For over 30 years, the United States has relied on an all volunteer force to defend the nation at home and abroad. Before that, the nation relied on the draft to ensure that it had enough soldiers, sailors, Marines, and airmen in wartime. Since the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the United States, DOD has launched three major operations requiring significant numbers of military servicemembers: Operation Noble Eagle, which covers military operations related to homeland security; Operation Enduring Freedom, which includes ongoing military operations in Afghanistan and certain other countries; and Operation Iraqi Freedom, which includes ongoing military operations in Iraq and the Persian Gulf area. These operations have greatly increased overseas deployments. Moreover, they are the first long-term major overseas combat missions since the advent of the all volunteer force in 1973. To ensure that sufficient forces are available for the services to accomplish their missions, Congress authorizes an annual year-end authorized personnel level for each service component. To function effectively, the services must, among other things, access and retain officers at appropriate ranks and in the occupational specialties needed to enable its units to contribute to the services’ missions. The services rely on monetary and nonmonetary incentives, where needed, to meet their accession and retention needs. The careers of military officers are governed primarily by Title 10, which has incorporated the DOPMA legislation, giving the services the primary authority to recruit, train, and retain officers. Title 10 specifies the active duty and reserve service obligations for officers who join the military: graduates of the service academies must serve a minimum of 5 years on active duty; and up to an additional 3 years on active duty or in the reserves; ROTC scholarship recipients must serve a minimum of 4 years on active duty and an additional 4 years on active duty or in the reserves; and other types of officers have varying service obligations (for example, pilots must serve 6 to 8 years on active duty, depending on the type of aircraft, and navigators and flight officers must serve 6 years on active duty). Similarly, Title 10 authorizes the services to directly commission medical specialists and other professionals to meet their needs. The services generally met most their past needs for newly commissioned officers; but the Army faces some unique problems accessing enough officers to meet its needs and has not developed a strategic plan to address these challenges. The Marine Corps, Navy, and the Air Force generally met their needs for accessing newly commissioned officers in FYs 2001, 2003, and 2005. However, all services experienced problems recruiting enough medical professionals in FYs 2001, 2003, and 2005; and most had problems accessing racial and ethnic minorities to diversify their officer corps. Our analysis of documentary evidence confirmed the services’ reports that their accession programs generally met their officer needs in selected recent years, but each experienced some shortfalls in certain ranks and specialties. The services do not develop overall yearly goals for the total number of commissioned officers needed. Instead, they adjust the enrollment in OCS/OTS throughout the year to meet higher or lower than expected demands for newly commissioned officers by the various occupational specialty groups of importance to the service. The Army and the Marine Corps are increasing their numbers of newly commissioned officers because of their growing end strengths, whereas the Navy and the Air Force are accessing fewer officers because they are reducing their end strengths. The Army did not meet its overall accession needs for newly commissioned officers in FYs 2001 and 2003, though it met its needs in 2005. The Army has two distinct types of commissioned officers. Most officers are commissioned in its basic branches or specialty areas, such as infantry or signal, and are commissioned through major accession programs. The second type of officers are and those who are directly commissioned, such as medical professionals. In FY 2001, the Army needed 4,100 of these officers in its basic branches and instead it commissioned 3,791, in FY 2003 it needed 4,500 and instead commissioned 4,433. In FY 2005, it exceed it goal of commissioning 4,600 of and instead accessed 4,654 in it basic branches. During those years it was increasing the number of commissioned officers entering the service (see table 1). Specifically, the Army commissioned 5,540 officers in FY 2001, 5,929 in FY 2003, and 6,045 in FY 2005. In each of the examined fiscal years, the Army’s ROTC program accounted for around half of all newly commissioned officers, with nearly 1,000 of those officers being accessed annually into the Army despite not being awarded a scholarship. The Army increased total accessions from FY 2001 to FY 2005 by nearly doubling the number of officers commissioned through OCS. Our independent review and analysis of data and other materials from the commissioning sources found that the Army does not recruit officers to fill a specific specialty, and instead, officers are placed in general specialty areas based on the needs of the Army. Some general specialty areas are more popular than others, and the Army attempts to match an officer candidate’s preference to the needs of the Army. However, the service’s needs prevail, and some officers may be placed in specialty areas outside of their preferences if shortfalls are present. In contrast, the Marine Corps met its overall accession needs for newly commissioned officers for the examined fiscal years, while increasing the number of officers it commissioned in FY 2005 (see table 2). Increasing accessions by 241 from FY 2003 to FY 2005 represents about an 18 percent increase in the number of newly commissioned officers. Relative to the other services, the Marine Corps commissioned a larger percentage of its officers through programs other than the academy or ROTC program. For example, in FY 2005, 76 percent of the Marine Corps’s newly commissioned officers came from OCS or other sources. However, the Marine Corps has also been increasing the number of officers commissioned from USNA. The Marine Corps does not have a separate ROTC program and instead, commissions officers through the Navy ROTC program. Our independent review and analysis of data and other materials from the commissioning sources and Marine Corps headquarters identified some areas where the Marine Corps was challenged to access newly commissioned officers for some occupational specialties. While the Marine Corps officials stated that they were challenged in accessing enough naval flight officers because officer candidates were not familiar with the position (which involves assisting pilots with aircraft and weapons systems), the service still recruited the number it needed based upon our examination of the data. The Navy also reported meeting its overall needs for commissioned officers during FYs 2001, 2003, and 2005. Since FY 2001, the total number of newly commissioned officers decreased from 4,784 to 3,506, a decline of nearly 27 percent (see table 3). A large portion of that decrease was accomplished by reducing the number of officers being commissioned through OCS, the program that can most easily and quickly be altered to reflect changing demands for producing commissioned officers. Despite generally meeting its overall accession needs for newly commissioned officers, the Navy experienced accession challenges in some specialty areas. Our independent review and analysis of data and other materials from the commissioning sources, Navy headquarters, and accession programs identified some areas where there were gaps between the numbers of newly commissioned officers needed and the numbers supplied to specialties by some of the commissioning programs. For example, USNA did not meet its quota for submarine officers in FY 2005, but other commissioning programs were able to compensate for the shortfall. Like the Marine Corps, the Navy faced a challenge in accessing enough naval flight officers, but the Navy met its overall need for newly commissioned officers by shifting the number of officers sent to that specialty by some commissioning sources. For example, Navy ROTC met its goal for naval flight officers in FY 2005 but not FY 2001 and FY 2003. The Navy’s OCS made up the difference in those years. According to Navy officials, some officers who may previously have gone into this specialty because of poor eyesight have their vision surgically corrected and instead become pilots. Like the Marine Corps and the Navy, the Air Force generally met its overall officer accession needs for FYs 2001, 2003, and 2005. As with the Navy, the Air Force decreased the number of newly commissioned officers in FY 2005 (see table 4). Specifically, the Air Force commissioned over 1,000 fewer officers in FY 2005 than it did in FY 2003, and it is working toward a plan to have about 9,000 fewer officers servicewide by FY 2011. The recent decrease in the number of newly commissioned Air Force officers was largely accomplished by commissioning fewer officers from OTS. Overall, the Air Force relied on its ROTC scholarship program for most of its officers and provided scholarships for the vast majority of the ROTC officer candidates. Despite meeting its overall needs for newly commissioned officers, the Air Force encountered challenges in some specialties. Our analyses and discussions with Air Force accessions officials identified air battle manager as an area where the Air Force has been challenged. USAFA expected to provide the Air Force with 10 air battle managers in FY 2005, but instead, three USAFA graduates became air battle managers. The other seven positions were filled by Air Force ROTC. All of the services have experienced problems accessing enough medical professionals, including physicians, medical students, dentists, and nurses. The Army, Navy (which supplies the Marine Corps), and Air Force provide direct commissions to medical professionals entering the service. Physicians. All of the services had difficulties meeting their accession needs for physicians (see table 5) in at least 2 of the 3 fiscal years that we examined. The Army and the Navy achieved 91 or more percent of their goals in each year studied, while the Air Force achieved 47 to 65 percent of its goal during the same 3 years. For each year, the Air Force had a higher goal than the other two services but accessed fewer physicians. Our review of the numbers of medical students participating in the services’ Health Professions Scholarship Program showed that additional physician-accession problems may appear in future years (see table 6). The services set their goals for awarding the scholarships based on their needs for fully trained medical professionals in the future. A medical student who accepts a scholarship will be commissioned into a military service upon completion of graduate school. While each service awarded scholarships to a sufficient number of the medical students who began their 4-year training in FY 2003 and will be ready for an officer commission upon graduation in FY 2007, the Army and Navy did not achieve their goals for awarding scholarships in FY 2005, and they may not access enough physicians in FY 2009. Dentists. Similar to the situation with physicians, the services have been challenged to access enough dentists in recent years (see table 7). No service met its goals for recruiting dentists in FYs 2001, 2003, or 2005. Both the Army and the Air Force, however, accessed more dentists in FY 2005 than they had 2 years before, and the Air Force showed improvement in FY 2005 over their FY 2003 accessions. Nurses. All of the services have struggled to access enough nurses (see table 8). Although the Navy exceeded its goal for accessing nurses in 2001, no service achieved its goal for any other period. In FY 2005, the services accessed a total of 738 of the 975 nurses (about 76 percent) that they needed. While some service officials have stated that medical professional recruiting is challenging because of concerns over overseas deployments, other service officials told us that it is also affected by the lack of income parity compared to the civilian sector. As part of the John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007, Congress approved an increase in the recruiting bonus for fully trained physicians and dentists, allowed the services to detail commissioned officers to attend medical school, extended the authority for undergraduate student loan repayment for medical professionals, increased the financial benefits student may receive as part of the Health Professions Scholarship Program, and required the services to report to Congress on this program and their success in meeting the scholarship program’s goals. Another step that DOD has taken to reduce the medical professional shortfalls is to convert uniformed medical positions to positions occupied by civilian medical professionals. In addition, DOD is considering asking for legislative authority to shorten the service commitment for medical professionals from the required 8 years of service on active or reserve duty, to encourage more medical professionals to join the military. However, these efforts have not yet been funded and their effect on medical recruiting is uncertain. All services had problems accessing newly commissioned minority officers to meet DOD’s goal of maintaining a racially and ethnically diverse officer corps. For every service, African Americans were a smaller percentage— by either 1 or 2 percentage points—of the accessed officers in FY 2005 than they were in FY 2003, but the representation of Asians/Pacific Islanders increased between the same two periods for every service except the Navy (see table 9). As points of comparison, we noted in a September 2005 report that the representation of African Americans in the officer corps DOD-wide was about 9 percent, as was the representation of African Americans in the college-educated workforce. Therefore, the percentages shown in the table indicate that only the Army met or exceeded the African-American DOD-wide and college-educated- workforce representation levels. Similarly, recruiting Hispanic officers has presented challenges to the services. In FY 2005, the Marine Corps accessed a higher percentage of Hispanic officers than the other services. While the Air Force accessed a lower percentage than the other services in each of the 2 fiscal years reported, it doubled its percentage of newly commissioned Hispanic officers from FY 2001 to FY 2003. However, this percentage of Hispanic officers accessed is smaller than the percentage of Hispanics in the United States at the time of the 2000 census (about 13 percent) and the percentage of Hispanics in the U.S. college population (about 9 percent). Some ambiguity is present in interpreting the findings for racial and ethnic groups because of the data. For example, the Air Force findings show large numbers of officers for whom some data were not available. Despite these data limitations, service officials explained that many of their challenges relate to the need for the services to recruit minority officers from the military-eligible segment of the college population. Navy and Air Force officials stated that their officer commissioning programs have more stringent entrance requirements than the other services and emphasize mathematics and science skills needed for the high-technology occupations found in their services. Officials from the commissioning programs in each service further noted that only a small segment of the African-American college population meets these entrance requirements. Each service operates a preparatory school in association with its academy to increase the pool of qualified applicants to enter its academy, giving primary consideration to enrolling enlisted personnel, minorities, women, and recruited athletes. Moreover, all officer commissioning programs, particularly the service academies, must compete with colleges and universities that do not require a postgraduation service commitment. In addition, USMA officials stated that citizenship status represented a barrier to improving the percentage of Hispanic officers. As of the 2000 census, 65 percent of Hispanics were U.S. citizens. While all of the services experienced some specialty- and diversity-related challenges in FYs 2001, 2003, and 2005, based on our review the Army faces some future officer accession problems not shared by the other services and has not developed and implemented a strategic plan to overcome these projected shortfalls. Our review, analyses, and discussions with Army officials indicated that the Army may struggle to meet its future accession needs. While all the services are contributing forces to operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Army is providing most of the forces for these operations. Other unique stressors on the Army’s commissioning programs include the expansion of the Army’s officer corps as part of the congressionally authorized 30,000-soldier increase to the Army end strength and the Army’s need for higher numbers of officers as part of its ongoing transformation effort to create more modular quickly deployable units. Notwithstanding these needs for more officers, some of the Army’s commissioning programs are not commissioning as many officers as they had in past years and are commissioning less than the Army had expected. The Army’s current approach is to first focus on its ROTC program and academy to meet its officer accession needs, and then compensate for accession shortfalls in these programs by increasing OCS accessions. While Army OCS is currently meeting the Army’s needs, Army ROTC and USMA are not. Army ROTC, for example, experienced a decline in its number of participants. In FY 2006, the Army calculated that 25,089 students would participate in ROTC. In contrast, 31,765 students were involved in Army ROTC in FY 2003. Army officials stated that to meet their current mission they need at least 31,000 participants in the program. Moreover, the Army uses its ROTC program for commissioning both active and reserve officers. Although the goal is 4,500 newly commissioned officers (2,750 active and 1,750 reserve) from Army ROTC in both FYs 2006 and 2007, Army officials project that the program will fall short of the goal by 12 percent in FY 2006 and 16 percent in FY 2007. Furthermore, fewer officers may be commissioned from the Army’s ROTC program in the future because fewer scholarships have been awarded recently, which Army officials attribute to budget constraints. For example, in FY 2003, the Army ROTC program had 7,583 officer candidates with 4-year scholarships; in FY 2004, 7,234; in FY 2005, 6,004. Army ROTC officials stated that fewer 4-year scholarship recipients means fewer newly commissioned officers in the future, since scholarship recipients are more likely to complete the program and receive their commission. Army ROTC officials believe that while negative attitudes toward Army ROTC are increasing on college campuses because of opposition to operations in Iraq, concerns about financing their education may make ROTC scholarships more attractive to officer candidates. In addition to challenges with its ROTC program, the Army has recently experienced difficulties commissioning officers through USMA, and projections for newly commissioned officers from USMA show that these difficulties may continue in the future. In FY 2005, USMA commissioned 912 officers, fewer than its mission of 950 officers. Similarly, USMA’s class that graduated in FY 2006 commissioned 846 graduates, short of the Army’s goal of 900. While the number of officer candidates who successfully complete the 4-year program at USMA varies, according to USMA data 71 percent who began the program in 2002 completed it in 2006 and received their commission. In contrast, in both FY 2001 and in FY 2003, 76 percent of those who began their course of study 4 years earlier completed the program and commissioned into the Army; and in FY 2005, 77 percent. USMA officials told us that the smaller graduating class in FY 2006 may be the result of ongoing operations in Iraq. The class, which will graduate in 2010, should have an additional 100 officer candidates to help address recent shortfalls; however, USMA officials indicated that facilities and staff limit additional increases. Commissioning shortfalls at USMA and in the Army ROTC program, as well as the Army’s need to expand its new officer corps, have required OCS to rapidly increase the number of officers it commissions; however, its ability to annually produce more officers is uncertain. In FY 2006, OCS was required to produce 1,420 officers, and in FY 2007, the Army’s goal for OCS is to commission 1,650 officers, more than double the number it produced in FY 2001. OCS program officials stated that without increases in resources and support such as additional housing and classroom space, OCS cannot produce more officers than 1,650 officers, its FY 2007 goal, limiting the viability of this approach. Additionally, the Army’s officer accession programs are decentralized and lack any sort of formal coordination, which prevents the Army from effectively balancing the results of failure in some officer accession programs. USMA does not directly report to the same higher-level command as ROTC or OCS. While ROTC and OCS both report to the same overall authority, they do not formally coordinate with one another or with USMA. For example, the Army does not coordinate recruiting and accession efforts to ensure that accession programs meet Army accessions goals, nor does it use risk analysis to manage resource allocations among the programs. USMA relies on its own full-time recruiters and Military Academy Liaison Officers—reservists, retirees, and alumni who meet with possible academy recruits and hold meetings to provide information to students. Officials from Army Cadet Command, which does not coordinate recruiting efforts with USMA, stated that Army ROTC has a limited advertising budget that focuses on print media, brochures, and local print media. In addition, as we previously discussed, Army ROTC has experienced a decrease in its scholarship funding while the Army’s needs for its graduates has increased, but the Army has not conducted a risk- based analysis of resource allocations to Army officer accession programs. Shortfalls in Army officer accessions have been compounded by the decentralized management structure for the officer accessions programs, and the Army does not have a strategic plan to overcome these challenges. Army personnel officials set a goal for each commissioning program. While those officials attempt to ensure that any commissioning shortfalls (program outputs) are covered by other commissioning programs such as OCS, the Army does not coordinate the recruiting efforts of its various commissioning programs (the input to these programs) to ensure that officer accession programs meet overall Army needs. While the Army’s has identified a number of options to increase officer accessions, it does not have a strategic plan for managing its shrinking accessions pipeline at a time when the force is expanding and its needs for commissioned officers are increasing. The Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 (GPRA) and Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government provide federal agencies with a results-oriented framework that includes developing a strategic plan. According to GPRA, a strategic plan should include outcome-related goals and objectives. Moreover, the Standards emphasize the need for identifying and analyzing potential risks that could slow progress in achieving goals. This risk assessment can form the basis for determining procedures for mitigating risks. The Army recognizes that offering more scholarships could improve its ROTC program accessions and has proposed increasing available scholarships. However, this is not part of a broader strategic plan that would realign resources to better meet the Army’s officer accession needs and minimize risk. Without such an alternative, given the decentralized management of the officer accession programs, and without a strategic plan that identifies goals, risks, and resources to mitigate officer shortfalls, the Army’s ability to meet future mission requirements is uncertain. While most of the services generally met their past officer retention needs, the Army faces multiple retention challenges. The Army has experienced decreased retention among officers early in their careers, particularly among junior officers who graduated from USMA or received ROTC scholarships. Moreover, the Army is experiencing a shortfall of mid-level officers because it commissioned fewer officers 10 years ago due to a post- Cold War reduction in both force size and officer accessions. Despite these emerging problems, the Army has not performed an analysis that would identify and analyze risks of near term retention problems to determine resource priorities. Although the other services generally met their past retention needs, each faces challenges retaining officers in certain ranks or specialties. Furthermore, each of the services had high continuation rates among African American and Hispanic officers, but each faces challenges retaining female officers. The Army has encountered retention challenges in the last few years, but the other services are generally retaining sufficient numbers of officers in the fiscal years that we examined. Overall, the Army has experienced decreased retention among officers early in their careers, particularly junior officers who graduated from USMA or received ROTC scholarships. Additionally, the Army is currently experiencing a shortfall of mid-level officers and has shortages within certain specialty areas. It is examining a number of initiatives to improve the retention of its officers, but these initiatives are not currently funded or will not affect officer retention until at least FY 2009. Moreover, the Army does not have a strategic plan to address these retention challenges. The Army has experienced multiple retention problems in recent years for officers commissioned through USMA and the ROTC scholarship program and for some occupational specialties despite retaining lieutenants and captains in FY 2006 at or above its 10-year Army-wide average. Our comparisons of the Army continuation rates shown in table 10 to those presented later for each of the other services revealed that the USMA continuation rates of 68 percent for FY 2001 and 62 percent for FY 2005 were 20 to 30 percentage points lower than the other academies’ continuation rates for the same fiscal year. Caution is needed, however, when interpreting cross-service findings because USNA and USAFA produce a large number of pilots who incur additional obligations that may not allow many of those officers to leave until 8 or more years of service have been completed. Second, a comparison of the Army’s FY 2001 and FY 2005 continuation rates for ROTC scholarship officers showed that rates decreased by 3 percentage points at years 4 and 5. Our review of the continuation rates in table 10 also revealed three other notable patterns. First, the total continuation rate for FY 2003 was higher than the rate for the other 2 years, reflecting the stop-loss policy that prevented officers from leaving the Army. Second, for each source and fiscal year, the lowest continuation rate for a commissioning source typically came in the first year that officers were eligible to leave the military—for example, year 5 for USMA and year 4 for ROTC scholarship. Third, since (1) the ROTC scholarship program produces more officers than any other commissioning source and (2) scholarship officers are eligible to leave the Army at year 4, that year of service had the lowest or next lowest total continuation rate for all 3 of the fiscal years that we examined. The Congressional Research Service reported that Army projections show that its officer shortage will be approximately 3,000 line officers in FY 2007, grow to about 3,700 officers in FY 2008, and continue at an annual level of 3,000 or more through FY 2013. For example, the Army FY 2008 projected shortage includes 364 lieutenant colonels, 2,554 majors, and 798 captains who entered in FYs 1991 through 2002. The criteria that the Army uses to determine its retention needs are personnel-fill rates for positions, based on officers’ rank and specialty. In addition to the general problem of not having enough officers to fill all of its positions, the Army is promoting some junior officers faster than it has in the recent past and therefore not allowing junior officers as much time to master their duties and responsibilities at the captain rank. For example, the Army has reduced the promotion time to the rank of captain (O-3) from the historical average of 42 months from commissioning to the current average of 38 months and has promoted 98 percent of eligible first lieutenants (O-2), which is more than the service’s goal of 90 percent. Likewise, the Army has reduced the promotion time to the rank of major (O-4) from 11 years to 10 years and has promoted 97 percent of eligible captains to major—more than the Army’s goal. Also, the Army is experiencing a large shortfall at the rank of major, and the shortfall affects a wide range of branches. For FY 2007, the Army projects that it will have 83 percent of the total number of majors that it needs. Table 11 shows that the positions for majors in 14 Army general specialty areas (termed branches by the Army) will be filled at 85 percent or less in FY 2007—a level that the Army terms a critical shortfall. Numerous factors may have contributed to the retention challenges facing the Army. Among other things, Army officials noted that some of the shortfalls originated in the post-Cold War reduction in forces and accessions. Although Congress has increased the authorized end strength of the Army by 30,000 since FY 2004 to help the Army meet its many missions expanding the mid-level officer corps could prove problematic since it will require retaining proportionally more of the officers currently in the service, as well as overcoming the officer accession hurdles that we identified earlier. Unlike civilian organizations, the Army requires that almost all of its leaders enter at the most junior level (O-1) and earn promotions from within the organization. Additionally, as part of our September 2005 report, the Office of Military Personnel Policy acknowledged that retention may have suffered because of an improving civilian labor market and the high pace of operations. Army officers may have already completed multiple deployments in Iraq and Afghanistan since the Army is the service providing the majority of the personnel for those operations. Another reason why the Army may be having more difficulty than other services in retaining its officers could be related to its use of continuation pays and incentives. Table 12 shows that the Army spent less than any other service in FY 2005 on retention-related pays and incentives for officers. While the Army has identified some steps that it needs to take in order to improve officer retention, the actions that have been implemented will have no immediate effect on retention. The Army has begun guaranteeing entering officers their postcommission choice of general specialty area (branch), installation, or the prospect of graduate school to encourage retention. A number of Army officers commissioned in FY 2006 took advantage of this initiative, and as a result, have a longer active duty service obligation. For example, as of May 2006, 238 academy graduates accepted the offer of a longer service obligation in exchange for the Army paying for them to attend graduate school. Although the Army believes that these initiatives will help address future retention problems, none will affect continuation rates until 2009 at the earliest because servicemembers are obligated to stay in the Army for at least 3 years. The more immediate retention challenge for the Army is keeping officers with 3, 4, or 5 years of service, as we have identified in this report. However, these officers are not affected by these initiatives. While the Army staff reported that they are exploring numerous options for addressing officer retention shortfalls, Army leadership has not identified which options will be funded and implemented. As noted earlier in this report, GPRA and the Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government provide a basis for developing a results-oriented strategic plan. Moreover, GAO’s guidance for implementing a results- oriented strategic plan highlights the importance of for ROTC scholarship identifying long-term goals and including the approaches or strategies needed to meet these goals. Without a plan to address both its accession and retention challenges, the Army will not have the information and tools it needs to effectively and efficiently improve its retention of officers in both the near term and beyond. The Marine Corps, Navy, and Air Force generally met their retention needs and had higher continuation rates from their major accession programs than did the Army. While the Navy and Air Force are currently undergoing force reductions that will decrease the size of their officer corps, all three services face officer retention challenges in certain ranks and specialties. The Marine Corps was able to meet its overall retention needs for FYs 2001, 2003, and 2005 by generally retaining more than 9 of every 10 officers at the four career-continuation points that we examined. Except for the 4- year career mark, our analysis showed that the Marine Corps’s total continuation rates for all 3 fiscal years typically exceeded 90 percent (see table 13). Officers who graduated from USNA had the lowest continuation rates at the end of their fifth year of service, coinciding with the minimum active duty service obligation for that commissioning source. Likewise, officers from ROTC scholarship programs had lower continuation rates at the end of year 4. For example, in FY 2003, the continuation rate was 67 percent; and in FY 2005, it was 79 percent. With a few exceptions, the Marine Corps met its retention needs and was able to fill critical specialties and ranks. We found that the Marine Corps was either under or just meeting its goal for fixed wing aviators (such as the junior officer level for the KC-130 tactical airlift airplane commanders and the AV-8 Harrier attack aircraft), rotary wing officers (at the junior officer level for all rotary wing occupations except one), and mid-level and senior intelligence, administrative, and communications officers in past fiscal years. Additional problems were present when we examined FY 2006 continuation data for emerging problems. Although the FY 2006 continuation rate averaged about 92 percent—excluding the fixed and rotary wing communities—the Marine Corps experienced lower than normal retention among combat support officers (such as administrative and financial management officers), combat arms officers (such as infantry, field artillery, and tank officers) as well as communications, logistics, and human source intelligence officers. However, FY 2007 projections for these categories of jobs averaged about a 90 percent continuation rate, excluding fixed wing and rotary wing communities. While the Navy generally retained sufficient numbers of officers in FYs 2001, 2003, and 2005, Navy officials and our independent review of documents revealed some areas that were not readily apparent solely by reviewing the continuation rates for the total Navy and officers entering through each commissioning program. The continuation rate among Navy junior officers commissioned from USNA or OCS was 90 percent or better in years 3, 4, and 5 of service for all 3 fiscal years studied (see table 14). However, officers commissioned from the Navy ROTC scholarship program had lower continuation rates at the end of 4 and 5 years of service, coinciding with their minimum active duty service obligation. Additionally, the Navy experienced lower continuation rates among officers, both overall and from each of the training programs, after 10 years of service. This lower rate at the 10-year career point may be partially explained because pilots incur additional obligations that may not allow them to leave until 8 or more years of service have been completed. The Navy’s potential future retention challenges may be eased by the flexibility that the Navy gains from not having to retain officers in some specialties at traditional rates since it is going through downsizing. However, our discussions with the officials who manage the Navy general specialty areas (termed officer communities by the Navy) and our independent analyses of retention documents revealed that the medical, dental, surface warfare, and intelligence communities are experiencing junior officer losses, which can later exacerbate mid-level shortfalls. Moreover, several managers of general specialty areas indicated that they were concerned about using individual Navy officers (rather than Navy units) to augment Army and Marine Corps units. The managers were unable to estimate the effect of such individual augmentee assignments on officer retention. These deployments are longer than the Navy’s traditional 6-month deployments and sometimes occur after officers have completed their shipboard deployment and are expecting their next assignment to be ashore with their families. Our review of documents for FYs 2001, 2003, and 2005, as well as our discussions with Air Force officials identified no major past retention problems. Except for the year 3 and 4 career points in FY 2001, the Air Force total continuation rates were 90 percent or higher (see table 15). The Air Force is reducing the size of its officer corps through a planned downsizing. In FY 2006, the Air Force reduced its force by about 1,700 junior officer positions. By 2011, the Air Force plans to complete an approximate 13 percent reduction in the number of its officers, totaling approximately 9,200 officers. The Air Force plans to accomplish the downsizing through the use of force shaping tools such as selective early retirement, voluntary separation pay, and other measures. Despite the need to retain fewer officers, the Air Force anticipates shortages in three specialties areas—control and recovery officers who specialize in recovering aircrews who have abandoned their aircraft during operational flights, physicians, and dentists. Staffing levels for these three specialties are just below 85 percent. While the services did well retaining African Americans and Hispanic officers, they did not do as well retaining women. The services want to retain a diverse, experienced officer corps to reflect applicable groups in the nation’s population. For the fiscal years and career points that we examined, African American and Hispanic officers usually had higher continuation rates than white and non-Hispanic officers, respectively; but female officers more often had lower continuation rates than male officers. When we compared the continuation rate of African American officers to that of white officers for a specific fiscal year and career point, our analyses found that the services were typically retaining African Americans at an equal or a higher rate than whites (see table 16). At one extreme, 11 of the 12 comparisons (all except for the FY 2003 3-year point) for the Army officers showed equal or higher rates for African American officers. Similarly, 8 of the 12 comparisons for both the Navy and Marine Corps rates as well as 6 of the 12 Air Force rates showed a similar pattern. Likewise, our analysis showed that the services were typically retaining Hispanic officers better than non-Hispanic officers (see table 17). In all 12 comparisons of the two groups of Army officers at the four career points in the 3 fiscal years, the continuation rates for Hispanic officers were equal to or higher than those for non-Hispanic officers. For 9 of the 12 Navy- based comparisons and 5 of the 12 Marine Corps-based comparisons, the same pattern was present. While the Air Force supplied information on Hispanics and non-Hispanic continuation rates for only FY 2005, the same pattern occurred for 3 of the 4 comparisons. In contrast, our analyses showed that all services encountered challenges retaining female officers. In 11 out of 12 comparisons for both the Army and Navy, our analysis found that male officers continued their active duty service at a higher rate than female officers (see table 18). For 10 of the 12 Air Force-based comparisons and 6 of the 12 Marine Corps-based comparisons, the same pattern was present. Furthermore, each service generally experienced lower continuation rates among its female officers compared with male officers at years 3, 4, and 5 of service. For example, overall, the Navy had the greatest difference in continuation rates between male and female officers who reached years 4 and 5 of service for all fiscal years studied; female officers averaged at least a 9 percentage point lower continuation rate than male officers. Similarly, continuation rates among female Air Force officers averaged almost 7 percentage points lower than the rate for male Air Force officers; among Army female officers, almost 6 percentage points; and among Marine Corps female officers, almost 4 percentage points. Retaining women may be particularly challenging in certain occupational specialties. For example, Navy officials explained that some female surface warfare officers do not view service as a surface warfare officer as compatible with family life and have much less incentive to stay in the Navy even when offered a continuation bonus. DOD officials stated that the behavior of women is different than men because of family considerations, and they said it is not surprising that women have different retention patterns and behavior than men. Retaining female officers at lower rates than male officers in these critical years may result in negative consequences such as having a less diverse cadre of leaders. We have previously reported that DOD has responded positively to most demographic changes by incorporating a number of family-friendly benefits; however, opportunities exist to improve current benefits in this area. DOD and the services are taking steps to enhance the foreign language proficiency of junior officers, but many impediments must be overcome to achieve the language objectives that DOD has laid out for junior officers. For example, to address DOD’s foreign language objectives, the service academies have requested additional funding and teaching positions to improve foreign language training for officer candidates at the academies. However, time demands on officer candidates, the inability to control foreign language curricula at ROTC colleges, hurdles in providing language training after commissioning, and problems in maintaining language skills among officers pose challenges to the services in developing a broader linguistic capacity. DOD has issued guidance and the services have developed plans to achieve greater foreign language capabilities and cultural understanding among officers. In February 2005, DOD published its Defense Language Transformation Roadmap which stated, among other things, that post- September 11, 2001, military operations reinforce the reality that DOD needs to significantly improve its capability in emerging strategic languages and dialects. In July 2005, the Principal Deputy in OUSD (P&R) issued a memorandum that required the services’ assistant secretaries for manpower and reserve affairs and their deputies to develop plans to achieve 2 of the Roadmap’s 43 objectives: develop a recruiting plan for attracting university students with foreign language skills and establish a requirement that junior officers complete added language training by 2013. Specifically, the OUSD (P&R) memo stated that (1) 80 percent of junior officers (O-1 and O-2) will have a demonstrated proficiency in a foreign language by achieving Interagency Language Roundtable Level 1+ proficiency; and (2) 25 percent of commissioned officers (“non-foreign area officers”) will have a Level 2 proficiency in a strategic language other than Spanish or French, with related regional knowledge. The February 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review went further, recommending, among other things, required language training for service academy and ROTC scholarship students and expanded immersion programs and semester- abroad study opportunities. In response to the 2005 OUSD (P&R) memo and the department’s language objectives, the Marine Corps developed a foreign language training plan that discussed the costs of achieving the two objectives and offered an alternative proposal for planning, implementing, facilitating, and maintaining foreign language and cultural skills of Marine officers and enlisted personnel. Other services are still drafting their responses to the OUSD (P&R) memo and DOD’s other language objectives for officers. In addition, the service academies have requested additional funding and positions to expand the foreign language training offered to their officer candidates. USMA already requires all its officer candidates to take two semesters of a language as part of their core curriculum. Beginning with the class that entered in 2005 and will graduate in 2009, USMA will require its officer candidates who select humanities or social science majors to add a third, and possibly a fourth, semester of foreign language study. USMA is also expanding its summer immersion, exchange, and semester- abroad programs in FY 2007 to give more officer candidates exposure to foreign languages and cultural programs. Within the next year, USNA plans to expand the foreign language and cultural opportunities available to its officer candidates by developing foreign language and regional studies majors, adding 12 new regional studies instructors in the political science department, and adding 12 new language instructors in critical languages such as Arabic and Chinese. Starting with the class that will enter in 2007 and graduate in 2011, USAFA will require certain majors to study four semesters of a foreign language. This change will affect about half of the academy’s officer candidates. The rest—primarily those in technical majors like engineering and the sciences—will take at least two semesters of foreign language, though they currently have no foreign language requirement. Some service officials, particularly those associated with commissioning programs, have identified many impediments that could affect future progress toward the foreign language objectives identified by DOD. These impediments include the following: Time demands on officer candidates. Some academy and ROTC program officials expressed concerns about adding demands on the officer candidates’ time by requiring more foreign language credits. Each academy requires its officer candidates to complete at least 137 semester credit hours, in contrast to the approximately 120 semester hours required to graduate from many other colleges. Reductions in technical coursework to compensate for increases in language coursework could jeopardize the accreditation of technical degree programs at the academies. Similarly, some officer candidates in ROTC programs may already be required to complete more hours than their nonmilitary peers. At some colleges, officer candidates may be allowed to count their ROTC courses as electives only. Academy and ROTC officer candidates in engineering and other technical majors may find it difficult to add hours for additional foreign language requirements since accreditation standards already result in students in civilian colleges often needing 5 years to complete graduation requirements. Lack of control over ROTC officer candidates’ foreign language curricula. While one of the objectives outlined by the Principal Deputy of OUSD(P&R) indicated that 25 percent of commissioned officers (non-foreign area officers) will have a Level 2 proficiency in a strategic language other than Spanish or French, ROTC programs do not have control over the languages offered at the colleges where their officer candidates attend classes. For example, out of nearly 761 host and partner Army ROTC colleges, the Army states that only 12 offer Arabic, 44 offer Chinese, and 1 offers Persian Farsi, all languages deemed critical to U.S. national security. Even if the ROTC programs could influence the foreign languages offered, additional impediments include finding qualified instructors and adapting to annual changes to DOD’s list of strategic languages. Moreover, if an officer candidate in ROTC or one of the academies takes a language in college based on DOD’s needs at that time, the language may no longer be judged strategic later in the officer’s career. For example, DOD operations in the Caribbean created a need for Haitian Creole speakers in the 1990s; however, that language may not be as strategic today because of changing operational needs. Language training expensive after commissioning. While language training after commissioning may appear to be an alternative step to help the services achieve DOD’s foreign language objectives, the Marine Corps identified significant costs associated with providing language training after commissioning. Unlike the other services, the Marine Corps obtains the vast majority of its officers through OCS or other, nonacademic sources. The Marine Corps estimated that it would need an end strength increase of 851 officers in order to extend its basic 6-month school of instruction by another 6 months and achieve Level 1+ foreign language proficiency for 80 percent of its junior officers, a stated goal in the OUSD (P&R) memo. It also estimated a one-time $150 million cost for military construction plus $115 million annually: $94.1 million for additional end strength and $21 million for training costs. The estimates for achieving the 25 percent goal for Level 2 proficiency totaled an additional $163 million, largely because of the $104 million associated with an end strength increase of 944 officers. Maintaining foreign language proficiency throughout an officer’s career. Although DOD offers online tools for language maintenance, our prior work has shown the difficulties of maintaining foreign language capabilities. We noted that DOD linguists experienced a decline (of up to 25 percent in some cases) in foreign language proficiency when they were in technical training to develop their nonlanguage skills (such as equipment operation and military procedures). Proficiency could decline if officers do not have an opportunity to use their language skills between the times when they complete their training and are assigned to situations where they can use their skills. Additional foreign language requirements could also have a negative effect on recruiting for the officer commissioning programs. Army, Marine Corps, and Air Force officials expressed concern that the new foreign language requirement may deter otherwise-qualified individuals from entering the military because they do not have an interest in or an aptitude for foreign languages. Service officials also stated that requiring additional academic credits for language study beyond the credits required for military science courses could also be problematic, particularly for nonscholarship ROTC officer candidates who are not receiving a financial incentive for participating in officer training. Since at least 63 percent of Army’s current ROTC officer candidates are not on a ROTC scholarship, officials said that increasing the language requirement could make it more difficult to reach recruiting and accession goals as well as the objective of having 80 percent of junior officers with a minimal foreign language proficiency. At the same time, our recent reports raised concerns about foreign language proficiency in DOD and other federal agencies such as the Department of State. Service officials recognize the impediments to foreign language training and are developing plans to implement DOD’s initiatives. Since many of these problem-identification and action-planning efforts began in the last 2 years, it is still too early to determine how successful the services will be in implementing the foreign language and cultural goals outlined in DOD documents such the Defense Language Transformation Roadmap and the Quadrennial Defense Review; therefore, we believe that it would be premature to make any specific recommendations. While all of the services are challenged to recruit, access, and retain certain types of officers, the Army is facing the greatest challenge. Frequent deployments, an expanding overall force, and a variety of other factors present Army officials with an environment that has made accessing and retaining officers difficult using their traditional management approaches. Moreover, delays in addressing its officer accession and retention shortages could slow the service’s implementation of planned transformation goals, such as reorganizing its force into more modular and deployable units, which require more junior and mid-level officers than in the past. Although the Army has begun to implement some steps that could help with its long-term officer needs, accessing and retaining enough officers with the right specialties are critical issues. Moreover, the limited coordination among the Army’s officer accession programs presents another hurdle in effectively addressing attrition rates at USMA, student participation in ROTC, and resource constraints for OCS. Similarly, the Army has not performed an analysis that would identify and analyze potential risks of continuing retention problems in the near term in order to determine priorities for allocating its resources. Without a strategic plan for addressing its officer shortages, the Army’s ability to effectively and efficiently set goals, analyze risks, and allocate resources could jeopardize its ability to achieve future mission requirements. In order for the Army to maintain sufficient numbers of officers at the needed ranks and specialties, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of the Army to develop and implement a strategic plan that addresses the Army’s current and projected accession and retention shortfalls. Actions that should be taken in developing this plan should include developing an overall annual accession goal to supplement specialty- specific goals in order to facilitate better long-term planning, performing an analysis to identify risks associated with accession and retention shortfalls and develop procedures for managing the risks, and making decisions on how resources should best be allocated to balance near- and long-term officer shortfalls. In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD partially concurred with our recommendation. DOD’s comments are included in this report as appendix II. DOD partially concurred with our recommendation to develop and implement a strategic plan that addresses the Army’s current and projected officer accession and retention shortfalls. DOD agreed that the Army does not have a strategic plan dedicated to current and projected officer accessions and retention. DOD said, however, that the Army performs analyses, identifies risk, develops procedures to mitigate risks, and performs other tasks associated with its strategy and planning process for officer accessions and retention. We recognize that these are important tasks, however they are not sufficient to correct the Army’s current and future officer accession and retention problems for the following reasons. First, as noted in our report, these tasks are fragmented, administered in a decentralized manner across multiple Army offices, and lack the integrated, long-term perspective that is needed to deal with the Army’s current officer shortfalls and future challenges. A more strategic, integrated approach would allow the Army to (1) establish long-term, outcome-related program goals as well as integrated strategies and approaches to achieve these goals and (2) effectively and efficiently manage and allocate the resources needed to achieve these goals. Second, some of these tasks are not fully developed. For example, the Army’s procedures for mitigating risk did not address important considerations such as the short- and long-term consequences of not implementing the option and an analysis of how various options could be integrated to maximize the Army’s efforts. Third, with regard to funding—a key element in strategic planning, Army officials indicated that they hope to use supplemental funding to address some of the challenges that we identified, but they also acknowledged that supplemental funding may be curtailed. In recent reports, we too noted our belief that supplemental funding is not a reliable means for decision-makers to use in effectively and efficiently planning for future resource needs, weighting priorities, and assessing tradeoffs. Considering all of the limitations that we have identified in the Army’s current approach, we continue to believe that our recommendation has merit and that an integrated and comprehensive strategic plan is needed. DOD mischaracterized our findings when it indicated our report (1) asserted that Army officer accessions and retention are down and (2) implied that recent decreases in accessions or retention have caused the challenges. On the contrary, our report discussed many factors that contributed to the Army’s officer-related staffing challenges and provided data that even showed, for example, an increase in accessions from FY 2001 to FY 2003 and FY 2005. The first table of our report showed the Army commissioned 6,045 in FY 2005, an increase of 505 from FY 2001 and an increase of 116 from FY 2003. Also, our report provides a context for readers to understand that these increases in accessions would still leave the Army short of officers because of new demands for more officers. Among other things, a larger officer corps is needed to lead a larger active duty force and the reorganization of the force into more modular and deployable units. With regard to retention, our report does not state that overall retention is down. Instead, we document retention by commissioning source, occupation, and pay grade, which revealed shortages that were not readily apparent at the aggregate level. Our report shows that the Army has experienced decreased retention among officers early in their careers, particularly among junior officers who graduated from USMA or received Army ROTC scholarships. Table 11 of our report makes the point by showing which types of occupations were over- and underfilled for officers at the rank of major. We show, for example, that infantry (an occupational group with a large number of officer positions) were overfilled (107 percent), but positions in numerous other occupational groups such as military intelligence (73 percent) were underfilled. Moreover, as with accessions, as the Army grows, it will be required to retain officers at higher than average percentages in order to fill higher pay grades. DOD also provided technical comments that we have incorporated in this report where appropriate. As agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce its contents earlier, we plan no further distribution of this report until 30 days after its issue date. At that time we will provide copies of this report to interested congressional committees and the Secretary of Defense. We will also make copies available to others upon request. This report will be available at no charge on GAO’s Web site at http://www.gao.gov. If you or other members of the committee have any additional questions about officer recruiting, retention, or language training issues, please contact me at (202) 512-5559 or stewartd@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made major contributions to the report are listed in appendix III. We limited the scope of our work to the four active duty Department of Defense (DOD) services: Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force. Also, we examined data for fiscal years 2001, 2003, and 2005 as well as projections for the current year (FY 2006 when we began our work) and future years. FY 2001 data represented the situations present immediately before the terrorist events of September 11, 2001; and FY 2005 data represented the most recent fiscal year for which the services had complete data. FY 2003 data provided information on interim conditions and allowed us to examine the data for trends. To determine the extent to which the services are accessing the numbers and types of commissioned officers required to meet their needs, we reviewed laws and DOD-wide and service-specific officer-management guidance, including Title 10 of the U.S. Code, including provisions originally enacted as part of the Defense Officer Personnel Management Act (DOPMA), defense authorization acts, the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review, and policies and directives. To gain a firm background on the origin and evolution of the all volunteer force, we studied information in books on the all volunteer force as well as information published by GAO, DOD, Congressional Research Service, Congressional Budget Office, and other organizations such as RAND. We reviewed documents from and obtained the perspectives of officials in Office Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, OUSD (P&R), services’ headquarters, services’ personnel and manpower commands, service academies, Reserve Officer Training Corps commands, and Officer Candidate Schools and Officer Training School commands (see table 19). The documents and meetings with officials allowed us to obtain an integrated understanding of recruitment and accession procedures, the availability of newly commissioned officers to fill positions in the military services, and potential causes and effects of any gaps between the numbers of officers available and the numbers of positions to be filled. We obtained and analyzed accessions and continuation data from DOD’s Defense Manpower Data Center, but our assessment of the data’s reliability identified incorrect information that was severe enough to prevent those data from being used for this report. As a result, we subsequently obtained accession and continuation information from the services. While we did not conduct independent analyses using the services’ databases, we did assess the reliability of their data through interviews and reviewing relevant documentation on service-specific databases. Comparisons of service-provided rates with similar information from other sources—such as information on the number of officer commissioned from the USMA— suggested that the service-provided rates were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report. Specifically, we examined information showing the numbers of officers commissioned from the services’ officer programs during FY 2001, 2003, and 2005 for trends and other patterns and compared the numbers of officers accessed to staffing needs. We performed these comparisons with consideration for the specialty, race, ethnicity, and gender of the officers. To assess the extent to which the services are retaining the numbers and types of officers they need, we reviewed laws and DOD-wide and service- specific policies and directives to gain a comprehensive understanding of officer retention. To gain a firm background on officer retention, we examined reports and studies by GAO, DOD, Congressional Research Service, Congressional Budget Office, and other organizations such as RAND. Additionally, we met with a number of DOD officials located at the services’ personnel directorates to obtain an understanding of officer retention missions, goals, historical trends, and projected forecasts for each service. We worked with DOD and service officials to identify differences in the metrics that each service uses to assess retention success, and to review proposed initiatives for enhancing officer retention and to address downsizing efforts. We analyzed documents from and obtained the perspectives of officials in the services’ headquarters, services’ personnel and manpower commands, service academies, ROTC commands, and OCS/OTS commands to obtain an understanding of retention, specifically whether the services are retaining the total numbers they needed as well as the number of officers needed in specific ranks and specialties (see table 20). We obtained and analyzed data provided by service headquarters on officer continuation rates at critical years in an officer’s service. In our calculation of continuation rates, officers were considered as having continued in a year if they were on the rolls on the first day of the fiscal year and the last day. We, in consultation with retention experts from the four services, chose to examine four key points in an officer’s career: years 3, 4, 5, and 10. Years 3, 4, and 5 reflect the minimum active duty service obligation for the major accession programs, that is, the first year an officer could leave the active duty service through resignation. For example, the minimum active duty service obligation is 3 years for OCS graduates and officers who were commissioned by ROTC but did not receive scholarship. Officers who received an ROTC scholarship have an obligation to serve 4 years, and academy graduates must serve at least 5 years. Additionally, some officers who receive specialized training, such as pilots, may be obligated to serve at least a 10- year obligation or 8 years from the completion of pilot training. We also analyzed continuation rates for subgroup differences broken out by occupation, race, ethnicity, and gender. Once we identified particular issues of concern to the service, such as the shortages for mid-level officers in the Army, we explored these issues in further detail. We relied on rates provided by service headquarters because of our previously cited concerns about the Defense Manpower Data Center data. Using the data reliability-assessment procedures discussed for our accessions work, we determined that the data were sufficiently reliability for the purposes of our report. Finally, to assess the steps taken and impediments confronting the services in their attempts to increase foreign language proficiency among junior officers, we reviewed policy materials such as the Quadrennial Defense Review, DOD policies and directives on officer candidate training, curricula for the academies, DOD and service memoranda, reports by GAO and others, and other materials related to language acquisition and maintenance by military personnel and federal employees. We obtained additional perspectives about foreign language issues in meetings with DOD and service officials located in OUSD (P&R), the services’ personnel directorates, service academies, ROTC commands, OCS/OTS commands, and the Defense Language Office. In each instance, we discussed the training programs for officer candidates, the ongoing and proposed steps to increase language proficiency among junior officers, and the challenges these programs face in providing officer candidates with the foreign language and training they need to serve as officers. We conducted our review from September 2005 through November 2006 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. In addition to the contact above, Jack E. Edwards, Assistant Director; Kurt A. Burgeson, Laura G. Czohara; Alissa H. Czyz; Barbara A. Gannon; Cynthia L. Grant; Julia C. Matta; Jean L. McSween; Bethann E. Ritter; Angela D. Thomas; and Adam J. Yu made key contributions to this report. Military Personnel: Reporting Additional Servicemember Demographics Could Enhance Congressional Oversight. GAO-05-952. Washington, D.C.: September 22, 2005. Military Education: Student and Faculty Perceptions of Student Life at the Military Academies. GAO-03-1001. Washington, D.C.: September 12, 2003. Military Education: DOD Needs to Enhance Performance Goals and Measures to Improve Oversight of the Military Academies. GAO-03-1000. Washington, D.C.: September 10, 2003. DOD Service Academies: Problems Limit Feasibility of Graduates Directly Entering the Reserves. GAO/NSIAD-97-89. Washington, D.C.: March 24, 1997. DOD Service Academies: Comparison of Honor and Conduct Adjudicatory Processes. GAO/NSIAD-95-49. Washington, D.C.: April 25, 1995. DOD Service Academies: Academic Review Processes. GAO/NSIAD-95-57. Washington, D.C.: April 5, 1995. DOD Service Academies: Update on Extent of Sexual Harassment. GAO/NSIAD-95-58. Washington, D.C.: March 31, 1995. Coast Guard: Cost for the Naval Academy Preparatory School and Profile of Minority Enrollment. GAO/RCED-94-131. Washington, D.C.: April 12, 1994. Military Academy: Gender and Racial Disparities. GAO/NSIAD-94-95. Washington, D.C.: March 17, 1994. DOD Service Academies: Further Efforts Needed to Eradicate Sexual Harassment. GAO/T-NSIAD-94-111. Washington, D.C.: February 3, 1994. DOD Service Academies: More Actions Needed to Eliminate Sexual Harassment. GAO/NSIAD-94-6. Washington, D.C.: January 31, 1994. Academy Preparatory Schools. GAO/NSIAD-94-56R. Washington, D.C.: October 5, 1993. Air Force Academy: Gender and Racial Disparities. GAO/NSIAD-93-244. Washington, D.C.: September 24, 1993. Military Education: Information on Service Academies and Schools. GAO/NSIAD-93-264BR. Washington, D.C.: September 22, 1993. Naval Academy: Gender and Racial Disparities. GAO/NSIAD-93-54. Washington, D.C.: April 30, 1993. DOD Service Academies: More Changes Needed to Eliminate Hazing. GAO/NSIAD-93-36. Washington, D.C.: November 16, 1992. DOD Service Academies: Status Report on Reviews of Student Treatment. GAO/T-NSIAD-92-41. Washington, D.C.: June 2, 1992. Service Academies: Historical Proportion of New Officers During Benchmark Periods. GAO/NSIAD-92-90. Washington, D.C.: March 19, 1992. DOD Service Academies: Academy Preparatory Schools Need a Clearer Mission and Better Oversight. GAO/NSIAD-92-57. Washington, D.C.: March 13, 1992. Naval Academy: Low Grades in Electrical Engineering Courses Surface Broader Issues. GAO/NSIAD-91-187. Washington, D.C.: July 22, 1991. DOD Service Academies: Improved Cost and Performance Monitoring Needed. GAO/NSIAD-91-79. Washington, D.C.: July 16, 1991. Review of the Cost and Operations of DOD’s Service Academies. GAO/T- NSIAD-90-28. Washington, D.C.: April 4, 1990.

Summary: Accessing and retaining high-quality officers in the current environment of increasing deployments and armed conflict may be two of the all volunteer force's greatest challenges. The military services use three programs to access officer candidates: (1) military academies, (2) the Reserve Officers' Training Corps (ROTC), and (3) Officer Candidate Schools (OCS). In addition to accessing new officers, the services must retain enough experienced officers to meet current operational needs and the services' transformation initiatives. GAO was asked to assess the extent to which the services are accessing and retaining the officers required to meet their needs. GAO also identified steps that the Department of Defense (DOD) and the services have taken and the impediments they face in increasing officers' foreign language proficiency. For this report, GAO examined actual accession and retention rates for officers in fiscal years (FYs) 2001, 2003, and 2005 as well as projections for later years. Also, GAO reviewed documents on foreign language training and plans. The services generally met most of their overall accession needs for newly commissioned officers, but the Army faces challenges accessing enough officers to meet its needs. The Marine Corps, Navy, and Air Force met their overall FYs 2001, 2003, and 2005 officer accession needs, but are experiencing challenges accessing specific groups, like flight officers and medical professionals. Moreover, the Army did not meet its needs for officers in FY 2001 and FY 2003 and expects to struggle with future accessions. To meet its officer accession needs, the Army's traditional approach has been to rely first on its ROTC and academy programs and then compensate for shortfalls in these programs by increasing its OCS accessions. Between FYs 2001 and 2005, the Army nearly doubled the number of OCS commissioned officers due to (1) academy and ROTC shortfalls, (2) decreased ROTC scholarships, and (3) a need to expand its officer corps. But OCS is expected to reach its capacity in FY 2007, and resource limitations such as housing and classroom space may prevent further expansion. In addition, the Army's three accession programs are decentralized and do not formally coordinate with one another, making it difficult for the Army, using its traditional approach, to effectively manage risks and allocate resources across programs in an integrated, strategic fashion. Without a strategic, integrated plan for determining overall annual accession goals, managing risks, and allocating resources, the Army's ability to meet its future mission requirements and to transform to more deployable, modular units is uncertain. All of the services except the Army generally met their past overall officer retention needs. The Army, which continues to be heavily involved in combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, faces many retention challenges. For example, the Army is experiencing a shortfall of mid-level officers, such as majors, because it commissioned fewer officers 10 years ago due to a post-Cold War force reduction. It projects a shortage of 3,000 or more officers annually through FY 2013. While the Army is implementing and considering initiatives to improve officer retention, the initiatives are not integrated and will not affect officer retention until at least 2009 or are unfunded. As with its accession shortfalls, the Army does not have an integrated strategic plan to address its retention shortfalls. While the Army is most challenged in retaining officers, the Marine Corps, Navy, and Air Force generally met their retention needs in FYs 2001, 2003, and 2005; but each experienced challenges in occupational specialties such as medical officers. DOD and the services are taking steps to enhance the foreign language proficiency of junior officers, but many impediments must be overcome to achieve the language objectives that DOD has laid out for junior officers. For example, academy and ROTC officer candidates already have demanding workloads and ROTC does not control curricula at host institutions. The services recognize these impediments and are drafting plans to implement DOD's foreign language objectives.