In 1992, the U.S. government initiated a program known as the Lisbon Initiative on Multilateral Nuclear Safety. This program is designed to help improve the safety of Soviet-designed reactors. The U.S. program is part of a larger international effort to improve the safety of these reactors. As of February 1996, 22 donors, including the United States, had pledged or contributed more than $1.4 billion in assistance to this effort. The 60 operational Soviet-designed nuclear power reactors pose significant risks because of deficiencies in their design and operation. Of greatest concern are 26 of these reactors that western safety experts generally agree fall well below accepted international safety standards and cannot be economically upgraded. These include 15 reactors known as RBMKs and 11 reactors known as VVER 440 Model 230s. The RBMK reactors—considered the least safe by western safety experts—and VVER 440 Model 230 reactors are believed to present the greatest safety risk because of inherent design deficiencies, including the lack of a containment structure, inadequate fire protection systems, unreliable instrumentation and control systems, and deficient systems for cooling the reactor core in an emergency. Most of these reactors are located in countries that do not have independent or effective nuclear regulatory bodies to oversee plant safety. Figure 1 shows the type and location of the 60 Soviet-designed reactors operating in the Newly Independent States and in central and eastern Europe. Several federal agencies share responsibility for the U.S. nuclear safety assistance program. The Department of State provides overall policy guidance, with assistance from the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). DOE is responsible for implementing projects involving training, operational safety, and safety-related equipment. Three of DOE’s national laboratories support the program. The Pacific Northwest National Laboratory provides the primary management support, and along with the Brookhaven National Laboratory and the Argonne National Laboratory, manages specific safety projects. NRC is responsible for assisting the recipient countries’ nuclear regulatory organizations. The goals of the U.S. safety assistance program have remained the same since its inception—encouraging the shutdown of the highest-risk Soviet-designed nuclear power reactors and reducing the risk of accidents. However, none of these reactors have been closed, and one has been restarted. In addition, DOE’s portion of the program has evolved and expanded to cover a broader range of safety projects. Although the United States remains committed to securing the closure of the highest-risk nuclear power reactors, none have been closed. Furthermore, Armenia recently restarted one of its VVER 440 Model 230 reactors. Department of State officials told us that progress has been made in getting closure agreements for some reactors in Bulgaria, Lithuania, and Ukraine, but these officials also recognize that it may be difficult for these countries to meet these agreements on a timely basis. For example, Bulgaria has agreed to a phased shutdown of its highest-risk reactors by 1998 as adequate replacement energy, such as hydroelectric power, becomes available. Department of State officials said the closure date will probably be delayed by 2 or 3 years because, among other things, the pace of economic reform in Bulgaria has been slow. In 1995, the G-7 nations (major industrialized nations) and Ukraine signed an agreement that includes Ukraine’s commitment to close the Chornobyl nuclear power reactor by 2000. State Department and USAID officials said that successful implementation of the agreement hinges on Ukraine’s progress in reforming the energy sector. Such progress is key to continuing the international financial assistance that may ease the impact of closure. DOE, national laboratory, and Department of State officials acknowledge that many of the highest-risk reactors may continue to operate for several more years. Many factors complicate U.S. and western nations’ efforts to obtain early closure of the highest-risk reactors, including (1) a lack of consensus, particularly among Russian nuclear safety experts, about the safety of their reactors; (2) concerns about the social and economic well-being of workers who would be displaced if reactors were closed; (3) a commitment to expanding nuclear power, particularly in Russia, to meet future energy needs; and (4) the need to obtain financing to support the development of replacement energy. DOE’s Director of the Office of Nuclear Energy, Science, and Technology said that Russia does not intend to close its highest-risk reactors for many years, and he believes that the United States should continue to provide assistance so that these reactors can operate as safely as possible until they are closed. Department of State and USAID officials also noted that it is sound policy to continue to reduce the risks of accidents at the highest-risk reactors. In keeping with this policy, DOE plans to increase technical assistance to RBMK plants, including Chornobyl. The Chornobyl initiative is part of a multinational effort to provide safety upgrades that can be completed quickly. DOE is planning to spend about $13.8 million at the Chornobyl nuclear power plant, including upgrades for fire safety at one of the two operating reactors and instituting operational safety and training programs for both reactors. In total, DOE plans to spend about $33 million for safety parameter display systems for plants with RBMK reactors. This system provides information, which is displayed on a monitor, to operators about plant conditions that are important for safety. In addition, DOE plans to spend about $8.5 million on a project to transfer western maintenance practices, training methods, and technology to staff at RBMK reactors. DOE officials noted that the project will not extend the life of the RBMK reactors but will improve safety. Our review of the RBMK maintenance initiative indicates that the repair or replacement of any component that a plant relies on would support the plant’s continued operations. While these efforts will not by themselves extend the lifetime of the plant, they will serve to keep the plant’s components in service longer. In 1993, the Chairman of NRC at that time said that it is difficult to draw a fine line between short-term safety improvements and upgrades that could encourage a plant’s operator to think in terms of long-term operations. DOE’s program was initially viewed as short- to mid-term, totaling between $25 million and $40 million, with additional funding planned of about $100 million. However, DOE’s portion of the program has grown because of the complexities and challenges involved in improving the safety of Soviet-designed plants. As of March 1996, DOE had initiated more than 150 projects in this program, and DOE’s Director of the Office of Nuclear Energy, Science, and Technology told us that approximately $500 million would be required over the next 10 years to address the program’s long-term safety and training needs. (According to Department of State and USAID officials, this estimate has not been agreed upon by other U.S. government agencies participating in the program.) In contrast, NRC views its regulatory assistance program, totaling about $28 million, as limited in terms of its size and scope. DOE and Pacific Northwest National Laboratory officials said that while it remains important to address short-term safety problems at the plant level, it is equally important to approach safety at a systemic level to help bring about sustainable improvements. As a result, the program has placed increased emphasis on transferring U.S. technology and encouraging the recipient countries to analyze and fix their own safety problems. According to DOE officials, the technology transfer aspect of the program is having a positive impact. DOE has developed a short- to mid-term plan that provides an overview of the program’s objectives, performance measurements and ongoing projects. Although they plan to do so, DOE officials have not yet established a long-term plan linking the program’s objectives to measurable goals or providing a date for meeting those goals. As a result, it is unclear how DOE will demonstrate when and how it has achieved the program’s goals. It is also unclear, without such a plan, when the program will end. According to DOE’s Deputy Associate Director for International Nuclear Safety, the 10-year approach is based on an intuitive view of the time needed to complete the program’s overall objectives. DOE officials told us in September 1996 that the agency has begun to develop a plan that will link objectives to goals and set a date for achieving these goals. DOE and NRC have received $208 million for their programs in the Newly Independent States and countries of central and eastern Europe. USAID has provided about 80 percent of the total funds received through various interagency agreements with DOE and NRC. The remainder of the funds has come from DOE ($30 million) and the Department of Defense ($11 million). Beginning in fiscal year 1996, DOE began receiving direct appropriations for the program but is still obtaining some funds from USAID for special projects, such as Chornobyl. (App. I provides greater detail on DOE’s and NRC’s costs for the safety assistance program and fig. I.1 provides information about the Chornobyl project.) The U.S. nuclear safety program has focused on several types of assistance, including management and operational safety, engineering and technology (including fire safety and other plant-specific improvements), plant safety evaluations, and regulatory enhancements. Operational improvements can be implemented at all plants regardless of reactor type. Plant-specific measures are generally directed toward reactors such as the oldest RBMKs and VVER 440 Model 230s. As figure 2 shows, the greatest percentage of the funds—36 percent—has or will be spent on management and operational safety, which includes training and safety procedures. As of March 31, 1996, DOE had obligated $119.2 million and had spent $78.3 million of the $180.1 million it had received. NRC had obligated $16.5 million and spent $11 million of the $27.9 million received. (See table I.1). Of the combined agencies’ expenditures, $42.2 million was for nuclear safety equipment and other products. More than half of the $42.2 million was for training or training-related items, such as simulators. Less than one-third of this amount was for safety-related hardware, such as fire safety or other plant-specific equipment. (See fig. I.2). Other program-related expenditures were for labor, travel, overhead, and other costs. (See tables I.2 and I.3). DOE, NRC, and Pacific Northwest National Laboratory officials recognize that their obligation and expenditure rates for their respective programs—particularly in Russia and Ukraine—have lagged over time. They stated, however, that several factors have contributed to the delays, including (1) concerns about nuclear liability in the United States that led to a change in DOE’s program management and stalled many projects;(2) logistical problems with establishing assistance programs in Russia and Ukraine; (3) the need to develop working relationships with Russian and Ukrainian organizations, some of which have experienced significant turnover and/or attrition of key personnel; and (4) procurement delays in the United States. DOE, national laboratory, and NRC officials noted concerns about their programs’ unobligated balances. As of March 31, 1996, DOE’s unobligated balance was about $61 million and NRC’s was about $11 million. DOE intended to obligate all currently unobligated funds by September 30, 1996. While NRC has obligated 88 percent of its funds for central and eastern Europe, its obligation rates for Russia and Ukraine are significantly lower. NRC expects to obligate its available funds, primarily for Russia and Ukraine, over the next few years. Of the 13 safety projects we reviewed, 11 have been delayed in their implementation and one has been completed. Projects have been delayed largely because of difficulties in getting U.S.-supplied equipment cleared through Russian and Ukrainian customs officials. While some of these difficulties continue, several projects are moving forward. Despite the recent progress, it is too early to assess the impact of these projects on safety. Eleven of the 13 safety projects implemented by DOE and NRC have been delayed, and 3 are more than 2 years behind schedule. At the time of our review, one project, a study of nuclear energy options for Russia, had been completed. The study concluded that, among other things, it was in Russia’s economic interest to upgrade some of its operating nuclear power reactors and to close and decommission some of its higher-risk reactors. (See app. II for a summary of the projects and the reasons for the delays). A number of factors have delayed the implementation of these projects, including (1) problems with customs, (2) foreign officials’ imposition of unanticipated and/or burdensome requirements, and (3) the inability of Russia and Ukraine to provide adequate financial support for some projects. Despite these impediments, several projects are now progressing more quickly. (DOE’s projects are discussed in detail in app. III, and NRC’s are discussed in app. IV.) For the 13 projects we reviewed, DOE has been requested to pay at least $505,000 in unanticipated costs. These costs include $442,000 to replace or refurbish unusable simulator parts in Ukraine, $34,000 to store U.S. equipment in European warehouses pending the resolution of customs problems in Russia, $26,000 for airfare to enable Ukrainians working on a year-long simulator project in the United States to return to Ukraine or to have their spouses visit them in the United States, and $3,000 to the Ukrainian customs organization for fees to authorize the release of equipment. In 6 of the 13 safety projects we reviewed, Russian and/or Ukrainian customs officials did not release U.S. equipment to the nuclear power plants in a timely manner. Under the terms of agreements that the United States entered into with Russia and Ukraine, this equipment is to enter into these countries duty-free. Local customs officials in Russia and Ukraine have not consistently recognized the duty-free status of this equipment. Department of State and USAID officials told us that other U.S. assistance programs in the Newly Independent States have experienced similar problems. Customs problems have included the following: Russian customs officials impounded 100 fire suits and related fire safety equipment, valued at $110,000, until customs duties were paid. This equipment was destined for the Smolensk nuclear power plant. Since no duties were paid, customs officials turned the equipment over to a Russian court, which donated the equipment to a local fire company. Realizing it could not use the equipment, the fire company eventually sent the gear to the nuclear power plant, about 1 year after it had been shipped to Russia. A U.S. contractor placed emergency batteries and related equipment in a storage facility in the Netherlands for several months pending the resolution of customs problems in Russia. The shipper requested the reimbursement of about $11,300 for storage costs, but DOE had not paid these costs at the time of our review. Russian customs officials have been holding a sample high-temperature suit and related equipment, valued at about $26,000, for over 2 years. The equipment, which was examined by Smolensk nuclear power plant officials in May 1994, is no longer considered useful by DOE except for demonstration purposes. As a result, DOE has not pressed Russian authorities to release it. No customs duties or storage fees have been imposed. Fire-retardant material, valued at $23,650, was stored in Finland for several months pending the resolution of customs problems. The shipper has claimed about $23,000 in storage costs, and this claim is being reviewed by the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory. The Department of State’s Senior Coordinator for Nuclear Safety Assistance said that customs problems have been raised with senior-level U.S. and Russian officials. Customs difficulties have been assigned to the Science and Technology Committee of the Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission for resolution. The Vice President has repeatedly mentioned his concerns to Russian Prime Minister Chernomyrdin, and both DOE and the Department of State have attempted to find a generic solution to the customs issue. However, pending such a resolution, case-by-case arrangements will still be required. Recently, DOE and Pacific Northwest National Laboratory officials have focused greater attention on resolving customs problems. In February 1996, DOE and Ukrainian authorities agreed to a standardized process under which nuclear safety-related equipment would be cleared duty-free by customs in Ukraine. Laboratory officials said that some equipment had recently been shipped successfully to Russian plants using the U.S. Embassy in Moscow to facilitate the process, although these officials do not consider this approach to be a long-term solution. Some U.S. industry officials also noted that customs problems have decreased in recent months. Because standardized customs procedures do not yet exist in either Russia or Ukraine, Pacific Northwest National Laboratory officials recognize that problems may continue to occur. These officials noted that their representative in Russia does, among other things, help resolve customs problems by working with Russian officials. Although the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory has a representative in Ukraine, his responsibilities are narrowly defined, and he does not routinely monitor customs issues. A Laboratory official said that the Ukraine representative’s position may be expanded to more closely resemble the responsibilities of the program’s representative in Russia. In addition to customs problems, other factors have contributed to delays affecting 5 of the 13 projects we reviewed. For example, DOE’s project to assist Russia in developing emergency operating instructions at a pilot nuclear power plant was delayed, in part, because the Russian organizations responsible for approving the instructions have been slow to act and have not given the project priority status. Although the instructions were drafted in 1992, a lengthy process of verification, validation, training, and regulatory approval delayed the implementation of a partial set of instructions until mid-1996. In another case, Russian authorities insisted that some U.S. fire safety equipment planned for shipment to the Smolensk plant had to be tested and certified in Russia. This equipment had already been approved for U.S. nuclear power plants. Testing of the equipment was delayed for several months because of disagreements over funding. During this period, Russian authorities refused to allow the U.S. contractor to visit the plant until the matter was resolved. A few U.S. contractors told us that DOE and the Department of State have not always been aggressive enough in helping resolve problems. In the cases of the emergency operating instructions and the fire safety equipment for the Smolensk plant, these contractors believed that DOE should have been more active in working with the appropriate Russian organizations to help resolve project delays sooner. One contractor noted that higher-level DOE officials needed to work more closely with key Russian officials to demonstrate the U.S. government’s commitment to the projects’ success. He noted that a key DOE nuclear safety official helped move the emergency operating instruction project forward after he had discussed the project with Russian officials from Rosenergoatom, the organization responsible for most nuclear power plants’ operations in Russia. In 3 of the 13 projects, Ukraine and Russia have been unable to adequately finance or support their share of the project. For example, a full-scope simulator for the Khmelnytskyy nuclear power plant in Ukraine, valued at $12.7 million, has been delayed partly by the plant officials’ inability to fulfill their commitments. As part of the project, the plant had agreed to provide certain components to be integrated into the simulator. However, the parts the plant provided were corroded. DOE paid for the replacements. In addition, the plant-supplied control room panels did not match the panels needed for the simulator; DOE paid for their modification as well. The simulator project—as well as other projects for which the United States has agreed to cover additional costs—raises questions about the ability of host countries to meet commitments in other ongoing and planned cost-sharing projects for the safety program. For example, other simulator projects for Russia and Ukraine are being developed on a cost-sharing basis with DOE. The total estimated DOE contribution to these simulator projects is about $24 million; Ukraine’s contribution is about $12 million; and Russia’s contribution is about $7.5 million. DOE’s simulator project manager said that some of the recipient countries’ contributions will be “in-kind” contributions of labor, rather than financial outlays. However, he said that DOE recognizes that these projects are risky and that DOE may have some additional costs associated with them. In October 1994, a USAID Inspector General’s report raised similar concerns about cost-sharing ventures. The report recommended that USAID, in coordination with DOE, ensure the development of procedures defining and documenting the role and use of U.S. government funding vis-a-vis host countries’ contributions. According to DOE, the work plans for each project now include a description of the host country’s expected contribution, which in many cases covers labor costs. Despite delays, some projects have shown results because the pace of implementing a number of these safety projects has accelerated in recent months. For example, DOE and Brookhaven officials told us that the cadre of trainers at the Balakovo training center in Ukraine has grown from less than 10 to about 70 since the project began and that the plant’s management is committed to the training program. In another project, NRC has worked closely with Russia’s nuclear regulatory body, Gosatomnadzor, to develop a legislative basis for nuclear regulation and legal enforcement. NRC and Gosatomnadzor officials view this initiative as a significant first step toward the creation of an independent nuclear regulatory body in Russia. Furthermore, we were told that a significant amount of fire safety equipment has recently been delivered and installed at the Zaporizhzhya nuclear power plant in Ukraine and emergency power equipment has recently been installed at the Kola plant in Russia. It is too soon to assess the extent to which the projects we reviewed are improving safety in Russia and Ukraine because most of these projects have not been completed. However, DOE, NRC, and national laboratory officials—as well as Russian and Ukrainian officials we met with—believe that the projects are beneficial. For example, DOE officials believe the fire safety equipment will reduce the likelihood of fires and improve detection and fire-fighting capabilities. A Russian official from the Smolensk nuclear power plant told us that the U.S. fire suits have increased fire fighters’ confidence. DOE officials said that they are attempting to measure safety improvements and to establish meaningful performance measures for the program. However, they said that the impact on plant safety of training, procedures, and changes in the safety culture is not clearly measurable. DOE’s Director, Office of Nuclear Energy, Science and Technology and officials at the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory said that the lack of reliable baseline safety data makes it impossible for DOE to quantify the extent to which safety has been improved. Laboratory officials believe that measurable safety improvements may take 2 to 5 years. DOE has established performance measures that primarily gauge performance in the technical work areas of the program by accounting for the number of plants or plant operators carrying out various tasks or projects. However, DOE has not yet reported on the results of these specific measurements. The Pacific Northwest National Laboratory is also attempting to gauge the impact of its program by gathering anecdotal evidence of improvements in nuclear safety. NRC has established results-based measurements that will be used to evaluate its regulatory assistance program. The U.S. nuclear safety assistance program has evolved into a longer-term effort than initially envisioned, but DOE has not yet developed a plan that reflects this effort. Although DOE has estimated that it will need $500 million over the next 10 years, it has not articulated how it will achieve its objectives over this period. DOE’s development of such a plan—which would link the program’s goals with anticipated costs, outcomes, and time frames—would go a long way towards gauging how the Department’s assistance is contributing to the improved safety of Soviet-designed reactors. It would also serve to provide a better estimate of how much assistance is required to meet the program’s objectives. The U.S. nuclear safety program has faced many challenges and impediments, such as the lack of a standardized customs process in Russia and Ukraine. While DOE has taken a more active role in resolving customs matters, this problem persists, contributes to delays, and increases the program’s costs. The Pacific Northwest National Laboratory has placed a program representative in Russia who helps resolve customs problems. Because numerous customs problems have occurred in Ukraine, we believe that a Laboratory representative in Ukraine could provide similar program assistance. To improve the management of the nuclear safety assistance program, we recommend that the Secretary of Energy take the following actions: Develop a strategic plan that (1) clearly links the program’s goals and objectives to performance measurements, (2) provides well-defined time frames for completing the program, and (3) projects the anticipated funds required to meet the program’s specific objectives, including the estimated U.S. contributions to cost-sharing arrangements that take into account the recipient countries’ ability to realistically meet resource commitments. Facilitate the timely and duty-free delivery of U.S. safety equipment to nuclear power plants in Ukraine. Specifically, the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory’s in-country representative in Ukraine should, as part of this position’s assigned duty, work with the appropriate government authorities to resolve customs problems should the position assume broader responsibilities in the future. Part of this monitoring responsibility could include periodic visits to the nuclear power plants in Ukraine. We provided copies of a draft of this report to the Departments of Energy and State, USAID, and NRC. The Department of State and NRC generally agreed with the report’s findings and provided clarifying information that we have incorporated into our report, as appropriate. DOE and USAID provided written comments. DOE disagreed that the U.S. assistance program posed a dilemma because it may encourage the continued operation of the same reactors that the United States wants to see closed as soon as possible. DOE noted that the U.S. equipment being provided does not extend the life of the reactors. We did not assert that the equipment would extend the operating life of the reactors, but we believe that certain types of equipment could be used to support the continued operation of higher-risk nuclear power plants. For example, DOE’s RBMK maintenance initiative provides the equipment, training, and technology that enables the plant’s components to remain in service longer, thus supporting the plant’s continued operations while improving plant safety. (See app. VI for DOE’s comments and our response.) USAID noted that our report (1) understated the overall level of progress being made by the U.S. assistance program and (2) gave the impression that no progress is being made toward obtaining the closure of the highest-risk Soviet-designed reactors. Regarding the first point, our report noted that several projects in our sample had made progress, resulting in, for example, the installation of safety-related hardware. However, we also noted that it was premature to assess the impact of these projects because only one had been completed. Regarding the second point, our report provided several examples of closure commitments that have been made but also stated that it will be difficult for the countries to meet specific closure dates. We also noted that, to date, no reactors have been closed, and one was recently restarted. (See app. VII for USAID’s comments and our response.) To address our objectives, we interviewed officials and obtained documentation from the Department of State, USAID, DOE, NRC, and the Brookhaven and Pacific Northwest National Laboratories. We also met with some government officials and nuclear power plant personnel from Russia and Ukraine. We reviewed 13 of approximately 196 ongoing DOE and NRC nuclear safety projects to determine how they are being implemented and are contributing to improved nuclear safety. Agency officials agreed that our selection included projects that represent the safety program’s highest priorities. Our scope and methodology are discussed in detail in appendix V. We performed our review from January 1996 through August 1996 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. We plan no further distribution of this report until 15 days from the date of this letter unless you publicly announce its contents earlier. At that time, we will send copies of this report to other interested congressional committees, the Secretaries of State and Energy, the Chairman of NRC, the Administrator of USAID, the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, and other interested parties. We will also make copies available to others on request. Please contact me at (202) 512-3841 if you or your staff have any questions. Major contributors to this report are listed in appendix VIII. This appendix provides detailed information on the Department of Energy’s (DOE) and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s (NRC) planned and actual costs for the U.S. nuclear safety assistance to improve the safety of Soviet-designed nuclear reactors. Percent of funds received spent Note : Does not include U.S.contributions to the Nuclear Safety Account totaling $25 million. This account is administered by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development. It also does not include $300,000 for NRC projects in Kazakhstan and Armenia. Central and Eastern European Countries. DOE - DOE Headquarters Activity PNNL - Pacific National Northwest Laboratory BNL - Brookhaven National Laboratory ANL - Argonne National Laboratory CH - Chicago Area Office BAO/ORNL - Brookhaven Area Office and Oak Ridge National Laboratory Includes salaries, wages, and pensions that are directly chargeable to the international nuclear safety program. DOE headquarters’ employees’ salaries are not charged directly to the program. Includes travel and per diem costs—foreign or domestic—of DOE and laboratory officials. Does not includes travel and per diem costs of foreign nationals under the program; these costs are included in “materials/subcontracts.” Includes directly applicable purchase orders, subcontracts, and consulting services. Contractor labor, travel, and overhead charges are included in this category. Also included in this amount is $38.8 million in safety-related equipment and products. Includes the costs of certain centralized services, including translation of documents. Includes charges for organizational overhead, general and administrative expenses, and service assessments. $3.5 Delayed. Plan to complete in 9/1996. 2.1 Delayed. Plan to complete in 12/1996. 4.5 Delayed. Plan to complete in 11/1996. 1.8 Delayed. Plan to complete in 12/1996. 13.5 Delayed. Plan to complete in 12/1998. 6.6 Delayed. Plan to complete in 9/1996. 12.7 Delayed. Plan to complete in 11/1997. 9.7 Plan to complete in 6/1997. 6/1995. .6 Delayed. Plan to complete in 12/1996. 1.5 Delayed. Plan to complete in 9/1997. complete in 6/1999. 2.5 Delayed. Plan to complete in 5/1998. This appendix discusses nine nuclear safety projects we reviewed that DOE has completed or is implementing in Russia and Ukraine. These projects, which have a total value of about $56 million, include a training center in Russia, a full-scope simulator in Ukraine, emergency power systems in Russia, fire safety equipment in Russia and Ukraine, spent fuel storage in Ukraine, emergency operating instructions for Soviet-designed nuclear reactors, and a study of nuclear energy options for Russia. The Balakovo training center in Russia is one of the two regional training centers established by the 1992 Lisbon Initiative on Multilateral Nuclear Safety. The purpose of the training center is to teach a systematic approach to training—the measurable, performance-based training program used for U.S. nuclear power plant personnel—to Balakovo plant personnel. The systematic approach to training is used as a method to develop or improve training programs for operations, maintenance and other technical support personnel. DOE expects that this training approach will eventually be transferred from Balakovo to the other VVER-1000 designed plants in Russia. As of March 31, 1996, DOE had allocated $9.4 million for the Balakovo training center and had obligated $9.7 million. About $4.3 million had been spent, as seen in table III.1. The Balakovo training center project was started in April 1993 and is expected to be completed by June 1997. However, training for other VVER 1000 plant operators in Russia may continue beyond 1997. According to DOE and Brookhaven officials and representatives from Sonalysts, Inc. (the U.S. contractor), no major delays have occurred in implementing the project because of the high level of cooperation from Balakovo plant management and Russian authorities. By working cooperatively with Balakovo plant personnel, DOE, Brookhaven, and Sonalysts, Inc. developed 12 job-specific training courses and 6 general training courses for the plant. As of May 1996, 6 of the 12 job-specific training programs and 3 of the 6 general courses had been completed. Along with the training, DOE is providing both course-specific equipment and equipment for the training center, such as circuit boards, soldering work stations, laser alignment equipment, computers, printers, and audiovisual equipment. Equipment shipped from the United States to the Balakovo training center has experienced some customs problems. According to the Brookhaven project manager, in one instance the plant paid a substantial amount to get a shipment of equipment out of customs storage. Two shipments of spare parts for a full-scope simulator for the training center, valued at $45,500, have been held in U.S. airport storage since August and September 1995 awaiting approval from Rosenergoatom (REA), for shipment. However, this Brookhaven official told us that, more recently, some equipment had been shipped successfully to the plant by using the U.S. Embassy in Moscow to facilitate clearance. For example, about $22,000 in soldering equipment that had been held in storage in Helsinki, Finland, since July 1995, pending resolution of the customs issue, was delivered to the plant in April 1996. DOE considers the Balakovo training center to be a success because of the plant management’s commitment to the training. In a March 1996 letter to DOE, the Balakovo plant manager stated that the training program was a success because of the effective interaction between the Russian and U.S. sides and the fact that the training approach had been applied to specific conditions at the plant. According to the Brookhaven project manager, the size of the Balakovo training center staff has grown from less than 10 in 1992-93 to about 70 in 1996, and instructors’ salaries are the same as plant operators. As of March 1996, about 600 personnel at Balakovo had been trained on material developed with U.S. assistance. Plant personnel have also begun to develop training material for additional duty areas and to train other personnel. Approximately 5,000 plant personnel require job-specific training. In a November 1995 meeting with DOE, officials from Russia’s Ministry of Atomic Energy (Minatom) said that they were pleased with the training program at Balakovo and wanted to adopt the training method to other VVER-designed plants in Russia. In April 1996, Brookhaven’s project manager met with Russian officials and agreed to a plan to transfer the training approach to other Russian plants. Because Balakovo does not have the resources to transfer the training approach to other plants, DOE agreed to continue to assist Russian organizations and Balakovo with additional training. The other regional training center in Khmelnytskyy, Ukraine, established by the 1992 Lisbon Initiative, will feature a computer-based simulator for the VVER-1000 reactor, as seen in figure III.1. DOE is purchasing a full-scope simulator for the Khmelnytskyy training center so that plant personnel can upgrade and maintain their operational skills in dealing with routine and abnormal events at the plant. DOE officials and representatives from S-3 Technologies, Inc. (the U.S. contractor) believe that the transfer of simulator technology to Ukrainian personnel will have long-term benefits. The simulator technology is being transferred to a Ukrainian team that will maintain and modify the Khmelnytskyy simulator and build and maintain simulators for the other nuclear power plants in Ukraine. As a part of this technology transfer, a Ukrainian company has learned how to manufacture control room panels, a key component of the simulator, that meet U.S. standards. The United States and Ukraine are working together to develop the simulator. S-3 Technologies, Inc. is designing, developing, testing, and installing the simulator in Ukraine and is providing training and support to the technology transfer team. As a part of the simulator development activities, the Ukrainians agreed to provide plant data, control room panels, and instruments, and to host a U.S. team in Ukraine for about a year. Brookhaven National Laboratory subcontracted with a Ukrainian company to modify the control room panels for the simulator. The Ukrainians also agreed to construct a building at the Khmelnytskyy training center to house the simulator. As of March 31, 1996, DOE had allocated $11.7 million for the simulator project against a total estimated cost of $12.7 million. It had obligated $11.7 million and had spent $8.5 million of this amount. Table III.2 shows these expenditures in greater detail. Most of the funding has come from the Department of Defense, which transferred $11 million to Brookhaven to build the simulator in November 1994. DOE allocated an additional $500,000 for development of the project specifications. Because of project delays and unanticipated costs, DOE has since added $1.2 million to the project. Included in these expenditures is $596,724 that DOE paid for travel, lodging, and other expenses for 22 Ukrainian technology team members who lived in the United States for approximately one year. (See table III.3.) Of that amount, $26,298 was for airfare that DOE or S-3 Technologies, Inc. paid for 12 Ukrainian spouses who traveled to the United States and 4 team members who traveled home, for about one month. According to a representative of S-3 Technologies, Inc., one member of the project team, a Ukrainian computer specialist, left the program to work for a U.S. computer firm and was replaced. PNNL officials, who authorized the payments, were not aware that the Ukrainian team member had left the project under these circumstances until we brought it to their attention. They noted, however, that they were led to believe that the team member had personal problems that caused his absence from the program. Furthermore, these officials stated that no inappropriate payments were made to the team member. The simulator project was originally expected to be completed by December 1996, and, according to DOE and Brookhaven project officials, is now expected to be completed by November 1997. Several events have contributed to project delays, including (1) a 9-month delay in receiving Department of Defense funds, (2) the reluctance of Khmelnytskyy plant management to provide complete and accurate plant data in a timely manner, (3) the unanticipated modification of Ukrainian-supplied control room panels, (4) the need to replace defective simulator instruments supplied by Ukraine, and (5) customs problems. The Ukrainians have had difficulties in fulfilling their agreements in a timely manner. This has led to project delays and unanticipated costs. An S-3 Technologies representative told us that the Khmelnytskyy plant management was hesitant to release plant data to his company and had asked for payment for the data collection effort. S-3 Technologies eventually received the plant data without paying for it. Furthermore, the plant did not provide complete and timely delivery of the control room panels and instruments that are required for assembling the simulator. DOE paid $389,000 to modify the control panels. In addition, because the crates containing the instruments and switches had been stored outside for 3 years, the switches were rusted and needed to be replaced, at a cost of about $52,600 to DOE. DOE has also agreed to pay about $30,000 for lodging costs for the U.S. contractor personnel who will be living in Ukraine for one year. Ukraine had originally agreed to cover these costs as well. Difficulties with customs have also contributed to delays in assembling the control room panels for the simulator. In a 1995 letter to DOE, an official with Ukraine’s state-owned nuclear power utility said that clearance of certain equipment had been held up because representatives of the U.S. Agency for International Development(USAID) mission in Kiev were unaware that the deliveries were part of DOE’s technical assistance program. In February 1996, the Khmelnytskyy plant’s general director noted in a letter to Brookhaven National Laboratory that the simulator project would be jeopardized if the customs problems were not resolved. In February 1996, DOE signed a protocol with Goscomatom, Ukraine’s nuclear power utility, to facilitate future deliveries of nuclear safety equipment from the United States to Ukraine. In January 1996, two shipments of simulator parts were delivered to a customs warehouse in Ukraine, but they were not released until U.S. officials visited the plant in April 1996. During this visit, DOE’s project manager told us that he agreed to have S-3 Technologies pay customs fees of between $2,000 and $3,000 to release a third shipment of simulator equipment. DOE and Brookhaven officials and representatives of S-3 Technologies are concerned that the training center building that will house the simulator will not be completed on time. During U.S. officials’ July 1996 visit to the plant, Pacific Northwest National Laboratory representatives reported that the training center building would be completed in August 1996. The control panels are also expected to be completed and installed in August 1996. About 16 to 18 S-3 Technology personnel will travel to the Khmelnytskyy plant in the fall of 1996 to integrate the simulator hardware with the software and to test and verify the simulator. The Khmelnytskyy team members will assist the U.S. contractors in testing the simulator in Ukraine. In addition, members of the technology transfer team representing Goscomatom will work at the Ukraine simulator support center in Kiev developing other simulators for Ukraine, such as one for the Rivne nuclear power plant. DOE is providing batteries and related equipment to improve the emergency power supply systems of the Kola and Kursk nuclear power plants in Russia. The batteries are used to provide electricity so that safety systems can function during a power outage, and the performance of most nuclear power plant safety systems depends on the availability of emergency power. The equipment will replace existing Russian-manufactured batteries that are not enclosed and present potential safety hazards. In the case of Kola, the new batteries are seismically qualified and meet U.S. safety standards. At Kursk, batteries will be of two types: seismically qualified and commercial. In both projects, the U.S. contractor, Burns and Roe, is responsible for developing specifications, purchasing and delivering the equipment, and monitoring equipment installation. The major pieces of equipment are being purchased in the United States. Figures III.2 and III.3 show existing batteries and U.S.- provided replacements. DOE has allocated approximately $3.5 million for the Kola project and about $2.1 million for Kursk. As of March 31, 1996, DOE had obligated $3 million and spent about $2.9 million for Kola and had obligated $2.1 million and spent about $607,000 for Kursk. Tables III.4 and III.5 provide an analysis of expenditures for the two projects. DOE’s project manager told us that both the Kola and Kursk battery upgrade projects were initially delayed for about one year because of Brookhaven’s and U.S. contractors’ concerns about nuclear liability. These concerns resulted in the transfer of overall program management from Brookhaven to Pacific Northwest National Laboratory. The Kola project, started in 1994, was originally expected to be completed by July 1995. DOE currently estimates that the project should be completed by September 1996. After the initial delay, DOE has proceeded according to schedule and the manufacture of the batteries is to be completed by July 1996. Installation will be completed when the reactor goes off line temporarily for routine maintenance. A representative from the U.S. contractor, Burns and Roe, noted that delays in the Kola project were also due to changes when the plant management decided to perform routine maintenance that forced the contractor to reschedule battery installation. The Kola project, like other projects we reviewed, also experienced customs problems, but these problems did not affect the project schedule, which had already been delayed. For example, in November 1995, equipment for the Kola project was shipped from the United States to Russia. As instructed by DOE, Burns and Roe held the equipment at a storage warehouse in the Netherlands pending resolution of customs issues. The equipment remained at the warehouse from November 1995 through early January 1996, when it was cleared for release and shipped to the plant. The warehouse charged the U.S. shipping agent $11,292 for storage fees, and DOE will be asked to reimburse the shipper for the fees. Despite these customs problems, according to the Burns and Roe representative, all of the Kola-related equipment has been delivered and the batteries for one of the units have been installed. This includes approximately $1.6 million for batteries, battery trays, and switchboards. Approximately $100,000 in similar equipment has been delivered to Kursk. The remainder of the equipment is scheduled for shipment in August 1996. DOE estimates that the Kursk project will be completed in December 1996. DOE is providing fire safety equipment to the Smolensk nuclear power plant in Russia to reduce the risk of fires and minimize their effect should they occur. Smolensk was selected as a pilot project by DOE in 1993, with the expectation that equipment would be delivered quickly to demonstrate the effectiveness of the U.S. safety program. In 1993, Brookhaven, which was initially assigned responsibility for project management by DOE, selected Bechtel Power Corporation to implement the project. Major items of equipment to be provided include fire suits, smoke detectors, fire doors, fireproofing materials, and radios. Figure III.4 shows an existing fire door at Smolensk and a sample replacement door is shown in figure III.5. Fire-fighting suits, already delivered to the plant, are shown in figure III.6. The estimated value of the project is $4.5 million. As of March 31, 1996, $2.7 million had been obligated, and about $1.3 million had been spent, as shown in table III.6. Numerous factors have delayed implementation of the Smolensk fire safety project, including (1) nuclear liability concerns that led to changes in U.S. project management, (2) customs problems, and (3) the lack of cooperation from key Russian organizations. According to a Bechtel representative, nuclear liability concerns—and the resulting change in DOE’s project management—contributed to an 8-month delay because additional contracts were not awarded to continue the work. As a result of these problems, the project has missed performance-related milestones. The project, which began in August 1993, was initially expected to be completed by December 1994. DOE now estimates that the project should be completed by November 1996. A Smolensk plant official told us that he appreciated the U.S. assistance but was disappointed that the fire safety equipment has not been delivered sooner. He said that the Russian bureaucracy has created many difficulties for the plant and the equipment is urgently needed. With respect to customs problems, in October 1994, a shipment of fire safety equipment, including 100 fire suits and fire hose nozzles valued at about $110,000, was impounded by Russian customs officials pending payment of the applicable customs taxes. When the Smolensk plant refused to pay, the customs office brought the matter before a local court. The customs office noted that as a private enterprise, it was responsible for generating income. The court agreed and upheld the assessment. Because no duty was paid, the court subsequently declared the items abandoned and the property of the state. In January 1995, the court released the shipment to the fire department of a regional capital located approximately 100 miles from the nuclear power plant. After discovering that the fire suits had the name of the power plant’s fire safety brigade labeled across the back in English, the city fire department notified the power plant. In September 1995, almost one year after the shipment had arrived at Smolensk, the equipment was sent to the nuclear power plant’s fire brigade. Because of the uncertainties associated with the customs clearance process, DOE decided to hold a $23,650 shipment of fire protection equipment destined for Smolensk in Helsinki, Finland. This equipment, primarily fire-retardant material, was stored at Helsinki in March 1995 and delivered to the plant in early January 1996. According to the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory, the shipper has reported storage costs of about $23,000, and the Laboratory is reviewing the reasonableness of this claim. In another instance, approximately $5,000 in fire safety equipment—including one sample fire door—was lost on its way to the Smolensk nuclear power plant. Also included in the missing items were power transformers, cable wire, and a power distribution panel for a fire detection system. According to DOE, the items were fully insured and were replaced with no operational or financial impact on the project. DOE and Pacific Northwest National Laboratory representatives and Bechtel officials also cited difficulty in working with Rosenergoatom to resolve difficulties in obtaining Russian certification for U.S.-supplied equipment. In April 1994, Rosenergoatom informed Bechtel that a considerable portion of U.S.-supplied equipment would have to be tested in Russia before it could be installed. The equipment identified for testing included fire brigade clothing, floor coating material, and fire doors. In April 1994, Rosenergoatom officials informed U.S. officials that none of the sample equipment previously left at the plant had been officially approved or certified because of the lack of funding. Rosenergoatom requested that the United States pay for the testing. Brookhaven National Laboratory agreed, but payment was delayed because of nuclear liability issues and the eventual change in DOE’s program management. The Pacific Northwest National Laboratory subsequently agreed to pay about $60,000 to Rosenergoatom for testing, but the contract was never signed because Rosenergoatom and the testing facility were unable to agree on how to share the anticipated U.S funds. During this period, Rosenergoatom refused to allow the U.S. contractor to visit the plant. In December 1995, after an absence of more than 2 years, Bechtel representatives were allowed to visit. According to DOE officials, Rosenergoatom and the plant are now accepting most of the materials without additional testing. Both U.S. and Russian officials from the Smolensk nuclear power plant believed that the fire safety equipment will ultimately have a beneficial effect, even though only a portion of the fire safety equipment has been delivered or installed. A Smolensk plant official told us that the fire suits have already had an impact because the firefighters are less hesitant to perform their jobs because they have improved equipment. He also noted that the plant needs more U.S. equipment than is currently planned in order to make comprehensive safety improvements. DOE is assisting Ukraine in developing on-site spent-fuel storage capacity at the Zaporizhzhya nuclear power plant in Ukraine so that the plant does not have to continue to pay for spent-fuel reprocessing in Russia. According to DOE officials, without adequate spent-fuel storage capacity at Zaporizhzhya, Ukraine might be forced to shut down some of its plants and continue to operate Chornobyl to compensate for lost power production. A key objective of the project is to transfer technology so that Ukraine can eventually manufacture the entire storage unit. This unit consists primarily of a concrete outer shell, a steel inner cask liner, and an inner basket, which holds the spent-fuel rods. For the DOE-funded portion of the project, U.S. vendors are supplying most of the metal materials and manufacturing major internal cask components for three storage cask (spent-fuel) systems. The components will be shipped to Ukraine for final assembly. Ukraine will be responsible for constructing the three concrete outer shells that will hold the spent fuel and will perform welding tasks. Ukraine is also providing certain materials and hardware. The goal is to provide Ukraine with the capability to manufacture the entire unit. DOE officials believe that once the technology is fully transferred, Ukraine will be able to manufacture about 12 casks per year in order to eventually allow the plant to become self-sufficient in managing spent fuel. Additionally, DOE officials believe that, if successful, Ukraine could export the casks. While DOE officials noted that the project is not directly related to improving the safety of Soviet-designed reactors, it nonetheless is a high-priority program for Ukraine and the United States. DOE believes that the technology transfer element of this project is essential to the program’s success. Additionally, the role of the Ukrainian regulatory body in monitoring the design and construction of the casks is central to DOE’s emphasis on including the regulator in all aspects of nuclear safety. While these benefits may be achieved, Ukraine’s limited resources raise questions about the number of casks it can ultimately manufacture. According to the contractor, hundreds of casks will be required to have a significant impact on improving capacity for on-site waste storage. In December 1993, Ukraine’s nuclear utility entered into an agreement with Duke Engineering and Services to supply Zaporizhzhya with 14 spent-fuel storage units valued at approximately $14 million. Subsequently, Ukraine requested that DOE help fund the project. DOE agreed to fund $6.6 million of the total cost for the production of the first three casks. As of March 31, 1996, DOE had obligated $6.5 million and had spent about $5 million on the project. Table III.7 shows the expenditures in greater detail. The overall pace of the project has been slow, although training has been provided to the Ukrainian regulator and plant staff and some equipment has been purchased and delivered. The project has faced significant impediments and is more than 6 months behind schedule; it was initially set for completion by the end of March 1996. DOE estimates that the project will now be completed after September 1996. At the time of our review, none of the casks had been built. The primary reasons for the delay are (1) a series of unanticipated design changes required by the Zaporizhzhya power plant and (2) greater-than-anticipated time to obtain a Ukrainian construction license. A U.S. contractor’s representative told us that the plant’s management has changed, causing interruptions in program continuity and responsibility for decision making. In his view, Ukraine’s lack of experience in this type of technology—coupled with the desire to demonstrate independence—has contributed to difficulties with project implementation. For example, officials at a Ukraine design institute would not initially approve the use of a standard U.S. welding technique because they were unfamiliar with the process, delaying the manufacture of part of the cask for about 5 months. Ukraine’s nuclear regulatory body, which is responsible for approving the project design and construction, has been slow to issue a construction license. Pacific Northwest National Laboratory officials and a representative of Duke Engineering and Services noted that the regulator has failed to respond in a timely fashion to a safety analysis report that is needed before construction can begin. These officials noted, however, that the delay is somewhat understandable because this is the first time that the regulator has been requested to license such a system in Ukraine. A Duke Engineering and Services representative said that customs problems did not delay project implementation. The project was already behind schedule because of problems with the Ukrainian regulator and plant management. However, he noted that several contractor personnel have spent time trying to resolve the customs issues, taking time away from other responsibilities. For example, some equipment including a $400,000 cask transporter, was impounded by Ukraine customs officials. The transporter and some ancillary equipment were delivered to the plant in early January 1996 but was not cleared for release to the plant until mid-April 1996. DOE is also providing fire safety equipment to the Zaporizhzhya nuclear power plant in Ukraine. DOE selected Zaporizhzhya—along with Smolensk—to be a pilot plant for the program to upgrade fire safety, expecting that this project would be implemented quickly. Burns and Roe is the primary U.S. contractor for the Zaporizhzhya project. DOE is purchasing fire protection suits, fire hose nozzles, smoke detectors, fire-proofing materials, fire alarms, and fire doors, and is assisting in installing the equipment. A key DOE objective is to transfer technology so that Ukraine can manufacture fire doors. As of March 31, 1996, DOE had obligated $1.8 million and had spent about $1.7 million for the project. Table III.8 shows these expenditures in greater detail. The project did not meet its initial expected completion date of December 1994. DOE currently estimates that the project will be completed in December 1996. According to Burns and Roe, the U.S. contractor, the delays have been caused primarily by (1) the plant management’s changes in work scope, (2) liability concerns, and (3) the inability of the Ukrainian company responsible for manufacturing the fire doors to meet milestones. Originally, Burns and Roe had planned to provide significant amounts of fireproofing materials for the reactor’s walls. However, the plant’s management subsequently requested that the materials be used for the floors, which required extensive reconfiguration of material requirements and rebidding of contracts. DOE’s project manager estimated that nuclear liability problems—and the resulting change in project management from Brookhaven to DOE—created a delay of 1 year. A Burns and Roe representative said the acquisition of Ukrainian-manufactured fire doors has delayed the project by about 7 months. As part of its program to transfer technology to support recipient countries’ infrastructure, DOE identified a Ukrainian company to produce fire doors for Zaporizhzhya. This company is expected to manufacture 122 fire doors that will be installed at one unit of the plant. Initial efforts to produce the doors were delayed because prototype doors manufactured by the company failed certifications tests. According to the U.S. contractor, the Ukrainian company then took about 5 months to redesign the doors. The doors passed inspection in June 1995. This company will be paid about $70,000 to produce the doors. At the time of our review, the production of the doors had recently begun. DOE estimates that all of the doors will be installed by September 1996. Overall, the project now appears to be progressing more smoothly. According to a Burns and Roe representative, the project is approximately 90-percent complete. According to DOE officials, with the exception of the Ukrainian fire doors, most of the equipment has been delivered, including 50 fire suits, 1,242 sprinkler heads, 160 smoke detectors, and fireproof sealant material. Other equipment, including fire extinguishers and face masks, will be provided by Ukrainian vendors. DOE and Pacific Northwest National Laboratory officials, as well as a Burns and Roe representative, believe that the project has met most of its safety-related objectives. In their view, the one operating unit at Zaporizhzhya that is receiving fire safety equipment is now more capable of reducing the incidence of fire and has an increased capacity to mitigate a fire’s consequences. DOE officials are confident that the Ukrainian company will continue to manufacture fire doors for Soviet-designed reactors, at least in the near-term. For example, the Ukrainian company was negotiating a contract with the Laboratory to provide between 300 and 500 fire doors for Chornobyl. In addition, these officials believe that the company will provide more doors to Zaporizhzhya over the next few years. They expressed some concern, however, about whether funds would be sufficient to provide fire safety upgrades at more than one unit of the plant. DOE is assisting plant operators in developing symptom-based emergency operating instructions for Soviet-designed reactors. In the event of an emergency, symptom-based operating instructions are designed to (1) specify operator actions in response to changing plant conditions, (2) allow the operator to stabilize the reactor without having to first determine the cause for the changing reactor conditions, and (3) contribute to faster decision making. DOE and national laboratory officials believe that the development and implementation of these instructions is one of the more significant components of the U.S. program to provide nuclear safety assistance. In their view, these instructions focus on the human element of safety and will contribute to a self-sustaining safety culture. DOE is also assisting in the development of operator training for the instructions. In addition, DOE is assisting in the development of operational control procedures. The Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO) has been responsible for transferring the U.S. methodology for developing and implementing the symptom-based emergency operating instructions. INPO was established by the U.S. nuclear industry in 1979 following the Three Mile Island Accident. Its purpose was to enhance the safety and reliability of commercial nuclear power plants. INPO has developed a series of operational procedures and guidelines that have been adopted by power plant operators throughout the United States and is considered a leader in the field of operational safety in general and in the field of symptom-based emergency operating instructions in particular. Since February 1991, DOE has awarded four sole-source contracts to INPO for $13.5 million to transfer documents and expertise to help develop emergency operating instructions for the Newly Independent States. The contract prices were based on a fee system used for membership in INPO. Under the terms of these fixed-price contracts, DOE accepted the fact that INPO’s accounting system did not meet government cost accounting standards and did not break out costs by such categories as labor, travel, and overhead. In addition to the INPO contracts, DOE has spent about $1.8 million to support the development of the instructions. (See table III.9.) As part of its overall support for the project, DOE is providing funds directly to several Russian nuclear power plants. As of March 1996, the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory had awarded contracts totaling $1.1 million to nine nuclear power plants that are developing the instructions in Russia, Ukraine, Bulgaria, and Lithuania. DOE’s project manager said the funds are needed to accelerate the pace of the program. The development and implementation of the emergency operating instructions has faced considerable impediments and delays. The experience at the Novovoronezh nuclear power plant is a case in point. In 1992, DOE’s former Assistant Secretary for Nuclear Energy said in congressional testimony that by mid-1993, 35 emergency operating instructions were to be implemented at Novovoronezh. By March 1996, only 22 of the instructions had been approved for implementation at one of the plant’s operating units. DOE and INPO officials noted that while the plant had drafted all of the procedures in 1992, numerous factors had delayed approval and implementation. Russian organizations that are responsible for approving the procedures have been slow to act and have not given the project priority status. A Pacific Northwest National Laboratory official told us that the Russian regulator and the VVER design institute were not included in the early part of the project. While this approach was dictated by the Ministry of Energy in the former Soviet Union, it became increasingly apparent that this approach did not ensure adequate coordination. A DOE official said that it was difficult to obtain a consistent story about which Russian organization was responsible for the delays. In August 1995, a Rosenergoatom official told a DOE official that the emergency operating instructions, in general, had been “headaches and a drain on resources.” In a March 1995 meeting between DOE and Minatom officials, DOE noted that it was very difficult to defend the U.S. nuclear safety assistance program when the Novovoronezh instructions were taking so long to be approved. DOE officials responsible for the project noted that although coordination among the key Russian organizations has improved over the years, it still could be better. DOE and Pacific Northwest National Laboratory officials noted that Russian officials have grown more supportive of the project. For example, the same Rosenergoatom official who had earlier criticized the project has made supportive statements since that time, according to DOE. In addition, in late September 1995, senior managers of key Russian organizations told a DOE representative that the project was a priority and that project management would be improved. Although disappointed by the pace of the instructions’ development, U.S. officials believe that progress is being made because Russia and Ukraine are displaying a greater commitment to implementing the instructions. For example, Goscomatom decreed that all reactor sites must develop emergency operating instructions by December 1996. In January 1996, Rosenergoatom directed all Russian plants to implement the instructions. Nevertheless, impediments remain for the project. For example, according to INPO, the development of the VVER instructions had stalled because the design institute had not provided engineering analysis. Furthermore, the design institute was generally unwilling to perform the analysis without compensation, which the nuclear power plants are unable to provide without funding assistance from the United States. Table III.10 shows the status of the emergency operating instructions by reactor type as of March 1996. Planned drafting completed (Month/year) Planned implementation date (Month/year) Partial approval on 3/1996. Additional 10 planned for 6/1997 The needed analysis has been identified. However the performing organization has not received any funds to perform the necessary analysis. Awaiting receipt of final documents from the nuclear power plants. U.S. officials cited a case in which operators’ exposure to the process of developing the instructions provided them with the knowledge to respond more effectively and efficiently to emergency conditions. In response to leakage of cooling water from a Ukrainian reactor, operators took specific actions to control the water leakage and prevented the reactors from overheating. In December 1993, the U.S. Secretary of Energy and the Russian Minister of Fuels and Energy agreed to conduct a joint study to examine options for electric power in Russia, as recommended by the Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission. This study was (1) intended to build on a 1993 study on electricity options for Russia prepared for the G-7 by the World Bank, the International Energy Agency, and the Russian government and (2) expected to provide a framework for investment by international financial institutions in Russia’s electricity sector. U.S.-Russian working groups were established on energy efficiency, thermal power plants, nuclear power, hydroelectric power, and a joint steering committee with representation from the Department of State, USAID, DOE and NRC. Because of Minatom’s initial resistance to participating in the joint study, DOE agreed to produce a second, parallel study that focused exclusively on the nuclear sector in Russia. DOE expected that its study would provide Russia with a cost-based analysis of nuclear energy options. The options evaluated were (1) enhancing the safety of operating plants, (2) closure and decommissioning of operating plants, (3) conversion of a partially built power plant to gas or coal, (4) completing a partially built plant, and (5) building a new generation of plants. The conclusions and findings of the nuclear study were integrated into the broader study. DOE spent about $2 million to prepare the Joint Parallel Nuclear Alternatives Study for Russia. The study was funded under DOE’s international nuclear safety program. (See table III.11 for greater detail.) The broader study, the Joint Electric Power Alternatives Study, prepared by USAID and its contractors, cost about $8 million. DOE’s nuclear study was completed in May 1995 and the broader electric power study was presented at a meeting of the Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission in June 1995. Both studies were intended to be completed on a fast track in order to be available for the July 1994 G-7 meeting, but completion of the studies was delayed for about 1 year. This delay increased DOE’s project costs by about $1 million. Department of State and Brookhaven officials told us that project delays were due to Russian difficulties in developing the data and models, and disagreements over cost assumptions. In addition, a large number of Russian energy ministries, institutes, and organizations jointly prepared the report with the United States, and it took more time than anticipated to get their agreement on the report. Although there were initial difficulties in gaining the cooperation of Minatom, a Department of State official believes that one of the long-term benefits of the DOE-funded study is that Minatom worked cooperatively with other Russian energy ministries and organizations. The study found that nuclear power was cost- competitive with other sources of electricity in Russia and concluded that it was in Russia’s economic interest to upgrade some plants and to close four to six of its older plants. The study also recommended that Russia develop a decommissioning program for a specific RBMK type of reactor. DOE and Brookhaven are now working with Minatom, the Kurchatov Institute in Moscow, and the Leningrad nuclear power plant in Russia to initiate a decommissioning study for Unit 1 of the plant. This appendix discusses four nuclear safety projects that NRC is implementing in Russia and Ukraine. These projects, with a total value of about $10.5 million, focus on (1) providing analytical simulators for Russia and Ukraine, (2) developing an emergency response center in Russia, (3) helping develop legal authority for Russia’s nuclear regulatory body, and (4) supporting efforts to perform a probalistic risk assessment at a Russian nuclear power plant. NRC plans to provide four analytical simulators for the nuclear regulatory bodies in Russia and Ukraine to use for training purposes. Simulators are planned for Ukraine’s regulatory center in Kiev and Russian regional and headquarters’ sites. The regulators will receive software needed to model VVER-1000 plants at Zaporizhzhya in Ukraine and Balakovo in Russia, a VVER-440/213 plant at Rivne in Ukraine, and an RBMK plant at Kursk in Russia. In addition, the regulators will be trained to perform software modifications so that nuclear power plants at Chornobyl and Kola can also be simulated. The analytical simulators will enable the regulators to familiarize themselves with plant operations. NRC believes that the regulators’ ability to monitor plant safety will be improved significantly by providing dedicated training simulators. Currently, only a handful of regulators obtain a few hours of training on existing plant simulators in Russia and Ukraine. When fully implemented, the regulators are expected to have an integrated system of computer hardware and software and to train designated personnel in the use and maintenance of the analytical simulators. NRC has allocated about $1.5 million for Russia and $2 million for Ukraine. As of March 31, 1996, NRC had obligated and expended $12,839 of this amount on personnel travel but had not yet spent any of its funds for Ukraine. Equipment and other deliverables have not yet been provided to Russia and Ukraine because of procurement problems at NRC. Table IV.1 shows the expenditures for this project in greater detail. The analytical simulator project was originally planned for completion by December 1996. NRC now projects that it will be completed about mid-1999. Project implementation has been slow primarily because of procurement delays. NRC has twice requested proposals for the analytical simulators in an attempt to obtain what it views as a reasonable price for the work envisioned. In May 1995, NRC requested proposals for simulators to be supplied to Russia. NRC considered the one proposal it received to be unreasonably high when compared with the government’s estimate of about $3 million. In December 1995, NRC solicited a proposal for both Russia and Ukraine and awarded a contract in June 1996 for $2.6 million. NRC plans to complete the project in several phases. The first phase, which started in December 1993 and is to be completed around December 1997, involves training personnel and delivery of simulator hardware to Russia and Ukraine. The second phase, which is projected to start in January 1997 and end in August 1998, involves the delivery of additional hardware to Russia. The third phase, which NRC plans to begin in September 1997 and complete by mid-1999, focuses on additional training and improved capabilities for the simulators. NRC is assisting Russia’s regulatory organization, Gosatomnadzor (GAN), in establishing a basic communications system and essential support capabilities for responding to emergencies at nuclear power plants. NRC’s effort is intended to reduce the severity of an emergency, should one occur, by reducing the incidence of radiological exposure to the public and the environment. The project provides for the purchase, installation, and in-place testing of prototype equipment at three locations—GAN Headquarters in Moscow, the Leningrad nuclear power plant near St. Petersburg, and the Kalinin nuclear power plant located between these two cities. After the prototype phase is completed, NRC plans to provide equipment to 11 other nuclear power plants and regional regulatory offices in Russia. Figure IV.1 shows the emergency response center in Moscow. NRC plans to complete a fully functional emergency support center in Moscow with communication links to each Russian nuclear power plant. NRC is taking a phased approach because of, among other things, operating uncertainties in Russia. NRC has contracted with Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC) for almost all of the work on the project, in accordance with plans approved by both NRC and GAN. NRC expects that a minimum amount of assembled equipment will be tested and operated in Russia during the prototype phase. The purpose is to determine if the equipment is fully suitable before making a U.S. investment in the entire Russian response system. NRC officials believe that once the transmission links are fully functional, the project will begin to show tangible, measurable progress. By improving communications among the plants and GAN, NRC believe the regulatory body’s role will be enhanced significantly because it will play a major role in coordinating activities in case of a nuclear power plant emergency. NRC has budgeted $1.5 million for the project. As of March 31, 1996, NRC had obligated about $1.3 million and had spent $524,738 for the project. Table IV.2 shows how the funds have been spent. The project, started in October 1992, was originally expected to be completed by February 1996 but is now projected to be completed by September 1997. NRC has provided some prototype equipment but has not yet expanded the project to provide basic communications and support equipment to all of the Russian nuclear power plants and to GAN headquarters. The prototype equipment associated with the project includes three compatible computers with fax modems and software, a dot-matrix printer, a facsimile machine, and three high-frequency radio base stations with fax modems. NRC officials and SAIC representatives said the prototype communications system, which is partially functioning, faced several impediments that delayed operations. For example, permits obtained from Russia’s Ministry of Communications to test radio communications were temporary and good for initial tests only. Under the prototype phase, the initial results from testing were poor but because the temporary permits had expired, further testing had to await better, permanent frequency assignments and permits by the Ministry. NRC finished the prototype work in the spring of 1996, and not by January 1995, as originally estimated. In addition, project-related equipment has not always been delivered in a timely manner because of customs problems. For example, three antennas costing about $2,000 were held by Russian customs for several weeks in mid-1995. The U.S. contractor had shipped the antennas, but they were impounded by customs officials, who demanded payment of import duties to release them. NRC brought this matter to the attention of a GAN official to get the equipment released. In another case, 10 modems and related cables that GAN officials had hand-carried to Russia were impounded by customs officials. As a result of that customs action, other shipments were halted and the installation of the equipment was put on hold. The matter was resolved in September 1995, but a SAIC representative told us that he has spent large amounts of time assisting GAN with customs problems. NRC is helping GAN to (1) develop a legal framework and create a system of enforcement and economic sanctions and (2) improve its ability to license civilian nuclear power plants and other civilian nuclear installations. NRC and GAN consider these objectives to be among the highest priority. Without a legal foundation for its operations—and the ability to impose fines for improper operations—GAN’s long-term effectiveness and viability remain questionable. GAN’s First Deputy Chairman told us that without the appropriate legislative backing, his organization will not be able to function effectively within the Russian nuclear bureaucracy. For example, the Russian official noted that although GAN can impose fines on nuclear installations, the fines are of little value. In the fall of 1994, NRC officials provided comments to GAN on the draft Russian law pertaining to the use of nuclear energy. The comments primarily related to the need to clarify GAN’s regulatory independence. According to NRC officials, NRC is not attempting to impose its own regulatory system on GAN. Rather, it seeks to work collaboratively and tailor its support to meet the needs of GAN. As a result, GAN has acquired detailed information about NRC regulatory practices and legal responsibilities through this project. NRC had allocated $577,934 for the project as follows: $502,934 for licensing activities and $75,000 for legislative and enforcement initiatives. As of March 31, 1996, NRC had obligated $479,773 and had expended $328,638 for licensing activities, and had obligated and spent $39,010 for legislative initiatives. Table IV.3 shows these expenditures in greater detail. Both the legislative and licensing initiatives have been delayed. The licensing project was originally scheduled to be completed in mid-1995 and is now scheduled for completion in mid-1997. The legislative initiative, which began in May 1994, was originally expected to be completed by December 1995. NRC now anticipates that the initiative will conclude by December 1996. NRC officials cited a number of factors that have contributed to schedule slippages, including (1) changes in the scope of the project, (2) longer-than-anticipated time to prepare and translate critical documents, and (3) delays in Russian completion of legislation and drafting of an enforcement policy. NRC officials emphasized that the completion of the project depends to a great degree on the maturation of GAN and its acceptance within the Russian bureaucracy. Despite these delays, NRC officials view the progress made under these initiatives as an important first step toward increased regulatory independence and effectiveness. In November 1995, Russian President Yeltsin signed legislation that established, in part, a legal framework for the regulation of nuclear safety. NRC assisted GAN in drafting this legislation. Both NRC and GAN officials noted that the law is a significant step toward “legitimizing” GAN. GAN has also been designated as the lead agency to develop a supplemental law about the roles and responsibilities of the regulatory organization in Russia. NRC officials also believe that the licensing initiative is now moving ahead. For example, GAN submitted a document to NRC that addresses the process for submitting and approving licenses for various nuclear installations. NRC is supporting Russia’s efforts to involve six Russian organizations, including GAN, to perform a Probalistic Risk Assessment for a VVER-1000 reactor at unit 1 of the Kalinin nuclear power plant. A Probalistic Risk Assessment is used to evaluate the potential for significant accidents occurring at a plant during different power operations. NRC has entered into agreements with six Russian organizations, including the plant designer, plant operator, the utility, and the regulator, to facilitate the assessment. GAN is responsible for coordinating and managing the project with the various Russian organizations participating in the development of the risk assessment. NRC believes that by performing the risk assessment, GAN and the other Russian participants will (1) obtain Probalistic Risk Assessment training and develop expertise to perform and/or evaluate risk assessments conducted for other nuclear power plants, (2) achieve an improved understanding of the value of risk assessments and their uses for improving safety, and (3) increase its stature. Additionally, NRC anticipates that as the Russian organizations collaborate on the project, they will become more open and willing to cooperate among themselves in conducting risk assessments on other plants in Russia. NRC plans to spend $2.5 million for the project. As of March 31, 1996, NRC had obligated $1.4 million and had spent about $1.1 million. Table IV.4 provides detailed information on these expenditures. The project began in mid-1994 but initially experienced difficulty getting under way. According to NRC officials, a number of factors contributed to delays. NRC had some difficulty obtaining agreement among the various Russian participants about their respective roles, responsibilities, and the extent to which a final report would be distributed to other VVER-1000 plants. NRC and GAN signed a memorandum of understanding for the project in December 1994, but the final implementing agreements for all the other Russian participants were not approved until August 1995. Development of the project guidelines was also delayed. To date, the project has focused primarily on defining the scope of the project, developing specific procedure guides for each project task, and formalizing the amount and type of training needed. In March 1996, NRC held a 2-month risk assessment workshop at which Russian technical staff representing the participating organizations met with NRC and U.S. experts. The purpose of the workshop was to begin the practical integration of the organizations and to focus on specific probalistic risk assessment tasks. NRC is attempting to structure the training so that the Russian organizations will be able to perform the probalistic risk assessments on their own with periodic NRC assistance and oversight. As part of this process, the Kalinin nuclear power plant staff is expected to provide specific information on plant design, operating history, and operating procedures. To identify the goals and objectives of the U.S. nuclear safety assistance program, we interviewed and obtained pertinent documents from officials at the Department of State, USAID, DOE, and NRC. We also met with officials at the Brookhaven National Laboratory in Upton, New York, and at the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory in Richland, Washington. We also met with representatives of the Nuclear Energy Institute and the Natural Resources Defense Council in Washington, D.C., to obtain their views about the priorities, objectives, and implementation of the U.S. program. To provide information on the amount and type of U.S. assistance being planned or provided, we obtained cost and program funding data from U.S. government agencies that provided the assistance. Specifically, we obtained these data from DOE, the Brookhaven and Pacific Northwest National Laboratories, and NRC. We did not independently verify the accuracy of the data they provided. To determine how the U.S. safety assistance program was being implemented, we judgmentally selected 13 DOE and NRC safety projects to review. These projects are valued at about $67 million. We limited our selection of projects to Russia and Ukraine because those countries are the primary recipients of U.S. assistance to improve the safety of Soviet-designed reactors. We based our selection on a number of factors: (1) the maturity of the project; (2) dollar value; and (3) diversity—equipment-related projects, training-related projects, legislative initiatives, and a study of nuclear energy options for Russia. We discussed our selection of projects with DOE and NRC officials. DOE officials requested that we add some additional training and equipment projects to our sample, which we did. NRC officials said the projects we chose represented a fair sample of the type of assistance NRC is providing. To assess the status of the selected projects and how they are improving safety, we met with appropriate DOE, NRC, and national laboratory officials. We also met with U.S. contractor representatives responsible for implementing the projects for DOE and NRC. Specifically, we met with officials from the following U.S. firms: Burns and Roe Company (Oradell, New Jersey); Science Applications International Corporation (Germantown, Maryland); S-3 Technologies, Inc. (Columbia, Maryland); Duke Engineering and Services (Charlotte, North Carolina); Sonalysts, Inc. (Waterford, Connecticut); and Bechtel Power Corporation (Gaithersburg, Maryland). We also met with a representative of the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (Atlanta, Georgia). We met with officials from Russia and Ukraine to obtain their views on U.S. nuclear safety assistance. Specifically, we met with Russian representatives from the Smolensk nuclear power plant and Russia’s Ministry of Atomic Energy, Minatom. We also observed a week-long safety assistance planning meeting between NRC and GAN officials. We met with several GAN officials, including the First Deputy Chairman, to discuss their views about the U.S. assistance program. We discussed the implementation of the Khmelnytskyy simulator project with several Ukrainian representatives from the plant and from Ukraine’s nuclear utility, Goscomatom. These representatives were part of the technology transfer team temporarily residing in the United States. The following are GAO’s comments on DOE’s letter dated September 17, 1996. 1. DOE disagreed with our position that the U.S. safety assistance program poses a dilemma because it may encourage the continued operation of the same reactors that the United States wants to see closed as soon as possible. DOE said that the equipment it is providing is targeted to specific safety deficiencies or to prevent the failure of critical safety equipment and does not extend the operating life of the Soviet-designed nuclear power plants. We have not asserted that the equipment will extend the life of the Soviet-designed plants but believe that some of this equipment may be used to justify the continued operation of the plants. As we noted in the report, the repair or replacement of any component that the plant relies on would support continued plant operations. In our view, DOE’s RBMK maintenance initiative provides the equipment, training, and transfer of technology that enables plant components to remain in service longer—thereby supporting continued plant operations while improving plant safety. For this reason, we maintain that the U.S. program poses a dilemma for U.S. policymakers. While the United States remains committed to the goal of shutting down the highest-risk plants, the assistance has the potential to keep the plants operating longer than they otherwise might have. The following are GAO’s comments on USAID’s letter dated September 18, 1996. 1. Regarding USAID’s comment that progress has been made in the U.S. assistance program, our report noted that several projects we reviewed are progressing and have, for example, resulted in installing fire safety equipment and other safety-related hardware. However, it is too early to assess the progress these projects have made in safety because only one of the projects we reviewed had been completed. Furthermore, most of the 13 projects we reviewed had been delayed, and progress was slow in many cases. 2. USAID commented that the report gives the impression that no progress is being made toward obtaining the closure of the highest-risk Soviet-designed reactors. Our report cites several instances in which closure commitments have been made but also notes that it will be difficult for the countries to meet specific closure dates because of the slow pace of economic reform and the need for financing to help develop alternative energy sources. We also note, however, that to date no reactors have been closed, and one was recently restarted. Jackie A. Goff, Senior Attorney The first copy of each GAO report and testimony is free. Additional copies are $2 each. Orders should be sent to the following address, accompanied by a check or money order made out to the Superintendent of Documents, when necessary. VISA and MasterCard credit cards are accepted, also. Orders for 100 or more copies to be mailed to a single address are discounted 25 percent. U.S. General Accounting Office P.O. Box 6015 Gaithersburg, MD 20884-6015 Room 1100 700 4th St. NW (corner of 4th and G Sts. NW) U.S. General Accounting Office Washington, DC Orders may also be placed by calling (202) 512-6000 or by using fax number (301) 258-4066, or TDD (301) 413-0006. Each day, GAO issues a list of newly available reports and testimony. To receive facsimile copies of the daily list or any list from the past 30 days, please call (202) 512-6000 using a touchtone phone. 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Summary: Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided information on: (1) changes in the U.S. nuclear safety assistance program's goals since its inception; (2) the costs associated with the program; (3) the status of 13 safety projects implemented by the Department of Energy (DOE) and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC); and (4) the way in which the agencies assess the effect of the projects on improving safety. GAO found that: (1) the U.S. nuclear safety assistance program's goals to reduce the risk of accidents and encourage the shutdown of the highest-risk Soviet-designed nuclear power reactors have not changed; (2) despite U.S. efforts to close these reactors, none of the highest-risk reactors have been closed and one in Armenia has been restarted; (3) DOE plans to increase its assistance to RBMK reactors to improve their safety while they continue operations; (4) reasons for not shutting down these reactors include the slow pace of the operating countries' economic reforms, concerns about displaced workers' social and economic well-being, and the need for financing for developing replacement energy sources; (5) DOE believes the nuclear safety assistance program should continue another 10 years and is developing a long-term plan that addresses how additional funds should be spent; (6) as of March 1996, DOE and NRC had received $208 million for their programs and had spent $89 million on nuclear safety equipment and products and other expenditures including program-related labor, travel, and overhead; (7) 11 of the 13 DOE and NRC safety projects reviewed have experienced delays, including untimely equipment deliveries due to customs problems and required equipment testing in Russia; (8) some projects have resulted in the installation of fire safety equipment and other safety-related hardware at nuclear powerplants and the development of safety-related training programs in Ukraine; and (9) it is too early to assess the extent to which these projects have improved nuclear reactor safety, and it is difficult to quantify the impact of the assistance provided.