According to CBP documentation, throughout the travel process, OFO’s NTC analyzes traveler information and uses it to provide CBP officers at CBP’s predeparture locations with relevant and timely information about an individual. According to CBP documentation, these efforts provide CBP officers stationed overseas and within the United States the ability to address risks or prevent the movement of identified threats toward the United States at the earliest possible point in the travel process. CBP’s predeparture programs use the results of NTC’s efforts to identify and interdict high-risk individuals destined for the United States while they are still overseas. Specifically, CBP operates three air predeparture programs that are responsible for all U.S.-bound air travelers—Preclearance; the Immigration Advisory Program (IAP) and Joint Security Program (JSP); and the regional carrier liaison groups (RCLG). In fiscal year 2015, CBP’s predeparture programs consisted of more than 670 CBP officers at 29 locations worldwide as outlined in figure 1 below. Preclearance. Preclearance locations operate at foreign airports and serve as U.S. POEs. Preclearance operations began in 1952 in Toronto to facilitate trade and travel between the United States and Canada. As of April 2016, CBP operates 15 air Preclearance locations in six countries. Through the Preclearance program, uniformed CBP officers at a foreign airport exercise U.S. legal authorities to inspect travelers and luggage and make admissibility determinations prior to an individual boarding a plane to the United States. According to CBP officials, an inspection at a Preclearance location is the same inspection an individual would undergo at a domestic POE, and officers conducting Preclearance inspections exercise the same authority as officers at domestic POEs to approve or deny admission into the United States. As a result, travelers arriving at domestic air POEs from Preclearance locations do not have to be re- inspected upon entry or if they are connecting to a domestic flight. In fiscal year 2015, CBP had about 600 staff located in Preclearance facilities around the world. Immigration Advisory Program (IAP) and Joint Security Program (JSP). IAP and JSP operate at foreign airports. According to CBP officials, under this program, unarmed, plain clothes CBP officers posted at foreign airports partner with air carriers and host country government officials to help prevent terrorists and other high-risk individuals from boarding U.S.-bound flights by vetting and interviewing them before travel. According to CBP program documentation, CBP established IAP in 2004 to prevent terrorists, high-risk, and improperly documented travelers from boarding airlines destined to the United States. Building on the IAP concept, CBP established JSP in 2009 to partner with host country law enforcement officials to identify high-risk travelers. CBP officers at IAP and JSP locations have the ability to question travelers and review their travel documents. They are to act in an advisory manner to the air carriers and host governments and do not have authority to deny boarding to individuals on U.S.-bound flights or fully inspect travelers or their belongings. IAP and JSP officers are authorized by CBP to make recommendations to airlines as to whether to board or deny boarding (known as a no-board recommendation) to selected travelers based on their likely admissibility status upon arrival to the United States. The final decision to board travelers, however, lies with the carriers. Regional Carrier Liaison Groups (RCLG). RCLGs are located and operate at domestic airports. CBP established RCLGs in 2006 to assist air carriers with questions regarding U.S. admissibility requirements and travel document authenticity. RCLGs are located in New York, Miami, and Honolulu. According to CBP officials, RCLGs are responsible for coordinating with air carriers on all actionable referrals from NTC on U.S. bound travelers departing from an airport without an IAP, JSP, or Preclearance presence. Each RCLG is assigned responsibility for travelers departing out of a specific geographic location. Similar to IAP and JSP, CBP officers in RCLGs also make no-board recommendations as appropriate to air carriers. CBP officers at RCLGs do not have authority to make admissibility determinations about U.S.-bound air travelers, and the final decision to board or not board a traveler lies with the carrier. CBP electronically vets all travelers before they board U.S.-bound flights and continues to do so until they land at a U.S. port of entry. Through these vetting efforts, CBP seeks to identify high-risk travelers from the millions of individuals who travel to the United States each year. CBP’s vetting and targeting efforts are primarily conducted by NTC and entail (1) traveler data matching and analysis, (2) rules-based targeting, and (3) recurrent vetting. CBP’s primary method of identifying high-risk individuals is through the comparison of travelers’ information (such as name, date of birth, and gender) against records extracted from U.S. government databases, including the Terrorist Screening Database (TSDB)—the U.S. government’s consolidated terrorist watch list. Traveler data matching focuses on identifying known high-risk individuals—that is, individuals who may be inadmissible to the United States under U.S. immigration law or who may otherwise pose a threat to homeland or national security. According to senior NTC officials, CBP devotes significant resources to traveler data matching and analysis. CBP’s primary tool for vetting and targeting travelers is the Automated Targeting System (ATS), which is a computer based-enforcement and support system that compares traveler information against intelligence and law enforcement data to identify high- risk travelers. Traveler data matching occurs throughout the travel process and, upon a positive or possible match, CBP officers can select these individuals for further vetting, interviewing, and inspection. CBP’s rules-based targeting efforts seek to identify unknown high-risk travelers—that is, travelers for whom U.S. government entities do not have available derogatory information directly linking them to terrorist activities or any other actions that would make them potentially inadmissible to the United States but who may present a threat and thus warrant additional scrutiny. According to NTC officials responsible for the rules-based targeting program, unknown high-risk travelers pose the greatest threat to the United States because their information is not contained in lists of known high-risk individuals and are therefore more difficult to detect. CBP identifies unknown high-risk individuals by comparing their information against a set of targeting rules based on intelligence, law enforcement, and other information. NTC officials stated that these rules have identified potential foreign fighters or other high-risk travelers. Within CBP, the NTC develops, modifies, and implements the targeting rules in ATS. On the basis of our interviews and reviews of CBP documentation, we found that when designing or implementing any new rules, NTC, in coordination with other partners at CBP, engages in a multiple-step assessment and review process to ensure that the proposed rule will meet its intended purpose and not impose an unjustifiable impact on legitimate travelers. Rules-based targeting evaluates travelers during the travel process and in some cases in advance of the travel process. If a traveler is a rule “hit”, this individual can be selected for further vetting, interviewing, and inspection. CBP supports its traveler data matching and rules-based targeting efforts through the use of recurrent vetting. NTC’s vetting, targeting, and traveler data matching activities in ATS run 24 hours a day and seven days a week and automatically scan through updated traveler information, when available. This process, known as recurrent vetting, is to ensure that new information that affects a traveler’s admissibility is identified in near real time. Recurrent vetting occurs throughout the travel process and continues until a traveler arrives at a domestic port of entry. For example, after checking into a foreign airport, a traveler may have his or her U.S. visa revoked for a security or immigration-related violation. Due to recurrent vetting, CBP would be alerted to this through ATS and could take action as appropriate. Information on individuals who the NTC identifies through traveler data matching or rules-based targeting, including recurrent vetting, is compiled automatically through ATS into a daily high-priority list, or traveler referral list. CBP officers at the NTC review the traveler referral list for accuracy and to remove, if possible, any automatically generated matches determined to not be potential high-risk individuals. After this review, CBP officers at the NTC use ATS to send the traveler referral list to officers at each Preclearance, IAP, JSP, and RCLG location, as shown in figure 2. According to CBP officials responsible for managing CBP’s predeparture programs, these traveler referral lists represent their daily, high-priority requirements. According to CBP officials, officers at each of these locations are required to assess each individual on the traveler referral list and verify travel and identity documents, as appropriate. CBP officers stationed overseas and at RCLGs communicate with the NTC regarding the authenticity and completeness of traveler documents and may send additional information to have the NTC verify that the documents are legitimate. Additionally, NTC coordinates its traveler data matching and rules-based targeting for international air travelers with TSA’s Secure Flight Program. In April 2014, NTC and TSA developed an electronic common operating picture, which displays a master CBP and TSA traveler referral list of high-risk travelers in both the NTC and TSA operations center. According to CBP and TSA officials responsible for these programs, joint display of high-risk traveler information permits both TSA and CBP to identify and resolve discrepancies in vetting travelers, coordinate their efforts, and functions as a security redundancy. In addition, NTC officials stated that CBP and TSA’s coordination efforts have allowed them to identify more high-risk travelers than they would have if they had been working separately. According to officials from NTC and DHS’s Offices of General Counsel, Privacy, and Civil Rights and Civil Liberties, CBP has internal and external processes in place to ensure that its vetting and targeting efforts—particularly the use of targeting rules—are relevant, manageable, and in compliance with privacy requirements. These officials reported that CBP reviews the targeting rules on a periodic basis to assess whether the rules remain relevant in light of evolving threats. In addition, CBP also conducts constant rule maintenance and development as needed in response to new or changing threats. According to CBP documentation, DHS’s Offices of General Counsel, Privacy, and Civil Rights and Civil Liberties also review the targeting rules on a periodic basis to ensure that the rules do not excessively affect the traveling public. According to NTC officials, to date there have been no disagreements about the validity or utility of the rules between NTC and the external review groups. Through its predeparture programs—Preclearance, IAP and JSP, and RCLGs—CBP identifies and interdicts high-risk travelers before they board U.S.-bound flights. Specifically, CBP data indicate that CBP’s predeparture programs identified and ultimately interdicted approximately 22,000 high-risk air travelers in fiscal year 2015. Preclearance. In fiscal year 2015, CBP officers at Preclearance locations determined that 10,648 air travelers were inadmissible out of the approximately 16 million air travelers seeking admission to the United States through a Preclearance location (see fig. 3). In addition to requiring that all travelers undergo a primary inspection, CBP officers in these locations also referred almost 290,000 individuals for secondary inspection. Because all precleared travelers are inspected at a foreign airport, CBP officials told us that Preclearance presents the best opportunity to prevent high-risk individuals from boarding a flight to the United States because the opportunity to conduct a secondary inspection or interview could result in information linking a person to terrorism or a crime that may render them inadmissible to the United States. CBP officers at the three Preclearance locations we visited—Montreal and Toronto, Canada, and Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates—noted that being able to conduct an inspection on travelers has allowed them to identify high-risk individuals. During our site visits to Preclearance locations, CBP officers stated that they conduct their own targeting activities, in addition to coordinated targeting activities with NTC. IAP and JSP. CBP officers at IAP and JSP locations made 3,925 no- board recommendations in fiscal year 2015 for the approximately 29 million air travelers bound for the United States from such locations (see fig. 4). During this same time period, CBP data indicated 1,154 confirmed encounters with individuals on the TSDB, including 106 on the No-Fly List. According to CBP officials, IAP and JSP officers receive the majority of their daily targets from the NTC and they work closely with the NTC to address high-risk targets and identify trends in high-risk travel. According to our observations and in-person discussions with IAP and JSP officials, on a daily basis, IAP and JSP officers resolve NTC targets, observe travelers, and issue no-board recommendations to carriers regarding persons scheduled to travel on U.S.-bound flights who will likely not be admitted into the United States upon arrival. IAP and JSP officers also conduct their own targeting initiatives and have access to the host airports’ sterile and boarding areas to question travelers and review their travel documents. According to CBP officials and IAP and JSP officers (and supported by our in-person observations), air carriers almost always follow IAP and JSP no-board recommendations. RCLG. CBP officers working at the three RCLGs made 7,664 no-board recommendations in fiscal year 2015 for the approximately 59 million travelers bound for the United States from locations within the RCLGs’ spheres of responsibility (see fig. 5). During this time period, CBP data indicate that RCLGs also reported 1,634 confirmed encounters with individuals in the TSDB, including 119 on the No-Fly List. On the basis of our site visit to the New York RCLG, as well as phone interviews with the Miami, Florida, and Honolulu, Hawaii, RCLGs, we found that RCLG officers regularly resolve NTC targets, respond to questions from air carriers, conduct research on long-term targeting initiatives, and issue no- board recommendations. According to CBP officials, in the event that RCLGs issue a no-board recommendation, airlines generally follow it. CBP officials from all three RCLGs could not recall any examples over the last 5 years of an airline not following a no-board recommendation from an RCLG location. In addition to preventing high-risk or other inadmissible travelers from boarding U.S.-bound flights, CBP’s predeparture programs have resulted in other benefits by, for example, (1) assisting air carriers, (2) enhancing coordination with host country law enforcement agencies, (3) gathering additional information on travelers to improve U.S. targeting activities, or (4) facilitating travel. CBP’s predeparture programs provide regular assistance to air carriers on relevant U.S. admissibility requirements and U.S. travel documents. During our site visits, we observed that IAP and JSP officers regularly interacted with air carriers, and provided a point of contact at foreign airports for air carriers and airport security employees who may have difficulties assessing the validity of travel documents or understanding U.S. immigration requirements. For example, during our site visit to one IAP location in Europe, officers reported keeping a separate telephone line for air carriers to use when requesting assistance regarding document validity. In addition, several airline representatives we spoke with reported that CBP officers from IAP and JSP locations have provided helpful training to staff. Further, according to RCLG officials we spoke with, the relationships that the RCLGs have established with air carriers allows RCLG officers to provide them with early information on potential traveler admissibility determinations, which ultimately help the air carrier avoid the costs associated with transporting inadmissible travelers back to their point of departure as well as fines that could be imposed. According to CBP documentation, one of the key advantages of its predeparture programs is the ability to improve coordination overseas between CBP and host country law enforcement agencies. As part of their daily duties, IAP and JSP officers are responsible for establishing positive working relationships with numerous foreign entities, including airlines and their security organizations, foreign border control authorities, and other law enforcement agencies. For example, during our site visits to the two JSP locations, host government law enforcement and security representatives emphasized that their coordination with and training from CBP was invaluable, and that it allowed them to better identify and target high-risk individuals. Host government officials told us that the expanded targeting efforts in their countries due to CBP’s presence at JSP locations also have a strong impact on regional security. Moreover, according to CBP officials, information sharing through the JSP program has led to enhanced coordination and targeting efforts to include taking action against international drug, currency, and human smugglers, and known or possible suspected terrorists. Similarly, during our site visits to three IAP locations in Europe, foreign law enforcement officials we spoke with told us that information sharing generally occurs informally between IAP officers and host government officials rather than through formal channels due to host country privacy concerns about formal information sharing arrangements with other governments. According to senior CBP officials, all of CBP’s predeparture programs provide key information that helps to improve NTC’s targeting efforts and also supports larger U.S. government information gathering efforts on high-risk individuals and threats to the United States (see fig. 6). For example, according to CBP data, in fiscal year 2015, CBP’s predeparture programs allowed CBP to identify thousands of previously unknown high- risk individuals and of these, CBP nominated more than 1,500 for inclusion in the TSDB. According to senior CBP officials, CBP officers stationed overseas in Preclearance, IAP, or JSP locations have the opportunity to collect information about travelers, their travel history, and any other pertinent information while engaging with these individuals in conversation as part of interviewing or inspecting them. Officials told us that the information collected can be maintained and used for future targeting efforts if these individuals travel to the United States again. Air carrier and airport authority representatives, foreign government officials, and CBP officials we interviewed reported that CBP predeparture operations help to facilitate travel into the United States. For example, CBP officials, as well as air carrier and airport authority representatives told us that Preclearance operations ensure that all individuals aboard a given plane have already been inspected and have been cleared for entry into the United States. As a result, officials told us that this provides airports with more domestic airport arrival gate options by allowing international flights to arrive at domestic terminals that may not otherwise be equipped to properly inspect international travelers. IAP and JSP also provide travel facilitation benefits, according to IAP and JSP officers we spoke with. For example, IAP and JSP officers assist U.S. citizens and lawful permanent residents who have lost, stolen, or expired documentation. Although U.S. citizens and lawful permanent residents can generally not be denied entry to the United States under U.S. immigration law, air carriers will typically deny boarding to travelers without proper documentation because the air carrier cannot verify documentation and the legal status of the individual as admissible to the United States. According to IAP and JSP officers, having a physical presence at the airport enables them to reconcile an individual’s identity by accessing CBP databases and recommending to the air carriers that they board the traveler. Further, U.S. embassy officials we interviewed in Europe stated that IAP officers routinely assist embassy staff in verifying travelers’ identities and, because of their access to CBP databases, IAP officers are able to facilitate travel for U.S. citizens and lawful permanent residents even when the embassy is closed. For example, embassy officials in Western Europe reported that IAP officers were instrumental in facilitating the travel of the parents of the American students who thwarted a terrorist attack on the Thalys train from Amsterdam to Paris in July 2015. Not all of the families had the required travel documentation for entry into France, and IAP officers worked with the Western European government and air carriers to ensure their arrival and departure. CBP has not evaluated the effectiveness of its predeparture programs as a whole, including implementing a system of performance measures and baselines to assess whether the programs are achieving their stated goals. In a January 2016 white paper, CBP states that its strategic goal for its predeparture programs is to achieve comprehensive and highest level coverage at all high-risk air transit points to the United States with a focus on using the programs to push the U.S. borders outward to intercept and address potential threats at the earliest possible opportunity. Other program-specific documentation that we reviewed articulates similar, high-level predeparture program objectives, which are primarily focused on enhancing national security, counterterrorism, and travel facilitation. CBP has taken some initial steps to measure the performance of its air predeparture programs by collecting data on program activities. For example, CBP tracks a variety of data on the activities across Preclearance, IAP, JSP, and RCLG locations, including data on the numbers of travelers issued no-board recommendations or deemed inadmissible; invalid travel documents seized; and No-Fly List and TSDB encounters. According to CBP officials, on occasion, CBP has used these data, among other inputs, to support adjustments to its operations, including closing two IAP former locations where CBP determined that high-risk traveler volume did not merit having a location. On the basis of our analysis of CBP documentation and interviews with program officials, CBP has not assessed the performance of these programs on a regular basis, in part because it has not established baselines for these measures. Therefore, CBP does not have anything against which to compare the data to determine whether the programs are achieving stated goals. Solely tracking increases or decreases in program data, such as traveler volume or the number of invalid travel documents seized, does not allow CBP to fully evaluate its predeparture programs as such changes in the data may not be an indicator of program success or increased efficacy. CBP officials told us that they have collected a large quantity of data and statistics regarding the actions of their predeparture programs and have done so since program inception for all programs. However, due to changes in operational focus, technology updates, and the use of separate data systems at predeparture program locations, CBP has not collected consistent data across all of its predeparture programs. As a result, CBP does not have baseline data on which to measure program performance. However, CBP officials stated that they now have updated and uniform data collection systems that are consistent across all predeparture programs. As a result, CBP officials stated that they should be able to identify performance baselines from fiscal year 2015 onward. According to senior CBP officials, some of the results of CBP’s predeparture programs are not easily measured. For example, some benefits, such as coordination and information sharing with host governments, are invaluable but difficult to measure. Officials also noted that relying on data alone may not always present the most accurate picture of the true impact of predeparture programs because changes to the travel process or other factors may impact the predeparture programs in ways that are not fully captured by the data. However, on the basis of our analysis of CBP’s documentation, including official hearing statements, and interviews with predeparture program officials, CBP uses these data as indicators of the programs’ success. According to GAO’s Program Evaluation Guide, which articulates best practices for program evaluation, a program evaluation is a systematic study using research methods to collect and analyze data to assess how well a program is working and why. Program evaluation is closely related to performance measurement and analyzes performance measures to assess the achievement of performance objectives or goals. Evaluations answer specific questions about program performance and may focus on assessing program operations or results. Evaluation can play a key role in strategic planning and in program management, providing feedback on both program design and execution. Moreover, in accordance with GPRA, as updated by the GPRA Modernization Act of 2010, performance measurement is the ongoing monitoring and reporting of program accomplishments, particularly towards pre-established goals, and agencies are to establish performance measures to assess progress towards goals. Agencies can use performance measurement to make various types of management decisions to improve programs and results, such as developing strategies and allocating resources, and identify problems and take corrective action. Developing and implementing a system of performance measures and baselines for each program would help ensure that these programs are achieving their intended goals. By using data from fiscal year 2015, for example, to develop initial baselines, CBP could better measure program performance towards meeting stated goals. CBP has plans underway to expand its predeparture programs, particularly Preclearance operations. According to CBP, Preclearance expansion is a significant homeland security priority. CBP has reported that it aims to preclear 33 percent of all U.S.-bound air travelers by 2024. Accordingly, in September 2014, CBP invited foreign airport authorities interested in having the United States expand Preclearance operations to their location to submit letters of interest. CBP received 25 letters of interest from foreign airport authorities. Of the 25 airports, CBP selected 18 to rank, prioritize, and score for potential new air Preclearance locations. CBP, in conjunction with TSA and considering input from Department of State, conducted technical site visits and evaluations of these airports. In particular, CBP and TSA assessed these airports based on a variety of factors related to national security, travel facilitation, and feasibility of operations, among other things. In May 2015, DHS announced plans to enter into formal negotiations to expand Preclearance to 10 airports in 9 countries. According to CBP Preclearance officials, all 10 priority airports are valuable in supporting CBP’s predeparture mission. Opening a new Preclearance location requires the entry into force of an international agreement between the United States and a foreign government and requires the resolution of various diplomatic issues such as the extent of the law enforcement capability of CBP officers within the host country to include the carriage of service weapons, CBP officer immunity or legal status within the host country, and other complex issues. After reaching an agreement with the host country, expansion timelines may change due to competitive pressures, facility readiness, and other factors, according to CBP Preclearance officials. The Director of Preclearance noted that, in accordance with the Trade Facilitation and Trade Enforcement Act of 2015, CBP will provide any requisite information and certifications to the appropriate Congressional committees before entering an agreement into force with the government of a foreign country to establish Preclearance operations. In May 2016, CBP again invited interested airport authorities to submit a letter of interest to participate in the Preclearance program by August 1, 2016. CBP officials told us that they also aim to expand IAP or JSP operations to other airports where CBP has determined there is a potential threat to the United States but Preclearance may not always be feasible. According to CBP officials, host countries and airport authorities must express interest in the program, coordinate with CBP so that CBP may determine if airports are suitable for participating in the program, and host countries must agree to bilateral arrangements before CBP will expand the program. Because CBP depends on the willingness of host country governments and airport authorities to establish overseas predeparture program locations, there are challenges to expanding Preclearance, IAP, and JSP. For example, not all of the airports that responded to CBP’s expansion solicitation may be able to secure the necessary support of their governments to enter into negotiations with the United States for Preclearance operations. Multiple senior CBP Preclearance officials stated that the willingness and readiness of the host government and airport authority are key factors impacting the timeline of expansion. As a result, CBP’s negotiation and planning efforts are furthest along with two countries that currently have willing governments and airport authorities, according to CBP officials. However, CBP did not select these two locations solely based on their score among the 10 priority locations that CBP selected for potential expansion. CBP officials stated that expanding to these locations does not preclude CBP from establishing Preclearance operations at some of the other airports where the benefits to the United States might be greater, as long as these other eight locations can meet CBP’s requirements. According to CBP’s Preclearance evaluation report, some high-priority airports that are interested in Preclearance may face challenges in meeting such requirements. For example, airports that provide service to the United States on multiple U.S. air carriers, such as London Heathrow, will need to ensure that all U.S. carriers have access to Preclearance services by, for example, reconfiguring terminals, according to CBP Preclearance officials. Further, airport authorities and host country governments in many locations are not interested and do not support establishing a CBP Preclearance operation. Moreover, CBP plans to expand Preclearance to locations where airport authorities agree to reimburse CBP for certain costs. For the first 14 Preclearance locations, CBP assumed all of the costs of Preclearance operations—including officer pay, travel costs, and other operational costs. Beginning with Abu Dhabi, CBP determined that its model for new Preclearance locations would include a requirement for costs to be shared with the host airport authority. CBP’s expenses for Preclearance inspections in Abu Dhabi are reimbursed to about 85 percent of all expenses. According to CBP officials, under this model, CBP is able to extend its borders without having to pay the full costs of operations. Airport authority officials we spoke with in Canada stated that they valued having CBP Preclearance operations at their facilities, but noted that high up-front development and implementation costs could be potential impediments for other airport authorities. Because of the cost-sharing model CBP has implemented, not all airport authorities may be willing or able to accept Preclearance operations in their facilities. According to CBP officials and documentation, airport authorities’ and host countries’ willingness to participate also affects CBP’s efforts to expand IAP and JSP operations, particularly concerns related to sovereignty, such as CBP officer presence in the country and airport. These officials also raised concerns about airside access, such as access to areas within the airport, freedom of movement, and ability to interview travelers. These officials stated that JSP and IAP expansion efforts are also impacted by officer safety and security concerns, particularly in potential expansion locations in Central and South America as well as the Middle East and Southeast Asia. CBP is taking some steps to address staffing and funding needed for the expansion of its predeparture programs, but because CBP’s efforts are still in the early stages and negotiations with host governments about planned expansion locations have not yet been finalized, it is too soon to determine whether CBP’s efforts will fully address its needs. According to CBP’s Assistant Commissioner for Human Resources Management, staffing is one of the most prominent challenges the agency faces. CBP data indicate that, as of February 2016, OFO was more than 800 officers below its congressionally authorized staffing level, which includes all POEs—OFO had 23,775 officer positions authorized and 22,937 officers on-board. In addition, according to CBP hiring and attrition data, as of February 2016, about one percent of initial applicants for a CBP OFO officer qualify. This means that CBP needs approximately 78,000 new applicants in fiscal year 2016 to meet its current officer gap. Further, in April 2016, CBP officials testified that OFO’s staffing model estimates that the agency will need to hire an additional 2,107 officers through fiscal year 2017 to account for growing volumes of trade and travel. CBP’s stakeholders, including several air carriers and air carrier associations we met with, also raised concerns about the impact of expanding Preclearance operations on domestic POEs because CBP plans to initially staff new locations with officers from domestic POEs. CBP’s Office of Human Resources Management has taken several steps to address the agency’s broader staffing gaps. In addition, in April 2016, CBP officials testified that CBP has begun initiatives aimed at decreasing the amount of time it takes for an applicant to complete the hiring process, increased the number of recruiting events, and coordinated with the Department of Defense to recruit qualified veterans and individuals separating from military service. Further, senior Preclearance officials stated that when staffing Preclearance locations for start-up operations, CBP selects temporary duty staff from various ports so as not to deplete the capacity of any one domestic POE. IAP and JSP also use temporary duty staff from multiple POEs for start-up and to augment core staff during seasonal peak travel. Further, a senior Preclearance official stated that new Preclearance locations will not be operational until sometime in fiscal year 2017 at the earliest and that, similar to the process in Abu Dhabi, CBP will initially staff a new operation with a smaller number of temporary duty officers and then gradually increase the number of permanent staff at these locations. Moreover, according to a CBP budget official, since the costs of new Preclearance positions will be mostly reimbursed by the foreign airport authorities, CBP will be able to backfill positions at domestic POEs that were vacated as a result of moving staff to Preclearance locations. In addition, CBP has reported that implementing additional Preclearance locations will reduce wait times at domestic air POEs and lead to more efficient inspections. Specifically, CBP’s 2016 white paper notes that Preclearance operations will reduce wait times at some of the busiest air POEs in the United States. In addition, CBP officials also stated that Preclearance operations have led to increased airport traveler processing capacity. However, according to CBP officials responsible for data collection and analysis across OFO programs, CBP does not have generalizable data or analyses on the effect of Preclearance expansion on domestic wait times, so they could not provide us with data to corroborate this statement. Further, according to CBP officials and an airline official we met with, reductions in wait times may be short-term because airlines and airports may add new international routes in place of precleared flights. On the basis of our review of CBP documentation, we could not determine the extent to which there is a causal relationship between Preclearance operations and long-term, reduced wait times at domestic POEs. As of May 2016, CBP officials stated that they are in the process of surveying all U.S. airports to gain insights on the full extent of the impact of Preclearance operations, particularly traveler wait times and processing capacity. CBP has also taken steps to model anticipated Preclearance, IAP, and JSP expansion staffing needs. However, CBP’s estimates are preliminary and senior officials noted that CBP will be in a better position to determine staffing needs once CBP is further along in the negotiation process with host governments. According to CBP officials, the total staff required for each new predeparture location depends on the negotiated CBP presence at each location, which has not been finalized. As a result, it is too early in CBP’s efforts to accurately estimate staffing needs of expanding CBP’s air predeparture programs, and to determine if CBP’S current and planned actions will address staffing needs. CBP has taken some steps to identify and address funding needs for the expansion of its predeparture programs, though it is too soon for us to determine if these actions will fully address CBP’s funding needs. As previously mentioned, CBP plans to expand Preclearance to locations where airport authorities agree to reimburse CBP for certain costs. Specifically, CBP intends to require the host airport authority to reimburse CBP for all of the agricultural and immigration inspection-related costs associated with Preclearance operations. Further, CBP officials stated that new Preclearance locations will generally be expected to provide the facilities and equipment necessary for Preclearance operations. Moreover, Preclearance officials stated that they are planning to use authority provided to CBP under the Trade Facilitation and Trade Enforcement Act of 2015, enacted in February 2016, to collect Preclearance payments for start-up costs in advance of opening new Preclearance facilities, and to collect reimbursement in advance of incurring the costs for the provision of certain activities, such as immigration or agricultural inspection activities. By using these two strategies, Preclearance officials stated that they should be able to secure airport authority funding for almost all activities associated with the planning and operations of future Preclearance locations. Although CBP prefers that the airport authority pay the majority of Preclearance costs, CBP officials stated that its expansion decisions are not solely driven by the costs CBP would have to incur to set up and maintain a Preclearance location. These officials stated that CBP would still consider expanding Preclearance to a desirable location even if the country or airport authority did not support the reimbursement model; however, CBP’s current expansion plans and white paper strategy indicate that they are primarily pursuing the reimbursement model. In contrast to Preclearance, CBP officials stated that CBP will continue to fund all of the costs associated with additional JSP and IAP locations. Officials told us that CBP has developed cost estimates for several potential JSP locations. Further, CBP has taken steps to model anticipated Preclearance and IAP and JSP expansion costs. CBP has incorporated Preclearance staffing estimates into a cost model, which includes costs for salaries, benefits, relocation, and office space. According to CBP budget officials, the total cost incurred by CBP depends on the total number of officers stationed at each location, which has not been finalized. Similarly, funding required for IAP and JSP locations is also dependent on the number of staff at each location. As a result, it is too early in CBP’s efforts to accurately estimate the cost of expanding CBP’s predeparture programs, and to determine if CBP’S current and planned actions will address funding needs. Through its predeparture programs, CBP seeks to prevent high-risk individuals from boarding U.S.-bound flights—a key aspect of the agency’s mission to secure the U.S. border. In support of this mission, CBP has implemented a layered security approach aimed at identifying and preventing the travel to the United States of such individuals as early in the travel process as possible. CBP’s approach uses information from across the government and leverages CBP officer’s physical presence at predeparture program locations around the world. As a result of CBP’s efforts to vet, interview, and inspect travelers, CBP interdicts thousands of high-risk travelers each year. Moreover, CBP’s predeparture programs have provided additional benefits that improve global safety and security and facilitate lawful travel. However, CBP has not evaluated the effectiveness of its predeparture programs as a whole, including using a system of performance measures and baselines by which to assess whether the programs are achieving their stated goals. By developing and implementing a system of performance measures and baselines to evaluate the effectiveness of its predeparture programs, CBP will be better positioned to measure predeparture program performance and to determine what these data indicate about whether the programs are achieving their stated goals. To better ensure the effectiveness of CBP’s predeparture programs, we recommend that the Commissioner of U.S. Customs and Border Protection develop and implement a system of performance measures and baselines to evaluate the effectiveness of CBP’s predeparture programs and assess whether the programs are achieving their stated goals. We provided a draft of this report to the Departments of Homeland Security, State, and Transportation for their review and comment. The Department of Transportation indicated that it did not have any comments on the draft report via e-mail. The Department of State provided technical comments via e-mail, which we incorporated as appropriate. DHS provided written comments, which are noted below and reproduced in full in appendix I, and technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. DHS concurred with our recommendation and described the actions it plans to take in response. Specifically, DHS stated that it plans to create a working group to develop and implement a system of performance measures and establish baselines to evaluate the effectiveness of CBP’s predeparture programs and to assess whether the programs are achieving their stated goals. If implemented effectively, these planned actions should address the intent of our recommendation. If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 512-8777 or gamblerr@gao.gov. Key contributors to this report are listed in appendix II. Rebecca Gambler, (202) 512-8777 or GamblerR@gao.gov. In addition to the contact named above, Kathryn Bernet (Assistant Director), Chuck Bausell, Jose Cardenas, Eric Hauswirth, Paul Hobart, Susan Hsu, Richard Hung, Benjamin Licht, Thomas Lombardi, Sara Margraf, Michael Silver, and Martin Wilson made key contributions to this report.

Summary: DHS seeks to identify and interdict international air travelers who are potential security threats to the United States, such as foreign fighters and potential terrorists, human traffickers, and otherwise inadmissible persons, at the earliest possible point in time. In fiscal year 2015, CBP processed more than 104 million U.S.-bound air travelers. CBP operates various predeparture programs domestically and overseas that are designed to identify and interdict high-risk travelers before they board U.S.-bound flights. GAO was asked to review CBP's predeparture programs. This report addresses (1) how CBP identifies high-risk travelers before they board U.S.-bound flights; (2) the results of CBP's predeparture programs and the extent to which CBP has measures to assess program performance; and (3) how CBP plans to expand its predeparture programs. GAO reviewed CBP policies and procedures and fiscal year 2015 data across these programs. GAO also visited nine foreign and one domestic airport, selected based on location and traveler volume, among other factors. Information from these visits was not generalizable but provided valuable insights into program operations. The Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) analyzes traveler data and threat information to identify high-risk travelers before they board U.S.-bound flights. CBP's National Targeting Center (NTC), the primary entity responsible for these analyses, conducts traveler data matching which assesses whether travelers are high-risk by matching their information against U.S. government databases and lists, and rules-based targeting, which enables CBP to identify unknown high-risk individuals. CBP operates multiple predeparture programs that use the results of NTC's analyses to help identify and interdict high-risk travelers before they board U.S.-bound flights. CBP officers inspect all U.S. bound travelers on precleared flights at the 15 Preclearance locations and, if deemed inadmissible, a traveler will not be permitted to board the aircraft. CBP also operates nine Immigration Advisory Program (IAP) and two Joint Security Program (JSP) locations as well as three Regional Carrier Liaison Groups (RCLG) that allow CBP to work with foreign government and air carrier officials to identify and interdict high-risk travelers. Through these programs, CBP may recommend that air carriers not permit such travelers to board U.S.-bound flights. CBP data show that it identified and interdicted over 22,000 high-risk air travelers in fiscal year 2015 through its predeparture programs. CBP officers at Preclearance locations determined that 10,648 of the approximately 16 million air travelers seeking admission to the United States through such locations were inadmissible. Similarly, CBP, through its IAP, JSP, and RCLG locations, made 11,589 no-board recommendations to air carriers for the approximately 88 million air travelers bound for the United States from such locations. While CBP's predeparture programs have helped identify and interdict high-risk travelers, CBP has not fully evaluated the overall effectiveness of these programs using performance measures and baselines. CBP tracks some data, such as the number of travelers deemed inadmissible, but has not set baselines to determine if predeparture programs are achieving goals, consistent with best practices for performance measurement. By developing and implementing a system of performance measures and baselines, CBP would be better positioned to assess if the programs are achieving their goals. CBP plans to expand its predeparture programs where possible, though several factors limit its ability to expand to all priority locations. In May 2015—after soliciting interest among foreign airport authorities and scoring interested airports using risk and other factors—CBP stated it would begin Preclearance expansion negotiations with 10 priority airports in 9 countries. As of November 2016, CBP had not completed the process required to begin operations in any locations prioritized for expansion, but had reached agreement with one location at which Preclearance operations could begin as early as 2019. According to senior CBP officials, Preclearance expansions are lengthy and complex processes because host governments and airports must be willing to allow for a Preclearance location, and CBP's Preclearance expansion strategy relies on partnering with airports that are willing to pay for the majority of operational costs. GAO recommends that CBP develop and implement a system of performance measures and baselines to evaluate the effectiveness of its predeparture programs and assess whether the programs are achieving their stated goals. CBP concurred with the recommendation and identified planned actions to address the recommendation.