As a component of DOJ, BOP’s mission, in part, is to protect society by confining federal offenders in the controlled environments of prisons and community-based institutions that are safe, humane, cost-effective, and appropriately secure. In fiscal year 2010, BOP oversaw more than 209,000 inmates, housing more than 170,000 of these inmates in its 116 institutions and relying on privately managed secure institutions; residential reentry centers, also known as halfway houses; bed space secured through agreements with state and local entities; and home confinement to secure the rest. In fiscal year 2011, approximately $6.4 billion was appropriated for BOP to carry out its mission. While there is no specific statutory provision requiring BOP to provide inmates with telephone services or privileges, BOP extends telephone privileges to inmates and asserts that telephone privileges help inmates maintain family and community ties and facilitate the reintegration of inmates into society upon release from prison. However, limitations and conditions may be imposed upon an inmate’s telephone privileges to ensure that these are consistent with other aspects of BOP’s correctional management responsibilities. For example, the length of telephone calls is generally limited to 15 minutes, and the warden may restrict or suspend temporarily an inmate’s regular telephone privilege when there is reasonable suspicion that the inmate has acted in a way that threatens the safety, security, or good order of the institution, or the protection of the public. For many years, BOP provided inmates with collect-call service only—whereby the receiving party, and not the inmate, bore the cost of the call. In 1988, BOP began to shift to its current Inmate Telephone System (ITS), which provides both a collect call and a direct- dial option, emphasizing inmates’ financial responsibility and reducing the burden on others of inmates’ calls. BOP personnel within the individual prisons maintain the ITS. Specifically, BOP staff are responsible for installing, maintaining, and repairing the telephone system. Vendors provide the hardware and software that enable ITS, also known as TRUFONE, to perform the following:  use voice recognition to identify inmates placing calls;  provide each inmate with a “personal access code,” which allows inmates’ TRUFONE accounts to be debited for the cost of their calls; check the inmate’s TRUFONE account to make sure the inmate has sufficient funds for a one-minute phone call;     deny particular inmates access to telephones as warranted; and  terminate all prison telephone service if security needs dictate. record all calls automatically; restrict inmates’ calls to numbers on the inmates’ contact lists; require placement of calls only from specific telephones; In addition to direct-dial telephone service, BOP has recently made e-mail available to inmates in all of its institutions through an electronic- messaging system. Through this electronic-messaging system, inmates can communicate with a list of contacts, but they cannot access the Internet. Both inmates and persons in the community with whom they correspond must consent to having all incoming and outgoing electronic messages monitored and retained by staff. BOP established commissaries to allow inmates to purchase items not issued by prisons. Inmates purchase commissary items with funds available in individual inmate accounts managed by BOP. Funds are placed into these accounts by friends and family members (through BOP), or may be earned as wages through work performed in Federal Prison Industries or other on-site work at an institution (e.g., food service, laundry). In 1998, the Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act of 1999 provided BOP with the authority to accept revenues and make expenditures from the Commissary Fund of the Federal Prison System in order to pay for ITS as well as other prisoner amenities. This authorized trust fund is a self-sustaining revolving fund account in which BOP deposits revenues generated by inmate telephone charges through ITS and pays the expenses of ITS operations—rather than through appropriations. BOP uses the profits (the amount of revenue that exceeds expenses) from operating the inmate telephone service, as well as those from the commissary and other services, to provide inmate amenities, such as employment opportunities and educational and recreational activities, that are not currently supported through appropriations. By providing amenities like these through telephone system profits, BOP is similar to other federal correctional institutions like those within the Department of Defense. In particular, the Army, the Navy, and the Marine Corps all charge inmates rates above cost for telephone service. The Navy uses the profits to provide items or activities, such as movies and sports contests, for the benefit of the inmates exclusively, while the Army and the Marine Corps use the funds to provide amenities to all persons on the base. In August 2010, the Cell Phone Contraband Act of 2010 was passed and amended 18 U.S.C. § 1791 to prohibit an inmate of a prison from possessing, obtaining, or attempting to obtain a cell phone. The Cell Phone Contraband Act also provided for punishing such possession with a fine or imprisonment for not more than 1 year, or both. BOP stated that cell phones are considered hazardous tools, as defined by BOP policy as tools most likely to be used in an escape attempt or to serve as weapons capable of doing serious bodily harm to others; or those hazardous to institutional security or personal safety. According to officials in BOP’s Correctional Programs Division, when an inmate is caught with a cell phone, an incident report is filed and the inmate is subject to BOP’s disciplinary process, which involves an administrative hearing. The inmate ultimately could face a range of sanctions from transfer to a higher-security institution to loss of “good time” or other privileges. BOP may refer the case to a law enforcement agency with criminal investigative authority for investigation, and/or to the local U.S. Attorney’s Office, which maintains discretion for prosecution. In addition to BOP, various federal agencies serve as key stakeholders in exploring and addressing the illicit use of cell phones in federal and state prisons. For example, DOJ’s National Institute of Justice (NIJ) coordinates subject matter experts into three technical working groups to address, among other topics, illicit cell phone use. Further, at its 2010 National Conference, NIJ convened a plenary panel to discuss the detection and defeat of cell phone use in prisons. NIJ also funds the National Law Enforcement and Corrections Technology Center (NLECTC) system, which assists state, local, tribal, and federal correctional agencies, as well as law enforcement and criminal justice agencies, in addressing technology needs and challenges, such as contraband cell phones. NIJ also hopes to soon establish an interagency working group with representatives from BOP, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC), and the National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA), to continue working on solutions to overcome illicit cell phone use in prisons, subject to the availability of funds. In particular, the FCC maintains an important role in combating illicit cell phone use in prisons because the FCC, in general, executes and enforces the provisions of the Communications Act of 1934, which prohibits nonfederal entities—such as state correctional institutions—from intentionally interfering with or blocking radio communications signals, which include cell phone transmissions. In addition, NTIA is a critical partner for the research capacity it possesses. Specifically, in December 2009, Congress directed NTIA, in coordination with BOP, FCC, and NIJ, to develop a plan to investigate and evaluate how wireless jamming, detection, and other technologies might be used for corrections applications in federal and state prison institutions. In response to this congressional direction, in May 2010, NTIA issued a Notice of Inquiry seeking public comment on “technologies that would significantly reduce or eliminate contraband cell phone use without negatively affecting commercial wireless and public safety services … in areas surrounding prisons.” These technologies include the following:  Jammers: Devices that transmit on the same radio frequencies as cell phones, disrupting the communication link between the phone and the cell phone tower, essentially rendering the cell phone unusable until the jamming stops.  Managed access systems: Those that intercept, or re-route, certain cell phone calls (i.e., unauthorized calls that inmates attempt) away from carrier networks, preventing them from reaching towers and completing the call.  Detection systems/devices: Those that locate, track, or identify unauthorized cell phones by, for example, scanning frequencies within correctional institutions to detect the location of a caller. After analyzing the comments it received, NTIA issued observations on advantages and disadvantages of each of these strategies, as detailed in appendix I. NTIA also reported that prison officials should be able to use technology for combating prison cell phone use while not disrupting public safety and federal government entities’ use of spectrum or citizens’ use of airwaves for cell phone communications. A number of states have expressed concerns over threats posed by contraband cell phones in their correctional institutions and sought out both independent solutions and federal assistance. In particular, during 2009, officials from 31 state and 2 regional (i.e., city-based) prison systems requested that the FCC initiate rulemaking to permit jamming of commercial mobile radio services (which would include cell phone signals) within correctional institutions. Also, officials from Texas and Maryland correctional departments have testified before Congress about the dangers posed by cell phones in prisons and to support passage of a bill known as the Safe Prisons Communications Act of 2009. States have implemented different means to define the legality of cell phone possession in prisons. Some states have specific statutory provisions making it illegal for inmates to possess cell phones while incarcerated in a state prison institution, while other states have statutorily defined cell phones to be contraband that is prohibited within a state prison institution. In addition, there are other states that have general statutory provisions banning contraband and allow the department of corrections to define what items are contraband administratively. In addition, the Association of State Correctional Administrators (ASCA)— an organization comprised of both BOP and state correctional officials that seeks to improve correctional services and practices—has been active in studying the issue of cell phones in prisons. For example, in July 2010, ASCA hosted a symposium to discuss the problem of cell phone smuggling and potential solutions to address the issue. BOP’s rates for inmate telephone calls typically are lower than selected states’ and military branch systems that also use inmate telephone revenue to support inmate amenities, and lowering rates would have several implications. BOP charges inmates $0.06 per minute for local calls and $0.23 per minute for long distance calls, with no connection charge. BOP sets its rates to cover the cost of operating the telephone system and to generate profits, which BOP uses to provide the majority of funding for inmate amenities—the most significant of which are wages for inmate employment and expenses associated with inmate recreational activities. If BOP reduced inmate telephone rates, inmates would benefit from the ability to make less expensive phone calls. However, lower rates also could result in less revenue, lower profits, and therefore fewer funds available for inmate wages and other amenities, unless BOP recovers these funds through other sources. According to BOP officials, when inmates have fewer opportunities for physical activity, idleness increases and the risk of violence, escapes, and other disruptions also rises. Currently, for direct dial calls, BOP charges inmates per minute rates of $0.06 for local calls and $0.23 for long distance calls with no connection charge. For collect calls, both local and long distance, BOP charges a connection fee and per minute charge. The rates that BOP charges inmates for a 15-minute direct-dial local call typically are lower than rates charged by most other correctional systems, such as state systems and Department of Defense military prisons that also use telephone system revenue to help finance prisoner amenities. As illustrated by table 1, a direct dial long distance call lasting 15 minutes would cost a BOP inmate significantly less than if he or she made that call in most other selected comparable correctional systems. In fiscal year 2010, BOP’s inmate telephone system generated approximately $74 million in revenue, cost approximately $39 million to operate, and showed a profit of approximately $34 million. Records provided by BOP for the first quarters of 2009, 2010 and 2011 indicated that inmates’ long distance calls generated more than 90 percent of BOP’s telephone revenues. According to BOP officials, over the past 12–18 months, the inmate telephone service has generated significantly less revenue as inmates purchased more local minutes and fewer long distance minutes. Figure 1—which shows the local and long distance phone minutes used and phone-system revenues for the first quarters of 2009, 2010, and 2011—illustrates this trend. BOP officials attribute this shift from long distance to local minute calls to the emergence of technology that allows inmates’ friends and family who do not live within the inmates’ local calling area to acquire telephone numbers local to the inmates’ prison locations. As a result, long distance calls that previously cost inmates $0.23 per minute can now be made for the local rate of $0.06 per minute—a savings of more than 70 percent on a 15-minute call. BOP officials told us that this trend has prompted them to consider eliminating the distinction between local and long distance call rates and instead set a uniform price for calls of either type that would fall somewhere between the current local and long distance rates. According to officials, this would lower rates for approximately 84 percent of the calls made by inmates that are long distance. BOP officials told us that while they anticipate losing some of the revenue generated by long distance minutes, they believe the sale of access minutes for their electronic messaging system, which has recently become available in all federal prisons, will compensate for some lost revenue. BOP officials told us that the number of electronic message minutes sold in 2010, at $0.05 per minute, was more than twice the number sold in 2009, and they expect even more minutes to be sold in 2011. With respect to telephone system costs, in fiscal year 2010, BOP spent approximately $39 million to operate the telephone system. About $9.7 million of this amount covered the costs of the telephone system’s physical resources, including hardware and software, which were purchased through competitively bid, governmentwide contracts. Just over $22 million covered labor costs, including technical, operational, and administrative costs of the inmate telephone system at each of the institutions. Another $7.5 million covered personnel salaries and benefits of headquarters staff, who provide administration and program management, including policy and procedures development, and training. BOP’s telephone system generated more than $34 million in profits in fiscal year 2010. Since BOP both receives and disburses money to pay for telephone service operations through its Trust Fund, profits from telephone service are also retained therein. In fiscal year 2010, BOP’s Trust Fund had total revenues, which included collections from BOP’s commissary services, of $331 million. After paying all related costs for phones and commissary provisions, there were Trust Fund revenues in excess of expenses of over $46 million and BOP’s phone service was responsible for $34 million, or 74 percent of this amount, while Trust Fund profits from all other sources amounted to almost $12 million, as shown in figure 2. BOP officials told us that BOP uses revenue from its Trust Fund to pay for various inmate amenities, such as wages to inmates and recreational materials—as illustrated by table 2. However, by law, there are some specific inmate amenities, among other items, that cannot be purchased with Trust Fund revenues. BOP officials told us that all aspects of BOP’s work are audited annually by an independent auditing and accounting firm, including BOP’s financial records; officials told us that BOP has been certified as in compliance since 1999. Lowering the rates it charges inmates for phone calls would have several implications for BOP and inmates. The primary advantage would be that inmates would incur lower costs for making calls. This could possibly encourage greater communication between inmates and their families, which BOP has stated facilitates the reintegration of inmates into society upon release from prison. In contrast, reducing inmate telephone rates could also have some disadvantages. BOP officials told us that lowered rates would likely result in lower revenues for the Trust Fund and therefore less profit, unless some provision was made to replace the lost revenue. With fewer profits, BOP would have less Trust Fund money to spend on inmate amenities. As a result, unless BOP recouped these revenues from other sources, BOP would have to reduce the wages it pays inmates for their labor and/or scale back the number and type of other educational and recreational activities it currently offers using revenue from the Trust Fund. According to BOP officials, such reductions could make prisons more dangerous to manage and more expensive to operate. For example, BOP officials said that inmates perform electrical work, which keeps prisons well lighted, as well as janitorial services, which preserve order and cleanliness—both of which contribute to institutional safety and reduce inmate idleness. According to BOP officials, inmate idleness increases the risk of violence, escapes, and other disruptions. BOP officials also reported that inmate work programs—which teach inmates, many of whom have never held a traditional job before, work skills and a work ethic (e.g., coming to work on time, taking directions from a supervisor, working effectively with co- workers)—can help inmates assimilate back into society upon completion of their prison sentence. This helps to reduce recidivism and thus contributes to public safety. If BOP wanted to lower inmate telephone rates while maintaining the current level of inmate services, BOP could explore one of two approaches: (1) recoup lost revenue resulting from lowered telephone rates by increasing prices inmates pay for other services, such as commissary items or electronic messaging system access, or (2) seek authorization allowing BOP’s general appropriation to be available for inmate amenities in addition to the funds from the Trust Fund. Regarding the first approach, BOP officials told us that they already receive inmate complaints related to current commissary prices, and as a result, the officials indicated reluctance to choose this option. In addition, raising commissary prices could result in inmates purchasing fewer items, and coupled with decreased telephone rates, overall Trust Fund revenues could decline, resulting in less funding available for inmate amenities, including wages. With respect to the second approach, if BOP reduced rates for telephone service and was given authority to replace the lost revenue with its appropriations, BOP could maintain both the inmate wage rate and the type and variation of inmate activity, and keep the prices inmates pay for other services from increasing. However, to accomplish this, BOP would have to seek authorization allowing BOP’s general appropriation to be available for inmate amenities, in addition to the funds from the Trust Fund. BOP officials told us they did not think this option was a realistic possibility, as they do not believe Congress would appropriate money for prisoner amenities. BOP and officials from most of the selected states we contacted reported increases in the numbers of cell phones confiscated at prisons over the last 3 to 4 years and cite cell phone use as a security concern. All of the BOP officials, as well as officials from all eight of the states’ DOCs with whom we spoke, cited cell phones as a major security concern, given the potential the phones provide for inmates to have unmonitored conversations that could further criminal activity, such as selling drugs or harassing other individuals. BOP has tracked the number of cell phones confiscated at its institutions, by prison camp and secure institutions, since 2008. Table 3 shows that the number of cell phones confiscated has increased each of the last 2 years. As the data also illustrate, over three-fourths (77 percent) of all cell phones confiscated at BOP institutions are found at prison camps, or “minimum security” institutions—this despite the fact that prison camps have accounted for only about 13 percent of BOP’s inmate population from fiscal years 2008-2010. Prison camps typically are located adjacent to larger, higher-security institutions but are usually not surrounded by perimeter fencing. In some instances, camps are located very near local roads or wooded areas. To illustrate the extent of the problem at one federal correctional complex, figure 3 shows cell phones confiscated by BOP from a federal prison and its adjacent work camp over a 1-year period. Officials from BOP’s Correctional Programs Division and three of the six regions that we spoke with attribute the rise in confiscated cell phones to the ease of availability of small, low cost cell phones that allow inmates to carry on unmonitored conversations with the desired contacts. In addition, officials we interviewed from two of the six regions also cited increasingly stringent search procedures by staff at some prisons resulting in a greater number of cell phone confiscations. Correctional Programs Division officials added that a combination of easier access to cheaper cell phones, better awareness by staff conducting contraband searches, and better collection of intelligence have all contributed to these increases, but it is difficult to determine how much each factor has resulted in increased cell phone confiscations. We selected and obtained information from eight states during the course of our review, and these selected states in general are also dealing with increasing numbers of contraband cell phones, as shown in table 4. Some of these selected states maintain cell phone confiscations in the aggregate and have not broken it out by camps as compared to secure institutions. The types of institutions in which most cell phones are found varied among the states we contacted. For example, officials we interviewed from two of the eight states indicated that based on their experience, most phones were found in prison camps, while officials from five other states said that their states have confiscated greater numbers of cell phones in more secure institutions. Officials from the eighth state said the number of cell phones found in camps and secure institutions was about equal. Three states also attribute the increase in cell phone confiscations to the availability of smaller, cheaper cell phones and additional search and detection efforts they have employed to identify cell phones. Officials we contacted from BOP’s Correctional Programs Division, six regional offices, and four institutions—as well as from each of the eight states we selected for our review—all cited contraband cell phones as an issue of serious concern. According to BOP officials in particular, inmates with cell phones are able to circumvent the approved prison telephone system and thus are able to hold unmonitored conversations. This, the BOP officials reported, could lead to several actions that threaten the security of prisons and expand criminal activity both inside and outside of a prison institution. For example, inmates could use cell phones to arrange the delivery of contraband drugs or other goods, transmit information on prison staff to or from noninmates, harass witnesses or other individuals, or potentially coordinate an escape. BOP management does not currently compile any specific data or prepare comprehensive reports of situations where contraband cell phones were used to conduct criminal activity in federal prisons—nor do DOJ or the Cell Phone Contraband Act require that these things be done. However, BOP officials we interviewed from two of the regions provided examples of criminal activity linked to cell phones. In one case, in January 2011, an inmate at a federal institution was sentenced to an additional 14 years in prison for running an identity-theft ring using a contraband cell phone. This inmate and his accomplices obtained personal information on credit card holders at various retailers and impersonated these account holders to fraudulently purchase over $254,000 worth of merchandise. In addition, officials from seven of our selected eight states provided examples of specific criminal actions that occurred as a result of inmate cell phone use. For example, in October 2008, a death row inmate in a Texas state prison used a smuggled cell phone to threaten a state Senator and his family. This same phone was also used by a number of other inmates within the prison. In addition, in 2007, an inmate in a Maryland detention center ordered the murder of a state witness via a cell phone. In 2005, an inmate in a New Jersey state prison—serving time for previously shooting at two police officers—used a contraband cell phone to order the murder of his girlfriend, who had previously testified against him during a trial. BOP and officials in selected states acknowledged that definitively linking the possession of a contraband cell phone to an individual can be challenging. For example, officials we interviewed from BOP’s Correctional Programs Division, and two of the four BOP institutions that we interviewed say that cell phones are often found on the grounds of an institution or in “common areas” such as bathrooms or television rooms rather than in the possession of an inmate directly. Cell phones are also frequently passed around and used by several different inmates, making it difficult to link the ownership of a cell phone to a particular inmate. In order to gain useful information—such as phone numbers or text messages—that could link a cell phone to an individual inmate or related criminal activity, BOP conducts forensic investigations of the cell phones it confiscates. BOP and the eight selected states we contacted have taken steps to address growing contraband cell phone smuggling and use in their correctional institutions, but BOP could evaluate existing technologies better to maximize its investment decisions. BOP has tested multiple cell phone detection technologies; however, it has not developed evaluation plans to measure the effectiveness of these tests. Moreover, BOP has shared information with state agencies to some extent on strategies for combating contraband cell phones, but BOP’s regional offices could pursue more direct connections with states in accordance with relevant BOP policy that encourages them to do so. By enhancing information sharing, BOP could gain knowledge from states’ practices and lessons learned and likewise, states’ practices could be better informed by learning more about BOP’s efforts related to cell phone detection. BOP and officials from all eight selected state correctional departments we contacted have developed multiple methods for preventing cell phones from entering prison institutions and being used by inmates. These include search procedures for visitors and correctional staff as well as cell phone detection technologies, which identify the use of cell phones once they have reached the inmate population. Through policy memorandums and program statements that govern its protocols, BOP has implemented agencywide screening procedures for all visitors, contractors, and staff for detecting contraband items. These procedures include the use of x-ray screening machines, walk-through metal detectors, and hand-held metal detectors. Though these procedures are not cell phone specific, BOP officials told us they represent a concerted effort in keeping contraband out of prisons in general. See appendix II for more information on the direction that BOP provides for screening of visitors, staff, and inmates. In addition to its search procedures, BOP has employed technology to stem the rise in cell phone smuggling. In particular, BOP has implemented two large-scale sensor-based cell phone detection systems at two of its prison institutions, a technology BOP officials described as being the only effective solution at this time. The Radio Frequency (RF) sensor based system detects the presence of cell phones and displays their approximate location using a monitored computer screen. In April 2007, BOP installed the original prototype sensor system in three housing units within one building, which included the purchase of a server, computer work station, and switches. According to BOP officials, the manufacturer provided the actual sensors and software at minimal costs in order to assist in research and development for the project, while other fiber and wiring were obtained from surplus supplies at no cost to BOP. Additionally, BOP officials told us that BOP staff installed the sensor system, helping cut costs that an outside party might have otherwise charged for installation. Because of these factors, BOP officials said a similar system installed by a contractor at other prison institutions would be more expensive. For example, BOP officials told us that it cost them approximately seven times more than the original system to install equipment for a newer-generation version of BOP’s prototype RF sensor system at a second prison institution in December 2010, even though BOP officials were able to install it themselves as they had in the first location. According to BOP officials, the second system covers 11 housing units in both an institution and prison camp, and is also configured so that officials throughout the prison can view areas of cell phone detection, which BOP officials said accounted for a higher installation cost. We found that all eight of the selected state officials we interviewed cited using entrance screening practices such as use of walk-through metal detectors or x-ray machines at their secure institutions; and, six of these states are using different cell phone detection techniques that BOP has not yet employed, such as canines and managed access. Additional information on cell phone detection strategies tested or deployed by BOP and selected state DOCs—as well as these officials’ perspectives on their utility—is deemed law enforcement sensitive and not included in this report. BOP takes several steps to determine which cell phone detection technologies to test. BOP’s OST is tasked with identifying promising technology in the area of cell phone detection, and all five OST staff share responsibility for testing and evaluating technology security initiatives throughout BOP. To make determinations about which technology BOP should test, OST officials told us that they familiarize themselves through working groups with other federal and state organizations and discussions with all interested product vendors with equipment that other federal or state correctional entities use. OST officials also explained that they have developed criteria over several years that they believe should be met before they will test any given approach. These four criteria are: 1. The equipment must work without affecting or collecting information from the general public located outside the correctional facilities’ secure perimeter. 2. The solution should have no legal restrictions. 3. The equipment must work with all cellular phone protocols. 4. The overall cost of equipment and installation must be fair and reasonable. Once OST is satisfied that the technology meets most of these criteria, OST tests the equipment at BOP headquarters and then sends it out to one or more prison institutions for testing by staff in a prison environment. Once tested, institutional staff then provide OST with a brief written response or phone call regarding their views of the equipment’s effectiveness. Once OST receives feedback from the prison institution, OST may then send the equipment to another institution for further testing by prison staff. While BOP has put the above criteria in place, it does not have a sound evaluation plan that includes, among other dimensions, criteria or standards for determining how well the technology works. OST officials told us that they rely on the process discussed above to make decisions regarding the effectiveness of cell phone detection equipment, but they acknowledged that the tests each institution conducts may vary in scope and rigor and that they have no evaluation plan to govern this process. OST officials told us they previously attempted to distribute consistent evaluation questions to institutional staff testing each technology, using an “Initial Technology Assessment” form, but that OST abandoned this practice because it rarely received the form back from prison institutions. Further, officials told us that when institutions do respond with technology test results, OST receives very little feedback. OST officials told us that institutional staff have limited time and resources for assisting them with cell phone detection technology evaluations because such testing is in addition to their normal duties. Also, OST has stated that some institutions are more eager than others for the opportunity to test new technology; thus, some institutions may not have the interest or expertise to contribute information to a technology assessment. In addition, according to OST, the role of the individual conducting the test can vary by institution. Specifically, equipment could be tested by a correctional officer, a lieutenant, or a computer specialist, a situation that OST officials said results in inconsistent testing methods because these individuals have different skills and knowledge levels. In addition, the OST official tasked with addressing contraband cell phone detection issues told us that BOP regions and local prison institutions regularly test cell phone detection devices and approaches, as well as other types of equipment, without OST’s knowledge and most often do not inform OST of their findings. For example, the official explained that in some instances, vendors notify OST of technology tests conducted at local prison institutions that OST was unaware of at the time. GAO’s internal control standards require that an agency’s organizational structure clearly define key areas of authority and responsibility, and establish appropriate lines of reporting. Thus, while OST applies its criteria to screen new technologies before sending them to prison institutions for testing, it lacks clearly defined responsibilities for the individuals conducting tests and sound evaluation methods to fully evaluate such technologies once institutional testing has been completed. As a result, BOP has implemented—and discarded—some technologies without fully evaluating them and documenting results as discussed below. We have previously reported that for tests of new technology, a sound, well-developed and documented evaluation plan should include: 1. well-defined, clear, and measurable objectives; 2. criteria or standards for determining program performance; 3. clearly articulated methodology, including sound sampling methods, determination of appropriate sample size for the evaluation design, and a strategy for comparing the pilot results with other efforts; 4. a clear plan that details the type and source of data necessary to evaluate the pilot, methods for data collection, and the timing and frequency of data collection; and 5. a detailed data analysis plan to track the program’s performance and evaluate the final results of the project. Certain details on the tests OST has conducted and the conclusions it has drawn have not been included here due to law enforcement sensitivities. OST officials explained that BOP has a policy, called Pilot Initiatives, Approval and Evaluation, that identifies numerous criteria that should be followed when implementing and evaluating pilot programs. The policy includes practices such as defining goals and objectives, developing an evaluation plan, describing costs for the program, and identifying advantages and disadvantages related to a broader implementation of the technology, all of which align with established best practices. According to OST officials, however, they have not designated the testing phase of any cell phone technologies as “a pilot” by the definition included in their policy, and OST does not apply the policy to any of their testing. In our view, BOP could benefit by using its pilot initiative-evaluation criteria as a best practice when evaluating cell phone detection tests to better inform decisions about whether investments on a larger scale are warranted. When we requested reports and documentation—including evaluation plans and reports—resulting from tests of the technologies that OST explained to us, officials sometimes provided us with brief overviews of testing methods that did not meet best practices. For example, OST told us it has not subjected its RF sensor system—currently deployed in two institutions—to any final assessment or evaluation outlining when and how BOP would determine whether adopting this system on a wider scale would be feasible and effective. On the other hand, in one instance, OST officials told us BOP did adhere to more rigorous evaluation procedures. Specifically, with assistance from OST, one prison institution has deployed the Ground Observation Reconnaissance Transmitter (GORT) in one of its institutions. When testing the GORT system, officials identified system goals and objectives; identified criteria for determining program performance; completed a final product evaluation that documented advantages and disadvantages of the system; and concluded that GORT successfully reduced smuggling of contraband including cell phones at the test location. OST officials told us the assessment of the GORT differed from assessments of its other technologies because the level of evaluation performed was at the discretion of the local prison institution implementing the system. OST officials agree that developing a sound evaluation approach that could be used by prison institution staff for testing cell phone detection technologies would strengthen BOP’s approach for combating the issue of contraband cell phones in prisons. Having an evaluation plan for selected cell phone detection technology that follows BOP pilot evaluation criteria or other best practices could help BOP more effectively measure how well each piece of equipment functions. Moreover, these steps could better allow OST to better inform BOP leadership’s decisions regarding the adoption of such technology and the associated resource allocations. BOP reports that OST collaborates with various state-level agencies, but has opportunities to improve coordination between its regional offices and states in identifying effective strategies and technologies for combating contraband cell phones in prisons. BOP recognizes the importance of outreach with state and local entities and has developed a policy statement governing such interaction. This policy notes that “communication and understanding among institutions and regional offices and their local communities will be enhanced by formal and informal contacts between staff and local agencies and organizations.” It further states that “Regional Directors and Wardens shall include in their lists of annual accomplishments a summary of all organizations with which their institutions or regional offices are formally associated, including a general statement about any significant contribution to operations or criminal justice relationships that have resulted from those associations.” Further, we have previously reported on the importance of interagency coordination and information sharing across federal, regional, state, and local government entities. We also previously reported that making efficient use of security technology to supplement and reinforce other security measures is a key practice for protecting federal institutions, but that the type of technology to use should be carefully analyzed. OST, located at BOP headquarters in Washington, D.C., reported coordination with state-level agencies through direct information sharing, professional organizations, and established working groups. In particular, ASCA officials told us BOP coordinates with their group through panels, demonstrations, and briefings. For example, OST also participates in multiple NIJ/NLECTC technology working groups (TWG) involving cell phone detection. OST also coordinates with representatives from multiple state DOCs on an individual basis after establishing relationships as members of professional organizations, committees, and working groups. For example, OST provided the New York correctional department with 30-day access to a cell phone detection device after the state demonstrated interest in the technology. According to OST, BOP has also shared information on its practices for detecting contraband cell phones with states such as Pennsylvania, Texas, and Florida. We corroborated BOP headquarters’ level of coordination with these groups and multiple state DOCs. At the regional level, we found that BOP’s regional offices had limited coordination with states regarding contraband cell phone issues. For example, one BOP regional director stated that his region coordinated with officials from ASCA, but said he has not coordinated with state entities because such coordination occurs through BOP officials in headquarters. Another regional director concurred, reporting that nobody in his region participates in any task forces, working groups, or other collaborative efforts with federal or state entities concerning cell phone detection issues because this should be occurring through headquarters’ outreach. As discussed earlier, some states have taken efforts that BOP does not currently use to combat contraband cell phones, such as canine detection units. Thus, enhanced coordination could allow BOP to better leverage information on potentially employing these state efforts to combat contraband cell phones. Likewise, while BOP has shared practices with states in the past, OST officials agreed that BOP could improve coordination efforts by its regional offices as well. In addition, while BOP policy states that “over the years, formal and informal employee relationships with organizations, such as advisory committees, law enforcement coordinating councils, criminal justice councils, and state and local planning organizations, have enhanced operations,” we found limited BOP regional-office interaction with state and local government agencies concerning contraband cell-phone smuggling and use. For example, according to BOP officials, Regional Directors and Wardens annually prepare a Performance Work Plan that lists, among other things, efforts made in establishing relations and collaborating with other state and local correctional and law enforcement entities in their communities. However, BOP officials have informed us that these plans do not provide a level of detail—such as including lessons learned on cell-phone-smuggling approaches and the technologies to address them—to inform BOP’s central office of the nature of issues discussed. Our review of the three work plans with which BOP provided us confirmed the limitations in the information they contained. As we have previously reported, by having a process in place to obtain and share information on potential threats, agencies can better understand the risk they face and more effectively determine what preventive measures should be implemented. Regularly reaching out to coordinate with key stakeholders, particularly at the state level, to learn about their cell phone–combating efforts could help improve BOP’s ability to address cell phone smuggling and use in prisons. Conversely, BOP’s outreach and coordination with states at the regional level—to highlight practices BOP believes are useful—could help inform state practices as well. Further, keeping records of these exchanges, through Performance Work Plans for example, could help the regional offices provide BOP with greater problem-solving information by leveraging states’ experience in addressing contraband cell phones. BOP provides a variety of options to its inmates for making phone calls to friends and families—at rates that compare favorably to correctional institutions operated by states and other federal agencies. Nevertheless, the number of contraband cell phones in prisons is rising. As documented in our discussions with federal and state officials, the illicit use of cell phones can pose a danger to staff and inmates, as well as to the public at large. BOP has reviewed a number of technologies and adopted large- scale sensor detection systems at two of its institutions in an attempt to combat this problem. BOP does have opportunities, however, to enhance assessments of how well these technologies can work. For example, if BOP formulated well-developed and well-documented plans for testing and evaluating cell phone detection and defeat technologies—including the establishment of goals, objectives, and criteria—and defined evaluation-related responsibilities for individuals performing the tests, it would be better positioned to make decisions before adopting these technologies. BOP also has opportunities to better leverage what states are learning in their attempts to better detect and prevent cell phone smuggling. In particular, if BOP encouraged its regional offices to improve coordination with its local counterparts, BOP could be better positioned to track and monitor what states were experimenting with and what their evaluation results have been. By taking these steps, BOP could make more well-informed decisions as it moves forward in addressing the growing safety and security threats posed by contraband cell phones in its prisons. To help BOP respond more effectively to contraband cell phone challenges, we recommend that the Attorney General direct the BOP Director to take the following three actions:  Direct OST to formulate evaluation plans that both support a consistent approach to testing cell phone detection technologies and strengthen decisions about deploying cell phone detection projects. Such plans should include key characteristics of successful evaluation methods, such as defining measurable objectives and including a detailed data analysis plan. The plans should also clearly define evaluation-related responsibilities for the individuals conducting the test at each institution.  Develop a policy to require that regions and institutions apply OST’s evaluation plans when testing the technology that OST believes may be viable for detecting or combating contraband cell phones. This policy should also require OST to provide the results of these evaluations to BOP leadership to better inform BOP-wide decisions regarding the adoption of such technology.  Enhance regional office collaboration with other federal, state, and local organizations; document what is learned; and share it throughout BOP to enhance agencywide knowledge of key efforts to prevent or minimize cell phone smuggling in prisons. We provided a draft of the sensitive version of this report to DOJ, and also requested comments from the Department of Commerce, FCC, and Department of Defense on nonsensitive draft excerpts related to these agencies. The agencies did not provide written comments. However, in an e-mail received July 12, 2011, the DOJ liaison stated that DOJ concurred with our recommendations. DOJ, FCC, and Department of Defense provided written technical comments, which we incorporated into the report, as appropriate. We are sending copies of this report to the Attorney General, Secretaries of Commerce and Defense and the Chairman of the Federal Communications Commission. In addition, this report will also be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov. If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact David Maurer at (202) 512-8777 or maurerd@gao.gov or Mark Goldstein at (202) 512-2834 or goldsteinm@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made major contributions to this report are listed in appendix III. In 2010, NTIA sought out and received public comments on “technologies that would significantly reduce or eliminate contraband cell phone use without negatively affecting commercial wireless and public safety services … in areas surrounding prisons.” NTIA analyzed the comments received and reported its observations on advantages and disadvantages of each of these technologies, as illustrated in table 5. Table 6 describes BOP memorandums or program statements related to entrance-screening procedures for staff and visitors at BOP institutions. Figure 4 provides examples of the types of equipment BOP uses to screen staff and visitors entering BOP institutions, as well as inmates on institution grounds. In addition to the contacts named above, Mike Clements and Joy Booth, Assistant Directors, and Adam Couvillion, Analyst-in-Charge, managed this assignment. Raymond Griffith and Nancy Zearfoss made significant contributions to the work. David Alexander, Madhav Panwar, and Ramon Rodriguez assisted with design and methodology. Willie Commons III provided legal support and Katherine Davis provided assistance in report preparation.

Summary: The rates Bureau of Prisons (BOP) inmates pay to make phone calls generate revenue that funds inmate wages and other amenities; however, inmates' contraband cell phone use is growing. The Cell Phone Contraband Act of 2010 criminalized cell phone possession in federal prisons and mandated that GAO study related issues. In response to the mandate, this report addresses (1) how telephone rates for BOP inmates compare with other correctional systems and the implications of lowering rates; (2) the number of cell phones confiscated in BOP and selected states, and any reported impact; and (3) the extent to which BOP and selected states have taken actions to minimize cell phone smuggling, these actions' effectiveness, and how BOP has coordinated internal and state information sharing. GAO reviewed BOP's policies, procedures, and cell phone confiscation data (2008-2010). GAO also interviewed BOP officials within BOP's 6 regions and 4 of its 116 institutions--as well as officials from 8 state correctional departments--selected for their cell phone detection efforts or challenges faced. The results are not generalizable, but provide insights. BOP's rates for inmate telephone calls typically are lower than selected state and military branch systems that also use telephone revenues to support inmate activities; lowering rates would have several implications. Inmates would benefit from the ability to make cheaper phone calls, but lower rates could result in less revenue and lower profits, and therefore fewer funds available for inmate wages and recreational activities. According to BOP officials, when inmates have fewer opportunities for physical activity, idleness increases, and the risk of violence, escapes, and other disruptions also rises. BOP and selected states confiscated thousands of cell phones in 2010, and these entities believe that rising inmate cell phone use threatens institutional safety and expands criminal activity. All of the BOP officials, as well as officials from all eight of the state departments of correction with whom GAO spoke, cited cell phones as a major security concern, given the potential the phones provide for inmates to have unmonitored conversations that could further criminal activity, such as selling drugs or harassing other individuals. BOP and selected states have taken actions to address contraband cell phone use in their correctional institutions, but BOP could better evaluate existing technologies to maximize its investment decisions. BOP screens visitors and staff to detect contraband and has also tested multiple cell-phone detection technologies. However, BOP has not developed evaluation plans for institutional use to measure the effectiveness of these tests, which could help ensure that such tests generate information needed to make effective policy decisions. Moreover, while BOP has shared detection strategies with state agencies to some extent, BOP's regional offices have only had limited interaction with states, and could increase coordination and knowledge sharing to better identify and benefit from other strategies being used. This is a public version of a sensitive but unclassified - law enforcement sensitive report that GAO issued in July 2011. Information that the Department of Justice deemed sensitive has been omitted. GAO recommends that BOP's Director formulate evaluation plans for cell phone detection technology to aid decision making, require use of these plans, and enhance regional collaboration with states. The Department of Justice concurred with GAO's recommendations.