Fairness Act of 1998. GAO-06-122R. Washington, D.C.: October 21, 2005. Taxpayer Information: Options Exist to Enable Data Sharing Between IRS and USCIS but Each Presents Challenges. GAO-06-100. Washington, D.C.: October 11, 2005. Immigration Services: Better Contracting Practices Needed at Call Centers. GAO-05-526. Washington, D.C.: June 30, 2005. Immigration Benefits: Twelfth Report Required by the Haitian Refugee Immigration Fairness Act of 1998. GAO-05-481R. Washington, D.C.: April 14, 2005. Immigrant Investors: Small Number of Participants Attributed to Pending Regulations and Other Factors. GAO-05-256. Washington, D.C.: April 1, 2005. Immigration Benefits: Eleventh Report Required by the Haitian Refugee Immigration Fairness Act of 1998. GAO-04-1030R. Washington, D.C.: August 13, 2004. Taxpayer Information: Data Sharing and Analysis May Enhance Tax Compliance and Improve Immigration Eligibility Decisions. GAO-04-972T. Washington, D.C.: July 21, 2004. Illegal Alien Schoolchildren: Issues in Estimating State-by-State Costs. GAO-04-733. Washington, D.C.: June 21, 2004. Undocumented Aliens: Questions Persist about Their Impact on Hospitals’ Uncompensated Care Costs. GAO-04-472. Washington, D.C.: May 21, 2004. Immigration Application Fees: Current Fees Are Not Sufficient to Fund U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services’ Operations. GAO-04-309R. Washington, D.C.: January 5, 2004. Immigration Benefits: Tenth Report Required by the Haitian Refugee Immigration Fairness Act of 1998. GAO-04-189R. Washington, D.C.: October 17, 2003. Social Security Administration: Actions Taken to Strengthen Procedures for Issuing Social Security Numbers to Noncitizens, but Some Weaknesses Remain. GAO-04-12. Washington, D.C.: October 15, 2003. Social Security Numbers: Improved SSN Verification and Exchange of States’ Driver Records Would Enhance Identity Verification. GAO-03-920. Washington, D.C.: September 15, 2003. H-1B Foreign Workers: Better Tracking Needed to Help Determine H-1B Program’s Effects on U.S. Workforce. GAO-03-883. Washington, D.C.: September 10, 2003. Supplemental Security Income: SSA Could Enhance Its Ability to Detect Residency Violations. GAO-03-724. Washington, D.C.: July 29, 2003. Immigration Benefits: Ninth Report Required by the Haitian Refugee Immigration Fairness Act of 1998. GAO-03-681R. Washington, D.C.: April 21, 2003. Aviation Security: Efforts to Strengthen International Passenger Prescreening Are Under Way, but Planning and Implementation Issues Remain. GAO-07-346. Washington, D.C.: May 16, 2007. Aviation Security: Federal Efforts to Secure U.S.-Bound Air Cargo Are in the Early Stages and Could Be Strengthened. GAO-07-660. Washington, D.C.: April 30, 2007. Aviation Security: TSA’s Change to Its Prohibited Items List Has Not Resulted in Any Reported Security Incidents, but the Impact of the Change on Screening Operations Is Inconclusive. GAO-07-634R. Washington, D.C.: April 25, 2007. Aviation Security: Risk, Experience, and Customer Concerns Drive Changes to Airline Passenger Screening Procedures, but Evaluation and Documentation of Proposed Changes Could Be Improved. GAO-07-634. Washington, D.C.: April 16, 2007. Aviation Security: Cost Estimates Related to TSA Funding of Checked Baggage Screening Systems at Los Angeles and Ontario Airports. GAO-07-445. Washington, D.C.: March 30, 2007. Aviation Security: TSA’s Staffing Allocation Model Is Useful for Allocating Staff among Airports, but Its Assumptions Should Be Systematically Reassessed. GAO-07-299. Washington, D.C.: February 28, 2007. Aviation Security: Progress Made in Systematic Planning to Guide Key Investment Decisions, but More Work Remains. GAO-07-448T. Washington, D.C.: February 13, 2007. Transportation Security Administration: Oversight of Explosive Detection Systems Maintenance Contracts Can Be Strengthened. GAO-06-795. Washington D.C.: July 31, 2006. Aviation Security: TSA Oversight of Checked Baggage Screening Procedures Could Be Strengthened. GAO-06-869. Washington, D. C.: July 28, 2006. Aviation Security: TSA Has Strengthened Efforts to Plan for the Optimal Deployment of Checked Baggage Screening Systems, but Funding Uncertainties Remain. GAO-06-875T. Washington, D.C.: June 29, 2006. Aviation Security: Management Challenges Remain for the Transportation Security Administration’s Secure Flight Program. GAO-06-864T. Washington, D.C.: June 14, 2006. Aviation Security: Further Study of Safety and Effectiveness and Better Management Controls Needed if Air Carriers Resume Interest in Deploying Less-than-Lethal Weapons. GAO-06-475. Washington, D.C.: May 26, 2006. Aviation Security: Transportation Security Administration Has Made Progress in Managing a Federal Workforce and Ensuring Security at U.S. Airports, but Challenges Remain. GAO-06-597T. Washington, D.C.: April 4, 2006. Aviation Security: Enhancements Made in Passenger and Checked Baggage Screening, but Challenges Remain. GAO-06-371T. Washington, D.C.: April 4, 2006. Aviation Security: Progress Made to Set Up Program Using Private- Sector Airport Screeners, but More Work Remains. GAO-06-166. Washington, D. C.: March 31, 2006. Aviation Security: Significant Management Challenges May Adversely Affect Implementation of the Transportation Security Administration’s Secure Flight Program. GAO-06-374T. Washington, D.C.: February 9, 2006. Aviation Security: Federal Air Marshal Service Could Benefit from Improved Planning and Controls. GAO-06-203. Washington, D.C.: November 28, 2005. Aviation Security: Federal Action Needed to Strengthen Domestic Air Cargo Security. GAO-06-76. Washington, D.C.: October 17, 2005. Transportation Security Administration: More Clarity on the Authority of Federal Security Directors Is Needed. GAO-05-935. Washington, D.C.: September 23, 2005. Aviation Security: Flight and Cabin Crew Member Security Training Strengthened, but Better Planning and Internal Controls Needed. GAO-05-781. Washington, D.C.: September 6, 2005. Aviation Security: Transportation Security Administration Did Not Fully Disclose Uses of Personal Information during Secure Flight Program Testing Initial Privacy Notes, but Has Recently Taken Steps to More Fully Inform the Public. GAO-05-864R. Washington, D.C.: July 22, 2005. Aviation Security: Better Planning Needed to Optimize Deployment of Checked Baggage Screening Systems. GAO-05-896T. Washington, D.C.: July 13, 2005. Aviation Security: Screener Training and Performance Measurement Strengthened, but More Work Remains. GAO-05-457. Washington, D.C.: May 2, 2005. Aviation Security: Secure Flight Development and Testing Under Way, but Risks Should Be Managed as System Is Further Developed. GAO-05-356. Washington, D.C.: March 28, 2005. Aviation Security: Systematic Planning Needed to Optimize the Deployment of Checked Baggage Screening Systems. GAO-05-365. Washington, D.C.: March 15, 2005. Aviation Security: Measures for Testing the Impact of Using Commercial Data for the Secure Flight Program. GAO-05-324. Washington, D.C.: February 23, 2005. Transportation Security: Systematic Planning Needed to Prioritize Resources. GAO-05-357T. Washington, D.C.: February 15, 2005. Aviation Security: Preliminary Observations on TSA’s Progress to Allow Airports to Use Private Passenger and Baggage Screening. GAO-05-126. Washington, D.C.: November 19, 2004. General Aviation Security: Increased Federal Oversight Is Needed, but Continued Partnership with the Private Sector Is Critical to Long-Term Success. GAO-05-144. Washington, D.C.: November 10, 2004. Aviation Security: Further Steps Needed to Strengthen the Security of Commercial Airport Perimeters and Access Controls. GAO-04-728. Washington, D.C.: June 4, 2004. Aviation Security: Challenges in Using Biometric Technologies. GAO-04-785T. Washington, D.C.: May 19, 2004. Aviation Security: Private Security Screening Contractors Have Little Flexibility to Implement Innovative Approaches. GAO-04-505T. Washington, D.C.: April 22, 2004. Aviation Security: Challenges Delay Implementation of Computer- Assisted Passenger Prescreening System. GAO-04-504T. Washington, D.C.: March 17, 2004. Aviation Security: Computer-Assisted Passenger Prescreening System Faces Significant Implementation Challenges. GAO-04-385. Washington, D.C.: February 13, 2004. Aviation Security: Computer-Assisted Passenger Prescreening System Faces Significant Implementation Challenges. GAO-04-385. Washington, D.C.: February 12, 2004. Aviation Security: Challenges Exist in Stabilizing and Enhancing Passenger and Baggage Screening Operations. GAO-04-440T. Washington, D.C.: February 12, 2004. Aviation Security: Efforts to Measure Effectiveness and Strengthen Security Programs. GAO-04-285T. Washington, D.C.: November 20, 2003. Aviation Security: Federal Air Marshal Service Is Addressing Challenges of Its Expanded Mission and Workforce, but Additional Actions Needed. GAO-04-242. Washington, D. C.: November 19, 2003. Aviation Security: Efforts to Measure Effectiveness and Address Challenges. GAO-04-232T. Washington, D.C.: November 5, 2003. Airport Passenger Screening: Preliminary Observations on Progress Made and Challenges Remaining. GAO-03-1173. Washington, D.C.: September 24, 2003. Aviation Security: Progress since September 11, 2001, and the Challenges Ahead. GAO-03-1154T. Washington, D.C.: September 9, 2003. Transportation Security: Federal Action Needed to Address Security Challenges. GAO-03-843. Washington, D.C.: June 30, 2003. Transportation Security: Post-September 11th Initiatives and Long- Term Challenges. GAO-03-616T. Washington, D. C.: April 1, 2003. Passenger Rail Security: Federal Strategy and Enhanced Coordination Needed to Prioritize and Guide Security Efforts. GAO-07-583T. Washington, D.C.: March 7, 2007. Passenger Rail Security: Federal Strategy and Enhanced Coordination Needed to Prioritize and Guide Security Efforts. GAO-07-459T. Washington, D.C.: February 13, 2007. Passenger Rail Security: Federal Strategy and Enhanced Coordination Needed to Prioritize and Guide Security Efforts. GAO-07-442T. Washington, D.C.: February 6, 2007. Passenger Rail Security: Enhanced Leadership Needed to Prioritize and Guide Security Efforts. GAO-07-225T. Washington, D.C.: January 18, 2007. Passenger Rail Security: Evaluating Foreign Security Practices and Risk Can Help Guide Security Efforts. GAO-06-557T. Washington, D.C.: March 29, 2006. Passenger Rail Security: Enhanced Federal Leadership Needed to Prioritize and Guide Security Efforts. GAO-06-181T. Washington, D.C.: October 20, 2005. Passenger Rail Security: Enhanced Federal Leadership Needed to Prioritize and Guide Security Efforts. GAO-05-851. Washington, D.C.: September 9, 2005. Transportation Security: Systematic Planning Needed to Optimize Resources. GAO-05-357T. Washington, D.C.: February 15, 2005. Transportation Security R&D: TSA and DHS Are Researching and Developing Technologies, but Need to Improve R&D Management. GAO-04-890. Washington, D.C.: September 30, 2004. Surface Transportation: Many Factors Affect Investment Decisions. GAO-04-744. Washington, D.C.: June 30, 2004. Rail Security: Some Actions Taken to Enhance Passenger and Freight Rail Security, but Significant Challenges Remain. GAO-04-598T. Washington, D.C.: March 23, 2004. Transportation Security: Federal Action Needed to Enhance Security Efforts. GAO-03-1154T. Washington, D.C.: September 9, 2003. Transportation Security: Federal Action Needed to Help Address Security Challenges. GAO-03-843. Washington, D.C.: June 30, 2003. Transportation Security Research: Coordination Needed in Selecting and Implementing Infrastructure Vulnerability Assessments. GAO-03-502. Washington, D.C.: May 1, 2003. Rail Safety and Security: Some Actions Already Taken to Enhance Rail Security, but Risk-based Plan Needed. GAO-03-435. Washington, D.C.: April 30, 2003. Transportation Security: Post-September 11th Initiatives and Long- Term Challenges. GAO-03-616T. New York City: April 1, 2003. Information on Port Security in the Caribbean Basin. GAO-07-804R. Washington, D.C.: June 29, 2007. Maritime Security: Observations on Selected Aspects of the SAFE Port Act. GAO-07-754T. Washington, D.C.: April 26, 2007. Transportation Security: TSA Has Made Progress in Implementing the Transportation Worker Identification Credential Program, but Challenges Remain. GAO-07-681T. Washington, D.C.: April 12, 2007. Port Risk Management: Additional Federal Guidance Would Aid Ports in Disaster Planning and Recovery. GAO-07-412. Washington, D.C.: March 28, 2007. Maritime Security: Public Safety Consequences of a Liquefied Natural Gas Spill Need Clarification. GAO-07-633T. Washington, D.C.: March 21, 2007. Combating Nuclear Smuggling: DHS’s Decision to Procure and Deploy the Next Generation of Radiation Detection Equipment Is Not Supported by Its Cost-Benefit Analysis. GAO-07-581T. Washington, D.C.: March 14, 2007. Combating Nuclear Smuggling: DNDO Has Not Yet Collected Most of the National Laboratories’ Test Results on Radiation Portal Monitors in Support of DNDO’s Testing and Development Program. GAO-07-347R. Washington, D.C.: March 9, 2007. Maritime Security: Public Safety Consequences of a Terrorist Attack on a Tanker Carrying Liquefied Natural Gas Need Clarification. GAO-07-316. Washington, D.C.: February 22, 2007. Combating Nuclear Smuggling: DHS’s Cost-Benefit Analysis to Support the Purchase of New Radiation Detection Portal Monitors Was Not Based on Available Performance Data and Did Not Fully Evaluate All the Monitors’ Costs and Benefits. GAO-07-133R. Washington, D.C.: October 17, 2006. Transportation Security: DHS Should Address Key Challenges before Implementing the Transportation Worker Identification Credential Program. GAO-06-982. Washington, D.C.: September 29, 2006. Maritime Security: Information sharing Efforts Are Improving. GAO-06-933T. Washington, D.C.: July 10, 2006. Coast Guard: Observations on Agency Performance, Operations and Future Challenges. GAO-06-448T. Washington, D.C.: June 15, 2006. Cargo Container Inspections: Preliminary Observations on the Status of Efforts to Improve the Automated Targeting System. GAO-06-591T. Washington, D.C.: March 30, 2006. Combating Nuclear Smuggling: DHS Has Made Progress Deploying Radiation Detection Equipment at U.S. Ports-of-Entry, but Concerns Remain. GAO-06-389. Washington, D.C.: March 22, 2006. Risk Management: Further Refinements Needed to Assess Risks and Prioritize Protective Measures at Ports and Other Critical Infrastructure. GAO-06-91. Washington, D.C.: December 15, 2005. Homeland Security: Key Cargo Security Programs Can Be Improved. GAO-05-466T. Washington, D.C.: May 26, 2005. Maritime Security: Enhancements Made, but Implementation and Sustainability Remain Key Challenges. GAO-05-448T. Washington, D.C.: May 17, 2005. Container Security: A Flexible Staffing Model and Minimum Equipment Requirements Would Improve Overseas Targeting and Inspection Efforts. GAO-05-557. Washington, D.C.: April 26, 2005. Maritime Security: New Structures Have Improved Information Sharing, but Security Clearance Processing Requires Further Attention. GAO-05-394. Washington, D.C.: April 15, 2005. Coast Guard: Observations on Agency Priorities in Fiscal Year 2006 Budget Request. GAO-05-364T. Washington, D.C.: March 17, 2005. Cargo Security: Partnership Program Grants Importers Reduced Scrutiny with Limited Assurance of Improved Security. GAO-05-404. Washington, D.C.: March 11, 2005. Homeland Security: Process for Reporting Lessons Learned from Seaport Exercises Needs Further Attention. GAO-05-170. Washington, D.C.: January 14, 2005. Port Security: Better Planning Needed to Develop and Operate Maritime Worker Identification Card Program. GAO-05-106. Washington, D.C.: December 10, 2004. Maritime Security: Better Planning Needed to Help Ensure an Effective Port Security Assessment Program. GAO-04-1062. Washington, D.C.: September 30, 2004. Maritime Security: Partnering Could Reduce Federal Costs and Facilitate Implementation of Automatic Vessel Identification System. GAO-04-868. Washington, D.C.: July 23, 2004. Maritime Security: Substantial Work Remains to Translate New Planning Requirements into Effective Port Security. GAO-04-838. Washington, D.C.: June 30, 2004. Homeland Security: Summary of Challenges Faced in Targeting Oceangoing Cargo Containers for Inspection. GAO-04-557T. Washington, D.C.: March 31, 2004. Coast Guard: Relationship between Resources Used and Results Achieved Needs to Be Clearer. GAO-04-432. Washington, D.C.: March 22, 2004. Container Security: Expansion of Key Customs Programs Will Require Greater Attention to Critical Success Factors. GAO-03-770. Washington, D.C.: July 25, 2003. Coast Guard: Comprehensive Blueprint Needed to Balance and Monitor Resource Use and Measure Performance for All Missions. GAO-03-544T. Washington, D.C.: March 12, 2003. Preliminary Information on Rebuilding Efforts in the Gulf Coast. GAO-07-809R. Washington, D.C.: June 29, 2007. Emergency Management: Most School Districts Have Developed Emergency Management Plans, but Would Benefit from Additional Federal Guidance. GAO-07-609. Washington, D.C.: June 12, 2007. Emergency Management: Status of School Districts’ Planning and Preparedness. GAO-07-821T. Washington, D.C.: May 17, 2007. Homeland Security: Observations on DHS and FEMA Efforts to Prepare for and Respond to Major and Catastrophic Disasters and Address Related Recommendations and Legislation. GAO-07-835T. Washington, D.C: May 15, 2007. First Responders: Much Work Remains to Improve Communications Interoperability. GAO-07-301. Washington, D.C.: April 2, 2007. Emergency Preparedness: Current Emergency Alert System Has Limitations, and Development of a New Integrated System Will Be Challenging. GAO-07-0411. Washington, D.C.: March 30, 2007. Hurricanes Katrina and Rita Disaster Relief: Continued Findings of Fraud, Waste, and Abuse. GAO-07-300. Washington, D.C.: March 15, 2007. Disaster Assistance: Better Planning Needed for Housing Victims of Catastrophic Disasters. GAO-07-88. Washington, D.C.: February 28, 2007. Homeland Security Grants: Observations on Process DHS Used to Allocate Funds to Selected Urban Areas. GAO-07-381R. Washington, D.C.: February 7, 2007. Homeland Security: Applying Risk Management Principles to Guide Federal Investments. GAO-07-386T. Washington, D.C.: February 7, 2007. Budget Issues: FEMA Needs Adequate Data, Plans, and Systems to Effectively Manage Resources for Day-to-Day Operations, GAO-07-139. Washington, D.C.: January 19, 2007. Transportation-Disadvantaged Populations: Actions Needed to Clarify Responsibilities and Increase Preparedness for Evacuations. GAO-07-44. Washington, D.C.: December 22, 2006. Homeland Security: Assessment of the National Capital Region Strategic Plan. GAO-06-1096T. Washington, D.C.: September 28, 2006. Hurricanes Katrina and Rita: Unprecedented Challenges Exposed the Individuals and Households Program to Fraud and Abuse; Actions Needed to Reduce Such Problems in the Future. GAO-06-1013. Washington, D.C.: September 27, 2006. Catastrophic Disasters: Enhanced Leadership, Capabilities, and Accountability Controls Will Improve the Effectiveness of the Nation’s Preparedness, Response, and Recovery System. GAO-06-618. Washington, D.C.: September 6, 2006. Coast Guard: Observations on the Preparation, Response, and Recovery Missions Related to Hurricane Katrina. GAO-06-903. Washington, D.C.: July 31, 2006. Child Welfare: Federal Action Needed to Ensure States Have Plans to Safeguard Children in the Child Welfare System Displaced by Disasters. GAO-06-944. Washington, D.C.: July 28, 2006. Disaster Preparedness: Limitations in Federal Evacuation Assistance for Health Facilities Should Be Addressed. GAO-06-826. Washington, D.C.: July 20, 2006. Purchase Cards: Control Weaknesses Leave DHS Highly Vulnerable to Fraudulent, Improper, and Abusive Activity. GAO-06-957T. Washington, D.C.: July 19, 2006. Individual Disaster Assistance Programs: Framework for Fraud Prevention, Detection, and Prosecution. GAO-06-954T. Washington, D.C.: July 12, 2006. Expedited Assistance for Victims of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita: FEMA’s Control Weaknesses Exposed the Government to Significant Fraud and Abuse. GAO-06-655. Washington, D.C.: June 16, 2006. Hurricanes Katrina and Rita: Improper and Potentially Fraudulent Individual Assistance Payments Estimated to Be between $600 Million and $1.4 Billion. GAO-06-844T. Washington, D.C.: June 14, 2006. Hurricanes Katrina and Rita: Coordination between FEMA and the Red Cross Should Be Improved for the 2006 Hurricane Season. GAO-06-712. Washington, D.C.: June 8, 2006. U.S. Tsunami Preparedness: Federal and State Partners Collaborate to Help Communities Reduce Potential Impacts, but Significant Challenges Remain. GAO-06-519. Washington, D.C.: June 5, 2006. Disaster Preparedness: Preliminary Observations on the Evacuation of Vulnerable Populations due to Hurricanes and Other Disasters. GAO-06-790T. Washington, D.C.: May 18, 2006. Continuity of Operations: Selected Agencies Could Improve Planning for Use of Alternate Facilities and Telework during Disruptions. GAO-06-713. Washington, D.C.: May 11, 2006. Federal Emergency Management Agency: Factors for Future Success and Issues to Consider for Organizational Placement. GAO-06-746T. Washington, D.C.: May 9, 2006. Hurricane Katrina: Improving Federal Contracting Practices in Disaster Recovery Operations. GAO-06-714T. Washington, D.C.: May 4, 2006. Hurricane Katrina: Planning for and Management of Federal Disaster Recovery Contracts. GAO-06-622T. Washington, D.C.: April 10, 2006. Hurricane Katrina: Comprehensive Policies and Procedures Are Needed to Ensure Appropriate Use of and Accountability for International Assistance. GAO-06-460. Washington, D.C.: April 6, 2006. Homeland Security: The Status of Strategic Planning in the National Capital Region. GAO-06-559T. Washington, D.C.: March 29, 2006. Agency Management of Contractors Responding to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. GAO-06-461R. Washington, D.C.: March 15, 2006. Hurricane Katrina: GAO’s Preliminary Observations Regarding Preparedness, Response, and Recovery. GAO-06-442T. Washington, D.C.: March 8, 2006. Emergency Preparedness and Response: Some Issues and Challenges Associated with Major Emergency Incidents. GAO-06-467T. Washington, D.C.: February 23, 2006. Expedited Assistance for Victims of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita: FEMA’s Control Weaknesses Exposed the Government to Significant Fraud and Abuse. GAO-06-403T. Washington, D.C.: February 13, 2006. Statement by Comptroller General David M. Walker on GAO’s Preliminary Observations Regarding Preparedness and Response to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. GAO-06-365R. Washington, D.C.: February 1, 2006. Hurricanes Katrina and Rita: Provision of Charitable Assistance. GAO-06-297T. Washington, D.C.: December 13, 2005. Hurricanes Katrina and Rita: Preliminary Observations on Contracting for Response and Recovery Efforts. GAO-06-246T. Washington, D.C.: November 8, 2005. Hurricanes Katrina and Rita: Contracting for Response and Recovery Efforts. GAO-06-235T. Washington, D.C.: November 2, 2005. Federal Emergency Management Agency: Oversight and Management of the National Flood Insurance Program. GAO-06-183T. Washington, D.C. October 20, 2005. Federal Emergency Management Agency: Challenges Facing the National Flood Insurance Program. GAO-06-174T. Washington, D.C.: October 18, 2005. Federal Emergency Management Agency: Improvements Needed to Enhance Oversight and Management of the National Flood Insurance Program. GAO-06-119. Washington, D.C.: October 18, 2005. Hurricane Katrina: Providing Oversight of the Nation’s Preparedness, Response, and Recovery Activities. GAO-05-1053T. Washington, D.C.: September 28, 2005. Homeland Security: Managing First Responder Grants to Enhance Emergency Preparedness in the National Capital Region. GAO-05-889T. Washington, D.C.: July 14, 2005. Flood Map Modernization: Federal Emergency Management Agency’s Implementation of a National Strategy. GAO-05-894T. Washington, D.C.: July 12, 2005. Homeland Security: DHS’s Efforts to Enhance First Responders’ All- Hazards Capabilities Continue to Evolve. GAO-05-652. Washington, D.C.: July 11, 2005. National Flood Insurance Program: Oversight of Policy Issuance and Claims. GAO-05-532T. Washington, D.C.: April 14, 2005. Homeland Security: Management of First Responder Grant Programs and Efforts to Improve Accountability Continue to Evolve. GAO-05-530T. Washington, D.C.: April 12, 2005. Homeland Security: Management of First Responder Grant Programs Has Improved, but Challenges Remain. GAO-05-121. Washington, D.C.: February 2, 2005. Homeland Security: Federal Leadership and Intergovernmental Cooperation Required to Achieve First Responder Interoperable Communications. GAO-04-740. Washington, D.C.: July 20, 2004. Homeland Security: Management of First Responder Grants in the National Capital Region Reflects the Need for Coordinated Planning and Performance Goals. GAO-04-433. Washington, D.C.: May 28, 2004. Project SAFECOM: Key Cross-Agency Emergency Communications Effort Requires Stronger Collaboration. GAO-04-494. Washington, D.C.: April 16, 2004. Flood Map Modernization: Program Strategy Shows Promise, but Challenges Remain. GAO-04-417. Washington, D.C.: March 31, 2004. Continuity of Operations: Improved Planning Needed to Ensure Delivery of Essential Government Services. GAO-04-160. Washington, D.C.: February 27, 2004. September 11: Overview of Federal Disaster Assistance to the New York City Area. GAO-04-72. Washington, D.C.: October 31, 2003. Disaster Assistance: Information on FEMA’s Post 9/11 Public Assistance to the New York City Area. GAO-03-926. Washington, D.C.: August 29, 2003. Flood Insurance: Challenges Facing the National Flood Insurance Program. GAO-03-606T. Washington, D.C.: April 1, 2003. Information Technology: Homeland Security Information Network Needs to Be Better Coordinated with Key State and Local Initiatives. GAO-07-822T. Washington, D.C.: May 10, 2007. Information Technology: Numerous Federal Networks Used to Support Homeland Security Need to Be Better Coordinated with Key State and Local Information sharing Initiatives. GAO-07-455. Washington, D.C.: April 16, 2007. DHS Multi-Agency Operation Centers Would Benefit from Taking Further Steps to Enhance Collaboration and Coordination. GAO-07-686R. Washington, D.C.: April 5, 2007. Critical Infrastructure: Challenges Remain in Protecting Key Sectors. GAO-07-626T. Washington, D.C.: March 20, 2007. Passenger Rail Security: Federal Strategy and Enhanced Coordination Needed to Prioritize and Guide Security Efforts. GAO-07-583T. Washington, D.C.: March 7, 2007. Homeland Security: Applying Risk Management Principles to Guide Federal Investments. GAO-07-386T. Washington, D.C.: February 7, 2007. Homeland Security Grants: Observations on Process DHS Used to Allocate Funds to Selected Urban Areas. GAO-07-381R. Washington, D.C.: February 7, 2007. Homeland Security: Opportunities Exist to Enhance Collaboration at 24/7 Operations Centers Staffed by Multiple DHS Agencies. GAO-07-89. Washington, D.C.: October 20, 2006. Critical Infrastructure Protection: Progress Coordinating Government and Private Sector Efforts Varies by Sectors’ Characteristics. GAO-07-39. Washington, D.C.: October 16, 2006. Information Security: Coordination of Federal Cyber Security Research and Development. GAO-06-811. Washington, D.C.: September 29, 2006. Critical Infrastructure Protection: DHS Leadership Needed to Enhance Cybersecurity. GAO-06-1087T. Washington, D.C.: September 13, 2006. Catastrophic Disasters: Enhanced Leadership, Capabilities, and Accountability Controls Will Improve the Effectiveness of the Nation’s Preparedness, Response, and Recovery System. GAO-06-618. Washington, D.C.: September 6, 2006. Homeland Security: DHS Is Addressing Security at Chemical Facilities, but Additional Authority Is Needed. GAO-06-899T. Washington, D.C.: June 21, 2006. Internet Infrastructure: DHS Faces Challenges in Developing a Joint Public/Private Recovery Plan. GAO-06-672. Washington, D.C.: June 16, 2006. Homeland Security: Guidance and Standards Are Needed for Measuring the Effectiveness of Agencies’ Facility Protection Efforts. GAO-06-612. Washington, D.C: May 31, 2006. Information Sharing: DHS Should Take Steps to Encourage More Widespread Use of Its Program to Protect and Share Critical Infrastructure Information. GAO-06-383. Washington, D.C.: April 17, 2006. Securing Wastewater Facilities: Utilities Have Made Important Upgrades but Further Improvements to Key System Components May Be Limited by Costs and Other Constraints. GAO-06-390. Washington, D.C.: March 31, 2006. Information Sharing: The Federal Government Needs to Establish Policies and Processes for Sharing Terrorism-Related and Sensitive but Unclassified Information. GAO-06-385. Washington, D.C.: March 17, 2006. Homeland Security: DHS Is Taking Steps to Enhance Security at Chemical Facilities, but Additional Authority Is Needed. GAO-06-150. Washington, D.C.: January 27, 2006. Risk Management: Further Refinements Needed to Assess Risks and Prioritize Protective Measures at Ports and Other Critical Infrastructure. GAO-06-91. Washington, D.C.: December 15, 2005. Critical Infrastructure Protection: Challenges in Addressing Cybersecurity. GAO-05-827T. Washington, D.C.: July 19, 2005. Critical Infrastructure Protection: Department of Homeland Security Faces Challenges in Fulfilling Cybersecurity Responsibilities. GAO-05-434. Washington, D.C.: May 26, 2005. Protection of Chemical and Water Infrastructure: Federal Requirements, Actions of Selected Facilities, and Remaining Challenges. GAO-05-327. Washington, D.C.: March 28, 2005. Homeland Security: Much Is Being Done to Protect Agriculture from a Terrorist Attack, but Important Challenges Remain. GAO-05-214. Washington, D.C.: March 8, 2005. Critical Infrastructure Protection: Improving Information Sharing with Infrastructure Sectors. GAO-04-780. Washington, D.C.: July 9, 2004. Technology Assessment: Cybersecurity for Critical Infrastructure Protection. GAO-04-321. Washington, D.C.: May 28, 2004. Critical Infrastructure Protection: Establishing Effective Information Sharing with Infrastructure Sectors. GAO-04-699T. Washington, D.C.: April 21, 2004. Critical Infrastructure Protection: Challenges and Efforts to Secure Control Systems. GAO-04-628T. Washington, D.C.: March 30, 2004. Critical Infrastructure Protection: Challenges and Efforts to Secure Control Systems. GAO-04-354. Washington, D.C.: March 15, 2004. Posthearing Questions from the September 17, 2003, Hearing on Implications of Power Blackouts for the Nation's Cybersecurity and Critical Infrastructure Protection: The Electric Grid, Critical Interdependencies, Vulnerabilities, and Readiness. GAO-04-300R. Washington, D.C.: December 8, 2003. Drinking Water: Experts' Views on How Future Federal Funding Can Best Be Spent to Improve Security. GAO-04-29. Washington, D.C.: October 31, 2003. Critical Infrastructure Protection: Challenges in Securing Control Systems. GAO-04-140T. Washington, D.C.: October 1, 2003. Information Security: Progress Made, But Challenges Remain to Protect Federal Systems and the Nation's Critical Infrastructures. GAO-03-564T. Washington, D.C.: April 8, 2003. Homeland Security: Voluntary Initiatives Are Under Way at Chemical Facilities, but the Extent of Security Preparedness Is Unknown. GAO-03-439. Washington, D.C.: March 14, 2003. Department of Homeland Security: Science and Technology Directorate's Expenditure Plan. GAO-07-868. Washington, D.C.: June 22, 2007. Combating Nuclear Smuggling: DHS’s Decision to Procure and Deploy the Next Generation of Detection Equipment Is Not Supported by Its Cost-Benefit Analysis. GAO-07-581T. Washington, D.C.: March 14, 2007. Combating Nuclear Smuggling: DNDO Has Not Yet Collected Most of the National Laboratories’ Test Results on Radiation Portal Monitors in Support of DNDO’s Testing and Development Program. GAO-07-347R. Washington, D.C.: March 9, 2007. Homeland Security: DHS Needs to Improve Ethics-Related Management Controls for the Science and Technology Directorate. GAO-06-206. Washington, D.C.: December 22, 2006. Combating Nuclear Smuggling: DHS’s Cost-Benefit Analysis to Support the Purchase of New Radiation Detection Portal Monitors Was Not Based on Available Performance Data and Did Not Fully Evaluate All the Monitors’ Costs and Benefits. GAO-07-133R. Washington, D.C.: October 17, 2006. Combating Nuclear Terrorism: Federal Efforts to Respond to Nuclear and Radiological Threats and to Protect Emergency Response Capabilities Could Be Strengthened. GAO-06-1015. Washington, D.C.: September 21, 2006. Combating Nuclear Smuggling: DHS Has Made Progress Deploying Radiation Detection Equipment at U.S. Ports-of-Entry, but Concerns Remain. GAO-06-389. Washington, D.C.: March 22, 2006. Combating Nuclear Smuggling: Corruption, Maintenance, and Coordination Problem Challenge U.S. Effort to Provide Radiation Detection Equipment to Other Countries. GAO-06-311. Washington, D.C.: March 14, 2006. Transportation Security R&D: TSA and DHS Are Researching and Developing Technologies, but Need to Improve R&D Management. GAO-04-890. Washington, D.C.: September 30, 2004. Homeland Security: DHS Needs a Strategy to Use DOE’s Laboratories for Research on Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Detection and Response Technologies. GAO-04-653. Washington, D.C.: May 24, 2004. Coast Guard: Challenges Affecting Deepwater Asset Deployment and Management and Efforts to Address Them. GAO-07-874. Washington, D.C.: June 18, 2007. Department of Homeland Security: Progress and Challenges in Implementing the Department’s Acquisition Oversight Plan. GAO-07-900. Washington, D.C.: June 13, 2007. Department of Homeland Security: Ongoing Challenges in Creating an Effective Acquisition Organization. GAO-07-948T. Washington, D.C.: June 7, 2007. Homeland Security: Observations on the Department of Homeland Security’s Acquisition Organization and on the Coast Guard’s Deepwater Program. GAO-07-453T. Washington, D.C.: February 8, 2007. Interagency Contracting: Improved Guidance, Planning, and Oversight Would Enable the Department of Homeland Security to Address Risks. GAO-06-996. Washington, D.C.: September 27, 2006. Catastrophic Disasters: Enhanced Leadership, Capabilities, and Accountability Controls Will Improve the Effectiveness of the Nation’s Preparedness, Response, and Recovery System. GAO-06-618. Washington, D.C.: September 6, 2006. Homeland Security: Challenges in Creating an Effective Acquisition Organization. GAO-06-1012T. Washington, D.C.: July 27, 2006. Coast Guard: Status of Deepwater Fast Response Cutter Design Efforts. GAO-06-764. Washington, D.C.: June 23, 2006. Coast Guard: Changes to Deepwater Appear Sound, and Program Management Has Improved, But Continued Monitoring Is Warranted. GAO-06-546. Washington, D.C.: April 28, 2006. Coast Guard: Preliminary Observations on the Condition of Deepwater Legacy Assets and Acquisition Management Challenges. GAO-05-651T. Washington, D.C.: June 21, 2005. Homeland Security: Successes and Challenges in DHS’s Efforts to Create an Effective Acquisition Organization. GAO-05-179. Washington, D.C.: March 29, 2005. Homeland Security: Further Action Needed to Promote Successful Use of Special DHS Acquisition Authority. GAO-05-136. Washington, D.C.: December 15, 2004. Coast Guard: Deepwater Program Acquisition Schedule Update Needed. GAO-04-695. Washington, D.C.: June 14, 2004. Contract Management: Coast Guard’s Deepwater Program Needs Increased Attention to Management and Contractor Oversight. GAO-04-380. Washington, D.C.: March 9, 2004. Contract Management: INS Contracting Weaknesses Need Attention from the Department of Homeland Security. GAO-03-799. Washington, D.C.: July 25, 2003. Purchase Cards: Control Weaknesses Leave DHS Highly Vulnerable to Fraudulent, Improper, and Abusive Activity. GAO-06-1117. Washington, D.C.: September 28, 2006. Internal Control: Analysis of Joint Study on Estimating the Costs and Benefits of Rendering Opinions on Internal Control over Financial Reporting in the Federal Environment. GAO-06-255R. Washington, D.C.: September 6, 2006. Financial Management: Challenges Continue in Meeting Requirements of the Improper Payments Information Act. GAO-06-581T. Washington, D.C.: April 5, 2006. Financial Management Systems: DHS Has an Opportunity to Incorporate Best Practices in Modernization Efforts. GAO-06-553T. Washington, D.C.: March 29, 2006. Financial Management Systems: Additional Efforts Needed to Address Key Causes of Modernization Failures. GAO-06-184. Washington, D.C.: March 15, 2006. Financial Management: Challenges Remain in Meeting Requirements of the Improper Payments Information Act. GAO-06-482T. Washington, D.C.: March 9, 2006. CFO Act of 1990: Driving the Transformation of Federal Financial Management. GAO-06-242T. Washington, D.C.: November 17, 2005. Financial Management: Achieving FFMIA Compliance Continues to Challenge Agencies. GAO-05-881. Washington, D.C.: September 20, 2005. Financial Audit: The Department of Homeland Security’s Fiscal Year 2004 Management Representation Letter on Its Financial Statements. GAO-05-600R. Washington, D.C.: July 14, 2005. Financial Management: Challenges in Meeting Requirements of the Improper Payments Information Act. GAO-05-417. Washington, D.C.: March 31, 2005. Financial Management: Effective Internal Control Is Key to Accountability. GAO-05-321T. Washington, D.C.: February 16, 2005. Financial Management: Improved Financial Systems Are Key to FFMIA Compliance. GAO-05-20. Washington, D.C.: October 1, 2004 Financial Management: Department of Homeland Security Faces Significant Financial Management Challenges. GAO-04-774. Washington, D.C.: July 19, 2004. Department of Homeland Security: Financial Management Challenges. GAO-04-945T. Washington, D.C.: July 8, 2004. Financial Management: Recurring Financial Systems Problems Hinder FFMIA Compliance. GAO-04-209T. Washington, D.C.: October 29, 2003 Department of Homeland Security: Challenges and Steps in Establishing Sound Financial Management. GAO-03-1134T. Washington, D.C.: September 10, 2003. Homeland Security: Management and Programmatic Challenges Facing the Department of Homeland Security. GAO-07-833T. Washington, D.C.: May 10, 2007. Homeland Security: Information on Training New Border Patrol Agents. GAO-07-540R. Washington, D.C.: March 30, 2007. Homeland Security: Management and Programmatic Challenges Facing the Department of Homeland Security. GAO-07-452T. Washington, D.C.: February 7, 2007. Budget Issues: FEMA Needs Adequate Data, Plans, and Systems to Effectively Manage Resources for Day-to-Day Operations. GAO-07-139. Washington, D.C.: January 19, 2007. Department of Homeland Security: Strategic Management of Training Important for Successful Transformation. GAO-05-888. Washington, D.C.: September 23, 2005. Human Capital: Observations on Final DHS Human Capital Regulations. GAO-05-391T. Washington, D.C.: March 2, 2005. Human Capital: DHS Faces Challenges In Implementing Its New Personnel System. GAO-04-790. Washington, D.C.: June 18, 2004. Human Capital: DHS Personnel System Design Effort Provides for Collaboration and Employee Participation. GAO-03-1099. Washington, D.C.: September 30, 2003. Homeland Security: DHS Enterprise Architecture Continues to Evolve but Improvements Needed. GAO-07-564. Washington, D.C.: May 9, 2007. Information Technology: DHS Needs to Fully Define and Implement Policies and Procedures for Effectively Managing Investments. GAO-07-424. Washington, D.C.: April 27, 2007. Homeland Security: Planned Expenditures for U.S. Visitor and Immigrant Status Program Need to Be Adequately Defined and Justified. GAO-07-278. Washington, D.C.: February 14, 2007. Enterprise Architecture: Leadership Remains Key to Establishing and Leveraging Architectures for Organizational Transformation. GAO-06-831. Washington, D.C.: August 14, 2006. Information Technology: Immigration and Customs Enforcement Is Beginning to Address Infrastructure Modernization Program Weaknesses, but Key Improvements Still Needed. GAO-06-823. Washington, D.C.: July 27, 2006. Information Technology: Customs Has Made Progress on Automated Commercial Environment System, but It Faces Long-Standing Management Challenges and New Risks. GAO-06-580. Washington, D.C.: May 31, 2006. Homeland Security Progress Continues but Challenges Remain on Department’s Management of Information Technology. GAO-06-598T. Washington, D.C.: March 29, 2006. Information Technology: Management Improvements Needed on Immigration and Customs Enforcement’s Infrastructure Modernization Program. GAO-05-805. Washington, D.C.: September 7, 2005. Information Security: Department of Homeland Security Needs to Fully Implement Its Security Program. GAO-05-700. Washington, D.C: June 17, 2005. Information Security: Department of Homeland Security Faces Challenges in Fulfilling Statutory Requirements. GAO-05-567T. Washington, D.C.: April 14, 2005. Information Technology: Customs Automated Commercial Environment Program Progressing, but Need for Management Improvements Continues. GAO-05-267. Washington, D.C.: March 14, 2005. Homeland Security: Some Progress Made, but Many Challenges Remain on U.S. Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology Program. GAO-05-202. Washington, D.C.: February 23, 2005. Department of Homeland Security: Formidable Information and Technology Management Challenge Requires Institutional Approach. GAO-04-702. Washington, D.C.: August 27, 2004. Homeland Security: Efforts Under Way to Develop Enterprise Architecture, but Much Work Remains. GAO-04-777. Washington, D.C.: August 6, 2004. Information Technology: Homeland Security Should Better Balance Need for System Integration Strategy with Spending for New and Enhanced Systems. GAO-04-509. Washington, D.C.: May 21, 2004. Information Technology: Early Releases of Customs Trade System Operating, but Pattern of Cost and Schedule Problems Needs to Be Addressed. GAO-04-719. Washington, D.C.: May 14, 2004. Information Technology: OMB and Department of Homeland Security Investment Reviews. GAO-04-323. Washington, D.C.: February 10, 2004. Homeland Security: Risks Facing Key Border and Transportation Security Program Need to Be Addressed. GAO-03-1083. Washington, D.C.: September 19, 2003. Information Technology: A Framework for Assessing and Improving Enterprise Architecture Management (Version 1.1). GAO-03-584G. Washington, D.C.: April 2003. Federal Real Property: DHS Has Made Progress, but Additional Actions Are Needed to Address Real Property Management and Security Challenges. GAO-07-658. Washington, D.C.: June 22, 2007. Homeland Security: Guidance from Operations Directorate Will Enhance Collaboration among Departmental Operations Centers. GAO- 07-683T. Washington, D.C.: June 20, 2007. Homeland Security: Management and Programmatic Challenges Facing the Department of Homeland Security. GAO-07-833T. Washington, D.C.: May 10, 2007. DHS Privacy Office: Progress Made but Challenges Remain in Notifying and Reporting to the Public. GAO-07-522. Washington, D.C.: April 27, 2007. Transportation Security: DHS Efforts to Eliminate Redundant Background Check Investigations, GAO-07-756. Washington, D.C.: April 26, 2007. Department of Homeland Security: Observations on GAO Access to Information on Programs and Activities. GAO-07-700T. Washington, D.C.: April 25, 2007. DHS Multi-Agency Operation Centers Would Benefit from Taking Further Steps to Enhance Collaboration and Coordination. GAO-07-686R. Washington, D.C.: April 5, 2007. Homeland Security: Applying Risk Management Principles to Guide Federal Investments. GAO-07-386T. Washington, D.C.: February 7, 2007. Homeland Security: Management and Programmatic Challenges Facing the Department of Homeland Security. GAO-07-452T. Washington, D.C.: February 7, 2007. Homeland Security: Management and Programmatic Challenges Facing the Department of Homeland Security. GAO-07-398T. Washington, D.C.: February 6, 2007. Homeland Security: Progress Has Been Made to Address the Vulnerabilities Exposed by 9/11, but Continued Federal Action Is Needed to Further Mitigate Security Risks. GAO-07-375. Washington, D.C.: January 24, 2007. Terrorist Watch List Screening: Efforts to Help Reduce Adverse Effects on the Public. GAO-06-1031. Washington, D.C.: September 29, 2006. Combating Terrorism: Determining and Reporting Federal Funding Data. GAO-06-161. Washington, D.C.; January 17, 2006. Homeland Security: Overview of Department of Homeland Security Management Challenges. GAO-05-573T. Washington, D.C.: April 20, 2005. Results-Oriented Government: Improvements to DHS’s Planning Process Would Enhance Usefulness and Accountability. GAO-05-300. Washington, D.C.: March 31, 2005. September 11: Recent Estimates of Fiscal Impact of 2001 Terrorist Attack on New York. GAO-05-269. Washington, D.C.; March 30, 2005. Department of Homeland Security: A Comprehensive and Sustained Approach Needed to Achieve Management Integration. GAO-05-139. Washington, D.C.; March 16, 2005. Homeland Security: Observations on the National Strategies Related to Terrorism. GAO-04-1075T. Washington, D.C.: September 22, 2004. Homeland Security: Effective Regional Coordination Can Enhance Emergency Preparedness. GAO-04-1009. Washington, D.C.: September 15, 2004. Intelligence Reform: Human Capital Considerations Critical to 9/11 Commission’s Proposed Reforms. GAO-04-1084T. Washington, D.C.: September 14, 2004. 9/11 Commission Report: Reorganization, Transformation, and Information Sharing. GAO-04-1033T. Washington, D.C.: August 3, 2004. The Chief Operating Officer Concept and its Potential Use as a Strategy to Improve Management at the Department of Homeland Security. GAO-04-876R. Washington, D.C.: June 28, 2004. Homeland Security: Communication Protocols and Risk Communication Principles Can Assist in Refining the Advisory System. GAO-04-682. Washington, D.C.: June 25, 2004. Transfer of Budgetary Resources to the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). GAO-04-329R. Washington, D.C.: April 30, 2004. Homeland Security: Selected Recommendations from Congressionally Chartered Commissions and GAO. GAO-04-591. Washington, D.C.: March 31, 2004. Homeland Security: Information Sharing Responsibilities, Challenges, and Key Management Issues. GAO-03-1165T. Washington, D.C.: September 17, 2003. Homeland Security: Information Sharing Responsibilities, Challenges, and Key Management Issues. GAO-03-715T. Washington, D.C.: May 8, 2003.

Summary: The Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) recent 4 year anniversary provides an opportunity to reflect on the progress DHS has made since its establishment. DHS began operations in March 2003 with the mission to prevent terrorist attacks within the United States, reduce vulnerabilities, minimize damages from attacks, and aid in recovery efforts. GAO has reported that the creation of DHS was an enormous management challenge and that the size, complexity, and importance of the effort made the challenge especially daunting and critical to the nation's security. Our prior work on mergers and acquisitions found that successful transformations of large organizations, even those faced with less strenuous reorganizations than DHS, can take at least 5 to 7 years to achieve. GAO was asked to report on DHS's progress in implementing its mission and management areas and challenges DHS faces. This report also discusses key themes that have affected DHS's implementation efforts. At the time of its creation in 2003 as one of the largest federal reorganizations in the last several decades, we designated the implementation and transformation of DHS as a high-risk area due to the magnitude of the challenges it confronted in areas vital to the physical and economic well being of the nation. After 4 years into its overall integration effort, DHS has attained some level of progress in all of its mission and management areas. The rate of progress, however, among these areas varies. Key underlying themes have affected DHS's implementation efforts, and will be essential for the department to address as it moves forward. These include management, risk management, information sharing, and partnerships and coordination. For example, while DHS has made progress in transforming its component agencies into a fully functioning department, it has not yet addressed key elements of the transformation process, such as developing a comprehensive strategy for agency transformation and ensuring that management systems and functions are integrated. This lack of a comprehensive strategy and integrated management systems and functions limits DHS's ability to carry out its homeland security responsibilities in an effective, risk-based way. DHS also has not yet fully adopted and applied a risk management approach in implementing its mission and management functions. Some DHS component agencies, such as the Transportation Security Administration and the Coast Guard, have taken steps to do so, but DHS has not yet taken sufficient actions to ensure that this approach is used departmentwide. In addition, DHS has taken steps to share information and coordinate with homeland security partners, but has faced difficulties in these partnership efforts, such as in ensuring that the private sector receives better information on potential threats. Given DHS's dominant role in securing the homeland, it is critical that the department's mission and management programs are operating as efficiently and effectively as possible. DHS has had to undertake these responsibilities while also working to transform itself into a fully functioning cabinet department--a difficult task for any organization. As DHS moves forward, it will be important for the department to continue to develop more measurable goals to guide implementation efforts and to enable better accountability of its progress toward achieving desired outcomes. It will also be important for DHS to continually reassess its mission and management goals, measures, and milestones to evaluate progress made, identify past and emerging obstacles, and examine alternatives to address those obstacles and effectively implement its missions.