The BRAC 2005 Commission Report contains 198 recommendations approved by the BRAC Commission for closing or realigning DOD installations. The text of each recommendation contains several sections with important contextual information: Cost and Savings Information Secretary of Defense Recommendation Secretary of Defense Justification By law, DOD must implement the actions recommended by the Commission unless the President terminates the process, or Congress enacts a resolution of disapproval. BRAC 2005 differed from prior rounds in three significant ways—the circumstances under which it took place, its scale, and its scope. Unlike prior BRAC rounds, which were implemented during times of declining defense budgets and in which the focus was on eliminating excess capacity and realizing cost savings, BRAC 2005 was conducted in a global security environment characterized by increasing defense budgets and increasing military end strengths after the events of September 11, 2001 and was conducted concurrently with overseas contingency operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. At the same time, DOD was engaged in an initiative to relocate thousands of personnel from overseas to the continental United States. The scale of BRAC 2005 was much larger than the scales of the prior four rounds. BRAC 2005 generated more than twice the number of BRAC actions as all prior BRAC rounds combined. Table 2 compares the number of individual actions embedded in the BRAC 2005 recommendations with the number of individual actions needed to implement the recommendations in the prior rounds and shows that the number of individual BRAC actions was larger in BRAC 2005 (813) than in the four prior BRAC rounds combined (387). The scope of BRAC 2005 was broader than the scope of prior BRAC rounds. In addition to the traditional emphasis on eliminating unneeded infrastructure to achieve savings, DOD’s goals for the 2005 BRAC round included transforming the military by correlating base infrastructure to the force structure and enhancing joint capabilities by improving joint utilization to meet current and future threats. As shown in table 2, the 2005 BRAC round had the second lowest number of major closures, the largest number of major realignments, and the largest number of minor closures and realignments. Part of this transformation effort included a focus on providing opportunities to increase jointness, though many of the BRAC recommendations focused on consolidations and reorganizations within the military departments rather than across departments. However, the six recommendations we reviewed, as well as other recommendations, including creating joint bases, focused on jointness across multiple services. DOD implemented the BRAC 2005 recommendations we reviewed by requiring military services to relocate selected training functions; however we found that, although DOD’s justifications for collocating each of the six training functions that we reviewed mentioned jointness or inter-service training as a potential benefit, two of the six training functions took advantage of the opportunity provided by BRAC to consolidate training to increase jointness. Specifically, we found that DOD implemented all six recommendations by relocating the select training functions—as recommended by the BRAC Commission—but that opportunities for joint training were realized in only two locations. Figure 1 shows the relocations associated with each recommendation. Based on our meetings with officials, we found that officials implementing two of the six training functions created by those recommendations—the Joint Center of Excellence for Culinary Training and the 7th Special Forces Group—had found ways to take advantage of being located together to consolidate training and train jointly. For example, officials at the Joint Center of Excellence for Culinary Training stated that while the Air Force conducts its culinary training separately, the Army, Navy, and Marine Corps have successfully consolidated two of the three phases of their training and use a joint curriculum to train students. These officials stated that they were successful at consolidating the culinary training curricula for the Army, Navy, and Marine Corps because the leadership involved with implementing this recommendation was supportive of finding a way to train jointly even if that meant changing their curricula. Additionally, Army and Air Force Special Operations Forces officials stated that the relocation of the 7th Special Forces Group to Eglin Air Force Base allowed for increased joint training operations with the Air Force Special Operations Forces located at Hurlburt Field, near Eglin Air Force Base. These officials stated that they were successful at consolidating training and increasing jointness because they were already conducting joint training prior to the BRAC 2005 round and that since their move, being in closer proximity has made it even easier to train jointly. The implementation of the remaining four BRAC recommendations that we reviewed relocated—moved separate functions to one location—but did not consolidate training functions. According to officials at the locations that did not consolidate training, they do not regularly coordinate or share information on their training goals and curricula, despite the fact that part of the Secretary of Defense’s justification for the moves in the BRAC 2005 process was that they would bring a “train as we fight: jointly” perspective to the learning process or would otherwise allow for joint training. Service officials told us that after these recommendations were proposed by DOD and approved by the BRAC Commission, they compared each of their original curricula but did not identify many areas of overlap. Training function officials stated that they had received minimal guidance related to consolidating training. Therefore, we found, they did not adjust curricula to take advantage of their proximity to consolidate training and possibly be more joint and consolidate space. Training function officials also stated that their four training functions have very different missions, making consolidation of their training more difficult. For example, while both the Navy and the Air Force train their navigators at Pensacola Naval Air Station, they train them to fly in different scenarios (e.g., over land or over sea) and in different airplanes. Although the services may have differences in their training, the 2005 BRAC Commission Report noted that the Secretary of Defense had described the 2005 BRAC round as an opportunity to promote jointness. The BRAC Commission Report stated that while the 2005 BRAC recommendations would “not move the ball across the jointness goal line, Commission decisions would help move the ball down the field” toward more jointness. Table 3 summarizes the status of each of the six BRAC recommendations that we reviewed. We found that four of the six training functions in our review missed the opportunity to consolidate training to increase jointness, because DOD provided minimal guidance to direct those implementing the recommendations. Service officials stated that to direct the implementation of the six recommendations we reviewed, DOD provided them with the language from the BRAC Commission report as well as guidance for developing business plans. Using the guidance provided, each of the military departments’ headquarters developed a business plan. This guidance focused on movement of personnel or construction. In our previous work on consolidation of physical infrastructure and management functions, we identified key practices, including developing an implementation plan for the consolidation. Such a plan should include essential change management practices such as active, engaged leadership of executives at the highest possible levels; a dedicated implementation team that can be held accountable for change; and a strategy measuring progress toward the established goals of the consolidation. None of the guidance given to the military departments provided this type of direction. For example, the language from the BRAC Commission report for each recommendation we selected for review is generally less than one page long and contains high level summary information on costs, the action being recommended, DOD’s justification for the recommendation, community concerns, and the BRAC Commissions findings and recommendations. The business plans developed by the military departments included the text of the BRAC 2005 recommendation, a description of costs and savings for each moving organization, a list of organizations moving, a time table for the movement of organizations, details on any military construction, and environmental information. According to a September 2005 memorandum issued by the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and related to planning for BRAC 2005 implementation, the business plans were to serve as a foundation for the complex program management necessary to ensure that the recommendations were implemented efficiently and effectively. Additionally, the memorandum states that the implementation challenges presented by transformational recommendations—particularly recommendations to establish joint operations—underscore the utility and necessity of the plans. However, officials from the Basing Directorate under the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Energy, Installations, and Environment, the group that oversaw the implementation of BRAC 2005, stated that while the business plans do not include the BRAC 2005 language containing DOD’s justification related to consolidating training to increase jointness, it is the business manager’s responsibility to implement the recommendation, taking into account the intent of the recommendation as described in the justification language. During our review, however, we found that officials responsible for certifying that these six recommendations had been implemented were not required by OSD to certify whether or not they had taken advantage of the opportunity to increase jointness. Rather, the business plan managers were focused on the completion of the construction of buildings and the movement of personnel. Further, officials at the four training functions that did not consolidate training told us that although they had initially compared each service’s curricula to identify common training, they felt that there was not enough overlap in the training for it to be consolidated. They also stated that they had not received direction from OSD or the military services on how to consolidate curricula in order to foster jointness in the event that course curricula had few similarities, prepared personnel to perform different missions, or used different equipment. Like the BRAC 2005 recommendations that directed the relocation of several training functions in order to promote jointness or consolidate similar training, another BRAC 2005 recommendation directed the consolidation of 26 service-specific stand-alone installations into 12 joint bases to take advantage of opportunities for efficiencies and reduce duplication of similar support services. In order to implement this joint basing recommendation, the Office of the Secretary of Defense issued guidance in January 2008 designed to establish a comprehensive framework to consolidate installation-support functions while meeting mission requirements. OSD also created an oversight structure for handling disputes and established a set of common standards for the installation support to be provided by each joint base. Furthermore, DOD issued a directive on military training that gives the Undersecretary of Defense for Personnel & Readiness the responsibility to oversee and provide policy for individual and functional training programs for military personnel and the collective training programs of military units and staffs. If DOD and the services believe that the training functions in our review can still capitalize on the opportunity to promote jointness provided by the BRAC 2005 recommendations, additional guidance will be an important first step toward being able to take advantage of this opportunity. Officials from the Undersecretary of Defense for Personnel & Readiness agreed that additional guidance would potentially be helpful in providing opportunities to consolidate training to increase jointness. Further, in the event of a future BRAC round, such guidance could provide a useful framework for taking advantage of the opportunities provided by similar recommendations focused on developing joint training capabilities. DOD cannot determine if implementing the 2005 BRAC joint training recommendations that we reviewed has resulted in savings in operating costs. In addition, implementation costs reported to DOD by the training functions’ business plan managers likely did not include all costs funded from outside the BRAC account—we found at least $110 million in costs that likely should have been included based on DOD guidance requiring all BRAC-related costs to be reported, even those from outside the BRAC account. As a result, DOD may have incomplete or inaccurate cost information when trying to determine annual cost savings or total implementation costs of these BRAC recommendations. Although we reported in 2012 that DOD had projected that four of the recommendations in our review would result in annual savings in operating costs, we found that DOD could not determine whether implementing the 2005 BRAC joint training recommendations that we reviewed resulted in savings in operating costs. For two of the training functions in our review, DOD was able to provide complete baseline cost data; however, officials for these training functions could not determine whether cost fluctuations were due to the BRAC moves. For three of the training functions in our review, DOD was unable to provide complete baseline operating costs from before it implemented the BRAC recommendations, but officials representing these training functions indicated that implementing the recommendations may have increased some costs. The Joint Strike Fighter training program established by recommendation #125 was a new program and therefore there were no operating cost data prior to BRAC implementation. In our prior work, we have identified the importance of developing baseline and trend data. By developing baseline operating costs, agencies can better evaluate whether they are achieving their cost savings targets. In addition, in our 1997 report on lessons learned from the four prior BRAC rounds, we found that initial cost and savings estimates for prior BRAC rounds were not based on reliable baseline data, because they were not of budget quality, were not consistently developed, and were poorly documented. As we also noted in our 1997 report, sound estimates of savings are important, because DOD may rely on savings from BRAC for other purposes. In 2014 we found that DOD was unable to determine whether the consolidation of training at the Medical Education and Training Campus resulted in cost savings, because it had not developed baseline cost information as part of its metrics to assess success. We recommended that DOD develop baseline cost estimates as part of its metrics to assess cost savings for future consolidation efforts within the Medical Education and Training Campus, and DOD concurred with this recommendation. To date, DOD has not taken any actions to implement this recommendation, because, according to DOD officials, they cannot take action on these recommendations until another BRAC round is authorized. Two of the training functions in our review—Undergraduate Navigator Training and Ft. Bragg, North Carolina (7th Special Forces Group move to Eglin Air Force Base)—were able to provide complete baseline cost data. However, for these two training functions, officials could not determine whether subsequent cost fluctuations were due to the BRAC moves, non-BRAC events, or some combination. For example, the budget officials from the Air Force’s Air Education and Training Command were able to provide us with detailed operating cost data for their undergraduate navigator training, going back to 1996. However, even with these detailed cost data, the budget officials we met with stated that they could not account for all of the different events that had resulted in cost fluctuations during that time. Air Force budget officials further stated that multiple events such as sequestration, maintenance issues, and changes in how certain expenses are funded that occurred while BRAC was being implemented made it extremely difficult to determine whether any savings in the program’s operating costs were due to the implementation of the BRAC recommendation or to these other factors. For the remaining three training functions—Culinary training, Transportation Management training, and Religious training— the programs could not provide complete operating cost information from prior to the move. For example, according to Army budget personnel, the Army culinary, transportation management, and chaplain training programs did not have data for various reasons, including a change in accounting systems, and because they are not required to keep data that far back. In addition, according to Air Force officials, because the Air Force culinary program is part of a larger multidisciplinary training program that includes subjects such as fitness and mortuary services, it is not possible to isolate the costs for the culinary portion of the training. While these programs either did not have any baseline operating cost data or detailed operating cost baselines, in some instances officials were able to provide examples of where they believed operating costs have increased as a result of the respective BRAC moves. For example: Air Force officials estimated that they spend an additional $300,000 annually to operate the department’s Chaplain Corps College at Fort Jackson, South Carolina than they did to operate the one at Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama. Navy officials provided operating cost data for their chaplain training program showing that they have spent an average of approximately $182,000 more per year since relocating to Ft. Jackson. Officials with both services cited increased travel costs as the primary driver of these increases, because Ft. Jackson does not have room for the students to stay on base. Therefore, according to officials, students from both services must stay at hotels in Columbia, South Carolina, and officials have to provide transportation to and from the base. A Navy culinary official estimated that sending students to Ft. Lee costs the service an additional $200,000 per year for airfare compared to what it cost when all training was at Naval Station Great Lakes, Illinois. This official also estimated that this travel takes about three days per student, which results in about $400,000 in lost work time per year. In addition, the official added that there are other costs related to getting the students to and from airports. Additionally, the Navy culinary official added that the training program has incurred additional administrative costs because the Army and Navy student tracking systems are not linked. Specifically, because the systems are not configured to exchange data, all Navy student data must be manually entered twice, once in each system. The official said that this equates to thousands of records per year and could take about $45,000 in labor costs to accomplish. For training functions we reviewed, Navy Joint Strike Fighter officials were able to identify a cost avoidance as a result of implementing the BRAC recommendation. As part of implementing this recommendation, the Air Force built a $59 million Academic Training Center at Eglin Air Force Base to serve the Air Force, Navy and Marine Corps. The Navy Joint Strike Fighter officials stated that if they had not colocated their program with the Air Force, the Navy would have had to pay to build and operate its own Academic Training Center. It is now likely not possible to determine baseline costs for implementing the recommendations in our review in order to determine the extent to which the implementation of these recommendations resulted in cost savings. Also, subsequent changes to the programs make it difficult to determine the effect of implementing the BRAC recommendations. Although it can sometimes be difficult to attribute costs and savings to a specific event, such as a BRAC change, DOD will not be able to estimate whether it has achieved annual savings in operating costs if it does not collect complete baseline cost data with which to measure progress. In 2012, we reported on DOD’s estimates of its final implementation costs for the BRAC 2005 recommendations; however, for two of the six recommendations in this review—the Joint Strike Fighter Initial Training Site and the 7th Special Forces Group move to Eglin Air Force Base—we found that at least $110 million in implementation costs funded from outside of the BRAC account that likely should have been included were not reported to DOD by the business plan managers. Thus DOD’s previously reported total cost of $35.1 billion to implement BRAC 2005 is likely somewhat understated. The statute authorizing BRAC 2005 established a special treasury account for purposes related to implementing the BRAC 2005 recommendations. During the lifetime of this account, DOD could also fund certain BRAC-related costs from outside the BRAC 2005 account to complete actions needed to implement the recommendations. For example, the services could use money obtained through their military construction process to renovate existing space or build new facilities. In 2010, we recommended that DOD take steps to capture and appropriately report to Congress any BRAC- related implementation costs that were funded from outside the BRAC account. DOD concurred with the recommendation, and in August 2010 the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Installations and Environment) issued a memo requiring BRAC business plan managers to submit all BRAC-related expenditures, including those funded from both inside and outside of the BRAC account. We reviewed the business plans for all six recommendations in our review, as well as data reported by the services to DOD, and found that none of them contained projects funded from outside of the BRAC account. Army and Air Force officials that we spoke with stated that there were general criteria for what could be included as a BRAC cost in the BRAC 2005 round. According to former business plan managers for some of the training functions in our review, and Army and Air Force service headquarters officials, some of these criteria included that the project be related to the physical move, the cost be for moves within the continental United States, the project not be related to addressing a deficiency that existed at the time of the BRAC recommendation, and the project be needed in order to comply with the original BRAC recommendation and not be used to accommodate personnel or mission expansion that happened after the BRAC decision. However, neither service nor OSD officials could provide us with any written guidance to this effect. Air Force officials also stated that language in the Form 1391—the DOD document to submit requirements and justification to Congress for funding for military construction projects— would indicate whether the project was BRAC-related. For three of the recommendations we reviewed, the military construction implementation costs reported to us were approximately the same as those reported to DOD in 2012. Business plan managers for recommendation 124—Joint Center for Excellence for Religious Training and Education—reported military construction implementation costs of approximately $11.6 million to DOD in 2012 and approximately $11.8 million to us in the course of this review. For recommendations 122— Joint Center for Consolidated Transportation Management Training—and 123—Joint Center of Excellence for Culinary Training—business plan managers reported combined military construction implementation costs of approximately $87.6 million to DOD in 2012, and approximately $89.4 million to us in the course of this review. For a fourth recommendation— Undergraduate Pilot and Navigator Training, recommendation #128—we could not determine what the total military construction implementation costs reported to DOD in 2012 were, because this was a bundled recommendation that contained projects on multiple bases, not just at Pensacola Naval Air Station, Florida. However, the final Pensacola military construction costs reported to us—$90.1 million—were close to the preliminary military construction estimates of $89.5 million for those projects. In the case of the Joint Strike Fighter and the Ft. Bragg, North Carolina recommendations, some projects that appear to be related to the BRAC move and were funded with non-BRAC money were not included in what was reported to DOD as required by DOD’s August 2010 memo. Examples of some of these projects that were not reported as BRAC implementation costs are Joint Strike Fighter (F-35) Parking Apron. In the official Form 1391 proposing this project and the need for the parking apron, the title of the project is “BRAC F-35 A/C Parking Apron.” Further, in the “Requirement” section of the document, the justification provided by the Air Force states that the build-up for Joint Strike Fighter operations includes relocating joint military instructor pilots and operations support personnel from Luke Air Force Base; Sheppard Air Force Base; Marine Corps Air Station Miramar, California; Naval Air Station Oceana, Virginia;; and the Naval Air Station at Pensacola, the moves required by this BRAC recommendation. Air Force headquarters officials stated that they did not include this as a BRAC implementation cost because they and the Navy headquarters officials agreed this cost was not related to the move. However, Air Force officials at Eglin Air Force Base as well as the Navy Business Plan Manager indicated that the Parking Apron was a necessary implementation cost. Furthermore, the cost for every other Air Force project that cited “BRAC” in the Form 1391 project title was counted as an implementation cost. By including this reference to BRAC in the 1391, this project was presented to Congress as a BRAC-related cost. The preliminary estimate for this project was $29 million dollars. Other Joint Strike Fighter Support Projects. This includes four projects related to the establishment of the Joint Strike Fighter training program. Three of these projects have language identical to that in the BRAC Joint Strike Fighter (F-35) A/C Parking Apron in the Requirement section of their Form 1391, which states that the build- up for Joint Strike Fighter operations includes relocating joint military instructor pilots and operations support personnel from Luke Air Force Base, Sheppard Air Force Base, Marine Corps Air Station Miramar, Ca., Naval Air Station Oceana, VA and the Naval Air Station at Pensacola. The Form 1391 for the fourth project cites the impending overcrowding as a result of establishing the Joint Strike Fighter training program as the justification for the project. Air Force headquarters officials stated that, for these projects, Air Education and Training Command or Air Force Materiel Command did not submit the project to the Air Force BRAC office to determine if it was a BRAC requirement. However, given the requirement language that cites the BRAC moves and the impending overcrowding, it is not clear to us that these were not BRAC implementation costs. Furthermore, Air Force documentation and headquarters officials acknowledged that one of these projects—the first phase of the Hydrant Refueling System Station—was a companion project to the BRAC F-35 A/C Parking Apron. The combined final cost for these projects was approximately $20.6 million. Housing. Neither the Joint Strike Fighter nor the Ft. Bragg business plan managers included the housing they built for Joint Strike Fighter pilot trainees or Special Forces Group soldiers as BRAC implementation costs. Air Force headquarters officials stated that there was a disagreement between the Air Force and the Navy about who should pay for the Joint Strike Fighter housing and how it should be paid for. In order to complete the housing prior to the arrival of students, the Air Force agreed to pay for the first housing unit and the Navy agreed to pay for the second unit. Regarding the barracks for the 7th Special Forces Group, at least one of these housing units was originally scheduled to be built with BRAC funding. However, Army headquarters and Special Operations Command officials stated that, due to construction delays, the Army reconsidered which funding source to use for some projects. As a result, all of the housing units ended up being built with regular military construction money as part of a larger project and no part of that project was counted as BRAC implementation costs. The decisions not to count the Joint Strike Fighter housing unit and the 7th Special Forces Group housing unit as BRAC implementation costs is inconsistent with the fact that housing for the culinary and transportation students at Ft. Lee, as well as the housing for navigator students at Pensacola Naval Air Station, were counted as BRAC implementation costs. The Joint Strike Fighter housing unit cost was $17.6 million and the cost of the three Army housing units ranged from $6.5 to 6.7 million each. 7th Special Forces Group Training Ranges. The Army built several training ranges on Eglin Air Force Base to support the move of 7th Special Forces Group from Ft. Bragg to Eglin Air Force Base. Army headquarters officials told us that the cost of the ranges was initially to be considered part of the BRAC implementation cost, and documentation shows that the Army planned to use BRAC funds to construct these ranges. However, due to the previously mentioned construction delays and changes to the funding source of projects, the ranges ended up being funded with Army military construction funds. When implementation costs were reported to DOD in the final business plan, the business plan managers did not indicate that there were any implementation costs funded from outside the BRAC account. The reasons for not including the ranges as a BRAC implementation cost are unclear. Both Army and Air Force headquarters officials stated that this may have been because the Air Force already had ranges at Eglin Air Force Base that the Army could have used. Air Force headquarters officials added that it may have been because the 7th Special Forces Group did not have these ranges at Ft. Bragg. However, officials with the Army Special Operations Command and the 7th Special Forces Group stated that the existing Air Force ranges at Eglin Air Force Base were insufficient for their training needs, and that they had all of the ranges in question when they were at Ft. Bragg. Not including the ranges as a BRAC implementation cost was also inconsistent with the other implementations of BRAC recommendations we reviewed, where the training facilities were counted as BRAC implementation costs. Construction of the ranges at Eglin Air Force Base cost a combined $39.3 million. An official with the Basing Directorate under the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Energy, Installations, and Environment—the group that oversaw the implementation of BRAC 2005—stated that the business plan managers were expected to include costs that were funded from outside the BRAC account in their final business plans and that, along with OSD General Counsel, they reviewed and provided comments on the cost submissions. However, the Basing Directorate official further stated that it was up to the military departments to ensure that all BRAC implementation costs were accounted for, and that the military departments had the flexibility to determine which costs would be associated with the BRAC recommendation and which would be attributed to other actions. We found that this flexibility in determining which costs were to be reported as BRAC costs led to inconsistencies in what kinds of projects were counted as BRAC implementation costs. By clarifying in guidance what is to be included as a BRAC implementation cost, DOD can help ensure that it has an accurate accounting of the final costs for any future BRAC implementation and that DOD and Congress are able to determine how much money is actually spent on any future BRAC rounds. BRAC 2005 provided DOD with the opportunity to consolidate infrastructure and also to become more efficient and effective in its operations. To that end, the recommendations for consolidating and developing joint training programs provided DOD with new opportunities for furthering transformation and promoting jointness to meet the new challenges DOD faces. However, two of the six recommendations focused on training have led to joint training rather than colocation, despite the opportunity to jointly train the force as it fights. All six recommendations were implemented as approved, but without additional guidance, DOD cannot ensure that it takes advantage of the opportunities provided by BRAC. If Congress approves a future BRAC round, DOD will have another opportunity to promote jointness should the department choose to propose such recommendations to a future BRAC Commission. However, without specific guidance that the military services can use in implementing jointness-focused recommendations—for instance on responsibility for monitoring implementation and measuring progress—the department may again face challenges in moving beyond colocation of functions. In implementing the training-focused jointness recommendations we examined, DOD did not collect baseline cost data for all of the recommendations as part of its implementation process, and without these data it could not determine the actual savings, if any, of implementing the recommendations. Unless DOD develops baseline cost data for the recommendations in any future BRAC rounds, it will be unable to determine the budgetary effect of its actions. Given that we found some implementation costs were paid for from other than the BRAC 2005-specific accounts, if DOD does not clarify in guidance the types of costs that are to be included as BRAC implementation costs, decision makers will lack reasonable assurance that the department’s cost data for any future BRAC round recommendations are fully reliable. To make further progress toward taking full advantage of the opportunity of consolidating training in order to increase jointness following the implementation of the BRAC 2005 recommendations, for the training functions that did not consolidate training beyond colocation, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness and the Secretaries of the military departments to provide guidance to the program managers on consolidating training, if DOD decides that taking advantage of an opportunity to increase jointness is still appropriate. To improve the ability of the military departments to take advantage of any opportunities provided by recommendations to develop joint training capabilities in a future BRAC round, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness—in consultation with the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Energy, Installations, and Environment—to develop and provide specific guidance for the military departments to use in implementing recommendations designed to consolidate training to increase jointness. To improve DOD’s ability to estimate savings, if any, from future consolidation of training—including any consolidation resulting from a future BRAC round—we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the military departments to develop baseline cost data. To improve the accounting of any future BRAC rounds, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Energy, Installations, and Environment to issue guidance clarifying what costs should be included in final BRAC accounting. We provided a draft of this report to DOD for review and comment. In response, DOD non-concurred with three recommendations and partially concurred with one recommendation. In its letter, DOD stated that our report misunderstands DOD’s approach to joint and common training and does not completely recognize the unique circumstances of BRAC recommendation development and implementation. We recognize that there is a difference between joint and common training; however, these BRAC recommendations, which DOD proposed and the BRAC Commission approved, emphasized jointness, not just common training. In fact, for several of these recommendations, the Secretary of Defense’s justification included “enhancing jointness” as part of the rationale, or proposed that the recommendation would allow DOD to “train as we fight; jointly.” DOD further stated that our report undervalues the importance of providing DOD components flexibility to determine BRAC costs and has a misplaced emphasis on estimating savings for transformational recommendations. We recognize the importance of flexibility among DOD components for most military decisions; however, as our report notes, flexibility in reporting BRAC costs led to inconsistencies in reporting of these costs across the department. In addition, cost and savings estimates are a part of the BRAC process. Both DOD and the Commission develop such estimates for each recommendation and did so for these six recommendations. Moreover, DOD emphasized savings in some of the six recommendations in its justification to the Commission. Specifically, DOD’s justification for the Joint Center of Excellence for Culinary Training reads in part “It is the military judgement of the JCSG that consolidation at the location with the largest amount of culinary training produces the greatest overall military value to the Department through increased training efficiency at lower cost.” Similarly, for the Joint Center of Excellence for Religious Training and Education, DOD’s justification to the Commission reads in part “Consolidation at Fort Jackson, SC creates a synergistic benefit by having each Service’s officer and enlisted programs conducted in close proximity to operational forces. Realized savings result from consolidation and alignment of similar officer and enlisted educational activities and the merging of common support functions.” Saving money in implementation of any federal program is an important goal. We continue to believe that it is important for DOD’s goals to include saving money where possible. DOD did not concur with our first recommendation, to provide guidance to the program managers of the training functions created under BRAC 2005 on consolidating training. In its response, DOD stated that our report misunderstands the definition of joint training and that DOD and the services are constantly seeking ways to improve training opportunities by either consolidating or collocating individual skills training. DOD further stated that the Interservice Training Review Organization would be the proper entity to address the issues identified in our report. In our report, we noted that the training functions were reviewed and these reviews did not find much overlap in training between services. Several of these reviews were conducted by the Interservice Training Review Organization. Further, one of the purposes of several of these transformational recommendations was to create opportunities to enhance jointness, as stated by DOD in proposing them to the Commission. Enhancing jointness would be going a step further than colocating services and aspiring to consolidate common training. DOD also states in its comments that the Interservice Training Review Organization was involved in implementing the Chaplain recommendation. Still, we found that, even with this involvement, DOD did not take advantage of opportunities to consolidate training to increase jointness in the Chaplain recommendation. We also noted that, in the absence of guidance from DOD, four of the training functions in our review did not make any further effort to consolidate training. We continue to believe that if DOD believes the training functions in this review would benefit from more consolidation of training, it should issue guidance. DOD did not concur with our second recommendation to develop and provide specific guidance for the military departments to use in implementing recommendations designed to consolidate training to increase jointness in the event of future BRAC rounds. DOD stated that while consultation with the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Energy, Installations, and Environment would be required within a future BRAC round, the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness already has the authority to develop this guidance. We recognize that the Under Secretary has the authority but as our report points out, it has not exercised it in this instance, and that guidance is needed to ensure that DOD takes advantage of the opportunities provided by BRAC. DOD did not concur with our third recommendation to develop baseline cost data in the event of any future consolidation of training. DOD stated that data calls for BRAC must ensure that the questions asked do not provide the personnel answering the questions insight into the various scenarios being considered and that all installations must be treated equally. Moreover, DOD stated that this is critical to maintaining the fairness and objectivity of the analysis by preventing the supplied data from being influenced by gaining and losing locations. During BRAC 2005, DOD estimated that it had collected over 25 million pieces of data from hundreds of defense installations and presumably was able to do so in a way that maintained fairness and objectivity without inappropriately disclosing to personnel providing the information something to which they should not be privy. DOD further stated that collecting baseline cost data for training activities in advance of an authorized BRAC process is not effective because the department will not be able to use previously supplied uncertified data. Nothing in our recommendation requires DOD to collect data prior to the implementation of a future, authorized BRAC round. Finally, DOD stated that it is not clear that a future BRAC round would include joint training. However, baseline cost data is needed for measuring either increased costs or savings for changes to any program, not just joint training. Thus, we continue to believe that without sufficient baseline cost information, DOD will be unable to determine the budgetary effect of its actions, including demonstrating cost savings. DOD partially concurred with our fourth recommendation, to issue clarifying guidance regarding what costs should be included in final BRAC accounting. DOD stated that micromanaging every cost decision across such a vast program would have been unreasonable and that ultimately, whether or not to fund various requirements from the BRAC account was a judgment call made by military headquarters officials. However, DOD agreed that it would be reasonable to consider placing additional emphasis on accounting for BRAC costs. We agree that managing a program as large as BRAC is difficult and that guidance on what costs should be included in the final BRAC accounting would help DOD to more accurately report the costs of implementing BRAC. We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional committees, the Secretary of Defense, the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, and the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Energy, Installations, and Environment. In addition, the report is available at no charge on our website at http://www.gao.gov. If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 512-4523 or leporeb@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made key contributions to this report are listed in appendix IV. The following table lists selected prior GAO reports on the Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) 2005 round, our recommendations in those reports, the Department of Defense’s (DOD) response, and DOD’s actions to date in response to the recommendations. The 24 reports listed contained 69 recommendations. DOD concurred or partially concurred with 57 of these recommendations and has implemented 37 of them. According to DOD officials, DOD will be unable to take actions on many of these recommendations until another BRAC round is authorized. GAO recommendation GAO-15-274—Military Base Realignments and Closures: Process for Reusing Property for Homeless Assistance Needs Improvements (Mar. 16, 2015). Update the Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) homeless assistance regulations to require that conveyance statuses be tracked. These regulatory updates could include requiring the Department of Defense (DOD) to track and share disposal actions with the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) and requiring HUD to track the status following disposal, such as type of assistance received by providers and potential withdrawals by providers. Partial concur. DOD stated that while it concurs with the value of tracking homeless assistance and other conveyances, it can do so without any change to existing regulations. DOD did not identify any actions it will take on how to track the homeless assistance conveyances in the absence of a regulatory update and did not indicate that it would work with HUD to update the regulations. Moreover, DOD did not explain how program staff would know to track the conveyance status in the absence of guidance requiring them to do so. Partial concur. DOD stated that while it already provides generic information about the property, the Local Redevelopment Authorities (LRA) and interested homeless assistance providers can undertake facility assessments following the tours. However, DOD did not provide additional detail or explanation about how it would provide information about the condition of the property or access to it. Pending. Awaiting authorization of a future BRAC round. Pending. Awaiting authorization of a future BRAC round. Specific guidance that clearly identifies the information that should be provided to homeless assistance providers during tours of on-base property, such as the condition of the property. DOD actions Pending. Awaiting authorization of a future BRAC round. Original DOD response Non-concur. DOD stated that the existing regulatory guidance is adequate for providers’ expressions of interest given that these expressions evolve as the redevelopment planning effort proceeds and they learn more about the property. Partial concur. DOD did not commit to taking any actions to provide this information and instead noted that any action should ensure that a legally binding agreement does not bind DOD to disposal actions it is unable to carry out. DOD further noted that the purpose of the legally binding agreement is to provide remedies and recourse for the LRA and provider in carrying out an accommodation following property disposal. Non-concur. DOD stated that providers may be considered only through specific expressions of interest in surplus BRAC property, and these suggested alternatives may be considered only within the context of what is legally permissible given the specific circumstances at each installation. Pending. Awaiting authorization of a future BRAC round. Specific information on legal alternatives to providing on-base property, including acceptable alternative options such as financial assistance or off-base property in lieu of on-base property, information about rules of sale for on-base property conveyed to homeless assistance providers, and under what circumstances it is permissible to sell property for affordable housing alongside the no-cost homeless assistance conveyance. GAO-14-577—DOD Joint Bases: Implementation Challenges Demonstrate Need to Reevaluate the Program (Sept. 19, 2014). Evaluate the 44 support functions identified in DOD’s guidance for joint base implementation to determine which functions are still suitable for consolidation. Subsequently, identify and make any changes that are appropriate to address limitations reported by the joint bases in consolidating installation-support functions, such as limitations related to workforces and geography. Pending. Awaiting authorization of a future BRAC round. Concur. DOD stated that it had already removed some installation-support functions from joint basing because they were not compelled for inclusion as part of the BRAC recommendation and otherwise did not offer opportunities for savings or consolidation. It further stated that in April 2014, the Senior Joint Base Working Group principals tasked their staffs to identify which installation support functions and performance standards were not providing value to the joint bases’ various military missions and to explore whether these functions and standards should continue to be included in joint basing. DOD did not provide time frames for completing such actions. Pending. In July 2015, an OSD official stated that DOD will not revise the 12 memorandums of agreement for the existing joint bases to show that some of the functions should not be consolidated but are using an abbreviated list of functions—excluding the functions we identified as poor candidates for consolidation—in evaluating the viability of new joint bases. GAO recommendation Take policy actions, as appropriate—such as issuing additional guidance—to address any challenges resulting in inefficiencies and inequities regarding efforts to consolidate installation-support functions—including, at a minimum, those identified in this report. Original DOD response Partial concur. DOD stated that it is mindful of challenges in implementing and operating joint bases and agreed that policy actions can address some challenges. However, DOD stated that it does not agree that these challenges require Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) level policies, citing instead the existing responsibilities and authorities already assigned to the military departments and the Joint Management Oversight Structure. Evaluate the purpose of the program and determine whether DOD’s current goals of achieving greater efficiencies and generating cost savings for the joint basing program, as stated in the 2005 BRAC Commission recommendation, are still appropriate or whether goals should be revised, and communicate these goals to the military services and joint bases and then adjust program activities accordingly. Subsequent to the evaluation above, provide direction to joint bases on their requirements for meeting the joint base program’s goals. DOD’s leadership should work with the military services to determine what reporting requirements and milestones should be put in place to increase support and commitment for the program’s goals. Non-concur. DOD stated that the goal of joint basing remains to increase the efficiency of delivering installation support at the 12 joint bases as described in the BRAC Commission’s recommendation number 146. DOD actions Pending. In July 2015, an OSD official told us that DOD is taking action on our recommendation to address any challenges resulting in inefficiencies and inequities regarding efforts to consolidate installation-support functions. DOD has drafted a joint basing handbook, which has been signed by the Air Force and the Navy, to address inconsistent service-level guidance. In addition, the Senior Installation Management Group now meets quarterly to handle conflicts and disputes between service policies and to address any challenges resulting in inefficiencies and inequities regarding efforts to consolidate installation- support functions. None planned. As of November 2015, DOD stated that no action is expected. Non-concur. DOD stated that the joint bases have been fully operational since October 2010 and have proven that they can deliver measurable and tangible savings across the installation-support portfolio. Therefore, DOD stated that it does not believe OSD should establish program milestones. None planned. As of November 2015, DOD stated that no action is expected. GAO recommendation GAO-14-630—Defense Health Care Reform: Actions Needed to Help Realize Potential Cost Savings from Medical Education and Training (July 31, 2014). The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs should direct the Director of the Defense Health Agency (DHA) to conduct a fully developed business case analysis for the Education and Training Directorate’s reform effort. In this analysis the Director should Identify the cost-related problem that it seeks to address by establishing the Education and Training Directorate, Explain how the processes it has identified will address the cost-related problem, and Conduct and document an analysis of benefits, costs, and risks. Concur. DOD stated that Medical Education and Training is the only shared service that has never had any type of oversight by the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs or the pre-DHA TRICARE Management Activity. Develop baseline cost information as part of DHA’s metrics to assess achievement of cost savings. Concur. DOD stated that Medical Education and Training is the only shared service that has never had any type of oversight by the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs or the pre-DHA TRICARE Management Activity. Pending. In a September 2014 letter, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs stated that baseline costing would be a key component of the Medical Education and Training Directorate’s strategic plan and would be presented in the form of a “deliverable” in moving forward to the Directorate’s final operating capability. The letter also noted that an inventory of all education and training products and services within the Military Health System will be undertaken shortly, and that this had never been accomplished before. However, the letter did not specifically address the development of metrics to assess achievement of any cost savings as we recommended. As of September 2015, no further actions have been taken. Pending. According to a September 2014 letter from the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs, the completion of a business case analysis will be a key component of the Directorate’s strategic plan and will be presented in the form of a “deliverable” to achieve its final operating capability. The letter did not specifically identify the cost-related problem that DOD seeks to address by establishing the Directorate nor did it specifically state if this would be addressed in its business case analysis under development as we recommended. As of September 2015, no further actions have been taken. GAO recommendation GAO-14-538—Defense Infrastructure: DOD Needs to Improve Its Efforts to Identify Unutilized and Underutilized Facilities (Sept. 8, 2014). Establish a strategic plan as part of a results- oriented management framework that includes, among other things, long-term goals, strategies to achieve the goals, and use of metrics to gauge progress to manage DOD’s real property and to facilitate DOD’s ability to identify all unutilized or underutilized facilities for potential consolidation opportunities. Concur. DOD stated that a strategy review is currently under way with initial guidance and initiatives. Pending. In response to a requirement under the Office of Management and Budget’s (OMB) Reduce the Footprint policy, DOD officials told us in July 2015 that they had developed a draft DOD Real Property Efficiency Plan that describes DOD’s strategic and tactical approach to managing its real property effectively and efficiently. Officials stated that this draft plan would also address our recommendation in September 2014 that DOD establish a strategic plan to manage it’s real property and to facilitate its ability to identify potential consolidation and disposal opportunities. This plan has not been finalized and implemented. As of October 2015, an official from the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Energy, Installations, and Environment stated that the plan is still under review and has not been provided to OMB. The official did not have an estimate for when the plan will be finalized and implemented. Officials also stated that a recently developed draft guide for calculating facility utilization should complement the draft plan in improving utilization data to better identify excess facilities. GAO-13-436—Defense Infrastructure: Communities Need Additional Guidance and Information to Improve Their Ability to Adjust to DOD Installation Closure or Growth (May 14, 2013). Direct the Secretary of the Army to issue guidance, consistent with DOD guidance, on specific levels of maintenance to be followed in the event of a base closure, based on the probable reuse of the facilities. Concur. DOD stated that the Army agrees to publish property maintenance guidance prior to closing installations in the event of future base closures. Pending. Awaiting authorization of a future BRAC round. In July 2015, DOD stated that the Army has agreed to publish property maintenance guidance prior to closing installations in the event of future base closures. There have been no additional base closures since the date of the report. GAO recommendation Direct the Secretaries of the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force to consider developing a procedure for collecting service members’ physical addresses while stationed at an installation, annually updating this information, and sharing aggregate information with community representatives relevant for local planning decisions, such as additional population per zip code, consistent with privacy and force protection concerns. Direct the Secretaries of the Army and the Air Force to consider creating or designating a civilian position at the installation level to be the focal point and provide continuity for community interaction for future growth installations and to consider establishing such a position at all installations. Original DOD response Partial concur. DOD stated that it agrees that information pertaining to the physical location of installation personnel helps affected communities plan for housing, schools, transportation and other off-post requirements and that existing policy requires the military departments to share planning information with states and communities. DOD also stated that in the event of future basing decisions affecting local communities, it will work with the military departments to assess and determine the best means to obtain, aggregate, and distribute this information to help ensure that adequate planning information is made available. Partial concur. DOD stated that it agrees with the need for a designated position at the installation level and will ensure that each military department is meeting this need through current practices. DOD also stated that many growth installation officials already serve as “ex-officio members” of the community’s growth management organizations and community officials agree that this has been quite valuable for both the department and affected growth communities. DOD actions None planned. In July 2015, DOD stated that there is no immediate need to undertake these efforts. Pending. Awaiting authorization of a future BRAC round. In July 2015, DOD stated that in the event the Department of Defense proceeds with future realignments that could result in a reduced footprint, there are provisions for Base Transition Coordinators to be designated as liaisons with affected communities. In the event these future realignments result in an expanded footprint or personnel growth, the department would consider this recommendation at that time. GAO-13-149—Military Bases: Opportunities Exist to Improve Future Base Realignment and Closure Rounds (Mar. 7, 2013). Work with the military services, defense agencies, and other appropriate stakeholders to improve the process for fully identifying recommendation-specific military construction requirements and ensuring that those requirements are entered into the Cost of Base Realignment Actions (COBRA) model and not under stated in implementation cost estimates prior to submitting recommendations to the BRAC Commission. Establish a process for ensuring that information technology requirements associated with candidate recommendations that are heavily reliant on such technology have been identified to the extent required to accomplish the associated mission, before recommendations and cost estimates are submitted to the BRAC Commission. Non-concur. DOD stated that the primary advantage of COBRA is to provide real-time comparison of scenarios to aid analysis and decision making, not to develop budget- quality estimates. None planned. As of November 2015, DOD stated that no action is expected. Partial concur. DOD acknowledged that information technology costs should be better estimated but added that a separate process is not necessary and stated that it can improve cost estimating by reevaluating the standard factors used in COBRA and by providing additional guidance as appropriate. Pending. Awaiting authorization of a future BRAC round. GAO recommendation Ensure that, during the development and comparison of BRAC scenarios, all anticipated BRAC implementation costs— such as relocating personnel and equipment—are considered and included in the COBRA model when comparing alternatives and generating cost estimates. Take steps to ensure that COBRA’s standard factor for information technology is updated and based on technological developments since the most recent COBRA update. Update COBRA guidance to require users to provide a narrative explaining the process, sources, and methods used to develop the data entered into COBRA to develop military personnel position-elimination savings. Identify appropriate measures of effectiveness and develop a plan to demonstrate the extent to which the department achieved the results intended from the implementation of the BRAC round. Original DOD response Non-concur. DOD reiterated that COBRA is not designed to develop budget quality estimates, nor can it reflect future implementation investment decisions made after BRAC recommendations become binding legal obligations for DOD. DOD actions None planned. As of November 2015, DOD stated that no action is expected. Concur. Pending. Awaiting authorization of a future BRAC round. Concur. Pending. Awaiting authorization of a future BRAC round. Non-concur. DOD stated that military value based on force structure and mission needs should continue to be the key driver for BRAC. DOD also stated that its business plan process is the best way to measure effectiveness. Non-concur. DOD stated that goals or overarching capacity targets would subvert the intent of the BRAC statute to develop recommendations based on military value and would preclude examination of a full array of closure and realignment options. None planned. As of November 2015, DOD stated that no action is expected. Establish a target for eliminating excess capacity in its initiating guidance to high-level department-wide leadership, consistent with the BRAC selection criteria chosen for a future BRAC round. None planned. As of November 2015, DOD stated that no action is expected. Limit the practice of bundling many potential stand-alone realignments or closures into single recommendations. Non-concur. DOD does not believe that bundling is problematic and stated that the examples we cited had been bundled because they shared a common mission and purpose, and bundling maximized military value. The practice of bundling can limit visibility into the estimated costs and savings for individual closures or realignments that are elements of the bundle and can make the Commission’s review more difficult, although DOD disputed this latter point. The 2005 BRAC Commission’s executive staff told us that bundling made their review more difficult because they needed to deconstruct the bundle to assess whether any changes were necessary. In some cases bundling is warranted, and it is for this reason that we recommended limiting the practice, not prohibiting it. None planned. As of November 2015, DOD stated that no action is expected. GAO recommendation If DOD determines that bundling multiple realignments or closures into one recommendation is appropriate, itemize the costs and savings associated with each major discrete action it its report to the BRAC Commission. Develop a process to ensure that any data- security issues are resolved in time to provide all information to the BRAC Commission in a timely manner by conducting a security review of all BRAC data during DOD’s recommendation development process, to include a review of the aggregation of unclassified data for potential security concerns and possible classification, if necessary. GAO-13-134—DOD Joint Bases: Management Actions Needed to Achieve Greater Efficiencies (Nov. 16, 2012). Original DOD response Partial concur. DOD stated that where appropriate, the department could highlight cost and savings associated with major actions, and that action would meet the intent of our recommendation. DOD actions Pending. Awaiting authorization of a future BRAC round. Concur. Pending. Awaiting authorization of a future BRAC round. None planned. As of November 2015, DOD stated that no action is expected. paring unnecessary management personnel, consolidating and optimizing contract requirements, establishing a single space management authority to achieve greater utilization of facilities, and reducing the number of base support vehicles and equipment. Non-concur. DOD said that such targets would burden and restrict the authority of local commanders to manage the merger of the formerly stand-alone bases into joint bases while implementing new organizational structures, which would unnecessarily risk negative effects to mission support when operational effectiveness of the bases is paramount. DOD stated that the department should continue its patient approach to obtaining savings and efficiencies at joint bases, because it is working. All of the Air Force-led joint bases reduced civilian positions, and the Navy chose not to fill all of its civilian vacancies. Finally, the creation of the joint bases is equivalent to the mergers of corporations with very different financial systems, management structures, operating procedures, and cultural differences. DOD stated the importance of empowering joint base commanders to design, implement, and adapt cost efficient and effective approaches to their unique situations while adopting new and cross-cutting business practices, as incubators of innovation. DOD decided to allow for an extended transition period and to defer near-term savings. GAO recommendation Continue to develop and refine the Cost Performance and Visibility Framework in order to eliminate data reliability problems, facilitate comparisons of joint basing costs with the cost of operating the separate installations prior to implementing joint basing, and identify and isolate the costs and savings resulting from actions and initiatives specifically resulting from joint basing and excluding DOD- or service-wide actions and initiatives. Original DOD response Partial concur. DOD stated that its Cost Performance and Visibility Framework already provides a method to collect quarterly data on performance toward the Common Output Level Standards, annual data on personnel assigned, and funds obligated for each joint base. However, DOD is addressing inconsistencies in the current data captured in the Framework and is improving its data reliability with considerable investment and the expectation to begin assessing joint base efficiencies by the end of fiscal year 2012. DOD stated that it would be able to make several comparisons–such as comparing the current fiscal year financial and performance data with the baseline and previous year’s obligations and the joint base’s baseline data with the costs of operating the separate installations—prior to implementing joint basing. DOD acknowledged that the comparison of the costs of operating separate installations would not identify cost savings resulting solely from joint basing and asserted the impracticality of isolating and distinguishing joint basing cost savings from the savings that result from DOD- or service- wide actions using the data contained in DOD’s Framework. Further, DOD pointed out that it did not believe that accounting systems were designed to track savings but to track expenses and disbursements. Partial concur. DOD stated that a quarterly feedback process on the joint base common standards and an annual review process that incorporates input from the joint bases already exist. Further, standards may need changing as priorities change and missions evolve, but the current process strikes an appropriate balance between the analytical burden of repeated reviews and the need for clarity and refinement. DOD also stated that it believes that reviewing all the standards simultaneously does not allow for the depth of analysis required to make sound decisions, and suggested that GAO conduct a qualitative assessment of the standards, because the findings appear to be based on an anecdotal assessment. DOD actions Complete. DOD provided guidance to the joint bases that resulted in improved quality of the data obtained for fiscal year 2012. Subsequently, DOD performed an analysis comparing this improved operating cost data with what it had projected would be the costs of operating the separate installations if the joint bases had not been created. This analysis showed that the joint bases were saving money relative to the costs of operating the separate installations. Together these actions met the intent of our recommendation and provided DOD with an improved picture of the cost of operating the joint bases as well as a comparison of the cost of operating the joint bases with the cost of operating the separate installations. Direct the joint bases to compile a list of those common standards in all functional areas needing clarification and the reasons why they need to be clarified, including those standards still being provided or reported on according to service-specific standards rather than the common standard. None planned. As of November 2015, DOD stated that no action is expected. GAO recommendation Amend the OSD joint standards review process to prioritize review and revision of those standards most in need of clarification within this list. Original DOD response Partial concur. See above. DOD actions None planned. As of November 2015, DOD stated that no action is expected. Develop a common strategy to expand routine communication between the joint bases, and between the joint bases and OSD, to encourage joint resolution of common challenges and sharing of best practices and lessons learned. Partial concur. DOD stated that it believed there were already mechanisms in place to facilitate routine communication between the joint bases, as well as between OSD and the joint bases, and that it is increasing those opportunities. DOD listed the various opportunities it has for sharing joint basing information, including yearly joint base site visits and an annual management review meeting with the joint base commanders. Develop guidance to ensure that all the joint bases develop and provide training materials to incoming personnel on how installation services are provided on joint bases. Partial concur. DOD stated that it would ensure that each of the services is providing training materials to incoming personnel; however, joint base commanders need flexibility to tailor training to the needs of their installations. Complete. DOD added an annual meeting beginning in February 2013 for Joint Base commanders to discuss issues the bases are facing, and in August 2013 distributed contact information for all Joint Base commanders and Deputy Joint Base commanders to each of the joint bases. As a result, joint bases have had expanded opportunities to share information on best practices and lessons learned and to resolve common challenges. In part because the annual Joint Base commander’s meeting takes place as part of an annual program review meeting with OSD, together these actions address the intent of this recommendation. Pending. In July 2015, an OSD official told us that OSD is taking action on our recommendation to develop and provide training materials to incoming joint base personnel. DOD has drafted a joint basing handbook, which has been signed off on by the Air Force and the Navy, to address inconsistent service level guidance. In addition, the Senior Installation Management Group now meets quarterly to handle conflicts between service policies and to address any challenges that have resulted in inefficiencies and inequities regarding efforts to consolidate installation- support functions. GAO recommendation GAO-11-814—Excess Facilities: DOD Needs More Complete Information and a Strategy to Guide Its Future Disposal Efforts (Sept. 19, 2011). Develop and implement a methodology for calculating and recording utilization data for all types of facilities, and modify processes to update and verify the accuracy of reported utilization data to reflect a facility’s true status. Partial concur. DOD has already begun some efforts to improve its utilization data and will to develop and implement appropriate procedures. DOD did not specify what actions it has completed to date or its time frames for completion. Develop strategies and measures to enhance the management of DOD’s excess facilities after the current demolition program ends, taking into account external factors that may affect future disposal efforts. Concur. DOD stated that it will work with the military departments to continue to develop and implement the most effective and efficient methods to eliminate excess facilities and excess capacity, but it did not provide any details or specific time frames for these efforts. Complete. In January 2014, the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology and Logistics) issued an update to DOD’s policy on inventory and accountability of real property assets. It includes procedures for inventory data requirements such as including accurate data submission in real-time or near real-time, and the creation of a Real Property Accountable Officer who is responsible for property inventory at the installation level. DOD’s corrective action plan and updated policy address our concerns with calculating, recording, updating, and verifying the accuracy of utilization data. Complete. The services have incorporated demolition into their installation planning and other facility space management programs. For example, the Air Force has incorporated demolition as a key feature in its ongoing initiative to consolidate space and personnel, and to achieve a 20 percent reduction in its property inventory by 2020. Also, DOD is more proactively managing its processes to meet historic preservation requirements, to address environmental preservation concerns, and to expedite completion of required environmental mitigation. Further, the services have begun implementing a policy in line with a January 2014 update to DOD’s policy on inventory and accountability of real property assets, which clarified the roles and responsibilities of the officer responsible for managing property inventory at the installation level, including the requirement to ensure that all disposal records are accurately recorded. GAO recommendation GAO-11-165—Defense Infrastructure: High Level Federal Interagency Coordination Is Warranted to Address Transportation Needs Beyond the Scope of the Defense Access Roads Program (Jan. 26, 2011). Update regulations and clarify guidance for the Defense Access Roads certification and funding process; develop working-level guidance for potential program users; and effectively communicate the regulations and working-level guidance to all federal, state, and local stakeholders. Partial concur. DOD stated that although it will work with the Department of Transportation to update Defense Access Roads regulations and clarify guidance, it believes that sufficient guidance for and awareness of the program exists. Complete. In response to our recommendation, in August 2012 DOD and the Department of Transportation agreed to more closely coordinate approaches to transportation issues. Additionally, in March 2013, DOD officials stated that, based on the results of coordinating a potential change to the Defense Access Roads eligibility criteria, leadership determined that the best approach would be to direct the Defense Access Roads program to update its guidance to ensure that the existing criteria are applied flexibly, as has been the case for urban areas during the implementation of BRAC 2005. Lastly, in June 2013, the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology and Logistics) issued a memo directing the Defense Access Roads Program to update its guidance. In addition, the Military Surface Deployment and Distribution Command Defense Access Roads Program office has begun communicating directly with the commanders of each growth installation to address previously reported issues regarding unawareness of the Defense Access Roads Program. These actions will allow program guidance to be updated to include the program’s procedures and will ensure that the guidance is effectively communicated to all stakeholders so that the program can be used to its fullest extent. GAO recommendation Routinely coordinate with the Secretary of Transportation to meet regularly, identify all existing federal transportation funding resources, and develop a strategy for affording priority consideration for the use of those funds and other resources for the benefit of communities most severely affected by DOD. Original DOD response Partial concur. DOD stated that the department would continue to work closely with the department of Transportation to assist communities affected by DOD actions but that the Department of Transportation does not have discretionary funds that it can use to target communities affected by DOD, and instead, state and local communities must advance defense-related transportation projects. DOD actions Complete. In response to this recommendation, DOD hosted a meeting of the Economic Adjustment Committee in August 2012 to examine Defense Access Roads funding and coordination issues. An outcome of that meeting was consensus that, as DOD develops future re-stationing decisions, greater coordination with local planning entities is essential to assessing effects on transportation. In June 2013, the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology and Logistics) issued a letter to the congressional defense committees detailing the proposed plan for improving the Defense Access Roads Program. As stated in the plan, DOD’s goal is to improve the assessment of effects on transportation; enhance collaboration with planning entities; expand the range of mitigation measures, including joint funding opportunities; and promote additional measures for managing transportation demand. These actions will allow for the effective interagency and intergovernmental coordination that is needed to help address the unmet transportation needs of defense- affected communities. GAO-10-725R—Military Base Realignments and Closures: DOD Is Taking Steps to Mitigate Challenges but Is Not Fully Reporting Some Additional Costs (July 21, 2010). Take steps to capture and appropriately report to Congress any BRAC-related implementation costs that are funded from outside the BRAC process. Concur. DOD noted that it is in the process of drafting new BRAC guidance, which will direct the services and defense agencies to provide a final accounting for all BRAC costs (both inside and outside of the account), among other items,. Complete. On August 5, 2010, the Deputy Undersecretary of Defense (Installations and Environment) issued a guidance memo to the military services and DOD agencies requiring all BRAC business plan managers to fully capture the costs and savings of BRAC 2005 by submitting a final BRAC financial display that captures all BRAC related expenditures (both inside and outside the BRAC account), which will give Congress more visibility over all BRAC implementation costs. GAO recommendation GAO-10-602—Defense Infrastructure: Army Needs to Improve Its Facility Planning Systems to Better Support Installations Experiencing Significant Growth (June 24, 2010). Develop and implement guidance that requires the Army Criteria Tracking System to be updated as changes to facility design and criteria are made. Concur. DOD stated that the Army has already taken action to enhance the accuracy of its planning systems to better respond to changing requirements. Develop and implement policies and procedures for linking other systems, such as the Army Range Requirements Model and the Army Health Planning Agency’s system, to the Real Property Planning and Analysis System in order to eliminate any potential confusion as to the correct range and medical facility requirements. Concur. DOD stated that it plans to partly address our recommendation by fielding a comprehensive range planning tool. Complete. In May 2010 the Army incorporated the functionality of the Army Criteria Tracking System into its web-based Real Property Planning and Analysis System, thereby linking the two systems and ensuring that as one is reviewed the other is reviewed and as one is updated the other is updated. The Real Property Planning and Analysis System is web based and changes can be made in real time. Similarly, because the Army Criteria Tracking System is now incorporated into the Real Property Planning and Analysis System, the Army Criteria Tracking System is now web based and changes to it can be made in real time. Complete. The Army stated that as of June 2010, the Army Range Requirements Model was being used to generate the range requirements in the Real Property Planning and Analysis System and that because the Army Health Facility Planning Agency does not have an automated system to generate requirements, the Army was manually obtaining hospital requirements and inputting them into the Real Property Planning and Analysis System. These actions eliminated two sets of requirements for ranges and hospitals, reducing any potential confusion. GAO recommendation Develop a streamlined mechanism to expedite the flow of stationing information to installations. Original DOD response Concur. DOD stated that the Army has already initiated improvements in its process and is evaluating additional streamlining measures. Modify existing guidance to enhance communication between decision makers and installations so that installation facility planners are notified when stationing actions are changed. Concur. DOD stated that the Army has already initiated improvements in its communication process and that the department is evaluating additional measures to ensure that data integrity and transparency are achieved. DOD actions Complete. In January 2012, DOD reported that the Army continues to enhance the flow of stationing information. All unit moves are now combined by installation and by fiscal year, significantly reducing the number of actions being processed. In August 2010, the Army staff issued guidance to the field (Installation Management Command) that clarified formal lines of communication and established protocol to differentiate between official and unofficial taskings, enabling installation commanders to focus on approved official actions. All stakeholders are better involved in the early stages of force structure actions, force design updates, concept plans, and leadership direction. In April 2012, DOD reported that a copy of the August 2010 Army staff guidance that clarified formal lines of communication was provided to the field (Installation Management Command). Complete. In August 2010 the Army issued guidance to better synchronize installations’ participation in stationing efforts. Specifically, the guidance (1) clarified formal lines of communication to ensure that all stakeholders are better involved in the early stages of force structure actions and force design updates and (2) established protocols to enable communication between staff at installations and Army Headquarters during stationing action implementation to ensure efficient completion of stationing actions. As a result, we believe the Army’s actions met the intent of our recommendation. GAO-09-703—Military Base Realignments and Closures: DOD Needs to Update Savings Estimates and Continue to Address Challenges in Consolidating Supply-Related Functions at Depot Maintenance Locations (July 9, 2009). Remove savings estimates that are not clearly the direct result of 2005 BRAC actions (including savings sometimes referred to as “BRAC enabled”). Update its 4-year-old data to reflect the most recent estimate of inventory levels available for consolidation. Concur. DOD stated that such savings estimates will be removed from savings estimates reported in the August 2009 business plan submission. Concur. DOD stated that it will use the most recent estimate of inventory levels available and update the savings calculations for inventory reductions in its August 2009 business plan. Complete. In DOD’s 2009 biannual Business Plan, the Defense Logistics Agency had removed those savings from its estimates. Complete. In DOD’s 2009 biannual Business Plan, the Defense Logistics Agency used updated inventory levels in its current estimate for savings related to this BRAC recommendation. GAO recommendation Apply current information on the timing of inventory consolidations (specifically, when they will begin and how long they will take) and exclude projected savings for consolidating Army and Marine Corps inventories with the Defense Logistics Agency. Original DOD response Concur. DOD stated that savings calculations for projected inventory reductions will reflect the current schedule of consolidating materiel and will be updated in the August 2009 business plan. Moreover, DOD stated that the update will show that no Army or Marine Corps inventory is available for consolidation. Revise and finalize an approved methodology which implements these steps and can be consistently followed by all the services and the Defense Logistics Agency over time. Concur. DOD stated that the new calculations would be documented in the August 2009 business plan and updates and revisions would be incorporated and staffed by the end of calendar year 2009. DOD actions Complete. In DOD’s August 2009 biannual Business Plan, The Defense Logistics Agency used current information regarding a later timetable for inventory consolidations and eliminated any savings from the Army and Marine Corps inventories since there will not be any available to consolidate. The resulting savings estimate will provide better information for congressional oversight and help maintain public confidence in the BRAC process. Complete. According to DOD, in 2010 and 2011, the department documented updates and revisions to the methodologies for projecting or tracking, or both, BRAC savings associated with the supply, storage, and distribution functions and inventories in the Cost and Savings Tracking Plan, which was in its second coordination cycle. GAO-09-336—Defense Infrastructure: DOD Needs to Periodically Review Support Standards and Costs at Joint Bases and Better Inform Congress of Facility Sustainment Funding Uses (March 30, 2009). Periodically review the installation support standards as experience is gained with delivering installation support at the joint bases and make adjustments, if needed, to ensure that each standard reflects the level of service necessary to meet installation requirements as economically as possible. Partial concur. DOD stated that further action to implement the recommendation was not necessary because the joint base memorandum of agreement template already requires periodic reviews to ensure that installation support is delivered in accordance with appropriate, common, output level standards. Periodically review administrative costs as joint basing is implemented to minimize any additional costs and prevent the loss of existing installation support efficiencies. Complete. In January 2011, DOD stated that the department now reviews the installation support standards annually for appropriateness, applicability, and performance. In addition to the annual review, the department implemented a cost and performance visibility framework under which the joint bases report how well the standards are being met. DOD stated that the reported information can assist in determining whether any adjustments need to be made to the standards. None planned. Partial concur. DOD stated that further action to implement the recommendation was not necessary because it had already established a process to periodically review joint basing costs as part of its planning, program, budget and execution system and that the joint base memorandum of agreement template requires periodic reviews of effects on missions and resources. GAO recommendation Complete a detailed analysis of the estimated installation support costs from the initial joint bases and report the results of the analysis to Congress in the department’s documents supporting the administration’s annual budget submission or other documents deemed appropriate. Original DOD response Partial concur. DOD stated that it is collecting estimated installation support cost information at the joint bases and that the information will be provided if Congress requests it. Increase the attention given to facility sustainment spending by summarizing and reporting to Congress the amount of budgeted sustainment funds spent on other purposes in the department’s documents supporting the administration’s annual budget submission or other documents deemed appropriate. Partial concur. DOD stated that it would collect and summarize the amount of budgeted sustainment funds spent on other purposes and that the information would be provided if Congress requested it. DOD actions Complete. In July 2011, DOD stated that it had established procedures for collecting installation support costs at the 12 joint bases and, by using a cost and performance visibility framework, the joint bases report cost and manpower annually six weeks after the end of the fiscal year. According to DOD, the information is analyzed in conjunction with performance data reported quarterly, to get an overall assessment of how well the standards for installation support are being met and the costs associated with those standards. DOD stated that it will continue to respond to requests for information from Congress with regard to the joint basing initiative. Complete. In July 2011, DOD stated that the department was monitoring the budgeting and execution of facilities sustainment in order to determine how much of the funding budgeted for sustainment is diverted to other purposes. DOD also stated that the department was currently collecting information at a sampling of installations across DOD on the sustainment tasks that are deferred in a given year and that the information would help inform decision-making with regard to facilities sustainment funding. Finally, DOD previously stated that it would provide Congress with information on the amount of budgeted sustainment funds spent on other purposes, if Congress requests it. GAO recommendation GAO-09-217—Military Base Realignments and Closures: DOD Faces Challenges in Implementing Recommendations on Time and Is Not Consistently Updating Savings Estimates (Jan. 30, 2009). Modify the recently issued guidance on the status of BRAC implementation to establish a briefing schedule with briefings as frequently as OSD deems necessary to manage the risk that a particular recommendation may not meet the statutory deadline but at a minimum at 6-month intervals through the rest of the BRAC 2005 implementation period, a schedule that would enable DOD to continually assess and respond to the challenges identified by the services and defense agencies that could prevent DOD from completing the implementation of a recommendation by September 15, 2011. Modify the recently issued guidance on the status of BRAC implementation to require the services and defense agencies to provide information on possible mitigation measures to reduce the effects of those challenges. Concur. DOD noted that BRAC business managers had and would continue to provide briefings on the status of implementation actions associated with recommendations exceeding $100 million, and that these briefings provide a forum for BRAC business managers to explain their actions to mitigate challenges. Complete. The Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Installations and Environment) issued a memo in November 2008 requiring the military services and defense agencies to provide the OSD BRAC Office status briefings. According to OSD, the briefings were needed to ensure senior leadership was apprised of significant issues affecting BRAC implementation by the statutory deadline. The first round of status briefings took place in December 2008. Concur. DOD noted that BRAC business managers had and would continue to provide briefings on the status of implementation actions associated with recommendations exceeding $100 million, and that these briefings provide a forum for BRAC business managers to explain their actions to mitigate challenges. Complete. According to DOD, in 2009 and 2010, the department required business managers to identify specific mitigation measures for BRAC recommendations that have construction projects that are scheduled to complete within 3 months of the statutory deadline. The purpose of these mitigation measures is to reduce the risk of not completing implementation of a recommendation by the BRAC deadline. These mitigation measures are identified and monitored in a tracking tool to help ensure they are implemented and the risk is reduced. As appropriate, the DOD basing office conducts additional follow-up meetings with business managers for specific issues or follows up via other contacts that occur between the routine 6 month briefing intervals. This helps to ensure DOD is making progress and implementation of recommendations is on track. As part of this process, six recommendations were identified as having particular risk. DOD briefed these six recommendations to key Senate and House staff in March 2010. GAO recommendation Take steps to improve compliance with DOD’s regulation requiring updated BRAC savings estimates. Original DOD response Concur. The department stated that it is emphasizing savings updates during its briefings and in all future business plan approval documentation. DOD actions Complete. On August 5, 2010, the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Installations and Environment) issued a guidance memo to the military services and DOD agencies regarding BRAC 2005 Final Business Plans and Other Reporting Requirements. Among other things, this guidance emphasized to the military services and defense agencies that it is imperative that the final financial displays for BRAC 2005 contain updated projections of recurring savings. GAO-08-665—Defense Infrastructure: High-Level Leadership Needed to Help Communities Address Challenges Caused by DOD- Related Growth (June 17, 2008). Develop and implement guidance—no later than the end of fiscal year 2008—that is consistent with DOD Directive 5410.12 for the timely, complete, and consistent dissemination of DOD planning information such as estimated time lines and numbers of personnel relocating, as well as demographic data such as numbers of school-aged children, and update this information quarterly. Concur. Although DOD indicated it would continue to work with the cognizant DOD components to ensure compliance with the directive, actions taken to date have not resulted in the military services’ development and implementation of guidance that we believe is necessary for providing more complete and consistent personnel relocation planning data to affected communities. Moreover, DOD did not explicitly say what steps it intends to take to ensure that the military services have implemented such guidance by the end of fiscal year 2008. With respect to our recommended action to provide information updates on a quarterly basis, DOD indicated that not all situations are conducive to quarterly updates. Complete. From January through March 2011, the military services and the head of the Defense Logistics Agency issued guidance for the timely, complete, and consistent dissemination of DOD planning information, such as military and civilian personnel changes and school-age children increases and decreases in accordance with DOD Directive 5410.12. Although DOD missed the deadline for implementing our recommendation, issuing this guidance facilitates the preparation of effective plans to minimize the economic impacts on communities resulting from changes in defense programs. GAO recommendation Implement Executive Order 12788 by holding regular meetings of the full executive-level Economic Adjustment Committee and by serving as a clearinghouse of information for identifying expected community effects and problems, as well as identifying existing resources for providing economic assistance to communities affected by DOD activities. In addition, this information should be updated at least quarterly and made easily available to all interested stakeholders at the local, state, and federal levels. Original DOD response Concur. DOD stated that it will develop an information clearinghouse that will identify federal programs and resources to affected communities, present successful state and local responses, and provide the Economic Adjustment Committee members with a basis to resource their assistance programs. Based on DOD’s comments, it is unclear as to whether DOD, as chair of the Economic Adjustment Committee, intends to call and periodically hold meetings of the full executive-level committee to provide the high-level federal leadership that we believe is necessary to more effectively coordinate federal agency assistance to impacted communities. DOD actions Complete. DOD regularly reconvened the full executive level Economic Adjustment Committee meetings from February 25, 2009 to September 2, 2010 and completed actions that met the intent of our recommendation by establishing a clearinghouse website in December 2009 to support states and communities undertaking local economic adjustment activity and federal agencies working to support such activities. By reconvening the full executive level Economic Adjustment Committee and setting up the clearinghouse website, DOD increased its ability to engage other federal agencies at a high level to promote interagency and intergovernmental cooperation and share information on a continual basis. DOD activated a publicly accessible website in December 2008 (www.eaclearinghouse.gov), managed by the Office of Economic Adjustment, which contains information such as service migration information, information on federal agency assistance programs, community profiles, and community redevelopment plans. GAO-08-315—Military Base Realignments and Closures: Higher Costs and Lower Savings Projected for Implementing Two Key Supply-Related BRAC Recommendations (March 5, 2008). Revise its business plans to exclude all expected savings that are not the direct result of BRAC actions. Non-concur. DOD stated that while the $172 million in potential savings for implementing the supply, storage, and distribution recommendation and the $71 million in potential savings for implementing the depot-level reparable recommendation were not directly the result of BRAC actions, the estimated savings were enabled by BRAC actions and should be attributable to the recommendations. According to DOD, enabled savings are savings initiatives that were enhanced in some way by the BRAC implementation actions (e.g. increased scope, more aggressively pursued, or moved in new directions). None planned. Original DOD response Concur. clear metrics for measuring the magnitude of actual costs and savings, a comparison of the actual costs and savings to the prior estimates to coincide with the required semiannual business plan updates, and explanations for actual cost and savings variances from estimates presented in the business plans. DOD actions Complete. According to DOD, in 2009, the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology and Logistics) established a standard DOD format for measuring the magnitude of actual costs and savings, and required DOD components to submit business plans in February and August that compared current costs and savings with prior estimates and justify any changes, by funding category. The Defense Logistics Agency has since updated cost and savings for BRAC recommendations on a semi-annual basis synchronized with the programming and budget cycles and compared actual costs and savings to prior year estimates. The magnitude of actual costs and savings are collected in a relational data base that was developed to compare actual costs and savings to prior year estimates. The data base has data on BRAC Recommendation 176-Depot Level Reparable Management and BRAC Recommendation 177-Supply, Storage, and Distribution Reconfiguration. For example, in the February 2009 business plans for BRAC Recommendation 176 and BRAC Recommendation 177, the Defense Logistics Agency compared costs and savings to prior estimates for each funding category and when there was a variance in a funding category, it included an explanation for the change in cost and savings. GAO recommendation Ensure that necessary funding to meet implementation milestones is reflected in all service and Defense Logistics Agency budget submissions for the remainder of the implementation period ending in fiscal year 2011. Original DOD response Concur. DOD actions Complete. According to DOD, the BRAC decision memorandums provide the resources to fully fund implementation during the 6-year BRAC implementation statutory period. Annually the DOD BRAC office goes through an extensive analysis to compare each business plan requirement to program funding (Program Review). If funding shortfalls are identified, the components are directed via a Program Decision Memorandum to fully fund requirements. The office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology and Logistics) issued a June 22, 2007 memorandum directing DOD Components to fully fund BRAC implementation during the 6-year statutory period. GAO-08-159—Military Base Realignments and Closures: Cost Estimates Have Increased and Are Likely to Continue to Evolve (Dec. 11, 2007). Explain, in DOD’s BRAC budget submission to Congress, the difference between annual recurring savings attributable to military personnel entitlements and annual recurring savings that will readily result in funds available for other defense priorities. Concur. DOD noted that military personnel reductions attributable to a BRAC recommendation as savings are as real as savings generated through end strength reductions. DOD also stated that while it may not reduce overall end strength, its reductions in military personnel for each recommendation at a specific location are real and these personnel reductions allow the department to reapply these military personnel to support new capabilities and improve operational efficiencies. Complete. The fiscal year 2009 DOD budget estimates for BRAC 2005 included language that stated, “To the extent that savings generated from military personnel reductions at closing or realigning installations are immediately used to fund military personnel priorities, these resources are not available to fund other Defense priorities.” Such language was not included in the prior year (fiscal year 2008) budget submittal to Congress. The Office of the Secretary of Defense stated that the insertion of this language would provide a better explanation to Congress of its estimated annual recurring savings resulting from BRAC. GAO recommendation GAO-07-1040—Military Base Realignments and Closures: Plan Needed to Monitor Challenges for Completing More Than 100 Armed Forces Reserve Centers (Sept. 13, 2007). Develop a plan for routinely bringing together the various stakeholders as a group, to include the state Army National Guard when appropriate, to monitor for and develop steps to mitigate implementation challenges should they occur. These steps should include ways to monitor and mitigate the effects of potential challenges on BRAC completion time frames, project cost and scope, construction quality, and capacity of the facility to meet changing mission requirements. Partial concur. DOD believes that GAO overlooked the various groups, forums, or plans that the Army has in place to assist with BRAC execution and management. DOD stated that the Army already has a plan in place to bring the various stakeholders together, however Army BRAC headquarters officials acknowledged that they could be more proactive in outreaching and communicating with the stakeholders on how to deal with and mitigate particular challenges associated with constructing 125 AFRCs. DOD also stated that the Army BRAC office will begin quarterly BRAC program reviews with the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Installations and Environment, which will further provide a forum for discussing and vetting issues affecting the BRAC program. Complete. The Army BRAC Office has taken several steps to implement the recommendation. In March 2009, the Army BRAC Office provided a BRAC 2005 program update to the Army Vice Chief of Staff, with representation from the Army National Guard and Reserves. In addition, the Army BRAC Division Reserve Component Branch, the Army Reserve Division, and the full time Army National Guard and Army Reserve liaisons assigned to the Army BRAC Office collaborated at BRAC summits in October 2009 and April 2010 where issues affecting US Army Reserve Command were discussed with Army National Guard and Army Reserve Command presenting their concerns. GAO-07-1007—Defense Infrastructure: Challenges Increase Risks for Providing Timely Infrastructure Support for Army Installations Expecting Substantial Personnel Growth (Sept. 13, 2007). Determine why there are data differences between headquarters and gaining bases with respect to the number of arriving and departing personnel. Partial concur. DOD stated that the Army had determined the cause of the differences and taken corrective action by establishing the Army Stationing Installation Plan (ASIP) as the single, unified source of installation planning population data to be used Army- wide. Complete. In January 2007 the Army designated the ASIP as the single, unified source of installation planning population data to be used Army-wide. In May 2008, the Army issued guidance that helped reduce the differences between the populations reported by Headquarters and the installations by ensuring that ASIP population data be used for reporting external to the Army and allowing pre-decisional unit moves to be used for internal planning. Lastly, in a memorandum of agreement signed in May 2009, the Army established an ASIP quarterly edit cycle to resolve discrepancies between Army official force structure data and “on the ground” situation. GAO recommendation Ensure that Army headquarters and base officials are collaborating to agree on Army personnel movement plans so that base commanders and surrounding communities can effectively plan for expected growth. This collaboration to reach agreement should continue as expected personnel movement actions are revised over time. Original DOD response Partial concur. DOD stated that the Army had already taken corrective action. The Army stated that in May 2007 it issued guidance that allowed installations to plan for anticipated unit moves that may not be reflected in the ASIP and to discuss these plans with local communities as long as they are appropriately identified as pre-decisional and subject to change. Army officials also stated that, in June 2007, they would ensure that installations forward all population and stationing issues to the Department of the Army headquarters for resolution. DOD actions Complete. In May 2007, the Army issued guidance that allowed installations to plan for anticipated moves that may not be reflected in the ASIP and to discuss these plans with local communities as long as they are appropriately identified as pre- decisional and subject to change. In addition, in May 2009 the Army issued a memorandum of agreement between the office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Installation Management and the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff G- 3/5/7 to close information gaps and improve timely reconciliation of disparate data among installation planners, force planners, and headquarters. The memorandum established an ASIP quarterly edit cycle to resolve discrepancies between Army official force structure data and the “on the ground” situation. GAO-07-641—Military Base Closures: Management Strategy Needed to Mitigate Challenges and Improve Communication to Help Ensure Timely Implementation of Air National Guard Recommendations (May 16, 2007). Develop a mitigation strategy to be shared with key stakeholders that anticipates, identifies, and addresses related implementation challenges. At a minimum, this strategy should include time frames for actions and responsibilities for each challenge, and facilitate the ability of Air National Guard headquarters officials to act to mitigate potential delays in interim milestones. Partial concur. DOD suggested a modification to the recommendation to clarify that the director, Air National Guard, is normally tasked by the Chief, National Guard Bureau. DOD also stated that mitigation plans cannot be released until they have been thoroughly vetted with all of the key stakeholders. Complete. The National Guard Bureau implemented a Strategic Communication Plan that provides affected units with the information they need to successfully complete BRAC actions and develop opportunities for follow-on missions at BRAC-affected locations. The Air National Guard Strategic Planning process, which is based on state involvement at all levels of the planning process, is the cornerstone and allows states to provide input to the Air National Guard Strategic Plan and ensures that states have the necessary information to implement those plans. The National Guard Bureau Strategic Communication Plan also incorporates Air Force communications. GAO recommendation Expand the Strategic Communication Plan to include how the Air National Guard headquarters will provide the affected Air National Guard units with the information needed to implement the BRAC-related actions. Original DOD response Partial concur. DOD stated it is incumbent upon the Air National Guard and all effected units to maximize established chains of leadership and communication to effectively manage and execute BRAC actions. The Director, Air National Guard, acknowledges that there are challenges in communicating with the units and that some unit commanders may not have the information that they feel they need to implement the BRAC recommendation and their new missions. DOD actions Complete. The National Guard Bureau, an oversight organization over Air National Guard, is providing key stakeholders with access to detailed BRAC implementation action timelines and programming plans, including BRAC contacts at each Air National Guard-affected base. Further, the Air National Guard Strategic Communication Playbook, which was updated in 2009, now focuses leadership attention to various strategic priorities including the implementation of Air National Guard BRAC recommendations. In addition, the Air National Guard Strategic Planning Process includes both Air Force level and National Guard Bureau level communication with various state-level Adjutants Generals about BRAC implementation. As such, the Air Force Chief of Staff and Air National Guard Director have hosted a meeting for all state-level Adjutants Generals to discuss BRAC actions. As a result of implementing our recommendation, Air National Guard headquarters’ ability to identify strategies and determine resources needed to effectively meet BRAC goals has improved. None planned. Report in the Air Force annual BRAC budget submission the costs and source of funding required to establish replacement missions for the Air National Guard units that will lose their flying missions as a result of BRAC 2005. Non-concur. DOD does not believe these costs are BRAC-related, because establishment of replacement missions was not part of the recommendations. DOD stated that BRAC funds cannot be used to establish these missions and that the costs in question have been appropriately programmed and budgeted in the Air Force’s regular military construction account. GAO recommendation GAO-07-304—Military Base Closures: Projected Savings from Fleet Readiness Centers Are Likely Overstated and Actions Needed to Track Actual Savings and Overcome Certain Challenges (June 29, 2007). Update the business plan for the fleet readiness centers (1) to reflect only savings that are directly related to implementing the recommendation, and (2) update projected onetime savings when data are available. Concur. DOD stated it considers military personnel reductions attributable to BRAC recommendations as savings that are just as real as savings generated through end- strength reductions. While the department may not reduce overall end-strength, it believes that the reductions in military personnel for each recommendation at a specific location are real. Complete. The Commander, Fleet Readiness Centers, updated the business plan in August 2009 to reflect savings directly related to the BRAC action to establish fleet readiness centers. The Navy updated projected savings directly related to implementing the recommendation, showing that overall savings projections of $1.151 billion from the August 2007 version of the business plan should not change, since changes to projected savings targets in some of the six Fleet Readiness Center locations that exceeded savings targets in some years were offset by the inability to meet savings targets at other locations or in other years. The Navy updated projected one-time savings when data became available by changing some savings projected in the 2009 version of the business plan (from our recommendation to re-categorize approximately $25 million per year from recurring savings) to one-time savings. GAO recommendation Monitor implementation of the recommendation to determine the extent to which savings already taken from the Navy budget are actually achieved. Original DOD response Concur. DOD actions Complete. The Navy has demonstrated sustained leadership devoted to implementing the BRAC recommendation for establishing Fleet Readiness Centers, as evidenced by successive leaders who have developed implementation plans and completed each phase of implementation over time. In addition, the Navy’s implementation guidance for Fleet Readiness Centers specifies that key measures include, in part, achieving savings targets. As a result, the Navy’s monthly report to the Fleet Readiness Center Commanders includes an analysis of the variance between savings projected and those actually achieved at the six Fleet Readiness Centers. These reports provide objective, outcome-oriented metrics for improving readiness and detailing six separate savings categories. Commanding Officers or Officers-in- Charge of specific centers are evaluated for their results and held accountable for achieving savings targets. Management tools developed by the implementation team for Fleet Readiness Centers have supported the identification of additional opportunities to realize savings. Continuing efforts to monitor implementation and develop mechanisms to improve performance and accountability have allowed the Navy to determine the extent to which savings already taken from the Navy budget for aircraft maintenance are actually achieved. GAO recommendation GAO-07-166—Military Base Closures: Opportunities Exist to Improve Environmental Cleanup Cost Reporting and to Expedite Transfer of Unneeded Property (Jan. 30, 2007). Report all costs (Defense Environmental Restoration Program and non- Defense Environmental Restoration Program)—past and future—required to complete environmental cleanup at each BRAC installation and to fully explain the scope and limitations of all the environmental cleanup costs DOD reports to Congress. We suggest including this information in the annual BRAC budget justification documentation, since it would accompany information Congress considers when making resource allocation decisions. Concur. DOD concurred with our basic recommendation; however DOD’s comments reflect only a partial concurrence, because DOD did not agree with our suggestion to include this information in the annual BRAC budget justification documentation. DOD stated its belief that this would be counterproductive and that Congress has prescribed the types of environmental information it wants presented in the budget documentation, which DOD complies with. Require that the military services periodically report to OSD on the status and proposed strategy for transferring unneeded BRAC properties and include an assessment of the usefulness of all tools at their disposal. We suggest placing this information in an easily shared location, such as a website, so that each service, and even the local communities and private sector, can share and benefit from lessons learned. Concur. DOD concurred with our recommendation to require the military services to periodically report to the Office of the Secretary of Defense on the status and proposed strategy for transferring BRAC properties and to include an assessment of the usefulness of all tools at their disposal. Although DOD did not comment on our suggestion to accomplish this through a shared website in order to maximize the sharing of lessons learned, DOD officials embraced the idea as something easily to do in comments they made during our exit interview with the department. Complete. DOD stated that in October 2008, the Assistant Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for the Environment, Safety, and Occupational Health determined that the Annual Report to Congress is the appropriate and best format to provide Congress with cleanup information on the DOD BRAC environmental programs. The annual report data is updated annually, via the electronic reporting system from the DOD components to the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Installations and Environment. The 2007 annual report provided BRAC site cost data through FY2007 and the estimated cost to complete for FY2008. The annual report is a comprehensive document designed to answer the many stakeholder questions that have developed over the many years of executing BRAC cleanup. The cost and budget data that appears in the annual report are also in the annual budget justification submitted to Congress in support of the President’s Budget Request. Complete. According to DOD, military departments are required to report on the status of all excess real property and to include the available acreages and the authority under which the land was transferred, conveyed, or otherwise disposed of. In June 2011, we contacted the responsible OSD office and were provided sufficient evidence that all four of the military services are now (within the last two years) reporting the status of excess real property to OSD. In addition, the DOD Inspector General’s written response of February 25, 2011, in closing out our recommendation, stated that the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Installations and Environment) continually reviews the need for new authorities and changes to existing authorities. GAO recommendation GAO-05-785—Military Bases: Analysis of DOD’s 2005 Selection Process and Recommendations for Base Closures and Realignments (July 1, 2005). Establish mechanisms for tracking and periodically updating savings estimates in implementing individual recommendations, with emphasis on both savings related to the more traditional realignment and closure actions and those related more to business process reengineering. Concur. No written comments provided. In providing oral comments on a draft of this report, the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Installations and Environment concurred with our recommendation. Complete. The Joint Action Scenario Team, a joint team DOD set up to develop and propose various joint reserve component recommended actions, incorporated our suggestions to include specific information in its summary reports and supporting documentation in order to withstand scrutiny and provide a clear understanding to outside parties— including us and the military service audit agencies—of the process leading to the ultimate decisions regarding recommended BRAC actions. GAO-04-760—Military Base Closures: Assessment of DOD’s 2004 Report on the Need for a Base Realignment and Closure Round (May 17, 2004). Include in the Secretary of Defense’s May 2005 report on recommendations for base closures and realignments a full discussion of relevant assumptions, and allowances made for potential future force structure requirements and changes, including the potential for future surge requirements. Concur. Complete. The Secretary of Defense’s May 2005 report to the BRAC Commission addressed several of these factors. For example, the report contained a discussion about current and future national security threats the department considered during its deliberations. In addition, the report included a copy of the Secretary of Defense’s January 2005 “Policy Memoranda Seven – Surge,” which outlined five steps DOD would take to meet the statutory requirements to consider a surge in the development of BRAC recommendations. Further, some of the military departments and joint cross service groups discussed during their analyses the steps they took to incorporate the possibility of future surge requirements. In addition to the contact named above, Gina Hoffman (Assistant Director), Leslie Bharadwaja, Michele Fejfar, Joanne Landesman, Amie Lesser, Stephanie Moriarty, Carol Petersen, Matthew Spiers, and Michael Willems made key contributions to this report. Military Base Realignments and Closures: Process for Reusing Property for Homeless Assistance Needs Improvements. GAO-15-274. Washington, D.C.: March 16, 2015. DOD Joint Bases: Implementation Challenges Demonstrate Need to Reevaluate the Program. GAO-14-577. Washington, D.C.: September 19, 2014. Defense Health Care Reform: Actions Needed to Help Realize Potential Cost Savings from Medical Education and Training. GAO-14-630. Washington, D.C.: July 31, 2014. Defense Infrastructure: Communities Need Additional Guidance and Information to Improve Their Ability to Adjust to DOD Installation Closure or Growth. GAO-13-436. Washington, D.C.: May 14, 2013. Military Bases: Opportunities Exist to Improve Future Base Realignment and Closure Rounds. GAO-13-149. Washington, D.C.: March 7, 2013. DOD Joint Bases: Management Improvements Needed to Achieve Greater Efficiencies. GAO-13-134. Washington, D.C.: November 15, 2012. Military Base Realignments and Closures: The National Geospatial- Intelligence Agency’s Technology Center Construction Project. GAO-12-770R. Washington, D.C.: June 29, 2012. Military Base Realignments and Closures: Updated Costs and Savings Estimates from BRAC 2005. GAO-12-709R. Washington, D.C.: June 29, 2012. Defense Health Care: Applying Key Management Practices Should Help Achieve Efficiencies within the Military Health System. GAO-12-224. Washington, D.C.: April 12, 2012. Military Base Realignments and Closures: Key Factors Contributing to BRAC 2005 Results. GAO-12-513T. Washington, D.C.: March 8, 2012. Excess Facilities: DOD Needs More Complete Information and a Strategy to Guide Its Future Disposal Efforts. GAO-11-814. Washington, D.C.: September 19, 2011. Military Base Realignments and Closures: Review of the Iowa and Milan Army Ammunition Plants. GAO-11-488R. Washington, D.C.: April 1, 2011. GAO’s 2011 High-Risk Series: An Update. GAO-11-394T. Washington, D.C.: February 17, 2011. Defense Infrastructure: High-Level Federal Interagency Coordination Is Warranted to Address Transportation Needs beyond the Scope of the Defense Access Roads Program. GAO-11-165. Washington, D.C.: January 26, 2011. Military Base Realignments and Closures: DOD Is Taking Steps to Mitigate Challenges but Is Not Fully Reporting Some Additional Costs. GAO-10-725R. Washington, D.C.: July 21, 2010. Defense Infrastructure: Army Needs to Improve Its Facility Planning Systems to Better Support Installations Experiencing Significant Growth. GAO-10-602. Washington, D.C.: June 24, 2010. Military Base Realignments and Closures: Estimated Costs Have Increased While Savings Estimates Have Decreased Since Fiscal Year 2009. GAO-10-98R. Washington, D.C.: November 13, 2009. Military Base Realignments and Closures: Transportation Impact of Personnel Increases Will Be Significant, but Long-Term Costs Are Uncertain and Direct Federal Support Is Limited. GAO-09-750. Washington, D.C.: September 9, 2009. Military Base Realignments and Closures: DOD Needs to Update Savings Estimates and Continue to Address Challenges in Consolidating Supply- Related Functions at Depot Maintenance Locations. GAO-09-703. Washington, D.C.: July 9, 2009. Defense Infrastructure: DOD Needs to Periodically Review Support Standards and Costs at Joint Bases and Better Inform Congress of Facility Sustainment Funding Uses. GAO-09-336. Washington, D.C.: March 30, 2009. Military Base Realignments and Closures: DOD Faces Challenges in Implementing Recommendations on Time and Is Not Consistently Updating Savings Estimates. GAO-09-217. Washington, D.C.: January 30, 2009. Military Base Realignments and Closures: Army Is Developing Plans to Transfer Functions from Fort Monmouth, New Jersey, to Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland, but Challenges Remain. GAO-08-1010R. Washington, D.C.: August 13, 2008. Defense Infrastructure: High-Level Leadership Needed to Help Communities Address Challenges Caused by DOD-Related Growth. GAO-08-665. Washington, D.C.: June 17, 2008. Defense Infrastructure: DOD Funding for Infrastructure and Road Improvements Surrounding Growth Installations. GAO-08-602R. Washington, D.C.: April 1, 2008. Military Base Realignments and Closures: Higher Costs and Lower Savings Projected for Implementing Two Key Supply-Related BRAC Recommendations. GAO-08-315. Washington, D.C.: March 5, 2008. Defense Infrastructure: Realignment of Air Force Special Operations Command Units to Cannon Air Force Base, New Mexico. GAO-08-244R. Washington, D.C.: January 18, 2008. Military Base Realignments and Closures: Estimated Costs Have Increased and Estimated Savings Have Decreased. GAO-08-341T. Washington, D.C.: December 12, 2007. Military Base Realignments and Closures: Cost Estimates Have Increased and Are Likely to Continue to Evolve. GAO-08-159. Washington, D.C.: December 11, 2007. Military Base Realignments and Closures: Impact of Terminating, Relocating, or Outsourcing the Services of the Armed Forces Institute of Pathology. GAO-08-20. Washington, D.C.: November 9, 2007. Military Base Realignments and Closures: Transfer of Supply, Storage, and Distribution Functions from Military Services to Defense Logistics Agency. GAO-08-121R. Washington, D.C.: October 26, 2007. Defense Infrastructure: Challenges Increase Risks for Providing Timely Infrastructure Support for Army Installations Expecting Substantial Personnel Growth. GAO-07-1007. Washington, D.C.: September 13, 2007. Military Base Realignments and Closures: Plan Needed to Monitor Challenges for Completing More Than 100 Armed Forces Reserve Centers. GAO-07-1040. Washington, D.C.: September 13, 2007. Military Base Realignments and Closures: Observations Related to the 2005 Round. GAO-07-1203R. Washington, D.C.: September 6, 2007. Military Base Closures: Projected Savings from Fleet Readiness Centers Likely Overstated and Actions Needed to Track Actual Savings and Overcome Certain Challenges. GAO-07-304. Washington, D.C.: June 29, 2007. Military Base Closures: Management Strategy Needed to Mitigate Challenges and Improve Communication to Help Ensure Timely Implementation of Air National Guard Recommendations. GAO-07-641. Washington, D.C.: May 16, 2007. Military Base Closures: Opportunities Exist to Improve Environmental Cleanup Cost Reporting and to Expedite Transfer of Unneeded Property. GAO-07-166. Washington, D.C.: January 30, 2007. Military Bases: Observations on DOD’s 2005 Base Realignment and Closure Selection Process and Recommendations. GAO-05-905. Washington, D.C.: July 18, 2005. Military Bases: Analysis of DOD’s 2005 Selection Process and Recommendations for Base Closures and Realignments. GAO-05-785. Washington, D.C.: July 1, 2005. Military Base Closures: Observations on Prior and Current BRAC Rounds. GAO-05-614. Washington, D.C.: May 3, 2005. Military Base Closures: Assessment of DOD’s 2004 Report on the Need for a Base Realignment and Closure Round. GAO-04-760. Washington, D.C.: May 17, 2004.

Summary: The 2005 BRAC round was the fifth round of base closures and realignments undertaken by DOD since 1988, and it was the largest, most complex, and costliest. DOD has relied on the BRAC process to reduce excess infrastructure and realign bases to meet changing force structure needs. According to the Secretary of Defense, BRAC 2005 provided opportunities to foster jointness among the military services. House Report 113-446 included a provision for GAO to review the status of BRAC 2005 recommendations to reduce infrastructure and promote opportunities for jointness. This report evaluates the extent to which DOD has (1) implemented the recommendations requiring the services to relocate select training functions to increase opportunities for jointness and (2) determined if implementing these recommendations has achieved cost savings. GAO reviewed guidance, course listings, and cost data; interviewed DOD and service officials. For each of the six recommendations GAO reviewed from the 2005 Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) round, the Department of Defense (DOD) implemented the recommendations by requiring military services to relocate select training functions; however, GAO found that two of the six training functions reviewed were able to take advantage of the opportunity provided by BRAC to consolidate training so that services could train jointly. In implementing the remaining four BRAC recommendations, DOD relocated similar training functions run by separate military services into one location, but the services did not consolidate training functions. For example, they do not regularly coordinate or share information on their training goals and curriculums. DOD's justification for numerous 2005 BRAC recommendations included the assumption that realigning military department activities to one location would enhance jointness—defined by DOD as activities, operations, or organizations in which elements of two or more military departments participate. For these four training functions, DOD missed the opportunity to consolidate training to increase jointness, because it provided guidance to move personnel or construct buildings but not to measure progress toward consolidated training. Without additional guidance for consolidating training, the services will not be positioned to take advantage of such an opportunity in these types of recommendations as proposed by DOD and will face challenges encouraging joint training activities and collaboration across services. DOD cannot determine if implementing the 2005 BRAC joint training recommendations that GAO reviewed has resulted in savings in operating costs. For three of the recommendations in this review, the services did not develop baseline operating costs before implementing the BRAC recommendations, which would have enabled it to determine whether savings were achieved. Without developing baseline cost data, DOD will be unable to estimate any cost savings resulting from similar recommendations in any future BRAC rounds. Further, costs reported to DOD by the training functions business plan managers for implementation of two of the six recommendations in this review likely did not include all BRAC-related costs funded from outside the BRAC account. A DOD memo requires BRAC business plan managers to submit all BRAC-related expenditures, including those funded from both inside and outside of the BRAC account. GAO identified at least $110 million in implementation costs that likely should have been reported to DOD in accordance with the memo but were not; therefore the $35.1 billion total cost reported for BRAC 2005 is likely somewhat understated. A DOD official stated that it was up to the military departments to ensure that all BRAC implementation costs were accounted for and that the military departments had the flexibility to determine which costs were associated with the BRAC recommendation and which were attributed to other actions. GAO found that this flexibility in determining which costs were to be reported as BRAC costs led to inconsistencies in what kinds of projects had their costs counted as BRAC implementation costs. By clarifying in guidance what is to be included as a BRAC implementation cost, DOD can help ensure that it has an accurate accounting of the final costs for any future BRAC implementation and that DOD and Congress are able to determine how much money is spent on any future BRAC rounds. To help improve the implementation of jointness-focused recommendations in any future BRAC rounds, GAO recommends that DOD provide additional guidance for consolidating training and reporting BRAC costs and require the development of baseline cost data. DOD partially concurred with the recommendation to clarify guidance for reporting BRAC costs but did not concur with the other recommendations, stating that GAO misunderstood its approach to joint training. GAO believes its findings and recommendations are valid and addresses these points in the report.