The intent of the Goldwater-Nichols Reorganization Act of 1986 was, in part, to reorganize DOD into a more unified military structure. Within that act, Congress included several provisions that specifically address the education of officers in joint matters, their assignment to joint organizations, and the promotion of officers serving in joint positions. The act also established a joint specialty officer designation for officers who are specifically trained in and oriented toward joint matters. Although the act contains a number of specific requirements, Congress also provided DOD with flexibility in meeting the requirements by granting it waiver authority when it can demonstrate justification. DOD approves waivers on a case-specific basis. These waivers apply to a number of the provisions, including (1) the methods for designating joint specialty officers, (2) the posteducation assignments for joint specialty officers, (3) the assignment of joint specialty officers to critical joint duty positions, and (4) the promotions of officers to the general and flag officer pay grades. Moreover, Congress has issued follow-on reports and made changes to the law in subsequent legislation. For example, a congressional panel on military education issued a report in April 1989 that contained numerous recommendations regarding joint professional military education. Among other things, this panel recommended that the services’ professional military education schools teach both service and joint matters and that the student body and faculty at each of the service schools include officers from the other services. DOD has implemented these recommendations. Most recently, Congress amended the law regarding the promotion criteria for officers being considered for promotion to the general and flag officer pay grades. The Goldwater-Nichols Act established a requirement that officers must have served in a joint position prior to being selected for these promotions. The amendment, contained in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002, will require most officers being considered for appointment to this grade after September 30, 2007, to complete the joint education program as well. DOD uses a number of multiservice and multinational commands and organizations to plan and support joint matters. Since passage of the Goldwater-Nichols Act, officers serving in these commands and organizations have overseen a number of joint and multinational military operations that range from humanitarian assistance and peacekeeping to major operations such as Operation Desert Storm and ongoing operations in Afghanistan. The number of joint positions in these organizations has ranged from a low of 8,217 positions in fiscal year 1988 to a high of 9,371 positions in fiscal year 1998. Changing missions and reorganizations have contributed to this variation. In fiscal year 2001, DOD had a total of 9,146 joint positions. Of these positions, 3,400 positions were allocated to the Air Force; 3,170 positions were allocated to the Army; 2,004 positions were allocated to the Navy; and 572 positions were allocated to the Marine Corps. Figure 1 shows that the Air Force had the largest percentage, followed by the Army, the Navy, and the Marine Corps. Officers in pay grades O-4 (majors in the Air Force, Army, and Marine Corps and lieutenant commanders in the Navy) and above can receive credit for joint experience when they serve in the Joint Staff, joint geographic and functional commands, combined forces commands, and defense agencies. In addition, the Secretary of Defense has authority to award joint credit to officers for serving in certain joint task force headquarters staffs. DOD has developed a joint duty assignment list that includes all of the active duty positions in pay grades O-4 and above in the multiservice organizations that are involved in or support the integrated employment of the armed forces. DOD’s policy places limits on the number of positions in the defense agencies and other jointly staffed activities that can be included on the list. The list of joint organizations and demographic descriptions of the officers serving in those organizations are provided in appendix II. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Force Management Policy, under the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, has overall responsibility for the policies and procedures governing DOD’s joint officer management program. Among other things, the Assistant Secretary is responsible for reviewing joint professional military education initiatives, approving the list of joint duty assignments, reviewing the promotion and appointment of joint specialty officers and other officers who are serving or have served in joint duty positions, and acting on requests to waive DOD joint officer management requirements. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has responsibility, among other things, for implementing DOD’s policies governing joint officer management and for making recommendations to the Assistant Secretary. The service secretaries are responsible for, among other things, supporting DOD policy and for ensuring the qualifications of officers assigned to joint duty positions. These responsibilities are delineated in DOD’s Joint Officer Management Program Directive 1300.19, issued on September 9, 1997. DOD has taken positive steps to implement the provisions of the Goldwater-Nichols Act that address the education of officers in joint matters, officers’ assignments to joint organizations, and the promotion of officers who are serving or who have served in joint positions. In certain cases, DOD has met or surpassed the act’s objectives. However, DOD has also relied on waivers allowable under the law to comply with the provisions. In addition, DOD has experienced difficulties in implementing some of its programs and policies that address joint officer development. Because of these difficulties, DOD cannot be assured that it is preparing officers in the most effective manner to serve in joint organizations and leadership positions. One of the provisions in the Goldwater-Nichols Act requires DOD to develop officers, in part, through education in joint matters. Accordingly, DOD defined joint education requirements in terms of a two-phased program in joint matters. It incorporated the first phase of the program into the curricula of the services’ intermediate- and senior-level professional military education schools. DOD offers the second phase of the program at the National Defense University’s Joint Forces Staff College in Norfolk, Virginia. This phase is designed to provide officers with the opportunity to study in a truly joint environment and to apply the knowledge they gained during the first phase of their joint education. DOD also offers a combined program that includes both phases at the National Defense University’s National War College and Industrial College of the Armed Forces in Washington, D.C. The Secretary of Defense is required to educate sufficient numbers of officers so that approximately one-half of the joint positions are filled at any time by officers who have either successfully completed the joint professional education program or received an allowable waiver to complete the education after their assignment. The act, however, did not identify a specific numerical requirement and, similarly, DOD has not established numerical goals concerning the number of officers who should complete joint professional military education. In the most effective model, officers would complete the first phase of joint education in an in-resident or nonresident program through one of the services’ professional military education schools. The in-resident programs are a full academic year in length; officers completing the curricula in nonresident programs will often do this over several years, given that they are completing their education on a part-time basis in addition to their normal duties. Upon completion of the first phase, officers would attend the second phase of the program at the Joint Forces Staff College. The Joint Forces Staff College offers the second phase three times during the year and, by law, this phase may not be less than 3 months. Upon graduation from the second phase, officers would be assigned to a joint position. According to DOD data, only one-third of the officers serving in joint positions in fiscal year 2001 had received both phases of the joint education program. This is due, in large part, to space and facility limitations at the National Defense University schools that provide the second phase. Although DOD assigns approximately 3,000 active duty officers to joint positions each year, the three schools, collectively, have about 1,200 seats available for active duty officers. Furthermore, the Joint Forces Staff College, from which most officers receive the second phase, is currently operating at 83 percent of its 906- seat capacity. Moreover, the number of unfilled seats at the Joint Forces Staff College has risen significantly in recent years, from a low of 12 empty seats in fiscal year 1998 to a high of 154 empty seats in fiscal year 2001. DOD officials cited pressing needs to assign officers to the increasing number of military operations as a major reason for these vacancies. A Joint Staff officer responsible for joint education expressed concern about the services’ ability to fill seats in the future due to the ongoing war on terrorism. Logistics, timing, and budget issues are also making it difficult for officers to attend the second phase of the joint education program. The Joint Forces Staff College can only accommodate approximately 300 students in each 3-month term and does not have the space to receive all of the service professional military education school graduates at the same time. Given that, officers can report to their joint position after completing the first phase and subsequently attend the second phase on a temporary duty basis at some point during their assignment. However, officers and senior leaders at the sites we visited told us that their joint commands cannot afford a 3-month gap in a position due to pressing schedules and workload demands. Officers at the U.S. Forces in Korea posed a slightly different problem. Given its remote location, officers typically serve in Korea for only 1-2 years. That command cannot afford to send someone serving in a 1-year billet away for 3 months. In addition to logistics and timing issues, related budget issues exist. When an officer attends the second phase en route to a joint command, the officer’s service pays the expenses associated with sending the officer to the Joint Forces Staff College. When the officer attends the program midtour, the joint organization pays the expenses. Officers serving on the Joint Staff told us that a former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff had instituted a policy that the Joint Staff would not send officers to the Joint Forces Staff College—or to any other training lasting more than 30 days—after they reported to the Joint Staff for duty. DOD officials confirmed this and explained that the former chairman understood the budget implications and, believing in the importance of joint education, instituted his policy with the expectation that the services would send their officers to the second phase of the education before sending them to their Joint Staff assignments. DOD officials acknowledged, however, that unintended consequences resulted from this policy. The services still are not sending their officers to the second phase before they assign them to the Joint Staff. Officers we interviewed suggested that alternatives should be considered for delivering the second phase of DOD’s joint education program. For example, some officers believed that the course should be shortened while others thought that it should be integrated into the first phase of the program that is offered in the services’ professional military education schools. However, to shorten the principal course of instruction at the Joint Forces Staff College, which delivers the second phase, would require a change in the law. In addition, considerable variation exists among the services in terms of the number of officers each service sends to the Joint Forces Staff College. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has directed that the seats at the Joint Forces Staff College be allocated among the services in accordance with the distribution of service positions on the joint duty assignment list. The percentage of seats reserved for each service at the school does, in fact, reflect the distribution on the list. However, while the Air Force filled almost 98 percent of its allocated seats in academic year 2001, the Navy filled only 67 percent of its seats. Moreover, vacancy rates for the Army and the Navy have, for the most part, increased between academic years 1996 and 2001. Table 1 shows seats filled and vacancy rates, by service, at the school for academic years 1996 through 2001. Table 1 also shows that the allocation of seats has been constant for the last 3 years. The officers we spoke with told us that they see the importance of completing the first phase of the joint professional military education program perhaps because, in most services, there is a clear correlation between completion of the first phase and promotion potential. In the Army and the Air Force, completion of the first phase has become a prerequisite for promotion to lieutenant colonel, if not by directive, then at least in practice. In all services, completion of the first phase, whether or not it is an absolute requirement, is looked upon favorably, at the very least, for promotion purposes. The officers we surveyed provided mixed responses when we asked them about their observations of the second phase of the program at the Joint Forces Staff College. Of the 184 officers in our survey who had completed the second phase of the program, 11 percent responded that attending the second phase was important to a very great extent, 33 percent responded that attending the second phase was important to a great extent, and 33 percent responded that attending the second phase was important to a moderate extent. About 24 percent of the officers who had completed the second phase responded that attending the second phase was important to a little or no extent. In focus group discussions, these officers said that the program is too long, redundant with the first phase of joint education, and of little added value. Some of these officers also said that the second phase of the program only had value for officers who were interested in being appointed to the general and flag officer grades in their future. Officers from all the services and pay grades in our focus groups agreed that, if an officer were to attend the second phase at all, an officer should attend en route before reporting to a joint position. Overall, officers at the commands we visited reported that they were adequately prepared for their joint position but, often times, cited a steep learning curve involved with working in their particular joint organization. Officers in over one-half of the focus groups we conducted said that they were most prepared for their joint positions because (1) they were serving in joint positions that drew upon their tactical level primary military occupation skills; (2) their military occupation, by nature, was oriented toward joint matters (e.g., communications, intelligence, special operations, foreign affairs); (3) they had previously served in a joint or staff position; or (4) they had attended both phases of the joint education program. Officers who responded that they were least prepared said that they were serving in joint positions unrelated to their military occupations or that they lacked familiarity of joint structures or organization, systems, and processes. General and flag officers with whom we spoke also provided mixed responses. While the senior officers talked about the strengths and importance of the joint education, some senior officers told us that they did not check the records of the officers serving under them to see whether the officers had attended the second phase of the joint professional military education program and that they did not view this lack of education as an issue. The act contains a number of provisions affecting the assignment of officers to joint positions. These provisions include (1) the percentage of graduates of the National Defense University schools who must be assigned to joint duty, (2) the number of joint critical positions that must be filled by designated joint specialty officers, and (3) the percentage of positions on the joint duty assignment list that must be filled by joint specialty officers or joint specialty officer nominees. The Goldwater-Nichols Act established specific requirements for DOD to assign officers who attended a joint professional military education school to joint positions after graduation. Placement of these graduates in joint positions was intended to help DOD realize the full benefit of education provided by all three joint colleges. First, DOD must send more than 50 percent of the officers who are not joint specialists to a joint position upon graduation from a joint professional military school. Table 2 shows that DOD has exceeded this requirement since fiscal year 1996. Second, DOD must assign all joint specialty officers who graduate from joint professional military education schools, including the Industrial College of the Armed Forces and the National War College, to joint positions upon graduation unless a waiver is granted. Table 3 shows that 140 joint specialty officers graduated from one of these schools in the past 6 years and that DOD did not place 35 officers, or 25 percent, into joint positions. DOD officials explained that the primary reason that these officers were given allowable waivers was because they had received orders to command assignments within their own service. The Goldwater-Nichols Act, as amended, further requires DOD to designate at least 800 joint positions as critical joint duty positions— positions where the duties and responsibilities are such that it is highly important that officers assigned to the positions are particularly trained in, and oriented toward, joint matters. DOD has met this requirement and has designated 808 positions as critical joint duty positions. However, DOD is also required to place only joint specialty officers in these positions unless the Secretary exercises his waiver authority. DOD has increasingly used its waiver authority to meet this requirement. The percentage of critical joint duty positions that were filled by officers other than joint specialty officers has steadily increased from 9 percent in fiscal year 1996 to 38 percent in fiscal year 2001. In fiscal year 2001, DOD was not able to fill 311 of its critical joint duty positions with joint specialty officers. In addition, DOD has left other critical joint duty positions vacant. The percentage of unfilled critical joint duty positions has steadily increased from 8 percent in fiscal year 1989 to 22 percent in fiscal year 2001. Therefore, only 331 positions, or 41 percent, of the 808 critical joint duty positions were filled by joint specialty officers in fiscal year 2001. Figure 2 shows the distribution of vacant and filled critical joint duty positions by joint specialty officers and non-joint specialty officers during fiscal years 1989 through 2001. The services fill these critical joint positions with officers who have both the joint specialty designation and the appropriate primary military skill, any additional required skills, and pay grade. However, when (1) no joint specialty officer with the other requisite skills is available for assignment (e.g., pay grade and military occupation) or (2) the best-qualified candidate is not a joint specialty officer, a waiver must be approved to fill the position with an otherwise qualified officer. Service and Joint Staff officials explained that DOD’s inability to fill a critical position with a joint specialty officer may be due to the fact that the critical joint duty position description may not reflect the commander’s needs at the time the position is filled. These officials told us that the most frequently cited reason for requesting an allowable waiver was because the commander believed that the best-qualified officer for the position was not a joint specialty officer. In addition, DOD’s population of joint specialty officers may not be sufficient to meet this requirement. By fiscal year 1990, DOD had designated just over 12,000 officers, who already had the joint education and experience, as joint specialty officers. However, DOD experienced a 56 percent decrease in its joint specialty officers between fiscal years 1990 and 1997 and has experienced moderate decreases in fiscal years 2000 and 2001. Officials on the Joint Staff attributed the decreases in the early years to the fact that the attrition of officers who received the designation in fiscal year 1990 has exceeded the number of new designations of joint specialty officers. DOD officials also projected that they would need to designate approximately 800 new joint specialty officers each year to maintain its current population. Since fiscal year 1990, however, DOD has only met this projection in 3 of the last 4 fiscal years. Figure 3 shows the number of new designations of joint specialty officers each year and the total number of joint specialty officers for fiscal years 1990 through 2001. Officials told us that DOD has been selective in nominating and designating officers for the joint specialty because of the promotion objectives specified in the law. Officials noted that as a result, the population of joint specialty officers has been small. The act requires the services to promote joint specialty officers, as a group, at a rate not less than the rate of officers being promoted who are serving on, or have served on, the headquarters staff of their service. This higher promotion standard is applied to joint specialty officers from the time they receive the joint specialty designation until they are considered for or promoted to pay grade O-6. DOD sought relief from this provision and, in December 2001, Congress reduced the standard for 3 years. During this 3-year period, the services are to promote joint specialty officers at a rate not less than the promotion rates of all other officers being promoted from the same military service, pay grade, and competitive category. Currently, about 2,700 officers meet the joint specialty officer qualifications but have not been designated, and DOD, given this change in the law, is in the process of designating these officers. Once they are designated, DOD will have a population of about 7,600 joint specialty officers. The act also requires DOD to fill approximately 50 percent of all of the joint positions on the joint duty assignment list either with fully qualified joint specialty officers or with officers who have been nominated for that designation. Although the act does not establish specific numerical requirements, it does require that the number should be large enough so that approximately one-half of the joint positions in pay grades O-4 and above will be filled by officers who are joint specialty officers or nominees who meet certain requirements. Because the act does not require DOD to report these data to Congress and DOD has not maintained historical data on the percentage of joint positions filled by either fully qualified joint specialty officers or joint specialty officer nominees, we were not able to measure progress. Nevertheless, we did ask DOD to provide us with data for a point in time. Table 4 shows that more than 70 percent of the officers who served in joint positions in July 2002 were joint specialty officers or nominees. We note, however, that DOD met this requirement by relying heavily on joint specialty officer nominees who filled more than 80 percent of the positions being filled by joint specialty officers or joint specialty officer nominees. This ranged from 79 percent in the Army to 87 percent in the Marine Corps. Comparable figures for the Air Force and the Navy are 83 percent and 84 percent, respectively. The Goldwater-Nichols Act established promotion requirements and objectives for officers being selected for appointment to the general or flag officer pay grade and for mid-grade officers who are serving or have served in joint positions. The Goldwater-Nichols Act set a requirement that officers must complete a full tour of duty in a joint duty assignment, or receive a waiver, prior to being selected for appointment to the general or flag officer pay grade. The Secretary of Defense may waive the requirement for (1) officers when the selection is necessary for the good of the service; (2) officers with scientific and technical qualifications for which joint requirements do not exist; (3) medical officers, dental officers, veterinary officers, medical service officers, nurses, biomedical science officers, chaplains, or judge advocates; (4) officers who had served at least 180 days in a joint assignment at the time the selection board convened and the officer’s total consecutive service in joint duty positions within that immediate organization is not less than 2 years; and (5) officers who served in a joint assignment prior to 1987 that involved significant duration of not less than 12 months. As of fiscal year 2001, DOD has been promoting more officers who had the requisite joint experience to the general and flag officer pay grades than it did in fiscal year 1995. In fiscal year 2001, however, DOD still relied on allowable waivers in lieu of joint experience to promote one in four officers to these senior pay grades. Figure 4 shows that the percentage of officers who were selected for promotion to the general and flag officer pay grades, and who had previous joint experience, rose from 51 percent in fiscal year 1995 to 80 percent in fiscal year 1999. Conversely, DOD’s reliance on waivers decreased from 49 percent in fiscal year 1995 to 20 percent in fiscal year 1999. Figure 4 also shows, however, that DOD experienced slight increases in its use of promotion waivers in fiscal years 2000 and 2001. DOD’s reliance on good-of-the-service waivers, in particular, to promote officers who had not previously served in joint positions is one indicator of how DOD is promoting its senior leadership. The service secretaries request use of this waiver authority when they believe they have sound justification for promoting an officer who (1) has not completed a full tour of duty in a joint position and (2) does not qualify for promotion through one of the other four specific waivers. We analyzed the extent to which DOD has relied on this waiver category to promote its senior officers because these waivers apply most directly to the population of general and flag officers who are likely to be assigned to senior leadership positions in the joint organizations. The Secretary of Defense has also paid particular attention to this waiver category and, in 2000, established a policy that restricts the use of good-of-the-service waivers to 10 percent of total promotions to the general and flag officer pay grades each year. DOD approved 185 good-of-the-service waivers, representing 11 percent of the 1,658 promotions to the general and flag officer pay grades, between fiscal years 1989 and 2001. Specifically, DOD approved 10 or more good-of- the-service waivers each year between fiscal years 1989 and 1998 and only 3 to 7 waivers in fiscal years 1999 through 2001. DOD relied most heavily on good-of-the-service waivers in fiscal year 1995, when it approved 25 waivers, and used them on a decreasing basis between fiscal years 1995 and 1999. In fiscal year 1999, DOD approved just 3 good-of-the service waivers. In the 2 years since the Secretary of Defense issued limitations on the use of these waivers, DOD has used them in about 5 percent of its promotions. Figure 5 shows the extent to which DOD has used good-of- the-service waivers between fiscal years 1989 and 2001. For most appointments to the general and flag level made after September 30, 2007, officers will have to meet the requirements expected of a joint specialty officer. This means that most officers, in addition to completing a full tour of duty in a joint position, will also have to complete DOD’s joint education program as well. Our analysis of the 124 officers promoted in fiscal year 2001 showed that 58 officers, or 47 percent, had not fulfilled the joint specialty officer requirements. These 58 officers included 18 of 43 officers promoted in the Air Force, 18 of 40 officers promoted in the Army, 19 of 33 officers promoted in the Navy, and 3 of the 8 officers promoted in the Marine Corps. The Goldwater-Nichols Act also established promotion policy objectives for officers serving in pay grades O-4 and above who (1) are serving on or have served on the Joint Staff, (2) are designated as joint specialty officers, and (3) are serving in or have served in other joint positions. DOD has been most successful in achieving its promotion objectives for officers assigned to the Joint Staff, but it has made less significant progress in achieving the promotion objectives for officers in the other two categories. (Appendix III provides detailed promotion data.) DOD has been most successful in meeting the promotion objective set for officers assigned to the Joint Staff. The act established an expectation that officers who are serving or have served on the Joint Staff be promoted, as a group, at a rate not less than the rate of officers who are serving or have served in their service headquarters. Between fiscal years 1988 and 1994, DOD met its promotion objectives for officers assigned to the Joint Staff in 43 out of 68 promotion groups, or 63 percent of the time. Between fiscal years 1995 and 2001, DOD met this objective in 55 out of 60 promotion groups, or 92 percent of the time. DOD has also made improvements in meeting its promotion objective for joint specialty officers. The act established an expectation that joint specialty officers, as a group, be promoted at a rate not less than the rate of officers who are serving or have served in their service headquarters.Between fiscal years 1988 and 1994, DOD met this promotion objective in 26 of 52 promotion groups, or 50 percent of the time. Between fiscal years 1995 and 2001, DOD met the promotion objective in 37 out of 50 promotion groups, or 74 percent of the time. Where DOD did not meet its promotion objective was somewhat random and we were not able to attribute problem areas to specific pay grades or services. As we noted earlier, this standard has been temporarily reduced, and, through December 2004, DOD is required to promote joint specialty officers, as a group, at a rate not less than the rate for other officers in the same service, pay grade, and competitive category. We also compared the promotion rates of joint specialty officers against this lower standard and found that, with few exceptions, DOD would have met this standard between fiscal years 1988 and 2001. DOD has made less significant improvement in meeting its promotion objective for officers assigned to other joint organizations. The act established an expectation that officers who are serving or have served in joint positions be promoted, as a group, at a rate not less than the rate for all officers in their service. Between fiscal years 1988 and 1994, DOD met its promotion objective in 41 out of 82 promotion groups, or 50 percent of the time. Between fiscal years 1995 and 2001, DOD met this objective in 60 out of 84 promotion groups, or 71 percent of the time. With few exceptions during the last 7 years, all services are meeting the promotion objective for their officers being promoted to the O-5 pay grade who are assigned to the other joint organizations. However, the services have had significant difficulty meeting the promotion objectives for their officers being promoted to the O-6 pay grade. For example, the Navy has failed to meet this objective for its O-6 officers since fiscal year 1988, and the Army has only met this promotion objective twice—in fiscal years 1995 and 2001— since fiscal year 1988. The Air Force has generally met this objective for its officers at the O-6 pay grade, but it has not met this objective in the past 4 years. Conversely, the Marine Corps had difficulty in meeting this promotion objective for its officers at the O-6 pay grade between fiscal years 1988 and 1994, but it met this objective in every year until fiscal year 2001. A significant impediment affecting DOD’s ability to fully realize the cultural change that was envisioned by the act is the fact that DOD has not taken a strategic approach to develop officers in joint matters. For example, DOD has not identified how many joint specialty officers it needs, and the four services have emphasized joint officer development to varying degrees. In addition, DOD has not yet, within a total force concept, fully addressed how it will provide joint development to reserve officers who are serving in joint organizations—despite the fact that it is increasingly relying on reservists to carry out its mission. Moreover, DOD has not been tracking certain data in a consistent manner that would help DOD measure its progress in following a strategy to meet the act’s overall objectives and its own goals as well. DOD has issued a number of publications, directives, and policy papers regarding joint officer development. However, it has not developed a strategic plan that establishes clear goals for officer development in joint matters and links those goals to DOD’s overall mission and goals. This lack of an overarching vision or strategy will continue to hamper DOD’s ability to make continued progress in this area. A well-developed human capital strategy would provide a means for aligning all elements of DOD’s human capital management, including joint officer development, with its broader organizational objectives. Professional military education and joint assignments are tools that an organization can use to shape its officer workforce, fill gaps, and meet future requirements. In prior reports and testimony, we identified strategic human capital management planning as a governmentwide high-risk area and a key area of challenge. We stated that agencies, including DOD, need to develop integrated human capital strategies that support the organizations’ strategic and programmatic goals. In March 2002, we issued an exposure draft of our model for strategic human capital management to help federal agency leaders effectively lead and manage their people. We also testified on how strategic human capital management can contribute to transforming the cultures of federal agencies. Several DOD studies have also identified the need for a more strategic approach to human capital planning within DOD. The 8th Quadrennial Review of Military Compensation, completed in 1997, strongly advocated that DOD adopt a strategic human capital planning approach. The review found that DOD lacked an institutionwide process for systematically examining human capital needs or translating needs into a coherent strategy. Subsequent DOD and service studies, including the Defense Science Board Task Force on Human Resources Strategy and the Naval Personnel Task Force, endorsed the concept of human capital strategic planning. DOD’s Joint Vision 2020 portrays a future in which the armed forces are “fully joint: intellectually, operationally, organizationally, doctrinally, and technically.” To exploit emerging technologies and to respond to diverse threats and new enemy capabilities requires increasingly agile, flexible, and responsive organizations. The vision requires the services to reexamine traditional criteria governing span of control and organizational layers; to develop organizational climates that reward critical thinking, encourage competition of ideas, and reduce barriers to innovation; to develop empowered individual warfighters; and to generate and reinforce specific behaviors such as judgment, creativity, adaptability, initiative, teamwork, commitment, and innovative strategic and operational thinking. The Goldwater-Nichols Act not only defined new duty positions and educational requirements but also envisioned a new culture that is truly oriented toward joint matters. The key question, today, is how does DOD best seize the opportunity and build on current momentum. In April 2002, the Office of the Secretary of Defense issued the Military Personnel Human Resource Strategic Plan to establish the military priorities for the next several years. The new military personnel strategy captures the DOD leadership’s guidance regarding aspects of managing human capital, but the strategy’s linkage to the overall mission and programmatic goals is not stated. DOD’s human capital strategy does not address the vision cited in Joint Vision 2020. DOD’s human capital approach to joint officer development—if it were linked to its overall mission—would emphasize individuals with the knowledge, skills, and abilities needed to function in the joint environment. DOD has not fully assessed how many joint specialty officers it actually needs. As we have previously shown, the number of joint specialty officers has decreased by almost 60 percent over the years, and DOD has a significant backlog of officers who, although otherwise qualified, have not been designated as joint specialty officers. Moreover, without knowing how many joint specialty officers it needs, DOD’s joint professional military education system may not be structured or targeted properly. For example, without first defining how many officers should be joint specialty officers—all officers, most officers, or only those needed to fill joint positions—DOD has not been able to determine the number of joint professional military education graduates it needs. Although we have already noted that there are many vacant seats at the Joint Forces Staff College, DOD does not know if the total number of available seats is sufficient to meet its needs or if it will need to explore alternatives for providing joint education to greater numbers of officers. Furthermore, comments from officers we surveyed at various commands demonstrate that they place different values on the importance of the joint specialty designation. Overall, officers told us that they viewed their assignment to a joint position as a positive experience and that their services also saw joint assignments as valuable career moves. Moreover, 51 percent of the officers surveyed responded that an assignment to a joint position is a defined aspect of their career path. Responses ranged from 57 percent in the Air Force, to 52 percent in the Army, 47 percent in the Navy, and 29 percent in the Marine Corps. However, many officers also told us that they were reluctant to seek the joint specialty designation. Their concern was that they would be flagged as joint specialty officers and, accordingly, be reassigned to subsequent tours of duty within joint organizations. They were concerned about the need to balance the requirements of already crowded service career paths and the expectation to serve in joint organizations. Their ultimate concern was that multiple joint assignments would take them away from service assignments for too great a period and that this time away could adversely affect their career progression and promotion potential. The officers responded that the joint specialty officer designation was not really important for the rank and file—but really only important for those who were going to be admirals and generals. In other words, these officers believed that the need to meet service expectations seemed to override any advantages that the joint specialty officer designation might provide. Our survey and more detailed responses to that survey are presented in appendix IV. Each of the four services has been assigning officers in pay grades O-4 through O-6 to joint organizations and, as of fiscal year 2002, about 50 percent of the services’ mid-level officers had served in at least one joint assignment. The percentage of officers who served in a joint position ranged from 46 percent in the Navy and the Marine Corps to 52 percent and 57 percent in the Air Force and the Army, respectively. Data—including some that we have already presented—however, suggest that the four services continue to struggle to balance joint requirements against their own service needs and vary in the degree of importance that they place on joint education, assignments, and promotions. The Air Force, for example, filled 16 more than its 1,983 allocated seats at the Joint Forces Staff College between fiscal years 1996 and 2001. During that 6-year period, the Air Force actually surpassed its collective allocation by 1 percent. The Marine Corps left 13 of its 316 allocated seats, or 4 percent, unfilled during those same fiscal years. Also during that time period, the Army left 192 of 1,760 seats, or 11 percent, unfilled and the Navy left 193 of 1,288 allocated seats, or 15 percent, unfilled. Accordingly, the Air Force has been able to send a higher percentage of its officers to a joint position after the officers attend a joint professional military education school. In fiscal year 2001, for example, 44 percent of Air Force officers serving in joint positions had previously attended a joint professional military education school. In contrast, 38 percent of Army officers and 33 percent of Navy and Marine Corps officers serving in joint positions had attended a joint professional military education school prior to their joint assignments. This difference can be largely attributed to the fact that the Air Force sends a higher percentage of its officers at the O-4 pay grade to the Joint Forces Staff College. Promotion statistics also suggest differences among the services. As we noted earlier, the Navy did not meet the pay grade O-6 promotion objective for officers serving in joint organizations other than the Joint Staff, and who are not joint specialty officers, between fiscal years 1988 and 2001. The Army met this objective 2 times, the Marine Corps met it 6 times, and the Air Force met it 10 times in the 14-year period. Our analysis of general and flag officer promotions showed that, between fiscal years 1995 and 2000, the Marine Corps used good-of-the service waivers to promote 19 percent of its officers to brigadier general. The Army used this waiver authority for 17 percent of its promotions, and the Navy used the authority for 13 percent of its promotions. In contrast, the Air Force only approved one good-of-the-service waiver during that time period. The Goldwater-Nichols Act states that the Secretary of Defense should establish personnel policies for reserve officers that emphasize education and experience in joint matters. A recent congressionally-sponsored study concluded, however, that DOD has not yet met this requirement and that DOD’s reserve components lack procedures to identify and track positions that will provide reserve officers with the knowledge and experience that come from working with other services and from joint operations. Providing education in joint matters to reservists has become increasingly important since 1986, given that DOD has increasingly relied on reservists in the conduct of its mission. When the act was enacted, reservists were viewed primarily as an expansion force that would supplement active forces during a major war. Since then the Cold War has ended and a shift has occurred in the way DOD uses the reserve forces. Today, no significant military operation can be conducted without reserve involvement. In addition, the current mobilization for the war on terrorism is adding to this increased use and is expected to last a long time. A few of the officers who attended our focus groups were, in fact, reservists serving on active duty in joint commands. We excluded their responses, however, since the educational and experience requirements for joint officers do not directly apply to reserve officers and, as indicated above, the Secretary of Defense has not as yet issued personnel policies emphasizing education and experience in joint matters for reserve officers as required by the Goldwater-Nichols Act. Nevertheless, many of the active duty officers we spoke with raised the issue of providing education to reservists. We interviewed officers at several joint organizations and found that reservists are serving in positions at all levels from the Chief of Staff at one command down to the mid-grade officer positions. Moreover, DOD has identified 2,904 additional positions that it will fill with reservists when it operates under mobilized conditions. All of this suggests that reservists can be assigned to joint positions without the benefit of joint education. In 1995, the Office of the DOD Inspector General recommended that DOD develop policy guidance that provides for the necessary training and education of reserve component officers assigned to joint organizations. The Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness concurred with this recommendation. In 1997, we reported that DOD officials noted that many details needed to be resolved. For example, they said that, since reservists typically perform duties on an intermittent or part-time basis, it is difficult for reservists to find the time to attend the 3-month second phase of the joint education program. Reservists also cannot be readily assigned to locations outside of their reserve unit area, thus limiting their availability for joint education. Another concern raised by a DOD official was that if the education and experience requirements for reservists are too stringent, the available pool of reservists who can meet them will be limited, thereby denying joint duty assignments to many highly qualified personnel. During our review, officials on the Joint Staff told us that DOD recently completed a pilot program that considered alternatives for providing joint education to reservists. DOD officials anticipate that they will be able to deliver joint education to reservists through distance- learning beginning in fiscal year 2004. DOD has a wealth of information to support its implementation of provisions in the Goldwater-Nichols Act, and it has been collecting data and submitting annual reports to Congress in accordance with the act’s reporting requirements. However, in cases where the act does not require DOD to report data, DOD has not tracked meaningful information that it needs in order to fully assess its progress. For example, DOD has not kept historical data on the number of positions in joint organizations that are filled with joint specialty officers and joint specialty officer nominees. Without trend data, DOD and others cannot assess the degree to which DOD is properly targeting its joint education program or foresee problematic trends as they arise. Also, when we attempted to identify the number of officers who have completed both phases of the joint education program, DOD officials told us that they did not have fully reliable data because the services do not consistently maintain and enter such information into their databases. Furthermore, DOD does not track the degree to which reservists are filling joint positions. Given that DOD plans to offer joint education to reservists and that reservists are serving in joint positions, tracking this type of data would help DOD identify reservists who have joint education and experience during mobilizations. Effective organizations link human capital approaches to their overall mission and programmatic goals. An organization’s human capital approaches should be designed, implemented, and assessed by the standard of how well they help an organization pursue its mission and achieve desired results or outcomes. High-performing organizations use data to determine key performance objectives and goals that enable them to evaluate the success of their human capital approaches. Collecting and analyzing data are fundamental building blocks for measuring the effectiveness of human capital approaches in support of the mission and goals of the agency. DOD has taken positive steps to implement the major provisions of the Goldwater-Nichols Act that address joint officer development. However, DOD has not taken a strategic approach toward joint officer development and, without a strategic plan that will address the development of the total force in joint matters, it is more than likely that DOD will continue to experience difficulties in the future in meeting the provisions of the Goldwater-Nichols Act. While DOD has made progress in implementing provisions of the law, it has not identified how many joint specialty officers it needs. Moreover, the fact that the four services have emphasized the development of their officers in joint matters to varying degrees suggests that DOD has not taken a fully unified approach and that service parochialisms still prevail. Addressing these points will provide DOD with data it needs to determine whether it has the resources or capacity to deliver its two-phased joint education program to all of the active duty officers who need it. Furthermore, although DOD is increasingly relying upon its reserve forces, including using reserves in some of its key joint positions, it has not fully assessed how it will develop its reserve officers in joint matters. Finally, DOD has not been consistent in tracking key indicators since enactment of the act in 1986. A strategic plan that is designed appropriately will help DOD assess progress made toward meeting the act’s specific objectives and overall intent regarding joint officer development. Because the services lack the guidance they need to undertake a unified approach that will address the development of the total force in joint matters, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness to develop a strategic plan that links joint officer development to DOD’s overall mission and goals. At a minimum, this plan should (1) identify the number of joint specialty officers needed, (2) include provisions for the education and assignment of reservists who are serving in joint organizations, and (3) be developed in a manner to provide DOD with more meaningful data to track progress made against the plan. We requested written comments from the Department of Defense, but none were provided. However, the Office of the Vice Director, Joint Staff, did provide us with DOD’s oral comments in which DOD partially concurred with our recommendation that it develop a strategic plan that links joint officer development to DOD’s overall mission and goals. DOD stated that its ability to develop a strategic plan, that would improve DOD’s capability to conduct successful joint operations, is limited by the current legislation that specifies 1) quotas that artificially drive the production of joint specialty officers, 2) requirements that limit the availability of the second phase of DOD’s joint education program, and 3) post-education requirements that make advance planning for joint education difficult. DOD added that it views provisions in the act as impediments that must be removed before it can develop an effective strategic plan. Our report recognizes that DOD is required to comply with numerous provisions in the act that address the education, assignment, and promotion of officers in joint matters. While we recognize that DOD must be mindful of these provisions as it attempts to develop a strategic plan, we do not believe that the act’s provisions prohibit DOD from developing a strategic plan to achieve its goals. We believe that DOD will not be able to demonstrate that changes to the law are needed unless it first develops a strategic plan that identifies the department’s goals and objectives for joint officer development and produces empirical data to support needed changes. In response to our recommendation that DOD develop a strategic plan that identifies the number of joint specialty officers needed, DOD asserted that numerical quotas prevent it from pursuing a strategic approach to joint officer development that is based on true joint specialty requirements. Instead, DOD stated that it will produce about 1,000 joint specialty officers each year in order to satisfy the law. However, the statute does, in fact, provide some flexibility and permits the Secretary of Defense to determine the number of joint specialty officers. The act only requires that approximately one-half of the joint positions be filled at any time by officers who have either successfully completed the joint education program or received an allowable waiver to complete the education after their joint assignment. DOD also asserted that officers today are more experienced in joint matters and therefore believes that the difference between a joint educated officer and a joint specialty officer has diminished. During our review, officers who participated in our focus groups told us they believe that today’s senior leaders should have joint experience and education. We continue to believe that, in the absence of a strategic plan that is requirements based, DOD is not in a position to determine whether it is producing too many or too few joint specialty officers. In response to our recommendation that a strategic plan should include provisions for the education and assignment of reservists who are serving in joint organizations, DOD stated that it has recently finalized guidance for their development and management and is developing a joint education program for reserve officers. However, this guidance was not available at the time of our review. The act states that the Secretary of Defense should establish personnel policies for reserve officers that emphasize education and experience in joint matters. Our report acknowledges the steps DOD is taking. Given that reservists play an integral role within the total force, we view these recent actions that DOD is taking to integrate reserve officers in joint matters as positive steps. In response to our recommendation that a strategic plan should be developed in a manner to provide DOD with more meaningful data to track progress made against the plan, DOD reported that it is revamping the data system it uses to evaluate joint officer management. When complete, DOD stated that it will have current and historical data and that this information will be used to identify and correct inconsistencies. We believe that a strategic plan would help DOD identify its goals and track progress made in its joint officer program. We view DOD’s effort in this area as a positive step, provided that the revamped data system gives DOD the information it needs to better manage its joint officer program. DOD also commented on our findings that address critical joint duty positions, joint education, and general and flag officers promotions. Concerning critical joint duty positions, DOD stated that it is further inhibited from achieving its joint vision by a legislative requirement to identify 800 critical joint duty positions and fill them with joint specialty officers. Moreover, DOD questioned whether there is a valid requirement for critical billets within joint organizations. DOD believes that the essential factors that should be considered to identify those officers who best meet the needs of a joint organization are service competencies and expertise in a military occupational skill. It stated that joint qualifications should be viewed as one of many attributes that can be used. Although we did not validate the numerical requirements for critical joint positions, we do discuss difficulties DOD has experienced in filling these positions with joint specialty officers. In the absence of a strategic plan that is requirements based, we continue to believe that DOD is not in a position to determine whether it is filling its critical billets appropriately. Regarding joint education, DOD stated that it realizes the value of joint education and the importance of acculturating its officers in joint matters. However, DOD also stated that it does not have the flexibility it needs to educate top quality officers in joint matters. DOD viewed the existing requirements that it must follow as inhibitors to good personnel management and further stated that these requirements cause some officers to miss joint education due to timing limitations. DOD believes that, in order to develop an effective strategic plan, it needs greater flexibility and that leveraging new educational technologies would facilitate its ability to prepare officers for the joint environment. Specifically, DOD asserted that, while it has the flexibility to offer the first phase of its joint education program in both resident and nonresident settings, it can only provide the second phase of its joint education program in an in-resident setting, and then must assign 50 percent of the graduates to a joint assignment. Our report acknowledges the progress DOD has made in providing joint education to its officers and the difficulties DOD has experienced in providing the second phase of its joint education program. We believe, however, that while legislative provisions address the education needed to qualify an officer for the joint specialty, DOD is not precluded from using new technologies and alternative venues to provide joint education. While officers educated under alternative approaches may not be awarded the joint specialty officer designation, these officers, nonetheless, would be better educated in joint matters and prepared for joint positions. We continue to believe that a strategic approach will help DOD better identify its joint education needs. Concerning general and flag officer promotions to pay grade O-7, DOD acknowledged that our findings regarding waiver usage are correct. However, DOD believed that without further analysis, our finding that DOD still relies heavily on allowable waivers to promote one in four officers to this level without joint experience is misleading. DOD pointed out that a closer examination of the types of waivers used might be a better indicator of how well it is doing. In our report, we identify the five categories of allowable waivers. We discuss the progress DOD has made in promoting officers with joint experience as well as its progress in limiting its use of good-of-the-service waivers in particular. During our review, we attempted to obtain data on the other categories of waivers. However, DOD does not capture and report waiver usage by the various categories in its annual reports and DOD was not able to provide it to us at the time of our review. We are sending copies of this report to appropriate congressional committees. We are also sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Defense; the Secretaries of the Air Force, Army, and Navy; the Commandant of the Marine Corps; and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. We will also make copies available to others upon request. In addition, this report will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov. If you or your staff have any questions concerning this report, please call me at (202) 512-5140. Major contributors to this report are listed in appendix V. To examine the steps the Department of Defense (DOD) has taken to address the education and assignment of officers in joint matters, we initially conducted a legislative history of the act, reviewed joint directives and publications, and analyzed data contained in the Goldwater-Nichols Act Implementation Reports that are presented as an appendix to DOD’s Annual Reports to the Congress for fiscal years 1988 through 2001. We also analyzed data contained in DOD’s joint duty assignment list database and interviewed and gathered data from officials serving in the Manpower and Personnel Directorate within the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and the four military services headquarters. In certain cases, we analyzed data dating back to fiscal year 1989. In other cases, we could only analyze data going back to fiscal year 1996 due to changes in DOD’s reporting methods that made comparisons difficult. We used fiscal year 2001 as our end point because that year represents the last year for which complete annual data were available. To assess the services’ compliance with provisions that pertain to the promotion of officers to the flag and general officer pay grades, we measured the extent to which the services promoted officers with the requisite joint experience or used allowable waivers. In addition, we obtained and analyzed individual biographies and service histories for each officer promoted to these senior pay grades in fiscal year 2001. To analyze the extent to which DOD has complied with provisions that address the promotions of mid-grade officers who are serving or have served in joint positions, we obtained and analyzed data from the Manpower and Personnel Directorate within the Joint Staff for fiscal years 1988 through 2001. To evaluate impediments affecting DOD’s ability to fully respond to the act’s intent, we reviewed previously issued Department of Defense vision statements and human resource strategic plans. We also analyzed existing data to measure trends over time and identify the key reasons why DOD is having difficulty in responding to the act. We interviewed agency officials and obtained data at the following locations: Manpower and Personnel Directorate, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Operational Plans and Interoperability Directorate, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Washington, D.C.; Office of the Secretary of Defense, Force Management and Policy, Air Force Education Branch, Headquarters, U.S. Air Force, Joint Officer Management Branch, Air Force Personnel Center, Randolph Air Force Base, Texas; Joint Management Branch, Army Personnel Command, Alexandria, Virginia; Office of Joint Officer Management Policy Office, Naval Bureau of Personnel, Arlington, Virginia; Marine Corps Training and Education Command, Quantico, Virginia; Personnel Management Division, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, National Defense University, Washington, D.C.; and Joint Forces Staff College, Norfolk, Virginia. To obtain the perspectives of officers serving in joint positions on joint officer development, we surveyed 557 officers and conducted focus group discussions with 513 officers serving in 11 different locations. We did not conduct a random sample due to the dispersion of officers serving in joint positions, and, therefore, cannot project from the information the officers provided us. However, we did attempt to include the different types of organizations in which officers serve in joint positions by selecting the Joint Staff, three geographic commands, two functional commands, three combined forces commands, and two defense agencies. While the results cannot be projected, the population of officers surveyed reflects the overall composition of the joint duty assignment list. At each location, we administered a survey (shown in appendix IV) and conducted focus group interviews with active duty officers in pay grades O-4, O-5, and O-6. To gain firsthand information from officers serving in joint duty positions, we asked them about their joint education and assignments. We also asked them about the value they place on (1) serving in a joint position and (2) attaining the joint specialty officer designation. In addition, we conducted individual interviews with senior officers and personnel officers at the commands we visited. We surveyed officers and conducted focus group discussions at the following offices, commands, and agencies: Joint Chiefs of Staff, Washington, D.C. Combined Commands Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe, Mons, Belgium Allied Forces South, Naples, Italy U.S. Forces Korea, Seoul, Korea Functional Commands Special Operations Command, Tampa, Florida Strategic Command, Omaha, Nebraska Geographic Commands Joint Forces Command, Norfolk, Virginia European Command, Stuttgart, Germany Pacific Command, Honolulu, Hawaii Defense Agencies Defense Information Systems Agency, Arlington, Virginia Defense Intelligence Agency, Arlington, Virginia We administered surveys, but did not conduct site visits, to officers serving in joint positions at the following locations within the U.S. Central Command’s area of responsibility: Joint Task Force—Southwest Asia, Office of Military Cooperation—Egypt, and We conducted our review from January 2002 through October 2002 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. This appendix presents information about the distribution of joint positions in DOD’s joint duty assignment list by organization, pay grade, and occupational category. Table 5 identifies the major commands and activities where joint positions are located and the number of joint positions that were in each command or activity in fiscal year 2001. In fiscal year 2001, DOD’s joint duty assignment list contained 9,146 joint positions for active duty officers in pay grades O-4 and above. Figure 6 shows that 80 percent of the positions were equally divided between the O-4 and O-5 pay grades. Joint positions include a wide range of occupational categories. Figure 7 shows that, in fiscal year 2001, the single largest percentage of joint positions fell within the category of tactics and operations. Officers with military occupation skills such as aviation and navigation, armor and infantry, and surface and submarine warfare serve in this category of positions. The second largest percentage of joint positions fell within the intelligence category. This category includes strategic intelligence, politico-military affairs, and information operations. The Goldwater-Nichols Act established promotion policy objectives for three categories of mid-level officers who are serving in or have served in joint positions. The act set expectations that these officers be promoted at a rate not less than the promotion rate of their peers. The services are expected to promote officers who are in or have been assigned to the Joint Staff, as a group, at a rate equal to or better than the promotion rate of officers who are or have been assigned to their service headquarters; promote joint specialty officers, as a group, at a rate equal to or better than the promotion rate of officers who are or have been assigned to their service headquarters; and promote officers who are serving in or have served in other joint assignments, as a group, that are not included in the previous two categories, at a rate equal to or better than their service average promotion rates. For our analysis, we compared progress DOD made between fiscal years 1988 and 1994 with progress DOD made between fiscal years 1995 and 2001. For each of the three promotion categories (Joint Staff, joint specialty officers, and officers serving in other joint positions), we multiplied the three pay grades by the four services by the 7 years and identified 84 potential promotion groups. We then eliminated those groups in which no promotions occurred to identify the actual promotion groups. We then counted the number of groups in which DOD met or exceeded the applicable standard. Table 6 shows that DOD met its promotion objectives for mid-level officers assigned to the Joint Staff in 43 out of 68 promotion groups between fiscal years 1988 and 1994, or 63 percent of the time. Between fiscal years 1995 and 2001, DOD met this objective in 55 out of 60 promotion groups, or 92 percent of the time. Table 7 shows that DOD met its promotion objectives for mid-level joint specialty officers in 26 out of 52 promotion groups between fiscal years 1988 and 1994, or 50 percent of the time. Between fiscal years 1995 and 2001, DOD met this objective in 37 out of 50 promotion groups, or 74 percent of the time. Table 8 shows that DOD met its promotion objectives for mid-level officers assigned to joint organizations other than the Joint Staff in 41 out of 82 promotion groups between fiscal years 1988 and 1994, or 50 percent of the time. Between fiscal years 1995 and 2001, DOD met this objective in 60 out of 84 promotion groups, or 71 percent of the time. We administered a survey to 557 officers serving in joint positions regarding their current joint duty assignment, their thoughts and opinions on joint duty assignments in general, joint professional military education, and other opinions regarding joint officer management. A copy of the survey appears at the end of this summary. Although the survey findings cannot be generalized to all officers serving in joint positions, the composition of the officers in our survey generally reflected the service and pay grade distribution in DOD’s joint duty assignment list. Thirty-seven percent of the officers were in the Air Force, 33 percent were in the Army, 24 percent were in the Navy, and about 6 percent were in the Marine Corps. Forty-seven percent of the officers were in pay grade O-4, 35 percent were in pay grade O-5, and 18 percent were in pay grade O-6. On average, the officers we surveyed had 16 years of commissioned service. We asked the officers in our survey to identify their current joint duty position in the context of broad functional areas and types of duties performed. Twenty-seven percent of the officers responded that their joint positions fell within the functional area of strategic, tactical, or contingency operations. Their duties involved command and control of combat operations or combat support forces; military operations; or the planning, development, staffing, assessment, or implementation of plans or requirements for forces and materiel. Twenty-eight percent of the officers surveyed responded that their joint positions fell within the functional area of direct or general support or the development, staffing, or assessment of military doctrine or policy. Forty-five percent of the officers responded that they were engaged in the functional areas of education and training or administration. They performed duties that included (1) directing, commanding, and controlling noncombat units, organizations, or activities or (2) providing general, administrative, or technical support services to military operations. Seventy-one percent of the officers we surveyed were serving in their first joint duty position in the joint duty assignment list. Twenty-one percent of the officers were in their second joint duty position, and the remaining 8 percent were serving in their third joint duty position. Most officers (85 percent) responded that their service had clearly defined the career path for their military occupation. On the other hand, just over half (51percent) of the officers responded that a joint assignment was a clearly defined component of their career path and about 35 percent of the officers responded that a joint duty assignment was not a well-defined aspect of their career path. (Fourteen percent of the officers responded that they were unsure.) Most officers (70 percent) responded that a joint duty assignment was beneficial to their career to a moderate or very great extent, while about 19 percent responded that a joint duty assignment was beneficial only to a little extent. The remaining 7 percent of the officers responded that a joint duty assignment was not beneficial to their careers. We asked the officers to identify the greatest incentive for serving in a joint position. The most common response offered by Army, Air Force, and Marine Corps officers was that joint duty assignments broadened their experience, perspective, and knowledge of the multiservice and multinational environment. The most common response offered by officers in the Navy was that joint duty assignments enhanced their promotion potential and professional development. Conversely, when we asked officers to provide their opinion regarding the greatest disincentive to serving in a joint duty position, officers in all of the services cited the time they spent in a joint position that took them away from their service. Seventy-seven percent of the officers we surveyed had attended the first phase of DOD’s joint professional military education program. Among those who had attended the first phase, 56 percent completed it at one of the professional military education schools and 44 percent completed Phase I through a nonresident program. Most officers (59 percent) responded that the first phase of the joint education program was beneficial to their careers to a great or moderate extent. Sixty-three percent of the officers responded that it was important to a great or moderate extent to complete the first phase of the joint education prior to serving in a joint position. Sixty-six percent of the officers believed that the first phase of the joint education increased their effectiveness in their joint position. Officers in all services responded that the first phase of the joint education provided a foundation of joint knowledge—a first exposure to joint doctrine, other service’s methods, and the operational and strategic levels of war-fighting. Thirty-six percent of the officers we surveyed said that they had attended the second phase of DOD’s joint professional military education program. The majority of these officers had attended the Joint Forces Staff College in Norfolk, Virginia (92 percent), while significantly smaller percentages had attended the Industrial College of the Armed Forces (5 percent) and the National War College (3 percent). Sixty-four percent of the officers had not completed the second phase of the joint professional military education program and the overwhelming majority (86 percent) of these officers reported that they would not likely attend the second phase before the end of their current joint duty assignment. Officers in all services cited timing, budget, and logistics issues as reasons for not attending the second phase after reporting to a joint assignment. They added their views that neither the losing nor gaining command wanted to be responsible for funding the education. About 60 percent of the officers responded that it was important to complete the second phase of the joint professional military education program prior to serving in a joint assignment and that this education would increase an officer’s effectiveness in a joint position. Slightly fewer officers (56 percent) responded that the second phase of the joint education program was beneficial to their careers. In addition, Ann M. Asleson, James R. Bancroft, Larry J. Bridges, Jocelyn O. Cortese, Herbert I. Dunn, Jack E. Edwards, Alicia E. Johnson, David E. Moser, Krislin M. Nalwalk, Madelon B. Savaides, and Susan K. Woodward contributed to this report.

Summary: DOD has increasingly engaged in multiservice and multinational operations. Congress enacted the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, in part, so that DOD's military leaders would be better prepared to plan, support, and conduct joint operations. GAO assessed DOD actions to implement provisions in the law that address the development of officers in joint matters and evaluated impediments affecting DOD's ability to fully respond to the provisions in the act. DOD has taken positive steps to implement the Goldwater-Nichols Act provisions that address the education, assignment, and promotion of officers serving in joint positions. However, DOD has relied on waivers allowable under the law to comply with the provisions and has experienced difficulties implementing some of its programs. Because of these difficulties, DOD cannot be assured that it is preparing officers in the most effective manner to serve in joint organizations and leadership positions. (1) Education. DOD has met provisions in the act to develop officers through education by establishing a two-phased joint education program, but has not determined how many officers should complete both phases. In fiscal year 2001, only one-third of the officers serving in joint positions had completed both phases of the program. (2) Assignment. DOD has increasingly not filled all of its critical joint duty positions with joint specialty officers, who are required to have both prior education and experience in joint matters. In fiscal year 2001, DOD did not fill 311, or more than one-third, of its critical joint duty positions with joint specialty officers. (3)Promotion. DOD has promoted more officers with prior joint experience to the general and flag officer pay grades. However, in fiscal year 2001, DOD still relied on allowable waivers in lieu of joint experience to promote one in four officers to these senior levels. Beginning in fiscal year 2008, most officers promoted to these senior levels will also have to complete DOD's joint education program or otherwise meet the requirements to be a joint specialty officer. Our analysis of officers promoted in fiscal year 2001 showed that 58 out of 124 officers promoted to the general and flag level did not meet these requirements. DOD has promoted mid-grade officers who serve in joint organizations at rates equal to or better than the promotion rates of their peers. However, DOD has had difficulty meeting this objective for colonels and Navy captains. DOD's ability to respond fully to these provisions has been hindered by the absence of a strategic plan that (1) establishes clear goals for officer development in joint matters and (2) links those goals to DOD's overall mission and goals. DOD has not identified how many joint specialty officers it needs and, without this information, cannot determine if its joint education programs are properly structured. The services vary in the emphasis they place on joint officer development and continue to struggle to balance joint requirements against their own service needs. DOD has also not fully addressed how it will develop reserve officers in joint matters--despite the fact that it is increasingly relying on reservists to carry out its mission. Finally, DOD has not tracked meaningful data consistently to measure progress in meeting the act's provisions.