According to the Department of Transportation’s Maritime Administration, over 9.3 million passengers departed from a U.S. port on North American cruises in 2008, on a total of almost 3,900 cruises from 30 ports. The U.S. ports with the most departures were located in Florida and include Miami, Fort Lauderdale, and Port Canaveral. Other ports with over 150 cruise departures in 2008 include Los Angeles, Long Beach, San Juan, and the New York City area. The Western Caribbean—including islands west of Haiti and ports in Mexico, Central America, and Columbia—was the most popular destination for passengers in 2008. These cruises carried nearly twice as many passengers, or more, than any other destination. Alaska, the Bahamas, the Eastern Caribbean, and the Pacific coast of Mexico were other popular destinations in 2008. See figure 1 for a map showing leading North American cruise departure and destination ports, as well as the number of departing passengers for these ports. Numerous international and domestic organizations play a role in the security of cruise ships. The non-U.S. stakeholders are diverse and have wide-ranging roles and responsibilities. These stakeholders include international organizations, governments of nations where cruise ships make stops or are registered, and owners and operators of the vessels and facilities (see table 1). In addition to international stakeholders, there are various domestic maritime security stakeholders in the United States. Table 2 lists key federal agencies and other domestic stakeholders, together with examples of the maritime security activities they perform. International, national, and state and local requirements guide maritime security, including the security of cruise ships and their facilities. At the international level, the International Maritime Organization (IMO), through its International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code, a part of the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, lays out the international framework designed to help ensure maritime security. National laws, regulations, and guidance direct federal agencies and vessel and facility operators on a nationwide basis. State and local requirements may also further direct activities of operators within their jurisdictions (see table 3). The enforcement of security requirements aimed at vessels is governed by two different systems: flag state control and port state control. The flag state is the country in which the vessel is registered and flag state control can generally extend anywhere in the world that the vessel operates. A flag state that is a contracting government to International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea has responsibility for ensuring that vessels flying its flag meet international security standards and that such flag state’s standards be at least as stringent as those included in the convention’s ISPS Code. The port state is the country where the port is located. Port state control is the process by which a nation exercises its authority over foreign-flagged vessels operating in waters subject to the port state’s jurisdiction. Port state control is generally intended to ensure that vessels comply with various international and domestic requirements for ensuring safety of the port, environment, and personnel. Thus, when a foreign- flagged cruise ship enters U.S. waters or a U.S. port, the U.S. port state control program, administered by the U.S. Coast Guard, becomes an additional means of maritime security enforcement. According to an official of the Cruise Lines International Association, of the cruise lines included in our site visits, only one had a vessel registered in the United States. Hence, although they carry large numbers of U.S. passengers, the vast majority of cruise line-operated vessels generally come under U.S. authority only when they enter waters over which the United States has jurisdiction. Risk management plays an important role in homeland security. Because the United States cannot afford to protect itself against all risks, Congress has charged DHS with coordinating homeland security programs through the application of a risk management framework. In 2006, DHS issued the National Infrastructure Protection Plan, which is DHS’s base plan that guides how DHS and other relevant stakeholders should use risk management principles to prioritize protection activities within and across each critical infrastructure sector in an integrated and coordinated fashion. Updated in 2009, the National Infrastructure Protection Plan requires that federal agencies use this information to inform the selection of risk-based priorities and the continuous improvement of security strategies and programs to protect people and critical infrastructure by reducing the risk of acts of terrorism. Within the risk management framework, the National Infrastructure Protection Plan also establishes baseline criteria for conducting risk assessments. According to the National Infrastructure Protection Plan, risk assessments are a qualitative and/or quantitative determination of the likelihood of an adverse event occurring and are a critical element of the National Infrastructure Protection Plan risk management framework. Risk assessments can also help decision makers identify and evaluate potential risks so that countermeasures can be designed and implemented to prevent or mitigate the potential effects of the risks. The National Infrastructure Protection Plan characterizes risk assessment as a function of three elements: Threat: The likelihood that a particular asset, system, or network will suffer an attack or an incident. In the context of risk associated with a terrorist attack, the estimate of threat is based on the analysis of the intent and the capability of an adversary; in the context of a natural disaster or accident, the likelihood is based on the probability of occurrence. Vulnerability: The likelihood that a characteristic of, or flaw in, an asset’s, system’s, or network’s design, location, security posture, process, or operation renders it susceptible to destruction, incapacitation, or exploitation by terrorist or other intentional acts, mechanical failures, and natural hazards. Consequence: The negative effects on public health and safety, the economy, public confidence in institutions, and the functioning of government, both direct and indirect, that can be expected if an asset, system, or network is damaged, destroyed, or disrupted by a terrorist attack, natural disaster, or other incident. Information from the three elements that assess risk—threat, vulnerability, and consequence—can lead to a risk characterization and provide input for prioritizing security goals. For example, MTSA required the Coast Guard to prepare Area Maritime Security Plans for ports around the United States. These plans convey operational and physical security measures, communications procedures, timeframes for responding to security threats, and other actions to direct the prevention of and response to a security incident. In its regulations implementing MTSA, the Coast Guard gave the primary responsibility for creating the Area Maritime Security Plans primarily to the Captain of the Port, based on the Area Maritime Security Assessment. Area Maritime Security Assessments examine the threats and vulnerabilities to activities, operations, and infrastructure critical to a port and the consequences of a successful terrorist attack on the critical activities, operations, and infrastructure at the port. Under the regulations, such assessments are to be risk-based, and assess each potential threat and the consequences and vulnerabilities for each combination of targets and attack modes in the area. With the information supplied in the assessment, the Area Maritime Security Plan is to identify, among other things, the operational and physical security measures to be implemented at Maritime Security Level 1 and those that, as risks increase, will enable the area to progress to levels 2 and 3. The Coast Guard uses a tool, known as the Maritime Security Risk Analysis Model, to assess risk for various types of vessels and port infrastructure, including cruise ships and cruise ship facilities, which is in accordance with the guidance on assessing risk from DHS’s National Infrastructure Protection Plan. The Coast Guard uses the analysis tool to help implement its strategy and concentrate maritime security activities when and where relative risk is believed to be the greatest. The model assesses the risk—threats, vulnerabilities, and consequences—of a terrorist attack based on different scenarios; that is, it combines potential targets with different means of attack, as recommended by the risk assessment aspect of the National Infrastructure Protection Plan. Examples of a Maritime Security Risk Analysis Model scenario related to cruise ships include a truck bomb or a boat attack. According to the Coast Guard, the model’s underlying methodology is designed to capture the security risk facing different types of targets, allowing comparison between different targets and geographic areas at the local, regional, and national levels. Also in accordance with National Infrastructure Protection Plan, the model is designed to support decision making for the Coast Guard. At the national level, the model’s results are used for (1) long-term strategic resource planning, (2) identifying capabilities needed to combat future terrorist threats, and (3) identifying the highest-risk scenarios and targets in the maritime domain. For example, Coast Guard officials reported that results are used to refine the Coast Guard’s Operation Neptune Shield requirements for the number of required cruise ship escorts and patrols of cruise ship facilities. At the local level, the Captain of the Port can use the model as a tactical planning tool. The model can help identify the highest risk scenarios, allowing the Captain of the Port to prioritize needs and better deploy security assets. As we reported in March 2009, Intelligence Coordination Center officials stated that the Coast Guard uses the model to inform allocation decisions, such as the deployment of local resources and grants. Although in January 2010 intelligence officials working at the National Maritime Intelligence Center stated there has been no credible terrorist threat against cruise ships identified in at least the preceding 12 months, stakeholders generally agreed that waterside attacks are a concern for cruise ships, and if attacks were successfully carried out, they could have extensive consequences. Despite the lack of evidence identifying recent threats, maritime intelligence officials identified the presence of terrorist groups that have the capability to attack a cruise ship, even though they have not identified any intent. As we previously reported in 2007, security officials in the U.S. government are concerned about the possibility of a future terrorist attack in a U.S. port. For example, captured terrorist training manuals cite ports as targets and instruct trainees to use covert means to obtain surveillance information for use in attack planning. Terrorist leaders have also stated their intent to attack infrastructure targets within the United States, including ports, in an effort to cause physical and economic damage, and inflict mass casualties. In addition, as reported both by the Coast Guard and RAND, cruise ships have been terrorist targets in the past and are still considered attractive targets for terrorists. Although intelligence officials reported that there have been no recent threats against cruise ships, this does not preclude the possibility of such an incident occurring in the future. According to maritime stakeholders, some concerns regarding cruise ship security exist, particularly with respect to waterside security. According to the Coast Guard’s Strategy for Maritime Safety, Security, and Stewardship, one of the greatest risks associated with maritime scenarios is a direct attack using waterborne improvised explosive devices. Officials we interviewed from the Coast Guard’s Intelligence Coordination Center stated that waterside attacks are a concern for cruise ships. Similarly, DHS’s Small Vessel Security Strategy states that small vessels could be used as a waterborne improvised explosive device to attack maritime targets as they have in the past overseas. The strategy further states that cruise ships operate in areas that are frequented by small vessels which may easily blend or disappear into other vessel traffic in ports and the coastal maritime environment, and are usually subject to less scrutiny than larger vessels in these areas. Coast Guard personnel from all of the four Sectors and 18 of the 25 port security stakeholders we interviewed also stated that a waterside attack is one of the most significant concerns for cruise ships. At one port we visited, various stakeholders responded to reports of a small vessel operating within the security zone of a cruise ship in 2007. Although the stakeholders cleared the cruise ship for departure after searching the area around the ship and its hull with divers, the small vessel was able to get within close proximity of the cruise ship before stakeholders responded. Representatives from the Cruise Lines International Association also reported that the greatest security concern for cruise ships is a waterside attack. Waterside attacks can also occur while a cruise ship is in transit, such as when pirates in the Gulf of Aden and western Indian Ocean attacked cruise ships. For example, at least three cruise ships have been attacked by pirates on small boats while armed with automatic weapons and rocket propelled grenades. The three vessels were able to evade the pirates by either maneuvering or fighting back. Some cruise line officials we interviewed stated that they decided not to sail to places where security risks exist, but as of 2009, some continue to sail in the Gulf of Aden. One cruise ship operator we interviewed stated that the passengers who take cruises that sail in these areas tend not to be Americans and are people who are comfortable with risk. This official told us that they explain the level of risk to the passengers and their strategy for minimizing the risk. According to officials at the National Maritime Intelligence Center there is also a concern that a terrorist could get on board a cruise ship to carry out a terrorist attack. For example, in 1985, terrorists were able to board and hijack a cruise ship, the Achille Lauro, resulting in the death of a passenger. Since that attack, various additional security measures have been implemented; including screening of passengers, crew members, and their baggage. However, according to a 2006 RAND report on maritime terrorism, if terrorists were successful in gaining access to a cruise ship, once on board, they could carry out various attack scenarios. Coast Guard officials and some port security stakeholders reported that concerns also exist for cruise ship facilities at U.S. and foreign ports. Personnel from two of the four Sectors and 6 of the 25 port security stakeholders we interviewed mentioned a vehicle borne explosive at a cruise ship facility as a concern, and 5 of the 25 port security stakeholders we interviewed mentioned concern about the possible risk of an armed individual attacking others at a cruise ship facility. Further, 6 port security stakeholders expressed concerns about the security level at some foreign ports, although Coast Guard reports from foreign port site visits indicate that there are few concerns with foreign ports that cruise ships typically call upon. Specifically, six recent reports from the Coast Guard’s International Port Security Program indicate that these countries, which include some of the most frequent cruise ship destinations, are generally found to be compliant with the ISPS Code. As part of the program’s activities, the Coast Guard also recommends changes that could improve security at cruise ship facilities in some locations as a result of their visits to these locations. In addition, although the Coast Guard’s October 2009 Port Security Advisory identifies 13 countries that are not maintaining effective anti-terrorism measures, a representative from the Cruise Lines International Association stated that these countries are not typical destinations for the cruise lines that the association represents. A successful attack on a cruise ship could affect the ship, its passengers, and the U.S. economy. As a result of an attack, damage to the cruise ship could occur and the extent of the loss of life would depend on the severity of the attack, according to various studies. Coast Guard officials stated that cruise ships are built to sustain various types of attack scenarios and keep passengers safe until they are able to be rescued, and that a very large hole in the hull would have to occur to cause any significant damage to the ship. Furthermore, according to the 2006 RAND study, most experts agree that sinking a cruise ship would be extremely difficult. However, according to this report and intelligence officials, the economic consequences of an attack on a cruise ship could be significant, as a successful attack on a cruise ship could result in decreased demand for cruise vacations, affecting a multibillion dollar industry. The RAND report further states that all attack modes targeting cruise ships have comparable estimates of potential economic harm. However, parasitic bombings— which involve a diver placing a highly explosive device on the hull of the ship, ramming attacks with improvised explosive devices, and biological attacks, including those involving contamination of a ship’s food or water supply, are projected to present greater potential for human casualties. In their efforts to secure cruise ships and their attendant port facilities, the responsible stakeholders—including the Coast Guard, CBP, Transportation Security Administration (TSA), DHS, as well as cruise ship owners and cruise ship facility operators—have taken various actions to implement applicable key maritime federal laws, regulations, and guidance designed to help ensure the security of cruise ships and cruise ship facilities. The Coast Guard conducts multiple types of security activities. The Coast Guard engages in both regulatory and operational activities designed to secure cruise ships and their facilities. As part of its regulatory activities, the Coast Guard inspects cruise ship facilities and cruise ships to ensure that they are meeting security requirements. Under SAFE Port Act amendments to MTSA, the Coast Guard is required to conduct security inspections of MTSA-regulated maritime facilities, including cruise ship facilities, at least twice a year to verify the effectiveness of the facilities’ security plans, and one of these inspections must be conducted without prior notice to the facility. During our observations of two cruise ship facility inspections, Coast Guard inspectors reviewed the security plan, checked to ensure that guards were at designated access points, and questioned facility personnel on security procedures. See figure 2 for a photograph depicting a Coast Guard inspection of a cruise ship facility. In addition to the inspection of cruise facilities, to enforce security and safety provisions under international agreements, domestic legislation and Coast Guard guidance, the Coast Guard also inspects cruise ships entering U.S. ports. Coast Guard guidance states that cruise ships are subject to security inspections as determined necessary by a risk-based targeting process to ensure that cruise ships are complying with security regulations and conventions. Vessels that have not been inspected in the last 12 months are subject to an inspection upon port arrival under this targeting process. Coast Guard officials stated that security examinations on high- capacity passenger vessels can be both announced and unannounced. Coast Guard officials stated that there are systems in place to identify when cruise ships and cruise ships facilities are due for inspection. Coast Guard officials stated that the Captain of the Port is responsible for ensuring that all cruise ship facilities inspections are conducted by reviewing the appropriate systems data. With respect to cruise ship inspections, Coast Guard officials stated that, at the time of our review, the agency exceeded the total number of required cruise ship security inspections. In February 2008, we reported that although Coast Guard officials told us that field units were meeting their inspection requirements for facilities, inspections may not have been documented in the Coast Guard’s database, or inspections may have been delayed by staff being diverted to meet higher-priority needs. Coast Guard officials stated that they are taking steps to rectify these issues by redesigning the database system to make it easier for the user to input data, which they expect to complete by 2011. In addition, they have created a daily report to inform local Coast Guard units when each facility is due for an inspection. Coast Guard officials stated that the agency is reviewing options on how to use its database as a method for headquarters to better track the local units’ performance in meeting their inspection requirements. The Coast Guard has also taken various operational actions designed to secure cruise ships. Through its internal guidance, the Coast Guard sets the standards for local Coast Guard units to meet for security activities, such as conducting passenger vessel escorts or security boardings. For example, Operation Neptune Shield requires Coast Guard units to escort a certain percentage of high capacity passenger vessels while in transit. These vessels include cruise ships, ferries, and excursion vessels carrying 500 or more passengers. Coast Guard data on Operation Neptune Shield performance shows that some districts did not meet their requirements for high capacity passenger vessels escorts in fiscal year 2008; however, Operation Neptune Shield allows the Captain of the Port the latitude to shift resources to other priorities when deemed necessary, for example, when resources are not available to fulfill all missions simultaneously. See figure 3 for a photograph of a Coast Guard boat escorting a cruise ship. Another Coast Guard security action involves security boardings of cruise ships. Such security boardings are done to verify the information submitted in advance of the ship’s arrival; verify that the ship and crew are operating as expected; and to act on intelligence. In 2008, the Coast Guard conducted pre-entry security boardings on some, but not all, cruise ships at major U.S. ports. According to Coast Guard officials, these boardings were conducted because these cruise ships met certain criteria under the Coast Guard’s targeting process. By regulation and at the discretion of the Captain of the Port, Coast Guard units, with or without the assistance of local law enforcement, may partake in other security measures as well. One such security measure is the enforcement of security zones that require other vessels to remain a certain distance from cruise ships. During our site visits to the ports, we observed the enforcement of security zones. See figure 4 for a photograph depicting a local law enforcement vessel enforcing a security zone at a port. The Coast Guard also partakes in waterborne, airborne, and shoreside patrols of critical infrastructure and key resources, including cruise ship facilities. In addition to its regulatory and operational activities to protect cruise ships and their facilities in the United States, the Coast Guard’s International Port Security Program also reviews port security conditions in foreign ports and recommends actions and measures to improve the antiterrorism measures in use at such ports, pursuant to MTSA requirements. CBP reviews passenger and crew lists for terrorist and criminal connections. CBP also maintains a role in the security of cruise ships and their facilities by screening passengers and crew for terrorist connections or criminal ties, and by helping to ensure that all passengers and crew are cleared for entry into the United States. Under CBP’s implementing regulations, operators of commercial vessels such as cruise ships are required to provide CBP with advance lists of information on passengers and crew—also known as a manifest. Before a cruise ship departs or arrives in the United States, CBP checks these manifests to screen persons against certain databases, such as terrorist watchlists and the National Crime Information Center database, to determine their potential risk to the United States or the cruise ship. This screening process identifies individuals with potential terrorism links or criminal warrants, as well as identifies those passengers and crew with potential immigration admissibility problems, among other things. For example, at one port we visited, we observed CBP officers removing a passenger from a cruise ship, due most likely to an outstanding criminal warrant, according to agency officials. For those cruise ships arriving in the United States, the agency also reviews the manifest to determine passenger and crew admissibility into the United States. Admissibility inspections are performed to determine the nationality and identity of each person wishing to enter the United States and for preventing the entry of ineligible aliens, including those thought to be criminals, terrorists, or drug traffickers. In the case of cruises originating at Canadian ports for U.S. destinations, CBP officials stated that CBP checks the admissibility of all passengers prior to the cruise ship departing Canada. Finally, agency officials reported that they inspect all passengers and crew before they enter into the United States when they disembark cruise ships, including those passengers whom CBP inspected while in Canada. TSA primarily has a supporting role. TSA’s role in cruise ship security is primarily as an advisor on transportation security screening and technologies. The agency also coordinates with the Coast Guard on security training and port security surge operations. TSA officials stated that the agency has conducted explosives and radiation screening technology pilot programs for passenger vessels and facilities, which include cruise ships, as part of its Security Enhancement and Capabilities Augmentation Program. Designed specifically for the maritime environment, TSA documents state that the program gives TSA the opportunity to network with different ferry and cruise ship operators around the United States, test emerging technologies, and develop strategies that the agency can use to respond to specific threats that arise from new intelligence or major events. Since February 2003, TSA officials stated that the agency has visited over 12 venues to test new technologies for screening passengers, ships, baggage, and stores to be loaded on passenger vessels, and that the goal of the pilot programs is to determine how the technologies work in different environments and in large scale application. The Security Enhancement and Capabilities Augmentation Program pilots can also provide operators with justification for grant funding, according to TSA. The pilots also give local agencies opportunities to observe and try the technologies. TSA officials stated that TSA shares the results of its pilots with the Cruise Lines International Association and cruise ship facility operators, including both pilot participants and nonparticipants. Although TSA does not track cruise ship facility operators that have implemented new technologies as a result of the TSA screening pilots, TSA officials reported that five facility operators, which included cruise ship operators, have adopted new technologies as a result of a TSA pilot program. TSA officials stated that TSA also creates and distributes security training courses for passenger vessel employees. The courses address topics to improve employees’ security awareness, increase the effectiveness of their reactions to suspicious items and persons, and assist in their efforts to respond to a transportation security incident. According to TSA officials, the agency’s involvement in surge operations is primarily through its Visible Intermodal Prevention and Response program. The program’s deployments involve the use of the agency’s assets, including explosive detection capabilities, transportation security officers, Federal Air Marshals and behavior detection officers—to help enhance the security of any transportation mode. Officials stated that since 2006 there have been 180 Visible Intermodal Prevention and Response maritime deployments. DHS developed a strategy to address the small vessel threat. DHS released the Small Vessel Security Strategy in April 2008 as part of its effort to mitigate the vulnerability of vessels—including cruise ships—to waterside attacks from small vessels, and the implementation plan for the strategy is under review. According to the strategy, its intent is to reduce potential security and safety risks posed by small vessels through operations that balance fundamental freedoms, adequate security, and continued economic stability. The goals of the Small Vessel Security Strategy are to (1) develop and leverage a strong partnership with the small vessel community and public and private sectors; (2) enhance maritime security and safety; (3) leverage technology to enhance the ability to detect, determine intent, and when necessary, interdict small vessels; and (4) enhance coordination, cooperation, and communications between federal, state, local, and tribal stakeholders, the private sector, and international partners. Subsequent to the development of the strategy, DHS began drafting a plan to implement the goals of its strategy. In January 2010, a DHS official stated that the implementation plan was currently awaiting approval by the Deputy Secretary of DHS, after which it would need to be sent to the Office of Management and Budget for review. Subsequent to the Office of Management and Budget’s approval, the implementation plan would be released. In September 2009, DHS’s Office of Inspector General produced a report that identified concerns with the Small Vessel Security Strategy and the draft version of its implementation plan. According to the report, while DHS had made progress in responding to potential small vessel threats, more remained to be done to provide effective guidance and operate effective programs to address small vessel threats. In addition, the Office of Inspector General recommended that DHS develop a more comprehensive strategy by (1) addressing the desirable characteristics and elements missing from its strategy and draft implementation plan and (2) evaluating the effectiveness of programs intended to support small vessel security before including them as part of its solution to improve security against the small vessel threats. DHS partially concurred with the Office of Inspector General’s first recommendation and plans to address this recommendation in the execution of its implementation plan. DHS did not concur with the Office of Inspector General’s second recommendation to evaluate the effectiveness of programs intended to support small vessel security, stating that the agencies that submitted specific actions for the implementation plan had already considered their effectiveness to support small vessel security. Cruise ship and facility operators implemented various security actions on board cruise ships and at facilities. Pursuant to the ISPS Code and its guidance, and Coast Guard’s implementing MTSA regulations and guidance like other regulated vessels and facilities, cruise ship and cruise ship facility operators must develop and implement security plans that address vulnerabilities identified in their security assessments. ISPS- regulated cruise ship and cruise ship facility operators are also required to ensure security assessments are completed and inspections are conducted to ensure they are meeting security requirements. Under Coast Guard regulations specifically directed to cruise ship facility operators, cruise ship facilities must meet additional security requirements, such as implementing measures to screen all persons, bags, and personal effects for dangerous substances and devices; check the identification of all persons trying to enter the facility; designate holding, waiting, or embarkation areas within the facility's secure area to segregate screened persons and their personal effects from unscreened persons and their personal effects; and provide additional security personnel to designated holding, waiting, or embarkation areas within the facility’s secure area, among other things. Similarly, cruise ship operators, under Coast Guard regulations specifically directed to cruise ships, must also meet additional security requirements, including the screening of all persons, bags, and personal effects for dangerous substances and devices; checking the identification of all persons attempting to board the cruise ship; and performing security patrols. To address such requirements in their security plans, stakeholders reported using various measures such as the presence of security guards or local law enforcement, and the use of cameras, vehicle checkpoints, canines, access control measures, and dive teams. See figure 5 for a photograph depicting truck unloading areas and canine screening of stores to be loaded onto a cruise ship. Cruise ship and cruise ship facility operators may use local law enforcement and security contractors to help meet security requirements. We also observed security contractors conducting passenger screening and noted the presence of local law enforcement at the facilities during a port visit. Although the Coast Guard has identified security-related deficiencies for cruise ship facilities and cruise ships, agency officials stated that cruise ship and cruise ship facility operators generally maintain good security measures. Of the over 1,900 cruise ship facility inspections the Coast Guard conducted in calendar years 2006 through 2008, Coast Guard data show 347 deficiencies recorded for all cruise ship facilities. Coast Guard officials stated that cruise ship facilities tend to have more requirements than other types of port facilities but also tend to better implement security measures, and that most deficiencies are corrected at the time of the inspection. Officials further stated that there was a decline in the number of cruise ship facility deficiencies in 2008, indicating that these facility operators have a better understanding of SAFE Port Act requirements. Personnel from the four Sectors we met with had issued few enforcement actions against cruise ship facilities in 2008—with one of the four Sectors issuing three letters of warning against a cruise ship facility for concerns related to access control. Of the over 1,500 foreign cruise ship vessel inspections the Coast Guard conducted in calendar years 2006 through 2008, Coast Guard data shows 18 security-related deficiencies for foreign cruise ship operators. Violations were generally related to issues with the cruise ship’s access control or restricted areas. Coast Guard officials stated that cruise ship vessel deficiencies tend to be less significant than those for other vessel types, and attributed this to the seriousness in which cruise ship operators approach security and the fact that these operators have a professional staff dedicated to security duties. Officials we interviewed from the four Coast Guard Sectors we visited stated that they had not issued any enforcement actions against a cruise ship in 2008, although personnel from one Sector stated that it had to delay a cruise ship because of a document violation. Furthermore, federal officials and cruise ship operators we interviewed reported that cruise lines implemented security measures beyond what is required of them. Federal officials, including Coast Guard officials, told us that because of the significant impact that a cruise ship attack could have on the industry, the cruise lines are very serious about security. The five cruise ship operators we interviewed all stated that their daily security operations are comparable to what the Coast Guard requires at elevated threat levels. According to cruise ship operators, the actions taken by cruise ship operators to ensure security include making risk-based decisions regarding which ports to call on, whether to conduct additional screening on board ships at foreign ports, whether to require foreign governments to take additional actions to secure their ports, and providing their own security protocols at their private ports of call. Specifically, cruise ship operators stated that they have cancelled planned destinations because of security conditions in some locations. According to these operators, these decisions have been triggered by various factors such as the heightened security concerns following the November 2008 terrorist attack in Mumbai, India, piracy activity in the Gulf of Aden, and intelligence reports. Stakeholders reported using various coordination efforts. As part of their efforts to secure cruise ships and their facilities, representatives from the Coast Guard, Cruise Lines International Association, and other port security stakeholders reported using various coordination efforts including meetings, jointly operated command centers, and the Coast Guard’s HOMEPORT—a secure Internet communications portal between Coast Guard Sectors and the port stakeholders in their areas of responsibility. Specifically, stakeholders reported participating in the Area Maritime Security Committee meetings, security officer meetings, and Cruise Lines International Association security meetings According to Cruise Lines International Association representatives, the association has hosted regular security meetings every 60 days for over 10 years, and coordinates with several intelligence agencies for these meetings, including the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Office of Naval Intelligence, the Department of State’s Overseas Security Advisory Council, Coast Guard, and CBP. Furthermore, Cruise Lines International Association representatives stated that most of the security directors for the cruise lines are former military or law enforcement officers, who bring established contacts and relationships in the security and intelligence fields with them to the private sector. Personnel from all four Coast Guard Sectors and all 25 port security stakeholders we met with generally reported positive relationships among the stakeholders. Four of the 25 stakeholders, however, mentioned some challenges working with federal agencies. For example, 1 stakeholder stated that initially there was some uncertainty about who had authority to make decisions about cruise ship operations, the Coast Guard or CBP, but that it had become clearer over time. The Coast Guard has plans to implement new maritime security awareness efforts to enhance the security of cruise ship operations. One of these efforts is intended to mitigate the threat posed by a small vessel attack. According to federal agencies, the U.S. government has limited information on recreational vessels, and it is difficult to detect a small vessel attack without prior intelligence. DHS documents state that the U.S. government has incomplete knowledge of the recreational boating public, their travel patterns, and the facilities they use, and that identifying and distinguishing legitimate small vessel users from those with intent to harm is difficult. Further, Coast Guard and Navy studies have demonstrated challenges in stopping a small vessel attack once one is under way. As we reported in March 2009, given the number of potential threats in many areas and the short period of time in which to respond to a threat, thwarting an attack by a smaller vessel without advance knowledge of the threat may prove challenging even with available systems and equipment that track smaller and noncommercial vessels in coastal areas, inland waterways, and ports. According to one Coast Guard official, the ISPS Code contributes to the overall security of vessels but is not specifically aimed at preventing a small vessel attack. However, the Coast Guard provides armed interdiction capability that when present helps to deter small vessel attacks, according to this official. The concern about small vessel attacks is exacerbated by the fact that most cruise ships sail according to precise schedules and preplanned itineraries that are readily available through the Internet, advertising brochures, or travel agents. As a result, information that could provide valuable intelligence for terrorists is easily obtained, allowing an attacker to pick the time and place to prepare for and carry out an attack against a targeted cruise ship. To address the waterside small vessel threat nationally, the Coast Guard has piloted a new initiative to enhance public awareness called Operation Focused Lens. Operation Focused Lens is a Coast Guard District-level initiative to increase awareness of suspicious activity in and around U.S. ports. It complements Operation Neptune Shield by helping to identify, deter, and prevent a small vessel attack, and directs additional resources and effort toward gathering information about the most likely points of origin for an attack, such as marinas, landings, and boat ramps. A Coast Guard District official stated that Operation Focused Lens had minimal impact on cost and resources, as they were able to easily shift resources to meet the requirements of Operation Focused Lens. According to Coast Guard officials, the Coast Guard views Operation Focused Lens to be a best practice, and the agency is considering plans to integrate Operation Focused Lens into its community awareness program, America’s Waterway Watch, and is developing requirements to implement aspects of Operation Focused Lens at additional locations. Coast Guard officials stated that they plan to discuss the expansion of Operation Focused Lens at the April 2010 Operation Neptune Shield conference. The Coast Guard also plans to develop new security regulations for cruise ships by 2011 in response to recommendations regarding cruise ship security measures made by the National Maritime Security Advisory Committee in 2006. The advisory committee was established under authority of MTSA to provide advice to the Secretary of Homeland Security via the Commandant of the Coast Guard on matters such as national security strategy and policy, actions required to meet current and future security threats, international cooperation on security issues, and security concerns of the maritime transportation industry. In 2006, the Coast Guard asked advisory committee members to specifically review and make recommendations regarding cruise ship security measures. The advisory committee’s recommendations included: (1) developing and publishing a listing of prohibited items not allowed on board cruise ships; (2) developing equipment performance standards for screening detection equipment; and (3) developing standards for screening operations, training, and qualifications of persons engaged in screening activities at cruise ship facilities. Coast Guard officials stated that in an effort to address the National Maritime Security Advisory Committee’s recommendation, a Notice of Proposed Rule Making for Cruise Ship Security Measures is under development with a publication date expected in 2011. Coast Guard officials stated the rule making will propose regulations that will provide detailed, flexible requirements for the screening of persons, baggage and personal items intended for boarding a cruise ship, and that they are working in consultation with TSA and the National Maritime Security Advisory Committee. Given the actions taken by the Coast Guard and port security stakeholders to protect cruise ships and their facilities from terrorist attacks, Coast Guard officials stated that aside from its planned actions, there are no additional measures that it should take or take more broadly at this time to protect cruise ships, as the current layered security practices included in vessel and facility security plans have successfully mitigated risks related to cruise ships and their facilities. Detailed information regarding these cases is security sensitive information. CBP earlier than manifest data, providing the agency with additional time to complete its passenger targeting process. CBP program officials reported that having access to Passenger Name Record data for cruise line passengers could offer benefits similar to those derived from screening airline passengers, although CBP has not conducted a study or evaluation measuring the benefits, or determining the potential cost to the agency, cruise lines, and cruise line passengers. Our previous work identified evaluations as a way for agencies to explore the benefits of a program. In addition, CBP’s 2005-2010 Strategic Plan states that the agency should seek to improve the identification and targeting of potential terrorists and terrorist weapons, through risk management and automated advanced and enhanced information. Furthermore, a January 2010 Presidential memorandum states that DHS should aggressively pursue enhanced screening technology, protocols, and procedures, especially in regard to aviation and other transportation sectors, consistent with privacy rights and civil liberties. CBP does not require this information from all cruise lines on a systematic basis, although CBP reported that some CBP field units have access to some cruise lines’ reservation systems and have received Passenger Name Record data on a case-by-case basis to enhance the information they have on passengers already identified for screening using other means. However, since field units do not have the same analytical tools as the National Targeting Center, they are less able to fully utilize the Passenger Name Record data on a systematic basis. CBP program officials stated that if the agency were to begin receiving and reviewing cruise line Passenger Name Record data, the effort would be highly automated and could allow for more effective and efficient targeting since the agency would receive the data earlier. Officials from CBP’s Office of Information and Technology, however, stated that without specific requirements and further knowledge about the cruise lines’ connectivity capabilities it is difficult to estimate the cost to both CBP and the cruise lines of implementing the technological aspects of a requirement to obtain Passenger Name Record data from the cruise lines. Based on CBP’s experience with implementing such a requirement for the air carriers, CBP’s Office of Information and Technology officials stated that there were costs to CBP and the air carriers for infrastructure, licensing, and ongoing maintenance; however, the cost depended on the air carrier’s existing system and infrastructure at the time the requirement was being implemented. As of January 2010, CBP was spending about $3 million per year to maintain connections with most of the air carriers, and officials stated that creating and maintaining connections with cruise line reservation systems would require new infrastructure and costs. According to a representative from the Cruise Lines International Association, the cruise lines would be willing to systematically share all Passenger Name Record data with CBP if required to do so. However, the Cruise Lines International Association did not know if this type of requirement would deter passengers from booking cruises. One cruise line official we interviewed stated that such a requirement would not be a major burden for their cruise line to implement, while another cruise line official stated that such a requirement could have significant cost implications for their cruise line depending on what data would be required and what requirements would be established for transmitting it to CBP, among other things. In addition to assessing the impact that such a data requirement would have on agency and industry resources, other aspects of such a requirement, such as verifying the agency’s statutory authority and assessing the impact on privacy issues, would also be important to study. Although CBP program officials stated that the agency’s regulations for collecting Passenger Name Record data apply to passengers traveling on international flights and not passengers on cruise ships, CBP officials, including a representative from CBP’s Chief Counsel, reported that various statutory authorities collectively provide the agency with the authority to require such information from the cruise lines. In addition, similar to the Passenger Name Record data requirement for air carriers, other important considerations for determining the cost and benefit of such a requirement for the cruise lines would be (1) assessing the privacy impacts of such a requirement on cruise passengers and developing any necessary public disclosure documents, and (2) determining the appropriate agreements that may be needed with other countries regarding the sharing and collection of this data. The Privacy Act of 1974 and the E-Government Act of 2002, in general, require federal agencies to protect personal privacy by, among other ways, limiting the disclosure of personal information and informing the public about how personal data are being used and protected. The E-Government Act and implementing Office of Management and Budget guidance require that agencies analyze how information is handled to (1) ensure handling conforms to applicable legal, regulatory, and policy requirements regarding privacy; (2) determine the risks and effects of collecting, maintaining, and disseminating information in identifiable form in an electronic information system; and (3) examine and evaluate protections and alternative processes for handling information to mitigate potential privacy risks. Another privacy consideration would be the availability of a redress mechanism for individuals who felt that they had been unfairly denied boarding as a result of the screening process. As reported in DHS’s 2006 report on Privacy and Civil Liberties, a robust redress program is essential for any federal program that uses personal information in order to grant or deny to individuals a right, privilege, or benefit. DHS’s Traveler Redress Inquiry Program serves as a single point of contact for individuals who have inquiries or seek resolution regarding difficulties they experienced during their travel screening at transportation hubs—like airports and train stations—or crossing U.S. borders. With respect to the collection of Passenger Name Record data from other countries, the privacy laws of other countries must also be considered. For example, in 2002, when air carriers operating international flights to and from the United States were first required to submit Passenger Name Record data to CBP, concerns about privacy were raised, and a permanent agreement on the sharing of this data between the United States and the European Union took several years to finalize. Without obtaining full information on the benefit and cost of requiring cruise lines to submit Passenger Name Record data to CBP and considering the associated privacy implications, CBP is not in the best position to determine whether the benefits of such a requirement would outweigh the potential costs to the agency and industry, and the risks to passenger privacy. Given the number of passengers that travel on cruise ships each year and the attractiveness of these vessels as terrorist targets, it is important that the risk to cruise ships is assessed and actions are taken to help ensure the security of these ships and their facilities. Federal agencies and maritime security stakeholders, including cruise lines, have implemented various measures to better secure cruise ships and their facilities. As examples, the Coast Guard provides escorts for cruise ships to prevent waterside attacks and CBP screens passengers using manifest data to prevent terrorists from boarding cruise ships. Although these measures have been implemented and there has been no recent credible terrorist threat against cruise ships, this does not preclude the possibility of such an incident occurring in the future, particularly given the existence of terrorist groups that have the capability to attack a cruise ship. Moreover, the President’s 2010 memorandum directing DHS to aggressively pursue enhanced screening efforts further underscores the potential importance of this type of security action. By conducting a study to determine whether requiring cruise lines to provide automated Passenger Name Record data on a systematic basis is cost effective and addresses privacy implications, CBP would be in a better position to determine whether additional actions should be taken to augment security through enhanced screening of cruise ship passengers. To enhance the existing screening process for cruise ship passengers, we recommend that the CBP Commissioner conduct a study to determine whether requiring cruise lines to provide automated Passenger Name Record data to CBP on a systematic basis would benefit homeland security, and if found to be of substantial benefit, determine the appropriate mechanism through which to issue this requirement. The scope of the study should include potential benefits to security, any need for additional authority and international agreements, resource implications for CBP and the cruise industry, privacy concerns, and any implementation issues related to the automated transfer of Passenger Name Record data from the cruise lines to CBP. We provided a draft of this report to the Departments of Homeland Security, State, and Defense for their review and comment. The Department of State responded that they did not have any comments on the report. We requested comments from the Department of Defense, but none were provided. The Department of Homeland Security, in its written comments, concurred with our findings and recommendation. Regarding our recommendation, DHS responded that CBP will conduct a study that outlines the security, cost, and facilitation benefits an automated Passenger Name Record system would bring to homeland security and the cruise line industry. Upon completion of the study, CBP will determine if the benefits of such a program are substantial enough to pursue full implementation of the program. DHS officials also provided technical comments on the draft that have been incorporated, as appropriate. Written comments from DHS are reproduced in appendix I. As arranged with your office we plan no further distribution until 30 days after the date of this report. At that time, we will send copies of this report to the Secretaries of Homeland Security, State, and Defense, and other interested parties. In addition, the report will be available on GAO's Web site at http://www.gao.gov. In addition to the contact named above, Dawn Hoff, Assistant Director, and Jonathan Bachman, analyst-in-charge, managed this assignment. Tracey Cross made significant contributions to the work. Stanley Kostyla assisted with design and methodology. Geoffrey Hamilton provided legal support. Linda Miller provided assistance in report preparation. Josh Ormond developed the report’s graphic. Supply Chain Security: Feasibility and Cost-Benefit Analysis Would Assist DHS and Congress in Assessing and Implementing the Requirement to Scan 100 Percent of U.S.-Bound Containers. GAO-10-12. Washington, D.C.: October 30, 2009. Maritime Security: Vessel Tracking Systems Provide Key Information, but the Need for Duplicate Data Should be Reviewed. GAO-09-337. Washington, D.C.: March 17, 2009. Supply Chain Security: CBP Works with International Entities to Promote Global Customs Security Standards and Initiatives, but Challenges Remain. GAO-08-538. Washington, D.C.: August 15, 2008. Maritime Security: National Strategy and Supporting Plans Were Generally Well-Developed and Are Being Implemented. GAO-08-672. Washington, D.C.: June 20, 2008. Supply Chain Security: Challenges to Scanning 100 Percent of U.S.- Bound Cargo Containers. GAO-08-533T. Washington, D.C.: June 12, 2008. Supply Chain Security: U.S. Customs and Border Protection Has Enhanced Its Partnership with Import Trade Sectors, but Challenges Remain in Verifying Security Practices. GAO-08-240. Washington, D.C.: April 25, 2008. Maritime Security: Coast Guard Inspections Identify and Correct Facility Deficiencies, but More Analysis Needed of Program’s Staffing, Practices, and Data. GAO-08-12. Washington, D.C.: February 14, 2008. Supply Chain Security: Examination of High-Risk Cargo at Foreign Seaports Have Increased, but Improved Data Collection and Performance Measures Are Needed. GAO-08-187. Washington, D.C.: January 25, 2008. Maritime Security: Federal Efforts Needed to Address Challenges in Preventing and Responding to Terrorist Attacks on Energy Commodity Tankers. GAO-08-141. Washington, D.C.: December 10, 2007. Maritime Security: The SAFE Port Act: Status and Implementation One Year Later. GAO-08-126T. Washington, D.C.: October 30, 2007. Combating Nuclear Smuggling: Additional Actions Needed to Ensure Adequate Testing of Next Generation Radiation Detection Equipment. GAO-07-1247T. Washington, D.C.: September 18, 2007. Information on Port Security in the Caribbean Basin. GAO-07-804R. Washington, D.C.: June 29, 2007. Port Risk Management: Additional Federal Guidance Would Aid Ports in Disaster Planning and Recovery. GAO-07-412. Washington, D.C.: March 28, 2007. Maritime Security: Public Safety Consequences of a Terrorist Attack on a Tanker Carrying Liquefied Natural Gas Need Clarification. GAO-07-316. Washington, D.C.: February 22, 2007. Coast Guard: Observations on the Preparation, Response, and Recovery Missions Related to Hurricane Katrina. GAO-06-903. Washington, D.C.: July 31, 2006. Maritime Security: Information Sharing Efforts Are Improving. GAO-06-933T. Washington, D.C.: July 10, 2006. Cargo Container Inspections: Preliminary Observations on the Status of Efforts to Improve the Automated Targeting System. GAO-06-591T. Washington, D.C.: March 30, 2006. Risk Management: Further Refinements Needed to Assess Risks and Prioritize Protective Measures at Ports and Other Critical Infrastructure. GAO-06-91. Washington, D.C.: December 15, 2005. Homeland Security: Key Cargo Security Programs Can Be Improved. GAO-05-466T. Washington, D.C.: May 26, 2005. Maritime Security: Enhancements Made, But Implementation and Sustainability Remain Key Challenges. GAO-05-448T. Washington, D.C.: May 17, 2005. Container Security: A Flexible Staffing Model and Minimum Equipment Requirements Would Improve Overseas Targeting and Inspection Efforts. GAO-05-557. Washington, D.C.: April 26, 2005. Maritime Security: New Structures Have Improved Information Sharing, but Security Clearance Processing Requires Further Attention. GAO-05-394. Washington, D.C.: April 15, 2005. Cargo Security: Partnership Program Grants Importers Reduced Scrutiny with Limited Assurance of Improved Security. GAO-05-404. Washington, D.C.: March 11, 2005. Maritime Security: Better Planning Needed to Help Ensure an Effective Port Security Assessment Program. GAO-04-1062. Washington, D.C.: September 30, 2004. Maritime Security: Partnering Could Reduce Federal Costs and Facilitate Implementation of Automatic Vessel Identification System. GAO-04-868. Washington, D.C.: July 23, 2004. Maritime Security: Substantial Work Remains to Translate New Planning Requirements into Effective Port Security. GAO-04-838. Washington, D.C.: June 30, 2004. Homeland Security: Summary of Challenges Faced in Targeting Oceangoing Cargo Containers for Inspection. GAO-04-557T. Washington, D.C.: March 31, 2004. Homeland Security: Preliminary Observations on Efforts to Target Security Inspections of Cargo Containers. GAO-04-325T. Washington, D.C.: December 16, 2003. Maritime Security: Progress Made in Implementing Maritime Transportation Security Act, but Concerns Remain. GAO-03-1155T. Washington, D.C.: September 9, 2003. Combating Terrorism: Interagency Framework and Agency Programs to Address the Overseas Threat. GAO-03-165. Washington, D.C.: May 23, 2003. Nuclear Nonproliferation: U.S. Efforts to Combat Nuclear Smuggling. GAO-02-989T. Washington, D.C.: July 30, 2002. Coast Guard: Vessel Identification System Development Needs to Be Reassessed. GAO-02-477. Washington, D.C.: May 24, 2002.

Summary: Over 9 million passengers departed from U.S. ports on cruise ships in 2008, and according to agency officials, cruise ships are attractive terrorist targets. GAO was asked to review cruise ship security, and this report addresses the extent to which (1) the Coast Guard, the lead federal agency on maritime security, assessed risk in accordance with the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) guidance and identified risks; and (2) federal agencies, cruise ship and facility operators, and law enforcement entities have taken actions to protect cruise ships and their facilities. GAO reviewed relevant requirements and agency documents on maritime security, analyzed 2006 through 2008 security operations data, interviewed federal and industry officials, and made observations at seven ports. GAO selected these locations based on factors such as the number of sailings from each port. Results of the visits provided additional information on security, but were not projectable to all ports. The Coast Guard has assessed the risks to cruise ships in accordance with DHS guidance--which requires that the agency analyze threats, vulnerabilities, and consequences--and, with other maritime stakeholders, identified some concerns. Specifically, agency officials reported in January 2010 that there had been no credible threats against cruise ships in the prior 12 months, but also noted the presence of terrorist groups that have the capability to attack a cruise ship. The Coast Guard, cruise ship and facility operators, and law enforcement officials generally believe waterside attacks are a concern for cruise ships. Agency officials and terrorism researchers also identified terrorists boarding a cruise ship as a concern. The Coast Guard has also identified the potential consequences of an attack, which would include potential loss of life and economic effects. Federal agencies, cruise ship and facility operators, and law enforcement entities have taken various actions to enhance the security of cruise ships and their facilities and implement related laws, regulations, and guidance, and additional actions are under way. DHS and component agencies have taken security measures such as the Coast Guard providing escorts of cruise ships during transit, and CBP's review of passenger and crew data to help target passenger inspections. Cruise ship and cruise ship facility operators' security actions have included developing and implementing security plans, among other things. The Coast Guard is also in the process of expanding a program to deter and prevent small vessel attacks, and is developing additional security measures for cruise ships. In addition, CBP's 2005-2010 Strategic Plan states that CBP should seek to improve identification and targeting of potential terrorists through automated advanced information. CBP, however, has not assessed the cost and benefit of requiring cruise lines to provide passenger reservation data, which in the aviation mode, CBP reports to be useful for the targeting of passengers for inspection. GAO's previous work identified evaluations as a way for agencies to explore the benefits of a program. If CBP conducted a study to determine whether collecting additional passenger data is cost effective and addressed privacy implications, CBP would be in a better position to determine whether additional actions should be taken to augment security.