The Palestinian territories, comprising the West Bank and Gaza, cover 2,402 square miles and have a combined population of over 4 million people. (See fig. 1.) Both the PA and Israel administer areas within the West Bank. The U.S. government, along with other countries, has provided intermittent security assistance to the Palestinians since 1993. In 1993, the Oslo Accord called for limited Palestinian self-rule and security responsibilities in the West Bank and Gaza. The subsequent 1995 Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip divided the West Bank into three zones and allotted civil and security responsibilities, to varying degrees, to the Israeli government and the PA. The Government of Israel allowed the PA to establish some security forces and coordinated with the PA on the establishment of limited self-rule in the West Bank and Gaza. The United States provided some non-lethal equipment and a small amount of funding for salaries to help the newly created PA security forces improve their professionalism and combat terrorism. Other countries provided the PA with security assistance focused on training and equipping the security forces. The outbreak of the second intifada (insurrection), which State reports resulted in the death of more than 3,000 Palestinians and about 1,000 Israelis between 2000 and 2004, disrupted security assistance efforts. In response to the intifada, the Israeli security forces reoccupied much of the West Bank previously ceded to PA control, set up hundreds of checkpoints and roadblocks throughout the territory, erected a wall separating Israel and some Palestinian territory from the rest of the West Bank, and destroyed much of the Palestinian security infrastructure. As a result, Israeli-Palestinian security cooperation ceased and other governments curtailed or halted their security assistance to the PA. Amid the violence, efforts to negotiate a Middle East peace agreement began in 2000 at Camp David and continued until 2003. Security assistance efforts did not resume until after the PA, Israel, United States, United Nations, European Union, and Russia agreed in 2003 to implement the Roadmap for Peace, a U.S.-proposed performance-based strategy, which calls for an independent Palestinian state coexisting peacefully with the State of Israel and, among other things, provides a plan for establishing the security preconditions necessary to create an independent Palestinian state. The Roadmap, among other things, obligates the PA and Israel to undertake specific actions to improve security as part of the ongoing Middle East peace process. In particular, the Roadmap obligates the PA to perform the following actions: Issue an unequivocal statement reiterating Israel’s right to exist in peace and security and calling for an immediate and unconditional ceasefire to end armed activity and all acts of violence against Israelis anywhere. All official Palestinian institutions end incitement against Israel. Have its rebuilt and refocused security apparatus begin sustained, targeted, and effective operations aimed at confronting all those engaged in terror and dismantlement of terrorist capabilities and infrastructure. This includes commencing confiscation of illegal weapons and consolidation of security authority, free of association with terror and corruption. Consolidate all Palestinian security organizations into three services reporting to an empowered Interior Minister. In return, the Roadmap obligates the Israelis to perform the following actions: Issue an unequivocal statement affirming its commitment to the two-state vision of an independent, viable, sovereign Palestinian state living in peace and security alongside Israel, as expressed by President Bush, and calling for an immediate end to violence against Palestinians everywhere. All official Israeli institutions are also to end incitement against Palestinians. Take no actions undermining trust, including deportations, attacks on civilians; confiscation and/or demolition of Palestinian homes and property, as a punitive measure or to facilitate Israeli construction; destruction of Palestinian institutions and infrastructure; and other measures specified in the Tenet work plan; and Progressively withdraw the Israeli Defense Forces from areas occupied since September 28, 2000, and the two sides restore the status quo that existed prior to September 28, 2000, as comprehensive security performance moves forward. Palestinian security forces to progressively redeploy to areas vacated by the Israeli Defense Forces. To help the PA and Israel meet their Roadmap obligations and pave the way for a two-state solution, the Secretary of State created the office of the USSC in 2005. The USSC, which operated with no project funding until mid-2007, initially focused on providing advice and guidance to the PASF on its reform efforts while also coordinating the programs of several other security donors. In addition, USSC officials coordinated and consulted with Israeli and Palestinian authorities in connection with the PA’s assumption of responsibility for security in Gaza following Israel’s August 2005 withdrawal. In January 2006, the Palestinian people elected a Hamas majority to the Palestinian Legislative Council. Following the results of the January 2006 election and the subsequent formation of a Fatah-Hamas unity government in 2007, the Quartet on the Middle East announced it would continue to provide support and assistance to the Hamas-led government only if the government would agree to nonviolence, recognize the State of Israel, and respect previous Israeli-Palestinian peace agreements. Hamas never accepted these conditions. U.S. direct assistance to the Palestinians was reduced and restructured, with the focus shifting to providing humanitarian and project assistance indirectly through international and non- governmental organizations. During this time, USSC focused on coordinating international assistance aimed at improving Gaza’s economy and helped coordinate the efforts of Israel, Egypt, and the PA to regulate and control the key Gaza border crossings. USSC also coordinated with Britain and Canada to provide training assistance to the PA’s Presidential Guard, a security organization under the control of the PA president with responsibility for protecting PA officials and facilities and manning the border crossings. In June 2007, Hamas forcibly took control of the Gaza Strip. This led the PA President to issue an emergency decree suspending the operation of the PA government and appointing a new government, without Hamas participation, to administer the affairs of the West Bank during the state of emergency, under a politically independent Prime Minister. As a result, the United States decided to re-engage with the PA directly and increased the amount of U.S. assistance aimed at improving the economic and security climate in the West Bank and increasing the capacity of the PA. As described by USSC and State officials, the USSC’s current mission is to (1) facilitate PA-Israeli cooperation and allay Israeli fears about the nature and capabilities of the PASF; (2) lead and coordinate international assistance for the PASF provided by the United States and other international donors to eliminate duplication of effort; and (3) help the PA rightsize, reform, and professionalize its security sector by advising the PA and by training and equipping the PASF to meet the Palestinians’ obligations outlined in the Roadmap. The head of the USSC, a lieutenant general in the U.S. Army, also serves as the deputy for security issues to the U.S. Special Envoy for Middle East Peace. The office of the USSC has a core staff of approximately 45 personnel as of March 2010. Headquartered in Jerusalem, the USSC includes up to 16 U.S. military personnel and several U.S. civilians. About 17 military staff provided to USSC by Canada operate in the West Bank, and two or more British military personnel from Britain support the USSC at the PA Ministry of Interior in Ramallah. USSC also maintains staff at the U.S. Embassy in Tel Aviv as liaisons to the government of Israel. State’s Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) maintains staff in Jerusalem to implement INL program funds, most of which underwrite USSC activities. About 28 INL-directed Dyncorps International contractors assist with USSC training programs in the West Bank and Jordan. Other INL staff and contractors manage equipment warehouse operations in Jerusalem and oversee construction projects in the West Bank under this program. Under the current president and prime minister, the PA formalized plans to reorganize and rebuild ministries and security forces in the West Bank with donor assistance between 2008 and 2010. The PA has consolidated a 23,000-strong security force under Presidential and Interior Ministry control, as called for in the Roadmap Agreement. As shown in figure 2, the PASF is comprised of uniformed services, civilian organizations, and intelligence offices. The U.S. government, through USSC and INL has allocated over $160 million in funding for the training of certain units of the PASF’s uniformed services, primarily the NSF, since 2007. USSC has also helped provide State-funded vehicles and nonlethal individual and unit equipment to both the NSF and Presidential Guard, totaling about $89 million. In addition, State has allocated approximately $99 million toward the renovation or construction of numerous PASF installations. Finally, USSC and INL have undertaken activities to increase the PA’s capacity, including building the Ministry of Interior’s capacity to plan and oversee the PASF and coordinate international donor assistance. State allocated $22 million in funding for these programs since 2007. (See table 1.) State also has requested a total of $150 million in additional INCLE funding for security assistance to the PA for fiscal year 2011, including $56 million for training activities, $33 million for equipping, $53 million for infrastructure activities, and $3 million for strategic capacity building activities. Since 2007, State, primarily through USSC, has allocated more than $160 million to support training of PASF units in Jordan and the West Bank. USSC has focused its training programs mainly on the NSF, and to a lesser extent, the Presidential Guard. The main component of the USSC training-related activities is battalion- level basic law enforcement and security training conducted at the Jordanian International Police Training Center outside Amman, Jordan. As of January 2010, the Jordanian International Police Training Center had trained four NSF battalions and one Presidential Guard battalion totaling about 2,500 personnel. The trained units include both existing units (Presidential Guard 3rd and NSF 2nd special battalions) and newly recruited battalions (NSF 3rd and 4th special battalions). This training consists of 19 weeks of basic training for all members of a battalion, which usually comprise approximately 500 troops. USSC officials told us that they currently plan to train a total of 10 NSF battalions at the Jordan center. State department officials reported that U.S. security assistance allocated to training from 2007 through 2010 covers the training of 7 of the proposed 10 battalions as shown in figure 2. This would allow one trained NSF special battalion to be deployed in each PA governorate in the West Bank (except in the municipality of Jerusalem, where the PA does not have security control) and one battalion to serve as a reserve for use as needed in any governorate. The basic training includes a mix of classroom and practical exercises focused on the broad areas of firearms operations, crowd control, close quarters operations, patrolling, detainee operations, and checkpoint operations. This training is also designed to help the PA transform and professionalize its security forces by producing well trained, capable graduates able to perform security-related duties supporting the Palestinian Civil Police or other duties as directed by the PA. According to U.S. officials, the training is structured to train by battalion to foster unity of command and build camaraderie among the troops. Although USSC and INL designed the syllabus for this training in consultation with the PA, instructors from Jordan’s Public Security Directorate conduct the training under the supervision of INL contractors. According to State and USSC officials, the United States fully vet all troops participating in USSC- sponsored training to ensure that no U.S. assistance is provided to or through individuals or entities that advocate, plan, sponsor, engage in, or have engaged in, terrorist activities. In addition, the PA, Israel, and Jordan also vet participants. Prior to the commencement of each battalion’s basic training course, the program trainers conduct three concurrent 4-week preliminary training courses for the battalion’s officers, noncommissioned officers, and drivers. These preliminary courses, intended to provide personnel the fundamental skills needed during the battalion training, focus on leadership skills for the officers and noncommissioned officers and advanced driving skills for the drivers. The Jordanian International Police Training Center also offers four 4-week concurrent specialized training courses for following their completion of the basic training course. The USSC also supports and INL funds specialized courses in the West Bank to train and assist members of the NSF special battalions and some other PASF organizations in areas such as leadership, human rights, media awareness, equipment maintenance, and food service operations. Some of the courses continue specialized training for selected members of the NSF battalions that received basic training at the Jordanian International Polic e Training Center. However, other courses—including a senior leadership course and an intermediate leadership course—are open to all branches of the PA security services. The senior leadership course, first offered in 2008, is a 2-month course for about 40 commanding officers from all branches of the PASF; as of February 2010, USSC had offered the c times. International trainers taught the initial sessions, and a team comprised of PA and international instructors conducted the most rece senior leadership course. The intermediate leadership course is a ne class for middle ranking and noncommissioned officers that adapts principles taught in the senior leaders’ course. Altogether, USSC ha conducted or supported 24 different specialized courses for PASF personnel in the West Bank between mid-2008 and March 2010, and plans to continue sessions of many of these courses while offering at least two new courses by the end of 20 and planned USSC courses. 10. Appendix II provides details on current Other, smaller U.S. programs train Presidential Guard and Civil Defense troops. In 2008, State’s Bureau of Diplomatic Security provided limited training exclusively to the Presidential Guard through its Anti-Terrorism Assistance program. This training focused on police tactical unit operations, leadership development at the middle and senior levels, investigative skills, and crisis response capabilities to enhance the operational effectiveness of the Presidential Guard. Finally, USSC and INL plan to support limited civil defense training for the Palestinian Civil Defense corps at Jordan’s regional civil defense training academy. Since 2007, State has allocated approximately $89 million to provide nonlethal equipment to 7 NSF battalions and the Presidential Guard. State plans to equip 10 NSF special battalions, as shown in figure 3. USSC is working to ensure that these security forces are properly equipped while garrisoned in their operations camps, and while operating throughout the West Bank. USSC intends to accomplish this by providing an initial issuance of nonlethal equipment to the battalions that have received basic training at the Jordanian International Police Training Center. As of March 2010, the USSC had provided the 3rd Presidential Guard battalion with an initial issuance of equipment, and had provided partial issuances of equipment to the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, and 4th NSF special battalions. State also reported that they have submitted the 5th NSF special battalion’s equipment package list to the Israeli government for approval. USSC and INL, in consultation with the PA, developed the lists of equipment provided to each battalion, which the Government of Israel must also approve. The initial issuance of nonlethal individual and unit equipment for each NSF special battalion includes uniforms with protective gear and operational equipment, including riot shields, batons, and handcuffs as well as computers, tents, basic first aid kits, and support vehicles. (For a list of the specific equipment provided to an NSF battalion see app. III.) USSC also provided the Presidential Guard battalion with a similar initial issuance of nonlethal individual and unit equipment, adapted for their mission specific needs. The USSC and INL also plan to provide search-and-rescue vehicles to the PA civil defense forces. Because all U.S.-provided equipment is subject to end-use monitoring, INL officials and documents note that State maintains the right to examine the property and inspect the records that govern its use. In addition, the United States provided the PA with equipment and training to implement and maintain an inventory system to record and track all U.S. equipment deliveries and disbursements. Since 2007, State has allocated approximately $99 million to renovate or construct PASF installations. The main focus of USSC and INL infrastructure activities is to fund and oversee construction of operations camps for 9 of the 10 NSF battalions trained at the Jordanian International Police Training Center. U.S. security assistance allocated to infrastructure from 2007 through 2010 covers the renovation or construction of six of the proposed nine camps (see fig. 4). The operations camps will serve as garrison facilities for the battalion as well as function as a base for conducting operations in the West Bank. USSC and INL are also funding and overseeing the construction or renovation of training and ministry facilities in the West Bank. Figure 5 shows the six planned and six ongoing or completed infrastructure projects, including the two NSF operations camps, as of March 2010. The six ongoing or completed infrastructure projects include NSF operations camps, training facilities, and Ministry of Interior facilities, and account for about $41 million of the total allocated for infrastructure. They are in varying stages of completion; however, INL officials expect that all ongoing infrastructure projects will be completed by early 2011. Jericho NSF Operations Camp. This operations camp is to serve as the garrison for the 2nd Special Battalion. The camp is to accommodate approximately 750 personnel and provide workspaces, basic vehicle maintenance facilities, parking for approximately 145 squad vehicles and 40 large vehicles, clinical facilities, tactical communications facilities, separate officer berthing and accommodation spaces, a logistic warehouse facility, and K-9 animal housing spaces. State allocated about $11.3 million to this project, which USSC and INL expect to complete by mid-2010. (See figs. 6 and 7.) Jenin NSF Operations Camp. This operations camp will consist of two barracks buildings that will accommodate approximately 576 troops, one officers’ accommodations building that will house over 100 officers, an operational center, mess hall, and gym. State allocated $11 million to this renovation, which USSC and INL officials expect to complete by the end of 2010. Hebron NSF and Special Police Force (SPF) Building. In this joint NSF and Special Police Force building, the police occupy the ground floor and the NSF the first floor. The goal is to make this building habitable by units from the NSF special battalions deployed to Hebron and make it usable for its intended security functions, including the provision of a safe and secure operating environment, that is capable of being shared with other PA security services. State allocated $170,000 for this renovation, which USSC and INL expect to complete in mid-2010. Nuweimah Training Center. The current training facility in Nuweimah is being refurbished and expanded with funding from INL, to serve as an NSF training facility. The facility is to include accommodations for approximately 2,000 troops and 24 classrooms for approximately 1,500 students. The PA’s initial plan was to renovate two NSF basic training facilities in Jericho—Nuweimah and Alami. However, according to an INL official the PA and USSC decided not to renovate the Alami site, owing to difficulties in securing needed land titles, and instead to shift all funds to Nuweimah. State allocated about $8 million to this project, which USSC and INL expect to complete by early 2011. Presidential Guard Training College (Jericho). The PA intends to use the college to house and train 500 law, order, and security personnel at any given time. This facility has classroom space and accommodations for 250 personnel, as well as dining and support facilities for 500 personnel. State has allocated about $9 million to construct this facility. According to an INL official, original work on the facility was carried out by the UN Office for Project Services, under INL supervision. This facility is currently fully operational, and USSC and INL expect construction to be complete by mid-2010. Ministry of Interior’s Strategic Planning Directorate renovation (Ramallah). USSC is renovating space in the Ministry of Interior to provide additional office space and a training hub for the Strategic Planning Directorate. The renovation is to add 90 spaces for new staff and two large classrooms, a meeting room, and a security room. State allocated $1.1 million to this renovation, which was completed in February 2010. To spend the remaining $58 million in infrastructure funding, USSC and INL proposed additional projects, including building NSF operations camps in Hebron, Bethlehem, Ramallah, Tulkarm, Tubas, and a civil defense center in or near Ramallah. However, one U.S. official told us that, because of difficulties in obtaining suitable land and other delays, the USSC is reviewing other options for the NSF operations camps, including constructing temporary operations camps until a permanent site can be identified or renovating existing joint security force facilities to allow them to be used to garrison NSF special battalions. As of March 2010, preliminary design work had begun on a temporary operations camp near Tubas. Since 2007, State has allocated approximately $22 million for capacity- building activities, focused mainly on creating the Ministry of Interior’s Strategic Planning Directorate. The Minister of Interior oversees all the security forces reporting to the PA prime minister. According to an INL document, the directorate conducts strategic planning to support security decision making at the executive and ministry level to help the PA establish law and order and facilitate other longer-term security-sector reforms. The directorate is staffed by individuals with strategic planning, logistics capability, and other expertise. According to USSC officials, when Gaza fell to Hamas in mid-2007 and the PA President issued presidential decrees declaring a state of emergency, suspending the current government, and forming a new, more moderate government, the Ministry of Interior lost its entire staff, leaving the newly appointed minister the task of building an entirely new ministry. INL-funded activities include providing technical assistance to the Strategic Planning Directorate, in particular, funding and assigning six international technical advisors to work within the directorate, and training for Ministry and Strategic Planning Directorate staff. According to State documents and officials, as of April 2010, after 2 years of service, the contracts of all six of these advisors had expired, and, at the request of the Minister of Interior, State did not renew them. According to a State official, the Minister of Interior stated in January 2010 that this effort had been concluded to the Ministry’s satisfaction, so there are no plans to replace these advisors. He noted that State has offered to make technical assistance available on an ad hoc basis and at the request of the Minister, and, along with other international donors, plans to continue to fund other training and equipping efforts at the Ministry in fiscal year 2011. In addition to forming the Strategic Planning Directorate, USSC and INL have undertaken other programs to increase the PA’s capacity. Examples include the following: USSC and INL are providing assistance in building the PA’s capacity to coordinate international security assistance. As part of this effort, USSC serves as a technical advisor to a security sector aid-coordinating body co- chaired by the Interior Minister and the government of the United Kingdom. USSC and INL are supporting a Canadian-funded effort to develop PASF capacity at the governorate level through the creation of Joint Operations Centers, which are intended to give PASF area commanders in each governorate the command and communications facilities necessary to conduct integrated security operations. In support of the PA justice sector, INL launched a $1.5 million small scale justice sector assistance project in Jenin. The program provides technical assistance, training, and modest amounts of equipment to improve capacity of the police to conduct criminal investigations and help the public prosecutor’s office manage its caseload. A U.S. official reported that this program could be replicated if successful in other governorates. U.S. and international officials have observed improved security conditions in some areas of the West Bank since the PA began deploying units trained and equipped with USSC assistance, although they acknowledge these improvements may not be directly or wholly attributable to USSC programs. However, State and USSC have not assessed how their programs contribute to the achievement of the PA’s Roadmap obligations because they have not developed clear and measurable outcome-based performance indicators and targets linking their program activities to stated U.S. program objectives. Numerous U.S., PA, Israeli, and other government officials stated that both the PA and the Government of Israel are satisfied with the impact USSC- trained and -equipped PASF battalions have had on improving the security conditions in the West Bank. PA and U.S. officials cited these improvements as examples of how U.S. security assistance is aiding PA progress toward attaining its security obligations under the Roadmap, including having its rebuilt and refocused security apparatus begin sustained, targeted, and effective operations to dismantle terrorist capabilities and infrastructure. These improved conditions include the following. Better PASF capacity to control potentially violent situations. According to U.S., international, PA and Government of Israel officials, USSC-supported and -trained PASF units contributed successfully to restored security and conducted counterterrorism operations in Jenin, Hebron, Bethlehem, and other areas between 2008 and 2009. Several U.S. and international officials also noted the lack of spontaneous or organized violence in PASF-controlled areas in response to the December 2008 through January 2009 Israeli incursion into Gaza was an indicator of the PASF’s growing capacity to anticipate and handle large scale demonstrations and limit potential violence. Fewer Israeli government checkpoints. Several U.S. officials suggested that the USSC also could point to some indicators as measures of the growing effectiveness of USSC-supported security forces, including the decline in the key manned Israeli security checkpoints in the West Bank. However, the officials stated they could not independently verify the validity or accuracy of the reported declines, nor would they directly attribute these outcomes to USSC activities. Revived economic activity. According to PA and U.S. officials and documents, the subsequent revival of private investment in Jenin, Hebron, Bethlehem, and other areas where USSC-trained and -equipped PASF battalions were deployed is another indicator that USSC assistance has influenced the security situation, although a senior PA official noted that PA fiscal policies may have also contributed to this revival. Improved public attitudes toward security forces. In addition, both State and PA officials noted that Palestinian polling suggests people’s views of the PASF have improved, and a State report cited such a poll as indicating growing understanding and confidence of the West Bank populace in their security forces. Although State and USSC report on PASF program outputs such as the number of personnel vetted, trained, and equipped, USSC has not defined or established outcome-based performance measures to assess the progress, impacts, and estimated costs of achieving USSC objectives. For example, USSC documents and officials note that USSC objectives include helping the PA create right-sized, professional security forces in support of its Roadmap obligations but do not specify measurable outcome-based program performance indicators. USSC and State officials attributed the lack of clear and measurable outcome-based performance indicators and their associated targets for their programs to three factors—(1) changing force requirements, (2) the early stages of PA planning and its limited capacity to rebuild and sustain its security forces, and (3) lack of detailed guidance from State about USSC program objectives, time frames, and reporting requirements. First, the PA’s planned force requirements have undergone several revisions. According to a U.S. official, and as U.S. and PA documents demonstrate, the planned size and composition of the NSF has changed from seven special battalions (five in the West Bank, two in Gaza) in early 2007, to five special battalions solely in the West Bank after the Hamas takeover of Gaza in June 2007. According to State officials and documents, the PA increased the number of battalions for the West Bank from five to seven by mid-2008, although the projected total number of personnel remained at 3,500 as each battalion was reduced in size from 700 to 500 personnel in part to create smaller units better suited for the urban environment in which they would operate. In 2009, the PA raised the projected size of the NSF to 10 special battalions, according to USSC officials. Some State officials and documents also noted that the PASF has not clarified the role of the Presidential Guard and that some of its units had assumed gendarmerie tasks beyond its original mandate, which may overlap with NSF responsibilities. The revised and unclear requirements reflect that the parties to the Roadmap agreement—the PA and Israel—have not agreed on common measures to assess progress in meeting their Roadmap security obligations, according to USSC officials. For example, a September 2008 USSC report noted that the Government of Israel and the PA have not developed “effects-based metrics” needed to define a successful PASF security or counterterrorism effort under the Roadmap. State officials stated that the Government of Israel prefers not to establish objectives or measures that might limit its flexibility to conduct security operations within the West Bank. Second, the PA’s plans and capacity to reform, rebuild, and sustain its security forces are still in a relatively early stage of development. As a result, State and USSC officials said it is difficult to set outcome-based targets to measure the progress or outcomes of their programs. For example, the PA’s capacity to direct its own transformation was lacking until recently. According to a senior PA official, the Minister of the Interior did not consolidate within the ministry the authority to request, accept, and coordinate all foreign donor security assistance until August 2009. Third, USSC officials said that State did not give USSC a “blueprint” for attaining defined and measurable objectives for its programs within a set period of time, or for estimating the amount and type of resources needed to achieve such USSC goals as aiding in the transformation of the PA security sector and the creation of a professional, right-sized security force. According to State, this stemmed from the absence of a requirements-based budget allocation process for USSC programs until 2008. Since then, however, State officials said they required USSC and INL to provide performance indicators beginning with the fiscal year 2009 Jerusalem mission strategic plan. Furthermore, a senior USSC official said they had little incentive to emphasize or develop performance targets because State had shown little interest in tracking performance in the past; in fact, regular monthly reports from USSC to State on its activities resumed only in November 2009 after a hiatus of more than a year. Despite these factors, deriving indicators to measure and manage performance against an agency’s results-oriented goals has been identified by GAO as good management practice because it would help provide objective and useful performance information for decision makers when faced with limited resources and competing priorities. GAO has previously reported that while agency managers encounter difficulties in setting outcome-oriented goals or collecting useful data on expected results in general, it is difficult to design effective strategies or measure the impact of programs without them. State and USSC officials noted that USSC was developing a campaign plan for release in mid-2010 to help the Palestinians implement their own revised security strategy—which was still not released as of March 2010–and expected the plan to incorporate performance indicators to the extent possible. According to U.S. military doctrine, effective planning cannot occur without a clear understanding of the desired end state and the conditions that must exist to in order to end the operation. Moreover, a campaign plan should provide an estimate of the time and forces required to reach the conditions for mission success or termination. Determining when conditions are met requires “measures of effectiveness,” such as outcome-based performance measures. GAO has reported on the importance of outcome-based performance indicators as a key characteristic of effective national security strategy planning and a necessary component of developing and executing campaign plans based on these strategies (see list of related GAO products at end of report). Although the fiscal year 2010 Jerusalem mission strategic plan identifies performance indicators for U.S. security assistance programs, the targets to measure progress towards achieving these indicators focus on program outputs rather than program outcomes. For example, the plan identified the performance indicator “building Palestinian security capabilities” to assess progress toward achieving State’s broader goal of reforming Palestinian security forces to improve law and order and reduce terrorism. However, this indicator is measured based on output targets such as “completing the training and equipping of at least one PG and one NSF battalion” in fiscal year 2008 rather than on outcomes such as reduced terrorism as measured by, for example, changes in the number of terrorist-related incidents or changes in crime rates. Moreover, neither the performance plan nor USSC documents establish measurable outcome targets for assessing progress towards such stated USSC objectives as creating a “right-sized, professional” security force or helping the PA transform its security sector. Nor do these plans and documents contain information on expected time frames or estimated total costs for achieving these goals. State and USSC officials acknowledged that it would be useful to describe the impacts of U.S. security assistance on such outcomes as reductions in the number of Israeli security checkpoints in the West Bank. Similarly, they acknowledged it would be useful to tailor some survey questions to establish baselines and assess over time the extent to which polling data suggesting growing Palestinian confidence in their security can be attributed to the conduct and actions of USSC-trained PASF personnel, but noted the difficulty in separating the impact of U.S. security assistance from the impact of such external factors as Israeli political and security actions. In March 2010, State and USSC officials said that they had tasked an officer to clarify how USSC activities achieve State objectives and to improve reporting on USSC performance. Logistical constraints on personnel movement and access, equipment delivery, and acquisition of land for infrastructure projects challenge the implementation of U.S. security assistance programs. In addition, State, USSC, and international officials and documents note that programs to develop the capacity of the civil police and the justice sector are not proceeding at the same pace as U.S. security sector reform programs. Logistical constraints—largely outside U.S. control–involving personnel movement and access, equipment approval and delivery, and land acquisition challenge the implementation of U.S. security assistance in the West Bank and Gaza. State travel restrictions and Israeli Defense Force security checkpoints limit the movement and access of U.S. personnel into and within the West Bank. State restricts U.S. government personnel travel into and within the West Bank and requires that they travel in armored vehicles with security teams when traveling to State designated high threat areas. However, such restrictions do not apply to personnel from other countries supporting the USSC, such as the United Kingdom and Canada, according to State officials. As a result, according to U.S. officials, USSC relies on non-U.S. personnel to visit Palestinian security leaders on a daily basis, gauge local conditions, and conduct training in the West Bank. Israeli security checkpoints when traveling into and out of the West Bank border also limit U.S. government personnel movement and access, according to U.S. officials. For example, on more than one occasion, U.S. government delegations, including staff from USSC and State, were prevented from entering or exiting the West Bank, according to USSC and State officials. PA officials also face movement and access difficulties crossing at Israeli checkpoints when traveling into and out of the West Bank, which hampers the ability of USSC to meet with PA outside of the West Bank. While a process exists for equipment approval and delivery as shown in figure 8, U.S. officials said problems affecting the approval and delivery of equipment have hampered USSC’s ability to equip the PASF in a timely manner. USSC officials noted that without a significant effort at a higher political level to streamline this process, delays will frequently occur with little recourse available to USSC. Delays in equipment approval and delivery have occurred throughout this process, for example: Delays in approval. An absence of agreed-upon terms for the approval of equipment requests, such as equipment specifications or a set timeframe to make approval decisions, has resulted in delayed Israeli approval of shipments of USSC and other donor equipment, according to U.S. and other donor officials. For example, State and EU donor officials told us that the Government of Israel has not agreed to specific procedures for pre-approval of equipment orders as it prefers to continue to approve or deny each equipment request on a case-by-case basis. According to an Israeli official, each equipment request must be reviewed on its own merits, as specifications can change. For example, an Israeli official stated that although the Government of Israel had approved procurement of a shipment of raincoats, it did not guarantee the approval of future shipments of raincoats of comparable types and quantities. In addition, because the parties have not agreed on time frames for submitting or approving equipment requests, significant differences between the amounts of time needed to approve various items have constrained USSC’s ability to estimate equipment delivery dates. For instance, some vehicles ordered for the Presidential Guard and NSF 2nd Special Battalion in March 2008 were delivered in June 2008 while others were not delivered until January 2009. On the other hand, USSC officials said in March 2010 that the time needed to complete the approval process has declined from approximately 3 months to 2 weeks for items that had been approved in prior shipments by the Israeli government. Nevertheless, these officials note there is no guarantee that previously approved items will continue to be approved by the Government of Israel. For example, they noted that as of November 2009 INL has paid at least $176,000 to store a $2.3 million shipment of approximately 1,400 radios and associated gear that the Israeli government approved for delivery, but was then impounded by Israeli customs upon arrival in port in early 2009 after the Government of Israel revoked this approval. Delays in delivery. Delays have occurred at Israeli customs and during shipment into the West Bank, constraining USSC’s mission of properly equipping the NSF and Presidential Guard, according to officials we spoke with. USSC officials stated that shipping items to Israel takes about 1 month by sea and as little as 1 day by air from the United States. However, USSC officials also stated that while the time needed for Israeli customs to approve shipments averages about 2 months, approval can take up to a year or more for items that require modification by the Israelis in order to pass Israeli customs inspections. For example, USSC officials noted that vehicles and trailers were held up as Israeli customs required modifications to their lights, brakes, and other specifications before they would release them. According to an Israeli official, the PA also contributes to the equipment delays at customs by not following the shipment instructions in the approved requests. For example, in one case equipment was shipped with other types of goods destined for the West Bank and the quantity of equipment was lower than the approved amount. In another case, the shipper consolidated a shipment of PASF items with items for other customers. The increasing number of equipment deliveries in 2009 has also added to the delays in clearing customs, according to the Israeli government official. Additional unexpected delays in delivery have occurred when Israeli customs inspectors have not released equipment shipments they have approved, according to USSC and INL officials. These officials told us that security inspections required at Israeli border crossings and checkpoints in the West Bank have also delayed delivery. USSC and INL officials noted that they have taken steps to improve their ability to deliver equipment on time, including: developing standardized NSF battalion equipment packages to minimize Israeli opportunities to question equipment specifications; requiring the contracted freight forwarder in Virginia to check every item against shipment manifests prior to shipment; and making greater use of airfreight delivery. In addition, USSC officials said they have shortened the lead times needed to procure and ship equipment over time by pre-ordering items previously approved by the Israelis to be included in later shipments. Moreover, USSC, INL, and PA officials and staff have found it difficult to check on the status of the shipment or to hold parties accountable for delays, according to USSC officials. These officials stated that conflict appears to exist between various Israeli government departments related to the equipping process, which periodically results in unexplained delays in equipment release or approval. According to USSC, it is unclear with whom USSC or PA officials should speak to seek redress for unexplained equipment delays; as a result, delays are often elevated to high level U.S. and Israeli officials, who then negotiate a resolution. These delays have hampered USSC’s ability to equip the trained NSF and Presidential Guard battalions in a timely manner. While the USSC planned to deliver equipment to these battalions upon their graduation from JIPTC, some of these battalions have operated for several months after graduation without all of their needed equipment. For example, INL ordered equipment for the PG 3rd battalion and NSF 2nd special battalion in December 2007 to be distributed at the time of their May 2008 graduation; however, USSC and INL officials noted that although these two battalions had received all of their vehicles as of March 2010, they had yet to receive 14 percent of their equipment. As of March 2010, the 3rd and 4th NSF special battalions that had completed training in Jordan prior to December 2010 had received over 90 percent of their vehicles but only 44 to 50 percent of their other equipment, according to State officials. These officials said that the 1st NSF special battalion, which graduated in January 2010, had not received any of the purchased vehicles and only 2 percent of its other equipment as of March 2010. INL officials stated that these equipment shortfalls had not significantly affected the ability of the NSF special battalions to operate once they were deployed back to the West Bank. However, they acknowledged that these units had been deployed to the field lacking critical items, such as helmets, armored vests, and communications gear, that had been proposed, and in some cases procured, by the USSC and INL but had not been approved for delivery by the government of Israel. The completion of U.S.-funded infrastructure projects has been delayed by constraints on acquiring land in the West Bank that are largely outside of U.S. control, according to USSC, INL, and PA officials. Israel must approve the location of all proposed facilities and does not set formal standards by which locations are approved, according to USSC officials. These officials also said the PA is largely limited to building in Oslo Area A, which is solely under PA authority but comprises less than 20 percent of the West Bank’s territory. USSC officials also stated that it is difficult to determine whether a proposed installation site includes land solely in Area A. In addition, the Government of Israel requires that the proposed installation sites must not be near Israeli settlements or access routes. After the Government of Israel approves an installation site, USSC officials stated they face a lengthy Palestinian process for establishing ownership rights and obtaining legal title to the land. These officials noted that conflicting land and property claims on the site also create a challenge to acquiring land for PA infrastructure projects. Figure 9 depicts areas where the PA usually can acquire land for security installations in the West Bank (area A) and areas where it cannot (areas B and C). Because of these restrictions and delays, USSC and INL officials said efforts to develop NSF operations camps beyond the two already under construction remain stalled as of March 2010. Owing to delays in acquiring suitable land for permanent camps and the need to house newly trained battalions, USSC and INL officials said they have built temporary operations camps. Similarly, because of delays in land acquisition, USSC and INL cancelled renovation plans of an NSF facility in Alami and redirected the funding to the Nuweimah facility, according to an INL official. Originally designed to house 700 trainees, Nuweimah will be expanded to house 2,000 trainees upon completion in fiscal year 2011. To work around restricted property in certain urban areas, the USSC and INL are planning to construct or renovate multistory buildings within urban- based security compounds known as muquata’as. This effort is underway or being planned for compounds in Tulkarm and other urban locations. As a result, some U.S.-funded PASF centers are holding more troops than originally planned and facilities are being built in a way that allows them to be expanded upon if needed, according to USSC and INL officials. These land acquisition problems constrain USSC’s goal to provide housing for each of the NSF special battalions upon their completion of training in Jordan. U.S. and international officials noted that PA civil police and justice sector reforms are not proceeding at the same pace as U.S. security sector reforms. Palestinian Civil Police (PCP) capacity is limited. According to EUPOL COPPS advisors, the PCP lags behind all other Palestinian security forces in funding for infrastructure and equipment. Although infrastructure exists, such as joint operation centers and prison facilities, about 60 new police stations need to be rebuilt or constructed and existing facilities need to be refurbished, according to a USSC document. The PCP also have difficulties obtaining certain types of equipment, such as finger printing equipment, radios, and personal protective equipment, according to EUPOL COPPS. Also, the judicial police—charged with serving court orders, protecting judges and judicial facilities, and transporting prisoners—lack vehicles and operating capabilities outside of Ramallah, according to a USSC report. According to a U.S. official, a decision was made in 2008 to increase the size of the NSF in the West Bank from 5 to 10 NSF special battalions in part to compensate for the lack of PCP capacity. According to State and international officials, the NSF and the PCP do not coordinate programs to a large extent. Although the NSF receives training on operating with the PCP at JIPTC and PCP are trained on operating with NSF at many different levels, including at USSC-sponsored courses, the NSF and PCP coordination needs to be strengthened, according to U.S. and other officials. While an INL official said the PA is taking efforts to increase coordination between these two security forces through the Interior Ministry’s Strategic Planning Directorate, the PCP’s lack of communication equipment, such as radios, limits coordination. A EUPOL COPPS official told us that it is difficult for the PCP to obtain radios and frequencies and such a lack of communication equipment constrains the building of a sophisticated and well-equipped civil police force. Justice sector capacity is limited. The PA justice sector still lacks sufficient infrastructure, organization, and updated laws, according to PA, U.S., and international documents and officials. Justice-sector infrastructure, such as facilities and courts in each governorate, require upgrades and improvements by 2011, according to USSC. U.S. and foreign officials told us that to improve justice-sector organization, the PA needs to more clearly define the roles of its government agencies. According to a USSC report, cooperation between the elements of the criminal justice system—the courts, police, and prosecutors—is poor. In addition, USSC reported that the physical separation of government agencies within and between governorates results in poor coordination. USSC further reported that the lack of clarity and consistency in PA laws and the lack of a working legislature also undermine PA civil police and justice-sector capacity. USSC reported that the PASF, including the civil police, are constrained in their ability to conduct security operations and to detain persons who present a security threat and the justice sector is constrained in convicting such persons because Palestinian laws on some related issues are vague and sometimes contradictory. However, such laws cannot be reviewed and updated until after a new Palestinian Legislative Council is installed. Moreover, a State document noted that the civil police and justice-sector capacity limitations have become a matter of greater concern as it has become apparent that other donors are not providing the necessary civil policing, justice-sector, and other pledged assistance necessary to keep pace with the progress the U.S. security assistance programs are achieving. According to U.S. and PA officials and documents, sustaining the progress they have made with U.S. assistance in the security sector may be difficult unless the lack of capacity in the civil police and the justice sectors with which the USSC-supported security forces must operate are addressed. To help address some of these gaps, State officials said State had recently reinforced its role for facilitating coordination among U.S. agencies and international donors for justice-sector issues. Examples of U.S. and international justice-sector reform programs include: the INL’s Justice Sector Assistance Project, USAID’s Rule of Law and Justice Enforcement Program, EUPOL COPPS’ civil police and rule of law program, and the Canadian International Development Agency’s “Sharaka” Program, as shown in table 3. In fiscal years 2007 through 2010, State allocated approximately $392 million in USSC assistance to support U.S. strategic goals and Roadmap objectives in the Middle East, and has requested $150 million more for fiscal year 2011. Most of this assistance has supported training and equipping new PASF battalions deployed in the West Bank. Although U.S. and international officials said that U.S. security assistance has helped the PA improve security conditions in some areas of the West Bank and is progressing faster than PA civil police and justice sector reforms, State and USSC have not established clear and measurable outcome-based performance indicators to assess and report on the progress of their security assistance. As such, it is difficult for State and the USSC to gauge whether or not their security assistance programs are helping the PA achieve its Roadmap obligations to undertake security sector transformation and create a right-sized, professional security force. Establishing and tracking outcome-based performance measures in the proposed USSC campaign plan would help inform decisions about the costs, progress, and impact of U.S. security assistance to the PA particularly given that this assistance is progressing faster than the PA civil police and justice-sector reforms. As State develops the USSC campaign plan for providing security assistance to the PA, we recommend that the Secretary of State establish outcome-based indicators and track them over time. State should define specific program objectives and identify appropriate outcome-based indicators that would demonstrate progress toward achieving those objectives, and would enable it to, among other things, weigh the progress made in developing the security forces, civil police, Ministry of Interior, and justice sectors. State provided written comments on a draft of this report, which are reprinted in appendix IV. State partially concurred with our recommendation that the Secretary of State establish outcome-based indicators and track them over time. State commented that they recognize the need for such indicators and have tried to develop ones that are meaningful at this stage of the program’s development. For example, State mentioned that they have included broad performance measures in the Mission Strategic Plan. INL has also factored performance measures into all of its funding obligating documents. State, however, accepts our point that these measures should be more performance-based. Now that trained and equipped security force units are in place, State anticipates developing meaningful security-related baseline data for measuring the progress of U.S. sponsored trained units. State further commented that they have already started to do this with the Jenin justice project, whereby the PA will be able to generate comparative data on the number, speed, and success of the cases they prosecute. In addition, State commented that INL is in the process of crafting a new Letter of Agreement with the Palestinian Authority. This letter is to contain project goals, objectives, and milestones that reflect the program’s recent and anticipated future growth in size and complexity. State cautioned that, as we reported, several factors outside of State’s control influence progress toward the most meaningful performance- based indicators. State noted that while security assistance provided by the United States can strengthen the capabilities of the Palestinian security forces to operate increasingly in certain areas, the Palestinian Authority will only be able to do so if it and the Government of Israel agree on the direction and pace of this deployment. Ultimately, State added, such an agreement depends on a range of political, economic, and social factors that encompass more than just the enhanced law enforcement and security capabilities U.S. assistance gives the PA security forces. State also provided technical comments that we incorporated, as appropriate. We are sending copies of this report to interested congressional committees and the Secretary of State. In addition, the report will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov. If you or any of your staffs have any question about this report, please contact me at (202) 512-3149 or gootnickd@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made major contribution to this report are listed in appendix V. David Gootnick Director, International Affairs and Trade. To describe the nature and extent of U.S. security assistance to the Palestinian Authority since 2007, we reviewed relevant documents and interviewed officials from the Departments of State (State) and Defense (DOD), the Office of the United States Security Coordinator (USSC), and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) in Washington, D.C., in the West Bank, at the U.S. Consulate in Jerusalem, and the U.S. Embassies in Tel Aviv and Amman, Jordan. We also met with PA, Israeli, and Jordanian government and security officials as well as recognized experts in Israeli- Palestinian affairs. We reviewed State’s Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) budget justifications for fiscal years 2008 through 2010 to determine the levels of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement (INCLE) funding allocated to USSC and INL security assistance programs in the West Bank. We determined that the INCLE funding allocation data was sufficiently reliable for our purposes. To describe the nature and extent of the training programs, we reviewed INL, USSC, and contractor status report documentation and conducted site visits to observe U.S.-sponsored training at the Jordanian International Police Training Center. We reviewed examples of training reports, student surveys, and after action reports used by USSC contractors to review the performance of their trainees during and after every National Security Forces (NSF) training session. To describe the status of USSC programs to equip the NSF, we reviewed equipment delivery lists, contractor statements of work, equipment delivery work orders, and summaries of equipment end use monitoring reports. We interviewed INL, USSC, Palestinian Authority Security Forces (PASF), and Jordanian officials about the status of equipment deliveries. To describe the status of the construction of PASF installations, we reviewed the August 2007 “Framework Agreement” signed between the Secretary of State and the PA Prime Minister as well as INL contract summary data and progress reports; visited construction projects in and around the city of Jericho; and interviewed PA and INL contract staff about project objectives, plans, and funding issues. We assessed the reliability of the data on the battalions trained and equipped by the USSC, and on the infrastructure construction data provided by INL. We did not assess the reliability of the data on the current size and structure of the PASF because we are presenting them for background purposes only. To assess State’s efforts to measure the effectiveness of its security assistance programs, we examined whether its approach identified and applied measurable performance indicators necessary to gauge results—as called for in a number of GAO products listed at the end of this report. These reports state that developing and applying outcome-based performance indicators are (1) a management best practice; (2) one of the key characteristics of effective national security strategy planning, particularly when developing counterterrorism strategies; and (3) a necessary component of developing and executing campaign plans based on these strategies. We also reviewed other GAO reports assessing the extent to which other U.S. assistance projects develop and apply results- based performance indicators. We reviewed the strategic plans for State’s Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs and the mission performance and the mission strategic plans for the U.S. Consulate in Jerusalem for fiscal years 2009 through 2011, as well as the four monthly activity reports the USSC has produced between November 2009 and March 2010. We examined United Nations Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs data and an Israeli Ministry of Defense report for changes in the number of Israeli roadblocks within the West Bank from 2007 to 2009. To determine factors that may affect the implementation of U.S. security assistance to the Palestinian Authority, we analyzed reports, conference presentations, and U.S. government sponsored studies to identify issues that affect U.S. programs. We conducted interviews with State, INL, and USSC officials in Washington, D.C., and in the field. We also met with Israeli, PA, Jordanian, and other international officials during our fieldwork in Israel, the West Bank, Jerusalem, and Jordan. To assess logistical constraints, we reviewed relevant UN and State documents on access and movement; INL and USSC documents on the logistics of providing equipment to the PA; and met with USSC officials to discuss challenges in acquiring land for U.S.- funded infrastructure in the West Bank. To illustrate the U.S.-funded equipment approval and delivery process, we developed a schematic representation and identified points during which the process may experience problems based on discussions with U.S., Israeli, and PA officials. We consulted with INL and USSC officials and incorporated their comments into our representation of the equipment approval and delivery process. To assess the capacity of the PA police and justice sector and its impact on U.S. security assistance, we reviewed documents from and met with USSC, Israeli, PA, and international officials. To examine the pace of U.S. and international assistance to the PA civil police and justice sector, we also reviewed State documents and met with current PA police and justice sector donors, including USAID, INL, and EUPOL COPPS. We conducted our work from July 2009 to May 2010 and in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. Table 4 shows the 24 different specialized courses the USSC has conducted or supported for PASF personnel in the West Bank between mid-2008 and March 2010, and the two additional courses it planned to offer as of March 2010. Table 5 shows the type and quantity of equipment approved for the NSF 3rd and 4th battalions. USSC procures an initial issuance of equipment for battalions trained with U.S. funds at the Jordanian International Police Training Center adjusting the issuance slightly for each battalion. An average battalion consists of 500 troops. David Gootnick (202) 512-3149 or Gootnickd@gao.gov. Cheryl Goodman, Assistant Director; B. Patrick Hickey; Michael Maslowski; Jillena Roberts; Martin De Alteriis; Mary Moutsos; Reid L. Lowe; and Joseph P. Carney made key contributions to this report. Etana Finkler provided technical support. The following GAO reports discuss how outcome-based performance indicators can be developed and applied as a management best practice: Human Trafficking: Monitoring and Evaluation of International Projects are Limited, but Experts Suggest Improvements. GAO-07-1034 (Washington, D.C.: July 26, 2007). Security Assistance: State and DOD Need to Assess How the Foreign Military Financing Program for Egypt Achieves U.S. Foreign Policy and Security Goals. GAO-06-437 (Washington, D.C.: April 2006). Results-Oriented Government: Practices That Can Help Enhance and Sustain Collaboration among Federal Agencies. GAO-06-15 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 21, 2005). Results-Oriented Government: GPRA Has Established a Solid Foundation for Achieving Greater Results. GAO-04-38 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 10, 2004). The following GAO reports describe outcome-based performance indicators as one of the characteristics of effective national security strategy planning: Rebuilding Iraq: More Comprehensive National Strategy Needed to Help Achieve U.S. Goals. GAO-06-788 (Washington, D.C.: July 11, 2006). Combating Terrorism: Evaluation of Selected Characteristics in National Strategies Related to Terrorism. GAO-04-408T (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 3, 2004). The following reports describe outcome-based performance indicators as a necessary component of campaign planning and execution: Combating Terrorism: The United States Lacks Comprehensive Plan to Destroy the Terrorist Threat and Close the Safe Haven in Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas. GAO-08-622 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 17, 2008). Securing, Stabilizing, and Rebuilding Iraq Progress Report: Some Gains Made, Updated Strategy Needed. GAO-08-837 (Washington, D.C.: June 23, 2008).

Summary: The 2003 Roadmap for Peace process sponsored by the United States and other nations obligates the Palestinian Authority (PA) and the Government of Israel to undertake security efforts as a necessary precursor for achieving the long-standing objective of establishing a Palestinian state as part of the two-state solution for peace in the Middle East. In 2005 the Department of State (State) created the office of the United States Security Coordinator (USSC) to help the parties meet these obligations. GAO was asked to (1) describe the nature and extent of U.S. security assistance to the PA since 2007; (2) assess State's efforts to measure the effectiveness of its security assistance; and (3) describe factors that may affect the implementation of U.S. security assistance programs. GAO analyzed documents; interviewed officials and regional experts; and conducted fieldwork in Jerusalem, the West Bank, Israel, and Jordan. State has allocated about $392million to train and equip the PA security forces, oversee construction of related infrastructure projects, and develop the capacity of the PA during fiscal years 2007 through 2010. Of this total, State has allocated: (1) more than $160 million to help fund and support training, primarily for the PA's National Security Force (NSF); (2) approximately $89 million to provide nonlethal equipment; (3) about $99 million to renovate or construct several PA installations, including two of the operations camps it plans to provide; and (4) about $22 million to build the capacity of the Interior Ministry and its Strategic Planning Directorate. State also requested $150 million for its programs for fiscal year 2011. Although U.S. and international officials said that U.S. security assistance programs for the PA have helped to improve security conditions in some West Bank areas, State and USSC have not established clear and measurable outcome-based performance indicators to assess progress. Thus, it is difficult to determine how the programs support the achievement of security-related Roadmap obligations. U.S. officials attributed the lack of agreement on such performance indicators to a number of factors, including the relatively early stage of PA plans and capacity for reforming, rebuilding, and sustaining its security forces. Developing outcome-based indicators to measure and manage performance against program goals has been identified by GAO as a good management practice. Such indicators would help USSC provide objective and useful performance information for decision makers. State and USSC officials noted that they plan to incorporate performance indicators in a USSC campaign plan to be released in mid-2010. The implementation of the U.S. security assistance programs faces logistical constraints largely outside of U.S. control, and these implementation efforts outpace international efforts to develop the limited capacity of the PA police and justice sector. Logistical constraints include restrictions on the movement of USSC personnel in the West Bank, lack of a process to ensure approval and timely delivery of equipment, and difficulties in acquiring suitable land for infrastructure projects. State, U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), and other international donors have been assisting the PA civil police and justice-sector reforms, although these efforts are not proceeding at the same pace as the security assistance programs.