The United States has a long history of refugee resettlement, but there was no formal program for the resettlement and admission of refugees until the Refugee Act of 1980 (Refugee Act) amended the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) to, among other purposes, establish a more uniform basis for the provision of assistance to refugees. Under the INA, as amended, an applicant seeking admission to the United States as a refugee must (1) not be firmly resettled in any foreign country, (2) be determined by the President to be of special humanitarian concern to the United States, (3) meet the definition of refugee established in U.S. immigration law, and (4) be otherwise admissible to the United States as an immigrant under U.S. immigration law. Under USRAP, USCIS officers determine an applicant’s eligibility for refugee status by assessing whether the applicant has, among other things, credibly established that he or she suffered past persecution, or has a well-founded fear of future persecution, and that he or she is not otherwise statutorily barred from being granted refugee status or admission to the United States. Among other things, USCIS officers may not classify an applicant as a refugee or approve an applicant for refugee resettlement in the United States if he or she: has participated in the persecution of any person on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group or political opinion; is inadmissible for having engaged in terrorist activity or associating with terrorist organizations; is inadmissible on certain non- waivable criminal or security grounds; or is firmly resettled in a foreign country. Under USRAP, cases may be presented for USCIS adjudication with a single applicant or may include a principle applicant with certain family members. All applicants on a case must be deemed admissible, but only the principal applicant must prove his or her past persecution or fear of future persecution. Before the beginning of each fiscal year and after consultation with Congress, the President is to establish the number of refugees who may be admitted to the United States in the ensuing fiscal year (i.e., a “ceiling”), with such admissions allocated among refugees of special humanitarian concern to the United States (e.g., by region or country of nationality). For example, for fiscal year 2016, the administration proposed and met a ceiling of 85,000 refugees in fiscal year 2016 (including a goal of admitting 10,000 Syrian refugees) and established a ceiling of 110,000 for fiscal year 2017. Since 2001, annual ceilings for refugee admission have generally been between 70,000 and 80,000 admissions; in the early 1990s, the ceilings were at more than 100,000 admissions. Actual admissions of refugees into the country have been at or below the ceiling in recent years. For example, the combined ceiling for fiscal years 2011 through 2016 was 451,000, during which the United States admitted about 410,000 refugees. Figure 1 shows refugee admissions by region during this time period. There are a number of steps in the USRAP screening process for applicants. Figure 2 provides an overview of the refugee screening process. Program access. First, State and USCIS make initial determinations about whether an individual will be accepted into or excluded from USRAP (referred to as program access) for subsequent screening and interview by USCIS officers. There are multiple mechanisms by which State and its partners receive USRAP applications. For example, most applicants are referred to USRAP by UNHCR, but applicants who meet certain criteria can apply directly. State has identified three categories of individuals who are of special humanitarian concern and, therefore, can qualify for access to USRAP: Priority 1 (P1), or individuals specifically referred to USRAP generally because they have a compelling need for protection; Priority 2 (P2), or specific groups, often within certain nationalities or ethnic groups in specified locations, whose members State and its partners have identified as being in need of resettlement; and Priority 3 (P3), or individuals from designated nationalities who have immediate family members in the United States who initially entered as refugees or who were granted asylum. Access: Determination by the Department of State and its U.S. Refugee Admissions Program (USRAP) partners of whether the applicant qualifies for the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) adjudication based on if he/she is of special humanitarian concern (i.e., if he/she is within a Priority 1, Priority 2, or Priority 3 category), among other things. Adjudication: USCIS’s process for deciding whether to approve or deny an applicant for refugee status. The adjudication process includes, among other things, at least one in- person interview; security checks; and, in some instances, additional review of the applicant’s case to address national security concerns. Approved application: Determination by USCIS officer that the applicant meets the refugee definition and is otherwise eligible for resettlement in the United States, and will subsequently be processed for travel to the United States. partners conduct biographic checks of certain applicants who are members of groups or nationalities designated by the U.S. government as requiring more thorough vetting. Interagency Check. Partners, including NCTC and elements of the intelligence community, screen biographic data of all refugee applicants within a designated age range against intelligence and law enforcement information within their databases and security holdings. Specifically, all refugee applicants within certain ages are required to undergo an Interagency Check. Further, security vetting partners are to continuously check interagency refugee applicant data against their security holdings through a refugee’s admission to the United States and, in some instances, after an applicant’s arrival and admission to the United States. Through these checks, applications are screened for indicators that they might pose a national security or fraud concern or have immigration or criminal violations, among other things. USCIS and FBI officials have testified at congressional hearings that security checks are limited to the records available in U.S. government databases (which may include information provided by foreign governments and other information on foreign nationals). According to State SOPs, security check responses are communicated through WRAPS, and RSC staff include them in the case file provided to the USCIS officer adjudicating the application. If at any time an applicant is identified as having a match for the Security Advisory Opinion or Interagency Check, the case is to be placed on hold. For Security Advisory Opinion results that are completed before the USCIS interview, State officers are to review any matches to determine if they relate to the applicant and should preclude the applicant from access to the USRAP. USCIS is responsible for reviewing security check results that are completed after the USCIS interview. Further, the CLASS check may require a Security Advisory Opinion or additional DHS review. Once prescreening is complete and RSC staff have received the results of certain security checks, they are to notify State and USCIS that the applicant is ready for interview and adjudication. DHS is to, based on policy, conduct an additional review of Syrian and certain other applicants prior to adjudication as part of prescreening. USCIS Adjudication. Third, USCIS adjudicates applications. USCIS coordinates with State to develop a schedule for refugee interviews each quarter of the fiscal year. USCIS officers conduct individual, in-person interviews overseas with applicants to help determine their eligibility for refugee status. RAD and IO—within USCIS’s Refugee, Asylum, and International Operations (RAIO) Directorate—share responsibility for adjudicating USRAP cases. In 2005, USCIS created the Refugee Corps, a cadre of USCIS officers within RAD who, according to USCIS officials, are to adjudicate the majority of applications for refugee status. These officers are based in Washington, D.C., but they travel to multiple locations for 6 to 8 weeks at a time (called circuit rides), generally making four trips per year, according to RAD officials. In addition, IO officers posted at U.S. embassies overseas can conduct circuit rides and interviews in embassies to adjudicate refugee applications, among other responsibilities. Before or during the circuit ride, USCIS officials are to take the applicants’ fingerprints, which are screened against DHS, Department of Defense, and FBI biometric databases, and if new information from the biometric check raises questions, USCIS officers may ask additional questions at the interview, require additional interviews, or deny the case. In addition, if USCIS officers identify new biographic information during the interview, such as an alias that was previously unknown or not disclosed to RSC staff, that information is vetted through the biographic security checks described above, per State and DHS policy. The officers are to place these applications on hold, pending the outcome of these checks. Further, consistent with USCIS policy, officers are required to place a case on hold to do additional research or investigation if, for example, the officer determines during the interview that the applicant may pose a national security concern. Based on the interviews and security checks conducted, USCIS officers will either approve or deny an applicant’s case. USCIS supervisory officers are to review 100 percent of officers’ adjudications, according to USCIS policy. Final processing and travel to the United States. If USCIS approves an applicant’s refugee application, RSCs are to generally provide the applicant with cultural orientation classes on adjusting to life in the United States, facilitate medical checks, and prepare the applicant to travel. Prior to admission to the United States, applicants are subject to the standard CBP and Transportation Security Administration vetting and screening processes applied to all travelers destined for the United States by air. CBP is to inspect all refugees upon their arrival at one of seven U.S. airports designated for refugee arrivals and make the final determination about whether to admit the individual as a refugee to the United States. From fiscal year 2011 through June 2016, WRAPS data indicate that USRAP received about 655,000 referrals and applications, associated with about 288,000 cases. As figure 3 indicates, during this time frame, more than 75 percent of applications were from refugees fleeing 6 countries—Iraq, Burma, Syria, Somalia, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and Bhutan—and the number of applicants from certain countries has changed over time. For example, the number of Bhutanese and Burmese applications decreased, but the number of Syrian and Congolese applications increased. State officials said that UNHCR submitted a large number of P1 Syrian referrals to USRAP in fiscal year 2016 because more people were fleeing that country due to conflict and the goal of admitting 10,000 Syrian refugees. From October 2015 through June 2016, WRAPS data indicate that more than one-third of USRAP applicants were Syrian. In addition to nationality, USRAP applicants’ characteristics varied in other ways. For example, as shown in figure 4, applications to USRAP from fiscal year 2011 through June 2016 were largely split between the P1 or P2 categories and about two-thirds were processed in one of three RSCs (Middle East and North Africa, Africa, and East Asia). Further, 75 percent of applicants were associated with cases that included immediate family members (which includes a spouse and unmarried children under the age of 21), while 25 percent of cases included only 1 individual. At any given time, there are a number of applicants at different stages of the USRAP process. According to State and RSC officials, State and USCIS process applications in the general order they were received. For example, table 1 shows that, of the applications received in fiscal year 2011, 56 percent were approved and admitted to the United States as of June 2016, 13 percent were still in process (pending access to USRAP, actively being processed, or on hold), and 31 percent of applications were closed before the applicant completed the USRAP process, as of June 2016. By comparison, as of June 2016, almost 70 percent of applications received in fiscal year 2015 were in process. Program Access. Of the total number of applications received from fiscal years 2011 through June 2016 (about 655,000), State and its USRAP partners made access determinations for about 590,000 of that amount— 569,000 (or 96 percent) of which they accepted, as of June 2016. As described earlier, State and its USRAP partners makes the initial determination on whether to grant an applicant access (accept) to USRAP for subsequent screening and interview by USCIS officers. According to State officials, one reason the acceptance rate is high is because State Refugee Coordinators stationed overseas provide feedback to UNHCR on the types of P1 applications that are not likely to be accepted or ultimately approved by USCIS officers. Further, according to State officials, State coordinates with UNHCR and USCIS to develop predefined eligibility criteria for certain P2 groups and applicants meeting those criteria may access USRAP once UNHCR submits the application to State. For example, State and UNHCR created a new P2 group in 2015 for Congolese who fled to Tanzania. To be part of the P2 group, applicants must have registered with UNHCR and verified their residence in the Nyaragusu refugee camp. From fiscal year 2011 through June 2016, acceptance of applications to USRAP for adjudication varied by nationality of the applicants. For example, excluding pending applications, USRAP partners did not accept 8 percent of Iraqi applicants. USRAP partners also did not accept 4 percent of Syrian applicants, and did not accept less than 1 percent of Burmese and Somali applicants. According to State officials, the most common reason why applicants are not accepted is that they fail to meet criteria to access USRAP. For example, according to State officials, acceptance rates were lower for Iraqi applicants because some Iraqis could not prove their association with the United States—a requirement under various P2 programs. As part of the adjudication process, USCIS officers are to confirm that applicants were appropriately granted access to USRAP. WRAPS data from fiscal year 2011 through June 2016 show that USCIS officers confirmed that over 99 percent (all but about 1,000 out of 351,000) of the applicants interviewed were appropriately granted access to USRAP (i.e., qualify for adjudication by USCIS), as of June 2016. USCIS Adjudications. According to WRAPS data, as of June 2016, USCIS officers interviewed about 62 percent (351,000) of the applicants who were granted access to USRAP from fiscal year 2011 through June 2016. USCIS officers approved 89 percent (314,000 of 351,000) and denied 7 percent (24,000) of these applications. Approval rates varied by RSC (see fig. 5). Applications may also be put on hold for a number of reasons. For example, holds may occur because of security check results, a USCIS officer did not have sufficient information at the time of the interview to approve or deny the applications associated with the case, or as a result of new information that came to light after the interview. For applications in our time period of analysis, WRAPS data indicate that 12 percent (about 81,000) were on hold as of June 2016. USCIS officials stated that they would make a final decision on these cases after receiving additional information, which could include outstanding or additional security checks results, information from family members’ cases, and conducting additional interviews. About 24 percent (138,000) of the applicants who were granted access to USRAP from fiscal year 2011 through June 2016 were awaiting interviews with USCIS (i.e., the applicant had an active case or a case that was on hold but had not received an interview), as of June 2016. RSC Middle East and North Africa (58,000) and RSC Africa (40,000) had the largest number of applications awaiting interviews. Some applicants have waited years to receive a USCIS interview. For example, according to WRAPS data, about 9,000 applications submitted in fiscal years 2011 or 2012 were active in June 2016 and the applicants had not yet received a USCIS interview. About 87 percent of these applications were applicants from Iraq or Somalia. In addition, there were about 6,000 applications received in fiscal years 2011 and 2012 that were on hold and had not received a USCIS interview, 93 percent of whom were from Iraq, Somalia, or Burma. According to State officials, the security situations in Iraq and a refugee camp on the border of Kenya and Somalia where many Somali applicants are located have made it difficult to schedule USCIS interviews at certain times in these locations, among other reasons. For applications received from fiscal year 2011 through June 2016 with security check results noted in WRAPS, the Interagency Check was the one that most often resulted in a result of “not clear” based on thresholds set by an interagency process including the intelligence community and law enforcement agencies. However, “not clear” results—meaning, the checks identified security or fraud concerns—represented a small percentage of all results for each of the three biographic checks and the fingerprint check, as of June 2016. Further, of the applicants who were admitted to the United States or had closed applications as of June 2016, the median number of days from initiation of the biographic security checks (at the time of the RSC prescreening interview) through the last completed Interagency Check (which is often the last check prior to departure for the United States) was 247 days. According to WRAPS data, the overwhelming majority of the about 227,000 applicants from fiscal year 2011 through June 2016 who were admitted to the United States as refugees had “clear” security check results, as of June 2016. However, one applicant who was admitted to the United States in 2012 had his security check status change from “clear” to “not clear” days before his planned travel. The security vetting process at that time did not account for responses from a vetting agency that had not been specifically requested and, therefore, an additional check of security vetting responses after receipt of a final response of “clear” had not been conducted. According to State officials, when the RSC realized the applicant had a “not clear” response, it notified local USCIS officials immediately. USCIS data show that the refugee has since adjusted to legal permanent resident status. According to a USCIS branch chief, at the time of the individual’s adjustment application, the derogatory information (which predicated the “not clear”) had been resolved and there was no basis for USCIS to deny the individual’s adjustment application. State has since updated security SOPs to require RSCs to run daily reports to check if any applicants with imminent travel plans have received an unsolicited Interagency Check “not clear.” The length of time to process a USRAP application varies. For example, of the applicants who applied from fiscal year 2011 through June 2016 and had been admitted to the United States, as of June 2016, 27 percent were processed in less than 1 year, 47 percent between 1 and 2 years, and 26 percent in more than 2 years. Figure 6 shows the cumulative length of time (median number of days) of key phases in the USRAP process. The lengthiest phase was from the time USCIS approved the applicant through arrival in the United States (a median of 189 days). State and RSCs have various policies and SOPs, trainings, and quality checks related to refugee case processing and prescreening. Policies and SOPs for USRAP. State’s USRAP Overseas Processing Manual provides an outline of the policies and procedures involved in overseas processing for USRAP, including instructions for using WRAPS, requirements for what information RSCs should collect during prescreening, and instructions and requirements for initiating certain national security checks, among other things. In addition, State developed SOPs for processing and prescreening refugee applications at RSCs, which State officials indicated provide baseline standards for RSC operations. Further, all four of the RSCs we visited provided us with their own local SOPs that incorporated the topics covered in State’s SOPs. Directors at the remaining five RSCs also told us that they had developed local SOPs that covered the overarching USRAP requirements. We observed how RSC staff implemented State’s case processing and prescreening policies and procedures during our site visits to four RSCs from June 2016 to September 2016. Specifically, we observed 27 prescreening interviews conducted by RSC caseworkers at the four RSCs we visited and found that these caseworkers generally adhered to State requirements during these interviews. For example, RSC caseworkers we observed reviewed applicants’ identification documents (e.g. passport, birth certificate, or marriage certificate) and recorded name variations (e.g. alternate spellings to confirm identity and for use in security checks); recorded “family tree” information (for security checks and to confirm family relationships for subsequent applicants); and recorded the applicants’ flight paths and persecution stories (to be used by USCIS officers in their interviews and to determine if the applicant qualifies as a refugee). In one location, we observed that RSC caseworkers were not consistently asking applicants during the prescreening interviews if they had any other aliases or nicknames. Further, USCIS officers identified the same issue in three separate RSCs, during circuit rides in fiscal years 2014, 2015, and 2016, according to RAD trip reports. Asking about aliases and nicknames is an expected practice for all RSC staff conducting prescreening interviews, according to State and RSC officials, because the information could be useful and important during an applicant’s biographic national security checks. Further, State officials said that if aliases are not identified prior to USCIS interview, it may delay processing because when USCIS officers identify additional names the RSCs must resubmit security checks. We brought the issue to the attention of RSC and State management, and, in response to our observations, the RSC revised its local SOPs to more clearly instruct RSC caseworkers to ask applicants if they had any aliases or nicknames, and State revised its prescreening SOPs and informed all other RSCs of the change. In addition, we observed how RSC staff in all four locations implemented additional required procedures during our site visits, such as initiating required security checks through WRAPS and compiling case file information for USCIS interviewing officers, and found that these RSC staff were complying with SOPs. Further, all nine RSC directors we interviewed stated that they were familiar with State’s requirements for their location and reported implementing them. Training on USRAP requirements. On the basis of our analysis of State’s cooperative agreements, RSC monitoring documents submitted to State, and interviews with State headquarters’ officials and all nine RSC directors, we found that these RSCs reported having various trainings for their staff. According to State officials, they have not developed specific training requirements for all RSCs because each RSC has different needs and conditions requiring individualized training programs. All nine RSC directors with whom we spoke said they have training programs ranging from technical trainings (e.g., WRAPS or interview training) to shadowing programs in which newly-hired staff observe more experienced RSC employees performing their duties. During our September 2016 site visit to RSC Africa, for example, we observed new-hire training for RSC caseworkers, as well as more experienced caseworkers mentoring and coaching the newer staff. At RSC Latin America, according to the director, new staff receive 1 week of WRAPS training and observe more experienced caseworkers conduct prescreening interviews until the new staff member is able to conduct the interviews alone. Quality control checks. On the basis of our analysis of RSC monitoring documents submitted to State, cooperative agreements, observations at the four RSCs we visited, and interviews with State headquarters’ officials and all nine RSC directors, RSCs have quality control checks to oversee case processing and prescreening to help ensure that RSC staff collect accurate and reliable information. For example, at all four RSCs we visited, we observed staff conducting both electronic and manual quality control checks of case information. Specifically, after the prescreening interview, RSC staff in all four locations reviewed the hard copy case file and ran checks in WRAPS for errors or omissions. Further, all four RSCs we visited had a dedicated quality control unit that is to monitor data quality and review regular data monitoring reports. Moreover, RSC directors in the other five locations stated that they have similar quality control checks in place, and all nine RSC directors stated that there are quality control checks at every stage of the USRAP process from case creation in WRAPS to when refugees are about to depart for the United States. According to USCIS officials we interviewed at headquarters and in the field, RSCs generally provide the information that USCIS officers needed to adjudicate applications, but they also identified areas for improvement during some circuit rides. For example, all 10 USCIS officers that we interviewed who participated in the circuit rides associated with our site visits stated that the information gathered by RSCs during the prescreening process was generally accurate, complete, and useful. However, 4 of these officers stated that they have encountered some errors when RSCs provided case files with missing documents or information. In addition, 70 out of the 107 RAD trip reports we analyzed contained feedback on RSC activities. Of these 70 reports, 10 reports stated that RSCs generally prepared the cases well, but 45 reports identified concerns with the quality of certain case files, including missing documentation. According to USCIS officials, missing documentation can lead to delays during the circuit ride while RSC staff obtain and provide copies of the missing documents or USCIS officers obtain the missing information during the interview. In addition, USCIS officers may need to place the application on hold until the missing documentation can be obtained. USCIS officers and State officials we interviewed stated that some of the missing information could only have been obtained during the USCIS interviews with applicants, while others stated that applicants can forget or neglect to give RSC staff all of their documentation despite repeated reminders from RSC staff. Further, five of the nine RSC managers stated that they request USCIS officers submit feedback at the end of circuit rides on the quality of the case file content and interpreters, and three of these RSC managers stated that they take action based on USCIS’s feedback. For example, RSC managers in two locations stated that they have excluded certain interpreters—who are hired on daily contracts—from subsequent circuit rides based on the feedback from USCIS officers. Additionally, USCIS officials stated that their supervisory officers often meet with RSC staff throughout and at the conclusion of a circuit ride to offer feedback on case preparation, among other things. USCIS headquarters officials also offer feedback to State headquarters officials on RSC operations after circuit ride teams return to Washington, D.C. State has control activities in place to monitor how RSCs implement policies and procedures for USRAP, but it does not have outcome-based performance indicators to assess whether RSCs are meeting their objectives under USRAP. Consistent with State’s January 2016 Federal Assistance Policy Directive, and according to State officials, State is required to monitor the RSCs it funds, whether through cooperative agreements or voluntary contributions. State funds four RSCs through cooperative agreements, four through a voluntary contribution to the International Organization for Migration (IOM), and self-operates the final RSC (RSC Cuba). On the basis of our interviews with State officials and as reflected in documentation from all nine RSCs, including quarterly reports to State, all RSCs have generally undergone the same monitoring regime regardless of funding mechanism. The four cooperative agreements and MOU with IOM establish objectives for the RSCs, which include interviewing applicants to obtain relevant information for the adjudication and ensuring the accuracy of information in WRAPS and the case files. State also establishes annual targets for the number of refugees who depart for the United States from each RSC. In addition, the cooperative agreements between the RSCs and State specify that State will periodically visit and evaluate the general performance of RSC operations. They also require RSCs to provide State with regular written reports on whether performance is in compliance with all the terms and conditions of the agreement. Consistent with funding requirements, the four RSCs with cooperative agreements submitted quarterly reports to State in fiscal year 2015, for example, that included information on how each RSC is addressing USRAP objectives. The reports included the number of applicants prescreened each quarter, the number of approved applicants who received cultural orientation training, and how RSCs compile applicant information. In addition, the four RSCs operated by IOM submitted quarterly reports using the same template. Further, according to State officials, the department has dedicated Program Officers located in Washington, D.C., and Refugee Coordinators based in U.S. embassies worldwide, who are responsible for providing support to RSCs and monitoring their activities. State headquarters officials and Refugee Coordinators we met with at the four RSC locations we visited told us that they have daily, informal interaction—via telephone, e-mail, or in-person—with the RSCs. State’s Program Officers also stated that they coordinate regularly with RSCs and conduct annual monitoring visits at RSCs to assess RSCs’ performance and complete monitoring reports based on their visits. We reviewed monitoring reports from eight State site visits to RSCs completed between 2015 and 2016 and found that some included narrative discussions of RSC case processing and timeframes, records management, coordination with other USRAP partners, and other topics. However, not all monitoring reports included consistent information on the same topics. For example, four of the eight monitoring reports we analyzed did not contain information on RSC case processing, prescreening interviews, and security check activities. Further, Program Officers are to complete separate monitoring reports for RSCs funded through cooperative agreements that assess the degree to which RSCs are making progress towards objectives based on project indicators. The indicators for RSCs, according to two fiscal year 2016 reports we reviewed, include the number of individuals prescreened and presented to USCIS for interview, the number of individuals who received cultural orientation training, the number of refugees that departed from those RSCs to the United States, and whether the RSCs ran security checks on all applicants. According to State officials, they also conduct daily monitoring of RSC activities through WRAPS data, which may be useful for monitoring RSC workload or data quality issues. Although State has established objectives and monitors several quantitative goals for RSCs—including the number of refugees that depart each year for the United States and the number of applicants who receive cultural orientation training—it has not established outcome- based performance indicators for key RSC activities such as prescreening applicants or accurate case file preparation, or monitored RSC performance consistently across such indicators. Specifically, neither the quarterly reports nor other monitoring reports we examined have or use consistent outcome-based performance indicators from which State Program Officers could evaluate whether RSCs were consistently and effectively prescreening applicants and preparing case files—key RSC activities that have important implications for timely and effective USCIS interviews and security checks. RSCs collect performance information from USCIS officers through surveys or in- person feedback sessions at the end of circuit rides, which could help inform the development of outcome-based performance indicators. For example, the survey asks USCIS officers to rate the quality of the RSC staff’s documentation of the applicants’ persecution claim. State could develop an indicator from this information and measure progress against it. According to State’s January 2016 policy directive, all assistance awards made by bureaus, offices, and posts—both domestic and overseas— within the department with assistance-awarding authority should have a monitoring plan that includes goals, objectives, and indicators that are outcome-oriented and capable of measuring the recipient’s progress in meeting these goals. In addition, according to State’s Performance Management Guidebook, a program requires a systematic process for monitoring the achievement of program activities; analyzing performance to track progress toward planned results; and using performance information and evaluations to influence program implementation and results. The guidebook states that each bureau, program, or project should establish goals; have specific measurable, outcome-oriented objectives; and develop and monitor performance indicators that focus on the results or effects caused. Moreover, in accordance with GPRA, as updated by GPRAMA, performance measurement is the ongoing monitoring and reporting of program accomplishments, particularly towards pre-established goals, and agencies are to establish performance measures to assess progress towards goals. These measures should link program efforts to desired outcomes. While GPRAMA is applicable to the department or agency level, performance goals and measures are important management tools to all levels of an agency. State officials said that in September 2016 they began to staff a new policy section within State’s Office of Admissions, and staff within this section are to begin standardizing the reporting of monitoring efforts, among other things. In addition, as of March 2017, according to State officials, the department and IOM were in the process of revising the MOU to include, among other things, new monitoring and reporting requirements that includes performance indicators. These officials also stated that, in future cooperative agreements, they plan to build on performance indicators developed by IOM while ensuring outcome-based results. However, as of March 2017, State did not have documentation or timelines for its plans to develop outcome-based performance indicators. Developing outcome-based performance indicators, as required by State policy and performance management guidance, and monitoring RSC performance against such indicators on a regular basis, would better position State to determine whether all RSCs are processing refugee applications in accordance with their responsibilities under USRAP. USCIS has policies and procedures to determine how to assign officers— RAD, IO, and temporary duty officers from other USCIS divisions—on circuit rides to adjudicate USRAP applications. According to USCIS officials, each fiscal year, based on State’s determination of the estimated number of cases that will be ready for USCIS interviews, RAD and IO divide responsibility for the anticipated workload. In general, RAD officers adjudicate refugee applications in locations where the caseload is large, such as Jordan and Kenya. According to USCIS officials, IO officers generally adjudicate refugee applications in locations where the refugee caseload is small, such as Pakistan, or where IO has a permanent office presence, such as Moscow, Russia. In fiscal year 2016, USCIS interviewed 43,705 refugee cases comprising 120,919 individuals. RAD interviewed 36,706 and, IO interviewed 6,999 of these cases. USCIS solicits a pool of temporary duty (temporary) officers from offices throughout USCIS who have volunteered to adjudicate refugee applications on circuit rides, contingent upon receiving additional training, when RAD or IO do not have sufficient staff capacity to meet the workload demands. According to RAD headquarters officials, there are no restrictions on assigning temporary officers to particular circuit rides. RAD officials stated that they generally assign RAD and temporary officers based on officers’ availability and interview experience. Additionally, temporary officers may commit to doing one or more circuit rides over one or more fiscal years. USCIS headquarters officials acknowledged that applications in some locations are more difficult to adjudicate than others and some temporary officers may not be as proficient or experienced at adjudicating applications as permanent RAD and IO officers. As a result, as resources permit, RAD and IO officials stated that they try to place temporary officers on circuit rides with caseloads that are best suited for their experience level. RAD headquarters officials also stated that, historically, they have planned for temporary officers to conduct approximately 15 to 25 percent of RAD’s refugee interviews and expect temporary officers to continue to be part of their workforce plan. When the refugee ceiling increased to 85,000 in fiscal year 2016, RAD increased the number of temporary officers on circuit rides to meet immediate mission needs while also working to hire additional refugee officers. RAD officials stated that, in fiscal year 2016, temporary staff completed 41 percent of RAD’s interviews. As of March 2017, RAD officials stated that they have undertaken significant hiring efforts in the past year, reducing the need for temporary officers. In addition, IO officials stated that fewer than 25 percent of the officers who participated in IO circuit rides in fiscal year 2016 were temporary officers. As of March 2017, IO officials stated that they do not plan to use temporary officers to adjudicate refugee applications for the remainder of fiscal year 2017. USCIS has developed policies and procedures for adjudicating refugee applications. These policies and procedures apply to RAD, IO, and temporary officers and include policies and procedures for how officers are to review the case file before the interview and conduct the interview as well as how supervisors are to review applications to ensure they are legally sufficient. For example, USCIS has developed a refugee application assessment tool that all officers are to use when interviewing the applicant to determine if the applicant was appropriately granted access to USRAP, had past persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution, is credible, is not a persecutor, and is admissible to the United States—including whether the applicant might be inadmissible due to national security or terrorism-related concerns. According to the assessment tool, at the time of interview, the USCIS officer is responsible for ensuring that appropriate security checks have been completed before making a decision on the application. Further, after receiving a completed refugee case file, supervisors are to review all forms and documents in the file that are relevant to establishing eligibility for refugee resettlement, including any documents provided by UNHCR or the RSC and those completed by the interviewing officer. Supervisors are to review the case file completed by the interviewing officer to ensure that the officer’s decision is legally sufficient, that the officer has reviewed security check results, and that all sections of the refugee application assessment are accurate and complete. In addition, USCIS has developed policies and procedures for determining when to place applications on hold. Specifically, officers may place an application on hold when the officer cannot make a final decision at the time of the interview—for example, if the outcomes of all required security checks are not yet available or if national security indicators requiring additional research become known to the officer at any point during the interview. We observed 29 USCIS RAD refugee interviews (including interviews by RAD officers and temporary officers) at four RSCs that we visited from June 2016 to September 2016 and found that the interviewing officers completed all parts of the assessment tool and placed cases that had pending security checks on hold, as required. We also observed that the USCIS officers documented the questions they asked and the answers the applicants provided. We also observed RAD supervisors while they reviewed officers’ initial decisions, interview transcripts, and case file documentation, consistent with RAD policy, at two of the sites we visited. Further, all six of the USCIS officers that we met with stated that supervisors conducted the required supervisory case file review during their circuit rides and the four supervisory officers we met with were aware of the requirements and stated that they conducted the supervisory reviews. According to USCIS policy, all USCIS officers who adjudicate refugee applications must complete specialized training, and the training varies based on the USCIS division of the officer (for example, Asylum or Refugee Affairs). However, temporary officers receive a condensed (or shortened) version of the trainings received by full time refugee officers and do not receive infield training. Figure 7 shows the training USCIS officers receive depending on whether they are in RAD, IO, or another USCIS division (i.e., a temporary officer). Protection Training. RAD training requirements for refugee officers state that officers are to attend a 4 week, in-person training (referred to as refugee basic training) that is specific to the refugee adjudication process, including classroom sessions, a written exam, and at least three mock interviews. IO headquarters officials stated that IO officers are to attend refugee basic training before adjudicating refugee applications. To adjudicate refugee applications, temporary officers are to have received “protection training,” the content of which varies based on the experience and qualifications of the temporary officer. Specifically, RAD’s training requirements for temporary officers state that officers who have not interviewed refugees in the past year are to receive an abbreviated in- person training that is either 3 days (if the temporary officer has recent interviewing experience for RAIO directorates, such as an asylum officer) or 20 days (if the temporary officer does not have recent interviewing experience for RAIO directorates). On the basis of our review of training syllabi, topics in refugee basic training, and temporary officer trainings include, at a minimum, applicable refugee and other immigration laws, refugee case file review, national security concerns, bars to refugee admission to the United States, and credibility assessment. Middle East Refugee Processing Training. Further, since October 2014, all officers (including temporary officers) who adjudicate applications that include applicants from Iraq and Syria are required to take the week-long Middle East Refugee Processing training. This training provides information to officers on the region’s history, specific country conditions, and additional training on indicators of potential national security concerns—such as military service history—for refugee applicants from Iran, Iraq, and Syria. This training includes briefings from law enforcement and the intelligence community. Predeparture briefings. In addition, prior to each RAD circuit ride, all officers, including temporary officers, who will adjudicate applications on that circuit ride are to receive a predeparture briefing that includes, among other things, any updated information on national security concerns and caseload trends for the particular circuit ride population. IO officials stated that their circuit rides are smaller and they do not always have formal predeparture briefings. However, IO officials told us their officers spend time before circuit rides reviewing case files and researching any country conditions or policy updates that officers deem relevant to their cases. All 10 RAD or temporary officers we interviewed who adjudicated applications or reviewed cases on the RAD circuit rides we observed stated that the USCIS trainings—particularly the predeparture briefings—were valuable and helpful. In-field training. RAD officers receive 10 days of “in-field training” from a dedicated trainer on their first circuit ride. According to RAD training requirements and circuit ride trip reports, during the in-field training period, new officers are to observe experienced interviewers, conduct interviews on a reduced schedule, receive individual guidance and performance feedback, and discuss case-specific issues with the trainers. In particular, 3 of the 107 trip reports we analyzed covered circuit rides with in-field training and noted that the in-field training period was valuable for new officers. For example, one report stated that new refugee officers benefited greatly from the in-field trainer’s knowledge and ability to be fully available for training and development. IO officials stated that they do not require formal in-field training for all new officers. Some new IO officers receive formal in-field training on RAD circuit rides, while others on smaller circuit rides may be paired with a more experienced officer and receive in-field mentoring on their first circuit ride. However, temporary officers do not receive in-field training. Although temporary officers receive training prior to participating in circuit rides, we found that they sometimes face challenges adjudicating refugee applications. For example, we analyzed the 44 available trip reports completed from July 2014 through June 2016 from RAD circuit rides that included temporary officers. In 15 of the 44 reports (about one-third), the RAD circuit ride supervisors noted that temporary officers faced challenges adjudicating refugee applications on the circuit ride. For example, one report indicated that although temporary officers completed the required training and predeparture briefing, they seemed not to have retained much information. Other reports indicated that temporary officers stated that they did not feel prepared to conduct some aspects of administrative and interview processes or that most temporary staff on the circuit ride only began to grasp the full range of law, policy, and procedures after 4 to 5 weeks on the circuit ride. One report also noted that temporary officers required de-facto mentoring on a daily basis. Further, USCIS headquarters officials and two interviewing officers we spoke with told us that some temporary officers make more errors than experienced officers, which contributes to inefficiencies, such as extra hours worked by supervisors. In addition, one temporary officer we observed stated that, despite the training she received, she felt unprepared to adjudicate cases on the first few days of her circuit ride. According to USCIS officials, all adjudications that are finalized have been determined by a supervisor to be legally sufficient. Consistent with USCIS policy, a supervisor is to review each case file and determine that the officer’s decision on the application is legally sufficient, among other things, before the decision is finalized. The supervisor may agree with the officer’s decision, request a reinterview for more information, or overturn the officer’s decision. On the basis of their review of trip reports, USCIS headquarters officials stated that in 2016, they revised the Refugee Processing Overview training (which is required for temporary officers with recent RAIO interviewing experience, such as asylum officers) and the predeparture briefing content (up to 8 days) to include mock interviews and more practical exercises about the refugee adjudication process. We reviewed syllabi for the Refugee Processing Overview training and found that the training increased from 1 day, without mock interviews, in April 2015 to 3 days, with two mock interviews and additional practical exercises about national security and terrorism-related concerns, in March 2016. However, unlike RAD officers and IO officers, USCIS has not offered in- field training for temporary officers. Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government states that management should demonstrate a commitment to recruit, develop, and retain competent individuals. The standards also note that competence is the qualification to carry out assigned responsibilities, and requires relevant knowledge, skills, and abilities, which are gained largely from professional experience, training, and certifications. USCIS officials told us that temporary officers receive a number of accommodations to help them adjudicate applications—including a reduced ramp-up schedule on their first days of interviewing and a compilation of frequently used adjudication tools and guidance—but that USCIS is unable to offer in-field training to temporary officers due to resource constraints. In March 2017, RAD officials also stated that they have undertaken significant hiring efforts in the past year, reducing the need for temporary officers. IO officials also said IO does not plan to use temporary officers for the remainder of fiscal year 2017. Nevertheless, interviewing officers, including temporary officers, play a critical role in the refugee adjudication process, and USCIS may use temporary officers to meet workload demands in the future. Some temporary officers have committed to working on three circuit rides in a 2-year period, and may interview hundreds of refugee cases over that time frame. Further, while enhancing training for temporary officers may require additional resources, the lack of experience and preparation among temporary officers has led to inefficiencies, as described by some USCIS supervisors. To the extent that USCIS uses temporary officers on future circuit rides, providing them with additional training, such as in-field training, would help better prepare them to interview refugees and adjudicate their applications, increase the quality and efficiency of their work, and potentially reduce the supervisory burden on those who oversee temporary officers. In addition to training, USCIS has developed guidance documents and tools to help officers identify USRAP applicants with potential national security concerns. However, USCIS could strengthen its efforts by developing and implementing a plan for deploying officers with national security expertise on selected circuit rides. USCIS provides a number of resources to officers to help them identify and address potential national security-related concerns in USRAP applications. Further, security check results (provided by interagency vetting partners) may help officers identify security concerns before the refugee interview. In addition, USCIS’s national security policies and operating procedures require that cases with national security concerns be placed on hold by interviewing officers. These cases are then reviewed by USCIS headquarters staff who have additional specialized training and expertise in vetting national security issues. These headquarters staff can clear the hold, deny the case, or refer the case back to USCIS officers for reinterview with suggested lines of questioning. Further, RAD maintains training lesson plans, guidance on particular issues (such as terrorism-related inadmissibilities), and country conditions information that is accessible to interviewing officers overseas. As discussed above, USCIS provides the most up-to-date guidance to interviewing officers during its predeparture briefings. While USCIS has training and guidance to adjudicate cases with national security-related concerns, USCIS trip reports and officers we interviewed indicated that it can be challenging to adjudicate such applications. About half of the trip reports we analyzed (52 of 107) identified national security concerns as a training need for future circuit rides or made policy or guidance requests regarding national security concerns. Of these 52 reports, 33 were from circuit rides with no temporary officers and 19 were from circuit rides with a mix of temporary officers and refugee officers. For example, some trip reports generally noted that officers had difficulty identifying what applicant characteristics would be considered potential national security concerns among certain populations being interviewed. In addition, one trip report stated that officers required repeated reminders to elicit all of the necessary details that headquarters reviewers would need to determine whether an applicant posed a national security concern. Further, one supervisor we spoke with during a site visit stated that guidance about identifying cases with national security indicators is ambiguous and, at times, contradictory. Moreover, both RAD and IO headquarters officials we met with stated that interviewing officers are hesitant to make decisions regarding cases with national security concerns, and, as a result, often place cases on hold that are ultimately determined not to have national security concerns. USCIS officials identified several reasons why it is challenging to provide training and guidance on how to adjudicate cases with potential national security concerns. For example, according to RAD and IO headquarters officials, indicators of national security concerns and the country conditions that give rise to them evolve and change; as a result, USCIS guidance on how to address those concerns also changes over time. To further help interviewing officers adjudicate cases with national security concerns, RAD initiated a pilot program in the second and third quarters of fiscal year 2016, through which it sent headquarters USCIS Security, Vetting, and Program Integrity (SVPI) unit officers with national security-related expertise to support interviewing officers on select circuit rides. During these circuit rides, according to RAD and SVPI officials, SVPI officers’ tasks included prescreening case files and applications for national security concerns, flagging those concerns, and recommending lines of questions for USCIS interviewing officers. During our August 2016 visit to Amman, Jordan, we observed 16 interviews of applicants whose case files the SVPI officer had prescreened for potential national security- related issues; interviewing officers used notes that the SVPI officer provided to inform the questions they asked applicants. In some instances, the SVPI officer stated that he met with the interviewing officer before the interview to discuss potential questions on issues of national security concern that the SVPI officer anticipated might arise. Further, during the interview, the SVPI officer was available for real-time webchats to answer officers’ questions as they arose. The SVPI officer, circuit ride supervisor, and interviewing officers we spoke with in Amman all stated that having SVPI present on the circuit ride was valuable. For example, one temporary officer, who was on her first circuit ride, stated that she could not imagine resolving cases with national security concerns without the in-field help of SVPI. USCIS headquarters officials stated sending an SVPI officer resulted in a decrease in cases requiring headquarters review, although other factors also played a role in this decrease. For example, the on-site SVPI officer was able to resolve some cases with potential national security concerns in the field and was also able to prioritize cases requiring headquarters’ review due to potential national security concerns. In December 2016, RAIO and SVPI officials said they had determined that the SVPI in-field pilot was successful and that they plan to make it a formal part of select circuit rides in the future. These officials stated that they plan to continue to send SVPI officers on select circuit rides with caseloads high in potential national security-related issues, as resources permit. The officials stated that RAD selects which circuit rides will have on-site SVPI support based on several factors, including the number of cases placed on hold for national security-related concerns during previous circuit rides to certain locations and the availability of SVPI staff. To increase SVPI’s ability to support circuit rides, in December 2016, USCIS posted an SVPI job announcement with eight potential vacancies. The announcement stated that the job may require travel of up to 180 days per year on overseas circuit rides. The USCIS officials told us that, as of March 2017, they continue to work to fill these positions and are drafting an SOP that will have guidance about roles and responsibilities for SVPI officers providing on-site support to RAD circuit rides, which they intend to finalize later in 2017. As of April 2017, USCIS reported having filled five of the eight positions. Further, according to USCIS officials, SVPI initiated a test of the operational aspects of the draft SOP by deploying a supervisory SVPI officer on a RAD circuit ride in March 2017. USCIS officials reported in March 2017 that the draft SOP had not yet undergone a legal review. According to these officials, they expect to issue the SOP by July 2017. However, USCIS did not provide documentation or timelines for its plans to expand the use of SVPI officers on selected circuit rides. We have previously reported that, in developing new initiatives, agencies can benefit from following leading practices for strategic planning. Congress enacted GPRAMA to improve the efficiency and accountability of federal programs and, among other things, to update the requirement that federal agencies develop long-term strategic plans that include agencywide goals and strategies for achieving those goals. The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) has provided guidance in Circular A- 11 to agencies on how to prepare these plans in accordance with GPRAMA requirements. We have reported in the past that, taken together, the strategic planning elements established under GPRA, as updated by GPRAMA, and associated OMB guidance, along with practices we have identified, provide a framework of leading practices that can be used for strategic planning at lower levels within federal agencies, such as planning for individual divisions, programs, or initiatives. One of these leading practices is to define strategies and identify resources needed to achieve goals. Strategies should be designed to align activities, core processes, and resources to support the mission. Further, strategies should include milestones as well as a description of the resources needed to meet established goals. RAIO officials stated that they plan to deploy SVPI officers on additional circuit rides in the future. While these plans are a positive step for helping officers address potential national security concerns on circuit rides, USCIS has not yet documented these plans or completed an SOP. Given SVPI’s lack of documentation for future plans and challenges identified by USCIS staff in adjudicating cases with potential national security concerns, it is unclear how or when RAIO will fulfill its plans to send national security experts on circuit rides to support interviewing officers. In light of the evolving and significant nature of national security concerns, developing and implementing a plan to deploy additional SVPI officers with national security expertise on circuit rides—including timeframes for deployment and how USCIS will select circuit rides for SVPI deployment—would better ensure that USCIS provides interviewing officers with the resources needed to efficiently and effectively adjudicate cases with national security concerns. USCIS has not conducted quality assurance assessments of refugee adjudications since fiscal year 2015 and has not developed plans for subsequent assessments, which help ensure that case files are completed accurately and that decisions by RAD, IO, and temporary officers are well-documented and legally sufficient. The RAIO Directorate conducted a quality assurance review of refugee adjudications in fiscal year 2015. The RAIO Directorate’s 2015 review included a sample of applications adjudicated by RAD and IO during one quarter of the fiscal year, which was not representative of all RAD and IO applications for the fiscal year. The 2015 quality assurance review found that most cases in the sample were legally sufficient. However, the review indicated that there were differences between RAD and IO adjudications. Specifically, the review rated 69 of 80 RAD case files (86 percent) as good or excellent, and rated 36 of 73 IO case files (49 percent) as good or excellent. Two of 80 RAD case files (less than 3 percent) in the review and 17 of 73 IO case files (23 percent) were rated as not legally sufficient. According to the assessment, USCIS placed these cases on hold or requested that RSCs schedule the applicants for reinterview. Among cases rated not legally sufficient, the most common deficiency identified was that interviewing officers did not fully develop the interview record with respect to possible inadmissibilities. Other deficiencies reported included interview records not being fully developed with respect to well-founded fear of persecution, improper documentation and analysis of terrorism-related inadmissibility concerns, incorrect hold determination, and required sections of the assessment leading to the adjudication decision that were incomplete. RAIO identified issues related to training and guidance for IO officers as well as supervisory review that may have led to these deficiencies. RAIO developed six high-priority action items to address the identified deficiencies in the quality assurance review and, as of November 2016, RAD and IO officials have made progress toward implementing them. For example, in 2016, IO issued a memorandum with required qualifications for IO officers who conduct supervisory review of refugee applications and provided additional guidance on which questions officers must ask during the interview in specific locations to ensure legal sufficiency. RAD and IO officials stated that they have taken steps to implement other action items identified in the 2015 review, such as incorporating more national security-related research, as appropriate, into the case file reviews that IO officers complete as part of their circuit ride predeparture preparation. RAIO officials stated that they have not completed a quality assurance review since fiscal year 2015, and, as of March 2017, do not know whether they will do so in fiscal year 2017. USCIS officials stated that they did not conduct a review in fiscal year 2016 for two reasons. First, in fiscal year 2016, RAIO officials stated that they faced resource constraints because they were focused on hiring and training new staff, and training and quality assurance are handled by the same team within RAIO. Second, the officials stated that there was value in allowing time for the action steps identified after the 2015 review to be implemented before conducting another review to identify if the action steps addressed the deficiencies noted in the prior review. RAIO officials also stated that even though they do not yet know whether they will conduct a quality assessment in fiscal year 2017, supervisors continue to review each refugee case file for legal sufficiency and completeness at the time of the interview. While supervisory review is an important quality control step, it does not position USCIS to identify systematic quality concerns, such as those identified in the fiscal year 2015 quality assessment results. USCIS’s January 2015 RAD and IO Roles and Responsibilities with Respect to Refugee Processing memorandum states that RAD is to establish quality assurance criteria and design the quality assurance program for refugee adjudications, in consultation with IO. The 2015 memorandum further states that RAD will conduct quality assurance reviews of refugee cases adjudicated by temporary officers, IO staff, and permanent RAD staff. Further, Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government states that management should establish and operate monitoring activities to monitor the internal control system and evaluate the results. The scope and frequency of evaluations are to depend on the assessment of risks, effectiveness of ongoing monitoring, and rate of change within the entity and its environment. In addition, standard practices for program management state that program quality should be monitored on a regular basis to provide confidence that the program will comply with the relevant quality policies and standards. Although there have been significant changes in the refugee caseload in the past 2 years (such as the increase in Syrian refugees), an increased use of temporary staff to conduct refugee adjudications in fiscal year 2016, and the difference in quality between RAD and IO adjudications noted in the 2015 quality assurance review, USCIS did not conduct quality reviews in 2016 and has no plans to conduct them in 2017. Regular quality assurance reviews could help provide USCIS reasonable assurance that RAD officers, IO officers, and temporary officers are consistently, accurately, and sufficiently documenting their adjudication decisions. Conducting regular quality assurance assessments of refugee adjudications would also provide USCIS officials with key information about the quality of USCIS refugee adjudications and allow them to identify any areas where officers face challenges, allowing RAD and IO to target training or guidance to areas where it may be most needed. Fraud can occur in the refugee process in a number of ways, and State, RSCs, and USCIS have implemented certain mechanisms to help detect and prevent fraud by USRAP applicants. In general, immigration benefit fraud often involves the willful misrepresentation of material fact for the purpose of obtaining an immigration benefit, such as refugee status. Immigration benefit fraud is often facilitated by document and identity fraud. Document fraud includes forging, counterfeiting, altering, or falsely making any document, or using, possessing, obtaining, accepting, or receiving such falsified documents in order to satisfy any requirement of, or to obtain a benefit under, U.S. law. Identity fraud refers to the fraudulent use of others’ valid documents. In the context of USRAP, applicants may attempt to apply for refugee status after having been denied refugee status or another immigration benefit, such as a visa, using another identity. Or, applicants may falsely present themselves as a national of a country eligible for resettlement to gain access to USRAP. Further, applicants may present false marriage claims or attempt to include unrelated children on their case. USCIS officers can encounter indicators of fraud while adjudicating refugee applications, and State has suspended USRAP programs in the past because of fraud. Examples include the following: Of the 107 RAD circuit ride trip reports we analyzed, 30 reports identified instances in which officers denied applications for fraud or misrepresentation. According to an SVPI official, applications with indicators of fraud may also be denied on other grounds, such as ineligibility, inadmissibility, and security check results, among others. In 2008, State suspended the P3 program, a family reunification program between a family member in the United States and the refugee applicant, because of widespread fraud, as discussed below. In 2015, State suspended a P2 program after discovering that two individuals who had been approved as refugees and admitted to the United States had submitted fraudulent documents gain access to USRAP. During the suspension period from March to December 2015, State and RSC officials reviewed all cases that they were processing for this P2 program. According to State officials, this review found additional applicants with fraudulent documents. State, RSCs, and USCIS have put mechanisms in place to help detect and prevent fraud by USRAP applicants. State. State has guidance intended to help RSC staff identify fraudulent refugee applicants, and State has strengthened access controls for some refugee applicants. For example, State SOPs require that, when entering a new case into WRAPS for prescreening, RSC staff verify that a duplicate record does not already exist in WRAPS for the applicants. According to State SOPs, one of the purposes of this step is to identify individuals who attempt to fraudulently access USRAP. RSC officials at all four locations we visited stated that they complete this procedure and our analysis of WRAPS data showed that RSCs have identified duplicate applicant records. State has also strengthened its controls for granting access to USRAP for some groups of refugee applicants. For example, after suspending the P3 program due to fraud in 2008, State restarted the P3 program in 2012 with additional controls in place, including a requirement for DNA testing for all claimed parent and child biological relationships. In addition, when State initiated the P2 Central American Minors program in 2014—which, like the P3 program, requires a familial relationship between someone residing in the United States and the refugee applicant—State instituted a requirement for DNA testing of all claimed biological relationships between the qualifying child and the qualifying parent. Further, after finding fraud in 2015 in a P2 program, as discussed above, State strengthened the mechanism for verifying access to USRAP. RSCs. RSCs have also implemented a variety of controls to help detect and prevent fraud among refugee applicants to USRAP. For example, according to all nine RSC directors, each RSC has a designated anti- fraud official or entity, consistent with GAO’s Fraud Risk Framework. Officials at all nine RSCs stated that they provide staff with training or information on applicant fraud trends. Further, RSC officials in two RSCs stated that they conduct their own research to detect potential applicant fraud. In addition, two of the four RSCs we visited conduct two prescreening interviews for each applicant rather than one. According to RSC officials, conducting more than one interview serves as a fraud deterrent because it allows the RSC staff to check for consistency across interviews and identify false information. Further, these RSCs require, where possible, that different interpreters participate in each interview to decrease the likelihood that applicants collude with interpreters. USCIS. Within USCIS, SVPI and adjudicators are responsible for antifraud activities related to the adjudication of the refugee application. USCIS has implemented a number of control activities to detect and prevent refugee applicant fraud. Through biometric checks, USCIS may identify that a USRAP applicant has multiple identities. According to SVPI officials, SVPI analyzes the results of the checks, identifies fraud indicators, and may complete a fraud referral so that the applicant can be interviewed or re-interviewed by an officer overseas to address the fraud concern. SVPI also receives fraud referrals from other sources, such as refugee officers and the RSCs, although SVPI officials stated that the number of such referrals is small. USCIS officials stated that, in many instances, interviewing officers deny an application with indicators of fraud on other grounds, which does not require the involvement of SVPI or a fraud referral. Interviewing officers may also place a case with indicators of fraud on hold for additional SVPI research. According to USCIS officials and training materials that we reviewed, USCIS officers who adjudicate refugee applications receive training in identifying fraud and processing cases with fraud indicators during basic training and predeparture briefings. We observed discussions about fraud trends at three of the four predeparture briefings that we attended. Additionally, the RAD trip report guide states that supervisors are to document any suspected fraud trends from the circuit ride, including how the fraud trend was identified, any actions taken in response to the trend, whether the trend was expected to continue, and examples of any suspected fraud. Of the 107 trip reports we analyzed, 72 contained information about applicant fraud or fraud trends. The information varied, ranging from detailed descriptions of individual cases denied due to misrepresentation or fraud to a more general description of potential fraud trends in certain populations, such as a lack of reliable marriage documentation. The remaining 35 reports stated that there were no fraud trends or left the section of the report about fraud trends blank, which indicates that the author of the trip report did not identify fraud trends on the circuit ride. State and USCIS have not jointly assessed applicant fraud risks across USRAP. Our Fraud Risk Framework calls for program managers to plan and conduct regular fraud risk assessments. According to our Fraud Risk Framework, there is no universally accepted approach for conducting fraud risk assessments, since circumstances among programs vary; however, assessing fraud risks generally involves five actions: (1) identifying inherent fraud risks affecting the program, (2) assessing the likelihood and impact of those fraud risks, (3) determining fraud risk tolerance, (4) examining the suitability of existing fraud controls and prioritizing residual fraud risks, and (5) documenting the program’s fraud risk profile. The framework provides managers with flexibility in deciding whether to carry out this and other aspects of fraud risk management at the program or agency level. In addition, Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government states that management should consider the potential for fraud when identifying, analyzing, and responding to risks, and analyze and respond to identified fraud risks, through a risk analysis process, so that they are effectively mitigated. Although State and USCIS perform a number of fraud risk management activities and have responded to individual instances of applicant fraud, these efforts do not position State and USCIS to assess fraud risks program-wide for USRAP or know if their controls are appropriately targeted to the areas of highest risk in the program. State and USCIS officials told us that each agency has discrete areas of responsibility in the refugee admissions process, and each agency’s antifraud activities are largely directed at their portions of the process. State is responsible for managing USRAP at a programmatic level and, according to State officials, State has responded to instances of fraud in USRAP. State officials said that they have not conducted an assessment of the risks associated with applications to USRAP because, according to these officials, such an assessment is USCIS’s responsibility. However, USCIS officials told us that SVPI—USCIS’s antifraud entity for refugee applicant fraud—only has authority over antifraud activities related to the adjudication of the refugee application, including security checks. USCIS officials stated that they are not responsible for, and do not have the authority to respond to, applicant fraud program-wide in USRAP, although they coordinate with State when fraud is brought to the attention of SVPI. As of March 2017, SVPI has a draft Fraud Process SOP, which identifies three main types of applicant fraud in USRAP—individuals who are using multiple identities; individuals who are claiming false family composition, such as marriage fraud; and individuals who are claiming a false country of nationality. In addition, the draft SOP identifies the main sources by which USCIS detects fraud in the USRAP application process—results from biometric checks and testimony and evidence from the USRAP applicant. However, USCIS and State have not jointly conducted a fraud risk assessment of the risks associated with applications to USRAP or determined a fraud risk tolerance for the program. Because the management of USRAP involves several agencies, without jointly and regularly assessing applicant fraud risks and determining the fraud risk tolerance of the entirety of USRAP, in accordance with leading practices, State and USCIS do not have comprehensive information on the inherent fraud risks that may affect the integrity of the refugee application process and therefore do not have reasonable assurance that State, USCIS, and other program partners have implemented controls to mitigate those risks. Moreover, regularly assessing applicant fraud risks program-wide could help State and USCIS ensure that fraud prevention and detection efforts across USRAP are targeted to those areas that are of highest risk, in accordance with the program’s fraud risk tolerance. Screening and adjudicating refugee applicants and applications are challenging tasks that involve entities across the U.S. government. RSCs have an important role in the refugee admissions process because they collect applicants’ information and conduct in-person prescreening interviews that USCIS officers use to help determine applicants’ eligibility and credibility. Developing outcome-based performance indicators, as required by State policy and performance management guidance, and monitoring RSC performance against such indicators on a regular basis, would better position State to determine whether RSCs are processing refugee applications in accordance with their responsibilities under USRAP. In addition, adjudicating refugee applications can be challenging. During a face-to-face interview, USCIS officers must, among other things, determine if the applicant meets the definition of a refugee; is inadmissible because of, for example, national security concerns or criminal activities; and is credible. Further, indicators of national security concerns (and the country conditions that give rise to them) evolve and change. To the extent that USCIS uses temporary officers on future circuit rides, providing them with additional training, such as in-field training, would help better prepare them to interview refugees and adjudicate their applications, increase the quality and efficiency of their work, and potentially reduce the supervisory burden on those who oversee temporary officers. Moreover, developing and implementing a plan to deploy additional USCIS SVPI officers with national security expertise on select circuit rides would better ensure that USCIS provides interviewing officers with the resources needed to efficiently and effectively adjudicate cases with national security concerns. In addition, conducting regular quality assurance assessments of refugee adjudications would also provide USCIS officials with key information about the quality of USCIS refugee adjudications and allow them to identify any areas where officers face challenges, allowing RAD and IO to target training or guidance to areas where it may be most needed. Given that USCIS officers encounter indicators of fraud while adjudicating refugee applications and fraud has occurred in USRAP programs in the past, it is important that USCIS and State implement leading practices to combat fraud. Without jointly and regularly assessing applicant fraud risks and determining the fraud risk tolerance of USRAP, in accordance with leading practices, State and USCIS do not have comprehensive information on the inherent fraud risks that may affect the integrity of the refugee application process. Moreover, regularly assessing applicant fraud risks program-wide could help State and USCIS ensure that fraud prevention and detection efforts across USRAP are targeted to those areas that are of highest risk. To better assess whether RSCs are meeting USRAP objectives, the Assistant Secretary of State for Population, Refugees, and Migration should take the following two actions: develop outcome-based indicators, as required by State policy; and monitor RSC performance against such indicators on a regular basis. To better ensure that USCIS officers effectively adjudicate applications for refugee status, the Director of USCIS should take the following three actions: provide additional training, such as infield training, for any temporary officers who adjudicate refugee applications on future circuit rides; develop and implement a plan to deploy officers with national security expertise on circuit rides; and conduct regular quality assurance assessments of refugee application adjudications across RAD and IO. To provide reasonable assurance that USRAP applicant fraud prevention and detection controls are adequate and effectively implemented, we recommend that the Secretaries of Homeland Security and State conduct regular joint assessments of applicant fraud risk across USRAP. We provided a draft of the sensitive version of this report to the Departments of Homeland Security, State, Defense, and Justice, as well as the Office of Director of National Intelligence, for their review and comment. State and DHS provided written comments stating that they concurred with our recommendations, which are reproduced in full in appendixes III and IV, respectively. In emails, a Director in the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy at the Departments of Defense and the Legislative Liaison Officer at the Office of Director of National Intelligence stated that these agencies did not have any written comments on our draft report. State, DHS, the Department of Justice, and the FBI provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. We are sending copies of this report to interested congressional committees; the Secretaries of Homeland Security, State, and Defense; the Attorney General of the United States; and, the Director for National Intelligence. In addition, the report is available at no charge on the GAO website at http://gao.gov. If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 512-8777 or gamblerr@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. Key contributors to this report are listed in appendix V. The Central American Minors (CAM) Program was established in November 2014 to promote safe, legal, and orderly migration of certain vulnerable children to the United States and began accepting applications on December 1, 2014. This family reunification program aims to deter children from El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras from undertaking a risky journey in an attempt to be reunited with a parent residing in the United States. CAM allows certain parents to request access to the U.S. Refugee Admissions Program (USRAP) for their children who are nationals of one of these three countries and are outside of the United States. Children who are found ineligible for admission as a refugee under USRAP but still at risk of harm may be considered for parole—in general a mechanism by which an individual not otherwise admitted to the United States may be permitted entry into the country on a temporary basis. CAM is jointly run by the Department of State’s (State) Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration and the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS). To participate in CAM, both parent and child must meet certain qualifying criteria. Among other criteria, a qualifying parent must be 18 years of age and lawfully present within the United States at the time of application and at the time of admission or parole of the beneficiary (e.g., a qualifying child) to the United States. The qualifying child must be a biological, step, or legally adopted child of the qualifying parent; unmarried; under the age of 21 at the time the qualifying parent initiates the process; and a national of El Salvador, Guatemala, or Honduras. Other family members of the child who meet certain criteria are also eligible to be part of the qualifying child’s application. For example, an accompanying parent who is the legal spouse of the U.S.-based qualifying parent may be eligible to travel with the qualifying child. However, the accompanying parent cannot derive his or her refugee status from the qualifying child and therefore must independently establish that he or she qualifies as a refugee. In July 2016 State and DHS announced that CAM would expand to include additional eligible family members, when accompanied by a qualifying child—(1) the children, regardless of age or marital status, of a U.S.- based qualifying parent; (2) the biological parent of a qualifying child who is not legally married to the U.S.-based lawfully present parent; and (3) the caregiver of a qualifying child who is related to either the U.S.-based lawfully present parent or the qualifying child. State began accepting applications that included these additional family members in November 2016. As shown in figure 8, a qualifying parent initiates the CAM application process in the United States by completing a form (DS-7699, or “Affidavit of Relationship” (AOR)) with the help of a resettlement agency—a State- funded entity that provides support services to refugees once they arrive within the United States. The qualifying parent files an AOR with the assistance of a designated resettlement agency, which forwards the AOR to State. State is to conduct a preliminary review of the AOR for completeness, including a check that the qualifying parent has provided proof of his or her lawful status, and then provide the case to Resettlement Support Center (RSC) staff. RSC staff are to prescreen the qualifying children according to the standard operating procedures for all USRAP applicants. Shortly after prescreening, RSCs are to collect the child’s DNA to confirm biological relationships between the parent and the qualifying child. State has established policies and procedures specifically for the collection and processing of DNA samples from the qualifying child. We observed RSC staff taking 5 separate DNA samples at the RSC Latin America San Salvador office, during which staff adhered to the established standard operating procedures for DNA collection. Separately, within the United States, State is to notify the parent in the United States to provide DNA samples to a U.S.-based, accredited lab to confirm the biological relationship with his or her claimed child or children. The parent must also cover the costs associated with the DNA testing, but State is to reimburse the costs of the tests if all the claimed biological relationships are supported by the DNA evidence, even if the beneficiary is not ultimately admitted as a refugee or paroled to the United States. The U.S.-based lab reports the results of DNA testing for all cases to State, which then uploads the results into the Worldwide Refugee Admissions Processing System for viewing by USCIS. Although USCIS does not require DNA testing for other eligible family members included on applications (e.g., the children of the qualifying child or the siblings of the qualifying child who are not biologically related to the U.S.-based parent)—citing, among other factors, concerns over the reliability of such testing between, for example, siblings—USCIS officials stated that additional DNA testing will occur for new CAM categories announced in July 2016. After prescreening, but before USCIS interviews the child, USCIS’s Refugee Access Verification Unit (RAVU) is to, among other things, take steps to confirm the parent’s lawful status and to review the results of DNA testing, if available. According to USCIS procedures, if RAVU cannot confirm the parent’s status or DNA testing results do not confirm the relationship, USCIS will generally reject the application. According to State data, USCIS rejected or disqualified about 600 (5 percent) of the approximate 12,000 CAM AORs submitted from December 2014 through March 2017. USCIS generally adjudicates CAM applicants as they do all other USRAP applicants. However, according to USCIS policy, and consistent with characteristics of the targeted populations and stated objectives of the program, USCIS officials stated that CAM applicants undergo additional vetting for potential gang affiliations in cases with such indicators. If USCIS concludes that such an applicant is not eligible for admission as a refugee, the applicant may be considered for parole. Vetting CAM applicants for potential gang affiliation. USCIS policy requires that officers place CAM applications on hold if gang affiliation indicators exist. As with all USRAP applicants, CAM program applicants are inadmissible to the United States as refugees if USCIS officers find them to be persecutors of others, have committed certain crimes, or be a threat to the security of the United States, among other things. Consistent with USCIS policy, USCIS officers may place a case on hold to do additional research or investigation if the officer determines that the applicant or other case members may be inadmissible due to information provided during the interview (e.g., the applicant has a known or suspected gang affiliation). For example, to further review CAM applications from Salvadoran applicants identified by USCIS interviewers as having indicators of possible gang affiliation during the USCIS interview, USCIS staff are to contact the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). For CAM applicants in El Salvador, FBI agents stationed in San Salvador are to coordinate with the government of El Salvador in sharing investigative information on gangs. According to FBI officials, if the FBI has any information on the CAM program applicant and potential gang affiliations, they are to forward the information to USCIS officials, who determine whether the information renders the applicant ineligible for the program. FBI officials in San Salvador said that they receive 6 to 10 requests per month from USCIS for any available information related to CAM program applicants. From December 2014 through March 2017, USCIS officers had placed about 14 percent of CAM applicants they interviewed on hold, and in most cases, according to State data, the hold was for USCIS’s headquarters’ review of possible gang affiliations. Parole. CAM program applicants found by USCIS to be ineligible for refugee status in the United States are to be considered on a case-by- case basis for parole, which is a mechanism to allow someone who is otherwise inadmissible to enter the United States on a temporary basis for urgent humanitarian reasons or significant public benefit. USCIS procedures require that, to support an authorization of parole, the qualifying child must assert to the USCIS officer during the interview that he or she has a fear of being harmed, and the objective evidence must demonstrate that the child would face a reasonable possibility of harm if he or she remains in their home country. The interviewing officer has discretion to conditionally approve parole, after consideration of the entire record, and several factors—such as the outcome of the security checks or derogatory information (which may include involvement in gangs or other criminal activity)—could lead to a denial of parole. The final decision regarding parole is made by a USCIS officer after review of medical exam results and an additional review of security checks. Once in the United States a parolee, unlike a refugee, is not considered to have been admitted into the country, has not been conferred a lawful immigration status, and does not have the benefit of a pathway to U.S. citizenship. Parole under CAM may be authorized for a period of up to 2 years and parolees are to file their request for re-parole no later than 90 days before the expiration of their authorized parole. Parolees may also apply for employment authorization but the extent to which they may be eligible for other public benefits is determined in accordance with U.S. law. Parole has been the most common outcome of CAM program applications, but a lower percentage of parolees have arrived in the United States than those granted refugee status through the program. From December 2014, when the program began accepting AORs, through March 2017, USCIS received AORs for about 12,100 individuals. Most of the AORs submitted were for applicants from El Salvador (86 percent). USCIS had made final decisions on half (6,300) of these applicants, approving 70 percent for parole and granting 29 percent refugee status. According to USCIS officials, more CAM cases receive parole because the generalized violence that applicants experience does not rise to the level of persecution or is not on account of a protected characteristic required to support a refugee determination. However, the officials noted that the conditions in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras, and the fact that the children are living without at least one parent in their country of origin are generally sufficient to demonstrate the fear of harm required to support a parole determination. USCIS officers determined that the remaining 1 percent of applicants did not qualify for refugee status or parole and denied the associated cases. However, a higher percentage of CAM applicants who had received refugee status had arrived in the United States, as of March 2017. Program data on applications submitted from December 2014 through March 2017 show that 63 percent (about 1,100) of all CAM-approved refugees and 33 percent (about 1,500) of CAM approved parolees had traveled to the United States. Parolees must finance their travel to the United States and do not receive benefits upon arrival, circumstances that, according to State officials, most likely account for the difference in CAM refugee and parolee arrivals. Refugees have access to travel loans, and must sign a promissory note to assume responsibility for repaying the cost of travel to the United States. Parolees are also responsible for paying for the costs of medical exams. The U.S. Refugee Admissions Program (USRAP) provides refugees who are of special humanitarian concern from around the world with opportunities for resettlement in the United States. The Departments of State (State) and Homeland Security (DHS) have joint responsibility for the admission of refugees to the United States. Specifically, State’s Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration coordinates and manages USRAP and makes decisions, along with DHS’s U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS), on which individuals around the world are eligible to apply for refugee status in the United States. Nine State-funded Resettlement Support Centers (RSCs) with distinct geographic areas of responsibility communicate directly with applicants to process their applications, collect their information, conduct a prescreening interview, and prepare applications for adjudication by USCIS. State and its partners—including USCIS—make initial determinations about whether an individual will be accepted into or excluded from USRAP (referred to as program “access”) for subsequent screening and interview by USCIS officers. State has identified three categories of individuals who are of special humanitarian concern and, therefore, can qualify for access to USRAP—Priority 1, Priority 2, and Priority 3. Table 2 describes these priority categories—including the multiple programs that comprise the Priority 2 category—and how State applicants within these priorities gain access to USRAP. In addition to the contact named above, Kathryn Bernet (Assistant Director), David Alexander, Mona Nichols Blake, Eric Erdman, Cynthia Grant, Brian Hackney, Paul Hobart, Eric Hauswirth, Susan Hsu, Thomas Lombardi, Mike McKemey, Erin McLaughlin, Thomas Melito, Clair Peachey, Mary Pitts, Elizabeth Repko, Judith Williams, and Su Jin Yon made significant contributions to this report.

Summary: Increases in the number of USRAP applicants approved for resettlement in the United States from countries where terrorists operate have raised questions about the adequacy of applicant screening. GAO was asked to review the refugee screening process. This report (1) describes what State and DHS data indicate about the characteristics and outcomes of USRAP applications, (2) analyzes the extent to which State and RSCs have policies and procedures on refugee case processing and State oversees RSC activities, (3) analyzes the extent to which USCIS has policies and procedures for adjudicating refugee applications, and (4) analyzes the extent to which State and USCIS have mechanisms in place to detect and prevent applicant fraud. GAO reviewed State and DHS policies, analyzed refugee processing data and reports, observed a nongeneralizable sample of refugee screening interviews in four countries in 2016 (selected based on application data and other factors), and interviewed State and DHS officials and RSC staff. From fiscal year 2011 through June 2016, the U.S. Refugee Admission Program (USRAP) received about 655,000 applications and referrals—with most referrals coming from the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees—and approximately 227,000 applicants were admitted to the United States (see figure). More than 75 percent of the applications and referrals were from refugees fleeing six countries—Iraq, Burma, Syria, Somalia, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and Bhutan. Nine Department of State- (State) funded Resettlement Support Centers (RSC) located abroad process applications by conducting prescreening interviews and initiating security checks, among other activities. Such information is subsequently used by the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS), which conducts in-person interviews with applicants and assesses eligibility for refugee status to determine whether to approve or deny them for resettlement. a After receiving an application, USRAP partners determine whether the applicant qualifies for a U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) interview. b USCIS officers may place an application on hold after their interview if they determine that additional information is needed to adjudicate the application. State and RSCs have policies and procedures for processing refugee applications, but State has not established outcome based-performance measures. For example, State's USRAP Overseas Processing Manual includes requirements for information RSCs should collect when prescreening applicants and initiating national security checks, among other things. GAO observed 27 prescreening interviews conducted by RSC caseworkers in four countries and found that they generally adhered to State requirements. Further, State has control activities in place to monitor how RSCs implement policies and procedures. However, State has not established outcome-based performance indicators for key activities—such as prescreening applicants and accurate case file preparation—or monitored RSC performance consistently across such indicators. Developing outcome-based performance indicators, and monitoring RSC performance against such indicators on a regular basis, would better position State to determine whether RSCs are processing refugee applications in accordance with their responsibilities. USCIS has policies and procedures for adjudicating applications—including how its officers are to conduct interviews, review case files, and make decisions on refugee applications—but could improve training, the process for adjudicating applicants with national security concerns, and quality assurance assessments. For example, USCIS has developed an assessment tool that officers are to use when interviewing applicants. GAO observed 29 USCIS interviews and found that officers completed all parts of the assessment. USCIS also provides specialized training to all officers who adjudicate applications abroad, but could provide additional training for officers who work on a temporary basis, which would better prepare them to adjudicate applications. In addition, USCIS provides guidance to help officers identify national security concerns in applications and has taken steps to address challenges with adjudicating such cases. For example, in 2016, USCIS completed a pilot that included sending officers with national security expertise overseas to support interviewing officers in some locations. USCIS determined the pilot was successful and has taken steps to formalize it. However, USCIS has not developed and implemented a plan for deploying these additional officers, whose expertise could help improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the adjudication process. Further, USCIS does not conduct regular quality assurance assessments of refugee adjudications, consistent with federal internal control standards. Conducting regular assessments of refugee adjudications would allow USCIS to target training or guidance to areas of most need. a All persons traveling to the United States by air are subject to standard U.S. government vetting practices. State and USCIS have mechanisms in place to detect and prevent applicant fraud in USRAP, such as requiring DNA testing for certain applicants, but have not jointly assessed applicant fraud risks program-wide. Applicant fraud may include document and identity fraud, among other things. USCIS officers can encounter indicators of fraud while adjudicating refugee applications, and fraud has occurred in USRAP programs in the past. Because the management of USRAP involves several agencies, jointly and regularly assessing fraud risks program-wide, consistent with leading fraud risk management practices and federal internal control standards, could help State and USCIS ensure that fraud detection and prevention efforts across USRAP are targeted to those areas that are of highest risk. This is a public version of a sensitive report issued in June 2017. Information that the Departments of Defense, Homeland Security, and State deemed to be sensitive is not included in this report. GAO recommends that State (1) develop outcome-based indicators to measure RSC performance and (2) monitor against these measures; USCIS (1) enhance training to temporary officers, (2) develop a plan to deploy additional officers with national security expertise, and (3) conduct regular quality assurance assessments; and State and DHS jointly conduct regular fraud risk assessments. State and DHS concurred with GAO's recommendations.