The September 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) outlined a strategy to sustain and transform the military force structure that has been in place since the mid-1990s. In this review, the Department of Defense (DOD) committed to selectively recapitalize older equipment items to meet near-term challenges and to provide near-term readiness. DOD recognized that the older equipment items critical to DOD’s ability to defeat current threats must be sustained as transformation occurs. DOD also recognizes that recapitalization of all elements of U.S. forces since the end of the Cold War has been delayed for too long. DOD procured few replacement equipment items as the force aged throughout the 1990s, but it recognizes that the force structure will eventually become operationally and technologically obsolete without a significant increase in resources that are devoted to the recapitalization of weapons systems. The annual Future Years Defense Plan (FYDP) contains DOD’s plans for future programs and priorities. It presents DOD estimates of future funding needs based on specific programs. Through the FYDP, DOD projects costs for each element of those programs through a period of either 5 or 6 years on the basis of proposals made by each of the military services and the policy choices made by the current administration. The 2003 FYDP extends from fiscal year 2003 to fiscal year 2007, and the 2004 FYDP extends from fiscal year 2004 to fiscal year 2009. Congress has expressed concerns that the military modernization budget and funding levels envisioned in the FYDP appear to be inadequate to replace aging equipment and incorporate cutting-edge technologies into the force at the pace required by the QDR and its underlying military strategy. As shown in table 1, of the 25 equipment items we reviewed, we assessed the current condition of 3 of these equipment items as red, 11 as yellow, and 10 as green. We were not able to obtain adequate data to assess the condition for the Marine Corps Maverick Missile because the Marine Corps does not track readiness trend data, such as mission capable or operational readiness rates, for munitions as they do for aircraft or other equipment. Rotary wing lift helicopters, specifically the CH-46E and the CH-47D helicopters, had the lowest condition rating among the equipment items we reviewed, followed by fixed wing aircraft. Although we assessed the condition as green for several equipment items such as the Army’s Abrams tank and the Heavy Expanded Mobility Tactical Truck, and the Marine Corps Light Armored Vehicle-Command and Control Variant, we identified various problems and issues that could potentially worsen the condition of some equipment items in the near future if not attended to. Specifically, for the Abrams tank, and similarly for the Heavy Expanded Mobility Tactical Truck, Army officials cited supply and maintenance challenges at the unit level such as repair parts shortages, inadequate test equipment, and lack of trained technicians that could impact the tank’s condition in the near future. While the Marine Corps has a Light Armored Vehicle-Command and Control Variant upgrade program under way, Marine Corps officials caution that any delays in the upgrade program could affect future readiness. According to service officials and prior GAO reports, the services are currently able to alleviate the effects of these problems, in many cases, through increased maintenance hours and cannibalization of parts from other equipment. The military services use a number of metrics to measure equipment condition. Examples include mission capable rates for aircraft, operational readiness rates for equipment other than aircraft, average age, and utilization rates (e.g., flying hours). The equipment items we assessed as red did not meet mission capable or operational readiness goals for sustained periods, were older equipment items, and/or had high utilization rates. For example, 10 of 16 equipment items for which readiness data were available did not meet mission capable or operational readiness goals for extended periods from fiscal year 1998 through fiscal year 2002. The average age of 21 of the equipment items ranged from about 1 year to 43 years. Some equipment items for which we assessed the condition as yellow also failed to meet mission capable or operational readiness goals and were more than 10 years old. However, offsetting factors, such as how frequently the equipment items did not meet readiness goals or by what percentage they missed the goals, indicated less severe and urgent problems than items we assessed as red. Other equipment items may have had high mission capable rates, but because of overall age and related corrosion problems, we assessed these equipment items as yellow to highlight the fact that these items could potentially present problems if not attended to within the next 3-5 years. The equipment items for which we assessed the condition as green generally met mission capable and operational readiness goals. While three of these equipment items—the Army Heavy Expanded Mobility Tactical Truck, the Air Force F-16, and the Marine Corps Light Armored Vehicle- Command and Control Variant—did not meet mission capable or operational readiness goals, we assessed the condition as green because the condition problems identified were less severe than the items we assessed as red or yellow. For example, an equipment item may have been slightly below the goal but only for non-deployed units, or the fleet-wide goals may have been met for the equipment item overall, although the specific model we reviewed did not meet the goals. In addition, although the rates for an equipment item may be slightly below its goal, it may be able to meet operational requirements. We also considered any upgrades that were underway at the time of our review that would extend the service life of the equipment. Maintenance problems were most often cited by the Army and Marine Corps officials we met with as the cause for equipment condition deficiencies for the equipment items we reviewed. Equipment operators and maintainers that we met with believed equipment degradation was the result of maintenance problems in one of two categories—parts or personnel. The parts problems include availability of parts or logistics and supply system problems. Availability problems occur when there are parts shortages, unreliable parts, or obsolete parts due to the advanced age of the equipment items. Logistics and supply system problems occur when it takes a long time to order parts or the unit requesting the parts has a low priority. In June, July, and August of 2003, we issued six reports highlighting deficiencies in DOD’s and the services’ management of critical spare parts. We also issued a report on problems DOD and the services are having dealing with corrosion for military equipment and that they had not taken advantage of opportunities to mitigate the impact of corrosion on equipment. Maintenance problems due to personnel include (1) lack of trained and experienced technicians and (2) increases in maintenance man-hours required to repair some of these aging equipment items. We reported in April 2003, for example, that DOD has not adequately positioned or trained its civilian workforce at its industrial activities to meet future requirements. Consequently, the Department may continue to have difficulty maintaining adequate skills at its depots to meet maintenance requirements. In most cases, the services have developed long-range program strategies for sustaining and modernizing the 25 equipment items that we reviewed. However, some gaps exist because the services either have not validated their plans for the sustainment, modernization, or replacement of the equipment items, or the services’ program strategies for sustaining the equipment are hampered by problems or delays in the fielding of replacement equipment or in the vulnerability of the programs to budget cuts. The two equipment items for which we assessed the program strategy as red are the KC-135 Stratotanker and the Tomahawk Cruise Missile because, although the services may have developed long-range program strategies for these equipment items, they have not validated or updated their plans for sustaining, modernizing, or replacing these items. In the case of the KC-135 Stratotanker, the Air Force has embarked on a controversial, expensive program to replace the tanker fleet, but as we have reported, it has not demonstrated the urgency of acquiring replacement aircraft and it has not defined the requirements for the number of aircraft that will be needed. Similarly, for the Tomahawk missile, the Navy has not identified how many of these missiles it will need in the future, thereby significantly delaying the acquisition process. We assessed the program strategy for eight of the services’ program strategies as yellow, some of them because they will be affected by delays in the fielding of equipment to replace the items in our review. According to service officials, as the delivery of new replacement equipment items is delayed, the services must continue using the older equipment items to meet mission requirements. Consequently, the services may incur increased costs due to maintenance that was not programmed for equipment retained in inventory beyond the estimated service life. For example, the planned replacement equipment for the Marine Corps CH-46E helicopter (i.e., the MV-22 Osprey) has been delayed by about 3 years and is not scheduled to be fielded until 2007. DOD has also reportedly cut the number of replacement aircraft it plans to purchase by about 8 to 10 over the next few years, thus the Marine Corps will have to retain more CH-46E helicopters in its inventory. Program management officials have requested additional funds to repair airframe cracks, replace seats, and move to light- weight armor to reduce aircraft weight, engine overhauls, and avionics upgrades to keep the aircraft safe and reliable until fielding of the replacement equipment. According to Marine Corps officials, the CH-46E program strategy has also been hampered by the 5-year rule, which limits installation of new modifications other than safety modifications into the aircraft unless 5 years of service are left on the aircraft. Procurement of the replacement equipment for the Marine Corps’ Assault Amphibian Vehicle has also been delayed (by 2 years), and it is not scheduled for full fielding until 2012. The program strategy for the Assault Amphibian Vehicle includes upgrades, but for only 680 of the 1,057 vehicles in the inventory. We also assessed the program strategy for some equipment items as yellow if they were vulnerable to budget cuts. For example, according to Navy officials, the Navy frigates’ modernization program is susceptible to budget cuts because the frigates’ future role is uncertain as the Littoral Combat ship is developed. In addition, the program strategy for the frigates is questionable because of the uncertainty about the role frigates will play. Specifically, Navy frigates are increasingly used for homeland defense missions, and their program strategy has not been updated to reflect that they will be used more often and in different ways. The Army’s CH-47D helicopter is also vulnerable to budget cuts. The Army plans to upgrade 279 CH-47D helicopters to F models under its recapitalization program; the upgrade includes a purchase of CH-47F model helicopters planned in fiscal year 2004. The fiscal year 2004 budget for this purchase has already been reduced. Program managers had also planned to purchase 16 engines, but funding was transferred to requests for higher priority programs. We assessed the program strategy for the remaining 15 equipment items as green because the services have developed long-range program strategies for sustaining, modernizing, or replacing these items consistent with their estimated remaining service life. For example, the Army has developed program strategies for all tracked and wheeled vehicles in our sample. Likewise, the Air Force has developed program strategies for most fixed wing aircraft in our sample throughout the FYDP. In the case of munitions, with the exception of the Navy Tomahawk Cruise Missile and Standard Missile-2, the services have developed program strategies for sustaining and modernizing the current missile inventory in our sample. In many cases, the funding DOD has requested or is projecting for future years in the FYDP for the equipment items we reviewed does not reflect the military services’ long-range program strategies for equipment sustainment, modernization, or recapitalization. According to service officials, the services submit their budgets to DOD and the Department has the authority to increase or decrease the service budgets based upon the perceived highest priority needs. According to DOD officials, for future years’ funding, the FYDP strikes a balance between future investment and program risk, taking into consideration the services’ stated requirements as approved by DOD. As shown in table 1, we assessed the funding for 15 of the 25 equipment items as red or yellow because the department’s requested funding did not adequately reflect its long-range program strategies for modernization, maintenance, and spare parts. For example, as shown in table 2, we identified fiscal year 2003 unfunded requirements totaling $372.9 million for four major aircraft equipment items we reviewed. The most significant funding shortfalls occurred when parts, equipment upgrades, and maintenance were not fully funded or when replacement equipment items were not fielded as scheduled. The equipment items for which we assessed the funding as yellow had funding shortfalls of a lesser extent than the red items. Although we assessed the funding as green for the remaining nine equipment items, program managers raised concerns about the availability of operation and maintenance funds in future years, and stated that insufficient operation and maintenance funds could potentially result in more severe condition problems and increased future maintenance costs. According to service officials, funding shortfalls occurred when parts, equipment upgrades, or maintenance were not fully funded or funds were reduced to support higher priority service needs. As we have previously reported, DOD increases or decreases funds appropriated by Congress as funding priorities change. Other shortfalls occur when units subsequently identify maintenance requirements that were not programmed into the original budget requests. In addition, when replacement equipment items are not fielded as scheduled, the services must continue to maintain these aging equipment items for longer than anticipated. Equipment items considered legacy systems such as the Marine Corps CH-46E helicopter may not receive funding on the basis of anticipated fielding of replacement equipment in the near future. The gaps between funding for legacy systems (which are heavily used and critical to the services’ mission) and funding for future replacement equipment result when fielding of the new equipment has been delayed and budgets have been reduced for maintenance of legacy systems. Funding for these legacy systems may also be a target for funding reductions to support higher service priority items. According to the program managers for some of the equipment items we reviewed (including the Army Abrams tank, Heavy Expanded Mobility Tactical Truck, and Navy EA-6B Prowler), as the services retain aging equipment in their inventories longer than expected, maintenance requirements increase, thus increasing operation and maintenance costs. Program managers raised concerns about the availability of sufficient operation and maintenance funding to sustain these aging equipment items in the future. Also, program managers stated that present sustainment funds (i.e., operation and maintenance funds) may only cover a small percentage of the equipment’s requirements, and they frequently rely on procurement funds to subsidize equipment improvements common to multiple equipment items. However, once production of the equipment item has been completed and procurement funds are no longer available for use, program managers must compete with the rest of the service for limited operation and maintenance funds. Program managers expressed concerns that operation and maintenance funds are not currently available to fund equipment improvements and noted operation and maintenance funds may not be available in the future. Based on our analysis of equipment condition, the performance of the equipment items in recent military conflicts, and discussions with service officials, program managers, and equipment operators and maintainers, we found that most of the equipment items we reviewed are capable of fulfilling their wartime missions despite some limitations. In general, the services will always ensure equipment is ready to go to war, often through surges in maintenance and overcoming obstacles such as obsolete parts, parts availability, and cannibalization of other pieces of equipment. Some of these equipment items (such as the Marine Corps CH-46E helicopter and all Air Force aircraft except the B-2) were used in Operation Desert Storm and have been used in other diverse operations such as those in Kosovo and Afghanistan. With the exception of the Army Stryker and GMLRS, all of the equipment items we reviewed were used recently in Operation Iraqi Freedom. The services, in general, ensure that equipment is ready for deployment by surging maintenance operations when necessary. Only one equipment item, the Marine Corps CH-46E helicopter, could not accomplish its intended wartime mission due to lift limitations. However, Marine Corps officials stated that they were generally satisfied that the CH-46E met its mission in Operation Iraqi Freedom despite these limitations. Of the remaining equipment items we reviewed, including all Air Force fixed-wing aircraft, all tracked and wheeled vehicles, and most munitions, service officials believe that most of these items are capable of fulfilling their wartime missions. According to service officials and program managers, while final Operation Iraqi Freedom after action reports were not available at the time of our review, initial reports and preliminary observations have generally been favorable for the equipment items we reviewed. However, these officials identified a number of specific concerns for some of these equipment items that limit their wartime capabilities to varying degrees. For example, only 26 out of 213 Marine Corps Assault Amphibian Vehicles at Camp Lejeune had been provided enhanced protective armor kits prior to Operation Iraqi Freedom. According to Marine Corps officials at Camp Lejeune, lack of the enhanced protective armor left the vehicles vulnerable to the large caliber ammunition used by the Iraqi forces. According to Navy officials, warfighting capabilities of the Navy EA-6B Prowler aircraft will be degraded if their capabilities are not upgraded and the outer wing panels are not replaced. Fleet commanders expressed concerns about potentially deploying some ships we reviewed with only one of three weapons systems capable of being used. However, program managers stated that plans were in place to reduce the vulnerability of these ships by fielding two compensating weapons systems. Although the military services are generally able to maintain military equipment to meet wartime requirements, the ability to do so over the next several years is questionable especially for legacy equipment items. Because program strategies have not been validated or updated and funding requests do not reflect the services’ long-range program strategies, maintaining this current equipment while transforming to a new force structure as well as funding current military operations in Iraq and elsewhere will be a major challenge for the department and the services. We do not believe, however, that the funding gaps we identified are necessarily an indication that the department needs additional funding. Rather, we believe that the funding gaps are an indication that funding priorities need to be more clearly linked to capability needs and to long- range program strategies. The military services will always need to meet mission requirements and to keep their equipment ready to fulfill their wartime missions. However, this state of constant readiness comes at a cost. The equipment items we reviewed appear to have generally fulfilled wartime missions, but often through increased maintenance for deployed equipment and other extraordinary efforts to overcome obstacles such as obsolete parts, parts availability, and cannibalization of other pieces of equipment. The reported metrics may not accurately reflect the time needed to sustain and maintain equipment to fulfill wartime missions. Substantial equipment upgrades or overhauls may be required to sustain older equipment items until replacement equipment items arrive. While our review was limited to 25 equipment items and represents a snapshot at a particular point in time, the department should reassess its current processes for reviewing the condition, program strategy, and funding for key legacy equipment items. Specifically we recommend that the Secretary of Defense, in conjunction with the Secretaries of the Army, Air Force, and the Navy, reassess the program strategies for equipment modernization and recapitalization, and reconcile those strategies with the services’ funding requests to ensure that key legacy equipment, especially those items needed to meet the strategy outlined in the September 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review, are sustained until replacement equipment items can be fielded. In reconciling these program strategies to funding requests, the Secretary of Defense should highlight for the Congress, in conjunction with the department’s fiscal year 2005 budget submissions, the risks involved in sustaining key equipment items if adequate funding support is not requested and the steps the department is taking to address those risks. As part of this process the department should identify the key equipment items that, because of impaired conditions and their importance to meeting the department’s military strategy, should be given the highest priority for sustainment, recapitalization, modernization, or replacement. If the Congress wants a better understanding of the condition of major equipment items, the department’s strategy to maintain or recapitalize these equipment items, and the associated funding requirements for certain key military equipment needed to meet the strategy outlined in the QDR, the Congress may wish to consider having the Secretary of Defense provide an annual report, in conjunction with its annual budget submissions, on (1) the extent to which key legacy equipment items, particularly those that are in a degraded condition, are being funded and sustained until replacement equipment items can be fielded; (2) the risks involved in sustaining key equipment items if adequate funding support is not requested; and (3) the steps the department is taking to address those risks. In written comments on a draft of this report, the Department of Defense partially concurred with our recommendation that it should reassess the program strategies for equipment modernization and recapitalization, and reconcile those strategies to the services’ funding requests. However, the department did not concur with our other two recommendations that it should (1) highlight for the Congress the risks involved in sustaining key equipment items if adequate funding support is not requested and the steps the department is taking to address those risks, and (2) identify the equipment items that should be given the highest priority for sustainment, recapitalization, modernization, or replacement. The department’s written comments are reprinted in their entirety in appendix III. In partially concurring with our first recommendation that it should reassess the program strategies for equipment modernization and recapitalization, and reconcile those strategies to the services’ funding requests, the department agreed that, while the overall strategy outlined in the September 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review may be unchanged, events over time may dictate changes in individual program strategies, that requires an order to meet the most current threat. The department stated, however, that through its past Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System and the more current Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution processes, the department had and continues to have an annual procedure to reassess program strategies to ensure equipment maintenance, modernization, and recapitalization funding supports the most recent Defense strategy. While we acknowledge that these budget processes may provide a corporate, department-level review of what is needed to accomplish the national defense mission, the department’s budget and the information it provides to the Congress do not clearly identify the funding priorities for individual equipment items. For example, although the funding to sustain the department’s major equipment items is included in its Operation and Maintenance budget accounts, these budget accounts do not specifically identify funding for individual equipment items. We continue to believe that the department, in conjunction with the military services, needs to develop a more comprehensive and transparent approach for assessing the condition of key legacy equipment items, developing program strategies to address critical equipment condition deficiencies, and prioritizing the required funding. The department did not concur with our second recommendation that, in reconciling the program strategies to funding requests, it should highlight for the Congress, in conjunction with its fiscal year 2005 budget submissions, the risks involved in sustaining key equipment items if adequate funding support is not requested and the steps the department is taking to address those risks. Specifically, the department stated that its budget processes and the annual Defense budget provide the Congress a balanced program with all requirements “adequately” funded and that the unfunded requirements identified by the program managers or the services may not be validated at the department level. While we agree that the department’s budget may identify its highest funding priorities at the department wide level, it does not provide the Congress with an assessment of equipment condition deficiencies, unfunded requirements identified by the services, and the potential risks associated with not fully funding the services’ program strategies. In this report, we identify a number of examples of equipment condition deficiencies and inconsistencies between the program strategies and the funding requests to address those deficiencies that were not fully addressed in the department’s budget documents. We believe that the Congress, in its oversight of the department’s major equipment programs, needs to be better informed of specific equipment condition deficiencies, the long- range strategies and required funding to address those deficiencies, and the risks associated with not adequately funding specific equipment modernization and recapitalization requirements. The department also did not concur with our recommendation that it should identify for the Congress the key equipment items that, because of impaired condition and their importance to meeting the department’s military strategies, should be given the highest priority for sustainment, recapitalization, modernization, or replacement. In its comments, the department stated that, in developing the annual Defense budget, it has already allocated resources according to its highest priorities. The department further stated that key items that are vital to accomplishing the department’s mission are allocated funding in order to meet the requirements of the most current Defense strategy, and that there is no need to restate these priorities with a list. Similar to our rebuttal to the department’s response to our second recommendation as discussed above, we do not believe that the department’s annual budget provides the Congress with sufficient information on the most severe equipment condition deficiencies and the funding priorities for addressing those deficiencies. We believe that a separate analysis, in conjunction with the department’s budget submissions, that highlights the most critical equipment condition deficiencies, the planned program strategies for addressing those deficiencies, and the related funding priorities is needed to provide the Congress with the information it needs to make informed budget decisions. The department also noted in its written comments that our report identifies the CH-47D, CH-46E, KC-135, EA-6B, Standard Missile-2, and the Tomahawk missile as equipment items with problems and issues that warrant action within the next 1 to 3 years. The department stated that it would continue to reassess these equipment items as it goes through its resource allocation process. Lastly, the department provided technical comments concerning our assessments of specific equipment items in appendix II, including the KC-135 Stratotanker, Assault Amphibian Vehicle, MV-22, Tomahawk Cruise Missile, and the CH-46E Sea Knight Helicopter. We reviewed and incorporated these technical comments, as appropriate. The revisions that we made based on these technical comments did not change our assessments for the individual equipment items. In some cases, the data and information the department provided in its technical comments resulted from program and funding decisions that were made subsequent to our review. We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Defense; the Secretaries of the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force; the Commandant of the Marine Corps; and other interested parties. We will also make copies available to others upon request. In addition, the report will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov. Please contact me on (202) 512-8365 if you or your staffs have any questions concerning this report. Major contributors to this report are included in appendix IV. To determine the level of attention required by the Department of Defense, the military services, and/or the Congress for each of the 25 equipment items we reviewed, we performed an independent evaluation of the (1) equipments’ current condition; (2) services’ program strategies for the sustainment, modernization, or replacement of the equipment items; (3) current and projected funding levels for the equipment items in relation to the services’ program strategies; and (4) equipments’ wartime capabilities. Based on our evaluation of the condition, program strategy, and funding for each of the 25 equipment items, we used a traffic light approach—red, yellow, or green—to indicate the severity and urgency of problems or issues. We established the following criteria to assess the severity and urgency of the problems. indicates a problem or issue that is severe enough to warrant action by DOD, the military services, and/or the Congress within the next 1-3 years. We selected this time frame of 1-3 years because it represents the time frame for which DOD is currently preparing annual budgets. indicates a problem or issue that is severe enough to warrant action by DOD, the military services, and/or the Congress within the next 3-5 years. We selected this time frame of 3-5 years because it represents the near-term segment of DOD’s Future Years Defense Plan. indicates that we did not identify any specific problems or issues at the time of our review, or that any existing problems or issues we identified are not of a severe enough nature that we believe warrant action by DOD, the military services, and/or the Congress within the next 5 years. We selected this time frame of 5 years because it represents the longer-term segment of DOD’s Future Years Defense Plan. We also reviewed the wartime capability of the selected equipment items, focusing on the extent to which each equipment item is capable of fulfilling its wartime mission. Because of ongoing operations in Iraq and our limited access to the deployed units and related equipment performance data, we were unable to obtain sufficient data to definitively assess the wartime capability for each of the 25 equipment items we reviewed, as we did for each of the other three assessment areas. To select the 25 equipment items we reviewed, we worked with the military services and your offices to judgmentally select approximately two weapons equipment items, two support equipment items, and two munitions items from the equipment inventories of each of the four military services—Army, Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps. We relied extensively on input from the military services and prior GAO work to select equipment items that have been in use for a number of years and are critical to supporting the services’ mission. We based our final selections on the equipment items that the military services believed were most critical to their missions. The 25 equipment items we selected for review include 7 Army equipment items, 6 Air Force equipment items, 7 Navy equipment items, and 5 Marine Corps equipment items. Our assessments apply only to the 25 equipment items we reviewed, and the results of our assessments cannot be projected to the entire inventory of DOD equipment. To assess equipment condition, we obtained and analyzed data on equipment age, expected service life, and the services’ equipment condition and performance indicators such as mission capable rates, operational readiness rates, utilization rates, failure rates, cannibalization rates, and depot maintenance data for each of the equipment items we reviewed. The specific data that we obtained and analyzed for each equipment item varied depending on the type of equipment and the extent to which the data were available. The scope of our data collection for each of the equipment items included both the active and reserve forces. We also met with the services’ program managers and other cognizant officials from each of the four military services for each of the 25 equipment items. In addition, we visited selected units and maintenance facilities to observe the equipment during operation or during maintenance and to discuss equipment condition and wartime capability issues with equipment operators and maintainers. Our observations and assessments were limited to equipment in the active duty inventory. To assess the program strategy for these equipment items, we reviewed the services’ plans for future sustainment, modernization, recapitalization, or replacement of the equipment items in order to meet the services’ mission and force structure requirements. We met with the services’ program managers and other military service officials to discuss and assess the extent to which the services have a strategy or roadmap for each of the 25 equipment items, and whether the program strategy is adequately reflected in DOD’s current budget or the Future Years Defense Plan. To assess equipment funding, we obtained and analyzed data on historical, current, and future years’ budget requests for each of the 25 equipment items we reviewed. We also reviewed the services’ budget requests, appropriations, and obligations for fiscal year 1998 through fiscal year 2003 to determine how the funds that had been requested and appropriated for each of the equipment items were used. In addition, we reviewed the Future Years Defense Program for fiscal year 2003 to fiscal year 2007 and for fiscal year 2004 to fiscal year 2008 to determine if the projected funding levels were consistent with the services’ program strategies for sustainment, modernization, recapitalization, or replacement of the selected equipment items. We also met with the services’ program managers for each of the 25 equipment items to identify budget shortfalls and unfunded requirements. We did not independently validate the services’ requirements. We were unable, however, to obtain specific information from the Office of the Secretary of Defense or the Joint Staff on the long-term program strategies and funding priorities for these equipment items because officials in these offices considered this information to be internal DOD data and would not make it available to us. To review the wartime capability of each equipment item, we discussed with military service officials, program managers, and equipment operators and maintainers the capabilities of the equipment items to fulfill their wartime missions and the equipments’ performance in recent military operations. Because of ongoing operations in Iraq and our limited access to the deployed units and related equipment performance data, we were unable to collect sufficient data to definitively assess wartime capability or to assign a color-coded assessment as we did with the other three assessment areas. We also reviewed related Defense reports, such as after action reports and lessons learned reports, from recent military operations to identify issues or concerns regarding the equipments’ wartime capabilities. We performed our work at relevant military major commands, selected units and maintenance facilities, and one selected defense combatant command. Our access to specific combatant commands and military units was somewhat limited due to their involvement in Operation Iraqi Freedom. The specific military activities that we visited or obtained information from include the following: U.S. Army, Headquarters, Washington, D.C.; U.S. Army, Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisitions, Logistics, and Technology, Washington, D.C.; U.S. Army Forces Command Headquarters, Atlanta, Ga.; U.S. Army, 1st Calvary Division, 118th Corps, Ft. Hood, Tx.; U.S. Army, Aviation and Missile Command, Redstone Arsenal, Precision Fire and Missile Project Office, Huntsville, Al.; U.S. Army, Tank and Armament Automotive Command, Warren, Mi.; U.S. Army, Cost and Economic Analysis Center, Pentagon, U.S. Army, Pacific, Ft. Shafter, Hawaii; and U.S. Army, 25th Infantry Division (Light), Schofield Barracks, Hawaii; U.S. Air Force, Headquarters, Plans and Programs Division, U.S. Air Force, Combat Forces Division, and Global Mobility Division, U.S. Air Force, Munitions Missile and Space Plans and Policy Division, U.S. Air Force, Air Logistics Center, Robins Air Force Base, Ga.; U.S. Air Force, Air Combat Command, Directorate of Requirements and Plans, Aircraft Division, and the Installation and Logistics Division, Langley Air Force Base, Va.; U.S. Air Force, Pacific, Hickam Air Force Base, Hawaii; U.S. Navy, Naval Surface Forces, Atlantic Fleet, Norfolk Naval Base, Va.; U.S. Navy, Naval Air Force, Atlantic Fleet, Norfolk Naval Base, Va.; U.S. Navy, Naval Weapons Station Yorktown, Va.; U.S. Navy, Naval Surface Forces, Pacific Fleet, Pearl Harbor, Hawaii; U.S. Navy, Naval Surface Forces, Pacific Fleet, Naval Amphibious Base, U.S. Navy, Naval Air Forces, Naval Air Station North Island, Coronado, U.S. Navy, Naval Weapons Station Seal Beach, Calif.; U.S. Navy, Electronic Attack Wing, U.S. Pacific Fleet, Naval Air Station Whidbey Island, Wash.; U.S. Navy, Naval Sea Systems Command, Washington Navy Yard, U.S. Navy, Naval Air Systems Command, Naval Air Station Patuxent River, Md.; U.S. Navy, Naval Air Depot, Naval Air Station North Island, Calif.; and U.S. Navy, Avondale Shipyard, Avondale, La.; U.S. Marine Corps, Systems Command, Quantico, Va.; U.S. Marine Corps, Aviation Weapons Branch, Pentagon, Washington, U.S. Marine Corps, Tank Automotive and Armaments Command, Warren, Mich.; U.S. Marine Corps, I Marine Expeditionary Force, Camp Pendleton, U.S. Marine Corps, II Marine Expeditionary Force, Camp Lejeune, N.C.; U.S. Marine Corps, Naval Research Lab, Washington, D.C.; U.S. Marine Corps, AAAV Technology Center, Woodbridge, Va.; and U.S. Marine Corps, Marine Forces Pacific, Camp Smith, Hawaii. We also obtained and reviewed relevant documents and reports from DOD and the Congressional Budget Office, and relied on related prior GAO reports. We performed our review from September 2002 through October 2003 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. For the 25 equipment items, each assessment provides a snapshot in time of the status of the equipment item at the time of our review. The profile presents a general description of the equipment item. Each assessment area contains a highlighted area indicating the level of DOD, military service, and/or congressional attention each equipment item needs, in our opinion, based on our observations of each equipment item, discussions with service officials, and reviews of service-provided metrics. First delivered in the early 1980s, the Abrams is the Army’s main battle tank and destroys enemy forces using enhanced mobility and firepower. Variants of the Abrams include the M1, M1A1, and M1A2. The M1 has a 105mm main gun; the M1A1 and M1A2 have a 120 mm gun, combined with a powerful turbine engine and special armor. There are 5,848 tanks in the inventory, and the estimated average age is 14 years. The M1 variant will be phased out by 2015. The M1 and M1A2 variant are being upgraded to the M1A2 Systems Enhancement Program (SEP) by July 2004. We assessed the condition of the Abrams Tank as green because it consistently met its mission capable goal of 90 percent from fiscal year 1998 through fiscal year 2002. Although the Abrams met its mission capable goal, supply and maintenance operations at the unit-level are a challenge because of repair parts shortages, unreliable components, inadequate test equipment, and lack of trained technicians. There are concerns that the future condition of the Abrams could deteriorate in the next 5 years due to insufficient sustainment funds. The lack of funds could result in an increase of aging tanks and maintenance requirements. We assessed the program strategy for the Abrams as green because the Army has developed a long-term strategy for upgrading and phasing out certain variants of aging tanks in its inventory. The Army’s Recapitalization Program selectively implements new technology upgrades to reduce operations and support cost. Additionally, the Army is phasing out the M1A2 from its inventory by 2009, and procuring 588 M1A2 SEPS. The SEP enhances the digital command and control capabilities of the tank. The Army also developed a program for improving the Abrams M1A2 electronics called the Continuous Electronic Evolution Program, which is part of the SEP. The first phase of this program has been approved and funded. According to an Army official, the next phase is expected to start in approximately 5 years. We assessed the funding for the Abrams as yellow because current and projected funding is not consistent with the Army’s stated requirements to sustain and modernize the Abrams tank inventory. The Army reduced the recapitalization budget by more than 50 percent for the M1A2 SEP, thereby decreasing the number of upgrades from 1,174 to 588. Unfunded requirements for the Abrams tank include the vehicle integrated defense systems, safety and environmental fixes, and an improved driver’s viewer system. Without adequate funding, obsolescence may become a major issue once tank production ends and procurement funds are no longer available to subsidize tank requirements. Procurement funding for the M1A2 SEP will be completed by 2003 and deliveries completed by 2004. According to an Army official, the Abrams procurement funding provides approximately 75 percent to 80 percent of the tank requirements due to commonality among the systems. While we did not have sufficient data to definitively assess the wartime capability for the Abrams, a detailed pre-war assessment prepared by the program manager’s office indicated that the tank is not ready or able to sustain a long-term war. During Operation Iraqi Freedom, the Abrams tank was able to successfully maneuver, provide firepower, and protect the crew. Losses were attributed to mechanical breakdown and cannibalization. The detailed assessment by the program manager’s office, however, indicated that limited funding, war reserve spare part shortages, and supply availability could impact the tank’s ability to sustain a long-term war. The Apache is a multi-mission aircraft designed to perform rear, close, deep operations and precision strikes, armed reconnaissance and security during day, night, and adverse weather conditions. There are approximately 728 Apache helicopters in the Army’s inventory—418 AH-64A models and 310 AH-64D models. The fleet average age is about 12 years. We assessed the condition of the Apache as yellow because the Apache AH- 64D model failed to meet the mission capable goal of 75 percent approximately 50 percent of the time, from fiscal year 1999 through fiscal year 2002; however, according to officials, the Apache mission capable rates have consistently exceeded the 75 percent goal in calendar year 2003. Aviation safety restrictions were cited as the reason why the Apache failed to meet mission capable goals. A safety restriction pertains to any defect or hazardous condition that can cause personal injury, death, or damage to the aircraft, components, or repair parts for which a medium to high safety risk has been determined. These restrictions included problems with the (1) aircraft Teflon bushings, (2) transmission, (3) main rotor blade attaching pins, (4) generator power cables, and (5) the removal, maintenance and inspection of the Auxiliary Power Unit Takeoff Clutch. The Army’s Recapitalization Program includes modifications that are intended to address these safety restrictions. We assessed the program strategy for the Apache as green because the Army has developed a long-term program strategy to sustain and upgrade the aging Apache fleet. The Army’s Recapitalization Program addresses costs, reliability, and safety problems, fleet groundings, aging aircraft, and obsolescence. The Army plans to remanufacture 501 AH-64A helicopters to the AH-64D configuration. The goal is to reduce the fleet average age to 10 years by 2010, increase the unscheduled mean time between removal by 20 percent for selected components, and generate a 20 percent return on investment for the top 10 cost drivers. The Army is on-schedule for fielding the Apache AH-64D. While we did not have sufficient data to definitively assess the wartime capability of the Apache, Army officials did not identify any specific concerns. These officials indicated that the Apache successfully fulfilled its wartime missions in Afghanistan and Operation Iraqi Freedom. In Operation Iraqi Freedom, the AH-64D conducted combat operations for both close combat and standoff engagements. Every mission assigned was flown and accomplished with the Apache AH-64D. The Longbow performance has been enhanced by targeting and weapon systems upgrades that have improved the Longbow performance over the AH-64A. The Stryker is a highly deployable-wheeled armored vehicle that employs 10 variations—the Infantry Carrier Vehicle (ICV), Mortar Carrier (MC), Reconnaissance Vehicle (RV), Commander Vehicle (CV), Medical Evacuation Vehicle (MEV), Engineer Squad Vehicle (ESV), Anti-Tank Guided Missile Vehicle (ATGM), and Fire Support Vehicle (FSV), the Mobile Gun System (MGS), and the Nuclear Biological and Chemical Reconnaissance Vehicle (NBCRV). There are 600 Stryker vehicles in the Army’s inventory, and the average age is less than 2 years. The Army plans to procure a total of 2,121 Stryker vehicles through fiscal year 2008. We assessed the condition of the Stryker as green because it has successfully achieved the fully mission capable goal of 95 percent, based on a 3-month average from April 2003 through July 2003. The Congress mandated that the Army compare the operational effectiveness and cost of an infantry carrier variant of the Stryker and a medium Army armored vehicle. The Army compared the cost and operational effectiveness of the Stryker infantry carrier against a medium armored vehicle. The Army selected the M113A3, and the comparison shows the Stryker infantry carrier vehicle is more survivable and provides better overall performance and mobility when employed in combat operations than the M113A3. We assessed the program strategy for the Stryker as green because the Army developed a long-term program strategy for procuring a total of 2,121 vehicles through fiscal year 2008, which will satisfy the total requirement. Of the 600 currently in the inventory, 449 are at 2 brigades—a 3rd brigade of the 2nd Infantry Division and the 1st brigade of the 25th Infantry Division, both of which are located at Fort Lewis, Washington. The other 151 are at fielding sites, training centers, and the Army Test and Evaluation Center. The remaining 1,521 will be procured through fiscal year 2007 with expected deliveries through fiscal year 2008. The next brigade scheduled to receive the Stryker is the 172nd Infantry Brigade at Forts Richardson and Wainwright, Alaska. The remaining Stryker Brigades Combat Teams to be equipped with the Stryker are the 2nd Cavalry Regiment, Fort Polk, Louisiana; 2nd Brigade, 25th Infantry Division, Schofield Barracks, Hawaii; and 56th Brigade of the 28th Infantry Division, Pennsylvania Army National Guard. We assessed the funding for the Stryker as green because current and projected funding is consistent with the Army’s stated requirements to sustain the Stryker program. The program is fully funded to field the six Stryker brigade combat teams. Approximately $4.1 billion has been allocated for all six combat teams through fiscal year 2009. The Secretary of Defense has authorized the procurement of the first three brigades, but the fourth brigade cannot be procured until the Secretary of Defense solidify to Congress that the results of the Operational Evaluation mandated by Congress indicated that the design for the interim brigade combat team is operationally effective and operationally suitable. The evaluation was completed in May 2003 and results are being finalized. While we did not have sufficient data to definitively assess the wartime capability of the Stryker, the Army did not identify any specific concerns regarding the system being able to meet its wartime mission. The Stryker has not yet been used in any conflict situation. In May 2003, GAO reported that the Army Test and Evaluation Command concluded that the Stryker provided more advantages than the M113A3 in force protection, support for dismounted assault, and close fight and mobility, and was more survivable against ballistic and non-ballistic threats. The CH-47 helicopter is a twin-engine, tandem rotor helicopter designed for transportation of cargo, troops, and weapons. The Army inventory consists of 426 CH-47D models and 2 CH-47F models. The CH-47F Improved Cargo Helicopter is a remanufactured version of the CH-47D and includes a new digital cockpit and a modified airframe to reduce vibration. The overall average age of the CH-47 is 14 years old. The Army plans to convert 76 D model aircraft to the F model between fiscal years 2005 and fiscal year 2009. We assessed the condition of the Chinook as red because it consistently failed to meet the Army’s mission capable goal of 75 percent from fiscal year 1998 to fiscal year 2002. Actual mission capable rates ranged from 61 percent to 69 percent. Army officials attributed the failure to meet the 75 percent mission capable goal to aging equipment, supply shortages, and inexperienced technicians. Maintaining aircraft has become increasingly difficult with the CH-47D failing to meet the non-mission capable maintenance goal of 15 percent, increasing from 27 percent in fiscal year 1998 to 31 percent in fiscal year 2002. We assessed the program strategy for the Chinook as yellow because the Army has developed a long-term strategy for upgrading and replacing the Chinook, but the strategy is not consistent with the Army’s funding priorities. There has been a delay in the plan to upgrade 279 D models to F models between fiscal year 2003 and fiscal year 2017 under the Army’s Recapitalization Program, reducing the number of CH-47F helicopters planned in the fiscal year 2004 budget by five due to unexpected funding constraints. These budgetary constraints also delayed the Army’s plans to purchase 16 engines because funding was transferred to support other non- recurring requirements. Readiness may be adversely affected if these engines are not procured because unit requisitions for these engines will not be filled and aircraft will not be fully mission capable. We assessed the funding for the Chinook as yellow because current and projected funding is not consistent with the Army’s requirements for sustaining and upgrading the Chinook helicopter. At present, the Army has identified unfunded requirements totaling $316 million, with $77 million needed to procure the five CH-47Fs and the 16 engines for which the funds had been previously diverted. The remaining $239 million would support other improvements including common avionics system, rotor heads, crashworthy crew seats, and engine modifications. The Army will resolve some or all of these requirements with projected funding of $3 billion to support the CH-47 program through fiscal year 2017. While we did not have sufficient data to definitively assess the wartime capability for the Chinook, Army officials indicated that it successfully fulfilled its wartime mission for Operation Iraqi Freedom despite current condition problems. These officials stated that the deployed units were able to overcome these condition problems because the deployed aircraft were provided a higher priority than non-deployed aircraft for spare parts. As a result, the estimated mission capable rates for deployed aircraft increased to about 86 percent during the operation. The HEMTT provides transport capabilities for re-supply of combat vehicles and weapon systems. The HEMTT’s five basic configurations include the cargo truck, the load handling system, wrecker, tanker, and tractor. The HEMTT entered into the Army’s inventory in 1982. The current inventory totals about 12,500 and the average age is 13 years. We assessed the condition of the HEMTT as green because mission capable rates have been close to the Army’s 90 percent goal, averaging 89 percent between fiscal year 1998 and fiscal year 2002. Moreover, the overall supply availability rates have exceeded the 85 percent goal from May 2002 to October 2002, averaging between 96 percent and 99 percent, respectively. In some instances, however, meeting the operational goals has been continually challenging because of aging equipment, heavy equipment usage, and the lack of trained mechanics. The lack of trained mechanics may also impact the Army’s future ability to meet the specified mission capable goals. In addition, a detailed pre-war assessment by the program manager’s office indicated that concerns regarding shortages of spare parts would significantly degrade the HEMTT readiness rates. We assessed the program strategy for the HEMTT as green because the Army has developed a long-term program strategy for sustaining and modernizing the HEMTT inventory. The Army’s plans include procuring 1,485 new tankers and wreckers through fiscal year 2007, which will satisfy the Army’s stated requirement. The Army also plans to rebuild some of the existing vehicles through the HEMTT Extended Service Program. This program, scheduled to be complete in fiscal year 2012, will insert technology advancements and will provide continuous improvements to the vehicle. Although there has been a reduction in the Army’s budget for the Extended Service Program, the plan is to continue rebuilding trucks in smaller quantities and at a slower pace. The Army’s Forces Command has implemented a Vehicle Readiness Enhancement Program that serves as an interim maintenance program for the HEMTT awaiting induction into the Extended Service Program. We assessed the funding for the HEMTT as yellow because current and projected funding is not consistent with the Army’s stated requirements to sustain and modernize the HEMTT inventory. Specifically, the Army has unfunded requirements of $10.5 million as of fiscal year 2003, of which $3.9 million is for spare parts and $6.6 million is for war reserves. In addition, the Army reduced the Recapitalization Program by $329 million. The Army had planned to upgrade 2,783 vehicles currently in the inventory; however, 1,365 will not be upgraded as a result of the reductions in the Recapitalization Program. Consequently, according to Army officials, maintenance and operating and support costs will likely increase. While we did not have sufficient data to definitively assess the wartime capability for the HEMTT, Army officials indicated that it has successfully fulfilled its wartime requirements during recent combat operations. Based on the program manager’s preliminary observations, the HEMTT performed successfully during Operation Iraqi Freedom. A detailed pre-war assessment by the program manager’s office indicated that the HEMTT was ready for war, but could experience sustainment problems due to a shortage of war reserve spare parts. The program manager’s office is currently assessing the condition of the active and war reserve equipment used in Operation Iraqi Freedom. The PAC-3 missile is considered a major upgrade to the Patriot system. Sixteen PAC-3 missiles can be loaded on a launcher versus four PAC-2 missiles. The Army plans to buy 2,200 PAC-3 missiles. The Army had a current inventory of 88 PAC-3 missiles as of July 2003. The average age of the PAC-3 missile is less than 1 year. We assessed the condition of the PAC-3 missile as green because approximately 89 percent of the missiles in the inventory were ready for use as of July 2003. Specifically, of the 88 PAC-3 missiles currently in the inventory, 78 were ready for use and 10 were not. In addition, the Army has not experienced any chronic or persistent problems during production. The PAC-3 missile completed operational testing and was approved for full production of 208 missiles in 2003 and 2004. We assessed the program strategy for the PAC-3 missile as green because the Army has developed a long-term strategy for sustaining the PAC-3 inventory, including procurement of 2,200 missiles that will satisfy the total requirement. The Army plans to purchase 1,159 PAC-3 missiles through fiscal year 2009. The remaining 1,041 missiles will be procured after fiscal year 2009. During the low-rate initial production, the Army procured 164 PAC-3 missiles from 1998 to 2002 at $1.7 billion. The Army has completed the low-rate initial production and has been granted approval for full production of 208 PAC-3 missiles beginning in fiscal year 2003, at a total estimated cost of $714 million. We assessed the funding for the PAC-3 missile as green primarily because current and projected funding is consistent with the Army’s stated requirements to sustain the PAC-3 inventory. The program manager’s office has not identified any funding shortfalls for the missile. Funding has been approved for the production of 1,159 PAC-3 missiles through fiscal year 2009 at an average production rate of nearly 100 missiles per year. The total production cost of the 1,159 PAC-3 missiles equates to $4.3 billion. The remaining 1,041 missiles will be procured after fiscal year 2009. While we did not have sufficient data to definitively assess the wartime capability of the PAC-3 missile, Army officials indicated that it successfully fulfilled its wartime mission during Operation Iraqi Freedom, successfully hitting enemy targets within two missile shots. The PAC-3 has also completed the operational testing phase and has been approved for full production. The Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System Dual Purpose Improved Convention Munition (GMLRS-DPICM) is an essential component of the Army’s transformation. It upgrades the M26 series MLRS rocket and is expected to serve as the baseline for all future Objective Force rocket munitions. The Army plans to procure a total of 140,004 GMLRS rockets. There are currently no GMLRS rockets in inventory, but it was approved in March 2003 to enter low rate initial production to produce 108 missiles. We assessed the condition of the GMLRS as green because the system has demonstrated acceptable performance during the System Development and Demonstration Phase, and was approved to enter low rate initial production in March 2003. We assessed the program strategy for the GMLRS as green because the Army has developed a long-term program strategy for sustaining the GMLRS inventory, including procurement of a total of 140,004 missiles that will satisfy the total requirement. Of this total, the Army plans to procure 18,582 missiles by fiscal year 2009. The remaining 121,422 will be procured after fiscal year 2009. The Army approved low rate initial production for a total of 1,920 missiles through fiscal year 2005. The initial operational capability date is scheduled for 2nd quarter fiscal year 2006. The Army has also preplanned a product improvement to the GMLRS-DPICM called the GMLRS—Unitary. This improvement is in the concept development phase and is scheduled to begin a spiral System Development and Demonstration. The Army has not decided how many of the 1,920 initial production rockets will include the guided unitary upgrade. We assessed the funding for the GMLRS as green because current and projected funding is consistent with the Army’s stated requirements to sustain the GMLRS Munitions program. The GMLRS program is fully funded and properly phased for rapid acquisition. The Army plans to purchase a total of 140,004 GMLRS rockets for $11.7 billion. Of the 140,004 GMLRS rockets, the Army plans to procure 18,582 through fiscal year 2009 for $1.7 billion. The remaining 121,422 rockets will cost the Army approximately $10 billion. In March 2003, the system met all modified low rate initial production criteria to enter the first phase to produce 108 rockets for $36.6 million. Phases II and III will procure the remaining 1,812 rockets during fiscal year 2004 (786 rockets) and fiscal year 2005 (1,026 rockets) for $220.4 million. While we did not have sufficient data to definitively assess the wartime capability of the GMLRS, Army officials did not identify any specific capability concerns. The GMLRS-DPICM is expected to achieve greater range and precision accuracy. The upgraded improvement will reduce the number of rockets required to defeat targets out to 60 kilometers or greater, and reduce collateral damage. It is also expected to reduce hazardous duds to less than 1 percent. The F-16 is a compact, multi-role fighter with air-to-air combat and air-to-surface attack capabilities. The first operational F-16A was delivered in January 1979. The Air Force currently has 1,381 F-16 aircraft in its inventory, and the average age is about 15 years. The F-16B is a two-seat, tandem cockpit aircraft. The F-16C and D models are the counterparts to the F-16A/B, and incorporate the latest technology. Active units and many reserve units have converted to the F-16C/D. The Air Force plans to replace the F-16 with the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter beginning in 2012. We assessed the condition of the F-16 as green because mission capable rates have been near the current goal of 83 percent with mission capable rates for all of the Air Force’s Air Combat Command (ACC) F-16s ranging from 75 percent to 79 percent during the past 5 years. Although these rates are below the goal, officials said they were sufficient to provide flying hours for pilot training, and to meet operational requirements. In fiscal year 2002, the planned utilization rate, (i.e., the average number of sorties per aircraft per month) for ACC aircraft was 17.5 sorties per month, and the actual utilization was 17.7 sorties. Although the average age of the F-16 is about 15 years, there are no material deficiencies that would limit its effectiveness and reliability. Known and potential structural problems associated with aging and accumulated flying hours are being addressed through ongoing depot maintenance programs. We assessed the program strategy for the F-16 as green because the Air Force has developed a long-term program strategy for sustaining and replacing the F-16 inventory. The program should ensure that the aircraft remains a viable and capable weapons system throughout the FYDP. Subsequently, the Air Force intends to begin replacing the F-16 with the Joint Strike Fighter (F-35), which is already in development. We assessed the funding for the F-16 as yellow because current and projected funding is not consistent with the Air Force’s stated requirements to sustain and replace the F-16 inventory. There are potential shortfalls in the funding for depot maintenance programs and modifications during the next 3-5 years. Although funding has been programmed for this work, unexpected increases in depot labor rates have been significant, and additional funding may be required to complete the work. For fiscal year 2004, the Air Force included $13.5 million for the F-16 in its Unfunded Priority List. While we did not have sufficient data to definitively assess the wartime capability for the F-16, the aircraft has successfully fulfilled its recent wartime missions. F-16 fighters were deployed to the Persian Gulf in 1991 in support of Operation Desert Storm, and flew more sorties than any other aircraft. The F-16 has also been a major player in peacekeeping operations including the Balkans since 1993. Since the terrorist attack in September 2001, F-16s comprised the bulk of the fighter force protecting the skies over the United States in Operation Noble Eagle. More recently, F-16s played a major role in Afghanistan in Operation Enduring Freedom, and have performed well in combat in Operation Iraqi Freedom, in which the F-16 once again provided precision-guided strike capabilities and suppression of enemy air defenses. During Operation Iraqi Freedom, the Air Force deployed over 130 F-16s that contributed significantly to the approximately 8,800 sorties flown by Air Force fighter aircraft. The B-2 is a multi-role heavy bomber with stealth characteristics, capable of employing nuclear and conventional weapons. The aircraft was produced in limited numbers to provide a low observable (i.e., stealth) capability to complement the B-1 and B-52 bombers. Its unique stealth capability enables the aircraft to penetrate air defenses. The Air Force currently has 21 B-2 aircraft in its inventory, and the average age is about 9 years. The first B-2 was deployed in December 1993, and currently all B-2s in the inventory are configured with an enhanced terrain-following capability and the ability to deliver the Joint Direct Attack Munition and the Joint Stand Off Weapon. We assessed the condition of the B-2 as yellow because the B-2 did not meet its mission capable goal of 50 percent. Officials said that the aircraft itself is in good condition, but it is the maintainability of its stealth characteristics that is driving the low mission capable rates. Officials pointed out that despite low mission capable rates the B-2 has been able to meet requirements for combat readiness training and wartime missions. For example, four B-2 aircraft were deployed and used during Operation Iraqi Freedom, and maintained a mission capable rate of 85 percent. Mission capable rates have improved slightly, and officials said that recent innovations in low observable maintenance technology and planned modifications are expected to foster additional improvement. We assessed the program strategy for the B-2 as green because the Air Force has developed a long-term program strategy for sustaining the B-2 inventory. Program plans appear to ensure the viability of this system through the Future Years Defense Plan. Procurement of this aircraft is complete. The Air Force plans to maintain and improve its capabilities, ensuring that the B-2 remains the primary platform in long-range combat aviation. We assessed the funding for the B-2 as green because current and projected funding is consistent with the Air Force’s stated requirements to sustain the B-2 inventory. The programmed funding should allow execution of the program strategy to sustain, maintain, and modify the system through the Future Years Defense Plan. The B-2 is of special interest to the Congress, which requires an annual report on this system, including a schedule of funding requirements through the Future Years Defense Plan. No items specific to the B-2 were included in the Air Force’s fiscal year 2004 Unfunded Priority List. While we did not have sufficient data to definitively assess the wartime capability for the B-2, the aircraft has successfully fulfilled its wartime missions despite current condition weaknesses. The Air Force demonstrated the aircraft’s long-range strike capability by launching missions from the United States, striking targets in Afghanistan, and returning to the States. More recently, the Air Force deployed four B-2 aircraft to support Operation Iraqi Freedom, where they contributed to the 505 sorties flown by bombers during the conflict. The B-2 Annual Report to the Congress states that the B-2 program plan will ensure that the B-2 remains the primary platform in long-range combat aviation. The C-5 Galaxy is the largest of the Air Force’s air transport aircraft, and one of the world’s largest aircraft. It can carry large cargo items over intercontinental ranges at jet speeds and can take off and land in relatively short distances. It provides a unique capability in that it is the only aircraft that can carry certain Army weapon systems, main battle tanks, infantry vehicles, or helicopters. The C-5 can carry any piece of army combat equipment, including a 74-ton mobile bridge. With aerial refueling, the aircraft’s range is limited only by crew endurance. The first C-5A was delivered in 1969. The Air Force currently has 126 C-5 aircraft in its inventory, and the average age is about 26 years. We assessed the condition of the C-5 as yellow because it consistently failed to meet its mission capable goal of 75 percent; however, mission capable rates have been steadily improving and, in April 2003, active duty C-5s exceeded the goal for the first time. Program officials pointed out that, although the total fleet has never achieved the 75 percent goal, there has been considerable improvement over time, with the rate rising from about 42 percent in 1971 to about 71 percent in 2003. The Air Force Scientific Advisory Board has estimated that 80 percent of the airframe structural service life remains. Furthermore, Air Force officials said that the two major modification programs planned, the avionics modernization program and reliability enhancement and re-engining program, should significantly improve mission capable rates. We assessed the program strategy for the C-5 as green because the Air Force has developed a long-term program strategy for sustaining and modernizing the aging C-5 inventory. The Air Force has planned a two-phase modernization program through the future years defense program that is expected to increase the aircraft’s mission capability and reliability. The Air Force plans to modernize the C-5 to improve aircraft reliability and maintainability, maintain structural and system integrity, reduce costs, and increase operational capability. Air Force officials stated that the C-5 is expected to continue in service until about 2040 and that, with the planned modifications, the aircraft could last until then. As an effort to meet strategic airlift requirements, the Air Force has contracted to buy 180 C-17s, will retire 14 C-5s by fiscal year 2005, and may retire additional aircraft as more C-17s are acquired. We assessed the funding for the C-5 as yellow because current and projected funding is not consistent with the Air Force’s stated requirements to sustain and modernize the aging C-5 inventory. According to officials, the program lost production funding because of problems during the early stage of the program. Currently 49 aircraft are funded for the avionics program through the Future Years Defense Plan. For fiscal year 2004, the Air Force included $39.4 million in its Unfunded Priority List to restore the program to its prior timeline. While we did not have sufficient data to definitively assess the wartime capability of the C-5, Air Force officials indicated that the aircraft has successfully fulfilled its recent wartime missions. The Air Force has not noted any factors or capability concerns that would prevent the C-5 from effectively performing its wartime mission. The KC-135 is one of the oldest airframes in the Air Force’s inventory, and represents 90 percent of the tanker fleet. Its primary mission is air refueling, and it supports Air Force, Navy, Marine Corps, and allied aircraft. The first KC-135 was delivered in June 1957. The original A models have been re-engined, modified, and designated as E, R, or T models. The E models are located in the Air Force Reserve and Air National Guard. The total inventory of the KC-135 aircraft is 543, and the average age is about 43 years. We assessed the condition of the KC-135 as yellow because it maintained mission capable rates at or near the 85 percent goal despite the aircraft’s age and potential corrosion of its structural components. Although the aircraft is about 43 years old, average flying hours are slightly over a third of its expected life of 39,000 hours, and an Air Force study projected the KC-135 would last until about 2040. All KC-135s were subjected to an aggressive corrosion preventive program and underwent significant modifications, including replacement of the cockpit. Nevertheless, citing increases in the work needed during periodic depot maintenance, costs, and risk of the entire fleet being grounded, the Air Force decided to accelerate recapitalization from 2013 to about 2006. We assessed the program strategy for the KC-135 as red because the Air Force has developed a long-term program strategy to modernize the aging KC-135 tanker fleet, but it has not demonstrated the urgency of acquiring replacement aircraft and has not defined the requirements for the number of aircraft that will be needed. As we stated in testimony before the House Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Projection Forces, the department does not have a current, validated study on which to base the size and composition of either the current fleet or a future aerial refueling force. The Air Force has a large fleet of KC-135s (about 543), which were flown about 300 hours annually between 1995 and September 2001. Since then utilization is about 435 hours per year. Furthermore, the Air Force has a shortage of aircrews to fly the aircraft it has. In Operation Iraqi Freedom, a relatively small part of the fleet was used to support the conflict (149 aircraft). Without a definitive analysis, it is difficult to determine if recapitalization is needed and what alternatives might best satisfy the requirement. We assessed the funding of the KC-135 as red because current and future funding is not consistent with the Air Force stated requirements to sustain and modernize the KC-135 tanker fleet. The Air Force has not addressed recapitalization funding in the current defense budget or in the Future Years Defense Plan. The Air Force plans to begin acquiring new aircraft almost immediately, but does not want to divert funding from other programs to pay for them. The Air Force proposed a unique leasing arrangement with Boeing that will provide new tankers as early as 2006. There remains controversy over the lease terms, aircraft pricing, and how the Air Force will pay for the lease. While we did not have sufficient data to definitively assess the wartime capability of the KC-135, Air Force officials indicated that the aircraft has successfully fulfilled its recent wartime missions despite current condition problems. The KC-135 comprised 149 of the 182 tanker aircraft the Air Force used during Operation Iraqi Freedom, and those aircraft flew almost 6,200 sorties and offloaded over 376 million pounds of fuel. The KC-135 maintained a mission capable rate above the current goal of 85 percent during Operation Iraqi Freedom. The CALCM is an accurate long-range standoff weapon with an adverse weather, day/night, and air-to-surface capability. It employs a global positioning system coupled with an inertial navigation system. It was developed to improve the effectiveness of the B-52 bombers and became operational in January 1991. Since initial deployment, an upgraded avionics package, including a larger conventional payload and a multi-channel global positioning system receiver, has been added on all of the missiles. The CALCM total inventory is about 478, and the average age is about 15 years. We assessed the condition of the CALCM as green because the CALCM has demonstrated high reliability. The Air Force has not noted any chronic factors or problems that limit the effectiveness or reliability of the missile. However, according to officials, the diagnostics test equipment needs to be upgraded because it is old and was designed to support less sophisticated missiles. Currently, the Air Force uses the same test equipment for both the conventional and nuclear weapons. We assessed the program strategy for the CALCM as green because the Air Force has a long-term program strategy for sustaining and modernizing its current inventory of cruise missiles. The Air Force does not have any future plans to convert or purchase any additional nuclear missiles. The Joint Chief of Staff must authorize the use of the conventional weapons and approve the program in order to procure additional missiles. As the inventory is depleted, the conventional weapon will be replaced with other systems with similar capabilities, such as the Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile, which is currently under development. The Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile will not be a one-for-one replacement for the conventional missile. We assessed the funding for the CALCM as green because current and projected funding is consistent with the Air Force stated requirements to sustain and modernize its cruise missile inventory. Procurement of the cruise missile is complete, and no funding has been provided for research and development or procurement in the fiscal year 2003 budget. While we did not have sufficient data to definitively assess the wartime capability for the CALCM, Air Force officials indicated that it successfully fulfilled its recent wartime missions. These officials indicated that the cruise missile played a significant role in the initial strikes during Operation Iraqi Freedom. During Operation Iraqi Freedom, 153 missiles were expended, and the version that is designed to penetrate hard targets was first employed. The Joint Direct Attack Munition is a guidance tail kit that converts existing unguided bombs into accurate, all-weather “smart” munitions. This is a joint Air Force and Navy program to upgrade the existing inventory of 2,000 and 1,000-pound general-purpose bombs by integrating them with a guidance kit consisting of a global positioning system-aided inertial navigation system. In its most accurate mode, the system will provide a weapon circular error probable of 13 meters or less. The JDAM first entered the inventory in 1998. The total projected inventory of the JDAM is about 92,679, and the current average age is less than 5 years. Future upgrades will provide a 3-meter precision and improved anti-jamming capability. We assessed the condition of the JDAM as green because it consistently met its reliability goal of 95 percent. The munitions are used as they become available; therefore, no maintenance is involved. Although the Air Force does not monitor the condition of munitions, they keep track of each component of the guidance kit, which is tracked for serviceability. The kit is under a 20-year warranty. The munitions are purchased serviceable and are tested before used by the operational units. In addition to high reliability, the JDAM can be purchased at a low cost and are being delivered more than three times as fast as planned. We assessed the program strategy for the JDAM as green because the Air Force has a long-term program strategy for sustaining and maintaining its production of the munitions. The Joint Direct Attack Munition requirements are driven by assessments of war readiness and training requirements. Currently, Boeing is in full production and is increasing its production to about 2,800 per month for the Air Force and Navy, an increase from approximately 700–900 a month. The second production line is up and running. We assessed the funding for the JDAM as green because current and projected funding is consistent with the Air Force’s stated requirements to sustain and maintain production of the munitions. The President’s fiscal year 2003 budget provided funding for the procurement of the system through the future years defense plan. Air Force officials stated that the munitions have all the funding it needs; however, it is limited by the production capability of its contractor, Boeing. While we did not have sufficient data to definitively assess the wartime capability of the JDAM, Air Force officials indicated that it has successfully fulfilled its recent wartime missions. The weapon system played a role in operations in Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq. According to the Air Force, the weapon has operationally proven to be more accurate, reliable, and effective than predicted. The Air Force has not noted any factors or capability concerns that would prevent the Joint Direct Attack Munitions from effectively fulfilling its wartime mission. Navy Destroyers are multi-mission combatants that operate offensively and defensively, independently, or as part of carrier battle groups, surface action groups, and in support of Marine amphibious task forces. This is a 62-ship construction program, with 39 in the fleet as of 2003. The average age of the ships is 5.8 years, with the Arleigh Burke (DDG-51) coming into service in 1991. The follow-on program is the DD(X), with initial construction funding in 2005 and delivery beginning 2011. We assessed the condition of the DDG-51 as yellow because work programmed for scheduled maintenance periods is often not accomplished. Because of budget limitations for each ship’s dry-dock period and a Navy effort to level port workloads and provide stability in the industrial base, maintenance items are often cut from the planned work package during dry-dock periods. Those items are then deferred to the next scheduled docking or accomplished as possible in the ship’s continuous maintenance phase. Deferring maintenance affects corrosion issues, particularly the ship’s hull. Engineering and combat systems have priority for resources with desirable, though not necessarily essential, crew quality of life improvements deferred to a later time. The Navy balances risk between available resources and deferring maintenance to make the most cost-effective decision and ensure ships deploy without or with minimal safety or combat system deficiencies. We assessed the program strategy for the DDG-51 as yellow because the Navy has developed a long-term program strategy for sustaining and upgrading the DDG-51 fleet; however, budget cuts in the Navy’s shipbuilding program affect upgrades to the warfighting systems and may lead to potential problems in the industrial base when transitioning from DDG to DD(X) ships. Navy officials noted that these budget cuts prevent them from buying the latest available technologies. These technologies are usually in warfighting systems, such as command and control and system integration areas. Management of the transition period from DDG to DD(X) shipbuilding between 2005 and 2008 will be key to avoid problems from major fluctuations in the workload and workforce requirements. We assessed the funding for the DDG-51 as yellow because current and projected funding is not consistent with the Navy’s statement requirements to sustain and upgrade the DDG-51 fleet. Lack of multiyear budget authority creates budget inefficiencies because the Navy is required to spend supplemental and 1-year funds within the year in which it is appropriated. The Navy attempts to reduce ship maintenance costs by leveling the maintenance workload for ship contractors, which provides the Navy and contractors greater flexibility and predictability. The lack of multiyear budgeting and the need to spend supplemental and 1-year funds in the current year limits that effort. Ports are not equipped or manned to accomplish the volume of work required in the time-span necessary to execute 1-year appropriations. In some cases, differences between the Navy estimate of scheduled maintenance costs and the contractor bid to do the work requires cuts to the ship’s planned work package, further contributing to the deferred maintenance backlog. While we did not have sufficient data to definitively assess the wartime capability for the DDG-51, Navy officials raised a number of capability concerns. Specifically, these officials indicated that the DDG-51 has successfully fulfilled its recent wartime mission, but with some limitations such as communications shortfalls and force protection issues. Although the DDG-51 class is the newest ship in the fleet with the most up to date technologies, fleet officers said there is insufficient bandwidth for communications during operations. Navy officials cited effective management of available communications assets rather than the amount of available bandwidth as the more immediate challenge. In the current threat environment, force protection issues remain unresolved. The use of the Ridged Hull Inflatable Boat (RHIB) during operations at sea without on- board crew-served weapons and hardening protection concerns commanders. The small caliber of sailors’ personal and crew-served weapons limits their effectiveness against the immediate and close-in threat from small boat attack. Navy FFG-7 Frigates are surface combatants with anti-submarine warfare (ASW) and anti-air warfare (AAW) capabilities. Frigates conduct escort for amphibious expeditionary forces, protection of shipping, maritime interdiction, and homeland defense missions. There are 32 FFGs in the fleet, with 30 programmed for modernization. The average age of the fleet is 19 years. The FFGs are expected to remain in the fleet until 2020. We assessed the condition of the FFG-7 as yellow because work programmed for scheduled maintenance periods is often not accomplished. Because of budget limitations for each ship’s dry-dock period and a Navy effort to level port workloads and provide stability in the industrial base, maintenance items are often cut from the planned work package during dry-dock periods. These items are then deferred to the next scheduled docking or accomplished as possible in the ship’s continuous maintenance phase. Deferring maintenance affects corrosion issues, particularly the ship’s hull. Engineering and combat systems have priority for resources with desirable, though not necessarily essential, crew quality of life improvements deferred to a later time. The Navy balances risk between available resources and deferring maintenance to make the most cost-effective decision and ensure ships deploy without or with minimal safety or combat system deficiencies. There is the additional burden of maintaining older systems on the frigates. We assessed the program strategy for the FFG-7 as yellow because the Navy has developed a long-term program strategy for sustaining and modernizing the FFG-7 fleet; however, the program is susceptible to budget cuts. The modernization program is essential to ensure the frigates’ continued viability. There is also uncertainty about the role frigates will play as the Littoral Combat Ship is developed. We assessed the funding for the FFG-7 as yellow because current and projected funding is not consistent with the Navy’s stated requirements to sustain and modernize the FFG-7 fleet. Uncertainty about modernization program funding and budget inefficiencies created by the lack of multiyear budget authority and the requirement to spend supplemental and 1-year funds when they are appropriated. The Navy attempts to reduce ship maintenance costs by leveling the maintenance workload for ship contractors, which provides the Navy and contractors greater flexibility and predictability. The lack of multiyear budget authority and the need to spend supplemental and 1-year funds in the current year in which they are appropriated limits that effort. Ports are not equipped or manned to accomplish the volume of work required in the time span necessary to execute 1-year appropriations. In some cases, differences between the Navy estimate of scheduled maintenance costs and the contractor bid to do the work requires cuts to the ship’s planned work package, further contributing to the deferred maintenance backlog. While we did not have sufficient data to definitively assess the wartime capability of the FFG-7, Navy officials identified a number of capability concerns including communications shortfalls and potential vulnerabilities to air warfare. The frigate’s ability to operate in a battle group environment is limited by insufficient bandwidth and lack of command circuits for communications requirements. The Navy shut down the frigate’s missile launcher because of excessive maintenance costs. Ship commanders in the fleet expressed concern about potentially deploying with only one of three compensating systems for anti-air warfare missions, the on-board 76-mm rapid-fire gun (CWIS-1B, Close-In Weapons System). Officials in the program manager’s office stated fielding plans were in place for the other two systems, the MK53 Decoy Launch System, called NULKA, and the Rolling Airframe Missile (RAM). These systems will help mitigate the frigate’s vulnerability after shutting down the missile launcher. The frigate’s value to surface groups operating independently of carriers is as a helicopter platform. The F/A-18 is an all-weather fighter and attack aircraft expected to fly in the fleet to 2030. There are six models in the current inventory of 875: A, 178; B, 30; C, 405; D, 143; E, 55; and F, 64. Average age in years is: A, 16.4; B, 18.0; C, 10.6; D, 10.1; E, 1.7; and F, 1.5. The Navy plans to eventually replace the F/A-18 with the Joint Strike Fighter. We assessed the condition of the F/A-18 as yellow because it consistently failed to meet mission capable and fully mission capable goals of 75 percent and 58 percent, respectively. Squadrons that are deployed or are training for deployment generally exceed these goals. Maintaining the aircraft is increasingly difficult because of personnel shortfalls, increased flying requirements, and lack of ground support equipment. Navy depot personnel indicated that the availability of spare parts remains the largest issue in repairing and returning aircraft to the fleet. We assessed the program strategy for the F/A-18 as yellow because the Navy has developed a long-term program strategy for sustaining and maintaining the F/A-18 fleet; however, it lacks a common baseline capability for all aircraft. Navy officials stated managing the configuration of the various versions of the aircraft is challenging. Each version of the aircraft has different repair parts, unique on-board equipment, and specially trained maintainers and pilots. To increase the service life of the aircraft, the Navy initiated the Center Barrel Replacement (CBR) program. CBR replaces those parts of the F/A-18 fuselage that have the greatest stress placed on them from landing on aircraft carriers. The Navy is also initiating a Navy/Marine Tactical Air Integration program that combines low flying-hour / low carrier-landing aircraft for carrier use and high flying- hour / high carrier-landing aircraft for shore basing. If CBR is adequately funded and the Tactical Air Integration initiative proceeds, the F/A-18 will remain a viable system into the future. We assessed the funding for the F/A-18 as yellow because current and projected funding is not consistent with the Navy’s stated requirements to sustain and maintain the F/A-18 fleet. The Navy intends to fly the F/A-18A-D models until 2020 and the E/F models to at least 2030. Funding for ground support equipment for the A–D models was eliminated, leaving operators and program managers to find resources elsewhere. Program dollars are often drawn back, pushing modernization to the out years. This is a problem for the CBR program that is $72 million short in the current Future Years Defense Plan. Navy personnel state that the CBR program must be fully funded to meet the number of aircraft required to support the Tactical Air Integration initiative and standards in the new Fleet Response Plan. While we did not have sufficient data to definitively assess the wartime capability for the F/A-18, Navy officials indicated that the aircraft has successfully fulfilled its wartime missions despite current condition problems. The A-D models, along with the E/F models coming into the inventory, provide a multi-capable aircraft for the many roles the war fighting commanders require. These multi-role capabilities were demonstrated during Operation Iraqi Freedom with the F/A-18 performing air, ground attack, and refueling missions. Navy officials stated that they will do whatever is necessary to accomplish the mission, but raised concerns that maintenance costs are increasing due to current conditions problems. Specifically these officials stated that increased maintenance man hours per aircraft sortie, increased cannibalization rates, and decreased readiness rates are creating more stress on the aircraft and the personnel who fly and maintain them. The EA-6B is an integrated electronic warfare aircraft system combining long-range, all-weather capabilities with advanced electronic countermeasures. Its primary mission is to support strike aircraft and ground troops by jamming enemy radar, data links, and communications. The current inventory is 121 with an average age of 20.7 years. The follow-on aircraft is the E/A-18G Growler Airborne Electronic Attack aircraft, a variant of the F/A-18 E/F. We assessed the condition of the EA-6B as yellow because it consistently failed to meet the mission capable goal of 73 percent. However, squadrons training for deployment or those that are deployed generally exceed this goal. Fatigue life expenditure (FLE), the predictable rate of wear and deterioration of wing center sections and outside wing panels, is a critical problem and has caused aircraft to be temporarily grounded or placed under flying restrictions to mitigate risk to the aircraft. Wing center sections are that part of the plane where the wings and fuselage attach. Outer wing panels are that part of the wing that fold up when the plane is onboard carriers. The Navy is aggressively managing the problem and has programs in place to replace these items in the near term. We assessed the program strategy for the EA-6B as yellow because the Navy has developed a long-term program strategy for upgrading the EA-6B fleet; however, aircraft capability requirements may not be met in the future. The Improved Capability 3rd Generation (ICAPIII) upgrade is a significant technology leap in jamming capabilities over the current second-generation capability. ICAPIII will counter threats through 2015 and provides an advanced jamming capability, accurate target location, and full circle coverage. By 2007, 30 percent of the fleet will be ICAPIII equipped. The Navy plans for the follow-on EA-18G Growler to join the fleet between 2008 and 2012. The Navy purchase plan calls for 90 aircraft with over two- thirds (65 aircraft) procured by 2009. We assessed the funding for the EA-6B as red because current and projected funding is not consistent with the Navy’s stated requirements to sustain and upgrade the EA-6B fleet. The Navy relies upon additional congressional appropriations rather than requesting funds to meet program requirements. In fiscal year 2003, the Congress appropriated an additional 17 percent ($40 million) over DOD’s request for the EA-6B. The Navy is not funding modernization programs to the stated requirements. The Navy’s requirement for the ICAPIII electronic attack upgrade is 42 systems, although the Navy is only funding 35 systems. According to the program manager, funding for replacing the EA-6B’s outside wing panels is still uncertain. While we did not have sufficient data to definitively assess the wartime capability for the EA-6B, Navy officials indicated that the aircraft has successfully fulfilled its wartime missions with some limitations. Potential funding shortfalls and capability limitations may affect the aircraft’s ability to perform its mission. Only 98 out of 108 aircraft in the Navy’s EA-6B inventory are available to the fleet. Current EA-6B capabilities can meet the threat, although without an increase in the number of ICAPIII capable aircraft, the Navy may not be able to meet future threats. According to Navy officials, there is an impending severe impact on warfighting capabilities if the Navy does not receive fiscal year 2003 procurement funding for outside wing panels as requested. Specifically, the combination of the expected wear and tear on the panels and the normal aircraft attrition rate could reduce the total EA-6B inventory by 16 in 2005. The LPD-4 ships are warships that embark, transport, and land elements of a Marine landing force and its equipment. There are currently 11 in the inventory with an average age of 35 years. These ships are expected to remain in the fleet until 2014. The San Antonio-class LPD-17 (12-ship construction program, LPD-17 through LPD-28) will eventually replace the LPD-4. We assessed the condition of the LPD-4 as yellow because work programmed for scheduled maintenance periods is often not accomplished. Because of budget limitations for each ship’s dry-dock period and a Navy effort to level port workloads and provide stability in the industrial base, maintenance items are often cut from the planned work package during dry-dock periods. These items are then deferred to the next scheduled docking or accomplished as possible in the ship’s continuous maintenance phase. Deferring maintenance increases corrosion problems, particularly for the ship’s hull. There are consistent problems with the engagement system for on-board weapons and the hull, mechanics, and electrical (HME) systems associated with the ship’s combat support system. The age of the LPD-4 fleet directly contributes to the deteriorating condition of the ships, particularly the hydraulic systems. The Navy balances risk between available resources and deferring maintenance to make the most cost-effective decision and ensure ships deploy without or with minimal safety or combat system deficiencies. We assessed the program strategy for the LPD-4 as green because the Navy has developed a long-term program strategy to sustain and replace amphibious dock ships and improve support to Marine amphibious forces. The Extended Sustainment Program was initiated because of delay in delivery of the new LPD-17 class ships. The program will extend the service life of 6 of 11 ships for an average of 7.3 years to the 2009–2014 time frame. The program consists of 37 prioritized work items endorsed by the Navy. The follow-on LPD-17 ship construction program incorporates innovative design and total ownership cost initiatives; however, no modernization or upgrades are planned in the construction timeline from 1999 to 2013. We assessed the funding for the LPD-4 as yellow because current and projected funding is not consistent with the Navy’s stated requirements to sustain and replace amphibious dock ships. The age and decommissioning schedule for the ships means funding priorities are placed elsewhere. The Navy is seeking cost savings through efforts to level the industrial base in ports and provide predictability and management flexibility for programmed maintenance work. A significant limitation in that effort is the inability to use multiyear budgeting and the need to spend supplemental and 1-year funds in the year of appropriation. Ports are often not equipped and manned to accomplish the volume of work required in the time-span necessary to execute 1-year budgets. While we did not have sufficient data to definitively assess the wartime capability for the LPD-4, Navy officials did not identify any specific capability concerns. These officials indicated that the LPD-4 fulfilled its recent wartime missions of transporting and moving Marines and their equipment ashore. The Standard Missile-2 (SM-2) is a medium to long-range, shipboard surface- to-air missile with the primary mission of fleet area air defense and ship self-defense, and a secondary mission of anti-surface ship warfare. The Navy is currently procuring only the Block IIIB version of this missile. While the actual number in the inventory is classified, the Navy plans to procure 825 Block IIIB missiles between fiscal years 1997 and 2007. Currently, 88 percent of the inventory is older than 9 years. A qualitative evaluation program adjusted the initial 10-year service life out to 15 years. We assessed the condition of the Standard Missile–2 as red because it failed to meet the asset readiness goal of 87 percent and only 2 of 5 variants achieved the goal in fiscal year 2002. The asset readiness goal is the missile equivalent of mission capable goals. The percent of non-ready for issue missiles (currently at 23 percent of the inventory) will increase because of funding shortfalls. We assessed the program strategy for the Standard Missile-2 as yellow because the Navy has developed a long-term program strategy for upgrading the Standard Missile-2 inventory; however, the Navy’s strategy mitigates risk with complementary systems as the SM-2 inventory draws down and upgrades to counter known threats are cut from the budget. In 2002, the Navy cancelled production of the most capable variant at the time, the SM-2 Block IVA. Currently, the most capable missile is the SM-2 Block IIIB, which is the only variant in production. This missile will be the main anti-air warfare weapon on board Navy ships into the next decade. Improved Block IIIB missiles will be available in 2004. The SM-6 Extended Range Active Missile (ERAM) is programmed for initial production in 2008 and will be available to the fleet in 2010. We assessed the funding for the Standard Missile-2 as red because current and projected funding is not consistent with the Navy’s stated requirements to upgrade the Standard Missile-2 inventory. There is a $72.6 million shortfall for maintenance and a shortfall of approximately $60 million for procurement in the current Future Years Defense Plan. While we did not have sufficient data to definitively assess the wartime capability of the Standard Missile-2, Navy officials indicated that it successfully fulfilled its recent wartime missions but with some limitations. Block IIIB and improved Block IIIB missiles successfully counter the threats they were designed to counter. However, the most capable variant in the current inventory cannot handle the more sophisticated known air threats. The Navy lost a capability to intercept extended range and ballistic missiles when development of the Block IVA variant was cancelled. The improved Block IIIB missiles will mitigate some risk until the SM-6 ERAM is deployed in 2010. Further, Navy officials stated that the Navy accepts an element of risk until the SM-6 is deployed because the threat is limited in both the number of missiles and the scenarios where those missiles would be employed. Officials also described the Navy’s anti-air warfare capability as one of complementary systems and not singularly dependent on the SM-2 missile. The Navy successfully increased the deployment of these missiles to the fleet for the recent operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, but the growing shortage of ready-for-issue missiles in future years could severely limit the Navy’s ability to meet future requirements. The Tomahawk Cruise Missile is a long-range, subsonic cruise missile used for land attack warfare, and is launched from surface ships and submarines. The current inventory is 1,474 missiles, with an average age of 11.88 years and a 30-year service life. During Operation Iraqi Freedom, 788 Tomahawk’s were expended. The follow-on Tactical Tomahawk (TACTOM) is scheduled to enter the inventory in 2005. We assessed the condition of the Tomahawk Cruise Missile as green because it consistently met asset readiness goals in recent years. The asset readiness goal is classified. We assessed the program strategy for the Tomahawk Cruise Missile as red because the Navy has developed a long-term program strategy for upgrading the Tomahawk Cruise Missile inventory; however, the future inventory level will not be determined until funding questions are resolved. During Operation Iraqi Freedom, 789 Tomahawks were expended with a remaining inventory of 1,474. The replenishment missiles are all programmed to be the new Tactical Tomahawk missile. Even when funding is appropriated and executed this fiscal year, the first available date for new missiles entering the inventory will be late 2005–2006. A remanufacturing program planned for 2002–2004 is upgrading the capabilities of older missiles. There are 249 missiles remaining to be upgraded. We assessed the funding for the Tomahawk Cruise Missile as red because current and projected funding is not consistent with the Navy’s stated requirements to replenish the inventory and new production is unresolved. Inventory replenishment funding was authorized by the Congress and, at the time of our review, was in conference to resolve differences between the two bills. While we did not have sufficient data to definitively assess the wartime capability for the Tomahawk Cruise Missile, Navy officials indicated that it has successfully fulfilled its wartime missions during recent operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. Improved Tomahawks came into the inventory in 1993 and provided enhanced accuracy on targets. The newest variant, the Tactical Tomahawk (TACTOM), is scheduled to come into the inventory in 2005 and improves the missile with an upgraded guidance system and in- flight re-programming capability. This upgrade program is also expected to lower the missile’s production unit and life-cycle support costs. The AH-1W Super Cobra provides en route escort and protection of troop assault helicopters, landing zone preparation immediately prior to the arrival of assault helicopters, landing zone fire suppression during the assault phase, and fire support during ground escort operations. There are 193 aircraft in the inventory with an average age of 12.6 years. We assessed the condition of the AH-1W as yellow because it consistently failed to meet its mission capable goals from fiscal year 1998 to fiscal year 2002. Although Camp Pendleton and Camp Lejeune AH-1W maintainers cited insufficient spare parts and cannibalization as problems, overall, operators were always positive in their comments about the condition of the AH-1W. Condition concerns will be remedied in the near term by the AH-1W upgrade program that is proceeding as scheduled with an October 1, 2003, anticipated start date. We assessed the program strategy for the AH-1W as green because the Marine Corps has developed a long-term program strategy for upgrading the AH-1W helicopter to the AH-1Z, achieving 85 percent commonality with the UH-1Y helicopter fleet. Estimated savings of $3 billion in operation and maintenance costs over the next 30 years have been reported. Additionally, the upgrade program will enhance the helicopter’s speed, maneuverability, fuel capacity, ammunition capacity, and targeting systems. We assessed the funding for the AH-1W as green because current and projected funding is consistent with the Marine Corps’ stated requirements to sustain and upgrade the AH-1W fleet. Although we assessed funding as green, Marine Corps officials at Camp Pendleton cited the need for additional funding for spare parts and noted that cost overruns have occurred in recent years for the AH-1W upgrade program. While we did not have sufficient data to definitively assess the wartime capability of the AH-1W, Marine Corps officials indicated that it successfully fulfilled its recent wartime missions but with some limitations. Specifically, prior to Operation Iraqi Freedom, Marine Corps operators at Camp Pendleton stated that the AH-1W’s ammunition and fuel capacity was insufficient for some operations, such as Afghanistan. The AH-1Z upgrade program, however, will address these concerns. The Sea Knight helicopter provides all weather, day/night, night-vision capable assault transport of combat troops, supplies and equipment during amphibious and subsequent operations ashore. There are 226 aircraft in the inventory. The CH-46E is more than 30 years old. The MV-22 Osprey is the planned replacement aircraft for the CH-46E. We assessed the condition of the CH-46E as red because it consistently failed to meet mission capable goals between fiscal year 1998 and fiscal year 2002. The operational mean time between failures decreased from 1.295 hours to 0.62 hours during the course of our review. Marine Corps officials cited concern over the aircrafts age and the uncertainty about the fielding of the MV-22 to replace the Sea Knight. Marine Corps officials called the current maintenance programs critical to meeting condition requirements. We assessed the program strategy for the CH-46E as yellow because the Marine Corps has developed a long-term program strategy to sustain and replace the CH-46E fleet. The sustainment strategy, dated August 19, 2003, outlines the service’s plans to sustain the CH-46E until retirement in 2015 or longer. However, according to press reports, DOD has decided to reduce the purchase of replacement systems by about 8 to 10 aircraft over the next few years. If DOD buys fewer replacement systems, the service will have to adjust the sustainment strategy to retain additional CH-46E aircraft in its inventory longer. We assessed the funding for the CH-46E as red because current and projected funding is not consistent with the Marine Corps’ stated requirements to sustain and replace the CH-46E fleet. Marine Corps officials asserted continued funding for maintaining the CH-46E is essential. The fiscal year 2004 budget request included a request for funding of safety improvement kits, long-range communications upgrade, aft transmission overhaul, and lightweight armor. The Navy lists CH-46E safety improvement kits as a $4 million unfunded requirement. While we did not have sufficient data to definitively assess the wartime capability of the CH-46E, Marine Corps raised a number of specific capability concerns. Specifically, these officials stated that the intended mission cannot be adequately accomplished due to lack of payload. The CH-46E has lost 1,622 pounds of lift since its fielding over 35 years ago due to increased weight and can only carry a 12-troop payload on a standard day. More recently, Marine Corps officials rated the performance of the CH-46E during Operation Iraqi Freedom as satisfactory despite these lift limitations. The AAV is an armored, fully-tracked landing vehicle that carries troops in water operations from ship to shore through rough water and surf zone, or to inland objectives ashore. There are 1,057 vehicles in the inventory. The Marine Corps plans to replace the AAV with the Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle (formerly the AAAV—Advanced Amphibious Assault Vehicle). We assessed the condition of the AAV as yellow because of its age and the fact that the Marine Corps plans to upgrade only 680 of the 1,057 AAVs currently in the inventory. Furthermore, the planned upgrade program will only restore the vehicle to its original operating condition rather than upgrading it to perform beyond its original operating condition. We could not base our assessment of the condition on readiness rates in relation to the readiness rate goals because the Marine Corps did not provide sufficient trend data. Marine Corps officials at Pacific Command stated that the heavy usage of the AAV during Operation Iraqi Freedom and the long fielding schedule of the replacement vehicle present significant maintenance challenges. However, we assessed the condition yellow instead of red based on favorable comments about the current condition of the AAV from operators and maintainers. We assessed the program strategy for the AAV as yellow because the Marine Corps has developed a long-term program strategy for overhauling the AAV; however, the program only restores the vehicle to its original operating condition and does not upgrade the vehicles beyond original condition. The Marine Corps initiated a Reliability, Availability and Maintenance/Rebuild to Standard (RAM/RS) upgrade program in 1998 to restore capabilities and lengthen the expected service life of the AAV to sustain the vehicles until the replacement system, the Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle (formerly the Advanced Amphibious Assault Vehicle), can be fielded. The RAM/RS is expected to extend the AAV service life an additional 10 years. These vehicles will be needed until the replacement vehicles can be fielded in 2012. However, the procurement of the replacement vehicles has reportedly already been delayed by 2 years. We assessed the funding for the AAV as yellow because current and projected funding is not consistent with the Marine Corps’ requirements to upgrade the AAV inventory. Requested funding rose from $13.5 million in fiscal year 1998 to $84.5 million in fiscal year 1999 as the Marines initiated the RAM/RS program. The requested funding level declined to $66.2 million by fiscal year 2002. The Marine Corps identified a $48.9 million unfunded program in the fiscal year 2004 budget request to extend RAM/RS to more vehicles. Marine Corps officials are concerned reconstitution of the vehicles from Operation Iraqi Freedom will not include funding for vehicles returning from Operation Iraqi Freedom for the RAM/RS program. While we did not have sufficient data to definitively assess the wartime capability of the AAV, Marine Corps officials indicated that it has successfully fulfilled its wartime missions but with some limitations. While these officials cited the AAV as integral to ground operations during Operation Iraqi Freedom, they noted specific stresses placed on the vehicles. For example, AAVs deployed to Operation Iraqi Freedom traveled, on average, over 1,000 miles each, a majority of those miles under combat conditions. Those conditions added about 5 years worth of miles and wear and tear to the vehicles over a 6- to 8-week period. In addition, prior to Operation Iraqi Freedom, Marine Corps officials at Camp Lejeune highlighted problems they encountered with obtaining enhanced armor kits to protect the vehicles from the .50 caliber ammunition that was used by Iraqi forces. At the time of our review, only 26 of 213 AAVs at Camp Lejeune had been provided the enhanced armor kits. Marine Corps officials at Camp Lejeune believed the lack of kits was due to insufficient funding. The LAV-C2 variant is a mobile command station providing field commanders with the communication resources to command and control Light Armored Reconnaissance (LAR) units. It is an all-terrain, all-weather vehicle with night capabilities and can be made fully amphibious within three minutes. There are 50 vehicles in the inventory with an average age of 14 years. We assessed the condition of the LAV-C2 as green because the Marine Corps has initiated a fleet-wide Service Life Extension Program (SLEP) to extend the service life of the vehicle from 20 years to 27 years. The LAV-C2 SLEP includes enhancements to communications capabilities. Marine Corps officials cautioned that any delays in SLEP could affect future readiness. While we assessed the condition as green, we noted the operational readiness rate for the command and control variant was 90.5 percent, below the 100 percent goal but higher than the operational readiness rate of 85 percent for the entire fleet. We assessed the program strategy for the LAV-C2 as green because the Marine Corps has developed a long-term program strategy for upgrading the LAV-C2 inventory. The program funded in the current FYDP will enhance communications capabilities and power systems and may afford commonality with Unit Operation Center and helicopter systems. The Marines Corps intend for the upgraded LAV-C2 to provide a prototype to establish baseline requirements for future capabilities and a successor acquisition strategy. Marine Corps officials stated the C2 upgrade program needs to be supported at all levels. We assessed the funding for the LAV-C2 as green because current and projected funding is consistent with Marine Corps stated requirements to upgrade the LAV-C2 inventory. Marine Corps officials have requested $72.2 million in the current FYDP to support major LAV-C2 technology upgrades. Marine Corps officials at Pacific Command recommended increased funding for procurement of additional vehicles, citing the current inventory deficiency as critical. While we did not have sufficient data to definitively assess the wartime capability of the LAV-C2, Marine Corps officials indicated that it has successfully fulfilled its recent wartime missions. Marine Corps reports regarding the operations in Afghanistan cited LAVs in general as the most capable and dependable mobility platform despite the fact that the number of available C-17 transport aircraft limited the deployment of the vehicles. Initial reports from Operation Iraqi Freedom also indicate that the LAV-C2 performed successfully. The Maverick missile is a precision-guided, air-to-ground missile configured primarily for the anti-tank and anti-ship roles. It is launched from a variety of fixed-wing aircraft and helicopters and there are laser and infrared-guided variants. The Maverick missile was first fielded in 1985. We assessed the condition of the Maverick missile as not applicable because the Marine Corps does not track readiness data such as mission capable or operational readiness rates for munitions as they do for aircraft or other equipment. We assessed the program strategy for the Maverick missile as green because the Marine Corps has developed a long-term program strategy for replacing the Maverick missile with more capable missiles. Maverick missile procurement ended in 1992 and the infrared variant will no longer be used in 2003. According to Marine Forces Pacific Command officials, a joint common missile is being developed and scheduled for initial operational capability in 2008. The new missile will be a successor to the Maverick, Hellfire, and TOW missiles. Marine Corps officials stated a joint reactive precision-guided munition for both fixed- and rotary-winged aircraft as a potential successor to Maverick and Hellfire missiles will be submitted to the Joint Requirements Oversight Committee for evaluation in fiscal year 2003. We assessed the funding for the Maverick missile as green because current and projected funding is consistent with the Marine Corps’ stated requirements to replace the Maverick missile inventory. Since fiscal year 1998, the Marine Corps limited funding for the Maverick to the operation and maintenance accounts. While we did not have sufficient data to definitively assess the wartime capability of the Maverick missile, Marine Corps officials indicated that it has successfully fulfilled its recent wartime missions but with some limitations. Specifically, these officials stated that the Maverick missile lacks an all-weather capability. Marine Corps officials cited increased risks due to sensor limitations of the laser variant that restricts the missile’s use to low threat environments. Although the Maverick fulfilled its wartime mission during Operation Iraqi Freedom, Marine Corps officials stressed that its success was due to the fact that this was the optimal environment for the Maverick—desert environment and a lack of low cloud cover. In any other type of environment, however, the Maverick’s use is limited. In addition to the individual named above, Richard Payne, Donna Rogers, Jim Mahaffey, Patricia Albritton, Tracy Whitaker, Leslie Harmonson, John Beauchamp, Warren Lowman, Ricardo Marquez, Jason Venner, Stanley Kostyla, Susan Woodward, and Jane Lusby made key contributions to this report. The General Accounting Office, the audit, evaluation and investigative arm of Congress, exists to support Congress in meeting its constitutional responsibilities and to help improve the performance and accountability of the federal government for the American people. 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Summary: GAO was asked to assess the condition of key equipment items and to determine if the services have adequate plans for sustaining, modernizing, or replacing them. To address these questions, we selected 25 major equipment items, and determined (1) their current condition, (2) whether the services have mapped out a program strategy for these items, (3) whether current and projected funding is consistent with these strategies, and (4) whether these equipment items are capable of fulfilling their wartime missions. Many of our assessments of 25 judgmentally selected critical equipment items indicated that the problems or issues we identified were not severe enough to warrant action by the Department of Defense, military services, and/or the Congress within the next 5 years. The condition of the items we reviewed varies widely from very poor for some of the older equipment items like the Marine Corps CH-46E Sea Knight Helicopter to very good for some of the newer equipment items like the Army Stryker vehicle. The problems we identified were largely due to (1) maintenance problems caused by equipment age and a lack of trained and experienced technicians, and (2) spare parts shortages. Although the services have mapped out program strategies for sustaining, modernizing, or replacing most of the equipment items we reviewed, some gaps exist. In some cases, such as the KC-135 Stratotanker and the Tomahawk missile, the services have not fully developed or validated their plans for the sustainment, modernization, or replacement of the items. In other cases, the services' program strategies for sustaining the equipment are hampered by problems or delays in the fielding of replacement equipment or in the vulnerability of the programs to budget cuts. For 15 of the 25 equipment items we reviewed, there appears to be a disconnect between the funding requested by the Department of Defense or projected in the Future Years Defense Program and the services' program strategies to sustain or replace the equipment items. For example, we identified fiscal year 2003 unfunded requirements, as reported by the services, totaling $372.9 million for four major aircraft--the CH-47D helicopter, F-16 fighter aircraft, C-5 transport aircraft, and CH-46E transport helicopter. The 25 equipment items we reviewed appear to be capable of fulfilling their wartime missions. While we were unable to obtain sufficient data to definitively assess wartime capability because of ongoing operations in Iraq, the services, in general, will always ensure equipment is ready to go to war, often through surging their maintenance operations and overcoming other obstacles. Some of the equipment items we reviewed, however, have capability deficiencies that could degrade their wartime performance in the near term.