Following problems with reconstruction efforts in Iraq in the fall of 2003, an internal State report concluded that the U.S. government had no standing civilian capacity to plan, implement, or manage stabilization and reconstruction operations; and the United States had relied on ad hoc processes for planning and executing these efforts. State recommended the establishment of a new office to provide a centralized, permanent structure for planning and coordinating the civilian response to stabilization and reconstruction operations. Accordingly, in August 2004, Secretary of State Powell announced the creation of S/CRS to coordinate U.S. efforts to prepare, plan, and resource responses to complex emergencies, failing and failed states, and post- conflict environments. Such efforts could involve establishing security, building basic public services, and supporting economic development. The Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2005 granted statutory authorization for S/CRS within the Office of the Secretary of State. In December 2005, President Bush issued NSPD-44 to improve the coordination, planning, and implementation of reconstruction and stabilization operations. NSPD-44 assigned the Secretary of State responsibility for planning and coordinating U.S. government stabilization and reconstruction operations in countries and regions at risk of, in, or in transition from conflict or civil strife. The Secretary, in turn, delegated implementation of the directive to the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization. NSPD-44 identifies the specific roles, responsibilities, and coordination requirements of U.S. government agencies that would likely participate in stabilization and reconstruction operations. It also requires State to lead the development of a civilian response capability, including the capacity to ensure that the United States can respond quickly and effectively to overseas crises. Finally, NSPD-44 established the NSC Policy Coordination Committee for Reconstruction and Stabilization Operations, which is co-chaired by the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization and NSC, and is comprised of representatives from other executive agencies. S/CRS has led an interagency effort to develop a framework for planning and coordinating U.S. stabilization and reconstruction operations. NSC has adopted two of three elements of the framework—the Interagency Management System and procedures for initiating its use. One element—a guide for planning stabilization and reconstruction operations—is still in progress. As of October 2007, the framework has not been fully applied to any operation. In addition, guidance on roles and responsibilities for State’s bureaus and offices is unclear and inconsistent, and the lack of an agreed-upon definition of a stabilization and reconstruction operation poses an obstacle to interagency collaboration. In addition, some interagency partners have shown limited support for the framework and S/CRS. Some partners described the proposed interagency planning process as cumbersome and time consuming. S/CRS is taking steps to strengthen the framework’s effectiveness by addressing agencies’ concerns and providing training to interagency partners, but differences between the planning capacities and procedures of U.S. government civilian agencies and the military pose obstacles to effective coordination. S/CRS has led an NSC interagency group to create a framework for developing specific reconstruction and stabilization plans under NSPD-44. Sixteen U.S. agencies participated in NSC interagency working groups tasked with developing the framework, including DOD. The framework is intended to guide the development of U.S. planning for reconstruction and stabilization operations by facilitating coordination across federal agencies and aligning interagency efforts at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. Key elements of the framework include the Interagency Management System (IMS) for managing high-priority and highly complex crises and operations, a guide for planning specific reconstruction and stabilization operations, procedures for initiating government-wide planning, including the IMS and the planning guide. IMS, the first element of the framework, was created to manage high- priority and highly complex crises and operations. IMS is a system for guiding communication and coordination between Washington policymakers and Chiefs of Mission, and civilian and military planners. In March 2007, NSC approved IMS and, with the Cabinet Secretaries and Deputy Secretaries, would determine whether IMS is required for a specific operation. If IMS is used, it would consist of three interagency groups: a Country Reconstruction and Stabilization Group (CRSG), an Integration Planning Cell (IPC), and an Advance Civilian Team (ACT) (see fig. 1). CRSG would be responsible for developing and integrating U.S. government policies, integrating civilian and military plans, and mobilizing civilian responses to stabilization and reconstruction operations. It would be comprised of the NSC policy coordination committee responsible for the country or region and would be supported by a secretariat comprised of staff from multiple agencies that develop the plans in conjunction with Chiefs of Mission and the U.S. military. CRSG also would mobilize resources, monitor and evaluate implementation, and coordinate with international partners. IPC would be responsible for integrating U.S. civilian agencies’ plans with military operations. IPC members would include civilian agency staff with country-specific, functional, or planning expertise. IPC would be located at the headquarters of the military combatant command responsible for planning military operations but would report to the CRSG rather than the combatant commander. IPC would not be formed when planning and implementing operations that do not require military actions. ACT would be deployed to the U.S. embassy, if one exists, to set up, coordinate, and conduct field operations and provide implementation planning and civilian-operations expertise to the Chief of Mission and military field commanders. ACT could be supported by Field Advance Civilian Teams (FACT) to help implement reconstruction and stabilization programs at the provincial or local levels. The second element of the framework, the planning guide, has not been approved by NSC because State is rewriting the guide to address interagency concerns. Although NSC is not required to approve the planning guide, S/CRS officials stated that NSC approval would strengthen the framework’s overall standing among interagency partners. Without NSC approval, the framework lacks the authority needed for interagency use. The planning guide divides planning for stabilization and reconstruction operations into three levels: policy formulation, strategy development, and implementation planning (see fig. 2). As currently envisioned, the guide states that goals and objectives at each level should be achievable; have well-defined measures for determining progress; and have goals, objectives, and planned activities that are clearly linked. At the first level of planning, policy formulation, Washington-based policymakers would articulate the overall goal or desired outcome the United States plans to achieve. At the second level, strategy development, the same Washington policymakers, in conjunction with the relevant Chiefs of Mission, would define the major objectives and essential tasks necessary to achieve the overarching policy goal, the resources necessary for completing each objective, and the implementing agency or bureau. At the third level, implementation planning, the agencies, bureaus, and overseas posts responsible for implementing the programs and tasks for achieving the objectives would develop work plans, resource requirements, and metrics for monitoring progress. The third element, which the NSC approved in March 2007, establishes procedures for using the framework when agencies are responding to an actual or imminent crisis or engaging in long-term scenario-based planning. Factors that may trigger a U.S. response to a crisis include the potential for significant military action in the near-term; actual or imminent state failure; events with significant potential to undermine regional stability and development progress, such as coups, economic collapse, or severe environmental damage; large-scale displacement of people; and impending or actual genocide, ethnic cleansing, or massive and grave human-rights violations. Planning for crisis responses may be initiated by the NSC (including the Cabinet Secretaries, Deputy Secretaries, or Policy Coordination Committees) or by a direct request from the Secretary of State or the Secretary of Defense. Long-term scenario planning may be conducted for crises that may emerge within 2 to 3 years. NSC, Chiefs of Mission, and Regional Assistant Secretaries of State may request the initiation of long-term scenario-based planning based on five criteria: (1) the potential impact on U.S. national security and foreign-policy objectives; (2) the regional impact or scale of humanitarian needs; (3) the potential for significant U.S. military involvement; (4) the probability of a crisis occurring, as indicated by U.S. government agencies, the United Nations, or other international organizations; and (5) the ability of the affected country or neighboring countries to respond to a crisis. As of October 2007, the framework has not been fully applied to any stabilization and reconstruction operation. S/CRS and interagency partners have used draft versions of the planning guide to plan operations in Haiti, Sudan, and Kosovo, but implementation of the resulting plans has been limited. Only the plan for Haiti was implemented. The plan for Sudan was not implemented because it was completed just as the government of Sudan and opposition groups signed a peace accord. Interagency planning for potential operations in Kosovo is ongoing. According to State officials, the administration is using interagency processes created in NSPD-1 National Security Council System for operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. NSPD-1 established the process for coordinating executive departments and agencies in the development and implementation of national security policies, which includes the interagency Principals Committee, Deputies Committee, and policy coordination committees. In May 2004, the President issued NSPD-36 to direct U.S. operations in Iraq following the transfer of sovereignty to the Iraqi government. This directive made State responsible for the direction, coordination, and supervision of all U.S. government employees, policies, and activities in Iraq, except those under the command of an area military commander or seconded to an international organization. According to the directive, the Commander of the U.S. Central Command—under the authority, direction, and control of the Secretary of Defense—continues to be responsible for U.S. efforts with respect to security and military operations in Iraq, including U.S. efforts in support of training and equipping Iraqi security forces. In April 2006, the U.S. embassy in Baghdad and the U.S.-led Multi-National Force-Iraq developed their first joint campaign plan for Iraq and issued a revision to their joint plan in July 2007. We found that NSPD-44, related State and administration guidance, and the planning framework collectively do not provide clear direction in three key areas. First, S/CRS’s roles and responsibilities conflict with those assigned to State’s regional bureaus and Chiefs of Mission in the Foreign Affairs Manual. Second, guidance is inconsistent regarding S/CRS’s responsibilities for conflict prevention efforts, which could compromise the office’s ability to fulfill its mandate. Third, the lack of a common definition for reconstruction and stabilization operations poses an obstacle to interagency collaboration. First, S/CRS’s roles and responsibilities conflict with those of State’s regional bureaus and Chiefs of Mission. In October 2005, we reported that collaborating agencies must agree on how to lead collaborative efforts. According to the Foreign Affairs Manual, each regional bureau is responsible for U.S. foreign relations with countries within a given region, including providing overall direction, coordination, and supervision of U.S. activities in the region. In addition, Chiefs of Mission have authority over all U.S. government staff and activities in their countries. As S/CRS initially interpreted NSPD-44, S/CRS’s roles and responsibilities included leading, planning, and coordinating stabilization and reconstruction operations; these responsibilities conflict with those of the regional bureaus and Chiefs of Mission. S/CRS officials stated that they expected the next version of the Foreign Affairs Manual to include a clearly defined and substantive description of the office’s roles. Second, guidance varies regarding S/CRS’s responsibility for preventing conflicts. NSPD-44 and the memo announcing S/CRS’s creation include conflict prevention as one of the office’s responsibilities. However, S/CRS’s authorizing legislation and the State memo aligning S/CRS with the Director of U.S. Foreign Assistance (DFA) do not explicitly include conflict prevention as a responsibility. Ambiguity about S/CRS’s prevention role could result in inadequate prevention efforts. A DOD official in the Global Strategic Partnerships office stated that responsibility for prevention is not currently assigned to anyone, and the work might not be done without such an assignment. Third, the lack of a common definition for reconstruction and stabilization operations poses an obstacle to effective collaboration under the framework. In our October 2005 report, we found that collaborative efforts require agency staff to define and articulate a common outcome or purpose. While the framework includes definitions for reconstruction and stabilization, it does not define what constitutes stabilization or reconstruction operations or explain how these operations differ from other types of military and civilian foreign assistance operations, such as counterinsurgency operations, counterterrorism operations, and standard development assistance. In addition, while S/CRS has developed a list of basic terms related to reconstruction and stabilization, staff from other bureaus and agencies had different definitions of these terms. As a result, it is not clear when agencies and bureaus are expected to apply the framework. S/CRS staff said that it is difficult to clearly define reconstruction and stabilization and difficult to determine when a response to a crisis constitutes a reconstruction or stabilization operation. Prior GAO work shows that the lack of a clear definition can pose an obstacle to improved planning and coordination of reconstruction and stabilization operations. In our previous report on DOD’s stability operations approach, GAO found that the lack of a clear and consistent definition of stability operations caused confusion among military planners and limited progress in strengthening stability-operations capability. State and other U.S. civilian agencies have concerns about the planning framework for three key reasons. First, some civilian interagency partners are concerned that S/CRS is assuming their traditional roles and responsibilities. Staff from one of State’s regional bureaus believed that S/CRS had enlarged its role in a way that conflicted with the Regional Assistant Secretary’s responsibility for leading an operation and coordinating with interagency partners. USAID staff noted how their agency had planned and coordinated reconstruction operations in the past and questioned why S/CRS now had these roles. Although most agency staff and outside experts we interviewed agreed that interagency coordination should improve, some USAID and State employees questioned why NSC was not given the primary role for planning and coordinating stabilization and reconstruction operations or for implementing NSPD-44. USAID and regional bureau staffs also said some aspects of the planning framework were unrealistic, ineffective, and redundant since interagency teams had already devised planning processes for ongoing operations in accordance with NSPD-1. For example, planning for U.S. assistance to Sudan and Darfur before 2005 was led by State’s Bureau of African Affairs. In 2005, S/CRS applied an early version of the planning guide to ongoing efforts in Sudan. USAID staff involved in both the regional bureau-led planning and S/CRS-led planning stated they were frustrated that S/CRS staff were not well-versed in Sudan policy and had to be educated before planning could occur. Other staff said S/CRS should focus more on filling the gaps in planning and operational mechanisms and focus less on policy development. Concerns about roles and responsibilities have led to confusion and disputes about who should lead policy development and control resource allocation. As a result, some of State’s regional bureaus have resisted applying the new interagency planning process to particular reconstruction and stabilization operations. S/CRS staff said one regional bureau discouraged the office’s involvement in a country that S/CRS identified as appropriate for the framework; another bureau is generally reluctant to allow S/CRS to participate in its efforts in the region. In addition, State and other agency staff said S/CRS had conflicts with DFA over which office controlled resource allocation for these operations. These disputes made it difficult for S/CRS to coordinate and plan reconstruction and stabilization operations using the framework. Second, some interagency partners stated that senior officials have provided limited support for S/CRS and its planning framework. In our October 2005 report, we stated that committed leadership from all levels of an organization is needed to overcome the barriers that exist when working across agency boundaries. Staffs from various State offices said senior officials did not communicate strong support for S/CRS or the expectation that State and interagency partners should follow its framework for planning and coordinating reconstruction and stabilization operations. In addition, S/CRS was not selected to lead planning for recent high-priority operations. When the office was created in 2004, S/CRS and other State officials agreed that it would not focus efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq because these operations had existing processes, and policymakers feared that the scope of those operations would overwhelm S/CRS. However, S/CRS has not been given key roles for operations that emerged after its creation, such as the ongoing efforts in Lebanon and Somalia, which several officials and experts stated are the types of operations S/CRS was created to address. These officials and experts stated that S/CRS has a large responsibility but little authority and no resources to achieve it. Third, interagency partners believe the planning process, as outlined in the draft planning guide, is too cumbersome and time consuming for the results it produces. Officials who participated in the planning for Haiti stated that the process provided more systematic planning, better identification of interagency goals and responsibilities, and better identification of sequencing and resource requirements. However, some officials involved in planning operations for Haiti and Sudan stated that using the framework was time consuming, involved long meetings and extra work hours for staff, and was cumbersome to use because it was overly focused on process details. Staff also said that, in some cases, the planning process did not improve outcomes or increase resources, particularly since S/CRS has few resources to offer. Other officials were frustrated when S/CRS processes were applied to interagency planning efforts that they believed were already functioning. As a result of these concerns, officials from some offices and agencies expressed reluctance to work with S/CRS on future reconstruction and stabilization plans. State is taking steps to strengthen the framework by revising and updating its draft planning guide based on feedback from other agencies and participants. S/CRS said it would commit to ensuring that the S/CRS- facilitated planning process is not duplicative or overly burdensome relative to its results and intends to provide assistance to State regional bureaus. S/CRS also said the revisions would provide more details about the framework’s implementation at the field level and metrics to assess progress. State officials also said S/CRS’s realignment under DFA would strengthen S/CRS’s control over reconstruction and stabilization resources. On March 12, 2007, the Secretary of State aligned S/CRS with DFA, while still maintaining a direct reporting relationship between S/CRS and the Office of the Secretary. DFA is charged with reorganizing U.S. foreign assistance and has authority over all State and USAID foreign-assistance funding and programs. However, it is not clear how the change will affect S/CRS’s role and the use of the framework. DFA has procedures and tools to guide the development of operational plans for foreign assistance, and its staff said some of those processes would likely be applied to S/CRS planning. According to S/CRS officials, S/CRS and DFA have recently developed a more productive working relationship than they had in the past. For example, the two organizations recently settled a dispute over funds State could receive from DOD under section 1207 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006. This act authorized the Secretary of Defense to transfer up to $100 million per year in fiscal years 2006 and 2007 to State to be applied to stabilization and reconstruction operations. According to State and DOD staff, in 2006 only $10 million was transferred to State due to a dispute between S/CRS and DFA over which office controlled the money. However, according to the March 2007 memo aligning S/CRS with DFA, S/CRS would be responsible for overseeing the transfer and use of these funds. S/CRS provided documents that indicated that State had obligated approximately $99.7 million of the $100 million available under section 1207 for fiscal year 2007. This funding was applied to ongoing stabilization and reconstruction operations in Haiti, Nepal, Columbia, Yemen, and Somalia; to the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership; and to infrastructure, economic development, rule of law programs, and counterterrorism activities in the Philippines, Indonesia, and Malaysia. In addition, S/CRS participated in DFA’s review of U.S. assistance to some countries for fiscal year 2008 and, as S/CRS acquires new staff, it plans to assume responsibility for the budget process of countries in DFA’s “rebuilding” category. Although S/CRS has not finished updating the framework guide or determined its role under DFA, it has taken other steps to strengthen the use of the framework and prepare interagency partners to coordinate effectively. For example, S/CRS offers Foreign Service Institute courses to train interagency participants in planning stabilization and reconstruction operations, leading and managing interagency coordination for such operations, and applying tools for early warning and conflict assessment. S/CRS reported that 352 federal employees participated in its training courses in 2006 and 452 employees participated in 2007. The majority of participants were from State, DOD, and USAID, although S/CRS reported that staff from seven other agencies also attended classes. Course instructors said it was difficult to attract participants from other agencies and described advertising to those agencies as ad hoc, in part because the Foreign Service Institute does not have an up-to-date list of contacts. S/CRS staff said they were exploring other strategies for recruiting course participants, such as identifying key agency leaders who agree that their staffs should attend. S/CRS also has developed tools and information to strengthen reconstruction and stabilization operations, such as information on guiding concepts and terms and tools for early warning and prevention, assessing best practices, and applying lessons learned. Although S/CRS made efforts to strengthen both coordination and the commitment of key DOD officials to the goals of S/CRS, several differences in military and civilian planning capacities and procedures pose obstacles to effective coordination. First, differences in planning capacities and resources make coordination difficult. In our report on DOD’s stability operations approach, we found that DOD and non-DOD organizations do not fully understand each other’s planning processes, and non-DOD organizations have limited capacity to participate in DOD’s full range of planning activities. State officials noted its planning differs from DOD’s; State is more focused on current operations and less focused on the wide range of potential contingency operations for which DOD must plan. State does not have a large pool of planners who can deploy to DOD’s combatant commands. DOD officials noted that their efforts to include non-DOD organizations in planning and exercise efforts were stymied by the limited number of personnel those agencies can offer. State officials indicated it does not have DOD’s capacity to staff operations and planning; both DOD and State staff doubted that civilian capacity and resources would ever match the levels desired. Second, State generally does not receive DOD military plans as they are being developed, which restricts its ability to harmonize reconstruction and stabilization efforts with military plans and operations as required by NSPD-44. DOD does not have a process in place to share, when appropriate, information with non-DOD agencies early in plan development without specific approval from the Secretary of Defense. DOD’s hierarchical approach limits interagency participation while plans are being developed by the combatant commands at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. NSPD-44 working groups are developing a process for reviewing military plans, when appropriate, but are not yet ready to use it. Third, agency staff and outside experts have found that differences in organizational structure, terminology, and information systems pose obstacles to effective coordination between military and civilian agencies. For example, S/CRS found that differences between civilian agencies’ headquarters and field organization and the strategic, operational, and tactical organization of the military can make coordination more difficult. The Administration’s July 2007 report to Congress stated it was developing common standards and systems, including blogs and other technologies, to address inconsistencies in U.S. information management systems and to support interagency collaboration and communication. In our stability operations report, we recommended that the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Secretary of State, provide implementation guidance on the mechanisms needed to facilitate and encourage interagency participation in the development of military plans; develop a process to share planning information with non-DOD agencies early in the planning process, as appropriate; and orient DOD and non- DOD personnel in each agency’s planning processes and capabilities. In commenting on the report, DOD said it partially agreed with our recommendations but did not indicate the steps it would take to implement them. State has begun developing three civilian corps to deploy rapidly to international crises but has not addressed key details for establishing and maintaining these units. First, State created two units within the department—the Active Response Corps (ARC) and the Standby Response Corps (SRC)—and has collaborated with several other U.S. government agencies to create similar units. State and other agencies, however, face challenges in establishing these units, including (1) difficulties in achieving planned staffing levels for ARC and providing training opportunities for State’s SRC volunteers, (2) agencies’ inabilities to secure resources for operations not viewed as part of their core missions, and (3) the possibility that deploying volunteers could result in their home units having insufficient staff. Second, in May 2007, State began an effort to establish the Civilian Reserve Corps (CRC), which would be made up of U.S. civilians who have skills and experiences useful for stabilization and reconstruction operations, such as civil engineers, police officers, judges, and public administrators, that are not readily available within the U.S. government. If deployed, reservists would become federal employees. State, however, does not yet have congressional authority to establish the CRC or to provide the planned benefits package for CRC personnel. In addition, State has not clearly defined the types of missions for which CRC would be deployed. Further, State has estimated the costs for establishing and keeping CRC ready to deploy, including costs for recruiting, training, equipping CRC personnel, but these estimates do not include the costs of deploying CRC personnel to other countries or sustaining them once deployed. To meet NSPD-44 requirements for developing a strong civilian response capability, State and other U.S. agencies developed internal mechanisms to reassign personnel in support of stabilization and reconstruction operations. S/CRS has taken the lead in expanding State’s internal capacity to respond to conflict by creating ARC and SRC. S/CRS also collaborated with several other U.S. government agencies to initiate the development of ARC and SRC units within those agencies. In 2006, State developed ARC within S/CRS to deploy during the initial stage of stabilization and reconstruction operations. S/CRS has 15 temporary staff positions for ARC; ARC staff serve 1-year rotations. In October 2007, 10 of the 15 authorized positions were staffed. ARC staff deploy to unstable environments to assess countries’ or regions’ needs and help plan, coordinate, and monitor a U.S. government response. Since 2006, ARC staff have deployed to seven locations: (1) Sudan, to help implement the Darfur Peace Agreement; (2) Eastern Chad, to monitor the displacement of civilians resulting from the conflict in Darfur; (3) Lebanon, to assist with the evacuation of American citizens and to coordinate assistance immediately following the Israeli-Hezbollah conflict; (4) Kosovo, to help plan for a follow-on to the United Nations Mission to Kosovo; (5) Liberia, to coordinate reforms of the security sector; (6) Iraq, to assist with integrating new Provincial Reconstruction Team members; and (7) Haiti, to plan the implementation and oversight of programs to improve security, local government capacity, and economic opportunity in Cité Soleil. According to S/CRS, regional bureau staff, and State’s Office of the Inspector General, ARC involvement and performance in these operations has been positive. When not deployed, ARC members engage in training and other planning exercises and work with other S/CRS offices and State bureaus on related issues to gain relevant expertise. SRC would deploy during the second stage of a surge to stabilization and reconstruction operations. SRC works to support activities of ARC when additional staff or specialized skills are required. Unlike ARC, SRC does not have not dedicated staff positions. Rather, when not deployed, current employees on the SRC roster serve in other capacities throughout State. Currently, SRC is composed of about 90 State employees and 210 State retirees. In July 2007, NSC approved S/CRS plans to increase SRC to a roster of 500 volunteers government-wide by fiscal year 2008, and to a roster of 2,000 volunteers government-wide by fiscal year 2009. If called upon, SRC members would be available for deployment within 60 days and could be deployed for up to 6 months. According to S/CRS staff, the office aims to have up to one-quarter of this standby corps ready for deployment at any one time. However, to date, S/CRS has deployed SRC members to only two ongoing operations: one to Sudan in support of the Darfur Peace Agreement and one to Chad to support refugees from Eastern Darfur. Although S/CRS has started working with other U.S. agencies to establish units similar to ARC and SRC, these efforts are in very early stages. Currently, only USAID and the Department of the Treasury have established mechanisms for responding rapidly to stability and reconstruction missions. USAID uses the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance and the Office of Transition Initiatives to respond to conflict situations. In addition, USAID has started developing its own internal surge capacity and has identified 15 staff available for immediate deployment to crises. USAID’s Bureau of Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance developed a proposal to create a civilian reserve office to respond to stabilization and reconstruction operations and requested funds to hire, train, equip, and deploy more than 50 staff specifically for this purpose. The Department of the Treasury’s Office of Technical Assistance has ongoing programs around the world and intends to build the capacity to lead long-term stability operations. In addition, the Office of Technical Assistance developed the First Responder Initiative in 2004, which includes approximately 30 staff who are willing to deploy rapidly to conflict areas in support of stabilization and reconstruction operations. State and other agencies face challenges in establishing their rapid response capabilities. These challenges include (1) difficulties in achieving planned staffing levels for ARC and providing training opportunities for State’s SRC volunteers, (2) agencies’ inability to secure resources for operations not viewed as part of their core missions, and (3) the possibility that deploying agency staff and SRC volunteers would result in staff shortages in their home units. S/CRS has had difficulty establishing positions and recruiting for ARC and training SRC members. S/CRS plans to increase the number of authorized staff positions for ARC from 15 temporary positions to 33 permanent positions, which State included in its 2008 budget request. However, according to S/CRS staff, it is unlikely that State will receive authority to establish all 33 positions. Although S/CRS has not had difficulty recruiting SRC volunteers, it does not presently have the capacity to ensure they are properly trained for participating in stabilization and reconstruction operations. ARC staff and SRC volunteers would be required to complete five courses offered jointly by S/CRS and the Foreign Service Institute. According to S/CRS staff, the Foreign Service Institute does not currently have the capacity to train the 1,500 new volunteers S/CRS plans to recruit in 2009. S/CRS is studying ways to correct the situation. Although other agencies have begun to develop a stabilization and reconstruction response capacity, most have limited numbers of staff available for rapid responses to overseas crises. Most agencies’ missions are domestic in nature. Nonetheless, domestic policy agencies, including the Departments of Homeland Security and Justice, operate overseas programs. However, officials from these agencies said international programs are viewed as extensions of their domestic missions. As a result, it is difficult for these agencies to secure funding for cadres of on- call first and second responders. Finally, State and other agencies said that deploying volunteers can leave home units without sufficient staff and, as a result, they must weigh the value of deploying volunteers against the needs of their units. For example, when not deployed to stabilization and reconstruction operations, current State SRC volunteers serve normal duty rotations at overseas posts or within State’s various bureaus and offices within the United States. According to State’s Office of the Inspector General, S/CRS has had difficulty getting State’s other units to release the SRC volunteers it wants to deploy in support of stabilization and reconstruction operations. The home units of the volunteers do not want to become short of staff or lose high-performing staff to other operations. Other agencies reported a reluctance to deploy staff overseas or establish on-call units because doing so would leave fewer workers available to complete the offices’ work requirements. Some civilian agencies recently agreed to identify, train, and deploy employees to stabilization and reconstruction operations provided that State fund the efforts. According to S/CRS staff, however, the training and deployment of non-State ARC and SRC would not begin until fiscal year 2009. In 2004, S/CRS developed an initial concept for CRC, which would be deployed in support of stabilization and reconstruction operations. CRC would be comprised of U.S. civilians who have skills and experiences useful for stabilization and reconstruction operations, such as civil engineers, police officers, judges, and public administrators, that are not readily available within the U.S. government. Reservists would serve 4- year terms of voluntary service and, if called upon, would deploy for rotations of up to 1 year. Reservists would remain in their daily jobs until called upon for service and would be ready for deployment within 30 to 60 days. Deployed CRC personnel would be classified as full-time term federal employees, with the authority to speak for the U.S. government and manage U.S. government contracts and employees. Volunteers would receive training upon joining CRC and would be required to complete annual training. In addition, they would receive training specific and relevant to an operation immediately before deployment. According to S/CRS staff, NSC has approved plans to develop a roster of 2,000 volunteers by fiscal year 2009; however, a BearingPoint study commissioned by S/CRS found that CRC would require at least 3,550 volunteers to respond to CRC goals. The BearingPoint study also noted that decisions about CRC’s roster size would likely evolve over time. In addition, a panel of experts convened by the Congressional Research Service concluded that the proposed roster may represent only a portion of what is likely required. The panel noted that simultaneously deploying CRC to two large and one small operation, as defined by BearingPoint, could require deploying the entire CRC roster. S/CRS staff said the office would assess whether to expand the roster in subsequent years. State cannot spend any funds for the CRC until Congress has authorized the CRC’s establishment. In 2007, Congress granted State the authority to reallocate up to $50 million of Diplomatic and Consular Programs to support and maintain CRC. However, the legislation specified that no money may be obligated without a subsequent act of Congress. Legislation that would authorize CRC is pending in both the Senate and the House of Representatives, but as of October 2007, neither chamber had taken action on the bills. In addition, State needs congressional authority to provide key elements of the planned compensation package for deployed volunteers. Under current plans, deployed volunteers would become full-time term federal employees and would receive compensation and benefits similar to those received by Foreign Service employees. Such compensation and benefits would include salary commensurate with experience; danger, hardship, and other mission-specific pays, benefits, and recruitment bonuses for hard-to-fill positions; overtime pay and compensatory time; leave accrual and payment for unused leave upon service completion; federal health, life, and death benefits, and medical treatment while deployed; dual compensation for retired federal workers; and the ability to count deployed time toward retirement benefits. The pending legislation would address some of the compensation authorities needed by State to offer the full proposed benefits package to CRC personnel. Specifically, it would authorize State to provide the same compensation and benefits to deployed CRC personnel as it does to members of the Foreign Service. However, the proposed legislation does not address whether deployed CRC personnel would have competitive hiring status for other positions within State or whether the time deployed would count toward government retirement benefits. In addition, deployed personnel would not have re-employment rights similar to those for military reservists. Currently, military reservists who are voluntarily or involuntarily called into service have the right to return to their previous place of employment upon completion of their military service requirements. However, the pending legislation to authorize CRC does not include similar rights for deployed CRC personnel. S/CRS staff said that the Civilian Reserve Task Force would assess whether re-employment rights are necessary based on the experience of recruiting the first 500 personnel. Further, S/CRS is moving the civilian reserve concept forward without a defined set of potential missions in which CRC would participate. According to S/CRS staff and pending legislation in the House and Senate that would authorize CRC, reservists would deploy to specific nonhumanitarian stabilization and reconstruction missions when called upon by the President. However, as with the planning guide and IMS, there is no agreed-upon definition for what constitutes a stabilization and reconstruction mission. S/CRS staff said they are still working through the conceptual differences between these and other types of operations, such as for counterinsurgency and counterterrorism, but that under its current approach, CRC could be deployed to almost any operation in a conflict zone. Although State has estimated some costs for establishing and sustaining CRC at home, the estimates do not include the costs of deploying CRC personnel to other countries or sustaining them once deployed. As shown in table 1, State has identified about $135 million in estimated costs for establishing and sustaining CRC at home during fiscal years 2008 and 2009. In comparison, Bearing Point’s study estimated that a 3-year startup period would cost approximately $341 million. Under current State plans, these funds would come from the fiscal year 2007 reallocation authority and from State’s fiscal year 2009 budget. The administration did not request any funds for CRC in fiscal year 2008. If Congress authorizes the CRC, State plans to obligate approximately $26 million of the $50 million authority in fiscal year 2007 supplemental funds to market the program and recruit, screen, and enroll the first 500 CRC personnel, including 350 with expertise in rule of law issues ($7.7 million); train the first 500 personnel ($5.1 million); purchase equipment such as armored vehicles, police weapons, electronics, cots, tents, and body armor ($2.3 million); administer CRC, such as establishing a home office and a U.S. Deployment Center, and hiring 37 new government staff and contractor positions to manage CRC’s day-to-day administrative functions ($6.4 million); and compensate CRC personnel when they are being trained ($4.2 million). State currently estimates that it will cost about $109 million to expand the CRC to 2,000 personnel in fiscal year 2009 (see table 1). In this phase, State would hire up to 26 additional administrative staff and provide training for the new CRC volunteers. As of October 2007, the Office of Management and Budget had not yet approved State’s request for $109 million. The actual funding request for 2009 may differ from these estimates. S/CRS estimates that the annual costs for sustaining at home a 2,000- volunteer CRC would be up to $47 million. According to S/CRS staff, these annual costs include the activities needed to ensure that CRC personnel are ready to deploy. However, they do not include costs for deploying CRC personnel outside the United States or sustaining them once overseas. Deployment and overseas sustainment costs could include security costs, which may be high in a conflict zone; salaries and allowances; operation and infrastructure costs, including for facilities; and life support, such as food, lodging, and medical support. Government personnel and outside experts in national security issues agree that the U.S. government must improve its capacity to plan for and execute stabilization and reconstruction operations. To address these issues, S/CRS and its interagency partners have worked to develop a new interagency planning and coordination framework and rapid response corps of civilian government and nongovernment personnel. Since the framework has never been fully applied, an understanding of its benefits and drawbacks remains unknown. However, concerns about roles and responsibilities and the value of the framework have slowed its acceptance by interagency partners. Although there is no requirement that NSC approve all elements of the framework, without such approval it will be difficult to ensure that U.S. government agencies collaborate and contribute to interagency planning efforts to the fullest extent possible. S/CRS has not completed developing plans to fully establish and maintain CRC, but is seeking authorization to begin recruitment of CRC volunteers. Although State received authority to reallocate up to $50 million for CRC, a separate act of Congress is required to authorize CRC before State may obligate that or future funding. S/CRS has developed a plan for using this funding to train, equip, and keep ready to deploy up to 2,000 CRC personnel by fiscal year 2009. However, costs of deploying CRC personnel to operations outside of the United States or of sustaining them at their new posts are not included. In addition, S/CRS has not yet specified types of missions for which the CRC would be used. Moreover, failure to provide full benefits and re-employment rights could affect State’s ability to recruit and retain personnel for CRC. These are critical elements for Congress to consider when debating the long-term commitment associated with authorizing CRC and the future oversight of CRC operations and effectiveness. To strengthen interagency planning and coordination of stabilization and reconstruction operations, we recommend that the Secretary of State clarify and communicate specific roles and responsibilities within State for S/CRS and the regional bureaus, including updating the Foreign Affairs Manual. In addition, we recommend that the Secretary, with the assistance of interagency partners, finish developing the framework and test its usefulness by fully applying it to a stabilization and reconstruction operation. To better understand the long-term fiscal and oversight commitments that would accompany authorizing CRC, when considering whether to grant such authority, the Congress should consider requiring the Secretary of State, in consultation with other relevant agencies, to report on the activities and costs required for its development; the administrative requirements and annual operating costs once it is established, including for sustainment at home, deployment, and sustainment once deployed; the types of operations for which it would be used; and potential obstacles that could affect recruitment, retention, and deployment of personnel. We received written comments on a draft of this report from the Department of Commerce (Commerce) and State (see appendixes II and III). In addition, State, DOD, and USAID submitted a joint statement to the draft report, which is included as part of State’s comments. The Departments of Agriculture (USDA), Commerce, Defense, Justice, and State and USAID also provided technical comments, which were incorporated into the report, as appropriate. The Departments of Homeland Security and the Treasury were provided copies of the draft report but did not comment. Commerce stated the report was a good overview of the new process for planning and coordinating stabilization and reconstruction operations, but did not comment on the report’s recommendations and matter for Congressional consideration. State said it partially concurred with our recommendations. It said that while it had no objections to the recommendations, it believes the progress made toward developing a civilian R&S capability was underreported. State said that the data GAO presented preceded a tremendous period of growth and change for the interagency process. In a joint statement, State, DOD, and USAID reiterated the draft report did not reflect the achievements made over recent months, including the IMS, ARC, SRC, and CRC. The joint statement did not comment on the report’s recommendations or matter for Congressional consideration. When providing technical comments, USDA, Justice, USAID each stated strong support for the new planning and coordination framework, and that they would continue to work with S/CRS to improve civilian deployment capabilities for stabilization and reconstruction operations. USAID further stated that more work is needed to clarify roles and responsibilities, particularly in the relationships between S/CRS and DFA, and between S/CRS and USAID. We disagree with the assertion that our draft report did not reflect changes that have occurred since the completion of our fieldwork. We completed our initial audit work in August 2007 and included in our draft report discussions and assessments on the framework elements NSC approved in March 2007 and on civilian response mechanisms. Our draft report did not include NSC-approved details for ARC, SRC, and CRC because those details were not provided until October 2007. We incorporated this new information into our final report, as well as other information from written and technical comments from six agencies. Our findings, conclusions, and recommendations reflect the status of the planning framework and CRC as of October 2007. As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce the contents of this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days from the report date. At that time, we will send copies to the Secretaries of Agriculture, Commerce, Defense, Homeland Security, Justice, State, and the Treasury and to the Administrator for USAID. We will also make copies available to others on request. In addition, the report will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov. If you or your staffs have questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 512-4128 or at christoffj@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made key contributions to this report are listed in appendix IV. To address both of the objectives of our review, we examined U.S. government documents and research and conducted more than 50 interviews with staff from 31 offices and bureaus at eight U.S. agencies with roles in reconstruction and stabilization operations (see table 2). We also interviewed staff members and reviewed reports and documents from eight U.S. government and independent research organizations. To determine the Department of State’s (State) efforts to improve interagency planning and coordination for stabilization and reconstruction operations, we interviewed current and former staff from the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) and reviewed documentation on its development, roles, and responsibilities. Documents reviewed include Presidential Decision Directive 56, National Security Presidential Directives 1 and 44, Section 408 of the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2005, the Foreign Affairs Manual, and internal State reports and memos. We also reviewed documentation from and held discussions with S/CRS, State’s regional and program bureaus, other agencies, and public and private research institutions on the development of the new planning framework for stabilization and reconstruction operations. Topics reviewed and discussed included mechanisms for triggering the process, roles and responsibilities of various actors, the Interagency Management System, the new planning template, and monitoring and evaluation requirements. We also discussed planning efforts and, where possible, reviewed resultant plans for stabilization and reconstruction operations in Haiti, Sudan, and Kosovo with S/CRS, staff from State’s relevant regional bureaus, and the U.S. Agency for International Development. Finally, we participated in five training courses on stabilization and reconstruction planning developed and taught by S/CRS staff in conjunction with the Foreign Service Institute. To determine State’s efforts to improve the deployment of civilians to these operations, we reviewed documents and interviewed State and other agencies’ staffs about the existing internal capacity each has for supporting stabilization and reconstruction operations and the actions they are taking to develop rapid deployment units and capabilities. We reviewed the development of the Active Response Corps, Standby Response Corps, and Civilian Reserve Corps by interviewing State staff from S/CRS, regional bureaus, select program bureaus, and the Office of the Inspector General. We reviewed BearingPoint’s study for creating and maintaining the Civilian Reserve Corps (CRC) and S/CRS plans for implementing the study’s recommendations, we examined proposals and assessments prepared by the U.S. Institute for Peace, the Institute for Defense Analyses, and the Congressional Research Service, and we reviewed pending legislation in the Senate and House of Representatives that would authorize CRC. Finally, we discussed S/CRS’s civilian reserve concept with staffs from other agencies including the Departments of Agriculture, Commerce, Defense, Justice, and the Treasury, and the U.S. Agency for International Development, as well as with private research institutions, including the Brookings Institution, the Center for Strategic and International Studies, and the RAND Corporation. We conducted our review from July 2006 to October 2007 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. We disagree with the assertion that our draft report did not reflect changes that have occurred since the completion of our fieldwork. We completed our initial audit work in August 2007 and included in our draft report discussions and assessments on the framework elements NSC approved in March 2007 and on civilian response mechanisms. Our draft report did not include NSC-approved details for ARC, SRC, and CRC because those details were not provided until October 2007. We incorporated this new information into our final report, as well as other information from written and technical comments from six agencies. Our findings, conclusions, and recommendations reflect the status of the planning framework and CRC as of October 2007. We also have specific comments to points raised by State (see below). 1. While we are aware of the efforts S/CRS and regional bureaus have made in the countries cited, we note that S/CRS involvement in most of them includes the deployment of a small number of staff or the allocation of section 1207 funds, which we recognized in the report. We also note in the report that S/CRS applied its draft planning guide to operations in Haiti and Sudan, and we note the outcomes of those plans. We also report that interagency staff involved in those efforts had different points of view on the merits of the planning process, that the planning guide is still in development, and that S/CRS is revising the planning guide based on partners’ concerns. 2. We chose to discuss CRC separately because of the potential costs associated with its development and sustainment. However, we acknowledge within the report that State views civilian response mechanisms—ARC, CRC, and SRC—as the fourth major element of the framework. 3. We have changed the text in our report to reflect State’s comment. 4. We reported on the basic structures of the IMS. We note that it is designed to ensure coordination between Washington and the field, and between the civilian and military sectors of government. However, since IMS has never been used, it is premature to state whether it is an effective tool. We found, however, that different documents outline different roles and responsibilities for S/CRS. While State and S/CRS have taken some steps to clarify S/CRS’ role, some interagency partners stated more must be done. For example, when providing comments on a draft of our report, USAID stated it would like more definition on the relationships between S/CRS and DFA, and S/CRS and USAID. State would seem to agree with this assessment since it plans to use exercises to identify gaps and clarify roles and responsibilities. Although we are encouraged that State plans to take these actions, we believe the true test of IMS’s effectiveness will come when it is applied to an actual operation. 5. We reported on the procedures for triggering the use of IMS and, once finalized, the planning guide. As with IMS, the true test of the effectiveness of these procedures will come when it is used for an actual operation. 6. We reported on the ongoing development of the draft planning guide, including its features; its use for planning operations in Haiti, Sudan and Kosovo; and revisions S/CRS is making based on partners’ concerns. We also note that although NSC need not approve this element, such approval would add credibility to the guide and the framework, as a whole. 7. Based on these comments and technical comments from State, we updated information on State’s plans for establishing CRC, including startup costs, annual costs, and authorizing legislation. We acknowledge that NSC approved a plan to establish by 2009 a roster of 2,000 CRC reservists who would deploy to stabilization and reconstruction operations. Although we constrain our discussion to higher-level considerations, we are encouraged by the list of achievements State says it recently made; however, we note that a number them are still in the draft or conceptual stage of development. In addition, we removed from the final report discussion on the punitive actions State could take against volunteers who refused to deploy. 8. We did not state that lists of possible locations for deployment of CRC volunteers should be maintained. Our finding and conclusion pertain to the lack of clarity for the type of operations for which CRC would be used. As stated in the report, State has not clarified how stabilization and reconstruction operations differ from other operations, such as counterinsurgency and counterterrorism, or traditional development assistance programs. Having a clear definition of the types of operations CRC volunteers could deploy to would enable State to better define the skill mix it needs for the CRC roster. It would also provide a basis for Congressional oversight and a valuable check against potential misuse. 9. We updated our discussions or ARC and SRC based on information provided in these and other technical comments. We are encouraged that S/CRS has developed these courses—five of which GAO staff attended. However, based on our findings, we are concerned that S/CRS and the Foreign Service Institute may not have the capacity to provide full training to 3,000 SRC and CRC volunteers in fiscal year 2009. 10. We adjusted the report to reflect this new information. We note that approximately $80 million of the $99.75 million was obligated in the final month of the fiscal year. 11. We do not challenge States interpretation that the legislation implicitly authorizes S/CRS to engage in conflict prevention activities. Our point was to show that ambiguities between the sources of S/CRS authorities can lead to confusion among partners over S/CRS’s true roles and responsibilities. 12. Although agencies may have official positions that they support S/CRS and the new framework, our fieldwork revealed that many individuals within State’s regional and program bureaus and other agencies have not yet accepted it. 13. We disagree with the assertion that our report does not reflect changes that occurred since the completion of our fieldwork. We completed our initial audit work in August 2007, and in October 2007 we obtained and incorporated additional information from agencies written and technical comments on a draft of our report. Our report reflects the status of the framework and development of civilian response capabilities as of October 2007. In addition to the individual contact named above, Judith McCloskey, Assistant Director; Sam Bernet; Lynn Cothern; Marissa Jones; and Sona Kalapura made key contributions to this report. Technical assistance was provided by Joseph Brown, Debbie Chung, Martin De Alteriis, Mark Dowling, Holly Dye, Francisco Enriquez, Timothy Fairbanks, Etana Finkler, Bradley Hunt, Marisela Perez, Nina Pfeiffer, and Jeremy Sebest.

Summary: In 2004, the Department of State created the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization to coordinate U.S. planning and implementation of stabilization and reconstruction operations. In December 2005, President Bush issued National Security Presidential Directive 44 (NSPD-44), charging State with improving coordination, planning, and implementation of such operations and ensuring that the United States can respond quickly and effectively to overseas crises. GAO was asked to report on State's efforts to improve (1) interagency planning and coordination for stabilization and reconstruction operations, and (2) deployment of civilians to these operations. To address these objectives, we conducted interviews with officials and reviewed documents from U.S. agencies and government and private research centers. The office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) is developing a framework for planning and coordinating U.S. reconstruction and stabilization operations. The National Security Council (NSC) has adopted two of three primary elements of the framework--the Interagency Management System and procedures for initiating the framework's use. However, the third element--a guide for planning stabilization and reconstruction operations--is still in progress. We cannot determine how effective the framework will be because it has not been fully applied to any stabilization and reconstruction operation. In addition, guidance on agencies' roles and responsibilities is unclear and inconsistent, and the lack of an agreed-upon definition for stabilization and reconstruction operations poses an obstacle to interagency collaboration. Moreover, some interagency partners stated that senior officials have shown limited support for the framework and S/CRS. Some partners described the new planning process, as presented in early versions of the planning guide, as cumbersome and too time consuming for the results it has produced. S/CRS has taken steps to strengthen the framework by addressing some interagency concerns and providing training to interagency partners. However, differences in the planning capacities and procedures of civilian agencies and the military pose obstacles to effective coordination. State has begun developing three civilian corps that can deploy rapidly to international crises, but key details for establishing and maintaining these units remain unresolved. First, State created the Active Response Corps (ARC) and the Standby Response Corps (SRC) comprised of U.S. government employees to act as first responders to international crises and has worked with several agencies to create similar units. However, these efforts are limited due to State's difficulty in achieving planned staffing levels for ARC, a lack of training available to SRC volunteers, other agencies' inability to secure resources for operations unrelated to their core domestic missions, and the possibility that deploying employees to such operations can leave units without sufficient staff. Second, in 2004, State began developing the Civilian Reserve Corps (CRC). CRC would be comprised of U.S. civilians who have skills and experiences useful for stabilization and reconstruction operations, such as police officers, civil engineers, public administrators, and judges that are not readily available within the U.S. government. If deployed, volunteers would become federal workers. S/CRS developed a plan to recruit the first 500 volunteers, and NSC has approved a plan to increase the roster to 2,000 volunteers in 2009. In May 2007, State received the authority to reallocate up to $50 million to support and maintain CRC, but it does not yet have the authority to obligate these funds. In addition, issues related to volunteers' compensation and benefits that could affect CRC recruitment and management would require congressional action. Furthermore, State has not clearly defined the types of missions for which CRC would be deployed. State has estimated the costs to establish and sustain CRC at home, but these costs do not include costs for deploying and sustaining volunteers overseas.