The Grow the Force initiative will increase the end strength of the Army and Marine Corps collectively by more than 100,000 by 2013, as shown in table 1. The Army and Marine Corps are using personnel from their increased end strength to establish new units, as well as adding personnel to existing units. The Army’s increased end strength will be used to create six new Brigade Combat Teams (21,000 soldiers), establish new combat support and combat service support units (16,000 soldiers), address shortfalls in existing units (13,000 soldiers), and establish additional training and headquarter capabilities (15,000 soldiers). The Army Reserve is adding two new brigades to its force structure and the Army National Guard will add new units and add personnel to existing units to increase its military police, engineering, and medical units to increase combat support and combat service support capabilities. The Marine Corps is using personnel from its increased end strength to establish new units and add personnel to existing units to address shortfalls in critical occupations, including military police, infantry battalions, intelligence battalions, and explosive ordnance disposal teams. DOD projects that facility requirements associated with Grow the Force will cost more than $17 billion, as shown in table 2. The Army requested about $2.8 billion for military construction in its budget requests for fiscal years 2007 and 2008, including over $400 million in the fiscal year 2007 supplemental budget request. The remaining $7.5 billion is for projects to support new combat support and combat service support units; new brigade combat teams; and quality of life projects, such as child development centers, at installations that are gaining additional personnel. The Marine Corps requested $951 million for military construction in its budget requests for fiscal years 2007 and 2008, including approximately $493 million in the supplemental budget requests for fiscal years 2007 and 2008. The remaining $6.1 billion will include projects for newly established units or units increasing in size through Grow the Force and quality of life projects. The Army and Marine Corps followed all of the steps typically used to determine construction projects when they developed the Grow the Force construction projects submitted in DOD’s budget requests for fiscal years 2007 and 2008, but the process was compressed. Specifically, the limited time available between when the Grow the Force initiative was announced and the fiscal year 2007 and fiscal year 2008 budget requests were submitted gave the services less time than during the typical process to develop and submit projects. The Army’s typical process for developing construction projects generally takes over 2 years; however, the Army completed the process in about 2 months for Grow the Force projects included in its fiscal year 2007 supplemental budget request and the President’s fiscal year 2008 budget request. In general, the Army’s typical process to develop construction projects includes five steps: (1) Army headquarters provides guidance to installations, (2) installation officials develop construction projects, (3) construction projects are submitted to Army headquarters for review and approval, (4) senior Army officials review and approve construction projects, and (5) construction projects are included in the Army budget for submission to Congress. For Grow the Force projects included in the fiscal year 2007 supplemental budget request and the President’s fiscal year 2008 budget request, the Army included all of the steps from the typical process, but completed them in a compressed time frame, as shown in figure 1. According to Army officials, projects submitted in the President’s fiscal year 2009 budget request were also developed using the steps of the typical process in a compressed time frame. The projects were developed in about 6 months instead of 2 years. Army officials expect that Grow the Force projects submitted in the President’s fiscal year 2010 budget request and beyond will follow the typical process and time frames. As with the Army, the Marine Corps’ process for developing construction projects generally takes about 2 years; however, the Marine Corps completed the process in 6 months for Grow the Force projects included in DOD’s supplemental budget requests for fiscal years 2007 and 2008. In general, the Marine Corps’ typical process for developing construction projects includes 6 steps: (1) Marine Corps headquarters sends guidance on facility projects to the installations, (2) installations develop project proposals and submit them to Marine Corps headquarters, (3) a military construction review board prioritizes the projects and sets funding limits, (4) the Naval Facilities Engineering Command reviews projects and validates the cost and scope of the projects, (5) Marine Corps headquarters reviews projects, and (6) construction projects are included in the Department of the Navy budget for submission to Congress. For Grow the Force projects included in the fiscal year 2007 and fiscal year 2008 supplemental budget requests, the Marine Corps included all of the steps from the typical process, but completed them in a compressed time frame, as shown in figure 2. Similarly, the Marine Corps followed all of the steps of the typical process for Grow the Force projects submitted in the President’s fiscal year 2008 budget request. A Marine Corps headquarters official said that the installations did not submit new projects developed specifically for Grow the Force in the President’s fiscal year 2008 budget request. Rather, they submitted projects that were already in the development process for future budget requests due to the limited time available to develop projects and environmental reporting requirements. Installations followed the typical process when developing these projects. According to a Marine Corps official, installations followed the typical process to develop projects included in the President’s fiscal year 2009 budget request and had the same amount of time to develop projects, although Marine Corps headquarters provided the guidance to installations to develop projects about a month later than for the typical process and installations submitted projects to Marine Corps headquarters about a month later than usual. A Marine Corps official expects that Grow the Force projects submitted in the President’s fiscal year 2010 budget request and beyond will follow the typical process and time frames for developing construction projects. As with the Army and Marine Corps, Army National Guard projects included in the President’s fiscal year 2008 budget request were developed following the typical military construction process. According to a National Guard Bureau official, the Army National Guard’s process to determine projects for the President’s fiscal year 2009 budget request was the same as the typical military construction process; however, the projects were developed in a compressed time frame. The Army National Guard’s Grow the Force projects submitted in the President’s fiscal year 2010 budget request and beyond will follow the typical process and time frames. Unlike the other components, the Army Reserve has not yet requested Grow the Force construction funding, but Army Reserve officials said that they have followed their typical process and time frames to develop construction projects to be included in future budget requests. We found that nearly all of the Grow the Force construction projects submitted by the Army and Army National Guard, and most by the Marine Corps, in DOD’s fiscal year 2007 and fiscal year 2008 budget requests supported the initiative. Specifically, we found that 65 Army projects, 3 Army National Guard projects, and 37 Marine Corps projects supported Grow the Force, but 13 projects did not, as shown in table 3. We determined that one Army project to upgrade a railroad yard at Fort Lewis, Washington, did not support Grow the Force because the project is in response to an existing deficiency. Specifically, the Army’s budget justification states that current facilities are overtaxed to support deployment from Fort Lewis as a result of growth through other Army initiatives. While approximately 2,000 personnel are being added to Fort Lewis through Grow the Force, we assessed this project as not supporting Grow the Force because the project was needed regardless of whether Grow the Force occurred and we did not identify a clear link between the additional personnel and an increased number of deployments, which would exacerbate the current capacity issues at the railroad yard. An official in the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Installation Management agreed with our assessment. As a result of the compressed time frame to develop and submit projects, we found that the 22 projects submitted by the Marine Corps in the President’s fiscal year 2008 budget request had already been planned and were moved up from future years’ budgets to meet existing deficiencies. We determined that 10 of these projects would support the Grow the Force increase because the existing deficiencies would be exacerbated by having more Marines on the installation due to the Grow the Force initiative. For example, officials from Twentynine Palms, California, said that they had already planned to include projects in their fiscal year 2010 and fiscal year 2011 military construction budget requests to build operations facilities designed to house multiple battalions due to existing deficiencies in administrative space on the installation. While the projects were not originally intended for the new personnel, installation officials identified these as projects that could be moved up to meet the new requirements for Grow the Force. However, we determined that the remaining 12 of the 22 projects totaling $210 million did not support the initiative because they address existing deficiencies rather than new units associated with Grow the Force, or address initiatives other than Grow the Force. We found that 7 of the Marine Corps projects totaling $137 million do not support Grow the Force because they address existing deficiencies on the installations that needed to be addressed regardless of whether Grow the Force occurred and we could not clearly identify that existing capacity issues these projects were designed to address would be exacerbated by additional personnel from Grow the Force. For example, the Marine Corps included a $7 million wastewater system modification project at Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, which budget justification documentation indicates is needed to limit environmental impacts and does not make reference to capacity issues from additional personnel through Grow the Force. Additionally, installation officials said this project would be needed regardless of whether Grow the Force occurred and was already planned to be included in a future budget request. Similarly, according to project documentation and information from installation officials, two projects to construct new operations facilities at Camp Pendleton, California, were to address existing quality issues, rather than capacity issues resulting from additional Marines added to the facility through Grow the Force. Additionally, we determined that 5 of the 12 projects that did not support Grow the Force, totaling nearly $73 million, supported other initiatives. For example, the Marine Corps submitted 2 projects for physical security upgrades that support installation security and force protection efforts, rather than supporting Grow the Force. The remaining three projects were barracks at Camp Lejeune and Camp Pendleton and a headquarters building at Marine Corps Base Quantico, Virginia, totaling $58 million, that support an initiative for wounded Marines, rather than Grow the Force. Marine Corp officials agreed that the 3 Wounded Warrior projects do not support the Grow the Force initiative. However, Marine Corps officials disagreed with our assessment that the remaining 9 projects do not support Grow the Force because they believe that each of the projects will help the installations manage issues related to additional personnel on the installation. While most of the Army, Army National Guard, and Marine Corps projects were clearly linked to Grow the Force, it may be more difficult to identify some Marine Corps and Army Reserve projects as supporting the initiative in future budget requests. Specifically, a Marine Corps official expected that installations would identify future unit-specific construction projects related to Grow the Force as supporting the initiative in budget justification documentation. However, the official expected that installationwide projects, including mess halls or quality of life projects, such as child development centers, would not be clearly linked to Grow the Force in future budget justifications because these installationwide projects would benefit and be used by all of the personnel on the installation, rather than only those added through Grow the Force. Further, we found that the Army Reserve, which submitted its first Grow the Force projects in the President’s fiscal year 2009 budget request, plans to link projects that support other related force structure changes to Grow the Force in budget justification documentation. Specifically, Army Reserve officials said they plan to link projects for about 16,000 soldiers to Grow the Force even though these personnel are not part of Grow the Force. These 16,000 soldiers are part of a related effort to realign the Army’s forces to better match operational needs, called rebalancing, and it is not clear what the facility requirements for these personnel may include. Unless budget justification documents clearly and appropriately link projects to the Grow the Force initiative, Congress will not have full visibility over the military construction projects associated with the Grow the Force initiative. Our analysis shows that some units will arrive at installations before facilities are constructed; however, the Army does not plan to purchase or lease temporary facilities, while the Marine Corps plans to do so to bridge the gap between when units are established and permanent facilities are constructed. Our analysis shows that units will be established at 11 Army installations prior to the completion of planned construction projects. However, the Army has not requested funding to purchase or lease temporary facilities to support the additional forces. To bridge the gap, the Army plans to utilize existing space, including space vacated by units deploying overseas, to accommodate the additional personnel. For example, installation officials at Fort Carson, Colorado, said they have used space temporarily vacated by brigade combat teams deployed overseas to accommodate additional personnel at the installation. However, the officials expressed concern about whether they would continue to have sufficient space on the installation to accommodate additional personnel with brigade combat teams returning from overseas deployments. According to National Guard Bureau officials, the Army National Guard will have units established before the completion of facilities for those units; however, the states, which are responsible for stationing personnel, have not yet submitted requests for any leased facilities. The majority of new Marine Corps units established between fiscal year 2007 and fiscal year 2011 will arrive at installations before permanent facilities are available. The Marine Corps requested $147 million in the President’s fiscal year 2008 budget request and plans to purchase or lease about 1,500 temporary facilities to house units while permanent facilities are completed. The majority of these facilities will be used at Camp Pendleton, California; Twentynine Palms, California; and Camp Lejeune, North Carolina. For example, Camp Pendleton requested nearly $40 million to lease some temporary facilities, such as office trailers, and purchase other temporary facilities, such as armories. In its fiscal year 2007 supplemental budget request, the Marine Corps requested $18 million to purchase temporary facilities for Twentynine Palms, including trailers, portable armories, and storage containers, to accommodate the increase in end strength until permanent facilities are completed. Camp Lejeune, which is receiving the largest end strength increase from Grow the Force, requested funding to lease trailers and purchase portable armories, which installation officials said would be used until the permanent facilities are complete. Each installation is responsible for determining temporary facility needs, and Marine Corps officials noted that temporary facility needs could vary from day to day depending on what units are deploying or being established and the type of space that is needed. According to installation officials we spoke with, temporary facilities will typically be used for 3 to 7 years, depending on the time between when units arrive at the installation and when construction is complete. A Marine Corps headquarters official expects that the Marine Corps will need additional funding for temporary facilities in the future, but has not yet determined the extent of the funding requirements. While most projects submitted in DOD’s budget requests for fiscal years 2007 and 2008 that were identified as Grow the Force projects showed a clear link to the Grow the Force initiative, some future Marine Corps and Army Reserve projects may not be clearly and appropriately identified as supporting Grow the Force. While the Marine Corps intends to clearly identify unit-specific projects as part of the initiative, the link between Grow the Force and installationwide projects may not be clear. Moreover, Army Reserve officials plan to link construction projects that do not support the end strength increase to Grow the Force. Because the Marine Corps intends to make some linkage between the projects and Grow the Force and the Army Reserve had not yet submitted projects for Grow the Force at the time of our review, we are not making a recommendation at this time. Additionally, it is not clear whether the active duty Army can accommodate the increased personnel through Grow the Force using only existing facilities, particularly since the Army plans to complete its active duty end strength increase by 2010, rather than 2013, as originally estimated. Because we did not examine whether the Army’s temporary facilities’ plan was efficient or feasible, we are not making a recommendation at this time. In commenting on a draft of this report, DOD stated that it disagreed with our assessment that 1 Army project and 12 Marine Corps projects did not support Grow the Force. DOD did not provide sufficient documentation that the existing capacity issues these projects were designed to address would be exacerbated by additional personnel from Grow the Force, which is why these projects did not meet our criteria for supporting Grow the Force. We agree that projects that address existing deficiencies, in addition to any number of other projects that DOD might undertake without being explicitly established for Grow the Force, can also enable DOD’s implementation of the Grow the Force initiative; our report does not say otherwise. It is important to note that we did not assess whether the projects were needed on an installation, but only whether DOD could provide sufficient documentation that the project met our criteria for supporting Grow the Force. For these reasons, we have not changed our report. DOD’s comments are reprinted in appendix II. DOD also provided technical comments, which we incorporated into this report as appropriate. We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Defense, Secretary of the Army, Secretary of the Navy, Commandant of the Marine Corps, and the Director of the Office of Management and Budget. We will also make copies available to others upon request. In addition, this report will be available at no charge on GAO’s Web site at http://www.gao.gov. If you or your staff have any questions concerning this report, please contact me at (202) 512-4523 or leporeb@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made contributions to this report are listed in appendix VI. To examine the process the Army and Marine Corps used to develop construction projects for Grow the Force, we reviewed information on the Army’s and Marine Corps’ typical processes for identifying construction projects and the Army and Marine Corps stationing plans. Additionally, we interviewed knowledgeable officials with the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics; the Army’s Assistant Chief of Staff for Installation Management, Operations and Plans (G-3), Program Analysis & Evaluation (G-8), Army Force Management (G-3), Installation Management Command, and the Army Corps of Engineers; Headquarters Marine Corps, Marine Corps Combat Development and Integration Command, and Naval Facilities Engineering Command; National Guard Bureau; and Army Reserve. We also contacted and visited officials at selected Army and Marine Corps installations, including Fort Bragg, North Carolina; Fort Carson, Colorado; Fort Lewis, Washington; Camp Lejeune, North Carolina; Camp Pendleton, California; and Twentynine Palms, California, to discuss the process to determine construction requirements. We selected these installations based on (1) the total amount of funding requested for Grow the Force projects in DOD’s budget requests for fiscal years 2007 and 2008 and (2) the number of personnel to be added to the installation through 2013 as a result of Grow the Force. To determine the extent to which Grow the Force projects submitted by the Army, Marine Corps, and Army National Guard supported the initiative, we analyzed budget justification documentation for projects submitted for the fiscal year 2007 supplemental budget request, the fiscal year 2008 Global War on Terrorism supplemental budget request, and the President’s fiscal year 2008 budget request. We included in our scope only those projects that the Army and Marine Corps submitted in the fiscal years 2007 and 2008 budget requests. Using the data in the budget justification documentation for each project, we categorized projects as either supporting Grow the Force or not supporting Grow the Force based on three criteria: (1) a statement affirming the project was in support of Grow the Force, (2) information that the project was for a unit being established as part of Grow the Force, and (3) reference to a capacity issue due to the additional personnel. In cases where we could not determine whether the project met our criteria, we sought additional information from appropriate headquarters or installation officials. We discussed our methodology and assessment with the appropriate Army and Marine Corps officials, who generally agreed with our approach. While we evaluated the extent to which projects submitted in DOD’s budget requests for fiscal years 2007 and 2008 supported the Grow the Force initiative, we did not validate the need for projects. To examine the Army’s and Marine Corps’ planned use of temporary facilities, we reviewed the Army’s and Marine Corps’ stationing plans and analyzed project documentation included in the Army and Marine Corps budget requests as well as documentation provided by the Marine Corps installations to determine which units may need temporary facilities. For the Army, we analyzed the difference between the date that construction is expected to be completed and the date units are expected to be established at the installation for unit-specific projects included in the fiscal year 2007 supplemental budget request and the President’s fiscal year 2008 budget request to determine the extent to which temporary facilities may be required. For the Marine Corps we analyzed project documentation for temporary facilities and documentation about temporary facilities provided by the installations and compared this information to the total number of new Grow the Force units for fiscal year 2007 through fiscal year 2011 to see how many units would require temporary facilities. Additionally, we interviewed knowledgeable officials in the Army, Army National Guard, and Marine Corps headquarters and selected Army and Marine Corps installations to discuss the overall strategy for temporary facilities, as well as installation-specific strategies. We conducted this performance audit from June 2007 through March 2008 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. Table 4 shows our assessment of the Army’s Grow the Force projects submitted in the fiscal year 2007 supplemental budget request and the President’s fiscal year 2008 budget request. We determined that 65 of the Army’s projects support Grow the Force, while 1 project does not support Grow the Force because it addresses an existing deficiency that needed to be addressed regardless of whether Grow the Force occurred. Table 5 shows our assessment of the Marine Corps’ Grow the Force projects submitted in the fiscal years 2007 and 2008 supplemental budget requests and the President’s fiscal year 2008 budget request. We determined that 37 of the projects support Grow the Force, while 12 projects do not support Grow the Force. Of the 12 projects that do not support Grow the Force, 7 of the projects address existing deficiencies that needed to be addressed regardless of whether Grow the Force occurred and 5 of the projects support another initiative. Table 6 shows our assessment of the Army National Guard’s Grow the Force projects submitted in the President’s fiscal year 2008 budget request. We determined that all of the Army National Guard’s projects support Grow the Force. Mike Kennedy, Assistant Director; Hilary Benedict; Renee Brown; Rebecca Guerrero; Linda Keefer; and Elizabeth Morris made key contributions to this report.

Summary: In January 2007 the President announced an initiative, referred to as Grow the Force, to increase the end strength in the Army by more than 74,000 by 2013 and the Marine Corps by 27,000 personnel by 2011 to enhance U.S. forces, reduce stress on deployable personnel, and provide necessary forces for success in the Global War on Terrorism. The Department of Defense (DOD) estimates that it will need more than $17 billion for facilities to accommodate the planned personnel increases. GAO was asked to review (1) the process the Army and Marine Corps used to develop construction projects associated with Grow the Force, (2) the extent to which the projects submitted in DOD's budget requests for fiscal years 2007 and 2008 support the initiative, and (3) whether the Army and Marine Corps plan to use temporary facilities while construction projects are completed. GAO reviewed the construction projects associated with Grow the Force in DOD's budget requests for fiscal years 2007 and 2008, reviewed stationing documents, and interviewed officials at Army and Marine Corps headquarters and six installations on the process used to develop projects. In comments on a draft of this report, DOD disagreed with GAO's assessment that 1 Army project and 12 Marine Corps projects do not support Grow the Force but did not provide sufficient documentation that existing capacity issues would be exacerbated by additional personnel. The Army and Marine Corps followed their typical process to develop construction projects when they developed the Grow the Force projects submitted in DOD's budget requests for fiscal years 2007 and 2008; however, the process was compressed due to the short period of time between the announcement of the initiative and submission of budget requests. For example, the active duty Army took about 2 months and the Marine Corps took 6 months to develop projects submitted in DOD's budget requests for fiscal years 2007 and 2008; the typical process takes about 2 years. Nearly all of the military construction projects submitted as Grow the Force projects in fiscal years 2007 and 2008 supported the Grow the Force initiative. GAO found that 68 of the 69 projects submitted by the Army and Army National Guard, totaling more than $2.3 billion, and 37 of the 49 projects submitted by the Marine Corps, totaling more than $665 million, supported Grow the Force. However, GAO found that 1 Army project and 12 Marine Corps projects did not support Grow the Force because they addressed existing deficiencies and were needed regardless of whether Grow the Force occurred or they supported another initiative. For example, the Marine Corps included a $7 million wastewater system modification project at Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, in its fiscal year 2008 budget request to address environmental issues. Officials said the project was already planned for a future budget request and would be needed regardless of whether Grow the Force had occurred. Additionally, GAO determined that 3 Marine Corps projects, totaling $58 million, were to construct facilities for wounded Marines that supported another initiative, not Grow the Force. While most of the fiscal years 2007 and 2008 projects were linked to Grow the Force, it may be more difficult to identify some Marine Corps and Army Reserve projects as supporting the initiative in future budget requests because the Marine Corps may not link installationwide projects to Grow the Force and the Army Reserve plans to identify projects for a related force structure effort as Grow the Force projects. GAO's analysis shows that some units will arrive at installations before facilities are constructed; however, the Army does not plan to purchase or lease temporary facilities, while the Marine Corps plans to do so to bridge the gap between when units are established and permanent facilities are constructed. The Army plans to use existing facilities, including facilities vacated by deployed units, to bridge the gap between the time when personnel arrive and the completion date of construction projects. The majority of new units will be established at Marine Corps installations before permanent facilities are complete and will require temporary facilities. The Marine Corps requested $147 million in fiscal year 2008 for temporary facilities, including armories and trailers, to bridge the gap between the time units arrive and the completion date of construction projects. A Marine Corps official expects that additional funding for temporary facilities will be required but the extent of the funding requirements have not yet been determined.