In the early 1990s, NASA was planning an infrastructure to support a projected annual budget of more than $20 billion and a civil service workforce of about 25,000 by the turn of the century. However, over the last several years, NASA has been directed by the Administration to reduce its future years’ budget levels. In the fiscal year 1994 budget request, NASA’s total funding for fiscal years 1994 through 2000 was reduced by 18 percent, or $22 billion. In the fiscal year 1995 budget request, total funding was reduced again by almost $13 billion, or an additional 13 percent. To absorb these major reductions, NASA focused on adjusting programs. For example, the Space Station program was restructured and given an annual budget ceiling of $2.1 billion. Similarly, the scope of the Earth Observing System program was reduced, and the program is being restructured once again. Also, funding was terminated for the Space Exploration Initiative, the National Launch System, and the National Aerospace Plane, and the Comet Rendezvous and Asteroid Flyby project was canceled. As part of the executive branch’s development of NASA’s $14.2-billion budget request for fiscal year 1996, NASA was directed once again to lower its projected budget through fiscal year 2000, this time by an additional 5 percent, or $4.6 billion. Rather than terminating or delaying core science, aeronautics, or exploration programs, NASA announced it would absorb this funding decrease by reducing infrastructure, including closing and consolidating facilities. NASA also said it would reduce its use of support contractors and decrease the size of its workforce to about 17,500 by the turn of the century—the lowest level since the early 1960s. While NASA’s actual and planned budgets and staffing levels have decreased sharply, the value of its facilities infrastructure has actually increased. From fiscal years 1990 through 1995, the current replacement value of NASA’s facilities increased by about 14 percent, not including inflation. At the end of fiscal year 1995, the agency’s facilities had an estimated current replacement value of $17 billion. The agency owned or leased about 3,000 buildings on nearly 130,000 acres of land at 71 locations. NASA’s facilities range in size from small buildings to large industrial plants. Appendix I provides information about facilities at NASA’s 10 field centers. As part of its infrastructure reduction efforts, NASA is also looking at ways to cut the cost of its field center support activities. Each NASA field center operates a wide range of such activities, with some support-unique missions at particular centers. Common activities include building maintenance, fire protection, security, printing, and medical services. NASA provides these services primarily through a combination of civil service employees, contractor labor, and arrangements with the Department of Defense (DOD) where facilities are collocated. NASA’s current facility closure and consolidation plans will not fully achieve the agency’s goal of decreasing the current replacement value of its facilities by about 25 percent (about $4 billion in 1994 dollars) by the end of fiscal year 2000. More importantly, these plans will not result in substantial cost reductions by that date. By the end of fiscal year 1997, NASA plans to have closed or converted facilities to cost-reimbursable status that have a current replacement value of $1.9 billion. Also, as of March 1996, planned reductions through fiscal year 2000 were $2.8 billion, or about 30 percent below NASA’s goal of reducing the current replacement value of its facilities by about $4 billion in 1994 dollars. Agency officials noted that the $4-billion reduction goal was a “stretch,” or aggressive goal, which they were never certain could be achieved. Additional reductions are unlikely in research and development facilities, but there may be opportunities for further reductions in office space, according to NASA officials. NASA classifies building space based on its primary use, such as office space. NASA was providing general purpose office space for about 53,000 civil service and contractor personnel at the end of fiscal year 1995. Agencywide, the average square feet of office space available per person, including substandard space, exceeded NASA’s standard by nearly 43 percent and the ceiling by over 25 percent. When substandard space is not included, this average exceeded the standard by over 27 percent and the ceiling by 12 percent. Future reductions in the number of on-site contractor personnel and NASA employees (almost 4,000) by fiscal year 2000 will make even more office space available. NASA estimates that the planned $2.8-billion reduction in the current replacement value of facilities will yield only about $250 million in cost reductions through fiscal year 2000. Although some of these cost reductions are from lowering facilities’ operations and maintenance costs, most result from four centers bringing contractor personnel from off-site leased space onto the centers to fill space left vacant because of reductions in NASA personnel and support contractors. Moreover, some cost reductions may be offset by increased costs in future years. For example, according to a NASA official, about three-quarters of NASA facilities are 30 or more years old and keeping these facilities operational may lead to higher operations and modernization costs. NASA has had problems in identifying, assessing, or implementing some cost-reduction opportunities. NASA personnel (1) did not thoroughly evaluate potential larger cost-reduction options, (2) limited the scope of consideration for consolidation, (3) performed questionable initial cost-reduction studies, (4) made inappropriate closure recommendations, and (5) substantially overstated cost-reduction estimates. Some of these problems resulted when NASA acted quickly in an attempt to achieve near-term cost reductions. NASA officials said that some cost-reduction estimates were “interim” estimates because NASA was pressured into prematurely providing what turned out to be imprecise savings estimates to Congress. Also, some NASA staff lacked experience in developing estimates, according to NASA officials. Although there were problems with some evaluations, which are discussed below, others appear to have been done better. For example, the Office of Space Flight reviewed in detail a proposed consolidation of automated data processing functions at a single location before developing a plan that offered several options. Concerns about closing facilities, relocating activities, and consolidating operations have sometimes been exacerbated by perceptions of the lack of fairness and impartiality in the decision-making process. In the past, we have expressed concerns about NASA’s ability to accurately and independently develop cost estimates to support its decisions on new and ongoing programs and projects. Just recently, the NASA Inspector Generaland NASA management have been discussing the structure required to meet NASA’s continuing need for independent, impartial, and technically credible systems analysis and program evaluation. NASA did not thoroughly evaluate potential larger cost-reduction options for consolidating wide area telecommunications networks. NASA has five such networks operating or being developed, and they provide a variety of communications services among headquarters, field centers, major contractors, affiliated academic institutions, and international partners. Due to advances in technology, NASA no longer needs to operate multiple telecommunications networks, and consolidating network operations at a single site offers economies of scale, as well as reduced administrative overhead. Last year, NASA’s Zero Base Review team recommended that the field centers compete to determine which one could consolidate the five wide area networks most cost-effectively. Goddard Space Flight Center, Ames Research Center, and Marshall Space Flight Center prepared consolidation proposals. NASA’s Office of Space Communications, which oversees the two largest networks, decided against a competition and did not formally consider the proposals offered by Goddard and Ames. Instead, with the objective of obtaining some budget cost reductions in 1997, it endorsed the Marshall proposal without determining which of the three proposals was the most cost-effective. However, Marshall’s proposal did not project cost reductions in the near term as aggressively as the others. For example, Goddard’s proposal estimated potential cost reductions over the next 6 years totaling $94.5 million more than the reductions in the Marshall proposal. Earlier this year, we recommended that NASA conduct an objective review of network consolidation to determine whether its chosen approach should be modified to achieve greater cost reductions. NASA agreed with this recommendation and arranged for an independent group to conduct the review. It indicated the agency’s telecommunications experts were not participating in the review because they would have a “biased” perspective. The independent review is scheduled to be completed this month. NASA’s initial network consolidation efforts were hampered by the lack of clear direction within NASA to include all five wide area networks in the consolidation effort. The Office of Space Communications, which directed the consolidation effort at Marshall, does not have authority over three of the five networks. The agencywide telecommunications network consolidation or streamlining efforts did not have a strong central advocate. NASA’s Chief Information Officer, who would be a logical choice to fill this role, was not directly involved in this effort. NASA initially excluded almost 40 percent of its supercomputer systems, which were used mostly for research and development, from the scope of a supercomputer consolidation study. The agency uses supercomputers to support some space mission operations and a variety of research projects, including developing new supercomputer technologies. In March 1995, NASA began studying ways to cut its supercomputer costs by consolidating their management and operation. However, its initial studies considered only some of the agency’s supercomputers and focused on nonresearch and development supercomputing systems. Although NASA’s consolidation study team had identified 29 supercomputers, NASA management excluded 12 existing machines and some planned for future procurement from consideration because (1) some are being managed under existing contracts that could be affected by a consolidation decision and (2) others were used in research programs primarily to develop new supercomputer technologies. We spoke with NASA program, field center, and supercomputer consolidation study officials about the reasons for, and appropriateness of, limiting the scope of NASA’s consolidation study. During a series of discussions, NASA officials acknowledged our concerns about the study’s limitations and expanded its scope to a phased approach that will eventually consider all of the agency’s supercomputers. In commenting on a draft of this report, NASA said the review will be based on a top-down plan for agencywide management of supercomputing operations and will design an optimal supercomputer architecture as a basis for determining future directions in this area. Questions about initial studies have delayed the decision-making process in NASA’s attempts to consolidate aircraft. Last year, the transfer of research and operational support aircraft from five NASA centers to the Dryden Flight Research Center was proposed. NASA headquarters tasked Dryden, the center that would gain from the consolidation, with planning and performing an aircraft consolidation study. In a recent report, the NASA Inspector General noted the Dryden study had estimated NASA could save $12.6 million annually by consolidating aircraft at Dryden. However, internal and external questions about the scope and quality of this study have slowed the decision-making process. Subsequent reviews of the costs and benefits of aircraft consolidation by both NASA management and the NASA Inspector General staff have resulted in much lower annual savings estimates. In light of the controversy that potentially accompanies any significant decision to consolidate, relocate, or close facilities, NASA would benefit from ensuring an adequate balance of expertise and interests for study teams, developing initial analyses that are objective and well-supported, and fairly and thoroughly considering reasonable alternatives before making decisions. In this way, NASA can develop defensible decisions that will withstand external scrutiny and can be implemented in a timely manner. Plum Brook Station was inappropriately recommended for possible closure twice. In February 1995, the NASA Federal Laboratory Review recommended reviewing the station for possible closure because it was being operated primarily for non-NASA users. At about the same time, NASA’s White Paper, formally titled A Budget Reduction Strategy, suggested that Plum Brook should be closed. NASA officials could not provide the rationale for the proposed action. The Laboratory Review report did acknowledge a problem concerning the existence of an inactive nuclear reactor at the station, and the Zero Base Review subsequently recommended retaining Plum Brook on a fully reimbursable basis because of the reactor. Plum Brook operates on a cost-reimbursable basis, with most of its operating cost covered by revenue from users of four test facilities at the station. Even if all four of the test facilities were closed, the operating cost would still be about $2 million, primarily because the Nuclear Regulatory Commission requires that the reactor be maintained in its current state. The only way to close the location and dispose of the property would be to dismantle the reactor. However, the cost for doing this would be prohibitively expensive—about $100 million in 1997 dollars, according to a 1990 estimate. In addition, there are no disposal sites to accommodate the radioactive waste that would be generated by the dismantling process. In some cases, NASA’s initial estimates of cost reductions were overstated. For example, the Zero Base Review estimated that $500 million or more could be saved through 2000 by commercializing the Tracking and Data Relay Satellite System. However, NASA later determined this approach could not be implemented and that none of the projected savings would materialize in the time frame targeted by the Zero Base Review. Also, the Zero Base Review claimed that consolidation of telecommunications networks would save between $350 million and $375 million. Subsequently, NASA officials acknowledged these cost reductions would not only be significantly lower, but the lower savings estimates had already been considered in the preparation of the networks’ future budget estimates. The estimated savings noted above were part of the total savings estimate that provided the basis for NASA’s claim that the fiscal year 1996 out-year budget reductions could be covered by infrastructure decreases. To the extent the estimates were overstated, additional pressure was placed on NASA program and field center officials to find efficiencies to supplant the overstated savings. For example, after NASA determined that commercializing the Tracking and Data Relay Satellite System would not reduce costs, it began aggressively negotiating a fixed-price contract for the purchase of three additional satellites needed for the system. However, NASA estimates that the fixed-price contract produced considerably less savings than the commercializing of the system. NASA’s future facility disposition decisions could be affected by environmental cleanup costs. Therefore, information about the extent and type of contamination, the cost of its cleanup, and the party who is financially responsible are relevant to such decisions. However, NASA officials do not yet fully know what the cleanup requirements will be and lack a policy for identifying other responsible parties and sharing cleanup costs. Currently, NASA officials are still working to identify all the challenges they face as a result of environmental contamination. NASA’s 1996 site inventory identified over 900 potentially contaminated sites, about half of which may require cleanup. At this time, according to NASA records, only 72 sites are classified as closed and, of these, only 15 required cleanup. Most sites are still in the early stages of the cleanup process, with almost 400 still being studied to determine the type and extent of contamination. NASA headquarters used selected portions of a DOD model to develop a preliminary cost estimate of $1.5 billion for cleaning up potentially contaminated sites over a 20-year period. Subsequently, NASA’s field centers, in response to our request, developed cost estimates totaling $636 million. This estimate excludes some sites that have not been studied and is a projection of cleanup cost for only the next 8 years or less. Although NASA field centers have not developed cleanup cost estimates for disposing of property in the future, officials at several centers believed the cost could be as much as two to five times higher than if NASA were to retain the property. The higher cost would occur if NASA cleaned up facilities to meet more stringent standards that might be required for disposal. Sharing cleanup costs with others could help NASA reduce its environmental cleanup costs. Environmental law holds owners, operators, and other responsible parties liable for correcting past environmental contamination. However, NASA has no policy on pursuing other responsible parties. It currently pays the cleanup costs for virtually all of its centers and other field locations, regardless of who was responsible for causing or contributing to the contamination. Although NASA has identified other responsible federal agencies, it has not generally tried to identify potentially responsible contractors or previous owners and pursue cost-sharing agreements with them. An ongoing facility reduction effort where cost sharing may be an issue involves land at NASA’s Industrial Plant in Downey, California. The city wants to acquire 166 acres of this property: 68 acres NASA has identified as excess to its needs and 98 acres it has identified as potentially excess. The city plans to use the land for economic development projects. An assessment of environmental contamination determined that 16 of the excess acres were free of contamination. Studies of the remaining excess acreage are underway. The eventual disposition of the remaining 98 acres of NASA-owned land is still unclear, and studies of their contamination status are still in the early stages. Before NASA took over the Downey facility, it was a DOD facility operated by the predecessor organization of the contractor currently operating the facility for NASA. NASA will have to decide which potentially responsible parties it will pursue in supporting any corrective actions that may be needed to meet applicable cleanup standards. However, NASA’s Johnson Space Center, which manages the Downey facility, has not yet begun to deal with the potential cost-sharing issue and, as noted above, there is no NASA-wide policy providing guidance on this issue. In commenting on a draft of this report, NASA stated it intends to complete a policy statement by the end of 1996 to address the issue of potential responsible parties at NASA facilities requiring environmental remediation. Among NASA’s initiatives to reduce its infrastructure are efforts to lower the field centers’ operations support costs. NASA spends over $1 billion annually to support maintenance and operations at field centers. Among the actions NASA is taking to reduce this cost is consolidating its payroll functions at one center to cut payroll-related civil service and contractor staffing by about 50 percent. It is also implementing a variety of initiatives to share resources and standardize processes at its principal aeronautics centers—Ames, Langley, Lewis, and Dryden. NASA estimates that this effort—known as Project Reliance—will reduce agency costs by about $36 million by fiscal year 2000. In June 1995, NASA expanded the scope of its cost-reduction search outside the agency; it teamed with DOD to study how the two agencies could significantly reduce their operations costs and increase mission effectiveness and efficiency through increased cooperation and sharing. Study teams, referred to as integrated product teams, began work in September 1995 in seven areas. We monitored three teams: major facilities, space launch activities, and base/center support and services. The objectives of the major facilities and space launch activities teams included assessing facilities’ utilization and recommending potential consolidations and closures. The major facilities team was responsible for (1) developing recommendations on test and evaluation and research facilities with unnecessary overlap or redundancy and (2) identifying and providing the rationale for consolidations, realignments, and reductions for specific facilities. The space launch activities team focused on increasing cooperation in its area, including range and launch facilities and infrastructure. Neither team recommended specific consolidations or closures or identified cost reductions in their final briefings to the Aeronautics and Astronautics Coordinating Board. Both teams did, however, identify barriers to increased cooperation and coordination between NASA and DOD, including differences in cost accounting systems, practices, and standards. More importantly, NASA and DOD officials noted a more general limitation: the “old paradigm”—that is, each NASA and DOD program protects its ability to maintain its own technical expertise and competence. The over- capacity situation in large rocket test facilities helps to illustrate this. Several years ago, the National Facilities Study concluded that there was excess large rocket test capacity and some facilities could be closed, but DOD and NASA officials involved in the study said no direction or funding was subsequently made available to pursue this recommendation. More recently, the major facilities team found that NASA and DOD each have excess large rocket test capacity based on both current and projected workloads. However, the team made no recommendation to consolidate facilities because comparable facilities’ cost data was not available. The team did recommend that a facility agreement in the area of rocket propulsion testing be established to identify areas where capability reductions and greater reliance between NASA and DOD would be possible in the future. While the issue of large rocket test capacity remains unresolved, some rocket test facilities are currently undergoing or being considered for modification. A rocket test complex at Edwards Air Force Base is being upgraded by DOD at an estimated cost of $15 million to $17 million. In addition, NASA plans to upgrade one of its rocket engine test facilities at Stennis Space Center for about $45 million. DOD and NASA officials believe that their respective upgrades are cost-effective, although they agreed that the agencies need to improve coordination to prevent further excess capacity. NASA believes that the rocket test facilities at Stennis and Edwards Air Force Base are not comparable. However, the National Facilities Study and the major facilities integrated product team raised the overall excess capacity issue, and it has not yet been resolved. Independent actions by DOD and NASA to upgrade their individual facilities potentially exacerbate the problem of overall excess capacity. NASA and DOD officials acknowledged that recommending sharing and increasing reliance on each other, including consolidating or closing facilities, was difficult. These officials pointed out that, in many cases, such actions are “too politically sensitive” or could result in near-term costs increases, rather than cost reductions. They noted that an external, independent process, similar to the one used by the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission, may be needed to overcome the sensitivity and cost issues. The base/center support and services team, which was responsible for recommending ways to increase cooperation in base/center support and services, examined existing and potential cooperative arrangements at eight NASA centers and one test facility collocated with or geographically near DOD installations. The team reported finding over 500 existing support arrangements and identified additional cooperative opportunities. The team identified changes to activities at several NASA locations, including having NASA’s Dryden Flight Research Center and the Air Force Flight Test Center jointly use space and combine certain operations; constructing one fuel facility for joint use by NASA’s Langley Research Center and Langley Air Force Base; and sharing use of contracts and services. Although the team expects such changes to lower the agencies’ costs by millions of dollars, it cited specific barriers to accomplishing more. For example, different negotiated wage rates for support service contractors could be a barrier, since consolidations would likely require paying the higher rate, thereby substantially or totally offsetting consolidation cost reductions. In other cases, merging certain activities could complicate existing procurements in small and disadvantaged business set-aside programs. However, the team said that many more sharing arrangements are possible and should be included in follow-on studies. In developing the follow-on process, this team recommended and then provided guidance on designating lead offices, establishing and updating metrics and milestones, and sharing information. NASA and DOD officials indicated that the work started by the integrated product teams would continue. A joint DOD-NASA report, which could be released later this month, will recommend that six alliances be established to continue the work initiated by the major facilities team, according to a NASA official. Only two of the alliances have been organized. The official also stated that four panels of the Aeronautics and Astronautics Coordinating Board are to be established to oversee the follow-on activities. However, three of the panels have been delayed due to personnel reorganizations affecting both DOD and NASA, and it is uncertain when they will be initiated, according to the NASA official. The only panel to be established to date is the Aeronautics Panel, which met in July 1996. The details of the follow-on processes for continuing the work of the integrated product teams have not yet been fully developed. One measure of the relevance and success of these processes will be how they handle an issue such as overcapacity in large rocket test facilities. In commenting on a draft of this report, NASA said that the NASA-DOD National Rocket Propulsion Test Alliance will strive for joint management of facilities so they can be brought on or offline and investments controlled for maximum benefit. NASA also said this alliance “will examine indepth the current and future projected workloads to achieve proper asset management and utilization of rocket test facilities.” We recently reported that NASA does not yet have fully developed plans to reduce its personnel level by about 4,000 full-time equivalent employees to meet its overall goal of decreasing the size of its workforce to about 17,500 by fiscal year 2000. Also, it may not be able to do so without involuntarily separating employees. NASA projections show that voluntary attrition should meet the downsizing goal through fiscal year 1998, but will not provide sufficient losses by fiscal year 1999. Thus, NASA intends to start planning a reduction-in-force during fiscal year 1998, if enough NASA employees do not retire or resign voluntarily. NASA’s ability to reach its workforce reduction goal by the turn of the century is subject to major uncertainties, including the shifting of program management from headquarters to field centers and the award of a single prime contract for managing the space shuttle at Kennedy Space Center. We proposed that, in view of these uncertainties, Congress may wish to consider requiring NASA to submit a workforce restructuring plan for achieving its fiscal year 2000 personnel reduction goal. NASA estimates that civil service personnel reductions will save about $880 million from fiscal year 1996 through fiscal year 2000. NASA faces barriers to accomplishing additional consolidations and closures that it may not be able to overcome on its own. Closing facilities, relocating activities, and consolidating operations in fewer locations with fewer employees is not easy because of concerns about the effects of such actions on missions, personnel, and local communities. NASA and DOD officials have suggested that a process similar to the one used by the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission may ultimately be needed to adequately deal with the political sensitivity and cost issues that inevitably accompany consolidation and closure decisions. Given NASA’s limited progress to date, further opportunities to reduce infrastructure, and the agency’s lack of control over some barriers to further reductions, Congress may wish to adopt the idea of having such a process if NASA’s efforts fail to show significant progress in the near future in consolidating and closing facilities. To help determine the need for an independent process to facilitate closures and consolidations of NASA facilities, Congress may wish to consider requiring NASA to submit a plan outlining how it intends to meet its goals for a reduced infrastructure through fiscal year 2000. Such a plan should include estimated cost reductions resulting from specific facility closures and consolidations. In commenting on a draft of this report, NASA stated that it is committed to streamlining its workforce and supporting infrastructure and is continuing to make fundamental changes in the way it operates. NASA specifically noted that it intends to meet its fiscal and programmatic challenges through efficiencies, restructuring, privatization, commercialization, out-sourcing, and performance-based contracting. NASA commented on a number of areas discussed in the report, and it provided us with some additional or updated information and suggested changes to enhance the clarity and technical accuracy of the draft. We have incorporated the agency’s suggested changes in the final report where appropriate. NASA’s comments are reprinted in their entirety in appendix III, along with our final evaluation of them. Our scope and methodology is discussed in appendix IV. Unless you publicly announce this report’s contents, we plan no further distribution until 30 days from its issue date. At that time, we will send copies to other interested congressional committees, the Administrator of NASA, and the Director of the Office of Management and Budget. We will also provide copies to others upon request. Please contact me on (202) 512-4841, if you or your staff have any questions concerning this report. Major contributors are listed in appendix V. Net usable square feet (thousands) Dryden Flight Research Center is located on Edwards Air Force Base, California. The study’s purpose was to advise the NASA Administrator on the approaches the agency’s management could use to implement the U.S. space program in the coming decades. Of the 15 recommendations made, 2 related indirectly to facilities infrastructure. The study was completed in December 1990. At the direction of the NASA Administrator, the agency’s Deputy Administrator reviewed NASA’s roles and missions and suggested ways to implement the Augustine Committee’s recommendations. The recommendations focused on NASA field centers’ missions and project management approaches. Of the 33 recommendations, 9 were related indirectly to facilities infrastructure. The study was completed in November 1991. With some modification, the NASA Administrator approved all recommendations from the Roles and Missions Study and called for implementation plans from the center directors and headquarters program offices. The recommendations were approved in December 1991. This federal governmentwide review examined cabinet-level departments and 10 agencies, including NASA. One of the 19 recommendations that focused on NASA was directly related to facilities. The review was completed in September 1993. This document was issued in January 1994 by the Associate Administrator for Space Flight in response to the Administrator’s December 1991 call for implementation plans and the current Administrator’s renewed emphasis on roles and missions. It identified a number of recommendations to implement the roles and missions recommendations and assigned follow-up responsibilities. Of 38 recommendations, 15 related to specific facilities. The study was initiated in 1992 by the NASA Administrator to develop a comprehensive long-range plan to ensure that research, development, and operational facilities were world-class and to avoid duplication of facilities. The study group was composed of representatives from NASA; the Departments of Defense (DOD), Transportation, Energy, and Commerce; and the National Science Foundation. Almost 200 recommendations were made, including 68 specifically related to NASA facilities. The study was completed in April 1994. Contracted by NASA and DOD, the National Research Council reviewed the findings in the National Facilities Study to evaluate the requirements presented in the national facilities plan for space and research and development operations. The Board made 11 recommendations, 4 of which related to facilities in general. None of the recommendations related to specific facilities. The review was completed in 1994. The Aeronautics and Space Engineering Board conducted this review at NASA’s request. The study’s purpose was to independently examine projected requirements for, and approaches to, the provision of needed aeronautical ground test facilities. The Board made 13 recommendations; 2 related to specific NASA facilities. The review was completed in 1994. Federal Laboratory Review Conducted under the auspices of the NASA Advisory Council, this study was tasked to evaluate and develop recommendations for improving the efficiency and effectiveness of the federal research and development investment in the NASA laboratory system. The review was also to consider possibilities for restructuring, consolidating, closing, or reassigning facilities. The Laboratory Review made 74 recommendations and 3 suggestions related to specific facilities. The review was completed in February 1995. The White Paper, formally titled A Budget Reduction Strategy, was intended as a starting point for discussions on a proposed realignment of center roles and missions and reinvention in a constrained budget environment. The paper made about 40 recommendations total; 15 were related to facilities. The paper was issued February 1995. This review was a NASA-wide effort to allocate reductions in the fiscal year 1996 President’s budget, set center role assignments, provide suitable guidance for the fiscal year 1997 budget, and change the way NASA conducted business. About 50 recommendations were made, of which 2 applied to specific facilities. The review was completed in June 1995. NASA teamed with DOD to study how the two agencies could significantly reduce their investment and operations costs and increase mission effectiveness and efficiency through increased cooperation at all organizational levels. Study teams, referred to as integrated product teams, began work in September 1995 in seven areas. Each team addressed facilities, as appropriate, in its assigned functional area. Teams reported their recommendation to the Aeronautics and Astronautics Coordinating Board in April 1996. Additional information on this effort is presented in the body of this report. The following are GAO’s comments on NASA’s letter dated September 6, 1996. 1. The language of the report was modified where appropriate. 2. NASA provided information on activities and initiatives that occurred after the issuance of our report on Telecommunications Network: NASA Could Better Manage Its Planned Consolidation (GAO/AIMD-96-33, Apr. 9, 1996). 3. Our description of the current situation at Downey is in the context of a potential, not a known, cost-sharing issue. 4. NASA provided information on two rocket propulsion test facilities and stated that they are not comparable. However, we made no comparison of these facilities. We merely pointed out that, while the issue of potential excess in large rocket engine test capacity remains unresolved, efforts are underway or planned to upgrade such facilities. As noted in the report, such independent actions potentially worsen the problem. The overcapacity issue could benefit from a thorough, governmentwide assessment. 5. The report discusses the possible future need for a process similar to the one used by the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission. Such a process could be applied to individual facilities, groups of facilities, or entire agencies. There is no reason to believe that the process would be appropriate only for DOD or for numerous locations. We reviewed the value of NASA’s facilities and its budgets and staffing; facility reduction plans; real property reports; utilization data and reports; studies, including the National Facilities Study and the NASA Federal Laboratory Review; environmental law, policies, and procedures; and reports by the NASA Inspector General. We interviewed officials at NASA field centers and in the Offices of Management Systems and Facilities, Headquarters Operations, Space Flight, Space Communications, Human Resources and Education, Environmental Management Division, and Inspector General at NASA headquarters. To discuss NASA-DOD coordination efforts, we interviewed NASA and DOD officials. We also spoke with officials from Rockwell International, Space Systems Division, about plans for the NASA Industrial Plant, Downey, California. We obtained information from all NASA field centers, including information on the value and utilization of facilities, plans for closing facilities and estimated savings through fiscal year 2000, facilities project budgets, and cleanup and cost-sharing activities. We also spoke with officials from other federal agencies, including the General Services Administration and the Environmental Protection Agency. We obtained electronic versions of NASA’s real property and major facility inventory databases and NASA’s potentially contaminated site inventory database, but did not independently verify the reliability of the data in the databases. Because the National Facilities Study included aircraft in its work, we included them in our review. We conducted our audit work at NASA headquarters, Washington, D.C.; Ames Research Center, Moffett Field, California; Goddard Space Flight Center, Greenbelt, Maryland; Wallops Flight Facility, Wallops Island, Virginia; Jet Propulsion Laboratory, Pasadena, California; Lyndon B. Johnson Space Center, Houston, Texas; NASA Industrial Plant, Downey, California; White Sands Test Facility, Las Cruces, New Mexico; John F. Kennedy Space Center, Florida; Langley Research Center, Hampton, Virginia; Lewis Research Center, Cleveland, Ohio; Plum Brook Station, Sandusky, Ohio; George C. Marshall Space Flight Center, Huntsville, Alabama; Michoud Assembly Facility, New Orleans, Louisiana; Santa Susana Field Laboratory, California; John C. Stennis Space Center, Mississippi; Phillips Laboratory, Edwards Air Force Base, California; and Vandenberg Air Force Base, California. We conducted our work from June 1995 through August 1996 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 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Summary: Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the status of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration's (NASA) efforts to achieve reductions and efficiencies in key areas of its infrastructure. GAO found that: (1) NASA plans for a $2.8-billion reduction in the current replacement value of its facilities will yield only about $250 million in cost reductions through fiscal year (FY) 2000; (2) NASA has experienced problems in assessing cost-reduction opportunities because it did not thoroughly evaluate cost-reduction options, excluded many systems in its review of ways to cut supercomputer costs, performed questionable initial studies for aircraft consolidation, made inappropriate closure recommendations, and overstated cost-reduction estimates; (3) although environmental cleanup costs could affect facility disposition efforts, NASA lacks a policy for identifying other responsible parties and sharing cleanup costs; (4) a joint effort between NASA and the Department of Defense to study potential operation cost reductions through increased cooperation and sharing yielded no specific recommendations for closures, consolidations, or cost reductions but did identify barriers to sharing and increasing interagency reliance; and (5) NASA ability to reach its workforce reduction goal by 2000 is subject to some major uncertainties, and NASA may need to plan a reduction in force if enough employees do not retire or resign voluntarily.