CBP is the lead federal agency in charge of securing the nation’s borders. When CBP was created, it represented a merger of components from three agencies—the U.S. Customs Service, the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), and the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service. Under the Immigration and Nationality Act, its implementing regulations, and CBP policies and procedures, CBP officers are required to establish, at a minimum, the nationality of individuals and whether they are eligible to enter the country at ports of entry. All international travelers attempting to enter the country through ports of entry undergo primary inspection, which is a preliminary screening procedure to identify those legitimate international travelers who can readily be identified as admissible. Regarding land ports of entry, the United States shares over 5,000 miles of border with Canada to the north (including the state of Alaska), and 1,900 miles of border with Mexico to the south. Individuals attempting to legally enter the United States by land present themselves to a CBP officer at one of the 170 ports of entry located along these borders. During the period of our investigations, U.S. citizens could gain entry to the United States by establishing their citizenship to the satisfaction of U.S. officials at a land port of entry. While this frequently involved a citizen presenting their birth certificate, photo identification (e.g., a driver’s license), or baptismal records, the law did not require U.S. citizens to present any of these documents as proof of citizenship. Until recently, U.S. citizens could enter the country at land ports of entry based only on oral statements. However, as of January 31, 2008, U.S. citizens age 19 and older are required, under the Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative, to present both proof of identity and citizenship when attempting to enter the United States by land. Documents that would fulfill this requirement could include a passport, a military ID with travel orders, or an enhanced driver’s license. In the absence of a single document that establishes both proof of identity and citizenship, U.S. citizens require multiple documents, such as a driver’s license and a birth certificate, to enter the United States. Requirements for entering the United States by sea are similar to those for entering by land. Regarding air ports of entry, starting on January 23, 2007, U.S. citizens were required, under the Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative, to present a passport or secure travel document when entering the United States. Prior to the implementation of this initiative, U.S. citizens entering the country by air from such locations as the Bahamas, Mexico, and Jamaica could establish their citizenship by oral assertions and documents such as drivers’ licenses and birth certificates. It is illegal to enter the United States at any location other than a port of entry. The U.S. Border Patrol, a component of CBP, patrols and monitors areas between ports of entry. However, given limited resources and the wide expanse of the border, the U.S. Border Patrol is limited in its ability to monitor the border either through use of technology or with a consistent manned presence. Commensurate with its perception of the threat, CBP has distributed human resources differently on the northern border than it has on the southern border. According to CBP, as of May 2007, it had 972 U.S. Border Patrol agents assigned to the northern border and 11,986 agents assigned to the southern border. The number of agents actually providing border protection at any given time is far smaller than these figures suggest. As mentioned above, in the September 2007 hearing on border security before your Committee, a CBP official stated that roughly 250 U.S. Border Patrol agents were patrolling the U.S.–Canada border at any given time—about a quarter of all agents reportedly assigned to patrol the northern border during that period. We found two types of security vulnerabilities in our covert testing at ports of entry. First, we found that, in the majority of cases, the government inspectors who reviewed our undercover investigators’ counterfeit documentation did not know that they were bogus and allowed them to enter the country. Second, we found that government officials did not always ask for identification. Although it was not a requirement for government officials to ask for identification at the time we performed our tests, we concluded that this was a major vulnerability that could allow terrorists or other criminals to easily enter the country. In table 1 below, each individual instance of an investigator crossing the border is noted separately, although, in some cases, investigators crossed the border in groups of two or more. We consider our attempts to enter the country through sea and air ports of entry as different from our land crossings. For one thing, we did not perform the same amount of testing that we performed at land ports of entry. For another, the standard for admittance via air ports of entry continues to be stricter than via land and sea routes. In table 2 below, each individual instance of an investigator entering the United States via air or sea is noted separately. Selected details related to these covert tests are discussed below. For our 2003 testimony, investigators successfully entered the United States using counterfeit drivers’ licenses and other bogus documentation through a land port of entry in Washington. They also entered Florida via air from Jamaica using the same counterfeit documentation. Similar follow-up work was performed throughout 2003 and 2004, resulting in successful entry at locations in Washington, New York, California, Texas, and Virginia using counterfeit identification. In 2006, investigators successfully entered the United States using counterfeit drivers’ licenses and other bogus documentation through seven land ports of entry on the northern and southern borders, adding the states of Michigan, Idaho, and Arizona to the list of states they had entered. In the majority of cases, investigators entered the country by land using rental cars. When requested, they displayed counterfeit Virginia and West Virginia drivers’ licenses and birth certificates to the government officials at ports of entry. They also used bogus U.S. passports and, in one case, a fake employee identification card in the name of a major U.S. airline. Government officials typically inspected the documentation while inquiring whether our undercover investigators were U.S. citizens. On some occasions, the officials asked whether our investigators had purchased anything in Canada or Mexico. In several instances, CBP officials asked our investigators to leave their vehicles and inspected the vehicles; they appeared to be searching for evidence of smuggling. In only one case on the northern border, one of our undercover investigators was denied entry because a CBP officer became suspicious of the expired U.S. passport with substituted photo offered as proof of citizenship. For our 2003 testimony, we found that INS inspectors did not request identification at a sea port of entry in Washington and a land port of entry in California. Our investigators’ oral assertions that they were U.S. citizens satisfied the INS inspectors and they were allowed to enter the country. Later, while conducting our 2006 covert tests, we found that CBP officers did not request identification during several foot crossings from Mexico. For example, on February 23, 2006, two investigators crossed the border from Mexico into Texas on foot. When the first investigator arrived at the port of entry, he was waved through without being asked to show identification. At this point, the investigator asked the CBP officer whether he wished to see any identification. The officer replied, “OK, that would be good.” The investigator began to remove his counterfeit Virginia driver’s license from his wallet when the officer said “That’s fine, you can go.” The CBP officer never looked at the license. However, the CBP officer did request identification from the investigator who was walking behind the first investigator. In another test on March 15, 2006, two investigators entered Arizona from Mexico by foot. They had received a phone call in advance from another investigator who had crossed the border earlier using genuine identification. He said that the CBP officers on duty had swiped his driver’s license through a scanning machine. Because the counterfeit drivers’ licenses the other two investigators were carrying had fake magnetic strips, the investigators realized they could be questioned by CBP officers if their identification cards did not scan properly. When the two investigators arrived at the port of entry, they engaged one of the officers in conversation to distract him from scanning their drivers’ licenses. After a few moments, the CBP officer asked the investigators if they were both U.S. citizens. They said, “yes.” He then asked the investigators if they had purchased anything in Mexico, and they responded, “no.” The CBP officer then said, “Have a nice day” and allowed them to enter the United States. He did not ask for any identification. We first reported on potential security vulnerabilities at unmanned and unmonitored border areas in our 2003 testimony. While conducting testing at U.S.–Canada ports of entry, we found that one of our investigators was able to walk into the United States from Canada at a park straddling the border. The investigator was not stopped or questioned by law enforcement personnel from either Canada or the United States. In our September 2007 testimony, we reported on similar vulnerabilities at unmanned and unmonitored locations on the northern and southern borders. The unmanned and unmonitored border areas we visited were defined as locations where CBP does not maintain a manned presence 24 hours per day or where there was no apparent monitoring equipment in place. Safety considerations prevented our investigators from performing the same assessment work on the U.S.–Mexico border as performed on the northern border. We found three main vulnerabilities during this limited security assessment. First, we found state roads close to the border that appeared to be unmanned and unmonitored, allowing us to simulate the cross- border movement of radioactive materials or other contraband from Canada into the United States. Second, we also located several ports of entry that had posted daytime hours and which, although monitored, were unmanned overnight. Investigators observed that surveillance equipment was in operation but that the only observable preventive measure to stop a cross-border violator from entering the United States was a barrier across the road that could be driven around. Finally, investigators identified potential security vulnerabilities on federally managed lands adjacent to the U.S.–Mexico border. These areas did not appear to be monitored or have a noticeable law enforcement presence during the time our investigators visited the sites. See table 3 for a summary of the vulnerabilities we found and the activity of investigators at each location. Selected details related to these covert tests are discussed below. According to CBP, the ease and speed with which a cross-border violator can travel to the border, cross the border, and leave the location of the crossing are critical factors in determining whether an area of the border is vulnerable. We identified state roads close to the border that appeared to be unmanned and unmonitored, allowing us to simulate the cross- border movement of radioactive materials or other contraband from Canada into the United States. For example, on October 31, 2006, our investigators positioned themselves on opposite sides of the U.S.–Canada border in an unmanned location. Our investigators selected this location because roads on either side of the border would allow them to quickly and easily exchange simulated contraband. After receiving a signal by cell phone, the investigator in Canada left his vehicle and walked approximately 25 feet to the border carrying a red duffel bag. While investigators on the U.S. side took photographs and made a digital video recording, the individual with the duffel bag proceeded the remaining 50 feet, transferred the duffel bag to the investigators on the U.S. side, and returned to his vehicle on the Canadian side. The set up and exchange lasted approximately 10 minutes, during which time the investigators were in view of residents both on the Canadian and U.S. sides of the border. According to CBP records of this incident, an alert citizen notified the U.S. Border Patrol about the suspicious activities of our investigators. The U.S. Border Patrol subsequently attempted to search for a vehicle matching the description of the rental vehicle our investigators used. However, the U.S. Border Patrol was not able to locate the investigators with the duffel bag, even though they had parked nearby to observe traffic passing through the port of entry. See figure 1 for a photograph of our investigator crossing the northern border at another unmanned, unmonitored location on the northern border with simulated contraband. In contrast to our observations on the northern border, our investigators observed a large law enforcement and Army National Guard presence near a state road on the southern border, including unmanned aerial vehicles. On October 17, 2006, two of our investigators left a main U.S. route about a quarter mile from a U.S.–Mexico port of entry. Traveling on a dirt road that parallels the border, our investigators used a GPS system to get as close to the border as possible. Our investigators passed U.S. Border Patrol agents and U.S. Army National Guard units. In addition, our investigators spotted unmanned aerial vehicles and a helicopter flying parallel to the border. At the point where the dirt road ran closest to the U.S.–Mexico border, our investigators spotted additional U.S. Border Patrol vehicles parked in a covered position. About three-fourths of a mile from these vehicles, our investigators pulled off the road. One investigator exited the vehicle and proceeded on foot through several gulches and gullies toward the Mexican border. His intent was to find out whether he would be questioned by law enforcement agents about his activities. He returned to the vehicle after 15 minutes, at which time our investigators returned to the main road. Our investigators did not observe any public traffic on this road for the 1 hour that they were in the area, but none of the law enforcement units attempted to stop our investigators and find out what they were doing. According to CBP, because our investigators did not approach from the direction of Mexico, there would be no expectation for law enforcement units to question these activities. We also identified several ports of entry with posted daytime hours in one state on the northern border. During the daytime these ports of entry are staffed by CBP officers. During the night, CBP told us that it relies on surveillance systems to monitor, respond to, and attempt to interdict illegal border crossing activity. For example, on November 14, 2006, at about 11:00 p.m., our investigators arrived on the U.S. side of one port of entry that had closed for the night. Investigators observed that surveillance equipment was in operation but that the only visible preventive measure to stop an individual from entering the United States was a barrier across the road that could be driven around. CBP provided us with records that confirmed our observations about the barrier at this port of entry, indicating that on one occasion a cross-border violator drove around this type of barrier to illegally enter the United States. Although the violator was later caught by state law enforcement officers and arrested by the U.S. Border Patrol, we were concerned that these ports of entry were unmanned overnight. Investigators identified potential security vulnerabilities on federally managed land adjacent to the U.S.–Mexico border. These areas did not appear to be monitored or have a manned CBP presence during the time our investigators visited the sites. For example, on January 9, 2007, our investigators entered federally managed land adjacent to the U.S.–Mexico border. The investigators had identified a road running parallel to the border in this area. Our investigators were informed by an employee of a visitor center that because the U.S. government was building a fence, the road was closed to the public. However, our investigators proceeded to the road and found that it was not physically closed. While driving west along this road, our investigators did not observe any surveillance cameras or law enforcement vehicles. A 4-foot-high fence (appropriate to prevent the movement of a vehicle rather than a person) stood at the location of the border. Our investigators pulled over to the side of the road at one location. To determine whether he would activate any intrusion alarm systems, one investigator stepped over the fence, entered Mexico, and returned to the United States. The investigators remained in the location for approximately 15 minutes but there was no observed law enforcement response to their activities. In another example, on January 23, 2007, our investigators arrived on federally managed lands adjacent to the U.S.–Mexico border. In this area, the Rio Grande River forms the southern border between the United States and Mexico. After driving off-road in a 4x4 vehicle to the banks of the Rio Grande, our investigators observed, in two locations, evidence that frequent border crossings took place. In one location, the investigators observed well-worn footpaths and tire tracks on the Mexican side of the river. At another location, a boat ramp on the U.S. side of the Rio Grande was mirrored by a boat ramp on the Mexican side. Access to the boat ramp on the Mexican side of the border had well-worn footpaths and vehicle tracks. An individual who worked in this area told our investigators that at several times during the year, the water is so low that the river can easily be crossed on foot. Our investigators were in this area for 1 hour and 30 minutes and observed no surveillance equipment, intrusion alarm systems, or law enforcement presence. Our investigators were not challenged regarding their activities. After performing our limited security assessment of these locations, investigators learned that a memorandum of understanding exists between DHS (of which CBP is a component), the Department of the Interior, and the Department of Agriculture regarding the protection of federal lands adjacent to U.S. borders. Although CBP is ultimately responsible for protecting these areas, officials told us that certain legal, environmental, and cultural considerations limit options for enforcement—for example, environmental restrictions and tribal sovereignty rights. We held corrective action briefings with CBP in 2006 and 2007 to discuss the results of our prior work. CBP generally agreed with our August 2006 findings and acknowledged that its officers are not able to identify all forms of counterfeit identification presented at land border crossings. In addition, in response to our August 2006 work, CBP officials stated that they supported the Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative and were working to implement it. This initiative has several parts, the most recent of which went into effect on January 31, 2008. In response to our September 2007 report, CBP indicated that resource restrictions prevent U.S. Border Patrol agents from investigating all instances of suspicious activity. CBP stated that the northern border presents more of a challenge than the southern border for several reasons, including the wide expanse of the border and the existence of many antiquated ports of entry. In response to this report, DHS provided a written update on numerous border protection efforts it has taken to enhance border security since 2003. To directly address vulnerabilities related to bogus documentation, DHS stated that measures have been implemented to enhance CBP officers’ ability to detect fraudulent documents, such as providing updated fraudulent document training modules to the CBP Academy for inclusion in its curriculum, implementing mandatory refresher training in detecting fraudulent documents, and providing the 11 ports of entry that have the highest rate of fraudulent document interceptions with advanced equipment to assist with the examination and detection of fraudulent documents. DHS also pointed out that, effective January 31, 2008, it has ended verbal declarations of citizenship at border crossings and now requires documents for U.S. citizens. If implemented effectively, this would address some of the vulnerabilities we identified in our 2003 and 2006 testimonies. According to DHS, although the full implementation of its Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative has been delayed, the implementation will also address vulnerabilities cited in our testimonies. In addition, DHS indicated that it has taken a number of actions related to the security of the northern border. In particular, DHS states that, as of April 2008, there were 1,128 agents assigned to the Northern Border—a 16 percent increase from the 972 agents identified in our 2007 report. Furthermore, DHS plans to double personnel staffing levels over the next 2 years to over 2,000 agents by the end of fiscal year 2010. DHS also indicates that CBP has established a field testing division to perform covert tests that appear similar to our own tests, with a particular focus on detecting and preventing illicit radioactive material from entering the United States. We addressed DHS technical and sensitivity comments as appropriate. We did not attempt to verify the information provided by DHS, but have included its full response in appendix I. As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce the contents of this report earlier, we will plan no further distribution until 30 days from the report date. At that time, we will provide copies of this report to the Secretary of Homeland Security and interested congressional committees and members. We will also make copies available to others upon request. In addition, this report will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at http://gao.gov. Please contact me at (202) 512-6722 or kutzg@gao.gov if you or your staffs have any questions concerning this report. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made major contributions to this report included John Cooney, Assistant Director; Andy O’Connell, Assistant Director; Barbara Lewis, Andrew McIntosh, Sandra Moore, and Barry Shillito.

Summary: From January 2003 to September 2007, GAO testified before the Committee on three occasions to describe security vulnerabilities that terrorists could exploit to enter the country. GAO's first two testimonies focused on covert testing at ports of entry--the air, sea, and land locations where international travelers can legally enter the United States. In its third testimony, GAO focused on limited security assessments of unmanned and unmonitored border areas between land ports of entry. GAO was asked to summarize the results of covert testing and assessment work for these three testimonies. This report discusses the results of testing at land, sea, and air ports of entry; however, the majority of GAO's work was focused on land ports of entry. The unmanned and unmonitored border areas GAO assessed were defined as locations where the government does not maintain a manned presence 24 hours per day or where there was no apparent monitoring equipment in place. GAO assessed a nonrepresentative selection of these locations and did not attempt to evaluate all potential U.S. border security vulnerabilities. Further, GAO's work was limited in scope and cannot be projected to represent systemic weaknesses. In response to this report, DHS provided a written update on numerous border protection efforts it has taken to enhance border security since 2003. GAO did not attempt to verify the information provided by DHS, but has included the response in this report. GAO investigators identified numerous border security vulnerabilities, both at ports of entry and at unmanned and unmonitored land border locations between the ports of entry. In testing ports of entry, undercover investigators carried counterfeit drivers' licenses, birth certificates, employee identification cards, and other documents, presented themselves at ports of entry and sought admittance to the United States dozens of times. They arrived in rental cars, on foot, by boat, and by airplane. They attempted to enter in four states on the northern border (Washington, New York, Michigan, and Idaho), three states on the southern border (California, Arizona, and Texas), and two other states requiring international air travel (Florida and Virginia). In nearly every case, government inspectors accepted oral assertions and counterfeit identification provided by GAO investigators as proof of U.S. citizenship and allowed them to enter the country. In total, undercover investigators made 42 crossings with a 93 percent success rate. On several occasions, while entering by foot from Mexico and by boat from Canada, investigators were not even asked to show identification. For example, at one border crossing in Texas in 2006, an undercover investigator attempted to show a Customs and Border Protection (CBP) officer his counterfeit driver's license, but the officer said, "That's fine, you can go" without looking at it. As a result of these tests, GAO concluded that terrorists could use counterfeit identification to pass through most of the tested ports of entry with little chance of being detected. In its most recent work, GAO shifted its focus from ports of entry and primarily performed limited security assessments of unmanned and unmonitored areas between ports of entry. The names of the states GAO visited for this limited security assessment have been withheld at the request of CBP. In four states along the U.S.-Canada border, GAO found state roads that were very close to the border that CBP did not appear to monitor. In three states, the proximity of the road to the border allowed investigators to cross undetected, successfully simulating the cross-border movement of radioactive materials or other contraband into the United States from Canada. For example, in one apparently unmanned, unmonitored area on the northern border, the U.S. Border Patrol was alerted to GAO's activities through the tip of an alert citizen. However, the responding U.S. Border Patrol agents were not able to locate the investigators and their simulated contraband. Also on the northern border, GAO investigators located several ports of entry in one state on the northern border that had posted daytime hours and were unmanned overnight. Investigators observed that surveillance equipment was in operation, but that the only preventive measure to stop an individual from crossing the border into the United States was a barrier across the road that could be driven around. GAO also identified potential security vulnerabilities on federally managed lands adjacent to the U.S.-Mexico border. GAO concluded that CBP faces significant challenges on the northern border, and that a determined cross-border violator would likely be able to bring radioactive materials or other contraband undetected into the United States by crossing the U.S.-Canada border at any of the assessed locations.