We have reviewed progress in implementing the Dayton Agreement’s military and civilian provisions since early 1996. In May 1997, we reported that the Bosnia peace operation had helped Bosnia take important first steps toward the Dayton Agreement’s goals. The NATO-led military forces—first the Implementation Force (IFOR) and later SFOR—had created and sustained an environment that allowed the peace process to move forward and Bosnians to begin returning to normal life. Nevertheless, while the task of implementing the civil aspects of the Dayton Agreement had begun, Bosnia remained politically and ethnically divided due principally to the failure of the political leaders of Bosnia’s three major ethnic groups to embrace political and social reconciliation and to fulfill their obligations under the Dayton Agreement. Many western observers told us that based on the current pace of political and social change in Bosnia, some sort of international military force would likely be needed there for many years to deter an outbreak of hostilities while Bosnians continue the reconciliation process. In June 1998, we reported that the pace of implementing the Dayton Agreement had accelerated beginning in mid-1997, due to a renewed commitment and level of effort—both political and military—by the international community. This renewed commitment led to an increased and intense involvement of the operation’s civilian and military organizations in implementing the agreement. Their efforts, combined with international pressure on Bosnia’s political leaders and positive political changes in the country, helped to accelerate the pace of Dayton implementation. However, we reported that conditions in Bosnia will have to improve significantly before international military forces could substantially draw down; even with the accelerated pace of implementing the agreement, it will likely be some time before these conditions are realized. In mid-1997, SFOR intensified its support for the civilian aspects of the Dayton Agreement and later began operations that supported the United Nations arms embargo against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. At the same time, SFOR continued its primary mission of controlling the three militaries in Bosnia. SFOR’s actions in all of these areas were consistent with its Dayton mission and were part of much broader international efforts that helped accelerate the pace of Dayton implementation. With the increased international emphasis on implementing the Dayton Agreement, beginning in mid-1997 SFOR increased its support for the civilian components of the peace operation. This increased support is consistent with SFOR’s authority as specified in annex 1A of the Dayton Agreement. The agreement specified that if resources were available and assistance were requested, NATO-led forces were to (1) help create secure conditions for the conduct of other Dayton Agreement tasks, such as elections; (2) assist the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and other international organizations in their humanitarian missions; (3) observe and prevent interference with the movement of civilian populations, refugees, and displaced persons and respond appropriately to deliberate violence to life and person; and (4) monitor the clearing of minefields and obstacles. SFOR’s support for civilian aspects of the operation was often provided indirectly as SFOR conducted its primary military mission. For example, SFOR’s general security presence has ensured that fighting among the three militaries in Bosnia has not resumed, thereby allowing the operation’s civilian organizations to continue their work and the people of Bosnia to proceed with the long process of political and social reconciliation. Further, during August 1997 SFOR began to take control of special police as called for by annex 1A of the Dayton Agreement, a step toward disbanding and disarming them and/or bringing them under the U.N. restructuring program for civilian police. This move helped convince Bosnian Serb political leaders to begin to participate in the U.N. police restructuring program in September 1997. In other cases, SFOR provided more direct support for the implementation of the civil aspects of the Dayton Agreement, primarily by providing a security presence, as shown in table 1. According to officials from the U.S. mission to NATO, the North Atlantic Council provided guidance and approved additional rules of engagement specifically for SFOR’s operations against the Bosnian Serb media. The council did not provide additional guidance for other SFOR operations that support the civil aspects of the peace agreement since these operations were already covered by existing rules of engagement. In late April/early May 1998, according to a NATO report, SFOR stepped up its military operations near Bosnia’s border with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to help ensure compliance with a U.N. Security Council arms embargo related to the escalating crisis in Serbia’s province of Kosovo. For the purpose of fostering peace and stability in Kosovo, the Security Council called on all countries to prevent the sale or supply of arms and related materiel to Kosovo and other areas of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. The prohibition covered such things as the sale and supply of weapons and ammunition; military vehicles, equipment, and spare parts; and training for terrorist activities. This resolution was aimed at preventing the participants in the Kosovo conflict—Serbs and ethnic Albanian Muslims—from receiving illicit military assistance from outside actors. According to a senior SFOR officer, the increased monitoring of the border and other tasks associated with SFOR support for the arms embargo do not constitute a new mission for SFOR but are an integral part of SFOR’s original mission to keep the peace in Bosnia. He explained that SFOR will have failed in its mission if the nationalist passions and anger of the Kosovo conflict—the same things that started the war in Bosnia—are allowed to permeate the country. Thus, the specific tasks being conducted by SFOR are designed to create a climate that does not allow Serb and Muslim extremists to inflame passions inside Bosnia. This view was reinforced by a NATO Secretary General’s report that concluded SFOR is conducting Kosovo-related operations under the authority of annex 1A of the Dayton Agreement. Specifically, the agreement gives SFOR “the unimpeded right to observe, monitor, and inspect any Forces, facility or activity in Bosnia and Herzegovina that the [SFOR] believes may have military capability. The refusal, interference, or denial by any Party of this right to observe, monitor, and inspect by the [SFOR] shall constitute a breach of this Annex and the violating Party shall be subject to military action by the [SFOR], including the use of necessary force to ensure compliance with this Annex.” Throughout 1997 and 1998, SFOR continued to fulfill tasks associated with its primary mission of enforcing the Dayton Agreement’s military aspects, as outlined in annex 1A of the agreement. Under SFOR supervision, the three militaries in Bosnia continued to observe the October 1995 cease-fire and to keep their forces separated. The militaries also demobilized additional troops, bringing their forces down to 55,500 soldiers by October 1997. SFOR enforced compliance with the military provisions of the Dayton Agreement by continually patrolling throughout the country, including in the zone of separation; routinely monitoring and inspecting SFOR-approved military storage sites and installations; and monitoring SFOR-approved military training and movement activities. According to the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), because the Dayton Agreement’s military objectives have largely been achieved, SFOR is in a position to provide broad support to civil implementation, within its existing mandate and capabilities. IFOR had largely accomplished Dayton’s military objectives by the end of its mission in December 1996, thereby allowing SFOR to be deployed with about half the force levels of IFOR. On June 15, 1998, the U.N. Security Council authorized the SFOR follow-on force, also known as SFOR, for a 12-month mission but left open the possibility that the authorization could be extended if warranted by the situation in Bosnia and developments in implementing the Dayton Agreement. SFOR’s mission will remain the same, but overall SFOR force levels are expected to decrease by November 1998. In January 1998, based on many political-military considerations such as improved conditions in Bosnia, the executive branch decided to draw down U.S. forces in Bosnia from about 8,500 troops to about 6,900 troops. After the United States decided to draw down troops, NATO lowered the operational requirements for the SFOR follow-on force. The new Multinational Specialized Unit began operations in late August 1998 but with force levels far below operational requirements due to the lack of force commitments from troop contributing countries. The mission of the follow-on force will continue to be to (1) deter renewed hostilities and (2) contribute to a secure environment for ongoing civil implementation efforts in order to stabilize and consolidate the peace. As with IFOR and the first SFOR mission, the SFOR follow-on force has the authority to use force to ensure the parties’ compliance with annex 1A and force protection. According to NATO documents, SFOR will continue, within its means and capabilities, to provide broad support for the implementation of the Dayton Agreement’s civil aspects. Specifically, it will assist UNHCR as a matter of high priority, with the phased and orderly return of refugees; IPTF in the reform and restructuring of Bosnia’s local police; OSCE in support of Bosnia’s September 1998 elections, including the installation of elected officials; the international war crimes tribunal by transferring persons indicted for war crimes to the tribunal; and the High Representative in implementing the civil aspects of the agreement. SFOR will retain its existing force structure of three multinational divisions in Bosnia led by the United States, France, and the United Kingdom, as well as air, naval, and support units located outside of Bosnia (see figs. 1 and 2). The number and nationality of maneuver brigades and battalions within the three multinational divisions will generally remain the same(see app. II). The United States will remain the largest force provider to SFOR, and Americans will continue to hold the key NATO military positions that control the operation. In preparation for the SFOR 6-month review due in December 1997, and in contemplation of a possible drawdown, NATO had performed a troop-to-task analysis for a smaller force with a relatively restricted mission called for under the first SFOR operation plan. Under this plan, NATO would have executed a phased drawn down to reduced deterrence force levels when security conditions in Bosnia had substantially improved. The U.S. military contribution to this force would have been 6,900 troops, with a significantly reduced force structure. In December 1997, the North Atlantic Council—based on NATO military authorities’ assessment of SFOR operations—determined that conditions in Bosnia would not allow SFOR to draw down to those levels for the foreseeable future. In late January 1998, the President decided that the United States would prefer to contribute about 6,900 troops to the SFOR follow-on force in Bosnia rather than continue to provide about 8,500 troops. NATO lowered its operational requirements for the follow-on force after the United States decided to draw down its forces. The U.S. drawdown occurred by mid-July 1998. The number of U.S. troops in Bosnia increased to between 10,500 and 11,300 troops by mid-September 1998 and, under current plans, will decrease to 6,900 troops by November. In describing the decision-making process, DOD officials told us that during December 1997 and January 1998 DOD had considered a wide range of political-military factors in deciding on the U.S. contribution to the SFOR follow-on force. They said that DOD’s decision to recommend a draw down to 6,900 personnel in Bosnia was based on a Joint Staff strategic assessment of the mission to be accomplished, the environment that it was likely to be accomplished in, and the risks to U.S. soldiers and their ability to accomplish their mission. During the strategic assessment process, according to DOD officials, improvements in Bosnia’s political and security environment, particularly in Republika Srpska, led DOD to conclude in January 1998 that existing U.S. force levels in Bosnia could safely be reduced. DOD officials believed that the rise of a relatively moderate Bosnian Serb leadership under Republika Srpska President Plavsic beginning in mid-1997—including the election of a relatively moderate Republika Srpska parliament and moderate Prime Minister in November 1997 and mid-January 1998, respectively—and the resulting reduction in power of Bosnian Serb hard-liners had improved conditions such that U.S. forces in Bosnia could safely be drawn down to 6,900 troops. A December 1997 options document prepared by the Joint Staff, which was the basis for the January 1998 drawdown decision, presented information on the force structure and associated force levels required for a range of potential missions for the SFOR follow-on force. In describing the option that was selected by the National Command Authority, the document indicated that the U.S. military could accomplish the current SFOR mission with two combat battalions in the country rather than its existing three combat battalions, thereby allowing the United States to reduce forces there to 6,900 troops. In the decision-making process, DOD had considered an operational assessment done by the U.S. European Command in late October 1997. This assessment—based on troop-to-task analyses for various mission options—showed that (a) if the SFOR follow-on force were to continue SFOR’s current mission, the United States would have to maintain its current force levels of about 8,500 troops and its current force structure in Bosnia, particularly its combat capability that included three U.S. combat battalions and two aviation task forces; and (b) if security conditions in Bosnia substantially improved and SFOR’s mission were to be reduced to providing restricted support for civil implementation, the United States could withdraw one of the three U.S. combat battalions from Bosnia and thereby reduce the number of U.S. troops there to 6,900. DOD had also considered SACEUR’s military judgment that to do the current SFOR mission with a 6,900 U.S. force level for Bosnia, the United States would have to maintain three combat battalions in the country and relocate some units nearby to Croatia. While this would have shifted some U.S. troops from Bosnia to Croatia, the overall U.S. SFOR force levels in theater would have remained about the same. After the decision was made, the U.S. military spent February through April 1998 identifying ways of reducing U.S. force levels in Bosnia to 6,900 troops while still maintaining three combat battalions in the country—the option of moving some units to Croatia was no longer being considered. In early March 1998, SACEUR explained to us that three U.S. combat battalions were still needed in Bosnia because (1) although the situation on the ground in Bosnia had changed and the risk had been reduced somewhat, the situation had not altered sufficiently to draw down the number of U.S. combat battalions from three to two; and (2) the Multinational Specialized Unit is not a replacement for SFOR’s combat units. On February 20, 1998, NATO decided that the SFOR follow-on force would continue SFOR’s existing mission, and soon after, the U.S. military and NATO began the troop-to-task analysis and force generation process for that force. To reach the 6,900 U.S. force level in Bosnia, DOD determined during this process that the U.S. military would maintain its three combat battalions in the country and instead reduce the number of other combat, combat support, and combat service support units. In planning for the drawdown, DOD expected other countries to contribute resources to make up for some of the U.S. force reductions, but other countries generally did not commit to do so. Instead, to achieve the reduced troop level objective, the SFOR Commander—a U.S. Army general officer—reassessed the force’s operational requirements during March and April 1998 and determined that the force could perform its mission with the lower-than-expected number of resources. This included, for example, consolidating two U.S. aviation task forces and reducing the number of U.S. attack helicopters from 40 to 16. After another NATO country agreed to contribute an additional two attack helicopters, the SFOR Commander determined that the force could accomplish its mission with only 18 attack helicopters in the consolidated task force. In another case, after the U.S. military decided to remove the U.S. target acquisition battery from the Sarajevo airport,the SFOR Commander decided that the battery was not needed given the low artillery threat in the Sarajevo area. According to DOD officials, NATO finalized the operational requirements for the SFOR follow-on force in late April 1998 and, in late May, officially approved the requirements and decided to draw down SFOR force levels. As of August 1998, 35 countries had pledged to provide about 33,300 soldiers to the SFOR follow-on force in Bosnia and Croatia, a lower number than the first SFOR mission (see table 2). Almost all of these troops are located in Bosnia. These numbers increased significantly around the time of Bosnia’s September 1998 elections and are expected to decrease back to August levels by November 1998. Appendix II provides more detailed information on the number of troops contributed to the SFOR follow-on force. NATO plans to continue the practice of reviewing SFOR operations at least every 6 months to determine whether changes in conditions in Bosnia would allow changes to SFOR’s tasks and force structure. These reviews would permit NATO members, in consultation with other SFOR contributors, to consider possible force reductions, taking into account the level of SFOR support required for military and civil implementation and deterrence requirements. The first 6-month review for the follow-on force would occur sometime before the end of December 1998. According to NATO officials and documents, the Multinational Specialized Unit—which has been described as a paramilitary, constabulary, or gendarmerie-type unit—will assist in dealing with civil disturbances associated with the return of refugees and displaced persons and the installation of elected officials. In doing so, the unit will work in close cooperation with international civilian organizations in Bosnia and will not engage in police functions. As of early September 1998, the new unit was significantly short of infantry personnel and air and ground transport assets and unable to become fully operational. According to SACEUR, the unit is an added force rather than a replacement for SFOR’s combat battalions and will leave Bosnia before or at the same time as SFOR’s combat units. Under current NATO plans, the Multinational Specialized Unit would consist of 800 soldiers in a brigade headquarters, two infantry battalions, and support and reserve components. As of September 3, 1998, five countries—specifically, Argentina, Italy, Romania, Slovenia, and the United States—had pledged about 500 of the required 800 soldiers. This would provide enough resources for one of the two battalions, a reserve company, a logistics company, and most of the brigade headquarters staff. Italy pledged to provide the bulk of these resources, or about 370 personnel; Argentina made the second largest pledge of about 70 personnel. DOD plans to provide two U.S. military personnel to the brigade headquarters, which will be based in the Sarajevo area. No countries had agreed to contribute resources to fill NATO operational requirements for the unit’s air and ground transport or for most of the second battalion. Because of these shortfalls, only one of the unit’s two battalions became operational before Bosnia’s September 1998 elections. According to DOD officials, the first battalion became combat ready on August 20, 1998. SACEUR said he had visited the battalion and considers them fully operational and most capable. The unit’s Italian commander, according to DOD officials, prefers to use the battalion’s organic ground transport rather than SFOR air transport that is external to his span of control. Differing views were expressed about why European countries are reluctant to contribute resources to the Multinational Specialized Unit. Senior international officials in Bosnia told us that European countries with troops in Bosnia believe that they had no operational requirement for such a unit; they believe their soldiers are already trained for and capable of dealing with civil disturbances faced by SFOR. On the other hand, SACEUR said that European countries are reluctant to provide resources because they view the unit as an effort by the United States to remove U.S. troops from Bosnia while European troops remained behind. According to a DOD official, the United States has reinforced this belief by contributing only two people to the brigade headquarters, rather than contributing a more significant number such as a company of military police. As constituted, the new Multinational Specialized Unit is to operate under SFOR control and the same rules of engagement as other SFOR elements. The SFOR Commander will have the authority to control the unit’s operations, within the operational parameters specified by each participating country’s national command authority. As of late July 1998, questions remained as to where, when, and how the unit would use force in fulfilling its mission and how the unit would coordinate its actions with IPTF and local police authorities. DOD officials said that the Multinational Specialized Unit should be looked at as a long-term “force multiplier” for SFOR because the unit is providing a new capability, rather than as a near-term unfilled requirement. They believe that the one-battalion-strong unit is quite capable and that the slower-than-expected deployment of the Multinational Specialized Unit will actually benefit, rather than hinder, the unit’s ability to conduct operations. They said that the slower deployment will allow the unit to be built and trained gradually for the mission and will enable better turnover of the unit’s forces in the future. According to SACEUR, under current plans the second battalion will come on line during the spring of 1999, as remaining forces are committed for this purpose. In early February 1998, DOD officials stated that the new specialized unit would eventually replace U.S. and other combat units in Bosnia. They said that the new unit would (1) take over SFOR’s “policing” functions and thereby allow SFOR’s combat units to withdraw and (2) remain in Bosnia after these units withdraw. However, by June 1998, this view of the unit’s role had changed. According to SACEUR, the Multinational Specialized Unit is not a replacement for SFOR’s combat battalions either in the near or long term; it will leave Bosnia before or at the same time as SFOR combat units. SACEUR said that the unit would allow SFOR to facilitate a secure climate of return for refugees and prevent hard-liners in Bosnia from inciting civil disturbances and intimidating returnees. NATO would deploy the unit immediately; the unit’s work would be finished when those refugees and displaced persons who want to go home are afforded an opportunity to do so. After the unit departed, NATO and SFOR would then be left with the problem of deterring any resumption of the conflict. DOD officials later explained that during the debate within NATO over the Multinational Specialized Unit’s role in the transition strategy, other NATO members did not accept the U.S. view of the unit’s role. Instead, they—and the NATO operation plan for the SFOR follow-on force—agreed with the views articulated by SACEUR. As outlined in NATO documents, NATO’s strategy for transitioning NATO-led forces out of Bosnia consists of (1) reducing the size, role, and profile of the SFOR follow-on force as conditions in Bosnia improve; and (2) progressively transferring responsibilities to Bosnia’s institutions, other civil authorities, the United Nations, the High Representative, OSCE, and other international organizations as appropriate. While NATO has established aims or objectives that are similar to those set by the civilian side of the Bosnia peace operation, NATO has not yet fully developed specific criteria for determining when conditions will have been achieved that would allow SFOR units to draw down or withdraw. According to DOD officials, the drawdown criteria are expected to be developed before NATO’s next 6-month review of SFOR operations. In describing its transition strategy for Bosnia, NATO has continued its effort to delineate conditions that must be met for the desired end-state objective for NATO operations in Bosnia to be realized. (See app. IV for a chronology showing the development of NATO’s end-state objective.) These conditions, described as “aims” in the NATO operation plan, are similar to (1) the set of “benchmarks” developed by the executive branch in early 1998 (see app. V) and (2) a set of conditions/goals established by the Peace Implementation Council’s Steering Board in early June 1998 (see app. VI). All three sets of aims describe the political, social, economic, and security conditions that the international community hopes to achieve in Bosnia at some undefined point in time. While NATO has further defined the conditions to be achieved in Bosnia, it has not yet established criteria that would link improvements in specific conditions to a drawdown or withdrawal of NATO forces from Bosnia. In early June 1998, SACEUR said that NATO would develop criteria that would relate troop levels and overall force structure to the accomplishment of or progress toward reaching the U.S. executive branch “benchmarks,” that is, conditions that are to be realized in Bosnia. According to SACEUR, in determining when and by how much to draw down forces, NATO will look at such things as the level of cooperation and security conditions in particular geographic areas in Bosnia and the way in which NATO troops contribute to the accomplishment of each one of the executive branch “benchmarks.” According to DOD officials, the operation plan for the SFOR follow-on force directs SFOR to develop drawdown criteria in conjunction with the peace operation’s principal civilian organizations. As part of this effort, DOD and NATO are working to prioritize NATO’s stated objectives and conditions so that NATO planners can focus on the most important tasks to be accomplished before a troop drawdown and/or eventual withdrawal can begin. According to DOD and State Department officials, some of these conditions do not necessarily have to be completely achieved prior to an SFOR drawdown or withdrawal. In the absence of drawdown criteria, the U.S. military has been reducing its contribution to SFOR due to considerations other than mission requirements and may continue to do so in the future. Many U.S. military officials told us that concern about continued political support for the mission played a large role in the January 1998 decision to drawdown U.S. forces in Bosnia from about 8,500 troops to 6,900. Further, according to U.S. officials at NATO’s military headquarters and the U.S. European Command, cost and other factors may drive future decisions regarding the timing of U.S. force reductions. In commenting on a draft of this report, DOD stated that to insinuate that the process was largely the result of “top down” political and cost concerns rather than force appropriate reasons was misleading and inaccurate. Although NATO has not yet finalized its drawdown criteria, DOD, State, and NATO have recognized that the results of the September 1998 elections, along with other changes in Bosnia’s political and security conditions, will play a large role in NATO’s upcoming decision on whether conditions would allow a further reduction in SFOR force levels. As previously stated, NATO will again consider potential SFOR force reductions sometime before the end of December 1998. While the overall security situation has improved in Bosnia, political and security conditions remain very volatile and will likely remain so for the foreseeable future. For example, in early September 1998, a senior State Department official told us that after the upcoming elections, returns of refugees and displaced persons across ethnic lines would likely spark violent incidents that require an SFOR response, even with the expectation that relatively moderate Bosnian Serb leaders would be elected. Also, in the recent elections, Republika Srpska voters elected a hard-line Serb nationalist to replace the relatively moderate Plavsic as Republika Srpska’s President. Thus, it may be more difficult than anticipated by DOD and State to implement key civil aspects of Dayton that directly affect Bosnia’s security environment—specifically, the return of non-Serb refugees and displaced persons to their prewar homes in Republika Srpska and the integration of non-Serbs into Republika Srpska’s police forces.Moreover, as previously discussed, the situation in Kosovo has the potential to inflame nationalist passions in Bosnia and thereby adversely affect the security environment there. DOD, State, and the U.S. European Command provided comments on a draft of this report. DOD and State agreed with much of our draft report and said that the decision to draw down U.S. troops in Bosnia was made only for force-appropriate reasons. Both agencies said that any inference that political considerations played a role is incorrect. DOD further said that the U.S. military did conduct detailed troop-to-task/operational and strategic mission analyses and that a thorough, strategically-based examination by the Joint Staff and the U.S. European Command led to the range of proposed options from which the option with the associated force structure was chosen. DOD also indicated that the drawdown decision was largely based on the recommendation of SACEUR, in his capacity as the Commander in Chief, U.S. European Command. Our draft report had discussed the operational and strategic analyses mentioned by DOD, but we modified the report to focus more clearly on the timing of the U.S. and NATO decision-making sequences and the related military assessments. DOD was also concerned about what it said was our negative portrayal of the manning and readiness of the Multinational Specialized Unit. We believe that our report accurately depicted the status of the unit’s manning and readiness. However, we have added to the report information on DOD’s views regarding the Multinational Specialized Unit. DOD’s written comments and our response to them are included in appendix VII. The Department of State found the draft report to be good overall, but it observed that SFOR’s support for the civil aspects of Dayton needed to be considered in the larger context that would include international civilian efforts—particularly with regard to surrendering indictees to the international war crimes tribunal—as civilian and military efforts to implement Dayton had been closely coordinated since mid-1997. We have expanded our discussion of this matter, noting that prior GAO reports on the Bosnia peace operation discuss in great detail the larger context of international efforts in Bosnia. State’s written comments and our response to them are included in appendix VIII. The U.S. European Command concurred with DOD’s response to the draft report and commented on additional issues. The command said that (1) we should not use of the term “expanded scope” when referring to SFOR military operations; (2) our description of the timing of U.S. troop reductions was incomplete; (3) one battalion of the Multinational Specialized Unit was fully operational; and (4) our report created an impression that NATO allies are not fully supportive of force requirements for the SFOR mission. We believe our report accurately depicted the situation in each of these four areas, but we have modified the report to add the command’s views on these matters. The command’s written comments and our response to them are included in appendix IX. To assess how the scope of the NATO-led military force’s operations in Bosnia has changed since mid-1997, we made visits to Bosnia in June and October 1997 and February 1998. During these visits, we did audit work in numerous locations throughout Bosnia and interviewed officials from the headquarters of SFOR and two of its multinational divisions; OHR; the U.N. Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina, including IPTF, U.N. Civil Affairs, and the Mine Action Center; UNHCR; and OSCE; as well as Bosnian displaced persons, many of whom had returned to their homes in areas controlled by another ethnic group. We also visited NATO headquarters and the U.S. mission to NATO in Brussels, Belgium, during September 1997 and February 1998 and obtained information from U.S. and NATO officials at these locations. Further, we analyzed numerous situation reports and other documents from U.S. agencies, NATO, SFOR, OHR, OSCE, IPTF, UNHCR, and other organizations. To assess (1) the mission, force structure, and force levels of the recently approved, NATO-led military force in Bosnia and (2) NATO’s strategy for transitioning NATO-led forces out of Bosnia, we obtained information from U.S. and NATO officials at NATO headquarters and the U.S. mission to NATO; SFOR headquarters in Sarajevo, Bosnia; DOD, the State Department, and the Central Intelligence Agency in Washington, D.C.; and the U.S. European Command and U.S. Army Europe in Germany. We also analyzed State, DOD, U.S. European Command, NATO, and OHR documents pertaining to these issues. We conducted our audit work from June 1997 through October 1998 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. We are sending copies of this report to the Secretaries of State and Defense, the Commander in Chief, U.S. European Command, and other appropriate congressional committees. Copies will also be made available to other interested parties upon request. This report was prepared under the direction of Harold J. Johnson, Associate Director, International Relations and Trade Issues, who may be contacted on (202) 512-4128 if you or your staff have any questions about this report. Other major contributors to the report include David Bruno, B. Patrick Hickey, and Judith McCloskey. Implementing the Dayton Agreement is a complex, decentralized peace operation designed to help Bosnia’s political leaders achieve the commitments they had made in signing the agreement. These commitments include providing a secure environment for the people of Bosnia; developing the institutions and practices of a unified, multiethnic, and democratic country that respects the rule of law; surrendering people indicted by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia to the tribunal; ensuring the right of refugees and displaced persons to return to their prewar homes; and rebuilding the economy. To assist the parties in their efforts, the international community established military and civilian components of the Bosnia peace operation. The peace operation consists of five principal organizations—a multinational military force led by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and four international civilian organizations. It also includes numerous countries and international organizations that have donated economic and other assistance to aid in Bosnia’s reconstruction and recovery since late 1995. Figure I.1 shows how the operation was organized as of December 1997. The peace operation’s military component consists of a NATO-led military force. The North Atlantic Council, the political leadership of NATO, authorized a military force, known as the Implementation Force (IFOR), for a 1-year mission that began on December 20, 1995. Recognizing the need for a continued NATO force in Bosnia, the North Atlantic Council in December 1996 authorized SFOR for an 18-month period that ended on June 20, 1998. The mandate of IFOR and later SFOR was to (1) monitor and enforce the military aspects of the agreement, including the separation and cantonment of the Bosniak, Bosnian Croat, and Bosnian Serb militaries in Bosnia; and (2) support the operation’s civilian organizations in accomplishing their missions, when requested and if resources allowed. The civilian component of the peace operation contained many organizations. OHR was established by the Dayton Agreement to assist the parties in implementing the civil aspects of the agreement and to coordinate the operation’s civilian organization. Other organizations participating in the operation include UNMIBH, with its unarmed, civilian police monitoring operation—IPTF—and other components; OSCE, which was to administer many aspects of and supervise countrywide elections, monitor arms control measures, and monitor and report on human rights; and UNHCR, which was responsible for developing a plan for and fostering the phased, orderly return of Bosnia’s refugees and displaced persons, of whom about 1.3 million have not returned home. This appendix provides information on troop contributions to SFOR by NATO and non-NATO countries (see table II.1) and organizational charts for SFOR’s three multinational divisions in Bosnia, as well as the support command in Croatia (see figs. II.1 through II.4). The three divisions are led by the United States, France, and the United Kingdom and operate in three separate military sectors. (continued) Number of troops deployed in Croatia is not available. The United States has deployed about 2,600 additional non-SFOR troops in Hungary and Italy in support of U.S. SFOR troops. (North) (U.S.) (U.S.) (U.S.) (Turkey) (Sweden) (U.S.) (Poland) (Lithuania) (U.S.) (Denmark) (Estonia) (U.S.) (Finland) Platoon (Latvia) Battalion (Norway) (Southeast) (France) (France) Platoon (Ireland) Platoon (Jordan) (Spain) (Italy) (Portugal) (Egypt) (Southwest) (U.K.) (U.K.) (U.K.) (U.K.) (Netherlands) (Canada) (Belgium) Infantry Battalion (Czech Republic) (Bulgaria) (Luxembourg) (U.K.) (Romania) Security Company (Greece) (Luxembourg) (Bulgaria) (Slovenia) (Austria) (Belgium) This appendix provides information on the drawdown of U.S. forces in Bosnia from about 8,500 personnel to about 6,900 personnel. In planning for the drawdown, the Department of Defense (DOD) expected other countries to contribute additional assets to make up for some of the U.S. force reductions; however, as shown in table III.1, other countries generally did not commit to do so. According to the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), the “expected contributions” were SFOR hopes—nothing more—as the countries never were committed to numbers listed in the table below. DOD officials also said that there was never any specific commitment by any country to provide additional forces; rather, there was just a general sense that the allies might be prepared to meet unfilled U.S. requirements. In most cases, NATO reassessed its operational requirements during March and April 1998 and determined that SFOR could accomplish its mission with the reduced force levels that would result from the U.S. drawdown. The United States, however, will provide 32 more civil affairs personnel than it had originally planned to make up some of the shortfall in this category. Also, a U.S. target acquisition battery will remain on call in Germany. Consolidated two task forces into one by August 1998; new task force given dual-hatted mission of sector support and theater operational reserve. Attack helicopters reduced from 40 to 16. A company of 10-12 attack helicopters was expected to be provided by another NATO country (for a total of 26-28 attack helicopters in the consolidated task force). 2 attack helicopters were pledged by the Netherlands (for a total of 18 attack helicopters in the consolidated task force). Medium lift helicopters reduced from 25 to 15. None expected. Not applicable. The reduction in helicopters reduced the number of U.S. troops in Bosnia by about 590. This low-density, high-usage asset is to be removed from Sarajevo airport, located in the French military sector, for a reduction of 30 U.S. troops in Bosnia. Another NATO country was expected to provide this resource. None provided. Number of these personnel in U.S. military sector reduced significantly, with psychological operations personnel reduced to one-third of previous numbers. Unnamed countries were expected to provide replacement civil affairs personnel. None provided. No replacements expected for psychological operations personnel. Not applicable. Reduced by 70 percent, for a reduction of at least 400 U.S. troops in Bosnia. Unnamed countries were expected to provide resources for some fire support and field artillery units. None provided. The U.S. European Command determined that other artillery support could be removed from Bosnia at a very low level of risk. Not applicable. One of these task forces supported the U.S. military sector in Bosnia, and the other served as the SFOR operational reserve that covered all of Bosnia. The target acquisition battery at the Sarajevo airport consisted of one Q-36 radar and support equipment with a crew of about 30 personnel. A target acquisition battery detects and tracks incoming artillery and mortar rounds in order to direct artillery fire back to the source of the incoming rounds. This appendix provides a chronology showing the development of NATO’s end-state objective for its operations in Bosnia from December 1995 through December 1996. In December 1995, as directed by the North Atlantic Council, the operation plan for the first NATO-led mission in Bosnia, IFOR, was approved with an end date rather than an end-state objective. In the absence of a defined end state, IFOR’s objectives were to complete the military tasks specified in the Dayton Agreement, to support the operation’s civilian organizations when requested and if resources allowed, and to withdraw from Bosnia by December 1996. The North Atlantic Council approved an end-state objective when it established the second NATO-led mission in Bosnia—SFOR—in December 1996. According to the SFOR operation plan, the desired NATO end state is an environment adequately secure for the “continued consolidation of the peace” without further need for NATO-led military forces in Bosnia. The plan lists four conditions that must be met for the desired end-state objective to be realized: The political leaders of Bosnia’s three ethnic groups must demonstrate a commitment to continue negotiations as the means to resolve political and military differences; Bosnia’s established civil structures must be sufficiently mature to assume responsibilities for ensuring compliance with the Dayton Agreement; The political leaders of Bosnia’s three ethnic groups must adhere on a sustained basis to the military requirements of the Dayton Agreement, including the virtual absence of violations or unauthorized military activities; and Conditions must be established for the safe continuation of ongoing, nation-building activities. In defining these conditions, NATO recognized that the ability of NATO forces to withdraw without the conflict resuming is closely linked to the achievement of the Bosnia peace operation’s civilian goals. Although the SFOR operation plan defined an end-state objective, it also asserted that these conditions would be achieved within 18 months, by June 1998. The plan did not, however, provide information on how the civil-related conditions were to be achieved or what criteria NATO would use to determine when the desired end state had been realized. Instead, the plan based the 18-month time frame on the assumption that the international community would develop a political framework and civil implementation strategy for 1997 and 1998 that would increase the emphasis on efforts of the operation’s civilian organizations and Bosnia’s political leaders to consolidate the peace. This appendix provides the key objectives and conditions (what the executive branch refers to as “benchmarks”) that the executive branch believes must be achieved if the peace process is to become irreversible (see table IV.1). The objectives and conditions cover 10 different areas, most of which are related to the civil aspects of the Dayton Agreement. The linkage between the executive branch “benchmarks” and a drawdown of NATO-led forces in Bosnia is unclear. In early June 1998, a senior State Department official said that NATO-led forces may be able to drawdown and withdraw once a “critical mass” of progress toward some or all of these “benchmarks” has been achieved. This official did not further define the term “critical mass.” In a letter to Congress dated July 28, 1998, the President said that the 10 conditions represent the point at which Dayton implementation can continue without the support of a major NATO-led military force. The letter did not define what constitutes a major NATO-led military force. Table V.1: U.S. Executive Branch Objectives and Conditions for Ensuring a Self-Sustaining Peace Process Ensure absence of conflict; support continued military balance. Cease-fire maintained. Establish basis for interentity cooperation. Weapons remain in storage, and arms limits not exceeded. Prevent return of extremist influence. Special police disbanded or restructured. Interentity arms control and confidence-building measures adopted. Covert external support for entity armies terminated. Federation train and equip programcompleted; traditional support and sustainment arrangement with Federation Army in place. Restructure, equip, and train police in accordance with democratic standards. All local police forces restructured and ethnically integrated, equipping underway. Separate police forces from party/ethnic control. Basic skill and human rights training completed. Reform and integrate judicial sector. Police deal effectively with civil disturbances and disorder. Police academies functioning; leadership professionalized. Intelligence services/secret police stripped of police function. Effective judicial reform program in place. Entity/national institutions functioning and taking increased control of functions now under international authority. Outlawed pre-Dayton institutions dissolved. Functioning customs services and control over revenues established. Empower legitimate institutional control over revenue collection and disbursement. Transparency established in budgets and disbursements. Dismantle corrupt, nongovernmental entities/institutions. Curb official corruption. Funds flowing to Bosnia’s national institutions; permanent staff and facilities in place. (continued) Divest political parties of control over media. Political parties divested of control of broadcast networks. Access to media for all political parties. Entity- and national-level policy and regulatory structures in place. Foster growth of independent media. Opposition party access to airwaves for future elections guaranteed under new election law. Alternative and/or independent media generally available throughout Bosnia. Election results implemented. Local, entity, and national governments beginning to function transparently. Influence of extremists reduced as moderates gain control. Elections are conducted in a free and fair manner. Parties accept binding arbitration for implementation of results in contested local elections. Electoral laws modified to meet international/OSCE standards. September 1998 elections conducted in free and fair manner. Need for OSCE supervision reduced. Republika Srpska economy improving, Federation economy continues to improve. Interim currency circulating freely, being used for official transactions. Foster interentity trade, commercial links, and inter-dependence. Agreement reached on permanent currency. Free market economic reforms in place. Public corporations formed; privatization laws in line with Dayton. Improve investment climate. Transparent budgets in place; government control established over sources of revenue. Major infrastructure (i.e., transportation, power, telecoms) repaired and functioning. Businesses and industry are opening, expanding. International Monetary Fund program in place, traditional lending programs begun. (continued) A credible minority return process is functioning. Entity property laws comply with Dayton. Property Commission fully functioning. Process for regional returns underway. Entity governments permit or participate in phased, orderly, cross-ethnic returns. Key cities have accepted substantial returns (Sarajevo, Banja Luka, Mostar). Local police protect returnees of all ethnic groups. Arbitral award implemented without violence. Local elections implemented. Integrated police functioning. Secure environment for returns established. Two-way returns progressing. Ethnic integration continues; multiethnic administration functioning. Ethnic reintegration of Brcko continues. Economic investment, job creation underway. Parties to the Dayton Agreement cooperate with the international war crimes tribunal in arresting and prosecuting indictees. Control of political, military, and media sectors by war criminals terminated. Indictees’ access to economic resources terminated. Significant number of top indictees at the Hague. Entity justice sectors cooperating with the war crimes tribunal. Local authorities facilitate the apprehension of indictees. International organizations and agencies effectively carry out implementation efforts without military support. Local authorities and/or entity armies capable of assuming responsibility for demining operations. OHR demonstrates authority to encourage and enforce interentity agreements without military backup. OSCE, NATO, and the European Union develop more traditional relationships with Bosnia. “The Steering Board underscores that conditions must be established in order for Bosnia and Herzegovina to become a modern country with the key elements of democratic institutions in place and the basic factors of ethnic confrontation removed: that requires a self-sustaining peace. The Steering Board asks the High Representative to submit for its consideration a report on the state of peace implementation in Bosnia and Herzegovina by mid-September . The report should focus on progress in relation to, inter alia, the following goals in the main areas: “A significant mass of returns reached and the phased, orderly, peaceful return of refugees and displaced persons on a self-sustaining basis in significant numbers. A self-sustaining and continuing cease-fire supported by transparent mechanisms for military to military cooperation. A core of basic legislation that imposes the rule of law and the establishment of an independent judiciary. Consolidation of free-market reforms, including a transparent privatisation that precludes political influence on the key economic sectors, and maintenance of an IMF program and effective free movement of goods, services and capital within Bosnia and Herzegovina. The restructuring, re-integration, retraining and equipping of police in both Entities in accordance with democratic and professional standards. The dissolution of illegal pre-Dayton institutions, with revenue and disbursement mechanisms brought under the control of legitimate authorities. The regulation of media in accordance with democratic standards and the availability of free and independent media throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina. The regular conduct of elections and implementation of election results in accordance with democratic standards. Cooperation by the Parties to the Peace Agreement with the ICTY [international war crimes tribunal] in the arrest and prosecution of war criminals. The consolidation of multi-ethnic institutions and of a secure environment for returns in Brcko. Full cooperation in peace implementation by neighbouring countries.” The following are GAO’s comments on the Department of Defense’s letter dated September 3, 1998. 1. Our report reflects DOD’s views that the new Multinational Specialized Unit represents an additive capability rather than a replacement for SFOR units. We have added information to convey DOD’s views that (a) the one-battalion-strong unit is already quite capable and (b) the unit’s Italian commander prefers to use the battalion’s organic ground transport rather than air transport that is external to his control. 2. DOD’s comments present information on operational and strategic analyses and commanders’ revised assessments without stating when these analyses and assessments occurred. We revised our report to clarify the timing of the various military assessments for U.S. participation in the SFOR follow-on force. As discussed in the report, none of the assessments provided to us by DOD showed that the U.S. drawdown decision in January 1998 was based on an operational or troop-to-task analysis of mission options. The troop-to-task analyses done by the U.S. military prior to the drawdown decision, which were the basis of the late October 1997 U.S. military/U.S. European Command assessment, determined the U.S. force structure and force levels necessary to perform (1) the current SFOR mission and (2) a relatively restricted mission in a substantially more favorable operating environment. Neither analysis showed that the U.S. military could accomplish the current SFOR mission with only two combat battalions or 6,900 troops in Bosnia. In contrast, the options document referred to by DOD said that the U.S. military could accomplish the current SFOR mission with only two combat battalions in Bosnia, thereby allowing the U.S. military to draw down to 6,900 troops. After the U.S. drawdown decision was made, the U.S. military did the troop-to-task analysis for the SFOR follow-on force concurrently with NATO/SFOR and identified ways of reducing force levels in Bosnia to 6,900 troops while still maintaining three U.S. combat battalions in Bosnia. According to officials from NATO military headquarters, DOD, and the U.S. European Command, the U.S. military and NATO began these troop-to-task analyses and the force generation process for the follow-on force in late February 1998. During this process, SACEUR and the SFOR Commander revised their assessments and concluded that SFOR could accomplish the current SFOR mission with the reduced U.S. force levels. According to DOD officials, NATO finalized its operational requirements for the SFOR follow-on force in late April 1998 and, in late May 1998, officially approved the operational requirements and decided to draw down SFOR force levels. The following are GAO’s comments on the Department of State’s letter dated September 11, 1998. 1. We have expanded our discussion of the larger context of military and civilian implementation of the Dayton Agreement, particularly in the area of international efforts to bring war crimes indictees to justice. We also noted that prior GAO reports on the Bosnia peace operation discuss in great detail the larger context of international efforts in Bosnia.2. We believe that our report accurately reflects the status of the Multinational Specialized Unit’s manning and readiness. Our report states that the unit is not a replacement for U.S. or other SFOR combat units. We note that State’s assertion that the unit adds to the capabilities of the international community to implement all aspects of the Dayton Agreement goes beyond the unit’s role as currently articulated by NATO. As discussed in our report, NATO intends for the unit to enhance SFOR’s capability to deal with civil disturbances associated with returns of refugees and displaced persons and the installation of elected officials. The following are GAO’s comments on the U.S. European Command’s letter dated September 10, 1998. 1. Appendix VII provides DOD’s comments on our draft report and our response to them. 2. We believe SFOR’s scope of operations has expanded but not beyond the bounds of the Dayton Agreement. We agree with the U.S. European Command that annex 1A of the Dayton Agreement has always called for the NATO-led force in Bosnia—first IFOR and later SFOR—to take control of special police; however, we note that neither NATO-led force began to control special police until mid-1997, after the High Representative had asked NATO to do so. We have added information on this matter to the report. We have also added the command’s view that because the Dayton Agreement’s military objectives had largely been achieved, SFOR is in a position to provide broad support to civil implementation, within its existing mandate and capabilities. 3. Our report discussed the timing of the U.S. drawdown, but we modified the report to clarify the information. 4. We believe our report accurately depicts the status of the Multinational Specialized Unit. However, we have added the command’s view that one of the unit’s two battalions is fully operational and most capable, as well as information provided by the command on plans for the second battalion to start operations during the spring of 1999 as forces are committed for this purpose. 5. We did not intend for our report to leave the impression that NATO allies are not fully supportive of force requirements for the SFOR mission; rather, we had intended to describe the U.S. military and NATO/SFOR planning processes for the SFOR follow-on force and to illustrate how operational requirements for the force appeared to be driven by the planned reduction in U.S. forces in Bosnia. Thus, the report included information on NATO lowering its operational requirements for the follow-on force during the force generation process that occurred after the U.S. decision to draw down to 6,900 troops in Bosnia. The first copy of each GAO report and testimony is free. Additional copies are $2 each. 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Summary: Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided information on the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)-led military force in Bosnia, known as the Stabilization Force (SFOR), focusing on: (1) how SFOR's operations in Bosnia have changed since mid-1997, particularly its support for the operation's civil aspects, and whether any such changes have exceeded SFOR's defined mission; (2) the mission and force structure of the post-June 1998 SFOR follow-on force, including the decisionmaking sequence for U.S. participation in the force and the status of developing the force's new Multinational Specialized Unit; and (3) NATO's transition strategy for removing NATO-led forces. GAO noted that: (1) the increased emphasis on implementing the Dayton Agreement that began in mid-1997 included an intensified effort by SFOR to support the agreement's civil provisions, but the force continued to employ most of its resources to control the Bosniak, Bosnian Croat, and Bosnian Serb militaries; (2) the mission and force structure of the SFOR follow-on force will remain largely the same as prior to June 1998; (3) SFOR levels in Bosnia increased from about 31,700 troops in August 1998 to about 36,100 troops at the time of the September elections in Bosnia but are expected to decrease again by November 1998; (4) in light of SFOR's need to deal with civil disturbances, NATO established a new Multinational Specialized Unit, a paramilitary- or gendarmerie-type unit, within SFOR; (5) as of September 1998, only part of the specialized unit was operational because countries have not yet committed sufficient resources to the unit; (6) this new unit will not replace U.S. or other SFOR combat units; (7) after considering several military analyses and a range of factors, the executive branch decided in January 1998 to reduce the U.S. troop level for the SFOR follow-on force from about 8,500 troops in Bosnia to about 6,900 troops; (8) after the drawdown decision was made, the U.S. military identified ways to reduce U.S. force levels; (9) NATO then lowered operational requirements for the follow-on force; (10) NATO will continue its practice of reviewing SFOR operations every 6 months to determine whether SFOR force levels could be further reduced; (11) NATO has developed a transition strategy for an eventual disengagement from Bosnia; (12) NATO has not fully developed specific criteria for determining when conditions would allow SFOR combat units to draw down and withdraw, but was in the process of doing so; (13) the NATO transition strategy consists largely of turning over various activities to local authorities or the peace operation's civilian organizations as conditions permit; (14) the transition strategy calls for the Multinational Specialized Unit to leave Bosnia before or at the same time as SFOR's combat units; (15) according to Department of Defense and NATO officials, specific drawdown criteria are expected to be developed before NATO's next 6-month review of SFOR operations; and (16) during this review, NATO will assess changes to the security and political conditions in Bosnia, including the results of the September 1998 elections, and determine whether SFOR force levels could be further reduced.