Since the beginning of the all-volunteer force in 1973, the military services have recruited hundreds of thousands of new enlistees each year. While these enlistees are required to sign contracts committing them to remain on active duty for a specified period of time, the services have found that many do not fulfill this commitment. In 1997, we reported on the reasons that enlistees do not complete their first 6 months of service. For this follow-on report, we have analyzed why enlistees who successfully complete their first 6 months of service are separated before their contract terms have expired. Before new recruits are sent to basic training, they are required to take an enlistment oath and sign a contract to serve one of the military services for a specified period of time, generally between 2 and 6 years. For enlistees who entered the services in fiscal year 1993, about 87 percent signed contracts for 2, 3, or 4 years. The breakdown of contract length is as follows: 8.2 percent for 2 years, 15 percent for 3 years, 64.2 percent for 4 years, 4.1 percent for 5 years, and 8.4 percent for 6 years. DOD defines attrition as the failure of an enlistee to complete his or her contractual obligation. Some attrition occurs during basic training, which lasts from 6 to 12 weeks, depending on the service. Some attrition occurs during initial skill technical training, which lasts for a few weeks to more than 1 year, depending on the enlistee’s occupation. Finally, some attrition occurs after enlistees have reported to their first duty assignments. By the 6-month point in enlistees’ first terms, most have completed both basic and initial skill training and have been assigned to their first duty stations, though this is not the case for enlistees whose occupations require longer and more extensive training. Two examples include the Air Force’s pararescue occupation, which requires 55 weeks of training beyond basic training and the Navy’s electronics technician rating, which requires 36.7 weeks of training after basic. In fiscal year 1993, 202,908 enlistees without prior military service signed first-term contracts. Of this number, 174,555 (86 percent) were men, and 28,353 (14 percent) were women. Women represented 22 percent of Air Force enlistees, 16 percent of Army enlistees, 13 percent of Navy enlistees, and 5 percent of Marine Corps enlistees. In terms of quality measures, 91.5 percent of all enlistees held high school diplomas, and 71.1 percent scored in the upper half of the Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT). (More data on this group’s demographics is contained in app. I.) In presenting our detailed analysis of first-term attrition, we track all enlistees who entered the services in fiscal year 1993 up until the end of fiscal year 1997, 48 months later, since this is the latest available data. For enlistees with 2-, 3-, and 4-year contracts, we counted as attrition those enlistees who did not complete the full length of their contracts. For enlistees with 5- or 6-year contracts, we counted as attrition those enlistees who did not complete 48 months of their contracts. In January 1997, we reported that one-third of all first-term enlistees do not complete their first terms of service and that a significant portion of this attrition occurs in the enlistees’ first 6 months. In our report, we made recommendations to the Department of Defense (DOD) and the services on how they could improve their (1) use of separation codes to better analyze attrition, (2) recruiter incentive systems by tying these systems to recruits’ successful completion of basic training, and (3) screening of recruits by adding and revising medical screening forms and moving all drug testing to the Military Entrance Processing Commands. We testified on this work before the Subcommittee on Personnel, Senate Committee on Armed Services in March 1997. The recommendations contained in our report were incorporated into the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1998 (P.L. 105-85). In January 1998, we issued a more detailed report on recruiter incentive systems and the selection of recruiters. This work was also aimed at identifying what could be done to reduce attrition. Among our recommendations were for the services to (1) improve the screening of recruiters to ensure that those selected for recruiting duty possessed traits characteristic of successful recruiters; (2) require incoming recruits to undergo physical fitness tests before they report to basic training to screen out candidates likely to separate early due to poor physical conditioning; and (3) encourage the use of quarterly floating goals for recruiters to relieve pressure on them and to increase their morale and productivity. In March 1998, we testified before the Senate Committee on Armed Services’ Subcommittee on Personnel and the House Committee on National Security’s Subcommittee on Military Personnel on how well the services were managing attrition and the screening of recruiters and their recruits. The Chairman and the Ranking Minority Member of the Senate Committee on Armed Services’ Subcommittee on Personnel asked that we continue our work in the area of attrition by analyzing the historical separation rates of enlisted personnel who serve 6 months but leave military service before completing their first contract terms. While we developed some overall historical attrition data, we focused our detailed analysis on enlistees who entered the services in fiscal year 1993 and were separated by the end of fiscal year 1997. Specifically, we determined (1) the rate and timing of attrition, (2) the extent of DOD’s investment in recruiting and training first-term enlistees, (3) reasons for attrition after training, (4) servicemembers’ perceptions of quality-of-life factors that contribute to attrition, and (5) actions DOD and the services are taking to reduce enlistees’ attrition. We also agreed to provide attrition data for enlistees by educational background, AFQT score, age at enlistment, gender, and race/ethnic group (see app. I). To determine historical first-term attrition rates, we obtained data from the Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC), whose primary purpose is to support the management needs of the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness. The data covered all enlistees without prior service who entered the military from fiscal year 1982 through 1993 and included the gender, educational background, age at enlistment, race, AFQT score, occupational code, and separation code (for those who left the services). To ensure a standardized reporting of attrition rates, we measured attrition at the 48-month point for all enlistees entering the services from fiscal year 1982 through 1993. These groups of enlistees reached their 48-month points of service from fiscal year 1986 through 1997. Our calculation of attrition did not include the early separation of enlistees with 5- or 6-year contracts who were discharged in their final 1 to 2 years of service. However, because the majority of first-term contracts are for 4 years, we made our calculation at the 48-month point to include the most recent data available (fiscal year 1997). Also, like DMDC, we did not count as attrition persons allowed to separate before the end of their terms through early release programs. Because our method does not include the attrition of enlistees with 5- or 6-year contracts who were separated in their final 1 or 2 years of service and because it does not include separations under early release programs, our information on attrition rates is somewhat conservative. Although we did not extensively test the reliability of DMDC’s database, we did discuss the Center’s computation of attrition rates with DMDC officials and recalculated these rates ourselves. Our recalculated rates were comparable to DMDC’s rates. We also compared our calculated attrition rates and categories of separation with information in the services’ databases, and officials in each military service who track attrition verified the accuracy of our data on reasons for early separation. To determine how much the services spend in recruiting and training each enlistee, we interviewed cost analysts at the Army’s Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), Fort Monroe, Virginia; the Marine Corps Combat Development Command, Quantico, Virginia; the Air Force’s Air Education and Training Command, Randolph Air Force Base, Texas; and the Navy’s Office of the Chief of Naval Education and Training Command, Pensacola, Florida. We also discussed the calculation of the services’ cost of recruiting and training enlistees with officials from the Center for Naval Analyses, the U.S. Army Cost and Economic Analysis Center, and the Naval Center for Cost Analysis, as well as service officials who track attrition. Because the services calculate recruiting and training costs differently and because analyzing the various costing methodologies was beyond the scope of our review, we formulated costs using data provided to us by DOD-level officials in the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Readiness) and the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Force Management Policy). To determine reasons that enlistees were separated between their 7th and 48th month of service, we first analyzed DMDC data by separation code. The separation codes included in DMDC’s database are taken from each servicemember’s official discharge form, the DD Form 214, “Certificate of Release or Discharge From Active Duty.” We then interviewed 254 first-term enlistees and 41 supervisors to gain insight into root causes for early separation. Prior to our site visits, we notified service officials that we wished to interview first-term enlistees who were (1) in occupations that we had determined had higher-than-average attrition rates and (2) being separated for misconduct, medical problems, unsatisfactory performance, drug use, and character/behavior disorders. (For a presentation of attrition rates by occupation, see app. II.) During our site visits, we interviewed all or nearly all enlistees being separated at the time. Our interviewees included 110 first-term enlistees who were being separated early and 144 first-term enlistees who planned to complete their terms. Of the 110 enlistees who were being separated early, 97, or 88 percent, were being discharged for misconduct, medical problems, drug use, performance problems, and character/behavior disorders. We interviewed an additional 41 enlisted personnel on their second or subsequent terms, as well as supervisory officer and enlisted personnel at all locations to obtain insights into their perceptions of what drives first-term attrition. We conducted one-on-one interviews with first-term enlistees and supervisors and conducted large group discussions with other commissioned and noncommissioned officers. We chose the following locations to conduct our interviews based on our analysis of where large concentrations of first-term enlistees were assigned, particularly in occupations experiencing higher-than-average attrition rates: the Air Force’s Air Combat Command, Langley, Virginia; the Navy’s Office of the Commander in Chief, U.S. Atlantic Fleet, Norfolk, Virginia, and Submarine Torpedo Facility, Yorktown, Virginia; the Marine Corps’ II Expeditionary Force, Camp Lejeune and Cherry Point, North Carolina; and the Army’s XVIII Airborne Corps, Fort Bragg, North Carolina. During our one-on-one interviews, we assured interviewees that we would not associate their names with information they provided to us. Though we took notes during our interviews, we did not record interviewees’ names. Interviews lasted from 10 to 45 minutes each. We asked open-ended questions that would allow enlistees to tell us how they felt about being in the service. In summary, our questions were as follows: Are you being separated before the end of your first term? If so, why? What do you plan to do after you leave the service? Do you want to stay in the service? If given the opportunity, would you like to reenlist? Do you have any other thoughts on your occupation and your time in the service? If you want to leave, is there anything the service could have done to make you want to stay? While our interviews with first-term enlistees do not represent a statistical sample, they provided useful insights into enlistees’ perceptions of the reasons for attrition. Our interviews were intended to solicit any and all thoughts on why enlistees were not completing their first terms and on the advantages and disadvantages of military service. To gain insight into first-term attrition, we interviewed officials in the Army’s Directorate of Military Personnel Management, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, Washington, D.C.; the Navy’s Office of the Assistant Chief of Naval Personnel for Military Personnel Policy and Career Progression, Bureau of Naval Personnel, Arlington, Virginia; the Air Force’s Directorate of Military Personnel Policy, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, Personnel, Washington, D.C.; and the Marine Corps’ Manpower Plans and Policy Division, Office of the Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for Military and Reserve Affairs, Arlington, Virginia. We conducted our review between August 1997 and September 1998 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. About one-third of all enlistees who entered the services between fiscal year 1982 and 1993 did not complete their first contract terms. Most of these enlistees were separated between their 7th and 48th month of service, when they had been fully trained and were assigned to jobs. Our analysis of all enlistees entering the services in fiscal year 1993 showed that these general historical trends continued. However, the rates were slightly higher in the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force. DOD’s attrition rates throughout this period are somewhat higher than reported because they do not include some enlistees who were allowed to separate early for various reasons, such as to attend a civilian school or to allow the services to meet mandated end strengths. DOD estimates of fiscal year 1998 costs indicate that by the time enlistees have been recruited and trained, generally within the first 6 months of service, the services have already spent about $35,000 on each one. This figure includes enlistees’ pay and allowances, as well as the cost of the services’ recruiting and training infrastructure. For enlistees who entered the services in fiscal year 1993, the cost of recruiting and training was lower, ranging from $19,143 to $24,885. Using these earlier costs, we estimate that the services spent $1.3 billion on recruiting and training the enlistees who entered the services in fiscal year 1993 but did not complete their first terms. During these enlistees’ abbreviated time in service, approximately $0.8 billion of the $1.3 billion was spent on enlistees’ pay and allowances. The remaining $0.5 billion was spent on the services’ recruiting and training infrastructure, which includes recruiting and training sites, instructors, and recruiters. When the services separate enlistees between their 7th and 48th month of service, they are not receiving a full return on their investment in personnel whom they have partially or fully trained and provided with on-the-job experience. DMDC, as DOD’s primary repository of servicewide attrition data, reports that for enlistees who entered the services between fiscal year 1982 and 1993, the attrition rate averaged 31.7 percent (see table 2.1). In most of these years, attrition rates have been lowest for the Air Force and highest for the Army. As shown in the table, attrition rates increased in the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force for those entering the services in fiscal year 1993 and being separated by the end of fiscal year 1997—the latest available data. In fact, these rates were higher than they had been in over a decade. The Marine Corps, in contrast, had the lowest attrition rate, continuing a 3-year decline beginning in fiscal year 1990. Our data indicates that most of the rise in attrition rates for the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force occurred during enlistees’ first 6 months of service. An analysis of the 35.8-percent attrition rate for enlistees who entered the services in fiscal year 1993 indicates that 13.6 percent of all enlistees were separated before they had completed 6 months of service or less. The remaining 22.2 percent were separated between their 7th and 48th month of service. (See fig. 2.1.) The first 6 months of service represent the period when the highest concentration of attrition occurred for enlistees who entered the services in fiscal year 1993. For the 72,670 enlistees who did not complete their first terms, 27,624 were separated in this initial period. Between month 7 and 12, an additional 7,607 enlistees were separated. During these enlistees’ 2nd, 3rd, and 4th years of service, attrition dropped gradually. In the 2nd year of service, 14,922 enlistees were discharged. In the 3rd year of enlistment, 12,395 persons were separated, and in the 4th year, 10,122 persons were discharged. (See fig. 2.2.) DOD-reported attrition rates include some enlistees who are separated voluntarily under the services’ early release programs, such as enlistees released from the Air Force voluntarily to take other employment opportunities. However, the reported rates do not include enlistees released voluntarily to attend school or for reductions in force. As a result, attrition rates would be even higher if they included all enlistees who did not complete their first contract terms. The services’ standard policy has been that enlistees are generally not to be released more than 90 days before the end of their first terms. However, in practice, the services have for various reasons released enlistees more than 90 days early. According to DOD, the 90-day release option exists to preclude the cost and the inconvenience of transferring servicemembers to new duty positions just as they are about to complete their terms of service and be discharged. Marine Corps and Army officials told us that this 90-day standard remained the policy during downsizing. In contrast, the Air Force and the Navy deliberately released first-term enlistees much earlier than 90 days to meet mandated decreases in end strength during downsizing. According to Navy data, beginning in fiscal year 1992, enlistees were voluntarily released up to 1 year before the end of their first terms. The number of these early releases peaked in fiscal year 1994, with 6,434 first-term personnel being allowed to separate 4 to 12 months early. In fiscal year 1997, this number was down to 1,604. The Navy’s most recent authorization for these reduction-in-strength early releases was disseminated by the Secretary of the Navy in fiscal year 1993 and continues through fiscal year 1999. None of the persons allowed to separate early from the Navy under the early release programs are included in DMDC calculations of attrition rates. During its downsizing, the Air Force allowed some first-term enlistees to be released after only 1 year of service to go into the reserves. The Air Force also allowed enlistees to be released early to attend school or to take other employment. There was no minimum time-in-service requirement for these two types of voluntary release. DMDC does not include Air Force enlistees released to go into the reserves or to go to school in its attrition statistics; it does include enlistees released early to take other employment. According to Air Force officials, allowing first-term enlistees to separate early was one way to avoid having to separate and pay benefits to more senior enlisted personnel while downsizing was occurring. The Air Force has recently announced its decision to reduce the number of early releases it approves, though its early release programs remain in effect. Our analysis of DMDC’s data on all enlistees who entered the services in fiscal year 1993 confirms that the Air Force and the Navy allowed large numbers of enlisted personnel to voluntarily separate more than 90 days early under early release programs between fiscal year 1993 and 1997. The Marine Corps and the Army, on the other hand, released fewer persons under these programs. (See table 2.2.) Enlistees released early to attend school or as part of reduction-in-strength programs are not included in DMDC’s calculation of attrition rates. Adding releases more than 3 months early to attrition rates for enlistees who entered the services in fiscal year 1993 does not affect the Army’s or the Marine Corps’ rates. However, it adds 4.7 percentage points to the Navy’s rate of 35.8 percent, increasing it to 40.5 percent, and it adds 3.5 percentage points to the Air Force’s rate of 32.5 percent, increasing it to 36 percent. According to DOD, in fiscal year 1993, the average cost of recruiting and training each enlistee ranged from $19,143 to $24,885, depending on the service. Using figures on the cost of recruiting and providing basic training to these enlistees, we estimate that the services invested $237 million in the 21,002 enlistees who entered the services in fiscal year 1993 and were separated in their first 3 months of service, when most had not yet begun initial skills training. We estimate that the services invested another $1.1 billion in the 51,668 enlistees who were separated after they had begun or completed their initial skills training. Of this total of $1.3 billion in recruiting and training funding, a DOD official estimates that about two-thirds, or $0.8 billion, was spent to pay the salaries of student enlistees, and one-third, or $0.5 billion, was spent to pay for the recruiting and training infrastructure, which includes recruiting and training sites, instructors, and recruiters. Updated recruiting and training costs provided by DOD indicate that these costs have risen since fiscal year 1993. In fiscal year 1998, DOD estimates the average cost of recruiting and training each enlistee is $35,500: $6,700 for recruiting and $28,800 for training. The fact that recruiting and training costs are rising demonstrates that if current attrition rates continue, the cost of attrition to the services will become even greater. While it is not feasible to expect to save the entire cost of recruiting and training for each enlistee who is not separated, the cost figures do demonstrate the magnitude of the cost of recruiting and training hundreds of thousands of new recruits each year. It would be expected that if there were a significant reduction in attrition, the recruiting and training infrastructure could be reduced, resulting in major savings. Also, it is clear that once the individual has been trained, the longer the services can keep an enlistee, the more of a return the services will receive on their investment. According to the official codes used to categorize enlistees’ separations, the primary reasons for the early discharge of enlistees who entered the services in fiscal year 1993 varied by gender and by service. While the services’ official separation codes capture general categories of discharge, we continue to find, as we did in our 1997 report on attrition from basic training, that the services use these separation codes differently and that these codes capture only one of several possible reasons for a single early discharge. The services’ sometimes extreme variations in the percentages of their separations for a given official reason suggest that the services interpret separation codes differently, that their separation policies differ, that the services have very different attrition problems, or some combination of these explanations. The principal reasons that men who entered the services in fiscal year 1993 were separated between their 7th and 48th month are presented in table 3.1 in order of their magnitude. As shown, over 70 percent of the servicewide men in this group were separated for misconduct, medical/physical conditions, performance problems, and drug use. The principal reasons that women who entered the services in fiscal year 1993 were separated between their 7th and 48th month are presented in table 3.2 in order of their magnitude. As shown, over 71 percent of all women in this group were separated for pregnancy, medical/physical problems, misconduct, performance problems, or parenthood. Overall attrition rates (or separation rates between 0 and 48 months) are higher for women who entered the services in fiscal year 1993 than they are for men. Separations for pregnancy explain the differences in attrition rates by gender in the Navy and the Air Force. However, this explanation does not hold true for the Marine Corps and the Army. If separations for pregnancy are subtracted from the total number of each service’s discharges, attrition rates for Navy women are actually 2 percentage points lower than they are for Navy men. After subtracting separations for pregnancy, attrition rates for Air Force men and women are the same. After subtracting separations for pregnancy, attrition rates are still 6 percentage points higher for Army women and 9 percentage points higher for Marine Corps women (see table 3.3). It should be noted that a much larger percentage of female separations are due to reasons related to parenthood—9 percent for women compared to 0.4 percent for men. Our analysis of reasons for separation between the 7th and 48th month indicates that, after separations for pregnancy are subtracted, discharges for misconduct, drugs, and alcoholism continue to represent higher proportions of separations for men than for women. On the other hand, discharges for medical/physical and performance problems, for character/behavior disorders, for dependency/hardship, and for parenthood continue to represent higher proportions of separations for women than for men. (See table 3.4.) The incidence of separations within each category varies by service. For example, for Marine Corps men who entered the service in fiscal year 1993, the leading cause of separation was medical problems, and for Army, Navy, and Air Force men in this group, it was misconduct. (Figs. 3.1 through 3.4 show each service’s major reasons for separation by gender.) Major reasons for female attrition also vary by service, although separations for pregnancy represent the largest single category of discharges for women in all four services. Separations for pregnancy represent between one-fourth and one-third of all female separations. For Navy and Marine Corps women who entered the services in fiscal year 1993, the second leading cause of separation was medical problems. For Air Force women, it was “miscellaneous” releases, and for Army women, it was performance problems. (See figs. 3.5 through 3.8.) In our January 1997 report on attrition from basic training, we made recommendations for DOD to improve the consistency with which the services apply separation codes. We found that the data DOD uses to track attrition is based on separation codes that the services interpret differently and that capture only one of many possible reasons for discharge. Our recommendations were incorporated in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1998 (P.L. 105-85), and DOD has formed a working group that is reexamining the services’ use of these separation codes. Our current analysis of separation codes confirms the continued need for this effort. First, the services’ extreme variations in numbers of separations for different reasons—such as unsatisfactory performance, medical conditions, and drug use—suggest that the services have different attrition problems, are interpreting the separation codes differently, have different separation policies, or some combination of these three explanations. Second, current separation codes do not provide information specific enough for DOD to understand the magnitude of certain types of discharge. For example, the separation code for unsatisfactory performance includes discharges for failure to pass physical fitness tests, career development tests, and on-the-job requirements but does not distinguish among the various categories of failure. The following sections describe the variations in percentages of enlistees separated for the major official reasons for discharge: misconduct, medical conditions, unsatisfactory performance, drug use, and pregnancy. The categories of offenses included under separations for misconduct range from civilian court convictions, courts-martial, and serious offenses, such as larceny, to the less egregious category of minor disciplinary infractions, such as being habitually late for work. For all enlistees entering the services in fiscal year 1993, separations for misconduct between the 7th and 48th month of service represented about one-third of all separations for the Navy and the Air Force. Separations for misconduct represented about one-fourth of all separations for the Army and the Marine Corps (see table 3.5). The Army and the Navy have made it clear that they do not wish to reduce attrition rates by trying to rehabilitate individuals who engage in misconduct. For example, the Navy has recently made its definition of a “pattern of misconduct” more stringent, changing the number of offenses constituting a “pattern” from three or more to two or more. Also, the Army’s Director of Military Personnel Management has emphasized to its major commands that two of the largest areas of separations, discharges for misconduct and discharges in lieu of court-martial, “are areas that are absolutely non-negotiable.” DOD and GAO both have efforts underway to determine whether there are better ways to screen incoming recruits for criminal backgrounds to ensure that all available information on past criminal behavior is considered in deciding whether to enlist new recruits. In April 1998, DOD issued a report making recommendations to improve the quality of its databases and to maintain preservice arrest information on recruits. GAO’s effort involves an examination of (1) the services’ policies, procedures, and practices for screening and granting enlistment waivers to recruits who have criminal backgrounds and (2) the completeness of the information sources used to check criminal records. Some enlistees now separated for misconduct may be candidates for rehabilitation. For all services’ enlistees who entered in fiscal year 1993 and were separated between their 7th and 48th month, 12 percent of those separated for misconduct, or 1,602 persons, were found to have committed “minor disciplinary offenses.” At one unit we visited, an Air Force officer told us that most separations for misconduct were not for serious offenses but rather for minor disciplinary infractions. He said that it was extremely rare for an enlistee to be granted probation and rehabilitation. In the 7 months he had been at the unit, he had seen only one case in which an enlistee had been able to convince the local commander not to separate him. The officer said that it is almost a “foregone conclusion” that enlistees whose separations process has begun will be separated. He viewed it as a “waste” to separate some of these enlistees. As we reported in January 1997, separations for medical problems represent a large portion of all attrition from basic training. In that report, we made several recommendations for improving the medical screening of incoming recruits. The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1998 included all of our recommendations, and DOD is now working to improve medical screening. Separations for medical problems are also significant for enlistees in their 7th through 48th months of service. Enlistees may be separated for any number of disqualifying medical conditions, for example, a separated collarbone, a brain tumor, fallen arches, a seizure disorder, a broken back, or a serious knee injury. For enlistees entering the services in fiscal year 1993, the Marine Corps separated a higher percentage of its personnel for medical problems than the other services did (see table 3.6). Again, the differences in numbers of enlistees placed in this category by the services may indicate variations in how the services apply separation codes. The fact that the Marine Corps has a higher number of enlistees separated for medical problems may also be a result of what may be the Marine Corps’ more rigorous physical standards and training. Some Marine Corps officials told us that separations for medical problems are related to the physical difficulty of some jobs that are very strenuous and make demands on the body, particularly on the knees and ankles. Army personnel with whom we spoke said that in many cases involving medical problems, enlistees arrive at their first assignments already injured as a result of training. Enlistees may be separated for unsatisfactory performance for a variety of reasons: for failing to perform adequately on their jobs, for failing physical fitness tests, or for failing career development tests. DMDC data indicates that the Army separates a far greater percentage of its enlistees for performance problems than do the other services (see table 3.7). The Army’s larger number of separations for unsatisfactory performance may indicate that the Navy, the Air Force, and the Marine Corps list another reason for separating persons who experience performance problems. Or it may indicate that the Navy, the Air Force, and the Marine Corps retain more of these enlistees. Another possible explanation is that during downsizing, the Army allowed enlistees with “bars to reenlistment” to voluntarily separate for unsatisfactory performance. According to Army regulations, a “bar to reenlistment” is a mechanism whereby Army commanders may put enlistees on notice that they may not reenlist unless their performance improves. In December 1996, the Army changed this policy, no longer allowing such soldiers to voluntarily separate. As a result of this change in policy, the Army reports that its separations in this category dropped from 1,050 in fiscal year 1996 to 305 in fiscal year 1997. Service officials told us that first-term enlistees may also be separated for unsatisfactory performance if they fail physical fitness tests. During our interviews with first-term enlistees, some told us that they were being separated because they had failed one part of the physical fitness test, such as the running portion or the sit-ups portion. Though we were told that alternate tests are available to certain enlistees, we spoke with enlistees who were being separated for failing the physical fitness test and did not know that such options existed or had not been offered alternate tests. In the Air Force, an enlistee may be separated for unsatisfactory performance if he or she fails career development course tests. Though Air Force policy permits commanders to allow enlistees to change jobs to stay in the Air Force after failing these tests, we found that commanders did not always make use of this alternative. The Air Force did not have data on how many enlistees were separated for failing their career development course tests or on how many were retained. For enlistees entering the services in fiscal year 1993, the Marine Corps and the Navy separated more persons between their 7th and 48th month for drug use than the other services did (see table 3.8). Differences in the services’ proportions of drug separations might be explained by differences in their use of separation codes. Service officials also speculated that these differences might be explained at least in part by the frequency of drug testing. For example, according to Navy and Marine Corps officials, the Marine Corps tests its enlistees for drugs a little over 3 times per year; the Navy tests its enlistees 2.15 times per year; the Army 2 times per year; and the Air Force 0.75 times per year. All four services take drug use very seriously. They all have mandatory requirements that such offenses are to be processed for separation, though such processing does not result in an automatic discharge for the offender. According to Navy, Army, and Air Force officials, these services have “zero tolerance” for drug use, and an enlistee is almost always separated after a first offense. The Marine Corps also has “zero tolerance” for drug use. However, two Marine Corps local commanders told us that they are beginning to reconsider the retention of one-time drug users. Conversely, officials in the Army appear to be considering actions that would result in the retention of fewer drug users. While the Marine Corps separates a much higher percentage of its enlistees for drug use than the Air Force and the Army, two local Marine Corps commanders told us that they were reviewing all separation packages and allowing certain enlistees to remain in the Marine Corps after their drug tests were positive. Each enlistee allowed a “second chance” was tracked closely to determine whether he or she successfully remained free of drugs. Both commanders who were granting second chances to drug users said that the Marine Corps has a monetary investment in enlistees who have been fully trained and are assigned to jobs. We interviewed two Marine Corps enlistees who had been given second chances after testing positive for drugs. The first enlistee said that a friend had put methamphetamines in his drink at a party without his knowledge. The second enlistee said that he had tried cocaine for the first time at a friend’s bachelor party. The Army’s recent actions, on the other hand, indicate that it is becoming stricter with drug users. Its current policy allows local commanders to decide whether to retain first-time drug users if they have 3 years of service or less. However, the Army has drafted a policy that, if finalized, will make retention of drug users even rarer. The new policy, if implemented, will make it mandatory for commanders to initiate separation processing for all enlistees found to have used drugs, though commanders will still have the authority to retain these enlistees. Army officials at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, told us that they had begun to send drug users to jail, rather than allow them to simply separate. These officials believed that this more punitive action was sending the message to enlistees that taking drugs was not an easy way out of the service. None of the services maintains data on how often drug users are retained. Because such data is not maintained, the services have no means of determining whether retaining enlistees found to have used drugs is an effective policy, that is, whether these enlistees represent good risks for either continuing to be productive servicemembers or for completing their first terms. Female enlistees in all services may be separated if they become pregnant, and male and female enlistees may be separated for “parenthood” if they cannot adequately provide for their children while meeting their service obligations. For female enlistees who joined the services in fiscal year 1993, separations for pregnancy represented between one-fourth and one-third of all female separations. When separations for parenthood are added, this portion rises even further (see table 3.9). The services’ policies regarding the separation of pregnant women differ. The Army and the Air Force allow pregnant women to separate at their own discretion, upon request. The Marine Corps and the Navy, on the other hand, place the decision of whether to separate pregnant women in the hands of the local commanders. That is, for Marine Corps and Navy women, automatic and voluntary separation for pregnancy is not an option. According to Marine Corps and Navy officials, the rationale behind their policies is that enlistees represent a recruiting and training investment and that the decision should be left up to the local commander. At present, none of the services maintains data to support the effectiveness of either allowing all pregnant women to separate or leaving this decision up to local commanders. For example, the services do not maintain data on how many enlisted women become pregnant and voluntarily stay in the service to complete their first terms or, in the case of the Navy and the Marine Corps, the number of pregnant women who are required to stay in the service after their requests to separate are turned down. Without such data, the services will be unable to determine whether first-term enlisted women who become pregnant and remain in the service after being denied separation prove to be productive servicemembers who successfully complete their terms. In an attempt to find root causes for enlistees’ early separations, we interviewed 254 first-term personnel and their supervisors. Many supervisors and first-term enlistees suggested that quality-of-life issues, such as a perceived erosion of benefits, pay, and advancement opportunities, coupled with long work hours and frequent deployments, may lie at the root of many separations. While our interviews do not comprise a representative, statistical sample of all first-term enlistees and clearly do not provide a basis for pointing out which quality-of-life improvements might lead to lower attrition rates, they do provide useful insights into underlying reasons for current attrition rates. All four of the services survey their personnel on quality-of-life issues in some way. However, the services do not currently administer exit surveys to first-term enlisted personnel, and they have not used available survey information to help analyze the problem of first-term enlisted attrition. That is, there is currently no formalized mechanism for prioritizing the concerns of first-term personnel who are discharged early or allowing the services to direct their attention to improving quality-of-life issues that will have the most effect on reducing the attrition of first-term personnel. Many enlistees expressed the general perception that military retirement and medical benefits are eroding and that their salaries are not competitive with those of the private sector. The sense that they could make more money in the civilian world was most prevalent in occupations with highly transferrable skills such as those involving computers. The perception that retirement benefits are eroding was another frequently expressed demotivator. This was particularly true when first-term enlistees worked side by side with enlistees who had entered the services before the retirement system was changed and whose retirement benefits were seen as clearly better. Finally, the sense that medical benefits were not as good as they used to be was expressed frequently as another reason that a career in the military was no longer as appealing. Many enlistees expressed frustration with not having more opportunities for career advancement. Many said that they felt that advancement opportunities were limited, that they had few choices to cross-train for other occupations, and that they were not allowed to transfer to other locations. Some who had joined the military for college benefits said that their long work schedules and deployments prevented them from taking night courses toward obtaining a college degree. One subgroup of Navy enlistees for whom career training appeared to be of particular concern was the general detail sailors. These sailors complete basic training and a 2.4-week apprenticeship course but do not attend a technical school that qualifies them for a Navy rating. According to Navy career counselors we interviewed, the Navy’s policy of not sending these sailors to technical schools is a primary driver of first-term enlisted attrition. In fact, Navy data indicates that general detail sailors experience a higher-than-average attrition rate. For example, for enlistees entering the Navy between fiscal years 1989 and 1993, the overall first-term attrition rate ranged from 30.5 percent to 35.8 percent. The attrition rate for general detail sailors during these years, however, ranged from 39.3 percent to 43 percent. Enlistees’ feelings about their deployment schedules varied, depending on how frequently they were deployed and on whether they were married. In some cases, deployment appeared to be a motivator. Some enlistees complained that they had joined the service to see the world and had not been able to deploy at all. Marine Corps officials told us that they believed that first-term enlistees who deployed generally had higher morale, fewer disciplinary problems, and a greater sense of mission. Other enlistees expressed frustration with deployment, especially those in occupations that required extensive and frequent travel away from home. For example, one supervisor of enlisted personnel in an Air Force fighter squadron said that his unit’s rigorous deployment schedule was the primary driver of enlisted attrition. He said that in one 18-month period, from June 1995 through December 1996, his entire squadron was deployed for 205 days. One-third to one-half of the squadron was deployed for an additional 134 days during this same period. Single enlistees frequently complained that their married counterparts were treated preferentially because they received housing and subsistence allowances and were allowed to live and eat off base or off ships. Single enlistees believed that, because they lived and ate on base or aboard ship, they were more available and thus were required to perform extra duties. They also said that they did not have equal amounts of time off and privacy. All four services have developed surveys to collect information from servicemembers on their perceptions of the quality of military life. However, no service currently administers exit surveys to first-term enlisted personnel or targets the information it collects from these surveys to the problem of first-term enlisted attrition and ways to reduce it. The Army currently administers two surveys to its personnel. First, commanders may administer a “Command Climate Survey” when they assume a new position, but they have the option of keeping the results confidential. Second, the Army Research Institute has administered a “Sample Survey of Military Personnel” to Army officers and enlisted personnel twice a year since 1943. The latest survey results, from the spring of 1997, indicate that 52.2 percent of all enlisted personnel are satisfied or very satisfied with the overall quality of Army life. Only 28.9 percent of enlisted personnel, however, were satisfied or very satisfied with their amount of basic pay, and only 28.1 percent were satisfied or very satisfied with their retirement benefits. Two other areas in which around one-third of enlistees expressed that they were satisfied or very satisfied were in (1) the number of personnel available to do the work (35.9 percent) and (2) the opportunity to select a job, training, or station of their choice (32.8 percent). In 1994 and 1995, the Army administered an exit survey to its personnel, but this effort was discontinued because Army officials believed that the survey duplicated the Army’s other two surveys. The Army Research Institute is in the process of developing another survey to be administered to all recruits as they enter basic training and as they either separate from training or continue on to their first duty stations. Data collection for this effort is expected to begin in January 1999. The Navy has administered a “Retention/Separation Questionnaire” to its personnel every year since fiscal year 1990. The questionnaire asks officers and enlisted personnel to rate their satisfaction with 45 aspects of Navy life and to identify the most important reason for leaving or thinking of leaving the Navy. The 1997 results showed that the top six reasons that Navy personnel cited for leaving or thinking of leaving the Navy were (1) lack of promotion and advancement opportunity, (2) family separation, (3) low basic pay, (4) quality of leadership/management, (5) quality of Navy life, and (6) lack of fairness in performance evaluations. The Air Force has administered a “Climate and Quality of Life Survey” to its officer and enlisted personnel every year since 1995. The survey contains questions on a variety of issues, including how many days are spent away from home, how many hours personnel work each week, and how personnel perceive the fairness of their pay and benefits. The Air Force’s latest survey, for 1997, indicates that 69 percent of all first-term enlisted personnel believe that the Air Force is a good place to work. However, a summary of the survey results states that the percentage of enlisted personnel who report that they plan to stay in the Air Force until they are eligible to retire dropped from 64 percent in 1995 to 58 percent in 1997. The average number of temporary duty days increased in this time period from 46 days per year to 60 days per year. The average number of work hours per week rose from 46 hours in 1996 to 49 in 1997. Only 28 percent of all first-term enlisted personnel believe that their pay and benefits are fair and equitable. Forty-four percent of all married enlisted personnel and 45 percent of all single enlisted personnel are satisfied with their medical benefits. When asked which of the programs, services, and facilities had the most positive influence on career intent, enlisted personnel tended to identify tuition assistance and Air Force-sponsored off-duty educational opportunities. Finally, the Navy Personnel Research and Development Center administered a survey in 1993 for the Marine Corps on quality-of-life issues. This survey, which contained questions on servicemembers’ perceptions of their residences, incomes, standards of living, and other things, was given to a sample of all active-duty Marine Corps personnel except those in the lowest pay grade, E-1. Overall, survey results showed that junior enlisted personnel were more negative on all measures of quality of life than members of other pay grades. For example, unmarried junior enlisted personnel, who are most likely to live in the barracks, had the lowest scores of all ranks on questions about satisfaction with housing. Junior enlisted personnel also had the lowest scores for satisfaction with their incomes. While current deployment status was not a factor in determining how members felt about their jobs, junior enlisted personnel reported fewer positive feelings about their jobs than did senior enlisted members and officers. The Marine Corps has discontinued this questionnaire while the Center for Naval Analyses develops a new “Climate Battery Survey.” The new survey will be divided into two parts, one on retention issues and a second one on separation issues. The Marine Corps plans to require all active-duty personnel to complete the separation portion of the survey before they leave the Marine Corps. Historically, the services have focused their efforts to reduce attrition on recruiting high school graduates with high scores on aptitude tests because these types of enlistees have lower attrition rates. Because the majority of all recruits are now high school graduates with high aptitude scores, the services must now focus on increasing the proportion of these enlistees who complete their first terms. The services have taken some steps to address attrition, such as encouraging commanders to examine opportunities to review separation packages, setting numerical goals for reducing attrition, and restricting certain voluntary and early separations. However, only rarely have these efforts been driven by an analysis of (1) exactly why attrition is occurring and (2) what separation policies might be changed to reduce the attrition of specific categories of enlistees. Two studies suggest that positive leadership, such as the services’ greater command emphasis on reducing attrition, has the direct effect of lowering attrition. While we spoke with local service commanders who are now reviewing separations packages to reconsider the possibility of retaining enlistees, we also spoke with first-term supervisors who continue to believe that a “zero defects” mentality remains a driver of attrition. These supervisors also told us that many enlistees continue to take advantage of separation policies to seek easy ways out of the military with minimal consequences. Historically, the services have focused on the recruitment of high quality personnel to minimize the time required for individual training and to reduce attrition. They have defined “high quality” recruits as young people who are high school diploma graduates and score in the upper 50th percentile of the AFQT. Our analysis of data on all enlistees who entered the services in fiscal year 1993 indicates that attrition rates continue to be lower for persons with higher educational levels. For example, those who entered the services in fiscal year 1993 with high school diplomas had an attrition rate of 35 percent. On the other hand, those with 3 to 4 years of high school but no diploma or general equivalency degree had a rate of 51.1 percent, and those holding general equivalency degrees had an attrition rate of 54.8 percent. Similarly, enlistees who score progressively higher on the AFQT continue to have decreasing rates of attrition. Those who scored in the highest AFQT category, category I, scores of 93 to 99, had an attrition rate of 27.5 percent. Those in category II, scores of 65 to 92, had an attrition rate of 32.4 percent; those in category IIIA, scores of 50 to 64, had a rate of 37.6 percent; and those in category IIIB, scores of 31 to 49, had a rate of 40 percent. (More data on attrition rates by educational level and AFQT score is contained in app. I.) Overall attrition rates for first-term enlistees now reflect the fact that the vast majority of the services’ recruits hold high school diplomas and score in the upper half of the AFQT. For example, of all enlistees entering the services in fiscal year 1993, 91.5 percent held high school diplomas, and 71.1 percent scored in the upper half of the AFQT. For these reasons, DOD’s overall attrition rate of 35.8 percent closely approximates the attrition rates of high school diploma graduates (35 percent) and persons who score in category IIIA of the AFQT (37.6 percent). All these statistics indicate that if DOD and the services did not target these higher quality recruits, attrition rates would almost certainly be higher. Efforts to reduce attrition rates below current levels need to be focused on finding ways to increase the likelihood that these already high-quality enlistees will complete their first terms. Although all four services hope to reduce their first-term attrition rates, they have made few formal policy changes to target enlistees who have completed training. The Air Force and the Army have set specific numeric targets for reducing attrition, and the Air Force, the Army, and the Marine Corps report that they have been successful in reducing attrition in some areas. However, only two services have targeted groups of enlistees they wished to reconsider for remedial action after training. The Army has targeted enlistees with bars to reenlistment who were previously allowed to voluntarily separate, and the Air Force has targeted persons allowed to voluntarily separate in the “miscellaneous” category, which includes enlistees allowed to separate early to take outside employment. In these two cases, the services will be able to measure the effect of their policy changes. Other service efforts have not similarly been linked to clearly identified problems. As a result, any success these efforts experience in lowering attrition may be either coincidental or have the unintended effect of retaining enlistees who really should be separated. In an effort to reduce first-term attrition, the Air Force has encouraged its commanders to look carefully at voluntary separation packages to reconsider retaining enlistees. It has also set numerical targets for reducing attrition rates. Specifically, the Air Force has issued a message to its commanders emphasizing the importance of restricting the numbers of persons allowed to be released in the “miscellaneous” category. Persons placed in this category include enlistees allowed to separate early to take other employment, as well as enlistees released for reasons not included in the Air Force’s list of separation codes. A successful reduction of this category could have an important impact, as this reason for separation represents 31 percent of all male and 23 percent of all female discharges. However, the Air Force will first have to analyze more fully who makes up this group and why they are being allowed to separate early. Other than targeting this one type of separation, the Air Force has issued no other guidance to its commanders on ways to reduce the attrition of first-term personnel. Specifically, the Air Force has not issued guidance to commanders that would assist them in identifying exactly what types of cases should be reviewed or what accommodations should be made to encourage more enlistees to complete their first terms. The Air Force’s target is to reduce its overall first-term attrition from the current rate of 32.5 percent to 27 percent. The Air Force has separated its target into two parts. First, it hopes to reduce attrition during basic training from its peak of 11 percent to 7 percent. Second, it hopes to reduce attrition after basic training by 5 percentage points—to 20 percent—from a peak of 25 percent for enlistees entering the Air Force in fiscal years 1991 and 1992. The Air Force plans to reevaluate these targets each year. While setting such numeric targets sends a clear and positive message to Air Force commanders about the importance of lowering attrition, Air Force officials provided us with no evidence that Air Force commanders had been asked to document what actions they take that are successful. Such documentation would allow the Air Force to apply successful methods to other units. In December 1996, the Chief of Staff of the Army directed Army leaders to reexamine their procedures to ensure that they were doing everything possible to reduce first-term attrition. The Army has also set numerical targets for reducing attrition. According to Army officials, however, the only formal policy change is that the Army no longer allows enlistees with bars to reenlistment to separate voluntarily. Like the Air Force, the Army hopes that calling its local commanders’ attention to the importance of retaining first-term personnel will result in lower attrition. Again, while we believe that such attention is critical, we could not identify any specific guidance to the commanders as to how they should go about retaining enlistees other than those with bars to reenlistment. In December 1996, the Army set the following numeric goals for reducing first-term attrition: To reduce fiscal year 1996 rates by 10 percent by the end of fiscal year 1997. This would mean that the Army’s 37-percent rate would be reduced to 34 percent. To reduce fiscal year 1996 rates by 20 percent by the end of fiscal year 1998. This would reduce the attrition rate to 30 percent. To reduce fiscal year 1996 rates by 33 percent by the end of fiscal year 2003. This would reduce the attrition rate to 25 percent. The Army reports that it has met its goal for fiscal year 1997. However, officials report that first-term attrition rates have leveled off, and the Army is now reassessing what its long-term goal should be. Its tentative, revised goal is to reduce the rate to 30 percent by 2003. On July 31, 1998, the Army’s Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel outlined acceptable ranges for training attrition. These ranges were intended to be used not as attrition ceilings but rather as indicators. The Army’s focus, again, was on emphasizing the importance of rehabilitating and instilling values in its personnel. While the Marine Corps has not established a numerical goal for the reduction of first-term enlisted attrition, local commanders we spoke with expressed their concerns about first-term attrition and cited their efforts to reconsider discharging enlistees in their units. Like the Army and the Air Force, however, Marine Corps officials cited only one formal policy initiative that they believe may reduce the attrition of enlistees between their 7th and 48th month of service. The Marine Corps calls this initiative a “unit cohesion” program. Under this program, some enlistees have begun to train and serve their first terms in groups of 2 to 13 people, depending on the military occupational specialty. Though the primary purpose of this program is to promote a greater sense of teamwork among Marine Corps enlistees, Marine Corps officials believe that the resulting higher morale will encourage more enlistees to complete their first terms of service. While we agree that unit cohesion may have a positive effect on lowering attrition, this effort is not directly linked to the primary reasons for separation in the Marine Corps—medical problems, misconduct, and drug use for men and pregnancy and medical problems for women. The Marine Corps has other initiatives to reduce first-term enlisted attrition, but these are aimed at separations before enlistees have completed their initial 6 months of service. These initiatives include (1) increasing the amount of time that recruiters spend with their recruits to improve their physical fitness and (2) restructuring recruit training to add more core values training and a field event to the end of the basic training period. The Navy hopes to reduce first-term attrition, and Navy officials said that initiatives for reducing attrition are aimed at the time enlistees spend in training, because this is the period in which increases in attrition have occurred. Among other things, Navy efforts to reduce attrition have been focused on increasing their recruiters’ interaction with recruits before they attend basic training and on improving physical training and student/instructor ratios during training. Navy officials cited no policy changes intended to reduce the numbers of enlistees separated after training. Neither has the Navy set numerical targets for reducing attrition rates. There is some evidence that positive leadership, such as the type of command emphasis the services are placing on reexamining the separation of enlistees, could have a positive effect. However, during our interviews with first-term enlistees and their supervisors, some continue to believe that there is a “zero defects” mentality in the services. That is, they believe that the services are not willing to work with a servicemember at any pay grade to give him or her a chance at rehabilitation. This mentality appears to be related to what some researchers have observed is the “volunteer in, volunteer out” philosophy that came about when the draft ended. During the draft era, some researchers have commented, commanders believed that enlistees had an obligation to fulfill and were more likely to work with enlistees experiencing motivational problems. With the advent of the all-volunteer force, on the other hand, commanders became less patient with below-average enlistees and were more likely to separate them. One obvious result of this change in philosophy was a rise in attrition after the draft ended. units with lower attrition demonstrated concern for the individual, expected trainees to meet standards, and were generally working to produce “a soldier I’d accept in a . . . unit.” Cadres in units with higher TDP rates tended to be more concerned with statistical accomplishments, fulfilling the traditional drill sergeant role, and “weeding out the duds.” They emphasized graduating “the best soldier in the United States Army” or “one I’d be proud to have in a . . . unit.” Their philosophy produced standards beyond the norm. The TRADOC team also found lower attrition rates in units that had higher numbers of senior grade noncommissioned officers and effective buddy systems. A 1988 Rand study also suggested that management policies have an effect on attrition and reported that the Army’s attrition rates decreased immediately after the TRADOC study called attention to the issues of Army leadership. The Rand study compared enlistees with similar educational levels and AFQT scores and found that the attrition of these groups depended on what geographical locations they were assigned to. The study concluded that the differences in attrition rates of similarly qualified enlistees suggest that “factors such as institutional policies and practices may have a critical effect on attrition levels.” The study noted that after the TRADOC study was completed and the Army had begun to focus on attrition, the Army’s attrition rates decreased in fiscal year 1985, resulting in the retention of 4 percent more high quality men and 6 percent more high quality women. During March 1998 testimony before the Senate Committee on Armed Services’ Subcommittee on Personnel, a panel of recruiters stressed the importance of making new enlistees more aware of the commitment they make in signing contracts for military service. They expressed the opinion that it is too easy for enlistees to get out of their service commitments. One Army recruiter, for example, said, “Sometimes we have got to hold them, hold their feet to the fire, so to speak, a little longer, and I think in the end they would be happy.” Our analysis of official reasons for separation and our interviews with first-term enlistees confirm that some enlistees who are now being separated might be retained if they faced stricter disincentives for early separation. Some enlistees who may now be seeking “escape routes” by reporting medical problems; committing minor disciplinary infractions; or failing their physical training, career development tests, or weight standards are now able to separate early and easily with honorable discharges. One Army unit we visited had already begun to attempt to close these easy ways out of the service by imposing more punitive measures for behavior such as drug use. We do not believe that current characterizations of service for enlistees whose behavior does not meet standards provide adequate incentives for such enlistees to complete their first terms. The services have been experiencing first-term attrition rates of about one-third for over a decade. During this time, the services have targeted their recruiting efforts toward enlisting high school diploma graduates who score in the upper half of the AFQT because they have lower attrition rates than recruits without these qualifications. This group continues to show lower attrition rates than other recruit groups. However, because the overwhelming majority of all recruits are now high school diploma graduates with high AFQT scores, the services must turn their efforts to encouraging more of their high-quality enlistees to complete their first terms. Reducing attrition rates will be complex and difficult. However, considering the cost of recruiting and training the thousands of enlistees who do not complete their first terms of service, the payoff of reducing attrition will be significant, since savings could then be channeled to other defense priorities. In reducing attrition, a first and critical step is for DOD to obtain more complete data on the magnitude of its losses. We believe that all separations—including voluntary releases more than 90 days early—need to be reported so that DOD and the services have a fuller and more accurate picture of their turnover rates. We are not suggesting that voluntary early release programs were not cost-effective downsizing tools. Rather, we believe that early releases should be managed and reported along with other types of first-term attrition. Releases more than 90 days early clearly result in a loss in the services’ recruiting and training investment. Second, collecting better data on why enlistees are being separated is key to the services’ ability to craft policies that increase the proportion of first-term personnel who complete their contractual obligations. In our 1997 report on attrition from basic training, we made recommendations to DOD and the services on ways to improve the use of separation codes to build a database for DOD to manage attrition. These recommendations were included in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1998 (P.L. 105-85), and DOD is now working to implement them. Our current work reaffirms the fact that separation codes are used inconsistently by the services and that these codes are not specific enough to capture exactly why separations are occurring. The assignment of these codes requires a degree of subjective judgment. This subjectivity may mask true reasons for separation and make it more difficult to analyze why attrition is occurring and to determine what can be done to decrease it. Third, data now available on the quality-of-life issues underlying attrition is not tied to the services’ efforts to prevent the attrition of first-term enlistees. If the services could use the data they collect from their several surveys on the quality of military life to prioritize first-term enlistees’ concerns, they could focus their attention on improvements that would have the most impact on reducing the attrition of first-term personnel. We believe that all the services are concerned about attrition and that service leaders are conveying this concern to their local commanders. Two services, the Army and the Air Force, have even set numerical goals for reducing first-term attrition. However, while there is research to support the positive effect of such command emphasis on finding ways to get more high-quality personnel to complete their first terms, we believe that setting numerical goals for reducing attrition without complete information on its underlying causes or guidance on what specific actions should be taken to reduce it may turn these goals into arbitrary ceilings. While command emphasis on attrition is critical to the services’ efforts to reduce it, this emphasis must be linked to clear policy changes that target specific groups of enlistees the services wish to retain. Better guidance to commanders on what actions should be taken to deal with identified problems or what accommodations could be made to retain certain categories of enlistees is also needed. The Army’s recent decision to rehabilitate enlistees with bars to reenlistment is one example of a successful policy change to reduce attrition. In this case, Army commanders targeted a group of enlistees they wished to retain—primarily those with performance problems—and made formal policy changes to do so. The Army will now be able to measure the effects of its policy change in terms of how many more enlistees it was able to retain and why. Our interviews with first-term enlistees, supervisors, and service officials indicate that other types of enlistees could be targeted for remedial action if specific mitigating actions are taken. For example, enlistees who commit minor disciplinary infractions, who fail physical fitness or career development tests, who are one-time drug users, or who become pregnant may simply need to be provided further counseling, optional testing, other job choices, or remedial training by their commissioned or noncommissioned officers. Finally, granting honorable discharges to enlistees who deliberately seek ways out of fulfilling their service commitments simply encourages others to do likewise. One Army unit we visited had already begun to attempt to close these “escape routes” and impose more punitive measures against certain enlistees, particularly those found to use drugs. We believe that some enlistees could be motivated to remain in the service if they knew that there were no easy ways out of their contracts and that serious negative consequences were associated with behavior or performance that warranted discharge. To capture more accurately the numbers of enlisted personnel separated before the end of their first terms, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the service secretaries to include as a separate category the numbers of first-term personnel released more than 90 days before the end of their contract terms when they report first-term attrition rates. In order to provide more information on what factors are related to first-term attrition, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the service secretaries to use existing quality-of-life surveys or create new ones to (1) collect information on the factors contributing to first-term enlistees’ separation and (2) identify quality-of-life initiatives aimed at reducing the attrition of first-term personnel. To retain as many first-term enlistees as possible, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the service secretaries to take the following actions: Continually emphasize to all commissioned and noncommissioned officers the costs of first-term attrition, the difficulty of acquiring new enlistees to replace early losses, and the importance of providing positive leadership in targeting first-term enlistees who could be encouraged to complete their contractual obligations. Collect more complete data on specific groups of enlistees whom the services wish to target for remedial action and issue guidance and formal policy changes to local commanders indicating what specific actions—such as more counseling, optional testing, further job choices, or remedial training—can be taken to prevent the early discharge of these targeted groups. Possibilities for targeting include enlistees being separated for minor disciplinary infractions, failure to pass physical fitness tests and career development tests, one-time drug use, and pregnancy. Reassess the appropriateness of providing favorable types of discharge to enlistees whose behavior or performance led to their early separation and ensure that proper incentives exist to encourage enlistees to complete their first terms. In commenting on a draft of this report, DOD concurred with our findings and recommendations. (DOD’s comments are presented in their entirety in app. III.) In an overall comment, DOD stated that our focus on the early separation of enlistees who entered the services in fiscal year 1993 might make it appear that attrition rates are higher than they really are because the persons in this group enlisted at the peak of military downsizing. As we state in our report, we concentrated our detailed analysis on this group of enlistees because they represented the group for whom the latest data was available 48 months after enlistment. We agree that the services might have been more willing to release first-term enlistees early during this period of downsizing. However, it should be noted that the peak of downsizing did not occur in fiscal year 1993. Rather, by fiscal year 1993, DOD was well into the downward trend in its force structure that had begun in the late 1980s. In concurring with our recommendations, DOD agreed to direct the services to (1) review their 90-day release policies and the exceptions granted to those policies, (2) prepare a report on quality-of-life issues that could be addressed to reduce attrition, (3) provide local commanders with guidance and formal policy changes related to specific types of attrition the services target for remedial action, (4) reassess the appropriateness of providing favorable types of discharges to enlistees whose behavior or performance led to their early separation to ensure that proper incentives exist to encourage enlistees to complete their first terms, and (5) prepare a report by October 1999 documenting service initiatives related to our recommendations.

Summary: Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed historical attrition rates for enlisted personnel who serve at least 6 months but leave military service before completing their first contract terms, focusing on: (1) the rate and timing of attrition during enlistees' first terms; (2) the extent of the Department of Defense's (DOD) investment in recruiting and training first-term enlistees; (3) reasons for first-term attrition after training; (4) service members' perceptions of quality-of-life factors that contribute to attrition; and (5) actions DOD and the armed services are taking to reduce enlistees' attrition. GAO noted that: (1) first-term attrition has been a long-standing and complex problem for the services; (2) while all four services are concerned about attrition, they have made few formal policy changes aimed at reducing attrition in specific target populations; (3) although the services collect survey data to assess attitudes about military service and quality of life, they do not use this data to analyze why separations are occurring or to formulate policy changes or actions aimed at reducing early attrition; (4) between fiscal year (FY) 1982 through FY 1993, 31.7 percent of all enlistees did not complete their first terms of service; (5) for Army, Navy, and Air Force enlistees who entered the services in FY 1993, attrition rates were higher than they had been in over a decade; (6) DOD's data on attrition does not include all enlistees allowed to separate early from the military; (7) using the FY 1993 cost estimates, GAO calculates that the services spent $1.3 billion on the 72,670 enlistees who entered the services in FY 1993 and departed prematurely; (8) because these enlistees were separated early, the services did not get a full return on their investment; (9) official reasons for the separation of enlistees who entered the services in FY 1993 varied by gender and service; (10) variances in the types of separations among the services indicate that the services interpret separation codes differently, that their separation policies differ, that the services have very different attrition problems, or some combination of these explanations; (11) in its 1997 report on attrition from basic training, GAO recommended ways for DOD to improve the use of these separation codes to build a more complete database on reasons for servicewide attrition; (12) GAO's recommendations have been incorporated into the National Defense Authorization Act for FY 1998, and DOD has begun to comply with these legislative requirements; (13) all four services are concerned about attrition, and the Army and the Air Force have set numerical targets for reducing it; (14) GAO found that the services did not always have adequate data on the exact reasons for separation; (15) without such data and formal policy changes, numerical targets will be arbitrary, and success in reducing attrition may either be coincidental or result in the failure to discharge enlistees who really should be separated; and (16) allowing many enlistees to easily separate with honorable discharges may inadvertently serve as a disincentive for them to persevere.