Over $1.2 trillion dollars in merchandise of foreign trade is handled at U.S. seaports each year, and according to DOT MARAD, U.S. ports accounted for the second highest number of cargo vessel calls worldwide in 2009. In addition, millions of individuals transit U.S. seaports annually on cruise ships, making the cruise industry a source of major economic activity. For example, direct spending for goods and services by the cruise lines and their passengers in the United States was about $19.1 billion in 2008. The global labor supply of seafarers who work on commercial vessels to support these types of activities is estimated at 1.2 to 2 million individuals. This figure encompasses individuals required for normal operation and service on board commercial vessels, including hospitality-related occupations on cruise ships such as food servers and entertainers. Compared to the total number of arrivals at U.S. land and air ports of entry, the number of foreign seafarers arriving in U.S. seaports is small. For example, according to CBP data, foreign seafarer arrivals accounted for almost 5 million of the approximately 27 million passenger and crew arrivals recorded in U.S. seaports in fiscal year 2007. In contrast, for that same year, CBP recorded 92 million passenger and crew arrivals on international flights and 300 million passenger and pedestrian arrivals at land border crossings. According to CBP data, in fiscal year 2009, approximately 80 percent of seafarers arriving by commercial vessel did so on board passenger vessels, such as cruise ships with the remaining 20 percent arriving by cargo or other vessel type. This is because individual cruise ship routes typically account for regular, frequent arrivals, and cruise ships typically employ hundreds of seafarers, while cargo ships often have just a few dozen seafarers on board. As a result, the seaports receiving the largest numbers of seafarers were generally those that had cruise vessel operations. In fiscal year 2009, CBP reported 10 of the 132 U.S. seaports of entry received 70 percent of foreign seafarer arrivals (see fig. 1 below). The State Department typically issues two types of non-immigrant visas to foreign seafarers: C1/D or D. D visas are “crewmember” visas that allow a seafarer to request a conditional permit to land in the United States only if arriving by ship as an active seafarer. Under the C1 category of the combined C1/D visa, seafarers are allowed to seek admission into the United States at any port of entry—such as an airport—for the purpose of transiting to ships for employment. If arriving by vessel in the capacity of an active seafarer, the D category of the combined C1/D visa may be used to request a conditional permit to land. Typically, these visas are valid for multiple entries over a period of up to 5 years, and the maximum time allowed in the United States for any single entry is 29 days. According to CBP data, the vast majority of foreign seafarers who arrive in U.S. seaports—over 95 percent in fiscal year 2009—possessed one of these non-immigrant visas. By far, the C1/D visa is the most frequently issued visa applied for and obtained by seafarers. Figure 2 below shows the share of C1/D and D visas the State Department issued in fiscal year 2009. As approximated by C1/D and D visa issuance, a few countries account for large shares of the foreign seafarers who apply for non-immigrant visas to enter the United States, with the Philippines supplying by far the most seafarers, followed by India and the Russian Federation. Tables 1 and 2 below illustrate C1/D and D visa issuance data for fiscal year 2009. A number of domestic and international stakeholders are involved with seafarer security issues. For example, among domestic stakeholders, multiple DHS components share responsibilities for ensuring that aliens for whom there may be national security or other concerns are not admitted to the United States. Table 3 lists some of these organizations and agencies and their roles related to seafarer security. International and national law and guidance govern maritime security, and include provisions that apply to seafarers. At the international level, the IMO, through its International Ship and Port Facility Security Code (ISPS) and its Convention on Facilitation of International Maritime Traffic (FAL), lays out the international framework designed to help ensure maritime security and prevent unnecessary delays in maritime traffic. In addition, national laws, regulations, and guidance also direct federal agencies and vessel operators on a nationwide basis. For example, the INA as amended requires that all aliens, including foreign seafarers, seeking admission to the United States be inspected by immigration officers. It also requires foreign seafarers, with certain exceptions, to obtain a conditional landing permit to land temporarily in the United States. To grant a conditional landing permit, CBP generally requires foreign seafarers to present a passport or seaman’s book and a non-immigrant visa with a D classification. Appendix I details key international and national laws, conventions, or guidance pertaining to seafarer security. According to Coast Guard National Maritime Intelligence Center officials we met, to date there have been no terrorist attacks involving seafarers on vessels transiting to U.S. ports and no definitive information to indicate that extremists have entered the United States as seafarer non-immigrant visa holders. Nevertheless, as we reported in 2007, security officials in the U.S. government are concerned about the possibility of a future terrorist attack in a U.S. port. Federal agencies have identified seafarer-related risks involving either (1) extremists entering U.S. ports as seafarers and their potential threat to vessels or port infrastructure; or (2) risks posed generally by illegal immigration into the United States, in particular: The State Department has reported that the exploitation of C1/D visas by aliens is a national security concern because the visas could be used by extremists to enter the United States. State Department and DHS reports chronicle several cases where groups of seafarers have been able to obtain valid visas through fraudulent means and successfully enter the United States. These fraud cases generally involved C1/D applicants using what were later determined to be fraudulent employment letters to obtain their visas. Still, according to the State Department, the extent of fraud among seafarer visa types—C1/D and D—is comparable with that encountered with other non-immigrant visa types and does not constitute a substantial problem. As we reported in 2007, the Coast Guard has assessed the hypothetical possibility that seafarers (or persons posing as seafarers) could conspire to commandeer a vessel with the intent of using it as a weapon or disrupting maritime commerce. However, vessel operator and industry group assessments have found this to be an unlikely scenario in part due to the vetting process shipping companies use when hiring, and particularly for cargo or tanker vessels, the technical complexity required for operating the vessels. The State Department’s visa adjudication process is the first layer of security implemented by federal agencies to prevent terrorists, certain criminals, or otherwise inadmissible aliens from gaining entry into the United States. Aliens wishing to temporarily enter the United States—such as foreign seafarers—fill out a visa application and make an appointment for an interview at U.S. embassies or consulates abroad; pay a fee; and submit photographs and 10-digit fingerprints. In turn, consular officers review applications, interview applicants, screen applicant information against federal databases, and review supporting documents to assess whether the applicant is an intending immigrant, potential threat to national security, or otherwise ineligible. Among other things, consular officers check for previous visa refusals, immigration violations, criminal histories, and terrorism concerns. If any such concerns arise, officers conduct additional security checks by seeking input through an interagency Security Advisory Opinion (SAO) (see fig. 3 for a description of the visa adjudication process). Following these steps, the State Department will either issue or refuse an applicant’s visa application. Those applicants who are granted visas may then present the visa to CBP officers to request admission into the United States when arriving at U.S. ports (CBP’s process for admissibility screening is discussed later in this report). In fiscal year 2009, the State Department reported that 265,512 applicants had applied for crew visas—C1/D and D. Of this number, the State Department issued 229,527 (86 percent) and refused 35,985 (14 percent). As we previously reported in 2007, the State Department has taken steps to strengthen the security of the visa adjudication process since the terrorist attacks of 9/11. For example, the State Department has increased use of internal databases to track fraud cases and identify trends, conducted an increased number of studies on visa adjudication practices, and enhanced and expanded consular officer training courses on fraud (see appendix II for a summary of selected actions the State Department has taken since 9/11 to strengthen the adjudication process). In addition, in 2007, following several cases in which seafarers obtained visas fraudulently from overseas posts, the State Department issued guidance suggesting additional steps that posts can take to identify fraud among applicants for non-immigrant seafarer visas—particularly in ensuring that the ship, visa applicant, and manning agency are bona fide entities. Before a commercial vessel’s arrival, both CBP and Coast Guard are to receive and screen advance information on commercial vessels scheduled to arrive at U.S. ports. Vessel operators or agents are required to transmit information to the Coast Guard’s National Vessel Movement Center, including CBP-required advance passenger and crew information—known as a manifest—and Coast Guard required Advanced Notice of Arrival (ANOA). Multiple components screen this advance information to identify national security-related or other concerns. Nationally, this includes screening by CBP’s National Targeting Center-Passenger (NTC-P) and Coast Guard’s Intelligence Coordination Center (ICC). Locally, CBP field units at seaports of entry screen crew manifests against various government databases and share the results with Coast Guard field units— known as Sectors. Appendix III provides a more detailed description of this advance-screening process. For all arriving commercial vessels, both CBP and Coast Guard policy requires that field units prepare risk assessments based on the results of advance-screening of vessel and seafarer information. CBP has the lead role with respect to passengers and seafarer issues and provides the Coast Guard with information on seafarers that raise initial security concerns. According to the CBP commercial vessel entry and boarding policy, CBP’s risk management approach begins with a collection of vessel information obtained during advance-targeting and is followed by an analysis to identify and address risk areas. CBP’s boarding policy identifies 19 different risk factors that field units are to consider for assessing risks posed by the vessel or seafarers. Among those risk factors are whether the vessel operator has had past instances of invalid or incorrect crew manifest lists, whether the vessel has a history of seafarers unlawfully landing in the United States, or whether the vessel is making its first arrival at a U.S. seaport within the past year. Additionally, for all arriving vessels, Coast Guard policy provides that field units are to prepare risk assessments to identify those considered high risk. For example, to quantify the risk factors Coast Guard uses a national scoring tool to screen vessels against a variety of items. See figure 4 for a description of the DHS process for screening, assessing risks, and inspecting foreign seafarers. (Up to 72 hour prior to vessel’ arrival) (Up to 48 hour prior to vessel’ arrival) CBP is the lead DHS agency responsible for inspecting all seafarers to determine whether they are admissible into the United States. CBP conducts these inspections to determine the nationality and identity, and for non-U.S. citizens, the admissibility of each person wishing to enter the United States and to verify that crew manifest information provided by a vessel operator matches the advance information received prior to the vessel’s arrival. For foreign seafarers, CBP’s seafarer inspection practices focus on (1) review of identity and travel documentation; (2) a comparison of the document to the seafarer to determine if he or she is in fact the true bearer; and (3) interviews to determine admissibility and the potential risks of the individual violating immigration laws. CBP officers rely on interviews with the seafarer, their experience in observing and assessing seafarer behavior, and verification of seafarer documents to determine who is or is not admissible to the United States. CBP requires all arriving seafarers to have either a passport or seaman’s book. While arriving foreign seafarers are not required to hold a visa to enter a U.S. seaport on a vessel, CBP requires all foreign seafarers to hold a valid visa to be eligible for a conditional landing permit for shore leave. Appendix IV provides additional information on CBP and Coast Guard boarding and seafarer inspection activities. The procedures and tools CBP officers use to conduct admissibility inspections vary to some extent based on whether the seafarer is arriving on a cargo or cruise vessel. To manage the high number of both seafarers and passengers, CBP generally conducts cruise vessel admissibility inspections at dockside inspection facilities similar to those at airports. To date, cruise line facilities at 15 seaports are equipped with U.S. Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology (US-VISIT), which provides biometric identification services to decision makers—in this case, CBP officers. CBP conducts almost all cargo vessel admissibility inspections on board the vessel without the benefit of tools—such as mobile passport readers— for electronically verifying a seafarer’s identity or immigration status. In this instance, CBP officers have to rely on information vetted before boarding the vessel and their skill sets to identify fraud and grounds of inadmissibility, both in reviewing documents and in interviewing seafarers. CBP headquarters and officials from seven of eight CBP field units we visited reported that having mobile or portable technology to electronically verify the identity of seafarers would enhance their efforts to identify fraudulent documents and confirm immigration status. Among the capabilities sought by field officials from the seaport areas we visited was having a portable device utilizing US-VISIT technology and providing a real-time response for seafarers fingerprinted on board their vessel. Field officials also reported seeking the ability to run background checks in the field and the ability to machine read visas and passports. DHS has recommended that DHS components electronically verify all immigration status determinations. According to 2006 and 2008 guidance issued by the DHS Screening Coordination Office (SCO), verification of immigration status should not rely solely on verification of physical security features present on a credential. The guidance states that electronic verification provides greater security and should be conducted, particularly where DHS owns the process. A CBP headquarters official reported that the primary challenge in deploying mobile biometrics readers or other tools for electronically verifying the identity of seafarers is a lack of available connectivity to network communications in the maritime environment. CBP headquarters reported the potential value that such tools would provide CBP officers for conducting on board seafarer inspections and that CBP had explored solutions in recent years. For instance, a CBP headquarters official reported that some field units had tried, generally without success, to use wireless laptops with access to CBP data as a way to verify the identity of seafarers arriving at seaports on board cargo vessels. Of the eight CBP field units we visited, three reported efforts to use mobile technology as an electronic verification tool during on board admissibility inspections. Of these three field offices, two reported efforts to use laptops with connectivity to CBP databases as an electronic verification tool, one of which reported some success while the other reported abandoning the effort because of poor connectivity. The third field office reported that it had participated in a DHS pilot in which its officers were provided with hand-held biometric scanners to capture fingerprints—the office reported the devices had provided value, but that they were not aware of the status or results of the pilot. In May 2009, DHS deemed as “high priority” the need for the department to obtain hand-held mobile biometrics screening capabilities that can effectively collect data samples from subjects in challenging operational environments—such as those offshore and at seaports of entry. To address this, in August 2009, DHS S&T issued a solicitation for research proposals for developing a hand-held screening device. However, according to the DHS S&T proposal, it is expected to take several years before this technology can be made available for use by DHS agencies, such as CBP. Moreover, DHS S&T officials reported that these proposals do not address the connectivity challenges reported by CBP field officers. DHS SCO has reported that given the inherent level of risk to security and immigration or other fraud, visual verification alone of travel documents poses significant concerns. In this way, by not having the ability to electronically verify the documents, CBP’s methods for inspecting cargo vessel crew offers less assurance that CBP is identifying fraud among documents presented by the foreign seafarers seeking admission into the United States. According to internal control standards, assessing risk exposure is important to providing reasonable assurance that program goals and objectives are met and determining options to address them. CBP reported that its cargo vessel admissibility methods involve multiple levels of screening to identify risks posed by seafarers. However, CBP reported that it had not conducted an assessment of the risks associated with not using electronic verification as part of its admissibility inspections for cargo vessel seafarers. Consequently, conducting an assessment to identify the risks of not meeting the DHS SCO recommendations for electronically verifying documents as part of immigration status determinations and identifying options for addressing any identified risks and their costs, would be important until new tools and technology become available. CBP has primary responsibility for identifying and reporting absconder and deserter incidents at U.S. seaports—both to Coast Guard and other federal and local law enforcement stakeholders—and for tracking them in CBP database systems. Meanwhile, the Coast Guard generally relies on CBP’s reporting of these events for populating its own records of the incidents, with Coast Guard Sectors receiving initial reports of the incident and disseminating the information among various components within Coast Guard. Figure 5 summarizes CBP and the Coast Guard’s processes for identifying and reporting absconder and deserter incidents at U.S. seaports. CBP has reported continuing challenges with its seaport field units’ recording of absconder and deserter incidents in CBP database systems. Since 2004, CBP has mandated that field units record all absconder and deserter events and related information in its ENFORCE database, and through 2007, CBP had issued several memoranda reminding field units to do so. In 2007, CBP headquarters issued a memorandum to field units reporting that its review of absconder and deserter cases found that CBP field units at many seaports of entry had not been properly utilizing ENFORCE to record these incidents. CBP headquarters and field units we contacted provided us with data on the number of absconder and deserter incidents identified at U.S. seaports from fiscal years 2005 through 2009. The number of incidents reported by CBP headquarters varied with those reported by seven of eight CBP field units we contacted—with considerable variations at six of these seaports. The following figure compares CBP headquarters and CBP field unit absconder and deserter data we received: According to 2007 guidance CBP headquarters issued to field units, it is critical that CBP field officers properly enter cases of seafarer incidents into the ENFORCE database in order to maintain data integrity and develop meaningful analysis of trends and risks. Further, the guidance notes that when adverse actions—such as seafarer absconder and deserter incidents—are not properly recorded, these inaccurate statistics not only impact targeting and analysis, but also inaccurately reflect workload with regard to staffing justification and assumptions. Officials from CBP headquarters and four field units we contacted reported that they did not know why their absconder and deserter data varied. A CBP headquarters official responsible for maintaining absconder and deserter incident data reported that he had used the ENFORCE database as headquarters’ source for the absconder and deserter data and reported that field unit officials may have been inexperienced and not known to use ENFORCE to access the data. In addition, CBP headquarters reported that without comparing the methodology and data we were provided by headquarters and field units, it could not conclude why the data varied. Meanwhile, field officials from two of these field units told us they believed the data they had provided were accurate. Overall, field officials reported using various sources to collect the data. For example, four field units reported they obtained their data from locally maintained sources, including hard copy incident logs. In July 2010, a CBP headquarters official responsible for managing the ENFORCE system for CBP stated that the agency had faced continued challenges with ensuring the accuracy of the data field officers had entered into ENFORCE potentially as a result of difficulty field officers experienced in navigating ENFORCE, and that CBP was working to improve the user interface of ENFORCE so that it more effectively served the reporting needs of CBP officers. According to internal control standards, accurate reporting of transactions and events are necessary to support management in making decisions. Program managers need operational data to determine whether they are meeting their agencies’ mission goals for effective and efficient use of resources, while operating information is also needed to determine whether the agency is achieving its compliance requirements under various laws and regulations. To do this, internal control should generally be designed to assure that ongoing monitoring occurs in the course of normal operations. Procedures including regular comparisons and reconciliations should be integrated into an agency’s activities. CBP has reported the importance of accurately recording absconder and deserter incidents to its targeting and analysis and workload staffing justification and assumptions. However, CBP headquarters and field officials were unable to fully explain why their respective records of these incidents varied so considerably. Because of these variances, CBP’s data are of undetermined reliability. Determining the reasons that absconder and deserter data varies between headquarters and field units, and taking any actions necessary to address them, could better position CBP to provide reasonable assurance that its data are reliable, thereby facilitating its targeting and analysis activities to help prevent illegal immigration at seaports. At the national level, Coast Guard’s Intelligence Coordination Center (ICC) maintains all Coast Guard reported asymmetric events involving vessels arriving at U.S. seaports, including absconders and deserters, in a classified database for use by Coast Guard leadership and field officials. Regionally, Coast Guard has command structures responsible for Atlantic and Pacific area operations, and each of these command structures has intelligence coordination components—known as the Atlantic and Pacific Area Maritime Intelligence Fusion Centers (MIFC-LANT and MIFC-PAC respectively). Each of these fusion centers maintains its own database of absconder and deserter incidents. Coast Guard field practices for tracking absconder and deserter cases vary by location, and Coast Guard ICC data on the number of absconders and deserters differed from that reported by both MIFC-LANT and MIFC-PAC. For example, for absconder and deserter incidents reported in the Coast Guard’s Pacific Area during the period of fiscal years 2007 through 2009, the ICC reported 86 total incidents, while MIFC-PAC reported 123. Similar data variances occurred between ICC and MIFC-LANT. For example, figure 7 shows that Coast Guard ICC and MIFC-LANT have reported differing numbers of absconders and deserters at seaports in the Coast Guard’s Atlantic Area during the period of fiscal years 2005 through 2009, which includes seaports on the east and gulf coasts, and Puerto Rico. Because the ICC and regional intelligence centers do not have a process in place for comparing their absconder or deserter data on a systematic basis, the Coast Guard is at risk of inconsistent or double counting by its MIFCs and ICC. An official with the ICC’s Maritime Smuggling Branch, which maintains this data, told us that Coast Guard leadership recognizes this risk and is looking to establish business rules for coordinating this information among its components. Moreover, according to several intelligence assessments issued by MIFC-PAC in 2009 and 2010, the sufficiency of reporting absconder and deserter events is a critical intelligence gap as there is a substantial likelihood that some absconder and deserter events were not reported through MIFC-PAC channels. In these reports, MIFC-PAC questioned the accuracy of the absconder and deserter reporting rates and the extent to which such incidents had gone unreported. According to internal control standards, accurate reporting of transactions and events are necessary to support agency operations and internal controls should generally be designed to assure that ongoing monitoring occurs to help ensure such reporting. According to Coast Guard intelligence assessments, thorough reporting of absconder and deserter events is essential for asymmetric migration analysis and is a core input to the Coast Guard’s vessel-targeting and threat-ranking programs. Thus, studying the absconder and deserter reporting and tracking methods of its components to examine their accuracy and thoroughness, including why data reported by ICC for absconders and deserters would vary from that reported by the two regional intelligence fusion centers, the Coast Guard could be better positioned to analyze asymmetric migration trends and implement vessel targeting and threat ranking programs. CBP and Coast Guard absconder and deserter records also varied considerably between the two agencies—both at the national and local seaport levels—with Coast Guard reporting far higher total absconder and deserter incidents than CBP for fiscal years 2005 through 2009. For example, nationwide, Coast Guard ICC reported 73 percent more absconder incidents and almost double the number of deserter incidents than CBP headquarters for this period. Moreover, in only one of these 5 years did CBP and Coast Guard report the same number of either absconder or deserter incidents. Figure 8 details Coast Guard and CBP headquarters absconder and deserter reporting for fiscal years 2005 through 2009. Disparities also exist between absconder and deserter data reported by the CBP and Coast Guard field units at seaports we contacted. For example, CBP and Coast Guard field units at the eight seaports we visited provided absconder and deserter data for those incidents that had occurred at their seaport areas of responsibility between fiscal years 2005 through 2009. Overall, Coast Guard and CBP field data of total absconder and deserter events varied at six of seven seaports that provided comparable data. For example, at one seaport, Coast Guard reported double the number of absconders, but only about half as many deserters as did CBP. See appendix V for port specific breakout of data. Both CBP and Coast Guard headquarters reported that they did not know why the two agencies’ records of absconder and deserter events differed. The agencies reported that one factor may be that they have different missions and purposes for using the data—with CBP reporting and tracking the information as part of its immigration and law enforcement mission, and Coast Guard doing so largely for intelligence reasons. For example, as a result of their differing missions, Coast Guard’s ICC indicated it did not share its information with CBP. Also, a Coast Guard intelligence official reported that while Coast Guard’s reports of absconders and deserters are largely based on information Coast Guard Sectors receive in the field, other sources are used as well. However, both agencies’ definition of absconders and deserters is similar, and guidance is in place for CBP field units to report the information to Coast Guard Sectors at seaports. Developing a systematic process for the two agencies’ headquarters to share and reconcile their data could help resolve inconsistencies in the difference between the Coast Guard and CBP data. While CBP and Coast Guard have each identified reporting and tracking absconder and deserter incidents as important for strategic and tactical reasons, the two agencies have no systematic process for sharing their absconder and deserter data to ensure they each are reporting an accurate and reliable representation of actual events. As a result, although DHS has identified illegal entry into the United States as a great concern, it is unclear how reliable the department’s records of such events are for determining the extent of the activity and informing its strategic and tactical planning for addressing it. According to an official with the Coast Guard’s ICC, the lack of coordination on this data within DHS is a data accuracy issue. He further noted that there is precedent for Coast Guard and other DHS agencies to coordinate in tracking data that may provide both law enforcement and intelligence value—which may benefit both agencies in their absconder and deserter reporting. For example, Coast Guard participates in an existing interagency forum for coordinating data related to narcotics seizures made in the maritime domain. As part of the Consolidated Counterdrug Database program (CCDB), Coast Guard officials meet on a quarterly basis with ICE and Drug Enforcement Administration officials to compare and discuss drug trafficking event records. The purpose of this forum is to review, de-conflict, and validate drug interdiction records to ensure that DHS has accurate data. CBP and Coast Guard have each faced some challenges with respect to reporting or tracking absconder and deserter events. While the two agencies have varied missions and collection methods for tracking and reporting the data, obtaining an understanding of these differences and the challenges faced would better support DHS’s efforts to address them. Moreover, sharing intelligence information among DHS components is one of DHS’ highest priorities, and although DHS is comprised of multiple components, it is nevertheless a single unified entity. Since 2007, DHS policy to improve information sharing among DHS components has called for all relevant information generated and received by individual entities within DHS to be accessible to and shared between and among all other DHS components. Establishing a systematic interagency process for sharing and reconciling information on absconder and deserter incidents consistent with internal control standards could better support each agency’s efforts to prevent illegal immigration at U.S. seaports and enhance homeland security. The INA requires all aliens, including foreign seafarers, seeking admission to the United States to be inspected by immigration officers and prohibits the landing of foreign seafarers, with certain exceptions, without a conditional landing permit. It also places a responsibility on vessel owners and agents, upon arrival to the United States, to provide immigration officers with a list of aliens employed on a vessel and detain foreign seafarers until they are inspected by an immigration officer, among other things. CBP has responsibility for identifying and reporting violations of these provisions and imposing civil monetary penalties to those vessel owners or agents that it determines violated the provisions. These penalties are intended to serve as a deterrent to future violations. The following table identifies CBP enforcement authority and associated civil monetary penalties. CBP has not met legal requirements for adjusting these civil penalties for inflation. In 1996, Congress amended the Federal Civil Penalties Inflation Adjustment Act of 1990 to require agencies to issue regulations at least every 4 years adjusting their covered penalties for inflation. The statute (hereinafter referred to as the “Inflation Adjustment Act”) required agencies with covered penalties to publish initial penalty adjustments in the Federal Register in 1996, and to adjust their penalties for inflation at least once every 4 years thereafter. However, our review of the Federal Register for the years 1996 to 2010 found that civil monetary penalties for the above violations had not been adjusted for inflation since calendar year 1999. For fiscal years 2005 through 2009, CBP reported assessing civil monetary penalties in 320 cases involving a total of 508 individual seafarers. CBP reported assessing and collecting approximately $883,000 and about $435,000 respectively, in 2010 dollars. However, if the penalties had been adjusted for inflation at least every 4 years as required under the Inflation Adjustment Act, these amounts would have been $973,000 and $470,000 respectively. CBP and the Department of Justice (DOJ) share responsibility for issuing regulations pertaining to these civil penalties. Officials from both agencies acknowledged that they had not met requirements for adjusting the above civil penalties under the Inflation Adjustment Act—with CBP reporting that it was because doing so had not been a priority since DHS was established, in 2003. As a result, the agencies did not take steps to meet requirements of the Inflation Adjustment Act. DOJ officials reported that while the two departments share responsibilities in issuing regulations for these penalties, DHS was responsible for drafting and initiating development of the regulation, as DHS is responsible for enforcing the law and imposing the civil penalties. Officials from CBP’s Fines Office reported first contacting DOJ in fall 2009 to discuss development of a regulation to adjust the penalties for inflation. However, neither DHS nor DOJ was able to provide a plan with timeframes for issuing the regulation, as recommended by project management best practices. Because CBP has not raised its penalties in over a decade, it has not exercised the full scope of its enforcement authority with respect to civil monetary penalties. Developing a plan with timelines for issuing regulation could better position CBP in assessing its progress to increase fines in accordance with the law and in ultimately meeting the intent of the law. Additionally, providing this plan to DHS leadership and Congress will provide it with key information to help ensure CBP fulfills these regulatory requirements. International implementation of ILO 185 has been limited to date—since its adoption in 2003 18 countries representing approximately 30 percent of the global seafarer supply have ratified it, and of that number, only 4 have been confirmed to issue ILO 185 seafarers’ identity documents (SIDs), according to a senior ILO official and an ILO meeting document. Table 5 lists the ratifying nations and dates of ratification, and indicates nations with confirmed ILO 185 issuance. In addition, other countries are developing ILO 185 issuance capabilities or issuing the credentials on a small scale. These countries include Canada, France, Malaysia, Nigeria, and the Republic of Korea, according to the ILO. To help ensure that the minimum requirements of the Convention are met by ratifying nations, ILO 185 established a review mechanism and mandates regular independent audits of countries’ issuance processes. Nations that satisfactorily complete the review will be placed on an ILO “List” of compliant countries that meet the minimum requirements for their SID issuance processes; nations that do not pass the review risk their credentials’ not being recognized by other nations. However, even though 18 countries have ratified the Convention—some as long ago as 6 years— no nations’ SID system or credentials have been independently evaluated as prescribed in the Convention, and no “List” has been created. Figure 11 in appendix VI illustrates the review process ILO established, but has not yet implemented, to promote compliance. In addition to the “List” process that is specific to ILO 185, the ILO Constitution sets reporting requirements for the implementation of all ILO conventions. For example, countries must demonstrate progress to the ILO in implementing conventions within set time periods after ratification, with the first reports usually submitted within 2 years of ratification. However, in the case of ILO 185, these implementation reporting deadlines were extended. The ILO received the first reports on ILO 185 implementation from some, but not all, countries that were requested to make submissions in 2010. According to a senior ILO official and ILO documents, a major reason for the delay in establishing the “List” process and the extension of regular ILO implementation reporting deadlines was to give the United States and other critical port nations more time to consider ratification. The ILO official noted that some of the ratifying countries were hesitant to invest in developing or deploying new SID systems if the credentials would not facilitate shore leave and transit in the United States. The ILO also wanted U.S. officials to be included in the review panels to create the first “List,” but the panels are only open to ratifying members. According to a senior ILO official and ILO documents, the “List” mechanism was created to strengthen international assurances that credentials will be issued in accordance with the Convention and is expected to be implemented starting in 2011. In the meantime, however, SIDs are being issued that have not undergone the full independent evaluation and vetting process stipulated in the Convention. For example, according to the ILO, one ratifying nation issued about 4,000 SIDs that were later found to be non-compliant with the Convention. These documents were recalled and reissued, but the newly issued SIDs were not independently evaluated and thus lack assurances that minimum requirements were met. As of January 2011, the United States had not ratified ILO 185 largely due to concerns over a provision for facilitating visa-free shore leave for foreign seafarers arriving in U.S. seaports with ILO 185 credentials. After 9/11, maritime security concerns in general took on greater urgency, and the United States submitted a set of proposals to the International Maritime Organization (IMO) to address specific vulnerabilities, including those related to seafarers’ identity documents. Among other things, the United States called for more uniform standards, including document security and biometrics, and a means by which member states could easily verify the validity of documents presented at ports of entry on a 24-hour basis. One such means of verification suggested by the United States was an electronic database capable of linking biometric information and data elements such as seafarer name, card number, and issuing authority to specific credentials and individuals. Responsibility for addressing these post 9/11 security concerns related to seafarer credentials shifted from the IMO to the ILO because of the labor organization’s long-standing administration of an earlier instrument on seafarer credentials, Convention 108. In 2002, the ILO invoked a “fast- track” mechanism to revise ILO 108, and the resulting convention—ILO 185—was adopted almost unanimously by ILO members in 2003. Unlike the earlier convention, ILO 185 requires countries to adopt certain credential features and issuance processes, incorporates fingerprint biometrics connected to national databases for verification purposes, and establishes a review mechanism to monitor countries’ implementation. The U.S. tripartite delegation of government, industry, and labor officials was among those that voted to adopt ILO 185 in 2003, and had been active in the drafting of the Convention, according to ILO and U.S. officials. However, because the Convention retained provisions that called for visa- free shore leave and other transit privileges for holders of ILO 185 SIDs, the United States has not ratified the Convention. The U.S. government considers the State Department’s visa adjudication process to be an important layer of border security to prevent terrorists, illegal immigrants, and criminals from gaining entry. In a statement issued at the time the Convention was adopted, the U.S. delegation affirmed its support for the intent of the Convention, but said that ILO 185 SIDs would not be accepted in lieu of visas for shore leave or transit—instead, according to the statement, the United States would consider steps to facilitate the visa application process for seafarers. Former and current officials from DOT MARAD and the State Department involved with the drafting and negotiation of the Convention told us that the U.S. government had opposed the language that provides for visa-free shore leave. Although the provision was ultimately kept, additional language allowed for member countries that could not meet the requirements for visa-free admission to instead provide arrangements that were “substantially equivalent.” According to ILO and U.S. officials this softening of the article was intended to give the United States and other member nations a potential avenue to ratify the Convention without eliminating its visa requirements. The Convention itself does not define what mechanisms may qualify as “substantially equivalent” to visa-free shore leave. However, in 2008 the ILO provided a “discussion paper” to U.S. agencies that outlined ways to potentially satisfy the Convention and also allow the U.S. to issue visas to seafarers. As of December 2010, the United States had not yet fully considered these or other potential means to meet the “substantial equivalence” clause, according to officials we spoke with from two agencies. Even if the Convention oversight mechanisms, such as the “List” process are implemented, some officials from the U.S. agencies we spoke with believed that foregoing the U.S.-controlled visa process based on the possession of a SID alone would expose the United States to potential deficiencies of other nations’ processes. Figure 9 below compares elements of the current U.S. screening process to a notional scenario in which an ILO 185 SID could be used in lieu of a visa for shore leave. Note, however, that other scenarios are possible under the Convention, including retaining the visa requirement, but these alternatives have not yet been developed. Although the Convention establishes numerous requirements for SID issuance procedures, countries retain discretion over their processes. The Convention requires that issuing authorities verify a SID applicant’s identity, nationality or permanent residence, and occupation as a seafarer. Issuing authorities must also verify “that the applicant does not constitute a risk to security.” Although the Convention recommends some best practices to achieve these results, such as vetting applicants against security-related databases, the specifics of the security vetting process are ultimately determined by the issuing state. Furthermore, as of January 2011, the ILO has not finalized arrangements for how and to what extent information in the national seafarer databases will be accessed. As part of the current visa adjudication process, the State Department collects applicants’ biometric data and checks it against databases for potential derogatory information. Even though similar biometric data would be collected under the ILO 185 SID issuance process, it is not clear that U.S. agencies could access the data for a similar database check, due to different privacy protection laws in different countries, according to ILO documents. Federal agencies involved had varied viewpoints on the implications of ILO 185. Several agencies and agency components, including the DHS Office of Policy, CBP, Coast Guard, and ICE within DHS; the State Department; Labor; and DOT MARAD are involved to differing degrees with ILO 185 policy issues. Officials representing seven agencies we spoke with cited both benefits and drawbacks of the Convention, with all agencies reporting that the visa-free shore leave provision had been the most significant barrier to potential U.S. ratification. Agency positions are summarized in table 6 below: Differences in agency positions reflect to some extent their differing missions. For example, in discussing ILO 185, Labor officials cited shore leave as an important worker right critical to safety while DHS Office of Policy representatives cited the potential security benefits of using biometric data to verify identity. DOT MARAD officials, who serve the U.S. merchant marine population, said that how the United States grants shore leave to foreign seafarers could impact how U.S seafarers are granted shore leave abroad. Even within the same agency, however, component perspectives on ILO 185 varied. For example, while acknowledging the difficulties associated with the visa-free shore leave provision, the Coast Guard, a component of DHS, expressed support for ILO 185. In April 2009, the Coast Guard issued a regulation that recognized ILO 185 seafarer documents as one of six acceptable forms of identification for persons arriving in U.S. waters from foreign ports. On the other hand, CBP, also a component of DHS, reported that although the ILO 185 seafarer document may provide identity information, it did not meet its requirements as a travel or admissibility document, and was therefore not accepted for those CBP purposes. CBP officials we interviewed at seaport field offices and in headquarters also questioned some of the Convention’s security benefits— including those cited by Coast Guard officials. Finally, a CBP document noted that the Convention does not provide for U.S. oversight or periodic review of foreign SID issuance practices. The law enforcement interests of the United States are not served, the document maintains, without assurance that the guidelines in the Convention are adhered to. Officials from relevant U.S. agencies, joined sometimes by ILO and other stakeholder representatives, met at least six times from 2005 through 2009 to discuss the Convention and related U.S. policy implications and options. However, according to officials who represented at least three agencies at these meetings, the discussions did not lead to any completed analysis or review of the Convention, and in particular, no definitive resolution was reached as to whether the United States should pursue “substantially equivalent” options or if the Convention cannot be ratified. Officials from four of the participating U.S. agencies said these meetings did not yield more results because it was difficult to achieve consistent participation and effort by all relevant agencies, given other demands and limited resources. For example, officials from the DHS Office of Policy acknowledged that ILO 185 fell under their purview at the departmental level, but that the Convention has not been a priority for their office, and that interagency involvement from the DHS departmental level has been limited to date. In addition, the change in administration along with legal delays in reestablishing a cabinet level committee on ILO issues (see below) has also postponed interagency actions on ILO 185, according to Labor officials. On May 4, 2010, the Secretary of Labor convened the President’s Committee on the International Labor Organization (PC/ILO) for the first time since 2000. Appendix VII shows the current members of the PC/ILO and its Tripartite Advisory Panel on International Labor Standards (TAPILS), as well as the mechanism by which the committee transmits recommendations to the president about ratification of ILO conventions. At its May 2010 meeting, the PC/ILO members adopted a series of conclusions that were forwarded to the President. One of these conclusions urged the TAPILS, in conjunction with other relevant agencies, to expedite its review of ILO 185 and where necessary find ways to resolve concerns about U.S. compliance. DHS is not represented at the cabinet level of this committee; however, officials from DHS, Coast Guard, CBP, and other relevant agencies were invited to participate as members of the TAPILS for the purpose of reviewing ILO 185. Although earlier interagency discussions were convened by the agencies themselves, the formation of the PC/ILO represents a more structured undertaking to review ILO 185 and other ILO conventions for their congruence with U.S. laws. As of December 2010, the TAPILS had established a procedure to review ILO 185 provisions that included creating a working group to develop potential approaches to the legal issues stemming from Article 6 of the Convention. However, according to one senior Labor official involved with the working group, there is no established time frame for the group to complete its review or for the larger committee to make a recommendation to the President. The previous 7 TAPILS’ law and practice reviews typically took 2 to 3 years to complete. In addition to U.S. government stakeholders, we spoke with representatives from seven industry and labor organizations, including the International Shipping Federation (ISF) and the International Transport Workers’ Federation (ITF)—two organizations that represent industry and labor in the ILO—about their perspectives on ILO 185 and other seafarer issues. All of the groups generally supported the Convention, primarily because of its visa-free shore leave provision, which they view as an important seafarer right and also a safety and efficiency issue. For example, due to the nature of the shipping industry, seafarers can spend extended time periods aboard their vessels. Without adequate time away from the vessel in the form of shore leave, mental and physical exhaustion can adversely affect seafarers’ welfare and lead to more accidents, according to labor and industry representatives. Representatives from five groups also pointed out that seafarers do not always know in advance if their vessels may call on U.S. ports and therefore may not possess U.S. visas for shore leave. Furthermore, representatives from the industry and labor organizations involved with drafting the Convention believed that ILO 185 has potential to improve maritime security if more widely implemented, particularly through its use of biometric identification and national seafarer databases. However, some organizations cited the cost of developing SID systems as a significant obstacle to ratification for some countries, particularly if the United States does not recognize the ILO 185 SIDs for shore leave. Officials from the four foreign governments we contacted—which collectively account for almost 30 percent of the supply of seafarers transiting to U.S. ports—reported that they support the Convention in general. Of these four foreign governments, two have ratified the Convention and two have not, although all issue specialized credentials to their seafarers. The two non-ratifying countries reported that they are considering ratification pending legal reviews. All four countries cited greater facilitation of shore leave for seafarers as a benefit of the Convention. This allowance, according to the countries, is an important safety consideration and can also increase worker productivity. Officials from these countries also cited the increased security features of cards, more robust background checks of SID applicants, and potential access to seafarer databases as benefits of the Convention. The increased cost of new SID systems is especially important given the relatively low number of countries that have ratified the Convention to date. For example, one country that ratified the Convention reported to us that it had not yet begun to issue the more secure SIDs because the positions on ILO 185 in a number of important countries are still unknown. If holding an ILO 185 SID does not afford seafarers any greater benefit than an older credential, particularly while in significant port countries like the United States, there is a disincentive for countries to spend funds upgrading their systems, according to officials from this country. Although we did not evaluate the quality of individual security features, the three countries we contacted that had developed ILO 185 SIDs all reported additional features compared with prior credentials. Given the number of seafarers transiting U.S. ports each year and the continued threats posed by terrorism to the United States, it is important that seafarer risks are identified and actions are taken to ensure security of vessels and port infrastructure, while preventing illegal immigration. DHS guidance recommends components use both physical and electronic methods for immigration inspections, but technology limitations have reportedly been the primary challenge to implementing this guidance on board cargo vessels. CBP has reported that electronic verification of immigration status or travel documents is an important objective. While this capability is unlikely to be available for several years, opportunities exist for CBP action. By assessing the risks of relying on physical inspection when conducting seafarer admissibility inspections on board cargo vessels and identifying options to address these risks and their costs, CBP could be in a better position to determine its course of action for addressing these risks until the technology becomes available. In addition, both CBP and Coast Guard have reported challenges with respect to their reporting and tracking of the illegal entry events by seafarers, known as absconders and deserters, and based on our overall assessment, we found their data to be of undetermined reliability. Moreover, Coast Guard and CBP records of these incidents vary considerably, and consequently, DHS has no accurate and reliable estimate to gauge the extent of the incidents. For each agency, (1) conducting a study of reporting methods and challenges faced, including why their records vary so considerably—within and among the agencies— and (2) moving forward, establishing a process for the two agencies to regularly share and reconcile these records could better position DHS in developing a stronger maritime security strategy. Finally, CBP has not increased its civil monetary penalties for seafarer-related immigration violations, as required by law, in over a decade. Civil monetary penalties are an important element of regulatory enforcement and can lose their ability to deter if unadjusted for inflation. While CBP and DOJ reported taking steps to meet requirements for inflation adjustment, the agencies have not developed a plan including timelines for issuing required regulation. Providing a plan with timelines for when this regulation will be issued could provide DHS leadership and Congress with key information and help ensure CBP fulfills regulatory requirements. To facilitate better agency understanding of the potential need and feasibility of expanding electronic verification of seafarers, to improve data collection and sharing, and to comply with the Inflation Adjustment Act, we are making four recommendations. We recommend that the Secretary of Homeland Security: direct the Commissioner of CBP to assess the national-security and other risks faced by CBP in the absence of technology to provide electronic verification as part of CBP’s admissibility inspections for cargo vessel seafarers and identify options for addressing these risks and their costs; direct the Commandant of the Coast Guard and Commissioner of CBP to: determine the reasons that absconder and deserter data varies between headquarters and field units, and between the Coast Guard and CBP and determine any actions necessary to address any variance; and jointly establish an interagency process for sharing and reconciling records of absconder and deserter incidents occurring at U.S. seaports. We further recommend that the Secretary of Homeland Security and the Attorney General of the United States develop a plan with timelines for issuing regulations, as required by the Inflation Adjustment Act, to adjust civil monetary penalties associated with violations of the Immigration and Nationality Act involving foreign seafarers gaining illegal entry into the United States and provide this plan to Congress. We provided a draft of this report to the departments of State, Labor, Transportation, Justice, and Homeland Security for their review and comment. The State Department provided technical comments. Labor, in an e-mail we received on December 15, 2010, also provided technical comments as well as a general comment regarding the ILO 185 Convention. The Transportation Department did not provide comments on the draft. DOJ did not provide official written comments on our report. However, in an e-mail received December 9, 2010, the DOJ liaison stated that DOJ concurred with the one recommendation we made to DOJ in the report. DHS, in written comments received December 17, 2010, concurred with all four of the recommendations in the report directed to DHS, and identified actions taken, planned, or under way to implement the recommendations. Written comments are summarized below and reproduced in appendix VIII. DHS also provided technical comments that we incorporated as appropriate. Regarding our recommendation to assess the national-security and other risks faced by CBP in the absence of technology to provide electronic verification as part of its admissibility inspections for cargo vessel seafarers and to identify options for addressing these risks and their costs, DHS concurred. DHS stated that CBP will work in conjunction with the DHS Screening Coordination Office to determine parameters to measure and assess risks associated with the absence of technology for onboard vessel inspection of seafarers. Regarding our recommendation to (1) determine the reasons that absconder and deserter data varies between headquarters and field units, and between the Coast Guard and CBP and determine any actions necessary to address them and (2) jointly establish an interagency process for sharing and reconciling records of absconder and deserter incidents occurring at U.S. seaports, DHS concurred. DHS stated that CBP and the Coast Guard would begin to asses the appropriate offices within each component involved in the review and to establish a working group to evaluate the current reporting process within each component, and between CBP and Coast Guard. Further, in its technical comments, DHS noted that it was working to co-locate the Coast Guard’s ICC Coastwatch and CBP’s National Targeting Center-Passenger and that this would help to eliminate many of the absconder- and deserter-reporting inconsistencies GAO identified between Coast Guard and CBP. Regarding our recommendation that the Secretary of Homeland Security and the Attorney General of the United States develop a plan with timelines for issuing regulations, as required by the Inflation Adjustment Act, to adjust civil monetary penalties associated with violations of the Immigration and Nationality Act involving foreign seafarers gaining illegal entry into the United States and provide this plan to Congress, both DHS and DOJ concurred. DHS stated that it was currently working together with DOJ to develop the regulations and hoped to issue final regulations in 2011. DOJ stated that it would report to Congress after GAO issued this report. However, it remains important that the two departments develop a plan with timelines for completing these actions and provide this information to Congress. Finally, while we made no recommendations regarding the status of the ILO 185 Seafarers’ Identity Document Convention, DHS and Labor both provided comments related to potential incongruence between the Convention and existing U.S. law. DHS noted that CBP would object to ratification of the ILO 185 Convention because of limitations of existing laws for CBP enforcement. Also, in oral and technical comments provided, Labor’s Director of the Office of International Relations within the Bureau of International Labor Affairs suggested we note the May 2010 recommendation of the PC/ILO that urged TAPILS and all relevant U.S. agencies to expedite its review of ILO 185 to find ways to resolve concerns about U.S. compliance. We are providing copies of this report to appropriate congressional committees, to the Secretaries of State, Labor, Transportation, and Homeland Security, to the Attorney General, and to other interested parties. This report will also be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov. If you or your staff has any questions concerning this report, please contact me at (202) 512-7036 or by e-mail at jeszeckc@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. Key contributors to this report are listed in appendix IX. Table 7 below lists select international and national laws, conventions or guidance that govern various aspects of seafarer security. Following the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the State Department sought to make its visa adjudication process more robust. Table 8 below describes some of the efforts initiated by the department in the areas of information/systems management, training, and collaboration with U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). CBP and Coast Guard each conduct advance-targeting of passenger and crew information to identify potential threats. Within CBP, the National Targeting Center-Passenger (NTC-P) screens passenger and crew manifests against certain databases, such as records from the Terrorist Screening Data Base (TSDB)—commonly referred to as the terrorist watch list—and the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s National Crime Information Center (NCIC) database, to determine their potential risk to the United States. This screening process is designed to identify individuals with potential terrorism links or criminal warrants and those passengers and crew with potential immigration admissibility problems. NTC-P uses an automated system—known as the Automated Targeting System-Passenger (ATS-P)—to screen individuals against various data sources. If NTC-P identifies a potential match to a TSDB record during its targeting, NTC-P refers the potential match to the FBI’s Terrorist Screening Center (TSC) for further vetting and confirmation. The TSC will make the final determination that the individual is a positive or negative match to the terrorist watchlist record. According to CBP officials, the number of terrorist-positive matches are extremely small in the maritime environment compared to those transiting to air and land ports of entry in large part due to the relatively smaller population of travelers arriving at seaports. Also at the national level, Coast Guard’s ICC performs central screening of the Advance Notice of Arrival (ANOA) to identify potential ties to criminal or terrorist activity. Should the ICC identify potential ties, it will disseminate the results of its screening to the Coast Guard at the seaport location where the vessel will be arriving—which will then be shared with the local CBP field unit at that location. At the local seaport level, CBP field units also conduct advance-targeting of crew and passenger manifest information. CBP Passenger Analysis Units (PAU) review arrival manifests using the ATS-P to identify individuals who pose security risks and warrant additional inspection. The screening process by NTC-P and the PAU identifies persons of interest prior to the inspection and provides support to the CBP field officer to determine if a seafarer can be authorized temporary landing privileges in the United States. PAU officers interact with both the NTC-P and the local Coast Guard Sector if they identify seafarers posing potential security concerns. Coast Guard Sectors rely on the ICC and CBP for information regarding any persons of interest and guidance on what actions to take based on the nature of the concern. CBP NTC-P officials reported that while NTC-P and local PAU’s generally reviewed similar information, they played complementary roles in identifying potential crewmember risks. For example, NTC-P has access to more terrorist-screening resources than do most local PAU’s and the NTC- P is staffed with officials from other law enforcement agencies, such as the FBI. Meanwhile, with local knowledge of seaport point of entry activity, PAU’s conduct further screening with a focus on seafarer immigration and law enforcement risks. Cargo Vessel Immigration Admissibility Boardings: To inspect seafarers arriving on cargo vessels, CBP officers board the vessel, order the crew to gather in a common area—typically the galley or crew lounge—and conduct interviews with each seafarer. Since these inspections occur on board the vessel in an un-automated environment, CBP officers have to rely on information vetted before boarding the vessel and their skill sets to identify fraud, both in documents and during interviews with seafarers. CBP officials report that if a concern arises regarding the identity of a crew being inspected on board a cargo vessel, CBP officers are equipped with radios or cell phones to call back to the CBP PAU or NTC-P for assistance. Enforcement and Compliance Inspections: In addition to CBP’s admissibility boardings, CBP boards commercial vessels to inspect crew as part of compliance inspections or risk-based security operations. CBP may conduct vessel boardings to address risks identified during advance- targeting and ensure vessel operator compliance with immigration regulations. Such boardings include reviewing security measures in place by the vessel operator to ensure high-risk seafarers to not depart the vessel. Coast Guard uses the results of its targeting assessments to guide the type and extent of operations field units may conduct on arriving commercial vessels. For example, based on intelligence, Coast Guard may conduct armed security boardings to examine seafarer passports and visas and ensure the crew list submitted via Advance Notice of Arrival (ANOA) is accurate. It also conducts inspections of vessel crew as part of its regulatory responsibility under the Maritime Transportation Security Act (MTSA), International Ship and Port Facility (ISPS), and Port State Control requirements of vessel operators. These include inspections of crew identification and travel documents, and reviews of crew certification and licensing documentation. From fiscal years 2006 through 2009, Coast Guard reported it had conducted approximately 17,000 MTSA and 37,000 ISPS inspections of commercial vessels entering U.S. ports. Of these inspections, Coast Guard reported finding approximately 5,000 security violations, which were generally related to access control of the vessel. We requested data from CBP field units and Coast Guard Sectors at eight domestic seaports summarizing the number of absconder and deserter incidents that the field units and sectors reported for fiscal years 2005 through 2009. At six of seven seaports that provided comparable data, CBP and Coast Guard field units and sectors reported varying numbers of incidents (see notes below describing our scope and methods of this analysis). CBP and Coast Guard field units and sectors reported the same number of incidents at only one seaport (Jacksonville). Below is a summary of the field unit reported data. Appendix VI: S Orga Convention (Revised), 2003 (ILO 185) The International Labor Organization’s Convention 185 (ILO 185) establishes international standards for nationally issued seafarers’ identity documents (SIDs). The Convention seeks to create a framework for nations to issue more secure, standardized credentials to bona fide seafarers, which, in turn, helps seafarers gain access to foreign territories for shore leave and other professional travel, such as transiting from an airport to meet a vessel in port. ILO 185 is a revision of ILO 108, a 1958 convention that established a structure for international recognition of national seafarers’ identity documents. Ratified by a total of 64 countries that did not include the United States, Convention 108 required ratifying countries to issue seafarers’ identity documents or seafarer passports to applicants to facilitate seafarer entry into foreign territories for shore leave or transit to or from a vessel. Aside from basic requirements, such as mandating that the documents list a seafarer’s full name and date of birth and contain a photograph, ILO 108 did not specify how the documents should appear or provide guidance on issuance processes. According to the ILO, identity documents issued under ILO 108 varied greatly in appearance and most did not contain security features. Moreover, according to a 2002 ILO briefing paper, member states were often unaware of what each others’ ILO 108 documents looked like, if the documents were real or counterfeit, and even whether the government in question had ratified the Convention. Furthermore, the Convention permitted a ratifying nation to issue documents to seafarers who were not citizens or permanent residents as long as they worked on vessels registered in the country or in its territory. This practice, according to an ILO official, resulted in some seafarers obtaining valid identification credentials from multiple nations based on their employment. To a much greater extent than ILO 108, the revised ILO 185 Convention sets minimum standards for how ratifying countries produce and issue their seafarer identity documents, including the data they contain, security features, and a fingerprint biometric. For example, ILO 185 requires SIDs to comply with certain International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) passport or other travel document specifications regarding materials used and credential dimensions and placement of data. The Convention also makes certain requirements for countries to maintain a national database to track credential issuance, whose information must be accessible to other ratifying nations, and calls for independent evaluations of SID issuance processes and ILO certifications of compliance. In accordance with Article 5 of the Convention, in 2005 the ILO developed a specific process by which its Governing Body could approve a “List” of ratifying nations that met minimum Convention requirements. In part due to the limited number of ratifying nations to date, this process has not yet been implemented, and as of January 2011, there is no list of compliant countries. Appendix VII: President’s Committee on the International Labor Organization (PC/ILO) The President’s Committee on the International Labor Organization (PC/ILO) is a federal advisory committee that, among other things, evaluates ILO conventions and makes recommendations to the President concerning potential U.S. ratification. The PC/ILO is chaired by the Secretary of Labor and consists of other cabinet level representatives from U.S. government as well as senior officials from labor and industry. Before the full committee reports to the President, a committee subgroup, the Tripartite Advisory Panel on International Labor Standards (TAPILS), reviews selected conventions for conformity with U.S. law. The PC/ILO was most recently convened in May 2010, and stated that a review of ILO 185 was a priority. Figure 12 below shows current PC/ILO membership and the mechanism by which it makes its recommendations. Charles A. Jeszeck, (202) 512-7036 or jeszeckc@gao.gov. In addition to the contact named above, David Bruno, Assistant Director, and Jason Berman, Analyst-in-Charge, managed this assignment. Chloe Brown and David Lutter made significant contributions to this report. Charles Bausell, Kathryn Bernet, Namita Bhatia Sabharwal, Richard Hung, and Stanley Kostyla assisted with design and methodology. Tracey King provided legal support. Jessica Orr provided assistance in report preparation. Maritime Security: Ferry Security Measures Have Been Implemented, but Evaluating Existing Studies Could Further Enhance Security. GAO-11-207. Washington, D.C.: Dec. 3, 2010. Maritime Security: Actions Needed to Assess and Update Plan and Enhance Collaboration among Partners Involved in Countering Piracy off the Horn of Africa. GAO-10-856. Washington, D.C.: Sep. 24, 2010. Maritime Security: DHS Progress and Challenges in Key Areas of Port Security. GAO-10-940T. Washington, D.C.: July 21, 2010. Maritime Security: Varied Actions Taken to Enhance Cruise Ship Security, but Some Concerns Remain. GAO-10-400. Washington, D.C.: Apr. 9, 2010. Supply Chain Security: Feasibility and Cost-Benefit Analysis Would Assist DHS and Congress in Assessing and Implementing the Requirement to Scan 100 Percent of U.S.-Bound Containers. GAO-10-12. Washington, D.C.: Oct. 30, 2009. Maritime Security: Vessel Tracking Systems Provide Key Information, but the Need for Duplicate Data Should Be Reviewed. GAO-09-337. Washington, D.C.: March 17, 2009. Supply Chain Security: CBP Works with International Entities to Promote Global Customs Security Standards and Initiatives, but Challenges Remain. GAO-08-538. Washington, D.C.: August 15, 2008. Maritime Security: National Strategy and Supporting Plans Were Generally Well-Developed and Are Being Implemented. GAO-08-672. Washington, D.C.: June 20, 2008. Supply Chain Security: Challenges to Scanning 100 Percent of U.S.- Bound Cargo Containers. GAO-08-533T. Washington, D.C.: June 12, 2008. Supply Chain Security: U.S. Customs and Border Protection Has Enhanced Its Partnership with Import Trade Sectors, but Challenges Remain in Verifying Security Practices. GAO-08-240. Washington, D.C.: April 25, 2008. Maritime Security: Coast Guard Inspections Identify and Correct Facility Deficiencies, but More Analysis Needed of Program’s Staffing, Practices, and Data. GAO-08-12. Washington, D.C.: February 14, 2008. Supply Chain Security: Examinations of High-Risk Cargo at Foreign Seaports Have Increased, but Improved Data Collection and Performance Measures Are Needed. GAO-08-187. Washington, D.C.: January 25, 2008. Maritime Security: Federal Efforts Needed to Address Challenges in Preventing and Responding to Terrorist Attacks on Energy Commodity Tankers. GAO-08-141. Washington, D.C.: December 10, 2007. Maritime Security: The SAFE Port Act: Status and Implementation One Year Later. GAO-08-126T. Washington, D.C.: October 30, 2007. Combating Nuclear Smuggling: Additional Actions Needed to Ensure Adequate Testing of Next Generation Radiation Detection Equipment. GAO-07-1247T. Washington, D.C.: September 18, 2007. Information on Port Security in the Caribbean Basin. GAO-07-804R. Washington, D.C.: June 29, 2007. Port Risk Management: Additional Federal Guidance Would Aid Ports in Disaster Planning and Recovery. GAO-07-412. Washington, D.C.: March 28, 2007. Maritime Security: Public Safety Consequences of a Terrorist Attack on a Tanker Carrying Liquefied Natural Gas Need Clarification. GAO-07-316. Washington, D.C.: February 22, 2007. Coast Guard: Observations on the Preparation, Response, and Recovery Missions Related to Hurricane Katrina. GAO-06-903. Washington, D.C.: July 31, 2006. Maritime Security: Information Sharing Efforts Are Improving. GAO-06-933T. Washington, D.C.: July 10, 2006. Cargo Container Inspections: Preliminary Observations on the Status of Efforts to Improve the Automated Targeting System. GAO-06-591T. Washington, D.C.: March 30, 2006. Risk Management: Further Refinements Needed to Assess Risks and Prioritize Protective Measures at Ports and Other Critical Infrastructure. GAO-06-91. Washington, D.C.: December 15, 2005. Homeland Security: Key Cargo Security Programs Can Be Improved. GAO-05-466T. Washington, D.C.: May 26, 2005. Maritime Security: Enhancements Made, But Implementation and Sustainability Remain Key Challenges. GAO-05-448T. Washington, D.C.: May 17, 2005. Container Security: A Flexible Staffing Model and Minimum Equipment Requirements Would Improve Overseas Targeting and Inspection Efforts. GAO-05-557. Washington, D.C.: April 26, 2005. Maritime Security: New Structures Have Improved Information Sharing, but Security Clearance Processing Requires Further Attention. GAO-05-394. Washington, D.C.: April 15, 2005. Cargo Security: Partnership Program Grants Importers Reduced Scrutiny with Limited Assurance of Improved Security. GAO-05-404. Washington, D.C.: March 11, 2005. Maritime Security: Better Planning Needed to Help Ensure an Effective Port Security Assessment Program. GAO-04-1062. Washington, D.C.: September 30, 2004. Maritime Security: Partnering Could Reduce Federal Costs and Facilitate Implementation of Automatic Vessel Identification System. GAO-04-868. Washington, D.C.: July 23, 2004. Maritime Security: Substantial Work Remains to Translate New Planning Requirements into Effective Port Security. GAO-04-838. Washington, D.C.: June 30, 2004. Homeland Security: Summary of Challenges Faced in Targeting Oceangoing Cargo Containers for Inspection. GAO-04-557T. Washington, D.C.: March 31, 2004. Homeland Security: Preliminary Observations on Efforts to Target Security Inspections of Cargo Containers. GAO-04-325T. Washington, D.C.: December 16, 2003. Maritime Security: Progress Made in Implementing Maritime Transportation Security Act, but Concerns Remain. GAO-03-1155T. Washington, D.C.: September 9, 2003. Combating Terrorism: Interagency Framework and Agency Programs to Address the Overseas Threat. GAO-03-165. Washington, D.C.: May 23, 2003. Nuclear Nonproliferation: U.S. Efforts to Combat Nuclear Smuggling. GAO-02-989T. Washington, D.C.: July 30, 2002. Coast Guard: Vessel Identification System Development Needs to Be Reassessed. GAO-02-477. Washington, D.C.: May 24, 2002.

Summary: The State Department and two components of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and the Coast Guard, are responsible for preventing illegal immigration at U.S. seaports and identifying individuals who are potential security risks. The International Labor Organization (ILO) adopted the Seafarers' Identity Documents Convention (ILO 185) to establish an international framework of seafarer identification documents and reduce their vulnerability to fraud and exploitation. GAO was asked to examine (1) measures federal agencies take to address risks posed by foreign seafarers and the challenges, if any, DHS faces; (2) the challenges, if any, DHS faces in tracking illegal entries by foreign seafarers and how it enforces penalties; and (3) the implementation status of ILO 185. GAO reviewed relevant requirements and agency documents on maritime security, interviewed federal and industry officials, and visited seven seaports based on volume of seafarer arrivals. The visits provided insights, but were not projectable to all seaports. Federal agencies use a layered security strategy to address foreign seafarer risks, but opportunities exist to enhance DHS seafarer inspection methods. Federal actions include: (1) State Department screening of seafarer non-immigrant visa applicants overseas and (2) DHS advance screening of commercial vessels' seafarer manifests and admissibility inspections of all arriving seafarers. CBP conducts cargo vessel admissibility inspections on board the vessel without the benefit of tools to electronically verify a seafarer's identity or immigration status because of a lack of available connectivity to network communications in the maritime environment. DHS has prioritized the acquisition of a mobile version of this technology capability but expects it to take several years before the technology is developed and available. CBP agrees that obtaining this capability is important but has not assessed the risks of not having it. Until CBP obtains the capability, identifying the risks and options to address them could better position CBP in preventing illegal immigration at seaports. DHS faces challenges in ensuring it has reliable data on illegal entries by foreign seafarers at U.S. seaports and has not adjusted related civil monetary penalties. First, both CBP and Coast Guard track the frequency of absconder (a seafarer CBP has ordered detained on board a vessel in port, but who departs a vessel without permission) and deserter (a seafarer CBP grants permission to leave a vessel, but who does not return when required) incidents at U.S. seaports, but the records of these incidents varied considerably. The Coast Guard reported 73 percent more absconders and almost double the deserters compared to CBP for fiscal years 2005 through 2009. As a result, the data DHS uses to inform its strategic and tactical plans are of undetermined reliability. Second, CBP is responsible for imposing civil monetary penalties on vessel operators whose seafarers illegally enter the United States; however, as of December 2010, CBP and DOJ had not met legal requirements for adjusting the penalties for inflation. Officials reported taking steps to meet these requirements, but have not developed a plan with timelines for doing so. Such a plan would better position CBP and DOJ to demonstrate progress to comply with legal requirements. International implementation of ILO 185 has been limited--18 countries, representing 30 percent of the global seafarer supply, have ratified ILO 185--and key ILO mechanisms to promote compliance are not expected to be in place until later this year. As of January 2011, the United States had not ratified ILO 185 largely due to concerns over a provision for facilitating visa-free shore leave for foreign seafarers. Perspectives varied among the four federal agencies GAO interviewed within DHS and the departments of State, Transportation, and Labor. Within DHS, the Coast Guard reported that it supported U.S. ratification, while CBP stated that ILO 185's lack of oversight did not serve U.S. law enforcement interests. The U.S. has recently undertaken an interagency review to consider ratification but has no timeline for completion. GAO recommends that DHS assess risks of not electronically verifying cargo vessel seafarers for admissibility, identify reasons for absconder and deserter data variances, and, with the Department of Justice (DOJ), develop a plan with timelines to adjust civil monetary penalties for inflation. DHS and DOJ concurred with GAO's recommendations.