GPRA is intended to shift the focus of government decisionmaking, management, and accountability from activities and processes to the results and outcomes achieved by federal programs. New and valuable information on the plans, goals, and strategies of federal agencies has been provided since federal agencies began implementing GPRA. Under GPRA, annual performance plans are to clearly inform the Congress and the public of (1) the annual performance goals for agencies’ major programs and activities, (2) the measures that will be used to gauge performance, (3) the strategies and resources required to achieve the performance goals, and (4) the procedures that will be used to verify and validate performance information. These annual plans, issued soon after transmittal of the president’s budget, provide a direct linkage between an agency’s longer term goals and mission and day-to-day activities. Annual performance reports are to subsequently report on the degree to which performance goals were met. The issuance of the agencies’ performance reports, due by March 31, represents a new and potentially more substantive phase in the implementation of GPRA—the opportunity to assess federal agencies’ actual performance for the prior fiscal year and to consider what steps are needed to improve performance and reduce costs in the future. DOT’s mission is to ensure a safe transportation system that furthers our vital national interests and enhances the quality of life of the American people. The agency has identified five strategic goals for achieving that mission: (1) eliminating transportation-related deaths and injuries; (2) shaping an accessible, reliable transportation system; (3) supporting economic growth; (4) protecting the environment; and (5) ensuring the security of the transportation infrastructure and the country. DOT’s combined performance plan and report is organized around these strategic goals. Table 1 illustrates how the report’s four key outcomes and their supporting performance measures correspond to DOT’s strategic goals. This section discusses our analysis of DOT’s performance in achieving selected key outcomes and the strategies the agency has in place, particularly strategic human capital management and information technology, for accomplishing these outcomes. Although DOT did not include specific human capital or information technology strategies for the four outcomes we reviewed, the Department did address these strategies in other parts of its performance report. In discussing the outcomes, we have also provided information drawn from our prior work on the extent to which the agency provided assurance that the performance information it is reporting is credible. For fiscal year 2000, DOT’s progress in achieving fewer transportation- related accidents, deaths, injuries, and property losses was limited. The Department reported the least success in highway safety—it did not meet any of its goals in this area. For example, DOT failed to meet its goals for reducing highway-related fatalities and injuries, despite meeting both goals in 1999. DOT’s best performance was in marine and hazardous material transport safety—it met all of its goals in these areas. DOT’s progress in and strategies for achieving its fiscal year 2000 goals are discussed below for the areas of highway, aviation, marine, pipeline, rail, and transit safety. Regarding highway safety, DOT had expected to achieve at least three of the six key goals, but it did not meet any of them (see table 2). For example, DOT did not meet its goal of less than 4,934 large truck-related fatalities in 2000. On the basis of estimated data, DOT reported that 5,307 fatalities involving large trucks occurred in 2000, which was a slight improvement from 1999 when 5,362 large truck-related fatalities occurred. DOT provided explanations for not achieving its highway safety goals. For example, DOT attributes the increase in highway fatalities to a continued increase in motorcycle fatalities and deaths of young drivers. For three of the unmet goals, performance improved compared to 1999. For example, DOT has made progress in seatbelt use; the 71-percent rate of front seat occupants using seat belts achieved in 2000 represents the highest in our nation’s history. This rate, however, was below DOT’s goal to increase seat belt usage to 85 percent. DOT’s highway safety data for 2000 are all preliminary estimates. The report notes that timeliness of performance information is a significant limitation of data from outside the agency— highway safety data comes from police reports and state data—and preliminary estimates are based on extrapolations of partial-year data. DOT reports that its data on highway fatalities and injuries have been in use for many years and are generally accepted as accurate. However, we have reported that DOT lacks high-quality, up-to-date information on the causes of large truck crashes; and, as a result, DOT has begun to improve its data on the causes of these crashes. For the most part, DOT’s strategies to improve highway safety appear reasonable; however, they may be insufficient to meet many of the agency’s 2001 goals in this area (see table 3). Some strategies, such as improving and expanding oversight and enforcement activities and improving safety data collection concerning motor carriers, address concerns that have been raised by GAO and DOT’s IG (see app. I). The strategies also include a large-scale safety awareness program targeted at teenage drivers and the Safe Communities program, which provides grants to develop and implement community-based transportation safety programs. DOT’s evaluation of the Safe Communities program showed success in some communities, such as Dallas, TX, where the use of child safety seats more than doubled following the implementation of a child safety seat loaner program. The agency is also proposing an increase in the resources available to counter the increase in fatality and injury rates by more than $30 million in fiscal year 2002. DOT does not indicate any activities to specifically address motorcycle fatalities, which had increased 8 percent from 1999 to 2000. In the area of aviation safety, DOT reported that it met its fiscal 2000 goal for reducing the rate of fatal commercial aviation accidents but did not achieve its other two goals—to reduce the rate of runway incursions that create dangerous situations that can lead to serious accidents and reduce the rates of air traffic operational errors and deviations. (See fig. 1.) For the three unmet goals, performance worsened compared to 1999, and DOT is skeptical that it will be able to reach the goals in 2001. DOT attributed these trends to improved reporting and tracking as well as greater flight volume in congested and restricted airspace. DOT’s performance report indicated that there is no significant and/or systematic error in the counts of accidents, runway incursions, operation errors, or operational deviations. In addition, the Department reported that it regularly checks or validates these data sets. On the basis of a joint government/industry working group determination and a GAO recommendation, DOT has switched to the use of departures rather than flight hours for determining the rate of air carrier fatalities. To improve aviation safety, FAA is implementing several initiatives designed to address shortcomings in training; technology; communications; and airport signs, marking, and lighting. FAA will also investigate the use of new safety technologies. In addition, to reduce runway incursions, the agency is undertaking initiatives to improve communications among controllers, pilots, and ground crews. The aviation strategies appear reasonable. Nonetheless, DOT reported that it was unsure of meeting any of these aviation safety goals in 2001. In the marine sector, DOT reported that it met all three of its safety goals—to reduce the number of recreational boating fatalities, reduce the rate of passenger vessel fatalities, and increase the number of mariners reported in imminent danger who are rescued. Next year, DOT will simplify the passenger fatality measure because the current measure has been difficult to understand. DOT indicated that it expects to meet all three goals in 2001. The report acknowledges that the data on recreational boating fatalities are probably underreported by at least 6 percent due to the need for interpretation of what constitutes a recreational boating fatality at the state level. In addition, in 2001, DOT will switch data sources for passenger vessel fatalities. The report indicates that the new data source— the Marine Information System for Safety and Law Enforcement—will be a significant improvement, but the improved data quality may cause serious difficulties in making comparisons to prior data. The agency’s strategies for achieving its marine safety goals in 2002 appear reasonable. The strategies include increasing staffing and training at rescue stations and command centers and promoting the wearing of lifejackets by recreational boaters. In 2000, DOT’s evaluation of its Recreational Boating Safety Program concluded that wearing personal flotation devices could save the lives of about 500 boaters each year. In addition, the agency intends to work with the U.S. Navy and Air Force, which also have search and rescue responsibilities, primarily for their own vessels and aircraft. The Air Force is the lead agency for land-based search and rescue, and the Coast Guard is the lead for maritime search and rescue. Despite one of the deadliest pipeline accidents in recent years, DOT projects that it met both of its goals for hazardous material transport safety—reducing pipeline failures and serious hazardous material transport incidents—because neither goal measures the increasing number of fatalities. DOT statistics show that pipeline fatalities have been increasing steadily over the past years (See fig. 2.). However, we recognize that the overall number of fatalities from pipeline accidents remains low, and that a single major accident can result in a significant increase in the number of annual fatalities. Preliminary estimates also show that DOT will meet its performance goal for reducing serious hazardous materials incidents in 2000. However, the fact that there were more incidents in 2000 than there were in 1999 will make it challenging for DOT to meet its 2001 goal. DOT acknowledged that the number of pipeline failures is likely underreported, and federal, state, and industry teams have been formed to improve the data. In addition, DOT reported that it is revising the collection and processing of pipeline accident data to improve the consistency and accuracy of the data on accident causes. To reduce the risk of pipeline failures, DOT works to establish safety regulations and ensure compliance. However, we have expressed concerns about certain agency initiatives to improve pipeline safety. For example, DOT has changed its approach to enforcing compliance with its regulations by reducing its use of fines and, instead, working with pipeline operators to identify and correct safety problems. We recommended that DOT determine whether this approach has improved compliance with pipeline safety regulations. A DOT official said that the Department is currently evaluating the effectiveness of its approach of working with pipeline operators to improve compliance. DOT reported limited success in achieving its rail and transit safety performance goals in 2000, when it met only two of five goals. (See table 3.) For 2001, the report indicated that the agency expects to meet only one of these goals. The rate of highway-rail crossing accidents fell in 2000, but DOT did not meet its goal. According to DOT, this goal was not met due, in part, to a 15-percent increase in highway-rail crossing accidents on private property, which the agency has limited authority or control over. DOT is attempting to improve rail safety through its educational outreach program and Safety Assurance and Compliance Program, in which the agency works with major railroads to identify and solve systemic problems affecting rail safety. To improve transit safety, the Federal Transit Authority provides grants to states to improve public transit infrastructure and works with states, local transit authorities, and the transit industry to develop technology, provide training, and supply technical assistance that advances safety. The agency reported that it did not meet its goal of reducing the number of flight delays as aviation delays and cancellations continued to increase in 2000 to the highest levels recorded, when nearly one in four flights were delayed, cancelled, or diverted. DOT indicated that bad weather accounted for about 70 percent of the delays. DOT had met its goal for reducing delays in 1999 but indicated that it would not meet its 2000 goal if the country experienced particularly bad weather in 2000. Similarly, DOT reported that it does not expect to achieve this goal in 2001 due to expected increases in air travel. DOT provides a clear and comprehensive discussion of the performance data. The performance report provides a definition of the measure, data limitations and their implications for assessing performance, procedures to verify and validate data, and the source database. For example, the report indicates that the lack of a common definition of delay has led to confusion and disagreement as to the extent of aviation delays. To address this problem, DOT formed a task force that recommended four new categories for the causes of flight delays: (1) circumstances within an airline’s control, (2) extreme weather, (3) circumstances within the national aviation system, and (4) late flight arrivals. DOT expects to test this new reporting format with airlines before formally implementing it. DOT’s strategies to reduce flight delays, such as improved weather tracking and reporting mechanisms, appear reasonable but do not appear likely to achieve the goal in the near term. For example, the report indicates that FAA’s best means for reducing aviation delays, such as its plans for all-weather access to runways and the construction of more runways, will happen only in the long term. In the near term, to meet the growing demand for air travel and decrease the number of flight delays, the agency is modernizing its air traffic control (ATC) system by acquiring a network of radar, automated information processing, navigation, and communications equipment. However, over the years, the agency’s ATC modernization and other major capacity-enhancing programs have not met expectations due to cost, schedule, and performance problems. We designated the ATC modernization program as a high-risk information technology initiative in 1995, and it continues to be a high-risk area. According to projections, DOT reported that it failed to achieve its 2000 goal to reduce highway congestion—measured by hours of delay per 1,000 vehicle-miles traveled on federal-aid highways—despite establishing a positive trend in 1999. However, in 2001, the agency expects to meet three new highway congestion goals—reducing congested travel time, peak period travel time, and traveler delay—that will replace the 2000 goal. DOT did not indicate why the agency failed to meet the 2000 goal. In addition, DOT estimated that it met its 2000 goal for improving highway pavement condition. Consequently, it plans to continue a number of initiatives designed to promote the construction of smoother pavements and extend pavement performance, such as providing funding for pavement maintenance and conducting pavement research. DOT also reported that it met its goal for increasing the number of metropolitan areas that have intelligent transportation systems, which use information and communication technology to extend the capacity of existing highway infrastructure and could help lessen congestion. The Department intends to fund intelligent transportation systems in additional metropolitan areas in 2002 as part of its strategy to reduce highway congestion. DOT’s report discussed the credibility of the information for each goal and added a limitation that we identified in last year’s report. We found that the 1999 performance report failed to explain that states provided no information for the highway pavement condition of about 7 percent of the miles on the National Highway System. This limitation to the data is explained in the 2000 report. However, the 2000 report did not address other problems with the pavement condition data that we identified, such as the fact that states vary in their approaches to measuring and reporting the statistic used to indicate pavement performance and do not uniformly follow DOT’s guidance for making these measurements. The Coast Guard is responsible, along with other federal agencies, for reducing the amount of illegal drugs smuggled into the United States. Although the agency seized a record 60.2 metric tons of cocaine in 2000, this was not sufficient for the agency to reach its goal—to seize 13 percent of the cocaine being smuggled into the country through maritime routes. Furthermore, the percentage of cocaine seized by the agency fell from 12.2 percent in 1999 to 10.6 percent in 2000 because of increases in the overall amount of cocaine smuggled. Consequently, the agency noted that it will be challenged to meet its goal in 2001. The data quality for this indicator is not as strong as it is for other indicators. The report notes that the secretive nature of the illegal drug trade could cause estimates of the amount of cocaine smuggled into this country to contain significant errors. The Office of National Drug Control Policy attempts to refine and improve this estimate each year, according to DOT. DOT provided a general overview of its strategies for 2002 to reduce the availability of illegal drugs, which included continuing to develop new tactics and vary its operations to thwart maritime smuggling. DOT reported that the Coast Guard’s efforts are part of an overall strategy to reduce the illegal drug supply entering the United Sates. The multiagency effort is coordinated by the Office of National Drug Control Policy; the Coast Guard’s role in the effort is to serve as the lead federal agency for maritime drug interdiction. For the selected key outcomes, this section describes major improvements or remaining weaknesses in DOT’s (1) fiscal year 2000 performance report in comparison with its fiscal year 1999 report, and (2) fiscal year 2002 performance plan in comparison with its fiscal year 2001 plan. It also discusses the degree to which the agency’s fiscal year 2000 report and fiscal year 2002 plan address concerns and recommendations by the Congress, GAO, DOT’s Inspector General, and others. As we found last year, DOT provides a clear and comprehensive discussion of performance goals, measures, and data in this year’s report. Overall, it is easy to ascertain DOT’s progress in meeting its goals because the performance information is clearly articulated in the performance report, which provides goal levels and the actual performance for all the measures we reviewed. This represents an improvement over last year’s performance report, for which we noted that DOT did not report actual performance for two goals: highway delays and pavement condition. For 1999, the agency reported that actual data were not available. For 2000, the agency estimated the level of performance. As was true last year, DOT’s goals and measures are meaningful, outcome oriented, objective, measurable, and quantifiable. In addition, summary tables list the fiscal year 2000 goals, trend data, and checkmarks to indicate goals that were met. For each performance measure, the agency provides a definition of the measure, data limitations and their implications for assessing performance, procedures for verifying and validating data, and the source for the data. The report also notes the agency’s attempts to improve the quality of its goals. For example, in 2000, DOT deleted the maritime safety goal to reduce the fatality rate among maritime workers and added the goal to reduce the fatality rate on passenger vessels. The agency reported that it made the change because it believed the new goal reflected a broader area of safety performance. In 2001, the agency made additional improvements; it simplified the passenger fatality measure to make it more understandable and implemented a new information system to improve the quality of its passenger fatality data. Regarding the highway pavement condition data, however, the report does not address several weaknesses we raised concerning last year’s report, such as the fact that states vary in their approaches to measuring and reporting the statistic used to indicate pavement performance and do not uniformly follow DOT’s guidance for making these measurements. DOT changed several performance measures for this year’s report. For example, it implemented a recommendation made by GAO and others to link its fatal commercial aviation accident measure to the number of departures instead of flight hours. However, the report did not always discuss its reasons for discontinuing or changing its performance measures, which sometimes occurred when performance was declining. For example, DOT discontinued its aviation safety performance goal of reducing the rate of deviations—aircraft entering airspace without prior coordination—but the report did not indicate why. DOT did not make its 1999 goal, and pilot deviations increased by 38 percent in 2000. As was true in 1999, the 2000 performance report does not always explain why DOT did not reach its performance goals or how its plans to mitigate the external factors that affect outcomes. For example, DOT indicated that it failed to meet its goals for reducing highway fatalities in part due to a continuing increase in motorcycle fatalities. However, DOT’s plan does not include any specific strategies for reducing motorcycle fatalities. As it did last year, the 2000 performance report addressed the majority of the management challenges identified by GAO, the Inspector General, and the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) by including a discussion of each management challenge in the section devoted to the relevant performance indicator. The management challenges not directly or indirectly linked to one of DOT’s goals were listed together after the goals. Although the report discussed DOT’s progress toward resolving most of the management challenges, it did not address aspects of the management challenge to enhance competition in the freight rail industry and consumer protection in the aviation and freight rail industries. DOT improved its discussion of the management challenges by indicating whether GAO, the DOT Inspector General, OMB, or some combination of these organizations identified each challenge. As it did last year, DOT identifies in a clear, well-organized manner the strategies and initiatives it will pursue for each of the 2002 performance goals. For the four outcomes that we reviewed, these strategies did not include strategic human capital management and information technology. However, the report discusses these types of strategies elsewhere. The report also provides the fiscal years 2001 and 2002 funding that DOT will direct toward each performance goal. This information is an improvement to last year’s report because it enhances the reader’s ability to compare the agency’s initiatives and the resources committed to those initiatives. The plan outlines DOT’s expectation for meeting its 2001 goals, and in several cases the plan indicates that the agency does not expect to meet its goals. This is especially true for the numerous goals that it did not meet in 2000. For example, in the short term, DOT may not be able to meet its goal for reducing the rate of runway incursions. The rate of runway incursions has increased over the last 6 years, with a very large upsurge in 2000, moving the rate of incursions even further from DOT’s goal. As a result, for the second straight year, DOT’s performance plan indicated that it is unlikely that the agency will meet its goal for the upcoming year. The plan also notes DOT’s continuing efforts to correct data limitations. For example, DOT found that its performance measure for highway congestion (delay per 1,000 vehicle-miles traveled) did not reflect the actual performance of the highway system in places where congestion regularly happens (e.g., congested, urban areas), and the measure was difficult for the public to understand. As a result, next year DOT will replace the one highway congestion performance measure with three new measures that DOT believes will reflect changing travel conditions more comprehensively by focusing on the different aspects of inefficient road performance in areas where congestion regularly occurs. The plan did not include a future performance goal for reducing pipeline accident injuries and fatalities even though one would appear relevant for several reasons. First, fatalities due to pipeline accidents are increasing. Second, the plan includes goals to reduce injuries and fatalities related to all of the other transportation sectors; and, third, DOT’s future plans for pipeline safety are geared, in part, toward reducing fatalities. As it did last year, in its discussion at the end of the relevant performance goal, DOT’s 2002 performance plan addressed the majority of the management challenges identified by GAO, the Inspector General, and OMB. For some of the management challenges, DOT breaks out its plans and goals by fiscal year. For example, in response to its management challenge for computer security, DOT lays out a number of milestones for improving computer security with specific dates leading up to May 2003, when all DOT systems are expected to be adequately protected. However, the plan acknowledged that DOT did not meet the first milestone on schedule. GAO has identified two governmentwide high-risk areas: strategic human capital management and information security. We found that DOT’s performance plan had a measure related to human capital but no corresponding goal. In addition, the agency’s performance report explained DOT’s progress in resolving certain human capital challenges. For example, the report indicated that DOT made progress in implementing its human resources management strategies in 2000 and has established worker satisfaction as a new performance measure in 2002. With respect to information security, we found that DOT’s performance plan did have goals and measures related to information security, and the agency’s performance report explained its progress in resolving a number of its information security challenges. For example, the report focused on FAA’s air traffic control information systems in response to a management challenge raised by GAO, the Inspector General, and OMB. In addition to the governmentwide challenges, GAO has identified six major management challenges facing DOT. We found that DOT’s performance report discussed the agency’s progress in resolving many of these challenges. However, the report did not adequately discuss the agency’s progress in enhancing competition in the freight rail industry and consumer protection in both the freight rail and aviation industries. Table 4 illustrates how the goals and measures address the eight management challenges that GAO identified. DOT has again produced a superior combined performance plan and report that is clear, understandable, and well organized. It is easy for the reader to quickly assess the agency’s progress in achieving key goals and understand its plans for the future, including the budget resources that DOT plans to direct toward achieving each goal. For readers seeking additional information, the report also provides details on the agency’s data for each performance measure, such as its definition, source, limitations, and DOT’s efforts to verify and validate the data. These characteristics make DOT’s report and plan a good model for other agencies to emulate. However, the report shows that DOT is generally achieving fewer of its key performance goals than last year. For example, in 2000, DOT failed to meet any of its goals for highway safety, including its goals for reducing the rate of highway fatalities and injuries that it had met in 1999. The plan is candid about the agency’s likelihood of not achieving some future goals. Some of this is understandable; DOT cannot mitigate all external factors, such as bad weather or human error. However, in several cases, DOT’s annual strategies and goals appear mismatched. Overall, DOT met fewer of its performance goals than last year, and it already projects that it will fall short on several future goals in important areas, such as aviation, highway, and transit safety. For goals in which DOT is not making adequate progress, the Department needs to either change its strategies or lower its expectations. In the case of pipeline safety, the mismatch between goals and strategies appears to be due to the lack of an appropriate measure. Specifically, DOT does not have performance goals to reduce pipeline fatalities and injuries, even though pipeline fatalities are increasing and the agency’s strategies to improve pipeline safety are geared toward reducing fatalities. In the other areas—highway, aviation, transit, and marine transportation—DOT has safety goals to reduce fatalities and injuries. We recommend that the Secretary of Transportation direct the operating administrations and the Office of Budget and Program Performance to improve the match between annual performance goals and strategies in the following ways: Change strategies so that they help DOT achieve its performance goals or lower performance goals to more achievable levels. In the latter case, the Department should provide a justification for why the changes were necessary, clearly note that the goals have been lowered, and identify any long-term strategies that will bring performance into better alignment with expectations. Establish performance goals for reducing the number of fatalities and injuries caused by pipeline failures to match similar goals in the aviation, highway, transit, and marine sectors. As agreed, our evaluation was generally based on the requirements of GPRA; the Reports Consolidation Act of 2000; guidance to agencies from OMB for developing performance plans and reports (OMB Circular A-11, Part 2); previous reports and evaluations by us and others; our knowledge of DOT’s operations and programs; our identification of best practices concerning performance planning and reporting; and our observations on DOT’s other GPRA-related efforts. We also discussed our review with DOT officials. The agency outcomes that were used as the basis for our review were identified by the Ranking Minority Member of the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee as important mission areas for the agency and do not reflect the outcomes for all of DOT’s programs or activities. The major management challenges confronting DOT, including the governmentwide high-risk areas of strategic human capital management and information security, were identified by GAO in our January 2001 Performance and Accountability Series and High-Risk Update and were identified by DOT’s Office of Inspector General in December 2000. We did not independently verify the information contained in the performance report and plan, although we did draw from other GAO work in assessing the validity, reliability, and timeliness of DOT’s performance data. We conducted our review from April 2001 through June 2001 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. We provided copies of a draft of this report to the Department of Transportation for its review and comment. In a letter, the agency indicated that it agrees with our recommendations. Specifically, the Department stated that annual performance targets should be realistic, strategies will be reviewed to better align them with performance goals, and pipeline injuries and fatalities should be included in DOT’s future performance plans. DOT’s written comments are included as appendix II. As arranged with your office, unless you publicly announce its contents earlier, we plan no further distribution of this report until 30 days after the date of this letter. At that time, we will send copies to appropriate congressional committees; the Secretary of Transportation; and the Director, Office of Management and Budget. Copies will also be made available to others upon request. If you or your staff have any questions, please call me at (202) 512-2834. Key contributors to this report were Teresa Spisak and Keith Cunningham. The following table identifies the major management challenges confronting the Department of Transportation (DOT), which include the governmentwide high-risk areas of strategic human capital management and information security. The first column lists the management challenges that we and/or DOT’s Inspector General (IG) have identified. The second column discusses what progress, as discussed in DOT’s fiscal year 2000 performance report, the agency made in resolving its challenges. The third column discusses the extent to which DOT’s fiscal year 2002 performance plan includes performance goals and measures to address the challenges that we and DOT’s IG identified. We found that DOT’s performance report discussed the agency’s progress in resolving all of its challenges. Of the agency’s nine major management challenges, its performance plan (1) had goals and measures that were directly related to 5 of the challenges and (2) had goals and measures that were indirectly applicable to four of the challenges.

Summary: The Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 requires agencies to produce annual performance reports. GAO reviewed the Department of Transportation's (DOT) performance reports for fiscal years 2000 and 2002 to assess its progress in achieving selected key outcomes in important mission areas. This report (1) assesses the progress DOT has made in accomplishing these outcomes and the strategies the agency has in place to achieve them and (2) compares DOT's fiscal year 2000 performance report and fiscal year 2002 performance plan with the agency's prior year performance report and plan for these outcomes. DOT's consolidated performance report makes it clear that DOT achieved only limited progress in fiscal year 2000 toward achieving the selected outcomes and that the agency directly indicated that its current strategies are not likely to result in achievement of the goals. DOT provided a clear, well-organized discussion of performance goals, measures, and data in both fiscal year 2000 and fiscal year 2002 performance plans.