The Departments of the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force each have their own educational institutions (academies) to produce a portion of each branch’s officer corps: U.S. Military Academy (West Point, N.Y.), established in 1802; U.S. Naval Academy (Annapolis, Md.), established in 1845; and U.S. Air Force Academy (Colorado Springs, Colo.), established in 1954. The academies are structured to provide a curriculum critical to the development of successful future officers in academic, military, and physical areas of achievement. Additionally, the academies emphasize the moral and ethical development of students through their respective honor codes and concepts. There are approximately 4,000 students enrolled at each of the three service academies at any given time, each comprising four classes. In December 2002, Congress authorized an annual increase of up to 100 students until the total number reaches 4,400 for each academy. In 2002 the Military Academy graduated 968 students; the Naval Academy 977 students; and the Air Force Academy 894 students. Faculty at the U.S. Military Academy and the U.S. Air Force Academy are comprised predominantly of military officers (79 and 75 percent, respectively), while at the U.S. Naval Academy 59 percent of the faculty are civilians. Table 1 shows the composition of the faculty at the service academies. DOD reports that the total cost to operate all three academies in fiscal year 2002 was $990.7 million. Table 2 shows the reported operating costs and cost per graduate for each academy from fiscal year 1999 through fiscal year 2002. We did not independently verify these costs. Prospective students must meet basic eligibility requirements for appointment to an academy. They must (1) be unmarried, (2) be a U.S. citizen, (3) be at least 17 years of age and must not have passed their twenty-third birthday on July 1 of the year they enter an academy, (4) have no dependents, and (5) be of good moral character. After determining eligibility, a candidate submits an application to a preferred academy or academies. Each submitted application is required to include information such as, but not limited to, the candidate’s (1) SAT scores (or American College Testing—ACT—examination scores); (2) high school grade point average (and class rank, if possible); (3) physical aptitude scores; (4) medical examination results; and (5) extracurricular activities. The academies admit those candidates that have secured a nomination and who represent, in the opinion of academy officials, the best mixture of attributes (academic, physical, and leadership) necessary to ensure success at the academies and as military officers. The military academies use a “whole person” method to assess potential candidates in three major areas: (1) academics, (2) physical aptitude, and (3) leadership potential. Each academy uses the same basic approach. Admissions assessments are weighted toward academic scores that include objective tests and high school performance. Leadership potential is measured by assessing athletic and non-athletic extracurricular activities. Subjective assessments of potential candidates in these major areas also contribute to final admissions “scores.” Such assessments include interviews with prospective candidates, teacher/coach evaluations, and analyses of writing samples. Though medical criteria differ between services, the medical examinations are conducted according to the same standards, under a joint DOD Medical Examination Review Board that manages the medical examination process and records for applicants to all academies. Each academy is authorized to permit up to 60 foreign students to attend at any given time on a reimbursable basis by their country of origin. This number does not count against the authorized student strength of the academies. The admission of foreign students is covered by separate policies and procedures. Our review was limited to the policies and procedures for admitting U.S. citizens to the academies. Figure 1 shows the basic steps in the admissions process for all U.S. applicants. Students who are disenrolled from an academy after the start of their third year may be required to complete a period of active duty enlisted service of up to 4 years or may be required to reimburse the federal government for the cost of their education. Those who are disenrolled in their first 2 years do not incur an active service or reimbursement obligation. The United States Military Academy’s admissions evaluation considers academics, leadership, and physical aptitude. Academic considerations include above-average high school or college academic records as well as strong performance on SAT/ACT. Additionally, the Military Academy considers recommendations from English, mathematics, and science teachers. The leadership potential considers demonstrations of leadership and initiative in sports, school, community, or church activities and strong recommendations from faculty and community leadership and is a more subjective assessment of character. Physical aptitude is based on a scored standardized test. This test is made up of pull-ups for men or the flexed- arm hang for women, push-ups, standing long jump, basketball throw, and shuttle run. Figure 2 shows the areas considered and the weights assigned to each area in the U.S. Military Academy’s whole person admissions process. The United States Naval Academy’s admissions evaluation considers academics, leadership, physical aptitude, and technical interest. Academic considerations include above-average high school or college academic records as well as strong performance on SAT/ACT. Additionally, the Naval Academy considers recommendations from English and mathematics teachers. Assessment of leadership potential represents a subjective evaluation of character in which the academy considers demonstrations of leadership in terms of extracurricular activities in sports, school, community, or church and strong recommendations from faculty and community leadership. Physical aptitude is based on a scored, standardized test consisting of pull-ups for men or the flexed-arm hang for women, push-ups, standing long jump, basketball throw, and shuttle run. Additionally, the Naval Academy considers the technical interest of a prospective student, which is measured through a questionnaire in the application packet and used to gauge interest in pursuing a technical degree. The intent of this requirement is to admit students that are interested in pursuing technical degrees, specifically nuclear and maritime engineering. The admissions board can also apply further points to an applicant’s overall whole person score based on further consideration of an applicant’s record, including such things as the results of the evaluation form filled out by the Naval Academy representative who interviewed the applicant. Figure 3 shows the areas considered and the weights assigned to each area in the U.S. Naval Academy’s whole person admissions process. The United States Air Force Academy’s admissions evaluation considers academics, leadership, and an assessment by the selections panel. Academic considerations include above-average high school or college academic records as well as strong performance on SAT/ACT. Additionally, the Air Force Academy considers recommendations from English and mathematics teachers. Under leadership potential, the academy considers extracurricular activities in sports, school, community, or church and strong recommendations from faculty and community leadership. Finally, the Air Force Academy Selections Panel makes an assessment of all potential students. This assessment is composed of a pass/fail score from the physical aptitude examination and the evaluation of the academy’s liaison officer evaluation, made after interviewing the applicant. The physical aptitude examination is made up of pull-ups for men or the flexed-arm hang for women, push-ups, standing long jump, basketball throw, and shuttle run. The leadership potential area and the admissions board include the more subjective assessments of a potential student. Figure 4 shows the areas considered and the weights assigned to each area in the U.S. Air Force Academy’s whole person admissions process. The President of the United States alone appoints candidates to the academies. Before receiving an appointment, all candidates must secure one or more nominations according to the following categories: congressional (including a U.S. senator, representative, delegate, or the service-connected (including, among others, children of disabled veterans, enlisted personnel in the active or reserve components, and students from ROTC programs or other designated honor school graduates); and other (including the academy superintendents’ nominees and other nominees to bring the incoming class to full strength). Figure 5 shows the approximate distribution of categories of academy nominations, based on the types and numbers of nominees per category allowed by law. Oversight of the academies is the responsibility of three principal organizations: OUSD/P&R, the service headquarters, and the board of visitors of each academy. According to Department of Defense Directive 1322.22 (Service Academies), OUSD/P&R serves as the DOD focal point for matters affecting the academies and has responsibility to assess academy operations and establish policy and guidance for uniform oversight and management of the military academies. The military departments perform the primary DOD oversight function for their respective academies. The superintendent of each academy reports directly to the uniformed head of his respective service (the Chiefs of Staff for the Army and the Air Force and the Chief of Naval Operations for the Navy), in accordance with the chain of command for each service. Each academy also has a board of visitors, mandated by law, that is comprised of congressional members and presidential appointees. These boards focus attention and action on a wide range of operational and quality of life issues at the academies. As educational institutions, the service academies are also overseen by several nongovernmental organizations that are outside DOD purview. Each academy undergoes periodic review by a higher-education accreditation body associated with its region of the country, usually involving a full review every 10 years with an interim review every 5 years. The accreditation bodies review such areas as core curriculum, strategic planning, self-assessments, diversity of faculty and students, and faculty credentials. The athletic programs of the academies are also subject to periodic certification by the National Collegiate Athletic Association. This body reviews academy athletics in terms of such issues as finances and impact on the education mission of the academies. We limited our review of oversight of the academies to DOD organizations and the boards of visitors. The OUSD/P&R, the services, and the academies’ boards of visitors conduct many oversight activities, but they lack a complete oversight framework. A complete oversight framework includes not only clear roles and responsibilities, but also performance goals and measures against which to objectively assess performance. Such elements embody the principles of effective management in which achievements are tracked in comparison with plans, goals, and objectives and the differences between actual performance and planned results are analyzed. Without formal goals and measures, oversight bodies do not have sufficient focus for their efforts and cannot systematically assess an organization’s strengths and weaknesses nor identify appropriate remedies that would permit DOD to achieve the best value for the investment in the academies. In a prior report, GAO concluded that better external oversight of the academies was needed to provide useful guidance and suggestions for improvement. The report recommended that DOD improve oversight of the academies through such measures as establishing a focal point for monitoring academy issues in the Office of the Secretary of Defense and establishing guidance on uniform cost reporting. OUSD/P&R and the services have established clear roles and responsibilities for oversight of the academies, with the former serving as the focal point for issues affecting all academies and the latter having direct oversight authority over their respective academies. DOD established guidance in 1994 for the oversight of the academies and for uniform reporting of costs and resources. OUSD/P&R is directly involved in those policy issues that affect all academies and require DOD-level attention and legislative matters. For example, the office was recently the DOD focal point on the issue of increasing authorized enrollment at the academies from 4,000 to 4,400. With respect to the academies, the office is chiefly concerned with monitoring the degree to which the services are meeting their goals for the accession of new officers. The office also coordinates major studies that affect the academies, such as a November 1999 report on the career progression of minority and women officers. The services are responsible for direct oversight of their respective academies; and the academies are treated similarly to major military commands. The superintendents of the academies are general/flag officers who report directly to the uniformed heads of their services (the Chiefs of Staff for the Army and the Air Force and the Chief of Naval Operations for the Navy). In addition to overseeing the academies’ budget through the same approval process as a major command activity, the services oversee the academies’ operations and performance primarily through the academies’ goal of meeting service officer accession targets. The superintendents are responsible for meeting those targets and, in so doing, are given wide discretion in such areas as modifying their specific admissions objectives and the process for matching graduates with service assignments. The service headquarters use a number of mechanisms to oversee academy performance. For example, each service headquarters provides officer accession targets to the academies so that the assignment of graduates and the make up of incoming student classes can be modified as necessary. In addition to general numbers of officers, each service also has a number of specialty officer fields that need to be filled, and the services also monitor the extent to which the academies will be able to meet those accession goals. The services also directly oversee the academies by requiring the superintendents to report on and discuss their operations. For example, the Air Force uses an annual forum of the most senior Air Force officers to focus on the Air Force Academy with respect to how it is meeting the needs of the operational Air Force. The Navy uses similar senior officer conferences and frequent interaction between the superintendent and Navy headquarters to conduct oversight. The Army uses the U.S. Military Academy Forum, comprised of senior Army officers, to address academy operations issues. The superintendents of the three academies also hold annual meetings to discuss issues common to all academies. These mechanisms have resulted in such academy actions as curriculum changes to increase the number of technical degree majors, increasing language requirements, and increasing the number of students attending the academies. While OUSD/P&R and the services conduct a wide variety of oversight activity, there are few stated performance goals against which to measure academy operations and performance. Each of the academies has a strategic plan that is focused on providing quality military and professional training and education in order to commission highly capable junior officers. These plans are approved by the service headquarters but are not generally used by the services as benchmarks against which to measure academy performance, and they do not contain specific goals against which to measure student performance. OUSD/P&R is required to assess and monitor academy operations based on the information provided in annual reports it requires from the service secretaries. These reports provide data on various aspects of performance, such as student demographics and trends, student quality, admissions and attrition trends, compensation for students and faculty, leadership and honor systems, and incidents of indiscipline. The reports provide OUSD/P&R and the services with information on current and past performance for academy operations, but apart from officer accession goals, neither OUSD/P&R nor the services have specific stated performance goals against which to compare the information provided in the assessment reports, thus they do not have an explicit basis for judging the adequacy of their performance. For example, the data collected by the academies show that graduation rates have increased in the last 10 years; however, there is no stated goal for a graduation rate against which to judge whether this rate of increase is adequate. Other data collected by the academies indicate that the percentage of females and minorities has fluctuated over the last 3 years, but apart from admissions targets used by the U.S. Military Academy, there are no stated goals against which to assess these trends. Additionally, academy officials regularly analyze data on student body performance to determine the extent to which admissions standards can be changed to affect student body performance. However, there are no stated goals for student body performance, apart from minimum graduation standards, that might help the academies and other oversight bodies assess overall student performance. The oversight efforts of each academy’s board of visitors are similarly limited by the absence of sufficient performance goals and measures. Each of the academies has a board of visitors, mandated by law and comprised of Members of Congress and presidential appointees, that is outside the DOD chain of command. The boards have a broad legal mandate to inquire into all aspects of academy operations. The boards meet several times a year to be briefed on and discuss academy operations and must conduct an annual visit to their respective academies. During these visits, the boards are briefed by academy staff on such issues as admissions, curriculum, recruiting, athletics, morale and welfare, and construction programs; they also interview students to obtain their perceptions of life at the academies. The boards also address inquiries to academy staff, which are usually followed up at subsequent meetings, and they make suggestions to improve operations or quality of life at the academies. For example, boards of visitors have recommended increased recruiting of qualified minority applicants from various congressional districts and increased surveying of students on quality of life issues. The boards submit annual reports to the President on the status of and issues at the academies but do not evaluate academy operations and performance against established performance goals. The boards of visitors do not have dedicated staffs to conduct their work, and though board members may inquire into any aspect of academy operations, the agenda is set largely by the briefings presented to the boards by academy officials. Academy officials with whom we spoke were generally satisfied with the oversight provided by the boards of visitors, though there were concerns at the Air Force Academy about poor attendance by board members during annual visits to the academy. The academies do not grant waivers from academic criteria but do not have absolute minimum scores for admission. Under the whole person approach, the academies can admit some applicants whose academic scores are lower than might normally be competitive for admission, but who in their totality (academics, physical aptitude, and leadership potential) are deemed an acceptable risk and qualified to attend an academy. This admissions approach is consistent with the intent of the academies to admit students who also demonstrate leadership and initiative characteristics, which cannot be quantified by purely objective scoring methods. When conducting their admissions processes, the academies do not set absolute minimum scores for academic ability. Rather, they establish a range of scores that would be considered competitive, based on past incoming class performance and academy research on the overall quality of the applicant pool. Prior to 2002, the Air Force Academy set absolute minimum academic scores, and a waiver was required to further consider an applicant who fell below that minimum, no matter how high his or her scores in the leadership area. However, the Air Force Academy no longer has absolute minimums and uses the same competitive range approach as the other academies. Under this approach, if an applicant’s academic score is lower than the competitive range guidelines, academy officials have some flexibility to further consider the applicant. Academy officials will re-examine the applicant’s record for information that might provide further insight about his or her academic achievement. For example, officials may contact high school teachers to inquire about the types and difficulty of the classes the applicant has been taking and his or her performance in those classes. Academy officials will also weigh the extent to which the leadership component of the applicant’s whole person score offset the low component. The applicant is considered a risk and is evaluated through a deliberative process by academy officials on the basis of their judgment of whether the applicant is fully qualified and capable of succeeding at that academy. The subjective nature of this approach is consistent with the intent of the whole person concept, by which the academies want to admit students who also demonstrate leadership characteristics that cannot be quantified by purely objective scoring methods. Academy officials do not consider these judgments to constitute a waiver of academic standards, but rather a judicious assessment of the whole person. The process for assessing those applicants whose academic scores are lower than might normally be competitive is nonetheless similar to the former Air Force Academy process for granting waivers. With over 10,000 applicants for each academy each year and about 1,200 students admitted, the academic standards are high. Academy data show that the academic quality of the applicants has remained high over the past 4 years, and the competitive ranges for academic scores used by the academies have remained the same or have increased during this time. However, it is possible for students to be admitted whose academic scores were not as competitive as some other applicants who may not have been admitted. Senators, representatives, and delegates may submit up to 10 nominees for each student vacancy available to him or her per academy. They may choose to designate one as a principal nominee. If an applicant receives a principal nomination and is in all other respects qualified, the academies must admit that applicant, even over an applicant on the same senator’s, delegate’s, or representative’s nomination list with higher academic and/or whole person scores. The other nominated names become alternates for possible admission later in the admissions process. Though some academies award credit for the extent to which an applicant surpasses the standards of the physical aptitude examination, there are minimum standards for the physical test that must be met. None of the academies uses a system of “waivers,” except for medical conditions. An applicant can be waived for a medical condition, based on the deliberation and judgment of DOD medical personnel and the academy superintendent. For example, an applicant who is disqualified due to a vision condition may apply for and receive a waiver, based on subsequent surgical vision correction or determination by the academy superintendent that the applicant would be able to serve on active duty without the vision condition being a problem. In our review of the academy classes that started in 1998 (class of 2002), we found differences among various groups of students in their admissions scores and similar differences in their performance while at the academies, but the differences were not significant in magnitude. In terms of performance after admission to the academies, differences between these student groups and the class as a whole were also not sizable. We reviewed data for the following distinct groups: minorities, academy preparatory school graduates, recruited athletes, lower 30 percent of class by academic admissions scores. For the class data we reviewed, minorities, academy preparatory school graduates, recruited athletes, and prior enlisted students all had lower average admissions scores than the average for the class as a whole, though these differences varied. The differences between groups and the class as a whole were not sizable, generally falling within 5 percent. Those differences that were statistically significant and outside the 5 percent range were still generally less than 10 percent of the class as a whole. Tables 3, 4, and 5, show the average admissions scores for the selected groups in the class that started in 1998 at the Military, Naval, and Air Force Academies, respectively. Although each academy uses the same fundamental whole person approach, they use different scales to calculate scores. Therefore, the academic and whole person scores cannot be compared across academies. Of those students in the lower 30 percent of the class in terms of academic admissions scores, about 44 percent were recruited athletes, between 25 and 31 percent were minorities, and between 20 and 34 percent were preparatory school graduates. Table 6 shows the percentage of the selected groups making up the lower 30 percent of the classes in terms of their academic admissions scores, by academy. We also found differences in performance after admission to the academies between selected groups and the class as a whole. For example, females at the Naval Academy had a lower graduation rate than the class as a whole, but they had a higher average academic grade point average (cumulative GPA) than the class as a whole and higher average class rank (order of merit). The differences in performance between the selected groups and the class as a whole were not sizable, generally falling within 5 percent. Those differences that were statistically significant and outside the 5 percent range were still generally less than 10 percent of the class as a whole. Tables 7, 8, and 9 show how the selected groups performed at the Military, Naval, and Air Force Academies, respectively. See appendix II for further information on comparisons of performance by defined student groups. Some groups—such as minorities, preparatory school graduates, recruited athletes, and students in the lower 30 percent of their class in terms of academic admissions scores—performed at lower levels on average in all categories than the class as a whole, but these differences varied between academies and by category and were not sizable. For example, one of the lowest average academic grade point averages for the groups we reviewed was 2.61 and the average for the class as a whole at that academy was 2.93. A 2.0 grade point average is required to graduate for academic and military averages. Similarly, the lowest graduation rate for the class we reviewed was 65 percent for the students in the lower 30 percent of their class in terms of academic admissions scores at one academy. The average graduation rate for the class as a whole was 74 percent. Our analysis of data for the students who entered the academies in 1998 (class of 2002) indicates that admissions scores are generally good predictors of performance at the academies. Of the admissions scores, the academic component of the whole person scores was often the best predictor of academic performance at the academies, and the whole person scores in their entirety were often the best predictors of military performance at the academies. Both academic and whole person admissions scores were good predictors of class rank. In general, whole person admissions scores were better predictors of graduation rate than the academic admissions scores alone. Although the service academies receive oversight from a number of organizations and have established guidance for that oversight that includes the reporting of a wide range of data on academy operations, without clear and agreed-upon performance goals, there is no objective yardstick against which to fully measure academy performance and operations, apart from the officer accessions goals currently used. Establishment of such performance goals is consistent with the principles of effective management and would enhance the quality of oversight already performed by OUSD/P&R, the services, and the academy boards of visitors, permitting them to more clearly note those areas in which the academies excel, highlight areas where improvement is warranted, and achieve the best value for the nation’s investment in the academies. To improve DOD oversight of the operations and performance of the service academies, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the OUSD/P&R, in concert with the services, to further enhance performance goals and measures whereby the information required in annual assessment reports can be better evaluated. These performance goals should be developed for each academy and, where appropriate, in common for all academies. The specific goals should coincide with performance elements agreed upon by the services and OUSD/P&R and might include such things as graduation rates, demographic composition of student classes, assessments of officer performance after graduation, and other performance information already collected by the academies, including performance characteristics of various groups of students. In comments on a draft of this report, DOD agreed with our recommendation to further enhance performance goals and measures for the service academies whereby the information required in annual assessment reports can be better evaluated. DOD further stated that the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness OUSD/P&R will (1) monitor development of improved goals and measures by the service academies, to include facilitating the development of common performance goals where appropriate and (2) update DOD Directive 1322.22, Service Academies, as required. DOD’s written comments are included in their entirety in appendix III. We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional committees; the Secretaries of Defense, the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force; and the Director, Office of Management and Budget. We will also make copies available to others upon request. In addition, the report will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov. Please contact me on (202) 512-5559 if you or your staff have any questions concerning this report. Key contributors are listed in appendix V. To assess the extent to which DOD oversees the service academies’ operations and performance, we interviewed officials at the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness; the Army, Navy, and Air Force headquarters; and the U.S. Military, U.S. Naval, and U.S. Air Force Academies. We reviewed documents on service and DOD oversight criteria and structures, reporting mechanisms, academy strategic plans, academy annual reports on operations and performance, boards of visitors’ minutes and reports, and superintendents conference reports. We also attended a U.S. Naval Academy Board of Visitors meeting at the Naval Academy in December 2002 and a U.S. Military Academy Board of Visitors meeting in Washington, D.C., in March 2003. Additionally, we reviewed criteria on the principles of effective management, such as those found in Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government. To assess the extent to which academy applicants are granted waivers from academic admissions criteria, we interviewed officials from the Military, Naval, and Air Force Academies and reviewed documents on admissions policies, standards, and practices. We discussed with academy officials their execution of the whole person approach, including how they assess applicants’ records, the weights applied to the various components of the whole person score (academic, leadership, and physical aptitude), and the justification for points given to various aspects of an applicant’s scores. We also reviewed data from each academy on trends in academic admissions scores. During site visits to each academy, we observed the evaluation of applicant packages for the incoming class of 2007 by academy officials, including how the whole person approach was applied for admissions scores. We also observed meetings of senior officials at each academy where applicants’ records were evaluated and final admissions decisions were made. To assess the extent to which admissions and academy performance scores differ between various groups of students, we analyzed admissions scores and academy performance scores for all students who started at the three academies in 1998 and should have graduated in 2002. This represented the most recent group of students for which complete data were available. We requested and received from each academy a database that included data on both admission scores and information about students’ performance while attending the academy. We did not independently assess data reliability, but we obtained assurances about data completeness, accuracy, and reliability from academy officials responsible for maintaining data at each academy. We analyzed these data separately for each academy since each academy calculated admission scores or performance scores somewhat differently. We identified six major groups of students common to all academies: females, minorities, academy preparatory school graduates, recruited athletes, prior enlisted personnel, and students whose academic admission scores fell in the lower 30 percent of the entering class (we chose the latter group in order to capture information on students whose academic admissions scores may have been lower than might normally be competitive). Information specifying a student’s membership in each of these groups was provided in the databases from the academies. To assess differences, we first compared the mean performance scores for each group to the overall mean for each performance measure for the entire class. See appendix II for details on the results of our analysis of the relationships between admissions and performance scores. In addition, we assessed the relationship between admissions scores and performance at the academies by using the whole person admission score and the academic component of the admissions score. We estimated the effects of those scores on four measures of performance for students at the academies: (1) cumulative grade point average (GPA), (2) cumulative military performance average (MPA), (3) order of merit (class standing), and (4) graduation rate. We used cumulative GPA upon graduation as an indicator of academic performance at the academies and military performance averages upon graduation as an indicator of military performance at the academies. Order of merit is a measure of class standing at each academy that combines academic and military grade performance and is a final rank for each graduating student. At both the Air Force Academy and the Naval Academy, order of merit is an actual class rank number. At the Military Academy, however, order of merit could range between 0 and 4.0 and was given on the same scale as grade point averages. For each academy, we analyzed the association of both the academic component scores and whole person admission scores with each of the performance scores using regression models. Relationships between the admissions scores and cumulative GPA, cumulative MPA, and order of merit were estimated using linear regression models. The relationships between these two admissions scores and the likelihood of graduating were estimated using logistic regression models. See appendix II for more details on the results of those analyses. Issues related to alleged sexual assaults at the academies fell outside the scope of our objectives. We conducted our work from October 2002 through May 2003 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. This appendix provides the results of our analyses of both admissions and performance scores for the class of 2002 at the U.S. Military Academy, the U.S. Naval Academy, and the U.S. Air Force Academy. We obtained data from all three service academies that included information on admissions scores (academic and whole person), performance scores while at the academy (cumulative academic grade point average, military performance average, and order of merit), attrition information where applicable, and various demographic characteristics for all students entering each academy in 1998. Table 10 shows the minimum, maximum and average admissions and performance scores for students at each academy. Table 11 shows graduation rates at each academy. Next, we compared the average admissions scores, performance scores, and graduation rates of the six student groups to these overall scores and rates. Tables 12, 13, and 14 show the average admission scores and the four measures of student performance for the overall sample, and for the six student groups, for each of the academies. Because we have data for the population of students in this class and there is no sampling error, the standard error of these estimates are small and differences that could be considered small in magnitude may in fact be statistically significant. In the tables below, differences that are statistically significant (p<.05) and exceed 5 percent are considered meaningful and noted, though such differences may not be practically significant when compared with class performance requirements overall. For example, at the Naval Academy the overall average academic admissions score is 618, 5 percent of 618 is about 31. Only those group average academic admissions scores that are statistically significant and more than 31 points below 618 are noted with an “a.” Differences that are greater than 10 percent are marked with a “b.” Regression models were used to assess the relationship between admission scores and performance at the three academies. We used linear regression models to examine relationships between admission scores and GPA, MPA, and order of merit. To examine the relationship between admission scores and the likelihood of graduating we used a logistic regression model. Both the academic admission score and the whole person score were included as independent variables in each model. We estimated separate regression models for each academy. The results of these regressions are shown in tables 15 and 16. The tables show both regression coefficients and standardized coefficients. In general, regression coefficients are interpreted as the predicted change in the dependent variable for every unit change in the independent variables. Here, we have scaled the admissions scores so that the regression coefficients in the table can be interpreted as the predicted change in the relevant measure of success for every 100-point increase in the academic or “whole person” admission score. For example, overall at the U.S. Air Force Academy, for every 100-point increase in the academic admission score we expect to see a 0.06 increase in GPA. For every 100- point increase in the “whole person” score, we expect to see a 0.18 increase in GPA. Both relationships are statistically significant, meaning that both the academic score and the “whole person” score are significant predictors of cumulative GPA at the academy. We cannot compare the size of these coefficients across the three academies, though, because the academic and “whole person” scores are on different scales. Because the size of the unstandardized regression coefficients is affected by the scale of the independent variables (the admissions scores), we use standardized regression coefficients to compare them. These appear in parentheses in the tables. To estimate these coefficients, all of the coefficients are standardized by dividing the regression coefficient by the ratio of the standard deviation of the success measure to standard deviation of the admission score. The standardized regression coefficients, therefore, represent the change in the measure of success for each change of one standard deviation in admission scores. Using standardized coefficients, one can conclude that the coefficient that is larger in magnitude has a greater effect on the measures of success. Using the same U.S. Air Force Academy example, we see that while the relationships between both academic and “whole person” scores and GPA are significant, the relationship between academic scores and GPA is actually a stronger one than the relationship between the “whole person” score and GPA. Overall, while the academic scores are often a better predictor of academic performance at the academies (GPA), the “whole person” scores are often better predictors of military performance (MPA). The academic admissions scores have no effect on MPA at the Military and Air Force Academies and the whole person scores, not the academic admissions scores, predict likelihood of graduating at all three academies. We also used the R statistic to estimate how much of the variation in each performance score can be explained by both academic and whole person admission scores. The admission scores explained about 30 percent of the variation in GPAs at both the Naval and Air Force Academies and about 40 percent of the variation in GPAs at the Military Academy. The admission scores explained between a quarter and a third of the variation in order of merit across the three academies. However, admission scores did not explain as much of the variation in either military performance scores or graduation rates. Therefore, while both types of admission scores are significant predictors of performance at the academy, they only explain between 7 and 40 percent of the variation in performance at the academies, and only a very small percentage of the variability in the likelihood of graduating. Other factors not studied here, such as the military training and academic environment students experience at the academies, may contribute to performance more than just students’ admissions scores do. In addition to the individual named above, Gabrielle M. Anderson, Herbert I. Dunn, Brian G. Hackett, Joseph W. Kirschbaum, Wendy M. Turenne, and Susan K. Woodward also made key contributions to this report. Military Education: DOD Needs to Align Academy Preparatory Schools’ Mission Statements with Overall Guidance and Establish Performance Goals. GAO-03-1017. Washington, D.C.: September 2003. Military Education: Student and Faculty Perceptions of Student Life at the Military Academies. GAO-03-1001. Washington, D.C.: September 2003. DOD Service Academies: Problems Limit Feasibility of Graduates Directly Entering the Reserves. GAO/NSIAD-97-89. Washington, D.C.: March 24, 1997. DOD Service Academies: Comparison of Honor and Conduct Adjudicatory Processes. GAO/NSIAD-95-49. Washington, D.C.: April 25, 1995. DOD Service Academies: Academic Review Processes. GAO/NSIAD-95-57. Washington, D.C.: April 5, 1995. DOD Service Academies: Update on Extent of Sexual Harassment. GAO/NSIAD-95-58. Washington, D.C.: March 31, 1995. Coast Guard: Cost for the Naval Academy Preparatory School and Profile of Minority Enrollment. GAO/RCED-94-131. Washington, D.C.: April 12, 1994. Military Academy: Gender and Racial Disparities. GAO/NSIAD-94-95. Washington, D.C.: March 17, 1994. DOD Service Academies: Further Efforts Needed to Eradicate Sexual Harassment. GAO/T-NSIAD-94-111. Washington, D.C.: February 3, 1994. DOD Service Academies: More Actions Needed to Eliminate Sexual Harassment. GAO/NSIAD-94-6. Washington, D.C.: January 31, 1994. Academy Preparatory Schools. GAO/NSIAD-94-56R. Washington, D.C.: October 5, 1993. Air Force Academy: Gender and Racial Disparities. GAO/NSIAD-93-244. Washington, D.C.: September 24, 1993. Military Education: Information on Service Academies and Schools. GAO/NSIAD-93-264BR. Washington, D.C.: September 22, 1993. Naval Academy: Gender and Racial Disparities. GAO/NSIAD-93-54. Washington, D.C.: April 30, 1993. DOD Service Academies: More Changes Needed to Eliminate Hazing. GAO/NSIAD-93-36. Washington, D.C.: November 16, 1992. DOD Service Academies: Status Report on Reviews of Student Treatment. GAO/T-NSIAD-92-41. Washington, D.C.: June 2, 1992. Service Academies: Historical Proportion of New Officers During Benchmark Periods. GAO/NSIAD-92-90. Washington, D.C.: March 19, 1992. DOD Service Academies: Academy Preparatory Schools Need a Clearer Mission and Better Oversight. GAO/NSIAD-92-57. Washington, D.C.: March 13, 1992. Naval Academy: Low Grades in Electrical Engineering Courses Surface Broader Issues. GAO/NSIAD-91-187. Washington, D.C.: July 22, 1991. DOD Service Academies: Improved Cost and Performance Monitoring Needed. GAO/NSIAD-91-79. Washington, D.C.: July 16, 1991. Review of the Cost and Operations of DOD’s Service Academies. GAO/T- NSIAD-90-28. Washington, D.C.: April 4, 1990.

Summary: Graduates of the service academies operated by the Army, Navy, and Air Force currently make up approximately 18 percent of the officer corps for the nation's armed services. The academies represent the military's most expensive source of new officers. The Department of Defense (DOD) pays the full cost of a student's 4-year education at the academies; and the related cost has increased over the past 4 years. Admission to the academies is highly competitive. The academies use a "whole person" method to make admission decisions. Recent studies by the Air Force raised questions about possible adverse effects of whole person admissions policies on student quality. GAO was asked to review all three service academies and specifically address the extent to which (1) DOD oversees the service academies, (2) applicants are granted waivers of academic standards, and (3) various groups of students differ in admissions scores and academy performance. The Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness (OUSD/P&R), the services, and the academies' boards of visitors conduct considerable oversight of the academies' operations and performance, but they lack a complete oversight framework. A complete oversight framework includes performance goals and measures against which the academies' performance could be better assessed. OUSD/P&R and the services use the number and type of commissioned officers as the primary measure of academy performance. OUSD/P&R requires and receives reports on academy performance from the services. While data submitted in these reports provide perspective on current performance compared with past performance, without stated performance goals and measures, these reports do not offer OUSD/P&R or the services as good an insight into the academies performance as they could. Additionally, though the academy boards of visitors serve as an external oversight mechanism to focus attention on a wide range of issues, they also do not assess the academies' performance against established performance goals and measures. The academies do not grant waivers from academic criteria or have absolute minimum scores for admission. However, under the whole person approach, the academies can admit some applicants whose academic scores are lower than might normally be competitive for admission, but who in their totality (academics, physical aptitude, and leadership) are evaluated by academy officials as being capable of succeeding at the academy. In our review of the academy classes that started in 1998 (class of 2002), we found that despite differences among various groups of students in their admissions scores and similar differences in their performance while at the academies, the differences in performance were not sizable. Some groups, such as females, performed better in some categories than the class as a whole and worse in others. Some groups (minorities, preparatory school graduates, recruited athletes, and students in the lower 30 percent of their class in terms of academic admissions scores) performed at lower levels on average in all categories than the class as a whole.