DHS conducts four main types of efforts abroad that can help to combat terrorism by thwarting terrorists and their plots before they reach the homeland: deploying programs and activities abroad—especially screening and targeting programs, along with select immigration benefit processing—to help interdict people who present a threat to the homeland and the money, information, and goods used to carry out terrorist and other transnational criminal agendas sooner in the trade, travel, and immigration cycles; working with and sharing information with international and federal partners to help counter terrorism and other international crime; working alongside foreign officials to support them in assessing their own security vulnerabilities and implementing mitigating actions; and helping other nations strengthen their security infrastructure by providing training and consultations, conducting assessments, or providing equipment. DHS component agencies and offices have primary responsibility for conducting activities that correspond with their particular missions, including those that help to combat terrorism. As shown in table 1, six operational components in our review have mission responsibilities in border, maritime, aviation, and cyber security; immigration; and law enforcement that contribute to DHS’s efforts to combat terrorism. DHS components are generally responsible for making operational decisions— such as how to allocate resources, both domestically and abroad—to meet component and DHS mission needs. DHS’s counterterrorism efforts are coordinated by DHS’s Counterterrorism Coordinator through its Counterterrorism Advisory Board. The board is co-chaired by the Assistant Secretary for Policy and the Undersecretary for Intelligence and Analysis and also includes component heads. According to Office of Policy officials responsible for working with the board, it meets weekly to discuss and develop plans and strategies related to counterterrorism. The Office of Policy, through the Counterterrorism Policy Office, also coordinates DHS participation in White House and interagency policy planning meetings related to counterterrorism. OIA is also a member of the Counterterrorism Advisory Board. DHS’s OIA has primary responsibility for coordinating all aspects of department international affairs, but does not have operational oversight of component activities. In August 2012, the Secretary of Homeland Security signed the DHS International Affairs Management Directive. Consistent with the Management Directive, the Assistant Secretary for International Affairs, in coordination with the heads of DHS’s operational and support components, establishes strategies, plans, and appropriate activities for DHS to develop foreign partner security capabilities and international cooperative programs that align with DHS strategic planning documents. The Secretary of Homeland Security has testified that to achieve its mission more effectively, it is important that DHS both identify and operate as “One DHS” in pursuit of its overarching homeland security missions. To that end, OIA is responsible for developing, coordinating, and executing departmental international policy, including reviewing departmental positions on international matters, negotiating agreements, developing policy and programs, interacting with foreign officials, and working with DHS personnel abroad. Although operational decision making and resource use are generally the purview of the individual components and offices, OIA is responsible for reviewing component requests to State for international deployments. Two White House strategies outline government-wide goals for promoting national security and combating terrorism at the highest level—the May 2010 National Security Strategy and the June 2011 National Strategy for Counterterrorism. The National Security Strategy articulates a strategic approach for advancing U.S. interests, including security, economy, and values. The National Strategy for Counterterrorism focuses more specifically on one of the National Security Strategy’s priorities— disrupting, dismantling, and defeating terrorist networks. Both national strategies call for a whole-of-government approach to help secure the nation and combat terrorism. They each also call for contributions that are in line with DHS activities abroad—carrying out programs to limit the movement of people and goods that pose a threat to the homeland and helping other nations build capacity to detect, deter, and capture such people and goods to limit their global movement. DHS coordinates its efforts abroad to combat terrorism with State and other federal partners. State is the federal agency responsible for coordinating and supervising efforts led out of U.S. missions—like combating international terrorism—in collaboration with various other U.S. government agencies working abroad, such as the Department of Defense, Department of Justice, and DHS, as well as foreign partners that are facing terrorist threats. When conducting efforts abroad, DHS operates under the authority of the chief of mission (typically an ambassador). Chiefs of mission are the principal officers in charge of U.S. missions and have full responsibility for the direction, coordination, and supervision of all government executive branch employees in that country, with some exceptions, like personnel under the Department of Defense’s Combatant Commanders. The staffing levels of a U.S. mission are determined by the chief of mission through the National Security Decision Directive-38 process. This directive, issued by the President, authorizes the chief of mission to determine the size, composition, or mandate of personnel operating at the U.S. mission. DHS also collaborates with State and other federal partners that provide the funding to support personnel who make the contributions. For example, many of the activities to build capacity and provide training abroad are funded through State programs. In some cases, DHS also collaborates to share information, knowledge, and skills, where appropriate, with other federal personnel operating abroad—for example, contributing border security expertise in Department of Defense capacity- building efforts or sharing information with other law enforcement personnel stationed at the same diplomatic U.S. mission. At each U.S. mission, State requires mission management to lead, in consultation with relevant stakeholders, two processes to identify strategies, priorities, and programming needs for the efforts that are to be carried out through the mission—including combating terrorism. The first—the Integrated Country Strategy (ICS)—is a multi-year plan that articulates the U.S. priorities in a given country. It is a single overarching strategy, completed every 3 years, that encapsulates government-wide policy priorities, objectives, and the means by which diplomatic engagement, foreign assistance, and other tools will be used to achieve them. The second is the Mission Resource Request (MRR), which is a budget document that explains and justifies the resources required to achieve a given mission’s highest foreign policy and management objectives, as drawn from the ICS. The MRR is submitted annually. The DHS components within our review carry out programs and activities abroad within their areas of expertise—border, maritime, aviation, and cyber security; immigration; and law enforcement, among others—that are designed to limit the movement of people and goods that could pose a threat to the homeland before they reach the United States. They also deliver training and technical assistance designed to enhance partner nations’ ability to limit such movement globally. According to our analysis of expenditure data and FTE data provided to us by DHS, DHS OIA and the components within our review spent approximately $451 million dollars on activities abroad in fiscal year 2012 and had about 1,800 FTEs stationed abroad in almost 80 countries as of May 2013. DHS conducts certain programs and mission activities abroad to prevent people and goods that would pose a threat from reaching the homeland. Table 2 details the mission activities falling within the definition of combating terrorism used in this report—that is, they have the potential to thwart terrorists and their plots whether designed specifically for that purpose or not. Within its areas of expertise, DHS also provides training and technical assistance activities—often at the request of and in coordination with other federal partners such as State or the Department of Defense— which are designed to help other nations build capacity and address vulnerabilities in order to limit the movement of people who present a threat to the homeland and the money, information, and goods used to carry out terrorist and other transnational criminal agendas. Figure 1 shows that in fiscal year 2012, the DHS components in our review conducted training and technical assistance to help combat terrorism with partners from about 180 countries. See appendix II for data associated with figure 1. Click on the name of the country for more information. Click on the X to close. For a printer-friendly version, please see appendix II, table 5. Participated in 1 activity (27) Participated in 6-10 activities (40) Participated in 2-5 activities (88) Participated in 10+ training activities (23) Table 3 provides additional detail about the types of training and technical assistance that each DHS component in our review provided in fiscal year 2012 to help combat terrorism abroad. Combined, TSA’s and ICE’s efforts to help foreign partners build capacity and address vulnerabilities in transportation security, transnational crime, and immigration and customs enforcement account for more than half of total foreign partner participation in training and technical assistance activities. According to our analysis of expenditure data provided to us by DHS OIA and the components within our review, DHS spent approximately $451 million dollars on activities abroad in fiscal year 2012. Some but not all of these expenditures were dedicated to combating terrorism. The budget for these expenditures comes from various sources, including annual appropriations, user fees collected, and interagency reimbursements. Expenditures increased from about $391 million to about $451 million over the 5-year period from fiscal years 2008 through 2012, as shown in figure 2. In pursuit of their different mission goals, each DHS component in our review conducts different activities abroad and tracks related expenditures accordingly. Although each DHS component in our review generally included salary and benefits, International Cooperative Administrative Support Services (ICASS), Capital Security Cost-Sharing Program (CSCS), travel, and operating costs in their data for expenditures abroad, some components included additional expenditures. For example, CBP includes expenditures in direct support of the Immigration Advisory Program and preclearance activities abroad, while other components do not include expenditures in direct support of programs and activities abroad. Appendix III shows the various elements included in each component’s expenditure data. From fiscal years 2008 through 2012, CBP consistently accounted for 40 to 50 percent of DHS expenditures abroad, which was generally due to the high number of FTEs dedicated to CBP airport preclearance and port security programs. Preclearance countries—Aruba, the Bahamas, Bermuda, Canada, and Ireland—account for more than 500 of the nearly 700 CBP FTEs abroad. These countries also account for about $117 million of CBP’s $187 million fiscal year 2012 expenditures abroad. About $49 million of these expenditures were funded by user fees. In some cases, DHS’s expenditures abroad are reimbursed by State and the Department of Defense. For example: State’s Antiterrorism Assistance Program and Regional Strategic Initiative provide funding for DHS training and technical assistance activities abroad that can help combat terrorism. The Department of Defense and State provide funding for USCG personnel who fill positions in their programs abroad, including those that can help combat terrorism. State provides funding for all DHS personnel and activities in Afghanistan. In fiscal year 2012, State provided about $13 million that largely supported CBP, ICE, and TSA efforts to share intelligence with other federal partners and target illicit activities such as fraudulent visa applications and human smuggling; transportation of drugs, weapons, and precursor material for improvised explosive devices; and illicit use of nontraditional money transfer networks. Figure 3 shows expenditures abroad by country and component in fiscal year 2012, as well as the locations of DHS FTEs stationed abroad as of May 2013. In fiscal year 2012, DHS expenditures were highest in the following five countries: Canada, Mexico, Bahrain, Germany, and the Bahamas. These expenditures were generally associated with high numbers of FTEs in each country. In Canada and Mexico, expenditures supported a range of efforts to expedite the legitimate cross-border flow of people, goods, and services and to interdict and prevent the illicit cross-border flows of people, weapons, drugs, and currency. In Bahrain, Germany, and the Bahamas, expenditures were primarily dedicated to force protection of U.S. naval vessels (which is reimbursed by the Department of Defense), aviation security efforts, and preclearance efforts, respectively. See appendix II for data associated with figure 3. Click on the name of the country for more information. Click on the X to close. For a printer-friendly version, please see appendix II, tables 6 and 7. $1-$500,000 (25) $2,000,001-$5,000,000 (26) $500,001-$2,000,000 (25) $5,000,000+ (18) According to DHS Office of Operations Coordination and Planning data, as of May 2013, DHS OIA and the six DHS operational components in our review had approximately 1,800 FTEs in almost 80 countries to help combat terrorism and achieve other mission goals. Employees include DHS and component attachés, program personnel, and locally employed staff. Some DHS employees also travel regionally and from the United States on a more temporary basis to conduct capacity-building activities. Table 4 shows the breakdown of FTEs by component for May 2013. On the basis of two surveys and interviews conducted with embassy personnel, we found that DHS has made contributions to U.S. missions in five key areas. We also identified 12 factors that facilitated DHS’s contributions to U.S. missions’ combating terrorism goals. A majority of DCMs and DHS attachés responding to our surveys reported that the factors we identified were significantly or moderately important. They most frequently identified as very important a set of factors that relate to supporting a climate of collaboration at the embassy. We also identified a variety of challenges DHS and other personnel in the U.S. missions have faced. Although many of the DCMs and DHS attachés reported experiencing these challenges to some degree, our survey results indicate that a majority did not experience the challenges or their impacts as significant. Using State’s and DHS’s goals, along with interviews conducted with DHS and State headquarters offices and interviews with embassy personnel, we identified five specific types of contributions DHS might make to a U.S. mission’s combating terrorism goals. As shown in figure 4, according to our survey results, the majority of the 41 DCM respondents indicated that DHS has significantly or moderately contributed to combating terrorism goals for each of the types of contributions we identified. It is important to note that in some cases, DHS does not have the opportunity to make certain types of contributions. For example, the opportunity to negotiate bilateral information-sharing agreements may not exist in some locations, while other locations may not engage in any capacity building. Similarly, one DCM survey respondent noted that DHS does not have primary responsibility for combating terrorism-related activities at the embassy but plays an important supporting role and has negotiated memorandums of understanding with host government officials on immigration and customs enforcement. Another respondent said that although DHS has not negotiated formal agreements, it has improved counterterrorism cooperation with the host government through informal understandings and relationships. As with our survey, DCMs we interviewed during our site visits also noted important contributions DHS has made to their mission’s combating terrorism goals in a variety of ways. For example, one DCM pointed to progress a DHS-affiliated law enforcement group had made to foreign partners’ ability to combat international crime. Another DCM said that DHS brought new networks of contacts to the table and leveraged relationships with host country partners, including one recent substantial contribution to a major nonproliferation effort. An ambassador we interviewed stated that CBP has facilitated numerous weapons and other illicit material seizures, including improvised explosive device precursor materials. By reviewing our prior work on interagency collaboration, along with information collected in our interviews with agency officials, we identified 12 factors that could facilitate DHS’s ability to contribute to U.S. missions’ combating terrorism efforts. DCMs and DHS attachés we surveyed provided information about the extent to which they believe the factors we identified are important for DHS to be able to contribute its knowledge and skills. Figures 5 and 6 show the complete list of factors we identified and the extent to which DCMs and DHS attaché respondents to our survey identified them as important. Overall, a majority of respondents to both surveys reported that nearly all of the factors we identified were very or moderately important to facilitating DHS’s contributions to U.S. missions’ combating terrorism efforts. The 12 factors we identified generally fall into two categories: (1) efforts to foster a collaborative climate, and (2) mechanisms to leverage resources and clarify roles and responsibilities. As we reported in September 2012, one of the key considerations in developing interagency collaborative mechanisms is whether the participating agencies have the means to recognize and reward collaboration. Another of these key features is bridging organizational cultures. We reported that different agencies participating in any collaborative mechanism bring diverse organizational cultures to it. To address these differences, we have found that it is important to establish ways to operate across agency boundaries, by, for example, developing common terminology and compatible policies and procedures, and fostering open lines of communication. Three of the factors we identified—the 3 that were most commonly selected as very important by DCM survey respondents—related to fostering an organizational culture that supports collaborative behaviors— (1) U.S. mission management promotes collaborative behaviors, (2) U.S. mission management actively seeks to help bridge organizational cultures, and (3) a culture of cooperation and informal information sharing exists. U.S. mission management promoting collaborative behaviors was most frequently identified as very important by both DCMs and DHS attachés. All 47 DHS attaché respondents identified it as very or moderately important, as did 40 out of 41 DCMs. A culture of cooperation and informal information was the second most frequently reported as very important for DCMs and third for DHS Attachés. Echoing our survey results, officials we interviewed at one U.S. mission we visited reported a strong collaborative relationship between DHS and other federal partners, and attributed it, at least in part, to the “tone at the top”—including both rewarding collaborative behaviors and discouraging failure to collaborate. At another U.S. mission we visited, an official noted that the DCM had forbidden the use of acronyms in interagency meetings, which had the effect of helping to ensure that use of specialized vocabulary did not unintentionally exclude participants from collaborative discussions. This official at this embassy noted that the action may seem simple but was nevertheless a critical signal to all the federal personnel at the embassy that the management valued collaborative action. Another related factor a majority of DHS attaché and DCM respondents— 33 of 47 and 34 of 40, respectively—identified as very important is having routine formal mechanisms for information sharing. One such mechanism U.S. missions use to facilitate effective contribution of DHS skills and expertise is law enforcement working groups focused on counterterrorism or security issues. Working groups, which are routine, formal meetings of diverse agency personnel with similar goals or functions, provide an opportunity for parties carrying out ongoing activities to share information and avoid conflicts. At two U.S. missions we visited, officials we interviewed pointed to the working groups as an essential collaboration mechanism. Our October 2005 work on practices to enhance and sustain interagency collaboration called for agencies to address needs by leveraging resources and agreeing on roles and responsibilities. Among the factors we identified that relate to this is DHS’s participation in developing U.S. mission strategic goals, and 35 of 41 DCMs and 43 of 47 DHS attachés responded that the factor was very or moderately important in facilitating DHS’s contributions. With some exceptions, such as military activities, federal activities abroad are conducted through the embassies under the authority of the chief of mission. DHS receives funding from State for a number of its training and technical assistance programs abroad, through programs like the Regional Strategic Initiative and the Antiterrorism Assistance program. For State, funding decisions are based in part on the product of planning processes undertaken at each individual U.S. mission. Therefore, the ability for DHS and State to share information about both strategic and programming decisions, particularly through U.S. mission planning processes, is an important element in DHS’s ability to make the maximum possible contribution to U.S. mission efforts. During our fieldwork we saw variation in the extent to and manner in which U.S. mission management integrated DHS into planning processes. In addition, open-ended comments on our survey reflected some frustrations with DHS integration—though these concerns did not appear to be pervasive or systemic. We visited two missions where officials expressed positive remarks about DHS’s opportunities to collaborate with its federal partners in the respective U.S. mission. In both of these missions, the DCM stressed to us the importance of fully integrating the DHS attaché into U.S. mission strategic planning. At these same two U.S. missions, the DHS attachés said they make a focused effort to ensure that the other federal partners understand the roles and responsibilities of DHS and all of its components—whether or not their personnel are stationed at the embassy. At another U.S. mission we visited, the DCM told us that the DHS attaché had an opportunity to participate in a strategic planning process and was later able to comment on the final product. However, this DHS attaché told us that he did not fully understand the purpose of the planning meeting he attended nor did he believe he had been provided encouragement or channels for further participation beyond the single meeting. At this U.S. mission, DHS personnel reported frustrations about limits on their ability to contribute, while U.S. mission management raised questions about DHS’s value to their mission. At another U.S. mission with border security concerns, DHS officials said the embassy’s border working group had not been addressing DHS priorities or activities. According to the DHS officials, the embassy was not encouraging a “whole-of-government” approach that recognizes the value of DHS contributions. Although few DCMs and DHS attachés reported that DHS does not participate in helping to develop U.S. mission strategic goals, some respondents discussed issues in open-ended comments with DHS’s integration and clarity of roles within U.S. missions. For example, in open- ended survey responses, one DCM said DHS personnel are individually cooperative, but internal stove-piping limits DHS’s ability to contribute. Another DCM commented that DHS is organized and deployed in a manner that limits its ability to bring its knowledge and skills to bear. We identified 14 potential challenges that could hinder the contribution of DHS knowledge and skills abroad to combating terrorism efforts. Fewer than half of respondents identified any of the challenges as moderate or significant challenges. In most cases, more than two-thirds said the challenges were minimal or did not apply to them. Figures 7 and 8 show the top 5 (or 6 in case of a tie for fifth place) most frequently identified challenges that DCMs and DHS attachés identified as representing some level of challenge—significant, moderate, or minimal—ranked by frequency. See appendix IV for a list of all 14 challenges and the extent to which DCMs and DHS attachés reported experiencing them. Some survey respondents elaborated, in written comments, about issues with DHS domestic management effectively coordinating with and leveraging personnel abroad. For example, one DHS respondent stated that DHS domestic management, through contact with foreign embassies in the United States, has come into conflict with DHS operations in country. A DCM respondent indicated that when issues arise, they often originate from insufficient coordination with DHS domestic management, with State, and with DHS in the field. Another DCM respondent indicated that DHS domestic management regularly gets involved in international affairs without informing DHS field office or embassy management. In addition, a DCM respondent indicated that challenges come primarily from the U.S. side (rather than DHS personnel at the embassy). In addition, officials we spoke with mentioned that sometimes miscommunication or misalignment between DHS domestic management and embassies causes problems. For example, at one U.S. mission we visited, the DCM and DHS personnel described an instance in which DHS domestic operations took down a communication link used by transnational criminals in the country without consulting anyone at the embassy, including DHS personnel. However, DHS’s law enforcement partners were monitoring the link for more strategic purposes and the action negatively affected their operation—an outcome that DHS personnel at the embassy could have alerted them to had they been consulted. Some respondents elaborated about the extent to which the availability of U.S. mission resources to sponsor programs that would call for contributions of DHS knowledge and skills is a challenge. For example, one DCM respondent indicated that the embassy is an old facility that is not sized adequately to house all the federal agencies and space restrictions affect the U.S. mission’s ability to accommodate DHS’s presence. In addition, at two sites we visited, officials indicated that space is scarce, especially given rapidly growing needs, so making room for DHS staff, or any other federal stakeholder, is challenging and requires a strong cost-benefit case. In addition, officials we spoke with mentioned constrained or unpredictable budgets hampering planning and the ability to dedicate resources to DHS programs or personnel. One DHS survey respondent commented that with little to no budget, it is difficult to build contacts with foreign partners, effectively communicate meeting outcomes, and develop long term strategic plans. Some respondents elaborated about the extent to which U.S. mission understanding of DHS’s role is a challenge. For example, one DHS respondent commented that in larger embassies the mission of counterterrorism is focused on other agencies, and DHS sometimes does not have the opportunity to discuss what it can offer. Another DHS respondent indicated that other mission personnel do not understand exactly the role of DHS and how it contributes to mission-related objectives. We also surveyed DCMs and DHS attachés about the extent to which the challenges they have experienced have affected DHS’s ability to contribute—for example, by creating conflicts, missed opportunities, project delays, or unnecessary overlap. As shown in figures 9 and 10, for all impacts that might have arisen from the identified challenges, more than two-thirds of respondents said the impact was minimal or did not affect them. DHS has taken actions to increase organizational and programmatic alignment for its resource use abroad—including establishing an intradepartmental governance board, reviewing the department’s international footprint, and creating a department-wide international engagement plan. However, DHS has not established mechanisms to help ensure that decisions to deploy resources abroad—which are made at the individual component level—effectively, efficiently, and consistently align with department-wide strategic priorities. DHS’s QHSR calls for a specific focus on strengthening the homeland security enterprise, in part by maturing the department. According to the QHSR, critical aspects of maturing the department include (1) improved organizational alignment—particularly among DHS headquarters components—(2) enhanced programmatic alignment to the homeland security missions; and (3) more efficient and effective management processes, including strategic planning, performance management, and accounting structures. To that end, DHS and OIA have taken three actions related to its resource use abroad since 2010. Establishment of the DHS International Governance Board in August 2012. The board is chaired by the Assistant Secretary for International Affairs and composed of heads of international affairs from the DHS components. The board provides a formal organizational mechanism for the component heads and OIA to collaborate and coordinate crosscutting policy issues related to international engagement. According to OIA officials, since its establishment, the board has met monthly to discuss and resolve issues like designating DHS attachés, expanding criminal history information sharing for law enforcement, responding to a new presidential directive that calls for interagency collaboration to enhance security capacity around the globe, and coordinating with State on DHS’s presence abroad. For example, in May 2013 the group considered who should be designated the DHS attaché in a country where two components had recently established offices. Review of the DHS international footprint. Over the period spanning 2011 and early 2012, DHS reviewed the department’s international footprint—the complete set of resources and efforts DHS had deployed abroad—with the intention of enhancing organizational and programmatic alignment. This “footprint review” was led by OIA, in coordination with component heads, and it evaluated the placement of resources on the basis of the QHSR’s five strategic missions, cost, and potential for engagement with host nations. In at least one case, according to OIA officials, this resulted in components reducing FTEs in one country and increasing them in another—generally in response to the potential to achieve key strategic priorities by strengthening engagement in the country where they increased the resources and to realize cost savings. Creation of an international engagement plan. In March 2013, the Secretary of Homeland Security signed DHS’s first International Engagement Plan. To promote common international objectives and priorities across the department, the plan maps key activities abroad to DHS’s five strategic missions. It also includes specific strategies in separate international engagement plans for various regions of the world including Canada; Mexico; Latin America and the Caribbean; Europe; the Middle East, Africa, and South Asia; and Asia Pacific.Each regional international engagement plan discusses DHS interests, challenges and opportunities, and strategic objectives, among other things. For example, the plan on Mexico states that the flow of goods and people through the Western Hemisphere and across the United States border, particularly those flows originating in or transiting through Mexico, represent both the most significant challenges and the best opportunities for DHS. Although a stated goal of DHS’s QHSR is to strengthen the homeland security enterprise and mature the department through improved organizational alignment across the components and programmatic alignment to homeland security missions, DHS has not established mechanisms to help provide assurance of alignment of its resource use abroad with department-wide and government-wide strategic priorities. Specifically, it (1) has not established specific department-wide strategic priorities to guide organizational and programmatic alignment; (2) does not have an institutionalized mechanism to ensure ongoing monitoring of alignment between resource use and strategic priorities; and (3) does not have the means to produce reliable, comparable cost data to support analysis of organizational and programmatic alignment in its department- wide resource use abroad. Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government calls for agencies to implement policies, procedures, techniques, and mechanisms to enforce management’s directives—for example, to help achieve the goals of organizational and programmatic alignment and efficient, effective management processes around its resource deployment abroad. In addition, the standards call for agencies to ensure that ongoing monitoring occurs in the course of normal operations, is performed continually, and is ingrained in the agency’s operations. Finally, the standards say that relevant, reliable, and timely information should be available to help an agency achieve its objectives. Although DHS has a broad mission set and decision making about resource use abroad is decentralized, it has not established specific department-wide strategic priorities—such as specific types of activities or target regions to further combating terrorism goals—for resource use abroad to help promote organizational alignment in resource decision making. DHS is tasked with a variety of responsibilities that are not directly aimed at preventing terrorist attacks. In the course of efforts to secure the homeland, some activities focus more broadly on transnational crime such as narcotics and human smuggling, money laundering, and immigration fraud that could be, in some cases, enablers for terrorist networks. In addition, the QHSR notes that DHS’s missions are multifaceted by nature, and efforts to fulfill them also involve promoting legitimate trade, travel, and immigration. DHS’s International Engagement Plan links the five QHSR missions to the kinds of activities that DHS conducts abroad. In this way, it helps ensure programmatic alignment to homeland security missions at a high level. However, it does not establish specific priorities to help guide resource decision making. For example, our analysis of DHS’s International Engagement Plan found that although there were goals listed for each region, there was no ordering of priorities by region, by source of terrorism, by function, or by goal (e.g., combating international terrorism). Because the plan covers all mission activities described within the QHSR without clear, specific priorities, it does not convey information about what might be most important when deciding how to deploy scarce resources. The lack of specific department-wide strategic priorities for resource use abroad also creates limitations in DHS’s ability to help ensure alignment of its priorities and abilities with government-wide efforts. Officials in the Office of Counterterrorism Policy and in OIA stated that DHS’s highest priority for resource use abroad is prevention of attacks on the homeland. Focusing on preventing attacks on the homeland is consistent with the National Security Strategy’s and the National Strategy for Counterterrorism’s calls for the use of homeland security tools to promote national security and counter terrorism. However, DHS’s Office of Counterterrorism Policy officials told us that because the regional plans within DHS’s International Engagement Plan covers all countries with which DHS engages, from Canada to Afghanistan, the plan does not represent a clear priority focus on countries with factors that represent more immediate threats to the homeland. They noted that in their engagement with the White House and other federal partners for government-wide counterterrorism efforts, DHS’s International Engagement Plan—because it covers all DHS missions, not just counterterrorism—does not help them demonstrate DHS’s counterterrorism priorities within its overall international engagement. According to OIA officials, the International Engagement Plan lays out in one place for the first time all of DHS’s international activities in an effort to improve organizational and programmatic resource alignment. However, they acknowledged that it does not necessarily serve to identify a clear set of priorities and principles that would help to guide future resource decisions. Instead, it represents more of a compendium of the many activities and priorities each of the contributing components and offices within DHS already had planned or under way. They noted that having a crosscutting view of all the activities and goals across the international footprint is a significant step forward for the department. They also said that more clarity on strategic priorities in future iterations would help ensure better organizational and programmatic alignment, but current priorities are largely determined independently by each component, and the department has not established a routine and crosscutting process for clarifying department-wide priorities. Specific strategic priorities would provide DHS critical information to guide resource trade-off decisions and ensure that resources are directed to the highest homeland security priorities across the department and government-wide. Although OIA conducted a one-time exercise to evaluate the department’s international footprint to try to bring it into better organizational and programmatic alignment, DHS has not established a routine or ingrained process that would continually assess the alignment between strategic goals and resource decisions. Each of the operational components we interviewed described different rationales and methods for deciding where and how many resources to deploy around the world. OIA officials acknowledged the need for mechanisms—such as the footprint review—to be conducted routinely in order to meet the goal of facilitating enhanced organizational and programmatic alignment. They also said the development of an institutionalized mechanism that includes department-wide methods and metrics that were meaningful to all of the components would help provide coherent strategic overlay to give the department better assurance of alignment between resource use and strategic priorities. These OIA officials added that they would like to enhance the rigor of the footprint review process and implement it on a routine basis, but have not done so because of resource limitations and competing priorities. Officials noted that ensuring a coherent department- wide approach to resource use abroad is an important goal. However, they said the first review was a major undertaking. They stated they have not devised an approach for implementing a routine, ingrained process with department-wide methods and metrics. Given that DHS’s components make individual decisions about resource deployment abroad, an institutionalized mechanism—whether it is enhancement and institutionalization of the footprint review or another control activity—to help routinely monitor and adjust organizational and programmatic alignment across the department would provide DHS better assurance that its strategic priorities translate to resource use decisions on an ongoing basis to support the QHSR’s goals. DHS does not have comparable cost data for its programs and activities abroad and has not established a standardized framework to capture these data to help inform resource decision making and to achieve management efficiencies when addressing issues that are common across the department. To achieve the organizational and programmatic alignment called for by the QHSR, it is important for decision makers at the component level to have information that helps promote such alignment on an ongoing basis and during routine monitoring activities. However, each of the components tracks its international expenditures differently, and according to OIA officials, the effort to collect comparable information that reliably informs management decision making has been challenging.framework for the costs of conducting activities abroad—for example, salaries, housing, and fees paid to embassies to cover certain administrative and security costs—across the department could enable OIA to identify best practices that could lead to cost savings in international deployments and enhance the ability to assess the outcomes and cost-effectiveness of programs and activities carried out abroad. A framework to help capture comparable cost data department- wide could provide with DHS critical information to make informed resource trade-off decisions and increase cost efficiency. Combating terrorism is a government-wide responsibility, which requires contributions from departments and agencies across the U.S. government. DHS and its components have made meaningful contributions by carrying out key homeland security activities abroad and through international engagement that helps other nations strengthen their security functions, making it harder for terrorists to operate globally. Although the operational decisions to deploy resources abroad are generally made by individual DHS components, DHS’s QHSR calls for efforts to mature the department through improved organizational and programmatic alignment around specific mission objectives like international engagement and combating terrorism. DHS has made some progress toward such alignment across its international footprint with recent actions it has taken—like completing an international footprint review that provided the department with an opportunity to help ensure that resources deployed abroad are devoted to the highest department- and government-wide priorities. However, the one-time review has not been established as an institutional process to help ensure alignment between priorities and resource decisions on an ongoing basis. Therefore, DHS does not have full assurance that department-wide priorities translate to resource-tradeoff decisions at the component level. Moreover, there are limitations that hamper DHS’s ability to consider two key factors for resource trade-off decisions—strategic priorities and cost. Although DHS’s International Engagement Plan describes how programmatic activities abroad align with the five missions outlined in the QHSR, these documents do not establish clear and specific strategic priorities for resource deployment abroad. In addition, without a common framework for tracking international expenditures across the department, DHS is limited in its ability to make informed resource trade-off decisions. An institutionalized process for a routine strategic review of DHS’s international footprint, supported by clear and specific priorities to inform trade-offs and a framework to capture comparable and reliable cost data across the department could help provide better assurance of organizational and programmatic alignment. In order to help ensure that DHS’s resource use abroad aligns with the highest department-wide and U.S. government-wide priorities, we recommend that the Secretary of Homeland Security take the following three actions: establish specific department-wide priorities for resource use abroad; establish a routine, institutionalized mechanism to ensure alignment of the department’s resource use abroad with the highest department- wide and government-wide strategic priorities; and establish a common reporting framework to allow for the collection of reliable, comparable department-wide cost data for resource use abroad. We provided a draft of this report to DHS and received written comments, which are reproduced in full in appendix V. We also provided a draft of this report to State and the Departments of Defense and Justice, which did not provide written comments. DHS and State provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. DHS concurred with all three recommendations, noting that it will take steps to implement them. With respect to the first recommendation, DHS stated that it will shape its International Engagement Plan into a more specific, comprehensive, and strategic plan for resource allocation abroad across the Department’s international organizations, with an estimated completion date of March 31, 2014. Regarding the second recommendation, DHS stated that it will develop a methodology and system for tracking newly identified strategic priorities and objectives that meet DHS and U.S. Government-wide priorities related to counterterrorism, with an estimated completion date of September 30, 2014. Finally, for the third recommendation, DHS stated that it will establish a working group to focus on a Department-wide system to capture individual component expenditure data and represent the information in a cohesive, comparable manner, with an estimated completion date of September 30, 2014. We believe these actions, if fully implemented, will address the intent of our recommendations. As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce the contents of this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days from the report date. At that time, we will send copies to Secretaries of Defense, Homeland Security, and State; the Attorney General; selected congressional committees; and other interested parties. In addition, the report will be available at no charge on the GAO website at http://www.gao.gov. If you or your staff have any further questions about this report, please contact Dave Maurer at (202) 512-9627 or MaurerD@gao.gov, or Charles Michael Johnson, Jr., at (202) 512-7331 or JohnsonCM@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. Key contributors to this report are listed in appendix VI. Our objectives were to answer the following questions: (1) What programs, activities, and resources does the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) have abroad to help combat terrorism? (2) How, if at all, has DHS contributed to U.S. missions’ efforts to combat terrorism and what factors, if any, have facilitated or hampered those contributions? (3) To what extent has DHS taken action to align its resource use abroad with departmental and government-wide strategic priorities? To define the scope of activities and resources to be included in this performance audit, we reviewed and analyzed key government-wide strategies related to combating terrorism—the May 2010 National Security Strategy and the July 2011 National Strategy for Combating Terrorism. We also reviewed DHS documents designed to establish its mission and goals such as the 2010 Quadrennial Homeland Security Review (QHSR), DHS’s Strategic Plan FY2012-2016, and DHS’s Performance and Accountability Report 2011-2013. Additionally, we reviewed DHS program documentation related to activities established in those documents. We also reviewed and discussed findings with the DHS Office of Inspector General officials responsible for a 2008 report that made a number of recommendations designed to enhance DHS’s management of international affairs. We also interviewed officials in DHS Office of International Affairs (OIA) and the Office of Counterterrorism Policy within DHS’s Office of Policy about the nature and scope of DHS activities abroad and DHS counterterrorism activities. In addition, we interviewed officials from the Department of State’s (State) Bureaus for Counterterrorism, Diplomatic Security, and Consular Affairs about the nature and scope of their coordination between their efforts and DHS efforts abroad, because these bureaus have efforts that involved collaboration with DHS abroad. On the basis of those document reviews and interviews, we determined that the DHS operational components with mission activities most relevant for a review of DHS efforts abroad to combat terrorism included U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), Transportation Security Administration (TSA), U.S. Coast Guard (USCG), U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS), and U.S. Secret Service (USSS). To identify the programs and activities that DHS has to help combat terrorism abroad, on the basis of our interviews with the DHS components and offices and the State bureau officials, we established a definition of combating terrorism for the purposes of identifying and collecting data on programs and activities: Any DHS program or activity that in the course of its normal operation may have the effect of thwarting terrorists or their plots whether designed solely and specifically for that purpose or not. Using that definition and through reviews of our prior work and DHS program documentation, we independently identified the list of programs and activities that constitute DHS’s efforts to combat terrorism abroad. We then verified the list with DHS officials responsible for various programs, refining it, as appropriate. To identify resources used abroad in support of these programs and activities, we asked DHS to provide expenditure and related data. On the basis of our interviews with OIA and budget officials from the six DHS operational components in our review, we determined that because DHS’s missions involve carrying out activities for multifaceted purposes, it would not be possible to isolate expenditures abroad for combating terrorism from expenditures abroad to carry out other mission activities. Therefore, we asked OIA and the six operational components in our review to provide data separately on all expenditures abroad, as well as data specific to training and technical assistance activities that met our definition for combating terrorism, for fiscal years 2008 through 2012. For the 5 years of expenditure data, we checked for consistency and reasonableness and discussed data reliability controls with OIA and each component office that provided it to determine how the data were collected and what controls were in place to help ensure its accuracy, among other things. We found that because of the differences in missions and methods for tracking expenditure data, the data sets provided by the components had some variations in the elements included in the data sets and limitations in the ability to isolate expenditures by country. In these cases, we attempted to harmonize the data definitions across the component data sets and worked with DHS component officials to agree on methods for estimating expenditures by country. For example, the individual country break-down of travel costs in USCIS’s Refugee Affairs Division was not consistently tracked separately by country, because the program’s activities commonly involved multicountry trips. To obtain travel costs for this program, USCIS joined three different sets of data: obligations, itineraries, and the central bill account for travel reimbursements. In fiscal year 2012, there were approximately 500 international travel authorizations. Of these, about 400 were for a single country. For the remaining multicountry itineraries, USCIS calculated expenditures by country by using the number of days spent in each country to calculate a percentage and divide the total itinerary cost. For example, on a $10,000 trip visiting country A for 4 days and country B for 6 days, expenditures would be calculated as $4,000 in country A and $6,000 in country B. We noted any remaining differences among component expenditure data sets, as necessary (see also app. III). On the basis of our discussions with knowledgeable DHS officials and the actions we took, we found that the data were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of providing a general estimate of expenditures abroad for fiscal years 2008 through 2012, with the additional information provided. The full-time-equivalent employees (FTE) stationed abroad are monitored at DHS through its Overseas Personnel and Activities Locator, which is maintained by DHS Office of Operations Coordination and Planning. The locator is updated monthly with self-reported data from the components, which may capture some personnel on travel duty in additional to permanently deployed FTEs. We collected these data for May 2013, the most recent month for which DHS was able to provide the data during the period of our study. On the basis of discussions about the system and relevant control activities with the responsible officials, we determined that these data were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of reporting FTEs abroad during the specified month in which they were collected. For the data we gathered on training and technical assistance activities for fiscal years 2008 through 2012, we attempted to obtain the number of personnel and expenditures dedicated to staff who conducted training and technical assistance on a temporary basis, but some components were unable to provide data for multiple fiscal years, and we encountered numerous challenges, such as inconsistent data definitions and lack of confidence by DHS officials in the accuracy or completeness of the data. As a result, we did not include this information in our report. However, we determined that information the six DHS operational components in our review were able to provide was sufficiently reliable for the purpose of reporting the foreign nation whose officials received DHS-delivered training and technical assistance. We made this determination on the basis of checks for reasonableness and discussions with responsible DHS officials about the steps taken to help ensure accuracy of the data. To examine how DHS has contributed to U.S. missions’ efforts to combat terrorism and the factors that have facilitated or hampered those contributions, we reviewed documentation about DHS’s component activities abroad and State programs and activities on which DHS collaborates. We also relied on our interviews with agency officials and web-based surveys of deputy chiefs of mission (DCM) and DHS attachés in U.S. missions where DHS components were stationed in the embassy. We interviewed officials from DHS OIA and the Office of Counterterrorism Policy with DHS’s Office of Policy; the six operational DHS operational components; and the State Bureaus for Counterterrorism, Diplomatic Security, and Consular Affairs about the nature and scope of DHS activities abroad and coordination with State. We visited 10 U.S. missions where FTEs from one or more DHS components were stationed. During these visits, we interviewed officials from DHS, generally including the DHS attaché and other senior DHS officials at the U.S. mission. We also interviewed State officials, including the DCM at each mission and other senior officials with responsibility for programs abroad that involve coordination or collaboration with DHS. On the basis of advice from State and DHS personnel at each U.S. mission, as well as availability and relevance, we also interviewed some officials from the Departments of Defense and Justice that may collaborate with DHS abroad. We conducted a total of 70 interviews. During these interviews, we asked questions and gathered specific examples of how DHS works abroad with federal partners under the authority of the chief of mission to help support government-wide efforts to combat terrorism. To provide balance and diversity, we selected the 10 U.S. mission sites based on a range of factors, including the nature and scope of DHS’s presence abroad—for example, the number of components represented and the size of the overall DHS deployment; indicators of terrorism risk—specifically we considered (1) inclusion in CBP’s Aliens from Special Interest Countries, (2) State’s country reports on terrorism, (3) designation as a terrorist safe haven, and (4) advice from DHS and State subject matter experts; safety, security, and related logistical concerns—based on State advice; and the opportunity to leverage resources. We visited Mexico City, Mexico; Panama City, Panama; Buenos Aries, Argentina; Manila, the Philippines; Tokyo, Japan; Jakarta, Indonesia; Singapore; Amman, Jordan; Kabul, Afghanistan; and Abu Dhabi and Dubai, United Arab Emirates. The results from our visits to these 10 countries cannot be generalized; however, the visits provided insights on how DHS contributes to U.S. mission combating terrorism efforts, what is working well, and any barriers to effective contribution. We analyzed the responses to our interviews about the nature and scope of DHS activities abroad and DHS counterterrorism activities with State and DHS officials at headquarters and with federal officials in the first 3 of the 10 site visits, to identify types of knowledge and skill contributions DHS has made to U.S. missions and any challenges and impacts DHS and its federal partners have encountered. We also relied on this set of interviews to identify factors that helped to facilitate DHS contributions in the U.S. mission environment. Because a U.S. mission is an inherently interagency environment, in addition to the interview responses, we considered the practices and considerations for promoting effective interagency collaboration outlined in two prior GAO reports when identifying factors that facilitate DHS’s ability to contribute its knowledge and skills. We used this analysis to develop two web-based surveys to be administered to all DCMs and DHS attachés in U.S. missions where one or more DHS components had FTEs stationed in the embassy. We identified all DCMs and DHS attachés meeting this definition from lists provided to us by State for DCMs and DHS OIA for DHS attachés. Our final survey populations included DCMs and DHS attachés in 57 U.S. missions. We selected DCMs to provide a perspective from State because the DCM supervises department heads within the U.S. mission and handles many issues pertaining to the day-to-day operation of the mission. We selected DHS attachés to provide a perspective from DHS because these officials act as the in-country representatives for DHS. We conducted survey pretests with five DHS attachés and three DCMs, a mix of officials with whom we had already met and with whom we had never discussed the purpose of our evaluation. During the pretests, we worked with the respondents to ensure the clarity and appropriateness of the language and questions in the survey. We also discussed with respondents the comprehensiveness of the lists we had developed—DHS contributions, facilitation factors, challenges, and impacts. On the basis of pretest feedback, we further refined our analysis of these items. In addition, to provide further assurance that our analysis was comprehensive in identifying DHS contributions, facilitation factors, challenges, and impacts, we included in our survey questionnaires open- ended questions that allowed respondents to provide additional information about these items. We administered the surveys between April 16, and July 19, 2013, to DCMs and DHS attachés in the 57 U.S. missions. We sent follow-up e- mail messages on April 24, 2013, May 1, 2013, and May 13, 2013, to those who had not yet completed the survey. Overall, we received responses from 41 DCMs and 47 DHS attachés, yielding a response rate of 72 percent and 82 percent, respectively. We ran comparative tests on the responses for factors, challenges, and impacts on the responses provided by DCMs and DHS attachés, and found no significant differences between the two groups. Additionally, in the survey we asked both groups to identify which facilitation factors were important, and in separate questions asked them to identify which were in place and operating effectively. We checked the responses for the factors most frequently identified as important against the factors in place and operating effectively and found no meaningful systematic trends indicating that any single factor was not in place across the embassies we surveyed. Because this was not a sample survey, it has no sampling errors. However, the practical difficulties of conducting any survey may introduce errors, commonly referred to as nonsampling errors. For example, difficulties in interpreting a particular question, sources of information available to respondents, or entering data into a database or analyzing them can introduce unwanted variability into the survey results. We took steps in developing the questionnaire, collecting the data, and analyzing them to minimize such nonsampling errors. In addition to pretesting our survey questionnaires as already mentioned, we worked with our social science survey specialists to design the questionnaire, and the questionnaires went through internal reviews with independent survey experts. When we analyzed the data, an independent analyst checked all computer programs. Since this was a web-based questionnaire, respondents entered their answers directly into the electronic questionnaire, eliminating the need to key data into a database, minimizing error. See appendix IV for survey results for contributions, challenges, and impacts. To evaluate the extent to which DHS has taken action to align its resource use abroad with departmental and government-wide strategic priorities, we analyzed DHS’s QHSR, in particular its prescriptions for maturing the department. These prescriptions include improving organizational alignment—particularly among operational components— enhanced programmatic alignment to the homeland security missions, and more efficient and effective management processes, including strategic planning, performance management, and accounting structure. Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government calls for control activities—that is policies, procedures, techniques, and mechanisms—to enforce management’s directives. In this respect, we evaluated the extent to which DHS had control activities in place to help achieve the goals of organizational and programmatic alignment and efficient, effective management processes around its resource deployment abroad. To evaluate the extent to which DHS had mechanisms in place designed to provide reasonable assurance of achieving its stated goal of department-wide organizational and programmatic alignment in the allocation and deployment of resources abroad, we reviewed documentation such as DHS’s Management Directive that describes roles and responsibility for managing international affairs. We also interviewed officials in OIA, the six DHS components in our review, and DHS’s Office of Policy about how decisions to deploy resources abroad are made and the extent to which they undertake efforts to facilitate programmatic and organizational alignment across the complete set of resources and efforts DHS deploys abroad. We also interviewed officials in the Office of Counterterrorism Policy within DHS’s Office of Policy about how DHS and government-wide counterterrorism goals inform resource use decisions. We conducted this performance audit from October 2012 to September 2013 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. Table 5 shows the number of training or technical assistance activities provided by components, by country in fiscal year 2012. Appendix III: Elements of Expenditures Included in Data for Expenditures Abroad by Component Elements of expenditures included CBP Office of International Affairs expenditure elements include salary and benefits, operating costs, International Cooperative Administrative Support Services (ICASS), Capital Security Cost-Sharing Program (CSCS), guard services, medical, and Diplomatic Telecommunications Service Program Office (DTSPO) expenditures by foreign post. In Kuwait, Office of International Affairs includes charges for personal service contractor moves. In Iraq, operating costs include travel, supplies, equipment, and training. CBP Office of Border Patrol expenditure elements include personnel costs and travel expenditures by foreign country. In Mexico and Canada, Office of Border Patrol also includes program costs such as various program and operating costs. CBP Office of Field Operations expenditure elements include salary and benefits, operating costs, ICASS, CSCS, guard services, medical, DTSPO, and training by foreign post. For the Immigration Advisory Program and Preclearance programs, Office of Field Operations also includes headquarters costs. For the Container Security Initiative, they also include charges for relocations, central circuits, travel, Container Security Initiative/ICE agent support, and other central expenses (information technology services and ICASS overhead) in support of foreign posts, but do not break these costs down by foreign post. ICE’s overseas expenditure elements by foreign post include salary and benefits, operating costs, dependent’s educational allowances, operational travel, permanent change of station moves (PCS), Department of State’s ICASS and CSCS charges for fiscal years 2009-2012, and purchase cards. ICE’s overseas expenditure elements also include Department of State’s ICASS and CSCS charges for fiscal year 2008, which cannot be broken down by foreign post. TSA expenditure elements include payroll, travel, ICASS charges, embassy expenses, and CSCS by foreign post. USCG expenditure elements include personnel costs, operating expenses, CSCS charges, and ICASS by foreign post. USCIS expenditure elements include payroll, general expenses, CSCS, ICASS, and travel by foreign post. USCIS also includes expenditures for total ICASS overhead costs in support of foreign posts. USSS expenditure elements include salaries, benefits, travel, communications and rents, guard services, medical, permanent change of station moves, supplies, equipment, building and maintenance, contractual services, Department of State support services, physical examinations, ICASS, and training expenses by foreign post. USSS’s overseas expenditure elements also include other central expenses (such as information technology services, CSCS, and ICASS overhead) in support of foreign posts), which cannot be broken down by foreign post. DHS OIA overseas expenditure elements include salaries, benefits, ICASS, operating costs, guard services, medical, and DTSPO by individual country for fiscal year 2009 through fiscal year 2012. Fiscal year 2008 data are unavailable. DHS OIA overseas expenditure elements also include CSCS, but those expenditures are not broken down by individual country. Figure 11 shows the results of the survey question: In the last 24 months, how much, if at all, has DHS contributed to your mission’s combating terrorism goals? Figure 12 shows the results of the survey question: In the last 24 months, how much, if at all, has DHS contributed in the following ways to U.S. government-wide combating terrorism goals in the mission for which you serve as DHS attaché? Figure 13 shows the results of the survey question: In last 24 months, what degree of challenge, if any, have the following been to DHS’s ability to contribute its knowledge and skills to your mission’s combating terrorism goals? Figure 14 shows the results of the survey question: In last 24 months, what degree of challenge, if any, have the following been to DHS’s ability to contribute its knowledge and skills to U.S. government-wide combating terrorism goals in the mission for which you serve as DHS attaché? Figure 15 shows the results of the survey question: In the last 24 months, if any of the following have occurred as a result of challenges described in question 6, how much of an impact has it had on DHS’s contributions to U.S. government-wide combating terrorism goals? Figure 16 shows the results of the survey question: In the last 24 months, if any of the following have occurred as a result of challenges described in question 6, how much of an impact has it had on DHS’s contributions to U.S. government-wide combating terrorism goals? In addition to the contacts named above, Adam Hoffman and Jason Bair, Assistant Directors; Chloe Brown; Marc Castellano; and Kathryn Godfrey made key contributions to this report. Also contributing to this report were Josh Diosomito; Lorraine Ettaro; Eric Hauswirth; Paul Hobart; Brandon Hunt; Thomas Lombardi; Alicia Loucks; Erin O’Brien; Anthony Pordes; and Christine San.

Summary: Combating terrorism is a governmentwide effort, to which DHS contributes. In such efforts abroad, DHS partners with the Department of State (State)-- the lead agency at U.S. missions. DHS deploys resources abroad to carry out programs and build capacity within its areas of expertise--border, maritime, aviation, and cyber security; immigration; and law enforcement. GAO was asked to examine DHS's efforts abroad to combat terrorism. This report answers the following questions: (1) What programs, activities, and resources does DHS have abroad to help combat terrorism? (2) How, if at all, has DHS contributed to U.S. missions and what, if any, factors have affected contributions? (3) To what extent has DHS aligned resource use abroad with strategic priorities? GAO analyzed DHS expenditures for fiscal years 2008-2012, personnel data for May 2013 and documents, such as national strategies and management directives. GAO also interviewed DHS and State officials in headquarters and 10 countries, selected on the basis of factors such as the size of DHS's presence. The results from site visits cannot be generalized but provided insights. GAO also surveyed DHS and State personnel in all 57 U.S. missions where DHS has a presence. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) carries out a variety of programs and activities abroad within its areas of expertise that could have the effect of thwarting terrorists and their plots while also combating other categories of transnational crime, and DHS expended approximately $451 million on programs and activities abroad in fiscal year 2012. For example, through the Visa Security Program, DHS has deployed personnel abroad to help prevent the issuance of visas to people who might pose a threat. As of May 2013, DHS has stationed about 1,800 employees in almost 80 countries to conduct these and other activities. In addition, DHS has delivered training and technical assistance in areas such as border and aviation security to officials from about 180 countries to enhance partner nations' security capacities. GAO identified five types of contributions DHS has made to U.S. missions (e.g., embassies and consulates), 12 factors that support DHS's ability to contribute, and a range of challenges and impacts related to DHS contributions. On the basis of surveys of DHS and State officials abroad, GAO found that DHS has significantly or moderately contributed to combating terrorism goals for each of the types of contributions GAO identified, including building relationships, identifying threats, and sharing information. The factors GAO identified that facilitated DHS's ability to contribute fell into two general categories: (1) facilitating a collaborative climate and (2) leveraging resources and clarifying roles and responsibilities. GAO also identified a variety of challenges, including DHS domestic management effectively coordinating with personnel abroad and partners at U.S. missions understanding of DHS's role. Fewer than half of respondents identified any challenge as moderate or significant. For impacts arising from these challenges, less than one-third of respondents identified them as causing a significant or moderate impact. DHS has taken actions to increase organizational and programmatic alignment, but has not established mechanisms to ensure that resource use abroad aligns with department-wide and government-wide strategic priorities. DHS has a stated objective to improve alignment across the department, and Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government calls for agencies to implement mechanisms to help ensure achievement of their objectives. Although DHS conducted a onetime review of the department's international footprint and created a departmentwide international engagement plan, DHS has not established mechanisms to help ensure that decisions to deploy resources abroad--which are made at the individual component level--align with department-wide and government-wide strategic priorities. Specifically, DHS (1) has not established department-wide strategic priorities for international engagement, such as specific types of activities or target regions to further combating terrorism goals; (2) does not have a mechanism for monitoring alignment between resource deployment abroad and strategic priorities; and (3) does not have reliable, comparable cost data for its programs and activities abroad and has not established a standardized framework to capture these data. Strategic priorities, a mechanism to routinely monitor alignment between strategic priorities and resource deployment abroad, and reliable cost data could provide DHS with critical information to make informed resource deployment decisions and help achieve its objective to improve organizational alignment across components. GAO recommends that DHS establish (1) department-wide strategic priorities, (2) an institutionalized mechanism to review resource alignment abroad, and (3) a method to collect reliable and comparable cost data for resources abroad. DHS concurred with these recommendations.