As with servicemembers and federal workers, industry personnel must obtain a security clearance to gain access to classified information, which is categorized into three levels: top secret, secret, and confidential. The level of classification denotes the degree of protection required for information and the amount of damage that unauthorized disclosure could reasonably be expected to cause to national defense or foreign relations. For top secret information, the expected damage that unauthorized disclosure could reasonably be expected to cause is “exceptionally grave damage”; for secret information, it is “serious damage”; and for confidential information, it is “damage.” To ensure the trustworthiness, reliability, and character of personnel in positions with access to classified information, DOD relies on a multiphased personnel security clearance process. Figure 1 shows six phases that could be involved in determining whether to grant an actual or a potential job incumbent a clearance. The three phases shown in gray are those that are most transparent to individuals requesting an initial clearance. Such individuals may not have been aware that they are allowed to apply for a clearance only if a contractor determines that access is essential in the performance of tasks or services related to the fulfillment of a classified contract (Phase 1), have certain appeal rights if their clearance request is denied or their clearance is subsequently revoked (Phase 5), and may need to renew their clearance in the future if they occupy their position for an extended period (Phase 6). In the application-submission phase, if a position requires a clearance (as has been determined in Phase 1), then the facility security officer must request an investigation of the individual. The request could be the result of needing to fill a new position for a recent contract, replacing an employee in an existing position, renewing the clearance of an individual who is due for clearance updating (Phase 6), or processing a request for a future employee in advance of the hiring date. Once the requirement for a security clearance is established, the industry employee completes a personnel security questionnaire using OPM’s Electronic Questionnaires for Investigations Processing (e-QIP) system, or a paper copy of the standard form 86. After a review, the facility security officer submits the questionnaire and other information such as fingerprints to OPM. In the investigation stage, OPM or one of its contractors conducts the actual investigation of the industry employee by using standards that were established governmentwide in 1997. As table 1 shows, the type of information gathered in an investigation depends on the level of clearance needed and whether an investigation for an initial clearance or a reinvestigation for a clearance update is being conducted. For either an initial investigation or a reinvestigation for a confidential or secret clearance, investigators gather much of the information electronically. For a top secret clearance, investigators gather additional information that requires much more time-consuming efforts, such as traveling, obtaining police and court records, and arranging and conducting interviews. In August 2006, OPM estimated that approximately 60 total staff hours are needed for each investigation for an initial top secret clearance and 6 total staff hours are needed for the investigation to support a secret or confidential clearance. After the investigation is complete, OPM forwards a paper copy of the investigative report to DISCO for adjudication. In the adjudication stage, DISCO or some other adjudication facility uses the information from the investigative report to determine whether an individual is eligible for a security clearance. For our May 2004 report, an OUSD(I) official estimated that it took three times longer to adjudicate a top secret clearance than it did to adjudicate a secret or confidential clearance. If the report is determined to be a “clean” case—a case that contains no or minimal potential security issues—the DISCO adjudicators determine eligibility for a clearance. However, if the case is determined to be an “issue” case—a case containing information that might disqualify an individual for a clearance (e.g., serious foreign connections or drug- or alcohol-related problems)—then DISCO forwards the case to DOHA adjudicators for the clearance-eligibility decisions. Regardless of which office renders the adjudication to approve, deny, or revoke eligibility for a security clearance, DISCO issues the clearance-eligibility decision and forwards the determination to the industrial contractor. All adjudications are based on 13 federal adjudicative guidelines established governmentwide in 1997 and implemented by DOD in 1998 (see app. II). The President approved an update of the adjudication guidelines on December 29, 2005. According to OMB, DOD should be using these updated guidelines. Industry personnel contracted to work for the federal government waited more than one year on average to receive top secret security clearances, and government statistics did not portray the full length of time it takes many applicants to obtain a clearance. Industry personnel in the population from which our sample was randomly selected waited on average over one year for initial clearances and almost a year and a half for clearance updates. The phase of the process between the time an applicant submits his or her application and the time the investigation actually begins averaged over 3 months, and government statistics did not fully account for the time required to complete this phase. In addition, the investigative phase for industry personnel was not timely, and government statistics did not account for the full extent of the delay. Delays in the clearance process may cost money and pose threats to national security. Industry personnel granted eligibility for top secret clearances from DISCO in January and February 2006 waited an average of 446 days for their initial clearance or 545 days for their clearance update. DISCO may, however, have issued an interim clearance to some of these industry personnel, which might have allowed them to begin classified work for many contracts. Beginning in December 2006, IRTPA will require that 80 percent of all clearances—regardless of clearance level—be completed in an average of 120 days. The government plan for improving the personnel security clearance process provides quarterly goals for various types of initial clearances. Since the completion of initial clearances is given priority over completion of clearance updates, much of our discussion in this section focuses on the timeliness of initial clearances. The application-submission phase of the clearance process took on average 111 days for the initial clearances that DISCO adjudicated in January and February 2006 (see table 2). The starting point for our measurement of this phase was the date when the application was submitted by the facility security officer. Our end point for this phase was the date that OPM scheduled the investigation into its Personnel Investigations Processing System (PIPS). We used this starting date because the government can begin to incur an economic cost if an industry employee cannot begin work on a classified contract because of delays in obtaining a security clearance and this end date because OPM currently uses this date as its start point for the next phase in the clearance process. The governmentwide plan on improving the clearance process noted that “investigation submission” (i.e., application- submission) be completed in 14 calendar days or less. Therefore, the 111 days taken for the application-submission phase took nearly 100 more days on average than allocated. Several factors contribute to the amount of time we observed in the application-submission phase, including rejecting applications multiple times, multiple completeness reviews, and manually entering data from paper applications. For example, an April 2006 DOD Office of Inspector General report cited instances where OPM rejected applications multiple times due to inaccurate information. The security managers interviewed for that report said it appeared that OPM did not review the entire documents for all errors before returning them. Security managers at two DOD locations noted that in some cases OPM had rejected the same application submission three or four times for inaccurate information. The cited inaccuracies included outdated references, telephone numbers, and signatures, as well as incorrect zip codes. Another source of delay is the multiple levels of review that are performed before the application is accepted. Reviews of the clearance application might include the corporate facility security officer, DISCO adjudicators, and OPM staff. A third source of the delay in the application-submission phase is the time that it takes OPM to key-enter data from paper applications. For April 2006, OPM’s Associate Director in charge of the investigations unit stated that applications submitted on paper took an average of 14 days longer than submissions through OPM’s electronic Questionnaires for Investigations Processing (e-QIP). She also noted additional information on e-QIP that could portend future timeliness improvements governmentwide: in May 2006, over 221,000 investigations had been requested through e-QIP by 50 agencies (up from 17,000 submissions by 27 agencies in June 2005), and a goal to reduce the rejection rate for e-QIP applications from the current 9 percent to 5 percent. The gray portion of table 2’s application-submission phase identifies some tasks that are not currently included in the investigation phase of the clearance process but which could be included in the investigation phase, depending on the interpretation of what constitutes “receipt of the application for a security clearance by an authorized investigative agency”—IRTPA’s start date for the investigations phase. Investigations for the initial top secret clearances of industry personnel took an average of 286 days for DISCO cases adjudicated in January and February 2006 (see table 2). During the same period, investigations for top secret clearance updates took an average of 419 days, almost 1½ times as long as the initial investigations. Compared to our findings, OPM reported that the time required to complete initial investigations for top secret clearances was much shorter when it analyzed governmentwide data for April 2006. The newer data indicate that OPM completed the initial investigations in 171 days. While some of that difference in investigation times reported by GAO and OPM may be related to better productivity, a later section of this report identifies other factors that could have contributed to the difference. The shorter period of 171 days is less than the 180 days provided as a goal in the governmentwide plan. But the methods for computing the 171 days may not have included the total average time required to complete an initial clearance. Many factors impede the speed with which OPM can deliver investigative reports to DISCO and other adjudication facilities. As we have previously identified, DOD’s inability to accurately project the number of requests for security clearances is a major impediment to investigative workload planning and clearance timeliness. As we noted in 2004 when both OPM and DOD were struggling to improve investigation timeliness, backlogged investigations contributed to delays because most new requests for investigations remain largely dormant until earlier requests are completed. The governmentwide plan for improving the personnel security clearance process also asserted that while the total number of OPM federal and contract investigators was sufficient to meet the timeliness requirements of the IRTPA, many of the investigative staff are relatively inexperienced and do not perform at a full-performance level. In May 2006, we noted that OPM reported progress in developing an overseas presence to investigate leads overseas, but acknowledged it will take time to fully meet the full demand for overseas investigative coverage. In May 2006, the Associate Director in charge of OPM’s investigations unit indicated that her unit continues to have difficulty obtaining national, state, and local records from third-party providers. Similarly, representatives for contractors and their associations are concerned that new investigative requirements like those in Homeland Security Presidential Directive-12 could further slow responses to OPM’s requests for information from national, state, and local agencies. Finally, more requests for top secret clearances could slow OPM’s ability to meet the IRTPA timeliness requirements, since investigations for that level of clearance are estimated to take 10 times the number of staff hours as do investigations for secret and confidential clearances. DISCO adjudicators took an average of 39 days to grant initial clearance eligibility to the industry personnel whose cases were decided in January and February 2006 (see table 2). The measurement of this phase for our analysis used the same start and stop dates that OPM uses in its reports, starting on the date that OPM closed the report and continuing through the date that DISCO adjudicators decided clearance eligibility. In December 2006, IRTPA will require that at least 80 percent of the adjudications be completed within 30 days. As of June 2006, DISCO reported that it had adjudicated 82 percent of its initial top secret clearances within 30 days. In its report, DISCO excluded the time required to print and transfer investigative reports from OPM to DISCO. Two data reliability concerns make it difficult to interpret statistics for the adjudication phase of the clearance process. First, the activities in the gray section in the adjudication phase of table 2 show that the government’s current procedures for measuring the time required for the adjudication phase include tasks that occur before adjudicators actually receive the investigative reports from OPM. Although the information that we analyzed could not be used to determine how much time had elapsed before DISCO received the investigative reports, DOD adjudication officials recently estimated that these printing and transfer tasks had taken 2 to 3 weeks. OUSD(I) and adjudication officials said that inclusion of this time in the adjudication phase holds adjudicators accountable for time that is not currently in their control. They acknowledge that OPM has offered faster electronic delivery of the investigative reports, but they countered that they would need to then print the reports since the files are not offered in an electronic format that would allow the adjudicators to easily use the electronic information. The second data reliability problem is DOD’s nonreporting of final dates of adjudication decisions to OPM. While we had the dates that the clearance eligibility was determined for our data, OPM officials have noted that DOD departmentwide reported about 10 percent of its adjudication decisions back to OPM for August 2006. Although OPM reports this information as specified by the government plan for improving the security clearance process, OPM officials acknowledged that they have not enforced the need to report this information. When asked about this issue, DOD officials indicated that OPM would not accept a download of adjudication dates from JPAS that DOD had offered to provide on compact discs. Since DOD represents about 80 percent of the security clearances adjudicated by the federal government, not including these data could make it appear as if adjudication timeliness is different than it actually is. In 2004, we outlined unnecessary costs and threats to national security that result from delays in determining clearance eligibility. Those same negative consequences apply today. Delays in completing initial security clearances may have an economic impact on the costs of performing classified work within or for the U.S. government. In a 1981 report, we estimated that DOD’s investigative backlog of overdue clearances cost nearly $1 billion per year in lost productivity. More than a decade later, a Joint Security Commission report noted that the costs directly attributable to investigative delays in fiscal year 1994 could have been as high as several billion dollars because workers were unable to perform their jobs while awaiting a clearance. While newer overall cost estimates are not available, the underlying reasons—the delays in determining clearance eligibility that we documented in this report—still exist today. The impact of delays in completing initial clearances affects industry, and therefore affects the U.S. government, which is funding the work that requires the clearances. In a May 2006 congressional hearing, a representative for a technology association testified that retaining qualified personnel is resulting in salary premiums as high as 25 percent for current clearance holders. The association representative went on to note that such premiums raise costs to industry, which in turn passes on the costs to the government and taxpayers. In 2004, representatives of a company with $1 billion per year in sales stated that their company offered $10,000 bonuses to its employees for each person recruited who already had a security clearance. In cases where recruits left for the company in question, their former companies faced the possibility of having to back- fill a position, as well as possibly settling for a lower level of contract performance while a new employee was found, obtained a clearance, and learned the former employee’s job. Also, industry representatives discussed instances where their companies gave hiring preferences to cleared personnel who could do the job but were less qualified than others who did not possess a clearance. The chair of the interagency Personnel Security Working Group at the time of our 2004 report noted that a company might hire an employee and begin paying that individual, but not assign any work to the individual until a clearance is obtained. Also, the head of the interagency group noted that commands, agencies, and industry might incur lost-opportunity costs if the individual chooses to work somewhere else rather than wait to get the clearance before beginning work. The negative effects of the failure to deliver timely determinations of initial clearance eligibility extend beyond industry personnel to servicemembers and federal employees. An April 2006 DOD Office of Inspector General report provided examples to illustrate how delays in the clearance process can result in negative consequences such as nonproductive time waiting for a clearance. That report noted that delays have caused students at military training facilities to remain in a holdover status while waiting for a final clearance to complete training courses, graduate, or deploy. In addition, students without a final clearance may have their duty stations changed, which impacts their ability to fully support DOD missions for which they were trained. Delays in completing clearance updates can have serious but different negative consequences than those stemming from delays in completing initial clearance-eligibility determinations. Delays in completing clearance updates may lead to a heightened risk of national security breaches. Such breaches involve the unauthorized disclosure of classified information, which can have effects that range from exceptionally grave damage to national security in the case of top secret information to damage in the case of confidential information. In 1999, the Joint Security Commission reported that delays in initiating investigations for clearance updates create risks to national security because the longer individuals hold clearances the more likely they are to be working with critical information systems. The timeliness statistics that OPM provided in the recent congressional hearings do not convey the full magnitude of the investigations-related delays facing the government. In her May 17, 2006, congressional testimony statement, the Associate Director in charge of OPM’s investigations unit said that OPM continued to make “significant progress” in reducing the amount of time needed to complete initial security clearance investigations. She supported her statement with statistics that showed OPM’s initial investigations for top secret clearances governmentwide averaged 284 days in June 2005 and decreased to 171 days in April 2006 (see table 3). When we converted these two timeliness statistics to a percentage, we found that the average time to complete an investigation for an initial top secret clearance in April 2006 was about 60 percent of what it had been in June 2005. We also calculated the percentage change for the numbers of investigations completed in the same 2 months and found that OPM had completed about 68 percent (5,751 versus 8,430) as many initial investigations for top secret clearances in April 2006 as it did in June 2005. Her statement went on to mention that another problem was developing—the inventory of pending investigations was increasing because of difficulty obtaining information from third-party providers. The testimony statement did not provide timeliness statistics for the investigations that are conducted for clearance updates, but that type of investigation probably had longer completion times than did the initial investigations. Our previously reviewed statistics on industry personnel (see table 2) indicated that clearance update investigations took about 1½ times as long as the initial investigations. The absence of information on clearance-update investigations from the OPM’s Associate Director’s testimony statement may be partially explained by the higher priority that OMB and OPM have placed on completing initial clearances so that individuals who have not previously had clearances can begin classified work sooner. At the same time, the absence of information on clearance- update investigations does not provide all stakeholders—Congress, agencies, contractors attempting to fulfill their contracts, and employees awaiting their clearances—with a complete picture of clearance delays. We have noted in the past that focusing on completing initial clearance investigations could negatively affect the completion of clearance-update investigations and thereby increase the risk of unauthorized disclosure of classified information. The testimony statement did not indicate whether or not the statistics on complete investigations included a type of incomplete investigation that OPM sometimes treats as being complete. In our February 2004 report, we noted that OPM’s issuance of “closed pending” investigations— investigative reports sent to adjudication facilities without one or more types of source data required by the federal investigative standards— causes ambiguity in defining and accurately estimating the backlog of overdue investigations. In our February 2004 report, we also noted that cases that are closed pending the provision of additional information should continue to be tracked separately in the investigations phase of the clearance process. According to recently released OPM data, between February 20, 2005, and July 1, 2006, the number of initial top secret clearance investigative reports that were closed pending the provision of additional information increased from 14,841 to 18,849, a 27 percent increase. DISCO officials and representatives from some other DOD adjudication facilities have indicated that they will not adjudicate closed pending cases since critical information is missing. OPM, however, has stated that other federal agencies review the investigative reports from closed pending cases and may determine that they have enough information for adjudication. Combining partially completed investigations with fully completed investigations overstates how quickly OPM is supplying adjudication facilities with the information they request to make their clearance-eligibility determinations. OPM told us that it does not continue counting the time when agencies return investigative reports for rework because they were in some way deficient. Instead, OPM begins the count of days in the investigative phase anew. OPM says that approximately 1 to 2 percent of its investigations are reopened for such work. OPM has indicated that system problems prevent them from continuing to monitor these returned investigations as a continuation of the prior investigations. By not fully capturing all investigative time—including the review time which occurred at the adjudication facility and resulted in returning a report—OPM is undercounting the number of days that it takes to conduct an investigation. Finally, our analysis of OPM’s quarterly reports, which are provided to OMB and Congress, revealed computational errors. For example, using information from such reports, we found that the number of adjudications completed in the second quarter of 2006 was off by about 12,000 cases. One reason for the errors was mistakes in the programs used to extract the data from OPM’s database, rather than the use of a documented and verified computer program that can be used again as data are updated. Without complete and accurate data and analyses, Congress, OMB, and others do not have full visibility over the timeliness of the clearance process. OPM provided incomplete investigative reports to DOD adjudicators, which they used to determine top secret clearance eligibility. Almost all (47 of 50) of the sampled investigative reports we reviewed were incomplete based on requirements in the federal investigative standards. In addition, DISCO adjudicators granted clearance eligibility without requesting additional information for any of the incomplete investigative reports and did not document that they considered some adjudicative guidelines when adverse information was present in some reports. Granting clearances based on incomplete investigative reports increases risks to national security. In addition, use of incomplete investigative reports and not fully documenting adjudicative considerations may undermine the government’s efforts to increase the acceptance of security clearances granted by other federal agencies. In our review of 50 initial investigations randomly sampled from the population used in our timeliness analyses, we found that almost all (47 of 50) of the investigative reports were missing documentation required by the federal investigative standards. The missing data were of two general types: (1) the absence of documentation showing that an investigator gathered the prescribed information in each of the applicable 13 investigative areas and included requisite forms in the investigative report, and (2) information to help resolve issues (such as conflicting information on indebtedness) that were raised in other parts of the investigative report. The requirements for gathering these types of information were identified in federal investigative standards published about a decade ago. We categorized an investigative area as incomplete if the investigative report did not contain all of the required documentation for that area or issue resolution. For example, we categorized the employment area as incomplete if investigators did not document a check of the subject’s employee personnel file or the required number of interviews of employment references such as supervisors and coworkers. At least half of the 50 reports that we examined did not contain the required documentation in three investigative areas: residence, employment, and education (see fig. 2). In addition, many investigative reports contained multiple deficiencies within each of these areas. For example, multiple deficiencies might be present in the residence area because investigators did not document a rental record check and an interview with a neighborhood reference. Looking at the data for figure 2 in a different way shows that three of every five reports that we reviewed had at least three investigative areas that did not have all of the prescribed documentation. Thirty-eight of the 50 investigative reports had two to four investigative areas with at least one piece of missing documentation (see fig. 3). The following examples illustrate some of the types of documentation missing from the investigative reports that we reviewed. When we discussed our findings for these investigative reports with OPM Quality Management officials, they agreed that the OPM investigators should have included documentation in the identified investigative areas. Residence, social, and employment documentation were missing. One investigative report did not have documentation on all of the required residence interviews or to show they checked rental records at two of the subjects’ residences. In addition, it contained no information from required investigator-developed social references, but information from interviews with two subject-identified social references was in the report. Federal investigative standards require investigators to interview at least two of the subject-identified social references and two additional social references that the investigator develops during the course of the investigation. Finally, investigators documented performing only 3 of the 10 employment interviews that would be required for the subject’s five jobs covered by the investigative scope. Residence, social, and employment documentation were missing. An investigative report on a DOD industry employee did not contain documentation on interviews with any neighborhood references where the subject had resided for 10 years. Similarly, the report contained interview documentation from one subject-identified but no investigator-developed social reference. Of the eight employment reference interviews required by federal standards for this investigative report, there was documentation that three were performed. Spouse national record documentation was missing. In another investigative report, required documentation for four national agency record checks of the subject’s cohabitant of 35 years was missing. The four types of missing checks were the Federal Bureau of Investigation name and fingerprints, OPM’s Security/Suitability Investigations Index, and DOD’s Spouse Defense Clearance and Investigations Index. Although federal standards indicate that investigations may be expanded as necessary to resolve issues, according to OPM, (1) issue resolution is a standard part of all initial investigations and periodic reinvestigations for top secret clearances and (2) all issues developed during the course of an investigation should be fully resolved in the final investigative report provided to DOD. We found a total of 36 unresolved issues in 27 of the investigative reports. The three investigative areas with the most unresolved issues were financial consideration, foreign influence, and personal conduct (see fig. 4). The following examples highlight investigative areas that lacked the documentation needed to resolve an issue. When we reviewed these investigative reports with OPM Quality Management officials, they agreed that the investigators should have included documentation to resolve the issues. Personal conduct and financial issues were unresolved. One investigative report did not contain documentation of the resolution of possible extramarital affairs and financial delinquency. During the course of the investigation, the subject reported having extramarital affairs; however, there was no documentation to show that these affairs had been investigated further. Also, the subject’s clearance application indicated cohabitation with an individual with whom the subject had previously had a romantic relationship, but there was no documentation that record checks were performed on the cohabitant. Moreover, information in the investigative report indicated that the subject defaulted on a loan with a balance of several thousand dollars; however, no other documentation suggested that this issue was explored further. Foreign influence issues were unresolved. The clearance application showed that the subject had traveled to an Asian country to visit family. However, in the subject interview, the subject reported not knowing the names of the family members or the city in which one relative lived. There was no documentation in other parts of the investigative report of a follow-up discussion with the subject about this issue. Financial issues were unresolved. An industry employee indicated “no” in his clearance application when asked if during the last 7 years he had a lien placed against his property for failing to pay taxes or other debt, but information in another part of the investigative report indicated that a tax lien in the tens of thousands of dollars had been placed against his property. The investigative report did not have additional information to indicate whether or not investigators asked the subject about the omission on the application or the tax lien itself. Although we found that the interview narratives in some of the 50 OPM investigative reports were limited in content, we did not identify them as being deficient for the purposes of our statistical analysis because such an evaluation would have required a subjective assessment that we were not willing to make. For example, in our assessment of the presence or absence of documentation, we found a 35-word narrative for a subject interview of a naturalized citizen from an Asian country. It stated only that the subject did not have any foreign contacts in his birth country and that he spent his time with family and participated in sports. Nevertheless, others with more adjudicative expertise voiced concern about the issue of documentation adequacy. At their monthly meeting in April 2006, top officials representing DOD’s adjudication facilities were in agreement that OPM-provided investigative summaries had been inadequate. The OPM Investigator’s Handbook provides guidance that directs investigators to be brief in the interview narratives but not to sacrifice content. Narrative documentation is required for subject interviews and all interviews with references contacted in the investigation, including neighbors, character references, and coworkers. The Associate Director of OPM’s investigations unit and her Quality Management officials cited the inexperience of the investigative workforce as one of the possible causes for the incomplete investigative reports we reviewed. This inexperience is due to the fact that OPM has rapidly increased the size of the investigative workforce. In December 2003, GAO estimated that OPM and DOD had around 4,200 full-time equivalent investigative personnel. In May 2006, the Associate Director said that OPM had over 8,600 employees. The Associate Director also indicated that variations in the training provided to federal and contractor investigative staff could be another reason for the incompleteness. These variations can occur since each contract investigative company is responsible for developing the training course for its employees. She, however, added that OPM (1) publishes the Investigator’s Handbook that provides guidance on how to conduct an investigation and forms the basis for the training, (2) approves the training curriculum for each contractor, and (3) occasionally monitors actual training sessions. The Associate Director also noted that she had little indication from her customers—adjudicators—that the investigative reports had problems since adjudicative facilities were returning 1 to 2 percent of the reports for rework. In our November 2005 testimony evaluating the government plan for improving the personnel security clearance process, we noted that the number of investigations returned for rework is not by itself a valid indicator of the quality of investigative work because adjudication officials said they were reluctant to return incomplete investigations in anticipation of further delays. We went on to say in November 2005 that regardless of whether that metric remains a part of the government plan, developers of the plan may want to consider adding other indicators of the quality of investigations. When we asked if OMB and OPM had made changes to the government plan to address quality-measurement and other shortcomings that we had identified in our November 2005 testimony, the Associate Director said the plan had not been modified to address our concerns but implementation of the plan was continuing. OPM’s Associate Director outlined new quality control procedures that were put in place after the investigations that we reviewed were completed. Among other things, OPM has a new contractor responsible for reviewing the quality of its investigative reports, a new organizational structure for its quality control group, and new quality control processes. After describing these changes, the Associate Director acknowledged that it will take time before the positive effects from the changes will be fully realized. DISCO adjudicators granted top secret clearance eligibility for the 27 industry personnel whose investigative reports contained unresolved issues without requesting additional information or documenting in the adjudicative report that the information was missing. Furthermore, in 17 cases, adjudicators did not document consideration of guidelines. In making clearance-eligibility determinations, the federal guidelines require adjudicators to consider (1) guidelines covering 13 specific areas such as foreign influence and financial considerations, (2) adverse conditions or conduct that could raise a security concern and factors that might mitigate (alleviate) the condition for each guideline, and (3) general factors related to the whole person. (See app. II for additional details on these three types of adjudicative considerations.) According to a DISCO official, DISCO and other DOD adjudicators are to record information relevant to each of their eligibility determinations in JPAS. They do this by selecting applicable guidelines and mitigating factors from prelisted responses and may type up to 3,000 characters of additional information. DISCO adjudicators granted clearance eligibility for 27 industry personnel whose investigative reports did not contain the required documentation to resolve issues raised in other parts of the investigative reports (see fig. 4). The corresponding adjudicative reports for the 27 industry personnel did not contain documentation showing that adjudicators had identified the information as missing or that they attempted to return the investigative reports to obtain the information required by the federal adjudicative guidelines. The following are examples of unresolved issues that we found in adjudicative and investigative reports and later discussed with DISCO officials, including administrators and adjudicators. For both examples, the DISCO officials agreed that additional information should have been obtained to resolve the issues before the industry personnel were granted top secret clearances. Information to resolve a foreign influence issue was missing. A state-level record check on an industry employee indicated that the subject was part owner of a foreign-owned corporation. Although the DISCO adjudicator applied the foreign influence guideline for the subject’s foreign travel and mitigated that foreign influence issue, there was no documentation in the adjudicative report to acknowledge or mitigate the foreign-owned business. Information to resolve a foreign influence issue was missing. An industry employee reported overseas employment on their application, but the subjects adjudicative and investigative reports did not contain other documentation of the 6 years (all within the scope of the investigation) that they spent working for a DOD contractor in two European countries. For example, the subject interview documentation did not indicate whether the subject’s relationships with foreign nationals had been addressed. The adjudicative and investigative reports did not document verification of the subject’s residence and interviews with overseas social references. Furthermore, the adjudicative report did not indicate that the foreign influence guideline was considered as part of the clearance determination. When asked why the adjudicators did not provide the required documentation in JPAS, the DISCO officials said that its adjudicators review the investigative reports for sufficient documentation to resolve issues and will ask OPM to reopen a case if they do not have enough information to reach an eligibility determination. The DISCO officials and Defense Security Service Academy personnel who teach adjudicator training courses cited risk management as a reason that clearance determinations are made without full documentation. They said that adjudicators make judgment calls about the amount of risk associated with each case by weighing a variety of past and present, favorable and unfavorable information about the person to reach an eligibility determination. The trainers also said that adjudicators understand that investigators may not be able to obtain all of the information needed to resolve all issues. Notably, DISCO and DOHA officials told us that DISCO adjudicators determine eligibility for cases with few or no issues and that DOHA adjudicates cases with potentially more serious issues. Seventeen of the 50 adjudicative reports were missing documentation on a total of 22 guidelines for which issues were present in the investigative reports. The guideline documentation missing most often was for foreign influence, financial considerations, alcohol consumption, and personal conduct issues (see fig. 5). We, like DISCO adjudicators, used the Adjudicative Desk Reference and DOD’s Decision Logic Table to help determine whether or not documentation of a guideline was needed. An example of the lack of documentation shown in figure 5 was when DISCO adjudicators did not record consideration of the personal conduct guideline despite a subject’s involvement in an automobile accident while driving with a suspended driver’s license, no auto insurance, and an expired car license. DISCO officials stated that procedural changes associated with JPAS implementation contributed to the missing documentation on guidelines. DISCO began using JPAS in February 2003, and it became the official system for all DOD adjudications in February 2005. Before February 2005, DISCO adjudicators were not required to document the consideration of a guideline issue unless adverse information could disqualify an individual from being granted clearance eligibility. After JPAS implementation, DISCO adjudicators were trained to document in JPAS their rationale for the clearance determination and the adverse information from the investigative report, regardless of whether or not an adjudicative guideline issue could disqualify an individual from obtaining a clearance. The administrators also attributed the missing guideline documentation to a few adjudicators attempting to produce more adjudication determinations. Decisions to grant clearances based on incomplete investigations increase risks to national security because individuals can gain access to classified information without being vetted against the full federal standards and guidelines. Although there is no guarantee that individuals granted clearances based on complete investigations will not engage in espionage activities, complete investigations are a critical first step in ensuring that those granted access to classified information can be trusted to safeguard it. Adjudicators’ reviews of incomplete investigative reports can have negative economic consequences for adjudication facilities, regardless of whether the incomplete report is (1) an inadvertent failure by OPM to detect the missing information during its quality control procedures or (2) a conscious decision to forward a closed pending case that OPM knows is not complete. Specifically, adjudication facilities must use adjudicator time to review cases more than once and then use additional time to document problems with the incomplete investigative reports. Conversely, an adjudicative review of incomplete cases could have the benefit of alerting adjudicators to negative information on a person who has been granted an interim initial clearance so that the adjudication facility could determine whether that interim clearance should be revoked pending a full investigative report. Incomplete investigations and adjudications undermine the government’s efforts to move toward greater clearance and access reciprocity. An interagency working group, the Security Clearance Oversight Steering Committee, has noted that agencies are reluctant to be accountable for poor quality investigations and/or adjudications conducted by other agencies or organizations. To achieve fuller reciprocity, clearance-granting agencies need to have confidence in the quality of the clearance process. Without full documentation of investigative actions, information obtained, and adjudicative decisions, agencies could continue to require duplicative investigations and adjudications. Incomplete timeliness data limit the visibility of stakeholders and decision makers in their efforts to address long-standing delays in the personnel security clearance process. For example, not accounting for all of the time that is required when industry personnel submit an application multiple times before it is accepted limits the government’s ability to accurately monitor the time required for each step in the application-submission phase and identify positive steps that facility security officers, DISCO adjudicators, OPM investigative staff, and other stakeholders can take to speed the process. Similarly, OPM’s procedure of restarting the measurement of investigation time for the 1 to 2 percent of investigative reports that are sent back for quality control reasons does not hold OPM fully accountable for total investigative time when deficient products are delivered to its customers. In fact, restarting the time measurement for reworked investigations could positively affect OPM’s statistics if the reworked sections of the investigation take less time than did the earlier effort to complete the large portion of the investigative report. Information-technology-related problems are another area where needless delays are being experienced. Failure to fully utilize e-QIP adds about 2 weeks to the application-submission time, and the government must pay to have information key-entered into OPM’s investigative database. Likewise, an estimated 2 to 3 weeks are added to the adjudication phase because of the need to print and ship investigative reports to DISCO and other adjudication facilities. These and other reasons for delays show the fragmented approach that the government has taken to addressing the clearance problems. In November 2005, we were optimistic that the government plan for improving the clearance process prepared under the direction of OMB’s Deputy Director for Management would be a living document that would provide the strategic vision for correcting long- standing problems in the personnel security clearance process. However, OPM recently told us that the plan has not been modified in the 9 months since we labeled it as an important step forward but identified numerous shortcomings that should be addressed to make it a more powerful vehicle for change. While eliminating delays in the clearance process is an important goal, the government cannot afford to achieve that goal by providing investigative and adjudicative reports that are incomplete in key areas required by federal investigative standards and adjudicative guidelines. The lack of full reciprocity of clearances is an outgrowth of agencies’ concerns that other agencies may have granted clearances based on inadequate investigations and adjudications. OMB’s Deputy Director of Management has convened an interagency committee to address this problem and has taken steps to move agencies toward greater reciprocity. The findings in this report may suggest to some security managers that there is at least some evidence to support agencies’ concerns about the risks that may come from accepting the clearances issued by other federal agencies. Readers are reminded, however, that our review and the analyses presented here looked at only one aspect of quality—completeness of reports. We could not address whether the information contained in the investigative reports we reviewed was adequate for determining clearance eligibility and whether all 50 of the industry personnel should have been granted clearances. Such judgments are best left to fully trained, experienced adjudicators. Still, our findings do raise questions about (1) the adequacy of the procedures that OPM used to ensure quality before sending its investigative reports to its customers and (2) DISCO’s procedures for reviewing the quality of the clearance determinations made by its adjudicators when information was missing from the investigative reports or decisions were not fully documented in JPAS. Furthermore, as we pointed out in November 2005, the almost total absence of quality metrics in the governmentwide plan for improving the clearance process hinders Congress’s oversight of these important issues. Finally, the missing documentation could have longer term negative effects such as requiring future investigators and adjudicators to obtain the documentation missing from current reviews when it is time to update the clearances currently being issued. To improve the timeliness of the processes used to determine whether or not industry personnel are eligible for a top secret clearance, we are making the following recommendations to the Director of the Office of Management and Budget to direct the Deputy Director for Management, in his oversight role of the governmentwide clearance process, to take the following actions: Direct OPM and DOD to fully measure and report all of the time that transpires between when the application is initially received by the federal government to when the clearance-eligibility determination has been provided to the customer. Inherent in this recommendation to increase transparency is the need to provide all stakeholders (including facility security officers, federal and contract investigators, and adjudicators) information about each of their steps within the clearances phases so that each can develop goals and implement actions to minimize delays. Establish an interagency working group to identify and implement solutions for investigative and adjudicative information technology problems—such as some parts of DOD continuing to submit paper copies of the clearance application, or inefficiencies—such as the continued distribution of paper investigative reports—that have resulted in clearance delays. To improve the completeness of the documentation for the processes used to determine whether or not industry personnel are eligible for a top secret clearance and to decrease future concerns about the reciprocal acceptance of clearances issued by other agencies, we are recommending that the Director of the Office of Management and Budget direct the Deputy Director for Management, in his oversight role of the governmentwide clearance process, to take the following actions: Require OPM and DOD to (1) submit to the Deputy Director their procedures for eliminating the deficiencies that we identified in their investigative and adjudicative documentation and (2) develop and report metrics on completeness and other measures of quality that will address the effectiveness of the new procedures. Update the government strategic plan for improving the clearance process to address, among other things, the weaknesses that we identified in the November 2005 version of the plan as well as the timeliness and incompleteness issues identified in this report, and widely distribute it so that all stakeholders can work toward the goals that they can positively impact. Issue guidance that clarifies when, if ever, adjudicators may use incomplete investigative reports—closed pending and inadvertently incomplete cases—as the basis for granting clearance eligibility. We received agency comments from OMB, DOD, and OPM (see apps. III, IV, and V, respectively). In addition, OMB and OPM provided separate technical comments which we incorporated in the final report, as appropriate. In his comments to our report, OMB’s Deputy Director for Management did not take exception to any of our recommendations. Among other things, he noted his agreement with our report’s conclusion that agencies must identify and implement new investigative and adjudicative solutions to improve the quality and timeliness of background investigations. The Deputy Director stated that National Security Council’s Security Clearance Working Group had begun to explore ways to identify and implement such improvements. He also said that the quality of the investigations and adjudications are of paramount concern and that he would ask the National Security Council’s Personnel Security Working Group to determine when, if ever, an adjudicator may use incomplete investigative reports to determine whether to grant a security clearance. Although our recommendations were not directed to DOD, the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Counterintelligence and Security) noted his concurrence with our recommendations. The Deputy Under Secretary also discussed the use of incomplete cases as the basis for adjudication. He maintained that when the unresolved issues appear to be of minor importance, a risk management adjudication may be prudent. After noting that patchwork fixes will not solve the fundamental problem—”the current process takes too long, costs too much, and leaves us with a product of uncertain quality”—the Deputy Under Secretary reported that DOD is working on a new process. In her written comments, OPM’s Director stated that she fully supported the intent of our report but expressed concern that we had based our findings upon a number of inaccurate facts. We disagree. To address the Director’s concerns, we grouped her concerns into four general categories as discussed below. The Director stated that a fair comparison cannot be made between PIPS (OPM’s investigative database) and JPAS (DOD’s clearance database that also includes investigative timeliness data). As our scope and methodology section makes clear, we did report information from OPM and DOD databases, but the focus of our report was not a comparison of databases. While we did present timeliness findings based on the two databases, we did not perform comparisons—a condition that would have required us to report statistics on the same population for the same time period. Instead, our draft report clearly noted when we were supplementing our findings from the DOD database with more recent statistics from OPM. We also noted that the OPM findings were governmentwide. Therefore, we are puzzled by the Director’s comment since we supplied the additional OPM- provided statistics in our efforts to present a balanced view and reflect OPM’s statements that investigation timeliness had improved. The Director’s later statement that a fair comparison cannot be made between the data in the two systems is troubling because underpinning effective oversight is the prerequisite for reliable data. Regardless of whose data are used, the two databases should produce timeliness statistics that agree and cover the full periods that IRTPA require to be monitored: total clearance process, investigations, and adjudications. The Director took exception to our report’s assertion that stakeholders and decision makers are limited in their ability to address delays in the security clearance process because of incomplete timeliness data. She stated that OPM feels stakeholders and decision makers have the most comprehensive data possible to understand and address the delays in the security clearance process. At the same time, other parts of her comments noted deficiencies in OPM’s timeliness data. For example, she noted that OPM does “not account for the timeliness of multiple submissions” [of applications], and that OPM only measures “timeliness from beginning to the point where OPM has completed all items under our direct control via the Closed Pending process.” We stand behind our assertion that OPM has incomplete timeliness data, and we believe the Director’s admissions about the limitations of the OPM data reinforce the empirical basis of our assertion. The evidence supplied in our draft report further contradicts the Director’s assertion that stakeholders and decision makers have the most comprehensive data possible. Our approach for investigating timeliness and completeness is fully described in our scope and methodology, including the specific steps that we took. For example, we sent written questions and verbally inquired with OPM staff about whether OPM tracked timeliness for certain situations, and the staff’s written and verbal answers to those questions indicated that the agency does not measure the timeliness of situations such as multiple submissions and the full period required to conduct an investigation when the investigative report is returned because of quality problems. IRTPA did not identify situations that could be excluded from mandated timeliness assessments. Therefore, we stand by our conclusion that without fully accounting for the total time needed to complete the clearance process, OMB and Congress will not be able to accurately determine whether agencies have met future IRTPA requirements. Concerning our findings that initial clearances took 446 days and clearance updates took 545 days, the director noted that a sample of current cases would likely show a marked improvement in consistency and would reflect the many process improvements that have been put in place since the time of transfer. Also, she indicated that some of the problems that we reported were the result of transferred staff and cases. We agree that it is possible that different findings might be obtained if a more recent population were examined today. However, the population that we examined represented the most up-to-date information available when we began our timeliness analyses. With regard to the Director’s statement that some of the problems were caused by the transfer of investigative functions and personnel from DOD, OPM had 2 years to prepare for the transfer between the announced transfer agreement in February 2003 and its occurrence in February 2005. In addition, 47 of the 50 investigative reports that we reviewed were missing documentation even though OPM has quality control procedures for reviewing the reports before they are sent to DOD. Lastly, the Director indicated that our report discounts the government’s efforts to correct clearance problems, like the impact of IRTPA and the government’s Plan for Improving the Personnel Security Clearance Process. In addition, the Director wrote that the draft report did not address the effects of the backlog and agencies’ inaccurate projections of investigations workload. To the contrary, our draft report discussed each of these issues and we believe the report presents a balanced assessment of programs—identifying problems, discussing ongoing efforts to correct situations, and helping the reader understand the context within which a program functions. For example, the introduction discussed IRTPA, the development of the plan, additional actions that were coordinated through OMB’s Deputy Director for Management, and the transfer of DOD’s investigative function to OPM. Similarly, we noted in the investigation- completeness section that OPM has increased its investigative workforce in recent years. Our draft report also identified both concerns as factors that impede the speed with which OPM can deliver investigative reports. After careful consideration of the OPM Director’s concerns, we continue to believe our findings and conclusions have merit. As arranged with your office, unless you publicly announce its contents earlier, we plan no further distribution of this report until 30 days from the date of this report. At that time, we will send copies of this report to interested congressional members: the Director of the Office of Management and Budget; the Secretary of Defense; and the Director of the Office of Personnel Management. We will also make copies available to others upon request. In addition, the report will be available at no charge on GAO’s Web site at http://www.gao.gov. If you or other members have any additional questions about DOD’s personnel security program, please contact me at (202) 512-5559 or stewartd@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this correspondence. GAO staff who made major contributions to the correspondence are listed in appendix VI. The scope of our work emphasized the analysis of information on top secret clearances for industry personnel. Earlier in this report, table 1 showed that all of the investigative information needed to determine eligibility for a secret or confidential clearance is also required as part of the investigative report considered when determining eligibility for a top secret clearance. In addition, examining the timeliness and completeness of documentation for top secret clearances focused our efforts on a level of clearance where greater damage could occur through the unauthorized disclosure of classified information. Our examination of clearance information for industry personnel continued a line of research discussed in our report issued in May 2004. With about 34 percent of its 2.5 million clearances held by industry personnel who are performing contract work for the Department of Defense (DOD) and 23 other agencies, this segment of the workforce is playing an increasingly larger role in national security. To examine the timeliness of the processes used to determine whether or not industry personnel are eligible for a top secret clearance, we reviewed various documents, including laws and executive orders, DOD security clearance policies, Office of Personnel Management (OPM) policies, and the government plan for improving the security clearance process. These sources provided the criteria that we used in our analyses, as well as insights into possible causes for and effects of the delays in obtaining timely clearances. We also reviewed clearance-related reports issued by organizations such as GAO, DOD’s Office of Inspector General, and DOD’s Personnel Security Research Center. We interviewed headquarters policy and program officials from DOD’s Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and OPM and obtained and evaluated additional documentation from those officials. In addition, representatives from the organizations shown in table 4 provided additional interview and documentary evidence that we also evaluated. A major focus of our timeliness examination included our analysis of computerized data abstracted from the Joint Personnel Adjudications System (JPAS) and statistical reports on timeliness that OPM produced for DOD. We calculated the number of days required for each case for three phases of the process and the total process. Missing dates for the start or completion dates for a phase prevented the calculation for some cases. Also, we eliminated some dates for the phases when the start date was chronologically later than the end date. As a result, the number of applicable cases varies for each calculation. The abstract was for the population of 1,685 industry personnel granted initial top secret clearances and 574 industry personnel granted top secret clearance updates by the Defense Industrial Security Clearance Office (DISCO) during January and February 2006. The application-submission and investigation phases of the clearance process for those 2,259 industry personnel were started at various times prior to the final adjudication determinations. We assessed the reliability of the JPAS data by (1) performing electronic testing of required data elements, (2) reviewing existing information about the data and the system that produced them, and (3) interviewing agency officials knowledgeable about the data. While we found problems with the accuracy of some of the JPAS data, we determined they were sufficiently reliable for selecting a sample of cases for our review and for calculating average days for the clearance process. DOD and OPM also provided timeliness statistics for other time periods, levels of clearances, types of personnel, and other federal agencies to provide us with a broader context to interpret the timeliness statistics that we extracted from the DISCO database abstract. To examine the completeness of the documentation of the processes used to determine whether or not industry personnel are eligible for a top secret clearance, we used the sources identified above to answer the timeliness question concerning: laws, executive orders, policies, reports, and materials and testimonial evidence provided by the organizations listed in table 4. The sources and materials provided us with an understanding of the criteria for evaluating whether prescribed information was present in or absent from investigative and adjudicative reports used in the clearance process. Members of the GAO team attended OPM’s basic special agent training course for 3 weeks to gain a greater understanding of investigative procedures and requirements and participated in the Defense Security Service Academy’s online basic adjudicator training to learn more about adjudicative procedures and requirements. Following the training, we began a multiple-step process to review and analyze the investigative and adjudicative documentation associated with DISCO determinations of clearance eligibility for industry security clearance cases. We started by randomly selecting 50 cases from the population of 1,685 initial clearance applications adjudicated by DISCO during January and February 2006. Once our sample was selected, we obtained paper copies of the completely adjudicated case files. We developed a data collection instrument that incorporated information from sources such as the federal investigative standards and adjudicative guidelines, OPM’s Investigator’s Handbook (Draft Version 5), and DOD’s Personnel Security Research Center’s Quality Rating Form—an analysis tool to help DOD adjudicators assess the quality of investigative reports used to make adjudication decisions. Our staff who developed the instrument then trained other members of our team on how to use the instrument in order to ensure the accuracy and consistency of data entry. We refined our instrument utilizing feedback from DOD’s Personnel Security Research Center staff and our pretest of the instrument on cases not included in our sample of 50 cases. To ensure the accuracy of our work, a second team member independently verified information that another team member had initially coded. As part of each review, we examined each report of investigation to ensure that all of the investigative requirements had been met (e.g., neighborhood reference checks) and to determine if issues that were raised as part of the investigation had been resolved by OPM investigators. After a thorough review of the investigative report and associated materials, we reviewed the JPAS adjudicative report. The JPAS report showed the final adjudicative decision, including any guidelines that were applied and any mitigating information. Our assessment of each case was entered into an electronic database and analyzed to determine the completeness of the files and to identify areas of deficiency. In addition to obtaining statistical findings, we identified 8 cases that best illustrated several types of deficiencies identified by our reviews and statistical analyses. We then met with investigations and adjudications experts from the Defense Security Service Academy to discuss several cases. We also discussed our findings for each of the 8 cases with investigative experts from OPM’s Quality Management group and adjudication experts from DISCO. By discussing the issues contained in each case with OPM and DOD experts, we were able to learn more about the causes of the incomplete documentation and confirm the accuracy of our observations on 16 percent of our sampled cases. We performed our work from September 2005 through August 2006 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. In making determinations of eligibility for security clearances, the federal guidelines require adjudicators to consider (1) guidelines covering 13 specific areas, (2) adverse conditions or conduct that could raise a security concern and factors that might mitigate (alleviate) the condition for each guideline, and (3) general factors related to the whole person. First, the guidelines state that clearance decisions require a common-sense determination of eligibility for access to classified information based upon careful consideration of the following 13 areas: allegiance to the United States; foreign influence, such as having a family member who is a citizen of a foreign country; foreign preference, such as performing military service for a foreign country; personal conduct, such as deliberately concealing or falsifying relevant facts when completing a security questionnaire; emotional, mental, and personality disorders; outside activities, such as providing service to or being employed by a misuse of information technology systems. Second, for each of these 13 areas, the guidelines specify (1) numerous significant adverse conditions or conduct that could raise a security concern that may disqualify an individual from obtaining a security clearance and (2) mitigating factors that could allay those security concerns, even when serious, and permit granting a clearance. For example, the financial consideration guideline states that individuals could be denied security clearances based on having a history of not meeting financial obligations. However, this adverse condition could be set aside (referred to as mitigated) if one or more of the following factors were present: the financial condition was not recent, resulted from factors largely beyond the person’s control (e.g., loss of employment), or was addressed through counseling. Third, the adjudicator should evaluate the relevance of an individual’s overall conduct by considering the following general factors: the nature, extent, and seriousness of the conduct; the circumstances surrounding the conduct, to include knowledgeable participation; the frequency and recency of the conduct; the individual’s age and maturity at the time of the conduct; the voluntariness of participation; the presence or absence of rehabilitation and other pertinent behavioral changes; the motivation for the conduct; the potential for pressure, coercion, exploitation, or duress; and the likelihood of continuation or recurrence. When the personnel security investigation uncovers no adverse security conditions, the adjudicator’s task is fairly straightforward because there is no security condition to mitigate. In addition to the contact above, Jack E. Edwards, Assistant Director; Jim D. Ashley; Jerome A. Brown; Kurt A. Burgeson; Susan C. Ditto; David S. Epstein; Cindy K. Gilbert; Cynthia L. Grant; Sara G. Hackley; James P. Klein; Ron La Due Lake; Kenneth E. Patton; and Jennifer L. Young made key contributions to this report. DOD Personnel Clearances: Questions and Answers for the Record Following the Second in a Series of Hearings on Fixing the Security Clearance Process. GAO-06-693R. Washington, D.C.: June 14, 2006. DOD Personnel Clearances: New Concerns Slow Processing of Clearances for Industry Personnel. GAO-06-748T. Washington, D.C.: May 17, 2006. DOD Personnel Clearances: Funding Challenges and Other Impediments Slow Clearances for Industry Personnel. GAO-06-747T. Washington, D.C.: May 17, 2006. Managing Sensitive Information: DOE and DOD Could Improve Their Policies and Oversight. GAO-06-531T. Washington, D.C.: March 14, 2006. GAO’s High-Risk Program. GAO-06-497T. Washington, D.C.: March 15, 2006. Managing Sensitive Information: Departments of Energy and Defense Policies and Oversight Could Be Improved. GAO-06-369. Washington, D.C.: March 7, 2006. Questions for the Record Related to DOD’s Personnel Security Clearance Program and the Government Plan for Improving the Clearance Process. GAO-06-323R. Washington, D.C.: January 17, 2006. DOD Personnel Clearances: Government Plan Addresses Some Long- standing Problems with DOD’s Program, But Concerns Remain. GAO-06- 233T. Washington, D.C.: November 9, 2005. Defense Management: Better Review Needed of Program Protection Issues Associated with Manufacturing Presidential Helicopters. GAO-06- 71SU. Washington, D.C.: November 4, 2005. Questions for the Record Related to DOD’s Personnel Security Clearance Program. GAO-05-988R. Washington, D.C.: August 19, 2005. Industrial Security: DOD Cannot Ensure Its Oversight of Contractors under Foreign Influence Is Sufficient. GAO-05-681. Washington, D.C.: July 15, 2005. DOD Personnel Clearances: Some Progress Has Been Made but Hurdles Remain to Overcome the Challenges That Led to GAO’s High-Risk Designation. GAO-05-842T. Washington, D.C.: June 28, 2005. Defense Management: Key Elements Needed to Successfully Transform DOD Business Operations. GAO-05-629T. Washington, D.C.: April 28, 2005. Maritime Security: New Structures Have Improved Information Sharing, but Security Clearance Processing Requires Further Attention. GAO-05-394. Washington, D.C.: April 15, 2005. DOD’s High-Risk Areas: Successful Business Transformation Requires Sound Strategic Planning and Sustained Leadership. GAO-05-520T. Washington, D.C.: April 13, 2005. GAO’s 2005 High-Risk Update. GAO-05-350T. Washington, D.C.: February 17, 2005. High-Risk Series: An Update. GAO-05-207. Washington, D.C.: January 2005. Intelligence Reform: Human Capital Considerations Critical to 9/11 Commission’s Proposed Reforms. GAO-04-1084T. Washington, D.C.: September 14, 2004. DOD Personnel Clearances: Additional Steps Can Be Taken to Reduce Backlogs and Delays in Determining Security Clearance Eligibility for Industry Personnel. GAO-04-632. Washington, D.C.: May 26, 2004. DOD Personnel Clearances: Preliminary Observations Related to Backlogs and Delays in Determining Security Clearance Eligibility for Industry Personnel. GAO-04-202T. Washington, D.C.: May 6, 2004. Security Clearances: FBI Has Enhanced Its Process for State and Local Law Enforcement Officials. GAO-04-596. Washington, D.C.: April 30, 2004. Industrial Security: DOD Cannot Provide Adequate Assurances That Its Oversight Ensures the Protection of Classified Information. GAO-04-332. Washington, D.C.: March 3, 2004. DOD Personnel Clearances: DOD Needs to Overcome Impediments to Eliminating Backlog and Determining Its Size. GAO-04-344. Washington, D.C.: February 9, 2004. Aviation Security: Federal Air Marshal Service Is Addressing Challenges of Its Expanded Mission and Workforce, but Additional Actions Needed. GAO-04-242. Washington, D.C.: November 19, 2003. Results-Oriented Cultures: Creating a Clear Linkage between Individual Performance and Organizational Success. GAO-03-488. Washington, D.C.: March 14, 2003. Defense Acquisitions: Steps Needed to Ensure Interoperability of Systems That Process Intelligence Data. GAO-03-329. Washington D.C.: March 31, 2003. Managing for Results: Agency Progress in Linking Performance Plans With Budgets and Financial Statements. GAO-02-236. Washington D.C.: January 4, 2002. Central Intelligence Agency: Observations on GAO Access to Information on CIA Programs and Activities. GAO-01-975T. Washington, D.C.: July 18, 2001. Determining Performance and Accountability Challenges and High Risks. GAO-01-159SP. Washington, D.C.: November 2000. DOD Personnel: More Consistency Needed in Determining Eligibility for Top Secret Security Clearances. GAO-01-465. Washington, D.C.: April 18, 2001. DOD Personnel: More Accurate Estimate of Overdue Security Clearance Reinvestigations Is Needed. GAO/T-NSIAD-00-246. Washington, D.C.: September 20, 2000. DOD Personnel: More Actions Needed to Address Backlog of Security Clearance Reinvestigations. GAO/NSIAD-00-215. Washington, D.C.: August 24, 2000. Security Protection: Standardization Issues Regarding Protection of Executive Branch Officials. GAO/T-GGD/OSI-00-177. Washington, D.C.: July 27, 2000. Security Protection: Standardization Issues Regarding Protection of Executive Branch Officials. GAO/GGD/OSI-00-139. Washington, D.C.: July 11, 2000. Computer Security: FAA Is Addressing Personnel Weaknesses, But Further Action Is Required. GAO/AIMD-00-169. Washington, D.C.: May 31, 2000. DOD Personnel: Weaknesses in Security Investigation Program Are Being Addressed. GAO/T-NSIAD-00-148. Washington, D.C.: April 6, 2000. DOD Personnel: Inadequate Personnel Security Investigations Pose National Security Risks. GAO/T-NSIAD-00-65. Washington, D.C.: February 16, 2000. DOD Personnel: Inadequate Personnel Security Investigations Pose National Security Risks. GAO/NSIAD-00-12. Washington, D.C.: October 27, 1999. Background Investigations: Program Deficiencies May Lead DEA to Relinquish Its Authority to OPM. GAO/GGD-99-173. Washington, D.C.: September 7, 1999. Department of Energy: Key Factors Underlying Security Problems at DOE Facilities. GAO/T-RCED-99-159. Washington, D.C.: April 20, 1999. Performance Budgeting: Initial Experiences Under the Results Act in Linking Plans With Budgets. GAO/AIMD/GGD-99-67. Washington, D.C.: April 12, 1999. Military Recruiting: New Initiatives Could Improve Criminal History Screening. GAO/NSIAD-99-53. Washington, D.C.: February 23, 1999. Executive Office of the President: Procedures for Acquiring Access to and Safeguarding Intelligence Information. GAO/NSIAD-98-245. Washington, D.C.: September 30, 1998. Inspectors General: Joint Investigation of Personnel Actions Regarding a Former Defense Employee. GAO/AIMD/OSI-97-81R. Washington, D.C.: July 10, 1997. Privatization of OPM’s Investigations Service. GAO/GGD-96-97R. Washington, D.C.: August 22, 1996. Cost Analysis: Privatizing OPM Investigations. GAO/GGD-96-121R. Washington, D.C.: July 5, 1996. Personnel Security: Pass and Security Clearance Data for the Executive Office of the President. GAO/NSIAD-96-20. Washington, D.C.: October 19, 1995. Privatizing OPM Investigations: Implementation Issues. GAO/T-GGD- 95-186. Washington, D.C.: June 15, 1995. Privatizing OPM Investigations: Perspectives on OPM’s Role in Background Investigations. GAO/T-GGD-95-185. Washington, D.C.: June 14, 1995. Security Clearances: Consideration of Sexual Orientation in the Clearance Process. GAO/NSIAD-95-21. Washington, D.C.: March 24, 1995. Background Investigations: Impediments to Consolidating Investigations and Adjudicative Functions. GAO/NSIAD-95-101. Washington, D.C.: March 24, 1995. Managing DOE: Further Review Needed of Suspensions of Security Clearances for Minority Employees. GAO/RCED-95-15. Washington, D.C.: December 8, 1994. Personnel Security Investigations. GAO/NSIAD-94-135R. Washington, D.C.: March 4, 1994. Classified Information: Costs of Protection Are Integrated With Other Security Costs. GAO/NSIAD-94-55. Washington, D.C.: October 20, 1993. Nuclear Security: DOE’s Progress on Reducing Its Security Clearance Work Load. GAO/RCED-93-183. Washington, D.C.: August 12, 1993. Personnel Security: Efforts by DOD and DOE to Eliminate Duplicative Background Investigations. GAO/RCED-93-23. Washington, D.C.: May 10, 1993. Administrative Due Process: Denials and Revocations of Security Clearances and Access to Special Programs. GAO/T-NSIAD-93-14. Washington, D.C.: May 5, 1993. DOD Special Access Programs: Administrative Due Process Not Provided When Access Is Denied or Revoked. GAO/NSIAD-93-162. Washington, D.C.: May 5, 1993. Security Clearances: Due Process for Denials and Revocations by Defense, Energy, and State. GAO/NSIAD-92-99. Washington, D.C.: May 6, 1992. Due Process: Procedures for Unfavorable Suitability and Security Clearance Actions. GAO/NSIAD-90-97FS. Washington, D.C.: April 23, 1990. Weaknesses in NRC’s Security Clearance Program. GAO/T-RCED-89-14. Washington, D.C.: March 15, 1989. Nuclear Regulation: NRC’s Security Clearance Program Can Be Strengthened. GAO/RCED-89-41. Washington, D.C.: December 20, 1988. Nuclear Security: DOE Actions to Improve the Personnel Clearance Program. GAO/RCED-89-34. Washington, D.C.: November 9, 1988. Nuclear Security: DOE Needs a More Accurate and Efficient Security Clearance Program. GAO/RCED-88-28. Washington, D.C.: December 29, 1987. National Security: DOD Clearance Reduction and Related Issues. GAO/NSIAD-87-170BR. Washington, D.C.: September 18, 1987. Oil Reserves: Proposed DOE Legislation for Firearm and Arrest Authority Has Merit. GAO/RCED-87-178. Washington, D.C.: August 11, 1987. Embassy Blueprints: Controlling Blueprints and Selecting Contractors for Construction Abroad. GAO/NSIAD-87-83. Washington, D.C.: April 14, 1987. Security Clearance Reinvestigations of Employees Has Not Been Timely at the Department of Energy. GAO/T-RCED-87-14. Washington, D.C.: April 9, 1987. Improvements Needed in the Government’s Personnel Security Clearance Program. Washington, D.C.: April 16, 1985. Need for Central Adjudication Facility for Security Clearances for Navy Personnel. GAO/GGD-83-66. Washington, D.C.: May 18, 1983. Effect of National Security Decision Directive 84, Safeguarding National Security Information. GAO/NSIAD-84-26. Washington, D.C.: October 18, 1983. Faster Processing of DOD Personnel Security Clearances Could Avoid Millions in Losses. GAO/GGD-81-105. Washington, D.C.: September 15, 1981. Lack of Action on Proposals To Resolve Longstanding Problems in Investigations of Federal Employees. FPCD-79-92. Washington, D.C.: September 25, 1979. Costs of Federal Personnel Security Investigations Could and Should Be Cut. FPCD-79-79. Washington, D.C.: August 31, 1979. Proposals to Resolve Longstanding Problems in Investigations of Federal Employees. FPCD-77-64. Washington, D.C.: December 16, 1977. Personnel Security Investigations: Inconsistent Standards and Procedures. B-132376. Washington, D.C.: December 2, 1974.

Summary: The damage that unauthorized disclosure of classified information can cause to national security necessitates the prompt and careful consideration of who is granted a security clearance. However, long-standing delays and other problems with DOD's clearance program led GAO to designate it a high-risk area in January 2005. DOD transferred its investigations functions to the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) in February 2005. The Office of Management and Budget's (OMB) Deputy Director for Management is coordinating governmentwide efforts to improve the clearance process. Congress asked GAO to examine the clearance process for industry personnel. This report addresses the timeliness of the process and completeness of documentation used to determine the eligibility of industry personnel for top secret clearances. To assess timeliness, GAO examined 2,259 cases of personnel granted top secret eligibility in January and February 2006. For the completeness review, GAO compared documentation in 50 randomly sampled initial clearances against federal standards. GAO's analysis of timeliness data showed that industry personnel contracted to work for the federal government waited more than one year on average to receive top secret clearances, longer than OPM-produced statistics would suggest. GAO's analysis of 2,259 cases in its population showed the process took an average of 446 days for initial clearances and 545 days for clearance updates. While OMB has a goal for the application-submission phase of the process to take 14 days or less, it took an average of 111 days. In addition, GAO's analyses showed that OPM used an average of 286 days to complete initial investigations for top secret clearances, well in excess of the 180-day goal specified in the plan that OMB and others developed for improving the clearance process. Finally, the average time for adjudication (determination of clearance eligibility) was 39 days, compared to the 30-day requirement that starts in December 2006. An inexperienced investigative workforce, not fully using technology, and other causes underlie these delays. Delays may increase costs for contracts and risks to national security. In addition, statistics from OPM, the agency with day-to-day responsibility for tracking investigations and adjudications, underrepresent the time used in the process. For example, the measurement of time does not start immediately upon the applicant's submission of a request for clearance. Not fully accounting for all the time used in the process hinders congressional oversight of the efforts to address the delays. OPM provided incomplete investigative reports to DOD, and DOD personnel who review the reports to determine a person's eligibility to hold a clearance (adjudicators) granted eligibility for industry personnel whose investigative reports contained unresolved issues, such as unexplained affluence and potential foreign influence. In its review of 50 investigative reports for initial clearances, GAO found that that almost all (47 of 50) cases were missing documentation required by federal investigative standards. At least half of the reports did not contain the required documentation in three investigative areas: residence, employment, or education. Moreover, federal standards indicate expansion of investigations may be necessary to resolve issues, but GAO found at least one unresolved issue in 27 of the reports. We also found that the DOD adjudicators granted top secret clearance eligibility for all 27 industry personnel whose investigative reports contained unresolved issues without requesting additional information or documenting that the information was missing in the adjudicative report. In its November 2005 assessment of the government plan for improving the clearance process, GAO raised concerns about the limited attention devoted to assessing quality in the clearance process, but the plan has not been revised to address the shortcomings GAO identified. The use of incomplete investigations and adjudications in granting top secret clearance eligibility increases the risk of unauthorized disclosure of classified information. Also, it could negatively affect efforts to promote reciprocity (an agency's acceptance of a clearance issued by another agency) being developed by an interagency working group headed by OMB's Deputy Director.