As a foreign policy tool, the U.S. government provides assistance to security forces (military and police) in more than 150 countries around the world, including Indonesia, the Philippines, and Thailand. State provides assistance to foreign security forces through at least six programs and activities. Appendix II provides additional details on these programs. Antiterrorism Assistance (ATA) is used to train foreign security forces in anti-terrorism and terrorism response tactics. Economic Support Fund (ESF) is used primarily for economic assistance to promote political or economic stability; however, some ESF is allocated for training foreign security forces. Foreign Military Financing (FMF) is used to provide grants and loans for the acquisition of U.S. defense equipment, services, and training by foreign governments. This assistance is aimed at improving defense capabilities and fostering stronger military relationships between the United States and recipient nations. International Military Education and Training (IMET) is used to train and educate foreign military forces and related civilian personnel. Expanded-IMET (E-IMET), a variant of the regular IMET program, focuses on democracy, the rule of law, and human rights training and education. International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE) is used primarily to support counter-narcotics, intelligence, border patrol, and interdiction activities. Peacekeeping Operations (PKO) supports multilateral peacekeeping and regional stability operations that are not funded through the United Nations. DOD provides a mix of appropriated and nonappropriated assistance to foreign security forces through at least four programs or activities. Appendix III provides additional details on these programs. Excess Defense Articles (EDA) are nonappropriated assistance in the form of excess U.S. defense articles drawn from DOD stocks. The President is authorized to transfer, with limitations, defense articles declared as excess by the military departments to foreign governments in support of U.S. national security and foreign policy objectives. Drawdown is nonappropriated assistance that the President is authorized to draw down from the stocks of any U.S. government agency for emergencies, disasters, counternarcotics, refugee assistance, peacekeeping, anti-terrorist activities, and nonproliferation. Regional Defense Counterterrorism Fellowship Program (CTFP) is a DOD program used to provide funding to foreign military and related civilian officials to attend U.S. military education institutions and selected regional centers for nonlethal training. Joint Combined Exchange Training (JCET) permits U.S. special operations forces to train with foreign military forces, provided that the training primarily benefits U.S. forces. The host nation’s security forces also derive a benefit. The Department of Justice provides assistance to foreign security forces through at least two Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) and Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) training activities in foreign countries. DEA trains law enforcement officials and police to carry out special counter- narcotics operations. The FBI also trains law enforcement officials and police in these countries. Following the September 11 terrorist attacks, the Philippines and Indonesia became central to the U.S. government’s antiterrorism efforts in Southeast Asia due to their strategic importance, Muslim populations, and insurgency movements that use terrorist tactics. The U.S. government has been concerned with radical Islamist groups in Southeast Asia, particularly those in Indonesia, the Philippines, and other countries that are known to have ties to the Al Qaeda terrorist network. For more than a decade, Al Qaeda has penetrated the region by establishing local cells, training Southeast Asians in its camps in Afghanistan, and by financing and cooperating with indigenous radical Islamist groups. According to the Congressional Research Service, Indonesia and the southern Philippines have been particularly vulnerable to anti-American Islamic terrorist groups. A spate of violence in Thailand’s Muslim provinces in early 2004 intensified the focus on Islamic extremism in southern Thailand. The violence has forced Thai authorities to publicly re-evaluate the threat of a Muslim separatist insurgency with financial and operational ties to international Islamic terrorist groups. According to the State Department’s 2004 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, the three countries we reviewed face several human rights challenges. The Philippines. According to State’s human rights report for the Philippines, the government generally respected the human rights of its citizens. However, some elements of the country’s security forces were responsible for arbitrary, unlawful and, in some cases, extrajudicial killings, disappearances, and torture, and arbitrary arrest and detention. Indonesia. State’s human rights report for Indonesia stated that the Indonesian government made progress in its transition from three decades of repressive and authoritarian rule to a more pluralistic and representative democracy. The government’s human rights record remained poor, however, and it continued to commit serious abuses. For example, the report stated that “ecurity force members murdered, tortured, raped, beat, and arbitrarily detained civilians and members of separatist movements, especially in Aceh and to a lesser extent in Papua. Some police officers occasionally used excessive and sometimes deadly force in arresting suspects and in attempting to obtain information or a confession. Retired and active duty military officers known to have committed serious human rights violations occupied or were promoted to senior positions in the Government and the (military).” Thailand. According to State’s human rights report, the government of Thailand generally respected the rights of its citizens, but there were significant problems in some areas. For example, separatist violence in southern Thailand resulted in the deaths of more than 180 persons at the hands of security forces. In addition, no progress was reported in investigations into the extrajudicial killings of approximately 1,300 suspected drug traffickers during the Thai government's 3-month “War on Drugs” campaign from February through April 2003. However, the Thai government maintains that the deaths were the result of disputes between those involved in the drug trade. U.S. assistance to security forces in the Philippines, Indonesia, and Thailand was provided through at least 12 programs and activities managed by State, DOD, and Justice. This assistance comprises a mix of appropriated funds used for procuring training and equipment, as well as nonappropriated assistance such as transfers of excess military equipment taken from U.S. stocks. The Philippines was the largest beneficiary of this assistance from fiscal years 2001 to 2004. U.S. assistance to security forces in the Philippines largely supported the Philippines Defense Reform—a comprehensive defense assessment to develop a multi-year defense strategy, enhance mobility, and build defense capacity. Restrictions on Indonesia prohibited it from receiving military equipment; however, Indonesia received funding to train its security forces. U.S. assistance to Thailand is used for procuring equipment and training for such activities as counter narcotics and antiterrorism. State, DOD, and Justice allocated a total of approximately $265.7 million to train and equip security forces in the Philippines, Thailand, and Indonesia in fiscal years 2001 to 2004. This amounted to $179.6 million for the Philippines, $47.5 million for Indonesia, and $38.6 million for Thailand. Figure 1 shows a comparison of U.S. assistance for each of the three countries and illustrates that the United States provided the Philippines with significantly more assistance than Indonesia and Thailand. State allocated most of the assistance, $212.9 million (80.2 percent), while DOD allocated $52.2 million (19.6 percent), and Justice allocated $518,000 (less than 1 percent). Figure 2 shows a comparison of assistance by agency, illustrating that State allocated most of the assistance to train and equip security forces in the Philippines, Thailand, and Indonesia. This assistance was provided through at least 12 programs and was used for procuring a variety of equipment, training, and services within each country. Figure 3 shows a comparison of U.S. assistance by program for each of the three countries. The FMF allocation for the Philippines represented the largest single program across all three countries. State, DOD, and Justice assistance to train and equip security forces in the Philippines in fiscal years 2001 to 2004 totaled about $179.6 million and helped support the Philippines Defense Reform-- a comprehensive defense assessment to develop a multi-year defense strategy, enhance mobility, and build defense capacity. Table 1 shows the U.S. agency, program or activity, allocations, and some examples of how the assistance was used. State, DOD, and Justice allocated a total of about $47.5 million in assistance to train Indonesian security forces in fiscal years 2001 to 2004; however, various congressional funding restrictions limited Indonesia’s eligibility for U.S. military assistance and training over this period. State provided $43.3 million (91 percent of the country total), including $23.2 million (49 percent) of the country total in police training through the Economic Support Fund. DOD provided military training through its Regional Defense Counterterrorism Fellowship Program (CTFP). Indonesia is the single largest recipient of this assistance worldwide. Table 2 shows the U.S. agency, program or activity, allocations, and some examples of how the assistance was used. State, DOD, and Justice allocated a total of about $38.6 million in assistance for Thai security forces to procure a variety of defense articles, services, and training supporting activities such as counter narcotics, military training, antiterrorism, and force modernization. The largest share of the money was used for training law enforcement officials in counter narcotics operations and for providing the Thai military with advanced training. Table 3 shows the U.S. agency, program or activity, allocations, and some examples of how assistance was used. We found no evidence that the three posts we visited vetted an estimated 6,935 law enforcement officials trained with State assistance between fiscal years 2001 and 2004. The trainees included 32 Indonesian police from a notorious special-forces police unit that was prohibited from receiving U.S. training funds under State policy because of the unit’s prior human rights abuses. We found better evidence of vetting in DOD-implemented training programs. For example, in the Philippines, we randomly sampled 107 DOD trainee files and estimated that 87 percent of the trainee files contained some evidence of vetting, while 13 percent contained no evidence of vetting. We also found evidence of vetting for all 35 DOD trainee files that we randomly sampled in the other two countries, although these results are not projectable. Vetting did not occur because of weaknesses in some agencies’ management controls. First, State and Justice headquarters units did not assign clear roles and responsibilities for vetting foreign security forces, nor did they clearly communicate these responsibilities to all employees involved in the process, especially to law enforcement officials at posts. Second, prior to 2004, two of the three posts did not establish written policies and procedures for all of the offices involved in the vetting process, or specify the documentation and records retention requirements for these units. Third, neither State headquarters nor the three posts established systems to periodically monitor compliance with vetting requirements. Each of the annual Foreign Operations Appropriations Acts since 1998 has included a provision, commonly referred to as the “Leahy Amendment,” that restricts the provision of assistance appropriated in these acts to any foreign security unit for which State has determined there is credible evidence that the unit has committed gross violations of human rights, unless certain conditions have been met. DOD’s appropriations acts have contained a similar restriction on DOD-funded training since fiscal year 1999. To implement these legislative restrictions, in June 1999 and February 2003, State directed all posts involved in providing security assistance to foreign security forces to have procedures in place to ensure compliance with the restrictions. Between 1999 and 2004, DOD and State issued specific instructions to the posts on implementing these restrictions for DOD- managed training programs. While the provisions restrict funding to “any unit of the security forces of a foreign country,” State policy applies the restrictions to individual members of security forces, as well. State and DOD guidance reflects this policy. Vetting candidates for human rights concerns commonly would include the following steps, according to post officials, State headquarters officials, and State guidance. First, the office at the post sponsoring the training reviews biographical and service information provided by the host government to determine if the individual or unit has been involved in gross violations of human rights. Second, the sponsoring office forwards the name to the political affairs office at the post for its independent review. The political affairs office or sponsoring office also circulates the candidate’s name to other relevant offices within the post. As part of this second step, the human rights officer or a foreign service national assigned to the political office typically searches newspaper articles or the Internet for evidence of the candidate’s involvement in gross violations of human rights. The political office may also consult human rights nongovernmental organizations in-country or national commissions on human rights for any information they have on the candidate. Other offices at the post to whom the candidate’s name is sent are expected to review any information they have and report the results of their search to the political office. Finally, the post sends the candidate’s name to State headquarters to be distributed to relevant bureaus for final review and approval. At the three posts we visited, we found lapses in human rights vetting for foreign security forces, particularly in law enforcement training programs. Table 4 shows the estimated number of law enforcement personnel that U.S. officials estimated had received training but for whom no vetting had occurred. U.S. officials based these estimates on the sizes of the groups trained in each country for particular programs. In addition, table 5 shows the results of a sample of trainee names that we reviewed at each post to identify evidence of human rights vetting. The Philippines. We found no evidence that any of the estimated 1,175 Filipino police forces receiving training under Justice’s International Criminal Investigative Training and Assistance Program (ICITAP) in fiscal year 2004 were vetted for evidence of gross violations of human rights. A post official said that a foreign service national in his office responsible for ICITAP performed some vetting on these candidates, but could not document the important step of coordinating with the political affairs office as required by State guidance until late 2004. In addition, we reviewed 107 randomly selected trainee files from an estimated total of 787 trainees in the DOD-implemented programs and found some evidence of vetting in most instances (93 files). The remaining 14 files contained no evidence that vetting had occurred. Indonesia. We found no evidence that an estimated 4,000 Indonesian law enforcement officials who received training under Justice’s ICITAP were vetted for possible human rights violations prior to October 2004. These trainees include 32 police from a notorious unit ineligible for such training under the ICITAP, according to State officials. In addition, our review of 10 randomly selected DOD trainee files from an estimated total of 353 trainees showed some evidence of vetting in all instances. Files for DOD- implemented training generally included evidence that the Political Affairs Office was included in the vetting process, indicating a more inclusive and independent post-wide review. Post officials said that they had implemented new post-wide procedures in late 2004 to improve the vetting process, and now vet candidates for all post programs in accordance with earlier State guidance. Thailand. We found no evidence that the approximately 1,760 Thai law enforcement officials who received training under the Foreign Operations Appropriations Act-funded law enforcement training programs were vetted for possible human rights violations. In contrast, our review of 25 randomly selected DOD trainee files from an estimated total of 795 trainees in the DOD-implemented programs showed some evidence of vetting. For example, DOD training files generally included an initialed and dated checklist returned from the Political Affairs Office, indicating the status of the post-wide review. However, the DOD official in Thailand responsible for IMET training said that his office did not submit names of individuals to receive in-country IMET training to the country team for vetting because officials were not aware of this responsibility. According to 1999 DOD guidelines, all individuals and units scheduled for in-country DOD-implemented training should be vetted. Officials and post estimates indicated that about half of the 795 trainees were trained in-country between fiscal years 2001 and 2004. In technical comments on a draft of this report, DOD stated that the post is now vetting all in-country military training, but provided no evidence to support this. Lapses in vetting occurred because the agencies did not assign clear roles and responsibilities for vetting foreign officials; departments and posts lacked clear and consistent vetting procedures; and State and posts did not establish a system to monitor compliance with these procedures. GAO’s Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government prescribes basic standards for management controls in the federal government. Internal control is an integral part of an organization’s management that provides reasonable assurance that an entity achieves (1) effectiveness and efficiency of operations, (2) reliability of financial reporting, and (3) compliance with applicable laws and regulations.As a result, U.S. agencies did not always vet foreign security forces for derogatory human rights information before providing them with U.S.-funded training opportunities. Neither State headquarters nor the three posts we visited had clear roles and responsibilities established for vetting foreign security forces receiving State funding from fiscal years 2001 and 2004 or for monitoring posts’ or State headquarters’ compliance with vetting procedures. As a result, officials at the posts we visited expressed confusion over their vetting roles and responsibilities, especially those related to law enforcement training programs. According to GAO’s internal control standards, an organization should establish a positive control environment, including an organizational structure and clearly defined roles and responsibilities conducive to sound management controls. However, State guidance did not establish a single bureau to be responsible for implementing the vetting process or for monitoring posts’ compliance with vetting procedures. This was an important omission because four State bureaus are involved in either establishing policy or managing State-funded training programs: Bureau of Political-Military Affairs; Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement; Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor; and the Bureau of East Asia and Pacific Affairs. State lacked clear policies and procedures for human rights vetting in several areas: (1) only the Manila post established postwide procedures, as required, prior to 2004; (2) State established no documentation and record retention requirements regarding vetting documents; (3) the posts did not conduct a comprehensive review of all candidates for assistance through a central focal point, such as the political affairs office, before 2004; (4) State headquarters did not specify whether posts needed to submit candidates’ names to State headquarters for additional review and approval. According to GAO’s internal control standards, policies and procedures help enforce management directives and are integral to achieving effective results. State’s June 1999 and 2003 guidance directed all posts to establish procedures to implement the human rights restrictions for all Foreign Operations Appropriations Act-funded aid to security forces and DOD- funded training. According to our internal control standards, policies and procedures help enforce management directives and are integral to achieving effective results. However, only Embassy Manila established written procedures for human rights vetting as required prior to 2004. Guidance issued in 1999 directed that posts report their procedures to the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor by a certain date, but a Bureau official believed that posts had not done so. Nonetheless, prior to 2004, two of the three posts did not establish written policies and procedures for the vetting process. Two of the three posts we visited— Manila and Jakarta—established new written procedures for human rights vetting in the fall 2004; the Bangkok post had not yet established written procedures at the time of our visit in March 2005. In contrast, DOD and State issued more detailed supplemental guidance to DOD officials at posts for DOD-funded training, including criteria to apply in screening candidates and checklists to track vetting processes. State’s 1999 and 2003 guidance also did not specify documentation and record retention requirements for the documents used at posts or headquarters in the human rights vetting process for Foreign Operations Appropriations Act-funded assistance. As a result, the Jakarta post was unable to provide us with any documentation of post vetting conducted for ICITAP between fiscal years 2001 and 2004. By contrast, documentation for vetting candidates for DOD-implemented training generally was more complete, and included check-lists, approving signatures, and biographical information on nominees in separate folders. DOD documentation was generally better because DOD had established criteria and procedures for screening candidates in the programs it manages. These procedures include a records retention requirement of at least 10 years for specific programs. State’s guidance to the posts also stated that each post should designate an embassy point of contact, such as political counselor, to coordinate a comprehensive review of candidates for assistance by relevant members of the country team. However, we found that such coordination had not occurred before 2004 for Foreign Operations Appropriations Act-funded law enforcement training. For example, post officials in Manila and Jakarta stated that designated embassy points of contact began receiving names of candidates for law enforcement training only in early 2004. We found that the three posts did not consistently cable names of all candidates for Foreign Operations Appropriations Act-funded training to State headquarters for vetting by bureaus because State had not yet written this procedure into guidance. Officials at State headquarters said this procedure was required. During our efforts to clarify whether this was a requirement, we asked State officials to identify the written guidance specifically requiring posts to cable candidate names back to Washington for further vetting. However, these officials could not identify any specific language prior to February 2005 when State headquarters issued new instructions to the posts. Officials at the Embassy in Jakarta said they were not aware of this procedure, did not cable names of candidates for Foreign Operations Appropriations Act-funded training back to State headquarters, and wrote to State criticizing this as a burdensome new procedure in 2005. We found that no headquarters office within State currently is charged with the responsibility of monitoring the posts’ compliance with State’s human rights vetting procedures. However, our internal control standards state that an organization should continually monitor as part of ongoing operations to assess the quality of performance over time. State and post officials are uncertain which office has the overall responsibility for monitoring human rights vetting activities. Some officials said that the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor had this responsibility, while others cited the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs or the Bureau for East Asian and Pacific Affairs. Officials in each bureau were unaware of which office had this responsibility. We found that State’s guidance to the posts between 1997 through 2005 contained no provision that accorded this role and responsibility to any office. State provided no evidence that any unit at State headquarters was fulfilling this function. Without a monitoring system in place, State could not identify instances where a post was not complying with required procedures or instances where confusion about requirements existed. In Indonesia, 32 members from a brigade associated with prior human rights abuses were trained on six separate occasions under ICITAP between July 2002 and March 2003. However, in testimony to the House International Relations Committee in March 2003, then-Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs said that no such brigade members “currently participate in the ICITAP police program,” at the time when such individuals were participating in this training. State sought to correct this situation by issuing written guidance to the post in November 2003. No one at State headquarters was aware that the three posts did not consistently cable names of all candidates for Foreign Operations Appropriations Act-funded training to State headquarters for vetting by bureaus, although officials at headquarters said this was required. In reviewing cable traffic related to human rights vetting from the three posts, we found that the Jakarta Embassy had not cabled State headquarters with names of any candidates for further vetting. State issued new guidance in February 2005 intended to improve the efficiency of the human rights vetting process. State announced that it had established a new human rights database, the Abuse Case Evaluation System (ACES), to be a clearinghouse for information on alleged human rights abuses. According to the guidance, data will come from sources currently used for human rights vetting, such as post reporting, press, nongovernmental organizations, national human rights commissions, and other sources. Users at posts and at State headquarters will be able to enter a comment on allegations, and the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor will check information for completeness and accuracy. As ACES becomes populated with data, it could become an important tool for posts and State to make human rights vetting more efficient and effective, as well as to facilitate human rights monitoring and reporting in general, according to the guidance. The guidance stated that posts will enter incidents of alleged human rights abuses into ACES whenever they occur or are reported to post. This step will replace the requirement that posts report alleged abuses via cable and keep track of allegations at post. Finally, the guidance established some roles and responsibilities for offices at main State, particularly when differences arise over credibility of evidence or the response to such evidence. However, this new system does not address all the deficiencies that we found at the three posts and adds an additional resource concern. For example, the guidance does not assign a monitoring role to any main State office or procedures to ensure posts’ compliance with vetting procedures. In addition, because ACES will be a classified system, foreign national employees at posts will not be allowed access to it. Foreign nationals currently play an important role in entering and maintaining the available human rights vetting data at posts but would not be allowed to do so using the ACES database. Consequently, the new system might require cleared U.S. post officials to assume database duties that could not be conducted by foreign nationals. To date, State guidance has not addressed the potential for either shifting responsibilities from foreign to U.S. employees at posts or adding more U.S. personnel for this task. The U.S. government lacks a clear and coherent multiyear national security assistance strategy, making it difficult to assess progress in achieving stated U.S. foreign policy goals, such as stemming terrorism, promoting regional stability, and demonstrating respect for human rights. State’s National Security Assistance Strategy, provided to Congress in May 2003, meets two of nine objectives of the Security Assistance Act of 2000. The strategy does not, however, identify how resources will be allocated to accomplish objectives, how programs will be combined at the country level to achieve objectives, or how security assistance programs will be coordinated with other U.S. government agencies. In addition, the strategy fails to discuss performance measures that are necessary to track the achievement of goals and objectives. State and DOD have produced a variety of other national, regional, and country-level strategic planning documents, but these documents do not collectively satisfy the act’s objectives. State’s National Security Assistance Strategy meets two objectives of the Security Assistance Act of 2000; it is consistent with the U.S. National Security Strategyand identifies overarching security assistance objectives (see table 6). State’s strategy, however, does not cover the other seven objectives of the act. The Security Assistance Act of 2000 was designed to address previous shortcomings in security assistance planning by providing Congress with a clear and coherent multiyear plan for security assistance programs, on a country-by-country basis. The act urged State to submit to Congress a plan, prepared in consultation with other agencies, that identified overarching security assistance objectives, the role specific programs would play in achieving them, and resource allocations for each country. Further, the Security Assistance Act of 2002 required State to brief Congress on its plans and progress in formulating and implementing the strategy, and to provide a description on the actions taken to include such programs as IMET, FMF, and EDA, as well as other assistance programs to foreign security forces in the strategy. In response to the acts of 2000 and 2002, State prepared a 16-page PowerPoint document entitled, “National Security Assistance Strategy Briefing” and used it to brief selected congressional committees in May 2003 (see app. III for the briefing). State officials in the Bureau of Political- Military Affairs said that the briefing constitutes State’s current National Security Assistance Strategy and that, through negotiations with congressional committee staff, State was exempted from annually updating the strategy, as urged in the law. We reviewed the briefing to determine the extent to which the strategy addresses the nine objectives of the acts and found the following. The strategy is not a multiyear plan since it was prepared only once and does not discuss outyear program plans. The strategy was not prepared in coordination with the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. A State official reported that the briefing was given together with representatives from DSCA and OSD and provided us with OSD’s six-page briefing on “DOD Security Cooperation.” However, in reviewing State’s strategy, we did not find evidence that it was coordinated with OSD or the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Despite congressional direction, the strategy was not prepared in consultation with other appropriate agencies. The briefing indicates that the coordination process begins at the country level, includes DOD priorities, occurs through State roundtables and an excess defense articles coordinating committee, and through “day-to-day coordination.” However, State does not further detail whether it coordinates with other appropriate agencies that provide assistance to foreign security forces, such as Justice. The strategy does not discuss specific security assistance objectives for each program on a country-by-country basis. Key countries such as Indonesia, the Philippines, and Thailand (among others) are identified but the strategy does not identify which programs and security assistance tools are being implemented in those countries. The strategy does not discuss the resources needed or used for the various programs and how they will be combined at the country level to achieve objectives. The outline accompanying the briefing asserts that State’s bureau and mission performance plans discuss how military assistance tools contribute to achieving U.S. foreign policy goals at the regional and country level, respectively. However, the strategy does not incorporate key activity and resource information from these documents; Although the strategy lists key countries, it does not address how the various programs are to be combined within each country to achieve objectives. As mentioned, we identified at least 12 programs that provide assistance to foreign security forces in Indonesia, the Philippines, and Thailand. However, the strategy does not discuss how programs funded by State’s Bureau of International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement in Thailand, for example, are combined with DOD’s in-country counternarcotics activities. Finally, the strategy does not detail how security assistance programs will be coordinated with other U.S. government assistance programs managed by DOD and other agencies. Specifically, it does not identify all other forms of assistance provided to foreign security forces under at least three different funding sources—State, Defense, and Justice. State officials said they are aware of related programs funded by DOD and Justice that provide assistance to foreign security forces, but that they do not consider those programs “security assistance” and would not include them in a National Security Assistance Strategy. In addition, the strategy fails to discuss the performance measures that can be used to assess progress towards achieving goals. Our prior work has emphasized that agencies should link strategic planning to performance measures, and that performance measures can better inform—or justify— how resources should be allocated to accomplish program objectives. Officials in Indonesia, the Philippines, and Thailand acknowledged that it is difficult to generate quantitative performance measures for some security assistance programs, but highlighted several qualitative measures, or “big wins” in the region that help illustrate the effectiveness of U.S. security assistance programs. For example, a senior U.S. official in Thailand stated that Thai security forces are very supportive of the U.S. government’s war on terrorism and of reducing the demand for drugs. In the Philippines, U.S. government officials highlighted the positive impact U.S. government security assistance programs have had on the Philippine Defense Reform effort. Although not reflected in State’s strategy, some efforts have been made to develop more quantifiable measures. For example, State’s Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs includes quantitative measures for programs in its official interagency or intergovernmental agreements with Indonesia, the Philippines, and Thailand. Also, the Office of Management and Budget’s (OMB) Program Assessment Rating Tool (PART) uses performance measures to evaluate some of State’s programs that provide assistance to foreign security forces (and other federal government programs). As part of the executive budget formulation process, PART evaluators assess programs by applying 25 questions under four broad topics: (1) program purpose and design, (2) strategic planning, (3) program management, and (4) program results (i.e., whether a program is meeting its long-term and annual goals). The 2004 PART reviews of State’s ATA program and Security Assistance Programs to the Western Hemisphere were rated as “effective” and “moderately effective,” respectively. However, we found that the latter review has limitations because it identifies multiple programs, but rates them as one unit of analysis. We reported in January 2004 that inherent challenges exist in assigning a single rating to programs that have multiple purposes and goals. In addition, the report cited that PART has merit but remains “a work in progress that needs considerable revisions to be an objective, evidence- based assessment tool.” DOD’s unified commands operate a Theater Security Cooperation Management Information System (TSCMIS) to track training and other activities with foreign security forces in their regional areas of responsibility. Officials can use the system to assess the effect of DOD events on country-level goals and objectives. U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM) officials reported that TSCMIS captures and stores key program data, but due to resource constraints, they are uncertain whether information is consistently entered into the system or maintained. In addition, the assessments are conducted by activity managers and country directors and are therefore not independent reviews of programs. State and DOD annually develop various country, regional, and national strategy and planning documents that address some objectives of the Security Assistance Act of 2000. Figure 4 illustrates how these documents relate to each other. Appendix IV contains a detailed analysis of how other State and DOD planning documents address objectives of the act. Although none of these documents constitute a single, multiyear national security assistance strategy that covers all agency programs, we found that they offer the potential for developing the comprehensive assistance strategy called for in the act. We found that some State planning documents address certain objectives of the act. For example, State develops annual Mission Performance Plans (MPP) for each of its overseas posts. The 2006 MPPs for Indonesia, the Philippines, and Thailand address some objectives of the Security Assistance Act because they contain information on some programs that provide assistance to foreign security forces, are generally consistent with the National Security Strategy of the United States, and are prepared in consultation with appropriate agencies at each post. State also prepares annual regional level Bureau Performance Plans (BPPs) that are consistent with the National Security Strategy of the United States, and to some extent, address how combining resources and programs will achieve regional objectives. DOD also produces annual country and regional planning documents that address some objectives of the Security Assistance Act. For example, DOD’s annual country-specific security assistance plans for the Philippines, Indonesia, and Thailand meet some objectives of the act because they are consistent with the National Security Strategy of the United States, include some discussion of DOD-implemented assistance to foreign security forces and how the assistance will be combined and contribute to achieving certain “end states.” Similarly, DOD’s Theater Security Cooperation Plans (TSCP) are prepared by DOD’s unified commands and include regional security assistance and other activities for the current year, plus the next 2 fiscal years. PACOM’s fiscal year 2004 TSCP addresses selected objectives of the act. It is consistent with the U.S. National Security Strategy, is coordinated with the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and includes discussion of certain security cooperation activities. In commenting on a draft of this report, State observed that our report does not include information about the Global Affairs Dashboard pilot project, which State said has the potential to become a useful tool for security assistance strategic planning. We were not informed in the course of our review of the Global Dashboard, which has yet to be developed and deployed. U.S. agencies do not have adequate assurance that U.S. training funds are being used to train and equip only foreign security forces with good human rights backgrounds. Because they have weak internal controls, the agencies inconsistently apply human rights vetting requirements. Improved internal controls would provide greater assurance that all individuals are properly vetted for human rights issues before receiving U.S. assistance. State has not produced a clear and coherent national security assistance strategy meeting the objectives of the Security Assistance Act of 2000. As a result, it may be difficult for Congress to assess the contributions that U.S. security assistance programs make to broader U.S. foreign policy objectives and to have assurance that the programs’ objectives are being met. Without an integrated strategy for U.S. security assistance that, at a minimum, addresses the nine elements of the Security Assistance Act of 2000, the potential exists for uncoordinated approaches, duplication of efforts, or gaps in coverage. As a result, State and Congress will be deprived of an important source of information for making future resource allocations and program decisions. Since a number of related State and DOD strategic planning processes are already in place, the agencies could use the plans produced under these related processes as the basis for producing a new strategy that fully meets the objectives of the Security Assistance Act of 2000. To help provide assurance that foreign candidates of U.S. security assistance programs comply with existing legislative restrictions and State policies on human rights, we recommend that the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretaries of Defense and Justice take the following three actions to strengthen management controls by issuing new consolidated guidance for vetting foreign security units. As part of these new controls, posts and headquarters units should establish the roles and responsibilities of posts and headquarters units for vetting foreign candidates for human rights consideration; written policies and procedures covering all entities involved in the vetting process at posts, including documentation and record retention policies specifying what documentation is needed and where and how long vetting files should be maintained; and monitoring mechanisms and a central focal point to verify that these procedures are being carried out properly. To help provide both State and Congress with the information needed on how U.S. security assistance programs help support U.S. foreign policy and security objectives, we recommend that the Secretary of State take the following actions using existing plans and strategies within State and DOD as the basis for developing an integrated strategic plan for all U.S. government assistance programs that provide training, equipment, or technical assistance to foreign security forces (military and police). This multiyear plan should be periodically reported to Congress in response to the Security Assistance Act of 2000, which urged the Secretary of State to develop a multiyear security assistance plan. In addition, the strategy should be coordinated with the Departments of Defense and Justice and any other agencies providing assistance to foreign security forces; identify all federal agency programs providing assistance to foreign security forces, regardless of their funding source; describe all related resource allocations used to support program goals, incorporate quantitative and qualitative performance measures designed to determine the extent to which country programs contribute to broader U.S. foreign policy and security objectives. We provided a draft of this report to the Secretaries of Defense and State and to the Attorney General for their review and comment. We received written responses from the Secretaries of Defense and State that are reprinted in appendixes V and VI. The Secretaries of Defense and State and the Attorney General also provided us with technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. The Secretary of Defense concurred with our report in principle. However, in technical comments on a draft of this report, DOD asserted that our report states that DOD assistance programs in Indonesia and Thailand are “100 percent compliant” with human rights vetting requirements. We disagree with DOD’s comment because our report did not conclude that DOD programs in Indonesia and Thailand were “100 percent compliant.” Instead, our draft report stated that all 35 of the limited sample of trainee files we reviewed in these two countries showed some evidence of human rights vetting. The small sample size of the DOD-sponsored trainees relative to the much larger sample of law enforcement trainees precluded us from projecting our findings to the entire universe of DOD-sponsored trainees. Furthermore, DOD later acknowledged in its comments on the draft report that in-country trainees in Thailand—about half of the 795 trainees for fiscal years 2001 to 2004—were not vetted during the period we reviewed. The Secretary of State acknowledged the need for continued improvement on human rights vetting procedures but stated that it is operating its assistance programs in full compliance with the law. State commented that any vetting of individuals is done as a matter of State policy and practice, not as a matter of law. We agree with State’s comment. However, in reviewing State’s application of its policy on human rights vetting of individuals, we found significant weaknesses that resulted in an estimated 6,900 individuals receiving U.S. training assistance without any evidence that they had first been vetted for gross violations of human rights. Therefore, we recommended in our report that State strengthen its management controls on vetting to meet its stated policy goal of not providing U.S. assistance to suspected gross human rights violators. State also commented that it has fully complied with congressional intent regarding a national security assistance strategy. State disagreed with our finding that the national security assistance strategy met only two of nine objectives of the law. It said that our findings are based on incomplete information because many of the objectives were met and discussed in a May 2003 oral briefing with selected Congressional staff, and that the absence of further requests for a briefing on the national security assistance strategy or additional requirements relieved it of further obligations. We disagree with State’s comments. The documents, which State identified as representing a national security assistance strategy, met only two of nine objectives that the law urged State to address in crafting this strategy. The briefing was a good first step, but a detailed written plan is needed for wider distribution, and for providing documentation for tracking progress in moving forward. We are sending copies of this report to interested congressional committees, and the Secretaries of Defense, Justice, and State. We will also make copies available to others upon request. In addition, this report will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov. If you or your staff have any questions concerning this report, please contact me at (202) 512-8979 or at christoffj@gao.gov. Contact points for our Office of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made major contributions to this report are listed in appendix VII. To identify the nature and extent of U.S. assistance to foreign security forces in Indonesia, the Philippines, and Thailand, we met with officials of the Departments of Defense, State, and Justice in Washington, D.C., responsible for administering various aspects of U.S. assistance programs to foreign security forces. We also met with U.S. Pacific Command officials in Honolulu, Hawaii; and U.S. Embassy and foreign government officials in Manila, the Philippines; Jakarta, Indonesia; and Bangkok, Thailand. We also obtained the statutory authorizations for these programs from program officials and from our independent legal searches. We obtained data on the nature and extent of the activities funded by these programs in Indonesia, the Philippines, and Thailand from program officials and State and DOD Web sites. We reviewed the reliability of funding data provided by State and DOD by comparing it with similar data obtained from other sources to check for completeness, consistency, and reasonableness. We also interviewed program officials responsible for managing the data to assess how it was developed and maintained. We found the data sufficiently reliable for representing the nature and extent of program funding. To assess the extent to which the three posts included in our review complied with human rights vetting requirements from 2001 to 2004, we reviewed program policy and procedures issued by State and DOD officials in Washington, D.C., and at the three posts, and how these procedures were implemented at each post. We also interviewed relevant officials in Washington, PACOM, and the three posts, and discussed vetting requirements and processes. At each post, we asked the relevant post officials to identify the total number of foreign security officials trained under all programs provided under the Foreign Operations Appropriations Act and DOD appropriations act subject to the Leahy restrictions from 2001 to 2004. We then randomly selected and reviewed program files for those officials. We reviewed the files for compliance with human rights vetting requirements as set forth in legislation and State policy guidance. To conduct the file review, we used a data collection instrument to systematically capture whether key steps in the post’s human rights vetting process occurred, such as whether the political affairs office at each post was involved. We were able to estimate that 87 percent of files for DOD trainees in the Philippines had some documentation subject to a sampling error of plus or minus 10 percent. The 95 percent confidence interval surrounding this estimate ranges from 80 percent to 92 percent. However, due to small sample sizes for the other agencies in the other countries, we were unable to make other reliable estimates about the percentage of files for which some vetting occurred. The small sample sizes occurred because, after we had drawn our sample, U.S. officials told us that no files existed for several large groups of trainees, including approximately 4,000 trainees under the ICITAP program in Indonesia and 1,439 trainees from the Narcotics Affairs Section in Thailand. In addition, after we had drawn our sample, we were told about other groups of trainees that had not been vetted. As a result, our estimates for the numbers of trainees for which no vetting occurred are based on officials' estimates of the numbers of trainees that had taken the training that should have been vetted, not the file review we conducted. To assess the reliability of the estimates on trainees that had not received training, we interviewed officials, and compared the estimates they provided with other available information. While we found that some of the components in the estimates were less precise than others, we determined that these estimates were sufficiently reliable to indicate that many thousands of trainees had not been vetted. In addition, to obtain a general understanding of the human rights situation in each country, we also met with State human rights officers, national commissions on human rights in each country, as well as representatives of nongovernmental organizations involved with human rights issues. Specifically, in the Philippines we met with Task Force Detainees; in Indonesia, we met with The Commission for Involuntary Disappearance and Victims of Violence, Voice of Human Rights in Indonesia, and the National Forum for the Commission on Human Rights in Papua; and in Thailand we met with Forum Asia and Human Rights Watch. In addition, we met with nongovernmental organizations in Washington, D.C., to understand the general human rights situation on countries included in our review: Amnesty International, East Timor Action Network, Human Rights Watch, and the Robert F. Kennedy Memorial Center for Human Rights. To assess the U.S. government’s national security assistance strategy, we met with State, DOD, and Justice officials in Washington, D.C., responsible for managing and administering U.S. assistance to foreign security forces. We also met with U.S. Pacific Command officials in Honolulu, Hawaii; and U.S. Embassy officials in Manila, the Philippines; Jakarta, Indonesia; and Bangkok, Thailand. We analyzed key planning documents from State and DOD to determine the extent to which they addressed the nine strategic objectives of the Security Assistance Act of 2000, that urged State to develop a multiyear National Security Assistance Strategy. As part of this assessment, we analyzed State’s Strategic Plan, Mission Performance Plans for each post we visited, and the Bureau Performance Plan for the Bureau of East Asia and Pacific Affairs. We also assessed PACOM’s Theater Security Cooperation Plan, reviewed three other unified command’s theater security cooperation plans, and assessed security assistance plans for the three countries included in our review. To address the extent to which State and DOD have performance measures for programs that train and equip foreign security forces, we interviewed agency officials, reviewed OMB’s 2004 and 2005 Performance Assessment Rating Tool assessments, DOD’s Theater Security Cooperation Management Information System, and Justice’s Letters of Agreement with other agencies and with the three countries included in our review. We conducted this review from June 2004 to June 2005 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. We use the term “allocations” to describe the broad mix of appropriated and nonappropriated assistance being provided to foreign security forces in these three countries. State and DOD appropriations accounted for 83 percent of the total; nonappropriated assistance in the form of Excess Defense Articles and drawdowns from DOD stocks accounted for 13 percent of the total; and DOD and Justice expenditures accounted for 4 percent of the total. Expenditures data were used for the DOD’s JCET program and Justice’s DEA and FBI training activities because separate appropriations and country allocation data does not exist. The following are GAO’s comments on the Department of State letter dated July 12, 2005. 1. State commented that the Leahy provisions apply only to units, not individuals, of foreign security forces, and said that applying human rights restrictions at the individual level is a matter of policy. State also asserted that it takes additional measures to avoid the provision of U.S. assistance to individuals suspected of gross human rights violations, whether inside or outside the security unit setting. However, our work showed that State’s policy is not being effectively implemented. We found that an estimated 6,900 individuals received U.S. training assistance without any evidence that they had first been vetted for gross violations of human rights. Therefore, we recommended in the report that State strengthen its management controls to meet its stated policy goal of not providing U.S. assistance to suspected gross human rights violators. 2. State said that U.S. embassies in the Philippines, Indonesia, and Thailand reviewed their human rights vetting procedures and brought them into compliance with Department guidance. We agree that embassies in Manila and Jakarta wrote their human rights vetting procedures during the course of our review to bring them into compliance with State guidance. However, Embassy Bangkok does not have written procedures and is not in compliance with State guidelines. More importantly, State lacks a system for monitoring compliance with its guidelines. As discussed in our report, we found that no headquarters office within State is currently charged with the responsibility of monitoring the posts’ compliance with State’s human rights vetting procedures and recommended that such a monitoring mechanism be established to verify that these procedures are being carried out properly. Such a system would help eliminate the major gaps in vetting we found at the three posts we visited. State further commented that the State-run International Law Enforcement Academies and Philippines ATA programs have been fully incorporated in human rights vetting procedures since 1999. However, this comment is not relevant to our main finding that we found no evidence that about 6,900 foreign security forces were vetted for human rights concerns before receiving U.S. law enforcement training under ICITAP. 3. State acknowledged the need for continued improvement, especially concerning better oversight of the implementation of posts’ procedures. It noted that some oversight is provided through the periodic Inspector General inspections. State said that it purposely allows the posts flexibility in deciding vetting guidelines. We contacted the State Inspector General and found that their periodic post inspections have not included assessments of State’s human rights vetting process at any of the three posts. We found that State had conducted an inspection at only one post--Embassy Bangkok--between fiscal years 2001 through 2004. 4. We disagree with State’s comments that (1) central oversight of posts’ compliance with vetting requirements in a single office is not needed, and (2) its new database system will mitigate the need for centralization in one bureau. As stated in our report, no office within State is charged with the overall responsibility of monitoring posts’ compliance with human rights vetting requirements, which has led to lapses in the vetting process across all three posts. Currently, four different bureaus within State share some responsibility for implementing these requirements. This has resulted in confusion in the field and gaps in implementing departmental vetting policies. State’s guidance issued to the posts between 1997 through 2005 did not assign this role and responsibility to any one office. A central focal point would help identify instances where a post was not complying with required procedures or instances where confusion about requirements existed. The new database, alone, will not solve the vetting problems we identified or replace the need for designating an office with the express responsibility of monitoring how posts implement their human rights vetting requirements. 5. We disagree with State’s statement that our decision to include a full range of programs and activities supporting foreign military and police forces within the scope of our review undermined our assessment of State’s compliance with the Security Assistance Act. As officials with State’s Bureau of Legal Affairs repeatedly stated, there is no statutory definition of “security assistance,” or even a commonly agreed-upon definition within the federal government. In the absence of a legal definition, and for the purposes of our report, we defined security assistance as U.S. government assistance to train and equip foreign security forces (military and police). Although State officials indicated that it traditionally considers security assistance to include FMF, IMET, EDA, and PKO programs, the Security Assistance Act of 2002 states that FMF, IMET and EDA as well as other similar training programs to foreign security forces shall be included in State’s briefing on the strategy. It will be difficult for State to craft a comprehensive security assistance strategy, as called for in our report, without including at least the 12 related programs and activities described in our report. 6. We disagree that the absence of further requests for a briefing on the national security assistance strategy somehow changed the intention of the Security Assistance Act of 2000 to have an annual report to Congress. The Security Assistance Act of 2000 urged State to provide an annual strategy while the 2002 act mandated a status briefing on the development of that strategy. We understand that State fulfilled its requirement to brief the committees on the progress of the strategy, as called for in the 2002 act, but we disagree that a lack of request for additional briefings altered the intention of the 2000 act, which urged State to provide an annual National Security Assistance Strategy to Congress. 7. The briefing was a good first step, but a detailed written plan is needed for wider distribution, and for providing documentation for tracking progress in moving forward. 8. We agree with State’s observation that our report does not include information about the Global Affairs Dashboard pilot project, which State said has the potential to become a useful tool for security assistance strategic planning. Although we were not informed in the course of our review of the Global Dashboard, which has yet to be developed and deployed, we support all State efforts to develop better strategic planning tools for U.S. security assistance programs. We have revised the report to reflect this new information. 9. We have made changes in the body of the report to reflect State’s comment that the draft incorrectly referred to IMET and FMF as DOD programs, when they are Foreign Operations Appropriations Act- funded programs. 10. The draft report already reflected the distinction between State policy and the law. 11. We have updated the report to reflect State’s comment. 12. We agree with State’s comment that Embassy Manila had written procedures for human rights vetting prior to 2004 and made changes in the report to reflect this comment. However, we disagree with State’s comment that Embassy Manila provided us with all relevant documents during our visit in March 2005, including an October 2000 cable outlining post human rights vetting procedures. In fact, the post provided us only with the procedures in effect since late 2004. 13. We have revised the graphic to reflect State’s comment that no EDA articles were transferred to Indonesia. 14. We have revised the graphic to correct the value for CTFP. 15. State commented that ATA allocations should be $7.8 million, rather than $1.9 million, for the Philippines; $19.1 million, rather than $14.8 million, for Indonesia; and $4.2 million, rather than zero, for Thailand. In subsequent discussions with State officials, they said that these figures represent “either obligations or expenditures,” and not allocations, as we requested. We could not verify the numbers that they provided through agency comments and State was not able to provide us with corrected values for the allocations. As a result, we made no changes to the report and reported the available ATA country allocations as presented in State’s Congressional Budget Justifications. 16. We revised our report language to reflect State’s comment. 17. State misinterpreted our generic description of the human rights vetting process, which was not intended to imply that all State officials share a common understanding of vetting policies and procedures. During our fieldwork at the three posts, we found major gaps in the implementation of State’s vetting procedures. 18. We have changed the report to reflect State’s comment that it is the responsibility of the initiating office in Jakarta, not the political section, to obtain clearances from all other sections. 19. State asserts that some of the 300 ATA in-country trainees in Thailand who were not vetted were not members of the security forces and thus should be excluded from the table. However, we carefully separated out non-security forces from our review before assessing compliance with human rights vetting procedures. Our numbers were based on our file review in Embassy Bangkok and discussion with the ATA Program Director. This analysis showed that of 708 ATA trainees between 2001 and 2004; 144 were security forces sent to the United States, 321 were security forces trained in Thailand, but not vetted; and 243 were non- security forces trained in Thailand for whom vetting was not required. 20. We disagree with State’s comment that the number of Indonesian trainees from 2001 through 2004 is 705. We revised the incorrect figure (210) in our report to reflect the number (297) provided by the post in its “DS/ATA Indonesia Summary Sheet.” 21. We disagree with State’s comment that we may be implying a relationship between the ATA program and all security assistance programs to the western hemisphere, based on our discussion of PART ratings in our draft report. We did not intend to imply a relationship between the two programs. As stated in our draft report, the 2004 PART conducted two separate reviews. One review was for the ATA program, which it rated as “effective.” The other review was for all security assistance programs to the Western Hemisphere, which were rated as “moderately effective.” 22. State contends that the National Security Assistance Strategy is a multiyear plan because the Bureau Performance Plans are multiyear documents. The Bureau Performance Plans are different documents and serve a different purpose as indicated in our report. We acknowledge in the report that the Bureau Performance Plans are consistent with the National Security Strategy of the United States, and to some extent address how combining resources and programs will achieve regional goals as called for in the act. However, the Bureau Performance Plans do not constitute a National Security Assistance Strategy. 23. State said that it coordinated development of the National Security Assistance Strategy with the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and other appropriate agencies. We acknowledge that State’s annual roundtables and other communications are useful in developing and “fine-tuning” security assistance goals and objectives. However, we did not find anyone in those offices who participated in developing the National Security Assistance Strategy —the briefing slides, outline, and oral presentation. One State official earlier had said that DOD officials were involved only in presenting a briefing on EDA as part of State’s Strategy briefing and a separate briefing on DOD’s security cooperation efforts. In addition to the individual named above, Stephen M. Lord, Assistant Director; Jeffrey D. Phillips; Ann M. Ulrich; Jonathan Ban; Matthew Helm; Lynn Cothern; Mary Moutsos; and Sidney Schwartz made key contributions to this report.

Summary: The executive branch has bolstered assistance to the Philippines, Indonesia, and Thailand to contribute to U.S. foreign policy and security goals. To further human rights goals, Congress restricts certain security assistance funds from being provided to any units of foreign security forces when credible evidence exists that units have committed gross violations of human rights. GAO (1) describes the nature and extent of U.S. assistance to foreign security forces in the Philippines, Indonesia, and Thailand, (2) assesses the controls used to achieve compliance with human rights restrictions on U.S. funding to foreign security forces in these countries, and (3) assesses the U.S. government's national security assistance strategy. The United States allocated about $265.7 million in assistance from fiscal years 2001 to 2004 to equip and train security forces in the Philippines, Thailand, and Indonesia. U.S. law restricts the provision of funds to units of foreign security forces when the Department of State has credible evidence that the unit has committed gross violations of human rights. Agency guidance extends these restrictions to individuals of foreign security forces and requires posts to establish procedures to vet candidates for U.S. sponsored training for possible violations. However, we found no evidence that U.S. officials vetted an estimated 6,900 foreign security trainees--about 4,000 Indonesian, 1,200 Filipino, and 1,700 Thai police--trained by Justice with State law enforcement assistance between fiscal years 2001 through 2004. These candidates included a total of 32 Indonesian individuals trained over time from a notorious special-forces police unit previously prohibited under State policy from receiving U.S. training funds because of the unit's prior human rights abuses. We found better evidence of vetting in training programs managed by DOD. State issued new guidance in February 2005 intended to improve the human rights vetting process and establish a database of human rights abuse allegations. State has not produced a clear and coherent national security assistance strategy that meets objectives that Congress urged State to address in 2000 legislation. As a result, State and Congress may be deprived of the information needed to make future decisions about these programs. State's 2003 strategy met only two of nine objectives in the law. Among other shortfalls, the strategy did not identify how programs would be combined at the country level to achieve objectives or be coordinated with other U.S. government agencies. Several State and DOD planning documents, while not collectively providing a complete national security assistance strategy, address some of the legislation's objectives.